

The Right and Radical Right in the Americas

Ideological Currents from Interwar
Canada to Contemporary Chile

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LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Bar-On, Tamir, editor. | Molas, Barbara, editor.
Title: The right and radical right in the Americas : ideological currents from interwar Canada to contemporary Chile / edited by Tamir Bar-On and Barbara Molas.
Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021041634 (print) | LCCN 2021041635 (ebook) | ISBN 9781793635822 (cloth) | ISBN 9781793635839 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Conservatism—America—History. | Right-wing extremists—America—History. | Radicalism—America—History. | Right and left (Political science)—America—History. | America—Politics and government.
Classification: LCC JC573.2.A6 R54 2021 (print) | LCC JC573.2.A6 (ebook) | DDC 320.520973—dc23/eng/20211012
LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2021041634>
LC ebook record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2021041635>

♾️™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards Institute for Information Sciences, Perennial Paper for Books and Journals, ANSI Z39.18-1988 (Permanence of Paper).

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Chapter 2

Corporatism and Authoritarianism in Latin America

The First Wave

António Costa Pinto

INTRODUCTION

Corporatism put an indelible mark on the first decades of the twentieth century—during the interwar period particularly—both as a set of institutions created by the forced integration of organized interests (mainly independent unions) into the state, and as an organic-statist type of political representation, alternative to liberal democracy.¹ Variants of corporatism inspired conservative, radicalright, and fascist parties, not to mention the Roman Catholic Church. The so-called “third way” was favored by some sections of the technocratic elites, and even by some on the left of the political spectrum.² But it mainly inspired the institutional crafting of dictatorships, from Benito Mussolini’s Italy through Primo de Rivera in Spain or the Uriburu dictatorship in Argentina and the New State in Brazil. Some of these dictatorships, such as Mussolini’s Italy, made corporatism a universal alternative to economic liberalism, the symbol of a “fascist internationalism.”³ In fact, variants of corporatist ideology spread to the global world of dictatorships in the 1930s.⁴

Corporatism as an ideology and as a form of organized interest representation was promoted strongly by the Roman Catholic Church, from the late nineteenth through to the mid-twentieth century, as a third way of social and economic organization in opposition to both socialism and liberal capitalism.⁵ Much of the model predates the Papal encyclical, *Rerum Novarum* (1891), and was due to the romanticizing of medieval Europe’s feudal guilds by nineteenth-century conservatives who had become disenchanting with liberalism and were fearful of both socialism and democracy.⁶ Indeed, corporatist

ideas became increasingly the vogue among younger Catholics frustrated with “parliamentary” political Catholicism. However, “the church’s explicit endorsement surely moved corporatism from seminar rooms to presidential palaces,” especially after the publication of the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).⁷ Pope Pius XI assumed that as a result of the Great Depression, liberal capitalism and its associated political system was in decline and that new forms of economic and social organization were now needed.⁸ The powerful intellectual and political presence of corporatism in the political culture of Catholic elites both in Europe and Latin America paved the way for other more secular influences.

Corporatism became a powerful ideological and institutional device against liberal democracy during the first half of the twentieth century, but the neo-corporatist practices of some democracies during its second half—not to speak of the use of the word within the social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s—demands a definition of the phenomenon being studied, and for the sake of conceptual clarity, to disentangle social from political corporatism.⁹ Social corporatism “can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered and functionally-differentiated categories, recognized or licenced (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories (. . .).”¹⁰ Political corporatism, on the other hand, can be defined as a system of political representation based on an “organic-statist” view of society in which its organic units (families, local powers, professional associations, and interest organizations and institutions) replace the individual-centered electoral model of representation and parliamentary legitimacy, becoming the primary and/or complementary legislative or advisory body of the ruler’s executive.¹¹

A central ideal of corporatist thinkers was the organic nature of society in the political and economic spheres. This was based on a critique of what fascist thinker Ugo Spirito called the egotistical and individualist *homo economicus* of liberal capitalism, which was to be replaced by a *homo corporativus*, who would be motivated by the national interest and common values and objectives.¹²

During the interwar period, corporatism permeated the main political families of the conservative and authoritarian political right: from the Catholic parties and social Catholicism to radicalright royalists and fascists, not to speak of Durkheimian solidarists and supporters of technocratic governments associated with state-led modernization policies.¹³ Royalists, republicans, technocrats, fascists, and social Catholics shared “a notable degree of common ground on views about democracy and representation” and on the project of a functional representation as an alternative

to liberal democracy, namely as constituencies of legislative chambers or councils that were established in many authoritarian regimes during the twentieth century.¹⁴ However, there were differences between the Catholic corporatist formulations of the late-nineteenth century and the integral corporatist proposals of some fascist and radical right-wing parties. When we look at fascist party programs and segments of the radicalright, like the Action Française-inspired movements, the picture is even clearer, with many reinforcing “integral corporatism” vis-à-vis the social corporatism of Catholicism.

Although cut from the same ideological cloth, social and political corporatism did not necessarily follow the same path during the twentieth century. The historical experience with corporatism has not been confined to dictatorships, and in liberal democracies “implicit tendencies towards corporatist structures developed both before and concurrently with the emergence of fascism.”¹⁵ In fact, occupational representation was not limited to the world of dictatorships, with several democracies discovering complements to the typical parliamentary representation.¹⁶ Corporatist ideology was a particularly powerful influence in Ireland’s 1937 Constitution, for example, while several other interwar bicameral democracies introduced corporatist representation to their upper chambers.¹⁷

Many ideologues of social corporatism—particularly within Catholic circles—advocated a societal corporatism without the omnipresent state, but the praxis of corporatist patterns of representation was mainly the result of an imposition by authoritarian political elites on civil society.¹⁸ In fact, “whatever pluralist elements there were in corporatism (notably the stress on the autonomy of corporations), they were annihilated by a foundational commitment to a supreme common good, infusing with a sense of purpose and direction a complex pyramidal edifice that had the state at its apex.”¹⁹ Social corporatism offered autocrats a formalized system of interest representation with which to manage labor relations: legitimizing the repression of free labor unions through the co-optation of some of its groups in state-controlled unions, often with compulsory membership. Corporatist arrangements also sought to “allow the state, labour and business to express their interests and arrive at outcomes that are, first and foremost, satisfactory to the regime.”²⁰ In practical terms, the institutionalization of social corporatism in most dictatorships followed models close to the proclamations contained in the Italian Labor Charter (*Carta del Lavoro*), thereby demonstrating its primacy.²¹ State intervention, a major imbalance between business and labor associations (with the former having greater influence and the independence of the latter eliminated) and the creation of strong para-state institutions, was typical of almost all the corporatist experiments. In fact, the elimination of free unions and their forced integration into the state was the dominant characteristic.

However, during this period, corporatism was also used to refer to the comprehensive organization of political society beyond state-social groups relations seeking to replace liberal democracy with an anti-individualist system of representation.²² As Peter J. Williamson noted, "what did unite the corporatist was their indifference to the concept of democracy and democratic norms" and from this it was just a small step to corporations as a representational structure.²³ Corporatist theorists presented a reasonable diversity of the "organic basis of representation drawing on the permanent forces of society," in their alternatives to liberal democracy, but as the Marquis de La Tour du Pin (1834–1924), a French Catholic royalist, noted, this representation must be "essentially consultative."²⁴ The curtailment of this new legislature's powers and the autonomy of an executive with a head of government who is not responsible to parliament is an almost universal proposal of corporatists in early twentieth-century politics.

THE DIFFUSION OF CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Social Catholicism preempted the spread of corporatism in Latin America.²⁵ The Roman Catholic Church and its associated lay organizations and intellectuals, following the publication of the Papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and especially *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), became central transnational agents in the introduction of corporatist alternatives to the excesses of liberal capitalism. As in other parts of the world in the first half of the twentieth century, the official church looked for ways to regain its role in society, and the proliferation of lay Catholic organizations was crucial for the spread of corporatism.²⁶ Organized and directed by Catholic clergymen, associations such as Catholic Action sought to enhance the involvement of Catholics in social and political structures. Part of the church's response to secularism, socialism, and Protestantism, in the words of Pope Pius X in 1903, it sought to bring about the "re-Christianization" of society.²⁷ During the 1930s, the official church and its thinkers made corporatism an alternative to communism and liberal democracy, and "the task of the era was to forge a modern Catholicism that could make its peace with the new authoritarianism."²⁸

In Argentina, during the 1930s, such influential figures as Monsignor Gustavo Franceschi articulated a type of reactionary "national Catholicism" that was based on a "home-grown right-wing ideological posture that equated Argentine national identity with Catholicism."²⁹ In Brazil, convergence between the authoritarian corporatism of the church and politics was also clear, even with some convergence with the fascists of Plínio Salgado's Brazilian Integralist Action (Ação Integralista Brasileira, or AIB).³⁰ In

particular, Cardinal Sebastião Leme, archbishop of Rio de Janeiro from 1930 to 1942, viewed Getúlio Vargas and his corporatist *Estado Novo* (New State) as being "consistent with the Church's hierarchical vision of society."³¹ It is important to remember, though, that the church and state conciliation did not proceed without conflict, or that there were versions of social Catholicism that were more compatible with liberal democracy. In Chile, the split between the young Catholics, Manuel Antonio Garretón with his *hispanismo* and corporatism and Eduardo Frei, the future leader of the Christian Democratic Party, is just one example.³²

It is in this context that Catholic intellectuals, in many cases priests and friars, crossed the Atlantic Ocean and Latin American borders several times. The Catholic press gave voice to an impressive process that spread social and political corporatist ideas throughout Latin America. Among the names mentioned on both sides of the Atlantic were those of two Spanish Jesuits, Father Palau and Joaquín Azpiazu, who were ardent defenders of Catholic (social?) corporatism.³³ The Jesuits were important in the spread of corporatist ideas in Latin America, so much so that other names could be mentioned: men such as Félix Restrepo in Colombia and Miguel Bullrich and Luis Chagnon in Argentina. Azpiazu, whose writings constantly appeared in the Catholic press, was probably the most important.³⁴ The more moderate Restrepo did not eliminate democracy from his corporatism, which was associated with Oliveira Salazar's New State in Portugal. For Restrepo, "corporatism re-establish[es] the lost equilibrium, realizing the project of the Creator in the world of labour."³⁵ Azpiazu, however, claimed corporatism was the basis of the "totalitarian state": "Strong [. . .] without the weakness and hesitations of the liberal and socialist state."³⁶

Of course, the Catholic Church was not alone in fanning the flames of corporatism in Latin America.³⁷ The influence of new European traditionalist radicalright thinking was also very important, and this was not in conflict, since the Catholic milieu "was the main recipient of Maurassianism" after World War I, in a strict association with the "Catholic revival."³⁸ In Argentina, for example, the synchronicity was clear from the 1920s in such magazines as *Criterio* and the writings of Monsignor Franceschi.³⁹ In Brazil, the magazine *A Ordem* and Jackson de Figueiredo's Dom Vital Centre promoted the same Catholic restoration program and called for the "regeneration of the nation," which it claimed was being threatened by mass "immigration, Judaism and communism."⁴⁰ Again, "the movement of men from both sides of the Atlantic is the decisive factor in the spread of Maurasianism in Latin America."⁴¹ When we examine the corpus of the new authoritarian nationalist constructs in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and many other Latin American countries, we see a very impressive influence of Action Française, blended with the corresponding Iberian elite movements—*Acción Española* in Spain

and *Integralismo Lusitano* in Portugal. Many Latin American intellectual-politicians who collaborated closely with the dictators and were associated with the institutionalization of corporatism in Latin America, came from this cultural background: from José de la Riva-Agüero in Peru to Leopoldo Lugones and the Irazusta brothers in Argentina.⁴²

The Spanish intellectual Ramiro de Maeztu, one of the most influential in Latin America, is probably the clearest example of these transatlantic cultural transfers.⁴³ The principal ideologue of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and a critic of liberal democracy, who unified *hispanismo* and corporatism, Maeztu was a towering intellectual presence in Latin America.⁴⁴ An ambassador to Argentina of Primo de Rivera in the late 1920s, he was even more important because of the union between traditionalist Catholicism with *Action Française*-inspired intellectuals in the Iberian-Latin American conservative milieu during the first half of the twentieth century, to which was added active anti-U.S. views.⁴⁵

The domestic fascist parties were another tool for diffusion of integral corporatist ideas that often completed and radicalized the local social Catholic culture.⁴⁶ Dozens of fascist parties emerged in Latin America during the 1930s, many of which were no larger than small political groups with little impact.⁴⁷ Most were modeled on Italian fascism, although some were closer to German National Socialism or Nazism. Earlier immigration to Latin America from Spain, Italy, and Germany ensured the extremist political culture of these countries was present in the Latin American political arenas. Nevertheless, as in Europe, even those closest culturally to German National Socialism were closer programmatically to Italian fascism and there, despite their diversity and different abilities to mobilize, corporatism was contained in all their political manifestos. This was true in Brazil and Peru, where fascist movements had the greatest political and electoral success, where the AIB of Plínio Salgado and the Revolutionary Union (*Unión Revolucionaria*, or UR) of Luis A. Flores presented political corporatism as their political banner, not to mention the clerico-fascism of the Mexican synarchists.⁴⁸ In the case of the AIB, the integral state it called for in its manifestos was an organic whole, and its national secretary for doctrine, Miguel Reale, stressed integral corporatism would be the New State's representation model.⁴⁹ The "totalitarian corporatist state" was also the political goal of the UR in Peru.⁵⁰ In all their diversity, the smaller and more mimetic Latin American fascist parties faced the same direction, with them all eventually copying the Italian model more directly; however, their influence was limited.

As elsewhere in the world, including Europe, many of these fascist parties were not recognized as such by Italian officials, with the reports to Rome being very pessimistic and critical except in the case of the more important parties, such as the AIB.⁵¹ The strategy employed by Italian diplomats and

fascist institutions met with more success among conservative political and intellectual elites, including the Catholic clergy and sections of the armed forces.

The economic crisis of 1929 paved the way for a "true Fascist Italy geopolitics in Latin America," particularly toward new authoritarian regimes, including the Uriburu dictatorship in Argentina, Busch in Bolivia, Vargas in Brazil, Benavides in Peru, and Terra in Uruguay.⁵² With the export of fascist corporatism, Italy also sought to develop a cultural model of Pan-Latinism, although with less success.⁵³

When looking at the European authoritarian models, those most mentioned in 1930s Latin America are the Portuguese New State, Italian fascism, and the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in Spain, with the Italian Labor Charter and corporatist representation as the two main features.⁵⁴ To varying degrees, the ideological background described above shared these references whenever events brought them close to power. Franco Savarino provided a good summary of what these regimes had to offer authoritarian leaders in 1930s Latin America (although he was referring to Italian fascism):

[A] modernizing policy (nationalist, corporatist, mobilizing) capable of strengthening national communities, consolidating states, enhancing authoritarian leadership and proposing changes to the geopolitical balance that are more favourable both to the emerging powers and the dependent "peripheries" [. . .] From this perspective, it can be said Fascism sought a pragmatic and utilitarian way of solving specific problems and to find a way forward.⁵⁵

By the late 1930s, U.S. diplomacy started to express concerns about "fascist influence" in Latin America. As an American journalist noted, these models do not "coincide with the traditional American view of the desirable state" and represent "a considerable obstacle to Pan-American understanding and, consequently, to collective defence."⁵⁶ In Latin American thought, the New Deal response to the crisis of 1929 was challenging the corporatists' solutions, and by the mid-1930s, it had become "an international trade mark [. . .] and a source of inspiration as well," with interventionist options that were more friendly to democracy.⁵⁷

A WAVE OF DICTATORSHIPS

Latin America participated in what has been called the "first wave of democratization," and in the subsequent reverse wave that by 1942 had significantly reduced the number of democratic regimes in the world.⁵⁸ Regardless of the political regime classification adopted or the different periodization, by the

early 1930s—and especially during the Great Depression—there was “a surge of reactionary regimes (that) reduced the proportion of competitive systems to a low of 19 per cent in 1943.”⁵⁹ Between 1930 and 1934, there were thirteen successful coups, followed by a further seven in the final years of the decade.⁶⁰ During this time, an impressive spectrum of authoritarian regimes was established, some of which were very unstable and poorly institutionalized, while others were more consolidated.

The year 1930 was a pivotal one “in Latin American history due to the number of regime changes that took place.”⁶¹ In Argentina, President Hipólito Yrigoyen was removed from power by a military coup led by General José Félix Uriburu, which was typical of the events of that decade. “A democratic government overthrown by military intervention backed by the conservative classes, who attempted to create a system of limited participation, which preferably did not depend on elections, adopting some version of the corporatist institutions established in Italy.”⁶² In Brazil that October, General Tasso Fragoso prevented an elected president from taking office, although the consequent appointment of Getúlio Vargas did not lead to an immediate break with liberalism—that did not happen until 1937 with the establishment of the *Estado Novo* (New State). In Peru in 1930, President Augusto Leguía was overthrown by Colonel Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro. In Uruguay, President Gabriel Terra established a dictatorship in 1933. In 1936, in Bolivia and Paraguay, coups by Colonel David Toro and Rafael Franco respectively, paved the way for authoritarian regimes. Across much of Central America, the old oligarchical politics also lost ground to authoritarian strongmen. By 1939, few Latin American countries remained liberal democracies.⁶³

The 1929 crisis worsened some elements of crises of liberal-democratic regimes, although with different impacts. As in Europe, it was not easy to find in Latin America the determining factor for the rise of authoritarianism with the Great Depression. There is in fact a wider range of variation, with it proving difficult to discern “common political patterns riding on the back of the common economic experience of the Depression.”⁶⁴ In Chile, for instance, the overthrow of General Carlos Ibáñez’s dictatorship was pushed along due to the 1929 crisis, while in Venezuela, Juan Vicente Gómez, a traditional dictator whose regime adopted some superficial “social” traits in the early 1930s, had been in power since 1909. Nevertheless, even if “there was no strict rule regarding Depression-induced political change,” there was a clear move toward economic *dirigisme* that “tended to produce a conservative and authoritarian direction of travel.”⁶⁵ This process of state intervention in the economy and within interest groups increased the appeal of corporatist structures during the 1930s, which were sometimes legitimized through the authoritarian experiences. Nevertheless, if social corporatism suppressed and dismantled independent labor organizations, using them as instruments of state policy,

the same did not happen in Chile or Colombia under López Pumarejo. In the latter case, the legitimation of state intervention in the economy was clearly inspired by the New Deal, showing that “democracy and capitalism could be reconciled despite the challenges of the Great Depression.”⁶⁶

The nature of (corporatist?) authoritarian regimes was also diverse in terms of chronology and type, ranging from the *dictablanda* of Gabriel Terra in Uruguay to the authoritarian New State of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, or the short-lived Dictatorship of Uriburu in Argentina to the durable, albeit unstable, “competitive authoritarianism” of Sánchez Cerro and Óscar Benavides in Peru, or of Cárdenas in Mexico. The Mexico of Lázaro Cárdenas was perhaps the most unique example because it was very different in nature from the corporatist experiences in the southern part of the continent. The perception of Cárdenas, during the 1930s, was that he was associated with the progressive social policy of the left of the political spectrum and opposed by the conservative, Catholic, and fascist right.⁶⁷

The authoritarian wave associated with corporatism also marked the authoritarian regimes of Central America. Nicaragua, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez’s San Salvador, and Fulgencio Batista’s Cuba were also part of this cycle.⁶⁸ In Nicaragua, for example, authoritarian corporatism was a strong presence, and its ideological and political roots were very close to the Iberian and Catholic models, even here in direct “response to the ‘democratizing’ effects of the US occupation.”⁶⁹ In Batista’s Cuba, which rejected political corporatism in the 1940 Constitution, its presence was equally important.⁷⁰

As has been noted several times, from both comparative and transnational perspectives, the authoritarian “reverse wave” of the interwar period was a process “contaminated by mutual emulations that are affirmed in their national development (but which are) part of the same historical cycle.”⁷¹

THE FASCIST ERA IN LATIN AMERICA

During the 1930s, a wave of dictatorships swept over Latin America, each adopting new authoritarian institutions that were created in the political laboratory of the interwar world, particularly the personalization of leadership, the single or dominant party and the “organic-statist” legislatures based on corporatist models. Latin America participated in what has been called the first wave of democratization and in the subsequent “reverse wave” of the interwar period. Corporatism had its first global moment during this period, and Latin America was an integral part of this political dynamic.⁷²

It seems clear that the majority of these regimes did “undergo, simultaneously, a political-economic and a legal-political transformation, which led to

the emergence of regimes with pronounced corporatist features.⁷³ Claiming legitimacy through organic views of society, they partially incorporated organized labor into the state, simultaneously offering workers constitutional recognition of collective socio-material rights while attempting a new type of (corporatist) political representation in the configuration of the new political systems.

Corporatism permeated the main political families and elites of the conservative and authoritarian political right and of supporters of technocratic governments associated with state-led modernization policies in both Europe and Latin America during the interwar period. However, in Latin America, the conservative and reactionary Catholic intellectual-politicians tended to be the ones who promoted corporatist alternatives by synthesizing fascist and social Catholic options, which were often shaped by the interventionist options associated with the 1929 crisis. It is in this context that Catholic authoritarian intellectual-politicians crossed the Atlantic Ocean and the borders of Latin America on a number of occasions, adopting models that were readily available on the Iberian Peninsula, such as those of Miguel Primo de Rivera in Spain and Oliveira Salazar in Portugal.⁷⁴

The Catholic press gave voice to an impressive process that spread social and political corporatist ideas associated mainly with Iberia throughout Latin America, thereby avoiding association with Italian fascism. When we examine the corpus of the new authoritarian nationalist constructs in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and many other Latin American countries, we see the influence of *Action Française* blended with the corresponding Iberian elite movements—*Acción Española* in Spain and *Integralismo Lusitano* in Portugal. For example, the Argentinian nationalists were the main creators of an authoritarian version of Argentinian national identity: one that was corporatist, Catholic, Hispanic, and Latin, and which placed great stock on values such as hierarchy, anti-liberalism, and anti-communism.

To emphasize the instrumental and transitory nature of his authoritarianism in Brazil, Oliveira Viana differentiated his project from the Italian Fascist model, stressing the technical-judicial nature of his approach and promoting both *Manoilescu* and the New Deal jurists, while maintaining the authoritarian model. Many of the other Latin American intellectual-politicians who collaborated closely with the dictators that were associated with the institutionalization of corporatism in Latin America hailed from this cultural background.

In the world of interwar dictatorships, however, both the single (and/or dominant party) and the corporatist bodies became the backbone for the institutionalization of these regimes.⁷⁵ In almost all authoritarian regime institutionalization processes during this period, the attempt to create a party, to help the dictator consolidate his position, soon became the Achilles' heel

of the institutional reform process. Usually, the product of conservative coalitions supported by military coups, it was generally the resilience of the liberal conservative parties that prevented them from consolidating. In fact, party politics remained central to the institutional arrangements, with many of these regimes being unable to consolidate, and with them remaining mixed forms of competitive authoritarianism with limited pluralism and elections characterized by large-scale abuses of state power, although with formal democratic institutions that remained the principal means of legitimacy. That was the case of the "infamous decade" in Argentina and Peru after Sánchez Cerro. In Chile, Carlos Ibañez del Campo was resisted by the parties, and following a series of complex negotiations, the regime party failed to become a central part of the political arena of that period with its existence being cut short when Ibañez stood down as president in 1931. Elsewhere, the "state of exception" was the norm, with the suspension of elections and parliaments.

The attempts to create official parties multiplied, but they remained diverse in nature. The dominant model was to construct them from above, based on a more or less forced winning unification. In Paraguay, Juan Stefanich, who had emerged as the strong man of the government, was the main figure behind the creation of the UNR as the new regime's official party in November 1936, becoming its first president of a party that had been created at the "invitation" of the dictator, Rafael Franco. In Bolivia, David Toro tried to create a dominant party, the PSE. In Peru, Sánchez Cerro created the UR. Vargas's New State in Brazil was perhaps the only regime to consolidate without a party. The LCN, suffered opposition from many members of the regional elite, and Vargas feared any new party could create a focus for tensions that could weaken his hold on power.

The "corporatist parties," such as Ibañez's Republican Confederation for Civic Action of Workers and Employees (Confederación Republicana de Acción Cívica de Obreros y Empleados de Chile, or CRAC), were in the minority. A blend of corporatist institution and political party, and with parliamentary representation, CRAC served as a representative body alongside the parties in a controlled Congress. The exception was the paradigmatic case of Cárdenas's Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, or PRM) in Mexico, the only dominant "corporatist" party to consolidate, although with political origins and ideological legitimacy that was very different from those mentioned above, being closer to a nationalism, secularism, and developmentalism that was associated with the left.⁷⁶

The 1929 crisis worsened some elements of the crises of liberaldemocratic regimes, although with different impacts. Unlike with Europe, it was not easy to find in the Great Depression the determining factor for the rise of authoritarianism. There was, in fact, a wider range of variation. What was carried out

in the authoritarian regimes of the 1930s Latin America under the ideological and institutional umbrella of corporatism was accomplished by liberal-democratic regimes and progressive liberals, as in Colombia and Chile. While social corporatism became associated with the New Deal in some countries of Latin America, in Colombia progressive liberals used this association to drive forward with the expansion of the state's social role in the face of strong opposition from the Conservative Party and the Catholic Church.

The New Deal, as "a national version of a larger pattern," was a variant of the responses to the 1929 crisis, which challenged the response of the corporatists to the crisis. This later became the dominant model of state-interest group relations, especially with labor in Latin American regimes.⁷⁷ Of course, transfers and transnational connections were on the move, and some of the icons of the New Deal, particularly the creation of state regulation agencies, were also adopted by authoritarian regimes. To avoid association with Italian fascism and other European dictatorships, like those in Spain and Portugal, the political discourse associating the institutionalization of social corporatism with the New Deal was often used for political legitimation of authoritarianism; however, while social corporatism suppressed independent labor organizations with state control, using them as instruments of state policy, this did not happen in Chile or Colombia under López Pumarejo. In fact, in Colombia, some of the institutional arrangements were introduced while maintaining a restricted democracy.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have dealt with the successes and failures of the institutional reform processes in selected authoritarian regimes in Latin America during the 1930s, to understand how and why the Latin American authoritarian regimes fit into the dynamic of the global spread of corporatist models during the interwar period. Claiming legitimacy through organic views of society, these regimes partially incorporated organized labor into the state, simultaneously offering workers constitutional recognition of collective socio-material rights while attempting a new type of (corporatist) political representation in the configuration of the new political systems. Latin America in the 1930s was therefore clearly integrated into the corporatist global wave.

NOTES

1. See António Costa Pinto, ed., *Corporatism and Fascism. The Corporatist Wave in Europe* (London: Routledge, 2016); António Costa Pinto and Federico

Finchelstein, eds., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Europe and Latin America* (London: Routledge, 2018).

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Chapter 3

White Multiculturalism An Interwar Radical-Right Approach to Canadian Ethnic Integration¹

Bàrbara Molas

INTRODUCTION

This chapter contributes to studies of multiculturalism and the radical right. Much like existing scholarship on multiculturalism or cultural integration as a postwar Western phenomenon, I argue that such projects were defined by a new “cultural” racism that located “shared values” at the center of its discourse, thereby replacing prejudice on the basis of origin with new parameters of exclusion or “markers of difference.”² This scholarship relies on the consensus that this transition occurred in the 1970s, and that it successfully used “culture” to further prewar racist understandings of difference. By using Canada as the case study, and religion as an example, this chapter shows that the use of culture as a means to legitimize discrimination was already shaping “post-race” discourses on diversity in the 1930s. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that ethnic minorities of European descent other than British and French (the “two founding nations” of Canada) played a central role in promoting such a transition, which they envisaged as an opportunity to overcome their sense of alienation: a process in which Christian groups of European descent (white groups) would be “uplifted” and incorporated into the Canadian nation to the detriment of new “others.” Thus, this chapter suggests that, during the interwar period, cultural racism enabled Canadian ethnic minorities to advance a new supremacist view of the social order so that they could overcome what Eviane Leidig has called “a socio-psychological fear of ethnic and/or religious misidentification” with the broader nation or the dominant ethnic groups, that is, Canadians of English and French descent.³

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