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## **Gandhi and Mao As Communicators: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory**

Kusum Jitendra Singh

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# Gandhi and Mao As Communicators: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory

## Abstract

This study is a comparative analysis of the communication practice and theory of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Mao Tse Tung during the period in which they were the major leaders of the national liberation movements in India and China. In broadest terms, the problem dealt with is how they succeeded in communicating with hundreds of millions of illiterate peasants without the use of such modern means of communication as radio and television. If they had not solved the problem of communication, they would have been would-be leaders with very few followers and their movements would have been doomed to failure.

The major method is that of content analysis in the context of the broader patterns of historical change in the countries involved. The first step, therefore, is a panoramic summary of the socio-economic and political situations in India and China during the period between World Wars I and II, the growth of the Indian and Chinese movements for independence from foreign control, and the detailed phases of national struggle during the critical war-time years of 1942 through 1944. The next step is a detailed content analysis of the major themes in almost all the recorded messages of Gandhi and Mao in the 1942-44 period. The quantitative analysis shows that, despite many differences with respect to other themes, the various themes relating to leadership style, received the greatest amount of attention from both. The qualitative analysis shows that, despite important differences, both Gandhi and Mao discussed leadership in terms that dealt not only specifically with channels of communication but also with goal values as alternatives to the perceived conditions of crisis, two broader themes that helped establish a sense of communality and understanding between the leaders and the led. The next step pulls together the communication theories of both Mao and Gandhi, a presentation based not only on the content analysis for the 1942-44 period but also on explicit statements over a longer period and tacit premises which are inferred from more general statements. It is suggested that the operational doctrines of both Gandhi and Mao have important implications for communication theory and that the more specific communication of each is a version of what, in Mao's terminology, has been called "the mass line."

Finally, conclusions are reached concerning the multi-modal, multi-directional communication behavior of both Gandhi and Mao and their emphasis on the necessity that the communicator identify himself with the needs and even the life-styles of the recipients. These conclusions, it is suggested, have possible implications for future research on the vital connection between communication and development and particularly on the possibility of non-charismatic leadership in so-called "developing" countries.

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Communication

## First Advisor

George Gerbner

## Comments

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY

Kusum Jitendra Singh

A DISSERTATION

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

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#### A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory

Kusum Jitendra Singh

Supervisor: Prof. George Gerbner

This study is a comparative analysis of the communication practice and theory of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Mao Tse Tung during the period in which they were the major leaders of the national liberation movements in India and China. In broadest terms, the problem dealt with is how they succeeded in communicating with hundreds of millions of illiterate peasants without the use of such modern means of communication as radio and television. If they had not solved the problem of communication, they would have been would-be leaders with very few followers and their movements would have been doomed to failure.

The major method is that of content analysis in the context of the broader patterns of historical change in the countries involved. The first step, therefore, is a panoramic summary of the socio-economic and political situations in India and China during the period between World Wars I and II, the growth of the Indian and Chinese movements for independence from foreign control, and the detailed phases of national struggle during the critical war-time years of 1942 through

1944. The next step is a detailed content analysis of the major themes in almost all the recorded messages of Gandhi and Mao in the 1942-44 period. The quantitative analysis shows that, despite many differences with respect to other themes, the various themes relating to leadership style received the greatest amount of attention from both. The qualitative analysis shows that, despite important differences, both Gandhi and Mao discussed leadership in terms that dealt not only specifically with channels of communication but also with goal values as alternatives to the perceived conditions of crisis, two broader themes that helped establish a sense of communality and understanding between the leaders and the led. The next step pulls together the communication theories of both Mao and Gandhi, a presentation based not only on the content analysis for the 1942-44 period but also on explicit statements over a longer period and tacit premises which are inferred from more general statements. It is suggested that the operational doctrines of both Gandhi and Mao have important implications for communication theory and that the more specific communication of each is a version of what, in Mao's terminology, has been called "the mass line."

Finally, conclusions are reached concerning the multi-modal, multi-directional communication behavior of both Gandhi and Mao and their emphasis on the necessity that the communicator identify himself with the needs and even the life-styles

of the recipients. These conclusions, it is suggested, have possible implications for future research on the vital connection between communication and development and particularly on the possibility of non-charismatic leadership in so-called "developing" countries.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE AIMS AND METHODS OF THIS STUDY

This study attempts to identify the communication practice and theory of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Mao Tse-tung, leaders of two largest national liberation movements in the history of the world. It is a comparative analysis of their communication practice and theory directed toward mass participation in Indian and Chinese national movements during the period between the 1920's and 1940's.

In doing this, the purpose has been to avoid the one extreme of concentrating entirely on the Gandhi-Mao messages and theories and the other extreme of concentrating on the broad social movements in which they played leading roles as communicators. This requires not only an objective content analysis of major messages of the two leaders but also the placing of these messages in the context of the broader systems of society, action and thought within which they operated and to which they contributed.

This report will first sketch the two liberation movements in a broader historical perspective, and then, to help determine the basic elements of Gandhi's and Mao's communication theories, it will make an empirical analysis of samples of their own writings. More specifically, the project has

been concerned with the question: What were the explicit and implicit communication theories of these two leaders that could be discerned in their daily national struggle, and how were these theories reflected in their work? To make the problem manageable, this part of the analysis will concentrate on two of the critical phases of their movements, namely, the 'Quit India' movement in India and the 'Rectification' movement in China. Both movements cover approximately the same period from 1942 to 1944.

The movements in India and China raise the question of obvious connections between communication and the shaping of two different kinds of national movements pursuing two different kinds of economic and social development. Gandhi's movement sought independence from the British and took the form of social and moral reform, while Mao's sought radical restructuring of the system. To some extent, therefore, this study is not only of communication and development but also of national liberation movements against the established systems within the respective countries, and thus involves socio-political conflict.

A national liberation struggle subjects leaders to unusual leadership challenges. This study necessarily addressed itself to the question: "How did Gandhi and Mao succeed in building a mass movement against tremendous odds without access

to modern media of communication?" It does not deal, however, with the anti-liberation forms of communication that were mounted by their opponents. Nor does the study claim that the communication skill of these two leaders was solely responsible for liberating their nations. There were pre-existing conditions, an evolution of events, economic phenomena, and so on. A host of sociological and other factors will have to be left to one side so as to bring sharply into focus the communication behavior and theory of the leaders under study.

The main focus of this study has been on those elements of communication styles of Gandhi and Mao which increased mass participation and national consciousness, overcoming not only powerful adversary communication systems but developing successfully their own countervailing means of communication. The most significant element appears to be the method of "mass line" communication, a term often used by Mao to emphasize direct contact with the masses. Although Gandhi never enunciated such a phrase, his actual practice was very similar to Mao's. Basically, the "mass line" is a non-elitist guiding concept which aims at what might be called "leadership without elitism." To what extent was the "mass line" style of communication significant in overcoming communication barriers between leaders and led? And what were the similarities and the differences in Gandhi's and Mao's use of mass line communication?

Although the investigator cannot hope to answer these questions definitively, the aim has been to develop some tentative answers that might serve as a basis for future research in various Third World countries on the long-neglected subject of the relation between communication and national liberation movements, as well as between communication and social, economic and cultural development.

#### Communication and Development

Over the last decade special attention has been given to the role of communication in the developing countries. Despite many differing viewpoints on the various connections between communication and development, all Western writers in the field are agreed that the connection between the two is intimate.

For some reason, however, no one thus far has studied the communication efforts of any liberation movement that helped start the development process in a former colonial country. In other words, most studies focus on development after liberation. This study emphasizes liberation as a prelude to development and distinguishes between two kinds of liberation: one anti-imperialist only and the other socialist or communist. Gandhi's movement was mainly the former, while

Mao's movement embraced both. This definition includes a behavioral distinction as well as a value orientation.

Communication researchers such as Schramm, Lerner and Pool, have somewhat given less attention to the "action frame" of media content. Their focus has been more on discrete images and isolated messages rather than with "the role of the communications media in defining broad types of forms of action".<sup>1</sup> This approach tends to ignore political parties, factions, and pressure groups as channels of communication.

The premise of most of communication research of the last twenty-five years or more is that development occurs through the spread of cultural elements from the developed to the developing countries, and obstacles that prevent this flow are namely: illiteracy, poverty, population explosion and above all, the traditional attitudes in the developing world. To put it in Lerner's words, "Asian ethnocentrism is not merely a self-indulgent nuisance but actually a major obstacle to development progress."<sup>2</sup> The assumption is based on the belief

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<sup>1</sup>J.L. Peacock, "Religion, Communications and Modernization: A Weberian Critique of Some Recent Views." Human Organization 1, 1969

<sup>2</sup>Daniel Lerner, "International Cooperation and Communication", in Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, pp. 103-125

that mass media are characteristic of advanced society, and therefore will promote advance in traditional society which has been shown to be not so.<sup>3</sup> New technology is also seen as the solution to the problems of underdevelopment, without any attempt to define the social, economic, and political systems.<sup>4</sup>

This view tends to underplay the development structure of the social system within which the communication and cultural change takes place.<sup>5</sup> In other words, it is not so much a matter of advanced countries transferring technology which produces a change in the social structure, as it is the transformation of the social structure which permits change and development. In short, most research is urban-biased and concerned with transmission of new skills and equipment, regardless of whether the structural situation of the intended audience makes development possible or impossible for the majority.

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<sup>3</sup>Sultana Krippendorff's unpublished dissertation, Communication Approach to Political Development: A Critique with Examples from India, (University of Illinois, 1971) gives an insightful analyses of the consequences of 'more communication'.

<sup>4</sup>Feltehausen, "Conceptual Limits of Development Communication Theory." Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism, Columbia, S.C., August, 1971

<sup>5</sup>Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," Monthly Review, Vol. 18, No.4, September, 1966



Besides the structural constraints operating on the social-class structure and on the agrarian and industrial relationships within the Third World countries, there is yet another constraint implying political subordination due to increasing dependence on foreign aid. Just as a concentration of purchasing power in the hands of the ruling elite distorts the demand bias ("demonstration effect" whereby the consumption patterns of the rich countries tend to be emulated by the elite of the poor countries resulting in an increase of import of foreign goods and imbalance of foreign exchange),<sup>6</sup> so the dominance of Western communication theories tends to limit cultural autonomy and to distort indigenous development, making it extremely difficult to break away from the vicious circle of subordination.

The power elites in the developing countries, who try to intellectualize their communication policies, are found to pursue two interrelated views simultaneously. On the one hand, they see high technology media as exciting instruments for rapid development; on the other hand, they want to control change and move with utmost caution, so as not to upset the

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<sup>6</sup>Thomas E. Weisskopf, "Capitalism, Underdevelopment and the Future of the Poor Countries", The Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 4, No. I Winter, 1972, pp. 1-35

established pattern of social relations.<sup>7</sup> To support the latter view, which in any case dominates, the elite rely on equilibrium models of the West in which order predominates and change is controlled.<sup>8</sup>

There appears to be a consensus, however, that development means structural change and not merely a variation of policy.<sup>9</sup> There is also agreement that the structural change must be autonomous to the socio-political system of the nation and not something imposed from outside.<sup>10</sup> Views differ mainly on the questions whether development, as defined by Western theorists,<sup>11</sup> necessarily means progress for developing countries, no matter what the pattern of development or what contribution communication might make.

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<sup>7</sup>Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty. Pantheon Books, New York: 1970, passim

<sup>8</sup>Rajni Kothari, "Values and Paradigms in Indian Social Sciences," paper submitted to the twenty-ninth International Congress of Orientalists, Paris, July 1973

<sup>9</sup>Gunnar Myrdal, Against the Stream. Pantheon Books, New York: 1972. See also E.P. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful. Harper & Row, 1973, passim

<sup>10</sup>Herbert I. Schiller, "Authentic National Development versus the Free Flow of Information and the New Communications Technology," Communications, Technology, and Social Policy. G. Gerbner, et al, John Wiley & Sons, 1973, pp. 467-480

<sup>11</sup>W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge University Press, London, 1962

Recently many analysts concerned with this problem have been trying to liberate their discipline from pre-conceived notions of development or from attempts to predetermine the norms and values of developing nations. These new approaches deal with the overall operation of the cultural processes which mark developing societies with some of their most distinctive characteristics. They permit the analyst to raise basic questions within the context of the total system; they take into account the social structure, values and behavior patterns of the larger system within which development is observed. Such approaches permit the analyst to build a framework for critical discussion of purposes and goals in an ongoing historical process. This is somewhat contrary to the approach of established theories which generally take the social system as given and treat troublesome issues as settled.

Communication problems in the developing countries cannot be approached without conceiving of development as systemic change. Particularly under the prevailing conditions of crisis that this study is investigating, these changes are expedited when there is a widely shared perception of common goals and leaders who know how to share their goals and the perception of crisis with others. Accordingly, the messages of liberation leaders may be regarded as battlegrounds of the contending forces on the social stage. To bring about change

in the social, political bases and economic goals, Gandhi and Mao developed countervailing messages powerful enough to transform the national environment. Gandhi used his strategies to fight a colonial regime; yet others were used by Mao to develop socialism in his country. One may ponder over the implications of these two kinds of successful movements for more recent movements of national liberation and social change in the developing countries today--particularly in countries where the media are used to support the existing institutions to prevent change other than through those institutions. This subject, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

### Methodology

The study combines an historical analysis of the two liberation movements during the entire period from 1920 through the 1940's with a content analysis of Gandhi's and Mao's recorded communications during the crucial years of 1942-44.

The interconnection between these two methods of analysis becomes essential when one considers the unintended and even unrecognized consequences of some actions which may perform significant functions.<sup>12</sup> Thus, many actions that are

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<sup>12</sup>Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 19-84

not recorded in formal communications may have a latent communication function just as important, or even more important, than the manifest content of formal communications. For instance, Gandhi's prayer meetings may perform the "latent" function of reinforcing national identity, just as Mao's rent reduction campaign against the landlords performed the "latent" functions of establishing peasant's identification with the Chinese Communist Party.

Fuller discussion of these issues is left to chapter III, entitled "The Gandhi-Mao Themes, 1942-44," but they illustrate the importance of combining two methodologies to understand the communication behaviour and theory of leaders of liberation movements.

#### Historical analysis of Gandhi-Mao liberation movements

For the purpose of historical analysis the study surveys Gandhi's three major national campaigns, spaced roughly ten years apart: 1921-22, 1930-32, and 1942-44. In the case of Mao, the survey covers the continuous struggle with its ebb and flow during the years of 1927, 1934, and 1941-42. These experiences provided the foundation for the final stages of struggle and were, in a sense, a preparation for Gandhi's Quit India movement in 1942 and Mao's Rectification campaign of 1942. The struggle itself, of course, continued

in both countries well after 1944. It was in 1947 that India finally achieved her independence from the British. In China, after the defeat of the Japanese, the Civil War was fought and won by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. The historical analysis provides background for contrasting the differences and similarities in the two kinds of movements.

Primary sources include all available publications (speeches, correspondence, articles, and other documents) of Gandhi's and Mao's writings, covering the period from 1920 upto the time of independence of each country. Other related sources appear in the bibliography, together with selected list of the major historical studies upon which this study is based.

### Content analysis

Content analysis is a process of summarizing the contents of messages in such a way that an analyst may make useful inferences from the summary. Its first stage involves transforming raw data into units which permit systematic and objective description of the meaning of messages. Krippendorff points out that,

One of the most distinctive features of messages is that they provide indirect (vicarious) information to a receiver, that is, information about events that take place at a distant location; about objects that

have existed far in the past, and about ideas in other people's minds....the ability of a message receiver to regard sensory data as indirectly informative about a source is what content analysis must cope with explicitly.<sup>13</sup>

Content analysis on its own, however, does not guarantee against invalid interpretations. Serious efforts, therefore, have to be made to relate content inferences to other aspects of the social system, for instance, leadership style. Such comparisons must also take note of multiplicity of function in various types of social behavior. To put it differently, it is essential in this kind of study to supplement (or complement) content analysis with other analytical methods dealing with the broader historical context within which the messages have appeared or with the individual characteristics of the source. Perhaps no single method by itself is sufficient to give us the knowledge, insight, and wisdom necessary to understand complex communication processes.

#### Choice of sample

For content analysis of messages, the entire set of recorded messages by Gandhi and Mao have been used covering a three year period from the beginning of 1942 to the end of 1944.

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<sup>13</sup>K. Krippendorff, "Models of Messages: Three Prototypes," in The Analysis of Communication Content: Developments in Scientific Theories and Computer Techniques, pp. 69-106

In dealing with this period, the study relied mainly on the following volumes:

Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Vol. VI by D.G. Tendulkar, published by the Government of India, 1955

The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. IV English edition based on the Chinese edition, People's Publishing, Peking, July, 1952 (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, 1954)

There are many reasons for using all messages of this period, rather than some random set of messages over a much longer period. The content analysis is more meaningful if not wrenched from the context of a specific historical period. The period chosen (the most critical years of World War II) happens to have represented a decisive turning point in the liberation movements in both countries and a major challenge to the mobilization and communication efforts of Gandhi, Mao and their associates.

Gandhi's own writings have been more extensively published than Mao's, but there is no one text of Gandhi's writings fully comparable to Mao's Selected Works. The historical record as published by the Government of India, Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, in 1953 is the closest approximation. This consists of Gandhi's own writings in Young India and Harijan (newspapers), statements and



interviews to the national and international press, and his correspondence with the British Government and other heads of states and influential friends and sympathisers.

However, it should be pointed out that Vol. IV of Mao's works are by no means a complete collection of his works of this period. They represent a selection of what Mao and his editors thought to be important texts for study in the period after 1949. Furthermore, all of the texts were edited, Mao's rich language was toned down and some changes were made in meaning.

As shown in Table 1, "Gandhi-Mao Messages, by Type of Documents, 1942-44," (page 16), the record shows 58 messages for Gandhi during this period and only 16 for Mao. The average Mao message, however, was much longer; the total number of words for Mao's 16 documents adds upto over 57,000 as contrasted with about 50,000 of Gandhi's 58 documents.

TABLE 1

## Gandhi-Mao Messages, By Type of Documents, 1942-44

<u>Number of Documents</u> (by type)	<u>Gandhi</u>	<u>Mao</u>
Speeches	4	7
Editorials	3	5
Articles	16	2
Directives or Resolutions	1	2
Interviews or Press conferences	15	0
Letters	19	0
TOTAL	<u>58</u>	<u>16</u>
Number of words	50,077	57,600
Number of pages	158	111

SOURCES: Gandhi: Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (8 vols., 1951-54) by D.G. Tendulkar, Vol. VI, published by the Government of India, 1953

Not included: "Death of Kasturba" (his wife) pp.293-309: (purely personal)

Gandhi-Jinnah Talks" and some letters. pp.338-356: (purely communal)

Mao: English edition of The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV, based on the Chinese edition, People's Publishing House, Peking, July, 1952 (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, 1954)

Not included: "Appendix: Resolution on some Questions in the history of our Party." Probably drafted by Mao and adopted in 1945 (purely party document)

NOTE: For details see Appendix 'A'.

Greater variation, however, is found in the type of message. Most of Mao's came in the form of speeches and editorials in the party press. Most of Gandhi's came in the form of either articles, interviews, press conferences and letters. It is interesting to note that Mao's letters are not available neither are there any records of press conferences or preserved in his selected works for this period.

Gandhi's writings are originally in three languages: Gujrati, Hindi and English. Most of the major Gujrati publications have been translated into Hindi and English, the two languages in which the investigator is proficient. Also the investigator had an opportunity to listen to the original disk recordings available at the national archives in New Delhi, which reflect Gandhi's direct humor combined with a relentless skill challenging his audience. Needless to say, much of this intimacy that Gandhi had with his audience is lost in the English translations of his speeches. Also lost is the religious and philosophic overtones of some of the Sanskrit terms, such as Gandhi's most characteristic doctrine, nonviolence or ahimsa, and satyagraha, more literally "truth force," discussed in Chapter IV.

This must be particularly so in the case of Mao's writings where the study has had to rely solely on English

translations.<sup>14</sup> The official translations may often seem curiously shrill in tone and purely ideological, especially to Westerners because of their own cultural and political bias. For instance, "imperialism" may appear as an incendiary and extreme term but to some one living in a colonial or semicolonial country it is a natural statement of fact. In other words, the English translations have to cope not only with the Chinese language but also with Mao's version of Marxism-Leninism in the Chinese context. This means two language barriers, the Chinese barrier and the Communist barrier. Mao's available writings, in any case, are far from adequate, as the archives of revolutionary literature were either destroyed deliberately by the Kuomintang or dispersed or lost during the years of war,<sup>15</sup> or simply never reissued in print.

#### Analytical Scheme

The analysis focused on how Gandhi and Mao defined the conditions of crisis confronting their nations and helped

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<sup>14</sup> Professor Allyn Rickett of the University of Pennsylvania, who is well versed in the intricacies of the Chinese language, has often commented on the stilted translation of Mao's "earthy colorful" phraseology.

<sup>15</sup> According to the Publisher's note to Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, 1954)

establish certain goal values which could be realized in practice through improved leadership style and effective use of available channels of communication. The attempt has been to distinguish between the content, style and channels of communication reflected in Gandhi's and Mao's practices and writings for the purpose of making comparisons. The rationale for developing the scheme was that the leader's ability to articulate and to symbolize, and then to communicate and share with the people his perceptions of the crisis and his strategy of resolving it, was crucial to the success of the liberation movement.

A simple count of words and symbols seemed not to be justifiable as this study emphasized concepts. Therefore, the theme was selected as the unit of analysis and the entire document as the context of unit. Classification of these themes was done on four major categories on the instrument of analysis described in Chapter III, "The Gandhi-Mao Themes, 1942-1944." The analytical measure of attention indicated the presence and frequency of subject elements in the themes. The many themes appearing in the written documents of 1942-44 period have been classified into four broad categories dealing with conditions of crisis, desirable goal values, leadership style, and channels of communication.

The reliability of the analysis was achieved by measuring agreement between the investigator and Valerie Jaworski of the Annenberg School of Communications, using Scott's inter-observer agreement coefficient for nominal scales.<sup>16</sup> The agreement coefficient achieved in this study was .8227 and therefore, a high degree of reliability was demonstrated.

#### Plan of study

As an essential background for the content analysis, Chapter II "The Context of the Gandhi-Mao Communications" presents a broad historical review of the Indian and Chinese liberation movements and then narrows down to the 1942-44 phases of national struggle.

Chapter III, "The Gandhi-Mao Themes, 1942-1944", summarizes the results of the content analysis, with a quantitative and qualitative discussion of each of the major categories - namely, conditions of crisis, goal values, leadership styles, channels of communication.

In Chapter IV, "Communication Theories of Gandhi-Mao", inferences concerning the communications theories of

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<sup>16</sup>W.H. Scott, "Reliability of Content Analysis: The Case of Nominal Scale Coding." Public Opinion Quarterly, 19 (1955) pp.321-325

the two leaders have been presented. These inferences are based on both their explicit statements, as presented in Chapter III, and their statements and behavior over the entire historical period of the two liberation movements.

In Chapter V, "Gandhi and Mao as Communicators: Summary and Conclusions," two levels of conclusions are presented: some specific, but still tentative, propositions on the communication behavior of Gandhi and Mao, and some possible implications of these findings for future theory and research on the relationship between communication and development.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CONTEXT OF THE GANDHI-MAO COMMUNICATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the socio-economic and political situation as it prevailed in India and China during the World War I and II period. This will provide an historical perspective to the analysis of Gandhi's and Mao's central messages during the later stages of the national movements and to the development of their communication theories. The underlying assumption is that the social system has to be understood as a context for the messages, and this requires explicit description of the special nature of Indian and Chinese societies.

The discussion will touch on these points:

- (1) What historical factors contributed to the emergence of the two national liberation movements?
- (2) What were the major barriers, difficulties, and problems in communication?
- (3) What prerequisites were available in these countries for conducting a national liberation movement, and what channels and modes of communication were used?



### The Gandhi-Mao Liberation Movements

A fundamental element common to India and China was the two World Wars, which were decisive factors in the emergence of revolutionary situations in both countries. The wars caused general upheavels and economic and political pressures, creating climates conducive to national demand for radical change. And yet a "revolutionary situation" by itself does not guarantee a national movement unless there are leaders capable of seizing the opportunity for decisive action.

The setbacks suffered by the Western powers during World War I somewhat cracked the armor of invincibility of the British empire.<sup>1</sup> Then came two great events. The first was the Russian Revolution of 1917, beginning as a hopeful liberation movement against the greatest of the surviving despotisms. The Russian disavowal of imperialism was appealing to colonial countries all over the world. The second event was American intervention in the war in 1917, which led on to President Wilson's enunciation of his Fourteen Points supporting national freedom and self-determination of peoples.

If the course of the war disillusioned Indians and Chinese about Western civilization, these two events nonetheless

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<sup>1</sup>Perceival Spear, India. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: 1961, p.364 Also the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 had impact on both India and China

emboldened them to demand self-government in the name of fundamental principles accepted by the Allied Powers. The war, in other words, brought about a mental revolution in both countries and created a climate for, genuine national movements. The differences between the two movements are briefly highlighted in Figure 1, "Two Liberation Movements: India and China" (page 25). In this chart the investigator has shown some of the essential similarities and differences in terms of the socio-political situation, the general characteristics of each movement, the forms of struggle, the base of each and the consequences for both the countries. Fuller discussion follows.

### India

The outbreak of World War I formed for India a dividing line between the old and new worlds. At the beginning of the 19th century India had lost both political freedom and her cultural pride.<sup>2</sup> After 1914 the picture changed; there was a new awakening partially due to the revolutionary activity of Gandhi.

During World War I Britain needed the men and wealth of her colonies, and although India supplied both, antagonism continued to increase. Britain's wartime needs to curb the

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<sup>2</sup>R.C. Majumdar, (Ed.) The History and culture of the Indian People. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Part II, Bombay, 1951, p. 149

FIGURE 1

## Two Liberation Movements: India and China

	<u>India</u>	<u>China</u>
<b>Socio-political situation in country</b>	Direct colony; large; illiterate economic under-development	Indirect colony; large; illiterate; economic under-development
<b>Characteristics of movement</b>	Nationalist; pacifist	Socialist; nationalist; non-pacifist
<b>Forms of struggle</b>	Satyagraha; non-cooperation; civil disobedience	Agrarian reforms; warfare
<b>Base</b>	All classes (landlords, business, professionals, peasants and workers); urban-based	Peasants, workers, soldiers, and alliance with petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie; rural based
<b>Consequences</b>	Independence from British rule	Socialist revolution followed independence

terrorists and win the support of the Congress Party of India brought promises of eventual self-government within the empire. However, in 1918, the British passed the Rowlatt Acts, which were an effort to stop terrorism by empowering the government to secretly try suspected offenders without the benefit of a lawyer or a jury. It was in response to the Rowlatt Acts that Gandhi dedicated himself to the nationalist movement which was to be transformed into a powerful force under his leadership. "The Rowlatt Act was the parent of the Non-cooperation Movement," said Sir Surendranath Bannerjea, one of the national leaders.<sup>3</sup> It was these Acts more than anything else that brought Gandhi to the center of the Indian political scene.

April 13, 1919, was another turning point in the liberation movement. Brigadier-General Ronald E.H. Dyer carried out the Amritsar massacre killing 379 men, women and children and wounding 1,137 by the official British count. This further eroded the myth of British justice and fair play.

When the British raised the tax on salt which Indians were no longer allowed to make, Gandhi and his 70 followers walked from his dwelling to the sea, almost 200 miles away. The number of followers grew along the route, and upon reaching

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<sup>3</sup>Clark D. Moore & David Eldredge (Ed), India Yesterday and Today. A Bantam Pathfinder Book, 1976, p. 163

the shore, they scooped salt water and evaporated salt in symbolic defiance. These gestures were recorded in the press and newsreels around the world. So active were his followers that British jails were bulging with an estimated 50,000 Indian nationalists in 1930. Arrests stirred Indian and foreign opinion against the imperial policy.

With World War II, the British continued to offend those whose support they needed. They declared war for India against Germany and Japan without consulting the Indian leadership. Furthermore, the British Parliament passed an act which suspended the rights granted in the Government of India Act of 1935, and Winston Churchill declared that the statement of war aims contained in the Atlantic Charter (which among other things respected "the rights of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live") did not apply to India, but only to those countries overrun by the Axis powers.

In reaction to these events the Indian Congress Working Committee adopted a lengthy resolution on September 15, 1939. It took the gravest view of the British proclamation of war without the consent of the Indian people, protested against the exploitation of Indian resources for imperialist ends, and openly declared that India cannot associate herself with a war

said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is denied to her

The Working Committee therefore invites the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism, and the new order that is envisaged, in particular how those aims are going to apply to India and to be given effect in the present.<sup>4</sup>

The All India Congress Committee endorsed this view on October 10, and demanded that "India must be declared an independent nation and present application must be given to this status to the largest possible extent."<sup>5</sup>

In order to enlist more enthusiastic support from India, the British government sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India in 1942 with an offer of independence at the end of the war. Until this time, there had been no recognition by Britain that independence was a legitimate Indian goal.

The Cripps plan, however, was rejected by the nationalist leaders for two reasons. First, it would have left Britain in control of India until the war's end. Second, and more important, the plan would permit the provincial governments and the princely states, some of each controlled by Muslims, to become independent of a united India.

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<sup>4</sup>The Indian Annual Register, 1939, II, 226-8

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. p. 231

At Gandhi's urging, the Congress response to the Cripps mission was to pass a "Quit India" resolution and promise civil disobedience if Britain did not comply. The British responded by imprisoning 60,000 nationalists including most of the leaders of the Congress.

This effectively muzzled the Congress for the duration of the war and left an open field for the development of the Muslim League. The League had been encouraged by the Cripps plan which transformed their slogan of a Muslim state into a realizable goal. At the war's end, the League was a force with which to be reckoned.

In 1945, the British Labor Party, which was pledged to Indian self-government, swept into control of Parliament. Two years later independence within the Commonwealth was granted to India and the Muslim state of Pakistan--despite better opposition from Gandhi who had always worked for a unified, independent India.

### China

Unlike India, China was saved from outright domination by the intense rivalry of the foreign powers. China was pressed on all sides by competing powers anxious for its trade and territory: Russia from the north, Great Britain (via India and Burma) from the south and west, France (via Indochina)

from the south, and Japan and the United States (in part, via the Philippines) from the east.<sup>6</sup>

In this sense, China was a semicolony under the simultaneous influence of several imperialist powers (in contrast to India which was a colony controlled by a single imperialist country). Both the countries were, however, semifeudal.<sup>7</sup>

In the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese government attempted reforms in order to develop internal strength to resist foreign intrusions, especially against Japan who had already established a strong foothold. The 1911 Revolution was a turning point in the history of China:

If there is one word to describe China since 1911, it is revolution. Revolution is the sweeping away of an old order--an ancient political system, a traditional culture, an uncreative economy, a ruling class which only exploits, and a system of social organization which no longer satisfies men. China has undergone all these revolutions.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Harry Magdoff, "Colonialism" (1763-c.1970) Encyclopaedia Britannica. Helen Hemingway Benton, Publisher, 1974 fifteenth edition, p.897

<sup>7</sup> A "semifeudal" country is one in which elements of feudalism exist side by side with elements of capitalism

<sup>8</sup> Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Republican China, Vintage Books, 1967, p.xiii



From 1911 to 1925 China floundered in one of the most chaotic, confusing, and disunited periods in her history. C.P. Fitzgerald points out how the disintegration of all central control into warlordism discredited the ideals of republican government, "the Chinese became completely disillusioned with the false Gods of the West. They turned restlessly to some other solution."<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the new doctrine of the Bolshevik Revolution could not fail to attract.

After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, the Kuomintang became an ideological vacuum; in spite of several abortive efforts, Chiang Kai-shek never succeeded in endowing it with a dynamic and persuasive ideology.<sup>10</sup> The war against the Japanese and the extermination campaigns against the Communists threw the country into serious confusion and tended to magnify all the inadequacies and shortcomings of Chiang's regime to the advantage of the Chinese Communist Party.

The period of collaboration with the Kuomintang against the warlords and imperialists (1924-26) has been designated by the Chinese Communist Party as the "First Revolutionary Civil War." In the following ten years (1927-1937) the Chinese

<sup>9</sup>C.P. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China. Penguin Books, London: 1964, pp.43-54

<sup>10</sup>Franz Schurmann et al, op. cit., p.5

Communist Party pursued a course of armed insurrection, called "The Second Revolutionary Civil War."<sup>11</sup> The Kiangsi Period, as the years from 1927 until the Long March in 1934 came to be known, were years of hardship and struggle for the Communists. By 1934 the pressure on the Communists had grown too great, and bursting out of Chiang's blockade line, they performed the spectacular feat known as the Long March, which ended the Kiangsi Period.

The survivors of the Long March finally settled in Shensi Province in Northwestern China at the end of 1935. These years are known as the Yen-an Period, named after the new Communist capital where the Communists developed modern Chinese Communism's organizational and ideological foundations.

The invasion of China began in 1931 with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the ensuing series of encroachments which finally led to the long and disastrous Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). Chiang was reluctant to get involved with Japan before resolving the Communist problem. Shortly before the outbreak of war, however, as a result of the Sian Incident in which Chiang was kidnapped by his own generals, a new United Front had been formed.

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<sup>11</sup> Franklin W. Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967, p.35

It was not until 1945 that the Japanese occupation army surrendered and left Chinese soil, but their departure did not resolve China's internal conflict. No sooner had they laid down their arms than the smoldering rivalry between the Communists and the Nationalists erupted with renewed fury, plunging the war weary Chinese people into five more years of destruction and deprivation.

The United States government was committed to Chiang's Nationalist regime, but as the Civil War raged on, it became increasingly obvious which side had people's support. The Communist takeover of China finally took place in 1949 after the collapse of Chiang's regime.

#### Communication barriers

The communication problem that confronted Gandhi and Mao was not only the enormous power of their imperialist and native adversaries (particularly in China, foreigners themselves represented only part of the problem), who controlled most channels of communication but also the fact that their countries were poor and backward, almost totally lacking in the prerequisites for conducting a national liberation movement: namely, a common language, adequate roads and railroads to tie the land surface together, literate people capable of communicating over great distance, an effectively

organized political party to mobilize the masses, and radios, newspapers, telephones, and telegraph to provide normal modern communication.<sup>12</sup>

The colonial policy of the British in India sought to strengthen and preserve the communal and ethnic divisions, as well as create religious and status differences. These barriers made it almost impossible for the national leaders to communicate their ideas to the people, and they were also unable to assess people's political and social aspirations. The leaders of the Congress Party were all members of the urbanized educated elite and were isolated from the 80 per cent of the population that lived in villages.

Briefly, the Indian and Chinese societies were marked by two distinct systems of communication: the villages pursuing the traditional communication network based upon personal relations, and the elite in the cities communicating through print media and radio. This situation reflected social distances of such magnitudes that large sectors of the population had no contact with one another. While the gap provided

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<sup>12</sup> A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism. Popular Book Depot, Bombay: 1959, pp. 201-211

Alan P.L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China. University of California Press, 1971, pp. ix-xvi

stability for the ruling regime, it created a tremendous sense of isolation and frustration on the part of the national liberation leaders.

The biggest communication barrier in both India and China was the European orientation of their leaders, which was far removed from the mundane world of the common people in their own countries. Ironically enough the prestige of these leaders within their party and among their opponents depended on their capacity to identify themselves as closely as possible with the aspirations of the common people as well as with traditional values. More important, if the national leaders were to represent their countries in the face of foreign aggression they had to obtain the support not only of the elites but of all the major elements of the population.

Absence of a common language or a language with many dialects created complex problems in India and China; the number of languages spoken created many social and political barriers. Not only was there a gulf between the written language and the spoken, but knowledge itself was jealously guarded in an esoteric language by the brahmin and the mandarin intelligentsia in a status-conscious society.

It was during this trying period that leaders like Gandhi and Mao appeared on the scene who could speak to the

common people as well as the elites. While the intellectuals discussed and wrote papers and articles about how to approach problems and organise mass organizations, Gandhi and Mao were out among the people creating genuine mass movements. While the majority of the party members catered to the interests of the middle class, Gandhi and Mao were out campaigning on behalf of the depressed peasants, and thus, mobilizing people's support that the Congress party of India and the Chinese Communist party lacked.

#### Leadership style

The fact that communication obstacles were overcome and that Gandhi and Mao successfully communicated highly controversial messages to huge masses of the people dispersed over vast areas before the era of radio and television (as did every other charismatic leader before mass media were invented) raises interesting questions as to how they did it.

Communication to be conducted successfully across vast geographical distances with groups of people speaking different interests, requires alertness on the part of the communicator, no less to the meaning of one's own speech than to the expectations of such an audience. It also requires organization and communication networks to forge a link between the leaders and the led. Above all, a leader's success in establishing

reciprocity between himself and the people at large is part of his communication skill.

Louis Renou<sup>13</sup> in an interesting passage explains Gandhi's "inner voice," upon which he claimed to rely for decisions and direction, as a feeling of what the masses expected of him. Han Suyin<sup>14</sup> notes that the "intuitiveness" of Mao was really his desire to be totally integrated with his own people. In an article, "Why India Follows Gandhi" H.N. Brailsford explains it by saying that in India the leader who can control and discipline himself is considered capable of commanding the universe.<sup>15</sup> In other words, Gandhi sought to combine his appeal to the spiritual elements in the Indian make-up with his understanding of India's political and social problems. This is why, Sir Reginald Coupland maintains, "what gave the Congress its present strength was its conversion from a movement of the intelligentsia into a movement of the people; and that was Mr. Gandhi's doing, almost single-handed."<sup>16</sup> C.F. Andrews, who knew Gandhi intimately for many years, had this to add:

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<sup>13</sup>Louis Renou, "Gandhi and Indian Civilization," Gandhi Memorial Peace Number. Visva Bharati Quarterly, 1949, p.231

<sup>14</sup>Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge. Little, Brown & Company, Boston: 1972, p. 188

<sup>15</sup>H.N. Brailsford, "Why India Follows Gandhi," The Forum, IXXXV, May, 1931 passim

<sup>16</sup>Sir Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem. 3 vols. in one; Oxford University, London: 1944, p.92

Thus Mahatma Gandhi remains rooted in the soil of India. He is not deracine, like so many of those who have stayed for a long time away from India and have adopted wholesale Western customs. His mind stretches out in ever wider and wider circles...but the centre of his being ever remains fixed in Hinduism itself, which is his first and only love.<sup>17</sup>

As for Mao's charismatic tie to the Chinese people, Lucian Pye maintains that the psychological link between Mao's private relationship to words and his public appeal helps to explain his extraordinary charismatic powers.<sup>18</sup> Schiffer believes that Mao had the ability to convince the Chinese people that China can be restored to its rightful position of greatness in the world if only she would submit to demanding moral standards of struggle and sacrifice.<sup>19</sup> Undoubtedly these comments are biased by hindsight because it was not until the 1960's that Mao's charismatic quality in the traditional sense was generally recognized.

Cultures, however, do differ in their responsiveness to different leadership styles.

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<sup>17</sup>C.F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas. Macmillan, N.Y.: 1930, p.52

<sup>18</sup>Lucian W. Pye, Mao Tse-tung. Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York: 1976, pp. 229-260. Pye's hypothesis is that Mao's vast range of primary experiences best explains Mao both as rebel and as charismatic leader.

<sup>19</sup>Irvine Schiffer, Charisma: A Psychoanalytic Look at Mass Society. University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 1973, passim



Culture, as a preference for certain modes of behavior, involves a preference for certain personality structures rather than others; the kind of person favored in one culture may be condemned in another.<sup>20</sup>

In other words, leadership style is in fact a dynamic process "adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas."<sup>21</sup> In the Indian culture politics may easily lose out to religious values; an Indian critic of Gandhi pointed out that "behind his politics there was always the touch of the old Indian tradition of leadership, entirely different from what you understand in Europe. We in India understood it."<sup>22</sup> Or, as Gandhi himself once remarked to a friend, "Most religious men I have met are politicians in disguise. I, however, who wear the guise of a politician, am at heart a religious man."<sup>23</sup>

In Chinese culture the relationship between religious thought and public affairs always had a curious ambivalence.<sup>24</sup> With his imaginative use of Marxism-Leninism, Mao provided the Chinese with a new set of ethics not merely to replace

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<sup>20</sup> Charles Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior. N.Y.: 1946, p.209

<sup>21</sup> Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and its Scope," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 39, Dec., 1953, pp.401-424

<sup>22</sup> M.R.Jayakar, Talking of Gandhiji. Orient Longmans, 1957, p.14

<sup>23</sup> Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi. Natesan, 1918, 2nd ed., p.xxiv

<sup>24</sup> Robert T. Oliver, Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China. Syracuse University Press, 1971, p.79

traditional Confucianism and Taoism but to fuse what was hitherto inadequately joined.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, Mao's slogans gave an essentially religious dimension to his words and ideas.

Gandhi's and Mao's leadership of their parties was significantly different. Although Gandhi was a decisive influence in Congress he never held any official position in its hierarchy. It was a leadership style peculiarly Indian and surely unique in the history of revolutions. In China the link between Mao and Chinese Communist Party was institutionalized though it had an extra party leadership element because of Mao's intensely personal style. Gandhi and Mao were both however important links between the party and the people.

#### Communication channels

The anti-liberation forces had almost a monopoly on the mass media and therefore Gandhi and Mao had no other choice but to use non-media communication forms in addition to the press. They communicated with the masses through detailed intimate organizations and this is why organizational modes of communication were such powerful weapons in their movements.

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<sup>25</sup>Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution. Oxford University Press, London: 1965, passim

Party organization. The Party is a key communication link with the people, and therefore a task fundamental to the liberation movement was to build the party organization. Gandhi set out to bring about a complete change in the Congress organizational constitution in the 1920 Nagpur session. Congress party units were established at the lowest village level, at the district level, and at the provincial level.<sup>26</sup> A whole super-structure of authority was created, along with the appropriate chain of command and lines of communication. In Nehru's words,

He (Gandhi) made it democratic and a mass organization. Democratic it had been previously also, but it had so far been limited in franchise and restricted to the upper classes. Now the peasants rolled in, and in its new garb it began to assume the look of a vast agrarian organization with a strong sprinkling of the middle classes. This agrarian character was to grow. Industrial workers also came in, but as individuals and not in their separate, organized capacity.<sup>27</sup>

The Chinese Communist Party organization went through a radical change at the time when Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Communists in 1927.<sup>28</sup> Driven from the cities, the center of the movement shifted to the newly established rural areas of the inland hills. But the shift was more than geographic:

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<sup>26</sup> Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress. S. Chand & Company, New Delhi: 1947, p.207

<sup>27</sup> J. Nehru, The Discovery of India. John Day, N.Y.: 1948, p.23

<sup>28</sup> Franklin W. Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1967, p.40

an almost complete change in leadership went hand in hand with a sharp change in Communist revolutionary practice. Old revolutionaries like Ch'en Tu-hsin and Li Li-san, were replaced by advocates of peasant revolution, like Mao and Chu Teh. Mao's leadership changed the Party into a real mass organization.<sup>29</sup>

In countries like China and India, where the vast majority of the population come from the peasant class, an aggressive land reform policy is sure to elicit popular support. It is of significance, therefore, that Gandhi and Mao chose peasant grievances for their initial campaigns in their respective countries. Gandhi launched the Champaran and the Khaira peasant campaigns<sup>30</sup> which established him as a prominent leader of Indian nationalism, gave him an effective protest weapon which he used to link the peasantry with the Congress, and inspired and brought important new leaders into the Congress.<sup>31</sup> Mao's first important report was on the peasantry in which he made the poor peasantry the "revolutionary vanguard."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Republican China, Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, N.Y.: 1967, pp.113-177

<sup>30</sup> As described by Gandhi in his autobiography, The Story of my Experiments with Truth. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, pp. 99-102

<sup>31</sup> R.I. Crane, "Modern India: A Background," University of Chicago Magazine, November, 1956, pp. 10-11

<sup>32</sup> "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan." Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.I, March, 1927, pp. 21-59

The difference of course is that the Chinese Communist Party never regarded agrarian reforms as anything more than a phase in the building of a mass base, a stage enabling them to develop the revolutionary struggle toward the conquest of power and the ultimate realization of socialist changes. Gandhi, on the other hand, was looking for moral victory against injustice, that is, to bear out his belief that one man with truth on his side could wield immense moral power. There was an ambivalent element in his attitude toward the place of power in politics.

Because he always looked at politics more from the standpoint of the rebel than of the ruler, of freedom than of authority, of the individual than of the State.<sup>33</sup>

What is important, however, is, that by bringing peasants into their concept of the communication process Gandhi and Mao unleashed the enormous creative power of the masses. For the first time in the history of the liberation movements in India and China, the Chinese Communist Party and the Congress Party became mass organizations, in the sense that national awakening had not only penetrated to the people at large, but also made them active participants in the struggle for freedom. As contributions to this process, Gandhi and Mao promoted three main criteria in the organization of their parties:

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<sup>33</sup>Raghavan Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi. Oxford University Press, New York: 1973, p.53

- (1) The party must represent the interests of the masses;
- (2) The masses must be treated as equals;
- (3) The masses must be aroused and educated and led by the correct methods.

These three criteria were addressed to the party workers, because the responsibility for articulating and maintaining the communication link belonged to the leaders, not the led. The party can fulfill the tasks of mass mobilization if it abides by these criteria.

The press. Gandhi and Mao looked upon the press as a potent weapon in the struggle to educate and persuade public opinion both inside and outside the country. However, a press based on mass circulation needs a high rate of literacy in society, and literacy, in turn, depends on a national government which is committed to such a goal. Repressive government policies, lack of equipment and facilities, illiteracy, and general apathy were some of the obstacles that Gandhi and Mao had to overcome before the press could play a significant role in national movements.

The structure of the press in India was rather complicated during the national movement. The prominent newspapers which generally supported the views and actions of the British government in India were The Statesman, The Times of India, The Civil and Military Gazette, The Pioneer, and The Madras Mail.

Some of the nationalist papers supporting the Indian National Congress were: Amrita Bazar Patrika, The Hindustan Times, The Hindu, The Leader, The Indian Social Reformer, The Modern Review were some of the outstanding journals reflecting the liberal school of nationalism. The most important for the movement was the Party press, organized at national, regional, and local levels, corresponding to the organizational structure of the Party.<sup>34</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru guided the policy of the National Herald launched in August 1938, an English daily supporting the Congress. In Bombay, there was a Congress newspaper in the Bombay Chronicle, and the Free Press Journal. These newspapers pursued a policy of supporting the Congress party. Gandhi had his own newspapers, Young India and Harijan<sup>35</sup> which presented his views mainly. He stated in one of his editorials:

I would like every Congressman who desires to serve in the Satyagraha Sena (nonviolent army) to read my two speeches made at Rangarh (at the subjects committee meeting of the party) as well as whatever else I may write in Harijan on the struggle, and to carry out the instructions meant for him or her<sup>36</sup>

As the national struggle proceeded Indian vernacular newspapers assumed a new tone in attacking the government;

<sup>34</sup> S. Natarajan, A History of the Press in India. Asia Publishing House, 1962, p.50

<sup>35</sup> Harijan was to appear in three languages: Harijan in English, Harijanbandhu in Gujrati and Harijansevak in Hindi.

<sup>36</sup> Harijan, March 30, 1940

the press became an influential factor in molding public opinion, as there were twenty newspapers published in English and some two hundred in Indian languages.

Mao had no access to the national press which was primarily pro-Western. The basic principle of the press structure of the Chinese Communist Party was of course integration of the press with the Party structure. The functions of the press were specifically propaganda and agitation. Mao told the staff of a communist newspaper, "Your job is to educate the masses, to enable the masses to know their own interests, their tasks, and the Party's general and specific policies"<sup>37</sup> The press was directed to emphasize mass political agitation, "...the press should carry editorials on rent reduction and reports of good examples. As rent reduction is a mass struggle by the peasants, Party directives and government decrees should guide and help it instead of trying to bestow favours on the masses...."<sup>38</sup>

The first charge of sedition brought against Gandhi in 1922 was based upon four articles he had written in Young India. In his defense at the trial he said the following:

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<sup>37</sup>Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. IV, pp. 225-227

<sup>38</sup>Ibid, pp. 126-130



.....it has been a precious privilege for me to be able to write what I have in the various articles tendered in evidence against me.....I am here, therefore, to invite and cheerfully submit to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is a deliberate crime and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.....<sup>39</sup>

Against the government's order to shut down his newspaper, he declared in the columns of Harijan on October 24, 1940:

Let everyone become his walking newspaper and carry the good news from mouth to mouth.....telling my neighbour what I have authentically heard. This no government can suppress. It is the cheapest newspaper yet devised, and it defies the wit of government, however clever it may be.

During the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930, Gandhi brought out unregistered mimeographed sheets of news. As early as 1919 he had remarked on the possibilities of written newspapers which "need not occupy more than one side of half a foolscap."<sup>40</sup> It had the advantage of not needing large finance and Gandhi was insistent that the national movement must be as independent of finance as possible. Commending these newspapers as a potential power for "transmission of pure ideas in a concise manner" (without advertisements), he reminded his public of the tradition of India of "imparting instruction of oral teaching." Furthermore, Gandhi advocated acceptance of responsibility for these sheets by advising the

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<sup>39</sup>Young India, March 23, 1922

<sup>40</sup>Jag Parvesh Chander, (Ed.) Teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. Indian Printing Works, Lahore: 1945, p.45

writer to place his name and address on every copy (expressing open defiance to the suppression of the press and inviting arrest by the government). This was also in accordance to what Gandhi had written in Young India on January 10, 1922 when he referred to the policy of the government in restricting individual liberty:

I believe that an Editor who has anything worth saying and who commands a clientele cannot be easily hushed so long as his body is left free. He has delivered his unfinished message as soon as he is put under duress....Let us break the idol of machinery and leaden type. The pen is our foundry and the hands of willing copyists our printing machine...Let us use the machine and the type, whilst we can, to give unfettered expression to our thoughts. But let us not feel helpless when they are taken away from us by a "paternal" Government, watching and controlling every combination of types and every movement of the printing machine. But the handwritten newspaper is, I admit, a heroic remedy meant for heroic times...We must apply Civil Disobedience for the restoration of free speech, free association and free press is almost the whole Swaraj (freedom).

Gandhi also made full use of the growing number of vernacular papers and persuaded them to pledge to the nationalist cause. Each such paper, with its local following, was in a position to publicize Congress goals and educate the public on important developments. More important, the vernacular press could expose local grievances to which Congress needed to be attuned, thus bringing a variety of issues effectively before the high command.

Mao's attention to newspapers began early in his life:

I had acquired a newspaper-reading habit, and from 1911 to 1927, when I climbed up Chingkangshan (his guerrilla base area) I never stopped reading the daily papers of Peiping, Shanghai, and Hunan.<sup>41</sup>

Mao published an article in a national journal even before he was out of school, and found the Hsiang-chiang p'ing-lun himself the year after he graduated from Normal School.<sup>42</sup> Mao's article in the Hsiang River Review in 1919 spoke of need for a cultural revolution to change society--"the only way to emancipate millions of people and their energy and to carry forward the ultimate aim of liberating the country from imperialism and all capitalists."<sup>43</sup> An article by him On Radicalism stated that armed struggle was the only way a revolution could succeed. This resulted in a ban on Mao's weekly by the provincial governor of Hunan, and the Student Union was disbanded. He contributed articles to another student paper, New Hunan, which too was suppressed in December 1919.<sup>44</sup>

In the Hsiang Chiang Review, New Hunan, and other papers, Mao's articles covered the whole spectrum of change, of revolt

<sup>41</sup> Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. Grove Press, Inc., N.Y.: 1938, p.150

<sup>42</sup> Lucian Pye, op. cit., pp.242-243

<sup>43</sup> Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution 1893-1954. Little, Brown and Co., Boston: 1972, p.76

<sup>44</sup> A Concise History of Chinese Newspapers. Hong Kong, 1957, p.173

against tradition and the breakthrough of a generation into a new world. The first issue of the Hsiang River Review contained his article "The Women's Revolutionary Army," which evoked response from the girl's schools and according to Han Suyin led to the establishment of "an alliance of women students" to "fight imperialism, militarism and capitalism, and all superstition".<sup>45</sup> In 1926 Mao wrote in the Communist Weekly Guide on "The Bitter Sufferings of the Peasants in the Provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang, and their Anti-feudal, Anti-landlord Movement," in 1930 he advocated "without investigation no right to speak,"<sup>46</sup> and advised workers and students to study the situation first hand before writing anything.

In the prevailing illiteracy and poverty of the masses, however, Gandhi and Mao, as leaders of mass movements, had to link the written word to the spoken; that is, link newspapers with face-to-face communication. Erickson gives an apt illustration of how Gandhi became a "living, walking newspaper":

Luther's pamphlets, in all their formidable formality, could count on the fast multiplication and distribution of printed matter--hot off the press. But Gandhi entrusted himself to the railroads, and while loudly

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<sup>45</sup>Han Suyin, op. cit., pp. 75-78

<sup>46</sup>Oppose The Party 'Eight-Legged Essay' (February 8, 1942) Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 46-62

complaining against the miserable conditions of third-class travel, he made the very most of joining the masses in motion, in stations, and especially in the compartments where they were thrown together most indiscriminately, often far away from home, and yet sure to return there or to arrive in new places with such news as spreads from rail centers to villages via ox-carts and camelback. And then Gandhi stopped and stayed and talked, a quiet, almost tender orator, but a man of the most intense and convincing presence, and a speaker who could make intimate contact with each particular audience.<sup>47</sup>

Mao emphasized collective newspaper reading among workers and peasants so as to establish a degree of genuine identity of interest between the party and these two social groups.<sup>48</sup>

Although the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party used the press for political and social education of their more literate activists, they had no choice but to rely on face to face communication to communicate effectively with the illiterate rural society.

Mass organizations. Of all the means of communication linking leaders with followers, mass organizations were perhaps the most significant in the Congress Party's and the Chinese Communist Party's strategy of national mobilization. In India operations such as the Mass Contacts Programme of the mid-thirties had strengthened contact with the public. It was

<sup>47</sup>Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York: 1969, p. 278

<sup>48</sup>F.T.C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China. Frederick A. Praeger, New York: 1964, passim

through volunteer organizations that the message of freedom by non-cooperation was spread among the masses. According to the official report, "the members of volunteer organizations spread themselves over the countryside, inspiring rustics, only a shade more credulous than themselves, with contempt for constituted authority."<sup>49</sup> In addition, the Village Constructive Programme, on which Gandhi had put so much emphasis through the years, had borne its fruit in organizational groupings that linked the Congress structurally with the masses.<sup>50</sup> This was true also of the Congress youth program. Though the membership of the Congress fluctuated during the Gandhian era, membership figures were always higher than in any previous period of Congress history.

Mao maintained that "democratic centralism" can be widely and effectively practiced in mass organizations only when its efficacy is demonstrated in revolutionary struggle and the masses understand that it is the best means of mobilizing their forces and is of the utmost help in their struggle.<sup>51</sup> All the organizations, including unions, peasant associations, national salvation associations, were organized on the basis of democratic centralism; that is, they had a broad mass base but

<sup>49</sup>R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India. Vol.III, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta: 1963, p.205

<sup>50</sup>Robert I. Crane, "Leadership of the Congress Party," in Leadership and Political Institutions in India, 1959, p.185

<sup>51</sup>Ilpyong J. Kim, "Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques developed in the period of the Chinese Soviet Republic," in Chinese Communist Politics in Action, 1969, pp.78-98

lower levels submitted to orders from higher levels and the individuals submitted to organizational discipline.<sup>52</sup>

These mass organizations were devoted to mobilizing the masses for assisting the Party in national struggle and social construction. In recognition of this service, the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party assisted the organizations financially and by providing them with meeting places and equipment. In other words, the Congress Party<sup>53</sup> and the Chinese Communist Party<sup>54</sup> were in firm control of these mass organizations, most of which its political workers had initially organized.

Both, Gandhi and Mao had almost a mystical reliance on the masses, and the techniques for mass mobilization, simple yet thorough, depended primarily on face to face contact. Gandhi's campaigns of "going to the people"<sup>55</sup> and Mao's "to-the-village"<sup>56</sup> were far more effective and widespread than ever before in the history of India or China. Mao constantly exhorted party members to get close to the masses,

<sup>52</sup>James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, University of California Press, Berkeley: 1967, pp.736-764

<sup>53</sup>Robert I. Crane, op. cit. pp. 169-187

<sup>54</sup>Charlmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. Stanford University Press, 1962, passim

<sup>55</sup>M.K. Gandhi, Towards Non-Violent Socialism. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad: 1951, p.8

<sup>56</sup>Mark Seldon, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Harvard University Press, 1971, p.210

both physically and psychologically, and to listen to all popular opinions and demands.<sup>57</sup> The "Resolutions on the Peasant Movement" adopted at the enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee in July, 1926<sup>58</sup> told Party members to adopt the peasant's style of speech, action, living conditions, and dress. By June 1, 1943, the Chinese Communist Party mass line in China appeared in a form that has remained virtually unchanged down to the present time.

Briefly, the Congress Party's approach and that of the Chinese Communist Party to mass mobilization was infused with a new element that was of decisive importance in the success of the two parties. This element was nationalism, accompanied by a sense of urgency that created a united front against a foreign enemy. During this period of struggle, the public pronouncements of Gandhi and Mao always included emotional and nationalistic appeals for total mobilization against a powerful enemy. The nationalistic orientation placed mass participation in the service of a cause that transcended group interests and the class struggle.

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<sup>57</sup>Mao, "Rectify the Party's Style in Work," Selected Works, IV, pp. 42-43

<sup>58</sup>C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, eds., Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927. New York: 1956, pp. 298-302



### The 1942-44 Phases of National Struggle

As already indicated, the national liberation movements developed over a long period of time between the 1920's and 1930's. In both cases a critical turning point in the development of their struggle was in the 1940's. This is no accident because this period was the hardest fought period of World War II - fighting which had a big impact on both India and China.

A brief historical sketch of Gandhi's 'Quit India' movement and Mao's 'Rectification' campaign which culminated in the final struggle for freedom will provide the basis for analyzing the messages of each during the 1942-44 period in the next chapter.

#### The 'Quit India' movement of 1942

The action of the British Government in sending Indian troops abroad, to the Middle East and Singapore and later of issuing a proclamation of war, without consulting central or provincial legislatures was criticized by the Congress Party as an act which dragged India into the war without her consent.<sup>59</sup> The action was no doubt strictly constitutional but it was certainly against the spirit of the Act of 1935 under which, though Defence and Foreign Affairs were reserved subjects, the Governor-General should have consulted responsible ministers in

<sup>59</sup>The Working Committee Resolution dated September 14, 1939, p.12

the matter of a declaration of war. The Congress withdrew its members from the central legislature as a protest against the sending of troops without its consent and when war was proclaimed, Congress provincial ministers resigned from seven out of eleven provinces. The Haripura Congress meeting in 1938 had already declared that India would take no part in Britain's war and would resist the employment of India's manpower and resources. The conflict between the Indian people and the British Government became increasingly sharp during the war which finally culminated in the 'Quit India' movement led by Gandhi. He demanded freedom of India before Britain's victory; the government wanted victory first before it was willing to grant India's independence.

By 1942, the Japanese had swept swiftly through South-east Asia to the borders of India and threatened to invade. The Congress party affirmed in a manifesto that India "will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defence against aggression and for economic co-operation..." but only as a free nation could India be effective. The British government, however, had no intention of giving India freedom, independence, Dominion status, or even lesser rights. Winston Churchill was Prime Minister and he was always guided by his famous dictum of November 10, 1942, "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside at the liquidation of

the British Empire." He had said in 1935, "Gandhism and all it stands for must ultimately be grappled with and finally crushed".<sup>60</sup> From the time Churchill became the King's First Minister in 1940, to the day in 1945 when he was ousted from office, he waged an unceasing war with Gandhi. This explains the failure of the mission undertaken by Stafford Cripps on behalf of the British government in the middle of 1942.

Fiasco of the Cripps Mission. The Cripps Mission was a cumulative result of several factors. The first was the threat of Japan to India. During the period from December 7, 1941, when Japan struck at Pearl Harbor, to March 7, 1942, when Rangoon fell, Japan completed the occupation of the whole of South East Asia. With Pearl Harbor and the rapid loss of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma resulted in a greater inclination to act on the part of the British and a greater disposition to co-operate among Indian leaders.<sup>61</sup>

The Indian government started releasing Indian leaders from prison under the stress of Japanese conquest and on March 11, 1942-- four days after the fall of Rangoon -- Churchill announced the Cripps Mission giving as his reason that: "The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of

<sup>60</sup> Louis Fischer, Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World. A Signit Key Book, 1954, p. 135

<sup>61</sup> Perceival Spear, India. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1961, p. 395-406

the Japanese advance had made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life, to guard their land from the menace of the invader".<sup>62</sup>

A second factor was the pressure of President Roosevelt. Roosevelt talked to Churchill privately at the time of his visit to Washington in December, 1941. He again sent a cable to Churchill on March 10, in which he went so far as to suggest a concrete solution to the Indian problem on the lines of an analogy of U.S. history between 1783 and 1789.<sup>63</sup> The next day Churchill announced the Cripps Mission.

Developments in India also demanded some measure of settlement. The first was the growing frustration in India with the advance of the Japanese and the economic effects of the war which culminated in an awesome famine in Bengal in 1943 when millions of people died like flies. Also the Axis propaganda (from Berlin) was proving very effective in rousing the masses who would rejoice every time the British suffered reverses.<sup>64</sup> The second development was that the Congress broke with Gandhi (who was opposed to the war effort) and offered

<sup>62</sup> Amba Prasad, The Indian Revolt of 1942. S. Chand & Company, Delhi: 1958, p.14

<sup>63</sup> R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, op. cit., p. 199

<sup>64</sup> R. Coupland, Cripps Mission. London, 1942, pp. 28-29

cooperation in the war effort so as to arrive at some settlement. Furthermore, public opinion in England was now turning overwhelmingly in favor of reconciling India. Cripps assured the British parliament that the "Government was much concerned as was everybody else."<sup>65</sup> The Labor party impressed upon the government the urgency of forming a national government. The reasons why Churchill agreed to Cripps proposals, as explained by him in a letter to the Viceroy of India, were two: assuaging American opinion by showing British sincerity of purpose, and organizing better defence of India.<sup>66</sup>

Cripps arrived in India on March 22, 1942, and left on April 11, 1942. In these twenty days, high hopes were raised which amounted to nothing in the end. The main lines of the proposals may be summarised as follows. An Indian Union with Dominion status, under a new Indian Council was to be set up immediately after the war. Freedom to draw up the constitution would include the right of secession from the Commonwealth. The Indian states would be free to join the Union, and provinces could withdraw if they wished. Disputes arose, however, over the precise powers of the new council, particularly with regard to defense.

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<sup>65</sup>R. Coupland, *Ibid.* ., p. 187

<sup>66</sup>Lord Halifax, The Indian Problem. New York: 1942, pp.200-211

Gandhi's reaction was unfavorable, particularly to the prospect of a divided India. He felt that Cripps had allowed himself to become a part of the machinery of British imperialism and so advised Cripps to "take the first plane home." Some of the leaders, like Nehru were for acceptance, but, the final word was spoken by Gandhi, who travelled to Delhi to urge rejection. He described the offer as a "blank cheque on a failing bank." And so by April 1942, Gandhi had already evolved the demand that "the British should leave India now in an orderly manner," and in June he told an American journalist, "I am not interested in independence after the war. I want independence now. That will help Britain win the war." This demand developed into a call for a "short and swift open rebellion" in which all patriots, including the soldiery, would participate. He was faced, he said with "a drastic situation requiring a drastic remedy."<sup>67</sup>

Briefly, the Cripps Mission ended in a fiasco because of Britain's unwillingness to accede to India's minimum demands.<sup>68</sup> The deep-seated distrust between the government and the Indian leaders was finally responsible for the Mission's complete failure. The refusal of the government to declare its war aims,

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<sup>67</sup>Tendulkar, op. cit., pp. 89, 93, 99, 117

<sup>68</sup>Hiren Mukerji, Gandhiji: A Study. National Book Agency (Private) Ltd., Calcutta: 1958, p.140

the Atlantic Charter statement of Churchill and the past record of British policy towards the Congress all made the Congress suspect that Cripps was a tool of the arch-imperialist Churchill.<sup>69</sup>

Gandhi and the "August Revolution". The failure of the Cripps mission brought about a dramatic change in Gandhi's communication style. The writings of this period reflect new anti-war, anti-British sentiments, very different from the earlier stress on accommodation and cooperation between the people and the government. A systematic content analysis of the period before 1942 might reveal different findings from the 1942-44 period we will be analysing in the next chapter. Our study shows that from 1942 onwards, Gandhi acted with new urgency. For instance, he spoke of nonviolence for the first time in a different tone:

I have decided that even at certain risks, which are obviously involved, I must ask the people to resist the slavery....There is ordered anarchy all round and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result, because of the British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than the present anarchy. After all, those who are unarmed cannot produce a frightful amount of violence or anarchy, and I have a faith that out of this anarchy may arise pure non-violence. But to be a passive witness of the terrible violence that is going on, of the terrible anarchy that is going on in the name of resisting a possible foreign aggression, is a thing I can't stand. It is a thing that would make me ashamed of my ahimsa (nonviolence)<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup>J.L. Nehru, Discovery of India. New York, 1946, p.472

<sup>70</sup>quoted in Hiren Mukerji, op. cit., p. 145

It was about this time that Gandhi began to popularise his dramatic slogan "Quit India."<sup>71</sup> Early in May, 1942, he said in the course of an interview:

From the frustration of every effort made to bring about unity by me among others, has arisen this logical step for me that not until British power is wholly withdrawn from India, can there be any real unity, because all parties will be looking to the foreign power...Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that real heart unity, genuine unity, is almost an impossibility unless British power is withdrawn and no other power takes its place.<sup>72</sup>

Gandhi sponsored a Congress resolution urging struggle for freedom "with all the armed as well as other forces at her (India) command."<sup>73</sup>

The government policy, after the failure of the Cripps mission, was to postpone the constitutional issue to the end of war, and in the meanwhile, to penalise any revolt and to prepare Indian and world opinion against the Congress, by propaganda. It was "a policy of three P's--postponement, penalisation and propaganda."<sup>74</sup>

<sup>71</sup>"The original idea of asking the British to go," Gandhi said to Louis Fischer in June 1942, "burst upon me suddenly. It was the Cripps fiasco that inspired the idea." Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase, p.130

<sup>72</sup>Harijan, May 3, 1942

<sup>73</sup>J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp.480-85

<sup>74</sup>Amba Prasad, op. cit., p.83



Matters now came quickly to a crisis. Congress, under Gandhi's guidance, declared nonviolent resistance demanding that the British "Quit India". The sanction behind this demand was mass civil disobedience. The new slogan gathered, in one rush of feeling, all the humiliations and resentments in the country of the last many years. To the traditional slogans like 'Long Live Revolution,' 'Victory to Gandhiji,' 'Victory to Mother India,' 'Long Live Free India,' Gandhi added new ones like 'We shall do or die,' and 'Quit India.' The new slogans demanded complete withdrawal and expressed determination to die in the fight for freedom.

The aims and objects of the movement were stated in a Congress Working Committee resolution passed at Wardha on July 14, 1942, and adopted at the meeting of the All India Congress Committee at Bombay on August 8. Nehru stated that the resolution was sponsored by Gandhi himself and into it went all his beliefs and ideas.<sup>75</sup> Three objects were stated in the Wardha resolution and three more were added in the Bombay resolution. These were as follows:

- (1) To overthrow foreign domination of India
- (2) To build up a spirit of resistance to aggression among the people and to release that energy and enthusiasm to defend India
- (3) To achieve communal unity at the withdrawal of the British

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<sup>75</sup>J. Nehru, op. cit., p.484

The Bombay resolution added three more:

- (1) To throw all India's resources against Nazism and Fascism to win moral support of all oppressed humanity
- (2) To help Asiatic nations fighting colonialism regain their freedom
- (3) To bring about a world federation which would ensure disarmament and pooling of the world's resources for humane purposes.

The Resolution had the overwhelming support of the Congressmen and was passed with only 13 opposing it out of 300 members of the Congress Committee that were present.<sup>76</sup>

The Resolution included sanction to enforce a mass civil-disobedience campaign. "After all," said Gandhi, "this is open rebellion," it looked as though the peak of the crisis was coming in October. At this point the government struck hard. The whole Congress was declared an illegal organization. There followed a short but sharp outbreak of violence which caused widespread dislocation, especially in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Bengal. Official figures reckoned over 1,000 killed and 3,000 injured by the end of the year, while more than 60,000 were arrested. The government described it as the Congress Rebellion and tried to connect Congress leaders with it; Congress ascribed the violence to the intolerable strain imposed by government intransigence on popular feeling.

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<sup>76</sup>Indian Annual Register, 1942, Vol. II, p.244

It was clear to both, however, that Gandhi had succeeded in shaking India out of her lethargy and the torpor of centuries. It seemed as though the government had triumphed but it was not very difficult to perceive that the tremendous underground reservoir of national feeling was awaiting a release by war pressure in order to come to the surface.

#### The 'Rectification' movement of 1942

Since 1938 Mao had hinted several times that a great "study" drive for Party building was essential. It was necessary to reorient, correct, strengthen and stabilize the Party, especially now that it showed overwhelming expansion in the three years after the outbreak of war in 1937, there was a twenty-fold increase in party membership from 40,000 to 800,000 with consequent defects. And it was also necessary to settle some unresolved "historical questions," that had arisen since January 1935, when at the so-called Tsunyi conference Mao was first voted into power. Furthermore, a great many intellectuals who were politically unseasoned due to their bourgeois background, had come to Yen-an. In December 1939 Mao had stated the Party's need for intellectuals "who serve the working class and the peasantry; without the participation of intellectuals, the Revolution cannot be victorious." Mao's "rectification"

movement therefore became urgently necessary. As the shortages and material difficulties temporarily added to the disunity factors, the subsequent Production Drive also created the conditions in which rectification could occur. The theme of the Rectification movement became the union of "the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the reality of the Chinese Revolution."<sup>77</sup> In June 1941 Hitler's forces invaded the USSR. This at once cleared the confusion in Communist minds arising from Stalin's non-aggression pacts with both Hitler and Japan--which Mao had defended. In December 1941 occurred Pearl Harbor; with America in the war, China became of enhanced importance. The U.S. did not want Chiang to start another anti-communist onslaught like the one against Mao's New Fourth Army in January 1941.

The Chinese Communist Party under Mao's guidance was the main force pinning down Japanese armies, and now the next step had to be the solidification of power. And for this, a Rectification movement in Mao's view was essential. It was a total preparation of the Party for total victory; reorienting its attitude to the masses, reshaping its style of communication, streamlining it, throwing out opportunists, enemy agents and other "undesirables," quelling "factions," and writing Party history. It was a tremendous political education project.

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<sup>77</sup>Boyd Compton, Mao's China, Party Reform Documents, 1942-44. University of Washington Press, 1952, p.xxxix

To this Mao gave his attention for the next three years and it bore fruit as planned.

This campaign paints a picture of Mao's Party as it was molded and trained in the Anti-Japanese War Bases to win a startlingly swift victory in the Civil War. Mao took great pains to educate leaders and most of his writings during this period speak about Party problems and are addressed to a Party audience.

In two speeches of February 1, 1942, launching the campaign officially, Mao set forth guidelines which were followed during the next two years. His major theme was the role of ideology in the Chinese revolution, particularly in "the study of current affairs...historical research, and...the application of Marxism-Leninism."<sup>78</sup> Mao launched a broad three-front attack on errors in the Party's style of work and thought. He criticised subjectivism in thought, sectarianism (separation from the masses) in Party relations, and formalism in literature and art. Mao's harshest comments were reserved for those who "study the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin abstractly and aimlessly, and do not inquire about their connection with the Chinese revolution...it's merely theory for the sake of theory."<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Reconstruction of Our Studies," in Compton, Mao's China, p.62

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p.64

The greatest significance of the Rectification campaign was Mao's insistence that Marxism be made Chinese. He saw Marxism as an "arrow" and the Chinese liberation movement as a "target." The principal enemy of the Rectification movement was the dogmatist:

In speech they can appear more Marxist than anyone else...they invariably base their actions on books, on set phrases of Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin... Their decisions...are from book formulas, historical comparisons, or from similar events in Russia and the countries of Western Europe.<sup>80</sup>

Mao's February speech was not the signal for an entirely new Party policy. It came rather as the formalization of a development which began with the war. In 1940, in "The New Democracy," Mao presented a detailed interpretation of the Chinese revolution. Here again he focused on the sinification of Marxism. The lines of thought leading to the Rectification movement were further developed in 1941 with Mao's speech on "The Reconstruction of Our Studies" and a Central Committee resolution on "Strengthening the Party Spirit." The culmination was in Mao's February, 1942, speech and the formal movement which started in April.

The Yen-an Period. The Rectification movement marked a major turning point in the Chinese Communist Party; indeed, for many students of Chinese Communism the Rectification

<sup>80</sup> Liu Shao-ch'i, "Liquidation of Menshevik Thought in the Party," Compton, Ibid., p.255

movement for all practical purposes was the Yen-an period.<sup>81</sup> It was the Party's most creative epoch that culminated in its final triumph. The problems that emerged were in the base areas and the tensions implicit in New Democratic politics.<sup>82</sup> Under conditions of guerrilla warfare throughout North China, and with only primitive communications linking them with Yen-an, blind obedience to party directives was not encouraged, although the Rectification movement did attempt to strengthen the chain of command. Guerrilla conditions required a maximum of flexibility and decentralization of control and authority. Therefore, it was critically important that local leaders share the goals and ideas of the movement. In other words, the Rectification movement sought to "harmonize the two conflicting imperatives of 'conscious action' by individuals and impeccable social discipline".<sup>83</sup> Toward this end the party launched a cadre education campaign to instill primary loyalty to the movement in the face of powerful enemy forces and conflicting personal bonds. The slogan "Unified leadership and

<sup>81</sup> Mark Seldon, The Yen-an Period. Harvard University Press, 1971, p.188

<sup>82</sup> New Democratic politics constituted new approaches to mass participation, local leadership, and administration, which sought initially to stabilize and then gradually to transform the institutional fabric of the border region.

<sup>83</sup> Stuart R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1966, p.269

decentralized administration" defined the control exercised-- overall authority and leadership were concentrated in Yen-an but local initiative was encouraged, a system which required a high level of political education.

During 1941-42 there emerged a constellation of policies associated with the "mass line" out of the devastation brought about by Japanese aggression coupled with Chiang's blockade against Communist-led base areas. Yen-an, capital of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, served as the Party's headquarters throughout the War of Resistance against Japan. The mass line politics of 1943 represented a synthesis of policies containing in a developed form virtually every significant element of the Chinese Communist Party's distinctive approach to the war of liberation.<sup>84</sup>

The scope and intent of the policies implemented throughout the base areas at the time of the Rectification movement are suggested by the major campaigns launched simultaneously by the party and government. Viewed as an integrated program, the Yen-an period represents a distinctive approach to economic development, social transformation, and liberation war. Here we may suggest the dimensions of the major campaigns that make up the Rectification movement.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Mark Seldon, *op. cit.*, p.177

<sup>85</sup>Mark Seldon, *Ibid*, p.210



- (1) The campaign for simple administration, the purpose of which was to reduce costs for the taxpayer, to transfer power to local communities, and to encourage a style of communication in line with the national liberation movement.
- (2) The "to-the-village" campaign designed to destroy barriers between an educated elite and the most deprived people in the countryside, as well as between mental and manual labor.
- (3) The campaign for the reduction of rent and interest aroused the peasantry in areas where there had been little or no land revolution.
- (4) The cooperative movement, based on traditional forms of mutual aid, was the party's first major effort, to reorganize the village economy.
- (5) The production movement introduced a variety of new approaches to the economy of the border region. One of these was an "organizational economy" in which every organization and every cadre participated in tasks ranging from management of new industries to collecting manure for the cooperative vegetable garden of the local party branch.

- (6) The popular education movement expanded the scope and modified the form and content of education, spreading literacy and introducing new ideas to remote villages.

Briefly, it was during the Yen-an period that a communication style of leadership in the liberation movement was raised to the level of theory as the mass line. The mass line represents the most important contribution of the Chinese experience to the theory and practice of conducting liberation movements.

This linking of theory and practice in the context of intense struggle was the hallmark of the chengfeng (rectification) movement. The result was to forge a working consensus both on ultimate values and immediate action within cadre units, to increase communication between leadership and lower-ranking cadres as well as between cadres and the people, and to heighten cadre awareness of the integral part their own work played in a unified revolutionary movement.<sup>86</sup>

Commitment to the party and the movement was particularly critical during the civil war period that followed and during the intensification of rural revolution when the support of large numbers of cadres from an elite background, who had initially joined the party to fight the Japanese, had to be retained. The Rectification movement helped create an institutional context for individual education and change.

Preparation for total victory. The central purpose of the Rectification movement was to build the Party's ability to

<sup>86</sup>Mark Seldon, op. cit., p.195

conduct a national war leading to total victory. The reconstruction and transformation of the stagnant agrarian economy was the key to the success of the movement. From 1942, in Shen-Kan-Ning the movement's primary task lay in transforming the structure of social and particularly economic life at the village level. Shortly the drive spread to every base area in North and Central China. In the final triumphant years of the war of resistance against Japan, the mass line took root in the base areas and on the battlefields throughout China. This prepared the movement for its final victory during the civil war.

## CHAPTER III

### THE GANDHI-MAO THEMES: 1942-44

The previous chapter has provided the broader context of the Indian and Chinese liberation movements and the specifics of the national struggle in both countries during 1942-44. The task of this chapter is to provide a quantitative and qualitative message analysis of the basic themes used by the two leaders during this brief but critical period. The next chapters will draw certain inferences from these findings concerning, first, the more latent (as contrasted with the more explicit or manifest) communication theories of Gandhi and Mao, and second, -- as part of the general conclusions -- their communication behavior.

#### Analytical Scheme

The statements of Gandhi and Mao on communication have been classified with the concept of mass line as the central element. The concept of mass line may be defined as a non-elitist approach initiating genuine mass participation and linking the leaders and the masses through multi-modal communication networks. The attempt is to distinguish between the content, style and channels of communication reflected in Gandhi's and Mao's practices and writings for the purpose of making comparisons.

Careful reading of the materials suggest that the following categories - all of which tend to heighten the sense of national identity and focus on the people's needs and demands - are among the most salient elements of their statements during the period of 1942-44:

A. Conditions of Crisis deals with a situation in which severe deprivation, oppression, violence are inflicted or threatened. It is a statement of expectation or fact about the enemy and the context of the conflict. The subheadings are as follows:

1. Political: conditions of crisis in the political scene were coded as themes on:

- (a) imperialism
- (b) fascism
- (c) feudalism
- (d) capitalism
- (e) communism

2. Social: the following subheadings reflect conditions of crisis in the social scene:

- (a) civil war
- (b) violence, repression, oppression
- (c) illegality
- (d) immorality
- (e) incompetence
- (f) illiteracy
- (g) poverty
- (h) exploitation
- (i) passivity
- (j) false propaganda

3. Party: the conditions of crisis within the Congress Party of India and the Chinese Communist Party as perceived by Gandhi and Mao were coded under the following headings:

- (a) bureaucracy
- (b) intellectualism
- (c) sectarianism
- (d) subjectivism
- (e) warlordism

- B. Goal Values deals with the substantive demands that the leader is making on behalf of the liberation movement under the following subheadings:

1. Nationalism (united front, harmony, solidarity etc.)
2. Power (political, ideological etc.)
3. Material well-being (economic, safety etc.)
4. Morality (concern with ends and means, spiritual etc.)

- C. Leadership Style deals with the leader's response to crisis and with the techniques of mobilizing the masses in terms of methods of persuasion etc.:

1. Trust the masses
2. Trust the elites
3. Personal example and deed
4. Integration of theory and practice
5. Toleration, moderation, flexibility
6. Self-reliance, fearlessness

7. Sacrifice, discipline
8. Serve the people
9. Confidence
10. Uniqueness (of methods, situation, or struggle)
11. Truthfulness (not bluffing people)
12. Nonviolence.
13. Noncooperation
14. Civil disobedience
15. War
16. Anarchy

D. Channels of Communication deals with modes or means of communication that the leader suggests to achieve goals of the movement:

1. Personal contact
2. Mass media
3. Party organization
4. Mass organization
5. Education
6. Art and literature

After the selection of content based on a formal, pre-determined, unbiased plan and precise definition of categories, the units of measurement must be specified clearly, so that the results can be duplicated.

The unit of analysis. One promising approach is to study themes that are manifest in a cluster of words, and therefore, the theme has been selected as the unit of analysis and the entire document as the context of unit. In its most simple form, a theme is a statement about a subject matter; it takes the form in which issues are usually discussed. The method was to select all major themes from each document: this brought a total number of 301 themes (see Appendix B). Classification of these themes was done on four major categories on the instrument of analysis described above. The categories developed for the present research reflect an attempt to reach a "balance between reliability of the procedures on the one hand and the meaningfulness of the categories on the other."<sup>1</sup>

Terms of the analysis. The term of analytical measure is that of attention, which is the result of selection of phenomena to be attended. A measure of attention is an indication of the presence and frequency of subject elements in a message system:

The significance of attention as an aspect of the process of message-production and image-formation is that it stems from, and, in turn cultivates, assumptions about existence; it provides common conceptions about what "is".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bernard Berelson, "Content Analysis," Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Gardner Lindzey. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1954, p.514

<sup>2</sup> George Gerbner, "Toward 'Cultural Indicators': The Analysis of Mass Mediated Public Message Systems." Audio Visual Communication Review Vol.17, No.2, Summer 1969, p.145



The common awareness of public issues forms a basis for social interaction. In other words, the assumption is that leaders want to seek contact with masses, and assuming that their behavior is motivated by this, the frequencies are interpreted with which a leader chooses to talk about or make references to a phenomenon as a measure of attention.

The definition is based on the rationale that before a movement takes national dimension the leader must begin with attention appeals to particular values in order to make contact with a mass public. In other words, before leaders can expect the masses to understand the "whole message" or its "purpose" they have to secure their attention. The means of securing attention in a national struggle are not technical ones, but are instead values from the ideology whose dissemination is the leader's main concern. These means for gaining attention have been characterized as goal values--that is, demands of the particular community.<sup>3</sup> The function of these ideological appeals is to accomplish psychological softening or hardening of the mass public before the real purpose of the message is achieved. These fundamental values are closely related to beliefs and sentiments people admire in their community.

The measure of attention, therefore, indicates the presence and frequency of relatively simple concepts and symbols

<sup>3</sup>Karin Doving, Road of Propaganda. Philosophical Library, New York: 1959, pp.25-81

in a leader's messages making public appeals for identification and demands. At this stage, there is less concern for factual discussion of complex or controversial issues as the focus is on appeal to general community values so as to achieve national support. The attention measure therefore conceals many conflicting interests which may come to the fore after the movement has developed to a later stage.

### Reliability

Scientific research should be replicable. Replicability means that any other coder reaching the same findings if the procedure is repeated, using different coders. One method of testing replicability in message analysis research is by giving a reliability test to independent coders, and then calculating agreement coefficients. If one reaches a high degree of intercoder agreements, reliability of the procedure is established. Problems may arise for the simple reason that on the one hand training coders is necessary for significant reliability, on the other hand such training may influence them to the idiosyncrasies of the research design. According to Krippendorff,

If the observers are independent, then such measures assess the extent to which the recording instructions are uniformly interpreted and operationalized across individuals. But since observers can agree on describing an event in wrong terms -- for example, because of implicit experiences that are not shared

with the research designer - replicability cannot assess whether an instruction is applied as intended.<sup>4</sup>

It seems difficult to achieve perfect agreement above the .9 level -- and reliability of research would be doubtful if the level is very low.

Briefly, this is how the investigator approached the problem at hand:

To summarize the content briefly and reliably it was first noted and counted in the margin every theme expressed by the two leaders in all the documents during 1942-44. Then a set of categories was developed to represent all themes. Thus a preliminary qualitative analysis provided the basis for the set of categories to be explored in a more rigorous kind of quantitative message analysis. The purpose of any quantitative research, however, is to derive meaningful inferences which are of a qualitative nature. Alexander George points out that the relationship between the two is a circular one, each providing new insights for the ongoing analysis.<sup>5</sup>

The instrument of analysis used in this study has four major categories which are further subdivided, as shown above.

<sup>4</sup>K. Krippendorff, "Reliability in Message Analysis" (The Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, January 1973) p.16 (Mimeographed.)

<sup>5</sup>Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis. New York: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1959, passim

The attempt is to describe with a maximum of objectivity and at the same time with a maximum of relevance to the underlying communication dynamics as revealed in Gandhi-Mao statements of this period. The set of categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.

An experiment preliminary to the reliability testing was conducted in September, 1976, under the guidance of Michael F. Eleey, member of the staff at the Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania. Agreement between the two coders (the investigator and Valerie Jaworski, also a member of the staff of Annenberg School) for the experiment test was .93 on Gandhi's themes and .93 on Mao's themes.

After the preliminary experiment a final set of categories was developed for the classification of themes. The reliability test was conducted under controlled conditions, supervised by Professor George Gerbner, of the Annenberg School of Communications. To increase reliability of classification an attempt was made to specify as clearly as possible the characteristics of statements that were to be placed in a given category. The reliability of the analysis was achieved by measuring agreement among the investigator and Valerie Jaworski using Scott inter-observer agreement coefficient for nominal scales.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>W.H. Scott, "Reliability of Content Analysis: The Case of Nominal Scale Coding." Public Opinion Quarterly, 19 (1955) pp.321-325

We accept variables as reliable if  $r$  is .7 or larger. The agreement coefficient achieved in this study was .8227 and therefore, a high degree of reliability was demonstrated. (For further details see appendix C)

### Findings

As pointed out above, the many themes appearing in the written documents of this period have been classified into four broad categories dealing with conditions of crisis, desirable goal values, leadership style, and channels of communication. This general classification is the basis of Table 2, "Frequency of Themes," (page 84) which summarises the findings and gives percentages referring to proportions of frequency, as well as the rank order of major themes indicated by the frequency. The Tables 3-6 present the findings of the most frequent themes by subcategories and rank order.

As shown in Table 2, leadership style was the most frequent theme for both Gandhi and Mao. It accounted for 46% of the total themes used by the two leaders. By 1942-44, a relatively late date in the two liberation movements, the conditions of crisis and the goal values were probably so well known and appreciated that over-emphasis upon them would not contribute enough to the process of liberation. On the other hand, there was also a difference with respect to channels of communication. For Mao, this subject ranked second in

TABLE 2

## Frequency of Themes

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Gandhi</u>			<u>Mao</u>			<u>Total</u>	
	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	Rank	No.	%
1. Conditions of crisis	31	18.5	3	26	19.9	3	57	19.0
2. Goal values	47	28.1	2	15	11.2	4	62	20.6
3. Leadership style	74	44.3	1	65	48.8	1	139	46.3
4. Channels of communication	16	8.9	4	27	20.3	2	43	14.0
Total	168	100		133	100		301	100

frequency, as contrasted with last place for Gandhi. This might perhaps be explained by the fact that Mao had less access to the established channels of communication than did Gandhi and therefore had to give this subject much more attention.

A more detailed analysis of these themes, however, requires looking at each major category separately.

#### Conditions of crisis

In Chinese the word "crisis" is written with two characters, one signifying "danger," the other "opportunity." In the history of liberation movements this two-sided aspect of crisis is obvious. History proves that not all revolutionary crises end in freedom from oppression; in fact they may lead to greater tyranny of the governing class or they may merely replace one despotism by another. On the other hand, crises may give the best opportunities to leaders to introduce radical changes. A national crisis therefore helps leaders to prepare the grounds for mass movements by discrediting prevailing creeds and institutions and detaching from them the allegiance of the people and making it possible to take action against powerful groups which are normally well entrenched and invulnerable.

Gerbner, in his study of cultural indicators, points

out that "most critical public consequence of mass communications are in defining and ordering issues."<sup>7</sup> This study indicates that Gandhi and Mao defined the crisis as a struggle for survival; they linked the struggle for independence to the improvement of the condition of the common man and woman. Gandhi's most potent slogan was "Do or Die", which freed the people from fear of death itself. People became susceptible to the appeals of social movements only after Gandhi and Mao succeeded in making them not only aware of the crisis but also to make them believe that change was possible. For instance, in India and China people had to be made aware of pervasive social injustice and exploitation and they had to be convinced that the mighty power of the British and the Kuomintang could be challenged and overthrown.

The articulation of nationalistic themes by Gandhi and Mao evidently strengthened preexisting desires for political independence and at the same time it inspired quite a new set of political expectations among the people of India and China. The imposition of alien authority generated tremendous traditional resistance that Gandhi and Mao subsequently transformed into nationalist rebellion. Natural disasters, such as famine

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<sup>7</sup>George Gerbner, "Toward 'Cultural Indicators': The Analysis of Mass Mediated Public Message Systems," AV, vol.17, No.2, Summer, 1969 pp.85-108



and wars, inflicted abnormal hardships on the people making them susceptible to their messages of crisis.

If we look at Table 3, "Themes on Conditions of Crisis" (p. 88) we will find that imperialism is seen as one of the major conditions leading to a political crisis. Both Gandhi and Mao give this equal amounts of attention, and here we may only infer their concern by their frequent reference to it. The themes, however, indicate that they both do not talk of imperialism in the same way. This will become clear as the analysis proceeds.

Gandhi's conception of imperialism was really the logical extension of a line of thinking that had begun in 1920's:

I said to myself, there is no State run by Nero or Mussolini which has not good points about it, but we have to reject the whole, once we decide to non-cooperate with the system. "There are in our country grand public roads, and palatial educational institutions," I said to myself, "but they are part of a system which crushes the nation. I should not have anything to do with them. They are like the fabled snake with a brilliant jewel on its head, but which has fangs full of poison". So, I came to the conclusion that British rule in India had crushed the spirit of the nation and stunted its growth, and so I decided to deny myself all the privileges, services, courts, titles. The policy would vary with different countries but sacrifice and self-denial are the essential points.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Young India, June, 1921

TABLE 3

## Themes on Conditions of Crisis

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Gandhi</u>		Rank	<u>Mao</u>		Rank	<u>Total</u>	
	No.	%		No.	%			%
<b>1. Political</b>								
(a) imperialism	7	22.6	2	6	23	1	13	22.8
(b) fascism	-	-	-	2	7.8	3	2	3.5
(c) feudalism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(d) capitalism	-	-	-	2	7.8	3	2	3.5
(e) communism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(f) socialism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>2. Social</b>								
(a) civil war	-	-	-	2	7.8	3	2	3.5
(b) violence	12	38.7	1	1	3.8	4	13	22.8
(c) illegality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(d) immorality	4	12.9	3	-	-	-	4	7.0
(e) incompetence	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(f) illiteracy	-	-	-	1	3.8	4	1	1.7
(g) poverty	2	6.5	5	1	3.8	4	3	5.2
(h) exploitation	3	9.6	4	-	-	-	3	5.2
(i) passivity	1	3.2	6	-	-	-	1	1.7
(j) false propa- ganda	2	6.5	5	2	7.8	3	4	7.0
<b>3. Party</b>								
(a) bureaucracy	-	-	-	4	15.3	2	4	7.0
(b) intellectua- lism	-	-	-	1	3.8	4	1	1.7
(c) sectarianism	-	-	-	2	7.8	3	2	3.5
(d) subjectivism	-	-	-	1	3.8	4	1	1.7
(e) warlordism	-	-	-	1	3.8	4	1	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>26</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>57</b>	<b>100</b>

In the 1930's Gandhi concluded:

The British people must realize that the Empire is to come to an end. This they will not realize unless we in India have generated power within to enforce our will.<sup>9</sup>

By 1940's Gandhi declared imperialism to be so "satanic" that it threatened to explode in hatred toward the British:

Imperialism is the greatest of evils

-Document 22, Theme 62

We must fight imperialism and not the British people

-Document 41, Theme 115

Imperialism is the enemy facing our country

-Document 1, Theme 3

Furthermore, Gandhi made imperialism a moral issue:

I have said more than once in these columns that the Nazi power had risen as a nemesis to punish Britain for her sins of exploitation and enslavement of the Asiatic and African races.

-Document 17

Britain is morally indefensible, while she rules India

-Document 18, Theme 50

It is not right for any nation to hold another in bondage. India has ancient culture, ancient civilization, such variety and richness of languages. Britain should be ashamed of holding these people as slaves.

-Document 25

Britain cannot win the war as long as she holds India in slavery.

-Document 24

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<sup>9</sup>Young India, April, 1930

With this subversive image of the opponent Gandhi sought to justify cutting off important sources of the British power by withdrawing cooperation and obedience of the Indian people:

A Government is an instrument of service only in so far as it is based upon the will and consent of the people. It is an instrument of oppression where it enforces submission at the point of the bayonet. Oppression therefore ceases when people cease to fear the bayonet.<sup>10</sup>

Gandhi's satyagraha (truth force) was therefore a well-conceived communication technique to fight against political and economic domination and injustice.

Mao's conception of imperialism is somewhat different. He explicitly identifies imperialism as the chief instigator of revolutionary movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries. A chief characteristic of the imperialist penetration of China, Mao maintains, was "the collusion of imperialism with the feudal forces to arrest the development of Chinese capitalism."<sup>11</sup> The image of the opponent thus includes not only the imperialist forces, but also the feudal elements.

Japanese imperialism is daily menacing China

-Document 15, Theme 113

The Kuomintang is collaborating with the Japanese Imperialists

-Document 9, Theme 61

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<sup>10</sup>Young India, October, 1919

<sup>11</sup>"The Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist Party," December 1939. Selected Works, II, pp.306-13

Mao's political themes, therefore, call attention to the consequences of imperialism:

Under the twofold oppression of imperialism and feudalism, and especially as a result of the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people, and particularly the peasants, have become more and more impoverished and have even been pauperized in large numbers, living in hunger and cold and without any political rights. The poverty and lack of freedom among the Chinese people are on a scale seldom found elsewhere.<sup>12</sup>

The power of imperialism is however seen as transient which will soon collapse, although, from the short-term perspective it is still powerful and in possession of the mechanical means of mass destruction:

Japanese imperialism is mustering up all its strength for a dying kick

-Document 16, Theme 120

Therefore, Mao argues, war is an inescapable consequence of the imperialist policy:

War is our first priority in our struggle

-Document 16, Theme 121

Liberation wars are differentiated into those waged against imperialism (national liberation wars) and those waged against domestic reaction (civil or class liberation struggle). The basic distinction between a people's war and a counter-revolution war, says Mao, is that the former is rooted in, and waged by, the broad masses of the people. The decisive role

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid

of the people in determining the character and outcome of war, Mao believes, stands in direct contrast to the false imperialist theory that "weapons decide everything." Mao's faith in the ultimate victory of the national liberation movement is therefore based on the power of the masses.

We will overcome obstacles and crush the Japanese imperialists

-Document 12, Theme 82

We shall finally defeat the enemy

-Document 4, Theme 33

The world will enter a great age of liberation

-Document 11, Theme 75

The dawn of victory is in sight

-Document 6, Theme 41

Imperialism is doomed, according to Mao, because it is decadent and retrogressive. Its fundamental weakness is that it is separated from its "people." The "logic" of imperialism, that is, aggression, oppression, and exploitation, is incompatible with that of the masses. It is "riddled with insuperable contradictions"; it is "sitting on a volcano" and it is its own "gravedigger."

Mao, therefore, developed an adapted version of Marxist-Leninist theory to apply to the "colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal" China and developed broad forms of struggle to fight his opponent.

Table 3, "Themes on Conditions of Crisis", (p.88) also shows that for Gandhi another crisis that looms large is violence embedded in the prevalent social conditions due to foreign control, while 35% of Mao's themes on conditions of crisis refer to the crisis within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This is not unexpected as we know that Mao's Rectification movement aimed to create an environment of struggle in which fundamental values and perceptions could be re-examined and challenged by revolutionary ideals. Mao insisted that the tendency of some Party members to look down or ignore non-Party elements was a form of "sectarianism" which led to isolation of the Communists from the total Chinese population.<sup>13</sup> His focus therefore, was on organizational and educational methods to overcome these communication barriers between leaders and masses. The serious barriers, according to Mao, were bureaucracy, intellectualism, warlordism, and sectarianism:

Bureaucracy leads to communication barriers with the masses

-Document 12, Theme 89

Warlordism is the result of isolation from masses

-Document 12, Theme 90

Formalism has no content

-Document 2, Theme 16

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<sup>13</sup>"Rectify the Party's Style in Work", Selected Works, IV, pp.42-43

Mao's barbs against Party formalism were directed primarily against his Moscow-trained rivals in the Russians Returned Student group whose power was curbed by the Sixth Plenum. The 1942 Rectification movement, therefore, focused on intensive education, small-group study, criticism and self-criticism to bring the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party closer to the Chinese population. The movement represented a final stage in Mao's consolidation of leadership.

Gandhi's frequent reference to violence can be explained by the fact that as the government became more repressive the people responded with increasing militancy. What is interesting, however, is that despite Gandhi's insistence on non-violence, there is a change in his attitude toward the people resorting to violence.

Violence appalled Gandhi to the extent that whenever it occurred in the 1920's or even 30's he was "actually and literally praying for a disastrous defeat (of the liberation movement)." In other words, nonviolence above everything else-- even above the independence of India, so it seemed. He sought to harness the potential force of the masses into peaceful channels, "I know that the only thing that the Government dreads is this huge majority I seem to command. They little know that I dread it even more than they." In 1934, while explaining his view of the reasons for the failure of nonviolent movements,



Gandhi stated quite explicitly an important element of communication theory:

I feel that the masses have not yet received the message of satyagraha owing to its adulteration in the process of transmission. It has become clear to me that spiritual instruments suffer in their potency when their use is taught through non-spiritual media...The indifferent civil resistance of many...has not touched the hearts of the rulers.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, in his effort to touch the heart of the rulers Gandhi went to the extent of transforming mass civil disobedience to individual civil disobedience in 1940:

Satyagraha needs to be confined to one qualified person at a time. In the present circumstances only one, and that myself, should for the time being bear the responsibility of civil disobedience.<sup>15</sup>

In other words, it was a symbolical battle, calling the attention and sympathy of the whole nation, and permitting participation in spirit of millions upon millions, resulting in resurgence of moral strength. This would have dissipated in a series of sporadic actions (inviting ruthless repression in helpless people) all over the country if people had taken to the streets. It is not the number that counts but the quality, Gandhi maintained, "more so when the forces of violence are uppermost."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Harijan, June, 1934

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., September, 1940

<sup>16</sup> Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase. 2 vol. Ahmedabad: Navjivan, 1958, p.107

On August 8, 1942, however, while launching the 'Quit India' movement Gandhi crystalized the prevailing mood of the people in these words, "there was a desperateness in it, an emotional urge which gave second place to logic and reason or a calm consideration of the consequences of action." And he went on to state in a mood of near frenzy,

I want freedom immediately this very night, before dawn, if it can be had. Freedom cannot now wait for the achievement of communal unity....Fraud and untruth today are stalking the world. I cannot be a helpless witness to such a situation. I have travelled all over India as perhaps nobody in the present age has. The voiceless millions of the land saw in me their friend and representative, and I identified myself with them to an extent it was possible for a human being to do. I saw trust in their eyes, which I now want to turn to good account in fighting this empire upheld on untruth and violence. However gigantic the preparations that the empire has made we must get out of its clutches...Here is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it. The mantra is: 'Do or Die' We shall either see free India or die in the attempt; we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery....

Gandhi's perception of conditions of crisis in 1942-44 was serious enough to include the possibility of violence. He squarely held the British responsible for any eruption of violence in the country:

Britain practices the most organized and successful violence in India the world has seen

-Document 31, Theme 87

The Government repression is breeding discontent

-Document 44, Theme 122

The Government encourages violence when the people want to proceed peacefully

-Document 49, Theme 136

Gandhi was responding to a very wide mass-awakening all over the country, the extent and intensity of which was a revelation, both to the Indian leaders and to the government.

### Goal values

Every society has its own value system. The communication system of a given society, therefore, is part of its total culture and can be understood in that context. Culture provides people with symbols, myths, values and information, and forms their general attitudes towards what is desirable or undesirable.

In a struggle of national dimensions, leaders set standards of high morality to meet the public need of a picture of its own ideal self. Lasswell defines value as "the word we use to indicate that there are some impulses with which we associate our ego symbol at a given time."<sup>17</sup> The leader must also simplify communication by the use of fundamental values in times of great stress when a nation is fighting for liberation and needs the support of the whole population.

The daily experience both for the leader himself and for

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<sup>17</sup>H. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1950

his people is the struggle for existence; not only a struggle for material well-being but for human dignity and spiritual well-being as well. These two goals comprehend, in fact, all other values demanded. Our study shows that Gandhi and Mao repeat this theme in various forms when referring to nationalism, political power, material well-being or morality. Many of the themes appear in slogan form: let us unite for action, liberation will end poverty. The slogan itself is not literally mentioned in the text, but it is involved in the message by synonymous references, repeated over and over again in varying ways, identical in function, and dominant because of its frequent appearance. In countries, like India and China, largely populated by illiterate masses it is far easier to capture, communicate, and popularize the essence of a struggle in a slogan than to try to explain its intricacies in a jargon style. The masses are more receptive to language they easily understand and their sense of commitment is more easily touched. The use of slogans is also consistent with traditional Indian and Chinese practice, wherein the ancient rulers communicated their orders in similar, easily understandable terms. A slogan has been defined as follows:

Comprehension of a current public demand referring to the community value. This characterization of a slogan explains its great suggestive effect on the public mind, since the demand is the fundamental condition for establishing the community mind.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup>Karin Doving, Road of Propaganda. Philosophical Library, New York: 1959, p.30

The differences in social and linguistic background and in circumstance due to the wide geographical dispersion of India and China were in fact obstacles that made the appeals to the national goal values still more necessary for attention to the actual message. It is not possible to appeal to a mass audience without starting with the well-known values of the people and then link them to what the leader wants them to do. Gandhi and Mao sought to narrow down conflicting interests within groups, classes and castes by focusing on common values. They used the facts of poverty and want as a means of identification for common action. The demand for freedom from poverty was transformed to demand for national freedom. Whether independence might relieve the poverty in the country was still an unsolved problem, since a skillful communicator leaves the verification of his message to public experience.

As shown by Table 4, "Themes on Goal Values," (page 101) Gandhi gave most frequent attention to morality and Mao most frequent attention to nationalism. Another difference is that, as one might expect, Mao gave much more attention to material well-being than did Gandhi. Nonetheless, each of these four themes on goal values were highly important.

Nationalism. Here are some of the nationalistic themes common to both Gandhi and Mao:

TABLE 4

## Themes on Goal Values

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Gandhi</u>		<u>Rank</u>	<u>Mao</u>		<u>Rank</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	No.	%		No.	%		No.	%
1. Nationalism	11	23.4	2	7	47.8	1	18	29.1
2. Power	9	18.2	4	2	12.2	3	11	17.7
3. Material well-being	10	21.2	3	5	32.2	2	15	24.1
4. Morality	17	37.2	1	1	7.8	4	18	29.1
Total	47	100		15	100		62	100

We must be united to achieve independence

-Gandhi, Document 20, Theme 58

National unity will end communal disharmony

-Gandhi, Document 39, Theme 111

All patriotic forces must unite and save China

-Mao, Document 11, Theme 78

The first principle of the united front is  
disciplined unity

-Mao, Document 16, Theme 127

The various sectors of the Indian and Chinese population which supported the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party had their own special interests, peculiar grievances, differing objectives, and unique ideologies. But so long as India and China remained dependent, the various interests could submerge their differences because the winning of independence was the critical factor in solving all other problems. This may explain the speedy diffusion of nationalism and receptivity of the elite to the elaborated symbols of identification with the common people of India and China. For instance, Gandhi and Mao insisted on "language of the masses" or service as modes of behavior.

Briefly, Gandhi and Mao stressed the importance of maintaining a dialectical relationship between unity and social and economic change. The primary focus of their activity consisted in mobilizing the masses and seeking an alliance with the

intellectual elite and other groups as a move to oust foreign domination. They both succeeded in solving the triple problem of national identity, independence, and legitimacy, but while Gandhi failed to achieve a decisive revolutionary break from an imperialist past, Mao succeeded in bringing about a real socio-economic revolution.

This was the major difference between Gandhi's and Mao's nationalism. The nationalist movement in India was essentially a bourgeois movement and Gandhi was the representative functioning inevitably within the nationalist ideology. Mao's nationalist movement was operating within the Marxist-Leninist ideology which sought to effect a total revolution by overthrowing domestic landlords, warlords, and native capitalists.

Power. Here is a sample of their themes:

Power must belong to the people

-Gandhi, Document 41, Theme 117

We must have political power to decide our own future

-Gandhi, Document 4, Theme 15

Power means to unite the Party, the government and the army with the people

-Mao, Document 10, Theme 70

Patriotic forces must work toward democracy and freedom

-Mao, Document 11, Theme 79



Gandhi's concept of power is peculiarly his own and basically very different from that of Mao's. Apart from the fact that at different times Gandhi narrowed and broadened his political approach, there was also an ambivalence in regard to political power. Nehru remarked:

In spite of the closest association with him (Gandhi) for many years, I am not clear in my own mind about his objectives. I doubt if he is clear himself. One step is enough for me, he says; and he does not try to peep into (the) future or to have a clearly conceived end before him.<sup>19</sup>

This was because Gandhi always looked at politics more from the standpoint of the rebel than of the ruler, of freedom than of authority, of the individual than of the State.<sup>20</sup> He believed that true power resides in the people and not in governments or legislatures,<sup>21</sup> and he hoped that political power, in the ordinary sense, would not enter Indian villages. "Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the fear of punishment and the other by acts of love".<sup>22</sup> Gandhi was in fact really trying to challenge the very notion of power as practiced over the lives of the people through government and legislatures. He was anxious to increase the participation of the people in the government and cut down the increasing power of bureaucracy.

<sup>19</sup>J. Nehru, Nehru on Gandhi. J. Day Co., New York: 1941, p.32

<sup>20</sup>Raghavan Iyer, op. cit. p.53

<sup>21</sup>D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, op. cit., vol. 6, p.340

<sup>22</sup>Young India, January, 1925

Material well-being. Here are some of the themes on material well-being common to both Gandhi and Mao:

Only national government can relieve misery of poverty

-Gandhi, Document 46, Theme 128

Economic well-being is possible only with political freedom

-Gandhi, Document 17, Theme 47

After victory people will be better off economically

-Mao, Document 7, Theme 48

Collective mutual-aid organizations will bring economic well-being

-Mao, Document 12, Theme 87

Both perceived impoverishment of their countries as the result of systematic "exploitation." Once the shackles of imperialism were removed, Gandhi and Mao believed, rapid social and economic development would ensue. However, a major difference between Gandhi and Mao emerges in their means of achieving this goal. Gandhi calls his approach to economic equality "nonviolent socialism"<sup>23</sup> which means cooperative or social approach in contrast to individualism. For Mao, the word socialism means a system of nationalized ownership of the means of production. To put it differently, Gandhi demanded moral revolution to accomplish the material well-being of the people; Mao sought radical structural change to achieve social revolution. Gandhi was concerned with means of attaining egalitarianism, Mao with the goal

<sup>23</sup>M.K. Gandhi, Towards Non-Violent Socialism, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad: 1951 (edited by Bharatan Kumarappa), p.9

itself.

Briefly then, national liberation is a goal value which provides material well being for the poverty-stricken people. And political power is necessary to ensure security of the nation and provide protection from imperialism and exploitation.

Morality. Both, Gandhi and Mao, sought to apply moral values in the difficult domain of political and social action. They maintained that a national liberation movement is a just struggle against exploitation. A just cause provides in itself a moral superiority. A people with justice on their side will arouse world public opinion in support of their cause. Here is a sample from their themes on morality:

Our demand is based on justice

-Gandhi, Document 32, Theme 89

Justice demands that Britain free India

-Gandhi, Document 38, Theme 106

We have been waging a just war against the imperialist Japanese for more than five years

-Mao, Document 6, Theme 39

We consider our war entirely just

-Mao, Document 9, Theme 64

Gandhi, however, focused on harmony and Mao on conflict as the integral part of struggle. Gandhi defined morality as promoting harmony in all human relationships through individual effort. Mao sought to define it in terms of promoting prole-

tarian unity through submerging of the individual in the collectivity of the working masses. Nonetheless, both their thinking was governed by a total value judgement. For Gandhi, the enemy is the greed of materialism, the judge is the individual who frees himself from selfishness, and the executioner is the moral law. For Mao, the enemy is the capitalist system, history the judge and its executioner the masses. Therefore with Mao national struggle inevitably involves class conflict; with Gandhi it is any situation of human conflict, even a conflict within the individual in making the right choice.

Briefly, the morality for both Gandhi and Mao lay in the meeting of needs and expectations of the masses. But whereas Mao accepted Marxist-Leninist theory, which defined the content of those needs and indicated long-range approaches to their satisfaction, Gandhi was content in developing a step-by-step approach which could meet the needs of the people as and when the situation rose.

### Leadership style

In view of the fact that themes of leadership style received most attention, as already pointed out (see Table 2, "Frequency of Themes"), one may very well ask, "Why do leaders talk of leadership style?"

It is important to remember that in these documents, Gandhi and Mao are not addressing the masses; their audience is the party cadre, literate participants, activists and sympathizers. As already indicated, Gandhi's messages appear mostly in Young India and Harijan, the two papers that he edited, and in his many interviews by the press and in his correspondence to the government and his friends. Mao's messages are addressed to party cadres through party papers and party functions. It is plausible to conclude, therefore, that Gandhi and Mao aimed at training the party members to be better communicators, and at developing leaders by broadening their perspectives on national crisis and goals; above all, by personal example of their own lives.

Gandhi and Mao groomed a disciplined group of cadres and built a hierarchy—a few score of leaders and thousands (not hundreds of thousands) of lesser party activists. For training the party member and cadre to become better communicators, both begin with the individual, and, thus conceived, provided a comprehensive theory of learning to ensure the thorough remolding of each individual. Mao has said that "as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed."<sup>24</sup> Gandhi has said, "I have an undying faith in the responsiveness of human nature."

-Document 35, Theme 97

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<sup>24</sup>"The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," Sept., 16, 1949, Selected Works, IV, p.454

In other words, man or woman is not an abstract unit but living persons with concrete problems.

The key to the analysis of the person, in both Gandhi's and Mao's terminology is the "character." The decisive element entering into character is the quality which permits the individual to accept his or her role in a society moving toward egalitarianism: "humanitarianism" for Gandhi and "proletarian collectivism" for Mao, and which permits the person to become fully identified with the people: "lowliest of the low" for Gandhi and "working class" for Mao. From this point of view, the character or nature of the individual is malleable and changeable, and the purpose of leadership training and education is to heighten a sense of service and moral responsibility. A few examples will illustrate this point:

Discipline and dedication is necessary to practice civil disobedience

-Gandhi, Document 51, Theme 143

Truthfulness must be followed in every action of our life.

-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 166

New education is necessary to learn how to serve the people

-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 165

Discipline and devotion is the criteria for leaders

-Mao, Document 8, Theme 53

Times of difficulty call for dedication

-Mao, Document 14, Theme 106

Personal example and deed makes people  
believe in workers

-Document 16, Theme 133

A cursory glance at Table 5, "Themes on Leadership Style," (page 111) shows that non-violence received the most attention from Gandhi, as one might expect, and confidence the most attention from Mao. A more careful examination of the entire table, however, shows, an underlying similarity -- since Gandhi's emphasis on non-violence was often a form of communicating confidence. Moreover, both Gandhi and Mao gave special attention to the themes of serving the people, sacrifice and discipline, personal example, and self-reliance.

Both aimed to reduce leadership to practical precepts and steps which may be followed and which may be employed to communicate their policies. The elements of Marxist-Leninist approach were later briefly elaborated by Mao in On Practice and On Contradiction, and Gandhi in My Experiments with Truth. For both, men's knowledge develops step by step through struggle and discipline from a lower to a higher level, that is from the superficial to the profound, and from the one-sided to the many-sided. Gandhi's oft-proclaimed statement that he was the humblest seeker after truth had the same meaning as Mao's implicit belief that he was truly seeking the correct interpretation of Marxism to the unique Chinese situation.

TABLE 5

## Themes on Leadership Style

Themes	Gandhi			Mao			Total		
	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	Rank	No.	%	
1. Trust the masses ..	2	2.7	8	9	13.8	2	11	7.9	
2. Trust the elites ..	8	10.8	4	-	-	-	8	5.7	
3. Personal example ..	2	2.7	8	4	8.1	4	6	4.3	
4. Combine theory with practice	-	-	-	8	12.3	3	8	5.7	
5. Toleration ..	-	-	-	2	3.0	6	2	1.4	
6. Self reliance & fearlessness	4	9.4	6	2	3.0	6	6	4.3	
7. Sacrifice & discipline ..	12	16.2	2	8	12.3	3	20	14.3	
8. Serve the people ..	9	12.1	3	9	13.8	2	18	12.9	
9. Confidence ..	9	12.1	3	17	28.1	1	26	18.7	
10. Uniqueness ..	5	8.7	5	3	4.8	5	8	5.7	
11. Truthfulness	2	2.7	8	2	3.0	6	4	2.8	
12. Nonviolence ..	13	17.9	1	-	-	-	13	9.3	
13. Noncooperation	3	4.0	7	-	-	-	3	2.1	
14. Civil disobedience ..	3	4.0	7	-	-	-	3	2.1	
15. War ..	-	-	-	1	1.9	7	1	0.7	
16. Anarchy ..	2	2.7	8	-	-	-	2	1.4	
Total ..	74	100		65	100		139	100	



Hitler remarks in Mein Kampf<sup>25</sup> that the strength of a movement must be judged more by the sacrifices it can demand than by the perquisites it can offer.<sup>26</sup> Merton suggests that social psychologists need to study the deep and far-reaching type of human behavior as symbolized by the effort of Prometheus to serve mankind at whatever cost to himself.<sup>27</sup> Weber maintains that such an action flows from deep conviction of its unquestionable value, irrespective of consequences.<sup>28</sup>

The following is a sample of the themes on sacrifice:

'Do or die' means do your duty

-Gandhi, Document 49, Theme 133

Sacrifice of Congressmen has raised India's status in the eyes of the world

-Gandhi, Document 53, Theme 147

We must make heavy sacrifices in our struggle of deliverance

-Gandhi, Document 21, Theme 61

Struggle necessarily entails sacrifice, and death is common

-Mao, Document 14, Theme 108

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<sup>25</sup> Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941, pp.702-706

<sup>26</sup> J. Kennedy in his Presidential inaugural address in 1961 said, "Do not ask what the country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country."

<sup>27</sup> R.K. Merton, Mass Persuasion, N.Y.: Harpers & Brothers.

<sup>28</sup> Max Weber, Social and Economic Organization. The Free Press, N.Y.: 1947, p.362

It is of great significance to die for the interests of the people

-Mao, Document 12, Theme 103

To die for the sake of the people is to die a worthy death

-Mao, Document 15, Theme 109

The willingness to sacrifice one's life, of course, is the highest form of personal example for others to follow. It is the most powerful means of persuasion which is significantly different from propaganda because of its "higher degree of social interaction between the persuader and the persuadee"<sup>29</sup>

Both Gandhi and Mao point out that it is in the interest of the leaders to set an example of truthfulness and simple living if they wish to carry conviction with the masses:

My deeds will carry conviction against British false propaganda

-Gandhi, Document 38, Theme 107

Influence depends on truthfulness and sincerity

-Gandhi, Document 55, Theme 153

Moral conduct makes people believe in leaders

- Mao, Document 16, Theme 129

Personal integrity determines influence

-Mao, Document 2, Theme 11

We now turn to themes that are more frequent with Gandhi. His concept of trusteeship is a concept which does not show up in

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<sup>29</sup>Karin Dovring, op. cit., p.30

Mao's themes (it is conceivable that Mao may perceive the party as a trustee of the people--we have no way of knowing from the present text). However, only 4% of all Gandhi's themes on leadership style refer to trusteeship. This is somewhat surprising but quite compatible with the general analysis of this period that Gandhi was coming round to the idea that people will have to fight for their rights; that it is not sufficient to work for the people but that leaders must work with them. This is clear from Gandhi's several important interviews that he gave to Louis Fischer in June 1942, in the course of which he drew a picture of his contemplated civil disobedience movement:

In the villages peasants will stop paying taxes...But refusal to pay it will give the peasants courage to think that they are capable of independent action. Their next step will be to seize the land.

-Document 23

Gandhi had earlier explained his concept of trusteeship in these words:

The trusteeship theory is not unilateral, and does not in the least imply superiority of the trustee. It is, as I have shown, a perfectly mutual affair, and each believes that his own interest is best safeguarded by safeguarding the interest of the other.<sup>30</sup>

By focusing attention on the theme of trusteeship Gandhi hoped to raise the social consciousness of the leaders about changes that were necessary. By emphasizing the needs of the poor, he drew attention to the greed of the rich:

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<sup>30</sup>Harijan, June 25, 1938

I visualize a system of trusteeship where there would be no poor

-Document 57, Theme 159

In Mao's writings we find the theme - trust the masses - occurs five times more frequently than Gandhi's. Although both relied implicitly on the strength of the masses, their image of the masses was not identical. Gandhi saw them as a potential force:

They often perceive things with their intuition, which we ourselves fail to see with our intellect. But whilst the masses know what they want, they often do not know how to express their wants and, less often, how to get what they want. Herein comes the use of leadership....<sup>31</sup>

Nonetheless Gandhi strongly believed:

The masses are pillars of strength to build the movement on

-Document 37, Theme 103

Mao's experience of the masses was very different, as a sample of his themes reflect:

Workers and peasants are more knowledgeable than intellectuals

-Document 1, Theme 4

Trust the masses and follow "from the masses, to the masses" principle

-Document 8, Theme 55

The revolutionary years taught Mao to place high value on the motive force of the masses. As far back as the 1920's he was developing techniques by which policy would be tested and integrated with the social sources of revolutionary power in

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<sup>31</sup>Young India, November, 1930

China. His reference to theory and practice in the text aims to unite policy, ideology, and social practice in a continuous process, which is the basic element of the mass line communication:

Link the general with the specific by studying facts

-Document 8, Theme 49

Marxism serves the people in a practical way

-Document 3, Theme 24

The sharpest contrast in handling of leadership style relates to Gandhi's repeated reference to nonviolence and Mao's mention of confidence in his ultimate victory. However, both express confidence in their unique weapons of struggle; Gandhi's eternally spiritual nature of the Indian peasantry gives the same assurance of victory that Mao's inevitable course of class development does.

The method of nonviolence has awakened the masses

-Gandhi, Document 51, Theme 140

For the first time in history, the unique method of nonviolence has been practiced by vast masses

-Gandhi, Document 32, Theme 90

Nonviolence is uniquely suited to India's dumb millions

-Gandhi, Document 24, Theme 69

The method of nonviolence will bring India's freedom

-Gandhi, Document 53, Theme 148

Nonviolence is a unique force for good

-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 167

The Chinese revolution will achieve victory

-Mao, Document 13, Theme 102

We are confident the world situation will change

-Mao, Document 5, Theme 37

We remain powerful in spite of our small organization

-Mao, Document 4, Theme 31

We shall become invincible

-Mao, Document 4, Theme 32

This kind of attention also emphasizes the leader's efforts to appear before his people with strong powers of conviction and to present his enemies or problems as powerless, weak, or insignificant. Even when the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party were at a low ebb and the vulnerability of the party was obvious to most of their associates Gandhi and Mao made statements of confidence using the demands on the future as a part of their identification with strength.

Briefly then, the themes of Gandhi and Mao call attention to those elements in leadership style which are non-elitist and which diminish or even remove the psychological distance between the leaders at the "top" and the people at the "bottom".

### Channels of communication

Despite the fact that India and China were lacking in mass media resources, Gandhi and Mao saw an effective communication system operating in their countries. As Margaret Mead puts it, "the whole mesh of human social life might logically, and perhaps, in other contexts, fruitfully, be treated as a system of human communication."<sup>32</sup>

National liberation movements call for developing leadership skills and multiple channels of communication to provide shared values and response to crisis. The specific channels that Gandhi and Mao call attention to are those that are most relevant for initiating the national struggle, and these could not always be mass media as the two-step model assumes.

Gandhi and Mao were the first national leaders who recognized in their respective countries the role of the masses and mass action in the struggle for national liberation in contrast to earlier leaders who thought of the masses as passive and ignorant. Gandhi and Mao evolved a program of struggle which would mobilize the masses against the established system.

As is evident on Table 6, "Themes on Channels of Communication," (page 119) the most striking similarity

<sup>32</sup>"Some Cultural Approaches to Communication Problems," in Lyman Bryson, ed., The Communication of Ideas. New York: Harper, 1948, p.9

TABLE 6

## Themes on Channels of Communication

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Gandhi</u>		<u>Rank</u>	<u>Mao</u>		<u>Rank</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
1. Personal contact	4	25.0	3	5	18.9	3	9	21.0
2. Party organization	-	-	-	4	14.8	4	4	9.0
3. Mass organization	1	6.8	4	6	22.2	2	7	16.2
4. Arts and literature	-	-	-	4	14.8	4	4	9.3
5. Education	6	37.0	1	7	29.9	1	13	30.2
6. Mass media	5	31.2	2	1	3.7	5	6	14.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>43</b>	<b>100</b>



between Gandhi and Mao is that both gave most attention to the role of education. Each gave significant attention to the role of personal contact. The sharpest contrasts are that Gandhi paid more attention to the mass media (namely, the press) and that Mao deals with the arts and literature, channels not mentioned even once by Gandhi.

Here are some of their statements on education:

It is through new education that we learn to resist selfishness

-Gandhi, Document 58, Theme 168

True education is necessary to learn to live simply

-Gandhi, Document 57, Theme 165

Education of the masses will lead to eradication of inequalities

-Gandhi, Document 37, Theme 104

Education is necessary to arouse the villagers

-Gandhi, Document 2, Theme 7

Education implies learning the Marxist theory

-Mao, Document 8, Theme 58

Education through a united front can fight illiteracy

-Mao, Document 16, Theme 124

Education should be expanded through schools, literacy classes and other means

-Mao, Document 16, Theme 125

Education of party members will strengthen the party

-Mao, Document 13, Theme 96

And themes on personal contact take the following form:

There must be a living bond between the leaders and the masses

-Gandhi, Document 9, Theme 29

Personal contact with the villagers must be established through constructive program

-Gandhi, Document 1, Theme 5

Maintain close personal contact with the masses to avoid making mistakes

-Mao, Document 13, Theme 100

Merge with the people through art and literature

-Mao, Document 3, Theme 18

The sharpest contrast appears in relation to mass media, to which Gandhi refers eight times more than Mao, and in relation to mass organizations, to which Mao refers more than twice in comparison to Gandhi. Table 3 also shows that Gandhi makes no reference to party organization while Mao's frequency on party organization is 15% of all the themes on channels of communication.

It must be remembered that Gandhi's opponent was the British government which took special pride in its liberal tradition, and which believed in granting its colonials the so-called right of free press and assembly. Gandhi used these very values as weapons against the British, so that the struggle for the freedom of the press became an integral part of the liberation movement. The Indian nationalist movement always agitated against the increasing repressive measures of the government to muzzle the nationalist press. Without the press, all-India conferences of

nationalist organizations were difficult to prepare and organize. For instance, it was to Gandhi's Harijan that the Congress and its supporters turned to for directives to conduct their political activities during the great mass movement of 1942-44. With the extraordinary situation arising out of the "Quit India" campaign launched on August 8, 1942, the government adopted a plan of rigid control over publication of Indian news. Gandhi closed down the Harijan in protest against the government's banning of reports on the campaign in the press. Throughout the period Gandhi objected to the censorship, the arrest and detention of working journalists and pre-censorship of messages. And at the same time he constantly reminded the press of its responsibilities to the people in a national struggle:

The Press should discharge its obligations and duties freely and fearlessly and not allow itself to be cowed down or bribed by Government. Let the Press be ready to be closed down rather than allow itself to be misused by the authorities; and then to be prepared to sacrifice their buildings, machinery and big establishment...Let it not sacrifice its self-respect and submit to humiliation.<sup>33</sup>

Press can advance the cause of India's freedom

-Document 52, Theme 145

The newspaper must be resumed to disseminate my views on national matters

-Document 1, Theme 2

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<sup>33</sup>M.K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. The Publications Division, Ministry of Information, The Government of India, Delhi, 1958, p.203

Harijan may be suppressed by the British but my ideas cannot

-Document 34, Theme 94

The press must carry a sustained agitation against violence of the British

-Document 10, Theme 30

Indian press will help win the national cause

-Document 39, Theme 110

Mao faced a different situation. For one thing, he had no recourse to free press or freedom of movement under the Kuomintang regime. According to Mao, "people have no legislative body to make use of, nor legal right to organise the workers to strike"<sup>34</sup> Therefore, Mao had no other choice but to turn to party organization and mass organizations as the main form of communication. He certainly used the press as much as he could as a supplementary instrument in organizing party and non-party organizations. It was the organizational weapon he had to turn to as a way to communicate to the masses:

Launch a broad mass campaign to facilitate struggle against the enemy

-Document 10, Theme 71

A centralised, united Party permits mobilization of the masses

-Document 8, Theme 57

It is through a united Party that we can achieve our goal of liberation

-Document 7, Theme 47

Gandhi, as pointed out earlier, had a unique relationship with

<sup>34</sup>"Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works, II, 1954, p.267

the Congress. Although he dominated the party for nearly thirty years, he was not even a member of the Congress since 1934 when he resigned from the party. Nehru called him "permanent super-president" as no major decision could be made without consulting Gandhi. Furthermore, the Congress Party was a loosely knit organization resembling a platform of national interests rather than a close-knit organization like that of the Chinese Communist Party. This enabled Gandhi to act as an independent agent whenever he felt the Congress Party was not ready to support his actions:

Gandhi was not highly dependent on the party, for he could often establish contact with the broad mass of the people without the intervention of any organization. Because he attached a high importance to symbolic acts, and because newspaper coverage insured that his own symbolic acts would be widely reported....<sup>35</sup>

In other words, Gandhi and Mao made the fullest use of press whenever they could and then they counter-balanced their weaknesses by going all out on organizational channels of communications to mobilize people. They could not communicate with the masses through anything but detailed, intimate organizations of various types, and through symbolic action expressing fully their identification with the masses.

Briefly then, in talking to their immediate followers

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<sup>35</sup> E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. Princeton University Press, 1967, p.217

both Gandhi and Mao - each in his own way - stressed the importance of multiple channels of communication in developing a broader based leadership upon which the success of their movement depended.

### Summary

These themes of Gandhi and Mao help illustrate the essential elements of mass line communication, that is, the non-elitist guiding principle on relations between leaders and followers. The illustrations were limited to the 'Quit India' movement in India and the 'Rectification' movement in China during 1942-44 which directed attention to the critical phases of national struggle. Other periods might have revealed different facets of Gandhi's and Mao's messages. In the analysis of the four sets of themes on conditions of crisis, goal values, leadership style, and channels of communication, the relationship between these themes and the concept of mass line is not directly evident or explicitly stated; nonetheless they are closely related.


What is really focussed on in this content analysis is the style of leadership that may carry forward a broad, popular movement of development with main emphasis on the full participation of the masses. The analysis of Gandhi's and Mao's themes of 1942-44 period suggests that both draw attention to this aspect of their movement. Nonetheless, there were

significant differences as suggested by their allocation of attention to certain themes. In Figure 2, "Unique and Common Themes in Gandhi-Mao Messages: 1942-44", (page 127) one of the obvious differences that have been brought out is that Gandhi focussed on the press while Mao paid greater attention to party and mass organisations.

While the themes on channels of communication deal directly with a vital aspect of communication during the two liberation movements, in the case of the other themes, the connection with communication is indirect and less obvious. The task of Chapter IV is to draw upon all four sets of themes, as well as other historical matter, in an effort to make explicit Gandhi's and Mao's communication theories, which, are implicit throughout their writings.

FIGURE 2

Unique and Common Themes in Gandhi-Mao Messages: 1942-1944





## CHAPTER IV

## COMMUNICATION THEORIES OF MAO AND GANDHI

With all the attention to Gandhi and Mao as leaders of the two largest mass movements of the 20th century, it has rarely been pointed out that to an important extent each of them came to positions of power in their countries because of their remarkable mastery of communication techniques. Their writings have until now never been examined in terms of communication theory and practice. We do not yet know the extent to which Gandhi and Mao were aware of the communication process they were engaged in and in what terms they were thinking of communication strategy or tactics.

In the case of Mao, the "mass line" theory may be treated as a manifestation of his concern with communication; and among China specialists this has been an occasional subject for discussion. On examination, however, it turns out that Gandhi also had much to say or write on communication. While he never took the trouble of pulling all his thoughts on the subject together in a single article or speech, the elements of a Gandhi theory of communication may be put together by a careful investigation of his writings.

This chapter will therefore examine Mao's and Gandhi's writings during the two liberation movements in terms of

communication, with the concept of mass line as the central element. With the historical analysis of the two movements (Chapter II) in which they were involved as evidence from the field of action; and with the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the major themes in their recorded messages during critical phases of the movements (Chapter III), it is now possible to thread one's way through Gandhi's and Mao's writings in search of their ideas on communication between leaders and the masses.

Their most explicit ideas on communication, as expressed during the critical 1942-44 period, have already been set forth in the previous chapter. But as one searches further, one finds a wealth of ideas not only on communication channels but also on other aspects of communication that may often be more fundamental, although less obvious, and that may, in fact, determine how communication channels are selected or used. Many of these relate to leadership styles of communication and the role of leaders in conveying to their followers a sense of commitment to specific goal values that may serve as beacons for escaping conditions of perceived crisis.

In countries like India and China, no effort could have gone beyond abstract intellectual discussion without finding ways of actually talking to the masses. On the other hand, no communication strategy can be divorced from the substance of

what is being communicated; above all, the strategy for organizing mass action. Therefore, in discussing Gandhi and Mao this Chapter begins by restating more formally than in previous chapters the general strategy of each of the two leaders and then proceeds to the communication theories, both explicit and implicit, that were an inherent part of their strategy.

Neither their explicit nor their tacit ideas on communication can be regarded as isolated or ad hoc improvisations. They all seem to hang together -- even though neither Gandhi nor Mao ever deemed it necessary to bring them together in a separate package called "communication theory." One might well imagine that if either of them had been confronted with this interpretation, he might have answered, in words comparable to those used in Moliere's Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme: "Faith, for more than forty years I have been speaking communication theory without knowing it!"<sup>1</sup>

For both Gandhi and Mao, ideological leadership provided the strategic norms that shaped their ideas on communication. In Mao's case, however, the "mass line" doctrine provided the link between general theories on social revolution and specific

<sup>1</sup>For this insight, which may well relate to the writings of other national leaders as well as to Gandhi and Mao, the investigator is indebted to Professor Robert Lewis Shayon of the Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania. In Moliere's famous play: "Faith, for more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it. I am infinitely grateful to you for telling me so."

theories on how leaders can best communicate with the led. Since this doctrine, explicitly set forth by Mao, has many less explicit parallels in the messages of Gandhi, the analysis will start with Mao first and then proceed to Gandhi. In each case, as mentioned earlier, it is necessary to precede the formulation of their communication theories with a brief review of what is generally known concerning their general theoretical positions.

#### Mao: Marxism and the "Mass Line"

Mao, of course, was very explicit about the fact that he was writing and speaking theory, Marxist theory. Of all national leaders in the Marxist tradition, he went the furthest in stressing the unity of theory and practice. Without theory, he repeated again and again, there could be no successful revolution. Without testing theory in the laboratory of social action, and distinguished from the scientific laboratory, this kind of theory could not be valid. With this orientation, he became over the years a major innovator in Marxist theory, accepting received Marxist doctrine up to a certain point but then extending it and changing it in a way that proved disconcerting, to say the very least, for doctrinaire Marxists in other countries.

#### Mao's version of Marxism

Mao's movement was directed toward building a unified

party committed to common ideas and goals. It was Marxist to be sure, but the emphasis was on creative adaptation to the unique problems and need of a socialist revolution in China. Mao and his associates found they could not rely on the Soviet experience; (and in a sense, every successful socialist movement has had to innovate, as in the case of Cuba or Yugoslavia) and therefore, emphasized the Sinification of Marxism, which meant that ideology be studied in the context of Chinese experience. Mao called for "an end to writing eight-legged essays on foreign models."<sup>2</sup> The value of theory to Mao could only be in its application to the Chinese environment.

The purpose here is not to discuss Mao's relations with the Soviet Union or even to attempt a formal comparison between Maoism and Leninism. Although these are related subjects, the focus of this study is on Mao's communication with the illiterate masses, the aim of which was to make Marxism intelligible and meaningful and provide a guide for action. Mao repeatedly stated "Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action".<sup>3</sup>

Mao believed that no political party could possibly lead a liberation movement to victory unless it possessed

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<sup>2</sup>"On the New Stage," translated in Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp.113-114

<sup>3</sup>"On Practice," Selected Works, Vol. 1, p.282

revolutionary theory and a knowledge of history and had a profound grasp of the practical aspects of mass movements. Mao maintained that such a party is that which is based on the Marxist-Leninist theory and style which can lead the working class and the broad masses of the people to victory. The process of applying Marxism-Leninism to the revolutionary situation in China involved modification and adaptation but the fundamental concept of revolution remained intact.

Mao's idea of a liberation movement is based on his theory of "uninterrupted revolution". As early as 1937, he wrote, "We advocate the theory of the continuous development of revolution, of the continuous development of a democratic revolution into a socialist revolution".<sup>4</sup> To put it simply, the theory of uninterrupted revolution maintains that the liberation process continues to unfold from beginning to end. In other words, the movement follows the "general law of history" and passes through a series of identifiable phases. The point is that the various stages of movement (including the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist) can only be divided conceptually; they form the whole of a single process. The principal dynamics of revolutionary development, Mao maintained, consist of a united front, the army, and the Party. These for him, are the three "magic weapons" of the Chinese revolution.

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<sup>4</sup>"Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 278.

To grasp the conditions under which revolutionary struggle is to be conducted at a given time, Mao points out, revolutionary leadership must undertake extensive analyses of class contradiction in society. The purpose of class analysis is to enable revolutionaries to make the necessary, crucial distinction between the "people" and the "enemy" at any given point in time. The interrelationships and interaction of various classes determine the nature and direction of the revolutionary movement.

The terms "people" and "enemy" have historical and developmental connotations, their content changing with the changing phases of the revolutionary movement. In general, "people" is defined as all "progressive" social forces that at any given moment support the proletariat in its quest for power; they form, at that point, the "motive forces" of revolution. The "enemy", by contrast, contains all "reactionary" classes against which the revolution aims; they are, at any given point, the "targets" of revolution.<sup>5</sup>

The revolutionary party brings political enlightenment not only to the proletariat but to the masses of the people as a whole (including the peasantry and "enlightened" segments of the bourgeoisie). The masses are viewed as the "real heroes" and the "makers of history". The revolutionary guides the

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<sup>5</sup>"Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp.13-20

the masses and is the most decisive factor in fanning their revolutionary enthusiasm, without which the party cannot lead the liberation movement to victory.

The central task, said Mao, is to mobilize the masses so as to overthrow imperialism. But mobilizing the masses alone is not sufficient. The Party must also attend to the living conditions of the masses to make them realize that "we represent their interests, that our life and theirs are intimately interwoven".<sup>6</sup>

Mao maintained that the party must operate not only as spokesman of the "majority" of the worker and the peasant masses, but that it must also "educate" the masses and "penetrate" into the workers and peasants and exercise direct political leadership over them:

Do we want to win the support of the masses? Do we want to devote all their efforts to the war front? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe; and work earnestly and sincerely in their interests and solve their problems of salt, rice, sheiter, clothing and childbirth, in short, all their problems. If we do so, the broad masses will certainly give us support and regard the revolution as their very life and their most glorious banner....The masses, the millions upon millions of the masses who sincerely and earnestly support the revolution...are a wall of bronze and iron which no force can ever break, absolutely none. The counter-revolutionary forces can never break us, but we shall break them. By rallying millions

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<sup>6</sup>"Take Care of the Living Conditions of the Masses and attend to the Methods of Work", Selected Works, Vol.1, p.149



upon millions of the masses round the revolutionary government and by expanding the revolutionary war, we shall be able to wipe out any counter-revolution and take over the whole of China.<sup>7</sup>

Marxism-Leninism was therefore to provide China with a consistent ideology of national political power based on a thoroughgoing, reciprocal relationship between leaders and led.

Mao's insistence that Marxism-Leninism be fused with specific historical conditions and given "a definite national form" before it is put into practice led to three fundamental changes in conducting the Chinese liberation movement:

(1) Peasantry-based Party. This was necessitated by Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Communists in 1927 when the latter were driven from the cities and confined to the inland hills. Land-locked and constantly under siege from without, the Communists had no choice but to turn to the peasant for support.<sup>8</sup> In the "Report of an investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Mao said in 1927:

"The erroneous measures taken by the revolutionary authorities concerning the peasant movement must be speedily changed. Only thus can any good be done for the future of the revolution. For the rise of the present peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern

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<sup>7</sup>"Care of Living Conditions of the Masses", Selected Works, vol. 1, p.150

<sup>8</sup>Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Republican China. Vintage Books, New York; 1967, pp.173-174

and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a tornado or tempest, a force so extraordinarily swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to suppress it."<sup>9</sup>

It was from the ranks of the common peasants that Mao built the first Red Army. During the years of struggle in Chingkang-shan and afterward, Mao had openly recognized a common bond between revolutionaries and secret societies and other armed outlaw organizations. He had consistently solicited the support of such groups despite criticisms from the party hierarchy.<sup>10</sup> This reflected in part his identification with the ancient tradition of hero banditry, in part his populist sense of their revolutionary potential. Mao asserted that their character could be changed by intensive political education once they had joined the Red Army. Peasants, soldiers, and even the bourgeoisie could transcend their class background through education and revolutionary process. Democracy in the army, Mao believed, was an "important weapon" for ensuring loyalty to the Communist cause, as it gave the soldiers a sense of "spiritual liberation" that was absent in the Kuomintang armies.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp.21-22

<sup>10</sup> Mark Selden, The Yen-an Way, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p.104

<sup>11</sup> "The struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", Selected Works, Vol.1, p.83

(2) Alliances. In China the urban proletariat class was exceedingly small; Mao put it at a mere two million people as late as 1926.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the proletariat could not lead a liberation movement on its own strength alone; it had to rely on all other classes, forces, and groups that might, for whatever reason, support its cause. The transition to a united front policy was a complex and challenging task for Mao. Throughout 1936, conflicting policy lines coexisted within the Chinese Communist Party. Eventually, under Mao's leadership the party emerged as the most effective spokesman for patriotic sentiment at a time of mounting concern about Japanese incursions in China. This led to a military detente with the warlord and Kuomintang armies which had been directly threatening the rural base areas of the communists; and prompted significant support among middle school and college students, thousands of whom flocked to Yen-an. Communist appeals provided a focus for nationwide pressure to end the Civil War, and paved the way for the Second United Front under Mao's leadership. From this time on, the public pronouncements of the Chinese Communist Party

<sup>12</sup>"Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", Selected Works, Vol.1, pp.13-20

always included emotional and nationalistic appeals for total mobilization against Japan.<sup>13</sup>

(3) Protracted warfare. Mao maintained that since the enemy is superior in power, the war would be protracted, undergoing (from the standpoint of the revolutionaries) three stages of development: "strategic defence," "strategic stalemate," and "strategic counter-offensive." Because the revolutionaries were weak, Mao said, they were bound to lose ground in the initial phases of the conflict. Meanwhile, it was necessary to develop over a vast territory a war of maneuver to harass the enemy and undermine his effectiveness and morale. This required mass political mobilization, a united front of "the whole people", and the development of peasant guerrilla warfare on a national scale. Having attained sufficient strength, the revolutionaries would then launch a counteroffensive to destroy the enemy. The overall strategy was summed up in the following terms:

....we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup>For instance, see "The Ten Great Policies of the Chinese Communist Party for Anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation," in A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Brandt, Conrad, Benjamin Schwartz, and John A. Fairbanks. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952, pp.242-245, and the manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee following the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937, quoted in Mao, Selected Works, II, pp.57-58

<sup>14</sup>"On Protracted War", Selected Works, II, p.180

Furthermore, Mao maintained that there could be no delimitation, no partition between various forms of struggle like military action, political and economic agrarian policies in the Chinese liberation movement. In other words, the aim of the Chinese Communist Party was not only to win a war of liberation against Japan, but also to promote social and political movement on a country-wide scale, and above all, to take power. To keep the geographical sprawl united through ideology and organization, mass struggle on all fronts and in various forms had to be carried out.

Building the Party organization on a mass base was a task fundamental to the national struggle. This was accomplished by fusing the Party and Red Army into a twin synthesis, but with the Party in ideological control. It was through the Red Army, carrying out the policies of the Party, that the agrarian revolution, essential for the support of the masses, could develop. This complex triple relationship of masses-Party-Army is the basis of Mao's forms of struggle.

Mao maintained that the Red Army was not only a military instrument but above all a political form of propaganda, agitation, promoting land reform and peasant struggle, educating the people and leading them to establish their own associations, to take power from the landlords. The Red Army therefore was the best training ground for Party cadres, since armed struggle was the dominant mode of the liberation movement.

Basically, the forms of struggle were broadly divided among four types of organizations. These were the government ("soviets"), the Chinese Communist Party, the army, and the mass organizations. Their struggles were coordinated through formal and informal channels of communication that included joint meetings, mutual campaigns and interlocking leadership.<sup>15</sup>

The mode of struggle had two key elements: one, struggle toward rationalized hierarchy and centralized organization, the other toward reliance on the force generated by an aroused peasantry through land revolution and guerrilla warfare. In 1942, for the first time, economic development and social change in the base areas became the key mode of struggle. The implication of this element of communication is that there is less need for the use of overt party power. In fact, the party controls by leading and the masses "control" by participating, and this is on the assumption that the "vanguard" cannot have interests differing from those of the masses. The approach emphasizes direct, open channels of communication to the lowest levels of information.

#### "Mass Line"

Older forms of Marxism, as developed in other countries, would have broken down through communication failures, leaving

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<sup>15</sup>Mark Seldon, The Yen-an Way. Harvard University Press, 1972, p.140

Mao's group as a powerless sect. Hence, Mao developed not only a relevant ideology but also a mass line communication doctrine. Mao appears to be the first Chinese leader (Gandhi was the first Indian) to develop a mass communication approach based not on authority but on the reciprocal relationship between political leaders and the general Chinese population. He maintained that the leaders should not create artificial and psychological barriers in thought or behavior that would cut them off from the revolutionary "mass base". The concept of the "mass line" therefore seems to be direct response to the traditional weak linkage between leaders and led. In other words, the function of mass line was to avoid "cutting oneself off from the masses".

The aspects of Mao's communication that concern us most are his general ideology of mass participation and his conception of the mass line as a style of communication. Though the formal mass line concept includes other matters, mass line communication is perhaps the most important idea in terms of a national liberation movement, for it determines the relationship between the leader and the led, and it determines how the people will participate in the national struggle.

Mao's ideology and the modes of communication that he used can be comprehended within the framework of a series of questions, all bearing on mass line communication. These include:

- (a) What communication approach will encourage the widest possible mass participation in liberation movement?

- (2) What is the correct style to achieve a synthesis of Party leadership and mass action?
- (3) How should one channel this activity into directions that support national goals?

These questions combine to make the "mass line" a unifying theme in the communication theory of Mao.

In 1938, Mao compared the difference between a style of approach which would gain popular support and one which would turn away such support. He argued that "such things as selfishness and self-interest, inactiveness and negligence in work, corruption, degeneration and vainglory are most contemptible; while the spirit of impartiality, of active and hard work, of self-denial in the interest of the public and of complete absorption in arduous work, commands respect."<sup>16</sup> The most effective style, therefore, to mobilize the masses and create an atmosphere of popular commitment is the mass line reflecting service, responsibility, consultation, and common sacrifice.

Direct contact with masses. The mass line places particular emphasis on the points of direct contact between the masses and leaders in order that supervision and guidance may be simple and meaningful. Such an approach calls for a high degree of alert response to developments within the masses and at the level of actual work.

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<sup>16</sup>"The role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", Selected Works, II, p.247



The leader aims through the mass line not only to "elevate the level of consciousness of the masses" but also his own by imbibing "the opinions and experiences of the masses". Mao formalized the mass line method as a general guide to action in these words:

In all practical work of the Party, correct leadership can only be developed on the principle of "from the masses, to the masses". This means summing up (i.e., co-ordinating and systematising after careful study) the views of the masses (i.e., views scattered and unsystematic), then taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining and popularising them until the masses embrace the ideas as their own, stand up for them and translate them into action by way of correcting and testing their correctness. And this is to be repeated over and over again, so that each time these ideas emerge with greater correctness and become more vital and meaningful.<sup>17</sup>

Stages of "from the masses, to the masses". The process from the masses to the party center and back emphasizes flexibility and participation under general guidance, on the one hand, and supervision and centralized authority (democratic centralism), on the other. This process, however, occurs within a well-conceived flexible framework which has four progressive stages:<sup>18</sup>

(a) Perception: In this first stage, the cadres operate within the worker-peasant masses, studying their "scattered and unsystematic views" and knowledge in order to identify problems,

<sup>17</sup>"On Methods of Leadership", Selected Works, Vol.IV, pp.111-117

<sup>18</sup>John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China. Cornell University Press, New York: 1963, p.72

to coordinate views and knowledge, and to determine areas of strength and weakness for party operation.

(b) Summarization: Then in the second stage, the cadres sum up tested and scattered views and information into reports.

(c) Authorization: In the third stage, the highest committee responsible for the area covered by the reports receives the cadre reports with comments from lower echelons and if necessary issues authoritative directives or instructions.

(d) Implementation: In this stage, these general directives are then sent back through the apparatus to be explained and popularized among the masses "until the masses embrace the ideas as their own, stand up for them and translate them into action by way of testing their correctness".

This process is continuous in which everyone participates, from the leading cadres right down to the common worker and peasant. The general flow of the process emphasizes direct communication and flexibility in making modifications according to actual needs of the situation. The cadre is to be a pupil first, then a teacher, and is not to pretend to be knowledgeable without concrete study. Mao's slogan was "without investigation no right to speak." The mass line stipulates that cadres must adjust to sudden changes by reappraising their own knowledge in the light of the new situation.

The principal obstacles or barriers to mass line communication were seen by Mao to be "tailism", defined as the erroneous practice of blindly following untutored popular demands; "commandism", "isolationism", "bureaucratism", and "warlordism", were forms of practice too far removed from the people. "Commandism" and "bureaucratism", the most serious barriers, are phenomena common to officious, arrogant bureaucrats, while "isolationism" is the failure to enlist the participation of nonparty people, or, as Mao put it in 1938, "to think that only we ourselves are good and everyone else is of no use".<sup>19</sup> "Warlordism" was a serious problem in the People's Liberation Army during the civil war; other critical civil "sins" were "sectarianism", which created problems of unity and solidarity within the party and masses, and "subjectivism", an attitude divorced from objective reality.<sup>20</sup> Mao included the "right" and "left" approach also as barriers to mass line communication. The "right" erred by regarding the liberation movement as an exclusively party-military affair and opposed its "socialization" through Mao's united-front policies; the "left" pushed the "socialization" component to its limits thus alienating some sections of the populace.

In the revolutionary environment of the civil war, the mass line evolved naturally in response to the demands of war-time

<sup>19</sup>"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War". Selected Works, Vol.II, p.247

<sup>20</sup>Mao's earliest ideas on subjectivism are found in "On Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party", Dec., 1929, Selected Works, I, p.112

events. Only after prolonged immersion in these events did Mao abstract the general principles and rationalize an operational code for the mass line method.

It was during the "low ebb" period in the history of the liberation movement in 1927-1930 that Mao developed the "democratic, mass line" in response to the desperate military position of the party and the Red Army. Between 1930 and 1949, communication procedures were detailed, organizations were created, and methods of implementing policy were acquired. During the rectification campaign of 1942-1944, the mass line method became the operational code necessary to gain support of the masses.

The Japanese aggression--particularly after their full-scale 1937 invasion -- made Mao's mass line approach nationally relevant and popular. According to Mao, it integrated "the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie of the whole country".<sup>21</sup>

In maintaining a correct mass line approach, "from the masses, to the masses", it is necessary to establish close contact "not only between the Party and the masses outside the Party (the class and the people), but first of all between the leading bodies of the Party and the masses within the Party (the cadre

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<sup>21</sup>"On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism", Selected Works, I, p.163

and the membership)". The principle of the party's organizational unity is democratic centralism, which may serve as the model for relationships between the party and the Chinese people (mass line).<sup>22</sup>

Organizational communication barriers within the party, such as subjectivism, formalism, doctrinarism and empiricism, etc., challenged correct mass line communication. In the main, Mao linked the removal of communication barriers to the central role of communication in the organizational life of the party. Communication aims to educate the Party and those who have made mistakes. In other words, the main channels of communication are education and party struggle, which are closely linked. There are inherent contradictions within the party owing to the presence of ideological contradictions which must be continuously "synthesized" through struggle and reinforced by a "united, iron discipline".

Despite the appearance of contradiction, however, mistaken democracy ("individualism", "tailism", "adventurism") and excessive centralism ("commandism", "bureaucratism", "warlordism") reflect basic ideological barriers, according to Mao, arising from class contradictions outside the party, rather than contradictions within party organization. In trying to identify the areas of tension and common expectation linking leader and led, Mao saw

<sup>22</sup> John Wilson Lewis, op. cit. p.184

the need for making conflict an integral part of the political process. In his theoretical essay "On Contradiction," Mao states that the resolution of contradiction through mediated forms of social conflict provides the dynamic element to social change, "Materialist dialectics considers external causes to be the condition of change and internal causes to be the basis of change, external causes becoming operative through internal causes".<sup>23</sup>

"Criticism-self-criticism". This was to resolve non-antagonistic contradictions (which can be resolved without violence) and to activate the new relationships. The formula of "unity-criticism-unity" was worked out during the Rectification Movement of 1942.

Small groups for study and production were established by party cadres in which new types of intimate relationships were cultivated to replace the former family ties. The small size of these groups permitted the development of reciprocal obligations in general agreement with traditional schemes. Under party supervision, these obligations were nurtured and then closely examined and criticized in order to bring them into conformity with the requirements of the collectivity and party leadership. At the same time, "criticism-self-criticism" made possible for lower-echelon party members to come forward with their own grievances and suggestions, and thus tended to institutionalize

<sup>23</sup>Selected Works, Vol. II, p.16

conflict in a creative way. There has been a constant tension between the desires of some to see all conflict ended and the impulse in others which makes the release of aggression exceed the limits of ordered institutional political combat.

Briefly, the whole process aims at "socialization", that is, "to increase political consciousness, to explain social policies, to teach specific techniques, or even to raise the cultural level of the public."<sup>24</sup>

By constantly applying criticism and self-criticism to remove barriers from proper ideological practice, ideal communication relationships of the mass line are created in the organizational life of the party. In correcting mistakes, criticism and self-criticism become unifying forces. Party members are thus educated to participate "democratically" in the process of communication so that they can distinguish "right from wrong," eliminate wrong attitudes, and improve leadership's communication style. In other words, methods of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education are used to settle controversial issues. Briefly then, Mao's communication theory aims to integrate through critical inter-personal processes and active participation not only "vertically" the different levels of the political system but more significantly the relations among his closest associates

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<sup>24</sup>Victor Li "Introduction", Allyn and Adele Rickett, Prisoners of Liberation. Anchor Press, Doubleday Garden City, New York: 1973

in the Party's leading bodies.

Self-criticism meant complete confession and symbolized allegiance to Mao's values. The psychological effect of public confession as an organizational device was a major tool of the Rectification Campaign of 1942.

### Summary

The most decisive element of Mao's communication theory is the concept of Marxism-Leninism as applied to the "colonial, semi-colonial, and semifeudal" country of China. The underlying principle is Marxism's "categorical demand"<sup>25</sup> in approaching social problems that theory be integrated with the actual circumstances.

Mao's most characteristic communication practice was to initiate and promote a close relationship between the leaders and the masses so as to arouse active participation and support of the people.

The rationale for Mao's theory and practice was that the masses are the creators of history. Mao had a profound faith in the creative force of the people, and that is why he insisted that the main task of the Chinese Communist Party is to work in closest connection with the people. Communists must proceed "from the

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<sup>25</sup>"On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", February, 1914. Lenin's Selected Works, IV. International Publishers, New York: 1943, p.255, "Letter on Tactics", April, 1917, Ibid., VI, pp.32



real needs of the masses". All measures of the Party would fail unless the masses "are conscious and willing".<sup>26</sup>

Such a close connection with the popular masses, however, could only be achieved if Party functionaries had had moral character, were genuinely dedicated, and behaved with modesty. A Chinese Communist, Mao maintained, "should not slight or look down upon such persons (backward people), but become friendly towards them, unite with them, and persuade, and encourage them to go forward".<sup>27</sup> To overcome communication barriers and to avoid becoming opinionated and domineering, the Party members must go through the process of criticism-self-criticism.

Class analysis is the foundation of Mao's mass line communication. Class analysis provides the communication technique to separate the reliable from the unreliable, friends from enemy. Class analysis, therefore, determines not only the nature of direction of the movement but also the relation of the Communist Party to the masses, which is the most important criterion in differentiating that party from other parties.

Briefly then, the mass line communication theory of Mao can operate only through well-trained cadres -- having an advanced ideological consciousness -- who comprehend the union of

<sup>26</sup>"The United front in Cultural Work", Selected Works, IV, pp.225-227

<sup>27</sup>"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", Selected Works, II, p.247

revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. The operational code of mass line permits the cadres to penetrate the intimate face-to-face social relationships within the general society. Mao maintained that the communication effectiveness of lower-level cadres will be judged by their success in educating and organizing the masses, continuously raising the level of mass consciousness and by the degree of mass unity and activism. In this sense, mass line communication may be seen as creating a new and ideal relationship between the leaders and the people.

Basically, there are four main elements in Mao's communication theory:

- (1) Organization, as the network of communication;
- (2) Ideology, as the unifying content of communications;
- (3) Criticism, as the dynamic to overcome communication barriers;
- (4) Mass Line, as the motivating force to the national liberation movement.

#### Gandhi : Non-violent Liberation and Tacit "Mass Line"

In a certain sense, Gandhi was still more of an innovator than Mao. He explicitly rejected the Marxist interpretation of history:

The Marxist regards the mind 'a reflex of the material environment', I cannot accept that...If I have an awareness of that living principle within me, no one can fetter my mind. The body might be destroyed, the spirit will proclaim its freedom. This to me is not a theory; it is a fact of experience.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup>Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase, Vol.2, p.137

In 1922 Gandhi wrote, "History is more a record of wonderful revolutions than of so-called ordered progress."<sup>29</sup>

Since Gandhi rejected Marxism he had to provide an alternative to it; he had to start from scratch in formulating a so-called "non-violence" ideology of national liberation to help unite and guide his diverse followers among both the rural masses and the urban elites.

This ideology, although less explicit than Mao's (and perhaps because it was less explicit) became an immediate inspiration to the other national liberation movements throughout Asia, the Middle East and Africa, where scores of former colonies achieved independence with little or no blood-shed. It also provided the direct inspiration for Martin Luther King and other leaders of the "non-violent" civil rights movement in the United States. Part of its power stemmed from Gandhi's vague but rhetorically powerful visions of a socialistic and egalitarian society; this aspect was widely adopted by the leaders of other independence movements. Whether they ever understood his special modes of communication -- his tacit "mass line", if you will -- is another matter. One thing is sure: no other leader of a "war without violence" was ever able to develop such intimate bonds of communication and understanding with illiterate masses.

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<sup>29</sup>Young India, February, 1922

Gandhi's version of liberation

Gandhi's ideology rests on two main norms, nonviolence and truth, which linked Gandhi with traditional India and united him to the common people. Gandhi conceived of nonviolence at several levels and at the ground level, as it were, it was frankly a political tactic. Violence for freedom would merely stiffen British resistance, putting the British on grounds where they felt sure of themselves, and alienate world opinion. There was a great deal of this nonviolence from expediency, as Gandhi himself said:

The English are splendidly armed; that does not frighten me, but it is clear that, to pit ourselves against them in arms, thousands of Indians must be armed. If such a thing be possible, how many years will it take?<sup>30</sup>

Gandhi's non-violence, therefore, was simply the only intelligent, realistic, expedient program which he had at his disposal. Also the "morality" which surrounded this policy of non-violence was to a large degree a rationale to cloak a pragmatic action with a desired and essential moral theme. And so the next aspect of non-violence was its use as a moral method,

Non-violence does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means the pitting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant...And so I am not pleading for India to practice non-violence because she is weak. I want her to practice non-violence being conscious of her strength and power.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup>M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj. Navajivan, Ahmedabad, 1938, p.50

<sup>31</sup>Young India, December, 1938

Nonviolent action, to put it differently, became not passive resistance, but a moral principle taking the initiative in active struggle; a link was forged between a means of mass struggle and a moral preference for nonviolent means.

At the third and highest level of Gandhi's thought, non-violence was an inner spiritual principle. It aimed at the inner conversion of an opponent by the power of love and suffering. Expressed in a paradox, Gandhi's method was to contrive to be "constitutionally unconstitutional".<sup>32</sup> Gandhi maintained that "a nonviolent rebellion is not a programme of seizure of power. It is a programme of transformation of relationship ending in a peaceful transfer of power".<sup>33</sup>

Briefly then, nonviolence became the revolutionary weapon of the weak against the strong in the battle of national freedom. The weak must not surrender. The weak must not obey. Instead of inflicting suffering, the weak must invite suffering on themselves and put the oppressor to shame and make his weapons as useless as possible. Large masses of people must act collectively, fearlessly, and nonviolently against terror and injustice. This help give the participants a sense of their own power, as Nehru put it, "a black pall of fear was lifted from the people's shoulders".<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Spear, op. cit., p.363

<sup>33</sup>Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The last Phase: Vol.2, Navajivan, 1958, p.323

<sup>34</sup>Nehru, Nehru On Gandhi. The John Day Company, New York: 1948, p.70

Indeed, Gandhi built his nonviolent liberation movement with specifically the "dumb millions" of India in mind.

We have been trying to act on the masses from the commencement of our struggle. We regard them as our mainstay, for it is they who have to attain swaraj (freedom). It is neither the sole concern of the monied men nor that of the educated class.<sup>35</sup>

He believed that the traditional Indian meekness and obedience of the "lowliest of the low" could be transformed into strength and courage. Gandhi's decision to make the Harijans ('untouchables', the lowest caste) and the women his special causes was a shrewd political attempt to recruit support from this otherwise unmobilized groups. The only effective sanction against injustice, Gandhi stressed, is enlightened public opinion. In so doing, Gandhi reversed the ancient Indian maxim, "As the king, so the people", and declared "As the people, so the king".<sup>36</sup>

Swaraj, which was India's political slogan for freedom and independence, was used by Gandhi and particularized to mean self-rule, self-control. In other words, the goal of Gandhi's nonviolent movement was not only to free India from colonial rule but also to remold or create a new man and woman. This is what Gandhi meant by swaraj. It literally means "self-rule" and in its original connotation meant autonomy of the moral self where strict control is exercised over the senses.

<sup>35</sup>Young India, April 20, 1921

<sup>36</sup>Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase. Navajivan, 1958, Vol.2, p.51

In December 1929, the Congress met at Lahore and passed the resolution declaring that the word "Swaraj" in Article I of the Congress Constitution shall mean 'Complete Independence'.<sup>37</sup> In Gandhian interpretation it came to mean willingness to suffer in the cause of freedom,

Whatever awakens people to a sense of their wrongs and whatever gives them strength for disciplined and peaceful resistance and habituates them to corporate suffering brings us nearer Swaraj.<sup>38</sup>

Gandhi, therefore, used swaraj to mean not only national self-government but also to mean any government responsible to the people, and even to mean the acceptance of nonviolent noncooperation which would give the nation the self-confidence necessary for exerting its will over the government.<sup>39</sup>

Real swaraj will come not by the acquisition of authority by a few but by the acquisition of the capacity by all to resist authority when it is abused. In other words, swaraj is to be attained by educating the masses to a sense of their capacity to regulate and control authority.<sup>40</sup>

The ideal society towards which Gandhi worked, he described it as sarvodaya, which literally means "uplift of all". Based upon nonviolence it is envisaged in terms of harmonious,

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<sup>37</sup>P. Sitaramayya, History of the Indian Congress. Vol.11, S. Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1947, p.209

<sup>38</sup>Young India, March 8, 1928

<sup>39</sup>D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma. Delhi 1961, Vol.2, pp.73-74

<sup>40</sup>Young India, January 29, 1925

casteless, classless society with equal opportunity for all. As Gandhi put it:

India has enough and can have enough--  
if some of her sons did not corner the  
good things and deprive the masses of  
their due.<sup>41</sup>

Therefore, Gandhi's two norms, nonviolence and truth lie at the heart of his entire social and political ideology. With nonviolence as the means, and truth as the common end, Gandhi formulated his version of a nonviolent socialist society. But before such a society could materialize, Gandhi believed, India had first to accomplish the immediate goal of freedom from foreign control. To Gandhi, a radical change in the social and economic order was, indeed, the meaning and essential purpose of overthrowing foreign rule. Without it, independence would be an empty achievement.

Economic equality is the master key to nonviolent independence...A nonviolent system of government is clearly an impossibility so long as the wide gulf between the rich and the hungry millions persists. The contrast between the rich palaces of New Delhi and the miserable hovels of the poor, laboring class cannot last one day in a free India in which the poor will enjoy the same power as the richest in the land. A violent and bloody revolution is a certainty one day unless there is a voluntary abdication of riches, and the power that riches give, and sharing them for the common good.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>J.C. Kapur "India in the Year 2000", The Futurist, August, 1974, pp.160-166

<sup>42</sup>Quoted by G. Myrdal in Against the Stream. Pantheon Books, New York: 1972, p.237



Gandhi's vision of a nonviolent socialist society was based on the belief that once the power was transferred to the masses of the Indian people, these masses would assert themselves and carry out the economic and social revolution. This belief, in turn, was based on the assumption that the colonial rule had so suppressed the forces for progress that once the shackles of imperialism were removed, rapid transformation will begin.

Myrdal points out that Gandhi was one of the first leaders either in India or anywhere else in South Asia who drew public attention to social and economic equalization,

Gandhi's egalitarianism became one of the links between him and the rationalistic intellectuals of Nehru's type, who, unlike Gandhi, were relatively unconcerned with religion.<sup>43</sup>

Gandhi and Nehru together persuaded the Congress to declare at their session in Karachi in 1931 that "in order to end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include real economic freedom for the starving millions".<sup>44</sup>

For Gandhi the really significant choice did not lie between capitalism and socialism, but between centralization of power and a system based on decentralization of authority.

Nehru wants industrialization because he thinks that if it is socialized it would be free from the evils

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid p.235

<sup>44</sup> Ibid p.236

of capitalism. My own view is that the evils are inherent in industrialism, and no amount of socialization can eradicate them.<sup>45</sup>

Gandhi's sarvodaya vision was based on those primary associations in which communication of human beings is as of person to person; and industrialization was to disrupt this as little as possible. Nonviolence and centralized power were incompatible according to Gandhi. In support of small-scale village industry, he explained, "...millions of people can take their share in this work and progress can be arithmetically measured,"<sup>46</sup> and insisted that decentralization of industry "preserves the purity and compactness of domestic life, artistry and creative talent, as well as the people's sense of freedom, ownership and dignity."<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, Gandhi's swadeshi (home-spun cloth, emphasizing self-sufficiency) movement not only served an economic function in the actual supply of cloth, it also carried significant ideological implications. Gandhi wrote in Harijan on November 30, 1934,

I have no partiality for return to the primitive methods of grinding and husking for the sake of them. I suggest the return, because there is no other way of giving employment to the millions of villagers who are living in idleness.

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<sup>45</sup> Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, Navajivan, Ahmedabad : 1951, p.185

<sup>46</sup> Harijan, August 18, 1940

<sup>47</sup> Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, Navajivan, Ahmedabad : 1951, p.185

Swadeshi was necessary for economic decentralization which Gandhi conceived as a measure to prevent concentration of wealth and power. The central effort during the years of the nationalist struggle for swaraj lay in the propagation of khadi (home-spun cloth), as Gandhi said, "You cannot get swaraj by mere speeches, shows, processions, etc. What is needed is solid, steady, constructive work."<sup>48</sup>

It was the constructive program, Gandhi believed, that gave content to the expectations of rural people and invited their active enthusiasm and participation in the liberation movement. In general, the program included the following points: (1) communal unity; (2) removal of untouchability; (3) prohibition; (4) Khadi; (5) other village industries; (6) village sanitation; (7) new education; (8) adult education; (9) uplift of women; (10) health education; (11) propagation of national education; (12) promotion of economic equality.<sup>49</sup>

Among these items, the production of home-spun cloth was central. In hand-spinning Gandhi saw at once not only the economic solution, but also an answer to the psychological and political problems of the nationalist movement.

Khaddar has the greatest organising power in it because it has itself to be organised and because it affects all India. If Khaddar rained from heaven it would be a calamity. But as it can only be manufactured by the willing co-operation of starving

<sup>48</sup>Young India, September 5, 1929

<sup>49</sup>Gandhi, Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place, Navajivan, Ahmedabad : 1941, p.28

millions and thousands of middle class men and women, its success means the best organisation conceivable along peaceful lines.<sup>50</sup>

It might be argued that the spinning of thread might not do much to alter economic conditions in the country, nonetheless, the experience of working together in great mass meetings gave people an exhilarating sense of participation (which Gandhi calls "organising power") in the political process. Another action that gave the same feeling was making a bonfire of foreign cloth. To wear foreign clothing was sinful, Gandhi argued, because it deprived the Indian weaver of the right to work. "I must refuse to insult the naked by giving them clothes they do not need, instead of giving them work which they sorely need."<sup>51</sup>

Briefly, Gandhi worked for self-sufficient rural republics, as he explained to Nehru,

The essence of what I have said is that man should rest content with what are his real needs, and become self-sufficient.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, Gandhi insisted on personal service for others as an essential ingredient of leadership. Therefore, the concept of trusteeship in Gandhian language means service as a mode of behavior. This behavior is grounded in his doctrine of aparigraha: nonpossession or voluntary poverty. Recognizing that absolute non-possession is an

<sup>50</sup>Saklatvala and M.K.Gandhi, Is India Different? The Class Struggle in India : Correspondence on the Indian Labour Movement and Modern Conditions. London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1927, p.23

<sup>51</sup>Young India, November 11, 1929

<sup>52</sup>Cited by J C Kapur in "India in the Year 2000", The Futurist August, 1974, pp.160-166

abstraction and unattainable, Gandhi suggested that "if we strive for (non-possession), we shall be able to go further in realizing a scale of equality on earth than by any other method".<sup>53</sup> Economic equality was essential, Gandhi maintained, because "violence is bred in inequality". His deep concern was with the problem of mass poverty. He went so far as to say that for the poor the economic is the spiritual<sup>54</sup> and that to them God can appear only as bread and butter.<sup>55</sup> The cause of poverty was, in his view, the covetousness of the rich and the exploitation of the needy by the greedy. The redistribution of income is more important than the raising of output, and the fulfilment of the basic needs of the masses requires not raising of expectations but of the limitation of the wants of the richer classes. Gandhi set out to regulate the rich by persuading them to hold property not for personal benefit but rather as a 'trust' for the welfare of the masses. This nonviolent method was based on the belief that "change of heart" could be brought about if persuasive appeals were made to their conscience.

Gandhi's idea of service as a mode of behavior included manual labor; he went so far as to suggest that it should be a qualification for the franchise, "it should be neither property nor position but manual work..." In this way "all who wish to

<sup>53</sup>N K Bose "An Interview with Mahatma Gandhi", National Herald, Dec. 28, 1938

<sup>54</sup>Young India, May 1927

<sup>55</sup>Young India, October, 1931

take part in the Government and the well-being of the State", could prove themselves, and the labor-test would be far superior to that of either literacy or property.<sup>56</sup>

The trusteeship concept, therefore, aimed toward removing psychological and other kinds of barriers associated with class or status, between the leaders at the 'top' and the masses at the 'bottom'. A genuine posture of 'humility' and 'lowliness'; Gandhi believed, must be the basis for effective leadership.

The most important characteristic of Gandhi's version of liberation was that it must be in harmony with basic values. If the goal is a nonviolent society, the mode also must be nonviolent; if human freedom is the end, coercive modes (except moral coercion) are ruled out; if truth is to be the basis of the new society, then false propaganda or distortion of truth are inadmissible; if the aim is dispersal of power, the mode cannot be centralized power, and so on. Furthermore, Gandhi maintained that technical media by itself cannot be effective.

I now come to the means of propagating what is called the 'Gandhian' ideology. The propagation of truth and nonviolence can be done less by books than by actually living those principles. Life truly lived is more than books. I do not say that we may not issue books and newspaper. I only say that they are not indispensable...We must make a sincere effort to enter our opponent's mind and to understand his viewpoint. That is what is meant by nonviolence walking straight into the mouth of violence. If we are armed with that attitude of mind, we may hope to propagate

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<sup>56</sup>Dhawan, op. cit., p.282

nonviolence principles. Without that, book and newspaper propaganda is of no avail.<sup>57</sup>

Gandhi's national movement addressed itself to the most fundamental questions in communication: how to persuade individuals and groups to adopt new ways of thought and action? The method of persuasion that Gandhi offered was given the name of "satyagraha" (truth force). The main elements of this method were new education, and complete identification with the masses in manner of speech and life style.

#### Gandhi's "Mass Line"

As one examines carefully Gandhi's ideas not only on channels of communication but on the entire problem of links between the leaders and the led, it is hard to avoid noticing their similarity with Mao's ideas on the "mass line". One might well imagine that if he had enjoyed the opportunity of reading a systematized statement of the mass line, he might well have exclaimed "Faith, for forty years, I have been using the mass line without knowing it".

There were three basic elements in Gandhi's mass line: truth force (satyagraha), new education (nai talim), and symbolic action. ~~These are in many ways~~ comparable to -- and of course different from -- Mao's stages of "from the masses, to the masses", criticism and self-criticism, and direct action.

<sup>57</sup>Harijan, May 13, 1939

Truth force is basically a method of persuasion by personal example and deed. To the persuasion of words it adds the persuasion of a leader's sincerity; more potent and simple and therefore better understood by the masses.<sup>58</sup> Gandhi called it "a programme of propaganda",<sup>59</sup> and declared that "public opinion is a mightier force than gunpowder".<sup>60</sup> Gandhi believed that people interpreted messages in terms of their conception of the leader's character and reputation. In his autobiography he distinguishes between an argumentative speech and an emotional appeal<sup>61</sup> and comes to accept the limits of a logical argument,

....one who hears or reads a word does not always understand it in the speaker's or writer's sense. Therefore the heart, that is devotion, faith and knowledge grounded in experience are invested with greater importance. Logic is a matter of mere intelligence, which cannot apprehend things that are clear as crystal to the heart. On the other hand the intellect often believes in certain things, but if they do not appeal to the heart, they must be rejected.<sup>62</sup>

In other words, effective leadership means the ability to communicate intuitively with the masses,

<sup>58</sup>Richard B. Gregg, The Power of Non-Violence. Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad: 1960 (2nd edition), p.67

<sup>59</sup>Young India, August, 1925

<sup>60</sup>Young India, March, 1929

<sup>61</sup>M K Gandhi, The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad: 1956. pp.112-113

<sup>62</sup>Gilbert Murray, Talking to Gandhiji. Orient Longmans, 1957, p.12



They often perceive things with their intuition, which we ourselves fail to see with our intellect. But whilst the masses know what they want, they often do not know how to express their wants and, less often, how to get what they want. Herein comes the use of leadership....<sup>63</sup>

Gandhi recognized the need for inspired leadership in political and social activity and maintained that anyone who followed satyagraha courageously was capable of leading the nation. Satyagraha may use any of several modes of nonviolent action. Those which were most commonly used during the liberation movement are non-cooperation and civil disobedience.

In principle, noncooperation is simply the refusal to cooperate with a requirement which is taken to violate fundamental "truths" or refusal to cooperate with those responsible for such violations. Noncooperation may include strike, walkout, hartal (voluntary closure of shops and businesses, usually for a twentyfour hour period), and resignation of offices and titles.

Civil disobedience is the direct contravention of specific laws and may include such activities as non-payment of taxes. The civil character is maintained in principle by the inviting of, and voluntary submission to, sanctions provided by law for action contrary to the legal norm.<sup>64</sup> Until their national liberation

<sup>63</sup>Young India, November 1930

<sup>64</sup>Joan V. Bondurant, "Satyagraha versus Duragraha: The Limits of Symbolic Violence", in Gandhi: His Relevance for Our Times. Ed. Ramachandran & Mahadevan, New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967, p.39

movements had used two weapons to achieve its ends, namely, constitutional agitation and violent revolution. In contrast, Gandhi developed the unique weapon of non-violent direct action, which he defended in these words,

I was a believer in the politics of petitions, deputations and friendly negotiations. But all these have gone to the dogs. I know that these are not the ways to bring this Government round. Sedition has become my religion. Ours is a non-violent battle.<sup>65</sup>

This was thus a kind of a political battle which generated the maximum Indian strength while using British strength to its own disadvantage.

I believe, and every body must grant that no Government can exist for a single moment without the cooperation of the people, willing or forced and if people suddenly withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the Government will come to a standstill.<sup>66</sup>

By withdrawing the cooperation and obedience of the subjects, Gandhi sought to cut off important sources of the ruler's power. At the same time noncooperation and disobedience created severe enforcement problems. And in this situation, severe repression against nonviolent people would be likely not to strengthen the government but to alienate still more Indians from British rule and at the same time create not unity in face of an enemy but dissent and opposition at home.

It is not a matter of carrying conviction by argument. The matter resolves itself into one of matching forces.

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<sup>65</sup>Young India, July 10, 1929

<sup>66</sup>Young India, December 20, 1930

Conviction or no conviction, Great Britain would defend her Indian commerce and interests by all the forces at her command. India must consequently evolve force enough to free herself from the embrace of death.<sup>67</sup>

The basic elements of truth force or satyagraha struggle can be cited as follows: (1) complete self-reliance; (2) propaganda to be an integral part of the movement; (3) demands to be consistent with truth; (4) search for avenues of cooperation with the adversary on honorable terms; (5) no compromise on basic principles; and (6) full agreement on fundamentals before accepting a settlement.

As a means of communication, satyagraha seeks to effect change and it operates within a conflict situation. It employs force, although the character and result of the force of satyagraha are essentially different from those of Mao's means of communication. According to the Congress Party, there was a significant change in the country's political climate. For the first time in Indian history the issue of independence was not the sole concern of the elite but became the focus of attention of people at large. Even the Government was forced to admit the nationalist character of the movement. In a statement submitted to the British Parliament, the Government of India made the following observations regarding the general results of the earlier movement in 1920's:

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<sup>67</sup>Young India, February, 1931

Mr Gandhi's intensive movement during the years 1921 and 1922 has diffused far and wide, among classes previously oblivious to political considerations, a strong negative patriotism born of race hatred of the foreigner. The less prosperous classes both in town and the country-side have become aroused to certain aspects--even though these be mischievous, exaggerated and false--of the existing political situation. On the whole, this must be pronounced, up to the present, the most formidable achievement of the noncooperation movement. That it has certain potentialities for good will be maintained by many; that it will immensely increase the dangers and difficulties of the next few years can be denied by few.<sup>68</sup>

At the same time, the Report of the Congress Enquiry Committee noted with enormous satisfaction:

Witnesses from all parts of the country speaking from direct knowledge have testified to the outstanding features of the crisis through which the country is passing. These are: (1) the general awakening of the masses to their political rights and privileges, (2) the total loss of faith in the present system of Government, (3) the belief that it is only through its own efforts that India can hope to be free, (4) the faith in the Congress as the only organization which can properly direct national effort to gain freedom, and (5) the utter failure of repression to weaken the people. Our own personal observation in the course of our tour round the whole country fully corroborates the evidence on these points....<sup>69</sup>

Gandhi's new emphasis on mass participation led him to develop the concept of new education, which he called Nai Talim, geared to the needs of the masses.

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<sup>68</sup> Accounts and Papers, 1922, Vol.XVI, p.108. Parliamentary papers

<sup>69</sup> Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress.  
S. Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1947, p.201

Mass line - education. Gandhi's first concern was to replace English by a national language, not only to remove the symbol of alien domination but also to open up channels of communication between the people and their leaders.

Among the many evils of foreign rule this blighting imposition of a foreign medium upon the youth of the country will be counted by history as one of the greatest. It has sapped the energy of the nation, it has shortened the lives of the pupils. It has estranged them from the masses, it has made education unnecessarily expensive. If this process is still persisted in, it will rob the nation of its soul. The sooner, therefore, educated India shakes itself free from the hypnotic spell of the foreign medium, the better it would be for them and the people.<sup>70</sup>

Gandhi maintained that Indian leadership could not in fact lead a profound national regeneration unless able, quite literally, to speak to the people in their own language. "Every time I am obliged to speak in the English language before an audience of my countrymen, I feel humiliated and ashamed."<sup>71</sup> He had said earlier:

In my opinion the existing system of education is defective, apart from its association with an utterly unjust Government, in three most important matters:

- (1) It is based upon foreign culture to the almost entire exclusion of indigenous culture;
- (2) It ignores the culture of the heart and the hand and confines itself simply to the head;
- (3) Real education is impossible through a foreign medium.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>70</sup>Young India, July 5, 1928

<sup>71</sup>Young India, January 13, 1927

<sup>72</sup>Young India, September 1, 1921

Gandhi maintained that new education must be closely linked to the many pressing social and political problems. For one thing, the country had to be self-supporting and geared toward meeting the needs of the majority rather than a select few. Gandhi put great stress upon constructive work and training of teachers, "maximum of work and minimum of speech must be our motto".<sup>73</sup>

The most important element of training was character-building rather than intellectual brilliance:

It is possible for a teacher situated miles away to affect the spirit of the pupils by his way of living. It would be idle for me, if I were a liar to teach boys to tell the truth. A cowardly teacher would never succeed in making his boys valiant, and a stranger to self-restraint could never teach his pupils the value of self-restraint. I saw, therefore, that I must be an eternal object-lesson to the boys and girls living with me. They thus became my teachers, and I learnt I must be good and live straight, if only for their sake. I may say that the increasing discipline and restraint I imposed on myself at Tolstoy Farm was mostly due to those words of mine.<sup>74</sup>

It would seem then that Gandhi's mass line education was primarily concerned with creating prerequisites and conditions under which a sound communication process could operate,

Education should be so revolutionalized as to answer the wants of the poorest villager instead of answering those of an imperial exploiter.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Harijan, June, 1939

<sup>74</sup>My Experiments with Truth. p.414

<sup>75</sup>Harijan, August 21, 1937

Symbolic action. Gandhi had to work harder than Mao to identify himself with the masses. Unlike Mao, he represented also the rich and to be credible with the "lowliest of the low" Gandhi not only wore loin cloth but went to great length to adopt poverty as a way of life. Furthermore, he lived day in and day out open to public view, as on a stage. He took the people and even his opponents into confidence not only in regard to his actions but even his motivations,

Secrecy, in my opinion, is a sin and a symptom of violence, therefore, definitely to be avoided, especially if the freedom of dumb millions is the goal. Hence all underground activity, in my opinion, is taboo.<sup>76</sup>

It was not surprising that the masses looked upon Gandhi as a living symbol of the moral power and goodness in man. He had an exceptional insight into the power of symbolic actions on the minds of men and women. As Nehru remarked, Gandhi had "a curious knack for doing the right thing at the psychological moment".<sup>77</sup> Wolfenstein points out that,

In part as a result of his barrister's training, Gandhi's mind always had a legalistic bent. He thought in terms of formulas, vows, and symbolic acts.<sup>78</sup>

Gandhi's famous vows served a vital function in focussing

<sup>76</sup> Harijan, July 9, 1944

<sup>77</sup> J. Nehru, Nehru on Gandhi, op. cit., p.22

<sup>78</sup> E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. Princeton University Press, 1967, p.277

on public programs during the national struggle. Many of his programs were symbolic in the setting of the India Gandhi was attempting to elevate into self-respect and freedom. For nationalism to be aroused among people who had been dominated by an alien culture for so long, it meant rejecting the principal symbols previously incorporated into the indigeneous culture.<sup>79</sup> For instance, rejection of high technology, boycott of all foreign goods, insistence on the use of vernacular language, and wearing of khaddar (coarse hand-spun cotton), were to become in the minds of all Indians the mark of a man or a woman who sought India's freedom. The symbol of the spinning wheel, which Indian peasants had ceased using before the last years of the nineteenth century, was an effective way of drawing attention to the colossal problems of poverty, unemployment, low production and general apathy in rural life of India. In a country of extraordinary diversity of dress and manners, the adoption of the simple white "Gandhi cap" cut across high caste and low, rich and poor, and gave a sense of national identity.<sup>80</sup>

The Salt March of 1930 was Gandhi's most dramatic symbolic act when he marched a couple of hundred miles through the summer dust of Indian country roads to a lonely beach and there to pick up a fleck of forbidden salt and defy an unjust law.

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<sup>79</sup> Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution. London and Philadelphia, 1925, passim

<sup>80</sup> Ainslie T. Embree, India's Search for National Identity New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, passim



It was a simple act but it did more than any act of any leader before to unite the Indian people and hasten the end of British rule in India.<sup>81</sup> This act of defiance focussed symbolically the attention of the whole world on the unjust Salt Act, which affected the lives of the majority of the poor in India.

### Summary

The most decisive element of Gandhi's communication theory is the concept of satyagraha (truth force) which is both a philosophy of life as well as the technique of stupendous mass action for paralysing the total structure of a despotic government. The basis of this mass movement, however, is always individual awareness through suffering, and the success of satyagraha depends on individual discipline and total commitment. Without discipline struggle becomes dehumanized because the relationship between protestor and opponent falls out of a communication context. More precisely, discipline gives to satyagraha the power to individualize and concretize conflict so that strong interpersonal communication can be established. Gandhi perceived the communication process as the context wherein human relationships are either openly developed or violently repressed. Satyagraha, therefore, became in the hands of Gandhi the communication tool for the development of human relations. Gandhi's communication

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<sup>81</sup>S. Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-34. London, Wishart & Company Ltd., 1935, pp.70-73

theory, in other words, is geared toward the building of human relationships via two-way communication based on mutual trust.

In armed struggles, the stress is on collective action and defense. In satyagraha, the aim is moral victory of the "heroic meek" through active nonviolent resistance which touches the conscience of the imperial oppressor, assuming, of course, that the opponent has it to some degree.<sup>82</sup> This theory is based on the acceptance of the concept of suffering for the vindication of truth and justice. Suffering sends three messages. First, it awakens the individual to a sense of his or her dignity and power. Second, it makes a direct appeal to the oppressor's sense of morality. Third, it intensifies favourable public opinion.

Gandhi's communication practice is based upon traditional Indian concepts to which he gave new meaning. He attributed symbolic value to many of the traditions and concepts derived from the Indian experience. The spinning wheel, homespun cloth, fasting and vows, the term Harijan (the children of God) possessed powerful symbolic value because they translated profound ideas into the simple realities of Indian life. This was the functional aspects of the communication symbols as distinguished from the essential core of Gandhi's communication theory.

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<sup>82</sup>Gandhi would never have had a chance against a totalitarian state such as that of the Nazis. It is dubious whether under those circumstances the idea of nonviolent resistance would even have occurred to Gandhi. He believed in "arousing the world", which is only possible if the world gets a chance to hear what you are doing.

Gandhi relied on word-of-mouth propaganda because of its grass-roots nature and because of its high persuasive quality. He also made full use of the print media to disseminate his ideas in India as well as in other countries. This messages and style of communication aimed to establish emotional identity and a non-manipulative, nonelitist relationship between leaders and led.

The main elements of Gandhi's communication theory may be listed as follows:

- (1) credibility of leadership through moral conviction, right means, and total identification with needs and aspirations of the people;
- (2) decentralization of power based on face to face contact between leaders and masses. In other words, social control by self-organization;
- (3) mass line education to overcome communication barriers; adoption of national language in place of foreign medium;
- (4) noncooperation with the exploiting regime and the pursuit of a general policy to serve the genuine needs of the people.

## CHAPTER V

### GANDHI AND MAO AS COMMUNICATORS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem dealt with in this study is how did Gandhi and Mao succeed in communicating with hundreds of millions of illiterate masses against tremendous odds without the use of modern mass media. If they had not solved the problem of communication, they would have been would-be leaders with very few followers and their movements would have been doomed to failure.

The major method has been that of content analysis in the context of the broader patterns of historical change in the countries involved. The historical analysis of the growth of the Indian and Chinese liberation movements indicates that though Gandhi and Mao helped mobilize the people in their respective countries, there were important differences between their movements. The major difference, of course, is that Gandhi led a struggle for national independence only (with the hope of a decentralized democratic socialism after independence); Mao was the leader of a struggle not only to throw out all foreign invaders but also to effect a total social revolution based on the complete overthrow of domestic landlords, warlords and native capitalists. It is interesting to note, on the assumption that such things can be roughly estimated, that in India, where the

caste and linguistic barriers to communication were greater, the societal changes were less substantial and that in China, where the task of communicating with the masses was less formidable, the societal changes were remarkably greater.

Detailed content analysis of the major themes during the critical war-time years of 1942 through 1944 shows that Gandhi, although leader of an essentially non-socialist movement, gained additional support by disseminating messages that provided overtones of a socialist utopia to appeal to his more radical followers. In contrast, Mao, as leader of a movement for socialist revolution gained additional support for liberation movement by appealing to those primarily interested in indigenous capitalism or in national independence. The analysis shows that the immediate concern was to unify their respective countries against foreign aggression by submerging national conflicts. Both Gandhi and Mao demonstrated how economic deprivation was brought about by the repressive policies of the imperialists, destroying the modicum of security necessary for national development. Thus, nationalism became an effective ideology for sustaining mass participation in the liberation struggle.

#### Tentative Propositions

In building mass participation without such advanced means of communication as radio and television, and without much access to the other media then controlled by their adversaries,

Gandhi and Mao were, respectively, uniquely Indian and uniquely Chinese. Either one would have been a fish out of water in the other country or, for that matter, in any other country. Nonetheless, there were many common characteristics of their communication behavior. These may be briefly, although still tentatively, summarized in the following three interrelating propositions:

1. Gandhi's and Mao's operational doctrine was based on the mass line theory.

The first proposition is the most fundamental. It provides the foundation for both their modes and styles of communication, which are summarized in the next two propositions.

The mass line theory developed a new code of morality providing a non-elitist guiding concept which aimed at "leadership without elitism," as discussed in Chapter IV. New relationships were forged between the masses and leaders through direct contact and personal example, rather than relying merely on formal institutions. In other words, the communication process was facilitated by the mass line, with more intimacy and interchange being fostered between leaders and led.

In an effort to narrow the distance between the leaders and the led, the mass line theory structured mental activity into a leadership process which gave content to the required non-elitist practice in communicating with the masses. Gandhi and Mao sought the elite actions needed to activate the potential of

the great mass force, but both claimed that the elite was not superior to the masses and that they must remain in close contact with the masses to gain knowledge and wisdom. This meant a difficult process of educating the elite to look less at themselves in self-admiration and more at the masses of the people, their problems, their potentialities, their modes of thinking and their inherent wisdom. In doing this -- and here is the essential paradox of the mass line communication -- a steady flow of elite communication through small-circulation newspapers provided an indispensable communication link among the formal and informal leaders of the party groupings and non-party organizations that finally became rooted in the masses and led the masses of their countries to successful liberation against foreign control. The deliberate transformation of an elite struggle into an open popular movement of such scope is probably without parallel in the history of national movements.

This transformation was possible because the substance of the messages themselves was based on widespread popular needs and sentiments. Both of these leaders, as already shown in detail, stressed the broad themes of conditions of crisis and goal values, thereby drawing attention to the serious deprivation the masses were experiencing and making them susceptible to appeals justifying new and intensified revolutionary activity. They also helped establish a sense of communality and understanding between leaders and the led, a sense that was deepened

by Gandhi's and Mao's stress on the various themes relating to leadership style and channels of communication.

More specifically, the themes of sacrifice, service, truthfulness, personal example, and self-reliance called attention to the varying forms of struggle; while all the other themes focussed on means of mobilizing elites and masses for the many forms of action required to overthrow imperialism and build some new form of confidence and self-respect among the people as a whole. The mass line communication, in other words, aimed at active mass participation by those at the bottom of society, rather than merely large-scale indoctrination of relatively inert masses by those at the top.

An interesting contrast, however, emerges between Gandhi and Mao in their image of the masses. Although Gandhi perceived the masses as "pillars of strength," he thought more in terms of potential force for future purposes of social struggle. He did not think the "dumb semi-starved millions scattered over the length and breadth of the land in its 700,000 villages" were ready yet to challenge the power of the established regime, "some day we shall have to start an intensive movement without the rich people and without the vocal educated class. But that time is not yet", Gandhi wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on April 1, 1928.<sup>1</sup> To put it differently, Gandhi did not base his movement on the

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<sup>1</sup>As cited by J C Kapur, op. cit., p.163



independent strength of the masses whom he loved and trusted no doubt but did not think sufficiently strong for purposes of social struggle. Mao, on the other hand, as the analysis in Chapter III and IV shows, believed that his movement could not succeed without the "conscious and willing" support of the masses with their "boundless creative power".

Furthermore, Gandhi's focus on harmony and Mao's on conflict as the integral part of struggle necessitates a critical assessment in terms of its implications for mass line communication. Gandhi would yield to none in his desire for the elimination of exploitation, but he insisted that the individual exploiter must be approached with love and forbearance rather than hate. He believed in arousing the conscience of the opponent so as to effect the structure and dimensions of interpersonal communications. The concept of conscience may have ultimate significance on its own in a moral sense, but its practical import for Gandhi lay in its connection with his plea for heroic and rebellious action on the part of the masses.

Gandhi's concept of trusteeship, therefore, may be seen as a way of drawing attention to exploitation and greed of the rich, rather than merely as a principle stating that rich must become 'trustees' for the welfare of the masses. In this sense, Gandhi would appear closer to Mao than it seemed possible at first glance. Gandhi provided moral options to the rich but it

was nonetheless a method of arousing the masses against injustices of the established system. It is no accident, therefore, that education of leaders received high priority from both Gandhi and Mao.

The final element in the mass line approach, in addition to the general concept and the specific themes, was a communication style that enabled them to effect a synthesis of the new political awakening with the tradition and sentiment of the historic past. Gandhi built a movement on the basis of his own personal suffering, while being the spokesman for an anticolonial Congress party organization. Gandhi's adoption of poverty as a way of life and his complete identification with the masses made the Congress party more credible with the public at large. The important element of Gandhi's credibility was not only the prestige it gave to the Congress party but also that it was a continuing factor in political and social cohesion. In times of political upheaval, the Indian elite could rely on the symbolic image of Gandhi as the "Father of the nation" and extend the "system of admiration" across the country. What impressed the Indian elite and the British government was the fact that Gandhi's communication style succeeded in unlocking the door to the hearts of the people where they themselves could not hope for a hearing. Mao's leadership, during this period, on the other hand, was more of an institutional nature; although Mao was theoretically accepted by his party as 'first among equals,' so to speak.

Mao was primarily the leader and ideologist for a revolutionary organization, as well as a man who adjusted maximally to wielding power once his communist party came to power. In other words, what Mao achieved in terms of intimacy and close connection with people's masses through party and mass organizations, Gandhi accomplished in larger part through immense personal appeal and prestige. For both the primary function of their organizations was to bring leadership into contact with their natural sources of strength, the great mass of the people. Here, clearly, are leaders different from each other and yet, at the same time, sharing important communication characteristics in their effort to reach the different masses of their respective countries. Both sought mass participation in the liberation movements but it was not of the same nature; the styles and the means of communication had to be adapted to and directed by the conditions in each country.

While Gandhi often stated that he was a man of action only and not interested in theory, this study unquestionably reflects his involvement for more than two decades in developing an ideology and a doctrine which was communicated to followers in his own country and admirers throughout the world. Like Mao, he was at the interface of theory and practice throughout his life. Gandhi perhaps underestimated his theoretical contributions to the movement. On the other hand, Mao perhaps overstated his theoretical behavior in order to help him develop in China the kind of prestige that Stalin developed for himself in the Soviet

Union as the great theoretician of Marxism.

Thus first proposition in the study suggests that the liberation movements led by Gandhi and Mao have important implications for communication theory. One of the major elements -- until now recognized mainly by a few students of Indian and Chinese history but practically unknown to communication researchers -- was the formulation of a mass line theory which, properly interpreted, provides a significant contribution to human knowledge about communication.

2. Both Gandhi and Mao developed multi-modal and multi-directional communication strategies.

Figure 3, "Multiple Channels of Communication of Gandhi and Mao," (page 188) shows that the messages were transmitted by a complex network in which organizations and individuals were linked by all available modes of communication. The most important elements were:

- (a) close, primary, interpersonal relations in which basic mutual identifications were developed and maintained;
- (b) party organization and mass organizations which through their communication networks linked up leaders and masses;
- (c) the press which played a significant role in disseminating Gandhi's and Mao's ideas and in educating leaders.

Gandhi's and Mao's multi-modal low technology style was a successful attempt to cope with a real problem under circums-

## FIGURE 3

## Multiple Channels of Communication of Gandhi and Mao

<u>Channels</u>	<u>Gandhi</u>	<u>Mao</u>
1. Personal	contact with the masses through walking tours and train journeys; adoption of loin cloth to identify with the poor; spinning wheel to focus on self-reliance; Gandhi-cap signifying united action	austere living; simplicity of language and style; accessibility to the masses; non-elitist attitude
2. Party organization	Congress Party as an expression of national interests; Congress Party as an instrument of political struggle through social and moral reform; extraparty leadership	Chinese Communist Party as an instrument for structural change; institutional leadership
3. Mass organization	women participation for the first time; Harijan mobilization; peasants; youth and students; big and small business; professionals	women; students; soldiers; workers; peasants; sought support from secret society and other armed outlaw organizations; intellectuals
4. Arts and literature	reinterpretations of ancient scriptures; devotional singing	revolutionary poetry; dramatic representation of history in terms of revolutionary struggle of the masses
5. Education	ashram discipline; spiritual training; character building	Marxism-Leninism; character building; Red army discipline
6. Mass media	national press; international press; own press ( <u>Young India</u> and <u>Harijan</u> ); leaflets; posters; loudspeakers; pamphlets	party press; leaflets; posters; loudspeakers; pamphlets

tances where other resources were lacking. Despite poverty, illiteracy and lack of normal communication facilities both nations were successfully organized to listen and receive the messages. Both created an intimate mass communication system at fantastically low capital costs, though very high labor oriented. Gandhi's daily prayer meetings, Mao's discussion meetings, and various mass campaigns were attended by hundreds of millions of people substituting for audio-visual or scarce print media. A highly economical wired loudspeaker system substituted for radios that even in battery form would have been too expensive. The system also provided secure communication for mobilization in the villages and in Mao's base areas, and did double service as a telephone system for official business. During campaigns the walls were plastered with posters and hand-written slogans; news sheets by illegal printing presses were produced and distributed. These activities form a most important part of any liberation campaign, particularly in the early stages when the population is being mobilized to support the cause. Furthermore, Gandhi and Mao conducted their national struggle in three main languages directed at diverse audiences:

- (a) combative language directed toward their opponents;
- (b) communication with intellectual elite in 'modern' idiom and style; and
- (c) use of 'traditional' imagery and symbols while communicating with the masses.

He spoke in a low singsong. His tone was always conversational, even when he was addressing millions of people. Whatever he said was to the point, and he used mostly simple words to say simple things. He never resorted to histrionics, or any rhetorical device, although he was fond of using parables and proverbs, and quotations from the Bhagavad Gita and other sacred books.<sup>2</sup>

Edgar Snow says of Mao that he never talked above the heads of his audience but he never talked down to them either; he was intimate and always in contact.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, these messages flowed in both directions to and from the leader, his closest associates, the leaders of party, and their opponents; and from all of the party double (not only from the leader himself) to the masses. Here the central concept is multiple flow of messages from the leader to subleaders (handful of specialized spokesmen, who in turn are linked to hundreds or thousands of lesser party activists who communicate to the masses) and back, while at the same time the leader maintains direct contacts with the masses. This may be illustrated as follows:

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<sup>2</sup>Ved Mehta, "Mahatma Gandhi and his Apostles," The New Yorker, May 10, 1976

<sup>3</sup>Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, Grove Press, Inc. New York: 1961, p.53

This study shows that Gandhi and Mao throughout their liberation movement consistently employed the expressed values of their opponents when demanding freedom for their countries. Their language was highly combative and their argument carefully developed on moral grounds to embarrass and defeat their enemies. Their style of communication expressed confidence in their ultimate victory. Both used words as weapons to damage the self-esteem of their opponents and in so doing raised the struggle to a higher level of morality and justice.


In their communication to the intellectual elite Gandhi and Mao sought to change centuries old colonial ways of thinking and acting which served imperialist interests rather than the interests of their own people. They set out to awaken the elite to the national calamity if they continued to live their life so far removed from the mainstream of the life of the masses.

The reliance of this study on the anglicized translations of Gandhi's and Mao's statements does not permit enough attention to the 'traditional' aspects of their language addressed to the masses, except by reading reports of eyewitnesses or journalists. It is reported, for instance, that their style was simple and earthy, and that their use of words had a traditional quality which made it easy for them to communicate effectively with peasant audiences. Here is an eyewitness account of one of Gandhi's followers:



FIGURE 4

## Multiple Flow of Messages



3. They both developed unique styles of non-charismatic leadership.

For many decades, almost all discussions of leadership bow to the idea of charisma. Max Weber, who introduced the term into sociological usage, defines it as,

a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman...regarded as of divine origin...<sup>4</sup>

In contrast, the third proposition states that despite false interpretations by admirers of "charismatic leadership," neither Gandhi nor Mao had charisma in the traditional sense. They were<sup>4</sup>Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. The Free Press, New York: 1947

successful communicators not because they were "charismatic" leaders, but because they were rather super-ordinary - in the sense of being very natural, very human and a part of not apart from, the masses. To put it another way, their leadership quality lay not in "divinity" but rather in their ability to communicate simply and meaningfully with their audiences the broader problems of their liberation movements. Both established reciprocity and a unique relationship with their respective masses based on intimate appeal and identification. As Jawaharlal Nehru said of Gandhi, "he did not descend from the top; he seemed to emerge from the millions of India, speaking their language and incessantly drawing attention to them and their appalling condition."<sup>5</sup> And Edgar Snow said of Mao, "There is a real flow of intimacy between him and the people. He always seems to be in contact."<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, the concept of symbolic action is central to Gandhi's and Mao's noncharismatic leadership. It is through symbolic action that they both expressed fully their identification with the masses. Gandhi's loincloth and Mao's rustic living fulfilled a triple function. It emphasized simplicity of living, coarse home-spun cloth became a militant symbol of self-sufficiency, and it identified Gandhi and Mao with the poorest of people. Gandhi's Dandi March (Chapter II and IV) and Mao's

<sup>5</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India. John Day, N.Y.: 1946, p.209

<sup>6</sup>Cited by Han Suyin, op. cit., p.379

Long March<sup>7</sup> were to be the eminently practical and highly symbolic focus of their liberation movements. It is here that they take a stand as rebels against the State and say "no" to exploitation, and imperialism. The symbolic action is rooted in both denial (to the metaphor of progress through competition and acquisition of material goods) and affirmation (to common participation and collective endeavor, justice, and egalitarianism). Gandhi's and Mao's peculiar genius lay in their understanding of the existing social structure, with the enormous importance of its traditional symbols, which could be made part of the new political process.

In conclusion, one might say that in the early 1940's, many observers of the Indian and Chinese scene knew that imperial control of India and China were immutable facts. They could also see that the foreign forces dominating the two countries had at their command not only armies but all the then-available media of communication: the press, the radio, the schools and the major bureaucratic organization. Indeed, the foreign dominators themselves seem to have confidence in their own invincibility.

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<sup>7</sup>Mao did not lead the Long March the way Gandhi led his. However, it was during the March that Mao emerged as a significant leader of the Chinese Communist Party. For Mao, the Long March served as a political symbol for the Chinese people, "Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding machine...It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation...The Long March...has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future". In "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", Selected Works, I, p.161

Historians may review endlessly all the many factors that led to their downfall by the end of the 1940's, and no one could ever single out one factor and give it a quantitative value as above all the other. Yet this study makes it now obvious that among the necessary -- although not sufficient -- factors were the communication doctrines and practices of the two major leaders of the anti-imperial movements, Gandhi and Mao. By converting their communication theories into practice, they proved the non-invincibility of those who dominated the formal media of communication in these two countries. They demonstrated for these two vast countries the enormous power of communication strategies based, as the study has shown, on the principles of mass line, multi-modal and multi-directional communication, and non-charismatic leadership.

#### Possible Implications for Communication Theory and Research

Is it possible that any of the conclusions discussed so far in this chapter may have a bearing on theory and research in communication on the relationship between communication and development?

There seems to be a growing body of research on communication and development in the countries of Third World. Much of this research recognizes the fact that masses of the people of these countries are still illiterate, as they were when Gandhi and Mao led their people in search for new roads to development. Thus, throughout these countries the same question arises that confronted Gandhi

and Mao as leaders of their respective liberation movements. There are good reasons, therefore, to give more attention to India and China both before and after their liberation, as well as more attention to the forms of communication used by the anti-liberation forces.

#### More attention to India and China before and after Liberation

This is necessary not only because they are the biggest countries in the world, which is important, but also because they illustrate different tendencies in developments one taking the form of state-supported capitalism, and the other that of peasant-based socialism. This calls attention to the problem of conflicting development philosophies, which is the inescapable environment of any serious communication research. Therefore, the social scientists who are concerned with the use of communication as an instrument of development, must begin with some philosophical framework concerning the nature of development itself.

Anyone examining the role of communication in India and China today is bound to be impressed by the degree of conflict between competing interests reflected in the rapidly changing sequence of events. The source of the social conflict is the fact that a majority of the "westernised" (or "capitalist-roaders") leaders perceive themselves as directly dependent for fraternal values upon the western (or socialist) community, while the "native" intellectuals are more rooted in the parochial perspectives of the

social context. The latter reject foreign "solutions" while the former attempt a near-total incorporation of western capitalist or socialist models. Bringing the conflicting issues into the open, therefore, may mean the opening up of new approaches and possibilities. This is particularly true in the developing countries where development is a process of struggle between divergent ideologies and power groups.

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This study/indicates that Gandhi and Mao were the "synthesizers" combining traditional symbols with the new political development. One such statement from Mao, which is very similar to the many that Gandhi made, illustrates their role as "synthesizers":

We must meet these foreign materials as we do our food...separated into essence to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded...so-called "wholesale-Westernization" is a mistaken viewpoint. China has suffered a great deal in the past from the formalist absorption of foreign things.<sup>8</sup>

The success of their movements indicates that they would have been swamped by the "westernised" or the "native" leaders if not for their almost intuitive contact with the masses who provided the necessary leverage and a strong base for their movements.

Comparative studies of messages during both pre-and post-revolutionary periods might give more useful insights into the present development process. Although the period of 1942-44 was critical to the success of the liberation struggle, content analysis

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<sup>8</sup>Han Suyin, op. cit., p.401

of messages during the third of a century after 1944 could reveal different findings. For instance, more research might reveal an element of elitism in Mao's mass line after the communist victory in 1949. Even more significant may be an analysis of the messages during the entire period of national movements revealing the changing relationship between communication and social, economic, political and cultural development.

Furthermore, the underlying assumption here is that the anti-liberation forces had the weapons and the mass media but perhaps not the same kind of party and non-party organizations as did the liberation forces. Fuller study of the messages and the channels of communication of the anti-liberation forces might be very revealing.

This study suggests broader applicability, indicating the possibility that themes developed for liberation movements and the styles of communication of Gandhi and Mao may not be unique to those two countries. With certain adaptations they may suggest general imperatives for successful communication with the masses under similar social conditions where the leaders of national liberation movements feel they are fighting, if not for a new social order, then at least for national independence. Therefore, it would seem that content analysis, is an indispensable starting method to illuminate aspects of messages that are most relevant to national policy issues. A macro-systemic approach will help put the

communication issues in the context of developing countries' social systems and their internal conflicts as represented by different kinds of social movements for change and development.

A major program of combined research and action called Development Support Communication, is being carried out under the auspices of the United Nations' Development Program. DSC, which recognizes the connection between development and communication, is an ongoing activity in a few developing countries, such as India, Tanzania, and Guyana. In the further development of research along these lines, it may be fruitful to state the three propositions discussed above, as preliminary hypotheses or questions to guide the research. For instance: (1) To what extent is - or should be - some version of mass line being used or developed by Third World leaders; (2) to what extent are the multi-modal and multi-directional communication strategies being adopted in Third World countries or being designed by DSC services; (3) to what extent is leadership seen in non-charismatic terms as distinguished from efforts to use the new mass media to develop the imagery of "superhuman" leaders?

Empirical pursuit of these questions may throw light upon the efforts being mounted to surmount what seems to be invincible obstacles to development. In many parts of the world poverty, tribalism, caste, disease, natural disasters and neocolonialism seem to be immutable facts. In so far as communication research



may prove to be a helpful factor, it is possible that in some of these countries, as in India and China, these barriers to development might be surmounted by further development of the ideas of mass line, multi-modal and multi-directional modes, and non-charismatic leadership.

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**APPENDIX A**

Gandhi's Major Messages, 1942-44

## By Type of Documents

	<u>Editorial</u> , Jan. 18, '42 "Peace Organization." pp. 55-57	Occasion	<u>Length</u> (est. words) 3p-1,050
2	<u>Editorial</u> , Jan. 19, '42 "Real War Effort." pp. 57-59		1 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-420 words
3	<u>Speech</u> , Jan. 21, '42 pp. 59-63	Silver Jubilee Convocation of the Benares Hindu 'Varsity	5p-1,660 words
4	<u>Interview</u> , Jan. 22, '42	Congress Workers	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ p-788 words
5	<u>Article</u> , Jan. 23, '42 p.66		1p-325 words
6	<u>Conference</u> , Feb. 1, '42 pp. 67-71		5p-1,700 words
7	<u>Article</u> , Feb. 11, '42 pp.71-72		1p-350 words
8	<u>Interview</u> , Feb. '42 p.73 "Non-Violent Revolution"		$\frac{1}{2}$ p-175 words
9	<u>Article</u> , '42 "Plea For Calmness" p.74		1p-350 words
10	<u>Article</u> , '42 "Criminal Assaults" pp.76-79		3p-1,050 words
11	<u>Directive</u> , March 7, '42 pp.79-80		1p-350 words
12	<u>Interview</u> , '42 pp.80-82		2p-700 words
13	<u>Article</u> , March 16, '42 "Scorched Earth" pp.82-83		1p-350 words
14	<u>Interview</u> , '42 pp.83-84		1p-350 words

Gandhi's Major Messages, 1942-44

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|----|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 15 | <u>Article</u> , '42<br>"Non-Violent Resistance"<br>pp.84-86            |                                     | 2p-700 words                  |
| 16 | <u>Article</u> , April 13, '42<br>"That Ill-fated Proposal"<br>pp.90-92 |                                     | 2p-680 words                  |
| 17 | <u>Article</u> , April 26, '42<br>pp.93-96                              | <u>Harijan</u>                      | 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-1,137 words |
| 18 | <u>Article</u> , May 3, '42<br>pp.98-100                                | <u>Harijan</u>                      | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ p-525 words   |
| 19 | <u>Article</u> , May 11, '42<br>"To Every Briton"<br>pp.100-102         |                                     | 2p-700 words                  |
| 20 | <u>Press Conference</u> , May 18, '42<br>pp.103-111                     |                                     | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ p-2,625 words |
| 21 | <u>Article</u> , May 31, '42<br>p.111                                   | <u>Harijan</u>                      | $\frac{1}{2}$ p-175 words     |
| 22 | <u>Interview</u> , May 31, '42<br>pp.111-114                            | Rashtriya<br>Yuvak Sangh<br>members | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ p-875 words   |
| 23 | <u>Interview</u> , June, '42<br>pp.114-127                              | Louis Fischer                       | 11p-3,850 words               |
| 24 | <u>Interview</u> , June, '42<br>pp.127-133                              | International<br>News Service       | 5p-1,700 words                |
| 25 | <u>Interview</u> , June, '42<br>pp.133-137                              | Associated<br>Press                 | 5p-1,700 words                |
| 26 | <u>Letter to a correspondent</u><br>June, '42<br>pp.137-139             |                                     | 2p-680 words                  |
| 27 | <u>Letter</u> June, '42   | <u>The Times</u>                    | $\frac{1}{2}$ p-175 words     |
| 28 | <u>Letter</u> , June 14, '42<br>pp.141-144                              | Chiang Kai-<br>shek                 | 3p-1,050 words                |
| 29 | <u>Letter</u> , July, '42<br>pp.144-145                                 | President<br>Roosevelt              | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ p-525 words   |

Gandhi's Major Messages, 1942-44

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|----|--|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| 30 | <u>Article</u> , '42<br>pp.145-146         |                                | 1p-350 words    |
| 31 | <u>Editorial</u> , July, '42<br>pp.147-48  | <u>Harijan</u>                 | 1½p-525 words   |
| 32 | <u>Interview</u> , '42<br>pp.152-162       | Press                          | 10p-3,500 words |
| 33 | <u>Letter</u> '42<br>pp.162-163            |                                | 1½p-525 words   |
| 34 | <u>Letter</u> , '42<br>pp.164-165          |                                | 1½p-525 words   |
| 35 | <u>Letter</u> , '42<br>pp.165-168          | <u>Harijan</u>                 | 3p-1,050 words  |
| 36 | <u>Interview</u> , '42<br>pp.168-170       | Press                          | 1½p-525 words   |
| 37 | <u>Article</u> , Aug. 2, '42<br>pp.173-176 | <u>Harijan</u>                 | 3½p-1,225 words |
| 38 | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.176-78                 |                                | 2p-700 words    |
|    | <u>1942</u>                                |                                |                 |
| 39 | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.179-181                | <u>Manchester<br/>Guardian</u> | 2½p-875 words   |
| 40 | <u>Letter</u><br>p.182                     | British rulers                 | 1p-325 words    |
| 41 | <u>Speech</u><br>pp.187-190                |                                | 2½p-875 words   |
| 42 | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.217-218                | British Rulers                 | 1¼p-437 words   |
| 43 | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.227-228                | " "                            | 1p-325 words    |
| 44 | <u>Letter</u><br>p.228                     | " "                            | 1p-325 words    |

Gandhi's Major Messages, 1942-44

- |             |  |   |                 |
|-------------|--|---|-----------------|
| 45          | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.230-231                    | British Rulers                              | 1½p-525 words   |
| <u>1943</u> |  |   |                 |
| 46          | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.236-237                    | " "   | 2p-640 words    |
| 47          | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.240-242                    | " "   | 2p-700 words    |
| 48          | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.243-44                     | " "   | 1p-350 words    |
| 49          | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.262-274                    | " "   | 12p-4,200 words |
| 50          | <u>Letter</u><br>pp.276-287                    | " "   | 10p-3,500 words |
| <u>1944</u> |  |   |                 |
| 51          | <u>Speech</u><br>pp.313-317                    | Congressmen                                 | 3½p-1,225 words |
| 52          | <u>Article</u><br>pp.320-22                    |   | 2p-700 words    |
| 53          | <u>Interview</u> , July 14, Press<br>pp.324-27 |   | 3p-1,050 words  |
| 54          | <u>Interview</u><br>pp.330-331                 |   | 1½p-525 words   |
| 55          | <u>Article</u> , August 9<br>pp.335-337        | 'Quit India'<br>anniversary                 | 2p-700 words    |
| 56          | <u>Article</u> , October<br>pp.363-366         |   | 3p-1,050 words  |
| 57          | <u>Interview</u> "<br>pp.366-369               |   | 3p-1,050 words  |
| 58          | <u>Speech</u> , November 19, '44<br>pp.369-371 | All-India<br>Basic Education<br>at Sevagram | 2p-700 words    |

		<u>Pages</u>	<u>Words</u>
Speeches	4		
Editorials	3		
Articles	16		
Directives or Resolutions	1		
Interviews or Press Confe- rences	15		
Letters	19		
TOTAL	58	158	50,077

Not included: "Death of Kasturba" (Gandhi's wife) pp.293-309  
"Gandhi-Jinnah Talks" pp.338-356

SOURCE: Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (8 vols., 1951-54) by D.G. Tendulkar, Vol. VI, published by the Government of India, 1953

Mao's Major Messages, 1942-44

## By Type of Documents

	<u>Occasion</u>	<u>Audience</u>	<u>Length</u> (est. words)
1 <u>Speech</u> , Feb.1, '42 "Rectify the Party's Style in Work" pp.28-45	Inauguration of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party		18p-7,000 words
2 <u>Speech</u> , Feb.8, '42 "Oppose the Party 'Eight-Legged' Essay"	Cadres meeting in Yenan		17p-6,500 words
3 <u>Speech</u> , May 23, '42 "Talks at the Yanan Forum on Art and Literature" pp.46-62			31p-12,400 words
4 <u>Editorial</u> , Sept.7, '42 "An Extremely Important Policy"	<u>Liberation Daily</u>		3 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-1,440 words
5 <u>Editorial</u> , Oct.12, '42 "The Turning-Point in World War II" pp.98-103	<u>Liberation Daily</u>		5 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-2,240 words
6 <u>Speech</u> , Nov.6, '42 "In Celebration of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the October Revolution" p.104			1p-240 words
7 <u>Article</u> , Dec. 1942 "Economic and Financial Problems During the Anti-Japanese War"	Report: <u>Economic and Financial Problems</u>		6p-2,200 words
8 <u>Resolution</u> , 1943 "On Method of Leadership" pp.111-117	Central Committee of the Communist Party		6 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-260 words
9 <u>Editorial</u> , July 12, '43 "Some Questions Put To The Kuomintang" pp.118-125	<u>Liberation Daily</u>		7 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-2,840 words



Mao's Major Messages, 1942-44

10. Directive, Oct. 1, '43 Central Committee of 5p-2,000 words  
 "Spread In The Base the Chinese Communist  
 Areas The Campaign For Party to the membership  
 Rent Reduction, For  
 Production, And For The  
 Government and Protection  
 Of The People"  
 pp. 126-130
11. Editorial, Oct. 5, '43 Liberation Daily 17p-6,700 words  
 "A Comment On The  
 Eleventh Plenary Session  
 Of The Kuomintang's  
 Central Executive Committee  
 And The Second Session Of  
 The Third People's Political  
 Council"  
 pp. 131-147
12. Speech, Nov. 29, '43 Reception to the 9p-3,500 words  
 "Let Us Get Organised" labour heroes of  
 pp. 148-156 the Shensi-Kansu-  
 Ningsia border  
 region
13. Article, April 12, '44 Preparatory to the 13 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-5,270 words  
 "Our Study And The Seventh National  
 Current Situation" Congress of the Party  
 pp. 157-170
14. Speech, Sept. 8, '44 Memorial meeting 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ p-600 words  
 "Serve The People" for Comrade Chang  
 pp. 219-220 Szu-teh, held by orgs.  
 subordinate to Central  
 Committee of Chinese  
 Communist Party
15. Editorial, Oct. 11, '44 Hsinhua News Agency 3p-1,200 words  
 "On Chiang Kai-Shek's  
 Speech On The Double  
 Tenth Festival"  
 pp. 221-224

Mao's Major Messages, 1942-44

16	<u>Speech</u> , Oct. 30, '44 "The United Front in Cultural Work" pp. 225-227	Conference of Cultural and educational workers	2 $\frac{1}{4}$ p-870 words
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	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Words</u>
Speeches	7	
Editorials	5	
Articles	2	
Directives or Resolutions	2	
TOTAL	<u>16</u>	111
		57,600

NOTE: Not included "Appendix: Resolution On Some Questions In The History Of Our Party." From page 171 to 218, probably drafted by Mao. It was adopted on April 20, 1945.

SOURCE: English edition of The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV, based on the Chinese edition, People's Publishing House, Peking, July 1952. (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London: 1954)

APPENDEK B

Gandhi's Major Themes, 1942-44

Theme  
No.

Document 1, 1942

- 1 The elite must work for the welfare of the masses
- 2 The newspaper must be resumed to disseminate my views on national issues
- 3 Imperialism is the enemy facing our country
- 4 'Back to the villages' is the most effective program to serve the people
- 5 Personal contact with the villagers must be established through constructive program

Document 2, 1942

- 6 The rich must work for the common good
- 7 Education is necessary to arouse the villagers
- 8 Spinning will provide employment

Document 3, 1942

- 9 The Congress Party must serve the interests of the poor
- 10 The students must learn their national language
- 11 English language has enslaved the Indian mind
- 12 Universities must serve the needs of the masses
- 13 Universities must work toward communal harmony
- 14 Students must become models of simple living

Document 4, 1942

- 15 We must have political power to decide our own future
- 16 We are confident of our victory

17 Production of cloth will provide employment

18 Influence depends on serving the masses

Document 5, 1942

19 Hindustani helps personal contact with illiterates

20 Hindustani creates national unity

Document 6, 1942

21 Experts must help and advice the villagers

22 Cooperatives are economically beneficial to the masses

23 We must pay attention to humanitarianism

Document 7, 1942

24 The rich must become trustees of their wealth for the common welfare of the poor

25 Preserving the cattle is economically beneficial

Document 8, 1942

26 Power of nonviolence is unique

27 Adoption of nonviolence has increased the prestige of the Congress

Document 9, 1942

28 Nonviolence is the most effective method to fight a powerful opponent

29 There must be a living personal bond between the leaders and the masses

Document 10, 1942

30 The press must carry a sustained agitation against violence of the British

31 Best weapon is fearlessness

Document 11, 1942

32 Elite with skills should help the villagers

33 Constructive programs will improve economic conditions in villages

Document 12, 1942

34 Able-bodied person should be given employment instead of charity

35 Self-reliance inevitably means real independence

Document 13, 1942

36 Humanitarianism must be given top priority in military preparations

Document 14, 1942

37 Retreat is often a unique method of resistance

Document 15, 1942

38 Nonviolent resistance is uniquely suited to the practice of the dumb millions

39 Confidence in our mission is the basis of our struggle for independence

40 Nonviolence is the best method to pursue our goal

41 Our goal must be the determined pursuit of the constructive program

Document 16, 1942

42 National harmony must be established

43 Nonviolence must be followed scrupulously by rank and file

44 India must have control over her own defence

Document 17, 1942

45 It is morally wrong for Britain to enslave Asian and African races

46 Britain is following the imperialist policy of 'divide and rule'

47 Political freedom will enable Indian leaders to solve national problems

48 We trust the masses never to take to violence

49 Nonviolence will be successful if the whole nation adopts it

Document 18, 1942

50 Britain is morally indefensible while she rules India

51 Morality demands that British withdraw

Document 19, 1942

52 Britain will gain morally if they leave India voluntarily

53 Britain is exploiting India

54 Britain's war is impoverishing India

55 Britain's immoral domination of India must end

Document 20, 1942

56 Unadulterated noncooperation will sterilize opponent's weapons

57 Britain's war will have moral basis only if she grants India's freedom

58 We must maintain unity to achieve independence

59 Free India will be a moral force for the good of mankind

Document 21, 1942

- 60 We should rely on ourselves to get rid of the British  
61 We must make heavy sacrifices in our struggle of deliverance

Document 22, 1942

- 62 Imperialism is the greatest of evils  
63 Noncooperation means not to do the ruler's bidding at any cost  
64 Confidence in nonviolence will overcome slavery

Document 23, 1942

- 65 Britain will benefit morally if she withdraws voluntarily  
66 Self-reliance is the best way to fight for independence

Document 24, 1942

- 67 My moral appeal to Britain to free India is made in Britain's own interest  
68 Masses must be organized to strengthen the movement  
69 Nonviolence is uniquely suited to India's dumb millions  
70 Thousands of villagers are being oppressed by the British  
71 The Congress Party is committed to serving millions of the poor in India

Document 25, 1942

- 72 Britain is exploiting India  
73 I want unadulterated independence  
74 Britain is spreading false propaganda against India  
75 It is immoral for any nation to hold another in bondage



Document 26, 1942

- 76 Discipline and sacrifice are necessary for nonviolence  
77 Confidence in nonviolence is protection against aggression

Document 27, 1942

- 78 Britain is oppressing the people of India  
79 Britain is alone responsible for violence  
80 I prefer anarchy to the present slavery of India

Document 28, 1942

- 81 We must be self-reliant in working out our own salvation  
82 I will run the risk of anarchy to win freedom

Document 29, 1942

- 83 Britain is exploiting India and Africa  
84 Britain's acceptance of my proposal will put her on a moral plane

Document 30, 1942

- 85 Civil disobedience is necessary for India's survival  
86 Passivity has led to most of our difficulties

Document 31, 1942

- 87 Britain practices the most organized and successful violence in India the world has seen

Document 32, 1942

- 88 Our demand is unconditional freedom  
89 Our demand is based on justice

90 For the first time in history the unique method of non-violence has been practiced by vast masses

Document 33, 1942

91 Congress must represent national interests

92 It is India's moral right to demand British withdrawal

93 Our demand is wholly just and vindicates justice

Document 34, 1942

94 Harijan may be suppressed by the British but my ideas cannot

95 Harijan propagates my ideas on nonviolence

Document 35, 1942

96 We appeal for British withdrawal in the name of justice

97 I have an undying faith in the responsiveness of human nature

Document 36, 1942

98 We have to make many sacrifices for our liberty

99 Initial act of justice is necessary for Britain to win the war

100 Britain intends to continue imperialism

Document 37, 1942

101 Congress must represent national interests of all

102 Autocracy must be converted into genuine trusteeship

103 The masses are pillars of strength of our movement

104 Education of the masses will lead to eradication of inequalities

Document 38, 1942

- 105 My movement serves the downtrodden masses  
106 Justice demands that Britain free India  
107 My deed will carry conviction against false propaganda

Document 39, 1942

- 108 Indian national government will be based upon the will  
of the majority of the people  
109 I have unflinching confidence in the efficacy of non-  
violence  
110 Indian press will help win the national cause  
111 National unity will end communal disharmony

Document 40, 1942

- 112 British are repressing an authentic national movement  
113 British oppression is causing suffering to millions  
114 It is the duty of the masses not to betray the movement  
by violence

Document 41, 1942

- 115 We must fight imperialism and not the British people  
116 Congress must represent the whole nation  
117 Power must belong to the people

Document 42, 1942

- 118 We must prepare for much higher sacrifices

Document 43, 1942

- 119 My activities are humanitarian and not political

Document 44, 1942

- 120 Congress policy must remain unequivocally nonviolent  
121 The British in India are responsible for violence  
122 The British repression is breeding discontent

Document 45, 1942

- 123 The British Government is spreading false propaganda  
124 My method is truthfulness in the face of falsehood  
125 The law of nonviolence knows no defeat

Document 46, 1943

- 126 The British are responsible for violence  
127 British repressiveness is daily increasing  
128 Only national government can relieve misery of poverty

Document 47, 1943

- 129 Civil disobedience is a legitimate method against the British  
130 I appeal to Highest Tribunal for justice

Document 48, 1943

- 131 I reiterate openly my confidence in nonviolence

Document 49, 1943

- 132 I am confident national movement cannot be defeated because nonviolence knows no defeat  
133 'Do or Die' means do your duty  
134 My method is based on nonviolence  
135 Congress is committed to attaining India's freedom

- 136 The British Government has invited violence when the people want to proceed peacefully

Document 50, 1943

- 137 'Quit India' movement aims to free India  
138 Adoption of nonviolence has raised the prestige of Congress  
139 The British Government is imperialist, not democratic

Document 51, 1944

- 140 Method of nonviolence has awakened the masses  
141 Wealthy must work for the welfare of the masses  
142 Only a national government can help the suffering poor  
143 Discipline and dedication is necessary to practice civil disobedience  
144 Harijan helps to convey my message to the people

Document 52, 1944

- 145 Press can advance the cause of India's freedom

Document 53, 1944

- 146 Nonviolence is my basic belief and practice  
147 Sacrifice of Congressmen has raised the status of India in the eyes of the world  
148 The method of nonviolence will bring India's freedom  
149 British rule is causing progressive poverty of people

Document 54, 1944

- 150 Only national government can establish democracy  
151 'Quit India' resolution demands that India be governed by Indians

Document 55, 1944

- 152 Civil disobedience is necessary to resist domination
- 153 Influence depends on truthfulness and sincerity
- 154 My movement aims toward achieving the welfare of the masses

Document 56, 1944

- 155 Discipline is as necessary for civil disobedience as it is for an armed struggle
- 156 Sacrifice is necessary to achieve independence
- 157 Education must help students to gain national consciousness
- 158 Duty toward the country must be kept in mind by the labor when making demands

Document 57, 1944

- 159 I visualize a system of trusteeship where there would be no poor
- 160 Discipline and sacrifice is real bulwark of people against injustice
- 161 Congress is fully committed to serving the toilers of the land
- 162 Noncooperation is the sovereign remedy for safeguarding farmer's interests

Document 58, 1944

- 163 You must take up the challenge of serving the villagers
- 164 We must establish a living personal link between ourselves and the people
- 165 New education is necessary to learn how to serve the people
- 166 Truthfulness must be followed in every action of our life

- 167 Nonviolence is a unique force for good
- 168 It is through new education that we learn to resist selfishness

Mao's Major Themes, 1942-44

Theme  
No.

Document 1, 1942

- 1 We must build up a centralized, unified Party
- 2 Intellectuals must serve the people
- 3 We must integrate theory with practice
- 4 Workers and peasants are more knowledgeable than intellectuals
- 5 National unity is necessary for which we are striving
- 6 Tolerance is a more effective treatment than violence in cases of political illness
- 7 Sectarianism within Party creates factional struggles
- 8 Subjectivism is incompatible with Party principles
- 9 Party serves the masses

Document 2, 1942

- 10 Learn the language of the masses which has content
- 11 Personal integrity determines influence
- 12 Learn from the common people how to bring change
- 13 Do not bluff people
- 14 Communist movement is scientific as it is based on truth
- 15 Agitation must be based on facts
- 16 Formalism has no real content

17 Speak simply and directly to the rank-and-file worker

Document 3, 1942

18 Merge with the people through art and literature

19 Serve the broad masses of the people

20 Cadre must undergo a long process of re-education

21 Cadre must gain knowledge of Marxism-Leninism

22 Imperialist culture undermines people's culture

23 Learn to understand the masses through their art and literature

24 Serve the people in a practical way through Marxism

25 Sectarianism disrupts the Party

26 Experts should serve chiefly the masses

27 Political struggle must be communicated through art and literature

28 Serve the masses to gain support

Document 4, 1942

29 We are confident of our victory

30 Party organization must be effectively channeled to reach the masses

31 We remain powerful in spite of our small organization

32 We shall become invincible

33 We shall finally defeat the enemy

Document 5, 1942

34 Fascism is based on aggression

35 We must stop fascist aggression



36 Stalingrad victory is a unique event for the world

37 We are confident the world situation will change

Document 6, 1942

38 We are confident of our own future victory

39 We have been waging a just war against the imperialists

40 Our Anti-Japanese war calls for sacrifice

41 The dawn of victory is already in sight

Document 7, 1942

42 Economic well-being of all is our slogan

43 Economic development will provide supplies

44 Do not tax the people too heavily

45 Serve the people to lighten their burden

46 Bureaucracy is harmful to the party

47 A united Party will achieve our goal

48 After victory people will be better off economically

Document 8, 1943

49 Link the general with the specific by studying facts

50 Link the leadership with the masses by personal example

51 Publicise general directives by personal contact

52 Conduct mass campaigns to establish links with masses

53 Discipline and sacrifice are the criteria for leaders

54 Personal contact is the best way to reach the masses

55 Trust the masses and follow "from the masses, to the masses" principle

- 56 Bureaucratic leadership is harmful
- 57 A well organized Party permits mobilization of masses
- 58 Education means learning the Marxist theory

Document 9, 1943

- 59 The Kuomintang-capitalist party has set itself against the Chinese people
- 60 The Communist Party stands for a united China
- 61 The Kuomintang is collaborating with the Japanese imperialists
- 62 It is the duty of the Kuomintang to strengthen Resistance to the enemy
- 63 Kuomintang is increasing the danger of a civil war
- 64 We consider our demands entirely just
- 65 The Kuomintang-capitalists are plotting the "dissolution" of the Communist Party which will weaken China.

Document 10, 1943

- 66 Rent reduction is mass organized struggle of the peasants
- 67 Press reports on the struggle will arouse the masses
- 68 Party members must set a personal example among the masses
- 69 Bureaucratic approach is harmful to economic development
- 70 Power means unity between the Party, the government, the army and the people
- 71 Launch a broad mass campaign to facilitate our struggle

Document 11, 1943

- 72 The Soviet Union will annihilate fascism and liberate people

- 73 Japanese imperialists will try to destroy Communists in  
China
- 74 Fascism will be buried beneath the waves of change
- 75 The world will enter a great age of liberation
- 76 Civil war will lead to the extinction of the Kuomintang
- 77 Kuomintang is deceiving people by false propaganda
- 78 All patriotic forces must unite and save China
- 79 Patriotic forces must work toward democracy and freedom
- 80 An unprecedented great change in human history is  
imminent

Document 12, 1943

- 81 We must combine fighting with mass organization
- 82 We shall certainly crush the Japanese imperialists
- 83 We are confident of winning
- 84 Self-reliance is of great significance to our struggle
- 85 Kuomintang is inflicting poverty on the people
- 86 Mutual-aid organizations will bring economic wellbeing
- 87 Mutual-aid was wisely discovered by the masses themselves
- 88 Personal contact with the masses must be established
- 89 Bureaucracy leads to communication barriers with the  
masses
- 90 Warlordism is the result of isolation from masses

Document 13, 1944

- 91 Learn from past experience in order to avoid making  
mistakes

- 92 Toleration can unite comrades
- 93 Concrete analysis of concrete conditions is Marxism
- 94 Chinese revolution is unique in its unusual protractedness
- 95 Unique feature of the Chinese revolution is the vital importance of rural base areas
- 96 Education of inner-Party comrades will strengthen Party
- 97 Chinese Communist Party has overcome enormous difficulties
- 98 We must study facts and problems of big cities
- 99 We must organize the masses in the big cities
- 100 Maintain close contact with masses to avoid mistakes
- 101 Learn the method of analysis of concrete facts
- 102 Chinese revolution will triumph

Document 14, 1944

- 103 It is of great significance to die for the interests of the people
- 104 We trust the judgement of the masses
- 105 Our goal is to liberate the entire nation, particularly the masses
- 106 We must be courageous in times of difficulty
- 107 It is our duty to struggle hard for the sake of people
- 108 Struggle necessarily entails sacrifice, and death is common
- 109 To die for the sake of people is to die a worthy death
- 110 Mass memorial meetings should become a regular practice
- 111 Mass mourning honoring the dead will express national unity

112 Wee are marching toward a common national goal

Document 15, 1944

113 Japanese imperialism is daily menaning China

114 Kuomintang lacks competence in political, military, economic or cultural field

115 Chiang Kai-shek must strengthen the United Front against enemy

116 Chiang Kai-shek must meet people's demand for democracy

117 Chiang is preparing for civil war against the Chinese Communist Party

118 Chiang will not succeed in any of his schemes

119 Chiang is repressing people into holding their tongues

Document 16, 1944

120 Japanese imperialism is mustering up all its strength for a last dying kick

121 War is our first priority in our struggle

122 Culture helps army to fight enemies in their minds

123 Under the present system broad masses are still illiterate

124 Education through a united front can fight illiteracy

125 Education should be expanded through schools, literacy classes and other means

126 Serve the people through trained doctors

127 Discipline is the first principle of the united front

128 Education through united front is important

129 Cultural workers must serve the people with enthusiasm

130 Cultural workers must work in close contact with the masses

- 131 The masses are capable of making up their own minds
- 132 Our cultural work will activate the masses
- 133 Personal example and deed makes people believe in workers

APPENDIX C

### Reliability

The reliability of the analysis was achieved by measuring agreement among two coders. Using Scott's inter-observer agreement coefficient for nominal scales;

$$= \frac{P_o - P_e}{1 - P_e}$$

where  $P_o$  is the proportion of observed agreements and  $P_e$  is the proportion of agreements that would be expected by chance. If the reliability test produces the following contingency table

		Coder 1			
		1	2.....j		
Coder 2	1	$n_{ij}$		n <sub>.1</sub>	
	2			n <sub>.2</sub>	
	1			n <sub>.i</sub>	
		n <sub>1.</sub>	n <sub>2.</sub>	n <sub>j.</sub>	n <sub>..</sub>

then the observed proportion of agreements is :

$$P_o = \frac{1}{n_{..}} \sum_i n_{ii}$$

and the expected proportion is:

$$P_e = \frac{1}{n_{..}^2} \sum_i n_{.i} n_{.i}$$

We accept variables as reliable if  $\pi$  is .7 or larger.



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