



**Reading Differences from Children's Picture Books:  
Constructing and De-constructing Images and Texts**

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## Abstract

My thesis questions *how* pictures are read; it raises questions about what has to be in place for a reading and what has to be in place for something to be seen *as such* in a text or a picture. It analyses claims from a wide and multidisciplinary array of sources: from children's literature and art criticism, from literary theory, philosophy and neuroscience in order to think through a series of problems and issues to do with the reading of pictures and the reading of pictures within children's picture books specifically.

Because reading difference is a key approach and a recurring issue, I will read Gilles Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* in order to think through the relationship between these two underpinning aspects of reading and go on to draw on Jacques Derrida's *Memoirs of the Blind*; and this is because I read this text as constituting 'drawing' as the repetition of differences. These texts are read in relation to Anthony Browne's picture book, *One Gorilla*, a text that as a counting book, is necessarily fundamentally engaged in both repetition and the articulation of difference.

This thesis is also one that engages with extant critical notions about reading, the 'child reader', and notions of reader competence. It subjects these ideas to scrutiny in order to think through what is at stake in the claims about the putative educational intention or purpose of children's literature that these notions lead to; they will be read in relation to Aliko's *My Five Senses* and Paul Shower's picture book, *Use Your Brain*.

Finally, this thesis is about the impossibility of interpretative mastery. Indeed, this thesis unpicks many apparent attempts at mastery, including its own, acknowledging in the end the impossibility of arriving at an interpretation without remainder.

## **Declaration**

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Yuna Nam

## Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	5
<b>Introduction: Picture as Such?</b> .....	7
<b>Part I: Reading ‘A Counting Book’</b>	
Chapter 1: ‘One Gorilla’: from Eyes to Body .....	32
Chapter 2: ‘Primates’, ‘one family’ and ‘my family’ .....	57
Chapter 3: Eyes of the Other .....	69
Chapter 4: The Back Cover and Blurb .....	79
Chapter 5: Reading the Translation of Blurb .....	87
<b>Part II: Reading ‘a Let’s-Read-and-Find-out Science Book’ I</b>	
Chapter 6: A Message of ‘MESSAGE’ .....	92
Chapter 7: Picture and Something Other than Picture .....	111
Chapter 8: Seeing and Eyes .....	131
Chapter 9: Reading ‘I’ and the Repetition .....	152
<b>Part III: Reading ‘a Let’s-Read-and-Find-out Science Book’ II</b>	
Chapter 10: ‘Your Brain’ and its Picture .....	184
Chapter 11: Reading Science Texts with Derrida’s <i>The Truth in Painting</i> .....	200
Chapter 12: Reading ‘Sound’ without its Sound .....	219
Chapter 13: Text of Picture, Text of Text, Picture of Picture, Picture of Text .....	234
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	271

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## **Introduction: Picture as Such?**

Before reading ideas on pictures in children's books and criticisms, I will introduce my own case of looking at the picture. Imagine that I am in a gallery and standing in front of a painting. I might look at the painting for a while and pass on to the next one. I might look at the painting, read the title, and look for how and when it was drawn. I might read or listen to some story about that painting before, during, or after looking at that painting. In my case, the ways of looking at the pictures are not always the same; they are different case by case. When I look at the pictures in a book, how I read or look at the pictures or the book itself is not always the same. This thesis started from my personal experience of reading pictures and my curiosity about others' claims and ideas in relation to pictures and words in children's books and criticisms. What do they read from picture books? Pictures are often discussed in children's literature and children's literary criticism, but the roles and definitions used about them are not always the same. Furthermore, not everyone uses the word 'pictures'; it is mentioned as different words such as 'figures', 'images', 'illustration' and 'painting'. Then, I have to change my question - what are *they* (my emphasis) and how are they claimed in different texts?

My thesis is not the first to analyse the pictures and the texts in children's picture books. The crucial difference between my thesis and others' works is that this thesis aims to read picture books alongside different kinds of texts; it includes not only children's picture books but also children's literature criticism, art theory, philosophy, medical texts and autobiography. These are the main picture books which I have chosen to read: *One Gorilla* from Anthony Browne, *My Five Senses* from Alike and *Use Your Brain* from Paul Showers and Rosalind Fry. In each part of the thesis, I will read one of

these picture books separately. Then, I will also read the other, different, texts or pictures with their corresponding picture book in each chapter. I will not read the three picture books in this introduction yet; instead, I would rather explain how I read pictures in relation to the different kinds of texts. In that sense, this introduction sets out the approach which shows how I read pictures and texts.

I will start with reading children's literary criticism from Peter Hunt as my first step to thinking about another critic's thoughts about pictures. In *An introduction to Children's Literature* Hunt reads 'children's books' with 'pictures'.

Here there is the central paradox of children's books: that pictures are accessible to children, but that the meanings derived from them are not; that the picture "closes" text — that is, limits and cuts off the possibilities of interpretation — as well as stimulating the imagination; that a picture may complement or contradict the words, but it is not read in a linear way.<sup>1</sup>

'Here' is not here and 'there' is not there. 'Here there' is prior to 'the central paradox of children books'. In other words, 'the central paradox of children's books' follows after '[h]ere there'. 'Here there' and 'the central paradox of children's books' are retrospective. Although there are '[h]ere' and 'is', '[h]ere there' and 'is' do not remain in the present. This is because the moment of '[h]ere there is' passes. What is supposed to be '[h]ere there' will be in the past. For that reason, 'is' also has passed to the past. Therefore, I read that 'that pictures are accessible to children, but that the meanings derived from them are not' is not about the present state of 'pictures' and 'the meanings'.

According to the statement above, 'children's books' are more general than

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<sup>1</sup>Peter Hunt, *An introduction to Children's Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 9.



‘the central paradox’. It is because there is only one ‘central paradox’ and it is ‘the’ ‘central paradox’; ‘children’s books’ are not *the* (my emphasis) books and the number of them is not specified within the text. ‘[T]he central paradox’ is part of ‘children’s books’, but the ‘children’ did not place ‘the central paradox of children’s books’ somewhere around ‘[h]ere’ or ‘there’. ‘[C]hildren’s books’ belong to ‘children’, but it is not the ‘children’ who made a claim that they possess anything such as ‘books’. As the ‘paradox’ within the text is the ‘central’ one, ‘the central paradox’ is claimed with a certain level or degree. Since there is ‘the central paradox’, there might to be other paradoxes (e.g. less central or marginal paradoxes) in the case of ‘children’s books’. Whatever other paradoxes there are in the case of ‘children’s books’, ‘[h]ere there’ is ‘the central paradox’.

‘[P]ictures’ and ‘the meaning’ are different from each other. There is an attribute in the case of ‘pictures’; it is an accessibility. However, there was no mention of such an attribute in the case of ‘children’ and the ‘children’ do not access anything or anywhere according to the text. ‘[P]ictures’ are not something that comes from anywhere, but ‘the meanings’ are ‘from’ something other than ‘the meanings’. ‘[T]he meanings’ are not the origin, but it does not mean that ‘pictures’ or ‘them’ are original. I would rather insist that ‘the meanings’ are supplementary to ‘them’. There are differences between ‘them’ and ‘pictures’; they are different from each other because there is neither ability nor accessibility in the case of ‘the meaning’. Furthermore, nothing is derived from ‘pictures’ and ‘pictures’ are not derived from anything/anyone.

After the semi colon, there is ‘the picture’. ‘[T]he picture’ is not ‘pictures’ which ‘are accessible to children’. ‘[T]he picture’ is not claimed with any ability, but it does not mean that ‘the picture’ is incapable. ‘[T]he picture’ does not provide access. What ‘[t]he picture’ does is not what ‘pictures’ do. “[T]ext” is neither opened nor

closed according to the text.

There is no full stop after the sentence, ‘that the picture “closes” text’. After ‘that the picture “closes” text’ comes a dash, ‘that is’, a comma, ‘limits and cuts off the possibilities of interpretation’, another dash and ‘as well as stimulating the imagination’. ‘[T]hat’ is not a dash; ‘that’ is ‘that’ and dash is dash. ‘[T]hat’ is something which does not close anything. For that reason, I read that the ideas on ‘that’ and ‘the picture’ are different from each other. Instead of closing, ‘that’ ‘limits and cuts off the possibilities of interpretation’ and also ‘stimulat[es]’ the imagination’.

There is no interpretation of ‘interpretation’. ‘[I]nterpretation’ is neither something to be interpreted nor something that interprets. ‘[T]he possibilities of interpretation’ will not be the same as a result since ‘the possibilities of interpretation’ are what are to be ‘limit[ed] and cut off’ by that which is other than ‘the possibilities of interpretation’. Because of ‘limit[ing] and cut[ing] off’, ‘possibilities of interpretation’ will be something less than their previous ‘possibilities of interpretation’. However, it does not mean that ‘the possibilities of interpretation’ would become something other than ‘the possibilities of interpretation’ after being ‘limit[ed] and cut[...] off’.

Without reading the sentence between the two dashes, I could read one sentence in this way: ‘that is, limits and cuts off [...] as well as stimulating the imagination’. ‘[T]he imagination’ is ‘the’ one whereas ‘interpretation’ is not. In other words, ‘interpretation’ is more general than ‘the imagination’ within the statement above. According to my reading, ‘stimulating the imagination’ is also something less than what ‘stimulating the imagination’ will be as a result since it is also what will be ‘limit[ed] and cut off’ by something other than ‘stimulati[on]’ or ‘the imagination’.

‘[A] picture’ does not ‘complement’ and ‘contradict’ ‘the words’ at the same time. ‘[A] picture’ does not always ‘complement or contradict the words’. It is ‘the

words' which are 'complement[ed]' or 'contradict[ed]'; 'the words' themselves do not 'complement or contradict' anything. When 'a picture' possibly 'complement[s] or contradict[s]', 'it' does not read 'it'. '[I]t' is claimed to be 'read' by another which is not 'it'. '[R]ead[ing]' is not 'in a linear way'. In other words, 'it' would be 'read', but not 'in a linear way'.

Within Hunt's text, there are no images of 'pictures', 'the picture' or 'a picture'. Compared to Hunt's text, there are several images such as posters and a photo collage in William Mitchell's article, 'What Do Pictures "Really Want?"<sup>2</sup> Mitchell does not address himself to picture books and children, but I decided to include his article in this introduction in order to see different views on pictures from a different perspective. Furthermore, there are multiple questions in 'What Do Pictures "Really" Want?' and the title of Mitchell's article itself is also a question. Also, apart from reading a different view of Hunt, I wondered what the answers to Mitchell's questions were.

In the case of the title, the question is not asked by '[p]ictures'. According to the title, the '[w]ant[ing]' or desire of '[p]ictures' is claimed with realness; in other words, '[p]ictures' might '[w]ant' something without realness. The answer to the title is not given in the title. In order to read more ideas on 'pictures' and perhaps find an answer, I will continue to read the first paragraph of 'What Do Pictures "Really" Want?'.

The dominant questions about pictures in recent work on visual culture and art history have been interpretive and rhetorical. We want to know what pictures

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<sup>2</sup> William Mitchell, 'What Do Pictures "Really" Want?', *October*, 77 (Summer 1996), 71-82 (p. 71), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/778960> [accessed 29 September 2019].

mean and what they do: how they communicate as signs and symbols, what sort of power they have to affect human emotions and behavior. When the question of desire is raised, it is usually located in the producers or consumers of images, the picture treated as an expression of the artist's desire, or as a mechanism for eliciting the desires of the beholder.<sup>3</sup>

‘The dominant questions’ are not ‘pictures’ and vice versa. In the case of ‘questions’, they are ‘[t]he dominant’ ones. Those ‘questions’ are not dominated by anything and anyone. ‘The dominant questions’ do not dominate ‘pictures’. None of ‘[t]he dominant questions’ is questioned within the text. ‘The dominant questions’ are not about ‘[t]he dominant questions’ themselves. Those ‘questions’ are something ‘about pictures’ but within the boundary of ‘recent work on visual culture and art history’.

‘[V]isual culture and art history’ within the text are not about all visual culture and art history because they are restricted to ‘work’ forms that are ‘recent’. Neither are ‘pictures’ nor ‘visual culture and art history’ themselves ‘interpretive and rhetorical’. Those ‘questions’ are ‘interpretive and rhetorical’, but it is unknown from when and to whom they have been ‘interpretive and rhetorical’. Although there is no one who had asked about ‘[t]he dominant questions’, they ‘have been’ already in existence as ‘interpretive and rhetorical’ to the perspective on the statement above.

‘We’ and ‘pictures’ are different from each other since it is not ‘pictures’ who ‘want to know’. I am not one of ‘[w]e’, so it is not I who ‘want[s] to know what pictures mean and what they do’. ‘We’ is plural and these ‘[w]e’ do not ‘know’ ‘what pic-

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 71.

tures mean and what they do' yet. '[T]o know' is a desire which is not claimed as originating from '[w]e' and that is not a knowledge of '[w]e'. The knowing of '[w]e' is later to that desire. The perspective on '[w]e' has knowledge of what '[w]e' do not 'know' and what '[w]e want to know'. For the perspective on 'pictures', 'pictures mean' something and 'they do' something, but 'pictures' themselves do not propose anything such as the meaning of 'pictures' and 'what they do'.

I read that 'how they communicate as signs and symbols' and 'what sort of power they have to affect human emotions and behavior' are not as same as 'what pictures mean and what they do'. I would rather read '[w]e' 'want to know' 'how they communicate as signs and symbols' and 'what sort of power they have to affect human emotions and behavior'. According to the perspective on the second 'they', 'communicat[ion]' is something that is done 'as' something other than the second 'they'. For that reason, I do not read that the 'communicat[ion]' of the second 'they' equates to 'signs and symbols'. '[S]igns' and 'symbols' are both multiple in number. The 'communicat[ion]' of the second 'they' needs more than a single sign or symbol. Does the statement above mean there would be no communication if there were not multiple signs and symbols? Does the statement above mean that communication can be the 'communicat[ion]' of the second 'they' as long as the 'communicat[ion]' is with 'signs and symbols'? Does the statement above also mean there is no restriction to being 'signs and symbols' if they can 'communicate as signs and symbols'? The third 'they' do not 'have' just any kind or all kinds of power; what 'they 'have' is a 'sort of power'. Furthermore, what 'they have' is not a power; what 'they have' is lacking as 'power'. This 'sort of power' belongs to the third 'they' and it is claimed with a purpose which is to 'affect human emotions and behavior'. For the perspective on the 'human', 'emotions' and 'behavior' are different from each other, but 'emotions' and 'behavior' are different

from each other not because the ‘human’ had claimed them to be so, the difference between ‘emotions’ and ‘behavior’ is not what the third ‘they’ had claimed either. The number of ‘emotions’ is not singular whereas ‘behavior’ is. When a ‘sort of power’ ‘affect[s]’ things then, only a single ‘behavior’ will be ‘affect[ed]’. Although ‘emotions’ and ‘behavior’ are different from each other, ‘emotions’ and ‘behavior’ are still something to do with ‘affect[ing]’ the ‘human’. The ‘human’ itself is not ‘affect[ed]’ by a ‘sort of power’, instead those ‘emotions’ and ‘behavior’ would change when a ‘sort of power’ ‘affect[s]’ them. Something which is not the ‘emotions and behavior’ of the ‘*human*’ (my emphasis on ‘human’) would not be ‘affect[ed]’ by this ‘sort of power’. The ‘[e]ffect’ of a ‘sort of power’ is related to what ‘[w]e want to know’. ‘[W]hat pictures mean and what they do’ are not only a desire of ‘[w]e’; it is also something regarded as unknown to ‘[w]e’. For that reason, the ‘communicat[ion]’ of the second ‘they’ and the ‘sort of power’ the third ‘they’ has are also both the desire and the unknown knowledge of ‘[w]e’.

‘[T]he question of desire’ is neither questioned nor answered. From reading ‘the question of desire’, I have started to read that the questions in Mitchell’s articles are ‘the questions of desire’. In other words, for Mitchell, ‘desire’ is what something ‘want[s]’. To be ‘raised’ and to be ‘located’ do not happen at the same time. In addition, ‘the question of desire’ is not claimed with particular frequency whereas ‘it’ is ‘usually located’ somewhere. There is a moment ‘when’ that ‘question of desire’ is ‘raised’. The location of ‘it’ is not always ‘in the producers or consumers of images’. ‘[T]he question of desire’ is not specified as being ‘in’ anywhere whereas ‘it’ is ‘located in’ some place. The location of ‘it’ would not usually be outside of ‘the producers or consumers of images’ and must happen ‘[w]hen the question of desire is raised’. Therefore, the idea of location is restricted to a certain period of time and position.

‘[T]he picture’ will be ‘treated’ after or ‘[w]hen the question of desire is raised’ and when ‘it is usually located’. The ‘treat[ment]’ of ‘the picture’ is ‘as’ something else which is ‘an expression of the artist’s desire’ or ‘a mechanism for eliciting the desires of the beholder’. The ‘treat[ment]’ of ‘the picture’ is conditional to the two different moments, ‘[w]hen the question of desire is raised’ and when ‘it is usually located in the producers or consumers of images’. ‘[T]he picture’ would not be ‘treated as’ something else without its prior conditions. ‘[T]reat[ing]’ in the statement above is neither claimed to come from ‘the picture’ nor from ‘the question of desire’ which was raised before ‘the picture treated as’ something else. ‘[A]n expression’ and ‘a mechanism’ do not treat ‘the picture’ in any particular way. With the location of ‘desire’ in ‘the producers or consumers of images’, ‘the picture’ is then ‘treated as’ two different things which are not related to any location, or ‘the producers’ or ‘consumers of images’. When ‘the picture’ is ‘treated’ in a particular way, ‘the picture’ itself would not be ‘an expression of the artist’s desire’ and ‘a mechanism for eliciting the desires of the beholder’. For that reason, I read that ‘an expression of the artist’s desire’ and ‘a mechanism for eliciting the desires of the beholder’ are different from each other. ‘[T]he artist’s desire’ also does not elicit anything and has not been not elicited by anything or anyone. ‘[A]n expression’ which is part of ‘the artist’s desire’ also does not elicit anything and has not been elicited by anything or anyone. In the case of ‘the artist’s desire’, there is ‘an expression’, but there is no expression in the case of ‘the desires of the beholder’. In this respect, ‘the artist’ and ‘the beholder’ are different to the perspective on the statement. I read the difference not only because of the way ‘desire’ is enumerated since in the case of ‘the artist’, ‘an expression’ is part of ‘the artist’s desire’. ‘[A]n expression’ is not what has been expressed by ‘the artist’ or from the ‘desire’ of ‘the artist’; as part of ‘the artist’s desire’, ‘an expression’ is what ‘the picture’ would be ‘treated as’, which is

something else other than ‘the picture’ ‘[w]hen the question of desire is raised’. ‘[T]he beholder’, on the other hand, does not possess any desire; ‘the desires’ are part of ‘the beholder’, but ‘the desires’ are not what ‘the beholder’ is beholding. ‘[T]he desires’ are ‘elicit[ed]’ by something other than ‘the desires’ and ‘the beholder’ themselves. ‘[T]he picture’ is not ‘treated as’ ‘an expression’ and ‘a mechanism’ at the same time. ‘[A] mechanism’ is something ‘for eliciting’ but ‘a mechanism’ does not itself elicit anything. The ‘eliciting’ of ‘a mechanism’ is set ‘for’ ‘the desires of the beholder’; for that reason, ‘the artist’s desire’ or ‘an expression of the artist’s desire’ would not be elicited.

I will move on to read the last two pages from ‘What Do Pictures “Really” Want?’. There is a part which starts with ‘[s]o what do pictures want?’<sup>4</sup> The second question follows, ‘[a]re there any general conclusions to be drawn from this hasty survey?’<sup>5</sup> These two questions are not about a *real* (my emphasis) desire of ‘pictures’. According to the second question, ‘any general conclusions’ need to ‘be drawn from’ something or somewhere. ‘[T]his hasty survey’ is prior to ‘any general conclusions’. ‘[A]ny general conclusions’ are to ‘be drawn’ later. ‘Really’ (or the word, real) is no longer claimed within the questions until the last page.<sup>6</sup> From the first to the last page of ‘What Do Pictures “Really” Want?’, ‘pictures’ do not give an answer to any of the questions. All the questions, including the title of the article, do not come from ‘pictures’. I expected that the perspective on ‘pictures’ might give an answer to the questions on behalf of ‘pictures’; but no answer was given in the first page. I do not mean,

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 82.



however, that there should necessarily be an answer to the question or that something has to be given as an answer because something has been asked with a question mark. On the last page, however, I found a part which seems to be an answer to those questions. This is about what ‘pictures’ ‘want’ and do not ‘want’.

What pictures want, then, is not to be interpreted, decoded, worshiped, smashed, exposed, demystified, or to enthrall their beholders. [...] The desires of pictures may be inhuman or nonhuman, better modeled by figures of animals, machines, or cyborgs, or even more basic images [...] What pictures want in the last instance, then, is simply to be asked what they want, with the understand that the answer may well be, nothing at all.<sup>7</sup>

For the perspective on ‘pictures’, ‘pictures’ are claimed to ‘want’ something and that is ‘[w]hat’. ‘What’ is not claimed by ‘pictures’. ‘What pictures want’ is repeated twice, but these repetitions are not repeated by ‘pictures’. In that sense, ‘pictures’ do not ‘want’ ‘to be interpreted, decoded, worshiped, smashed, exposed, demystified, or to enthrall their beholders’, but ‘interpret[ing], decod[ing], worship[ing], smash[ing], expos[ing], demystif[ying]’ and ‘enthrall[ing]’ are not claims that come from ‘pictures’. For the perspective on ‘pictures’, there is a difference between ‘be[ing] interpreted, decoded, worshiped, smashed, exposed, demystified’ and ‘enthrall[ing] their beholders’. ‘[E]nthral[ing]’ is not something to be when there are ‘beholders’. Here, there is no one who possesses ‘pictures’, but there is an idea of ownership in the case of ‘their beholders’. ‘[P]ictures’ do not enthrall ‘pictures’. ‘[P]ictures’ are not being watched, seen

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

or looked at; there are ‘their beholders’, but ‘their beholders’ also do not watch, see or look at ‘pictures’. ‘[B]eholders’ also do not hold anything. ‘[P]ictures’ are not what are being held by ‘their beholders’. The number of ‘pictures’ is also plural, but the numbers of ‘beholders’, ‘their’ and ‘pictures’ are all not specified as such. In addition, ‘pictures’, ‘their’ and ‘beholders’ are not who or what are *the* (my emphasis) ones. For those reasons, I read that there is no particular picture which ‘want[s]’ ‘to be interpreted, decoded, worshiped, smashed, exposed’ and ‘demystified’. In addition, no particular picture ‘want[s] to’ ‘enthrall’ a particular beholder (or beholders).

The ‘pictures’ and ‘[t]he desires’ are both plural although the ideas on ‘[t]he desires’ and ‘pictures’ are different. In the case of the statement above, ‘pictures’ are never *the* (my emphasis) ‘pictures’, but ‘[t]he desires’ which are part of ‘pictures’ are ‘[t]he’ ‘desires’. It is not ‘pictures’ that ‘may be inhuman or nonhuman’; it is ‘the desires of pictures’ that ‘may be inhuman or nonhuman’. However, to ‘be inhuman or nonhuman’ is not always likely in the case of ‘[t]he desires of pictures’. In addition, ‘[t]he desires of pictures’ are not ‘inhuman’ and ‘nonhuman’ at the same time or altogether. To be ‘inhuman’ and ‘nonhuman’ is not the choice of ‘pictures’ or ‘[t]he desires of pictures’, but ‘the desires of pictures’ are ‘inhuman’ or ‘nonhuman’ if there is a possibility of ‘be[ing] inhuman or nonhuman’.

‘The desires of pictures’ are not with certainty ‘better’ if they are not ‘modeled’ by something else. To be either ‘inhuman or nonhuman’ is not ‘better’ in that sense. ‘[F]igures of animals’, ‘machines’, ‘cyborgs’ and ‘even more basic images’ are the subjects of ‘model[ing]’ and they are what is regarded as ‘better’. However, it does not mean that ‘figures of animals’, ‘machines’, ‘cyborgs’ and ‘even more basic images’ are not ‘inhuman or nonhuman’. Whatever the ‘figures of animals’, ‘machines’, ‘cyborgs’ and ‘even more basic images’ are, they are ‘better’ than ‘[t]he desires of pictures’ in

terms of ‘model[ing]’.

‘[F]igures’ and ‘pictures’ are something different within the text; they are different from each other because ‘animals, machines, or cyborgs, or even more basic images’ only belong to ‘figures’; and ‘figures’ would be the result of ‘model[ing]’. In addition, even ‘animals’, ‘machines’, ‘cyborgs’ or ‘even more basic images’ are different from each other since ‘animals’, ‘machines’ and ‘cyborgs’ are not any of the ‘even more basic images’. ‘[P]ictures’ are also not one of the ‘even more basic images’. In the case of ‘images’, they are neither specified as images nor as basic images. Being ‘even more basic’ is something for the ‘images’ to be, but this is not the case for the ‘pictures’.

According to the last sentence of the text from Mitchell above, ‘[w]hat pictures want’ is ‘in’ ‘the last instance’. It is still not ‘[p]ictures’ that have insisted that ‘pictures want’ ‘to be asked what they want’. ‘[W]hat they want’ is something that needed ‘to be asked’. ‘[T]hey’ and ‘pictures’ do not say that ‘they’ or ‘pictures’ want something, neither do ‘pictures’ ask anything either. Being ‘asked what they want’ not only takes place ‘in’ somewhere or some time but it is also claimed within sequences such as ‘last’ and ‘then’. For that reason, ‘pictures’ would not ‘be asked what they want’ at first or in the middle of ‘the instance’. There is a certain turn in which ‘pictures’ are to ‘be asked’ about their desires, and ‘the understand’ is a supplement to asking ‘what they want’. ‘[T]he answer’ is not given by ‘pictures’ and ‘they’. ‘[T]he answer’ is a single ‘answer’ and also claimed only with probability (‘may’); therefore, ‘the answer’ is not certainly ‘nothing at all’. ‘[N]othing at all’ may not be ‘the answer’ after all; moreover, ‘nothing at all’ may not be ‘the answer’ without ‘the understand[ing]’.

From this point onwards, I will start to read Jacqueline Rose’s *Sexuality in the*

*Field of Vision* in order to read ‘Dora’, a certain section of that volume.<sup>8</sup> Before I start reading the first chapter of *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* where ‘Dora’ is mentioned, I will state in advance that this reading will not be irrelevant to this introduction or this thesis just because Rose’s text is not about reading pictures as such. It is also not totally irrelevant for my reading of Rose to occur between my reading of Mitchell’s art theory related text and Ellen E. M. Roberts’ book on the process of publishing children’s literature.<sup>9</sup> It is indeed the case that ‘Dora’ is not a picture within the text and also there is no picture within the text, but I am reading this section here because I argue that there are wider issues here that are relevant to thinking about my reading of ‘pictures’ precisely because of the way ‘Dora’ is claimed within the text.

‘Dora’ is not Rose’s creation. According to the text, ‘[t]he case of Dora was first drafted under the title “Dreams and Hysteria” in 1901, the year after the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams*’.<sup>10</sup> Thus, ‘[t]he case of Dora’ was not completed in ‘first draft’. The draft was neither published by ‘Dora’ nor by Rose. According to Rose’s text, ‘Dora’ is something as a draft. ‘Dora’ is not completely alien to Mitchell’s ‘pictures’ because just as Mitchell’s ‘pictures’ make no claims on their own behalf neither does ‘Dora’ does herself claim that there was any case or draft about ‘Dora’. Whoever or whatever ‘Dora’ is, ‘Dora’ is part of ‘[t]he case’ and she exists as the ‘first draft’ with ‘the title’. Something has been given as ‘the title’, but ‘Dora’ is not a title itself. ““Dreams and Hysteria”” is neither ‘Dora’ nor ‘[t]he case of Dora’. ‘Dora’ is not

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<sup>8</sup> Jacqueline Rose, ‘Dora - Fragment of an Analysis’ in *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*, 3rd edn (London and New York: Verso, 1989).

<sup>9</sup> I will start to read the section that begins ‘[i]nitially a child reads a picture book because it has pictures in it’ on page 24.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

outside of '[t]he case', the draft and 'the title "Dreams and Hysteria"'.

I will continue to read more about 'the case of Dora' in Rose's text:

[A]s if the case of Dora could only appear finally at the point where the implications of its failure had already been displaced onto a theory of sexuality, by no means complete and still highly problematic, but at least acknowledged as such.<sup>11</sup>

Whatever Freud tried to do or did with 'Dora', 'the case of Dora' is regarded here 'as if' there are 'the implications of its failure'. '[T]he case of Dora' could not 'appear' if it were not 'finally at the point' where there is a 'displace[ment]'. The 'appear[ance]' of 'the case of Dora' is a supposition from the perspective on 'the case of Dora'. What is more, 'the case of Dora' is not always there 'at the point' for 'appear[ing]'. '[T]he case of Dora' and 'the implications of its failure' are additional '[...]to a theory of sexuality'. There might be other theories, but what is claimed with 'the case of Dora' is 'a theory of sexuality' specifically. In other words, 'the case of Dora' or 'the implications of its failure' are not 'displaced onto' any theories or just sexuality. '[D]isplace[ment]' is neither in itself 'complete' nor 'highly problematic', but it is 'acknowledged as' '[in]complete' and 'highly problematic'. The 'acknowledge[ment]' of 'the case of 'Dora' is similar to its 'appear[ance]' since both the 'acknowledge[ment]' and the 'appear[ance]' are what is to be regarded as such by another who is not 'Dora' herself.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

In terms of thinking further about *regarding* (my emphasis), I will now compare two different pages from Mitchell's 'What Do Pictures "Really" Want?' and Rose's *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*. There are two pictures at the bottom of page 80 in 'What Do Pictures "Really" Want?' (left image). I found an image which is similar to one of the pictures on the front cover of *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (right image).

of the beholder before the finished work" (51). Or it may be violent, as in *The Rape of the Saisse*, where the "scrivings of the men on the raft" are not simply to be understood in relation to their formal composition and the sign of the rescue ship on the horizon, "but also by the need to escape our gaze, to put an end to being beheld by us, to be rescued from the ineluctable fact of a presence that threatens to theatricalize even their sufferings" (154).

The end point of this sort of pictorial desire is, I think, the purism of modernist abstraction, whose negation of the beholder's presence is articulated in Wilhelm Worringer's *Abstraction and Empathy* and displayed in its final reduction in the white paintings of the early Rauschenberg. Abstract paintings are pictures that want not to be pictures. But the desire not to show desire is, as Lacan reminds us, still a form of desire. The whole anti-theatrical tradition reminds me again of the default feminization of the picture, which is treated as something that you awaken desire in the beholder while not disclosing any signs of desire or even awareness that it is being beheld, as if the beholder were a voyeur at a keyhole.

Barbara Kruger's photo collage *Existed (Your Gaze Hits the Side of My Face)* speaks rather directly to this pursuit of puritanical account of pictorial desire. The marble face in the picture, like the absorbed face of Chardin's boy with a bubble, is shown in profile, oblivious to the gaze of the spectator or the harsh beam of light that takes its features from above. The inwardness of the figure, its blank eyes and stony absence of expression make it seem beyond desire, in that state of pure activity we associate with classical beauty. But the verbal labels glued on to the picture send an absolutely contrary message: "your gaze hits the side of my face."




Jean-Baptiste Chardin: Soap Bubbles. *Color* 1751-57



Barbara Kruger: *Existed (Your Gaze Hits the Side of My Face)*, 1982.

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Left: from William Mitchell  
Right: from Jacqueline Rose

According to Mitchell's text, the picture is described as 'Barbara Kruger's photo collage *Untitled (Your Gaze Hits the Side of My Face)*'.<sup>12</sup> However, the caption of the picture is different from the text since it is stated as '*Barbara Kruger. Untitled (Your Gaze Hits the Side of My Face). 1982*'.<sup>13</sup> In the case of Mitchell's text, 'photo collage' is neither *a* nor *the* (both my emphases) 'photo collage'; it is someone's 'photo collage' with a title which is given as '*Untitled (Your Gaze Hits the Side of My Face)*'. In addition, there is 'speak[ing]' within the text – ('Barbara Kruger's photo collage ... speaks rather directly to this purist or puritanical account of pictorial desire')<sup>14</sup> – ; although it is written as 'speaks', the 'speak[ing]' of 'Barbara Kruger's photo collage' is a retrospection since it was written as 'speaks' previously. Furthermore, I do not hear any speaking of 'Barbara Kruger's photo collage'; 'speak[ing]' is addressed as text without sound. The 'speak[ing]' which I do not hear is claimed as being done 'rather directly to this purist or puritanical account of pictorial desire'.<sup>15</sup> The speaking is done neither to 'pictures' nor to '*Barbara Kruger*'.

So, what do 'pictures' *really* (my emphasis) 'want'? The perspective on 'Barbara Kruger's photo collage *Untitled (Your Gaze Hits the Side of My Face)*' and the perspective on the title, 'What Do Pictures "Really" Want?' never tell what 'pictures' really want.

According to the blurb on the back cover of *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*, '[c]over design' and '[c]over illustration' are different from each other. Neither '[c]over design' nor '[c]over illustration' are done by Rose. 'Cover design' does not have a title,

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<sup>12</sup> William Mitchell, 'What Do Pictures "Really" Want?', p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

but there is ‘*Your Gaze Hits the Side of my Face* by Barbara Kruger’ in the case of ‘[c]over illustration’. ‘Chris Millett’, who did ‘design’, is not addressed with courtesy on the back cover whereas ‘Barbara Kruger’ is claimed with ‘courtesy of the artist’. If I compare Rose’s text with Mitchell’s, there is no claim about courtesy in Mitchell’s article.

In the case of the picture in Mitchell’s article, the top part seems missing; I stated ‘missing’ because I can read ‘Your’ and see more hair on the front cover of *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*. Although these two were originally from Barbara Kruger, the two pictures are framed differently and claimed with different ideas. The same picture becomes different pictures in the different frames. Even ‘Barbara Kruger’ is not the same Barbara Kruger in each text. Even the picture is stated as a ‘photo collage’ in one of the texts and a ‘design’ in another.

I would like to come back to the issues which are specifically related to ‘a child’, ‘picture book’ and ‘picture’ before I move on to chapter 1. There are two chapters which are about the adult and the child who read a picture book in Ellen E. M. Roberts’ *The Children’s Picture Book: How to Write it, How to Sell it*.<sup>16</sup> I will read parts of these chapters in order to see how ‘the child’ and ‘pictures’ are claimed together within the text:

Initially a child reads a picture book because it has pictures in it. A picture is a lure, an instantaneous glimpse of a complex situation, a door that opens to the view beyond. The picture book uses illustrations to draw children into the world

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<sup>16</sup> Ellen E. M. Roberts, *The Children’s Picture Book: How to Write it, How to Sell it* (London: Polar Press, 1981), pp. 3-4.



of words. For a child to whom reading is uncharted territory, the pictures provide a map of what's to come. [...] The title only hints at the content, and the only way he can estimate whether he will like the book is to check out the pictures.<sup>17</sup>

The perspective on 'a child' knows why 'a child' 'reads' 'a picture book'. In other words, 'a child reads a picture book' because there is a reason to do so. '[H]a[ving] pictures in it' is the '[i]nitial' reason why 'a child reads a picture book'. '[A] picture book' is something that is to 'ha[ve] pictures' inside it. Books without pictures or pictures outside of picture books are not there within the text. '[A] picture book' and 'pictures in it' are different from each other. As they are different from each other, 'a picture book' is not by itself 'a lure', 'an instantaneous glimpse of a complex situation' or 'a door that opens to the view beyond'.

What '[t]he picture book' 'uses' is not the 'pictures' in '[t]he picture book'. This is because nothing is claimed to be *in* (my emphasis) there in the case of '[t]he picture book'. Instead of using pictures, '[t]he picture book uses illustrations'. 'The picture book' is '[t]he' one when '[t]he picture book uses illustrations', but 'illustrations' are not *the* (my emphasis) 'illustrations' at that time. '[C]hildren' will be 'draw[n]' 'into the world of words' when '[t]he picture book uses illustrations', but there is no 'world' for '[t]he picture book' and 'illustrations'. '[C]hildren' are outside of 'the world of words' before 'illustrations' 'draw' 'children' in and 'illustrations' would not 'draw children into the world of words' unless '[t]he picture book uses illustrations'.

'[R]eading' might not be 'uncharted territory' 'to [s/he] who[...]' is not 'a

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

child'. There is 'a child' for 'whom reading is uncharted territory'; but this is not the case for all the children. In the case of 'a child', though, there might be other 'territor[ies]' which are not 'uncharted'. However, 'reading' is claimed to be an 'uncharted territory' in the case of 'a child'. Within that sentence, it is 'the pictures' which 'provide a map of what's to come'. '[I]llustrations' are something to 'draw children' in and 'the pictures' are something to 'provide' to 'a child to whom reading is uncharted territory'. In that sense, the 'uncharted territory' might not be 'uncharted' after all since there is already 'a map of what's to come'. However, how does 'a child' know that 'the pictures' are 'a map'? How does 'a child' know that it is especially 'a map of what's to come' when 'a child' is 'provide[d]' with 'the pictures'?

Although 'reading is uncharted territory' to 'a child', there is '[t]he title' which 'hints at the content' and 'the pictures' from which 'he can estimate whether he will like the book'. 'The title' and 'the pictures' are excluded from the 'uncharted territory' since they are known as such to the perspective on the statement above. '[H]e' does not estimate 'the content' from '[t]he title' whereas there is a possibility to 'estimate', by 'check[ing] out the pictures', 'whether he will like the book'. '[H]int[ing] at the content' is not 'the [...] way' to guess 'whether he will like the book', 'the *only* way' (my emphasis on 'only') to do that is 'to check out the pictures'. '[T]he pictures' are claimed to be 'check[ed] out' in order to 'estimate' preference with respect to 'the book'. In other words, 'the pictures' do not hint at the content, indeed, 'the pictures' do not do anything whereas '[t]he title only hints' at something other than '[t]he title'. However, 'the only way' is not only one 'way' because 'he' had claimed it to be so. '[W]hether he will like the book' is claimed to be something that 'can' be 'estimate[d]'. Does this mean that 'whether he will' *not* (my emphasis) 'like the book' can also be

‘estimate[d]’ in this sense? When ‘the pictures’ are being ‘check[ed] out’, the perspective on ‘he’ will know or would be able to judge ‘whether he will like the book’. It will not be ‘the pictures’ that ‘he will like’ although it is ‘the pictures’ that have been ‘check[ed] out’. The ‘estimat[ing]’ is claimed to be ‘he’s’ ability and the ‘liking’ of ‘the book’ is the result of the ‘estimat[ion]’.

In the following page of *The Children’s Picture Book: How to Write it, How to Sell it*, the ideas which are claimed about ‘[p]icture book pictures’ are similar to ideas that I am going to read from the blurbs on other picture books later in this thesis.

Picture book pictures help a child want to read, and then they help him to read. The pictures are at once exciting and reassuring, all in the cause of helping the child appreciate your story. Writing appears in book form so it can endure. It endures for the moment so that the child can concentrate on a particular page that holds his interest; it endures for months so that he can read and reread it until he knows your words by heart; it endures for years so that he can share it with a sister or a friend; and it endures for generations so that he can pass it on to his children and their children. The illustrations in the children’s picture book invite the child in; the words invite him to stay, and to come back again.<sup>18</sup>

It is not any pictures which ‘help a child want to read’ and ‘help him to read’. Only as long as they are ‘[p]icture book pictures’ do they ‘help a child want to read’ and ‘then [...] help him to read’. ‘[A] child’ does not read ‘[p]icture book pictures’ according to the text above, indeed there is no child who reads within the text; rather ‘a child’

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

‘want[s] to read’ ‘[p]icture book pictures’. What is more, what ‘a child want[s] to read’ is not a ‘[p]icture book’ because ‘a child wants to read’ ‘[p]icture book pictures’. It is not stated whether ‘a child’ or ‘him’ required any ‘help’ before either of them read anything. ‘Picture book pictures’ and ‘they’ already do something to ‘a child’ and ‘him’ before ‘a child’ and ‘him’ ‘read’.

‘The pictures’ might not be ‘exciting and reassuring’ before and after ‘at once’. Furthermore, ‘your story’ is not itself ‘exciting and reassuring’. ‘[Y]our story’ is different from ‘[t]he pictures’ not only because of their number but also because of the ownership of ‘your story’. ‘The pictures’, on the other hand, do not belong to ‘your’ and ‘the child’. ‘The pictures’ also do not belong to ‘[t]he pictures’ themselves. When ‘[t]he pictures are at once exciting and reassuring’, ‘the child’, on the other hand, would ‘appreciate your story’. ‘[A]ppreciat[ing] your story’ by ‘the child’ is conditional on ‘all in the cause of helping’. If ‘helping’ is not part of ‘all in the cause’ or something is missing from ‘all in the cause’, then ‘all in the cause of helping’ would no longer be ‘all in the cause of helping’.

‘[E]ndur[ing]’ is an ability of ‘it’; ‘it’ does not ‘endure’ simply when ‘[w]riting appears in book form’. The ‘appear[ance]’ of ‘[w]riting’ is not out of ‘book form’, but when ‘[w]riting appears’, there is no *form* (my emphasis) for ‘[w]riting’. However, ‘[w]riting’ is ‘in book form’ when it ‘appears’. Does that mean ‘[w]riting’ might not be ‘in [the] book’ without the ‘form’? Does that mean ‘it’ cannot ‘endure’ if there is no ‘form’ for the ‘book’?

There are four different ‘endur[ings]’ in the statement above. In the case of the first ‘[e]ndur[ing]’, there is ‘the child’ who ‘can concentrate’. However, the ability to ‘concentrate’ is limited not only to ‘a particular page that holds his interest’ but also by ‘the moment’. The ability to ‘concentrate’ is timely and objectively conditional for the

perspective on 'the child'. When there is a claim about the second 'endur[ing]', there is no child, rather, it is 'he' who 'can read and reread it'. Does this mean that 'he' will not 'read and reread it' after 'he knows your words by heart' in that sense? When the first 'endur[ing]' is 'for the moment', the second 'endur[ing]' is 'for months'. The ability to 'concentrate' in the case of 'the child' 'endures for the moment', but the ability to 'read and reread' in the case of 'he' 'endures for months'. The 'concentrat[ion]' and the 'read[ing]' are different from each other not only because they are what 'the child' and 'he' do respectively, but also because of the duration of time. For the perspective on 'he', what 'he knows' is not what 'he' has 'read and reread'. The result of 'read[ing] and reread[ing]' is 'know[ing] your words by heart'. Those 'words' are not from 'a particular page' as in the previous sentence or something he 'read[s]' or 'reread[s]'. The result of 'endur[ing] for months' is getting the knowledge of 'your words by heart'. The third 'endur[ing]' is 'for years' and there will be a 'shar[ing of] it' with others such as 'a sister or a friend'. It is only 'he' who is claimed alongside this form of 'endur[ing]'; does that mean 'he' will not 'share it' with someone who is not 'a sister or a friend'? The 'shar[ing]' by 'he' is an addition to 'endur[ing] for years' and it seems that 'he' does not 'share it' with multiple people. There is no *she* (my emphasis) within the text above. It is 'he' who has an ability to 'pass it on to his children and their children'. The idea of 'generation' starts from 'he' and it is claimed to be 'pass[ed] it on to' 'children' who are 'his children and their children'. From reading 'generation', I read an idea of family. There is a possibility that something 'can be pass[ed...] on' and that is what 'he', 'his children' and 'their children' can do.

There are 'the illustrations' which are 'in the children's picture book' according to the last sentence of the statement above. 'The illustrations in the children's picture book' and 'the words' are different from each other; 'the words' are not claimed to be

‘in the children’s picture book’ whereas ‘[t]he illustrations’ are. ‘The illustrations’ ‘invite the child in’, ‘the words invite him to stay’ and then ‘come back again’; ‘the words’ do not invite someone ‘in’ and ‘[t]he illustrations’ do not do what ‘the words’ do.

‘[T]he children’s picture book’ itself does not ‘invite’ ‘the child’ or ‘him’ ‘in’ according to the statement above. Does that mean that ‘the child’ and ‘him’ would not read any of ‘[t]he illustrations in the children’s picture book’, ‘the children’s picture book’ itself or ‘the words’ without the invitation?

In the next chapter, I will read Anthony Browne’s *One Gorilla*.<sup>19</sup> This book is ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ and also a picture book. I am not aiming to find an answer to my personal questions such as ‘how would I read the picture if there is also a word (or words)?’, ‘how would I read the picture if there is no word on that page?’ and ‘what is the relation between the picture and a word (or words) when they are on the same page?’ Instead, I will keep these questions in my mind when I read the perspectives on the pictures and the text and see how the different ideas about various words are claimed there within the pictures and the text. In Chapter 1, I will start the chapter by reading Anthony Browne’s *One Gorilla* and later will read it with Emmanuel Lévinas’ *Totality and Infinity*, Gilles Deleuze’s, *Difference and Repetition*, Jennifer Ford’s ‘A, B and (not) Seeing: Animals and Other Ironies in Alphabet Books’ and Daniela Caselli’s ‘The Wives of Geniuses I Have Sat with: Body Hair, Genius and Modernity’ - which means I read philosophical texts (from Lévinas and Deleuze), children’s literary criticism (from Ford) and gender study (from Caselli) in order to read a picture book, *One Gorilla*, demonstrating that however different such texts may seem from another, my


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<sup>19</sup> Anthony Browne, *One Gorilla* (London: Walker Books, 2015).

readings can and do produce connections and similarities between them.

## Part I: Reading ‘A Counting Book’

### Chapter 1: ‘One Gorilla’: from Eyes to Body



(Front Cover of *One Gorilla*)

Between ‘One Gorilla’ and ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’, there is ‘A Counting Book’. In terms of the distance, ‘One Gorilla’ is closer than ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ to ‘A Counting Book’. In addition, ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ is all in capital letters whereas ‘One Gorilla’ and ‘A Counting Book’ are not. There is a picture of a gorilla. ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ is within the frame of the picture. ‘One Gorilla’ and ‘A Counting Book’ are above picture.

‘A Counting Book’ is not ‘One Gorilla’, ‘A Counting Book’ does not count and ‘A Counting Book’ is not what ‘[o]ne [g]orilla’ is ‘[c]ounting’. There is a single ‘[b]ook’ according to the statements on the front cover and it is particularly, ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’.



‘Gorilla’ is claimed with a number, ‘[o]ne’. There is also only one picture. ‘Gorilla’ is different from ‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’ since ‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’ is not *one* (my emphasis) Anthony Browne. ‘One [g]orilla’ has been already counted as ‘[o]ne’. ‘Counting’ is not in the present in that sense.

If I take that there is no letter on the front cover, I see that there are two different parts: one is the white part and the other is the part with different colours. Since the white part is relatively above of the other part, I will call this the upper part. In that sense, the part with different colours is the lower part as it is relatively on the lower part. The picture does not say that it is something or anything, but I read that picture as the gorilla. There is no outline in the cases of the upper and lower parts. Although there is no line in between those parts, I still read that there are two different parts on the front cover. I do not read that white as a gorilla. From reading the lower part with different colours, I read that it is a gorilla. None of the colours in any of frames claims there is a gorilla. However, I still read that there is a gorilla.

‘One Gorilla’, ‘A Counting Book’, ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ and a gorilla are all on the same page. For that reason, I might read the pictorial gorilla with ‘One Gorilla’, ‘A Counting Book’ and ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’. ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ is within the frame of the pictorial gorilla. ‘A [c]ounting [b]ook’ and ‘One Gorilla’ are also on the front cover with the pictorial gorilla, but they are not within the frame of the pictorial gorilla. In the case of ‘One Gorilla’, ‘One Gorilla’ helps me read out *a gorilla* (my emphasis). Furthermore, I do not read the picture as the picture of ‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’ or the picture of ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’. Why do I not read that gorilla as ‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’ when ‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’ is in the same frame as the gorilla? The distance between ‘One Gorilla’ and the gorilla is further than the distance between

‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’ and the gorilla. However, I still read the gorilla is neither ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ nor Anthony Browne. My reading of ‘One Gorilla’, ‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’, ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ and the pictorial gorilla on the front cover is based on a reading of perspective and also of difference.

From reading the pictorial gorilla, I not only read face but also two eyes, a nose, a mouth and an ear on the face. It seems that the face looks closer to the gorilla’s face than B[rowne]’s. In terms of reading the gorilla’s face, I will focus on reading the eyes on its face first.

In order to expand my reading of the pictorial gorilla and the eyes on it, I will look for the ideas on the eyes in different text; there are ‘the eyes’ in Emmanuel Lévinas’ *Totality and Infinity*. In the chapter, ‘A. Sensibility and the Face’, there are claims about ‘the face’ and ‘the eye’.<sup>20</sup> I think that the ideas which are claimed in ‘A. Sensibility and the Face’ are relevant to my reading of the face on the front cover of *One Gorilla*. After reading *Totality and Infinity*, I will compare the ideas which are claimed in *Totality and Infinity* with *One Gorilla*.

As Plato noted, besides the eye and the thing, vision presupposes the light. The eye does not see the light, but the object in the light. Vision is therefore a relation with a “something” established within a relation with what is not a “something”. We are in the light inasmuch as we encounter the thing in nothingness.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Emmanuel Lévinas, ‘A Sensibility and the Face’ in *Totality and Infinity*, trans, Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer, 1991), pp. 187-93.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 189.

The statement above is not a note of 'Plato'. 'Plato noted' according to the statement, but the rest of the statement above is not the note of "Plato's note".

'[T]he eye', 'the thing', 'vision' and 'the light' are all different from each other. '[T]he eye' and 'the thing' are not 'the light'. Neither 'the eye' nor 'the thing' 'presuppose' or are 'presuppose[d]'. '[V]ision' 'presupposes the light', but 'the light' does not presuppose 'vision'. When 'vision presupposes the light', 'the eye and the thing' are not with 'vision' and 'the light'. '[T]he eye and the thing' are not on the same side of presupposition. I do not mean that 'the eye and the thing' are alien to 'vision', 'the light' and presupposition. However, I also do not mean that 'the eye and the thing' are somewhere next to 'vision', 'the light' and presupposition.

'[S]ee[ing]' is what '[t]he eye' does. However, '[t]he eye' does not 'see' everything; 'the light' is excluded from the seeing or from what '[t]he eye' is claimed to do. 'The eye' also would not 'see' 'the object' if 'the object' is outside of 'the light' (or is not 'in the light'). The 'see[ing]' of '[t]he eye' and the ability to 'see' 'the object' are conditional on 'the light'.

The idea of 'a relation' in the case of '[v]ision' means that vision needs something other than '[v]ision' itself to be. Without 'a "something"', there would not be 'a relation' to '[v]ision'. In addition, 'a relation' not only needs 'a "something"' but also another 'establish[ment]' of 'a relation' which is different from the previous 'relation'. They are the same word, 'a relation', but the second one is something which is 'established within'. 'Vision' in the third sentence is neither of *a* nor *the* (both my emphases) one, whereas every instance of 'a relation' and 'a "something"' is 'a' single/singular one. The perspective of the statement has different point of views for '[v]ision' from 'a relation' and 'a "something"'. 'Vision' does not see '[v]ision' itself.

‘We’ and ‘we’ are different since ‘we’ are not ‘in’ somewhere. It is ‘the thing’ that is ‘in nothingness’ and ‘we’ would ‘encounter’ ‘the thing’ if ‘the thing’ is ‘in nothingness’. Neither are we always ‘in’ somewhere in that sense. ‘We are in the light’, but I am not ‘in’ there. ‘[W]e encounter the thing in nothingness’, but I do not encounter anything. There are ‘[w]e’ who are ‘in the light’ and also other ‘we’ who ‘encounter the thing in nothingness’. There is no one who sees in the fourth sentence although ‘[w]e are in the light’. ‘[E]ncounter[ing]’ is not seeing. Being ‘in the light’ is not a key to ‘see[ing]’. It seems there needs to be ‘the eye’ and something has to be ‘in the light’ in order to be ‘see[n]’.

For the perspective in the statement above, ‘the eye’ is singular. In addition, ‘the eye’ is always ‘the’ one no matter what it is claimed to be in relation to/with. There is a distinction between ‘the eye’ and ‘we’ (or ‘[w]e’). ‘[T]he eye’ does not belong to ‘we’ (or ‘[w]e’). According to the statement above, ‘see[ing]’ is conditional and not everything does ‘see’. The perspective on ‘the eye’ has a knowledge of what has to be seen (‘the object’) although ‘the eye’ is not ‘the eye’ of the perspective on ‘the eye’.

There are two eyes on the front cover of *One Gorilla*. These two eyes are not the eyes of ‘A[nthony] B[rowne]’. Being within the same frame does not give an ownership to either the picture or the statement. The two eyes are within the frame of a gorilla, but that gorilla does not own any of the eyes either. The gorilla does not own ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ either although ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ is within the frame of the gorilla. The gorilla does not own any part or colour.

I see white on both of ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ and the eyes of gorilla. These white colours are not the same white for the perspective for the reason that the white on the eyes are not the white of ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’. In that sense, the white of the

upper part is also not the white on the eyes and the colour of 'ANTHONY BROWNE'. These three white colours are not claimed with the same idea although they are the same colour. In other words, 'ANTHONY BROWNE' is different from the gorilla and the upper white part. 'ANTHONY BROWNE' is neither body nor hair of that gorilla. 'ANTHONY BROWNE' is neither a gorilla nor part of a gorilla.

When I read the front cover, I could have read that 'there is a picture of an animal', 'there is a picture of monkey', 'there is a picture of chimpanzee', etc. The reason why I stated *a gorilla* and *the gorilla* (both my emphases) is because of those two statements: 'One Gorilla' and 'A Counting Book'. Because of the picture and the statements, I can read that there is a gorilla. It is a gorilla. It is a gorilla with several colours and frames. I read a face and a body from the picture. From the picture, I read two eyes, a nose, an ear and a mouth.

There are no page numbers in *One Gorilla*. In other words, the pages are not counted with numbers. I do not mean that there is no '[c]ounting' after the front cover just because there is no page number. I read continuity from '[c]ounting' so there might be the ideas which are related to '[c]ounting' in other pages of *One Gorilla*. There are '1', 'Gorilla' and a gorilla on two pages after the front cover.<sup>22</sup> The picture of a gorilla seems to be similar and also different from the previous one on the front cover. On the front cover, 'One Gorilla' is stated in a single line at the top. On the following page, '1' is in the first line and 'Gorilla' is stated in the second line.

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<sup>22</sup> As I have mentioned that there is no pagination in *One Gorilla*, thus I will state the pages without stating the page number. I will use the right and left pages instead.



'1' and 'Gorilla' are also on the same page, but they are not claimed with the same idea since they are in different lines with different sizes and colours. '1' is bigger than 'Gorilla'. '1' is almost three times bigger than 'Gorilla'. '1' is turquoise. 'Gorilla' is black. I could have read '1 Gorilla' together at first from the first paragraph of this chapter, but I read '1' and 'Gorilla' separately because of the differences between those two. '1' is different from 'One' on the front cover. While the size of 'One' on the front cover is the same as 'Gorilla', '1' is different from 'Gorilla' below it for many reasons. The perspective on '1' and 'Gorilla' claims different ideas for both '1' and 'Gorilla'. '1' and 'Gorilla' are different from each other, likewise '[o]ne Gorilla' is different from '1 Gorilla'.

On the right side of '1' and 'Gorilla', there is a picture. I read the white part and the non-white part from the right page. If I take it that there is no '1' and 'Gorilla' on the left page, there are also the white part and the non-white part. I do not read the white part as a statement. However, what I read as a picture of a gorilla is from reading the non-white part. Although there are many colours within the frame of non-white part,

I still read that the number of a gorilla is one. However, the number of frames of a gorilla is plural. It does not mean that the white part is nothing. In other pages of *One Gorilla*, there are repetitions of the white parts and the non-white parts. There are the repetitions of numbers and letters as well.

Repetition is not what I could read only from *One Gorilla*; for example, I also could read repetition in *My Five Senses* and *Use Your Brain*; in *My Five Senses*, I could read the repetition of ‘I’ on page 21<sup>23</sup>; in *My Five Senses*, I could read the repetition of ‘—’ and ‘· ·’.<sup>24</sup> Since *repetition* (my emphasis) continues to appear not only in this chapter but also elsewhere in my thesis, I would like to take a look at repetition from different text and move on reading of repetition in *One Gorilla*. Before making further claims about the repetition in *One Gorilla*, I will read Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* to see how repetition has been claimed within that text.<sup>25</sup>

Repetition is not generality. Repetition and generality must be distinguished in several ways. Every formula which implies their confusion is regrettable: for example, when we say that two things are as alike as two drops of water; or when we identify ‘there is only a science of the general’ with ‘there is only a science of that which is repeated’. Repetition and resemblance are different in kind - extremely so.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> See for another example of reading the ideas on ‘repetition’: Chapter 9, from page 151.

<sup>24</sup> See for my reading about the repetitions of ‘—’ and ‘· ·’: Chapter 10, from page 190.

<sup>25</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. by Paul Patton (London and New York: Continuum, 2001).

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

‘Repetition’ ‘is’ something other than ‘[r]epetition’. ‘Repetition’ is also ‘not generality’. There are the repetitions of ‘[r]epetition’ and ‘generality’ in the first and the second sentences, but these ‘[r]epetition[s]’ and ‘generalit[ies]’ are different from each other; in the case of the first sentence, ‘[r]epetition’ and ‘generality’ do not need to be distinguished; ‘[r]epetition’ and ‘generality’ in the second sentence are claimed to be ‘distinguished in several ways’. ‘Repetition and generality’ in the second sentence are something can be ‘distinguished’, but they have to be ‘*in several ways*’ (my emphasis). The number of ‘ways’ is multiple, but it is not infinite. ‘Repetition and generality must be distinguished’ within the boundary of ‘several ways’. Something other than ‘several ways’ or something outside of ‘several ways’ is not for ‘distinguish[ing]’ ‘[r]epetition and generality’ of the second sentence.

‘Every formula’ in the third sentence is not the ‘several ways’ and also not ‘*in several ways*’ (my emphasis). ‘Every formula’ does not formularize and formulate. ‘Every formula’ does not regret and it does not insist that something is ‘regrettable’. ‘Every formula’ is neither mathematics nor science. ‘[T]he[y]’ do not claim that ‘confusion’ belongs to ‘the[m]’ or that something has been ‘implied’ in ‘[e]very formula’. However, ‘[e]very formula’ is claimed to be ‘regrettable’ and this ‘implies their confusion’.

There are two different ‘example[s]’ of ‘[e]very formula’. The first ‘example’ is claimed with a moment, ‘when’ and ‘say[ing] of we’. The ‘two things are as alike as two drops of water’ is not what I said; it is what ‘we say’ during the moment, ‘when’. ‘[T]wo things’ are not ‘two drops of water’ because they are something ‘alike’. ‘[T]wo things’ and ‘two drops of water’ are something to be compared with the idea of likeness. The second ‘example’ is also claimed with a moment, ‘when’, and the ‘iden-



tif[ying]’ of the ‘we’. What ‘we identify’ is within the quotation marks. Within the quotation marks, there are two different things: ‘only a science of that which is repeated’ and ‘only a science of the general’. They are what ‘we identify’ during the period of ‘when’ and these are different from the first example, of what ‘we say’. I would like to add that the previous ‘we’ and ‘we’ who are claimed to ‘say’ are different from each other although they are all ‘we’. Two ‘we’ are different from each other because the latter ‘we’ do not say anything. In other words, it is not the first ‘we’ who identify something. ‘[W]hen we identify’, there would be two different ‘science[s]’. ‘[T]he general’ and that ‘which is repeated’ are both part of ‘only a science’. However, the former and the latter ‘science[s]’ are different from each other not only because the former is claimed with ‘the general’ and the latter is claimed with ‘of that which is repeated’; they are different from each other also because ‘only a science of that which is repeated’ is an addition of ‘only a science of the general’.

Then, ‘[r]epetitions and resemblance’ are claimed to be ‘different in kind - extremely so’. ‘Repetition’ and ‘resemblance’ are not the same. In addition, they are not the ‘[r]epetition’ and ‘generality’ in the first and the second sentences. ‘Repetition and resemblance’ in the last sentence above are ‘different’, but they are different ‘in kind’. They are ‘extremely’ ‘different’ with ‘in’ the aspect of ‘kind’.

In the following paragraph, there is no *repetition* (my emphasis). ‘Generality’ without repetition is stated there in the second paragraph. It seems that repetition does not always have to be claimed with ‘[g]enerality’ for the perspective on ‘[g]enerality’.

Generality presents two major orders: the qualitative order of resemblances and the quantitative order of equivalences. Cycles and equalities are their respective symbols. But in any case, generality expresses a point of view according to

which one term may be exchanged or substituted for another. The exchange or substitution of particulars defines our conduct in relation to generality.<sup>27</sup>

There might be other ‘major orders’ or other ‘orders’ which are not the ‘two major orders’. ‘[T]wo major orders’ are something to be ‘present[ed]’. In that sense, ‘[g]enerality’ is not ‘two major orders’ and vice versa. ‘Generality’ in the first sentence might not ‘present[s]’ other ‘orders’ or other ‘major orders’ which are not these ‘two major orders’. ‘[T]wo major orders’ are, however, not selected as ‘two major orders’ by ‘[g]enerality’ in the first sentence. In addition, these ‘orders’ are different ‘orders’ which are ‘the qualitative order of resemblances’ and ‘the quantitative order of equivalences’. ‘[R]esemblances’, then, are not part of ‘the quantitative order’ and ‘equivalences’ are not part of ‘the qualitative order’. Both ‘the qualitative order of resemblances’ and ‘the quantitative order of equivalences’ are ‘present[at]ions’ of ‘[g]enerality’. They are not ‘[g]enerality’ themselves. They would not be ‘two major orders’ if ‘[g]enerality’ did not ‘present’ these ‘two major orders’.

In the third sentence, there is also ‘generality’, but ‘generality’ in the third sentence does not present anything. Consequently, ‘[g]enerality’ in the first sentence and ‘generality’ in the third sentence are different generalities. This is because the third one is claimed with ‘[b]ut’ and ‘in any case’. It is also because ‘[g]enerality’ in the first sentence does not express anything. Also, for the perspective of the third sentence, ‘view’ is part of ‘a point’. ‘[A] point’ is not ‘a point’ of ‘generality’; rather ‘a point of view’ is what has been ‘expresse[d]’. ‘[O]ne term’ would not be ‘exchanged’ and ‘substituted for another’ at the same time. In addition, ‘exchange’ or ‘substitut[ion]’ ‘for another’ is not

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

always likely to happen. If there is ‘one term [that] may be exchanged or substituted for another’, does that mean there would be the other terms which may not be ‘exchanged and substituted’? In that sense, ‘generality’ may not express all points of views.

In the last sentence above, ‘generality’ is neither generally general nor particularly particular. ‘[P]articulars’ are part of ‘[t]he exchange’ or ‘substitution’. There, ‘generality’ is claimed after ‘in relation to’. Therefore, I read that ‘[t]he exchange or substitution of particulars’ are not out of ‘relation’ which is particularly in relation to ‘generality’. I do not conduct anything, but there is ‘our conduct’ in the statement above. Not everything defines ‘our conduct’; it is ‘[t]he exchange or substitution of particulars’ which is claimed to ‘define’ ‘our conduct’ and ‘our conduct’ is something to be ‘define[d] by that which is other to the ‘our’.

I do not read that either ‘generality’ (or ‘[g]enerality’) or ‘repetition’ is ‘[c]ycles and equalities’. This is because neither ‘generality’ (or ‘[g]enerality’) or ‘repetition’ own ‘their respective symbols’. ‘[S]ymbols’ in the statement above are ‘respective symbols’, but the number of ‘symbols’ is plural. ‘[T]heir respective symbols’ is a group of respective symbols which belongs to ‘their’. Therefore, ‘their respective symbols’ are the repetition of respective symbols.

‘[R]epetition’ in Deleuze’s text is then claimed with ‘see[ing]’. Since *seeing* (my emphasis) was one of the ways that I looked at the pictures and one of reasons why I started to write this thesis, I was personally interested to read this part where ‘repetition’ and ‘see[ing]’ were claimed together. I will read the paragraph which makes claims about ‘see[ing]’ and ‘repetition’ and then go back to reading the pictures in *One Gorilla*.

[W]e can see that repetition is a necessary and justified conduct only in relation

to that which cannot be replaced. [...] Reflections, echoes, doubles, and souls do not belong to the domain of resemblance or equivalence; and it is no more possible to exchange one's soul than it is to substitute real twins for one another. If exchange is the criterion of generality, theft and gift are those of repetition. There is, therefore, an economic difference between the two.<sup>28</sup>

There are the 'we' who 'can see'. For that reason, 'repetition' and 'a necessary and justified conduct' are what 'we' 'see' due to the ability of 'we'. However, the abilities to 'see' are limited. In other words, 'we can see [...]' does not mean that 'we can see' any repetitions or all repetitions. What 'we can see' is 'a' single number of 'repetition' and 'a necessary and justified conduct'. When 'a necessary and justified conduct' are 'only in relation', they 'cannot be replaced'.

'[R]esemblance' and 'equivalence' do not belong to the same domain. In each case of 'the domain of resemblance' and 'the domain of [...] equivalence', something might and might not belong there. But whatever belongs there, '[r]eflections, echoes, doubles, and souls do not belong to the domain of resemblance or equivalence'. Then, in view of this, 'reflections, echoes, doubles, and souls' belong somewhere other than 'the domain of resemblance or equivalence'.

In the case of 'one's soul', 'one' is claimed to have an ownership of 'soul'. '[S]oul' belongs to 'one'. '[O]ne' and 'soul' are different from each other, but they are '*in relation*' (my emphasis) in terms of ownership. '[T]he domain' is also claimed to have ownership of 'resemblance' and 'equivalence'. Likewise 'one's soul', 'the domain' and 'resemblance or equivalence' are also in relation in terms of ownership. It is not

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

‘one’ who claims the idea of ownership, but rather ‘one’ has ‘soul’ according to the statement. There is ‘one’ who has ‘soul’ and ‘real twins’ who are not ‘one’. My question about ‘real’ is, what is the difference between twins and ‘real twins’? If there were no ‘real’ in front of ‘twins’, I might have read *twins* as *twins* (both my emphases). However, if ‘twins’ are not ‘real’, they might not be able to be ‘substitut[ed]’ to the perspective on ‘real twins’. Due to ‘real’, I read the realness has been added to ‘twins’. Possibilities of ‘exchang[ing]’ and ‘substitut[ing]’ are claimed through the comparison of ‘exchang[ing] one’s soul’ and ‘substitut[ing] real twins for one another’. It might be possible to ‘exchange’ something other than ‘one’s soul’, but it is not ‘possible’ to ‘exchange one’s soul’. The impossibility of ‘substitut[ing]’ is the same for ‘real twins’; if they were not *real* (my emphasis) ‘twins’, they might have been substituted by another.

‘[E]xchange is the criterion’ is a supposition and the prior condition of the latter part of the sentence. ‘[E]xchange’, which is stated after ‘[i]f’, is ‘the criterion of generality’. There is no criteria of ‘the criterion’ within the text. Wherever or whatever ‘[t]here’ is, ‘[t]here is’ ‘an economic difference between the two’. I have been reading ‘repetition’ (and ‘[r]epetition’) and ‘generality’ (and ‘[g]enerality’). ‘Repetition’ (and ‘repetition’) and ‘generality’ (and ‘[g]enerality’) seem to be grouped as ‘the two’ and there is ‘an economic difference between the two’. The ‘difference’ ‘between the two’ is not about any difference; it is ‘an economic’ one. The ‘difference’ is somewhere ‘between’ ‘the two’; thus, ‘the two’ might not be economically different in that sense after all since the idea of differentness is ‘*between*’ (also my emphasis) ‘the two’.

There is no number and word within the frame of a gorilla. Although the frames of ‘1’, ‘Gorilla’ and a gorilla are all different, I read a gorilla with ‘1’ and ‘Gorilla’. Neither a gorilla, ‘1’ nor ‘Gorilla’ claim that they are related to each other. The

gorilla does not claim anything through the picture since the perspective does not belong to the gorilla. In addition, '1' and 'Gorilla' are on the other page to that gorilla. However, I still read there is a gorilla — but I would like to add that it does not mean that I am claiming that the gorilla is '1 Gorilla' and vice versa

I read a face and a body from the gorilla. There is no outline around the gorilla and the frames of a gorilla. In the same way, I read that there is no outline between the face and the body. Although there is no line which divides or defines the face and the body, I still read that there are the face and the body of a gorilla. According to my reading of those two pages, the face and the body are different from each other. The face is something above the body. In the case of the face, there are two eyes, one nose, one mouth, forehead, one ear and hair.

I would not claim that 'there is another ear on the other side of the face' or that 'one of the ears is missing in that picture' since I do not see the other side of the face. What I see is all I see.<sup>29</sup> The size of the body is bigger than the face. In the case of the body, there are hair, two arms and a torso. I would not claim that 'I read part of the body' or that 'the picture does not show the whole body of the gorilla' since the perspective of the picture does not claim any ideas related to a part versus the whole. That gorilla is one gorilla as it is. For example, I do not need hands and legs in order to read a body or one gorilla. I also do not need to know what is inside of that body and face of the gorilla. I read them as they are on the page.

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<sup>29</sup> In a related analysis about the notion of the 'missing', see for instance: Sue Walsh, 'Disability and Animal Studies' in *Rethinking Disability Theory and Practice* ed. by Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 24-5.

In the case of *One Gorilla*, there are ‘1 Gorilla’, ‘2 Orang-utans’, ‘3 Chimpanzees’, ‘4 Mandrills’, ‘5 Baboons’, ‘6 Gibbons’, ‘7 Spider Monkeys’, ‘8 Macaques’, ‘9 Colobus Monkeys’, ‘10 Lemurs’ and ‘All Primates’. Although numbers, words and pictures in *One Gorilla* are all different, I read that there is the repetition of the frames. For example, all pictures are next to the numbers and the words. All numbers are bigger than the words. In the case of ‘3 Chimpanzees’, there is the picture of three chimpanzees. There are three faces and three bodies. Next to ‘6 Gibbons’, there are the picture of six gibbons. From reading six gibbons, I also read six faces and six bodies. I read that those are the repetitions in *One Gorilla*.

Since there is ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ on the front cover, I read that *One Gorilla* belongs to a certain category of books. In ‘A, B and (not) Seeing: Animals and Other Ironies in Alphabet Books’, Jennifer Ford reads alphabets, pictures and animals with texts by Jacques Derrida.<sup>30</sup> In terms of reading ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ and the pictorial gorilla from *One Gorilla*, reading Ford’s text would be another example to show how the different perspectives on certain kinds of ‘books’ affect the claims about ‘an image’ in those ‘books’. After finish reading Ford’s article, I will read the text from Derrida in order to think more about gorilla, numbers and the pictures.

All alphabet books are politically, ethically and culturally constructed. Even in books that are almost wordless, apparently simple constructs can be hidden and censored. For instance, the phrase “c is for cow” that includes an image of a cow on a farm has already presented (censored/hidden from) the young reader with

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<sup>30</sup> Jennifer Ford, ‘A, B and (not) Seeing: Animals and Other Ironies in Alphabet Books’, *The Oxford Literary Review*, 41:2 (2019), 219–237. DOI: 10.3366/olr.2019.0280 [accessed 13 February 2020]

an ideology of farms, of “farmed animals”. Concepts of early literacy are prioritised in such a way that early concepts and images of animals can be paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised.<sup>31</sup>

Other ‘books’ might not be ‘politically, ethically and culturally constructed’, but there is no exception to ‘[a]ll alphabet books’. ‘All alphabet books’ were already being ‘constructed’ as such. Furthermore, it is not a single alphabet book which is ‘politically, ethically and culturally constructed’. ‘All alphabet books’ are also not separately ‘constructed’ ‘politically’, ‘ethically’ or ‘culturally’ since they are all ‘constructed’ ‘politically, ethically and culturally’. Being ‘constructed’ was not done by ‘[a]ll alphabet books’ themselves. They are not ‘constructed’ by anyone or anything, but they were ‘constructed’ as such already.

‘[B]ooks’ in the second sentence is different from ‘[a]ll alphabet books’ in the first sentence; there are ‘books’ which are ‘almost wordless’. Since there are ‘in[side of] books’, there might be other sides of ‘books’. In that sense, other ‘books’ or other sides of ‘books’ might not be ‘almost wordless’ so that they might not be ‘apparently simple’. Being ‘almost wordless’ is the case of the certain part of ‘books’. The ‘in[side of]’ of ‘books’ are not wordless; it is lacked to be ‘wordless’ because it is ‘almost wordless’. ‘[C]onstruct[ing]’ of ‘apparently simple’ is conditional to ‘in[side]’ of ‘books’; ‘in[side]’ of ‘books’ has to be ‘almost wordless’ in order to be ‘apparently simpl[y]’ ‘construct[ed]’. As ‘construct[ing]’ of ‘apparently simple’ can be ‘hidden and censored’, it might not be ‘hidden and censored’. If ‘construct[ing]’ of ‘apparently simple’

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 222.



is 'hidden and censored', 'apparently simple' is 'hidden and censored' to someone who sees it. To be 'hidden and censored' is still there with 'apparently simple'.

If I assume that 'the phrase "c is for cow" that includes an image of a cow on a farm' are 'in books' that are 'include[d]' as one of '[a]ll alphabet books', they should be 'politically, ethically and culturally constructed' and that this constructedness 'can be hidden and censored'. However, is that so? I do not read that 'the phrase "c is for cow" that includes an image of a cow on a farm' as located *in* (my emphasis) anywhere. Therefore, 'the phrase "c is for cow" that includes an image of a cow on a farm' is not 'almost wordless, apparently simple'. That 'instance' is only the case for 'the phrase "c is for cow" that includes an image of a cow on a farm'. Nothing has been claimed as an instance with respect to '[a]ll alphabet books' and 'in books'. '[T]he phrase "c is for cow" that includes an image of a cow on a farm' is neither 'constructed' nor 'can' '[it]' 'be hidden and censored'; it is instead a retrospective 'present[ation]' 'with an ideology of farms, of "farmed animals"'.

According to the statement above, 'the phrase', "'c is for cow'", 'an image of a cow on a farm', 'a cow on a farm' which is part of 'an image' and "'farmed animals'" are all different from each other. There are differences between 'cow' which is claimed with 'c' and 'a cow' which is claimed with 'an image'. '[C]ow', which is claimed with 'c', is not *a* (my emphasis) 'c' whereas 'a cow' is. There is something 'for' 'cow', but there is nothing for 'a cow'. '[C]' is not claimed as an image (or the image). '[C]ow', which is claimed with 'c', is not on anywhere whereas 'a cow' is 'on a farm'. However, 'an image' is not 'on a farm', but both 'a cow' and 'on a farm' are parts of 'an image'. '[A]n image of a cow on a farm' is claimed as having 'already presented' something, but 'the phrase "c is for cow"' is not. What 'the phrase "c is for cow"' does and what

‘an image of a cow on a farm’ does are, therefore, different from each other for the perspective of the statement above.

‘[P]resent[ing]’ in the statement above is not only retrospective but also selective since ‘an image of a cow on a farm has already presented (censured/hidden from) the young reader’. ‘[A]n image of a cow on a farm’ will not be ‘presented (censured/hidden from)’ to others who are not ‘the young’, ‘reader’ and ‘the young reader’. ‘[P]resent[ing]’ is with the addition of ‘an ideology of farms, of “farmed animals”’. Both ‘farms’ and ““farmed animals”” are part of ‘an ideology’ and they are all plural. However, ‘farms’ are not farmed whereas ‘animals’ are something to be ‘farmed’ when they are part of ‘an ideology’. Not all ideologies are ‘already presented (censured/hidden from) the young reader’. It is neither ‘cow’, which is claimed with ‘c’, nor ‘a cow’, which is part of ‘an image’, claim that ‘the phrase ‘c is for cow’ that includes an image of a cow on a farm has already presented (censured/hidden from) the young reader with an ideology of farms, of ‘farmed animals’”.

There are multiple ‘[c]oncepts of early literacy’ which are ‘prioritised in such a way’. ‘Concepts of early literacy’ are plural, but ‘such a way’ is not plural. ‘Concepts of early literacy’ are not ‘prioritised’ outside of ‘such a way’; they are all ‘in’ ‘such a way’. There is a single ‘way’ which is claimed to be ‘that early concepts and images of animals can be paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’. In the case of ‘[c]oncepts of early literacy’, they are not themselves early concepts. However, ‘concepts’ which are ‘in such a way’ are the ‘early’ ones. Those ‘early concepts’ are not claimed with literacy. With ‘early concepts’, there are also ‘images of animals’. Those ‘early concepts and images of animals’ might not ‘be paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’ because there is also a possibility that they also cannot

be. If there is a possibility that ‘early concepts and images of animals’ ‘can be paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’, then there would be ‘prioriti[zing]’ of ‘[c]oncepts of early literacy’ which is ‘in such a way’. The ‘concepts’ which are before or after of ‘early concepts’ are claimed as ‘paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’. In other words, ‘animals’ which are not ‘images’ would not ‘be paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’. There is a possibility that ‘early concepts and images of animals can be paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’, but there is no one or nothing who or which does the hiding, obscuring, losing or displacing, depoliticising ‘early concepts and images of animals’.

On the following page of ‘A, B and (not) Seeing: Animals and Other Ironies in Alphabet Books’, Ford then states that

[u]nderstanding alphabet books, including Jay’s ABC, is a highly interactive and surprisingly complex process, starting with the premise that engaging with the book presumes understanding already exists (an experienced reader already knows that “a is for apple” and needs to guide the novice reader).<sup>32</sup>

In the case of ‘[u]nderstanding alphabet books’, it is ‘a [...] process’ which is ‘highly interactive and surprisingly complex’. ‘Understating alphabet books’ is different from ‘starting with the premise’. They are different from each other because ‘a highly interactive and surprisingly complex process’ does not process with any premises and also

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 223.

‘starting with the premise’ is not something which is ‘highly interactive and surprisingly complex’; in addition, ‘the premise’ is the addition to ‘starting’ and ‘starting’ is conditional on ‘[u]nderstanding alphabet books’. In order to ‘start with the premise’, ‘[u]nderstanding’ already has to be ‘[u]nderstood’ as such.

‘[T]he premise’ is neither a premise of ‘Jay’ nor of ‘Jay’s ABC’. It is also not ‘the premise’ of or coming from ‘alphabet books’. There would be no ‘premise’ before ‘starting’. ‘[T]he book’ is not something to be understood according to the statement; it is something to be ‘engag[ed] with’. When ‘the book’ is ‘engag[ed] with’, there would be an ‘understanding’ which ‘already exists’. In addition, when ‘the book’ is ‘engage[ed] with’, ‘understanding’ is what is to be ‘presume[d]’. Therefore, before ‘[u]nderstanding’ something about ‘alphabet books’, there is ‘already’ a different ‘understanding’ which is not a ‘highly interactive and surprisingly complex process’.

‘[T]he premise’ is singular and it is ‘the’ one. ‘[A]n experienced reader’ is also singular, but it is not the one. Rather than being *a* (my emphasis) reader, ‘the novice reader’ is ‘the’ one. The two different ‘reader[s]’ in the statement above do not read; ‘an experienced reader’ is someone who ‘knows’ about something and ‘needs to guide’ ‘the novice reader’. ‘[T]he novice reader’ has not claimed that it ‘knows’ what ‘an experienced reader already knows’. ‘[T]he novice reader’ is someone who would be ‘guide[d]’ due to the ‘need’ of ‘an experienced reader’. In other words, ‘the novice reader’ would not be ‘[g]uide[d]’ by ‘the novice reader’ itself. ‘[T]he novice reader’ is not experienced; ‘the novice reader’ does not know “‘a is for apple’”. ‘[A] is for apple’ is within quotation marks and that is a knowledge of a particular reader. ‘[A] is for apple’ would be ‘already know[n]’ to particular reader if that reader is ‘an experienced’ one. In other words, ‘a is for apple’ is not known to all readers. Readers who do not know ‘a is for apple’ would be ‘guide[d]’, but ‘an experience reader’ does not claim

that it ‘needs’ to do anything. ‘[A]n experienced reader’ does not ‘guide’ ‘an experienced reader’ itself. ‘[A] is for apple’ and ‘an experienced reader’ do not need to be ‘guide[d]’ to “‘a is for apple’”.

In the first paragraph which I read from Ford, there is ‘the young reader’. It has not been claimed whether ‘the young reader’ is the experienced or the novice in ‘A, B and (not) Seeing: Animals and Other Ironies in Alphabet Books’. I would like to claim that ‘the young reader’ is neither ‘an experienced reader’ nor ‘the novice reader’. In other words, to be either ‘an experienced reader’ or ‘the novice reader’ is not related to being young or not young.

According to the statement from Ford, ‘1 Gorilla’ could be ‘know[n]’ and not ‘know[n]’ to different readers. ‘1 Gorilla’ might be something which is ‘need[ed] a guide’ from Ford’s point of view. However, to what extent is ‘the [...] reader’ ‘experienced’ and not ‘experienced’? To what extent is ‘the [...] reader’ ‘novice’ and not ‘novice’? I wondered what I should do with ‘*One Gorilla*’ after reading these ideas about different ‘reader[s]’. Am I a reader who is reading or doing something else? — Why do I need to know about me when I read?

‘[I]mages of animals can be paradoxically hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’ according to Ford. However, since this has been claimed as a possibility, I would read that ‘1 Gorilla’ and a gorilla’ are not by contrast ‘hidden, obscured, lost or displaced, depoliticised’.

In terms of repetition, there is hair around the picture of a gorilla. Hair is claimed by several colours and similar shapes. There is no hair on ‘1’ and ‘Gorilla’. The face and the body are also claimed with several colours, but I read that hair is different

from them. Hair is also different from the eyes, nose, mouth, ear, arms and torso. It seems that hair is either on inside or outside of the frame due to the shape of hair. It does not mean that hair is outside of the face and the body. It also does not mean that hair is outside of the eyes, nose, mouth, ear, arms and torso. According to my reading, hair is on the face and body. For example, an ear is not on the body. A nose is not on the body either. I read that there is an idea of singularity when I read '1', 'Gorilla', the face, the body and the gorilla, but the number of hair is not singular. The number of hair is uncountable to me; it is numerous. Because of how it looks like on the page, it made me think about some questions: Could one strand of hair be read as a frame? Or is there no frame of hair? Can I read hair separately from other parts of the face and body?

I started to read hair in this chapter because reading in hair is not only what I am interested in. My interest about hair has come from reading the differentness of colours, shapes, the frames, etc. Henceforward, I will include Daniela Caselli's text in order to think further about hair. In Caselli's 'The Wives of Geniuses I Have Sat with: Body Hair, Genius and Modernity', 'body hair' is 'such a topic' which is 'to discuss' for '[t]hose two try to expose this become exposed in turn'.<sup>33</sup> In the following page of Caselli's paper, '[b]ody hair' is then stated 'as a not-yet-legitimised topic for discussion'.<sup>34</sup> I did not mention hair as *body hair* (my emphasis) although some hair was on the frame of the body. Caselli then first mentions 'facial hair' on page 25. It is the 'facial hair' of 'Marian Halcombe'.<sup>35</sup> '[H]er facial her' and 'Marian's facial hair' are also

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<sup>33</sup> Daniela Caselli, 'The Wives of Geniuses I Have Sat with: Body Hair, Genius and Modernity' in *The Last Taboo*, ed. by Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 18.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24-5.

‘Marian’s unspeakably disturbing moustache’.<sup>36</sup> According to Caselli, when she reads ‘facial hair’ with ‘Marian Halcombe’, it belongs to ‘Marian’ and ‘her’. The ‘moustache’ also belongs to ‘Marian’, but it is an ‘unspeakably disturbing moustache’. Although ‘Marian’ does not claim that her ‘moustache’ is ‘unspeakably disturbing’, it is ‘unspeakably disturbing’ to another’s point of view. I did not bring Caselli’s text to this part because I also have some social, political or cultural issues that I wish to discuss about hair. What is more, I do not read that hair is *a topic* (also my emphasis). Because I see that hair is there, I wanted say something about it.

I would like to read two more sentences from Caselli. One of them is: ‘only if we think of body hair as a construction will we be able to see it, discuss it and analyse it’.<sup>37</sup> I am not insisting that I support Caselli’s view or other’s views that have been mentioned in her text. There are the ‘we’ who are claimed to ‘able to see it’. When ‘we think of body hair’, ‘body hair’ is no longer ‘body hair’ for ‘we’ who ‘see’. When ‘we think of body hair’, ‘body hair’ is part of the ‘think[ing]’ of ‘we’. In addition, ‘body hair’ would be something of ‘a construction’. Then, ‘we’ ‘will’ ‘be able to see’ ‘it’ which is no longer ‘body hair’. There also would no longer be ‘body hair’ in the case of ‘discuss[ion]’ and ‘analys[is]’. ‘[B]ody hair’ is not only part of ‘think[ing]’. It will be ‘see[n]’, ‘discuss[ed]’ and ‘analyse[d]’ under certain conditions although it itself does not do any of these things.

The last sentence that I wish to read is that ‘[i]n my work, then, I will not assert that body hair is something real or natural, there to be shown’. ‘[B]ody hair’ is not ‘something real or natural’ and ‘there to be shown’ for the perspective of the statement;

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

and for this is that it to be the case 'I will not assert', instead it seems there is another (or others) who 'assert[s]' that 'body hair is something real or natural, there to be shown'. Therefore, 'body hair' is either 'real or natural' or not 'real or natural'. '[B]ody hair' is either 'there to be shown' or not 'there to be shown'.


I have read some parts from Caselli's text because I wished to read how hair has been claimed in another critics' text. Caselli not only makes claims about her view in her paper but also introduces others' views in order to read hair. Hair on a gorilla might not be 'there to be shown' for Caselli. There is hair, but it is not to be shown with political, cultural and social issues. I read that hair is there when I read a gorilla, but I also do not read that hair is there to be shown.



## Chapter 2: 'Primates', 'one family' and 'my family'

The first number is '1' and the last number is '10' in *One Gorilla*. According to the perspective on the pages, counting is counting numbers one by one. Alongside numbers, there are ten different animals. Counting is continual and in order, but it is not infinite. For the perspective on numbers, ten numbers are always on the top or on the right side of animals. The colours of numbers are all different whereas the colours of animals are all black. However, the colours of pictures are not claimed with a single colour.

After 10, the following page starts with '[a]ll Primates'. There are three repetitions of '[a]ll' on those two pages (see the image below). All three lines starts with '[a]ll'. The colour and size of '[a]ll' are all the same.



(Next two pages after '10', 'Lemurs', and the Picture)

Since '[p]rimates', 'one family' and 'my family' are all claimed with '[a]ll', it seems that '[p]rimates', 'one family' and 'my family' are in the same group. However, as '[a]ll' are repeated for three times in the different lines with three different words, I read that '[p]rimates', 'one family' and 'my family' are not in the same group.

‘Primates’ is different from ‘one family’ and ‘my family’. ‘Primates’ starts with the capital letter, but ‘one family’ and ‘my family’ start with the lower cases. The number of ‘[p]rimates’ is plural, but the numbers of ‘one family’ and ‘my family’ are not plural. ‘Primates’ neither one nor my ‘[p]rimates’. What is more, the picture on the right side of ‘[a]ll [p]rimates is not plural in number.

There are two different families on the left page: ‘[a]ll one family’ and ‘[a]ll my family’. Both families are grouped as ‘[a]ll’ and the numbers are all singular. However, ‘my family’ is not ‘one family’ and vice versa. I have read ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ from the front cover; in that case, I would read that the first family is *counted* (my emphasis) as ‘one’. ‘Primates’ and ‘my’ are not one of ‘all one family’. In addition, ‘[p]rimates’ and ‘my’ are not counted likewise ‘[a]ll one family’. The second family is not my family. In other words, that ‘family’ does not belong to me. The second family belongs to ‘my’ who is not me. ‘All my family’ does not own ‘[p]rimates’ and someone who is part of ‘one family’. ‘All my family’ is not a family for all. All ‘[p]rimates’ and two different ‘famil[ies]’ exclude each other.

The picture is on the right and the left page, but there are more colours on the right page. I would like to claim that the picture on the right page can be read with ‘[a]ll [p]rimates’, ‘[a]ll one family’ and ‘[a]ll my family’. I read that there are three different frames on those two pages: the frame of the statement, the frame of the white part and the frame of non-white part. Before reading the right page in more detail, I would like to read Jacques Derrida’s *Memories of the Blind*. Derrida also reads *something* (my emphasis) on the ‘drawings’ in his text. As I am trying to read *the picture* (my emphasis) on the right page, inserting and reading his text would show different ways to read ‘drawings’ and something on the ‘drawings’ from my reading of *One Gorilla*.

— Shall I just listen? Or observe? Silently watch you show me some drawings?  
— Both, once again, or rather between the two. I'll have you observe that reading proceeds in no other way. It listens in watching. Here is a *first hypothesis*: the drawing is blind, if not the draftsman or draftsman. As such, and in the moment proper to it, the operation of drawing would have something to do with blindness, would in some way regard blindness [*aveuglement*]. In this *abocular* hypothesis (the word *aveugle* comes from *ab oculis*: not from or by but without the eyes), the following remains to be heard and understood: the blind man can be a seer, and he sometimes has the vocation of a visionary.<sup>38</sup>

According to the first line, 'listen', 'observe' and 'watch' are all different from each other. The first 'I' has not 'listen[ed]', 'observe[d]' and 'watch[ed] you' yet. '[L]isten', 'observe' and 'watch you' are what 'I' asks 'you' whether 'I' '[s]hall' do one of these. '[L]isten', 'observe' and 'watch you' are not what the first 'I' would do altogether; 'I' '[s]hall' do one of 'listen', 'observe' and 'watch you'. Since 'listen[ing]' is claimed with 'just', I read that 'listen[ing]' without 'just' and 'listen[ing]' with 'just' are different from each other. There are different levels of sound in the case of 'watch[ing]'; because of '[s]ilently', 'watch[ing]' is not soundless. In addition, 'observ[ing]' is not claimed with sound. '[S]ome drawings' are not what the first 'I' sees. The first 'I' also does not look at 'some drawings'. When 'you show[s] me some drawings', the first 'I' would 'watch' 'you' who would 'show me some drawings'. I read that there is a distinction between the first 'I' and 'me'. It is because 'you' does not 'show' anything to the first 'I' and 'me' does not 'watch'.

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<sup>38</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Micheal Naas (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 2.

It seems '[b]oth, once again, or rather between the two' is an answer of the first sentence. The answer which is given is either '[b]oth, once again' or 'rather between the two'. Firstly, the answer could be '[b]oth' 'just listen' and 'observe'; as there is 'once again', 'just listen[ing]' and 'observ[ing]' would be repeated. The other answer could be 'rather between the two'; in other words, 'just listen[ing]' and observ[ing]' are not what the first 'I' is expected to do; there is something different which is different from 'just listen[ing]' and observ[ing]'; if the answer is 'rather between the two', 'just listen[ing]' and observ[ing]' cannot be the simultaneous choice for the first 'I'.

There is the second 'I' after the second dash. '[Y]ou' might 'observe', if the second 'I' lets 'you' 'observe that reading proceeds in no other way'. '[Y]ou' has not 'observe[d]' 'reading proceeds in no other way' from 'I''s point of view. '[R]eading' would not be 'proceed[ed]' if 'reading' is out of 'no other way'. In the future time, which will be the retrospection as a result, the second 'I' is claimed to 'have' the moment of 'you observe[s] that reading proceeds in no other way'. In the next sentence, '[i]t' 'listens' with the condition of 'in watching'. '[L]isten[ing]' of '[i]t' is not out of 'in watching'. 'It' not only 'listens'. When '[i]t listens', '[i]t' is also within 'watching'.

'Here' is not here somewhere around my statement. 'Here' is neither 'is' nor 'a *first hypothesis*'. 'Here', there would be to be more '*hypothes[e]s*', but the one which is stated is 'a *first*' one. The '*first hypothesis*' then continues as 'the drawing is blind, if not the draftsman or draftswoman'. '[T]he drawing' is either 'blind' or 'draftsman or draftswoman'. For the perspective on the statement, 'blind' is not 'draftsman' and 'draftswoman'. In other words, 'draftsman' and 'draftswoman' are not 'blind'. '[B]lind' is neither man nor woman for the perspective on 'blind'. '[T]he drawing' of 'blind' is conditional on 'draftsman or draftswoman'; 'if' 'the drawing' is 'not the draftsman or

draftswoman’, ‘the drawing is blind’. ‘[T]he drawing’ cannot be ‘blind’, ‘draftsman’ and ‘draftswoman’ altogether at the same time.

‘As such’ is claimed with ‘in the moment proper to it’. If there were no ‘proper moment’ in the case of ‘it’ or if ‘proper moment’ were not ‘to it’, there would be no ‘operation of drawing’. Furthermore, ‘something’ would have nothing to do with the first ‘blindness’. Therefore, ‘the operation of drawing would have something to do with blindness’ is conditional on ‘[a]s such’ and ‘in the moment proper to it’. ‘[D]rawing’ is part of ‘the operation’. ‘[T]he operation of drawing’ does not certainly have ‘something to do with blindness’. In other words, ‘the operation of drawing’ might have nothing to do with the first ‘blindness’. ‘[T]he operation of drawing’ is not operated by anyone including the perspective on the statement.

The second ‘blindness’ is different from the first ‘blindness’ because 1. The first ‘blindness’ is not in anywhere, 2. There is no ‘way’ and ‘regard[ing]’ in the case of the first ‘blindness’, 3. ‘[S]omething’ is not what something to do with the second ‘blindness’, 4. ‘[aveuglement]’ is not claimed with the first ‘blindness’. ‘[B]lindness’ are repeated for twice, but they claimed with different ideas. These ‘blindness’ becomes as ‘blindness’ and also two different ‘blindness’ because of other than ‘blindness’.

‘[A]bocular’ and ‘*ab oculis*’ are not claimed with ‘the word’, but ‘aveugle’ is claimed with ‘the word’. Therefore, ‘*abocular*’ and ‘*ab oculis*’ are different from ‘aveugle’ to the perspective on the statement. In addition, ‘aveugle’ is not tilted like ‘*abocular*’ and ‘*ab oculis*’. ‘[T]he word aveugle’ and ‘*ab oculis*’ are not ‘[i]n this *abocular* hypothesis’. In the previous part of the statement, ‘blindness’ never has been claimed with the eyes; there, ‘[i]n this *abocular* hypothesis’, ‘the eyes’ are first to be mentioned. I read the absence of ‘the eyes’ from ‘*abocular* hypothesis’, ‘the word aveugle’ and ‘*ab oculis*’. ‘[T]he following’ is conditional on ‘this *abocular* hypothesis’

since ‘the following’ is ‘[i]n’ there. Being ‘heard and understood’ is not what ‘the blind man’ does. In addition, ‘the following’ is not the hearing and understanding since the hearing and understanding are what ‘to be’ ‘remain[ed]’ as the ‘hear[ing] and understand[ing]’ to ‘the following’.

According to the statement, ‘the blind man’ is not a woman. ‘[A] seer’ is neither a man nor a woman. ‘[T]he blind man’ is not always ‘a seer’. In other words, not all ‘the blind man’ can be ‘a seer’. There is ‘he’ after ‘the blind man can be a seer’. That ‘he’ could be ‘the blind man’. However, as the ideas on ‘he’ and ‘the blind man’ are different from each other, I will not read that ‘he’ and ‘the blind man’ as the same. ‘[H]e’ is neither a man nor a blind. ‘[H]e’ is not she either. ‘[T]he blind man’ and ‘a seer’ do not have anything according to the statement, but ‘he’ ‘has’. However, ‘he’ does not have ‘the vocation of a visionary’ always. Therefore, ‘the vocation of a visionary’ is not always likely to be ‘the vocation’ in the case of ‘h[im]’. In that sense, ‘he’ might have other vocation (or vocations) if it were not ‘sometimes’; ‘he’ might do not have any vocation then. ‘[A] seer’ is not a vocation. For the perspective on the statement, there is a possibility to be ‘a seer’. In other words, there is another possibility that ‘the blind man’ cannot be ‘a seer’. ‘[H]e’ is neither ‘a seer’ nor ‘a visionary’. ‘[T]he blind man’ is also neither ‘a seer’ nor ‘a visionary’. It is not ‘the blind man’ and ‘he’ who hears and understands ‘the following’.

Here is the *second hypothesis* then—an eye graft, the grafting of one point of view onto the other: a drawing of the *blind* is a drawing of the blind. Double genitive. There is no tautology here, only a destiny of the self-portrait. Every time a draftsman lets himself be fascinated by the blind, every time he makes

the blind a *theme* of his drawing, he projects, dreams, or hallucinates a figure of a draftsman, or sometimes, more precisely, some draftswoman.<sup>39</sup>

There is another '[h]ere' where 'the *second hypothesis*' is. '[A] drawing of the *blind*' is different drawing from 'the drawing' which is claimed after 'a *first hypothesis*'. '[T]he drawing' which is claimed after 'a *first hypothesis*' is not 'the drawing' of (my emphasis) something. In addition, 'a drawing of the *blind*' is not *the* (my emphasis) 'drawing'.

For the reason that it is 'an eye graft', 'an eye' might not have been there in the first place. '[A]n eye' has been grafted as 'an eye graft'. Then, 'one point of view onto the other' is claimed with 'the grafting'. '[T]he grafting' does not graft 'an eye' according to the text above. Nothing has been grafted from 'an eye graft' and 'an eye' is not 'one point of view'. Therefore, I do not read that 'the grafting of one point of view onto the other' is 'an eye graft'. '[T]he grafting' does not remain with 'one point of view' since it 'graft[s]' 'onto the other'. '[V]iew' is not *one* (my emphasis) 'view' whereas 'one point' is the 'one'. Does that mean there could be *other points* (my emphasis) if they are not part of 'view'?

After the colon, there are two words which are in italic: '*blind*' and '*of*'. The Italic letters and non-Italic letters look different from each other. For that reason, I would like to claim that 'a drawing of the *blind*' and 'a drawing *of* the blind' are different from each other in terms of the differentness of the shapes of words. Although there is a word, 'tautology', '[t]here is no tautology here'. There is 'tautology' within the statement, but not '[t]here' and 'here'. Here is a word, 'tautology' and there is 'only a

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

destiny of the self-portrait' without 'tautology'. '[T]he self-portrait' is not the portrait *of* (my emphasis) someone and something. Furthermore, nothing is *on* (my emphasis) 'the self-portrait' in the statement above. Instead of a tautology, there is 'only a destiny of self-portrait' which does not belong to any 'self'.


The 'fascinat[ion]' is not claimed by 'a draftsman', 'himself' and 'the blind'. The perspective on 'a draftsman' knows when 'a draftsman' is 'fascinated'. There is a distinction between 'a draftsman' and 'himself' since 'a draftsman' is not fascinated'; it is 'himself' who is 'fascinated by the blind'. It is not stated whether 'the blind' knows that there is someone who 'lets' someone else to 'be fascinated by' that 'the blind'.

There is 'every time' when 'he makes the blind a *theme* of his drawing'. It is not only once when 'the blind' will be 'ma[d]e' as something else. The result of 'mak[ing]' will be 'a *theme* of his drawing'. Although 'the blind' is prior to 'a *theme* of his drawing', it is unknown whether there is 'the blind' somewhere around 'a *theme* of his drawing'. '[H]e' not only 'makes' 'the blind' something else but also makes 'a *theme* of his drawing' from 'the blind'. '[A] *theme*' is latter to 'mak[ing]' in that sense. '[H]is drawing' belongs to 'his', but 'a *theme*' does not belong to 'his' and 'he'. No matter how many times 'he makes', 'he' will not have ownerships on 'the blind' and 'a *theme*'.

'[A] draftsman' is part of 'a figure'. '[A] figure' is what 'he projects, dreams, or hallucinates'. '[A] figure of a draftsman' could be other than 'a figure of a draftsman' 'sometimes'. With the frequency of 'sometimes', 'he projects, dreams, or hallucinates' 'some draftswoman'. The preciseness is claimed with 'some draftswoman'. In addition, 'some draftswoman' is not part of 'a figure'. '[S]ome draftswoman' might be part of 'a figure', but 'he' has to 'project, dream, or hallucinate' 'sometimes' at first.



According to the text from Derrida above, ‘a *theme*’ is not made by something which is on that ‘drawing’. It is ‘he’ who ‘makes’ ‘the blind’ as ‘a *theme* of his drawing’. Since I was reading the picture which is next to ‘All Primates. All one family. All my family...’, I will continue to read the picture and three sentences. I also have put other two pages below in order to compare the picture and ‘All Primates’, ‘All one family’ and ‘All my family’.



For the reason that I see one person in the first picture, I expected that the statement on the left might be *I Person* or *I Man* (both my emphases). However, there is no *I* (my emphasis) on the left side of the picture. There is ‘one’, but it is not an Arabic number which I read from ‘1 Gorilla’. ‘1’ on the second picture and ‘one’ on the first picture are

different from each other not only because they are '1' and 'one' but also because of their sizes and colours.

According to the right page, the numbers of primates and family are not plural. In other words, 'primate[s]' and 'family' do not have to be plural if I read them with the picture on the right side. I have already read that '[p]rimates', 'one family' and 'my family' are all different, but there are no three figures on the right page. I might read '[p]rimates', 'one family' and 'my family' from reading the right page, but the number of figures does not have to be three.

The pictorial faces and bodies in the upper and the lower images look different from each other. The face and body on each page are different from each other because of their colours and shapes. For example, hair of the pictorial gorilla and hair of the picture next to three sentences look different from each other in terms of colors: in the case a gorilla, colours of hair are yellow, orange, green, blue and brown; in the case of the picture next to three sentences, colour of hair are black, brown and white. In terms of reading hair, there are black eyebrows on the face of the picture next to three sentences, but I do not see any eyebrow from the pictorial gorilla. There is no hair on the body of the first picture. Instead, there is a t-shirt. The gorilla does not wear any t-shirt. In the case of a gorilla, there are more wrinkles and hair on the face when I compare its face with the upper face. In Susan Ann Bintu Walsh's 'Translating "Animal", or Reading the "Other" in Kipling's 'Mowgli's Stories', 'his exteriority, or body, identified him to the "Jungle people" as man'.<sup>40</sup> According to the text from Walsh, there needs to be either 'his exteriority' or 'body' in order to 'indentif[y]' 'him'. In addition, it is not 'h[e]' who

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<sup>40</sup> Susan Ann Bintu Walsh, 'Translating 'Animal', or Reading the 'Other' in Kipling's 'Mowgli's Stories' in *Kipling's Literature: Language, Identity, and Construction of Childhood* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 53.

‘identifie[s] him[self]’; when ‘h[e]’ is ‘identified’, it will be ‘to the “Jungle people”’. There are differences between ““Jungle people”” and ‘him’ because it is ‘h[e]’ who is ‘identified’ ‘as man’. ““Jungle people”” are not claimed with any exteriority and body. ‘[H]is exteriority’ and ‘body’ are for the ‘identifi[cation]’. Although ‘him’ is not ‘his exteriority’ and ‘body’, they will be ‘identified’ ‘as man’. In that sense, ‘h[e]’ and ‘man’ are also different from each other; ‘h[e]’ is prior to ‘man’ and ‘man’ is not someone who is identified as ‘h[e]’. In the later part of Walsh’s paper, it is mentioned that ‘Mowgli’s identity as human is premised upon the animal’.<sup>41</sup> ‘Mowgli’s identity’ is something ‘as human’. ‘[H]uman’ is not *the* (my emphasis) one, but ‘the animal’ is. For the perspective on ‘human’ and ‘the animal’, they are different from each other because ‘human’ is something to be ‘premiered upon’ by other than ‘human’. ‘[T]he animal’ is ‘upon’ the ‘premier’. Therefore, I would read that ‘the animal’ is prior to ‘Mowgli’s identity as human’. Since ‘Mowgli’s identity as human’ is latter to ‘the animal’, I read that ‘Mowgli’s identity as human’ is conditional on ‘the animal’ and the ‘premier’.

‘All Primates’, ‘[a]ll one family’ and ‘[a]ll my family’ are there on the page. The picture is also there on the page. If I read that the picture is ‘premiered upon’ the text, then the picture might be read with the premises, which are ‘[a]ll Primates’, ‘[a]ll one family’ and ‘[a]ll my family’. The picture could be read with all of ‘[a]ll Primates’, ‘[a]ll one family’ and ‘[a]ll my family’. It also could be read with one of ‘[a]ll Primates’, ‘[a]ll one family’ or ‘[a]ll my family’. Likewise ‘Mowgli’ is read as ‘his exteriority, or body’ and ‘as man’ to ““Jungle people””, the picture will no longer be the picture when I try to write something about it on my paper. My writing about the picture

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
<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

would be another version of 'exteriority', 'body' and 'as man'. Even if I do not wish to 'identify' the picture as such, there is a possibility that the picture is going to be 'identified' as such to some extent.

In the following chapter, I will read two eyes from the pictorial gorilla and two eyes from the picture next to three sentences. I will also read a text by John Berger in order to read the ideas on 'eyes' therein. Then, I will move onto another pages in order to read the faces and eyes in *One Gorilla*.

### Chapter 3: Eyes of the Other

On the right side of the image, there are two eyes on the right page and there



are two eyes on the right page of the image below.



Four eyes do not look at me. It is me who is looking at the right pages and four eyes. In that sense, I would like to add that the four eyes do not make any gaze; nothing is coming from those eyes.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> For a critique about 'gaze' see, for instance: Jessica Medhurst, 'Alice Liddell as the Beggar Maid, seen: seeing and not seeing the child in Charles Dodgson's photograph', *Textual Practice*, 33:6, 901-916

Before continuing to read the different eyes from different pictures, I will bring in a text by John Berger. In ‘Ape Theatre’, Berger reads the eyes which are not his eyes. After reading the ideas on other’s ‘eyes’ in ‘Ape Theatre’, I will continue to read the picture and the statement in *One Gorilla*.

Her orang-utan eyes operate exactly like mine - each retina with its 130 million rods and cones. But her expression is the oldest I’ve ever seen. [...] I look at her with her eyelids which are so pale that when she closes them they’re like eye cups, and I wonder.<sup>43</sup>

‘[E]xact[...]like[ness]’ does not make ‘[h]er orang-utan eyes’ and ‘mine’ the same eyes. The ‘eyes’ of ‘[h]er’, the ‘orang-utan’ and ‘mine’ are different to the perspective because ‘[h]er orang-utan eyes’ are not ‘mine’. ‘Her orang-utan eyes’ do not belong to ‘m[e]’. ‘Her orang-utan eyes’ would not ‘operate’ in the same way as ‘mine’ because they ‘operate exactly like’ ‘mine’. If ‘each retina with its 130 million rods and cones’ is the ‘operat[ion]’ of ‘[h]er orang-utan eyes’, the ‘operat[ion]’ of ‘[h]er orang-utan eyes’ is not only something to do with ‘eyes’ but also with ‘each retina with its 130 million rods and cones’. Neither the ‘eyes’ of ‘[h]er’, the ‘orang-utan’ nor ‘mine’ are the ‘retina’ itself since ‘eyes’ are not ‘with’ anything within the text above. In addition, it is the ‘retina’ which ‘operate[s]’ with ‘its 130 million rods and cones’. ‘130 million rods and cones’ are not the rods and cones of ‘eyes’. In the case of the ‘retina’, in other words, it is ‘with’ ‘130 million rods and cones’ and also owns them.

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DOI:101080/0950236X.2019.1624328, ‘Alice’s beggar portrait did not look prurient at all’ (p. 125). The one looker in these constructions of Alice Liddell as the Beggar Maid that I read as not seeing is Liddell, whose eyes are directed out of the frame rather than at herself’ (p. 910).

<sup>43</sup> John Berger, ‘Ape Theatre’ in *Why Look at Animals?* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 48.

Then, there is an ‘expression’ which belongs to ‘her’. ‘[H]er expression’ is not ‘[h]er orang-utan eyes’ and vice versa. There is no exact age of ‘her expression’, but it is ‘the oldest I’ve ever seen’. ‘[H]er expression’ is measured to be ‘the oldest’ by the ‘see[ing]’; the ‘see[ing]’ is from ‘I’. ‘[H]er expression’ is not ‘the oldest’ or an ‘expression’ but because of the ‘see[ing]’ from ‘I’. There are no other expressions which are older than ‘her expression’ in the case of ‘I[’s]’ ‘seeing’. ‘[H]er expression’ is not something to be expressed and ‘her’ does not express anything according to the text above. Furthermore, the one claimed to own that ‘expression’ does not see that ‘expression’.

‘I’ does not ‘look at’ ‘I’ itself. This ‘look[ing] at’ is different from the ‘see[ing]’ of ‘I’ in the previous sentence because ‘I’ has not ‘seen’ ‘her expression’ with *at* (my emphasis). Therefore, the ideas on ‘her expression’ and ‘her with her eyelids which are so pale’ are different from each other. When ‘I look at her’, there is distinction between ‘her’ and ‘her eyelids’. In addition, ‘her eyelids’ is an addition to ‘her’. When ‘I look at her’, ‘her’ is not pale. ‘[H]er eye lids’ are not ‘so pale’ because ‘her’ had claimed so; the ‘pale[ness]’ of ‘eye lids’ is claimed by ‘I’ who ‘look[s] at her’. The ‘pale[ness]’ does not cover all over ‘her’. Only part of ‘her’ is ‘so pale’.

Berger goes on to make claims about ‘Neo-Darwin[ism]’ but later he returns to ‘[t]he mother orang-utan’. I will skip some paragraphs and read the part where ‘[t]he mother orang-utan’ is stated. There, ‘[t]he mother orang-utan’ is being ‘watch[ed]’ by the other who is not ‘[t]he mother orang-utan’ and ‘I’.

The mother orang-utan has come back, this time with her baby. She is sitting right up against the glass. The children in the audience have come close to watch her. Suddenly, I think of a Madonna and Child by Cosimo Tura. [...] The

more one emphasizes the millions of years, the more extraordinary the expressive gestures become. Arms, fingers, eyes, always eyes . . . A certain way of being protective, a certain gentleness.<sup>44</sup>

The perspective on the statement knows which one is '[t]he mother orang-utan' and which one is not '[t]he mother orang-utan'. The previous one is not only 'mother' but also 'the' one. '[H]er baby' is not claimed with the word, *orang-utan* (my emphasis). In the following sentence, '[t]he mother orang-utan' is no longer '[t]he mother orang-utan' after when it is claimed with 'her baby'; it is 'she'. 'The mother orang-utan has come back', but 'her baby' has not. The perspective on '[t]he mother orang-utan' knows that '[t]he mother orang-utan' already 'has come' and also knows that this 'com[ing]' is 'com[ing] back' (my emphasis); 'com[ing]' is a repetition, but only for '[t]he mother orang-utan'. The time when '[t]he mother orang-utan' was not 'with her baby' is not 'this time'. '[T]his time' is the time when '[t]he mother orang-utan' is 'with her baby'. '[H]er baby' is not only an addition of 'com[ing] back' but also an addition of 'this time'. '[H]er baby' is neither he nor she. '[H]er baby' is neither a baby nor the baby; it is 'her baby'. '[H]er baby' is neither an orang-utan nor an orang-utan baby.

'[S]itting' of '[s]he' is different from 'com[ing] back' of '[t]he mother orang-utan'. Once '[s]he is sitting', '[s]he' does not sit again. '[H]er baby' does not sit when '[s]he is sitting right up against the glass'. '[H]er baby' is absent when '[s]he is sitting right up against the glass'. '[T]he mother orang-utan' is no longer '[t]he mother' and 'orang-utan' when it is claimed as '[s]he'.

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. 49-50.



I read that '[t]he children in the audience' are separated from 'her' because of 'the glass'. 'The children' are 'in the audience'. However, '[t]he children' are not 'the audience' for the perspective on the statement when '[t]he children' 'have come close to watch her'. '[H]er' and '[s]he' who is 'sitting right up against the glass' are neither '[t]he children' nor 'the audience'. 'The children' are claimed to 'watch'; 'watch[ing]' is not what 'I' and 'the audience' do. 'I' is not one of '[t]he children in the audience'. 'I' does not 'come close' likewise '[t]he children'. Instead of watching, 'I' is 'think[ing]' with a suddenness. '[A] Madonna and Child by Cosimo Tura' are part of 'think[ing]'. '[T]hink[ing]' and 'a Madonna and Child by Cosimo Tura' are separated from '[t]he children in the audience' and 'her'. '[T]hink[ing]' of 'I' has been already passed. Therefore, the '[s]udden[ness]' of 'think[ing]' and 'a Madonna and Child by Cosimo Tura' are retrospective.

It is not 'I' who emphasizes; it is 'one' who 'emphasizes the millions of years'. '[T]he millions of years' can be 'emphasize[d]' 'more', but not less. '[E]mphasiz[ing]' 'the millions of years' is not a claim of 'one'; the perspective on 'one' knows that what is 'emphasize[d]' 'more'. In other words, the perspective on 'one' knows what is not to be 'more' when 'one' is 'emphasiz[ing]'. '[T]he expressive gestures' are neither external nor internal; they 'become' as 'the more extraordinary' when 'one emphasizes the millions of years'. To be 'the more extraordinary' and becoming are not what 'one' has claimed. '[T]he expressive gestures' are not from 'one'. To be 'extraordinary' would not be lessen. If there is 'one' who 'emphasizes millions of years', 'the expressive gestures' would be 'more extraordinary'. To be 'the more extraordinary the expressive gestures' is conditional to the former phrase, '[t]he more one emphasizes the millions of years'. Therefore, 'the expressive gestures' do not become 'the more extraordinary' without 'one', 'emphasiz[ing]' and 'the millions of years'.

‘Arms, fingers, eyes, always eyes’ are not ‘the expressive gestures’. ‘Arms, fingers, eyes, always eyes’ are not ‘extraordinary’ either. There are two ‘eyes’, but the ideas which are claimed on each ‘eyes’ are different from each other. Therefore, I read that these ‘eyes’ are not the same eyes; the second ‘eyes’ are ‘always eyes’, whereas the first ‘eyes’ are not something always. In that sense, the first ‘eyes’ are similar to ‘[a]rms’ and ‘fingers’ since ‘[a]rms’ and ‘fingers’ are claimed without frequency. ‘[B]eing protective’ is part of ‘[a] certain way’, but ‘a certain gentleness’ is not part of anything. In addition, ‘being protective’ and ‘gentleness’ are different from each other since ‘gentleness’ is not something be gentle whereas ‘protective’ is something to be ‘protective’. There are ‘[a] certain way of being protective’ and ‘a certain gentleness’ in the case of ‘[a]rms, fingers’ and ‘eyes’.

I will move on to the last page of ‘Ape Theatre’. There is no ape in the last page. I will start from reading the sentence where ‘[o]ne of the male chimps’ is stated. Likewise ‘[t]he mother orang-utan’, ‘[o]ne of the male chimps’ is being read by other than ‘[o]ne of the male chimps’. After finish reading the text from Berger, I will go back to *One Gorilla* in order to read the eyes on the picture.

One of the male chimps is suddenly angry. Histrionically. Everything he can pick up he throws. He tries to pull down the stage trees. He is like Samson at the temple. But unlike Samson, he is not high up in the group hierarchy of the cage. The other actors are nonetheless impressed by his fury.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 52-3.

‘One’ is a part of ‘the male chimps’. Although ‘[o]ne’ is the part of ‘the male chimps’, ‘[o]ne’ is neither a ‘male’ nor a chimp. ‘One’ was not ‘angry’ before. Being ‘angry’ with a suddenness has not claimed from ‘[o]ne’. ‘[T]he male chimps’ are not ‘suddenly angry’. In other words, being ‘angry’ and not being ‘angry’ are distinguishable for the perspective on ‘[o]ne’ and ‘the male chimps’.

In the following sentence, there is no ‘[o]ne’ who is ‘angry’. ‘Histrionically’ is different from ‘suddenly angry’ because ‘[h]istrionically’ is what ‘he’ is able to do (‘can pick up’) and also what ‘he’ does (‘throws’). ‘[P]ick[ing] up’ and ‘throw[ing]’ are different for the perspective on ‘he’ since what ‘he throws’ is not what ‘he’ can do. Then, ‘[h]e tries to pull down’; the perspectives on ‘he’ and ‘[h]e’ know the differences between the ability, the trial and doing of ‘he’ and ‘[h]e’.<sup>46</sup> ‘He’ is not ‘Samson at the temple’ and vice versa. Although there is similarity (‘like’) between ‘[h]e and ‘Samson at the temple’, there is a difference (‘unlike’) between ‘Samson’ and ‘he’.

‘The other actors’ are not ‘he’ who is ‘not high up in the group hierarchy’. It is not ‘he’ who ‘impresses’ ‘[t]he other actors’; it is ‘his fury’ which ‘impresses’. Not any fury ‘impresses’ ‘[t]he other actors’; it has to be the ‘fury’ which belongs to ‘h[e]’. There are ‘[t]he other actors’ within the text, but no one acts when there is ‘his fury’. Being ‘impressed’ is distinguishable for the perspective on ‘[t]he other actors’ and ‘his’ who owns ‘his fury’. ‘[H]is fury’ does not belong to ‘[t]he other actors’.

In terms of reading *action* and *acting* (both my emphases), I will read Susan Ann Bintu Walsh’s “In Translating ‘Animal’, or Reading the ‘Other’ in Kipling’s

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<sup>46</sup> See, for instance, ‘[w]riters for children must know who they are. They must know and understand children, otherwise they would not be able to write for them in the first place. But they must also know who *they* (as adults) are’. The perspectives are on ‘[w]riters’, ‘children’, and ‘they’. The knowledge and understanding, and ability are not what ‘[w]riters’, ‘children’ and ‘they’ have claimed in that statement. Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*, p. 70.

Mowgli's Stories". According to the statement, 'it is worth noting here that it is primarily the *act* of looking that Mowgli becomes or reveals himself as human, rather than through any external marker on the body'.<sup>47</sup> There, 'looking' is part of 'the *act*'.

'[L]ooking' and 'the *act*' are different from each other. '[L]ooking' is not *the* (my emphasis) 'looking' when it is part of 'the *act*'. I would like to claim that 'Mowgli' is similar to '[o]ne of the male chimps' from Berger's text. As '[o]ne of the male chimps' is claimed to be 'suddenly angry' from other's perspective point of view, 'becom[ing]' and 'reveal[ing]' of 'Mowgli' are also claimed by the other who is not 'Mowgli' himself. When 'Mowgli' is seen as 'becom[ing]' or 'reveal[ing] himself', 'Mowgli' is neither 'Mowgli' nor 'himself'; 'Mowgli' is something 'as human'. What is more, 'becom[ing]' and 'reveal[ing] himself' do not happen at the same time for the perspective on 'Mowgli'. The result of 'becom[ing]' or 'reveal[ing] himself' is to be 'as human'; 'Mowgli' is and will not be a human in that sense. When there is 'becom[ing]' or 'reveal[ing] himself', 'it is primarily the *act* of looking' 'rather than through any external marker on the body'. Then, 'becom[ing]' or 'reveal[ing]' oneself 'as human' of others would be 'through any external marker on the body'. Therefore, 'any external marker on the body' and 'the *act* of looking' are different from each other in the respect of 'becom[ing]' and 'reveal[ing]' oneself.

The eyes are there on the right pages and someone else, like I, reads that the eyes seem to *look* (my emphasis) although these eyes do not look anything. That looking is an interpretation from I who is not on two right pages (see page 69). I would read that the eyes on the lower right page (see page 69) are the eyes of a gorilla and the eyes

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

on the upper right page (see page 69) are the eyes of all primates, all one family or all my family.

There is ellipsis after '[a]ll my family'. In the following page, there is '[a]nd yours!' It seems that all the pictorial faces are claimed to be 'yours!'.



(Last two pages of *One Gorilla*)


I read an idea of ownership from '[a]nd yours!'. That ownership is different from the ownership which I read from 'my' of '[a]ll my family'. This is because 'yours!' do not own something such as 'family'. Furthermore, 'yours!' are not *all* (my emphasis) 'yours'. However, I do not mean that 'yours' are partly 'yours!' or less than to be 'yours' because there is no *all* (my emphasis) in front of 'yours!'. In the previous page, the number of 'my' is singular, but the number of 'yours!' is not certain likewise 'my'. '[Y]ours!' are not counted with particular number likewise '[a]ll one family'.

Next to 'and yours!', there are multiple people. The number of faces is more than ten. I would not read these faces are the faces of '[a]ll my family' although there is

ellipsis in the previous page. The faces on these two pages are not the faces of my and your families either. The faces of ‘yours!’ are neither mine nor yours.

## Chapter 4: The Back Cover and Blurb

On the blurb of *One Gorilla*, there is ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans, three chimpanzees ... and you’ in the first sentence. ‘[G]orilla’, ‘orang-utans’ and ‘chimpanzees’ are counted with numbers whereas ‘you’ is not. What is more, there is a distinction between ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans, three chimpanzees’ and ‘you’ since there is the ellipsis and ‘and’ between ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans, three chimpanzees’ and ‘you’.



(The Back Cover of *One Gorilla*)

The first ‘you’ and the second ‘you’ on the blurb are the different from each other although they look same. The second ‘you’ is ‘in this exceptional book’ whereas the first ‘you’ is not in anywhere. The second ‘you’ is claimed to ‘count’ whereas the first ‘you’ is not.

‘[Y]ou’ has been repeated twice within the blurb. However, ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans’ and ‘three chimpanzees’ are not. I would like to address that ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans’ and ‘three chimpanzees’ and not ‘beautiful primates’ because ‘primates’ are not counted like ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans’ and ‘three chimpanzees’. Furthermore, ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans’ and ‘three chimpanzees’ are neither claimed as beautiful nor as primates. ‘One gorilla, two orang-utans’ and ‘three chimpanzees’ do not belong to ‘the world of beautiful primates’.

Because ‘this most exceptional book’ is where the second ‘you’ is claimed to be ‘in’, I read that there is a separation between ‘the world’ and ‘this most exceptional book’. Therefore, the second ‘you’ and ‘beautiful primates’ are not ‘in’ the same place. ‘[B]eautiful primates’ are part of ‘the world’, but ‘beautiful primates’ are not in ‘the world’. ‘One gorilla, two orang-utans, three chimpanzees’ and the first ‘you’ are neither the part of ‘the world’ nor ‘in this most exceptional book’. Therefore, ‘[o]ne gorilla, two orang-utans, three chimpanzees’ and the first ‘you’ do not ‘[c]elebrate’ and ‘count’.

For the reason that ‘this most exceptional book’ is there within the statement, other books are not ‘this most exceptional book’. Other books which are not ‘this most exceptional book’ are excluded to be ‘most exceptional’. In addition, I read an irony from ‘this most exceptional book’ since ‘this’ is not that ‘book’ and that ‘book’ is not ‘this’ either. ‘[T]his’ and ‘book’ are ‘the most exceptional’ for the perspective on the statement; two different things are claimed to be ‘the most exceptional’ but the number of ‘the most exceptional book’ is one, not two.

‘Celebrat[ing]’ is stated first and then ‘count[ing]’ is stated later. I do not read that ‘[c]elebrat[ing]’ happens before ‘count[ing]’. ‘Celebrat[ing]’ and ‘count[ing]’ are conditional on each other because of ‘as’. There would be no ‘[c]elebrat[ing]’ if ‘you’ does not ‘count them in this most exceptional book’. There would be no ‘celebrat[ing]’



if it is not ‘you’ who ‘count[s]’ or ‘you’ does not ‘count them’. There will be no celebration if ‘you count[s] them’ out of ‘this most exceptional book’ or ‘count[s]’ something other than ‘this most exceptional book’. For the perspective on the blurb, ‘the world of beautiful primates’ and ‘this most exceptional books’ are not the same. ‘[T]he world of beautiful primates’ is where ‘beautiful primates’ belong. ‘[Y]ou’ is claimed to be ‘in’ ‘this most exceptional book’. Although ‘you’ is ‘in’ somewhere, I do not read that ‘you’ belongs to ‘this most exceptional book’. There is no one who ‘[c]elebrate[s]’, but it is ‘you’ who is claimed to ‘count’. ‘[Y]ou’ and ‘them’ are not beautiful like ‘beautiful primates’. ‘[Y]ou’, ‘them’ and ‘beautiful primates’ are distinctive from each other because they are all different from each other. However, none of the differences are claimed from any of ‘you’, ‘them’ and ‘beautiful primates’.

Before reading other lines and the picture on the blurb, I would like to read some part from Judith Butlers’s *Frames of War*. I have read the frames for several times in this and other chapters, but I have not read any ideas which have been claimed on ‘the frame’ in other text from other critics. There are ‘framing’ and ‘the frame’ in *Frames of War* — what are ‘framing’ and ‘the frame’ for the perspective on the statement and what ideas are claimed within that text?

Although framing cannot always contain what it seeks to make visible or readable, it remains structured by the aim of instrumentalizing certain versions of reality. This means that the frame is always throwing something away, always

keeping something out, always de-realizing and de-legitimizing alternative versions of reality, discarded negatives of the official version.<sup>48</sup>

According to the first sentence, ‘framing’ and two ‘it’ are claimed with different ideas. The ‘structur[ing]’ of the second ‘it’ would ‘remain’ once it is ‘structured by the aim of instrumentalizing certain versions of reality’. However, ‘framing’ and the first ‘it’ are not structured. The second ‘it’ does not remain as its original status since what will ‘remain’ is a result of ‘structur[ing]’. ‘[R]eality’ is singular, but ‘certain versions’ are plural. There are no other realities which are part of ‘certain versions’ according to the text above. ‘[C]ertain versions’ are neither real nor realities themselves; they are the ‘versions’ which have a single ‘reality’ as a part of them. ‘[S]tructur[ing]’ is done by ‘the aim’, but it is not ‘the aim’ of the second ‘it’. Whatever ‘certain versions of reality’ were before, ‘certain versions of reality’ will no longer be the same ‘certain versions of reality’ when ‘it remains structured’. Regardless of what ‘framing’ can or cannot contain, the second ‘it remains structured by the aim of instrumentalizing certain versions of reality’.

‘[F]raming’ does not frame; ‘[F]raming’ is an ability to ‘contain’ something, but this ability does not happen always. ‘[F]raming’ and the first ‘it’ are claimed with different ideas because the first ‘it’ does not have any ability and also does not contain anything. In other words, ‘framing’ does not seek anything whereas ‘it seeks to make visible or readable’. When there is ‘framing’, ‘what it seeks to make visible or readable’ would not ‘always’ be ‘contain[ed]’ by ‘framing’. For the perspective, when there is ‘framing’, there is no vision and reading; nothing sees and reads; nothing has seen and

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<sup>48</sup> Judith Butler, *Frames of War* (London and New York: Verso, 2009), p. xiii.

been read. There is a claim about ‘visible or readable’, but this ‘visible or readable’ is ‘ma[d]e’ to be ‘visible or readable’ with a purpose to ‘seek’. ‘[T]o be ‘ma[d]e’ ‘visible or readable’ is not only conditional on the ‘seek[ing]’ of the first ‘it’ but is also conditional on the ability of ‘framing’.

‘This’ is not ‘the frame’. ‘This’ does not mean ‘the frame’. ‘[T]he frame’ does not frame about ‘the frame’. ‘[T]he frame’ does something other than framing which is ‘always throwing something away, always keeping something out, always de-realizing and de-legitimizing alternative versions of reality’; and they are what ‘[t]his means’. There are the repetitions of ‘always’ and ‘something’ in the second sentence. For that reason, there is no exception in the case of ‘throwing something away’, ‘keeping something out’ and ‘de-realizing and de-legitimizing alternative versions of reality’. In that sense, ‘the frame’ is similar to the second ‘it’ in the first sentence since ‘the frame’ does not remain as the first status. ‘[T]he frame’ will not be the previous ‘the frame’ after ‘throwing something away’, ‘keeping something out’ and ‘de-realizing and de-legitimizing alternative versions of reality’. However, ‘the frame’ is still ‘the frame’ according to the statement.

‘[R]eality’ in the second sentence is different from the first ‘reality’ in the first sentence. It is because ‘reality’ in the second sentence is part of ‘alternative versions’; it is not part of ‘certain versions’. The numbers of ‘alternative versions’ and ‘certain versions’ are plural. Later, in the second sentence, there is ‘the official version’ which is part of ‘discarded negatives’. ‘[T]he official version’ is not claimed with reality and ‘the official version’ is singular; ‘the official version’ is ‘the’ one whereas ‘certain versions’ and ‘alternative versions’ are not *the* (my emphasis) versions. Why ‘the official version’ is different from ‘certain versions’ and ‘alternative versions’? Is it because ‘the

official version' is 'the official' one? Is it because 'the official version' is part of 'discarded negatives'? Whatever the reason is (or the reasons are), there are different versions in the statement above.

Although the statement is not from 'framing' and two 'it', the perspective on 'framing' and two 'it' has knowledge about the abilities of 'framing' and what two 'it' do. The abilities of 'framing' and what two 'it[s]' do are all different from each other. There are multiple faces and bodies in *One Gorilla*. The faces and the bodies do not claim that they are visible or readable as the faces and the bodies. I would rather insist that the frames in *One Gorilla* help me to read the faces and bodies. There is no gorilla, no number, no counting, no book, no ANTHONY BROWNE, no name and no primates in the page where '[a]nd yours!' is stated. I read the statement, '[a]nd yours!' with the faces and bodies. I read the faces and bodies with '[a]nd yours!'. When I read the frames, I differentiate and distinguish the frames. It does not mean that my reading of the frames is 'throwing something away, always keeping something out' of the frames.

In the second sentence of the back cover of *One Gorilla*, there is 'this' which is 'most exceptional book' and also there are 'WALKER BOOKS' and 'AND SUBSIDIARIES' above the barcode. There are two different books on the back cover whereas there is one book on the front cover. No one is counting on the front cover, but 'you' is claimed to 'count' according to the statement on the back cover. '[T]his most exceptional book' is different from other books because it is the 'most exceptional' one. Therefore, I read that '[a] [c]ounting [b]ook' and 'WALKER BOOKS' are not 'this most exceptional book'. For the reason that there is 'this most exceptional book', I read an idea of exception from 'this most exceptional book'. The idea of exception makes me to read that '[a] [c]ounting Book' and 'WALKER BOOKS' are the exceptions to be

‘this most exceptional book’. For the reason that ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ and ‘WALKER BOOKS’ are not ‘this most exceptional book’, ‘you’ does not ‘count’ anything ‘in’ ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ and ‘WALKER BOOKS’. ‘[Y]ou’ is not ‘in’ ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ and ‘WALKER BOOKS’ since ‘you’ is claimed to be ‘in this most exceptional book’ only.

Between ‘in this most exceptional books’ and ‘WAKER BOOKS’, there are two captions within the quotation marks. The first caption is “‘gorgeous ... funny ... an essential new classic” —*The Times*’ and the second captions is “‘detailed depictions of monkeys and apes bring a new depth to first numbers” —*Julia Eccleshare*’. On the right bottom of the back cover, there is a picture of a lemur. It looks similar to the pictorial lemurs which I read from the pages where ‘10 Lemurs’ are stated. ‘*The Times*’ and ‘*Julia Eccleshare*’ are not ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’. Something is or are ‘gorgeous’, ‘funny’ and ‘an essential new classic’ in *One Gorilla* according to the caption. However, what is ‘gorgeous’, ‘funny’ and ‘an essential new classic’? Is it ‘*The Times*’ or *One Gorilla*? Is it ‘WAKER BOOKS AND SUBSIDIARIES’ or ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’? Whatever ‘gorgeous’, ‘funny’ and ‘an essential new classic’ is or are, ‘gorgeous’, ‘funny’ and ‘an essential new classic’ are not what ‘One Gorilla’, ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ and ‘ANTHONY BROWNE’ did claim in *One Gorilla*. However, as ‘gorgeous’, ‘funny’ and ‘an essential new classic’ are there, there are the ideas which are related to ‘gorgeous’, ‘funny’ and ‘an essential new classic’ on the back cover. According to the second caption, ‘monkeys’ and ‘apes’ are different from each other, but they are all part of ‘detailed depictions’. I already have mentioned that there is a lemur on the back cover. Then, that lemur is one of ‘detailed depictions of monkeys and apes’ according to the text. In that sense, a lemur ‘bring[s] a new depth to first numbers’. There might be other numbers which are not the ‘first numbers’, but what a lemur ‘bring[s]’ is

‘a new depth to first numbers’. There might be other depths which are not ‘a new depth’. To what extent something is ‘new’ and not ‘new’ are not stated; but ‘a new depth’ is ‘new’. ‘[A] new depth’ is claimed to be ‘br[ought]’ ‘to’ somewhere or something else which is not ‘a new depth’. ‘*Julia Eccleshare*’ is neither one of ‘detailed depictions’ nor ‘monkeys and apes’. However, ‘*Julia Eccleshare*’ is claimed to know what ‘bring[s]’ something to something else.

The blurb does not do anything, but there are claims and ideas which are claimed and announced by the perspective on the blurb. I wondered how the perspective on the blurb, the perspective on the front cover, and the perspectives on the following pages of the front cover are different from each other. Why I think that the perspective on the blurb, the perspective on the front cover, and the perspective on the following pages of the front cover are all different? In the next chapter, I will read the ideas on the blurbs. After reading the ideas on the blurbs, I will read different picture book which was written by Alike in 1962.

## Chapter 5: Reading the Translation of Blurb

I never heard the word, *blurb* (my emphasis), before I started writing this thesis. In other words, I did not have any knowledge about blurb before 2017; I knew the word, back cover, but I never knew that there is something on the back cover which is called blurb. The first time to know about this word goes back to the days when I started writing my thesis. I was reading *My Five Senses* at then and my supervisor mentioned blurb when we were reading the statements on the back cover together. I wanted to know the meaning of blurb in Korean. I did not have to search the word in Korean, but I did it for my own curiosity.

There is a website which is called 'NAVER'.<sup>49</sup> I found the results from the encyclopedia section. There were two words: 'blurb' and '블러브 blurb'. Since the words were different (the first one was without Korean and the second one was with Korean) from each other, I expected that each word might from the different encyclopedias. However, both words were from the same encyclopedia. In this chapter, I will read the first one and its explanation note.

### blurb

**blurb**(블러브)는 '(책 표지 따위의) 선전문구, 추천문, 추천광고, 과대선전'을 뜻한다. 책 표지의 날개나 뒷면에 책을 설명해놓은 글, 또는 기사의 전체 머리글 밑에 붙는 돌출글로 흔히 기사 내용을 축약하거나 기사의 중요성이나 유용성을 알려주어 독자들이 본문의 기사를 읽도록 유도하는 기능을 한다.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> <https://www.naver.com>

<sup>50</sup> Junman Kang, 'blurb' in *NAVER Encyclopedia* <<https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=2076445&cid=41810&categoryId=41812>> [accessed 19 November 2017]

This is my translation of Korean explanation:

blurb

blurb(블러브) means ‘an advertising slogan, a testimonial, an advertisement for recommendation and a bombastic propaganda (of book cover)’. As a note on the back side of the front cover or the back cover for giving an explanation about the book, or as a blurb (my translation of 돌출글) which is added under the preface, commonly, it condenses the story or tells either the importance or the value of the story to function as an inducement for the readers to read the story of the book.

‘[B]lurb’ in the first line and ‘blurb(블러브)’ in the second line are not the same word since ‘blurb(블러브)’ is stated with brackets and Korean. ‘[B]lurb(블러브)’ is not ‘an advertising slogan, a testimonial, an advertisement for recommendation and a bombastic propaganda (of book cover)’ themselves since they are what ‘blurb(블러브)’ ‘means’.

‘[B]lurb(블러브)’ does not mean one of ‘an advertising slogan, a testimonial, an advertisement for recommendation and a bombastic propaganda (of book cover)’. Although ‘blurb(블러브)’ is not any of ‘an advertising slogan, a testimonial, an advertisement for recommendation and a bombastic propaganda (of book cover)’, ‘an advertising slogan, a testimonial, an advertisement for recommendation and a bombastic propaganda (of book cover)’ are the meaning of ‘blurb(블러브)’.

Nothing is advertised and nothing advertises anything in the case of ‘an advertising slogan, a testimonial, an advertisement for recommendation and a bombastic propaganda (of book cover)’. ‘[B]lurb(블러브)’ does not advertise and is not advertised



either. There is a word, ‘advertising’, among ‘an advertising slogan’, but ‘an advertising slogan’ does not advertise and is not advertised likewise ‘blurb(블러브)’ does not advertise and is not advertised.

‘[A] note’ and ‘an advertising slogan, a testimonial, an advertisement for recommendation and a bombastic propaganda (of book cover)’ are different from each other not only because ‘a note’ is not claimed with quotation mark but also because ‘a note’ is not part of anything. ‘[A] note’ is somewhere ‘on’. According to the statement, covers are two sided: ‘front’ and ‘back’. The covers are not only two sided but also double-sided. ‘As a note’, ‘a note’ is not on ‘the front cover’. Something on ‘the front cover’ is then not ‘a note’. ‘[B]lurb(블러브)’, which is claimed to be ‘[a]s a note’, needs to be ‘on’ the backside of something.

‘[G]iving an explanation about the book’ is a purpose of ‘a note’. The purpose of ‘a note’ is there where ‘a note’ is ‘on’. Then, there would be no purpose of ‘giving an explanation about the book’ on the front cover. ‘[A]n explanation’ is something ‘about’ other than ‘an explanation’. ‘[A]n explanation’ does not explain. ‘[A]n explanation’ does not give anything either. ‘[A]n explanation about the book’ is not ‘the book’ itself. ‘[A] explanation’ is something ‘about’ and it will be on the backside of covers. ‘As a note’, ‘a note’ has never been a note. ‘[A] note’ does not give anything about ‘a note’.

There are two ‘as’ in the second sentence of my translation. ‘[A] note’ and ‘a

blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ are different from each other.<sup>51</sup> ‘[A] blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ is something ‘as a blurb’<sup>52</sup> likewise the case of ‘a note’. However, ‘a blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ is not on somewhere. For the perspective, ‘a blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ is an addition of ‘the preface’. ‘[A] blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ is not ‘the preface’ itself. ‘[T]he preface’ is prior to ‘a blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ so ‘a blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ can be ‘*added*’ (also my emphasis) ‘under the preface’. In other words, ‘the preface’ existed as ‘the preface’ somewhere before ‘a blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’ were ‘added under the preface’.

For the perspective on the statement, ‘it’ does two different things: ‘condens[ing]’ and ‘tell[ing]’. However, ‘it’ does not always ‘condenses’ or ‘tells’. It is because there is ‘commonly’ within the statement. There is a possibility that ‘it’ might not be ‘condense[d] and ‘t[o]l[d]’. When ‘it condenses’, it is ‘the story’ which claimed to be ‘condense[d]’ by ‘it’. ‘[T]he importance’ and ‘the value of the story’ will not to be ‘condense[d]’. ‘[C]ondens[ing]’ does not happen always, but there is a possibility that ‘the story’ would be the different story when it is ‘condense[d]’. However, it is still ‘the story’ although ‘the story’ is ‘condense[d]’. There is a possibility that ‘the importance’ and ‘the value of the story’ would be ‘t[o]l[d]’. ‘Tell[ing]’ in the statement does not ‘tell’ about ‘it’. ‘[T]he importance’ and ‘the value of the story’ are not something to be

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<sup>51</sup> According to Korean statement, ‘blurb’ is translated into two different ways: 1. As a transliteration 2. As an interpretive translation. ‘돌출글’ is the interpretive translation whereas ‘블러브’ is transliteration. When I read words in Korean at first, I thought ‘돌출글’ and ‘블러브’ are referring something different. Later, I realised that they are the same word in terms of meaning. However, in this paper, I read those two words differently because the ideas on those two words are different from each other.

<sup>52</sup> For the reason that there is no article (‘a’, ‘an’ and ‘the’) in Korean, I was not sure whether if I should put an article in front of ‘blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’. In the case of ‘blurb (my translation of 돌출글)’, I put an article. It is because ‘돌출글’ is the first word to be stated and the number of ‘돌출글’ is singular. I also wanted to show the distinction between ‘blurb’ in the first line and ‘돌출글’. ‘[B]lurb’ in the first line is stated without an article on NAVER, so I did not add any articles in the first and the second lines before ‘blurb’.

‘t[o]l[d]’ together. As a result of ‘tell[ing]’, ‘either of the importance’ or ‘the value of the story’ would be ‘t[o]l[d]’. For the perspective, ‘condens[ing]’ and ‘tell[ing]’ are not only ‘condens[ing] the story’ and ‘tell[ing] either the importance or the value of the story’ since there is a purpose, ‘to function as an inducement’. ‘[F]unction as an inducement’ is also a purpose and the result of ‘condens[ing]’ and ‘tell[ing]’.

The perspective on ‘the readers’ has a knowledge about what would ‘the readers’ do if there is ‘an inducement’, what would ‘the readers’ ‘read’ and what induces ‘the readers to read the story of the book’. When they ‘read the story of the book’, they also read the ‘function as an inducement’ which is a purpose of ‘the importance or the value of the story’. ‘[T]he story of the book’ is not just ‘the story of the book’ in that sense; ‘the readers’ also read ‘the story’ which is ‘condense[d]’ and ‘the importance or the value of the story’. Due to ‘commonly’, ‘the readers’ might not be ‘induce[d]’ even if there were ‘function’ which ‘function as an inducement’.


I did not think about ‘*the readers*’ and ‘*the story*’ (both also my emphases) when I begin to write this paper. What are the readers and the story? How are they claimed in others’ statements? I began to read the ideas on the pictures and the statements and it seems that there are more other issues which I need to think about further.

In the following chapter, I will read one of ‘LET’S READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’. With reading *My Five Senses*, I will read Jacques Derrida’s *The Truth in Painting* in order to read the ideas on ‘painting’, Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* in order to read the ideas on ‘repetition’ and Martin Barker’s *Comics: Ideology, Power and the Critics* in order to read differences between ‘the speech bubble’, ‘a represented character’ and ‘words’.

## Part II. Reading ‘a Let’s-Read-and-Find-out Science Book’ I

### Chapter 6: A Message of ‘MESSAGE’

On front cover of *My Five Senses*,<sup>53</sup> there are three statements: ‘this is a let’s-read-and-find-out science book’, ‘my five senses’ and ‘by aliki’. The number of ‘senses’ is specified as a particular number, ‘five’. According to the title, ‘five senses’ do not belong to ‘senses’; they belong to ‘my’.



(Front cover of *My Five Senses*)

The statement, ‘my five senses’, is neither from ‘my’ nor me. It is the perspective on ‘my’ which claims that there is an ownership to ‘my’. ‘[M]y five senses’ belong to ‘my’ not because ‘my’ had claimed so. ‘[M]y five senses’ are not mine. ‘[M]y five senses’ are neither my ‘senses’ nor ‘aliki’'s. As there is ‘by’ in front of ‘aliki’, ‘aliki’ and ‘my’

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<sup>53</sup> Aki Kuroda, *My Five Senses* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1962).

are claimed with different ideas on the front cover. For example, ‘aliki’ is not claimed with the idea of ownership and something seems to be done ‘*by*’ (also my emphasis) ‘aliki’.

On the back cover, the first line of the statements is ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’. ‘FROM’ and ‘*by*’ are different words, but I read that ‘FROM’ and ‘*by*’ are somewhat similar as they are claimed with the names. Instead of expanding my ideas on the names, such as ‘aliki’ and ‘ROMA GANS’, I will read Jacqueline Rose’s text where two different names are stated. In Rose’s *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*, there is a chapter, ‘Rousseau and Alan Garner’.<sup>54</sup> Rousseau and Alan Garner are also someone’s names likewise ‘aliki’ and ‘ROMA GANS’. The ideas on ‘Rousseau and Alan Garner’ are neither from ‘Rousseau’ nor ‘Alan Garner’, but it is claimed as if the ideas are from ‘Rousseau’ and ‘Alan Garner’. The chapter, ‘Rousseau and Alan Garner’, is not only related with the matter of name but also ‘children’ and ‘child’. As *My Five Senses* is also ‘planned for the child’,<sup>55</sup> I regarded that reading this text from Rose would be another example to understand how name has been claimed with the issue about ‘children’ or ‘child’. Later, I will continue to read *My Five Senses*.

Garner, like Rousseau two centuries before him, places on the child’s shoulders the responsibility for saving humankind from the degeneracy of modern society. For Garner, this is to be achieved through myth; for Rousseau, through something which, in various and complicated ways, he defines as ‘nature’. It might,

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<sup>54</sup> Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction* (London and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984), p. 43.

<sup>55</sup> See my reading about ‘planned for the child’ from page 101.

therefore, seem strange to argue for their similarity. [...] The purpose of literature for children in Garner, and the purpose of education in Rousseau, are remarkably close.<sup>56</sup>

Despite the time difference between ‘Garner’ and ‘Rousseau’, there is similarity between them: ‘plac[ing] on the child’s shoulders the responsibility for saving humankind from the degeneracy of modern society’. Although it is not a statement from ‘Garner’, it is claimed as if ‘Garner’ did ‘place’ ‘on the child’s shoulders the responsibility’. ‘[T]he responsibility’ is something can be ‘place[d] on’ somewhere. According to the text above, ‘the child’ does not place ‘the responsibility’ ‘on’ their ‘shoulders’ by themselves. For the reason the perspective is on ‘the child’, I would like to claim that the perspective on ‘the child’ knows about what ‘the child’ has as their belongings. ‘[T]he child’ has multiple ‘shoulders’ and there might be a singular ‘responsibility’. If ‘the responsibility’ has been ‘place[d] on’, it would be on ‘the child’s shoulders’. Furthermore, ‘plac[ing]’ ‘on the child’s shoulders the responsibility’ is a purpose ‘for saving humankind from the degeneracy of modern society’; that is not a purpose which has been claimed from ‘the child’ and ‘Garner’. For the perspective on the statement, ‘modern society’ and ‘the degeneracy’ are not detached from each other since ‘the degeneracy’ is part of ‘modern society’. There is ‘humankind’ who needs to be ‘sav[ed] from’ ‘the degeneracy of modern society’. ‘[H]umankind’ is different from ‘the child’, ‘Garner’ and ‘Rousseau’. ‘[H]umankind’ is neither human nor kind of human. ‘[H]umankind’ will not be ‘sav[ed]’ by ‘humankind’ itself, but by ‘the responsibility’ of ‘the

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

child'. In other words, it is not only 'the child' who saves 'humankind from the degeneracy of modern society'; there needs to be 'the responsibility' and 'the child' with their '*shoulders*' (also my emphasis) in order to 'sav[e]'.

In the following sentence, there are differences between 'Garner' and 'Rousseau'. 'For Garner', 'this' is not only something to be 'achieved' but also something needs to be 'through myth'. '[M]yth' does not achieve. '[M]yth' also does not make an achievement. '[M]yth' needs to be gone 'through' in order to 'be achieved'. '[S]omething' is claimed to be 'through' in the case of 'Rousseau' and that 'through' is 'in various and complicated ways'. '[N]ature' is what has been defined 'as'. However, the definition of 'nature' is not the definition of 'Rousseau''s; it is 'define[d]' by the perspective on 'he'.

'[A]rgu[ing] for their similarity' is not necessarily 'seem[ed]' 'strange' because 'it' '*might*' (also my emphasis) 'seem strange'. With the probability, 'argu[ing] for their similarity' is 'seem[ed]' by the other who is not 'their' themselves. '[T]heir similarity' is not what 'the[y]' 'argue'; it is not what 'Rousseau' and 'Garner' argue either. '[S]imilarity' belongs to 'their', but 'the[y]' do not claim that they own anything such as 'their similarity'.

According to the last sentence of the statement above, there are two different purposes in the cases of 'Garner' and 'Rousseau'. The perspective on 'Garner' and 'Rousseau' knows which purpose is for whom. Although these purposes are different purposes, they are 'remarkably close'. However, they are not 'remarkably close' to 'Garner' and 'Rousseau'. In other words, '[t]he purpose of literature' and 'the purpose of education' are not the same purpose; they are still different purposes. The excessiveness of being 'close' does not make '[t]he purpose of literature for children in Garner'

and ‘the purpose of education in Rousseau’ as the same purpose. The purposes of ‘Garner’ and ‘Rousseau’ within the text are not about any purposes; in the case of ‘Garner’, ‘literature for children’ is part of ‘[t]he purpose’; in the case of ‘Rousseau’, his purpose is ‘the purpose of education’. If literature is not ‘for children’, it would not be ‘in Garner’. However, ‘education’ in the statement is not something for whom.

In the following part of ‘Rousseau and Alan Garner’, ‘Garner’ and ‘Rousseau’ are not mentioned within the sentences. I could not find two words in the following part and also the ideas which are related to ‘Garner’ and ‘Rousseau’. Instead, there is a part which stresses about ‘children’s fiction’ with ‘pedagogy’. Since *My Five Senses* is also related with children’s education, I will read some part from ‘Rousseau and Alan Garner’ in order to think about children’s fiction and education together.

Once it is viewed in these terms, children’s fiction starts to return to the arena of pedagogy and learning which it was meant to have left behind. [...] It is not just that children’s writing is seen as the repository of a literary tradition under threat of disintegration in the adult world. It is also that narrative fiction starts to be assigned a supreme status in the process of education itself.<sup>57</sup>

‘[V]iew[ing]’ is ‘in’; ‘it’ would not be ‘viewed’ as ‘it’ ‘[o]nce it is viewed’. ‘[I]t’ can be ‘viewed’ as other than ‘it’ such as ‘these terms’. There is no *arena* (my emphasis) in the case of ‘children’s fiction’, but ‘pedagogy and learning’ are claimed with ‘the arena’; for that reason, ‘children’s fiction’ and ‘the arena of pedagogy and learning’ are claimed with different ideas; in addition, it is only ‘children’s fiction’ which is claimed

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 63.




to 'start to return'; 'the arena of pedagogy and learning' does not return to somewhere according to the text above. There are different stages of 'return[ing]' because 'children's fiction' has not returned to 'the arena of pedagogy and learning' yet. I read an intention from being 'left behind' since 'it was meant to have left behind'. Being 'left behind' is neither the intention of 'children' nor 'the arena of pedagogy and learning'. '[T]he arena of pedagogy and learning' would be 'left behind', if there is no 'return[ing]' of 'children's fiction'. Although the 'return[ing]' is only 'start[ed]', 'it' can be 'viewed in these terms'. I read that 'children's writing' and 'children's fiction' are different from each other since 'children's writing' is 'seen as' other than 'children's fiction'. '[C]hildren's fiction' has not been seen because 'it is viewed'. Thus, there is a 'writing' which is claimed to belong to 'children', but no 'children' claim that any 'children' have 'children's writing'. None of the 'children' had written 'children's writing' either.

'[T]he repository' is part of 'a literary tradition', so it is not only 'the repository' or 'a literary tradition' which would be 'seen as'. '[T]he repository' is not the literary repository, but 'a literary tradition' is literary one. '[T]he repository of a literary' is 'in the adult world' whereas 'children's writing' is not; not everything is 'in the adult world' for the perspective on the statement. In addition, there is no world such as the world of children or the child world. Nothing is claimed to threaten and disintegrate 'the repository of a literary tradition', but it is 'under threat of disintegration'. '[C]hildren's writing' is not 'under threat of disintegration'. However, as it is 'seen as the repository of a literary tradition', 'children's writing' is 'seen as' 'under threat of disintegration in the adult world'. '[S]ee[ing]' in the statement above does not see something; it 'see[s]' something 'as' something else. '[S]ee[ing]' is a retrospection because it is claimed as 'seen'.

'[A]ssign[ing]' of 'narrative fiction' has not finished since it is 'started to be assigned'. Even if the 'assign[ing]' is not finished, 'a supreme status' will be 'assigned' to 'narrative fiction'. There might be other 'status' which is or are not 'supreme' when other kinds of 'fiction[s]' are 'start[ed] to be assigned'. When 'narrative fiction starts to be assigned', 'a supreme status' is 'in the process of education itself'. '[A] supreme status' which is claimed with 'narrative fiction' is conditional to the certain 'process'; that 'process' has to be 'in the process of education itself'. '[N]arrative fiction' does not decide which status to 'be assigned'. '[A] supreme status' is not 'narrative fiction' and vice versa. '[A]ssig[ning]' does not mean that 'narrative fiction' will become 'a supreme status in the process of education itself'. In the case of 'education itself', 'education itself' is not a process. There is 'the process' which is part of 'education itself'. '[N]arrative fiction', 'a supreme status' and 'the process' are not educational. '[E]ducation itself' does not educate. There is nothing which educates in the statement above. '[N]arrative fiction starts to be assigned a supreme status in the process of education itself', but there is no result of starting the 'assign[ment]'.

Having finished reading the ideas on names and education in a number of different texts, I will now return to reading the back cover of *My Five Senses*. Here there are also some issues which related to names and education.



## A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS

*Professor Emeritus of Childhood Education,  
Teachers College, Columbia University*

*Children Want to be up-to-date.*

As a child reads or is read to, he feels himself stretch in importance. This is a feeling that each child should have in growing up. *Let's-Read-and-Find-Out Science Books* are designed to help him acquire this feeling. They are planned for the child who is eager to know.

In the case of 'by aliki', there is no other word except 'by aliki' within that line. In the case of 'FROM ROMA GANS', there is 'A MESSAGE' in front of 'FROM ROMA GANS'. Although 'A MESSAGE' is 'FROM' (also my emphasis) 'ROMA GANS', 'ROMA GANS' does not have an ownership of 'A MESSAGE'. Roma Gans does not

claim that any message is from him.<sup>58</sup> ‘A MESSAGE’ does not contain anything. ‘A MESSAGE’ does not go *to* (my emphasis) someone, somewhere, something, etc. ‘A MESSAGE’ is not from ‘Professor Emeritus of Childhood Education, Teachers College, Columbia University’. ‘Professor Emeritus of Childhood Education, Teachers College, Columbia University’ follows ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’; ‘Professor Emeritus of Childhood Education, Teachers College, Columbia University’ is smaller than ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’ and written in italics. Although the blurb does not say that ‘ROMA GANS’ *is* (my emphasis) ‘Professor Emeritus of Childhood Education, Teachers College, Columbia University’, I somehow read ‘[c]hildren want to be up-to-date’ is ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’ who is a ‘Professor Emeritus of Childhood Education, Teachers College, Columbia University’.

Although ‘[c]hildren’ do not make any claim in the statement above, being ‘up-to-date’ is what ‘[c]hildren’ want to be. It is not a single child who wants to ‘be-up-to-date’. It seems that there is no exception for the ‘[c]hildren’ who do not want to be ‘up-to-date’. In other words, the ‘[c]hildren’ do not want to remain as they are; ‘[c]hildren’ need to be different. ‘Children’ are not ‘up-to-date[d]’ yet for the perspective on ‘[c]hildren’. If someone are up-to-dated, they are no longer ‘[c]hildren’ even if they claim that they are still ‘children’? If someone do not want to be up-to-dated, they are not ‘[c]hildren’ no matter who they are?

The numbers of ‘a child’ who ‘reads’ and ‘is read to’ are singular. To ‘read’ and being ‘read to’ are not for the children. The ideas on ‘[c]hildren’ and ‘a child’ are different from each other. For example, there are no others who are not ‘[c]hildren’ within that sentence, whereas there are ‘a child’, ‘he’ and ‘himself’ when ‘a child’ has been

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<sup>58</sup> I mentioned ‘him’ because of ‘*Emeritus*’.

claimed. Both '[c]hildren' and 'a child' are not he and she.<sup>59</sup> However, there are 'he' and 'himself' who is no longer 'a child'. There are distinctions between 1. 'a child' and 'he'/'himself', 2. 'he' and 'himself'. Therefore, the one who 'reads'/'is read to' and the other one who 'feels' are different from each other. In other words, 'a child' does not feel what 'he feels'; 'he' and 'himself' do not read and has not been read what 'a child reads or is read to'.

Although 'he' does not read and no one is claimed to read to 'he', 'he feels himself stretch in importance'. However, what 'he feels' is conditional on what 'a child reads or is read to'. What 'he feels' is not prior to what 'a child reads' and 'is read to'. It is not 'he' who makes the claim about 'he', but the perspective on the statement has knowledge about what 'he feels' and what happens after when 'he feels'. What 'he' 'feels' is not only 'himself' but also 'stretch in importance'. '[H]imself' is claimed to be 'in importance', but 'he' is not 'in' there. With 'in' 'importance', there is 'stretch[ing]'. According to the statement, 'he' does not own any self. It is 'himself' who is claimed to own 'self'. After 'he feels', there will be 'stretch[ing]'. Unlike 'he', 'himself' would 'stretch'. However, 'stretch[ing]' of 'himself' is 'in' the boundary of 'importance'. According to the statement, 'he' and 'a child' are not 'in importance'. In addition, 'a child' does not feel and stretch. In addition, the perspective on the statement does not state how to 'be-up-to-date'.

'[A] feeling' is what 'each child should have in growing up'. '[E]ach child' is not out of 'growing up' for the perspective on 'each child'. In other words, when 'each child' is 'growing up', 'each child' is with 'in' 'growing up'. Having 'a feeling' is not a choice of 'each child'; it is what 'each child should have'. It seems there is no exception

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<sup>59</sup> See, more ideas about 'gender' in Judith Butler's 'Gender Regulation' and 'Doing Justice to Someone' in *Undoing Gender*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 40-74.

‘in growing up’ in the case of ‘each child’, but there might be an exception of not having ‘a feeling’. Therefore, ‘a feeling’ is different from ‘in growing up’. ‘[A] feeling’ is what ‘each child’ needs to ‘have’ whereas ‘in growing up’ is not. As long as ‘each child’ is ‘in growing up’, ‘each child’ would be ‘child’. ‘[A] feeling’ is not an innate feeling for the perspective on ‘each child’.

Then, there are ‘this feeling’ and ‘him’ in the following sentence. I do not read ‘each child’ and ‘him’ as the same. This is because ‘each child’ does not get help from ‘Let’s Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’. ‘[H]im’ does not have ‘this feeling’; ‘this feeling’ is not what ‘him’ had before when he got help from ‘Let’s Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’. ‘[T]his feeling’ is a particular feeling which is to have in the later time with the assistance of ‘Let’s Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’. In other words, ‘him’ does not have an ability to ‘acquire’ ‘this feeling’ without the help from ‘Let’s Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’. ‘[H]elp[ing]’ and ‘acquir[ing]’ are the ‘design[s]’ of ‘Let’s-Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’. Therefore, ‘acquir[ing]’ ‘this feeling’ is not an achievement of ‘him’. ‘[H]im’ does not read ‘Let’s-Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’. What ‘him’ gets from ‘Let’s-Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’ are the help which has been already ‘designed’.

There are no ‘Let’s-Read-and-Find-Out Science Books’ and ‘him’ in the following sentence; there are ‘[t]hey’ and ‘the child’. The claim, ‘who is eager to know’, is not from ‘the child’. ‘[T]he child’ does not ‘know’; ‘eager[ing]’ is prior to ‘know[ing]’ for the perspective on ‘the child’. ‘[T]o know’ is not getting a knowledge. ‘[T]o know’ is a result of ‘eager[ing]’.

‘The child’ is a singular, but ‘[t]hey’, which are ‘planned for the child’, are plural. These plans already have existed from the past since ‘[t]hey are planned’. ‘They’ are not what ‘the child’ had ‘planned’, but ‘[t]hey’ are still something ‘for the child’.

There is ‘the child who is eager to know’, but the plans are not what something to make. It also seems that ‘the child’ does not know that there are multiple things which are ‘planned for the child’.

As I have been reading the ideas on ‘BOOKS’ from the blurb and also the ideas on ‘[a] [c]ounting [b]ook’ from *One Gorilla*, I wanted to read more ideas about books from other criticisms. *One Gorilla* and *My Five Senses* are not only picture books but also children’s books. When books are the books for children or children’s books, it seems the criticisms, the review or the blurbs are sometimes related with education, pedagogy, instructive guide, etc. In *The Children’s Bookroom: Reading and the Use of Books*, Dorothy Atkins states that

Books help children read. From the earliest stages they are more helpful than reading schemes because they promise and provide pleasure in reading. Teachers are certainly influential but first they themselves need a good enthusiastic knowledge of children’s books so that they can choose and help young readers at all levels to choose, reading in partnership with them.<sup>60</sup>

And Atkins also states that

There are plenty of books for children to read for themselves but some need first to be given the right introduction. [...] We know that parents’ choice of books differs from teachers’ choice and that both differ from the children’s

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<sup>60</sup> Dorothy Atkins, *The Children’s Bookroom: Reading and the Use of Books* (Exeter: Trentham Books, 1989), p. 1.

choice and an important starting-point is a willingness to begin where the children are.<sup>61</sup>

The text from Akins above does not mention singular child. Instead, only multiple ‘children’ are mentioned. In terms of the number, there are no teacher and parent; they are all stated as ‘teachers’, ‘[t]eachers’, ‘parents’ and ‘they’. ‘Books’ and ‘books’ are also always in plural. It seems that the ‘stages’ are divided into different ‘stages’ in terms of time difference. My question is, to what extent ‘the earliest stages’ are the *earliest* (my emphasis) and not the ‘earliest’? There are multiple ‘stages’ which are ‘the earliest’ according to the text above. Then, there might be other stages which are not ‘the earliest’. What are these ‘stages’ then? To what extent are these ‘stages’ stages? ‘Books’ would be *less* (my emphasis) ‘helpful than reading schemes’ in the later stages. Otherwise, ‘[b]ooks’ might not be ‘helpful’ after ‘the earliest stages’.<sup>62</sup>

The reasons why ‘they are more helpful’ is because ‘they promise and provide pleasure in reading’. ‘[P]romis[ing] and provid[ing] pleasure’ are restricted to ‘in’ part of the ‘reading’. Out of ‘reading’, ‘they’ would not ‘promise and provide pleasure’. ‘[P]romis[ing] and provid[ing] pleasure’ are not a claim from ‘they’, but ‘they’ are claimed to ‘promise and provide pleasure’ particularly in the case of ‘in reading’.

‘[K]nowledge’ in the statement is not a knowledge about everything; ‘knowledge’ is part of ‘children’s books’. In addition, ‘knowledge of children’s books’ ‘need[s]’ to be ‘a good enthusiastic’ one. ‘[A] good enthusiastic knowledge of children’s books’ is not what ‘[t]eachers’ or ‘they’ have; it is what ‘they themselves need’.

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp.7-8.

<sup>62</sup> See, for more examples about how ‘the child’ has been claimed from other critics: Erica Burman, ‘Gender and Childhood in Neoliberal Times’ in *Children in Culture, Revisited*, ed. by Karin Lesnik-Oberstein (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 18-34.



‘[Y]oung readers’ do not choose and help. ‘[A] good enthusiastic knowledge of children’s books’ does not choose and help since ‘they can choose and help young readers’. To ‘choose and help young readers’ are the ability of ‘they’; ‘they’ and ‘a good enthusiastic knowledge of children’s book’ are not the same for the perspective on the statement.


‘[Y]oung readers’ are not all the same readers since ‘young readers’ are ‘at all levels’. The reason why ‘they themselves need a good enthusiastic knowledge of children’s books’ is because of ‘young readers’. ‘[N]eed’ is what ‘they’ or ‘themselves’ claimed to be ‘need[ed]’. ‘[Y]oung readers’ would not make a choice without ‘help’ from ‘they’. ‘[Y]oung readers’ are not the readers who read something. ‘[T]hey’ who have an ability to ‘choose and help’ do not read. ‘Books help children read’ and there is ‘reading in partnership’. ‘Teachers are certainly influential’ and the result is that ‘they themselves’ will ‘influen[ce]’ the choices of ‘young readers’. ‘Teachers’ and ‘children’ in the first sentence are not at any level, but there are ‘levels’ for ‘young readers’.

In the second passage from Atkins, there are multiple ‘books’ which are ‘for children’. The quantity of ‘books for children’ are ‘plenty’. ‘There’ is somewhere where there are ‘plenty of books for children’. However, ‘children’ do not ‘read’ ‘plenty of books’ at first since ‘the right introduction’ is ‘first to be given’ to ‘some’. In other words, without ‘giv[ing] the right introduction’ to ‘some’, ‘children’ would not ‘read’ ‘plenty of books for children’. ‘[S]ome’ is selective from ‘children’, but not all ‘some’ would ‘read’ ‘plenty of books for children’ although ‘some’ was ‘given the right introduction’. There is a possibility that some of ‘some’ could be excluded from ‘read[ing]’.

In the last sentence of the second passage, there are three different ‘choice[s]’. Each ‘choice’ belongs to ‘parents’, ‘teachers’ and ‘the children’. ‘[A]n important starting-point’ is ‘important’ not because of ‘parents’, ‘teachers’ and ‘the children’ had

claimed so. According to the statement, ‘an important starting-point’ is neither a thing nor a place to start; it is ‘a willingness to begin where the children are’. For the perspective on the statement, ‘starting-point’ and ‘begin[ning]’ are different from each other. Because there is no will in the case of ‘an important starting-point’ and there is no importantness in the case of ‘begin[ning] where the children are’. None of ‘parents’, ‘teachers’ and ‘the children’ have not start[ed] and beg[un] anything yet. ‘We know’ different ‘choice[s]’ from different groups. However, who are ‘we’ and what do ‘we’ ‘know’ about different ‘choice[s]’? Does ‘know[ing]’ about different ‘choice[s]’ of different groups ‘help’ anyone to be belonged to these groups?

In both parts from Atkins and *My Five Senses*, there is ‘help[ing]’. ‘[H]elp[ing]’ is something about ‘help[ing]’ the others who are not the perspective on the statement. However, these others, on the blurb of *My Five Senses* and the text from Atkins, did not require any ‘help’. From now on, I will go back to the back cover of *My Five Senses* and continue to read the lower part of the blurb on the back cover.



#### LET'S-READ-AND-FIND SCIENCE BOOKS

1. *present basic science information*
2. *are written with an understanding of how children think*

3. *are brief enough for the young child to cope with*
4. *are long enough to challenge him.*<sup>63</sup>

On the back cover of *My Five Senses*, the two lines, ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’ and ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND SCIENCE BOOKS’, are all in the capital letters. I can see the widest green space between two different statements on top of ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND SCIENCE BOOKS’. After ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’ and ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND SCIENCE BOOKS’, the following statements are all in the italic type. The widest green space does not separate anything, but it seems that there is a division between the statements. For that reason, I would like to claim that ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ and ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’ are in different frames. Due to green, I read that there are the upper and lower frames on the back cover. The statement, ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’, is in the lower frame since it is under the green space.

If someone reads ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’, that someone does not read ‘basic science information’; it would be the ‘present[ation]’ of ‘basic science information’ from ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’. There are different levels for the case ‘science information’. ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ ‘present’ ‘*basic*’ (also my emphasis on ‘basic’) level of ‘science information’. ‘[B]asic science information’ is not what has written, but

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<sup>63</sup> ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND SCIENCE BOOKS’ series were published from Thomas Y. Crowell Company. The blurbs on the back cover of ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND SCIENCE BOOKS’ series are all same although the books were published in different years from different authors and illustrators. In other chapters, I will also read one of ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND SCIENCE BOOKS’ from Thomas Y. Crowell Company. However, I will not read the blurb with the other book. Instead, I will closely read the texts on the blurb in *My Five Senses*.

‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ have ‘written with an understanding’. However, not all the understandings have ‘written’; what has ‘written’ is ‘an understand of how children think’. ‘[H]ow children think’ could be understood and also could be ‘written’. ‘[A]n understanding’ has not written by that ‘children’. ‘[H]ow children think’ is not ‘an understanding’ from ‘children’ either.

The lengths of ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ are different in accordance with two different cases. To be ‘brief’ in the case of ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’, they are ‘enough’ particularly ‘for the young child’. In other words, ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ would not be ‘brief enough’ for every child because every child is not ‘the young’ one. To be ‘brief enough’ is, therefore, exclusive to some others who are not ‘the young child’. The perspective on number 3 statement has a knowledge what is to be ‘brief enough’ especially ‘for’ whom. However, to be ‘brief enough’ is not always the case for ‘the young child’; ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ are ‘brief enough’ when they are ‘cope[d] with’ by ‘the young child’. In order to be ‘cope[d] with’ by ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’, all the ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ have to be ‘brief enough’. In addition, ‘cop[ing] with’ is a purpose of ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ for ‘the young child’. What if ‘the young child’ cannot ‘cope with’ although ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ are ‘brief enough’? It seems there is no exception of ‘cop[ing]’ in the case of ‘the young child’.

On the other hand, ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ are ‘long enough’. To be ‘long enough’, ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ are supposed to ‘challenge him’. The lengths are ‘long enough’ only for ‘him’. They are not ‘long enough’ for ‘the young child’. Although ‘him’ does not make any

claim about 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS', 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' are all 'long enough' so that 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' would 'challenge him'. The number of 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' are plural. No matter how many 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' are, they would be always 'long enough' if the purpose of 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' is to 'challenge him'.

From the statements 1 to 4, there are 'children', 'the young child' and 'him'. I could have read that 'the young child' and 'him' are the same. I also could have read that 'the young child' and 'him' are 'children'. However, I did not read 'the young child' is 'him'. I also did not read 'young child' and 'him' are 'children'. It was because the ideas on 'children', 'the young child' and 'him' are all different from each other. In addition, I have not read any he or him from 'the young child' and 'children' likewise I have not read any child or children from 'him'. The same series of other books, which are 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS', can be 'brief enough' and also 'long enough' due to different reasons. Therefore, I would like to add that 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' are not the same 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' to 'children', 'the young child' and 'him' although they are all 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS'.

Both perspectives on the front and back cover of *My Five Senses* and the statement above from *The Children's Bookroom: Reading and the Use of Books* claim that books are something 'for' (also my emphasis) someone. Forness in the case of books is not claimed either by 'the child' nor by 'children'. There are 'choose and help' and


‘choice’ in Atkins’s text.<sup>64</sup> Both ‘choose and help’ and ‘choice’ are not claimed by ‘children’. For that reason, when I read ‘[t]here are plenty of books for children to read for themselves’, I wondered how can ‘plenty of books’ can be something ‘for children’ and also ‘for themselves’. Although ‘children’ and ‘the child’ do not claim that there is something which is ‘for’ ‘children’ and ‘the child’, something is still ‘for’ ‘children’ and ‘the child’ due to the perspective on ‘children’ and ‘the child’.

In the following chapter, I will focus on reading the front cover of *My Five Senses* with Jacques Derrida’s *The Truth in Painting*. In order to read the ideas on pictures and texts, I will read the text from Derrida - how are ‘painting’ and ‘the idiom’ (or ‘the words’) are differentiated within Derrida’s text? How would I then read the pictures and statements on the front cover of *My Five Senses*? I might not be able to give a certain or clear message in the following chapter. However, I will try to read out how they are claimed there within the front cover and text.

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<sup>64</sup> See page 102.

## Chapter 7: Picture and Something Other than Picture




(Front cover, *My Five Senses*)

‘[T]his’ is ‘this’, not that. ‘[T]his’ is claimed to be ‘a let’s-read-and-find-out science book’. In other words, ‘this’ seems to be other than ‘this’ since ‘this is’ something else. I am not insisting that ‘this’ has gone to somewhere else; ‘this’ did not go away somewhere from ‘this is a let’s-read-and-find-out science book’. ‘[T]his’ does not objectify both ‘this’ and ‘a let’s-read-and-find out science book’. The front cover of *My Five Senses* is neither ‘this’ nor ‘a let’s-read-and-find out science book’.

‘[I]s’ is not ‘this’ and vice versa. ‘[I]s’ has written in the present tense, but ‘is’ is already passed from the present moment after when it was written. ‘[I]s’ is not a bridge of ‘this’ and ‘a let’s-read-and-find-out science book’ although ‘is’ is claimed as ‘this is’ ‘a let’s-read-and-find out science book’. ‘[I]s’ is not ‘a let’s-read-and-find-out science book’ and vice versa.

‘[T]his’ is not only a ‘book’ but also ‘a let’s-read-and-find-out science’ ‘book’. According to the statement, ‘read[ing]’ is different from ‘find[ing]-out’. ‘[R]ead[ing]’ is

prior to ‘find[ing]-out’. Both ‘read[ing]’ and ‘find[ing]-out’ are what ‘[u]s’ are claimed to do, but ‘read[ing]’ and ‘find[ing]-out’ are not the obligations. ‘[U]s’ are suggested not only to ‘read’ and but also to ‘find-out’. There is an idea of suggestion which are claimed on ‘[u]s’, but it does not mean that ‘[u]s’ will ‘read-and-find-out’. It is because ‘read[ing]-and-find[ing]-out’ are the supplementary of ‘a [...] book’.



There are the five arrows next to ‘my five senses’. In the case of the arrows on the front cover, there are two different parts: one is the triangle and the other is the line with dots. The triangles are not closer to ‘my five senses’ when they are compared to the lines with dots. They are rather closer to the face. The part which is closer to ‘my five senses’ is the line with dots. ‘[M]y five senses’ are not my senses. ‘[M]y five senses’ are not the senses of the perspective on ‘my’. ‘[M]y five senses’ are also not the senses of the picture. The statement on the front cover is not from ‘my’, but the perspective on ‘my’ knows what ‘my’ has. The numbers of the arrows and ‘my five senses’ are five. However, ‘my’ and ‘my five senses’ are not the arrows. The arrows do not belong to ‘my’ and the arrows do not own anything. ‘[F]ive senses’ belong to ‘my’, but the arrows are not the arrows of ‘my’ and the pictorial face.

There is no word in the case of the arrows. This is the reason why I read the arrows are different from ‘my five senses’. The arrows are on the left side of the frame of ‘my five senses’. Suppose there are two parallel lines on top and bottom of ‘my five



senses'. The arrows would not exceed these virtual parallel lines. In addition, the nearest statement of the arrows is 'my five senses'; it is neither 'by aliki' nor 'this is a let's-read-and-find-out science book'. I would like to insist that it would be difficult to read the arrows without making any relation between the five arrows and 'my five senses'.

If I read the arrows from top to bottom, the top arrow becomes the first arrow. In other words, the one which is closest to 'my' becomes the first arrow and the one which is closest to 'senses' becomes the last arrow. All the arrows seem to point different parts of the face. What could I read from the first arrow then? In the case of the first arrow, it seems to point the white oval with black outline and dark green circle. I have mentioned in the previous sentence that 'it seems to point' something not only because of the shape of the arrow but also because of the pictorial face. I read that the white oval with black outline and dark green circle as one of the frames. To read a certain frame which is near to the triangles, I need to read, 'my five senses'. The perspective on 'my five senses' claims that 'senses' are 'five' within the text, but there is nothing more about that 'five'. If I read the frame which is near to the first triangle, I can read the white oval with black outline as an eye and dark green circle as a pupil of that eye. The frame which is near to the first triangle looks like one of 'my five senses' although the frame does not claim anything on the front cover.

There is nothing about sight or seeing on the front cover. Therefore, I would not insist that 'my' owns something like an eye, a pupil or an eye with a pupil. Nevertheless, when I saw the white oval with a black outline, I read it as an eye and the dark green circle as a pupil. I will not insist that the pictorial eye is something to do 'my five senses' yet. This is because *an eye* (my emphasis) does not always mean that it is one of the senses.

According to the blurb, 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS

present basic science information’. For the reason that there is also a statement, ‘this is a let’s-read-and-find-out science book’ on the front cover, I read that the front cover also ‘present[s] basic science information’. In that sense, the face on the front cover is a ‘present[ation]’ of ‘basic science information’. Therefore, the arrows are also the ‘present[ation]’ of ‘basic science information’. With using my basic information, I already have read that the certain frame is an eye. Therefore, I would like to add that the eye on the front cover is a presentation of sight. Furthermore, it might ‘present’ one of ‘my five senses’. The eye does not belong to ‘my’ and ‘my five senses’, but the pictorial eye seems to be related with ‘my’ or ‘my five senses’.

When I read the pictures in children’s books, I do not always read the pictures and the statements together. However, when I read the picture on the front cover of *My Five Senses*, I read the picture and the statement together for some reasons. In *The Truth in Painting* from Jacques Derrida, I found ‘[s]omeone’ who is claimed to be ‘interested in the idiom in painting’.<sup>65</sup> It seems there are some ideas not only related to ‘painting’ but also ‘the idiom’. I thought that it might be helpful to read the ideas on ‘[s]omeone’, ‘painting’ and ‘the idiom’ in order to read the eyes on the front cover of *My Five Senses*. I will start from reading the first paragraph of the first chapter in *The Truth in Painting*.

Someone, not me, comes and says the words: “I am interested in the idiom in painting.”

You get the picture: the speaker is impassive, he remained motionless for the duration of his sentence, careful to refrain from any gesture. At the point where

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<sup>65</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 1.

you were perhaps expecting it, near the head and around certain words, for example, “in painting,” he did not imitate the double horns of quotation marks, he did not depict a form of writing with his fingers in the air. He merely comes and announces to you: “I am interested in the idiom in painting.”<sup>66</sup>

‘I am interested in the idiom in painting’ is not what ‘me’ ‘says’. ‘I am interested in the idiom in painting’ is not ‘the words’ of ‘me’. “I am interested in the idiom in painting” is claimed to be ‘the words’ which are from ‘[s]omeone’ who is not ‘me’. ‘I am interested in the idiom in painting’ is ‘the words’ which are spoken within the quotations marks. ‘[M]e’ does not ‘come’ and ‘say’. What ‘[s]omeone’ does is not what ‘me’ does. For the perspective on the statement, ‘[s]omeone’ and ‘me’ are different from each other since ‘[s]omeone’ and ‘me’ are claimed to do something different.

‘You get[s] the picture’, but ‘[y]ou’ does not own ‘the picture’. ‘You’ also does not see ‘the picture’. ‘You’ is neither ‘the speaker’ nor ‘he’. ‘[T]he speaker’ does not say any word because ‘the speaker is impassive’. ‘[G]et[ting] the picture’ of ‘[y]ou’ is prior to the ‘impassive[ness]’ of ‘the speaker’. ‘[Y]ou’ is not ‘impassive’ when ‘the speaker is impassive’. Being ‘impassive’ is claimed to be ‘impassive’ by the other who is not ‘the speaker’. Likewise ‘impassive’, ‘motionless’ is read as ‘motionless’ by the other who is not ‘he’. To be ‘motionless’ is not something without motion since ‘motionless’ of ‘he’ is ‘remained’ as ‘motionless’. To be ‘motionless’ is conditional on ‘remain[ing]’ of ‘he’ and also ‘for the duration of his sentence, careful to refrain from any gesture’. In other words, as long as there are ‘the duration of his sentence, careful to re-

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

refrain from any gesture', 'he' would 'remain motionless'. '[H]is sentence' is not his motion. '[S]entence' belongs to 'his', but 'any gesture' does not belong to anyone. '[A]ny gesture' could be 'refrain[ed]' by 'he'. For these reasons, 'motion' and 'gesture' are different to the perspective on the statement because 'motion' does not need to be refrained and 'he' does not need to be careful to be 'motionless'.

'[N]ear the head and around certain words' are not only an 'example' but also what 'you were perhaps expecting it'. '[I]t' is not 'the head' and 'certain words'. '[I]t' is something which is 'near the head' and 'around certain words'. What 'you were perhaps expecting' is '[a]t the point', but it is not at 'the head' and 'certain words'. There might be no 'expecting' '[a]t the point' since 'it' is 'perhaps' to be 'expect[ed]'. '[Y]ou' might have not been 'expecting it'. '[Y]ou' might have 'expect[ed]', but there is a possibility that 'you' might not be '[a]t the point' when 'you were [...] expecting it'. Therefore, 'near the head and around certain words' are not what 'you' would expect necessarily for the perspective on 'you' and 'it'.

'[T]he double horns of quotation marks' and 'depict[ing] a form of writing with fingers in the air' remind me of the image of quotation marks somehow. In other words, when I read 'the double horns of quotation marks' and 'depict[ing] a form of writing with fingers in the air' together, the image of “ ” came across my mind. However, the statement claims that 'he did not' do them. Therefore, I needed to erase the image of quotation marks. For the perspective on 'he', 'imitat[ing]' and 'depict[ing]' are different from each other. In the case of 'his fingers in the air', there is no 'double horns' and 'quotation marks'. '[H]is fingers in the air' is an addition of 'a form of writing' which 'he did not depict'. ‘ “ ’ and ‘ ” ’ are not stated as ‘quotation marks’; ‘ “ ’ and ‘ ” ’ and ‘quotation marks’ are claimed with different ideas by the perspective on the statement because there is no ‘in painting’ in between of ‘quotation marks’. However, I read that

there are the quotation marks, which are ‘ “ ’, ‘ ” ’, around ‘in painting’. It is not ‘ “ ’ and ‘ ” ’ which are claimed with ‘the double horns’. The number of ‘horns’ is plural and it is ‘double’ in the case of the ‘quotation marks’ — but where is that horn of ‘horns’? ‘[T]he double horns’ should be part ‘of’ somewhere ‘quotation marks’, but I do not see the image of the double horns. I only see the words, ‘the double horns’. ‘[A] form of writing’ seems that it might have been ‘depict[ed]’, but ‘he did not depict a form of writing with his fingers in the air’. Does that mean other than ‘he’ could have ‘de-  
pict[ed] a form of writing with his fingers in the air’? Does that mean ‘he’ could have ‘depict[ed] a form of writing with his fingers in the air’, but ‘did not’? As there is no depiction, I do not see any depiction of ‘a form of writing’, ‘his fingers in the air’ or ‘a form or writing with his fingers in the air’.

““I am interested in the idiom in painting”” is not something for ‘you’; it is a result of ‘merely com[ing]’ and ‘announce[ment]’. ““I am interested in the idiom in painting”” is neither from anyone nor anywhere. However, ““I am interested in the idiom in painting”” is something ‘to you’. There is an ‘announce[ment]’, but it does not mean that ‘you’ would hear something.

‘[T]he idiom’ is not out of ‘painting’. From the perspective’s point of view, ‘[h]e’ knows that ‘the idiom’ is ‘in painting’; it is not out of ‘painting’. ‘[T]he idiom’ is not only inside of ‘painting’ but also ‘in[side]’ of ‘interested’. ‘[T]he idiom’ and ‘painting’ are differently ‘in’ somewhere else.

As he comes and has just come [*vient de venir*], the frame is missing, the edges of any context open out wide. You are not completely in the dark, but what does he mean exactly?

Does he mean that he is interested in the idiom “in painting,” in the idiom itself, for its own sake, “in painting” (an expression that is in itself strongly idiomatic; but what is an idiom?)?<sup>67</sup>

There are two different ‘com[ings]’ in the statement above: ‘comes’ and ‘has just come’. However, it is only one (‘he’) who ‘comes’ and ‘has just come’. ‘[T]he frame is missing’ and ‘the edges of any context open out wide’ are conditional on two ‘com-ing[s]’ of ‘he’. ‘[H]e comes’, ‘has just comes’, ‘the frame is missing’ and ‘the edges of any context open out wide’ are the consecutive happenings. For example, ‘the frame is missing’ comes after ‘he comes and has just come’.

‘[T]he frame’ and ‘the edges of any context’ are ‘the’ ones whereas ‘any context’ is not the one. For that reason, when ‘any context’ is compared to ‘the frame’ and ‘the edges of any context’, ‘the frame’ and ‘the edges of any context’ are more certain to the perspective on the statement above. However, the number of ‘the frame’ and the number of ‘the edges of any context’ are not same. Nothing is part of ‘the frame’, but ‘the edges’ are the part of ‘any context’. Since it is claimed to be ‘any context’, there is no restriction to be ‘context’ as long as ‘any context’ belongs to ‘the edges’. In the case of ‘any context’, there are ‘the edges’ which are ‘open[ed] out wide’; ‘the edges’ are different from ‘the frame’ since the opening of ‘the edges’ does not continue like ‘the frame’.

Something can be ‘in’ ‘the dark’ according to the statement. For the reason that ‘[y]ou are not completely in the dark’, ‘[y]ou’ is not completely out of ‘the dark’. Part of ‘[y]ou’ is ‘in the dark’. ‘You’ is neither coloured nor shaded. There is darkness

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

around '[y]ou'. Something can be 'in the dark' 'completely', but it is not the case of '[y]ou'.

It seems 'he' did not 'mean exactly' for the perspective on 'he'. '[H]e' did not ask 'what does he mean exactly' and it is not asked by '[y]ou' either. To 'mean exactly' is questioned with 'what', but 'what' does not 'mean' something exact since 'what' is asked as a question. To 'mean' is to be exact and also not exact according to the statement. For that reason, I would like to insist that there could be other 'mean[ing]' which is (or are) not 'exactly' 'what', but I do not know what that (or those) could be.

After the first question, '[y]ou' is no longer stated within the following three sentences. The second question is also about 'he' and 'mean', but 'he' and 'mean' in the second question are different from 'he' and 'mean' in the first question. There is no exactness within the second question. '[H]e' in the second question does not claim that 'he is interested in'; it is asked by the perspective on 'he'. '[H]e' in the second question also '[d]oes' not 'mean' anything. Whatever 'he' is 'interested', the interestness are all claimed to be 'in'. '[H]e' is claimed to be 'interested in' something, but the interestness and what are 'in' do not belong to 'he'. What 'he' is 'interested in' is assumed as 'the idiom "in painting"'.

Next to "in painting", there are 'an expression that is in itself strongly idiomatic' and 'an idiom'; these two are within the brackets. There is a single 'expression' which is 'in itself strongly idiomatic'. '[A]n expression' in the statement above is not an expression itself. '[I]tself' is not 'in' where 'an expression' is claimed to be 'in'. Therefore, 'an expression' and 'itself' are different from each other. '[I]tself' is not empty since 'an expression' is 'in' there. In other words, 'an expression' is not only 'strongly idiomatic' but also 'in itself'. Within the brackets, there is no idiom. Within the brackets, there is 'an expression' which is 'strongly idiomatic'. So far, I have read 'the idiom'

in two different sentences, but none of them is ‘strongly idiomatic’. ‘[A]n idiom’ is asked with ‘what’. ‘[A]n idiom’ is asked with ‘what’, but it does not mean that the perspective on ‘an idiom’ does not know about ‘an idiom’. ‘[A]n idiom’ can be asked and its number is singular. ‘[A]n idiom’ is different from ‘an expression’ because ‘an idiom’ is not ‘strongly idiomatic’. ‘[A]n idiom’ is also not idiomatic like ‘the idiom’.

In the following two paragraphs of the statement above, ‘words’ are repeated for four times and ‘painting’ are repeated for seven times. ‘[W]ords’ are always plural and ‘painting’ is always singular. According to the statement of the first paragraph, four ‘words’ and six ‘painting[s]’ are something to be ‘in’. The ideas which are claimed on ‘words’ and ‘painting’ are all different from each other to the perspective on the statement.

That he is interested in the idiomatic expression itself, in the words “in painting”? Interested in words in painting or in the words “in painting” Or in the words “ ‘in painting’ ”?

That he is interested in the idiom in painting, i.e., in what pertains to the idiom, the idiomatic trait or style (that which is singular, proper, inimitable) in the domain of painting, or else— another possible translation— in the singularity or the irreducible specificity of pictorial art, of the “language” which painting is supposed to be, etc.?<sup>68</sup>

‘[M]ean[ing]’ of ‘he’ is no longer claimed within the questions above. ‘That he is inter-

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., pp. 1-2.



ested in [...]?’ is asked twice. ‘[T]he idiomatic expression itself, in the words “in painting”’ might be and not be what ‘he is interested in’ since it is asked as a question. Furthermore, ‘the idiomatic expression itself, ‘the words “in painting”’ might be and might not be ‘*in*[side]’ (also my emphasis on ‘in’) of the interestness. ‘[T]he idiomatic expression itself’ and ‘the words, “in painting”’ are not claimed to be ‘interested in’ something. “‘[I]n painting”’ is not only surrounded by the quotation marks but also claimed with ‘the words’. There are differences between ‘the words’ and “‘in painting”’ because 1. there is no quotation mark around ‘the words’, 2. ‘[T]he words’ and “‘in painting”’ are all words, but “‘in painting”’ is a different word which I read with ‘the words’, 3. ‘[T]he words’ are not “‘in painting”’. ‘[T]he words “in painting”’ is neither the painting nor the idiom; it is ‘the idiomatic expression itself’.

In the second paragraph of the first sentence above, ‘he is interested in the idiom in painting, i.e.’. Because of ‘i.e.’, I read that the interestness continues as ‘in what pertains to the idiom, the idiomatic trait or style (that which is singular, proper, inimitable) in the domain of painting, or else’. ‘[P]ertain[ing]’ is ‘in[side]’ of what ‘he is interested’. With ‘in’ what ‘he is interested’, ‘pertain[ing]’ ‘pertains to’ ‘the idiom’, ‘the idiomatic trait or style (that which is singular, proper, inimitable) in the domain of painting’, ‘else [...] in the singularity’, ‘the irreducible specificity of pictorial art, of that “language” which painting is supposed to be’ and ‘etc’.

‘[T]he idiom’ is neither the trait nor the style. ‘[T]he idiom’ is not idiomatic either; instead, there is ‘the idiomatic trait or style’ which is ‘in the domain of painting’. Not all the trait and style are ‘in the domain of painting’. There are the certain ‘trait’ and ‘style’ which are ‘in the domain of painting’. ‘[T]hat which is singular, proper, inimitable’ are something about ‘the idiomatic trait or style’. To be ‘singular’, ‘proper’ and ‘inimitable’ are claimed with ‘the idiomatic trait or style’; ‘the idiom’ is also singular, but

it is not something ‘proper’ and ‘inimitable’ within the text.

‘[E]lse’ is different from ‘the idiom’ and ‘the idiomatic trait or style’ since there is no translation of ‘the idiom’ and ‘the idiomatic trait or style’. There is ‘another possible translation’ of ‘else’, but ‘another possible translation’ has not been translated as such. ‘[A]nother possible translation’ of ‘else’ is not a certain ‘translation’ since it is ‘possible’ to be a ‘translation’. In addition, there might other translations of ‘another possible translation’ of ‘else’. In short, ‘else’ can be translated and also translated as other than ‘else’ because of ‘another possible translation’.

‘[T]he singularity’ and ‘the irreducible specificity’ are claimed with different idea since ‘the singularity’ is not ‘irreducible’. It is only ‘the [...] specificity’ which is ‘the irreducible’ one. However, it does not mean that ‘the singularity’ is reducible one. It also does not mean that ‘the irreducible specificity’ is already reduced to be ‘irreducible’ since nothing has been reduced from ‘the irreducible specificity’. The thing which is ‘irreducible’ is ‘the [...] specificity’. They are different from each other, but two of them are all part of ‘pictorial art’ and ‘the “language” which painting is supposed to be’. ‘[P]ictorial art’ and ‘the “language”’ are different from each other although ‘the singularity’ and ‘the irreducible specificity’ are all claimed to be part of ‘pictorial art’ and ‘the “language” which painting is supposed to be’. They are different from each other because there is no supposition of ‘pictorial art’.

In the following paragraph of the statement above, there are the claims about ‘you’. The ideas and claims are not from ‘you’. The perspective on the text supposes that ‘you’ might have counted ‘at least four hypotheses’.

Which makes, if you count them well, at least four hypotheses; but each one divides again, is grafted and contaminated by all the others, and you would never be finished translating them.

Nor will I.

And if you were to bide your time awhile here in these pages, you would discover that I cannot dominate the situation, or translate it, or describe it. I cannot report what is going on in it, or narrate it or depict it, or pronounce it or mimic it, or offer it up to be read or formalized without remainder. I would always have to renew, reproduce, and reintroduce into the formalizing economy of my tale—overloaded each time with some supplement—the very indecision which I was trying to reduce. At the end of the line it would be just as if I had just said: “I am interested in the idiom in painting.”<sup>69</sup>

The number of ‘hypothes[i]s’ could be more than four since there are ‘at least four hypotheses’. The number of ‘four hypotheses’ are something to be counted by ‘you’. According to the statement, ‘you’ does not only ‘count’ but also ‘count’ something ‘well’. In other words, the number of ‘hypothes[i]s’ needs to be ‘count[ed]’ ‘well’. ‘[F]our hypotheses’ are not only counted but also ‘ma[d]e’ as ‘at least four hypotheses’. ‘[Y]ou’ does not make anything; what ‘you’ does is ‘count[ing] them well’.

‘[H]ypotheses’ are not ‘divid[ed]’, ‘grafted’ and ‘contaminated’ altogether at the same time. At first, ‘each one divides again’. ‘[D]ivid[ing]’ is different from ‘graft[ing] and contaminat[ing]’ because ‘graft[ing] and contaminat[ing]’ are not

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

‘grafted and contaminated’ ‘again’. In addition, ‘divid[ing]’ is not ‘divid[ed]’ by anyone. ‘[D]ivid[ing]’ does not happen once. ‘[D]ivid[ing]’ might happen twice or three times — and ‘each one’ can be ‘divide[d] again’. However, the number of ‘divi[sion]’ of ‘each one’ is not specified as such. ‘[D]ivid[ing]’, ‘graft[ing]’ and ‘contaminat[ing]’ are not what ‘each one’ does; ‘graft[ing]’ and ‘contaminat[ing]’ would be done by ‘all the others’. To be ‘divide[d] again’ is prior to ‘graft[ing]’ and ‘contaminat[ing]’. The consequence of ‘divi[sion]’, ‘graft’ and ‘contaminat[i]on’ are that ‘you would never be finished translating them’. ‘[C]ount[ing]’ and ‘translating’ are claimed with different ideas by the perspective on ‘you’ since there is no negation in the case of ‘count[ing]’. ‘[Y]ou’ might ‘translat[e] them’, but there will be no end of ‘translating them’ — there is an end of ‘translating them’, but it is not the case for ‘you’. There is no finish in the cases of ‘count[ing]’, ‘divid[ing]’ and to be ‘grafted and contaminated’. ‘[E]ach one’ is excluded from ‘all the others’ since ‘each one’ does not do something what ‘all the others’ do. For that reason, ‘all’ of ‘all the others’ does not mean all. There is an exception to be ‘all the others’ in the certain circumstances. There are the others who are not part of ‘all the others’. ‘I’, who is not I, also will not ‘finish’ ‘translating them’.

‘[T]ranslati[on]’ will not be ‘finished’ by ‘them’ either.

The numbers of ‘these’ and ‘pages’ are both plural and they might be all ‘here in’. ‘[Y]ou’ and ‘your time’ also might be ‘here in’. ‘[Y]ou’ is not always ‘here in’ since there is a time when ‘you’ would be ‘here in’. It is not ‘you’ who claims something about ‘you’ in the statement, but ‘you’ is claimed to ‘bide your time awhile here in this page’. In addition, there is ‘your time’; ‘[t]ime’ belongs to ‘your’ for the perspective on

'your'.<sup>70</sup> The result of 'bid[ing] your time awhile' of 'you' is 'you would discover that I cannot dominate the situation, or translate it, or describe it' and 'I cannot report what is going on in it, or narrate it or depict it, or pronounce it or mimic it, or offer it up to be read or formalized without remainder'. As it is 'you would discover', 'discover[ing]' of 'you' might not happen. '[Y]ou' does not always 'discover' that 'I cannot dominate the situation, or translate it, or describe it' and 'I cannot report what is going on in it, or narrate it or depict it, or pronounce it or mimic it, or offer it up to be read or formalized without remainder'. It is 'you' who 'would discover' and there is 'I' who 'cannot' do multiple things. 'I' does not 'discover' that 'I cannot' do such things. I have counted the number of things what 'I cannot' do: 1. 'I cannot dominate the situation', 2. 'or translate it', 3. 'or describe it', 4. 'I cannot report what is going on in it', 5. 'or narrate it', 6. 'or depict it', 7. 'or pronounce it', 8. 'or mimic it', 9. 'or offer it up to be read or formalize without remainder'. The number of what 'I cannot' do is nine. Nine verbs which 'I cannot' do are claimed with 'or'. I read what 'I cannot' do are all different from each other and 'I' is not supposed to do these nine actions at the same time.

Then, there is a list of what 'I would always have to' do. What 'I cannot' do and what 'I would always have to' do are different from each other. In the case of what 'I would always have to' do, there is a frequency, 'always'. What 'I cannot' do is not claimed with 'would'. However, there is a possibility for 'I' that 'I' might not 'have to' do something which are stated in the statement above. In other words, 'I' might not 'have to' 'renew, reproduce, and reintroduce'. However, when 'I' 'renew, reproduce and, reintroduce', this 'I' 'would always' do 'renew, reproduce, and reintroduce'. What

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<sup>70</sup> I did not change 'your' as *you* (my emphasis) although 'your' seems grammatically incorrect within the text. It was because I did not wish to confuse 'you' and 'your' which are mentioned in the same sentence. As I read 'you' and 'your' are claimed with different ideas, I had to differentiate 'you' and 'your' clearly. Regardless of the grammatical reason, that is the reason why I mentioned 'your' and 'you' as they are.

‘I would always have to’ do with ‘my tale’ has not done yet.

‘[M]y tale’ will be not be the same tale after ‘the formalizing’ since ‘I would always have to renew, reproduce, and reintroduce into the formalizing economy of my tale’. However, it does not mean that ‘my tale’ will become other than ‘my tale’ after ‘the formalizing’. Despite the constant ‘formalizing’, it will still be ‘my tale’. ‘[T]he formalizing economy of my tale’ will contain what ‘I’ have ‘renew[ed], reproduce[d], and reintroduce[d]’. The result of ‘renew[ing], reproduc[ing], and reintroduc[ing]’ are to be ‘overloaded each time with some supplement’. ‘[R]enew[ing], reproduc[ing], and reintroduc[ing]’ do not only ‘renew, reproduce, and reintroduce’ ‘my tale’ but also ‘overload’ ‘some supplement’ into ‘my tale’. ‘[O]verload[ing]’ seems to happen more than once. In addition, ‘some supplement’ has been loaded already to ‘my tale’. ‘[O]verload[ing]’ will not happen at the same time as ‘I’ ‘renew[s], reproduce[s], and reintroduce[s] into the formalizing economy of my tale’ and when ‘I was trying to reduce’. Whenever ‘overload[ing]’ happens, ‘some supplement’ would be ‘overloaded’ as an addition to ‘my tale’. The trial of ‘I’ was ‘to reduce’, but the result of ‘reduc[ing]’ is ‘overload[ing]’.

There is ‘the end’ of ‘the line’. According to the statement, ‘the line’ is not a line which is situated at somewhere particular. There might be no ‘I just had said’ and “‘I am interested in the idiom in painting’” ‘[a]t the end of the line’, if they are not ‘[a]t the end of the line’. ‘At the end of the line’, in other words, there would be more than ‘the line’, what ‘I just had said’ and also “‘I am interested in the idiom in painting.’” ‘“I am interested in the idiom in painting’” has been already ‘said’ and it would be ‘[a]t the end of the line’. Therefore, “‘I am interested in the idiom in painting’” is not only saying of ‘I’ but also what has been left ‘[a]t the end of the line’.

Another paragraph starts with ‘[a]nd should I [...]’. For the reason that the paragraph starts with ‘[a]nd’, it seems that something from the previous part has not ended yet. I will read the two paragraphs which all start with ‘[a]nd’. Within the paragraphs, there are the repetitions of ‘I’.

And should I now write it several times, loading the text with quotation marks, with quotation marks within quotation marks, with italics, with square brackets, with pictographed gestures, even if I were to multiply the refinements of punctuation in all the codes, I wager that at the end the initial residue would return. [...] And I leave you now with someone who comes and says the words, it is not I: “I am interested in the idiom in painting.”<sup>71</sup>

‘[T]o multiply the refinements of punctuation in all the codes’ is prior to ‘write it several times, loading the text with quotation marks, with quotation marks within quotation marks, with italics, with square brackets, with pictographed gestures’ to ‘I’. ‘[M]ultiply[ing] the refinements of punctuation’ does not exceed the boundary of ‘all the codes’ since ‘the refinements of punctuation’ are ‘in’ ‘all the codes’. There are ‘the refinements’ which are the part of ‘punctuation’. No matter how many ‘the refinements of punctuation’ there are, ‘the refinements of punctuation’ are ‘in all the codes’. Both ‘punctuation’ and ‘the refinements’ are not claimed with all, but ‘the codes’ are claimed with ‘all’. There might be some other ‘refinements of punctuation’ which are not ‘in’ ‘all the codes’. ‘[A]ll the codes’ have not been ‘multipl[ied]’ and refined. The number of ‘the refinements of punctuation’ which are ‘in all the codes’ seems to be increased,

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

but the number of what 'I write now it' has not been increased.

It is only 'I' who is claimed to 'write it several times'. In other words, 'I' does not write once if 'I' 'should' 'write it'. No matter how many 'several times' 'I' 'write[s] it', the time when 'I' 'write[s] it' would be 'now'. '[N]ow' is repetitive. In other words, 'now' is whenever 'I' 'should' 'write it several times'. '[N]ow' is conditional on 'I', what 'I' 'write[s]' and 'several times'. What 'I' 'write[s]' is 'load[ed] with' multiple number of things. '[I]t', which is written by 'I', has been 'load[ed]' something which are not 'it'. When something are 'load[ed]' to 'it', they are 'with' 'loading'. It is neither 'it' nor writing which 'load[s]' 'quotation marks', 'quotation marks within quotation marks', 'italics', 'square brackets' and 'pictographed gestures'. '[I]t' is not only what 'I' 'should' 'write' with the frequency of 'several times' and the moment of 'now'. '[Q]uotation marks', 'quotation marks within quotation marks', 'italics', 'square brackets' and 'pictographed gestures' are also the additions of what 'I' 'write'.

There is 'I' who then 'wager[s]'. What 'I' is claimed to 'wager' might not happen because it is claimed on the basis of 'wager[ing]'. Not all the residues would 'return' 'at the end'; what would be 'return[ed]' is 'the initial residue'. Since the number of 'the initial residue' is singular and it is 'the initial' one, there would be no other residues which 'would return' 'at the end'. '[T]he initial residue' also does not always 'return' because the moment of 'return[ing]' has to be 'at the end'. For example, 'the initial residue' might not 'return' if 'the initial residue' is not 'at the end'. In other words, there is a possibility that 'the initial residue would' not 'return' although it is 'at the end'. To be 'at the end' does not mean that there will be the 'return[ing]' of 'initial residue'. However, to what extent is it 'the initial' one and to what extent is it 'at the end'? Furthermore, what is to be *at* (my emphasis) 'the end'? I would like to claim that it might not be 'the initial' one and 'end'/'at the end' to 'you' since the claim about 'wager[ing]' is



from the perspective on 'I'.

In the last sentence of the statement above, there are 'I' and 'you'. Since 'I leave[s] you now', 'you' is not with 'I' 'now'. 'I' might have been with 'you' before 'now'. Both 'you' and 'I' do not come and say. '[C]om[ing]' and 'say[ing]' are what 'someone' does. '[T]he words' are, therefore, neither from 'you' nor 'I'. '[Y]ou' is being left 'with someone', but it does not mean that 'you' sees 'who' is 'come[ing]' and hearing any of 'the words'. "I am interested in the idiom in painting" is not only 'say[ing]' but also 'the words' of 'someone'. "I am interested in the idiom in painting" is not what 'you' hears because there is no hearing of 'you' in the statement above. Although 'the words' are "I am interested in the idiom in painting", 'the words' are not 'the words' of 'I'. It also has been claimed as 'it is not I'.


'[C]om[ing]' and 'say[ing]' 'the words' are not what 'someone' has claimed; it is the perspective on 'someone' who claims that 'someone' 'comes and says the words'. 'I' and 'you' never say anything. It is claimed that 'someone who comes and says the words'. However, I do not see anyone coming and hear anyone saying. I do not hear "I am interested in the idiom in painting" either. I have not seen anyone 'leav[ing]'. I also have not seen that 'you' and 'someone' are together. I still do not see any painting of 'painting'.

I started to read and write something about 'painting' in this chapter because I was interested in paintings. It is not me who says, "I am interested in the idiom in painting". However, I am also interested in painting and the idiom in painting. I am interested in reading "I am interested in the idiom in painting". It was 'I' who left 'you' with "I am interested in the idiom in painting". Although I was not left with 'you' and 'someone', it was interesting to read something about 'the idiom', 'painting' and 'the

idiom in painting' — as if I was with 'someone' and listen to 'the words', “I am interested in the idiom in painting.””

## Chapter 8: Seeing and Eyes

The last page number in *My Five Senses* is 33 and the first page number is three. As there are no page one and page two, I have counted backwards from page three to see which pages might have been page one and page two. I have attached those two pages below.



I will read these two pages as the pages without page number since I do not see any numbers on the page. On the left page, there is 'I can see! I see with my eyes!'. There are two 'I' and two 'see'. However, I read that 'see[ing]' are different from each other. The first 'I' has an ability to 'see'. There is no ability to 'see' when the second 'I' is claimed to 'see with my eyes'. '[M]y eyes' are the addition of 'see[ing]' of the second 'I', but there is no addition in the case of the first 'I'. It is not 'my eyes' which 'see'. '[M]y' does not see like 'I' who 'see[s] with my eyes'. There is no ownership in the cases of the first and the second 'I'. The number of 'my eyes' is plural. The number of 'my eyes' is not one. No matter how many 'my eyes' are, 'I see with my eye'. If there is only one eye or no eye to 'my', would the second 'I' 'see'?

If I compare the right page with the front cover, there is no arrow. I read two eyes from the blue circle. There are two curved lines around each blue circle. I have read the two 'I' from the text, but there is one 'I' on right page. 'I' on the right page is claimed with different colours and frames. In the case of the right page, eyes are neither an addition of 'I' nor what the frame sees. In addition, the number of eyes is two. It seems that the ideas on 'my eyes' on the left page and eyes on the right page are different from each other. Eyes on the right page are claimed with different colours and shapes. If there were no two blue circles and four curved lines, it would have been difficult for me to read that there are two eyes. I do not read any ideas which are related to the ownership when I read the right page. However, if I read two eyes on the right page with 'my eyes' on the left page, those eyes on the right page belong to the frame which I read as the pictorial 'I'. Therefore, I would like to insist that two blue circles and four curved lines belong to the pictorial 'I'.

Two eyes on the right page do not *see* (my emphasis) although I have read the pictorial eyes from reading 'my eyes' which 'I see with'. In that sense, the pictorial 'I' on the right page does not see either. In addition, the perspective on the right page does not claim that the pictorial 'I' is someone who sees. However, as I have read out two eyes and the pictorial 'I' from reading the text, I would like to insist that there could be some frames which are related to 'can see' and 'see with my eyes'. Then, where are those 'see[ing] with my eyes' and 'can see' on the right page? Where is 'my' who is different from 'I' on the right page?

On both right and left pages, there is green. Black is also on both pages, but I do not read that green and black are claimed with the same idea. For example, black is a colour of the picture in the case of the right page, but it is a colour of the statement in

the case of the left page. Green is not colour of a letter. Green is not within the frame which I had read as 'I'. Both black and green are all colours, but they are different to the perspective on right and left pages. Green is not a colour of the statement. On the right page, green is none of hair, eye, ears, mouth, etc; it is out of 'I'. I would not say that 'green is a colour of background'. In the case of the left page, the statement is not in front of green. In the case of the right page, 'I' is not in front of green either. In other words, green on both pages is not behind any other frames. Therefore, I will not announce in this chapter that there is a background on the right and left pages.

Then, what is green on both pages? Green on each page is not 'I'. Green is not nothing, because I read that there is green. Green on each page is same green. However, green is framed differently on each page. In the case of the right page, green is always outside of other colours. In other words, the frame of green is outside of the others. However, green on the left page is not only outside of the letters but also inside of the letters. If there were no vertical line in the middle, I would have not read the right and the left page. I can fold the two pages with my hands. For those reasons, green also seems to be divided into two different parts.

I do not read any of 'I' and 'see[ing]' from green. Therefore, I would like to claim that green is not what 'I can see' and 'I see with my eyes'. '[S]ee[ing]' (also my emphasis) is not only claimed on the left and the right pages. '[S]ee[ing]' is also stated in other pages of *My Five Senses*. None of the statements in *My Five Senses* clarifies what 'five senses' are. I have read the five arrows on the front cover, but the five arrows do not claim that the picture of eyes are related to 'five senses'. In *My Five Senses*, the narration does not mention that 'see' is one of 'my five senses'. For that reason, I did not wish to conclude that 'see[ing]' is one of sense of 'I' or 'my'. What is more, 'senses' and 'see' are never claimed together on the same page of *My Five Senses*. Therefore, I

will not insist that ‘see[ing]’ is one of ‘senses’. ‘[S]enses’ and ‘see’ are different from each other because ‘see’ does not belong to anyone and anything.

For the reason that ‘see[ing]’ has been mentioned in the first page of *My Five Senses*, I regarded that there might be the ideas which I have read from the blurb and front cover. ‘[T]his’, which is *My Five Senses*, ‘is a let’s-read-and-find-out science book’. *My Five Senses* is one of ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’. Thus, *My Five Senses* might ‘present basic science information’ and have ‘written with an understanding of how children think’. ‘[S]ee[ing]’ in the first page is, therefore, ‘written with an understand of how children think’ and a ‘presentat[ion]’ of ‘basic science information’. According to the left page, ‘see’ is what ‘I can’ and ‘I’ does; these are also ‘written with an understand of how children think’.

I wished to read how seeing is claimed in other criticisms. In John Berger’s *Ways of Seeing*, there is a part which claims about ‘see’, ‘look at’ and ‘vision’.<sup>72</sup> I thought that this part from Berger is similar to what I have read from *My Five Senses*. In order to think how seeing and other ideas, which are related to seeing, are claimed within the different text, I will read Berger’s text.

According to the title, *Ways of Seeing*, ‘[s]eeing’ is not ‘[w]ays’. There seems to be multiple ‘[w]ays’ which are part of ‘[s]eeing’. The number of ‘[s]eeing’ is not plural; ‘[s]eeing’ is not what to be seen. ‘Seeing’ has not ‘[s]ee[n]’ by anyone. What are the ‘[w]ays’? What are the ‘ways’ which are part of ‘[s]eeing’?

‘Seeing comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can

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<sup>72</sup> John Berger, *Ways of Seeing*, 7ed (London and Harmondsworth: British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin Books, 1979).

speak'.<sup>73</sup> 'Seeing' is not 'word'. Time for 'come[ing]' of '[s]eeing' and 'words' are different; '[s]eeing' is prior to 'words'. 'Seeing' does not go. 'Seeing' also does not go to 'words'. 'Seeing' does not come with or after 'words'. '[W]ords' are not something to come for the perspective on the statement above. There is a sequence between '[s]eeing', 'com[ing]' and 'words'. Once '[s]eeing comes', 'words' would be there after 'com[ing]' of '[s]eeing'. 'Seeing' is different from what '[t]he child looks and recognizes' because '[s]eeing' is not what '[t]he child' does. In that sense, 'words' are not as same as 'speak[ing]' because 'words' are not what 'it can' do. '[L]ook[ing] and recogniz[ing]' are different from 'speak[ing]' because 'look[ing]' and 'recogniz[ing]' are not what '[t]he child' can do. 'The child' does not need an ability in order to 'look' and 'recognize', but 'it' needs an ability to 'speak'. There is a sequence between 'look[ing]'/ 'recogniz[ing]' of '[t]he child' and 'speak[ing]' of 'it'. '[L]ook[ing] and 'recogniz[ing]' are prior to 'speak[ing]'.

'Seeing' is different from 'look[ing] and recogniz[ing]' for the perspective on the statement. Therefore, '[s]eeing' is not 'look[ing] and recogniz[ing]'. 'Seeing' is claimed with 'words' whereas 'look[ing] and recogniz[ing]' are claimed with an ability of 'speak[ing]'. '[L]ook[ing]' and 'recogniz[ing]' are grouped together although they are different as '[t]he child' do 'look' 'and' 'recognize'. 'The child' does not do either of 'look[ing]' or 'recogniz[ing]'. Furthermore, it is not '[t]he child' who speaks; there is no one who speaks. There is 'it' who 'can speak'. The ability of 'it' is different from 'look[ing] and recogniz[ing]' of '[t]he child' since 'look[ing]' and 'recogniz[ing]' of '[t]he child' is not an ability. In addition, 'look[ing] and recogniz[ing]' of '[t]he child' are prior to 'speak'. When 'it can speak', it would not happen at the same moment when

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

‘[t]he child looks and recognizes’.

But there is also another sense in which seeing comes before words. It is seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding world; we explain that world with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it. The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled.<sup>74</sup>

In the case of ‘seeing’, nothing is coming. ‘[S]eeing’ is something ‘which establishes our place in the surrounding world’. There is ‘our place’, but ‘seeing’ does not belong to ‘our’. ‘[O]ur place’ is different from ‘the surrounding world’. It is because ‘the surrounding world’ is not established by anything, but ‘our place’ is claimed to be ‘establishe[d]’ by ‘seeing’ which is not ‘our’<sup>75</sup>. Therefore, I read that ‘seeing’ and ‘establish[ment]’ are prior to ‘our place’. ‘[O]ur place’ will not be ‘in the surrounding world’ if there are no ‘seeing’ and ‘establish[ment]’.

‘[T]he surrounding world’ does not belong to ‘our’ either. For that reason, ‘place’ and ‘the surrounding world’ are different from each other; ‘the surrounding world’ is not in anywhere whereas ‘our place’ is ‘in’ ‘the surrounding world’. ‘[O]ur’ who own ‘place’ are not in ‘our place’. However, it does not mean that ‘our’ are *in* (my emphasis) ‘the surrounding world’ either. What is claimed to be ‘in the surrounding world’ is the ‘place’. ‘[O]ur place’ might have not been established yet because ‘seeing’ ‘establishes our place’. ‘[E]stablish[ment]’ of ‘seeing’ is not for ‘the surrounding world’. Therefore, ‘the surrounding world’ would not be ‘establishe[d]’ by ‘seeing’ whereas ‘our place’ would continue to be ‘establishe[d]’ as long as there is ‘seeing’.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 7.



After semi-colon, there is 'that world with words'. '[W]ords' are the additions of 'that world'. '[W]e' are the one who 'explain that world with words'. '[W]ords' do not explain. '[W]e' do not 'explain' 'we'. Since it is 'we' who are claimed to 'explain that world', the 'expla[nation]' itself is neither from 'that world' nor 'we'. '[E]xplain[ing]' of 'we' is not what 'we' see. When 'we explain', the 'expla[nation]' is 'with' multiple 'words'. '[W]ords' are not from any of 'we'. '[W]ords' are the addition of 'expla[nation]'. '[W]orld' can be 'explain[ed]' by 'we' and 'with words'. The particular 'fact' 'can never' be 'undo[ne]'. '[W]e are surrounded by it' is 'the fact' which is claimed by the perspective on 'we'. Once 'we explain that world with words', 'words can never undo the fact'. Therefore, there might be other words which are not the additions of 'expla[nation]'. The 'words' are claimed with an ability which 'can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it'. '[W]ords' are not 'the fact'. '[T]he fact' and 'we' do not 'undo the fact'; 'words' also do not 'undo the fact'. Since 'words can never undo the fact', there is no exception for 'words' of 'undo[ing]' 'the fact that we are surrounded by it'. '[T]he fact' is unchangeable not because it is 'the fact'; 'the fact' will be never 'undo[ne]' due the ability of 'words'.

'The relation' is not the relation *of* (my emphasis) 'what we see' and 'what we know'. 'The relation' is what to be in 'between' of 'what we see' and 'what we know'. The relation might be 'settled' if it is not '[t]he relation' of 'what we see and what we know'. However, '[t]he relation' is claimed to be 'never settled'.

The way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believe [...] We only see what we look at. To look is an act of choice. As a result of this act, what we see is brought within our reach - though not necessarily within arm's

reach. To touch something is to situate oneself in relation to it.<sup>75</sup>

For the reason that ‘see’ is what ‘we’ (also my emphasis) ‘see’, it is not the ‘see[ing]’ of a single person. However, the number of ‘the way we things’ is singular. In other words, something that has been ‘affected by what we know or what we believe’ is a single ‘way we see things’. ‘[W]e’ do not ‘see’ neither ‘we’ nor ‘[t]he way’. There are multiple ‘things’ ‘we see’, but only a single ‘way’ is for ‘see[ing]’.

‘The way we see things’ does not affect. ‘The way we see things’ is not ‘affected by’ ‘[t]he way’, what ‘we see’, ‘we’ and ‘see[ing]’. An ‘affect[ion]’ is from other than ‘[t]he way’, what ‘we see’, ‘we’ and ‘see[ing]’. An ‘affect[ion]’ is external to what ‘we see’, ‘we’ and ‘see[ing]’. Since an ‘affect[ion]’ is external, ‘[t]he way we see things’ is not innate to ‘we’.

In the case of the first sentence, there are three ‘we’. All ‘we’ look same, but I do not read that these ‘we’ are claimed with the same ideas. As I have already read the first ‘we’, I will continue to read the second and the third ‘we’ in the following paragraphs.

The second ‘we’ are who ‘know’ and the third ‘we’ are who ‘believe’. The perspective on the second and the third ‘we’ has knowledge about what ‘we’ ‘know’ and ‘believe’. In order to affect ‘[t]he way we see things’, ‘know[ing]’ and ‘believ[ing]’ have to be ‘what we know’ and ‘what we believe’. Not everything affects ‘[t]he way we see things’. Not all the ‘know[ing]’ and ‘believ[ing]’ affect ‘[t]he way we see things’.

I do not know what is ‘what’ since I am not one of ‘we’. However, it does not mean that none of ‘we’ knows ‘what’ is what. Whatever ‘what’ is, the second and the

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

third 'we' are claimed to 'know' and 'believe' 'what'. For the reason that there is something that has been 'know[n]' and 'believ[ed]', both 'what' are claimed to 'affect' '[t]he way we see things'. Without 'what we' are 'know[ing]' and 'what we' are believ[ing]', there might be nothing such as '[t]he way we see things'.

'[W]hat' has been 'see[n]' is 'what we look at'. The result of 'look[ing] at' is what '[w]e only see'. In this case, what '[w]e only see' are limited to 'what we look at'; this 'see[ing]' is conditional on 'look[ing] at' of 'we'. To 'see' is not 'an act of choice'. When there is 'an act' due to '[t]o look', 'choice' is part of 'an act'. However, 'at' is not 'an act of choice'. '[A]t' is not part of 'an act' either. Therefore, 'what we look at' is not 'an act of choice'; only '[t]o look' is 'an act of choice' according to the statement above.

'[W]hat we see' has been already 'brought within our reach'. In other words, 'what we see' is not only 'a result of this act' but also what has been already expected as such. The perspective on 'we' and 'our' knows that what would it be like when 'see[ing]' is 'brought'. What has '[been] brought' does not exceed 'our reach'. '[W]hat we see' does not mean that it is 'necessarily within arm's reach'. In other words, 'what we see' could exceed the boundary of 'arm's reach'. '[O]ur reach' is not necessarily 'arm's reach'. According to the statement, '[t]o touch something' is not just a physical touch; it is 'to situate oneself in relation to it'. When 'oneself' is 'situate[d]', it is 'in' 'relation' with 'it'. In order to '[t]o touch something', 'oneself' and 'it' need to be 'in relation'. However, 'it' (or 'something' which is claimed to be 'touch[ed]') does not need to be 'situate[d]' likewise 'oneself'.

We never look at just one thing; we are always looking at the relation between things and ourselves. Our vision is continually active, continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around itself, constituting what is present to

us as we are.

Soon after we can see, we are aware that we can also be seen. The eye of the other combines with our own eye to make it fully credible that we are part of the visible world.<sup>76</sup>

When '[w]e' are claimed to 'look at' some 'thing', '[w]e' 'look at' more than 'one thing'. When '[w]e' 'look at' more than 'one thing', 'we' do not only 'look'; there is 'at' with 'look[ing]'. '[L]ook[ing] at' and 'see[ing]' are different from each other because all 'see[ing]' are not claimed with 'at'. If '[w]e' do 'look' without 'at', '[w]e' might 'look' 'one thing' or the other 'thing' which is not 'one thing'. However, as '[w]e' are claimed to 'look at', they 'never look at just one thing'. For the perspective on '[w]e', there would be no possibility of 'look[ing] at' more than 'one thing' or other than 'one thing' in the case of '[w]e'.

There is no exception of 'looking at the relation between things and ourselves' in the case of 'we'. In addition, 'looking at the relation' of 'we' is more continuous than 'look at' of '[w]e'. 'We' might not 'always' look at 'the relation'. In other words, 'we' might not 'never look at just one thing'. Even if '[w]e' might 'always' look at 'the relation' which 'we are always looking at', I would like to claim that the ideas which are claimed on '[w]e' and 'we' are still different from each other. Therefore, 'look at' of '[w]e' and 'looking at' of 'we' are never the same.

'[T]he relation between things and ourselves' is something to be 'look[ed] at'. When 'we are always looking at', 'we' do not look at 'we'. '[W]e' do not look at 'things and ourselves' either. What is to be 'look[ed] at' by 'we' is a 'relation'. No matter how

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

many 'things' and 'ourselves' there are, a single 'relation' would be 'look[ed] at'. '[T]he relation' is something can be 'looked at'. '[T]he relation' would not be 'the relation without 'things and ourselves'. '[T]he relation' is not 'thing and ourselves' and vice versa. '[T]he relation' needs to be somewhere 'between' of 'things' and 'ourselves' according to the statement above. '[T]hings' do not own any self, but 'ourselves' are claimed to own multiple 'selves'. Due to the idea of ownership, 'things' and 'ourselves' are different from each other. It is 'we' who are 'always looking at the relation', but 'things and ourselves' do not look at anything.

No matter how many '[o]ur' there are, '[o]ur vision' would be singular. It is not '[o]ur' who are 'continually active, continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around itself, constituting what is present to us as we are'. As long as 'vision' belongs to '[o]ur', '[o]ur vision' would be 'continually active, continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around itself, constituting what is present to us as we are'. Being 'active' and 'moving' are not claimed with 'things' whereas 'holding' is. In addition, when '[o]ur vision' claimed to 'continually holding things', it is situated 'in' somewhere. When '[o]ur vision' is 'continually active' or 'continually moving', '[o]ur vision' does not 'circle around' anything. '[H]olding' of '[o]ur vision' is different from being 'active' and 'moving'.

'Our vision' is not only 'continually active, continually moving' and 'continually holding things in a circle around itself' because it also has been 'constitut[ed] what is present to us as we are'. For the perspective on the statement, being 'constitut[ed]' is not something continuous like 'active', 'moving' and 'holding'. '[W]hat is present to us' is not only a presentation but also a constitution. What has been 'constitut[ed]' and 'what' has been 'presented' are not for 'us'.

'Our' are claimed to own 'vision', but it does not mean that '[o]ur' or any of

'[o]ur' see or can see. It is same for 'us' and 'we'. There is no one who does see or can see in the statement above. 'Our vision' is not mine. I am not 'in' there. I do not 'circle around' although I know that I have a vision. For the reason that the perspective is not my perspective, I would not say that 'constituting what is present to us' is my case. I am not any of 'us' and 'we'. There are 'we' who 'are always looking at the relation between things and ourselves', but those 'we' do not look at '[o]ur vision' which is 'continually active, continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around itself'. Any of 'we' in the statement above do not look at 'us'.

The moment when 'we are aware that we can also be seen' is '[s]oon after we can see'. Ability to 'see' is prior to the 'aware[ness]' of 'we'. What 'we' 'aware' is not unlimited; in the case of 'we', 'that' is limited to 'we can also be seen'. '[W]e can also be seen' is what 'we are aware' of. In other words, 'we can see' is not what 'we are aware' of.

'The eye of the other' is not 'our own eye' since 'our own eye' will 'combine' later 'to make it fully credible that we are part of the visible world'. 'The eye of the other' and 'our own eye' do not see. There is 'the visible world' which 'we are part of'; 'we' are not full of 'the visible world' whereas '[t]he eye of the other' can 'make it fully credible'. To be 'credible' is claimed to be 'fully credible', but it needs to be 'ma[d]e' as 'fully credible' most of all. Therefore, 'that we are part of the visible world' is not only a 'combin[ation]' of the two different 'eye[s]' but also something that has been 'ma[de]' after the 'combin[ation]'.

I have finished reading the text about 'seeing' and 'see'. The ideas on 'seeing' and 'see' sometimes are related with 'know[ing]', 'believ[ing]', 'touch[ing]', etc in Berger's text. The ideas on 'seeing' and 'see' in *My Five Senses* are also related with other

things for some cases. The reason why I have chosen to read ‘see’ and ‘seeing’ from Berger is not solely because I wished to read how seeing is claimed in other criticisms; it is also related to my personal experience of reading the pictures — seeing is the main sense or the way what I am using when I read the pictures. However, I have to admit that seeing is not the only way or the sense what I use.

Before reading *My Five Senses* again, I will read Emmanuel Lévinas’ *Totality and Infinity* in order to see how Lévinas’ had claimed ‘touch’ and ‘vision’ in his text.

Inasmuch as the movement of the hand that touches traverses the “nothing” of space, touch resembles vision. Nevertheless vision has over the touch the privilege of maintaining the object in this void and receiving it always from this nothingness as from an origin, whereas in touch nothingness is manifested to the free movement of palpation. Thus for vision and for touch a being comes as though from nothingness, and in this precisely resides their traditional philosophical prestige.<sup>77</sup>

It is not ‘the hand’ which ‘touches’; it is ‘the movement of the hand that touches’.  
‘[T]he “nothing”’ is ‘the’ one; ‘the “nothing”’ is not nothing for the perspective on the statement above. Furthermore, there is ‘space’ where ‘the “nothing”’ is claimed to be its part. ‘[T]he movement of the hand’ does not ‘traverse’ ‘the “nothing”’; it is ‘the “nothing” of space’ where ‘the movement of the hand’ ‘touches’ and ‘traverses’. ‘[T]ravers[ing]’ ‘the movement of the hand’ does not necessarily contain touching, but there is

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<sup>77</sup> Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 189.

‘touch[ing]’ in the case of ‘travers[ing]’. ‘[T]he “nothing” of space’ has been ‘traverse[d]’ and also ‘touche[d]’ by ‘the movement of the hand’. A claim, ‘touch resembles vision’, is what has been stated later than ‘the movement of the hand that touches traverses the “nothing” of space’. ‘[T]ouch resembles vision’, but ‘vision’ might not resemble ‘touch’. ‘[T]ouch’ is not as same as ‘vision’.

‘[V]ision’ does not have ‘the privilege’ ‘over the touch’ for all the cases because ‘the privilege’ of ‘vision’ is refined to ‘maintaining the object in this void’ and ‘receiving it always from this nothingness as from as origin’. In other words, ‘touch[ing]’ would not be always *under* (my emphasis) ‘the privilege’ of ‘vision’. There is repetition of ‘this’ in the statement above: ‘this void’ and ‘this nothingness’. For the reason that ‘void’ and ‘nothingness’ are claimed with ‘this’, I would like to claim that ‘this void’ is not void and ‘this nothingness’ is not nothing. ‘[T]he object’ is not only ‘in this void’ but also has been ‘maintain[ed] [...] in this void’ with ‘the touch[ing]’ ‘the privilege’. There, ‘in this void’, ‘the object’ has not been seen and touched. When ‘it’ is claimed to be ‘receiv[ed]’, ‘it’ is not in anywhere. Something would be ‘from’ ‘an origin’ without an exception. ‘[I]t’ is not from ‘an origin’ when ‘it’ is ‘receiv[ed]’. ‘[I]t’ is ‘from this nothingness’. There might be something ‘from’ ‘this nothingness’. It seems that being ‘nothing[ness]’ can be mean something for some cases.

In addition, ‘in touch nothingness is manifested to the free movement of palpation’. In this case, vision is not ‘in’ anywhere; vision is not claimed with ‘touch’ and ‘touch[ing]’ of ‘nothingness’. Without stating vision, ‘touch nothingness’ is ‘manifested to the free movement of palpation’. However, to be ‘manifested’ does not mean that ‘touch nothingness’ is visible or detectable as ‘touch’ itself. Not all ‘touch[es]’ would be ‘manifested to the free movement of palpation’. ‘[T]he free movement of palpation’



is not out of ‘manifestat[ion]’. With ‘in’ the boundary of ‘the free movement of palpation’, ‘touch[ing] nothingness’ is claimed to be ‘in’ there. ‘[T]he free movement of palpation’ does not include vision. In other words, vision would not be ‘manifested to the free movement of palpation’.

Something would be ‘from nothingness’,<sup>78</sup> but it is not the cases for ‘vision’ and ‘touch’. ‘[A] being’ is also not ‘from nothingness’. ‘[V]ision’, ‘touch’ and ‘being’ are the latter and they are already ‘in this’ ‘their traditional philosophical prestige’. ‘[T]heir traditional philosophical prestige’ might not be out of ‘this’. ‘In’ there, ‘their traditional philosophical prestige’ ‘resides’. What is claimed to be ‘reside[d]’ ‘in’ there is neither tradition nor philosophy. ‘[P]restige’, which is not mine, belongs to multiple people. However, ‘prestige’ is also not the prestige of the perspective on the statement above. ‘[T]he[y]’ who own ‘traditional philosophical prestige’ is exclusive some other than ‘the[y]’ in that sense.

In relation to Berger and Lévinas’ texts and the pages which I have been reading from *My Five Senses*, I will read Yukuan Chen’s ‘Seeing Vision: Gesture, Movement and Colour in Painting in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s Staring: How We Look’. There, Chen reads Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s ‘Staring: How We Look’.<sup>79</sup> According to Chen, ‘this issue specifically by reading Garland-Thomson’s reading/description of a painting: the 1938 painting *Blind Beggars* by American artist Jacob Lawrence, and

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<sup>78</sup> This ‘nothingness’ is not ‘this nothingness’.

<sup>79</sup> See, more texts from Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and how Yukuan Chen reads the text from Garland-Thomson in ‘Seeing Vision: Gesture, Movement and Colour in Painting in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s Staring: How We Look’ in *Rethinking Disability Theory and Practice* ed. by Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 149-64.

her framing of her reading/description of this painting in her book.’<sup>80</sup> For the perspective on the statement, ‘reading’ is not ‘description’ and vice versa. It is not ‘Jacob Lawrence’ who claims that there is ‘a painting’. Something has been ‘read’. As a result of ‘reading’, ‘a painting’ is claimed to be from ‘American artist Jacob Lawrence’ and ‘reading/description’ is claimed to be from ‘Garland-Thomson’. In the case of ‘the 1938 painting *Blind Beggars*’, there is a singular ‘issue’ which is ‘specifically by reading Garland-Thomson’s reading/description of a painting’. ‘*Blind Beggars*’ is from ‘American artist Jacob Lawrence’ and it is read as ‘a painting’ in a ‘book’ of ‘Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’ according to the text from Chen.

After reading ‘the 1938 painting *Blind Beggars* by American artist Jacob Lawrence’, Chen states that

[t]here is something about the seen object that can in turn be observed to be produced constantly through a way of seeing in the framing of the narration. This is, then, exactly where the blurring point of seeing is situated, and it is somehow situated there unavoidably, just as the question of how the object is indicated to be seen is never and cannot be settled.<sup>81</sup>

‘[O]bject’ is ‘the seen object’. Because the ‘object’ is ‘the seen’ one, ‘see[ing]’ has been done. There is ‘turn’ for the ‘obsev[ation]’ of ‘the seen object’. ‘[T]he seen object’ would not be ‘observed’ if it is not ‘in turn’. What has been ‘observed’ is ‘produced

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<sup>80</sup> Yukuan Chen, ‘Seeing Vision: Gesture, Movement and Colour in Painting in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s *Staring: How We Look*’, p. 150.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.

constantly through a way of seeing in the framing of the narration'. There is 'the framing' for 'the narration'. In other words, 'the narration' is not out of 'the framing'. In addition, 'a way of seeing' is 'in the framing of the narration', but 'a way of seeing' is not part of 'the framing'. '[O]bserv[ation]' of 'the seen object' is not constantly observed, but 'produc[ing]' is 'produced constantly'.

The claim about 'something about the seen object', '[t]hen', continues in the following sentence. In the second sentence above, 'seeing' is not *the* (my emphasis) 'seeing' whereas 'the blurring point' is 'the' one. Compared to 'seeing', 'the blurring point' is more specific than 'seeing'. The perspective on the statement knows 'where' and 'how' 'the blurring point of seeing' is 'situated'. However, to what extent has something been 'blurr[ed]' and not 'blurr[ed]'? In addition, to what extent is 'the blurring point' the 'point' as the 'point'? There is 'the seen object' in the first sentence and 'the object is indicated to be seen' in the last sentence. '[T]he object' in the last sentence, then, might not 'be seen' because it is 'indicated to be seen'. For the perspective on the statement above, 'how the object is indicated to be seen' is part of 'the question'. In other words, 'how the object is indicated to be seen' is not 'the question' itself. Not all the questions are 'never and cannot be settled'. Other questions, which are not 'the question of how the object is indicated to be seen', would be 'settled' in that sense. Or, I read that '[t]he question[s]' are something claimed to be 'settled' within that statement above. '[T]he question of how the object is indicated to be seen', is not only 'never [...] settled' but also 'cannot be settled', but the impossibleness of 'be[ing] settled' is neither claimed by 'the question' nor 'the object'.

In the following sentence of the text from Chen, there is the second 'question' which is about 'how it is indicated to be seen'.

Indeed, it cannot even be set free from the question of how it is indicated to be seen, and thus free from it constantly being interpreted as seen: this is already a version of seeing or interpretation of the object being seen; it is already an addition or even a substitution of the object being indicated to be seen in that the object is always already never self-identical in being the ‘object’ of ‘vision’.<sup>82</sup>

Since there is ‘[i]ndeed’, I read that ‘the question of how the object is indicated to be seen’ and ‘the question of how it is indicated to be seen’ are claimed with different ideas although they look almost the same. The claim about ‘the question of how the object is indicated to be seen’ is not something ‘[i]ndeed’ or less to be ‘[i]ndeed’ when it is compared to ‘the question of how it is indicated to be seen’. ‘[I]t’ is not ‘free from’ the certain question, ‘[i]ndeed’. The impossibility of ‘be[ing] set free from the question of how it is indicated to be seen’ of ‘it’ is then claimed that ‘it’ would be ‘constantly’ ‘interpreted as’ ‘it’ is ‘seen’. ‘[I]t’, which is ‘constantly being interpreted as seen’, is also not ‘free from’ ‘constantly being interpreted as seen’. ‘[I]t’, which is ‘constantly being interpreted as seen’, does not see; it is ‘interpreted’ and ‘seen’ by the other which is not ‘it’.

‘[A] version of seeing’ and ‘interpretation of the object being seen’ are the retrospections to the perspective on the statement above; these are all ‘already’ to be ‘a version of seeing’ and ‘interpretation of the object being seen’. Although ‘a version’ is ‘a version of seeing’, ‘a version’ is neither claimed from ‘seeing’ nor ‘the object’. Although ‘interpretation’ is ‘interpretation of the object being seen’, ‘interpretation’ is not

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid., pp. 154-5.

the ‘interpretation’ which has been claimed from ‘the object’. ‘[A]n addition’ and ‘a substitution’, which are claimed with ‘the object being indicated to be seen’, are also the retrospections. However, ‘an addition’ and ‘a substitution’ are different from each other although these two are part of ‘the object being indicated to be seen’. It is neither ‘vision’ nor ‘object’ which is ‘self-identical in being’. In the case of “‘object’”, ‘object’ is not only within the quotation marks but also part of the “‘vision’”. What is claimed with ‘self-identical in being’ is “‘object’” which is a part of “‘vision’”, but ‘the “object” of “vision”’ is ‘always’, ‘already’, and ‘never’ ‘self-identical in being’. For the reason that ‘the “object” of “vision”’ is ‘always’, ‘already’, and ‘never’ ‘self-identical in being’, ‘the “object” of “vision”’ is either of ‘an addition’ or ‘a substitution of the object being indicated to be seen’.

Seeing is hence produced and constructed by both the possibility and the impossibility of seeing [...] And in Garland-Thomson’s description of a painting, it can be said that both her description of a painting as her seeing of a painting and her construction of *seeings* in a painting are all bound up with this possibility and impossibility of seeing.<sup>83</sup>

‘[P]roduced’ and ‘constructed’ from ‘[s]eeing’ are different from each other. ‘[B]oth the possibility and the impossibility of seeing’ are prior to ‘produc[ing]’ and ‘construct[ing]’ of ‘[s]eeing’. For those reasons, I read that ‘[s]eeing’ and ‘seeing’ are different seeings.

There is something ‘in’ ‘Garland-Thomson’s description of a painting’. ‘[I]n’

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 155.


there, there is a possibility of being 'said'. '[B]oth her description of a painting as her seeing of a painting and her construction of *seeings* in a painting are all bound up with this possibility and impossibility of seeing' are what have been 'said' with a possibility; in other words, they might have not been 'said' as such. They are 'said' as such within the statement above, but they are not the saying from 'Garland-Thomson'. For the perspective on the statement, both 'description' and 'construction' belong to 'her'. '[H]er description' and 'her construction' are different from each other although they are all belong to 'her' and also 'all bound up with this possibility and impossibility of seeing'. In the case of 'her description', 'a painting as her seeing of a painting' is claimed to be its part; 'a painting' is part of 'her seeing' and 'her seeing', which has 'a painting' as its part, is part of 'her description of a painting'. In the case of 'her description', it seems that there is repetition of 'a painting', but I am insisting that they are different from each other; the first one has the second one as its part with 'her description', but the second one is not yet part of 'her description' with 'a painting'. In the case of 'her construction', '*seeings* in a painting' are claimed to be its part; there are multiple '*seeings*' which are particularly 'in' a single 'painting'. '*[S]eeings* in a painting' are prior to 'her construction'. For that reason, '*seeings* in a painting' are the retrospections since they are already part of 'her construction'.

Then, 'seeing', which is claimed with 'this possibility and impossibility', is 'all bound up with' 'her description' and 'her construction'. This 'seeing' has not necessarily seen; 'seeing' might have been seen or not. '[S]eeing' is either 'possible' or 'impossible' with the additions of 'her description' and 'her construction'.

Having finished reading the ideas of 'eye' in Berger, 'vision' in Lévinas and 'the object being seen' in Chen in this chapter, I will return to the picture book *My Five*

*Senses* in order to consider the repetitions of 'I' therein. I will go on to read this repetition of 'I' in relation to other texts such as Martin Barker's *Comics: Ideology, Power and the Critics* and Martin Heidegger's 'The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics' in order to consider how these different texts address the question of the construction of the 'I' and its being.

## Chapter 9: Reading 'I' and the Repetition



Sometimes I use all my senses at once.

Sometimes I use only one.

I often play a game with myself.

I guess how many senses I am using, at that time.

When I look at the moon and the stars,

I use one sense.

I am seeing.

In the first line, 'I' does not always 'use all my senses'. The frequency of using 'all my senses' is '[s]ometimes'. No matter how many 'all my senses' are, 'I' is claimed to 'use' 'all my senses' '[s]ometimes' and also 'at once'. From my perspective, 'at once'



can be read in four different ways: 1. 'at once' as at the same time, 2. 'at once' as immediately, 3. 'at once' as one time, 4. likewise 'look at', 'once' is claimed with the preposition, 'at'. From 1 to 3 are semantic interpretation and 4 is grammatical interpretation. Whichever 'at once' is, 'I' will 'use' 'all my senses' when it is '[s]ometimes'. Due to 'all', 'my senses' are grouped as 'all my senses'. The grouping is not claimed by 'my' who owns 'senses'. It is also not claimed by 'I' who '[s]ometimes' 'use[s]' 'all my senses at once' either. For the perspective on the statement, there would be a moment when 'I' would not 'use all my senses at once'. Because of '[s]ometimes', there might be other times when 'all my senses' would be not 'use[d]'; 'I' might not 'use all my senses' 'at once' other than '[s]ometimes'.

The second sentence also begins with '[s]ometimes I use' likewise the first sentence.<sup>84</sup> 'Sometimes I use' of the first sentence and the second sentence look same, but I am insisting that the different ideas are claimed on each '[s]ometimes I use'.<sup>85</sup> What 'I use[s]' in the second sentence is different from what 'I use[s]' in the first sentence; what 'I use[s]' in the second sentence is the 'only one'. For the perspective on the first and the second sentences, 'all my senses' and 'only one' are different from each other not only because of their numbers. When the second 'I' 'use[s] only one', 'only one' would not be 'use[d]' at once. In addition, 'one' does not belong to anyone whereas 'all my senses' are claimed to belong to 'my'; 'only one' is not any of 'all my senses'. '[A]ll my senses' are not something to be only. For the perspective on the statement, what the second 'I' 'use[s]' is neither a sense nor my sense. It is also not one sense since 'only' has been claimed with 'one'. 'I' in the second sentence does not 'use' multiple senses when 'only one' is 'use[d]'.

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<sup>84</sup> I did not write '[s]ometimes I use' as '[s]ometimes I use[s]' in this sentence because I thought it is more appropriate to put the original form, '[s]ometimes I use'.

<sup>85</sup> For the same reason as the footnote above, I also used '[s]ometimes I use'. I used '[s]ometimes I use[s]' in other parts of my thesis except these two parts.

'I' in the first and 'I' the second sentences do not need other self when each one 'use[s]' something, but the third 'I' is claimed to 'play' 'with' 'myself'. '[P]lay[ing]' is 'play[ing]' something 'with' the other. '[M]yself' is not the one who 'play[s] a game'; 'myself' is an addition when 'I often play[s] a game'. Except for the moment, 'often', there would be other moments when 'I' does not 'play a game'. Then, there would be other possibility that 'myself' would not be *'with'* (also my emphasis) 'I'. '[M]yself' is not only an addition of 'play[ing] a game' but also conditional on the certain moment, 'often'.

'[S]enses' in the fourth sentence are different from 'all my senses' in the first line because 1. 'senses' do not belong to anyone and anything, 2. 'senses' in the fourth sentence are not something to be all, 3. the number of 'senses' are 'guess[ed]' whereas 'all my senses' in the first sentence are something to be 'use[d]'. It seems that the 'senses' which are 'guess[ed]' are countable, but the number of the 'senses' is not specified as such. There are two 'I' in the fourth sentence. In the case of the fourth sentence, when 'I' does something, it does not have to be 'myself' who does something different. When 'I' 'guess[es]' something, 'I' '[is] using' something different from what 'I' 'guess[es]'. '[G]uess[ing]' of 'senses' and 'using' is conditional on 'at that time'. '[A]t that time', both 'I' do not know 'how many senses I am using' since 'I' is claimed to 'guess' what 'I [is] using'. The 'us[age]' of 'senses' does not give all the knowledge to 'I'.

'[A]t that time' is a moment which is claimed with 'at' and 'that'. It might read the 'time' when 'I often play a game with myself', but I also would like to focus on reading 'at that time' itself rather than making correlations with another sentence. '[A]t that time' is not all of the time. '[T]ime' in the statement above is not only limited to certain period of 'time' but also somewhere 'at'. Therefore, I insist that 'at that time' is

different from the ‘time’ without ‘at’. In that sense, ‘at that time’ is different from ‘time’ without ‘that’ either. I do not read any ideas which are related to ‘at that time’ from ‘I often play[s] a game with myself’. ‘[A]t that time’ is different from ‘I often play[s] a game with myself’ since 1. ‘I often play[s] a game with myself’ is not somewhere ‘at’, 2. ‘[P]lay[ing] a game’ is not a ‘time’. ‘[A]t that time’, ‘I’ might have ‘play[ed] a game with myself’, but ‘at that time’ does not have to be the moment when ‘I often play[s] a game with myself’. There is no one who is playing and no one who has self ‘at that time’.

There are also two ‘I’ in the fifth sentence likewise the fourth sentence. In the fifth sentence, the former ‘I’ is claimed to ‘look at’ something during ‘[w]hen’ and the latter ‘I’ is claimed to ‘use one sense’ apart from ‘[w]hen’. Two ‘I’ in the fifth sentence do not do the same thing. What one of ‘I’ does is conditional on what the other ‘I’ does. In other words, ‘us[ing] one sense’ is conditional on ‘look[ing] at the moon and the stars’. For that reason, the latter ‘I’ does not always ‘use one sense’. There is a sequence between ‘look[ing]’ and ‘us[ing]’; first, ‘I look[s] at the moon and the stars’ and then, ‘I use[s] one sense’. In order to ‘use one sense’, there should be a moment, ‘[w]hen I look[s] at the moon and the stars’ first.

‘[T]he moon and the stars’ are something to be ‘look[ed] at’. ‘[S]ee[ing]’ is an ability of ‘I’, but ‘the moon and the stars’ are not the result of an ability. ‘When I look[s] at the moon and the stars’, there is ‘I’ who is claimed to ‘use one sense’. In this fifth sentence, ‘one sense’ is not something to be ‘only one’. When I compare ‘one sense’ with ‘only one’ in the second sentence, it seems not all single sense are ‘only’ one for the perspective on the statement above.

In the sixth sentence, ‘I [is] seeing’. I have read that there is ‘one sense’ in the

fifth sentence. I do not read 'seeing' in the sixth sentence is 'one sense' of the fifth sentence. I also do not read that 'seeing' is one of 'all my senses' in the first sentence or one of 'many senses' in the fourth sentence. 'I' in the sixth sentence does not use anything. I might have read the fifth and sixth sentences together although there is a full stop in between them. If so, 'I use[s] one sense' and then 'I [is] seeing'; that 'seeing' is conditional on '[w]hen I look[s] at the moon and the stars' if I read the fifth and the sixth sentences together. '[L]ook[ing] at' and 'seeing' are different from each other although they all can be read with 'I use[s] one sense'. They are different not only because of 'at' of 'looking at' and 'ing' of 'seeing'. They are also different from each other because of 'the moon and the stars'. What 'I [is] seeing' in the sixth sentence is not mentioned. I do not mean that 'I [is] seeing' nothing, but there is nothing like 'the moon and the stars' when 'I' is claimed to 'see'.

From now on, I will read page 21 and the page which is on the left side of page 21. I have brought two pages below.



Sometimes I use all my senses at once.  
Sometimes I use only one.  
I often play a game with myself.  
I guess how many senses I am using, at that time.

When I look at the moon and the stars,  
I use one sense.  
I am seeing.

As I have already read, there are ‘the moon and the stars’ and two ‘I’ in the fifth sentence of page 21. I read the pictorial moon on page 21 and the pictorial stars on both pages. The colours of the moon and some of the stars are white. According to the statement, the number of ‘the stars’ is plural; I also read that the number of the pictorial stars is plural. I have read two ‘I’ from the statement, but I see one pictorial ‘I’ from reading the left page.

I can differentiate the moon, the stars and ‘I’ when I read them from the picture. ‘[T]he stars’ are followed by ‘the moon’, but it does not seem that there is a sequence of reading the pictorial moon and the stars. ‘[T]he moon and the stars’ are what ‘I look[s] at’. If that so, the moon and the stars are what have been looked at by the pictorial ‘I’ on the left page. ‘When’ is the moment when I read the left page and page 21. ‘When’ of ‘[w]hen I look at’ on the picture is not the time when the pictorial ‘I’ looks the moon and the stars.

I will read one sentence from Rose’s *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*. There are claims about ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’. *My Five Senses* and *One Gorilla* are not claimed as children’s *fiction* (my emphasis) in any of the statements. However, I read *My Five Senses* and *One Gorilla* are not only children’s books but also children’s fictions. Before continuing reading the pictures and the statements in *My Five Senses*, I would like to find out what kind of ideas are claimed on ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’ in Rose’s text.

Children’s fiction started with a division between two different types of language and modes of address, but this division has progressively been removed,

as the adult intention has more and more absorbed into the story and, apparently, rendered invisible.<sup>86</sup>

‘[A] division between two different types of language and modes of address’ is not prior to ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’. From ‘start[ing]’ of ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’, there would be ‘a division between two different types of language and modes of address’. ‘[T]wo different types of language’ are not only different from each other because they are ‘two different’ but also because of ‘types’. ‘Children’s fiction’ is not claimed with ‘type’ whereas ‘language’ is. ‘Children’s fiction’ is not something which is addressed, but ‘language’ is something to be ‘address[ed]’ with ‘modes’. ‘[T]wo different types of language’ and ‘modes of address’ would not be together once ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’ is ‘start[ed]’. However, ‘this division’ would not remain with ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’ as a result since it ‘has progressively been removed’. It is not mentioned that how and where ‘this division’ ‘has [...] removed’, but it will be ‘removed’ from ‘start[ing]’ of ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’.

Before the ‘remov[al]’ of ‘this division’, there would be ‘absorb[ance]’ of ‘the adult intention’ ‘into the story’. ‘[F]iction’ which belongs to multiple ‘[c]hildren’ has been already ‘absorbed’ with ‘the adult intention’ ‘into the story’ according to Rose. ‘[T]he adult intention’ is ‘invisible’ to both ‘[c]hildren’ and ‘the adult’. The ‘absorb[ance]’ of ‘the adult intention’ would not be ‘absorbed’ at once; the number of ‘the adult intention’ is singular, but it seems it could be also progressively ‘absorbed into the story’. The result of ‘absorb[ance]’ of ‘the adult intention’ is to be ‘invisible’. It is ‘invisible’, but it does not mean that ‘the adult intention’ has been disappeared or removed from ‘[c]hildren’s fiction’.

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<sup>86</sup> Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*, p. 59-60.

Then, what I am reading is not only '[c]hildren's ficiton' but also 'the adult intention' which is 'rendered' to be 'invisible' in accordance of Rose's point of view. In addition, from reading *My Five Senses* and *One Gorilla*, there would be 'two different types of language' and 'modes of address' which would be finally 'removed'. There are multiple 'I' on page 21. From the beginning, I read the picture as 'I' of the fifth sentence. The way how I have read the pictorial 'I' and the moon/the stars might be considered as reading the invisible adult intention. However, I would like to claim that I did not read any intention from page 21 although it might seem likely so.

I found a passage about comics from Martin Barker's *Comics: Ideology, Power and the Critics*.<sup>87</sup> Comics are not the picture books. For that reason, reading Barker's text may seem as irrelevant to my thesis — before reading the text from Barker, I want to make it clear that it is not necessarily the case. There are 'a speech balloon', 'a represented character' and 'words' within the text and they are different from each other. I was interested in how 'a speech balloon', 'a represented character' and 'words' are claimed differently.<sup>88</sup> In addition to that, I will read the part which claims about 'words' and 'see' as they are related to reading the ideas on seeing.

How does a speech balloon work? In one sense, it is obvious. A set of words are accredited to a represented character by a tail running from the balloon - or by a set of small bubbles if it is 'thought'. So, we read the words, see the direction of the tail, and thus recognise who is supposed to have said (or thought)

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<sup>87</sup> Martin Barker, *Comics: Ideology, Power and the Critics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 10.

<sup>88</sup> Later, I will read speech bubble from the picture in *Use Your Brain*: See pages from 265 to 266.

them.<sup>89</sup>

According to the text above, it is not ‘a speech’ which is ‘accredited to a represented character by a tail’; it is also not ‘words’ which are ‘accredited’. In the case of ‘a speech balloon’, ‘it is *obvious*’ (my emphasis on ‘obvious’) that ‘[a] set of words’ are ‘accredited to’ other than ‘a speech balloon’. I do not know how many ‘words’ can be ‘[a] set’. No matter how many ‘words’ are counted as ‘[a] set’, the number of ‘[a] set’ is one and only one ‘set of words’ is ‘accredited to a represented character by a tail’.

There is ‘a tail’ which is read differently from ‘the balloon’. ‘[T]he balloon’ is not running. It also does not make ‘a tail’ run. ‘[T]he balloon’ is prior to ‘a tail’ since ‘a tail’ is ‘from the balloon’. In other words, ‘a tail’ is not only the latter but also a supplement of ‘the balloon’. There were no images of ‘a tail’ and ‘the balloon’ in Barker’s text. For that reason, ‘running from’ was not an image which I could see from the page. Therefore, I have to imagine, ‘a tail running from the balloon’, if I wish to do so.

There are two different ‘accredit[ions] to a represented character’: one is ‘by a tail running from the balloon’ and the other is ‘by a set of small bubbles if it is “thought”’. ‘[A] represented character’ does not accredit according to the text. There might be ‘a speech balloon’ around ‘a represented character’, but ‘a represented character’ would not give ‘a speech’ through ‘a speech balloon’. It is because ‘a represented character’ does not do something. Instead, ‘we’ ‘read’, ‘see’ and ‘recognise’.

In the case of ‘a set of small bubbles’, there is no tail. ‘[A] set of small bubbles’ might be read as ‘thought’, but I read ‘a set of small bubbles’ and ‘thought’ are different from each other. ‘[A] set of small bubbles’ and ‘thought’ are different not only because

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 10.



“‘thought’” is within the quotation marks but also because ‘a set of small bubbles’ is not essentially a thought. ‘[A] set of small bubble’ is read as ‘if it is’ ‘thought’ for the perspective on the statement above. “‘[T]hought’” is thought, but ‘a set of small bubble’ might not be thought.

In the last sentence, there is ‘who’ who is ‘supposed to have said (or thought) them’. This ‘who’ is not ‘we’ since ‘we’ are claimed to ‘read’, ‘see’ and ‘recognise’. For the perspective on the last sentence, ‘we’ are not ‘a represented character’ since ‘a represented character’ does not ‘read’, ‘see’ and ‘recognise’. ‘[T]he words’ what ‘we read’, ‘the direction of the tail’ what ‘we’ ‘see’ and ‘suppos[ing]’ what ‘have said (or thought)’ are the results of ‘accredit[ions]’. According to the statement, what ‘we’ ‘read’, ‘see’ and ‘recognise’ are all different from each other. For example, ‘the direction of the tail’ is not what ‘we’ read because it is what ‘we see’. For another example, ‘the words’ what ‘we read’ are different from ‘the tail’ since there is no direction in case of ‘the words’ and ‘the words’ are not what ‘we see’. What has ‘see[n]’ by ‘we’ is ‘the direction of the tail’. Due to ‘and’ and ‘thus’, what ‘we recognise’ is the last result of ‘accredit[ion]’. A supposition is not a recognition, but in order to be ‘supposed’ as such, it has to be ‘recognise[d]’ by ‘we’ at first. ‘[W]e’ do not suppose anything. It is the perspective on ‘who’ who claims that ‘who is supposed to’ do something. What has been ‘said’ and ‘thought’ by ‘who’ are ‘supposed’ by ‘recogni[tion]’. What has been ‘said’ and ‘thought’ are not in the present moment. For that reason, what ‘we’ ‘recognise’ is something happens in the past; it is always retrospective.

What has been ‘said’ and ‘thought’ can be ‘recogni[zed]’ as such in that sense. As I differentiate ‘the moon and the stars’ and ‘I’ who is claimed to ‘look at’, I also differentiate the pictorial moon/the stars and the pictorial ‘I’. When I look at the left page

and read it with '[w]hen I look at the moon and the star, I use one sense', the left page becomes something about '[w]hen I look at the moon and the stars, I use one sense'. In other words, 'us[ing] one sense' of 'I', 'look[ing] at the moon and the stars' of 'I' and 'seeing' of 'I' can be read from the same picture. As I have already mentioned, the statement 'look at the moon and the stars' and 'seeing' themselves are different from each other, but I can read these two different sentences from the same frame on the picture. The number of 'I' on the left page is not plural, but I read multiple 'I' from the left page.

On page 33 of *My Five Senses*, there are two sentences: 'Whenever I go, whatever I do, every minute of the day, my senses are working' and '[t]hey make me aware'. '[M]y senses' and '[t]hey' are not mine. '[M]y senses' do not belong to 'I' who 'go[es]' and 'do[es]'. In addition, it is not 'I' who is 'working' when 'my senses are working'. The moment when 'my senses are working' is different from the moments when 'I go[es]' and 'I do[es]'. '[W]orking' of 'my senses' are conditional on the moment of 'every minute of the day'.

The ideas on '[t]hey' and 'my senses' are different from each other. 'They' do not own anything. 'They' are not working either. What '[t]hey' are claimed to do is 'make me aware'. '[M]e', therefore, is also different from 'I' who 'go[es]' and 'do[es]'. 'They' are not 'me' and vice versa. '[M]e' does not aware. '[M]e' does not make anyone aware either. '[A]wareness' on page 33 is something to be 'ma[d]e aware'. '[A]war[ing]' of 'me' is latter to 'mak[ing]'. '[A]war[ing]' of 'me' is not conditional on 'every minute of the day'.



On top of the left page, there are ‘I SEE’, ‘I HEAR’, ‘I TASTE’, ‘I SMELL’ and ‘I TOUCH’. ‘I SEE’, ‘I HEAR’, ‘I TASTE’, ‘I SMELL’ and ‘I TOUCH’ are in five different frames. At bottom of each frame, there are five frames with pictures. The colours of frames are not all different from each other, but the pictures and the statements within the frames are all different. Therefore, I read five different statements and 25 different pictures from the left page. ‘I SEE’, ‘I HEAR’, ‘I TASTE’, ‘I SMELL’ and ‘I TOUCH’ do not exceed the boundary of the frames. Some of the frames with pictures exceed the boundary of other frames, but I still read that there are 25 different pictures (or 25 frames with different pictures). For example, ‘I SEE’ is within the green frame. ‘I SEE’ and green do not exceed other frames such as the frame with ‘I HEAR’ and the blue frame with the picture of the sun.

On page 33, there is nothing about *the sun* (my emphasis), so it might sound problematic to state *the picture of the sun* (also my emphasis). It is not only the case for the sun; below the sun, I read that there is a boat. I read that the frame with the sun from reading a white circle and 12 white triangles. I also read the frame with a boat from

reading two blue triangles, a white line and a half white circle. In addition, it seems that the frames with the sun and a boat are claimed as what 'I SEE[s]' although there is nothing about what 'I' sees on page 33. I read that 'I' would 'SEE' the sun. In other words, I read that the pictures, which are underneath 'I SEE', are what 'I' is claimed to 'SEE'. Therefore, I would like to claim that 25 pictures are what 'I SEE[s]', 'I HEAR[s]', 'I TASTE[s]', 'I SMELL[s]' and 'I TOUCH[es]'. If there were only 'I SEE' and no pictures underneath, I would not know what 'I' might 'SEE'. If there were no 'I SEE' and only the pictures, I have read the sun and the boat differently. Because 'I SEE' and the sun are there, I read that the sun is not what 'I HEAR[s]', 'I TASTE[s]', 'I SMELL[s]' and 'I TOUCH[es]'.

In relation to 'senses' and 'aware', I would like read some part from Patti Bellantoni's *If It's Purple, Someone's Gonna Die: the Power of Color in Visual Storytelling*.<sup>90</sup> In the chapter of 'THE BEGINNING', 'awareness' is claimed with 'see[ing]' of 'color'. The reason why I am reading this part is not only because of 'awareness' but also because of 'see[ing]' and 'color'. I have not read any critics who have focused on reading colors, so I wanted to read this text and move on to read *My Five Senses* afterward. Bellantoni does not read the colours with picture books or children's books. Bellantoni reads the colours with the films. Although the text in *If It's Purple, Someone's Gonna Die: the Power of Color in Visual Storytelling* is about reading the colours in the films, I thought it would be helpful to read the ideas on colours for constructing my thesis.

The genesis for this book goes back to a day more than twenty years ago at the

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<sup>90</sup> Patti Bellantoni, *If It's Purple, Someone's Gonna Die: the Power of Color in Visual Storytelling* (Oxford: Focal Press, 2005).

School of Visual Arts in New York when I observed that my design students were making arbitrary color choices in their work. In order to investigate the conceptual possibilities needed to inform their color decisions, I asked them to bring to class what they thought was “Red.” [...] On the day of the appointed class, the students appeared wearing red, and predictably brought in paint chips and color swatches, along with wrapping papers and fabrics. [...] What also arrived, however, were things no one had anticipated: hot peppers, muscle balms that made the skin feel hot, toy fire engines with blinking lights and sirens, red hot cinnamon balls, and rock ‘n roll music. What everyone experienced that day forever changed our awareness of how we see color.<sup>91</sup>

The number of ‘[t]he genesis for this book’ is singular. ‘The genesis for this book’ is not at the present moment because it ‘goes back to a day more than twenty years ago’. ‘[A] day more than twenty years ago at the School of Visual Arts in New York’ is not only the past of ‘I’ but also ‘[t]he genesis for this book’. ‘[A] day more than twenty years ago at the School of Visual Arts in New York’ might not be the genesis for other cases, such as other than ‘this book’. ‘[W]hen I observed’ something, that time was not ‘[t]he genesis for this book’. However, it is claimed to be ‘[t]he genesis for this book’ later ‘when I observed that my design students were making arbitrary color choices in their work’ ‘at the School of Visual Arts in New York’. ‘The genesis for this book’ is claimed to be ‘genesis’ not because of ‘this book’ and ‘my design students’ ‘at the School of Visual Arts in New York’; it becomes ‘[t]he genesis’ later due to the perspective on ‘this book’.

What ‘I observed’ is ‘my design students were making arbitrary color choices

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. xxi.

in their work'. Although the claim is not from 'my design students', the perspective on 'my design students' knows that 'color choices' were 'arbitrary'. In addition, 'making arbitrary color choices' is claimed to be '*in*' (also my emphasis) 'their work'. '[A]rbitrary color choices' are not *their* (my emphasis) choices whereas 'work' is 'their work'. '[W]ork' is not arbitrary whereas 'color choices' are. Although 'arbitrary' is 'in their work', there is no ownership in the case of 'arbitrary color choices'. In addition, 'work' is not the 'choices' and vice versa.

'I' and 'my students' were all 'at the School of Visual Arts in New York'. However, 'I' was not 'in their work'. 'I' was not one of 'my students'. '[M]y students' did not observe according to the statement whereas 'I observed' 'my students'. 'I' did not make any of 'arbitrary choices' either. 'I asked them to bring' something because there was a purpose, 'to investigate the conceptual possibilities needed to inform their color decisions'. '[D]ecisions' in the statement above are 'their color decisions', but 'their color decisions' had not been made as 'decisions' before 'my student' 'br[ought]' something 'to class'. '[D]ecisions' were what 'needed to inform' before made as 'their color decisions'. Although 'decisions' are '*their*' (also my emphasis) 'color decisions', 'their color decisions' are conditional on what 'I asked them to bring to class' and 'what they thought was "Red"'. '[T]hem', in that sense, cannot 'bring' anything to 'class' since it is limited to 'what they thought was "Red"'.

'[A]ppeared wearing red', 'brought in paint chips and color swatches, along with wrapping papers and fabrics' and 'arrived, however, were things no one had anticipated' are 'what they thought was "Red"'. I read that these are also 'their color decisions' although none of 'the students' claim that any of those three are 'their color decisions'. There is a statement, 'no one had anticipated'. In other words, the perspective on the statement has knowledge about what 'my design students' 'at the School of Visual

Arts in New York' were 'anticipat[ing]' at that time. The thoughts about "'Red'" and the 'anticipat[ion]' are all known to 'I'.

'[H]ot peppers, muscle balms that made the skin feel hot, toy fire engines with blinking lights and sirens, red hot cinnamon balls, and rock 'n roll music' are 'things' and also what had been 'thought' as "'Red'". Although 'things' are claimed to be 'no one had anticipated', that is not the point of views from 'my students' 'at the School of Visual Arts in New York'. 'What everyone experienced that day' is not claimed from 'everyone', but it is claimed as what 'everyone experienced'. Since 'that day', 'our awareness of how we see color' 'forever changed'. '[C]olor' is what 'we see'. There is no exception for any of 'we' whose 'awareness of how we see color' did not change. '[W]e see color' is claimed with '[h]ow'. '[H]ow we see color' is part of 'our awareness'. '[A]wareness' belongs to 'our', but 'colour' does not belong to 'we'. '[T]he students appeared wearing red' and that is one of '[w]hat everyone experienced that day'. Although not 'everyone' was 'wearing red', 'wearing red' is claimed to be '[w]hat everyone experienced that day'. '[O]ur awareness of how we see color' might have not been 'forever changed' if there were no 'that day' and '[w]hat everyone experienced'. '[O]ur' do not aware something *how* (my emphasis). Therefore, I read that 'awareness' and 'see' are different from each other to the perspective on the statement.

The following year, I incorporated this experiment into my curriculum and made the project more specific. The class was to select a color and then build an environment that explored the color's association with the five senses. [...]  
As students began to explore the sounds, tastes, smells, textures, and, of course, "sight" of a color, they discovered, for example, that what smells, feels, or

tastes a certain color may not be that color (e.g. strawberries do not taste red).<sup>92</sup>

Apart from '[w]hat everyone experienced that day', 'this experiment' is 'incorporated' 'into' 'my curriculum' after 'that day'. Although 'that day' has been passed, it is still claimed to be '*this*' (also my emphasis) 'experiment' in '[t]he following year'. When the time becomes '[t]he following year', 'this experiment' is no longer 'this experiment' only; 'this experiment' is 'incorporated' 'into' 'my curriculum'. However, 'this experiment' did not incorporate into 'the project'. '[T]his experiment' and 'my curriculum', in that sense, are not as 'specific' as 'the project'. 'I' did not 'select a color' and 'build' anything such as 'an environment'. In the case of 'the project', which is 'more specific' than 'this experiment', it is not 'I' who 'select[ed] a color'. In the case of 'the project', there is 'an environment' which has been 'buil[t]' after 'select[ing] a color'. '[T]he five senses' are not something to be 'select[ed]' by '[t]he class'. '[T]he five senses' are the addition of 'the color's association'. '[A] color' is what 'to [be] select[ed]' and 'an environment' is what to be 'explored'. '[S]tudents', who are stated after 'the project', are not *my* (my emphasis) students. There was no beginning in the case of 'discover[ing]', but 'students began to explore'.

It seems that 'the sounds, tastes, smells' and 'textures' are different from the 'sight' for the perspective although 'a color' is all of their parts. When 'students began to explore', "'sight" of a color' is something 'of course' to be 'explore[d]' whereas 'the sounds, tastes, smells' and 'textures' are not something 'of course' to be 'explore[d]'. In addition, there are double quotation marks around the 'sight' when there are no quotation marks around 'the sounds, tastes, smells' and 'textures'. When 'students began to

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., pp. xxii.



explore’, they ‘explore[d]’ five different things. However, what ‘they discovered’ were three different things: ‘what smells, feels, or tastes a certain color’. ‘[S]trawberries do not taste red’ is an example of ‘what smells, feels, or tastes a certain color may not be that color’. In that sense, the color of ‘strawberries’ may not be ‘red’. ‘[A] certain color’ may be ‘that color’ if there were no ‘smell[ing]’, ‘feel[ing]’ and ‘tast[ing]’ in that case? ‘[S]trawberries’ would be ‘red’ if it were not claimed with the ‘taste’?

In the following sentence, there is a reason why ‘the students began to blindfold each other’ after ‘they discovered’ ‘that what smells, feels, or tastes a certain color may not be that color’.

Because of this, the students began to blindfold each other during their explorations of the color’s smell, touch, and taste. Although their environments were filled with the color, not being able to see what they were smelling, touching, or tasting for those few minutes led them to a heightened awareness of their visceral responses. It also freed them to seek out sense associations other than sight, which, in turn, gave them a deeper understanding of that color’s effect on their perception. It also inspired the students to go beyond the superficial.<sup>93</sup>

‘[B]lindfold each other during their explorations’ is what had ‘began’ ‘during their explorations’. This beginning is different from the previous beginning which I read from the previous part of the statement. Although there was a beginning of ‘explor[ing] the sounds, tastes, smells, textures, and, of course, “sight” of a color’, there would be an-

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. xxii.

other beginning. In the case of the latter beginning, the number of ‘explorations’ is plural and they belong to ‘their’. ‘[T]heir explorations’ are something to do with ‘the color’s smell, touch, and taste’ whereas the previous ‘explor[ing]’ is something ‘to explore the sounds, tastes, smells, textures, and, of course, “sight” of a color’. Therefore, I read that ‘their explorations’ are different from the previous ‘explor[ing]’.

‘[T]heir environments’ are not ‘the color’, because ‘their environments were filled with the color’. ‘[F]illing’ of ‘the color’ is an addition to ‘their environments’. For the perspective on the statement, if ‘their environments’ were ‘filled with color’, ‘they’ would be ‘able to see what they were smelling, touching, or tasting’. Because of ‘blindfold’, the ability to ‘see that they were smelling, touching, or tasting’ was ‘being’ negated. However, the negation of ‘being able to see what they were smelling, touching, or tasting’ had ‘led them to a heightened awareness of their visceral responses’ ‘for those few minutes’. If there were no ‘blindfold’, there would not be ‘few minutes’ which ‘led them to a heightened awareness of their visceral responses’. The time for ‘le[a]ding them to a heightened awareness of their visceral responses’ of ‘blindfold’ is ‘for those few minutes’. ‘[A] heightened awareness of their visceral responses’ is conditional on ‘blindfold’ and also ‘for those few minutes’. ‘[A] heightened awareness of their visceral responses’ is the latter to ‘their explorations of the color’s smell, touch, and taste’. The perspective on ‘the[y]’ could differentiate ‘their visceral responses’ and ‘a heightened awareness’. I read that ‘responses’ are external to ‘visceral’. Furthermore, the perspective on ‘the[y]’ knows that ‘responses’ are ‘visceral responses’ and these ‘responses’ belong to ‘the[y]’ although ‘the[y]’ do not claim anything within the statement above. ‘[T]he[y]’ had ‘led’ to both ‘awareness’ and ‘responses’. However, the numbers of ‘awareness’ and ‘responses’ are different from each other. ‘[T]heir visceral responses’ are not heightened visceral responses whereas ‘awareness’ is ‘a heightened’ one.

‘[T]hey’ who ‘were smelling, touching, or tasting’ are claimed to ‘le[a]d’ ‘to a heightened awareness of their visceral responses’ because of ‘blindfold’.

‘[T]he[y]’ would not be ‘freed’ if there were no ‘blindfold’. In other words, because ‘the[y]’ were ‘not being able to see’, ‘the[y]’ were ‘freed’ ‘to seek out sense associations other than sight’. ‘[T]o seek out’ does not associate with ‘sight’; ‘seek[ing]’ is not ‘see[ing]’ and vice versa. ‘[O]n their perception’, not anything is ‘on’ there because ‘that color’s effect’ is claimed to be ‘on their perception’. Therefore, it is not any color’s ‘effect’ which is ‘on their perception’; it is ‘that color’ which ‘filled’ ‘their environment’ as an addition to ‘their environment’. ‘[P]erception’ is not ‘understanding’ and vice versa. Without ‘free[ing] them’, ‘a deeper understanding of that color’s effect on their perception’ would not be ‘g[i]ve[n]’. In the case of ‘understanding’ of ‘that color’s effect on their perception’, ‘understanding’ could be claimed with different levels. ‘[T]he[y]’ are ‘g[i]ve[n]’ ‘a deeper understanding of that color’s effect on their perception’ because of the prior status of ‘them’. To what extent is ‘understanding of that color’s effect on their perception’ ‘deeper’ and not ‘deeper’?

‘[T]he superficial’ is something what ‘the students’ ‘go beyond’. However, in order to ‘go beyond the superficial’, ‘the students’ need to be ‘not being able to see what they were smelling, touching, or tasting for those few minutes’ so that ‘their environments’ ‘inspire[d]’ ‘the students to go beyond’, particularly, ‘the superficial’.

Due to the statement on page 33, I read that 25 pictures within the frames, ‘I SEE’. ‘I HEAR’, ‘I TASTE’, ‘I SMELL’ and ‘I TOUCH’ are the picture of ‘my senses are working’. In relation to my reading of ‘I SEE[s]’ and the pictorial sun and boat, I will read some parts from Martin Heidegger’s *Identity and Difference*. In the chapter, ‘The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics’, ‘Being’ and “‘Being’” are read

as such. Although there is no word, *being* (my emphasis), in *My Five Senses*, I thought that my way of reading the statement, the statement within the frame, and the picture within the frame are relevant to the ideas which are claimed on ‘Being’ and “‘Being’” in ‘The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics’. I will start with reading the first paragraph of the chapter. Then, I will continue to read the part where ‘Being’ and “‘Being’” are stated.

This seminar made an attempt to begin a conversation with *Hegel*. A conversation with a thinker can be concerned only with the matter of thinking. The matter of thinking presses upon thinking in such a way that only thus does it bring thinking to the heart of the matter and from there to thinking itself.<sup>94</sup>

‘[A]n attempt’ is something to be ‘made’ with a purpose. The purpose of ‘[t]his seminar’ is ‘to begin a conversation with *Hegel*’. There might be no ‘conversation with *Hegel*’ in ‘[t]his seminar’ since ‘a conversation with *Hegel*’ is claimed to be ‘made’ with ‘an attempt’. It is not ‘*Hegel*’ who makes ‘an attempt to begin a conversation’. ‘*Hegel*’ is claimed to be ‘with conversation’, but ‘*Hegel*’ does not make an attempt and begin anything. There needs to be ‘[t]his seminar’ and then ‘an attempt’ has to be ‘made’ by ‘[t]his seminar’ before the ‘begin[ning]’ of ‘a conversation with *Hegel*’. There would be no ‘begin[ning]’ of ‘a conversation with *Hegel*’, if no ‘attempt’ had ‘made’.

‘A conversation with a thinker’ and ‘a conversation with *Hegel*’ are different conversations. There is no attempt and beginning in the case of ‘[a] conversation with a

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<sup>94</sup> Martin Heidegger, ‘The Onto-Theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics’ in *Identity and difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Raw, Publishers, 1969), p. 42.

thinker'. 'A conversation with a thinker' is not conditional on any seminar. '[A] conversation with *Hegel*' is not related with the matter of thinking. '[C]oncern[ing]' does not always happen because '[a] conversation with a thinker' can be and cannot be 'concerned'. What is more, 'concern[ing]' is not concerned with everything; 'concern[ing]' is 'only with the matter of thinking' once it is 'concerned'. It is not 'a thinker' who 'can be concerned'. '[A] thinker' is an addition of '[a] conversation', which 'can be concerned'. Therefore, '[a] conversation with a thinker' might have not been 'concerned' yet. 'A conversation' is also claimed with the supplements: 'a thinker' and 'the matter of thinking'. Other than 'the matter of thinking' would not 'be concerned' with '[a] conversation with a thinker' in that sense. 'A conversation with a thinker' is, therefore, a conversation which is exclusive and restricted to certain conditions.

In the following sentence, there are '[t]he matter of thinking', two 'thinking[s]' and 'thinking itself'. '[P]ress[ing]' '[t]he matter of thinking' and the first 'thinking' are 'in such a way'. The first 'thinking' is not above of 'press[ing]' '[t]he matter of thinking'. '[S]uch a way' is a singular 'way' which causes the second 'thinking' to be brought 'to the heart of the matter and from there to thinking itself'. The second 'thinking' does not go to 'the heart of the matter'. The second 'thinking' is brought 'to the heart of the matter'. The second 'thinking' is brought by other which is not the second 'thinking'. Where the second 'thinking' would be brought is not 'the matter'; the second thinking' would not be brought somewhere other than 'the heart of the matter'. In other words, there would be other part (or parts) in the case of 'the matter', which is not 'the heart'.

Bringing 'thinking to the heart of the matter' is a prior condition of 'there to thinking itself'. There is no 'there' somewhere around 'the heart of the matter'. However, there would be 'thinking itself' 'from there' after 'thinking' is brought 'to the heart

of the matter'. '[F]rom there', there is no one who thinks. '[T]hinking itself' which is 'from there' does not think. 'The matter of thinking presses upon thinking in such a way' so that 'it' 'does' 'bring thinking to the heart of the matter and from there to thinking itself', but I have not read any beginning of 'a conversation with *Hegel*' or '[a] conversation with a thinker' 'from there'. There is no one who thinks or begins conversation 'from there'.

Regardless of punctuation marks around 'Being', 'Being' and "'Being'" are claimed with different ideas. I will move on to the next page to read out 'Being' and "'Being'".

Thus Hegel himself explicitly gives to the matter of his thinking that name which is inscribed over the whole matter of Western thinking, the name: Being. (In our seminar, the manifold yet unified use of the word "Being" was discussed. For Hegel, Being means first, but *never exclusively*, "indeterminate immediacy." Being is seen here from the viewpoint of determining mediation, that is, from the viewpoint of the absolute concept, and thus with reference to the absolute concept. "The truth of Being is essence", that is, absolute reflection.<sup>95</sup>

Because of '[t]hus', 'Hegel himself explicitly gives to the matter of thinking' is read as a consequence of the previous part (or sentence). However, it is not the consequence of the previous part because 'Hegel himself' had claimed so. 'Hegel himself' does not give anything in the statement above. '[G]iv[ing]' is claimed to be 'explicit', but it is not because of 'Hegel himself'; it is 'explicitly' 'give[n]' for the perspective on the statement.

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

‘Hegel’ and ‘himself’ do not separately ‘gives to the matter of his thinking’. It is ‘Hegel himself’ who ‘explicitly gives to the matter of his thinking’. Although ‘Hegel himself’ and ‘his’ might be read as the same person, I read that ‘Hegel himself’ and ‘his’ are different from each other. They are different from each other because ‘his thinking’ belongs to ‘his’, not ‘Hegel himself’. ‘[H]is thinking’ is not full of ‘his thinking’ since ‘the matter’ is part of ‘his thinking’. ‘[T]he matter’ is not ‘the matter’ of ‘Hegel himself’. ‘[E]xplicitly giv[ing]’ needs ‘Hegel himself’ whom to give and ‘name which is inscribed over the whole matter of Western thinking, the name: Being’ which is to be ‘give[n]’.

The first ‘name’ is already ‘inscribed over the whole matter of Western thinking’. ‘[I]nscrib[ing]’ does not give the first ‘name’ any name. Once the first ‘name’ is ‘inscribed over’, the first ‘name’ would be different name: ‘Being’. ‘[T]he whole matter of Western thinking’ is what ‘inscribed over’ ‘Being’.

There is no thinking such as Northern, Southern or Eastern thinking in the statement above. Only ‘Western thinking’ is part of ‘the whole matter’. ‘Western thinking’ is not ‘his thinking’. For those reasons, ‘that name’ has not been ‘inscribed over the whole matter of’ other thinkings which are not ‘Western thinking’. ‘[T]he name: Being’ is not a name which was given by anyone and anything including ‘Hegel himself’; nothing is ‘inscribed over’ ‘the name: Being’. In other words, ‘the name: Being’ is not ‘inscribed over’ ‘that name’. Therefore, ‘the name: Being’ and ‘that name’ are different from each other.

‘Being’, which is claimed before the bracket, and ‘Being’/“‘Being’”, which are claimed after the bracket, are also different from each other. ‘Being’ which is claimed before the bracket is not included ‘in our seminar’. ‘Being’/“‘Being’” which are claimed after the bracket are not claimed with a name. ‘In our seminar’, ‘Hegel himself’

is not there. '[D]iscuss[ion]' about 'the word "Being"' is not out of 'our seminar'.

'[T]he word "Being"' was already 'discussed', but 'Hegel' does not seem to be '[i]n our seminar'. '[O]ur' do not include everyone and anyone. Therefore, 'the manifold yet unified use' might not be 'the manifold yet unified use' in the case of 'the word "Being"' to whom who is not 'our'; this includes 'Hegel' and 'Hegel himself'.

'[T]he manifold yet unified use of the word "Being"' is not what 'Being' is claiming. The discussion has been finished. '[T]he [...] us[age] of the word' is not decided by that 'word'. '[T]he us[age] of the word "Being"' is not 'the manifold yet unified' for 'our' although the discussion was '[i]n our seminar', but it is still claimed as 'manifold yet unified' because the perspective on the statement does claim so. Apart from the discussion, there is a 'mean[ing]' of 'Being' in the following sentence. The 'mean[ing]' of 'Being' and 'Hegel' are not '[i]n our seminar'. The 'mean[ing]' of 'Being' is stated by the perspective on 'Hegel' and 'Being'. The 'mean[ing]' of 'Being' is not only the 'first' but also '*never exclusively*, "indeterminate immediacy"'. If something means '*never exclusively*' and 'indeterminate immediacy', the meaning of something could be 'indeterminate immediacy' always inclusively on the other hand. For that reason, I read an irony from the 'mean[ing]' of 'Being' since 'Being means first' and also not first ('*never exclusively*, "indeterminate immediacy"') for the perspective on the statement.

Then, 'Being' is claimed to be 'seen here'. '[H]ere' is not here. '[S]ee[ing]' of 'Being' was from the past since 'Being' is already 'seen here'. '[T]he viewpoint of determining mediation' is where 'Being is seen'. Although 'Being' is claimed to be 'seen here', I would like to claim that 'Being' is not there, 'the viewpoint of the absolute concept'. In other words, 'here' is not 'the viewpoint of determining mediation' because 'the viewpoint of determining mediation' is prior to 'here'. '[T]he viewpoint' is not the



viewpoint of Hegel. 'Being is seen here', but 'the viewpoint' is neither seen nor viewed. '[T]he viewpoint' is not about viewing 'the viewpoint'. Although it is stated as 'the viewpoint of the absolute concept', it is not a point of view of 'the absolute concept'.

'Being is seen here' first from 'the viewpoint of determining mediation' and also 'from the viewpoint of the absolute concept'. However, 'the viewpoint of determining mediation' is not 'the viewpoint of the absolute concept'; when 'Being is seen here from the viewpoint of the determining mediation', that does not reference to anything. '[T]he absolute concept' is not 'here' and not seen from somewhere.

'Being' is not the truth itself. 'The truth' is part of 'Being'. 'The truth', 'Being' and 'essence' are within the quotation marks, but "'The truth of Being is essence'" is not quoted by any of '[t]he truth', 'Being' and 'essence'. Nothing reflects anything and nothing is reflected within that quotation marks, but 'that is, absolute reflection'.

'[A]bsolute reflection' is not a reflection of 'that' (or 'that is'). Absoluteness of 'absolute reflection' does not make 'absolute reflection' as an absolute reflection. For the reason that 'reflection' is claimed with certain degree, 'absolute', 'absolute reflection' is not a reflection itself. In addition, 'absolute reflection' does not reflect anything absolutely.

The truth of essence is the concept in the sense of in-finite self-knowledge. Being is the absolute self-thinking of thinking. Absolute thinking alone is the truth of Being, "is" Being. Truth here means always that the knowable as such is known with a knowledge absolutely certain of itself.)<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

There is 'self-knowledge' which is 'in-finite'. '[S]elf-knowledge' is not the knowledge of the perspective on the statement. That 'in-finite self-knowledge' is not the knowledge of anyone or anything. The perspective on 'in-finite self-knowledge' has knowledge about 'self-knowledge' that 'the sense' is part of 'in-finite self-knowledge'. Within 'the sense of in-finite self-knowledge', there is 'the concept'. 'The truth of essence' is not 'in the sense of in-finite self-knowledge'; '[t]he truth of essence' is not with 'the concept'. Nothing is 'in-finite' and there is no self in the case of '[t]he truth of essence'. For that reason, I read '[t]he truth of essence' and 'the concept in the sense of in-finite self-knowledge' are different from each other.

'[T]he absolute self-thinking of thinking' is neither a thinking of 'self' nor a thinking of 'Being'. 'Being', which is claimed to be 'the absolute self-thinking of thinking', does not think in the statement above. 'Being', which is claimed to be 'the absolute self-thinking of thinking', is not a thinker. I read two different 'thinking[s]': 'the absolute self-thinking' and 'thinking'. '[T]he absolute self-thinking' is part of 'thinking'. '[T]hinking' which has 'the absolute self-thinking' as its part is not absolute for the perspective on the statement. In addition, 'thinking' is not 'the' one whereas 'the absolute self-thinking' is 'the' one. 'Being' is not an absolute being. '[T]he absolute self-thinking' is not absolutely absolute although the absoluteness is claimed on 'the absolute self-thinking'.

'Absolute thinking alone' is not claimed with self. 'Absolute thinking alone' does not think. 'Absolute thinking alone' is not alone because the 'alone[ness]' is claimed with '[a]bsolute thinking'. With the 'alone[ness]', there is '[a]bsolute thinking'. Furthermore, '[a]bsolute thinking alone' is claimed with 'the truth of Being' and 'Being'. I am not claiming that '[a]bsolute thinking alone' is with 'the truth of Being' and 'Being' somewhere. 'Absolute thinking alone', 'the truth of Being' and 'Being' are not

anywhere for the perspective on the statement. ‘Truth’, however, is ‘here’. ‘Truth’ is different from ‘the truth of Being’ and ‘Being’. The ‘mean[ing]’ of ‘[t]ruth’ will no longer be ‘the knowable as such is known with a knowledge absolutely certain of itself’ if it is out of ‘here’. Hegel and ‘Hegel’ are not ‘here’ where the ‘mean[ing]’ of ‘[t]ruth’ has been claimed. The ‘mean[ing]’ of ‘[t]ruth’ is ‘knowable’ and ‘known’ not only ‘here’ but also to the perspective on the statement. It is unknown whether ‘Hegel’ or Hegel knows about ‘[t]ruth here’.

‘Truth’ in the statement above is not *the* (my emphasis) truth, but ‘knowable as such’ is ‘the’ ‘knowable as such’. To be ‘the knowable’ is something to be knowable ‘as such’. However, ‘as such’ might not be known to ‘the knowable’. ‘Truth’ is claimed with the ability to know ‘as such’, but what can be ‘known’ and not ‘known’ are not stated within the statement above. ‘[T]he knowable as such’ would be ‘always’ ‘known’ with the addition of ‘a knowledge absolutely certain of itself’ as long as they are all ‘here’. ‘[A] knowledge absolutely certain of itself’ is a retrospection since it is already ‘known’ as an addition. ‘[A] knowledge absolutely certain’ is part of ‘itself’.

At the same time, Hegel rigorously thinks about the matter of his thinking in the context of a conversation with the previous history of thinking. Hegel is the first thinker who can and must think in this way. Hegel’s relation to the history of philosophy is the speculative, and only as such a historical, relation. The character of the movement of history is an occurrence in the sense of the dialectical process. Hegel writes: “The same development of thinking which is portrayed in the history of philosophy is portrayed in philosophy itself, but

freed from that element of historical externality, *purely in the element of thinking.*" (*Encyclopedia*, 14.)<sup>97</sup>

'At the same time' is not the time which had claimed from 'Hegel'. 'At the same time' is when 'Hegel rigorously thinks'. 'Hegel' is not rigorous; it is 'think[ing]' of 'Hegel' which is 'rigorous'. '[T]hink[ing]' of 'Hegel' is 'rigorous' whereas '[a]t the same time' is not. '[T]hink[ing]' of 'Hegel' is not about everything or anything; it is limited to 'the matter of thinking in the context of a conversation with the previous history of thinking'. '[T]he matter of his thinking' is not rigorous although 'Hegel rigorously thinks about' it. '[T]he matter of his thinking' is neither in 'think[ing]' of 'Hegel' nor '[a]t the same time'; it is 'in the context of a conversation'. Although 'Hegel' is the one who 'rigorously thinks about the matter of his thinking', 'Hegel' is not 'in the context of a conversation'. There is 'thinking' which belongs to 'his', but 'the matter', which is part of 'his thinking', is not 'his'. '[T]he context of conversation' does not belong to anyone and anything. '[T]he context of conversation' is neither 'the context of a conversation' of 'his' nor 'Hegel'. '[T]he previous history of thinking' is not 'in the context of a conversation'. Furthermore, 'the previous history of thinking' is not 'in the context of a conversation' when 'Hegel rigorously thinks about the matter of his thinking'. '[T]he previous history of thinking' is a supplement of 'think[ing]' of 'Hegel'. 'At the same time' and 'the previous history of thinking' are not the same moment. In addition, 'the previous history of thinking' is different from 'his thinking' and what 'Hegel rigorously thinks' '[a]t the same time'. '[T]he previous history of thinking' is not in anywhere. '[T]he previous history of thinking' does not belong to 'his' and 'Hegel'.

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., pp. 43-4.

‘Hegel’ is numbered as ‘the first’ and stated as ‘thinker’. Furthermore, ‘the first thinker’ is someone ‘who can think and must think in this way’. ‘[T]his way’ is a single ‘way’ which is not claimed with other ways. ‘[T]hink[ing]’ of ‘who’ is, therefore, limited to ‘in this way’.

The claim about ‘Hegel’s relation’ is not only something about ‘Hegel’ and ‘relation’ — that is also about ‘the history of philosophy’. ‘Hegel’ does not claim that ‘the history of philosophy’ and ‘Hegel’s relation’ are related as such in the statement above, but ‘Hegel’s relation to the history of philosophy’ is ‘the speculative’. There is another relation in the same sentence: ‘a historical, relation’. ‘[A] historical, relation’ is not ‘Hegel’s relation’. ‘[A] historical, relation’ is a relation which is not a history itself. ‘[A] historical, relation’ is something as ‘a historical, relation’. ‘Hegel’s relation to the history of philosophy’ is claimed to be ‘the speculative’ and it is limited to ‘a historical, relation’. I do not read that ‘history’ of ‘the movement of history’ and ‘history’ of ‘the history of philosophy’ are the same history. There is ‘[t]he character’ in the case of ‘the movement of history’. ‘The character’ is ‘an occurrence’. ‘[A]n occurrence’ is not within ‘the movement of history’, ‘[t]he character’ or ‘[t]he character of the movement of history’. ‘The character of the movement of history’ and ‘an occurrence’ are distinctive from each other since ‘an occurrence’ is only ‘in the sense of the dialectical process’. Not all the occurrences are ‘[t]he character of the movement of history’ since ‘an occurrence’ needs to be ‘in the sense of the dialectical process’. ‘[A]n occurrence’ is not ‘in’ ‘the dialectical process’; where ‘[a]n occurrence’ claimed to be ‘in’ is ‘the sense of the dialectical process’. Therefore, nothing occurs and has been occurred in ‘the dialectical process’. ‘[T]he dialectical process’ does not process in the statement above.

Although there is a statement, ‘Hegel writes’, nothing has been written by He-

gel. 'Hegel' is claimed to write such words by the perspective on 'Hegel'. The statement has already written as such by other than 'Hegel'. What 'Hegel writes' is within the quotation marks, but that is not a writing of Hegel. In addition, 'Hegel writes' something, but the writing of 'Hegel' is already in the past.

I do not see a portray of '[t]he same development of thinking', but '[t]he same development of thinking' is 'portrayed' twice. The number of '[t]he same development of thinking' is not plural, but it seems that '[t]he same development of thinking' could be 'portrayed in' somewhere twice. 'The same development of thinking' would be always 'in' somewhere as long as it is 'portrayed'. The ideas on 'portrayed in' are different from each other. The latter case is 'freed from that element of historical externality' although it is 'portrayed in philosophy itself'. 'The same development of thinking' is already 'portrayed in the history of philosophy' and would be 'portrayed in philosophy itself' later. According to the statement, '[t]he same development of thinking' does not remain as '[t]he same development of thinking' since it has been 'portrayed' differently for twice. 'The same development of thinking' is not portrayed as 'that element of historical externality'.

'The same development of thinking' is 'freed from that element of historical externality', but '[t]he same development of thinking' and 'that element of historical externality' are still claimed together within those quotation marks. However, '[t]he same development of thinking' is still 'freed from that element of historical externality'. '[T]he same development of thinking' is neither 'freed from' any 'element' nor 'history externality'. 'The same development of thinking' is not portrayed within 'that element of historical externality'.

Nothing is portrayed when '[t]he same development of thinking' is *purely in the element of thinking*'. When '[t]he same development of thinking' is 'portrayed in'


somewhere, nothing is *purely* (my emphasis) in. Although '[t]he same development of thinking' is 'freed from that element of historical externality', '[t]he same development of thinking' is still *purely in* somewhere else which is not 'that element of historical externality' itself. 'The same development of thinking which is portrayed in the history of philosophy' is *purely in the element of thinking*, but none of '[t]he same development of thinking which is portrayed in the history of philosophy' is an element of *'the element of thinking'*. Even *'thinking'* is not *'the element'*.

In the next part of my thesis, I will analyse another picture book alongside a range of texts in order to further expand upon and show my ideas. In the following chapter, I will take up the picture book *Use Your Brain*. Like the 'five senses' of 'my five senses', 'brain' of 'your brain' belongs to something else which is not the 'brain' itself. Alongside this text, I will also read different brains in a number of different texts such as William Uttal's *The New Phrenology*, Robin D. Morris', 'Relationships and Distinctions among the Concepts of Attention, Memory, and Executive Function' in *Attention, Memory, and Executive Function* and Hermann Haken's *Principles of Brain Functioning: A Synergetic Approach to Brain Activity, Behavior and Cognition*. There, I will keep thinking about *'messages'* (also my emphasis) and the issues and ideas which are related to the pictures.

### Part III. Reading ‘a Let’s-Read-and-Find-out Science Book’ II

#### Chapter 10: ‘Your Brain’ and its Picture

In the case of *My Five Senses*, the word, ‘message’, is stated in the blurb only once. In the case of *Use Your Brain*, there are several ‘messages’ within the statement. The first ‘messages’ appears on page 7. I will read the front cover and then continue to read page 7 in order to read the ideas on ‘messages’.



(Front cover, *Use Your Brain*)

‘USE YOUR BRAIN’ is neither ‘THIS’ nor ‘A LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOK’. ‘USE YOUR BRAIN’ is not ‘THIS IS A LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOK’ either. According to the text, ‘YOUR BRAIN’ is neither *a* nor *the* (both my emphases) brain. ‘YOUR BRAIN’ belongs to ‘YOUR’. Thus, ‘YOUR BRAIN’ is not a brain of its own. All ‘brain[s]’ in *Use Your Brain* always belong to ‘your’. In other words, ‘your brain’ is never a brain and the brain for the perspective on ‘your brain’.



On the front cover, there is '[i]llustrated by Rosalind Fry' underneath 'USE YOUR BRAIN'. 'YOUR BRAIN' does not belong to 'Rosalind Fry' and it is not 'Rosalind Fry' who 'USE[s]' 'YOUR BRAIN'. The '[i]llustrat[ions]' in *Use Your Brain* do not belong to 'Rosalind Fry'. 'PAUL SHOWERS' does not own 'YOUR BRAIN' and also does not 'USE' 'YOUR BRAIN' either.

From reading 'BY' and '[i]llustrated by', I read that there are differences between 'PAUL SHOWERS' and 'Rosalind Fry'. In Perry Nodelman's *Words about Pictures: The Narrative Art of Children's Picture Books*, it has been claimed that '[i]llustrators also must struggle to find their styles'.<sup>98</sup> For the reason that 'Paul Showers' is not one of '[i]llustrators', he might have not been 'struggle[d] to find' his 'styles' from Nodelman's point of view. However, to what extent is it a 'struggl[ing]' and not 'struggl[ing]? How do '[i]llustrators' know that they have 'f[ou]nd' (also my emphasis) 'their styles'? Does that mean that 'their styles' are not 'their styles' unless they are 'f[ou]nd'? '[S]tyles' in Nodelman's text are not only plural but also belong to someone who 'struggle to find their styles'.

Since I regard that styles are not alien from illustrations and pictures, I will read some more passages about 'styles' in Nodelman's text. What are 'styles' in relation to 'illustrators'?

[A]nd because styles do convey meanings, illustrators must make the choices that create style in picture books deliberately in the context of their conception of the narrative effect they intend, rather than unconsciously in the context of

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<sup>98</sup> Perry Nodelman, *Words about Pictures: The Narrative Art of Children's Picture Books* (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1988), p. 78.

their experience or merely in terms of their personal preferences.<sup>99</sup>

It is not ‘illustrators’ who ‘do convey meanings’ although they ‘create style in the picture books’. ‘[I]llustrators’ may have not made any choices since there are ‘the choices’ which ‘illustrators must make’. ‘[T]he choices’ in the statement above are not any choices of ‘illustrators’. ‘[T]he choices’ are conditional on ‘meanings’ of ‘styles’ which are claimed to be ‘convey[ed]’. After ‘the choices’ are ‘ma[d]e’, ‘styles’ are ‘create[d]’ ‘in the picture books’ and also ‘in the context of their conception of the narrative effect they intend’. When ‘style’ is ‘create[d]’, ‘style’ is already part of the ‘inten[tion]’ of ‘the[m]’. When ‘style’ is ‘create[d] in the picture books’, the ‘inten[tion]’ of ‘the[m]’ is already part of ‘the context of their conception’. ‘[S]tyle in the picture’ might be ‘unconsciously in the context of their experience’ and ‘merely in terms of their personal preferences’. However, those are not claimed to be ‘the choices’ of what ‘illustrators must make’. I will not insist that there are the better or worse choices *for* (my emphasis) ‘illustrators’ since the statement above is not a claim from ‘illustrators’.

As there is ‘BY PAUL SHOWERS’ on the front cover, I read that *Use Your Brain* is not a solo work of ‘Rosalind Fry’. *My Five Senses* and *One Gorilla* have no distinction between writers and illustrators, but there is difference between ‘Rosalind Fry’ and ‘PAUL SHOWERS’. I found a part which mentions about ‘collaboration’ from the same chapter in *Words about Pictures: The Narrative Art of Children’s Picture Books*. After reading the ideas about ‘collaboration’ in Nodelman’s text, I will go back to read the front cover of *Use Your Brain*.

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

As a medium which requires collaboration between people with different skills rather than the unqualified expression of one person's unique vision, picture books are much like theater. There too the style of a specific production emerges from a number of different individual contributions, and there too style is less significantly an expression of individual personality than a source of meaning.<sup>100</sup>

'[P]icture books' are something '[a]s a medium which requires collaboration between people with different skills'. Although there is no statement anywhere that *Use Your Brain* is a picture book, I still read that *Use Your Brain* is a picture book because of '[i]llustrated by Rosalind Fry'. In my perspective (since *Use Your Brain* is a picture book), *Use Your Brain* is something '[a]s a medium which requires collaboration' rather than 'the unqualified expression of one person's unique vision'.

'[P]icture books' are closer to '[a]s a medium which requires collaboration between people with different skills'. '[S]kills' are not same for 'people' who do the 'collaboration'. The numbers of 'skills' and 'people' are plural, but the numbers of 'collaboration' and 'a medium' are singulars. In other words, no matter how many 'people' do the 'collaboration' work with 'different skills', there will be a singular 'medium'. Unlike 'collaboration', 'vision' is from 'one person'. In addition, it is '*unique*' (also my emphasis) 'vision' which belongs to 'one person'. However, the 'expression' is claimed to be '*the unqualified*' (also my emphasis) one, if it has 'one person's unique vision' as its part. Neither 'a medium' nor 'collaboration' is claimed to be unique and unqualified within the text. Therefore, I would like to insist that 'the unqualified expression of one

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 81.


person's unique vision' and 'a medium which requires collaboration between people with different skills' are different from each other. '[P]icture books' and 'a medium' are not 'theater' although there is a similarity between 'picture books' and 'theater'.

Compared to 'the unqualified expression of one person's unique vision', 'picture books' and 'a medium' are closer to the 'theater'. 'There' is not only place where 'the style of a specific productions emerges'. Because of '[t]here too', there might be other than 'there' where 'the style of a specific production emerges'. 'There', not all the styles emerge. What 'emerges' '[t]here' is 'the style' which has 'a specific production' as its part. '[E]merg[ing]' of 'the style of a specific production' has not 'emerge[d]' from '[t]here'; it is 'from a number of different individual contributions'.

'[C]ontributions' are not singular, but there are 'a number of different individual contributions'. There are 'a number of different individual', but 'contributions' are not individually contributed when 'the style of a specific production emerges from' there, 'a number of different individual contributions'. In addition ('and'), 'style' is not the style when it is 'there'. '[T]here' and somewhere 'too', 'style' is claimed to be 'less significantly an expression of individual personality'. It does not mean that 'style' is not 'a source of meaning' 'there' and somewhere 'too'. Rather than being 'a source of meaning', 'style' is more like 'an expression of individual personality' although 'less significantly' has been claimed with 'an expression of individual personality'. '[S]tyle' could be read as 'a source of meaning', but there is something another ('an expression of individual personality') which is closer to 'style'. However, I do not mean that 'style' *is* (my emphasis) 'an expression of individual personality' itself as I have already read that there is 'less significantly'. In the case of 'an expression', it is not an expression of 'individual' nor 'personality'. Nothing is expressed although 'there' is 'an expression'; in other words, 'an expression of individual personality' is not something

to express. '[I]ndividual personality' is part of a single 'expression'. '[I]ndividual personality' is also singular. There are no multiple personalities in the case of 'individual' and there are no multiple number of expressions in the case of 'individual personality'.

'YOUR BRAIN' is not my brain. The ownership of 'YOUR BRAIN' is claimed by the other who is not the owner of 'YOUR BRAIN'. The perspective on 'YOUR BRAIN' does not 'USE' 'YOUR BRAIN'. The perspective on 'YOUR BRAIN' does not 'USE' anything. It seems that 'YOUR BRAIN' can be used, but there is no one 'USE[s] YOUR BRAIN'. It is not mentioned whether 'YOUR BRAIN' was used. It is not mentioned whether 'YOUR' does or did use 'YOUR BRAIN'. The idea of ownership does not make 'YOUR' to 'USE YOUR BRAIN'.



Within each letter of 'USE YOUR BRAIN', there are the green shapes. In the case of 'U' of 'USE YOUR BRAIN', there are one green rhombus, two short green lines next to a green rhombus and six green circles next to the two short green lines.

There are the shapes within ‘USE YOUR BRAIN’ and those shapes within each letter are not always identical. Although there are the shapes within the letters, ‘USE YOUR BRAIN’ is different from the picture of flowers and butterflies. This is because I do not read any letters from the pictorial flowers and butterflies.<sup>101</sup>

Although the statement on the front cover does not mention that there are ‘YOUR’ and ‘YOUR BRAIN’ on the picture, I somehow read ‘YOUR’ and ‘YOUR BRAIN’ from the picture. Furthermore, I also read the idea of ‘USE’ from the picture. In the case of the pictorial ‘YOUR’, it is claimed with the black outline. Within the outline, there are the white part, black lines, the black part and a pink butterfly. The black outline around ‘YOUR’ is the thickest line on the picture. Because of the outline, I read that the outer part of the outline is not ‘YOUR’ and the inner part of the outline is ‘YOUR’. Within the frame of ‘YOUR’, there is the pictorial ‘YOUR BRAIN’. I read it as ‘YOUR BRAIN’, but that brain is not my brain. I read a head from the picture. The pictorial ‘YOUR BRAIN’ is not only within the frame of ‘YOUR’ but also somewhere on the head.


In case of the picture, it seems other than ‘YOUR’ and ‘YOUR BRAIN’ can be used or need to be there in order to be used. For example, the butterflies and the flowers are neither of ‘YOUR’ nor ‘YOUR BRAIN’, but they are what ‘YOUR’ is claimed to ‘USE’. The hand of ‘YOUR’ and the butterflies does not move. The picture of ‘USE’ is not about the movement of the frames.<sup>102</sup> Although ‘YOUR’ and the hand do not move, I read the idea of ‘USE’ from the picture. From reading ‘YOUR BRAIN’, butterflies

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<sup>101</sup> See more readings and examples about ‘typographic variation’ and ‘[u]se of colour in text’ in Sue Walker’s *Book Design for Children’s Reading* (London: St Bride Foundation, 2013) pp. 50-7.

<sup>102</sup> See, the ideas on ‘movement’: YuKuan Chen, ‘Seeing Vision: Gesture, Movement and Colour in Painting in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s Staring: How We Look’ in *Rethinking Disability Theory and Practice*, ed. by Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 149-64.

within the frame of 'YOUR BRAIN', the hand, the butterfly above the hand and the line which is near to those butterflies, I read 'USE YOUR BRAIN'.



The line which is near to two butterflies is also the repetitions of '—' and '·'. In terms of different lengths of '—' and '·', I read them as short lines and dots. The line which is near to two butterflies is then the repetitions of short lines and dots. I would like to add that the line, which I read in the previous sentence, is different from the outline of 'YOUR'. They are the different lines not only because of their thickness and lengths. I do not read the repetition from the outline of 'YOUR'.

In the case of the line which is near to two butterflies, it looks like as if the line is on the pictorial 'YOUR BRAIN', the head of 'YOUR' and the eye.<sup>103</sup> Although the line is not above of or on any of the frames, it looks likely so. On the right side of the line, there is a dot, but it is difficult to see the end of the left side; it might be the dot or the short line. For the perspective on the picture, left edge of the line is different from

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<sup>103</sup> For more examples and statements about 'the name', 'the object', 'link' see, Judith Butler's 'Arguing with the Real' in *Bodies That Matter* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 156-65.

right edge. The smallest butterfly which is within the frame of 'YOUR BRAIN' is on the left side and I cannot see clearly whether the line and the butterfly are in the same frame or not. In the case of the butterfly at the right side of the hand, I can see that the line and the butterfly are not in the same frame. Two butterflies near to edges are not only different in sizes and colours. The butterfly on the right side is not within the frame of 'YOUR' whereas the smallest butterfly on the left side is within the frame of 'YOUR' and also 'YOUR BRAIN'.

As I have already mentioned, there is an eye on the front cover. I read an eye from reading a black triangle on the head. There are two triangles on the head, but for me, the upper triangle is an eye whereas the lower one is not. The line, which I also have read as the repetitions of short lines and dots, is one of the reasons why I read 'USE YOUR BRAIN' from the front cover. For that reason, I would like to claim that the upper triangle is also something to do with 'USE YOUR BRAIN' because the line seems to be on the eye. In terms of reading the lines, Jane Doonan insists in her book that '[l]ine creates contour, modeling, shading, and a sign for movement.'<sup>104</sup> What a single 'line' 'creates' is four different things: 'contour, modeling, shading, and a sign'. The numbers of '[l]ine', 'contour', 'modeling', 'shading', 'a sign' and 'movement' are all singular, but 'a sign' is the only one which to be '*a*' (also my emphasis) 'sign'. Furthermore, I would like to claim that 'movement' could be read in two different ways: 1. '[l]ine creates' four different 'movement[s]' which are 'contour' 'for movement', 'modeling' 'for movement', 'shading' 'for movement' and 'a sign for movement'. 2 '[l]ine creates' a single 'movement' which is claimed with 'a sign'. Whatever that 'movement' is, 'creat[ing]' of '[l]ine' is 'for' 'movement'. According to Doonan, 'movement' is

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<sup>104</sup> Jane Doonan, *Looking at Pictures in Picture Books* (Lockwood: The Thimble Press, 1993), p. 23.



something to be ‘create[d]’ by the ‘line’. In addition, the ‘line’ is prior to ‘contour, modeling, shading, and a sign for movement’ regardless of ‘creat[ing]’. However, without ‘creat[ing]’ of the ‘line’, there would be no ‘contour, modeling, shading, and a sign for movement’.

Doonan also states that ‘through the use of lines of different weight and thickness, line suggests movement.’<sup>105</sup> There are ‘different weight and thickness’ in the case of ‘lines’. ‘[L]ines’ which are claimed with ‘weight and thickness’ are part of ‘the use’. ‘[L]ine suggests movement’, ‘but through the use’ which has lines of ‘different weight and thickness’. ‘[L]ine’ which ‘suggests movement’ is neither *the* nor *a* (both my emphases) line. Because of ‘suggest[ion]’, I read that ‘line’ is not necessarily ‘movement’. ‘[L]ines’ and ‘line’ are different from each other. ‘[M]ovement’ of ‘line’ which is ‘suggest[ed]’ is conditional on ‘the use of lines’. If ‘the use of lines’ does not ‘through’, there would not be ‘movement’ which is ‘suggest[ed]’. However, what if ‘different weight and thickness’ are not part of ‘the use of lines’? I would like to add that ‘movement’ of ‘line’ is also conditional on ‘different weight and thickness’ of ‘lines’. As long as ‘lines of different weight and thickness’ are part of ‘the use’ and ‘through’, ‘line suggests movement’ for Doonan.

The eye on the front cover is not a brain, but it is related to the idea of using a brain. ‘USE YOUR BRAIN’ is something to do with inside and outside of ‘YOUR’ and ‘YOUR BRAIN’. The eye and the smallest butterfly are all within the frame of ‘YOUR’ likewise ‘YOUR BRAIN’, but it is only ‘YOUR BRAIN’ which belongs to

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

‘YOUR’. Due to the statement, I read that the pictorial ‘YOUR BRAIN’ is ‘YOUR[s]’, but the eye and the smallest butterfly are not ‘YOUR[s]’.

The hand which I read with ‘US[ing]’ is not apart from the frame of ‘YOUR’ since the outline of the hand and the outline of ‘YOUR’ are the same line. For that reason, the hand is also not apart from pictorial ‘YOUR BRAIN’. Although I do not read the hand as pictorial ‘YOUR’ hand, I still read that the hand is what has been ‘USE[d]’ with pictorial ‘YOUR BRAIN’. There are two arms on the picture, but not all the arms are claimed with a hand. To ‘USE YOUR BRAIN’, one hand is there for ‘US[ing]’.

Within the outline, there are the thinner black lines and five small circles within the frame of hand and arm. The thinner lines are not out of pictorial ‘YOUR’. They look different from the lines on the head. Reading the picture from reading ‘USE YOUR BRAIN’ is not only related with pictorial ‘YOUR’ but also related with inside of the frame, such as inside of the arm and the hand.

In terms of reading ‘YOUR’ from the picture, I read a head, a hand, an arm, the butterflies, etc. In ‘Style as Meaning’, Nodelman also writes about ‘structures’, ‘colours’, ‘lines’, ‘shapes’ and ‘style’ in his text. Those ‘structures’, ‘colours’, ‘lines’, ‘shapes’ and ‘style’ are claimed after ‘picture books’ and ‘pictures’. I will read Nodelman’s text and read it with *Use Your Brain* together before I move onto the next chapter.

*All* pictures in picture books have narrative functions. Their various structures and colors, their various lines and shapes and media, and, above all, their style, all have the potential to express the meaning and mood of a story; if this means

they are like toys, then all narrative is like toys.<sup>106</sup>

That is not a claim about all the pictures; those ‘[a]ll pictures’ are ‘in picture books’. Not all the pictures ‘have narrative functions’. In other words, not all pictures have ‘narrative functions’. ‘[P]icture books’ are not all ‘picture books’. As long as ‘[a]ll pictures’ are in ‘picture books’, ‘[a]ll pictures’ have an ownership on ‘narrative functions’. What is ‘narrative functions’ of ‘[a]ll pictures in picture books’ to the perspective on the statement?

‘Their various structures and colors, their various lines and shapes and media’ ‘all have the potential to express the meaning and mood of a story’, but ‘their style’ is ‘above all’ to the others. In terms of numbers, ‘their style’ is singular and not something ‘various’. Although there are differences between ‘their style’ and the others, ‘all have the potential to express the meaning and mood of a story’. In the case of a single ‘story’, there are ‘the meaning and mood’. ‘[T]he meaning’ is not ‘mood’ and vice versa. ‘[T]he meaning’ and ‘mood’, which are different from each other, might be ‘express[ed]’ when ‘the meaning and mood’ are part of ‘a story’. However, the possibility to be ‘express[ed]’ is not owned by ‘a story’; ‘the potential’ to be ‘express[ed]’ is what ‘their style’, ‘[t]heir various structures and colors’, ‘their various lines and shapes and media’ are claimed to ‘have’. In other words, ‘express[ing] the meaning and mood of a story’ is not the potential of ‘a story’ or the potential of ‘the meaning and mood of a story’.

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p. 98.

There is a similarity between ‘they’ and ‘toys’. In other words, ‘they’ and ‘toys’ are not the same although ‘they are like toys’. ‘[A]ll narrative is like toys’ is conditional on ‘if this means they are like toys’. Therefore, ‘all narrative’ cannot always be ‘toys’. Likewise ‘they’ and ‘toys’ are not the same, ‘all narrative’ and ‘toys’ are different from each other.

My questions about the statement from Nodelman is that how the perspective on the statement knows about 1. ‘All pictures in picture books have narrative functions’ so that 2. ‘all have the potential to express the meaning and mood of a story’? If ‘[t]heir various structures and colors, their various lines and shapes and media, and, above all, their style’ do not ‘have the potential to express’, ‘the meaning and mood of a story’ on the front cover of *Use Your Brain* would been was pressed. Furthermore, what could be ‘the meaning’ and ‘mood of a story’ on the front cover? Are there ‘the meaning’ and ‘mood of a story’ which are either ‘express[ed]’ or ‘press[ed]’? ‘[T]hey are like toys’, but what are something ‘like toys’ on the front cover of *Use Your Brain*? Are the pictures in *Use Your Brain* ‘like toys’? If the pictures in *Use Your Brain* ‘are like toys’, does that mean other than the pictures are not ‘like toys’? However, what are ‘toys’ and what are ‘pictures’?

In relation to reading ‘[a]ll pictures in picture books’ from Nodelman’s text above, Nodelman also claims in the different text that

what distinguishes picturebooks from other texts is exactly what their name suggests: the presence of pictures. They have pictures because children, people believe, need or are at least greatly benefited by their presence. Without pictures, people think, children cannot make much sense of words.

But perhaps that is just because the words are so simple that they do not make

much sense on their own anyway.<sup>107</sup>

Although two texts are all from Nodelman, it is written as ‘picture books’ in the previous text and ‘picturebooks’ in the latter text above. The perspectives on each statement has different ideas about ‘picture books’ and ‘picturebooks’. The difference between the two words is whether there is a space between ‘picture’ and ‘books’. Apart from the external difference, ‘picturebooks’ and ‘picture books’ are still different from each other. In the statement above, ‘picturebooks’ are ‘distinguishe[d]’ ‘from other texts’. ‘[T]exts’, which are not ‘picturebooks’, are claimed to be ‘other’. ‘[P]icturebooks’ are ‘distinguishe[d]’ *‘from’* (also my emphasis) in terms of ‘their name’. One of the differences between ‘picture books’ in the previous text and ‘picturebooks’ in the latter text is that ‘picturebooks’ are claimed with ‘their name’ which is not plural. In other words, ‘picturebooks’ has the same ‘name[s]’. ‘[P]icturebooks’ are the ‘name’ of ‘picturebooks’, but there is no name of ‘other texts’. ‘[T]he presence of pictures’ is not claimed with ‘other texts’. Does that mean there is no picture of ‘other texts’? Otherwise, there are pictures, but these pictures are not part of ‘[t]he presence’ in the case of ‘other texts’? Furthermore, ‘[t]he presence of pictures’ are not ‘exactly’ ‘distinguishes’ ‘picturebooks from other texts’ because it is ‘their name’ which ‘suggests’.

In the following sentence, ‘children’ and ‘people’ are not included in ‘they’ because ‘children’ and ‘people’ do not have any ‘pictures’. However, ‘children’ and ‘people’ are different from each other; it is ‘people’ who ‘believe’ that ‘children’ are someone who ‘need or are at least greatly benefited by their presence’; ‘believ[ing]’ is what ‘people’ do. ‘[H]av[ing] pictures’ are the reason why ‘people’ ‘believe’ that ‘children’

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<sup>107</sup> Perry Nodelman, ‘Words Claimed: Picturebook Narratives and the Project of Children’s Literature’ in *New Directions in Picturebook Research*, ed. by Teresa Colomer, Bettina Kümmerling-Meibauer, and Cecilia Silva-Díaz (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), p. 12.

‘need or are at least greatly benefited by their presence’. In that sense, ‘children’ might not ‘need’ and ‘greatly benefited by their presence’ in the case of others’ beliefs.

‘[M]ak[ing] much sense of words’ is conditional on ‘pictures’. ‘[M]ak[ing] much sense of words’ is an ability of ‘children’. However, ‘making much sense of words’ with ‘pictures’ are not what ‘children’ ‘think’; it is thought of ‘people’ that ‘children’ are unable of ‘mak[ing] much sense of words’. ‘[P]eople’ do not ‘think’ that they would not ‘make much sense of words’ ‘[w]ithout pictures’. For the perspective on ‘children’, ‘pictures’ are not something to *make sense of* (my emphasis) whereas ‘words’ are. Even if ‘children’ are with ‘pictures’ and ‘children’ can make sense of ‘words’ with ‘pictures’, ‘mak[ing]’ ‘sense of words’ in the statement above is lacking. It is because ‘children’ can ‘make’ ‘*much*’ (also my emphasis) ‘sense of words’. No matter how much ‘children’ ‘make’ ‘sense of words’ with ‘pictures’, it would be less than that ‘sense of words’.

‘[T]he words are so simple’ and ‘they do make much sense on their own anyway’ are all something less to be certain (‘but perhaps’). In other words, ‘the words are so simple’ and ‘do not make much sense on their own anyway’ are insisted to be as such although they are somehow uncertain. ‘[T]he words’ are more than ‘simple’ because they are ‘so simple’. For the perspective on the statement on ‘the words’, I read that picture are neither so simple nor simple. Because ‘the words are so simple’, ‘they do not make much sense on their own anyway’. That is not ‘anyway’ according to ‘the words’. To what extent are ‘the words’ ‘simple’ or ‘so simple’? To what extent ‘do’ ‘they’ ‘make’ ‘*much*’ (also my emphasis) ‘sense’ or ‘make sense’ without ‘much’?

In this is chapter, I tried to read the front cover of *Use Your Brain* with other statements from Perry Nodelman and Jane Doonan. Nodelman and Doonan’s texts are

based on reading children's picture books. In the following chapter, I will continue to read the front cover of *Use Your Brain* and read it with Jacques Derrida's *The Truth in Painting*, Lorraine Daston and Perter Galison's *Objectivity* and William Uttal's *The New Phrenology*. These three books are neither about children's literature nor children's literature theory, but by reading these texts, I will see what claims are made about 'painting', 'image' and 'Figure' in philosophical, scientific and medical books.

## Chapter 11: Reading Science Texts with Derrida's *The Truth in Painting*

In Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison's *Objectivity*, there is a statement about '[t]his book'.<sup>108</sup> *Objectivity* is a singular 'book'. It is distinguished from other books within the text. What is 'objectivity'? What is 'object' (or 'objects') within the text?

It 'is about the creation of a new epistemic virtue - scientific objectivity - that drove scientists to rewrite and re-image the guides that divide nature into its fundamental objects.'<sup>109</sup> Since *Objectivity* is 'about the creation of a new epistemic virtue', what I read from *Objectivity* is not 'the creation of a new epistemic virtue' itself, but something 'about' it. '[A] new epistemic virtue' is the 'new' one, but already has been created as 'the creation'. Therefore, I read that 'the creation of a new epistemic virtue' is the retrospection for the perspective on the statement. '[T]he creation of a new epistemic virtue' will be 'the creation' which has something 'new' as its part no matter when I read it. The result of 'the creation of a new epistemic virtue - scientific objectivity' is that two different things: 'rewrite' and 're-image' 'the guides'. '[T]he guides' are the latter of 'rewrit[ing]' and 're-imag[ing]'. '[S]cientists' did not 'rewrite and re-image the guides' by themselves because it was 'the creation of a new epistemic virtue' which 'drove scientists'. According to the text about 'the guides', 'nature' is not 'its fundamental objects'; 'nature' can be 'divide[d] into' other than 'nature'. For the perspective on the statement, 'nature' is neither something 'fundamental' nor 'objects'.

'Scientific objectivity has a history. Objectivity has not always defined science. [...] Objectivity preserves the artifact of variation that would have been erased in the

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<sup>108</sup> Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity*, 3rd edn (New York: Zone Books, 2015), p. 16.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.




name of truth.’<sup>110</sup> For Daston and Galison, there is a ‘objectivity’ which is ‘[s]cientific’ and that ‘objectivity’ owns ‘a history’. ‘[S]cience’ is something to be ‘defined’, but not ‘always’. In other words, ‘[o]bjectivity’ did ‘define’ ‘science’ although there might be exceptions. I do not read that the ‘defin[ition]’ of ‘science’ *is* (my emphasis) ‘[o]bjectivity’. There are nothing and no one who ‘erase’ ‘the artifact of variation’, but it ‘would have been erased’ ‘in the name of truth’. If ‘the artifact of variation’ were not ‘in the name of truth’, it could have been ‘erase[d]’. On the other hand, there is ‘[o]bjectivity’ which ‘preserves the artifact of variation that would have been erased in the name of truth’. ‘[P]reserv[ing]’ and ‘eras[ing]’ are different to the perspective on the statement because ‘[o]bjectivity’ is not something to be erased. Furthermore, ‘[o]bjectivity’ keeps ‘the artifact of variation’ from ‘eras[ing]’ and ‘the name of truth’ because it ‘preserves’. Is the ‘preserv[ation]’ of ‘[o]bjectivity’ related with ‘ha[ving] a history’?

Reading the ideas on ‘[s]cientific obtivity’, ‘[o]bjectivity, and ‘science’ caused me to read different brains in other texts. In William Uttal’s *The New Phrenology*, there is an ‘[i]mage of the human brain’ at the bottom of the page.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>111</sup> William Uttal, *The New Phrenology* (Cambridge and Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), p. 67.



‘Figure 2.10’ was not produced by anything while ‘[i]mage of the human brain’ was ‘produced by a CAT scanning procedure’. ‘Image of the human brain’ is not numbered. It is neither ‘the human’ nor ‘brain’ which was ‘produced’ after ‘a CAT scanning procedure’. The result of ‘produc[ing]’ is ‘[i]mage’ which has ‘the human brain’ as its part.

‘[A] CAT scanning procedure’ ‘produce[s]’ ‘[i]mage of the human brain’.

‘CAT’ is an abbreviation of ‘Computer-Assisted X-Ray Tomography’.<sup>112</sup> Therefore, ‘a CAT scanning procedure’ is not only a procedure but also something which was assisted by the computer. The chapter is titled as ‘The Technologies’ and there is a note: ‘to review methods, both traditional and recent, used to brain anatomy and function’.<sup>113</sup> ‘Computer-Assisted X-Ray Tomography’ is one of ‘[t]echnologies’ and also one of ‘methods’ which is to be ‘review[ed]’.

<sup>112</sup> See more about ‘CAT’ on page 61 in *The New Phrenology*.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 183.

For the reason that '[t]he black regions are bone', the other regions which are not black are not 'bone'. 'Figure 2.10' and '[i]mage' are '[u]sed with the permission of J. E. Faulkner, Medical Imaging, Good Samaritan Hospital, Phoenix, Arizona'. '[T]he permission' is an addition of usage. With 'the permission' from 'J. E. Faulkner, Medical Imaging, Good Samaritan Hospital, Phoenix, Arizona', 'Figure 2.10' and [i]mage' are there in *The New Phrenology*. It is not 'the human' who gave 'the permission'. It seems that 'the human' who owns 'brain' did not permit to produce and use. In addition, '[u]s[ing]' is not what 'J. E. Faulkner' does. 'Image of the human brain' is '[u]sed', but it is not what 'the human' and 'the human brain' did either.

I would like to go back to *The Truth in Painting*. I will read the last three pages in 'Passe-Partout' and finish reading Derrida's *The Truth in Painting*. There, Derrida reads '[d]iscourses on painting' with 'reproduc[ing]'. I thought that '[d]iscourses on painting' and 'reproduc[ing]' are similar to 'Figure 2.10'/'[i]mage of the human brain' and 'produc[ing]' in Uttal's text because '[d]iscourses on painting' in Derrida's text are the result of 'reproduc[ing]'. After reading the ideas on *The Truth in Painting*, I will go back to read *Use Your Brain*.

Discourses on painting are perhaps destined to reproduce the limit which constitutes them, whatever they do and whatever they say. [...] A series of oppositions comes in the train of this one, which, incidentally, is not necessarily primary (for it belongs to a system whose edging itself reintroduces the problem). And there the trait is always determined as an opposition-slash.

But what happens *before* the difference becomes opposition in the trait, or *with-*

out its doing so? And what if there were not even a *becoming* here? For *becoming* has perhaps always had as its concept this determination of difference as opposition.<sup>114</sup>

'Discourses' are not 'painting'. 'Discourses' are 'on painting'. It is not 'painting' which is 'destined to reproduce the limit'. 'Discourses on painting' are also not always 'destined to reproduce the limit'. In other words, there is a probability that '[d]iscourses on painting' would not be 'destined' as such. '[R]eproduce[ment] the limit' is not what '[d]iscourses on painting' do; it is the result of 'destin[ation]' which has been designated to 'painting'. '[T]he limit' does not limit; it 'constitutes them'. '[T]hem' are not only a 'constitut[ion]' of 'the limit' but also something has been 'reproduce[d]'. Due to 'reproduce', I read that 'the limit' already has been produced before. However, it is not '[d]iscourses on painting' which had produced 'the limit' before. 'Discourses on painting' does not constitute themselves; they are 'constitute[d]' by 'the limit' which is also 'destined to reproduce'. '[P]ainting' does not 'do' and 'say' 'whatever' for the perspective on the statement; it is '[d]iscourses on painting' which 'do' and 'say'. However, 'whatever' '[d]iscourses on painting' 'do' and 'say', they might not remain as the same as before. This is because of 'reproduc[ement]' and 'constitut[ion]'.

'[T]his one' might be or not be 'primary'. Whatever it is, 'com[ing]' of '[a] series of oppositions' is 'in the train of this one'. 'A series of oppositions' is not 'the train of this one'. When '[a] series of oppositions comes', that is 'com[ing]' with 'this one'. It is 'incidental' and 'not necessarily primary' for the perspective on 'this one'. '[T]his one' 'belongs to a system' and this is the reason why it is 'not necessarily primary'.

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<sup>114</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, p. 11.

‘[A] system’ does not reintroduce ‘itself’ to ‘the problem’ at first according to the statement; ‘a system’ ‘edg[es] itself’ to ‘reintroduce[ment]’ and ‘it’ has been ‘belong[ed] to’ that ‘system’.

‘And’ when ‘there’ is ‘com[ing]’ of ‘[a] series of opposition’, ‘the trait always determined as an opposition-slash’. Likewise ‘[d]iscourses on painting’, something other than ‘the trait’ ‘determine[s]’ ‘the trait’. One of the differences between ‘[d]iscourses on painting’ and ‘the trait’ is that the latter one is ‘always determined’. Due to ‘always’, the ‘determin[ation]’ is non-exceptional in the case of ‘the trait’ whereas ‘[d]iscourses on painting’ are ‘destined’ with a probability. ‘[A]n opposition-slash’ is not ‘[a] series of oppositions’ and vice versa. ‘[S]lash’ of ‘an opposition-slash’ is neither a picture nor a painting. ‘[S]lash’ of ‘an opposition-slash’ is not an opposition of ‘an opposition-slash’; I read ‘an opposition-slash’ as something other than ‘an opposition’ which has been claimed with ‘-slash’.

‘[O]pposition in the trait’ is asked as a question in the following paragraph. When ‘opposition in the trait’ is asked, ‘opposition[s]’ are no longer claimed with ‘[a] series’. ‘[O]pposition in the trait’ is something to ‘become’ or it could be ‘opposition in the trait’ ‘*without*’ ‘becom[ing]’. ‘[H]ere’, which is also ‘there’, there is a possibility that ‘there were not even a *becoming*’. ‘[C]oncept’ belongs to ‘its’. ‘[I]ts concept’ was ‘always’ belonged to ‘*becoming*’. ‘[D]ifference as opposition’ is part of ‘this determination’. ‘[D]ifference’ which is part of ‘this determination’ might not become ‘as opposition’ since ‘difference’ was already ‘had as its concept’ ‘as opposition’.

So the question would no longer be “What is a trait?” or “What does a trait become?” or “What pertains to such a trait?” but “How does the trait treat itself? Does it contract in its retreat?” A trait never appears, never itself, because it

marks the difference between the forms or the contents of the appearing. A trait never appears, never itself, never for a first time. [...] I follow here the logical succession of what I long ago called, before getting around to the turn of painting, the *broaching* [*entame*] of the origin: that which opens, with a trace, without initiating anything.<sup>115</sup>

‘What is a trait?’, ‘[w]hat does a trait become?’ and ‘[w]hat pertains to such a trait?’ might not be ‘the questions’ even if they are asked with question marks. For the perspective on the statement, ‘the question[s]’ are ‘[h]ow does the trait treat itself?’ and ‘[d]oes it contract in its retreat?’.

‘A treat never appears, never itself’, but it does not mean that ‘[a] treat’ or ‘itself’ was disappeared. There is a reason why ‘[a] treat never appears’: ‘because it marks the difference between the forms or the contents of the appearing’. What has been ‘mark[ed]’ would be ‘the difference’ to the perspective on the statement.

‘[A]ppear[ing]’ of ‘[a] treat’ and ‘appear[ing]’ of ‘[a] trait’ are different from each other since ‘[a] trait’ is the one which ‘never appears’ ‘for a first time’. ‘A trait’, then, might appear after ‘a first time’ perhaps with ‘itself’.

‘[T]he origin’ is not broached by anything and anyone. However, there is ‘the *broaching* [*entame*] of the origin’ ‘which opens, with a trace, without initiating anything’. ‘[T]he *broaching* [*entame*] of the origin’ and it is what is to be ‘called’ from ‘long ago’. ‘[C]all[ing]’ is what ‘I’ did. ‘[L]ong ago’ is ‘long’ for the perspective on ‘I’. It seems that ‘call[ing]’ of ‘the *broaching* [*entame*] of the origin’ is not what ‘I’ did after ‘long ago’. The ‘call[ing]’ is the part of ‘the logical succession’ which ‘I follow[s]’.

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

‘I’ would not get ‘to the turn of painting’ since ‘I’ is claimed to ‘follow here the logical succession’. In the case of ‘the logical succession’, there is no beginning or initiating. After ‘I follow[s] here the logical succession’, ‘the *broaching* [*entame*] of the origin’ ‘opens, with a trace, without initiating anything’. ‘[I]nitiating’ is not ‘which opens’; ‘anything’ would not be ‘initiat[ed]’ when something ‘opens’. There will be ‘a trace’ as an addition of ‘open[ing]’.

One space remains to be broached in order to give place to the truth in painting. Neither inside nor outside, it spaces itself without letting itself be framed but it does not stand outside the frame. [...] The trait is attracted and retrac(t)ed there by itself, attracts and dispenses with itself there [*il s'y attire et s'y passe, de lui-même*]. It is situated. It situates between the visible edging and the phantom in the center, from which we *fascinate*.<sup>116</sup>

‘One space’ and ‘place’ are different from each other; ‘place’ is something to be ‘give[n]’ ‘the truth in painting’ whereas ‘[o]ne space remains’ with a purpose ‘to be broached’. ‘[G]iv[ing]’ ‘place’ is a purpose of ‘broach[ing]’. ‘[T]he truth in painting’ might not be there, ‘place’, if ‘space’ does not ‘remain to be broached’. When ‘place’ is ‘give[n]’, ‘place’ is not counted as one ‘place’. However, ‘space’ is ‘[o]ne space’ when ‘place’ is ‘give[n]’ ‘the truth in painting’. Then, is there a possibility that there may be other spaces for ‘remain[ing]’ and ‘broach[ing]’? There is ‘place’ for ‘the truth in painting’, but ‘[o]ne space’ itself is not for ‘the truth in painting’.

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 11-2.

‘[I]t spaces itself’ ‘[n]either inside nor outside’ — does that mean ‘[i]t spaces itself’ other than ‘inside’ and ‘outside’? Then, where else could the ‘spac[ing]’ be? Apart from the notion of *sides* (my emphasis), ‘it’ is ‘space[d]’ by ‘itself’. ‘[I]tself’ would not be ‘framed’ when ‘it does not stand outside the frame’. ‘[I]t’ would ‘stand’ other than ‘outside the frame’ when there is ‘spac[ing]’ of ‘it’. There is no claim about *inside* (my emphasis) when ‘it’ is claimed with ‘stand[ing]’. ‘[S]tand[ing]’ and ‘spac[ing]’ are different from each other for the perspective on the statement above. *Self* (my emphasis) is not mentioned when ‘the truth in painting’ is claimed with ‘place’, but there are ‘it’ and ‘itself’ when ‘it’ is ‘space[d]’ and ‘itself’ is ‘framed’. In the case of ‘spac[ing]’ ‘it’, there will be ‘fram[ing]’ and ‘stand[ing]’. Each ‘fram[ing]’ and ‘stand[ing]’ are different from each other since ‘itself’ is not something to ‘stand’ and ‘it’ is not something to ‘be framed’.

‘The trait’ is ‘there’ when ‘[t]he trait is attracted and retrac(t)ed’. However, when ‘[i]t is situated’, ‘[i]t’ is not ‘there’. ‘It’ is not only ‘situated’ but also ‘situates between the visible edging and the phantom in the center, from which we *fascinate*’. There would be other part which is not ‘center’ in the cases of ‘the visible edging and phantom’. ‘It’ is not there, ‘in the center’, because ‘[i]t is’ somewhere ‘between the visible edging and the phantom in the center’. [S]ituat[ing]’ of ‘[i]t’ is conditional on ‘we’. Without the ‘*fascinat[ion]*’ of ‘we’, there would be no ‘situat[ing]’ or ‘[i]t’. Furthermore, ‘*fascinat[ion]*’ of ‘we’ is prior to ‘situat[ing]’ of ‘[i]t’. For the reason that I am not one of ‘we’, I am not ‘*fasciate[d]*’. I am not there, ‘from which’ where ‘we’ are claimed to be ‘*fasciate[d]*’.

[...] *Between* the outside and the inside, between the external and the internal



edge-line, the framer and the framed, the figure and the ground, form and content, signifier and signified, and so on for any two-faced opposition. The trait thus divides in this place where it takes place. The emblem for this tapas seems undiscoverable; I shall borrow it from the nomenclature of framing: the *passe-partout*.<sup>117</sup>

‘[A]ny two-faced opposition’ is already ‘faced’ as ‘two’. In other words, there would be no more or less face in the case of ‘any two-faced opposition’. ‘[T]he outside and the inside’, ‘the external and the internal edge-line’, ‘the framer and the framed’, ‘the figure and the ground’, ‘form and content’ and ‘signifier and signified’ are ‘any two-faced opposition[s]’. From reading ‘and so on’, there are other ‘any two-faced opposition[s]’ which are not mentioned within that statement. ‘*Between*’ of ‘the outside and the inside’ does not make ‘the outside and the inside’ as one face since ‘the outside and the inside’ are still one of ‘any two-faced opposition’; that is same for ‘the external and the internal edge-line’.

Before ‘[t]he trait divides’, ‘[t]he trait’ is ‘in this place’. In addition, ‘it’ was ‘take[n]’ before the ‘divi[sion]’. I do not know what ‘[t]he trait’ *of* (my emphasis) — is ‘[t]he trait’ ‘[t]he trait’ of ‘any two-faced opposition’? It is not ‘this tapas’ which ‘seems undiscoverable’; it is ‘[t]he emblem for this tapas’. ‘The emblem for this tapas’ is not ‘undiscoverable’. To be ‘undiscoverable’ is what to be ‘seem[ed]’. To be ‘undiscoverable’ is discoverable as ‘undiscoverable’ by ‘seem[ing]’. ‘[T]he *passe-partout*’ is what ‘I shall borrow it is from the nomenclature of framing’. ‘[T]he *passe-partout*’ is neither a name nor the frame. ‘The nomenclature of framing’ does not name anything in

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

the statement above. 'I' did not have 'it' since 'I shall borrow' from somewhere else. However, 'borrow[ing]' of 'it' is not compulsory to 'I'. It seems that 'it' is detachable 'from the nomenclature of framing'.

The passe-partout which here creates an event must not pass for a master key. You will not be able to pass it from hand to hand like a convenient instrument, a short treatise, a viaticum or even an organon or pocket canon, in short a transcendental pass, a password to open all doors, decipher all texts and keep their chains under surveillance. If you rushed to understand it in this way, I would have to issue a warning [*avertissement*]: this forward [*avertissement*] is not a passe-partout.<sup>118</sup>

'[H]ere', 'an event' is 'create[d]'. 'The passe-partout' 'creates an event' before '[t]he passe-partout' 'pass[es]'. '[A]n event' is not 'pass[ing]' 'for a key'. '[A]n event' would be 'here' as a 'creat[ion]' of '[t]he passe-partout', but 'a mater key' 'must not' be 'pass[ed]'. Therefore, I read that there might be no 'pass[ing]' of 'a master key' even if there is 'an event' which is 'create[d]' by '[t]he pass-partout'.

'[P]ass[ing] it' is something to do with 'hand' and 'hand'. '[A] convenient instrument, a short treatise, a viaticum or even an organon or pocket canon' are something can be 'pass[ed] from hand to hand'. However, they are not as same as 'it'. 'You' has an ability to 'pass it from hand to hand', but there will be the moment when '[y]ou will not be able to pass it from hand to hand'. In other words, '[y]ou', other than the moment of the future, is 'able to pass it from hand to hand'. '[A] master key' is not 'a

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

transcendental pass, a password to open all doors' and 'decipher all texts and keep their chains under surveillance'.

The perspective on 'you' knows what 'you' 'understand[s]' and how 'you' would 'understand' 'it'. The perspective on 'you' also knows how 'you' 'understand[s] it'. '[Y]ou' might have neither 'rushed' nor 'underst[oo]d'. '[Y]ou' might not be 'in this way'. '[T]his way' contains 'understand[ing]' of 'you' 'in' it. '[I]ssue a warning [*avertissement*]' will be the result of 'understand[ing]' of 'you'. '[A] warning' is what 'I' 'issue[s]'; it is not what 'you' gets. '[T]his forward [*avertissement*] is not a passe-partout' is what would be 'issued' and it is 'a warning' for the perspective on the statement above.

I write right on the passe-partout well known to picture-framers. And in order to broach it, right on this supposedly virgin surface, generally cut out of a square of cardboard and open in its "middle" to let the work appear. The latter can, moreover, be replaced by another which thus slides into the passe-partout as an "example". To that extent, the passe-partout remains a structure with a movable base; but although it lets something appear, it does not form a frame in the strict sense, rather a frame within the frame.<sup>119</sup>

'[W]rit[ing]' of 'I' is not 'the passe-partout'. The statement above is not what 'I' has written. Something is 'well known to picture-framers', so it might not 'well known' to others who are not 'picture-framers'. In the first sentence, 'writ[ing]' of 'I' is

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

not claimed as ‘the work’. In the second sentence above, there is no more ‘writing’. Instead, there is ‘the work’. ‘[T]he work’ does not ‘appear’ by itself. It is not ‘I’ who ‘let[s] the work appear’. Before ‘the work appear[s]’, there are some steps: 1. ‘it’ will be ‘generally cut out of a square of cardboard’. 2. ‘it’ will be ‘open[ed] in its “middle” to let the work appear’. 3. Then, ‘it’ would ‘broach’ and ‘the work’ would ‘appear’. Since ‘it’ is ‘suppose[d]’ to be ‘on this [...] virgin surface’, ‘broach[ing]’ of ‘it’ does not have to be done ‘on’ the ‘virgin’ one. When there is a ‘virgin surface’, ‘a square of cardboard’ would be ‘cut out of a square of cardboard’ and ‘open[ed] in its “middle” to let the work appear’. No one or nothing ‘cut[s] out’ and ‘open[s], but ‘the work’ will ‘appear’ ‘in its “middle”’.

There is a ‘replace[ment]’ in the case of ‘[t]he latter’. I read ‘[t]he latter’ as ‘open in its “middle” to let the work appear’. After the ‘replace[ment]’, ‘[t]he latter’ will be ‘replaced by another’ — does that mean that ‘[t]he latter’ is no longer there? However, ‘replace[ment]’ does not remove ‘[t]he latter’ from ‘in its “middle”’. When ‘the work’ is ‘appear[ing]’, there would be the ‘replace[ment]’ of ‘another’ and ‘[t]he latter’ ‘slides in the passe-partout’. ‘[T]he passe-partout’, which is ‘as an “example”’, is different from the previous ‘[t]he passe-partout’. Since ‘[t]he latter’ ‘slides into the passe-partout’, the latter ‘the passe-partout’ is accessible.

It is not ‘a structure’ itself which makes ‘a structure’ itself to be ‘with a movable base’; ‘the passe-partout remains a structure with a movable base’. ‘[A] structure’ is with an addition, ‘a movable base’ and it is ‘remain[ed]’ by the other than ‘a structure’. Thus, ‘the passe-partout’ is neither ‘a movable base’ nor ‘a structure’.

‘Appear[ing]’ of ‘something’ is not what ‘something’ does or can do. ‘[A]pppear[ing]’ of ‘something’ is conditional on ‘it’; without ‘let[ting]’, there might be no ‘appear[ing]’. In that sense, ‘it’ is prior to ‘something’. There is another ‘it’ within

that sentence. The latter ‘it’ ‘does not form a frame in the strict sense’. In other words, the latter ‘it’ possibly ‘form[s] a frame’. ‘[I]t’ is out of ‘the strict sense’. ‘[A] frame’ is not out of ‘the frame’. Different frames would be ‘within’ other different frames when ‘the passe-partout’ ‘lets something appear’. ‘[A] frame’ is not ‘form[ed]’, ‘it’ ‘rather’ ‘form[s]’ ‘a frame within the frame’.

Instead of reading the whole last section of *The Truth in Painting*, I will move on to the last three paragraphs of the first chapter.

*Passe-partout*, the word and the thing, has other uses, but what would be the point of listing them? They can be found easily [*il’s se trouvent tout seuls*]. And if I were to put them all in a table [*tableau: also “picture” — TRANS.*], there would always be one that would play among the others, one taken out of the series in order to surround it, with yet one more turn.<sup>120</sup>

‘*Passe-partout*’ is claimed to possess ‘other uses’. These ‘other uses’ are not only belongings of ‘*Passe-partout*’ but also something can be ‘list[ed]’. However, ‘other uses’ are not listed within the text. The reason why ‘the[y]’ are listed is not from ‘the[y]’. What is more, there is a question, ‘what would be the point of listing them?’ This questioning does not mean that there is no ‘point of listing them’. There might be ‘the point’, but ‘the point of listing them’ does not make the perspective on ‘the[y]’ ‘list’ ‘other uses’.

Since ‘[t]hey can be found easily’, ‘[t]hey’ cannot be ‘found easily’ on the other hand. When ‘other uses’ of ‘the word and the thing’ are ‘in a table’, it would not be finished with ‘put[ing] them all in a table’. For ‘I’, there are some expected results of

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p.13.

‘put[ting]’ which are ‘one would play among the others’ or ‘one taken out of the series’ without the exception. I do not know which one is the ‘one’ among ‘*Passe-partout*, the word and the thing’. Whatever ‘one’ is, that ‘one’ is different from ‘the others’ when it ‘would play’. ‘[O]ne’ is also different from ‘the series’ because ‘one’ is ‘taken out of the series’. What is ‘surround[ed]’? What is ‘it’ which is ‘surround[ed]’? ‘[I]t’ is not any of ‘one’, ‘the others’, and ‘the series’. I read ‘it’ as ‘a table’ or ‘“*picture*”’. ‘[A] table’ or ‘“*picture*”’ does not only possibly contains ‘them’ ‘in’ there, but also could be ‘surround[ed]’ by ‘one’ which has ‘taken out of the series’.

*Passe-partout* nevertheless cannot be written in the plural, by reason of grammatical law. This derives from its idiomatic makeup and the grammatical invariability of the adverb. But it can be understood in the plural: “Curiosities of all sorts, plaster casts, molds, sketches, copies, *passe-partout* containing engravings” (Théophile Gautier). In a word, it is written in the singular but the law of its agreements may require the plural.

The internal edges of a *passe-partout* are often beveled.<sup>121</sup>

‘*Passe-partout*’ is what has ‘written’ and there is ‘grammatical law’ of ‘*Passe-partout*’. According to ‘grammatical law’ in the statement, there ‘cannot be’ *passe-partouts* (my emphasis). ‘[G]rammatical law’ is a ‘reason’ why there is no plural in the case of ‘*Passe-partout*’. ‘[G]rammatical law’ is not my law. Although ‘grammatical law’ is not mine, to write *passe-partouts* (my emphasis) is against the ‘reason of grammatical law’. Being unable to ‘wri[te] in the plural’ is ‘from its idiomatic makeup and

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p.13.

the grammatical invariability of the adverb'. In other words, 'its idiomatic makeup and the grammatical invariability of the adverb' is prior to 'this'. Writing '*Passe-partout*' and 'underst[anding]' of 'it' are different 'in' numbers since 'underst[anding]' can be 'in the plural'. '[U]nderst[anding]' of 'it' seems to be free from 'reason of grammatical law' or not influenced by 'reason of grammatical law'.

““Curiosities of all sorts, plaster casts, molds, sketches, copies, passe-partout containing engravings”” are what ‘can be understood in the plural’. It is ‘written’, but not written ‘in plural’. ““Curiosities of all sorts, plaster casts, molds, sketches, copies, passe-partout containing engravings”” are within the quotation marks, but they are not quoted by ‘Théophile Gautier’. I would rather read that “[c]uriosities of all sorts, plaster casts, molds, sketches, copies, passe-partout containing engravings”” are quoted by other than ‘Théophile Gautier’ to be there in the statement above. ““Curiosities of all sorts, plaster casts, molds, sketches, copies, passe-partout containing engravings”” may not be ‘understood in plural’ to some of others.

‘[I]ts agreements’ are not agreed by ‘Théophile Gautier’. ‘[I]ts agreements’ are not the agreement of anyone or anything within that statement. I did not agree anything to be ‘its agreements’, but there are ‘its agreements’. There is ‘a word’ which is ‘[i]n’. ‘[A] word’ is not out of there where ‘it is written in singular’. ‘[A]greements’ belong to ‘its’ and ‘a word’ does not possess any agreement. To be ‘the plural’ is from the ‘require[ment]’. No one ‘require[s]’ ‘it’ to be ‘the plural’, but ‘it’ ‘may’ be ‘the plural’ when it is ‘agree[d]’ ‘[i]n a word’.

There are multiple ‘edges’ in the case of ‘a passe-partout’, but these ‘edges’ are the ‘internal’ one. ‘[A] passe-partout’ and somewhere other than ‘internal edges of a passe-partout’ might not be ‘beveled’. ‘The internal edges of a passe-partout’ are not always ‘beveled’. In other words, ‘[t]he internal edges of a passe-partout’ are ‘beveled’

and not ‘beveled’. If ‘[t]he internal edges’ are ‘beveled’, would that affect anything to ‘a passe-partout’? If ‘[t]he internal edges’ are not ‘beveled’, would that affect nothing?

In relation to reading ‘Figure’ and ‘brain’, I would like to read Hermann Haken’s *Principles of Brain Functioning*.<sup>122</sup> I will describe one page of *Principles of Brain Functioning*: ‘Hermann Haken’ is at the top. ‘Principles of Brain Functioning’ is under ‘Hermann Haken’ and it is the biggest of all the statements on that page. The following statement is ‘A Synergetic Approach of Brain Activity Behaviour and Cognition’ and the size of the statement is as same as ‘Herman Haken’. Under those three statements, ‘[w]ith 220 Figures’ is followed. On the bottom, there is ‘Springer’ which is bigger than ‘Hermann Haken’ and ‘A Synergetic Approach of Brain Activity Behaviour and Cognition’. On the left side of ‘Springer’, there is an emblem — it looks like an emblem to me. I read that emblem is not one of ‘220 Figures’. On top of the emblem, there is a horse head. Within the black circle, SJ letters are twisted together as if they are one letter. Under SJ, there is ‘1842’. ‘Principles of [b]rain [f]unctioning’ are not specified as such in number, but there are ‘220 [f]igures’. ‘Principles of [b]rain [f]unctioning’ and ‘[a] [s]ynergetic [a]pporach’ to ‘[b]rain [a]ctivity [b]ehavior and [c]ognition’ are claimed with the additions. In other words, ‘220 Figures’ are the supplements of those two.

From the picture on the front cover of *Use Your Brain*, I have read an eye, line, two butterflies, a hand, a brain, etc. In *Principles of Brain Functioning*, ‘[h]uman vision is certainly the field of cognition that has been studied best experimentally and perhaps

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<sup>122</sup> Hermann Haken, *Principles of Brain Functioning: A Synergetic Approach to Brain Activity, Behavior and Cognition*, ed. by Hermann Haken (Berlin: Springer, 1996).



also theoretically'.<sup>123</sup> It is not any vision which is 'certainly the field of cognition that has been studied best experimentally and perhaps also theoretically'; it is a claim about '[h]uman vision'. There, 'cognition' is a part of 'the field'. '[C]ognition' is neither the cognition of human nor the cognition of vision, but '[h]uman vision' is 'certainly the field of cognition'. '[T]he field of cognition' has been already 'studied' both 'experimentally' and 'theoretically'. However, it has not been best studied 'theoretically'.

The chapter, 'Visual Perception', starts with, '[i]t is my deep conviction that by studying visual perception or, more precisely speaking, *pattern recognition* we can learn a good deal about *cognition*'.<sup>124</sup> '[V]isual perception' and '*pattern recognition*' are what 'we can learn a good deal about *cognition*'. '[C]ognition' is different from 'visual perception' and '*pattern recognition*' since '*cognition*' has to be learned from 'visual perception' and '*pattern recognition*'. Without 'visual perception' and '*pattern recognition*', 'we' might not 'learn' 'a good deal about *cognition*'. '[L]earn[ing]' 'about' '*cognition*' is an ability of 'we'. However, 'we' cannot 'learn' all 'about *cognition*'.

Then, '[w]e want to study visual perception at the cognitive level, or in other words, we want to understand how a brain may recognize objects (or patters) through vision. [...] When we see a face [...]'<sup>125</sup> is followed in the same page. What '[w]e want' is 'to study visual perception at the cognitive level'. '[V]isual perception' in this sentence is what to be 'stud[ied]' particularly 'at the cognitive level'. There seems to be different levels in the case of 'visual perception', but what 'we want to study' is 'at the

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 257.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p. 239.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 239.

cognitive level'. '[I]n other words', what 'we what to understand' needs to be 'through vision'. Before 'through vision', 'a brain may recognize objects (or patterns)' and that could be 'underst[oo]d' by 'we'. According to the text, 'pattern recognition', 'vision', 'visual perception', 'cognition' and 'brain' are related with seeing. This is similar to what I have read from the front cover in *Use Your Brain*.


## Chapter 12: Reading ‘Sound’ without its Sound

In *The Child, the Artist, and the Book*, Donnaræ MacCann insists that ‘children’s book illustration is never purely non-objective, unless it is simply a decorative design on the margins of the page’.<sup>126</sup> From reading ‘purely non-objective’, it reminded me of ‘[o]bjectivity’ from *Objectivity*. Apart from Daston and Galison’s ‘[o]bjectivity’, I read the statement from MacCann that 1. there might be something which is/are purely objective, 2. there might be something which is/are not purely non-objective, 3. there might be something which is/are not purely objective. ‘[T]he page’ and ‘the margins’ are different from each other. ‘[T]he margins’ are part of ‘the page’. ‘[A] decorative design’ is not on ‘children’s book’ because it is ‘on the margins of the page’. ‘[I]llustration’ is not something to be part of ‘children’s book’ while ‘the margins’ are part of ‘the page’. ‘[C]hildren’s book illustration’ is not decorative, but there is ‘simply a decorative design on the margins of the page’.

On page one of *Use Your Brain*, the first sentence starts with ‘[k]nock on your head with your knuckles’. ‘Knock’ is stated for four times in four different sentences. The first four sentences all start with ‘[k]nock’. Since they are all started with ‘[k]nock’, I read ‘[k]nock’ as a repetition.

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<sup>126</sup> Donnaræ MacCann, *The Child, the Artist, & the Book* (Los Angeles: University Library at UCLA, 1962), p. 14.



Knock on your head with your knuckles.  
 Knock on top. Knock above your ears. Knock your  
 forehead.  
 Can you hear the hollow sound?  
 The top part of your head is hollow inside—like a  
 pumpkin.  
 It is hollow but it is not empty.  
 Your brain is in the hollow part.

Knock on your head with your knuckles.

Knock on top. Knock above your ears. Knock your forehead.

Can you hear the hollow sound?

The top part of your head is hollow inside—like a pumpkin.

It is hollow but it is not empty.

Your brain is in the hollow part.

In the first sentence, ‘head’ and ‘knuckles’ belong to other than ‘head’ and ‘knuckles’. Both belong to ‘your’.<sup>127</sup> However, ‘your’ does not do anything ‘on your head’. It is because ‘[k]nock’ is not what ‘your’ does. ‘Knock’ does not ‘[k]nock’ anywhere or everywhere of ‘your’. ‘Knock’ is for ‘[k]nock[ing]’ ‘on your head’, ‘on top’, ‘above your ears’ and ‘your forehead’. ‘Knock’ in the first sentence would be done ‘with’ the addition of ‘your knuckles’. ‘[Y]our knuckles’ do not ‘[k]nock’ other parts of ‘your’ such as ‘above your ears’ and ‘your forehead’. ‘[T]op’ in the second sentence does not belong

<sup>127</sup> I will not change ‘your’ as ‘you’ although ‘your’ is not grammatically right to be written. I did not want to change ‘your’ other than ‘your’ due to confusion of reading. What is more, there are ‘Your’ and ‘your’ within the text. Instead of using the change forms of ‘your’ and ‘Your’, I used the original words.

to anything or anyone. '[Y]our forehead' would not to be '[k]nock[ed]' above or on 'forehead'. There is the repetition of '[k]nock', but each '[k]nock' is different from each other.

There are six hands on the left page and one hand on page one. They are all hands, but different hands. The hand on page one does not knock anything since it is holding a pumpkin. On the left page, two hands from different people are knocking on the heads and the other two hands are knocking on the pumpkin. They are all knocking with hands, but I read that knocking of each hand is different from one another. In *Difference and Repetition*, there is a paragraph starts with 'repeat[ing]' and 'behav[ing] in a certain manner'. I thought that reading the 'repetition' from 'behav[ing] in a certain manner' is relevant to my reading of '[k]nock'.

To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent. And perhaps this repetition at the level of external conduct echoes, for its own part, a more secret vibration which animates it, a more profound, internal repetition within the singular. This is the apparent paradox of festivals: they repeat an 'unrepeatable'. They do not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the 'nth' power.

With respect to this power, repetition interiorizes and thereby reverses itself.<sup>128</sup>

'[T]o behave' is something 'to behave in a certain manner' when 'to repeat' is claimed with 'behav[ing]'. When '[t]o repeat' is claimed to be 'behave[d]', 'behav[ing]' would not be out of 'a certain manner'. From 're-', I read that something behind 're-' has been

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<sup>128</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 24.

claimed with the idea of againness. From ‘be-’, I read that something behind ‘be-’ has been claimed with the idea of to beness. In the case of ‘repeat’, it is not something to ‘be’ as such. In the case of ‘behav[ing]’, it is not something to be ‘re’-done. When ‘to behave’ is ‘in a certain manner’, it is for ‘repeat[ing]’ for the perspective on the statement. ‘To repeat’ is then ‘in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent’. There, ‘repe[tition]’ is ‘in relation’. This ‘repe[tition]’ does not mean either ‘equal’ or ‘equivalen[ce]’. It also does not mean that ‘repeat[ing]’ itself is ‘unique or singular’ since ‘repeat[ing]’ is ‘in relation to’ ‘something’. ‘[S]omething’ which is ‘in relation’ has to be either ‘unique or singular’ without something either ‘equal or equivalent’.

‘[T]his repetition’ which is ‘at the level of external’ is not the external repetition. ‘[T]his repetition’ might not be ‘at’ that ‘level of external’ because of ‘perhaps’. The number of ‘echoes’ is plural and they are ‘conduct[ed]’ with a possibility. ‘[E]choes’ follows ‘this repetition at the level of external’. There is ‘for its own part’; it is something ‘for’ to the perspective on ‘its own part’. In other words, ‘part’ of ‘for its own part’ is not part of ‘this repetition at the level of external’. ‘[P]art’ is not ‘at the level of external’ either. ‘[I]t’ possesses ‘its own part’. In the case of ‘for its own part’, there are ‘a more secret vibration which animates it’ and ‘a more profound, internal repetition within the singular’. ‘[A] more secret vibration’ does not vibrate; it ‘animates it’. ‘[A] more secret vibration’ is neither a secret nor secretly animate something. It is a single ‘vibration’ which is ‘a more secret’ one. It seems that ‘animat[ing]’ of ‘it’ has to be ‘a more secret vibration’. ‘[T]he singular’ is not *a* (my emphasis) ‘singular’. ‘[T]he singular’ is external to ‘internal repetition’ since ‘a more profound, internal repetition’ is ‘within’ there. Since it is ‘a more secret vibration’ which is claimed with ‘secret’, it is

not secret to me that there is an idea of secrecy within the text. '[A] more profound, internal repetition' is not only 'internal' but also internal to 'the singular'.

'[F]estivals' are not *the* (my emphasis) ones whereas 'the apparent paradox' is. There are multiple 'festivals' which are part of 'the apparent paradox'. These 'festivals' are not apparent whereas 'the apparent paradox' is 'apparent' for the perspective on the statement. I read an idea of unablens from 'an "unrepeatable"'. In other words, it is not able to be 'repeat[ed]' in the case of 'an "unrepeatable"'. However, 'they repeat' it. Unablens of 'an "unrepeatable"' is not impossible to 'repeat' in the case of 'they'.

'They', 'a second', 'a third time' and 'the first' (or 'the first time') are all different from each other. First, it is '[t]hey' who 'add' something 'to' 'the first'. '[T]he first' is not numbered as the first by 'the first' itself. '[A] second and a third time' might be 'add[ed]' 'to the first', but '[t]hey do not add a second and a third time to the first'. '[A] second and third time' might be 'add[ed]' 'to' other than 'the first' by '[t]hey'. Although there is no *fourth* or *fifth time* (both my emphases), there is 'the "nth" power' in the statement above. According to the statement above, nothing has been 'add[ed]' to 'the first' or 'the first time'. It is not '[t]hey' who 'carry' 'the first time'. '[T]he first time' does not 'carry' 'the "nth" power' either. '[T]he first time' is prior to 'the "nth" power'. '[T]he "nth" power' is not claimed with time. In addition, 'the "nth"' one is claimed with 'power'. '[T]he "nth" power', therefore, is different from 'the first time', 'a second' and 'a third time'.

Then, 'this power' is '[w]ith respect to' 'repetition'. '[T]his power' is not 'the' one and it is not something *nth* (my emphasis) when it is '[w]ith respect to' 'repetition'. 'With respect to this power', 'repetition' 'interiorizes'. That 'repetition' does not re-

verse because it is ‘itself’ which ‘reverses’. ‘[R]evers[ing]’ of ‘itself’ is the latter of ‘interioriz[ing]’ of ‘repetition’. In other words, ‘revers[ing]’ of ‘itself’ is conditional on ‘interioriz[ing]’ of ‘repetition’ — and this is all ‘[w]ith respect to this power’.

After four ‘[k]nock[ing]’, there is a question, ‘[c]an you hear the hollow sound?’ According to the question, there is ‘the sound’ which ‘you’ ‘can’ hear’. ‘[Y]ou’ is asked if ‘you’ could ‘hear the hollow sound’. It is not asked such as ‘*Do* (my emphasis) you hear the hollow sound?’. ‘[H]ear[ing] the hollow sound’ is claimed with an ability to ‘hear’ particular ‘sound’. In other words, it is not asked such as ‘can you hear’ ‘the sound?’. The perspective on ‘you’ knows what ‘the hollow sound’ is. It also knows what kind of ‘sound’ ‘can’ be ‘hear[d]’.

‘[H]ead’ belongs to ‘your’, but ‘[t]he top part’ does not belong to ‘your’. ‘[Y]our head’, which is part of ‘[t]he top part’, is ‘hollow inside’. It is not ‘your head’ which is ‘hollow inside’. The other part ‘of your head’ might not be hollow inside. To be ‘hollow’ is not about sound when it is claimed with ‘[t]he top part of your head’. To be ‘hollow’ is ‘like a pumpkin’. ‘[I]nside’ of ‘[t]he top part of your head’ is not ‘a pumpkin’, but they are similar to the perspective on the statement. The perspective on the statement has a knowledge that there is ‘inside’ for both ‘a pumpkin’ and ‘[t]he top part of your head’. To be ‘hollow’ in the cases of ‘a pumpkin’ and ‘[t]he top part of your head’ are not external.

‘It is hollow but it is not empty’; since ‘it is not empty’, something might be there. ‘[T]he hollow sound’ is not ‘in[side]’ of ‘[y]our’. As ‘[t]he top part of your head is hollow inside’, ‘[t]he top part of your head’ is not ‘empty’. As there is ‘the hollow part’, ‘your head’ is not ‘empty’. ‘Your brain’ is not out of ‘[y]our’. ‘Your brain’ is not in the hollowness; there is certain ‘part’ where ‘[y]our brain’ is claimed to be ‘in’.



There is a pumpkin above a girl on the left page. I have read a pumpkin from reading green colour and black lines. There is also white colour and black line within the frame of pumpkins. The girl wearing a pink dress and a boy wearing a white t-shirt seem to knock the pumpkin. Another girl who is under the pumpkin seems to hold the pumpkin with her two hands. I read '[k]nock on your head with your knuckles' from the left page by reading a boy wearing the white t-shirt and a girl wearing a pink dress. By reading four hands from them, I read '[k]nock', 'your head' and 'your knuckles'. Since the girl who is holding the pumpkin does not knock, I read that she is excluded from 'your' who '[k]nock[s] on your head with your knuckles'.



Knock on your head with your knuckles.  
 Knock on top. Knock above your ears. Knock your forehead.  
 Can you hear the hollow sound?  
 The top part of your head is hollow inside—like a pumpkin.  
 It is hollow but it is not empty.  
 Your brain is in the hollow part.

On page one, there are two different pumpkins: one is close to foot of a boy and the other one is close to the hand of that boy. The reason why I read the difference from the pumpkins is not only because these pumpkins are on the different positions. In the case of the pumpkin on the hand, I see *the inside* (my emphasis) of the pumpkin. From reading the black part within the pumpkin, I somehow read it as an empty pumpkin.

Jane Doonan claims about ‘hue’, ‘tone’ and ‘saturation’ in the chapter, ‘Colour’.<sup>129</sup> In relation to reading the black part from the pumpkin, I will read some part from *Looking at Pictures in Picture Books*. According to Doonan, ‘[t]one is a measure of light and dark of an area regardless of its colour.’<sup>130</sup> In the case of ‘an area’, there is ‘light and dark’ ‘area’. ‘[L]ight and dark of an area’ can be measured by ‘a measure’, which is also ‘[t]one’. Although ‘[t]one’ is claimed with ‘colour’, it is something ‘regardless of its colour’. ‘[C]olour’, for the perspective on the statement, is not ‘a measure of light and dark of an area’. Then, Doonan also adds ‘[t]one (shading) is used to model an object, showing us its physical structure [...]’<sup>131</sup> There, ‘[t]one’ is claimed with ‘(shading)’. ‘[S]hading’ is neither a shade; it is also not shaded. ‘Tone’ with ‘(shading)’ ‘is used to model an object, showing us its physical structure’. ‘[A]n object’ is something to be ‘used’ for ‘model[ing]’. In other words, ‘model[ing]’ is the purpose of ‘us[ing]’. ‘[A]n object’ itself does not show ‘us its physical structure’ according to the text from Doonan. ‘[I]ts physical structure’ is not what ‘us’ are seeing; it is ‘show[ed] us’. However, ‘show[ing]’ of ‘its physical structure’ needs to be ‘used to model an object’ by ‘[t]one (shading)’. In other words, ‘its physical structure’ is the latter to ‘an object’ and conditional on ‘us[ing]’ of ‘[t]one (shading)’ and also ‘show[ing]’. From reading two different pumpkins on page one, I read a separation from one of the pumpkins. In the case of a separated pumpkin, the top part is on the head of the boy and bottom part is what he is holding; I read the separation from these parts. However, I do not read the idea of separation from the pumpkin next to the feet.

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<sup>129</sup> Jane Doonan, *Looking at Pictures in Picture Books*, p. 30.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30-1.

In relation to ‘the hollow sound’, Martin Barker also reads different sounds from speech balloons and words. On top part of page 10 in *Comics: Ideology, Power, and the Critics*, there are three different frames. There are a speech bubble and a word in each frame. Instead of attaching a copy of page 10, I will the ideas on ‘the balloon’, ‘the word’ and ‘the meaning of sound’.

Now compare 1 to 3. What is the difference? Of course we know immediately - the second shows loudness, shouting; the third suggesting whispering. Yet there is a puzzle with the third. Who would whisper ‘Help!’?

The puzzle comes from how the size of the balloon relates to the size of the word. It is as if, in fact, we don’t *read* the words at all. We hear them. We might put it that in the comic form, there is an interaction between the pictureness and the verbalness of the speech-balloon, to produce the meaning of sound. We ‘hear with our eyes’.<sup>132</sup>

From ‘1 to 3’ is for ‘compar[ing]’. When ‘1 to 3’ are ‘compare[d]’, there would be ‘the difference’ what ‘we’ are claimed to ‘know immediately’. ‘[K]now[ing]’ about ‘the second’ and ‘the third’ is not about knowing ‘1’. ‘[K]now[ing]’ about ‘the second’ and ‘the third’ is different from each other not only because the previous one is about ‘know[ing]’ ‘loudness’ and the latter is about ‘know[ing]’ ‘whispering’; they are also different from each other because ‘the second’ one ‘shows’ and ‘the third’ is ‘suggesting’. The ‘loudness’ is not something to be ‘suggest[ed]’ and ‘whispering’ is not something to be ‘show[ed]’. ‘1’ is not claimed with any of ‘loudness’ and ‘whispering’. ‘1’ is

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<sup>132</sup> Martin Barker, *Comics: ideology, power and the critics*, pp. 10-1.

neither showed nor suggested. '[A] puzzle' is not 'with' '1' and 'the second'. '[A] puzzle' is an addition to 'the third'. 'Help' is surrounded by quotation marks and ends with an exclamation mark. "'Help!'" is a 'whisper[ing]' of '[w]ho' for the perspective on the statement above. I can see and read the 'whisper' which is also stated as "'[h]elp!'". The 'whisper' in the statement above is a word which is surrounded with quotation marks and ends with an exclamation mark.

In the case of 'relat[ion]' in the text, it is that something is 'relate[d] to' something else. Because something is 'relate[d]' 'to' (also my emphasis) something else, I read that 'the size of the balloon' and 'the size of the word' are not necessarily interactively related with each other. '[W]e don't *read* the words at all' and '[w]e hear them' are claimed to be 'as if' 'in fact'. In other words, not '*read*[ing] the words at all' of 'we' and 'hear[ing] them' of '[w]e' are not the 'fact'. Among '*read*[ing]' and 'hear[ing]', what '[w]e' are claimed to do is 'hear[ing]' 'the words'. "'Help!'" is one of 'the words' what 'we' do not '*read*', it is what '[w]e hear' for the perspective on the statement above although 'hear[ing] them' are not the 'fact'.

'[T]he comic form' is 'the' one. '[I]n the comic form', 'an interaction between the pictureness and the verbalness of the speech-balloon' does not always happen. In other words, there might be no 'interaction' 'in the comic form'. '[A]n interaction' is something to be ('is') 'between the pictureness and the verbalness of the speech-balloon'. '[A]n interaction' is not 'the pictureness' and 'the verbalness'. '[T]he pictureness and the verbalness' do not make 'an interaction' either. '[P]roduc[ing] the meaning of sound' is latter of 'an interaction between the pictureness and the verbalness of the speech-balloon'. What is more, 'the meaning of sound' would not be 'produce[d]' without 'an interaction' in the case of 'the comic form'.

‘[W]e don’t read words at all. [...] We “hear with our eyes”’ — if I compare this passage with ‘I can see! I see with my eyes’ from *My Five Senses*, I find some similarities from ‘I see with my eyes’ and ‘[w]e “hear with our eyes”’. ‘[M]y eyes’ and ‘our eyes’ are additional to ‘see[ing]’ and ‘hear[ing]’ so that ‘I’ and ‘[w]e’ would ‘see’ and ‘hear’. Without ‘my eyes’ and ‘our eyes’, ‘I’ and ‘[w]e’ might not ‘see’ and ‘hear’. If there were no ‘my eyes’ or ‘our eyes’, it would have been different seeing of ‘I’ and hearing of ‘[w]e’.

I would have read ‘the hollow sound’ from reading colours and lines. The picture of ‘the hollow sound’ is not what I hear. As it is stated ‘[c]an you hear the hollow sound?’, the pictorial ‘you’ might not ‘hear the hollow sound’. The pictorial ‘you’ might hear other sound which is not ‘hollow’. The left page and page one are not empty since I already have read pumpkins, knuckles, ‘your’, etc. According to the statement, there is sound which is ‘the hollow sound’, but it is not what ‘your’ will hear. Although there are ears on each of two pictorial ‘your’, I do not read that these ears hear ‘the hollow sound’.

To be ‘hollow’ is ‘not empty’, then what about ‘the hollow sound’? ‘[T]he hollow sound’ does not mean that it is not an *empty* (my emphasis) sound. ‘[T]he hollow sound’ is something ‘can’ be ‘hear[d]’ and it is asked to ‘you’. Can other than ‘you’ ‘hear the hollow sound’? Can ‘a pumpkin’ ‘hear the hollow sound’? Although ‘a pumpkin’ is ‘hollow’ likewise ‘[t]he top part of your head’, the likeness does not make ‘a pumpkin’ and ‘your’ the same. ‘[A] pumpkin’ and the pictorial pumpkins in *Use Your Brain* are not asked whether they hear anything within the text.

In Uttal’s *The New Phrenology*, I found a chapter which is ‘to review methods, both traditional and recent, used to brain anatomy and function, with emphasis on those

germane to evaluating the localization hypothesis.’<sup>133</sup> The title of chapter is ‘The Technologies’. In that chapter, ‘the brain’ is always ‘the’ one.<sup>134</sup> The purpose of ‘[t]he technologies’ and ‘methods’ are ‘to review’. Because of the word, ‘review’, I would like to claim that the purpose of chapter, ‘The Technologies’, is to *re-* and *view* (both my emphases). For the perspective on the statement, ‘methods’ are either ‘traditional’ or ‘recent’. To be ‘recent’ is not ‘traditional’ and vice versa. When some ‘methods’ are ‘traditional’, some other ‘methods’ are ‘recent’. However, to what extent some are ‘traditional’ and some others are ‘recent’?

I have read ‘Figure 2.10’ from *The New Phrenology*.<sup>135</sup> ‘Figure 2.10’ is one of ‘methods’ which is either ‘traditional’ or ‘recent’. ‘Figure 2.10’ is ‘review[ed]’ by one of ‘[t]he technologies’: ‘Computer-Assisted X-Ray Tomography’.<sup>136</sup> ‘*Tomography* nowadays refers to a wide variety of reconstruction techniques that can be used to produce three-dimensional images or maps of objects that are differentially transparent to several different kinds of electromagnetism or radiation’.<sup>137</sup> ‘[N]owadays’ are the sum of ‘[n]ow’ which is counted by ‘days’. Therefore, ‘[t]omography’ is not about now. ‘[N]owadays’ are conditional on ‘refer[ring]’ of ‘[t]omography’. Before and after ‘nowadays’, ‘[t]omography’ might not refer to ‘a wide variety of reconstruction techniques’. ‘*Tomography*’ is not ‘a wide variety of reconstruction techniques’ because ‘a wide variety of reconstruction techniques’ are the ‘refer[rals]’ of ‘[t]omography’. The number of

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<sup>133</sup> William Uttal, *The New Phrenology*, p. 29.

<sup>134</sup> See more examples about ‘the brain’ from William Uttal’s ‘The Technologies’ in *The New Phrenology*, pp. 29-87.

<sup>135</sup> See pages from 201 to 202 in this thesis.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

‘reconstruction techniques’ is plural and ‘reconstruction techniques’ are part of ‘a wide variety’. Therefore, ‘reconstruction techniques’ are not only plural but also various.

‘[U]s[age]’ of ‘a wide variety of reconstruction techniques’ is for ‘produc[ing] three-dimensional images or maps of objects’. In other words, ‘produc[ing] three-dimensional images or maps of objects’ is the purpose of ‘us[age]’ of ‘a wide variety of reconstruction techniques’. ‘[O]bjects’ are ‘produce[d]’ as ‘images or maps’ which are ‘three-dimensional’. What are ‘produce[d]’ are the result of ‘reconstruction techniques’. Therefore, ‘three-dimensional images or maps of objects’ are the repetition or the representation of ‘objects’. ‘*Tomography*’, in terms of referring, ‘produce[s]’ something which is not the original. ‘[T]hree-dimensional images or maps of objects’ are ‘differentially transparent to several different kinds of electromagnetism or radiation’ as long as they are ‘produce[d]’ with ‘[T]omography’. To be ‘differentially transparent’ is due to ‘several different kinds of electromagnetism or radiation’; it is not because of the ‘objects’. There are the multiple ‘kinds’ which are ‘different’ in the cases of ‘electromagnetism’ and ‘radiation’. ‘[E]lectromagnetism’ and ‘radiation’ are different from each other. The numbers of ‘electromagnetism’ and ‘radiation’ are not specified as such. Whatever the numbers of ‘electromagnetism’ and ‘radiation’ are, the degrees of ‘transparen[cy]’ would be different when they are ‘produce[d]’. However, the ‘produc[t]’ might not be always produced as ‘[t]omography’ since that ‘techniques’ are possibly ‘used to produce three-dimensional images or maps of objects’.

In the following part, tomography is no longer claimed. ‘Even more striking is the ability of a tomographic system to reconstruct and visualize a three-dimensional

map or model of the inside of the body—all the while without violating its physical integrity'.<sup>138</sup> '[T]he tomographic system' is part of 'the ability'. Therefore, it is not 'a tomographic system' which is to 'reconstruct and visualize a three-dimensional map or model of the inside of the body'; it is 'the ability of a tomographic system' and that is '[e]ven more striking' because 'its physical integrity' is not 'violat[ed]'. Then, 'the ability of a tomographic system' would be less 'striking', if 'a tomographic system' has no ability to 'reconstruct and visualize a three-dimensional map or model of the inside of the body' with 'violating its physical integrity'. Since 'a three-dimensional map or model of the inside of the body' is 'reconstruct[ed]', I read that 'the inside of the body' is a 'reconstruct[ion] and visualiz[ation]' of 'a three-dimensional map or model'. However, 'reconstruct[ion] and visualiz[ation]' would be done by 'a tomographic system'.

Body what I read from Uttal's text is 'the body'. It is neither a body nor several bodies. It is not 'the body' which is to be 'reconstruct[ed] and visualiz[ed]' as 'a three-dimensional map or model'. There is 'the body'. There is certain 'side' of 'the body'. If something is not located 'the inside of the body', that would not be 'reconstruct[ed] and visualize[d]' by 'a tomographic system'. '[T]he inside of the body' is claimed to be part of 'a three-dimensional map or model' when it is 'reconstruct[ed] and visualize[d]' by 'a tomographic system'. In other words, 'the inside of the body' would be 'reconstruct[ed] and visualize[d]' as 'a three dimensional map or model'. Therefore, 'a three-dimensional map or model of the inside of the body' and 'the inside of the body' are never the same since 'the inside of the body' is always prior to 'a three-dimensional map or model of the inside of the body'.

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid, p. 63.



‘[P]hysical integrity’ belongs to ‘its’. In other words, ‘its’ owns ‘physical integrity’. I will not insist in this paper that ‘the inside’ is ‘integrity’ (or ‘integrity’ is ‘the inside’). I also will not insist that ‘the body’ is ‘physical’ (or ‘physical’ is ‘the body’). Nothing has been produced as ‘a three-dimensional map or model’ in the case of ‘its physical integrity’. In addition, ‘the body’ does not own anything. The moment of ‘reconstruct[ing] and visualiz[ing]’ are not as same as ‘all the while’ and the moment of ‘without violating’. Therefore, I do not read that ‘the inside of the body’ as ‘its physical integrity’.

There is a moment, ‘all the while’ when ‘the tomographic system’ is ‘reconstruct[ing] and visualiz[ing]’. During ‘the while’ of ‘reconstruct[ing] and visualiz[ing]’, there would be no ‘violating its physical integrity’ since it has been ‘all’ of ‘the while’. In other words, the moment when ‘the inside of the body’ is ‘reconstruct[ed] and visualize[d]’, ‘the inside of the body’ could be ‘violat[ed]’ ‘its physical integrity’. That would be less ‘striking’ or not ‘striking’ if ‘its physical integrity’ would be ‘violat[ed]’ as I have once mentioned before.

In the following chapter, I will start with reading the text from Neil Cox. Cox gave a lecture about ‘*Head, 1913*’ in ‘The Watson Gordon Lecture 2008’. ‘*Head, 1913*’, which is from Pablo Picasso, is claimed to be ‘a work’ in the text. I will read how ‘a work’ is claimed and continue to read *Use Your Brain* with other texts such as Uttal’s *The New Phrenology* and Anthony Browne and Joe Browne’s *Playing the Shape Game*.

### Chapter 13: Text of Picture, Text of Text, Picture of Picture, Picture of Text

'*Heads, 1913*' is claimed to be 'a work' in *Picasso's 'Toys for Adults': Cubism as Surrealism*. It is not 'a work' of Neil Cox. Cox reads '*Heads, 1913*' as 'a work' in his lecture. I will read the first paragraph and read *Use Your Brain* afterward.

I am going to speak this evening of a single object now in the collection of the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art in Edinburgh (fig.1). It is a work on card-board, made with papers of several colours that have been pasted on to it, and a few black chalk lines. It is called *Head*, and it is a work by Pablo Picasso [...]. It is a grubby little thing, forty-five by thirty-three centimetres, consisting at very first glance of a white triangle, a blue rectangle, alongside that a smaller greyish undulating 'B' shape, the whole sitting on a black 'T' shape. There is a dirty, yellowed square to the bottom left underneath one arm of the 'T' (fig.2). Much more difficult to discern - it depends on the conditions in which the object is seen - is another strip of paper that passes over the 'T' and up into the core of the white triangle (fig.3).<sup>139</sup>

Within the statement, '[i]t is called *Head*'. It is also what 'I am going to speak' (but that has been already spoken in 'The Watson Gordon Lecture 2008'). It is also 'a single object now in the collection of the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art in Edinburgh' which is part of 'speak[ing]'. '[S]peak[ing]' is conditional on 'this evening' and 'I'. According to the 'speak[ing]', '[i]t is a work' and also 'a grubby little thing' — There are different ways to argue about '*Head, 1913*'.

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Although I do not see any image when I read the text, I could imagine that there are different colours and shapes of ‘*Head, 1913*’. For example, there are ‘a white triangle, a blue rectangle, alongside that a smaller greyish undulating “B” shape, the whole sitting on a black “T” shape’. What is more, ‘the object’ is claimed to be ‘seen’. ‘[T]he object’ is also stated as ‘the core of the white triangle’ and there ‘is another strip of paper’. In that sense, ‘the core of the white triangle’ is not ‘another strip of paper’. There is no colour in the case of ‘another strip of paper’. ‘[A]nother strip of paper’ is also different from ‘the core of the white triangle’ because ‘strip’ is not triangle and there is no core anywhere around ‘another strip of paper’. Although ‘the object is seen’, something is claimed to be ‘passe[d] over’ and ‘up into the core of the white triangle’. ‘[S]ee[ing]’ in the text has been done already, but something other than ‘see[ing]’, ‘pass[ing] over’ and ‘up into’, can be read alongside ‘see[ing]’.

On page 20 in *Use Your Brain*, there are two pictorial ‘you’ who ‘turn a somersault’. They are all in the pink frame. Two pictorial ‘you’ in the pink frame are different from each other although they are all ‘turn[ing] a somersault’. Before continuing reading the differences from two pictorial ‘you’ in the pink frame, I will read the text on page 20 and then go back to read two pictorial ‘you’.

Your brain is very important. It is carefully protected from harm.

It has thick, hard bone all around it, called the skull.

Your brain floats in a fluid in the hollow part of your head.

The fluid is like a cushion.

It keeps your brain from being bumped when you turn a somersault.

‘Your brain’ and ‘your brain’ belong to ‘[y]our’ and ‘your’. ‘[Y]our brain’ and ‘your brain’ are not others’ brains. The degree to which ‘[y]our brain’ is important is stated as ‘very’. If ‘[y]our brain’ is not ‘important’, is ‘[y]our brain’ no longer ‘[y]our brain’? What if ‘[y]our brain’ is important but not ‘very important’? ‘It’ does not protect ‘[i]t’; ‘[i]t’ is what to be ‘carefully protected’. When ‘[i]t is’ ‘protected’, ‘[i]t is carefully protected’. ‘[P]rotect[ion]’ is not something for ‘harm’. ‘[H]arm’ is apart ‘from’ ‘[i]t’.

According to the third sentence, ‘thick, hard bone’ belongs to ‘[i]t’. As ‘thick, hard bone all around it’ is ‘called the skull’, ‘the skull’ is not a calling from ‘the skull’. ‘It’ does not call ‘the skull’ as ‘the skull’ either. ‘[B]one’ is ‘thick’ and ‘hard’ whereas ‘[y]our brain’ and ‘[i]t’ are not. ‘Your brain’ is not a bone. ‘[I]t’ is not out of ‘the skull’ because ‘thick, hard bone’ is ‘all around it’. To have ‘thick, hard bone all around’ is how ‘[i]t is carefully protected from harm’. In other words, ‘[i]t’ would not be ‘carefully protected from harm’, if there were no ‘thick, hard bone’. In addition, ‘[i]t’ might not be ‘carefully protected from harm’, if ‘thick, hard bone’ is not ‘all around it’.

‘Your brain’ in the third sentence is claimed to be ‘in’ somewhere twice. ‘Your brain’ and ‘your head’ are different from each other because ‘your head’ is not in somewhere like ‘[y]our brain’. ‘Your brain’ is internal to ‘your head’ and ‘your head’ is external to ‘[y]our brain’. ‘[F]loat[ing]’ of ‘[y]our brain’ is also claimed to be ‘in’ with ‘[y]our brain’. ‘Your brain’ and ‘your head’ are not *the* (my emphasis) ones whereas ‘the hollow part’ is. There is ‘a fluid’ which is ‘in the hollow part of your head’ and it is also not *the* (my emphasis) one. ‘[Y]our head’ is not full of ‘your head’ because ‘part’ of ‘your head’ is ‘the hollow part’. ‘[T]he hollow part’ is not *in* (my emphasis) ‘your head’, but ‘a fluid’ is ‘in the hollow part of your head’. ‘Your brain’ is ‘in a fluid’. Therefore, ‘the hollow part’ is not full of ‘the hollow part’; there is something other than ‘the hollow part’ inside. Furthermore, ‘a fluid’ is not full of ‘a fluid’ because

'[y]our brain' is 'float[ing] in' there. On page 20, 'the hollow' is neither a sound nor the sound. 'The hollow' is 'part of your head' and that 'part' is where '[y]our brain' is claimed to be 'in'. For the perspective on the statement, 'a fluid' is something 'in' between '[y]our brain' and 'the hollow part of your head'. '[A] fluid' is neither yours nor mine. For that reason, 'a fluid' is different from '[y]our brain' and 'your head'. As there is 'the hollow part' in the case of 'your head', 'your head' is not empty.

Although '[y]our brain' is 'in a fluid' and 'in the hollow part of your head', 'your brain' would be 'bumped' under certain circumstances. '[T]he hollow part of your head' and 'your head' are not 'like a cushion' for the perspective on the statement. Neither 'the hollow part of your head' nor 'your head' 'keep[...] your brain from being bumped'. 'Your brain' is 'carefully protected from harm' and '[t]he fluid' 'keeps your brain from being bumped when you turn a somersault'. However, 'your brain' in the last sentence is not carefully kept. '[P]rotect[ing]' and 'keep[ing]' are claimed with different ideas for perspective on the statement. '[H]arm' is not 'you', but 'your brain' might be 'bumped' when 'you turn a somersault'. Because of what 'you' does, 'your brain' is 'ke[pt]' from 'being bumped'. However, 'you' is still neither harm nor harmful to 'your brain' in the last sentence of page 20.

There is a pink square frame on page 20. From reading the text, I read two pictorial 'you' who 'turn a somersault'. Two pictorial 'you' are not the edges of the pink frame. I would like to add that two pictorial 'you' are within the pink frame. It seems that two pictorial 'you' are all floating in the hollow part of the pink frame. Is the pink frame 'a fluid' then? If so, could I read the white frame, which is on the outside of the pink frame, as 'the hollow part of your head'?

From two pictorial ‘you’, I see ‘your brain’ from the left ‘you’. It is because I read two pictorial ‘you’ with ‘your brain float[ing] in a fluid in the hollow part of your head’. Although I have read two pictorial ‘you’, I did not read two brains from the picture. Does that mean ‘you’ on the right side is not with the brain?

None of the sentences on page 20 states that ‘your brain’ is visible to me. In other word, ‘your brain floats in a fluid in the hollow part of your head’ might be there in the picture. If there are two pictorial ‘your brain[s]’, ‘your brain’ is something I can read and also cannot read. If so, being ‘in a fluid’ and ‘in the hollow part of your head’ of ‘your brain[s]’ are different from each other in the case of two pictorial ‘you’.

From reading two pictorial ‘you’, I realized that I was reading not only the outlines of two pictorial ‘you’ but also inner parts of two pictorial ‘you’. I already have read the ideas about ‘in’, ‘internal’, ‘inside’, etc. Although the bodies are not the brains, the bodies have been claimed with the brains in many texts (e.g. *Use Your Brain, The New Phrenology, Objectivity*). Apart from reading the brain, I will see how inner parts of the bodies are claimed in the different texts. What I am going to read for the first is in the last paragraph of chapter, ‘Computer-Assisted X-Ray Tomography’ in *The New Phrenology*. The second one is Anthony Browne and Joe Browne’s *Playing the Shape Game*.

[W]e should remember that all of the X-ray and tomographic techniques discussed in this chapter have one enormous advantages—they are all noninvasive: no surgery is required to peer into the insides of a living human body. For examining anatomical structure, whether normal or abnormal, these techniques represent a breakthrough of epochal consequence. Only recently have psychologists been able

to take advantage of these impressive engineering developments, as analogous techniques to explore the function as well as structure of the nervous system have emerged. We turn now to one of the first of these functional techniques.<sup>140</sup>

‘[R]emember[ing]’ in the first sentence is not what ‘we’ are doing; ‘remember[ing]’ is what ‘we should’ do. ‘[W]e’ do not choose what to ‘remember’. What ‘we should remember’ is not all the techniques; these ‘techniques’ are ‘in this chapter’; they are not out of ‘this chapter’. What ‘we should remember’ is ‘all the X-ray and tomographic techniques’. ‘[A]ll of the X-ray and tomographic techniques’ are not ‘we’ have ‘discussed’. For that reason, what ‘we should remember’ is not all the X-ray and tomographic techniques. It is an irony that the number of ‘one enormous advantages’ is not singular — Although it is claimed as ‘one enormous’, the number of ‘advantages’ is plural. ‘[O]ne enormous advantages’ belong to ‘all of the X-ray and tomographic techniques’. Even if there is a possibility that ‘one enormous advantages’ were already known to ‘we’, ‘we’ still need to ‘remember’ ‘one enormous advantages’.

‘[O]ne enormous advantages’ is that ‘they are all noninvasive’. It is not some of ‘they’ which are ‘noninvasive’. There is no exception to be ‘noninvasive’ in the case of ‘they’. If ‘they’ were invasive or some of ‘they’ were invasive, ‘they’ would no longer ‘have’ ‘one enormous advantages’. For the reason that it is ‘one enormous advantages’, there might be other ‘advantages’ which are less or more than ‘enormous’; but the ‘one’ which is mentioned in the statement above is ‘enormous’ one. ‘[A]ll noninvasive’ is that ‘no surgery is required to peer into the insides of a living human body’. For the perspective on the statement, ‘surgery’ is something which ‘require[s]’ ‘to peer

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<sup>140</sup> William Uttal, *The New Phrenology*, p. 68.

into the insides of a living human body'. However, 'they' and 'all of the X-ray and tomographic techniques' are not needed to do 'surgery'. If 'a living human body' is not invaded and not 'peer[ed] into', it is an advantage for the perspective on the statement.

'[A] living human body' is not a human. '[A] [...] body' is not dead because it is 'a living' one. '[S]urgery' is neither something for the dead nor for the dead body. '[S]urgery' does not 'peer into' 'human' and outside of 'a living human body'. '[A] living human body' has multiple 'insides'. Some surgeries are invasive because it is 'required to peer into the insides of a living human body'. For that reason, 'surgery' and 'they' are different from each other because 'surgery' is not 'noninvasive'.

The purpose of 'these techniques' is for 'examining anatomical structure'. '[E]xamining anatomical structure' is neither 'for' 'human' nor 'a living human body'. '[E]xamining anatomical structure' could be either 'normal or abnormal'. '[N]ormal[ity]' and 'abnormal[ity]' of 'examining anatomical structure' are not claimed to be 'normal or abnormal' because of who examines and whom/which is examined. '[T]hese techniques' do not examine; they 'represent a breakthrough of epochal consequence'. The number of 'these techniques' is plural, but the number of 'a breakthrough of epochal consequence' is not plural. Within the statement, 'a breakthrough of epochal consequence' is a 'represent[ation]' of 'these techniques'. '[T]hese techniques' do not break through an 'epochal consequence'. '[T]hese techniques' are not 'a breakthrough of epochal consequence' itself because they 'represent' it.

There are multiple 'psychologists' who have an ability 'to take advantage of these impressive engineering developments'. '[T]hese impressive engineering developments' are not 'the techniques' because they are the 'developments' which are 'impressive' and 'engineering' ones. '[T]hese impressive engineering developments' are not



something to develop; they ‘have’ ‘been’ ‘take[n]’ by ‘psychologists’ who have an ability ‘to take advantage’. I read that ‘recently’ is the moment when ‘psychologists’ ‘have’ ‘been able to take advantage of these impressive engineering developments’. ‘[T]hese impressive engineering developments’ would be ‘recent’ ‘developments’ as long as these ‘psychologists’ ‘take advantage’ from ‘these impressive engineering developments’.

There are ‘the function’ and ‘structure’ in the case of ‘the nervous system’. ‘[T]he function as well as structure of the nervous system’ would not be ‘explore[d]’, if there were no ‘analogous techniques’. However, in order to be ‘explore[d]’, ‘analogous techniques’ need to be ‘emerged’ at first. Without ‘emerg[ing]’ of ‘analogous techniques’, ‘psychologists’ would not ‘take advantage of these impressive engineering developments’. Therefore, ‘advantage of these impressive engineering developments’ is conditional on ‘emerge[nce]’ of ‘analogous techniques’.

Because of ‘now’, there would be no ‘turn[ing]’ of ‘[w]e’ before and after ‘now’. In other words, ‘turn[ing]’ or ‘[w]e’ are conditional on ‘now’. ‘We’ do not ‘turn’ ‘to’ anything or everything. In addition, ‘[w]e’ do not ‘turn’ ‘to’ all of ‘these functional techniques’. What ‘[w]e’ would ‘turn’ is to ‘one of the first of these functional techniques’.

From now on, I will read Anthony Browne and Joe Browne’s *Playing the Shape Game*. I have been reading *My Five Senses* in the previous part and *Use Your Brain* in this part. *My Five Senses* and *Use Your Brain* were published before 1975. The one which I am going to read was published in 2011. In other words, it was published

40 years later when *Use Your Brain* was published.<sup>141</sup> Since the year of 2011 is closer to ‘recent’ when it is compared to the years of 1962 and 1975, I thought that reading *Playing the Shape Game* would be an example of reading the ideas which are related to ‘recent’.

The title of chapter three in *Playing the Shape Game* is ‘Bodies and Greetings Cards’. After Anthony Browne left college, it ‘seemed’ ‘[m]edical illustration’ which ‘involve[s] making small, detailed illustrations of operations to be used in medical journals and text books’ would ‘be the perfect job’ for him.<sup>142</sup> According to the text from Browne, ‘[m]edical illustration’ is different from other types illustrations since it has ‘operations to be used in medical journals and text books’ as its part. The ‘operations’ can be illustrated. These ‘operations’ will be ‘in medical journals and text books’ when they are illustrated as ‘small, detailed illustrations of operations’. In order to be there in ‘medical journals and text books’, ‘[m]edical illustration’ needs to ‘involve’ ‘small, detailed illustrations of operations’. ‘Medical illustration’ ‘involves’ other ‘illustrations’ which are ‘small, detailed illustrations of operations’. For the perspective on the statement, ‘[m]edical illustration’ and ‘small, detailed illustrations’ are not the same. They are different from each other not only because the former one is singular and the latter one is plural; they are different from each other also because it is ‘small, detailed illustrations of operations’ are something to be ‘involve[d]’ in ‘[m]edical illustration’.

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<sup>141</sup> Anthony Browne and Joe Browne, *Playing the Shape Game* (London: Doubleday, 2011).

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

Then, he ‘was employed by Manchester University to produce illustrations to help the medical students understand the operations’.<sup>143</sup> ‘[I]llustrations’ were ‘produce[d]’ after he ‘was employed by’ someone other than him. An ‘employ[ment]’ is prior to ‘produc[ing] illustrations’ in that sense. What Browne did at ‘Manchester University’ was ‘produc[ing] illustrations’. These ‘illustrations’ were not only ‘produce[d]’. These ‘illustrations’ were also ‘produce[d]’ with a purpose to ‘help’ others who were not Anthony Browne himself. ‘[T]he operations’ are something will be ‘underst[oo]d’ by ‘the medical students’. In other words, ‘the operations’ were not what Browne had to ‘understand’. It was not Browne who was helping ‘the medical students’ because they were ‘illustrations’ which were ‘help[ing]’.

On page 50, he states that ‘I had to attend the operation and make a sketch of each surgical procedure. Later, in the studio, I converted the sketches into more detailed paintings’.<sup>144</sup> ‘[A]ttend[ing] the operation’ is what ‘I had to’ do. It seems that ‘the medical students’ who were supposed to ‘understand’ did not ‘attend the operation’. For ‘understand[ing]’, ‘the medical students’ do not have to be there for ‘attend[ing]’. For ‘help[ing]’ and ‘produc[ing]’, ‘I’ had to be there. ‘[E]ach surgical procedure’ is what ‘I’ ‘ma[d]e’ as ‘a sketch’. According to the statement, it is not ‘the operation’ which ‘I’ ‘ma[d]e’ as ‘a sketch’. There are different ‘surgical procedure[s]’ in the case of ‘the operation’ and there is a singular ‘sketch’ which ‘I’ ‘ma[d]e a sketch of’. ‘[E]ach surgical procedure’ is part of ‘a sketch’ which ‘I’ ‘ma[d]e’ after ‘attend[ing] the operation’, but ‘the operation’ is not the part of ‘a sketch’. ‘[A] sketch of each surgical procedure’ is then ‘converted’ by ‘I’ ‘in’ different place, ‘the studio’. ‘[T]he studio’ is not the place where ‘I had to attend the operation’.

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

‘[T]he sketches’ are different from ‘more detailed paintings’. They are different from each other not only because sketches and paintings are different things. ‘[T]he sketches’ are something to be ‘converted’ ‘into’ something else which are no longer ‘the sketches’. ‘[T]he sketches’ are not detailed whereas ‘paintings’ are ‘more detailed’ for the perspective on the statement. ‘[M]ore detailed paintings’ and ‘the sketches’ are both ‘in the studio’, but ‘more detailed paintings’ were not there when ‘I had to attend the operation’.

I will move on to the part where Browne mentions ‘[t]he sketches’ and ‘the paintings’. There, he also mentions about ‘the organs’ and ‘objects’. For the reason that I read the body in *One Gorilla, My Five Senses* and *Use Your Brain*, I regarded that reading the following part from Browne will be helpful to understand how the body has been claimed within the text.

The sketches were speculative, to say the least, and it was a challenge to turn what was a veritable bloodbath into a comprehensible sequence of events. In the end, the paintings that I produced were far from honest representations of the real operations. I had to depict the organs as clear and identifiable — not the shapeless, blood-soaked objects they actually were. It was very much an imaginary, ‘cleaned-up’ impression of the scene.<sup>145</sup>

‘The sketches’ and ‘the paintings’ are different from each other. ‘[T]he paintings’ are something which are ‘produced’ ‘[i]n the end’ whereas ‘[t]he sketches’ are not. In other words, ‘[t]he sketches’ are prior to ‘the paintings’. ‘The sketches were speculative’ in

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

terms of ‘say[ing] the least’ and ‘turning what was a veritable bloodbath into a comprehensible sequence of events’. ‘[A] veritable bloodbath’ and ‘a comprehensible sequence of events’ are different from each other because ‘a comprehensible sequence of events’ is a result of ‘turn[ing]’ of ‘a veritable bloodbath’. ‘[S]equence of events’ is supposed to be ‘comprehensible’ whereas ‘a veritable bloodbath’ is not. In other words, ‘a veritable bloodbath’ was not something comprehensible likewise ‘sequence of events’ to the perspective on the statement. ‘The sketches’ themselves are not challenging, but ‘turn[ing]’ ‘a veritable bloodbath’ ‘into’ something other than ‘a veritable bloodbath’ is ‘challeng[ing]’.

‘In the end’, ‘a comprehensible sequence of events’ does not remain as a result; it is not what to be ‘produce[d]’ ‘[i]n the end’. ‘The sketches’, ‘a comprehensible sequence of events’ and ‘the paintings’ are the consecutive sequences which I read from the text above. Thus, I read that ‘a comprehensible sequence of events’ and ‘the paintings’ are different from each other. The number of ‘a comprehensible sequence of events’ is singular, but it will be multiple ‘paintings’ ‘[i]n the end’.

Alongside of ‘a comprehensible sequence of events’, there are ‘the real operations’. ‘[T]he [...] operations’ are something ‘real’ whereas ‘the paintings’ are ‘far from [...] [t]he real operations’. There are different realness within the text and these different realness are depends on what they are claimed with. ‘[T]he paintings’ are not unreal, but it is less ‘real’ than ‘the real operations’.

What ‘I produced’ was ‘the paintings’ so that ‘the real operation’ is prior to ‘the painting’. For the perspective on the statement, ‘the real operations’ are part of ‘honest representations’ and ‘honest representations’ are not what ‘I produced’. Therefore, ‘honest representations’ and ‘the paintings’ are also different from each other although they are all latter to ‘the real operations’.

‘[T]he organs’ are something already have been ‘depict[ed]’ by ‘I’. Therefore, I would like to claim that ‘the shapeless, blood-soaked objects’ are similar to ‘a veritable bloodbath’ since ‘the shapeless, blood-soaked objects’ are also supposed to be changed into different thing by other than themselves. ‘[T]he organs’ could be either ‘clear and identifiable’ or ‘the shapeless, blood-soaked objects’. ‘[T]he organs’ and ‘the [...] objects’ are different from each other because ‘the organs’ are ‘not’ ‘shapeless’ and ‘blood-soaked’. Although ‘the organs’ are not ‘actually’ how ‘they’ ‘were’, ‘the organs’ are ‘clear and identifiable’ as ‘the organs’.

‘[T]he scene’ is part of ‘an imaginary, “cleaned-up” impression’. Both ‘the scene’ and ‘as imaginary, “cleaned-up” impression’ are in the past because it has been claimed that ‘[i]t was very much’ as such. ‘[A]n imaginary, “cleaned-up” impression of the scene’ is not how ‘they actually were’. ‘[A]n imaginary, “cleaned-up” impression of the scene’ is closer to ‘the organs’ which ‘I had to depict’ rather than ‘the shapeless, blood-soaked objects’. To be ‘an imaginary, “cleaned-up” impression of the scene’ is excessive because ‘[i]t was very much’ to be ‘an imaginary, “cleaned-up” impression of the scene’.

I had rapidly scrawled in the operating theatre, I had to rely on my imagination to turn the operation into a story that could be easily read. It was a difficult story to tell. Quite often something significant was obscured by an organ or the surgeon’s hands or a medical instrument, and I had to guess at what happened behind the offending object.<sup>146</sup>

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
<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

‘[T]he operating theatre’ reminds me of John Berger’s ‘Ape Theatre’. ‘I’ was ‘in’ there for ‘rapidly’ ‘scawl[ing]’. ‘[I]n the operating theatre’, ‘I’ did not ‘operate’. ‘[T]he operation’ does not have to be rapid whereas ‘scrawl[ing]’ of ‘I’ was ‘rapid’. ‘[I]n the operating theatre’, ‘the operation’ would not be ‘the operation’ after ‘rely[ing] on my imagination’. It is because ‘the operation’ will be ‘turn[ed]’ ‘into’ ‘a story that could be easily read’. For the perspective on the statement, ‘a story’ has an idea of ‘imagination’ although it was from ‘the operation’. ‘[A] story’ is something ‘could be’ ‘read’ ‘easily’.

‘[A] story’ cannot be any stories since ‘that’ has to be ‘easily read’. What ‘I had to rely on’ was not ‘the operation’ when ‘I had rapidly scrawled’; it was ‘my imagination’ which ‘I had to rely on’. Although that was ‘a story that could be easily read’, ‘[i]t was a difficult story to tell’. In other words, ‘read[ing]’ and ‘tell[ing]’ of ‘a story’ are different for the perspective on the statement. It is not a ‘difficult story’ to ‘read’ and not an easy ‘story to tell’ although both ‘stor[ies]’ are all from ‘the operating theatre’.

The frequency when ‘something significant was obscured’ was ‘[q]uite often’. ‘[S]omething significant was obscured’ happens more than ‘often’; it was not always, but it was not never either. ‘[S]omething significant’ does not become ‘obscured’ by ‘something’. There are three different reasons why ‘something significant was obscured’. Does that mean ‘something significant’ might not have been ‘obscured by an organ or the surgeon’s hands or a medical instrument’? If ‘something significant’ was not ‘obscured’, ‘I’ would not have to ‘guess at what happened behind the offending object’. Therefore, I would like to claim that ‘guess[ing]’ of ‘I’ is conditional on the condition of ‘something significant’. ‘[A]n organ’, ‘the surgeon’s hands’ and ‘a medical instrument’ are not ‘something significant’. ‘[A]n organ’, ‘the surgeon’s hands’ and ‘a medical instrument’ are ‘obscur[ing]’ ‘something significant’. ‘I’ does not know ‘what

happened behind the offending object’. It seems ‘I’ knows what is to be ‘offend[ed]’ and not ‘offend[ed]’ in the case of ‘the [...] object’. However, ‘I’ does not know what was ‘happen[ing] behind the offending object’ since ‘I had to guess at what happened behind’. ‘I’ does not have to ‘guess at what happened’ in front or other sides of ‘the offending object’.



The pictures on the left side were not ‘in the operating cinema’ because they are what have been ‘produced’ as ‘a story that could be easily read’. They are also what ‘I converted the sketches into more detailed paintings’ ‘[l]ater, in the studio’. ‘[T]he offending object’ goes through ‘my imagination’, ‘turn[ing]’, ‘guess[ing]’, ‘scrawl[ing]’, etc. The pictures on the left side are not only ‘more detailed paintings’ but also ‘illustrations’ for ‘help[ing] the medical students understand the operations’.





Figure 2.7  
Standard X-ray image of the brain. Note that the brain is barely visible with this kind of transmission radiogram. From Robinson and Uttal, 1983, used with the permission of the Division of Neuroradiology, Department of Radiology, University of Michigan.



The picture on the top is from Uttal's *The New Phrenology* and the rest two are from Shower's *Use Your Brain*. That is 'Figure 2.7' and also 'standard X-ray image of the brain'. For Uttal, 'the brain' is part of 'standard X-ray image', but 'the brain' is not part of 'Figure 2.7'. 'The brain is barely visible with this kind of transmission radiogram' is something for '[noting]' (also my emphasis). Does that mean 'the brain'

would not be '[n]oted' as 'barely visible', if there were no notice from Uttal? The visibility of 'the brain' is claimed with the addition, 'this kind of transmission radiogram'; 'the brain is barely visible' not because of transmission radiogram. What I see is something 'barely visible' which is not 'with' transmission radiogram. '[T]he brain is barely visible', but it does not mean that 'the brain' is invisible. '[T]he brain' is 'visible' but 'barely' for the perspective on the statement. The picture, for the perspective on the statement, is claimed with the idea of visibility, but that is also claimed to be '[n]oted'. 'Figure 2.7' and image are not the brain of 'Robinson and Uttal', but they are 'from Robinson and Uttal, 1983'. Although they are 'from Robinson and Uttal, 1983', 'the permission' of 'us[a]ge' was not 'from Robinson and Uttal, 1983'. '[T]he permission' was not permitted by 'the brain' either. 'Figure 2.7' is 'used' according to the statement and there is an addition of 'the permission of the Division of Neuroradiology, Department of Radiology, University of Michigan'.

According to the statement of page 20 in *Use Your Brain*, the brain is not '[s]tandard X-ray image of the brain' and a figure because it is claimed as 'your brain' and '[y]our brain'. Nothing has been permitted to be used on page 20. There are also different claims about 'your brain' and '[y]our brain' on page 16 of *Use Your Brain*. There are the pictures of the alphabets on page 16. There are a bench, a dog, a girl and a boy on page 17. I see three different heads from page 17, but I do not see any brain on page 17. However, there are still the claims about '[y]our brain' and 'your brain' on the left side page.

Your brain does many things.

You use your brain to remember.

You remember the alphabet

and your best friend's face  
and the taste of ice cream  
with your brain.

'Your brain does many things' according to the first sentence on page 16. As 'many things' are not *much* (my emphasis) things, I would like to claim that the number of what '[y]our brain does' is not infinite. For that reason, there is a limitation in the case of 'many things'. Nevertheless, '[y]our brain does' something more than one thing.

'You' in the second sentence is claimed to 'use' there. In order to 'remember', '[y]ou' is claimed to 'use' 'your brain'. In other words, neither 'your brain' nor 'your' 'use[s]' 'your brain' in order to 'remember'. '[U]s[ing]' of 'your brain' is prior to 'remember[ing]'. Nothing is claimed to be 'remember[ed]' in the second sentence. None of 'your brain' and 'your' makes '[y]ou' to 'use' and 'remember'.

In the third sentence, '[y]ou' is claimed to 'remember' three different things: 'the alphabet', 'your best friend's face' and 'the taste of ice cream'. It is not 'your brain' which 'remember[s]' 'the alphabet and your best friend's face and the taste of ice cream'. They are what '[y]ou' 'remember[s]' with the addition of 'your brain'. As 'the alphabet', 'your best friend's face' and 'the taste of ice cream' are what to be 'remember[ed]', I would like to claim that those three are already known to '[y]ou'. There are the letters of the alphabet on page 16. Although 'the alphabet' in the statement is not plural, there are multiple letters around the statement. What '[y]ou remember' 'with your brain' are claimed with different sizes, fonts and colours.

'You' does not 'remember' all the faces or all the friends. 'You' does not 'remember' 'your best friend' either. There is a single 'face' of 'your best friend' which would be 'remember[ed]'. The numbers of 'your best friend' and 'face' which belongs

to 'your best friend' are all singular. I read that there are a girl, a boy and a dog on page 17. The numbers of faces on page 17 are all singular. I would like to claim that a girl, a boy and a dog could be read as 'your best friend' although the number of them are three. Since it is a single 'face' which is claimed to be 'remeber[ed]', it would be one of those three's faces which would be a memory of '[y]ou'.



'You' does not 'remember' all the tastes. 'You' in the third sentence does not 'remember' any ice creams either. '[I]ce cream' is part of 'the taste' and 'the taste of ice cream' is what to be 'remember[ed]' with the addition of 'your brain'. '[T]he taste of ice cream' would be 'the taste of ice cream' as long as '[y]ou remember[s]' it 'with your brain'. On page 17, there are two hands of a girl. From reading two hands, I also read fingers, spoon and ice cream. In addition, by reading the black line on the face of a girl, I read that there is a tongue on the face of a girl. Although, a girl does not taste or eat anything, I read that there is an idea of tasteness. I do not read 'the taste of ice cream with your brain' from a boy and a dog. Therefore, I read two different 'remember[ing]' from looking at one frame. In other words, I read 'remember[ing]' of 'your best friend's

face' and 'the taste of ice cream' from a girl. As a girl is whom '[y]ou remember[s]' with 'your brain', I read that a girl is retrospective likewise the statement.

'You' and 'your brain' are neither the picture of ice cream nor the spoon. 'You' and 'your brain' are also not a bench, a boy and a dog. I do not see the picture of 'your brain' on page 16 and page 17. Although I do not see the picture of 'your brain', the picture on both pages are still about 'remember[ing]' of '[y]ou' with 'your brain' and 'us[ing]' 'your brain'.

The brain and remembering are not only the issue that appear in *Use Your Brain*. I have found and read some other books which were written about memory, learning, understanding and remembering in relation to the brain. For example, in 'Relationships and Distinctions among the Concepts of Attention, Memory, and Executive Function', Robin D. Morris states that '[o]ver the years, there has been a trend in the field of learning disabilities [...]'.<sup>147</sup> '[A] trend in the field of learning disabilities' has not happened only for a year. '[A] trend', in that sense, has lasted for multiple 'years'. During '[o]ver the years', 'a trend' in the case of 'the field of learning disabilities' was not changed according to the statement because there was still 'a' single 'trend'.

In 'Relationships and Distinctions among the Concepts of Attention, Memory, and Executive Function', 'the measures frequently used to study children with learning disabilities have not been developed for children, but have been adapted from work with adults with little regard for their differences'.<sup>148</sup> '[C]hildren with learning disabilities' are the subject for the 'study[ing]' and there are 'the measures' which have been 'used' and 'developed'. As there is 'frequently' within the statement, there should be a

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<sup>147</sup> Robin D. Morris, 'Relationships and Distinctions among the Concepts of Attention, Memory, and Executive Function' in *Attention, Memory, and Executive Function* ed. by G. Reid Lyon and Norman A. Krasnegor (Baltimore and London: 1996), p. 11.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

moment when ‘the measures’ have not been ‘used to study children with learning disabilities’. Then, except for ‘frequently’, ‘the measures’ might not have been ‘used’ at all. In other words, ‘the measures’ might have been ‘used’, but might not have been ‘used’ for ‘*study[ing]*’ (also my emphasis). In other words, ‘the measures’ might have been ‘used to study’, but not for studying ‘children with learning disabilities’. ‘[L]earning’ and ‘study’ are different from each other for the perspective on the statement because ‘children with learning disabilities’ are not the ones who ‘study’ with ‘the measures’. ‘[L]earning’ is something which is ‘with’ ‘children’, but ‘study’ is not *with* (my emphasis) ‘children’ although ‘study[ing]’ is something ‘used to study’ these ‘children’.

In Morris’ statement, there are two different ‘children’: one is ‘children with learning disabilities’ and the other is ‘children’. Morris does not mention children *without* (my emphasis) ‘learning disabilities’. If there are ‘learning disabilities’ in the case of ‘children’, it seems that those ‘children’ are ‘with’ these ‘learning disabilities’. In Morris’ chapter, there are claims about ‘adults’, but there is no adult who is *with learning disabilities* or *learning without disabilities* (both my emphases). Does that mean ‘adults’ are someone who are not related with ‘learning disabilities’ and ‘learning’?

Instead of ‘be[ing] developed for children’, ‘the measures’ ‘have been adapted from work with adults’. ‘[T]he measures’ are claimed to ‘be[en] developed’ *for* (also my emphasis) ‘children’. However, there is no development when ‘the measures’ ‘have been adapted from work with adults’. In addition, nothing is *for* (my emphasis) ‘adults’. What has been claimed ‘with adults’ is ‘adapted from work’, but ‘with little regard for their differences’. The differences are neither with ‘children’ nor with ‘children with learning disabilities’. There was ‘regard for their differences’ in the case of ‘work with adults’ although it was ‘little regard’. However, ‘regard for their differences’ is not for

all ‘adults’. Then, ‘adults’ who were not ‘work with’ would not be the ones who ‘re-  
gard[ed] for their differences’. There are other ‘adults’ who are excluded from  
‘adapt[ation]’ in that sense. Although there was no ‘develop[ment]’ from ‘children’ by  
‘frequently us[ing]’ ‘the measures’, the perspective on ‘children’ or ‘children with  
learning disabilities’ has a knowledge that there might be ‘develop[ment]’ ‘for chil-  
dren’.

There is a statement about ‘[m]easurement tools’ in the next paragraph: ‘Meas-  
urement tools can be considered as the ultimate “translators” of our verbal/linguistic  
concepts and constructs into the scientific language of numbers which can then be in-  
vestigated using the tools of mathematics’.<sup>149</sup> ‘Measurement tools’ are not for ‘chil-  
dren’, ‘children with learning disabilities’ and ‘adult’ in that sentence. ‘Measurement  
tools’ do not measure. ‘[C]onsider[ing]’ ‘[m]easurement tools’ ‘as the ultimate “the  
translators” of our verbal/linguistic concepts and constructs into the scientific language  
of numbers’ is claimed with a possibility. In other words, there is a possibility that  
‘[m]easurement tools’ cannot be ‘considered’ as such. ‘[T]he ultimate “translators”’ are  
not for ‘children with learning disabilities’ and ‘children’. ‘[T]he ultimate “translators”’  
do not belong to ‘our’ whereas ‘verbal/linguistic concepts’ are ‘our’”s. There are two  
different ‘concepts’ and ‘constructs’ which are ‘verbal’ and ‘linguistic’. For the per-  
spective on the statement above, ‘verbal’ and ‘linguistic’ are not the same concept and  
construct. ‘[C]oncepts’ and ‘constructs’, in that sense, are also not the same thing be-  
cause each of them is claimed with ‘our verbal/linguistic’. Furthermore, ‘our’ and ‘chil-  
dren with learning disabilities’ (or ‘children’) are not the same – so I do not read that

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

‘our verbal/linguistic concepts and constructs’ belong to ‘children with learning disabilities’ or ‘children’. There are ‘numbers’ which are part of ‘the scientific language’. They ‘can then be investigated using the tools of mathematics’. ‘[T]he scientific language of numbers’ cannot ‘be investigated using the tools of mathematics’ unless ‘the ultimate “translators” of our verbal/linguistic concepts and constructs’ are ‘into’ that ‘the scientific language of numbers’. Then, ‘[m]easurement tools’ might not be ‘considered as the ultimate “translators” of our verbal/linguistic concepts and constructs’ if there is no ‘into the scientific language of numbers’.

There is a question, ‘[w]hy do we need such test-derived translations?’<sup>150</sup> Then, ‘[w]e need them because verbal labels and definitions are, owing to the limited specificity of language in general, not clearly delineated at the level necessary for evaluation within a scientific enterprise’ is followed.<sup>151</sup> ‘[W]e’ in the question did not ask the question and ‘[w]e’ did not answer to that question. It is the perspective on ‘we’ and ‘[w]e’ who asks and answers about ‘such text-derived translations’. There are the multiple ‘test-derived translations’ which are claimed to be ‘need[ed]’. ‘We need them’ not because ‘test-derived translations’ are something to do with ‘children’ or ‘children with learning disabilities’. ‘[S]uch test-derived translations’ are ‘need[ed]’ because ‘verbal labels and definitions are’ ‘not clearly delineated at the level necessary for evaluation within a scientific enterprise’. In the case of ‘verbal’, there are ‘labels and definitions’ and these are not ‘clearly delineated’. Although ‘verbal labels and definitions’ are ‘delineated’, they are not ‘clearly delineated’ particularly ‘at the level necessary for evaluation within a scientific enterprise’. Does that mean if ‘verbal labels and definitions’

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p. 12.



were ‘delineated’ at the other levels, ‘verbal labels and definitions’ could be ‘clearly delineated’? ‘Owing to the limited specificity of language in general’, ‘verbal labels and definitions are’ ‘not clearly delineated at the level necessary for evaluation within a scientific enterprise’. That ‘language’ which is claimed after ‘[o]wing to the limited specificity’ is ‘in general’. Not all the languages are ‘in general’. It is neither *a* nor *the* (both my emphases) language which is claimed to be ‘in general’. ‘[L]anguage in general’ is part of ‘the limited specificity’. The perspective on the statement has different ideas for each of ‘language in general’ and ‘the limited specificity’ because 1. ‘the limited specificity’ is not in anywhere, 2. it is ‘the’ ‘limited specificity’, 3. ‘the limited specificity’ is not general ‘specificity’ although ‘language in general’ is part of it. There is a single ‘language’ which is ‘in general’ and also a single ‘limited specificity’. However, to what extent is ‘language’ in the boundary of ‘general’? To what extent would ‘specificity’ be ‘limited’ as ‘specificity’? There is ‘evaluation’ which is ‘within a scientific enterprise’. ‘[E]valuation’ is not ‘within’ any enterprises in that sense; it is a singular ‘enterprise’ which is ‘scientific’. ‘[E]valuation’ is not ‘scientific’ whereas ‘a scientific enterprise’ is. If ‘evaluation’ is not ‘within a scientific enterprise’ or if there is no ‘level’ which is ‘necessary for evaluation within a scientific enterprise’, ‘verbal labels and definitions’ would be still ‘not clearly delineated’.

Later, in the text,

‘[a] review of the articles within these journals indicated that there were over 25 different measures described as attentional in nature, 15 different measures of memory and learning, and over 20 different measures of executive functions

(typically described as problem-solving skills) for the individualized assessment of school-age children.<sup>152</sup>

There are ‘different measures’ claimed with different numbers. ‘[D]ifferent measures’ are repeated for three times, but each ‘different measures’ are different from each other; the first ‘measures’ are ‘described as attentional in nature’, but the latter two ‘measures’ are not *described as* (my emphasis) such; the second ‘measures’ are ‘measures of memory and learning’ and the number is 15; the third ‘measures’ are ‘measures of executive functions’ ‘for individualized assessment of school-age children’ and the number is ‘over 20’.

There are two different ways of reading ‘for the individualized assessment of school-age children’ and its previous part from Morris. The first way is that ‘measures described as attentional in nature’ and ‘measures of memory and learning’ are also ‘for the individualized assessment of school-age children’ with ‘measures of executive functions’. The second way is that only ‘measures of executive functions’ are ‘for the individualized assessment of school-age children’. Whichever are ‘for the individualized assessment of school-age children’, these are the ‘measures’ for measuring ‘attentional in nature’, ‘memory and learning’ or ‘executive functions (typically described as problem-solving skills)’ of ‘school-age children’. For the perspective on the statement, something about ‘school-age children’ can be ‘measure[d]’ by ‘different measures’. In addition, ‘school-age children’ are part of ‘the individualized assessment’ when they are claimed with ‘different measures’. ‘[D]ifferent measures’ are ‘individualized’ ‘for’ ‘assess[ing]’ the multiple ‘school-age children’, but to what extent is ‘the individualized

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

assessment' 'individualized' as an 'assessment'? '[T]he individualized assessment' is not for any 'children'. If children are not 'school-age[d]', then 'measures' are not 'for' these children. In addition, what are 'school-age children'? To what extent are 'children' 'school-age[d]'?

Morris also states that '[i]n many of these domains, the data suggest that children's attentional, memory, and executive functions improve with age. As children develop, they become more accurate, they process information more quickly, and they are better able to handle information of increasing complexity in an increasingly automated manner.'<sup>153</sup> It seems 'attentional, memory, and executive functions' are something to be grouped together when they are claimed with 'children'. It is not 'children' who claim about 'children's attentional, memory, and executive functions'. It is 'the data' which 'suggest' about 'children'. According to 'the data', there are 'attentional, memory, and executive functions' which belong to 'children' and they 'improve with age'. Again, in that statement from Morris, 'children' are claimed with the 'age'. It is not 'children' themselves who 'improve'. '[I]mprov[ing] with age' of 'children's attentional, memory, and executive functions' is not only the suggestion of 'the data' but also something which is '[i]n many of these domains'. Out of 'many of these domains', there might be no 'data' which 'suggest that children's attentional, memory, and executive functions improve with age'. Does the statement mean that 'children's attentional, memory, and executive functions' would not be 'improve[d]' without 'age'? '[C]hildren develop' and 'they' 'become more accurate', 'process information more quickly' and 'better able to handle information of increasing complexity in an increasingly automated manner'. In other words, without 'develop[ing]', 'they' would not 'become

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

more accurate', 'process information more quickly' and 'better able to handle information of increasing complexity in an increasingly automatized manner'? To what extent is 'develop[ment]' development? '[C]hildren' do not claim that they are developing or have been developed. '[C]hildren' also do not claim that there is no development of 'children'. Does the statement from Morris mean that 'children' are someone who 'develop' no matter who they are? If 'children develop', being 'accurate', 'process information', being 'able to handle information of increasing complexity in an increasingly automatized manner' will be 'more' or 'better'. It seems there would be no one who would not be less 'accurate' (or not 'accurate'), 'process information' less 'quickly' (or slowly) and would not be 'able to handle information of increasing complexity in an increasingly automatized manner' if 'children develop'.

In relation to reading the picture of a dog from page 17 in *Use Your Brain*, I will read some part about 'knowledge' in Haken's *Principles of Brain Functioning*. Haken's text divides 'the animal' and 'human' in terms of 'knowledge'. The perspective on 'the animal' and 'human' does not clarify about itself and it seems that the perspective knows about differences between 'the animal' and 'human's' 'knowledge[s]'. What is more, there is 'each individual brain' when Haken describes 'knowledge' of 'humans'. I regarded that Haken's following text is highly related to my reading about the brain and knowing from *Use Your Brain*.

The transfer of knowledge in the animal kingdom is very limited. This is not so between human because of language in the spoken or written form. Thus the enormous advantage that humans have over animals is due to this collective tradition of knowledge that has so far been laid down, in particular, in libraries. At present we are witnessing a new revolution due to the computer. It not only allows us to store

information, but also to process it in a variety of ways. [...] In addition to the internal storage and processing of information in each individual brain, we now have to take into account the external storage and processing of information.<sup>154</sup>

‘[K]nowledge’ and ‘language in the spoken or written form’ are different from each other because it is ‘knowledge’ which is part of ‘[t]he transfer’. In addition, ‘language in the spoken or written’ is not the ‘knowledge’ according to the statement above. There is ‘[t]he transfer of knowledge in the animal kingdom’ although it is ‘very limited’. It is ‘very limited’, but why and how it is ‘very limited’ are not stated in *Principles of Brain Functioning*. Is it ‘very limited’ because there is no language in the case of ‘the animal kingdom’? Is it ‘very limited’ because the language of ‘the animal kingdom’ is not ‘the spoken and written’? Is it ‘very limited’ because there is no ‘form’? Is it ‘very limited’ because something is not ‘between’ ‘the animal kingdom’? Whatever the reasons are, ‘[t]he transfer of knowledge’ is not ‘very limited’ in the case of ‘human’. Although ‘[t]he transfer of knowledge’ ‘between human’ is not ‘very limited’, it is still ‘limited’. ‘Language’ ‘between human’ is ‘in the spoken or written form’. Then, ‘[t]he transfer of knowledge’ ‘between human’ is still ‘limited’.

‘[T]his collective tradition’ does not include ‘language in the spoken or written form’; ‘this collective tradition’ did not collect ‘language in the spoken or written form’ as ‘this collective tradition’. ‘[T]his collective tradition’ is exclusive to some other things. The reason why there is ‘the enormous advantage’ is ‘due to this collective tradition of knowledge’. From ‘[t]he transfer of knowledge’ and the idea of betweenness, ‘knowledge’ is part of ‘this collective tradition’. ‘[T]his collective tradition’ not only

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<sup>154</sup> Hermann Haken, *Principles of Brain Functioning: A Synergetic Approach to Brain Activity, Behavior and Cognition*, pp. 289-90.


has 'knowledge' as its part but also has been 'laid down' 'in libraries'. Both 'knowledge[s]' of 'humans' and 'animals' are 'limited'. However, because of 'the enormous advantage that humans have over animals', 'knowledge' is part of 'this collective tradition' and it is 'in libraries'. Is 'knowledge', which is part of 'this collective tradition', not the knowledge of 'animals' or from 'the animal kingdom'? When 'knowledge' is claimed with 'this collective tradition' 'in libraries', 'knowledge' is not divided like '[t]he transfer of knowledge'.

'[T]he computer' is different from 'libraries' because 'libraries' are neither something 'new' nor 'revolution[ary]' for the perspective on the statement. Before 'present', 'we' might not have witnessed 'a new revolution' because it is '[a]t present' when 'we are witnessing a new revolution'. After '[a]t present', what 'we' are going to 'witness[ing]' is not 'a new revolution' anymore in that sense. If there were no 'computer', 'we' might have not 'witnessing a new revolution'. '[U]s' do not 'store information' and also do not 'process it in a variety of ways' because it is 'the computer' which 'allows us to store information, but also to process it in a variety of ways'. In other words, 'the computer' is prior to 'store information' and 'process it in a variety of ways'; without 'allow[ing]', 'us' would not 'store information' and 'process it in a variety of ways'.


There is 'now' which is with 'we' in the last sentence. '[W]e' are neither 'each' nor 'individual'. '[T]he internal storage and processing of information' is double 'internal' because it is 'internal' one and also claimed to be 'in each individual brain'. Since it is claimed as 'each individual brain', 'the internal storage and processing of information' are all 'in' 'each individual brain'. If there is no 'brain', 'the internal storage and processing of information' might not be 'in' 'individual'. There are 'the external storage and processing of information' which are not 'in each individual brain'. It is

neither 'individual' nor 'brain' who 'take[s] into account the external storage and processing of information' including 'the internal storage and processing of information in each individual brain'. '[T]ak[ing] into account the external storage and processing of information' and 'the internal storage and processing of information in each individual brain' are what 'we' 'have to' do. '[W]e' did not 'have to take into account' these two different 'information[s]' before 'now'. '[N]ow' would be no longer 'now' when the statement is stated. What 'we' 'have to take into account' after 'now' then?

'Your brain does many things' and '[y]ou use[s] your brain to remember': these are 'written with an understanding of how children think'. '[T]hink[ing]' is something to do 'how' and 'an understanding' which was 'written'. In that sense, 'messages' are also something which is 'written with an understanding of how children think'. '[T]he child who eager[s] to know' are 'now' 'planned' to read 'messages'.



A fire truck sounds its siren. The noise comes into your ear.  
The nerves of your ear send messages to your brain.  
You know a fire truck is passing by outside.



Nerves carry messages to your brain from every part of your body:  
from your legs and your ears,  
from your tongue and your nose,  
from your stomach and eyes and the palms of your hands,  
from your arms and your teeth and your toes.

These four pages above are what I read before the two pages about ‘remember[ing]’. There are ‘messages’ on many pages of *Use Your Brain*, but it seems that ‘remember[ings]’ do not have to be claimed with ‘messages’ or ‘message’. ‘A MESSAGE FROM ROMA GANS’ on the blurb of the back cover and ‘messages’ on page nine and page 11 are different messages. They are different not only because of the numbers (the previous one is singular and the latter two are plural), but also because ‘FROM’ on the blurb and ‘to’ on page nine and page 11. In the case of ‘messages’ on page nine, ‘[t]he nerves of your ear send messages to your brain’. ‘[M]essages’ are not *from* (my emphasis) somewhere, someone or something like ‘A MESSAGE’ on the blurb.



The statement of page nine starts with '[a] fire truck sounds its siren'. '[I]ts siren' is the latter of '[a] fire truck'. '[S]iren' belongs to 'its', but '[t]he noise' does not belong to anything and anyone. '[I]ts siren' is not '[t]he noise' itself. The same sound is not the same to everything in the case of page nine. It seems that being '*in*' (also my emphasis) 'your ear' changes '[t]he noise' as something other than '[t]he noise'. Then, 'its siren', which is outside of 'your ear', might not be '[t]he noise' if it is not 'in' 'your ear'. In other words, it might not be '[t]he noise' to 'your' or other sides of 'your'.


'The noise comes into your ear' and '[y]ou know[s]' something about 'outside' because '[t]he nerves of your ear send messages to your brain'. 'The noise' does not 'come into' 'your brain' directly because it is '[t]he noise' which 'comes into' 'your ear'. In addition, it is not 'your ear' which 'send[s] messages to your brain'; there are multiple 'nerves' in the case of 'your ear' and multiple 'messages' will be sent 'to your brain' from 'your ear' by '[t]he nerves of your ear'. If '[t]he nerves of your ear' do not send 'messages to your brain', then '[y]ou' will not 'know a fire truck is passing by outside'.

'You know[s] a fire truck is passing by outside', but it is not what 'your brain', 'your ear' and 'your nerves' know that 'a fire truck is passing by outside'.

'[K]now[ing]' in the statement is limited to '[y]ou'. However, this 'know[ing]' is conditional on 'the nerves of your ear', 'your brain' and 'send[ing] messages'. Without any of these three, '[y]ou' would not 'know' 'a fire truck is passing by outside'.

'[K]now[ing]' of '[y]ou' does not mean that '[y]ou' knows that there is '[t]he noise' which is 'in[side]' of 'your ear', the 'com[ing]' of '[t]he noise' and there is 'its siren' which is 'sound[ed]' from '[a] fire truck'. The knowledge of '[y]ou' in the fourth sentence and what happens in the previous sentences are not the same. According to the knowledge of '[y]ou', '[a] fire truck' is located 'outside' and it is 'passing'. '[A] fire

truck is passing by outside' is what '[y]ou know[s]', so it might not have happened actually. Indeed, there is no claim about '[a] fire truck is passing by outside' from the first to the third sentences.



There are the pictorial fire trucks on page eight and page nine. I read a boy on page eight and I assume that a boy is '[y]ou' who is claimed to 'know a fire truck is passing by outside'. There is a black line with curves (or small circles) on the ear and hand of '[y]ou'. The black line with curves is also on page nine. The frame of '[y]ou' does not exceed page eight, but the black line with curves (or small circles) is on both pages. I read that the black line with curves is from the fire truck and goes to one of two ears because I read them with the text. In the case of reading the picture on page nine, the black line with curves can be read as 'its siren' what '[a] fire truck' is 'sound[ing]'. The sound of a truck is what I read from the black line with curves. In the case of page eight, however, the black line with curves on the ear read differently from the line on page nine. For the reason that the line is within the frame of ear, I read that it is the picture of '[t]he noise'. In addition, since it is also within the frame of '[y]ou', the black line with curves is also what '[y]ou' is 'know[ing]' by the result of '[t]he nerves of your

ear send messages to your brain’. The sound on the picture is what I read from the same line, but they are different sounds due to their different framing on each page.<sup>155</sup>

On top right side of the head, there is a speech bubble. There are fire trucks, houses and people who are smaller than the pictorial ‘[y]ou’. This speech bubble is not a speaking of ‘[y]ou’: According to the last sentence on page nine, it is what ‘[y]ou know[s]’. What ‘[y]ou know[s]’ is not innate too ‘[y]ou’ in the case of picture on page eight. What ‘[y]ou know[s]’ is something I can see and read. What ‘[y]ou know[s]’ is a frame which is smaller than some of the frames on page eight and page nine; for example, it is smaller than the pictorial ‘[y]ou’ and the green square on page eight. As I have already read that ‘the black line with curves is also what [y]ou know[s]’, ‘know[ing]’ of ‘[y]ou’ in the case of the picture can be read from the two different frames.


The fire trucks on page eight and the fire truck on page nine are different from each other. They are different trucks not only because they look different from each other but also because of their frames. The fire truck on page nine is what I read with ‘[a] fire truck sounds its siren’ and ‘[t]he noise comes into your ear’. On the other hand, the fire trucks on page eight are what ‘[y]ou know[s]’. These trucks are the pictorial result of ‘[t]he nerves of your ear send messages to your brain’. Although ‘[y]ou’ is not ‘outside’ of either the green frame or page eight, ‘send[ing] messages to your brain’ makes ‘[y]ou’ ‘know[s] a fire truck is passing by outside’.

On page eight, I cannot see the pictorial ‘[t]he nerves’, but I can read the pictorial ‘your ear’. I also can see the result of ‘[t]he nerves of your ear send messages to

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<sup>155</sup> For more readings and ideas on ‘framing’ and ‘boundary’, see Carole Scott’s ‘Frame-making and Frame-breaking in Picturebooks’ in *New Directions in Picturebook Research*, ed. by Teresa Colomer, Bettina Kümmerling-Meibauer, and Cecilia Silva-Díaz (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 101-12.

your brain’ with the speech bubble on page eight. Instead of finishing this chapter by reading your brain on page nine, I will move on to the following two pages in order to read more about ‘*nerves*’ (also my emphasis). It is due to my curiosity about reading ‘*nerves*’ from the text and the picture.



‘Nerves’ on page 11 are not *the* (my emphasis) ‘[n]erves’. They do not belong to ‘you’. Although there is no ownership, ‘[n]erves’ do something in relation to ‘part’ ‘*of*’ (also my emphasis) ‘your’ ‘*body*’ (also my emphasis); ‘[n]erves’ do not ‘carry messages’ to neither ‘you’ nor ‘body’; where the ‘messages’ are ‘carr[ied]’ is claimed to be ‘your brain’. Wherever ‘[n]erves’ ‘carr[ied]’ ‘from’, it will go ‘to your brain’. For the perspective on page 11, ‘your brain’ is different from ‘part of your body’. ‘[Y]our brain’ is not part of neither ‘part’ nor ‘your body’. ‘[Y]our legs’, ‘your ears’, ‘your tongue’, ‘your nose’, ‘your stomach and eyes and the palms of your hand’, ‘your arms’, ‘your teeth’ and ‘your toes’ are the examples of ‘every part of your body’. As they are ‘every part of your body’, they are not ‘your brain’, ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’. ‘[M]essages’ need ‘[n]erves’ in order to be ‘carr[ied]’. Therefore, I read that ‘[n]erves’ shift

the positions of ‘messages’ when they are claimed with ‘you’. The number of ‘messages’ and ‘[n]erves’ are not specified as such, but it seems there are multiple ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’ for ‘your brain’ and ‘every part of your body’. In other words, ‘your brain’ do not receive only one ‘message’ from ‘every part of your body’.

Two people on page 10 and a dog on page 11 are the pictorial ‘you’ to me. In that sense, these two people and a dog are all claimed with ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’. However, I cannot see any ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’ by reading the pictorial ‘you’. Invisibility of ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’ in the case of the picture does not necessarily mean that there are no ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’ as picture. According to the picture, no matter what ‘you’ does, ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’ are there, ‘every part of your body’ and also ‘your brain’. I do not see that ‘[n]erves’ and ‘messages’ are moving around on the picture. Instead, I see that three ‘you’ who are all different from each other. Three pictorial ‘you’ are not the same. However, as I all read them as ‘you’, they are all claimed with ‘your brain’ and ‘every part of your body’. In other words, there are ‘your brain’ and ‘every part of your body’ in the case of the dog which I also read as ‘you’. The dog which I also read as ‘you’, then, has received ‘messages’ if they were ‘carr[ied]’ by ‘[n]erves’. What I see is the ‘messages’ being ‘carr[ied]’ to ‘your brain’.

Although I am not one of ‘[c]hildren’ who ‘want to be up-to-date’, I read ‘LET’S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS’ because I wished to read and write about them. ‘A MESSAGE’ was not for me, but I tried to read what ‘A MESSAGE’ was. ‘[M]essages’ are the words, the picture which I have not mentioned with colours and lines, something that has been read and something that has been written in this thesis. Although I am not either ‘the young child’ or ‘him’, I would like to claim

that 'LET'S-READ-AND-FIND-OUT SCIENCE BOOKS' were 'brief enough' 'to cope with' and also 'long enough to be challenging' – that is *my* final message.

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