

An Archaeological Survey of the Site of the Lattimer
Massacre, Lattimer, PA



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Abstract

The Lattimer Massacre occurred in September of 1897 in the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania. It has been described as the bloodiest massacre of the nineteenth century. In this event, a company-sponsored sheriff and a posse of local businessmen shot into a crowd of striking Eastern European mine laborers, resulting in the deaths of at least nineteen. A survey was initiated by the Department of Anthropology of the University of Maryland as part of a broader research program examining labor and immigration heritage of the Anthracite Region of Northeast Pennsylvania. The site was surveyed on three dates in the fall of 2010, November 13 and 14 and December 4, 2010. Members of BRAVO conducted systematic and random metal detecting surveys of three areas. At the conclusion of the survey and subsequent analysis some of the initial goals for the project were satisfactorily completed, while others remain elusive. No cartridges dating to the massacre were found. The location of the initial engagement was identified by a cluster of three bullets from the period of the massacre or earlier. A fourth bullet was identified roughly where the right side of the line of deputies was situated.

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1.0 Introduction

The Lattimer Massacre occurred in September of 1897 in the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania. It has been described as the bloodiest massacre of the nineteenth century. In this event, a company-sponsored sheriff and a posse of local businessmen shot into a crowd of striking Eastern European mine laborers, resulting in the deaths of at least nineteen. The words inscribed on the monument to the Lattimer Massacre, erected in Pennsylvania in 1972 by the United Labor Council, the AFL-CIO and the UMWA, describes the event as a massacre not a battle. The striking miners are shot down “like so many worthless objects” while the members of the sheriff’s posse are “licensed life takers”. As many as 150 men armed with pistols and rifles fired upon unarmed striking laborers and miners of Eastern European descent striking for fair wages and working and living conditions equal to that of longer-established groups. The posse killed at least 19 and wounded as many as forty more (Pinkowski 1950; Novak 1996). Many specific details of the event have been obscured not only by the passage of time, but also by the many conflicting reports conveying or interpreting the events of the day. This chapter will focus on the specific context and passage of the event, offering an archaeological perspective of the event that materializes certain episodes, while also adding some ambiguity to its sequence.

The survey was initiated by the Department of Anthropology of the University of Maryland as part of a broader research program examining labor and immigration heritage of the Anthracite Region of Northeast Pennsylvania. Dr. Paul Shackel began the project in 2009 with an ethnographic survey of the region. With the help of ethnographer, Kristin Sullivan, the team collected archival material, oral histories and ethnographic data on the region’s past and present.

In the summer of 2010, archeologist Michael Roller joined the project. The first excavation, lead by Roller and Shackel, was to be a survey of the site of the Lattimer Massacre. The research goals for the survey were to determine whether artifacts associated with the event remain in the site and to determine whether they retain integrity. If materials associated with the event are present, the research interests were to recreate the location,

movement, and armaments of the posse. Roller and Shackel contacted the owner of the land, the late Pasco Schiavo, to ask for permission to survey the property. Schiavo, with deep family roots in the region, supported the immigration and industrial heritage of the region, serving on the Board of Eckley Miner's Village. He offered access to the site.

Roller identified BRAVO (Battlefield Restoration and Archaeological Volunteer Organization) of Monmouth, New Jersey as a potential collaborator for the project. BRAVO is an all-volunteer organization promoting public interest of battlefield archaeology. They have worked on a number of prominent sites throughout the mid-Atlantic, mainly from the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and the War of 1812. Their field specialty is in metal detection. Upon contacting Dan Sivilich, president of BRAVO, he responded in twenty minutes, and offered to donate his time, equipment and team for the effort. Sivilich, it turns out, has family roots in the anthracite region, having been the first male in his family to not work in the coal mines.

The site was surveyed on three dates in the fall of 2010, November 13 and 14 and December 4, 2010. Members of BRAVO conducted systematic and random metal detecting surveys of the 3 areas. On the first day, the volunteers were instructed to form a line along the berm of Area 2 with spacing of approximately 10 feet between each person. The group would then metal detect from east to west remaining inside the designated area. Once completed, the volunteers were allowed to meander in any direction, but also were instructed to concentrate on areas where artifact clusters were found during the systematic search. A total of eight members of BRAVO spent 113 hours over the three days, metal detecting and mapping the results. This does not include post survey data analysis via GIS time or report writing time.

Following the survey of the site of the Lattimer Massacre, the Anthracite Heritage project has conducted excavations in a variety of domestic settings in Lattimer, Pardeesville and Eckley Miner's Village. Two books (Roller 2018, Shackel 2018), two dissertations (Roller 2015, Westmont 2018) and countless articles and conference presentations have come out this research. It all began here in Lattimer.

2.0 SETTING



Figure 2: Boundaries of the Lattimer Massacre Survey conducted November 13, 14 and December 4, 2010 including locations of Major Survey Areas and Historic Features. (Map by Author, November 2019)

The Lattimer Massacre site is located on the Hazleton Quadrangle, on the western edge of the town of Lattimer, Pennsylvania. The rough location of the massacre site was identified using archival sources and local knowledge. The roughly 6.25-acre parcel is located near the west entrance into the town.

The current property consists of three distinct areas. The first is a basalt gravel covered entrance to the mine that was once paved. The paving has been bulldozed off into a berm on the west edge of the entrance, beyond which was Area 2. This consisted of underbrush and a relatively new growth of trees. Area 3 was to the north and was a culm bank of primarily black slate intermixed with a small quantity of anthracite coal.

Soil types encountered on the site consist of Buchanan Chancery Loam; Sm (Strip Mine), and PpB (Pocono Extr. Stony Sandy Loam).

A study of photographs from the period established that a waste pile of culm was deposited on the site, visible in aerial photographs taken in 1938, and postdating the massacre. By the 1950s, much of the waste material was removed, most likely reclaimed to extract remnant coal. An electrical substation occupied the eastern edge of the site, also visible in the 1938 aerial. It was not present during the 1897 event. The first house along Main Street, which figures in some accounts as a landscape reference to the location of the posse, was burned down in the third quarter of the twentieth century and a new house has been built roughly in its location. The raised bed of the trolley tracks that also featured so prominently in accounts was also eliminated from the landscape sometime after the 1950s.

2.1 Historical Context

The presence of anthracite coal in the northeast corner of Pennsylvania was known as early as the late eighteenth century, but difficult geological and geographical conditions prohibited its efficient extraction and transport until an economic, social, and material infrastructure for its production, consumption, and transportation was established in the middle of the nineteenth century (Dublin and Licht 2005: 10–34). Moreover, domestic and industrial consumption of anthracite would not commence until industry interests developed specialized furnaces and hearths to burn it, and convinced the public of the utility and thrift of its adoption (Dublin and Licht 2005: 10; Itter 1934: 28–29). Anthracite coal, composed of nearly pure carbon, requires a high temperature to burn, but when lit produces a high temperature flame with very little smoke owing to its relative lack of impurities. Despite this superior quality, establishing and maintaining a mass market for anthracite would prove difficult throughout its history.

The geographical and geological provenance of anthracite complicated the laborious processes of its extraction and transportation. Unlike English and Virginian coal, which are often located on the shores of rivers or oceans, anthracite is found within and between isolated mountain ranges in diagonally stratified beds. In the early days of industry, massive capitalization was required to construct the network of canals and railroads to connect mineral sources to markets in the industrial centers to the north and

east. By the 1830s, investors had completed three major canals in the region, expanded eventually to a total of six. In time, eleven rail lines were constructed to align with the canals, connecting to existing rail networks throughout the country (Chandler 1972; Powell 1980: 13). This intensive capital investment infrastructure demanded that companies find ways to ensure uninterrupted or, even better, escalating loads of coal to fill railcars. As such, coal production within these corporations became subordinate to the financial security of transportation interests (Aurand 2003: 21–22). Coal-rich properties were strategically exploited in a manner that may have been disadvantageous or inefficient to coal operations.

The geological positioning of anthracite coal, deeply buried in narrow and sharply contorted seams, was infamously difficult to mechanize until the proliferation of strip mining machinery in the 1930s (Blatz 1994: 14; Jerome 1934: 121). In contrast to the technological and organizational adjustments confronting industrial workers in other industries, coal miners used essentially the same methods, tools, and skills for the entire first century of the industry (Arnold 2014: 3–4; Dublin and Licht 2005: 20). Sandwiched between sheets of rock in strata of various thicknesses and declination, each coal seam involved some combination of caprice, foreknowledge, and risk to excavate. Miners chased anthracite seams across geological folding and faulting that defied the logic of aboveground space.

As superficial deposits of coal were depleted in the early stages of the industry, the excavation of deep seams of anthracite grew increasingly difficult and costly. At an industrial scale, coal operations required major capital investment, including the minimal measures taken to sustain the lives of laborers working underground. Mere survival, not comfort, was the goal of such technologies. Industrial-scale mining operations required the technological means to ventilate poisonous and explosive gases and to drain water before humans could survive the subterranean environments as deep as 2,000 feet below the surface (Dublin and Licht 2005: 20–21). This required implementing an assortment of pumps, boilers, fans, and other ventilation apparatuses, as well as elevators to deliver product, workers, and tools in and out of the ground.

A unique landscape reflecting the political economy of the coal industry began to take shape by the 1850s. Depending on the region, coal operations were run either by large

transportation conglomerates, such as the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad and the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, or by smaller independent family-run operations, such as that of Lattimer Mines. The former variety tended to operate under a form of absentee ownership connected to a corporation located in Philadelphia or New York (Rose 1981: 65). In contrast, Lattimer was one of about ten operations run by the local Pardee Family around Hazleton (Foulke and Foulke 1979). These family-run operations resembled feudal systems of land tenure, overseeing large tracts of land dotted with isolated small mining operations, coupled with worker settlements “strewn, by the caprice of the worn and upended strata” (Berthoff 1965: 262). This particular arrangement of company town, or patch town, reflected a situation in which companies maintained ownership of practically everything within the boundaries of the landscape: parcels, houses, roads, retail businesses. In these isolated environments, workers became dependent upon company paternalism, often through the binding force of debt.

The demographics of the anthracite region reflected this human mobility throughout its history. Beginning in the early stages of the industry, companies influenced the character and flow of immigration to the region, though this was far from the only way the region was populated. Company agents were sent overseas and to major ports courting new immigrant groups to join the Pennsylvania anthracite labor pool (Barendse 1981: 7–8, 24–28; Brooks 1898; Greene 1968; Roberts 1904). The first arrivals were skilled miners from Scotland, Wales, England, and Germany, who introduced craft techniques for anthracite’s difficult extraction (Before this time, the British Isles contained the world’s only major anthracite mines.)

Irish workers and their families migrated to the region between the mid-1840s and 1880s. The first wave fled the Potato Famine beginning in 1845, though emigration continued as English landowners evicted tenants to transform land usage from tillage to pasture (Miller & Sharpless 1998: 138). These Irish immigrants brought with them the class disadvantages of poverty brought on by exile or a lack of a competitive skill base in mining (Berthoff 1965; Dubofsky 1996). In a pattern echoed and elaborated upon in the region throughout the end of the century, colonialist antipathies based upon religious and ethnic divisions were recapitulated in the anthracite region, interwoven with work-related tensions (Itter 1934: 32).

Beginning in the 1870s, the largest number of immigrants came from Italy and Eastern Europe including Poles, Slovaks, Galicians, Tyroleans, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, and Hungarians. In the largely agricultural economy in southern Italy, a regional depression caused a competitive demand for cash to purchase land released by the collapse of feudal land arrangements. Italians responded by emigrating throughout the world (Hoerder 2002: 341–342). Some ultimately returned to purchase land, though many stayed in their new countries. About 18 million Italians left the country between 1876 and 1930. A third of these migrants moved to North America (Hoerder 2002: 341–342). The contemporary wave of migrants from Eastern Europe included many nationless subjects of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian Empire or German empires (Dillingham Commission 1911:661; Ngai 2004a). Besides the economic pressures from changing land practices, many of these populations suffered under political, religious and ethnic repression (Ngai 2004: 120).

As in many industrial contexts, new immigrants were at first put to work in relatively unskilled laboring roles, and paid considerably less than longer established groups (Dubofsky 1996; Barrett and Roediger 1997; Roediger and Esch 2012). At this time, coal operators introduced mechanized processes such as strip mining and washery operations. Washery operations used mechanical means to reclaim small fraction coal from the ubiquitous waste, or culm banks of the region. At their introduction, long established underground miners recognized these new processes as efforts to bypass or destabilize the value of their craft skills. A motto of strikes during the time incited a boycott of coal produced through the washery process: “Don’t handle washery coal; that is what the operator stole from the miner” (quoted in Roberts 1901: 212).

The diversity of groups entering the region offered an additional advantage to operators, whose carefully balanced arrangements were threatened most by the possibility of organization. Competition, hierarchicalization and language barriers made organization particularly difficult. Edward Pinkowski (1950: 209) alleges that, “[Calvin Pardee] filled the houses at Lattimer largely with Italian immigrants and those in Harwood with Slovaks, Poles and Lithuanians. With a wholesale mixture of nationalities he felt that there would be less chance of a consolidation of the working men against his interests”.¹ Despite their responsibility for the initial introduction of new immigrant labor to the region, coal mine operators nonetheless kept a wary eye out for signs of radicalism in their new workers.

The particular arrangement of a company town in the region is colloquially known as a “patch” or a “patch town,” reflecting an isolated environment in which companies maintained ownership of practically everything within the boundaries of the landscape: land parcels, houses, roads, and retail businesses. Workers became dependent upon company paternalism, often through the binding power of debt.

Through a variety of factors, racialized nationalities of each group occupied places in a hierarchy, leveraging within and against their capacities to resist exploitation. Companies reified and exacerbated the discourse of racial hierarchy through wage practices, discriminatory litigation and the institutionalization and reinforcement of particular spatial and material conditions (see Bethoff 1965; Mulrooney 1989; Novak 1996, Roller 2018). Comprising a totalized environment of social and environmental control, patches, nonetheless, encompassed a multiplicity of domestic arrangements, including neighborhoods or districts reflecting their various social and industrial functions. Domestic spaces were divided into to reflect a social, racial, and industrial hierarchy ranging from the houses of management to company-built homes and enclaves of shanties for the most recent migrants.

2.2 Site Context: The Lattimer Massacre

Tensions were on the rise between capital and labor in the years leading up to the Massacre of 1897. Beginning in the early 1880s, a series of global and regional economic depressions affected the industry. Leading up to the Panic of 1893, the price of coal dropped to the lowest it had been since its peak in about 1865, with the exception of the 1877 depression. In these uncertain times, coal operators had recourse to a few options to maintain profitability. They could moderate productivity to drive up prices by work stoppages or limiting the coal cars available for miners (Blatz 2004:48; Walker 1924). They could also cut production costs by mechanizing extraction processes and decreasing labor costs. In testimony to a Federal investigation of these monopolistic price controls during the strike of 1888, an attorney described this system as one in which “[the coal operators] take first the miner by the throat with one hand and the consumer by the throat with the other” (W.H. Hines, to Congress 1889: 530).

Organizing efforts in the region had proven difficult for the United Mine Workers (UMW), the largest industrial union in the country. The union turned to politics, an avenue which had seen growing success nation-wide (Dubofsky 1996:74-82). In 1896, a new union representative by the name of John Fahy was appointed in the Anthracite region. Fahy began his tenure by courting the new immigrants, offering speaking roles at rallies to Eastern Europeans as well as the nativized rank-and-file (Blatz 2004: 49). Despite these efforts, membership remained disappointingly low. In 1896, Fahy joined a three person committee devoted to lobbying the governor and legislature to pass pro-labor legislation (Greene 1964:202, Blatz 1994: 53-54). In 1897, he helped to expand an 1889 labor law to include a language requirement for the licensing of underground miners, specifically targeting the prohibition of foreign laborers (Aurand 1985: 228, Greene 1964:201). Furthermore, at Fahy's urging the governor produced a more explicit anti-immigrant measure known as the Campbell Act which placed a tax of 3-cents per day on employers for each foreign-born male over twenty-one they employed (Greene 1964:203, Blatz 1994:54). This tax would be passed on to the laborers (Greene 1964; Novak 1996). The courts and political establishment went a step further to close a possible loophole in this process. A few days before the Campbell Act was passed, the Naturalization Court of Luzerne County, which held jurisdiction over the greater Hazleton area, revised its rules complicating the process for naturalization. The new rules required, among other steps, a petitioning process, the appointment of an attorney, and an examination on state and national laws in English. These procedural roadblocks greatly increased the cost, complexity, and time it would require to become a citizen, the only way to avoid the tax (Turner 1977:16).

For the laborers of the region, work was sporadic throughout the decade of the 1890s. By the summer of 1897, collieries were open only two to three days per week (Novak 1996). Tensions were high in the region, with the Campbell Act passed at the beginning of the summer coupled with the extended stress of economic recession. Backlash from workers was temporarily neutralized in the Southern and Northern coalfields, where large corporations were more likely to pursue discretionary tactics to mollify their workers such as offering concessions on wages or other work conditions. In the Middle coal region

this was not the case, where the independent operators interpreted such intercessions as acquiescence.

The precipitating event for the summer's strikes came in early August of 1897 at the Honey Brook Colliery south of Hazleton. A newly appointed superintendent by the name of Gomer Jones made logistical changes to save money. He specifically targeted the wages of mule drivers and the above-ground coal stripping laborers, many of whom were recent immigrants (Blatz 2004: 56). Jones' measures included removing some jobs from payroll, lowering wage rates, and adding a tax to coal used by employees. He also consolidated the mule stables into one location, adding several hours of unpaid travel time to the mule driver's day. Presided over by a Slovak supported by an Italian assistant, the mule drivers struck on August 14. They demanded the coal mine operators remunerate them for their travel time or that they reinstate the original locations of the mule barns (Greene 1968: 130). The strikers urged other workers to join them, setting up a picket line near the colliery. Brandishing an axe handle or crowbar, Gomer Jones confronted the strikers, (Novak 1996:19-20; Aurand 2002:7). The exact sequence of events is not clear, but when a melee broke out, Jones struck a young mule driver by the name of John Bodan, breaking his arm. That evening, Bodan reported the assault to the police, listing out witnesses among those present and providing the weapon as evidence (Novak 1996: 20). Word spread quickly about the assault and by the 16th of August many of the workers of the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company struck in sympathy for the drivers. The striker elected two leaders for the opposition, a Slovak by the name of Józef Kinchila and an Italian named Nille Duse (Novak 1996:27; Wolensky 2014:206). By August 20th the strikers came to an agreement with the company, winning some of their demands including a promised analysis of wage rates from other collieries and an investigation of Jones' conduct. The strike resulted in an increase in union membership by New Immigrant factions. John Fahy, back at work in the field, organized seven UMWA locals. Grouped by ethnicity, they amounted to about a thousand men in the region (Turner 1977:25).

Somewhere around the 25th of August, a strike wave hit the collieries belonging to independent operator A.H. Van Wickle. Again, it was not the nativized underground miners but the young, mostly foreign-born slate-pickers that struck this time. The strikers demanded higher wages and an end to the system of company stores and obligatory

company doctors (Blatz 2004; Greene 1968; Turner 1977). By the 21st of August, the first wage deductions from the Campbell Act came into effect and the laborers unexpectedly found their paychecks diminished (Blatz 2004; Turner 1977). The strike quickly spread to other collieries, stretching into the beginning of September. Parades and rallies of Eastern European and Italian workers occupied the parks and streets of the city. Some wielded clubs and iron bars. They marched behind American flags to signal their belief that they were entitled to the rights they demanded as aspiring citizens.

On the 3 September 1897, *The Hazleton Sentinel* printed this description of a rally in McAdoo and the subsequent march towards Hazleton:

By 10 o'clock this morning the vicinity of the hall on Blaine Street was black with people including many women. The Italian women are the most aggressive and they display a spirit that in such times is most dangerous to contend with... The strikers gave the word to move and they came down to the corner, a solid mass of humanity that was formidable to behold. At the head of the column three men carried American flags and a large stoutly built woman carried a mallet. A score of young men had formed a line with their clubs held horizontally. Everything caught before this line had to either join the ranks or get out of the way.

On 4 September, 1897, striking miners impatiently awaited the results of the eight-person committee charged with securing concessions from Head Superintendent Lawall of the L&WB company. The *Wilkes-Barre Times* (4 September 1897; Wolensky 2014; Greene 1968) had this description:

It was a spirited meeting, full of Italian and Hungarian curses, threats and insinuations... The committee reasoned, but of no avail, the miners were determined to give a demonstration. One burly Italian yelled at the top of his voice, "Whata da good of [the committee of] eighta da men! I'a kill a Lawall better alone!"...And to demonstrate that he meant what he said he drew forth a good sized carving knife and flourished it in the air yelling "Vendetta!" This burst of Italian eloquence tended to invigorate the crowd... The Italian continued the matter in hand, "We getta do move on, and closa up the district," he said.

UMWA representatives took this opportunity to organize, forming locals and signing on a great number of laborers and miners. However, the newspaper reported that ultimately,

their efforts to contain the energy and momentum of the strike was found wanting. A march beginning in the town of McAdoo on the morning of the 1st of September elicited a prophetic comment from a correspondent, who wrote: "The strong arm of the law cannot be subordinated to the designs of the inflammatory leader, and order must be maintained. Does it mean bloodshed? We hope not." (*Hazleton Sentinel*, 2 September 1897)

As colliery after colliery fell in the region to strikes, coal operators grew anxious. Determined to stop the lost profit and social instability, the coal company operators called upon the sheriffs of the three local counties to stop the strike. James Martin, Sheriff of Luzerne County, was called back from a vacation in Atlantic City to protect the areas in his jurisdiction. These included areas north of the city of Hazleton, including the town of Lattimer. On his return to the city, he met with coal industry administrative staff rather than with public officials. They made it clear to Martin that he would be held responsible if the mining operations in the region were affected. They also pledged that the companies would pay the expenses for the organizing and arming of a posse (Turner 1977:28, Novak 1996: 90).

Martin deputized a posse of 87 local citizens, applying the law of *posse comitatus*. This law allows the drawing up of an armed force of deputized citizens when a situation of unrest such as a riot is present (Turner 1977: 28). Because of his unfamiliarity with the community, the local operators recommended Martin appoint two chief deputies chosen by them. They were two local businessmen with ties to the coal industry, Thomas Hall and A.E. Hess (Novak 1996: 119, 125). Despite the illegality of delegating authority, Martin tasked Hall with selecting and notifying the members of the posse (Coxe, in HoR 1901: 137). Nearly all the men involved had middle class or professional positions in the city or surrounding regions. By name, all are of Western European origin.ⁱⁱ Among them were half a dozen college graduates. Many had close connections to the coal industry including a banker, two civil engineers, a construction foreman, a mine superintendent, a salesman of blasting powder, a lumber merchant, bookkeeper, and coal company store manager. At least one coal miner, Alonzo Dodson, was also present (Pinkowski 1950: 9; Novak 1996: 118-119, 124-126, 131, 158). Twenty-three deputies were employees of the Calvin Pardee & Company, 22 of whom lived in the town of Lattimer. Fourteen worked for the Lehigh Valley Coal Company. Six were members of the Coal & Iron Police (Turner 1977:28).

The coal operators paid for all the expenses accrued by the deputies. The superintendent of the G.B. Markel and Company ordered rifles and shotguns, shipping them to a warehouse owned by the A. Pardee Company. Each member of the posse was given a Winchester repeating rifle and, by some accounts, a shotgun and/or revolver (Pinkowski 1950:9-10; Turner 1977:28-29; Novak 1996:90-92). The shotguns were loaded with No. 8 shot (Pinkowski 1950:9-10). The rifles were likely the Model 1895 Winchester repeating rifle loaded with .44-40 caliber bullets (Novak 1996: 136). In addition, the deputies were supplied with a trolley car so they could move unimpeded throughout the region. This vehicle, along with telegraphic communication, allowed law enforcement to travel in advance of the marching strikers (Turner 1977; Hazleton Sentinel, 3 September 1897).

A total of 500 deputies and 300 Pinkerton detectives joined other law enforcement to make up this force (Greene 1964:206). For the next few days the deputies chased the strike across the town, attempting to neutralize its spread. For the most part, the striking laborers were orderly and quiet. Martin, known for his restraint, remarked to an acquaintance on the 9th of September that the posse was not entirely necessary given the fact that the strikers conducted themselves in a relatively orderly fashion. To a Mr. Frank Pardee on the evening of the 9th, Martin would complain that as the strikers were “doing nothing wrong” he therefore “had no right to interfere” with them (HoR 1901:138). The coal operators, on the other hand, did not think this was the case.

By September 9, the strikes shut down most of the collieries to the south of the city, putting great pressure on mine ownership. The collieries of Calvin Pardee to the north, including Lattimer, were an exception. Strikers shut down Harwood colliery, south of the city and occupied largely by Eastern Europeans, for a few days and organized a large UMWA local among its miners and laborers. They elected a Slavic laborer, Joseph Mehalto, as president and John Eagler, a Hungarian, as secretary. Upon the formation of the union they sent a demand to the Pardee office for a raise of ten cents in wages, a reduction in the cost of blasting powder and the elimination of the company store and doctor (Pinkowski 1950: 11). The colliery at Lattimer, however, remained open. For the strike to work, production had to stop in all the operations of the notoriously stubborn and powerful Pardee family business (Pinkowski 1950: 11; Turner 1977: 30).

On the 9th and 10th of September, representatives from Lattimer, first an Italian, and then a man by the name of John Glanati (alt. Glavati or Hlavaty) asked the men at Harwood to assist them with shutting down their colliery (Racek, in HoR 1901:48; Novak 1996:105,109). The UMWA local declined to help but insisted that the marchers walk under an American flag and urged them to not bring any weapons. The strikers borrowed a flag from nearby Humboldt colliery (Eagler, in HoR 1901:55). Approximately 250 to 300 men collected in Harwood around 1 o'clock and began the march to Lattimer, intending to pass through West Hazleton. On the way, they collected more men. Eyewitness accounts estimate the number of marchers ranging from 200 to 1000 men, with most accounts estimating the size of the march as averaging between 200 and 300 men (Evans in LFM 1898; Sykes in LFM 1898; Charles, in LFM 1898; Hoyt, in HoR 1901:85; Sherman, in HoR 1901:50; Stiver, in HoR 1901:51; Pinkowski 1950:11, 12; Turner 1977:30).

Law enforcement first stopped the marchers along their route into West Hazleton. Evan Jones, Chief of Police and about 40 of the deputies confronted the strikers, refusing them entrance into the city and demanding that they disband. A melee broke out and Deputy Thomas Hall broke a striker's arm (NYT 11 February 1898). Deputy Ario Pardee Platt took offence at the strikers' wielding of the flag and took one of the flagpoles, broke it, tore the flag up, and threw it to the ground.

Following this first violent confrontation the marchers continued towards Lattimer. The deputies made their way ahead by trolley to await them. John Welsh, a man from Hazleton who witnessed the encounter spoke with Deputy Edward Turnbach in the trolley, who commented that: "We have been marching around the country after these fellows for several days now. I don't see why the sheriff won't let us shoot some of them" (FLM 1898: 366). Other witnesses overheard phrases such as, "I'd like to get a pop at the sons of bitches. I'll bet I'll drop six," "Everyone of the Goddamn Hunks ought to be shot," and "We'll get even with them in Lattimer" (Turner 1977: 31; Miller and Sharpless 1998).

In Lattimer, about forty or more deputies and employees of the Calvin Pardee Company joined the posse, making up a total force of 80 to 150 men. What followed is classic example of the *Rashomon* effect in which the many divergent first-person accounts contradict each other. Only a schematic sequencing be ascertained by sorting through these accounts. The sheriff and his posse first arranged themselves in a horseshoe shape running

across the road into town. They then rearranged their lines so that they stretched from the edge of the road into a field to provide enfilading fire along the long axis of the column of marchers.

Deputy Hess later testified that the line of deputies was 75 to 100 feet from the road on the right and 15 feet on the left" (Hess, in HoR 1901:141). Reportedly, when the marchers came into view, Sheriff Martin left the posse and walked towards the head of the line. He met the head of the line below a large gumberry tree, locals would later memorialize as "the Massacre Tree." After some discussion turned into struggle, someone fired a shot. The posse followed with a volley which continued for one to three minutes. The marchers turned and ran, but many got caught between the posse and the raised bed of the trolley line. Even as they scattered to the southeast and southwest away from the fire, the men continued to empty their magazines. One deputy pursued the retreating men, going so far as to run to the top of the steep embankment to fire after them, in the direction of a nearby schoolhouse several hundred yards away. The principal and his assistant witnessed the start of the event from the schoolhouse, and as strikers ran in their direction the deputies turned to fire towards them hitting the schoolhouse and felling several men yards away. In the chaos of the moment, the posse shot one of their own deputies in the arm (Wilkes Barre Times, quoted in Novak 1996:131).

Following the massacre, a shaken Sheriff Martin took the first train back to Wilkes Barre. At the train station, Martin gave the first of several different accounts he would give of the moments before the firing began. To a reporter at the station he described how:

They acted very viciously, reviling and kicking me, knocking me down and tramping upon me. I called upon my deputies to aid me, and they did so, but they were unable to accomplish much. I realized that something had to be done at once or I would be killed. I called to the deputies to discharge their firearms into the air over the heads of the strikers as it might probably frighten them. It was done at once, but it had no effect whatever on the infuriated foreigners, who used me so much rougher and became fiercer and fiercer, more like wild beasts than human beings... I then called upon the deputies to defend themselves and shoot if they must to protect their lives or to protect the property that they had been sent to guard from being demolished. The next second there were a few scattered shots fired into

the infuriated foreigners and a moment later the entire force of deputies discharged a solid volley into the crowd. I hated to give the command to shoot and it was with awful sorrow that I was compelled to do so, but I was there to do my duty and I did it as best I knew how.... (Martin, quoted in Novak 1996: 143)

As Martin made this statement, recorded by a few reporters, and printed in the paper the next day, his attorney George Ferris took him by the arm and pulled him away to the hotel across the street. In the next public statement made by Martin, he altered the story, perhaps by the coaching of his attorney. This time he reflected:

When the strikers reached us I ordered them to halt and they did so... A few of the men came from the head of the crowd and shouted that they did not care for me or my deputies and that they intended to go to Lattimer and stop the mine. While I was arguing with the men I saw them talking secretly and I knew that some trouble was brewing. The first thing I knew some big Italian came from the crowd, one of the men that had been shouting at me, and grabbed me by the throat.... The fellow pulled my head under his arms and struck me on the shoulders, and when I had a chance to look up I saw that I was surrounded by several fierce looking men. I shouted to the men that they should arrest the person who had attacked me, but in the confusion the deputies evidently did not hear what I said. Then I heard a shot and it was soon followed by another. This seemed a signal for a combined volley on the part of the deputies and before I could extricate myself from the crowd that had surrounded me there was one rifle crack after another.... The order to fire never came from my lips. When the deputies saw that I was attacked I suppose they thought it was their duty to protect me.... (Martin, quoted in Novak 1996: 145)

By some accounts, Deputy A.E. Hess kicked a prostrate victim, continuing the violence even after the shooting ended. Upbraided for his behavior by a bystander, he replied, "shut up or you will get the same dose" (Novak 1996: 131). Some deputies and bystanders placed the wounded on the trolley upon which they were transported to the Hazleton State Hospital. The conductor reportedly refused to carry the wounded because they could not pay fare until the schoolteacher gave him \$1 to defray the costs (Marinko, in LFM 1898: 366).

The wounded overwhelmed the capacity of the hospital in Hazleton, requiring the expedited discharging of patients to make empty beds (Pinkowski 1950: 17). Exact numbers of the wounded vary by account, but generally run between 32 and 50 (Pinkowski 1950; Miller and Sharpless 1998: 234). The treatment of wounds required the amputation of limbs, perforation of skulls to relieve pressure from head wounds, and multiple bullets extracted from abdominal wounds (Pinkowski 1950). In the Philadelphia Inquirer on the 14th of September, Dr. Kellar reported that, “The head cases are extremely puzzling. The bullets have imbedded deeply into the substance of the brain, which has oozed out through the openings of the skull. These bullets, of course, cannot be removed. Notwithstanding this the patients are conscious and spend portions of the day in conversation with their wives and families” (Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 September 1897). Meanwhile, some deputies fled town, hiding in a hotel in Atlantic City under assumed names (Miller and Sharpless 1998: 234; *Wilkes Barre Times* 17 September 1897).

3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN

The Lattimer Massacre took place over about five confusing minutes on September 10 of 1897. Contemporary accounts of the massacre and its social context have been written by a number of historians who have recreated a narrative of the event by synthesizing what has been reported in newspapers, official documents, and the scraps of trial transcripts that have survived therein (Greene 1964, 1968; Novak 1996; Pinkowski 1950; Turner 1977). In all these accounts, however, the timeline for the few crucial minutes of the massacre can be traced back to the same contested primary and secondary sources. In 2010 the University of Maryland endeavored to create an archaeological account of these few moments of the massacre to contribute to the scholarship surrounding the event. As part of a public engagement program on issues of the region’s heritage of labor and immigration, the project also sought to return the event to the active attention of the public.

The first piece of literature devoted wholly to the massacre is written by Edward Pinkowski’s in the 1950s. Pinkowski’s account relates the events through dramatic prose, demonstrating a clear partisanship in his account in favor of the strikers. The ambiguity that presides over the historical documentation of the event is downplayed for rhetorical

force. A number of accounts by historians Victor Greene and George Turner followed, providing a rich contextual analysis derived from their intellectual roots in the schools of new social and labor histories (Greene 1964, 1968; Turner 1977). Nonetheless, the diversity of accounts are partially addressed in each of these accounts. The most recent, best known, and perhaps most theatrical, account of the event comes from Michael Novak's 1978 historical fiction *The Guns of Lattimer*, reprinted in 1996 with a new introduction by the author. A number of contemporary accounts derive the core sequence of events largely from these secondary sources (Miller & Sharpless 1998; Wolensky 2013). Additionally, a number of historical essays have been written about the event providing much needed analysis and context (Aurand 2002; Beik 2002; Blatz 2002; Culen 1977; Dubofsky 2002; Stolarik 2002; Turner 1984; Wolensky 2008). Robert Wolensky's 2014 account, in particular, adds a much-needed context of Italian radicalism to the proceedings.

Archaeological methods of prospection for reconstructing the movements of forces in battles have been well developed in historical contexts. At present, little research has been conducted to examine more recent violent engagements. Archaeological examinations of the Ludlow Tent Colony in Colorado and Blair Mountain in West Virginia used a number of archeological methods to reveal significant information about these twentieth century conflicts (Larkin and McGuire 2009; Ludlow Collective 2001; Nida and Adkins 2011; Reckner 2009; Wood 2002). In the case of Blair Mountain, archaeologist Brandon Nida used the study of armaments and ballistics to recreate the movements of the battle (Nida and Adkins 2011). Another research context relevant to this study is forensic science, wherein sophisticated methods for analyzing spent shell casings or projectiles can reveal significant information about the events from which they originate.

The methods of conflict archeology and forensic science were applied to the site of the Lattimer Massacre. The goals for this survey were to determine the location of the massacre site, identify a firing line and locate the initial engagement. Further goals for the study included reconstructing the size of the posse, the variety of munitions they employed and tracing their movements throughout the event.

4.0 FIELDWORK

4.1 Field Methods

The survey crew spent two weekends in November and December of 2010, a total of about 113 hours, examining the site. Standard battlefield surveying techniques using metal detectors were employed in the survey. Ten foot-interval transect lines were laid through the underbrush and on each day a crew averaging about eight field technicians conducted a systematic and then a semi-systematic metal detector survey (Sivilich 2011). Artifacts were excavated immediately upon being located by each volunteer using small shovels or garden-type trowels. Excavation depths did not exceed 12 inches. Each artifact was placed in a specimen bag and assigned a separate artifact number except in cases in which a number of identical artifacts were found together adjacently. The excavation site was marked with a pin flag. Modern debris such as aluminum cans, shotgun shells, etc. were not marked or documented but removed and later discarded (Sivilich 2011).

The artifact locations were digitally recorded using two separate methods. A datum was set up for the site relative to utility poles across the road from the study area. First, for items visible from this location each location was shot in with a Trimble 5600 total station laser transit with a TDS Ranger 500 data collector. For object locations that were not visible from the road, an Earthmate PN-20 handheld GPS unit was used to piece-plot each location. All data was compiled and plotted using ArcGIS 10.2 software on geo-referenced aerial photographs.

4.2 Fieldwork Results

A total of 43 artifacts were recovered in the survey. They included seven bullets of various calibers, 22 cartridges, six copper jackets, a miner's tin cup, a cupric metal suspender clip, a silver-gilded serving spoon and several objects of unidentified copper alloy hardware (Sivilich 2011). The non-arms-related artifacts were most likely unrelated to the massacre with the exception of the tin miner's cup, which showed signs of perforation by shotgun blast. The other items likely reflect domestic refuse from the adjacent houses or material remnants of the electrical substation.




Figure 3 Map showing the locations of selected artifacts recovered in the Lattimer Massacre Survey plotted into ARCGIS 10.2

5.0 Analysis



Figure 4: Selected non-arms-related artifacts recovered from the Lattimer Massacre survey including: (top) silver gilded spoon; (bottom-L) miner's tin cup; (bottom-R) ribbon pin or suspender hook.

Artifacts were subjected to field cataloguing to aid in devising the most effective field strategy during each day of the survey. Subsequent to the fieldwork, they were brought to Monmouth, New Jersey and subjected to a preliminary round of artifact analysis to determine which of the recovered items dated to the massacre. This determination was complicated by the

complexity of conducting such an analysis during the era in question, which represents a transition between various developments in armament technology. The artifacts were subjected to a variety of tests and subsequent cataloguing before a final analysis of the spatial distribution of artifacts was concluded. In the process of analysis some artifacts which were determined to not date to the historic period of interest and/or were considered redundant to the research questions were discarded.

5.1 Artifact Analysis

Battlefield archaeologist Doug Scott aided in the analysis of munitions, employing the techniques of firearm identification. Artifacts were examined for tool marks such as those left by firing pins, extractor and ejector marks and barrel rifling. Weights and diameters for each bullet were carefully measured and recorded. In many of these cases, striations, flaws, scratches, and other unusual wear patterns were carefully documented to match munitions to a particular weapon or class of weapons (Scott 2011). The period of the massacre is a difficult period for firearm analysis given the introduction in this period

of numerous developments in armament technology including the centerfire cartridge, smokeless powder, high velocity rounds and copper jacketing (Barnes 2006: 10).

Brass cartridges or casings contain the gunpowder charge propelling the projectiles from firearms. Cartridges remain in the weapon or are ejected at the time of firing so their recovery in battlefield archaeology often indicates the rough location of a weapon at the place of discharge. Headstamps are company logos and inscriptions placed into the base of cartridges indicating caliber and place of manufacture. Scott determined that the sixteen shell casings we recovered in the survey all post-date the massacre. These included four .30-06 cartridges that have a *terminus post quem* date of 1906 (artifact #'s 239, 282); ten .35 Remington cartridges with headstamps dating to after 1932 (artifact #'s 240N, 277); seven .30-30 cartridges with headstamps that postdate them to the 1970s (artifact #'s 240S, 257, 278, 279, 280, 281); and a single .32 pistol casing that dates to after 1903 (artifact# 271) (Scott 2011: 2-3). A total of seven bullets were recovered, of which four could date to the massacre. Those that decidedly post-dated the massacre included one .357 round (artifact# 253) developed in 1935 and two .38 Specials, introduced in 1902 (artifact #'s 243, 245) (Scott 2011: 3-4).

Seven copper jackets (artifact #'s 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 264 and 265) were also among the munitions recovered in the survey. Copper jackets were applied to bullets with the invention of smokeless powder. The resultant increase in muzzle velocities from this innovation required that a jacket of copper alloy of 60% copper and 40% nickel be applied to bullets to prevent their melting when coming into contact with the barrel. Dating these items proved difficult using the standard array of scientific methods and technologies available to firearm identification. These rounds often had an exposed tip called a soft point, advertised by Winchester as “metal-patched” and adopted around 1892 for the .30 Winchesters. However, with significant use of these munitions during the Spanish-American War, particularly loaded in the new 1903 Springfield rifle with its faster muzzle velocity, the cupro-nickel compound had a tendency to melt in the barrel (Hatchers 1966: 343-345). This was solved in 1922 with the use of copper and tin and later zinc.

The copper jackets were found clustered near the road where historic accounts suggested close range firing occurred. To determine whether the jackets could be of the period of the massacre a trace elements analysis or XRF was used to test the chemical

signature of the alloy used in its manufacture. Jeff Speakmen, Head of Technical Studies at the Smithsonian Museum Conservation Institute contributed a few hours to conduct this analysis. A typical readout of one of the jackets (artifact# 256) (Figure 4) shows a peak for copper and zinc content and the complete lack of nickel. This analysis revealed that these jackets also dated to after the massacre, at least after 1922.




Figure 5: Typical XRF reading of post-1922 copper-zinc alloy jackets showing copper and zinc peaks; (inset) Artifact# 256, copper jacket, during the XRF analysis.

The total assemblage of munitions recovered from the site is divisible into two categories: artifacts post-dating the Massacre and those that diagnostically could date to the Massacre or before. Those that post-date the event were scattered throughout the landscape, likely reflecting their origins in various recreational, subsistence-based, or other unrelated gun use in the eras after the Massacre.



Figure 6. Artifact #242 and #258, .38 long and short rounds recovered from the site of the Lattimer Massacre

In contrast, the munitions that predated or were contemporaneous with the period of the Lattimer Massacre were largely found clustered at one location. They include two .38 caliber long or short rounds (artifacts #242 and #258) and a single, heavily

impacted .22 round (artifact# 259). The .38 caliber long and short rounds were introduced in 1875 for the Colt Revolver, though many other manufacturers chamber the round. Markings on them suggest they were most likely fired from one or more Smith and Wesson revolvers (Barnes 2006: 298; Scott 2011:4). The .22 caliber round, developed in the 1860s, is still the most popular small bore round today.

These three rounds were found in a cluster at the edge of the road, at the plotted location of the “Gumberry” or “Massacre Tree”, recalled in accounts of the massacre as the initial site of confrontation. A fourth round, a heavily patinated .32 caliber pistol round, may also date to the massacre (artifact# 238). The .32 was introduced in 1875. The land and groove marks suggest it was fired from a Smith and Wesson revolver. It exhibited heavy patination akin to that of other period munitions identified. It was found in the middle of the field, approximately 170 feet from the massacre tree (Figure 3-8). This is around the area where the posse were lined up.

A complete table [Table 1] of artifacts with descriptions from the analysis of munitions, including *terminus post quem* dates for each diagnostic item follows. [Note: those marked with an * were discarded as redundant data during the analysis; shaded rows indicate ordinance possibly associated with the Massacre]:

Artifact Number	Object	Number	Description	Description
250	Badge or ribbon pin	1		
237	Brass plate	1		
273	Brass plate	1		
238	Bullet	1	pistol round, .32 caliber, fired in a Smith & Wesson revolver	post-1875
242	Bullet	1	.38 caliber Long and Short, fired in a Smith & Wesson revolver, impact deformed	post-1875
243	Bullet	1	.38 caliber full-jacketed/ .38 Special, fired in a Smith & Wesson or Ruger revolver	post-1902
244	Cup	1	tin cup	
245	Bullet	1	.38 caliber full-jacketed/ .38 Special, fired in a Smith & Wesson or Ruger revolver	post-1902

253	Bullet	1	0.357, fired in a Smith & Wesson or Ruger revolver	post-1935
258	Bullet	1	.38 caliber Long and Short, fired in a Smith & Wesson revolver	post-1875
259	Bullet	1	pistol round, 0.22, impact deformed	post-1860s
241	Clothing snap	1		
251	Copper jacket	1	cupro-nickel jacket, about .30 caliber	
252	Copper jacket	1	cupro-nickel jacket, about .30 caliber	
254	Copper jacket	1	cupro-nickel jacket, about .30 caliber	
255	Copper jacket	1	cupro-nickel jacket, about .30 caliber	
256	Copper jacket	1	cupro-nickel jacket, about .30 caliber	
264	Copper jacket	1	cupro-nickel jacket, about .30 caliber	
265	Copper jacket and sheet metal	1	cupro-nickel jacket, about .30 caliber	
274	Lead sinker	1		
249	Misc. copper hardware	1		
239*	Shell casing	2	.30-06, stamped "R-P 30-06 SPRG"	post-1960
257	Shell casing	1	.30-30, stamped "Winchester 30-30 WIN"	post-1970s
271	Shell casing	1	.32 pistol, stamped "R—32 ACP"	post-1903
277*	Shell casing	2	Remington .35, stamped "W-W Super 35 REM"	post-1932
278	Shell casing	1	.30-30, stamped "Winchester 30-30 WIN"	post-1970s
279	Shell casing	1	.30-30, stamped "Winchester 30-30 WIN"	post-1970s
280	Shell casing	1	.30-30, stamped "Winchester 30-30 WIN"	post-1970s
281	Shell casing	1	Winchester 30-30	post-1970s
282*	Shell casing	2	.30-30, stamped "Winchester 30-30 WIN"	post-1960

240N*	Shell casing	8	Remington .35, stamped "W-W Super 35 REM"	post-1932
240S	Shell casing	2	.30-30, Winchester brass shell casings	post-1970s
272	Silver-gilded spoon	1		




Figure 7: Map showing bullets identified in the survey with likely association with the massacre relative to locations of the deputies, strikers and raised bed of the trolley line.

6.0 Interpretation

The figure above shows the locations of the bullets identified during the survey relative to the positions of the deputies, marchers and the raised bed of the trolley line as described in historic accounts of the event and reconstructed through existing landscape features. At the conclusion of the survey and subsequent analysis some of the initial goals

for the project were satisfactorily completed, while others remain elusive. No cartridges dating to the massacre were found. Munitions post-dating the Lattimer Massacre made up the majority of items recovered in the survey. These artifacts were scattered throughout the surveyed areas suggesting that they were associated with the great variety of activities conducted in the woods of rural Pennsylvania involving firearms. The munitions dating to the period of the Massacre, though numbering far fewer, by-and-large were clustered in a single area. Moreover, this area corresponded with the location of the “Gumberry” or “Massacre Tree.” These artifacts may mark the location of the initial engagement of the massacre as described in numerous accounts. A fourth bullet, which may date to before or during the period of the Massacre, was identified roughly where the right side of the line of deputies was situated. From this limited data, the rough location of the massacre site and the initial encounter has been established and new questions can be proposed of the initial sequence of events in the Lattimer Massacre. If the three bullets all date to this event, their location suggests that, at least in this area, the site retains archeological integrity despite numerous landscape changes on the property in the intervening years.

The absence of brass cartridges can be interpreted in several ways. They may have been collected from the field after the massacre, or the processes of building up and removing slate may have removed, covered-over, or otherwise disturbed them from their location. An additional possibility is that the location was not in the area surveyed. This is unlikely given the consistency of historical accounts tying this location to existing topographic features. The line of deputies is described by historic sources as lining up along the fence line of the first house, in an enfilading line or crescent, and arranged parallel to the line of marching strikers (Hess, in HoR 1901:141; Martin, in Palmer 1913:80; Novak

1996:125). This arrangement of the deputies was decided upon by Martin who, after first arranging the men in line across the road, was dissatisfied with this approach. He then instructed them to line up along the side of the road (Martin, in Palmer 1913:80). As the road curved towards the house at this location, the marching strikers moved closer towards the deputies so that, as one account held, the line of deputies was "75 to 100 feet on the right and 15 feet on the left" from the line of marchers (Hess, in HoR 1901:141). It was reported by one source that the right side of the line of deputies delivered the most fire and even swiveled towards their left to pursue strikers who ran in the direction of the school. In the process one of the members of the posse was shot in the arm (Wilkes Barre Times, quoted in Novak 1996:131).

Two of these bullets identified in the survey as possibly dating to the Massacre originated from one or another .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, and not from the .44 Winchester repeating rifles described in many accounts. If this cluster of bullets, including two .38 Long and Short rounds and a heavily impacted .22 represent the initial volley, the archaeology has gone one step closer to answering the question of who fired the first shots. As pointed out by Turner (1977:4), there is no one answer for how the shooting began. Sheriff Martin gave multiple accounts of who fired first and why, in some accounts he ordered the deputies to fire, and in other accounts asserting a complete ignorance as to how it began as he was incapacitated at the moment. The same is true of the accounts of deputies, strikers and other witnesses.

When asked if the deputies were all armed with Winchesters during the trial, Martin asserted, "All except a few, who had buck shot guns" (Palmer 1913:83). The archaeology

raises the question of who of those present might have been armed with a revolver besides the sheriff. One possibility points to those who were not among those deputized and armed on the 7 September from the original shipment of rifles but who were previously armed with standard issue side arms: the Coal & Iron police, Pardee Coal Company guards or other law enforcement agents. Of course, the possibility exists that the bullets pre-date or post-date the massacre. However, their spatial patterning, clustered near the location of the “Massacre Tree,” as well as their proximity to the road gives some evidence to their association. All historic accounts suggest that after the initial encounter, the massacre continued on for one to three minutes, with the deputies firing at the fleeing strikers as far as 300 yards away in the area to the south of the area surveyed. Future research may return to survey this area as well.

The fourth bullet, a highly patinated .32 revolver bullet is an anomalous find that may suggest a number of possibilities. It may be from an unrelated event such as hunting or target shooting. It may have been a misfire, or shot into the ground by a reluctant or anxious member of the posse. Or it may have been, controversially, return fire from a striker with a pistol. While trial transcripts contain accounts of weapons among the strikers, these accounts are controversial. In several instances, witnesses later admitted they were paid to relate this falsity in court (Novak 1996: 211-212; 215). Nonetheless, the archaeology presents us with just such a possibility.

7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A newspaper reporter left this account of his visit to the site of the Lattimer Massacre the

day after the tragic event:

The shooting occurred at the bend of a dusty road leading from Hazleton and bordered by a rank growth of bush. For a background, however, the affray had a row of half a dozen frame cottages, mean enough in appearance, yet in the little yard in front of each a few bright-hued flowers grow. To-day only a step from these desert blossoms lay a portion of a man's brains, and a little beyond a horrible bundle of gory rags, upon which the blood was still wet. (*Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 12, 1897)

Suggestively juxtaposing the domestic materiality of the company town with the products of horrific violence, the author uncannily reveals the darkness lurking below the surface of the industrial landscape. The reporter exposes residents' quotidian efforts to brighten the landscapes of their living spaces (with "little yards" and "bright-hued flowers") as hopeless efforts at normalcy, merely the "background" for brains and gory rags. It is almost as if these macabre objects grow from the cursed garden soil.

The Lattimer Massacre is a deeply scalar event. As an incident of explicit violence, the most important details may be in its buildup and aftermath (Roller 2014, 2018). Of the brief encounter, perhaps little more can be said of its particulars that does not distract from its broader implications. Its greatest significance may be in the way in which it crystallizes the violence at the center of everyday life in this era of great social, political, and economic upheaval at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The regional efforts by organized labor and other forces to litigate migration did not occur in a vacuum. Newspaper readers of the era, including public officials, law enforcement, and business leaders, would see articles about domestic events such as Lattimer juxtaposed with news about imperial exploits, both written in similarly racialized discourse. During this period, the racial character of American identity was in the process of legal definition. The federal government, with the lobbying of a variety of interests, passed laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), the Foran Act (1885), the Scott Act (1888), the Geary Act (1892), and the Anarchist Exclusion Act (1902); in addition, the

Supreme Court decided on Plessy vs. Ferguson (1896), and the Dillingham Commission was formed (1911).

The bureaucratization of racial thinking during this time empowered all those called to execute these laws with the sovereignty of the state, defined as the power over life and death. At such a scale, the question of “who shot first?” or “who was acquitted in the trial?” becomes an abstraction: a Kafkaesque absurdity. An analysis of the racial dimensions of the region’s landscapes defined the predisposition for violence on the part of the deputies, just as it would preordain the outcome of the trial. The event revealed significant rifts in the towns of Lattimer Nos. 1 and 2, breaking down along racial lines. The new immigrant communities of Lattimer were radicalized by the event for some time afterward. At the same time, the longer established groups organized themselves along racial lines to stand by the management and attempt to persuade the immigrant factions to lessen their demands. Perhaps more than anyone present at the time, the wives of coal laborers understood the systemic violence of their community’s living and working conditions. Forced to provide for a family on a shoestring budget, it was abundantly clear to them that a change had to come. Radicalized women such as Mary Septak continued the fight longer than any others, weaponizing their pots and pans.

In a sympathetic and revealing Wilkes Barre Times editorial written the day after the Massacre, an author wrote, “It must be remembered that confronting the sheriff and his legal force was a desperate mob of unreasonable and unreasoning men whose carelessness of life both the sheriff and his deputies were thoroughly acquainted” (*Wilkes Barre Times*, September 11, 1897). As the editorial might suggest, the eruption of violence might have seemed almost brutally predestined at its occurrence to all those who witnessed it.

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ⁱ In fact, census and company records indicate this was not entirely the case, at least by the turn of the century, though it may have been true for the period leading up to the Massacre as the missing 1890 census is not present to provide us with evidence supporting this assertion.

ⁱⁱ Last names of posse members noted during the subsequent trial included: Anderson, Babcock, Barton, Cook, Diehl, Hess, McShea, Mulhall, Nichols, Osborne, Pardee, Platt, Siewell, Turnbach, Warriner and Zierdt.