

Surviving Marginalization in Development-Induced Displacement in Zimbabwe: A Case Study of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project.

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DEDICATION

Firstly, I dedicate this academic work to the Lord Almighty, the creator of humanity. I have achieved this because of His abundant grace.

Secondly, this study is dedicated to the late Amai Mugombwi and my father Mahito Nhodo. I wish you were here Sisi and Baba to see your wishes fulfilled in a greater way;

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
AOA	Actor Oriented Approach.
BACOSI	Basic Commodities Supply Intervention
BHASO	Batanai HIV and AIDS Support Organisation
DA	District Administrator.
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Program
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GZU	Great Zimbabwe University
HIV	Human Immune Virus
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
JAMBANJA	Revolution
MDC A	Movement for Democratic Change Alliance
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
RTGS	Real Time Gross Service
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs	Small to Medium Enterprises
UKZN	University of KwaZulu Natal
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

USD	United States Dollar
VSL	Village Savings and Loan
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZESA	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority
ZIPWLMA	Zimbabwe Parks and Wild Life Management Authority
ZRCS	Zimbabwe Red Cross Society

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the state-people relations in the Tokwe-Mukosi dam project and the subsequent displacement in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. It dwells on the implications of the displacements on social networks and local institutions. It then proceeds to look at the adaptation mechanisms deployed by the flood victims in the new environs. Emphasis is made on the significance of livelihood assets, social capital, social networks and local institutions in dealing with marginalization. The study was grounded in qualitative methodology and participant observation, unstructured interviews, Focus Group Discussions and secondary sources of data were used as data gathering techniques. The study is actually based on the actual narratives of the Tokwe Mukosi people derived from twelve months of research at Chingwizi. Findings point to ambivalent relations between the Tokwe Mukosi people and the state. Of note is the fact that from the state's perspective, the displacements are necessary in the interest of 'the greater good' and development. Conversely for the affected villagers, these displacements can never be justified since they had adverse effects on their livelihoods, social networks, local institution, as well as their social wellbeing. This has culminated in an unpalatable impasse between the residents and the state in this development-displacement paradox.

Of note is the fact that despite enormous interest on the plight of the Tokwe Mukosi people nationally and internationally, research tended to evaluate them as passive victims of the state. The study nonetheless reveals that the Tokwe Mukosi people are far from becoming passive victims of their situation. The aptitude of the displaced people of Tokwe Mukosi to act based on agency is very clear in their ability to resist perpetual relocations at Chingwizi, as reflected in this study. In the same philosophy, the findings reveal their capacity to mobilize local resources to build resilience in the post displacement milieu. Central to their survival is a cocktail of livelihood assets, social capital and social networks. I highlighted that a significant number of the displaced people are falling back on local institutions. Emphasis was on how they are mobilizing and or creating new local institutions to build resilience. I also argued that their strategies for survival range between individual strategies and collective responses. These

responses are enabling them to deal with the evacuated futures, and to continue aspiring for better life in the hostile and marginalized environment. I however argue that many of the livelihood options adopted by the residents in question border on immorality, illegality and criminality. Nevertheless, the displacee status becomes the sanctifier of those anti-social and immoral strategies. The thesis also revealed that the livelihood options for the Tokwe Mukosi people are binary in nature. This means that they are either survivalists, or they are more sustainable in orientation. Findings also revealed that the Tokwe Mukosi people have been surviving for more than half a decade with very little state protection, but there is always a danger of justifying the state's inaptness under the guise of agency. The research highlighted that some residents are actually suffering from the unintended consequences of intended actions (survival strategies). In this study, I triangulated the Sustainable Livelihood Framework, the Actor Oriented Approach and the social capital theory to analyze the findings made herein. Complimentary concepts like legibility, strategic essentialism, capacity to aspire, times and the futures are also used to have a nuanced understanding of the Tokwe Mukosi people as rational calculative and strategic actors.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the reader to the study, and it shows the major focus of the study. Firstly, it chronicles the historical background to the dams and displacement paradox from the global, regional and local narrative. The central concern is to situate the Tokwe Mukosi experience within the said contexts. The chapter goes on to show the statement of the problem and the significance of this study, highlighting the knowledge gaps that the study seeks to fill. It then proceeds to show the study objectives and the research questions asked in this study. Lastly, it shows the structure and outline of the thesis.

1.2 Prologue

This study focused on a big dam project in Zimbabwe and how it impacted on the livelihoods of the Tokwe Mukosi community. It goes further to explore the various strategies adopted by the victims of the dam project to deal with vulnerability in the absence of the state and external assistance. Central to this study is the significance of social capital, social networks, local institutions and various livelihood assets, which the villagers deploy for protection within the community. It moves away from the orthodox view of dam projects and displacements where the affected persons are evaluated as passive victims. This will be achieved by considering agency and how the “victims” devise their own ways to deal with vulnerability and social exclusion; that is protection from below. This is also known as community based protection, which is largely dependent on the victims’ internal social norms, resources and power dynamics (Rosenberg 2016). This is predicated on the realization that in the absence of state and other externally driven protection (as is the case in Zimbabwe), local communities become the first and last providers of security and protection from shocks in forced displacements (Ruseel 2016).

From the outset, it should be underscored that there is no development intervention programme in Zimbabwe that has been nuanced by controversy than the involuntary displacement of the Tokwe Mukosi people to pave way for the construction of the biggest inland dam in Zimbabwe. The paradox is that based on the government's perspective, this initiative is imperative since it facilitates efficient and sustainable agriculture, ecotourism, hydroelectricity generation, as well as massive job creation for the locals (Government Engineering Department 2015). This quantitative definition of development entails that the needs and aspirations of the local communities can be sacrificed for the "greater good". Thus, socially and culturally, this dam project remains polemical since aspects that are pertinent to the locals such as livelihoods, social networks and local institutions have been pushed to the margins. What is emerging is that the government of Zimbabwe is practically taking a top-down approach to the relocation programme, without meaningful participation of the local people. Consequently, the locals are being perceived as sponges of the said developmental initiative. This is resulting in an ambivalent relationship between the state, local authorities, local institutions and the villagers. This dire situation has pushed the said relocation exercise into an arena of struggle where different actors contest to survive in view of the social marginalization that came with the relocations, albeit with little or no state assistance. It is evident that the contestations and conflicting life-worlds in the Tokwe Mukosi dam project are invariably having negative implications on the sustainability and acceptability of the programme at the local level, despite its publicized qualities.

1.3 Background to the Study

1.3.1 Dam projects and displacements: A global overview.

Forced displacements of villagers as a result of development and dam projects is not a novel issue. Internationally, the Three Gorges of 1993 in China is undoubtedly the biggest and most popular water project. The potential benefits envisioned by the designers of this dam project include hydroelectricity generation, flood protection and significant improvement for the river navigations (Gleick 2009). This dam project culminated in the forced movement of over 6

million villagers. In addition, these forced displacements resulted in a wide range of economic, political and social problems in China (see Gao 2009). Thus, Gleick (ibid) posits that the Three Gorges in recent times has become one of the most controversial development projects owing to its severe economic, social and environmental impacts. In the Indian context, it is estimated that over 20 million residents have been forcibly displaced in development related projects, and at least 65% of those displaced emanated from dam projects (Dwivedi 1999). It is also believed that over 3 300 large dams have been constructed resulting in controversial forcible relocations of citizens in India. The Narmada experience in the early 1990s is however the most striking example in those Indian dams, leading to the displacements of over 42000 families (Gates 2012). The Sardar Sarovar under the Narmada dam project in the Indian context becomes a classic example of a developmental project that is said to be in the 'national interest' or 'public good'. Herein the philosophy is that the dam project would benefit millions, minutely disadvantaging a few people by bringing water for domestic use, irrigation and hydroelectricity generation. For Flood (1998), the said benefits are couched in the utilitarian way of thinking which centers on balancing the needs of the majority against the minority. What it means therefore is that issues that are fundamental to the people who were directly affected by the developmental project are pushed to the margins.

In Africa, it is estimated that close to 400 000 people have been displaced owing to big dam projects that have been constructed for various reasons. (Chris de Wet 2 000). In Egypt and Sudan, the Aswan High dam project is a very good example of development-induced displacement. This water project led to the displacement of 100 000 farmers in those two nations between 1963 and 1969 (See Cernea 1990). In West Africa, Lassailly-Jacob noted that in the Ivory Coast, the Kossou dam construction led to the relocation of 75 000 residents in 1970. In Ghana, there is the Akasombo dam and the Kpong dams which produced a combined figure of 86 000 villagers from 1963 up to 1981(Adu-Aryee 1993). Overall, these dam projects managed to achieve the targeted goals such as provision of hydroelectricity and irrigation, but they have been instrumental in marginalizing the same people that are expected to benefit from these developmental projects, that is those that have been defined by architects of development as 'people in the way of progress' (Chris de Wet ibid).

In Southern Africa, it is unpalatable to talk of dam projects and displacements without alluding to the Cabora Bassa dam project in Mozambique. It was constructed in the 1970s by the colonial government in Mozambique, ultimately becoming the 5th largest dam in the world at that time (Isaacman and Isaacman 2013). Some of the much publicized benefits that would be realized from this dam project included mining, irrigation, transport and communication. Nevertheless, like many dam projects in Africa, the Cabora Bassa dam project did not only fail to ameliorate poverty and promote sustainable development but also put the lives of the poor in danger (Isaacman and Isaacman *ibid*). Still in Southern Africa, reference can also be made to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project of 1995, which is one of the largest water projects in Southern Africa. This huge dam project was funded by many partners including the South African government and the World Bank. Its aim was to provide electricity and water to South Africa and Lesotho (Mashinini 2010). This dam project led to the displacement of more than 320 households. The paradox however is that local farmers, their villages, land, burial sites and livelihoods were sacrificed in the quest for ‘greater good’ (Hitchcock 2010). It should be underscored that these projects clearly fall under development-induced displacements, and they are different from political refugees or disaster induced refugees (Hague 2004). Development induced displacement is a situation whereby individuals or communities are forced to move out of their homes or places of residence to pave way for economic development (Bose 2003).

1.3.2 Forced displacement in Zimbabwe: A colonial and post-colonial overview.

In the Zimbabwean context, forced displacements of residents as a result of developmental programs such as mining, bio-fuels, extraction of natural resources, formal housing and dam construction are not a unique feature. Hammer (2008) notes that violent displacements of many forms, preceding one another across time and space have littered the Zimbabwean history. This history of violent displacements dates back to the colonization of Zimbabwe by the British in the 1890s. During that time, a significant number of ‘natives’ were rendered landless and moved into the barren native reserves. The move was legitimized by the promulgation of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. It was subsequently followed by the Land tenure Act of 1969, leading to the genesis of what Mutepfa et al (1998) describe as institutionalized violence. This is

a scenario whereby the state unleashes violence against the ordinary citizens whenever its policy or policies are under threat. These displacements had a net effect of dislocating Africans from their land, and this directly impacted on the lives of the 'natives' whose land was the key source of livelihood and wellbeing. In addition to that, between 1956 and 1959, the colonial government in Zimbabwe heinously displaced the Gwembe Tonga people from the ecologically productive Zambezi river plains to pave way for the hydropower generation project in the Kariba Dam, under the auspice of the World Bank. Over and above electricity generation, other benefits to be realized in this massive dam project included reservoir fisheries and tourism. The institutionalized violence against the minority group culminated in the dislocation of over 57 000 inhabitants from their major sources of livelihoods, cultural and religious practices (see Mashingaidze 2013). This clearly marked the dawn of social exclusion of the Gwembe Tonga people from the mainstream economy, and they continue to survive on the margins in the post independent Zimbabwe political economy (also see Scudder 2005).

The aforementioned institutionalization of violence ironically continues to inform the relocation programs in post independent Zimbabwe. Following the said approach in the year 2000, there were massive displacements of white farm owners and farm workers orchestrated by the war veterans and ruling party ZANU PF supporters under the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP). These violent displacements were legitimized by the party's proclamation for radical land reform and the long standing promise for land rationalization in post independent Zimbabwe. It was believed that this would help to achieve the bifurcated goal of decolonization and socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding the moral, economic and political necessities, these forced displacements led to the loss of production, livelihoods and food security in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye 2006). Nevertheless this position is contradicted by the findings made by Scoones et al (2014) who opine that this programme was relatively successful in many facets.

Between the year 2005 and 2006, the government embarked on the infamous and highly militarized Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order). Officially, the operation was aimed at purging illegal structures, vendors, criminal elements, small business owners, and tuck-shop owners, as well as removing filth in major cities and towns. Many of these elements were

grossly blamed for stealing foreign currency from the state, creating health hazards and operating illegally (Hammar 2008). Notwithstanding the official discourse, the move was a highly political one as it appeared to target the urban electorate for voting against the ruling ZANU PF party in the preceding plebiscite (see Tibaijuka Report 2005 and Sachikonye 2006). The operation is estimated to have cost over 700 000 residents their homes and livelihoods, drifting the nation into a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. In response, a significant number of affected urbanites migrated to rural areas as part of the many survival gambits adopted by the vulnerable people in the absence of state assistance. What is apparent is that like the preceding displacement programs, the government took a technical approach to relocation albeit with lack of resources and proper planning, as well as significant participation of the affected populations.

The violent relations between the state and victims of forced displacements have also been documented succinctly by Hove et al (2014). They noted that in 2007, the government embarked on yet another atrocious operation known as operation *Chikorokoza chapera* (Operation no to panning), which aimed at flushing out illicit trade in mineral such as gold and diamonds. This operation negatively impacted on the livelihoods of many informal miners in Zimbabwe who were falling back on informal mining in the absence of formal employment. In the year 2011, the state followed this with yet another involuntary displacement of the Chiadzwa people from the Marange diamond fields in Manicaland province to pave way for the efficient and formal diamond mining. In this relocation program, it undertook to relocate close to 4 300 Marange families to ARDA Transau in Odzi. This culminated in yet another humanitarian crisis, which was epitomized by the use of institutionalized violence through the repressive state apparatus. What is evident is that the crisis was a manufactured problem because the government took a top-down approach to the relocation exercise, thereby glossing over the fundamental socio-cultural questions affecting the locals. These include the impact of the relocations on social institutions, social networks and livelihoods in general. These socio-cultural fundamentals form the foundation of this study.

Between the year 2012 and 2013, there was yet another developmental programme, which led to massive displacements of people in the Chisumbanje area in Manicaland and the Nuanetsi Range

in Mwenezi. These displacements were marshaled by the government working in cahoots with large conglomerates who were investing in bio-fuels and crocodile farming respectively. From a technical and quantitative dimension, the programme was comprehensive as it was expected to foster the much needed investment, generation of foreign currency and job creation for the said villagers. As has always been the case, the relocations lacked proper planning, and the villagers were ruthlessly given only a month to vacate the areas. These displacements clearly led to a serious impairment of the villagers' livelihoods in those two areas. Responding to the use of violence in these relocations, Mutopo et al (2013) argue that the major problem when it comes to displacements is that government's response is affected by political expedient imperatives that are regarded as more significant than the actual issues confronting the autochthonous people. For Madhihlare (2013), these displacements led to the loss of livelihoods as well as the socio-cultural and economic status of the affected villagers. Based on this case, it is evident that social inequalities between development beneficiaries and those expected to bear the brunt of development costs are not addressed in Zimbabwe (see Flood 1998).

The involuntary displacement at Tokwe Mukosi dam is the latest in a series of displacements carried out by the Government of Zimbabwe. Of note is the fact that the construction of the dam which is the precursor to said relocations has been ongoing since 1998, and the idea actually dates back to the colonial era. The Tokwe Mukosi dam is situated in Chivi district in Masvingo province, just below the Runde catchment area. Upon its completion, the dam, from the government's perspective, would ultimately become the biggest domestic dam in Zimbabwe, taking over from Lake Mutirikwi. The aim for the construction of the dam was to ensure that there was sufficient and reliable generation and supply of electricity; whilst simultaneously facilitating irrigation for the local communities and sugarcane estates in the southern parts of Zimbabwe (Government Engineering Department 2015). As has been the tradition, the government from the beginning did not consider the social cultural dynamics involved in the relocation since it focused more on the technical matters including compensation for the affected villagers in financial terms. It conceptualized the affected villagers as passive entities, thereby ignoring the fundamental internal aspects. These include the possible impact of the relocations on local institutions, social networks, livelihoods, as well as how the affected residents respond to such developments as rational, knowledgeable and strategic actors. This therefore becomes the

major focus of the study in an attempt to illuminate a complete picture of the displacements in Tokwe Mukosi.


The areas affected by the massive dam construction and the subsequent flooding include but are not limited to Mushawasha, Chiredzi, Chivi and some parts of Masvingo district. Following the technical approach to relocations, the government aimed at relocating the said villagers in three phases. The first phase aimed to move 1 247 families that were perceived to be in danger by the year 2013. The second phase targeted 1 878 perceived to be at risk by October 2014. The final phase focused on 3 268 families, mainly to protect the dam since these families would be in the buffer zone (Government Engineering Department 2012).

Notwithstanding the hazy element of planning, the Government of Zimbabwe does not command the requisite resources to move and compensate the affected villagers, thus very little was done in terms of meeting the projected figures. In the year 2014, the dam wall partially collapsed, culminating in severe flooding. A huge number of villagers particularly in Chivi south district were facing overwhelming floods. The flooding swept away livestock, infrastructure, agricultural projects, and human lives were in serious danger. As a palliative measure, the affected villagers, through the use of the army and the police, were forcibly moved to the inhabitable Mufula, Chisase, Chingwizi and Masangula areas in Mwenezi. The conditions in the holding camps, particularly Chingwizi are deplorable and up to this day the government is struggling to provide day to day basic necessities as well as resources to move a significant number of the villagers from the holding camps to their new territories.

The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that the victims have come to view the holding camps as far much better than the new plots allocated to them by the government. As a result, the villagers are resisting the movement from the transit camps to the designated plots. In response, the government is resorting to the common culture of violence against the victims albeit with serious resistance from below. This has arguably led to one of the most serious humanitarian crises the post independent Zimbabwean government has had to contend with. The paradox is that the flood victims have eventually become state victims, whereas the social contract stipulates that the state has the obligation to protect the affected citizens (Hove 2016). Against

this backdrop, this study dwells on the essential social cultural aspects in the forced displacement since they have been overlooked by both the state and previous researchers. It analyses the political nature of the state-people relations in the relocation exercise. By privileging the voice of the insignificant other, the study shall also assess the villagers’ vulnerability, adaptation and resilience in view of their untimely displacements. Last but not least, it shall consider the implications of the said displacements on the social networks, local institutions and livelihoods, as well as how the villagers as active social actors respond to their predicament. Emphasis will also be on how they mobilize social capital, social networks and local institutions to shake off the ‘victim’ status. Fig 1 below shows and Area Map of Displacement areas (Ward 22, 24 and 31-Chivi District) and Destination area (Ward 13-Menezi District).

Figure 1: Area Map Showing Displacement and Destination areas



Source- Author’s creation (2019)

1.4 Statement of the problem.

Traditionally, research on migration has mainly focused on the trifurcated areas, specifically international migration, xenophobia and the refugee problem. This has had an unintended consequence of pushing IDPs to the margins of social research. Nevertheless, in recent times, there has been a refreshing interest in the need to consider the plight of IDPs within the subfield of forced migration. Much as I acknowledge that there has been an increasing board of literature on IDPs and more specifically development-induced displacement, the fallacy is that research

has tended to be confined to the disaster period. Thus, the ‘victims’ have inadvertently become invisible in the post disaster situations. What it means therefore is that there is dearth of literature on the experiences of the displacees in post disaster environs like the Tokwe Mukosi experience. To contextualize this type of experience, in the Zimbabwean context, there is voluminous literature on the worrying conditions of the Tokwe Mukosi people in the aftermath of the flooding and the ensuing displacement (see Human Rights Watch, 1015, Hove 2016, Ndimande and Moyo 2018, Zikhali 2018 and Chazireni and Chigonda 2018, Benhura 2019). To this end, the general trend is that there is lack of academic scholarship on the positive post disaster experiences of the displaced persons. The humanitarian community has further compounded the situation by making such situations a development industry (Powel and Seddon 2007). To buttress this position, the invisibility and perpetual push of the Tokwe Mukosi people to the margins is reflected in the state’s approach to development. Of note is the recent development where the state is seized with the implementation of the proposed master plan for the Tokwe Mukosi dam, pointing to the thrive of quantitative development over qualitative development. Academic research has also shifted in the same direction. Thus academic institutions have been tasked to come up with contributions to the master plan, albeit with no reference to the displacees. In addition, academic research on the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and displacement has almost entirely focused on the displacees as passive ‘victims’ of their social situation. This study however moves away from this ‘black hole’ by dissecting the stratagems adopted by the people in question to paradoxically move from the ‘victims’ status to survivors. This is in the backdrop of six years after their dislocation from their ancestral land and the associated livelihoods. Thus, the study focuses on the how the displacees deploy agency in their encounters with the state, quasi state institutions and local institutions. The study also focused on the significance of social capital, social networks, livelihood assets and local institutions to deal with marginalization with very little support from the state for the Tokwe Mukosi people.

1.5 Significance of study

This study is significant because there is a realization that internal displacements such as the Tokwe Mukosi remain a very serious challenge confronting researchers and the humanitarian

community. The reason behind this is that internally displaced persons are not properly identified and protected, leaving them more vulnerable and marginalized compared to the more common refugees (See Holms 2008). It is also worthy to note that Internally Displaced Persons escape the attention of the national and international community as well as researchers once the disaster is over, making the displaced communities invisible victims. In the Zimbabwean context, a significant number of studies have been done on involuntary migration, but they either focused on international migration or took a technical and managerial approach to forced displacements. Mashingaidze (2013) and Mombeshora and Le Bel (2009) offer great insights into the internal involuntary displacements, from a people centered view. Nonetheless, they were responding to the dynamics that took place in colonial Zimbabwe. The post-colonial era in Zimbabwe undoubtedly provides novel dynamics worth exploring compared to the colonial context, lending credence to a study that focuses on post-colonial dynamics in dam project and displacement from a people centered perspective.

This study is also significant in the sense that most of the studies done globally and regionally were done in the context of relatively stable political and economic systems, wherein the state has the capacity to provide minimum support for the displaced communities as stipulated by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacements of 1998 and 2004. Notable examples include the Three Gorges in China, Narmada in India, Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Cabora Bassa in Mozambique *inter alia*. The Zimbabwean and Tokwe Mukosi experience is unique because the government is incapacitated to provide the required minimum support, owing to a litany of political and economic misfortunes bedeviling the nation. Moreover, owing to the sour political relations between Zimbabwe and the international community, the international donor community has not been forthcoming to provide protection for the displaced Tokwe Mukosi community in line with the dictates of the Kampala convention. Of note is the fact that Article 5(2) of this convention provides that in situations where the state is the perpetrator or violets the same, the international community should be the guarantor of such rights. This senario has inexorably left the displaced communities more vulnerable, forcing them to rely on community based protection with little or no support at all from the government and other local institutions. It should also be noted that within the academic and humanitarian

communities, displaced persons have been erroneously evaluated from a victimhood perspective, meaning they are unable to help themselves without external support. Consequently the displaced persons have been regarded as *tabularassas*. Responding to this parochial narrative, Andersson et al (2013) posit that literature in many cases patently misrepresents displaced persons, normally labeling them as victims or beneficiaries in their interactions with the state and other agencies. Another reason for the limited interest in what the displaced communities do for themselves is the wrong philosophy that these persons lack assets to deal with their social predicament. Accordingly, interest has almost always been on how to reduce their poverty and marginalization (Mararike 2011). This study moves away from this standpoint by focusing on how the victims devise means of survival as rational calculative and strategic actors. This is because the Tokwe Mukosi villagers are not merely peripheral in the whole displacement process or more appropriately they are not passive victims of their circumstances. It becomes necessary to look at these displaced persons as both victims and capable actors of social change, and how they build resilience in response to their predicament (Majidi and Hennion 2014).

Displacement inevitably stimulates unexpected survival strategies, adaptation and resilience. It is not only the gatekeepers, beneficiaries and perpetrators of forced displacements who possess agency, but also those adversely affected by the same process (Hammar et al 2010). Thus, taking a people centered approach as its axis, this study dwells on the micro-politics surrounding the relocation exercise at Tokwe Mukosi. It assesses the implications of the relocation exercise on social networks and social institutions, as well as how they use social networks and social institutions to deal with their predicament. In addition, the study focuses on the impact of the program on rural livelihoods and social security. By factoring in human agency, the study shall consider the vulnerability, adaptation and resilience of the said community in view of the detrimental effects of the calamity that befell them. Interest on how the displaced persons mobilize local resource for adaptation is also premised on the realization that the Tokwe Mukosi people cannot be given survival strategies, but they ought to survive and develop themselves, based on their social conditions (Mararike *ibid*).

1.6 Objectives of the study.

The ensuing study hinged on the impact of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project on the social institutions, social networks and livelihoods of the Tokwe Mukosi people in Zimbabwe. By factoring in human agency, it went on to look at how these social actors use local institutions, social networks and various livelihood assets for adaptation and building resilience in the alien territories. To achieve this, the following specific objectives became necessary.

- To examine the people-state relations in the forced displacements of the Tokwe Mukosi people.
- To analyse the implications of the forced displacements on the social networks of the Tokwe Mukosi community.
- To assess the impact of forced displacements on local institutions and how the victims use local institutions to deal with adversities.
- To examine the Tokwe Mukosi people's vulnerability, adaptation and resilience to forced displacements.
- To evaluate the significance of social capital in the adaptation to forced displacement among the Tokwe Mukosi displacees.

1.7 Key questions asked

The study was informed by the following questions

- What are the contestations and conflicting life worlds surrounding the relocations of the Tokwe Mukosi people?
- What is the position of the state on the relocations of the Tokwe Mukosi people and what are the effects and consequences?
- How have the livelihoods of the Tokwe Mukosi people been affected by the relocations?
- Which adaptation and resilience strategies do they adopt to deal with their situational exigencies?
- How sustainable are the livelihood strategies adopted by the Tokwe Mukosi flood 'victims'?

- What is the place and significance of social capital and social networks among the affected villagers?
- What is the impact of forced displacements on local institutions and how do they use local institutions to deal with their challenges?
- What are the experiences of vulnerable groups in the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and displacement?
- Which other cultural aspects and identity markers are necessary for survival among the Tokwe Mukosi people?

1.8 Structure and outline of the thesis.

Chapter 1: Introduction/background

This chapter provides the background to the study and introduces the research problem, broad problems to be addressed and research questions. It also provides the significance and objectives of the study, and concludes by giving the limitations and delimitations of the study.

Chapter 2: Conceptual and theoretical frameworks

In tandem with the researcher's desire to move away from the victimhood approach which is dominant in studies in forced displacements, the chapter triangulates the Actor Oriented Approach, the Sustainable Livelihood Framework and Social Capital Theory. Other complementary concepts like legibility, evacuation of the immediate future and strategic essentialism will be referred to in the data analysis chapters. This also helps to unravel the complexities of the forced displacements and the capacity of the affected villagers to deal with their own situations as rational and strategic actors.

Chapter 3: Literature review

This chapter provides a relevant literature review on the topic; it situates the study within forced migration studies in general and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in particular. It locates the study within the major studies done on dam projects and displacements. It looks at what literature says on dam projects and displacements globally and then moves to the regional

context. After offering the global and regional views, it then cascades down to the Zimbabwean context.

Chapter 4: Research methodologies and methods

This chapter chronicles the overall methodology in which the study falls in. It analyses the data gathering techniques utilized, data, sampling techniques, sample size, study area and the ethical issues underlying the research. Lastly in this chapter, I dwell on my field experiences, which are the challenges and successes.

Chapter 5: Differential life worlds in the state-people relations at Tokwe Mukosi.

This chapter reflects on the experiences of different actors in the Tokwe Mukosi forced displacements and the micro-politics entrenched in the forced displacements. It identifies different actors involved and their conflicting interests. The chapter shows the divergent life worlds in the relocation exercise and how these militate against the sustainability of the relocation programme. Central to this discussion is the state's shifting identities from a pre-modern state to the modern state, which is influenced by the quest for legibility. Lastly, in the analysis of the state people relations, it uncovers some of the ulterior motives of the state in the relocation exercise such as the desire to accrue political capital through, politicking, electioneering and gerrymandering. The central argument is that the Tokwe Mukosi displacees are far from being regarded as passive victims in such political processes.

Chapter 6: Displacement, evacuation of the near future, livelihood capacities and capabilities.

This chapter is based on the implications of the forced displacements on the livelihoods of the locals. It focuses on how the displacements pushed the villagers into the vulnerability context or what is known as the evacuation of the near future. It goes on to look at the Tokwe Mukosi people's adaptation and resilience to their problem. Vital to the adaptation are social networks, local institutions, livelihood assets and various forms of capital at the villagers' disposal. The

major argument in the discussion is the idea that the locals are far from being passive victims of their situation. I therefore look at their capacities and capabilities to redefine the distant future.

Chapter 7: Local institutions and survival for the displaced other.

This chapter hinges on the implications of the forced resettlement of the Tokwe Mukosi people on local institutions. It proceeds to look at how the Tokwe Mukosi people utilize previous local institutions and new local institutions for adaptation and to build resilience in the new area. It also aims at complimenting the previous chapter by moving away from individualistic strategies to collective responses to vulnerability. Thus, it dwells on the interplay between local institutions, identity markers, social networks and social capital in the quest for surviving social marginalization at Chingwizi. Local institutions are then categorized under public, private and civic institutions. Lastly, it shows how strategic essentialism is pushed to sanctify immoral and or illegal collective responses to vulnerability.

Chapter 8: Summery conclusion and recommendations.

This chapter dwells on the summary, conclusion and recommendations made in the study at Tokwe Mukosi. It moves on to show how the research met the outlined objectives of the study. It also proffers areas for further research, based on some of the pertinent issues raised by the respondent which were however not primed for this study. Lastly, it problematizes the overreliance on agency, showing how this creates problems for both the state and the displaced persons at Chingwizi.

1.9 Conclusion

This introductory chapter has specified the central focus of the study based on the objectives of the study. It offered a brief global overview of water projects and displacements in general. The global overview was necessary since it helped to locate the Tokwe Mukosi dam project within the major water projects in the world, such as the Three Gorges and the Narmada experience. The chapter then proceeded to the regional experience, particularly the Aswan High dam project,

Kossou, Cahora Bassa, and the Lesotho High water dam project. Based on this global and regional historical overview, I was able to show the linkages and gaps between these water projects and the Tokwe Mukosi experience. The gaps that were identified were then used as the justification and significance of the study. The chapter then cascaded to the Zimbabwean experience on forced displacements in general, both in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe as the precursor to the Tokwe Mukosi dam displacements. I then concluded by highlighting the significance of the study, objectives that informed the study, key research questions, and the overall structure of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In tandem with the researcher's desire to move away from the victimhood approach which is dominant in the studies in forced displacements, the researcher triangulated three theories, that is the Actor Oriented Approach to development, Sustainable Livelihood Framework and social capital theory. Of note is the fact that mainstream development theories had the laxity of taking a macro approach to dam projects and the experiences of the displaced communities, thereby losing sight of the social actors involved in the process. These three perspectives are unique in the sense that they are micro approaches or people centered perspectives. Their common denominator is that they put people and their agency at the center of sociological analysis, thereby helping to unravel the complexities surrounding dam projects and displacement, as well as the people's adaptive capacities from within the community. The ensuing chapter therefore dwells on the applicability of the Actor oriented approach, Sustainable livelihoods framework and social capital theory in the understanding of the lived experiences and adaptive capacities of the Tokwe Mukosi people in light of their displacement and vulnerability. Reference shall also be made to complimentary concepts like legibility, temporalities and the futures as well as strategic essentialism.

2.2 The Actor-Oriented Approach

Taking the actor-oriented approach as its axis, this study seeks to move away from the conventional binary opposition in sociology with regards to what influences the outcome of social change and displacement dynamics in the Zimbabwean context. This debate is based on the developmental practitioners who emphasize the primacy of external intervention programs and policies (structure) visa-a-vis the beneficiaries of development (agency). Thus, the propensity of viewing society and the individual as separate entities (dualism) has lost ground in development discourse and practice, in favor of a more intricate relationship between the individual and society (duality of structures) (Also see Giddens 1981). The philosophy is that

social process is an outcome of the dialectical relationship between the individual and society. Moving away from this orthodox approach, herein I shall consider the said elements as inextricably interrelated elements or more appropriately, as two sides of the same coin. What is ostensible is that in as much as the government and other external actors may treat the villagers in the Tokwe-Mukosi area as passive entities, (this has been the fallacy in many studies on forced displacements), the villagers in question are active tactical, calculative and rational actors. This gives them the power to define and redefine their experiences in response to the constraining external policies and intervention programs such as their forced relocation to pave way for the dam construction. This also helped to illuminate the complex responses to the dam construction and the subsequent displacements, concurrently hinging on the adaptation, resilience, socio-historical and cultural expectations of the affected villagers.

The aforementioned qualities were counterpoised with those of the external social actors such as the state, various government departments, international community and the Civil Society. Forced displacements in Tokwe Mukosi and the resultant social organization or disorganization can therefore be conceptualized as a product of the dialectical relationships, interfaces and struggles between actors with diverging and conflicting interest in the exercise. It should be underscored that the locals are far from being regarded as a disembodied social grouping or passive consumers of external programs, rather they are rational actors. (Also see Long 1999) Henceforth, they have the aptitude to process, evaluate the Tokwe Mukosi relocation programme and maneuver in their experiences with the architects of the dam construction. This, points to the capacity of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers to devise their own livelihood strategies to deal with their own situation. Thus, it becomes theoretically and practically wrong to evaluate them as passive victims of their own situation. In other words, they are far from being conceptualized as sponges of this outsider driven developmental programme.

In line with the forgoing position, the theory in question is also predicated on the understanding that every developmental intervention programme is replete with politics. It becomes a battlefield of knowledge or an arena of struggle where there are different social actors with conflicting and diverging interests. Grounded on the conflicting interests, the social actors in the Tokwe Mukosi relocation programme then strive to position themselves in line with the real or perceived benefits from the exercise. It should be emphasized that the different interests are

emanating from the life-worlds of the social actors, and these include the community culture, history, religion, social identity, cosmology, indigenous knowledge, class, political affiliation, age, gender *inter alia*. Among the Tokwe Mukosi villagers the life-worlds are deployed as tools to weigh the whole relocation program, to see if it is acceptable to them or not. Given this social milieu, Scott, (1985) posits that the fallacy embedded in outsider driven programs such as the displacements at Tokwe Mukosi is to treat the social actors as weak, dispirited and ignorant. Contrary to such a position, the said villagers are active socio-political beings endowed with the power to deploy the ‘weapons of the weak’. By resorting to the weapons of the weak, the community eventually engages in ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’, which will ultimately show their position in light of the forced relocations. These include but are not limited to sabotage, feet dragging, fanned ignorance and in extreme cases, direct confrontation. This typically explains the ambivalent relationship between the many social actors identified in this relocation exercise. This relationship is directly a product of the state’s top-down approach to the whole relocation exercise, with very little or no participation of the other concerned social actors.

In this study, I had a broader analysis of social actors. Accordingly in such an approach, focus will not be solely on individual actors such as local political leaders, traditional leaders, men, women, children and the youths, but the study also considered actors such as the state, traditional institutions, the Civil Society and other local institutions operating in the Tokwe Mukosi community. This is premised on the understanding that, just like individuals these entities are not passive but capable actors since they attach meaning in their interaction with other social actors in the whole relocation programme at Tokwe Mukosi. The identification of the diverse social actors and the conflicting interests lends credence to the application of the Actor-Oriented Approach since it also helped to unpack the polemical nature of the concept ‘community’. This is a moral imperative, which is often glossed over by the experts in development and displacements. Very often, a community is analyzed as a homogeneous entity. Nevertheless, it is necessary to deconstruct the concept and focus on the heterogeneity imbued in this concept (Also see Kamphosts et al 2009). In as much as the affected villagers belong to the same community territorially, they are different with regards to their experiences and life-worlds. These different experiences and life-worlds undoubtedly influence how the Tokwe Mukosi victims responded to

this human induced disaster, from within as part of community based protection. The panacea to the impasse that comes about as a result of the divergent life-worlds between the identified stakeholders is to implement the interface analysis. For Long (ibid) an interface is the point at which the interests of all the stakeholders in this developmental programme intersect. The overarching goal is to accommodate the interests of all social actors in Tokwe Mukosi, particularly those of the ‘silent victims’ of this developmental programme. Such an approach will go a long way in ensuring the sustainability of the programme, as well as sustainable livelihood outcomes for the displaced community. While the Actor oriented approach together with other agency theories are useful in understanding the responses of the citizens to social problems, its monumental weakness is that it justifies the state’s inaptness to protect the citizens. I shall further explore this dilemma in chapter 8 of this thesis.

2.3 Sustainable Livelihood Framework

The other approach used to analyze the experiences of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers is the Sustainable livelihood approach. Just like the Actor oriented approach to development, it is a people centered approach to development or a bottom up approach to development. This approach was popularized by the British Department for International Development (DFID) and since the 1990s it has blossomed to become the central approach to the implementation of development initiatives particularly in the developing societies (Morse et al 2009). The theory is grounded on the idea that a community at any given point is likely to fall under the vulnerability context (also related to evaporation of the immediate future). This vulnerability may emanate from economic, social, and environmental shocks, trends over time space, climate change or seasonality (Butler and Mazur 2007). Given such a situation, focus shifts to how the community or individuals within the affected community respond to this vulnerability. In this case, this theoretical framework helped the researcher to unpack the Tokwe Mukosi community’s vulnerability, resilience and adaptation to the catastrophic effects of floods and the ensuing forced displacements. Drawing from this approach, livelihoods encompass the capability activities and assets necessary for the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims to earn a living in view of their displacement and socio-economic marginalization They may be viewed as the capabilities assets (resources, stores, claims and access) and activities necessary for adaptation and building

resilience in response to vulnerability (Chambers and Conway 1991, DFID 2000). Carney 1998 provides a simplified definition of livelihoods, For him, a livelihood is made up of capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities for a means of survival.

Viewed this way, a livelihood is sustainable when it is able to cope with adversities at the same time maintaining assets and capabilities for both the victims and their future generations (see Kolimair and Gamper 2001). Chambers and Conway (ibid) posit that a livelihood becomes sustainable when it is able to cope with and recover from stress and shocks, at the same time maintaining and enhancing its capability assets; and it ought to provide sustainable livelihood chances for the forthcoming generation. These livelihood activities in most cases are aimed at sustaining livelihoods in the interim and safeguard the lives of the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims that are in turmoil. In the long run, these livelihood activities are however targeted at building resilience for the said flood victims in the new territory (also see DFID ibid).

To push the aforementioned position further, it is apparent that the Tokwe Mukosi community has fallen under the vulnerability context which inflicts a huge strain on its livelihoods as people move into the new environs. In order to survive in the new territories, various livelihood assets become indispensable for the said villagers. In this context, livelihoods then proffer capabilities, assets and strategies that will be adopted by the Tokwe Mukosi villagers to deal with their socio-economic dislocation. Given this social milieu, it is totally inevitable for the victims to try to secure food, income and other basic necessities through an avalanche of economic activities within the community. They muster various livelihood assets at their disposal into a livelihood mix to achieve sustainable livelihood outcomes. In line with this, Scoones (2009) identifies four types of capital that are combined by the victims under vulnerability. The first one is natural capital. This acts as a natural shock absorber, for example land, water, air and other environmental facilities at the disposal of the displaced community. The second one is economic capital or financial capital, which relates to the many economic forms albeit at a limited scale among the victims of Tokwe Mukosi who are poverty stricken. Popular forms of economic capital include cash, savings, credit and other economic assets, which then form the capital base for the displaced villagers. The third type is human capital, which has its emphasis on the individual or household knowledge and skills, availability of labor also including the physical wellbeing and good health for the villagers, which can be transformed into a survival asset.

Lastly and more importantly, there is social capital. This resonates well with the social resources acquired by the villagers prior to the forced relocations and in the aftermath of the relocations which they turn into livelihood strategies. Social capital is also linked to relations of trust and support, affiliations, associations, connections and social networks, which the victims fall back on in order to survive in the alien territories. Thus, sustainable livelihoods at Tokwe Mukosi become indispensable since they are facilitating community recovery from the strains that emanated from both the floods and the resultant displacements. This inevitably accords the villagers the capacity and capability to aspire despite their marginalized status (Appadurai 2008).

In addition to the above observation, in the context of the Tokwe Mukosi community, sustainable livelihoods as expected help in the strengthening and enhancement of the villagers' capabilities (Scoones *ibid*). These capabilities are accumulated based on the various livelihood programs adopted from within the community as part of community based protection. These include but not limited to community mobilization, community or personal income generating activities, rotating savings clubs, agriculture, labor service, business startup programs, food for work and remittances. They may also include gaining access to and using services available, exercising foresight, innovation, experimenting, collaboration and competition with others or even taking advantage of new conditions and resources available in the changed situation (Chambers and Conway *ibid*). It should also be underscored that from the point that the villagers were forcibly moved in to the harsh territories, the capabilities became mostly reactive as the villagers responded to the changing environment, but with time they slowly became proactive. My goal therefore is to see the applicability of these forms of capital among the Tokwe Mukosi villagers as they respond to their marginalization, considering the fact that assistance from the outsiders including the state has not been forthcoming, unlike in other water projects both regionally and internationally.

In the study, I also put emphasis on the prominence of various interventions (these may either be internal or external) and how they help to reinforce the livelihoods of Tokwe Mukosi villagers. Considering the incapacity and ineptness of the state and non-state actors in ensuring external support for the victims, the focus here is mainly on internal interventions and how these internal

interventions lead to livelihood outcomes for the displaced community. These livelihood outcomes include more sources of income for the economically deprived community, health security; food security, educational security, environmental security and sustainable utilization of natural resources in Tokwe Mukosi area (Also see Solesbury 2003).

Borrowing from Amartya Sen, I also show linkages between the livelihoods, capabilities and human security. This is based on the realization that there is a complex relationship between the said concepts, as human security is linked to the fostering of human capabilities in a community. Human capabilities encompass the infinite combinations of functions that the individuals and members of the Tokwe Mukosi community can achieve, including a set of vectors functioning's showing the person's freedom to choose the type of life that they wish to lead (Also see Hussein et al 2004). Sen (2000) goes on to identify four elements that form the core of human security,

- A focus on the individual lives as opposed to state centred models.
- Acknowledgement of the importance of the society and social arrangements in making the lives of the members of the community secure.
- A concentration on the downside risks to human lives.
- Emphasis on the more basic human rights.

Of note is the fact that many of the livelihood portfolios maybe immoral and in worst cases illegal, but strategic essentialism is used to sanctify such survival strategies (Spivak 2008). In the context of the Tokwe Mukosi people, the displacee status becomes the rational justification for those survival strategies notwithstanding their immoral and illegal nature.

2.4 Social capital theory

The study also draws insights from the works of key social capital theorists such as Putnam (1993), Bourdieu (1984) and Colman (1990). In the 1990s, social capital theory gained impetus and became one of the dominant theories in understanding poor people's vulnerability and adaptation to shocks and stress. Social capital relates to elements of social life, including

networks, norms and trust that will enable social actors to act together more effectively in pursuit of the common goal (Putnam 1995). This type of capital, unlike other forms of capital identified under the Sustainable livelihood framework above, has a collective component since it is external to the individual, making it suitable for the understanding of a group or community's adaptive capacity in response to the social marginalization and poverty (Njuki et al 2008).

Pointing to this collective ingredient embedded in social capital, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) believe that social capital is based on the networks and norms that enable individuals to act collectively as opposed to individualistic survival mechanism. Given its virtues, this theory is therefore indispensable in the analysis of the Tokwe Mukosi people's economic and cultural dislocation, vulnerability and unity in the new territories, consequently broadening participation and inclusivity in light of their forced movement (See Putnam 1995). What is evident is that social capital was and still is a rallying point prior to the displacement and post displacement of Tokwe Mukosi communities respectively. In the post-displacement Tokwe Mukosi community, social capital helps to bond differentiated social groupings, at the same time fomenting community security, food security, health security, personal security *inter alia*. This is achieved by ensuring the production of mutually beneficial norms of reciprocity, generalized trust and cooperation among the villagers (Putnam *ibid*).

Social capital therefore becomes a critical component for surviving in response to the calamity that befell the said community. It has also been intimated that the multi-layered and complex ties established through everyday interaction maybe the best social resource in the Tokwe Mukosi Villagers' capacity to adapt as well as collective response to the challenges that came with the displacements (Also see Pelling and High 2005). It ought to be underscored that the normal aspect when analyzing the displaced communities' response to vulnerability and marginalization is that in addition to mobilizing the previously acquired social capital, they ubiquitously develop novel habits, allegiances, relationships as strategies of resistance and feelings of belonging in the quest for survival (Hartnack 2016). The generally accepted philosophy is that peer groups, friends, families local institutions and other associates form the asset that will be mobilized in the time of social marginalization (Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

Based on Putnam's (ibid) submission, features of social organization such as social networks, social norms, relations of trust and mutual support culminate in proper social organization and cooperation, leading to social security and human security in the new environment. Volunteering and philanthropy are also critical elements in the understanding and appreciation of the Tokwe Mukosi people's experiences and adaptive capacity. It is also imperative to note that community organizations encourage the emergence of civic virtue, tolerance for diversity, social exchange and trustworthiness among the villagers as part of their social capital matrix. While addressing social capital at the micro-level Bourdieu (2002) further buttresses the appreciation of the dynamics of survival within this vulnerable and volatile community. He posits that social capital relates to the amount of social connections possessed by an individual and in most cases this is dependent on the size of networks of connections that will be mustered for survival in a volatile environment. Critical in the understanding of the significance of social capital are three concepts identified by Putnam (ibid), that is bonding social capital, bridging social capital and linking social capital. An elaboration of these three concepts and their applicability in understanding adaptation and resilience of the Tokwe Mukosi community suffices.

2.4.1 Bonding social capital

Bonding social capital may be viewed as ties which are shared between members, typified by ethnic groups, religious groups, networks of close friends, peers and relatives within a specified locality (Claridge, 2007; Njuki et al 2008; High, 2005). Among the Tokwe Mukosi people, bonding social capital is internally driven and helps to cement social networks, adaptation and resilience among this fragmented social grouping. It enhances unity among people who share a lot of similarities, reinforcing in-group solidarity. Bonding social capital will obviously be cherished more than any other form of social capital within this displaced community. As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, assistance from the state and non-governmental organizations has been worryingly erratic. This then leaves the community to rely more on closely knit relations as part of internally driven protection. They should therefore rationally fall back on

bonding social capital more than any form of cultural capital. This is also reinforced by the demographic composition of the victims, which means that people who were displaced from the same area will naturally have strong ties, networks and relations of trust, which become ubiquitous in dealing with vulnerability in the interim. This is because this type of social capital is associated with immediate survival than development and helps the Tokwe Mukosi community to adjust in light of their forced movement (see Pelling 2003). Moreover, as noted by Woolcock and Narayan (2000), this type of social capital is what the communities under vulnerability mobilize to 'get by'. What it means therefore is that bonding social capital is not sustainable in the long run.

2.4.2 Bridging social capital

While bonding social capital is inward looking, bridging social capital is conversely outward looking and creates connections between strangers and people from diverse social cultural backgrounds. Bridging ties are directed towards relationships of exchange in most cases of associations with reciprocated interests or goals, but they have different social identities (High ibid). Another distinction between bonding and bridging social capital is proffered by Onyx and Mullen (2000). They posit that bonding social capital on one hand is mainly directed towards multiple networks, dense, long-term reciprocity, thick trust, shared norms and obscured instrumentality; whilst Bridging social capital on the other hand is characterized by extensive, loose networks, weakened reciprocity blurred type of trust and is highly instrumental. Whereas bonding capital is very useful for the adaptation of the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims, bridging social capital become necessary for building resilience. It is essential for the actual development to occur or it is what the community require to 'get ahead' (Woolcock and Narayan ibid). Thus, bridging social capital is also an essential element in the survival gambits adopted by the Tokwe Mukosi community to deal with their social exclusion and social marginalization in a more sustainable way.

2.4.3 Linking social capital

Linking social capital resonates well with the connections between the community and local institutions which may be internal or external institutions. Of note is the fact that when evaluating the significance of linking social capital, focus should be on the critical role played by local institutions. This is premised on the realization that in most cases, these institutions determine how communities under vulnerability respond to their vulnerability (Agarawal 2008). Agarawal (2008) goes further to argue that, because adaptation is local (as is the case with the Tokwe Mukosi Community), it follows that it becomes imperative to appreciate the significance of local institutions in shaping adaptation and strengthening the capabilities of the vulnerable communities as part of their social capital matrix. Szreter and Woolcock (2004) conceptualize linking social capital in light of the norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal and or institutionalized power in society.

This form of capital is fundamental when other forms of capital have been strained due to incessant vulnerability as has been the case with the Tokwe Mukosi Community. This relationship may also help to buttress or harness the other forms of social capital identified above. A community endowed with strong linking social capital has greater chances of dealing with poverty and vulnerability (Woolcock and Narayan *ibid*). Given this background, relations between the community and local institutions become critical for survival. The critical functions of these local institutions include but not limited to gathering and disseminating information, skills development and allocation of resources. In this context, there are three types of local institutions necessary for adaptation and building resilience among the vulnerable villagers and for Agrawal (2008), they can be defined as private, public and civic institutions in their formal and informal elements. Public institutions include government department, local governments, and other local agencies operating in the Tokwe Mukosi resettlement area. Civic institutions also include cooperatives, loan groups and producer organizations. Lastly private institutions include private enterprises, service organizations like NGOs and charitable organizations (See Agarawal *ibid*). Overall Linkages with these local institutions as part of linking social capital provide an opportunity for Tokwe Mukosi flood victims to get valuable resources, which are indispensable for adaptation and building resilience (see Pelling and High *Ibid*).

While theoretically an attempt has been made thus far to show the differences between those three types of social capital identified by Putnam, there is a tacit acknowledgement that it is practically unsound to emphasize on that distinction. This is because there is an intricate relationship that exists between those three subsets of social capital. Their application overlaps and they also mutually reinforce each other. To buttress this complementarity, Njuki et al (ibid) states that the three types of capital support each other since strong ties enshrined in bonding social capital are diversified by the presence of bridging social capital whose bonds are weaker but are nonetheless more crosscutting. Still in the same relationship, linking social capital provides room for the accumulation of information and requisite resources as well as the highly regarded networks to ensure survival. In as much as there may be different level of prominence for these three types of social capital they are not exclusive of each other, thus they cannot be treated in isolation (also see Leonard and Onyx 2003).

2.5 Conclusion

The foregoing chapter has elaborated the theoretical lenses used to analyze the Tokwe Mukosi people's experiences on forced displacements and vulnerability as well as how they responded to their vulnerability and social marginalization. As a result, three theoretical frameworks were triangulated to get a nuanced understanding of the said issues. The Actor oriented approach was significant in understanding the contestations and conflicting life-worlds surrounding the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and the subsequent displacements. It also helped to show the life-worlds of the different social actors and how these life-worlds affected the actors' evaluation of the dam project and displacement. To understand the actions of the state (a prime actor in this displacement), Scott's concept of legibility was used and it helped to further buttress the conflicting interests between the state and the locals at Chingwizi. The Sustainable livelihood framework helped to unpack the villager's vulnerability and how they mobilize a plethora of livelihood assets to deal with their vulnerability with very minimum support from external actors. These livelihood assets include human capital, natural capital, economic capital and

social capital. The social capital theory was indispensable as it helped to augment and corroborate my analysis drawn from the other two theories. The key issue under the Social capital theory is Putnam's trifurcated view of social capital, which consists of bonding social capital, bridging social capital and linking social capital respectively.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW.

3.1 Introduction

The 21st century has achieved the status of the “the century of ‘refugees’, and this is reflected by the salience and increasing interest in the plight of the forced displaced persons (Colson 2008). In literature and policy, dam projects and displacements have largely been informed by the modernist and rationalist philosophy, thereby skirting the human face to the development-displacement paradox. The chapter starts by showing the competing definitions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), based on the realization that although the displacees of dam projects have been ignored in literature on IDPs they qualify to be IDPs in several respects. Thereafter, it focuses on the definitions of development and progression to modernity based on various scholarly views and the classical sociological perspectives. This is necessitated by the awareness that this philosophy is ultimately the same philosophy driving the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and the subsequent displacement in Zimbabwe.

Classical sociologists and their views then become the precursor to this popular philosophy in displacement. It then proceeds to unpack scholarly views on development, displacements and modernity as well as a review of literature on dam projects and displacements from the global and regional narratives. This global and regional view will lead to the focus on what literature says from the local perspective. From the local perspective my focal point is the post-colonial literature on development induced displacements in Zimbabwe, relating these experiences to the Tokwe Mukorsi dam experience. Overall the section identifies areas of debate and controversy in the scholarly community on development induced displacement, at the same time situating the study in this scholarly debate.

3.2 Internal displacements-definitions, concepts and perspectives.

It is a truism that traditionally Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have not been given the requisite attention in the international platform and agenda. Logically, interest has been on the

more common refuges (Holms *ibid*). This is in spite of the observation that there are approximately 26 million Internally Displaced Persons globally and these are highly pronounced in 50 countries across the world (Deng 2001, Borton et al 2005, Birkland 2009). It has actually been observed that the number of IDPs since the mid-1990s has outstripped the number of people who seek shelter outside their own borders (Kalin and Williams 2010). This background has obviously necessitated an increased interest in the study of the challenges confronting Internally Displaced persons at the global scale. The dilemma of these Internally Displaced Persons from the international community's standpoint is that they are within the domestic jurisdiction and become different from the way the refugees who cross international borders are treated and protected (Hager 2006). In the Zimbabwean experience, issues of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic matters will inevitably come to the fore and such scapegoating means the internally displaced and vulnerable communities like the Tokwe Mukosi community escape the much needed international attention and recognition (see Cohen and Deng 1998, Tibajuka 2005, Hammar 2008). As observed by Chaudhry (2010), such scapegoating and lack of political will on the part of governments poses one of the greatest obstacles in the endeavor to provide protection for the IDPs. In addition, there was no international instrument in place to deal with the challenges confronting IDPs at that time.

Contrary to the aforementioned position, in recent times however, there has been a remarkable awareness of the global nature of the crisis confronting Internally Displaced Persons. This growing interest in the plight of Internally Displaced Persons came to light in the early 1990s. The interest was reinforced by the United Nations Guiding principles on IDPs, which were formulated by the United Nations General Assembly in 1998. These guiding principles have continued to receive wide spread support regardless of the fact that they are not binding. What this means is that the displaced communities have no recourse internationally if their rights have been violated (Kalin and Williams *ibid*).

Despite the said growing interest in IDPs the serious challenge when attempting to conceptualize it is that the concept is polemical. There is no consensus among the academics, researchers, policy makers and the humanitarian community on what constitutes an Internally Displaced

Person. Two aspects are however central in the conceptualization of the concept in question. The first one is the involuntary nature of the movement and the second one is that they do not cross their national border (United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1996). Given this background in 1992 the United Nations Secretary General in Deng (1995) went on to define Internally Displaced Persons as,

“Persons or a group of persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or manmade disaster and who are within the territory of their own country” pge 49.

Conceptualizing Internally Displaced Persons this way maybe attractive but it raises a number of serious concerns. In the first place defining them in relation to the temporal and numerical elements means people who will be displaced over a long period of time maybe glossed over. This is graphic when one looks at the Tokwe Mukosi experience where villagers have been moved in three phases and many more will be moved in the next few years to pave way for the dam project and the highly anticipated Agro town. It is also practically unsound to believe that displaced persons will almost always be displaced in large numbers. In actual fact the movement can be done in groups and at times it can be an individual experience (see Cohen 2004, Money ibid). In addition to these glaring shortcomings, it is also important to note that defining IDPs as persons confined to the territory of their own country is also problematic because this definition fails to account for the possibility of a sudden border change, thereby missing out on other people who might need protection (Malinowski et al 2016).

A more sophisticated definition of IDPs which aims at correcting the inadequacies of the earlier definition became imperative and it is actually contained in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons of 1998. Herein they are defined as,

“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced to or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”
See Cohen (2004) pge 464.

This definition retains most of the underlying causes of displacement raised in the original definition, but it is richer and much more flexible. What this entails is that the causes of displacement can now vary depending on the context. It opened room for the subjective understanding of the causes of internal displacement, which may help to accommodate persons displaced by development projects like dam projects in the context of this study, who have hitherto been overlooked in literature on IDPs. It should however be underscored that in as much as there has been a notable zest to accommodate persons who have previously been excluded in the original definition of IDPs, statistics on IDPs have worryingly focused on people displaced by conflict and human rights violations (Money *ibid*, International Committee of the Red Cross 2009). What this implies is that development induced displacements remain a dark figure in the global statistics on internal displacement. The persons displaced by developmental projects have therefore become the ‘Invisibly Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) as opposed to Internally Displaced Persons (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008).

3.3 Development problematic-The dilemmas of defining and conceptualizing development.

Development has become a buzzword among contemporary researchers, development practitioners, the state and the academic community. It is also believed to be an economic, social and moral imperative in any state or context. It has actually become a code word for refusing to be left behind in a world of rapid transformation, infrastructure (including dam projects), technological innovation and scientific discovering, implying that every state is eager to seek development in the inevitable drive towards modernity (Lee 2005). Interestingly, the Zimbabwean government has refused to be left behind in the quest for modernity through various

projects including Tokwe Mukosi dam construction for irrigation, tourism and hydro power generation. Notwithstanding the overwhelming popularity of this term, the problem however is that it is difficult to pin down because it is an amorphous and ambiguous concept. The ambiguity emanates from the realization that it means different things to different people. What constitutes improvement or positive social change varies according to culture, historical context, class gender and relations of power (Pieterse 2010). Sociologically the concept has been conceptualized differently from classical sociological theory to modern development theory. Despite the inherent ambiguity, the generally agreed view is that development denotes evolutionary social change, improvement or progress from a lower stage to a higher stage, presumably in a linear model (Toye 2007). The change however ought to be desirable for it to qualify to be regarded as development, making it a value laden concept. It becomes very difficult to demarcate what to improve, how to improve it and the major question of who decides on what to improve and how to improve it (Summer and Tribe 2008). This speaks to the debates and controversies surrounding the construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project in the name of “development” and who would ultimately be the winners or losers of this developmental initiative. The aforementioned ambiguity can also be linked to the idea that development has been defined from an economic perspective, Human development perspective, social perspective, Sustainable Development perspective *inter alia* (see Pieterse *ibid*). This elusive nature of development lends credence to the multifaceted understanding of any developmental project aimed at fostering development like the Tokwe Mukosi Dam project in Zimbabwe.

In line with the above view, the economic dimension of development puts more emphasis on the principles of economic progression or improvement. The principles include but not limited to the accumulation of capital, use of technology, division of labour and an increase in productivity. This is also pushed by the much vouched desire to move towards modernity and this has been the rationale behind the construction of mega dam projects across the world in general and the Tokwe Mukosi dam project in particular. It should be underscored that the Modernization theorists starting from the post second world war era were among the most vocal in defining development in a modernist manner. They characterized modern societies as those that take on social, political cultural and economic tenets from the highly developed western societies,

focusing mainly on highly differentiated and technologically sophisticated institutions and urban industrialized societies (Viterna and Robertson 2015). It should be underscored that in practical sense, these tenets of modernization may be manipulated by the ruling elite to gain political capital as opposed to the genuine need to foster development.

Based on this reasoning, development was simply a question of national progression achieved through instilling the appropriate orientations, norms and values in the south, enabling those countries to partake in the wealth creating economic institutions (Ports 1997, Rapley 2007). Fashionable as it might appear to the state, planners and development practitioners, this approach to development has glaring shortcomings. This is because dams, roads, mines, and pipelines both reflect and instantiate the mega social projects of colonialism, modernity, capitalism, development and globalization, which are worryingly ethnocentric top down and logo-centric (Gillert and Lynch 2003).

Over and above this they are far removed from the needs and aspirations of the poor and marginalized sections of society, whom development programmes should ironically target. They normally fall prey to elite capture there by failing to put the last first (also see Chambers 2013). This has led to uneven development between and within societies (Smith 2008). Instead of being salvation for communities, particularly the displaced communities, development is paradoxically becoming a threat, with the winners and losers (see Streeten 1998, Nyamnjoh 2003). Politically and ideologically development is seen as a narrative of western hegemony aimed at destroying popular practices, local aspirations and knowledge (Sardan 2006). In post-development thinking, development is deconstructed simply because it has become the new religion of the west (and the state at the local level), imposition of science and modernity as power, with the homogenization and westernization effect (Pieterse 2000, Rist 1997, Sach 1992).

Development and developmental projects should therefore be deconstructed for their inherent power relations and their authoritarian machinations. It is very clear that in the development field, most orthodox theories in spite of their philosophical and ideological grounding, focus

largely on the economic aspects, turning a blind eye to social, political and cultural issues or at best these aspects are treated as peripheral (Hague 2004). In tandem with this realization, the United Nations Development Programme goes on to state that, the main objectives of the economic view of development are ominously superficial and devoid of the human face of development. The necessity of a more people centered development as a moral imperative inevitably led to the interest in what is now commonly known as the Human Development approach. This approach relates to the overall improvement in the quality of human life, wellbeing and the acceptance that there is no correlation between economic transformation and the quality of life for the poor and in the context of this study, the displaced Tokwe Mukosi community (see United Nations Development Programme 2015, Hague 2004),

In addition to the aforementioned position, the focal point of the Human Development dimension is qualitative development as opposed to quantitative development. Based on the need for qualitative development, it puts emphasis on human development indicators such as human security, literacy rate, infant mortality rate, and the general life expectancy (Smith 2016). There is also a realization that the indicators of economic development perspective and the human development perspective are diametrically opposed and economic indicators tend to override human development indicators. Thus, it follows that in developmental projects such as the Tokwe Mukosi dam project human development is inevitably sacrificed in the quest for the 'greater good'. Economic development in modernist terms therefore results in radical transformation of the community's social fabric, economies and livelihoods, adversely affecting human development.

In recent years, development theorists and practitioners have turned attention to a more fluid and more encompassing definition of development, that is the social development dimension. The said approach dwells on the overall development of society in its movement towards modernity with a more rational orientation as well as the positivistic approach (Smith 2016). It incorporates the social-cultural, environmental and political elements of social change which have hitherto been glossed over by the economist or modernist thinkers in development in the dam project-development conundrum (de Wet 2005).

To show the diverging and sometimes contradictory definition of development there is a spirited interest in what has come to be known as the Sustainable Development Approach, as a new direction in development theory and practice. This interest followed the challenges that emerged owing to the technocratic drive towards modernity as well as the failure of the economic perspective to foster sustainable development for the vulnerable and marginalized sections of society like the internally displaced communities. The approach in question was first popularized by the Brundtland Commission in the 1970s. As a pro-poor perspective the Sustainable development approach states that for sustainable development to be realized, the developmental program ought to meet the needs of the present at the same time enabling future generations to meet their own needs (World Commission on Environment and Development 1988). Unlike the segmented and at times paranoid definitions of development, sustainable development entails the long term sustainability of the economy and the environment, which is achieved through balancing economic, cultural, social and environmental interests of the marginalized in development (Emas 2015). Contrary to the technocratic approach vouched by the modernists in development, the researcher's desire in this context is to capture the voice and experiences of the displaced Tokwe Mukosi community on the displacement-development dilemma.

In recent times, Amartya Sen (1985) envisioned development in light of capability assets, wherein he enthused that a normal society ought to provide citizens with the freedoms and a chance to choose a life style they cherish. Of note is the fact that Amartya Sen's vision for development is extremely blurred in the Zimbabwean context, particularly with reference to the Tokwe Mukosi people whose capabilities have been heavily strained by the forced displacements. Prett et al (2013) go on to give a more comprehensive definition of the term development, which I believe helps to dilute the competing definitions of the term highlighted in this section. They conceptualize development as transformational view of the entire state, where change is emphasized across the four dimensions that is the polity, the economy, social relations and public administration. To further cement this conceptualization of development Viterna and Robertson (2015), state that a developed nation should ideally provide the minimum protection which relates to infrastructure, educational security, health security, food security, employment,

as well as legal and judicial protection from discrimination and abuse with the aim of making the citizens realize their capabilities.

3.4 Situating the displacement-development paradox within classical sociological theories.

The aim of this section is to synchronize the ideas of main sociological theorist on development or social progress. These theorists offer different and at times competing and contradicting perspectives on development, which points to the elusive nature of development as a concept as highlighted in the preceding section. It focuses on the founding fathers of sociology such as August Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx. Going back to history, it is necessitated by an observation that these theorists and their ideas constitute a critical intellectual development that had a remarkable influence on development theory. Thus, these theorists left an indelible mark on contemporary development discourse and practice.

3.4.1 August Comte and the drive towards development and modernity.

Comte is widely considered to be the founding father of sociology in general and the modernization theory, which is perhaps the oldest development theory. His version of development or social dynamics was later refined, revised and at times rejected by theorists who wrote after him. His philosophy of development was heavily influenced by organicism, thus he conceptualized development in an evolutionary perspective. He believes that society, human race and the human mind pass through three stages in the acceleration to modernity and positivism. The first stage, which he unequivocally criticized, is the theological stage. This is a society dominated by tradition, myth and belief superstition. Human beings in such a society explain social phenomena in terms of beings or force (Ritzer and Smart 2003). In the metaphysical stage people now turn to nature when they attempt to explain social phenomena. In the positivist which is the final stage, they begin to rely on science and examine phenomena in terms of reasoning (Abraham and Morgan 1985). The positivist stage tallies well with the need for scientific

innovation, infrastructural development and modernity in the contemporary societies and positivism can be used as a tool for the reordering and restructuring society in a more rational and just manner (Turner 2003). This kind of reasoning correlates very well with the construction of the mega dam projects across the world and in Zimbabwe, which are aimed at furthering development and human progress. The drawback to the fulfillment of Comte's vision of development or progress is that many social institutions are conservative and in some cases they are reactionary. Thus, they would do anything within their capacities to retain their ideologies, culture and tradition whenever social change becomes ubiquitous (Smith Ibid). This actually helps to explain the ambivalent relations between the state and various stakeholders in dam projects, development and displacement enigma.

3.4.2 Emile Durkheim and the evolutionary development.

Durkheim was a great French sociologist, a functionalist and sometimes he is widely considered to be the second founding father of sociology, although he did not claim to be one of the founding fathers of sociology (Gane 2003). Building on the Comtean theory of social change and development he opined that society goes through two stages of development. It moves from what he terms mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity and evolution is what propels social change. Through this process society moves from smaller and primitive societies to larger, complex and industrial societies (Ritzer and Goodman 2010). Mechanical solidarity is a condition that obtains in a society with a strong and pervasive sense of collective consciousness. This communal collective consciousness acts as social cement that binds society together.

Collective consciousness relates to the amalgamation of beliefs, norms and values that are shared by all members of that particular society (Ritzer and Goodman 2013). Other features of mechanical solidarity include but not limited to the absence of individualism, repressive laws, low degree of interdependence and such societies are rural or primitive in outlook. It goes without saying that these features, like in any other rural community, were the backbone of the pre-displacement Tokwe Mukosi community. Development, at least in modernist terms actually

led to the disruptions of these fundamental attributes of this community. This situation for Durkheim (1964) culminated in a state of normlessness or anomie largely attributable to the weakened collective communal consciousness. This means that in the alien territories, the sense of community that used to bind the Tokwe Mukosi people has been weakened as a result of that transition.

Organic solidarity is the next and final stage of development which is a common feature in modern complex and industrial societies. This evolutionary change is a great stride towards civilization and complexity (Seidman 2012, Durkheim *ibid*). Some of the observable features of this stage are high division of labor, weakened collective communal consciousness, consensus on very general values, high interdependence, high individualism and the societies are urban and industrial in outlook (Durkheim *ibid*). Although the transition to organic solidarity led to serious disorder, Durkheim envisioned the advent of a new set of order in these societies. What brings about order and solidarity in this context is division of labor. There will be people who perform specialized tasks which are interdependent and interrelated for the benefit of society.

In the Zimbabwean context, the said evolutionary transformation to a more complex industrialized society dovetails with the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset). This is the blueprint that is currently driving the economy and development in Zimbabwe. This policy, particularly the infrastructure and utilities cluster seeks to rehabilitate infrastructural assets and to recover utility services that include water and sanitation infrastructure, energy, power supply and transport (Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 2013). Noble as it may sound, this cluster emphasizes more on quantitative development. Thus, these highly technical developmental projects like the Tokwe Mukosi dam project bring the displacement-development nexus under scrutiny. This situation may sadly lead to development without people (Smith 2001), as indigenous people may be evaluated as people in the way of modernity and development (Loo 2004). In many developmental projects this then becomes the justification for displacing local people to pave way for development, at least in the Durkheimian sense.

3.4.3 Karl Marx-capitalism, alienation and the struggle for resources in forced displacements.

Representing German sociology Marx offered an alternative but radical view of social change and development. For this reason, his theory from the beginning was alienated in mainstream development discourse and practice. Nevertheless, there has been a renewed interest in Marx's theory, particularly as it relates to social change and development (MacLennan 2003). He believes that all known human societies go through a series of stages of development. The first stage being primitive communalism, which is essentially an egalitarian society and there was no exploitation. Exploitation of man by man started with the advent of the period of slavery where class and stratification started to surface. This was followed by the feudal mode of production, capitalism and communism for Marx will be the final and adorable mode of production (Reid 1972). Unlike the two classical theorists alluded to in this section, Marx evaluated change from a revolutionary rather than evolutionary perspective. He posits that the history of mankind is the history of class struggle because it is class conflict that becomes the engine for social change and development. This points to the inevitability of conflict in society in general and developmental projects like dam projects have not been immune to conflict and contradictions.

While he talks of several stages of development, Marx devoted his life to the understanding of capitalist mode of production and its related evils for the ordinary and marginalized sections of society. The modern, industrial society for Marx is just but an experience of estrangement that emanates from the serious and callous commodity production and the industrialized social milieu (MacLennan *ibid*). Alienation is a ubiquitous social condition for the poor or the working class in the capitalist mode of production. Alienation for Marx has a devastating effect on human beings who labour in a capitalist economy and society in general (Ritzer *ibid*). Borrowing from this line of thinking, the displaced communities like the Tokwe Mukosi community go through a progressively reified alienated existence as they are debased and dislocated from their traditional sources of livelihood. In as much as this capitalist mode of production is primarily interested in

increased productivity and income generation(which is the goal of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project), it is not interested in using technology and infrastructure for the good of the poor and marginalized citizens (Rosen 1998, Carver 1998, Wendling 2009). This is because in the modern capitalist society, developmental projects are paradoxically aimed at benefiting the elite and the visible in society.

The poor, particularly in Africa, are consequently alienated from their land, culture, livelihoods, land and sources of wellbeing (Se Mutopo et al 2013). This is clearly a form of decapitalization that pauperizes the displaced communities as they are alienated from the manmade and natural capital which is of utmost important for their survival (Smith 2001). The issue at hand is that it is highly impossible to maintain a balance between what the agents of development such as the state in the Tokwe Mukosi context cherish and the actual issues affecting the very poor in society. Thus programs aimed at developing the poor communities such as the mega dam projects can at best keep them poor and at worst push them below the poverty datum line (Fernandes 2005). To worsen the already precarious situation, the compensation principle which is fashionable for many governments in the displacement and development paradox mostly target the ‘visible’ members of society and those who lose their livelihoods are sadly glossed over (Smith *ibid*).

The displacement of villagers from their capital inextricably generates conflict between the government and the affected villagers. This conflict is in many ways similar to the conflict between owners of the means of production and the working class. To a certain degree this conflict points to the aspect of class consciousness for the affected villagers, wherein they are moving from a class in itself to a class for itself. The aim here is to survive and recover the dislocated capital and livelihoods.

3.5 Modernity, capitalism, development projects and delusional development.

The 21st century is undoubtedly the period of the most radical ambivalence when one looks at the history of capitalism and modernity, this has actually led to the dialectic of progress and devastation (Barkin and Lemus 2016). Notwithstanding this ambivalence, the dam project and displacement enigma is continuous informed by the capitalist and modernist thinking. The monumental challenge confronting this philosophy is that its architects believe that the persistence of backwardness and poverty in rural economies lies squarely on the persistence of pre-modernist or pre-capitalist modes of production or what is known as *compensindios* (Arizmendi 2016). To further buttress this point, Savage and Warde (2010) opine that the issue at stake in the capitalism, modernity and development impasse emanates from the myth of progress, that is the delusion that capitalism and modernity are the preconditions for the desired lineal history of social, political and economic progress.

The implications of the modern world and its emphasis on progress, technology and infrastructural development have been succinctly described by Giddens 1990 as a juggernaut. It is ominously a runaway engine of colossal power which, together as human beings, we can push to some extent but also threatens to blast out of control and which could render itself asunder (Giddens 2013). The Tokwe Mukosi dam project in Zimbabwe as part of the modernity, capitalism and development matrix becomes a juggernaut which inevitably crushes and pushes away those who may try to resist it, leading to the marginalization of the villagers in this project. It is very clear that as long as social institutions that support and streamline this kind of modernity incessantly endure, humanity will never be in a position to control in totality the direction of development (Giddens Ibid). To echo the sentiments on the alienating and destructive effect of capitalism, development and displacement, Ritzer (2010) says, humanity shall never be entirely secure because the terrain through which modernity runs is infested with high risks and undesirable consequences for the poor and vulnerable. This is surely the same path that the Tokwe Mukosi displacees in Zimbabwe have been pushed to follow.

The detrimental effects of modernity can also be seen in that it is pushing away, destroying or surpassing traditional forms of social organization and culture in many dam projects. At best this process can be viewed as a very dynamic and cumbersome development, with remarkable

increase in scope and pace with the knock-on effect of changing previous systems, which are seen as inimical to progress (Trigilia 2003). It is highly contradictory, culminating in serious conflict between the winners and losers of this juggernaut of modernity (Streeten 1998). Still on the relationship between modernity and the peasant economy, critical Marxists see a relationship of domination because capitalism and modernity absorb and penetrate the peasant economy, placing it at its service (Barkin and Lemus 2016). Thus, the construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project represents the subversion of the peasant economy, replacing it with the capitalist mode of production. This naturally generates conflict as modes of production clash (Powell 2014; Hoppe 2010; Ng 2009). As a result of this Juggernaut of modernity and the clash of the modes of production, those occupying the bottom of the ladder like the Tokwe Mukosi people suffer under the burden of avoidable lifestyles, hunger, diseases and other related challenges including social risks (Turner 1990). Modernity, capitalism and development also lead to the disruption of systems of production, loss of assets, jobs, the dismantling of social and food security among the societies that are experiencing such change (World Bank 1994). In essence, they create landscapes of abandonment and estrangement, at the same time promoting a sense of loneliness and vulnerability for the displaced populations (Salerno 2003).

Modernity and its unintended consequences for the poor and vulnerable have also been conceptualized by Giddens (Ibid) in terms of four basic institutions in society. The first institution is capitalism, which is the symbol and prime mover of modernity. Capitalism dwells on such elements as commodity production, private ownership of property and the class system (also see Marx Ibid). It should be underscored that these facets of capitalism and modernity were the basis for the construction of the mega dam project in question and the subsequent displacement of Tokwe Mukosi Villagers in Zimbabwe. The end product is the establishment of an Agro-based town that is purely capitalistic in nature. Industrialism is the second aspect, which is linked to the use of machinery for production and inanimate sources of power (Ritzer Ibid). This is also evident in a number of settings including but not limited to transport, hydrogenation and communication. More significantly, when it comes to the state-people relations in internal displacements in Zimbabwe are the third and fourth ingredients of modernity enunciated by Giddens. These are surveillance capacities and control of the means of violence. Surveillance in

the context of the displaced communities is the continuous supervision of these villagers mainly in the political arena (See Giddens 1990). Control of the means of production is the capacity of the government to use military supervision or force in the face of civil resistance. In tandem with this position it has been seen that the history of the Zimbabwean government in internal displacements and development is littered by the use of institutionalized violence through repressive state apparatus (Hartnack 2016; Hove 2016; Hove et al 2008; Rutherford 2008; Tibajuka Ibid, Katsaura ibid).

For Giddens (Ibid), the new type of modernity that societies are currently experiencing comes with so many destructive elements and risks, making it a risk society for the ordinary citizens. This destructive tendency of modernity and capitalism has also been elaborated by Bauman (1989) in his analogy of modernity and holocaust. It is very clear that the onset of capitalism and modernity brought a sense of humiliation and lack of self-worth for the poor (Nhodo et al 2015). Commenting on the impact of capitalism, globalization and modernity on the Zambian poor Ferguson (2003) argues that, this colossal movement brings a sense of abjection, and this refers to the callous process of being pushed aside, expelled or discarded from the mainstream economy. It does not end there since the process does not only mean being pushed out but being pushed down, which entails debasement and mortification (Ferguson Ibid, Ferguson 1999). The Tokwe Mukosi people's experience clearly typifies this kind of experience since they have been pushed out of the mainstream economy in the quest for modernity and development. They have been pushed to the margins of society, where social life and survival is a daily struggle.

3.6 Dam projects and displacement: An anatomy of global and regional scholarship and trends.

The history of displacements as a result of dam projects is a long standing one, both globally and regionally. The displacement that emanates from dam projects in recent times is considered to be an endemic social phenomenon that impacts on the uprooted, the host communities, governments and multilateral agencies that work with the displaced persons (Colson 2008). From a

developmentalists' perspective, these dam projects are coated and supported by progress at the local, national, regional and international scales. In most cases, they are aimed at ensuring job creation, narrowing energy gap and enhancing water storage for irrigation in order to achieve sustainable development (Wragg-Morris 2012). In spite of these publicized virtues, these dam projects wherever they have been constructed; resulted in the displacement of millions of people across the world. In many cases they appear to have achieved their quantitative goals, but they have also been at the center of the many social and economic challenges afflicting the people who had to make way for their construction (Chris de Wet 2005).

It is very clear that these forced displacements of citizens aimed at infrastructural development epitomize a serious category of destructive change, which is a by-product of economic progression (Cernea 1996). It should also be emphasized that such outsider driven development projects in line with quantitative ideals are in the main extractive rather than being transformative (Mararike 2011). These dam projects are undoubtedly needed because they improve the quality of life, provide employment, irrigation, water sources and energy, but they almost always impinge on the rights of the people through state-power. Resultantly, the ordinary citizens, particularly the peasants, end up worse off in the process (Cernea 2009). Based on their detrimental impacts, these mega dam projects should only be constructed in tandem with the best practices, and they should only be confined to cases where adequate policies and political will to implement the policies exist (Scudder 2005).

The aim here is to overcome the social, economic and environmental costs, particularly for the poor and vulnerable communities facing displacements, for example the Tokwe Mukosi community. Many governments particularly in Africa are however found wanting on this aspect as they continue to lack adequate policies to meet the minimum requirements for the IDPs in general, and those displaced by developmental dam projects in particular. This precarious situation is exacerbated by the lack of political will and the flagrant disregard of the rule of law principle, particularly in the Zimbabwean context (Howard-Hassmann 2010).

Globally, the Three Gorges in China is a classic example of displacement that is induced by development. It is arguably the largest water project in the history of humanity (Tuch and Yao

2006,). From the time that it was constructed, it generated conflict and controversy at various levels, predominantly on its human and ecological repercussions (Dieu 1996, Du 2010). This is because it culminated in the forced movement of between one million and two million people, and ultimately, over six million residents would be displaced upon its completion (Gleick 2015). Symptomatic of any water project, the people affected are those that had previously benefitted from the resources that come from the river, leading to a callous dislocation from their livelihoods (Padovani and Brown 2006). It should be underscored that in most cases, when displacement and the associated costs come from such developmental dam projects, they are often justified as costs borne by a few villagers for ‘the greater good’ (Dwivedi 1999).

Just like the Tokwe Mukosi experience, the cost and benefit analysis in the Three Gorges was skewed in favor of quantitative development. The benefits envisioned include flood reduction, electricity generation and navigation. The social costs imbued in this project were however not emphasized. To buttress this point, Gleick (ibid) opines that in such projects, the benefits are easier to identify and quantify, comparing to the costs which normally manifest after the project. As argued above, from a moral perspective, these dam projects should not be accepted. The subsequent displacements and their justifications can remotely be accepted if the affected citizens are not left worse off than their previous state (Cernea 1993). This moral imperative is however very difficult to guarantee, given the state’s emphasis on quantitative development. Contrary to the displacements at Tokwe Mukosi, the social costs in the Chinese experience were mitigated by the political will on the part of the government and the availability of funding. This social economic context made the Three Gorges a model of successful relocation and rehabilitation project in the world, regardless of the said social costs (Ponsel and Pujoh 2006).

Contrary to the technical and top-down approach which continues to inform the dam project and displacement paradox on the global arena, Scudder (2005) succinctly analyzed the social costs of dam projects that have hitherto been ignored in what he terms the multidimensional stress. Here, he offers a trifurcated analysis of stress in forced displacement, wherein he talks of physiological stress, psychological stress, as well as social cultural stress. Physiological stress is a product of factors such as lack of nutrition, overcrowding and serious levels of morbidity. It is evident that

the flooding and subsequent forced relocations imposed a huge strain on the livelihoods of the Tokwe Mukosi community, exposing them to high risks of physiological stress. The overcrowded and inhabitable conditions at Chingwizi, Chivasa and Masangula hold camps are a clear testament of the physiological stress that the Tokwe Mukosi people are going through.

Psychological stress is linked to factors such as grief over loss of homes, unbearable trauma, and the growing uncertainty concerning an unknown future for the victims of forced displacement in most cases (Scudder *ibid*). The floods and the forced movement naturally resulted in traumatic conditions for the said victims. To further compound the problem, the future of the displaced victims remains precariously unknown. This is because the government of Zimbabwe lacks the required resources to solve the problem at hand. Lastly, there is social cultural stress, which is an unwanted product of loss of religion, culture, cosmologies, old activities, livelihoods and the disempowerment and marginalization of the traditional leaders (Scudder *ibid*). In Zimbabwe therefore, the displaced citizens are ubiquitously exposed to these elements of social cultural stress as they move into alien and inhabitable territories provided by the government.

As noted in the foregoing section Scudder's (2005) analysis of stress and vulnerability for the displaced residents is highly applicable in the Tokwe Mukosi context. He was nonetheless responding to the international context and conditions for the IDPs, which is remarkably different from the Zimbabwean experience on IDPs. This is because the institutions, structures, policies, laws and financial resources which are necessary for the provision of support and protection for displaced persons are highly limited and in many cases, they are non-existent in Zimbabwe. The international community and the usually dependable donor community have not been forthcoming in the provision of external support for the victims, owing to a number of factors. Given this background, it would be prudent to look at how the Tokwe Mukosi people are dealing with the stress and vulnerability highlighted above, with limited or no external support and protection as rational calculative and strategic actors.

While Scudder (ibid) focused on stress in forced relocations, other scholars talk of Transactional costs in displacements (Patil and Ghosh 2015; Cernea 1997; Cernea 2003; Kirby 2010). These are efforts displaced populations need to shoulder in order to regain their lost social-physical and economic standards (Patil and Ghosh 2015). These transactional costs resonate well with the social and cultural facets such as livelihoods, social networks, social capital and social institutions, which the displaced populations are likely to lose in the process. In addition to that, upon the relocation of the Tokwe Mukosi, it was necessary for the government to consider three disruptions of involuntary movements identified by (Cernea 1997). These are physical, social and economic disruptions. Rehabilitation of the victims of forced displacements should primarily focus on these critical elements.

Physical rehabilitation ought to concentrate on replacing the damaged infrastructure, which includes houses, schools, clinics, shopping centers and roads. Economic rehabilitation should reinstate the affected villagers' sources of income, and social rehabilitation is aimed at the refurbishment of social networks as well as cultural beliefs, cosmologies and religious beliefs which are affected as people are uprooted from their ancestral land. To support this, Mutopo et al (ibid) opine that land for Africans, taking for instance the Tokwe Mukosi people is a source of economic being, social wellbeing, a source of pride, and it is also symbolic. This means that displacing the people from their land comes with so many costs, and these costs in many cases cannot be quantified. This study is therefore aimed at moving away from the orthodox technical approach to displacements by achieving what Cernea (2003) terms the process of knowledge accumulation, correlation, codification and refinement. This new direction to forced displacements calls for the amalgamation of the voice of the sociologist and the victims on one hand, whilst on the other hand it calls for institutions and technocrats to reach an interface in forced displacements at Tokwe Mukosi.

While IDPs may suffer from stress or incur transactional costs as highlighted above, the fallacy is that in research and humanitarian work the victims of dam construction are wrongly perceived as weak, apathetic and unable to help themselves (Anderson et al 2013). They are believed to be at the mercy of the government and other philanthropic agencies. The Narmada experience in

India is a very good example of how the victims resist and influence relocation policy as rational, calculative and strategic social actors. The threat of marginalization as a result of displacement in this dam project unintentionally produced strong resentment among the villagers who expressed their discontentment through resistance, protests and local movements (Dwivedi 1999). Such actions by the villagers who are presumed to be weak and passive become part of the everyday forms of peasant resistance (Scott 1985). Here they use weapons of the weak to show their position with regards to the development and displacement problem. It is every clear that such acts are a direct product of quotidian practices of these actors and in most cases they range from dissimulation, feet dragging, false compliance, feigned ignorance, pilfering, slander, arson, sabotage *inter alia* (Scott and Kerkvliet 1986, Moore 1998). More interestingly such acts of resistance do not need a lot of coordination because the villagers make use of implicit understanding and various local networks, they often typify some form of personal self-help and mostly they avoid direct confrontation with the government (Scott 1985).

Just like the Three Gorges, the Narmada Valley project is considered to be one of the largest developmental water projects in the whole world (Dieu 1996). In this dam project, affected villagers used international opinion, the court system and non-violent protests to resist the government led relocations in the name of 'greater good' (Gates 2012). In as much as there is an element of uniformity with the Tokwe Mukosi dam project with regards to citizens' response to the situation, one should not ignore the differences in terms of the social, political and economic contexts and how this has influenced the villagers' responses. In India, the political space was far more democratic for the victims to exercise their rights and freedoms, while in Zimbabwe the democratic space is severely limited. Historically, the Zimbabwean government has always turned to the use of institutionalized violence against the victims whenever they resist relocation (see Mutepfa 1998).

Thus, it follows that in displacements the government's responses are driven by political expedient imperative, seen as more important than the social costs confronting the victims (Mutopo et al 2013). In a scenario where national or local authorities do not have respect for international and local laws like the Zimbabwean experience, locally defined needs, strategies

and understanding differ significantly from idealized international approaches (Carstensen 2016). This inevitably makes the Zimbabwean situation unique, thereby calling for a different approach in the understanding of the displaced communities.

Still on the global context, another glaring shortcoming is that when the dams are constructed, the estimates of the developmentalists in displacement are exceeded by the actual numbers of people that will be displaced at the end (Wragg-Morris). This position is also corroborated by the World Commission on Dams (2000), which with reference to the Sarovar dam project in India reports that under enumeration ranged between 20 000 and 40 000 persons. From the onset, the dam project in question expected to displace 39 700 villagers; but in the end it is projected to displace over 320 000 citizens (World commission on Dams Ibid). This underestimation comes at a huge cost for the locals as people who might need protection become invisible in the process. The Zimbabwean government is actually falling into the same trap as more people are expected to be displaced to pave way for the establishment of the agro based town and game reserve in and around the Tokwe Mukosi dam in addition to the initial estimates.

In Africa, a significant number of dam projects have been constructed in the name of development, and most of them were funded by the World Bank. The most famous ones include the Kariba dam, Akasombo, Kossou, Aswan, Cahora Bassa and Lesotho Highlands Water project. As noted in the preceding sections, most of the dam projects in Asia and the rest of the world were famous for their size and the benefits accrued from these dam projects. Conversely, the majority of the dam projects in Africa are notoriously popular for their adverse effects on the populations staying in their proximity (Thomas 2002). To put this into perspective, the total number of people forcibly moved to pave way for development just in the Kariba dam, Kossou and the Akasombo in Africa is far much greater than the number of people displaced by the largest dam projects in Asia (Cernea 1997). The detrimental effects of these dam projects including the Tokwe Mukosi dam have however been camouflaged by the potential ‘benefits’ brought by these developmental projects. In as much as they have been put forward as the ‘silver bullet’ of development, these dam projects are increasingly becoming Africa’s biggest pie in the sky, particularly for the poor peasants (Cohen 2014).

In Togo, the Nangbeto hydro project of 1992 is a very good example of development without people. It is arguably the most popular water project in Togo (World Bank Operations Evaluation 1998). This dam project culminated in the dislocation of 7,626 peasants, and just like many dam projects in Africa, it was constructed without significant resettlement planning, leading to an unprecedented resettlement disaster (Thomas *ibid*). The irony is that the project was funded and supervised by the World Bank, but it went on to violate the World Bank operational policy for dam projects. This policy is anchored on the need for an improvement on the previous living standards, production Levels and income generating capacity for the displaced communities (World Bank Operations Policy 1992). Regrettably, instead of fostering these ideals, this dam project resulted in massive land pressure, decreased soil fertility and reduced productive capacity. The Nangbeto valley hydro project therefore brings into question the desirability of these projects, particularly for the peasants whose livelihoods are entirely dependent on the environment.

In Ethiopia, the World Bank went on to underwrite the conversion of Awash valley into a commercial plantation solely aimed at cash crop production. Commercial plantations were therefore supposed to replace the traditional forms of production like pastoralism, which are unproductive in the strict economic sense. Following this line of thinking, Behnke and Kerven (2013), carried out an opportunity cost of replacing pastoralism with irrigated plantations in the same area. They went on to quantify the economic benefits and came to the conclusion that pastoralism is a primitive, archaic, and unproductive mode of production which cannot be compared to modern and technologically advanced forms of agriculture like plantation irrigations. The resultant displacement of over 25 000 pastoralists not only demonstrated the World Bank's double standards, but also its insincerity because the livelihoods of these pastoralists in Ethiopia were severely affected (Baru 1998). At the core of this and many other dam projects in Africa is the misconception among governments and policy makers that peasant land is underutilized, implying that it ought to be "developed" in order to maximize its productive capacity (MacDonald 2001). This has inevitably led to the expropriation of the peasants' ancestral land and alienation from their sources of livelihoods (Kloos 1982).

In Southern Africa, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project is one of the largest water projects in Africa. It also led to the displacement of 400 households (Hitchcock 2015). This exercise is unique because most of the victims were entirely dependent on food relief and other livelihood support from the government, multilateral agencies and the Civil Society (Hitchcock 2015). Such a situation is too idealistic to apply in displacements in the Zimbabwean context. Currently, the government is incapacitated to relocate and rehabilitate the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims leaving them to fend for themselves. For every US\$1 generated by treasury, US\$0, 90 towards meeting salaries for the government's workforce is leading to serious financial problems for the government (Nhodo 2014). The dire political environment obtaining in Zimbabwe also means that the much needed financial support from the international agencies has not been forthcoming, leaving them more vulnerable than the Lesotho Highlands Water Project victims. Thus Nyamadire et al (2014) posit that the problem in relocations in Zimbabwe is that the government lacks funding and mechanisms for compensating loss of families, land shrines and heritage, which are critical components in rural economies. Thus, very little has been done to reduce transactional cost and stress in the forced relocations in Zimbabwe.

3.7 Post independent Zimbabwe and the legacy of “development” and displacement.

3.7.1 The Fast Track Land Reform Program (*Jambanja*) and the development-displacement paradox.

The Fast Track Land Reform program (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe remains one of the most controversial experiences in the development-displacement conundrum. Based on such controversy, it generated remarkable attention within Southern Africa and beyond (Derman 2006). Within Zimbabwe it is commonly known as *Jambanja* (outright action), clearly underlining the violence embedded in this land reform program. It was carried out starting from the year 2000 up to the year 2004 by the ZANU PF government with the support of the veterans of the armed struggle popularly known as the war veterans in Zimbabwe. In principle the aim for

the violent removal of white farm owners and the subsequent redistribution of land to black Zimbabweans was to address the dual goal of decolonization and development, which were the fulcrum of the liberation struggle. Nevertheless, in practice the programme was a highly political and partisan exercise.

The farm invasions were actually in protest to the 'no vote' in the constitutional referendum done in the same year, which could have led to a smooth and orderly process of redistributing land to Africans through constitutional means. Other extenuating factors include the collapse of the negotiations with the former British colonizers on the funding for land reform, the failure of the 1998 donor conference to raise funds for land acquisition and the incessant legal battles between the ZANU PF government and the white farm owners on land acquisition (Moyo 2006). Irrespective of the moral necessities, a serious drawback of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe is that it benefited mainly the war veterans and ZANU PF supporters, excluding former farm workers and those seen as traitors or those working against the ruling party (Magaramombe 2010). The program is estimated to have displaced and dislocated over 4 000 white farm owners and close to 1 million Former black farm workers and their families from their land and sources of livelihood (Sachikonye 2005). Of these displaced persons the former farm workers were the worst affected category. This is partly because the majority of these farm workers were of a foreign origin and this background inevitably made them invisible leading to severe marginalization.

What is clear is that before the FTLRP and displacement the farm workers developed a very strong sense of community, social networks and solidarity. This type of displacement consequently had a knock on effect of ripping apart the farmworker's communal solidarity as it dispersed, dismantled and fragmented the normal social organization and the newly created kinship and personal ties in the farm villages (Cernea 2000). Over and above this, these displacements culminated in the serious levels of stress, insecurity and confusion for the former farm workers (Hartnack 2016). The general economic contraction, unprecedented inflation, breakdown in state services, severe unemployment, shortages of basic commodities and the political violence orchestrated by the war veterans and the militia worsened the situation for the displaced farm workers (Kinsey 2010, Magaramombe 2010).

What also made the situation unpalatable for these displacees were the inherent differences of farm workers in terms of origins, language, tradition and customs. These aspects are the critical ingredients for adaptation and building resilience for people under vulnerability such as these farm workers following their forced movement (Hartnack 2005). Of note is the fact that the Tokwe Mukosi dam displacees (which are the focus of this study) differ from the FTLRP displacees because they share a lot with regards to origins, language religion, tradition *inter alia*. Given this unique geographical and social context, various livelihood assets, social networks, social institutions and social capital become the hallmark for dealing with vulnerability. The differential conditions between the actors in question have also been captured by Rutherford (2008). He observed that the displaced farm workers in a significant way belong to a community whose activities, resources and leadership are worryingly reliant on the state. Thus they lacked alternative means of survival such as strong social institutions, social networks and social capital. They are therefore operating on the margins of the socio-economic and political order in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye2003). In most cases these former farm workers have fallen into the “forgotten people” category (Hartnack 2005).

In spite of the rhetoric of neutrality in the land distribution, an insignificant number of farmworkers (less than one percent) benefited from the resultant land redistribution (Magaramombe 2010). In respond to the displacement farm workers adopted a cocktail of coping mechanism, some moved into the cities and towns, peri-urban areas and others crossed the national borders into the neighboring countries. The majority however did not have many options and remained in the same farm villages becoming ‘the displaced in place’ (Magaramombe 2010). In other contexts this kind of displacement is known as ‘in situ displacement’ (Feldman et al 2003). Therefore, what this means is that there was no physical or geographical movement of the farm workers as opposed to the Tokwe Mukosi villagers who had to move into harsh and alien territories to pave way for the dam construction. These farm workers continued to occupy the same geographical spaces and their dislocation was socio-economic rather than geographical dislocation (Partridge 2000). Much as the picture appeared gloomy for the displaced former farm workers, a significant proportion was fortunate to get material and financial support from churches and other philanthropic organizations, without which they could not survive (Hartnack

ibid). Such a background is however far removed from the intricacies of Tokwe Mukosi experience, where external support and protection is erratic. This situation then pushes the Tokwe Mukosi displacees to fall back on community based protection.

3.7.2 State repression and displacement under Operation Murambatsvina/ Operation Restore Order.

When one looks at the post independent Zimbabwean history of population movement, it is very clear that this history is littered with repression and violence (Bratton and Masunungure 2006). After the violent displacements of white farmers and the predominantly black farm workers under the FTLRP, the next major event in a series of displacements was Operation Murambatsvina. This operation is also known as Operation Restore Order. It was a wide spread state sponsored campaign against the citizens in the major cities and towns in Zimbabwe. From the ZANU PF government's perspective this cleanup campaign was not only inevitable but functional for the urban populace. The reasons proffered for the brutal campaign were summed up by the chair of the Harare city council commission in Potts (2006). She said at that time,

The aim is to enforce city by-laws in areas of vending, traffic control, illegal structures touting/abuse of commuters by rank marshals, street/life prostitution, vandalism of property, infrastructure, stock theft, illegal activities, among others have led to the deterioration of standards thus negatively affecting the image of the city.....Operation Murambatsvina is going to be a massive exercise in the CBD and suburbs which will see the demolition of all illegal structures and all activities in undesignated areas.... Pge 275.

As has always been the tradition Operation Murambatsvina was justified by the government as nothing more than a move against criminal elements in the cities and towns (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008). This was just a smokescreen, in reality this operation was aimed at curtailing independent economic and political functions which were seen as

harboring the opposition party in the towns and cities, following the dismal performance of the ruling party in the preceding plebiscite (Brett and Masunungure *ibid*). Based on this reality check Operation Murambatsvina was simply a serious form of punishment inflicted on the urban populace for supporting the Movement for democratic change, which is the biggest opposition party in Zimbabwe (Mlambo 2008).

To further demonstrate its arrogance the government went on to state that it did not make any resident homeless just because these were nefarious persons living in shacks and it had a moral obligation to deal with them (Dorman 2016). This is ominously the same arrogance that continues to guide the state-people relations in forced displacements including the Tokwe Mukosi dam project. According to the special envoy sent to monitor the situation in Zimbabwe by the United Nations Anna Tibaijuka (2005), more than 700 000 citizens lost their livelihoods and or homes owing to this unprecedented crackdown. To corroborate this Potts (2008) posits that this draconian operation had far reaching implications on the evicted persons' social and economic life as well as the inalienable right to life if we consider the unintended consequences of this operation from the pro-poor perspective.

While there is voluminous literature on the impact of forced displacements in general and Operation Murambatsvina in particular, very little is known with regards to how the affected persons try to recover and reassert their livelihoods in post displacement situations. Emphasis of previous studies on violent displacements has almost always been on why the state acted that way, why displacements occurred and the general impact of displacements on the livelihoods of the displacees (Brett and Masunungure 2008, Sachikonye 2006, Human Rights Watch 2007, Chipungu and Adebayo 2012, Kamete 2009). This lacuna in research has also been observed by the Internal Displacement monitoring Center (2008). Referring to Operation Murambatsvina, it noted that three years after Operation Murambatsvina there is no elaborate stresses, figures or estimates of the victims in the aftermath of this operation. It therefore becomes prudent to focus more on the experiences of the displacees in post displacement situation, not only as victims but as rational and strategic actors capable of dealing with their situation. This enables us to move away from the victimhood perspective which continues to inform studies on Internally Displaced

Persons.

Considering the foregoing position, it is clear that there has been dearth of literature on what the displacees do for themselves in post displacement situations in Zimbabwe. Credit can marginally be extended to Pottes (2006) as well as Musoni (2010), for attempting to look at how the victims tried to devise other means of survival in response to forced displacements. It is documented that a significant number of the victims of Operation Murambatsvina died due to the disruption of their livelihoods and the related stress and trauma (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008). For those who survived this scourge, a significant number moved in to stay with relatives. Those who were fortunate to have links with rural communities migrated to rural areas, and others moved into peri-urban areas where they had access to the city, thereby maintaining their livelihoods through commuting. (Potts 2006).

The humanitarian community also came in to ameliorate the detrimental effects of Operation Murambatsvina albeit on a limited scale. The findings of these scholars in post displacement communities are telling, but this context is remarkably different from the Tokwe Mukosi forced displacements. This is because the victims of Operation Murambatsvina lacked a sense of community as they were largely based on the different social, economic and geographical differences. This made it highly impossible for them to mobilize social capital, local institutions and social networks for adaptation and building resilience in response to their predicament. Contrary to the experiences of Operation Murambatsvina victims, the said aspects become the backbone of the adaptive capacities of the Tokwe Mukosi victims tied to their unique background.

In addition to the aforementioned differential experiences, while the humanitarian community was there to assist the victims of Operation Murambatsvina, it is sadly not available for the Tokwe Mukosi Victims owing to an avalanche of political and economic factors in Zimbabwe's political economy (Hove 2008). These contextual differences, adaptive capacities and strategies of urbanites like the Operation Murambatsvina victims are inevitably different from the rural

communities like the Tokwe Mukosi community, thereby lending credence to a study that looks at significance of social networks, social capital and local institutions for adaptation and building resilience among the displaced rural communities.

3.8 Conclusion

The fulcrum of the foregoing chapter was to situate this study in the past and the present scholarship trends on Internally Displaced Persons. It shows the continuities and discontinuities between this study and such scholarship trends. I however started by showing the ambiguities surrounding the definition of Internally Displaced Persons within the scholarship community. I then moved on to problematize yet another key term in this study, which is development. It has become a buzzword in literature and practice as nation states have moved to implement dam projects in the quest for development and modernity. In such a review, my aim was to look at the winners and losers in this development-displacement paradox. I showed that in almost all the cases, the very poor are the losers as they suffer the unintended consequences of development. I then proceeded to focus on the experiences of mega dam projects and displacement from both the global, regional community, and then I cascaded to the Zimbabwean context. Here I argue that the Zimbabwean experience at Tokwe Mukosi is at variance with regional and international trends owing to a plethora of political, economic and social obstacles to meeting the minimum standards for IDPs. Some of these misfortunes are economic problems, political instability and the general culture of violence in the state-people relations in this development and displacement matrix. Such variations become the plausible justification for engaging in a study of this magnitude.

CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGIES AND METHODS.

4.1 Introduction-setting the context

A sound academic study is framed by ontological and epistemological positions, but more significantly by the methodology and methods utilized by the researcher to meet the objectives underlining the research. Research methodology relates to the quest or search for new knowledge. For Kothari and Gaurav (2014), methodology is a scientific or systematic search for pertinent data on a given topic, which also involves the transition from the known to the unknown. In the same line of thinking, methods refer to many ways, techniques or processes used by the researchers to collect and analyze data (Halperin and Health (2012)). The ensuing chapter dwells on the ontological and epistemological questions as well as the overall methodology adopted in this study and the data gathering techniques employed thereof. It grasps the ethical and practical reflections in the field and the stratagems deployed to deal with the challenges encountered. This is predicated on the understanding that the field in the research process is essentially a political arena where pragmatic rules as opposed to normative rules become the flagship of the whole research process.

As part of reflexive ethnography, I show how the *Wematongo* (someone from the original area of displacement) status became critical in circumventing many practical and ethical impediments in this research. The chapter will also move on to chronicle the sampling processes and techniques used to select participants in this study. Lastly in this chapter, I focus on the limitations and delimitations of the study. It is however prudent to start by situating the methodological issues within the ontological and epistemological debate, which had footprints on the methodology and the research process in this study.

4.2 Ontological and epistemological questions in the study of the socially marginalized.

In sociological research, ontological and epistemological questions are pertinent as the precursor

to any research. Ontology is directed towards the understanding of social reality. It is also aimed at the description of the entities that exist as well as an understanding of the kind of relationships between elements, at the same time analyzing the categories of being (Cuba and Lincon 1989). It seeks to answer the following two fundamental questions

- What exists?
- What is the nature of the social world? (Halperin and Health 2012).

It is worth noting (as observed in this study) that ontological positions impact on the procedures and processes of knowing (epistemology). Conversely, epistemology should best be understood as the theory of knowledge that dwells on the nature and scope of knowledge (Slevitch 2011). Cuba and Lincon (1989) went on to postulate that in general, epistemology is premised on the following key questions,

- How does a researcher know what he or she wishes to know?
- What is the truth?
- What is the correlation between the researcher and what is observable?

This ontological and epistemological background remarkably influenced my choice of qualitative methodology over quantitative methodology in the understanding of lived experiences of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers in the post displacement condition. The rationale informing this was to examine the people-state contestations entrenched in the forced displacements of the Tokwe Mukosi people, and to analyze the implications of the forced displacements on the social networks of the Tokwe Mukosi community. It also aimed at assessing the impact of forced displacements on local institutions and how the victims use local institutions to deal with adversities. It also sought to examine the Tokwe Mukosi people's vulnerability, adaptation and resilience to forced displacements.

4.3 The efficacy of interpretivist philosophy in studying the 'otherised'

From the outset, it is prudent to understand that there are two competing paradigms in sociological research. These are positivism and interpretivism. Given the fact that this study was

purely qualitative, it followed that the research should be grounded in interpretivism, which is also the dominant paradigm in qualitative studies. Interpretivism in a significant way is linked to the classical sociologists like Max Weber and the Symbolic interactionists. It was refined and popularized by Shurtz (1978) in modern sociological theory and research. While I acknowledge that positivism has great potential to open different dynamics in the understanding of IDPs, it nevertheless falls short when it is counterpoised with the objectives of this study. My aim was not to impose my reality on the subjects. At the same time I did not wish to ensure reliability, replicability and generalization of the displaced persons' experiences but a deeper, subjective and context specific understanding of these social actors. In a nuanced approach, I tried to reorient research on IDPs in a subjective direction which is also based on the knowledge and meanings attached by the actors to social action.

In tandem with the aforementioned methodological orientation, the core value of this paradigm and my research was to work with the subjective meanings endowed in the flood 'victims', to acknowledge their being, to understand them, to construct them and to use them as the fulcrum of understanding displacement-development matrix (Golkuhl (2012)). It should also be underscored that for the positivists objects are insignificant unless the researcher imposes his or her own social reality upon them. On the contrary, for the Interpretivists, social reality is on the subjective and shared meanings between the researcher and the participants. This philosophical background greatly influenced my interaction with the participants throughout the research. Participants were therefore viewed as interpreters as well as co-producers of data, making the research process a socially constructed enterprise (Golkuhl 2012).

What this kind of relationship means is that ontologically, I acknowledged that the researcher and social reality have a dialectical existence or more appropriately, they are two sides of the same coin. Epistemologically, I also appreciated that my experience and their experiences are intentionally constituted through the lived realities and that the object is interpreted based on the meanings of my experience (Sandburg 2004).

4.4 Research methodology

The nature of the study, based on the aforementioned ontological and epistemological standpoints, made it imperative for the researcher to use qualitative methodology. In adopting qualitative methodology, I was also influenced by Trow's (1957) assertion that when it comes to social research, the problem being investigated determines the methodology to be used. Thus, qualitative methodology was chosen because the ultimate goal of this research was to dwell on the way or ways in which the Tokwe Mukosi villagers understand and interpret their life worlds within their context. To augment this position, Artkinson et al (2001) posit that the underlying principle of qualitative studies is embedded in their interpretive approach to social life and the analysis of the lived realities of the social actors. In tandem with the subjective understanding method, the study sought to understand the Tokwe Mukosi people in their context. This became the basis for understanding the insignificant 'Other' in sociological research. This is also driven by the desire to empathize rather than to merely describe or explain the intricacies of the Tokwe Mukosi people, which has been the major trap which previous researchers on the area under study fell in.

In line with the above, Denzin and Lincoln (2011) conceptualize qualitative methodology as a paradigm that is specifically concerned with the subjectivity of social life, enabling the researcher to see social life through the perspectives of the researched. The gist of qualitative methodology therefore is the innate desire to observe the social world from the standpoint of respondents. Throughout my stay in the field, this particular methodology proved to be a highly people centered methodology. This virtue helped to facilitate the much needed rapport between the researcher and the researched, something that would have been difficult to obtain using the quantitative approach. In many ways, this approach is detached from the reality on the ground. This is also influenced by the nature, background, experiences and history of the displaced Tokwe Mukosi community.

In as much as proponents of quantitative methodology have a strong case against the interpretivists and phenomenologists, this methodology was inappropriate in studying the Tokwe Mukosi victims based on a cocktail of factors, chief among them being the status of a displaced

person, which is also a master status in the new environs. Given this background quantitative methodology notwithstanding its virtues would not assist to meet the aforementioned objectives of this study. Of note is the fact that many studies done in Zimbabwe on the challenges faced by Internally Displaced Persons tended to adopt a quantitative approach, wherein methods such as questionnaires, surveys and statistical methods were central. This fallacy is mainly linked to the fact that the majority of these studies are funded by humanitarian organizations. Thus, quantitative methodology appeals greatly to the donor community. This is evident in many reports that were produced by organizations such as Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, Catholic Relief Service, OXFAM and Batanai HIV and AIDS Service Organization (BHASO). (Many of these were used as secondary sources of data for this research). While such methodological approaches maybe useful, they tend to gloss over the lived realities, shared meanings and experiences of the displaced communities.

4.5 Research methods.

4.5.1 The Utility of ethnography in understanding the displaced Persons.

In line with qualitative methodology, the research used ethnography, which primarily focuses on the understanding of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors of the researched community involving participation of the researcher. (See Denzin and Lincoln *ibid*) The researcher endeavored to develop reflexive ethnography that dwells on the intricate relationship between the participants' life-worlds and the researcher's interpretation of the situation at hand. For Brewer (2000) ethnography is,

“The study of people in naturally occurring settings or fields by means of methods which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner, without meaning being imposed on them externally” pge 7.

Ethnography therefore became an appropriate approach primed at understanding the behavior of the Tokwe Mukosi people in the natural setting, with the focus being on the socio-cultural interpretations of social life and experience in the post displacement community (Marcee 2013).

Watson-Gegeo (1988) opines that there are four basic goals of ethnography and these are,

- To focus on the culturally specific behaviour of individuals in the many groups that aggregate into a society.
- To link the micro context to the overarching macro elements like the community and society.
- To be guided by a conceptual framework that frames the different situations and the subsequent research questions that the investigator seeks to answer at the end of the research.
- To have a strong understanding of the problem in its own terms with the aim of producing grounded theory (also known as the emic approach).

Based on these internal attributes of ethnography, I went on to adopt an ethnographic insider approach. Here I sought to describe the respondents' experiences from the terms of the Tokwe Mukosi people or what is known in sociology and anthropology as the emic approach to social research. Throughout the research I made sure that I immersed myself in the setting under study for an extended period of time, developed strong understanding with the participants and took a number of roles in this unique environment (Morris et al 1999). I deliberately tried to avoid imposing my life-world as an outsider on the community in question. This point augurs very well with Long's actor oriented approach to development as enunciated in chapter 3 of this thesis.

Based on ethnography, the researcher triangulated a number of research methods. These ranged from participant observation, unstructured interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and secondary sources of data. Nevertheless participant observation was used as the main method of data gathering.

Ethnographic research was undertaken from October 2017 to October 2018. In February 2019, I visited and stayed at Chingwizi for two weeks in the company of my five undergraduate students. They were undertaking research on the various facets of the Chingwizi community.

This visit accorded me the opportunity to polish some grey areas that I observed in the process of producing this write up. I therefore managed to observe and record emerging and complementary trends among the displacees. We interacted and took part in the daily activities of the residents in the following areas, Bongo, Nyuni, Masangula, Mufula and Mukosi.

4.5.2 Participant Observation

Based on the strengths of ethnography, highlighted in the preceding section, I went on to employ participant observation which also became the main data gathering method for this study. As stated in the previous section, participant observation as part of ethnography was undertaken over a period of one year, starting from October 2017 to October 2018. Participant observation encourages researchers to actively participate in the everyday activities of the researched community, simultaneously recording crucial events. Here, I aimed at understanding social action in a naturalistic environment without imposing social reality on them. I was therefore able to immerse in the everyday life of the Tokwe Mukosi people over an extended period of time. The rationale was to obtain a holistic picture of the political nature of the forced relocations, how the respondents' livelihoods, local institutions and social networks were affected. The other reason was to look at how the respondents modified and created new social networks and social institutions to deal with adversities in the new context.

It should also be underscored that participant observation is very effective when studying rural and often marginalized communities like the Tokwe Mukosi community. This is linked to the philosophy that such communities have relatively homogeneous populations. In these communities, the rate of mobility is low compared to urban communities (Grankil 1974). It follows that such data gathering techniques are customized for small scale communities like the Tokwe Mukosi community in Mwenezi. This therefore makes participant observation critical in understanding the physical, political, socio-cultural and economic aspects of such rural communities. In this study I wanted to appreciate what the Tokwe Mukosi people do, with whom and the frequency of such actions.

In addition to the above, it must be stressed that participant observation is also useful when little is known (qualitatively) on the subject under investigation, like the Tokwe Mukosi people who continue to survive on the margins of society. Furthermore, it is important when the differences between those on the margins and the outsiders, implying a situation whereby their experiences are obscured from what the outside actors perceive. My experience in the field reveals that the Tokwe Mukosi people and their plight are hidden from what people outside this particular community know. These people have fallen under the category of the forgotten people. Given this context, participatory methods become instrumental in empathizing with such people.

Centered on participant observation, I was able to describe what was happening, where and when it occurred from the victims' lifeworlds. Based on the emic approach and with the assistance of my student research assistants, I was able to participate in the daily activities of the researched. I also participated in the many community gatherings and social events to meet the outlined objectives of participant observation. Many of these gatherings were political gatherings. This is because my research coincided with the 2018 general elections in Zimbabwe. The majority of these gatherings were ZANU PF gatherings and this resonated well with the fact that the area under study is a ZANU PF stronghold. A few gatherings for the opposition parties were nevertheless attended by the researcher. Other gatherings included religious gatherings, funerals and the donor community gatherings. I also participated and observed behaviors during the local beer drinking parties, which are very common in the summer season in the Zimbabwean rural communities. More importantly, I participated in the local informal markets which were done at the end of every month. These markets are popularly known as BACOSSI in Zimbabwe, and this means the Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention. It is a term that was borrowed from the central government policy that ensures cheap and affordable supply of basic commodities during the times of economic hardships for the poor. For the Tokwe Mukosi people, it implied a market where they can access all basic requirements at affordable prices.

Again, in line with the dictates of participant observation, I participated and observed interactions in three distinct funerals among the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people. The first one was conducted near Bongo business center in July 2018. The second one, which was more elaborate, took place at Nyuni village in November the same year. Lastly, I participated at a

funeral that was conducted at Ngundu Shopping center. This shopping center is located in the *matongo* area. It is interesting to note that a bus belonging to Nyaradzo funeral services was sent to Chingwizi to ferry the displacees to attend this funeral. It shall be indicated that this was one of the significant social arrangements in place to maintain ties with the kinsmen in the *matongo* area. Participating in these social events helped the researcher to determine the place and significance of informal burial societies vis-à-vis private local institutions like Nyaradzo funeral services in a comparative way.

I also participated at local events like *humwe*, this is a local and civic institution created to provide labor for households in a collective and reciprocal way. (I will dwell on the importance of this local institution for survival in chapter seven of this thesis). Lastly, I attended and observed proceedings at the general meeting of one of the biggest Village Loan and servings (VLS) programme at Chingwizi. Overall, the participation in these types of gatherings helped the researcher to understand rural economies and the livelihood strategies deployed by the villagers, at the same time observing various forms of informal networks for survival.

Outside the Chingwizi area, I also attended and participated in the commissioning ceremony for the Tokwe Mukosi dam in 2017. The official commissioning was superintended by the then president of Zimbabwe R, G Mugabe. It was also attended by many ministers and officials from many government departments as well as traditional leaders. Many displaced Tokwe Mukosi villagers were also bused to grace this ceremony. This presented an opportunity to identify and understand the different life-worlds in the conceptualization and meaning of development between the state and displaced communities from remote areas in Chingwizi.

As we participated in the daily life of the researched together with my research assistants, we were able to take field notes. We deliberately made careful and objective notes, whilst recording key events and observations. While participant observation presents challenges in creating rapport, rapport with the researched in this case was easy to create because a significant number of respondents were known to the researcher and the researcher was known by the respondents based on the same historical connection. Many of my research participants were originally from

Mushawasha and Chivi, which is also my rural home. This helped me to such an extent that while we were in the field, reference was continuously made to that historical connection, and this partly made the researcher an insider in the whole research process. While I shared a lot with the community under investigation, as a participant observer, I made an effort to learn the experiences of my subjects while maintaining the outsider label. In this interactive process, we were also able to take photos of social situations that we thought could help to further illuminate the issues under investigation.

By taking an insider approach, I clearly followed what Muzvidziwa (2004) terms 'doing Anthropology at home' and this proved to be very useful in gathering data in a very flexible way. Of note is the fact that sometimes it was very difficult to draw a line between the actual research and social life during my stay in Zimbabwe in that particular year of research. Many of my social encounters both in Chivi and Masvingo urban would be turned into very useful research settings. An interesting case is when I visited Maringire shopping center during the Christmas holiday as per tradition. (In my culture, one is expected to visit their rural home every festive season). As we were having drinks in the company of my brothers, two gentlemen approached and greeted us in a jovial mood. They were then introduced to me as *vana Sekuru* (uncles) from Zifunzi who were displaced to Chingwizi following the flood disaster. Based on reflexivity, the situation was turned into a research context, albeit in a highly informal way. These two relatives eventually became very important in my subsequent stay at Chingwizi.

Another interesting context that points to the efficacy of being a resident researcher was a funeral that I attended at Gororo near Ngundu Growth point. A workmate in the department of Sociology and Social Anthropology from that particular area lost his father. As per the cultural expectations and the spirit of *Ubuntu/Hunhu*, I had to attend that funeral in the company of other members from the department. It turned out that the Gororo area is part of the *Matongo* for the Chingwizi people. Again, as part of the cultural expectations, many of these displacees attended the funeral. Such contexts, despite the fact that they fell outside conventional research, would undoubtedly offer the researcher some insights into the lives of the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people. This is because many conversations pertaining to how they are 'getting by' or going ahead at Chingwizi would naturally occur.

4.5.3 Unstructured interviews

Participant observation and unstructured interviews were not completely divorced from each other during the whole research process. Instead, unstructured interviews in most cases were conducted as part of the researcher's engagement with participant observation. Unstructured interviews bring a framework for the respondents to air out their views freely with regards to the issues brought by the researcher or what they themselves introduce during the research process. (Ojong 2004). This method helped the researcher to probe deeply into the experiences, challenges as well as stratagems deployed by the Tokwe Mukosi people in response to their involuntary movement. It also provided the opportunity for the respondents to express themselves naturally, enabling the researcher to gather data that is rich in validity. During the interview process, the researcher to a limited extent relied on recording the interview processes, and the interviews were transcribed as a faster and more efficient way of collecting data. It should be stressed that some of the interviewees were not comfortable with the recording of the interviews. This is partly due to the political environment in Zimbabwe, and the contestations surrounding the displacement in question. Thus, the obtaining situation inevitably made the topic highly sensitive and political. In such situations, I needed to be highly flexible to accommodate those who felt threatened by the recording of the conversations. Thus, I resorted to taking field notes and the use of memory.

In addition to the village interviewees, the researcher interviewed five key informants. This helped to corroborate data gathered using participant observation, unstructured interviews and Focus Group Discussions. These were interviews with knowledgeable people in the Tokwe Mukosi community. Of note is the fact that key informants based on their skills and social positions are better placed to provide information, and that position gives them a deeper understanding of the situation at hand (Marshall 1996). The key informants were drawn from key government official in the ministry of local governance, the village chair and employees from two main Non-Governmental Organizations working in the Tokwe Mukosi area. These key informants were particularly useful in providing a more neutral position on the state-people

relations in this dam project and displacement conundrum. They also helped in providing a clear understanding of the role of local institution in the struggle for survival at Tokwe Mukosi, a topic that I deal with at length in Chapter 7 of this thesis. To buttress the culture of fear in Zimbabwe, all the key informants except one were uncomfortable with the use of the audio recording device. Again, I had to rely on taking the field notes and the use of memory.

With the qualitative approach in mind, the interviews that I conducted were not standardized or rigid. Many of them were flexible and in most cases, they occurred as conversations, I was however guided by the interview guide, which also assisted in ensuring that the conversations remained in streak with the research objectives. The researcher deliberately gave the respondents the opportunity to decide the locations for the interviews. A significant number of them were however conducted at the places of residence of the interviewees, especially those interviews that were conducted in the post-harvest time. During the farming and harvesting season, I was flexible enough to do the interviews while the interviewees were engaging in their daily activities. The aim was to ensure minimum disruption of the respondent's day to day activities, particularly their livelihoods. The locations for the interviews presented extra-observational insights for the researcher. Most of the Interviews lasted between 30 minutes to one hour, depending on the situation.

In spite of the virtues of unstructured interviews, they were however not easy to conduct based on a number of experiences. Of note is the fact that the one hectare plots meant that the households were too close to each other. Sometimes we would arrive at a homestead and after the introductions, the neighbors would come to greet the new visitor in line with the cultural expectations of the Shona people. In a significant way, this would end up unintentionally disrupting the interview process as the neighbors would take long time to go. Given such a background, we had to be very patient and in one incident, we changed the interview to become a Focus Group Discussion.

As indicated above, the *Wematongo* identity in this research was very critical in creating rapport in this research, particularly in participant observation. Nevertheless, it presented a minor problem when it comes to unstructured interviews. Each time I introduced myself as a resident of

their original Chivi place, most of the respondents would be very happy and accommodative. They would go on to enquire a lot about the situation back home and how most of the people were doing. While I felt comfortable with this gesture, it inadvertently turned to be time consuming. Eventually, it limited the number of interviews to be conducted per day. Faced with this practical challenge, patience became a virtue. I also had to reschedule some of the appointments.

In practical terms, some of the interviews at times turned to be political in orientation. This is because power is covertly in the hands of the researcher as opposed to the researched. I observed that some of my respondents, despite the assurance that I am a resident researcher, were reluctant to speak on one and one situations, partly due to their prior experience and the general interaction with state agents. This therefore means that this method may not be the best when focus is on the vulnerable and marginalized citizenry like Internally Displaced Persons. To deal with this pitfall, I used Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). These two methods then augmented and corroborated each other to produce thick descriptions and understanding of the issue under study. In the next section, I therefore focus on the significance of FGDs in understanding this vulnerable community.

4.5.4 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

As mentioned in the preceding section, I also used FGDs in this study. The overarching reason was to deal with the major shortcomings of unstructured interviews. Madriz in Denzin and Lincoln (2011) opines that group discussions impart to social research the component of multi-vocality. This is because respondents are encouraged to talk to each other, simultaneously creating an environment that is closer to the natural world. Group discussions also helped respondents who could not speak on face to face situations to speak up. What also became evident is that the interaction of group members produced insights into the daily experiences of the people, ways of dealing with vulnerability and the shared beliefs (Nyumba et al 2018). They

therefore proved to have a great potential to generate data that is unique, compared to the other primary methods.

In this research process, FGDs were relatively easier to conduct based on the team work that I had with my research assistants. I went on to assume the role of the facilitator, and this helped us to create a relaxed and conducive environment for the purposes of effective group discussions. The research assistants took the responsibility of recording, observing the non-verbal cues and the overall group dynamics. Group members who wanted to dominate the discussions were kept under control, and those who felt marginalized were encouraged to be active. We also made sure that the discussions were not unnecessarily too long, so that the participants would not bear the unintended consequences of fatigue and loss of concentration. Conventionally, three group discussions were conducted and in terms of composition, the first was made up of women only. The second had men and the last group was a combination of both men and women. In addition to these formal FGDs, we resourcefully managed to turn some informal discussions based on participant observations into FGDs. This was particularly true in social events and community gatherings. This became apparent in the beer drinking parties, religious gatherings, Village Loan and Servings (VLS), BACOSI events, *humwe*, political gatherings, funerals *inter alia*. Above all, such informal FGDs offered the much needed extra observational insights in this research.

4.5.5 Secondary sources of data

Finally, In terms of data gathering techniques I made use of secondary sources of data. The aim was to augment the data gathered using the aforementioned primary sources of data. I therefore reviewed local and international newspapers that covered the challenges afflicting the Tokwe Mukosi people in the face of the disaster and post displacement social milieu. In addition to that, I also made use of newspaper, various reports published by human rights pressure groups, local and international organizations working in this area. These included but not limited to the Lawyers for Human Rights, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, BHASO OXFAM and Catholic Relief Services. Lastly, I made use of reports published by various government departments, and these reports helped to ascertain the government position on the issue under discussion. These reports were also critical in espousing the state people relations at Chingwizi. The major

drawback in the reports published by both the local and international organizations was the reductionist tendency. Mostly, the Tokwe Mukosi people are evaluated from a 'victims' label. This is partly because most of these were published during the disaster year. Six years after the disaster, most NGOs would go back to the cocoon. Nevertheless, this data was important in unraveling the state people relations, and this is a central theme that I will interrogate in chapter 5.

4.6 Sampling

The study was carried out in a part of Masvingo province called Mwenezi, and the targeted localities were Chingwizi holding camp, Mukosi, Bongo shopping center and the Nyuni area. These are the areas that temporarily housed the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people. These people were moved from Chivi and Masvingo rural to pave way for the mega Tokwe Mukosi dam project. When it comes to social research, it should be reiterated that an appropriate sampling technique provides the platform to minimize cost, carry out the research efficiently, increase flexibility and greater accuracy (Chochran 2010). In tandem with the paradigms guiding social research, there are two basic sampling approaches in social research and these are probability and non-probability sampling methods. The first one is linked to quantitative research, and the latter is more appropriate in qualitative research.

Based on the aforementioned binary observation, I went on to choose non-probability sampling method as the overall approach in the quest to select respondents for this study. The goals of this research in many ways had a bearing on the choice of non-probability sampling method. In this study, I sought to get a deeper understanding of the study area without generalizing my findings to the whole of Zimbabwe. This method also proved to be a convenient way of sampling with very little or no costs incurred at the end. Non-probability sampling method is also fundamental when one considers the sensitivity and the political nature of the Tokwe Mukosi people and their predicament in these alien territories.

Within the aforementioned sampling method, I went on to use purposive sampling technique, which is also known as judgmental sampling. What it means is that I used my personal judgment

to select information rich cases for this study. Accordingly, Teddlie and Yu (2007) define purposive sampling as a non-probability sampling method where the researcher selects respondents based on the actual purpose associated with the research questions. As I alluded to elsewhere in this thesis, purposive sampling was easy to apply considering the historical connections and networks that I shared with the Tokwe Mukosi people. Through purposive sampling, I went on to select 30 respondents for unstructured interviews. An attempt was however made to include women, the aged and people with disabilities in the sample selected. The aim was to capture the experiences of those that I consider to be people who are surviving bifurcated marginality. Nevertheless, the majority of my respondents were men and this is largely linked to the patriarchal nature of the Tokwe Mukosi community. It follows that female respondents were difficult to access for interviewing compared to their male counterparts. While a larger sample would have been desirable, it was not feasible given the nature of the study which is a case study. Thus, the findings would not be generalized but remain peculiar to the Tokwe Mukosi people.

Taking purposive sampling as its axis, the research also included six key informants. These included the acting District Administrator (DA) for Mwenezi, an employee from the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society (ZRCS), a member from the Ministry of labor and social welfare, an official from the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) and a ZANU PF village chairperson. I also interviewed an official from the Zimbabwe Parks and Wild Life Management Authority (ZIPWLMA) and this helped to get an official position with regards to its relations with the Tokwe Mukosi people in view of the proliferation of poaching both at Chingwizi and the Tokwe Mukosi dam. During the initial phase of this research, it was difficult for the researcher to get appointments from the respondents. It was the planting season and it was followed by the harvesting period for the farmers in Zimbabwe. Thus, many of them were busy working in the fields for subsistence. I therefore relied heavily on participant observation during the period in question. The winter season nonetheless presented easy access to the respondents as their workload was reduced during this time of the year. The initial findings in this study were presented at the research symposium held at GZU in the School of Social Sciences in 2017. Again, I presented the findings at an International conference held at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe

in 2018. These platforms and the constructive criticisms thereof helped to sharpen and refocus the study in a greater way.

4.7 Research ethics and the dialectics of the insider and outsider.

4.7.1 Gaining entry through the politics of belonging (*Wematongo*).

In this section, I reflect on the ethical dilemmas that I encountered in the twelve months of research at Chingwizi in Mwenezi. It should be emphasized from the outset that any study that involves people raises ethical questions (Muzvidziwa 2004). As argued elsewhere in this report, the relations of mistrust between the states and residents in the pre-displacement and post-displacement phases inevitably made this study a highly political and subjective study. This state of affairs raised serious challenges in getting the letter of authority from the central government, which was a prerequisite for carrying out this research. The letter in question would also ensure that the research is couched in the ethical imperatives in sociological research. This would also help to ensure that the study meets the University of KwaZulu Natal (UKZN) ethical guidelines for postgraduate studies. To the central government, the local and provincial authorities, the Chingwizi area and the other transit camps that house the Tokwe Mukosi people are insulated from research and other humanitarian activities deemed to be political in orientation.

In order to get the aforementioned permission, I had to go through a cumbersome process, starting from the local and provincial authorities up to the central government. Given the volatility of the political environment in this context, the local authority and provincial authority would only facilitate the process, but I needed final authority from the central government. It became evident from the outset that ethical guidelines would be very difficult to observe in their crude form. As a researcher, I needed to be very flexible, patient and pragmatic to achieve my objectives. This is also linked to reflexive ethnography, which was the main method used to gather data in this study. In the final analysis getting the authority to do research became a negotiated position. I needed to make practical negotiated agreements with the central government and its subsidiaries. In such a dilemma, Teshome-Bahiru and Negash-Wossone

(2007) encourage ethnographic researchers to ensure that such agreements be grounded in real discussions involving individual and public discussions of the research and its purpose.

To achieve that objective, I had to navigate the challenge of providing evidence and explanations that there were no political motives underlining this research. The authorities were therefore assured that this research was merely for academic purposes. Most importantly, I had to deploy social capital, wherein the politics of identity and belonging became a valuable resource. I had to produce evidence that I am a resident researcher. This is because my rural home is Chivi in Masvingo, which is the area that was affected by flooding and the subsequent displacements. This actually made me *Wematongo*, a popular title among the Tokwe Mukosi people given to someone with the same identity, original geographical location and socio-economic predicament. Armed with this status, I was then granted the authority to do research, albeit after three months of waiting and lobbying.

Informed consent was also one of the key ethical considerations that I had to seriously consider in this study. The aim here was to protect and fully inform my participants about the purpose, risks and benefits for participating in this research. While I acknowledge that the size, cultural background and location of my study area made it difficult for the respondents to understand many of the technical facets of ethics, I made an attempt to make sure that the local people get adequate knowledge about the nature and purposes of this study. This would mean that they participated voluntarily from an informed position. Permission was also sought by the researcher to record the interviews. The politics and contestations embedded in these internal displacements however made some respondents uncomfortable with the use of audio recording devices and the signing of informed consent forms.

In as much as I managed to have many of my respondents signing the Informed consent forms, some respondents particularly the elderly were averse when it comes to the signing of informed consent forms as well as the use of audio recording devices. As stated above, this was a byproduct of the volatile state-people relations and wide spread culture of violence in Zimbabwe. Consequently, this has led to uneasiness and relations of mistrust between the Chingwizi people

and public institutions. (I explore this element in chapter 5 of this thesis). To put this into perspective, when I requested to record VaJongwe (50) (not real name) he said,

“Nhai mwanangu kana dzingori nyaya ngatingotaura handiti wati uriwematongo. Ko zvekusayina nekutepewa zvakva kupi?Unoda kuzviendesa kupi?Bva, kana zvakadaro ngazvikone.”

(My son; if it is just a discussion, let’s just talk. Did you not say you are from *matongo*? If so, then what’s with this idea of signing a form and recording? What do you want to do with that information? If that’s the case, we’re not going to talk).

Some respondents agreed to be recorded, but they were in a meditative mood and the information provided was inconsistent. Faced with this social challenge, I had to be flexible and embrace the ideals of reflexivity in such contexts. Thus, to deal with this practical challenge, the researcher resorted to taking field notes with the help of the two research assistants. This explains why I had fewer recorded interviews in this study, compared to the field notes.

In addition to the above mentioned solution, recorded respondents were also promised that the recorded data will be stored in a safe and secure laptop and that the data will be destroyed after five years. To guarantee confidentiality and anonymity, I gave them the assurance that I will use pseudonyms as opposed to their real names. This helped in a significant way to instill confidence in them, given the volatile relations between the state and the displaced villagers. To this end, all the names I used in the presentation and analysis chapters are not the real names of the respondents interviewed in this study. The problem of recording and signing in forms is not peculiar to this study. Muzvidziwa (2004) experienced the same problem in his study in Masvingo urban in Zimbabwe. He noted that form filling had negative implications on the relations between the researcher and the researched, considering the fact that the respondents are not used to such bureaucratic procedures. In his submission, the situation was exacerbated by the repressive colonial history wherein the signing of forms and divulging information were considered to be risky. Adding to the serious challenge of signing forms, as a resident researcher I observed that some important aspects that were directly linked to the discussion would be

discussed unexpectedly and in many cases, this would happen in other social contexts outside the research. While it is ethically important to request the spontaneous respondents to sign the informed consent forms, it practically made little sense to such people. This would also have a knock on effect on the flow of information. Moreover, it would alienate the researcher from the discussions.

Faced with the aforesaid ethical and practical challenge, I had to be very flexible in finding an informal way of informing the respondents that such information is linked to my study. I had to explain myself and make them understand that I wished to use this information only if it was agreeable with them. This situation points to the observation that in practical terms getting informed consent should not always follow the conventional and rigid process. Rather, it is always a dynamic and endless process. My experience at Tokwe Mukosi is echoed by the American Anthropological Association code of ethics (2009). It states that getting informed consent does not always require a signed form. Instead, it is the quality of the consent that is of paramount importance.

Trust was further enhanced by the change of the political landscape in Zimbabwe, following the removal of the then ZANU PF leader Robert Mugabe. To put this into perspective, the Mugabe regime was labeled as undemocratic, repressive and intolerant to human rights and freedoms such as freedom of association and expression. On the contrary, the new government popularly known as ‘The New Dispensation’, at least during the time of research, was said to have opened up the political space and human freedoms. Much as the larger part of the fieldwork was conducted towards a general election, this relative democratization of the state and state institutions encouraged some respondents to discuss issues affecting them freely during the research process. The *wematongo* label was also critical in the establishment of rapport with the respondents. As indicated in the previous section, I was therefore able to move freely in the community, interviewing my respondents and participating in many community gatherings and other related social events.

All the interviews conducted with the villagers were conducted in the vernacular Shona language. I took into consideration the fact that my target population is a rural community which

values the local language. Speaking in English language would have created an artificial barrier between the researcher and the researched. Moreover, culturally, in this community every black person is expected to address people in Shona. Thus, all my interviews were conducted in Shona and then translated to English.

Traditionally emphasis has been on the need for the researchers to avoid harm and to protect the respondents. Thus, the need to protect and ensure the integrity of the researcher has been glossed over. In recent times, calls have been made for the researchers to equally avoid putting themselves at risk in the research process (Burgess 2004). What it means therefore is that researchers ought to avoid researches that are likely to put them in danger. Based on social capital and common identity, adapting to the 'hostile' conditions at Chingwizi was relatively easy. However, as part of the researcher's integrity, I have to acknowledge the element of fear and anxiety that I experienced particularly in the second phase of my research. My respondents indicated that the Chingwizi area is habitat to some of the most dangerous wild animals and reptiles, given the fact that it was formally a wild animal ranch.

Throughout the fieldwork, we were always reminded of the threats from the marauding buffalos at Chingwizi. Another threat came from the vicious snakes, scorpions and spiders including the black widow. Given the transitory nature of the resettlements, these reptiles would easily enter the temporary structures at night, putting human life at risk. There are so many cases of bites by these reptiles that were recorded at Chingwizi clinic. One extreme case is that of a young man who was bitten by a black mamba and succumbed to death. During the first phase of my research, we managed to circumvent such challenges and fears because we would sleep in my small car at Tokwe Mukosi primary school together with my two research assistants. In the second and final phase of the research, I coincidentally met my uncle at Bongo business center who then offered us accommodation at the nearby Chekai village. The challenge now was that culturally, it was unacceptable for us to sleep in the car. Thus, he went on to offer us a room where we would sleep on the floor. In many cases, he would warn us about the risks from the aforesaid reptiles. Another serious common threat was that of the small black ant that is believed to be very poisonous at Chingwizi, leading to instant death for human beings.

While we were sitting around the fire during the first night, my uncle who is a widower, narrated the harrowing experiences of this dangerous and yet common ant. He indicated that the clinic is yet to find an antidote for its venom, but the locals are falling back on indigenous knowledge. The belief is that the only solution is to rub the fluids from the female genitalia into the wounds from these ants. He jokingly but yet in a scaring manner said,

“Mwanangu zvino zwawasiya mukadzi kumba uchafira kuno kuChingwizi, isu kuno tatorujaira rusvosve urwu.”

(My son since you left your wife behind, you are going to die here because of these small ants as for us, we are now used to them).

After noticing our tense reaction, he however gave us the assurance that we will be safe. He indicated that he was going to put fire in our hut all the time to scare away the ants. The situation was aided by the fact that it was the rainy season Zimbabwe and the temperatures were low at Chingwizi, to the extent that we were comfortable with the fire in the hut at night.

4.8 Conclusion

The foregoing chapter synthesized the methodological orientation of this study and the subsequent methods used to gather data. The study was grounded in qualitative methodology, where ethnography was the overall framework for the field work. Based on ethnography, the study utilized participant observation, unstructured interviews, key informant interviews and secondary sources of data as the main data soliciting methods. The chapter situated the methodology used within the interpretive paradigm as well as the epistemological and ontological questions in social research. It provided the sampling method and the ethical dilemma faced by the researcher throughout the data gathering processes. The ethical challenges emanated from the marginalized status of the respondents and the subsequent protracted relations between the locals and the state. I dwell on the politics of recording and signing forms in this study. To circumvent this and other practical challenges, reflexivity became the key to achieving

the objectives of this study. Thus, in the end, the whole research process was turned into a negotiated enterprise.

CHAPTER 5 DIFFERENTIAL LEWORLDWDS IN THE STATE-PEOPLE RELATIONS AT TOKWE MUKOSI.

5.1 Introduction

Taking a people centered approach to the understanding of dam projects and displacement, this chapter dwells on micro politics, contestations and conflicting lifeworlds in the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and the aftermath. While I identified a number of actors and their interests in this developmental project, I emphasized more on the relations between the state and the Tokwe Mukosi villagers. The chapter starts with the brief historical background to the Tokwe Mukosi dam project, showing the temporalities and complexities therein. This background is aimed at signposting the reader to the penultimate relations between the state and the locals in the post relocation milieu. To show the ambiguities in this project, I situate the chapter within the actor oriented approach, also borrowing Scott's (1998) concept of legibility to understand the behavior of the state as a key actor in this development-displacement matrix. Lastly the chapter unpacks politicking and electioneering insinuations underlying the relations between the state and the Tokwe Mukosi displacees. In the relations between the state and the Chingwizi people, I am particularly interested in showing how the Chingwizi people are shaking of the 'victims' status and marginalization in the political field.

5.2 Tokwe Mukosi dam project and displacement- history and temporality.

The Tokwe Mukosi dam project is a product of the amalgamation of two major rivers in Masvingo province in Zimbabwe. These are Tokwe, also known as Tugwi River among the Karanga people in the southern part of Zimbabwe and the Mukosi River. The dam was constructed by an Italian company Salani-Impregilo and unlike many dam projects discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, the Tokwe Mukosi dam project was wholly funded by the state, albeit with serious financial constraints. The total costs for the construction of this dam project are estimated to be over US\$300m. In the later stages the aims for the construction of the dam were

modified but from the beginning it was primarily aimed at supplying irrigation water for the main sugar cane producers in the southern parts of Zimbabwe. As stated elsewhere in this thesis, the dam is believed to be the second largest human made dam in Zimbabwe after the famous Kariba dam. Within Zimbabwe, it nevertheless becomes the largest inland dam, taking over from Lake Mutirikwi, also known as Lake Kyle.

The hype, conflict and contradictions entrenched in the construction of this dam project have all led many to believe that the project is an invention of the post-colonial modernization and development agenda in Zimbabwe. Evidence to the contrary shows that the idea was long back mooted by the Rhodesian government (colonial government) in 1955 (The Sunday Mail 5 March 2017). This was in line with the dictates of the Green Revolution agenda. Despite the major interests, the idea suffered a stillbirth as the country unexpectedly drifted into a protracted liberation struggle, which persisted up to the year 1980. The war for independence had a knock on effect of diverting the funds that could have been used for construction purposes towards funding the war.

In the renewed zest for development and modernity the post-colonial state then reconsidered the idea to construct the Tokwe Mukosi Dam in 1997. Sadly construction of the dam stopped the same year following severe financial constraints afflicting the nation at that time. While many factors have been highlighted as the causes of the delayed outcome, this situation was largely a result of a serious financial crunch, popularly known as the black Thursday in Zimbabwe in November 1997. Raftopolous (2008) however blames unbudgeted gratuities for the veterans of the liberation struggle as well as unplanned intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict in the same year. These events instigated a huge strain on the national treasury, leading to the said economic crunch. Nevertheless, Hove (2016) is particularly interested in the internal dynamics in the Zimbabwean political economy. Thus, for him this failure to meet the projected timelines is by and large linked to corruption, rigidity deliberate policy and state repression.

The suspension of the dam construction was however lifted in the year 2001 but it was further suspended in 2004. For many the completion of the dam project at this particular time appeared in the horizons. This is because rationally, a country that is struggling politically and economically will have other priorities other than infrastructural development. The Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 significantly offered renewed hope and optimism for the success of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project. The GNU was a coalition government between the rivalry political parties following the disputed 2008 general elections in Zimbabwe. Additional to this, the dollarization and or adoption of the multi-currency regime in the same year provided relative economic stability for the generality of the Zimbabwean populace. This stability to a larger extent guaranteed the availability of resources for infrastructural development, which was however marginal in the previous regime. Given this development, the construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam resumed in July 2011. It was eventually completed in 2016 and commissioned a year later by the then president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe.

Moving on to the atrocious but ubiquitous relocations of the villagers in and around the dam, the state through the local authorities and the ministry of local government identified three areas for resettling residents who suffered the unintended consequences of this developmental project. These areas are Chisase in Masvingo district, Masangula in Mwenezi district and Chingwizi also in Mwenezi district. It should be underscored that before relocations, the state promised each household 4 hectares of land in addition to compensation which was calculated based on the value of the household property. Upon relocation, those relocated to Chisase and Masangula areas were surprised to be allocated less land against the initial promises by the state. These plots were for construction of houses and dry land farming as opposed to irrigation agriculture as guaranteed before relocation.

This background, coupled with the failure to deliver on the promises made, caused many of the villagers in Chivi to instinctively resist relocations to Chingwizi. For the majority of them this resistance was out of the fear of the unknown in the alien territory. Thus by the end of 2013 very little was done in terms of meeting the projected figures for relocation of the affected villagers. The failure by the state to fulfill the initial promises in the long run greatly influenced the state-

people relations as shall be illuminated in the subsequent sections.

Between December 2013 and November 2014 Chivi and the catchment areas for the Tokwe Mukosi dam received above normal rainfall which culminated in severe flooding. The flooding put human life, the villagers' property and livestock at great risk. An estimated 6393 families, translating into over 20 000 villagers were inundated by floods (Zikali 2018). Under such circumstances at law, the state was justified to declare the flooding a state of emergence, which therefore warranted intervention of the police and the military. The state then responded by using force with the help of security forces to evict the reluctant villagers to the Chingwizi holding camp in the Nuanetsi ranch, Mwenezi.

What made the situation dire was the state's lack of preparedness to deal with this emergency situation. The villagers were then forcibly moved from their homesteads without support structures, compensation, food, shelter and other related social amenities. While their Chingwizi destination was supposed to be a transit camp, it took the state more than three years to move the villagers from the camp to yet another contested one hectare plots. This humanitarian crisis attracted attention locally and globally. Of interest is the attention it received from local popular musicians, particularly from the unexpected genre of the Zim Dancehall artists. This is because for the older generation this genre of music is associated with immorality and antisocial behavior. I decided to single out Ras Caleb's song entitled *Tokwe Mukosi* based on its ability to sum up the predicament of the Tokwe Mukosi displacees at that time succinctly. I therefore move on to recite some of his lyrics that are directly linked to the subject under discussion;

“.....Mwari inzwaiwo minyengetero yedu, zvorwadza. Nevaya vanonamata paSabata musakanganwawo hama, zvorwadza, Tokwe Mukosi hii hii hii hii, amaiwe kani ndabuda misodzi, zvorwadza moyo wangu, tabuda misodzi. Jah Jah tumirai ngirozi, tapindwa nenjodzi, Jah Jah tumirai ngirozi.....”

Mafashamu atibata paMasvingo, mhuri dzodisplesewa, now left with nowhere to go.....Varume ngatibatidze maoko, zvingava zviratidzo zvenguva. Mwari baba tinzwirei nyasha because tashungurudzwa. Tokwe Mukosi hii hii tabuda misodzi.

(God please listen to our prayers, it's painful. For those who worship on the Sabbath day, do not forget our relatives, it's painful. Tokwe Mukosi hii hii hii, I shed tears, it pains my heart. We shed tears. Lord, Lord send your angels, this is a disaster, Lord. Lord please send your angels.....)

We have been disturbed by the floods, families are being displaced and now they are left with nowhere to go.....Let's put our hands together, these might be the signs of the time, Lord God have mercy because we have been troubled. Tokwe Mukosi hii hii we shed tears).

The Nuanetsi ranch, which was their destination for the first relocation phase is a private property owned by a farmer and business man Muller Conrad Rautenbach. This business man has strong connections with the ruling party ZANU PF. It is located about 150km from the Tokwe Mukosi dam site. There are continuities in that just like the Chivi area the Chingwizi area falls in the semi-arid region and the rainfall pattern in this site is unfavorable both for agricultural purposes and human settlement. While the two areas have a lot in common, the remoteness of Nuanetsi ranch however presents a huge strain on livelihood opportunities compared to the Chivi area. During my field work the respondents constantly referred the Chivi area as *matongo* (home) this clearly showed the ambivalence and uneasiness with the situation at hand for the affected villagers. Given impulsive response to the disaster by the state, the victims were forcibly put in this camp without proper supporting structures, facilities and social amenities.

The place for the initial relocation is known as *kumatende* (tents), reflecting the temporality of this resettlement phase. Thus there was no proper accommodation for the flood victims who were forced to stay in the tents which were mainly provided by the donor organizations. Of note is the fact that there were serious politics of inclusion and exclusion to access the much needed

tents. What is clear in this research is that the relocation of the flood victims from the Tokwe Mukosi basin was hindered by a plethora of factors. These include but not limited to lack of political will, lack of resources, preparedness, and out-and-out resistance from the affected villagers (UNDP 20114). Many of my respondents narrated the harrowing experience in this holding camp and I will explore this in the next chapter. The aforementioned flooding and displacement affected 12 villages in total and these villages include Johwa, Chekai, Ndove, Vhomo, Tagwirei Chikosi and Nongera (Tarisai 2018).

Much as modernity, rationalization and development were the trifurcated goals of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project, in real terms the approach used by the state in the penultimate relocation exercise resembled a pre-modern state in many crucial ways. Gaining insights from Scott (1998), the Zimbabwean state in line with the behavior of the pre-modern state was partially blind in its conduct in the whole dam project and displacement conundrum. Based on the technical approach to development, the state glossed over the grievances of the Tokwe Mukosi people and the potential of these grievances to degenerate into a serious revolt and rebellion against the state. The affected villagers were frustrated by a combination of factors, which were wholly attributed to the state.

Of note is the fact that before relocating these villagers, the state projected a favorable horizon, in the Mwenezi area coupled with a promise of 4 hectares of land for dry land farming and a share in the irrigable land for the displacees. They were also promised compensation for their displacement in full settlement once they agreed to move to the guaranteed land. Upon arrival at Chingwizi holding camp the horizon however became blurred for the villagers. This is because contrary to the promised plots for relocation, the villagers had to bear the brunt of staying in an inhospitable Chingwizi holding camp for three years. The findings in this study reveal that staying in this holding camp had negative ramifications on the political economy of the displaced persons as well as their social wellbeing. I shall pursue this aspect in the proceeding chapter in this thesis.

The failure by the state to honor its promises became a contentious and highly political issue among the displaced persons who consistently evaluated themselves as the ‘forgotten people’ who were also engulfed by a sense of isolation. In his analysis of the impact of modernism and globalization on the Zambian residents, Ferguson (2002) captures the kind of feeling and experiences of the Tokwe Mukosi during this time succinctly. These displacees were experiencing a feeling of abjection, meaning the process of being pushed aside, expelled or discarded from the fruits of modernity, of which under normal circumstances these villagers were supposed to be the primary beneficiaries of modernity. However, this process does not only mean being thrown down but also debasement and mortification for the ordinary villagers who were moved to the Chingwizi holding camp (Ferguson *ibid*). To further buttress this kind of estranged feeling, John, who came to Chingwizi as a bachelor but is now a father of two, said,

“Mudhara ipapo takachibvondora because hurumende yakatinyepera, tichingogara semasquatter munyika yevatorwa (Mwenezi) saka papasina yekutamba sevanhu vakaraswa”

(My brother we had to revolt because the government misled us, we were living like squatters in an alien territory, so at the end we had very little options as forgotten people).

Also in support of this sense of alienation and dejection was Mai Tanaka (40) who said,

“Panguva iyoyi tainzwa kuti takatoraswa, uye hatisiri chinhu, kwaingova kungoti chikuru kufema asi varume vazhinji vakaramba kuzvigashira vakabva varatidzira zvikuru.

(During our stay in the tents we felt like we were rejected, and dignity was lost as well. We only consoled ourselves by the belief that what is important is to survive but men in the tents failed to accept the situation leading to the revolts and the demonstration).

The unpalatable state-people relations at Chingwizi were further compounded by the fact that other Chivi people who were subsequently resettled after the Chingwizi flood victims were given four hectares of land in the relatively better Masangula area, with fair compensation compared to those at Chingwizi. The Masangula area is approximately 8km from the Chingwizi holding

camp. This move by the state exacerbated a sense of alienation for the residents at Chingwizi who have fallen under the category of ‘persons waiting for development’. At this point it should be reiterated that resettling other Chivi residents at Masangula was a divide and rule policy adopted by the state to manage the resettlement process. I had the opportunity to interview the village chairman in the Masangula area, who believed that although the villagers felt arm-twisted by the state for not getting the promised larger land, comparatively people in his area were happy with the land they were allocated by the state, which was bigger and more productive compared to their traditional Chivi and Chingwizi areas. Showing off his relatively big plot, he said,

“Sezvamuri kuona, munda uyu igombo chairo rinopa uye wakakura, nokudaro tine chikonzero chekufara. Matambudziko atingori nawo ndeemigwagwa yakashata, kushaya mvura yekunwa yakanaka uye kusanaya kwemvura zvakanaka. Kunyari zvakatinakira tinorwadzirwa hama dzedu dzakarashwa paChingwizi”

(As you can see this is a virgin land which is productive, it is also big so we have all the reasons to be happy. The only challenges that we have are the roads, poor rainfall patterns and unreliable water supply. We however feel for our relatives who have been abandoned at Chingwizi).

In addition to the foregoing failed promises and policy inconsistencies, the state went on to assure the affected villagers full monetary compensation for displacement upon arrival at Chingwizi, alas to this day a significant number is yet to get compensation. Again the residents were resisting second relocation to the designated one hectare plots popularly known as *Kumahekita*. The villagers as rational and calculative actors gave the state preconditions for the movement from the holding camps. Firstly, they were demanding full compensation for relocation. Secondly they were demanding permanent relocation in the land that was promised by the state prior their eviction from Chivi. Responding to the impending second relocation Gogo Neruvanga said,

“Zvainge zvisina kunaka, taisvika kupi tichiitwa bhora kana pwere nehurumende isu takura

kudai”

(The situation was bad we could not tolerate the state playing games with us as if we were kids).

The precarious situation at Chingwizi was further compounded by the state’s desire to move the clinic from the Chingwizi transit camp to a new settlement in the Nuanetsi ranch. The new site for the clinic would be close to the 1 hectare plots earmarked for the second relocation of the villagers. As an agentic actor in this relocation program, the state in its thinking hoped that the villagers would be lured into accepting relocations to the new settlements, despite the temporality of this phase of relocation. Given this background the relations at Chingwizi became a battlefield with different actors who had different and conflicting interests to the relocation program, leading to a serious *impasse* between the state and relocated residents. The different and conflicting lifeworlds, particularly between the state and the Tokwe Mukosi villagers had negative implications on the sustainability of the relocation exercise at Chingwizi. It became a battle field where the said actors competed to position themselves well in this program. Just like many developmental projects, the Tokwe Mukosi dam project was replete with politics, conflict and contradiction (Long 1998).

As noted earlier on, the blindness of the state pushed it to move the Tokwe Mukosi people into the highly concentrated Chingwizi camp and this inevitably presented the villagers with opportunities to organize and mobilize support against the police and the state effortlessly. Consequently, the Tokwe Mukosi villagers in Chingwizi stayed in congested tents and this made it difficult for the state and law enforcement agents to control and suppress the revolting residents. More importantly, the tents unlike proper and modern human settlements are not traceable and many of the respondents highlighted this virtue, which also became the hallmark of the protracted demonstrations against the state. What this therefore means is that unlike in the modern settlements, the identity of the revolting residents was very difficult to ascertain.

In one of the group discussions the respondents revealed how strategic meetings were secretly

convened in the tents to resist second relocations through the use of force by the state. Insurgence became the key strategy deployed by the residents in the process. They would strategically protest and attack the police and when they were overwhelmed they would then retreat to the tents for refuge. To buttress this point one of the interviewees who identified himself as Baba John said,

“Bamunini iyi yakange yatove hondo yechimurenga chaiyo, saka pakashanda chigorira chaicho, kwaive kungobhomba kana zvasunga tohwanda hedu mumatende, chamuhwande hwande chaicho”

(My brother, it resembled the past liberation war in Zimbabwe, so we used the guerrilla tactic of bombing then when under pressure we would retreat to the tents, it was more like the hide and seek game).

Based on this unique strategy in the history of displacement in Zimbabwe, it was easier for the Tokwe Mukosi villagers to instigate one of the greatest forms of resistance against the state. A significant number of police officers were heinously injured and two vehicles belonging to the police were burnt down by the protestors at Chingwizi. The way the Tokwe Mukosi villagers reacted to forced displacement is quite exceptional given the heavy handedness in which the state dealt with resistance in the previous relocation programs. Cases in point include, Operation Murambatsvina, Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, displacement at Chiadzwa, Chisumbanje and the more recent Operation Restore Legacy. This unfortunate incident in a significant way was a prognosis to my view that unlike other victims of forced displacement in Zimbabwe, the Tokwe Mukosi people are far from being conceptualized as passive victims of the situation created by the state. While the conclusion made by Dye (2016), Hove (2018) and Benhura and Naidu (2018) that the victims of displacements emanating from developmental projects are passive victims of the state is acceptable from a moral and humanistic perspectives, the revolts at Chingwizi help to corroborate the position that the displacees are not weak but have the potential to engage in everyday forms of peasant resistance, with the goal of alleviating the situation (Scott

1984).

The deterritorialisation of the Tokwe Mukosipeople and the subsequent collective reaction thereof has been summed up by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) who say,

“When an element is deterritorialised, when it eventually escapes from an apparatus of capture and begins to construct its line of flight, it does not have to do so alone, it has the potential to connect up with other deterritorialised elements and to begin to form not just a single line, but flows, aggregates, collectives and multiplicities, whose elements remain distinct but move together in a shared project to evade capture.” Pge 30.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I interrogated Zimbabwean state’s *modus operandi* in development and displacement where, I argued that the state’s conduct in such a problem is littered with the use of institutionalized violence to ensure submission. Notwithstanding resistance from the locals, the findings made on the state people relations at Tokwe Mukosi clearly shows that the state continues to ‘dance around the same spot’ (Helliker 2010). Centered on this philosophy armed riot police were unleashed against the protesting Tokwe Mukosi residents. The situation was like a war situation as helicopters and armed police ravaged the holding camp in response to the violence by the residents. Narrating her ordeal Mbuya Musekiwa said,

“Mwanangu ndakanzwa guru kumhanya nekuti hondo yemabhunu yange yadzoka zvino zvikopokopo zvichitenderera pamusoro pematende, hadzaimbopwanyika hope husiku hwacho”

(My son I felt my stomach turning, it was like a war situation with the British colonizers, with many helicopters hovering above the tents, we could not afford to sleep that night).

In response to the retaliation by the police, ordinary villagers particularly women and children abandoned their tents and hibernated in the nearby mountains. A significant number returned to

matongo (Chivi) seeking refuge or stayed with the relatives in the surrounding areas. It is estimated that over 300 villagers were arrested and detained at the Triangle police camp. These arrests were arbitrary and indiscriminate to the extent that even the elderly, people with disabilities and the sick were arrested and detained. Many of them were however released without trial based on the lack of incriminating evidence and four villagers were convicted and sentenced to prison for public violence (The Zim Situation 2014).

The state-people relations at Tokwe Mukosi are also a marker of how the state violated the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons of 1998, which the Zimbabwean government is ironically a signatory. The use of force to evict the villagers negates voluntarism, which is a key facet of the UN Guiding principles. There was also a clear lack of support for the displacedes to resettle in the new territories and there was no mutual agreement to that effect. Reflecting on the lack of voluntarism and lack of support in this development induced displacement Mai Desire (34) had this to say.

“Takati tazarirwa nemvura yatugwi tichi kumatongo, mapurisa nemasoja vakangouya nemarori ndokusvikoti munhu wese ngaasimuke tiende Chingwizi usingadi uchida. Ini ndakangotora mitundu yangu nevana kwakupinda murori, baba vakasara vachichengeta zvipfuyo zvedu nekuti papasina wokusiira. Takasvikoiswa kumatende uko taigara semakonzozo ufunge. Totenda Mwari vakapindira nokuti dai chirwere checholera chakauya tose taiparara”.

(Following the severe floods in the traditional Chivi area that were coming from Tokwe river, the police and soldiers came with big trucks and ordered all the villagers to get into the trucks, whether you liked it or not. I then carried my few remaining possessions and my little children. My husband remained behind to take care of livestock which could not be loaded into the trucks. We were then dumped at the Chingwizi tents, where we were overcrowded like rats. We however thank God that there was no cholera outbreak during that time, otherwise we were all going to die).

What is also deplorable for many villagers when it comes to this displacement is the temporality of the relocations which also became sequential. They started with the transitory movement from

Chivi to the transit camp, next was the proposed but resisted movement from the transit camp to the 1 hectare plots and ultimately to the proposed new settlements which up to the time I finished my fieldwork continued to appear like a remote possibility, given the lack of political will and resources to relocate the affected villagers. Contrary to the situation at hand the UN Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (1998) stipulate that before relocations there ought to be minimum land tenure, civil status and all these components should be pointing toward the sustainability of the proposed solution to the problem. Commenting on these volatile relations between the displacees and the state, Human Rights watch (2017) says,

“In the case of arbitrary resettlement of flood victims at Chingwizi, the state failed to satisfy all the conditions, nor has it assured health, shelter, food and water to the displaced, in the breach of its own constitutional obligations” pge 11.

To further cement my position that the Tokwe Mukosi villagers are far from being conceptualized as passive victims of the situation, as rational actors the villagers also took it upon themselves to challenge the serious human rights violations orchestrated by the state through the court system. With the legal assistance from various humanitarian human rights lawyers a number of villagers mounted a court challenge which they won with compensation to follow. In his ruling in the villagers’ court challenge, the magistrate said,

“The court will impose damages that will send a message against wrongfulness of the actions of the police (State)” (The legal Monitor 2007) pge 20.

Compensation for police brutality against the Tokwe Mukosi residents ranged between US\$300 to US\$950. Again by falling back on the court system, these residents proved to be resourceful and strategic social actors rather than passive victims of the vicious state. This virtue however remains peculiar to the Tokwe Mukosi experience in the history of forced displacements in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

Again to show their aptitude to resist unfavorable state interventions the residents directly confronted a delegation of 10 ministers sent by the president to convince the villagers to move

into the disputed 1 hectare plots. The ministers were humiliated as the villagers protested against the proposed address. For them the prerequisite for such an address was the provision of food, compensation and adequate land for resettlement. The displacees' spokesperson actually interjected one of the ministers who tried to give a speech, he said,

Kusiri kufa ndekupi (whether we are going to die or not), we don't care because you are now shifting goal posts on land, where are we going to be moved, we also demand food and compensation (The standard May 11 2014) pge 3.

Another woman interrupted the minister's speech,

All we need is the truth, you moved us from our original homes promising a better future but it has turned into hell. You made us malnourished, when will we get the money (The Standard *ibid*) pge 3.

In the midst of all the bickering between the state and the villagers, the state had to change its approach to the whole relocation exercise. By thinking and seeing like the state the Zimbabwean government had to suppress and neutralize the demands of the resistant villagers in the quest to meet the outlined objectives of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project. In the forthcoming section I explore the *modus operandi* and the transition by the state from a primordial state to an astute and modern state in the state-people relations at Chingwizi.

5.3 Legibility, state craft and the reincarnation of the modern state at Chingwizi.

As we saw in the historical background of the Tokwe Mukosi displacement explicated in the foregoing section, the state's conduct at Tokwe Mukosi resonated well with that of a traditional state. This conduct had devastating implications on the displacement and subsequent relocation of the affected residents at Chingwizi. What we have here is a scenario where we have an ambiguous relationship between the state and the Chingwizi villagers. On one hand we have the state that is craving for high modernism and development and on the other hand we have the

Tokwe Mukosi residents who are lethargic to enter high modernism (Scott 1998). In order to stamp authority and ensure submission of the agitated villagers, the state had to mutate and act like a modern state. Legibility became the driver of the second resettlement phase among the Tokwe Mukosi people. The objective here was to arrange or organize the residents in such a manner that makes it easier for the state to superintend and control the subjects. Legibility particularly in the Zimbabwean context was done under the guise of resettling the villagers to help them get social amenities like clinics, roads, schools and clean water supply. Reflecting on the acrimonious relations as well as the state's wish to have an orderly resettlement one of the key informants said,

"Vanhu ava vanzwisisei ndozvavari, nhoroondo yavo huru ndeyekuoma musoro pese pese. Ko vanorambirei kugariswa zvakanaka nemamiro akaita zvinhu muChingwizi. Hurumende iri kuda kuvapa zvikoro, zvipatara, mvura yakachena nezvimbuzi mukugariswa kutsva uku asi ivo voramba, Izvi zvakangofanana nekuda kubvisa nguruve mumadhaka, haimbofi yakabvuma."

(You ought to understand these people for what they are, they have a history of being a stubborn people all the time, and how can they reject an offer for proper human settlement given the circumstances at hand. The state is offering social amenities in addition to human settlement. It is like a situation where you want to move a pig from a pig stay, it obviously resists).

Based on the dictates of legibility, Scott (1998) opines that a modern state thinks and acts in a different way which is guided by the following principles, which are hitherto ingredients for disaster in developmental projects like the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and the displacement that ensued.

- There is severe administrative ordering.
- There is an inevitable high modernist ideology that is couched in a strong belief in science and technology.
- There is the desire by the state to exercise power and enforce implementation of developmental projects.
- There is the existence of an incapacitated Civil Society to provide checks and balances to the toxic developmental projects implemented in the interest of "The Greater Good".

Criticism has nonetheless been raised against Scott's (ibid) evaluation of the behavior of the modern state on the basis that his primary focus was on the primordial, anarchical and atavistic state compared to the less vicious and more liberal states that are illustrative of the behavior of the modern society (Deepak 2000). While such criticisms may be justified, my experience on the state people-relations in the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and the penultimate relocations warrants a reconsideration of Scott's analysis and evaluation of the state vis-à-vis the local people. As argued in the previous section the state in this developmental project has been viewed in a very negative and suspicious manner. This is also linked to the history of violence underlying the displacements at Tokwe Mukosi. Such violence is heavily linked to the desire by the state to exercise power and ensure submission of the militant Tokwe Mukosi residents.

Based on the benefit of hindsight and the inevitable vision of acting like a modern state, in the second phase of the relocation of the Chingwizi villagers, the state had to act differently. The ubiquitous relocations were aimed at relocating the villagers from the Chingwizi holding camp to the designated 1 hectare plots. Consequently, there was a spirited effort to make such relocations legible compared to the previous approach. The state endeavored to organize the villagers in a more classic resettlement. This novel resettlement would possibly be a proactive strategy that is also aimed at preventing revolts by the agitated Tokwe Mukosi villagers, who up to this point have been evaluated by the state as 'people in the way of modernism.'

Legibility in this context became a new administrative approach and social knowledge, facilitating the imagination and organization of the revolting villagers in a very specific way that would also foster absolute surveillance by the state and its subsidiaries like the, military and local leadership at Chingwizi. The local leadership responsible for facilitating surveillance included the village heads, ZANU PF chairpersons and party youth leaders. This surveillance in the Zimbabwean context becomes total surveillance in the sense that there is a blurred line between the state on one hand and the ZANU PF and local leadership on the other hand. The local leadership, village chairpersons, the police, militia and ZANU PF youths were actually state representatives in this developmental and displacement paradox.

In line with the goal of achieving legibility in the proposed one hectare plots there was also deliberate naming of the resettlement areas to make them traceable. The new areas were Masangula (with relative stability), Bongo, Tokwe Mukosi and Nyuni. These areas went on to house a number of villages. The villages went on to retain their original names and leadership. Some of these villages included Mudzungudzi, Jawa, Chekai, Madzivire and Tsikisai. Although the naming of these areas was beneficial to the villagers for identity and adaptation purposes (I will explore this aspect in the preceding chapter), there were statecraft and legibility components imbued in this political development. The villagers were then tasked to select one hectare plots that corresponded with their original places prior to their relocation. This had an unintended consequence of capacitating the state to locate villagers in case of future rebellion based on the villages, names and records of households in the state's possession.

When I visited the District Administrator's office at Mwenezi one of the Assistant District Administrators indicated that, contrary to the haphazard arrangement at the holding camp, they now have records and names of household heads matching with a particular village. This he said was very important for administrative purposes but in practical terms, I observed that this was an important mechanism for surveillance and subjugation of the villagers. Whereas I pointed out the uniqueness of the Tokwe Mukosi experience, the use of the aforementioned tools for surveillance is akin to the post colony in Africa. Mbembe (1992) acknowledges the continuities of domination and punishment from the colony to the post colony but in many ways the post colony has devised novel and subtle methods of surveillance and punishment. In the post colony power is therefore deliberately invested in the leader who then diffuses the same power into the party (ZANU PF), administrators, soldiers, the police, government officials *inter alia*. Given such a situation, in the post colony the state has aimed to institutionalize itself in the quest for legitimation and the birth of such institutions and related state machinery then constitute a new regime of violence (Mbembe 1992).

The above mentioned reorganization of the villagers created a platform and strategies that forced

by way of observing or surveillance, making it possible to induce the effects of power by the state among the displacees (Scott 1998). This kind of arrangement in the interim has a knock on effect of making the Tokwe Mukosi residents traceable and submissive to the whims and caprices of the state. At the micro level, ZANU PF village chairpersons working in cahoots with the youths and the militia are part of the structures put in place by the state to control the villagers in the new settlements. In most cases these agents rely on the use of symbolic violence to ensure submission. It is very important to note that in Zimbabwe it is very difficult to delineate the state from the ZANU PF party. Thus many of the party structures and machinery among the Tokwe Mukosi people work to advance the interests of the state. In support of this new strategy deployed by the state, Comrade Muchaparara (not real name), one of the ZANU PF village chairpersons. Said,

“Kubvira patakabviswa kumatende tichiuyiswa kuno kumahectare ndinoona kuti runyararo nekugarisana zvakanaka zvave nyore kuwanikwa kubudikidza nemapurisa edu. Musiyano uripo mukuru ndewekuti kuno kumahectare nhubu hadzinetse kubata, nezuro chaiko pakamboita mhirizhonga pachikoro cheMukosi. Nhubu dzacho dzakangozikanwa kuti dzabva kuNyuni saka vakabva vateverwa nemapurisa pamikova yavo vakasungwa kwakuendeswa kukamba kuTriangle.”

(Ever since we were moved from the tents to the one hectare plots, I have observed that peace and order are now very easy to maintain for the police. Unlike what happened at the tents the culprits are easy to identify, just last night there was some chaos over food distributed by the government at Mukosi school and the hooligans were identified as the youths from Nyuni, so they were apprehended by the police at their places of residence and taken to Triangle police station).

The foregoing strategy bordered on making the Tokwe Mukosi people docile and identifiable compared to the higgledy-piggledy kind of settlement at the Chingwizi holding camp. While Foucault (1970) was commenting on architecture rather than legibility his ideas on power and discipline can be linked to this discourse. He says,

“Architecture (legibility) renders visible those who are inside in more general terms, an

architecture that would operate to transform individuals to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them” Pge 70.

As mentioned earlier on, the process of achieving legibility was by no means a smooth process for the state as it faced serious resistance from below. The Tokwe Mukosi villagers as rational and knowledgeable actors deployed agency to resist the said relocations. Taking it from Long (1998), the state just like the Tokwe Mukosi residents should also be conceptualized as a rational and calculative actor. As a rational actor the state had to use strangulation and stimulation processes to achieve legibility in the second phase of relocating the displaced persons. (See Arrighi 1970). Stimulation entailed providing incentives that would attract the defiant residents to move to the new settlements. Conversely by strangulation the state had to use force or remove the benefits that would eventually push the villagers to move to the selected plots.

In the beginning the state decided against the traditional culture of the use of institutionalized violence against the displacees. Stimulation therefore became a fashionable strategy to lure the defiant Tokwe Mukosi villagers into accepting the 1 hectare plots. The state then instituted some form of positive corruption to hoodwink the villagers into accepting its position. As a result, the office of the minister for provincial affairs is said to have dangled USD\$40 as an incentive for those who accepted the state’s offer of the 1 hectare plots. While this amount at face value appears to be very little, it meant a lot for the villagers who had been deprived of their livelihoods and sources of income. A significant number of residents particularly the youths therefore capitalized on this offer. The hardcore Tokwe Mukosi household heads remained adamant and insisted on their usual demands. I also observed that there were some opportunists that benefited on the disorganized way in which the resettlement exercise was conducted. It was reported that during the evacuation of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers to Chingwizi, some people who were anticipating future benefits of the resettlement then masqueraded as flood victims. Many of these were ready to accept whatsoever the state could offer in the new territories. In line with this one of my respondents who identified himself as Baba Nelson (not real name), had this to say,

“Panga pakandiipira ndiiri kwachivi mwana wamai saka panga pasina chekumirirara, pakabviswa vanhu nemafashamu ndakangojoinawo kuuya kuno uye pakatanga nyaya yemahekita ndakatomhanyira kutora, ndakatopinda kutaura kuno apa mari ndakapiwa. Hapisisina musiyano neavo vakadzingwa nemvura, izvozvi pachanzi hurumende yavekupa ma4 hekita ndopinda futi.”

(Life was tough back in Chivi my brother, I just joined the displaced persons to benefit from the state, as a result when the talk of the 1 hectare plots started I had to accept it quickly. As it stands I am relatively better, moreover I got the money from the state. I now have similar status with those that were actually affected by flooding to the extent that when the state avails the 4 hectare plots I will also benefit).

Those who were willing to move to the new plots were also promised the much needed food relief in the one hectare plots. This strategy however falls under what Machingura (2012) terms ‘the Messianic feeding of the masses’. In a Machiavellian way, the state collects resources from the general citizenry and in turn gives it to the marginalized citizens like the Tokwe Mukosi people. In this context the state positions itself as the philanthropist and selfless savior to achieve the goal of political capital and legitimacy.

In addition to the food relief and monetary incentives, the state also persuaded BHASO to construct boreholes and pit latrines in some of the 1 hectare plots to attract the villagers to accept the offer. It is interesting to note that those who accepted the plots went on to achieve the *matangwe* (first born) status. This is a symbolic status signaling the pioneers of great relief from the Chingwizi disaster, at least from the state’s lifeworld. As I interacted with the villagers I however observed serious divisions in the Tokwe Mukosi community which are attributed to this development. Despite this achieved status, many of the initial beneficiaries of the one-hectare plots are branded *vatenges* (traitors) by the *bonafide* Tokwe Mukosi flood victims. Thus in the final analysis, the state’s attempt to stimulate the villagers in question into accepting its offer was a monumental disaster.

The failure to stimulate the villagers left the state with no option but to revert to the culture of institutionalized violence against the citizen. The state then decided to strangle the Tokwe Mukosi villagers into submission by wantonly removing the clinic at Chingwizi holding camp to the new area in the Nuanetsi ranch. As noted earlier on in this chapter, this Machiavellian tactic did not achieve the projected outcomes. It actually became the immediate cause of revolt that left a trail of destruction in the Chingwizi holding camp.

Following the failure of the aforementioned strategy, the state went on to suffocate the already suffering residents by denying them access to food aid from donor organizations operating in the area. It should be noted that up to that point the displaced were surviving solely on donor driven food aid, particularly from organizations such as Red Cross Society of Zimbabwe, OXFAM, Catholic Relief Services, BHASO *inter alia*. This direct attack and strategic removal of humanitarian support obviously fly in the face of the United Nations guidelines on internally displaced persons. The guidelines clearly stipulate that starvation and politicization of humanitarian aid as strategy to coalesce the displaced into submission should be discouraged (UN guidelines on Internally Displaced Person 1998). Just like the previous attempt this Machiavellian strategy backfired as the residents maintained their position and demands for compensation and 4 hectare plots as promised by the state before their displacement. Given this background the state then resorted to the use of force and threats for the villagers to move out of this camp.

In the midst of all the struggles some residents particularly the youths used social media platforms to gain sympathy locally and globally by posting photos and videos related to their situation. As part of the many strategies used to strangle the villagers into submission, the state then marginalized the villagers from the wider society by disconnecting network Chingwizi. Up to the time I completed my fieldwork mobile network connectivity in the area under study remained a serious challenge.

5.4 The state, politicking, electioneering and displacement.

The discourse on the relations between the state and the Tokwe Mukosi people would be incomplete without alluding to electioneering and gerrymandering by the state in the quest for political capital. While modernism and development were offered as the core philosophies for the construction of the dam, to a certain extent it was just a smokescreen. A closer analysis reveals that the relations were undercoated by a spirited desire by the state or the ruling party ZANU PF to amass political capital through this mega dam project. It should be underscored that traditionally the history of the Tokwe Mukosi dam construction has always been about politicking. To put this into perspective, there have been serious concerns about uneven development in Zimbabwe, with development seen as pro- Mashonaland (the dominant tribe in Zimbabwe). To avoid political cost based on tribal politics, critics believe that the state had to appropriate the colonial government's idea of constructing a dam project in one of the largest provinces in Zimbabwe. Masvingo province and particularly the Mwenezi and Chivi districts became strategic areas politically for ZANU PF which as noted in the previous section, is conflated with the state.

The dismal performance of the ruling party in the 2008 parliamentary elections in Masvingo province became a wakeup call to the reality that the party was losing a grip on the electorate and its stronghold. What it means is that the interest in this dam projected is tacitly couched in the politicking and electioneering gimmick. In addition the failure to bring finality to this conundrum has ethnic and tribal undertones which have inadvertently led to uneven development in Zimbabwe. This point has been buttressed by Ilorah (2009). He opines that in the African context leadership is characterized by ethnic and tribal bias and favoritism which influence who gets what and how with regards to resource allocation. It is believed that this developmental project was only meant to please and pacify the electorate in the province that has hitherto been marginalized in development. Responding to this relationship, VaMajoni (not his real name), a pensioned senior citizen had this to say,

“Dhamu reTokwe Mukosi harina kumbobvira raitirwa vanhu kana kuti development. Chokwadi chaicho ndechekuti hamungagoni kuipatsanura nenhau yemaelections. Ndirikutarisa history

yayo uye zvirikuitika muno muChingwizi. Tichiri kumatongo taingonzwa zvedhamu kana totarisana nemelections. Ndinovimba iwe pachako unotoshamisika kuti sei zvakatora nguva yose iyi kuti ripere kuvakwa. Ukatarisa kumashonaland kune zvirongwa zvedevelopment zvakatozotangira kumashure asi zvakangopera nyore nyore.”

(The Tokwe Mukosi dam project has never been about the people and development, the truth is that it can never be separated from the elections. I am making reference to the history and what is also happening here at Chingwizi, when we were kumatongo, we could only hear about the dam towards election time. I am also sure you might be wondering why the state took all these years to complete the construction of the dam. There are also many developmental projects in Mashonaland that were implemented way after the Tokwe Mukosi dam but they have always been smooth compared to Masvingo.)

The coincidental disbursement of compensation for the villagers towards the 2018 harmonized elections helps to heighten critics' evaluation of the relationship between the dam project and the electioneering mantra at Tokwe Mukosi. Many villagers indicated that they have been getting their compensation in dribs and drubs prior to the 2018 elections. Such an approach inevitably has an impact on their future and planning purposes. The election time particularly for the Tokwe Mukosi displaces in their long history with the state has also created a psychological contract in terms of compensation. Thus towards every election the villagers have a legitimate expectation. It appears the state and or ZANU PF is strategically mastering this kind of expectation for political gains.

Reflecting on this kind of relationship, the late former resident minister for Masvingo province, Shuvai Mahofa addressing the affected residents and the need to compensate them before the elections said,

We want people to vote in the right way when they have received their compensation in full. (Newsday 25 March 2017).pge 1

In the same spirit the minister of Local Government indicated that, the state in its master plan

had come up with a strategy to reserve 26 hectares of irrigable land around the dam for the displaced and vulnerable Tokwe Mukosi people. Such promises however bordered on politicking as one would wonder if the ordinary villagers who are used to dry land farming can command the requisite capital and knowledge to partake in the complicated irrigation agriculture. Suffice to say six years after those promises and up to the time I completed my fieldwork, nothing was done in that regard.

What is also disturbing the villagers is that the former head of state and the incumbent have never visited the flood victims to empathize with them. Sharing his frustrations one of the former village leaders said,

“Takungozvigashira hedu zvishoma nezvishoma kuti isu tingori vanhu vakarashwa vanoongodiwa badzi kana hurumende inezvainoda kutishandisa. Chinorwadza ndechekuti president wenyika ino chaiye haasati ambotishanyira kuona kuti tirikurarama sei, kunongouya maminister pano neapo vachingotinyepera nhema dzoga dzoga. Chimwe Chinorwadza ndechekuti mutungamiriri webato rinopikisa MDC ndiye badzi anongouya kuzotiona asi unoziva chose kuti vazhinji muno tiri veZANU PF.”

(We are slowly coming to terms with the fact that we are forgotten people, who only become relevant when the state wants to use them. The president has never visited us, only the deceitful ministers who also keep on lying to us come occasionally. What is also depressing is the opposition president MDC A instead of the national president visited us but you know very well that many of us belong to ZANU PF).

Political grandstanding was also evident at the official opening ceremony of the Tokwe Mukosi dam in 2017 by President Mugabe. As is always the tradition many villagers were bused from the Chingwizi area to attend the occasion. Some of the residents that were interviewed at this function claimed to have received part of their compensation three days prior to the ceremony.

Through state craft, the state clearly wanted to appease the agitated villagers at the same time presenting an amicable impression of the relations between the state and the displacees. Such an approach then made the whole ceremony dramaturgical as it was all about impression management. One of the villagers who identified himself as Murambwi lamented.

“Takadaidzwa kuti tive pachiitiko ichi, vamwewo vakatomanikidzwa kuuya pano. Changa chakakosha hacho ndechekuti ivo president vatange vambouyawo kuChingwizi vaone hupenyu hwatiri kurama nekugozha kwehupenyu. Ndinovimba waona mumiriri wedu achipa chikumbiro cheminda yekudiridzira uye minda iyo yavakatipromisa tisati tabviswa nedhamu asi ivo (president) varatidza kushaya hanya nazvo. Hatizivi izvozvi kuti vachatipa here mabhazi okudzokera kumba kuChingwizi, Mwari ndivo vanoziva havo.”

(They invited us to attend this occasion and some were even forced to come, but the noble thing would have been a situation where the president visits us at Chingwizi first, to see the kind of life and conditions there. I am sure you saw our representative making a request for plots for irrigation and the promised land, but he (the president) seemed not to care. We do not even know if they are going to provide transport back to Chingwizi, only God knows)

The Chingwizi area eventually became a battle field for acquiring political capital between ZANU PF and the opposition MDC Alliance party in the run up to the 2018 general elections. In June 2018 the newly elected MDC Alliance presidential candidate Nelson Chamisa visited the Chingwizi area. In his speech at a rally conducted at the nearby Rutenga shopping center (Which I also attended), he lamented the level of neglect suffered by the Chingwizi villagers at the instigation of the state. He strongly believes that the state is the architect of all the misery faced by the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims. He went on to call for immediate action to ameliorate the detrimental effects of that neglect. The opposition leader was in turn criticized by the new resident minister for Masvingo province for trying to politicize the situation with aim of gaining political capital in a situation that was well managed by the state (The Herald June 12, 2018).

Amid all this political bickering, the villagers who are also a significant actor in this process were positioning themselves well. They proved to be far from being perceived as political pawns. A significant number of respondents revealed that although they are getting 1 bag of maize per household from the state through the ministry of social welfare, they were ready to punish the ruling party in the impending general elections. Voting against the state or ZANU PF in the impending plebiscite would be part of a combination of the weapons of the marginalized in line with the everyday forms of peasant resistance against development from the above (Scott 1984).

The voting patterns in the Mwenezi east constituency which house the Chingwizi area nevertheless revealed a complicated trend. Contrary to the expectations based on the political climate before the elections, ZANU PF won resoundingly in this constituency. The main explanation for this trend is the internal changes and restructuring that took place within the ZANU PF towards the end of 2017, where Robert Mugabe was ousted and replaced by President Emerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Tribal politics were actually sharpened and Mnangagwa just like the Tokwe Mukosi people is from the Karanga tribe. Given this background and the aforementioned politics of inclusion and exclusion in accessing resources in the Mugabe regime, President Mnangagwa was bound to get political sympathy from the Chingwizi residents, despite their hatred of the state and ZANU PF at that particular time. Asked on the sudden changes in the voting behavior Mai Jabu said,

Taigotadza kuvhotera Murambwi (Mnangagwa) wedu, yatovawo nguva yedu yekudya, Mazezuru aingodyawo wani. Plus tisakangwanwa kuti nhamo yedu yaingova yamugabe kwete ZANU PF.

(We needed to vote for our very own, it is now our time to enjoy the benefits, the Zezuru (Tribe from Mashonaland where Mugabe came from) enjoyed the benefits for far too long, besides the problem was Mugabe not ZANU PF).

Although tribal politics had a bearing on the voting behavior and relations with the state, I also

observed that the vote was partially a protest vote in a more unique way. The villagers believed that the opposition MDC Alliance party imposed an unpopular candidate as its parliamentary candidate. It fielded a former resident minister for Masvingo (Kudakwashe Basikiti) who defected to the MDC Alliance. It should be stressed that the Tokwe Mukosi villagers were evacuated to Chingwizi area during Basikiti's tenure as resident minister. Thus many of the people's challenges are attributed to Basikiti, who also had an acrimonious relationship with the flood victims from the outset. He is consequently accused of corruption, nepotism in the distribution of humanitarian aid and Kleptocratic tendencies. Over and above this, villagers believed that he was the face behind the politics of belonging which is currently haunting them at Chingwizi. The relations between the displaced Chivi and Mushawasha residents and the native Shangani and Mwenezi people remain hazy as the displacees are constantly labeled as *Vauyi* (aliens).

The politics of belonging to a greater extent breeds the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the access to scarce resources mostly provided by donor organisations. To this end Basikiti is popularly known as *Dzandeya* (someone with mental instability) among the displaced Tokwe Mukosi residents. At one of the BACCOSI market gatherings the former resident minister attempted to address the Chingwizi villagers to get support in the forthcoming elections. He was apprehended by the youths, who also threatened to burn down his car. Such an incident is testimonial to the troubled relationship between Basikiti and the local residents. These relations in the end led to the poor performance of the opposition in the 2018 general elections.

Whereas I acknowledge some level sincerity by the state and its failure to find a sustainable solution to the problem 6 years after relocation, it is also persuasive to factor in the element of gerrymandering in the conduct of the state in the Tokwe Mukosi debacle. Typical of many African states, the state as a rational actor is interested in getting political attention from the marginalized sections of society. This political attention in many cases is very difficult to achieve from the elites, particularly in the urban settings. At Chingwizi, this recognition is obtained through palliative strategies like I bag of maize per household policy. In many interviews that I conducted at Chingwizi, the politics of inclusion and exclusion in accessing the

1 bag of maize was salient. Those who were linked to ZANU PF had relatively easy access to this staple diet while those opposed to it, particularly those who revolted were elbowed out. Labeling then become a serious outcome of the micro-politics at Chingwizi. Consequently, residents who were inclined towards the ruling regime were positively labeled as “Patriots” and those who resisted government policies were labeled as *Vatenges* (Sellouts) (see Gukurume 2018). In all these dynamics double marginality was the final outcome for a number of residents. On one hand they have been marginalized from the macro economy and on the other hand they are being marginalized from the micro economy and political processes at Chingwizi.

In as much as it is contested, gerrymandering also manifests itself in the incessant dangling of irrigable land as well as land for dry land agriculture. Gerrymandering was also evident in the relations between the donor organizations and the state. The state was able to put a leash on these organizations by emphasizing that they should be accredited by the office of the resident minister. Those that were often evaluated as politically incorrect would not be given the permission to operate in the area. In addition to getting political capital this also helped to weaken the Civil Society which should ideally provide checks and balance on the behavior of the state in such circumstances. The desire to gain political capital and recognition is therefore at the center of the state’s failure to come up with a sustainable solution to the problem at hand. Thus it can be argued that the state’s need to find a sustainable solution to the problems at Tokwe Mukosi has always been one step forward and two steps back (Scott 1998). It should be reiterated that the partisan control of national developmental projects is not novel in the history of the post colony and the ZANU PF party. This is because such a strategy has always fallen under the political mobilization agenda in all sections of the nation’s political economy (Kamete 2017, Gukurume 2018, Maringira and Gukurume forthcoming 2018).

5.5 Conclusion.

This chapter focused on the incompatible relations between the state and the locals in the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and displacement. It showed the differential and conflicting lifeworlds

between these fundamental social actors. Taking a modernists approach to development, the state is erroneously glossing over the needs and aspiration of the people who have been affected by this developmental project. Legibility is therefore seen as the *sine qua non* to the *impasse* between the state and the local residents. This is partly influenced by the state's desire to amass political capital, which has also led to the politicking and electioneering gimmick. The villagers from the state's position have therefore become pawns in this electioneering endeavor. The chapter however emphasized the significance of agency in the behavior of the Tokwe Mukosi people vis-à-vis the state. It emphasized that the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims can never be understood as passive entities, which has been the major problems with researches done by the previous researchers in this area. They are proving to be resourceful, rational, calculative and strategic actors in their interaction with the state and other actors in this program. In many ways their actions and behavior proved to have a remarkable bearing on the state's actions. Thus there is a dialectical relationship between the residents in question and the state, turning the whole relocation exercise into a battlefield of knowledge or a political arena.

CHAPTER 6 TIME, FUTURISM, LIVELIHOOD, CAPACITIES AND CAPABILITIES.

6.1 Introduction

This chapter builds on the previous chapter by focusing on the vulnerability of Tokwe Mukosi residents and the implications of that vulnerability on the livelihoods of the displacees. The idea is to locate this vulnerability in the context of the Sustainable livelihood Framework. Guyer (2007) and Jain's (2007) conceptualization of time and temporality shall also be used to further illuminate the vulnerability of the said residents. In the subsequent sections, I then critique the last two theorists, particularly their failure to acknowledge agency and the livelihoods capacities and capabilities of the actors to act out of the temporalities. The section is premised on the realization that it has been more than half a decade since the Tokwe Mukosi villagers have been forcibly moved to the Chingwizi area. It therefore becomes prudent to unpack the strategies, capacities and capabilities used to sustaining their households given the huge strain on their livelihoods following their abrupt dislocation from their ancestral land in Chivi.

Time is critical to the philosophy and understanding of social dynamics but what happens to our ability move sequentially through time in the era of complicated governance and uncertainty becomes an even more reasonable concern (Cunningham 2014). Based on this critical component, interest on time, temporality and the futures has received considerable attention in the academia in recent times. In the beginning such interest was however limited to the realm of economics, following the triumph of Rostow's theory, under the banner of modernization. The Neo-liberal philosophy which in essence was the revitalization of the modernization theory was also couched in time, temporality and the magnification of the future. In the religious sphere credit should be extended to Guyer (2007) in his work on evangelism, prophesy and the futures. In health one should also acknowledge Jain (2007) and Cunningham (2014) for situating time, temporality and the future within the context of cancer illness or more appropriately what they termed 'living in the prognosis'. In Anthropology, it would be a matter of injustice to ignore the work of James Ferguson on the expectations of modernity and the Copper-belt theory in Zambia.

Understanding of forced displacements in the context of time, temporality and the future has however remained a grey area in the academia in general and sociology specifically.

In an attempt to fill this lacuna in sociological research, I therefore wish to situate the understanding of forced displacements at Tokwe Mukosi within the critical aspects of time, temporality and the futures. Importance will be attached on the understanding of the evacuation of the near past and the near future as articulated by Guyer (2017). Living in the prognosis by Jain (2007) will also be applied in line with the Sustainable Livelihood Framework. Of particular interest is the understanding of the flood victims as social actors who have fallen under the vulnerability context. What is at stake here is the issue of tautology because evacuation of the near future and prognosis can be interfaced with the vulnerability context as espoused by the sustainable Livelihood Framework. Firstly I need to unpack the first two before applying those concepts to the experiences of the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims at Chingwizi.

While focusing on religiosity, Guyer (2007) dwells on the evacuation or evaporation of the near past and the future through prophecy and evangelism. In many dire social situations, the near past and the near future are often strategically removed or erased from the current experiences. Significance is then placed on the present but unpleasant situation as well as the far distant future. This has the net effect of inhibiting the potential of the people to aspire for better life while in their unpalatable present conditions. Their current situation, which in all earnest is dominated by suffering, poverty, social inequalities and conflict, is then presented in an attractive way as temporal, transitory and a normal human condition. The far distant future is then depicted as the ultimate destination characterized by happiness and prosperity. It means the destination is worth celebrating, thereby justifying the means (suffering) to achieving the end (prosperity). There is therefore a bifurcated trajectory of time and the futures. The near future, as highlighted above is then privatized and the distant future which is dominated by prosperity is then made public and glorified. Again as a palliative measure, the present situation is romanticized and conceptualized as a necessary and ubiquitous path towards the desirable destination which is appearing in the horizon. Guyer (2007) contents that the evacuation of the near future is just as painful as death of the near past. The decline of the near future instills some sense of insecurity,

abjection, dejection and despair for those exposed to these human made conditions (Ferguson 1998). The philosophy behind the current experience of the Tokwe Mukosi people at Chingwizi fits in well into the broader yet conservative discourse of austerity for prosperity (See John Mill 1806-1875). This has nonetheless been the philosophical mantra adopted by the new Emerson Mnangagwa administration in the Zimbabwean political economy in general.

While focusing on health, Jane (2007) reflects and corroborates the aforementioned view on the evacuation of the near past, the near future and temporality in the analogy of cancer illness. In what she terms 'Living prognosis' she says,

The prognosis activates terror—the shock of having harbored cancer, the fear of an unknown future seemingly presented through survival-rate numbers, the brush with a culture of death. But bizarrely, at the same moment, it dissolves that very terror in the act, its very function, of aggregation. The number itself imbricates one's life into the inevitable and the universal; the number becomes the backdrop against which one can no longer locate the shape of one's own life. The prognosis offers an abstract universal, moving through time at a level of abstraction that its human subjects cannot occupy, and in so doing it threatens to render us all (for we are all moving through the culture of cancer) inert. Simply a structure of and for our fantasies, the prognosis itself has no time for the human life and death drama. Pge 78.

This kind of feeling is evaluated as living in the time of in-between as bodies are engulfed with calculations of risks, sense their own borrowed space in vulnerability, (un) sure that the process is too beyond their control or whether there will be new forms of threats to be confronted as we navigate through the unknown (Cunningham 2014).

Of note is the fact that the state and the Tokwe Mukosi residents had contradicting perceptions in terms of time and the projected horizon in this dam project. The state was preoccupied with the projection of a distant horizon while the affected villagers had very little concern about the far horizon. Their interest was specifically on the evacuated near future and how to bring back the

evacuated futures. Based on futurism which has always been the buzzword in Zimbabwe, the dam project is anchored on a combination of drivers of ‘development’. These prime movers of ‘development’ are also presented as the eventual destination which the citizenry, particularly the displacees should cherish. These are,

- Technological development, modernity and rationality
- Establishment of an agro-based town around the dam.
- Generation of foreign currency through tourism
- Hydro-electricity generation for Masvingo province.
- Fishery and world life management
- Sugarcane plantations in the Chiredzi and Triangle areas.
- Small holder irrigation around the dam. (Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe 2013).

These ‘valuable’ outcomes became the painful but necessary justification for the suffering bestowed on the Tokwe Mukosi people. These displaced persons are seen as only suffering in the interim but in future the whole nation will enjoy the benefits. Although the projected horizon up to the time I finished my field work was still blurred, there were some efforts made in that direction. As indicated in the last chapter the dam was officially commissioned in 2017, paving way for these other mega projects, at least from the state’s perspective. A state of the art road was constructed, linking the Tokwe Mukosi dam with the major highway road in Zimbabwe. This idea was influenced by the desire to lure tourists and the need to establish an agro based town. To fulfill the fishery objective the state under the command fisheries program, which is a subset of the general Command Agriculture policy deposited over 200 000 fingerlings in the dam and more varieties would be added in future (The herald 14 August 2017). It was then planned that the department of Parks and World Life would then offer contracts to the people staying around the dam under the cooperative system. In my interview with an official from the said department, it was revealed that the locals would be offered contracts for fishing in January 2019. While this is a noble idea, very little has been done to ensure that the majority of those displaced by the dam would also benefit from this initiative. What is clear is that the Tokwe Mukosi villagers remain marginalized notwithstanding the projected and favorable horizon.

The above mentioned objectives for the construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam were the long term development projections by the state. These projections in a way have connotations of fantasy and futurism which are irresistible. The horizon has thus become more generalized, powerful and confident (Guyer 2007). This distant future has also been made public by being included in many government policies and the state media. The state is glorifying the construction of the dam project and the benefits subsumed but very little is said in terms of the unintended consequences of the dam project. The near future of the Tokwe Mukosi people which has been evaporated is of very little significance in the state's desire to reach the projected horizon.

It should be underscored that the precarious situation at Tokwe Mukosi was not an event but a process. As articulated in the previous chapter, the movement from Chivi to Chingwizi, which was also the first phase of relocation, led to the dislocation of the villagers from the macro Zimbabwean political economy (evacuation of the near future). Such a precarious situation called for the need to embrace novel livelihood strategies, albeit with little resources for the affected residents. While I acknowledge the existence of alternative livelihood strategies in traditional Chivi area, the rural economies in this area were mainly anchored on subsistence farming, animal husbandry and market gardening. The floods that affected the Chivi area destroyed crops that were near the harvesting stage and marooned livestock. It became apparent that even before the relocations, these villagers were already facing serious food insecurity. The floods and the untimely relocations from the Chivi area therefore culminated in the disruptions of these livelihood strategies. This explains the unwarranted evaporation of the near future or the vulnerability context which the villagers are confronting at Chingwizi.

The vulnerability of the villagers was further compounded by the failure of the state to honor its promises. Chief among these promises was the provision of four hectare plots upon arrival at Chingwizi. This unfortunate development had negative ramifications on subsistence farming, which was the backbone of the displacees' economies and livelihoods. To put this into context the villagers were then forced to stay in the tents for the next three years without land to partake in the traditional livelihood strategies. The second relocation phase which was achieved after a

protracted struggle did not help to improve the Tokwe Mukosi people's condition. In this transitional phase they were required to move into one hector plots. These infamous plots are popularly known as *Kumahekita* among the displacees.

In a series of precarious situations and temporality, the villagers have been given notice of the impending third relocation exercise. The dilemma however is that as usual the state is yet to secure the land for this relocation exercise. The District administrator for Mwenezi lamented this precarious situation and pleaded with the state to secure the land in order to bring finality to the struggle at hand (The Herald January 2019). A closer analysis however shows that this is just a smokescreen, aimed at obfuscating the capitalist undertones masked in this relocation program. Given the fact that the Chingwizi area is situated at the confluence of two important rivers in Masvingo province, the area is very attractive for the establishment of a mega ethanol plant. The plant is believed to be under the auspices of Zimbabwe Bio Energy (ZBE), which is also owned by Billy Rautenbach. It is believed that ZBE dangled an irresistible US\$400 million for investment in the said project (The Herald *ibid*). This is therefore putting the state in a huge dilemma. In recent times there has been a mantra for mega development deals to drive the economy in the new political dispensation, leaving the state in a compromising position. Given the connections and links that the Business mogul has in ZANU PF and the state, the chance that the Tokwe Mukosi people will stay permanently in this area becomes remote. The move to relocate the Tokwe Mukosi people again makes sense in quantitative development but in the end this will ultimately lead to development that eludes the people.

6.2 Temporality and the politics of space at Tokwe Mukosi

Socially and economically, the resettlement in the one hectare plots came at a huge cost for the affected villagers. Back in the *matongo* area the villagers grew a variety of crops which also had both cultural and economic significance. These include but not limited to, millet, rapoko, sorghum, groundnuts and round nuts. The limited space in the new settlements implied that growing such crops became highly impossible for the troubled residents. While emphasis from

the outsiders' perspective may be on the growing of crops that lead to food security, crops like groundnuts and round nuts had social, symbolic and economic value, particularly for Chingwizi women. Such crops come with status for women and they defined Africanness. Given the limited space coupled with the severe drought a significant number of households had to sacrifice these crops in favor of maize, for food security. Lamenting this situation, Mai Nemaushe (47) had this to say,

Zvakatiomera Mwanangu kuno kuChingwizi, tiri kumatongo taiziva kuti mukadzi chaiye anofanira kuva netseu yake yenzungu kananyimo. Nzungu kunyanya dzaitikoshera padovi remumba kana kuchivirika chaiko kuti tiwane zvimari, zvino zvekuno izvi hamenowo. Tava kungoti ndozviripo regai tingozvigashira.

(Life is tough here in Chingwizi, in our place of origins (*matongo*) it was common practice that every wife should have her own plot of groundnuts or round nuts. Groundnuts in particular were essential for peanut butter or even trading for survival. In this situation we are lost; we just have to accept the situation).

Also pointing to the abovementioned gendered implications of the politics of space and the resultant vulnerability a male household head had this to say,

“Chirongwa chemahecta chakatibvisa hubaba hwose nekuti patsika dzedu tinoti murume chaiye anofanira kuve nedura (pointing to the space), zvino chero tikati hedu ivhu racho rakasimba ungavakira dura ipapa here? Tinonzi ipapa ndipo pekurima, pekuvakira nekuchengeta zvipfuyo”.

(The one hectare plot is surely a threat to my masculinity. In our culture a real man should have a granary that is always full, (pointing to the small space) I cannot construct a granary for this space. They told us that we should do all our activities here like constructing temporary accommodation, growing crops and keeping livestock).

The villagers' vulnerability and despair in the new plots has been aggravated by the relocation arrangement in place prior to their movement to Chingwizi. What is at stake is that before

relocating the villagers, the state targeted household heads for relocation and compensation. The problem is that it is now six years after the relocation, implying that a significant number of children who were below the age of 18 are getting married and ready to start their own families. The need to accommodate these new families has added to the politics of space in the new settlements. Responding to this serious challenge, Mai vaPrivy (55) said,

“Patakadzingwa nemvura kwaChivi ndakauya nevana vangu vashanu, vakomana vatatu vasikana vaviri, dambudziko zvino rave rekuti vakomana vose varoora, vava nemhuri dzavo saka handina pekuvaisa. Ndakatongovaratidzawo pekuvaka zvitumba zvavo muhecta iyoyi, ndingaite sei.”

(When we were evacuated from Chivi to this area, I came with my five children, three boys and two girls. The problem now is that all the boys have since got married and have their own families. I do not have extra space to accommodate them. I simply subdivided the one hectare for them to construct their own temporary houses).

Mai VaPrivy further pointed out that the arrangement that she made for the three families is working in the interim. In future she is however anticipating serious conflicts and contestations over the little resources that they have. She went on to say,

‘Kumberi kunoenda uku ndiri kuona dambudziko. Zvinonetsa chose kuti vana vemunhu vagare pachivanze chimwe vanototi vanetsane. Ukuwo kudivi revakadzi ihoho chaiyo, vamwene nevaroora zvinonetsa kugarisana. Hurumende inofanira kupaongorora ipapa yogadzirisa nekukurumidza’

(In the long run I foresee problems with this arrangement. It’s always a challenge to have three married sons who are sharing the same yard, conflict is inevitable. In another direction I have daughters in law who are always fighting. The state should quickly find a solution to this problem.

The politics of space and competition emanating from emerging families is not peculiar to Mai Privy’s case. Many other families lamented this new problem at Chingwizi. Thus, this and other

problems at Chingwizi are simply a manifestation of the failure by the architects of development to take a people oriented approach to development. It is always necessary to take a people centered view that would help to solve such micro politics and family dynamics for the sustainability of any developmental project.

Temporality and the zest to reach the distant future are also omnipresent in the structures constructed for accommodation in the new one hectare plots. The state is insisting on the construction of temporary plots based on the realization that this is just a stop gap measure toward their permanent settlements in the third and penultimate relocation phase. Thus many families constructed pool and dagga huts for accommodation. There are also many risks and insecurities that are associated with these temporary structures. Firstly, the fact that the Chingwizi area was a wildlife ranch means there are threats from wild animals and snakes for many residents. Secondly the soil type and water in Chingwizi are not suitable for construction purposes. Some villagers reported that during the rainy season the dagga can easily be washed away leading to the collapse of many structures.

Figure 2: Typical housing structures at Chingwizi



Source: Author's creation (2018).

Based on the aforementioned politics of space and housing provision at Chingwizi, I observed that a significant number of families are now erecting permanent houses which are futuristic in nature. Responding to the question on why the residents are now defying the state's directive, VaSwela (68) who constructed a four roomed house, which interestingly had a satellite dish installed on it had this to say,

“Chokwadi chiripo ndechekuti tatove nemakore six tirimuno tichingovaka dzimba dzamapango gore roga roga nokuti dzinowa kana kukanaya mvura yakawanda, zvino nezera rangu iri handingazvikwanisi kana kuri kunzonziwo tichabviswa zvekare totangira ipapo. Hurumende inotofanira kundibhadhara imba yangu yandakavaka iyi”

(The truth is that it has been six years since we have been moved to this place and I am expected to build a hut almost every year because if we receive a lot of rains the huts collapse. Given my advanced age, I can't do that. In the unlikely event that the state moves us out of this area, we will see how it goes, in fact the state has to compensate me for the house that I have constructed).

While I will focus on the compensation paradox later, it should be noted that the compensation problem feeds very well into the emergent political economy at Chingwizi. During the time of research some villagers that had received compensation faced a serious dilemma in investment decisions owing to a plethora of social and economic misfortunes. Housing among the native Chivi villagers is one of the priority areas for investment. The temporality of the second resettlement phase means this investment area is highly compromised. The limited space in the one hectare plots further compounded the risk of investment in that portfolio. In line with the politics of space at Chingwizi, investment in the much needed subsistence farming was impossible for a number of displacees.

My stay and interaction with the Tokwe Mukosi residents revealed that livestock particularly cattle had both symbolic and economic value. Together with subsistence farming, they formed

the backbone of the rural economy in both pre-and post-displacement communities. During the flooding and evacuation of the Tokwe Mukosi people, a lot of livestock was either marooned or lost in the process. Many villagers therefore anticipated to rebuild their heads after receiving the contentious compensation package. The problem was that the allocated land in the new one hectare plots could only curter for temporary accommodation, painting a huge dent on the investment in livestock. As such many respondents complained about lack of investment potential in the new environs compared to the Chivi area. . VaMapira (50) lamented the obtaining situation,

“Zvakaitika izvi hazvitifadzi zvamuchose. Kwachivi taive nemombe zhinji chose. Ini ndakarasikirwa nedzakawanda pamafashamu, shomane dzakasara dzave nedambudziko remafuro muno munzvimbo. Kutaura kuno ndakapiwa half yemari yangu asi handigone kutenga dzimwe mombe, Kuvaka imba kwayo kana kuita chimwe chinhu chiri nani. Inotongori mari isingaitike musoro nayo. Umwe moyo unotongoti ndiidye yese nekuti irikuramba ichidonha”

(We are not happy at all with the prevailing situation. In Chivi we had a lot of cattle. I then lost a lot of cattle as a result of floods and a few that I manage to salvage are at risks because there are no pastures. I have been paid half of my compensation but I can't buy cattle anymore, I can't construct proper accommodation or do anything, it's useless money and I am tempted to squander it because it is losing value each day).

Given the dire situation at Chingwizi the state had to decree that Billy Rautenbach, Triangle estate, the Shangani people and the new Tokwe Mukosi villagers share the available resource in the interim. But conflict and contestations over space continue to manifest between the triad, despite the state's intervention. In such a scenario it becomes polemical because we have three actors with contradicting and conflicting interest. Consequently the Tokwe Mukosi villagers are enduring bemusement by what they consider hostile neighbors when it comes to pastures and sources of water. Billy Rautenbach in particular only makes the resources available when there is political pressure from the central government. To underline the unpalatable relations with the Chingwizi villagers, he went on to fence off his farm and water reservoirs towards the end of

2018. The Chingwizi villagers were then left vulnerable since they did not have many alternatives.

The nearby Triangle estate just like Billy Rotenberg's resources is always embroiled in serious conflict of space with the Tokwe Mukosi villagers. Owing to the ever shrinking grazing space, livestock often stray into the Triangle sugar cane plantations. The estate's security system is responding to this problem in a heavy-handed way. The animals are often locked up without food for some days until the owner pays a heavy fine ranging between USD50 and USD100. This amount is beyond the capacity of many villagers whose displacement dislocated them from the mainstream economy. Many villagers lost livestock as a result of this strict policing regime. Despite many attempts by the local leadership and government officials to mediate, the estate remains adamant in its approach to the problem at hand. The obtaining situation has therefore led to the overburdening of the already vulnerable Tokwe Mukosi villagers.

The conflict between the Triangle estate and the new occupants is also extending to the available water sources for irrigation. Some resourceful Tokwe Mukosi people, particularly women have nefariously set up small vegetable gardens along a major canal that borders the Triangle estate and the Tokwe Mukosi people. In the process they are diverting water from the canal to irrigate the small gardens. It was reported that the Triangle security personal in many cases would burn down the small gardens which are seen as a serious threat to the estate's operations. Towards the end of the fieldwork, it appeared as if the estate had given up on the Tokwe Mukosi people and their shenanigans. In an informal interview with one of the Triangle security personal, he retorted,

" Vanhu ava vakaoma musoro, isu tatonetawo navo, dambudziko riripo ivo vanongofunga kuti vanekodzera pazvinhu zvose, zvinotongoratidza kuti hurumende inechikwereti navo saka zvose izvi ingori nyaya yokuedza kudzororwa chikwereti chavo. Chero mukaisa nyaya yacho kumapurisa mapurisa haana chaanokwanisawo kuita."

(These people are big head, we are now tired of the situation, the problem is that they always think that they have the right to everything, it is very clear that they think the state owes them something, so all these actions are aimed at ensuring that the state pays back. Even if you take the matter to the police they cannot do anything about it).

Responding to this survival strategy and the conflict thereof, a woman who identified herself as Amai Mhurai (32) said,

“Dambudziko ratinaro remurivo muno muChingwizi iguru uye rakangonangana nemudzimai. Takazvitarisa muno muChingwizi mugwenga, zvasiyana nekwaChivi kwataidiridza magadheni mumatsime kana munaTugwu (Tokwe River). Takamboedza kuita gadheni dzacho pachibhorani zvikashaya basa, mvura yacho inemunyu saka haiite. Zvadaro takatoona kuti semadzimai ngatitange reduwo Jambanja remagadheni tikasadaro muriwo tingauwanepi.”

(The problem of getting vegetables here at Chingwizi is serious and it’s a problem that every woman faces. If we look at it closely, the situation is different from Chivi where we would set up gardens around wells or along the Tokwe river. We tried the same idea using borehole water here but the problem is that the water is salty so it’s not good for that purpose. Given the situation as women we decided to start our own *Jambanja* (revolution) for gardens, if we do not do that then we won’t get the vegetables).

The acronym *Jambanja* in the context of the small gardens along the canal fits in very well within the broader FTLRP in Zimbabwe that I alluded to in Chapter Three. The two events are couched within the philosophy of force in a haphazard manner to achieve some semblance of equality and social justice in the redistribution of natural resources in this political economy (see Masunungure 2008). Of note is the fact that this *Jambanja* is unintentionally generating internal conflict among the Tokwe Mukosi people. This type of conflict is directly linked to the traditional gender roles in society. Some men at Chingwizi are greatly opposed to the idea of small gardens. In their view the gardens are ‘eating’ into the little space available for grazing, thereby putting livestock at greater risk. In a FGD conducted at the nearby Bongo business center a male respondent who was responding to this contentious issue said,

Takazvitarisa chakakosha chii muriwo nemombe? Dai ndiri sabhuku ndaiiti ngazvibviswe zvimaghadeni izvozvo nokuti tatambura nehufuro muno. Chishuviro changu ndechekuti dai estate yaramba ichipisa maghadheni iwayo.”

(What is more important, vegetables or cattle? If I was the village head, I would immediately direct the removal of those gardens because we have limited pastures here. My wish is that the estate continues to burn down those gardens).

Notwithstanding the espoused contestations and conflicting lifeworlds in the small gardens puzzle, there was a spirited zest to transform these gardens into a *mushandirapamwe* (community garden). This is not a novel strategy because the strategy dates back to the pre-displacement Chivi community. It emerged that such a collective strategy had a bifurcated goal, which is to ensure household food security and income generation for the households in question (Taru 2013).

The relations between the indigenous Shangani people and the Tokwe Mukosi villagers are also adding to the serious contestations over grazing space at Chingwizi. Historically the Shangani people have been coexisting with Billy Rautenbach, albeit at the periphery of the former's land. The coming in of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers obviously unsettled the Shangani villagers who also believe that they are the *dejure* owners of the land occupied by the displacees. In response to what they perceive to be unfair land invasion by the *defacto* aliens, they are employing a number of strategies to frustrate the Tokwe Mukosi people. The main strategy is to drive cattle belonging to the Tokwe Mukosi people from their pastures into the triangle estate. This strategy is actually fueling the tension between the estate authorities and the Tokwe Mukosi villagers.

In this study, I observed that the only space that is free from conflict for the villagers is the area along the railway line. This railway line is used to transport raw sugarcane from other fields to the refinery at Triangle and it passes through the Chingwizi area. While this has provided relief to the villagers in terms of grazing, the area's carrying capacity is severely limited. Over and above this, there is a great risk of losing livestock to the train. VaMapara further complained and

said,

“Kamafuro kasara ndipo apo panjanji. Dambudziko nderekuti mombe dzapera nezvitima Panopfuura chitima chenzimbe chinodonhedza nzimbe mombe dzoterera dzichidja saka panotevera chimwe dzotsikwa. Dambudziko iri rakanyanya muchirimo apo patinenge tisingafudzi mombe. Iro gore rino ndakatsikirwa mombe nhatu nechitima.”

(The only space we have for grazing is along the railway line. The space is however risky because of the train. In many cases the goods train passes and drops sugarcane which then attracts our cattle putting them at risk of being run over by the goods train. This problem is highly pronounced in the winter, this year alone I lost three cattle to the goods train).

The territoriality which is graphic in the relations between the Tokwe Mukosi and the Shangani people over natural capital is ubiquitously affecting other facets of social life between the two actors. This is apparent in courtship, marriage and sexual relations. Sexual boundaries dividing the two communities are clearly defined albeit with relations of superiority and inferiority. Whereas dating or marrying a Shangani woman was regarded as normal, it was taboo for a Tokwe Mukosi woman to date a Shangani man. The protectionist gesture was omnipresent in the case where a Shangani man was beaten up by a group of Tokwe Mukosi men at Nyuni shopping center for allegedly dating a popular Tokwe Mukosi woman, identified as *muchina*. The case was reported to the police but nothing was done to the accomplices. The irony is that for the Tokwe Mukosi men, dating a Shangani woman was highly cherished and vindicated given the myths surround the initiation rites among the Shangani women. This is in tandem with the *Chinamwali* Shangani culture which among other things socializes the Shangani women to be good in marriages including pleasing a man in bed (Gukurume and Nhodo forth coming).

6.3 Space and the dialectics of naming at Chingwizi.

While I observed that the conflict between the Tokwe Mukosi people and the autochthonous Shangani people was deeply entrenched in the struggle over resources, the conflict can be traced back to the construction and subsequent naming of the two schools at Chingwizi. These are Tokwe Mukosi primary school and Nyuni secondary school respectively. Based on the claim that

they are the rightful owners of the Chingwizi area, the Shangani people legitimately thought they reserved the right to name the two schools in question. This is in line with their cultural imperatives and social identity. In their cultural expectations these two schools ought to be named Bongo primary school and Bongo secondary school respectively. The schools would ultimately be named after the nearby *Bongo* Mountain which had both religious and symbolic status for the Shangani people. Of note is the fact that many of the Shangani ritual practices, including the rites of passage are conducted in this mountain. Paradoxically for the Tokwe Mukosi people, this was an opportunity to revitalize the hitherto compromised social identity through the naming of such important local institutions.

To achieve the above-mentioned objective, they therefore demanded that the two schools be named Tokwe Mukosi primary school and Nyuni secondary school respectively. These names just like the new resettlement area in the one hectare plots corresponded with the names of their original villages in the *matongo* area. To achieve this seemingly insurmountable task, strategic essentialism became the necessary tact to circumvent the many structural challenges that are related to naming and social identity. Based on strategic essentialism, the Tokwe Mukosi people then lobbied the state to embark on the voting system to break the aforementioned *impasse*. It was very clear that the decision would go in favor of the Tokwe Mukosi people who actually outnumber the Shangani people. The voting system was just a dramaturgical method meant to give that process some semblance of impartiality and transparency.

What it means therefore is that the Chingwizi area has been turned into a battlefield. In this battlefield we have four primary social actors. These actors as indicated above are the state, Billy Rautenbach, Triangle estate and the traditional Shangani people. The interest and more specifically, the lifeworlds of these actors are at loggerheads. All these actors are therefore competing to position themselves in line with the real or perceived benefits in this developmental project. Such contestations and conflicting lifeworlds inevitably have negative ramifications on the sustainability of this relocation project.

6.4 Compensation and the economic security-Insecurity matrix at Chingwizi.

Compensation for the relocation of the Tokwe Mukosi people is arguably the most controversial and sensitive aspects at Chingwizi. In the preceding section, I made reference to the unreliable and unpredictable compensation in relation to investment potential. The implications of this form of compensation are nevertheless deeper and much more pronounced. I therefore focus on the compensation, livelihoods and the security-insecurity dilemma at Chingwizi. While the major aim of compensation is to ameliorate vulnerability, leading to better livelihood opportunities, the situation at Chingwizi points to the contrary. Initially, the state was justified in the failure to provide compensation during and immediately after the evacuation of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers but the justification of financial incapacity does not stand six years after relocation. The incapacity to adequately compensate the villagers is a serious form of insecurity. It is also contrary to the dictates of the United Nations guidelines on Internally Displaced Person, particularly principle Number 7, subsection 3 (a). This principle among other things encourages nation states to take necessary steps that would ensure that the displacees receive compensation for their relocation (UN Guidelines on Internally Displaced Persons 1998).

A significant number of residents at Chingwizi vociferously complained that they have not yet received their compensation six years after their evacuation from Chivi. This failure to fully compensate the displacees has pushed them into the vulnerability context since many of their livelihood assets have been severely affected. In cases where compensation has been received it has been done selectively and in most cases payment has been staggered making it unreliable. The staggering of the payment is further creating more insecurity for the villagers. Many villagers therefore complained that it is growingly becoming impossible for them to have concrete plans on how to use the money in a sustainable manner. Pointing to this unreliability, a male respondent said,

“Mari yacho hauna musoro waungaita nayo nekuti haiuyi yakabata, uye, iharugwa chaidzo, zvekare medu muno ungategei nayo nekuti vanotoda mari chaiyo kwete yemufoni iyi, yatongova yekudya iyi asi mangwana tozodii.”

(It is impossible to invest given the processes of payment, since we cannot get a lump sum payment. The staggered amounts are very little. Moreover we are getting mobile money which is not well accepted for transactions in the area, so the only thing that can be done is to spend the money but you also need to think about tomorrow).

The relocations and the compensation paradox at Chingwizi also points to the politics of inclusion and exclusion based on class differentiation and social capital. Elements of corruption, nepotism and *kleptocracy* were also highlighted in the disbursement of compensation by the state. To further illuminate this point Mai Zuzu (40), in one of the FGDs said,

‘Ngatinzwisise kuti kubvira pakatanga mari yedhamu haina kumbobvira yagadzirirwa isu varombo nekuti hauna chaunoishandisa. Mari iyi ingori yevanhu varinani nekuonekera, vanongoti vakaiwana vanokwanisa kuwedzera votenga imwe minda kana kunogara have kuchirungu nemumagrowth point sekwangundu. Vazhinji vakauya kuno kuchingwizi ndivo varombo vekupedzisira.’

(We ought to understand that, from the beginning that compensation was not aimed at improving the lives poor people like us. Those who are visible and connected got their compensation and relocated to other areas, many of them either bought new plots or relocated to urban areas and growth points like Ngundu. Those who came to Chingwizi are the very poor).

An unpopular case among the Tokwe Mukosi residents is that of a well connected politician who was fully compensated for his rural home despite the fact that he was not staying at the residence in question. They largely blamed the former resident minister for all the problems related to their compensation.

The mode of payment introduced by the state also became an worrying source of marginalization

for many Tokwe Mukosi Villagers. In the first instance the villagers were required to open bank accounts with a specified local bank called CBZ. This arrangement was nevertheless far removed from the complexities of the Tokwe Mukosi rural economy. Many residents complained that their displacee status meant that they did not have the required particulars to open bank accounts. Some reported that they lost their particulars following their hasty relocation at Chingwizi. Thus many villagers were marginalized in the compensation process.

In response to the banking impediments, the state encouraged the residents to embrace the much more flexible mobile money. The most pronounced facility at Chingwizi is Ecocash which is a platform facilitated by Econet, which is the main service provider in Zimbabwe. Formally mobile money and associated electronic transactions were envisioned by the authorities as a viable option in view of the severe cash challenges afflicting the nation. Despite its adoption, the sustainability of this strategy was always in doubt given the volatility of the Zimbabwean economy, particularly in the aftermath of the contested general elections of 2018. While the adverse effects of the liquidity crunch are widespread in Zimbabwe, its effects are more pronounced in rural and particularly marginalized communities like Chingwizi. On one hand the state was so obsessed with the use of mobile money as the solution to the liquidity crunch but on the other hand it had disconnected the Chingwizi area from the wireless networks following the revolts that I discussed in chapter 5. The rationale was to cut off communication between the revolting residents and the wider society as well as the international community. This practically made the use of mobile money very difficult at Chingwizi.

It follows that unlike urban economies, rural economies are purely anchored by the use of cash as opposed to electronic transactions. At this point, I should stress that there was serious confusion in terms of currency during the time of study as Zimbabwe adopted a multi-currency regime. This regime was made up of the adoption of The South African Rand, the Tswana Pula, Chinese Yuan and the United States dollar which was the dominant currency. In addition the government introduced a surrogate currency popularly known as the bond note. Theoretically the United States Dollar, the bond note, RTGS and mobile money were all pegged at a ratio of 1:1. Practically there were so many challenges because in the informal economy and various

transactions, the rates are always fluctuating. Given this background the payment of compensation using electronic and mobile money further compounded the already precarious situation for the Tokwe Mukosi residents.

I observed that in the small tuck-shops opened by some enterprising residents (I will explore this in the following section), the preferred mode of payment for the traders was initially the bond note. Towards the end of the research these traders switched to the South African Rand and the US dollar, which were all beyond the capacity of villagers. The situation was almost similar with regards to individual transactions, transaction at BACOSSI and beer drinking parties. A few individuals and business persons who continued to accept mobile money normally charged an interest of 2% for every transaction. To understand how this trade regime disadvantaged the vulnerable villagers, it is important to also factor additional transactional cost in the trade in mobile money. To put this into context, the newly appointed minister of finance in his monetary policy review on 1 October 2018, imposed a mandatory tax of 2 % for every transaction above \$10 and those that are below \$500 000 (Fin 24 2018). This continuous taxation system was catastrophic for the poor and vulnerable rural communities who were previously excluded from the formal taxation system through displacement.

To show resilience to this critical liquidity crunch, some residents resorted to “buying money” from the thriving informal economy at Triangle and Masvingo. This is a delicate form of transaction where an individual transfers cash to the informal money changers and gets cash at an interest of 10 to 20 %. This type of transaction in a way falls under what Gukurume (2010) and Gukurume (2015) terms money-burning (*kubhena mari*). This was a survival strategy adopted by many Zimbabweans at the zenith of the economic decay in Zimbabwe in the year 2008. The transactions at Tokwe Mukosi are however unique in the sense that for Gukurume (ibid), money-burning was a livelihood strategy that ordinarily benefitted the two parties involved, that is the money changers and the residents. In the context of the Tokwe Mukosi, villagers simply benefitted from the availability of cash but they were the ultimate losers in such an unpredictable economy. Their buying power in the use of mobile money continued to plummet, pushing them deeper into the vulnerability context. Much as Jones (2010) was

reflecting on the urban economy, he also captures the unpredictability of the Zimbabwean economy by labeling it *Kukiya Kiya* economy. The rationality for this acronym is that the formal modes of transaction have been curtailed severely to the extent that nothing is straight anymore in Zimbabwe (Jones 2010). This has culminated in the anything goes philosophy among the vulnerable villagers.

The precarity and the compensation paradox at Chingwizi have been further compounded by floating or unpredictable monetary policy. As stated above, prior to the 2018 general elections and soon after the elections, the state insisted that the USD and the surrogate local currency should trade at a rate of 1:1. In early 2019, the state came up with a raft of changes that have negative ramifications on compensation for the Tokwe Mukosi people. It was then announced that officially the USD is now trading at 1:2, 50 with the bond note and or what is now regarded as the RTGS bond. Ironically in the informal market which is very convenient to many Zimbabweans, the rate is around 1:4, 50. The problem however is that when the evaluations were done in view of compensating the villagers, the two currencies were at par. It remains to be seen whether the compensation will be migrated to the USD. This is nevertheless highly unlikely given the debilitating economic crisis in Zimbabwe.

The inevitable third relocation phase is further complicating the compensation paradox at Chingwizi. As has always been the case in the relations between the state and the villagers, the villagers are demanding full compensation. This then becomes a precondition for their acceptance to move to the new plots in the unlikely event that the state secures that land. As rational and strategic actors some villagers have vowed not to move to the new plots even if the state settles the outstanding arrears. They are also demanding full compensation for the likely disruptions and losses to be incurred in the third relocation phase. Another section was of the opinion that since the state has incessantly failed to provide the promised or alternative land, they would demand full compensation so that they buy their own land and be weaned from this uncouth relationship.

6.5 Bringing back the distant future-livelihoods, capacity and capabilities among the displaced persons

The concept of community is one of the concepts that are difficult to operationalize in the academia. In many cases researchers and scholars have become megalomaniac. Thus, they erroneously balkanized people's experiences and conditions under the term 'community'. In almost all the publications on the experiences of the Tokwe Mukosi people, authors constantly talk of the Tokwe Mukosi Community. The end result has been the universalization of the experiences of the residents in this area. I clearly acknowledge that what makes these people similar is that they belong to the same geographical area as well as their displacee status. But there is need to understand that a community is not a homogeneous entity, Evidence has actually shown that it is characterized by sheer heterogeneity (Kamphost etal 2007, Nhodo etal 2013). Thus there is need to unpack this concept to understand the diversity of human existence embedded therein.

In as much as they belong to the same community, share the same status and geographical location one should understand that the Tokwe Mukosi people have different lifeworlds based on family backgrounds, educational qualifications, class skills, age *inter alia* (Long 1999). These different lifeworlds inevitably affect how the villagers respond to their social condition and the various livelihood strategies that they muster to survive marginalization and aspire for better life. My experience at Tokwe Mukosi reveals that the aspirations are never monolithic, instead they are very subjective. They also range from individual aspirations to group or collective aspirations. This variation is informed by the realization that for one to aspire, they obviously need capabilities and practices (Nathan 2005).

In this section, I am particularly interested in showing how the Tokwe Mukosi people are trying under extremely difficult circumstances to shack off the 'victims' label. Based on the interviews and interactions that I had with the displacees, I deliberately avoid generalizing their responses to the problem. While many of my respondents showed resourcefulness, resilience, the tenacity to

aspire and redefine the projected futures, there were also some respondents who switched to the waiting mode. This was particularly evident when the villagers were moved from the Chingwizi holding camp to the one hectare plots under the second phase of relocation. Switching to the waiting mode means this category of residents has resigned to fate and is awaiting the state to determine their futures.

A significant portion of the youths at Chingwizi in particular were trapped in the waithood mode. It should be reiterated that many of the youths did not have their own 1 hectare plots, a social condition that pushed them to rely on their parents for material support. Their livelihood opportunities were also limited. Tafara (21) who came to Chingwizi as a teenager now has two children said,

“Isu mayouths takaomerwa, kungogara badzi nekungonwa doro kana tangosanganawo naro, tingaitai hedu, Kwachivi kwaitova nani vanhu vaimboita maricho manje kuno hapana hapana. Totongotarisira kuti panopiwa vanhu minda nehurumende totokwaniswawo. Takatarisirawo zvekare kuti minda yeirrigation ichapiwawo isu mayouths.”

(As the youths we are struggling, we have very little to do. This is the reason why we end up abusing alcohol each time we get access to it. In Chivi the situation was better because people could get opportunities to partake in some part time jobs. Here in Chingwizi those opportunities are limited. Most of us are only waiting for the state to avail land in the forthcoming relocation and we will capitalize on that situation. We are also hoping that the proposed plots for irrigation will target the youths at Chingwizi).

It was not the intention of this study to look at the implications of this waithood mode on the lives of the future generations. Further research may therefore be needed. Nevertheless during my interviews with the youths and the newly married, they constantly referred to the serious implications of their waiting conditions on the future of their children. The state on its part declared free education for children at Chingwizi but concerns have been raised on the learning

conditions at these schools. They did not have proper infrastructure and support material for quality education. The prevailing situation and failure to provide adequate education for children at Chingwizi therefore points to another lost generation in this development- displacement matrix.

A significant number of residents, particularly men also exhibited the wanton condition. This is apparent in certain consumption patterns and subsumed elements of consumerism and extravagancy. It is reported that some residents resorted to buying small second hand cars, motorbikes, bicycles and associated luxuries after receiving their partial compensation packages. This was also influenced by the lack of investment opportunities that I highlighted in the foregoing section. Many of these second hand cars were proving to be very expensive to maintain, considering the remoteness of Chingwizi. This led to further impoverishment for some of the households that invested in these cars. At the micro level this situation points to the unsustainability of the ‘new’ money. In line with this, one respondent in a Focus Group Discussion conducted at Bongo business center, where many of those cars were parked (and others dumped) said,

“Tingavashora hedu ivava vakatenga zvimota asi ingofungai kuti mari yacho yaishandei zvine musoro. Muno medu hatina zvikoro zvatingati ungaendesa vana kuchikoro, hatikwanisi kutenga mombe kana kuvaka dzimba, dambudziko haro nderekuti zvimota zvacho hazvina kutana kufa nekuti vazhinji vaitenga zvakangosakara nekuda kwehutsotsi hevanotengesa. Uyewo tisakangamwa kuti mugwagwa wedu hauite”.

(We are failing to understand why these villagers did what they did but what else did you expect them to do with the money given the circumstance. In this area you cannot invest in your children’s education because there are no proper schools, at the same time you cannot buy cattle or build proper accommodation. The only problem is that the villagers were duped because those cars are too old and they cannot survive in these remote roads).

This waiting mode has been theorized by many scholars in literature and it has come to be known as the waithood condition (Hanwana 2012, Mate 2014 and Gukurume 2018). This condition for this category of the Tokwe Mukosi residents is epitomized by uncertainties, precariousness, insecurity and stagnation in socio-economics terms (Ferguson 2002 and Gukurume 2018). This kind of experience resonates well with the ideas of Jane (ibid) of people living in prognosis which I explicated in the foregoing section. It has also influenced many researchers on the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and displacement. To this end villagers, at Tokwe Mukosi have been bunched under the flood “victims” status or more importantly the victimhood approach to forced displacement. In sociological theory this philosophy is derived from key structuralist like Durkheim, Parsons and Marx who tended to reduce human beings to passive victims of their social situations.

As argued above, during my initial visit and stay at Chingwizi, there were serious stereotypes and otherisation of the residents who invested in small cars and associated luxuries. My subsequent visits and interviews then called for the rethinking of this popular but reductionist narrative. These residents actually have a different way of looking at this whole issue. Notwithstanding the unforeseen challenges thereof, some of the residents were futuristic since the main purpose was to use cars as pirate taxis in and around the Chingwizi areas. In the beginning this would appear to be an astute and viable option given the remoteness and transport challenges afflicting the area. In a particular way these residents were making the most out of the waithood situation. Such ingenuity and ability to see opportunities out of an otherwise compromised situation signal their ability and capacity to aspire. Furthermore, investing in movable property was a rational decision given the transitory and temporality of the Chingwizi settlement. By taking an emic approach to the understanding of the displacees, I then empathized with those that bought cars for personal use, motorbikes and bicycles. To that end, I realized that their displacee status and the trying conditions at Chingwizi did not stifle their capacity to aspire for living in a better world. Moreover a car in particular is a status symbol in the local culture.

To move out of the waitness mode and show the genuine capacity of aspiring for better lives, other villagers mobilized a plethora of livelihood assets and social capital into a cocktail of livelihood strategies. I have decided to put these strategies into two categories. The first set of survival strategies are survivalist in orientation and the second category is for the relatively affluent and are more sustainable. I will focus on survivalist strategies before moving on to more sustainable survival strategies at Chingwizi.

Human capital was of paramount importance for survival, particularly for women who engaged in traditional beer brewing and trading. This strategy was mainly pronounced in the summer among the Chingwizi residents. The trend was to have beer drinking and selling parties in every two days in the many Chingwizi villages sampled for this study. In this study it was further observed that this venture was dominated by women, signifying the gendered dimension to livelihood strategies. Many respondents who adopted this livelihood strategy highlighted that they were able to sustain and in some cases supplement family requirements. These family needs included but not limited to food, clothing and educational requirements for the families who had children learning outside the Chingwizi settlement. To buttress the survivalist nature of beer brewing Mbuya VaChipo (68) said,

“Nyaya yekubika nekutengesa doro takavira nayo kare kumatongo saka kana tiri padambudziko zvinotibatsira kutengawo zvimwe zvidiki zvinodiwa pamba kuti tirarame. Mari yacho haina kuwanda asi yakakosha chose”.

(The strategy is not a new strategy; we started it long back in the original Chivi area. When we are facing hardships it helps us to be able to buy life’s basics. We do not earn much but it is very important).

She went on to say that beer brewing was a skill that she learnt from her mother in law after her marriage to the late husband. Although this strategy is significant, respondents underscored the practical and moral impediments imbued in this strategy. Over and above being a labor intensive strategy, there was an acute shortage of small grain which was a key ingredient in this process. The limited space in the one hector plots coupled with unreliable rains made it impossible to produce crops like millet sorghum and rapoko for beer brewing purposes. Considering the

unavailability of these commodities, their price at Chingwizi was actually inflated compared to the official prices at the Grain Market Board (GMB) and other localities outside Chingwizi.

To circumvent the aforementioned challenge and also in the spirit of resourcefulness, some women, particularly the younger ones travel to Rutenga to buy the heavily subsidized grain at the Rutenga GMB for beer brewing. It was pointed out that this arrangement would make the traders realize higher profits. Other commonly cited challenges in this survival strategy are the market constrains and the general liquidity crunch bedeviling the nation. To remain in business these traders are also falling back on the relations of trust and mutual support created over an extended period of time. These relations in many cases date back to the *Matongo* area and were reinforced at Chingwizi as part of the many survival maneuvers in the face of vulnerability. To this end, it emerged that some women formed social clubs for marketing the product which are commonly referred to as *Bharon* in this community. In these clubs they take turns to brew beer and it is mandatory for members to buy the product in a merry go round system. What it means therefore is that the viability of the business is enhanced since the market is readily available. Commenting on this strategy another female respondent (28) had this to say,

Muno muChingwizi doro harifambi nekuti vanhu vazhinji Havana mari, kusara kwekuti vatopiwa yekudzlingwa nedhamu. Nekudaro bharon rakatikoshera kana chijana chako chekubika doro chasvika. Izvizvotibatsira kugona kungorarama sezvo matsvagirow emari achisiyana.”

(Business here is very low because people do not have money. Normally they get money after staggered compensation fees are paid. In this case, *bharon* becomes important when it is your turn to brew beer. This strategy helps us to at least survive since strategies for survival here are different).

A similar but less risk venture adopted by the Chingwizi people is trade in the *Mukumbi* (*amarula* juicy). Here the villagers are falling back on natural capital since the amarula tree is abundant in the Mwenezi region. This business is also highly pronounced during the summer period. Its

seasonality makes it very popular among the Chingwizi people compared to traditional beer. This also makes it less risky because of the ever availability of the market. Other enterprising women explore the market at the nearby triangle estate, where the product is also popular among the estate workers. While producing amarula juicy is labor intensive, it is nevertheless less expensive to produce compared to the traditional beer, thereby raising the profit margins for the traders in question. The commonality is that both strategies are palliative measures. Therefore they fall under the survivalist category.

As argued above both traditional beer brewing and trade in *mukumbi* were critical for sustenance but they raised serious moral questions and dilemma for the largely Christian Tokwe Mukosi residents. On one hand their Christian values are against such practices and on the other hand they need to survive in this dire situation. Thus to survive they had to play a balancing act between Christianity and the quest for survival. Commenting on this dilemma a female Christian respondent said,

”Zvinonetsa pakuti church yedu haibvumire zvekubika mukumbi nedoro izvi but dambudziko riripo isu todawo kurarama nekuti Zvakatiomera muno muChingwizi, chero mukuru wechurch arikuzviziva kuti ndizvozvaticurikuita but chekuita hapana, chikuru kurarama zvimwe zvinozotevera hazvo”.

(The church prohibits these strategies but there is nothing that can be done because the aim is to survive. The church leaders know about those strategies but they cannot do anything in this context. What is important is to survive then everything else will follow).

Moving on to the more sustainable strategies, there was an interesting case of VaMajoni. Based on human capital he went on to create a makeshift welding workshop. The workshop was station at the *matende* area which was abandoned following the second relocation process. He went on to illegally connect electricity from the mainline which supplied electricity to Billy Rautenbach farm and household. He claims that he learnt the welding skills after working for a big hardware shop in Masvingo urban for 10 years. Upon receiving his incomplete relocation allowance, he decided to buy a welding machine before opening this workshop. During the time of research

VaMajoni had already employed four welding assistants, signaling the growth and expansion of his business. He said that he simply took advantage of new business opportunities in the new environment following their relocations from Chivi. Fig 3 shows a makeshift workshop at Chingwizi;

Figure 3: The Makeshift workshop at Chingwizi



Source: Author's creation 2018.

Based on the history of temporality, remoteness and deprivation, the Chingwizi area provided a ready market for a wide range of products produced at this workshop. He also highlighted that to maintain the market, he had to be flexible and customize his products in line with the requirements of the people at Chingwizi. He therefore specializes in the production of products like hoes, axes, machetes, knives and scotch carts which, are on demand in the area in question. To deal with the common problem of cash shortages he is relying on bonding and linking social capital. His popularity, networks, relations of trust and goodwill means that he can easily sell a lot of his products either on installment or on credit. To this extent he can sell products in

Mukosi and the surrounding villages. Barter trade is also crucial in overcoming the liquidity problem bedeviling the Chingwizi area. He was therefore open to exchanging small products with grain and small livestock, while scotch carts could be exchanged with cattle or goats depending on the number. Responding to the viability of barter trade in this context he said,

“Vamwe vanoenda kunorima muminda yavo ini worksop iyoyi ndiyo munda wanguwo kana ndikawana chibage kanazvimwewo zviyo ndotoendesa kuGMB sevamwe. Gore rapera ndakatoindisa matonne maviri echibage zvakaoma kudaro”

(Other people in Chingwizi work in the fields to produce food but I always make sure that I get the same through barter trade. After exchanging my products with grain, I also sell to the GMB. Last year I sold two tones of maize to the GMB).

In the middle of the discussion he suddenly paused and pointed to the other direction and said,

“Urikuona mombe idzo, ndakadzitenga nemari yekugadzira ngoro. Dzandaiva nadzo dzakaparara patakadzingwa nemafashamu. Parizvino ndave netwenty five but dambudziko rehufuro ranetsa. Ndavakutongoita dzokutengesa kunevemabhucha vanouya muno kuti ndiwane mari.

(Look at that herd of cattle; I bought them using proceeds from this workshop. The cattle that I had perished when we were relocated to this place. At the moment, I have twenty five but the new challenge is that the pastures are too small. Whenever I trade in cattle, I simply sell them off to some merchants here).

After seeing his business growing, VaMajoni has since diversified into grain milling. He went on to buy a grinding mill which he also illegally connected to the main electricity line that passes through the Chingwizi area. He says the idea came through after realizing the necessity of the service at Chingwizi. Before this venture people used to travel for about 10 km to the Masangula area for that service. Asked about the illegality of the electricity connections and the associated risks, he responded with a smile and rhetoric questions at the same time,

“Saka zvaunoti zviripamutemo ndezvipi? Tototi kutidzinga nekutirasa kwakaita hurumende uku ndiko kuripamutemo here? Unofanira kuziva kuti kana tiripanguva yakadai panezvinhu zviviri, kufa kana kurarama, inini ndakasarudza kurarama”

(So what else is legal here? Do you mean displacing us and dumping us here is legal? You should understand that in this situation there are two issues, death or survival. I chose to survive).

Although his businesses appeared risky, he believes that it is thriving and he is planning to buy another grinding mill and start another business at the Masangula area. He is also planning to buy a pickup truck in the near future for the easy of doing business. While he was enthusiastic about the progress in his business, the much talked about third relocation of the Tokwe Mukosi people was a serious source of insecurity for him. Disruptions of his businesses were obviously ubiquitous. Given the complexities surround the relocation and compensation paradox in the previous relocations, he was worried that he will not be compensated for the disruptions in the event that they are eventually relocated to a new area. The concerns were further buttressed by the state’s emphasis on the construction of temporary structures signaling the temporality of the current relocation.

The ability to anticipate future benefits as a survival strategy was also evident in the strategic actions of some of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers in both the pre-displacement and post-displacement social contexts. This became a strategy in surviving marginalization in the aftermath of the disaster for a significant number of victims in both Chivi and Mushawasha areas. It was indicated that some residents were willing to be evacuated and resettled immediately in anticipation of getting land in the limited four hectare plots in the *Mufula* area, which is adjacent to Chingwizi. This was in the backdrop of serious resistance by many villagers to be evacuated from their ancestral land. A case in point is that of Samanyanga (37). He revealed that soon after the floods, he voluntarily availed himself to the responsible authorities for evacuation and resettlement whilst most of his kinsmen resisted. The propensity to become futuristic was rewarded given the fact that he went on to be allocated four hectares of land in the

Mufula area.

In line with the ability to anticipate, Samanyanga also encouraged his aging father (Sekuru Mabasa) to also avail himself for the allocation of the same land. Given his advanced age, it was clear from the outset that Sekuru Mabasa would not withstand the demands of starting a new life in the new and remote environment. Thus, after the allocation of the land he then voluntarily donated his four hectare plots to his youngest son, Samanyanga. Sekuru Mabasa then went on to stay at his house at Ngundu growth point, a survival strategy that was adopted by many elderly persons in the Tokwe Mukosi displacement. In the final analysis based on agency and what I call strategic positionality, Samanyanga went on to accumulate eight hectares of land in the new territory. Responding to his ingenuity he said,

“Zvazvinoda ndezvekuti kana paita dambudziko seratakaona kumatongo, zvinotodaa kuti munhu uonere gap. Hama dzangu zhinji dzakaramba kuuya kuno pakutanga, nhasi uno varikutambura muma hectare. Isu takatanga kubvuma kuuya zvinhu zvirinani nekuti takawana mafour hectares mumwe nemumwe. Nekudaro tikabatanidza nemunda wababa vangu ndatove ne eight hectares saka chekuchema hapana, chero dai ndakaramba ndirikwachivi ndingadai ndisiri zvandiri nhasi. Kutura kudai ndine record kuGMB yehumaster farmer.”

(What is needed is that whenever there is a problem like the one we encountered, you ought to look for opportunities. Many of my relatives were adamant and refused to come here when the opportunity was there. As we speak they are languishing in the one hectare plots. Those who accepted the offer are relatively in a better position. Personally, if I combine my four hectares and the four hectares I got from my father, it means I now have eight hectares so there is no reason I should complain. Even if I had remained in Chivi my life would not have changed for the better. Right now I hold a record of being a master farmer at GMB).

Again, based on the capacity to anticipate and become futuristic, Samanyanga revealed that he resigned from his post as a baker at ZISCO Steel. ZISCO Steel used to be one of the leading steel

makers in Zimbabwe before the economic downturn. His baking experience then facilitated the fulfillment of his vision of owning his own bakery in the Mufula area. The remoteness of the area implies that he is pouncing on the uniquely available market for bread and other related products. With regards to human capital, Samanyanga indicated that he has employed three women who previously belonged to the now defunct *Takabatana* baking club. This was a prominent women baking club in the pre-displacement area in Chivi. The dislocation of the Tokwe Mukosi people from their area led to the disruption of this local institution. Conflict over the redistribution of the little compensation received from the state also aided to the disruption of this local institution. What it means is that unlike other local institutions that I will deal with in chapter 7, the resuscitation of *Takabatana* bakery was always going to be precarious owing to these and other challenges. This scenario however worked to the advantage of the resourceful Samanyanga who is simply tapping into the available human capital base for survival. It should be underscored that during the time of research, this business enterprise was thriving to the extent of competing with products from established bakeries like Lobels and Bakers Inn at Chingwizi.

Based on the competitiveness of his products, it was revealed that he managed to push vendors who used to sell Lobels and Bakers Inn bread at Chingwizi out of business. Responding to this competition, he said,

“Chingwa changu chinodiwa navanhu zvakanyanya muno muChingwizi nekuti vanoti chakakura uye chinonaka nekugutsa kupinda cheLobels neBakers’ Inn. Muno muChingwizi vanotochiti Mudzinga Zhara. Imwe nyaya ndeyekuti sezvamunoona mutengo yechingwa iri kuramba ichingokwira nguva dzose asi isu mutengo wedu wakaderera chaizvo uye unoita sezvo vanhu vekuno Chingwizi vachinetseka panyaya yemari.”

(The bread that I bake is popular here at Chingwizi. This is because it is big, delicious and filling unlike Lobels and Bakers Inn. Here at Chingwizi they fittingly call it *Mudzinga zhara* (Hunger chaser). Another issue is that the prices of bread in Zimbabwe are always going up but our price is stable and affordable. This is because most of the people here are struggling to earn money).

It should be noted that the ability to create goodwill with the small business owners at both Bongo and Nyuni business centers is adding gloss to Samanyanga business. As part of that goodwill he indicated that in certain cases he supplies the products on credit. This is a move that has also added to the growing popularity of his business enterprise. Riding on the ever increasing popularity he has plans to grow his business to cover the rest of Mwenezi district. By venturing into farming and baking, it therefore means Samanyanga is able to diversify his livelihood portfolios. This livelihood diversification is very critical given the unpredictability of farming coupled with the debilitating effects of climate change in Zimbabwe. The Samanyanga case illuminates the capabilities and the capacity to aspire regardless of the challenges that come with the displaced status at Chingwizi. To show the capacity to aspire under extremely difficult circumstances, Samanyanga is now a proud owner of a truck and a luxury car.

Just like the cases of VaMajoni and Samanyanga, some local traders in the spirit of innovation opened two business centers at the Chingwizi area. Before the opening of the two business centers, residents needed to travel for about 40km to Triangle to buy basic necessities. The first one is a relatively smaller but expanding shopping center in the Nyuni village. The second and bigger shopping center is situated at Mukosi and it is popularly known as *PaBongo*. Popular businesses included grocery shops, bottle stores, clothing shops, and hair salons. These entrepreneurs are exhibiting creativity to the extent that most of the products that the residents need are available at competitive prices. To deal with the energy challenges, the entrepreneurs have embraced clean energy and other alternative sources of energy like gas. Consequently, almost all the bottle stores and grocery shops use either gas or solar powered freezers. During my initial visit based on the etic approach, I was surprised to buy cold coke drinks at both Bongo and Nyuni shopping centers.

The abovementioned feeling was also influenced by the remoteness of the area as well as the makeshift structures thereof. Notwithstanding the social marginalization, the bottle stores in the two shopping centers are furnished with good facilities including television sets, radios and pool

tables. It was highlighted that based on the upgraded facilities, the two business centers are even attracting patrons from as far as Triangle estate. These developments clearly show that despite their displacement and dislocation from the mainstream society, the Tokwe Mukosi people continue to aspire for better lives.

In as much as the interviewed entrepreneurs at both Bongo and Nyuni shopping centers were generally content with their businesses, just like many innovative residents, they were worried about the temporality of the second relocation phase. This temporality inevitably has an impact on the sustainability of this venture. They continue to operate in a very informal way and the situation has been exacerbated by the state which insists on the construction of temporary structures. Lamenting the situation, one respondent who operated a vibrant liquor store said,

“Dambudziko nderekuti zvose zvatakavaka ndezvokukiya kiya nekudaro hapana chiripamutemo. Izvizvinoreva kuti hatikwanisi kuwana malicence okuoperata apa makambaini makuru anoda licence kuti vatisupplaye. Sezvazviri tirikunyanya kungo hodha kublack market saka profit inobva yaita shoma.”

(The problem is that these are all temporary and therefore informal structures. What it means is that we cannot get licenses to operate and the major suppliers of our products require licenses in order to supply the products. As it stands, we are just informally buying the products and this situation has an impact on the profit margins).

Figure 4: Bongo shopping center



Source: Author's creation 2018.

While the failure to get operating licences was cited as the major challenge faced by many small business operators at the said shopping centers, there was a remarkable change at the beginning of January 2019. In chapter 4, I indicated that I accompanied my undergraduate student researchers to Chingwizi, which also turned out to be my mop-up field research. In this phase of research, it was revealed that liquor store operators collectively lobbied DELTA Beverages (The major liquor producer in Zimbabwe) to supply them the products just like what it does with established operators nationwide. When I interviewed the same bottle store operator, his narrative had changed this time. He said,

“Mudhara iye zvino zvati dzorei mbijana nekuti takapiwa ne pump price paDELTA ichiuya naro futi but zveMuzimbawe hapana chiristraight iye zvino vakuti unofanira kutenga kireti imwe yedoro nemaUSA (USD) kuti ugotengeserwa four nebond kanaRTGS bond manje muno USA haribatikwe zvokumhanya”

(My man, things are far much better because we now get beer at pump price (actual price) because DELTA now supplies it here. The problem however is that nothing is straight here, now

they are demanding that we buy one crate of beer in USD for us to get four more crates of beer in bond notes or RTGS bond).

The propensity to persuade DELTA beverages to supply the product despite the high level of informality at the two shopping centers points to the aptitude of the displacees to mobilize linking social capital in a vertical way. Here it was also pointed out that they were using the economies of affection to rationally achieve their objective. Thus the displacee and marginalized status became the moral justification for the need to get such a facility. I shall explore the interplay between linking social capital, local institutions and strategic essentialism at length in Chapter 7 and 8 of this thesis.

In the previous chapter I opined that gerrymandering and electioneering were the hallmark of the state people relations at Tokwe Mukosi. The entrepreneurs at both *Nyuni* and *Bongo* have not been spared from the ZANU PF cum the state's *modus operandi*. It was indicated that in the past there was a *laissez-faire* approach to the access space and operations at the two business centers. However in recent times the ownership and control of the two business centers have since been hijacked by the party officials who in the usual kleptocratic manner determine who gets access to the stands at the said businesses centers. For an individual to get access to a shopping stand or to remain in business, they had to remain politically correct or at least have connections. They should always be seen to be supportive of the party and its functions through material and or monetary sponsorship. This position can be corroborated by the statement made by a respondent, who said,

“While we appreciate the contribution of this strategy to our overall survival, the problem is that the whole issue has been politicized. What we therefore need to do is to be ZANU PF during the day and at night we know where we belong, otherwise you can never be allowed to operate here.”

It should be pointed out that in response to the state's failure to provide a permanent solution to the plight of the Chingwizi residents, some frustrated residents abandoned their plots and moved elsewhere and others sold their plots and moved to new settlements all together. The favorable destination for many of those who decided to buy their own new plots is the Uswaushava area. They also had alternatives to the extent that a few returned to the matongo area, others moved to the cities and growth points. Some calculative and strategic residents then claimed ownership of such plots and added them to their one hectare plots. This situation presented an alternative for people like Mai Desire, who were desirous to get larger pieces of land for subsistence farming. She highlighted that she bought additional five hectare plots after selling her cattle. She also used a portion of her relocation allowance to purchase those additional plots. Cumulatively Mai desire has five hectares of land for subsistence farming albeit in different locations. Given this background, she has since lost interest in the impending third relocation phase since it is likely to prejudice her of these investments.

Another interesting case in this displacement and survival matrix is that of Mai Lucy (38). She claims to practically own six hectares of land. She was very fortunate to have siblings who were allocated their own one hectare plots but were not comfortable with the obtaining situation at Chingwizi. Two of the siblings moved to Bulawayo and the other three moved to South Africa looking for better life chances. She has thus become the *defacto* Owner of those 5 other plots which she is putting to good use. In the subsequent years, she claims to have produced sufficient food for her family, whilst at the same time producing for the market. Boasting of her current situation she said,

“Hanzvadzi zviya zvekunzi Chingwizi ndekwevanhu vanotambura ndezvakare zviya, haasi munhu wese ari kutambura, ini ndotoona kuti nditori nani pane zvandaiva kwaChivi nekuda kwema hecta andakapiwa nehanzvadzi dzangu. Chakanakira kuno ivhu racho rinopa saka dambudziko rine vazhinji nderokuti pavakapiwa padiki, Ini kuri kuguta chaiko ndiri kuguta, saka ndinorumbidza Mwari”.

(My brother, the belief that Chingwizi is a place for the poor is no longer applicable here. Not

everyone is suffering in this place. As for me, I am in a far much better position than in Chivi, because of the extra plots that I got from my brothers. So I can only praise God).

Without being overly megalomaniac, the many survival strategies employed by the Tokwe Mukosi people at Chingwizi are symptomatic of how the poor, the marginalized, and the socially excluded groups endeavor to aspire. In spite of their situation, the marginalized citizens always have a voice, which in this context is expressed through negotiation with the same political and cultural conditions that mediate their predicament (Appadurai 2004). Taking it further, as argued elsewhere in this thesis, the state has arbitrary projected specific horizons in this dam project and consequent displacement. As rational actors, some of the Tokwe Mukosi people have nonetheless set or at best redefined the same projected horizons through various survival strategies. Suffice to say, many of the survival strategies are at variance with the state's horizons. The end result is a conflict of aspirations between the state and the Tokwe Mukosi residents.

The daily toils and survival gambits of the Tokwe Mukosi people in their survivalist or long term orientations have hitherto been espoused by Appadurai (Ibid), who says,

Thus, in strengthening the capacity to aspire, conceived as cultural capacity, especially among the poor the future oriented logic of development could find natural allies, and the poor could find the resources required to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty (marginalization).pge 72.

In tandem with this line of thinking, Narayan et al (2000) reflecting on the voices of the poor argue that the marginalized residents are neither simple sponges nor secret revolutionaries, instead as highlighted above they are survivors. In the final analysis, they are only after strategically maximizing the terms of trade between recognition and redistribution in the immediate future (Appadurai ibid). While survival strategies like poaching, illicit beer brewing and illegal electricity connection as highlighted above border on illegality, there are serious moral concerns underlying such stratagems. One may go on to question if at all we have

alternatives given the protracted nature in which the relocations were undertaken. Added to this matrix is the state's lack of political will to bring sanity to the whole resettlement debacle.

6.6 Conclusion

The foregoing chapter focused on how the Tokwe Mukosi displacees have inadvertently been pushed into the vulnerability context, which I also equated to the evacuation of the near future or living in prognosis. This condition is a direct product of their unplanned and abrupt dislocation from their ancestral land. By framing this vulnerability context within the concept of time and the futures, I was able to show the differential lifeworlds between the state and the locals with regards to the immediate futures and the projected horizons. While the immediate futures for the Tokwe Mukosi people have evaporated, the chapter underscored the tenacity of the marginalized persons to aspire, redefine and at times bring back the future that is appearing in the distant horizon. This is achieved by the mobilization of various livelihood assets and social capital to produce livelihood outcomes. In the same vein, it shows that the various livelihood strategies deployed by the residents are a manifestation of agency aimed at improving their social condition. The chapter therefore calls for the jettisoning of reductionists tendencies that have hitherto dominated the evaluation of The Tokwe Mukosi displacees leading to the 'victims' status. Without generalizing their experiences, I argued that the Tokwe Mukosi people are rational, resourceful and strategic actors.

CHAPTER 7 LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR SURVIVAL AND INCLUSIVITY FOR THE DISPLACED OTHER.

7.1 Introduction

As indicated in the previous chapter, adaptation mechanisms deployed by the Tokwe Mukosi villagers range between individual or household strategies, to collectivistic strategies. After focusing on the individualistic strategies in the foregoing chapter, this chapter dwells on the more collectivistic strategies. This is premised on the realization that adaptation or the process of building resilience is never entirely individualistic. I therefore focus on the importance of local institutions in the struggle for survival among the Tokwe Mukosi community. To give the reader a nuanced appreciation of the role of local institutions at Tokwe Mukosi, I begin with a brief but general conceptualization of local institutions before unraveling how these local institutions have been an important resource to survive marginalization. Emphasis will be on how the villagers mobilize existing local institutions and or create new ones in light of their marginality. Of importance to this discourse is the nexus between local institutions and social capital in the quest for survival among the marginalized rural poor.

7.2 Conceptualizing local Institutions

Local institutions have in recent times become an important asset that shapes how rural populations respond to vulnerability and in the same process building resilience in communities facing adversities (Agrawal 2008). Considering the realization that adaptation at Tokwe Mukosi is almost entirely local, importance should be attached to how the local institutions inform adaptation and improve the capacity of the displacees to survive social exclusion. While my emphasis is mainly on the many informal institutions at Tokwe Mukosi, it ought to be pointed out that Local institutions fall into three broad categories. These are public, private and civic institutions (Agrawal 2008).

- Public institutions-relate to various government departments, ministries, ZANU PF

organs, opposition parties central and local government at Tokwe Mukosi.

- Private institutions-these include Non-Governmental Organisations, charity organisations and private businesses.
- Civic institutions-examples include cooperatives, internal savings schemes, burial societies *inter alia*. (Agrawal 2008).

The first two local institutions are formal in nature and are based outside the community, and they have symbiosis with linking social capital. On the contrary, the last one is highly informal and inward driven. It should also be underscored that civic institutions, particularly in rural communities, appear in a traditional form. They are also based on the mobilization of bonding and bridging social capitals. On the whole Local institutions foster a coterie of bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Dahal and Adikari 2017). While commenting on community based natural resources management, Mukamuri (2009) posits that institutions present perhaps the best condition for sustainable management of resources in many rural communities.

7.3 The efficacy of local institutions at Tokwe Mukosi.

In literature, on the significance of the above mentioned types of local institutions, there has been a fallacy of looking at the positive interrelationship between those types of local institutions. What makes the Tokwe Mukosi situation unique is the fact that overreliance on informal institutions is a product of the ineptness of the private and public institutions to provide local protection. The political and economic environment in Zimbabwe has also posed a huge strain on the private institutions like the NGOs and this has exacerbated the vulnerability of the Tokwe Mukosi people. It should be stressed that the sensitivity of the Tokwe Mukosi displacements has also led to the ambivalent relationship between the state and the NGOs. What this means therefore is that for the NGOs to operate in this area they have to go through a cumbersome accreditation process. Thus, many of the NGOs operating in this area are hamstrung by the obtaining environment. Consequently, this has a knock on effect on the Tokwe Mukosi people to effectively mobilize linking social capital for survival.

With regards to public institution, the irony is that for the Tokwe Mukosi people, the precarious situation they confront is perceived to be a product of the same institutions. This has led to the relations of ambivalence between the state institutions and the locals. Interestingly, this ambivalence was reflected each time I tried to introduce myself to some respondents who did not know me. As part of the ethical considerations, I had to produce a letter of authority to do research which had the government logo and stamp. Some respondents would then show discomfort each time they saw the letter. I would then go on to explain that I do not work for the government but I am just an academic researcher. VaMajoni, the wielder actually confronted me at first when I produced the same letter. He responded angrily by saying,

“Matanga vanhu vehurumende, hamunete nekutishungurudza? Ticharuwanawo rinhi rugare?”

(You people from the state, you are at it again. Will you ever stop bothering us? When shall we ever have peace?).

After explaining the purpose of my visit and clearly pointing out that I am a student researching for academic purposes, he then accepted my invitation to be interviewed. After the interview, I then realized that the nature of his survival strategy had an impact on his initial response. It bordered on criminality hence the fear of anything associated with the state.

The state as a local institution has furthermore worsened the commonly accepted belief among many Tokwe Mukosi residents that it is the architect of all the misery they face. This is because it is insisting on a bag of maize per household as food relief. The size of the family does not matter and for some residents with bigger families, this arrangement was actually an insult. In addition, the residents were required to pay US\$2 per family for the transportation of the same and an additional US\$0, 50 for packaging of the maize. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional food relief programs by NGOs which they were dependent on in the *Matongo*. Here, the quantity of the food was relatively satisfactory and it corresponded with the number of children in the family. Moreover, the donating organisations would meet all the transportation and operating expenses.

At the primary school at Chingwizi, the state facilitated a feeding scheme for the learners. This was a noble idea given the situation at hand, but it unintentionally became another source of conflict between the public institutions and the Chingwizi villagers. Just like in the food relief programme, parents or guardians were required to pay US\$1 per child every month to cover the operating expenses. Little as it might appear from an etic perspective, \this amount of money is beyond the capacity of a significant number of residents. To this end, one respondent complained,

“Hazvina kunaka nekuti iyo hurumende inofunga kuti inobvepi mari iyoyi, ini ndine vazukuru uye nherera five vane vabereki vakafa nechirwere saka ndoiwanepi \$5 pamwedzi mumwe nemumwe. Chinondishamisa ndechekuti iyo hurumende yacho yatokanganwa kuti ndiyo yakatipinza padambudziko irori nekutidzinga kumisha yedu”

(This is not fair, how do they expect us to raise that money. I have five grandchildren orphaned by HIV and AIDS so where can I get \$5 every month. What surprises me is that the same state is forgetting that we are in this situation because it displaced us from our homes).

The decision to redirect the operating expenses to the villagers in the two respective programmes would obviously attract bitterness from the villagers. This is also partly because it has always been their expectation that government programmes should be accessed for free, a position that has been further buttressed by their displacee status (I will pursue this position in the proceeding section as part of strategic essentialism).In addition it is their belief that the state institutions should always fulfill the psychological and social contract between the state and the Tokwe Mukosi people.

Given the above mentioned relationship between the locals and public institutions, the locals are rationally falling back on civic and informal institutions. The social relations, networks and social capital were largely mobilized in a horizontal form of relations. Kinship relations were of utmost importance among many respondents that I interviewed. They cherished many kinship

ties both within and beyond the Chingwizi area. Outside the Chingwizi area, the *matongo* was a prime institution which they used as a resource for dealing with marginalization. In the realm of education, I indicated earlier on that the standard and facilities in education provided by the state at Tokwe Mukosi was comparatively very poor. In response to this unfortunate predicament, some respondents rationally sent their children back to the *matongo* where they stay with relatives who survived displacement. This way the Tokwe Mukosi people are utilizing existing kinship ties and family relations to survive social exclusion. It was reported that in this arrangement the children would only come back to Chingwizi during the school holidays and sometimes the parents would visit them in the *matongo* area.

Figure 5: Tokwe Mukosi primary school



Source: Author's Creation (2017).

A case in point is that of a respondent whose four children were staying with his in-laws in the Nemauzhe area in Chivi. It cannot be disputed that this kind of arrangement has negative implications on the performance of the children in question but most of the parents view it as a better arrangement compared to the vagaries of the Tokwe Mukosi area. While my interest was not on the impact of displacement on education, many of my respondents kept on making reference to this highly sensitive issue. They reported a disturbing rate of school dropouts, which

also had a gendered dimension. While both boys and girls were affected, girls suffered more compared to the boy child. It was therefore revealed that many young girls who dropped out of school ventured into prostitution in surrounding towns and growth points. Popular areas included Triangle, Chiredzi, Jerera, Ngundu, Mhukahuru and Chivi. These young girls are popular with older men, particularly truck drivers; and they are popularly known as *Zvichingwizi*. When loosely translated it means 'small Chingwizis'. Further research would therefore be imperative to unearth the challenges and overall consequences on the educational performance of children in this displaced community.

Kinship ties, relations of trust and mutual support were also relevant for a section of the Tokwe Mukosi people who wished to maintain the much needed livestock. Given their abrupt displacement coupled with inadequate pastures, some residents rationally left their livestock in the custody of the same relatives. Some of the residents who brought their livestock to Chingwizi devised many ways of returning their livestock to their places of origins. A popular strategy was to sell their cattle at Chingwizi and buy others in the *matongo* area pointing to the significance of cattle in the rural economies. Another section of the Tokwe Mukosi people has also become nomadic in the quest to maintain this valuable property. They are moving back to the vacated area, taking advantage of the abundant but neglected areas for pastures. Adaptation to life in this area is nonetheless easy and they reported that they are getting all forms of support from their kinsmen. In addition, there is another strategy pursued by the calculative residents known as *kuronzera mombe* (loaning out cattle). Here some Chingwizi residents based on social networks go into an arrangement where they loan their cattle to poor households in the *matongo* area. The poor households would then benefit from draught power, milk, manure and other related benefits. This therefore makes it a win-win social arrangement.

As I pursued this matter with kin interest it was also revealed that some agentic residents have also formed social clubs which they call *madzoro*. In the nomadic sense, they take turns to herd cattle in the *matongo* area. In many of these clubs, it was indicated that an individual will only be absent for a month in a year. Responding to This social arrangement a male respondent (37) said,

“Muno muChingwizi sezvauri kuona hamuna ufuro apa mombe ndihwo upfumi chete hwatinahwo vazhinji vedu. Kuti murume mukuru unogarira kurima muchihecta ichochi hazvina musoro zvekare. Nekudaro takatozoshandisa njere dzokuita madzoro ekufudza mombe kumatongo kuti dzirarame. Kuti zvibatane umwe neumwe wedu anoita mwedzi ariko ozodzoka hake kumba kumhuri umwe woendawo zvichingodzaro. Pakupedzisira, unozongo risa mombe kwemwedzi umwe pagore.”

(As you can see, there are no adequate pastures here at Chingwizi yet cattle are very important as a symbol of wealth for us. A real man cannot just depend on the one hectare plot. Given the situation we needed to be innovative. Therefore, we are returning to *Matongo* for grazing purpose. To balance things we, made an arrangement that every member in the club goes there for a month and return to Chingwizi for the family, so at the end of it an individual will be away from the family for a month only in a year).

The *madzoro* concept therefore shows the propensity of the locals to not only use existing local institutions but to also create new institutions which are responsive to the current and peculiar challenges.

In addition to sustaining livelihoods for the vulnerable Tokwe Mukosi people, the *Matongo* institution became very important as a place of refuge during the protracted conflict with the public institutions. These public institutions included the police and the Department of Wild Life. In chapter five of this thesis, I interrogated the violent clashes between the locals and the police following the decision by the state to forcibly move the agitated residents to the one hectare plots. The *Matongo* area went on to harbor many residents, particularly fugitive men who were running away from the life-threatening situation. In this way, they moved on to stay with relatives, thereby mobilizing existing social ties in their ancestral land.

As stated elsewhere in this study, the Chingwizi area which housed the Tokwe Mukosi people was previously a game reserve. Given their vulnerability and threatened livelihoods, poaching has also become a valuable livelihood strategy. Mobilizing social networks, some resourceful residents are forming poaching teams which are known as *Vakwashiri* (The hunters). These

poaching teams are capitalizing on what they consider as natural capital in their survival matrix. Mostly, they go for smaller animals but when need be they go for bigger ones such as buffalos. At times, these poaching teams encroach into the Billy Rautenbach farm and this is also another source of conflict between the locals and this businessman. While this strategy is important, it also attracts the wrath of the police and game rangers. Based on the culture of violence at the macro level, these officers often use violence as a policing mechanism. In response many residents flee the area and hibernate in the *Matongo* area.

In the other phase of research, it was indicated that one of the poaching teams had pulled down a giant buffalo in the previous two months. In the spirit of camaraderie, they shared the meat with other Chingwizi residents. This act was followed by a serious crackdown by the police on the perpetrators. The members of the team rationally fled the Chingwizi area back to *Matongo*. One day in the evening, I decided to attend a drinking party popularly known as *dhari* in the company of my two research assistants and a villager from Mukosi. In the beginning, most of the patrons were in a pensive disposition, with the assumption that we were undercover police officers. After being introduced by the accompanying villager and the assurance that the lead researcher was from *Matongo*, a relaxed environment ensued. The discussion that we had in the process turned into a Focus Group Discussion. Coincidentally, some members from the hunting team that committed the poaching offence were in attendance. One of them then started to narrate their experience. He indicated that they walked for close to 40 kilometers to Triangle rerouting to *matongo* to seek temporary refuge following the serious clampdown by the police. To show the uneasy relations between the locals and the police, a male patron kept on shouting while we were listening eagerly to the unfolding story at the same time probing the respondent,

“Varume ndati siyanai nenyaya iyi, Matosungwa imi. Matosungwa zveshuwa imi”

(Gentlemen, do not talk about that issue, you are already under arrest. You are under arrest for sure).

He eventually disappeared from the compound to the surprise of most of the people at the function. It is also worth noting that the poaching teams' sphere of influence goes beyond the

Chingwizi area. Some teams are actually returning to the Tokwe Mukosi dam to poach fish. Bonding social capital then becomes important in marketing the fish at Chingwizi. Here they utilize the relations of trust and goodwill. This kind of relationship accords them the opportunity to sell their products on credit, popularly known as *kunyora kumusana*. In other cases, they exchange it with grain also known as *kudirisa* in the vernacular language. In an interview with a member of the poaching teams, it emerged that these actors in a way are trying to reclaim natural capital that rightly belongs to them. He went on to justify the ‘crime’ by saying,

“Hapana mhosva apa nekuti dhamu nderedu iri. Tisu takarwadziwa nekuvakwa kwaro saka yave nguva yeduwo yekudya”

(There is no crime here because it is our dam. We are the ones who suffered because of its construction, now it’s our time to also enjoy the benefits). By mobilizing natural capital beyond the Chingwizi area, these residents are clearly falling back on bridging social capital to survive the unintended consequences of the dam construction.

The manifestation of poaching at Chingwizi is a symptom of the villagers’ deprivation in natural capital. It follows that after such deprivation, they simply improvise. Here they actually do it in a very systematic manner through new local institutions like the poaching teams. The success of the teams has also been aided by social relations before relocation and the new relations at Tokwe Mukosi. It is a daunting task for the law enforcement agents to successfully investigate and nab poaching at Chingwizi because witnesses are always elusive. Based on the relations and the sense of solidarity among the Tokwe Mukosi people, the locals are always ready to protect each other against outsiders like the police in times of trouble. One respondent said,

“Zvekuba mhuka muno medu hazvityisi nekuti hatitengesani kumapurisa”

(Poaching here is easy because there are no sell outs so even when the police come we do not expose each other).

This innovative capacity and resourcefulness by the marginalized citizens has been captured by

Merton in Jang and Agnew (2015). He posits that society has cultural goals and the socially prescribed means of achieving the cultural goal. However at times society places a barrier for some members to achieve the same cultural goals. People respond to this barrier in a multiplicity of ways but of interest to here are the innovators. The innovators unlike the conformists look for alternative but deviant ways of achieving the same cultural goal. In the same line of thinking the Tokwe Mukosi people's goal is to survive but the displacee status becomes a barrier to achieve that goal. In this regard poaching is just but one of the many ways in which the locals have innovated in order to survive, albeit in a deviant way.

Another significant local institution at the disposal of some of the Tokwe Mukosi residents is the Village Savings and Loan scheme (VSI). It is popularly known as *Fushai* in Zimbabwe, denoting investing for the future. This is a microfinance scheme that is also internally driven. It is the brainchild of CARE International whose aim is to move away from the orthodox top-down approach to development. It is conceived as a people centered approach to development whose goal is to build capacity by mobilizing local resources for sustainable development in rural communities (Kebirungi 2008). It is also cost effective rural financing strategies (Hugh 2006). Here, the villagers group themselves into either larger or smaller groups based on their internal networks and relations of trust. Members then pool monetary resources which they compulsorily loan to group members with an interest on a monthly basis. At the end of the year they would then share the proceeds. At Chingwizi, the interests ranged between 15% and 20% per group depending on the size of the group. It is different from the traditional merry-go-round strategy in that this is more organized but they both share the informal component and that social capital is the backbone of these two strategies.

The VSL philosophy however did not originate at Chingwizi. It was indicated that most of the villagers in this scheme were trained by CARE International prior to their relocation from Chivi. This was part of the broader capacity building programme in the *Matongo* in Chivi area. In an interview with an official from CARE International it was revealed that the organization is only there to render technical guidance for the villagers in this program and everything is done by the villagers.

At Chingwizi, there were both larger and smaller VLSs. The smaller ones were highly informal and mostly composed of people with personal relationships. The larger ones during the time of research were moving towards formalization of their operations. One of the groups actually had a formal constitution and an organizational structure composed of the Chairperson, Treasurer, Secretary and a security detail. In October 2018, I attended a meeting convened by the most pronounce VLS group at Bongo business center. Therein there were strong indications to make the programme viable. Thus, they insisted that in the December meeting when they share the proceeds it was mandatory to move away from the consumptive to more sustainable income generating programs. The envisioned programmes included but not limited to market gardening, piggery and poultry projects. As I interacted with the respondents in this meeting, there were indicators of the gendered nature of the envisioned income generating projects and the composition of this local institution. Out of the twenty members only two were men and the rest were women. Culturally in the Chingwizi area, these income generating projects are regarded as feminine. This position has been further reinforced by patriarchy which is deeply rooted in the culture at Chingwizi in particular and among the Shona peoples in general.

Whereas the philosophy behind VLS institution emanated from the *Matongo* area, there is a clear interface between linking social capital and bonding social capital. CARE international is bringing in linking social capital by simply mobilizing at the same time strengthening the already existing bonding social capital. Bonding social is expressed in the personal relations created before and after resettlement at Chingwizi. These personal relations are therefore the mainstay of the *Fushai* project. This has been corroborated by the Chairlady of the biggest *Fushai* program at Chingwizi, who said,

“Chazvakanakira muno muChingwizi tingori vanhu vehukama nokudaro tinozivana kuti uyu panyaya dzemari anonetsa uyu haanetsi. Vaya vanonetsa togara tavavharira kunze kweFushai”.

(The advantage that we have here at Chingwizi is that most of the people are related and we know each other very well. We know all the mischievous people in financial terms, so we just close the door for them in the *Fushai* program).

In the final analysis, the Village Loan and Savings was particularly important for the Tokwe Mukosi people. Their marginalized position meant that access to loans and the conventional savings was highly compromised. In its prognosis, this program would help to push the members out of the vicious cycle of poverty considering the fact that it worked in the past in other villages in Zimbabwe. The future of this program notwithstanding its merits remains bleak considering the unpredictability of the Zimbabwean economy. The hyper inflationary environment is negatively impacting on the savings of this local institution. To remain afloat the members will need to devise new strategies. Towards the end of November there were strong indications to the migration to the United States Dollar and or the South African Rand.

In the last chapter I made brief reference to BACOSSI, I also wish to discuss it under this chapter because it is one of the novel informal institutions at Tokwe Mukosi. It is a mobile marketing strategy conducted at Chingwizi on a monthly basis. It is an outcome of the convolution of both private and civic institutions as well as individuals to market their products. To this end, local business persons, villagers and big companies outside Chingwizi through the Chingwizi area during BACOSSI events. The purpose is to either market their products or to buy the products at cheaper prices. During my fieldwork I participated and observed events at two BACOSSI gatherings, where I also got the opportunity to buy roadrunner chickens and millet. Here, I also observed that NRichards, one of the biggest retail companies in Zimbabwe participates at these monthly events. Residents actually believe that at BACOSSI all the products are available and affordable, leading to the popularity of such local institutions.

The participation of different villages and private companies at BACOSSI is just but a convergence of different types of social capital and social institutions in this struggle for survival. Same level relations between individuals were maintained as a marketing strategy, signifying the importance of bonding social capital. Many villagers ranging from Masangula, Nyuni, Mukosi and even Triangle cane cutters participated at BACOSSI and this is evidence of the existing bridging social capital. The participation of private companies also points to the

aptitude of the locals to use linking social capital, which unlike the other two forms of social capital comes in vertical direction.

7.4 Strategic essentialism, local institutions and the struggle to become.

There is burgeoning interest in strategic essentialism and how it has been part of the many strategies adopted by the marginalized groups in society. The term was coined by Spivak (2008) in the quest for understanding the strategies deployed by women to fight social exclusion. It has subsequently been applied by Gide (2010) in the analysis of the relations between journalists and ethnic minorities. Abraham (2009) unpacks it in the context of the feminist agenda in religion. Overall, it is a strategy that nationalities, groups and other marginalized citizen like the Tokwe Mukosi residents present themselves. It occurs whenever there are relations of domination and subordination (Motamedi et al 2016). Identity categories evidently become the rallying point for collective representation by minority groups with the aim of settling political ends. Reflecting on my Tokwe Mukosi experience strategic essentialism becomes a political strategy deployed by the ‘victims’ who are also acting on the basis of the displacee status in the interest of unity, recognition and the struggle to become real citizens (Chalder 2011).

While there is a huge body of literature on strategic essentialism, there is paucity of literature on strategic essentialism as a strategy used by the IDPs like the Tokwe Mukosi residents. As argued elsewhere in this study, the dearth of literature on the capacity of the displacees to deploy agency and strategic essentialism can be largely attributed to the fallacy of always portraying them as passive victims of the situation. In the mission for collective representation, it emerged that the Tokwe Mukosi people are mobilizing strategic essentialism which mostly manifest itself through local institutions.

It is quite evident that just like in the feminist and racial studies, the displacement at Tokwe Mukosi has hitherto created binaries of inferiority and superiority. These binaries are clear in the

relations between the Tokwe Mukosi people and the state. They are also present in the highly political relations with the Triangle estate and the Shangani people. This has resulted in what can be called the Tokwe Mukosi 'essence' (Eide). This kind of situation helps them to demand special treatment from the other actors in resource allocation. Drawing from Spivak (2008) their work can be read as strategic use of positive essentialism. The clear explanation of the Tokwe Mukosi people's encounters with other actors is imbued in strategic actions which may also be understood as being pragmatic in this highly political environment (Eide 2006). In a collective way strategic essentialism has pushed the residents to downplay their differences in the interim in the interest of the common purpose. The purpose is to deal with social marginality that came with the dislocation from their ancestral land and livelihoods.

The collective nature of the resistance and conflict between the Tokwe Mukosi people and the state speaks to the utility of modulating personal differences for the common purpose. In many cases, it is assisting the locals to push for their rights in view of their marginalization. The systematic manner in which the guerrilla kind of resistance, which I alluded to earlier on in chapter five of this thesis becomes the ideal type of strategic essentialism. While their actions were labeled as acts of banditry by the state, these residents were able to draw sympathy from both the local and international communities. Their marginalized and subordinate status became the moral justification for those actions. Such rational and strategic actions also helped to strengthen linking social capital among the contesting displacees. Internationally the residents who were arbitrarily arrested following the violent protests were able to harness legal support from The Lawyers for Human Rights. Their case is one of the standout cases where residents were able to successfully sue the state and receive compensation in the history of postcolonial Zimbabwe.

Locally, linking social capital based on strategic essentialism was apparent in the minimal support that these residents amassed from various NGOs working at Chingwizi. As we saw in Chapter five, such support was however curtailed by an avalanche of factors, chief among them corruption, gerrymandering and the electioneering gimmick by the state. Consequently the support was politicized and highly skewed towards food aid which was also palliative in nature.

Outside political relations, strategic essentialism and agency are also deployed to good effect in many of individualistic and collective strategies for survival at Chingwizi. Ordinarily, such cases like illegal electricity connections in the case of VaMajoni that I discussed in the preceding section attract heavy sanctions from the police and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). It is worth noting that in as much as this act has not escaped the attention of the responsible authorities, it has been normalized in the pretext of the dire situation that the Tokwe Mukosi people find themselves in. The same can also be said regarding the rampant poaching in and outside the Chingwizi area. Here the displacee status rationalizes and sanctifies such illegal strategies. Of note is the fact that up to the time I finished my field work, there were no recorded cases of prosecution despite the proliferation of poaching at Chingwizi and beyond.

The history and current predicament of the Tokwe Mukosi people have also been used to lay claims to scarce resources at Chingwizi. These resources include but not limited to water, pastures and food aid. Based on the political and acrimonious relations between the residents and Billy Rautenbach, the latter went on to fence off his pastures and water sources from the Tokwe Mukosi people. The state was then put in an intercalary position considering the links it has with the businessman in question. The obtaining situation then forced the state to side with the residents. Pursuant to that it, successfully lobbied the business mogul to avail the contested resources in the interim towards the end of 2018. A closer analysis shows that this became one of the exceptional cases where the Tokwe Mukosi people mobilized the state as a social institution to provide protection. Above all this was some form of linking social capital that was also coming in a vertical way to gain access to resources. In addition to that, the Tokwe Mukosi case goes down as a rare case where the state is at least able to provide food relief to its citizen given the dire financial constraints that the country is going through. Nevertheless, as we noted earlier on, the residents complained about the inadequacy of food relief that they are getting from the state. In addition, serious concerns were raised about the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the access to this important staple diet.

Politically, the displacee status is of utmost importance in the relationship between the locals and ZANU PF party at Chingwizi. In chapter five I highlighted that the relations between the state

and or ZANU PF were characterized by gerrymandering and electioneering. While this is true it should be emphasized that the Tokwe Mukosi displacees are far from being rendered passive victims of the ZANU PF's shenanigans. On the contrary, they exhibited the tenacity to use agency in a dialectical way. Thus, claiming allegiance to ZANU PF and its structures at Chingwizi became a strategic move used to lay claims to valuable resources needed for survival. Towards the end of my field work, it was indicated that a group of youths in Nyuni engaged the ZANU PF Youth League for it to also induce the ZANU PF Politburo to expedite their allocation of land. The Politburo is the supreme decision making organ of the ZANU PF party and is chaired by the president. Their case is strengthened by the fact that only their parents were allocated land in the aftermath of the forced displacement. As noted in chapter 5, most of these youths have started their own families. Such a precarious situation has heightened the need for land in this context. In a list of their request they also included request for first priority in the allocation of irrigable land. In the same vein a group of villagers approached the ZANU PF chairperson in view of getting fishing permits at Tokwe Mukosi dam. In these request the overall justification is that they are the ones who suffered most out of the dam construction. Given this background, rationally, they should be accorded an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of modernity, which is believed to be the fulcrum of the Tokwe Mukosi dam construction.

At the micro level, allegiance to ZANU PF is also a ticket to acquiring limited resources such as food aid. While the relations between the locals and ZANU PF were distasteful, the ZANU PF chairperson and other organs like the ZANU PF Youth and Women's leagues became key institutions for determining who gets access to food aid. Political affiliation is also used in the politics of inclusion and exclusion to the much cherished land for small enterprise business. At both Bongo and Nyuni business centers, it was revealed that one had to be politically correct to get access to land for business purpose. Additionally, it also became a viable strategy which the entrepreneurs mustered to remain operational. In tandem with this a female business person at Nyuni remarked,

“Kana uri webusiness sesu kudai unototamba inorira. Ukasatoita zveZANU PF upenyu hunokuomera. Nekudaro kunyange usiri weZANU PF unotongoita izvozvo kuti zvinhu zvifambe.”

(If you are in business like us you ought to dance along. If you dissociate yourself from ZANU

PF your life becomes difficult. So even if you do not like ZANU PF you have to pretend).

The tenacity to use the above mentioned local institution for survival was also observed by Nhodo (2013). He observed that many of the respondents in the newly formalised Chimusana market in Masvingo had to be ZANU PF during the day and MDC (the main opposition party) at night. Such a strategy was indispensable for retaining the trading places and wares. Similar findings were observed by Gukurume (2018) in his study of Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Harare where allegiance to ZANUPF was turned into social and economic capital for the youths. As we observed in the previous section, donating to the ZANU PF cause was also a viable strategy used to remain in business for small shop owners at Chingwizi. It should be noted that the patron-client relationship between the Chingwizi villagers and ZANU PF is not peculiar to this context. ZANU PF is just using this commercial space to amass or generate the much need political mileage (Gukurume 2018). This has always been part of the party's culture and mobilization strategy to gain political capital (Kamete 2017). What is new however is the capacity of the displacees to also use ZANU PF to strengthen linking social capital for survival in the alien context.

7.5 Identity markers, local institutions and survival among the displacees.

During my stay at Chingwizi, I witnessed an intersection of social identity and local institutions as part of the survival gambits deployed by the inhabitants. As stated elsewhere, there were two major communities that were displaced from their original places to form the Tokwe Mukosi community at Chingwizi. These are Tokwe Mukosi and Nyuni. There was a spirited effort by the state as part of legibility to maintain the same living arrangement by correspondingly naming the two major communities at Chingwizi. An attempt was also made to maintain the same villages, their names and leadership under those two communities. These villages include but not limited to Mudzungudzi, Madzivire, Maheya, Muzvimwe, Tsikisai, Chekai and Jawa. While most of the villagers were coerced to move into those villages, there were covert measures in place that ensured that the villagers moved into the plots that corresponded with the names of their original

villages in the *matongo* area. Much as this arrangement was a noble idea aimed at uniting the fragmented communities, it nonetheless became a serious source of conflict between the Tokwe Mukosi people, other local institutions and the established leadership of chief Chitanga in Mwenezi. I will focus on these relations in chapter 8 of this thesis.

In the long run, the aforesaid living arrangement helped to strengthen bonding social capital which proved to be the hallmark of survival in the alien territories. Commenting on the indispensability of bonding social capital that was reinforced by the strategic living arrangements in the one hectare plots, a female respondent (39) who identified herself as VaChivi had this to say,

“Kunyari takarwadziwa nezvakaitika, tinoona magariro edu akanaka. Muno Munyuni vatorwa vashoma, Nekudaro tinobatsirana nezvidiki zvatinaivo apo zvinenge zvakaoma”

(Although the displacements were painful, we are happy with the current living arrangement. Here in Nyuni there are very few aliens and this puts us in a position to assist each other with the little that we have in times of trouble).

Much as there were a few aliens at Nyuni and Tokwe Mukosi, there was also a deliberate effort to ensure social inclusion by using totemism as a rallying point. This helped to instill a sense of belongingness and solidarity for the hitherto marginalized community. Over and above this, the said living arrangement facilitated the maintenance of the networks and local institutions that were important in the *matongo* area. Based on social networks reciprocity was cited as the commonly used survival options in the three villages at Chingwizi.

Coincidentally, as I interviewed VaChivi, a middle aged man arrived at her homestead with a small packet of fish. In the middle of the interview the respondent was forced to stop and welcomed the visitor in line with the cultural expectations in this community. In a welcoming voice she said, *“Titambirezve Mirambwi yangu, matiunzireiko nhasi. (Welcome Murambwi*

(totem), what did you bring for us today?). The man responded with a smile, “*Ndakabva kudhamu nezuro kunoredza saka ndati ndiunzire VaChivi vangu svimuto.*”(I came from the dam yesterday for fishing so I thought I should bring VaChivi (totem) some relish). After the expected introductions, the interviewee asked to be excused for a while and they went on to have a private conversation. I waited patiently for about 30 minutes and when they came out of the hut the man said good byes but VaChivi stopped him and said, “*Mirai Murambwi ndikubatisei tunzungu utu munopa muroora wangu aite dovi ndoziva munorida.* (Wait Murambwi (totem) I have these ground nuts for my in-law to make peanut butter for you, I know you love it). After the man’s departure the interviewee went on to chronicle what had transpired, emphasizing the significance of social exchange and reciprocity in the new territory. This therefore points to the importance of bonding social capital among the displaced Tokwe Mukosi villagers.

Voluntary organisations at Chingwizi were also a manifestation of the centrality of bonding social capital. Of importance are the burial societies in the sampled villages. Although they came in an informal way many respondents highlighted their indispensability in times of bereavement. These burial societies were anchored on relations of trust as they were composed of members with personal ties and relations. While they are informal their structure resembles formal organisations. To this end they had the chairperson deputy chairperson, secretary and the treasurer. During my stay at Chingwizi, I had the opportunity to attend and participate in a burial of a villager near Bongo business center. Based on class the funeral might fall short of an elaborate funeral but the local burial society was at least able to meet some of the basic requirement of a funeral. Consequently, it was able to provide food, transport and the much cherished coffin for the deceased. The ability of this local institution to provide the requisite services for its members has however been compromised by the dire macro environment in Zimbabwe. The inflationary environment means that most of the savings by such informal organisations are eroded leading to incapacitation. Moreover towards the end of 2018 the prices for most of the basic commodities and services more than doubled, thereby putting such organisations in a dire situation.

In as much as the burial societies were popular institutions one cannot gloss over the class

differences. These class differences had a bearing on the membership and non-membership to these local institutions. As a result of this I observed a complicated class matrix characterized by three distinct classes. The first is comprised of the extremely marginalized residents who cannot afford the subscriptions necessary for membership. Often these residents are enmeshed in the waithood mode highlighted in the preceding sections. The second class is relatively better off and they are managing the required subscriptions to become full members of these burial societies. Lastly there is a category that is considered to be above the other two classes. This class based on the ability to mobilize various forms of capital for survival is also able to mobilize and outsource linking social capital in the form of funeral service providers. I observed that such residents rely mostly on the Nyaradzo funeral service which is popularly known as *Sahwira Mukuru* (Reliable friend) in Zimbabwe.

As I interacted with the respondents during the aforesaid funeral, I observed that this event reinvigorates a sense of community and social identity among the villages identified in this study. Villagers from the other village thronged the Bongo area to pay condolences to the bereaved family. This gesture and cultural practice is known as *kubata maoko* at Chingwizi. This way they were able to provide moral support to the members of their community in the time of need. They were also able to provide material support to the bereaved families popularly known as *chema*. What is apparent is that these processes capacitated the displaced persons to mobilize bridging social capital from the other villages.

Of note is the fact that linking social capital was also important considering that relatives from the *Matongo* also attend such events, at the same time providing the same support that the locals provided. It was also indicated that in a reciprocal way the Villagers from these villages visit the *Matongo* during such occasions to provide the same support. Although such events are unfortunate they indirectly help to maintain kinship ties and identity with relatives in the *Matongo* area for many of the Tokwe Mukosi residents.

The unity and solidarity for the Tokwe Mukosi residents in times of adversities were captured by

the family representative who gave the closing remarks and thanked people who had contributed towards the success of the burial at the said funeral. He said,

“Chekutanga ndinoda kutenda hama dzedu dzebheria society dzatinadzo nezvadzatiitira pano. Chechipiri ndodakutenda vakarabwa, vanakomana nevanasikana vedu pane zvavakaita kubvira pakurwara nepakuvigwa kwaamai. Chechitatu ndoda kutendazve vavakidzani vedu nerudo rwavo, kunyanya Mai Rhozi, regai nditi simukai muonekwe navanhu. Ngatimbovaomberera maoko. Regai ndipedzisire nekutenda hama neshamwari vatabata navo vabva kumatongo, Mukosi, Masngula nekuNyuni, rudo rwavonerutsigiro rwavo rurambe rwakadero. Ngativaomberere maoko zvekare. Ndinokutendai mese zvakare.”

(Firstly, I would like to thank members from the burial society here present for their role. Secondly, I wish to thank our in-laws, sons and daughters for the work done from illness up until we buried our mother. I also want to thank our neighbors for their love, particularly Amai Rhozi, may you please standup so that they can see you. Let’s clap hands for her. Let me finish by thanking our friends and relatives from Matongo, surrounding villages and Mufula and Masangula. Your love and support should be maintained, let’s also clap hands for them. Once more, I thank you all).

Solidarity and collectivism is the linchpin of the local culture both at Chingwizi and the Matongo area. These very important attributes of African culture were also maintained through the *humwe* or *nhimbe* concept among the displaced persons. While the ultimate objective was to instill a sense of solidarity, this element had a bifurcated objective in that it also helped to provide the much needed labour for some members who did not have adequate labour. This then made it a survival strategy in the final analysis. *Humwe* is a social arrangement where an individual invites close relatives and friends to provide labour as a team to complete a specific task. In a reciprocal way, the hosts brew beer and provide food, all to be consumed in a celebratory way after completing the task at hand. This idea, some of the social institutions discussed above was inherited from the traditional Chivi area.

The utility of *humwe* as a survival strategy is however compromised by the politics of space for agricultural purposes. It is therefore mostly utilized by resourceful residents like Mai Lucy who managed to acquire additional space for agriculture. It is also used for the construction of pool and dagga huts and toilets in most of the villages sampled for this study. What is clear is that this local institution is very successful based on the mobilization of bonding social capital. In a dialectical manner, I also observed that it helps to further reinforce the same bonding social capital as it is utilized by people with the same level relationship. Thus unlike linking social capital it comes in a horizontal form.

In this chapter and the preceding chapter, I focused on the intricate relationship between agency, social capital, social networks and local institutions in the desire to survive marginalization for the displaced. With an exception of Samanyanga, VaMajoni, families which managed to get additional space for farming and the small tuck-shop owners, most of the survival strategies are nevertheless survivalist in nature. They were just palliative measures meant to at least meet the life's basics in the interim. I wish to revisit and problematize the overreliance on agency in the context of Machiavellian states in Africa. Thus, in the following chapter, I will direct the reader towards a rethinking of agency in the context of the Tokwe Mukosi people.

7.6 Displacement and marginalization: A case for the renaissance of the *Zunde Ramambo* local institution at Chingwizi.

The discussion on the disruption and significance of local in dealing with vulnerability can never be complete without a focus on *Zunde Ramambo* institution (Chief's granary). In principle this local institution can be primed in plugging the deficiencies of externally driven protection for the Tokwe Mukosi people that has been discussed in this thesis. *Zunde Ramambo* can be conceptualized as an indigenous initiative that becomes a social safety net in times of droughts, wars and economic recession for the marginalized and vulnerable sections of the community. It is an informal and inward driven social and economic mechanism for protection which has a collective ingredient (Ringson 2017).

In the conceptualization of local institutions, I stated that the Tokwe Mukosi people are rationally falling back on civic and informal local institutions to survive the outlined social exclusion. Looking closely at the attributes of the *Zunde Ramambo* initiative, I therefore believe that it can be one of the most important local institutions that can be used as part of the broader community based protection for Tokwe Mukosi people. Much as it has many variations depending on the geographical and cultural contexts, it has a two pronged meaning. For some it denotes people working together in a plot to produce food during the time of plenty that would then be stored in the chief's granary for future use. Yet for others it implies the pulling of resources at the community level that would then be stored in the same granary (Mararike 2015). Despite these disparities the common denominator is that it is anchored in the feeding capacity of the chief in times of need. What differs therefore is the mechanism in place to access the requisite food (Machingura 2012).

While a host of scholars acknowledge the significance of *Zunde Ramambo* as a social safety net, Batasara (2015) laments the decline of this local institution. She attributes this decline to the colonization of Zimbabwe which had the knock on effect of eroding the power of the local leadership. The war of liberation also led to the disintegration of communities which indirectly affected this local institution. However, in recent times, there has been a remarkable interest in reviving the *Zunde Ramambo* institution for sustainable development in society. Batasara (2015) calls for the strengthening of this significant institution to deal with the detrimental effects of climate variability and or climate change. Ringson (2017) looks at the place of this institution in the care and support for Orphans and Vulnerable Children OVCs. Fontein (2009) considers its importance in the reintegration of the fragmented families in the aftermath of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. Mhaka (2015) has a case for the *Zunde Ramambo* institution in wild life management and natural resources in general.

Given the volatile macro-economic environment and further challenges that came with the displacement of the Tokwe Mukosi people, many respondents particularly those engrained it the

waitthood mode yearned for the revival of this important local institution. They highlighted that prior to their displacement significant strides were made towards the revitalization of the *Zunde Ramambo* following its decline in terms of protection for the poor. The inevitable displacement then reversed all the gains made to that effect. While most of the local institutions have been resuscitated in the face of vulnerability, the revival of the *Zunde Ramambo* institution is elusive at Tokwe Mukosi. This is largely attributed to the disruption of the chieftainship and headmanship which are the backbone of this institution. To put this into perspective, while many village heads in the pre-displacement community (*MaSabhuku*) were maintained, they became redundant as their functions were arbitrary usurped by the partisan ZANU PF chairpersons. This is proving to be a contentious issue which is also leading to protracted conflict between the two parties at Chingwizi. The resultant conflict is having ripple effects on the efforts to revive this institution. To exacerbate the already precarious situation, the established chieftaincy of *Mushawasha, Nemauzhe, Gororo and Nyajena* which was the mainstay of the *Zunde Ramambo* institution was left behind in the *matongo* area. By virtue of their occupancy of the private land in Chingwizi, the villagers have also been alienated from the Chitanga chieftaincy which superintends the Mwenezi district.

What makes the situation precarious for the Chingwizi traditional village heads is the fact that chief Chitanga who is the *dejure* overall leader of the Mwenezi district is falling to recognize them. This has led to serious conflict between the two actors who are also exhibiting different lifeworlds in this context. In an interview with one of the Tokwe Mukosi village heads, it was revealed that the bone of contention is that according to the Shangani culture they are not fit to hold any political office under chief Chitanga until they have gone to the mountain for initiation. In such cultural contexts, a man remains a boy unless he goes to the mountain for the initiation ceremony (Van Gennep 1909 and Gwata 2009). It is only after this rite of passage that they have an inalienable right to hold such a political office. Conversely, the said village heads are refusing to submit to the Chitanga hegemony and engage in counter hegemonic struggles wherein they are trying to show their displeasure covertly or overtly. It was indicated that the village heads and even their subjects do not recognize chief Chitanga as their leader. Instead, they identify themselves as *vanhu vaGororo, Nemauzhe, Nyajena naMushawasha* (Gororo, Nyajena,

Nemauzhe or Mushawasha's people).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned practical impediments, it should be underscored that the *Zunde Ramambo* institution is indispensable in the provision of social safety net for the hitherto disenfranchised Tokwe Mukosi people. In its original objectives, it would be important in the provision of protection for not only the displaced persons but also persons facing bifurcated marginalization like the OVCs, persons with disabilities, the elderly and women. More importantly, this will go a long way in meeting the Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs) which Zimbabwe is a signatory. SDGS among other things seek to ensure reduced social inequalities, achieve gender equality, end hunger, achieve food security and end poverty in all its manifestations by the year 2030 (UNDP 2017). Above all given the extra virtues of this institution, it would also facilitate unity and solidarity between the fragmented social actors identified in chapter six of this thesis.

The need for solidarity is particularly true, taking into consideration the fact that the *Zunde Ramambo* institution is deep-seated in the *Ubuntu* African philosophy. This philosophy among other attributes emphasizes the spirit of togetherness, respect, loyalty solidarity and hospitality (Mbigi 1995). Harnessing the virtues of the *Zunde Ramambo* institution is relatively easier in the Tokwe Mukosi community given the possible interplay between this local institution and other local institutions like the *Humwe* institution which is also premised on the collectivist ethos. In addition the *Zunde Ramambo* will revolve around the already existing social capital at Chingwizi, simultaneously strengthening the same social capital. To achieve this it is paramount to adopt an interface analysis that would also help to reconcile the identified conflicting lifeworlds in the pillars of this local institution.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter signifies a transition from individualist strategies to collective strategies for survival among the Tokwe Mukosi people at Chingwizi. It therefore focused on the efficacy of local institutions in providing local protection for the displacees at Chingwizi. Emphasis was on how they mobilize existing local institutions at the same time looking at how they create new local institutions for survival. These local institutions include public, private and civic institutions. It however contends that the inaptness coupled with the ambivalent relationship between the public and private institutions on one hand and the Chingwizi residents on the other has pushed the villagers to fall back on local and informal institutions. In as much as the public institutions at Chingwizi are interested in using the residents to gain political capital, the same residents are also using such institutions to survive marginalization in a strategic way. It also emphasized the inextricable relationship between local institution, social networks and social capital in the Tokwe Mukosi people's survival strategies web. It shows that while some villagers were uncouth in this survival matrix, the displacee status became the flagship and moral justification for such survival strategies. This kind of conduct falls within strategic essentialism a strategy used mostly by the poor and marginalized citizens. Added to the survival web are issues of identity and collectivism which were also used as the rallying point to survive social marginalization. Lastly the chapter underscored the utility of the *Zunde Ramambo* local institution in the provision of protection particularly for people facing double marginalization. These include the OVCs, the aged, women, children and people with disabilities.

8 CHAPTER 8 SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

8.1 Introduction.

This is the final chapter of this thesis and it dwells on the summary, recommendations and conclusions made herein. I am also interested in showing how the study met the outlined objectives. These objectives were, to examine the people-state relations at Tokwe Mukosi, to evaluate the Tokwe Mukosi people's vulnerability adaptation and resilience to forced displacements, to assess the role of local institutions in dealing with vulnerability and to analyze the place and significance of social capital and social networks in the quest for survival at Chingwizi. In addition to this, I shall proffer areas for further research that I unpacked in the course of this research.

8.2 Tokwe Mukosi displacements, the past, the present and the future.

In the first chapter of data analysis, I started with the historical overview of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and the subsequent displacement. The aim was to signpost the reader to the temporalities and precarity of the incessant relocation phases at Chingwizi. First of all, there was the evacuation of the villagers from the *matongo* area. This was predicted on the severe flooding that inundated the area following the collapse of the dam wall. It has been revealed that the disaster culminated in arguably the biggest mass movement of people in the postcolony Zimbabwean society. What it means is that based on the lack of disaster preparedness and financial resources the state was forced to move the homeless villagers into the Chingwizi transit camp. This marked the genesis of the protracted and ambivalent relations between the Tokwe Mukosi villagers and the state. Up until this time, the state ordinarily acted like a primordial state in its relations with the villagers (see Scott 1998). Its imprudent actions are reflected in the resettling of the agitated villagers in a single transit camp. I contend that this social development accorded the residents the opportunity to stage one of the greatest forms of resistance in the post-

colonial history of development and displacement. This was in spite of the state's culture of violence against dissent in Zimbabwe. Clearly this was the first move that shows that the Tokwe Mukosi displacees are far from being conceptualized as passive victims of the social situation.

In light of the said resistance, legibility and statecraft became the viable options at the state's disposal. In a series of relocation, there was another relocation of the villagers from the Chingwizi transit camp to the one hectare plots. While the use of force was the linchpin of this relocation phase, there were underlying elements of legibility and statecraft. I argued that the state at that point acted like many modern states across the world. The allocation of plots and subsequent naming of the villages was therefore classic in making the revolting residents subjects of the state. It had the overall effect of making the Tokwe Mukosi villagers traceable. This would then make future revolts impossible. Up to the time I finished my research, there were no recorded cases of villagers in open confrontation with the state. In a significant way legibility pushed the villagers to fall back on alternative means and strategies to survive social exclusion. These alternative strategies then became the focus of this study.

The ubiquitous relocation of the Tokwe Mukosi people from the one hectare plots to the yet to be identified area is also a manifestation of temporality and evaporation of the immediate future (Guyer2008). It was revealed in this study that this situation is having ripple effects on the livelihoods of the Tokwe Mukosi people. Above all the impending future relocation and the hype behind the master plan for the Tokwe Mukosi dam will inevitably usher new problems and new forms of social inequalities. While the rest of Zimbabwe is futuristic and positive about the projected horizon, a few questions remain unanswered as the nation moves into the glorified future,

- What will be the place for the marginalised Tokwe Mukosi people?
- What will happen to the newly emerging families who are not appearing in the state's records of beneficiaries?
- Are there any chances that the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people will benefit in the

envisioned master plan?

- What are the prospects of the Tokwe Mukosi people receiving full compensation?

It is my contention that unless there are drastic changes to the state's behavior, the Tokwe Mukosi people will obviously be further marginalized. This is pursuant to the state's conceptualization of the Tokwe Mukosi people as people in the way of development.

It was also revealed that the aforementioned temporality, coupled with erratic compensation has also contributed to the dislocation of the villagers from their livelihoods and sources of social and cultural wellbeing. In addition it was observed that these social developments had negative implications on social capital, social networks and local institutions. These elements were however critical in the pre-displacement and post-displacement phases for the marginalized residents.

This study is also a reflection of the unique experience of the Tokwe Mukosi 'victims' in their endeavor to shake off the 'victim' status. This status has hitherto been the flagship of many studies on IDPs in Zimbabwe. This kind evaluation as indicated in chapter 5 permeated into the national, regional and International communities. I nevertheless carefully avoided universalizing the responses of the villagers to this vulnerability context. I therefore revealed a section of the respondents who have switched to the waithood mode (Hanwana 2012) or people waiting for development. They are also conceptualized as people waiting for the state (Oldfield and Grayling 2015). It has been underscored that the waithood mode or the paradox of people waiting for the state is inadvertently shaping the politics of finding alternative options for resettlement and survival for the displacees (Oldfield and Grayling *ibid*).

In the understanding of the state people relations at Tokwe Mukosi, the study also revealed the elements of electioneering and gerrymandering that were sugarcoated by the state's humanist attitude. As noted in the study, this was particularly true in the allocation of business stands and food relief. These were highly politicized and the overarching goal was to amass political capital

for the ruling ZANU PF party. Of note is the fact that the commonly threading niche for this study was to capture the propensity of IDPs to deploy agency in the work of a disparaging social arrangement. Thus, the thesis argued that, while the state was interested in gaining political capital, the villagers are dialectically and tactfully using the same institution to acquire valuable but scarce resources at Chingwizi.

8.3 The politics of space and compensation.

It emerged in the foregoing study that the relocation exercise from the *matongo* to the Chingwizi holding camp ideally targeted household heads, both for land allocation and compensation. Six years later there has been a serious evolution and new families are evolving from those targeted households. It was revealed that this social development is increasing pressure and demand for land in the one hectare plots. Consequently, there is demand for more land to resettle not only the initially targeted households but also the newly emerging families. The directive by the state that the villagers build temporary structures in the occupied land is further complicating life at Chingwizi. The research revealed that this directive is indirectly linked to the investment potential in such rural economies.

To put this into perspective, it should be underscored that prior to their relocation the Tokwe Mukosi villagers valued investment in permanent structures like houses. This form of investment has nonetheless been severely affected by the lack of space and the transitory nature of the relocations at Chingwizi. In addition to investment in structures, it emerged that investment in livestock was also one of the viable investment areas before relocations. It follows that after receiving part payments for compensation, the villagers expected to reinvest in livestock particularly cattle. Above all cattle ownership is a status symbol for the Tokwe Mukosi people. It was argued that the limited grazing space in the one hectare plots has therefore adversely affected investment in this portfolio.

The above mentioned situation was exacerbated by the increasing competition for space between the villagers, Billy Rautenbach, Triangle estate and the indigenous Shangani people. In the end, while some villagers received part payments, compensation is inadvertently increasing vulnerability for the said villagers. The macro-economic environment which is also inflationary has further compounded insecurity for the Tokwe Mukosi people. In light of the limited grazing space and unavailability of other related resources, it was revealed that the villagers are appealing to the economies of affection. Here they are strategically applying the displacee status which has hitherto pushed the state to persuade Billy Rautenbach to open not only the pastures but the watering sites for the villagers. It was however noted that this strategy is working in the short-term. Thus, its sustainability remains questionable given the unpalatable relations between the two social actors. This therefore explains why some of the interviewed villagers are falling back on the *matongo* and *madzoro* local institutions to maintain and resuscitate this investment potential. In the long run, notwithstanding its own challenges this arrangement is seen as more sustainable compared to the arrangement with the business mogul.

It has also been noted that while there are palliative measures in place, the struggle for space and resources entails that the Tokwe Mukosi people are just living in a borrowed space (Dewolf 2017). Given the fact that in the past six years at Chingwizi, the villagers have been moved several times and they continue to receive communication regarding the impending relocation, they are simply floating in permanent temporalities (Greyling 2012, Hilal and Petti 2018). Based on agency, I however went on to look at popular strategies deployed by the Tokwe Mukosi people at Chingwizi in this permanent, temporalities state.

8.4 Interfacing, social capital, social networks and local institutions for survival.

The study explicated a unique interplay of social networks, social capital and local institutions among the displacees at Tokwe Mukosi. These were in response to the volatile situation at hand. These forms of assets were critical for the transition from the waithood mode to guarantee the

capacity to aspire by the majority of the residents. I went on to classify local institutions at Chingwizi under public, private and civic institutions. The research indicated that public and private local institutions bring in linking social capital which comes in a vertical form. Civic institutions at Chingwizi are inward driven and hinge on bonding and bridging social capitals. Unlike linking social capital, the researcher observed that bonding social capital at Chingwizi is highly pronounced in people with the same level relationship. Thus, it manifested itself in a horizontal form. It was also revealed that the acrimonious state-people relations had negative ramifications on the capacity of the Tokwe Mukosi people to fully mobilize linking social capital from both the public and private local institutions. This therefore explains the overreliance on civic and informal local institutions as part of community based protection. Popular local institutions at Chingwizi included but not limited to burial societies, BACCOSSI, *humwe*, burial societies, poaching teams and Village Loan and Savings.

Linking social capital was also significant and it was realized through the *matongo* institution. Here, the relations created prior to their relocation to the Chingwizi area are of prime importance. Many villagers are maintaining social ties with the relatives who survived the disaster and relocations. From the research findings, these forms of networks were important in the realm of education for the displacees' children, given the backdrop of below standard educational facilities at Chingwizi. It was also important for maintaining livestock in the aftermath of the disaster and the post-relocation phase. The study revealed that the ever shrinking grazing spaces as well as the politics of space between the various social actors at Chingwizi have put livestock in a dire situation. Given such a situation, sending back livestock or buying new livestock in the *matongo* area became a fashionable strategy among the Tokwe Mukosi people. It has also been revealed that this local institution has also led to the emergence of a new *madzoro* institution. There is a symbiotic relationship between the *madzoro* and *matongo* social institutions. That way, linking social capital is coming in to create and simultaneously strengthen bonding social capital.

To show the indispensability of the *matongo* institution, it was further indicated in this study that this local institution is significant in proffering material and emotional support in times of

adversities for many Tokwe Mukosi people who managed to maintain such ties. In addition, I also revealed that the *matongo* institution became an important sanctuary for fugitive Chingwizi villagers, running away from persecution by the repressive state apparatus.

To a lesser extent, the study exposed the propensity of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers to mobilize linking social capital from both public and private local institutions. These came in the form of the state, ZANU PF and a few NGOs operating in the area. It emerged that their ability to use these local institutions was propelled by use of their displacee status to either draw sympathy from them or strategically positioning themselves to access scarce resources in this marginalized political economy. This kind of action as indicated in the study falls within the realm of strategic essentialism (see Spivak 2008). In terms of moral support the study discovered that the villagers drew sympathy from the humanitarian community. This support was particularly important in the aftermath of the disaster but years after the disaster this support has become elusive. This can be largely attributed to political interference by the state and its functionaries like ZANU PF as well as the volatile macro-economic environment in Zimbabwe. In the same vain, the legal support that some villagers got from the Lawyers for Human Rights to contest their arbitrary arrest and harassment by the police speaks volumes to the utility of linking social capital at Chingwizi.

The research also highlighted the place and significance of social identity in the Tokwe Mukosi people's survival and resilience matrix. This is evident in the deliberate naming and clustering of the villagers in corresponding villages at Chingwizi. Totemism is also proving to be a key identity marker used for adaptation and creation of bonding and bridging social capital at Chingwizi. It was observed that Totemism helped to instill a sense of solidarity and belongingness for the hitherto fragmented community in the new environs. Social identity was also important in the maintenance and creation of local institutions. These local institutions include *humwe*, merry-go-rounds and burial societies, which were all anchored on the mobilization of bonding and bridging social capital.

8.5 From economic entrepreneurs to social entrepreneurs.

In general, the study elaborated the significance of resourcefulness and entrepreneurship to deal with social exclusion in the many transitional phases at Chingwizi. It is interesting to note that exceptional entrepreneurship is translating into what Taru (2019) terms social entrepreneurship at Chingwizi. Social entrepreneurship is accumulated based on the newly acquired status by entrepreneurs in question. This status conversely generates symbolic capital and symbolic violence. Symbolic capital is then deployed to get scarce resources in society. A case in point is that of a local business entrepreneur who went on to contest in the 2018 elections and became the local councilor at Chingwizi. This signals the capacity to use social entrepreneurship and symbolic capital to get political capital. It emerged that most of these social entrepreneurs are revered at Chingwizi and their presence is often recognized at events and other social gatherings like funerals, church gatherings and political rallies. In addition, they have ultimately become opinion leaders in important matters concerning the community.

8.6 Rethinking agency and social capital at Tokwe Mukosi.

In this study, I showed that the Tokwe Mukosi people are harnessing agency, social capital and various livelihood assets to survive social marginalization in a unique way. While this is working in the interim, I wish to emphasize that the sustainability of some of the strategies used is questionable owing to a number of factors raised in the study. It is clear that except the cases of resourceful welders, small tuck-shop business entrepreneurs, the bakers and residents who strategically got extra plots for farming, other strategies are survivalist in nature. The perpetual relocation of the villagers is further compounding the situation. In as much as the displacee status was the moral justification, it was indicated that many of the coping mechanism deployed border on illegality and at times they are risky. Cases in point include poaching, illegal electricity connections and child prostitution. Given the risks involved, it is noble for the state and its functionaries to find a sustainable solution to the Tokwe Mukosi people's predicament.

It should also be underscored that ideally, it is the state's responsibility to find a sustainable solution to this problem in line with the dictates of the social contract. What is at stake is that overreliance on human agency is militating against the drive to find a sustainable solution to the Tokwe Mukosi debacle. The probable justification for the state's inaptness is that six years after their displacement, the people are surviving, therefore they will continue to survive. This is also a typical example of the state which is also acting on the basis of agency. It is undisputable that the situation is working in the interest of the state and its structures. Agency and the many survival options available to the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people may actually become a smokescreen that diverts people's attention from the pertinent issues afflicting them. Taru (2013), commenting on agency, opines that overemphasis on agency has unintended consequences of creating what he terms a 'structuration cult'. If residents can strategically evade the constraining social structures, it follows that there is no need for immediate state action to assist them. This also makes it difficult for the same residents to solicit intervention from the state (Taru Ibid).

While I observed that bonding social capital was the hallmark of survival among the respondents, overreliance on this form of social capital has also been questioned by Woolcock and Narayan (2000). The contention is that bonding social capital is simply there to make the residents "get by". Thus, there is need to strengthen bridging and linking social capital at Chingwizi to make people 'get ahead' (Woolcock and Narayan 2000) and this is the essence of inclusive development.

8.7 Recommendations

The foregoing study makes the following recommendations to resolve the *impasse* and ensure sustainable development at Tokwe Mukosi.

- There is need to revisit the contentious compensation paradox for the nation to comply with the United Nations minimum standards for IDPs.
- There is need to adopt an interface analysis that will help to reconcile the contestations

and conflicting lifeworlds between different social actors at Chingwizi.

- It is imperative for the state to expeditiously rationalise the compensation formula and revise the packages in tandem with the recent currency migration from United States Dollar to the RTGS bond and the hyper inflationary macro-economic environment.
- The state should make sure that the Chingwizi villagers are fully compensated not only for the previous displacement but also for the impending third and final relocation.
- To prioritize the youth and the newly emerging families in the forthcoming relocations.
- To embrace Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) to ensure sufficient compensation for the villagers.
- The state should fulfil its promise of four hectare plots so as to improve the tainted state-people relations at Tokwe Mukosi.
- It also needs to ensure security of land tenure through proper documentation, including access to important resources such as water and grazing land.
- The state should prioritise people suffering from double marginalization such as women and people with disabilities in its intervention programs.
- The state should also ensure that the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people are at the centre of the proposed master plan for the dam to ensure social justice and inclusivity.
- The state, working with the Civil Aviation Department (CPU) should work towards strengthening disaster management and preparedness to avoid what happened at Tokwe Mukosi in future.
- It is paramount to revisit the fishing permits allocated to the locals so as to prioritize the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people.
- In the interim, there is need to strengthen the local conflict resolution mechanism rather than relying on violence to resolve social problems.
- Based on the displayed ingenuity and resourcefulness by the Tokwe Mukosi villagers, the state should desist from the portrayal of the Tokwe Mukosi villagers as ‘victims’. It should therefore make efforts to support some of the more sustainable survival strategies in the forthcoming relocation of the villagers to another territory.
- The state should also avoid a generalized approach to the third relocation. This is based on the observation that many entrepreneurs have become resilient and they are likely to resist the impending third relocation.

- To avoid the recurrence of resistance in the forthcoming relocation, priority should also be given to residents in the waitlist mode.
- The state should work towards the strengthening of local institutions, social capital and social networks to build resilience and ensure sustainable development for the Tokwe Mukosi people.

8.8 Suggested areas for further Research.

The following areas are suggested for further research.

- Gender based violence among the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people.
- Displacement, sexuality and child prostitution.
- The experiences of people facing double marginalization in development-induced displacements such as women, the youths and people living with disabilities.
- The impact of forced displacements on education among the Tokwe Mukosi people.
- Displacement, culture and social identity.
- Displacement and Human Security.

9 CONCLUSION

The foregoing study in the final analysis was primarily interested in showing a unique trend in the study of IDPs. It avoids the major trap that many researchers on the Tokwe Mukosi people have unintentionally fallen into. The trap is that of always evaluating the Tokwe Mukosi people as passive victims of their social situation. I however acknowledge that the fallacy is partly a product of the timing of the studies, many of which were carried out in the aftermath of the disaster. I acknowledge that six years after the disaster, the social situation has changed. This has led to a new trend of survivors rather than victims and this has been the running theme in this study. I however started by focusing on the state-people relations following the heinous dislocation of the Tokwe Mukosi people from their ancestral land. From the outset, it reveals the

different and competing lifeworlds between the state and the locals in this development-marginalization paradox. To show the social differentiation and diversity in lifeworlds, the study did not homogenize the responses of the Tokwe Mukosi people to this human induced disaster. Before moving on to the actual relations, it was prudent to start by a brief historical background of the Tokwe Mukosi dam project. In this historical background, emphasis was made on the temporality and transitory nature of the relocation. Based on the transitory nature of the relocation, the researcher observed three distinct phases of relocation, and these phases had adverse effects on the livelihoods of the Tokwe Mukosi people.

Taking the actor oriented approach to the relocation exercise, the study also revealed a number of actors and their interests in the relocations. It was then observed that the state (a key actor), just like the Tokwe Mukosi people, is deploying agency and this is influencing its conduct at Tokwe Mukosi. Thus, it emerged that such conduct is highly influenced by legibility and Machiavellian undertones. The study reveals that the move to relocate the villagers from the tents to the one hectare plots typifies the behavior of the modern state in its quest to create relations of domination and subjugation. Such relations are meant to ensure total submission by the agitated Tokwe Mukosi people. Ultimately, it was further revealed that legibility in a significant way is helping to transform the villagers into subjects of the state. It was also observed that the subsequent naming of the villages and the registration of the plots, despite the transitory nature of the relocation also made it easier for the state to make the villagers traceable (Scott 2008).

Much as the study acknowledges the dire social situation that the Tokwe Mukosi people encountered, it pointed to the uniqueness of these displacees' experience in the understanding of IDPs. This uniqueness is anchored on the ability of the locals to redefine their futures and social situations. In the first place, the tenacity to openly confront the state is a clear manifestation of their failure to resign to the 'victims' label. Politically, socially and economically, the study exposed the uniqueness of the villagers in their ability to use the same structures aimed at subjugating them, the aim being to survive social marginalization.

I argued that, the failure to rely on open confrontation pushed the locals to resort to more subtle and perhaps acceptable survival gambits. This way many villagers are falling back on community based strategies to move with time. To underline the importance of local and informal strategies, it emerged that various forms of capital, social networks and local institutions are important not only for survival but to build resilience among resourceful Tokwe Mukosi people. I however chose not to be megalomaniac in the evaluation of the Tokwe Mukosi people's experiences. This is linked to the realization that strategies deployed by residents vary based on the social situation, age, gender and history. Also significant in such variations is the value of social capital, human capital, local institutions and social networks. While it was acknowledged in this study that some of the survival strategies fall within the realm of illegality and immorality, strategic essentialism was used to justify such strategies.

The study proved that the Tokwe Mukosi displacees, unlike other displacees locally and regionally, have a unique experience, but there is always a danger of sanctifying injustice in the name of agency. In the last chapter, it was indicated that accepting such a situation as normal inevitably justifies the state's failure to fulfill the social contract. Lastly, the study went on to proffer recommendations and possible areas for further research. It is envisioned that adopting some of the recommendations will go a long way in bringing finality to the protracted relations between the state and the displaced Tokwe Mukosi people. This would also lead to sustainable and inclusive development, in line with the dictates of the Sustainable Development Goals.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1

Research Participant Informed Consent Form



SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Prospective Research Participant: Read this consent form carefully and should you have any questions, feel free to ask before you decide whether you want to participate in this research study or not. Feel free to ask questions at any time before, during or after your participation in this research.

Thesis Information

Title: Surviving Marginalisation in Development Induced Displacements in Zimbabwe. A case Study of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project

Principal Investigator: Nhodo Lloyd

Level of study: Doctor of Philosophy

Contacts: +277629973244 email: lnhodo@gzu.ac.zw

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Institution: University of KwaZulu- Natal, Durban, South Africa

Contact details of Institution: The School Ethics Office,

Phumelele Ximba,

Telephone; +27 (31) 260 3587

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1. Purpose of this Research Study

You are being asked to participate in a research study designed to explore the state-people relations in forced displacements, the implications of forced displacements on social networks and social institutions. It also looks at the villagers' vulnerability, adaptation and resilience in light of the forced displacements.

2. Procedures

You will be asked to take part in an individual in-depth interview (face to face), and focus group discussions.

3. Possible Risk or Discomfort

Given that this study will ask about your experiences on displacement, vulnerability, adaptation and resilience, you may choose not to answer some questions or choose to terminate your participation entirely. Reference to counselors will be available for those who feel they need counseling.

4. Ownership and documentation of specimens

The information derived from interviews and focus group discussions will be solely used for thesis and nothing else. The interview scripts will be safely kept by the researcher for five years after the publication of the thesis. Thereafter, the scripts would be shredded and cassettes destroyed.

5. Possible Benefits

The research will undoubtedly help to understand the underlying social cultural issues which have been glossed over in previous researches and development projects. The results may be useful in informing policy in Zimbabwe and beyond.

6. Financial consideration

There is no financial compensation for your participation in this research.

7. Confidentiality

Your identity in this study will be treated as confidential. The results may be published for scientific purposes but will not mention your name or include any identifiable reference to you. However, any data or records obtained as a result of your participation in this study may be inspected by the thesis supervisor or by research assistants in this study, (provided that such individuals are legally obligated to protect any identifiable information from public disclosure, except where disclosure is otherwise required by law or a court of competent jurisdiction). These records will be kept private in so far as permitted by law. In order to ensure confidentiality, you will not be asked to indicate your names and do not write your name on any of the research material such as the interview guide and/or the consent form.

8. Termination of the research study

You are free to choose whether you participate or not in this study. There will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled to if you choose not to participate. You will be provided with any significant new findings developed during the course of this study that may relate to or influence your willingness to continue your participation. In the event you decide to discontinue your participation in the study:

These are the potential consequences that may result:

Reduction in sample population,

Please notify of your decision so that your participation can be orderly terminated.

In addition, your participation in the study may be terminated by the investigator without your consent under the following circumstances:

The researcher realizing that you cannot continue with the study due to emotional instability, being drunk or falling ill during the interview.

Unanticipated withdrawal of consent to do research by the ministry of Provincial Affairs.

9. Available sources of information

Any further questions you have about this study will be answered by the Principal Investigator:

Name: Nhodo Lloyd

Phone Number: +263773663403 +277629973244

Any questions you may have about your right as a research subject will be answered by:

Professor B V Ojong

Phone Number: +27 718904832

10. Authorization

I have read and understood this consent form, and I volunteer to participate in this research study. I understand that I will receive a copy of this form. I understand that my consent does not take away any legal rights in the case of negligence or other legal fault of anyone who is involved in this study. I further understand that nothing in this consent form is intended to replace any applicable, state or local law/s.

Participant Signature:

Date:

Principal Investigator Signature

Date:

Translation.

GWARO REMVUMO YEKUBVUNZWA MIBVUNZO

Avo vanotarisirwa kubvunzwa mibvunzo mutsvakurudzo iyi, tangai maverenga gwaro iri mozoronga kupinda kana kurega kupinda mutsvakurudzo ino. Makasununguka kubvunza mibvunzo panguva dzose kana munepamunoda kunzwisisa

Tsananguro yetsvakurudzo.

Musoro: Nzira dzokurarama mushure mekugariswa patsva zvichitevera kuvakwa kwedhamu, Tokwe Mukosi.

Muktsvaki woruzivo: Nhodo Lloyd

Danho redzidzo: Chiremba wedzidzo

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Mudzidzisi: Professor Ojong email: ojong@ukzn.ac.za

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Chikoro chedzidzo: University of KwaZulu- Natal, Durban, South Africa

Pamunobata vamwe vadzidzisi vangu: The School Ethics Office,

Phumelele Ximba,

Runhare; +27 (31) 260 3587

+27 31 260 2431

1. Zvakanangana netsvakurudzo ino.

Munokumbirwa kupinda mutsvakurudzo yedzidzo inoda kuziva kudyidzana kwenyu nehurumende mushure mekugariswa patsva. Inodawo kuziva zvakare kuti zvakaunzei pakudyidzana kwenyu nehukama hwamainge muinawo nevamwe venyu mudunhu, uyewo amwe mapoka amakanga muinawo kare. Chekupedzisira, toda kuziva kuti zvakaunzei maringe nemhindu dzenyu dzamaive nadzo dzokurarama, uye mhindu itsva dzamave nadzo dzokurarama.

2. Matanho atichatora

Muchakumbirwa kubvunzwa murimega kana kuti mumapoka

3. Njonzi dzingangovepo

Kana pakaitawo kuti mabvunzwa nyaya dzinokubatai moyo makasununguka kusapindura mibvunzo yakadaro, zvekare mune kodzero yokubuda mutsvakurudzo iyi. Kune vanenge vanyanya kurwadziwa tichavatsvagira kansera wepfungwa nemagariro.

4. Zvabuda mutsvakurudzo zvichachengetwa sei.

Tinovimbisa kuti ruzivo rwatichawana mutsvakurudzo iyi ruchashandiswa pane zvedzidzo chete uye ruchachengetwa kwemakore mashanu rwozorwaswa harwo mushure.

5. Zvamungawana mutsvakurudzo

Ruzivo uru rwuchabatsira kunzwisisa magariro enyu mudunhu muno mushure mekugariswa patsva uye runogona kubatsira hurumende nevamwewo pazvirongwa zvakadai izvi

6. Maererano nechauviri mutsvakurudzo.

Hatitarisiri kuti muchabhadhrwa mutsvakurudzo iyi.

7. Kuchengetedzwa kwezita nezvichataura.

Ndinovimbisa zvakare kuti hapana mumwe munhu acahaziva kuti ndataura nemi uye kuti tataurei. Zvatataura zvichashandiswa pane zvechikoro badzi. Mudzidzisi wangu

nevanondibatsira ndivo badzi vanebvumo yekutarisa nenguva dzirikure zvatichataura mutsvakukurudzo. Zvataura zvichachengetedzwa sezvinongotaurwa nemutemo. Mutsvakurudzo iyi hatizobvunzi mazita enyu ekuzvarwa nawo nokudaro hamutarisirwi kunyora mazita

8. Kubuda kwenyu mutsvakurudzo iyi.

Mune kodzero yekuramba kupinda mutsvakurudzo iyi kana zvisingakuiitirei zvakanaka uye hapana anozokupai mhosva. Ikodzero yenyu zvakare kunzwa zvichange zvabuda mutsvakurudzo iyi zvisinei nekuti mazoramba kuenderera mberi. Kubuda kwenyu mutsvakurudzo kunosakisa kuti huwandu hwevanhu vachabvunzwa vaite vashoma nekudaro munokumbirwa kutaura paine nenguva kana pfungwa iyi ichinge yakubatai.

Zvichakadaro, mudzidzi anekodzerowo zvakare yekurega kuendera mberi netsvakurudzo kane achinge aona zvisingaenderane uye kana paine zvimwewo zvavhiringa,

9. Kwamungwana ruzivo maererano ne kudzidza kwangu

Kana uine zvimwe zvamungada kuziva nezvekudzidza kwangu batai vadzidzisi vangu kana ini pane zvinotevera.

Mudzidzi:

Zita: Nhodo Lloyd

Phone Number: +263773663403 +277629973244

Mudzidzisi

Professor B V Ojong

Runhare: +27 718904832

Hofisi yedu yebasa

P. Mohun HSSREC Research Office, Tel: 031 260 4557 E-mail: mohunp@ukzn.ac.za

10. Kupa Mvumo

Ndinotenda kuti ndaverenga ndikanzwisisa gwaro iri nokudaro ndinobvuma kupinda mutsvakurudzo iyi. Ndinozviziva kuti kubvuma kwangu hakunditoreri kodzero dzangu uye ndichariwana gwaro iri. Kana paine zvakanganisika mutsvakurudzo ndinoziva kuti hapana chirimugwaro iri chinoratidza kuti chingandikanganisa kana kutyora mutemo wenyika.

Signature: yenyu

Date:

Signature yemudzidzi

Date:

Appendix 2 interview guide



SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Interview Guide

. Sex of respondent

. Age of respondent

1. What are your perceptions on the relocations?
2. In your view, what are the challenges associated with the relocations?
3. Are there any benefits associated with the relocations?
4. What are the effects of forced relocations on livelihoods?
5. Which adaption strategies have you adopted and how sustainable are they?
6. In what ways have the relocations affected your social networks?
7. How do the villagers respond to the affected social networks?
8. How have the social networks assisted you to adjust in the new environment?
9. Can you identify some of the social institutions available in the pre and post-displaced community?
10. In your view, what are the impacts of relocations on these social institutions?
11. In what ways are the social institutions assisting you to survive?

12. How do the villagers respond to the affected social institutions?
13. Which other aspects of culture have been affected and what are the effects and consequences?
14. Can you say men and women were affected by the relocations differently? Explain your answer.
15. How do men respond to the relocations?
16. How do women respond to the relocations?

Translation

Mibvunzi ichabvunzwa

. Mukadzi kana murume

. Makore emunhu

1. Munooni sei maererano nokugariswa kwenyu patsva?
2. Sekuona kwenyu ndeapi matambudziko amunosangana nawo zvichitevera kugariswa kwenyu patsva?
3. Sekuona kwenyu ndezvipi zvakanakira kugariswa kwenyu patsva?
4. Sekuona kwenyu kugariswa patsva kwakashandurei maerano nenzira dzekurarama?
5. Ndedzipi mhindu itsva dzekurarama dzamava kushandisa uye dzinobatsirei?
6. Kugariswa kwenyu patsva kwakasandurei pakubatana kwenyu sevanhu vamwe?
7. Vanhu varikuitei maerano nekushanduka kwe humwe hwenyu?
8. Humwe nekubatana kwenyu kurikubatsirei pakurarama kwenyu munzvimbo itsva?

9. Mungatitaurira here mamwe emapoka amaive nawo musati magariswa patsva uye ayo amave nawo magariswa patsva?
10. Kugariswa patsva kwakasandurei maererano nemapoka enyu echivanhu?
11. Mapoka aya arikubatsirei pakurarama kwenyu munzvimbo itsva?
12. Murikuitei maerano nekusandurwa kwakaitwa mapoka aya?
13. Ndezvipi zvimwe zvechivanhu chenyu zvakakanganisaka uye zvakavhiringei?
14. Varume nevakadzi vakavhiringwa zvakafanana here nekugariswa patsva, tipei tsanangudzo?
15. Varume varikuitei kuti zvinhu zvinake?
16. Ko vakadzi varikuiteiwo kuti zvinake?

Appendix 3 Key informant interview guide



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Key Informant Interview Guide

Sex of respondent

Age of respondent

Position of the Key Informant

1. What is your role in the relocations at Tokwe Mukosi?
2. Can you describe the people-state relations in the relocation exercise?
3. What are the major challenges confronting the relocation programme?
4. What are the effects of forced relocations on the general livelihoods of the villagers?
5. In what ways have the relocations affected the villagers' social networks?
6. Can you identify some of the social institutions available here?
7. In your view, what are the impacts of the relocation exercise on the various social institutions?
8. What is the significance of social institutions for the villagers in the new environment?
9. Which other aspects of culture have been affected and what are the effects and consequences?
10. Can you say men and women were affected by the relocations differently? Explain your answer.

Translation.

Mibvunzo ichabvunzwa vakuru vaneruzivo

Murume kana mukadzi

Makore ekuberekwa

Chinzvimbo pabasa

1. Basa renyu raiva rei pakugariswa kwevanhu patsva?
2. Mungatsanangura here kudyidzana kwehurumende nevanhu ve Tokwe Mukosi?
3. Mungatiudzawo here mamwe ematambudziko akanangana nekugariswa kwevanhu patsva?
4. Kugariswa patsva kwakakanganisei pamhindu dzekurarama?
- 5 Kugariswa patsva kwakakanganisei maererano nekubatana nehumwe hwevanhu?
6. Mungatitaridzawo here mamwe mapato asinei nezvekutongwa kwenyika anowanikwa muno?
- 7s. Kugariswa patsva kwakakanganisei pamapato ayo?
8. Mapoka enyu emuno arikubatsira sei vanhu kurarama munzvimbo itsva?
9. Ndezvipi zvimwe zvechivanhu zvakakanganisika uye zvakavhiringei?
10. Varume nevakadzi vakavhiringwa zvakafanana here nekugariswa patsva, tipei tsanangudzo?



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Focus Group Discussion Guide

1 Lets start our discussion by knowing what makes the relocations at Tokwe Mukosi good-What are some of the positive aspects of the relocation programme?

2. In your view, what are some of the aspects that are not so good about the relocations?

3 What are some of the effects of the forced relocations on livelihoods?

4. What are some of the adaption strategies adopted by the villagers and how sustainable are they?

5 In what ways have the relocations affected the community's social networks?

6. How have the social networks assisted members in this community to adjust in the new environment?

7 In your view, what are the impacts of relocations on your social institutions?

8. What kind of support are you getting from social institutions in the newly allocated areas?

9. Which other aspects of culture have been affected and what are the effects and consequences on the affected villagers?

10. Can you say men and women were affected by the relocations differently? Explain your answer.

11. What suggestions do you have to solve some of the challenges raised in this discussion?

12. That concludes our discussion, thank you for coming and sharing your experiences with us.

Translation

Mibvunzo ichabvunzwa muzvikwata.

1. Ngatitange hurukuro yedu nekuziva zvimwe zvakanakira kugariswa patsva
2. Sekuona kwenyu ndezvipi zvezvimwe zvakaipira kugariswa patsva? Ngatitange hurukuro yedu nekuziva zvimwe zvakanakira?
- 3 Kugariswa patsva kwakashandurei pamhindu dzekurarama?
4. Ndedzipi dzimwe mhindu itsva dziri kushandiswa munzvimbo itsva kutsvaga kurarama?
- 5 Kugariswa patsva kwasandurei pakubatana kwevanhu?
6. Kubatana nehumwe kurikubatsira sei vanhu kurarama munzvimbo itsva?
7. Kugariswa patsva kwakasundura sei mapoka enyu emuno?
8. Nderupi rubatsiro pakurarama kwenyu rwamunowana mumapoka ekunze kwedunhu renyu?
9. Ndezvipi zvimwe zvechivanhu chenyu zvakakanganisaka uye zvakavhiringei?
10. Varume nevakadzi vakavhiringwa zvakafanana here nekugariswa patsva, tipei tsanangudzo?
11. Ndezvipi zvamungati zvingaitwa kugadzirisa matambudziko ataurwa muno?
12. Nyaya yedu yapera, tinokutendai nenguva yenyu?

Appendix 5 ethical clearance



20 November 2017

Mr Lloyd Nhodo 213574334
School of Social Sciences
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Nhodo

Protocol reference number: HSS/1415/017D

Project title: Surviving marginalisation in development induced-displacements in Zimbabwe: A case study of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received 11 August 2017, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully,

.....
Dr Shamila Naidoo (Deputy Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

cc Supervisor: Professor Ojong
cc. Academic Leader Research: Professor Maheshvari Naidu
cc. School Administrator: Mr N Memela

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

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REF: ADM/23/8

14 November 2017



ZIMBABWE

Office of The Secretary
P. Bag 7706
Causeway,
Harare


Mr Lloyd Nhodo
Great Zimbabwe University
Box 1235
Masvingo

**APPROVAL OF AUTHORITY TO UNDERTAKE A RESEARCH: MR LLOYD
NHONO: UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL STUDENT**

The above subject matter refers;

It is my pleasure to advise you that the Head of Ministry in his memorandum dated 31 October 2017 has approved your application to undertake a field research.

You are mandated to complete the Official Secret Act before commencement of the research project. It is our hope that the research findings will help the Ministry in coming up with relevant strategic actions in the study area undertaken.



FOR: SECRETARY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND NATIONAL HOUSING

Cc: The Director, Civil Protection

The Provincial Administrator, Masvingo Province

