

**UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL**

**INFORMALITIES OF URBAN SPACE, STREET  
TRADING AND POLICY IN THE CITY OF  
BULAWAYO, ZIMBABWE**

**By**

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## **ABSTRACT**

As cities in the global South undergo rapid informalisation, their respective governments have utilised technocratic and modernist “spatial rationalities” to regulate this urban process. Evidently, through use of plans, grids, by-laws, modernist discourses, Bulawayo’s city authorities in Zimbabwe have in past years construed the existence of informality in its city centre as discordant with the aesthetics of a “world class” city. This negative characterisation of Bulawayo’s informal sector is extended to its participants who are normatively described as an “undesirable” and “chaotic” group to be controlled and sometimes excluded from the cityscape. However, this thesis argues that Bulawayo’s deindustrialisation and Zimbabwe’s economic malaise has necessitated the informalisation of urban space which is epitomised by a pronounced presence of street traders on the cityscape. Indeed, Bulawayo’s economic downturn has given some street traders the impetus and legitimacy to violate urban laws and encroach on urban public spaces, remaking them into viable resources to cope with the effects of unemployment.

Consequently, this thesis examines how the informalisation of Bulawayo’s urban space has shaped and reconfigured the “everyday” and “lived” interactions between city authorities and street traders in managing informality. It further seeks to examine how the informalisation of urban space in the context of Bulawayo’s deindustrialisation impacts the way its citizens and city officials understand and reimagine Bulawayo’ urbanity, work, and spatiality.

Using responses extracted from 41 participants comprising street traders, city officials and representatives of civic organizations, the theoretical works of Foucault (1994), Lefebvre (1974), and Gramsci (1971), and historical analysis, the thesis shows that in the context of regulating informality, interactions between city authorities and street traders have been characterised by contestations, negotiations and sometimes collaborations. On one hand, the Bulawayo’s city authorities operating under a politically violent “state” have responded to urban informality with brute force (raids and evictions). On the other hand, Bulawayo’s street traders have resisted these evictions through picketing, litigations, and sit-ins at the mayor’s office to challenge policies that preclude them from realising their right to the city. They have further demonstrated through campaigns and workshops how street trading is crucial to generating household income, promoting work independence and developing a localised solidarity economy.

In negotiating this contested terrain, the thesis demonstrates that Bulawayo's city authorities have sometimes shown sympathy towards the plight of street traders, embraced them as part of the city's urban reality. Further, they recognise the important role street trading plays in sustaining urban livelihood, tackling unemployment and contributing to the city fiscus. As such, Bulawayo's city authorities have revised some of the exclusionary urban planning policies that prevented an integration of informal trade into the mainstream local economy. Additionally, while raids and evictions have been regarded as important methods of managing street trading, Bulawayo city authorities have sought to use other strategies that are less violent and intimidating. This thesis utilises the works of Foucault (1994) on "governmentality" Lefebvre (1974) on "the production of space", and Gramsci on "hegemony and consent" (1971) to argue that in situations where raids have proven to be violent, city authorities have utilised vending bays, discourses of "cleanliness" visually projected on street signs and billboards to control street traders' illegal conduct and contain informality from a distance.

The thesis also argues that the transformation of Bulawayo from being an industrial city to what Mlambo (2017) refers to as a vendor city has also meant that people's perceptions of Bulawayo as a place of work have radically changed. Accordingly, the deindustrialization of Bulawayo coupled with the entrenchment of informality has seen the participants in this study rework their social identities and challenge the meaning of work and urban citizenship. While participants in this study argued that street trading fostered work independence, they noted that income and social insecurity associated with informal work makes them susceptible to poverty. Some participants described street trading as an activity characterised by multiple forms of exclusions such as raids, evictions, and shortages of vending spaces that impede their right to the city.

This thesis also demonstrates that theories of urbanity still require reworking in the context of the global South city to encompass the experiences of crisis and deindustrialisation outside of the rural/urban dyad and the linearity of development that assumes only modernity through industrialisation.

**Keywords:** Informality, space, governmentality, poverty, Zimbabwe

## ACRONYMS

<b>BCC</b>	Bulawayo City Council
<b>BSAC</b>	British Southern African Company
<b>BUTA</b>	Bulawayo Upcoming Traders Association
<b>BVTA</b>	Bulawayo Vendors and Traders Association
<b>CZI</b>	Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
<b>ESAP</b>	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>MDC</b>	Movement for Democratic Change
<b>NVUZ</b>	National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe
<b>RBZ</b>	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
<b>SWITA</b>	Street Wise Traders Association
<b>WOZA</b>	Women of Zimbabwe Arise
<b>ZANU-PF</b>	Zimbabwe African National Unity- Patriotic Front
<b>ZEPARU</b>	Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit
<b>ZCHIEA</b>	Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy
<b>ZIMSTATS</b>	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency
<b>ZRP</b>	Zimbabwe Republic Police

## **DECLARATION- PLAGIARISM**

I, **Danford Tafadzwa Chibvongodze, Student Number: 211551117** declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
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**Student Signature:**

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**Date:** 01 December 2020

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
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**Figure 1: The Map of Zimbabwe and the Location of Bulawayo**



Source: Voice of America (2013).

# CHAPTER ONE: BULAWAYO BURNING: A CITY FACED WITH AN URBAN CRISIS?

## 1.1 Introduction and Background to the Problem

The urban forms and workings of an African city can no longer be defined by technocratic planning parameters of physical infrastructure as they are slowly being redefined by ordinary citizens through everyday lived urban experiences (Pieterse, 2013; Simone, 2004). In light of intensified urban crises, poor urbanites have altered former colonial African urban environments remaking them into informal spaces, where everyday socio-economic transactions that generate stability in urban livelihoods are enacted. Yet, it is disturbing that while informal practises of appropriating urban spaces have been largely responsible for sustaining most of Zimbabwe's unemployed and poor urban populace, the city authorities of Zimbabwe are reluctant to sufficiently integrate such urban processes into urban development policies.

Indeed, current African city authorities appear fixated within a developmentalist mind-set of seeking solutions to urban ills through state-controlled formal ways of producing city spaces (Kihato, 2007; Pieterse, 2013). Instead of seeing informal economic activities as part of the city's infrastructures that ordinary people utilise to cope with urban poverty, they have normally been construed by city planners and bureaucrats alike as disorderly, illegal, "anti-development" and at odds with their aesthetic of cityness. In many cases, the informal practices of producing urban spaces have been met with hostility perpetrated by city bureaucrats thereby disrupting livelihoods (Kihato, 2011; Lourenco-Lindell, 2002; Tostensen et al., 2002). Resorting to former colonial and technocratic spatial rationalities, post-colonial governments have sought to put all of its city spaces within their control, arresting any form of self-appropriation of urban space by ordinary citizens (Huxley, 2006; Miraftab, 2009; Watson, 2009).

The Bulawayo City Council is one such local government institution that has utilised technocratic and modernist "spatial rationalities" to control the informalisation of urban spaces. It has effectively regulated informal activities such as street trading within the cityscape by presenting them as "disorderly", "problematic" and "misplaced". Consequently, this technocratic governance of urban space constructs street traders as "offenders" and an



“undesirable group” in constant need of controlling and monitoring. Much of the city council’s frustrations appear to stem from its inability to effectively contain the ever-growing street trade within the ambit of planned and designated areas. Accordingly, the Bulawayo City Council, through its policing unit, has sought to spatially exclude street traders working outside the confinements of designated grids and trading zones.

The Bulawayo City Council’s responses to informality are however multiple and contradictory. While some of its officials have handled informality with hostility as seen in raids, evictions and confiscation of street traders’ goods, others have embraced it as part of the city’s urban reality. Indeed, city officials that participated in this study recognise the central role street trading play in sustaining urban livelihood, tackling unemployment and contributing to the city fiscus. They have encouraged the Bulawayo City Council to revise its urban planning policies to integrate the informal trade into the mainstream local economy. In recognising the increasing numbers of street traders and the proliferation of the informal sector, the city council is reclaiming unused urban spaces converting them into fully serviced vending sites that caters for street traders’ needs. The demarcating and servicing of new vending sites such as Queens Highlanders Club flea market (see Figure 17), for instance, shows the city council’s commitment to creating inclusive urban environments.

This study reveals that although Bulawayo’s street traders sometimes characterise the city council as being “predatory” to their livelihoods, they seem to be sympathetic to the state’s compromised position when managing informality. Indeed, the Bulawayo City Council is usually conflicted on how to uphold urban bylaws without limiting the economic rights of those violating them. Further, the Bulawayo City Council has involved street traders’ organisations in reformulating some of its archaic bylaws that no longer fit into Bulawayo’s present-day spatial practices. In responding to civil society organisations’ calls to recognise street traders’ economic rights, in 2017, the Bulawayo City Council amended the Urban Councils (Model) (Hawkers and Street Vendors) By-Laws of 1976. As one city official argued, the amended Bulawayo City Council Hawkers, Vendors and Flea Markets By-Laws of 2017 symbolises the council’s obligation to repeal some of the urban policies that impede street traders to realise their socio-economic rights fully. Under the amended Bulawayo City Council Hawkers, Vendors and Flea Markets By-Laws of 2017, the city council has sought to decongest the city centre and cater to the increasing street trading activity by opening new vending sites along the edges of the city.

While in the opening chapter of this thesis, I focus on how the Bulawayo city authorities have implemented a series of exclusionary policies leading to the raiding and eviction of street traders, I also recognise their sympathetic and compassionate acts towards street traders. Indeed, Bulawayo's city authorities sometimes turn a blind eye and choose not to punish street traders that violate the provisions of the Hawkers, Vendors and Flea Markets By-Laws. Therefore, it is misleading and dishonest to simply characterise Bulawayo city authorities as “villains” that are insensitive to the street traders’ plight. I argue that these authorities are not always bent on demonising informality and chastising street traders. This study reveals that city authorities have sometimes adopted policies and decisions that are empathetic to Bulawayo’s urban life’s harsh realities. For instance, one of the city officials who participated in this study argued that sometimes it is atrocious to prevent an already vulnerable group of people from realising their economic rights.

### *1.1.1 The Modern and the Informal City: Conflicting Rationalities*

The city council has discouraged the increase of illegal street trading by tapping into modernist narratives of “cleanliness” and “progress”. These narratives are propagated into the imaginary schema of those needing control, in this instance- street traders. For example, the highly publicised planned development of a mall and transport hub in Bulawayo’s city centre speaks to the council’s effort to regain the city’s status as a collective space of modernity, employment, and progress. Morreira (2010) argues that most Zimbabwean cities have always been imagined as symbols of formal employment, progress, and civilisation. Indeed, the planned construction of the mall and transport hub will serve to re-ignite the Bulawayo City Council’s motto “*Siyе Phambili*” (Let us move forward). This maxim has been crucial in invoking a sense of commitment among city managers and ordinary citizens alike to strive towards achieving progress, development, and modernisation of Bulawayo. The persistent reference of Bulawayo by its figurative “*Ko ntuthu ziyathunqa*” a isiNdebele<sup>1</sup> expression meaning “a city that billows smoke,” serves not only as a reminder of its past as an industrial powerhouse but also of the disappearance of industries in the city of Bulawayo.

Indeed, street traders’ existence within the confines of many cities in the global South has generated a situation of “conflicting rationalities” between city bureaucrats and those occupying informal spaces (Watson, 2009:2267). Smit et al. (2021:32) describe “conflicting

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<sup>1</sup> IsiNdebele is one of Zimbabwe’s official languages and is indigenous to the Northern Ndebele people. It is widely spoken in the Southern part of Zimbabwe (Matabeleland and Midlands).

rationalities” as conflict or mutual incomprehensibility that emanate when “... expert and bureaucratic power/knowledge encounter less visible, but no less assertive, circuits of knowledge and power of groupings of the poor grounded in the particularities of space and place”. In the context of planning, Watson (2009) notes that most cities in the global South are located within the conflicting rationalities characterised by the logic of governing and that of survival. On one hand, exist city planners and technocrats who are located within the rationality and logic of governing space whew. According to Watson (2009: 2268), this logic and rationality is driven by the ideas of modernisation and that of “...creating ‘proper’ communities living and working in “proper” urban environments”. She adds that this technocratic governance of space strives to extend control over outlying informal spaces, reintegrating them into the formal grid. On the other hand, exists marginalised and impoverished urban populations surviving largely under conditions of informality. The logic or rationality that informs these forms of “subaltern” and “informal” urbanism is that of survival (see Chabal, 2010).

Despite relentless efforts by the state to control and regulate African urban spaces by imposing visions of a “planned city”, new urban forms of “subaltern urbanism” have emerged within urban confines where the control of the state is highly concentrated (Bayat, 1997; Kinyanjui, 2013). In Africa, a continent where 50 percent of the economically productive populace is out of formal employment and about 60 percent live in slums, poor urbanites have relied more on the informal sector and spaces to generate income and auto-construct of affordable housing (Murray, 2010; Trefon, 2004; Swilling, 2013). While the state has in most instances, considered urban informality in Bulawayo as a threat to normative spatial rationalities of “order” and “modernity” and “progress”, on one hand, some of the urban poor has seen it as an alternative pathway out of poverty and precarity. On the other hand, some of the urbanite as this thesis shall show in Chapter 7 identify informality with precarity, desperation and continued susceptibility to poverty.

This “conflicting rationalisation” of urban informality has manifested in the outward contestation over urban space between technocrats and the subalterns. Subaltern and street traders’ groups such as Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), Bulawayo Agenda, National Vendors Union Zimbabwe (NVUZ) and the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCHIEA) have been at loggerheads with the Ministry of Local Government over its forceful removal of street traders from the urban centres. To lessen the number of informal traders operating illegally in the major cities of Zimbabwe, the state issued an eviction

ultimatum in early 2015, which culminated in a recent militarised eviction of street traders in Harare. Although the Bulawayo City Council has sometimes been sympathetic to street traders' plight, they intend to evict traders from an essential urban node to make way for the construction of a mall.

There are several studies on informality and contestation over urban land in Zimbabwe (see Kamete, 2009; Magure, 2014; Musoni, 2010; Ndiweni et al., 2014) that attempts to theorise these contestations within discourses of the knowledge, power, politics and the production of space. Seirlis' (2004) brilliant work on space and belongingness of the coloured people<sup>2</sup> in Zimbabwe interrogates how power and knowledge were utilised by the Rhodesian government to produce social relations that excluded Africans from city spaces. She powerfully argues that racial and spatial sensibilities worked together not only to exclude the native African from having full claim to urban space but also to create "...a moral capital for legitimizing a particular political and social order" (Seirlis, 2009: 408).

However, Bulawayo's black residents resisted these exclusionary political and social processes, the "*Zhii*" urban riots of 1960 (see Nehwati, 1970:251) is but one example where residents rallied against discriminatory colonial urban laws.

In this study, I engage the works of Lefebvre (1991), Foucault (1994) and Gramsci (1971) to theorise current tensions over urban space that exist between Bulawayo city authorities and street traders. This thesis traces these conflicts back to the historical and colonial production of urban space in Bulawayo. It asserts that the discriminatory serialisation of identity (race, ethnicity) onto city spaces during the colonial period polarised the "positionality" and "belongingness" of black bodies with the urban space.

It is this polarisation that informs postcolonial city authorities in Zimbabwe and Bulawayo to systematically evict and exclude informal traders from accessing urban spaces. For instance, in 2017 one of Bulawayo's prominent street traders' organisations, the Bulawayo Vendors and Traders Association (BVTA), called out the Bulawayo City Council for using archaic colonial by-laws in governing the current operations of street traders. They appealed for the repealing of the *Urban Councils (Model) (Hawkers and Street Vendors) By-Laws of 1976* as its provisions were promulgated under an unjust colonial system. It further maintained that the council's lack of urgency in revising bylaws enacted under a discriminatory colonial system

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<sup>2</sup>In the Zimbabwean context, "coloured people" refers to those that are of mixed race.

continues to exclude street traders from exercising their right to the city. Although later in 2017, the Bulawayo City Council amended the *Urban Councils (Model) (Hawkers and Street Vendors) By-Laws of 1976*, the BVTA felt that these amendments were cosmetic and fail to fully integrate informal economic activities into Bulawayo's urban economy (BVTA, 2018; Bulawayo24, 2017).

The implementation of “*Operation Murambatsvina*”/ Restore Order in 2005, is another example of how the Zimbabwean government like its colonial predecessors used discourses of “dirt” and “diseases” to exclude certain residents from the city (Dorman, 2015). In Chapter 2, 3 and 8, I discuss in detail how tropes of “dirt” and “disease” have shaped the production of space, politics and the construction of urban citizenship in Zimbabwe.

It is worth noting that the production of space in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe also interacted with the appropriation of “occupational identities”. On one hand, for the black African, the city meant a place of formal industrial work and not necessarily a place of permanent residence. Cities also came to symbolise a livelihood of wage employment and capitalist-consumptionist societal values that identified with the formal labour system, stylish clothing, and other forms of “civilisation” (Castillo, 2003; Seirlis, 2009:408). On the other hand, informal occupations such as street trading and subsistence farming were considered as an aberration to the idea of a modern city. They were seen by city planners as conflicting with ideal urban forms and an epitome of rural life not matched with European urbanity (see Murray, 2011:52). The rapid informalisation of urban space in the city of Bulawayo should have an impact on how its citizen re-constructs their “occupational identities” more importantly, when the number of formal jobs has gradually declined. I am particularly interested in how urban spaces are utilised or assist the ordinary urbanites in dealing with the transitioning of Bulawayo from being an industrial economic powerhouse to becoming a highly informalised and precarious city. The thesis investigates how the informalisation of space and changes in urbanity in Bulawayo intersects with what Chabal (2010:3) refers to as “the politics of survival” and agency among the urban poor.

Furthermore, the thesis intends to examine the effect informality has on the street traders' perception of urban spaces and the city in relation to their bodies, imaginations, survival, and livelihoods. While on one hand, the thesis investigates how the Bulawayo City Council has interpreted the increasing number of street traders operating outside designated areas. On the other hand, the thesis further explores the various methods the city council has adopted to

control the informalisation of urban space and the activity of street trading. The other purpose of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of some of the tactics and socio-political processes that have been adopted by street traders' associations and civic organisations in response to the city council's spatial control techniques. The next section of this provides a contextual background of the present battle over urban space that exists between the city fathers, civic organisation and street traders.

### *1.1.2 "Bulawayo Burning": Contesting Urban Spaces in Precarity*

The phrase "Bulawayo burning" has been used metaphorically by Ranger (2010) and Vera (1998) to describe Bulawayo's degeneration into a state of violence and protest in the 1960s. It further alludes to the *Zhii* riots of 1960 that took place in the township of Makokoba, in which black Africans staged protests against the exclusionary urban practices of the colonial city council (Ranger, 2010).

In 2013, the Bulawayo City Council issued a public notice informing street vendors operating along Batch and Lobengula Street of their imminent evictions and relocation. These evictions were to make way for the proposed construction of a state-of-the-art mall and a regional transport hub. The Bulawayo City Council initially set the eviction date for the 30<sup>th</sup> of December 2013. However, due to delays in contract negotiations between the council and the prospective construction company, the evictions were eventually implemented in 2018, five years after the initial pronouncement of the Egodini project. It was revealed in the contractual agreements that Terracotta Trading, a South African based construction firm, is to oversee the development of the mall. Terracotta is expected to invest between US\$ 52 to US\$ 56 million into this infrastructural development project (Shumba, 2015).

This proposed development of the multi-million-dollar mall at the Batch Terminal Rank is informed by narratives of "progress", "modernity," and "cleanliness" that continually shape Bulawayo's technocratic urban processes. Its architects envisage that the construction of the mall and transport hub is likely to provide Bulawayo with much-needed formal employment. Informal traders are also set to benefit from this new mall which is expected to house close to 750 modern, clean and safe vending stalls to be situated on the mall's roof and basement. At least 250 of the vending stalls will be situated in the basement, strategically maximizing the vendors' exposure to the flow of human traffic (Bulawayo24, 2013). The proposed modernised mall and transport terminal further consists of loading and off-loading bays capable of handling at least 20 cross border buses and 75 commuter taxis.

While the anticipated construction of the mall and transport hub is likely to bring development and create new jobs, it has sparked outrage from street traders and civil organisations that represents the interests of the urban poor. The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCHIEA), Bulawayo Agenda and WOZA have condemned the imminent evictions and relocation of street traders. Its officials are concerned that the council has not effectively communicated with street traders about the relocation sites. They argue that failure to provide temporary sites while the mall is under construction will have dire consequences on the livelihoods of the already economically marginalized street traders. The ZCHIEA has further contended that the mall development project is top-down with less room for consultation and involvement of street traders in this urban development process (Mberengwa, 2015).

Debates have also emerged among street traders and their representatives about the allocation and licensing of the vending stalls. There is still no clarity on what criteria will apply in the selection of traders to be placed in the new stalls. Moreover, the ZCHIEA is concerned that the cost of leasing the spaces may increase, street vendors are currently paying US\$ 2.40 per day which they consider to be exorbitant (Mberengwa, 2015). The question then is: can the proposed development of the mall and transport hub in Bulawayo be understood as yet another form of “accumulation by dispossession” set out by big corporations to make profits from public urban spaces? Harvey (2004:47) defines “accumulation by dispossession” as the “...commodification and privatization of land... conversion of various forms of property rights – common, collective, state, etc. – into exclusive private property rights”. The processes of “accumulation by dispossession” ultimately leads to “...suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative, indigenous, forms of production”.

The encroachment of street trading on the city’s metropolises has generated clashes between street traders and the state. While it was expected that the resigning of President Robert Mugabe in 2017 would facilitate the democratisation of urban spaces, the government of Zimbabwe’s “second republic” under the leadership of Emmerson Mnangagwa has intensified its raids and evictions of street traders across major cities. For instance, in December 2017, barely two weeks after Mugabe’s forced removal, President Mnangagwa’s government implemented “Operation Restore Sanity”, in which the army forcibly removed street traders operating from “undesigned” vending spots (Thornycroft, 2017). Those directly affected by “Operation Restore Sanity” viewed the clean-up exercise as disruptive to urban livelihoods and a violation

of their constitutional right to earn a living. The implementation of “Operation Restore Sanity” was followed by yet another militarised eviction of street traders conducted soon after the general elections of 2018. Commenting on the motive behind the unleashing of forced displacement and eviction of street traders, various activists and opposition leaders argued that evictions conducted after the 2018 elections were a form of political retribution for those urbanites that voted against ZANU-PF. This was a repeat of a similar governance logic that motivated *Murambatsvina*.

In criticizing the politically motivated evictions of street traders across Zimbabwe’s urban centres, the leader of the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe, Stan Zvorwadza, decried the military clampdown on vendors, arguing that political leaders; “[...] should not exhibit ‘sour grapes tendencies’, they should lead by example and try to unite the people no matter who they voted for [...]” (Independent Online, 2018:np). For some civil leaders and street traders’ associations, “Operation Restore Sanity” evoked painful memories of the 2005 Operation *Murambatsvina* (say no to dirt), where the Mugabe regime evicted and violently removed those working in the informal sector and domiciled in informal settlements from urban spaces.

In Bulawayo's context, politically charged evictions of street traders have been countered by urban social movements that have called for the government’s tolerance towards informal work and the precariousness emanating from the Zimbabwean economic malaise. For instance, on 24 June 2015, a Bulawayo based social movement, Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) mobilised street traders and convened at the mayor’s office to oppose a national eviction ultimatum set by then Minister of Local Government, Ignatius Chombo. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of June 2015, the local government minister, in close consultation with high ranking officials of the national army and police, issued a 7-day ultimatum to urban municipalities to remove informal traders and street vendors operating from undesignated sites. He then tasked the municipalities to take measures to decongest the cities by finding alternative vending sites outside the central business district. The former local government minister challenged the presence of uncontrolled street trading and vending in urban areas, arguing that it posed a threat to the orderliness and health standards of a city. In many instances, he asserted that unregulated street vending not only affected urban aesthetics but also disrupted pedestrian flow on pavements and operations of formal businesses. For example, during the 73rd Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ) annual general meeting held in Bulawayo in February 2015, Ignatius Chombo, is quoted by the Bulawayo24 News, one of Bulawayo’s leading digital newspapers, as having said:



[...] the upsurge of indiscriminate vending in urban areas has acutely affected the ambience of our environs while compromising the health of the residents [...] vendors are selling their wares from everywhere including on pavements, open spaces and in front of shops (Bulawayo24, 2015:np).

While the above excerpt depicts an accurate reality of how uncontrolled street vending can affect other space users such as formal businesses and pedestrians, the former Minister was accused by WOZA and other Bulawayo based civil society organisations as seemingly and insensitively oblivious to widespread national unemployment. Accordingly, the increased demand for urban space as an economic resource in cities like Bulawayo seems to emanate from more than a decade long deterioration of Zimbabwe's economic and political processes (Alexander, 2003: 94; Potts, 2010:89; Sachikonye et al., 2007). The city of Bulawayo is yet to recuperate from its massive de-industrialisation.

A city once revered for its employment-creating industries, Bulawayo is now reeling from closure of factories resulting in an unemployed populace and reduced household income (Mills, 2012). While the Zimbabwe census of 2012 puts Bulawayo's official unemployment rate at 20 percent, commentators have argued otherwise, stating that it hovers between 80 and 90 percent.<sup>3</sup> The 2017 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency's (ZIMSTATS) "Poverty analysis" report indicated that the poverty line datum for an average family in Bulawayo was US\$556,50 (Zimstats, 2017). This poverty line datum is above the wages of most Zimbabweans who earn an average of US\$ 100 per month (Standard, 2019). For households with unemployed heads, this has translated to an increase in susceptibility to urban poverty and food insecurity.

The appalling economic and political conditions have provided a fertile ground for the growth of informality and street trading in Bulawayo. The collapse of Zimbabwe's formal sector has left about 5 million people dependent on the informal sector (Murwira, 2014). Zimbabwe is sometimes described as a country of vendors (Kamhungira, 2014), where people try to sell anything to survive. Street vending has become engraved in Zimbabwe's urban aesthetic. It is slowly being accepted by the urban poor and academics elsewhere as Zimbabwe's real economy.

Jones (2010) describes this new type of street economy as a "*Kukiya kiyi*" economy. The Shona term '*Kukiya kiyi*' has come to mean multiple forms of 'making do' that people pursue to

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<sup>3</sup> There is a general disagreement on Zimbabwe's official unemployment rate. The government and international organisations such as the International Labour Organisation have claimed the unemployment rate of Zimbabwe to be sitting at 5%. This has been disputed by leaders from trade unions, civil societies and opposition parties who suggest that the unemployment rate of Zimbabwe is somewhere between 80% and 90%.

survive economic pressures. It is usually associated with the informal economy. It encapsulates any necessary activity that anyone engages in “to get by” or “survive the day”. The “*Kukiya kiya*” economy permitted urbanites to suspend and circumvent the formal economy’s workings and ordering and set up their urbanity (Jones, 2010). For instance, supermarkets’ “emptiness” in 2008 forced urban dwellers to re-align their urban consumption practices away from the supermarkets to vendors operating on street pavements, who at that time stocked food commodities not available in shops.

Consequently, the prevailing politico-economic crisis and increasing poverty in Zimbabwe has given local urbanites the impetus and legitimacy to transform urban spaces into spaces of survival. Moreover, the changing of urban space through informalisation guarantees that poor urbanites can claim their “right to the city”. Harvey (2008:23) writes that the right to the city “[...] is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city”. For him, the city’s transformation and the reshaping of urbanisation processes can only be achieved when individuals engage in the reinterpretation of the meaning of urbanity and its iconographies.

In Chapter 7 of this thesis, I argue that the rapid informalisation of Bulawayo has led to some urbanites to question the relevance of modernity and cityness in the context of Bulawayo. For example, the presence of informal activities like subsistence farming in the city of Bulawayo is widely interpreted by urban locals as indicating the vanishing of cityness, since in Zimbabwe subsistence farming is regarded as a rural activity. In such a case, the ruralisation of Bulawayo as a city through subsistence farming has required urbanites to reconfigure in their collective memories of what urbanity is and what it represents (Chibvongodze, 2013; also see Morreira, 2010). Renegotiating the meaning of modernity and cityness in a rapidly informalising urban environment has also involved Bulawayo’s urbanites coming into terms with the “precarisation” of urban livelihoods. The term “precarisation” has its origin in the works of Standing (2011:16). He uses the term to describe a process by which one is subjected to economic pressures that lead to a lack of steady employment, income, and “...a secure work-based identity” (Standing, 2011:9).

Subsequently, the expansion of Bulawayo’s informal sector has coincided with the emergence of a new urban social class – “the precariat”. Indeed, the growing number of street vendors and informal traders in Bulawayo can be identified with the “precariat”. It is important to note that

while street trading lessens urban poverty levels, Bulawayo's street traders, like any other precariat, still experience incidences of income insecurity, exploitation, marginality, and feelings of relative deprivation (see Bayat 2000 and Standing 2011). Such experiences of “precarity” by Bulawayo informal traders stand in contrast to the very few urbanites that still occupy full formal employment and receive a stable monthly income. While this “precarity” of Bulawayo urbanites will continue to increase the demand for urban space (Brown, 2001), it is unsettling that the informal appropriation of space by the urban poor is repressed sometimes with brutal force (Potts, 2006: 291; Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; Kamete, 2009; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010; Musoni, 2010). Within waves of state led violence, this violence against street traders is also linked to wider patterns of state violence where ZANU-PF exert their violent control. Linked to the violent characterisation of the Zimbabwean state and uniformed services (see, Sachikonye, 2011).

## **1.2 Research Objectives**

My thesis builds upon Zimbabwe’s politico-economic meltdown trajectory that seem to have contributed to the informalisation of Bulawayo’s urban spaces, transforming the city’s urban processes and how “modernity” is perceived. By using street trading as the prism through which I examine informality and urban change, the main aim of this study is to examine how the informalisation of Bulawayo’s urban space has shaped and reconfigured the “everyday” and “lived” interactions between city authorities and street traders in managing informality.

The other objectives that guides are that of utilising street trading as a unit to examine the political, economic and social processes that have driven the informalisation of Bulawayo’s urban space and labour. Additionally, by using street trading as a frame of understanding the informalisation of space and labour, the study further examines the “everydayness” and “lived experiences” of street trading in Bulawayo. To this end, it specifically sheds light on how street trading enables and sometimes disables the lives of those involved in it. Moreover, it delves into how street trading has altered how they perceive urbanity, work, and spatiality. The study also intends to gain insights into how city authorities have used bylaws and other spatial control technologies to handle the intensification of informality in Bulawayo. To this effect, the study is also interested in how street traders have responded to the urban laws and technologies of spatial governance that seek to control informality and the production of urban space.

The study thus seeks:

1. To examine the perceived political, economic, and social processes drivers of informalisation of urban space and labour in Bulawayo.
2. To explore the “everydayness”, “lived experiences” and “subjectivity” of street trading in Bulawayo, particularly how it enables or disables the lives of those involved in it.
3. To examine how the informalisation of urban space and labour shapes how “spatiality”, “urbanity” and “work” are construed and reimagined.
4. To analyse the policies and technologies of spatial control that the city authority employs in handling street trading and informality in Bulawayo.
5. To explore how street traders have responded to how the Bulawayo city authority handles informality.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

To achieve the above-mentioned research objectives and provide direction to this research process, the study will address the following main research question:

- How does the informalisation of Bulawayo’s urban space shape and reconfigure the “everyday” and “lived” interactions between city authorities and street traders in managing informality?

The main research question is supported by another set of five sub-questions which are as follows:

1. What are the perceived political, economic, and social processes drivers of the informalisation of urban space and labour in Bulawayo?
2. What do the everyday lived experiences of street trading look like?
  - a) How does street trading enhance or disable the livelihoods of those involved in it?
3. How does the increase of street trading and the rapid informalisation of space and labour in Bulawayo shapes how “spatiality, “urbanity” and “work” are construed and re-imagined?
4. What policies and technologies of spatial control has the city authority of Bulawayo utilised in urban spaces in the context of increased street trading and urban informality?
5. How do street traders respond to the policies and methods of spatial control enacted by the city authority to regulate urban informality?

## **1.4 Rationale and Significance of Study**

My Master's dissertation largely influenced the desire to conduct this study. In my Master's dissertation (see Chibvongodze, 2013), I explored how the emergence of subsistence farming, an activity commonly practised in rural areas at Bulawayo's urban margins has allowed citizens to reproduce urban spaces and re-imagine a city informed by their localised everyday experience. The Master's dissertation introduced me to complex and yet fascinating texts on radical urban theory; I read the works of Lefebvre (1974), Simone (2008), Mbembe and Nuttal (2008), and Soja (1989). These intellectuals drew me closer to the field of radical urban theory and critical geography. At the end of the Master's degree, I felt that I had not fully engaged with the discourses of radical and critical urbanism. The desire to gain a deeper understanding of radical urban theory compelled me to continue to delve more into the politics of Bulawayo's spatiality, only now in a different context. I shift my focus away from the urban farmer to the street trader.

Compared to urban farmers who "unlawfully" occupy urban land on the city's margins, the street traders of Bulawayo tend to appropriate space located within the city's central business district. Consequently, their appropriation of central urban spaces allows them to be in frequent contact with city officials and as already stated this leads to fierce contestations over urban space, raids and evictions of street traders. In responding to raids and evictions, Bulawayo's street traders have converted cityscapes into "spaces of defiance" by mobilising themselves and challenging policies and practices that preclude them from accessing urban resources. In this power of self-mobilisation, I find street traders an interesting group to study and project some of the underpinnings of radical urbanism and critical geography in Bulawayo's informal urban processes. Indeed, street traders are at the forefront of "cyborg urbanism" and "chameleon urbanism" (Chapter 4 and Chapter 8) that remake everyday urban imaginaries, symbols, and identities outside a dominant modernist and technocratic interpretation of cities.

The study is significant to the field of critical urban studies scholarship in three ways. Firstly, this study of Bulawayo's urbanity contributes to emerging theoretical realms on African urban assemblages and insurgent forms that are at odds with the visions of a planned and ordered city. This research contributes to urban scholarship by generating new empirical and theoretical understanding of alternative infrastructural geographies, and how these conditions and shape the patterns of urban development emerging in African cities. This research validates an

optimistic interpretation of African cities. Amidst their uneven physical infrastructure and poor service delivery, ordinary African people have come to where the city has failed to create sophisticated social infrastructures and transitional informal spaces that make cities work. This research hopes to add to the growing literature on Afrocentric urban theory that recognises poor people as vital urban infrastructures in their own right.

Secondly, the study argues that urban transition in Africa can only come full circle when ordinary urban dwellers are seen as “city planners” and “architects” in their own right, who, through informal ways of producing space are capable of creating infrastructures similar to those of modernized networked cities. Indeed, the potential of urban development in African cities is located within “informal urbanism”, where the invisible web of social networks, living vitalities, and fluid everyday socio-economic transactions among local urbanites enables them to access urban resources. Lastly, this research will help create a platform to unlearn some dominant developmentalist-modernist discourses that paint dystopian images of African cityness as somehow lacking, deficient, and chaotic. This thesis, thus, seeks to redirect the conceptualisation of African urbanity away from notions of a “planned” city to that of a “practised” city, where marginalized urban residents through self-provisioning adopt innovative ways to sustain livelihoods. As such, it contributes to the larger scope and reach of decolonization and postcolonial scholarship which is changing the overall heuristic and epistemology of African studies.

### **1.5 A Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian Approach to Understanding Space in Bulawayo**

In theorising how, the activity of street trading intersects with the production of space in Bulawayo, the study engages Lefebvre’s (1974) work on the production of space, Foucault’s (1994) insights on power and governmentality, and Gramsci’s (1971) writings on hegemony. The study weaves these three theories with radical urban theory to examine the political economy of space in both Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial periods. These theories are supported by emerging discourses on African and radical urbanism. In Chapter 8, I suggest that the control of urban informality in the global South has always depended upon pairing the production of knowledge with that of space. The production of knowledge is used by the dominant group to produce and legitimise what Huxley (2006: 774) terms “dispositional spatial rationalities” which are then attached to subaltern groups and the spaces they occupy. Huxley’s (2006) notion of “dispositional spatial rationalities” is discussed in detail in the next subsection.

According to Foucault (1994), space is not just a container waiting to be occupied, but a medium through which power and knowledge are produced and exercised. Lefebvre (1974:1) notes that space that “not so many years ago...had a strictly geometrical meaning” now occupies a special role in the production of knowledge and certain actions. Indeed, physical space has transcended from being confined to mathematics and physics to become a crucial instrument in establishing a body of knowledge and expertise utilised by the bourgeoisie to control and regulate lower classes’ social behaviour. Demissie (2012:5) adds that space is a medium in which the state and the powerful administer “methods of surveillance, inspection and punishment” over their subjects. Foucault (1969:238) shares Lefebvre’s views, asserting that “knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse”. Suppose we follow Foucault and Lefebvre’s contention that “space” and “knowledge” are a single entity. In that case, it can be deduced that the “production of space” is intimately intertwined with the “production of knowledge”. The production of these two correlatives – i.e. “space” and “knowledge” cannot be achieved without the use of hegemony.

Gramsci sees society as dominated by two distinct bodies, the “political society” and the “civil society” (Bates, 1975). The political society comprises the government, the courts, and the police and is synonymous with the State, whereas the civil society consists of intellectuals, schools, churches, clubs, and parties (ibid). The political society (State) depends on the civil society to exercise power over its subjects through consent. Therefore, the civil society functions as “...a marketplace of ideas, where... intellectuals succeed in creating hegemony to the extent that they extend the world view of the rulers to the ruled, and thereby secure the ‘free’ consent of the masses to the law and order of the land” (Bates, 1975:353). Gramsci’s approach to hegemony is essential in understanding how both the colonial and post-colonial African states utilised the discourse of planning to establish European dominance on urban spatiality.

Lefebvre (1974) echoes the same argument raised by Gramsci, contending that hegemony goes beyond the ruler's influence and coercion. He asserts that it extends to the controlling of space for production and management of the rulers’ ideologies and rationalities that are later imposed on the ruled. The notion of hegemony corresponds with Foucault’s thesis of ‘governmentality’. In his concept of governmentality, Foucault emphasises the importance of space in the construction and sustaining of the ideals and truths of governments and ruling elites and eventually in the construction and orientation of the subject. Government bureaucrats and

ruling elites, therefore, seek to entrench their world view on to the created subject via the production of knowledge which is intimately linked to the production of space. But how do space and knowledge relate to planning and practice, particularly in controlling of informality by the State?

### *1.5.1 Ideology, Symbols, Representations, and Spatial Disposition as Methods of Control*

Planning is an essential component of the modernist project (Huxley, 2006; Kamete, 2009). According to Huxley (2006), planning policy is crucial in facilitating the State in implementing a spatial rationality of social order and surveillance of space. She identifies “dispositional spatiality rationality” as one of the critical tool planners use in maintaining gaze on cityscapes. Huxley (2006:774) describes the role of “dispositional spatiality rationality” as chiefly that of “...drawing boundaries and producing order that will foster correct comportments... it operates with the logic of grids of classification for the spatial disposition of ‘men and things’, to bring arrangement and visibility to bear on individuals and populations problematised as ‘chaotic’ and ‘uncontrolled’”. Once the spatial dispositions of an individual or populations are deemed unruly and incongruent with the desired registers of modernist urban imaginary are categorised as objects for policing, control and discipline (ibid).

The representation of urban informality as criminal through various top-down modalities of power such as grids and by-laws give city managers a convenient impetus of curtailing its expansion in urban centres (Ferguson and Lohmann, 1994; Kihato, 2007). Interestingly, Huxley’s notion of “dispositional spatial rationality” strikes a chord with Lefebvre’s concept of the “representations of space”. Similarly, in this concept Lefebvre (1991:38) considers “representations of space” as the conceptualised space and “...the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers” where technocrats’ ideological dominance over subaltern groups is enacted.

Lefebvre (1991) asserts that the representations of space allow technocrats to produce what he terms “representational spaces”. He describes “representational spaces” or “spaces of representation” as space “...directly lived through associated images and symbols” and “...overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects” (Lefebvre, 1991:39). For Lefebvre (1991) it is in these “representational spaces” that the dominant class entrench power and hegemony over less powerful groups by transmitting its symbolic, abstract and ideological representation of things. Space as Lefebvre (1990) puts it embodies the ideologies of those



producing it. He writes that “ideologies do not produce space: rather they are in space, and of it” (Lefebvre, 1990:210).

For Simone (2088:70) Lefebvre’s concepts of “representations of space” and “representational spaces” show us how identity relates to spatiality. He further notes that spaces are linked to specific identities, functions, lifestyles, and properties so that city spaces become legible for specific people at given places and times. Lefebvre’s assertion helps us gain critical insights on how the production of urban spaces in Zimbabwe infused European imaginaries that imposed a modernist utopian image of order and control on a so-called “uncivilised” African population (Popke and Ballard, 2004:101).

As such, the thesis argues that as black Zimbabweans symbolically interacted with these European imaginaries of modern urbanity that constructed them as backward and primitive outsiders not fully entitled to urban citizenship, they internalised cities as a European space (Mitchell, 1987; Seirlis, 2004). This thesis, traces how the historical production of urban space and social identities feeds into the current governance modality of controlling urban informalities such as street trading. It also intends to uncover how the informalisation of urban space, as seen in the increase of street trading offers a platform for the disenfranchised to challenge such exclusionary spatial practises.

## **1.6 Research Approach and Methods**

This study adopts a qualitative approach to explore the lived experiences of street trading and everyday informality in the city of Bulawayo. To this end, I engaged in participant observation, in-depth interviews and conducted a focus group discussion with street traders, city officials and representatives of street traders’ organisations to gain insights into their perceptions and attitudes towards informality, urban change, and spatiality. Data collection techniques of participant observation, in-depth interviews and a focus group discussion were crucial in permitting a deeper understanding of the street traders’ lived experiences, life stories and narratives in relation to coping with the Bulawayo’s urban crisis. A total of 41 participants were purposively recruited to contribute to this study. The reasons and justifications for choosing a qualitative research approach, data collection and sampling techniques are explained in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

## **1.7 Definition of Terms and Understanding of Concepts**

### *1.7.1 Urban Space*

The term “urban space” loosely refers to all urban land that is normally governed by the city’s municipal authority, be it the central business district (CBD), industrial or residential area. However, in this thesis, urban space is not only understood in terms of physical space, but it extends to what Lefebvre (1991) refers to as the “social space”. The social space is normally made up of everyday lived experiences, multiple social identities and symbols (Lefebvre, 1991).

### *1.7.2 Street Trader*

The term “street trader” is used in this thesis to broadly refer to all people selling goods and commodities either at stalls or on road pavements registered or not registered. In Bulawayo, street trading includes economic activities such as vending vegetables, fruits and other non-food stuffs that include electrical consumables, cosmetics, hardware, clothes and traditional medicine.

### *1.7.3 Urban Informality*

The understanding of urban informality has constantly evolved across different time frames and settings. Initially, in the early 1970s, urban informality was understood as an emerging “*sector*” of an economy operating outside the modern economic system (see Hart, 1973). This evolving informal economy sector was occupied by low paid urban dwellers that lacked formal contracts and social security. Conversely, this sector was primarily regarded as playing a critical role in helping the urban “poor” cope with harsh conditions and realities of surviving outside the “formal” economy. Consequently, urban scholars have sometimes explored the relationship between urban informality and urban poverty.

Further, urban informality is defined within the discourse of “legality”. As such, urban informality is normatively associated with urban processes and actions that violates urban by-laws and property rights (see De Soto, 2000). In recent writings, scholars have argued that the conceptualisation of urban informality must move beyond “sectorism” and “legality” to it being understood as a political act, where subaltern groups resist exclusionary urban policies and practices. Accordingly, there is a renewed interpretation of urban informality as embodying the resilience and agency of the urban poor (Ferguson, 2007; Chabal, 2009; Viana 2009; De Boeck, 2011).

#### *1.7.4 Informal Appropriation of Space*

In this thesis, the informal appropriation of urban space is understood as the self-allocation of “working or trading spaces” by street traders without approval from city authorities. It is generally considered illegal, “chaotic” and “disorderly”.

### **1.8 Structure of Thesis**

This thesis has eight further chapters which are as follows:

**Chapter Two** foregrounds and problematises present-day spatial contestations existing between the Bulawayo City Council and street traders within the “urban historiography” of Bulawayo. It traces existing struggles over Bulawayo’s urban space back to colonial socio-spatial policies that prevented Africans from accessing the city’s public spaces (Thornton, 1999). The history of Bulawayo’s urbanity is analysed in the four periods of 1894-1933, 1948-1960, 1970-1980 and 1990-2008.

**Chapter Three** engages Foucault’s (1995) concepts of “bio-power” and “governmentality”, Lefebvre’s (1974) theory on “the production of space” and Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” to examine how the body, space, and ideology interact with the production of governable city spaces and the disciplining of urban informality.

**Chapter Four** discusses the emergence of an informal distributive economy in the economically embattled cities of the global South. It goes on to explore how the urban poor, specifically those engaged in informal employment utilise associational networks and social ties to maximise economic opportunities and livelihoods within conditions of unprecedented levels of unemployment and urban poverty. The chapter further examines the linkages between the formal and informal sectors. Particular attention is given to how informal associational networks are linked up with the global economy.

**Chapter Five** discusses the research paradigms that inform this study and gives reasons for adopting these paradigms and the broad research methodology. It further explains the factors that influenced the selection of the research locations. Moreover, the chapter describes the instruments that were used for data collection and why they were chosen. It further gives an insight to the sampling technique used in selecting the participants and the reasons why such a technique was utilised. The chapter goes on to explain how the collected data was processed, how it was analysed and some of the limitations of the research processes.

**Chapter Six** is the first of three results chapters, and examines how the participants framed the political, economic and social processes that have necessitated the informalisation of labour and space in Bulawayo, specifically within the context of street trading.

**Chapter Seven** is the second of the results chapters and focuses on everyday informality in the context of Bulawayo's street trading. In exploring the everyday lived experiences of informality, this chapter looks at how street trading both enables and disables livelihoods.

**Chapter Eight** is the third of the results chapters, and explores the governmentalities, political technologies and mechanisms that the city authority of Bulawayo has utilised to manage street traders' conduct and urban informality in general. It employs the theoretical ideas discussed in Chapter three to argue that in an instance where raids and evictions prove ineffective, the Bulawayo City Council has depended on reproducing spatiality, vending bays and visual representations such as street signs and billboards to control street traders' illegal conduct and contain informality.

**Chapter Nine:** Summarises the findings of the study and examines the implications they have on the research objectives and research questions outlined in the first chapter of the thesis. Additionally, the chapter highlights the theoretical contributions of the study while pointing to possibilities for further research.

## **CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF THE PRESENT: CONTESTING URBAN SPACES IN COLONIAL AND POST- COLONIAL BULAWAYO**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides contextual orientation for the case of street trading in Bulawayo. Firstly, it discusses current contestation over urban space existing between the Bulawayo City Council and street traders. It foregrounds and then problematises these contestations within the “urban historiography” of Bulawayo. It traces existing struggles over Bulawayo’s urban space back to colonial socio-spatial policies that prevented Africans from accessing the city’s public spaces (Thornton, 1999). The history of Bulawayo’s urbanity is analysed in the four periods of 1894-1933, 1948-1960, 1970-1980 and 1990-2008.

The periods of 1894-1933 and 1948-1960 are important in interrogating the historicity of spatial contestations in Bulawayo in two ways.

The periods are characterised by the racialisation of space through several discriminatory pieces of legislative such as the Municipal Regulations of 1897, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, and the Native Urban Locations Ordinance (No 4 of 1906) which served the interests of the white minority at the expense of an African<sup>4</sup> majority. Secondly, the periods, particularly the 1948-1960 phase herald some of the defining struggles over urban spaces carried forward by African men and women who opposed the discriminatory urban laws enacted by the colonial system. The *Zhii* riots of 1960 which are discussed in detail as this chapter unfolds, symbolised a major uprising by Africans against the exclusionary and segregating urban laws that systematically worsened the material conditions of blacks living in the undesirable townships.

The second aim of this chapter is to explore the rapid informalisation of Bulawayo’s urban spaces and its labour between the period of 1970-1980 and 1990-2008, with particular attention given to the post-independence era between 1990 and 2008. This period is crucial in contextualising the growth of Zimbabwe’s urban informality in two important ways. This period marks Zimbabwe’s transition from a state that espoused socialism to one that embraced neoliberalism..

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<sup>4</sup> In this chapter the term African is used interchangeably with terms like “native” and “black”. It is not used to refer to “naturalized Africans” (Europeans born and raised in the African continent).

The adoption of neoliberalism in 1991 culminated in the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that increasingly resulted in the plummeting of employment, household earnings and living standards in the cities. Moreover, the period is characterised by the ZANU-PF led government's gross mismanagement of the national economy which manifested in unfettered corruption and unbudgeted compensation pay-outs of Z\$50 000 in 1997 to increasingly agitated war veterans resulting in Zimbabwe's economic plunge (see Bond and Manyanya, 2002). This "plunge" precipitated an environment of political polarisation concomitant with an emergence of a 'precarious' urban populace that survived more by straddling the formal-informal [economy] and rural-urban sectorial linkages.

Lastly, the chapter explores the development and the rise of a unique type of localised urban economy in Zimbabwe which Jones (2010) refers to as the "*Kukiya kiya*" economy. This localised urban economy became dominant after the economic meltdown of Zimbabwe's national economy and the collapse of Bulawayo's industrial complex in particular.

## **2.2 Current Contestation on Bulawayo's Cityscape**

In 2013, the Bulawayo City Council (BCC) threatened to evict and relocate street vendors operating along Batch and Lobengula Street to make way for the proposed construction of a mall and a regional transport hub (Sibanda, 2013). This threat of eviction of informal traders from the city's busy street has sparked outrage from civil society organizations that represent street traders and the urban poor. The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy (ZCHIE), for instance, has contested this proposed mall and transport hub construction project, arguing that it would have dire consequences on the livelihoods and household income of the already economically marginalized and struggling street traders. It further asserted that the pending evictions of street traders might infringe on the economic and social rights to public space and is counterproductive to the informal sector which has more than five million jobs nationally (Murwira, 2014). Street trading remains a visible and common form of livelihood in the city of Bulawayo. The steady de-industrialization of Bulawayo combined with the decline of wage employment and household income pushed urban masses into the burgeoning local economy of street trading (Ndiweni et al., 2014). At least 22 000 Bulawayo workers have been retrenched since the post 2000 economic crisis (ibid).

The street traders of Bulawayo are organized into two categories. The first category consists of licensed street traders. These are normally vegetable vendors and flea market operators located

along 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Avenue and Lobengula Street. A second category comprises unlicensed street traders. They are generally considered by city authorities as illegal and non-conformist parties operating outside regulated spaces. This category comprises informal foreign currency dealers (*Osiphatheleni*)<sup>5</sup> and vendors who sell a wide range of consumables such as soft drinks, sweets, airtime, batteries, and cosmetics. These informal traders appear to resist the hegemonic control and appropriation of urban space by the Bulawayo City Council. They prefer to be mobile rather than be stationed at stalls. According to Brown (2001), the mobility of street traders allows them to have control over time and space, thus establishing their services at certain strategic street nodes depending on the tide of human traffic flow. This mobility is not a new practise. For instance, Wild (1992) writes that most African vendors of the 1930s operating in Salisbury (now Harare) did not make use of the Market Square allocated by the council as they disliked doing business under municipal control. Street traders that fall in the non-conformist and illegal category are targets of municipal police raids and harassments. A large number of these traders operate in the vicinity of the Bulawayo Commuter Terminal (*Egodini*).

While the Bulawayo City Council has embraced “informality” as part of Bulawayo’s urban reality, it has in some instances acted with hostility and negativity towards street trading and other informal economic activities. Much of the city council’s frustrations appear to stem from its inability to effectively contain or keep the elusive street trading within planned and designated areas. Accordingly, the Bulawayo City Council regards any urban processes operating outside the confinements of designated grids and plans as disorderly, illegal and chaotic, and inconsistent with the ideals of a planned and modern city. Historically, Bulawayo was established to embody the European modernity and Western spatial arrangements for controlling urban forms (Ranger, 2010). With its broad streets, that resemble those of American cities, the makers of Bulawayo hoped to deal with human and traffic congestion thereby reducing disorderliness, overcrowding, and dirtiness (*ibid*).

This rationality of modernity and obsessive spatial management was transposed into post-colonial Bulawayo. As a resident of Bulawayo, I remember news stories circulating in the mid-1990s saying that Bulawayo had been named among the cleanest cities in Africa. It is therefore not surprising in some cases street trading is treated with mixed feelings as it stands in

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<sup>5</sup> Most informal money exchange traders of Bulawayo when approaching a potential customers or luring passers-by they ask “*usiphatheleni*”, which translates to “What have you brought us?”. They use this question “*usiphatheleni*” to identify and market themselves as money exchange traders. It is in this marketing strategy that the term “*Osiphatheleni*” has come to be associated with informal money exchange traders (also see Mawowa and Matongo, 2010:327).

contradiction with the modernist planning ideals that the city was founded on. The Bulawayo City Council, have in the past years attached negative associations to street trading, associating it with dirt, chaos, diseases, and crime. However, it is important to mention that any productive analysis of spatial management and planning of space in Bulawayo's cityscape or any African city must be carried out within a critical discourse that explores the intimate relationship between space, race, and capital (also see Ndi, 2009:11).

### **2.3 Spatiality, Race and Capitalism in Colonial Bulawayo (1894-1933)**

The city of Bulawayo was established in 1894 like most cities in colonial Rhodesia as a space in which Europeans<sup>6</sup> could occupy and claim natural and permanent rights (Kaarsholm, 1999). With its Victorian buildings, Bulawayo was regarded by both the colonialist and the subject as a "white man space" and a domineering symbol of white civilisation and supremacy (Mitchell, 1987; Ranger, 2010). As such from its inception, Africans were deprived of any chances of obtaining permanent and full rights in the city of Bulawayo. Early colonial laws like the Municipal Regulations of 1897 and the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, ensured that the colonial regime excluded black Africans from accessing the city. These laws further enabled colonialists to effectively control and discipline the movements, labour participation and the residence of Africans. One of the early writers on Bulawayo's racial bifurcated urban life, Nehwati (1970: 256) had this to say about how colonial spatial laws alienated the Africans:

Under the laws of the country, the Africans have no *de jure* residential status in Bulawayo. They are foreigners, as are all Africans in Rhodesian towns, because all towns fall into the European areas as defined by the Land Apportionment Act.

The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 later amended in 1941 contained the "infamous" pavement by-law that prohibited native Africans from walking on the urban centre's pavements. The pavement by-law was intentionally enacted to dispossess the African of any "sense of belonging", and "ownership" of the city particularly its centres. It further functioned not only to monitor the movements of African urbanites in town centres but also to reduce the "visibility" of black bodies within the cityscape. Consequently, the pavement by-law required Africans to learn to self-regulate their movement in and across town spaces. Under this segregating spatial law, Africans found it difficult to move freely on city spaces. In her

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<sup>6</sup> In the context of this thesis, the term European(s) is used to refer to colonial settlers whose origins could be traceable to the European continent.



captivating novel *“Butterfly Burning”*, Vera (1998) vividly captures the dilemma Africans faced in utilising city spaces in a highly panoptic colonial city of Bulawayo. She notes:

Bulawayo is not a city of idleness. The idea is to live within the cracks. Unnoticed and unnoticeable, offering every service but within the capacity to vanish when the task required is accomplished. So, the black people learn how to move through the city with speed and due attention, to bow their heads down and slide past walls, to walk without making the shadow more pronounced than the body or the body clearer than the shadow...The people walk in the city without encroaching on the pavements from which they are banned (Vera, 1998:3, 4).

In colonial Rhodesia, dislocating black bodies from the town was also systematically achieved through the creation of “native reserves” in 1930 (Seirlis, 2008). The apportioning of rural native reserves to Africans in colonial Rhodesia banished the newly colonised subjects from the city and asserted Africans’ autochthony to the countryside (Phimister, 1988; Seirlis, 2008). By linking the identity of Africans to the reserves through customary land rights and tribal authority, colonialists hoped to fabricate a social order in which Africans became associated with the countryside and are also seen as its natural occupants. This association of “blackness” with the “countryside” or “reserves” functioned as a way of polarising and abnormalising the “physical” and “spiritual” existence of “blackness” in urban areas which were deemed as “white reserves” or “white spaces”. As Mitchell similarly points out:

Europeans expected their African servants and employees to maintain a substantial involvement in a rural economic and social system and never become totally immersed in town activities. The ‘urbanised’ African was in fact viewed as a ‘detribalised’ person, whose sheet anchor of traditional customs and values had been slipped and who was in a consequence a disorganised and dissociated person (Mitchell, 1988:99).

Writing about the production of Africa’s spatiality, Mamdani notes that the alienation of the black body from the city represented an advanced type of “territorial segregation” which he refers to as “institutional segregation” (see Mamdani, 1996:5). For instance, this idea of “institutional segregation” in South Africa which was a brainchild of Jan Smuts<sup>7</sup>, opposed the notion of transforming Africans and their institutions to match European standards. In contrast to the French colonial administrative policy of “assimilation”, British colonial administrators advocated for the racial dualism of colonies that followed a spatially separated but mutual development of white and native institutions. The institutionalisation of segregation operated through the politicisation of ethnicity and space to enforce the governance of the colonised

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<sup>7</sup> While, Hendrik Verwoerd is probably known for effectively engineering and implementing apartheid policies as the 7<sup>th</sup> Prime Minister of apartheid South Africa, Jan Smuts- the 2<sup>nd</sup> Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa is regarded as the early campaigner of racial and territorial segregation in colonial South Africa. His political and social thought was central in the implementation and institutionalisation of the apartheid system in 1948 by the National Party.

from a distance. Governing Africans from afar, as I have already stated meant that the colonialist effectively used local institutions such as local chieftaincies and tribal authorities to politically institutionalise the ethnic identities of the Africans to the newly created native spaces (Mamdani, 1996).

I argue that “institutional segregation” was effective in weakening Zimbabweans’ ability to claim a right to life in the city and caused them to embrace rurality as part of their lived reality. For instance, during colonial times and certainly in present day Zimbabwe, rural areas (*kumusha/ekhaya*)<sup>8</sup> are not necessarily perceived as a by-product of colonialism and settler capitalism but as spaces embodying the spiritual realism and cosmos of the black people (Chimhanda, 2013). Rural spaces<sup>9</sup> are generally considered by ordinary Zimbabweans as playing a critical role in the practice of Shona and Ndebele traditional religion. In both Shona and Ndebele religions, a rural home is regarded as animating a sense of spiritual connectedness with the ancestral and spiritual world. Rural life is closely associated with strengthening the Shona and Ndebele ethical value of *unhu/Ubuntu*, this ethical value centres on the consolidation of the human, natural and spiritual inter-connectedness (Chibvongodze, 2016).

Although, rural areas are a product of capitalism – a system which was abusive to Africans, a majority of Zimbabweans take pride in their rural identity and choose rural homes as their final resting place (for example, see Brown, 1994:77-78). It is a widely held belief among Zimbabwean that the humanness of an individual is disrupted when ties with the “rural place” are severed. Dorman (2015:95) rightly explains that “...the ability of urban Zimbabweans to claim a right to life in the city has itself been weakened by the dominant and internalised assumption that ‘all’ Zimbabweans have a rural home (*musha*) and without such identifiers people are not ‘fully’ Zimbabweans. The use of the idea ‘home’ in claiming rural areas discursively weakens urban claims to belonging”.

An urbanised African in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe is thus understood by other Africans as an individual that “has lost his or her way”, leading a life that opposes African morality (Mitchel, 1987). This negative attitude towards urbanised African or the so-called “detrified native” was also shared by the Europeans. The resentment of urbanised African by whites and blacks alike is highlighted by Mitchell (1987:101) who notes that:

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<sup>8</sup> This is a common reference of rural areas in local languages of Shona and isiNdebele respectively.

<sup>9</sup> In this thesis, rural spaces refer to former reserves or communal lands that are governed by customary law.

...both Europeans and Africans came to look upon the way of life that Africans adopted in the towns as degraded and disorganised. This was what was implied by the notion of 'detrribalisation' which has dominated the perceptions of African city life...The image of town here is that of a 'non-tribe' in the sense that the departures from tribal norms of behaviour, whether real or imagined, were evaluated in moral terms and given a pejorative connotation.

For whites, especially the technocrats, an urbanised native was not only considered a disorganised individual but a threat to the purity of "white urbanisation" and the structures of colonialism (see West, 2002:22). Cook (1930) shows how the emergence of townships adjacent to the cities in apartheid South Africa sent white politicians and urban inhabitants into a "panic" mode, fearing an imminent collapse of a segregated society. He captures excerpts from Jan Smuts' lecture entitled "The Native Policy of South Africa", delivered in 1929 at Oxford University, England:

These urbanised natives constitute the real crux, and it is a difficulty which goes far beyond the political issue. They raise a problem for the whole principle of segregation, as they claim to be civilized and Europeanised and do not wish to be thrust back into the seclusion of their former associations or to forego their new place in the sun, among the whites (Cook, 1930:229).

Echoing Cook's sentiments, Ferguson (1999) argues that it is misleading to assume that all Africans identified the so called "tribal homes" as their rightful place of belonging. Instead, in his study of migrant labour patterns in the Copperbelt, Zambia, Ferguson (1999) notes that some African workers shunned the repeated movements between the city and their rural areas. Ultimately, such workers opted to permanently settle in the urban areas and claim a right to life in the city. Indeed, Ferguson (1999:39) writes that the rural to urban movements were not always defined and orderly,

"While some authorities favoured a cyclical "migrant labour system" in which workers would balance short spells of wage labour with long stays in their "tribal homes" they recognized that rural-urban mobility was not always so orderly. For urban migrants were not simply docile short-term "target workers" anchored to well defined village homes; their mobility always threatened to become excessive, dangerous, and uncontrolled..." (Ferguson, 1999: 39).

Further, as capitalism began to expand, it even became harder to discourage African workers to permanently settle in the city as more labour was readily needed (Mamdani, 1996). Accordingly, as the population of urbanised Africans rose steadily to meet the needs of capitalism the "...beneficiaries of [colonial] rule appeared an alien minority and its victims evidently an indigenous majority" (Mamdani, 1996:6). The white urbanites' fear of being outnumbered by Africans was also experienced in colonial Rhodesia, where the rising numbers of Africans in the cities of Salisbury (now Harare) and Bulawayo caused a lot of discomfort to

their white counterparts. Yoshikuni (2006) notes that the increase of the black middle class in Salisbury after 1900 resulted in antagonistic interactions between the newly arrived black residents and white urbanites intending to maintain a white city. He continues to say that “the presence of such free African dwellers, along with a crowd of African shoppers and passers-by, in the middle of the white city greatly discomforted European citizens, in particular, the wealthier ones, who asked the authorities to enforce both stricter segregation and better controls” (Yoshikuni, 2006:29).

Efforts to contain a bulging African population in Salisbury and Bulawayo in the early 1900s led to the adoption of the Native Urban Locations Ordinance (No 4 of 1906). This ordinance effectively served as a legal framework for normalising a segregated apportioning of residential spaces between different racial groups. The ratification of the ordinance by colonial administrators resulted in the creation of townships, which were essential in absorbing the population increase of African rural migrants and at most control the spatial movements of natives in the towns. In constructing the African ghettos, the colonial government intended to offer a solution of supplying the much-needed labour to increase production while not compromising European spatial domination over towns.

The creation of the African ghettos as Bond (1993:73) understands it “...reflected the need to reproduce labour power in new ways sensitive to spatial consideration”. The establishment of *Harari*<sup>10</sup> (now Mbare) as the first black township in Salisbury in 1907 in accordance with the Native Locations Ordinance, can be regarded as a colonial urban policy to resolve the issue of labour demand and solving the “problem for locating Africans in the right place” (Yoshikuni, 2007:32). Unlike Mbare, Makokoba had already existed since 1893 as a place first built by Africans (Musemwa, 2006; Ranger, 2010a). However, Makokoba was eventually put under the authority of Bulawayo’s local town administrators, who through the Native Locations Ordinance gained a day-to-day control and overall governance of Makokoba (Ranger, 2010b).

The ghettoization of native Africans in colonial Bulawayo led to the emergence of two separate cities; one belonging to whites, while the other belonged to blacks. As Musemwa (2006:187) notes, “...the city of Bulawayo was typically a tale of two cities in one...” and was fragmented into a distinctly white and black city. In the case of Bulawayo, the white city composed of the

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<sup>10</sup> The name of Zimbabwe’s capital city “Harare” has its roots in “*Harari*”, one of the oldest townships in Zimbabwe. “*Harari*” is a Shona term that literally translates to “he or she does not sleep”. The city of Harare is commonly known by locals as a “city that does not sleep”, as it is always bustling with activities.

central business district (CBD) and the low-density suburbs located to the north and east of the CBD. The black city of Bulawayo represented the sprawling African township of Makokoba (ibid). Musemwa's understanding of colonial Bulawayo's spatial duality mirrors that of Fanon (1963:36) who sees the colonial town as divided into two entities -the "native town" and the "settlers' town". For Fanon, whilst the native and the settler town have a symbiotic relationship (also see Nehwati, 1970:256), it is an unequal one with vast discrepancies in material condition and development trajectories.

The white city of Bulawayo which Nehwati (1970:256) refers to as the "real Bulawayo" comprised modern facilities and amenities. It was endowed with economic and political power to make major decisions that concerned the larger Bulawayo, the black city included. By contrast, the black city was impoverished and usually built with cheap materials. It lacked economic resources and opportunities and was plagued with unemployment, social insecurity, and inadequate housing (Nehwati, 1970). The black city was left to the undesirable, to use Mpofu's (2010) language, while Ranger (2010b:2) argues that the townships of Bulawayo were spaces of "trauma", "subjugation", "crime" and "chaos".

Mayer's (1963) early ethnographic studies of townships in Eastern Cape Province, South Africa documents similar appalling urban conditions and experiences within Port Elizabeth's township. He notes that the residents of the ghettos in Port Elizabeth:

Like other urban populations, especially those at a low standard of living, the town-dwelling Africans seem to have serious problems in the sphere of morality and social control...Prima facie the urban locations (i.e. residential quarters to which non-white people are confined, by law as well as custom) seem to abound in violent crimes, drunkenness, drug addiction, theft, robbery, offences by children out of parental control, and sexual laxity (Mayer, 1963:115).

Fanon (1969) identifies the urban ills mentioned by Mayer (1963) as by-products of the stark material inequalities that exist between the settlers' and native town. In a chapter titled "Concerning Violence" contained in his *magnum opus*, "The Wretched of the Earth". He describes the settlers' town as:

... a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town...The settler's feet are never visible except perhaps in the sea; but you are never close enough to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's town is a well-fed town, an easy-going town; its belly is always full of good things. The settlers' town is a town of white people, of foreigners (Fanon, 1963:39).

This settlers' town that Fanon depicts stands in contrast to that of the natives which is:

...a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute...It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built on top of each other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village...a town wallowing in the mire. It is a town of niggers... (ibid).

It is not surprising that such disparities of the two towns which also characterised Bulawayo's colonial urbanity and that of the Southern African region provided fertile grounds for growing African dissent and discontent with the segregated development of urban areas. Indeed, far from being microcosms of immorality, chaos, and slumming, townships soon became hotbeds of African "urban politics" and broader nationalist movements. As this chapter will show the Bulawayo urban uprisings such as the *Zhii* riots of 1960 were partly a result of the unfavourable standards of living and the discriminatory laws that residents of the locations were subjected to. Similarly, the most defining struggles against white domination in neighbouring countries such as South Africa were fuelled by township politics, the Soweto uprisings of 1976 immediately come to mind.

The struggle against urban repressive laws led to the rise of urban political activists such as Benjamin Burombo, Joshua Nkomo and Violet Moeketsi in the 1960s. These activists were among the first black politicians to promote the ideology for a non-discriminatory city where citizens had equal access to opportunities and possessions in the city of Bulawayo. They quickly became a formidable force in the destabilisation of white domination over urban areas. Their political activism is discussed in detail elsewhere in this chapter.

The next section of this chapter looks at how spatial arrangements [spatio-body relations] were manipulated by the town administrators of colonial Bulawayo to serve the needs of capitalism. It will also delve into colonial discriminatory urban spatial laws that were enacted to systematically protect the monopoly and control of "white capitalism" by stunting the growth of a black middle class, informal tradesmen and merchants residing in townships. In principle, space was used as a mode of capital accumulation for the whites and as a medium to dispossess Africans of any means of production.

### *2.3.1 Space as a Mode of Capital Accumulation and Dispossession*

At this stage, the thesis will focus on how spatiality and race became important factors in the development of white capitalism and commerce, while at the same time suppressing an

emergence of an African petty-bourgeoisie class. As I have noted above, any serious interrogation of spatial-human relations in colonial towns, one should be cognisant of the powerful influence capitalism had on how space and bodies were organised and more importantly produced. In carrying this argument forward, I concur with Soja's observation of the dominance that systems of accumulation have on urban space and its immediate systems. He argues that "...capitalism finds the need to intervene, to reorganise space and to make urban systems function more effectively for the accumulation of capital" (Soja, 1989:101). His argument speaks to that of Harvey, who had written earlier on the immense impact capitalism has on the urbanisation process. In his book, "The Urbanization of Capitalism" Harvey (1978) argues that the process of urbanisation is a product of capitalism and vice versa. He asserts that through urbanisation and the development of cities "...capitalism perpetually strives, therefore, to create a social and physical landscape in its own image and requisite to its own needs at a particular point in time..." (Harvey, 1978:124).

Lefebvre (1974) also recognises the importance of space in supporting the accumulative processes of capitalism and the establishment of a market economy. He argues that through the manipulation of the production of space "...the bourgeoisie's enlightened despotism and the capitalist system have successfully established control over the commodity market" (Lefebvre, 1974:62). Fanon (1963) has consistently asserted that colonialism-cum-capitalism has always thrived on an unequal spatial arrangement. Space was not only essential for enabling the flourishing of colonial capitalism in Bulawayo, but it was also utilised to control and discourage the participation of some of the emerging black petty bourgeoisie in capitalist enterprise and to prevent them from competing with colonial capitalism (Thornton, 1999). While, the underpinnings of colonial capitalism hinged on notions of free enterprise and fair competition, such principles, however, "...proved to be remarkably elusive for Africans, revealing the essentially monopolistic nature of colonial capitalism" (Thornton, 1999:19).

This exploitative feature of the Rhodesian colonial capitalism was further promoted by the forceful and violent institutionalised re-appropriation and control of indigenous land by the British South African Company (BSAC)<sup>11</sup>. The hostile expulsion of natives from the fertile land and their immediate placement in reserves by the BSAC demonstrated the first steps in which physical space (land) was used to cater to the needs of capitalist development. An

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<sup>11</sup> With Cecil John Rhodes at its helm, the British South African Company occupied a central role in the colonial occupation of Zimbabwe.

important result of dispossessing Africans of their productive land was that it led to the systematic process of dispossession. Arrighi et al. (2010:114) consider this process "...a necessary condition of a successful capitalist development", since it facilitated the commercialisation of rural economies. It further allowed for an effective subordination of labour once utilised by rural agro-production systems to the needs of capitalism. We might regard this as an instance of what Harvey (2004) terms "accumulation by dispossession", which entails the "...commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; conversion of various forms of property rights – common, collective, state, etc. – into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative, indigenous, forms of production..." (Harvey, 2004:74).

Such dispossessions and commodification of communal property trigger yet another exploitative process of "primitive accumulation". Primitive accumulation is the systematic proletarianisation of those dispossessed from land, for instance, rural farmers or pastoralists. With no land or animals on which to base their livelihood, those dispossessed of their land are forced to partake in wage labour. Marx (1963: np) explains that "the systematic theft of communal property was of great assistance...in 'setting free' the agricultural population as a proletariat for the needs of industry". The same processes were fundamentally critical not only in introducing a wage-based economy in colonial Bulawayo but also in shaping the spatio-labour relations between the whites and blacks. The spatial planning of Bulawayo's black townships, for instance, made it difficult for its residents to conduct meaningful self-sustaining production outside the wage-based economy.

In its inception, Makokoba was constructed as a "temporary" residential area with little or no space apportioned for gardening practises or food production (see Musemwa, 2006:200). Efforts to resuscitate the rural practice of subsistence farming in Makokoba were further strained by an erratic supply of water to the township. Musemwa (2006) confirms this, arguing that the lack of agro or green spaces in Makokoba was a direct result of unequal power relations with regards to the distribution and mobilisation of water between the colonial city and the African township. The colonial hydro politics of limited distribution of water to black residential areas of Bulawayo, which continued in post-colonial Bulawayo, thus functioned to dispossess the African urbanites of any means of agricultural production that may undermine



their full participation in the labour, cash and wage economy (also see, Van Binsbegen and Geschiere, 1985; Castillo, 2003).

For Musemwa (2006) depriving African urbanites of agro spaces and their connection to the environment (urban land) had devastating implications of the survival of the traditional (informal) practices of subsistence farming in the colonial city. He argues that "...by denying Makokoba residents the comforts that came with abundant water supplies, as well as the space for greening, as exemplified by the luxurious and idyllic gardens that emerged in the white suburbs, the colonial state exposed Africans to deleterious social and environmental consequences" (Musemwa, 2006: 188). Marx (1963) argues that the advancement of capitalism through wage labour alienates humans from their natural environment. He sees this alienation as disruptive to traditional and indigenous forms of social metabolism leading to a process, he terms the 'metabolic rift'<sup>12</sup>. The development of a capitalist society as Marx (1963) argues, incapacitates humans from utilising the environment for social production, forcing them to rely on wage labour and the formal economy. Moreover, the rationality of a waged based economy is further entrenched by thwarting any form of informal and entrepreneurship activities taking place outside the ambit of the real economy. However, the discouragement of entrepreneurship in African urban communities by colonial authorities did not necessarily halt the emergence of local petty bourgeoisie in the township of Makokoba.

### *2.3.2 The Rise of the African Petty-Bourgeoisie in Colonial Bulawayo*

As noted by Thornton (1999), several African businessmen from the townships managed to acquire some form of economic independence from wage labour by setting up enterprises in their local areas. Wild (1992) states that due to a more liberal attitude the city council of colonial Bulawayo had towards African trade, by 1925, the city had a larger number of African businessmen than Salisbury (now Harare). He further notes that the council in some instances provided support to informal African urban farmers by allowing them to purchase land within the vicinity of the town to grow vegetables and fruits. This agricultural produce was later traded in European residential and business areas (see Wild, 1992: 25). By 1925, at least a significant group of eight Africans effectively owned land ranging from 6 to 89 acres around Bulawayo and supplied the city centre with vegetables (Thornton, 1999). The documentation of land ownership and farming businesses by Africans in Bulawayo by Wild (1992) and Thornton

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<sup>12</sup> The process of "metabolic drift" can be described as the alienation of humans from their natural environment. Marx see is an important part of 'primitive accumulation'.

(1999) seem to contradict the generally held views that blacks were excluded from owning the means of production in colonial Rhodesia.

The emergence of African businessmen in Bulawayo was received with mixed reactions from white urban dwellers and the council alike. On one hand, alarmed by the growth of skilled African artisans in the period of (1926-1933) posing a threat to white colonial domination, white artisans appealed to the city authorities to relocate Natives residing in 'town native locations' and to the periphery of the town (Ranger, 2010; also see, Thornton, 1999; West, 2001; Wild, 1992 and Yoshikuni, 2007). On the other hand, faced with mounting pressure coming from white labour unions, the presiding town clerk in the period in question even suggested to the council to move African tradesman from the Location and house them into newly created Native Village Settlements situated outside the town (Ranger, 2010). By initiating the relocation of African traders away from the city, the Bulawayo city authorities intended to protect white capitalism and enterprise from emerging independent skilled artisans and the informal petty bourgeoisie.

While the relocation of natives to the village settlements did not take immediate effect, the city council was determined to stunt the growth of informal enterprise in the ghettos. African artisans and emerging businessmen were subjected to tighter regulations and controls, ultimately vitiating any indication of the growth of an African enterprise and elite class (Thornton, 1999; West, 2001). Under these regulations such as the Native Urban Locations Ordinance, conducting trade by black artisans in the townships was prohibited (Ranger, 2010b). The cottages in Makokoba Township were to be only used for accommodation purposes and not for skills trading. This meant that independent skilled artisans who lost their businesses under these new regulations were siphoned into wage-labour.

Interestingly, the council's adoption of a *laissez-faire* approach towards African trade was somehow regarded as a "necessary evil" that was crucial for maintaining residential segregation. The city council made efforts to select a few handpicked African business traders to help establish businesses in the retail sector (Wild, 1992; Thornton, 1999). In their view, supporting African traders to establish stores in the townships would "...considerably reduce African trade to and from town and, as a result, "*Kaffir trade*" would be cleared out of the city" (Wild, 1992:33). African retail businesses in townships thus proved to be useful interceptors in preventing the influx of black consumers in the city. In promoting African traders, the council also hoped to reduce the antagonistic relations between emerging African traders and Indian

merchants, as their continued conflicts were seen as a potential threat to colonial rule. The presence of Indian traders in the township and concentration at busy streets such as Lobengula Street had long been resented by African businesspeople who condemned what they saw as the monopolistic and exploitative nature of their businesses. Ranger (2010b) gives an account of these tensions between Indian traders with and emerging African entrepreneurs who called for the removal of Indians from the townships and the granting of trading licences to African businesses instead of to Indian enterprises:

Both Asian hawkers and eating-house keepers in the Location and the Asian stores in Lobengula Street itself came under attack from would-be African entrepreneurs and from the mission educated. There were widespread demands, from the Matabele Home Society and the Industrial Commercial Union (ICU) alike, for the expulsion of Asians from the Location and grant trading licences to Africans (Ranger, 2010b:48).

Seeing this as a source of threat to Bulawayo's stability and that of white power, the council quickly contained the impending conflicts by granting trading licences to a small number of African business people selected based on "... 'character', previous experience in business and available capital" (Wild, 1992:37). The provision of such support to African trade by the colonial city council directly contributed to the rise of a new crop of an elite African business class. This newly formed class strategically assumed a function for the white colonial administration, as it served to neutralise any possible dissent may have emanated from the poor sections of the black population. It is perhaps worth pointing out that the other reason for supporting and formalising African businesses by colonial authorities was to legitimise the rooting out of informal and unlicensed businesses in the townships of colonial Bulawayo.

Although deafening calls were coming from African traders for the expulsion of Asians from busiest streets such as Lobengula Street, Railway Street, and Grey Street, the city council was reluctant to relocate Indian merchants from these lucrative streets as they acted as a frontier between black and white Bulawayo (Ranger, 2010b). The period between 1910 and 1930 witnessed the rise of Indian merchants such as M.H Naik<sup>13</sup>, B.K Patel, I Seedat, and K.R Vashee (see Ranger, 2010b:47). With help from the council, Indian merchants managed to open stores along Lobengula Street which traded in clothing and other accessories. For African shoppers, Indian shops were associated with affordability, bargained purchases and were easily accessible. As such Lobengula Street soon became known as Africa's town, and the construction of this street as an African space was exactly what city authorities and white

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<sup>13</sup> Naik established the popular *Thandabantu* (Love the people) store which is still operating to this present day.

residents had hoped for. Ranger (2010b:47-48) points out that for white urbanites, Lobengula Street represented a segregation buffer that "...played the role of sucking up African customers and holding them from the pavements and shops of white Bulawayo". However, the council's obsession with restricting natives' movement in European spaces and its persistent suppression of township local economies did not remain unopposed. With an increasing number of rural women migrating to the city following the collapse of rural economies, the battle for urban space and inclusive economic participation by unemployed African women became important.

#### **2.4. The Feminisation of Bulawayo's Urban Spaces: The Era of Shebeens and Beer brewing (1948-1960)**

There is a vast literature that associates the feminisation of colonial cities in Rhodesia between the 1930s and 1960s with the rise of the informal economy (Barnes, 1991; Jeater, 2000; Jackson, 1999; Mpofu, 2014; Ranger, 2010b; West, 1997; 2001). For example, Jackson's (1999) study of gender and space in Bulawayo and colonial Rhodesia reveals that early developments of the informal sector in colonial cities were spearheaded by women. According to Jackson (1999), a wide variety of women participated in the informal economy of colonial Rhodesia as independent beer brewers, hawkers, while some engaged in illicit sex work. This was the case with Bulawayo. As the city began to feminise, townships such as Makokoba and Mzilikazi<sup>14</sup> were soon inhabited by a mass of unemployed women that could not be absorbed by a male-dominated labour market. The type of employment offered by the booming industrial complex was not suitable for women, whereas an already feminised domestic work sector was too marginal to cater for an increasing number of women coming from the rural areas (Ranger, 2010).

One can argue that the nature of capitalist accumulation that prevailed in colonial Bulawayo produced a feminised "lumpen proletariat". Pushed to the margins, African women were forced to partake in a shadow urban economy of illegal beer brewing, hawking, shebeens, and prostitution (Jackson, 1999). Shebeens<sup>15</sup> and beer brewing proved to be particularly lucrative businesses. Mpofu (2014) identifies shebeens as the most crucial source of income for marginalised women living in the townships in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Shebeens

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<sup>14</sup> Named after the first king of the Ndebele nation, Mzilikazi is one of the oldest townships in Bulawayo. It is located near Makokoba.

<sup>15</sup> The term shebeen which has its origins in Ireland refers to any illicit place (tavern or bar) where alcohol is sold without a trading licence. In Zimbabwe, people normally convert their home into a shebeen particularly during weekends. Most shebeens in Bulawayo were and still are run by single or unmarried women and traditional food is also sold in these shebeens.

and home-based beer brewing further signified a new form of “insurgent entrepreneurialism”, where poor African women engaged in the informal or the so-called “illegal” economic activities not only to cope with the effects of the exclusionary capitalist system but to challenge it (Mpofu, 2009; 2014; Meth, 2010). Such economic activities created an innovative and redistributive type of local economy. As Edwards (1988:81) argued, shebeens allowed the money earned from formal wage employment “...to circulate within the community as fast as possible so that dependants and those either unemployed or seeking work could subsist”. Similarly, Ranger (2010b) notes that during the colonial time, women from Bulawayo townships were able to purchase foodstuffs, clothes and to a lesser extent bought land from proceeds obtained from shebeens and home brewing businesses.

On the contrary, white city administrators associated the mushrooming of shebeens with a decline in morality among African communities. Municipal authorities linked shebeens with uncontrolled and excessive drinking of alcohol, violent fights, prostitution, untidiness, and disorderliness (West, 1997). They asserted that shebeens and traditional beer brewing establishments were in contradiction with the logic of producing moral, orderly, and governable urban spaces. Furthermore, shebeens were perceived by the council and white businesspeople alike as being detrimental to labour productivity. In many cases as Hentschel (2013) has observed, excessive and uncontrolled consumption of alcohol in shebeens made workers sometimes totally unfit to perform work. Edwards (1988) shows, how the culture of shebeens in Durban townships, South Africa, for instance, was highly opposed by the colonial authority. According to Edwards (1988:79), colonial authorities in Durban resented the shebeen culture as it “... existed in direct conflict of the ideas of sobriety, cleanliness, respect for the dignity of wage labour and religious observance”. The growth of the female-dominated shebeens was also linked to the high prevalence of prostitution and sexually transmitted infections in African townships. Consequently, women were singled out by both city officials and African men as carriers and transmitters of sexual infections.

#### *2.4.1 The “Sexual Pathologisation” of Women in Bulawayo*

To counter the proliferation and operations of women-owned shebeens and home-based brewing enterprises, concerted efforts were made by the colonial officialdom to restrict the migration of women from the rural areas to towns. In colonial Rhodesia, restrictions of women’s mobility into and between urban spaces utilised what Jackson (1999:149) describes as a “medico-patriarchal” discourse. Operating within this discourse, capitalism aligned with

African patriarchy to construct the mobile bodies of African women as hosts and agents of venereal diseases that threatened the morals and health of men in wage employment (Barnes, 1992; Jackson, 1999; Schmidt, 1991; West, 1997). African women occupying urban spaces were thus regarded by both Europeans and African males as morally loose and sometimes understood as stray sexual predators needing control. For instance, white Christians males decried the presence of “*skokiaan*”<sup>16</sup> and “*shebeen queens*”<sup>17</sup> and single women in African townships, seeing them as synonymous with the moral breakdown of society. Jackson (1990) provides an excerpt from a petition signed by a community of white male Christians based at the Falcon mine in the mining town of Mvuma, in colonial Rhodesia who attributed the decline of morality and order faced in Mvuma townships to “loose women”:

For some time, we have considered that there is something wrong with a people to give rise to the great amount of quarrelling, fighting and burning of houses, and also the vast amount of venereal disease. All the happenings are interfering with the morals and welfare of the man employment and the only cause of the trouble is the number of loose women, who are permitted to roam about without hindrance (Jackson, 1999:157).

This sexual pathologisation of single African women by whites was also exercised by their African male counterparts. West (1997) writes of African men in colonial Rhodesia as vehemently opposing the idea of single women living and working in the city, socially categorising them as prostitutes, home wreckers and uncultured. They disliked the presence of unmarried African women in male-dominated spaces such as beerhalls and dormitories. African men argued categorically that it was abnormal for women to be in town and their presence in urban areas was therefore seen as “...very much out of place” (Jeater, 2000: 35). In certain ways, African males felt emasculated and disrespected by the existence of single women in their spaces, whom they accused of degenerating African customs by embracing western lifestyles (West, 1997).

It is important to mention that the consumption of western commodities, particularly cosmetics (lightening cream, lipstick, facial powder) in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe is normally associated with single women that are sexually immoral and culturally wayward (Jackson, 1999). The African political leadership of Bulawayo notably the Southern Rhodesia Bantu Congress (SRBC), made calls to colonial authorities for the expulsion of women

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<sup>16</sup> “Skokiaan” is a type of home brewed beer which contains high concentration of alcohol. The production and consumption of “Skokiaan” in the townships of Bulawayo has in the past year been criminalised and restricted by the local government.

<sup>17</sup> Shebeen queens are women involved in the running and management of shebeens.

applying such cosmetics, who they called “*mapendeke*”<sup>18</sup> or “*omazakhela*”<sup>19</sup> from male spaces (beerhalls and township dormitories). West (1997:645) quotes the *Bantu Mirror* newspaper of 31 January 1942 that carried a story in which an official from the SRBC argued that, “The presence of “*Pendeke*” with painted lips and cheeks where self-respecting men are drinking is offensive and instigates the formation of ill-fated friendships between young men and young women”.

In 1958, a correspondent to the same newspaper appalled by the increase of women in Makokoba stated that:

One cannot find so many wicked women in other towns as can be counted in Bulawayo. They should send their policemen to arrest any women found harbouring in rooms which are supposed to be for ‘men only’. The factories should also be blamed for employing women in place of men. This will surely encourage young girls of school-leaving age to run away from reserves into town in order to make money from factories and from men (cited in Ranger, 2010:176).

Colonial authorities, ironically with support coming from African males adopted legislative measures to control the influx of unmarried African women from rural areas to towns. For instance, the adoption of the Native Registration Act of 1936 formalised the control of African women’s mobility from rural areas to cities and within towns to both the colonial and African patriarchy system. As such, under this Act, women could only reside in towns after they have gained approval from African male authorities (relatives or husbands) and white town officials. The restriction of free movements within urban spaces was “...part effort to appease African patriarchy, and part effort to appease the rapidly expanding European population which competed with all levels of African petty-entrepreneurial activities” (Jackson, 1999:155).

Although the Native Registration Act did not fully achieve its intended purpose of curbing the mobility of African women from rural areas to towns, it did have some negative effects on their urban informal economic activities that heavily depended on mobility. As Jackson indicates (1999:155), the Act proved to be detrimental to African women “...operating in the ‘informal’ economic sector as keepers of rooming houses, beer brewers, wood collectors and food hawkers”. These entrepreneurial activities required intensive intra-urban mobility of which the Act denied, thereby repressing the budding growth of the informal sector. Despite such repressive measures, the informal sector largely dominated by African women continued to

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<sup>18</sup> This a derogatory Shona term used to describe women that are considered “morally loose”. It has also been applied to African women that apply lightening creams, lipstick and make up.

<sup>19</sup> This Ndebele term is used to refer unmarried women who rent single rooms in the city.

expand and increase in importance. Accordingly, after the collapse of a traditional peasant economy with the adoption of the Land Apportionment Act and institutionalisation of the “cash economy”, the informal sector became a crucial source of income for Zimbabwean women migrants who failed to dominate the male dominated formal employment sector (Barnes, 1991). Indeed, earlier census records of 1936 showed, for example, that only 6 percent<sup>20</sup> of African women in Salisbury (now Harare) had formal wage employment. The same can be said of Bulawayo, where only a sizable number of African women found wage employment as “nannies”<sup>21</sup> in the domestic work sector and selected industries. Unsurprisingly, calls to evict women from urban spaces were met with resistance coming for women. They came together and formed formidable associations that made headways in Bulawayo’s urban politics.

By the late 1950s, for instance, the Bulawayo African Township Women’s Association (BATWA) composed mostly of respectable married women had firmly established itself as a progressive social movement advocating for the inclusion of African women in urban spaces (Ranger, 2010; 2011). Under the leadership of Violet Moeketsi, the BATWA demanded that the provisions of the Native Registration Act and Native Urban Areas Act which restrained free mobility of African women in urban spaces be revoked. Its members strongly opposed the widespread police raids and expulsions of any women suspected of being a prostitute (Ranger, 2010: 174, 183).

The BATWA further lobbied to other black-led social movements such as the Bulawayo Township Advisory Board (BTAB) to support them in lodging their disputes against the ill-treatment and criminalisation of African women. It also collaborated with the Bulawayo’s Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union, a labour movement led by urban populist Charles Mzingeli, in addressing everyday matters affecting the poor and marginal women of Bulawayo (Scarnecchia, 2008). I argue that while women did not participate in urban protests like the *Zhii* riots of 1960, the role they occupied in advocating and advancing the socio-economic democratic rights of African urbanites should not be downplayed. Indeed, it is the womenfolk’s political expediency and their continued conscientisation of the African leadership on the townships’ squalid living conditions and lack of economic opportunities that foregrounded urban protests such as the *Zhii* riots of 1960 (see Ranger, 2010b: 234).

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<sup>20</sup> Also see Barnes (1991).

<sup>21</sup> T. O Ranger talks of the “nannies of Khumalo”, who found domestic wage employment in the then famous European suburb of Khumalo. They were held in high esteem by township folks as they could afford to buy the fanciest clothes and bicycles, which at that time symbolised wealth (see Ranger, 2010b:174).



## 2.5 The “*Zhii*” Riots of 1960: Battling for an Inclusive City

In July of 1960, Bulawayo was engulfed by a series of violent protests that targeted the colonial administration and emerging African business elites. There is a lot of controversy and confusion surrounding the causes of the 1960 riots. However, complaints raised by those that participated in the *Zhii*<sup>22</sup> riots centred on the socio-economic issues of low wages, poor living conditions, and unemployment. In asserting his argument on the causes of the *Zhii* riots, Nehwati (1970:255) argues that any explanation of the riots should consider their background. Nehwati (1970) and later Ranger (2010b) regard the *Zhii* riots as a typical progressive struggle that Africans waged against the discriminatory laws and other repressive measures institutionalised by the colonial order of that period. The very nature of the attacks, selective as they were, they followed lines of race and class. Rioters destroyed everything which they thought represented the authority and economic power of the colonial administration. According to Nehwati (1970:252) who experienced the *Zhii* riots first hand, the attacks were carried out in a systematic and well-crafted manner, targeting, “...administrative buildings, beer gardens, newspaper works, bus shelters and shops, and any motor vehicles which were parked at the administrative offices...Trains were stoned and attempts were made to burn the railway rolling stock at the [...] marshalling yard”.

For Nehwati (1970) the attack on the Rhodesian Railways, an entity that had nothing to do with the administration of African townships, indicates the complexity and advancement of “class consciousness” fuelling the *Zhii* revolution. Indeed, the Rhodesian Railways being central to the economy and a major employer of African labour was seen by the poorly paid Africans-cum-rioters as an important part of an exploitative colonial assemblage. The African leadership had on many occasions raised the issue of poor wages among African workers before it culminated in the riots of 1960. For instance, Ngwabi (1989) notes that as early as 1950, Benjamin Burombo, one of the leading figures in African urban politics had observed with discontent how urban African workers were being underpaid. In one of the many conferences on African urban grievances organised by Benjamin Burombo himself, called to the employers to update wages in line with the cost of living. The African political leadership also argued that disparities in wages between Africans and Europeans excluded Africans from fully enjoying the privileges that came with living in an industrial city like Bulawayo. It is not surprising then

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<sup>22</sup> The word “*Zhii*” is loaded with military connotations. Nehwati (1970:251) suggests that the word *Zhii* has in many instances used as a “war cry” when attacking an opponent. The term also means “devastating action”, “complete destruction” or “crushing any object beyond retrieval”.

that when the *Zhii* attacks were carried out they targeted urban spaces that in some way represented privilege or by contrast symbolised the oppression of Africans. These attacks were meant to destabilise the monopoly whites had on the city, such:

In the city, they attacked the retail shops and restaurants. These were singled out because they are the places where Africans feel the impact of racial discrimination: prices are high and African wages are low, one-sixth of the white man's wage, yet and in the shops the African pays the same prices as the white man does. The restaurants deny him service. European-owned bars were attacked because they are a symbol of the white man's affluence and privilege (Nehwati, 1970:257).

Ranger (2010b) however warns us of the danger of assuming that the *Zhii* attacks of 1960 were only directed to whites since the African middle class was not spared from these attacks. Emerging black business owners, particularly shop traders, were immediate victims of these violent uprisings, losing most of their merchandise through lootings. Moreover, well-kept township houses which were presumed to belong to those that have attained the middle-class status were ransacked by angry mobs. Ranger (2010b) sees the *Zhii* pandemonium as the epitome of a Marxian class struggle, in the sense that attacks were only directed to those that appeared well-off or at a higher pedestal in society regardless of race or ethnicity. In supporting his argument on the signs of "class consciousness" in the patterning of the attacks, Ranger (2010b:237) writes that an inquiry to the violent Bulawayo disturbances found that "well-kept and trim houses and gardens had been damaged and looted.hovels and badly kept houses were not damaged, and many contained loot". The burning questions then are: 1) were the riots a typical case of the poor masses revolting against the rich? 2) How were these disturbances related to the spatial arrangements prevailing at that time?

### *2.5.1 The Role of Poverty in the Zhii Riots*

The *Zhii* upheavals were a result of the mass poverty that characterised the materially beleaguered townships or so-called "black city". The Commission of Inquiry into the *Zhii* riots established by Ashton Hugh, then mayor of Bulawayo revealed that the disturbances were a product of high levels of unemployment and income poverty which had pushed township households into a state of precariousness (Nehwati, 1970; Ranger, 2010b). Accordingly, the *Bantu Mirror* of 6 August 1960 reported that the "unemployed Africans who roam the city streets" were largely responsible for the turmoil that ensued during the riots (see Ranger, 2010b:235). In a similar vein, the *Chronicle* newspaper of 5 August 1960 revealed that most goods looted during the riots were recovered from African families that were experiencing extreme levels of poverty.

For instance, A.T.M. Mehlis, a police officer involved in the recovering of looted goods argued that destitution among Africans was the major reason for the occurrences of the riots. Narrating his experiences of witnessing widespread poverty in African townships while searching for looted goods after the *Zhii* riots, A.T.M. Mehlis had this to say, “searching the township houses for stolen goods, I found little but vast numbers of children and also everywhere poverty” (quoted in Ranger, 2010b: 235). Similarly, the *Parade* newspaper of September 1960 indicated that most of the grievances that were raised by the rioters “centred on low wages and unemployment” (ibid). Nehwati (1970) has however contested the portrayal of the “unemployed” as the only protestors that participated in the riots of 1960. He argues that of all the agitators that were arrested, about 75 percent of them were in employment. The involvement of the employed and presumably not so impoverished Africans in the riots suggests that unemployment and poverty could not only have been the only main causes of the riots. For Nehwati (1970) and Ranger (2010b), the riots represented an attack on the broader structural and spatial arrangements of the colonial city that perpetuated the deplorable conditions in the black townships.

### *2.5.2 Resisting the Structural and Spatial Arrangements of Colonial Bulawayo*

The *Zhii* riots characterised a multi-faceted resistance that reflected anti-European sentiments, Africans’ antagonistic feelings towards the municipality, gender, and class tensions. As already noted by Nehwati (1970) and Ranger (2010b) argued that the riots were not simply about the lack of unemployment among Africans, but a protest on the lack of basic amenities and provisions of decent housing, water, and sanitation in the townships. The unequal spatial arrangements between the “black city” and the “white city” of Bulawayo, underpinned through discriminatory urban laws, precipitated the hostility Africans had towards Europeans. The *Zhii* riots were an embodiment of a political attempt by urban Africans to violently disentangle the racial discrimination in appropriating space and social services. Many Africans looked to the riots as a beginning of the freedom struggle and a political advancement towards a non-racial Bulawayo.

Although the riots of 1960 were chaotic and violent, they paved the way for the growth of African nationalism. Black nationalist leaders later challenged their exclusions from the decision-making structures of a white-dominated city council. The likes of Burombo called for the self-governance of townships with minimal involvement of the city council (Bhebhe, 1989). He argued that the inclusion of Africans in the city of Bulawayo could only materialise if they

are allowed to independently build their house designs, choose their residential location, and determine the services they wanted (Bhebhe, 1989). Similarly, the *Zhii* riots opened avenues for women to stage their protests against the draconian urban spatial laws and the unchanging patriarchal system that had systematically kept women out of the confines of the city. Women's urban associations openly criticised the idea of a city being a male space (Ranger, 2010).

Taking advantage of the bad reputation single men had gained from participating in the riots, women quickly assumed a newfound role of being good citizens and sought common ground with their oppressors i.e. city officials and African males (Nehwati, 1970). By collaborating with married African men and city officials in condemning the so-called bachelors for the violent lootings and destruction of properties in the townships, women challenged a long-held view that females were the sole cause of the decline in moral and social order in the city (Ranger, 2010). Women later demanded the city council to be responsive to the ever-growing informal economy by constructing more vending sites in townships and at the peripheries of the city. In general, the *Zhii* riots had little impact in halting the increasing levels of unemployment in Bulawayo, resulting in a rapid expansion of the informal sector (Nehwati, 1970).

## **2.6 Informal Trading and the Last Days of Colonialism (1970-1980)**

Like in most African cities, Bulawayo's informal trade rose steadily in the aftermath of the global oil shock of the 1970s, which caused the plummeting of wage employment in most economies in Africa (Mpofu, 2010). Apart from the oil crisis, unemployment was further heightened by the eroding of the Rhodesian economy in 1974 caused by the British imposed sanctions on Ian Smith's regime (Mpofu, 2009). The sanctions directly led to the shutdown of manufacturing industries in Bulawayo, resulting in the dwindling demand for formal wage labour consequently forcing residents to rely more on informal activities for survival (ibid). Between 1974 and 1979, the number of street vendors had rapidly increased with over 500 informal traders selling consumable goods including vegetables, boiled eggs, Mopani worms, dried tobacco leaves and electrical components in the township of Makokoba and its surrounding areas such as Country Bus Terminus, popularly known by locals as *Erenkini*<sup>23</sup> (Davis, 1978).

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<sup>23</sup> *Erenkini* is a corruption of the English term "Rank-in".

The majority of emerging informal traders were not registered by the council as the colonial licencing system remained reluctant to accommodate informality within the urban confines (Ranger, 2010). Davis (1978) criticised the failure of Bulawayo City Council's urban governance and business licencing structures to control and at least recognise the economic value of the bulging informal economy and its impact on the many impoverished and jobless households in the townships. He gave this evocative account of the informalisation of townships in Rhodesia:

Walk around the urban townships of Rhodesia or live for only a short while in the tribal trust lands and you will find illegal or pirate taxi operators, vegetable hawkers, curio makers, back street bicycle repairers, builders, furniture makers, tailors, prostitutes, shebeen queens, shoe-shine boys, herbalist and a host of other operators, mostly small-scale commodity producers are people providing services all of whom are ignored in official definitions of economic activities (Davis, 1978:4).

The unwillingness of the Bulawayo City Council of 1970s to mainstream informal trading into the urban landscape, despite its positive impacts on urban livelihoods, was mainly influenced by the dominance of modernist approaches at the time. For instance, the proliferation of street trading activities in Johannesburg, South Africa were considered as an aberration to the idea of a modern city and were seen by city planners as conflicting with the ideal urban forms and plans that were constructed according to European urbanity (Murray, 2011:52). Accordingly, by constructing and branding street trading within discourses of filthiness, uncivilization, criminality, backwardness, and chaos, the colonial urban authority succeeded in deliberately sanctioning and stunting the developments of street trading in urban centres (see Popke and Ballard, 2004:104).

It is, however, important to note that the banning of informal activities in colonial cities of Africa provided fertile grounds for future establishments of street-level “insurgent entrepreneurialism” and “solidarity entrepreneurialism”. By utilising these forms of entrepreneurialism, traders managed to organize collectively, mobilise, and defy municipal by-laws by moving from the margins to the centre of urban districts (Meth, 2010; Kinyanjui, 2013). The informal traders' gradual occupation of the urban central districts in Bulawayo in the early 1980s like in other African cities was facilitated by strong urban social networks, complex social capital relations of kinship that promoted group agency, and a further nurturing of collective entrepreneurialism in street trading (Brown *et al.*, 2010).

While the democratisation of urban spaces after Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 led to the gradual encroachment of informal traders, acceptance, and integration of informal

traders into the urban economy, contestations over urban space continued to characterise Bulawayo's urbanity. Indeed, the conflicting rationalities of "informal" versus the "formal", "clean" versus "filthy", "planned" versus "unplanned" and "orderly" versus "disorderly" which existed among city authorities and township residents of colonial Bulawayo remained embedded even in post-colonial Zimbabwe urban spatial politics (see Morreira, 2010:359).

For instance, in 2005 contestation over the appropriation of urban space manifested in the implementation of the controversial Operation *Murambatsvina* (say no to dirt) a "city cleaning" exercise that was aimed at taming the increase of informalities, informal traders, and filth within cities across Zimbabwe. The carrying out of such an exercise was unsettling and untimely given the harsh urban realities of unemployment, depressed wage incomes, low purchasing power and food shortages that epitomise urban life (Potts, 2006; 2010). The impacts of Operation *Murambatsvina* (say no to dirt) are discussed in detail in the next section. The next section also explores some of the major political and economic processes that have shaped and reshaped urban informality in post-colonial Zimbabwe specifically the period of 1990 to 2010.

## **2.7 Developments of Informality in Post-colonial Zimbabwe (1990-2008)**

The period of 1990 to 2010 is characterised by four major interrelated political and economic processes that have a profound impact on the constitution and reconstitution of urban informality in Bulawayo. The adoption of the World Bank inspired Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in 1990; the rise of informal foreign currency dealers; the rolling out of Operation *Murambatsvina* (say no to dirt) across major cities across Zimbabwe in 2005 and the rise of the *Kukiya kiya* economy.

### *2.7.1 Informalisation under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme*

The implementation of ESAP from 1991-1995 marked a transition of Zimbabwe from being a socialist state to one dominated by free-market development strategies (Masaka, 2013; Bond and Manyanya, 2002). Under ESAP, the economy of Zimbabwe was rapidly liberalised and deregulated and the role of the state in socio-economic development was replaced by market forces (African Development Bank, 1997; Sachikonye *et al.*, 2007:102). The state was further expected by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to set up a new direction in policy implementation and development strategy which de-emphasised

investments and expenditure on public and social goods such as health and education (Sachikonye et al., 2007).

Deflating the public service wage bill, retrenchments, removal of subsidies on foodstuffs, salary cuts and privatisation of state parastatals were some of the outcomes of ESAP (Kamete, 1998; Bond and Manyanya, 2002; Sachikonye et al., 2007). The implementation of ESAP intensified rather than reduced urban poverty and consequently promoted an increase in informal activities (Drakakis- Smith et al., 1995; Kanji, 1995; Potts, 2010; Magure, 2014). The loss of formal employment, retrenchments, food insecurity, and loss of household income “...saw the emergence and rapid growth in the informal sector... comprising of cross-border trading, mineral panning (particularly gold), petty trading and currency trading” (Sachikonye et al., 2007:119).

By the end of 1993, Bulawayo had contributed its share to the 60 000 job losses recorded nationally by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (Kanji, 1995). The shrinking of wage labour in Bulawayo’s textile and manufacturing sector meant an increased demand and competition for urban space needed for setting up informal activities such as urban subsistence farming and vending (Brown, 2001:326). Moyo (2000) expresses a similar view, arguing that ESAP “...led to increasing poverty, growing numbers of retrenches, low-income urbanites to turn towards the land for their survival or economic enterprise”. Alexander (2003:94) agrees with Moyo (2000) and Brown (2001) and notes that “...the implementation of a structural adjustment programme in 1991, and the ensuing decline in services and land redistribution, as well as economic decline and drought, placed a premium on gaining access to land and other resources”.

According to Brown (2001) urban public spaces such as parking lots, pavements and unused lands became important for the urban poor to utilise for meaningful accumulation and household economic survival. The ESAP had far-reaching socio-economic impacts that built up and spilled over to the next decade of post-2000. It is this neo-liberal project that unleashed a series of unfortunate events such as the food riots of 1999, the chaotic land occupations, hyperinflation, and the cash crunch that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of a new type of informal foreign currency trader (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010).

### 2.7.2 *The Rise of Informal Foreign Currency Dealers*

The post-2000 political and economic quagmire spurred the emergence of a new type of street trader operating in a newly established informal currency trading economy. Informal currency traders popularly known in Bulawayo as “*Osiphatheleni*” proliferated along the busiest streets of the city, occupying the urban public spaces between Fort Street, 5<sup>th</sup> Avenue, and 6<sup>th</sup> Avenue; these spaces were affectionately known by locals as the “World Bank” (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). The illegal operation of informal currency trader or “*Osiphatheleni*” in the major cities of Zimbabwe was easily justified by the depreciating of the Zimbabwean dollar that forced people to buy stable foreign currencies such as the American dollar, the South African Rand and the Botswana Pula. Since the formal banking systems were bankrupt in foreign currency and transacting in rather low government fixed rates of exchange, many people opted for informal currency traders who had much higher exchange rates (Jones, 2010; Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). The closeness of Bulawayo in terms of geography to both South Africa and Botswana also allowed informal currency trading to flourish. Remittances from Zimbabweans in the diaspora ensured that the business of informal currency trading operating within the rapidly informalising city thrived (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006).

The presence of informal currency traders and the unabated increase of illegal foreign exchange dealings in cityscapes did not remain unchecked and uncontested. The setting up of “Home Link” a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) in 2005 at the heart of the so-called “World Bank” signalled an attempt by the state to re-appropriating of this urban space and reclaim it from unruly informal currency traders. Home Link, a brainchild of the then Governor of the RBZ Gideon Gono, was established to be the only receiver of remittances and trader in foreign currency. The Home Link project, however, was subjected to fierce competition from the parallel foreign exchange market with favourable exchange rates (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). The government employed tactics such as police raids on suspected informal currency dealers. However, this did not yield tangible results as the police themselves ended up soliciting bribes from foreign currency street traders, thus turning a blind eye. Unsettled by the perceived increase of criminality and the ‘spatial unruliness’ associated with informal foreign currency trading, the government unleashed a state induced displacement exercise “*Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order*” in 2005 (Hammar, 2008; Morreira, 2010; Magure, 2014).



### 2.7.3 Taming Informality and Disorderliness through 'Operation Murambatsvina'

Operation *Murambatsvina/ Restore Order* which was conducted in 2005 was a state-backed spatial management process aimed at cleaning up urban areas "...physically, morally and legally" (Hammar, 2008:426). Under this operation home-based industries, illegal house cottages, tuck shops, and trading stalls were razed to the ground by the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the youth militia resulting in the intensification of poverty in an already economically stressed urban population (Kamete, 2009). This controversial operation crippled the informal economy which had come to be seen as the "real economy", employing at least 70 percent of the urban population in Zimbabwe and constituting at least 60 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006).

According to the "Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe" by Tibaijuka (2005), the negative impacts of Operation *Murambatsvina/Restore Order* were dire, directly destroying the livelihoods of 700 000 urban dwellers and indirectly affecting about 2.4 million urbanites that depended on the informal sector for survival. These figures are particularly worrying if they are compared to the unemployment figures for the post-2000 period in Bulawayo. For instance, According to Mills (2012) in post-2000, the Bulawayo manufacturing industries continued to dwindle with only 350 fully operational manufacturing companies employing around 100 000 people against a population of close to a million of the economically active. He further asserts that by the end of 2009, only 250 manufacturing companies were left, employing only 50 000 people.

Interestingly, the ZANU-PF led government utilised and re-enacted past colonial discourses of modernity to justify its implementation of "Operation *Murambatsvina/ Restore Order*". As the name suggests, it was done with the same intent as colonialists had of getting rid of dirt in "white spaces". It is not therefore surprising that the campaign was laden with colonial-cum-civilization narratives of "cleanliness", "orderliness" and urban sanity that African urbanites were subjected to in colonial Rhodesia (Morreira, 2010:361). Far from restoring order in city spaces, for many Bulawayo residents "Operation *Murambatsvina/Restore Order*" was seen as an affront to basic human rights and the right to the city (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006; Kamete, 2009; Mpofo, 2011). Bulawayo residents regarded "Operation *Murambatsvina*" as reducing their "urban citizenship" and existence in the cityscape to mean nothing more than "*tsvina*" (dirt).

It is necessary to mention that Operation *Murambatsvina/Restore Order* was not simple informed by colonial and modernist rhetoric. As I will show in Chapter 3, the operation was utilised by ZANU-PF as a tool to amass power and destabilise MDC's key constituencies and electorate base. According to Ncube (2018:41), ZANU-PF used the operation to "...frame dissenting voices and all other forms of being that are perceived as deviating from the normative codes of the so-called Zimbabwean national identity". Thus, for Robert Mugabe, then President of Zimbabwe, the operation served to rid of those that ZANU-PF identified as attempting to reverse the gains of Zimbabwe's independence by voting for opposition parties. The MDC supporters, for example, were metaphorically described as "impure" citizens working with white farmers and the British government to return Zimbabwe to its sullied colonial history.

Harris (2008:44) argues that the clean-up exercise formed part of Mugabe's decolonisation campaign and a nationalistic struggle "... to return Zimbabwe to a 'pure' past, unsullied by the history of colonisation". In supporting Harris' argument, Wermter (2009:25) writes that Operation *Murambatsvina* targeted urban citizens "...that had voted for the "dirty" opposition [MDC], dirty because supported by white farmers [colonialists] had to be removed so as to "purify" the place by only allowing "pure" anti-colonialists to reside there [ZANU PF members]". It can be argued that Operation *Murambatsvina/Restore Order* was not just a clean-up exercise, but a process ZANU-PF utilised to consolidate political power, reignite ZANU-PF nationalism, and shape norms of urban citizenship. Indeed, Dorman (2015:85) articulates that "the pattern of urban clearances and intolerance of informality found in Zimbabwe are not simply a reflection of uncritical continuities with the colonial period. Instead, we can see how the re-assertion of 'order' by the post-colonial state is tied into nation-building, claiming the land and framing post-colonial citizenship, not just as 'belonging' but also as 'producing'".

## **2.8 The Emergence of the *Kukiya kiya* Economy**

The sudden collapse of the retail industry in 2008 and the subsequent dollarisation of the economy in 2009 gave the informal sector a new lease of life, leading to the rise of a unique street economy – the *Kukiya Kiya* economy. Jones (2010) demonstrates that the *Kukiya kiya*

economy<sup>24</sup>, which gained its potency in 2008 brought with its new forms of assemblages that made urbanity more malleable, flexible and accessible for impoverished urban denizens. According to Jones (2010) *Kukiya kiya*, is a Shona term that refers to multiple forms of “making do”. The term is also associated with the informal economy and it encapsulates any necessary activity that anyone engages in “to get by” or “survive the day”. In essence, the *Kukiya kiya* economy permitted urbanites to suspend and circumvent the workings and ordering of the formal economy and set up their form of urbanity. For instance, the emptiness of supermarkets forced urban dwellers to re-align their urban “imaginaries” and “realities” away from the supermarkets to street vendors operating on pavements who at that time of the crisis stocked food commodities not available in the shops (Brown, 2001).

Similarly, the *Kukiya kiya* economy also reconfigured the urban spatial and planning order. By 2008, the appropriation of urban space in Bulawayo was no longer left to city authorities, but to anyone who is “getting by” or trying to survive the precarious economic environment (Jones, 2010). It can also be argued that the appropriation of urban space from below by informal street traders of Bulawayo opened the urban terrains to new spatial-relations between bureaucrats and informal traders that were based on re-negotiating spaces through bribing of law enforcers, resistance through “quiet encroachment” and partial tolerance by turning a blind eye to illegal activities (see, Bayat, 1997; Magure, 2014). Similarly, Enwezor et al. (2003:19) argue that as African urban inhabitants reconfigure, remake cities and deploy their forms of urbanity borne out of daily realities and African cities become spaces for “...negotiations and agreement where new organizations and services, freedoms and autonomous spaces are emerging and developing- many of which are improvisatory-new types of exchanges, development and subsistence, forms of solidarity and resistance”.

Scholars like Ndi (2009) would argue that the emergence of the informal economy at the height of a collapsing more formal economy allowed the once restricted informal traders and the ordinary black urbanites to deconstruct hegemonic ideologies and the discursive processes through which narratives of European modernities were made to dominate the African urban space. Ndi (2009) goes on to argue that formal and capitalistic economy instabilities such as those experienced in Zimbabwe in the last two decades are essential in providing a platform for discontinuing the local urbanites’ over-dependency on Western capitalist-modernist urbanism. For instance, the collapse of the formal economy and the subsequent growth of the

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<sup>24</sup> In Zimbabwe the term *Kukiya kiya* is associated with the informal sector/economy.

*Kukiya kiya* economy led to a ruralisation of urban space where through rural-urban linkages, rural practises such as subsistence farming have been transferred to townships dotted across Bulawayo (Chibvongodze, 2013).

Shying away from western urbanism and the formally ordered economy, urban subsistence farming has permitted urban dwellers in Bulawayo to transpose innovative traditional cultures, institutions, practices and the indigenisation of the urban economic culture and discourses (Chibvongodze, 2013; also see Ndi, 2009). Demissie (2009) also subscribes to Ndi's contention, stating that the existence of the informal sector in African cities has created a unique Africanized form of urbanity where "...urban inhabitants are reconfiguring and remaking urban worlds, deploying their own forms of urbanity born out of their historical and material circumstances...recreating dense social networks, flows exchanges, and knowledge with their own architectural and urban development imprints" (Demissie, 2009:1-2). The transitioning of African cities and the emergence of new forms of Afro-centric urbanism is discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

## **2.9 Conclusion**

This chapter analysed current conflicts over the use of urban space existing between city authorities and street traders in Bulawayo. It problematised these struggles over city spaces within an "urban historiography" of Bulawayo. The chapter argued that prevailing planning and spatial rationalities which continue to sanction informal activities in the cityscape of Bulawayo are deeply embedded in past colonial and modernist discourses that systematically excluded the Native Africans together with their livelihood from the confines of the city. It further critically interrogated how space, race, and capitalism interacted in unison to form an ordered and panoptic urban environment in which the emergence of the informal economy was easily controlled and managed. The chapter also established that although colonial Rhodesia disallowed the informal economy, it did thrive. Localized economic activities such as shebeens and home-based beer brewing penetrated the wage-based urban economy of colonial Bulawayo creating a redistributive type of a local economy, where money earned from formal wage employment was allowed to circulate within the township.

The chapter further asserted that the encroachment of street traders in the cityscape in post-colonial Bulawayo was largely contributed by an intensification of urban poverty in the 1990s after Zimbabwe embarked on the destructive ESAP which manufactured mass urban poverty,

thus increasing the demands for city spaces among the impoverished urbanites. As urban informality continued to increase in the wake of a de-industrializing economy of Bulawayo, struggles over spaces existing between street traders and city authorities intensified culminating in the rolling out of Operation *Murambatsvina* in 2005 which temporarily dislodged the informal economy.

The chapter also briefly discussed the re-emergence of the informal economy in the form of *Kukiya kiya* economy. In this type of localised economy informal traders and ordinary people in general have reconfigured the workings and ordering of the ailing formal economy, reassembling it and re-appropriating city spaces in a manner that speaks to their material experiences and perception of everyday urban life. This informal re-appropriation of urban space by the ordinary has in many cases been met with resistance coming from city officialdom. They regard it as being misplaced within the rationalities of a “planned city” and have utilised various modalities of identity, legislations, knowledge, and power to at least control the informalisation of urban space. The next chapter looks at how the production of space, knowledge, and identity interacts with the broader “hegemonic” control of informality in urban spaces.

## CHAPTER THREE: CONTROLLING INFORMALISATION OF URBAN SPACE AND THE BODY: FROM IDEOLOGY TO PRACTICE<sup>25</sup>

*“The body is an appropriate place to begin a ‘psychoanalysis of space’, partly because it is the one site for the intensifying articulation of power, desire and disgust of the individual, the social and the spatial...the body is never a merely passive surface...” (Pile, 1996:184).*

*“Everyday space is not only self-evidently innocent but also bound into various and diverse social and psychic dynamics of subjectivity and power” (Rose, 1993:37).*

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter engages Foucault’s (1995) concepts of “bio-power” and “governmentality”, Lefebvre’s (1974) theory on “the production of space” and Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” to understand how the body, space, and ideology interact with the production of governable city spaces and the disciplining of urban informality. It further explores how this interaction functions in producing certain “consensual” rationalities, subjectivities, and realities that are later utilised by city authorities to problematise and regulate the conduct of certain space users, in this case – street traders. While in this chapter, I recognise Foucault, Gramsci and Lefebvre’s immense contributions to the spatial, body and knowledge discourse, I extend on their work and examine the existentialities, territorialisation, and production of black bodies within African urban spaces. In the previous chapter, I argued that for one to fully appreciate the current evictions of Zimbabwe’s street vendors and informal traders, one should trace it back to the production of both black bodies and spatial identities under colonial rule.

This chapter will, therefore, appeal further to the work of Pile (1995) and Gordon (1995) in interrogating specifically how the *situatedness* of black bodies in cities, which according to Fanon (1963) is most of the time fragmented intersects with the control of informalisation. It goes on to argue that that the regulation of urban informality does not only include the actual evictions and raids but rather also involves subjecting the body and the activity of street traders to certain negative connotations. In regulating urban informality, discourses of power and ideology are utilised to construct it as a problem and a pathology. It further considers the

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<sup>25</sup> Some parts of this theoretical chapter were used for a book chapter titled “*Citizenship, Gender and the Technologies of Governance: An Interrogation of the Low-Income Housing Programme in KwaZulu-Natal*” written by Sithembiso Lindelihle Myeni and Danford Tafadzwa Chibvongodze (2020) pp 112-126. The chapter appears in a book titled “*The Political Economy of Government Subsidised Housing in South Africa*” edited by Myeni, S and Okem, A; published by Routledge, London in January 2020.

“body” as an important site in which such pathologisation of urban informality takes effect. The chapter also contends that the negative representation of informality in most African cities has always coincided with the undesirable portrayal of the black body. It is useful at this stage to point out that in this chapter I treat the term “body” not only in a biological sense, but I extend it to mean race, gender, social identity, language, and to some extent one’s occupation.

The second part of this chapter aims at critically examining the influence spatial rationalities have in forging social and occupational identities of urbanites. It raises an argument that the socio-occupational identities are essential tools used by those in the upper echelons of urban governance to exclude certain groups of people particularly street traders from the confines of the city. In supporting this contention, the chapter focuses on cases where such identities have been utilised to carry urban processes such as evictions of street vendors, demolishing of slums and criminalisation of the “powerless” that partake in the informal economy. The chapter briefly looks at some of the evictions and slum clearance processes that have been conducted in the cities of New Papua Guinea, Zimbabwe, and India. City officials from the aforementioned countries have similarly utilised the rationalities of cleanliness and modernity to justify the evictions of informal traders and slum dwellers.

The third part focuses on how the re-interpretation of urban informality, “occupationality” and “cityness” by post-modernist urban theorists that have impacted the way informal traders or the so-called “poor” are now represented in the field of urban studies. It reviews the writings of Chabal (2009); Roy (2009); Nuttal and Mbembe (2008), Pieterse (2013), and Myers (2011) which argue for a renewed urban approach that understands and celebrates the important role street trading occupies in the global economy. The next section looks at the complex relationship between space, the body, identity, and rationality in the (re)constructing of “cityness” and “*urban sensorium*” in African cities. Attention is given to how such a relationship intersects with urban informality.

### *3.1.1 Problematizing Informality: As a Mode of Urban Spatial Control*

As cities in the global South continue to grow in population density, its respective urban authorities have tended to rely on modernist ideologies and spatial rationalities to regulate informality and urban sprawl (Huxley, 2006; Kamete, 2009). Accordingly, the control of urban informality in post-colonial Africa has largely depended on “modernist discourses” constructing it as a problem and an aberration to the notions of aesthetic cities. Its regulation

has therefore centred on transmitting seemingly agreed depictions of urban informality as illegal, “anti-development”, “chaotic” and “unclean”. Such negative representations of urban informality are also extended to the urban poor who seem to dominate the informal sector. Consequently, the control of informal traders by city officialdom has depended on appropriating their bodies with certain markers that represent them as “disorderly”, “unruly” and a “threat” to hygienic urban spaces (Huxley, 2006; Kamete, 2009). To use Foucault’s (1995:136) expression, containing informality in African cities, has involved the “offering up” of the bodies of those deemed “undesirable” to technologies of control. This subjecting of the body to various techniques of spatial control by technocrats has been guided by the interrelated processes of 1) bio-power 2) the production of *representation* and *representational* spaces, 3) Hegemonic use of power and “governmentality”. In many ways, these processes have functioned to depict “urban informality” as a challenge to urban governments seeking what Byerly (2010) refers to as a “good city” with equally “good citizens”. The immediate relationship between the body and space is established through the modalities of bio-power, which establishes self-regulation and governing of urban spaces by technocrats from a distance.

### **3.2 Bio-power: The Production of Space and Subaltern Bodies**

Rabinow and Rose (2006:196) see “biopower” as one of the technologies of power that “serves to bring into view a field comprised of rationalised attempts to intervene upon vital characteristic of human existence”. The physical body is one such vital human characteristic that has been crucial in the execution of biopower. Foucault (1978, 1995) finds the body as an important site of exercising “disciplinary power” and exerting social control over space and those considered as subjects. He asserts that the “docility” of the body and the ability to train it allows it to be subjected to certain sets of “discourses”, “truths” and “ideologies” that are essential in governing everyday conduct of others from a distance (Foucault, 1995:136). Pitts (2003) agrees with Foucault (1995) arguing that the body is not only a biological entity but a site where power and knowledge are produced and enacted. She further regards the body as a “...primary space to identify, label and manage the psyche” of the ruled. Foucault (1995) and Pitts’ (2003) assertion is also supported by Rabinow and Rose (2006) who state that biopower functions effectively when the “the body”, is made to relate to “discourses of truth” and “...to array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth” (Rabinow and Rose, 2006:197).

For Sibley (1992) and Pile (1996) biopower goes beyond subjecting the body to certain truths or authorities, but also involves attaching it to imaginary and symbolic spatialities. They further



go on to employ Freudian psychoanalysis methods to ascertain the intricate relationship of the body and space in forming boundaries between the self and others. Subsequently, they assert that these boundaries work to control and separate people from certain places based on their human characteristics such as culture and identity. In many ways, the production of identities in relation to spatiality has been closely linked to the exclusion and “othering” of certain groups in cities. This is noted by Sibley (1992:107) who states that “...the boundaries of societies are continually redrawn to distinguish between those who belong and those who, because of some perceived cultural difference, are deemed to be out of place”. Those that are seen to be out of place in certain spaces are then “...held at a distance through the social regulation of space” (Pile, 1995:88). Accordingly, the social regulation of space legitimises the exclusion of a particular group by representing its culture, identity, and disposition as “undesirable”.

For instance, Sibley’s (1992) work on the Gypsies in urban Britain shows that constructing the Gypsy community as “dirty”, “disorderly” and “dangerous” by dominant British society allowed for them to be viewed as “polluting” spaces controlled by the dominant society. Consequently, Sibley argues that marking Gypsies as “pollution” further permitted their presence in urban Britain to be viewed as being “out of place” and therefore legitimising the authorities’ regulation, control and policing spaces inhabited by Gypsies. This social organisation of space is similar to that of colonial Rhodesia, where the production of space was complemented with the production of cleanliness and the racialization of dirt (Burke, 1996:17). In controlling Africans in the so-called “European spaces”, their bodies were represented as “filthy, dirty and hygienically unsafe” and unfit to occupy urban spaces (Burke, 1996: 19-20). This disgust towards African bodies is seen in early European missionaries’ interaction with the local *Shona* people whom they later described as “*chiSwina*” or “*Amaswina*”<sup>26</sup> meaning “dirty people” (Burke, 1996:26; Makoni et al., 2006:385). Interestingly, this derogatory name with its roots in coloniality is widely used by the *Ndebele* people of today for instance when looking down upon the *Shona*. The dirtying of the African body in colonial Africa had a profound effect on how its ontological structures relate to space, specifically to spaces reserved for Europeans.

In my understanding, if the “body is consciousness” as stated by Sartre (1956:105), then the body plays a vital role in shaping people’s feelings, worldviews, actions and thoughts. In this

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<sup>26</sup> This term *Amaswina* is also found in the early writings of a Reverend Thomas Morgan Thomas, more specifically in his book “Eleven Years in Central South Africa” published in 1872. He uses this term to describe the *Shona* people.

case, the construction of African bodies as embodying “dirt” and “pollution” by dominant Europeans plays out in the way Africans think of themselves or act around Europeans or in any spaces they occupy. Ideally, the disgust in the presence of African bodies in certain areas deemed to belong to Europeans infused not only a sense of inferiority among colonial Africans but further made their existence in areas reserved for Europeans a troubling if not an alienating one (Fanon, 1961; Pile, 2000). Such alienation is felt by Fanon in his colonial experiences of Paris as a black person. Pile (2000:263) captures Fanon’s grappling with the “...colonial situation [that] puts a mirror up to the face of the black man and the reflection tells him that he is inferior...”. Because colonised black people can only view themselves as the “other” or the “inferior” in relation to white places and spaces, it forces them to subconsciously or consciously withdraw their bodies from such polarising spaces (also see Vera, 1998).

Commenting on how the institutionalisation of white racism at Britain’s workplaces operates, Puwar (2004:59) observes that it depends on constructing black bodies as “invaders” of spaces traditionally reserved for white people. Consequently, black bodies that occupy job positions formerly reserved for whites are kept under super-surveillance and are made to feel unwelcome and out of place. Indeed, Puwar (2004:41-42) argues that “the claims ‘black’ bodies make on institutions by occupying spaces they are not expected to be in are constantly challenged by a look which abnormalises their presence and locates them, through the workings of racialised framings, as belonging elsewhere...”. Puwar (2004:40) asserts that the policing of black bodies in Britain’s racially polarised workplace helps to “...glue collectivities of whiteness with a superior sense of their ‘natural’ right to occupy privileged spaces of institutional representation...”. It further permits the “...negative construction of black bodies in the asymmetrical racial binary...” to be placed “... outside ‘civilised’ white places” (Puwar, 2004:60). Yancy (2017: xv) adds that it is this “white gaze” which he understands as the surveillance of “...the black body within the context of whiteness” that causes the black body to undergo a process of self-alienation and withdraw its presence when confronted with the “white gaze” (see Yancy, 2017:4).

Gordon (1995:98) argues that making the body invisible in the presence of whiteness was “...part of the traditional chattel roles of blacks in slavery and blacks in colonial societies”. I regard this “invisibility” as a self-regulation exercise that feeds into the grand regulation scheme of space by the dominant group. It is worth noting that, when the colonised blacks withdrew their bodies from the so-called European spaces, they found “solace” and “freedom” in the so-called black spaces such as townships, projects or ghettos notwithstanding their

wretchedness and impoverishment. By yearning freedom, I assert that the black body restricted itself to the township—a place where it was at least comfortable albeit within the destitution and precariousness that characterised that space. Hegel points to the importance of freedom to the existentiality of the body when he writes that “in so far as I am alive, my soul and my body is the existence of freedom, and I feel through it” (Hegel, 1967:94). With its presence being felt in the ghetto on one hand, and its absence recognised in European spaces, the black body learns to regulate itself between these contrasting situations.

This predicament of the black body is discussed by Gordon (1995:102):

...the black body lives on fine line between Absence and orchestrated Presence. It disciplines itself to be *incognito*, to blend in with its environment on the one hand, and at other times it grins, dances, leaps, twirls; it exaggerates itself. Its existence is always superfluous. Since its problem is that it exists, its efforts to justify its existence always miss their mark.

While Gordon (1995) sees self-regulation of black bodies as always in limbo, I assert that it is within this self-regulation of the body that the effectiveness of colonial *biopower* is found. It is important to acknowledge that self-regulation is not only established through the production of space and bodies, but also the production of knowledge (or production of truth) by dominant groups.

### 3.2.1 *Big Brother is Watching: The Logics of Self-Regulation*

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1995) shows that the exercise of power is not only a top-down process nor is it solely depend upon the application of repression, but also rests on “individualised” self-discipline (Foucault, 1995:120). In addition to subjecting the body of the ruled to bear the world views of the rulers, the other function of *biopower* is that of creating an environment where ruled subjects can regulate themselves following certain laws, forms of authorities, and “discourses of truth” with minimum supervision. Foucault (1995) warns against understanding the exercise of power only in the context of coercive and repressive state apparatus such as the army, police, and fiscal administration, arguing that this is not only inadequate but misleading. He then suggests that power is “ubiquitous”, meaning that it is at work everywhere and at any time when the body interacts with “objects” of this world.

Foucault’s argument (1995) helps in understanding the logic of self-regulation. Let us take for example a motorist who stops at a red traffic light in a not so busy road with fewer patrols from traffic officers. According to Foucault, the behaviour displayed by the motorist indicates that laws can be obeyed without any administering of force. For him, stopping at a red traffic light

is a matter of a motorist knowing what is prescribed as being “right” and “wrong”. In this case, the prescribed knowledge is “*you stop at a red traffic light*”, the motorist not only understands it as instructive or prohibitive traffic law but sees it as the “universal truth” which induces a sense of safety to the motorist and others. It is the recognition of this “universal truth” as interpreted by the motorists that encourages adoption of a self-regulating behaviour that abides by traffic laws, even in instances where no law authorities are enforcing it.

Hence, in recognising the importance of both power and truth or knowledge in regulating social behaviour, Foucault (1991) rightly maintains that certain “... ‘practices’ do not exist without a certain regime of rationality ... If I have studied ‘practices’, ... it was in order to study [the] interplay between a ‘code’ which rules ways of doing things ... and a production of true discourses which serve to found, justify and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things ...” (Foucault 1991a: 79). Foucault (1980) further argues elsewhere that “there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of the truth” (Foucault, 1980:93). Moreover, exercising power over subjects through self-regulation ensures that it becomes acceptable, and is seen as a good act and a norm by those being ruled. This argument is well put by Foucault who states:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also transverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault, 1995:120).

For instance, in the context of spatial control, biopower is administered through objects such as regulatory signs (a good example would be that of a “do not litter” signage). Such objects function not only to establish surveillance on space but also guarantees that the ruling class establishes the “governmentalities” of space through “consent”. Like Foucault, Gramsci (1977) also identifies the importance of “consent” in the production of governable spaces. Neo-Gramscian theorists such as Jessop (2005) have argued that while Gramsci is not usually considered a spatial theorist, his work illustrates the centrality of spatiality in the exercise and maintenance of hegemony.

### 3.3 Gramsci's Spatial-Hegemony Dialectic

Gramsci's notion of "hegemony" as Lefebvre (1974) understands it simply implies ruling or exerting permanent influence by the ruling class with minimal repressive violence. There was a growing realisation by those fighting Fascism that power was not exclusively secured through armies but via other human mediation such as schools, policies, intellectuals, plans, and experts (Bates 1975). For Gramsci (1977), it was more apparent that this form of power which he described as "hegemonic" had become an effective governing method employed by rulers over the Italian masses. Central to this "hegemonic power" was the idea of governing society through consent, which according to Bates (1975:352) is "...secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world views of the ruling class".

While, Gramsci (1977) is not normally considered a spatial geographer, his work on linguistics and specifically on *historicism* displays a full appreciation of the importance of space in influencing how hegemony operates and vice versa (Lefebvre, 1974:10; Kipfer, 2013; Goonewardena, 2005; Jessop, 2005). More importantly, Gramsci considers space as a discourse in which social relations and practices are produced and enacted (Jessop, 2005:424). Similarly, neo-Gramscian writer, Goonewardena (2005) asserts that the production of hegemony cannot be achieved without the production of space. Moreover, he argues that space is a medium of hegemony as it can be used to mirror the ideologies of the ruling elites (also see Martin and Miller, 2003).

The question of space being ideological is also raised by Jameson (1988b:35) and Lefebvre (1974:210). For instance, Lefebvre (1974:210) argues that while "ideologies [...] do not produce space, they are in space". Lefebvre (1974:11) goes on to ask a pertinent question in the opening pages of his book, *The Production of Space*, of whether "it is conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched"? He responds to this question by stating that an answer to such a question must be a "no" since space is heavily embedded with power and knowledge ready to be used in producing hegemony and vice versa. In exploring Gramsci's contribution to urban theory, I, therefore, analyse his influence on Lefebvre, more specifically in the conceptualisation of Lefebvre's spatial triad. Lefebvre's spatial triad consists of three interrelated aspects of space: *representations of space* (conceived space), *representational space* (lived space), and *spatial practices* (perceived spaces). Likewise, Kipfer (2008) has argued that traces of Gramsci's concept of hegemony are seen in each of Lefebvre's spatial triad and more crucially in his writing on the critique of everyday urban life.

It is also important for this chapter to interrogate the role of capitalism in the production of space and hegemony. According to Lefebvre (1974), the expansion of capitalism is attributable to the monopolistic control of the ruling class over the means of producing space. His views on the influence of capitalism on spatiality mirror that of Gramsci, who also contended that capitalism particularly in Italy and elsewhere in Europe was central to the establishment of a dual spatiality comprising of two distinct spaces—the city and the country. This spatial divide under the expansion of capitalism had some implication in the appropriating and shaping of social identities, which became apparent with the peasantisation and proletarianisation of space (Gramsci, 1977).

On one hand, “the city” became associated with “high modernism” spearheaded by politicians and technocrats, with the proletarians being at the foot of labour. Such a space centred around the planning and social organisation of “things”, to create transport hubs, grid cities, large factories, and communication infrastructure. On the other hand, “the country” embodied the traditional economies of peasant agriculture, and further served to supply cities with food and surplus labour. A similar pattern of such a capitalist production of space is seen in colonial and post-independent Zimbabwe which I discussed in the previous chapter. While the production of space is germane to the (re)production of capitalism and vice versa, it is the implications it has on the appropriation of spatial identities and the shaping of the social process that is of concern here.

In realising the powerful role of capitalism in influencing space via hegemony, Lefebvre, however, feels that the total control of space by the bourgeoisie and technocrats remains unopposed. He poses a critical question of whether it is instinctive that space will always serve hegemonic power. Another question is whether the masses will always consent to power and the appropriation of space from above? (see Lefebvre, 1991:11). These thought-provoking questions direct us to a neo-Gramscian notion of “counter-hegemony”, which suggests that subaltern groups do not always consent to the ideas or spatial methods of technocrats and ruling elites sometimes they contest them. Gramsci viewed the Italian rural and urban proletariat in particular as having the agency to mobilise and resist certain top-down assemblages, spatial identities, and hegemonies. Gramsci’s influential work on counter-hegemony has inspired some of the most recent literature on “subaltern urbanism” (for example see Roy, 2011; Meth, 2010; Kinyanjui, 2013; Mehrotra, 2008; Simone, 2008). In Chapter 8, I will explore the relevance of Gramsci’s idea of counter-hegemony in understanding street traders’ protests and the sprouting of street traders’ organisations in the city of Bulawayo. I will revisit some of

Gramsci's views on space in the later chapters of this thesis and see if his oeuvre can be applied in understanding the current contestation over urban space in an increasingly informalising city of Bulawayo. But, for now, I want to introduce the most important process in the production of space and hegemony which is capitalism.

### **3.4 The Domination of Capitalism is in "Space"**

In the previous chapter, I noted the influential role capitalism had in the re-organisation of space in colonial Rhodesia. Furthermore, I engaged the work of Harvey (1978, 2004); Scott (1998); Marx (1963) and Soja (1989) to show how capitalist accumulation depends much on having a hold on space and utilising it to control commodities such as labour. I went on to discuss space as being essential in subordinating labour to capital through the processes of "*primitive accumulation*" and "*accumulation by dispossession*". In this section, I engage Lefebvre's representations of space to provide an understanding of the processes in which capitalism is bound up with hegemony and the spatial form. Moreover, I draw my understanding of the capitalist production of space and hegemony from Gramsci's Marxist discourse on *historicism*, which I have already stated, which relates to some of my main arguments raised in Chapter 2. I appreciate how Gramsci looks at space with an historical lens, arguing that people's sensibilities towards space or any social interactions transacted through space are largely shaped by historical processes.

#### *3.4.1 Hegemony in the Representations of Space*

Capitalist hegemony and "modernism" can never be fully achieved without a well-crafted production and top-down appropriation of what Lefebvre refers to as the "representation of space". He considers "representations of space" or "conceived space" as closely "...tied to the relations of capitalist production and to the order which those relations impose and hence to knowledge, to signs, to code, and to 'frontal' relations" (Lefebvre, 1974:33). The "conceived space" is described by Merrifield (2000) as being a platform where ideology and power are embedded. It is in the "representations of space" (conceived space) that ideology and knowledge are used in the intervening and modifying of spatial *texture* by technocrats. According to Lefebvre (1974), "representations of space" which he also regards as a "space for capital", intervenes the spatial by way of constructing high rise architectural buildings, factories, and expansive spatial grids. The construction of such architectural assemblages is left to assorted professionals and technocrats that include planners, engineers, developers,

geographers, and urbanists. These agents and actors are further useful in ensuring that capitalism prevails through consent.

The other defining role of the “representations of space” is that of subordinating labour to capital in the early stages of capitalist advancement. As Marx (1965) argues, the subordination of labour to capital resulted in a metabolic drift. In the previous chapter, I argued that capitalism disrupted people’s direct dependence on the environment’, forcing them to depend on the wage-based economy. This dispossession of humans from nature facilitates an entrenchment of capitalism. Such a metabolic drift has an impact on the nature of space- a space once occupied by “nature” is emptied only to be re-occupied by “capital” through urbanisation.

Lefebvre (1974:49) has argued elsewhere that “...the invisible fullness of political space (...the space of the city) set up its rule in the emptiness of a natural space confiscated from nature”. The dominance of capitalist advancement thwarts “...the naturalness forever and upon its ruins established the space of accumulation (the accumulation of all wealth and resources: knowledge, technology, money...and symbols” (Lefebvre, 1974:49).

It should be noted that “representations of space” do not only facilitate the establishment of capitalism through consent; sometimes violence is meted out in producing the space of accumulation and that of hegemony. We are reminded by Lefebvre that “representations of space” which are the centres of wealth, power and dominance always “...endeavours to mould spaces it dominates (i.e. peripheral spaces), and it seeks, often by violent means, to reduce the obstacles and resistance it encounters there (Lefebvre, 1974:49). More often, the “representations of space” are marked with the establishment of a “bureaucratic and political authoritarianism immanent to a repressive space” (ibid).

There is inexhaustible historical literature on violent land dispossession projects that were carried out all over the globe under the auspices of capitalism. In Chapter 2, I discussed the violent land dispossessions in colonial and post-independent Zimbabwe, Gramsci writes of the dispossession of land from the rural *Sardinian* peasants in Italy by their local bourgeoisie. Additionally, in his prison notes, Gramsci writes that the hegemony of American industrialism centred on forcing people off the land, proletarianising peasants by pushing them into factories and wage employment. It is worth mentioning that Gramsci (1978:35, 268-269) insisted that the hegemony of American industrialism was epitomised by the emergence of “Fordism”, firmly grounding industrialism in the “factory”. While the dominance of “Fordism” spilled over into the everyday spaces of factory workers (i.e. neighbourhoods, public buildings, and



streets) they fiercely struggled for autonomous control of these spaces. The pervasiveness of hegemony is constantly felt in “everyday space”. As Pile (1992:173) would suggest, adequate “...understanding [of] social space in the abstract requires some grounding in the bodily experience of everyday life”. A focus on the interaction between hegemony and the production of “lived space” which are reflections of everyday experience (Lefebvre, 1992) is necessary if we are to understand the construction of spatial identities and dispositionality.

### 3.4.2 *Everyday Space*

One of the major contributions of Lefebvre in spatial theory or rather in critical geography was that of challenging us not to think of space strictly in a geometrical or architectural sense. Indeed, in the introductory passage of his book *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre redirects our focus away from the physical “nature” of space to what he terms “social space” (Lefebvre, 1974:1), which he considers not to be a “dead empty area” but pulsating with life. In other words, space is an extension of everyday life experiences. Lefebvre (1992: 6) talks of space as being a direct result of the *Le quotidien* defined as “...the mundane, the everyday and also the repetitive, what happens every day”. He engages his concept of “*Rhythmanalysis*” to argue that the production of space thrives on keeping abreast with everyday experiences that are always new, flexible, and innovative, usurping them into the modalities of power.

The consolidation of power and hegemony comes full circle in the “representational space” which according to Merrifield (2000:174) is “...directly *lived* space, the space of everyday”. This aspect of space is “directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols of its users and inhabitants...and it overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects (Lefebvre, 1974:39). I consider the production of this “representational space” as directly linked to the production of social identities and spatial dispositions. My observation also relates to that of Simone (2008) who argues that it is in the “representations” and “representational” space that attachment of identity to spatiality takes form. In his understanding of the appropriation of city spaces, Simone (2008: 70) asserts that “spaces are linked to specific identities, functions, lifestyles, and properties so that the spaces of the city become legible for specific people at given places and times”.

Similar to Foucault’s notion of biopower, I further see “representational space” as essentially important in tying the “body” to spatiality. The spatialisation of the “body” and certainly that of social identities is embedded in the “representational space”. Similarly, Grosz (1999:385)

argues “the city in its particular geographical, architectural, and municipal arrangements is one particular ingredient in the social construction of the body ...the form, structure and norm of the city seeps into and affect all other elements that go into the construction of corporeality”.

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the “spatialisation of the body” and social identities in the cities of Zimbabwe followed rigid racial, gender, class, and occupational lines. For instance, the central space of the city in colonial times was reserved for European residents, while the use of these spaces by Africans was tantamount to ‘criminality’. In the same manner, women’s residence in the cities was highly restricted, while the spill-over of occupational activities such as street trading from townships to city centres were aggressively contained. More importantly, this territorialisation of urban spaces led to technocrats and the society at large to attach negative spatial rationalities to a particular group of space users.

In a practical sense, the visibility of women in cities, for example, became to be associated with the spread of sexual immorality and diseases. Moreover, informal traders like the economic activity of vending were associated with the “uncleanliness” of urban spaces and were also perceived as disrupting the beautiful aesthetics of the city. This negative representation of such space users which persists in modern-day Zimbabwe categorises them as subjects to be controlled. In her concept of “dispositional spatial rationality”, Huxley (2006) has also argued that representing certain people as a threat to the orderliness of cities is important for urban technocrats constantly maintaining gaze on cityscapes.

Huxley (2006:774) describes the role of “dispositional spatiality rationality” as chiefly that of “...drawing boundaries and producing order that will foster correct compartments (sic)... it operates with the logics of grids of classification for the spatial disposition of ‘men and things’, to bring arrangement and visibility to bear on individuals and populations problematised as chaotic and uncontrolled”. Once the spatial dispositions of an individual or populations are deemed chaotic or unruly and incongruent with the desired registers of modernist urban imaginary, they are categorized as objects requiring policing, control and discipline (ibid). The dispositional spatiality rationality further helps to facilitate hegemony by permitting urban technocrats to directly influence people’s perceptions of the world and of their world (Merrifield, 2000). This brings us to the third aspect of spatiality that technocrats utilise to produce and maintain hegemony- the “perceived space”, sometimes referred to as “*spatial practices*”.

According to Lefebvre (1996:108), the “perceived space” or *spatial practices* represent a “...continuum midway between small-scale individual practices and large-scale social processes and institutions”. He further asserts that people always appropriate space according to broader social, economic and political realities they find themselves in. Similarly, like “representations of space” and “representational space”, the *spatial practices* embody the ideologies, socio-cultural beliefs, knowledge, symbols and more importantly the linguistics which inform the “spatial territoriality” of individuals. In interrogating the interaction of everyday individual perceptions with *spatial practices*, I will focus mainly on the issue of *language*, which I regard as instrumental in the spatial territorialisation of Zimbabwe and other African countries. I argue that a critical analysis of the spatial-hegemony dialectic is incomplete if it does not thoroughly capture the role of *language* in the production of space and that of power (also see Grang and Thrift, 2000:4; Ives, 2004).

### 3.4.3 *The Linguistics of Space*

In understanding Gramsci and Lefebvre’s approach to space and power, there is an urgent need to project our focus squarely on how they treat “space” as being linguistic. Lefebvre (1974:17) uncovers the concealed relations between space and language, stating that language is “spatiality capable of bringing order to the qualitative chaos (the practico-sensory realm) presented by the perception of things”. Lefebvre (1974) views language as a medium for the codification of space, the meaning of space and that of place is indeed communicated through language. Additionally, as Gramsci argues, through historical and repetitive everyday social processes, language has been positioned to subject people to specific spaces. The same argument is echoed by Lefebvre (1974:17) who asserts that specific spatial codes inherently found in language have been “established at specific historical periods” and have an impact on how society’s members relate to space.

He further suggests that it is through the everyday language that “subjects” are made to “accede to *their* space and to their status as “subjects” acting within that space and (in the broadest sense of the world) comprehend it” (Lefebvre, 1974: 17). Moreover, Grang and Thrift (2000:7) note that identity formation i.e. of “self” and “other” in the context of spatiality is “...often interpreted through a language...”, which puts up binaries that include and exclude particular social groups in utilising specific spaces. The daily use of local languages in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, for instance, attests to this argument that language mediates the appropriation of space. For example, the Ndebele locals of Bulawayo refer to the “city” as “*indawo yamakhiwa*”

(a white person's space) and the rural space as "*lapho okulenkaba yomuntu omnyama*" (where the roots of a black person are located). On one hand, the "city" has always been associated with "*ukuphucuka*" (modernity) which is also closely tied to "*amakhiwa*" (white people). On the other hand, the rural areas are known as "*indawo ezingela ntuthuko lempucuko*" (spatial areas that are underdeveloped and backward) that are linked to "*impilo yomuntu onsundu*" (the life of a black person).

Interestingly, Africans that are perceived to be successful and residing in former European suburbs are considered by other blacks as "*abelungu*" or "*amakhiwa*". This is also noted by Ngcoya (2016:42) who argues that the success of black Africans particularly those in the middle class is "...often equated with whiteness". It is against this standardisation of "whiteness" with "cityness" and "modernity" that I regard language as being used intentionally or otherwise to exclude those that appear to be "unsuccessful" and "not modern", and street traders seem to fit in these categories.

Street traders are discursively characterised in everyday language as "*abantu abaletha ukungcola edolobheni*" (people who produce filth in the city) and their presence in the city is often regarded as being problematic, disruptive to the city's aesthetic and its modernity. While, street trading is now widely accepted as a means of alleviating urban poverty in Bulawayo, street traders still experience harassment and evictions at the hands of the State (Morreira, 2010). The eviction and harassment of street traders in Zimbabwe have been partly politically motivated and have centred around limiting the informal traders' right to claim urban citizenship (Morreira, 2010). Similarly, in countries such as New Papua Guinea and India, the practice of controlling informality has been informed by how urban identities and citizenship are politically constructed to effectively remove those that are perceived as unfit to be in cities.

### **3.5 The Practice of Controlling "Urban Informalities" in New Papua Guinea, India, and Zimbabwe**

The countries of New Papua Guinea, India, and Zimbabwe have utilised similar political processes to deal with the unchecked informalisation of urban spaces. The validation of evicting street traders and slum dwellers in the respective countries evolved around the appropriation of urban identities and crucially the "right to the city". As stated by Holston (2008), when cities experience overcrowding due to rapid urbanization and high rural-urban migration, the State may find it necessary to exploit spatial identities to exclude "undesirable"

elements that come with their expansion. The control of urban informality in New Papua Guinea, for instance, has rested on re-enacting colonial urban and rural spatial divides such that the evictions of urbanites in the informal sector have been motivated by the perceptions that they should be rural residents (Koczberski et al., 2001).

### *3.5.1 Evictions and Slum Clearance in New Papua Guinea*

According to Connell (2003) and Koczberski et al. (2001), city authorities in New Papua Guinea have notoriously manipulated citizens' rural-urban binary identities established by the colonial spatial order to systematically evict slum dwellers from the urban fringes. According to Koczberski et al. (2001), state-induced evictions and slum clearance in New Papua Guinea's major towns of *Port Moresby*, *Madang*, *Lae*, *Kokopo*, *Goroka* and *Kimbe* were chiefly carried out to reverse the rural-urban migration flow. Accordingly, the extensive slum evictions that gripped New Papua Guinea between 1997 and 1999, primarily targeting informal traders, the unemployed, and slum dwellers were meant to restore spatial order and free urban space by displacing them to rural areas.

To justify the infamous *Madang* slum evictions which occurred between 1997 and 1999 affecting at least 8000 households (about 35 per cent of the city), the State relied on colonial spatial rhetoric of the "...villages as being the rightful place for Papua New Guineans-a place that offers a cleaner, more dignified and more 'traditional' way of life" (Korzybski et al., 2001: 2028). The act of evicting slum dwellers from informal settlements and forcing them to migrate to rural areas far from being perceived by the State as a violation of human rights was justified as a moral obligation by city leaders in preserving the rural and traditional lifestyle of Papua New Guineans (Connell, 2003). Additionally, forced removals of informal settlers were further motivated by the escalation of crime, unemployment, prostitution, and pollution in which the State argued that major cities like the capital *Port Moresby* instead embodying beauty and order had transformed into landscapes of despair and urban disorder (Nibbrig, 2002).

As such, the State viewed impoverished urban informal settlers, street vendors, beggars and the unemployed as "... prone to all the negative consequences of an urban life-a squalid, morally impoverished existence and crime-ridden lifestyle. The task then is a moral one, to remove these people from the urban landscape by encouraging them to return home to lead 'fulfilling' and productive lives" (Koczberski et al., 2001: 2028). By portraying marginalized Papua New Guinea urbanites as "temporary" town residents with permanent resident status in

rural areas, the city officials of New Papua Guinea resuscitated old colonial spatial techniques of controlling informality through circumscribing the bodies of locals within designated rural territories. Technically, the *Madang* slums clearance operation and evictions of street traders reinforced colonial depictions of local urbanites' presence in the city as totally misplaced and far removed from the rural place. The alienation of those in the informal sector from accessing full urban citizenship, the right to urban spaces, and in some instances nationality, is also evident in some of the eviction programmes that have been conducted in a largely informalising and slumming India.

### 3.5.2 Tackling Informality in India

The political act of disenfranchising street traders and slum dwellers from the city has also been at the heart of most slum clearance programmes and contestation over urban spaces in India (Baviksha, 2003; Radhakrishna, 2007; Bhan, 2009). Disqualifying slum occupants from the city of Delhi has been achieved by craftily shifting the government's failures in providing basic social amenities and an increasing anesthetization of poverty and urban space to slum dwellers (Bhan, 2009:17). The Indian bourgeois class comprising environmental economists, planners, and property owners have presented local slum dwellers and informal traders as economically unviable, environmentally harmful, and criminal, attaching their identities to the "unwanted" built environment of illegal slums (*ibid*). Baviskar (2003) adds that linking the visibility of dirt and pollution in Delhi to the existence of street traders as well as slum dwellers has been utilized by courts and the municipal council to come up with strong motives of removing street traders from city centres and flattening the *jhuggis* (slum houses) in Delhi.

On the one hand, in as much as the State of India recognizes that the right to urban citizenship of the urban poor is intimately connected to national citizenship, on the other hand, it has exploited the same notion of citizenship to exclude the poor who are normally seen by the State as migrants not having a permanent foothold in urban areas (Radhakrishna, 2007). This view is supported by Baviskar (2003:92) who argues that the destruction of 51,461 *jhuggis* between 1990 and 2003 and 45,000 *jhuggis* between 2004 and 2007 by the Delhi Development Agency was mostly informed by the perception of slum dwellers as rural or Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants with no grounds to claim eligibility to civic citizenship in Delhi.

### 3.5.3 Cleanliness or Politics? The Intricateness of Spatial Contestation in Urban Zimbabwe

Similar tactics of alienating people from claiming their urban spaces and “right to the city” were used by the government of Zimbabwe during *Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order* in 2005. Although it masqueraded as a “cleaning exercise” and an urban process of taming the chaotic nature of rapid urbanization and informalization, it carried a complex and politically partisan agenda (Kamete, 2009; Hammar, 2008; Bracking, 2005). While, the reasons for carrying seemed convincing and valid, critics were sceptical about the intentions of the highly militarized urban removals (Potts, 2006: 291; Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; Kamete, 2009; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010; Musoni, 2010). Critics have downplayed the notions that the operation was conducted solely to arrest illegal dealings, nip out corruption, and improve people’s lives in the cities. Contrary to these justifications, these critics have argued that *Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order* was politically motivated in three ways.

Firstly, adversaries of the operation have viewed it as a campaign of political retribution against opposition supporters in the cities; given the timing, when it was implemented. The execution of the forced evictions occurred just after less than two months of the March 2005 parliamentary elections, where the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) had failed to garner parliamentary seats of urban constituencies in Harare and Bulawayo that went to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Indeed, Bratton and Masunungure (2007:26) note that *Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order* appeared as an act of retribution by a vituperative ruling party against a non-compliant electorate”.

Secondly, the operation might have been used by ZANU-PF as an instrument of dismantling and destabilizing MDC’s key constituencies and electorate base (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005:22, 2010; Kamete, 2009: 907). The MDC has enjoyed immense electoral support from the major cities of Harare and Bulawayo as compared to ZANU-PF which has a stronghold in rural areas. Consequently, there are arguments that the forced urban removals of 2005 were intended to ‘ruralise’ the urban populace. Evicted families “...were instructed to return to their ‘homes’ in Zimbabwe’s rural areas regardless of whether they were born and bred urbanites” (Bratton and Masunungure, 2007:24). By driving urban residents to rural spaces, the ZANU-PF leadership anticipated easy coercion of the displaced urban residents into their support base (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010).

Thirdly, some political analysts assert that *Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order* was necessary for curtailing and containing a growing public discontent of urbanites emanating

from deepening poverty, economic and political crisis. These discontents might have been perceived by ZANU-PF as threatening to the legitimacy and credibility of their political structures, therefore dislodging such dissatisfaction through dispersing disgruntled urbanites to rural areas became crucial (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010). On the contrary, Tibaijuka (2005) does not solely put all the blame on ZANU-PF, in writing her facts finding mission report on *Operation Murambatsvina* (say no to dirt), she argues for the contextualization of this operation within a paradigm of persistent colonial spatial, biomedical and modernist discourses that continued to subject the African body to surveillance and control in post-colonial Africa (also see Burke, 1996:10-11). Cleaning operations such as *Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order* have however faced opposition from subaltern groups that have sought to remake cityscapes, re-appropriating them in a manner that speaks to their daily existence.

### **3.6 Subaltern Urbanism and Counter-Hegemony: Producing Future Cities**

Despite relentless efforts by the state to control and regulate African urban spaces by imposing visions of a planned city, new urban forms of “subaltern urbanism”, sometimes referred to as “rogue urbanism” (see Pieterse and Simone, 2012), have emerged within the urban confines where the control of the state is highly concentrated. The influx of women informal garment traders in the central business district of Nairobi, Kenya documented by Kinyanjui (2013), for example, signals a transition in African urbanity where the state and privately funded property developers are no longer the sole appropriator and producer of urban space. This spatial practice speaks to another important argument brought forward in Lefebvre’s theory on the production of space. Lefebvre argues that it is misleading to assume that the production of space is only limited to bureaucrats, administrators, and planners. He asserts that the production of space also takes place in everyday activities of “inhabitants” and “users” (Stanek, 2011).

By realising that the ordinary too can produce and reproduce space to their accord, Lefebvre then questions the dominance and relevance of the planning and modernist discourses in the constructing of a city. Lefebvre suggests that ordinary space “users” do not necessarily accept all the socio-spatial identities assigned to them by bureaucrats in both conceptualised and lived spaces. This argument feeds into the Gramsci’s “counter-hegemony” discourse, where space is treated as an interface characterised by a battle of ideas and contestation between “users” of space and its planners. Additionally, Jessop (2005) argues that since space is made up of everyday life activities, collective memory, and multiple social identities it becomes a site where various identities compete for dominance. He goes on to assert that “...the naming,



delimitation, and meaning of places are always contested and changeable and the coordinates of any given physical space can be connected to a multiplicity of places with different identities, spatio-temporal boundaries and social significance” (Jessop, 2005:42). The idea of “subaltern urbanism” further challenges the territorialisation of identities along the rural and urban divide. I will show in the next chapter that the proponents of subaltern urbanism have called for an expansive view that recognises cities, particularly those in Africa as places produced by a combination of both urban and rural social processes (see Tostensen *et al.*, 2001; Chabal, 2010). This rejection of spatial binaries and spatialized social identities also forms the crux of Gramsci’s understanding of subalternism which has shaped postmodern urbanism. For instance, Gramsci is praised by Kipfer (2013) for his dealings with subalternity and counter-hegemony, he notes that “...the power of Gramsci’s own formulation about subalternity is in his refusal to treat the city and the countryside divide as equivalent to social distinctions (peasantry versus workers or intellectuals, subaltern versus elite or transhistorical conception of modernity/traditional, progression/stagnation, and civilisation)” (Kipfer, 2013:95).

In taking the notion of counter-hegemony discourse and Gramsci’s views on subalternism forward, I argue that the informalisation of urban space epitomises contestation in two important ways. Firstly, informalisation of space is radical in the sense that it offers the urban poor in Africa an opportunity to challenge and dislodge modernist-cum-capitalist spatial rationalities and discourses and at least remake the city to fit the urban form they want. Secondly, the culmination of informalisation in urban Africa, either in the form of street trading, informal settlements, or labour gives the subaltern a platform to contest the negative characterisation of informality.

While I engage with the works of Gramsci, Lefebvre, and Foucault, I keep in mind these critical questions, of whether the increase of street traders in urban spaces of Bulawayo, particularly in areas undesignated for vending or with reference to the upsurge of urban social movements in Bulawayo, be interpreted as “subaltern urbanism”. If so, is it by any way effective in challenging dominant modernist visions of urban practice within the city of Bulawayo and Zimbabwe’s broader urban landscape? Can the ideas of Gramsci, Lefebvre, and Foucault be applied in understanding the processes and methods that street traders in Bulawayo use to appropriate contested urban spaces? I will attend to these questions in my later chapters. For now, I will redirect my attention to how subaltern urbanism has generated a crop of scholars that advocate for alternative ways in interpreting the urban processes of African cities

(Robinson, 2001; Simone, 2008; Myers, 2011; Pieterse, 2013). These urban scholars have made headways in formulating theories and visions that interrogate urban informality at least within the context of African urbanity.

### *3.6.1 African Urbanism: Reinterpreting Informality in African Cities*

The literature on “African urbanism” is burgeoning. Urban scholars such as Simone (2008), Murray (2011), Kihato (2007), Nuttal and Mbembe (2008), Pieterse (2013) have written extensively on the need to broaden an optimistic urban scholarship which speaks to the realities, processes, and experiences of African cities. This breed of scholars shies away from interpreting African urbanity through the lens of Western urban theories which sees informalities, infrastructural deficiency, and high levels of poverty in African cities as a symptom of failed development. Instead, they reinterpret the informalities of African cities as urban processes that when properly harnessed through effective urban policies can be converted to “assets”, “capacities” or “opportunities” that boost urban livelihoods (Ferguson, 2007:75).

The most important impulse behind the rise of “African urbanism” scholarship and research has been that of putting ordinary people’s everyday practices and behaviours at the centre of city-making. For instance, Pieterse (2008) calls for a conceptual inversion that adopts a “bottom-up” exploration of African cities. He argues that it is only when the African city is understood “...through the eyes of most poor denizens that appropriate the city for their own needs” that city bureaucrats can begin to appreciate people as an important form of urban infrastructure. In a similar vein, Simone (2008) argues for a shift from the “technological representation” of the city to seeing people as infrastructures reorienting the focus towards everyday practices. Such a shift can only occur when “...people are recognized as the means through which materials flow in many cities” (Lawhon et al., 2013:11).

According to Simone (2008), it is not necessarily the physical built environment that has facilitated the expansion of economic and social opportunities for poor urbanites, but it is the people themselves as infrastructure-the social infrastructure. He argues that given the paucity of physical and formal infrastructure in Africa, poor urban citizens tend to rely on each other via highly flexible, mobile, and informal social networks to gain access to niches of the urban economy and reduce vulnerability to poverty. Interestingly, the concept of ‘people as infrastructure’ pushes urban scholars to rethink and re-theorize African cityness in two important ways. Firstly, it affords contemporary thinkers engaged in urban research an

opportunity to circumvent dominant developmentalist-modernist discourses that continue to depict dystopian images of African cityness as somehow lacking, deficient, and chaotic. It does this by redirecting the conceptualisation of African urbanity away from notions of a networked city to that of a creative city, where marginalized urban residents through self-provisioning adopt innovative ways of using space to eke out a living (Simone, 2010).

Secondly, the concept opens urban theorists to a renewed understanding and characterization of informal urban users particularly on how they are connected to local and even global urban circuits. Far from seeing street traders, hawkers and touts as “nuisance”, “vices” and an “eyesore” to the aesthetic city, the concept sometimes rebrands them as “insurgent entrepreneurs” and “critical players” in the urban economy (Meth, 2010; Kinyanjui, 2013). The *Jua Kali*<sup>27</sup> industry of Kenya located mostly in informal or unplanned spaces stands out as a good case of how enclaves of informally appropriated urban spaces can drive an economic activity generating 2 million jobs annually (Daniels, 2010).

The same can be said about South Africa’s informal sector which according to Murray (2011:102) has enabled ordinary people to discover “...new ways of renaming and reusing urban space, with the aim of ensuring their own survival”. Simone’s (2008) deep excavation of Johannesburg, through a range of ethnographic materials, uncovered that despite being surrounded by the dilapidated and fragmented inner-city, marginalized urban dwellers have transformed liminal spaces into a “space of possibility” (Stobie, 2005:33; Murray, 2011). He maintains that through incessantly flexible, fluid, and everyday provisional intersections, urbanites have managed to consolidate livelihoods and multiply economic opportunities for one another. For Simone (2008), it is this flexibility and sometimes disorderly nature of inner-city Johannesburg that permits residents to reconfigure cityscapes for an effective response to urban crises.

The findings by Simone are supported by Mbembe and Nuttal (2008) who argue that the African city exists beyond its poor architecture and its making is not necessarily a product of careful or orderly planning and engineering of urban spaces. Rather they are produced randomly by a subaltern populace and because urban spaces are flexible and malleable, users rework them to fit their everyday experience and living conditions (Kihato, 2011). Mbembe and Nuttal’s argument is consistent with that of Lefebvre (1974:42) who contends that “...urban spaces are elusive” and “...maybe qualified in various ways: [they] may be

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<sup>27</sup> “Jua Kali” is a loose term used by local Kenyans to refer to the informal sector.

directional, situational or relational, because [they are] essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic”.

Scholars engaged in the field of African urbanism have also contested the negative labels and misleading interpretation of informality as a phenomenon associated with poverty, crime, illiteracy, backwardness, unemployment, and dissonance. There is vast research evidence that points to the fact that wealthy citizens have been benefiting more from informality than their poor counterparts. Indeed, Hart (2010) powerfully argues that the informal sector is a field that is not wholly dominated by the so-called “poor” or by countries in the global South but is also a sector consisting of rich and wealthy players, some that are found in developed economies. As Hart (2010) notes, “...it is inconsistent to claim that the urban poor have an informal economy, but their richer masters do not; or that the developing countries have an informal sector but not the developed” (Hart, 2010:150).

Ranganathan (2014), for instance, documents the rise of “water mafias” in India’s slums, where businesspeople have taken advantage of poor water service delivery and set up businesses that provide water to slums. Similarly, South African rich property owners have participated in a lucrative business of “shack farming”. Shack farming is a form of leasing, in which landowners rent out their land for the “autoconstruction” of multiple shack dwellings (Cox, 2001). Freund’s (2011) study on elitism and urban poverty in the city of Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) reveals that formal and salaried workers of Kinshasa are actively involved in informal urban agriculture, converting unused urban spaces into sites of accumulation and attainment of food security.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

This chapter uses Foucault’s (1995) concepts of “biopower” and “governmentality”, Lefebvre’s (1974) theory on “the production of space” and Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” to interrogate how the body-space-ideology dialect function to produce rationalities, ideologies, and subjectivities. The chapter then discusses how these rationalities, subjectivities, and ideologies are utilised by city authorities to problematise and regulate the conduct of certain space users. In this chapter, I argued that when technocrats present urban informality as a “disorderly”, “crime-ridden” and “unclean” urban process, they affirm their legitimacy to exclude or at least regulate it within the confines of the city. This misrepresentation of informality in urban Africa coincides with the colonial production of bodies, which in most

cases appropriated “black bodies” with conditions of “dirt” and “filth”. By using Foucault’s notion of “biopower”, I assert that the docility of the body allows it to be subjected to discourses, truths, and logic of social control making it governable from a distance. I contend that the control of informality is more effective when the logic of self-regulation is enforced. In following up this argument, in Chapter 8, I show that power is not only exercised top-down, and nor is it always repressive and brutal, but it is a subtle process enforced through individualised self-discipline through tools of governmentality such as the bureaucratic control of the allocation of vending sites and discursive signifiers such as regulatory signs and billboards.

The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 8 suggests that street traders respond in different ways to the city authorities’ ideals of governing from a distance and modernist planning. On one hand, there exist street traders that conform to planning regulations and the authorities’ vision of having an orderly and clean Bulawayo. Such street traders are licenced and operate from designated vending sites and show commitment to keeping the city clean. Further, they blame unlicensed street traders for contributing to Bulawayo’s uncleanliness and disorderliness. On the other hand, there are unlicensed street traders who operate illegally on street pavements and in front of retail outlets. While such traders recognise their violation of bylaws, they perceive the encroachment on pavements as defiance and desperation. To them defiance means more than just simply violating the city’s bylaws, but an act of resisting the effects of poverty and unemployment. To this fact, they consider the unlawful occupation of pavements as necessary survival. Some of these street traders, as I will show in Chapter 8, argue that by generating money from street traders through leasing vending bays, the city council illegitimately appropriate the little money traders make from selling their goods. Moreover, they pointed to the insensitivity of Bulawayo city authorities that want to generate money from public urban spaces at a time when unemployment has made people survive on such spaces.

This chapter further built upon Chapter 2 and took an in-depth look at the hegemonic influence capitalism has on the production of spatial identities and hegemony. It argued that capitalism is entrenched in what Lefebvre (1974) refers to as the “representations of space”, where, ideologies and knowledge generated by professionals such as planners, engineers, and architects intervene and modify spatiality to serve the needs of capitalist accumulation. Moreover, the chapter focused on how hegemony is achieved by linking the spatialisation and

territorialisation of bodies to the everyday interaction people have with symbols, images, objects, and language. In this chapter, I specifically focused on the use of language in demarcating urban space. I argued that language has been utilised in colonial Rhodesia and post-independent Zimbabwe to include and exclude people in the city of Bulawayo. I see language as continuing to play a pivotal role in maintaining the racialisation of urban space, where the exclusivity of urban space to “whiteness” persists at least in the spatial memory of many Bulawayo citizens.

The chapter also explored the practical implication of the spatialisation of identities in relation to the control of informality, it does this by briefly reviewing the evictions and slum clearance that have been conducted in the countries New Papua Guinea, Zimbabwe, and India. The city authorities of these countries have similarly utilised the rationalities of “cleanliness” and “modernity” to justify the evictions of informal traders and slum dwellers. Finally, in this chapter, I asserted that the production of space, bodies, and the spatialisation of social identities through hegemonic urban policy has not remained unchallenged. Indeed, a crop of emerging urban scholars that have done immense work on African cities, form part of a new wave of “subaltern urbanism” that challenges the dystopian representation of African urbanism. I question whether the illegal occupation of cityscapes by street traders and the rise of street traders’ civic organisation can be treated as a form of subaltern urbanism. I shall answer this question in the analysis chapters.

The task of Chapter 4 will then be that of opening new lines of thoughts and understandings on alternative infrastructural geographies of urban development that are emerging in African cities. It is one of the overall objectives of this research study to push for a renewed optimistic interpretation of African cities. Amidst their appalling physical infrastructure, poor service delivery and declining urban economies, ordinary African people have come in where the city has failed to create sophisticated social infrastructures and transitional informal spaces that make cities work.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE INFORMAL URBAN ECONOMY AND THE REPRODUCTION OF CITIES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH**

*“The notion of informalisation should no longer be taken as an indication of what is not working in Africa but rather as the conceptualization of that which is effectively taking place -the norm rather than the exception” (Chabal, 2009:130).*

### **4.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, I discuss the emergence of an informal distributive economy in the economically embattled cities of the global South. I focus more on how informal workers utilise associational networks and social ties to maximise economic opportunities and livelihoods within conditions of unprecedented levels of unemployment and urban poverty. More importantly, in this chapter, I examine the linkages between the formal and informal sectors. I am particularly interested in looking at how informal associational networks are linked up with the global economy and this shall be analysed within the re-emerging literature on “the globalisation from below” (cf. Mathews et al., 2012). The advantages and demerits of the formal and informal sector linkages shall be discussed in this chapter.

The chapter also deals with how the informalisation intersects with what I regard as the production of space from below. I understand the production of space from below as a process where the urban poor claim and self-appropriate unused urban spaces basically to sustain their livelihoods. I will go on to examine how the production of space from below which I consider a form of resilience and agency not only allows ordinary urban citizens to re-appropriate their spatial and occupational identities but also reproduce urban spaces. I consider spatial identities as perceptions people hold about the spaces they occupy, whereas occupational identities are meanings people develop to what they consider as work. Furthermore, I argue that the innovative production of space from below has led the bottom-up creation of unique informal cities which I identify as “rhizomatic” cities, “chameleon” cities, and “soft” cities. I further engage the work of Deleuze and Guarrati (1987) on agencement and deterritorisation to further show how the need to survive the harsh urban environments of poverty usually leads to the reordering of space.

In concluding the chapter, I focus on some of the drawbacks of romanticising informality as a ready solution in improving the lives of those in the margins. The optimistic accounts on informality sometimes ignore the precarious state and desperation of those that partake in

informal activities mostly comprising street trading. Standing (2011) writes about an emerging precariat class largely involved in the informal economy as accumulating little income from it. I shall show in the results and analysis chapters that some of the participants felt that street trading, when compared to formal employment, is not financially rewarding. I further question the social processes of agency and resilience and am critical of how resilient citizens permit a situation where the State shifts its responsibilities to citizens already stuck in poverty. I go on to note how the notion of resilience complements the entrenchment of neoliberalism, I shall discuss this in detail as the chapter unfolds.

#### **4.2 Tapping into the New Distributive Informal Economy**

In coping with the effects of chronic unemployment and poverty, the urban poor in Africa have managed to create a unique type of localised distributive economy (see, for example, Ferguson, 2015; Scoones, 2016). Under this distributive economy, urbanites, particularly informal traders can piece together livelihoods through distributing their labour and goods across local and transnational networks. While these informal distributive processes and networks are important to Africa's informal urban economy, they have received little attention from scholars and policymakers and remain underdeveloped theoretically and analytically (see, for example, Ferguson, 2015:90).

In traditional distributive economies accessing goods and services has normally required people to sell their labour in a market of wage labour. I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, that the production of space plays a pivotal role in achieving this type of economy. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis, for instance, I note how dispossessing Africans of their land in the colonial era worked effectively to entrench a wage-based economy and at the same time destabilised African livelihoods that largely depended on land utilisation. With the failing of many African economies notably under structural adjustment programmes, the numbers of those in wage employment are yet to improve. It is recognisable that a large proportion of Africans now belong in the precariat group (Standing, 2011) which is characterised by unemployment, lack of secure worked-based identity, and endemic poverty. Indeed, Ferguson (2015) notes many of poor Africans are largely or wholly excluded from wage labour and do not access commodities and services through wage income. If many of the African poor are excluded from wages employment, how do they secure their livelihoods?



According to Ferguson (2015:91), most of Africa's urban poor improvise livelihoods through a "complex mix of other activities" that usually lie outside wage employment. He suggests that while these activities do not necessarily facilitate the production of goods and services, they "engineer distributions of goods produced elsewhere by accessing or making claims on the resources of others" (Ferguson, 2015:90). Ferguson's (2015) notion of the new distributive economy challenges us to rethink how African urban economies function. It forces us to confront the reality that it may not be the implementation of development from above that has rescued a multitude of Africa's urbanites from absolute poverty. Certainly, we need to start thinking of bottom-up economic activities working to prevent the urban people from experiencing incidences of poverty. But what does the new distributive economy look like and how does it influence the way urban spaces in Africa are appropriated? There are at least four important features that characterise the new distributive economy, which is also closely linked to the informal economy. These are:

1. It is driven by ordinary people, who are mostly unemployed or in desperate situations. Ferguson (2015) considers it a form of "human economy" made and remade by people (also see, Hart *et al.*, 2010:5).
2. It has a "head of its own" while the production of goods and services may not be a priority in this economy, associational life and informal networks are.
3. It is organised outside state bureaucracies, capitalist markets, and dominant economic ideologies and expertise, although in some cases it collaborates with the aforementioned economic arrangements.
4. It challenges the meaning of "occupationality" and that of "labour", under this economy, as any social or economic activity that has a monetary return is classified as employment.

### **4.3 Rethinking the Urban Informal Economy**

The failure of neoliberal programmes to stimulate economic growth in many African countries, has forced the poor to insert themselves into the broader economy, remaking it in the process. The developments of localised economies such as the *Ku Kiyā-Kiyā* in Zimbabwe, for instance, signals an adoption of bottom-up economic tactics by ordinary people to solve problems that actors in the "real economy" cannot. According to Jones (2010) *Ku Kiyā-Kiyā*, which is a Shona term that refers to multiple forms of "making do" is associated with the informal economy and encapsulates any necessary activity that anyone engages in "to get by" or

“survive the day”. This kind of bottom-up and human-oriented economy, allows poor citizens to assert their economic right to the city by permitting them to develop their logic of what an economy entails (Lourenco-Lindell, 2001). The *Ku Kiya-Kiya* economy permits urbanites to suspend and circumvent the workings and configurations of the formal economy and urban space. For instance, the emptiness of supermarkets forced urban dwellers to re-align their urban imaginaries and realities away from the supermarkets to street vendors operating on pavements who at the time of the food shortage crisis stocked commodities not available in shops.

In describing the changing dynamics of the Zimbabwean economy after the year 2000, Jones (2010) comments that as the formal economy collapsed, the informal economy emerged from the shadows to assume the role of being the “real economy”, he writes:

... since 2000 the ‘real economy’ of Zimbabwe has turned into a *Ku Kiya-Kiya* economy, with an emergent logic and historical motion quite different from that which preceded it. This has entailed a progressive encroachment of economic styles and tactics formerly relegated to the urban social margins. Indeed, activities formerly associated with down-class urban youth and ‘part-time’ female work, have rapidly become the source of livelihood for much of the urban population (Jones, 2010:286).

The argument that informal economic activities now constitute the real economy (see, Jones 2010) is at the core of De Soto’s work on informality. De Soto’s (2000) views on the informal economy inject a new line of thinking about the conceptualisation of the increasingly informalising economies of the global South. Contrary to viewing the informal economy as representing a dysfunctional economy, De Soto (2000) describes it as promoting economic growth and creating new jobs at a rate faster than that of formal economies (also see Ferguson, 2010:74). The above view is also shared by Mathews and Vega (2012) adding that the informal economy not only creates employment for millions of people but allows for the poor to have access to affordable consumables. They go on to challenge the implicit assumption that the informal economy is separate from national economies. Instead, they assert that with the ever-increasing globalization, the informal economy has become part of the global economy hence they prefer to use the term “globalization from below” when referring to the informal economy. Accordingly, Mathews and Vega (2012) suggest that it is futile to distinguish the formal and informal sectors of the economies since they constitute each other. The linkages of the formal and informal economies shall be discussed in depth as the chapter unfolds.

For William and Round (2008), the treatment of the informal economy as contributing much more than the formal economy, draws us to question the modernist views of the informal

economy as being retrogressive. The tenets of modernisation and growth theories that hold the informal economy as being normatively regressive to the progressive formal sector seem inapplicable to the current state of African urban economies. For instance, in Zimbabwe, it is estimated that around US\$ 7 billion is circulating within the informal urban economy (see Herald, 2014; eNCA, 2016). The same informal urban economy reportedly provides income to over 80 percent of the otherwise unemployed Zimbabweans. Considering this staggering value of Zimbabwe's informal urban economy and its immense contribution to livelihoods, is it then romanticism to argue that it is Zimbabwe's real economy? Is it not useful then to treat the informal economy in the same manner that formal economies are treated as just being ordinary? In confronting the relevance of the formal and informal economy binary in contemporary urban Africa, it is pertinent to have a global perspective of how these two economies constitute and link to each other.

#### *4.3.1 Formal and Informal Economy Linkages: Global Perspectives*

A large number of street traders in the global South have depended on trading and transnational networks linked to global economies particularly that of China to support their informal economic activities. The interesting work of Mathews et al. (2012) on “globalization from below” shows us that, informal trading is not a stand-alone entity that operates outside the logic of global neoliberal economics but is intimately linked to the global economy. For Mathews and Vega (2012), informal trading has provided an immediate environment for most of those in the global South to experience “globalisation from below”. They provide a detailed definition of “globalisation from below”,

...as the transnational flow of people and goods involving relatively small amounts of capital and informal, often semi-legal or illegal transactions, often associated with “the developing world”, but in fact apparent across the globe... [it is] ...the low-end of globalisation of traders buying used or copy merchandise under the radar of the law, and transporting these goods by container or in their luggage across continents and past borders, to be sold by street vendors at minimal prices...This is a business without lawyers and copyrights, run through skeins of personal connections... (Mathew and Vega, 2012:1).

Mathews and Vega (2012) like those who wrote before them on the similar subject (see, Falk, 1997; Brecher et al., 2000; Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2002) move away from earlier top-down approaches of globalisation that sees it as a field only dominated by big corporations, highly skilled professional and technocrats. Instead, they suggest that most of the world's population which is mostly impoverished, unskilled, and living under precarious conditions

also seem to be represented on the other end of the globalisation process. They go on to argue that it is at the lower end of globalisation, which is mostly ignored by mainstream theorists, where most of the citizens in the global South can secure employment and income.

The same observation is done by Knowles (2014) who through her insightful book, “*Flip Flop: A Journey Through Globalization’s Backroads*”, argues that an understanding of globalisation will be incomplete if it is only applied on the globalisation processes occurring at the top level, neglecting the ones at the bottom. She traces the seemingly ordinary and everyday commodity - flip flops (from their production in China to them being traded in the streets of Ethiopia) to argue that it is limiting to only focus on how flip flop production enhances the national economy of China. Instead, she encourages us to look further at how flip flops shape the everyday livelihoods of those located on the other side of the globe, in this case, Ethiopia.

She further reveals, in her book, that the flip flops produced in China are some of the cheapest merchandise that Ethiopian street traders sell to those who otherwise cannot afford to purchase footwear. More importantly, Knowles (2014) asserts that the mass production of flip flops in China does not only facilitate China’s competitive hold on the global market but supports the increasing size of informal trade in the African cities. Ultimately, the growing size of informal trade facilitates the urban poor’s access to cheap goods and employs millions of people leading a wage-less life.

As for Altman (2008), the reduction or worsening of urban poverty strongly depends on the relationship between the informal and the formal economy. She disagrees with those that view the informal economy as an end-result of a failed formal economy (also see Chabal, 2009:130). Conversely, Altman (2008) argues that the capacity of the informal sector to contribute more to poverty alleviation lies with the efficient performance of the formal economy. In her study that explored the potential of the informal economy in reducing poverty in South Africa, Altman (2008:5) had this to say, “...the expansion of the informal economy can have a positive effect on poverty if it arises as an off-shoot of a rapidly growing formal sector. It can reflect worsening poverty where it is stimulated by a collapsing formal economy...” (Altman, 2008:5). Similarly, Bandyopadhyay (2012) challenges the view that the expansion of the formal economy stunts the growth of the informal sector and eliminates its major players like street traders.

In analysing the linkages between formal and informal processes in India, Bandyopadhyay (2012) shows that the corporatisation of India’s retail industries as seen in the establishment of

malls has to some extent accrued some benefits to the street hawkers of India. He describes the relationship between malls and hawkers in Calcutta, India as a synergistic and a symbiotic one. For Bandyopadhyay (2012), the presence of malls in Calcutta affects street trading in various ways. Firstly, the malls have created increased pedestrian traffic on the streets leading to an increased customer base for street traders operating from the sidewalks situated close to newly established malls. Secondly, Bandyopadhyay (2012) argues that malls generate a desire for luxury goods that eventually promotes an increased sale of counterfeit products among street vendors trading in the shadows of malls. Thirdly, some street traders in Calcutta sell products on behalf of established shops allowing them to claim some commission for every purchased product.

Such a trend was also noticed by Rajagopal (2010) when he conducted a study exploring the coexistence between malls and street traders in Mexico City, Mexico. His study showed that street traders situated closer to malls had a larger customer base and their products sell briskly compared to those located at the city's outskirts. Some researchers argue that formal businesses have also benefited enormously from street trading. For instance, Mpofu (2010) and Gumbo (2013) state that the wholesale business in Zimbabwe has for past decades thrived because of street trading. In Zimbabwe, street traders normally purchase large quantities of commodities from wholesalers, repackaging them into smaller quantities to be sold at a profit.

Moreover, street trading has generated a considerable amount of revenue for emerging African economies. While it has been an insurmountable task to tax street traders, they have provided their fair share of revenue through licensing fees and rents paid to local governments. The contribution of the informal trade in the gross domestic product (GDP) of several economies in Sub-Saharan is significant. The contribution of the informal economy to the GDP is highest in the country of West Africa. For example, in Benin, Niger, and Togo, the informal sector, excluding agriculture, accounts for more than 50 percent of these countries' GDP (International Labour Organisation, 2013). On one hand, the informal sector of India not including agricultural activities constitutes at least 46 percent of the country's GDP. While on the other hand, in Latin American countries such as Guatemala and Colombia, the informal sector contributes over 30 percent of non-agricultural goods and services produced in the respective economies (Vanek et al., 2014). However, it should be noted that the linkages between the formal and informal economies and its participants are not exclusively reciprocal.

#### *4.3.2 The Exploitative Interaction of the Formal and Informal Sector*

The relationship between the formal and informal sectors is not always a collaborative one. The two sectors have sometimes engaged in competitive relations where they contest for urban spaces. On one extreme, established formal businesses have complained about street traders intercepting their customers and encroaching on their premises (Kamete and Lindell, 2010; Bandyopadhyay, 2012; Crossa, 2016). While on the other end, adversaries of the privatization of space have decried how international companies, the state, and the emerging middle class of the global South collude to exclude street hawkers from accessing public urban space (Schindler, 2014).

For Watson (2009), top-down urban planning schemes that seek to produce “world-class” urban spaces such as malls, normally fail to consider the needs of the urban poor. To attract foreign direct investments, the state commonly gives in to the demands of capital, particularly when faced with the trade-off of pursuing city renewal projects and that of catering to the spatial needs of the poor (cf. Ghertner, 2011). In other cases, the urban poor working in the informal sector are evicted from urban spaces to pave way for grandeur spatial developments.

Schindler (2014) strongly criticizes world-class urban developments of India, as serving only the interests of large international corporates and that of the emerging middle class. Schindler argues that far from accruing economic benefits to street hawkers, most of India’s urban renewal projects have further impoverished them at the expense of the growing middle class. Ballard (2012:563) adds that any development narrative and projects centred on nurturing the middle-class informal employment such as in India and indeed elsewhere, “...threaten to displace, and justify the displacement of, economically marginalized groups seen as surplus to development”.

In a similar vein, referring to Smith’s (1996) concept of revanchism, Atehortua (2014) and Huang et al. (2014) accuse elites and those in the middle-class of abusing their privilege and power to exclude marginalised urban citizens from city spaces. They go on to assert that dominant classes constantly reclaim the city’s prime spaces from some members of the population, such as street vendors, the homeless, and sex workers (ibid). Roy and Alsayyad (2004, 2005) are some of the critics of revanchism. They do not see any immediate benefits that gentrification of urban spaces has on the urban poor’s capacities or livelihoods. In her critical exploration of the notion of urban upgrading, Roy (2005) suggests that it is limiting for policymakers to always assume that the human material conditions are influenced and

improved by the physically built environment. She argues that overemphasizing on gentrifying and upgrading of the physical environment leads to the “aestheticization of poverty”, a process “...that equates upgrading with aesthetic upgrading rather than the upgrading of livelihoods, wages, political capacities” (Roy, 2005:150).

Drawing from the above-mentioned arguments, this thesis will later seek to understand whether the development of *Egodini* mall at a location known to be concentrated with most of Bulawayo’s street traders, can be considered as a form of revanchism or an aestheticization of poverty. What are the street traders’ perceptions and views towards the construction of a mall on the spaces they currently trade from? Moreover, in Chapter 8, the thesis will situate the Bulawayo street traders’ experiences with informality within the context of globalisation from below. Additionally, the later chapters of this thesis will reveal the nature of relations or linkages the street traders of Bulawayo have with local, regional, and global formal economies.

In analysing these linkages, the thesis will take into consideration the proliferation of Chinese traders and products in Zimbabwe. A high presence of Chinese traders and an influx of their products in Zimbabwe has been largely facilitated by the state’s “Look East Policy”<sup>28</sup> adopted after relations with the West collapsed. But how do the street and informal traders in Bulawayo view the increasing number of Chinese shops in the city? Is the presence of Chinese traders beneficial to Bulawayo’s street traders or not? And more importantly what is the nature of the relationship between local small formal businesses and street traders? While formal and informal sector linkages may be critical in reducing incidences of urban poverty, it is the associations between and across the urban poor that seem to play a leading role in coping with urban crises. It is then essential for this chapter to gain insights into how associational networks shape and influences Africa’s urbanity.

#### **4.4 Associational Networks and Survival in Urban Africa**

The survivalist and improvisatory lifestyle that characterise the urban Africa of today, essentially revolves around the urban poor’s ability to mobilise economic resources through associational networks and collaborations (Tostensen *et al.*, 2001; Simone, 2004; Trefon, 2004; Lindell, 2010; Chabal, 2009; Murray, 2010). Social networks are widely utilised by the African urban poor to compensate for the overwhelming failures of the post-colonial nation-state. By

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<sup>28</sup> In 2003, the government of Zimbabwe adopted the “Look East Policy” as a measure of countering economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Western nations. It sought to strengthen bilateral investments and trade relations with the Asian countries, notably China.

activating social and economic alliances when faced with hardships, African urbanites can multiply possibilities and opportunities that "...enables people simply to carry on with life and gets things done" (Trefon, 2004:2). In the same vein, Hart et al. (2010) understand social networks as stimulating a sense of agency among those categorized as being "oppressed" or "marginalised" either politically or economically. They further view cooperation among actors in the informal sector as offering them an alternative path to socio-economic development as well as substituting and complementing the formal economy.

As for Chabal (2009:127-149) "the politics of surviving" in Africa revolve around social networks which in many instances assist the urban poor to turn mainstream economics on its head, remaking and customising it to be attuned with their urban environment. Chabal's assertion is consistent with that of Demissie (2007:156) who argues that urban Africans have responded to crises through "...creating and recreating dense social networks, flows, exchanges, and knowledge with their own architectural and urban development imprints". Conversely, Demissie (2007) and Ndi (2007) regard informality as a condition that necessitates the ordinary African to transcend from the colonial cityscape into a newly created indigenised urban space and economic culture. Indeed, Ndi (2007) posits that the emergence of informal economies allowed African labourers to challenge the exploitative remnants of colonial capitalism. He argues that with the rapid expansion of the informal economy and the deepening of poverty among Africans living under colonialism:

...labour forces came to perceive urban corporate capitalism and evolutionist modernism as neocolonial threats whose expansion had to be checked or conquered through new geopolitical and ideological alignments such as indigenization of the urban economic culture and micro-political discourses. From this geopolitical and ideological repositioning, old traditional cultures, institutions, and practices were transposed into the urban spaces as a remedial response to the progressively restrictive and culturally constraining narratives of imperial history (Ndi, 2007:170).

Surviving Africa's urban crisis has also meant that the poor resist poverty by straddling the urban and rural divide. Creating and strengthening the associational ties between rural and urban areas, not only increased their economic opportunities among urbanites but has helped change the discourse of what a city is and what it represents. For instance, Trefon (2004) writes that the transference of traditional farming from rural areas to cities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) does not only assist its urbanites to cope with urban crises but has consequently led to the reinvention of the cities' identities. The uptake of rural subsistence agriculture on urban soil has indeed created a new form of cross-fertilised African urbanity resembling a unique mix of both rural (traditional) and urban (modern) lifestyles. This cross-



fertilized form of African urbanity has prompted scholars to characterise African cities as experiencing a phenomenon of “rurbanisation” (Trefon, 2004:490).

The process of “rurbanisation” as interpreted by Ndi (2007) dislodges the Western imperial and colonial representation of the African city as a space non-contaminable with African traditional and cultural processes. It further resets the thought that African cities are spaces only meant to serve the interests of capitalism or the idea that one’s existence in the city must be tied to strict time work schedules<sup>29</sup>. For instance, Ndi (2007:176) asserts that the post-colonial city has “...materialized its lifestyle by indigenizing lived time. He goes on to state that “...the city-scape patterns of industry based on the mechanical laws of schedule...” is “...replaced by cyclical patterns reminiscent of the natural rhythms of rural agrarian life” (ibid). It is through these urban processes of “rurbanisation” and “informality” that urbanites battling poverty not only gain control over time but can regulate urban space. Shying away from western urbanism and the formally ordered economy, urban subsistence farming, for instance, has permitted urban dwellers to transpose innovative traditional cultures, institutions, practices, and the indigenization of the urban economic culture and discourses (Chibvongodze, 2013; also see Ndi, 2009). Urban subsistence farming further enables the poor urbanites to gain control over urban space and co-produce practised cities alongside planned ones.

In this chapter, I identify practised cities as consisting of the following; “rhizomatic cities”, “kinetic cities”, “soft cities” and “chameleon cities”, which are normatively produced outside Western planning traditions. Indeed, these cities defy the logic of planning and they seem to be produced around issues of affect, imaginings, ambitions, and disappointments than they are products of maps, grids, geometries, or the physical architecture (see Lefebvre, 1974:1). Merrifield (2000:174) defines practiced cities as a patchwork of lived spaces or multiple spaces of feelings that “... [do] not obey rules of consistency or cohesiveness, neither [do they] involve too much ‘head’: [they] are felt more than thought”. I shall look at the nature of practiced cities [kinetic cities, soft cities, and chameleon cities] in detail, attention is given to their influence on poverty resistance and the creative use of urban space.

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<sup>29</sup> Capitalism thrives on disciplined labour, meaning that workers are subjected to strict mechanical time schedules. Consequently, labour has been reduced to a common numerical term that speaks to time such as 24/7 or Nine to Five (9am to 5pm).

## 4.5 Informality, Resilience and Resisting Poverty in Practised Cities

### 4.5.1 Rhizomatic Cities

The concept of rhizomatic urbanism has its origins in the works of Deleuze and Guattari (1987). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) use the concept of a rhizome to describe knowledge and culture as consisting of a multiple dimension that connects like rhizomes of a plant. They argue further that unlike a tree, "...the rhizome resists the organizational structure of the root-tree system which charts causality along chronological line...". Instead, as asserted by Varley (2013:12), the rhizome "unlike a tree, in which everything is structured through one trunk, a rhizome can grow a shoot at any point, extending along 'lines of flight' to connect a multiple, decentralised, range of locations". The idea of "lines of flight" mentioned by Varley (2013:12) takes centre stage in Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) philosophy on rhizomes. Rayner (2013: np) defines "lines of flight" as "...bolts of pent-up energy that break through the cracks in a system of control and shoot off on the diagonal. By the light of their passage, they reveal the open spaces beyond the limits of what exist". The "lines of flight" represents a break away from a society of normalisation and control which subsequently pushes people to challenge the status quo.

Opposing the status quo leads to the formation of a potentially new transformative territory of innovation, human creativity, escaping the real and above all re-ordering of space and things (Fredriksen *et al.*, 2014; Rayner, 2013). The concept of rhizomatic urbanism speaks directly to the nature of most African cities. Several authors have adopted Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) concept of rhizomatic spaces to explain the nature of informal urbanism, more specifically how it evades planning and urban by-laws. In his study of informality in Egypt, Furniss (2016:310) argues that the encroachment of slum dwellers on city spaces has permitted them to produce "permanent new spaces rhizomatically alongside the pre-existing order". He further suggests that the informalisation of urban space through slumming "...rather than merely subverting, reinterpreting or repurposing spaces instituted by others, the urban poor—whose settlements may be quite permanent and ordered—also coproduce the city through the process of creating the physical features of the built environment" (Furniss, 2016:312). Furniss' (2016) analysis of urban informality in Egypt not only lends from the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) but also utilizes Bayat's concept of "quiet encroachment", which is a salient feature of rhizomatic urbanism.

According to Bayat (2000:545-546), quiet encroachment is the “...silent, protracted and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on those who are propertied and powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives. It is characterised by quiet, largely atomised and prolonged mobilisation with episodic collective action—open and fleeting struggles without clear leadership, ideology, or structured organisation”. In resisting and mitigating poverty, the poor slowly infiltrate urban spaces converting them into a resource for accumulating income and hijacking municipal services that are otherwise inaccessible. Essentially, as Bayat (2000:548) puts it, “surviving the distressed cities of the global South, has meant that the poor inexorably redistribute social goods through direct and unlawful ‘acquisition of collective consumption (land, piped water...roads), public space (street sidewalks...intersections)”.

The urban poor living in various cities of the global South have resisted these exclusions by building ‘illegal’ connections to networked infrastructures that secure them water, sanitation, food, housing, and electricity. In cities where for example, water services have been privatized and commodified, illegal water connections become rampant. Chng (2012) documents how slum dwellers of Manila, Philippines’ capital city resort to illegal water connections in accessing water. Similarly, Bond (2014) posits that the illegal connections to water mains by poor South Africa’s urban communities represent a formidable social resistance to extremely unequal socio-ecological processes that excludes the poor from accessing water. The same can be said when explaining the rise of “*izinyoka*” (illegal electricity connectors) in South Africa’s poor communities where electricity prices are beyond the reach of many. For Swilling (2013), it is this defiant nature of the rhizomatic or informal city that facilitates the poor’s re-connection with the city if they are cut off from accessing urban services.

Rhizomatic urban spaces also help the urban poor to effectively and actively manipulate the flexibility of time, space, and socio-metabolic flows when responding to windows of opportunity as they appear (also see Tostensen *et al.*, 2001; Murray, 2010; De Boeck, 2011; Swilling, 2013:73). For instance, Murray (2010:150) finds the rhizomatic characteristic of Johannesburg’s inner city in South Africa as facilitating “...ability to move quickly to find whatever casual work is available at the time”. While De Boeck’s (2011) argues that surviving Africa’s harsh urban conditions rests on the semi-nomadic journeys and movements urbanites make as they oscillate between urban spaces in search of opportunities. It is important to note that the study of rhizomatic cities has also coincided with the growing representation of African cities as being highly kinetic, soft, and chameleonic.

#### *4.5.2 Kinetic Cities: Urban Spaces in Constant Motion*

The notion of kinetic cities is attributed to Mehrotra's (2008) writings on India's urban landscape. He identifies most cities in the global South as being two dimensional – composing the static city and the kinetic city. On one hand, the static city is dependent upon the physically built architecture for its representation. It is built using "...permanent material such as concrete, steel and brick and "...forms a two-dimensional entity on conventional city maps and is monumental in its presence" (Mehrotra, 2008:206). On the other hand, there exists a kinetic city whose presence is temporal. According to Mehrotra (2008:206), the kinetic city is autoconstructed from "...recycled material: plastic sheets, scrap metal, canvas, and waste wood". He associates the kinetic city with informality, pointing that it is a city "...created by those outside the elite domains of the formal modernity of the state and is thus a pirate modernity that slips under the laws of the city simply to survive, without any conscious attempt at constructing a counterculture" (Mehrotra, 2008:206).

While the static city is dependent upon the physically built architecture for its representation, Mehrotra argues that the kinetic city does not necessarily lie in the formal production of architecture but seeks to challenge it. This view by Mehrotra is similar to that of Lefebvre (1974:1), who likewise asserts that space does not only carry a "...geometrical meaning" but a social one. In advancing Lefebvre's idea of space as being social, Mehrotra calls for a conceptualization of urban space in terms of the social and associational value it generates for its occupants. For Mehrotra (2008:206), the city does not solely rest on "...pieces of architecture", but on "...spaces that hold associative values and that support their residents' lives and livelihoods". The kinetic city can be seen in the symbolic images of informal activities such as hawking, street vending, and slum-dwelling which all come together to create ever-transforming urban spaces and a city in constant motion. Vianna (2009) agrees with Mehrotra (2008) arguing that the constantly changing constitution of spaces in many cities in the global South typifies their chameleonic form of urbanity.

#### *4.5.3 Chameleon-Soft Cities: Ever-changing Urbanscapes*

Chameleon urbanism signifies a strong survival instinct where the urban poor recreate certain morphological components of space to meet their immediate needs. Viana (2009) argues further that "this kind of urbanism faces cities in terms of its inhabitant's self-volition, presenting malleable and adaptive responses to their questions on different parts of the African

urban space, stepping away from abstract and alien schemes which ignore its realities and specifications” (Viana, 2009: i). The concept of chameleon urbanism reflects Raban’s (1974) notion of the soft city. In his idea of the soft city, Raban criticizes straight-jacket approaches and ideologies that conceptualise cityscapes as hard and purely abstract. Instead, he writes that “cities, unlike villages and small towns, are plastic by nature” (Raban, 1974:2), meaning that their very form can be warped and reconstructed around lived experiences. He further suggests that the softness of modern cities creates urban environments that are “...amenable to a dazzling and libidinous variety of lives, dreams, and interpretations” (Raban, 1974:8). Raban also argues that the elasticity of cities invites an imprint of multiple identities and it awaits to be remade and consolidated into a shape that suits inhabitants’ everyday life.

Gupta (2009:44) suggests that the notion of soft city and Raban’s solid understanding of everyday life in the metropolis of London “...simply eludes, even undermines the urban planner’s reckonings” and allows a shift in viewing the city from a planned to a practiced one. According to Raban (1974:2), the “soft city may be more real, than the hard city one can locate on maps, in statistics, in monographs on urban sociology and demography and architecture”. A similar argument is forwarded by Varley (2013:13), who notes that identifying cities through maps is a “colonising practice” that the state has always used to impose order on space. For her, like the soft city—a depiction of informality thrives outside the radar of the planning map, and in some cases “resisting representations” in those maps (ibid).

In practical terms, the processes of agency and resilience as evident in the emergence of urban informality seem to be the product of these chameleonic and soft forms of urbanism. Ideally, this flexible, plastic, and informal form of urbanism enables and incapacitates the poor to become more active actors in urban processes (De Boeck, 2011:272). Similarly, Simone (2008:69) describes informal economies of most African cities as mainly “...constituted through the capacity of individual actors to circulate across and become familiar with a broad range of spatial, residential, economic, and transactional positions”. He identifies these patterns of brief circular and nomadic migrations as crucial in activating resilience and enabling the urban poor to respond in a timely manner to bouts of urban crises.

Simone’s assertion on the importance of spatial flexibility and nomadic migrations in urban survival is similar to that of Deleuze and Guarrati (1987), who argue that nomadism which also entails fluidity and dynamism of space forms a basis of resilience and agencement. For Fredriksen *et al.* (2014), the flexibility of space not only helps urbanites to adapt to varied

situations but permits them to switch identities to suit different configurations and situations (cf. Callon, 2007). Bryceson (2010) notes that the malleability and changes in the use of urban space have had much impact on influencing urbanites to adopt multi-occupational identities. For instance, passenger steerers in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, rely much on the terminal space to earn income by winning and directing customers to board a certain bus, they also work as seat holders in periods of transport scarcity (Trefon, 2007). It is important to bear in mind that the notions of informality, agency, and resilience are by no means devoid of shortcomings and limitations.

#### **4.6 Challenging the notions of “Informality” and “Resilience”**

While proponents of urban informality such as Ferguson (2007), De Boeck (2011), Viana (2009) and Chabal (2009) celebrate it as a major force of resilience and a medium of accumulating power and economic resources by the poor, some commentators such as Cornwall (2008), Trefon (2008) and Boonyabancha et al. (2012) note its limitations. Its adversaries consider it as rhetoric in the field of international development, joining a list of other buzzwords such as “empowerment”, “self-reliance”, and “civic-engagement”. Even though informality has helped people cope with the extremes of poverty, it has also dovetailed with neoliberalism which has contributed to global urban poverty.

Cornwall (2008) advances this argument, stating that although informal practices embody agency and self-reliance of the urban poor, they also play an important part in the neoliberal project. She is skeptical towards informality and its notions of resilience and agency, contending that “local self-mobilization may be actively promoted by the state and international agencies as part of the efficiency goals that are entirely consistent with neo-liberal approaches to development”. Cornwall (2008) is supported by Bottrell (2013) who states that both concepts of resilience and agency encapsulate the principles of individualisation, self-reliance, and self-mobilization which are essential in the implementation of any neo-liberal project. The informalisation of cities in the global South fits within the ambit of fostering a neoliberal citizenry, where the state’s responsibilities of providing social goods are rolled back, shifting them not only toward market forces but to ordinary citizens.

Creating a neoliberal citizen has thus evolved into positively labeling those in the informal sector as “entrepreneurs” and “economic heroes” who through their ingenuity and creativeness managed to survive in urban environments with fewer opportunities. This view is strongly held

by De Soto (2000) who praises those in the informal sector as efficient citizens that are crucial in nurturing a competitive capitalist economy. For him, informality represents the penetration and full participation of the poor in the market-based economy since it dismantles the legal barriers imposed on market participation by the state.

#### *4.6.1 The Harsh Realities of Informality*

For some critics, notions of agency and resilience are problematic since they obscure structural inequalities perpetuated by neoliberal policies. They criticize the neoliberal interpretation of informality, arguing in overemphasizing the merits of informality, neoliberals fail to acknowledge the structural inequalities and mass impoverishment perpetuated by neoliberal policies (Bottrell, 2013; Kapoor, 2005). Proponents of informality are criticized for ignoring the harsh realities of living and working in the informal sector. In his study of street trading in Zambia, Ferguson (2015) noted that while street vending thrives in major cities, its financial rewards are marginal and unsustainable compared to salaried employment. He found that the low sales turnover and the stiff competition among Zambian street traders negatively affected their profit returns. Standing (2011) writes extensively of an emerging precariat class that lacks income security and the ability to save most street vendors fit into this category.

Additionally, street traders work under unfavorable urban environments with continuous harassment and evictions by city authorities. Exposure to extreme weather conditions, lack of proper sanitation infrastructure, and limited vending space are some of the challenges faced by street traders. In the case of Zimbabwe, the allocation of vending space is greatly influenced by political affiliations. Rogerson (2016) notes that large portions of vending sites in the city of Harare are allocated to ZANU-PF supporters who in turn rent them out to desperate street vendors. The politicisation of street vending in Harare has led to the emergence of space barons that extort money from street traders facing imminent evictions. According to Mbanje (2015) space barons believed to be linked to ZANU-PF politicians, demand exorbitant “protection fees” from street traders who intend to keep their vending spaces in the event of an eviction. The susceptibility of street traders to exploitative space barons and politicians undermines their ability to sustain livelihoods and in worst scenarios can lead to their disempowerment.

#### *4.6.2 The “Disempowering Effect” of Resilience*

Despite the celebratory remarks accorded to the concept of resilience, its critics are concerned about its disempowering impact on the urban poor. Bottrell (2013) warns that resilience can

lead to reluctance and disinterest among the urban poor to challenge prevailing political and economic processes that perpetuate poverty. He then asserts that while coping mechanisms devised by the poor assist them to withstand crises, they are however disempowering and exploitative in the long term. The same is argued by Bezuidenhout and Fakier (2006) who state that it is through self-initiated coping strategies and informal economic activities that the responsibilities for fixing the negative outcomes of neoliberalism are shifted from the state to the poor (also see Ballard, 2014). In her critique of informality, Roy (2009:148) argues that celebrating informal socio-economic activities as an indication of urban poor's self-sufficiency, innovativeness, and resilience "...obscures the role of the state and even renders it unnecessary".

Desai et al. (2015) agree with Roy (2009), arguing that improvising sanitation and housing through informal infrastructure has, for example, resulted in the unwillingness of the urban poor in India to lay claim to proper sanitation and housing infrastructures from the state. While, in his ethnographic study of informality in Kinshasa, DRC, Trefon (2002) showed that innovative survival and coping strategies by urbanites impeded them from challenging a despotic political government that prevailed under Mobutu Seseke's leadership. Despite their remarkable prowess in mobilizing economic resources, Trefon (2002) is of the view that the citizens of Kinshasa "...have proven themselves abysmally inapt with respect to transforming political discourse and political desires into political mobilization" (Trefon, 2002:483). Moreover, the urbanites of Kinshasa appear preoccupied with mobilizing resources to meet the "here and now" daily needs, rather expending their energies in inducing political change which is perceived as a long-term commitment that does not satisfy immediate needs.

The same can be said of Zimbabwe, where the unabated growth of urban informality has coincided with an increase in political apathy and alienation among the ordinary urban citizen. Chibvongodze's (2013) study on informal urban farming in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe reveals how through this activity, urbanites have become disinterested in participating in the political process. By disconnecting themselves from politics either out of frustration, apathy and legitimate fear of violence those in the informal sector, inadvertently lead the fragmentation of any grassroots political mobilization and cohesion that may challenge the existing political order. While it can be argued that the minimal existence of public protests in Zimbabwe is attributable to the deployment of "repressive state apparatus" to quell public discontent, one is also tempted to suggest that the unwillingness of the ordinary Zimbabweans to better their lives without the assistance of the state prevents them discharging their energies to protesting.



On one hand, the rise of informal traders' associations demanding rights for street vendors has done little to effect change and agency. Meagher (2010:51) stresses that one must be cautious not to overestimate the power of informal traders' organisation in influencing urban policies. Instead, she argues that "... the recognition that informal mobilisation and associational life do not necessarily translate into popular movement has encouraged greater attention to issues of power relations rather than organisation capacity. On the other hand, poverty and insecurity undermine the ability of the poor to form politically effective associations". Social movements led by those working in the informal sector have also been prone to co-option and coercion by NGOs, the state, and the so-called "social entrepreneurs". This hijacking of poor people's social movements by larger political and social institutions is well noted by Boonyabancha et al. (2012) who out point that:

The energy, resourcefulness and motivation of low-income households and communities to bring about change in their own lives constitute a substantive problem-solving force. But it is a force that is constantly being constrained, coerced, coopted and suppressed by mainstream development practice. As a result, the urban poor themselves end up believing that they have no power to make change (Boonyabancha et al., 2012:442).

These movements are further hampered by the weakening of associational networks particularly in urban societies that are rapidly liberalising. Despite the usefulness of associational networks in expanding economic and social opportunities of the poor, they have done little in moving people out of poverty.

#### *4.6.3 The Downside of Associational Networks*

Some scholars suggest that associational networks and social ties do not necessarily lead to the reinforcement of resilience, empowerment, and the ability to resist poverty. In many instances, associations and networks can work against the assumed good of the common interests of society. The limitation of associational networks is noted by Meagher (2010:301) who argues that "even well established and dynamic livelihood networks and associations have tended to follow the disempowering trajectory [...] rather than fostering societal connectivity and political empowerment". Lin (2010) reinforces Meagher's argument by stating that associational networks and social ties are more likely to empower those that are already at a better social standing and with the capacity to take up economic opportunities.

Due to gender inequalities, women often have less social capital than men, therefore reducing their capabilities to fully participate in the informal economy (also see Lin, 2000b; Sapiro,

2006:175). Since access to associational networks is largely shaped by cultural identity, race, and gender norms, its usefulness is thus limited to a specific group. Lin (2000b) argues that unequal access to associational networks or social capital often reproduces and reinforces the exclusion and disempowering of other social groups such as women and minority ethnic or racial groups. He further cautions that social networks are not free from competition and they readily work for those with an economic or social advantage over the other.

In his analysis of the politics of survival in Africa, Chabal (2009) attests that social networks are interfaces of intense competition for controlling and accessing resources. He aptly puts it that in poor Africa “competition between networks is intense and it is those who have the most extensive and most reliable set of arrangements who are likely to prevail” (Chabal, 2009:138). Meagher (2010) agrees with Chabal (2009), commenting that the liberalization of most African economies triggered intense competition within the informal economy. She points out how individualization and competition, activated by neoliberalism undermines the cooperation, trust and civic engagement within the already established socio-cultural networks (Meagher, 2010:110).

By critically exploring informal manufacturing networks in the *Aba*'s informal shoe and garment industry in Nigeria, Meagher evinces that liberalization and the opening up of the Nigerian economy, has put extreme pressure on already existing original *Igbo* shoe traders of *Aba* as competitive new entrants from other towns and ethnic groups are integrated into the shoe and garment industry (ibid). She further uncovers that these new entrants who are usually rich and politically connected have brought in their networks that have diluted and weakened the original *Aba* networks that were crucial in the creation of the shoe and garment industry. The weakening and displacement of *Aba* networks by the wealthy informal traders has meant poor local *Aba* traders who lack access to credit and capital emerge as ‘losers’ even though they have spent years creating the local shoe industry. The loss of control on the local shoe industry by the local *Aba* community has translated to businesses losses, reduced income, squeezed profit and reduced access to credit and the exclusion of women traders (Meagher, 2010:111-113).

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the emergence of an informal distributive economy in cities in the global South. According to Ferguson (2015), this type of economy is driven by ordinary people who are mostly unemployed and wageless, while Hart *et al.* (2010) regard it as a human-oriented

economy that is made and remade not necessarily by technocrats but by ordinary people. The emerging informal economy is normatively seen as having a “head of its own” and organised around associational life and social ties. Indeed, in informal economies as Scoones (2016) suggests wageless urbanites can sustain livelihoods and resist poverty through distributing their labour and goods across localised and transnational networks. This chapter also challenged the negative characterisation of the informal economy by modernist theorists that have always considered it regressive. On the contrary, the chapter argued that the informal economy can be regarded as the “real economy” since it occupies a crucial role in employment creation and growth.

Additionally, the chapter examined the sectoral linkages between the formal and informal economies. It gave special attention to the usefulness of these linkages to both formal and informal traders and the global society in general. According to Mathews *et al.* (2012), the linkages have assisted informal traders to gain access to cheap goods in the global market thus maximizing their profits. A large number of street traders operating in Africa have depended on trading and transnational networks linked to global economies particularly that of China to support their informal economic activities. However, the chapter argued that the relationship between the formal and the informal economy can be sometimes exploitative. Contestation over spaces between big businesses and informal traders, consequently, lead to evictions of informal traders. For instance, expansive architectural developments such as shopping malls have been blamed for displacing street traders, thus aggravating their precarious condition.

This chapter further interrogated how informality intersects with the production of space from below. It argued that informality allows ordinary urban citizens to not only re-appropriate their spatial and occupational identities but also reorder space. Indeed, the production of space from below has led to ordinary citizens co-producing unique informal cities that are identifiable as “rhizomatic” cities, “chameleon” cities and “soft” cities. These cities defy the logic of planning and usually break away from notions of Western urbanism to take the form that reflects the everyday practices, imaginings, thoughts, cultural memories of the ordinary people producing it.

Lastly, the chapter delineated some of the drawbacks of romanticising informality as a ready solution in improving the lives of those in the margins. It argues that the celebratory accounts on informality sometimes overlook the precarious state and desperation of those that partake in informal activities mostly comprising street trading. Drawing from Standing’s (2011) and

Ferguson's (2015) observations, the chapter argued that those in the informal sector occupations work under harsh conditions with small financial returns. The chapter further questioned the notions of informality and resilience. It criticized how these processes permit a situation where the state shifts its responsibilities to citizens already stuck in poverty away from a social contract and toward a symbiosis with market-based provision under neoliberalism.

# **CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCHING THE STREET TRADERS OF BULAWAYO: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIELDWORK EXPERIENCES**

## **5.1 Introduction**

The chapter discusses the research paradigms that informed this study and gives reasons for adopting these paradigms and the broad research methodology. It also discusses the conditions and factors that influenced me in selecting research locations. Moreover, the chapter explains the instruments that were used for data collection and why they were chosen. It discusses the sampling techniques used in selecting the participants. Reasons for choosing the sampling methods, the sample size of the participants, and recruitment methods are also discussed in this chapter. It goes on to explain how the collected data was processed and how it shall be analysed. The chapter concludes by discussing the challenges I faced during my fieldwork. It further shares the steps and actions I took to solve some of the problems I encountered throughout my data collection process.

### *5.1.1 Interpretivist and Constructivist Approaches to Social Research*

This study is purely qualitative and adopts an interpretivist and a constructivist approach in addressing the research questions as well as attempting to achieve its objectives. In this section, I explain interpretivism and constructivism as approaches to social research and give reasons for choosing these paradigms.

The proponents of interpretivism and constructivism research share the objective of “...understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Schwandt, 1994:118). They reject the positivist notion that there is only a single identifiable reality and truth that can be measured or studied. Instead, the approaches adopt a relativist stance to suggest that reality is not singular but consists of “multiple mental constructions” (Guba, 1990:27). Additionally, these approaches are interested in “...interpreting deeper meaning in discourse and understanding multiple realities that are represented in a collection of personal narratives or observed behaviours and activities” (Guest *et al.*, 2012:14). Constructivist and interpretivist approaches follow that “... any attempt to understand social reality has to be grounded in people’s experiences of that social reality” (Gray, 2014:24). They focus on subjective human experience, exploring the personal

construction of the individual's world (Gray, 2014; Guest *et al.*, 2013). Fuss (1989:3) asserts that for constructionist theorists and researchers, people's lived realities are:

...systems of representations, social and material practices, laws of discourses, and ideological effects. In short, constructionists are concerned above all with the production and organisation of differences, and therefore reject the idea that any essential or natural givens precede the process of social determination.

Constructivist and interpretivist paradigms suggest that the real meaning of people's experiences is captured when phenomena "speak for themselves" without interference from the investigator (Gray, 2014). These paradigms, therefore, require us to "... lay aside our prevailing understanding of phenomena and revisit our immediate experience of them in order that new meanings may emerge" (Gray, 2014:24). Moreover, they stress the importance of "...becoming one with what one is seeking to know [...] allowing the phenomenon to speak directly to one's own experience" (Moustakas, 1990:16). In this way, a researcher is "able to encounter and examine it, to engage in a rhythmic flow with it – back and forth, again and again – until one has uncovered its multiple meaning" (*ibid.*).

While followers of positivism insist that the purpose of research is that of predicting and controlling nature, those of interpretivism and constructivism assert that the objective of research is to understand and interpret reality, particularly how it is constructed. For Schwandt (1994:118), constructivist and interpretivist researchers believe that "... to understand [the] world of meaning one must interpret it" and must "...elucidate the process of meaning construction and clarify what and how meanings are embodied in the language and actions of social actors". A constructivist or an interpretivist inquirer understands that the construction of meaning is based on the individual's interaction with the immediate environment.

According to Guba and Lincoln (1985:80), constructivism and interpretivism rest on the philosophical belief that "social reality is a construction based upon the actor's frame of reference within the setting". This view is shared by Babbie (2010) who argues that constructivist and interpretivist approaches allow researchers to tap into the deeper meanings of people's experiences as they interact with their immediate environments. Similarly, Baxter and Jack (2008: 544) consider these approaches as allowing researchers to explore "...complex phenomena within their contexts". Weinberg (2008) extends Baxter and Jack's argument positing that constructivism and interpretivism seek to demonstrate that people's worldviews are shaped by historical contexts and processes. I must discuss the reasons why I chose the two approaches that guide my research process.

### *5.1.2 Justification for Adopting the Constructivist and Interpretivist Paradigm*

Two underlying factors compelled me to adopt a constructionist and interpretivist approach in examining informality of space, street trading, and the formulation of urban policy in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. The first factor that influenced my choice of research paradigms are the theoretical approaches that guide my thesis. The work of Foucault on power and discipline relates to constructivist thinking. For instance, Miller (2008:251) regards Foucault as a “constructionist”. According to Foucault (1994), the exercise of power depends much on the construction of regimes of truth and knowledge which in turn achieves objectivism. Knorr-Cetina (1981:1) notes that to the objectivist or constructivist such as Foucault “...the world is composed of facts and the goal of knowledge is to provide a literal account of what the world is like”. Constructivist researchers, like Foucault, see people’s perceptions and everyday social realities as socially produced constructs used to manage differences and enforce discipline.

The thread of constructivist and interpretivist thinking also weaves through Lefebvre’s theory on the production of space. For instance, Lefebvre (1974) regards space as a social product that is constructed out of symbols, codifications, and representations. Additionally, in his spatial triad model, Lefebvre identifies the “spaces of representations” as embodying people’s lived experiences. Moreover, he argues that the production of space is a direct result of “...the mundane, the everyday [...] the repetitive [and] what happens every day” (Lefebvre 1992:6). One can argue that the premise of the Lefebvrian approach towards understanding social reality through analysing space is consistent with that of constructivist and interpretivist research paradigms. Indeed, the importance of everyday lived experiences in the construction of social reality is stressed by all three approaches.

Constructivist and interpretivist researchers further relate to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Like Foucault, some of Gramsci’s ideas can be considered constructionist. For example, Weinberg (2008:14) borrows from Gramsci’s notion of hegemony when describing constructivist and interpretivist researchers. He states that these researchers seek to demonstrate that “...certain states of affairs that others have taken to be eternal and/ or beyond the reach of social influence...” are products of hegemonic processes constructed through symbolic interaction between rulers and the ruled.

The second factor that compelled me to adopt constructivist and interpretivist approaches is the nature of the research objectives and research questions at hand. The main research

objective of this thesis is that of assessing the intensification of street trading in Bulawayo and its impact on the interpretation of urbanity, spatiality, and identity by street traders and other citizens. It further explores the everydayness and lived experiences of street trading and it intersects with the locals' resistance to poverty and their "politics" of survival. The task of my thesis is to mainly interrogate how informality of space in the context of street trading influences or alters the perceptions of Bulawayo's informal traders towards "cityness", identity and spatiality. Moreover, the thesis questions how the everyday practice of street trading empowers or disempowers those engaged in it.

To achieve the thesis' objective and address the questions it poses, I employ data collection methods that are strongly embedded in interpretivist and constructivist approaches. I engaged in participant observation and conducted in-depth interviews with street traders to gain insights into their perceptions and attitudes towards informality, urban change, and spatiality. The methods of participant observation and in-depth interviews also permitted me to acquire a deep understanding of the street traders' lived experiences, life stories, and narratives in relation to coping with urban crises. A detailed discussion on the methods of participant observation and in-depth interviews is further developed below.

## **5.2 Selecting the Research Sites**

Data was collected from four sites within the city of Bulawayo (see Figure 5.1, p107). I chose the following vending sites,

- Basch Commuter Omnibus Rank popularly known as Egodini (Situated along Lobengula Street).
- Bulawayo Early Market Place (Located along 4<sup>th</sup> Avenue).
- Queens Club Market (Situated along Masotsha Ndlovu Road).
- The Bulawayo Central Business District.

Several reasons motivated me to choose these sites. First, I chose the Basch Commuter Omnibus Rank site mainly because it is the largest and most lucrative vending site and has the busiest pedestrian flow in the city of Bulawayo. More importantly, this site is occupied by informal traders facing imminent eviction from this site to pave way for the proposed construction of Egodini shopping mall and a regional transport terminal. This eviction has generated a lot of contestation among street traders' organisations and the municipality.

Second, I selected the Bulawayo Early Market Place as my research site mainly because it pulsates with vending activity and provides a convenient location for the analysis of the




phenomenon of street trading. Additionally, most warehouses that supply agricultural products such as vegetables and fruits to Bulawayo's street traders are concentrated in this area. Another interesting feature about the Bulawayo Early Market Place is that it is one of the two streets that has been pedestrianised by the Bulawayo City Council to cater for the expanding informal sector. The other street that was converted into a pedestrianised space is Lobengula Street.

I also included the newly established Queens Club Market site as part of my study. This vending site was created in December 2015 to accommodate unlicensed and illegal vendors evicted from the central parts of the city. When I sought permission from the Bulawayo City Council to conduct my study, its officials suggested that I consider the Queens Club Market as a possible site for investigation. They noted that it would be useful for the study to uncover how vendors were experiencing this newly created space. I was also drawn to this vending site due to its location. Unlike other vending sites, the Queens Club Market is further from the city centre and most public transport routes. After several visits to this site, I developed a keen interest in why the Bulawayo City Council's Town Planning Department chose this isolated place as a vending site. I became more interested in how such remoteness of this site impacted on street traders and how it speaks to Bulawayo's urban planning and policy.

Lastly, I chose the central business district as a site to conduct my research. I have always looked at Bulawayo's city centre as an indication of urban informality. It encapsulates everything that my study intends to investigate. It reflects the new forms of urbanity that seem to defy the rules and laws of planned and regulated cities. For many Bulawayo residents, the inner city stands out as a collective space for hustlers, pickpocketers, street entertainers and unlicensed vendors. It is a space generally associated with unruliness, criminality and is normally subjected to constant regulation and surveillance by municipal security authorities. It is in the central part of the city that I witnessed most raids on those regarded as illegal street vendors. In interacting with illegal street vendors operating across the inner city, I sought to understand the conditions or dispositions that inform their criminalisation. Spending time with illegal street traders operating in central Bulawayo, allowed me to have a glimpse of how they cope with raids and the impact they have on their trade.

**Figure 2: The Street Map of Bulawayo and Location of Research Sites**



Source: Google Maps (2017).

**KEY**

**Green Circles:** Basch Commuter Omnibus Rank (*Egodini*) and Lobengula Street Market

**Purple Circle:** Bulawayo Early Market Place situated along Fourth Avenue.

**Red Circle:** Queens Club Market situated along First Avenue.

**Blue Circle:** The Bulawayo Central Business District.

### 5.3 Data Collection and Fieldwork Experiences

The process of collecting data began in April 2016 and ended in June 2016. Data collection was conducted in the city of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe at locations shown in Figure 5.1. It was done in three stages which were as follows:

Stage 1: Contacting gatekeepers.

Stage 2: Sampling and selection of participants.

Stage 3: Conducting in-depth interviews, a focus group discussion, and participant observation.

Stage 4: Preparations for data analysis.

#### 5.3.1 *Contacting and Collaborating with Gatekeepers*

A gatekeeper is the initial contact person who facilitates the researcher's access to potential participants and further assists the researcher to familiarize him or herself with the area under study (Crowhurst, 2013; Saunders, 2006). Gatekeepers are usually community leaders or representatives of organisations and state institutions. When approaching gatekeepers, I was careful not to see them as only "instruments" of entering the field. I took heed of Crowhurst's (2013: 464) advice that researchers should not only view gatekeepers as "...static figures in the field to be gotten past". Instead, I maintained a continuous relationship after my initial encounter and made efforts to create a working environment where gatekeepers felt that they were collaborators and partners in my research process.

In establishing this collaborative working relationship with gatekeepers, efforts should be made to provide them with adequate information about the nature of my study, its objectives, and possible benefits. In my case, I provided gatekeepers with a summary of the study which outlined the research objectives and its research design. I furnished gatekeepers with interview guides, a letter of motivation from my supervisors, and the university's official letter proving my status as a Ph.D. student. By providing these documents in the preparation stage of my fieldwork, I minimised any amounts of suspicion that the gatekeepers might have had on the first contact. While I considered the research study of street traders' lived experiences as less sensitive, the gatekeepers I interacted with were very cautious in dealing with me and my intentions were scrutinized. In some instances, my requests to gain entry into the research field were simply ignored, particularly those I sent to vendors' social movements. I had anticipated that due to the volatile political environment of Zimbabwe, some people would be reluctant to

participate in this study. Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert (2008) identify a lack of cooperation and participation from gatekeepers as a common stumbling block for researchers researching sites with political contestations. I shall give a detailed account of the difficulties and dilemmas I encountered in the field later in this chapter.

I approached the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA) – an umbrella organisation for other street traders’ organisations and social movements to facilitate my access to potential participants. I chose this organisation because of its strong ties with street traders. According to its official website, ZCIEA was formed in 2002 under its parent body, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Its sole mandate is that of mobilising informal traders’ associations and strengthening their resistance against harassment of informal traders, political abuse, and evictions. From its inception, ZCIEA has collaborated with international organisations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) in advocating for street traders’ economic and labour rights. I secured permission to conduct my research on street traders affiliated to the ZCIEA through the Secretary General’s office located in Harare. I communicated with the Secretary-General of ZCIEA through electronic mail (see appendix 1), upon him reviewing my research documents he sent an official letter (see appendix 2) granting me access to its affiliate members.

Communications to secure a letter granting permission to research the city’s vending sites were also done with the Bulawayo City Council. I sent electronic mails requesting a gate keeper’s letter to the Council’s public relations department and documents detailing and supporting my research study were attached (see Appendix 3). The application to conduct my research in vending sites operated by the city council was approved by the council’s General Purposes Committee on the 24<sup>th</sup> of August 2015. I was provided with an official letter from the Town Clerk’s office that granted me the authority to research street vendors operating at locations covered by the research study (see Appendix 4). When I arrived in Bulawayo for the fieldwork, I reported to the Council’s Public Relations Department which later directed me to relevant departments such as the Town Planning, Economic Development, and Security Department.

The Bulawayo City Council assisted in locating some of the influential leaders of street traders’ organisations, for instance, it arranged a meeting between myself and the chairperson of the Bulawayo Upcoming Traders Association (BUTA). The Town Planning Department assisted with maps, plans of vending sites, and statistical information on street trading in the city.

Similarly, the Department of Economic Development provided me with information on the contributions of street trading to Bulawayo's economy and the projects it has implemented to promote the informal sector. More significantly, the collaboration made with gatekeepers at initial contact and during the fieldwork played a fundamental role in the sampling and selection of participants.

#### **5.4 Sampling and Selecting Participants**

Sampling is one aspect of qualitative research that is overlooked, and its processes are sometimes considered less important (Noy, 2008; Robinson, 2014). Denizen and Lincoln (2005) stress its importance, arguing that sampling ensures that a researcher identifies the appropriate informants, gets the right information, and thereby generates data that speaks to the objectives of the study. Robinson (2014) identifies a three-step approach that researchers take when sampling, the steps are as follows,

1. Define a universe sample.
2. Decide on a sample size.
3. Devise a sample strategy.

##### *5.4.1 Defining the Universe Sample*

A universe sample is established by way of creating an inclusion and exclusion criteria before recruiting participants (Morse, 2005; Patton, 1990; Robinson, 2014). The study included participants involved in the activity of street trading either as street traders, city officials formulating policy concerning street trading and civil organisations representing street traders' interests. This study only included street traders operating within the 2-kilometer radius from Bulawayo's city centre. Street traders working outside the vicinity of Bulawayo's metropolitan area were excluded from the study. As such informal traders situated in townships, such as those trading at eNtumbane Shopping Complex, Kelvin Industrial area, enculturated Shopping Centre and eLuveve (*eSporweni*) were excluded. The reason why I excluded vending sites located in townships is strongly influenced by the research problem stated in Chapter 1. The research problem, together with the objectives and research questions require that I focus on street traders constantly experiencing raids and evictions from the council's security authorities. When compared to street traders operating in the city centre, those situated in townships rarely experience raids.

Furthermore, when recruiting participants, I ensured that they were representative of every sub-sector of street trading. I identified 8 sub-sectors that are shown in Table 5.1 below. Informal traders involved in small-scale businesses such as construction, carpentry, metalwork, mechanics, and grind-milling were not included in this study since most of these establishments are zoned in industrial areas far away from the study's jurisdiction.

**Table 1: The Sectors of Street Trading and the Profile of Street Traders that Participated in the Study**

Street Trading Sub-Sector	Profile of Street Traders
Agricultural/horticulture/gardening produce	These street traders sold agricultural products such as vegetables, fruits, flowers, maize (roasted and cooked), beans and peanuts.
Meats/edible insects	Such street traders sold meat (beef and chicken), Mopani worms.
Second hand and new clothes	Some of the selected participants traded in secondhand clothes imported from Mozambique and the United Arab Emirates (Dubai). Others sold new clothes imported from South Africa and China.
Tailoring and knitting	This study included those involved in tailoring of school uniforms and knitting of school jerseys.
Electronic consumable	These traders sold radios, speakers, amplifiers, blank compact discs, pirated digital video discs (DVDs), cellphone batteries, and electric cables.
Telecommunication, banking and electricity services	These street traders sold recharge airtime of Zimbabwe's major telecommunication companies. These traders also run informal telecommunication or cellphone banking outlets. Some of them sell electricity credits on behalf of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Agency (ZESA).
Confectionery, plastics, cigarettes	A few of the participants sold sweets, chocolates, biscuits, and other goods such as plastic bags and cigarettes.
Stationery	Some of the participants traded used Secondary school textbooks, exercise books, pens and pencils.

Key informants included officials working in organisations that have dealt with issues of street trading in one way or the other. While I identified ZCHEA and the Bulawayo City Council as the key informants, I recognised and included officials from other organisations actively involved in advocating for the interests of street traders in Bulawayo. In the research proposal, I stated that I intended to interview officials from the following organisations,

- Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA)
- Bulawayo Agenda (BA)
- Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCHEA)
- The Bulawayo City Council (BCC)
- The National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe (NVUZ)

From the above-mentioned organisations, I only managed to interview officials from the Bulawayo City Council and those belonging to the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations. The Officials of Bulawayo Agenda and the National Vendor Union of Zimbabwe, respectively, did not respond to e-mails sent. I visited their premises, only to be notified that they were out of the country. Members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise did not respond to requests for interviews sent via electronic mail. I tried to telephonically contact the leader of Women of Zimbabwe Arise, but she was unreachable.

However, my misfortunes in failing to recruit officials from Bulawayo Agenda, Women of Zimbabwe Arise and the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe soon turned around, when officials from the Bulawayo City Council introduced me to officials from other street traders' organisations. With assistance coming from city council officials, I managed to conduct interviews with officials belonging to these organisations,

- Bulawayo Vendors and Traders Association (BVTA)
- Bulawayo Upcoming Traders Association (BUTA)
- Streetwise Traders Association (SWITA)
- Bulawayo Florist Association (BFA)

Table 2 appearing on the next page, provides the profiles of the key informants. It shows the organisational positions held by each key informant that participated in the interviews.

**Table 2: The Profiles of Key Informants and Their Organisational Positions**

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Person(s) Interviewed and their Organisational Capacity</b>
Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association (ZCHEA)	– Lindiwe Malaba <sup>30</sup> [F] ( <i>Association Member</i> ) – John Mpesu [M] ( <i>Association Member</i> )
Bulawayo City Council (BCC)	– Bongani Mangena [M] ( <i>Economic Development Unit Official</i> ) – Sihle Masina[F] ( <i>Vending Bay Allocation Unit Official</i> ) – Themba Msomi [M] ( <i>Town Planning Official</i> )
Bulawayo Vendors and Traders Association (BVTA)	– Thabani Moyo[M] (BVTA Official)
Bulawayo Upcoming Traders Association (BUTA)	– Sam Nkomo [M] ( <i>Association Member</i> ) – Joseph Makhubalo[M] ( <i>Association Member</i> )
Bulawayo Florist Association (BFA)	– Mandla Ndlovu [M] ( <i>Association Member</i> )
Streetwise Traders Association (SWITA)	– Casey Jones [M] ( <i>Association Member</i> ) – David Moss [M] ( <i>Association Member</i> )

M= Male

F=Female

#### 5.4.2 Deciding on the Sample Size

This study recruited a sample of 41 participants for in-depth interviews and a focus discussion group. In this sample of 41 participants, 10 of them were officials from the city council and street traders' associations. Of these 10 officials, 5 were street traders, these key informants were also interviewed separately in their capacity as street traders. The gender representation of officials interviewed is as follows: females (2) and males (8). A total number of 36 street traders participated in this study, of which 23 of the street traders took part in in-depth interviews, while 13 participated in a focused group discussion. The gender representation of street traders that participated in in-depth interviews is as follows: females (13) and males (10). In the focus group discussion, the gender representation was as follows: females (7) and males

<sup>30</sup> All names used in this study are false. This was done to protect the identity of participants.



(6). Of the 41 participants that participated in this study, 28 responded to face to face in-depth interviews. The gender representation of the total sample is females (21) and males (20).

The size of the sample in qualitative research is determined by the study's objectives, its theoretical underpinnings, available financial resources, time frames, and data analysis strategies (Fugard and Potts, 2015; Malterud et al., 2016; Robinson, 2014). The main objective of this thesis is that of interrogating urban change and informalisation of urban space through the lived experiences of street traders in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. This objective required me to draw up a "thick description" of the street traders' everyday experiences, which I could only achieve by having a smaller sample size. In their concept of "information power", Malterud et al. (2016:1753) argue that smaller sample units generate data that is rich and intensive compared to larger samples. Additionally, I chose a smaller sample size because of the theoretical premise informing this study. For Lefebvre (1974), understanding space calls for social researchers to have an intimate interaction with its inhabitants. The rapport between a researcher and the participant is easily attainable if the number of participants is manageable.

The duration of my fieldwork was limited by two constraints. First, due to financial and time constraints, I found it practical to interview only 41 participants. While I received a research grant for my fieldwork, accessing my funds proved futile because of the prevailing cash shortage in the country. The unfavourable exchange rate between the South African Rand and the American Dollar harmed my purchasing power. For instance, a R100 note could only fetch US\$6, which was barely enough to cover transport and food for the participants. Second, I travelled to Zimbabwe using a personal car, and upon arriving at the Beitbridge border post, I managed to pay temporary vehicle importation duty of only 60 days. With such a limited time frame, I considered it practical and sound to have a small number of participants.

#### *5.4.3 Devising the Sampling Strategy*

I used purposive and snowball sampling to locate and recruit participants. Purposive sampling permits a researcher to select "a case because it illustrates some features or process in which a researcher is interested in" (Silverman, 2010:141). This sampling method targets "people who fit the criteria of desirable participants" (Henning *et al.*, 2004:71). It allows the researcher to develop "a set of criteria for the selection of participants" (Moustakas, 1990:46). In this study, I recruited people involved in street trading within and around the city centre of Bulawayo. Since I was particularly interested in street traders who have experienced raids and evictions,

street traders operating in the townships were excluded from the study. I easily located these street traders, since those evicted were relocated to the newly created Queens Club vending site (see Figure 5.1). I was further interested in street traders that have been involved in street trading for longer periods. I relied on the city council officials' knowledge and municipal vendors' registration records to locate such traders. I targeted street traders involved in diverse economic activities ranging from selling vegetables, meat, electrical consumables, airtime, second-hand clothes, and foodstuffs (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.4).

I purposively sampled street traders' organisations that have been vocal and at the forefront of advocating for the inclusion of street traders in the city centre. I depended on reports in newspapers and digital media to learn more about organisations engaged in protests against the council's negative stance towards the increasing number of illegal vending in the city of Bulawayo. The most notable of these organisations are WOZA (although, I ended up not interviewing any of its officials), ZCHIEA, BUTA, and SWITA. I requested officials from these organisations to provide me with their expert knowledge, share the visions and missions of their organisation with regards to street traders' rights in Bulawayo. I further requested these organisations to refer me to their members and fellow social movement activists.

Establishing a working relationship with these organisations had an immense contribution to the success of the snowball sampling process. Snowball sampling is a method whereby a key informant refers the researcher to other participants who may participate in the study and provide more information on the subject being researched (Maree and Petersen, 2007). This sampling technique was helpful in locating participants that were difficult to access. I used snow ball sampling to recruit informants working in street traders' associations that I was not aware existed. For instance, city council officials referred me to Casey Jones, and official from Streetwise Traders Association (SWITA). Upon completing the sampling process, I then moved to the third phase of my data collection which involved conducting in-depth interviews, a focused group discussion, and participant observation.

## **5.5 In-depth Interviews**

In-depth interviews elicit participants' feelings, perceptions, and lived experiences which are crucial in unravelling specific phenomena (Guest et al., 2012). In conducting interviews, researchers attempt to explore "...the world from the subject's point of view, to unfold the meaning of people's experiences, to uncover their lived word..." (Kvale, 1996:1). For

Nieuwenhuis (2007), the purpose of conducting qualitative interviews is that of gaining an understanding of how participants construct knowledge and social reality. I conducted semi-structured interviews to capture the meanings, perceptions and attitudes street traders, city officials and activists attach to the increase of informality in Bulawayo.

### *Semi-Structured Interviews*

These types of interviews require the researcher to prepare predetermined questions that are specific to the topic at hand (Nieuwenhuis, 2007). Schensul et al. (1999:149) note that “semi-structured interviews combine the flexibility of the unstructured, open-ended and structure and closed-ended questions [...]”. Fontana and Frey (1998:56) argue that unlike structured interviews that attempt to interrogate behaviour “within pre-established categories”, semi-structured interviews seek to understand people’s behaviours without imposing any categorisation or limits to inquiry. Nieuwenhuis (2007:87) argues that while semi-structured interviews sometimes “define the line of inquiry”, researchers should be attentive to “new emerging lines of inquiry” that can be probed further. Schensul et al. (1999) further reiterate that although questions in semi-structured interviews schedules are pre-formulated, the answers to those questions are open-ended.

In my case, semi-structured interviews allowed for a focused and yet unrestrictive conversation with participants on issues related to street trading, space, and urban policy in Bulawayo. It allowed me to capture their personal views, attitudes, perception, and thoughts towards informality, the changing of urban lifestyle, and coping with poverty in a somewhat wageless society. Moreover, with semi-structured interviews I managed to tap into the participants’ life histories, tracing some of the participants’ transitioning from formal employment to informal employment. I felt that the interviews offered me an opportunity to gain insights into the lived experiences of street trading, from the opportunities it offers, to the challenges faced by those participating in it.

Conducting semi-structured interviews permitted me to direct the flow of the interviews, while at the same time allowing participants to express their views and perceptions freely. Indeed, I made efforts to ensure that the interviewing process was an empowering experience for the participants by allowing them to also control the direction of our conversation. Henning et al. (2004:66) note that in conducting semi-structured interviews, the researcher “relinquishes power and invites participants to be equal co-directors of the process”. For Fontana and Frey

(1998), inviting participants to equally direct the flow of the conversation stimulates a sense of co-ownership of the research process, thereby increasing levels of trust and rapport between the researcher and the participant. They further argue that “close rapport with participants opens doors to more informed research” (Fontana and Frey, 1998:60). Since establishing rapport with participants requires a researcher not to “impose the world of academia and preconceptions upon them” (ibid), it was necessary that I develop interview guides that are not relatable to the research objectives and questions but also to participants.

### *5.5.1 Preparing Interview Guides*

An interview guide directs the course of the conversation between the interviewer and the respondent. It lists the themes, areas, and topics to be discussed in an interview (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004; Simmons, 2008). It ensures that the discussion between the interviewer and the participants does not deviate much from the topic under investigation. In some instances, an interview guide can “...allow for the possibility of non-directive interviewing which the interviewees determine the course of the interview” (Simmons, 2008:186). For Kvale (1998:129), a good interview guide should “contribute thematically to knowledge production” by aligning the interview questions together with the research questions and objectives of this study. A good interview guide should also promote “positive interaction, keep the flow of the conversation going, and motivate the subjects to talk about their experiences and feelings” (Kvale, 1998:130).

I prepared three interview guides containing questions uniquely designed for each group of my participants. First, I developed an interview guide for street traders (see Appendix 5), I then prepared one for representatives from street traders’ organisations (see Appendix 6) and one for the Bulawayo City Council (see Appendix 7). The questions contained in the interview guide were framed around the research questions that the thesis seeks to answer. While I aligned my interview questions with the research objectives, I ensured that they were sensitive, relatable, empathetic, and understandable to all participants. Issues of gender, educational level, age, language, and professional expertise were therefore taken into consideration when I developed the interview guides. While the interview guides were written in English, I read out interview questions in either isiNdebele or Shona. I am competent in both languages.

From the interview guides, I manage to capture diverging and converging views that participants had on the increase of street trading within city spaces. The questions listed in the interview guides assisted me to:

1. Uncover the social, economic and political conditions that have pushed people into street trading.
2. Understand the everyday lived experiences of street traders, the type of economic activities they are involved in and how it relates to the appropriation of urban space.
3. Gain insight on the participants' understanding of the interactions between street trading, occupationality, urban policy and infrastructural development.
4. Explore some of the feelings and attitudes participants have towards raids, the criminalisation and negative characterisation of street traders.

Table 3 below shows how interview questions were developed from the research questions and objectives.

**Table 3: How Interview Questions Were Developed**

Research Objectives	Research Questions	Interview Questions
To explore the “everydayness”, “lived experiences” and “subjectivity” of street trading in Bulawayo, particularly how it enables or disabled the lives of those involved in it.	What do the everyday lived experiences of street trading look like? How does street trading enhance or disable the livelihoods of those involved in it?	<i>“Describe what your day as a street trader is like”?</i> (Street Traders).  <i>“What are some of the impacts street trading has on your household”?</i> (Street Traders).
To examine how the informalisation of urban space in the context of street trading has impacted on how cityness, spatiality and occupational identity is construed and interpreted in the city of Bulawayo.	How has the increase of street trading and the rapid informalisation of space in Bulawayo impacted on the way spatiality, cityness and occupational identity are construed?	<i>“How would you as an organisation interpret the increase in the informalisation of urban space as evidenced by the rise of street traders on city spaces”?</i> (Street Traders Associations).
To interrogate the nature and dynamics of conflicts that arise from the formal and informal appropriation of urban space in Bulawayo	What is the nature of “contestations” over urban space existing between the Bulawayo City Council and street traders?  Has the Council’s urban policies and formal appropriation of urban spaces improved or disenfranchised the lives of street traders?	<i>“Bulawayo is rapidly becoming an informal city as seen with the intensification of street trading on city spaces. Do you have any policy in place to address the increasing number of street traders”?</i> (Bulawayo City Council).

### *5.5.2 Conducting the Interviews*

Conducting interviews was both challenging and intriguing. Despite securing permission from the gatekeepers to access the field, getting potential participants to participate in the interviews proved to be difficult. Crowhurst (2013) argues that being granted access by gatekeepers does not necessarily mean that the researcher will not have to negotiate with other potential participants. She further notes that "...the gatekeeper's facilitation does not automatically mean that the target population will take part in the study, and the researcher should seek their permission directly" (Crowhurst, 2013:465). The facilitation of interviews required me to personally seek permission from potential participants that I had been referred to by gatekeepers. The interviewing process involved explaining the research objectives and its possible benefits to the participants. I read out the information contained in the informed consent and all the ethical implications of the study. Interviews with street traders were conducted at their vending bays while those with key stakeholders were done at their workplaces.

Participants were more likely to engage in an interview after I had visited them several times, and during those visits, I had purchased some of their goods. For instance, I only managed to interview one fruit vendor after I had visited her three times and bought bananas from her during the visits. These many visits and buying from her helped to build trust with the respondent. I also noticed that participants were only willing to be interviewed after they had been given some time with the interview guide. Therefore, I allowed some of the participants to familiarise themselves with the interview guide at least two days before the interview.

Familiarisation with the interview guide created easiness, relaxation and confidence among the participants, permitting participants to talk freely and openly about their experiences with street trading. I also ensured that the conversation with street traders was informal and casual so I could minimise the distracting habit of constantly looking at the interview guide. While measures were taken to build rapport with interviewees, other participants, particularly older females refused to be voice recorded. In instances where participants refused to be recorded, I jotted down their responses in a note pad. This process of taking notes during interviews was cumbersome and reduced the quality of data. Nevertheless, younger male participants were willing to be recorded, with some requesting that I playback the recorded interview. Some of the participants refused to sign informed consent forms, arguing that the signing of these documents exposed their identities. As a token of appreciation for participating in this study,

refreshments, and snacks were provided to participants. The profiles of the street traders, the dates when interviews were conducted, and duration are shown in Table 4 (below).

**Table 4: Profiles of Participants and Interview Logistics**

Street Trader (Pseudonym)	Gender	Economic Activity	Date and Time of Interview
Maggie Zunguza	Female	Fruits, sweets, vegetables, cigarettes trader	21/04/2016
Moses Khozi	Male	Plastic, sweets, cigarettes	23/04/2016
Prudence Ndlovu	Female	Vegetable trader	24/04/2016
Kudzi Zhou	Female	Mealies (Maize) trader	28/04/2016
Mandla Ndlovu	Male	Florist	06/05/2016
Mkhululi Banda	Male	Plastic bag trader	09/05/2016
Mehluli Siziba	Male	Banana trader	09/05/2016
Job Sibanda	Male	Roasted maize and fruits trader	09/05/2016
Miriam Ndlovu	Female	Second-hand clothes trader	09/05/2016
Lindiwe Malaba	Female	School uniform, vegetable, sweets trader	09/05/2016
Soneni Mkhize	Female	Knits and sell school jerseys	09/05/2016
Mischek Gumbo	Male	Used textbooks trader	10/05/2016
Joseph Makhubalo	Male	Cellphone consumables trader	10/05/2016
Sam Nkomo	Male	Electrical gadgets trader	10/05/2016
Brian Mpofo	Male	Sells sweets	12/05/2016
John Mpesu	Male	Fruits and clothes traders	12/05/2016
Dorcas Sibanda	Female	Knits and sell school jerseys	12/05/2016
Gogo Madlela	Female	Second-hand clothes trader used plastic buckets trader	16/05/2016
Maria Gumede	Female	Second-hand clothes, vegetable, dried meat trader	16/05/2016
Sicelo Nleya	Female	Second-hand clothes trader	16/05/2016
Nokuthula Ngwenya	Female	Second-hand clothes trader	16/05/2016

## 5.6 Focus Group Discussion

I conducted one focus group discussion which consisted of 13 participants; 7 were females and 6 were males. The size of this focus group discussion was slightly above the prescribed maximum number of 12 (also see Gibbs, 2012). However, from this size I captured more diverse and rich perspective on the everydayness of street trading. Although it was not my initial plan to conduct a focus group interview, one of the Bulawayo Upcoming Traders official insisted that I conduct one. This deviation from the original plan of conducting individual interview to a focus one, not only enriched the data quality but it saved me time. The official assisted in selecting participants and organising a group that was representative of gender, age, and occupation. The proceedings were recorded using a digital voice recorder, while the official volunteered to take notes. Participants came from a diverse vending background and were mainly from Egodini vending site. To this end, the purpose of the focus group discussion was to illicit street traders' views on how the construction of Egodini mall will impact their activity of street vending. As stated in Chapter 1, the construction of the mall will likely lead to the eviction and relocation of traders operating close to Egodini Taxi rank.

The main advantage of this focus group discussion was that it facilitated the capturing of a wide range of responses and opinions that enriched the quality of data. Nieuwenhuis (2007:90) indicates that focus group discussions deactivate "...inhibitions that may otherwise discourage participants from disclosing information". By listening to the experiences of others, participants in group interviews can "...amplify, qualify, amend or contradict" information being gathered in the discussion (Lofland and Lofland, 1984:14). Frey and Fontana (1993:24) state that group interviews are helpful in the process of "indefinite triangulation". Indefinite triangulation is when opinions are modified and elaborated after they have been bounced back and forth among group participants.

The focus group discussion I had with the street traders was captivating, stimulating a provocative discussion and debate around street trading in Bulawayo and the development of the Egodini mall in particular. The information that was generated from the discussion was immense in detail, compared to one generated from a single respondent. The diversity in opinions and views enabled participants to build on each other's comments validating or disputing what has been said by another group member. I also used the information gathered from the group discussion to validate the data obtained from individual interviews.



**Figure 3: A Focus Group Discussion Session**



*These are some of the participants that sat down for the focus group discussion. Source: Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

### *5.6.1 Participant Observation*

This study used participant observation to collect data. Participatory observation is a method in which the researcher gathers data “...by being present and participating in the activities of the subjects under investigation” (Sanchez-Jankowski, 2002:145). It further involves the researcher “immersing himself or herself in a chosen setting to gain an insider perspective of that setting” (Nieuwenhuis, 2007:85). During the data collection period, I visited vending sites and observed the following: how street traders allocated space, the types of goods being sold, how raids are conducted, and how street traders respond to them. Moreover, I observed the movement of street traders across urban spaces. I also took pictures of street signs, newspaper headlines, placards, and billboards that I thought carried messages related to informality, street trading, and cleanliness of the city.

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2016, I was invited by Streetwise Traders Association (SWITA) to participate in the Workers’ Day celebration. The celebration was organised by the National Social Security Authority (NSSA), a parastatal tasked by the government of Zimbabwe to provide social

security to citizens. This celebration involved labour unions marching around the city carrying placards with messages raising awareness on workers' safety. The march was followed by speeches from leaders of street traders' organisations, I noted down their remarks on the experiences of street traders in Bulawayo.

### *5.6.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation*

Data analysis and interpretation involve organising texts and descriptions from transcribed interviews into "categories, themes and sequences that tell the story of each research participant" (Moustakas, 1990:49; also see Huberman and Miles, 1994). It further encompasses translating data into patterns of meaning and descriptions leading to a better understanding of social realities (Henning et al., 2004). In this research, data analysis was conducted in two stages. First, I familiarised myself with themes emerging from the transcribed data. The slow process of transcribing the interviews became critical in assisting me to accurately code the data both inductively and deductively and point out recurring topics and consistencies within the data. According to Henning et al. (2004) researchers who transcribe their interviews are more competent when it comes to coding the data.

The second stage involved the coding of data. Inductive and deductive approaches were adopted in data coding. In developing inductive codes, segments of interview texts were organised under-identified themes emerging from the data itself. Constructing inductive codes permitted the data to "speak for itself", therefore data analysis was organised and conducted around issues participants considered important. Inductive coding intended to capture the participants' unique understanding of the interactions of urban space and livelihood in Bulawayo. This inductive coding exercise was crucial in pointing out dissimilarities existing in the participants' views and attitudes towards issues relating to street trading, urban policy, and informalities of urban space.

The development of deductive codes was determined by the research objectives, theoretical underpinnings, and secondary data. It is impossible for a researcher to solely depend on primary data to develop themes (see Henning, 1995; Philips, 1987). The idea to "let the data speak for itself", although useful in capturing real experiences, is criticized by Henning et al. (2004:52) as not only an impractical data analysis method, but one that can reduce the quality of analysis. They assert that thematic analysis is not only conducted using primary data, but the researcher

may rely on the knowledge they already have. Therefore, the thematic analysis was guided by the knowledge I already possess on urban informality.

For Henning *et al.* (2004) knowledge from primary data is not useful unless researchers relate it to their disciplinary knowledge. However, Tomaselli and Dyll-Myklebust (2015) caution that the knowledge researchers bring to the field should not sideline that of the participants. In my case, I considered research participants as co-producers of knowledge; their opinions and contributions were brought into conversation with existing literature on urban informality. The triangulation of research findings with existing literature and objectives of this study was necessary for keeping the study focused. Moreover, triangulation validates some of the issues raised by participants in the interviews against already existing secondary data (Schutt, 2012). The data was organised and sorted into themes through N-VIVO 10, a computer-based data analysis software package. This qualitative computer-based data analysis programme assists researchers to sort and place segments of interview texts into relevant themes.

### *5.6.3 Ethical Considerations*

The research process can contribute to ethical challenges that require a researcher to take the necessary steps to ensure that the research process does not harm participants (Patton, 2002). This research strived to achieve the following ethical requirements: informed consent, privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity. For Boeije (2010:44) an “informed consent is intended to ensure that participants are placed in a situation where they can decide, in full knowledge of the risks and benefits of the study, whether and how to participate”. I read out the informed consent form (see Appendix 8) either in English, IsiNdebele, and Shona. Before conducting interviews, I informed the respondent that participation in this research was voluntary, that they had a choice to refuse to answer any question, and if need be, that they were free to withdraw from the interview. However, as already mentioned in this chapter, some of the participants were reluctant to sign the informed consent form. Instead, participants that were unwilling to provide a written consent, gave a verbal one.

To protect the identity of the participants, the real names of the participants were replaced by pseudonyms. The digital audio recorder was only used after approval from the respondent had been granted. I signed a memorandum of understanding with the Bulawayo City Council that I shall share with them the research findings (see Appendix 9). I also intend to share the findings with relevant street traders’ organisations. Ethical approval was granted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 10).

## **5.7 Researcher's Reflexivity, Positionality and Potential Limitations of the Study**

The researcher's reflexivity and positionality call for an evaluation of how an individual's subjectivity impacts the research process (Ravitch and Carl, 2016; Sikes, 2004). It allows researchers to locate their views, cultural identity, personal background and gender in relation to the research process and research outcome. It further permits researchers to acknowledge and disclose their true selves and seek to understand how they influence subjects' participation and response. When I was in the fieldwork, I felt that my gender, ethnicity and personal background influenced the research process.

Firstly, I found it difficult to recruit female participants in this study. When compared to their male counterparts, female participants were the most hesitant to participate in the study. In those instances, I could not help myself but feel that being a male researcher prevented me from easily recruiting women to participate in interviews. Older women were more uncomfortable with me being a male researcher. For example, there was an old woman whom I was referred to, refused to be interviewed because she distrusted young men. Secondly, I felt that my ethnicity influenced the way I viewed and approached potential participants. I am Shona by descent, while the area under study is predominantly Ndebele. Although I was born and raised among the Ndebele people, there are some moments where my Shona identity made me feel like an outsider. This feeling of being an outsider determined how I viewed and approached participants.

For instance, I presumed that potential Ndebele participants were less likely to participate upon learning that I am Shona, and this presumption influenced how I introduced myself towards the participants. For example, when I introduced myself to a Ndebele respondent, I tended to overemphasize that I am a Bulawayo citizen. He was amused by the introduction and asked why I mentioned the "born and raised in Bulawayo" part. We both realised that this unusual introduction was an attempt to mask my Shona identity and my attempt at assuring him that I understood Ndebele both as language and cultural identity.

Lastly, my background had an impact on how participants responded to questions being asked. Most of the participants did not answer some questions fully; they argued that I already knew the conditions that compelled them to engage in street vending. For example, when I asked them what pushed them into street trading, most of them would simply reply "you know the Zimbabwean situation". While participants considered me as an insider who knew about street

vending and Zimbabwe's dire economic situation, I explained to them that I have never experienced the economic meltdown as a street vendor, thus my views would not be that useful.

I should state that assuming the dualistic role of a researcher (outsider) and that of a Bulawayo citizen (insider) exposed to street vending, resulted in potential biases. In some interviews, I gave my background knowledge on street vending and participants would provide responses that are aligned to what I would have said. Kanuha (2000:444) discusses the predicament of assuming the insider role when conducting research. He argues that while being an insider researcher "... enhances the depth and breadth of understanding a population that may not be accessible to a nonnative scientist..." it raises "... questions about objectivity, reflexivity, and authenticity of a research project are raised because perhaps one knows too much or is too close to the project and maybe too similar to those being studied". Apart from my personal biases, the study faced other challenges.

#### *5.7.1 Limitation of Study*

As noted already, female street traders showed unwillingness to participate in the interviews. Although this unwillingness to participate was partly because of my gender, the country's political environment where discussing economic and social issues is avoided for safety reasons largely contributed to their reluctance to participate. My thoughts proved to be accurate, as most of the female participants agreed to be interviewed only after I had proved that I was not working for the police and the notorious intelligence unit by showing them my university student card. I later realised that some participants became more open and receptive when they learnt that I was a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Another setback I faced was when I was conducting a focus group discussion. Some of the female participants were not keen to contribute to the discussion. I could tell from their body language that female participants were uncomfortable in sharing their experiences and opinions on informality with other participants. Most female participants spoke in a toned-down voice, bowed down their heads to avoid eye contact with other participants. I noticed that only one female respondent was vocal and contributed a lot to the discussion (see respondent pictured holding a voice recorder in Figure 2, p119). Frey and Fontana (1993) argue that the power differential between men and women can greatly impact on how participants participate. In a patriarchal society, such as that of Zimbabwe, women are more likely to be withdrawn and less keen to participate in situations where social issues are being discussed in public and around men.

## **5.8 Conclusion**

Interpretivist and constructivist paradigms were used to guide the qualitative research process of this study. The selection of these paradigms was influenced by the theoretical approaches and research objectives guiding this study. The chapter gives an insight into the research sites under study, detailing why they were chosen for data collection. Factors such as level of street trading activity, proximity to the city centre, frequency of evictions, and pedestrian flow influenced the selection of the four research sites.

This chapter discussed the sampling techniques used for the study. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed in recruiting 41 participants. In-depth interviews (28 interviews) were conducted with street traders and key informants from the city council and street traders' organisation. A focus group discussion (13 participants) was conducted with street traders selected from diverse trading backgrounds and vending sites identified in this chapter. The in-depth interviews were crucial in eliciting a thick descriptive account of the participants' views and attitudes towards street trading and the informalisation of urban space in Bulawayo. While the focus group discussion provided a rich and diverse insight into the lived experiences of street traders. The proceeding of in-depth interviews and focused group discussion were recorded through a digital voice recorder. Recordings were later transcribed and were thematically analysed through NVIVO 10.

Finally, this chapter discussed the ethical considerations taken in this study. The research adhered to all ethics protocols that ensure informed consent, privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity of participants. Participation was voluntary and guided by the informed consent form, which participants were required to sign before the commencement of the interview. However, some of the participants were reluctant to sign the informed consent forms citing that it nullified their anonymity. Challenges were experienced in recruiting female participants, the researchers' gender aided in this problem. The next three chapters focus on the presentation, interpretation, and analysis of the data collected.

# **CHAPTER SIX: THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROCESSES DRIVING THE INFORMALISATION OF URBAN SPACE AND LABOUR IN BULAWAYO**

## **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter is the first of three chapters that presents, discusses, and analyses research findings from the fieldwork conducted in Bulawayo between April and June 2016. In this chapter, I address one of the thesis' objectives which seeks to examine the political, economic and social processes driving the informalisation of urban space and labour in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. To achieve this objective, the thesis attends the first two research questions posed in the Introduction chapter which are:

1. What are the perceived political, economic, and social processes drivers of informalisation of urban space and labour in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe?
2. What do the everyday lived experiences of street trading look like?


This chapter is structured in three sections. The first section looks at how the participants interpret the informalisation of urban space and labour in relation to Zimbabwe's economic crisis and the de-industrialisation of Bulawayo in particular. I use street traders' everyday experiences as a prism through which I analyse the transitioning of Bulawayo from an industrial city to a city of vendors (also see Mlambo, 2017). This chapter does not intend to conduct an exhaustive historical analysis of Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis, instead, it will focus on what other scholars have considered as the significant era of the Zimbabwean crisis, the period of 1990 to 2013 (for example, see Bond and Manyanya, 2002). They argue that street trading and informality are a direct offshoot of a severe decline and de-industrialisation of the Zimbabwean economy (see Gwisai, 2010). Most participants in this study noted that the de-industrialisation of the Zimbabwean economy has produced unprecedented levels of urban unemployment and increased the impoverishment of urbanites.

The second section of this chapter focuses on how social processes such as social ties, family's background and previous formal work experience have facilitated the informalisation of urban space and labour. While some participants perceived unemployment and urban poverty as the major drivers of informality, others considered social factors such as social ties, family

background in informal business also played an instrumental role in compelling urbanites to join street trading and the informal economy.

The final section looks at how Bulawayo's geographical proximity to neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Botswana has also acted as a driver of informalisation in Bulawayo. Attention is given to cross-border trading and the informal money exchange business. Some of the participants argued that the proximity of Bulawayo to neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Botswana, and Zambia has provided a fertile ground for the growth and expansion of cross-border trade which they find to be the driving engine of Bulawayo's informal sector (also see Manjokoto and Ranga, 2017; Mawowa and Matongo, 2011). A thematic presentation, discussion, and analysis of the drivers of informality is summarised in Figure 4, below.

**Figure 4: The Drivers of Urban Informality in Bulawayo**





## 6.2 De-industrialisation, Disinvestment and Unemployment

*“I have always said if you are in a city [...] I mean if you run across a city and you do not see cranes then there is something wrong [...] something is very wrong. It is very symbolic, very symbolic...” Bongani Mangena, Bulawayo City Council, Economic Development Unit, Bulawayo City Council<sup>31</sup>.*

Several of the participants directly explained increasing informality and street trading as a result of Bulawayo’s massive de-industrialisation. They associated de-industrialisation with a decrease in employment opportunities and an entrenchment of poverty. These participants argued that Bulawayo has in its last two decades lagged in terms of economic development and employment creation. Most of them reminisced of a Bulawayo which had vibrant industries offering plenty of formal jobs. Bongani Mangena<sup>32</sup>, an official based at the Bulawayo City Council’s Economic Development Unit, confirmed that Bulawayo was once, as he put it, a “spoiled city”. He argued that it was “spoiled” in the sense that it had more than enough industries that supplied enough employment to those seeking modern city life. He mentioned Dunlop, Merlin, Duly’s, National Foods, Lobels Bakery, National Blanket, and Puzey and Payne as companies that once absorbed most of the city’s labour force. Bongani Mangena noted that some of the companies he mentions have since been shut down. Those that are still operating do so at minimal production levels.

Faced with such a decline in industrial productivity, Bulawayo City Council’s Economic Development unit’s role in reviving Bulawayo’s economy has become more critical than ever. According to Bongani Moyo, the Economic Development unit stands resolute in finding ways to resuscitate collapsed industries by attracting foreign investments from neighbouring countries and beyond. When we discussed Bulawayo’s economic climate and its state of foreign investment, Bongani Mangena argued that the local economy is now highly informalised with low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI):

We are in a very difficult situation in Bulawayo. Perhaps, I am not even being fair to say in Bulawayo but Zimbabwe. Since 2000, there is very little in terms of economic development. Even if you check the FDI it is very [...] it is very minimal. Things are getting from big, gradually going to small and smaller. I will give an example right behind you, you got Haddon and Sly which used to be a big departmental store if you get in there now there are small compartments selling small things and so forth it has been subdivided into a hundred of these

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<sup>31</sup> These sentiments were once shared by, the then Chairperson of the War Veterans Association, Christopher Mutsvanga. In a video recording that has gone viral on social media, Mr Mutsvanga laughs at the fact that most of those born in the 90s have never seen a crane moving across the skies. He suggests that this shows the lack of infrastructural development that has characterised modern Zimbabwe.

<sup>32</sup> All names used in the results chapters are pseudonyms.

compartments. It is indicative of the situation that we are in (Bongani Mangena, Interview, 19 May 2016).

Bongani Mangena asserted that the plummeting of foreign investments translates to decreased industrial production, low infrastructural development, and high unemployment rates. For him, the increase of street trading and other forms of informal trade across city spaces is linked to reduced streams of foreign investment in the local and national economy.

The arguments raised by Bongani Mangena are supported by Thabani Moyo, an activist working with the Bulawayo Vendors and Traders Association (BVTA). He shed more insight into the interactions between disinvestment, unemployment and the growing numbers of street traders in Bulawayo. Thabani Moyo explained that the gradual loss of investments on industries has compelled previously labor-intensive industries to reduce production and downsize their workforces:


There are low levels of investments and production in large industries. We still have some companies like Pretoria Portland Cement producing cement in the city and bricks, such companies are producing something. In the beverages industry, Delta is also producing soft drinks, but we know that generally there has been a collapse of such expansive industries. I mean the industrial capacity utilisation right now is at 15 percent. We are only left with mostly services-based industries, for instance, in telecommunication, hospitals, education, pharmaceutical, and retail. Unfortunately, the services industry does not employ a large number of people (Thabani Moyo, Interview, 10 May 2016).

The observations made by Bongani Mangena and Thabani Moyo of Bulawayo's dire economic situation is more telling when projected against Zimbabwe's figures and indicators on FDI, manufacturing utilisation output, unemployment and the nature of its political economy. For instance, Zimbabwe lags far behind in FDI when compared to neighbouring countries in the SADC region. In 2015, Zimbabwe attracted US\$625 million of FDI, while Zambia and South Africa's economies pulled in FDIs worth US\$1.7 billion and US\$ 1.6 billion respectively (CZI, 2016). Commenters attribute the erratic flow of FDI in the Zimbabwean economy to a myriad of factors that include the implementation of the 2007 indigenisation policy by the ZANU-PF led government, the state's violation of property's rights, the persistent lack of foreign currency to purchase manufactures' raw materials and political instability (see Gwenhamo, 2011; Magure, 2012, Mlambo, 2017).

The negative impacts of restricted FDI flow into Zimbabwe's economy is reflected in a decrease in capacity utilisation and output of most manufacturing industries. It can be stated that while the manufacturing sector increased its capacity utilisation in the initial years of

the government of national unity (GNU) (2009-2013), the years that followed recorded a downturn in capacity utilisation. For instance, while between 2008 and 2011, the capacity utilisation of the national manufacturing sector grew from a mere 10 percent in 2008 to 57 percent in 2011, this three-year growth in capacity utilisation was however short-lived (CZI, 2016, RBZ, 2016). As shown in Figure 5, from 2011 to 2015, the manufacturing sector steadily reduced its capacity utilisation from 57.2 percent in 2011 to 34.3 percent in 2015 (CZI, 2016).

**Figure 5: Manufacturing Contribution to GDP and Capacity Utilisation**



Source: CZI (2016).

A reduction in FDI flows and the manufacturing sector’s capacity utilisation further helps to explain the high levels of formal unemployment in Zimbabwe’s urban economy. Indeed, the de-industrialisation of the manufacturing sector has contributed to a national shutdown of 4,610 firms between 2011 and 2014, thus leading to 55,443 job losses (ILO, 2016). Consequently, the shedding of manufacturing jobs has coincided with an increase in informal employment. The Zimbabwe’s Labour Force and Child Labour Survey of 2014<sup>33</sup> reports a low national unemployment rate of 11 percent<sup>34</sup> and depicts a high informal employment rate of 94 percent. Moreover, the same survey indicates that the urban youth of Zimbabwe are more likely to be

<sup>33</sup> The Labour Force and Child Labour Survey (LFCLS) is conducted by the Zimbabwe’s central statistics office after every 5 years.

<sup>34</sup> This is a broad unemployment rate. The 2014 Labour Force and Child Labour Survey uses the broad definition of unemployment. This definition refers to any person who is 15 years and above who, during the reference period, was without work, available for work and was not taking any measures to seek work (see: LFCLS, 2014:134).

unemployed or discouraged to look for work. Indeed, at least 50 percent of Zimbabwe's urban youth (15-24) are considered unemployed and when age is extended to 35 years, the unemployment rate is still relatively high at 37 percent (LFCLS, 2014). The statistical figures speak to the lived experiences of the ordinary Zimbabwean surviving on the streets as traders. It is then important to look at how the ordinary Bulawayo citizen navigates a city that has undergone massive deindustrialisation.

### *6.2.1 The Lived Experience and Representations of Bulawayo De-industrialisation*

The deindustrialisation and informalisation of labour form the everyday struggle of my research participants who tied their precarious life of unemployment to these large-scale political and economic processes. They argued that the demand for urban spaces for vending mirrors Bulawayo's transformation from a city of industries to a city of vendors. Mishek Gumbo, a street bookseller operating near Egodini terminal is one citizen among many who constitute the 37 percent of unemployed Zimbabwean youth. He illegally occupies an urban space where he sells used books to students and others specialising in a similar trade.

In 2006, Mishek lost his job as a sales representative for an established company specialising in car parts. He stated that the company shut down due to increased operating costs and a lack of foreign currency to buy car parts from neighbouring South Africa. Mishek was fortunate enough to receive a retrenchment package which he used to start a small business of selling used textbooks. As a holder of a degree in marketing and a former sales professional, he sees trading in used textbooks as a temporary measure of coping with unemployment. He hangs on the hope of using his degree to re-enter the formal labour market if a job does come by. In the following interview extract, Mishek describes the frustration of failing to use his educational qualifications to secure a formal job:

**Danford:** Many of Bulawayo's citizens were employed in industries. As you know these industries have since collapsed. If these industries are revived and they are to generate employment again, would you consider leaving street trading and work in the industries?

**Mishek:** We are all waiting for the industries to operate again. I have qualifications that are gathering dust. I cannot wait to put them into good use. I will leave street trading, there is more security and benefits in formal employment (Mishek Gumbo, used textbooks trader, Interview, 10 May 2016).

Mishek's experiences with unemployment and street vending are similar to fellow educated street traders like Mehluli Siziba. Mehluli is one of the educated street traders who is waiting to utilise his educational skills to enter the formal labour market once the economy recovers.

He is a trade tested artisan who specialised in construction and bricklaying at the Bulawayo Polytechnic College. Although he passed his trade test as a bricklayer in 2015, Mehluli has only managed to secure a few short-term contract jobs with two construction companies. He currently survives through selling bananas at various intersections in the city. While Mehluli admitted that he was initially embarrassed about being a street trader, vending has helped him deal with short spells of unemployment experienced when moving from one job contract to another:

When I am not vending, I do some construction jobs. I used to work at a construction site in Matsheumhlope<sup>35</sup>, but sometimes I do work in various sites within the city of Bulawayo. I also do a lot of painting and anything related to the construction and maintenance of buildings. These construction jobs are hard to come by. I sell bananas in the streets only when I am waiting for my next contract jobs...I make an amount of US\$60 per day from these bananas you see. The money I get from these bananas allows me to survive. It is better to be on the streets vending than sitting at home. I know it might be embarrassing to sell bananas at a street corner when one considers that I have a National Certificate in Bricklaying. Bricklayers used to earn a decent wage before the economic problems of this country started in 2008 (Mehluli Siziba, Banana Vendor, Interview, 09 May 2016).

While younger street traders associated street trading with the current economic decline of Bulawayo, older street traders traced it back to the mid-1990s. Prudence Ndlovu and Sam Nkomo were among the oldest and long-serving street traders I interviewed, each having more than twenty-five years of street trading experience. Sam Nkomo, who trades in clothes, electrical consumables and who is one of the leaders at the Bulawayo Upcoming Traders Association (BUTA) noted that the number of street traders started swelling in the mid-1990s. He highlighted that the origins of BUTA can be linked to the more pronounced presence of street traders and increased demand for vending space after the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991:

This organisation (BUTA) was formed in 19... [*drags his speech*] ...1995 and was officially launched by the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo. The immediate role of BUTA was to assist people to access vending spaces. As street traders, we realised that our numbers had increased putting pressure on the few sites allocated by the city council. Life was unbearable after ESAP [*shakes head and laughs*], everyone became poor and unemployed. Street trading became the only option for almost anyone who wanted to survive the impacts of poverty and unemployed. Since its humble beginning, the organisation has acted as a representative of street traders both licensed and unlicensed. We still engage with the municipality on issues concerning the acquisition of vending space (Sam Nkomo, Clothes trader and BUTA official, Interview, 10 May 2016).

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<sup>35</sup> Matsheumhlope is low density residential area situated in the Eastern part of the city of Bulawayo.

Prudence Ndlovu recalled how the effects of the ESAP left her jobless. Before her retrenchment, Prudence worked as a shirt presser at one of Bulawayo's prominent clothing companies. When she was retrenched in 1993, Prudence received a meagre retrenchment even though she worked for the company for almost thirteen years. She explained her reasons for participating in street trading:

...the retrenchment money was too little; I had no income. The situation was worsened when I and my husband divorced three months after the retrenchment. I soon found myself in a single-headed household with no money. This unfortunate situation forced me to look for a vending space that was becoming difficult to acquire. The implementation of ESAP resulted in a lot of people losing their jobs, meaning that the number of those involved in informal work like street trading also grew. If you have a lot of street traders in a small city like Bulawayo then there is bound to be pressure on space, more particularly vending bays. I was lucky that I got a vending bay at the Bulawayo Early market (Prudence Ndlovu, Vegetable vendor, Interview, 24 April 2016).

Precious Ndlovu echoes Zeleza's (1999) view on the impacts of structural adjustment programmes in Africa. He argues that the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Africa promoted the feminisation of poverty, driving most women to the informal economy. He further notes that: "...women's concentration in clerical and manual manufacturing jobs compounded their vulnerability, for these occupations were the most affected by the retrenchments of the 1980s and early 1990s" (Zeleza, 1999:51). Women are also more susceptible to the effects of SAPs and economic crises since they shoulder the brunt of household social and economic reproduction (also see Brand *et al.*, 1995:132; Sadasivam, 1997:636).

The accounts that were given by Sam Nkomo and Prudence Ndlovu of how the ESAP intensified urban poverty, unemployment rates, and street trading uptake in Bulawayo relate to those of Mpofu (2015). For instance, Mpofu (2015) argues that the upsurge of Bulawayo's informal trade around the mid-1990s was directly influenced by the collapse of the textile and clothing industry under the newly adopted neoliberal regime. By enforcing trade liberalisation and opening the Zimbabwean economy to regional and global markets, many local textile and clothing industries shut down due to lack of competitiveness. The failure to compete with the influx of second-hand clothes imported from neighbouring countries, notably Mozambique, disrupted the production systems and profit margins of most local textile and clothing firms (Kanyeze, 2006; ZEPARU, 2014).

The onslaught of the ESAP was more damaging to Bulawayo's textile and clothing sector, an industry which at that time was the largest employer (Mills, 2012; ZEPARU, 2014). Textile and clothing companies in Bulawayo such as Merlin, Archer Clothing, Security Mills, and Cotton Printers were among the first to experience business failure necessitated by trade liberalisation, forcing them to lay off thousands of workers (see Mpofu, 2015: 29). The adoption of ESAP in 1991 created a decade cumulative effect on Bulawayo's unemployment rates, for instance, Mbiba and Ndubiwa (2006:12) estimate that between 1992 and 2002 Bulawayo's textile and clothing sector shed around twenty thousand jobs.

For Mbiba and Ndubiwa (2006) imposing SAPs resulted in the mass production of urban poverty and unemployment. They further assert that SAPs pushed the urban poor into a more precarious informal sector, where competition over urban space and lack of income security further disabled them in resisting poverty. As noted by BUTA's official, Sam Nkomo, the Bulawayo City Council of the mid-1990s was ill-prepared in terms of providing vending space for new entrants coming out of employment, thus banning those trading illegally and outside stipulated vending demarcations (also see Mpofu, 2015: 29).

### **6.3 Family's Previous Involvement in Street Trading and Social Networks**

*“My father started working here at this space...He was one of the street traders that operated from this flower market when it was opened in the 1930s. He is the reason why I am a street trader today” (Mandla Ndlovu, Flower trader and Chairperson of the Bulawayo Florist Association, Interview, 06 May 2016).*

While participants identified unemployment as a major driver of informality in the city of Bulawayo, other participants stated that they were recruited into street trading due to social ties and their families' long involvement in the informal sector. Several of the participants joined street trading through social ties, while others were compelled to become traders due to their family's history and involvement in street vending and work in the informal sector. For instance, Mandla Ndlovu, who has worked as a florist at the city hall market for the past sixteen years was recruited into street vending by his father. Mandla has been involved in the family's floral business since 1987, although he became a full-time street trader in 2000 shortly before his father died. The spaces that he is currently working from were previously occupied by his late father. Mandla who is also a member Bulawayo Florist Association (BFA) and florist stated that his family's history in the floral business dates to the 1930s, around the time the first Bulawayo flower market was opened. He points to this family's history of selling flowers as the main reason he participates in street vending. In the year 2000, Mandla inherited the street

business from his gravely ill father after realising that he could not manage its everyday operation:

I started selling flowers at the city hall in 2000. I was born into this flower business. I can say I was raised from the money made from selling flowers. When my father became seriously ill around 2000, he asked me to take over the business. Fortunately, I was working part-time at a textile company, this gave me some time to focus on the family business. When my father died in June of 2000, I left the textile job and concentrated on street trading now on a full-time basis. My training in the floral sector and of course the family experience in the flower business allowed for a smoother transition from my previous formal job. My father was a well-respected street trader and I intend to continue his legacy of hard work and entrepreneurship. I hope to pass this business to my children, my son [*points at his son*] helps me to sort and prepare these flowers. It is my wish that when I die, he continues with this business (Mandla Ndlovu, Flower trader and a member of the Bulawayo Florist Association, Interview, 06 May 2016).

The Ndlovu family specialises in fresh and artificial flowers. At the time of the interview, the displayed fresh flowers I could only recognise were roses (*Rosoideae*), flame lilies (*Gloriosa*), and proteas (*Proteaceae*). A single rose sells for US\$0.50, while a bouquet of roses can cost up to US\$5.00. The proteas and flame lilies which are sold in flowerpots fetched a much higher price, selling for US\$15.00 each. Mandla sources his fresh flowers from Harare and since they are perishable, he uses overnight transport. He makes less profit out of perishable flowers, thus orders them in small quantities. His artificial flowers are mostly made from synthetic materials that are morphed into shapes or personalised messages to suit the customers' needs.

These artificial flowers are commonly used at funerals, weddings, birthdays and corporate functions. I noticed that most of the artificial products that Mandla sold were for funeral events. Mandla confirmed that funeral artificial flora products have a higher sales turn-over, grossing an average of US\$ 30 per day. These products include bouquets and decorated polystyrene crosses (see Figure 6 and Figure 7) that Mandla and his son spend the whole day preparing. According to Mandla, the role of florists is not merely to profit out of painful experiences such as death, but to ensure that those that have departed receive a dignified and decorated burial.



**Figure 6: Street Florist Operating at the Bulawayo City Hall**



*Mandla Ndlovu preparing a bouquet of roses. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

**Figure 7: Styled Bouquet of Roses Ready for Sale**



*Street florists tend to make high sales during times where people buy gifts to show appreciation to their loved ones. This photo was shot a week before Mother's Day. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

Other florists working in the market, such as Mary Moyo, have diversified their services to include exotic and indigenous potted plants, Mary Moyo is one such florist. I was introduced to Mary Moyo through a friend. Mary Moyo shares a similar background with Mandla Ndlovu, like him, she was raised in a family of entrepreneurs. The plant nursery she owns once belonged to her late grandfather. Despite joining street trading for economic reasons, Mary regarded her trading as a personal quest to fulfil her late grandfather's intention of setting up a plant stall near the city hall. By establishing this plant stall in early 2016, Mary has not only achieved her grandfather's wish but has also introduced her business to a wider clientele:

I could have never brought our family business to the streets if it was not for my grandfather. He had this persistent urge to come and sell his plants in the streets, although at that time our family was supplying other nurseries with indigenous plants. My grandfather passed away in 2012, it is only after four years that I have thought of fulfilling his plan of moving our business to the streets. I think my participation in street trading is part of my grandfather's business plan although he is not around to see it being implemented. Street trading is now a huge business and it helps deal with unemployment. I am happy that I moved my business to the city hall market. I am lucky that I have lots of people buying from me. On a busy day, I do get reasonable profits (Mary Moyo, flower and plant trader, Interview, 23 May 2016).

In fulfilling her grandfather's plans of moving a successful business to the street economy, Mary has amassed substantial turnover from her plants (flowers, medicinal). According to Mary, plant sales can reach around US\$100 per day, this is twice what other florists accrue a day. This competitive advantage and success over other florists is not purely based on luck as Mary argues. I associate her success and high sales with the family history in the plant nursery business, which endowed the business with physical assets and financial resources such as investments, land, and vehicles. I also argue that it is these assets and the family's history in business that strongly motivated Mary Moyo to partake in street trading even as a late entrant. For instance, Mary's strong financial standing allows her to occupy three vending bays costing a total of US\$30 per month. This amount of space enhances Mary's sales turnover and her customers' satisfaction since she can display larger quantities of plants, offering customers a wider range. Compared to her counterparts that transport their plants in pull carts, Mary uses a truck permitting her to move the plants in large quantities and in a convenient way.

**Figure 8: Mary's Plants Displayed on Her Vending Bays**



*Mary occupies three vending bays. With such ample space, she can display larger quantities of plants thus offering customers a wider range of choice. Photo by: Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

There is empirical evidence documented in Sierra Leone that shows that pretty traders belonging to families with established businesses are more likely to be successful than their counterparts (see Kamara, 2008: 182-195). Kamara (2008) accredits their participation and eventual achievements in the informal economy to the financial and resource boost they receive from their family businesses. My research findings further indicate that street trading and the informalisation of urban space is driven by social networks and associations.

### *6.3.1 Social Networks and Associations in Bulawayo's Street Trade*

Within the literature, social networks occupy a contradictory status. Some research suggests that social networks function as “barriers to entry” in the African urban economy (Berrou and Gondard-Delcroix (2017:2). Other research shows that social networks facilitate the urban poor's inclusion and exclusion into the informal sector (Chabal 2009, Meagher, 2010; Odera, 2013). In Bulawayo, social networks are indeed important in facilitating participation in the informal economy. Most participants gained entry in the informal sector through interpersonal networks. As stated by one street trader, Misheck who notes that, “...in Zimbabwe, everything is about who you know” (Mishek Gumbo, used textbooks trader, Interview, 10 May 2016). Apart from allowing Bulawayo street traders to gain entry into the informal sector, social

networks further facilitate access to credit, vending space, security, favours, and other economic opportunities.

For instance, Brian Mpofu was recruited into street trading through a friend's social network. I encountered Brian at the Bulawayo Centre; a shopping complex where young people hang out. He markets chocolates and sweets to anyone he bumps into. I was one of the potential customers approached by Brian, and after buying his sweets, I asked to interview him. Brian dropped out of secondary school after his mother could no longer afford to pay his school fees. During the time he dropped out of school, Brian's family struggled with food insecurity and sometimes skipped meals. When Brian's friend learnt of the family's ordeal, he asked his sister who owns a sweet shop if she can provide Brian with an opportunity to earn some money for his family:

I have a friend that I attended primary school with. His name is Mgcineni. When I dropped out of school because no one could pay for my fees I would spend most of my time at his place. Mgcineni then approached her sister and asked her to offer me sweets and chocolate on credit. His sister who also has had a hard life owns a small shop that sells sweets agreed to help me. She has a shop close to Greens supermarket. Even though she records the quantity of sweets and chocolates I take on credit, our work relationship is based on trust. So, I sell sweets then pay the credit and I keep the profits. Sometimes, I am generous enough to share my profits with her. I use the profit to buy more sweets and chocolates (Brian Mpofu, Sweets vendor, Interview, 12 May 2016).

This excerpt shows how social networks assist people to enter the informal sector, even with no financial resources. In the case of Brian Mpofu, not only did social networks offer him an opportunity to participate in street trading but it enabled him to receive a credit to acquire goods for resale. The research showed that trust and kinship play an important role in facilitating those entering the informal sector in accessing credit which is transacted in the form of money and goods. Mupedziswa and Gumbo (2001), Manjikoto and Ranga, (2017) identify a lack of access to credit and financial assistance among street traders as a major barrier preventing them from partaking in Zimbabwe's informal economy. While some research participants considered social networks as an important pull factor in their participation in the informal sector and informalisation of urban spaces, others emphasised that their educational and professional background is among the motivators of joining street trading.

## 6.4 Previous Educational Training and Formal Work Experience

The uptake of informal economic activities has further been influenced by informal workers' previous educational training and work experience. Some of the participants, particularly male participants, pointed to their vocational and employment background as assisting them to transition to informal trading after losing a formal job. One such case is that of Mandla Ndlovu, who apart from his family's historical involvement in the flower business, argued that a course he had taken in business studies motivated him to become a street florist. Similar are the circumstances of Mishek Gumbo whose academic training and work experience in marketing reflect in his trade of books. While Mishek downplayed the role of his educational background, I noticed that there were instances where it was useful. For example, Mishek stated that because of his background knowledge in marketing acquired at university and the workplace, it is easier to advise clients studying marketing related subjects on which textbooks to purchase.

I was impressed by Mishek's customer care skills which I immediately assumed were gained through his educational and professional training. Mishek asserted that his business thrives on ensuring that his customers get whatever textbook they need, an art of enterprise he learnt from some of the degree courses he took. According to Mishek, customer satisfaction should be at the core of any trade whether it is formal or informal. He commented:

What is most important is the customer's satisfaction. I do not want the customers to leave my stand without that book I do not currently have. If I find the book from other sellers, I will go fetch it and present it to the customers. I want my customers to be satisfied with my service. Good service helps in growing my customer base (Mishek Gumbo, Interview, 10/05/2016).

Mkhululi Banda and Job Sibanda are among the street traders who linked their current economic activity to previous work experience. Mkhululi Banda, who used to work at a company that produces plastic bags and wares, now sells plastic bags in front of OK supermarket. By utilising connections with his former employer, Mkhululi accesses defective plastic bags at no cost:

I used to work for Zappy plastics<sup>36</sup> for five years up until 2009 when I was retrenched. Some of the colleagues were not retrenched, I was the unfortunate one, maybe it is because I was the last one to join the company. My former workmates are sympathetic to my situation of joblessness; no wonder they supply me with these defective plastic bags at no cost. I know this act might appear unlawful, but you know *imbuzi idla lapho eyake yabotshelwa khona* (A goat eats where it was once tethered). Initially, I thought of moving to South Africa, but my former work colleagues encouraged me to sell plastics. I stand in front of supermarkets and sell plastics

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<sup>36</sup> This company name is a pseudonym.

to shoppers, some supermarkets like OK do not sell plastics to their customers (Mkhululi Banda, Interview, 09/05/2016).

Mkhululi's experiences of street trading validate Chabal (2009) and Meagher's (2010) argument of how previous work experience combined with social networks is important in Africa's politics of survival. Interestingly, Job Sibanda used the same adage, "a goat eats where it is tethered" to explain how he uses his association with the former employer to survive in the streets of Bulawayo. Job sells raw and roasted mealies (maize) at Egodini taxi rank (see Figure 9). He formerly worked as a truck loader for an agricultural produce company located at Bulawayo's early market. His work exposed him to some of the maize farms surrounding the city, where he now buys mealies for resale at a negotiated price. He explained how his former work experience as a truck loader contributed to him becoming a maize vendor:

When I was working for Wonderland Farm Produce<sup>37</sup>, we would travel to nearby farms, where I would load mealies in the truck. Most of the farms we drove to are in the uMguza area. In 2015, I was laid off, the company manager told me that my services were no longer required since drivers were now expected to load their trucks. Faced with unemployment, I realised that the only business I could undertake was that of selling mealies since I already knew where to buy them at a cheap price. I enlisted my cousin who owns a pick-up truck to assist me in transporting mealies from the farms to the city. I know most of the farmers and they give me discounts all the time (Job Sibanda, Interview, 09/05/2016).

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<sup>37</sup> This company name is a pseudonym.

**Figure 9: Mealies Roasting Business at Egodini Taxi Rank**



*Job Sibanda used his previous job experience of working at an agricultural products company to venture into this informal business of selling raw and roasted mealies. This is one of his maize roasting set-ups located at Egodini taxi rank. Photo by: Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

From the above accounts, street trading can be considered as an interface where a transfer of skills from the formal to informal employment sector takes place. This view is seconded by Bongani Mangena, who, as an official at the Bulawayo City's Council's Economic Development Unit has facilitated numerous formal to informal labour skills transfer projects. He noted that in responding to a high incidence of retrenchments, the city council managed to establish labour-absorbing informal factories with funds obtained from foreign donors. While these factories are not fully operational, Bongani Mangena attested to their usefulness in facilitating a shift of formal labour skills to the informal sector. He commended the Bulawayo City Council's informal factories project for offering those retrenched an opportunity to apply their previous formal work experience in the emerging informal economy:

“As a city, we took deliberate action to accommodate those retrenched from their formal jobs by allowing them to work in self-contained informal factories or compartments so to speak. These compartments are twenty square metres equipped with small geyser, washing basin, electricity a whole self-contained thing so people can start operating from there. We started with forty-six of those units and then we came with another sixteen. All of them are in Kelvin

North<sup>38</sup>. They were built by the council; the first lot was a co-operation between us and our sister city Aberdeen where that city donated some... I think it was over about £200 000 something there about which were provided to assist in doing that. With this project, the city council invited those who were retrenched and had previously technical skills and experience from the formal sector in fields ranging from sewing, sales, mechanics, shoe production, welding, and toolmaking to occupy these small factories. Through my department, the council further provided tools, machinery, and inputs like sewing machines, rubber, and welding rods to the project's beneficiaries. Some of the beneficiaries have converted these spaces into tuckshops where they now sell various food commodities (Bongani Mangena, Interview, 19 May 2016).

However, one informant offered a different interpretation of the role of education and previous work experience. Casey Jones, an official from the Streetwise Traders Association (SWITA) argued that those that are educated and have been retrenched prefer to migrate and find formal work in neighbouring countries rather than pursue street trading. He doubted if those with academic credentials and specialised skills consider informal work rewarding and may not have intentions to partake in it. By contrast, he asserts that the proliferation of Bulawayo's informal sector and an increase in the number of street traders should be linked to the city's geographical proximity to neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Botswana.

### **6.5 The Influence of Bulawayo's Geographical Location on Street Trading and Urban Informality**

Survival in Bulawayo centres on informal cross border trading activities operating between the countries of Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa (Manjokoto and Ranga, 2017; Muruviwa and Dube, 2016). The distance of Bulawayo to South Africa and Botswana places informal-cross border trading as one of the major drivers of the city's informal economy. Indeed, the proximity of Bulawayo to South Africa and Botswana compare with other major cities such as Harare, for instance, reduces the costs of moving goods across borders, thus increasing not only the flow of informal trade but also the number of its players. Additionally, Bulawayo's proximity to South Africa facilitates informal traders' access to cheaper South African commodities which are later sold for profit. For instance, participants trading in electrical gadgets and computer consumables pointed to the availability of cheaper electric goods in wholesalers situated in the South African border town of Musina. The accessibility of inexpensive electronic goods in South Africa coupled with the entrenchment of technology has contributed to the growing numbers of traders dealing in electrical consumables. Such traders

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<sup>38</sup> This is an industrial site zoned in a residential area. The Kelvin North industrial hub was intended to boost the local economic capacity of townships located in the western part of Bulawayo city. This industrial hub has undergone massive de-industrialisation since the contraction of the national economy. According to the Bulawayo City Council Economic Development Officer, most of the Kelvin North small-scale industrial projects pioneered by the city council are now "white elephants" due to lack of investment and decades of economic depression.



are a regular sight at Egodini taxi rank where they sell products ranging from radio speakers, earphones, batteries, blank compact discs, cell phone chargers, and electric plugs.

Casey Jones<sup>39</sup> described himself as one of the informal cross-border traders benefiting from moving goods in from Musina and sometimes Johannesburg. When I interviewed him, he had returned from South Africa with bags of new clothing comprising work suits, school jerseys, belts, winter jackets, hats, and traditional Zulu attire. Despite facing competition from other traders who are sourcing clothes from other neighbouring countries like Mozambique, Casey argued that being close to South Africa gives him access to clothing that is unique and of great quality, and this makes him stand out from other vendors. For example, I noticed that Casey was the only one among fellow traders specialising in Zulu beads and *izicolo* (traditional hats worn by married Zulu women). Casey further revealed that having a monopoly over Zulu traditional clothing popular among the Ndebele people has enabled him to accumulate more profits than his counterparts.

The closeness of Bulawayo to South Africa has also had a positive impact on those in the floral business. From one conversation I had with a floral trader, I learnt that she travels fortnightly to buy polystyrene from Johannesburg. The polystyrene foam is used in the preparation of flower bouquets and customising them to the customers' needs. For example, Figure 3, p10, shows a flower bouquet styled with the word "MUM" on a white polystyrene form. The proximity of Bulawayo to South Africa and Botswana has not only promoted success among traders in the informal sector of clothing and floral, but also among a special type of informal money exchange traders known as *Osiphatheleni*<sup>40</sup> sometimes referred to as *Amapostoli*<sup>41</sup>.

Informal money exchange traders have probably benefited more from Bulawayo's proximity to South Africa and Botswana. Its proximity to the border enables an easy flow of remittances from these neighbouring countries into the city, consequently stimulating the growth of its informal currency exchange business. It is therefore not surprising that when compared with

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<sup>39</sup> Casey Jones is also an official of the Streetwise Traders Association (SWITA).

<sup>40</sup> Most informal money exchange traders of Bulawayo when approaching a potential customers or luring passers-by they ask "usiphatheleni", which translates to "What have you brought us?". They use this question "usiphatheleni" to identify and market themselves as money exchange traders. It is in this marketing strategy that the term "Osiphatheleni" has come to be associated with informal money exchange traders (also see Mawowa and Matongo, 2010:327).

<sup>41</sup> This Ndebele reference "*Amapostoli*" is a corruption of the English word "Apostles". Most of informal money exchange traders belong to various African Apostolic churches. These traders are easily identifiable with their traditional white Apostle regalia.

other major cities such as Harare, which is further away than the borders with South Africa and Botswana, Bulawayo's informal foreign currency trade is more prominent and well established.

While *Osiphatheleni* are criminalised by the state, their presence on every street corner is pronounced. As I moved across the city of Bulawayo during my fieldwork, I was approached by one female *Osiphatheleni* who noticed the South African number plates affixed on my vehicle. She attempted to lure me into using her services: “*Woza uzotshintsha bhudi, ngizokutshintshela nge rate e right*” (My brother come let me change your money, I have the best exchange rate), “*Awula amaRand bhudi, sondela eduze ngikutshintshele*” (Do you have the Rand with you, come closer let me change it for you). Upon realising that some outlets such as fuel stations were reluctant to accept the South African Rand, I was forced to rely on *Osiphatheleni* to convert my money to American dollars.

In a country where the formal banking system is dysfunctional and experiencing cash shortages, the role of *Osiphatheleni* has become even more crucial (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). Despite *Osiphatheleni* being labelled “criminal” by the state, Mawowa and Matongo (2010) have come in the defence, describing them as entrepreneurs who strategically respond to needs created by the decade long deterioration of Zimbabwe's formal monetary system. By taking advantage of the voluminous inflow of remittances from South Africa and Botswana, informal foreign currency traders have produced a profitable parallel money market, employing a sizable number of Bulawayo citizens.

## **6.6 Conclusion**

Using empirical evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with some of Bulawayo's street traders, city officials and leaders in the civil society, this chapter argues that the informalisation of Bulawayo's city spaces and the subsequent increase of street trading activity is attributable to decades of Zimbabwe's economic decline and political crisis. Conversely, the collapse of Zimbabwe's economy has been accompanied by the de-industrialisation of Bulawayo's local economy. A key informant working within the Bulawayo City Council's Economic Development Unit, Bongani Mangena attributed the de-industrialisation of Bulawayo to the plummeting of foreign direct investment and gross mismanagement of the national economy. Consequently, the collapse of Bulawayo's labour-absorbent industries in the textile, motor, food processing, and clothing sector precipitated job losses and an enlargement of the informal labour pool. As Brown (2001) argues, an upsurge of informal labour in an economy showing no signs of recovery create an increased demand for urban space by the unemployed.

Accordingly, urban space is converted into an economic resource that the poor utilise to earn a living and sustain livelihoods (Brown, 2001).

The chapter also suggested that the conditions that have facilitated an increase in street trading activity and informality of urban space are social. The existence of strong social ties and networks work in ensuring that one easily gains entry to the informal sector. Some of the participants pointed out that they were inclined to join street trading because family members or friends had already achieved some success in establishing informal businesses and needed their assistance in expanding the enterprise.

Conversely, other participants noted that they participate in street trading because of family history and background in street trading, where a parent or relative has at one point worked as a street trader. Such participants argued that their current involvement in street trading serves to continue the family's tradition and achievements in the informal business. Participants who once worked in the formal sector perceived their previous experience in a formal job as a factor that contributed to them joining street trading. These participants argued that street trading has necessitated a transfer of skills and knowledge acquired in the formal sector to meet the immediate needs of the informal economy. Participants that are cross-border traders and informal forex dealers noted that the proximity of Bulawayo to South Africa and Botswana was an important determinant for them when they decided to join the informal labour sector. They felt that the proximity of Bulawayo to South Africa and Botswana has immensely contributed to the flourishing of the local urban informal economy. The next chapter seeks to explore how the informalisation of urban space and the practice of street trading, in particular, enhance or disable the livelihoods of those involved in it.

# **CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EVERYDAYNESS OF BULAWAYO'S STREET TRADING: OPPORTUNITIES AND THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF INFORMALITY**

## **7.1 Introduction**

While this thesis traces the political, economic, and social processes that drive the informalisation of urban space in Bulawayo, it is also pertinent to explore the everydayness of informality in the context of street trading. In exploring the everyday lived experiences of informality, this chapter looks at how street trading has been construed by the participants as an enabler as well as a disabler of urban livelihoods.

On one hand, participants conceived the activity of street trading as having rescued multitudes of Bulawayo citizens from experiencing destitution, food insecurity, and chronic poverty. Most participants regarded street trading as an important source of employment and income. Other participants perceived it as a form of employment and entrepreneurship that affords them a sense of ownership and control over their labour, while some considered street trading as critical in the generation of the city's revenues. On the other hand, some participants were cognisant of the precariousness and insecurities that come with informal work. To them, street trading can never be categorised as "work" or a form of "employment" since it fails to guarantee one a steady income, retirement benefits, and social status.

Instead of perceiving street trading as employment, some of the participants whom I identify as "educated street traders" (those that have undergone some form of tertiary education) conceptualised street trading as an activity one does when waiting to be recruited into informal employment. Contrary to other street traders who argue that informal work has imparted them with a sense of self-worth and a degree of control over labour, some street traders who have attained college and university education argued that street trading embodies feelings of shame, humiliation, and frustrations to those who have hoped to better their lives through formal education.

This chapter is partitioned into two distinct sections. The first section focuses on some of the positive outcomes associated with participating in Bulawayo's street trading. In this section, the chapter will show that street trading has provided opportunities to generate household

income, improve household food security, and contributes immensely to education outcomes. Additionally, in this section, the chapter will show that informal work has led to work independence, control over labour and the establishment of a humanistic and socially moral economy underpinned by the African values of *ubuntu*. More significantly, the first section of this chapter shall further demonstrate that street trading has had some important economic contributions to the city's fiscus and its local economy. The second section of this chapter looks at the precarious everydayness and subjectivity of Bulawayo's informality. The precarity of street trading is examined through the experiences of the so-called "educated street traders", who perceive street trading as less of an economically and socially rewarding undertaking but a form of waiting. The second section will also discuss the harsh realities of street trading that participants identify as having a retrogressive effect on their lives. Participants pointed to the brutish lived experience of street trading characterised by constant raids, lack of income security, scarcity of working space, and alienation.

## **7.2 The Everydayness of Street Trading in Bulawayo: A Thematic Representation**

One of the objectives of this thesis as stated in the Introduction chapter is that of examining the "everydayness", "lived experiences" and "subjectivity" of street trading in Bulawayo. In carrying out this objective, the thesis addresses the research question posed in the first chapter on how street trading enables and disables the livelihoods of those participating in it. To effectively attend to the above research question, this analysis chapter organises the empirical findings into two major themes: 1) The empowering and enabling outcomes of street trading, 2) The Precariousness and harsh realities of street trading. These are then further divided into interrelated sub-themes. A thematic presentation, discussion, and analysis of these themes is summarised in Figure 10 (see page 151). Further, this chapter addresses one of the thesis' objectives which seeks to examine how the informalisation of urban space and labour shapes how "spatiality", "urbanity" and "work" are construed and reimagined in Bulawayo.

**Figure 10: The “Everydayness” of Street Trading in Bulawayo**

<b>Research Question and Research Objective</b>	<b>Theme 1</b>	<b>Theme 2</b>
<p><b>Research Question</b> How does street trading enhance or disable the livelihoods of those involved in it?</p> <p><b>Research Objective</b> To explore the “everydayness”, “lived experiences” and “subjectivity” of street trading in Bulawayo, particularly how it enables or disabled the lives of those involved in it.</p>	<p><b>The Empowering and Enabling Outcomes of Street Trading</b></p> <p>(Sub-themes)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Provision of Household income</li> <li>-Improved educational and nutritional outcomes</li> <li>-Work independence and control over one's labour.</li> <li>-Establishes a moral/human economy</li> <li>-Generates revenue for the city and boost Bulawayo's local economy</li> </ul>	<p><b>The Precariousness of Street Trading (Sub-themes)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Alienation, frustration and the pain of waiting</li> <li>-Lack of Social and Income Security</li> <li>-Raids, evictions and displacement</li> <li>-Remoteness of vending sites</li> <li>-Competition from formal businesses</li> <li>-Scarcity of vending bays</li> </ul>

### 7.2.1 Provision of Household Income

The view that street trading is an important generator of income and financial freedom varied among participants. For instance, several participants felt that street trading contributed less to their personal and household income. They insisted that one cannot fully attain financial stability from street vending. However, this view was challenged by some participants who thought of it as providing income security to their families. Indeed, these participants argued that this income security attained through street trading has positively contributed to the nutritional and educational outcomes of their households. Accordingly, a large proportion of income generated by female traders heading households, for instance, is used in purchasing food commodities and paying school fees. For Sicelo Nleya, a single mother who raised two boys on her own, street trading became an important economic activity in meeting the food and educational requirements of her two sons:

As a single mother and street trader, I managed to raise and feed my boys with the money I made from selling second-hand clothes. You know boys eat a lot (*laughs*), so I made sure their stomachs were catered for. I enrolled my boys at Northlea High School, it is a good school. I paid their fees and daily transport costs to the school. The older son finished studying law in South Africa last year, I do not see him coming back home because of a lack of employment opportunities in Zimbabwe lacks employment opportunities. The younger one completed his 'A level' last year and is now in the national army air force. I am proud that I educated my sons using money from street vending (Sicelo Nleya, second-hand clothes trader, Interview, 16 May 2016).

A few metres away from Sicelo's vending bay, sits an elderly woman, Maria Gumede who, like Sicelo, trades in second-hand clothes. Maria's main reason for participating in street trading is that of financing the primary education of her grandchildren. With no source of income and the removal of the state's subsidies on education, Maria noted that street trading became the only viable activity that she could engage in to keep her grandchildren in school. While Maria considered money accumulated from street trading as a pittance, the low costs of primary education have enabled her to pay school fees for three grandchildren. In the interview excerpt below, Maria described street trading as more than just work, but an extension of her gender role as a caregiver:

**Danford:** Could you please tell me and how has street trading has assisted you?

**Maria Gumede:** My child, we are now living in difficult times. Even in these trying times I must assume my role as a grandmother and ensure that every grandchild is fed and sent to school. I am their mother now! My work in street trading provides money for school fees and food. The reason you see me working under this scorching sun is simply that of seeing my grandchildren complete primary schooling. Before I became a street vendor, I asked myself what activity I can involve myself in, so I can fund my grandchildren's fees. Street trading was the only available option, at least for an old woman like me. I should be honest with you my child, the money I get from this work is little, but somehow, I have managed to send my three grandchildren to school (Maria Gumede, second-hand clothes trader, Interview, 16 May 2016).

From the conversation I had with Gogo Gumede, I was taken aback by how she transposed her gendered identity of grandmother and "mother" into her vending bay. She described herself and the vending bay as "*insika yomuzi*" (a pillar of her home). For her, the provision of income does not necessarily lie in selling clothes but also in securing a space to conduct one's trading. Despite complaining about not owning a tent, which left her exposed to the scorching sun, Gogo Gumede placed great value on her vending space, describing it as a "protector of livelihood". With a faint smile, Gogo Gumede had more to say about her vending space: "*mntanami loba sihawula, indawo le isigcinile*" (My child amid our suffering, this vending space has taken care of us).

Similarly, Brian, the sweet vendor, perceived urban space and vending as crucial in sustaining his family's livelihood. Moving across city spaces selling sweets has permitted Brian to earn money to assist his household. Like most participants, the proceeds obtained from his trade were diverted to purchasing foodstuffs and paying for education. At the age of seventeen, Brian is proud to be vending for his family from the money he says is gained from utilising urban space. When asked to explain how his enterprise benefits his family, Brian pointed to urban space as a crucial resource to his informal work:

**Danford:** How is your family benefiting from income generated from selling sweets?

**Brian:** Before I started selling in these streets, we had a food crisis at home. In some instances, we would not have mealie-meal and relish. We were used to asking our neighbours, but now I can afford to buy food and I even bought plates from a Chinese shop. The city with its people who buy from me has allowed me to help my family with anything. From this space, you are looking at right now I mean the Bulawayo Centre, jostling with people I am sure I will get one or two people to buy my sweets. It is in these streets that I could obtain money used to buy exercise books for my younger brother, his books ran out of pages. Apart from buying books, I also paid his school fees balance of US\$10 (Brian Mpofu, Sweets vendor, Interview, 12 May 2016).

Gogo Gumede and Brian's views on the usefulness of urban spaces in combating poverty agree with those of Brown (2001). Brown (2001) argues that while Zimbabwe's city officials have failed to recognise the importance of urban space in tackling poverty, it remains "... a crucial resource for poor households, particularly those engaged in informal sector employment..." (Brown, 2001:328). Moreover, Gogo Gumede and Brian's perceptions of urban spaces as generators of income are similar to Bayat's (2000) argument pointed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. In his theory of "quiet encroachment", Bayat (2000:548) argues that in mitigating poverty, the poor turn to urban spaces, transforming them into "...a resource for accumulating income". Appropriating urban spaces for street trading has contributed to street traders earning incomes that compete with those working informal employment. For instance, Mehluli a banana vendor claimed that his monthly profits are between US\$400 and US\$500 after input costs are met. These profits are on par with monthly salaries received by most government employees. While I considered the low pricing of bananas as contributing to Mehluli's profits, he attributed it to his mobility instead. By oscillating between city spaces with his pushcart full of bananas, Mehluli increases opportunities in various urban spaces. For him, having access to multiple spaces translates to higher income earnings. Mehluli's argument feeds well into the discussion on Mary done in the preceding section of this chapter. Like Mehluli, having access to multiple



vending bays has helped Mary's plant business accrue an income that is comparable to that offered in the formal sector.

The accumulation of substantial profits by street traders such as Mehluli and Mary, require us to rethink how street trading has been construed in terms of earnings. Indeed, it forces us to challenge the conventional notion that the informal sector's contribution to household income is marginal when compared to that of the formal sector (see Ferguson, 2015). Centeno and Portes (2006:40) write that in economic crises, "...informal self-employment ceases to be a 'cushion' against the ups-and-downs of the formal-sector labour demand to become a desirable alternative to it. Street vending, for instance, becomes preferable to the wages and work conditions available in 'formal' privatized plants". Few of the participants that voluntarily left formal employment during a critical plunge of the Zimbabwean economy in 2008, argued that their current earnings in self-employment are much better compared to what they were earning in the formal sector. The above research findings are similar to those established in Latin American countries such as Mexico, for instance. Maloney (2004) notes that Mexican workers moving from salaried jobs to self-employment tend to experience income gains.

Income gains in the informal sector have contributed to some street traders acquiring larger assets such as motor vehicles and property. For instance, I was surprised when I learnt that Sicelo purchased her second-hand vehicle with money generated from the informal clothing business. She has since hired a driver and ventured into the transport business. Her driver transports goods between the city of Bulawayo and the rural area of Nkayi in Matabeleland North region. Such acquisitions of assets by street traders challenges us to rethink street trading as not only a survival practice. Indeed, some of the participants did not describe their activities as merely a daily routine of getting by. Instead, they perceived it as a significant conduit of accruing good financial returns and attainment of physical assets. Besides enabling livelihoods through income earnings and accumulation of assets, other street traders mentioned that they enjoy the degree of independence and flexible working hours that comes with street trading.

### *7.2.2 Work Independence and Control over Labour*

The diminishing of formal work in Bulawayo has given some of the street traders an opportunity to reclaim ownership of labour and redefine the meaning of work. Participants interpreted ownership and control of labour to mean the ability and freedom to express one's creativity, identity, and talent through street vending. For example, Sam Nkomo who sells audio equipment at Egodini taxi rank and is known for playing distinct Afro-beats that attract

by-passers stated that street trading has given him a platform to showcase his talent as a street disc jockey. While Sam was satisfied in attaining good returns from selling pirated audio discs and speakers, he argues that immense gratification of his work comes from entertaining pedestrians with recently released African music. He explained that his deejaying transcend the role of marketing to that of granting him an opportunity to showcase his talent through everyday work:

I think my job is fulfilling. I use music to sell my products, I specialise in selling speakers, burned compact discs, amplifiers, and audio chords. I play the latest music not only to attract customers but also to entertain pedestrians who may not even buy my products. The people of Bulawayo love South African house music and are catching up to Nigerian music too, so I play it all the time. Some pedestrians do come and surround my working area and listen to South African and Nigerian music tunes I play. I never thought I would become a street DJ, I suppose this vending business has helped me discover a talent I never knew existed in me (Sam Nkomo, Interview, 10 May 2016).

In as much as Sam Nkomo considered vending as work and a source of livelihood, he also perceived it together with music as important sites for reproducing his township identity. For instance, during our interview, Sam continuously played the “*Wololo*” hit song by South African artist *Babes Wodumo*<sup>42</sup>, which at that time had become popular and identifiable in most Bulawayo townships. In understanding Sam’s vending site as a microcosm of the township lifestyle, I was intrigued by how this influences his approach to the meaning of work. I capture his captivating argument on the interplay between work, identity, and freedom in an interview excerpt below:

My work reflects what is happening in the township, I mean in as far as music is concerned. I believe that your work should reflect who you are. I play Babes Wodumo because I know she is currently popular “*emalokitshini*” (townships) and this should reflect in my work if I am to woo customers. I think a person can never enjoy or gain control overwork if it does not reflect his or her everyday life. I am happy that I am free to incorporate township music into my daily work, it makes my job enjoyable (Sam Nkomo, Interview, 10 May 2016).

Other street traders conceived work enjoyment and independence in terms of having flexible working hours. Such traders argued that the culmination of one’s control over labour manifest in their ability to self-allocate working hours. They shunned the mechanised and rigid arrangement of time found in informal work environments. For example, Lindiwe Malaba, who

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<sup>42</sup> I have come to associate this song which is categorised under the *Gqom* genre—a type of South African house music not only with township life but with the energy of informal urban spaces such as taxi ranks and vending sites of Durban, South Africa as well as those of Bulawayo in Zimbabwe. This song can be found by following the link below.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hlkybvVEQ4g>

at the time of the interviews was president of the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations, described the fixed 8 am to 5 pm work schedule characterising the formal employment sector as limiting the optimum accumulation of income (also see Mills, 2014).

On one hand, she argued that work earnings accrued in the formal sector are relatively low as workers no longer work overtime due to plummeted industrial productivity. On the other hand, she contended that informal workers sometimes earn more than formal employees since flexible working hours not only permit informal workers to maximise earning potential but also allows them to diversify their sources of income. Lindiwe's argument relates to that of Owusu (2007:452) who points out that apart from indigenising time and de-institutionalising employment, the flexibility of informal labour further creates "...a suitable environment for the intensification of other forms of earning a livelihood". Lindiwe Malaba had this to say about how gaining control over the allocation of working time impacts one's livelihood:

In the informal sector, you get what you put in. If you choose to work long hours, your daily earnings increase. I start work at around 5 am and finish at 7 pm meaning I work more hours when compared to those with office jobs. When I retire back home, I am sure I would have acquired a daily income that is more than that of a company employee. Street traders work very hard, for instance, at 5 am in the morning a person can start selling foodstuffs to travellers at the *Erenkini* bus terminus and at 10 am the same person is operating a pushcart assisting other street traders move their goods across the city, and at 8 pm the very same person is helping a driver load a taxi with passengers. You see such flexible and long working hours force one to become a "*mabambazonke*" (jack-of-all-trades) (Lindiwe Malaba, Interview, 10 May 2016).

The diversification of livelihoods and the prevalence of long working hours in Bulawayo's informal sector has reshaped Bulawayo's urbanity in two important ways. Firstly, it has ensured that the activity and vitality of the city no longer conform to rigid wage employment working hours, but the rhythmic flow of people across urban spaces. Ndi (2007:169) makes a similar observation on informal labour in urban Africa arguing that it has produced a "...new cultural urbanism" that calls upon us to rethink of "...time via narratives of movement, networks, simultaneity, juxtaposition, flows, dispersion, fluid mobilities, practices, and clusterings". Secondly, it contests the normative representation of Bulawayo as a sleepy and lazy city, whose activities ceased after the sound of a *Shayela* siren<sup>43</sup>.

Several participants argued that street trading has awakened the city, pumping it with life from sunrise until the late hours of the night. For instance, a key informant, Casey Jones from a street

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<sup>43</sup>These sirens were commonly blown at Bulawayo's industrial sites to signal the end of work shift. Work shifts in industrial sites normally end around 5pm in the afternoon.

traders' organisation, SWITA, reiterated that at a time of massive de-industrialisation, street vendors have made the city of Bulawayo to continuously tick and work overtime. In an excerpt below, Casey Jones further argues that the informalisation of Bulawayo's urban space and labour has impacted on labour processes, temporality and Bulawayo's cityness:

The development of the informal sector as seen in the increase of street trading has somehow permitted people to be in control of their labour processes. Street trading does not follow a certain time schedule, we can trade from six in the morning to around ten at night. You see, things have changed in Bulawayo when I was fairly young, you would see stream of people coming from the industries, the city was known for its factory workers. I am sure you know that Bulawayo was once known for its thermal towers that now lie idle because everything has collapsed. All those factory workers were replaced by street traders, so the industrial hours have long gone. As street traders we pride ourselves in using our own labour and time to survive the hard times we are currently facing (Casey Jones, SWITA official, Interview, 08 May 2016).

Although some participants felt empowered in controlling their labour and working hours, a few derived their satisfaction from being able to provide cheap and affordable goods to economically pressed citizens. Such participants not only viewed their work as a means of attaining income but as a moral obligation to help others survive the pernicious conditions of an economic downturn.

### *7.2.3 Understanding Virtue in Street Trading and Bulawayo's Informal Economy*

Some participants asserted that their economic activities have guaranteed them a moral responsibility of helping others resist urban poverty. In interacting with participants, I was keen to understand how they interpreted their moral responsibilities in helping Bulawayo citizens cope with poverty. First, participants believed that by providing people with access to cheap foodstuff, they assist urbanites to lessen household food insecurities. Second, some participants insisted that street trading bolsters consumers' purchasing power. They argued that unlike in supermarkets where prices are exorbitant and non-negotiable, street trading offers affordable prices that can be negotiated. When highlighting the important role street traders play in providing access to affordable consumables among Bulawayo residents, Brian shared this; "I can say ninety percent of the street traders are good and they have helped in the betterment of Bulawayo. We sell cheap goods to those that cannot afford to buy from Choppies<sup>44</sup> or Thomas Meikles supermarket"<sup>45</sup>. Brian's understanding of the informal sector as an eliminator of urban

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<sup>44</sup> Choppies is an international retailing group, headquartered in Botswana.

<sup>45</sup> Brian Mpofo, Sweets vendor, Interview, 12 May 2016.

poverty is widely shared by most ordinary Bulawayo residents who commonly refer to sites of informal trading activity as “*mupedza nhamo*”<sup>46</sup> [eradication of poverty].

Lastly, it was interesting how street traders and some key informants conceived this process of negotiating prices as a human act of showing kindness and empathy towards the next person. Street traders express their compassion towards customers by providing extra goods known as “*imbasela*” in seemingly high purchases. For instance, one street trader who sells vegetables noted that she provides customers with “*imbasela*”<sup>47</sup> when a single purchase exceeding US\$5.00 is made. She described the provision of “*imbasela*” as a collaborative effort between her and the customer in rewarding each other in any lucrative transaction. Furthermore, she explained the rewarding of “*imbasela*” as embedded in the African moral and cultural value of expressing empathy and willingness to help others. The cultural and moral operative of the “*imbasela*” token is arguably reflective of moral beliefs ingrained in some of the Ndebele proverbs. Ndebele proverbs such as “*izandla ziyagezana*” (the hand washes the other) and “*ikhotha eyikhithayo*” (It [the cow] licks the one which licks it)<sup>48</sup>, for example, speak to the principal role of reciprocity in entrenching good human relations among Africans and the Ndebele people.

In a broader sense, participants and key informants conceived the street trading as a morally sound activity when compared to the formal retailing sector. They went on to posit that the empathetic logic imbued in street trading and its transactional processes makes it non-individualistic and less exploitative. Indeed, participants contended that unlike formal retailers who only view customers within the confines of business and profit margins, street traders see them as humans first with a shared lived experience of urban precariousness. Notwithstanding, the critical role the street trading has played in rescuing multitudes from urban poverty, participants argued that street vending occupies an ever-crucial function of tasking the ordinary person with the duty of resuscitating the morality of “*Ubuntu*”<sup>49</sup> in their everyday lived reality.

I argue that the moral operatives of Bulawayo’s street trade which revolves around the African cultural ethos of humanness, cooperation and communitarianism typify the fundamental

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<sup>46</sup> This Shona term means the eradication of poverty.

<sup>47</sup> *Imbasela* are extra goods given to a customer by a trader when high purchases are made. It can also be construed as an act of showing of appreciation to the customer.

<sup>48</sup> For a comprehensive translation of Ndebele proverbs to English, refer to Pelling (2001). *A Practical Ndebele Dictionary*, Longman Zimbabwe, Harare.

<sup>49</sup> *Ubuntu* is an African philosophy which asserts that the humanity of an individual is only complete if it re-affirms that of others (also see Ramose, 2002).

underpinnings of the distributive human economy that I discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis. Further, the above findings confirm Hart et al. (2010), Jones, (2010) and Ferguson's (2015) argument that strong cultural practices of sharing and rich social networks are critical in helping the ordinary people navigate through the harsh realities of urban poverty. In the next section, I explore how street trading has emboldened solidarity among the street traders of Bulawayo.

#### *7.2.4 Solidarity, Associations and Social Networks Among Street Traders*

The daily operation of Bulawayo's street trade hinges on solidarity built around the consolidation of social relations and effective organisation of associational networks. It was interesting to discover that associational networks not only assist street traders to tackle matters concerning street trading but also other aspects of social life. For instance, associational networks have not only been utilised to establish social groups related to street trading such as cleaning and crime and noise monitoring groups. The research findings reveal that street traders organise beyond vending sites to establish other social groups such as burial societies, savings groups (stokvels), and educational groups. An official from BUTA, Sam Nkomo shed light on the importance of associational networks in developing solidarity among street traders at Egodini market:

As street traders we are organised and united. We have a burial society and savings group with the structures of BUTA. We have sweeping groups that operate on a rotational basis. If you look around our working spaces, you will hardly see litter. Street traders are sometimes viewed as a group of disorganised people, I can argue otherwise. People who are not street traders may not know that we have burial societies and stokvels like many organisations you will find in Bulawayo. We share information on other opportunities that are not related to street trading, for example, educational scholarship. We have also mobilised ourselves into fighting crime such as pickpocketing, I can assure you our customers are safe from crime (Sam Nkomo, Clothes trader and BUTA official, Interview, 10 May 2016).

The views expressed by Sam Nkomo were shared by Bulawayo City Council's Economic Development Unit's official, Bongani Mangena, who also attested to the mobilising prowess which street traders of Bulawayo possess. He further warns us that a myopic interpretation of street traders as a splintered and disorganised social group prevents one from recognising the solidarity and innovativeness street traders create when confronting a social problem. Bongani Mangena went on to reiterate that an outsider "... would be surprised that street traders have running burial societies and they have all sorts of arrangements like stokvels...". Other participants suggested that solidarity and unity among street traders are seen through acts such as sharing of bays, manning each other's bays, and alerting each other in the event of imminent

raids. It is worth noting that the benefits of street trading surpass that of promoting solidarity and communitarianism among street traders to further include boosting the city's revenues and expansion of formal businesses.

#### *7.2.5 Generation of Revenue and Profits for the City Council and Formal Businesses*

In an urban economy with a shrunken revenue collection base and low financial investments, street trading has become a major source of generating revenues for the city council. A growing corpus of literature suggests that an amount of between US\$ 7 billion and US\$ 14 billion is circulating within Zimbabwe's informal economy (for example see: ENCA, 2016; Herald, 2017). While the reliability of these figures has sparked debates among commentators on the real value of Zimbabwe's informal economy and its potential in replenishing state revenues, its enormous size can assist in validating these figures. Tellingly, the IMF initiated a study in which it ranked the scale of the informal economies' contribution to national GDP and Zimbabwe was classified as a country with the second largest proportion of the economy being informal. Indeed, according to Medina and Scheineder (2018) Zimbabwe's informal economy contributes 60.6 percent to the nation's GDP.

The growth of an informal sector has certainly been useful in replenishing the Bulawayo City Council's revenue base. The city's revenues are partly accrued through leasing vending bays and issuing of trading licenses. At the time of my fieldwork, approximately 1800 vending bays were being leased and each vendor paid an average monthly fee of US\$12<sup>50</sup>. Remarkably, on weekends, the Bulawayo City Council leases out spaces surrounding their administrative headquarters popularly known as the "Tower Block" to informal traders (see Figure 11). According to one participant, renting a vending space during Saturdays and Sundays at "Tower Block" costs US\$20 per day. It is quite revealing that city authorities readily embrace informal trading when it serves them as a platform for accumulating huge sums of money.

Similarly, Bulawayo's formal businesses, notably wholesale retailers have had an increase in sales volumes and profits due to the infiltration of street traders in urban spaces. It can be argued that local retail wholesalers such as Anand Brothers' wholesalers (see Figure 12), Pista Enterprise, and Zapalala Enterprise's business success has been supported by an ever-expanding informal sector (also see Mpofu, 2010; Gumbo, 2013). In reciprocating the positive

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<sup>50</sup> These figures were confirmed by Sihle Masina, the Vending Bay Allocation Officer during an interview, conducted on the 20<sup>th</sup> of April 2016.

influence street vendors have on wholesale sales turnover, retailers like Pista Enterprise have provided street traders with tents (see Figure 13).

**Figure 11: Tower Block Market**



*The Tower Block Flea Market opens every Saturday and Sunday. The administrative headquarters of the Bulawayo City Council, the iconic Tower Block (tall building behind the trees) can be seen in the background. Photo by: Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*



**Figure 12: Anand Brothers Wholesale: The Vendor's Den**



*The Anand Brothers Wholesalers benefits immensely from street traders who purchase large quantities of food commodities. These commodities are repackaged into smaller quantities and sold at a profit. Photo by: Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

**Figure 13: Sheds Provided to Street Traders by a Retail Outlet**



*Some of the sheds that were provided to street traders by Pista Enterprise. Note the company's branding on the sheds. Photo by: Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

In theorising the interaction of informal labour and capitalist accumulation, Samson (2015) argues that “informal workers create new spheres of accumulation that the state and formal capital seek to capture” (Samson, 2015:814). In Bulawayo, the city council and private businesses have depended on informality for the accumulation of revenues and profits. For instance, Themba Msomi, an official working within the Bulawayo City Council Town Planning Unit, noted that street traders occupy an important position in marketing, distributing, and selling commercial products for major Zimbabwean companies. He gave examples of how mobile telecommunication outlets such as Econet, Telecel and Net One are more profitable because they use street traders as inexpensive distributors of their products such as prepaid airtime and money transfer service (see Figure 14).

Furthermore, Mkhululi pointed to how street traders create informal networks that permit multinational companies like Coca Cola to distribute their products to areas they cannot reach themselves. More importantly, Mkhululi regarded street traders as brand ambassadors for the corporate world and argued that the informal traders’ contribution to the rise of profitable global businesses such as Econet or Coca-Cola deserves recognition.

While there is a pertinent clarion call among scholars writing on subaltern urbanism to recognise the usefulness of informality in replenishing urban livelihoods and boosting global business, there is a risk of overly romanticising street trading as a magic bullet to solving urban poverty. There is a need to acknowledge the precariousness of street trading and how it disables urban livelihoods. The last section of this chapter looks at the challenges of urban informality and how they constrain life and urban livelihoods.

**Figure 14: Informal-Formal Business Linkages in the Telecommunications and Energy Sector**



*These informal containers shops run by street traders in Bulawayo are crucial in distributing mobile telecommunication products such as prepaid airtime, electricity, and money transfer service. Source: Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

### **7.3 The Precariousness of Bulawayo’s Informality: Its Constrains on Urban Life and Livelihoods**

Notwithstanding the capacity of informal trade to generate household incomes, foster individual entrepreneurship, and create agency and resilience among the urban poor, participants described the everyday life of a street trader as brutish and precarious. Participants expressed their discontent on how multi-layered forms of exclusions such as constant raids and shortage of vending spaces negatively impacted on their livelihood. Further, street traders were critical of the city council’s ineffectiveness in providing sheds in newly established vending sites. They also complained about how the remoteness of newly allocated vending sites negatively affects their business volume and profitability. More broadly, participants argued that the unsustainable income earnings coupled with the cut-throat competitiveness in the informal work make street trading a precarious and less rewarding occupation. For those that underwent formal university education, street vending stirred excruciating feelings of frustrations and alienation. I shall explore the precariousness of street trading in detail starting with the plight of an educated street trader.

### *7.3.1 The Frustrations of an Educated Street Trader*

The expression “educated street trader” is not only understood as an oxymoron among Zimbabweans but a true depiction of the unemployment crisis engulfing the nation. Despite accruing financial gains from directly participating in street vending, participants with formal education showed their displeasure in practising informal work. These participants felt that street trading invokes feelings of shame, humiliation, and frustrations to those who have hoped to get ahead through their formal education. In the case of Mishek and Mehluli who have attained higher educational qualifications in marketing and bricklaying respectively, they argued that street trading has done little in enriching their professional development and occupational identity.

To them, being educated and having to end up selling in the streets is an anomaly that can cause feelings of depression, regret and self-blame. For instance, Mishek felt that with his marketing degree, he should not be a street trader and his presence in the streets is therefore misplaced and unnatural. Instead, he argued that as a university graduate, he is better placed in the formal employment sector. Similarly, Mehluli felt disempowered and frustrated that his acquired skills in bricklaying were unusable in his daily undertakings as a banana trader. Further, in a Zimbabwean society where street trading has for long been construed as an activity of the uneducated, it is unsurprising that educated street traders such as Mishek and Mehluli find their situation humiliating.

As I reflect on Mishek and Mehluli’s agitations of having to acquire higher education only to become street traders, I find Dubois’ (1903) seminal work on double consciousness apropos and helpful in understanding their conflicted experience. DuBois (1903) describes double consciousness as a mental conflict that emanates from having two irreconcilable identities. Dubois (1903) used the concept of double consciousness to understand the conflicted thought process that Black Americans undergo when projecting their identity of being Negroes in a racialised American society. The mental conflict emanates when Black Americans attempt to embrace the American identity but encounter racism and exclusion in a society which is predominantly white. Similarly, they find it difficult to relate to their African identity, decimated by a prolonged period of slavery. This identity crisis is also captured by Fanon (1967) who faces the same dilemma experienced by Black Americans of being black in a white-dominated society. He explains the predicament of his blackness in the European city of Paris,

he states, "...without a Negro past, without a Negro future, it was impossible for me to live my Negrohood. Not yet white, no longer wholly black, I was damned" (Fanon, 1967:138). In the case of Mishek and Mehluli, vacillating between the two incompatible diametric positions of being street traders (often associated with lack of education) and being graduates has brought mental distress. The educated street traders' mental anguish has served as a rallying point for some social movements such as the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe (NVUZ) who in 2015 with other civic groups like *Tajamuka* (*We have had enough, we are revolting!*) and #Thisflag movement led by Evan Mawarire mobilised a protest themed around the unpleasant lived experiences of unemployed university graduates turned street traders (see Figure 15).

The prevailing hardships of street trading do not only bring stress and frustrations to educated street traders, but also to participants that recognised themselves as less educated. These participants were worried about how street trading conjures feelings of an insecure future. Furthermore, such participants were anxious about how street trading fosters a crippling culture of waiting. As people wait, so are they reluctant to plan for the future.

**Figure 15: The Predicament of a University Graduate Vendor**



*In 2015, social movements such as the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe (NVUZ) took to the streets of Harare to protest and raise awareness of the desperate and excruciating existence of university graduates that are surviving as street traders. Photo by Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi (2015)<sup>51</sup>.*

### 7.3.2. Waiting in Vain and Insecure Futures

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<sup>51</sup> <https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-vendors-resist-eviction-in-harare/2852363.html> (Accessed, 12 May 2018).

In his writing on youth unemployment and class politics in India, Jefferey (2010) argues that waiting is an important feature of Indian wageless life. Likewise, he rightfully identifies the Zimbabwe of 2008, as a nation that was effectively in waiting (see Jefferey 2010:4; also see Bayart, 2007). During my fieldwork, I spent time with participants who viewed street vending as nothing more than a form of waiting. Indeed, some of the uneducated street traders I interviewed, saw informal work as an activity one does while waiting for a better future and prosperous Zimbabwe to come. However, participants noted that waiting for life to improve whilst one engages in street trading elicits feelings of despair and hopelessness that may subject one to social stigma and ridicule.

Like in most modern societies, the waiting and idleness that comes with unemployment are often viewed negatively by most Zimbabweans. In Bulawayo's everyday life those that lead an idle lifestyle or sell at street corners illegally are sometimes considered as lazy, criminals, rowdy, and unfit to lead an urban life. As someone who grew up in a middle-class household in Bulawayo, I can confirm that I was socialised to look down upon those that are unemployed and idle, labelling them with disparaging designations such as *oMatshayinyoka*<sup>52</sup> or *oLova*<sup>53</sup>. There was also a shared belief that those seen as *oMatshayinyoka* or *oLova* should relocate to rural areas and perhaps engage in activities that require less skills such as farming and herding cattle.

Interestingly, the current alienation of the unemployed and illegal street traders through assigning them negative labels resembles that of colonial authorities who also relied on negative stereotypes to ostracise women from assuming urban citizenry. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I discussed how colonial authorities in the city of Bulawayo utilised negative labels to represent women as undesirable urban residents. Accordingly, the women of Bulawayo were subjected to a "medico-patriarchal" discourse where colonial administrators together with African men constructed their bodies as carriers of venereal diseases (see, Jackson, 1999; West, 1997). Similarly, the negative characterisation of the unemployed as "oMatshayinyoka" or

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<sup>52</sup> *oMatshayinyoka* is a Ndebele term which when translated to English means "those who kill snakes". It is commonly used as a reference to unemployed males that spend most of their time at home idle. There is a shared belief in the townships of Bulawayo that those that are unemployed and seem unoccupied are normally called to track and kill snakes in the event they intrude in peoples' homes. Sometimes being known by the community as *uMatshayinyoka* does not only speak to one's unemployment status but also to the low social standing one occupies.

<sup>53</sup> *oLova* is also a Ndebele term used to refer to those that are unemployed and not involved in any economic activity.

“oLova” like the sexual pathologisation of women in colonial Bulawayo served to delegitimise their stay in the city, banishing them to rural areas.

### *7.3.3 Lack of Social and Income Security*

One of the major disabling impacts of street trading is that it fails to provide a comfortable standard of living with income security, guaranteed pension pay-out, and the ability to save earnings. According to the International Labour Organisation (2002), the lack of social and income security is a salient feature of the informal economy. The deficit of social protection in the informal sector means that those that partake in informal work are at a greater risk of being exposed to social exclusion and occupational health hazards. Equally, in the urban economy where critical commodities such as food are accessed using income, the lack of it translates to increased incidences of food insecurity and nutritional deficiencies. One elderly participant was unequivocal about how the lack of social security in street trading prevents the aged members of society from living a comfortable and enjoyable life. She explained her difficulties:

“I have been working on the streets for too long and I am yet to see a better Zimbabwe. As we are speaking right now, the old people of Bulawayo like myself are not receiving any assistance and pensions from the government. Look at me I will die a street trader!”<sup>54</sup>

The breakdown of Zimbabwe’s welfare regime and subsequent failure of the state to provide social security to its aging populace not only pushes the elderly to participate in the already perilous informal sector but makes it extremely difficult for the aged to leave the informal sector. Although the National Social Security Authority of Zimbabwe has begun groundbreaking talks<sup>55</sup> on setting up a pension fund and a medical aid scheme for informal workers, many street traders are still without pension funds or medical insurance schemes. While some street traders, particularly those registered with associations may have benefited from financial and funeral insurance accessed through the associations’ savings groups and burial societies, unregistered traders find it difficult to cope with crises. Maggie Zunguza, an unregistered street trader explained how a lack of medical aid and life insurance as basic employment benefits among informal workers heightens life insecurities. Maggie’s definition and understanding of what a job is rested squarely on its ability to provide some form of stability and assurance of

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<sup>54</sup> Interview with Maria Gumede, second-hand clothes trader, 16 May 2016.

<sup>55</sup> This was revealed by a National Social Security Authority of Zimbabwe (NASSA) representative during the 2016, May 1<sup>st</sup> Workers Day commemoration event that took place at the Bulawayo city hall. As I have already stated in Chapter 5 of this thesis, I was fortunate to be invited by the Sweetwise Traders Association (SWITA) to partake in this event. SWITA is one of many organisations in the civil society advocating for NASSA’s pension coverage to be extended to informal workers.

the future. Using this line of thinking, Maggie felt that it would be inappropriate to consider street vending as a job:

I do not perceive street vending as a job because of several reasons. Firstly, street vending does not consist of a compensation and life cover, it is disabling in that way. If I am to be hit by a car today, I will leave my sons with no one or any insurance scheme to cater for their needs. Secondly, street vending offers no medical aid like informal employment. If I am to get sick it means that I will have to pay for hospital bills from my pocket (Maggie Zunguza, Fruit, sweets and cigarettes trader, Interview, 21/04/2016).

Maggie's reasoning does relate to that of Ferguson (2015:99) who dismisses the celebrated rise of informal labour at the back of Zambia's collapsing mining industry arguing that "...it is misleading to simply merge improvisatory survivalists with workers as if they formed a single class". Indeed, some participants argued that it is ludicrous to lump them together with those working in the formal sector since informal traders have higher levels of income security than formal jobholders. Such participants understood income insecurity to mean having inadequate monthly earnings to sustain a decent standard of living. For example, Mishek, a book trader, argued that while earnings in the formal sector have fallen drastically in the last years, those in formal employment still enjoy fixed and stable earnings compared to their counterparts engaged in informal labour.

I identified several intertwined factors that contribute to income insecurity among Bulawayo street traders. Firstly, the occurrence of income insecurity can be linked to low sales turnover which characterise most street trading. Street traders dealing in clothing, stationery, flowers, and electronic consumables are more likely to experience low sales turnover since these products are not essential for everyday use. For instance, Mishek, noted that he only makes high sales at the beginning of each school term when the demand for exercise and textbooks are on the increase. Similarly, Mary, a florist, pointed out that it is difficult to reach high levels of sales since flowers and plants are considered luxury goods. She argued that people would rather prioritise purchasing foodstuffs than buying flowers or plants. Secondly, I found that competition emanated from street traders having to sell similar products and foodstuffs especially when they share a small market base. This competition further exists between street traders and formal business institutions.

#### *7.3.4 Facing Competition from Formal Businesses*

Scholars such as Altman (2008), Bandyopadhyay (2012), and Rajagopal (2010) assert that the growth of formal businesses supports the advancement of the informal sector and its



effectiveness in reducing urban poverty. However, the competitiveness of formal businesses in pricing, market share, quality of goods and services have threatened the operation of most informal traders. Street traders such as Dorcas Sibanda are among some of the many informal traders that faces fierce competition from formal business establishments. Dorcas, a single mother who has never participated in any type of formal work, survives on selling school woollen jerseys that she knits herself. At the time of the interview, Dorcas had just finished up hand- knitting a school jersey which she said will fetch around US\$20. Despite projecting a reasonable return from selling her knitted jerseys, Dorcas expressed concerns over low sales turnover which she attributed to the assumedly high pricing of her products and competition from Chinese stores:

I have been in the knitting business for over 15 years. One of the recent challenges I have faced apart from having to pay the hefty monthly fees for this vending bay I am operating from is that the sales of my jerseys have tumbled. While in the past years my sales have been high during the school winter term, in recent years the turnover is low. I think my sales are affected by the presence of Chinese shops. The China shops are everywhere in Bulawayo and they sell their products at cheaper prices. While the presence of China shops and Chinese goods has benefited some consumers and street traders it has affected me negatively. For example, you might find that this jersey that I have knitted will cost a potential customer around US\$ 20, but in a China shop, a school jersey might cost US\$10. Although China shops offer lower prices, I think the quality of their goods is of a low standard. I would like to think that the quality of my knitted jerseys is good no wonder why I have managed to retain few customers, but this has not improved my sales (Dorcas Sibanda, school jersey trader, Interview 12 May 2016).

The above excerpt affirms how disastrous globally linked formal businesses can be on some sections of Africa's informal economy. Indeed, as stated in Chapter 4, the linkages between the formal and informal sectors are not always beneficial to informal workers. Since these two sectors operate at a competitive interface, street traders and corporations sometimes compete for operating space and a larger share of the customer base. Unsurprisingly, through mass production and the use of cheap labour, global economies such as that of China have managed to export inexpensive and competitively priced goods to African economies (Knowles, 2014). While the flooding of cheap Chinese goods into Sub-Saharan Africa is advantageous to cash strapped consumers, it has however prevented many local producers like Dorcas from accessing a larger market that can assist in sustaining the continuity of their informal businesses. Apart from driving informal traders out of business, big corporations with support from city authorities pursuing a modernist urban agenda have systematically evicted street traders from accessing public urban space (Roy, 2005; Huang et al., 2014; Schindler, 2014).

### 7.3.5 Raids, Evictions and Scarcity of Space

In their fixation to maintain urban modernity and order, the Bulawayo City Council relies on conducting raids and evictions as methods of controlling and managing informality (Kamete, 2017). The council utilises statutory instruments and municipal police officers known among locals as *oMakhokhoba*<sup>56</sup> to arrest, fine and displace unlicensed street traders who operate outside designated spaces of vending (see Figure 16). For instance, Section 23, subsection 2 of the Bulawayo City Council Hawkers, Vendors and Flea Markets by-laws of 2017<sup>57</sup> instructs municipal police officers and other law enforcers such as state police to conduct raids, arrest, fine and confiscate goods from street traders operating from pavements and whose activities are directly or indirectly “...obstructing the use of any public place, or is a nuisance to any person in the vicinity of any public place”.

While city council officials perceived by-laws, raids, and fining as necessary in maintaining order and cleanliness in the city, a representative from street traders’ associations regarded them as a gross violation of their constitutional right to earn a living. Social movement organisations such as Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) and SWITA, for example, argue that the raiding and eviction of street traders contravene Section 14 and 15 of the Zimbabwean Constitution which calls for the state to promote access to employment and food security to all citizens, especially women and youth. One of the street traders I interviewed had this to say about raids:

The raids are bad and are conducted in an unconstitutional and non-transparent manner. Goods are confiscated without compensation this is a bit unfair. We do not know what the council and the police do to confiscated goods. Policies and by-laws concerning vending are not clear and are not people centred (Prudence Ndlovu, vegetable trader, Interview, 24 April 2016).

Prudence sees the confiscation of street traders’ goods as non-transparent and somewhat corrupt, which compels one to not only view raids as modernist planning practices but foil for opportunistic looting by law enforcers. Indeed, in the interactions I had with street traders,

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<sup>56</sup> *oMakhokhoba* is an expression used by local Bulawayo citizens to refer to municipal police. While its origin is unknown, I can only assume that it is a geographical expression since at one point in Bulawayo’s history a larger number of the municipal police resided at Makhokhoba, Bulawayo’s oldest township. *oMakhokhoba* are easily identified by their sky-blue uniforms, sometimes they are equipped with cuffs, rifles and baton sticks. The use of this expression is generally met with resistance and hostility from most municipal police officers as they find it offensive and distasteful.

<sup>57</sup> This is a newly enacted by-law and fulfils the requirements of the Part XVII (by-laws and regulations) of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1995 which guides municipalities in the formulation of by-laws. The Bulawayo City Council Hawkers, Vendors and Flea Markets by-laws are an amendment of the Urban Councils (Model) (Hawkers and Street Vendors) By-Laws of 1976 SI 902/76, SI 668/77.

they raised numerous allegations on the unscrupulous and unethical practices where law enforcers (municipal and state police) end up reselling confiscated goods for personal gains. I recall one street trader pointing at a group of women and sharing this with me:

You see all those women selling fresh meat, soap, and honey their spouses are police officers. The goods they are selling are probably confiscated elsewhere. You see an outsider cannot tell if its confiscated goods, but I know their partners are police officers. We are told that the confiscated goods are destroyed at Drill Hall, but we all know it is a lie. Police officers are benefiting from these raids and they will rather spend the whole day conducting raids rather than fighting crime.<sup>58</sup>

Similarly, an official from BUTA, Joseph Makhubalo argued that the act of unleashing raids and evictions on those considered violating by-laws is indicative of a city authority that is unaware of swelling numbers of street traders in a city battling with a scarcity of vending spaces. He further condemned the raiding and evicting of street traders as insensitive and in some way illogical if one is to consider that the city is battling with high unemployment and poverty rates:

The raiding and evicting of street traders have become part of Bulawayo's everydayness. Some of us are lucky because we have formalised vending spaces, but for others operating from pavements are always in confrontation with the law and because of that they lose their goods through confiscations. What worries me is that officials from the city council, are aware of the increase in street trading activity and the factors contributing to it. There is glaring evidence that because of unemployment, everyone is in the streets selling something for survival. As BUTA leaders, we have engaged with the city council on the matter concerning the rising number of street traders in our city spaces. I am sure they have informed you of the problem of inadequate vending spaces (Joseph Makhubalo, BUTA Association Member and Consumable Trader, Interview 10 May 2016).

In an interview I had with the council's vending bay allocation officer, Sihle Masina, it was revealed that by the end of 2015 at least 8000 licenced street traders were on the allocation waiting list and without vending spaces. Although in 2016, the council allocated nearly 1000 vending stalls in newly created sites (Queens Club Market situated along Masotsha Ndlovu Road) some of these vending spaces remain unoccupied due to their remoteness and lack of shade (see Figure 17). In the next chapter, I shall dwell more on how the scarcity of vending spaces exacerbates contestations between city officials and street traders.

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<sup>58</sup> This excerpt is from an encounter with a street trader. The brief discussion I had with the trader was recorded in my field notes.

**Figure 16: Raids and the Control of Informality in Bulawayo**



*A municipal police officer conducting a raid in the street of Bulawayo city. Photo by Voice of America (2015).<sup>59</sup>*

**Figure 17: The Newly Opened Queens Highlanders Club Market**



*This newly created Queens Highlanders Club market located along Masotsha Ndlovu road in Bulawayo has not attracted so many street traders who argued that its remoteness to major taxi ranks and pedestrian flow makes it unattractive to traders and an unfit site for conducting a profitable business. Photo by: Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

<sup>59</sup> <https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-council-bulwayo-vendors/2922477.html> (Accessed, 25 June 2018).

## 7.4 Conclusion

By examining the political, economic, and social processes that have contributed to the informalisation of urban space and intensification of Bulawayo's street trading, this chapter explored the everydayness of street trading in Bulawayo. In this regard, it analysed the positive and negative outcomes of street trading on the lives of those practising it.

The chapter revealed that street trading and the broader informal economy enhances the urban livelihoods of Bulawayo citizens in three important ways. Firstly, the chapter notes that street trading generates much-needed income for those not employed in the formal labour market. The income acquired from street trading is mainly exchanged for food commodities and educational outcomes. Accordingly, participants noted that street trading enhances household food security and nutrition. A large portion of money accrued from vending is utilised to purchase meat, mealie meal, vegetables, and other nutritional requirements. Some participants have invested money acquired from street trading towards school and university tuition. Furthermore, street vending has enabled some households to acquire larger assets such as vehicles permitting them to venture into the transport business, thus increasing their income streams.

Secondly, participants are attracted to street trading because of the independence and control one has on his or her labour. Such participants argued that street trading allows them to express their creativity, identity, and talent in their industry. Moreover, they seem to enjoy the flexible working hours that come with informal work. Thirdly, participants commended street trading for its function in strengthening the cultural values of *ubuntu* and moral responsibility by assisting the urban poor gain access to their cheap goods and services.

Fourthly, street trading has been crucial for the Bulawayo City Council and to private companies' accumulation of revenues and profits. In Bulawayo, revenues are partly generated through licensing of street traders, whereas street traders have assisted wholesale retailing and telecommunication with the distribution of their services and goods.

The chapter further focused on how street trading and informality limits the livelihoods of those involved in it. When compared to fellow workers in the formal sector, street traders are more likely to experience social and income insecurity. According to the participants, income insecurity negatively impacts food security, thus exposing street traders and their families to poverty shocks and hunger. For educated street traders, vending evoked feelings of stress,

depression, and embarrassment since in Zimbabwe it is normatively associated with uneducated and uncultured people. Participants felt that raids and evictions directed to them by the city council and the state enormously reduce their daily earnings and further worsen the income insecurities they experience.

In the next chapter, I engage the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis to explicate the contestations over urban spaces between the Bulawayo City Council and the street traders and between street traders themselves. It will also look at how space, urbanity, identity, and “modernity” has been challenged and (re)produced by both the Bulawayo City Council and street traders in the context of increased urban informality.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: THE GOVERNMENTALITY, PRODUCTION, AND POLICING OF BULAWAYO'S URBAN SPACES IN THE CONTEXT OF STREET TRADING: ACCOUNTS OF CONFORMITY AND DEFIANCE.**

*[Technocrats] ...unaware of what's going on in their own mind and in their working concepts, profoundly misjudging in their blind field what's going on (and what isn't), end up meticulously organizing a repressive space (Lefebvre, 1974: 208).*

*In the modernist vision of an orderly city, informality in general and street traders - an especially visible manifestation of informality - in particular, do not fit (Skinner, 2009:101).*

*...with government it is not a matter of imposing law on people but of arranging things so as to produce an end appropriate to and convenient for each of the things governed (Inda, 2005:4).*

*...the streets are the settings in which theatrical interpretations of social life are produced. It is here that subjects discover that meanings are unstable and susceptible to change. Also, it is here that subjects appear who, in speaking, construct themselves as new authorities and authorise their discourses as mechanism distinct from the official ones (Vich et al., 2004:61).*

### **8.1 Introduction**

This chapter examines the strategies and tools of governmentalities that the city authority of Bulawayo utilise to manage street traders' conduct and urban informality in general. By employing Foucault's concepts of "governmentality", "politics" and Lefebvre's theoretical understanding of space, the chapter argues that in situations where raids prove ineffective, the Bulawayo City Council has utilised spatial disposition, urban enclaves like vending bays and visual representations such as street signs and billboards to control street traders' illegal conduct and contain informality. The chapter further asserts that by using these strategies, city authority and state security officials does not only create "governable subjects" and regulate street traders' use of urban space from a distance but has given them an opportunity to:

1. Determine the "legality" or "illegality" of street traders.
2. Define how urban spaces are appropriated and who gets to occupy them.
3. Produce and reproduce identities and characterise street traders.
4. Enforce the self-regulation of street traders as they utilise space, thereby allowing for the governance of space from a distance.
5. Infuse visions of a planned and modernist city.
6. Subject illegal street traders to raids, evictions and confiscating of their goods.

The chapter also examines how Bulawayo's street traders have responded to the Bulawayo city authority's methods and outcomes of spatial control. It argues that in responding to these methods of spatial control, street traders have shown behavioural patterns of conformity and defiance. In the context of this thesis, and certainly that of Bulawayo's urban processes, street traders that are labelled by the city authority as being "conformists" are ones that are licensed, occupy vending bays and uphold the city's bylaws. By contrast, those that are considered as "deviants" are commonly unlicensed, seem not to heed bylaws as they operate on undesignated spaces such as pavements. To this end, the chapter explores how street traders perceive and respond to the labels, disposition, and identities attached to them by the state. It argues that by characterizing street traders as "conformists" and allocating vending bays, the city officials show a degree of commitment towards achieving an inclusive and accommodating city.

The chapter, however, also questions whether enforcing conformity through allocation of vending bays creates an inclusive and enabling urban environment. It follows Kamete's (2017) assertion to argue that the support of conforming street traders has little to do with inclusivity, but more of a biopolitical strategy of constructing self-governable subjects and enforcing "individualised" self-discipline (also see Foucault, 1995:120). It goes on to suggest that street traders categorised as "deviants", interpret this label as reflecting the insensitivity and unsympathetic attitude city officials have towards their precarious lives. Some participants who fall in the "deviant" category argued that their presence on pavements is indicative of the scarcity of vending bays and deeper contestations over urban spaces.

Finally, the chapter attempts to understand the street traders' responsiveness to the Bulawayo City Council's governing of urban space within the context of emerging forms of informal urbanism. By referring to the rhizomatic, kinetic, and chameleonic urban forms discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, this chapter contends that some street traders temporarily counter the production of space from above, challenging the way urban spaces are defined and governed. Furthermore, the chapter counters Foucault's arguments that people do not necessarily have agency at the whims of power. Instead, it shows that the street traders of Bulawayo engage in unique types of agencement to evade the long arm of the law. The street traders use various innovative methods to elude the city authority's policing unit, which include blowing whistles to raise an alarm of an ambush attack, fleeing into the cracks and passages of the city inaccessible by patrolling municipal vehicles and inventing creative ways of moving around with goods without being noticed. Additionally, some male participants indicated that



the type of clothing and footwear plays a critical role in successfully escaping a raid. However, participants whose trade is classified as illegal by bylaws noted that the most formidable resistance to their exclusion from the city's pavements lies in their ability to challenge the negative labels attached to them by city officials and sometimes by their fellow street traders. Therefore, this chapter needs to begin by looking at how the production of space interacts with that of identities within the sphere of street trading and informalities of urban space in Bulawayo.

## **8.2 Making and Managing a Street Trader: Spatial Rationalities**

In managing and disciplining urban informality, governing city officials utilise spatial representations or dispositionality to produce governable subjects (see Huxley, 2006). Certainly, the governmentality of urban spaces in cities such as Bulawayo has largely depended on creating operative spatial rationalities that foster appropriate subjectivities and regulate those that are deemed problematic. Accordingly, Bulawayo city authorities and its citizens alike have used spatial rationalities to qualify street traders' appropriateness, or lack thereof, to occupy certain urban spaces. As such the policing of Bulawayo's urban space has to a larger degree hinged on enacting governmentality practices that seek to "make up people" (also see Huxley, 2006:772; Rose, 1996:328). Ideally, the "making up" of people in urban spaces has led to street traders being grouped and classified into distinct categories that warrant different responses and interventions from city officials.

On one hand, there exist street traders that are discursively characterised as "good citizens" that abide by city bylaws and contribute to the city's revenue streams. Street traders in this classification are licensed and utilise vending spaces allocated by the municipality. On the other hand, lie street traders that are classified as "bad citizens". These street traders are normatively described as "illegals" they operate from undesignated spaces like pedestrian pavements. Conversely, assigning the illegal label on those selling their goods outside prescribed vending spaces has made it permissible for the Bulawayo City Council to problematise them as a group of street traders, representing them as a formidable threat to the creation of ordered city spaces. It is quite interesting how the utilisation of spatial rationalities in the maintenance and imagining of ordering Bulawayo urban space have fetishized notions of "dirt" and "hygiene", which ultimately become crucial in the biomedical production of urban space in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Indeed, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I draw from the works of Barnes (1992); Burke (1996) and Jeater (2000) to argue that spatial rationalities aimed at producing policeable and

self-governing bodies in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe have centred around utilising the politics of dirt. From the empirical evidence that I gathered from my interactions with street traders (both licensed and unlicensed), I argue that the production and appropriation of spatial identities and representations of “dirt”, “filth” and “chaos” has played a critical role in the governmentality of Bulawayo’s urban spaces and in promoting the spatial formalization of street traders.

### *8.2.1 Street Trading and Representations of Dirt and Uncleanliness*

Participants took different positions on the way in which street traders are meant to contribute to dirt and uncleanliness. Some participants, particularly those that identified themselves as licensed street traders, asserted that littering and the accumulation of dirt in the city should be attributed to illegal street traders. These participants argued that illegal street traders, who in many cases do not have permanent vending bays feel less obliged to sanitize spaces they occupy temporarily. Conversely, those that operate from vending bays, have a greater commitment to keeping such spaces clean since they are occupied permanently. Moreover, licensed traders operating on vending bays noted that they are bound by the city’s bylaws to keep the vending bays clean all the time. In an interview passage below, one of the licensed street traders attributed dirtiness to those he referred to as illegal. He contended that his trading license binds him to keep the vending bay hygienic and presentable:

**Danford:** There is a shared view among the city council and the citizens of Bulawayo that street traders contribute to littering and uncleanliness of the city. Do you agree with this view?  
**Sam:** That is correct. We can never run away from this truth. I would argue that illegal vendors are responsible for this littering and uncleanliness that we see in some parts of our streets. The mere fact that they are unlicensed with the city council makes them less responsible for cleaning up the various spaces they occupy. On the contrary, I am licensed with the council and this license requires street traders to take full responsibility for their bays and immediate surroundings. Under this license, I am obligated to sweep and keep my working site clean. If I fail to promote the cleanliness of my vending bay, I risk losing my license. Unlicensed street traders are not bound by these requirements that is why they have little care in maintaining cleanliness in the spaces they work, because they have no risk of losing something. Besides, if I do not clean my bay at the day, tomorrow morning I will come and find it dirty (Sam Nkomo, Clothes Trader and Chairperson of BUTA, Interview, 10 May 2016).

Another licensed trader, Nokuthula Ngwenya who trades in second-hand clothes at Highlanders club vending sites, noted that unregulated and illegal street trading has led to overcrowding of street traders on the pavement, inadvertently leading to a high concentration of litter on such pavements:

...I think the overcrowding of vendors in the inner parts of the city brings dirt and irresponsible behaviour such as littering. I want to add that overcrowding puts pressure on sanitary utilities such as toilets. Look at the Egodini taxi rank, for instance, it has only two toilets serving the whole of Egodini vending site. You can imagine the burden that is exerted on the sewer system. Have you ever seen how dirty those toilets are? Those toilets are a health hazard (Nokuthula Ngwenya, Interview, second clothes trader, 16 May 2016).

When I spent time at the taxi rank, I noticed heaps of rubbish. Indeed, by traversing across Egodini taxi rank, one can easily identify heaps of rubbish littered by street traders operating outside the Egodini vending site. Such heaps of dirt usually attract a lot of flies and produce an unbearable stench (see Figure 15). Nokuthula's view of Egodini taxi rank as an eyesore and an unhygienic space is supported by the city's town planner, Themba Msomi who criticizes unlicensed traders for creating unsafe environments that are likely to breed diseases:

We have a crisis at Egodini taxi rank, I am sure you have been there. There is rubbish all over the place and in this dirt, you will find vendors selling fresh meat and cooked food on pavements near Egodini taxi rank. What surprises me is that other street traders sell underwear clothing right next to those trading in cooked food. In such environments, traders may contribute to the spread of diseases such as cholera and we all know that our health systems cannot cope with an outbreak of such a disease. All these crises emanate from illegal street traders, they are not supposed to be there. Since they are operating illegally, it is difficult to inspect some of the food they sell. The other worrying thing is that most women that sell meat at pavements near Egodini taxi rank are wives of police officers, so you can imagine how difficult to arrest them (Themba Msomi, Interview, Town planner, 09 May 2016).

The above concerns of illegal street trading causing health hazards were discussed with some of the illegal street traders, who appeared cognizant of the role they play in dirtying the Egodini taxi rank. For instance, Kudzi, a mealie vendor, described her livelihood as a dirty one that excessively contributes to littering. During the interview, she showed me heaps of maize leaves and cobs that have accumulated on a space that she illegally occupies, and this was her perception of how vending contributes to dirt:

As someone who sells fresh mealies to the public, I am quite conscious of how my work contributes to the filth you see in this place. The problem is that the city council is yet to allocate us proper places to sell our roasted and cooked mealies. You see if you are selling cooked or roasted food, it is not only difficult to obtain a proper or legal space to work from, but one must go through a tedious process of seeking a permit that allows one to sell cooked food. While I do admit that my peeling of mealies leaves and throwing it on the ground consequently leads to the polluting of the taxi rank, I also blame the city council for not providing enough refuse bins (Kudzi Zhou, Interview, 28 April 2016).

Other illegal vendors disagreed with assertions that hold them liable for littering the city. They refuted views that perceived them as the sole upholders of Bulawayo's cleanliness, instead, some argued that the sanitization of the city should be construed by both authorities and citizens

as a shared commitment and responsibility. Brian, an illegal street trader who earns a living from selling sweets argued that it is misleading and rather unreasoned to assume that unlicensed street traders can single-handedly contribute to the accumulation of rubbish in the city. For Brian, achieving cleanliness in Bulawayo is a collaborative effort shouldered by him and his customers. Since customers are the final consumers of his products, Brian was of the view that it is their responsibility to ensure that in his case sweets wrappings are properly disposed of. In an interview excerpt below, Brian thinks that it is a bit harsh to place all the blame on Bulawayo's uncleanliness on those considered illegal street traders:

**Danford:** There are some people who associate illegal street traders with littering and uncleanliness. They argue that street traders bring a lot of dirt in the city. As for yourself, you sell sweets and if we can look around you can see sweet wrappings littered all over city space. How do you respond to such people?

**Brian:** Right, while I dropped out of school, my reasoning is sound. In this instance, you gave me a pie, If I eat this pie, this a respected and tidy place, I cannot just throw the pie wrapping here. I must [no] [...] I have to look for a bin and throw it in the bin. I should not throw the pie wrapping all over the place, it is not right...that is not right. For example, I do not understand people who throw till slips on the streets, that is not right. People should carry whatever used up containers, sweets wrapping, and till slips and dispose of them at their homes not here in town. Anyways, it is always important for people to keep their till slips, in cases where they would want to exchange their goods. We cannot solely blame unlicensed street vendors for littering, customers are also responsible. I do agree that vendors discard fruit and vegetable boxes in the streets, thus making the city look untidy, but those who buy from them should also think about keeping the city clean. It is everyone's responsibility, people who buy from street traders must not throw their litter anywhere they want. I argue that singling out street traders being responsible for littering and uncleanliness in Bulawayo is unfair (Brian Mpofo, Sweets vendor, Interview, 12 May 2016).

Some of the interviewed illegal street traders identified supermarkets as major contributors to littering in the city. They asserted that most of the disposed waste found in the streets can be traced back to the shelves of major supermarkets. For instance, one of the illegal street traders, Mkhululi Banda who sells plastic bags in front of OK supermarket insisted that his contribution to littering is far less than that of supermarkets. He reasons that when matched with that of supermarkets, the volume of plastics he sells in the streets is an insignificant contributor to the city's waste. He challenged the notion that present street traders as large contributors of littering in Bulawayo:

**Danford:** I have been informed by the city council and some of the street traders that illegal street traders such as yourself are the major contributors to littering in the city. I notice that you sell different types of plastic, do you consider yourself contributing to the littering of the city? I ask this question because one city council official told me that plastic waste occupies a considerable share of litter in the city.

**Mkhululi:** I will not disagree with any view that sees us street traders as a source of littering in the city. However, I challenge the misconception of us being the major contributors to dirt. I think supermarkets and other stores and not necessarily street traders should be held liable for contributing much to Bulawayo's uncleanliness. I ask you to look at this heap of litter in front of us and tell me if some of these containers are of products being sold by street vendors. You can see there are bottles of all sorts of beverages and plastic bags from TM supermarket which is just across us. Now tell me, why must I be blamed for this litter if everyone including the city council could see that I am not responsible for such litter. I do not sell Coca-Cola, so why must I account for the Coca-Cola bottles you see here disposed of in the streets. TM supermarket should be held accountable. At least OK supermarket has moved away from selling grocery bags, that is why you see me selling them here at their doorsteps (Mkhululi Banda, Interview, 09 May 2016).

### **8.3 The Politics of Dirt and Urban Control**

The above insights provided by Brian and Mkhululi challenged me to rethink about how the politics of "dirt" has intersected with the production of space and identity in post-colonial Bulawayo. Firstly, their accounts led me to explore how the colonial appropriation nuances of "dirt" and "uncleanliness" to certain urban space users considered "undesirable" continue to act as an important impetus for their expulsion from cityscapes. For instance, in the case of Brian and Mkhululi, their lack of trading licenses and permanent trading spaces not only makes them undesirable space users but presents them as suitable subjects at which negative connotations can be ascribed. By portraying street traders like Brian and Mkhululi as responsible for dirt and thus a threat to the city's sanity and "modernity", the Bulawayo City Council has in many instances seen their removal from city spaces as a necessary if not a logical form of control and restoration of order in the city.

Secondly, from the participants' accounts such as that of Sam Nkomo (see page 179), I assert that the "politics of dirt" continues to be constructed around issues of mobility and lack of permanence. For instance, Sam Nkomo reasoned that the spread and accumulation of dirt should be attributed to the nomadic and sporadic movements of those street traders working outside demarcated vending sites. Like in colonial times, in present-day Bulawayo, bodies that are highly mobile or lack entitlement of spatial permanency are construed as hosts and agents of dirt. To this end, street traders involved in circular movements across the city and that do not have permanent vending bays are negatively characterised as creators and distributors of dirt thus requiring control.

### 8.3.1 *The Weaponisation and Instrumentalisation of Filth*

It is virtually impossible to discuss the production of space, power, and social control in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe without focusing on the weaponisation and instrumentalisation of filth. Indeed, the production and control of urban space in colonial Rhodesia and that under Robert Mugabe strongly relied on the production of cleanliness, health, and politicisation of dirt and bodies (also see Burke, 1996:17; Chibvongodze, 2013:35). For colonial administrators, as I have already stated in Chapters 2 and 3, associating Africans with filthy, dirty, and unhygienic bodies and behaviours worked effectively to justify the implementation of segregating and racial urban laws. In post-colonial Zimbabwe, the politicisation of dirt served the function of consolidating power for Mugabe and ZANU-PF elites. For instance, in the early chapters of this thesis, I discuss how the ZANU-PF led government through the infamous large-scale urban cleaning campaign “*Operation Murambatsvina*”, used the weaponisation of dirt and this became important in their efforts to destabilise the MDC’s urban support base (see Dorman, 2015).

Some participants noted that current raids directed to unlicensed street traders are a mere continuation of “*Operation Murambatsvina*” and somewhat represent a colonial way of policing city spaces. For instance, Sicelo Nleya, a second-hand trader, reasoned that the occurrence of raids in present-day Bulawayo can be traced back to *Operation Murambatsvina*. She argued that this operation which had to do more with politics than cleaning the city triggered sustained victimisation of those the State views as dirt. According to Sicelo some of the recent raids she experienced evoked memories of *Operation Murambatsvina*, where she was brutally displaced from *eSporweni*, a vending site which was considered undesignated and illegal for informal trading. She had this to say about her victimisation:

I have experienced numerous raids and you never get used to them. The victimisation has been sustained through the years and that has badly affected my livelihood. Whenever I experience a raid, I remember how we were evicted from the eSporweni market. We created eSporweni it was just a rundown park with tall grass, we occupied it and converted it to a business hub. With all that we had put in, we were evicted from eSporweni. I remember it was that time of *Murambatsvina*, the police came on horseback with dogs and removed us by force. They chased us away, it is unfortunate because business was brisk at eSporweni. If I continued operating from that place, by now I could have purchased more trucks. There was a lot of money at that eSporweni, but the council did not want to listen to our pleas, they said we were causing disorder, but I think we were just being punished for something that I am yet to know. Maybe we do not deserve to be in the city because we do not have proper jobs (Sicelo Nleya, Second-hand trader, Interview, 16 April 2016).

Reading from the preceding passage, one can argue that the instrumentalisation of dirt goes beyond institutionalising a regime of order but rather centres around the production of urban citizenship. In the case of Sicelo, she interprets her experiences of raids and *Operation Murambatsvina* as processes that not only problematise her as dirt, but also strip away her claim to urban citizenship and a sense of belonging to an urban environment. Certainly, Sicelo's utterance, "*Maybe we do not deserve to be in the city, because we do not have proper jobs*" speaks to how contemporary power holders are adopting and adapting colonial spatial practices to exclude those identified as unfit for urban life.

When describing *Operation Murambatsvina* or raids directed to street traders, Ncube (2018) argues urban processes are not necessarily concerned with bringing order and sanitation but to violently punish those who seem not to fit within the norms of urban citizenship. He criticises *Operation Murambatsvina*, arguing that the "...cleaning", "cleansing" and "sanitising" proposed by the government did not necessarily bring order, but rather imposed a certain form of order and logic that it views as appropriate. These "cleaning" exercises, often violent and fatal, evidently attempt to punish those considered dirty and unclean or responsible for causing dirt" (Ncube, 2018:44). Ncube's (2018) assertion goes without stating how bodies become sites at which power is produced, enacted, and exercised.

The categorisation of unlicensed street traders such as Sicelo, Brian, and Mkhululi as contributors of dirt and disorder in the city of Bulawayo relates to how the production of "representations" and "rationalities" within spaces operate to impose order and control (also see Lefebvre, 1974). One can argue that municipal legislation such as the Bulawayo City Council Hawkers, Vendors, and Flea Markets by-laws of 2017, for example, works towards producing "conceived spaces" since it legally states who should or should not occupy city space and what appropriate behaviours are expected from space users.

For instance, through this municipal law, Bulawayo city authorities can legitimately conceive illegal street traders together with the spaces they occupy as "representations" of untidiness, disorderliness, and sources of diseases, thus needing constant control and supervision. In supporting the evictions of street traders, for example, the city's town planner Themba Msomi gave an account of how bylaws have assisted in removing illegal street traders from pavements that have become to represent chaos and disorderly in an increasingly informalising Bulawayo:

"...recently we conducted a series of raids targeting those operating from street pavements. A street pavement is meant for pedestrians, but illegal street vendors have occupied these spaces

and are now selling fresh meat, fruits, and even underwear, then as a planner, I would say pavements have ceased to serve their purpose. Pavements are meant for pedestrians, if we begin to see people occupying them and selling stuff then we are given the mandate by our bylaws to intervene and remove any street vendor on the pavement. It is sad to see that our pavements have come to represent- chaos and overcrowding. I mean one cannot even walk without being cautious of stepping on someone's tomatoes and some sell meat next to those selling underwear. When we apply our bylaws, you will see that our pavements have become a major source of spatial disorder and need urgent control" (Themba Msomi, Interview, Town planner, 09 May 2016).

As I have already stated in Chapter 3 of this thesis, "conceived spaces" allow planners such as Themba Msomi and technocrats to align spatial use to certain behaviours, code of conduct, and ideologies as prescribed by those in positions of authority. Certainly, in conceiving Bulawayo as "Zimbabwe's pride" in terms of cleanliness and order, its administrators will stifle any spatial behavioural processes that seek to challenge the representation of Bulawayo as a clean and modern city. For Kamete (2017b: 3) the production of the city is in itself an act of dominance where "...planners cut up urban spaces, meticulously naming and categorising them". He states that categorising spaces is a "basic ideological mechanism" in planning that "...primarily determines where things should be and what, how and when things should be there". The vending site is a good example of how the categorisation of space and its occupiers has been equally instrumental in controlling urban spaces in the city of Bulawayo.

#### **8.4 Vending Sites and the Enclaving of Urban Informality**

At the time I conducted my fieldwork in 2016, the city of Bulawayo had more than 10 fully functioning vending sites (also known as flea markets) in and around the city's CBD. Some of the popular informal trading sites include Egodini market, TM Hypermarket, Fort 11 flea market, Highlanders Club market, and Unity Village flea market (see Figure 19). The city council's vending bay allocation officer, Sihle Masina, described these vending sites as a calculated planning mechanism of enclaving and modernising urban informality. She argues that by enclaving informality, the city council gains control over how space is allocated, appropriated, and occupied. Further, Sihle stated that vending sites have enabled her department to quantify the number of licenced street traders currently operating in Bulawayo's city spaces. In an interview excerpt below, Sihle mentions the importance of the vending site as both a planning and governing tool:

Vending bays are key to achieving a planned and orderly city. We use vending sites to decongest the city's streets and pavements, thus allowing free movements of vehicles and pedestrians. It is also important to mention that vending bays not only assist my department in controlling spatiality in the city of Bulawayo, but they are pivotal in helping the city strengthen



its fiscus and financial revenues. Moreover, vending bays allows us to have an estimate of street vendors operating in the city, and having such information is necessary if we are to know the size of Bulawayo's informal sector. We have encouraged street traders through their relevant associations to desist from selling from pavements and pushcarts and utilise vending spaces. As the council's vending bay allocation officer, I applaud those good citizens that operate from bays and even pay for them. Unfortunately, you know some bad citizens do not conform to urban bylaws, they choose to sell their goods from undesignated areas (Sihle Masina, Interview the Vending Bay Allocation Officer, 20 April 2016).

Ideally, for the Bulawayo City Council, a good street trader is one that fully appreciates, understands, and conforms to the trading spaces allocated by local government. Kamete (2017:76) unscrambles the logic behind vending sites noting that in Zimbabwe such sites are perceived by city planners and traders alike as "...spaces where informality is warehoused to achieve several goals: eliminating disorder, making informals contribute to public coffers and modernizing informal enterprises". Further, Kamete (2019:4) suggests that vending sites not only facilitate the attainment of order but facilitate "...the crafting, elaboration and imposition of categories that lay the groundwork for determining what is out of place, where and when". As such, in the case of Bulawayo, those occupying vending sites are not only praised by city authorities for being conformists, but they are also then considered "legal", "orderly", "clean" vendors that contribute to the city's revenue streams.

By contrast, street traders operating outside allocated vending sites are generally viewed by Bulawayo's city authorities as "bad citizens" and a symptom of a dysfunctional city. Their existence and activity on the city's spaces are usually framed around notions of "illegality", "chaos" and in most cases are blamed for littering and being a health hazard. Ironically, fellow street traders operating in vending sites also expressed reproach to those branded as illegal. For instance, they described unlicensed traders working on street pavements as not only disrupting the pedestrian flow but also undermine their decent efforts of earning an income from spaces they have paid for.

**Figure 18: A Busy Vending site at Egodini Bus Terminal**



*This is one of the vending sites that the Bulawayo City Council uses to warehouse informality and to at least have visual surveillance on the informal sector. Photo by Chronicle Newspapers (2015).*

**Figure 19: Unity Village Flea Market in Bulawayo**



*The Unity Village Flea market is an example of how the Bulawayo City Council has attempted to modernise and enclave the informal sector. Such flea markets are critical in assisting the Bulawayo city authority clamp down illegal street vending. Note the “No Hawkers Allowed” sign by the main entrance. Photo from Unity Village Facebook Page (2019).*

## 8.5 Visual Surveillance: The Panoptic Governing of Informality through Billboards and Street Signs

Billboards and regulatory signs have also played a significant function in assisting the Bulawayo City Council to minimise some of the negative outcomes of street trading such as littering. As stated by Themba Msomi, an official working within the Bulawayo City Council's Town Planning Unit, the city authority has joined forces with various stakeholders in the private sector to use billboards and regulatory signs as a way of sensitising the public of Bulawayo to uphold sanitation in and around the city. According to Mkhululi, the city council works with formal business establishments to erect billboards and regulatory signs in areas where street traders are concentrated. He argued that billboards bolster the municipal police officers' efforts to regulate the behaviours of street traders, more particularly in instances where officers are not physically present to discipline street traders. He explained the effectiveness of billboards and regulatory signs in enforcing panoptic surveillance of urban spaces,

As a department of town planning, we have partnered with the business sector to control illegal street vending and littering by using billboards and signs. If one is to walk around the city, they will notice that there are billboards pitched up in spaces where street traders are largely concentrated and with high visibility. We have utilised these billboards to remind our citizens and specifically street traders to always keep our city clean. They have further served the purpose of discouraging common violations of the city's bylaws such as selling on pavements. I am sure you have seen billboards and signboards with this message "*Keep Bulawayo Clean*" and other messages warning citizens about the repercussions of breaking bylaws. Billboards and regulatory signs have been useful tools in our "*Keep Bulawayo Clean*" campaign that we jointly run with our public relations department. Above all, billboards and signposts have permitted us to regulate behaviours and achieve order without necessarily dispatching our municipal policing unit (Themba Msomi, Interview, Town Planning Unit Official, 09 May 2016).

Mkhululi's insights on the billboards in governing urban spaces from a distance feed well to the Gramscian and Foucauldian conceptualisation of power. Certainly, Foucault (1995) would agree with Mkhululi's argument that billboards are an effective technology of power that set a normative tone of what is expected by those who sponsor them of the behaviour of street traders. He has always maintained that power works smoothly when it seduces and appeals to those which it intends to subject. To revert to his own words, quoted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Foucault (1995:120) claims that "what makes power hold, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also transverses and produces things, it induces pleasure...". Similarly, my findings suggest that as some of Bulawayo street traders symbolically interact with billboards and regulatory signs, they unconsciously and willingly embrace the authority's message of keeping Bulawayo clean and orderly. One can

only imagine that they would not readily accept the same message if it is spread with violence and brutal force such as in the case of Operation Murambatsvina. Indeed, one of the focus group participants criticised Operation Murambatsvina but at the same time appeared to support the authority's idea of regulating street traders' behaviours through billboards. However, he notes that some may not necessarily comply with regulatory messages inscribed on billboards,

We do not want another Murambatsvina. Instead, the city council must embark on a cleaning programme that appeals to everyone. We are ready to assume responsibility in keeping our city clean. We have seen and heard how the city council has made efforts in discouraging litter on boards, bins, and radio, we are ready to work with it in keeping our city clean. I would not throw rubbish on the ground after seeing a "no littering" sign. But as you know we were raised differently, we have some that litter right next to this sign [*laughs*] (Focus Group Discussion, 17 May 2016).

To those following Gramsci's footsteps, the use of billboards and regulatory signs to regulate street vending in Bulawayo mirrors the operations of hegemony. According to Gramsci, hegemony and power thrive where consent is established between the ruler and the subject. In the case of governing Bulawayo's urban spaces and as shown in the interview extract above, billboards have forged consent among city authorities and street traders on adopting behaviours that minimise littering in the city.

**Figure 20: A Billboard Located Outside the Bulawayo City Hall**



*Billboards such as these shown here are utilised by the Bulawayo city authority to encourage cleanliness in the city. Such billboards are important technologies of power that city managers use to govern urban spaces without resorting to excessive force. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

**Figure 21: Cleanliness is Every Citizen's Responsibility**



*The Bulawayo City Council uses messages pasted on litter bins to encourage its citizens to be responsible and dispose of litter in these yellow bins which are dotted across the cityscape. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

**Figure 22: Regulatory Signs Boards Discouraging illegal Street Vending Practices**



*A billboard (left) and a regulatory sign (right) are some of the methods used by city authorities and other stakeholders to criminalise and discourage those selling on pavements and trading state-regulated goods such as pharmaceuticals. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

## 8.6. Outcharming Informality: Governing Bulawayo City Spaces through Aesthetics

The city of Bulawayo, like most cities in the global South, has embarked on several urban gentrification projects that not only seek to reorganise urban spaces and impart them with an aesthetic of “modernism” but are used by city authorities as methods to displace and drive out informality from the city’s public spaces. I argue that while the construction of shopping centres in outlying townships in past years demonstrates the city authorities’ commitment to boosting the city’s aesthetic image and beautify city spaces, it has been accompanied by the removal of street traders from the very spaces that the shopping centres will be built on. For example, over the past years, the Bulawayo City Council has partnered with various stakeholders in the construction of major shopping centres such as Entumbane Shopping Centre, Nkulumane Shopping Mall (see Figure 23 and 24, respectively) and Bulawayo Centre.

At the time I conducted my fieldwork in April of 2016, street traders working at Egodini vending site (see Figure 18) were facing imminent eviction from their workspaces since plans of constructing Egodini mall had now reached an advanced stage. The initial announcement for evicting street traders from the Egodini vending site was communicated by the city council in 2013. However, due to delays in contractual agreements between the city council and Terracotta, a South African based contractor, evictions were halted for another five years. Eventually, the evictions were implemented in 2018, two years after I had met up with Bongani Mangena, then the council’s Economic Development Officer and overseer of the *Egodini mall* project to discuss the impact of this project on street traders and the city’s iconography. In the same year of 2016, as already stated in Chapter 5, I sat down in a focus group discussion with street traders based at *Egodini* to elicit their views on how the construction of the mall will impact their livelihood and Bulawayo’s urbanity.

According to Bongani, the construction of *Egodini* mall epitomises the council’s commitment to revive Bulawayo’s image as an attractive and a world-class city (see Figure 25). He added that the development of a new mall at *Egodini* vending site and taxi rank serves as an opportunity to beautify the urban space and outcharm undesirable urban processes that may be difficult to nip out using physical policing. For him, beautiful built environments like malls have the power to transform negative behaviours to those that uphold the sanctity of urban spaces. He explains the seductive effect marvellous architecture has on space users:

The construction of a mall at Egodini vending site and taxi rank will be very crucial in making that space beautiful and presentable. I mean Egodini, as a place is not pleasant to the eye. You and I are aware of how dirty and messy that place can be. Its surroundings do not inspire, or

should I say I does not promote cleanliness. I suppose people find it easy to litter in a normatively filthy place. I think Egodini mall will sanitise the place. With its beautiful structural designs and majestic presence, I can only imagine that there is this sense of uneasiness after throwing trash in a beautiful mall. Somehow, if a place is well kept and clean like the front of our headquarters (the Tower Block) people are reluctant to litter such as space. I mean the feeling of embarrassment tends to overwhelm anyone who litters in any visually beautiful space (Bongani Mangena, Interview, 19 May 2016).

Bongani's arguments on the usefulness of beautiful spaces in eliciting good behaviour from space users seem to borrow from Hentschel's (2011) theorisation of spatial management. In her writing about the emerging forms of spatial management in urban Africa, Hentschel (2011:148) introduces us to the notion of "*flirty surfaces*", where she argues that root causes of good or bad behaviour should not be located "...somewhere deep in the history of society, but rather in space itself, right at the city's surface (ibid). She pushes her argument further to suggest that "...badly designed space *create* unruly behaviour, while well-shaped spaces *make* people adopt good manners" (Hentschel, 2011: 149).

Hentschel's theorisation of "*flirty surfaces*" as a tool that urban practitioners use to exert control over urban spaces and "*charm out*" informality from such spaces is consistent with Ghertner's (2011:279) notion of "*rule by aesthetics*". In his study of the production and politics of urban space in India, Ghertner (2011) notes that the aesthetics of malls have been a powerful instrument of governmentality and arresting the increase of Indian slums. He asserts that the construction of malls right at the heart of Indian slums have enabled "...state intervention into an otherwise ungovernable terrain" (Ghertner, 2011:282). He adds that the aesthetics of *world-class* infrastructure permits the state to emit its identity, norms, ideologies, and "truths" to its citizens that work to transform them into governable subjects.

**Figure 23: The Main Entrance to Entumbane Shopping Centre located at Entumbane Township, Bulawayo**



Photo by Zimbabwe Media Review (2019).

**Figure 24: The Front Elevation of eNkulumane Shopping Complex situated in eNkulumane Township, Bulawayo**



*Entumbane and eNkulumane Shopping complexes are some of the infrastructural developments where Bulawayo city partnered with the private sector to gentrify townships and boost their local economies. They were also built to decongest Bulawayo's city centre. Photo by PlacesMap.net (2016).*



Street traders that participated in the focus group discussion also shared Bongani's view that spatial aesthetics promote good behaviour and discipline when using public urban spaces. For instance, one of the focus group discussants, after looking at the mall's model pictures, asserted that Egodini mall with beautiful surfaces and upmarket stores will instil in the people of Bulawayo feelings of pride and give them the impetus to keep the mall and the surrounding area clean. The discussant shared his views on how the mall will infuse discipline to its future users:

We are looking forward to the construction of the Egodini mall. I have seen some of its model pictures and I must say it is a beautiful mall. I anticipate that all the disarray and noise we are experiencing now will come to pass as soon as the mall is completed. Besides the mall providing us with employment and a safer place to sell our goods, it will certainly restore our pride as Bulawayo citizens and will impart us with a responsibility to keep it clean and free from vandalism (Focus Group Discussant #1, Focus Group Discussion, 20 May 2016).

While some of the focus group discussants imagined the development of Egodini mall as a vehicle that will facilitate a further development of informal enterprises and subsequently improve their livelihoods, others expected the mall project to have disastrous outcomes on their economic security. For instance, street traders operating from the *Egodini* taxi rank argued that the impending relocation that will ensue with the initial construction of the mall is likely going to reduce their income and disrupt the customer base which has taken them a lot of years to develop. Additionally, while the Bulawayo City Council has informed them of plans to integrate informal traders in the architectural design of *Egodini* mall, focus group discussants expressed their concern over how the vending spaces will be allocated. To this fact, street traders exhibited feelings of doubt on whether the allocation process will be fair, inclusive, and transparent. Below are some of the views that capture street traders' scepticism towards the possibilities of benefiting from the *Egodini* mall development:

While we welcome the development of a mall in the city centre of Bulawayo, which we all think is overdue I have a lot of worries about this project. First, I do agree that the construction of the *Egodini* mall will create employment, but my worry is, will Bulawayo citizens be given first preference when recruiting? I ask this question because we have had many cases in which companies outsource labour from other parts of the country only to the detriment of us locals. Second, will the money generated from the mall going to benefit the citizens of Bulawayo or it will only feed the rich politicians. You know very well that we have politicians that own a chain of supermarkets. Third, I am very much concerned with this imminent relocation. I am told that they will move us to Queens Highlanders Club market situated Masotsha Ndlovu road. I think this will negatively affect our businesses in terms of revenues and sales. I mean there is no form of activity at Masotsha Ndlovu road, there is no taxi rank, the pedestrian flow is close to nothing. How does the city council expect us to make money and later on survive at that "dead" place? I think the owners of the mall will benefit at our very own expense (Focus Group Discussant #2, Focus Group Discussion, 20 May 2016).

I think it is too early for us as street traders to celebrate the incoming construction of the Egodini mall. I say this because it is still unclear how we will benefit from this initiative; we were not even included in the planning phase. We have not engaged with the Bulawayo City Council to ask them how the allocation of vending spaces at the mall will be done. My question then is: Are we going to be given preference in the allocation of bays since we are already selling at *Egodini* mall? What type of goods will be allowed to be sold at the mall? Will they allow those selling plastics, sweets, and roasted mealies (maize), or they will only allow luxurious goods? To be honest, I don't foresee us selling vegetables and roasted maize inside that beautiful mall. Is there any office that street traders can go and register for allocation of a vending bay at this mall which they say will be constructed soon? It is really difficult for one to celebrate the Egodini mall project when we are still battling with these unanswered questions (Focus Group Discussant #3, Focus Group Discussion, 20 May 2016).

In interpreting and analysing the negative perceptions street traders have towards the construction of *Egodini* mall and its immediate impact on livelihoods, I revisit the question I raise in Chapter 4 of whether the construction of *Egodini* mall at the hub of Bulawayo's informal trade can be construed as urban revanchism and an aestheticization of poverty. By inferring from the above concerns raised by focus group discussant #2 and #3, one can argue that at its initial stage, the *Egodini* mall project is already showing elements of urban revanchism. As already highlighted in Chapter 4, revanchism represents “[...] the city's intent to eradicate undesirable populations from prime spaces in order to create positive images, thereby attracting high mobile capital [...]” (Haung et al., 2014:171).

In many instances, urban gentrification projects such as *Egodini* mall do little in enhancing the livelihood of those considered poor, but rather act as conduits of accumulating capital for political elites (see Smith, 1996; Atehortua, 2014). Given the extractive nature of Zimbabwe's political economy, which is set up to benefit a few political elites (for example see, Bratton, 2014:8), it is unsurprising that focused group discussant #2 fears that the construction of *Egodini* mall will serve the interests of a few handpicked politicians already owning a chain of retail stores and real estate. The discussant's view is reflective of Zimbabwe's colonial and post-colonial business sector which has largely been controlled and dominated by a cartel of politicians and petty bourgeoisie (also see Chapter 2 of this thesis). For instance, during the time of my fieldwork, two prominent politicians – cabinet Minister Obert Mpofu<sup>60</sup> and former Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko<sup>61</sup> were controlling a large stake of Bulawayo's retail industry (for example see, The Zimbabwean, 2011; Nehanda Radio, 2015).

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<sup>60</sup> <https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/04/villagers-bemoan-buscod-invasion/> (Accessed 19 July 2021).

<sup>61</sup> <https://nehandaradio.com/2015/08/02/vp-mpfoko-fires-100-workers/> (Accessed 19 July 2021).

While some Bulawayo citizens are of the view that the construction of *Egodini* mall will improve the city's aesthetic and urban livelihood through employment creation, focus group discussant #3 has a differing view. He argues that world class representations embedded in the *Egodini* mall project might exclude those deemed as not espousing notions of “*ukuphucuka*” (modernism). Although he is aware of the city authorities' intentions to incorporate informal traders in the mall's architectural design, focus group discussant #3 asserts that such authorities would likely exclude those selling goods considered “inferior” which may downgrade the mall's image. For example, in the excerpt in page 196, focus group discussant #3 argues that selling roasted maize at the upcoming *Egodini* mall is unimaginable since it is food that some locals normally associate with “rurality” and to a certain extent “primitiveness”. For him selling foodstuffs such as roasted maize at modern urban space such as shopping malls will be discouraged as it disrupts its “attractiveness” as it brings symbolic “representations” of rural life. Conversely, this leads focus group discussant #3 to suggest that only those selling high-end luxury goods that perhaps embody modernity and world class standards will be permitted to rent and own spaces at *Egodini* mall.

The reasoning of focus group discussant # 3, on how symbolic representations play a critical role in determining who gets to be included or excluded from certain urban spaces, corresponds with Lefebvre's (1974) notion of “representations of space” (conceived spaces) and “spatial practices” (perceived spaces). Lefebvre regards “representation spaces” and “spatial practices” as interfaces in which an individual's spatial territorialities, territorial cognitions, and behaviours are formed, shaped, and embedded. Additionally, as already noted in Chapter 3, it is in the “representations of space” and “spatial practices” that space ceases to be this “abstract” container but a place where identities, rationalities, and realities are constructed such that specific peoples are made to qualify or become ineligible in certain urban spaces (Lefebvre, 1974; also see Simone, 2008). The application of Lefebvre's conceptualisation of “conceived spaces” and “perceived spaces” in the production of *Egodini* mall space, can help us understand why focus group discussant # 3 feels that his presence at the future mall would be alienating. Indeed, with his “street trader” identity usually constructed against nuances of “dirt”, “traditionality”, “informality” and “lawlessness”, it makes it difficult for discussant # 3 to juxtapose his existence into a space of “modernity”, “progressiveness” and “luxurious aesthetics” such as the forthcoming *Egodini* mall.

While the neoliberal governmentality of space coupled with the control over space has entailed the removal and displacement of street traders, there is evidence of growing resistance against

such punitive measures. The street traders of Bulawayo have adopted multiple ways and creative means to resist evictions and the victimisation of those working in the informal sector.

**Figure 25: An Advertisement Flyer for the Egodini Mall Development**



*This is a flyer I picked up at the Bulawayo City Council's Public Relations Department. While the construction of Egodini Mall is yet to commence, the citizens of Bulawayo are patiently waiting to be part of this initiative. The use of the "A world Class" phrase in the advertisement, speaks to the city council's effort to inscribe Bulawayo's urban spaces with an aesthetic of world classism. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

**Figure 26: The Model Plan of Egodini Mall and Transport Hub**




Photo by Bulawayo City Council (2016).

## **8.7 Quiet Encroachment, Subalternity and Resisting Urban Control**

The street traders of Bulawayo engage in various forms of socio-political resistance to assert their right to the city. These forms range from simply reoccupying street pavements when evicted, to utilising *autoconstructed* pushcarts to swiftly evade the municipal and national police and using petitions, picketing, and the courts to reverse displacements. Some of the participants as this chapter will show have challenged the logic of warehousing informality through vending sites.

### *8.7.1 Encroaching Pavements*

To those that are labelled as illegal street traders, the “unlawful” occupation of street pavements is considered as an act of defiance. They understood their defiance to mean more than just simply violating the city’s bylaws, but an act of resisting the effects of poverty and unemployment. To this fact, they conceived their encroachment on pavements as a necessity informed by the logic of survival. For instance, Maggie Zunguza perceived encroaching pavements as not amounting to any lawlessness since it does not pose any immediate danger to anyone. Instead, she argued that it is rather insensitive for city officials to prevent the unemployed from utilising public urban spaces to mitigate their precariousness. In an extract below, Maggie does not consider herself a lawbreaker, but a responsible citizen who should be commended for taking care of her family:

I do not think occupying the pavement makes me a criminal. By occupying this pavement causes no harm to anyone but assist me in feeding my family. The real criminals are there at Lobengula street, you know them, those pick pocketers, they should chase away those. The police should not bother an unemployed woman like myself. I occupied this pavement out of desperation, do you think I enjoy working at this space where I do not have privacy and no shade to protect me from the sun. City officials should understand our plight as unemployed citizens of Bulawayo [...] the other problem is that I do not have the money to pay for the vending bay, I do not make much from selling these sweets and cigarettes. The city spaces should be free to everyone, why do they want us to pay (Maggie Zunguza, Fruit, sweets and cigarettes trader, Interview, 21/04/2016).

Due to the lack of employment opportunities caused by the de-industrialisation of Bulawayo, Maggie explains that she has little choice but to disregard the by-laws and hawk her sweets on pavements. She argues that disobeying the council's pavement laws gives the wageless the agency to occupy space to hawk and survive. Maggie uses a Shona expression, "*ukaita zvedzvene unofa nenzara*" (If you become a law-abiding citizen, you will die of hunger) to justify practices of "everyday resistance" as seen in her pervasive claim-making on the city's pavements. Maggie also contests the idea of how urban public spaces are used as instruments for making money. Maggie thinks that by extracting money from street traders through vending bays, the city council is unfairly parting away with the little money traders make. Therefore, Maggie argues that the monetisation of public urban spaces at a time where unemployment has made people survive on such spaces increases their vulnerability to poverty. As stated in the previous chapter, some participants felt that raids were not always about enforcing conformance to modernist and colonial aesthetics in the abstract but opportunities for law enforcers to confiscate goods in order to resell them for personal gains.

In writing about space and politics, several urban studies scholars have drawn from Gramsci's concept of subalternity to argue that city spaces are sites of fierce contestation between the city officials and those in the margins (for example, see, Roy, 2011; Choplin and Ciavolella, 2016; Gillespie, 2017). They suggest that while the exerting of control on city spaces by state officials may lead to conformity, it is sometimes met with insurgency from those operating in the margins of the formal economy who are wageless. Further, these scholars have immensely contributed to the emergence of subaltern urbanism scholarship, which seeks to explore the various techniques those in the margins utilise in defending their right to access the city. Sheppard et al. (2013:897) note that subaltern urbanism scholarship focuses on the "...tactics, encroachments and subversions, and accommodations..." that the marginal utilise in reproducing urban spaces as they interact with urban by-laws and policies (also see, Bayat,

197; 2000). It further seeks to disrupt how mainstream global urbanism conceptualises the production and appropriation of urban space (Sheppard, et al., 2013).

**Figure 27: Street Traders Operating from Pavements**



*Bulawayo's street traders encroaching on pavements* Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).

### 8.7.2 *The Body as a Vending Site*

Some of the participants whose trade relies on intensive cyclic movements across the city were opposed to the idea of being stationed at demarcated vending sites. Instead, street traders specialising in lightweight goods like airtime, belts, sweets, mirrors, jewellery, and small electronic consumables opt to use their bodies as a medium from which they sell goods and meet potential customers. They argued that unlike vending bays that forces one to be sedentary, the nature of the goods they sell allow for a constant movement across the city. Moreover, they argued that the profits they make from their sold products are paltry, thus, insufficient to cover the monthly costs of occupying a vending bay. In resolving their lack of financial resources to lease bays and that of reaching their potential customers, it is revealing how these street traders used their bodies as extensions of vending sites.

The street traders' understanding of the physical vending site as also encompassing the biological unit (human body) appealed to me as a feature of subaltern urbanism. I argue that by conceptualising their bodies as spaces equivalent to vending sites, however flexible in their form, street traders (un)consciously defy the logic of a vending site (also see Kamete, 2019) that seeks to contain and make them conform to the notion of a planned city and formal

urbanism. This act of defiance is displayed by Brian Mpofu, a sweets trader, who sees his body as an extension of a confectionary shop:

My day involves a lot of moving up and down the streets. As I have already told you, we have a shop near Greens Supermarket where I go and collect more sweets, when they are sold out. But when you look at me right now, I am just as good as that shop. If you see me with my sweets, then there will be no need for you to visit our shop. I have brought the shop to you, I am the shop [*laughs*] (Brian Mpofu, Sweets vendor, Interview, 12 May 2016).

In analysing Brian's perception of his body as an extension of the physical urban infrastructure, I turn to Gandy's (2005) notion of cyborg urbanisation. His concept challenges traditional urban theories that always treat the human body and the physical space as separate entities. Instead, Gandy (2005:33) argues that as ordinary cities undergo extraordinary urban changes either through technological advancement or informalisation the "...blurring of boundaries between the body and the city" begins to take shape. Brito-Henrique et al. (2019:1) explain Gandy's concept of cyborg urbanisation further and argue that urban spaces are "... constructed as an extension of the human, while also reconfiguring what the human is". Similarly, through his concept of "people as infrastructure", Simone (2008) encourages us to envision the city beyond its physical infrastructure (roads, skyscrapers, factories, etc.) and focus more on "...everyday intersections of the body and infrastructure in the metabolic city" (also see Desai et al., 2015:98).

### 8.7.3 *The "Gomba" Pushcart: Invented and Autoconstructed Urban Spaces*

While traversing the city of Bulawayo, I further observed that street traders have also challenged the idea of containment that comes with vending sites by using two-wheeled pushcarts popularly known to residents as "*oGomba*". *oGomba*, which are normally autoconstructed from scraps of metal sheets form an important part of Bulawayo's cityscape acting as alternative invented spaces for those that cannot afford to pay vending bay rentals. Additionally, like the human body, *oGomba* pushcarts act as an extension of vending sites that frees street vendors from paying monthly vending bays rentals. *oGomba* pushcarts are commonly utilised by fruit and vegetable vendors and some in our interactions asserted that the autoconstructed pushcarts permit them to easily move with the rhythm of pedestrian flow. For instance, one of the street traders, Mehluli Siziba who sells bananas from his *Gomba* pushcart noted that the flexible mobility that comes with operating *oGomba* push carts has allowed him to effortlessly evade raids and flee from the police. He explains the advantages



the so-called illegal street vendors operating from pushcarts have over those selling from legally designated vending sites:

**Danford:** I see you sell your bananas from a pushing cart. Some of the urban authorities I interviewed pointed out that pushcarts like the one you are operating are an obstruction to pedestrian flow. These urban authorities have encouraged all vendors operating pushcarts should use designated fruits and vegetable sites allocated by the city council. How do you respond to such views?

**Mehluli:** I do not think I contribute to the obstruction of pedestrians. I always place my pushcart on the side of the pavements, this I believe gives enough room for people to walk up and down the pavement. I do not see myself occupying a vending bay anytime soon because of various reasons. Firstly, I do not like to be stationed in this one defined space, that would be bad for my business. I make more money when I move up and down the city luring customers to buy my bananas. I would like to think that I have a better sales turnover than those vendors selling bananas at the Early Market Place. They might call me an illegal trader, but I am surviving that how it is in this country everyone is breaking the law to survive, how can one be said to be a criminal by trying to pursue a better life. Secondly, by operating my pushcart I do not get to pay any vending rentals to anyone. Honestly, I do not want to part with my money paying for a space that contributes less to my livelihood. I would rather operate from my *Gomba* which I do not pay rentals for and is inexpensive to maintain (Mehluli Siziba, Banana Vendor, Interview, 09 May 2016).

By defying the logic of using vending sites and submitting to the laws of a planned city, Mehluli and other “illegal vendors” are responsible for creating what is described by Mehrotra (2008) as kinetic cities. In chapter 4 of this thesis, I explored Mehrotra’s notion of the “kinetic city” which he describes as autoconstructed from “...recycled material: plastic sheets, scrap metal, canvas, and waste wood”. He goes on further to define it as a city “...created by those outside the elite domains of the formal modernity of the state and is thus a pirate modernity that slips under the laws of the city simple to survive, without any conscious attempt at constructing a counterculture”.

In reiterating Mehrotra’s theorisation of the “kinetic city”, I argue that the reasoning behind the utilisation of the biological body and *oGomba* as vending bays speaks to the tenets of kinetic urbanism. Indeed, by constructing bodies and pushcarts as urban space, the street traders of Bulawayo have challenged the modernistic and technocratic production of space that considers space as static and as a planned end product. Instead, these street traders argued that the freedom of appropriating their bodies and pushcarts as extensions of the physical urban space not only allows them to create fluid and mobile spaces but further emboldens them to be resilient, responsive, and invent innovative surviving tactics when confronting poverty. The arguments forwarded by Brian and Mehluli on their reluctance to utilise vending sites as places of work are consistent with those that were given by the Harare vendors of the 1930s discussed

in Chapter 2. These vendors detested the overbearing control of the colonial urban authority on city spaces (see Wild, 1992).

**Figure 28: A Street Trader Traversing the City with a Gomba Pushcart**



*Mehluli Siziba is shown in this picture pushing his Gomba Pushcart. Street traders like Mehluli see their push carts as a form of autoconstructed urban space that can be equated to other planned urban spaces such as vending bays. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

#### *8.7.4 Whistling, Pulling Strings, the Fashion, and Flight*

In resisting containment and authorities' control of urban spaces, the street traders of Bulawayo have adopted innovative methods of evading the policing and surveillance of urban spaces. The whistle proved to be one of the most efficient tools illegal street traders used in alerting each other of an imminent raid. According to one of the street traders I had a brief conversation with before our interview, the sound of a high-pitched whistle lets one know that *oMakokoba* (municipal officers) are nearby, thus one needs to pack up his or her goods and be on the run. It is interesting to note that the whistles are performed with different melody patterns that carry messages that are not only distinct to the evaders' ear but cannot be easily decoded by *oMakokoba*. Moses Khozi, a plastic and cigarettes trader, gave me an insight into the intricate world of the street whistle and its important use in the contestation of urban space in Bulawayo:

**Danford:** Early this morning, I witnessed a raid on street traders selling from pavements. There was commotion but I could not help but notice how the evading of municipal was highly organised. I also noticed that before the raids there were sounds in the form of whistles and hisses that came from a group of street traders sitting and standing by the pavements. Can you tell me more about the whistles? What is their role in resisting raids?

**Moses:** We use the whistle to alert each other of the presence of *oMakokoba* (municipal officers) or the police. The melody of the whistle tells us the intensity of the imminent raid and how we should react to it. For instance, a smooth and hollow whistle is usually performed when the imminent raid is less threatening and is being carried out by a small number of *oMakokoba*. Normally, when one hears a smooth and hollow whistle which is made by creating a small opening with one's lips and then blowing, we immediately know that the threat of a raid is not that serious, and we may not flee because the whistle signals that there are less than five *oMakokoba* within sight. However, if the whistle is high pitched and it is of high frequency and is performed by sucking air through the lips, we instantly know that an intense raid will take place. This type of a whistle informs one to pack up his or her goods with haste and to run away as far as possible, since the imminent raid will be conducted by a much larger force of *oMakokoba* (Moses Khozi, Plastic bag, Sweets and Cigarettes Vendor, Interview, 23 April 2016).

I was also intrigued by how whistling is incorporated into other innovative ways of averting raids. According to Moses, whistling only alerts one of imminent raids and does little in assisting one to flee expeditiously. During my fieldwork, I realised that most of the illegal street traders sold their products from canvas and plastic mats that had long strings tied to each of the four corners and when these strings are pulled together in an upward direction they force the canvas or plastic mat to follow a shape of a pouch, thus enclosing the goods inside the formed pouch. Moses had this to say about the usefulness of the string invention when evading a raid and stopping the confiscation of one's goods:

In an event of a raid, by pulling up the strings attached to the corners of mats you see traders selling their goods from, these mats become bags thus making the carrying of goods during a chase much easier. The pulling of the strings assists the street traders to swiftly pack his or her goods, throw them across his or her back and flee from *oMakokoba* within a stroke of a second (Moses Khozi, Plastic bag, Sweets and Cigarettes Vendor, Interview, 23 April 2016).

As I marvelled at this ingenuity, I came to realise that an effective street traders' resistance to urban control was one that depended much on the manipulation of space and time. Indeed, the use of strings on canvases and the use of *oGomba* for instance, give street traders the ability to create flexible space, granting them the capability of swiftly responding to and contesting any form of external control that threatens their livelihoods. Other street traders also directed my attention to how their dressing and fashion sense has acted as a formidable method of countering raids. In an informal conversation I had with Brian, the sweets vendor, who before our interview shared with me how wearing "*o Oli*" (Converse All Star canvas tennis shoes) and a pair of trousers enables him to outrun the police and *oMakokoba*. He argued that "*o Oli*" tennis shoes are light and easy on the feet making him run faster than the security forces who are normally wearing heavy leather boots.

I jotted down some of the arguments he made, below is an excerpt of the field notes containing his admiration of “*o Oli*” tennis shoes:

“...You see when you put on “*o Oli*”, you become a *Pantsula*. One of the characteristics of a *Pantsula* is that of moving fast and being streetwise. Ngeke ulibambe *iPantsula* lhlala liphambili! (You never touch a *Pantsula*, he is always ahead of you). The police and *oMakokoba* will never seize my goods because I run faster than them and I am always two steps ahead...” (An excerpt from field notes, Brian Mpofu, Sweets vendor, 12 May 2016).

The constant need by street traders to invent ways of facilitating an easy flight from the technologies of control reflects the *rhizomatic* nature of African cities. In chapter 4 of this thesis, I discussed how the informal city with its rhizomatic urban forms is largely constructed along various “lines of flight”. I reiterated Rayner’s (2013:np) definition of “lines of flight”, where he sees them as “...bolts of pent-up energy that break through the cracks in a system of control and shoot off on the diagonal...”. Indeed, by employing innovative ways such as coded whistles to alert one another of imminent raids, manipulating space through pulling strings, and wearing tennis shoes that increase one’s mobility across the cityscape, the street traders of Bulawayo break away from the city authorities’ control on urban spaces. Apart from engaging in innovative ways of evading raids and evictions, street traders have also resorted to protests and legal processes to resist the technocratic management of Bulawayo’s city spaces.

#### *8.7.5 Protests and Challenging the Negative Characterisation of Street Traders*

While spaces for protest remain closed and heavily suppressed by the state, Bulawayo based street traders’ associations and social movement groups have resorted to various forms of protest to air their dissatisfaction with oppressive urban by-laws and raid operations. These street traders’ associations adopt numerous methods of protests, including marching and picketing, petitioning and occupying of mayoral offices (see Figure 28). One social movement group which is at the forefront of advocating for street traders’ rights to the city of Bulawayo is the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA). According to its mission statement, the sole mandate of WOZA is that of mobilising Zimbabweans, informal traders, in particular, to demand social justice and protection of livelihoods from their elected leaders.

This social movement comprising over 70 000 members that are predominantly women has engaged in nonviolent protests, sit-ins and picketing to avert many raids and evictions directed towards street traders working on city spaces (Ndlovu, 2009). Apart from protesting against evictions and raids which are conducted in total disregard of the citizens’ precarious conditions, WOZA has challenged the city council’s urban policies as not only non-transformative but

unresponsive to the citizen's vulnerability to poverty and social strife. For instance, WOZA has consistently called for the revision of Zimbabwe's Urban Council Act which still retains some colonial forms of governing urban space. Conversely, WOZA has strategically adopted a rights-based legal mobilisation tactic to challenge evictions. It regards the Zimbabwean Constitution as an important litigation tool in asserting their rights to occupy city spaces and earn a living. To this end, WOZA leaders argue that Section 14 of the Zimbabwean Constitution which mandates the state to have "...appropriate and adequate measures are undertaken to create employment for all Zimbabweans, especially women and youth" overrides all other city by-laws that seek to evict those trading on city spaces illegally.

**Figure 29: Members of WOZA Social Movement Group Picketing in Front of the Mayor's Office**



*Magodonga Mahlangu seen in this picture holding a loudspeaker hailer and Jenni Williams (wearing a blue woollen hat) are the two forces behind the street trader's protest and occupation of the Mayor's office in 2013. Photo by Woman of Zimbabwe Arise (2013).*

**Figure 30: A Protest March Organised by WOZA**



*In 2013, WOZA organised a protest march that successfully reversed the city council's decision to evict street traders from Egodini Taxi Rank. The evictions were meant to facilitate the construction of Egodini Mall. Photo by Butholezwe Nyathi (2013).*

While protests and litigations are now becoming important tools that street traders utilise to contest oppressive urban policies, leaders belonging to SWITA, a prominent social movement in Bulawayo felt that there is a need for city authorities to unlearn some of the negative attitudes they have towards informality. For instance, David Moss, an official from SWITA argued that when not supported by educational engagements that dispel stereotypical representations appropriated to street traders, protests and litigations are less effective in averting evictions. He maintained that one of the major objectives of SWITA is that of challenging the negative characterisation of street traders as major contributors of littering in Bulawayo. Similar to Brian and Mkhululi's arguments highlighted in the earlier passages of this chapter, David Moss dismissed the view that street traders have generated a lot of filth within Bulawayo's urban centres. To this end, he regarded this view as stemming from the way street traders are unfairly and negatively profiled by city authorities:

The raids and evictions being conducted by the Bulawayo City Council emanate from a place of ignorance, misinformation, intolerance, and miseducation. For city officials, a street trader whether illegal and legal is someone who breeds rubbish and chaos wherever he or she goes.

They can never characterise a street trader beyond negativity. As you see and already know Bulawayo is a very clean city, so city authorities seem to panic when they see the number of street traders growing every day. They then begin coming up with all sorts of misconceptions about street traders as chaotic, disorganised and causing mayhem in the city. It important that I share this information with you, at SWITA we have a well-functioning sweeping committee that oversees the cleaning of bays and our immediate surroundings, we have a groceries club (stokvel) and a burial scheme (David Moss, SWITA official, Interview, 08 May 2016).

The notion of David Moss' argument was that resisting evictions can never be fully achieved if the whole process of constructing subjectivities is unquestioned or goes unchallenged. Like Foucault, David Moss and his organisation SWITA recognises the important interactions of space and power in producing subjectivities and attitudes that can constraint street traders' identities, restricting their practices of placemaking within the city. By using educational workshops and conducting visit sites with ordinary citizens and government officials, SWITA hopes to create an environment where everyone is allowed to unlearn all the misconceptions that street traders are chaotic and are the reason why Bulawayo is unclean. On one of the educational tours I participated in, we encountered a street trader who belonged to SWITA sweeping off litter from the pavement (see Figure 31, below). An encounter with the sweeping trader somewhat strengthens David Moss' argument that street traders are responsible citizens who make efforts to keep the city spaces tidy and litter-free.

**Figure 31: A Street Trader Sweeping along a Pavement**



*The images above, of a street trader sweeping along the pavement, compel us to rethink the normative classification of street traders as irresponsible citizens that fail to keep the city spaces clean. Photo by Danford Chibvongodze (2016).*

Participating in SWITA's education tour and the subsequent encounter with a street trader sweeping along the pavement (exhibited in Figure 31), impelled me to rethink the normative societal construction of street traders as irresponsible citizens that fail to keep the city spaces clean. Indeed, it is the encounters such as the one I had during the SWITA tour that allows one to reconsider and reject discourses that always associate street traders with "dirt".

## **8. 8 Conclusion**

By employing Foucault's theoretical insights on "governmentality", "politics", Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" and Lefebvre's notion on the "production of space", this chapter examined how the Bulawayo City Council utilises subjectivities to manage street traders' conduct and warehouse informality. The chapter argued that while the Bulawayo city authorities have heavily depended on raids and eviction to control informality, it also relies on softer and less confrontational panoptic and biopolitical methods to govern urban spaces. Consequently, in producing governable bodies, Bulawayo city authorities have utilised billboards, regulatory signs, vending bays and malls to stimulate an urban environment of self-governing citizens that are more responsive in upholding cleanliness and order within city spaces.

While the aforementioned methods of governing Bulawayo's urban space are effective in creating order, they are perceived by some street traders as perpetuating colonial spatial policies that constructed African bodies around notions of "filth" and "dirt", thus restricting their movement and presence in and across urban spaces. For instance, some participants pointed to the 2005 *Operation Murambatsvina*, a government-sponsored initiative that sought to drive out elements of informality as a reincarnation of colonial spatial practices of yesteryears. Using cases of shopping malls such as Entumbane and Nkulumane shopping complexes and the upcoming *Egodini* mall, the chapter also argued that urban renewal projects have not only assisted Bulawayo city authorities attain a "world-class" status but have also been vital in dispelling informality from certain urban spaces. To support this argument, the chapter engages the work of Hentschel (2011) and Ghertner (2011) on the importance of aesthetics in snuffing out urban informality and governing spatial behaviours from a distance.

Although raids and evictions are effective methods of producing governable subjects and exerting top-down control over urban spaces, the chapter argues that these methods have often been met with resistance coming from street traders. Street traders' defiance ranges from subtle



and quiet forms of resistance such as encroaching and reoccupying street pavements when evicted, to more confrontational and bolder actions such as picketing, protesting and occupying mayoral offices. In resisting raids, evictions, and being banished to vending sites, some of Bulawayo's street traders adopt flexible and individualised forms of resistance. Further, some participants felt that raids targeted to illegal street traders present law enforcers with an opportunity to seize goods for personal gain.

To this effect, traders evade raids by using unique techniques such as coded whistles to alert each other of imminent raids. On one hand, the utilising autoconstructed push carts and their bodies as mobile vending sites have provided room for street traders of Bulawayo to challenge the logic of the vending site and the constitutive meaning of urban space. On the other hand, their understanding of the human body as an extension of urban space disrupts the technocratic top- down production of space and warehousing of informality through vending sites. Thus, the street traders' conceptualisation of the human body as part of the urban spatial forms can be read as a form of subaltern urbanism, where Bulawayo's street traders do not necessarily consent to power and the appropriation of space from above.

# **CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUDING THE STUDY: TOWARDS REINTERPRETING AFRICAN URBANISM AND BULAWAYO'S URBAN FUTURE(S)**

## **9.1 Introduction**

The objective of this thesis as stated in the Introduction, was to examine how the informalisation of urban space in the context of Bulawayo's de-industrialisation impacts the way its citizens and city officials understand urbanity, work, and space. To this end, this thesis used the activity of street trading, a crucial component of informality as a lens through which to examine how the production, management and policing of urban space by both city officials and ordinary street traders have intersected and responded to Zimbabwe's "troubled" political economy.

More importantly, the thesis treats street trading and informality in general as important categories for analysing the role of space in the production of governmentality, subjectivity, and urban politics in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Specifically, this thesis uses street trading and informality as units to historically explore how politics has been instrumental in managing and governing Bulawayo's urban spaces. In exploring and interrogating the politics of urban space in Bulawayo, this thesis uses the theoretical works of Foucault, Lefebvre, and Gramsci to not only illustrate the importance of spatial practices in the production of disciplinary power but examine how the process of producing urban space in both colonial and post-colonial Bulawayo has always been a contested terrain.

Further, the research study sought to explore the impacts that street trading and the informal and formal appropriation of urban space has on the lives of those practising it. In examining the impacts of street trading and informality on the lived experiences of Bulawayo citizens, this thesis not only intended to investigate the conditions that have pushed them into street trading, but it also looked at how informality informs their social identities, perception of space and temporality, understanding of labour and everyday survival. Additionally, the thesis sought to examine how urban policies and the top-down appropriation of space as implemented by city authorities and private companies influence the current and future lived experiences of street traders. Accordingly, the thesis looked at the synergies existing between informality and formal businesses.

Using empirical evidence gathered from the interviews and a focus group discussion involving 41 participants comprising street traders, Bulawayo City Council officials, and civil society leaders, this thesis established three major findings that are presented, discussed, interpreted and analysed in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 respectively.

## **9.2 Summary of Findings**

The first major finding which is outlined in Chapter 6 links the informalisation of urban space and proliferation of street trading in Bulawayo to several long term political, economic, social, and geographical processes (see Figure 3). While these processes complement and influence each other, the politico-economic drivers of informality and the intensification of street trading seem to operate at the macro level, while the socio-geographic contributors operate at a micro or individualistic level.

On a large scale, the increase of informality and a defined presence of street trading on Bulawayo's urban space epitomises a three-decade economic meltdown and the disintegration of Bulawayo's industrial complex (Ndiweni et al., 2014; Mlambo, 2017). Consequently, the 30-year long deindustrialisation of Bulawayo has resulted in massive retrenchments, mass unemployment, the disappearance of wage income and increased household vulnerability to poverty which has pushed people into the informal sector. While on a much smaller scale, social and geographical processes relating to familial background, social ties, individual's previous work experience, proximity to neighbouring South Africa and Botswana have been important contributors to the burgeoning of the informal sector and the increased practise of street trading.

The second major finding which is discussed in Chapter 7 suggests that while informality and street trading in particular have permitted Bulawayo citizens to significantly enhance their urban livelihoods and gain control over their labour, temporality, and space, they have also been experienced with conditions of precarity, risk, instability, and frustrations. The third major finding shows that the production and control of urban space in Bulawayo remains a contested terrain between city authorities and street traders. While some street traders have conformed to the logic of formal appropriation of space and technologies of governing urban space such as vending sites, others seek to challenge these instruments and policies of governmentality. Indeed, Chapter 8 of this thesis evinces that some street traders resist occupying vending bays and operate from unregulated urban spaces such as pavements.

Having highlighted the major findings of this thesis, Chapter 9 then intends to offer an integrated interpretation and conclusive analysis of these findings. It relocates the overarching interpretation and analysis back to the literature and theoretical insights discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. This chapter further gives a critical overview of how the empirical findings push us to rethink the intersectionality of urban space, urbanity, precariousness, politics, urban control, and Zimbabwe's political economy. It is important to note that the purpose of this chapter is not that of merely summarising issues and arguments raised in the previous eight chapters, but it also seeks to understand the implications they have on the research questions and objectives posed in Chapter 1.

### **9.3 Rethinking Temporality and the Concept of Time in Bulawayo's Informal City**

The thesis' exploration of Bulawayo's informality offers an opportunity to interrogate the concept of temporality and time in post-work societies. As indicated in Chapter 2, the establishment of a capitalist society and a wage-based economy in Africa depended much on disrupting Africans' relationship with the land (space) and time. Indeed, the dispossession of Africans from their land and the consequent entrenchment of wage labour coincided with the imposition of "...clock-discipline on an African workforce" (Cooper, 1995:237; also see Atkins, 1988). This infiltration of colonial temporal notions on an African labour force persisted in post-colonial Bulawayo as the 8 am-5 pm "*Shayela*" time frame continued to form part of Bulawayo's everyday life (see Mills, 2015:4).

This thesis argues that to a greater extent deindustrialisation compels an ordinary citizen to rethink temporality and the concept of time as it relates to space and labour. For instance, in Chapter 7, the thesis asserted that the disappearance of formal jobs has permitted those informally employed to gain control of their labour through the self-allocation of working hours. Indeed, the flexibility of informal work in terms of working hours has led to ordinary citizens, in this case, street traders to challenge and to a certain degree reject notions of mechanised and rigid arrangements of time that characterise formal work environments. The afore-mentioned assertion is supported by Ndi (2007:169) who notes that those working in the informal sector have challenged the "imperial time"<sup>62</sup> and the formal production of space and

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<sup>62</sup> Ndi (2007) understanding of "imperial time" in relation to industrial or formal labour appears to be consistent with Mills' (2015) conceptualisation of the "*Shayela*" time frame. Both concepts seem to point to the 8am to 5pm or the 9am- to 5pm time frame that normally characterise the world and sociology of work.

have "...sought to exercise control over the means and processes of production by narrating new forms of temporal and physical spaces".

What is remarkable about the street traders' reimagining of temporality and the concept of time is how it plays out on urban space. In Chapter 7, the thesis advances Ndi's (2007) argument to assert that informality has not only altered the conceptualisation of time among Bulawayo's street traders but has changed how the city's spatial form behaves. The thesis argues that street trading with its flexible working hours which go beyond the 5pm "*Shayela*" time frame has permitted Bulawayo's spatial practices and performances to operate around the clock. Indeed, some of the street traders that participated in this study noted that the increase in the volume of street trading has transformed a once-sleepy city into a lively one, pulsating with spatial performances and activities that endures until midnight. Further, the reproduction of time and urban space by ordinary Bulawayo citizens, particularly those that are unemployed functions as an antidote of easing the pain of waiting.

### *9.3.1 Easing the Pain of Waiting*

The thesis asserts that the appropriation of urban space assists the unemployed youth deal with the excruciating pain of waiting for employment and the betterment of life in Zimbabwe. Borrowing from the work of Jefferey (2010) on the politics of waiting and youth unemployment in India, Chapter 7 theorises that Bulawayo's urban informality embodies a form of waiting. Equally, some of the street traders that were interviewed in this study found their work or activities a way of passing time as they wait to acquire formal employment or get an opportunity to migrate to neighbouring South Africa and Botswana. This aforementioned view was commonly expressed by street traders that have attained some form of university or college education. The encroachment of the educated Bulawayo youth-cum- street traders on the city's pavements assists in resolving social alienation and frustrations that come with being an unemployed university graduate. In a broader sense, urban informality and street trading, in particular, have permitted the youth of Bulawayo to undergo a paradoxical existence of "suffering and smiling", to use Chabal's (2009:3) expression. Ultimately, increased visibility of street traders on Bulawayo's urban space has forced its citizens to have a renewed interpretation and outlook of Bulawayo's "cityness" and urbanity.

## 9.4 Reimagining Bulawayo's Urbanity: A City that No Longer Billows Smoke

In Chapter 1, the thesis uses the Ndebele expression “*Kontuthu Ziyathunqa*” [“the city that billows smoke”] to refer to the city of Bulawayo. It then argues that the use of this expression evokes the iconographic representations and imaginations of Bulawayo's past, particularly its industrial complex and emitting thermal towers. While the thermal towers no longer emit smoke, they symbolise Bulawayo's identity, they are a constant reminder to the people of Bulawayo and Zimbabwe in general of how Bulawayo used to be a city of factory work. Conversely, the deindustrialisation of Bulawayo at the backdrop of Zimbabwe's economic malaise has not only led to mass unemployment and the gradual informalisation of Bulawayo's labour force but has also altered the symbolic representation of Bulawayo as a “modern industrial city”. As Bongani Mangena, a city official with the Bulawayo City Council argued in Chapter 6, the collapse of Bulawayo's industrial economy meant that one cannot quite experience the city or urban *sensorium* and “sights” that characterise a typically modern and industrial city. He finds it difficult to imagine that one can refer to Bulawayo as a city when infrastructural development that is normally associated with towering cranes is non-existent.

Perhaps it is important to reiterate Bongani's views on how the lack of development in Bulawayo permits for the reimagining of the city's symbolic representation. As highlighted in Chapter 6, Bongani had this to share with regards to Bulawayo's current state of maldevelopment, “...I have always said if you are in a city [...] I mean if you run across a city and you do not see cranes then there is something wrong [...] something is very wrong. It is very symbolic, very symbolic...” (Bongani Mangena, Interview, 19 May 2016). In retrospect, the symbolic transformation of Bulawayo from being an industrial city to what Mlambo (2017) refers to as a vendor city has also meant that people's perceptions of Bulawayo as a place of work have radically changed. For workers, the consequence of deindustrialisation coupled with the entrenchment of informality has seen its citizens rework their occupational identities and challenge the meaning of work and urban citizenship.

### 9.4.1 *The Wageless and the Educated Precariat*

In Chapter 2, the thesis conducted a historical analysis to show how the embedding of capitalism in African cities depended on the production of African's urban citizenship around the notion of wage labour. To this end, the thesis argues that through the logic of “accumulation by dispossession”, colonialism-cum-capitalism thrived by disrupting Africans' land-based

livelihood thus pushing them into a wage-based urban society (see Fanon, 1963; Harvey, 1978; Soja, 1989; Kaarsholm, 1999 Arrighi et al., 2010). Unsurprising, the uptake of urban citizenship and the formation of spatial identity in capitalist centres such as Bulawayo and others in Africa has always been configured on how wage labour is produced. However, with the diminishing of wage labour in many cities around the globe, the construction of identity around the concept of formal wage labour is becoming insignificant. Indeed, as Bulawayo continues to informalise, its citizens particularly those that have been casualties of retrenchments and are now unemployed, are re-adjusting their perception of what “work” or “employment” means and are now regarding it as any activity that generates income. Further, the rise of a wageless class in Bulawayo has led to an increase in the volume of street trading, precipitating contestations over urban space.

### **9.5 Inviting Lefebvre, Foucault and Gramsci into Bulawayo’s Spatial Contestations**

The thesis adapted Lefebvre, Foucault, and Gramsci’s postulations on power and spatiality to understand the nature of spatial contestations in urban Bulawayo. As a follow-up to the question raised in Chapter 3 of whether the aforementioned theorists’ ideas apply to Bulawayo’s spatial contestations, the thesis finds their insights on power, hegemony, and space pertinent in comprehending Bulawayo’s everyday urban politics. The thesis further finds the encroachment of street traders on undesignated vending spaces and the consequent surge of street traders’ social movements reflective of Gramsci’s views on “subaltern urbanism”. The illegal occupation of urban spaces by some street traders of Bulawayo shows that they do not necessarily need to consent to power in the appropriation of space (see Lefebvre, 1991:11).

By realising that the ordinary too can produce and reproduce space to their accordance, Lefebvre then questions the dominance and relevance of the planning and modernist discourses in the constructing of a city (see Lefebvre, 1991:11; Stanek, 2011:82). Lefebvre (1991) suggests that ordinary space “users” do not necessarily accept all the socio-spatial identities assigned to them by bureaucrats in both conceptualised and lived spaces. This argument appears to feed into the neo-Gramscian discourse, where space is treated as an interface characterised by the battle of ideas and contestation between “users” of space and its planners. Using Gramsci’s approach to spatiality, Jessop (2005) argues that since space is made up of everyday life activities, collective memory, and multiple social identities it becomes a site where various identities compete for dominance. He goes on to assert that “...the naming, delimitation, and meaning of places are always contested and changeable and the coordinates

of any given physical space can be connected to a multiplicity of places with different identities, spatio-temporal boundaries and social significance” (Jessop, 2005:424).

In taking this neo-Gramscian discourse forward, this thesis argues that the informalisation of urban space epitomises contestation in two important ways. Firstly, informalisation of space is radical in the sense that it offers Bulawayo’s urban poor an opportunity to challenge the top-down production of space and at least remake the city to fit the urban form they want. For example, in Chapter 8, the thesis discusses how by imagining their bodies as equivalent to vending sites, some street traders are challenging the limiting and modernist conceptualisation of urban space as only constituting physically constructed infrastructures (rails, roads, buildings, vending bays, parking lots, etc). Secondly, the culmination of informalisation in Bulawayo, in the form of street trading and labour has given street traders a platform to contest the negative “spatial dispositions” that technocrats have conveniently attached to informality. By so doing, ordinary citizens become radicals, reworking the planned city, changing its flows, and spatiality to suit their immediate economic and social needs. The assembling of social relations on Bulawayo’s space and its governmentality are therefore not completely top-down but can be administered from below.

Lefebvre (1991) and Foucault (1994) however warns that the appropriation of urban space from below is only a temporary process that can always be countered by dominant producers of space. In his writings on informal spaces, Lefebvre notes that such spaces can only survive inasmuch as its occupiers fight and fend off any “...forces of homogenisation” that seek to formalise or in the worst case destroy its forms (1991:373). If the “defensive posture” of those occupying informal urban spaces is weak, sooner or later formal urban forms or dominant spaces engulf such spaces shifting the power of spatial appropriation away from the ordinary to the technocrats (ibid). Indeed, in many instances, the Bulawayo city authorities have managed to utilise its policing unit (*oMakhokhoba*) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) to regain control over illegally occupied urban spaces. Moreover, Bulawayo city authorities have depended on the biopolitical exercise of power to reclaim and maintain their dominance on spatial behaviour and how space should be appropriated. Related to its biopolitical governance of urban space, Bulawayo city authorities utilise discourses of “cleanliness”, “modernity” “aesthetics” and vending to regulate informality from a distance.

Although the informal appropriation of urban spaces is disrupted through raids and evictions, street traders have resorted to litigation measures and protest to contest for their right to



appropriate space in the city of Bulawayo. The Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) is one of Bulawayo's social movements that have been critical of the raids and eviction directed to illegal street traders by the city authority. It has appealed to Section 14 of the Zimbabwean Constitution to criticise the raiding and eviction of illegal street traders as defeating the state's commitment to creating a conducive environment that promotes and protects informal employment. Accordingly, WOZA has made use of protests, occupation of mayoral offices, and picketing to advocate for a Bulawayo City Council that is sympathetic and more accommodative to the street traders' immediate needs. For those that cannot contest the city authority through courts, silent encroachment on the city's pavements is regarded as a political act of defiance. Taking from Harvey's (2008) notion of "the right to the city", the pavement encroachers have come to understand the act of illegally occupying pavements to mean more than just simply violating the city's bylaws, but that of generating urgency and agency in the face of urban poverty.

The aforementioned acts of defying the top-down appropriation of space either through litigations or the stubborn re-occupation of urban spaces after evictions challenge the assertion that the less powerful always lack the agency to fight the overbearing and ever permanent exercising of power by ruling elite or technocrats. Indeed, street traders and urban social movements through legal and street politics (quiet encroachment on pavements) processes have somewhat dismantled the city authority's efforts to exclude those it labels illegal from accessing urban resources. In some instances, these acts of defiance have necessitated the city authority to re-evaluate its policies that may intend to eject illegal street traders from Bulawayo's urban spaces. Subsequently, by contesting for their right to the city through courts or by fiercely re-occupying spaces in situations where evictions have been conducted, street traders and relevant urban movements do not only produce agency that dismantles power but forces those in power to be empathetic to their cause.

### **9.6 Informality and the Sympathetic "State"**

The Zimbabwean state has normally been described as being unsympathetic to the plight of street traders and those working in the informal sector. The implementation of Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, for instance, epitomised the application of state repression and a gross violation of Zimbabweans' right to the city. Given Zimbabwe's high unemployment and poverty rates, the unleashing of raids on street traders by the state is generally construed as

being uncaring to the suffering of the urban populace. Further, street traders argue that raids are sometimes used by law officials to solicit bribes and impound goods for personal gain.

However, it is misleading and uncritical to characterise the Zimbabwean “state” as solely bent on demonising informality and chastising street traders. In this study, it is revealed that the city authority, a representative of the Zimbabwean “state” has adopted policies that are accommodative and empathetic to the harsh realities of Bulawayo’s urban life. For instance, the Bulawayo City Council’s Economic Development Officer, Bongani Mangena argued that it is sometimes counter-productive to implement evictions and raids on an already vulnerable group comprising the unemployed. He juxtaposed the increase of informality with Bulawayo’s massive de-industrialisation and the plummeting of its employment rate. Surprisingly, Bongani Mangena argued that faced with the city’s mass unemployment, some officials in the Bulawayo City Council have sometimes embraced informality and adopted policies for its integration in the local economy. For instance, Bongani noted that the Bulawayo City Council promotes local informal trade by inviting street traders to trade at its main offices at the end of every week (see Figure 11).

Similarly, Bulawayo City Council’s Town planner, Themba Msomi argued that the Bulawayo City Council has adopted a lenient stance towards street traders and informality in general. He noted the crucial role street traders occupy in assisting formal businesses and parastatals distribute and market goods and services. In recognising the importance of street trading in tackling unemployment and contributing to the city fiscus, the Bulawayo City Council has revised its urban planning policies to integrate the informal trade into the mainstream local economy. Realising the growing number of street traders and the sheer expansion of the informal sector, the city council has reclaimed abandoned urban spaces converting them into fully serviced vending sites that accommodate the street traders’ immediate needs. For Themba Msomi, the demarcating and servicing of new vending sites speaks to the city council’s efforts to create an inclusive urban environment that seeks to uphold the socio-economic rights of those working in the informal sector.

While some street traders view the state as being predatory to their livelihoods, they seem to understand the state’s compromised position in managing informality. Indeed, the Bulawayo City Council is usually conflicted on how to implement actions that uphold urban bylaws without trampling the economic rights of those that violate such laws. To this effect, the city council has relaxed some of its bylaws to cater to the needs of street traders and the operations

of the informal sector. Perhaps the most important realisation by some of the planning technocrats working at the Bulawayo City Council is the futility of implementing modernist policies in an urban environment that is rapidly informalising and experiencing an economic meltdown. Consequently, the entrenching of urban informality in a city that has undergone de-industrialisation has required Bulawayo's city authorities to re-adjust urban planning policies to be receptive to the informal sector. Accordingly, as an organ of the state, the Bulawayo City Council is now realising that the informality and the self-appropriation of space from below should not be regarded as a deficit but as a unique mode of producing urban space. Tellingly, the reformulation of urban policy to suit the needs of street trading attests to the city authorities' embracing of informality as an important component of Bulawayo's urban future(s).

### **9.5 Contribution of Study: By Way of Conclusion**

This study contributes to the field of critical urban studies scholarship in three ways. Firstly, the study reinforces an understanding and adoption of an African oriented urban theorem and framework that offers renewed insights on Africa's urbanism. Building on Lefebvre's work (1974:1) who argues that space should not be understood only in the "abstract and geometrical" but also in "social" terms, the study utilises the idea of "biological" bodies as being equivalent to concretely produced spaces. Essentially, those that cannot access urban spaces have sought to reproduce their bodies as alternative social infrastructures that replenish urban livelihoods and improve the inflexibility of informal work.

Conceptualising Bulawayo street traders' bodies as extensions of vending sites, for example, encourages us to reimagine African urban spaces and cities as not only made up of unresponsive concrete but also largely constructed around malleable and flexible human infrastructures. This study makes an addition to already existing and emerging tenets on African urban theories and critical urban geography. The exploration of bodies as extensions of vending sites conducted in Chapter 8, for instance, feeds into Simone's (2008) theory on "people as infrastructure". In his theory, Simone (2008) argues that through their bodies and social networks and infrastructures, people produce their own spatial forms to necessitate the flow of resources across the African city.

The study further adds to other emerging ideas on "*cyborg urbanism*" or "*cyborg cities*" which so far has received limited attention (for example see, Gandy, 2005; Desai, 2015; Brito-Henrique et al., 2019). These ideas focus on how the intersectionality of the body and the

physical urban space contributes to the processes of place-making and everyday localised urban practices. Further research can perhaps look at how African urban informality can be juxtaposed in the notions of “*cyborg urbanism*”. Such a research undertaking can address questions on whether cities like Bulawayo, Johannesburg, or maybe Lagos should be regarded as “*cyborg cities*”.

Secondly, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the role of *politics* in the production of space in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. It manages to interweave Foucault and Gramsci’s views on “power” and “hegemony” with Zimbabwe’s urban history to show how the politicisation of “dirt” through racial, gender, and colonial discourses continue to inform the present-day governmentality of Bulawayo’s urban space. Indeed, colonial nuances of “dirt” and “uncleanliness” have been used by the post-colonial Zimbabwean government to expel and abject those that the state deems “undesirable” to occupy urban spaces. Tibaijuka (2005), for example, gives a convincing argument on how colonial modes of producing space played a crucial role in compelling the state to implement “*Operation Murambatsvina*” to drive out those it considered unsuitable for urban life. There are not so many studies that have focused on the politics of dirt, race, and the production of space in Zimbabwe and specifically that of Bulawayo.

Notable works on the “politics of dirt” and its interaction with the governmentality of space in Zimbabwe can be found in the writings of Burke (1996); Jackson (1999) and Dorman (2016). Scholars are demonstrating a renewed interest in how the historical instrumentalization of “dirt” and the enacting of discourses on “cleanliness” occupy an important role in the production of subjectivity and governable urban space in post-colonial Africa. For instance, in her new book, *Histories of Dirt Media and Urban Life in Colonial and Postcolonial Lagos*, Newell (2019) explores how “dirt” in both colonial and post-colonial Nigeria has been utilised as a discourse to justify the inclusion and exclusion of certain social groups from accessing urban spaces and claiming a place in the city.

The material presented in Chapter 2 and 3, provides a good platform to conduct further research on how the historical production of space is intimately intertwined with the production of racial identities and belonging. These future research endeavours might assist in addressing some of the critical theoretical and epistemological questions on identity, space, dirt, and issues on hygiene. For instance, why do South Africans as a collective find it difficult or rather abnormal to envision white people living in shacks? Asked differently, why is it that when black South

Africans occupy the same shacks it is considered a societal norm and a reality that one can easily phantom or readily accept? Scholars such as Burnett (2018) have begun attending to such questions through their writings on “white consciousness”, space and belonging in post 1994 South Africa.

Lastly, this study affords us an opportunity to further explore how the emergence of Africa’s alternative human economies has influenced its urban future(s) in terms of temporality, cityness, space and labour processes. Indeed, the rise of Bulawayo’s informal economy as an alternative to its ailing modern economy has had an impact on the meaning of “work”. On one hand, the concept of work in Bulawayo’s has normatively been understood in terms of wages, defined within mechanical work time (8 am to 5 pm), and security. On the other hand, in an informalising city, the people of Bulawayo have come to redefine “work” to mean any form of economic and social activity that gives one an income and the room to survive the harsh realities of urban unemployment.

In this “make do” or “*Ku Kiya Kiya*” economy, the people of Bulawayo find it difficult or rather alienating to reconcile the Bulawayo of yesteryears which boasted of a massive industrial complex to that of the present dominated by a highly precarious informal economy. While participating in the informal economy provides Bulawayo citizens with considerable control over the production of labour and working time, it offers fewer financial rewards and social protection. However, alternative economies such as that of Bulawayo’s street trade seem to make a considerable contribution to the city’s fiscus and have been utilised by the city’s technocrats to merge and promote the economic synergies between the formal and informal economy. The rapid informalisation of economy and de-industrialisation has also meant that residents are reconfiguring the meaning of Bulawayo’s “cityness”, more so in instances where its modernist appeal and iconographic representation is slowly vanishing. Amidst disappearing modernities, ordinary Bulawayo urbanites have improvised where the industrial city has failed to produce sophisticated social infrastructures and transitional informal spaces that make cities work.

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# Appendices

## Appendix 1

Request for Gatekeeper's letter and ZCIEA's participation in a PhD research study on "Informalities of Urban Space , Street Trading and Urban Policy in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe"

danford chibvongode <danfordchibvo@gmail.com> to wisborn

7/10/15

Dear Wisborn Malaya

Following our telephone conversation, I have attached the supporting documents ie. ( Official request letter, draft gatekeepers' letter, interview guides and informed consent form) for your review and record keeping. I have drafted the gatekeepers' letter for you. Please go through the drafted gatekeepers' letter, if satisfied with its contents kindly insert your logo and put your signature. If you may need any clarity please contact my supervisors, their contact details are as follows: Prof Sarah Bracking email : [bracking@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:bracking@ukzn.ac.za) , telephone e : +27(31)2601544, Prof Richard Ballard email : [richard.ballard@gcro.ac.za](mailto:richard.ballard@gcro.ac.za) telephone : +27 11 717 7282]. Thanks for your cooperation.

Regards

6 Attachments

- Official Letter\_Re...
- Gate keepers res...
- Interview Guide fo...
- Interview Guide fo...
- Informed Consent...
- Brief Sketch of Ph...

## Appendix 2



### ZIMBABWE CHAMBER OF INFORMAL ECONOMY ASSOCIATIONS

10th Floor Chester House  
Cnr Speke Ave. / 3rd St  
Box 3549, Harare, Zimbabwe  
E-mail: zcieazim@gmail.com  
Website: www.zciea.org  
Tel: 794742, 794702, 703093 Fax: 794725

ZCIEA PRESIDENT  
0773 706 775  
psanzvenga@yahoo.com

ZCIEA SECRETARY GENERAL  
0772 361 905  
0712 724 650  
wisbornm@yahoo.com

*All correspondence to be addressed to the Secretary General*

07 July 2015

Mr. Danford Tafadzwa Chibvongodze  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
School of Built Environment and Development Studies  
Durban  
South Africa.

Dear Sir:

**REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT PHD RESEARCH: INFORMALITY  
OF URBAN SPACE, STREET TRADING AND POLICY IN BULAWAYO,  
ZIMBABWE.**

I refer to your letter dated 01 July 2015 on the above-cited subject. I am pleased to inform you that your request to interview our staff and street traders affiliated to the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations in your PhD research study entitled: "Informalities of Urban Space, Street Trading and Policy in the City of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe" is granted. I further grant you permission to conduct your PhD in the CBD areas of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.

Please note that this permission is granted subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. That all information collected from individuals will be done with duly informed consent from the participating individuals and that participation is voluntary.
2. That data provided to the researcher with all personally identifying information such as names, addresses and job titles is removed so that the data cannot be traced to any individual.
3. That the findings of the research will be shared with our organisation.

I take this opportunity of wishing you the best in your studies.



The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations.

*"The Chamber that delivers"*

*For transforming informal economy activities  
into mainstream activities*

# Appendix 3

Request for permission to conduct an academic research and Bulawayo's City Council's participation in a PhD research study on "Informalities of Urban Space , Street Trading and Urban Policy in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe"



People (2)

danford chibvongodze <danfordchibvo@gmail.com>  
to bongiwengwenya

7/20/15

Bongiwe Ngwenya  
bngwenya@citybwo.co.zw



Show details

Dear Bongiwe Ngwenya

I hope I find you well. Kindly find attached documents to support my official request for gatekeeper's permission to conduct research in the CBD area of Bulawayo and to interview staff from the Bulawayo City Council's public relations department. Please let me know when you receive the e-mail.

Thank you so much for your cooperation and enjoy your day.

Kind Regards

...

## 6 Attachments



The attachments section displays six PDF files. Each file has a thumbnail showing a document header with the Bulawayo City Council logo and some text. The titles of the files are: Danford\_Chibvon..., Danford\_Supervis..., Danford\_Chibvon..., Danford\_Chibvon..., Danford\_Chibvon..., and Danford\_Chibvon... (repeated). The thumbnails also show a 'PDF' icon in the bottom left corner.

## Appendix 4



# City of Bulawayo

All Communications  
To be addressed to the  
Town Clerk

Town Clerk's Office  
Municipal Buildings  
Fife Street  
P.O. Box 591  
**Bulawayo**

Tel: (263-9) 75011  
Fax: (263-9) 69701  
Email: [tcdept@citybyo.co.zw](mailto:tcdept@citybyo.co.zw)  
Website: [www.citybyo.co.zw](http://www.citybyo.co.zw)  
Facebook: The City of Bulawayo  
Twitter: @CityofBulawayo  
Call Centre: 08084700 (Ecorer,)  
08004700 (Telone) (09)71290

Our Reference: TNB/AN N6A/103

3 September, 2015

Danford T. Chibvongodze  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
Anglo Residence  
Block 3 Room 15 Glenwood  
**DURBAN**

Dear Sir

**RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH WITHIN  
BULAWAYO CITY COUNCIL ENTITLED "INFORMALITIES OF URBAN  
SPACE, STREET TRADING AND POLICY IN BULAWAYO, ZIMBABWE".**

With reference to your letter dated 15 July 2015, please note that there are no objections to your request to carry out research within Bulawayo City Council premises subject to the following conditions:

- a) You should submit a copy of your research findings including the Executive Summary upon completion of the research exercise.
- b) Council should be indemnified against any accidents/mishaps, which may occur during this period.

Accordingly you may approach any of Council's Service Departments as appropriate for assistance.

Yours faithfully



## Appendix 5

### Interview Guide for Street Traders (Private and Confidential)

#### Questions

1. What is the highest level of your education?
2. When did you start street trading? [How did you get into street trading?]
3. Describe what your day as a street trader is like?
4. Are you registered street trader? If so, please tell me about the registration process?
5. Is street trading your only source of income? If not, what other sources do you have?
6. What commodities do you sell?
7. Where do you source the goods/commodities that you sell?
8. Can you give me a rough estimate of the profits you make per day?
9. How do you move your goods/ commodities to your space of trading?
10. Who allocated you the space that you currently operating from?
11. Have you ever had a formal job? If so, how is it different from street trading?
12. Do you see street trading as a form of occupation or employment?
13. If you are to get a formal job in the near future will you leave street trading?
14. What are some of impacts street trading has on your household?
  - a) What is the size of your household?
15. What are some of the challenges you face as a street trader?
16. Have you ever experienced any form of harassment from the municipal police or the national police? If yes what are some of the tactics you use to evade evictions?
17. What are your views of the raids and evictions of street traders on urban space?
18. How do you think street trading is characterised?
  - a) Do you see unregistered street traders as criminals or conducting an illegal activity?
  - b) Do you consider street trading as a chaotic and backward activity?
19. How would you respond to this statement made by some of the politicians that “Zimbabwe is now a vendor nation”?
  - a) Do you think Bulawayo is now a “city of vendors”?
  - b) Do you still consider Bulawayo as a modern and industrial city?
20. Are you a member of any street traders’ association? If yes which one?
  - a) What have been some of the benefits of belonging to an association?
  - b) What are some of the drawbacks of being part of an organisation?
  - c) Do you hold any meetings?
21. Do you think it is justified for street traders to operate in restricted areas such as the central business district?
22. There has been a debate in Zimbabwe about taxing street traders. Street traders have complained that the tax is exorbitant, yet their work environment seems not to improve. What is your take on this matter?
23. Do you think street traders play a positive or a negative role or both? In what ways?
24. In 2013, the Bulawayo City Council announced that it will evict street traders operating at the Batch Terminal and make way for the construction of a state-of-the-art mall and transport hub consisting of modern vending stalls. Due to contractual delays with contractors, the evictions are yet to be implemented. The
  - a) Are you aware of the proposed construction of the state of art mall and transport hub at Batch Terminus?
  - b) How do you think the construction of a modern mall equipped with vending stall will impacts your work as a street trader?

## Appendix 6

### Interview Guide for Officials from Civic/ Street Traders Organisations (Private and Confidential)

#### Questions

1. Can you give me a brief history of your organisation?
2. What are the objectives of the organisation?
3. Do you have any projects that educate street traders about their rights?
4. How do you engage with the municipality with regards to concerns raised by street traders?
5. What are your sentiments towards the evictions of street traders from some of the urban spaces such as the Basch Commuter Terminal for example?
6. Do you have any campaigns against evictions of street traders? If so
  - a) How do you mobilise people in such campaigns?
  - b) Are they effective in sensitising the government about the plight of street traders?
7. How do you recruit street traders into your organisation?
8. Some say that the informal economy has become Zimbabwe's real economy. Do you agree with such views?
9. Street trading is not only an issue of survival but it also a labour issue. Have you at any point in time engaged the Department of Labour in channelling the grievances of street traders to the state?
10. Do think the municipality has allocated enough space for street traders?
11. What are the ideologies that inform your campaigns and movements?
12. Do you work or engage with other stakeholders apart from the government?
13. How would you as an organisation interpret the increase in the informalisation of urban space as evidenced by the rise of street traders on city spaces?
14. How would your organisation respond to this statement made by some of the politicians that "Zimbabwe is now a vendor nation"?
  - a) Do you think Bulawayo is a "city of vendors"?
  - b) Do you still consider Bulawayo as a modern and industrial city?
15. Does your organisation think it is justifiable for street traders to operate in restricted areas such as the central business district?
16. There has been a debate in Zimbabwe about taxing street traders. Street traders have complained that the tax is exorbitant, yet their work environment seems not to improve. What is the position of your organisation on this matter?
17. Do you think street traders play a positive or a negative role or both? In what ways?
18. In 2013, the Bulawayo City Council announced that it will evict street traders operating at the Batch Terminal and make way for the construction of a state-of-the-art mall and transport hub equipped with modern vending stalls. Due to contractual delays with contractors, the evictions are yet to be implemented.
  - a) What is the position of your organisation on this matter?
  - b) What impacts does your organisation think it will have on the street traders?

## Appendix 7

### Interview Guide for Officials from the Bulawayo City Council (Private and Confidential)

#### Questions

1. Bulawayo is rapidly becoming an informal city as seen with the intensification of street trading on city spaces. Do you have any policy in place to address the increasing number of street traders?
2. How much space do you allocate annually to street traders?
3. Can you please enlighten me on the registering process of street traders?
4. How would you describe the city of Bulawayo in terms of Economic Development?
5. What do think about the use of raids and evictions as a strategy of controlling informality?
6. Has the municipality at any given stage engage with street traders and representatives from street traders' organisations?
7. There have been arguments from some commentators that most municipalities in Zimbabwe are still using outdated colonial by-laws to deal with current problems such as informality, which in most cases are insensitive of the plight of the urban poor. Does the Bulawayo City Council see itself as having that predicament?
8. There has been a debate in Zimbabwe about taxing street traders. Street traders have complained that the tax is exorbitant yet their work environment seems not to improve. What is the position of the Bulawayo City Council on the tax issue?
9. How much revenues are generated from the levy collected from street traders working from stalls erected by the municipality<sup>63</sup>?
10. Street traders have always been characterised in a negative way. Now that street trading is the common form of survival in Bulawayo. In what way does the municipality perceive street traders?
11. Could you tell me about the proposed construction of a mall and transport hub at the Batch Terminus- a space currently occupied by street traders?
  - a) How will the construction of a mall and transport hub impact on the street traders currently using that space?
  - b) Are there any measures put in place by the Bulawayo City Council to accommodate street traders that might face a temporal eviction from the Batch Terminal when the construction of the mall does begin?
12. Do you think street traders play a positive or a negative role or both? In what ways?

---

<sup>63</sup> Note that I use Bulawayo City Council and municipality interchangeably.

## Appendix 8

### Informed Consent Form (Private and Confidential)

(To be read out by researcher before the beginning of the interview. One copy of the form to be left with the respondent; one copy to be signed by the respondent and kept by the researcher.) My name is Danford Tafadzwa Chibvongodze (student number 211551117). I am doing research on a project entitled “Informalities of Urban Space, Street Trading and Policy in the City of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe”. This project is supervised by Professor Sarah Bracking and Professor Richard Ballard based at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal and University of the Witwatersrand, respectively. Should you have any questions and need more information about the research project the contact details of my supervisor are as follows:

Prof Sarah Bracking  
School of Built Environment and Development Studies  
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.  
Tel: +27 31 2601544.  
Email: bracking@ukzn.ac.za

Thank you for agreeing to take part in the project. Before we start I would like to emphasize that:

- your participation is entirely voluntary;
- you are free to refuse to answer any question;
- you are free to withdraw at any time.

The interview will be kept strictly confidential and will be available only to members of the research team. Excerpts from the interview may be made part of the final research report. Do you give your consent for: (please tick one of the options below)

- Your name, position and organisation, or
- Your position and organisation, or
- Your organisation or type of organisation (please specify), or
- None of the above

Please sign this form to show that I have read the contents to you.

----- (signed) ----- (date)  
----- (print name)

Write your address below if you wish to receive a copy of the research report:



Appendix 9

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR RESEARCH STUDENTS

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made between the City of Bulawayo (hereinafter referred to as Council) of the one part and Mr/Mrs/Miss DANFORD I CHIBVONGODZE (Full names) I.D Number OR-798175 H-18 hereinafter referred to as "researcher" of the other part.

Contact Address UK2N, ANGLO RESIDENCE BLOCK 3 ROOM 15, GLENWOOD DURBAN

Student Number 211551117

Name of Educational Institution UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

Telephone/Mobile number +27 79 730 8692

Faculty HUMANITIES

Department BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

This agreement witness that:

1. The Researcher agrees not to divulge any information which he/she gains as a result of his/her research at Council department/s.
2. The Researcher agrees to indemnify the Council against any injury that may occur to her/him during the Course of the research with the Council.
3. The Researcher will submit a copy of his/her research findings, including the executive summary upon completion of the project to the Council.
4. The Researcher agrees that all costs relating to the research project will be met by him/her and Council has no obligation in this regard.

Signed on behalf of Council this.....Day of.....20.....

As witness

- 1.....
- 2.....

Council official

Signed at Bulawayo City Council by the researcher this 18<sup>th</sup> day of August 2015

1. K. Shumba
2. C. Chumbura

D.T. CHIBVONGODZE

Researcher

Educational institution

- ❖ The Education institution **Agrees without failure** that their students submit a copy of the executive summary of their research findings to Council upon completion of their research study.

Signed on behalf of the institution

SCHOOL STAMP

**School of Built Environment & Development Studies  
University of KwaZulu-Natal  
Shepstone Building  
Howard College Campus  
Durban, 4041 South Africa**

## Appendix 10

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18 January 2016

Mr Danford Tafadzwa Chibvongodze 211551117  
School of Built Environment and Development Studies  
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Chibvongodze

Protocol reference number: HSS/1807/015D  
Project title: Informalities of Urban Space, Street Trading and Policy in the City of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

### Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received 27 November 2015, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

**PLEASE NOTE:** Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

.....  
Dr Shenuka Singh  
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

Cc Supervisor: Prof Sarah Bracking & Prof Richard Ballard  
Cc Academic Leader Research: Dr Cathy Sutherland  
Cc School Administrator: Ms Lindile Danisa

---

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee


Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)

Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building

Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000

Telephone: +27 (0) 31 260 3587/8360/4557 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 260 4609 Email: [ximbac@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:ximbac@ukzn.ac.za) / [snymann@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:snymann@ukzn.ac.za) / [mohunp@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:mohunp@ukzn.ac.za)

Website: [www.ukzn.ac.za](http://www.ukzn.ac.za)



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Founding Campuses: Edgewood Howard College Medical School Pietermaritzburg Westville

---