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Some Aspects of the Interaction of Speaker and Hearer in the Construction of the Turn at Talk in Natural Conversation

Charles Goodwin

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Some Aspects of the Interaction of Speaker and Hearer in the Construction of the Turn at Talk in Natural Conversation

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE INTERACTION OF SPEAKER AND HEARER
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TURN AT TALK IN NATURAL
CONVERSATION

Charles Goodwin


A DISSERTATION

in

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Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of
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for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Supervisor of Dissertation



Graduate Group Chairman

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. Preliminary Definitions

Some of the phenomena to be investigated in this dissertation will here be tentatively defined. The present definitions are tentative because I believe that precise definitions of these phenomena can only be obtained by empirical investigation of their properties.¹ When the research that has investigated these phenomena is reviewed later in this chapter some of these definitions will be made more precise, though at no point will it be claimed that completely adequate definitions have been formulated.

I.1 Conversation

Goffman has noted that two different approaches can be taken to the definition of conversation. One can try to capture:

¹With respect to definitions for the terms "language" and "word" Vološinov (1973:45) notes:

We do not of course, have in mind anything like a conclusive definition of these concepts. Such a definition (insofar as any scientific definition may be called conclusive) might come at the end of a study, but not at its beginning. When beginning an investigation, one needs to construct methodological guidelines, not definitions. It is essential to separate it from the reality surrounding it and to make a preliminary delimitation of it. At the outset of an investigation, it is not so much the intellectual faculty for making formulas and definitions that leads the way, but rather it is the eyes and hands attempting to get the feel of the actual presence of the subject matter.

the special sense in which the term tends to be used in daily life, which use, perhaps, warrants a narrow restricted definition. Thus, conversation, restrictively defined, might be identified as the talk occurring when a small number of participants come together and settle into what they perceive to be a few moments cut off from (or carried on to the side of) instrumental tasks, a period of idling felt to be an end in itself, during which everyone is accorded the right to talk as well as to listen and without reference to a fixed schedule; everyone is accorded the status of someone whose overall evaluation of the subject matter at hand--whose editorial comments, as it were--is to be encouraged and treated with respect; and no final agreement or synthesis is demanded, differences of opinion to be treated as unprejudicial to the continuing relationship of the participants. (1975:36, footnote 17)

Alternatively the term can be used to provide a very general description of talk:

Following the practice in sociolinguistics, "conversation" will be used in a loose way as an equivalent of talk or spoken interaction. (Ibid:36, footnote 17)²

It is in this sense of the term that the word "conversation" is used in this dissertation.

² A similarly broad definition of conversation is provided by Schegloff (1968:1075-1076):

I use "conversation" in an inclusive way. I do not intend to restrict its reference to the "civilized art of talk" or to "cultured interchange" as in the usages of Oakshott (1959) or Priestly (1926), to insist on its casual character thereby excluding service contacts (as in Landis and Burt 1924), or to require that it be sociable joint action, identity related, etc. (as in Watson and Potter 1962). "Dialogue", while being a kind of conversation, has special implication derived from its use in Plato, psychiatric theorizing, Buber, and others, which limits its usefulness as a general term. I mean to include chats as well as service contacts, therapy sessions as well as asking for and getting the time of day, press conferences as well as exchanges whispers of "sweet nothings". I have used "conversation" with this general reference in mind, occasionally borrowing the still more general term "state

Despite the broad scope of the term when it is used in this fashion, conversation is still but a special case of focused interaction and as such stands in contrast to unfocused interaction:

The communicative behavior of those immediately present to one another can be considered in two steps. The first deals with unfocused interaction, that is, the kind of communication that occurs when one gleans information from another person present by glancing at him, if only momentarily, as he passes into and then out of one's view. Unfocused interaction has to do largely with the management of sheer and mere copresence. The second step deals with focused interaction, the kind of interaction that occurs when persons gather close together and openly cooperate to sustain a single focus of attention, typically by taking turns at talking. (Goffman 1963:24)

Placing conversation in this typology raises some analytic difficulties. Because Goffman bounds the area of his investigation in terms of copresence, conversations between nonpresent parties, such as phone calls, are excluded from it.³ The distinctions he makes nevertheless remain analytically valuable for the investigation of conversation.

Goffman also notes that though conversation is defined in terms of talk it can include behavior other than talk:

of talk" from Erving Goffman.

³Elsewhere (1953:113) Goffman notes that:

(T)he criterion of immediate presence provides a heuristic delimitation of scope, not an analytical one. From the point of view of communication face-to-face interaction does not seem to present a single important characteristic that is not found--at least within certain limits--in mediated communication situations.

What, then, is talk viewed interactionally? It is an example of that arrangement by which individuals come together and sustain matters having a ratified, joint, current, and running claim upon attention. Games provide another example . . . But no resource is more effective as a basis for joint involvement than speakings. Words are the great device for fetching speaker and hearer into the same focus of attention and into the same interpretive schema that applies to what is thus attended. But that words are the best means to this end does not mean that words are the only one or that the resulting social organization is intrinsically verbal in character. Indeed, it is when a set of individuals have joined together to maintain a state of talk that nonlinguistic events can most easily function as moves in a conversation. Yet, of course, conversation constitutes an encounter of a special kind. It is not positional moves of tokens on board that figure as the prime concern; it is utterances, very often ones designed to elicit other utterances or designed to be verbal responses to these elicitations (Goffman 1975:33).

While recognizing the place of nonlinguistic events in conversation Goffman does not lose sight of its essential character as talk. In this dissertation conversation is taken to include nonlinguistic as well as linguistic behavior, and both will be investigated; but talk is seen to occupy a central place in the structure of conversation.

I.2 Turn-Taking

A basic empirical finding about conversation, one that has been discovered independently by different investigators (see for example Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, Goffman 1964:135, Duncan 1974, Jaffe and Feldstein 1970:9, Allen and Guy 1974:30, 177, Yngve 1970:1-2, Argyle 1969:201-202), and can be seen by even casual inspection of almost any fragment of conversation is that talk within it proceeds through a sequence of turns. Indeed Allen and Guy (1974:224) note that:

The word "converse" comes from two Latin elements: con and vertere which mean to turn together in a continuing process of reversal.

Miller (1963:418) gives this phenomenon the status of a language universal but notes that it does not seem intrinsically necessary:

Consider . . . the remarkable fact that conversational partners alternate between talking and listening. This reciprocity, which I assume is universal, is not a necessary consequence of any auditory or physiological inability to speak and hear simultaneously; one voice is poor masking noise for another. There is no a priori reason why two people who have questions to ask one another could not question simultaneously and answer simultaneously. Nevertheless we alternate.

In the abstract the phenomenon of turn-taking seems quite easy to define. The talk of one party bounded by the talk of others constitutes a turn, with turn-taking being the process through which the party doing the talk of the moment is changed.

A number of problems with such a definition emerge when actual conversation is closely examined. For example, both simultaneous talk and silence between the talk of different parties are regularly found. Such phenomena raise relevant theoretical questions about the proper definition of the turn's boundaries as well as the process through which it is exchanged.

However, providing a better description of either the turn or turn-taking requires careful investigation of actual data. Such analysis is beyond the scope of the present attempt to provide preliminary definitions. Though the definition given above will eventually be found inadequate it does at least locate a phenomenon that can be made the

subject of further investigation. When research into the structure of turn-taking is discussed, other definitions of the turn will be examined in terms of their ability to accurately characterize the phenomena being studied.

I.3 Types of Participants

The term "participant" will be used to refer to anyone engaged in a conversation. The use of this term implies reference to a specific conversation. For example, on a busy street several different "withs" (Goffman 1971:19-27) may be simultaneously engaged in conversation. A party is a participant to the conversation in his "with" but not a participant to conversations in other withs.⁴ Someone not part of a relevant conversation will be called a nonparticipant. In many cases, such as the street example, this distinction is quite clear. However, at other times, for example when a new member is joining a casual group, the distinction between participant and nonparticipant may be ambiguous or even one of the events at issue in the interaction. I wish to leave the manner in which the distinction is formulated in such cases a

⁴ Goffman (1953:116-117) examines in more detail some of the theoretical issues raised by such a situation. He notes that while directed information will be confined to a single conversational cluster, undirected information, for example one's choice of clothes and companions, will be available to all in one's physical presence. These issues are given more extended treatment in Goffman (1963) where some of the same distinctions are examined with respect to differences between focused and unfocused interaction.

matter for empirical investigation. I also wish to use the term participant in a broad enough sense to include someone who is momentarily disattending the conversation.

A party whose turn is in progress at a particular point in time will be called a speaker. In that pauses may occur within a turn a party may be a speaker even though he is not saying anything at the moment. Because the term speaker is defined in terms of the turn, in some circumstances, such as simultaneous talk, whether or not a party is a speaker may be subject to dispute. (For analysis of this and related issues see Jefferson (1973)).

Duncan (1974:302) has defined an "auditor" as "a participant who does not claim the speaking turn at any given moment."

This definition seems inadequate in a number of respects. First, Schegloff (1968:1092-1093) has noted that:

(C)onversation is a "minimally two-party" activity. That requirement is not satisfied by the mere copresence of two persons, one of whom is talking. It requires that there be both a "speaker" and a "hearer." . . . "hearer-ship" can be seen as a locus of rules, and a status whose incumbency is subject to demonstration . . .

Second, a number of different types of nonspeaking participants must be differentiated. Goffman (1975:3) makes the following distinctions:

Observe now that, broadly speaking, there are three kinds of listeners to talk: those who overhear, whether or not their unratified participation is inadvertent and whether or not it has been encouraged; those who are ratified participants but (in the case of more than two-person talk) are not specifically addressed by the speaker; and those ratified participants who are addressed, that is,

oriented to by the speaker in a manner to suggest that his words are particularly for them, and that some answer is therefore anticipated from them, more so than from the other ratified participants. (I say "broadly speaking" because all sorts of minor variations are possible--for example, speaker's practice of drawing a particular participant into an exchange and then turning to the other participants as if to offer him and his words for public delectation.)

(For other discussion on different types of listeners see Bales 1970:6 and Philips 1974:162-163; for an early statement on the importance of conceptualizing an utterance as being addressed to a recipient with specific characteristics see Vološinov 1973:85-86.)

In describing participants to the turn it will be useful to distinguish three different levels of organization.

First the activity⁵ of conversation provides a set of positions for the participants, the most salient being speaker and hearer. These positions have an ongoing relevance to the conversation in that different kinds of actions such as speech and silence are appropriate to each. These positions also differ in terms of the number of parties who can appropriately occupy each. While only one party can occupy the position of speaker at any moment the position of recipient is not restricted to any specified number of participants. Through the process of turntaking the parties occupying these positions are changed.

Second, distinct from the positions provided by the activity are the actions of individual participants displaying incumbency or nomin-

⁵On the analytic usefulness of using activities to describe some elements of social organization see Goodenough (1971:30).

cumbency⁶ in these positions. Simultaneous talk is a noticeable event, in part because two individuals are displaying behavior appropriate to a position that should be occupied by one. How participants display their occupancy of the positions provided by the activity of conversation, especially the position of hearer, is one of the topics to be investigated in this dissertation.

Though events on this level of organization are performed by single individuals, they are nonetheless social and include a projection about the other as well as a display about the self. Consider the case of one party, A, addressing an utterance to another, B, who is however, attending a different speaker, C. In order to adequately describe A's action one has to include the projection of B as an addressee. That description is unaffected by whether or not B displays hearership to A.

⁶ It must be recognized that displays of nonincumbency can be as carefully and relevantly constructed as displays of incumbency. For example a speaker might begin an utterance addressed to a specific party and inappropriate to others present. Before the recipient of the utterance has been made clear one of the inappropriate parties may begin to attend the speaker as a hearer. The speaker might then emphasize who his addressee is (for example with an address term) while avoiding the inappropriate hearer. Upon recognizing that the utterance is not being directed to him, the inappropriate recipient might then actively turn his attention elsewhere. In such a situation both nonhearership and nonaddress have been carefully displayed.

B's own actions relevant to the position of hearer can be described separately. Further, a display of hearership on B's part includes a projection of the party he is attending as speaker. Units which provide projections of the matching identities of both self and other have been termed "identity relationships" by Goodenough (1965:6).

The term "hearer" can thus refer to three quite different objects. First it might designate the complementary position to "speaker" provided by the activity of conversation. Second it might refer to the addressee of an act by a speaker. Third it might designate a party performing acts in his own right relevant to the position of hearer. If these distinctions are not kept in mind confusion results since, for example, a party may be an addressee without acting as a hearer.

A third level of organization is provided by events that can only be described in terms of the actions of more than one individual.⁷ For example, the exchange of turns in conversation requires action by at least two parties, one who changes his behavior from speaking to silence, and another who moves from silence to speaking. The actions of either alone are insufficient to provide for an exchange of turns.

⁷ John Smith (personal communication) has reported that the distinction between an act toward another by one individual and an act defined in terms of the behavior of several individuals has raised conceptual problems in ethology. Thus the analysis of a "display" is appropriate to a social act by a single individual, a greeting for example, but cannot be applied to a social act defined by the actions of several individuals, for example, a handshake.

For a definition of display see Smith (1974:332). My own use of the word is not meant to imply the technical, evolutionary sense it has as a term in ethology.

Within the turn events such as the mutual address of a speaker toward the hearer and the orientation of the hearer or lack of it toward the speaker are defined on this level of organization. What Goffman spoke of as "ratification" also belongs here.⁸ The identity assumed by one party is ratified not by his own actions but by the action of another who assumes a complementary identity toward him. For example, it is quite common in conversation that while a speaker is addressing an utterance to one party, another, who hasn't been attending him, will also begin to orient to him. In such circumstances speakers frequently address a subsequent part of their turn to the new party thus ratifying him as a hearer.

The term "collaborative action" has been given to events on this level of organization by Sacks and his colleagues and they have provided extensive investigation of their structure in conversation. (See for example, Schegloff and Sacks 1973, Jefferson 1973, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974).

It should be noted that the terms speaker and hearer are being used here in a slightly different way than they are usually employed in linguistics. The present emphasis is on the complementary positions they describe in a particular social arrangement. In linguistics the social character of these terms is usually not given much attention. Rather, the speaker is conceptualized primarily as an entity capable of

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A discussion of the reciprocal quality of ratification is found in Goffman (1967:34) and Goffman (1964:35).

constructing sentences and as such is not generally distinguished analytically from his listener who is assumed to possess a similar competence in order to be able to comprehend sentences. Thus Chomsky (1965:3) refers to "an ideal speaker-listener". The present use of these terms is, however, consistent with the linguistic practice of formulating definitions distributionally (see for example, Lyons 1969:147).

I.4 Units of Talk

Linguistics and allied fields such as kinesics have provided a rich technical vocabulary for describing the units regularly found in conversation. This vocabulary is not, however, without its problems. First, it has been developed within two separate linguistic paradigms, which might loosely be called structuralism and generative grammar. These paradigms make very different assumptions about both the nature of the phenomena being examined and what a proper theoretical description of that phenomenon consists of. Therefore, classifications of phenomena formulated within these different theoretical frameworks are likely not to be consistent with each other. For example, Scheflen (1974:19) defines a sentence as follows:

A syntactic sentence is not identified according to a grammatic structure; it is instead that unit of speech that is marked off by certain traditional behaviors that accompany the stream of speech.

Such a definition of the sentence would not be accepted within the framework of transformational grammar. Indeed, Lyons (1972:61) argues that from the perspective of contemporary linguistics "sentences never occur in speech". Rather (Lyons 1969:176):

As a grammatical unit, the sentence is an abstract entity in terms of which the linguist accounts for the distributional relations holding within utterances. In this sense of the term, utterances never consist of sentences, but of one or more segments of speech (or written text) which can be put into correspondence with the sentences generated by the grammar.

For my analysis I will find it necessary to examine the details of actual speech as well as abstract linguistic units which do not stand in a one-to-one relationship with the sounds in the speech stream.⁹ I will use the term "utterance" to refer to the stream of speech actually produced by a speaker in conversation and the word "sentence" as well as related terms such as "phrase" and "clause," to refer to abstract entities capable of describing distributional relationships within and between utterances.

Bloomfield (1946:170) defines a sentence as "an independent linguistic form, not included by virtue of any grammatical construction in any larger linguistic form". Though the structural independence of the

⁹For example, the word "put" occurs twice in the following fragment of speech but only once in the sentence produced through that speech:

Dianne: He pu:t uhm, ((0.7 second pause)) Tch!
Put crabmeat on th'bo::dum.

Were I unable to distinguish these different levels of organization, or were I committed to a theoretical framework that recognized the analytic validity of only one, my ability to adequately analyze the structure of conversation would be seriously compromised.

(This example is taken from tape #G.50(03;45). The system used to transcribe it can be found on pages 111-120.)

sentence can be called into question¹⁰ this definition remains useful.

In defining "utterance" as the actual stream of speech I meant to include the entire vocal production of the speaker, not only those sounds which could be placed in correspondence with elements of sentences, but also phenomena such as midword plosives, inbreaths, laughter, crying, "uh's" and pauses. I also do not wish to separate a speaker's speech into subordinate utterances in terms of its sentence-like properties. Rather I wish to leave units on these different levels of analysis conceptually distinct and admit the possibility of an utterance containing several sentences as well as the possibility of a sentence being constructed through several utterances. The utterance can, however, be divided into sub-sections in terms of units appropriate to its own level of organization such as the "phonemic clause" or "breath-group". (A definition of the phonemic clause is provided by Boomer 1965:150. For a definition of the breath-group see Lieberman 1967:26-27. These units will be discussed in greater detail when research into the turn and related phenomena such as the utterance is examined.) For clarity I also wish to restrict the use of the term "utterance" to vocal phenomena and not, as Grice (1969:147) does, include the possibility of "sentence-like" nonvocal phenomena such as hand signals.

¹⁰The work of Sacks and his colleagues on the sequential organization of conversation has provided some analysis of the structures organizing separate sentences relative to each other (see for example, Schegloff 1968; Jefferson 1973; Sacks 1973). Within linguistics proper ties between different sentences have been examined by Gunter (1974); Hiz (1969), and in the work on discourse analysis to be discussed below.

The definition given the sentence also differentiates "discourse analysis" from the analysis of conversation. George Lakoff (1972:130) defines a "discourse" as "essentially a string of English sentences". In view of the distinction discussed above between utterance and sentence the study of discourse from the perspective of contemporary linguistics can be seen as quite different from the study of conversation. Work on discourse in linguistics (with the exception of the work of Labov to be discussed below) has in fact not examined sequences of actual talk but rather restricted itself to the study of hypothetical sentences. The structure of speech acts rather than turn taking has emerged as the central theoretical problem in this analysis. (A good sample of the work available on this issue can be found in Cole and Morgan 1975. For a critique of this approach from a sociolinguistic perspective see Hymes 1971:62.) Finally, in part because of the particular definition given discourse, analysts of it have not generally viewed events smaller than the sentence as within the scope of their inquiry while analysts of conversation have devoted considerable attention to such phenomena (see for example Sacks 1972; Jefferson 1974a; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974). The analysis of discourse is thus not the same as the analysis of conversation.

One linguist stands as an exception to what has just been said. William Labov has consistently argued the importance of using actual speech for the study of language (for example 1972b:184). He has also recognized the importance of the sequential organization of talk for the study of discourse. Thus he states (1972b:252):

The fundamental problem of discourse analysis is to show how one utterance follows another in a rational, rule-governed manner -- in other words, how we understand coherent sentences.

Finally, he has provided analysis of specific discourse structures operative in actual talk (for example, Ritual Insults (1972a, Chapter 8), Narratives (Ibid., Chapter 9) and Requests, Labov and Fanshel. (in press). However, with the exception of the work of Labov, analysts of discourse and analysts of conversation have been examining different types of phenomena from different theoretical perspectives.

The units of talk considered until this point have all been vocal. However the definition of conversation provided at the beginning of this chapter was left broad enough to include other types of behavior. Indeed this interdependence is so strong that the boundary between language and non-language emerges as a difficult theoretical problem. For example, Lyons (1972:53) notes:

Intonation and stress . . . are almost universally regarded as being part of language. They are non-verbal: they do not identify or form part of the words of which the utterance is composed. And yet they are an essential part of what is commonly referred to as "verbal signals". If I have laboured this point unduly, it is because it is not clear to me whether the term 'non-verbal communication', as it is used by many authors, is intended to include the essential linguistic non-verbal component in verbal communication or not.

Even more difficult problems are found with the definition of paralinguistics:

The term paralinguistics is particularly troublesome. As Crystal (1969:140) says. "There is substantial disagreement . . . in the literature, and the tendency has been to broaden its sense to a point where it becomes useless." Crystal himself . . . restricts the term to features of vocal signals. However, a case

can be made for applying it . . . to those gestures, facial expressions, eye-movements, etc, which play a supporting role in normal communication by means of spoken language . . . The important point about paralinguistic features is that they differ from prosodic features in not being so closely integrated with the grammatical structure of utterances.

I have been at some pains in this section to emphasize the point that there is room for considerable disagreement as to where the boundary should be drawn between language and non-language.

In order to deal with such problems¹¹ Lyons finds it useful to distinguish the different types of behavior that can be found in talk in terms of overlapping rather than mutually exclusive categories. Thus, in order to adequately characterize verbal, prosodic and paralinguistic features Lyons (1972:52) proposes that:

It will be convenient to recognize two separate dichotomies; and for this purpose, I will use the terms linguistic


11

Linguists are not the only ones who have found the term 'nonverbal' awkward. Thus, Worth and Adair (1972:12) note that:

The term nonverbal is ambiguous. It has been used to refer to almost anything expressive or communicative that falls outside the strict definitions of language proposed by professional linguists. Thus, nonverbal has been used to describe such diverse acts as handwriting, painting, movies, and graphics; gesture, facial expression, and hand-body movement; music in its written form; as well as such language-connected acts as pauses, shouting and whispering, and speech rhythm. Many of the above activities are directly connected by correlation or transformation to speech and are more properly referred to as metaverbal . . . We will use the term nonverbal when we wish to make a point of separating what we are talking about from speech or spoken language in general, but it is important to understand that we do not want to imply by nonverbal that nonverbal events are not language related.

(subsuming verbal and prosodic) and non-segmental (subsuming prosodic and paralinguistic). For linguistic and paralinguistic features taken together I will introduce the term locutional . . . My reason for wishing to establish these two different dichotomies is that, from one point of view, the verbal and the prosodic components go together; they would definitely be regarded as part of language by almost all linguists, whereas the situation with respect to paralinguistic features is far less clear. From another point of view, however, prosodic and paralinguistic features go together: they are 'superimposed', as it were, upon the segments (phonemes, syllables, words, etc.) which constitute the verbal component of the utterance.

The complete set of distinctions proposed by Lyons can be displayed most simply with the following chart.¹² (The classification system represented by the chart is described in Lyons 1972:49-55. The chart itself is taken from the comments of the editor, Hinde, on Lyons' article, Hinde (1972:91).



¹²The term "gesture" which Lyons employs has been shown by Birdwhistell (for example 1966:184-185) not to describe a relevant analytic unit of non-vocal communication. Lyons does not however, use this term in a way that would invalidate the set of distinctions he draws.

Lyons' classification of the different kinds of behavior that can occur in the production of talk is more accurate and useful than the more frequent distinction between verbal and non-verbal behavior. In arguing that (Ibid:54)

The fact that there is such a complete and intimate interpenetration of language and non-language should always be borne in mind in considering the relationship between verbal and nonverbal communication

Lyons is in agreement with Birdwhistell (1970:162, see also Birdwhistell 1973:93-94) about the interrelationship of speech and body movement:

My own research has led me to the point where I am no longer willing to call either linguistic or kinesic systems communication systems. All of the emerging data seem to me to support the contention that linguistics and kinesics are intracommunicational systems. Only in their interrelationship with each other and with comparable systems from other sensory modalities are the emergent communications systems achieved.

Birdwhistell (for example 1970) provides very detailed description and analysis of the different kinds of non-vocal behavior that can occur in talk as well as the relationship of that behavior to speech. Birdwhistell (1970:xiii) has stated that his goal "was to develop a methodology which could exhaustively analyze the communicative behavior of the body". In this dissertation my primary analytic concern is not with nonvocal phenomena per se but with rather limited aspects of the structure of the turn at talk. I will therefore examine only a very small part of the nonvocal behavior that occurs in conversation, in essence, whether or not a participant is gazing toward a specified other. My decision to limit myself to this very narrow aspect of nonvocal be-

havior emerges in large part from my recognition of the complexity and intricate order Birdwhistell has demonstrated to be operative in this area.

II. Phenomena to be Investigated in this Dissertation

This dissertation will investigate some very limited aspects of the structure of the turn at talk in conversation. The scope of inquiry is defined in part by previous research on the structure of the turn. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson have demonstrated that many features of the turn's organization are provided by the procedures employed to organize turn-taking (see for example Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974. They have also examined many aspects of the turn's structure that are not the product of turn-taking (for example Schegloff 1972; Jefferson 1974) but that does not affect the distinction being drawn here. Their work will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter). The present investigation takes their work as a point of departure but will focus on aspects of the turn's structure not directly implicated in the process of turn-taking, but rather resulting from other aspects of its organization.

Analysis will focus specifically on interaction between speaker and hearer within the turn. It will be argued that one way in which a nonspeaking party can indicate whether or not he is acting as a hearer is by gazing at the speaker. Hearership can of course be demonstrated in other ways (this technique would obviously not be applicable to telephone conversation) but this is the only method that will be systematic-

ally investigated in this dissertation. Gaze can also be used by a speaker to indicate that the party being gazed at is an addressee of his utterance. Other techniques available to the speaker for indicating that his utterance is directed to some specified recipient will also be examined, especially in Chapter IV.

In Chapter II some basic features of the mutual orientation of speaker and hearer toward each other will be examined. It will be found that the actions of the speaker vary in terms of whether or not he obtains the gaze of the recipient toward whom he is gazing. A speaker who gazes at a nongazing recipient produces a phrasal break, such as a restart or a pause, in his utterance. After such a phrasal break nongazing parties regularly begin to move their gaze to the speaker. If they do not the speaker produces another phrasal break. The string of phrasal breaks ends, and the speaker proceeds with the sentence being constructed in his turn, when the gaze of the recipient is at last obtained. This process provides some demonstration, first, that having the orientation of a hearer is relevant to the speaker's construction of his turn and second that the speaker has available to him procedures for bringing about this state of affairs. The use of such procedures produces characteristic phenomena within his utterance such as restarts and pauses.

Chapter III will focus upon a particular class of techniques available to the speaker for coordinating his actions with relevant actions of his recipient. It will be found that in order to achieve such coordination the speaker has the ability to add new sections to the utter-

ance he is producing. For example, despite the production of several restarts the speaker may find that he is still gazing at a nongazing recipient at the end of his utterance. In order to provide time within his turn to move to a new recipient the speaker can add a new section to his utterance. This addition also changes his sentence by adding a new word or words to it. It is found that the speaker has the ability to add new sections to units on many different levels of organization from within the phoneme to the addition of whole new sentences to his turn. Insofar as this process produces changes not only in the utterance but also in the sentence, some demonstration is provided that sentences emerge through a process of interaction between speaker and hearer as they mutually construct the turn.

Chapter IV will investigate one way in which possible recipients to a turn might be distinguished from each other. It will be argued that some actions in conversation, for example reports, propose a recipient who does not yet know about the event being described by the speaker while other actions, for example, the request for information, propose a recipient who has knowledge of the event being talked about.¹³ These

¹³The relevance of the states of knowledge of speaker and hearer to the organization of conversation has been examined by a number of different investigators. For example, Labov (Labov 1970, Labov and Fanshel, in press) provides analysis of how different states of knowledge of speaker and hearer can distinguish different kinds of action. Schegloff (1972) examines how a speaker will select different possible identifications of the same object in terms of how he analyzes the state of his recipient's knowledge about that object. Sacks (1974:341) describes how story prefaces include information enabling a participant to determine whether or not he has heard the story that the speaker proposes to tell. Jefferson (1973:56-59) has examined how a demonstration of prior knowledge about what is currently being told might systematically provide

two types of recipients are mutually exclusive in that an action appropriate to one is inappropriate to the other. A situation will be examined in which both types of recipients are simultaneously copresent. For example, a speaker describes an event in the presence of both someone who has not yet heard about it and someone who participated in it with him. Analysis will focus on the problem of how the speaker can construct a turn capable of providing for the participation of both types of recipients. It will be found that the speaker has available to him a number of techniques that enable him to change an utterance appropriate to one type of recipient into one appropriate to the other. The use of these techniques produces a range of characteristic phenomena within the turn including changes in the utterance's intonation, changes in the type of action being constructed by the utterance and changes in the state of knowledge proposed for the speaker as well as his recipient. In this chapter some demonstration is provided that the speaker has the ability not only to add new sections to his utterance but also to change its emerging meaning so that it maintains its appropriateness for its recipient of the moment.

This dissertation thus investigates some specific aspects of the interaction of speaker and hearer in the construction of the turn at talk. First, particular states of mutual orientation between speaker and hearer are described and found to be relevant to the structure of the turn. Second, the participants are found to possess specific

for the occurrence of a particular type of overlap. This work will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. At present all I wish to demonstrate is that the distinction being proposed is a recognized one in the analysis of conversation.

techniques for achieving and maintaining appropriate states of mutual orientation. The structure and operation of these techniques is described. Third, the use of these techniques produces specific phenomena in the utterance. These phenomena include intonation changes and phrasal breaks in particular positions in the utterance, changes in the sentence being produced within the turn, and provide for some of the organization of the participants' gaze toward each other.

III. Relevance of This Research to Other Lines of Study

The research in this dissertation is relevant to several different lines of study in the social sciences.

First, it is perhaps most relevant to the study of human interaction. Simmel (1950:21-22, cited in Psathas 1973:3) has argued that¹⁴

if society is conceived as interaction among individuals, the description of the forms of this interaction is the task of the science of society in its strictest and most essential sense.

Conversation is among the most pervasive forms of human interaction.

However as Goffman (1963:13) has noted:

The exchange of words and glances between individuals in each other's presence is a very common social arrangement, yet it is one whose distinctive communication properties are difficult to disentangle.

¹⁴ A similar position is taken by ethologists in the study of nonhuman societies. For example Cullen (1972:101) states that, "All social life in animals depends on the coordination of interactions between them."

Conversation has been studied as a form of human interaction by a number of different investigators including Goffman, Sacks and his colleagues, and Duncan (see for example Duncan 1974). The organization of gaze in interaction has also received considerable analysis (see for example Kendon 1967; and Argyle and Cook 1976). The present research examines some previously uninvestigated aspects of these phenomena.

Second, the work in this dissertation is relevant to several issues in linguistics. The major locus for the production of language in the natural world is conversation. However in contemporary linguistics it is frequently assumed that linguistic phenomena, such as sentences, can be adequately analyzed in isolation from such a process of communication. Thus Lyons (1969:98) states:

(L)inguistic theory, at the present time at least, is not, and cannot, be concerned with the production and understanding of utterances in their actual situations of use . . . but with the structure of sentences considered in abstraction from the situations in which actual utterances occur.

Such a position is based in part on particular theoretical statements by Chomsky. For example (Chomsky 1965:3-4):

Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance. This seems to me to have been the position of the founders of modern general linguistics, and no cogent reason for modifying it has been offered. To study actual linguistic performance, we must consider the intersection of a variety of factors, of which the underlying competence of the speaker-hearer is only one. In this respect, study of language is no different from empirical investigation of other complex phenomena.

We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations). Only under the idealization set forth in the preceding paragraph is performance a direct reflection of competence. In actual fact, it obviously could not directly reflect competence. A record of natural speech will show numerous false starts, deviations from rules, changes of plan in mid-course, and so on.

Several different arguments relevant to the research in this dissertation are made here.¹⁵ One is that phrasal breaks, such as false starts, are not reflections of the speaker's competence. Chapters Two and Three of this dissertation investigate through the analysis of actual material whether phrasal breaks are in fact manifestations of incompetence on the part of the speaker. A second argument made by Chomsky is that linguistic competence can be analyzed without reference to the process of interaction within which sentences emerge in conversation.¹⁶ Chapters Three and Four investigate whether the interactive process of

¹⁵ Some assumptions in this statement not examined in this dissertation have received considerable attention by other researchers. For example much work in sociolinguistics has established that speech communities are not homogeneous (a good summary of this work is provided by Gumperz 1972) and that the analysis of such variation is essential for any adequate theory of language. Thus Labov (for example 1972b) has demonstrated that consideration of the social distribution of phonological variation is essential for the study of sound change.

¹⁶ It is sometimes further argued that a corpus of actual talk is inadequate because it will not provide examples of all the phenomena capable of being constructed by the procedures used to produce that talk. This is certainly true but irrelevant. When abstract procedures capable of constructing observed events are specified these procedures are found to be capable of constructing a range of events, many as yet unobserved. In an as yet unpublished lecture (Jan. 15, 1970:26) Sacks argues that specifying procedures, which he refers to as "machinery," for a specific conversational sequence

constructing the turn might have consequences on the structure of the sentence produced within that turn. Both these issues are relevant to the question of whether the record of speech provided by actual conversation, and the range of phenomena found within it, are or are not proper data for the analysis of how speakers construct sentences and other linguistic phenomena.

The present research thus investigates an aspect of communicative competence relative to the production of language, the interaction of speaker and hearer in the construction of the turn at talk, that has been

permit us to . . . think of that particular sequence as really one machine product. That is to say, it's not this conversation as an object that we're terribly interested in, but we can begin to see machine moves that produce this as a series of moves, only appreciated as a series of moves among the potential sets of moves that are otherwise to be actualized for some people . . .

The situation here is similar to that found in componential analysis where a description of the components used to specify distinctions found in a particular kin system may also specify "zero lexemes", categories not represented by specific lexemes, but none the less latent in the culture. (On this issue see Goodenough 1956:209,211.)

Moreover, examining actual speech does not prevent the analyst from also using his intuitions. Indeed, the recognition of relevant phenomena in conversation would be impossible if intuitions were not systematically employed as a source of data by the analyst. Intuitions about what is happening are important products of the procedures used to construct conversation and will be studied in this dissertation.

The issue is perhaps not that actual speech restricts the analyst to inadequate and degenerate data, but rather that if he refuses to look at actual talk an important range of phenomena may be inaccessible to observation and study.

almost totally ignored in traditional linguistics.¹⁷ Further, the analysis itself is relevant to traditional concerns in linguistics of both a theoretical (the construction of the sentences and utterances, for example) and a methodological (the type of data appropriate for the study of language) nature.

Third, some work in this dissertation is relevant to a line of research in psychology and sociology which has investigated phrasal breaks, such as restarts and pauses, in utterances (see for example Goldman-Eisler 1961, 1972; Mishler and Waxler 1970; Dittman 1974; Dittman and Llewellyn 1969; Bernstein 1962; Jones 1974; Cook 1971; Cook, Smith and Laljee 1974; Maclay and Osgood 1959; Mahl 1959; Argyle 1969; Allen and Gale 1974; Henderson 1974; Martin and Strange 1968). Details of this work will be examined where relevant in Chapter II. For the present it is sufficient to note two assumptions made within it.

First, in all of this research phrasal breaks are assumed to result from processes entirely internal to the speaker, such as anxiety, cognitive difficulty or problems in encoding this utterance. An alternative possibility is explored in this dissertation, specifically, that the actions of the hearer as well as the speaker might be relevant to the production of phrasal breaks by the speaker. It certainly cannot be argued that processes internal to the speaker are irrelevant to the pro-

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Some analysis of the assumptions a speaker makes about his recipient have been provided in the study of speech acts (for example Searle 1970) and deixis (for example Bar-Hillel 1954). However, in such studies the hearer has been analyzed merely as an addressee and the process of interaction between speaker and hearer has not been investigated.

duction of phrasal breaks or that the hearer is implicated in the production of all phrasal breaks. However, in cases where the speaker's phrasal break is coordinated with specific actions of the hearer it would seem inadequate to attempt to specify either the distribution of phrasal breaks within the utterance or the processes providing for their occurrence without reference to the actions of the hearer.

Second, the psychological research on phrasal breaks shares with contemporary linguistics the assumption that such phenomena are the products of incompetence.¹⁸ The work in this dissertation thus complements a particular line of research in psychology by investigating interactively phenomena which have there been investigated from an individual perspective.

Fourth, the research in this dissertation is relevant in a number of different ways to the study of human communication.¹⁹

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Indeed such phenomena are argued to demonstrate that informal conversation is a defective form of speech communication. Thus, Argyle (1969:118-119) states:

Informal speech occurs on relaxed and intimate occasions between friends and families, and is found to be ungrammatical, repetitive, full of slang words and private abbreviations, and is extremely redundant and inefficient as far as conveying information is concerned. However, the main purpose of such conversation is probably not to convey information all in the usual sense, but to establish and sustain social relationships between people.

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In this dissertation Krippendorff's definition of communication (1969:7) as "a process of transmission of structure among the parts of a system which are identifiable in time and space" is utilized.

Cherry (1971:12) has stated that "conversation . . . is the fundamental unit of human communication." While types of interaction in which no words are exchanged would seem just as fundamental²⁰ conversation is certainly among the most basic forms of human communication. Analysis of the procedures through which it is organized thus contributes to our understanding of how human beings communicate with each other.

In addition to its importance as a form of communication in its own right, the analysis of conversation is also relevant to a number of theoretical issues in communications research.

First, many communications researchers have assumed that a unit smaller than the exchange of turns cannot be investigated as a communications process. For example, Coulthard and Ashby (1975:140) state:

The basic unit of all verbal interaction is the exchange. An exchange consists minimally of two successive utterances: one speaker says something and a second says something in return. Anything less is not interactive.

Similarly, Rogers and Farace (1975:226) argue that "the smallest unit of relational analysis is a paired exchange of two messages" where message is defined as "each verbal intervention by participants in dialogue".

Second, the turn has been employed to locate relevant units in many category systems constructed to study interpersonal communication

²⁰Such a position has been consistently taken by Goffman who conceptualizes conversation as but one type of focused interaction and assigns equal theoretical importance to unfocused interaction (see for example Goffman 1963). Similarly, though the work of Sacks and his colleagues has been directed specifically to conversation they state explicitly that "this is not because of a special interest in language, or any theoretical primacy we accord conversation" (Schegloff

(some examples are provided by the statements quoted in the last paragraph). However, in such studies the structure of the turn itself has remained unanalyzed. Analytic units are thus being specified in terms of a structure whose own properties are unknown (on this issue see Sacks 1963 and Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:701-702).

Third, but related to the point just made, a consistent problem in the study of interpersonal communication has been the location of appropriate units for analysis. In general the objects participants within interaction in fact construct, such as actual utterances, have not been made the primary subject of analysis. Rather, these objects have been transformed into other objects through the use of a category system, such as the ones proposed by Bales (1950); Soskin and John (1963); Sluzki and Beavin (1965); or Rogers and Farace (1975).²¹ Analysis has then focused upon relationship between these categories

and Sacks (1973:290).

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A good review of the different category systems that have been employed to code verbal interaction is found in Rogers and Farace (1975).

Goodenough (personal communication) has criticized category systems of this type because they take for granted what should be one of the main objects of study: the ability of the observer (or participants) to recognize discrete phenomena in the data and the organization of such perceptions. Thus, the ability of the observer employing Bales' category system to distinguish agreement from disagreement is not treated as part of the phenomena under investigation but rather used as a tool to study other phenomena. These matters have however, received explicit analysis from Sacks and his colleagues. For example, Sacks (1973b) has analyzed the construction of displays of agreement in conversation and the consequences the perception of a statement as an agreement, rather than a disagreement, has on the subsequent sequencing of the conversation.

rather than upon the phenomena in fact emerging with the conversation in the first place. This dissertation focuses investigation upon the objects actually being constructed within the interaction, such as specific sentences.

Fourth, Krippendorff (1969a) has distinguished three different analytic models for the study of communications processes: an association model, a discourse model, and a communications model. Each of these models makes different assumptions about the phenomena being studied and requires data with a different structure (the type of data required for different types of communications analysis is discussed more fully in Krippendorff 1969b). Communications models are more powerful than discourse models which in turn are more powerful than association models. Conversation provides data of the type required by communications models, specifically a detailed protocol of ordered exchanges through time. This dissertation provides some analysis of how the messages being exchanged by communicators are both changed by and manifestations of the constraints organizing their communication.

IV. Previous Research on the Turn and its Constituents

Both the structure of the turn and the structure of recognizable units in the stream of speech have been examined by investigators in a number of different fields.

IV.1 The Turn and Turn-Taking

Despite the abstract simplicity of the notions of turn and turn-taking, and the ease with which such phenomena can be recognized in conversation, providing a precise description of the turn is a difficult and elusive task. A review of attempts to describe its structure will not only provide a more accurate definition of the turn but will also summarize most of the research on the turn relevant to this dissertation.

The description of the turn is as much an empirical as a theoretical issue and in order to evaluate various proposals about its structure it will be useful to examine them with respect to actual data. Therefore a transcript of a fragment of actual conversation will now be presented. The complete transcription system can be found on pages 111-120 but for the points to be made at present it is sufficient to note that numbers in parenthesis mark periods of silence to the nearest tenth of a second and a left bracket joining utterances on different lines means that these pieces of talk are being produced simultaneously.

Tape G. 50 -- 'Clacia' -- 03:25-04:00

1. Dianne: Who's car is that down there
2. Dianne: ()
[
3. Clacia: BYE BYE ENJOY YER BRO::CILLI PIE::,
4. (0.4)
5. Dianne: Broclli pie::,
6. (0.6)
7. Clacia: She's going to her sister's house.

8. (0.3)
9. Clacia: (She thought-) Sh'jus couldn't wait t'get over
10. there'n get ridda this ha:ssle right? 'n then
11. she heard she wz having broccli pie'n she wz
12. really ticked off she didn't wanna go,
13. Dianne: Bro:ccli pie I think that sounds grea:t.
14. Clacia: I: said asparagus might sound a li'l bet bedder.but I
15. wasn't sure (but-) I'm not big on broccli.
16. Dianne: [Jeff made
17. en asparagus pie it wz s::so :goo:d.
18. Clacia: [I love it.
19. Clacia Yeah I love tha:t
20. Dianne: [He pu:t uhm,
21. (0.7)
22. Dianne: Tch! Put crabmeat on th'bo::dum.
23. Clacia: Oh: ::
24. Dianne: [(Y'know) with chee::se,=
25. Clacia: Yeah.Right.
26. Dianne: [En then jus' (cut up) the broc-r the asparagus
27. coming out in spokes.=It w z so good.
28. Clacia: [Right.
29. Clacia: (Oh:Go:d that'd be fantastic.)

It can be observed that the talk in this fragment does proceed through a sequence of turns. The two parties alternate in their production of talk and while one is speaking the other is generally silent.

However, the delineation of the unit being exchanged, the turn, poses problems. Are lines 7 and 9 in which the same party speaks after a period of silence different parts of the same turn or two different turns? The same situation occurs in lines 20 and 22 but there the sentence begun in line 20 is not completed until line 22. Are these cases different or the same? Is the silence in line 6 part of any particular turn and if so which one? Is this silence the same type of object as the silence in line 21? Line 16 occurs simultaneously with the end of line 15? Whose turn is in progress at that point? All of line 28 is produced simultaneously with part of line 27. Does line 28 constitute a turn?

Though the unit being examined has not always been called a turn, answers to questions such as these have occupied the attention of linguists, communications researchers and anthropologists as well as researchers explicitly investigating conversation. Thus, Harris (1951:4, cited as a definition of the turn in Goffman 1975:9) defines the utterance as "a stretch of talk, by one person before and after which there is silence on the part of the person."²²

²²Frake (1972:91) proposes a similar definition:
The constituents of exchanges are utterances: stretches of continuous speech by one person.

By such a definition lines 20 and 22 as well as lines 7 and 9-12 would be different units. Bernstein (1962:38) by defining an utterance to extend "from the time subject commenced to talk until he finished" would group the speech of the same person around a silence into the same unit.

Taking a slightly different approach some researchers have attempted to specify the boundaries of the turn in terms of talk on the part of the other party rather than silence on the part of the speaker. Thus Fries (1952, cited in Jaffe and Feldstein 1970:10) defines the utterance as "all the speech of one participant until the other begins to speak". This definition becomes problematic when simultaneous talk occurs. According to it Dianne's utterance in line 17 ends before she has finished pronouncing her sentence. Norwine and Murphy's definition of "talk-spurt" (1938:281, cited in Jaffe and Feldstein 1970:12) encounters similar problems.

Jaffe and Feldstein (1970:19) avoid the conceptual ambiguities of their predecessors and produce a set of rules and categories so clear that it enables a computer to code some turn-relevant features of audio records of conversation without human intervention. (They ignore the content of what is said and examine the process of exchanging turns purely in terms of the sequence of sounds and silence of the different participants.) Thus, their definition of possession of the floor marks its boundary in terms of both speech by the next speaker and silence by the previous speaker:

DEFINITION 2: "Possession of the Floor"

The speaker who utters the first unilateral sound both initiates the conversation and gains possession of the floor. Having gained possession, a speaker maintains it until the first unilateral sound by another speaker, at which time the latter gains possession of the floor. The conversation terminates at its last sound. (Jaffe and Feldstein 1970:19.)

The very success of their project raises the question of whether constructing an internally consistent set of categories capable of unambiguously coding any relevant data presented to it is in fact what's at issue in defining the phenomena being investigated. Rather than revealing the order in terms of which the data is structured Jaffe and Feldstein themselves admit that their category system sometimes imposes order on it by fiat. Speaking of the patterns in their data they state (1970:114):

Others, especially those involving simultaneous speech, are so complex that some rule is called for to bring order out of the chaos. The "speaker switching rule" used in defining possession of the floor. . . resolves, by fiat, all these complex patterns that defy classification.

The precision of their categories thus obscures rather than clarifies the phenomena being investigated through use of those categories. Simultaneous speech has been approached as a phenomenon worthy of study in its own right by other investigators (see for example Jefferson, 1972) and they have found it to be not chaotic but rather precisely ordered.

Similar problems arise with the way Jaffe and Feldstein classify silence in conversation. Silence between the talk of different parties is assigned to the turn of the party who was speaking before the silence

(Jaffe and Feldstein 1970:19). However, as Sacks and his colleagues (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:715) have pointed out, silence after a question is regularly heard as being part of the next speaker's, the answerer's, turn. (Consider for example the silence after a teacher asks a student a question.)

Jaffe and Feldstein's work demonstrates that logical, internally consistent definitions can be constructed that will unambiguously classify a stretch of conversation into distinct turns. However, neither the power of this system to resolve ambiguous phenomena such as simultaneous talk, nor its logical consistency, provides any assurance that it is in fact an appropriate instrument to study the phenomena being investigated with it.

The problems with Jaffe and Feldstein's system might be mere weaknesses which could eventually be eliminated by successively refining their definitions. This does not, however, seem to be the case. Closer study reveals that any category system that unambiguously divides a stretch of observed conversation into a single set of distinct objects will suffer similar problems.

Consider the categorization of the silence that occurs in the following fragment:

G.26:(T)9:00

John: W'l I, I took this cou:rse.
(0.5)

Ann: in h ow tuh quit?

John: [which I rilly recommend.

There is general agreement among investigators that silence should be classified differently according to whether it occurs within the turn of a single speaker or between the turns of two different speakers. (See for example Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:715 and Goffman 1975:10. Even Jaffe and Feldstein (1970:19) who did not include the content of speech in their analysis found it necessary to distinguish different kinds of silence in these terms.) For convenience a within-turn silence is frequently referred to as a "pause", while a between-turn silence is called a "gap".

When Ann begins to talk the silence in this fragment is placed between the turns of two different speakers. It thus constitutes a gap rather than a pause. However, John's talk a moment later continues the production of the unit in progress before the silence began. The silence is now placed within the ongoing talk of a single speaker. As such it is a pause rather than a gap. The same silence thus yields alternative classifications at different moments in time and from the perspective of different participants. (On this process see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:715, especially footnote 26.)

This is not to say that either the silence or the rules for producing it are ambiguous. The types of objects, pauses and gaps, constructed by the alternative structural descriptions remain conceptually distinct from each other. Further, at the point where Ann begins to talk the data provides no evidence to support the classification of the silence as a pause rather than a gap. Though John subsequently demonstrates that he has not finished talking and that the silence should therefore be cate-

gorized as a pause this does not change the reading of the situation available at the time Ann began to act.²³

No single classification of this silence is available to the analyst. Rather, to describe it accurately, he must deal with it as an event emerging through time capable of ongoing transformation.

Much the same point can be made with respect to the definition of the turn. When Ann begins to talk John may be seen as having constructed a complete turn. (Ann's action of beginning her talk where she does provides some evidence that participants within the conversation itself see the turn as having been completed.) However, when his later talk is produced his earlier talk becomes but the beginning of the turn eventually constructed. (Note that the talk in the later unit is a subordinate element of the earlier unit and thus can not be seen as the beginning of a new unit.)²⁴

²³ For clarity, the issue here has been oversimplified. In fact, when John produces his second piece of talk it might be argued that the participants are proposing competing definitions of what is occurring. However, as Jefferson (for example, 1973) has demonstrated, participants have available to them techniques for negotiating such issues.

²⁴ Bloomfield's distinction (1946:170) between included position, "a linguistic form [that] occurs as part of a larger form" and absolute position, a linguistic form "not included in any larger (complex) linguistic form" is relevant here. John's second piece of talk is in included position with respect to his first and thus cannot be seen as the beginning of a new sentence.

At the time Ann begins to talk her turn is positioned as the next turn after John's. However, when John resumes talking Ann's talk becomes placed in an "interruptive" position, beginning not after but in the middle of another party's talk.

This example provides some insight into why obtaining an accurate and analytically relevant definition of the turn has proved so elusive.

First, almost all of the definitions considered have been concerned with the problem of accurately defining the boundaries of the turn. However, it appears that in actual conversation the boundaries of the turn are mutable. Different boundaries can be specified for the same unit at different points in the sequence. Even the issue of whether or not some turn follows another will have different answers at different points in time. Thus, a definition of the turn as a static unit with fixed boundaries does not accurately describe its structure. Rather, the turn has to be conceptualized as a time-bound process.

Second, some of the data considered (for example Ann's beginning to talk where she does) suggests that the location of turn boundaries is not simply a problem for the analyst but one of the issues the participants face in arranging the exchange of turns. If this is correct then the delineation of the turn is not properly an analytic tool for the study of conversation but rather part of the phenomena being investigated and as such should be approached empirically. Such a position has in fact been taken by Sacks and his colleagues. Thus, with respect to the investigation of how conversations are closed Schegloff and Sacks

(1973:290) state:

We have proceeded under the assumption (an assumption borne out by our research) that insofar as the materials we worked with exhibited orderliness, they did so not only for us, indeed not in the first place for us, but for the co-participants who had produced them. If the materials (records of natural conversations) were orderly, they were so because they had been methodically produced by members of the society for one another, and it was a feature of the conversations that we treated as data that they were produced so as to allow the display by the co-participants to each other of their orderliness, and to allow the participants to display to each other their analysis, appreciation, and use of that orderliness. Accordingly, our analysis has sought to explicate the ways that exhibit their orderliness, have their orderliness appreciated and used, and have that appreciation displayed and treated as the basis for subsequent action. In the ensuing discussion, therefore, it should be clearly understood that the 'closing problem' we are discussing is proposed as a problem for conversationalists; we are not interested in it as a problem for analysts except insofar as, and in the ways, it is a problem for participants. (By 'problem' we do not intend puzzle, in the sense that participants need to ponder the matter of how to close a conversation. We mean that closings are to be seen as achievements, as solutions to certain problems of conversational organization.²⁵)

²⁵ Not all researchers investigating the social organization of language are in agreement with Sacks and his colleagues on this issue. Thus, Fishman (1972:450-451) states that the 'constructs' involved in the analysis of talk

including situations, role relationships and speech events. . . originate in the integrative intuition of the investigator . . . [and] are extrapolated from the data of "talk" rather than being an actual component of the process of talk. [Italics in original]

The position of Sacks and his colleagues is, however, consistent with that traditionally taken in linguistics (where the importance of emic analysis has long been recognized) and some approaches in anthropology. For example, Goodenough (1965:1) states that one of the principal goals of ethnographic description is to "make social events within [a] society intelligible in the way they are intelligible to its members".

The position has sometimes been taken, however, that the only way a member's view of some phenomenon can be obtained is by asking him, and

Third, insofar as the boundaries of the turn mark points of speaker change an accurate definition of the turn is not independent of a specification of the process through which turns are exchanged. It thus does not seem possible to first define the turn and then work out how it is to be exchanged. Rather, intrinsic structural elements of the unit being exchanged, its boundaries, seem implicated in the process of exchange itself.

The organization of turn-taking in conversation has been most extensively investigated by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson. (The most succinct presentation of this work can be found in Sacks, Schegloff and

Sacks and his colleagues do not do this. However, in linguistics, even when emic analysis has been at issue, replies by informants are not treated as statements about the behavior being studied but rather as samples of such behavior. (Thus Burling (1972:96) observes that many social scientists "elicit statements that describe behavior" while linguists "elicit examples of behavior.") It has been recognized at least since Sapir observed (1963:548) that the patterns of interest to the linguist are "not so much capable of conscious description as of naive practice" that a speaker may not be consciously aware of the emic phenomena being studied by the linguist. Their orientation to such phenomena is, however, demonstrated in the patterned nature of their speech. Samples of conversation not only provide good examples of speech behavior but a speaker producing a next utterance

thereby displays (in the first place to his co-participants) his understanding of the prior turn's talk . . .

herein lies a central methodological resource for the investigation of conversation . . . a resource provided by the thoroughly interactional character of conversation. It is a systematic consequence of the turn-taking organization of conversation that it obliges its participants to display to each other, in a turn's talk, their understanding of other turns' talk . . .

But while understandings of other turns' talk are displayed to co-participants, they are available as well to professional

and Jefferson 1974. The analysis in that paper is, however, built on ten years of previous research and some aspects of it, for example the analysis of overlap, are covered in more detail in other articles.) The turn-taking system they describe provides a way to deal with the problematic aspects of the turn noted above and to specify its structure more adequately. Because this work constitutes the point of departure for the present dissertation it will be examined in some detail.

The system they describe consists of two components and a set of rules operating on those components. The first component describes the type of units that can be utilized to construct a turn. A key feature of such turn-constructural units is that (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:702):

Instances of the unit-types . . . allow a projection of the unit-type under way, and what, roughly, it will take for an instance of that unit-type to be completed.

Many different types of speech units, from single words to sentences have

analysts, who are thereby afforded a proof criterion (and a search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn's talk is occupied with. Since it is the parties' understandings of prior turns' talk that is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is THEIR understandings that are wanted for analysis. The display of those understandings in the talk of subsequent turns affords both a resource for the analysis of prior turns and a proof procedure for professional analyses of prior turns--resources intrinsic to the data themselves. (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:728-729.)

The data provided by conversation is thus adequate for the analysis of phenomena oriented to by participants in constructing it.

this property.²⁶ The property of recognizable completion has several consequences. First, it specifies where in the turn transition to a new turn can occur. Second, it specifies the limits of the speaker's current right to talk:

As for the unit-types which a speaker employs in starting the construction of a turn's talk, the speaker is initially entitled, in having a turn, to one such unit. The first possible completion of a first such unit constitutes an initial transition-relevance place. Transfer of speakership is coordinated by reference to such transition-relevance places, which any unit-type instance will reach. (Ibid:703.)

A second component of the system allocates the next turn. Procedures included in this component are divided into two groups. In one "next turn is allocated by current speaker's selecting next speaker" (Ibid:703). In the other "next turn is allocated by self-selection" (Ibid:703). Thus, next speaker can either select himself or be selected by current speaker.

Turn-taking in conversation is organized by the following rules operating on these components (Ibid:704):

(1) For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructive unit:

(a) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then the party so selected has the right and is obliged to take next turn to speak; no others have such rights or obligations, and transfer occurs at that place.

²⁶For example (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:709):

Sentential constructions are capable of being analyzed in the course of their production by a party-hearer able to use such analyses to project their possible directions and completion loci. In the course of its construction, any sentential unit will rapidly (in conversation) reveal

(b) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then self-selection for next speakership may, but need not, be instituted; first starter acquires rights to a turn, and transfer occurs at that place.

(c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then current speaker may, but need not continue, unless another self-selects.

(2) If, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructural unit, neither la nor lb has operated and, following the provision of lc, current speaker has continued, then the rule-set a-c re-applies at the next transition-relevance place, and recursively at each next transition-relevance place until transfer is effected.

In specifying how turns are exchanged, these rules also describe significant aspects of the structure of the turn itself. For example, they avoid the problems of approaches that conceptualize the turn as a static structure by explicitly providing (for example, through Rule 2) discrete but mutable boundaries. These rules also lead to alternative classifications of silence as well as the possibility of one type of silence being transformed into a different type: (Ibid:715, footnote 16):

Parties' treatment of silence in conversation is contingent on its placement. To put it roughly; intra-turn silence (not at a transition-relevance place) is a 'pause', and initially not to be talked in by others; silence after a possible completion point is, initially, a gap, and to be

projectable directions and conclusions, which its further course can modify, but will further define,

The orientation of conversationalists to the projectability of turn-constructural units is empirically evident in actual sequential materials. On this issue see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 702-703, footnote 12).

minimized; extended silences at transition-relevance places may become lapses. But some silences are transformable. Thus, if a developing silence occurs at a transition-place, and is this a (potential) gap, it may be ended by talk of the same party who was talking before it; so the 'gap' is transformed into a 'pause' (being not intra-turn). This is one way that 'gap' is minimized.

On a more general level both turn-taking and the turn itself can be characterized as being "locally managed, party-administered, and interactionally controlled". (Ibid:727).

Turn-taking is locally managed because the system deals with single transitions at a time in a comprehensive, exclusive and serial fashion.²⁷ (Ibid:725). Such local organization is also applicable to the structure of the turn itself:

The system is, however, locally managed with respect to turn-size as well. Not only is the allocation of turns accomplished in each turn for a next, but the determination of turn-size is accomplished locally, i.e., in the developmental course of each turn, under constraints imposed by a next turn, and by an orientation to a next turn in the current one. (Ibid:725.)

The system is party-administered because control over its operations and products is vested in the participants to the conversation themselves (Ibid:726).

Finally, and of particular relevance to the work in this dissertation, this system provides for the interactive construction of the turn:

²⁷ Such a view of turn-taking stands in contrast to many other approaches (for example, Taylor 1970) which have sought structure in conversation (or in the groups conversing) by trying to find repetitive multi-turn sequences.

Turn-size is also the product not only of party-administered local management, but of interactional production. That involves the sort of turn-unit used by the turn-taking system, a facet which can here be used to explicate further what we mean in characterizing the system as 'interactionally managed'. The turn-unit is of a sort which (a) employs a specification of minimal sizes, but (b) provides for expansion within a unit, (c) is stoppable (though not at any point), and (d) has transition places discretely recurring within it, (e) which can themselves be expanded or contracted; all of these features except the first are loci of interactional determination. By virtue of this character, it is misconceived to treat turns as units characterized by a division of labor in which the speaker determines the unit and its boundaries, with other parties having as their task the recognition of them. Rather, the turn is a unit whose constitution and boundaries involve such a distribution of tasks as we have noted: that a speaker can talk in such a way as to permit projection of possible completion to be made from his talk, from its start, allowing others to use its transition places to start talk, to pass up talk, to affect directions of talk etc.; and that their starting to talk, if properly placed, can determine where he ought to stop talk. That is, the turn as a unit is interactively determined. (Ibid:726-727.)

The structure of the turn-taking system also provides for the interactive organization of a number of more specific types of phenomena in particular types of turns. For example, stories routinely contain many sentences before they come to their completion. However, the turn-taking system only allocates one turn-constructional unit (of which the sentence is a particular type) to the speaker at a time. The systematic production of stories without interruption is possible only if Rule 2b, granting others the right to begin talk at each transition-relevant place can be suspended until the end of the story. Such a suspension requires the agreement of the hearer since it is he who would invoke

Rule 2b.²⁸ This dilemma shapes the production of stories in conversation into a particular format. First, the speaker produces a single-unit turn containing an offer to produce a multi-sentence turn (a turn of this type is frequently referred to as a "story preface" (Sacks 1974). The hearer then provides an acceptance (or rejection) of the offer and only then does the speaker proceed to construct his multi-sentence turn. The preface routinely provides information enabling the hearer to recognize when the story has been completed so that the suspension of Rule 2b can be lifted at the appropriate moment. The particular structure stories take in conversation is thus organized in part by the orientation of participants to the features of the turn-taking system. (The interactive structure of stories in conversation receives extensive analysis in Sacks' unpublished lectures of spring 1970 and fall 1971. The use of story prefaces to provide for the production of multi-sentence turns is analyzed explicitly in the lecture of April 9, 1970. A published synopsis of some of this work, including the points discussed here, can be found in Sacks 1974.)

²⁸A similar problem is posed in the organization of conversational closings (Schegloff and Sacks 1973:294-295):

A machinery that includes the transition-relevance of possible utterance completion recurrently for any utterance in the conversation generates an indefinitely extendable string of turns of talk. Then, an initial problem concerning closings may be formulated: HOW TO ORGANIZE THE SIMULTANEOUS ARRIVAL OF THE CO-CONVERSATIONALISTS AT A POINT WHERE ONE SPEAKER'S COMPLETION WILL NOT OCCASION ANOTHER SPEAKER'S TALK, AND THAT WILL NOT BE HEARD AS SOME SPEAKER'S SILENCE . . . the problem is HOW TO COORDINATE THE SUSPENSION OF THE TRANSITION-RELEVANCE OF POSSIBLE UTTERANCE COMPLETION.

The features of the turn-taking system can also provide for the systematic production of a particular class of restarts. Specifically, the speaker can begin a new unit before his original unit, the only unit to which he is entitled at the moment, comes to completion by producing a correction. Thus, with respect to the utterance:

Ken: You wanna hear muh-eh my sister told me a
story last night

Sacks (1974:342) provides the following analysis:

We raise for consideration the possibility that his use of what is begun as a sentence internal correction, . . . muh-eh my . . . and is turned into a way to start a second sentence in the preface without having the first go to completion, does indeed constitute a method for satisfying the first possible completion transition use rule while building an utterance in which that does not coincide with its first sentence's first possible completion. I am suggesting that his construction can be viewed as a device whereby transition points are avoided, but not overrun, their occurrence being here and elsewhere rather delicately attended matters.

In turns that contain more than a single turn-constructural component the distribution of components within the turn is frequently organized by the properties of the turn-taking system. Many adjacent turns in conversation take the form of particular types of utterance-pairs for example, question-answer, greeting-greeting, accusation-denial, complaint-rejection, etc. Despite differences in particular pair types, all such pairs have many organizational features in common (for example, the first element in the pair sets constraints on what can be done in the turn following it) and can be analyzed as a single class. For convenience, the members of this class are referred to as "adjacency-pairs". (Schegloff and Sacks 1973) the first element in a pair is called a "first pair part"

and the second, a "second pair part".²⁹ A turn may contain many components in addition to a first or second pair part.³⁰ However in such multi-component turns the first pair part will be placed in a particular position, at the end of the turn since it invokes Rule 1a. Similarly, if a turn contains a second pair part it will be placed at the beginning of the turn. A speaker can thus employ a first pair part to specifically mark that his turn has come to completion and that someone else now has the obligation to talk. This process in fact provides one major class of

²⁹Some analysis of the properties of adjacency pairs can be found in Schegloff and Sacks (1973). These phenomena are discussed in more detail in Sacks' Spring 1972 class lectures and the 1973 Summer Institute of Linguistics lectures.

³⁰Goffman (1975:3) has proposed the term 'back pair' to refer to:

the second pair part of one couplet and the first pair part of the very next one, whether these parts appear within the same turn, as in:

A₁ : "Are they going?"

B ₁ /B ₂ :	"Yes. Are you?"
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A₂ : "I suppose."

or across the back of two turns, as in:

A₁ : "Are they going?"

B ₁ :	"Yes."
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A ₂ :	"Are you?"
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B₂ : "I suppose."

multi-component turns:

It should, therefore, be noted that a turn's talk, whether or not it initially be constructed as a first pair part, can be made into a locus of 'current selects next' by the affiliation to it of a 'tag question', e.g. You know?, Don't you agree?, etc.

The availability of the 'tag question' as affiliable to a turn's talk is of special importance, for it is the generally available 'exit technique' for a turn. That is, when a current speaker has constructed a turn's talk to a possible transition-relevance place without having selected a next, he may, employing his option to continue, add a tag question, selecting another as next speaker upon the tag question's completion, and thereby exiting from the turn. In this regard, the tag question is one member of a class we may call 'recompleters', a class that supplies one major source of the talk done when rule 1c's option is exercised. The effectiveness of tag questions in this regard is that they invoke rule 1a, making the start of a particular next speaker's turn relevant on THEIR completion. (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:718.)

The structure of turn-taking is thus implicated in the organization of many different types of conversational phenomena from corrections (Jefferson 1974a) to stories (Sacks 1974) and even, as Jefferson (1974b) has shown, the syllable by syllable production of laughter. Most relevant to the present dissertation is the interactive organization it provides for the structure of the turn.

The position turn-taking occupies in conversation permits a more precise definition of conversation itself:

Not all conversational activity is bounded and collected into cases of the unit 'a single conversation'. That unit, and the structure that characterizes and constitutes it, is therefore not necessarily relevant wherever conversational activity occurs. On the other hand, other orders of organization, most notably those organizing utterances and the speaker turns in which they occur, are coterminous with, and indeed may be taken

as defining, conversational activity (though not all talk; not, for example, formal lecturing). (Schegloff and Sacks 1973:292.)³¹

Other forms of talk can be distinguished from conversation in terms of explicit differences in the structure of their turn-taking (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:729).

It seems, as noted, correct to say that generally the allocational techniques for conversation provide for one turn-allocation at a time. But alternatives to such a mode of operation are readily found. Thus, in debates, the ordering of all turns is pre-allocated, by formula, with reference to 'pro' and 'con' positions. In contrast to both debates and conversation, meetings with chair-persons partially pre-allocate turns, and provide for the allocation of unallocated turns via the use of the pre-allocated turns. Thus, chair-persons have rights to talk first, and to talk after each other speaker, and they can use each such turn to allocate next-speakership.

The foregoing suffices to suggest a structural possibility: that turn-taking systems, or at least the class of them whose members each preserve 'one party talks at a time', are, with respect to their allocational arrangements, linearly arrayed. The linear array is one in which one polar type (exemplified by conversation) involves 'one-turn-at-a-time' allocation, i.e. the use of local allocational means; the other pole (exemplified by debate) involves pre-allocation of all turns; and medial types (exemplified by meetings) involve various mixes of pre-allocational and local-allocational means.

³¹ Conversational activity that does not occur in the unit a single conversation includes talk between

members of a household in their living room, employees who share an office, passengers together in an automobile, etc., that is, persons who could be said to be in a 'continuing state of incipient talk'. (Schegloff and Sacks 1973:325.)

Such talk differs from a single conversation in that it does not require exchanges of greetings or closings and permits extended lapses between talk.

However, these other speech exchange systems are constructed through constraints on the turn-taking system of conversation:

While we have referred to conversation as 'one polar extreme' on the linear array, and 'ceremony' as possibly the other pole, we should not be understood as proposing the independent or equal status of conversation and ceremony as polar types. It appears likely that conversation should be considered the basic form of speech-exchange system, with other systems on the array representing a variety of transformations of conversation's turn-taking system, to achieve other types of turn-taking systems. In this light, debate or ceremony would not be an independent polar type, but rather the most extreme transformation of conversation--most extreme in fully fixing the most important (and perhaps nearly all) of the parameters, which conversation allows to vary. (Ibid, 1974:730-731.)

The organization of turn-taking as analyzed by Sacks and his colleagues thus permits more accurate and precise definitions of both conversation and the turn than those provided at the beginning of this chapter.³²

Other investigators have provided different analyses of how turn-taking might be achieved in conversation. Jaffe and Feldstein (1970:17) provide the simplest version of what is perhaps the most common hypothesis, the proposal that turn-transition is cued by a discrete signal on the part of the speaker:

An explanation for the switch of roles is still required, however. We look to the cues operative at the boundary between time domains. The utterance of each speaker is presumably terminated by an unambiguous "end of message" signal, at which point the direction of the one-way channel (and the transmitting and receiving roles) are simply reversed.

³² Such definitions could not, however, have been constructed without

In essence, conversation is argued to be like short-wave radio communication with the production of some equivalent of "over" at the end of each turn signaling to the recipient that he should now take the floor. A common candidate for such a signal is a pause.³³

The turn-taking system proposed by Duncan (1974) is essentially of this type. In this system the speaker cues his recipient that he is about to relinquish the floor by producing a "turn-yielding signal" (Duncan 1974:302). On the basis of empirical observation six specific turn-yielding signals are described; rising or falling (but not sustained) pitch at the end of a phonemic clause, elongation of the final syllable of a phonemic clause, the termination of a hand movement used during the turn, a number of stereotyped expressions such as "you know" which may be accompanied by a drop in pitch and the termination of a grammatical clause. Though the hearer may take the floor after one or more of these signals, he is not required to do so (Ibid:303). The more signals displayed at a specific moment the greater the probability of the recipient taking the floor (Ibid:308). However, the speaker has the ability to

extensive theoretical investigation of actual empirical materials. Rough definitions of the type provided earlier are thus quite appropriate as guides to further research as long as their provisional character is kept in mind.

³³However, turns are regularly exchanged without any silence occurring between them whatsoever (for specific examples see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:731. The Jefferson transcription system uses an equals sign to mark turn-transition without any intervening silence).

neutralize any floor-yielding signals he is displaying with an "attempt-suppressing signal". This signal consists of the speaker maintaining gesticulation of his hands during the turn-yielding signals (Ibid.:304).

Because of its focus on a set of discrete signals, Duncan's turn-taking system does not organize in terms of a small set of specific rules the range of conversational phenomena that the system of Sacks and his colleagues does. For example, it confines its analysis to the termination points of turn-constructive units and does not examine either their projectability or the ability of the speaker to delay or avoid their reaching termination. Different types of turn allocation techniques, such as adjacency pairs, are not included and no sharp distinction is drawn between a current speaker selecting a next at a specific point (so that the selected party is located as the one who has the floor even if he is silent) and self-selection by the next speaker. Sacks' system provides for the systematic possibility of overlap (for example, two parties may invoke Rule 1b simultaneously) at the positions where it characteristically occurs (transition points) while for Duncan (1974:302) such a situation means that

the turn-taking mechanism may be said to have broken down, or perhaps to have been discarded, for the duration of that state.

Gap between turns is not analyzed by Duncan.³⁴ Because of its power and generality, and because it provides a more accurate description of the detailed phenomena actually found in conversation (for example overlap),

³⁴

It did not occur in his data and is mentioned as a structural possibility (Duncan 1974:302) but not discussed.

the approach to turn-taking of Sacks and his colleagues will be followed in this dissertation.

IV.2 Utterance Units

In addition to research on turn-taking as a phenomenon in its own right, some of the phenomena that occur within the turn have received extensive study from investigators in a number of disciplines. The unit which had perhaps received the most study is what has come to be called the phonemic clause:

a phonologically marked macrosegment which, according to Trager and Smith, contains one and only one primary stress and ends in one of the terminal junctures /I,II,#/. (Boomer 1965:150.)

This unit has been important not only in the analysis of the natural units into which the stream of speech, the utterance, is divided but also in the investigation of intonation, kinesics, and the psychological study of speech encoding. Though the phonemic clauses fell into some disrepute when the position of Chomsky gained ascendance in linguistics a slight variant of it, the "breath-group" was subsequently reintroduced into linguistics within the framework of transformational grammar by Lieberman (1967). Lieberman's work has not been generally accepted (for a recent critique see Gunter 1976), and recent work by Goffman (Class Lectures, Spring 1976) indicates that the structure of the utterance, including its intonation, is far more complex than the work done on the phonemic clause would indicate. Nevertheless, the unit has been quite important to a number of very diverse approaches to the study of a range of phenomena occurring within the turn. Research on its structure will

therefore be examined in some detail.

Analysis of the phonemic clause stems from Pike's (1945) work on intonation. Pike argued that some points in the stream of speech are marked by "pauses". Pike used the term "pause" in a somewhat different way than most subsequent investigators, indicating by it not simply a period of silence, but a unit defined by both intonation and silence. On the basis of intonation two different types of pauses were distinguished (Pike 1945:31).

When a person makes a cessation of speech, there is a PAUSE. There are two significant types of pause . . . a TENTATIVE one and a FINAL one; these may be symbolized by a single and a double bar / and // respectively and have the meaning indicated by their labels.

The tentative and final pauses affect in different ways the material which precedes them. The tentative pause tends . . . to sustain the height of the final pitch of the contour . . . there may prove to be occasional slight drift upward . . . The final pause modifies the preceding contour (or contours) by lowering in some way the normal height of the contour.

Pike thus distinguishes two different patterns of intonation which can terminate units. Rising intonation indicates "uncertainty or finality" and is found "in hesitation and after almost all questions". (Pike 1945:32.) Falling intonation marks "finality" and "occurs most often at the end of statements". (Pike 1945:33.) These pauses thus divide utterances into two different classes, roughly corresponding to statements and questions.

The placement of such pauses is not however, restricted to the ends of utterances. They can also be found in mid-utterance where they help to divide the stream of speech into relevant grammatical units:

Frequently, pauses in the middle of sentences separate large grammatical units such as clauses, or separate smaller units in such a way as to contribute toward their internal unity . . . (Pike 1945:33).

Building on the work of Pike, Trager and Smith (1951, cited in Lieberman 1967:188) distinguished three terminal junctures. Pike's final pause, indicated by falling pitch, was marked as [#]. Rising pitch was marked as [//] and sustained pitch as [/].

There are of course the three terminal junctures that, with the requirement that there be one and only one primary stress, define the phonemic clause.

The phonemic clause was essentially a product of structural linguistics. However, within the framework of contemporary linguistics a similar unit, the "breath-group" was introduced by Lieberman (1967:26-27):

It is a universal of human speech that, except for certain predictable cases, the fundamental frequency of phonation and the acoustic amplitude fall at the end of a sentence. The physiological basis of this phenomenon may be a condition of at least articulatory control. If the tension of the laryngeal muscles is not deliberately increased at the end of expiration when the subglottal air pressure falls, the fundamental frequency of phonation will also fall. One can see that, in some cases, less "effort" is expended in the articulatory control problem if the laryngeal tension is not deliberately increased precisely when the subglottal air pressure falls. The speaker simply maintains about the same laryngeal tension throughout the entire expiration. He does not bother to increase the laryngeal tension to counter the falling subglottal air pressure. This pattern of articulatory activity thus produces a prosodic pattern that is characteristic of the ones that are used to delimit the boundaries of unemphatic, declarative sentences in normal speech. We shall term this pattern of articulatory activity the "archetypal normal breath-group".

This unit has the same falling terminal intonation contour as Pike's "final pause" or Trager and Smith's # juncture. A marked breath-

group, characterized by non-falling final intonation, stands in contrast to the normal breath-group:

The marked breath-group contrasts with the unmarked breath-group during the last 150-200 msec of phonation where the tension of the laryngeal muscles increases in the marked breath-group. The increased tension of the laryngeal muscles counters the falling subglottal air pressure, and the marked breath-group thus has a terminal non-falling fundamental frequency contour. The marked breath-group is consequently in a sense the "simplest" alternative to the unmarked breath-group since the laryngeal tension is increased at only one point in the breath-group--where the subglottal air pressure falls. (Lieberman 1967:105.)

This unit has the same terminal intonation as Pike's "tentative pause" but includes both the [/] and the [//] junctures of Trager and Smith. Lieberman (1967:123) argues that these two junctures are in fact instances of the same object, the marked breath-group, occurring in different positions:

Trager and Smith use essentially these three terminal junctures to differentiate between the unmarked breath-group (contours that end with #), marked breath-groups that occur in sentence final position (//), and marked breath-groups that occur in the middle of sentences (/). They note that juncture // corresponds phonetically to a rise in pitch whereas the juncture / corresponds phonetically to a sustenance of pitch. This phonetic distinction may simply be a coarticulation effect. When a speaker uses a marked breath-group in the middle of a sentence, he may not complete the tensioning of his laryngeal muscles at the end of the marked breath-group before he begins to relax these muscles for the breath-group that follows.

The phonemic clause was defined in terms of a single peak of primary stress as well as its terminal junctures. Lieberman (1967: 105-106) also included a stress feature [P_g] in his definition of the breath-group but admitted the possibility of more than one occurring in a single breath-group. He also argued that the breath-group and the stress feature were conceptually distinct with the breath-group consti-

tuting a more basic level of organization:

The breath-group may be a feature of every language. It is doubtful whether [P_g] is used in every language. (Lieberman 1967:107.)

Lieberman's breath-group is thus not identical to the phonemic clause. Nevertheless, both units have much in common. First, both lines of research are in agreement that it is possible to clearly demarcate comparatively large units in the stream of speech. Second, in both lines of investigation the intonation contour at the end of these units, roughly the final 150-200 msec, is found to be particularly important. Third, differences in the ending intonation contour are categorized in approximately the same fashion. A primary distinction is made by all investigators between falling and non-falling³⁵ intonation with some investigators further sub-dividing non-falling into sustained and rising. Fourth, despite very different theoretical points of departure, investigators in both traditions agree that falling intonation at the end of a unit marks finality and is found at the termination of declarative statements (see for example, Pike 1945:33 and Lieberman 1967:38-39) while non-falling intonation marks either a question or that the utterance being produced has not yet come to completion (see for example, Pike

³⁵Lieberman (1967:53) notes that

the acoustic correlate of [+BG] may be a level terminal fundamental frequency contour, a rising fundamental frequency contour, or a falling fundamental frequency contour that, however, falls less than it would have in the absence of the terminal increase in laryngeal tension.

The marked breath-group can thus include a slightly falling contour as well as raising contours. As long as this is kept in mind the label

1945:32 and Lieberman 1967:60, 168).³⁶

It is also argued that the units being examined can be used to mark the constituent structure of the speaker's sentence (see for example, Pike 1945:33 and Lieberman 1967:110). However, Lieberman (1967:124) criticizes Trager and Smith for assuming that such a process would be generally operative:

They erred, however, in assuming that the intonation reflected the constituent structure within all sentences. Normally, a speaker will produce an entire sentence on a single unmarked breath-group (pitch "morpheme" 231# in Trager-Smith notation). It is only when the speaker is trying to disambiguate the sentence that he will consistently segment smaller constituents by means of intonation.

Lieberman's point is well taken since all relevant constituents of a sentence are certainly not marked. Nevertheless, by arguing that "it is only when ambiguity arises that intonation becomes important" (Lieberman 1967:125) Lieberman seems to put himself in a similarly extreme and untenable position. For example, the turn-taking system described by Sacks and his colleagues permits a speaker to continue an utterance which has been brought to a point of possible completion when no other party selects to speak. The emergent utterance will contain several breath-

"non-falling" should not cause confusion and avoids more cumbersome terminology.

³⁶Rising intonation is not, however, a definitive question marker since on the one hand it can occur in the absence of a question, for example, to mark non-termination, and on the other, questions constructed with special particles, such as wh-words, are terminated with falling intonation (on this issue see Lieberman 1967:132-133). For further problems with the notion of a "question" see Schegloff (ms.).

groups but the division of the utterance into these breath-groups will not be the product of an attempt to disambiguate it.

The study of how potentially ambiguous sentences can be disambiguated has, however, led to the analysis of further cues capable of dividing an utterance into constituent units. O'Malley, Kloker and Dara-Abrams (1973:217) define a juncture as:

. . . an abstract linguistic unit that is postulated to account for the ability of a native listener to locate certain kinds of boundaries in a spoken utterance on the basis of direct acoustic cues and/or his knowledge and expectations about the lexical, syntactic, and semantic constraints of English.

To study how junctures are signaled in the stream of speech they investigated the cues used to mark parentheses in spoken algebraic expressions, comparing for example, " $(q + r) * z$ " with " $q + (r * z)$ ". It was found that pauses were a very reliable cue to the correct placement of parentheses, even among mathematically naive subjects. However, they note (Ibid:218) that other cues are also implicated in the marking of junctures:

It should be emphasized that juncture is not at all the same as silence. In general, junctures are signaled by lengthening of the preceding syllables and the overall shape of the pitch contour as well as by silence intervals. In rapid speech, syllable lengthening seems to be the most reliable cue and silence the least.

Kloker (1975:5) found that in fact, "vowel and sonorant lengthening is an acoustic cue to the phonological phrase structure in spontaneous English speech." Macdonald (1976) found that the perceived meaning of a sentence such as

Big cats and dogs are quite ferocious.

could be changed from

(Big (cats and dogs)) are quite ferocious.

to

((Big cats) and dogs) are quite ferocious.

either by putting a pause of 50 to 150 msec. between units³⁷ or by lengthening the final consonant of a unit by the same amount.

Thus, in addition to pitch contours durational changes can also be used to mark relevant units in the stream of speech. This possibility was considered by Pike in his original analysis of pauses. He noted that a variant of the tentative pauses exists in which no silence occurs.

Rather

. . . there may be a lengthening of the last sound or two of the preceding word. This length takes up the same time as the physical pause would have done. (Pike 1945:31.)

Pike used a special symbol [:] to indicate that the sound preceding it had been lengthened.

The study of the phonemic clause, breath-group and specific juncture cues is quite relevant to the analysis of turn-constructural units. Indeed, Duncan's work utilizes the phonemic clause explicitly (1974:301) and the first of his turn-yielding cues, a phonemic clause ending on either raising or falling intonation (Ibid:303) is based directly on the work of Trager and Smith. However, the work on the phonemic clause is not sufficient to provide an adequate characterization of turn-constructural units. Like Duncan's approach to turn-taking it fails to provide

³⁷Macdonald's work also provides some study of just how much silence constitutes a noticeable pause in speech. She found (1976:569) that the

a systematic analysis of the projectability of such units. Nevertheless, this work constitutes one of the major studies of the natural units constructing the turn.

Changes in pitch have been found to be quite important for the description of both the phonemic clause and the breath-group. However, similar changes in pitch have been marked in quite different ways by different analysts. It would therefore seem appropriate to indicate here how intonation will be transcribed in this dissertation. Changes in pitch will be marked with conventional orthography.³⁸ A period indicates

300 msec. of silence used by O'Malley and his colleagues was "too long and sounded artificial." For her work she used pauses of 50, 100 and 150 msec. This suggests that somewhere between 150 and 300 msec. silence begins to be perceived not simply as a structural marker but as a noticeable rupture in the production of speech. (Particular linguistic contexts might, of course, modify this. For example, in mid-word a much shorter silence might produce a very noticeable pause.) Interestingly enough, the boundary at which silences were specifically marked in the early transcription of Sacks and his colleagues was 0.2 second.

³⁸The use of punctuation symbols to mark changes in pitch is not a recent development. Lieberman (1967:129, citing Hadding-Koch 1961:9) describes

a medieval rule for liturgical recitation from Munster which states that a fall in pitch corresponds to periods, a small rise to commas, and a large rise to interrogatives . . .

The rule was written as shown here:



Sic can-ta com-ma, sic du-o punc-ta: sic ve-ro punc-tum.



Sic sig-num in-ter-ro-ga-ti-o-nis?

falling intonation and this corresponds to Pike's final pause, Trager and Smith's [#] juncture or the terminal intonation contour of Lieberman's unmarked breath-group. A question mark indicates raising intonation and thus corresponds to Trager and Smith's [//] juncture, Lieberman's marked breath-group, and one aspect of Pike's tentative pause. A comma indicates an intonation change between that marked by a question mark or period (as occurs for example, after items in a list in conversation). However, the intonation change appropriate to a comma might be slightly falling rather than sustained. The comma is thus not an exact equivalent of Trager and Smith's [/] juncture but might indicate a variant of Lieberman's marked breath-group. Intonation changes between these major positions can be indicated by a combination of these symbols, e.g. ";" or "?."

In addition to pitch, stress was found relevant to the description of the phonemic clause. Stress is not the result of any single phonological process. Rather "increases in amplitude, fundamental frequency, and duration are all cues to the perception of stressed syllables" (Lieberman 1967:30). In the transcription system to be used in this dissertation changes in pitch or amplitude are marked by underscoring while longer than normal duration is marked with a colon. Raise in pitch can thus be indicated in two different ways, either by underscoring or by an orthographic symbol such as a question mark.

The phonemic clause has been used as an analytic resource in disciplines other than linguistics and has been found to organize non-

vocal as well as vocal phenomena within the turn and to be relevant to the study of speech encoding. The study of kinesics is based explicitly on the methods of structural linguistics (Birdwhistell 1973:97). Scheflen (1964:320) reports unpublished work of Birdwhistell demonstrating that the junctures marking the phonemic clause are regularly accompanied "by a movement of the head, eyes, or hands". More precisely (Scheflen 1974: 20):

In English there are three kinds of terminal markers:

1. The speaker drops his pitch level and allows a part of his body to fall at the completion of a declarative.
2. He raises pitch and body part at the completion of a question.
3. If he is articulating a sequence of syntactic sentences, he will hold his pitch and the marking body part level until he has finished the first syntactic sentence in the sequence.

If Lieberman's argument that junctures are divided into two, rather than three, classes is valid, some details of the kinesic classification system might also have to be reexamined. However, the outcome of such a dispute would not challenge a generalization such as the following:

(T)he terminal bodily movements and the terminal pitch changes occur in the same direction. If pitch is raised, the eyelids, head, or hand will be elevated slightly. When pitch is lowered, such bodily part is lowered. (Scheflen 1974:20.)

While kinesics found the phonemic clause relevant to the study of body movement another line of research discovered that it was applicable to the psychological study of speech encoding. Boomer (1965) found that pauses in speech most frequently occur after the first word of a phonemic

clause. He argues that this provides evidence that speech encoding is organized in terms of the phonemic clause rather than proceeding word by word as some earlier studies (for example, Maclay and Osgood 1959) had implied. This work led to a second line of investigation relating speech to body movement through the phonemic clause. Building on Boomer's work Dittman (1974:174) found that body movement as well as pauses in speech occurred near the beginning of the phonemic clause (see also Dittman and Llewellyn 1969). In addition, the phonemic clause was found to organize the actions of the hearer as well as those of the speaker. Dittman and Llewellyn (1967:342) report that:

The spontaneous vocal listening responses of the interviewer seemed to be inserted almost exclusively at the boundary points, called junctures, between the speaker's phonemic clauses and almost never at any points within the clauses.

Such a finding is obviously relevant to the description of the turn at talk, providing an approach to specifying the distribution of one party's talk within the turn of another. The structure of the phonemic clause was also used to differentiate two different types of pauses: juncture pauses which occur at its boundaries and hesitation pauses which occur within the clause(Boomer 1965:151, 153-154).

Work in both kinesics and psychology thus provides some demonstration that a number of different aspects of talk, including both vocal and non-vocal phenomena, may be organized in terms of a single unit, the phonemic clause or breath-group. Similar findings have been made with respect to units on other levels of organization. Condon and his associates (for example, Condon and Ogston 1966; Condon and Ogston 1967; Condon and Sander 1974) have shown that the boundaries of body movements

of both speaker and hearer coincide with syllable and other boundaries in the stream of the speaker's speech. Condon and Sander (1974) even found that the movements of one day old infants were precisely synchronized with the articulatory segments of human speech (whether English or Chinese, live or taped) but not with disconnected vowel or tapping sounds. If the infant is already moving when speech starts

. . . points of change in the configuration of moving body parts become coordinated with points of change in sound patterns characterizing speech. (Condon and Sander 1974:101.)

The stream of speech thus seems to provide a (perhaps innately recognized)³⁹ reference signal capable of synchronizing the behavior of separate participants. (An analogy which comes readily to mind is the music of the band in the circus which trapeze artists use to coordinate their separate actions. However, in conversation the signal used to synchro-

³⁹This work provides a direct challenge to the common argument that language behavior is not manifest until about the child's first year. Condon and Sander (1974:101) note the implications their work has for theories of language acquisition:

This study reveals a complex interaction system in which the organization of the neonate's motor behavior is entrained by and synchronized with the organized speech behavior of adults in his environment. If the infant, from the beginning, moves in precise, shared rhythm with the organization of the speech structure of his culture, then he participates developmentally through complex, sociobiological entrainment processes in millions of repetitions of linguistic forms long before he later uses them in speaking and communicating. By the time he begins to speak, he may have already laid down within himself the form and structure of the language system of his culture. This would encompass a multiplicity of interlocking aspects: rhythm and syntactic "hierarchies", suprasegmental features, and paralinguistic nuances, not to mention body motion styles and rhythms.

nize the actions of the participants, the stream of speech, is itself a product of their coordinated action, much as if the music in the circus was not a preformulated melody but rather an emergent product of the coordinated actions of the performers and simultaneously a resource employed to achieve that very coordination.) This work provides a strong demonstration that language is not simply a mode of expression for the speaker but rather constitutes a form of social organization, implicated in the coordination of the behavior of the different parties present.

Condon and Sander (1974:101) argue that their work

. . . suggests that the "bond" between human beings should be studied as the expression of a participation within shared organizational forms rather than as something limited to isolated entities sending discrete messages.

The work of Condon and his associates shows the intricacy of coordinated behavior between speaker and hearer one can expect to find within the turn and indicates some of the processes through which that coordination is achieved.

Condon and Ogston (1967:227-229) note that speech and body movement become more independent in sequences larger than the word. The method they use for finding a relationship between speech and body movement--congruent boundaries for these different types of action--must therefore be used with caution when analyzing units as large as the phonemic clause. For example, Lindenfeld (1971) has sought to determine just how much relationship exists between syntactic units and units of

This may provide an empirical basis for a new approach to language acquisition.

body movement. She argued (1971:228) that body movements whose boundaries coincided with syntactic boundaries were related to speech while body movements whose boundaries fell in the middle of syntactic units were not. However, when language and body movement are considered with reference to the process of turn-taking, an alternative possibility emerges. Specifically, in order to indicate that though a possible turn-transition place is being marked syntactically the floor is not being yielded, the speaker might position his body movement so that it bridges a syntactic boundary, beginning shortly before the termination of one turn-constructive unit but not ending until a new unit is under way. (In such a case the body movement would constitute what Duncan (1974:304) has analyzed as an "attempt-suppressing signal".) From this perspective, a close relationship between kinesics and syntax would be demonstrated precisely in the lack of congruence between syntactic and kinesic boundaries. Some of Lindenfeld's own examples are consistent with this line of analysis. For example (1971:231):

There was nobody I could talk to and no...no., etc.

I didn't go for that...And uh every...one, etc.

In both of these examples the speaker begins his body movement just before the next transition point of his turn and continues the movement until a new turn-constructive unit has been begun. Such positioning is quite consistent with the argument that the speaker is placing his body movement so as to indicate that he is not prepared to yield the floor at the syntactic boundary in his utterance marking the termination of a turn-

constructional unit.⁴⁰

The analysis of the natural units into which the stream of speech is divided thus supports Goffman's conceptualization of talk (for example the definitions of conversation cited at the beginning of this chapter) as an interactionally sustained form of social organization achieved through the coordinated action of multiple participants and including within its scope non-vocal as well as vocal phenomena. Work on the phonemic clause provides careful description of how intonation can be employed both to mark the termination of units in the stream of speech and to classify units into different types. The ability to specify natural terminations is essential for the analysis in Chapter III of this dissertation and the alternation between falling and non-falling pitch contours is quite important for the analysis in Chapter IV. Though most of the research on the units reported here was not concerned with the process of turn-taking, it has considerable relevance to the analysis of conversational phenomena such as turn-taking and the structure of turn-constructional units.

⁴⁰ Pike (1967:568) provides a similar analysis for the placement of pauses at syntactic boundaries:

Pause-group borders may be made to crisscross with sentence borders . . . so that at the sentence border no pause occurs whereas immediately after the second sentence begins the pause does occur. This is the device by which people talk so that others 'cannot get a word in edgewise'.

Note: That is what she used to say. But now she doesn't say it any more (with no pause at the period-plus-ligature; but with pause and sharply indrawn breath after But).

V. Gaze

The aspect of non-vocal behavior to be examined most intensively in this dissertation is gaze. The glances of individuals toward other individuals, and especially their mutual gaze upon each other, has in fact been the subject of considerable study in the social sciences. Simmel (1969:358) provides the following analysis of the social organization of gaze:

Of the special sense-organs, the eye has a uniquely sociological function. The union and interaction of individuals is based upon mutual glances. This is perhaps the most direct and purest reciprocity which exists anywhere. This highest psychic reaction, however, in which the glances of eye to eye unite men, crystallizes into no objective structure; the unity which momentarily arises between two persons is present in the occasion and is dissolved in the function. So tenuous and subtle is this union that it can only be maintained by the shortest and straightest line between the eyes, and the smallest deviation from it, the slightest glance aside, completely destroys the unique character of this union. No objective trace of this relationship is left behind, as is universally found, directly or indirectly, in all other types of associations between men, as, for example, in interchange of words. The interaction of eye and eye dies in the moment in which the directness of the function is lost. But the totality of social relations of human beings, their self-assertion and self-abnegation, their intimacies and estrangements, would be changed in unpredictable ways if there occurred no glance of eye to eye. This mutual glance between persons, in distinction from the simple sight or observation of the other, signifies a wholly new and unique union between them.

This dissertation will investigate in some detail (especially in chapters two and three) the structures organizing mutual gaze within the turn and the orientation of the participants toward even a very small, momentary deviation from "the shortest and straightest line between the eyes". It will be found, however, that mutual gaze is not constant

throughout the turn and Simmel himself (1969:358-359) suggests some theoretical basis for why this should be the case:

The limits of this relation are to be determined by the significant fact that the glance by which the one seeks to perceive the other is itself expressive. By the glance which reveals the other, one discloses himself. By the same act in which the observer seeks to know the observed, he surrenders himself to be understood by the observer. The eye cannot take unless at the same time it gives . . . The glance in the eye of the other serves not only for me to know the other but also enables him to know me . . . A person is not at all completely present to another, when the latter sees him but only when he also sees the other.

Gaze is thus not merely a means of obtaining information, the receiving end of a communications system, but is itself a social act.⁴¹ Within conversation the gaze of the participants toward each other is con-

⁴¹Goffman (1963) has examined in some detail the social organization of gaze within interaction. He notes for example (1963:92) that:

Eye-to-eye looks . . . play a special role in the communication life of the community, ritually establishing an avowed openness to verbal statements and a rightfully heightened mutual relevance of acts.

The social character of glances organizes not only their meeting but also their avoidance (1963:95):

. . . mutual glances ordinarily must be withheld if an encounter is to be avoided, for eye contact opens one up for face engagement. I would like to add . . . that there is a relationship between the use of eye-to-eye glances as a means of communicating a request for initiation of an encounter, and other communication practices. The more clearly individuals are obliged to refrain from staring directly at others, the more effectively will they be able to attach special significance to a stare, in this case, a request for an encounter. The rule of civil inattention thus makes possible, and "fits" with, the clearance function given to looks into other's eyes.

Gaze is thus a particularly important form of communication in face-to-face interaction, its absence being as significantly structured as its presence.

strained by its social character and these constraints, rather than purely informational issues, provide for the organization and meaningfulness of gaze within the turn. Thus, the gaze of a speaker toward another party can constitute a signal that the speaker's utterance is being addressed to that party.⁴² Similarly, the gaze of another party toward the speaker can constitute a display of hearership.⁴³ Such social attributes of gaze provide for its ordered distribution within the turn. The structure of this distribution will be one of the main subjects investigated in Chapter Two.

The movement of gaze within conversation makes relevant some consideration of how participants arrange themselves for conversation. Scheflen (1964:326-327) notes two basic patterns: side-by-side or face-to-face, this latter being referred to as a *vis-à-vis* arrangement. He argues that these different arrangements are typical of different kinds of activities, the *vis-à-vis* providing for interaction between the parti-

⁴²See for example, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:717) and Philips (1974:162). Bales (1970:67) notes that a speaker who wishes to address a group as a whole must avoid letting his glance "pause on any one person long enough to encourage the belief that he speaks to that particular one". Schegloff (1968:1088) reports a case where a speaker on a bus addressed an utterance to another party without turning his gaze to that party. This led to an elaborate search by others on the bus for the addressee of the utterance. This dissertation will explicitly examine the orientation of participants in conversation toward the gaze of the speaker as a form of address and the constraints this imposes on their action (for example, the utterance of the speaker must be one that can be appropriately addressed to the party he is gazing at).

⁴³For example, Argyle and Cook 1976:121 note that

Glances are used by listeners to indicate continued attention


cipants while side-by-side arrangement involves mutual orientation toward some third party or object. In conversations with more than two participants both arrangements are typically found, for example, two side-by-side listeners vis-à-vis a speaker. Participants sometimes orient different parts of their bodies in different directions so that the same party can be in vis-à-vis arrangements with two different others.

The exact orientation of participants toward each other within a vis-à-vis requires more precise specification. Sommer (1959:250-251) found that people who had a choice preferred to seat themselves corner-to-corner rather than face-to-face.⁴⁴ Ekman and Friesen (1974:276-277) report much the same preference and note that such a seating arrangement is implicated in the organization of gaze since it makes gazing at the other a marked act.⁴⁵

In Western society a dyadic conversation usually occurs in a seating position where the rest positions of the faces are not directly vis-à-vis. People sit at slight angles to each other rather than directly face-to-face, particularly if no table is interposed. Looking at the other person requires an act, moving the eyes or the head from center, and the act

and willingness to listen. Aversion of gaze means lack of interest or disapproval.

⁴⁴I.e., positions such as B and A in the following diagram were preferred over positions such as B and H:



⁴⁵Schefflen (1974:29) notes that a participant who is speaking to several others will orient his body to a point midway between his recipients. Then, while speaking, he will turn from one to the other. Such an arrangement would seem consistent with the analysis of Ekman and Friesen since within it gaze toward another is constituted as a marked, noticeable act.

ends by returning to the resting position where it is easy not to look or not to be looked at. Seating a dyad in direct face-to-face confrontation can produce the same discomfort as removing all screens blocking the view of the body below the waist. Such seating positions connote interrogation and severe role inequality.

In addition to the structural relationship between seating position and gaze noted by Ekman and Friesen other aspects of the arrangement of the participants are also relevant to the organization of the conversation. For example, the order in which a speaker generally addresses different recipients may be constrained by the details of their seating arrangement. However, while such phenomena are recognized as relevant and possible subjects for further research they are beyond the scope of the present dissertation. The arrangement of participants will therefore not be specifically investigated.⁴⁶

Kendon (1967) has provided the most extensive analysis of the function of gaze within conversation. He reports a particular distribution of gaze over the course of an utterance (a term he uses in roughly the sense of turn at talk). A speaker looks away at the beginning of his utterance but gazes steadily toward his addressee as the utterance

⁴⁶It may however, be reported that the data is generally consistent with the findings of Sommer and Ekman and Friesen but that very frequently the physical structures available for seating make achievement of the preferred arrangement difficult or impossible. For example, most picnic tables have benches along the side but do not have chairs at the end. Only face-to-face or side-by-side positions are thus available to participants though they can and do modify this somewhat by turning their bodies in appropriate directions. In a dyadic conversation that was not constrained in such a fashion (tape #G.50. The participants were seated in individual lawn chairs) the participants arranged themselves in precisely the positions described by

approaches termination. A hearer, however, looks away from the speaker near the end of his utterance.⁴⁷ Thus, when turn-transition occurs the new speaker is gazing away from his recipient as is expected of a speaker near the beginning of his utterance.

Gaze at the termination of turns is not investigated in this dissertation. However, the sequencing of gaze at turn-beginning studied in Chapters Two and Three of this dissertation is consistent with the pattern described by Kendon and supports his findings.

Ekman and Friesen,

47

Analysts investigating gaze from an individual rather than an interactive perspective have found that after being asked a question a subject turns his head to the side in characteristic directions (for example, left versus right) depending upon the content of the question (for example, whether it deals with verbal or mathematical material). The argument here is that lateral orientation is controlled by frontal centers in each hemisphere of the brain and that 'when the effects of the two centers are equally balanced, attention is directed straight ahead' (Kinsbourne 1972:539). However the brain is asymmetrical with respect to certain cognitive functions, with language processes occurring predominantly in the left hemisphere while spatial and temporal processes are localized in the right hemisphere. It is proposed that when a person engages in processes requiring the use of a specific hemisphere, for example, a verbal task, 'the verbal activation overflows into the left-sided orientation center, driving attentional balance off center and to the right' (Ibid.:539). In such experiments the person asking the stimulus question is seated behind the subject. Gur (1975) investigated what happened when subject and experimenter were seated face to face. She found that the same subjects who would turn their eyes in different task-related directions when not facing

Kendon also finds (Ibid.:26) that the hearer gazes at the speaker more than the speaker gazes at the hearer. The pattern of gazing is also somewhat different for each position. Hearers give speakers fairly long looks broken by comparatively brief glances away while speakers alternate looks toward their recipients with looks away from them of about equal length (Ibid.:27, 33). The looks of the speaker toward the hearer occur at the ends of phrases (Ibid.:41). At points of hesitation the speaker looks away from his recipient, gazing back at him when fluent speech is resumed (Ibid.:41). Mutual gaze between speaker and hearer is found to be quite short, in most cases lasting less than a second (Ibid.:28).

According to Kendon (Ibid.:52-53) an individual's perceptual activity within interaction functions in two different but inter-related ways: as a means of monitoring and as a means of regulation and

another would, when facing the questioner, move 'their eyes predominantly in only one direction, either right or left, regardless of problem type' (Gur 1975:751). This supports the possibility that 'an experimenter's presence before the subject affects the lateralization of underlying cerebral activities in lawful and meaningful ways' (Ibid.:752). Gur concludes that 'situational variables interact with variables related to cerebral activity in producing gaze aversions as well as in determining their direction'. By focusing on a particular situational variable, processes of interaction between speaker and hearer implicated in the construction of the turn at talk, the present work complements this line of investigation. For a more complete summary of such work see Argyle and Cook (1976:21-23).

expression. These functions account in some measure for the positioning of gaze within interaction. Thus, the places where a speaker gazes at his recipient, utterance endings and phrase boundaries within the utterance, are choice points, places where the future action of the speaker is contingent on the subsequent action of his hearer. By looking at his recipient at these points the speaker can both monitor the recipient's response and signal that a response is desired (Ibid:4)

We have suggested that when p looks at the end of his utterances, or at the ends of his phrases within an utterance, he is checking on his listener's responses, in particular he may be looking to see if q is still attending to him. By looking at q, as we suggested, he also signals to him that he is giving him his attention, and thus if, in looking at q, p sees that q is looking at him, he sees that he is being 'received'. The mutual gaze, momentarily held, at least, would thus appear to be an integral part of the set of signals that people are on the lookout for in interaction as indicators that each is still taking account of the other.

The characteristic gaze patterns at utterance ending can also function to signal the willingness of each party to effect turn-transition at that point (Ibid:60):

It is suggested that the speaker, by looking at the auditor, signals to him that he is ready for him to start speaking, as well as being able to see whether this signal has been received. In looking away, the other person signals that he has accepted the 'offer' of a change of role.

Other analysts have suggested different explanations for the intermittent character of gaze in activities such as conversation. Eibl-Eibesfeld (1974:28) for example, attributes it to an innate fear of being stared at:

If it is true that we respond innately with fear to a stare or to eye-patterns resembling a stare, then this alone could bring about the independent learning of patterns of shifting the glance, or of cutting off the stare by lowering the lids and briefly looking away, during friendly social contact.

Argyle and Dean (1965) on the other hand argue that mutual gaze satisfies affiliative needs.

In the face of such conflicting explanations Kendon (1967:59-60) argues that the primary function of eye-contact is the achievement of the various tasks posed in the course of moment-to-moment interaction:

At the very least we must entertain two hypotheses, that on the one hand to engage in eye-contact with someone is to seek to affiliate with him, and on the other it is to challenge him. However, the present writer agrees with Weisbrod (1965) that it is more economical to suppose that when one perceives that another is looking at one, one perceives that the other intends something by one, or expects something of one. In a word, one perceives that one is being taken account of by another. It seems reasonable to suppose that this will have quite marked arousing consequences, but what line of action it rouses one to take will depend upon the context in which the LOOK is perceived . . .

In this view of eye-contact, it is easy to see why it will be sought for in interaction, since we can only be sure that we are being effective in what we do if we know that the other is taking account of it. To receive his gaze is to receive an indication that one is being taken account of. We should thus expect that p will seek eye-contact with whoever he is interacting regardless of the specific kind of response he seeks from him, and it will be rewarding to him not because through eye-contact any particular 'need' is gratified, but because through eye-contact p knows that he is affecting q in some way and that he is, thereby, making progress in whatever he is attempting to do.

In this dissertation gaze will be investigated in terms of specific tasks posed in the construction of the turn at talk. A great many other factors, such as dominance, embarrassment, the maintenance of an

appropriate equilibrium of intimacy, various emotional characteristics and distance, have however, also been found relevant to gaze. This research is too extensive to discuss in detail and is not directly relevant to the analysis in this dissertation. An excellent summary of it can be found in Argyle and Cook (1976).

VI. Data

Data for the analysis in this dissertation consists of approximately fifty hours of videotape of actual conversation recorded in a range of natural settings.

The term "actual conversation" is meant to contrast the data used in this dissertation with data consisting of reports about conversation⁴⁸ (as might, for example, be obtained by questioning people about what they do in conversation) on the one hand and hypothetical versions of it (as are employed for example, by many linguists studying discourse) on the other.

⁴⁸The conceptual problems of using reports as data about the phenomena being reported on are well known. The report may be inaccurate in the sense that the description fails to correspond to the phenomena being described (for example, a male is described as a female or, as Sommer and Becker (1974:261) found, a subject tells an interviewer that he performs some action which actual observation shows he does not perform).

Scheflen (1974:47, see also Ibid:15) notes another, more serious problem. Informants may be unable to codify relevant aspects of the phenomena being reported on:

A person uses the suprasegmental features of speech, a variety of gestures and facial displays, shifts or "punctuation" behavior, territorial arrangements, and certain regulatory or metabehaviors . . . in exact traditional detail, but he can tell us only about certain gestures and forms of speech.

The term "natural" is meant to distinguish the samples of conversation used in this dissertation from samples obtained in conditions, such as experiments, where attempts are made to control in principled

He cannot apparently visualize the other features. We assume, then, that only certain features of the representational system have been explicated and identified in the history of a people's self-examination. Many features and aspects of an emic system have not been coded in the language of a people, and these are not consciously represented in cognition anywhere in the culture.

For such events (which include conversation), reports will fail to provide relevant information about the phenomena being described within them.

Yet another problem has been noted by Sacks and his colleagues (see for example, Sacks 1963, 1966; Schegloff 1972; Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel and Sacks 1969). The same phenomenon can be accurately described in many different ways (for example a single individual might be accurately described as "Fred", "my husband", "a guy", "a Causasian male", "an engineer", "A Philadelphian", etc.). The problem of accurate correspondence between a description and the phenomenon being described is thus subordinate to the analytically prior problem of specifying the procedures governing the selection of some appropriate description from the set of correct descriptions. In view of this it is argued that the process of description itself rather than the object being described should be the primary focus of analysis. The principles providing for the construction of appropriate descriptions have been found to be lodged within the interactive circumstances of their production, a point demonstrated in some detail in Schegloff's (1972) analysis of how terms to describe a specific phenomenon, place, are selected. Sacks (1972:331-332) argues that the independence of a description from the object it describes is in fact a great advantage to the social scientist since he can study descriptions as phenomena in their own right without having to wait for the other sciences to provide definitive characterizations of the objects in the world being described (such a position seems quite close to that of cognitive anthropologists such as Goodenough and Frake who focus analysis on how the perception of phenomena is organized by a culture (for example, the principles used to classify plants) rather than on the objects so perceived (i.e., the scientific descriptions of the flowers themselves)),

ways parameters of, or variables within, the talk being sampled.⁴⁹

The importance of using natural data for research of the type undertaken in this dissertation has been emphasized by a number of investigators. For example, Condon and Ogston (1967:221) argue that:

The need to control the variables in experimental method tends to modify the process under investigation. In human behavior, it is quite often not even clear what the variables are, such that they could be controlled. What is required to some extent is a method which could investigate and make relatively rigorous, predictable statements about a process without disrupting the process too severely.⁵⁰

They note further that

Naturally occurring processes are, theoretically, as determined as the events in a controlled experimental situation.

In sum, the use of reports to analyze the objects being described within the reports poses some rather serious conceptual problems. This is especially true for the study of conversation since reports are among the phenomena constructed within it. They, therefore, should be part of the subject matter under investigation.

⁴⁹The present work is thus similar to what Birdwhistell (1970:18) refers to as 'the natural history approach':

In kinesics we engage in experimentation in the British sense. That is, we look at phenomena to trace what is happening, rather than attempt to control the variables and make something happen in an artificial situation. This is the natural history approach.

⁵⁰What Condon and Ogston propose is quite compatible with the approach to conversation taken by Sacks and his colleagues. For example, Schegloff and Sacks (1973:289-290) state that:

This project is part of a program of work undertaken several years ago to explore the possibility of achieving a naturalistic observational discipline that could deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, empirically, and formally.

Scheflen (1964:319), arguing for the importance of studying events in context, observes that

. . . the chance to determine experimentally the function of an element is lost if the system in which it functions is scrapped.⁵¹

The importance of naturalistic data for the study of the hearer, one of the main subjects investigated in this dissertation, has been emphasized by Kendon. For example, after reviewing some existing research on the hearer (1974:150) he states:

In all these cases, however, the investigator has studied only those features of the listener's behavior he has determined in advance. The listener is always giving a controlled performance, where what he does and when he does it has been decided upon beforehand, as part of the experimental design. We know remarkably little, in a systematic way, about what it is that listeners ordinarily do, and how what they do is related to what speakers do.

Argyle (1969:22) argues that groups constructed especially for study, such as T-groups

. . . are quite unlike any other kind of small social group, and the results obtained will probably not be applicable to other groups.

Rather than continuing to use artificial situations as sources of data

Argyle (Ibid:15-16) states that "it is essential to study social behaviour in specific settings". He notes further that even the data of investigators using a naturalistic approach, such as Scheflen and Kendon,

⁵¹Schegloff (1972:432) makes a similar argument about the weakness of hypothetical data:

A central reason for frowning on invented data is that while it can be easily invented, it is invented only from the

has been drawn largely from psychotherapy sessions and laboratory groups and states (Ibid.:22) that "it would be most valuable to have similar material on sequences of interaction in families, work-groups, etc."

An emphasis on the importance of natural data is not confined to analysts of human interaction. It has come to be recognized in linguistics, in large part through the work of Labov, that the study of language requires data drawn from the actual situations of everyday life. Thus, Labov (1972b:xiii) state that:

There is a growing realization that the basis of inter-subjective knowledge in linguistics must be found in speech--language as it is used in everyday life by members of the social order, that vehicle of communication in which they argue with their wives, joke with their friends, and deceive their enemies.

Labov's theories about the type of data appropriate for the study of speech were a strong influence on the naturalistic approach to data collection taken in this dissertation.

The data for this dissertation consists of conversations recorded in the following situations:

<u>Settings and Participants</u>	<u>Tape Numbers</u>
Members of a lodge of the Moose and their families at both an ice cream social and a picnic in Southern Michigan	<u>7 hours</u> : G.33; G.34; G.51; G.52; G.65; G.66; G.74; G.75; G.76; G.77; G.78; G.89; G.90; G.91
A black extended family in the kitchen of one of their members in North Philadelphia, recorded on three separate occasions	<u>10,5 hours</u> : GA.6; GA.7; GA.8; GA.9; G.35; G.36; G.37; G.38; G.39; G.40; G.41; G.42; G.43; G.44; G.45; G.46; G.47; G.96; G.138; G.139; G.140

point at which it is relevant to the point being made, thereby eliminating a central resource members use in hearing it, i.e., its placement at some "here" in a conversation, after X; in short, by eliminating its conversational context.

<u>Settings and Participants</u>	<u>Tape Numbers</u>
Butchers in an Italian-American meat market in South Philadelphia	<u>2.5 hours:</u> G.1; G.2; G.3; G.4; G.5
A teenage swim party in Tenafly, New Jersey	<u>4.5 hours:</u> G.53; G.54; G.55; G.56; G.57; G.58; G.59; G.60; G.61
Three midwestern couples drinking beer in the back yard, Central Ohio	<u>3.5 hours:</u> G.82; G.83; G.84; G.85; G.86; G.87; G.88
An Italian-American bridal shower in Northeast Philadelphia	<u>3 hours:</u> G.112; G.113; G.114; G.115; G.116; G.117; G.119
A bridge game in Tenafly, New Jersey	<u>2 hours:</u> G.23; G.27; G.30; G.102
Several middle class women sitting on the lawn at a Fourth of July block party, suburban Pittsburgh	<u>3.5 hours:</u> G.50; G.120; G.121; G.122; G.123; G.124; G.127
Middle and old-aged friends at a birthday party on Long Island	<u>1 hour:</u> GA.2; GA.4
Family get together, Central Ohio	<u>1.5 hours:</u> G.79; G.80; G.81
Wall Street Bankers Shipboard Cocktail Party	<u>3 hours:</u> G.49; G.68; G.69; G.70; G.97; G.104
A family reunion in Tenafly, New Jersey	<u>5 hours:</u> G.8; G.10; G.11; G.12; G.13; G.17; G.29; G.31; G.100; G.103
A young couple talking with a friend in their living room in Tenafly, N.J.	<u>1 hour:</u> G.98; G.99
Middle class family dinners with friends:	
Suburban Pittsburgh	<u>1 hour:</u> G.126; G.131
West Philadelphia	<u>.5 hour:</u> G.26
North Philadelphia	<u>1.5 hours:</u> G.14; G.15; G.16

The situations in which data was collected have been described in terms of some standard and easily recognizable characteristics of the participants, events and settings. Such a description has been provided

to make more clear and specific the nature of the data utilized in this dissertation. It is not, however, meant to imply either that the data was selected in terms of these characteristics or that such characteristics are necessarily relevant to the structure of the conversation taking place in these situations.⁵²

Contact with the groups that were filmed was made in a number of different ways. In some cases the participants were relatives. When visiting them I would bring recording equipment and ask if I could tape some of their activities, explaining that I was gathering data for my dissertation. In other cases, access to a group was obtained through a relative. For example, on arriving home at one point, I learned that my teenage sister's girlfriends were having a swim party. I asked my sister if I could tape it and she put me in touch with the girl at whose house the party was to take place. Permission was obtained from this girl and the party was taped. Established relationships other than kinship also provided a basis for access to particular groups. For example, my wife had been doing participant observation of a black extended family in

⁵²For further discussion of this issue, see Schegloff and Sacks (1973: 291-292, including footnote 4). The work in Chapter Four of this dissertation can be used to illustrate the difficulties that would be posed if particular attributes of the participants were assumed, in the absence of a demonstration of their relevance in the data itself, to be ordering features of the conversation being examined. It is found in Chapter Four that speakers differentiate their recipients in terms of whether or not the recipient already knows about the event being discussed by the speaker and that orientation to this feature produces utterances with a characteristic structure when recipients with both states of knowledge are copresent. This feature is quite sensitive to other aspects of human social organization, serving, for example to mark in moment-to-moment talk the distinction between parties who share much of their experience in common, such as spouses,

Philadelphia for over five years and I had been included in this work for the past several years. Permission was obtained to tape this family in the home of one of their members and they were taped on several occasions. Access to the groups so far discussed was facilitated by some form of previous tie (direct or intermediate) with the group. However, in other cases contact with the group was not made until the time of taping. For example, I read in the newspaper that a local lodge of the Loyal Order of the Moose was holding an ice cream social on a particular date. Approximately half an hour before the scheduled beginning of the event, I showed up at the lodge with my recording equipment, explained what I wished to do and asked if I could tape the event. Other groups, including a meat market, a fraternity party and a jewelry store, were approached in a similar fashion. On two occasions permission to tape was denied. One was a pinball arcade and the other was a firehouse where the officer in charge said that he would first have to check with

and those who do not, such as acquaintances. It might thus seem that the organization of conversation in such circumstances should be analyzed in terms of such social attributes of the participants as their marital status. Such an approach would not, however, accurately characterize the phenomena under investigation since, on the one hand, this feature can be used to invoke the relevance of a very broad range of social attributes (for example, even in a situation where spouses are present, talk by army veterans about common service experience may locate them as parties who share knowledge of events that their spouses lack. Description of the participants in terms of particular attributes thus does not necessarily indicate how the parties are being classified within the conversation); and on the other, its operation is not consistent within specific social relationships (for example, when husband tells wife what happened at the office, the spouses' states of knowledge are not equivalent). The structure of this feature is thus independent of the particular social identities invoked by it within specific situations. Such considerations show the value of examining conversation in a broad range of situations

his supervisor. Eventually a letter denying permission to tape was received from Philadelphia Fire Commissioner Joseph Rizzo.

Tape #G.26, a half-hour dinner conversation, was not recorded by me but rather by George Kuetemeyer. This tape was obtained quite near the beginning of my data collection, when little other data was available, and began to be used in an informal seminar which was meeting to investigate videotaped interaction. Because of the growing familiarity of the members of the seminar with this tape it continued to be used for a number of months and was transcribed by Gail Jefferson, one of the seminar participants who has a reputation as an outstanding transcriber. Because of these events this tape became as important in my analysis as many of the tapes I recorded myself and I am indebted both to Mr. Kuetemeyer and the parties on the tape for permitting me to use it.

and events (the generality and structural variety of its procedures can be more clearly investigated) but indicate that the attributes of such situations are not necessarily organizing features of the conversation occurring within them. Rather, as Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:699-700) have noted:

Conversation can accommodate a wide range of situations, interaction in which persons in varieties (or varieties of groups) of identities are operating; it can be sensitive to the various combinations; and it can be capable of dealing with a change of situation within a situation. Hence, there must be some formal apparatus which is itself context-free, in such ways that it can, in local instances of its operation, be sensitive to and exhibit its sensitivity to various parameters of social reality in a local context. Some aspects of the organization of conversation must be expected to have this context-free, context-sensitive status; for, of course, conversation is a vehicle for interaction between parties with any potential identities, and with any potential familiarity.

It should be noted that some work in sociolinguistics has followed a quite

Both the types of events that could be recorded and the usefulness of the material obtained were heavily constrained by the technical requirements of the recording process. Some consideration of this process will both clarify the nature of these constraints and provide a more precise description of the data utilized in this dissertation and the procedures employed to obtain it.

All data was recorded on one-half inch videotape (EIAJ Type-1 standard) in black and white.

Data suitable for the analysis in this dissertation could have also been provided by film. Tape was chosen over film for the following reasons: First, half inch videotape equipment is much less expensive than a sixteen millimeter film camera and tape recorder capable of recording a film with a synchronized soundtrack.⁵³ Second, videotape is

different approach. For example, Ervin-Tripp (1973:66) states that

For most sociolinguistic analyses the important features of participants will be sociological attributes. These include the participants' status in the society, in terms such as sex, age, and occupation; their roles relative to one another, such as employer and his employee, a husband and his wife; and roles specific to the social situation, such as host-guest, teacher-pupil and customer-salesgirl.

⁵³This is not true with respect to Super-8 equipment and before turning to videotape I attempted to record conversation with it. The equipment I had (an Optasound unit) failed to keep synch reliably, making analysis of the type done in this dissertation impossible. Since that time this problem has been corrected by the appearance of single system Super-8 sound. However, Super-8 film is designed to produce only an original rather than an optimum second generation copy. If this situation were rectified, Super-8 could be a very valuable tool for research in the social sciences.

much less expensive than film capable of recording an equivalent amount of time.⁵⁴ Third, a comparatively long period of time (slightly over half an hour on the equipment I used) can be recorded without interruption. Equipment capable of doing this in sixteen millimeter is both expensive and bulky.

While these reasons led to the choice of tape over film, it should be noted that in some respects film is a superior medium to tape for work of the type being done here. It provides greater resolution thus permitting the recording of finer detail, is more permanent than tape and is capable of being easily viewed at a great many different speeds. Under appropriate circumstances (such as generous funding) film might be preferred over tape though it is not certain how long this will remain the case.

Black and white was chosen over color both for reasons of cost and because the recording equipment was more reliable and versatile. What was lost by not having color cannot be assessed. Smith's work on tongue displays (Smith, Chase and Liebllich 1974) suggests that the color difference between the tongue and lips and the rest of the face might be an important signal in interaction, one that is quite possibly relevant to the work in this dissertation.

Because of the focus of this dissertation on conversation, secur-

⁵⁴ It is not, however, true that one can economize with tape by erasing what doesn't turn out to be useful. Not only is it frequently difficult to determine what is or is not valuable until analysis is well advanced, but each time a recording is copied, a significant quality loss occurs. Thus, if proper quality is to be maintained, an original tape can be reused only if it is decided that nothing on it is worth keeping.

ing a high quality record of the participant's speech was a prime concern in data collection. The video camera I used (a Sony AVC-3400) had a microphone built into the camera. This microphone was not, however, adequate for my purpose. First, it recorded a high-pitched hum generated by other electrical equipment in the camera. Second, being at camera position, it was some distance from the participants. Tests at the time I was beginning to record data showed that the main influence on sound quality, even more important than the quality of the microphone used, was the distance of the microphone from the participants. The closer the microphone, the better the sound. The best sound is obtained by actually attaching a lavalier microphone to the speaker. Because of the quality obtained, this method is regularly used by linguists to obtain samples of speech.

Such a procedure would, however, pose serious problems for the present study. First, it would severely constrain the movements of the participants. Wires would be attached to them making it awkward for them to move from position to position within the group and impossible to leave the group without also disentangling themselves from the microphone. A new participant would have to be wired-up before joining the group. Second, anyone looking at another participant would have his attention directed to the recording situation. What is at issue here is quite different from the issue of the participants' awareness that they were being recorded. Gazing at the other is an integral part of conversational activity, and indeed one of the principal phenomena in-

vestigated in this dissertation. To obtain good sound the lavalier microphone would be placed quite close to the mouth, constituting an unusual, noticeable and distracting object just at the point when gaze at the other was initiated.⁵⁵ In view of these problems, it is not surprising that use by linguists of the lavalier typically takes place in a special situation, the interview, where the single party wearing the microphone is confined to a restricted place and does not see anyone else so encumbered. Even in such circumstances obtaining samples of other than formal speech styles is an important problem.⁵⁶

Some of the liabilities of the lavalier can be avoided by using a highly directional "shotgun" microphone which is capable of obtaining fairly good sound at some distance from the speaker. This is in fact, the method used to obtain sound in natural situations by many documentary filmmakers. Such a microphone would not, however, be suitable for the present work. Precisely because it is so highly directional its position must be constantly shifted to keep it pointing at the speaker of the moment. Further, it records the speech of the person it is being pointed at better than it records the speech of other participants. A

⁵⁵At one point in my data collection I used a lavalier, placing it on the prospective bride at a bridal shower. She reported being quite aware of the microphone and the attendant sitting next to her said that she was reminded of the fact that what she said was being recorded every time she looked at the bride. Both of these participants felt that the presence of the lavalier constrained their talk.

⁵⁶The work of Labov (for example 1972b:207-216) provides the best analysis of the constraints on speech imposed by the interview situation as well as the most productive attempts to overcome these limitations.

microphone of this type would thus be both extremely intrusive and would produce a poor record of many basic conversational phenomena such as overlap.⁵⁷

In view of these considerations I recorded speech by positioning a stationary microphone with the participants but not attached to them. The microphone was centrally placed and located as close to the participants as possible without being excessively intrusive. The placement that produced perhaps the best results was over the center of the group slightly above the heads of the participants. It seems that within conversation our eyes do not glance equally in all directions but gaze predominately in front of us or downward. Thus, though a microphone might be less than a foot from a person's head, if it is above the head it will remain relatively unobtrusive. A standard microphone stand with a flexible gooseneck was capable of placing the microphone in this position. However, the arrangement was much less intrusive if a stand was not placed within the group. Outdoors the best arrangement consisted of hanging the microphone from a tree and running the cable through the branches and along the trunk of the tree. Indoors the microphone could be hung from some fixture on the ceiling or placed on a stand positioned

⁵⁷ Use of this microphone is in fact quite congruent with the behavior of listeners in conversation. For example, it shifts attention from participant to participant as speakership changes. Indeed, I have observed that a soundman manipulating this device relies on many of the same conversational cues examined in this dissertation; for example, moving to a new speaker after a restart, and thus producing a clear record of the sentence begun after the restart. It is precisely the ability of this microphone to adapt to conversational structures and human participation in them that makes it a poor tool for the analysis

on a high object such as a refrigerator.

This method of obtaining sound imposed strong constraints on the type of conversation that could be recorded. Most notably, because of the cables, it was difficult to record people who moved from place to place. Recording was most successful when the conversation occurred in a fixed place of limited size, such as at a table.⁵⁸ Moreover, because of the intrusion caused by hanging cables, it was desirable to have the microphones placed before the participants arrived. Thus, many conversations were chosen to be recorded not on the basis of participants, who weren't known when the choice was made, but rather, for technical reasons, on the basis of location.

To offset the limitations of being confined to a single location, three microphones were used.⁵⁹ Sometimes different microphones were

of such phenomena.

⁵⁸Other investigators have encountered similar limitations. Thus, Sommer (1974:249) notes

Another limiting element in the work to date is that almost all the studies have involved discussion groups around tables and chairs. We know little about the ecology of working groups . . . or co-acting individuals, particularly if they are standing or moving. Again, the technical problems of recording interaction patterns of moving individuals are much greater than if the individuals are seated in a classroom or around a conference table.

⁵⁹Two of the microphones were medium quality electric condensors (Sony ECM 21's. A test before purchase showed that higher quality microphones did not produce a noticeable improvement in sound quality under field conditions). The third was a highly directional dynamic microphone (an Electro-Voice 644).

placed in different locations so that the camera could move from one to another as circumstances demanded. More frequently, one microphone was hung in a fixed location while one or two of the others were mounted on stands so that they could be moved when needed. While this arrangement provided some flexibility for moving from location to location, it did not make it possible to record moving groups.

The technical requirements for obtaining a picture of adequate quality also constrained the types of events that could be recorded. The most important factor governing picture quality was the amount of light available. The video camera used would produce a picture with ordinary room lighting. However, the picture was grainy, lacked some detail, and was not of sufficient quality to produce good copies. While some early data was obtained under these conditions, whenever possible an attempt was made to provide sufficient light to produce a good picture. This could be done in a variety of ways. For some situations floodlights were directed toward the participants. However, such lights have the strong disadvantage of being quite intrusive, even when bounced off the ceiling. Some of the liabilities of flood lights can be avoided by placing higher powered bulbs (at least 200 watts) in the existing light fixtures of the setting. While changing the light level, this method maintains the normal lighting arrangement of the setting and is far less intrusive than movie lights. This arrangement works best when high overhead fixtures are available. It was used in preference to flood lights whenever possible. The least intrusive way of obtaining sufficient light

consists of choosing a location where the existing lighting is adequate. A room well illuminated by fluorescent lighting usually produces an adequate picture,⁶⁰ and whenever possible, settings with such lighting were selected for taping. Finally, the best, as well as the least intrusive lighting, can be obtained by taping outdoors. For this reason, much of the data used in this dissertation was recorded outdoors.

Other constraints on what could be recorded were imposed by the characteristics of the vidicon tube. Unlike a film camera, this tube averages all the light in a scene. Therefore, participants could not be recorded in front of a bright background, such as the sky or a window, without losing detail in their features. Further, any bright point of light in the picture produces a dark, permanent burn on the tube and must be avoided. Finally, the best picture was obtained when the lighting was comparatively even. All of these considerations limited what could be successfully taped. For example, when recording outdoors, it was desirable to have the participants in the shade and in front of a solid background.

Other limitations were imposed by the characteristics of the recorded image. First, its ability to resolve detail is limited. Thus, a great deal more can be seen about a face that fills the frame than about one that occupies only a corner of it. If the actions of several participants are to be observed simultaneously, information is lost about the

⁶⁰It has been reported to me that the vidicon tube is more sensitive to fluorescent than incandescent light.

finer actions of each. A choice must therefore be made. For the work being discussed here the choice of what to include within the frame was governed by the research problems for which the data was being collected. Thus, at one point, I wished to investigate how speakers animate characters within stories.⁶¹ Therefore, whenever a story preface occurred, I filled the frame with the face of the speaker who had produced the preface.⁶² However, most of my research focused on the process of interaction between speaker and hearer. For such analysis I needed information about the simultaneous action of all participants. Therefore, all participants were included within the frame.

In order to obtain maximum detail the camera was panned and tilted, and a 12.5 to 75 millimeter zoom lens was adjusted, as the configuration of the group changed, or its members moved, so that the group just filled the frame. On a very few occasions it was necessary to use an 8.5 millimeter wide-angle lens rather than the zoom in order to include all members within the group. The camera was still panned and tilted when this lens was used.⁶³

⁶¹On this issue see Goffman 1974, Chapter 13, especially section V.

⁶²This work, which occupied less than an hour of tape, is not reported in this dissertation.

⁶³This method of taping thus, does not conform to the "locked off camera" paradigm of Feld and Williams (1974:1). However, neither does it conform to their "researchable film" paradigm where

. . . angle and focal length changes [are] justified only by the triggering pattern of human response and intuition in relation to the event. (Ibid:10)

Seating arrangements posed a second technical problem for the recorded image. If someone was behind some else he could not be seen. In many cases, this problem could be avoided or at least strongly limited by careful selection of camera position. Natural seating arrangements, such as picnic table with benches but no chairs, were sought which provided an opening for the camera. When these were not available chairs would sometimes be moved so that visual access to the group for the camera was not blocked. The camera was mounted on a movable cart so that its position could be changed easily to provide the best view of all participants as circumstances changed. Only very rarely (a game of bridge--tapes G.23 and G.102--and a family dinner--tapes G.126 and G.131) were the participants arranged specifically for the camera. As people moved within the group it frequently happened that someone was blocked, at least temporarily. Unless this was the very beginning of taping, or involved a new person sitting down, this was not called to the attention of the group. If the camera could not be moved to a better position the problems created by this situation were accepted.

While the technical details of the recording situation can be specified with some exactness, the consequences on the event of the fact that it was being observed are more elusive. Heider (1976:80) notes that "normal, naturally occurring conversation . . . is a relatively low-energy, fragile sort of behavior, which is easily disrupted by the camera."

In the present work particular research interests, rather than the intuitions of the moment, determined what was to be included within the frame. I am in complete agreement with Feld and Williams then they state (Ibid.:8) that "(W)e consider it essential that the researcher, trained in the observation of his subject, also be the filmer."

Problems related to the process of observation have in fact, emerged as important theoretical and methodological issues in several different fields. In linguistics, largely through the work of Labov, it is recognized that the most important source of data for the study of linguistic structure is the vernacular, "the style in which the minimum attention is given to the monitoring of speech". (Labov 1972b:208) However,

Any systematic observation of a speaker defines a formal context in which more than the minimum attention is paid to speech. (Ibid.:209, italics in original)

This situation leads to the Observer's Paradox:⁶⁴

The aim of linguistic research in the community must be to find out how people talk when they are not being systematically observed; yet we can only obtain these data by systematic observation (Ibid.:209).

The problem noted by Labov is not confined to linguistics but seems to emerge whenever precise information about natural human behavior becomes important. For example, Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1974:21) states that hidden cameras are "a prerequisite for any documentation of natural undisturbed behavior". It should be noted, however, that considerable dis-

⁶⁴ A rather different position is taken by Levi-Strauss (1974:133):

We may say, then, that as concerns language, we need not fear the influence of the observer on the observed phenomenon, because the observer cannot modify the phenomenon merely by becoming conscious of it.

It may be, however, that Labov and Levi-Strauss are in fact talking about different issues, with Labov focusing on the problem of obtaining relevant data in actual situations, while Levi-Strauss is dealing with the problem of control over the structures involved in the production of language. Labov's analysis of Steve K. (1972b:103-105) in fact provides strong evidence that speakers cannot control through consciousness relevant aspects of their speech behavior which will nevertheless vary significantly and regularly with respect to different observational contexts.

agreement exists on this issue. Thus, unlike Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Feld and Williams (1974:9) believe that the process of filming does not significantly alter the behavior being filmed.

This issue has emerged in communications research in a slightly different form. Worth and Gross (1974) argue that intentionality is essential for human communicative action and on this basis distinguish natural events, which lack intentionality, from symbolic events, which possess it. An observer employs different interpretive strategies to deal with these different types of events, treating natural events as informative but symbolic ones as communicative. They note that this has important consequences on how a recording of human activity can be interpreted and analyzed, A film of, for example, a psychiatric interview, taken with a hidden camera can be looked at with the interpretive strategies appropriate to a natural event. However,

Were the camera crew to have been in the room during the interview, moving around and filming the event from various positions, or were the film to be clearly edited and rearranged by the filmmaker, most of us would realize that we were seeing a symbolic event which had been intentionally put together for the purpose of implying something the filmmaker wished to communicate. We would recognize that the events we observed had been selected and organized into a "whole", and that the appropriate interpretative strategy was one which analyzed the structure of the film and the relationships of its elements, in addition to incorporating any attributional interpretations which we might make about the people in the film on the basis of our general social knowledge. (Worth and Gross 1974:34.)

It is thus recognized by theorists in a number of different fields that the process of observing a natural event can itself change the structure of that event. For both technical and ethical reasons, hidden cameras were not used to collect any of the data utilized in this dissertation.

Participants were always aware that they were being recorded. The problems of observation are thus relevant to the data being used for analysis in this dissertation.

While most discussion of this issue has focused simply on the presence of the observer (or camera) such a concept, in fact includes several different types of phenomena which must be distinguished analytically.

First, the behavior of the observer may organize the behavior being observed. Interviews provide a particularly clear example of this process. The actions of the interviewer shape the interaction into a particular pattern with a distinctive turn-taking structure providing different types of action for the interviewer and the party or parties being interviewed. Wolfson (1976:189ff) examines some of the problems posed by the use of such structures in linguistics.

Some investigators have attempted to deal with such problems by making the actions of the interviewer as well as the parties being interviewed part of the final published record of the event (a particularly striking example is provided by Jean Rouch's Chronicle of a Summer). However, while such a strategy makes accessible the actions of the observer, it does nothing about the changes in the event itself wrought by the structure of his behavior.

The observer's actions may modify the structure of the event even though the observer does not cause any changes in the behavior of the participants. For example, after the event he can rearrange his record

of it, as happens for instance, when a film is edited. Further, the technology used to record the event in the first place will inevitably modify it in a systematic fashion. Any camera position or framing of participants involves a choice from a set of alternatives and any of the alternatives not selected would have produced a different record of the event. Similarly, using a category system, such as that of Bales (1970: 92) to code the event will lose much information about the event and organize the information that remains in a particular fashion determined as much by the structure of the category system as by the events being categorized.

Analytically distinct from the behavior of the observer, is the observer as an addressee of the participants. People act differently toward different types of others⁶⁵ and this will have consequences on their production of talk.⁶⁶ This has important consequences for the investigator wishing to sample the speech behavior of different types of individuals. If the investigator is the addressee of the party he is observing, as is the case with interviews, he will obtain samples of how these different individuals talk to an academic stranger. He will not, however, have obtained samples of how they talk to each other.

An investigator can, however, systematically observe and record the speech of different groups of people without himself being the addressee of that talk. In his early interviews in New York, Labov (1972b:89) observed that "At any point in the interview, the subject may address re-

⁶⁵For some discussion of the relevance of this for the conceptualization of culture, see Goodenough (1963:260-261).

⁶⁶For some analysis of precisely how talk will vary in terms of its intended recipient, see Schegloff (1972).

marks to a third person and casual speech may emerge." In order to obtain better data about the vernacular he therefore began to supplement formal interviews with group sessions "in which the interaction of members overrides the effect of observation, and gives us a more direct view of the vernacular with less influence of the observer"⁶⁷ (Ibid:109).

Specifically

In our work in South-Central Harlem . . . we studied adolescent peer groups through long-term participant observation. Individual interviews were carried out with all members of the group, yielding the individual data we needed on each individual. A series of group sessions was held in which the speech of each member (picked up from a lavalier microphone) was recorded on a separate track. There was no obvious constraint in these group sessions; the adolescents behaved much as usual, and most of the interaction--physical and verbal--took place between the members. As a result the effect of systematic observation was reduced to a minimum. (Ibid:210)

Analytically distinct from both the behavior of the observer and his status as an addressee of the participant's action are changes in the event caused by the mere fact that it is being recorded as well as the observable presence of the recording equipment. Some investigators have argued that if participants are recorded in a group, they will ignore the recording equipment. Thus Gumperz (1972:25) states:

Although it would seem difficult to induce people to speak normally while a tape recorder is operating, it has been found that when speakers are interviewed in groups, the social obligations among members frequently lead them to disregard the recording instrument and to behave as if they were unobserved.

⁶⁷ For a more detailed analysis of changes in speech that occur when someone other than the interviewer becomes the addressee see Labov (1972a: 207-212; 1972b:89-90).

The issue would, in fact, appear to be a bit more complex than Gumperz indicates. Participants in conversation never 'behave as if they were unobserved'. Rather, they organize their behavior in terms of the observation it will receive from their co-participants. For example, a speaker does not simply 'forget' but displays to the others present that he is engaged in a search for a word.⁶⁸ The issue is thus, not what participants do when they are unobserved, but whether the techniques they use to deal with observations by a camera are different from those used to deal with observation by co-participants. This is an empirical question requiring further research. It seems quite plausible that people may avoid discussing a variety of 'sensitive' topics in the presence of a tape recorder (though the Watergate tapes provide some counter evidence) just as they avoid mentioning such topics in the presence of certain types of co-participants.⁶⁹ It seems far less plausible that phenomena on the level being examined in this dissertation would be changed, that for example, restarts would act to bring the gaze of a recipient toward the speaker when the camera was present but not when it was absent, though this remains an empirical question.⁷⁰

⁶⁸The techniques employed by speakers to signal 'word searches' have been extensively investigated by Sacks and his students. Though most of this work is as yet unpublished, Jefferson (1974) analyzes some aspects of this process.

⁶⁹For an analysis of such avoidance in an actual speech situation see Thomas (1958:70-71).

⁷⁰It is frequently assumed and sometimes explicitly argued (for example, Wolfson 1976) that direct participant observation is less disruptive of

In gathering data, I tried to deal with problems such as these in a number of different ways.

First, I attempted to limit as much as possible my interaction with the people I was taping. I could, of course, have chosen instead to become a member of the group myself. However, while such an approach would have provided a better record of my actions it would have made more serious many of the other problems discussed above. For example, all the different groups I taped would have had a common addressee and my own behavior would have significantly organized the behavior of others in the group. Moreover, focus toward the camera would have been greatly increased unless I fixed it at a particular angle and focal length and left

the phenomena being observed than recording that phenomena with a tape recorder. This does not seem to be necessarily the case. Consider the problem of investigating the gaze of the hearer. The tool that a participant observer would use to observe the gaze of others, his own gaze, is itself a relevant event in the interaction in which he is participating. If the observer employs his gaze in an inappropriate fashion, a noticeable event will occur which may well disrupt the process being observed. However, as noted by Schefflen (1973:88-89) gazing at a hearer is inappropriate:

There is another convention of orientation in a conversation. It is impolite to look at listeners. One is to look at the speaker of the moment . . . As a consequence we rarely get to observe the behavior of listeners and we do not ordinarily see the total bodily behavior of others in conversation.

The camera, though intrusive and perhaps disruptive in other ways, does not focus attention on the gaze of either party (especially if it is not pointed at one participant in particular but includes both speaker and hearer(s) within the frame) and is not itself an oriented-to feature of the process under observation. In this particular case use of a camera is less destructive of the process being examined than direct participant-observation would be.

it. The strategy I chose to adopt was quite similar to that employed by Labov in recording group sessions.

I accounted for my lack of engagement by displaying involvement in the technical details of recording. Thus, were a participant to turn to me, he would find me studying the VU meter on the microphone mixer or checking the image in the viewfinder. I also wore earphones and gazed toward the viewfinder from a slight distance and at an oblique angle rather than pressing my eye to the camera. The camera was thus not presented as an extension of my face and body directed toward the participants but, rather as an object that was itself the focus of my attention (this was, of course, made possible by the fact that I was not peering through the lens, as is the case with a film camera, but rather looking at a very small television monitor). I was thus a person present at the event but not one immediately accessible for interaction; my involvement being directed to other tasks claiming my full attention.⁷¹

⁷¹Bids for my attention by the participants were in fact rather rare. Those that did occur provide some indication of how the participants themselves saw me. For example, in the following, despite repeated attempts by Marlene to obtain the floor, (one occurs at the beginning of this fragment) Tina has been holding the floor continuously for several minutes. In an attempt to get a hearer, Marlene addresses each of the others present. I am the last person addressed.

Tina: An you ain't gonna tell me. My stereo an shit?
Only one side of the speakers is playin and all
that shit now. So what am I supposed to do.//
I gotta get it fixed

Marlene: Well,

Tina: I'm not-
[So I told her I said I don't want that- I'll get it

Second, I tried to limit and make explicit, as far as possible, the organization imposed on the event by my recording of it. Thus, once the camera was set up and the participants were present, I tried to record them continuously until they left the scene. My reasons for not trying to select particular events are the same as those stated for a similar strategy by Erving Goffman (1953:3):

While in the field, I tried to record happenings between persons regardless of how uninteresting and picayune these events seemed to be. The assumption was that all interaction between persons took place in accordance with certain patterns, and hence, with certain exceptions, there was no prima facie reason to think that one event was a better or worse expression of this patterning than any other event.

fixed, and everything. I said You wanna buy it off me? for seventy five dollars. I don't want that thing. But her kids done come in there and done messed with it. I very seldom I ever played my- my recording machine. And Marlene'll tell ya, the only time I play is when you come over or Marlene came over or maybe once in a while late in the night when GranDaddy was livin. And me and Harold would get down stairs cuz we didn't wanna go upstairs and act- kid around or sompm. You know. But other than that. I didn't never play my recordin machine.// My boy wasn't even

Marlene: James,

Tina: allowed to play my recording machine.// Unless

Marlene: James

Tina: if he play it somebody grown put it on for him,

Marlene: James, Tommy,

Tina: You know, that// Marlenea- cuz Marlene told me

Marlene: Candy and Chuck- I'm tellin ya.

From a somewhat different perspective Margaret Mead (1973:257) has noted that:

The future usefulness of field data for different kinds of exploitation, many of them unanticipated at the time the field work was done, is a direct function of the extent to which material can be collected in large, sequential and simultaneous natural lumps on which no analytical devices of selection have operated. So 1,200 consecutive feet of film is better than a 500, a 200, a 100 foot roll; 100 feet on a battery-operated camera is better than 100 feet taken with six rewinds and reselections. Long verbatim texts are more valuable than many short verbatim texts; tapes which contain many other kinds of information are more valuable than several hand-recorded verbatim texts. Only materials which preserve the original spatial-temporal relationships are virtually inexhaustible as sources for new hypotheses and ways of testing old hypotheses. The more material is codified by the method of selection, as when sample scenes, standard-length anecdotes, standard interviews, standard texts, are used the more immediately useful it may be in relation to some hypothesis and the less its permanent value.

The video recorder I used could record for slightly longer than a half hour before tape had to be changed. Except for the time lost when tape was being changed (approximately a half minute to a minute) the recorder was run continuously, sometimes for more than six hours. In order to maintain a consistent and explicit approach toward the selection of what participants to include in the shot, the shot was framed (with several

Tina: It's the same as when- when when uh uh uh uh what hurt me was when we went out for Easter . . .

Here the bid to me occurs only when the party making the bid is in strong need of a recipient to establish her position as a speaker and has already called upon all other available participants.

exceptions noted earlier) to include all present participants. The practice of shooting continuously for a long period of time might also have contributed toward obtaining samples of interaction in which the behavior of the participants was influenced less by the camera than by each other. This is, however, an empirical question which requires further investigation.

VIII. Transcription

Data was transcribed according to a system for capturing the auditory details of conversation designed by Gail Jefferson and a system for recording gaze direction devised by myself.⁷²

The complete transcription system will now be described. The description of the audio system is taken verbatim from Jefferson.

Transcription System

Sequencing

<u>Item</u>	<u>Instance</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
//	D: <u>Tha:t's th'name I'm</u> // tryina think of.] C: <u>Yeah, right.</u>	Double obliques indicate point of overlap.
[D: <u>Tha:t's th'name I'm</u> tryina think of.] C: <u>Yeah, right.</u>	Alternate version. Single left bracket at point of overlap, with overlapping talk placed at that point in the ongoing talk.
=	C: Oh <u>diffrint</u> yeh this is= D: <u>I</u> don't think you wanna get . . .	Equal sign at end of prior line, equal sign at start if next line indicates that there is no break between the two lines.

⁷²The system for coding gaze was suggested by that used by Kendon (1967) and brought to my attention by Jefferson.

Item	Instance	Explanation
	C: This is a hell'v a discussion,= C: =hheh heh,	Paired equal signs also used to indicate no break in, e.g., two 'actions' by same speaker
=	D: <u>We</u> had this <u>one</u> girl;-she wz from . . . D: <u>We</u> had this <u>one</u> girl;she wz from . . . C: Who even <u>o:wns</u> one.Right? C: Who even <u>o:wns</u> one.=Right?	Single equal sign within a single line of talk indicates no break. Alternate version. No space between two 'actions' indicates no break.
]	D: <u>Tha:t's</u> th'name I'm tryina think of] C: <u>Yeah</u> , right.] D: . . . witha//pegnoir set.] C: Who even <u>o:wns</u>] one.Right?	Right bracket indicates point at which overlapping utterances reach completion. In this case they end simultaneously. In this case, at the end of D's utterance, C is at the end of " <u>o:wns</u> ".
]=	D: <u>Tha:t's</u> th'name I'm // tryina think of]=	Right bracket + equal signs indicate that both utterances end simultaneously and are followed with no break by some subsequent talk, which is indicated with a prepositioned equal sign.
[[D: hhuh:h C: [[Oh really?	Double left brackets indicate two utterances simultaneously begun.
=	[[C: So it's somethin= D: () C: =[[<u>Hi</u> Ca:r1,	An equal sign at the end of a line followed by an equal sign plus double left brackets in

Item	Instance	Explanation
		preposition for the next two utterances indicate that two subsequents are simultaneously begun and follow with no break upon the prior completion.
<	D: Y'know. <u-mean <u>who</u> goes tih college ... C: <u>Mondee</u> nights we play, (0.3)<I mean we go tih <u>ceramics</u> .	"Less than" sign indicates a hurried start, e.g., a push into prior space.
(1.0)	D: <u>He</u> pu:t uhm, (0.7) D: Tch! Put <u>crabmeat</u> on th'bo::dum.	Numbers in parentheses indicate elapsed time by tenths of seconds (in this case 7/10 of a second). These are rough timings.
<u>Speech</u>		
-----	D: <u>We</u> had this <u>one</u> girl;. . . D: °huh- <u>huh</u> <u>huh-huh</u> !	Underscoring indicates some form of emphasis; it may be pitch or amplitude determined. A short underscore indicates lighter stress than a long underscore.
::	D: Ih-wuz <u>pretty</u> nice, It rilly wa:s, D: un I swear t'Go::d, she wannid t'be...	A single colon or row of colons indicates prolongation of the immediately prior sound. Length of colon row indicates roughly length of prolongation.
rr	C: <u>rRight</u> .	Alternate notation for some sonsonants, e.g., M, N, S, R is multiple letters.

Item	Instance	Explanation
::	C: Who even <u>o</u> :w ⁿ s one.Right?	Combination of stress marker and prolongation marker yields intonation contour, e.g., in the first case, there is no rise or fall of pitch or volume at colon.
__::	D: <u>do</u> zens of <u>tho</u> :se,	In the second case the pitch or volume drops at the colon. In the third case the pitch or volume raises at the colon.
::	C: <u>Hi</u> Ca:rl,	

.,;??		All punctuation markers indicate <u>intonation</u> , moving by degrees from full stop to "question" intonation (which may be present in non-questions and absent in questions).

-	C: Oh <u>diff</u> rint yeh this is-	Dash indicates a cutoff.

CAPS	Cr: I <u>WI:LL</u> <u>FATHER</u> ? I H(h)AVEN'T MADE IT <u>OVER</u> there yet.	Utterances/utterance parts in caps indicate relatively much increased volume.
	D: 'T's K.D.K.A.:.,	Caps are also used for initials and do not then indicate increased volume.

°	C: °Oh::	"Degree" sign indicates low volume. Double degree sign indicates very low volume.
	C: °°(en 'e said)	
	(°: Hmm?	Return to higher volume is not systematically indicated. "Degree" sign in speaker-designation

Item	Instance	Explanation
		column indicates unknown speaker seems to be female.
'hhh	C: 'hhhh I <u>called</u> im th'nex'day . . .	A dot preceding a row of H's indicates an in-breath. Without a dot the row of H's indicates an outbreath.
wohhhrd	Cr: Yes, Missiz Claysha <u>Gohhd</u> .	A row of H's within a word indicates breathiness.
(h)	D: . . .grease it wi(h)th va(h)seli(h)ne	H's in parenthesis indicate within-speech plosives--can be associated with, e.g., laughter, crying, breathlessness.
word	C: ... very much <u>diffrent</u> th'n <u>she</u> was.	A dot under a letter in a word indicates that it is "pronounced"; either in the sense that it is <u>present</u> , as in the first instance, where it might otherwise be treated as an unnoticed as-to-pronunciation version of e.g., "w'z," or as in the second instance, where it might otherwise be treated as an unnoticed as-to-pronunciation version of "couple'v girls." The dot in these cases shows that the 'full' pronunciation is present; or as in the third instance, in the sense that it is <u>emphasized</u> , in this
	C: ...en a couple of girls...	
	C: Yeah r:right.	

<u>Item</u>	<u>Instance</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
		case, the T in "right" being more heavily pronounced than usually.
u-	C: But no:uh-thut- u-the <u>Texans</u> were...	Lower case u with a dot under it and a cutoff marker is a symbol of minimal "uh" preceding a word.
<u>Transcript Notes</u>		
()	C: She wz () ing guys up t'the...	Blank parentheses indicate no hearing. Size of parenthesis indicates length of unheard talk. Blank parentheses in speaker-designation column indicates no identification of speaker.
()	: Hmumum?	
(word)	C: She wz () ing guys up t'the (room).	Words in parentheses indicate a possible hearing.
C:	(Ours is) a hell'v a <u>discussion</u> , (This is)	A pair of words-in-parentheses indicate either disagreement among co-transcribers, or agreement to both possibilities by co-transcribers, or double hearings by a single transcriber.
(D):	ss- ss-	Parenthesis around a name in the speaker designation column indicates a possible speaker of the object in the talk.
(D):	(hhu:h,)	When both speaker and talk are in parentheses, it is possible that one said that, or that

Item	Instance	Explanation
		someone else, e.g., not in this conversation said it, or that it is a non-speech sound (NS).
(word) D:	I said ((snaps fingers)) <u>Clayzie</u> .	Doubled parentheses contain either descriptions of actions going on right then, as in the first instance, or of features of the talk to follow, as in the second instance; i.e.,
C:	I said ((falsetto)) mmuu, o ((return)) kay <u>fi:ne</u> .	"mmuu" and "o" are said in falsetto, "kay" is done in normal voice.

Gaze Direction

Speaker C:	...X_____,,,	A staff is used to mark some relevant features of the participants' gaze. The gaze of the speaker is marked above the utterance; that of the recipient below the utterance. Thus in this example C is the speaker and D is her recipient.
Utterance	'N <u>he</u> ca- <u>he</u> calls me a Vassar sno:b	
Recipient D:!X_____	

X	C: X 'N <u>he</u> ca- <u>he</u> calls me a Vassar sno:b C: [X	"X" marks the precise point where the gaze of the party marked reaches his co-participant. In this example the gaze of the speaker, C, reaches her recipient just at the cut-off in her utterance. The gaze of the recipient, D., reaches the speaker just at the beginning of the word "Vassar".
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Item	Instance	Explanation
<p>. . . C: . . .X 'N <u>he</u> ca- <u>he</u> calls me a Vassar sno:b D:^IX</p>		<p>A series of dots indicate that the party marked is moving his gaze toward his co-participant. The first dot marks precisely where this movement begins. In this example C begins to bring her gaze toward her recipient at "he," finishing this movement at the point marked by "X." The recipient D, begins to move toward the speaker immediately after the cut-off, at the beginning of the second "he," and finishes her movement at the beginning of "Vassar."</p>

<p>_____ C: . . .X _____ 'N <u>he</u> ca- <u>he</u> calls me a Vassar sno:b D:^IX _____</p>		<p>A line indicates that the party being marked is gazing at his co-participant. In this example the speaker gazes at her recipient during "he calls" and the recipient gazes at the speaker during "Vassar sno:b."</p>

<p>, , , C: . . .X _____ , , , 'N <u>he</u> ca- <u>he</u> calls me a Vassar sno:b D:^IX _____</p>		<p>A series of commas indicates that the party marked is moving his gaze away from his co-participant. In this example the speaker moves her gaze away from her recipient at the beginning of "me." The first comma marks the precise point where the act of looking away begins. The</p>

Item	Instance	Explanation
		last comma does not necessarily mark the termination of this movement.

Name	J: <u>B</u> _____, ... <u>A</u>	If necessary the specific party being gazed at can be marked by placing a name or initial above the line. The name or initial might replace the "X" marking the point where a party's gaze reaches his co-participant. In this example the speaker moves his gaze from B to A just at the end of the word "t'da:y." Further, one of the recipients of this utterance, A, is not gazing at the speaker but at another recipient, B. (Note that when a speaker moves his gaze from one party to another the notation of dots and commas becomes ambiguous since the speaker is simultaneously moving away from one party and toward another.)
or	one <u>one</u> week ago t' <u>da</u> :y.	
Initial	B:	
A:	... <u>B</u>	

Systems other than the one used here could have been employed to transcribe the data. For example, speech could have been transcribed phonetically and some systems for coding body movement, such as Bird-whistell's (1970:257-282), would have recorded far more detail than the present system.

The question thus arises as to why the present system, rather than some other system, was chosen for the work in this dissertation.

Researchers who have utilized phonemic systems have found them almost useless for investigating conversational phenomena. Thus, Duncan (1974:300-301) transcribed his data in terms of segmental phonemes but found that "the segmental phonemes were the least important components of the study." The Jefferson system was constructed specifically to record phenomena in the stream of speech relevant to the organization of conversation. Thus, it not only notes such sequential phenomena as the precise location of both silence and simultaneous speech but also records changes in duration which do not distinguish segmental phonemes in English and phenomena relevant to units larger than the sentence, such as differences in time between sentences or turns. While this system does not capture all relevant distinctions in the stream of speech⁷³ it is the system most relevant to the issues being investigated in this dissertation.

Transcription of nonvocal phenomena was restricted to an extremely limited set of distinctions about the participants' gaze toward each other. This was not because these distinctions are thought to be the only ones relevant to the organization of the participants' interaction, but rather for just the opposite reason: specifically, some recognition of just how much the details of body movement are implicated

⁷³ The problems, and perhaps impossibility, of developing a transcription system capable of adequately noting all relevant distinctions in the stream of speech are well known. For example, Sapir (1974:51) observes that:

in the organization of talk. This is demonstrated by the research on kinesics discussed earlier and also became apparent whenever data was examined closely. It was nevertheless decided that if the scope of investigation was expanded, even the limited phenomena already included would not be dealt with either adequately or within a reasonable period of time. The work of McQuown and his associates (1971) demonstrates just how much time (well over twenty years) can be devoted to the intensive analysis of a very small strip of interaction.

Exactly what constitutes gaze toward another within conversation has received some study. Despite the general acceptance of the phrase "eye-contact" participants do not, in fact, gaze into each other's eyes. Schefflen (1974:67-68) describes gaze toward another within conversation as follows:

The history of writing is in essence the long attempt to develop an independent symbolism on the basis of graphic representation, followed by the slow and begrudging realization that spoken language is a more powerful symbolism than any graphic one can possibly be and that true progress in the art of writing lay in the virtual abandonment of the principle with which it originally started.

In face-to-face conversations, the orientation of middle-class American is rarely eye-to-eye. Each fixates his central vision at a spot somewhere between the cheek and the shoulder of the other fellow, just out of the range for eye-to-eye gazing. When central vision is focused on the cheek-shoulder of a vis-à-vis, the remainder of the upper body is visible in peripheral vision. When movement occurs outside the space, it will be perceived in peripheral visual fields and will trigger an orienting reflex. Focal vision is then shifted to observe the moving part.

Exline (1974:73-74) provides a similar description⁷⁴ but argues that the exact point of focus of a participant's gaze does not pose special problems for the analyst (or for the participants) since the initiation and termination of glances toward another are signalled by movements of the head:

We have data which suggest that individuals think they are being looked in the eye when in actual fact the looker is focused somewhere in a zone marked by the eyebrow and eye pouch above and below the eye, and by the eye corner nearest to the ear on either side of the head. Within this zone a look focused on the root of the nose between the eyes is often interpreted as an eye-to-eye look. It is my belief that the validity problem is not critical, for our observations indicate that most people turn their heads and faces slightly away from the other when they break contact. Even if one looks into a zone of regard rather than the eye itself, the other reacts as if he were engaged in eye contact.

Exline's approach to the description of other-directed gaze will be adopted in this dissertation. The boundary points of head-movements toward and away from the other will be used to locate where gaze begins and ends in otherwise ambiguous cases.

⁷⁴The fact that gaze is not restricted to a specific small area of the other's face leads Argyle and Cook (1976:56) to argue that the term "eye-contact" should be replaced by the phrase "mutual gaze".

Transcription is sometimes thought to be a fairly mechanical task that can be adequately performed by secretaries (an example is provided by the Watergate transcripts) or coders given a few hours training (see for example, Allen and Guy 1974:103). Accurate transcription⁷⁵ on the level of detail required for the analysis in this dissertation, in fact, requires a great deal of skill. All transcription was therefore performed by a very few transcribers who had, however, extensive experience. The most important transcriber was Gail Jefferson who had been transcribing conversation for over eight years, developed the transcription system utilized, and is recognized by both analysts of conversation and linguists investigating actual speech as the most accurate person transcribing conversation. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Jefferson for transcribing tapes G.4, G.26, G.50, G.83, and G.84 and for checking other transcribers' work on other passages. A second transcriber (Marjorie Goodwin) had six years experience transcribing conversations recorded in natural settings. The third transcriber was myself. While I had less transcription experience than either of the other two persons mentioned I did have several years experience analyzing taped speech and checked all work I did with at least one other transcriber. A fourth transcriber (Malcah Yeager) was a trained phonetician. However, perhaps because of both the quality of the recording used here (her other work had

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Accuracy is not always taken to be the goal of transcription. For example, Allen and Guy (1974:104) report that

Regular words were restored to conventional spelling in disregard of elision or slurring of syllables or occasional mispronunciations.

involved single speakers talking into a lavalier), and the different phenomena being examined, this training did not make her more accurate than the other transcribers. All persons performing transcription thus had extensive experience attending to and transcribing the details of actual speech.

All transcription in this dissertation was checked by at least two transcribers. Many investigators (for example, Kendon 1967:25) have argued that different transcribers should reach agreement on what is said in a particular passage. This does not, however, appear to be either a realistic or an appropriate goal in the transcription of conversation. Not only do conversations in natural settings occur in locations that are far from ideal for either hearing or recording speech, but the speech signal itself may not be entirely unambiguous. Lieberman (1967:164-165) reports a series of experiments showing that words spoken in conversation and recorded under the very best of conditions cannot be reliably identified when heard in isolation. He argues that

[T]he acoustic signal in itself is insufficient to identify the phonetic content of the message uniquely. Some of the distinctive features that specify each phonetic segment probably can be determined from the available acoustic signal. Other distinctive features cannot be uniquely identified. The listener therefore forms a hypothesis concerning the probable phonetic content of the message that is consistent with the known features. However, he cannot test this hypothesis for its syntactic and semantic consistency until he gets a fairly long segment of speech into his temporary processing space. The speech signal therefore, remains unintelligible until the listener can successfully test a hypothesis. When a hypothesis is confirmed, the signal abruptly becomes intelligible. The acoustic signal is, of course, necessary to provide even a

partial specification of the phonetic signal. However, these experiments indicate that in many instances the phonetic signal that the listener "hears" is internally computed. The listener mentally constructs a phonetic signal that incorporates both the distinctive features that are uniquely characterized by the acoustic signal and those that he hypothesizes in order to arrive at a reasonable syntactic and semantic interpretation of the message.

Such a description of speech perception stands in marked contrast to the reasons advanced by Kendon (1967:25-26) for seeking agreement among transcribers:

[S]ince this part of the work was purely descriptive, and no interpretation was involved, it is thought likely that discrepancies between different transcribers would be quite small.

The regularity with which a request to repeat some item occurs in conversation provides some demonstration that accurately hearing what was said is a problem faced by participants within the conversation itself. From a somewhat different perspective Jefferson (Ms.) in an unpublished paper, has noted that while "yes" and "no" are clearly distinguishable objects both in meaning and pronunciation, either can be signalled in conversation by "'mneh', an acoustically ambiguous object". In view of such features of the stream of speech, the goal of accurate transcription would seem better served by admitting the possibility of different hearings of the same stretch of speech. Accepting this possibility, as the Jefferson transcription system does, produces a more accurate record of the speech being transcribed than either settling

disputed cases by flipping a coin (a method used by Buban (1976:285) to resolve differences between coders) or forcing transcribers to agree on a single hearing.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NEGOTIATION OF A STATE OF MUTUAL GAZE BETWEEN SPEAKER AND HEARER AT TURN BEGINNING

I.1 The Apparent Disorderliness of Natural Speech

Natural speech is frequently considered a poor source of data for the analysis of linguistic structure. Specifically, sentences produced through it are regularly found to be impaired in a variety of ways.¹ Thus a sample of natural speech will contain not only well-

¹The statements of Chomsky and Lyons noted on pages 25 and 26 of the last chapter provide some specific examples of how some contemporary linguists view actual speech as being of such "degenerate quality" (Chomsky 1965:58) that it is of limited usefulness for the study of linguistic competence. A similar view of speech production has been expressed by some psychologists. For example, Martin and Strange (1968:478) argue that natural speech is so defective "that it is hazardous to guess at the exact constituent structure of any given utterance." It is also frequently argued that the participants themselves do not perceive the restarts, pauses and fragments in their talk. Thus Lyons (1972:58) states that:

The speaker and hearer may not even notice them during the conversation itself, since there is generally sufficient redundancy to compensate for the channel noise that performance errors introduce.

Mahl (1959:114) also finds that participants do not notice the errors they make but that when transcripts containing such errors were shown to participants in a conversation

Reactions. . . were rarely neutral. They included surprise and interest, scorn in the case of someone else's speech, but despair, shame, and anger in the case of being confronted with one's own speech.

Mayor Frank Rizzo of Philadelphia brought a six million dollar libel suit against a reporter who portrayed his speech as ungrammatical. According to Rizzo (as quoted in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (3/19/76:3):

formed grammatical sentences²:

(II-1) G.26:(T)03:30

John: These egg rolls are very good.

(II-2) G.84:(T)07:00

Curt: Al's a pretty damn good driver.

(II-3) G.50:(T)07:00

Clacia: Christ it wz jus go:rageous.

I was amazed at what I read. . . I was sick to my stomach, disgusted. It was an attempt to show me as illiterate.

Speakers themselves thus agree with linguists and psychologists that their mistakes, though not perceived at the time, constitute defects in their performance as speakers. Some novelists, on the other hand, put grammatical mistakes in their writing precisely to make it appear 'conversational'. Thus Henry Miller is reported to have said of a new book that in it his "grammatical mistakes are uncorrected and the style of the new book . . . is conversational" (as reported in the Columbia South Carolina Record, 9/25/76).

Among the very few to argue that speech in natural conversation is not in fact basically defective and ungrammatical is William Labov (see, for example, Labov 1972b:203; 1975).

²Data is cited as follows. First the tape number is given, i.e., 'G.50'; then, after a colon a second number identifying the place on the tape where the example is found is given. The zero point for all measurements is the place where a picture first becomes visible on the tape. Because of differences in counters on different video machines the number will take one of three forms. If a period occurs after the first two numbers, i.e., '15.2', the first number gives the minutes and second, the tenths of minutes to the place in the tape where the example is located. If three numbers occur within a period, i.e., '152', the place is being specified in terms of the number of revolutions of the right hand tape reel (with a 5-inch reel). Finally, for data where a Jefferson transcript is available the time measurements in the transcript are used and a "T" occurs right after the colon, i.e., 'G.50:(T)03:50'. The three different notation systems can be easily reconciled with conversion tables and permit quick location of any particular example.

(II-4) G.4:451

Al: Yer mudduh was ravin' about the veal cu'lets
les' night.

(II-5) G.84(T)01:30

Phyllis: I only got two more cigarettes.

(II-6) G.84(T)06:30

Mike: It's a pretty good ca:r.

(II-7) G.4.432

Joe: Take 'er to MacDonald's.

but such a sample will also contain sentences characterized by phrasal breaks, false starts, long pauses and isolated ungrammatical fragments:

(II-8) G.126:330

Debbie: Anyway, (0.2) um:, (0.2) we went t- I went ta
bed really early.

(II-9) G.75:668

Barbara: Brian yer gonna haf- You kids'll hafta go down
o closer so you can hear what they're gonna do:.

(II-10) G.58:410

Sue: I come in t- I no sooner sit down on the couch
in the living room, en the doorbell rings.

(II-11) G.140:352

Tommy: You agree wid- You agree wi'cher aunt on anything.

(II-12) G.76:659

Ethyl: Wher- uhhh Where do they register.

(II-13) G.87:309

Curt: We wen down ta- (0.2) wh'we went back ta school,
out ta Missoura we had'ta ride a bus,

(II-14) G.84:(T)03:30

Mike: So:mebuddy rapped uh:. (1.2) DeWald'nna mouth.

(II-15) G.23:149

Jere: I have more- y I have- (0.2) trouble keepin it
clea:n (though).

I.2 The Use of Restarts to Construct Unbroken Sentences

In contrast to the grammatical coherence of examples II-1 to II-7, examples II-8 to II-15 manifest the proposed disorder of actual speech. However, note that examples II-8 to II-13, though they contain fragments of sentences, also contain coherent grammatical sentences:

(II-8) G.126:330

Debbie: I went ta bed really early.

(II-9) G.75:668

Barbara: You kids'll hafta go down closer so you can hear what they're gonna do:.

(II-10) G.58:410

Sue: I no sooner sit down on the couch in the living room, en the doorbell rings.

(II-11) G.140:352

Tommy: You agree wi'cher aunt on anything.

(II-12) G.76:659

Ethyl: Where do they register.

(II-13) G.87:309

Curt: Wh'we went back ta school, out ta Missoura we had'ta ride a bus,

Further, in these examples there is a particular sequential distribution ordering the placement of the sentence fragment relative to the coherent sentence. Specifically, the fragment is placed before the coherent sentence. Thus in all of these examples a single format is manifest:

[Fragment] + [Coherent Sentence]

This format defines a restart. Though it provides one demonstration of the possible disorder of natural speech it is a phenomenon with a specifiabile structure in its own right that occurs repetitively

in actual talk. Further, within it is found one locus for the occurrence of coherent grammatical sentences in natural speech.

This structure will be investigated with respect to the possibility that its repetitive occurrence is not haphazard but rather one regular product of the procedures constructing actual talk and, more specifically, that the structure has the effect of achieving one of its elements: the occurrence of a coherent grammatical sentence in natural speech.

In order to investigate this possibility one other aspect of the behavior of the participants in conversation, their gaze, will also be examined.³

In most turns at talk in face-to-face conversation the speaker

³The work of Kendon (1967) provides strong empirical support for the argument that gaze is a relevant feature of face-to-face talk. Thus he states (Ibid.:52):

(Data have been presented which show that direction of gaze changes in a regular fashion in association with other things that people in interaction are doing, notably in association with utterances, certain aspects of their structure and to some extent with their content.

Kendon's work will be examined in more detail at the specific points where it is relevant to the present analysis.

is gazed at by some other party.⁴ The following will be proposed as one rule implicated in the organization of the interaction of speaker and hearer in face-to-face talk.⁵

Rule #1: A speaker should obtain the gaze of his recipient during the course of a turn at talk.

⁴The ethnographic literature provides one striking exception to what will be said about gaze in this chapter. Whiffen (1915:254, cited in Goffman 1963:95) reports that

When an Indian talks, he sits down, no conversation is ever carried on when the speakers are standing unless it be a serious difference of opinion under discussion; nor, when he speaks, does the Indian look at the person addressed, any more than the latter watches the speaker. Both look at some outside objects. This is the attitude also of the Indian when addressing more than one listener, so that he appears to be talking to some one not visibly present.

The mere fact that Whiffen could report this as a noticeable event is some demonstration that he recognizes the prevalence of gaze in conversation in societies other than the one being described here. It would be most interesting to have films or tapes of the people Whiffen is talking about.

⁵This rule is obviously not applicable to talk that is not face-to-face, such as telephone conversations.

Some actual utterances⁶ will now be examined with respect to the possibility that they are in fact systematic products of the orientation of participants to the feature specified by Rule #1. Below the utterance the gaze direction of the recipient will be marked as follows: A solid line will indicate that the recipient is gazing toward the speaker. The absence of such a line will indicate that the recipient's gaze is directed elsewhere and an "X" will mark the precise point at which the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker. When a

⁶No claim is being made either that the utterances being examined in this dissertation are representative examples of a random sample or about the frequencies with which the processes being discussed occur. The present analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative. Labov (1972b:258) has noted that discourse analysis is not yet at the stage where quantitative methods are appropriate:

Quantitative research implies that one knows what to count, and this knowledge is reached only through a long period of trial and approximation, and upon the basis of a solid body of theoretical constructs. By the time the analyst knows what to count, the problem is practically solved. . . . When we can say what is being done with a sentence, then we will be able to observe how often speakers do it.

Sacks (10/24/67:4-6) argues that mere frequency of occurrence is not an appropriate measure of the orientation of participants toward a proposed rule. Rather the analyst should look to places where the rule would locate violations and see if the participants orient to what happens there as a violation or in some other fashion display in their actions an orientation toward the rule. Discussing speaker selection techniques he argues (Ibid.:6) that

such a question as "How do we go about determining the effectiveness of speaker-selection techniques?" should involve study of those techniques and how they work, and should not be done by constructing some test (without respect to how speaker-selection techniques work in detail) which seems to provide what looks like a measure of it.

recipient's gaze reaches the speaker during a pause each tenth of a second in the pause will be marked with a dash in order to indicate where in the pause the gaze actually arrives. For simplicity and clarity only the beginnings of turns will be so marked:

(II-8) G.126:330

Debbie: Anyway, (0-2) uh:, (0.2) we went t- I went ta bed
Chuck: [X_____

(II-9) G.75:668

Barbara: Brian yer gonna ha f- You kids'll hafta go down
Brian: [X_____

(II-10) G.58:410

Sue: I come in t- I no sooner sit down on the couch
Deirdre: [X_____

(II-11) G.140:352

Tommy: You agree wi d- You agree wi'cher aunt on anything.
Pumpkin: [X_____

(II-12) G.76:659

Ethyl: Yeah. Wher- uh hh Where do they register.
Barbara: [X_____

(II-13) G.87:309

Curt: We wen down t a- (0.2) wh'we went back ta school,
Gary: [X_____

(II-16) G.99:255

Jere: They're gettin- (-----) They're in living in the
Ann: [X_____

(II-17) G.50:(T)06:15

Clacia: B't I: uh, (0.9) Ro:n uh:., Ron's family moved, intuh
Dianne: [X_____

(II-18) G.79:326

Ross: S:x hunder d? (0.4) Six hundred miles'n'hour er somp'n
Curt: [X_____

(II-19) G.76:584

Barbara: God that's: , I don't want that life.

Gordie: [X _____]

(II-20) G.75:122

Bea: Well they've done away wi_{th} (0.3) They've done away

Jim: [X _____]

(II-21) G.91:385

Pam: So wha'ya'nie? Where you livin now.

Tina: [X _____]

(II-22) G.98:690

Ann: I think he₁: I think he'even get it wi'the fir(h)st

Pat: [X _____]

(II-23) G.91:198

Betty: D'you like living out the₁r- Are you on the lake?

Pam: [X _____]

(II-24) G.11:234

Helen: Jeannie you haf t₁o- Can I get chu a drink?

Jeannie: X _____

In all of the above cases: (1) the recipient is not gazing at the speaker at the beginning of his turn; (2) the recipient directs his gaze to the speaker; (3) without bringing his previous sentence to completion the speaker begins a new sentence at the point at which he gains the gaze of a recipient.

The close conjunction between a recognizable event in the utterance of the speaker and the place where the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker is consistent with the possibility that the gaze of the hearer is relevant to the speaker in the construction of his turn.

The sequence of actions performed by the speaker produces a restart. The relationship between the different elements of the

restart and the recipient's gaze raises the possibility that different states of recipient gaze are not treated equivalently by the speaker but rather that one is preferred over the other. The sentence being produced before the gaze of the recipient was obtained is abandoned without being brought to completion. When the speaker has the gaze of his recipient a coherent sentence is produced. Having the gaze of a recipient thus appears to be preferred over not having his gaze and this preference appears to be consequential for the talk the speaker produces in his turn. This is consistent with the possibility that gaze is one means available to recipients for displaying to a speaker whether or not they are acting as hearers to his utterance.⁷ Sacks

⁷Goffman (1967:134) argues that "the spontaneous involvement of the participants in an official focus of attention" is a "fundamental requirement" of "social encounters of the conversational type." He further notes that

It would be helpful to have available, and oblige the use of, "back-channel" cues. . . from hearers so that the speaker, while he was speaking, could know, among other things, that he was succeeding or failing to get across, being informed of this while attempting to get across. (Goffman 1975:4)

Though a hearer can signal his attentiveness in a number of different ways (see for example Wieman 1976:12), many investigators (for example Argyle (1969:108-109, 202), Argyle and Cook (1976:121, 184), Goffman (1967:123), Scheflen (1974:68-69), Philips (1974:143-144)) have noted the special importance of gaze as a display of attentiveness. Thus Kendon (1967:36, footnote 7) states that

We make the assumption here that to perceive the direction of an individual's attention we rely largely upon the direction in which he is looking.

(10/26/67, part 2, p. 7) has noted that

One wants to make a distinction between 'having the floor' in the sense of being a speaker while others are hearers, and 'having the floor' in a sense of being a speaker while others are doing whatever they please. One wants not merely to occupy the floor, but to have the floor while others listen.⁸

In conversation speakers are thus faced not simply with the

With reference to conversation Argyle and Cook (1976:121) state that "Glances are used by listeners to indicate continued attention and willingness to listen." With respect to failure of the recipient to gaze at the speaker Philips (1974:270) notes that "sustained direction of gaze away from conversational encounters is treated as inattention."

Argyle (1969:105) notes that in order to display proper attention a hearer may gaze at "some object with which they are both concerned" rather than the speaker. Though the present research will restrict itself to studying the gaze of the hearer toward the speaker the situation described by Argyle is recognized as valid and not inconsistent with the analysis being developed here (for example, the appropriateness of gazing elsewhere than at the speaker is frequently marked in a special way by the speaker, i.e., "Look at that!")


From a physiological rather than a social perspective Diebold (1968:550-551) states that

It is now apparent. . . that in the perception of speech, performances indicative of maximal comprehension are those in which the incoming speech signals reach the receiver's ears with minimal interaural temporal discrepancy, such as would be optimized only by the receiver facing [the speaker].

⁸For some other consideration of this distinction see Philips (1974). She argues (Ibid.:162) that it is useful

to conceive of speakers and non-speakers (or hearers) as sustaining two ends of a 'floor' which is 'held' by the speaker.

task of constructing sentences, but rather with the task of constructing sentences that are in fact attended to appropriately by a hearer. Suppose that a recipient began to display proper hearership well after the speaker had begun to produce a sentence. If the speaker brings that sentence to completion his utterance will contain a coherent sentence and no sentence fragment. However when the actions of both speaker and hearer are taken into consideration that complete sentence may in fact constitute a fragment since only part of it has been attended to properly by a hearer:



By beginning a new sentence when the gaze of the recipient is obtained the speaker is able to produce his entire sentence while he is being gazed at by the hearer.

Rather than providing evidence for the incompetence of speakers in actual conversation restarts may provide some demonstration of the orientation of speakers to producing sentences that are in fact attended appropriately by their recipients.

These considerations raise at least one other issue. If the speaker is in fact oriented toward producing sentences while he has the

gaze of a hearer, the question emerges as to why he begins to produce a sentence without the gaze of the hearer. One, though certainly not the only, basis for such an action will be considered.⁹

The speaker's action is situated within a turn at talk. The turn-taking system is organized such that occurrences of both gap and overlap are minimized (on this issue see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, especially pages 706-708 and 715) providing for the achievement of one of the basic features of conversation, that "at least, and no more than, one party speaks at a time" (Schegloff and Sacks 1973:293). Were the speaker to wait until he had the gaze of his recipient before starting to speak, gap would result. Alternatively another party might begin to speak, losing him the opportunity for the turn. Such a solution to maintaining the preference for producing a sentence while being gazed at by a speaker is thus not compatible with basic features of the process through which turns are exchanged in conversation. The production of a restart when the gaze of a recipient is obtained provides one technique for orienting to a preference for being gazed at during the production of an utterance while yet maintaining other features of

⁹When a more complete analysis of the participants' gaze is provided later in this chapter it will be found that hearers do not in fact have to be gazing at the speaker from the absolute beginning of his turn. The beginnings of the utterances being examined here do, nevertheless, violate the rules and preferences organizing the participants' gaze within the turn.

the turn-taking process in conversation.¹⁰

These considerations also locate a place in the turn, turn beginning, where investigation of Rule #1 might initially be focused.

I.3 The Use of Restarts to Request the Gaze of a Hearer

Not all restarts exhibit the precise coordination with the arrival of a recipient's gaze displayed in the examples considered above:

(II-25) G.50:(T)05:30

Clacia: 'N he ca- he calls me a Vassar sno:b.
Dianne: ______X

(II-26) G.76:652

Ethyl: So they st- their classes start around, (0.2) in
Barbara: ______X

(II-27) G.90:475

Lee: Can ya bring?- (0.2) Can you bring me here that nylon?
Ray: ______X

¹⁰Sacks and Schegloff (in press) have investigated the organization in conversation of multiple preferences which can not be concurrently satisfied. They note (*Ibid.*:1) that a common feature of second order devices for integrating the separate preferences is

to prefer satisfaction of one of the applicable preferences, the other being relaxed to such a point as will allow the preferred to be achieved: The non-preferred of the two is not suspended but "relaxed step by step."

Such an analysis would seem applicable to the present phenomenon.

(II-28) G.99:435

Jere: Ya know what I di- (0.2) They had teleph_lones in the
Pat: l_X_____

(II-29) G.50:(T)07:30

Clacia: En a couple of girls- One othe_lr girl from the:re,
Dianne: l_X_____

(II-30) G.85:565

Carney: When he was: a- You mea_ln when he was traffic- judge?
Phyllis: l_X_____

(II-31) G.75:193

Bea: They got three: They go_lt three in on this nex million
Jim: l_X_____

(II-32) GA.8:00.6

Chil: She- she's reaching the p- She's at the p_loint I'm
Helen: l_X_____

(II-33) G.126:194

Chuck: This- Ih'this's for the ltwo of us.
Eileen: l_X_____

(II-34) G.50:(T)00:15

Clacia: But no:. uh- thut- u- the Texan_ls were the ones that
Dianne: l_X_____

(II-35) G.91:520

Betty: The first ketch I mean Susie- y'kn_low she jus threw it.
Pam: l_X_____

(II-36) G.126:297

Eileen: I ask him, (0.1) I ask him if he- (0.4) c'd- If
Debbie:

Eileen: you c_lould call 'im when you got in
Debbie: l_X_____

(II-38) G.50(T)05:45

Clacia: The most ih- the most ama:zing thing wu,z tuh see the
Dianne: ______X

(II-39) G.103:544

Joe: My mother tol me th't- We had a col,d wader flat
Pat: ______X

(II-40) G.50:(T)08:20

Clacia: Bu:t.uh, b't there- there wz th'Bethe,l Park- crew,
Dianne: ______X

(41) G.26:(T)18:45

Beth: Michael- Daniel's fa,scinated with elephants.
Ann: ______X

In all of these cases the gaze of the recipient is gained after the restart. These examples will thus not support the possibility that the speaker is awaiting the gaze of a recipient before proceeding to construct a coherent sentence.

Further, in most of these examples the point at which the recipient begins to gaze at the speaker is rather distant from the restart. The argument that the restart and the movement into orientation by the recipient are performed with reference to each other, which seemed strong in the previous data because of the close coordination between the two events, here seems weak.

It will be argued that examples such as these are instances of an alternative but related process to the one described above. Specifically

it will be argued that in cases of this type the restart constitutes a signal by the speaker that the gaze of a recipient is being requested.

Let us consider first the problem of the distance between the restart and the point at which the gaze of the recipient is gained. In analyzing the first set of restarts no consideration was given to the time required for a recipient to move his gaze from some other position to the speaker. This process will in fact occupy some time.

The movement bringing the recipient's gaze to the speaker will be marked with a series of dots and examples II-25 through II-41 will be re-examined in light of it.

(II-25) G.50:(T)05:30

Clacia: 'N he ca- he calls me a Vassar sno**b**.
Dianne: [X_____

(II-26) G.76:652

Ethyl: So they st- their classes start around, (0.2) in
Barbara: [X_____

(II-27) G.90:475

Lee: Can ya bring?- (0.2) Can you bring me here that nylon?
Ray: X

(II-28) G.99:435

Jere: You know what I di- (---) They had telephones in the
Pat: [X_____

(II-29) G.50(T)07:30

Clacia: En a couple of girls- One other girl from the:re,
Dianne: X_____

(II-30) G.85:565

Carney: When he was: a- You mean when he was traffic- judge?

Phyllis: [X _____]

(II-31) G.75:193

Bea: They got three: They got three in the nex million

Jim: [X _____]

(II-32) GA.8:00.6

Chil: She- She's reaching the p- She's at the [p]oint I'm

Helen: [X _____]

(II-33) G.126:194

Chuck: This- Th'this's for the two of us.

Eileen: [X _____]

(II-34) G.50(T)00.15

Clacia: But no:.uh-thut- y-the Texass were the ones that rilly

Dianne: [X _____]

(II-35) G.91:520

Betty: The first ketch I mean Susie- y'know she jus threw it.

Pam: . . . [X _____]

(II-36) G.126:297

Eileen: I ask him, (0.1) I ask him if he- (0.4) c'd- If you

Debbie:

Eileen: c ould call'im when you got in

Debbie: . [X _____]

(II-37) G.87:167

Gary: I know Freddy- (0.2) Freddy useta work over the plant.

Mike: [X _____]

(II-38) G.50:(T)05:45

Clacia: The most ih- The most ama:zing thing wu₁z tuh see the
Dianne: 'X_____

(II-39) G.103:544

Joe: My mother tol me th't- We had a col'd wader flat
Pat: 'X_____

(II-40) G.50:(T)08:20

Clacia: Bu:t.uh, b't there- there wz th'Bethe₁ Park- crew
Dianne: 'X_____

(II-41) G.26:(T)18:45

Beth: Michael- Daniel's fa_scinated with elephants.
Ann: 'X_____

When the movement bringing the recipient's gaze to the speaker is considered an element in the process, the orientation of recipients to the restart in examples II-25 through II-41 is seen to be quite precise.¹¹ The argument that the restart and the gaze of the recipient toward the speaker might be performed with reference to each other seems

¹¹The present data would seem to challenge the frequently made claim (for example Mahl (1959:114), Allen and Guy (1974:171-172), Dittmann (1974:175), Lyons (1972:58)) that participants do not notice the phrasal breaks that occur in natural conversation. Dale (1974:174) states that "subjects perceive the presence of hesitations but not their precise location." The close conjunction between the actions of the recipient and the phrasal break in the present examples provides evidence, that to the contrary, participants do orient precisely to the location of phrasal breaks. This data also casts doubt on the accuracy of Martin and Strange's statement (1968:474) that "while . . . hesitations mark speaker uncertainty they have little utility for the listener."

once again tenable.

I.4 Structural Basis for the Use of a Restart to Perform Two Distinct Tasks

The examples cited immediately above remain distinct from those considered previously in that the gaze of the recipient toward the speaker begins after the restart. Two separate classes of restarts seem to be at issue. In one the restart begins a new sentence when the gaze of the recipient arrives. In the other the restart serves as a signal to request the gaze of a recipient.

The possible basis for the existence of two separate classes such as these will now be examined.

First note that the restart, containing as it does a marked phrasal break, is applicable to any sentence whatsoever. The flow of the utterance is interrupted in a quite noticeable fashion. A hearer can recognize the occurrence of a restart quite independently of the content of the particular utterance in which it occurs. Being first general, that is, not confined to particular types of utterances either for its production or its recognition, and second extremely noticeable, a marked break in the flow of talk, the restart is well suited to serve as a

signal.¹²

However, unlike some other possible signals (for example an interjection like "Hey" or a tap on the shoulder) the restart can itself remedy the trouble it marks. Thus even if it is not needed as a signal it might still be employed as a remedy.

Some evidence that a restart used to begin a new sentence at the point where the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker might also constitute a signal to other recipients is provided by the following examples:

(II-12) G.76:659

Ethyl: Yeah=wher- u hh Where do they register.
 Barbara: . . . X _____
 Gordie: X _____

(II-16) G.99:255

Jere: They're gettin- ([-----]) They're i-n living in the
 Ann: . . X _____
 Pat: X _____

¹²Jefferson (1974:187-188) provides specific analysis of how a displayed interruption in the flow of talk can be systematically utilized by participants in the production of their talk. Members of a contrast class, such as 'left' and 'right', which occur adjacent to each other can be heard either as two succeeding items in the utterance, i.e., 'Turn LEFT RIGHT here', or as a correction with the second term replacing the first, i.e., 'Turn LEFT- RIGHT here.' One way in which a speaker can distinguish these possibilities is by placing a hesitation after the first term when a correction is being performed.

The presence of a hesitation can instruct a hearer to treat a prior term as syntactically disconnected from a subsequent, and implicate an alternate system for interpreting the contrast pair which will not result in an attempt to make sense of, e.g. '...left right...' as co-components of a developing utterance. (Ibid.:188)

(II-42) G.87:297

Mike: ·hh ·hh I got ho: [me (---) ·hh I got home that night.
 Gary: . . X _____
 Curt: X _____

In these cases a restart marking the achievement of orientation by a first recipient draws the gaze of a second recipient.

I.5 Recycling the Request for the Gaze of a Hearer

The restart as a request and the move into orientation of the recipient which answers it constitute a type of summons-answer sequence. Schegloff (1968) has provided extensive analysis of the structure and use of summons-answer sequences in conversational openings. Though Schegloff was investigating the opening of a whole conversation rather than the beginning of a turn, the analysis he developed seems as applicable to the level of organization currently being examined as it is to the openings of conversations in general.

Schegloff notes for example (Ibid.:1089) that

The initial problem of coordination in a two-party activity is the problem of availability: that is, a person who seeks to engage in an activity that requires the collaborative work of two parties must first establish, via some interactional procedure, that another party is available to collaborate.

The construction of a turn at talk is an activity requiring the collaboration of at least two parties, a speaker and a hearer. The present analysis provides some demonstration that the problem of availability

can emerge within the turn itself and that summons-answer sequences are one technique through which the availability of the participants to each other can be established.

Summons-answer sequences can be used to solve the problem of availability in part because they provide moves for each of the separate parties whose availability to each other is at issue. The speaker produces a request for the gaze of a hearer and a recipient provides an answer to that request by bringing his gaze to the speaker. Further, as Schegloff notes (Ibid.:1083) a party answering a summons incurs the obligation to listen to further talk by the summoner. In the data considered until this point both parties have in fact performed the actions at issue in the sequence. However one would not expect this to always be the case. The recipient might not hear the request, might be otherwise engaged or might refuse to respond to it.

The problem arises, however, as to how an analyst can investigate absent events, phenomena which do not occur, such as some party's failure to do something.¹³ To address this problem as well as the problem of what in fact constitutes a sequence as opposed to two items that happen to be adjacently placed, Schegloff (Ibid.:1083) proposes that

¹³More precisely, as noted by Schegloff (Ibid.:1083):

How can we, in a sociologically meaningful and rigorous way, talk about the "absence" of an item; numerous things are not present at any point in a conversation, yet only some have a relevance that would allow them to be seen as "absent."

summons-answer sequences have a property he refers to as "conditional relevance":

By conditional relevance of one item on another we mean: given the first, the second is expectable; upon its occurrence it can be seen to be a second item to the first; upon its nonoccurrence it can be seen to be officially absent -- all this provided by the occurrence of the first item.

Thus the occurrence of a summons establishes the relevance of an answer to it. If the answer does not occur its absence can still be located. Further, participants do in fact orient to such absence by, for example, repeating¹⁴ the summons. If, on the other hand, the summons is answered, the summoner proceeds to provide further talk.

From such a perspective the examples so far considered in which the recipient moves immediately into orientation would constitute but one possible trajectory of this sequence. Another possible trajectory would arise if the speaker failed to secure a recipient with his request. He might then repeat the request until a recipient had been obtained and only at that point proceed with further talk.

If such a process were in fact occurring it would be expected that at the beginning of some turns several restarts would be found. Specifically, the speaker, not obtaining a recipient with his first request, might repeat it until a recipient was obtained. Thus it would be

¹⁴Schegloff notes (*Ibid.*:1082) that one other property of summons-answer sequences is that if they have been properly answered they cannot be repeated.

expected not only that a string of restarts would be found, but that this string would be terminated at a particular point: specifically, when the gaze of a recipient was obtained.¹⁵

¹⁵This process can also be viewed from a ritual perspective. Being gazed at by a recipient not only ensures that the channel between speaker and hearer is functioning but also constitutes a display that the speaker is receiving from the hearer the respect owed him. Lord Chesterfield, writing to his son (Letters of Lord Chesterfield to His Son, pp. 261-262, cited in Goffman 1953:149-150), had the following to say about inattention in conversation:

There is nothing so brutally shocking, nor so little forgiven, as a seeming inattention to the person who is speaking to you; and I have known many a man knocked down for (in my opinion) a much slighter provocation than that shocking inattention which I mean. I have seen many people who, while you are speaking to them, instead of looking at, and attending you, fix their eyes upon the ceiling, or some other part of the room, look out of the window, play with a dog, twirl their snuff box, or pick their nose. Nothing discovers a little, futile, frivolous mind more than this, and nothing is so offensively ill-bred; it is an explicit declaration on your part that every, the most trifling, object deserves your attention more than all that can be said by the person who is speaking to you. Judge of the sentiments of hatred and resentment which such treatment must excite in every breast where any degree of self-love dwells, and I am sure I never yet met with that breast where there was not a great deal. I repeat it again and again (for it is highly necessary for you to remember it) that sort of vanity and self-love is inseparable from human nature, whatever may be its rank or condition. Even your footman will sooner forget and forgive a beating, than any manifest mark of slight and contempt. Be therefore, I beg of you, not only really, but seemingly and manifestly, attentive to whoever speaks to you.

The repeated requests by speakers in the present examples thus also constitute a form of priming, a series of insistent claims for their ritual due from their co-participants.

Examination of the production of actual restarts at turn beginning supports the possibility that such a process might be involved in their construction. First, multiple restarts are in fact found at the beginning of some turns. Second, this string of restarts comes to an end and a coherent sentence is entered when the recipient at last begins to move his gaze to the speaker. For example:

(II-32) GA.8:00.6

	Restart (1)		Restart (2)	
Chil:	She-	she's reaching the p-	She's at the	point I'm
			X_____

(II-35) G.91:520

	Restart (1)		Restart (2)	
Betty:	The first	<u>ketch</u> ,	I mean	Susie-
Pam:				y'know she jus' threw it.
			X_____

(II-36) G.126:297

	Restart (1)		Restart (2)	
Eileen:	I ask him, (0.1)	I ask him if he-	(0.4) c'd-	If <u>you</u>
Debbie:			
Eileen:		could call 'im when you got <u>in</u>		
Debbie:		.X_____		

(II-40) G.50:(T)08:20

	Restart (1)		Restart (2)	
Clacia:	Bu:t.uh, b't there-	there	wz th'Bethel Park- crew	
Dianne:			X_____

Each of the utterances contains not one but two restarts. (Subsequent analysis will reveal that the restart is not the only phrasal break that can request the gaze of a hearer. Analysis of the above examples in terms of such a possibility would reveal that some, such as II-36, contain more than two requests for a hearer.) When the gaze of a recipient has been obtained the speaker stops producing restarts and enters a coherent sentence.

It was argued above that a restart could be employed either to begin a new sentence when the gaze of a recipient had been obtained or to request the gaze of a recipient. Multiple restarts also emerge when a speaker employs both of these procedures to coordinate his utterance with the actions of his recipient. A first restart requests the gaze of the recipient while a second is used to begin a new sentence at the point where the gaze of the recipient actually reaches the speaker.

(II-17) G.50(T)06:15

	Restart	Restart
	(1)	(2)
Clacia:	B't I: uh, (0.9)	Ro:n uh: ., Ron's family moved, intuh
Dianne:		. . . <u>lx</u>

(II-43) G.50:(T)050

Restart
(1)

Clacia: Y'know when we were- u- the first semester wih were
 Dianne:

Restart
(2)

Clacia: there we (ha:d), (-|--) uh- down't the hotel we hadda
 Dianne: X _____

(II-44) G.26(T)19:35

Restart Restart
(1) (2)

Beth: Dez yer- Does yer: does yer: uh, (0.2) body crease
 Ann: X _____

(II-45) G.91:550

Restart Restart
(1) (2)

Betty: I had about three differnt- I hear'it A, bout three
 Pam: X _____

When the possibility of recycling a summons is included in the process it can be seen that a speaker beginning a restart before a recipient has begun to gaze to him is not in a particularly vulnerable position. Specifically, if a recipient fails to orient to him soon after the restart he can terminate that attempt as a fragment and produce another restart.

With this in mind examples in which the recipient does not move

into orientation immediately at the restart, but rather some period of time after the request, will be considered:

(II-37) G.87:160

Gary: I know I reddy- (0.2) Freddy useta wor_k over the plant.
Mike: |X_____

(II-38) G.50(T)05:45

Clacia: The most ih- the most ama:zing thing wu_z tuh see the
Dianne: |X_____

(II-40) G.50:(T)08:20

Clacia: Bu:t.uh, b't there- there wz th'Bethe_l Park- crew, en
Dianne: |X_____

(II-46) G.82:618

Pan: Why'n'cha go out- (0.4) What's that one swin_g doin' up
Bruce: |X_____

(II-47) G.78:115

Sara: 'hh That's like- She tells me down there et the |corner
Flora: X_____

In these examples some period of time elapses between the production of the request and the beginning of the recipient's move into orientation. When the possibility of multiple restarts is taken into account such an event becomes non-problematic to the functioning of the process at issue. Specifically, the move into orientation by the recipient need not occur immediately after the restart. Rather, the speaker can continue with his sentence for a time even in the absence of a recipient in the expectation that one will quickly orient to him. If

this does not happen he retains the option of stopping his sentence prior to its completion and starting again. In each of the present examples though the recipient does not move precisely at the restart, he moves before the speaker is put in the position of having to recycle his request. It may be that the recipient's starting to move into orientation operates retroactively. By starting to attend one may recognizably display that one has already heard some of the prior talk, and that therefore it need not be redone. Thus though a summons-answer sequence of this type provides the capability for achieving quite precise coordination between the actions of speaker and hearer it also permits some leeway in the performance of their actions relative to each other.

The process of recycling requests until the orientation of a recipient is obtained which has just been examined provides some evidence for the possibility that a state in which a recipient is attending the speaker during the production of a coherent sentence is neither accidental nor automatic but rather something toward the achievement of which the actions of the participants might be actively directed.

The restart thus constitutes one technique available to participants in conversation for coordinating the actions of the speaker and those of the recipient so that the recipient is attending the speaker during the time when he is producing a coherent sentence.

I.6 An Alternative to the Restart for Securing the Gaze of a Recipient Near the Beginning of a Sentence: Delaying the Onward Development of the Sentence Until a Recipient's Gaze Has Been Obtained

When examining the restart as a request for the gaze of a recipient it was found that the speaker did not require the gaze of his recipient from the absolute beginning of his sentence. It was sufficient that he obtain it near the beginning.

If the speaker had a technique for obtaining the gaze of his recipient near the beginning of his first proposed sentence he might be able to continue with the sentence without producing a restart.

Coherent Sentence

. X _____

However we are examining a situation in which the speaker does not have the gaze of his recipient when he takes the floor. For clarity let us assume that during the time required for the recipient to bring his gaze to the speaker the sentence would advance well toward its completion:

Coherent Sentence

. X__

The length of time required for the recipient to move into orientation would pose no problem to the speaker if he had a way of holding his sentence at its beginning until he obtained his recipient's gaze. A very simple way the speaker might accomplish this task is by

ceasing to speak near the beginning of his sentence, waiting until the gaze of his recipient is secured, and then continuing with the sentence:

[Beginning] + [Pause] + [Continuation]

. X _____

By using a pause to delay the onward development of his sentence in this fashion the speaker is able to secure the gaze of his recipient near the beginning of his sentence despite the fact that it takes his recipient some period of time to bring his eyes to the speaker. A possible alternative procedure to the restart for securing the gaze of a recipient near the beginning of a speaker's sentence when the speaker does not have that recipient's gaze at the beginning of his turn is thus located.

Actual instances of the occurrence of this format provide evidence that a pause in the speaker's sentence might in fact be employed to coordinate the production of his sentence with actions of his recipient. Specifically, it is regularly found that during the pause the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker:

(II-48) G.26:(T):13:25

Michael: Who knows, 'hh (- ----) nu:mbers'n letters (huh),
Don: I_X _____

(II-49) G.23:124

Ann: Wh'n you had that big uhm:, (----- -) tropical
Jere: I_X _____

(II-50) G.50(T)04:00

Clacia: (Ye-nd) uh, (-- --) Muddy Ritz wz saying that 'e had
Dianne: [x]_____

In these examples a pause is employed to hold the speaker's sentence near its beginning until the gaze of a recipient has been obtained. The use of a pause in this fashion is structurally analogous to the use of a restart to produce a new sentence beginning when a recipient's gaze has been secured.

Non-speech sounds can also be used to delay the onward progression of a sentence. In the following a sentence is delayed until the orientation of a recipient is achieved by the use of both an inbreath and a pause:

(II-48) G.26:(T)13:25

Michael: Who knows, 'hh (- ----) nu:mbers'n letters (huh),
Don: [x]_____

Pauses and non-speech sounds are not the only tools available for delaying the speaker's sentence until some relevant event has occurred. Filled pauses¹⁶ such as "uh", "uhm", and "eh" also occupy time within a

¹⁶A number of different types of phrasal breaks have been distinguished in the psychological literature. The category systems of Mahl (1959) and Maclay and Osgood (1959) contain most of the distinctions found in this research. Mahl (1959:111) classifies speech disturbances into eight different types:

1. "Ah" . . .
2. Sentence Correction . . .
3. Sentence incompletion . . .
4. Repetition . . .
5. Stutter . . .
6. Intruding incoherent sound . .
7. Tongue-slip . . .
8. Omission.

sentence without advancing the sentence toward its projected completion. Possessing such properties they also constitute possible methods for delaying a sentence until the gaze of a recipient has been secured.

In the following the addition of two "uh's" to the middle of a sentence delays its movement toward completion until the gaze of its recipient has reached the speaker:

(II-51) G.76:090

Gordie: Wh't- What is uh: u^h: Mitch got anyway,
Ethyl: . . . X_____

Maclay and Osgood (1959:24) define four types of hesitation:

1. REPEATS (R): All repetitions, of any length, that were judged to be non-significant semantically . . .
2. FALSE STARTS (FS): All incomplete or self-interrupted utterances. I saw a very . . . is an incomplete utterance with FS following very, while I saw a very big//a very small boy is a self-interrupted utterance with FS following big. The second case represents an instance of RETRACED FS and the first an instance of NON-RETRACED FS. This distinction is made on the basis of whether or not the speaker backed up in an attempt to correct one of the words he had already used.
3. FILLED PAUSES (FP): All occurrences of the English hesitation devices [g, æ, ə, m]
Of these alternatives [ə] is by far the most frequent in our data.
4. UNFILLED PAUSES (UP): . . . UP has two major forms: silence of unusual length and non-phonemic lengthening of phenemes.

The distinctions made in this literature will be used where relevant.

In terms of the present analysis filled and unfilled pauses are alternative means accomplishing the same task. Thus it is not surprising that they sometimes occur together. In the following the movement of the utterance toward its termination is delayed for the full period of time required for the recipient to move into orientation through the use of both filled and unfilled pauses:

(II-14) G.84:(T)03:30

Mike: So:mebuddy rapped uh:. ([-----) DeWald'nna mouth.
Curt: [X_____

(II-50) G.50:(T)03:50

Clacia: (Ye-nd) uh, (-- --) Muddy Ritz wz saying that 'e had a
Dianne: [X_____

(II-52) G.50:(T)03:50

Dianne: He pu:t uhm, (--- ----) Tch! Put crabmeat on th'bo::dum.
Clacia: [X_____

A pause is a complex object constructed from a number of separate phenomena including, among other things, stopping talk in mid-utterance, a period of silence, and moving from silence to talk at the end of the pause. Ceasing to produce talk in mid-utterance, even though here followed by silence rather than a new sentence beginning, produces a phrasal break. Such a phrasal break could be used to request the gaze of a recipient.

The following provide possible instances of the use of a pause

beginning as a request for the gaze of a hearer. In them a recipient begins to turn toward the speaker after the speaker's entry into a pause produces a phrasal break.

(II-14) G.84:(T):03:30

Mike: So:mebuddy rapped uh:. ([-----]DeWald'nna mouth.
Curt: . . X_____

(II-52) G.50(T)03:50

Dianne: He pu:t uhm, (--- ----) Tch! Put crabmeat on th'bo::dum.
Clacia: [X_____

(II-53) G.26:(T)03:30

Don: They've changed- (--- -) the China City.
John: . . . [X_____

(II-54) G.75:614

Barbara: Uh:, my kids. (-----[-] had all these blankets, en
Ethyl: [X_____

(II-55) G.86:510

Mike: Speakin of pornographic movies I heard- (-- [----] a while
Carney: . [X_____

(II-56) G.79:434

Ross: 'N big sarjun 'nere- (s'n) (-- [-----] th'a'meril had'n
Ells: . [X_____

(II-57) G.76:620

Ethyl: I (hadda) who::le: (---- [-----] pail fulla those
Jim: . X_____

(II-58) G.126:190

Chuck: Uh- (--- [----] Mother where's the salad.
Deedee: . [X_____

(II-59) G.84:226

Curt: How's uh, (----- [-]) Jimmy Linder.
Gary: .. 'X _____

Further evidence that the entry into the pause is being employed to request the attention of a hearer is provided by other details in some of these examples. For instance, in many the visibility of the phrasal break is accentuated by a change in intonation. In the following there is both an elongation in the last sound of the previous word and a marked drop in pitch. (This is indicated in the transcription by the period after 'uh:').

(II-14) G.84:(T)03:30

Mike: So_mebuddy rapped uh:. (-----) DeWald'nna mouth.
Curt: . [X _____

In the following though no elongation occurs a drop in pitch does.

(II-54) G.75:614

Barbara: Uh:, my kids. (----- [-]) had all these blankets, en
Ethyl: [X _____

In the following examples the pause is entered with a glottal stop (indicated in the transcript with a "-").

(II-53) G.26:(T)03:30

Don: They've changed- (---- [-]) the Chinà City.
John: ... 'X _____

(II-55) G.86:510

Mike: Speakin of pornographic movies I heard- (-- ----) a while
Carney: . [X _____

The noticeability of these pitch changes (though not the glottal stop) is contingent in part on their position after the beginning but prior to a recognizable completion of a turn-constructural unit. If they occurred at the ends of turn-constructural units they would constitute appropriate terminal contours, for example, instances of Lieberman's (1967:104) "unmarked breath group."

Such changes in intonation make more noticeable the phrasal break produced in a speaker's utterance when he enters a pause and provide support for the possibility that the phrasal break is being utilized to request the attention of a hearer. Other evidence for the existence of a signal of this type at the beginning of the pause is also available. For instance, in some examples entry into the pause is preceded by another display of trouble in the utterance such as the production of an "uh" or "uhm".

(II-14) G.84:(T)03:30

Mike: So₂mebuddy rapped uh: . ([-----] DeWald'nna mouth.
Curt: . . . X _____

(II-52) G.50:(T)03:50

Dianne: He put: uhm, (---[----] Tch! Put crabmeat on th'bo::dum.
Clacia: X _____

(II-58) G.126:190

Chuck: Uh- (---[----] Mother where's the salad.
Deedee: . X _____

(II-59) G.84:226

Curt: How's uh, (----- -) Jimmy Linder.
Gary: .. [X _____

In all of these cases the production of the "uh" is coupled with a change in pitch producing a strong display of trouble which is well suited to request the attention of a recipient.

Like a restart, the beginning of a pause, as well as the production of a word such as "uh", is able to signal that the services of a hearer are needed. However with this same pause the speaker is also able to delay further production of his sentence until the gaze of his recipient is secured. In this sense the pause is a more versatile tool than the restart. Specifically, it can, if needed, combine the functions of both classes of restarts, requesting the gaze of a recipient and delaying the production of the speaker's sentence so that the gaze of this same recipient is secured at the beginning of the sentence.

These examples raise one other issue. In the other examples so far examined in this chapter the hearer has either been gazing or moving his gaze to the speaker from the beginning of the speaker's sentence. In these examples neither gaze nor movement toward the speaker occurs before the pause is entered; yet this portion of the speaker's sentence is not repeated when the gaze of the hearer is at last obtained.

If gaze is in fact one way in which attentiveness to what the speaker is saying as well as hearership is displayed, the present data would indicate that speakers may treat their hearers as being capable of recovering portions of the utterance spoken before the hearer began

to display orientation to the speaker. The following data¹⁷ provide some demonstration that participants in conversation are in fact able to recover some piece of talk that they initially indicate has not been heard:

(II-60) [Schreiner:CB:1:2]

Rick: So howju get home.hh
Linny: Hu:h,
Linny: Ben gay me a ride,

(II-61) [Schreiner:CB:1:2]

Rick: Wuhdiyih mean.
(1.0)
Linny: Huh?
(0.2)
Rick: Whudi_yih mean.
Linny: I mean I don't think I(h)'m ready
t'take an exam.

¹⁷I am indebted to Gail Jefferson for providing me with this data. The present analysis of it is intended only to show that participants in conversation do in fact display to each other the ability to recover an item of talk that they have previously indicated has not been heard in some relevant fashion. Many other relevant features of this process, such as the operation of one word questions such as "Huh", are not examined at all. The general organization of repairs in conversation has received considerable study from Sacks and his colleagues (for examples Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks forthcoming). Some published analysis of the repair process can be found in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974), Jefferson (1972), Schegloff (1972), Jefferson (1974), and Sacks (1974).

(II-62) [Shreiner:CB:1:2]

Rick: How'v yuh been feeling lately.

Linny: Hu:h?
(0.7)

Linny: How do I feel?

In these examples by producing a "huh", a participant indicates that the last item of talk has not been heard in some relevant fashion and requests that it be repeated. However before the repeat is provided (at least in complete form) the party who requested the repeat produces an utterance showing that the requested item has been recovered. These examples provide some demonstration that participants in conversation display to each other the ability to recover a piece of talk that has been previously marked as not having been heard.¹⁸

¹⁸Chafe (1973:17) notes that "human beings have a special ability to retain sound within their minds for a short time after it has been heard." More precisely

It is not difficult to observe through introspection that, whenever sounds are heard, they remain in the mind for a brief period, during which they are available for further processing. What is particularly striking is that they are available during this period regardless of whether they entered consciousness when they were first received, i.e., even if they were not attended to when they first entered the mind through the auditory apparatus, attention can subsequently be switched to them, and they can be brought into consciousness during this brief period of availability. Probably the most familiar experience that involves this phenomenon is that in which we fail to pay attention to ('listen to') something when it is said, but subsequently turn our attention to it and process it like any other verbal input. This ability has an obvious relevance to language.

II. Criteria for Choice Between These Procedures

The speaker in natural conversation thus has available to him two different techniques for securing near the beginning of his sentence the gaze of his recipient. He can either begin a new sentence by producing a restart when his recipient reaches orientation or he can pause near the beginning of his original sentence and await the gaze of his recipient before developing the sentence further.¹⁹

¹⁹Precisely where in his utterance the speaker places such a pause is an issue that is beyond the scope of the present analysis, but one relevant for future study. A considerable amount of research has in fact been done on where pauses occur in utterances. First, a distinction is generally made between 'juncture pauses' and 'hesitation pauses'. Juncture pauses occur at the boundaries between major units in the sentence (this argument has been made from the perspective of both structural linguistics (see for example Cook, Smith and Lalljee 1974:15) and transformational grammar (for example Lieberman 1967: 125)). Juncture pauses are usually considered to be "essentially linguistic" phenomena, serving for example to demarcate units in the stream of speech, while hesitation pauses "are attributed to non-linguistic or extra-linguistic factors"(Boomer 1965:151, footnote 3).

Most research has focused on hesitation pauses. As noted by Boomer (1965:148):

The linking hypothesis is that hesitations in spontaneous speech occur at points where decisions and choices are being made.

Some early theories (for example Maclay and Osgood 1959) argued that phrasal breaks occurred before words of high uncertainty. However Boomer (1965) found that pauses occurred most frequently after the first word of a phonemic clause. He argued (1965:156) that this finding provided evidence that speech was encoded in terms of the phonemic clause rather than the individual word (Ibid.:148). Specifically, he proposed that the pattern he found demonstrated that speech encoding occurred in at least two stages, with hesitations occurring after a

Each of these procedures is able to accomplish the task at hand, securing the attention of a recipient near the beginning of the speaker's sentence. Further, the two procedures have important structural similarities. Most noticeably, each provides the speaker with the ability to request the gaze of the hearer and to permit the arrival of the recipient's gaze to occur early in his sentence.

One question that can emerge from that observation is why a speaker would choose one rather than the other to accomplish this task. Specifically, what criteria guide a speaker's selection between the two?

The choice of one procedure over another would be meaningless if the procedures did not differ from each other in some fashion relevant to the accomplishment of the tasks facing the speaker. A first step in

structural or grammatical decision had been made but before lexical selection (*Ibid.*:156). Building on Boomer's work Dittman (1974:172, see also Dittman and Llewellyn 1969) found that body movements tend to occur "at the beginning of fluent speech, be this when the speaker gets started on a clause or when he gets started after some non-fluency within the clause."

The pauses in the present data frequently occur at major structural boundaries in the speaker's sentence (for example just before or just after the verb). However the data is also roughly consistent (frequently several words occur before the pause is entered) with the patterns described by Boomer and Dittman. The pauses being examined do occur early in the speaker's utterance, as do body movements of the hearer as well as the speaker (the movements of the speaker will be examined later in this chapter).

specifying criteria for selection between them can consist of locating precisely how these procedures differ from each other in terms of the resources they provide the speaker for the accomplishment of relevant interactive tasks.

One place to search for such a difference might be in the phenomena constructed by such procedures. Restarts and pauses appear to be clearly distinguishable from each other and to present clear alternatives for the accomplishment of the task at issue:

Restart: [Fragment] + [New Beginning]

Pause: [Beginning] + [Pause] + [Continuation]

However, the distinctiveness of such phenomena, as well as their status as alternatives for the accomplishment of the task presently being investigated, is called into question by examples such as the following in which the gaze of a recipient is secured through use of both a pause and a restart:

(II-8) G.126:330

Debbie: Anyway, (0.2) uh:, (0.2) we went [t- I went ta béd
Chuck: [x_____

(II-16) G.99:255

Jere: They're gettin- ([-----) They're in living in the
Ann: . . [x_____

(II-17) G.50:(T)06:15

Clacia: B't I: uh, (0.9) Ro:n uh: .:, Ron's family moved intuh
Dianne: . . [x_____

the sudden closing of the vocal cords when speech production is abruptly terminated.²¹ Labov (Ms.) has argued that in English such a glottal stop constitutes a universal editing signal.

The talk that occurs after this interruption may either be a continuation of the unit already in progress or the beginning of a new unit. If it is the beginning of a new unit a restart has occurred. For example in the following while the talk after the first phrasal break constructs a restart, the talk after the second does not:

(II-15) G.23:149

	First		Second
	Phrasal		Phrasal
	Break		Break
	'		'
	'		'
Jere:	I have more-	u I have-	trouble keepin' it clea:n

After a unit has been interrupted a period of silence, a pause, may or may not occur before speech production is resumed. The talk after the period of silence may be either the beginning of a new unit, a restart (for example II-13, II-16, II-18, II-27, II-37, II-42, II-63), or a continuation of the unit already in progress (for example II-48 through II-59).

²¹I am indebted to William Labov for bringing this process to my attention.

One distinction in this process that may be relevant for the selection of one procedure over the other is whether the talk after the interruption continues the unit already in progress or begins a new unit.²² Which of these events happens affects not only the talk after the interruption but also the talk that preceded it. If the talk following the interruption does not continue the speaker's initial talk, then that original talk loses its status as a possible sentence beginning and becomes a sentence fragment. If, however, the talk following the interruption continues the talk that preceded it then that original talk maintains its status as the beginning of the unit currently under construction by the speaker.

The procedures which have been examined therefore provide a choice between continuing the unit in progress before the interruption, thus locating that talk as the beginning of the sentence eventually constructed, or beginning a new unit of talk and thus locating the talk originally begun as a fragment. Note that these distinctions become relevant only when talk is resumed after the interruption. Before that

²²The ability to recognize first, that a unit has stopped at some place other than a possible termination for it, or second, that some subsequent piece of talk is or is not a continuation of some prior unit, requires that the participants be able to determine from the part of the unit already produced what would constitute an appropriate termination or a continuation of it. As was noted in the last chapter, such a property is made explicit in the definition of a turn-constructive unit provided by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:702).

point the talk before the interruption could still become either a fragment or the beginning of the speaker's eventual sentence.

The criteria governing the speaker's selection of one of these alternatives over the other will now be investigated. Such investigation will, however, be restricted to criteria relevant to the process of negotiating a state of mutual gaze between speaker and hearer. Many valid reasons for interrupting or abandoning an utterance prior to its completion will not be examined in the present analysis.²³

The analysis until this point has provided some demonstration that obtaining the gaze of a recipient within the turn is in fact relevant to the speaker. However, even casual inspection of a visual record of conversation quickly reveals that the hearer does not gaze continuously toward the speaker. Rather during the course of a turn he gazes away from the speaker as well as toward him. Given the regular

²³The work of Sacks and his colleagues on repairs (cited in footnote 17, p. 165) analyzes many other processes that might lead to the interruption of a turn-constructional unit prior to its projected completion. The work of Goffman (in progress) on the different aspects of the self generated through repairs examines yet other aspects of this phenomenon. Further, it cannot be claimed that the interaction of speaker and hearer is relevant to the production of all restarts and pauses. Processes internal to the speaker, such as those examined by Boomer (1965), Mahl (1959) and Dittman (1974), are certainly relevant to the production of many phrasal breaks. While the present analysis focuses on the social and interactive use of restarts and pauses it is recognized that such phenomena may reflect actual difficulty the speaker is having in organizing what he is trying to say.

presence of both alternatives, the absence of a hearer's gaze at some point is not established. Either the speaker or an analyst could look at some specific place in a turn, find that the hearer is not gazing at the speaker, and yet not be able to establish that Rule #1 is being violated. The gaze called for by Rule #1 might occur elsewhere in the turn. Nevertheless the data already examined would indicate that speakers do in fact orient to the noticeable absence of a recipient's gaze at a specific point (for example by requesting such gaze).

The work of Sacks and his colleagues on the sequential organization of conversation provides analytic resources with which the problem of specifying the absence of a hearer's gaze at a particular place might be addressed. Sacks (1972:341) observes that:²⁴

Certain activities not only have regular places in some sequence where they do get done but may, if their means of being done is not found there, be said, by members, to not have occurred, to be absent. For example, the absence of a greeting may be noticed. . . Observations such as these lead to a distinction between a "slot" and the "items" which fill it, and to proposing that certain activities are accomplished by a combination of some item and some slot. . . . The notion of slot serves for the social scientist to mark a class of relevance rules. Thus, if it can be said that for some assertable sequence there is a position in which one or more activities properly occur, or occur if they are to get done, then: The observability of either the occurrence or the nonoccurrence of those activities may be claimed by reference to having looked at the position and determined whether what occurs in it is a way of doing the activity.

²⁴Note also Schegloff's (1968) concept of conditional relevance which was discussed earlier in this chapter (p. 149).

If the turn at talk provides a slot for the hearer to gaze at the speaker then the problem stated above could be resolved. The presence of such a slot would establish the relevance of the hearer's gaze at a particular place, while yet providing other places in the turn where the hearer could gaze elsewhere than at the speaker without his gaze being absent. The fact that the hearer looks both toward and away from the speaker would thus pose no particular analytic difficulties. Rather than searching the turn as a whole one could look at that particular slot to see whether the hearer is gazing at the speaker.

The following will be proposed as a rule describing where in the turn a hearer should be gazing at the speaker:

Rule #2: A recipient should be gazing at the speaker
when the speaker is gazing at him.

This rule relates the gaze of the hearer to a phenomenon which has not yet been examined in the present analysis, the gaze of the speaker. It also provides for the occurrence of mutual gaze or eye contact.

A related rule dealing more directly with both the gaze of the speaker and the phenomenon of mutual gaze will also be provided:

Rule #3: When a speaker gazes at a recipient he
should make eye contact with that recipient.

These rules²⁵ have a number of consequences, some of which will be briefly discussed.

First, the rules establish an unequal distribution of permissible lookings among the participants. A recipient can look at the speaker when the speaker is not looking at him without the rules being violated. However if the speaker gazes at a non-gazing hearer the rules are violated. On the other hand the speaker can look away from the recipient without violating the rules but the recipient cannot look away from a gazing speaker. Thus, if the rules are to be satisfied, the

²⁵In an earlier analysis (Goodwin 1975) a different set of rules was proposed to account for the present process. In essence those rules stated that in order to construct a turn at talk a speaker required the attentiveness of a hearer and that the state of a recipient's attentiveness could be inferred from his gaze. The present rules do not require an assumption about inferences being made by participants, but instead deal directly with their gaze. The present rules also account for particular aspects of the phenomena being investigated better than the old rules did. For example, a speaker who has the gaze of one recipient will sometimes turn to another who is found not to be gazing at the speaker. Such a situation constitutes a violation of the present rules, but not of the rules previously proposed, where the requirement that the speaker have a hearer was satisfied by the gaze of his first recipient. Speakers in such circumstances frequently do attempt to obtain the gaze of the second recipient, thus indicating that such a situation is in fact not appropriate.

Though the present rules are superior to the rules first proposed, it is expected that they too will have to be modified when more is learned about the organization of gaze within the turn.

I am indebted to Erving Goffman for bringing to my attention weaknesses in the original rule set and to Harvey Sacks, for not only noting the inadequacies of the original rules, but also for suggesting ways that those inadequacies might be dealt with. I alone am responsible for the weaknesses that now remain.

speaker should only gaze at a gazing recipient but does not have to gaze at him continuously, while a recipient can gaze either at a gazing or a non-gazing speaker, but should be gazing at the speaker whenever he is being gazed at.

Second, such a distribution of rights to look at the other is consistent with findings²⁶ made by a number of different investigators

²⁶The rules being proposed here are, however, possibly inconsistent with one reported finding about gaze in conversation. Kendon (1967:60) states that

at points in the interaction where the speaker and auditor exchange roles, the speaker characteristically ends his utterance by looking at the auditor with a sustained gaze and the auditor characteristically looks away as he begins to speak.

Elsewhere (*Ibid.*:33) he states that the speaker "tends to look away as he begins a long utterance, and in many cases somewhat in advance of it."

If the party moving from being a hearer to being a speaker does not look away until he begins his own utterance no conflict with the rules being proposed here occurs. If, however, that party begins to turn away before the end of the last speaker's utterance and, as Kendon states, the speaker ends his turn with a long look at the hearer, then the speaker will be gazing at a nongazing hearer.

I have not systematically examined the gaze of the participants at turn-ending. However, in view of Kendon's analysis, and its implications for the rules being proposed here, I examined gaze at turn-ending in an eleven minute conversation (Tape #G.50). This conversation was chosen because of its brevity and because, like Kendon's data, it had two participants. The speech unit Kendon used for analysis was what he called a "long utterance", defined (*Ibid.*:31) as any utterance over five seconds in length. For long utterances in my data I found approximately forty-three cases where the speaker was not gazing at a nongazing hearer at turn-ending and two where he was. (These figures are approximate for a number of rather serious

that hearers gaze at speakers more than speakers gaze at hearers (for example Kendon 1967:26; Argyle 1969:107; Nielsen 1964; Exline 1974:74; and Allen and Guy 1974:139-140). It is also compatible with the finding that though eye contact regularly occurs between a speaker and hearer within a turn at talk it is characteristically brief²⁷, its occurrence

reasons. Most importantly, as was discussed in the last chapter, it is not at all clear what should or should not be counted as a turn or where the terminal boundary of a long utterance should be located. For example, talk after a lapse may be initiated by the same party who last talked before the lapse. In such a case two turns would occur (for analysis of speech rate Kendon does in fact divide long utterances into smaller units when pauses occur). Within stories some pauses at the end of possibly complete sentences are possible transition points while others are not. In general I located the boundary of the turn at speaker transition. However, in cases where the same party who had last talked initiated talk again after a lapse, that talk was counted as two turns. I also excluded cases of overlap where who the speaker was could be seen as problematic but counted as turns some examples where the speaker's talk was overlapped by what Kendon (Ibid.:43) refers to as accompaniment signals.)

Despite the fact that this one piece of data supports in a limited way the rules being proposed here (I do not think the mere frequency of occurrence of some particular pattern is a reliable indicator of a rule of the type being proposed here. In addition to the basic problem alluded to above concerning what to count, the relevance of the rule can be better shown by finding exceptions to it, or violations of it, and seeing if the actions the participants then perform show an orientation to the rule) I recognize that these rules may be inaccurate and may have to be systematically modified. The process Kendon describes is in fact a plausible possibility for such modification in that it is one means of achieving the preferred order for the sequencing of the participants' gaze.

²⁷Thus Kendon (1967:27) notes that "mutual gazes tend to be quite short, lasting for little more than a second as a rule."

If rules such as those being proposed here are in fact relevant to the construction of the turn, then violations of them should be oriented to appropriately by participants. One way in which a violation of Rule #3 might be marked is by displaying that the sentence being produced when the violation occurred is impaired in some fashion.

The difference between the products constructed by the two procedures available to the speaker for securing the gaze of a recipient is precisely that one procedure, the restart, locates the sentence first proposed by the speaker as impaired while the other does not. The line of argument just advanced suggests that a possible basis for choice between these procedures might be found in the mutual gaze direction of the participants. Specifically, if a speaker looks toward a recipient and finds that he is not being gazed at, then an appropriate procedure to use to secure a recipient's gaze would be a restart. This procedure locates the sentence then being produced as impaired and replaces it with a new one precisely at the point where the relevant impairment is remedied: that is, when the speaker secures the gaze of a recipient. However,

his partner. Exline (1974:87) reports on an unpublished study by Champness on dominance in which subjects found themselves gazing at each other. He reports that "dominant Ss were the first to break the gaze. They looked away and immediately began to speak." Exline comments further

Perhaps, as is suggested by Kendon's work, they realized that to sit looking at the other in silence was a cue for the other to speak. (Ibid.:87-88)

if the speaker has not gazed at a recipient who was not gazing at him then no impairment of this type to his sentence has been located. In such a case it would be appropriate to continue with the original sentence.

Actual phrasal breaks associated with the achievement of orientation by a recipient will now be examined with respect to the possibility that rules of the type just considered are in fact implicated in their construction.

In the following the gaze direction of the speaker is plotted above the utterance. The gaze direction of the recipient continues to be marked below the utterance.

Original Sentence Not Continued

(II-9) G.75:668

Barbara: _____
Brian: Brian yer gonna ha f- You kid'll hafta go down closer
. X

(II-11) G.140:352

Tommy: _____
Pumpkin: You agree wi d- You agree wi'cher aunt on anything.
. X

(II-13) G.87:309

Curt: _____ ' ' '
Gary: We wen' down t_ra- (0.2) wh'we went back ta school,
. X

(II-16) G.99:255

Jere: _____
Ann: They're gettin- (-----) They're in living in the
. . I_X _____

(II-18) G.79:255

Ross: _____
Curt: S:ix hunder d? (0.4) Six hundred miles'n'hour er somp'n
. I_X _____

(II-21) G.91:385

Pam: X
Tina: So wha'ya ^{hi} e Where you living now.
. I_X _____

(II-23)

Betty: X
Pam: D'you like livⁱing out the r- Are you on the la:ke? er
. I_X _____

(II-25) G.50(T)05:30

Clacia: . . X , ,
'N he c a- he calls me a Vassar sno:b.
. I_X _____

(II-27) G.90:475

Lee: X
Ray: Can ya brin^g-? (0.2) Can you bring me here that nylo n?
. I_X _____

(II-29) G.50:(T)07:30

Clacia: X , ,
Dianne: En a couple of gir^lls- One othe r girl from the:re,
. X _____

(II-35) G.91:520

Betty: The first ketch I mean Susie- y'kn_{ow} she jus' threw it.
Pam: . . . [X]

(II-37) G.87:160

Gary: . . . [X]
I know Fredd_y- (0.2) Freddy useta wor_k over the plant.
Mike: [X]

(II-38) G.50:(T)05:45

Clacia: . . . [X, , . [X]
The mos t ih- the most ama:zing thing wu z tuh see the
Dianne: [X]

(II-39) G.103:544

Joe: [X]
My mother tol' me th't- We had a col_id wader flat
Pat: [X]

(II-41) G.26:(T)18:45

Beth: . . . [X]
Michael- Daniel's fa_{scinated} with elephants.
Ann: [X]

(II-42) G.87:297

Mike: 'hh 'hh I got ho:me (0.3) 'hh I got home that night.
Gary: . . X

(II-47) G.78:115

Sara: [X]
'hh That's li ke- She tells me down there et the corner
Flora; [X]

(II-63) G.76:108

Barbara: _____, '
I- (-- [---]) you know I think that's terrible.
Gordie: . . . X _____

(II-64) G.84:(T)06:30

Gary: _____
He's a policem'n in Bellview'n he [':, I guess he-
Mike: . X _____

Original Sentence Continued

(II-65) G.23:140

Jere: _____
Hafta puta ([-----]) li'l bub bler in
Ann: . . . X _____

(II-50) G.50:(T)04:00

Clacia: _____
(Ye-nd) uh, (-- [---]) Muddy Ritz wz saying that 'e had a
Dianne: X _____

(II-52) G.50:(T):03:50

Dianne: _____
He pu:t uhm, (--- [----]) Tch! Put crab m'eat on th'
Clacia: X _____

(II-53) G.26:(T)03:30

Don: _____
They've changed- (---- [-]) the China City.
John: . . . X _____

(II-54) G.75:614

Barbara: Uh:, my kids. (-----[-]) had all these blankets, en
Ethyl: X _____

(II-56) G. 79:434

Ross: 'N big sarjun 'nere- (s'n) (--[-----]) th'a'meril had'n
Ells: .. X _____

(II-59) G.84:(T)07:10

Curt: How's uh, (-----[-]) Jimmy Linder.
Gary: .. X _____

(II-49) G.23:124

Ann: Wh'n you had that big uhm:, (-----[-]) tropical
Jere: X _____

The sequencing of gaze direction in these examples supports the line of reasoning advanced above. Specifically, in those examples in which the speaker brings his gaze to the recipient before his recipient has begun to look at him a restart is produced. The sentence in progress when the violation of Rule #3 occurred is left a fragment. However, in those examples in which the speaker does not gaze at a non-gazing recipient the original sentence is continued after the phrasal break.

The utterances in which restarts occur are further subdivided

into three classes in terms of where the restart is placed with respect to the gaze direction of the participants. In some cases the restart is placed at the point where the speaker's eyes reach his recipient (II-25, II-27, II-29, II-37, II-38, II-39, II-41, II-47). In other cases the restart is placed at the point where the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker (II-9, II-11, II-13, II-16, II-18, II-21, II-23, II-42, II-63, II-64). Finally, in other cases the production of the restart is not precisely coordinated with the gaze of either speaker or hearer (II-35, II-45).

The basis for the division of these examples into such classes will now be investigated.

It has been argued that one basis for the construction of a restart arises when a speaker gazes at a recipient who is not gazing back at him. Suppose that when the speaker's gaze reaches the recipient he finds that though his recipient's gaze has not yet reached him, his recipient is in the process of moving toward him:

Speaker: X
Recipient: X

When the recipient's eyes reach the speaker he will find that the speaker is already gazing at him. A violation of Rule #3 will thus occur, providing a basis for abandoning the present sentence and beginning a new one.

However, it can also be recognized that the gaze of the recipient is about to reach the speaker. Therefore no request for his

gaze is required. In such a case the production of a restart can be delayed until the gaze of the recipient actually reaches the speaker.

Thus in cases where the recipient's gaze is already moving toward the speaker when the speaker's eyes reach him one would expect the restart to be placed at the point at which the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker:

Speaker: X _____
Utterance: Restart
Recipient: X _____

This is in fact the pattern found in examples II-21 and II-23.

However, suppose that when the speaker's eyes reach his recipient he finds that his recipient has not yet begun to gaze at him:

Speaker: X
Recipient:

It is apparent at this point that the speaker is gazing at someone who is not gazing at him. In that the recipient is not moving toward the speaker no basis for delaying the production of the restart until his gaze reaches the speaker exists. Rather the speaker is faced with the task of attracting his recipient's gaze. The production of a restart at this point as a request for a hearer provides one solution to this problem:

Speaker: X _____
Utterance: Restart
Recipient: X _____

Thus in cases where the speaker reaches orientation but finds that his

recipient has not even begun to gaze at him one would expect a restart to be produced immediately and therefore to occur at the place where the speaker's gaze reaches the hearer. This is in fact the pattern found in examples II-25, II-27, II-37, II-41, and II-47.

In many cases, such as the examples just listed, the restart occurs precisely at the point where the speaker's gaze reaches his recipient. However, in some cases (II-24, II-38, II-35) the restart is not produced until very slightly after the speaker has begun to gaze at his recipient:

(II-24) G.50(T)07:30

Clacia: [X, ,
 En a couple of girls- One other girl from the:re,
 Dianne: X _____

(II-38) G.50(T)05:45

Clacia: [X, ,
 The mos t in- the most [X] _____
 Dianne: [ama:zing thing wu:z tuh see the
 X _____

(II-39) G.103:544

Joe: [X _____
 My mother tol' m e th't- We had a col d wadder flat
 Pat: X _____

Despite the distance between the speaker's gaze and the restart in these examples their production seems compatible with a process of the type described above. First, the time between the arrival of the

speaker's gaze and the production of the restart is very brief. In these examples the phrasal break beginning the restart occurs in the syllable after the speaker's gaze reaches the recipient. Second, the units produced in this space, "ih-", "Th't-" and the end of "girls-", are marked by their pronunciation, for example by the glottal stop in each, as defective. The space between the place where the speaker's gaze reaches the recipient and where the restart actually begins is retroactively marked as impaired. Thus though the phrasal break in fact occurs a syllable later it is displayed as getting started at the point where the speaker's gaze reaches the hearer:

Clacia:^X
En a couple of gir'ls-

Clacia:^X
The mos't ih-

Joe:^X
My mother tol' m'e th't-

Other evidence that the speaker's act of gazing at a non-gazing recipient is implicated in the production of these restarts is provided by the fact that in examples II-24 and II-38 the speaker immediately pulls her gaze away from her recipient.

In these cases, as well as in those in which the restart is produced just at the point where the speaker's gaze reaches the recipient, the gaze of the recipient begins to move toward the speaker after the restart. These examples thus provide instances of a phenomenon examined

earlier: the use of a restart to request the gaze of a recipient. The present analysis permits the place where that request will occur to be specified with greater accuracy than was possible in the initial analysis of this phenomenon. Specifically, one place where it will regularly occur is at the point where a speaker's gaze reaches a recipient who has not begun to gaze at him.

Cases in which the speaker is gazing at his recipient from the very beginning of his utterance constitute a special instance of this situation. The beginning of the speaker's initial utterance, occurring when the speaker is gazing at a recipient who is not gazing at him, provides a first request for the gaze of that recipient. If the recipient does not begin to gaze within a reasonable period of time the speaker has the option of producing a restart to request his gaze. Such a restart would not occur in conjunction with the achievement of gaze direction by either speaker or hearer. Utterances II-35 and II-45 are consistent with such a possibility.

The speaker might, however, begin another new sentence at the point at which the gaze of his recipient is actually obtained. In such a case two restarts would be produced. While the first would not be coordinated with the achievement of orientation of either speaker or hearer the second would occur at the point where the recipient's eyes reach the speaker.

In example II-45 after a first restart secures the gaze of a recipient, a second new sentence is begun at the point where the re-

ipient's eyes reach the speaker:

(II-45) G.91:550

Betty: _____
 I had about three differnt- I hear'it A bout three
 Pam: [X_____

In example II-35 a second restart is not officially constructed when the recipient's eyes actually reach the speaker. However, the transition movement of the recipient is covered with a "y'know" so that the substantive beginning of the sentence does not occur until the recipient's gaze actually reaches the speaker.³⁰

(II-35) G.91:520

Betty: _____
 The first ketch I mean Susie- y'kn_{ow} she jus' threw
 Pam: . . [X_____

If a recipient fails to bring his gaze to a speaker who has been gazing at him from the beginning of his turn the speaker might thus produce a restart to request his gaze, this restart not occurring in conjunction with the achievement of orientation of either speaker or hearer. However, the recipient might begin to move his gaze to the speaker before such a request becomes necessary. In such a case the situation becomes equivalent to the one considered above in which a

³⁰"y'know" in this example may function analogously to the use of potentially deletable terms in positions of possible overlap as analyzed by Jefferson (1973).

speaker finds that his recipient is moving toward him but has not yet reached him. In such a situation the speaker can wait until his recipient's gaze actually arrives before producing the restart. Examples II-9, II-11, II-13, II-16, II-18, II-42, II-63, and II-64 are consistent with such a possibility.

The speaker of course is not restricted to using a restart only when he has gazed at a recipient who has not been gazing at him. As was noted earlier, other processes having nothing to do with the negotiation of a state of mutual gaze between speaker and hearer, might require the use of such procedures. Examination of such phenomena is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

Finally, a speaker might be able to determine in some fashion (perhaps peripheral vision) that he lacks a recipient's gaze before actually gazing at the recipient.³¹ Such a process is perhaps operative frequently in the cases of utterances in which the speaker produces a phrasal break which secures the gaze of a recipient, but delays his own gaze until after that event happens and then continues with his original

³¹Diebold (1968:557) reports that

There is evidence accumulating which suggests that humans as well as nonhuman anthropoids are acutely aware of 'being looked at' even when the looker is not in the visual field. In one experiment with rhesus monkeys . . . the investigator demonstrated consistent electroencephalographically measured changes in cortical activity associated with this situation, as well as overt global behavioral changes.

sentence. However in certain circumstances such a process can lead to the production of a restart when no violation of Rule #3 in fact occurs. The following (which will be examined in more detail in the next chapter) is a possible example of such a process:

(II-17) G.50:(T)06:15

Clacia: . . . [X
 B't, I: uh, (0.9) Ro:n uh: [':, Ron's family moved, intuh
Dianne: X

Here the speaker does not actually gaze at a non-gazing recipient. Her restarts may nevertheless demonstrate an orientation to Rule #3. Unlike most of the cases where the speaker continues with his original sentence, this utterance contains several phrasal breaks which may function as requests for the gaze of a hearer. The failure of the recipient to move after any of these requests, especially in view of the comparatively long pause provided, establishes the absence of a recipient's positive answer to the speaker's summons. Such an observable, negative answer to the speaker's request for gaze may constitute adequate grounds for a finding that Rule #3 is not being satisfied.

Earlier sections of this chapter focused on the gaze of the hearer. In this section that phenomenon has been found to be but an aspect of a larger process through which the gaze of both speaker and

hearer, including their avoidance as well as their contact, is organized.³²

³²As was stated earlier the present analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative. It is assumed that both the relevance of the rules proposed here and the orientation of the participants to them can best be established by locating and describing the procedures utilized by participants to achieve their features. The frequency with which particular procedures are employed is a separate issue. Some brief consideration will however be given to the frequency with which the patterns being described here occurred in a specific conversation. The conversation examined was an eleven-minute conversation between two middle class women (Tape #G.50). This particular conversation was chosen for several reasons: first, it is comparatively brief (it was terminated when one of the participants was called to the phone); second, except for one brief sequence, both participants can be clearly observed throughout the conversation; third, a transcript of the conversation by Gail Jefferson is available.

In this data eight cases were found in which a speaker gazed at a non-gazing hearer at turn-beginning and did not produce a phrasal break or attempt to remedy the situation in some other fashion. Fifty-four other turns were found which were in agreement with the process being described in this chapter. In fifteen other cases the participants did not gaze at each other within the turn. These figures are only approximate since, as was noted earlier, for sound theoretical reasons the unit to be counted as a turn cannot always be definitively established.

Some of the eight turns in which a speaker gazed at a non-gazing hearer may in fact constitute lawful exceptions to the process being described here or show an orientation to it in some other fashion. In one case a speaker beginning a story became involved in an elaborated word search, provided a partial description of the item being sought, 'thet looked like a steak place?', and then turned slightly away and put her hand to her forehead in a gesture typical of speakers searching for the next item in their utterance. At that point her recipient said "Ho: yeaum." while looking at the party engaged in the word search. It may be that the recipient's gaze display for the word search constitutes a special activity that is given priority over her gazing at a co-participant whose own utterance is also implicated in the word search. In another case a speaker produced a

III. The Production of a Pause after the Gaze of a Recipient Has Been Secured

The analysis to this point accounts only for pauses in the speaker's utterance that occur before the gaze of his recipient arrives. However pauses also regularly occur immediately after the gaze of a

phrasal break when her eyes reached a non-gazing recipient but her recipient did not begin to move toward the speaker until some time later. The speaker continued with her utterance, withdrew her gaze before her recipient acted, but did not return it to the recipient. In another case the speaker's gaze arrived while her recipient was moving toward her. The speaker did not, however, produce a phrasal break though she did add an appositive and a pause before continuing with the story introduced by the utterance in which the recipient's gaze arrived late. In another case a speaker producing a question did not obtain the gaze of her recipient. Without providing a space for her recipient to answer she produced a second question, restating the original one in a different form, i.e., "Who was it. D'ju'r'member." The second question recognizes the difficulty the speaker is having in producing an answer. The fact that the recipient does not gaze at the speaker may be relevant to the production of this second question before its addressee has been provided time to answer the first.

In some situations a recipient's lack of appropriate gaze may in fact demonstrate that he is not attending the turn properly. In one case the speaker withdrew her approaching gaze from a non-gazing recipient at the beginning of the turn and then brought it back at the beginning of a second turn-constructional unit to find that her recipient's gaze was approaching but had not yet arrived. At the end of that unit the recipient attempted to start a turn of her own, was overlapped by the first speaker, but then interrupted with the announcement that she had suddenly remembered something. The non-gazing recipient's subsequent actions in this case are consistent with the possibility that her original lack of gaze did in fact demonstrate lack of appropriate orientation to the turn of her co-participant.

recipient reaches the speaker. For example:

(II-13) G.87:309

Curt: _____
Gary: We wen' down t a- (0.2) wh'we went back ta school,
. [X _____

(II-18) G.79:326

Ross: _____
Curt: S:ix hunder d? (0.4) Six hundred miles'n'hour er somp'n
. [X _____ , , ,

(II-20) G.75:122

Bea: _____
Jim: Well they've done away wi th (0.3) They've done away
. [X _____

(II-66) G.86:352

Carney: _____
Phyllis: You know tha:t (0.4) first road offa the bypass
. . [X _____

Further, in some cases in which a pause is used to delay a speaker's utterance until the gaze of a recipient has been secured, the pause is not closed at the point where the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker. Rather the pause is continued for some period of time before production of the speaker's sentence is resumed. For example:

(II-50) G.50:(T)04:00

Clacia: (Ye-nd) uh, (-- --) Muddy Ritz wz saying that 'e had a
Dianne: [X _____

(II-52) G.50:(T)03:50

Dianne: He pu:t uhm, (--- ----) Tch! Put crabmeat on th'bo::dum.

Clacia: [X] _____

(II-54) G.75:614

Barbara: Uh:, my kids. (----- [-]) had all these blankets, en

Ethyl: [X] _____

These examples, too, (as well as utterances II-14, II-48, II-55, II-56, II-57) thus demonstrate the presence of a pause in the speaker's utterance after the gaze of his recipient has been secured.

A number of other phenomena produced within the turn might be related to this feature. For instance, it will be found below (pp. 207-210) that when a speaker secures a second recipient late in his turn he frequently recycles not his entire sentence, but a subordinate element of that sentence. In the following note what happens to the speaker's "the" after her second recipient reaches orientation:

(II-47) G.78:115

Sara: [X] _____
 'h That's li'ke- She tells me down there et the corner

Flora: [X] _____

Ed: _____

Sara: _____
 she couldn' even afford ta buy the: [th'b- (0.4)

Flora: _____

Ed: . [X] _____

Sara; _____
 r:en'a'bissel.

Flora: _____

Ed: _____

The usefulness of a pause after the gaze of a recipient has been secured is not clear. Such a pause might provide a recipient who was not attending the beginning of a speaker's utterance time to recover it. Alternatively, the recipient's action of moving his gaze to the speaker might constitute a possible disturbance to the turn. A pause after this act has been completed carries the turn well past the point of disturbance and gives the participants time to fully focus their attention upon each other. The function of this structural feature is a matter that requires further research.

IV. The Negotiation of Gaze in Mid-Turn

For clarity, analysis of the achievement of an appropriate state of mutual gaze has so far focused on the beginning of the turn. However gaze is relevant throughout the turn. The same procedures utilized to establish an initial state of mutual gaze at the beginning of the turn can be employed to renegotiate an appropriate state of gaze between the participants later in the turn. For example, in the following a speaker loses the gaze of her recipient in mid turn. By producing both an "uh" and a pause beginning at this point she constructs a request for a hearer. Then the further development of her utterance is delayed through use of a pause until the gaze of her recipient is once again secured:

(II-67) G.79:540

Margie: _____
'N he put it a:ll the way up my ba:ck. which was a
Ross: _____, ' ' ' ,

Margie: _____
big uh (-----) help on that.
Ross: X _____

The following provides another example of such a process:

(II-68) G.140:345

Tina: _____
You remember that- that white (1.0) that sweater
Marlene: . . . X , , , , ,

Tina: _____
sweate[r wi'duh (0.6) it was Earl's,
Marlene: . . . X _____

The speaker thus has the ability to negotiate an appropriate state of mutual gaze with his recipient not just at turn beginning but throughout the turn.

V. Securing the Gaze of Several Recipients

Such apparently minute events as phrasal breaks not only operate on a selected recipient but are found to be capable of coordinating the actions of several participants. Such coordination might be manifested in a variety of ways. First, the gaze of several recipients may reach the speaker at the same point and at this point

the speaker may produce a phrasal break:

(II-20) G.75:122

Bea: _____
 Well they've done away with (0.3) They've done away
 Jim: [X _____
 Ethyl: [X _____

(II-21) G. 91:385

Pam: [X _____
 So wha'ya nie-? [Where you living now.
 Tina: [X _____
 Ed: [X _____

(II-55) G.86:510

Mike: _____
 Speakin of pornographic movies I heard- (- - - - -) a
 Curt: [X _____
 Carney: [X _____

(II-69) G.76:580

Ethyl: _____
 No:pe. (-----) I don' want that ty:, (0.1) type of a
 Barbara: _____, [X _____
 Jim: _____ [X _____

Alternatively, in cases where the phrasal break has the effect of obtaining the gaze of a recipient, the beginnings of the movements into orientation of several participants may be performed with respect to the phrasal break:

(II-32) GA.8:00.6

Chil: She- she's reaching the p- She's at the point I'm
 Nancy: [X _____
 Helen: [X _____

(II-39) G.103:544

Joe: [X _____
 My mother tol' m e th't- We had a col'd wadder flat
 Pat: [X _____
 Ginny: [X _____

(II-41) G.26:(T)18:45

Beth: [X _____
 Michael- Daniel's fa scinated with elephants.
 Ann: [X _____
 Don: [X _____
 John: [X _____

A special case of this, mentioned earlier, occurs when the phrasal break simultaneously marks the arrival of one recipient's gaze and serves as a signal to a second recipient. Though this process was examined above only with respect to restarts, it can as well occur with pauses:

(II-48) G.26:(T)13:25

Michael: Who knows, 'hh (- ----) numbers n letters (huh),
 Don: [X _____]
 Ann: [X _____]

(II-51) G.76:090

Gordie: Wh't- What is uh: u:h: Mitch got anyway,
 Ethyl: . . . [X _____]
 Barbara: [X _____]

(II-58) G.126:190

Chuck: Uh- (--- ----) Mother where's the salad.
 Deedee: . [X _____]
 Debbie: [X _____]

(II-70) G.33:327

Bessie: F _____, M _____
 Mary: Wh:a: t (0.2) annoys _____ me so is they aiden: (0.3) tell
 Ted: . [X _____]
 [X _____]

(II-71)G.76:135

Gordie: This Moose i h- (0.2) Moose is sure got up some
 Barbara: . . . [X _____ , ,
 Jim: . . [X _____

(II-72) G.82:635

Carney: We have some- (0.2) Southern cantillilies?
 Gary: [X _____
 Pam: [X _____

In addition these procedures might be applied repetitively throughout the turn. For example in the following a first pause has the effect of obtaining one recipient and a second pause obtains the gaze of a second recipient:

(II-59) G.84:226

Curt: How's uh, (-----) Jimmy Linder. (-----)
 Gary: .. [X _____
 Mike:

Curt: He' s- he's on the Usac, (0.1) trail isn'e?
 Gary: [X _____
 Mike: . . . X _____ , , _____

VI. Units on Different Levels of Organization

Procedures for interrupting and resuming the development of turn constructional units have so far been considered only on the level of the sentence. However, units on other levels of organization, such as words, phrases and clauses, are also susceptible to being recognizably interrupted. The application of procedures for constructing interruptions to different levels of organization produces a range of characteristic phenomena such as mid-word hesitations, slight mistakes and minor corrections, which require the replacement of a word or phrase but do not impair the entire sentence.

In the following, units below the level of the sentence are interrupted so that while the recipient's achievement of orientation is marked with a phrasal break, that phrasal break is something less than a restart of the entire sentence:

(II-71) G.76:135

Gordie:	This Moose i _h -	(0.2)	Moose	is sure got up some
Barbara:	. . .	X		

. . . X _____

(II-73) G.12:369

Tony:	It's that much wor	k-	more work fer the undertaker ta
Frank:	X	

(II-74) G.79:626

Curt: Then: one time they had a bunch a . . . [X
 Ross: [X sc congressmen en

(II-75) G.23:155

Ann: Do you hafta change the wadd'er ever [X
 Jere: . . [X y- all the time

(II-76) G.23:244

Pat: Well now that I have short hair I hafta k- set my hair
 Ann: . . [X
 Chil: [X

In the following a phrasal break on a subordinate level of organization is used to request the attention of a hearer:

(II-77) G.26:(T)17:00

Beth: Michael's r- has a mi:lestone to announce he's gotta
 Ann: [M

Interruptions of units on subordinate levels of organization can also be used to mark the arrival in mid-turn of new recipients to the speaker's utterance:

(II-16) G.99:255

Jere: They're gettin- (-----) They're in living in the
 Ann: . . [X
 Pat: [X

(II-47) G.78:115

Sara: X
 .hh That's li'ke- She tells me down there et the corner
 Flora: X
 Ed: _____

Sara: _____
 she couldn' even afford ta buy the: th'b- (0.4)
 Flora: _____
 Ed: . X _____

Sara: _____
 r'en'a'bissel.
 Flora: _____
 Ed: _____

(II-78) G.26:(T)18:15

Don: B
 . . keep grow:ing rou:nd. from the fro:n- back t' the
 Beth: , , X
 Ann: _____

(II-79) G.76:648

Ethyl: . . . G
 Eastern start's the last of this month, an about
 Jim: _____
 Barbara: . . . X
 Gordie: . . . X _____

Ethyl: . . . X
 two weeks later s{t- uh Michigan.
 Jim: . X _____
 Barbara: _____
 Gordie: _____

(II-80) G.11:640

Nancy: _____
 An't w's one of these things where if you if you
 Pat: _____ [X
 Denise: _____
 Patty: _____

(II-81) G.99:481

Ann: _____
 Yeah en:, that was right there next t'th m ya know
 Jere: _____
 Pat: _____ [X

(II-82) G.76:560

Ethyl: B _____
 Ya know she's been ba ck in the hospital. a couple:
 Barbara: _____ [X
 Gordie: _____

Ethyl: _____
 (-----) a couple weeks?:
 Barbara: _____
 Gordie: .. [X _____

(II-83) G.26(T)11:50

Beth: _____
 'hh Well I find that li ke, like my thing was,
 Ann: _____
 John: _____ [X _____

In cases such as these Rule #3 is satisfied by the gaze of the first recipient. Nevertheless, the achievement of orientation by a new recipient provides a display that some recipient has not been attending his entire utterance. Locating only a subordinate element

of his sentence as impaired permits the speaker to mark the arrival of his new recipient without repudiating the gaze he has been receiving from his initial recipient.

The procedures examined in this chapter for negotiating an appropriate state of mutual gaze between speaker and hearer are thus available throughout the turn and are capable of coordinating the gaze of several recipients with the utterance of the speaker.

In this chapter some procedures available to participants in natural conversation for coordinating the separate actions of speaker and hearer in the construction of the turn at talk have been investigated. It has been found that the gaze of both parties is a relevant feature of the turn in face-to-face conversation and that the participants have access to and make use of systematic procedures for achieving appropriate states of mutual gaze. The use of these procedures produces characteristic phenomena in the speaker's utterance, including restarts, pauses and hesitations of various types. These phenomena have usually been attributed to processes internal to the speaker and have been taken to demonstrate incompetence on his part. The present analysis has provided some demonstration that though such

phenomena can reflect difficulty the speaker is having in producing his utterance, they can also function interactively and demonstrate the competence of the speaker to construct sentences that are oriented to appropriately by a recipient.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ADDITION OF NEW SEGMENTS TO UNITS TO COORDINATE THEIR PRODUCTION WITH THE ACTIONS OF A RECIPIENT

I. Introduction

One property of many different types of units found in natural conversation is that the length of the unit to be produced is neither fixed nor specified in advance but rather is determined locally within the turn through a process of interaction between speaker and hearer. The turn at talk itself (as analyzed by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974) provides a good example. A speaker is initially entitled to only one turn-constructural unit. However when the termination of that unit arrives a recipient may choose not to exercise the option provided by Rule #1b.¹ In accordance with Rule #1c the current speaker might then add another turn-constructural unit to his turn. The length of the turn eventually produced is thus an emergent product of a process of interaction between speaker and hearer.

This is also the case for other units produced in conversation such as sentences. For example, with respect to the following data:

Ken: We were in an automobile discussion.
Walter: discussing the psychological motives for
Al: drag racing on the street.

¹Features of the turn-taking system relevant to the points being made here were summarized in section IV.1 of Chapter One. The rule set itself can be found in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:702-706).

Sacks (1966, Lecture VI) notes that though Ken produces a sentence that could be heard as complete, a different sentence is eventually constructed when two other speakers add new sections to Ken's original sentence.²

This chapter will investigate the ability of speakers to coordinate their utterances with the actions of their recipients by adding new sections to the units they are producing. The phenomenon examined in the last chapter, the gaze of the participants toward each other within the turn, will be used to investigate this process. There will therefore be some repetition of examples, though in the present chapter the examples will be examined from a somewhat different perspective.

II. Lengthening Units by Adding Sections to their Ends and Middles

In the following utterances the speaker stops production of a fragment and begins a new sentence just at the point where the gaze of the recipient arrives:

(III-1) G.84:(T)06:30

Gary: He's a policem'n in Bellview'n he:, I guess he's,
Mike: . . . X_____

(III-2) G. 98:690

Ann: I think he:, I think he'even get it wi'the: fir(h)st
Pat: . . . X_____

²Some published analysis of the construction of a single sentence by different speakers, as well as the extendability of sentences past an initial completion point, can be found in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) and Jefferson (1973).

(III-3) G.76:584

Barbara: God that's:;, I don't want that life.
Gordie: [X_____

The last sound in the fragment in all of these examples is prolonged in its pronunciation (that is marked in the transcript by a colon after the sound which has been prolonged). Were these sounds not prolonged the speaker would stop pronunciation of the fragment shortly before the arrival of the speaker's gaze:

Gary: . . . in Bellview'n he [X
Mike: [X

Ann: I think he [X
Pat: [X

Barbara: God that's
Gordie: [X

By elongating the terminal sound in a word they are constructing, the speakers in these examples are able to lengthen that word with the effect that the termination of the fragment occurs precisely when the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker. These examples provide some demonstration that the ability of a speaker to pronounce certain sounds for variable lengths of time might be utilized to coordinate the pro-

duction of units in his utterance with the actions of a recipient.³

In the examples just examined this procedure, adding to the length of a phoneme by prolonging its pronunciation, was used to extend a unit that had come to a point of possible completion past that completion. Its use is not, however, restricted to this position. It can also be employed in the middle of a unit to delay the production of its initial completion point. The following provide examples of such a process:

³The ability of speakers to vary the length of the sounds they are producing has received some study. For example the work of O'Malley, Kloker, and Dara-Abrams (1973), Kloker (1975) and Macdonald (1976) demonstrates that "vowel and sonorant lengthening is an acoustic cue to the phonological phrase structure in spontaneous English speech" (Kloker 1975:5). Macdonald's work (1976) showed that changing the duration of sounds at constituent boundaries could change the perceived meaning of sentences with surface structure ambiguities. The work of Sacks and his colleagues has shown that lengthening sounds in this position, i.e., at the end of a turn-constructional unit, provides one systematic basis for the occurrence of overlap. Thus they note (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:707) that

Variation in the articulation of the projected last part of a projectably last component of a turn's talk, which is in fact a consequential locus of articulatory variation, will expectably produce overlap between a current turn and a next:

B: Well it wasn't me ::

A: ⁴No, but you know who it was.

(III-4) G.34:222

Esther: Wh::a: t (0.2) annoys me is they didn: (0.3) tell us
Amy: .. [X _____

(III-5) G.86:352

Carney: You know tha: t (0.4) first road off'a the bypass.
Phyllis: .. [X _____

Here the prolongation of phonemes in the middle of a word has the effect of delaying the occurrence of the end of the word until the recipient's gaze arrives.

Many different types of phenomena can be added to a unit to increase its length. In the following the glottal stop marking a phrasal break occurs well before the arrival of the recipient's gaze:

(III-6) G. 76:659

Ethyl: Yeah.=Wher-
Barbara: X _____

Here the speaker extends the length of the phrasal break by adding an "uh" and an outbreath to the original cut-off so that the termination of the phrasal break occurs precisely at the moment when the recipient's gaze reaches the speaker:

(III-6) G.76:659

Ethyl: Yeah.=Wher- uh hh Where do they register.
Barbara: X _____

The addition of these phenomena to the turn has the effect of delaying the beginning of a new sentence until the gaze of the recipient has been secured.

The analysis in the last chapter provided examples of a strip of silence (a pause) being added to a unit to delay its production until the gaze of a recipient had been secured.

In the following the speaker uses laughter to extend the length of a word until the recipient's gaze arrives:

(III-7) G.91:512

Betty: That wasn' any fa(hhh)i(h_h)r.
Pam: X__

Note that the addition of a new segment to some particular unit has an effect on the length of some but not all other units as well. The speaker's laughter here increases the length of the word in which the laughter occurs, the utterance containing the word, and the turn in progress. However, in terms of the distinction between utterance and sentence noted in the first chapter (pages 12-14) it does not increase the length of the speaker's sentence, i.e., no new elements such as words or phrases are added to the sentence.

The phenomena examined so far occupy time within an utterance without advancing it toward its completion because they do not contribute to the semantic meaning of the sentence under construction. However, the speaker also has available techniques which make it possible for him to use words with clear semantic meaning to accomplish this same task. For example, the onward progression of the sentence can be held in place by repeating a particular word in it. Though the word being repeated contributes to the semantic meaning of the sentence its repetition holds the sentence in place.

In the following the speaker moves his gaze from one recipient to another over the word "middle". After his gaze reaches his new recipient the word "middle" is repeated. Through this repetition the speaker is able to produce his entire sentence with his gaze on a recipient despite the fact that he moves from one recipient to another during its course:

(III-8) G.23:185

Chil: A
 Yes i'w's beautiful. (1.2) Coo:1, comfert'ble,

Chil: J
 (0.4) middle- middle fifties,

What is at issue in a repeat is not merely the occurrence of the same word twice in succession but the addition of a segment to the turn that is extraneous to the sentence being constructed within the turn. Participants in conversation are able to distinguish between a repeat and the same word occurring twice in succession within a sentence.⁴ In the following while the second "or" is a repeat, the second "is" is not:

(III-9) G.23:394

Pat: All this is is mayonnaise, the sauce. Y'n mayonnaise,
 tinged with milk or s- or, (0.5) or lemon juice.

⁴As was noted in the last chapter (footnote 14, p. 146) Jefferson (1974:187-188) has analyzed how speakers can use such phenomena as hesitations to instruct their hearers about whether two terms occurring adjacent to each other are to be interpreted as succeeding elements of the developing utterance, or whether instead the second term should be heard as a replacement for the first.

In a repeat one of the two occurrences of the word is extraneous to the sense of the utterance and its presence locates a phrasal break.

The speaker thus possesses a variety of techniques for modifying the units he is producing in order to achieve precise coordination with his recipient. The application of such techniques produces characteristic phenomena in the turn, including the elongation of phonemes, pauses, "uh"'s and repeats.

These procedures operate on several different levels of organization. For example coordination with a recipient might be achieved by adding an "uh" to a sentence. However, "uh" is in its own right a unit with a clear phonological structure and might itself be lengthened by the application of procedures appropriate to this level of organization, for example by lengthening the sounds constructing the word. The following provides an example:

(III-10) G.50:(T)06:15

Clacia: B't I: uh, (0.9) Ro:n uh:., Ron's family moved
Dianne: . . 'X_____

An object such as "uh:." demonstrates the operation of the processes being examined on two different levels of organization.

III. The Ability of Such Procedures to Modify the Emerging Structure of the Speaker's Sentence

While the techniques available to the speaker for coordinating his actions with those of his recipient have been found to produce a range of characteristic phenomena in the turn, the application of such techniques has not yet been shown to change the sentence being constructed by the speaker. Analysis will now focus on how the use of such procedures might result in the addition of new elements to the speaker's sentence.

It was seen above that one technique available to the speaker for extending the length of his utterance consisted of repeating a word in that utterance. However, rather than producing exactly the same item twice in succession the speaker has the capacity to change the item in some way when repeating it. For example, a noun phrase can be repeated, but modified, by adding an adjective to it. This change in the item produces not simply a repeat but a correction or clarifi-

cation of the original item.⁵

In the following the speaker loses the gaze of his recipient in mid-utterance. When it has been regained the speaker repeats the noun phrase that was produced while his recipient was disattending him but adds a new adjective to it:

(III-11) GA.4:302

Ralph: Somebuddy said looking at my: , son m,y oldest son,
Chil: _____, , . 'X_____

⁵The organization of repairs in conversation has been extensively investigated by Sacks and his colleagues. They find that speakers have the right to repair problematic components of an utterance in its course and sometimes can be challenged if they fail to do so. Thus Jefferson, examining a sequence in which an item in one speaker's utterance is repaired in the next turn by another speaker, notes that (Jefferson 1973:2):

The recipient shows that he has permitted, and the speaker has not provided, an unsolicited self-correction (or clarification or modification) of the problematic component. The recipient marks the problematic component now, BECAUSE the speaker has not dealt with it, and he did not mark it before because the speaker was expected to deal with it. The very display by the recipient of his having oriented to the speaker may then signal to the prior speaker that he did not sufficiently orient to his recipient.

This is one manifestation of a preference for self rather than other correction which Sacks and his colleagues have found to be implicated in the organization of a range of phenomena in conversation (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks Ms.) In some of the examples to be examined in the present analysis speakers utilize their right to make repairs in mid-utterance to coordinate the production of the utterance with the actions of a recipient.

Once again the speaker adds a segment to the unit he is constructing so that precise coordination between his actions and those of his recipient is maintained. Specifically, by repeating the part of the sentence spoken as his recipient was turning away from him, the speaker succeeds in producing the entire sentence constructed in his turn while his recipient is gazing at him. However the addition of the adjective to the second version of the item locates this version as a clarification rather than a repeat of the first. This process changes the sentence being constructed in the turn. If this segment had not been added the word "oldest" would not have been part of the sentence eventually produced by the speaker.⁶

Other examples of the accomplishment of particular interactive tasks through the addition of segments in the form of clarifications or corrections are provided by the following:

⁶Bolinger (1975:19) notes that a speaker might add a new word to his sentence to coordinate the production of the sentence with the speaker's own actions:

If you are asked what time it is and you know you will say without hesitation, "It's ten-fifteen." But if you have to look at your watch you may say "It's now -- ten-fifteen", inserting a drawled "now" to stall and keep command of the situation.

Goffman (1975:16) provides a similar analysis.

(III-12) G.84: (T)13:25

Curt: M _____, G _____
 I heard Little wz maki, n em, was makin frames'n
 Gary: X _____
 Mike: _____

Curt: _____
 sendin 'm t'California.
 Gary: _____
 Mike: _____

(III-13) G.26: (T)20:30

John: We're lookin at uh houses around he, re. (0.2) in this area.
 Don: . [X] _____

(III-14) G.84: (T)03:45

Mike: C _____, . G _____
 He wz up on the:: (0.1) trailer hh, er up on the
 Curt: _____, ' ' '
 Gary: _____

Mike: _____, . . C _____
 back of iz pickup truck with a, (0.4) with a jack.
 Curt: X _____
 Gary: _____

(III-15) G.84: (T)07:15

Gary: . . . C _____, . M _____
 (D'ya) ever go down t'the S'ndusky track down, the asphalt,
 Curt: _____
 Mike: X _____

In the first example (III-12) the speaker covers a shift in his gaze from one recipient to another by repeating a segment of his utterance. The repeat becomes a clarification, and the sentence being constructed in the turn is changed, when the reference of the pronoun "em" in the first version is made explicit in the second.

The recipient in the second example (III-13) does not achieve orientation until the initial completion point of the speaker's sentence. By adding a new section to the sentence in the form of a clarification the speaker is able to negotiate the occurrence of a state of affairs in which the recipient is attending the sentence eventually constructed during at least part of its production.

Corrections, as well as clarification, can be employed to lengthen an utterance by recycling a section of the speaker's sentence. The speaker in III-14 turns his gaze to a recipient who is not gazing at him and then loses the gaze of his first recipient. At that point the onward development of his sentence is delayed while a correction is produced. At the close of the correction the gaze of a recipient is regained and the onward progression of the speaker's sentence toward its termination is once again set in motion.

In III-15 a section is added to the sentence being constructed in order to provide time for the speaker to move his gaze from a recipient who is not gazing at him to one who is.

The following provides an example of how a speaker might repetitively add segments to his turn in order to negotiate an appropriate state of mutual gaze with his recipients:

(III-16) G.34:05.5

Elsie: See first we were gonna have Teema, Carrie, and Clara,
(0.2) a::nd myself. The four of us. The four children.
But then-uh: I said how is that gonna look.

The recipient toward whom the speaker is gazing near the beginning of her turn disattends her midway through her utterance. Though the gaze of this recipient is regained the speaker quickly shifts her gaze to a different recipient:

(III-16) G.34:05.5

Elsie: See first we were gonna have Teema, Carrie and .E
 Esther: |X
 Bessie: _____

Elsie: _____, .Bessie
 Clara, (0.2) a:nd myself.
 Esther: _____, _____
 Bessie: _____

However that recipient is not gazing at the speaker. Rather than advancing her utterance further the speaker holds it in place with an appositive:

(III-16) G.34:05.5

Elsie: See first we were gonna have Teema, Carrie, and .E
 Esther: |X
 Bessie: _____

Elsie: _____, .B
 Clara, (0.2) a:nd myself. The four of us.
 Esther: _____, , . _____ |
 Bessie: _____ |X

When Bessie finally does reach orientation this segment of the speaker's sentence is recycled yet another time with a second appositive, making clear why the four people being referred to constitute a single group:

(III-16) G.34:05.5

Elsie: _____ .E _____
 See first we were gonna have Teema, Carrie, and
 Esther: X _____
 Bessie:
 Connie:

Elsie: _____ .B _____
 Clara, (0.2) a::nd myself. The four of us.
 Esther: _____ , . . _____
 Bessie: _____ X
 Connie: _____ . X _____

Elsie: _____ .C _____
 The four children.
 Esther: _____
 Bessie: _____
 Connie: _____

Near the end of the second appositive the speaker shifts her gaze to another recipient who has been gazing at her. Only then does she resume the onward development of her utterance:

(III-16) G.34:05.5

Elsie: See first we were gonna have Teema, Carrie, and Clara,
 (0.2) a::nd myself. The four of us. The four children.
 But then-uh: I said how is that gonna look.

The sentence actually produced by the speaker in this turn emerges as the product of a process of interaction between the speaker and her recipients as they mutually construct the turn at talk.

Analysis will now turn to the investigation of examples in which a speaker adds a new section to his sentence without recycling an earlier portion of it.

In the following the speaker obtains both gaze and a response from a first recipient but then, while continuing with the same sentence, moves his gaze to a second recipient:

(III-17) G.26: (T)8:50

John: I gave, I gave u^D_p sm^Doking ci^Dgarett^Des::.
Don: . . . [X_____

Don: =Yea:h,

(0.4)

John: . . . ^{Beth}
l-uh: ^{Beth}one- one week ago t'da:y.

Beth, however, does not direct her gaze to John. The speaker thus finds himself in the position of gazing at a party who is not gazing at him.

Phrasal breaks occur just before and after John's gaze reaches Beth ("l-uh:" and "one-one"). Though these phrasal breaks do not secure the gaze of Beth, another party, Ann, does begin to attend the turn at this point. During the initial sections of John's sentence, and indeed for some time previous to it, Ann has displayed lack of orientation to the conversation, staring to her side with a fixed middle-distance look. However, shortly after the restart Ann abruptly raises her head and moves her gaze to the recipient of the present utterance, Beth:

(III-17) G.26:(T)8:50

John: . . . [X
 1-uh: one-one week ago t'da:y.

Beth:
 Ann: . . . B

Ann's abrupt movement of her gaze occurs in the standard position for a next move to a signal that the gaze of a recipient is being requested, i.e., shortly after a restart. However Ann does not direct her gaze to the speaker but instead to another participant, Beth. John's sentence is projected to come to a possible completion point rather soon after Beth brings her gaze to the turn. "I gave up smoking cigarettes one week ago today" is an adequately complete sentence and such a unit could be projected⁷ at the point Ann brings her gaze to the

⁷Units of other length also could have been projected here. The sentence could have reached completion after "ago" if the speaker had begun this section of it with "a" rather than "one" ("I gave up smoking cigarettes a week ago."). However the idiom begun with "one" projects the inclusion of a specific time reference such as "today" after "ago". The speaker also might have specified the time with a still shorter phrase such as "last week" and, indeed, the cut-off "l-" at the beginning of this section provides some indication that such an alternative was in fact begun but changed (Jefferson 1974:186 provides evidence that participants in conversation do in fact orient to such bits of sound as possible word beginnings). If this is in fact the case the speaker in this example, faced with the task of securing a new recipient's gaze in this section, has gone from a short unit ("last week"), skipped the next longest ("a week ago") and found a longer one ("one week ago today"), providing more time in his sentence for his task to be accomplished.

I am indebted to Gail Jefferson for bringing this progression to my attention.

turn. If the floor were to pass to the speaker's addressed recipient at this point Ann would be positioned to be gazing at the new speaker.⁸

Two different parties, John and Ann, are now gazing at Beth, who is returning the gaze of neither. If these two parties were gazing at each other instead of Beth the conditions specified in one of the rules proposed in the last chapter, Rule 3, would be satisfied. The speaker would be gazing at a gazing recipient. Because of Beth's failure to bring her gaze to him John might now be prepared to seek the gaze of another party. Ann, who has just displayed her orientation to the turn by bringing her gaze to its field of action, is a possible candidate. However, while the task of securing a gazing recipient might lead John to switch his gaze from Beth to Ann no comparable motivation exists for Ann to move her gaze to John, especially since she is not his current addressed recipient.

Less than a syllable after Ann begins to move into orientation John withdraws his gaze from Beth. He then brings it to Ann, reaching her after she has demonstrated her coparticipation in the field of action

⁸This sentence will be examined from a somewhat different perspective in the next chapter. There it will be found that the portion of the sentence produced when John gazes at Beth is designed specifically for Beth and not for Ann and that by the time Ann begins to move this had been displayed in the utterance in a number of different ways. Ann is provided with resources permitting her to locate not only that she is not the current addressed recipient of the utterance but also who that addressed recipient is and this may also be relevant to her choice of a particular party to gaze at.

constructed through his turn by gazing at Beth, but before the turn has reached its next projected completion. Note that the time required to reach this completion point has been extended through the elongation of a sound within "t'da:y."

John: Beth
 1-uh: { one- one week ago t'da:y. } Ann
 Beth:
 Ann: Beth

Though John is now gazing at Ann rather than Beth he is still gazing at a recipient who is not gazing at him. His move has, however, made it relevant for Ann to bring her gaze to him. As Ann is the party being gazed at by the speaker, Rule #3 now applies to her rather than Beth.

John's shift in gaze thus permits Ann to recognize that she should bring her gaze to him. However no time is left within the turn for Ann to perform this action. As indicated not only by its grammatical structure but also by its falling terminal intonation (indicated in the transcript by a period) John's utterance has come to a recognizable completion.

If the length of the turn could be extended Ann might have the time to move her gaze from Beth to John. However, providing the turn with such time for maneuvering requires that the sentence being constructed through it be extended past the completion point presently proposed for it.

Ann is given time to bring her gaze to John through the addition of the word 'actually' to his sentence:

In the following a speaker again adds an adverb to his sentence to provide time for a recipient to achieve orientation:

(III-19) G.33:025

Fred: How are you? today?

Fannie: . . . X

In the examples considered until this point only a single turn has been at issue. However, the speaker might repetitively make use of his ability to modify his emerging utterance to negotiate a state of mutual focus with his recipients over several turns at talk. The following provides an example of such a process:

(III-20) G.23:202

Ann: The week before last it was cold in Washington. All week.

Chil: =Was it?

Ann: =It was really cold en I'm thinking, 'h I was really thinking that summer was: finished,

When the speaker brings her eyes to her first intended recipient, Chil, she finds that he has not begun to gaze at her. The speaker covers a move to a different recipient by adding the words "All week." to her sentence:

(III-20) G.23:202

Ann: The week before last it was cold in Wash. ^{. . . . C} ington.

Chil: |

Jere: . . . X

Ann: . . . J _____
All w^eek.

Chil: _____

Jere: _____

At that point Chil quickly constructs a new turn to Ann's:

(III-20) G.23:202

Ann: The week before last it was cold in Washington. All week.
Chil: =Was it?

Ann then begins to address a new utterance to Chil, but he does not move into orientation until after she has begun to gaze at him:

(III-20) G.23:202

Ann: It was really ^{.C}_____g,
Chil: cold en I'm thinkin' _____X
Jere:

It was seen in the preceding chapter that in such a situation a restart is frequently produced. Here the speaker covers a move to a recipient who has been gazing at her by recycling the last clause of her sentence, while changing its tense and adding an adverb to it:

(III-20) G.23:202

Ann: It was really ^{.C}_____,^J
Chil: cold en I'm thinkin' g, 'h I was reall'y _____X
Jere:

Ann: _____
Chil: thinking
Jere: _____

As soon as this segment is complete Ann returns her gaze to Chil:

(III-20) G.23:202

Ann: It was really ^C_____,^J
Chil: cold en I'm thinkin' g, 'h I was reall'y _____X
Jere:

Ann: _____^C
 thinking that summ^{er} was: finished,
 Chil: _____
 Jere: _____

This sequence provides some demonstration of how a speaker might regularly employ the ability to modify an emerging utterance so as to accomplish particular tasks posed in the construction of the turn at talk.

Analysis to this point has been restricted to the addition of segments to a sentence. However, units added to a turn to accomplish particular interactive tasks might consist of whole sentences. In the following Fred and Alice have been admiring a coat Elaine received from her husband as a Christmas present. Fred says "I love these cute dolls when they're well dressed." The following turn then occurs:

(III-21) GA.4:018

Alice: _____^F
 A::h bedder yet, (0.7) They're well ^l cared for.=
 Fred:

 Alice: _____
 =That's what chu mean. Right?
 Fred: _____
 Mm Mmnnhmmmm.

The first section of Alice's utterance, "A::h bedder yet", projects that the next part of the utterance will provide an alternative to what Fred has just said. However when Alice's gaze reaches Fred he is not gazing

at her but instead looking toward a glass that he is bringing to his lips.⁹ Despite Alice's talk Fred does not interrupt this action and when the first completion of Alice's turn arrives, has the glass to his

⁹Fred's gaze cannot be clearly seen prior to this point because of both movement of the camera and the fact that Alice's head is briefly in front of his face. During the pause he moves his head in Alice's direction but it cannot be clearly established if he is gazing at her or beyond her. After holding this position briefly he moves toward his drink shortly before Alice resumes her utterance.

The larger sequence in which this exchange is located may be relevant to Fred's failure to gaze at Alice here:

(III-21) GA.4:018

Elaine: W'listen. Joe got me this for Christmas
 Alice: [so you c-
 Is n't that pretty?
 Fred: It's gor:geous.
 Elaine: [So you can tha:nk him.
 (0.2)
 Fred: It's gorgeous.
 Elaine: [Huh huh huh huh [huh huh 'h yeah it's nice and wa:rm.
 Alice: [Mm hm. [Do
 you think he'll get me:one?huh huh
 Elaine: [Well he mi:ght,
 Fred: I always love these cute dolls when they're well dressed.
 (0.2)
 Alice: A::h bedder yet, (0.7) They're well cared for.=That's
 what chu mean.=Righ t?
 Fred: [Mm Mmm hmm.

Elaine's husband has been drinking and noticeably flirting with some of the other women present. After the coat is admired Elaine states that it was a present from her husband. In his next utterance, "It's gorgeous", Fred does not deal with the husband. In her next utterance, "Do you think he'll get me one?" Alice does, though perhaps not in the way Elaine would like. In his next utterance, "I always love these cute dolls when they're well dressed", Fred again avoids the husband. The utterance of Alice being examined here again introduces the husband, an issue Fred has twice passed the opportunity to treat as a topic, and could be heard as claiming that Fred did not understand the import of Elaine's original statement. (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (MS.:23) note that "y'mean" is frequently employed to modulate a correction of something some other party has said.) Fred's lack of gaze here may thus in fact be a display of reluctance to coparticipate in Alice's turn.

lips. Alice adds another sentence to her turn, explicitly locating Fred as its addressee and noting the relevance of what she has just said for what was said in his turn. At the end of this unit the glass has just left Fred's lips. Alice then adds a first pair part explicitly requesting an answer from Fred to her turn.¹⁰

Though now operating at the level of the sentence¹¹ the procedures employed by speakers in these examples to achieve coordination with their recipients are structurally analogous to those examined earlier for synchronizing a phrasal break with the arrival of a recipient's gaze. Specifically, despite differences in levels of organization, the possibility might emerge that the projected termination of a unit being constructed by the speaker will not occur at the point required for the achievement of appropriate coordination with a recipient:

(III-16) G.76:659

Ethyl: Yeah.=wher-
Barbara: X

¹⁰ As was noted in Chapter One (pp.51-52) in their analysis of the turn-taking system Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:718) explicitly note that tag questions, such as the present "Right?", could be employed by speakers exercising Rule #1c after another party failed to exercise rule #1b to transfer the turn to that party.

¹¹ On yet another level of organization Jefferson (1972) in her analysis of 'side sequences' has examined how additional turns might be inserted into a sequence of turns.

(III-3) G.76:584

Barbara: God that's:
Gordie: . . . X

(III-17) G.26:(T)8:50

John: one- one week ag o t'da:y
Ann: . . . {B_____

Though units on different levels of organization are at issue-- in these examples fragments, words and sentences--in all cases the speaker has the ability to add a new section to the unit so that a new termination point, better suited to the immediate tasks posed in the interaction, is located:

(III-6) G.76:659

Ethyl: Yeah.=Wher- uh_hh Where do they register.
Barbara: . . . {X_____

(III-3) G. 76:584

Barbara: God that's: .:, I don't want that life.
Gordie: {X_____

(III-17) G.26:(T)8:50

John: one- one week ag o t'da:y. acshi_lly,
Ann: . . . {B_____, . . . {J_____

Procedures with much the same structure thus operate on many different levels of organization and enable the speaker to coordinate his actions with those of his recipient.

However, when these procedures are applied at the level of the sentence a different sentence than that originally projected by the speaker is constructed. Insofar as this is true the procedures utilized by speakers in conversation to construct sentences are, at least in

part, interactive procedures.

IV. The Use of Repairs to Lengthen a Unit

It has been argued that the contingencies of the interaction producing a particular turn at talk may require changes in the length of the units being produced through the turn. Speakers have been found to be able to use many different types of phenomena to lengthen the units they are producing. Despite the diversity of different types of units examined, many of them, such as repeats, pauses, "uh"'s, corrections and clarifications, constitute instances of a single class of phenomena which Sacks and his colleagues have investigated as repairs. Some properties of this class of phenomena which might make it useful for the tasks being investigated here will be briefly considered.

First, repairs are not limited to cases where some mistake or error has occurred. Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (Ms.:20) note that:

The term "correction" commonly is understood to refer to the replacement of an "error" or "mistake" by what is correct. The phenomena we are addressing, however, are neither tied to error nor limited to replacement. (i) It is a notable fact the occurrence or distribution of repair/correction is not well-ordered by reference to the occurrence of error. Repair/correction is found where there is no visible (or hearable) error, mistake, or fault; and visible/hearable error does not necessarily yield the occurrence of repair/correction. (ii) There are occurrences, clearly in the domain we are concerned with, which do not involve the replacement of one item by another (For example, those in which an item is not available to a speaker when due, as in a word search). Accordingly, we will refer to "repair" rather than "correction" (and to that which is repaired as the "repairable" or the "trouble source").

If repairs could only occur after some "error" had been produced they might not be useable for the tasks being investigated here. For example (as utterance III-11 shows) a recipient can turn away in mid-turn. Were the production of repairs restricted a speaker could not use one immediately in such a situation unless he happened to have made a recognizable "mistake" just before the recipient's gaze was lost. The lack of such restriction¹² means that repairs are available to the speaker anywhere in the turn and thus can be employed whenever useful.

Second, the techniques available for signalling repair provide a range of materials that can be added to an utterance and are also relevant to the process, examined in the last chapter, of requesting a recipient's gaze. Thus Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (Ibid.:7) note that:

Self-initiations within same turn (as contains the trouble source) use a variety of non-lexical speech perturbations, e.g., cutoffs, sound stretches, "uh"'s, etc., to signal the possibility of repair initiation immediately following.

Many of these phenomena are not only units which can be added to an utterance to lengthen it, but also phrasal breaks with which tasks such as requesting the gaze of a hearer can be accomplished. Further, as Sacks has noted (for example in his lecture of 10/11/71, p. 11) repair initiations, such as the beginning of a word search, may in fact invite reci-

¹² Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (Ibid.:19) note that same-turn self-initiation/self-repair can, and overwhelmingly does, combine the operations of locating the repairable and doing a candidate repair.

ipients to help the speaker and routinely recipients do try to do so. Thus, irrespective of its function in requesting a recipient's gaze, repair initiators may request the recipient's collaboration in other ways and may locate the talk as something they should have been attending in special ways.

Third, repairs can operate on both items not yet produced and items that have already been produced. Repairs on items not yet produced provide with a single structure means for both requesting gaze and adding sections to the speaker's utterance until gaze has been obtained. Consider the following:

(III-21) G. 50(T):04:00

Dianne: He pu:t uhm, (--- ----) Tch! Put crab meat on th'bo::dum.
Clacia: [x _____]

Here the repair initiators provide phrasal breaks to request a hearer's gaze; the pause following them provides time for the recipient to answer, and the retrieval of the item being sought, marked with a 'Tch!', warrants the speaker's continuing with her utterance.

Repairs on items already produced, corrections, clarifications and restarts for example, permit the speaker to add length to his turn by recycling a portion of his utterance. Both types of processes may occur in a way relevant to the analysis being developed here in a single repair. Utterances III-1, III-2 and III-3 provided some demonstration that a speaker might delay the beginning of a restart until the recipient's gaze had been secured by prolonging his pronunciation of the last sounds in the restart. Such lengthening can be heard as a repair ini-

tiation signalling and preparing for the upcoming restart.

Utterance III-11 provides another example of how such processes might be used together in a way relevant to the present analysis:

(III-11) GA. 4:302

Ralph: Somebuddy said looking at my:, son m^y oldest son,
Chil: _____, , .^lx_____

Immediately after Chil's gaze is lost, Ralph elongates a word and produces a marked change in intonation. Such actions may be heard as displaying that the speaker is having difficulty in producing the next item in his utterance. In part because of the display of trouble they provide, these repair initiators function to request the gaze of a hearer. After Chil's gaze is regained, Ralph recycles the section of his utterance produced when Chil was not gazing by performing a repair upon the item his request for Chil's gaze has located as problematic. Thus in this example an appropriate state of mutual gaze between speaker and hearer is negotiated through the integrated use of both a display of trouble in an item yet to be produced and a repair of that item after its production.

Fourth, repairs provide an account for the actions the speaker is performing. For example the phrasal breaks, pause and retrieval in utterance III-22 display that the speaker is involved in a word search.¹³

¹³ Thus Jefferson (1974:194) notes that a word search involves that a pause-marker is projected in advance of arrival of the problem, and conveys, e.g. 'I am thinking about how to put it.' Subsequently a term is produced which can be heard as a solution to the problem of how to put it.

The speaker's animation of her face is also implicated in the displayed word search. While producing the pause the speaker turns away and makes a face that is recognized in our culture as demonstrating that she is searching for the next word in her utterance. Repairs that recycle a portion of the utterance already produced (for example utterance III-11) generally use the repeated item to mark some change in the initial version of it, thus displaying that a correction or clarification is being done.

In the present analysis phenomena such as phrasal breaks have been argued to be produced, in some circumstances, with reference to the gaze of a recipient. The account provided by the process of repair, for example that the speaker in utterance III-22 is engaged in a word search, does not, however, include the gaze of a recipient. The question might therefore be asked why, if the gaze of the recipient is relevant to the production of some repairs, it is not officially recognized in those instances.

Goffman's analysis of the phenomenon he refers to as 'alienation from interaction' provides one possible approach to this issue. He notes (1967:134) that a fundamental requirement for conversation is "the spontaneous involvement of the participants in an official focus of attention." Deviations from or offenses against such involvement cause special problems:

The witnessing of an offense against involvement obligations, as against other ceremonial obligations, causes the witness to turn his attention from the conversation at hand to the offense that has occurred during it. If the individual feels responsible for

the offense that has occurred, he is likely to be led to feel shamefully self-conscious. If others seem responsible for the offense, then he is likely to be led to feel indignantly other-conscious in regard to them. But to be self-conscious or other-conscious is in itself an offense against involvement obligations. The mere witnessing of an involvement offense, let alone its punishment, can cause a crime against the interaction, the victim of the first crime himself being made a criminal. (Ibid.:125-126)¹⁴

Using a repair to secure the gaze of a nongazing recipient avoids focusing official attention on that party's lack of engagement in the turn.

As noted by Goffman (1953:34):

(I)n conversational order, even more than in other social orders, the problem is to employ a sanction which will not destroy by its mere enactment the order which it is designed to maintain.

Repairs provide one solution to this problem for the phenomena being examined here.

V. An Example of the Ability of Participants to Negotiate the Length and Meaning of Their Non-verbal Units

Until this point analysis of the ability of participants in conversation to modify the length and negotiate the meaning of the units they are in the process of constructing has been restricted to vocal

¹⁴Goffman's analysis may also be relevant to some aspects of the organization of the participants' gaze which were examined in the last chapter. For example Rule #3, as well as subordinate processes that follow from it such as the preferred order for sequencing of the participants' gaze at turn beginning, have the effect of organizing gaze so that a speaker should not witness a recipient's disattention.

units. However participants might have the ability to modify their non-vocal units in much the same way that they modify their vocal units.

For clarity investigation of such a possibility will begin by examining a type of action constructed entirely from nonvocal elements.

A very simple example of a task requiring for its accomplishment the coordinated nonvocal action of two participants occurs when one person lights another's cigarette. The cigarette held by one party and the match held by the other must be brought to the same place at the same moment in time.

An actual example of the performance of this task, recorded on videotape (G.91:055, example III-23) will now be examined.

Pam, finding herself with a cigarette but no matches, asks Betty for a light. Betty opens her purse and takes out a lighter. However, while Betty is doing this, one of Pam's children demands her attention and Pam turns to him. Thus when Betty finally produces her lighter, she finds that the person who requested it is engaged elsewhere. She nevertheless brings her lighter forward; but when it reaches the place where her partner's cigarette should be, it meets empty air. A failure to achieve coordinated action thus seems to have occurred.

However, the participants have the capacity to modify their emerging action so that precise collaborative action can nevertheless still be achieved. When Betty, in the course of bringing the lighter to Pam, discovers that she will not be met by Pam's cigarette, she strikes the lighter awkwardly and it fails to light. She then brings the lighter back in front of her and attentively fiddles with the flint

in a displayed attempt to fix it.

Pam terminates the exchange with her child and begins to turn back toward Betty. Immediately after this happens Betty stops working on the lighter and brings it back to Pam. The broken lighter thus suddenly becomes fixed just as Pam begins to return her attention to Betty. The lighter lights perfectly on Betty's first attempt, just before Pam's cigarette reaches it.

A rough diagram might make this process easier to visualize:

(III-23) G. 91:055

<u>Pam:</u>	<u>Betty</u>
Request for light	Action of bringing lighter to cigarette
Turns away to child	Locates lighter as defective
	Brings lighter for repair
Begins to turn toward Betty	Repair is located as complete: Begins to bring lighter back to Pam
	Lights lighter
Cigarette reaches lighter	

Collaborative action is here achieved through modifications in nonvocal units that are structurally equivalent to the modifications in vocal units considered earlier in this chapter. First a segment is added to the action of bringing the lighter to the cigarette so that precise coordination between this act and the reciprocal act of a co-participant, bringing the cigarette to the lighter, can be achieved.

Second, this added segment is displayed as added for reasons located within the original action; i.e., that the original action was impaired and required repair (that the initially offered light would not have worked and needed to be retracted in order to get it to work). It can be noted that this procedure, display of necessity of repair, is a version of one of the major reasons employed to warrant the addition of segments to vocal actions.

VI. Turn Beginning II: Re-examination of the Process of Negotiating a State of Mutual Focus at Turn Beginning

In this chapter two resources available to participants in conversation for the achievement of coordinated action have been examined: 1) the ability of participants to modify the length of the units they are constructing; 2) participants' ability to modify the emerging meaning of these units. The last section provided some demonstration that the ability of participants to modify units in this fashion is not restricted to vocal units but extends also to non-vocal units.

Competence of this type would seem relevant to the task examined in Chapter Two, the achievement of a state of mutual focus at turn beginning. Specifically it was found that the accomplishment of this task was negotiated through a process of interaction that included both vocal and non-vocal elements. Several different ways in which the ability to modify vocal and non-vocal units might extend the range of procedures available to participants for the negotiation of a state of mutual

gaze will now be examined. Analysis will focus first on the ability of the speaker to modify the state of his gaze as well as its movement toward a recipient. Then ways in which such modification might be coupled with additions to the speaker's utterance and changes in his sentence will be examined.

In the following the speaker gazes at a recipient who is not gazing at him. Despite this a turn is constructed in which the preferred order for the sequencing of the participant's gaze, first hearer and then speaker, occurs. As the recipient begins to move toward the speaker, the speaker withdraws his glance, returning it only after the recipient's gaze has been secured.

(III-24) G.76:659

Jim: _____, , X _____
 They'd think- (-----) Barber waz a gy'm up there.
 Gordie: [x _____

Here the speaker has actually gazed at his recipient before his recipient has begun to gaze at him. However the speaker is nevertheless able to order his gaze relative to his recipient's in a pattern that argues that the preferred sequence of gaze direction has in fact occurred. Specifically when the recipient's eyes reach the speaker he finds that he is not yet being looked at. Then, when the speaker's eyes return to his recipient, he finds that he is already being gazed at.

Another example of such a process is provided by the following:

(III-25) G.11:225

Pat: _____ / / / / / {X
 Diju wan a dr:in k? Do yo'u wanna refill on your drink?
 Denise: {X
 Patty: X _____

Here the sentence being spoken while the recipients' gaze is arriving is recycled as a clarification. Note however that no restart occurs. The original sentence is brought to an appropriate and recognizable termination. The absence of a phrasal break is consistent with the possibility that by actively withdrawing her gaze from her approaching recipients the speaker avoids displaying that nongazing recipients have been gazed at and instead argues that the preferred sequencing of gaze direction occurs.


In the examples just considered the speakers actually gaze at nongazing recipients. A speaker might, however, avoid this happening by modifying the movement of his gaze toward the recipient so that it does not in fact reach him. In the following the speaker starts to move her eyes toward her recipient but finds that she is not being attended. The projected look is transformed into a brief glance at the passing scene. Then the speaker requests her recipient's gaze with a restart while lowering her head and eyes as part of the motion of bringing her cigarette to an ashtray:

(III-10) G. 50(T):06:15

Clacia: / / / / /
 B't I: uh, (-----) Ro:n uh: , Ron's family moved
 Dianne: {X _____

A speaker might also manage to look at a recipient without officially constructing a glance. The following provides an example. As the speaker begins her turn she rubs her eye with her finger looking toward her recipient from behind it as she does so. After her recipient reaches orientation she drops her hand, turns toward her and produces a new coherent sentence.

(III-26) G.50(T)01:15

Clacia:  . . X
 Dianne: But we wen'tuh George town evry-(-l-) Y'know evry night
 lX

Clacia: we'd, get out'n we always went t'Georgetown inna ca:b
 which wz (a treat).

So far analysis has been restricted to the speaker's orientation toward a single recipient. The following provides an example of how a speaker might both modify her non-vocal action and construct a variety of vocal actions directed to different recipients in order to negotiate an appropriate state of mutual gaze at turn beginning.

The speaker, beginning to construct an utterance, starts to bring her gaze to its recipient. However her chosen recipient does not move into orientation toward her. Just as her eyes reach this recipient she pulls them away from him.

(III-27) G.78:150

Kate: X, ,
You know Don Mas'ters

Ned:

Though the speaker has avoided gazing at a non-gazing recipient the problem of securing the gaze of her recipient remains. The speaker in fact produces a summons at this point; but it is officially directed to someone other than the recipient she had just turned away from. As she begins to produce this utterance the speaker is taking a kleenex from her purse to give to her son who is eating a dripping ice cream bar. When she moves her eyes away from her first proposed recipient she moves them toward her son and summons his attention with the word "Here!"

(III-27) G.78:150

Kate: N, , . Son
You know Don Mas'ters=Here!

Ned:

Officially the summons is directed to someone other than the speaker's first proposed recipient. However it was seen in the preceding chapter that a marked break in the flow of an utterance may constitute a general signal that the services of a hearer are required. The present summons in fact secures the gaze of both the speaker's son and the original proposed recipient of her turn:

(III-27) G.78:150

Kate: N, , . Son
You know Don Mas'ters=Here!

Ned:

Son:

. . . . X
. X

The speaker is thus able to utilize this summons to secure the gaze of her original recipient while simultaneously arguing that in fact the summons is not directed to him but to someone else. Several purposes are served by such a structure of action. First, no problem in the state of mutual gaze between the speaker and her first proposed recipient is officially recognized. Thus focus does not shift from what the speaker was saying to her recipient's lack of attention to that talk. Second, mothers are entitled to perform certain actions to their children that they would not be permitted to perform to other adults. With this summons the speaker chastizes her son for not being attentive to her and taking the kleenex sooner. She is thus able to complain about a co-participant's lack of attentiveness without officially lodging the complaint against the party whose failure to pay attention to her caused her to move to her son in the first place.

The subsequent course of the utterance provides some evidence that the speaker is in fact oriented to the possibility that her summons will secure the gaze not only of her son but also of her first proposed recipient. Specifically immediately after the summons the speaker returns to the onward development of her original sentence:

(III-27) G.78:150

Kate: N, , . . . Son
Ned:	You know Don Mas [ters=Her [e! pi:che d. hor:seshoers a week
Son: X

When the speaker's summons obtains the gaze of her original recipient, the possibility emerges that the turn can after all be constructed so that the speaker's gaze reaches her recipient only after her recipient has begun to gaze at her. After her recipient begins to move into orientation toward her, the speaker starts to shift her gaze to him:

(III-27) G.78:150

Kate: N, , . . . Son N
 You know Don Mas [ters=Her [e] pi:che d. hor:seshoe [s a week
 Ned: . . . X

Kate: _____
 er so ago with Chuck?
 Ned: _____

When the speaker's eyes reach her recipient she finds that she is already being gazed at by him. However, as we have seen, such a state of affairs is in fact the achieved product of rather careful work on her part. First, she has avoided looking at a recipient who was not looking at her by transforming the beginning of a look toward him into a look toward her son. She then added an explicit summons to her turn, also apparently addressed to her son. Only after this summons has obtained her original recipient's gaze does she return her gaze to him. These actions would not have been possible if the speaker did not possess the ability to modify her emerging vocal and non-vocal action.

In the example just considered the speaker eventually obtained the gaze of her original addressee. In the following the speaker moves to a different addressee. This movement makes necessary the modification

of the sentence she is in the process of constructing.

(III-28) G.13:14.2

Pam: C _____ , . . G _____
 Hey what was: (0.8) yer [brother's: (-) girlfriend's name.
 Carney: ' , ' , ' , ' ,
 Gary: X _____

It was seen in the last chapter that the gaze of a speaker locates the party being gazed at as an intended recipient of the speaker. Pam's gaze at the beginning of this utterance locates Carney as its first intended recipient. However Carney's son Ryan is also requesting her attention, yelling that their dog Maxwell is missing:

(III-28) G.13:14.2

Ryan: Wher'd Ma- Where's Maxwell.
 Carney: { Smoking grass.
 Pam: { .hhh
 Pam: Hey what was: (0.8) yer brother's: (0.2) girlfriend's name.
 Carney: { Where is Maxwell.

Just as Pam begins her sentence Carney turns away from her and scans the yard, apparently looking for the dog. Pam produces a phrasal break by stretching one of the sounds she is pronouncing ("was:") and entering a pause. After the pause is entered she continues to gaze at Carney for a brief period of time but Carney continues to scan the yard. Pam then switches her gaze from Carney to Gary. At just about the same time Pam begins her move to Gary, Carney starts to move her head back toward Pam. Carney's head movement continues without interruption rapidly past Pam and terminates over her other shoulder where she scans the yard in that direction:

(III-28) G.13:14.2

Pam: _____
 Hey what was: (---- [' ' '] ye^G r^G br other's: (--)

Carney: , , , , , , , , , ,

Gary: X

Pam: girlfriend's name.
 Carney: _____
 Gary: _____

If Carney's move back to Pam were an answer to Pam's summons¹⁴, by the time Carney's gaze reaches Pam it is clear through Pam's gaze toward Gary that she has been abandoned as Pam's addressee. Note that Carney's actions display not that she is being inattentive to Pam but rather that she is engaged in other business.

When Pam switches her gaze from Carney to Gary she is required to change the sentence she is in the process of constructing. The party being asked about in the sentence is located through a chain of identifications beginning with her immediate recipient: "yer brother's: girlfriend's name." Because the addressee of the utterance is one element

¹⁴Unlike some of the earlier data such as utterance III-10 where a participant could be clearly seen beginning a movement toward the speaker but then changing it, Carney's movement here provides no evidence that it has been changed in its course. The earlier analysis suggests that a movement being changed in its course might be done without any noticeable alteration in it. However, in the absence of stronger evidence than is found here, I do not want to claim that this is happening in this example. It may well be that Carney's movement from its inception is oriented not to Pam but to the search for the dog, in which case Pam's simultaneous move to a different recipient avoids putting her in the position of looking at an addressed and requested recipient's gaze sweep right past her.

in the chain, changing recipients (unless both recipients are siblings, which is not the case here) requires that the chain itself be altered if the description of the person being asked about is to be maintained. If this portion of the sentence had been addressed to Carney a different reference would have been required to specify the same referent. Whatever that term might have been Pam now transforms it to "yer brother's" as she turns to Gary.

Pam's sound prolongation and pause before the production of "yer brother's" mark a word search. The speaker herself thus displays in her utterance that special attention has been given to the choice of the term produced after the pause. This raises the possibility of other processes¹⁵ that might be implicated in Pam's switch from Carney to Gary. It may be that Pam has not only lost the girlfriend's name, but now finds that she hasn't got Gary's brother's name either,¹⁶ and in order to get him identified to Carney, would have to add another layer, "Gary's brother's girlfriend's name." By turning to Gary she turns to another

¹⁵I am indebted to Gail Jefferson for bringing to my attention many phenomena that I did not initially perceive to be operative in this and many other utterances examined in both this and the last chapter.

¹⁶Goodenough (personal communication) has suggested that one reason why repairs may be utilized so extensively by speakers to coordinate their utterances with the gaze of their recipients is that a speaker who finds that he lacks proper orientation from a hearer may become distracted and lose the train of his utterance, thus generating a repair.

source of information to whom the identification can be more simply done.

This example provides some demonstration of how many of the processes investigated in both this chapter and the last one might converge in the production of a single utterance.

In this chapter the ability of participants in conversation to add new sections to units they were in the process of constructing has been investigated. It was found that participants had the ability to do this to units on many different levels of organization. Specific phenomena examined included the lengthening of sound articulation within a phoneme, the addition of phrasal breaks of various types to an utterance, the addition of new words and phrases to a sentence, the addition of sentences to a turn, and finally the addition of new sections to the non-vocal actions of the participants. The ability to add new sections to a unit was found to facilitate coordination of the speaker's actions, including his utterance, with the actions of a recipient, and to be useful in the accomplishment of various tasks posed in the construction of the turn at talk. Some of the reasons displayed by a participant for the addition of a new segment to a unit were also examined. Particular attention was paid to repairs, a class of actions utilized quite frequently to provide and account for the addition of sections to a unit. Frequently the reason displayed for the repair does not include some of the interactive tasks facilitated by the lengthening of a unit. Some ways in which the absence of focus on this process might be functional

were considered. Finally, the procedures examined in this chapter were found to provide further resources for the accomplishment of the task examined in the last chapter, the negotiation of appropriate gaze between speaker and hearer at turn beginning. In so far as both the length and the meaning of units such as the utterance are capable of such systematic modification it might be appropriate to say that they are not produced by the actions of either party alone but rather emerge through a process of interaction between speaker and hearer as they mutually construct the turn at talk.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF RECIPIENTS

I. The Defective Memories of Participants in Conversation

In the midst of describing some event speakers regularly forget or become unsure of some detail of that event and display their forgetfulness to their recipients. The following provide some examples. Brackets mark the portion of the utterance in which uncertainty is displayed.

(IV-1) G.86:490

Mike: I was watching Johnny Carson one night en there was a guy by the na- [What was that guy's name.=Blake?]

(IV-2) G.86:117

Carney: We hadda Pomerainian in the front yard. (0.4)
[°Was(n) it a pom- Pomerainian?]

(IV-3) G.85:610

Pam: He let my sister go! She was: (0.6) cited for,
[what was it=improper:, improper starting? er, or something,]

Carney: He let her go?

Pam: A:n she:- s:aid that it wasn't her fault when she was down there on- [What was this thing about when Sherry was up before Cooper, That- (charge)]

(IV-4) G.99:380

Pat: They jus s:table it.=An the earring is in en you leave it in. (0.4) [fer:, (0.6) fer:, (0.4) six weeks or something?]

(IV-5) G.99:385

Pat: Jere had ta help me. I gotta twist it. They told her to twist it completely around like six ti:mes, (0.8) [three times a day or something?]

(IV-6) G. 75:290

Barbara: Gordie brought some Orange Crush at Rink's this morning. [Six?:fer what? (1.0) Six fer fifty nine?]

(IV-7) G.126:330

Debbie: We went t- I went ta bed really early.=Paul left like about [what.=Eleven thirdy?]

(IV-8) G.75:260

Barbara: 'hh I sat down after you guys left, jus got goin good, This friend a mine comes over. [What'd she sit.=Almos two hours?]

(IV-9) G.75:187

Bea: I've got a daughter:, en s:on in law that's won [what.=Seven?]

(IV-10) G.86:626

Pam: Well I think what's funny is when [he was in gra:de school.=wa'n: it? En y- (0.2) you were up playing poker with the other: liddle kids?] (0.6) En, these kids: wouldn' have their lunch cuz Curt's: (0.7) gettin their lunch money from em,

(IV-11) G.75:380

Judy: Oh:: heavens I've been off, (0.3) [what. three months? now?]

In all of these cases the speaker displays uncertainty about some detail of the event he is describing. Such uncertainty might seem to result from the speaker alone and to provide a demonstration of the incompetent operation of his mind.

In opposition to such a view it will be argued here, first,

that such displays of uncertainty are not the products of an isolated speaker but rather are emergent features of the interaction between speaker and hearer and, second, that such displays, rather than providing evidence for the speaker's incompetence, provide a strong demonstration of his competence in the performance of the tasks in which he is engaged.

First, some consideration will be given to how displays of uncertainty are recognized and constructed.

II. The Construction of Displays of Uncertainty

To mark displays of uncertainty in the above utterances I have to some extent relied on my intuitions as a speaker of English. However some evidence that the participants themselves interpret these utterances in this fashion is provided by the next moves to them. After the production of such a display recipients regularly provide a vocal or nonvocal verification¹ of the item located as problematic. For example:

(IV-2) G.86:117

Carney: We hadda Pomerainian in the front yard. (0.4)
 ²Was(n) it a pom- Pomerainian?
 (0.8)
Gary: Yuh.

¹While the accuracy of the problematic item may be challenged (an example is provided on p. 260) it is most frequently verified. Some possible reasons for this will be discussed later in this chapter.

(IV-7) G. 126:330

Debbie: We went t- I went ta bed really early.=Paul left like
about what.=Eleven thirty?

(

Paul: ((Head nod signifying yes))

The displays of uncertainty thus constitute recognizable (primarily and relevantly to participants who utilize such recognition to construct an appropriate next move, but also to analysts) first moves in a two move sequence. For convenience the first move in this sequence will be referred to as a Request for Verification and the second move will be referred to as an Answer to that request. The sequence itself constitutes a particular type of adjacency pair.²

Inspecting the data it can be seen that a number of different syntactical devices are available to the speaker to signal uncertainty about what he is saying. First, he might begin the portion of his utterance being marked as uncertain with a wh-question:

(IV-1) G.86:490

Mike: What was that guy's name.

²Some properties of adjacency pairs were briefly discussed in Chapter One (pp. 50-51). For further analysis of their organization see Schegloff and Sacks (1973). For the present it is sufficient to note **that many of the techniques** employed to construct requests for verification are found in many other types of first pair parts and that as Schegloff and Sacks (Ibid.:296) note

Whenever one party to a conversation is specifically concerned with the close order sequential implicativeness of an utterance they have a chance to produce, the use of a first pair part is a way they have of methodically providing for such implicativeness.

Second, he can place a wh-question in 'tag position' after the item being marked as uncertain:

(IV-10) G.75:290

Pam: Well I think what's funny is when he was in grade
school.=wa'n: it?

Third, he can pronounce the uncertain item, or a pro-term for it, with rising intonation:

(IV-6) G. 75:290

Barbara: Six? fer what? Six fer fifty nine?

Fourth, an item not yet produced can be marked as problematic through devices such as hesitation, pauses, and elongation before its production:³

(IV-6) G.75:290

Pat: fer: (0.6) fer:, (0.4) six weeks or something?

Finally it can be observed that in many utterances several of these devices are used in conjunction with each other. Some of the differences between these devices as well as possible functions of their combination in particular patterns will be investigated later in this chapter. For the present it is sufficient to note that the co-occurrence

³ Ways in which such 'repair initiators' could mark the beginning of a word search were noted in section IV of the last chapter (pp. 238-241). Such phenomena have received extensive analysis from Sacks and his colleagues (see for example Jefferson 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks Ms.; and Sacks 10/11/71).

of several devices might resolve ambiguities possibly present if only one device were used. For example rising intonation can be used to signal phenomena other than uncertainty about what is being said.⁴ The

⁴For example Chafe (1970:213) notes that

those surface structure items which reflect new information are (with some exceptions) spoken with a higher pitch (and greater amplitude) than those which reflect old information.

Sacks and Schegloff (Ms.:5) note that a party producing a name the referent of which he is not sure that his recipient will recognize, may produce the name "with an upward intonational contour, followed by a brief pause." They call this object a 'try-marker' and note that because of its structure it can be employed quite generally (Ibid.:7)

(S)ince the try-marker involves the use of an intonation contour applied to a reference form, and followed by a brief pause, its use is not constructionally restricted to some particular recognitions or to subsets of them; whatever recognitional is otherwise available can be try-marked.

From a linguistic perspective Lyons (1972:62) notes that:

(A)n utterance may have the grammatical structure of a declarative sentence (as far as its verbal component is concerned) and yet have 'superimposed' upon this, as it were, the intonation more generally characteristic of a question.

Though only applied to the terminal intonation contour of a breath-group, Lieberman's analysis of the marked breath-group, discussed in Chapter One, provides some structural reasons for why a rise in intonation might be employed rather generally in speech to signal something special about what is being spoken with that rise. As he notes (1967:105) "the marked breath-group is . . . in a sense the 'simplest' alternative to the unmarked breath-group."

placement of an item with rising intonation after another signal of uncertainty serves to constrain the possible readings of it.

III. Where the Displays Being Investigated Occur

The displays of uncertainty currently being examined all occur in a particular environment. Specifically, prior to the display of uncertainty the speaker displays his knowledge of the event(s)⁵ within which the problematic item is situated. For example in (IV-1) the speaker states that he was watching the television show on which the person whose name is being searched for appeared. In (IV-2) the speaker describes an event which occurred on her property. In (IV-3) the speaker describes an event that happened to her sister and indicates her knowledge of many details of that event, such as its outcome. In (IV-4), (IV-5), (IV-7), (IV-8) and (IV-11) the speaker is explicitly located as a participant in the event being described. In (IV-6) and (IV-9) the speaker reports events about which she would be expected to have special knowledge because of her stated relationship to the event's participants ('Gordie' in IV-6 is the speaker's spouse, something known by her recipients).

⁵I am using the word 'event' to designate in as general a way as possible what the speaker is talking about. This is perhaps an aspect of 'topic' but both the definition and analysis of topic are far beyond the scope of the present investigation. (For an attempt to define topic see Keenan and Schieffelin 1976. For some analysis of how topic is constructed see Sacks 5/17/68 and Vuchinich 1975.)

Not all indications by the speaker that he lacks knowledge about some item occur after a prior display of knowledge. For example, in the following Beth utilizes one of the devices considered earlier, a wh-question, to indicate that she lacks knowledge about a particular event. However in this case there is no prior display on her part that she possesses knowledge of that event. Rather one of her coparticipants, Ann, indicates she possesses such knowledge, which indeed she assumes Beth lacks.

(IV-12) G.26(T)5:55

Ann: We coulda used a liddle, marijuana tih get through the weekend.

Beth: What happened.

The domain of the present investigation is thus restricted to situations in which the speaker makes two contrasting displays, first indicating that he is knowledgeable about some event, and then displaying uncertainty about some detail of that event.

IV. The Gaze of the Speaker Toward Different Recipients Over Different Displays

Analysis has so far focused almost exclusively on the speaker, and indeed this might appear reasonable since what is being examined are attributes of the speaker, i.e., different degrees of certainty about what he is saying. However I now wish to examine the possibility that the hearer as well as the speaker might be relevant to the production of these displays. I will begin by examining the speaker's gaze toward his

recipients during the production of these utterances.

The gaze of the speaker is noted above the utterance and once again the portion of the utterance in which uncertainty is displayed is marked with brackets.

(IV-1) G.86:490

Mike: Recipient A
I was watching Johnny Carson one night en there was a

Mike: _____, . . . Recipient B
guy by the na- [wha^t was that guy's name.=Blake?]

(IV-2) G.86:117

Carney: Recipient A
We hadda Pomerainian in the front yard. (0.4)

Carney: Recipient B
[°Was(n) it a pom- Pomerainian?]

(IV-3) G.85:610

Pam: Recipient A
He let my sister go! She was (0.6) cited for,

Pam: . . . Recipient B
[what was it.]

(IV-4) G.99:380

Pat: Recipient A
They jus s:taple it.=An the earing is in en you leave it

Pat: _____, _____, Recipient B
in. (0.4) [fer:, (0.6) fer':,(0.4) six weeks or something?]

(IV-5) G.99:385

Pat: Jere had ta help me. I gotta twist it. They told her to

Pat: Recipient A
twist it co[m]pletely around like six times,

Pat: ,..... Recipient B
(-----{--}) three times a day or something?)

(IV-6) G.75:290

Barbara: Recipient A
Gordie brought some Orange Crush at Rink's [this morning.

Barbara: . . Recipient B
[Six? Fer what?]

(IV-7) G.126:330

Debbie: We went t- I went ta bed really early.=Paul left like

Debbie: . . X
about [wha t.=Eleven thirty?]

(IV-8) G.75:260

Barbara: Recipient A
*hh I sat down after you guys left, jus got goin good,

Barbara: _____ , Recipient B
This friend a mine comes over. [What'd she sit.=Almos

Barbara: _____ , Recipient A
two ho[urs?]

(IV-9) G.75:187

Bea: Recipient A
I've got a dau[ghter], en s:on in law that's won

Bea: Recipient B
[what.=Seven?]

(IV-10) G.75:290

Pam: Well I think what's funny is when [he was in grade

Pam: . . . X
sch^lool. =wa'n: it? En y- (0.2) you were up playing poker

Pam: _____
with the other: liddle kids?] (0.6) En, these kids:

Pam: wouldn have their lunch cuz Curt's: (0.7) gettin their

Pam: lunch money from em,

(IV-11) G.75:380

Judy: Oh:: heavens I've been off, (0.3) [what. three months? n^X_{ow}?]

It is found that the speaker moves his gaze to a new recipient when he produces a display of uncertainty⁶. In essence the part of the utterance in which uncertainty is displayed is addressed to a different recipient than the part of the utterance in which no uncertainty is displayed. Such orderliness would not be expected if the only things relevant to the speaker's production of a state of uncertainty were particular states of his own mind. Rather the data suggests that the speaker is systematically constructing different types of action to the different

⁶In most of these examples such a shift occurs at just about the point where the display of uncertainty is begun. In some cases however, [IV-4], [IV-10], [IV-11]; the speaker does not begin looking at a new recipient until after the display is begun. Even in these cases, however, the speaker does gaze at a new recipient during the display. Further, it is possible that in some of these cases (for example, IV-10) where the tag-term retrospectively locates an earlier portion of the utterance as being included in the display) sound structural reasons exist for the placement of the speaker's gaze after the beginning of the display.

recipients toward whom he directs his gaze. One possible basis for such a change in action might be differences between the recipients relevant to the tasks posed for the speaker in the construction of the turn.

Before investigating this possibility further one other relevant matter will be briefly considered. A speaker can move his gaze from one recipient to another only when he has at least two recipients and indeed analysis in the rest of this chapter will be restricted to such situations. However speakers also become uncertain and forgetful when only one recipient is present. Such cases might seem to provide counter examples to the present observation, in essence providing instances where the speaker gazes at the same recipient over both types of display. However when such cases are examined it is found that during momentary forgetfulness or uncertainty the speaker withdraws his gaze from his recipient and gazes elsewhere with a middle distance look.⁷ For

⁷The fact that speakers look away while 'thinking' or searching for a word has been noted by a number of different investigators. For example Schefflen (1974:70) observes that

A speaker may also look upward, over the head of his listener. When he does so, he is likely to jut his jaw and bring his lower lip over the upper. He may even rub his chin or scratch the back of his head. Such posturing indicates thoughtfulness and may be associated with the subject's feeling of wishing to think about what he will say.

Argyle and Cook (1976:122) state that "aversion of gaze can act as a more or less deliberate signal that a person is thinking." Bales (1970:67) notes that such gaze aversion may forestall interruption. Moreover, as was noted in Chapter One, p. 78, some psychologists are using the direction in which the speaker turns his head after being posed with different kinds of cognitive tasks to make inferences about

example:

(IV-12) G.84:(T)10:15

Curt:

Didju know that guy up there et-oh. What th'hell is's name

the organization of the brain. Finally the work of Worth and Adair (1970) provides some evidence that these same signals are utilized by speakers in other societies. They report (Ibid.:26) that close-ups of the human face occur in only two places in Navajo films:

The first is most common, showing a full front view of the face with the eyes looking slightly upward--a sort of inward staring. When questioning the meaning of these shots, we were told by several of the students "that this shows my mother (or my brother) thinking about the design."

Elsewhere (1972) Worth and Adair quote one of their informants stating that:

He'll [the silversmith] be making some sort of design there on the ground--and then looks around a little bit here, there, maybe up in there [looking upward]. . . then I will make him sit there and think, oh maybe he'll be looking around up there, at the clouds like that. . . that's the way most people think. . .

A Yoruba student at the University of South Carolina, Omotundi Tejuoso, reports that gazing upward, as well as phenomena such as putting a hand to the head, constitute displays of thinking in her culture as well.

Gaze aversion while thinking thus seems to be a rather regular, systematic and widespread phenomenon in human interaction.

Thus, even in a single recipient situation, when providing a display of uncertainty the speaker regularly withdraws his gaze from the recipient toward whom he has proposed to be knowledgeable about the event within which the uncertainty is situated.⁸ Having made these observations most of the rest of the analysis in this chapter will be restricted to situations in which several recipients are present.

V. The Speaker's Analysis of His Recipient's Knowledge

The possibility will now be investigated that differences between the recipients toward whom the speaker directs his gaze are relevant to the changes observed in his certainty about what he is saying.

Ways in which attributes of the recipient might have consequences on the details of the speaker's talk have received considerable study by analysts of conversation.⁹ One aspect of this process of particular relevance to the phenomena being investigated here is the speaker's assessment of the state of his recipient's knowledge. Schegloff

⁸Indeed, as was indicated in earlier chapters, the right to look away during such an action can be used to accomplish other interactive tasks posed in the construction of the turn. For example, the speaker can employ it to avoid bringing his gaze to a recipient until the recipient's gaze has reached him.

⁹Indeed Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:727) have noted that "perhaps the most general principle which particularizes conversational interaction [is] that of RECIPIENT DESIGN."

(1972:90) provides a particularly clear example of the operation of this feature:

Persons introducing themselves use different "frames" in their introductions when claiming the recognizability of their name and when no such claim is made. On the telephone, for example, the frame "my name is _____" makes no claim to recognizability, while the frame "this is _____" does.

Schegloff (Ibid.:92) also provides evidence that in producing and recognizing identifications participants are in fact engaged in a process of analysis.¹⁰ A speaker's analysis of the state of his recipient's knowledge may be incorrect. While this calls into question the accuracy of a particular analysis it does not challenge the relevance of such an analysis for the production of the identification (for some consideration of this see Schegloff Ibid.:88-89). Thus what is at issue is not the actual states of the participants' knowledge but rather the

¹⁰For example, with respect to the following piece of data:

A: And he said that some teacher, who's coming uhm from I believe he might have said Brooklyn, some place in the east.

Schegloff (Ibid.:92) notes that:

Here the particular place that had been mentioned is not clearly remembered, but the outcome of some operation (some analysis of the place that was mentioned) is. This sort of finding has wider import; however, our interest here is only in showing that on hearing, such operations, classification (in short) "analyses" are done, and their outcome may be retained while the particular is not, and that what is meant here by "recognizability" is "analyzability" in this sense.

analysis they make of each other.¹¹ Indeed a range of phenomena found in conversation, such as pre-sequences to announcements (such sequences are examined by Terasaki 1976:18-32) demonstrate that participants themselves treat the accuracy of their analyses of each other as something to be determined interactively. The determination that some particular analysis is in error may in fact display an even more intricate examination of the participants' respective states of knowledge vis-a-vis each other. Thus Jefferson (1973:57-59), examining a particular type of mid-word overlap, notes that the party doing the overlap may want to demonstrate (rather than simply claim) that "I know what you're talking about" while at the same time showing that:

¹¹ Thus Terasaki (1976:i, footnote 3) provides the following consideration of the presentation of 'news' in conversation:

'News' is for conversation some report produced by its deliverer as not known to its recipient and subsequently interactionally ratified by the recipient as news-to-them. The factual character of the item's status as not having been previously mentioned between these two parties or previously known to the recipient is not at issue since interactants can be shown to have 'in fact' known some item and yet treat it as a 'first hearing.' (And it seems clear that recipients can have a variety of good interactional grounds for not displaying that they have heard an item previously. The discovery that a 'secret' is out and about, for example.) In contrast to an interest in the factual character of the recipient's prior knowledge or ignorance, our concern here is with the treatment of an item as not known. [Italics in original]

While I know what you're talking about I have specifically gathered that information from you as my informant now, and bring to bear on it what I know independently.

[Ibid.:58]

The analysis of the other's knowledge provided by most utterances is in fact quite complex, locating for example not only areas where the other is ignorant but also areas of knowledge relevant to the specified area of ignorance. Thus though the second utterance in the following fragment tells its recipient something he has indicated (in the first utterance) that he does not know, it also implies a range of knowledge that he does possess, such as the ability to recognize the referent of "Al":¹²

(IV-13) G.84:(T)01:45

Curt: Who w'n th'feature.

Mike: [Al won,

Further, these phenomena may be simultaneously operative in different ways on several different levels of organization. For example, the telling of a story can be rejected if its recipient indicates that he has already heard it.¹³ However, in order

¹²Sacks has noted (personal communication) that in conversation a speaker should not tell his recipient something he already knows but rather should use what he knows to tell him what he doesn't know.

For some consideration from a linguistic perspective of the interplay between "new" and "old" information see Chafe (1970:210-212).

¹³For some consideration of this phenomenon see Sacks (1974:343; 1973:139-140) and Goffman (1974:506-508).

to comprehend the story itself a recipient must be aware of a range of information states differentially distributed among the characters. As Goffman (1974:507) notes:

For in these presentations not only must the listener be ignorant of the outcome until the outcome is revealed, but also the protagonists in the strip must themselves be ignorant -- often differentially -- as are the characters in a stage play. The listeners thus must put themselves in the hands of the teller and suspend the fact that the teller knows what is to occur and that the individuals in the story, including the teller in his "I" form, will have come to know and therefore must (in some sense) now know.

From a somewhat different perspective Labov (1970:56-59) finds that different assumptions about the information states of the participants provide for the construction of a range of speech acts with a single speech form, the question.

The displays provided by utterances in conversation of the participants' knowledge about the event being discussed are thus quite complex. However despite this complexity participants can and do orient to specific displayed distinctions about each other's knowledge. To demonstrate this point a particular distinction, relevant to the analysis being developed in this chapter, will be examined.

Sacks (10/22/71:2-3) notes that one feature implicated in the selection of identifications of person is whether or not the recipient is expected to recognize the person being referred to. More precisely:

I'm going to describe one non-exclusive procedure for selecting identities. That procedure has two components plus the rules. The two components, ways of classifying persons, I'll just give very non-descriptive names to: I'll call a first type Type I and the second Type II, and I'll propose that a rule of their use is that you use Type I if you can.

One way of differentiating identifications made of persons in conversation is by reference to whether the speaker intends the recipient(s) -- or differentially among the recipients -- that they use the presented identification to find from that identification that they know the person being referred to. And we intend, by Type I, to be naming such a type identification. That is to say, a Type I identification is such an identification as a speaker produces with the intention of having the recipient use it to find some person that the recipient already knows. And a Type II identification is such an identification as a speaker uses to indicate to the recipient that he should not employ it to attempt to find who that he knows is being referred to. In recipient terms, given a Type I identification, it's the recipient's business to try to find from it, who that he knows that is being referred to. And given a Type II, it's his business to recognize that he's not to try to find from it who he knows that is being referred to.

Now, there are some obvious members of either group; so, for Type I obvious instances are things like first names (Jim, Joe, Harry, etc.). And obvious instances of Type II are things like (a guy, someone, etc.) . . . Indeed in the formulation I gave you first, 'recognize the person whom you know by that name' that's not quite correct and I would amplify it as to 'recognize the person that the speaker knows you know'; so that there can be Jims who you know, who you don't recognize when they say 'Jim', because you figure they don't know him, or they don't know that you know him. So there can be a person, Jim, who you know and who they know, and that's not the person who you understand, but you understand the person who you know that they know you know.

From this perspective the choice of an appropriate identification is determined not only by the attributes of the object being referred to but also by the speaker's analysis of his recipient.¹⁴ Such a process can perhaps be seen more clearly in utterances such as the following (examined in Sacks 10/22/71:6-8):

Jan, uh this friend of mine

So Jack s- uh one guy bought a dollar fifty worth of glue

¹⁴Thus Schegloff (1972:432-433, footnote 16) after an analysis of how identifications of place are formulated in conversation states:

It has been part of the program of one approach in the sociology of knowledge that accounts, descriptions, theories, etc. are to be examined most importantly not with respect to the objects with which they seek to come to terms, but with respect to the circumstances of the producers of the account, or its audience. To understand how some account comes to be offered, an investigator should look not to the objects being addressed; they will not explain the production of the account. It is to the circumstances of its production (its environing class structure, Zeitgeist, psychic states, cultural values, professional ambience, etc. in traditional studies) that one must look to understand its occurrence. I have argued here that formulations of location are used by reference to, and hence exhibit or "reflect", the situations or contextual features of their production. That a formulation is "correct" is, in this context, the least interesting of its features, for it would be equally true of a range of other formulations. Not any "correct" formulation will do. "Right" formulations are "right" in part by exhibiting the particulars of the situation of their use. These notes may then be read as bearing not only on issues in the study of conversational interaction, but also (if the two are separable) as an essay in the sociology of common sense knowledge.

In both of these utterances corrections occur, the correction consisting of the replacement of one identification with another. However both the original identification and the one subsequently substituted for it designate the same referent. The object being referred to is thus not at issue in the correction. Rather the correction consists of a change in the speaker's analysis of his recipient. In both cases a Type I identification is replaced by a Type II identification changing an instruction that the recipient attempt to recognize the referent to an instruction that he not make such an attempt.¹⁵

Through his selection of a particular type of identification the speaker thus distinguishes between possible recipients with alternative states of knowledge about the referent of the identification. A Type I identification proposes that the recipient is able to recognize the person being referred to while a Type II identification proposes that its recipient is not expected to perform such recognition.

Some demonstration is thus provided first, that speakers in fact distinguish between different types of recipients and second, that such distinctions are consequential for the detailed construction of their talk. Further, while recognizing the complexity of participant information states implicated in actual turns at talk, it nevertheless seems

¹⁵ An interesting use in literature of this property of identifications can be found in William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury where two characters of different generations and sex are identified by the same first name (Quentin) without that fact initially being made explicit to the reader who unwittingly attributes the attributes of one to the other.

possible to isolate and analyze independently particular distinctions oriented to by the participants.

The utterances being considered in this chapter will now be examined with respect to the possibility that the speaker is differentiating the separate recipients toward whom he gazes in terms of the type of knowledge they possess about the event under discussion.

In all of these utterances at least one recipient is proposed to have not yet been told about the event being described by the speaker while another recipient is shown to already have knowledge of that event.

The lack of knowledge of one recipient is displayed within the utterance itself in a variety of ways. For example the event is specified to have occurred at a time when the addressed recipient was not present. Thus in (IV-8) it is explicitly stated that the event occurred "after you guys left." The story in (IV-10) is about an event many years in the past. For other examples a time referent is not part of the fragment excerpted for analysis but is found in the larger sequence from which the fragment is taken. Thus (IV-4) and (IV-5) are taken from a longer story about how the speaker, Pat, had her ears pierced. At the beginning of that story it is established that this event took place since she last saw Ann, the first recipient toward whom she gazes in

these turns.¹⁶ The event being described in (IV-7) is similarly stated to have occurred since the speaker last saw her recipients. A second way in which a recipient's lack of relevant information is indicated consists of the use of Type II identifications. For example "this friend a mine" in (IV-8), "a daughter en son in law" in (IV-9), "the other: liddle kids" in (IV-10), "my sister" in (IV-3) or "a pomerainian" in (IV-2). In some cases, for example "one night" in (IV-1), both techniques are combined, a Type II description indicating that the recipient should not attempt to recognize the time being talked about.

The fact that the lack of knowledge of a recipient is indicated within the utterance itself not only provides evidence that speakers are in fact attending to their recipients in such terms but also indi-

¹⁶The story begins as follows:

(IV-14) G.99:356

Jere: Didn't you used to have pierced ears?
 Ann: N:o

 Ann: I always wanted them too en I was always: really scared
 en I fin_ally got my nerve to do it en my friend was
 Pat: I was too.
 Ann: gonna do it first () tch En she hollered so har:d
 'hh that I j'felt I jus couldn' stand it. 'hh I just
 couldn' do it.
 Jere: I talked her into it.
 Pat: Yeah.=Jere always wanted me to do it.
 Ann: You didn't have it
 before.=
 Jere: =N_o
 Pat: N:o: (I) did it out there.

dicates that such a distinction is relevant to the production of the utterance currently being constructed. Sacks (1974:341) provides some consideration of how such a distinction might be relevant:

Mentioning the time of occurrence or reception deals with the placing of the story in some conversation, as when the time can be seen to be between last interaction and this one the story is then warranted for telling via its status as possibly news. . .

This will be investigated further in subsequent analysis.

The other recipient toward whom the speaker gazes in these turns is located as someone who already knows about the event being described by the speaker. For example (IV-4) (note the opening statement in IV-5, as well as the data in the last footnote), (IV-5), (IV-6), (IV-7) and (IV-10) report events in which a person other than the speaker was a significant actor. In all of these utterances the speaker gazes toward that other person:

(IV-4) G.99:380

Pat: Ann
They jus s:table it.=An the earing is in en you leave it

Pat: _____, , Jere
in. (0.4) fer:, (0.6) fer :;, (0.4) six weeks or something?

(IV-5) G.99:385

Pat: Jere had ta help me. I gotta twist it. They told her to

Pat: twist it co Ann
mpletely around like six ti:mes,

Pat: ,..... Jere
(----- [---) three times a day or something?

(IV-6) G.75:290

Barbara: Ethyl
Gordie brought some Orange Crush at Rink's this morning.

Barbara: . . Gordie
Six? [fer what?]

(IV-7) G.126:330

Debbie: We went t- I went ta bed really early.=Paul left like

Debbie: . . Paul
about what.=Eleven thirty?

(IV-10) G.75:290

Pam: Well I think what's funny is when he was in grade

Pam: . . Curt
sch^{ool}.=wa:n: it? En y- (0.2) you were up playing poker

Pam: with the other: liddle kids? (0.6) En, these kids:

Pam: wouldn' have their lunch cuz Curt's: (0.7) gettin their

Pam: lunch money from em,

In (IV-2) the second recipient gazed at is the other party included in the speaker's "we", her husband Gary who shares "the front yard" with her.¹⁷ In the remaining examples the other parties gazed at (spouses in IV-3 and IV-8, a daughter in IV-9, and a mother in IV-11), are persons known and expected to be already informed about the event being discussed

¹⁷Who is included in the scope of a pronoun is an intricate issue far beyond the scope of the present analysis. (For some consideration of this phenomenon see Sacks 11/23/70:14-15 and 10/26/67:1-2).

by the speaker.¹⁸ For example the husband of the speaker in (IV-8) shares the same house with her and thus can be expected to know how long a guest stayed.

In these examples different parts of the speaker's turn are constructed to different types of recipients. For convenience a recipient presumed to already know about the event being described by the speaker will be called a knowing recipient while a recipient presumed to be not yet informed about that event will be called an unknowing recipient.

VI. The Consequences of Different Recipient States of Knowledge on the Speaker's Own Display of Knowledge

The question remains as to why differences in the speaker's addressed recipient should lead to changes in his own displayed knowledge about the event.

It can be noted, first, that the recipients at issue in these utterances, knowing and unknowing recipients, are not merely different but alternative to each other. The selection of one implies that the other is not being selected. One cannot be both knowing and unknowing about the same thing at the same time. Further, these distinctions are displayed in features of the utterance itself. Thus when the speaker moves from one type of recipient to the other some change in these features, as was found, for example, with the production of a Request for

¹⁸Further support for this statement will be provided shortly when some relevant work of Sacks is discussed.

Verification, is to be expected.

However, while that change will involve a change in the state of knowledge proposed for the recipient, in theory at least it need not involve a change in the state of knowledge displayed for the speaker. The states of knowledge of speaker and hearer might be unrelated to each other so that a change in the state proposed for one party had no effect on the state of the other. A knowing speaker could address either a knowing or an unknowing recipient without the type of recipient having any consequences on his own displayed knowledge about the event under discussion. Indeed this would perhaps be the expected situation if it were assumed that the primary determinant of a party's displayed knowledge were the extent of his previous information. It seems, however, to be empirically the case in this data that the states of knowledge of speaker and hearer are not independent of each other. Rather, changes in the state of one party's knowledge are accompanied by changes in the state of the other party's knowledge.

It can be further observed that these changes maintain a particular ordering of the participants' states of knowledge relative to each other. Specifically, the states of knowledge of speaker and hearer remain complementary to each other. When recipient is unknowing, speaker is knowing, while when recipient is knowing, speaker is unknowing. (The display of uncertainty is addressed to a knowing recipient while the lack of uncertainty is addressed to an unknowing recipient.) Thus despite changes in the individuals' states of knowledge a feature of the relationship ordering the separate states of speaker and hearer relative to

each other is consistently maintained.¹⁹ The fact that the speaker changes his own state of knowledge when moving from one type of recipient to another strongly suggests that this feature is relevant to the construction of the turn and oriented to by participants.²⁰

The speaker's change from no uncertainty to uncertainty thus emerges as a systematic consequence of the fact that different types of re-

¹⁹It is interesting to note that the feature of complementarity is maintained even in speech acts where the usual states of knowledge of speaker and hearer reverse, such as in Labov's 'test question' (Labov 1970:56-59).

²⁰This process is obviously not operative on all levels of organization where the states of knowledge of the participants are at issue. For example the speaker's displayed knowledge is not altered by a change from a Type I to a Type II identification. One possible locus for the present process is the range of sequential units, such as announcements, news and stories, that Terasaki (1976:5) analyzes as Informings. An adequate specification of where in conversation phenomena of the type being investigated here will be found is, however, far beyond the scope of the present analysis.

ipients are being addressed in different parts of the turn.²¹ The changes made maintain not only the appropriateness of the utterance, but also the appropriateness of the speaker himself, for the recipient of the moment.

²¹In so far as the present analysis would suggest that, at least in some circumstances, a display about a process that is apparently internal to the speaker might be organized socially, the issue of what the relationship between the display and the speaker's internal state is can be raised. Vološinov (1973:91) argues that

The claim can be made that it is a matter not so much of expression accommodating itself to our inner world but rather of our inner world accommodating itself to the potentialities of our expression. [Italics in original]

Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1964:53) states that "emotion is not a psychic, internal fact but rather a variation in our relations with others and the world." Goffman (1953:59-60) argues that the spontaneous manifestation of appropriate emotional states is in fact the product of a rather careful process of socialization:

(T)he emotional expression practiced by the members of a particular group is determined by the moral rules recognized in the group regarding social interaction. The member must not only learn how and when to express his emotions, but is morally obliged to express them in this approved way. Further, the member is obliged to obey the rules of expression, once learned, in a sufficiently automatic and unselfconscious way so that observers will in fact be partly justified in their assumption that the emotion conveyed to them is a dependable index of the actor's emotional state. It is suggested here that emotional expression is a reliable index because persons have been taught to act in such a way as to confirm the fiction that emotional response is an unguarded instinctive response to the situation.

VII. Addressing a New Hearer with a Different State of Knowledge

Some demonstration has been provided that speakers in conversation have the ability to construct turns at talk capable of providing for the participation of different, indeed mutually exclusive, types of recipients. Such an ability might be relevant to some of the tasks posed in the construction of the turn which were investigated earlier in this dissertation. For example, a speaker who fails to obtain the gaze of one recipient might seek to obtain the gaze of another recipient. However, that recipient might not have the same state of knowledge as the recipient to whom the turn was originally addressed. The speaker would thus have to reconstruct the emerging meaning of his utterance in order to move to the new recipient. The procedures being investigated in this chapter might provide him with the resources to do this.

In the following three parties, Pat, Jere, and Chil, are teaching a fourth, Ann, how to play bridge. Pat is explaining the bidding system to Ann.

(IV-15) G.23:490

Pat: Now if ya have thirteen points:, (1.0) counting: voids?
singletons en doubletons.=right?

Ann is the original intended recipient of the utterance. By its intonation the portion of the utterance constructed to her is located as a declarative statement, an action appropriate to one presumed to be ignorant of the rules of bridge.

Ann, however, does not direct her gaze to the speaker. During

the pause Pat looks at her intended recipient and discovers that she does not have her attention. A search for another recipient is begun, and Pat shifts her gaze from Ann to Chil.

(IV-15) G.23:490

Pat: Now if ya have thirteen points:, (-----^{... Ann}-----)

Pat: _____, ' Chil _____
counting:

Unlike Ann, Chil is presumed to know how to play bridge. Pat is thus faced with the task of reconstructing her utterance from one that proposed the ignorance of its recipient about the event located by the utterance to one that proposes that its recipient has knowledge of that event. Explaining to a novice, such as Ann, the details of the bidding system is both necessary and helpful. Telling an experienced bridge player these same facts is either insulting or absurd.

Note that Pat is faced with the task not simply of changing the state of knowledge proposed for her recipient, but also of displaying a change in her own knowledge of the event. Specifically, a feature of the actions being examined is that the states of knowledge of speaker and hearer remain complementary to each other. Thus if Pat locates her new recipient as informed about the event under discussion she must display ignorance about it.

The speaker is thus put in the somewhat contradictory position of being both informed about and ignorant of the same event within the same turn at talk.

In order to solve this apparent contradiction an object is required that will provide a warrant for the change in the state of the speaker's knowledge as well as for the change in action and recipient. One object that satisfies these criteria is the act of forgetting.

Pat accomplishes the task of moving from an unknowing recipient to a knowledgeable one by changing her intonation so that her statement becomes marked as problematic. The pronunciation of "voi:ds?", the place in her utterance where her eyes reach her second recipient, Chil, is characterized by both a slight rise in the speaker's intonation and a syllable break within the word.

Through this change in intonation uncertainty is displayed about what Pat is saying; and the action being constructed through her utterance is transformed from a statement to a Request for Verification, an action proposing that its recipient has knowledge of the event located by the action that the speaker is uncertain about.

However Chil also fails to attend the speaker. Pat then brings her gaze to the last party present, Jere, who, though he had briefly gazed at her, is discovered to have a glass in front of his face. Having failed to secure any of her three coparticipants as a recipient, Pat drops her eyes and escalates her action to the knowing recipients, adding to her utterance an explicit Request for Verification with full question intonation, "right?". Even this fails, and a gap over a second long follows:

(IV-15) G.23:490

Pat: Now if ya have thirteen points:, (-----Ann)
Ann:

Pat: _____, ' , ' _____, ' , ' _____, ' , ' _____
counting: voi[:ds? s:ingletons en dou'bletons.=right?(1.2)

Ann:

Chil:

Jere: _____, ' ,

Pat's failure to obtain a recipient generates the next item of talk.²² However note that her recipients are chided not for ignoring her, but for failing to pay attention to Ann:

(IV-15) G.23:490

Pat: Now if ya have thirteen points:, (1.0) counting:
voi[:ds? s:ingletons en doubletons.=right?
(1.2)
You gotta prompt Ann as she goes along. She's nevva
gonna remember all these things.

This example provides some demonstration of how the procedures being investigated in this chapter might be used in conjunction with some of the procedures investigated in earlier chapters to accomplish particular interactive tasks posed in the construction of the turn.

VIII. Interactive Problems Posed by the Copresence of Different Types of Recipients

Irrespective of the more general task of securing a hearer the

²²Sacks (1974:350) notes that in conversation "silence can be handled by turning the silence into a topic or by turning into a topic the preceding utterance or sequence by way of that feature of it that it produced a silence."

copresence of both a knowing and an unknowing recipient might itself pose problems for the construction of the turn. Sacks (10/19/71) has provided detailed analysis of how this might come about.

He notes, first, that one consequence of the general rule that "a speaker should, on producing the talk he does, orient to his recipients" (Ibid.:2) is that

if you've already told something to someone, or if you know in other ways that they know it, then you shouldn't tell it to them again; you shouldn't tell it to them at all. (Ibid.:3)

Thus, as was noted earlier, a recipient can reject another speaker's offer to tell a story by indicating that he has already heard it. For example:

(IV-16) G.126:375

Debbie: Now who wants to know about Nano's.
Paul: I don't.=I already heard about it.

The general applicability of this rule to conversation creates problems in particular situations, the most common of which is perhaps couples conversing with other couples. A member of a couple proposing to tell a story in such a situation will find that at least one other party present, his spouse, has already heard the story. Thus if the speaker tells the story he will be telling at least one party something that he already knows (Ibid.:3-4).

One possible way of circumventing this problem (at least for one telling) would be for spouses to avoid telling each other the stories they will tell to others until they were in the presence of others. In

actual fact such an action constitutes grounds for complaint, i.e., "How come you never told me that", by the unknowing spouse. Other features of the organization of conversation provide sound structural reasons for why this should be the case. Tellables and news of various types are organized such that one should tell particular others about some piece of news at the first opportunity to do so. This accounts in part for the phenomenon that a party can be asked about someone that he hasn't just seen and nevertheless state that the asked-about party is "all right." If some major event had occurred the assumption is that one would have been called and told about it:

For some sorts of people (and particularly people in such sorts of relationships as involve others asking you about them; i.e., they know what sort of relationship you're in with the one you're asking about) it's the business of such people to inform their more or less close acquaintances of any more or less dramatic events that happen to them. In some cases it's their business to, on the event's occurrence, sit down and start calling people up. Deaths, marriages, changes of jobs, whatever, are occasions for making a contact that otherwise one would not then have made with a variety of people. (Ibid.:5-6)

Thus the absence of such a call from someone with whom one is in a "reason for call relationship" can be used to infer that no such event has occurred. If a party were to learn that such an event had occurred and he had not been told he might answer to future inquiries that he and the asked-about party "aren't close anymore." (Ibid.:7)

Events which constitute appropriate reasons for call are differentially distributed among different recipients. For spouses the class of relevant events is extremely large:

Indeed, pretty much anything you would properly tell anybody else, you will have or should have told your spouse on the first occasion you could have -- which will characteristically be before you've had occasion to, in public with your spouse, be telling someone else. It would plainly be bizarre, seeing your spouse every day, to, on a Saturday night in the company of others, announce that you got a raise on Wednesday. She might well figure that something is up in that you didn't tell her that. (Ibid.:7-8)

A spouse hearing a partner telling others something that they haven't yet been told can thus, by virtue of the more general operation in conversation of "reason for call relationships", legitimately locate that event as inappropriate:

So, by virtue of what are really rather general considerations, spouses end up telling each other pretty much anything they ever tell anybody else -- or they should end up telling each other such things before they tell, if not anybody else, anybody else in the company of their spouse unless they happen to arrive and the spouse is there with somebody else. But that has nothing much to do with spouses, it has to do with rules for telling, and classifications of items that are tellable. (Ibid.:8)

Such considerations lead to

a modification of the general rule 'don't tell someone what you've already told them', a modification for spouses, which says 'in the presence of a variety of people, relax the don't-tell rule in the case of spouses', i.e., you can tell a story to a variety of people including your spouse that you've already told only your spouse. (Ibid.:9)

This leaves unresolved, however, the problem of what the spouse is to do

while listening to the story that's been already heard.²³ This problem is complicated by one further fact. Spouses jointly participate in many activities which can later constitute the basis for stories. The problem emerges as to how the parties are to divide up the work of telling the story. In some situations couples split apart when they meet with other couples. The men go to one place and the women another. The same stories may then be told in both places but in each setting only one possible teller will be present. If the parties remain together one, perhaps regularly the same party, the husband for example, gets the right to tell the story:

Then, of course, the wife is in a position such that she not only listens to stories that her husband has already told her about things that happened to him, but she also listens to, or at least doesn't tell, the stories that she knows by virtue of the fact that she, too, was one to whom they happened. (Ibid:11)

Listening to stories one already knows poses particular

²³Goffman (1953:341) reports that

(W)hen a husband told anecdotes to his friends, projecting an image of someone making a fresh and spontaneous contribution to the interplay, his wife and others present who had already heard the same person tell the same story with the same show of spontaneous involvement, would tactfully act as if it were all new to them and do an appropriate "take" when the climax of the tale was reached.

I might add that I asked the speaker in examples (IV-4) and (IV-5) what her husband did when she told stories he already knew. She told me that he acted in essentially the manner described by Goffman and maintained a show of interest in her story. Her own actions indicated that she in fact provided for his participation in her talk through use of some of the procedures being investigated in this chapter, a process she was totally unaware of when talking about the situation later.

problems because of other features of the organization of conversation. For example, one standard way to listen to a story (as well as motivation for listening) is for the hearer to try to determine if some comparable event happened to him and then tell that event in his next turn as a second story.²⁴ The use of such a procedure by a party who participated with the teller in his story would lead to a second telling of the same story (Ibid.:12-13).

Listening to a story one has already been told is thus not simply an individual problem manifesting itself in annoyance or boredom but a structural problem generated by the organization of conversation itself.

Some listening techniques are, however, available:

One such listening technique is . . . altogether kind of common, and that is, a spouse listens precisely to the story they already know for its more or less correct presentation, and engages in monitoring it utterance by utterance -- as a listener should. Now, however, for whether it's correctly presented as they know it. If not, what they do is put in corrections at the proper places. This, too, can be a more or less happy solution. It can also be a more or less unhappy solution. (Ibid.:13)

The following provides an example of such a process.²⁵ Jim and Nadine

²⁴A more complete analysis of this phenomenon is provided by Sacks in his class lecture of April 30, 1970.

²⁵Similar phenomena apparently occur among the Bushmen of southern Africa. Thomas (1959:89-90) reports a dispute over the correct version of a story between two parties having knowledge of the events reported in it.

Schefflen (1964:327) provides some other consideration of spouses jointly telling stories in our own society.

have gotten married to each other on three separate occasions. Fred attended their third wedding. In this fragment Nadine tells the story of their three weddings. Both Jim and Fred overlap her telling with their own versions of the events she is describing. Their participation is, however, constrained and organized by the nature of their knowledge of the event being described and by the structure of Nadine's story. Thus Fred talks into her story only when Nadine begins discussing the wedding he attended, while Jim talks throughout the story. Jim's participation is, however, oriented quite precisely to the structure of the segments through which Nadine's story is constructed.²⁶ Not only does the content of his talk follow Nadine's movement from segment to segment, matching her preface with a general statement about his own situation, her description of the weddings with his own list and her description of the meeting of the priest with his own; more importantly, his talk is oriented to the boundaries of these segments. For example, his list of the weddings runs to completion much sooner than Nadine's. After this happens he remains silent until Nadine enters a new story segment.

The data is as follows:

²⁶The organization of the internal structure of stories in terms of segments and the orientation of speaker and hearer to such segments in the conduct of their interaction was first noted and investigated by Jefferson (Ms.)

(IV-17) GA.4:257

Nadine: You remember Father Denelland that mar- Well yeah
we were married three times. Y//ou knew that story.
Anita: I didn't know ever // hear that.
Fred: That's right!
Nadine: Yeah well // we were married in-
Bob: Oh yea:h!
Jim: That's why // I'm // hooked!
Nadine: We-
(): °(int-)
Jim: I can't get out!
Nadine: [When we-
When we were youngsters we eloped:, and were
marr//ied in Maryland,
Jim: Went to Elkton.
Nadine: to Elkton Maryland,
Nadine: 'hh
Jim: [Then we got // married in Jamaica,
Nadine: The- the se:cond time we had all s//orts of (0.1)
property en everything we thought we should be married
again because of c:ivil papers and all that we were
ma(h)rried // in Long Island,
Jim: Then we got married in Saint Pa:t's.
Anita: I never heard this.
Fred: And then in Saint Pat's.
Nadine: ['hh the third time when I converted, I was married in
Saint Patrick's Cathedral. 'h And the priest who
married us:, had to meet Jim before the wedding and
he said, // 'hh well I've been w-
Jim: Find out whether I was a Knights // of Templar.
Nadine: He said-
Nadine: I'm certainly glad // ta marry a- t- t- m(h)-
ta me//(h)et a man who's willing ta marry a wo(h)ma(h)n//
three(h) ti(hhh)//(hhh)mes.
Jim: Or a Shriner.
Anita: (duh)
Anita: 'h Huh!
Fred: Eh ha ha ha
Bob: Eh ha heh heh

To illustrate the process through which a knowing party not selected as speaker monitors his partner's story for omissions and corrections one segment of the story will be focused on.

Nadine's statement "And the priest who married us:, had to meet Jim before the wedding" projects, in particular, with the word "had", that a reason for the meeting existed. However, Nadine chooses not to include that reason in her version of the event; and indeed it is not required for the point she is making, what the priest said at the meeting. Jim's statement "Find out whether I was a Knights of Templar.", which competes with the ongoing development of Nadine's line, provides a version of the omitted reason.

Jim's sequential placement of this item in the conversation is related directly to its status as an item of the original event that his wife has excluded in her description of it. Though this item could not have been placed before the meeting emerged in the story, and indeed becomes specifically relevant only after Nadine's projection of its existence, it could have been placed earlier than it was, after "wedding." However at that point Nadine as well as Jim could have produced the item. The fact of its exclusion in her version of the event had not yet been displayed by Nadine. This display occurs when Nadine moves to a new segment of the story, what the priest said; and only at that point does the reason for the meeting gain the status of an item omitted in Nadine's description of the event. If Jim does not provide it, it will not be provided at all. However, if Jim does not provide it quickly, the place for telling it in the conversation will be lost. It is not relevant to the next segment of the story and there the participants will become involved in the task of appreciating the story.

Both the substance and the placement of Jim's competing talk is thus oriented rather precisely first to his position as one who shared experience of the event with the speaker, and second to the structural details of her description of that event. He locates a feature of the event known to him as a coparticipant but omitted from his wife's description of it; and he provides that item only after the fact of its omission has been displayed and before the relevance of that item to the present state of the conversation is lost.²⁷

The problems Jim and Nadine encounter in describing their weddings result not from individual idiosyncracies or the nature of their "relationship" but rather are systematic consequences of the basic structures available to parties who have shared experience for the coordination of their interaction. Further, such problems are not confined to spouses, but rather emerge whenever parties who have experienced an event together are jointly in a position to describe it to someone else (some demonstration of this is provided by the next example where the two knowing participants are a mother and one of her daughters' boy-friends who happen to have shared a round of golf together). As Sacks (10/19/71:9) states, the difficulties spouses face in telling stories arise "not so much by virtue of being a spouse, but by virtue of the consequences of being a spouse."

²⁷Note that in so far as Jim must wait until the omission has been displayed, but must move before the next segment has been brought to completion, the beginning of his talk systematically occurs at some place other than a transition relevant place.

It can also be noted that the processes being examined here can constrain the ability of participants to utilize some of the procedures examined in earlier chapters. It was seen in Chapter Three that the task of coordinating the separate actions of speaker and hearer produces phenomena such as pauses which may be heard as displays of momentary forgetfulness. However, when two minds experienced the original event and both are present, one can remedy the other's forgetfulness. In the following Paul asks Eileen to describe to others an event they shared in common. Midway through her story Eileen pauses and Paul provides the next item in her utterance:

(IV-18) G.126:557

Paul: Tell y- Tell Debbie about the dog on the golf course
t'//day(h). he he heh
Eileen: eh hh.
Eileen: Ha ha ha // ·hh Paul en I got ta the first g:reen
·hh en this beautiful:
Paul: he he hhh
(0.3)
Paul: Ir//ish sedda.
Eileen: Irish sedda.
Debbie: Oh:::,
Eileen: came // tearin' up onta the first gr(h)een en tried ta
steal Pau(hh)l's go(h)lf // ball.
Paul: Oh: it was beautiful.
Paul: Eh heh heh.

The freedom of a speaker to accomplish relevant interactive work with phenomena such as pauses is thus constrained when another knowing party is present. In utilizing phenomena such as pauses the speaker runs the risk of having the knowing party quickly intrude on the telling of the event. Note how quickly Eileen provides the description herself after Paul begins to talk in the above example.

The presence of another party who shares with the speaker knowledge of the event he is describing can thus pose particular problems for the construction of his turn.

IX. Providing for the Participation of a Knowing Recipient

The procedures being investigated in this chapter provide one technique for dealing with the problems noted by Sacks that emerge when both unknowing and knowing recipients are copresent. By producing a request for verification about a subordinate aspect of the event being described a speaker can provide for the inclusion of a knowing recipient in a turn otherwise addressed to an unknowing recipient. A request for verification engages its recipient in many of the same operations that can lead to repetitive correction and competition such as was found in Nadine and Jim's story (example IV-17). For example, the knowing recipient is asked to monitor what the speaker is saying for its correctness. However his participation in the telling of the event is constrained by the form of the request. Unless he disagrees with what the speaker has said his turn should consist of a simple vocal or non-vocal display of agreement. Disagreement provides the opportunity for an extended turn contributing substantive information to the telling and this sometimes

happens.²⁸ However if disagreement does not occur²⁹ the knowing reci-

²⁸The following examples provide some comparison of the alternative trajectories that follow an affirmation and a denial of a request for verification. In the first the speaker's proposed description of the event is not challenged and no participation whatsoever of the knowing recipient in the telling of the event occurs. In the second the speaker's proposed description of the event is not agreed to; the knowing recipient gains substantive participation; and the onward development of the speaker's line is delayed until the issue located as problematic is resolved.

(IV-8) G.75:260

Barbara: Unknowning recipient
'hh I sat down after you guys left, jus got goin good,

Barbara: _____ , , , . . . Knowing Rec.
This friend a mine comes over. What'd sh^{le} sit.=Almos'

Barbara: _____, Unknowning Recipient
two ho^urs? (0.2) Then I went over to her house for

(IV-6) G.75:290

Barbara: Gordie brought some Orange Crush at Rink's this morning.
Six? fer what?
(1.0)

Barbara: Six fer fifty nine?

Gordie: ((Shakes head "no"))

Barbara: Sixty nine?
(0.5)

Gordie: Sixty nine.
(1.0)

Barbara: I like Orange Crush.

²⁹Sacks (1973b) has noted that a preference for agreement is found in conversation. Further, many of the techniques used to construct requests for verification project a bias for a positive rather than a negative answer to the request. For example with respect to tag questions Lakoff (1973:54) has noted that

One makes a statement when one has confidence in his knowledge and is pretty certain that his statement will be believed; one asks a question when one lacks knowledge on some point, and has reason to believe that this gap can and will be remedied by an answer by the

ipient's answer will not seriously interrupt the speaker's telling. The request for verification also focuses the recipient not on items omitted by the speaker in his telling (such as the reason for the meeting with the priest in Nadine and Jim's story) but rather on the things he has actually said. Finally, such a request may also operate ritually, displaying deference to the other party present who could be telling the story and obtaining his approval of and agreement with the way in which it is being told.

The utterances being examined in this chapter provide examples of different ways in which speakers might use such procedures to deal with some of the problems noted by Sacks. By utilizing a request for verification the speaker in IV-10 is able to locate the principle

addressee. A tag question, being intermediate between these, is used when the speaker is stating a claim, but lacks full confidence in the truth of the claim. So if I say

Is John here?

I will probably not be surprised if my respondent answers 'no'; but if I say

John is here, isn't he?

instead, chances are I am already biased in favor of a positive answer, wanting only confirmation by the addressee. I still want a response from him, as I do with a yes-no question; but I have enough knowledge (or think I have) to predict that response, much as with a declarative statement.

character in her story as one of its recipients.³⁰ In a long story such

³⁰In addition to the change in actions, the change in recipients in example (IV-10) also requires a change in the pronouns utilized to identify Curt. When Curt is not being gazed at and the proposed recipients of the story are unknowing recipients, Curt is referred to as "he". However, when Pam brings her gaze to Curt and locates him as her recipient he is referred to as "you":

(IV-10) G.75:290

Pam: Well I think what's funny is when he wa- in gra:de

Pam: . . Curt
sch^hool.=wa;n: it? En y- (0.2) you were up playing poker

Pam: with the other: liddle kids? (0.6) En, these kids:

Pam: wouldn' have their lunch cuz Curts: (0.7) gettin their

Pam: lunch money from em,

The same person is thus referred to by both second and third person pronouns within a single sentence.

George Lakoff (1968) has examined some of the ways in which the same person might be different entities in the same sentence and the consequences this will have on features of the sentence such as its pronouns. Thus with respect to the following sentence

I dreamed that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me.

he notes that

What is happening . . . is that more than one universe of discourse or possible world is being considered. There is the actual world, in which I do the dreaming, and then there is the world of my dream. And in the world of my dream, I am split up into two people.

For other consideration of this issue see Goffman (1974:524).

In the data currently being examined Curt is a present participant in one universe of discourse and a school boy in another. Pam's request for verification notes this distinction as well as the link between the two characters. Curt-the-present-participant can only be asked to verify the doings of Curt-the-little-boy because of some assumed relationship between them.

requests can be employed repetitively to provide for the ongoing participation of a present knowing party. Utterances (IV-4) and (IV-5) are but two of many examples of that speaker's use of this technique to include her husband, who was present at the event being described to the unknowing recipient, as an addressee of her talk. Utterance (IV-1) provides an example of a speaker's use of such a request to attempt to remedy trouble after it has occurred. Here the speaker is competing for the floor with another speaker. A knowing recipient to his talk starts to provide a next utterance to the other speaker's talk. Immediately after this happens the speaker locates this knowing recipient as a recipient to his talk with a request for verification. Because of the complexity of the data in this example and because it illustrates some other features of the phenomena being examined, such as structural differences between alternative techniques for constructing a request for verification, it will be examined in more detail.

After an utterance by another speaker, Curt, Mike and Pam self select as next speaker simultaneously. Mike stops speaking without bringing his turn to a recognizable completion and lets Pam bring her talk to an initial transition relevant place. He then reasserts his

claim to a turn.³¹ Pam, however, continues with her turn so that overlap again occurs. This time neither party relinquishes the floor to the other by terminating his talk before a possible completion. Eventually Mike's talk emerges in the clear:

(IV-1) G.86:490

Curt: The S'preme Court really screwed up.
(0.4)

Carney: RYAN!
(0.4)

Curt: I think that's terrible. I reall//y do.

Mike: Well,
Pam: [Yeah.=I think everybody should be allowed to (0.1)
s:ee what they want er

Pam: [read what they want. Bu:t,]

Mike: I was watching Johnny Carson o]ne

Mike: night en there was a guy

At this point Mike seems to have the floor to himself. However Mike's wife Phyllis now constructs a next utterance to Pam. This move marks

³¹A party who finds himself in overlap and terminates his own talk prior to a recognizable completion is entitled to reintroduce that talk after the party allowed to continue completes his turn. Thus Jefferson (1973:75-76), discussing a call to a police desk, notes that:

At the moment of overlap, Desk can decide what to do about the 'further' talk that he is in the course of producing. And he does have systematic options. If he intends to have his talk included in the course of the developing sequence, and perhaps has recognized that Caller's talk is appropriate and ought not be cut off, he can provide a first component of a Restart Format. That is, he can cut off his own talk and reintroduce it at the completion of Caller's utterance.

the initiation of a schism in the conversation.³² A line involving several participants and thus capable of sustaining itself independently exists in competition to Mike's. Immediately on the occurrence of this event Mike abandons his projected sentence, turns to Phyllis and directs a request for verification to her:

(IV-1) G.86:490

Pam: Yeah.=I think everybody should be allowed to- (0.1)
s:ee what they want er

Pam: _read what they want. Bu:t,]

Mike: [I was watching Johnny Carson o]ne

Mike: night en there was a guy

Mike: by the na- What was that guy's name.=Blake?

Phyllis: [Yuh:, 'h if they wanna go t'see it they should.

The distribution of knowledge among the participants is relevant to both the occurrence of the schism and the particular parties involved in it. Since a knowing party is already informed about the event being described by the speaker she is a likely party to enter a competing conversation and indeed her lack of engagement in the speaker's turn may

³²Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:713) note that

There are mechanisms for the schism of one conversation into more than one conversation. These mechanisms can operate when at least four parties are present, since then there are enough parties for two conversations. . . (A)ny pair of parties not getting or taking a turn over some sequence of turns can find their mutual accessibility for getting into a second conversation.

On this issue see also Goffman (1963:91) and Scheflen (1974:62-63).

provide some motivation for such action. An action such as a request for verification provides a speaker with procedures for dealing with this systematic possibility.

In the present case, however, Mike's action is not followed by a quick return to the onward development of his line. Instead a comparatively long word search occurs. This word search is in part a result of the particular way in which Mike's request for verification is constructed. Mike's request takes the form of a wh-question, "What was that guy's name.", followed by a proposed answer to that question, "Blake?". The end of the wh-question constitutes the termination of a turn constructional unit and at that point another recipient, Curt, provides a candidate identification of the person whose name is being

sought, "The critic."³³ Mike's proposed answer to the wh-question is thus overlapped by Curt's effort to locate the party whose name has been marked as problematic (as well as by what Phyllis is saying to Pam):

(IV-1) G.86:490

Mike: I was watching Johnny Carson one night en there was a guy

Phyllis: [Yuh:, .h if they wanna go t'see it they should.

Mike: [by the na- What was that guy's name.= [Blake?

Curt: (The critic.)

Mike repeats his proposed answer after the overlap has terminated.

³³During the production of this section of the utterance Mike gazes toward Phyllis, not Curt, and indeed Curt is not a knowing recipient to Mike's talk but rather one of his unknowing recipients. The issue of why Curt attempts to participate in the search for the missing name might therefore be raised. First, in this example, unlike most of the others examined in this chapter, the event being described by the speaker occurred in a public domain, i.e., on a television show. As Terasaki notes (1976:iv, footnote 23) in such cases a

determination that the news may be known is located in the fact that the intended news comes out of the realm of 'public news,' i.e., television, radio, newspapers, magazines, etc., which the Recipients can be thought of as having had equivalent access to for a first hearing.

Second, the preference noted earlier for Type I over Type II identifications organizes the actions of recipients as well as speakers. As Sacks and Schegloff (Ms.:3-4) note:

A non-recognitional having been done, recipient may find from other resources provided in the talk that he might know the referred to, while seeing that speaker need not have supposed that he would. He may then seek to confirm his suspicion by offering the name or by asking for it, characteristically offering some basis for independently knowing the referred to.

Nevertheless a protracted search by several recipients for the name sought in the request ensues:

(IV-1) G.86:490

Mike: I was watching Johnny Carson one night en there was a
guy by the na- What was that guy's name.//=Blake?
(The criti:.)
Curt: Blake?
Mike: No.
Pam: [A no-
(0.6)
Mike: Rob,ert Blake?
Pam: [Reed?
(0.2)
Mike: Er somp'n like 'at. =He was-
Pam: [Robert Reed. Robert Reed.
Mike: No:, [This guy's-
Curt: [No:, Rex Reed. °()
Pam: [Rex Reed. =Yuh.
Mike: [This guy's name was
Blake, (0.4) He was in the movie uh:, (0.6) In Cold
Blood.

Despite the fact that the party who located the name as problematic had the correct name available as soon as the request for it was made, an extended search for that name occurs. This provides some demonstration that though, as is being suggested here, marking a term as problematic may have the effect of including a knowing recipient in a turn otherwise addressed to unknowing recipients, the display of uncertainty thus produced is none the less an operative and oriented-to feature of the conversation. As Sacks (5/29/68:10) notes

(O)nce a thing gets done, whatever gets done, it may have to be dealt with for whatever it is, independently of the sort of thing it's directed to accomplishing.

The word search has the effect of delaying until its completion the onward development of Mike's story. Mike's request for verification might, however, have been constructed in other ways. Some alternative techniques for constructing a request capable of including a knowing recipient in a turn otherwise constructed to an unknowing recipient will now be compared with each other. For clarity this comparison will focus on the differences between two specific types, a request that contains a wh-question and a request made by producing a term but marking it as problematic.

A request constructed with a wh-question, such as "What was that guy's name", engages the mind of its recipient in particular operations and provides him with the opportunity to make a particular type of answer. In order to produce an answer to such a request its recipient must search his knowledge of the event for details about it that the speaker is unable to provide. In his answer he produces these details, for example the name being sought. The recipient of such a request thus contributes substantive new information to the speaker's description. Moreover, the speaker's right to describe the event to his unknowing recipients is in part based on his own knowledge of the event. A speaker producing a wh-question displays ignorance about a particular detail of that event, thus undercutting a claim upon which his right to talk to his other recipients is based.

A request to a knowing recipient might also be constructed by producing a candidate version of the term the speaker wants verified

while marking it in some way as problematic, for example, by pronouncing it with rising pitch. Utterances (IV-4), (IV-5), and (IV-10) contain requests for verification constructed in this manner and Mike's request about Blake could, at least in theory, have been constructed in this fashion, i.e., "I was watching Johnny Carson one night en there was a guy by the name of Blake?". A request with this structure projects a particular type of answer, a display of agreement or disagreement. Unless disagreement occurs its recipient is not provided with the opportunity to contribute substantive information to the speaker's description. Such a request also engages the mind of its recipient in particular types of operations. In order to provide an answer to the request the recipient should compare what the speaker has said and marked as problematic with his own knowledge of the event being described. The recipient is not, however, asked to examine other aspects of the event. Finally, by producing a candidate version of the item for which verification is sought, the speaker is able to mitigate his display of ignorance about an aspect of the event he is telling.

Thus, though both these structures can be used to address a knowing recipient they have different consequences for the subsequent course of the interaction. The production of an utterance component about which the speaker displays uncertainty projects minimum disruption of the speaker's ongoing description to his unknowing recipients. On the other hand a wh-question projects some substantive participation by its addressee. It sometimes in fact switches the main telling of the

event to the knowing recipient, and indeed seems to be employed for this purpose by speakers wishing to accomplish this task. In the following, as Phyllis herself indicates, Mike is the source of her own information about the events she mentions. After Mike answers Phyllis's request he becomes the principle teller of the story³⁴:

(IV-19) G. 84(T):215

Phyllis: Mike siz there wz a big fight down there las'night,

Curt: Oh rilly?

(0.5)

Phyllis: Wih Keegan en, what. Paul {de Wa:ld?

Mike: Tiffen. Paul de Wald. Guy out of,

Tiffen.

Despite the differences between these two structures properties of both are frequently combined in the production of a single request. Many requests to knowing recipients take the form of a wh-question followed by a proposed answer to the question.³⁵ For example:

³⁴The following provides another example of such a process:

(IV-20) G.139:209

Marlene: En y'know what Tina say? Tina say, (0-2) You know, she j- she- she she sound so cute though.=Tina said "You come over here I'm a do-" What'chu say // "I'm tellin yer mother?")=

Tina: 'hhhhh

= No I told her I sai:d uh: "I'm talkin to you. You hear me?" (0.6) En she mus' be shakin her head.=I said "Well can' chu say yes?" en she (say) ((falsetto))"yeah." 'hh En then she say somp'm I tell her I (say) "You better listen to me" I said "I'd- (0.2) en when you (com'o'ere) I(h) cut y(h)our m(h)o(h)d fuck(h)in tongue out."

³⁵Structures similar to this have been examined from the perspective of generative semantics by George Lakoff (1974) as "syntactic amalgams."

(IV-7) G.126:330

Debbie: We went t- I went ta bed really early.=Paul left like about what.=Eleven thirty?

(IV-8) G.75:260

Barbara: This friend a mine comes over. What'd she sit.= Almos' two hours?

(IV-9) G.75:187

Bea: I've got a daughter:, en s:on in law that's won what.= Seven?

(IV-11) G.75:380

Judy: Oh:: heavens I've been off, (0.3) what. three months? now?

The presence of the wh-word in this structure would seem to provide for the systematic possibility of overlap such as Mike encountered in example (IV-19). Speakers utilizing this format to include a knowing recipient may in fact orient to this possibility. Note that in many cases the proposed answer follows the wh-word without any gap (this is indicated in the transcript by an equal sign). Producing a new turn-constructural component immediately after the end of another component is one systematic technique used by speakers to prevent overlap. It can be further noted that in many cases the wh-word does not occur at the beginning of a sentence but rather as a pro-term for the missing item well into the sentence. It thus seems that though many requests providing for the inclusion of a knowing recipient contain wh-words, these requests are constructed in such a way that the possibility of overlap after the wh-word is oriented to and made less likely.

Having compared some of the differences between alternative structures for including a knowing recipient in a speaker's turn, Mike's turn (IV-1) will be re-examined. First, it can be seen that the long word search which interrupts his telling of his story is provided for in part by the particular structure he employs to include a knowing recipient in his turn. Specifically, he requests substantive information from his recipient by using a wh-question. Further, in this utterance the wh-word occurs at the beginning of a sentence, thus projecting the relevance of an answer well in advance of the place where the answer should be provided. Indeed in this case the speaker interrupts the sentence he has been producing so as to produce a whole new sentence directed toward obtaining this specific information. In comparison with many other requests using a wh-word, the speaker in this example marks in a particularly strong fashion both the absence of some item in his description and his request that some other recipient provide that item.

A request with a different structure, for example, continuing with the original sentence but pronouncing "Blake" with rising intonation, would have projected less disruption of the speaker's current description. Such a move would, however, both make less claims on the attention of the knowing recipient (she would not have been required to search her knowledge of the event for unknown information) and would not grant her a turn where she could contribute substantively to the telling of the event being described by the speaker. At the time Mike's request is made Phyllis is a speaker in her own right and, by collaborating in

the establishment of a conversation in competition with Mike's, has displayed in a strong way her lack of involvement in Mike's talk. The structures Mike in fact employs here, despite their liabilities, make stronger claims on their addressee's attention and participation, and might therefore be more appropriate than the others considered for the accomplishment of the particular tasks facing the speaker at the moment.

However, despite Mike's action to her, Phyllis does not turn to him.³⁶ Situations in which a speaker's request to a knowing recipient fails to obtain an answer from that party have not yet been examined. It would not, however, be expected that knowing recipients would always orient to such requests and that therefore speakers might have systematic techniques for dealing with such a situation. In the present case Mike provides a proposed answer, "Blake?", to the request himself. However, even in cases where the speaker does not provide the information sought in the request he is still able to move his description past that information by indicating its lack of relevance or unimportance. In the following the speaker marks with "what uh," that he is not able to provide some part of his description. During the pause following this he looks toward his wife, the other party included in his "we", but finds that rather than attending him she is passing food to another participant.

³⁶Goffman (1975:24) notes that:

(A)n addressed recipient can turn from the addressor to initiate what he hopes will be a separate state of talk with another party, minimizing any tendency to reply in order to invoke the boundary required by the conversation he himself is fostering.

He removes his gaze from her, looks down and then indicates with the phrase "of whatever" that the information marked as absent is not necessary, and then moves to the next element in his description:

(IV-21) G.26(T):12:45

John: Like las'night we were watching some video tape,
(0.5)
of what uh,

John: . Beth
(-----[-----]-)

Beth:

John: uh, (0.2) of whatever, en I noticed et one point that my
ha:nd jus' reached f'my pocket.

Speakers are thus able to deal with the failure of a knowing recipient to orient to their requests. The way Mike deals with this problem, providing a proposed answer to the request himself, produces a format, [Request] + [Proposed Answer to that Request] found in many requests for verification. It may be that this format is produced in several slightly different ways. In some cases the speaker may indicate, for example by placing the wh-word late in his sentence and producing the answer as quickly as possible, that he himself will provide the proposed answer. In other cases the speaker may provide that answer only after a recipient has passed the opportunity to do so.

The phenomena being investigated in this chapter thus provide one set of procedures for dealing with the problems noted by Sacks that emerge when a speaker tells a story in the presence of both parties who have already heard the story and parties who haven't. Alternatives

within this set provide a speaker with a range of procedures with somewhat different properties that can be used to accomplish a variety of tasks posed in such a situation. Moreover, if the addressee of the speaker's action fails to reply, the speaker has access to other procedures enabling him to continue with his turn despite the absence of relevant co-participation by a particular recipient.

X. The Inclusion of Different Types of Recipients in the Same Turn through a Transformation in the Structure of the Event Being Reported through the Turn

Solutions so far considered to the problem of including both an unknowing recipient and a knowing recipient within the same turn at talk have all involved a change in the information states projected for speaker and hearer by the speaker's utterance. In general this has been accomplished by transforming the original action to the unknowing recipient into one appropriate to a knowing recipient.

An utterance will now be investigated in which the information states of speaker and hearer remain constant while the event being reported is transformed as the speaker moves his gaze from one type of recipient to another.

The following sentence will be examined:

(IV-22) G.26:(T):8:30

John: I gave up smoking cigarettes one week ago today actually.

The actual production of the sentence is accomplished in two

different turns separated by a recipient's "yea:h,":

(IV-22) G.26:(T)8:30

John: I gave, I gave up smoking cigarettes::.=

Don: =Yea:h,
(0.4)

John: l-uh: one- one week ago t'da:y. acshilly.

However, irrespective of any such division, John's talk produces only a single coherent sentence. The manifest coherence of his utterances as a single sentence constitutes both an initial observation about their organization and a warrant for analyzing this talk as a single unit.

Within the coherence of this single unit it is, however, possible to locate subunits. In producing this talk the speaker directs his gaze to three different recipients over three different sections of the utterance. Specifically, his gaze is directed to Don during "I gave up smoking cigarettes", to Beth during "one week ago today", and finally to Ann during "actually." More precisely:

(IV-22) G.26:(T):8:30

John: . . . , Don , , . Don
I gave, I gave u^p smoking ci^garettes::.=

Don: =Yea:h,

John: . . . Beth . . . Ann
l-uh l^one- one week ago t'da:ly. acshilly

In brief, by plotting aspects of the speaker's gaze it is possible to divide his sentence into three separate sections during each of which the speaker gazes at a different recipient.

An attempt will now be made to demonstrate that each of these sections is designed specifically for the recipient toward whom the speaker is gazing at the moment. It will be argued, first, that each segment is appropriate to a specific recipient and inappropriate to other possible recipients and, second, that the recipient to whom it is appropriate is the recipient toward whom the speaker is gazing during its production.

The first section of John's sentence, "I gave, I gave up smoking cigarettes::." is a member of the class of actions that propose that the speaker has knowledge of an event about which the recipient is ignorant. It would be inappropriate to announce to someone that one had given up smoking when that recipient already knew it.

Don and his wife Ann are the dinner guests of John and his wife Beth. Neither has seen the speaker for some period of time before the present evening. John thus has reason to suppose that Don has not yet heard the news he is now telling. He would therefore be an appropriate recipient to an announcement such as that made by John; and it is to Don that John directs his gaze during this section of his utterance.

At least one party present at the dinner would not be an appropriate recipient to the first section of John's sentence. Beth, the speaker's wife, has been living in the same house with him for the past week and knows that he has given up smoking cigarettes. Further, this is something that the speaker knows that she knows and indeed, in terms

of the rules for telling news to spouses examined earlier in this chapter, the others present can also legitimately see these things. In so far as John's initial statement is appropriate to an unknowing recipient and Beth is a knowing recipient the present line of analysis implies that the event described to Don could not be reported to Beth.

For the next section of the sentence, "l-uh: one- one week ago t'da:y.", John switches his gaze from Don, an unknowing recipient, to Beth, a knowing recipient.

With the addition of this section to the sentence the news that John had stopped smoking cigarettes is transformed into a different piece of news: that today is an anniversary of that event. Such an anniversary is a new event that none of the parties present, including Beth, need be expected to know about.

The structure of an anniversary makes it particularly appropriate as a solution to a problem such as that faced by John. An anniversary is constructed via the lamination³⁷ of events at two separate moments in time, an original event which becomes the object of celebration

³⁷The analytic notion of lamination as a structural feature of events and actions is discussed in Goffman (1974:82, 156-157).

and the anniversary itself. The two are related by the occurrence of some regular period of time between them.³⁸



³⁸An interesting discussion of how measurements producing 'round numbers' can construct distinct cultural phenomena (a 'four minute mile' for example) is provided by Lotz (1968). He notes (Ibid.:104) that:

The fundamental and round numbers play a prominent part on the 'desiderative-imperative' aspects of our culture: in law, age limits, length of fish permitted to be caught, speed limits (with their implications for the problems of transportation); in sports: distances to be run specified in round numbers . . . in social events: wedding anniversaries, college class reunions, bicentennials; in prices and salaries (The American \$9.95 price tag is a deliberate avoidance of such numbers, aimed of course at having the customer psychologically class the article as within the range of the next lower 'round price').


Jefferson (1973:65-66) provides some analysis of how participants in conversation orient to and utilize this phenomenon in the construction of their talk. Gusfield (1976:20) notes how numbers that are recognizably not round, such as percentages given in decimals, may be employed by a scientist to demonstrate "meticulous attention to details . . . thereby avoiding a judgment by the reader that he has been less than scrupulous."

An anniversary is an appropriate object to call to the attention of someone who shared experience of the event celebrated by it with the speaker. More precisely, interest in the anniversary is contingent upon interest in the event being celebrated by it.³⁹ However, a party who knows of the original event need not know that a period of time appropriate for the location of an anniversary has passed. The laminated structure of the anniversary thus integrates items of common experience with novel information in a way particularly suited for the inclusion of a knowing recipient, such as Beth, in John's utterance.

Such a laminated structure also maintains the relevance of this section of the sentence for its original recipient. First, the initial report to him is incorporated within it as the lowest layer of the lamination. Second, the report of the anniversary continues to perform an action relevant to an unknowing recipient, the description of that original event. In particular it specifies the time at which the event occurred, an item that a recipient presumed to be ignorant of that event would not be expected to know. Thus, though this section of the sentence is made appropriate to a new type of recipient, it maintains its

³⁹For example, few other than a particular couple have any interest in the anniversary of their meeting.

relevance to its original recipient:



In essence each layer of the lamination locates an alternative type of recipient. Some demonstration is here provided that a cultural object emerging through a turn at talk might be selected for presentation at a particular moment because its structural properties permit the solution of interactive problems posed in the construction of the turn.

Other features of John's utterance provide support for the argument that he is reshaping his sentence in order to make it appropriate to a new type of recipient.

First, an alternative to the section of his sentence actually produced at this point is begun and abandoned:

John: l-uh: one- one week ago t'da:y.

The word beginning, "l-", plus the hesitation, "uh:", plus the second word "one" correspond to what Jefferson (1974a:186) has described

as the Error Correction Format. The word begun by the initial fragment⁴⁰ constitutes an alternative to the second word which corrects it. "Last week" and "last Monday" are possible alternatives to the section actually produced. An expression beginning with "last" in this position would do more than simply specify the time when the event occurred. It would argue for the status of the speaker's statement as news to an unknowing recipient by explicitly telling the recipient that it happened since they were last in contact with each other.⁴¹ In view of Don's "yea:h,", which neither acknowledges the newsworthiness of the event⁴² nor requests elaboration of it, warranting what has just been said in this fashion may be a relevant act for the speaker to perform.

⁴⁰For some analysis of how participants orient to sounds such as the present "l-uh!" as word beginnings see Jefferson (1974:185-186).

⁴¹On this issue see Sacks (1974:341). The alternative in fact produced at this point also has this relevance. Sacks (1/15/70:31) provides some analysis of the use of the word 'today' in reports and announcements. He notes that this term does not simply stand in contrast to other names for days as a way of specifying a time reference but rather warrants the report as news.

⁴²The relevance of a recipient's acknowledging the newsworthiness of an event and ways in which this is done have been investigated by Terasaki (1976:4-9).

Such a section differs, however, from the one eventually selected in that it does not construct an action appropriate to a recipient already informed about the event being described.⁴³ The rejection of such an alternative provides further support for the argument that John, faced with the task of making his utterance appropriate to a new type of recipient, reshapes the event being described through the utterance.

Other evidence that the anniversary, which redesigns the sentence for its new recipient, was not projected as an element of the sentence from its beginning is provided by the speaker's intonation, which locates surprise at the beginning of the section and places stress on the revelation of the anniversary:

John: l-uh: one- one week ago t'da:y.

The discovery intonation at the beginning of the section is placed in contrast to a possible beginning without such stress. Specifically, the first and second "one" differ most noticeably in their intonation so that the change in intonation is marked to be heard as the warrant for the restart. Such a structure both announces that something unanticipated has been discovered and locates where that discovery occurred. Recipients are thus informed not only that some new basis

⁴³Jefferson (1974:195) notes that in using a term such as "uh" to mark the replacement of some particular term with an alternative a speaker may rely upon

a recipient's capacity to understand that an error or inappropriateness has been circumlocuted, to identify that object, and to deal with its relevance and the relevance of its having been avoided.

for listening is being offered but that this new information was discovered after the first section of the utterance. Such an announcement would be particularly important for a party, such as Beth, who has been located as an unlikely recipient to the speaker's sentence by its first section.

John's utterance until this point thus provides some demonstration that a speaker in natural conversation has the capacity to modify the emerging meaning of his sentence as he is producing it with the effect that its appropriateness to its recipient of the moment can be maintained and demonstrated. Though the sentence originally begun proposed that its recipient had no knowledge of the event being described within it, by transforming that event and locating a new piece of news the speaker was able to make the sentence appropriate to one who shared experience of it with him.

Transforming the event being told in the way John does here is an unusual solution to the problem of including a knowing recipient in a turn otherwise constructed for an unknowing recipient. Further, John could have employed the procedures examined earlier in this chapter to make his utterance appropriate to Beth. For example, on turning to Beth John could have produced the time that the event took place (as he indeed began to do at the beginning of the section) but indicated that it was problematic by pronouncing it with rising intonation, i.e., "last week?" or "last Monday?". In a certain sense a solution of this type would have been simpler than the one actually used since it would have

involved less modification of the emerging utterance. John's choice of an atypical procedure for including a knowing recipient in his turn, and, further, a procedure that is not the most simple available for performing the tasks posed, invites speculation as to why his particular solution was chosen.

One other aspect of this data might be relevant to the speaker's seeing that a regular period of time, appropriate for the location of an anniversary, has passed. Sacks and his colleagues have shown that one feature implicated in word selection in conversation is punning relationships of various types.⁴⁴ Several utterances after John completes the sentence being examined here he states that he is taking a course on how to stop smoking. Concerning the course Beth says, "Yeh it wz like Seventh Day Adventist." The regular time relationship necessary for the discovery of the anniversary, seven days, is thus a feature of the scene being described. Once the anniversary has been found it has a preferred status for telling since it is the latest news, the original event being news that is already a week old.

Despite John's careful and precise work to redesign his utterance for Beth, and, with his phrasal breaks, to signal that her gaze is needed, she does not bring her gaze to him. It was seen in the last

⁴⁴See for example Sacks (1973) and Sacks' first three Fall 1971 class lectures.

chapter (pp. 227-231) that John secures the gaze of a different recipient, Ann. In order to provide time within his turn for Ann to move her gaze to him John adds a new section, the word "actually", to his sentence.

John: Beth , , . . . Ann
l-uh: {one- one week ago t'da: 'y. acshilly,
Beth: |
Ann: |
 Beth , . . . John

When John moves his gaze from Beth to Ann, the task of reconstructing his utterance so that it is made appropriate to his recipient of the moment is posed a second time. Unlike Beth, but like Don, Ann did not share with John experience of the event he is describing. Thus, a constraint on the segment to be added to the sentence to provide for her inclusion is that it make the proposed recipient of the sentence an unknowing recipient.

"Acshilly" accomplishes this task. Through its addition the discovery of the anniversary is transformed into a report about it. Rather than being asked to recognize the anniversary the recipient is told that in fact the event being marked by it did occur a week ago. The addition of "acshilly," thus again reconstructs the emerging meaning of John's sentence so that once more it becomes appropriate to its recipient of the moment.

In this chapter analysis has focused on the ability of the speaker to differentiate particular types of recipients and to display in his talk the appropriateness of his utterance for its recipient of the moment. Though recipients may be relevantly distinguished from each other in many different ways, the present analysis has been restricted to a single feature, the state of the recipient's knowledge about the event being reported by the speaker. Examining situations in which the main addressee of the turn was an unknowing recipient, but where a knowing recipient was also present, it was found that as the speaker moved his gaze to an unknowing recipient he produced a display of uncertainty about what he was saying, thus constructing an action, a request for verification, appropriate to a knowing recipient. In order to maintain the appropriateness of his utterance for a recipient with a particular state of knowledge the speaker changes his own state of knowledge. The ability to construct a turn capable of providing for the inclusion of both types of recipients was found to be useful both for the accomplishment of local tasks posed in the construction of the turn and because the copresence of knowing and unknowing recipients itself engenders particular structural problems. It was also found that a speaker might redesign his utterance for a knowing recipient by transforming the event being reported in it so that a new piece of news, appropriate to the knowing recipient, was provided. The analysis in this chapter provides further demonstration of the relevance of the hearer to the meaning and detailed construction of the utterance of the speaker.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has investigated some particular aspects of the interaction of speaker and hearer in the construction of the turn at talk in natural conversation. In Chapter Two the negotiation of an appropriate state of mutual gaze at turn beginning was examined. It was found that particular states of gaze were in fact relevant to the turn and that participants had access to systematic procedures for both achieving appropriate states of gaze and remedying the occurrence of inappropriate states. The use of these procedures produced characteristic phenomena, such as phrasal breaks, in the speaker's utterance. In Chapter Three the ability of participants to change the units they were in the process of producing by adding new sections to them was examined. It was found that vocal units on many different levels of organization, from within the phoneme to the sentence, as well as non-vocal units, were capable of such modification. It was further found that this ability constituted a resource for the achievement of social organization within the turn, in essence enabling one participant to coordinate the units he was producing with the relevant actions of a co-participant. This process does, however, lead to changes not only in the length of units being produced, but also in their meaning. The procedures investigated in this chapter were found to be relevant to the accomplishment of a number of tasks posed in the construction of the turn, including

the tasks investigated in Chapter Two. In Chapter Four the ability of the speaker to modify his emerging utterance so that it remained appropriate to its recipient of the moment was investigated. A situation was examined in which two different types of recipients, a knowing recipient and an unknowing recipient, were both present. It was found that a speaker who had been addressing his turn to an unknowing recipient could make it appropriate to a knowing recipient either by changing the states of knowledge projected both for himself and his recipient through a change in action, or by transforming the event being described so that it became appropriate to its new recipient. This dissertation has thus described and analyzed specific procedures utilized by speaker and hearer to coordinate their interaction in the construction of the turn at talk.

The work in this dissertation is relevant to research in several different fields.

First, some empirical analysis of a basic and pervasive form of human communication, conversation, has been provided. It has been found that not only the exchange of turns, but the internal structure of the turn at talk itself is constructed through a process of communication between speaker and hearer. Specific communication processes within the turn, for example, a speaker's request for his recipient's gaze and the answer to that request by the recipient, have been investigated and analyzed. It has also been found that this process of communication

may systematically lead to the modification of phenomena such as sentences constructed within the turn. On the one hand such findings cast doubt on the arguments of some communications researchers, for example Coulthard and Ashby (1975:140) and Rogers and Farace (1975:226), that communication is not present until an exchange of turns has occurred. On the other hand it suggests that processes of communication may be far more deeply implicated in the production of language than has traditionally been recognized in linguistics. The present work has also provided some demonstration that the process of communication involved in the production of the turn at talk organizes not only the vocal behavior of the participants but also aspects of their non-vocal behavior, such as their gaze. Specific communications structures relating vocal to non-vocal actions have been investigated. This work thus supports both theoretically and empirically the argument long made by Birdwhistell (for example 1970:162; 1973:93-94) that speech and body movement are integrated aspects of a single communications process. Some approach has also been made toward the analysis of communications processes from the perspective of models of the type Krippendorff (1969a) has termed discourse and communications models. Procedures through which essential variables in the turn, such as the appropriateness of an utterance for its recipient, are achieved and maintained in the face of changes in the relevant local environment, such as a change in recipients, have been specified and analyzed. Such procedures have been found to change

the phenomena being constructed within the turn with the effect that the utterance eventually produced is both modified by, and a manifestation of, the constraints organizing the communication of the participants in the construction of the turn. The work in this dissertation provides empirical analysis of specific communications behavior, such as utterances, sentences, phrasal breaks and gaze, the codes organizing such behavior into relevant communicative messages, for example, a request and its answer, and the communications institution, the turn at talk, within which these phenomena are situated. This dissertation thus investigates a range of different phenomena implicated in the organization of human communication.

Second, the work in this dissertation is relevant to the study of human interaction and in particular, to the analysis of conversation. Ties between the present work and other research into the structure of conversation have been made explicit throughout the dissertation and no attempt will be made to summarize them here. At present I merely wish to note that some of the same sequential phenomena Sacks and his colleagues found to be implicated in the organization of the exchange of turns, summons-answer sequences for example, were also found to be operative within the turn itself. Further, some of the structures they found to provide organization for the vocal behavior of the participants in conversation were found to also organize aspects of their non-vocal behavior. It would thus seem that structures noted and analyzed by

Sacks and his colleagues operate quite generally and organize a very wide range of phenomena in conversation, and perhaps in human interaction in general.

Third, the work in this dissertation is relevant to a number of different issues in linguistics, some of which have not yet been examined in the analysis. First, as was noted in Chapter One, some linguists have argued that natural speech should not be employed as data for the analysis of linguistic competence because of the many errors and phrasal breaks found within it. The present work has provided some demonstration that such phenomena may result not from the actions of the speaker alone but rather may be emergent products of the interaction of speaker and hearer in the construction of the turn at talk. From such a perspective phenomena such as phrasal breaks, rather than demonstrating the linguistic incompetence of a speaker, constitute manifestations of his competence to construct utterances and sentences that are in fact oriented to appropriately by a recipient.

Second, while excluding natural speech, and especially phenomena such as phrasal breaks from analysis, contemporary linguistics has placed great stress on the distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. However phrasal breaks, and indeed the process of repair in general, would seem to be precisely the place where participants orient to and make use of the distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. For example, in order to understand an utter-

ance such as "Somebody said looking at my son, my oldest son, he has the same mean little pig eyes as his father and grandmother." a hearer must distinguish between the utterance and another unit manifested within the utterance, a sentence, which does not contain all of the words spoken by the speaker. The process of performing and understanding repairs thus requires in rather specific ways that the speaker/hearer distinguish between what could and could not be an appropriate grammatical sentence. (Editing rules used to derive sentences from structures such as the above have been described by Labov 1975). It might be argued that the basis for such intuitions cannot be found in the data of actual speech. This does not, however, seem to be true. In many cases, such as the present, the correction is framed through a repetition of the item being corrected. Both the unit at issue and the way in which the unit is to be modified are thus displayed within the utterance itself. The ability of a speaker/hearer in such circumstances to distinguish a grammatical sentence from an ungrammatical string of words is thus provided by the very features of talk that Chomsky (1965:3) located as 'grammatically irrelevant', the process of repair itself. The distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences would thus seem to be not simply a constraint on the output of possible grammars (indeed if, as it is being suggested here, sentence fragments are objects that speakers carefully construct as fragments, then the procedures for constructing language behavior should include instructions for how to construct

such objects and distinguish them from objects that are in fact to be heard as complete, such as sentences), but rather to constitute a resource that participants in conversation actively utilize.¹ This being the case it would seem inappropriate for a discipline making use of this distinction as a basic part of both its methodology and theoretical orientation, to exclude from analysis the very data in which speakers and hearers attend to and make use of this distinction. A theoretical position that did not consider actual speech, and especially 'performance errors' such as restarts proper data for the study of language by linguists would, however, lead to just such a situation.

¹Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1975:29) observe that repair has been largely ignored by linguistics. They note that:

In being ignored, or attended a little bit at best, the phenomena of repair have not, however, avoided an assessment by linguistics. Repair has not been treated as a phenomenon which, being largely unstudied, was largely not understood, and was therefore of unknown but potentially considerable importance. Rather, it has been assessed as unimportant, useful perhaps as evidence on the functioning of important language systems or neurolinguistic mechanisms, but not by itself central.

We disagree. The organization of repair is the self-righting mechanism for the organization of language use in social interaction. If language is composed of systems of rules which are integrated, then it will have sources of trouble related to the modes of their integration (at the least). And if it has intrinsic sources of trouble, then it will have a mechanism for dealing with them intrinsically. An adequate theory of the organization of natural language will need to depict how a natural language handles its intrinsic troubles. Such a theory will, then, need an account of the organization of repair.

Operations of the type considered above would also seem relevant to how a child learns to construct sentences from the 'degenerate quality' (Ibid.:58) of the data provided by actual speech. More precisely, the structure of the correction process explicitly locates both relevant units in the stream of speech (in the above example a noun phrase is explicitly delimited) and the types of operations that can be performed upon such units (for example the addition, in a particular place, of an adjective to the noun phrase, this operation thereby also locating sub-units within the noun phrase). Other types of corrections display the alternative units that can occur in a particular slot (for example "We went t- I went ta bed really early).² Indeed it might be argued that if a child grew up in a platonic world where he heard only sentences and never utterances, he might not learn to produce sentences himself because he would lack the analysis of their structure provided by processes such

²Cazden (1972:106) reports unpublished work of Snow (1971) which suggests:

how some of the forms of modification and repetition may be particularly helpful to the child's acquisition processes. Partial repetitions like Put the red truck in the box now. The red truck. may provide information on the boundaries of grammatical units (and in this case the NP). Similarly with partial repetitions in new frames: Pick up the red one. Find the red one. Not the green one. I want the red one.

as repairs.³

Rather than bounding the subject matter of linguistics, intuitions about grammatical sentences seem to be elements in particular processes used to construct utterances in actual talk. If this is the case, then the structure of such intuitions cannot be adequately described if the processes within which they emerge and function, such as repair, are excluded from analysis. Rather such processes would seem to provide important data not only about the structure of language and how it might be learned, but also about the norms linguists use to analyze it.

Third, the work in this dissertation has provided some demonstration that conversational structures are implicated not only in the relationships between sentences, but also in the internal organization of the sentence itself. The process of communication between speaker and hearer as they mutually construct the turn at talk has been found to be capable of modifying both the length and the meaning of the sentence produced within the turn. The sentence has traditionally been examined

³Labov (1975) has noted that in English the glottal stop may constitute a universal editing signal. Such a signal would be extremely useful for an entity attempting to decipher operative structures in the stream of speech.

It may also be noted that many of the structures implicated in repairs are structurally analogous to some of the techniques used by linguists to analyze language, for example, the construction of elicitation frames for comparison of particular differences, the location of distributional classes in terms of what items can or cannot occur in a particular slot, the location of relevant units and possible modifications on those units.

in linguistics as a fixed, static object. However, both the work of Sacks and his colleagues and some of the analysis in this dissertation provide some demonstration that sentences are in fact time-bound structures emerging through and within a process of interaction.⁴ In so far as this is the case the procedures utilized to construct sentences are, at least in part, interactive procedures.

In conclusion, the analysis of the turn at talk in natural conversation provides the opportunity to investigate in detail a diverse and important range of communications phenomena. First, the turn is the locus of human linguistic production, the place where sentences emerge in the natural world. Second, the turn requires for its achievement the collaborative work of both a speaker and hearer and thus provides an elementary instance of the achievement of social order through communication. Third, within the turn participants are faced with the cultural task of displaying to each other the meaningfulness of their utterances and actions. Further, as features of the turn change the displayed meaning of the participants' emerging action must also change so that its appropriateness to the situation of the moment can be maintained. Indeed the situation of the moment is created and given shape

⁴Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:723) note that:

It is expectable, then, that some aspects of the syntax of a sentence will be best understood by reference to the jobs that need to be done in a turn-in-a-series, turns being a fundamental place for the occurrence of sentences.

through this communications process. The investigation of the turn at talk thus permits the analysis of social, linguistic, and cultural phenomena as elements of a single integrated communications process within which the ongoing situation of the moment emerges and changes through time.

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