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## Can People Talk Politics? A Study of Deliberative Democracy

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# Can People Talk Politics? A Study of Deliberative Democracy

## Abstract

Recently, political deliberation has undergone intensive theoretical scrutiny. While the amount of scholarship on deliberation has been on the rise, it has been limited to a rational / instrumental paradigm focused on the importance of political knowledge and deliberation as an instrument for producing informed public opinion. This dissertation offers an alternative paradigm, called the communal / conversational framework of deliberation, that instead underscores the importance of the enactment of civic identity and the centrality of political conversation before, during and after deliberation occurs. Through the exploration and analysis of four integral research questions—who participates, what do they say, how do they say it, and with what effect—these two frameworks will be compared and contrasted. The normative theoretical principles widely assumed by scholars of deliberative democracy are tested, using bivariate and multivariate analyses, content analysis, and close textual analysis from data generated from a recent project in deliberative democracy. The results provide broad support for the communal/conversational framework of deliberation. While it shares importance with the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation with regard to who participates and with what effect, the communal/conversational framework eclipses the rational/instrumental framework in affording an understanding and predicting what deliberators say and how they say it. It is political conversation, rather than political knowledge, that determines whether someone can in fact be sophisticated in how they talk about politics.

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Communication

## First Advisor

Vince Price

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# Can People Talk Politics?


## A Study of Deliberative Democracy

David Dutwin

A DISSERTATION  
In  
Communication


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at the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

April, 2002



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Supervisor of Dissertation



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Chair of Graduate Studies

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A dissertation is a collaborative project, developing from many years of classes, meetings, and informal conversations among teachers and fellow students. The doctoral education is purportedly where one becomes an expert of a particular field. Regardless of whether this is true, what is important is that the experience requires contact, conversation, and learning from others, more so than any other point in one's adult life (except, perhaps, when it comes to the topic of this thesis, politics). Thus, while my name is on the dissertation, the project is built upon the ideas and teachings of many. Of course, my parents must receive the greatest praise, for their "facilitation" and their ability to wait out my wilder years (which, I am glad to report, I made through unharmed). Great thanks go to my advisor, Vince Price, for his encouragement and guidance, and to the members of my committee, Vince Price, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, and Elihu Katz, for leading by example. In addition, my gratitude goes to Yariv Tsfati, Jenny Stromer-Galley, Tresa Udem, and Dannagal Goldthwaite for their assistance in the development of the coding instrument used in this project, and to Lisa Leher and Leah Neaderthal for helping me code the data.

Communication is a science and an art. Furthermore, I have come to believe that Communication is an invaluable art and science, for it is a subject that we come into contact with everyday. We all think, learn, react, and dream in language. As such, the professors I have had have not only taught me about the field of Communication but also, and most important, how to think, how to greet the world with reflexivity and new ideas critically. For this I most thank my committee, as well as other professors from whom I have learned so much, including Barbara Warnick, Lance W. Bennett, Leah Ceccarelli, John Stewart, J. Michael Hagen and Richard Johnston.

## ABSTRACT

### Can People Talk Politics? A Study of Deliberative Democracy

David Dutwin  
Vince Price, Dissertation Supervisor

Recently, political deliberation has undergone intensive theoretical scrutiny. While the amount of scholarship on deliberation has been on the rise, it has been limited to a rational / instrumental paradigm focused on the importance of political knowledge and deliberation as an instrument for producing informed public opinion. This dissertation offers an alternative paradigm, called the communal / conversational framework of deliberation, that instead underscores the importance of the enactment of civic identity and the centrality of political conversation before, during and after deliberation occurs. Through the exploration and analysis of four integral research questions—who participates, what do they say, how do they say it, and with what effect—these two frameworks will be compared and contrasted. The normative theoretical principles widely assumed by scholars of deliberative democracy are tested, using bivariate and multivariate analyses, content analysis, and close textual analysis from data generated from a recent project in deliberative democracy. The results provide broad support for the communal/conversational framework of deliberation. While it shares importance with the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation with regard to who participates and with what effect, the communal/conversational framework eclipses

the rational/instrumental framework in affording an understanding and predicting what deliberators say and how they say it. It is political conversation, rather than political knowledge, that determines whether someone can in fact be sophisticated in how they talk about politics.

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## Introduction

In the beginning of 1999, just as Philadelphia's mayoral primaries were moving into high gear, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* began a project in political deliberation and civic journalism. Over 500 individuals across the city gathered each month to deliberate—talk politics—in order to define the most pressing problems for the city, outline and consider the solutions to those problems, and ultimately frame the political dialogue of the candidates around the concerns and issues they generated in their discussions.

The designers of the project, all experienced in both civic journalism and prior National Issues Forums deliberations run by the Kettering Foundation, had a simple plan: In the first month, citizens would set the agenda by identifying the four or five of the most important issues facing the city of Philadelphia. In the second month, the citizens would create three choice frameworks, or public policy options, for each issue. While the third month focused on refining these choice frameworks, the final month would have citizens gather to argue for and against each choice framework, ultimately, it was hoped, being able to settle on specific policy choices, directions, and increased political information to use in confronting the candidates with their concerns.

In February, Chris Satullo, an editor for the *Inquirer* and key organizer of the deliberative events, published a list of policy options based on the citizens' discussions. The response was less than positive. The participants, or at least a significant number of



them, complained that the policy options, compiled into three choice frameworks, did not represent what occurred during their deliberations. Many of the citizen discussion groups, in fact, tried but did not come to any consensus as to what policy options should fall under each framework. Still others felt that the options published in the *Inquirer* were never even discussed, let alone placed into some sort of framework. While the *Inquirer* meant well, the result was that many citizens, told that this project was solely designed so that their voices could be heard, felt that their voices had been usurped and reframed into something quite different than what they felt they had said.

As someone who was involved in the project, who moderated, and who, as I will detail, spent over a year studying its character and outcomes, I am confident that the *Inquirer* had no motive other than to clarify what was said in prior discussions so that future discussions could have refined focus. Why then, was there an uproar by some of the participants over what the *Inquirer* said the public had said?

Answering this question is at the heart of this dissertation, and concerns a divide between what many academics, political sophisticates and journalists define as “deliberation” and what citizens actually do when they gather together in relatively large groups to talk politics. On the one hand, there is the notion that political discussion or deliberation elucidates policy options, is comprised of rational, argumentative dialogue, and is done to give certain public policies the backing of the people, all while the people become more knowledgeable and efficacious of politics. On the other hand, there is a second inclination that political deliberation is a communal event where citizens gather simply to talk politics, reify their role as citizens, act as citizens, and assert how the

political process can and should move closer to citizens and their needs, where one need not be politically sophisticated to talk and the talk need not be highbrowed.

It is important to note that these two styles of talking politics are not mutually exclusive, and both have had some voice in academic research. As such, they can be understood not as exclusive models of deliberation but rather as “expectation frameworks” of the character of deliberation that takes place when citizens gather to talk politics. Whether deliberation exhibits the properties of both or either framework is an empirical question and one that has important implications for our understanding of public opinion formation, the ability and character of citizen’s political talk, and our conceptions of democracy itself. The goal of this dissertation is to explicate these choice frameworks and their foundations in academic thought, as well as explore an actual event in citizen political deliberation to explore their empirical tenability and the implications of what occurs when citizens gather to talk politics.

Political deliberation is a specialized form of communication about politics. As I will detail, the act of political deliberation had been narrowly defined by scholars as something quite different than what truly occurs when citizens gather to talk politics. In short, scholars have conceived of deliberation as a means of informing the citizenry, of infusing the polity with informed, citizen-generated opinions on matters of public policy. Deliberation is meant to produce a small subset of citizens who can represent how the overall citizenry would act and think if they were all fully informed (Fishkin, 1991). The perspective asserts that deliberation is the last step to an informed public and informed policy. Furthermore, deliberation is understood to be a rational, quasi-argumentative

discussion about public policy. In addition to the creation of sophisticated and informed talk about politics, many scholars also believe that such talk can only be generated by sophisticated and knowledgeable citizens.

In contrast to these expectations, this dissertation will argue for an alternative set of expectations about political talk. The alternative framework envisages deliberation instead as a communal act, a celebration of citizenship, an event that catalyzes public opinion formation and reifies citizenship. The framework expects citizens to offer narratives on personal experiences rather than overt debate on public policy choices. It asserts the importance of talking politics over high levels of political knowledge, and focuses on the centrality of citizenship rather than political sophistication and the production of expertise.

This framework views deliberation as a performance of citizenship rather than an instrument of political learning and policy decision-making. Importantly, I plan to contrast this alternative framework to the current one by asking some rather far-reaching questions of deliberation, and by applying these questions to a real project in deliberation. This research gathers not only traditional variables of interest (“old” data, that is, data variables that have been asked in previous explorations of deliberation) but also with entirely new variables.

Chapter one will review the “rational/instrumental” framework of deliberation in a summary of prior research. I then propose a “communal/conversational” framework of deliberation, and show that such a model, though less well represented in empirical research, has firm and extensive roots in a vast array of literature across a wide range of

topics and fields. This review culminates in a set of alternative empirical expectations of deliberative character, consistent with each framework.

Chapter two introduces the data used for this project. The study draws upon not only traditional survey measures, but also content analyses of nearly every word spoken in the Philadelphia deliberations. I detail the coding scheme that was applied to these data and the variables it produced.

Chapters three through six each focus on a single “big” question. These questions will be justified in the present and following chapter and are, in sequence: Who participates and why? What do they say and how do they say it? Who says what? How does it affect them? These questions are not complex, but they are central to scholars concerned with deliberation. And more important, as I will detail, each framework provides clear expectations pertaining to each question. Thus, investigating these four questions leads to insights about the applicability of each framework. I examine the tenability of the two frameworks, through these four questions, in light of the Philadelphia experience.

Chapter three examines who participates in deliberation. Prior models of political participation have focused on socio-economic status (SES) variables and political sophistication variables (e.g. education, political knowledge, and political interest). While it is likely that such variables do matter in predicting who participates in deliberation, they need not be the sole focus in understanding who chooses to deliberate, if deliberation is a communal and informal act of political talk, we should expect that participation in deliberation is dominated by individuals who have a strong civic identity

or sense of communalism. This chapter will show that although many of the variables from the traditional framework of participation are found to predict participation in deliberation, there is also substantial evidence from both quantitative and qualitative analyses that the civic identity is a central motivator of deliberation.

Chapter four focuses on a descriptive analysis of deliberation, specifically, on what people say and how they say it. The rational/instrumental framework of deliberation views deliberation as an argumentative discussion on matters of public policy, where individual's values guide their public policy positions and arguments. However, as the organizers of the Philadelphia deliberations learned, citizens tend to focus on sharing their personal experiences and broad-ranging political values. When public policy is discussed, it is couched in the language and the values of the community, not the individual.

Chapter five asks who says what. It contrasts the traditional framework, which claims that deliberation will be best predicted by levels of political sophistication, with the alternative framework, which suggests that deliberative abilities are best predicted not by sophistication but by prior levels of conversation and conversational skill. Prior levels of conversation are indeed found to predict, not only how much one talks in deliberation, but also the degree to which such talk is argumentative and the degree to which an individual talks on a broad range of topics.

The final analysis is presented in chapter six and focuses on the effects of deliberation. The rational/instrumental framework of deliberation has provided some evidence that deliberation changes opinions, increases political knowledge, and increases

political efficacy. Deliberation is seen as a useful endeavor for the polity at large because those who participate in deliberation stand in for those who do not. In addition to reviewing the broad literature critiquing these claims, this chapter also presents new analyses focused on conversation rather than knowledge and opinion change, finding that deliberation increases post-deliberative political conversation. Rather than argue that deliberation is important to the polity at large because of some sort of representative status afforded to deliberative participants, the communal/conversational framework of deliberation argues that increased levels of conversation brought on by deliberation create a diffusion effect. As such, the polity is affected as the interest and vivacity of the participants is diffused into their separate social networks.

The conclusion provides an overall assessment of the character and nature of deliberation, based on these analyses. Although the rational / instrumental framework is found to have some importance in determining who is most likely to participate in such an event, the communal / conversational expectation frame is clearly most consistent with how the deliberative participants actually talked politics. Citizens spoke about community, about the civic values of accountability and responsibility, about the local focus, and about public policy only in so far as it could be related to the communitarian citizen's needs and expectations. At its essence, the communal / conversational frame defines politics at the personal level, through the eyes of a citizen and his or her "line of sight" experience. People define politics as they encounter it, as something agreed to amongst friends and neighbors. The citizens talked a certain brand of politics, one very different than the "normative standard." But as the conclusion will argue, the particular

brand of deliberation spoken in the Philadelphia deliberations was no less important, useful, or engaging than what normative theorists have hoped for.

The two expectation frameworks tested and investigated in this dissertation are again not mutually exclusive, but are rather ends of a spectrum on a few select dimensions of political talk. This dissertation is not, then, offering two models competing in a zero-sum game for sole rights to explain the character, nature, and effects of deliberation. Rather, each framework provides different expectations of how individuals come to be deliberative participants, how individuals argue about politics, and what individuals get out of the process. Each chapter is designed to study one of four key characteristics or dimensions of political talk. Analyses within each chapter point to different spots along the spectrum with regard to a specific characteristic of deliberation. These chapters on the research questions are preceded by chapters detailing the data to be used in the dissertation and theoretical justification for the two expectation frameworks. In the end, this dissertation will show that how citizens talk politics, while very different than predominant theoretical expectations, is vital to a legitimized and well-functioning democracy and a key catalyst in the formation of truly *public* opinions.

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## Chapter 1: Frameworks of Deliberation

The theory of deliberative democracy has strong ties to models of the public sphere and political thinking on rational political decision making. These Habermasian and Rikerian roots, I argue, serve as the central theoretical influences with which modern deliberative democratic theories are situated. The initial purpose of this chapter is to detail these roots and review the theory of deliberative democracy as it stands today, as it is this theory that models what should occur when citizens gather to talk politics. In doing so, I will offer the current theory of deliberative democracy as having a dominant perspective or expectation framework, one that at best is only marginally informed by many related literatures, including within the field of communication gratifications theory, research on political communication, and argumentation theory, and from related fields, literature on everyday reasoning and critical thinking. By reviewing the theoretically relevant literature of these other fields more closely, one finds that the alternative framework I am proposing holds strong theoretical validity.

While the initial purpose of this chapter is to review the theory of deliberative democracy as well as its theoretical roots, this chapter more importantly will make a case for the alternative, communal/conversational framework of deliberation based on these literatures and fields of research. In addition to creating a general case, I will explore the divergence between the two expectation frameworks by again looking at four integral questions with regard to deliberative democracy: Who participates in deliberation and



why, what do they say and how do they say it, who says what, and how does it affect them. Again, because deliberation is a communications process, these questions must be central to understanding deliberation both theoretically and in practice. And, it is these questions, as I will show, that have been the significant focus of scholars' arguments thus far in the theory of deliberative democracy.

### Deliberation Defined

The place to begin is by providing a general definition of deliberation as constructed by prior scholarship. Deliberation has its roots in rational democratic thought, specifically Habermasian and other theoretical veins of the public sphere. Habermas (1962/1993) envisioned a normative political discourse that was rational, equal and interpersonal. This public sphere was characterized by quality opinion and inclusiveness. The public sphere required a public space, including public manners, habits, and talents, and producing a "rational and critical discourse among everyone involved" (Carey, 1996, p. 381).

Two stand-out features in the way deliberation has developed as a concept are thus first as an exemplar of public sphere dialogue and second as an instrument that generates and places within democratic practice informed and rational citizen-based public thought. With regard to the latter, the concept of deliberation has been defined by deliberative scholars in light of its utility and place in democracy. Democracy, formally defined, must include the right of every citizen to an equal voice and an equal chance for that voicing. These are achieved through free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl, 1998). As such, a democracy must, in practice, allow for the freedom of expression, outlets for

alternative information, sites for associational autonomy, and the principle of inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 1998).

Deliberation is a practice designed to address these four characteristics. As I review below, deliberation must exhibit equality, for this satisfies the principle of freedom of expression. Deliberation is an outlet for alternative information, more so than ordinary political conversation in that there is a greater chance of meeting individuals with different information and different perspectives. Deliberation is a site for associational autonomy, and one of the functions of political communication, and deliberation specifically, is the provision of community contact. Finally, again based on the principle of equality, deliberation provides for inclusive citizenship, where individuals come to meet not as individuals but as citizens.

Deliberation, then, is “a conception of democratic politics in which decisions and politics are justified in a process of discussion among equal citizens” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 161). Furthermore, it is a public discourse, employing practical reasoning. Deliberation is a formalized discourse where citizens define political goals and weigh the choices available to achieve such goals (Walton, 1996). Deliberation contains mutual reason-giving (Gutmann & Thompson, 2000) and reasoned argument (Knight & Johnson, 1994), and is a site where self-interests are overshadowed by discussion of the public good (Bohman, 1996), guided by principles of reason and order (Bessette, 1994).

In addition, deliberation creates more fully-informed citizens, creating well-considered opinions from which decisions of public policy can be made. Indeed,

Fishkin's (1991) entire argument hinges upon this premise. This is deliberation's *instrumental* function: To produce well-considered, stable opinions through the combination of rational thought, reasoned argument, mutual reasoning-giving and an environment of full information, leading to rational, *democratic* (e.g., citizen generated) public policy decisions.

To say that deliberation is *rational* reflects the fact that deliberative practice is normatively designed to mirror the Habermasian ideal in which the public sphere is marked by rational thought, an equality of citizens and talk, and a fair, open, and engaged process. The characteristic of equality or symmetry has been described as an absolute necessity of deliberation, according to most scholars (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1962/1993; Mansbridge, 1983). Formerly defined, deliberation should be equal in who participates and in how seriously each individual's comments are taken and the amount of discussion and/or silence produced by each individual.

Deliberation has also reflected the Habermasian ideal of openness and engagement (Gutmann, 1993). Citizens must be willing and able to shape and reshape their opinions through deliberation (Bickford, 1996). Public reason-giving (Barber, 1994) and learning cannot occur without openness. In addition to openness, deliberation must exhibit engagement, that is, agreement and disagreement so that consensus or dissensus on political issues can be made public (Cohen, 1997; Barber, 1994; Knight and Johnson, 1994; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Without engagement, of which agreement and disagreement are crucial, there is no deliberation, simply the voicing of personal

opinions to citizens who have no interest in hearing such opinions, only interest in voicing their own.

Deliberation, as defined by deliberative theorists, also must contain reasoned argument (Bessette, 1994; Gutmann and Thompson, 2000; Knight & Johnson, 1994). Deliberation requires both reciprocity (Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996) and rational discourse. Deliberation is a process by which political decisions, both past and future, must be justified and debated, where public policies are weighed and judged (Gunderson, 2000). As modeled by deliberative theorists, deliberation is an argument-driven endeavor. The concepts of reciprocity and mutual reason-giving, coupled with persuasion, necessitate a form of discourse that is rational, logical, and rhetorical (Gutmann, 1993).

### Frameworks of Deliberation

As stated previously, this dissertation takes issue with the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation that has been developed over the past decade following mainstream thought on the public sphere and rational political decision making. While thus far I have provided only a topical review of this framework, I will now begin to describe that framework in detail as well as offer an alternative theoretical framework designated the communal/conversational framework. While I have provided some general attributes of the rational/instrumental framework in the previous section, I have yet to provide a fully explicated description. To move toward specifics, and more importantly, the development of empirical questions with which both the rational/instrumental and the communal/conversational frameworks can be tested,

compared, and contrasted, four central questions about deliberation are advanced and each framework is depicted in light of these questions. The important point to be made here is that the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation remains largely a theoretical perspective with little empirical support. This fact underscores the importance of developing and testing empirical questions with which the framework can be afforded (or not) evidentiary validity. In what follows, I will offer justifications for the importance of each question and review the rational/instrumental framework in light of each question. In addition, a review of literatures relevant to deliberation will offer evidence contrary to the rational/instrumental framework, and this same literature will offer support for a communal/communicative framework of deliberation. In table 1a below, a brief description of the two frameworks in light of the four major questions on deliberation is provided:

**Table 1a: Two Frameworks of Deliberation**

<b>Key Questions of Deliberation</b>	<b>Rational / Instrumental</b>	<b>Communal / Conversational</b>
<b>Who participates and why?</b>	Group representative of the polity, to form/affect public policy	Civic identifiers, a celebration of citizens, validation/enactment of their role as citizens
<b>What do they say and how do they say it?</b>	Talk of public policy, rational, argumentative	Stories of the community, argument not the primary focus
<b>Who says what?</b>	Knowledgeable citizens	Communalists/ conversationalists
<b>How does it affect them?</b>	Increases knowledge, efficacy, and creates well-considered opinions	Increases their conversational levels with others

**Who Participates and Why?**

For a number of reasons, the question of who participates and why is central to an understanding of deliberation. First, if those who participate are meant to be a representative subset of the overall polity, it is important to know whether deliberative events attain representativeness. If the sample is not representative, it is important to know in what way the sample differs from the general population and whether this difference has important consequences. Any difference between the target population and the sample also raises the question of whether there are specific reasons as to why representativeness was not attained. Finally, any unrepresentativeness may have serious

implications for what is said in deliberation and how it is said, in addition to what is retrieved from the deliberative event.

Although there are a number of different conversations within the literature on political participation,<sup>1</sup> the rational/instrumental framework either ignores these literatures entirely or focuses solely on traditional political science literatures and variables, namely socio-economic and other individual level indicators of participation including political knowledge and interest. A second class of studies, however, is also directly relevant to deliberative participation as it is focused on communicative acts of participation. This class includes the many different studies concerned with the spiral of silence theory first developed by Elizabeth Noelle-Neuman (1993), as well as a handful of studies that are specifically concerned with participation in a deliberative forum. In addition, and most central to the communal/conversational framework of deliberation, there are studies that focus on activists and other kinds of political participants that seek to describe the motivations to participate in politically relevant activities. This last class differs from the first two in its methodology which is only partially survey-based and primarily ethnographic. This literature, however, does provide a rich description of the civic-minded personality, affording the current study a starting point with which to formalize many important aspects of the communal/conversational framework.

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<sup>1</sup> Participation has some relation to social capital. Using factor analysis, Scheufele & Shah (2000) find civic engagement (a measure of three specific types of participation) to be one of three different dimensions of social capital.

Perhaps the most pertinent study with regard to the rational/instrumental framework is Verba, Schlozman, & Brady's Voice and Equality (1995), which argues that individuals do *not* participate in politics because they cannot, do not want to, or because they were not asked. From these three explanations the authors create a general typology of variables that might account for political participation, again falling into three general categories: resources, motivations, and opportunities. Resources can include available time, money, and skills. Motivations include political interest political efficacy, strength of partisanship, and political information. Finally, opportunities refer to recruitment networks, location within society, and the level of conversational links to others.

It is important to note that Verba et al. (1995) studied only certain types of participation, including voting, campaign work, contributions, contacts, protests, as well as political affiliations and informal community activity. While their study does not examine participation in political deliberations, it is nevertheless an important starting point with which to gain an understanding of the important relationships regarding participation in general. While there are differences in the number and strength of the independent variables that relate to the various participation variables studied in Voice and Equality, there are still commonalities across these variables that likely extend to deliberation as a participation variable of interest.

Verba and colleagues (1995) find that participation is a matter of all three categories (resources, motivations, and opportunities), and specifically find consistent positive relationships, regardless of the model, between participation and education,



family income, civic skills (stemming from prior social activity in the church, organizations and career), political interest and political information. Other significant positive relationships were evident in only some of their models, including political efficacy, partisan strength, issue involvement, and institutional recruitment (e.g., from churches and unions). Overall, Verba et al. argue for the commonality, but inequality of participation. In other words, while participation was widespread, it was heavily dependent upon socio-economic status and family and social upbringing. Money and class, it seems, not only predict the amount of money individuals might later give to politics, but effort and time as well.

The results found in Voice and Equality have been mirrored in a number of other studies on political participation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Conway, 2000; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Goel, 1980; Milbrath, 1972). There is, therefore, significant evidence within the political science literature that participation in political activities will not be representative but will instead hinge upon a number of factors including levels of political sophistication as well as socio-economic factors. Yet many empirical studies of deliberation and other deliberative events do not consider these factors significant enough to take seriously, other than to offer incentives to minimize some of these potential confounds to representativeness (Fishkin, 1996, 1999).

Again, if the rational/instrumental framework is concerned with systematic differences in participation at all, the focus resides in demographic variables and some attitudinal and psychological variables, especially political knowledge, education, and other SES variables. Noticeably absent in these studies is the inclusion of

communication factors both as independent and dependent variables<sup>2</sup>. These include political conversation (also called interpersonal discussion), attention and exposure to media, specifically newspapers and television news, and participation measured as attendance in a deliberative forum or even as simply the willingness to speak out about politics under certain social conditions. However, a separate but equally informative collection of studies on participation has been generated in recent years, many in response to Noelle-Neumann's (1993) spiral of silence theory, that have employed these communication variables with much success.

As summarized by Katz (1981), the spiral of silence theory states that individuals will suppress their opinions if they perceive themselves to be unsupported by others. It is a theory that depends on the assumption that individuals use the mass media in their search for support and that the mass media tend to speak monopolistically, as if with one voice. There are a wealth of articles that follow up on some aspect of the spiral of silence theory, which all tend to vary slightly based on the specific dependent variable of interest. These differ in the conditions under which one would be willing to speak to another about politics. Noelle-Neuman herself, and others after her, have set up their dependent variable as the willingness to discuss politics to a stranger on a train. Although the

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<sup>2</sup> With the exception of Schuefele's work on civic engagement, a summative measure of general participation including "going to a club or meeting," "did volunteer work," and "worked on a community project," (Scheufele & Shah, 2000) and general political participation (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000), where newspaper use, but not television use, was found to have a significant, direct and positive effect on participation.

willingness to speak may not be a traditional form of political participation, certainly not an institutional one, speaking out on politics is an important departure from the private sphere into the realm of politics, even if it is not an officially sanctioned and sponsored activity. Interestingly, regardless of these differences in the dependent variable, spiral of silence studies tend to support the findings of Verba et al. (1995) in that education, efficacy, interest, and political knowledge all significantly predict participation (e.g. Lasorsa, 1991; Salmon & Neuwirth, 1990; Scheufele, 1999). However, the evidence is far less consistent and depends on the specific dependent variable being tested. These studies often find demographic variables to be insignificant predictors of participation (Glynn, 1984, 1997). Other studies looking at participation in deliberative forums find similarly inconsistent results with demographic and SES variables, as well as for knowledge and efficacy (McLeod et al., 1996, 1999a, 1999b). Although these studies do not provide an alternative perspective (other than underscoring that media exposure should have some relation to participation), they do suggest that the traditional view of participation may not specifically apply to participation in deliberation.

A third and final collection of literature regarding political participation, comprising of in-depth studies of political participants including political and community activists, does offer direction for an alternative perspective of deliberation, specifically with regard to who participates and why. These studies suggest that participation in deliberation may be most significantly affected not by political sophistication and SES variables but by interest in one's community and an identification with being a civic minded citizen.

One such study employed in-depth interviews and found three different narrative genres of how individuals describe the generation of their own political activism: as the result of some personal crisis, through moral discovery, or as a general lifelong commitment (Teske, 1997). In explaining the source of their political activism, activists often describe a struggle for meaning or purpose stemming from some personal crisis, where activist involvement became a site for meaning and personal purpose. In such situations, individuals used political participation as therapy that helped define who they were as individuals. In contrast to the personal crisis narrative, where activism resolved some inner crisis, the moral discovery narrative is generated from external facts and events. Here individuals questioned their own personal worth and purpose in response to substantive public events. Finally, many individuals claim to be active in politics because of a lifelong commitment, often stemming from their earliest memories of their parents' activism of beliefs in the common good and participation toward creating and reifying the common good.

Common among activists is a strong concern for the well-being of others and of society. For many activists, this concern is generated from the values they hold most dear, values of commitment and obligation to further the common good. Teske takes on what he calls the government-centered view of rationality and participation with the citizen-centered view. While he recognizes Verba et al's (1995) position that civic-minded rationales play a significant part in motivating an individual to participate, Teske does critique the generalized political science tradition definition of participation as something that is done to influence or inspire government action. Rather, Teske argues

for a broader definition of political participation by relating it to the larger world of politics, such as the furthering of social values, changing attitudes, upholding ways of life, and having an influence in the social milieu. Furthermore, Teske is critical of the view that participation is essentially irrational, that participation has costs that far outweigh its benefits and rewards. Instead, he argues that participation is wholly rational, but specifically for personal reasons. Participation for activists is the enactment and further structuration of a personal identity. As such, participants follow quite rational desires, including becoming the kind of person they want to be, instantiating qualities and virtues they admire, playing a small role in history, ensuring that they leave behind a certain type of story, and upholding their most deeply held value commitments through their deeds and behavior.

Beyond activists, other studies seem to support the notion that even within the general population participation may be importantly shaped by one's political identity and the enacting of that identity. Matthews (1994), for instance, argues that people participate in politics to gain greater control over an uncertain future, as well as a desire to improve public policy decision making and to make the world and their communities better places in which to live. An additional motivator is citizens' recognition of the importance of addressing deteriorating civic relationships and the wish to develop the means and ability to work together more effectively.

Similarly, a number of scholars argue that participation requires, at the very least, a sense of community identity, education generally and civic education more specifically (Pateman, 1970). Rimmerman (1997) adds two additional elements, first, a belief by the

individual that participation will add to the development of their identity, and second, a belief that it is the duty of citizens to participate in their communities and become involved in the decisions that affect the quality of their lives.

As might be expected, the civic identity is not exclusively constructed prior to participation. In fact, the amount of participation in one's youth is a strong predictor of the later development of the civic identity, including both a sense of gratification and responsibility (Youniss, McLellan, & Yates, 1997). Indeed, Verba et al. (1995) found that two of the strongest predictors of adult political participation are participation in high school government and high school membership in non-athletic clubs. Furthermore, political activities in youth appear to engender political activity in adulthood through the inculcation of a number of participation's antecedents, for example, political efficacy (McAdam, 1988). In addition, it appears that any communal activity can have positive effects on adult participation, including religious participation, extracurricular activities, and close familial relationships (Smith, 1999).

It is very important to note that Verba et al. (1995) also provide support of a communal/conversational framework of communication by focusing on civic gratifications as motivators of political participation. Verba and colleagues theorized three potential gratifications: policy, civic, or material. In giving reasons for voting, 93 percent of respondents provided civic gratifications as the most important. For contacting a government official on a matter of national concern, 87 percent cited civic gratifications. These findings led Verba et al. to claim that civic motivations are an

essential part of the makeup of political participation in America. Other political scientists have agreed (Cheung, Chan, & Leung, 1999; Funk, 1998; Unger, 1991).

Finally, a number of scholars have provided typologies of political participation. It is interesting to note that few have included in these typologies a description of civically identifying individuals (see Kaase & March, 1979; Milbrath, 1972). However, Verba and Nie (1972) did find six different types of participatory citizens: inactives, voting specialists, parochial specialists, communalists, campaigners, and complete activists. Communalists are described as those who enjoy taking initiative for the community, performing acts with broad social outcomes and only moderate amounts of conflict. While not engaged in politics to the level of campaigners, communalists consistently engage in at least two of the five communal activities surveyed by Verba and Nie. Communalists are highly involved, hold a high degree of personal political skill, information, and efficacy, but do not exhibit high levels of partisanship or issue extremity. They are most distinguished from other types, according to Verba and Nie, by their high level of civic-mindedness.

Focusing on communalism, the alternative model of deliberation I am proposing here argues that the civic identity will be a primary if not the most important factor in determining who participates in political deliberation. The civic identity is an identity that is defined or given further structure through the enactment of participatory actions, where such participatory actions gratify the need of individuals to contribute to the collective good, to uphold the values of community and concern for others. Thus, factors which directly measure the civic identity should be more extant in participators of

deliberation than non-participants. This also suggests that the participants should mirror the characterization of communalists reported in Verba and Nie (1972). This means that participants will exhibit many of the features predicted by the rational/instrumental framework, namely, high levels of political knowledge and efficacy. Thus any analysis of deliberative participation is not expected to show strong support for the alternative framework and little for the traditional model. Since these two are in this case empirically related, I expect any study that tests for variables within both frameworks will find roughly similar support. Expectations specific to the current project will be explicated in greater detail in chapter three.

#### What Do They Say and How Do They Say It?

If there is an expectation that those who choose to participate in deliberation are systematically different than those who decline to participate, there will, in all likelihood, be implications for what is said and how it is said. Furthermore, what is said and how it is said is a benchmark of whether the discourse found in deliberation is generally rational and argumentative, as opposed to narrative and communal, in addition to whether the talk is public policy-based or instead grounded within the community and individual experience. This question is, in short, central to an investigation of the presence of both models in deliberation.

#### Principles in the Rational/Instrumental Framework of Deliberation

As mentioned earlier, the current expectation framework of deliberation is situated upon Habermasian principles of rationality, equality and engagement. Such



principles, and others, have been more or less directly adapted from conceptions of the public sphere to deliberation, as detailed below.

Deliberation, as mentioned, is “a conception of democratic politics in which decisions and politics are justified in a process of discussion among equal citizens” (Gutmann and Thompson, 2000, p. 161). Deliberation is essential in order to provide citizens a vehicle (instrument) with which to become politically engaged and to provide autonomy to the political process. Furthermore, deliberation is a public discourse that is marked by goal-directed practical reasoning. Citizens take the opportunity to define political objectives and to weigh the various means that purportedly achieve such goals and objectives (Walton, 1998). Through deliberation, citizens may create collective action, or, at least, “reencounter, reevaluate, and repossess” their own and other’s opinions (Barber, 1984). Deliberation is contrasted with two other kinds of discourse: private discourse, that is, discourse marked by consensus in homogeneous collectives (Habermas, 1962/1993), and technical discourse, a discourse characterized by limited rules of what constitutes valid evidence, presentation and judgment (Goodnight, 1982). Rather, deliberation is a discourse marked by mutual reason-giving (Gutmann & Thompson, 2000) and reasoned argument (Knight & Johnson, 1994), where self-interests are transformed into public goods (Bohman, 1996). It is, in short, part private discourse and part technical argumentation (Goodnight, 1982), a discourse that blends the formal and informal, guided by principles of reason and order (Bessette, 1994).

Deliberation has a number of central normative characteristics. As mentioned, the first is that it be guided by the norms of equality and symmetry (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen,

1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1962/1993; Mansbridge, 1983).

According to the Habermasian ideal, this means, in essence, checking one's personal attributes at the door, entering deliberation as equal to others in stature and respect.

Equality ensures that everyone has a chance at self-determination and association.

Equality is essential if deliberation is to achieve autonomy: Without equality there is no "people," just a select few who speak for all.

Deliberation also requires that citizens provide reflexivity or public reciprocity (Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). That is, citizens must publicly provide reasons for supporting or opposing any publicly stated political position. Deliberation, according to Barber (1984), is required when "some *action of public consequence* becomes *necessary* and when men (sic) must thus make a *public choice* that is *reasonable* in the face of *conflict* despite the *absence of an independent ground of judgment*" (p. 122, original italics). Reciprocity creates conflict, for it requires that citizens justify their reasons in the face of opposing political perspectives. As such, ultimately, some positions may be found to be based on purely moral grounds (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). However, through reciprocity, citizens are encouraged to at least understand the positions of others empathetically, to understand, in the absence of independent grounds for judgment, that many opposing points of view are credible.

Political actions, it is widely argued, should only arise through forethought and discussion. However, many citizens may have only loosely held or poorly informed positions on political issues, if any at all. By making public reason-giving a tenant of deliberation, citizens are able to encounter the reasons of others in order to become more

fully informed. As argued by Benhabib (1996), deliberation is necessary because no one single individual can foresee every perspective, nor will any single individual have all the information pertinent to any given political issue. Thus, deliberation is a form of discourse featuring fully explicated public reason-giving, containing a number of attributes, including the articulation of interests, persuasion, the exploration of mutuality and disagreement, affiliation and affection, self-expression, opinion reformulation and reconceptualization, and community building (Barber, 1984).

In deliberation, citizens accomplish two things simultaneously: they impart and receive information while formulating and reformulating their opinions. But because such actions occur within the realm of politics, discussions in deliberation are on topics in which truth is unobtainable. Deliberation is discourse about how we should proceed collectively and politically. As such, past facts must be framed as pertinent to future policy. According to Aristotle, deliberative rhetoric is discussion on topics based on practical knowledge where truth is unattainable, and is less a science than an art (Kennedy, 1991). It is a discourse where we “take others into our deliberations” to get a basis for making decisions that are more informed than if generated *in vacuo*. Deliberation requires that practical knowledge is made pertinent to the topic at hand, and by doing so it achieves its two functions of imparting information and (re)formulating opinions.

What then, are the goals of deliberation? As suggested, some of its goals are in fact inherent in deliberation itself, that is, to provide information and (re)formulate opinions. In addition, through the essential contact deliberation provides with others,

deliberation builds community as we encounter others, their positions, and attempt to, if not agree, come to understand why such positions, perhaps in conflict with our own, are taken by others (Barber, 1984; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In this sense, a principal outcome of deliberation is the instantiation of community through intimate communicative contact with others (Mill, 1886).

Deliberation may also achieve “a consensus on action” on a number of different political issues (Cohen, 1997). Most theorists have come to realize, however, that the more likely outcome is consensus on where people stand, where they agree and where they disagree (Barber, 1984, Knight & Johnson, 1994; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In this regard, it is hoped that, at the very least, deliberation will reduce the number of dimensions upon which citizens disagree (Knight & Johnson, 1994). Instead of mediating or transforming conflict, deliberation, it is hoped, minimizes or accommodates conflict through a process of reciprocity and what Gutmann & Thompson call the “economy of moral disagreement.”

Viewed normatively, then, deliberation should contain the following characteristics. First, deliberation should exhibit openness and engagement (Gutmann, 1993). In other words, citizens should be willing and able to shape and reshape their opinions through deliberation (Bickford, 1996). The value of autonomy discussed earlier (Gutmann & Thompson, 1993) is clearly synonymous with the principle of openness. Public reason-giving (Barber, 1994) and learning, two central *telos* of deliberation, cannot occur without openness.

In addition to openness, deliberation must exhibit engagement, or more specifically, agreement and disagreement so that consensus or dissensus on political issues can be made public (Cohen, 1997; Barber, 1994; Knight & Johnson, 1994; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Without engagement, of which agreement and disagreement are crucial, there is no deliberation, simply the voicing of personal opinions to citizens who have no interest in hearing such opinions, only interest in voicing their own.

A second principle of deliberation made by deliberative theorists is that it contain reasoned argument (Bessette, 1994; Gutmann and Thompson, 2000; Knight & Johnson, 1994). Deliberation requires this principle to exhibit both reciprocity (Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996) and rational discourse (Habermas, 1962). Deliberation is a process by which political decisions, both past and future, must be contested and justified, where public policies are evaluated and judged (Gunderson, 2000). As modeled by deliberative theorists, deliberation is an argument-driven endeavor. The concepts of reciprocity and mutual reason-giving, coupled with persuasion, necessitate a form of discourse that is rational, logical, and rhetorical. However, deliberation is not wholly argumentative. While distinct from private and technical argumentation, deliberation utilizes elements of both discourses. In short, it is part informal conversation and part political argumentation. Like Aristotle's conception of political dialogue, deliberation will contain arguments about the nature of the present political reality, a vision of the normative future political reality, and ways to realize the future given the present (Gunderson, 2000). However, the principle here of reasoned argument is relatively

diverse from author to author in terms of the level of sophistication possible by individuals in deliberation. For example, Walton (1998) argues that deliberation is meant to define political objectives in addition to discussing the various means by which a polity can meet such goals. Based on this interpretation, deliberation may not have to discuss the finer points of public policy so much as simply, and minimally, define the public's objectives. On the other hand, deliberation has also been defined as discourse in which public policies are fully explicated through public reason-giving, the articulation of interests and persuasion (Barber, 1994). In general, however, deliberative theorists claim that deliberation is an argument-driven endeavor. The concepts of reciprocity and mutual reason-giving, coupled with persuasion, necessitate a form of discourse that is rational, logical, and rhetorical.

A third principle of deliberation according to deliberative theorists is equality and symmetry (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1962/1993; Mansbridge, 1983). That is, deliberation should not only be equal in who participates but also in how seriously each individual's comments are taken and the amount of discussion and/or silence produced by each individual. Of the principles thus far, this principle is the most easily and directly measured by the degree to which minorities and perceived minorities speak as compared to majorities, as will be done in the present project.

With regard to what is said and how it is said, the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation can thus be characterized by the principles of equality, openness and engagement, and rational/reasoned argument. The communal/conversational framework

does not openly contradict or oppose the notion that deliberation should exhibit equality and openness. Nevertheless, whether deliberation is open and equal is an empirical question and one that surprisingly enough has yet to be tested. Given that the present project is fully capable of testing these principles and that such principles are relevant to the rational/instrumental framework that is being challenged and tested in this dissertation, these two principles will be explored empirically in chapters four and five.

Where there is conflict between the two expectation frameworks is with the principle of rational and reasoned argument. The communal/conversational framework stipulates that such reasoned and rational argument will not be a primary feature of deliberation, but will instead focus on personal narratives and communal issues. Given the centrality of the reasoned argument principle, it is paramount here to review literature that has explored individuals' abilities to argue in group settings. This includes literatures on argument, conversation, and everyday reasoning. As will be evident, these literatures call into question the ability of citizens to argue on public policy with much sophistication, and instead suggest that deliberation will be characterized by discourse only partially reasoned, generally argumentative, and highly experiential, consistent with the communal/conversational framework presented in this dissertation.

### Argumentation

Argument in conversation is a complex state of reason-giving in the form of assertions, announcements, and invitations to agreement that are given some kind of response, either an acknowledgment, agreement, disagreement, or counter-assertion (Coulter, 1990). The assertions made by speakers can vary from simple expressions of

thought and feelings to complex statements containing arguments tailored to the specific social context (O'Keefe, 1988). According to this literature the arguments in deliberative utterances can exhibit a number of features. Based on a Toulminian model, argumentative utterances can contain a claim, and, at the very least, data for that claim, although a number of other elements can come into play, including warrants that help describe the relevance of the data to the claim, and qualifiers, which state under what circumstances a claim is valid (Toulmin, 1958). There are also different types of data, or evidence for the claim. Evidence can be a simple co-occurrence of facts, or correlation of events, through assumption or analogy (Kuhn, 1991; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Evidence can also take the form of facts or anecdotal evidence such as stories and narratives (Baesler, 1997; Fisher, 1987; Schiffrin, 1990).

Responses, too, extend in complexity beyond simple agreement and disagreement. Responses can contain counter-arguments or rebuttals, pointing out causal insufficiencies or necessities (Kuhn, 1991). Jackson and Jacobs (1980) describe argument in terms of such claim and rebuttal "adjacency pairs." Disagreement in adjacency pairs can occur from either withholding agreement as to the truth of the claim (propositional disagreement) or because the claim is otherwise inappropriate (performative disagreement). Given the speaker's assessment of the rhetorical situation, she or he can initiate a range of strategies designed to avoid disagreement. Argument can be viewed in two ways, as a specific dialogic act that includes at least one protagonist and one antagonist, or as a larger process that may not contain an antagonist, although in this second sense, arguments are usually still framed with an antagonist in mind (Antaki,



1994; Jacobs, 1989; Meyers, 1998). Argument, then, is “both system (regularized, observable patterns of interactive argument) and structure (the virtual unobservable rules and resources undergirding argumentative interaction)” (Meyers et al., 1991).

Although many of these insights into the nature of argumentation were derived from close textual analyses of argument in practice, a number of qualifications make it unlikely that such elements would be present in deliberation. First, the “text” in which such argumentative attributes were examined are different from deliberation. Kuhn (1991) essentially prodded her participants to provide evidence, causal theories, counter-arguments and rebuttals, for example, asking of each participant “someone disagrees with you...what might they say to show that you are wrong?” (p. 146). In another example, the textual artifacts were “decision-making discussions,” typically on non-political hypothetical situations (see Meyers, et al. 1991). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) and Toulmin (1958) studied primarily jurisprudential discourse, a more technical style of discourse than deliberation. While the insights of these authors should not be understated, most argumentation theory and research has not yet investigated the tendency to provide such argumentative structures in citizen-based political deliberations. The possible exception is Antaki (1985), who, in studying open-ended, semi-structured interviews about political issues, found that individuals do in fact make arguments using data, claims, and warrants. However, even for his group of elite deliberators (university professors who were members of their own political party), the discourse was characterized by causal explanations that on average contained only a few paths (essentially, the number of distinct data used for each claim).

Indeed, the literature on argumentation suggests that most citizens have at best a *generalized* argumentative/reasoning ability. Not only do people tend to be “unexceptionally capable” when it comes to argumentation, they also tend to have relatively equal abilities across individuals. Although the studies are few, a number of scholars find similar patterns when it comes to the ability of individuals to use rhetorical language, argumentation, or reasoning abilities, that is, that these abilities formulate mostly during adolescence but flatten out in adulthood. Clark and Delia (1976), for example, found a general improvement over time in children’s ability to use persuasive strategies, but that these abilities leveled off starting around the ninth grade. Other scholars have found similar results with education levels on reasoning abilities (Gettys and Engleman, 1983; Perkins, 1985). Although there are few studies with which to make an assessment, the studies reported thus far suggest that most adults are similarly capable at producing the type of reasoning and rhetorical statements that might occur in deliberation.

Additionally, individuals seem to be similarly capable at a level that can be described as average at best. Antaki (1985), as mentioned, reported a study in which university professors who just formed a new political party in England talked politics in open-ended semi-structured interviews. An analysis of the transcripts found that multiple causation (more than one type of information used to support or refute a single claim) was frequent but also rarely greater than two. Given the elite level of those who participated in the study, it is unclear at what level average citizens might argue. However, if we take the positive but unremarkable level of the university professors as a

ceiling, a citizen's ability to argue should be average at best. Another perspective is provided by Ritchie (2000), who argues that the overall level of individuals' argumentative abilities is unexceptional based on a critique of the findings reported in Kuhn (1991). Similarly, prior experiments on reasoning tasks suggest that members of decision-making groups play passive roles, failing to elaborate poorly warranted claims and rarely exposing poor judgment (Gouran, 1986; Gouran and Hirokawa, 1986).

The literature on argumentation, in sum, provides a great deal of evidence for a number of argumentative models that people may or may not use with frequency in real life. As my critiques of the models presented in this section should make apparent, there are many reasons to believe that individuals rarely if ever reach the normative standard of reasoned argument. Furthermore, as I have noted, none of the studies of argumentation reviewed here use deliberation as their textual artifact or as the setting for their artifacts. Such studies thus provide a useful starting point but only go so far toward shedding light on what actual deliberation by ordinary citizens would look like. Nevertheless, all indications are that deliberation will not be significantly marked by rational, argumentative discourse on matters of public policy, given that studies of situations where such features were more likely to occur did not display such attributes.

The communal/conversational alternative to a rational framework of deliberation is one that focuses on narrative elements (Fisher, 1987). According to Fisher, communication is guided by four main principles: 1) humans are storytellers, 2) the paradigmatic mode of communication is good reasons, 3) good reasons are guided by history, biography, culture and character, and 4) rationality is defined by whether a

narrative contains good reasons and consistency. The narrative paradigm is important because it claims that individuals need not possess sophisticated, expert knowledge and argumentative abilities. All that is required is a logic of good reasons, what he calls narrative fidelity and probability.

Other scholars also provide support for the principle of narration. In a study of the relative effects of story and statistical evidence, Baesler (1997) found, contrary to expectations, that story evidence was as persuasive as statistical evidence, while being far more readable and personable. Furthermore, Schiffrin (1990) finds that stories are a primary argumentative force in providing testimonials for various positions and opinions. As such, story-based evidence may be far more pervasive in face to face political dialogue than more rational policy-based argument.

### Conversation

The literature on conversation further calls into question the reasoned argument principle of the rational/instrumental model. Wardaugh (1985), for example, claims that ordinary conversation is marked by the acceptance of uncertainty and contradictory information, and that interlocutors in conversation more often than not implicitly accept what others say. Such realities are incompatible with a high level of argumentative and reasoning ability, which would instead hold that individuals challenge contradictions and critique others' statements carefully. In addition, Eisenstat (1984) offers three different and contrasting styles of potential conversational discourse: serious public discourse, sociable interaction, and the legendary style. The legendary style, argues Eisenstat, is prevalent in group discussions. This style is characterized by the blending of facts and

interpretations into a dramatic and satisfying narrative. From the conversational perspective then, we would further expect deliberation to be characterized by both generalized argumentative ability and the use of narration.

In addition, the conversational paradigm offers a number of important maxims. Grice (1975) specifically posited the cooperative principle and the maxims of manner, relation, quantity and quality. The maxim of *manner* dictates that utterances avoid obscurity, ambiguity, and are brief and orderly. The maxim of *relation* states that utterances be relevant to the ongoing exchange. The maxim of *quantity* indicates that utterances are only as informative as is required for the purposes of exchange, and the maxim of *quality* states that conversationalists do not say what they believe to be false.

McCann and Higgins (1992) take these rules further still, providing a list of conventions undertaken by interlocutors. Specifically, communicators take recipients' characteristics into account, try to be understood, give neither too much nor too little information, are relevant, appropriate to the context, and convey the truth as they see it. On the other hand, recipients also take the communicator's characteristics into account, determine the communicator's intent, take context into account, and try to understand the message.

These "rules" of conversation appear parsimonious considering the nature and goals of deliberation. Part normative and part garnered from observation, the rules facilitate the creation of close contact among citizens, reciprocity, and an economy of moral disagreement in deliberation. By being relevant, appropriate, and by conveying their perceived truth, citizens must be accountable and open to each other in attempting to

provide fair reasons for their positions. Together, the maxims and principles suggest that individuals will provide only a minimum level of reasonableness required for their arguments. The maxim of quantity, for example, argues that people will not provide unnecessary information. Nevertheless, people will try to stay on topic and be relevant to the topic, as stated in the cooperative principle and maxims of relation and manner.

However, other aspects of conversation imperil the attainment of the normative features of deliberation. Implicit in talk are a number of tendencies, according to Wardaugh (1985). These include the tendency to accept uncertainty and contradictions, to go along with others, to accept statements implicitly at face value, and to accept others as they wish to appear. Such tendencies are troublesome if the goal of deliberation is to explore issues thoroughly. Indeed, deliberation must resist these tendencies, and instead challenge and explore uncertainties and contradiction and resist the inclination to accept statements at face value.

Thus, the literature can call into question some principles of the rational/instrumental framework but not others. Specifically, while participants will in all likelihood be reasonable and relevant (leading to openness and engagement), the literature on conversation calls into question the ability of citizens to engage in rational argumentative deliberation.

### Reasoning

Social psychology offers a different tack on deliberation from research on conversation and argument, for while these two latter areas of study are concerned with what is said, social psychology is primarily concerned with what is thought, or what

occurs within the mind. Instead of the ability to argue, social psychologists are more concerned with the ability to reason. Of course, because it is not possible to test directly what occurs in the mind of an individual<sup>3</sup>, social psychologists must operationalize what they want to study, and in most cases that means looking at the spoken or written word, that is, arguments and conversations. As such, the general argument in the literature on reasoning is no different than that of argumentation and conversation.

Studies on everyday reasoning and logic have to some extent explored the ability of citizens to argue in everyday conversation and other texts. This literature suggests that while elements of reasoning will be evident in deliberation, they will not be ubiquitous. Scholars have defined two kinds of reasoning: formal and informal. Given the “conversationality” of deliberation and indications of general and rather unsophisticated argumentative features, it is likely that informal or everyday reasoning is prevalent in deliberation. Galotti (1989) argues that everyday reasoning takes place on “ill-defined problems” (p. 334), that is, problems that lack at least one of the following features: baseline information, legal moves or operations, or fully specified goal states. Deliberation, as with political discussion in general, is often lacking pertinent information and is afforded only vague end-states. Furthermore, deliberation and everyday reasoning have both been described as situations in which problems are not self contained, where there are typically several potentially valid answers and no established procedures for solving any particular problem. Furthermore, as with many political issues, everyday

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<sup>3</sup> In this sense, “opinion” is similarly a phenomenon that can only be measured indirectly (Schiffrin, 1990).

reasoning takes place under conditions in which there may not be a “best” solution (Galotti, 1989). Reasoning is integrally linked to argumentation as it is the “primary interactive activity” (Meyers et al., 1998, p. 263) of argumentation. The central question, then, is whether citizens can achieve deliberation marked by critical discourse that is logical and reciprocal under such conditions.

A number of scholars challenge the notion that people engage in rational argumentation where opinions become shaped and reshaped in the context of accountability and reciprocity. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) was perhaps the most vocal opponent of the idea that citizens can engage in sophisticated political talk. Schumpeter argued that citizens are generally “impatient of long or complicated argument” (p. 249) and believed that, for the average citizen, “mere assertion, often repeated, counts more than rational argument” (p. 257). Even if citizens are given accurate and relevant information, their ability to deliberate in a rational manner may be unaffected. As argued by Schumpeter (1942), irrational decision making will still persist even in the face of education intended to teach individuals to use information in a deliberative communication environment. Based on his own survey-based research on the self-reported willingness and ability of citizens to engage in public discussion, Scheufele (1999) ultimately agreed that, with regard to political deliberation, “an informed and rational citizen does not exist” (p. 25). Furthermore, Braine (1978) argued that “people regularly omit premises, and rarely fully explicate the validity of positions they hold” (p. 19). Individuals often access and use only a fraction of the knowledge they possess on any particular topic (Perkins, 1985) and fail to explore hypotheses thoroughly when



exploring a range of topics (Gettys and Engleman, 1983). Individuals also “selectively misperceive socially supplied political information,” due in part to the pressures of the social context, a context that often supplies one sided, incomplete, and only partially pertinent political information (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). To complicate matters further, misinformation in conversational and argumentative contexts may be presented with absolute certainty. Indeed, there is evidence that those who are wrong are often more certain than those who are right (Fishcoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1977). Research suggests that people “overweight” influential individuals, increase their commitment to a position in response to counterfactual evidence, and continue to preserve beliefs after support for them has been totally discredited (Perkins, 1985). In his own research, Perkin’s findings “offer no reason to view students as especially competent at informal reasoning” (p. 567). In short, as argued by Perkins, “once the reasoner has evolved a simple mental model with no ostensible flaws, he or she is not likely to critique the model deliberately or consider alternative models” (p. 568). Like the literature on argumentation, then, the literature of reasoning suggests that individuals will not exhibit highly rational or well reasoned arguments in deliberation.

Thus, with regard to what deliberative participants say and how they say it, the literature on argumentation, conversation, and everyday reasoning strongly suggests that the principle of reasoned and rational argument, especially on public policy issues, will not likely be a common feature of deliberative dialogue. Instead, the communal nature of the participants (if they are indeed found to be civic identifiers) should lead to discussions marked by individual experience and communal narratives. Although argument and

overt reasoning should still be present in deliberation, they will likely not be prevalent features and indeed utterances containing such features should be in the minority.

### Who Says What?

While the previous question looks at deliberation as an aggregate phenomenon, the question of who says what refocuses on the individual level. This question is important because the rational/instrumental framework states that individuals with high levels of political sophistication will be best able to offer concise and rational arguments in deliberation. The rational/instrumental framework also again stipulates that individuals will be roughly equal in how much is said. Again, the communal/conversational framework does not offer any contradiction of this later principle but does take issue with the first, arguing instead that those who are most practiced in political conversation will not only talk more often in deliberation but on a wider variety of topics and with greater sophistication.

### Equality

Perhaps the most basic facet of deliberation that demands further exploration is the degree to which some individuals speak out and others do not. The predilection to speak is an important gauge of the equality principle of deliberation. At the heart of the equality principle is simply the requirement that individuals be given an equal opportunity to contribute to the deliberation at hand. Yet equality is not only granted by the structure of deliberation itself. It is also a gradually unfolding process in conversational practice that can be affected by both individual and social factors. The political power of the individual is not exerted by simply showing up at an organized

deliberation, but is rather measured by how much that person contributes (Sanders, 1997). As such, investigating whether there are systematic variations in the proclivity to speak is a central and critical research question. Furthermore—assuming that variations do exist—which factors account for them? There is, for example, variation in the individual factors that prior research has tied to the self-reported willingness to speak, such as knowledge, education, and personal opinion positions. There are also social factors, factors that only come into play when one encounters others in political dialogue. From conversation analysis to survey-based research on political talk, factors such as perceived self-placement on an issue in comparison to others have been found to affect the willingness to speak.

In exploring the tenability of the principle of equality, it is crucial to uncover the proclivity of individuals to speak out in deliberation. If some individuals speak out significantly more than others, or if the conversation is dominated by a select few, deliberation in practice may not attain this principle. If so, it is useful to not only find the disparity but to be able to explain the disparity based upon a range of individual characteristics. Furthermore, it is important to understand the social characteristics that might affect the disposition to speak.

The equality principle is most important when considering the concerns raised by Sanders (1997). Sanders claims that “real deliberation is likely to under represent exactly those who need representation the most...Even if these people show up, they are likely to be seen as the least persuasive, to be discounted more frequently” (p. 349). Furthermore,

deliberation may give rise to prejudice and privilege if such individuals lack an effective voice.

A similar criticism has been levied by Young (1996) and Bohman (1996). Young argues that persuasiveness is a concept that has been culturally constructed, and as such, is suspect to hegemony by the majority. Our sense of what is persuasive, argues Young, is what is most logical, rational, and dispassionate. As such, certain types of individuals, those who are most likely to talk with these characteristics, will be seen as more persuasive. Scholars are most concerned with racial and gender differences in this regard. Bohman (1996) makes a similar argument by outlining three types of inequalities in deliberation: opportunities, resources, and capabilities, otherwise termed political, communicative, and public capacities. Cultural imperialism places inequalities on cultural or political capabilities, as the arguments of minorities must be expressed in the language of the majority.

These concerns, however alarming, do not bear the weight of empirical evidence, but rather stand merely as theoretical possibilities. As stated by Dryzek (2000),

The force of all these criticisms of deliberation remain something of an open question pending sustained empirical investigation of the degree to which the claims about what actually happens in deliberation actually do describe reality. Are particular kinds of people in reality better than others at arguing in rational terms?...Is an individual's capacity to deliberate really directly proportional to social standing? (pp. 59-60).

Thus, we see the importance of exploring the question of equality, even if the alternative model of deliberation I am proposing here has no qualm with this tenet of the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation. Again, the divergence between the two

expectation frameworks with regard to who says what lies in whether there are individual discrepancies in the level of sophisticated talk and where such differences reside in terms of individual level data.

### Argument in Deliberation

Although the previous question raised concerns over whether individuals argue and argue well in deliberation, the present question looks at the differential capabilities of argumentation in deliberation between individuals. Just as knowledge, education, gender, and other variables may significantly determine disparities in the overall amount of deliberative talk, similar disparities may also exist with regard to the degree to which individuals are capable of sophisticated discourse. With a general (if not just short of complete) lack of prior empirical data, however, we cannot be certain of these potential relationships without further study. However, as prior literature makes clear, there are again two main suspects with regard to the ability and proclivity to argue in political deliberations. The rational/instrumental framework argues that only those high in political sophistication, as measured by knowledge, interest, and education, are proficient and prolific in deliberation. The communal/conversational framework, on the other hand, stipulates that it is not knowledge and education that predicts deliberative capabilities, but rather deliberation, in a sense, in and of itself. Put another way, political conversation should be a powerful and important predictor of further political conversation, especially deliberation.

The first argument, that more sophisticated individuals, typically measured by levels of knowledge, education, or interest are more capable of deliberation or

argumentation is indirectly supported by a number of studies. More interested people, those in “issue publics,” clearly have more knowledge and, some argue, are thus more able to use their factual knowledge in political conversation (Judd and Krosnick, 1989; Wegman, 1994). Another argument for this possibility contains three premises. First, people with less neutral stances on political issues are generally more likely to offer their opinions to others (or, individuals ambivalent toward a political issue have less reason to voice an opinion on that issue). Second, attentive public and issue public members are far more likely to have non-neutral opinions on a topic (Krosnick & Telhami, 1995). Finally, members of the attentive and issue publics are those, in comparison to the rest of the public, high in education, knowledge, and interest (Krosnick & Telhami 1995). By reversing the order of the premises, the argument can be made that individuals high in knowledge, education, and interest will be more prolific in deliberation. A different but also relevant argument for the relationship between sophistication and deliberation comes from studies of informal reasoning. Perkins, Allen, & Hafner (1983), for example, find that everyday reasoning, what they call a “make sense epistemology,” is dependent upon, in addition to other variables, a large store of knowledge and the ability to utilize such knowledge. Similarly, Galotti (1998) found in her review of the literature that everyday reasoning is based on three factors, including breadth and depth of knowledge, low bias in searching for arguments, and finally, a sophisticated integration of knowledge.

Politically knowledgeable individuals, then, should not only speak more frequently because of their larger repertoire of knowledge and ability to apply it to deliberations, but should also exhibit a wider range of utterance types. They should

create utterances that exhibit well reasoned opinions, containing the three elements of a deliberative opinion, factual, evaluative, and preference statements (Ehninger & Brockriede, 1963). But in addition, knowledgeable (as well as educated and highly conversational) individuals should also provide “modifiers” that is, single element insertions including bits of relevant knowledge, agreement tokens, and supporting narratives. Since they have more concretized or crystallized opinions (Tesser, 1978) they will be more willing to agree or disagree with the various positions taken by others. Such individuals are also generally more fluent in public speaking, presenting to others, and taking part in collective decision making (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, & Nie, 1993). Second, given the greater breadth of their knowledge, these individuals will also be better able to insert relevant facts into a conversation. While individuals low in some forms of knowledge may still be knowledgeable on some topics, highly knowledgeable individuals have greater breadth of knowledge, and are thereby able to contribute to the dialogue on many more of the topics under consideration.

Other sophistication measures have also been shown to be associated with various measures of talk. Cognitive complexity, a measure strongly associated with education, is significantly related to levels of appeal justification (essentially, the use of persuasive rhetorical communication) and the number of data found in such justifications (O’Keefe & Delia, 1979). Education, Emler and Frazer (1999) argue, should be strongly correlated with the volume and complexity of information exposure and role taking opportunities in conversation.

In addition, Scheufele (1999), as mentioned, defines two types of political discussion, opinion expression and political talk, both of which can arise in deliberation. Opinion expression was predicted by the perception of popular support, education, personal issue stance, and age, while political talk was associated with high political knowledge and political participation. Finally, such factors not only affect how one argues, but also the likelihood that one will argue at all. To cite one study, Lasorsa (1991) found, using survey-based data, that political outspokenness had substantively significant associations with education, age, newspaper readership, opinion certitude, self-efficacy, and political interest.

On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that such variables might not have significant impact, at least in the realm of informal reasoning. Perkins (1985) found that postprimary education levels had little impact on informal reasoning. Perkins specifically asked participants in his study to consider a number of public issues “not demanding extensive knowledge” to develop positions and supporting arguments. The dependent variables of interest were the number of sentences, lines of argument, objections, explanations, and judges ratings of the arguments made. While IQ was a significant predictor of these measures, age and, more importantly, education were not. In other studies, everyday reasoning achieved weak associations or null effects to various measures of intelligence (Ceci & Liker, 1986; Wager & Sternberg, 1986). While some evidence supports the sophistication to deliberation argument of the rational/instrumental framework, the evidence is far from substantive and convincing. In short, it is indirect evidence at best, and inconsistent as well.



The communal/conversational framework argues that political conversation rather than political sophistication is a precursor to deliberative capability. Consider the argument for the importance of deliberation: Virtually every deliberative theorist has argued that deliberation is essential in order to formulate opinions and preferences (Barber, 1994; Benhabib, 1996; Fishkin, 1991; Fishkin & Luskin, 1999; Gutmann, 1993; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Deliberation imparts information and exposes individuals to a broad spectrum of opinions (Benhabib, 1996). Deliberation encourages the articulation of interests (Barber, 1984). Deliberation, in short, provides individuals the opportunity to form and hold articulate opinions. Seen as one form of political talk, this argument can be extended to all sorts of political talk. As such, it seems more than reasonable that the more individuals talk about politics, the more articulate their interests, opinions, and knowledge become, and thus the more capable they are at voicing their interests, opinions, and knowledge in future political discussions.

Indeed, the vast literature on critical thinking supports this argument (see Paul, 1992). And many political theorists agree. As Lasch (1995) notes, those who talk about politics will exhibit more structured and organized arguments during deliberation, because individuals high in political conversation have had more opportunities to utter their opinions and defend them in public:

It is only by subjecting our preferences and projects to the test of debate that we come to understand what we know and what we still need to learn. Until we have to defend our opinions in public, they remain...half-formed convictions based on random impressions and unexamined assumptions (p. 170).

Again, this is the argument made by Dewey in The Public and Its Problems (1954): Communication with others begets more articulate communication. As Dewey states, “No man or mind was emancipated by being left alone” (p. 168). In fact, Dewey argues not that knowledge creates the ability to speak, but instead that “knowledge is a *function of association and communication*” (p. 158, italics mine). Although there is little empirical evidence one way or another on this claim, researchers do find, at least in the same discussions, that initial utterances are sometimes crude but are often followed by more sophisticated utterances, as the speaker’s opinions become more concretely formed (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Furthermore, Lalljee and Evans (1998) and Emler (1990) found a strong association between the organization of attitudes and political conversation. Additionally, Robinson and Levy (1986) found that political conversation was a significant predictor of comprehending political information from the media. Thus, it may be political conversation, rather than political sophistication, that is most important when it comes to the ability to effectively argue in political deliberations.

Chapter five, then, will focus primarily on two principles of deliberation, equality and reasoned argument. As such, the focus will move away from analyses on the character of deliberation and toward individual propensities to speak and argue on many topics in a deliberative setting, providing a number of tests of both the principles and expectation frameworks of deliberation presented here.

### How Does It Affect Them?

The final question, how does deliberation affect those who participate in deliberation, has been of substantial interest to researchers within the

rational/instrumental paradigm. This question is in fact the primary reason why this framework is “instrumental,” since it posits that deliberation serves as an instrument by which participants can become fully informed citizens and thus deliberation, as a deliberative poll, can serve as an instrument by which a fully informed public opinion can be cultivated (Fishkin, 1991, 1996). Despite claims of substantive opinion change, knowledge gains, and efficacy gains, studies of deliberation within the rational/instrumental framework suffer from a number of methodological criticisms. The communal conversational framework offers a different account of effects, stating that the most important effect of deliberation is to catalyze conversation, creating a two-step flow of communication starting with deliberators and ending with other members of the polity.

#### Prior Empirical Findings of Deliberative Effects

Perhaps the most powerful effect of deliberation found thus far is that it substantively improves political knowledge (Fishkin and Luskin, 1999). In eight of the eleven knowledge questions asked in their survey, participants in Fishkin’s National Issue Forums increased their aggregate score as little as 6 percent and as high as 58 percent. However, these findings do require some qualification. Despite recording as much as 58 percent improvement, the median question improvement between pre- and post-survey questions was seven percent. Also, the study design upon which this evidence is based is limited on a number of issues. First, the design did not include a control group and as such there was no empirical evidence that the participants improved any differently than non-participants. Second, many of the answers to the questions asked in the surveys could be found in the briefing materials given to the participants. Thus it might not

necessarily be the actual deliberative act that accounted for the reported improvements in knowledge. In addition, Fishkin did not report whether the items adequately scaled together, and thus whether a scaled measure exhibited a significant increase in knowledge in aggregate. Last, the battery of knowledge questions were identical from pre- to post-panel waves, raising the concern that prior exposure inflated the numbers found in the second wave of the panel. Separately these concern do not carry much weight: Together they question the validity of the findings.

Confirmatory evidence comes by way of the present project. An earlier report on the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project showed knowledge to be significantly and positively associated with participation in deliberation (Labrie, 2000). This finding is of particular importance in that the study design did not suffer from the concerns just raised with regard to the NIC. First, the panels in the present project did not contain identical knowledge questions. And although the surveys of this project did not ask significantly more knowledge items than did the surveys of the NIC, the items were scaled together to produce an overall test of knowledge, aiming for breadth rather than specific single items. In addition, rather than simply measure the amount of pre- to post-panel change that occurred, Labrie's analysis compared participants to non-participants, specifically to individuals who declined to participate. Finally, the surveys themselves were conducted almost one year apart from one another, minimizing the chance that the first test affected the second. Given the same consistent findings despite serious differences in their respective designs, the conclusion to be drawn by the data is that deliberation indeed improves a citizen's level of political knowledge.

A second effect of deliberation found by Fishkin is concerned with political efficacy. Fishkin argues that efficacy should change since deliberation is designed not only to improve knowledge and potentially induce opinion change but also to change attitudes, specifically, political attitudes toward political objects. Fishkin finds weak but consistent findings for all but one question regarding political efficacy.<sup>4</sup> Fishkin and Luskin did not report any attempt to scale the separate efficacy items together. Additionally, there is some question in my mind as to the direction of deliberative effects on efficacy. The simple explanation for a positive effect, of course, is that deliberation is an empowering practice, enhancing citizens' perceptions that they are part of an active polity. Certainly, this explanation has strong face value. However, in a rich textual study of political conversation, Eliasoph (1998) found, in a sense, just the opposite. Deliberation, she found, was marked by the "cynical chic." Indeed, the more public the setting, the less efficacious and proactive citizens seemed to be. Without invalidating Fishkin's findings, Eliasoph's research does provide a counterhypothesis, suggesting that deliberation can actually decrease efficacy by creating a "collective cynicism."

Finally, Fishkin and Luskin report consistent net and gross opinion change in the participants of the NIC. Again, however, there are many challenges to these findings. Despite nearly four days of deliberation, Fishkin found that only 25% of relevant opinions changed. Given the instability of political opinions, that is, the existence of nonattitudes (Converse, 1964), and the lack of a control group in Fishkin's quasi-

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<sup>4</sup> "I have no say in government," "Officials care about what I think," "Politics are too complicated (not

experiment (Tringali, 1996), it is unclear whether the participants would have changed their positions without having deliberated at all. Another concern was the Hawthorne effect, that is, that drastic changes in social conditions of the participants may have introduced uncontrollable effects in the experiment. Scholars have argued that the abundant attention paid to the participants (a free plane trip to Austin, free lodging, and national media attention) necessarily changed them in ways that could not be controlled.

In the words of Adair (1996), participants

know this is a novel experiment, and that its success depends on their behavior. They will be highly sensitive to cues to guide their responses. Will the evidence they are to judge be truly balanced, or will subtle expectancies be transmitted? In short, will they respond normally "on stage," independent of any bias, or be susceptible to the pressures known to produce social artifacts? (p. 16).

It should also be noted that many of the effects Fishkin found were short lived.

The study called for a survey of the participants a few weeks and also a few months after the deliberations. The majority of the effects Fishkin found were in the short term:

When surveyed later many individuals fell back to their pre-deliberation levels (Rasinski, 2000). Thus, although Fishkin and colleagues have produced a substantive amount of evidence regarding the effects of deliberation within the rational/instrumental framework, these effects are still in question because of the rather large body of methodological concerns raised regarding his research.

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significant)," "Politicians are out of touch," and "I have worthy political opinions."

## Communal/Conversational Deliberative Effects

The effects found by Fishkin were generated in the first place from a particular conceptualization of deliberation and specifically of how deliberation serves a democratic function. I have typified this perspective as the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation. In brief, Fishkin's (1995, Fishkin and Luskin, 1999) rationale for such effects is an outgrowth of the following premises designed to justify deliberation as an important democratic practice. Americans know little about politics (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1987, Price, 1998). This is important because democracy has long been premised upon an informed and engaged citizenry (Dahl, 1998). Fishkin argues that deliberation is a panacea for democracy, then, primarily by informing the public. But of course, deliberation cannot occur in numbers large enough to create an informed public. What, then, is the solution? Deliberation must somehow extend beyond its participants if it is to in any way significantly influence the democracy in which it is situated. Fishkin's answer is two-fold. First, given the general representativeness of its participants, polls of participants, post-deliberation, can provide us with the opinions of the larger public as if that larger public was indeed fully-informed, infused with knowledge through deliberation. Second, Fishkin envisages deliberative events as magnets for media coverage, and in this way, the discussions of actual citizens (hopefully) can be summarized to the larger public.

Both of these "extensions" of deliberation are premised on the oft-cited expectation of deliberation to produce "better answers" (Gunderson, 2000) or citizen-based political decisions (Barber, 1994; Benhabib, 1996). What has never been pointed

out, however, is how this assumption of “group decisions” is in conflict with notions of what conversation is supposed to do. This model sees conversation as an “end-practice” of democracy, in the face of many indications that it may in fact serve best as the first practice.

The communal/conversational expectation framework of deliberation, in contrast, views public opinion as a communicative process (Price, 1992), and considers deliberation to be not an end (the last act before decision-making) but a mean, that is, a process which improves the ability to make political decisions. As stated by Price and Roberts (1987),

Others give us an idea of what range of opinions will be acceptable; they help us to rethink our own views. Discussion shapes not only evolving public opinion but private opinions as well...Opinions must be seen as developing over time. They are the ongoing product of discursive activity...Opinions are formed through a continuing dialectic between thought and behavior (p. 789).

Thus if deliberation is seen as a formalized type of discussion, we can view deliberation as having a role at any place in the formation of opinion. Opinion formation is a continuous process in which deliberation can serve at any point to refine views and inform citizens, where “decisions” are not made but through which opinions become more refined.

A potential problem with this view is that it does not extend to those who do not participate. However, there is one possible way the opinion formation process may extend beyond the deliberative event, one unlike the two methods posited by Fishkin, the deliberative poll and media coverage of deliberative events: Increased conversation in the polity at large, spurred on by those who participated in deliberation. As the common



maxim goes, answering one question often leads to many more. Deliberation is an event where citizens come into contact with many other citizens, giving participants a unique and immersive chance to be exposed to the diversity of opinions and information held by others, opinion and information to which they may not have ever been exposed. “People do not necessarily end up seeing eye to eye on a conversational topic after debating it,” argue Price and Roberts (1987), “but they come away from discussion with a better understanding how other people think” (p. 798).

Ultimately, deliberation can be a major event in one’s political life. Is there any better instance in which we could hope for conversation to produce further political conversation? Deliberation can and should serve as an event that gives the polity something to talk about. If conversation is seen as a means and not an end, such an effect satisfies important central normative requirements of democracy, for it can help catalyze the formation of public opinion. Placed within the setting of a political campaign, the effect can further be enhanced since political campaigns themselves serve as events where political conversation is highly stimulated<sup>5</sup> (Waldman, 2000).

Why would we want to infuse the polity with greater conversation? Of course, because conversation leads to greater knowledge and more opportunities for opinion formation. Indeed, conversation, as opposed to the media, has been found to account for as much as half of the political knowledge held by individuals in self-reported surveys (Robinson, 1967). As mentioned in the introduction, political conversation is an

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<sup>5</sup> At least near election day.

important part of democracy, leading to the formation of public opinion, a political education, communal contact, and political information. Considering that the overall levels of political conversation of Americans is low (Robinson, 1976; Troidahl & Van Dam, 1966; Waldman, 2000), anything that might increase its frequency would be welcome.

#### Deliberation As a Trigger of the Two-Step Flow of Political Conversation

The communal/conversational framework of deliberation posits that deliberation is important to democracy as a significantly effective means of stimulating political conversation and thus serving as a catalyst to opinion formation.

This raises the possibility that deliberation sets up a two-step flow (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948) of political communication within the American electorate. The two-step flow of communication, as defined by those who first posited its existence, is a feature of mass communication where ideas flow from media to opinion leaders and from opinion leaders to less active segments of the population (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948). Thus in order for the two-step flow to occur in deliberation, those who deliberate must be or act like “centrals” (Weimann, 1982) in a political communication network. Participants must leave deliberation and act as “opinion-givers” (Robinson, 1976) to those who did not participate.

Although there has been much debate on the two-step flow model of communication, its basic premise has held in many different studies (Robinson, 1976; Weimann, 1982, 1994). Weimann (1982) found that “most of the flow of information is carried out by centrally located individuals” (p. 768), even when controlling for

demographics and other variables (Allen, 1969). In any case, the concerns raised with regard to the two-step flow do not effect the present study,<sup>6</sup> which will in chapter six present a test of the alternative model of deliberation specifically with regard to levels of post-deliberation conversation leading to a two-step flow of political information.

### Discussion and Summary

Deliberation is a formalized and immersive form of political communication, the most intense form of political talk across a broad perspective of political contact (see Waldman, 2000, p. 58). Deliberation has been defined in light of Habermasian principles of equality, openness, and rationality, leading to what I have been calling the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation. This model has characterized deliberation as a normative dialogic act leading to an informed public and rational citizen-generated public policy decisions. While I have spent considerable space providing literature that calls into question the rational/instrumental framework, I have spent less time developing the alternative communal/conversational framework, other than to provide literature that supports the likelihood of the civic identity as a precursor to deliberation and literature that supports the potential power of conversational practice in creating deliberative discourse and conversational deliberative effects. However, there are additional rationales for this conversational model, which I discuss below.

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<sup>6</sup> The first of these problems (Weimann, 1982) is ignoring direct flow, meaning the flow straight from news to non-opinion leaders, which of course is not a concern for deliberation, and second, ignoring different stages in the diffusion process, including awareness and interest. Deliberation compresses these steps into one overarching event.

According to research on political communication, political talk of any kind a) has the ability to aid in the formulation and reformulation of public opinion, b) provides a political education, c) affords communal and political contact, and d) diffuses political information and opinion. The first of these, advanced by a number of scholars, is that political communication and deliberation help formulate and reformulate opinion. Lasch (1995) argues that individuals cannot have informed opinions without first talking. Before political talk, individuals only have half-formed and vague opinions. Similar arguments have been made by other scholars (Cooley, 1909; Manin, 1987). Cooley argued that political contact brings “enlargement,” that individuals are broadened by coming into relation with others. Even Presidents have come to understand the importance of political talk in this regard. President Wilson, for example, argued that an individual “cannot be said to be participating in the making of public opinion at all until he has laid his mind alongside the minds of his neighbors and discussed with them the incidents of the day and the tendencies of the time” (in Schudson, 1998).

According to Kim, Wyatt and Katz (1999), the main function of political communication is to afford citizens to “bridge their personal experiences with the political worlds out there” (1999, p. 362). This provides some rationale for why we should even care whether in a democracy there is political talk. According to Mill (1886), only ordinary citizens could effectively and rightly express their own concerns: “There must be discussion to show how experience is to be interpreted,” Mill argued. “Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it” (p. 27). Thus,

political conversation is necessary to expose one to both opinions and arguments. It is necessary so that citizens can transform their experiences into political language and political concerns.

Other scholars have argued similar positions from different perspectives. For many, public opinion is defined as a communicative process, where opinion is not merely an aggregation of individual opinions but a communicative process where “disparate ideas are expressed, adjusted, and compromised” (Price and Roberts, 1987 , p. 784). These authors hint strongly at the role deliberation can play as a special form of communication when they argue that “public opinion is not a simple matter of cognition. It occurs within groups of communicating people, who together determine what the issue is, why it is a cause for public concern, and what can be done about it” (pp. 782-783). “In politics communication makes possible public opinion,” argued Cooley, “ which, when organized, is democracy” (1909, p. 85).

Political communication, along with deliberation, then, is the primary method by which opinions are formed and refined. A second function of political communication, that it provides a political education for those who engage in it, is related to the first. While most deliberative theorists argue that education must be changed to help individuals better deliberate, the implication of Lasch’s (1995) position on argumentation is that it is argument itself that provides this education. Communication is a performative art. Without denying that including more instruction on debate and discussion within the schools is an important change to help citizens better talk about politics, the best education in performative arts comes from practice itself.

A third function of political communication, and especially deliberation, is that it provides communal contact with other citizens. As the first function suggests, political communication “spreads the word” of what other ordinary citizens are thinking. As a primary activity by which a political community is established (Barber, 1984), citizens “think together” (Price and Roberts, 1987).

Finally, political communication and deliberation serve to spread political information. As mentioned in the Introduction, if we are so concerned with the lack of information in the polity, and we strongly believe that conversation imparts information, then we must see communication as a most important democratic activity. The notion that communication imparts information has received, as mentioned, strong support (Benhabib, 1996; Barber, 1984; Fishkin and Luskin, 1999; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Labrie, 2000).

A communications perspective of deliberation then, shares much with the well-established rational/instrumental framework, but differs significantly in that it defines deliberation as a process rather than an event which produces opinions and political decisions. Rather than an end, deliberation serves individuals no matter where they are in the opinion formation process. If someone has little experience with an issue, deliberation can provide that person with the basis on which an opinion may ultimately be formed. But that formation does not end with deliberation. As wholly embedded in the process, deliberation is but a stimulant of public opinion, one that, if successful, will ensure even greater and further discussion after formalized deliberations have ended.

The communal/conversational perspective is not, of course, in complete contrast to the normative theoretical literature that has been produced in the past decade. The two frameworks simply exhibit different expectations along similar lines of thought with regard to deliberation. The models do differ in significant ways with regard to each of the four questions presented above. While the rational/instrumental framework posits that individuals who participate in deliberation do so so that they can affect public policy, the communal/conversational model states that individuals join deliberations largely to enact a civic identity, a role as citizen. As to what individuals say and how do they say it, the traditional model centers on talk of public policy, talk that is largely rational and characterized by reasoned argument. The alternative model instead claims that individuals will talk about community issues largely with stories of personal experience. Furthermore, the alternative framework stipulates that conversationalists are most likely to speak up in deliberation and speak up in a sophisticated manner, in contrast to knowledgeable and otherwise politically sophisticated citizens, as posited in the rational/instrumental framework. Finally, the rational/instrumental framework argues that deliberation is an instrument with which to create informed citizens, and through the use of polling, informed public opinion. The communal/conversational framework argues instead that deliberation will produce more conversive citizens, leading to higher levels of conversation within the polity. For each area of focus, each chapter, the two models stress differential levels of importance and centrality. The centrality of rational argument in one framework is not met with the complete lack of argumentation in the other. Rather, argument is subsumed under personal narrative, akin to Fisher's (1987)

argument that narrative still contains valid inference forms and elements of argumentation.

Although there have been studies of deliberation with regard to its effects, there are surprisingly few studies of deliberation as a whole and of course none that have specifically tested the tenability of the principles upon which the rational/instrumental framework is based. As such, it was necessary to step back and develop these central questions to which deliberation could be effectively studied and from which an assessment of the expectation frameworks could occur. This chapter has discussed each framework in light of these questions, based not only on the literature of deliberative democracy but on other relevant literatures including argumentation, conversation analysis, everyday reasoning, and communication theory. These literatures suggest that many of the tenets of the rational/instrumental framework may not hold in real deliberative practice, while there is significant evidence for the communal/conversational framework of deliberation within each of the four questions I have posited. While the tenets of the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation may not be prevalent, the literature nevertheless suggests that they will still be part of deliberation, just under a different guise, with a different intensity, and for a different purpose. Thus this chapter had detailed an alternative framework that is not in complete contrast to the rational/instrumental framework, but rather, again in accordance to what the literature suggests, refocuses the tenets of the rational/instrumental model into a different frame.

The goal of this dissertation is to test the two frameworks in light of the four questions detailed in this chapter. Each question will be addressed in a separate chapter,



followed by a summary chapter assessing the two expectation frameworks and deliberation as an effective democratic practice. Of course, one must have data with which to test these questions and frameworks of deliberation. The following chapter details the data I use for this project, specifically with regard to their generation, limitations, and general character.

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## Chapter 2: Deliberative Data

To fully explore deliberation requires a wide range of diverse data, including data at different levels of analyses and data designed for different types of analyses. To explore who participates, it is necessary to have data on all who were asked to participate in order to make a comparison of participants and nonparticipants. To answer what is said and who says it requires, furthermore, data on what was said. Finally, the question of with what effect requires follow up data on the participants of a deliberative event. For perhaps the first time, all these data were collected in a joint project called Citizen Voices and The Philadelphia Compact.

### Citizen Voices / The Philadelphia Compact

In December 1998, *The Philadelphia Inquirer* announced a new exercise in public journalism called Citizen Voices. *The Inquirer* invited readers and their friends to participate in the project and published clip-out registration forms in the newspaper. The main purpose was to have citizens of Philadelphia gather at monthly deliberative forums to help set the agenda and inform the democratic process for the upcoming 1999 Philadelphia mayor's race.

In conjunction with this project, the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, began a side-by-side, collaborative project called the Philadelphia Compact. While the goal of the *Inquirer* was simply to obtain a sizeable number of participants for Citizen Voices, the

Philadelphia Compact aimed to produce a group of participants broadly representative of the city's population. Participants in the Philadelphia Compact, therefore, were recruited through a telephone survey, using random digit dialing. The brief survey described the project and invited all respondents to join. Those who said they were interested in participating were mailed registration forms, which had to be completed and returned in order to register as a participant.

In late January, 1999, Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact held their first round of neighborhood forums, which ranged in size from 10 to 30 participants and focused on sorting out which issues citizens thought were the most important to Philadelphia. Moderators at each of the 30 neighborhood forums presented participants with a hypothetical situation: It is the year 2010, and Philadelphia has just been named the most livable city in America. How did it get that way? The discussion was free ranging and diverse, and designed to push participants to uncover the four or five most important issues with regard to improving the city of Philadelphia as it existed in 1999 to how they envisioned it in 2010. At the end of these forums, as was the case with all subsequent forums, Philadelphia Compact participants were paid \$10 plus the cost of transportation and/or childcare.

In February, a second round of neighborhood forums was conducted, this time focusing on framing the five issues that citizens agreed in January were the most important facing the city of Philadelphia. These issues were neighborhood quality, jobs, education, crime, and government services. Participants were divided into groups, each focusing on one issue. The goal in February was to define different "choice frameworks"

for each issue. Participants were specifically asked to create a list of three issues or concerns pertinent to their specific issue. Moderators gave individuals a chance to voice their concerns, which were duly written on whiteboards. After a lunch break, participants returned and broke into smaller groups within their issue to discuss commonalities they saw in the quite long and detailed list of concerns they had created in the morning session. As they created a list of two to four common “choice frameworks” they began to identify specific features of the framework, including the key arguments for and against each choice, the values undergirding the choices, and the steps that must be taken to address the problems inherent in each choice. As the larger groups got back together each small group had a representative talk about the two to four groupings of concerns, or choice frameworks, that they had created. Finally, the larger group then decided upon three choices from the two to four choices presented by each smaller group as their final choice frameworks. For example, the education group created the following three action choices: scrap the system, sharpen the mission, and repair the connection. Under “scrap the system” were several general action steps, including a) clarify the mission of the schools, b) use the available resources to accomplish the mission, and c) hold students and adults accountable in a genuine way for results. Specifically, this choice called for establishing rigorous standards for what students should learn, ending social promotions, making local businesses partners in education, seeking additional resources from corporations, foundations, and universities, and refocusing of resources on academics and away from human services and other social needs (which would be shifted to agencies that specialize in such matters). One key argument for this choice was that schools exist

to teach children to learn. Teachers are not social workers or police officers but are, rather, educators who should remain focused on educating children. Each choice then, had different arguments and different actionable steps that might be taken to improve the state of education in Philadelphia.

A larger forum in March allowed all Citizen Voices and Philadelphia Compact participants to hear a number of experts, ranging from journalists to policy analysts, talk about concerns with crime in Philadelphia. Representatives of the February group also gathered to refine the choice frameworks for each of the five key issues they had identified.

Finally, an “issues convention” was held in April. Prior to this convention participants were sent informational materials including statements made by the candidates on each issue discussed at the convention and key statistics relevant to the city of Philadelphia and the issues facing the city. At this final pre-primary-election event, citizens were divided into small groups, each again focusing on one of the five key issue areas. Here in the issues convention citizens finally got the chance to argue and deliberate with each other on the value of the various choice frameworks developed in prior meetings. Participants discussed the benefits and weakness of the actions and arguments central to each choice. After a lunch break, each group developed questions for the candidates. These were used in a subsequent televised candidate debate (among five democratic contenders who remained on the ballot for the primary), as well as in the *Philadelphia Inquirer* as special Citizen Voices features in the editorial section. The primary election was held in mid-May, 1999. Citizen Voices continued throughout the

general campaign in the fall as well, but the focus here is solely on the primary election phase of the project.

A number of data were gathered throughout the project. In December, 1998, a brief, RDD screening survey was conducted ( $N=2600$ ) in order to recruit participants for the Philadelphia Compact. One English-speaking adult (age 18 or older) per household was interviewed. LHK Partners of Newtown Square, Pennsylvania conducted the surveys, using interviewers who were trained prior to calling and monitored during the interviewing. Roughly two thirds of respondents indicated that they were interested in possibly participating, after receiving a brief description of the project. If they expressed interest, citizens were sent registration forms in the mail. Only those who sent back the forms (and, of course, subsequently showed up to at least one of the forums) became members of the Philadelphia Compact.

In January, a follow up survey was conducted with 819 respondents who had earlier been contacted during the recruitment. Included were all those who did finally register as members of the Philadelphia Compact ( $n=317$ ), plus random subsets of people who said they were willing to participate but did not send back the registration forms ( $n=302$ ); and of those who were unwilling to participate ( $n=282$ ). At the same time, an independent RDD sample of 1002 English-speaking adult residents of Philadelphia were surveyed for purposes of comparison. Also included in this baseline survey were those who signed up for Citizen Voices through the Inquirer ( $n=306$ ). Unlike the brief screening survey used in the recruitment, this survey contained measures of citizens' interest, knowledge, trust in government, efficacy to politics, issue positions, media

exposure and political conversation, perceptions of others' opinions, and many other variables.

The survey was again conducted by telephone, and was fielded between January 4 and February 28, 1999. Each interview generally averaged 30 to 35 minutes in length. Generally, numbers selected for the sample received up to 15 calls if necessary for a contact, and some monetary inducements were used, if necessary, to encourage participants to complete the survey. The cooperation rate (defined by the American Association for Public Opinion Research as COOP4) was 42%.

After the election, a follow-up survey was conducted and was successful in recontacting 51% of those who participated in the baseline survey, including 46% of RDD respondents ( $n=457$ ), 61% of Citizen Voices ( $n=188$ ), 53% of the Philadelphia Compact ( $n=168$ ), 65% of those who were willing but did not participate ( $n=196$ ), and 53% of those unwilling to participate ( $n=150$ ). The survey repeated a majority of the questions included in the baseline survey as well as additional questions pertaining to the mayor's race (e.g., advertising awareness, feeling thermometers on the candidates, etc.).

In addition to the pre- and post-panel surveys, paper and pencil surveys were conducted after each monthly forum. In January, participants were asked general open-ended questions on their overall satisfaction of the project. The February survey included media exposure, political conversation and efficacy batteries as well as a battery of questions on the importance of various issues facing the city of Philadelphia. In March the pencil and paper format was used to tap into participants sentiments on the effectiveness of a number of different policy alternatives the city might take to combat

crime. The April survey included an extensive importance battery on a wide range of policy alternatives. Each survey also contained open-ended questions on the satisfaction participants had with the process as well as garnering input as to the effectiveness of the process and discovering what participants learned, enjoyed and did not enjoy throughout the process. Except for the April Issue Forum, only Philadelphia Compact members were asked and required to answer these surveys. Nearly every Philadelphia Compact participant who attended any given forum filled out the survey. In addition, nearly one-third of the Citizen Voices participants of the April Issues Convention filled out the April pencil and paper survey.

Finally, the project also employed court reporters to record the February and April forums, providing thousands of pages of transcripts of citizens deliberations. Additional insight was also drawn from newspaper accounts of the project.

The data available for analysis from the Citizens Voices / Philadelphia Compact project are as follows: a) a baseline survey of deliberative participants, individuals who initially signed up but did not attend, individuals who expressed interest but did not sign up, individuals who refused, and a RDD sample of Philadelphia residents, b) a post-panel wave survey of these same groups, c) verbatim transcripts of the February issue framing session and the April issues convention, and d) pencil and paper surveys from each of the four events, as well as newspaper coverage of each event. This wealth of data makes it possible to research each of the four questions detailed in previous chapters. Who says what and why can be explored by comparing participants with nonparticipants across a range of variables, in addition to exploring open ended questions of why they participated



and what they got out of the process. What is said and how is it said can be investigated by looking at the text itself. This question can be investigated in greater detail, furthermore, if relevant variables are developed from the text through the application of a coding instrument to the text. Indeed, the only way to effectively answer the third question—who says what—is by combining individual-level survey data with individual-level data generated from the text. The final question regarding effects can of course be investigated through pre- and post-panel wave information of both participants and non-participants. In summation, the data generated during the project are extensive, but not complete without applying a coding instrument to the text to generate variables pertinent to what is said and who says what. As the next section details, this instrument was developed over some time and based on a number of different literatures, again employing theories of deliberation, argumentation and conversation.

#### A Coding Instrument for Deliberation

Because few have looked at the dialogue of deliberation through an empirical lens, there was little textual precedent from which to develop a coding scheme of deliberative text. Even if there were a significant literature on coding deliberative events, limiting the formation of the present instrument from these articles might fall into a trap. I have detailed this same trap with regard to traditional literatures on deliberation, namely the relative lack of influence from related literatures like argumentation theory and conversation analysis. And, developing an instrument solely from theoretical literature would surely miss a number of nuances found within the text and likely be unreliable.

Therefore, the coding instrument created for this project was influenced by a number of literatures, specifically those reviewed in prior chapters. In addition, the scheme was significantly influenced by the handful of models and/or prior coding attempts made to similar texts. The first of these is Gunderson's (2000) modeling of deliberation as prescriptive, empirical and speculative, based on a similar division by Aristotle. These terms provide a good basic starting point from which to begin an operationalization of deliberation, as they roughly divide into the defining of the present, the stating of a normative future, and claims of how to get from the present to the future. The first of these, the defining of the present, can be further broken down into two elements. Because deliberation is dialogue of public policy, defining of the present can be made with or without a claim that such a present political reality is problematic and in need of change. Thus, Gunderson's theory served as the foundation for creating four types of statements made in deliberation: a (present) reality claim, a (present) problem, a future vision, or a solution (a statement that links the present to a normative future). I start with Gunderson as it is the "central" element in the present scheme.

An alternative model is the Toulminian model based on the claim, data, and warrant (plus other elements). However, this model was not used directly for a number of reasons. First, a general version of the Toulminian scheme was applied to the text without producing any notable results. The problem, one that would guide all of my efforts at coding the text, is the gap between theory and reality. While it makes great theoretical sense that argument is comprised of elements such as claims and data, not all deliberation is argument, and furthermore, the lines between what is argumentative and

what is conversational are often vague. Finally, the Toulminian scheme itself seemed too vague for the text: Nearly every statement could be seen as some sort of claim, and it was often unclear whether a statement (data) was really supporting a claim, and worse still whether there were any clear cases of warrants. In short, the model did not work but did point my efforts toward a better scheme, for it indicated first that a successful scheme must be comprised of argumentative and conversational elements, and second, that the type of claim, not merely whether something was in fact a claim, was the most important distinction to be made. Gunderson's scheme seemed to provide three types of claims, which I extended to four. In addition, Gunderson's model was developed not with argument but with political deliberation (again, as originally conceived by Aristotle) in mind, thus providing a closer fit from a theoretical standpoint.

For the same reasons, other strictly argumentative schemes did not seem to fit the text well, including, for example, the well known framework of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). Again, their scheme was developed out of studying jurisprudential texts, not political deliberation. The framework also "suffers" from being too argumentative and not able to capture specific deliberative moves, both argumentative and conversational. Rather than using either Toulmin (1958) or Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Meyers et al. (2000) built their scheme on selective ideas from these authors as well as additional authors (e.g. Jackson and Jacobs, 1980).

However, one aspect of both the Toulminian scheme and the Perelmanian scheme is prevalent in all of argument, that is, the frequency and necessity of support for the claims put forward by discussants. But from a coding perspective, the difficulty is still in

defining what types of statements truly support specific claims. In the text, support statements were often implicit, calling into question whether the speaker was really using information for such a purpose. The trick in making things clearer, paradoxically, was in making them more vague by taking note of Ritchie's (2000) discussion of knowledge and argumentation.

Ritchie's main claim toward argumentation was to recall that argumentation is dependent upon knowledge. A simple enough statement until one problematizes the concept of knowledge and how it is used in argument. Ritchie, following a number of philosophers before him asked where the line is drawn between knowledge and belief. The typical answer is that knowledge is "true belief, held on valid grounds" (p. 2). What then, is true or valid? As science developed, truth became known to be not something *a priori*, but something observable and built upon evidence, as much as such evidence could be garnered. Of course, in the social sciences, the quandary is in whether things are observable, and many have challenged what is even meant by the term observable. In the end, Ritchie argues that the difference between knowledge and belief is itself just a belief, what he calls the "belief about beliefs" (p. 6). Similar arguments have also been made by Schiffrin (1990).

Of course, it is nearly impossible to tell in actual discourse whether someone is supporting a claim with actual knowledge or just a belief (if such a separation is truly possible). From a coding standpoint the most reasonable option then was to not even try. Attempting to do so in the present project lead to unreliable coding variables. Instead, I decided to call support for or refutation of claims a more general term, "linked

information,” ranging from pure, unadulterated belief to the most statistical and technical evidentiary support. Of course, it is still possible to further define linked information as separate types, something I will discuss with contributions from other scholars later in the chapter.

In addition to Gunderson (2000) the present coding instrument was also influenced by the conversational argument literature (Meyers et al., 1991; Meyers et al., 2000). The conversational argument paradigm takes a structural perspective of argument as embedded in social interaction and is thus reflexive of the rules of social interaction. Conversational argument also has the benefit of having been tried on actual discourse, although that discourse was quite limited and very different than political deliberation. In short, the conversational argument coding scheme was applied to discussion over hypothetical situations and how the actors in those situations should act based on the information given on decision-making task discussions (see Kogan & Wallach, 1964, and Stoner, 1968 for details). The conversational argument paradigm contains five main elements; arguables, reinforcers, promptors, delimiters, and nonarguables. Arguables are further defined as potential arguables (essentially, claims), reason-using arguables (elaborations and responses), and reason-giving arguables (amplifications and justifications). Reinforcers are essentially agreements while promptors comprise of objections and challenges.

While useful, their scheme is still unlikely to fit on actual deliberation because it was again designed to be applied to a different kind of text, although their text appears much more similar to deliberation than do the texts used in other schemes. Additionally,

the frequencies of such codes in the research so far suggest that their scheme needed to be modified to provide a little more parity between variables. Assertions, for one, comprised of 45 percent of all statements in Meyers et al. (1991). Amplifications, elaborations, and objections, combined, tallied only one percent of the discourse. The fourth of their five general categories, delimiters, accounted for only two percent of the text. Clearly, some respecification of the scheme would improve its fit to conversational argument, let alone deliberation. The first adaptation made was to break up assertions into a number of categories. Luckily, as previously argued, the four primary argumentative elements provided thus far (reality claims, problem definitions, future visions, and solutions) are four types of assertions. As for the rest of the conversational argument scheme, a number of elements make theoretical sense and in pilot testing appeared frequently enough in the text. These “secondary argumentative elements” include agreements and disagreements, process statements, and elaborations.

Further support for these elements is also provided by Coulter (1990). Coulter, who defined argument as a collection of “assertoric sequences,” breaks such sequences into eight primary elements: assertions, counter-assertions, reassertions, acknowledgments, disagreements, agreements, pre-announcements, and backdowns. Again, these elements alone do not work as the primary elements of deliberation, as they are wholly argumentative and not at all conversational or collaborative. However, many of these fit with elements provided by other scholars, as Coulter provides a number of assertion types, agreement, and disagreement. A review of the text found no backdowns

and few argumentative pre-announcements. Reassertions were also found with some frequency, as they are a type of elaboration, or continuation of a prior self-made claim.

These models of argument and conversational argument, then, provide a number of elements that seem to be evident in deliberation, including claims (which are divided into reality claims, problem definitions, future visions, and solutions), elaborations, linked information, agreements, disagreements, and process statements. In addition, I added a code for statements that qualify, that is, statements which include both disagreement and agreement of a claim, as these seemed frequent enough in the text to warrant its inclusion.

Overall, the coding scheme is designed to measure various elements of argument, conversation, and other features of deliberation. These elements include different types of claims, information in support of claims, secondary statements (agreements, etc.), and process statements (questions, etc.). The scheme is designed to capture key features of deliberative dialogue, and ultimately to test the tenability of the traditional and alternative models of deliberation presented in previous chapters. This includes of course being able to test whether the principles of deliberation are in fact present in deliberation, especially reasoned argument since the alternative framework takes issue with whether deliberation in fact holds to this principle.

Of the three principles, openness is the worst situated to be studied in the present project. As discussed earlier, this principle is primarily assessed indirectly by the amount of opinion change made before and after deliberating. After studying the text, it became clear that “direct” measurement of such change based on the texts would be impossible.

People, in short, just don't provide any consistent evidence during deliberation that their opinions are open and changing. Thus, the coding scheme does not try to capture any dimension of the openness and engagement principle. As mentioned, this principle can and will be studied with other means, including qualitative analysis of the text.<sup>7</sup>

For engagement, a few additional variables were created. First, because moderators were used in the project, as with all actual political deliberations, one potential coding strategy was to count the number of times an individual directly engaged with a moderator. An additional measurement might be to count the types of responses made to other participants. As the primary utterance level variable of interest (as will be discussed shortly), this variable, though created to help inform the principle of engagement, became a larger description of the types of utterances made in deliberation. The first type of possible utterance is one in which the participant makes no connection with others but instead raises an issue that prior to that utterance was not discussed. This is called an agenda-setting utterance, or initial utterance. The only other possibility to the initial utterance is an utterance that responds to someone else. To further refine responses to others, such instances were divided into responding to the utterance immediately prior to the present utterance, responses to utterances made before the immediately prior utterance, and, again, responses to the moderator. To complete the

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<sup>7</sup> Specifically, the April Issues Convention morning session contained three sections: introductions, deliberation, and a conclusion which included a summarization of the arguments as well as discussion on what was learned and how individuals thinking changed. This last section, of course, is of great interest in investigating the openness principle.



variable I added, based on my review of the text, a code for utterances that were interrupted or otherwise cut-off. In addition to coding the types of utterances, the notion of elaboration was divided into two codes based on experience with the text and to further get at the concept of engagement. Instead of having one code for elaboration—an instance where a participant raises additional information on a topic or argument advanced in a prior utterance—this concept was divided into two different codes, elaboration and self-continuation. Elaboration, as a response variable and thus a secondary argumentative statement, can either attempt to provide the information asked for by the interlocutor, or can not do so at all. Not doing so can occur either because the participant has no other additional information to provide or because the participant is not fully trying to satisfy the query of the interlocutor, and thus is not truly engaging with him or her. So, though not a perfect measure of engagement, the distinction between elaborations and self-continuations (where the participant does not provide new information when encouraged to do so) seemed important and fruitful.

The second deliberative principle, reasoned argument, is of primary interest to the present study. However, at this point the coding scheme has in place only four claim types plus linked information as codes from which to garner information on this principle of deliberation. Specifically, the scheme does not yet provide information on what such claims are about. This is true in two senses, first, on the topic that is being discussed, and second, on the level of focus upon which each claim is made. For example, are participants arguing for public policy options or are they arguing about more general political claims? What genres of claims are there? To capture these qualities the coding

scheme details the degree to which each argumentative statement reflects a type of focus. In contrast to the specifics of public policy is the generalities of value claims. Warnick (1981) points out a rich literature that contrasts discourse using facts compared to discourse that references values. Furthermore, the prevalence of value argumentation was formally underscored by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in their theory of argument. Thus, a code for value argumentation was inserted into the coding scheme to measure the prevalence of this kind of argumentation. The final three possibilities were derived straight from a close reading of the texts. These included focus at the street / individual level, management / structural level, and the level of vague action. At the street / individual level, problems, future visions, and solutions are concerned with things where agency resides on the street, or with the individual (for example, “teachers need to spend more time one-on-one with a child”). A similar description can be made of the management / structural level (for example: “the problem with education is that schools are crumbling down around the students (structural)). Finally, vague action was designed to capture statements in which actions were described in the most general of terms (for example, the solution statement “schools need to get better”).<sup>8</sup> In contrast to these levels is the public policy level, where a citizen advocates or otherwise discusses a primary statement with regard to explicitly changing public policy, including the relative strengths and weaknesses of various issues and legislative actions.

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<sup>8</sup> For more details on the rules used in the coding scheme, see Appendix E.

The third principle of deliberation, equality, like openness, can not be directly researched with content analysis, although content analysis is a crucial element of an overarching research strategy that involves coding at the individual level and combining such data with the surveys conducted on the participants in the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project. As such, any variable in the coding scheme may be of some importance to testing equality. The most important empirical question with regard to equality is concerned with the relative amount of discourse produced by minorities versus majorities. To answer this question, all that is needed are variables measuring the amount of text provided by each individual. Such variables will be matched up to survey variables like race and gender, as will other variables in the coding scheme designed for this project.

At this point it is important to clarify the different measurements of the amount of text produced by each individual and how they were constructed. A handful of articles have been concerned with the problem of at what level a text can and should be investigated. Of course, text can be coded in aggregate, as was done by Hart & Jarvis (1999) in their analysis of the NIF deliberations. Their scheme segmented the text into 2500 word clusters, which served then as the unit of analysis. A second option is to analyze deliberation based on its overall topic, as was done by Gamson (1992). Of course, neither of these two options is useful for the present project. What is needed is something more specific. One obvious option is to code at the level of an utterance, that is, the beginning and ending of a specific speaking turn (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). These can be as short as one word or go on for many pages. Thus, although

certain elements might be useful at the utterance level, this level does not get specific to the degree necessary to actually capture the elements contained in the coding scheme thus far. The solution offered by a number of scholars (Auld & White, 1956; Hatfield & Weider-Hatfield, 1978; Murray, 1956) and utilized by Meyers et al. (1991, 1998, 2000) in the conversational argument paradigm is to code at the thought statement level, that is, a level underneath that of the utterance, a unit that begins and ends with each complete thought. Not only did Meyers et al. show that coding for thought statements can be highly reliable, the team also successfully coded their variables, including those I use in the present analysis, at the thought statement level. Ultimately, to test the principle of equality and to explore other empirical questions, the data will have to be aggregated to the individual level. Once aggregated, there are three variables that measure the amount of speaking made by each individual: total number of lines of text,<sup>9</sup> number of utterances, and number of thought statements.

The final principle, reasoned argument, will be measured using the variables already discussed as well as one new variable that looks at the level at which linked information and reality claims were made. As I have argued earlier, assessing argumentative and reasoning abilities is difficult given the indirectness of the concept. However, it is safe to say that some measure of the concept can be attained simply by counting the number of times each individual makes a primary argumentative statement as compared to other types of statements. But still, this measure would give no indication

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<sup>9</sup> Lines of text, measured by quarter lines, is as accurate as counting words spoken, but proved to be much

of whether individuals vary in their ability to provide sophisticated argumentative elements. Of course, we already have one code that may get at that: focus. On the face of it, public policy oriented claims are far more sophisticated than statements made only vaguely. As such, a contrast of these two types of statements may yield some information as to individuals' abilities to produce sophisticated argument. However, I also constructed a second variable dealing with the type of information used in reality claims and linked information, especially with regard to the level of complexity found in each instance of these statements. This type of variables has previously been advocated by Wegman (1994), who found that factual supportive statements range from general to specific and often include personal experience. As such, the variable distinguishes four types of information: specialized, experiential, general, and global. Specialized information is information that contains statistics, other quantitative information, or exhibits a high level of understanding of policies or other political phenomenon. Experiential information is linked information based on first or third person experience and is situated as a story. At the other end of the spectrum is global information, that is, information that is expressed in fully black and white terms, all or nothing, rather than statements which reveal a more nuanced perception of the world, as is the case with generalized information.

In addition to these codes were a handful of additional codes deemed useful to the analysis. In exploring the text, it was clear that on many occasions individuals made

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less time consuming for the coders to compile.

statements that clearly exhibited a relevance to other speakers' utterances, as predicted in the literature on conversation. These were coded as relevancy statements. In addition, those who did not possess information pertinent to a given topic may still have been relevant to it by asking questions about the topic. Thus, queries were added to the framework, both questions asking for additional information and questions asking for specific actions (e.g. solutions). Finally, there were statements which clearly were not relevant or did not significantly further discussion on the topic at hand. These were coded as conversational tangents.

Finally, specific codes were introduced to capture statements of role with specific interest to accountability and consubstantiality as value statements specifically tied to the civic identity. A table of the final coding instrument is provided below.

Table 2a: The Coding Instrument

Argumentative Elements	Utterance Type
<i>Primary Statements</i>	Initial
Reality Claims (Present Argument)	Response to Immediately Prior Other
Problem Definition (Present Argument)	Response to Non-prior Other
Future Vision	Response to Moderator
Solution (Links Present and Future)	Interrupted
Linked Information Claims	
<i>Secondary Statements</i>	<b>Primary Argumentative Focus</b>
Agreements	Vague Action
Disagreements	Value
Qualifiers	Street / Individual
<i>Continuing Statements</i>	Management / Structural
Self-continuations	Public Policy
Elaborations	
Secondary Statements to Moderator	<b>Linked Information/Claim Types</b>
	Specialized
	Experiential
	Generalized
	Global
<b>Conversational Elements</b>	<b>Topic</b>
Relevancy Statements	
Deliberative Meta-Talk	
Informational Query	
Solution Query	
N/Rs (Not Relevant)	
	<b>Role</b>
	Efficacy Statements
	Accountability Statements

In addition to the variables listed above, the coding instrument also required coders to note the gender and career of individuals if any in fact provided such information at any time during the deliberations. Another variable added near the end of the pilot phase was coherence, a variable where the coders were asked, based on their

own overall sense of the utterance, to rate the utterance from 1-10 on its overall degree to which it transmitted its points in a clear and concise way. Finally, agreements, disagreements, qualifiers, and linked information were linked to the original statement to which they were referring.

All told, the coding instrument designed here attempts to balance simplicity and complexity. Part argumentation and part conversation, deliberation is an extremely difficult text to code. Deliberation, like language in general, is truly a game that has no set rules and a multiplicity of possibilities (Wittgenstein, 1958). Any given utterance by any given speaker could move in any number of directions; it could respond to any prior utterance, or completely ignore anything that was said before and move onto an entirely new tangent. Of course, deliberation has norms, and they do not exist in mere theory. First, deliberation, as we have seen, is guided by norms of conversation. Argumentation is similarly led by norms, norms people learn through experience. In this sense, deliberation is extremely unforgiving to code, for it has no finite number of statement types available to its participants. Although conversational argument may appear by some prior theorizations and coding attempts to be relatively uncomplicated, Meyers et al. (1991) worry that,

A second possibility is that group argument is quite complex but that difficulties inherent in measuring it lead to conclusions of simplicity...The verbal interplay between members in groups, as well as frequent interruptions, tangents, and members' movement within and between different lines of argument, creates difficulties for coherently coding a single argument from its beginning until a final outcome is reached (p. 62).



However, as with any coding scheme, the key to its success lies in the successful application of theory to practice, where concepts aren't just dreamt onto the text but are actually broadly evident in the both theory and text. I believe the present scheme balances between the necessary complexity of deliberative practice while being firmly entrenched in theory, and is well designed to explore many of the principles detailed earlier.

### Implementation of the Coding Instrument

Of course, the other issue with regard to the relative complexity of the coding instrument is the attainment of intercoder reliability. Attaining reliability is not just a statistical necessity. Without it, the concepts proffered to be captured by the instrument are nothing more than figments of the mind, without any evidence that they exist in the text. During the final few months of the yearlong pilot testing of the coding instrument, I began testing reliability with a fellow graduate student, as up to that point my instrument had been nothing more than my own conglomeration of ideas and former theory. The initial results were clearly unsatisfactory, without any formal test of reliability. However, the experience led to additional modifications and further specifications of many of the instrument's rules and variables. At that point, two undergraduates were recruited to help attain final reliability and to aid in coding the text. After three weeks of training, the instrument underwent reliability testing among three coders. After three practice runs, the results of the third and fourth tests became stable, the third attaining the results in table 2b below.

Table 2b: Reliability Scores

Sample	Alpha
Unitization	.91
Utterance Type	.91
Coherence	.75
Thought Statement Type	.76
Agree/ Disagree To:	.95
Linked Information Type	.84
Linked to:	.71
Focus	.75

As is evident in table 2b, the reliability estimates for unitizing the text into thought statements reached .91, results that mirror those of the conversational argument project (Meyers et al., 1998, 2000). Every variable attained acceptable levels of reliability, using Krippendorff's *alpha*.<sup>10</sup>

As mentioned earlier in the project, the text coded for this project was generated during the morning session of the deliberations that took place during the April Issue Convention of the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project. Omitted were the introductions and conclusions; the text of interest is formal deliberation, and as such only the deliberative section of the text was included, as described in the prior chapter. This deliberative event was divided among twelve group discussions, eleven of which had court reporters transcribing the text. This text includes 1788 utterances and 3301 thought statements. The text took over one month to code, a total of approximately 100 labor

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<sup>10</sup> Reliability for role are not included because the variables did not occur with enough frequency to get a large enough N for testing.

hours. The size of the text may seem large, but considering that there were about 155 participants,<sup>11</sup> an average number of thought statements to individuals is just over 21. Given a roughly parametric distribution, this number was deemed satisfactory for the analyses that were conducted, descriptive and otherwise.

### Missing Cases

One consistent problem with the analyses of the current project was the loss of cases due to the many independent variables and the rather (traditionally) high number of missing cases associated with certain variables. Overall, the analysis in chapter three could have included 1135 individuals. However, 92 cases were lost due to respondents' failure to provide an income, and 149 individuals refused to answer whether they had any children. Overall, the multivariate analysis reported in chapter three employed 706 cases using listwise deletion. A number of analyses were performed replacing missing cases with means. Such analyses showed no substantive differences to the final analyses.

The problem of missing cases was more acute in the analyses of chapters four and five. Unfortunately, the true number of actual cases for the analyses of these chapters is not known, due mostly to poor bookkeeping of attendance of the deliberative forums. There were two places where attendance of the April issues conventions were recorded. First, attendance was taken at the event itself. When participants arrived at the event, they were required to sign up at the front door, at which point they were given a speaker number. This was subsequently entered into the survey data by matching up the

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<sup>11</sup> As will be detailed in the next chapter, it is not possible to know the true number of participants, given

participant's name in the attendance sheet to their name in the survey. This gives rise to a number of potential missing cases. First, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* continued to recruit citizens for the project after the baseline survey had been conducted. As such, there were individuals who participated in the April Issues Convention with no survey data with which to match up their speaker numbers. A second possible source of error was due to the structure of the event itself. Although participants were confronted with a sign-up table at the entrance to the event, the main entrance was not designed tightly enough to ensure that everyone had signed in. The result was that some individuals were not given a speaker number and subsequent name tag until afterward, making it extremely difficult to figure out who those people were in the transcripts.

The second place attendance was recorded was in the transcripts themselves. Most court reporters were present from the very beginning of the morning of the April Issues Convention session. During that time everyone who participated introduced themselves by their speaker number. As such, even if a participant never spoke during the actual deliberation, his or her speaker number should have been recorded in the transcripts. Thus, a list was compiled of every speaker number mentioned in the transcript. The problem here was that the transcripts had more numbers than were recorded on the attendance sheets. An attempt to match up the two types of attendance revealed a further problem. From a potential 189 numbers in the transcripts and 181 cases in the survey, there were 59 cases in the transcripts without survey data and 14 with

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discrepancies between the text and the survey.

survey data and no transcript information (although they were on the attendance sheet, see Appendix G). Luckily, of the 59 cases in the transcripts with no survey data, 24 were found to be typographical errors made by a coder (out of the 3301 thought statements that were coded, an unremarkable number of errors. Of course, the coding instrument was extensively checked for these and other potential errors). An additional 9 cases were found to be almost certainly typographical errors by the court reporters. For example, during an interaction between the moderator and speaker 11, the actual speaker became “speaker 111” and then immediately returned to speaker 11 in the transcripts. “Speaker 111” did not exist in the survey, and thus, the safe assumption was made that speaker 111 was nothing more than a typographical error made by the court reporters.<sup>12</sup> This leaves twenty unaccounted cases in the transcript without survey data. Many more of these might have been typographical errors, but there was not enough information to make this judgment or to otherwise account for these cases. In all then, some 32 percent of the overall potential cases were listed as missing. For this reason, two checks for missing data were conducted. First was a means test of cases with complete data to cases with no survey data on the transcript coding data ( $N = 20$ , see Appendix G). No significant differences were found. Second, a multiple imputation procedure was applied to each of

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<sup>12</sup> Remember, court reporters are not exactly trained to record a group where 20 or so different people might speak up at any moment, and indeed, very often many utterances were spoken in an overlapping fashion. And, court reporters had to find the speaker number sticker affixed to the participants chest before they could begin to write down what they said.

the regression analyses reported in this chapter. Again, no significant differences were detected. Results of these procedures is reported in Appendix G.

Finally the models in chapter six contained a high number of missing cases due to panel attrition. Of the 1130 participants in the analysis who responded to both time-one political conversation questions (friends and family, and others), only 688 individuals answered such questions in the post-panel wave. In comparison, the National Election Studies (NES) have averaged a response rate of just under 90 percent in the past seven presidential elections (Luevano, 1994). However, the difference here is not altogether surprising given the more localized election and the use of telephone rather than in-person interviews. Still, the response rate is by no means exemplary, and produces a sample that, on average, is more knowledgeable, interested, conversational, and educated (see Appendix H) than the overall population of Philadelphia residents. Luckily, there were no significant demographic differences, with the exception of age. Even then, full panel participants were only two years, on average, older than those who did not complete the final panel (46 vs. 44 years of age). Differences in political sophistication variables across panels have been noted in the NES surveys, most notably a difference in political knowledge (Traugott & Morchio, 1990). The differences here are only slightly worse than most NES surveys. Because missing cases were present in, as much as any other variable, the dependent variables, imputation techniques on the data were not employed.

While the issues with missing cases are substantive enough to report, the analyses performed in each chapter do not provide any evidence that these issues constitute a

significant challenge to the validity of the analyses. The issues with missing cases here do underscore the importance in future projects of keeping immaculate records of individuals who come in and out of the deliberative process in addition to striving for response rates above what is now considered average.

### Summary

The Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project provides a rich opportunity with which to study deliberation in practice and makes available a unique chance to test the principles and tenets of the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation as well as the alternative communal/conversational framework I have presented. The coding instrument is designed to capture key elements of deliberation and is based on prior deliberative literature, literature on argumentation and conversation, and the actual deliberative texts used for this project. Certainly, these data, both textual and survey-generated alike, afford the opportunity to research any number of research questions. However, this project will remain focused on four primary questions which are designed to not only provide an overall picture of deliberative dialogue but also to compare and contrast the two frameworks of deliberation presented here. Of course, each one of these questions itself leads to a number of hypotheses that must be detailed, investigated, and reported, the primary objective of the following four chapters.

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## Chapter 3: Participation in Deliberation

The vast majority of studies on political participation have focused on “traditional” variables including SES measures and measures of political interest, knowledge, and involvement. Of course, these variables have significant influence on the wide range of politically participative activities, and if one were interested in political participation in general, one would most certainly begin by exploring how age, income, education, gender and race, in addition to political interest, knowledge, efficacy and partisanship, affect participation as both a general and specific phenomenon. However, as important these measures are, the most important variables may not be so generalizable across different types of participation, but rather are specific to the nature of the particular type of participation in question, as is the case with income, which is a powerful predictor of monetary donations to a campaign.

If deliberation is indeed more conversational, more communal, and less argumentative, rational, and policy-based than currently thought in the predominant literature, it is reasonable to expect that who participates in deliberation can be best delineated not by variables associated with sophisticated argumentation and rationality but communal variables. Although the primary focus of political participation has been on the traditional political sophistication variables of education, interest, and knowledge, this chapter will explicate and argue for an alternative framework positing the importance of individuals’ civic identity and interest and frequency in political conversation.



Formally stated, the civic identity or civic-mindedness, that is, the degree to which an individual's personal identity is characterized by interest in the public good, the community, and the political welfare of others on a local level is not only a substantively significant predictor of whether one decides to participate in deliberation but also dramatically colors what the deliberations look like, that is, what is said and how it is said.

Civic-mindedness is a central part of the identity of many Americans today. And as this chapter will argue, the civic identity is a strong motivator that impels people to various forms of participation, especially deliberation, and significantly shapes what deliberators speak about and how they speak. Deliberation provides an outlet for civic identifiers to carry out what they perceive to be the essential American act: to speak on the public good. As such, the dialogue produced from the civic identity is public minded. Rather than being strictly 'rational,' Socratic, or argumentative on matters of public policy, deliberative discourse is marked by mutual reason-giving, a shared search for the public's goods, goals, and responsibilities. While there are certainly elements of argumentation, what individuals 'argue' about is not the issues in a traditional sense, but about the very nature of reality. Individuals have a role to play as participants in deliberation. In deliberation participants enact a role that includes a) stewardship to the city and those in it, b) citizen responsibility, c) enjoyment in engaging with others politically, d) belief that they can make a difference, e) interest in hearing others' opinions more than having their own voices heard, and most importantly, f) searching for the public good. The participants very clearly enact a role of *citizen*, a role that is

predicated on specific “agencies,” including the power to speak for other citizens, the right to define the public good, the right to spell out each actor’s (e.g., other citizens, politicians, etc.) political responsibilities, the responsibility to listen to other citizens, and the right to be heard by elites.

This chapter will explicate this argument by first reviewing some prior research on political participation and civic-mindedness (Verba et al., 1995). Second, I will provide evidence from regression analysis that the participants in the 1999 Philadelphia Compact / Citizen Voices project can be differentiated from other citizens not only with traditional predictors of political participation but with additional variables related to the civic identity. Third, I will detail a number of characteristics of the civic identity through not only the regression analysis but also analysis of open-ended survey items and a close textual analysis of the discourse generated by the participants in the project.

### Literature Review

As detailed in chapter two, the literature on political participation is diverse. In addition to political science studies on traditional types of participation (e.g., monetary and time donations to campaigns), a number of studies have looked at more communicatively oriented participatory variables, including political conversation with others, especially in perceived minority-status situations, as well as survey-based willingness to participate in deliberation. Finally, there are studies that approach the issue from the other side, focusing on the political activist and investigating the reasons why such individuals participate over and above other less participative citizens. Since chapter two offered a general review of these literatures with the specific intent of

detailing the relevancy to both the rational/instrumental and the communal/conversational expectation frameworks of deliberation, the present chapter will represent these literatures only to detail the variables important to these models and thus the variables that will be used in the analyses of this chapter.

As mentioned in chapter two, the most important study with regard to political participation is Verba and colleagues Voice and Equality (1995), which argued that individuals participate based on their levels of motivation, opportunity and skill. The most consistent predictors of participation were a number of SES variables, education, political interest and political knowledge. Verba et al.'s findings are generally supported by a wealth of other studies on participation. In a study of voting and contacting public officials, Vedlitz and Veblen (1980) found strong positive relationships between these two forms of participation and education and interest, with education serving as a stronger predictor of voting and interest as the better predictor of contacting a government official. Indeed, in line with Verba and colleagues (1995), most studies tend to find education to be a substantively significant predictor of participation (Conway, 2000; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; see Goel, 1980, p. 112 for a comprehensive but outdated list of studies supporting the relationship between education and various forms of political participation). Why education? According to Almond and Verba (1963), there are eight sources of this relationship. Compared to less educated individuals, the more educated person 1) is more aware of the impact government has on the individual 2) follows politics and election campaigns more closely 3) is more knowledgeable about politics, 4) has a wider range of political opinions, 5) discusses politics more frequently

and with a more diverse set of people, 6) has a greater sense of political efficacy, 7) is more likely to be a member of social organizations, and 8) believes other people to be more trustworthy. Indeed, there are many reasons why the bulk of studies on political participation, spanning the sixties (Almond & Verba, 1963) to the nineties (Brady, Schlozman, & Verba, 1999) find education to be the most important predictor of political participation.

Another important SES variable, income, is often found to have a strong relationship to participation, especially to forms of participation that “require high self-esteem or that require financial well-being” (Goel, 1980, p. 114). While the positive relationship between income and participation becomes attenuated for most basic forms of participation, for example, voting (Jensen, 1960; Lane, 1959), income exhibits a strong linear relationship to more costly forms of participation like attending meetings and joining political clubs (Milbrath, 1972). According to Conway (2000), there are three general explanations for the relationship between income and political participation. First, in comparison to low income individuals, more affluent individuals do not have to focus as much attention on the necessities of life. Second, citizens with higher incomes live in environments that tend to stimulate interest in politics, creating more social pressures and opportunities for political participation. Finally, income is likely to relate to a number of personality characteristics that also tend to relate to participation, for example, a personality that holds an “emphasis on purposive activity and personal competence, and a tendency to pay attention to events outside their immediate environment” (p. 30).

A third important demographic variable with regard to participation is age. Despite what one might expect, age has a positive relationship with certain types of participation and a negative relationship to others, mainly to the most effortful types of participation bordering on and including many forms of political activism (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). In addition, the effect of age differs for different generations (Miller & Shanks, 1992). While older Americans tend to be less educated, older Americans with a specific level of education tend to participate more than younger Americans (Conway, 2000). Also, while some studies report a curvilinear relationship, with those in their 40s and 50s attaining the highest level of participation (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Lipset, 1960), others report a basic linear relationship (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). Regardless of the shape of the relationship, age tends to exhibit a strong positive relationship to most forms of political participation.

Two final demographic variables, gender and race, have also been found to have important relationships to political participation. Although the reasons for lower voter turnout among blacks need no review here, what is important is that while the gap has decreased between whites and blacks (from twelve percent to five and a half percent from 1968 to 1996), the gap remains (Conway, 2000). As for gender, a gap has consistently existed. However, that gap was four percent in favor of men in 1968 and is now two and a half percent in favor of women (Conway, 2000). As for other types of participation, the gap in race remains, and cannot be fully accounted for with other related SES variables (Verba et al., 1995). Despite outpacing men in voter turnout, women still lag behind men in many other types of political participation, for example, affiliation with political

organizations, contact with government officials, and campaign contributions (Verba et al., 1995).

In addition to these five important demographic variables, there are a wealth of other variables that have been found to relate to political participation. These have been usefully categorized by a number of scholars. Again, Verba et al. categorize variables related to political participation in terms of opportunities, resources, and motivations. Milbrath (1972) categorizes these variables into environmental stimuli, personal factors, political setting factors, and social position factors. Goel (1980) describes the variables related to participation as demographics, personality determinants and attitudinal determinants. Among personality determinants Goel lists sociability, ego strength, authoritarianism, psychic needs, alienation, achievement, motivation, empathy, morality, and future orientation, to name a few. Community integration has also been posited as an important predictor of participation (McLeod et al., 1996, 1999), especially concerning voting (Pomper & Sernekos, 1991). These variables will not be reviewed here given the lack of ability of the data used for this project to operationalize such measures. Instead, only variables used in the analyses conducted in this chapter will receive attention. Secondly, these variables, namely political knowledge, interest, strength of party identification, and political efficacy, have a long history of effects with regard to participation.

Again from Verba et al. (1995), a number of these variables, specifically, knowledge, interest, and strength of party identification, are termed *engagement* variables, that is, variables which demonstrate that an individual is highly engaged in the

political process. As already mentioned, political interest and knowledge were consistently significant and positive predictors of participation across most of the studies in Voice and Equality. Partisan strength, on the other hand, was only significant in some of their models. Despite relatively stable and significant relationships between many of these variables, and to the demographic variables listed earlier, they still, nonetheless, have separate and significant effects on participation. Using structural equation modeling, for example, Scheufele & Shah (2000) find political interest to be a significant predictor of participation, but only indirectly through media use and social trust.

Perhaps one of the most comprehensively explored attitudinal variables studied in American politics, political efficacy has been found to have a somewhat inconsistent relationship to political participation. Efficacy can and has been measured a number of different ways, generally as internal (one can personally make a difference) and external (the system is responsive to me) efficacy (Craig & Maggionto, 1982). Both have been found to have a significant relationship to participation in multivariate analyses (Almond & Verba, 1963; Lane, 1959; Milbrath, 1971; Verba & Nie, 1972). Of all the variables reviewed here, efficacy has the least clear direction of causality, as participation has been shown to affect efficacy perhaps as much as the other way around (Eldersveld, 1956). Regardless, efficacy was a significant predictor of participation in some, but not all of the models presented in Verba et al. (1995).

As mentioned in chapter two, the spiral of silence theory provides a different perspective on participation in deliberation through its investigation of whether individuals are willing to participate in political conversation under perceived minority

opinion status. Although not a direct measure of participation by any means, the relatedness of the measures as two kinds of socialized political conversation makes it important to review the associations found in prior studies of the spiral of silence. One scholar who has studied the spiral of silence to a significant extent is Carroll Glynn. Although a number of her studies, like many on the spiral of silence, do not employ multivariate analyses that include the variables I am interested in for this project (e.g., 1984), her 1997 study does explore individual's willingness to express their opinions both to personal referent groups defined by the respondent and to generalized others ("people in town"). None of the demographic measures in either setup predicted opinion expression, although opinion intensity and fear of isolation were significant in both models.

Rather than separate opinion expression by its target (e.g., referent groups as compared to townspeople), Scheufele (1999) defined two different types of political discussion, opinion expression and political talk, both of which can arise in deliberation. Opinion expression was predicted by the perception of popular support, education, personal issue stance, and age, while political talk was associated with high political knowledge and political participation. Thus, there appears to be some evidence that the type of talk is affected by different factors. In addition, there is some evidence that such factors not only affect how one argues, but also the likelihood that one will argue at all. To cite one study, Lasorsa (1991) found, using a survey-based study, that political outspokenness had substantively significant associations with education, age, newspaper readership, opinion certitude, self-efficacy, and political interest. Similarly, Salmon and



Neuwirth (1990) found gender and education to have indirect effects in one's willingness to talk to strangers about political issues. Both perceived community concern and personal concern have significant direct effects of the willingness to speak, as did a knowledge measure specific to abortion, the topic used as the focus of the study.

In addition to studies on the spiral of silence, a handful of studies have used survey data to explore the willingness of individuals to participate in a deliberative forum. In one study (McLeod et al., 1996), attending a deliberative forum served as one dependent variable in a multivariate setup, with another defined as institutional activities, specifically, voting and contacting a government official, thus serving as a useful contrast between the two types of participation. Interestingly, demographics were highly predictive of institutional participation but not for attendance in a deliberative forum. However, all other independent variables showed similar levels of significance and direction. Specifically, McLeod found that media use variables and community integration variables were significantly associated to participation, including newspaper use, television use, and conversation (interpersonal networks). All were positive with roughly the same beta coefficients (@ .2).

While McLeod's 1996 study did not include many traditional antecedents to participation, his later 1999 study included political knowledge, interest, and efficacy. Again contrasting institutionalized participation with participation in a public forum, McLeod found very different results. While every variable in the model achieved either significant direct or indirect effects with institutionalized participation, newspaper use, political knowledge and efficacy did not have any significant impact on participating in a

deliberative forum. Television use had a weak indirect effect (through interpersonal discussion), while interpersonal discussion and political interest had strong and positive direct effects.

Finally, a third contribution from McLeod et al., (1999) also contrasted traditional forms of participation with participation in a deliberative forum. Again, demographics failed to attain significant relationships to participation in a deliberative forum while age, education and income had substantively significant relationships to institutional participation. Issue discussion was a strong predictor for both types of participation, while media use was insignificant for both types of participation.

McLeod's studies raise a more general question with regard to deliberation: What are the primary causal variables that propel one to communicate or remain silent on any given subject? One particular model of this process is provided by Grunig's (1977, 1983). His probabilistic model of communication behavior is based on four different theoretical concepts. According to the model, active or passive communication behavior can be determined by each individual's degree of problem recognition, level of involvement, constraint recognition, and referent criterion<sup>13</sup>. Thus, individuals are more likely to engage in a communication behavior if a) they perceive the topic on which the behavior is situated to be a problem that b) they care about and that c) they perceive themselves to have the efficacy to affect.

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<sup>13</sup> Referent criterion refers to knowledge of a solution carried from previous similar situations. There are few instances of this variable being significant toward participating in a communication behavior.

A final literature of potential insight with regard to political deliberation is the literature modeling different types of political participators reviewed in chapter two. Based on these few studies (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Milbrath, 1971; Verba & Nie, 1972) a number of features seem likely. Clearly, participation in deliberation is more demanding than voting and interpersonal political communication. Additionally, it is likely that communalists belong to or have participated in some community organizations. It is not clear, given their average to low tolerance for political conflict, whether they often try to persuade others to vote in a particular way. Just like communalists are differentiated from campaigners in that they participated in less conflictual activities, it appears reasonable that their style of political conversation is less conflictual as well, something that will be explored in the next chapter.

With regard to the communal/conversational framework, the most important literature, reviewed in chapter two, concerning activists and communalists. According to Bellah's famous study (1985), communalists are, in a sense, bilingual, in that they speak like ordinary citizens when it comes to politics, but also speak in a secondary voice not possessed by other citizens, that of the civic citizen. As reviewed in chapter two, the civic identity denotes an individual whose personality or identity contains the dimension of civicness. As such activities that fulfill or enact this dimension are seen as rational activities for that individual. While these studies do not provide specific variables for which to investigate in the present study, they do suggest that civic identifiers hold a strong sense of commitment to their communities and those who reside in them. It is likely, also, that their civic sense significantly affects decisions to participate in politics

and affects how they perform political activities, from reading newspapers to talking in a deliberative forum.

Although I have reviewed three very different types of literature on the subject, a number of commonalities exist, leading to clear expectations in trying to determine who is likely to participate in a deliberative forum. First, education seems to be a consistently important factor in whether an individual will participate, no matter what type of participation is involved. Additionally, income appears to be a relatively consistent predictor. While almost always substantively significant, age is a positive predictor of political participation but a negative predictor for activism and the potential to protest. Since participation in deliberation does not require the same intensity as protest but rather more closely mirrors mainstream forms of participation, age should have a strong and positive relationship to participation in a deliberative forum. Given the reversal in the gender gap in terms of voting, but its persistence in other higher forms of participation, there likely will be null effects for gender if participation in a deliberative forum is seen as a “moderate” form of participation. And while racial gaps still exist in all types of participation, such gaps may not exist in a multivariate setup where SES and attitudinal differences between races are controlled.

Other variables appear important as well, across studies, such as political knowledge and interest, although knowledge is not always a significant predictor in survey-based studies of the willingness to participate in a deliberative forum (McLeod, et al., 1999). Verba and Nie find communalists to be high in interest, knowledge, and efficacy. However, efficacy has not been a consistent nor particularly strong predictor,

although it has shown some relationship to many forms of participation. Nevertheless, Verba and Nie find that communalists differ from every other group in their study in achieving high marks of political efficacy.

### The Studies

Given this review of political participation, deliberation would seem a unique kind of enactment of the civic identity, whether or not a participant's identity is centrally constructed with civic concerns. Unlike voting, contact with government representatives, and most other traditional measures of political participation, deliberation requires more time and repeated contributions of opinion and information. Deliberation has a greater cost than voting or writing a letter to a member of Congress, and thus requires that the individual perceive and believe in the benefits that deliberation can provide. In short, deliberation, more than any other type of traditional citizen-based participation, requires a high level of interest and information, skill and motivation.

Deliberation also provides unique opportunities for the enactment of the civic identity not available in other types of participation. First, deliberation provides an opportunity to engage with other citizens who in all likelihood are also deliberating for the enactment of their own political identity. Second, deliberation is an opportunity to at least talk about if not on some level enact the public good. Third, as a citizen-based activity, deliberation is a communicative practice that socially constructs community. Many types of participation are private acts (e.g., voting, writing letters) while many social acts are designed for elite purposes, for example, volunteering for a candidate in a political campaign. Deliberation may be the one politically participative act that is truly

by the people and for the people, the very enactment of political community. Finally, deliberation is uniquely civic as compared to other types of participation in that it is an opportunity to reify the very values that entail the civic identity. In other words, participation in deliberation allows citizens to not only act out that personality but also talk about that personality: Citizens can deliberate either on or based upon the very social values, attitudes, and ways of life that define their own personality.

The question, though, is not just whether deliberation is an opportunity for such enactment, but whether, and how, citizens take advantage of deliberation as an opportunity to play out one's civic identity. Furthermore, given variables that adequately represent aspects of the civic identity, does civic-mindedness lead to a higher likelihood that one will join political deliberations if asked? With these general questions in mind, three different analyses were designed and carried out in the present study. The first, a regression analysis, was designed to determine the degree to which civic identity or communality related variables, for example, political interest, conversation, and knowledge, predict participation in the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact project. The regression analysis was also designed to incorporate a number of variables which I argue reflect aspects of the civic identity.

The second analysis took a different tack. A close textual analysis was performed as an inductive method of exploring the ways in which the civic identity is reflected in the actual discourse. Here specific genres or markers of the civic identity were explored, to address whether individuals enter deliberation with a particular role in mind, that of a

civic-minded citizen. As such, what commonalities existed across conversations with regard to the enactment of this personality?

Finally, a number of open ended survey questions concerning the quality and character of the deliberations that took place were tabulated and codified with regard to role. These questions provide a unique opportunity to explore the reasons or gratifications for participating, in the words of the actual participants. Combined, these analyses provide strong evidence not only that the civic identity is a powerful motivator to participate in politics and deliberation, but also provides insight to the kinds of goals and motivations that color and guide the deliberations themselves.

#### Regression Analysis: The Civic Identity and Participation

Using the baseline survey, the analysis employed logistic regression to compare those who participated to those who had the opportunity but declined to participate. As such, only those who were asked to participate are included in the analysis. The analysis was designed with variables that prior analyses have shown to have significant relationships with participation. In addition are a number of variables that, as I will argue, are significant aspects of the civic identity and its relationship to this project. The dependent variable in the logistic setup is of course coded 0 and 1, 1 being that the individual in question did participate in at least one forum. Descriptions of the independent variables are detailed below.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> There are many variables that, based on prior literature, likely have significant relationships to participation in a deliberative forum. These include other forms of participation, like voting. However, these variables were not included in the survey from which this project's analyses are derived.

*Income, Education, Gender, Race, Age:* As reviewed above, these demographic variables serve not only as important control variables in a multivariate setup but also have exhibited significant relationships to a number of different forms of participation. As mentioned, I expect education and age to be significant positive predictors. Income is less clear, given the lack of prior analyses studying a participative communicative act with income as an independent variable. Similarly, given the shrinking gaps in gender and race, such variables will likely have null effects on participation. Income ( $M = 1.76$ ,  $SD = .7$ ) was measured in the survey trichotomously, below \$30,000 (1), \$30,000-\$75,000 (2), and above \$75,000 (3). Education ( $M = 3.2$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ) is scored continuously from those who did not attend high school (1), to high school diploma, some college, college degree, and finally, post-graduate work (5). A dichotomous variable for African-Americans ( $M = .39$ ,  $SD = .49$ ) was included for race (no other minority group had an significant enough  $N$  for inclusion in the analysis). Gender ( $M = .49$ ,  $SD = .5$ ) was also scored dichotomously (male = 1). Finally, age ( $M = 45$ ,  $SD = 15.6$ ) was scored continuously.

*Number of Children, Employment Status, Neighborhood Participation:* Verba et al. (1995) define resource variables of participation as variables that can limit the amount of participation due to time, money, or civic skills. The difficulty in time variables, as detailed by Verba and colleagues, is that while individuals high in income may have the ability to pay others to do many time-consuming tasks (e.g. gardening, cleaning), thereby freeing up their own time, these same individuals may be more affluent because they spend more time and energy accumulating wealth. In addition, civic skills, the authors



argue, are necessary resources for participating in politics, skills inculcated from activities like attending meetings where decisions are made, planning such meetings, making speeches and presentations, and writing professional letters. Furthermore, education can be seen as a general measure of civic skills, as the activities listed above are most certainly related to job status and thus education.

As for the current project, there were few variables beyond education that appeared to be representative as resource variables. These included number of children, employment status and a battery of neighborhood participation variables<sup>15</sup>. Similar to Verba and colleagues' dilemma about how to interpret time variables, these three variables are difficult to interpret. Likely, a higher number of children would have made it more difficult to attend the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact forums, despite the provision of some childcare. As for employment status, full time status might be interpreted as having the money and status necessary to want to participate in a deliberative forum, but those not employed or part-time almost certainly have more time to give toward participation. Perhaps the most difficult variable to interpret is neighborhood participation. Those on the high end of the scale reported more involvement in things like community centers and town watch programs. As such, it would seem such individuals would be higher in civic skills and interest in getting involved in community affairs. However, such individuals also give more of their time to such activities, and may therefore have less time to give to a deliberative forum.

Number of children was measured dichotomously as either none or any ( $M = .39$ ,  $SD = .49$ ). Employment was also measured dichotomously ( $M = .69$ ,  $SD = .46$ ). Finally, neighborhood participation (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .6$ ,  $M = 1.77$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ) was developed as a summative scale from five different items (see Appendix A for the questions used in all scales in the analysis) and thus ranges from 0 to 5.

*Political Knowledge, Interest, Strength of Party ID:* As reviewed earlier, these three variables have been shown to have significant effects in a number of studies, and comprise the core of Verba et al.'s *motivational* variables. Political knowledge (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .72$ ,  $M = .69$ ,  $SD = .21$ ) is a scale averaging 12 items and ranges from 0 to 1. Political interest (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .74$ ,  $M = 6.81$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ) is an additive scale that ranges from 1 to 8. Partisan strength ( $M = .43$ ,  $SD = .5$ ) was constructed by dichotomizing a five point ideology scale, coding strong liberals (1) and strong conservatives (5) as 1 and other individuals 0.

*Political communication, Attention to media about politics, News use, Efficacy:* While the present survey did not have variables with which to mirror Grunig's (1983, see chapter 1) model, a number of variables are pertinent to the theoretical underpinnings of his model, including efficacy (constraint recognition). In addition, political conversation and attention to politics can be seen as variables that reflect a general level of involvement in politics.

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<sup>15</sup> See Appendix A for all details on the scales used in this analysis: neighborhood participation, knowledge, interest, conversation, and news use.

Political communication (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .69$ ,  $M = 2.18$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ) is a scale derived as the average of three items. Given their history of differential effects, attention to newspaper news ( $M = 2.93$ ,  $SD = .94$ ) and attention to television news ( $M = 2.93$ ,  $SD = .89$ ) concerning the race for mayor were not combined. Each ranges from one to four. Two news-use scales are based on factor analysis of six items. The first scale represents the use of news for *engagement* (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .6$ ,  $M = .35$ ,  $SD = .26$ ) purposes (e.g., to engage others in conversation) while the other is focused on the *spectacle* (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .61$ ,  $M = .63$ ,  $SD = .26$ ) of the race (e.g., to learn who is ahead and behind). Each scale was averaged and ranges from 0 to 1. Finally, efficacy (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .64$ ,  $M = 2.07$ ,  $SD = .84$ ) was developed as a scale based on six items and ranges from 0 to 4.

*Role variables: Perception of neighborhood quality, Years in neighborhood, Want to stay in Philadelphia or move out to suburbs, Age x Years in Neighborhood:* Finally, a number of variables were included in the analysis as reflective of some of the aspects of role that I argue citizens would act out in deliberations about the problems facing the city of Philadelphia. First, and similar to Grunig's (1977) argument that active communicators must first see a problem in order to engage in communication about it, I included a scale of five items that measure a respondent's perception of the quality of their own neighborhood (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .72$ ,  $M = 1.31$ ,  $SD = .47$ ) that ranges from 0 to 2. In the language of the civic identity, a problem must first be recognized in order for an activist to take on a role in trying to ameliorate the problem. Thus, participants may

be likely to have lower assessments of the quality of their neighborhoods than non-participants.

Perhaps most directly related to the civic identity and how it relates to this particular project is the question of whether respondents want to stay in Philadelphia or move out to the suburbs ( $M = .67$ ,  $SD = .47$ ). Rather than fleeing to the suburbs (a place with lower crime, better schools, and generally higher quality neighborhoods than in the city of Philadelphia), those with a civic sensibility not only recognize a problem but are intimately involved in the public good and the belief that they can successfully affect a problem. As such, civic-minded people, I argue, will be significantly more likely to want to stay in Philadelphia to work the problem rather than run away from the problem.

Finally, I included two variables, years as a resident in Philadelphia and an interaction term between age and years as a resident. Because years as a resident ( $M = 7.1$ ,  $SD = 2.98$ ) was poorly distributed, the original continuous variable was transformed into a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 11, with each one unit increase denoting 5 years of residency until the eleventh step, which includes all residents living in Philadelphia for over 60 years. I believe these variables are important because the civic identity likely has a time element, although scholars can't seem to agree upon exactly how age relates to activism and participation. Generally speaking, there is somewhat consistent support that older Americans are more participative. In addition, years as a resident is a particular sort of age: It is the time an individual has had to recognize the problems facing the city. How should this type of age relate to the civic identity? Certainly, it takes some amount of time for any individual to recognize the problems and

the character of those problems unique to Philadelphia. But is there a point at which individuals lose their sense of efficacy, loses their will to try to fight to fix such problems? Certainly there is reason for a loss of motivation in the city of Philadelphia, as the problems particular to this city, that is, high wage taxes, loss of population and its manufacturing base, urban flight, high crime and deteriorating neighborhoods and schools have been increasing for decades. Some residents may simply feel the problems are too entrenched, after years of seeing them develop, to talk their way out of them. Thus, in all likelihood there should be a significant interactive relationship between age and years as resident: The main effect of age should be linear and positive, whereas years of resident should modify age such that older residents with moderate length of residency will be most likely to participate.

## Results

As prior research has shown, many of the variables in the model have substantive relationships to one another, raising concerns that a) there will be significant multicollinearity in a multivariate analysis, and b) that relationships of the dependent variables to the independent variable will be significantly different in a bivariate analysis as compared to a multivariate analysis. Thus, I report the bivariate correlations between all the variables in the model in table 3a.

**Table 3a: Correlation Matrix of Participation Analysis Variables**

Given the rather large  $N$  in the analysis (approximately 1050 per bivariate association), it takes a rather small association to achieve statistical significance. Considering the large number of independent variables in this analysis, it is expected that correlations under .1 to .15 may not show up as significant relationships in the multivariate analysis. Even using this range as a cutoff (rather than the .065 level above which relationships become significant), the relationships between independent variables and participation are still largely as expected. Among the demographic variables, education achieves the strongest association to participation ( $r = .31$ ). Income also attains a relatively strong association to participation ( $r = .19$ ). As for the opportunity variables, none achieves a relationship to participation over .10 (or under  $-.10$ ). However, two of the resource variables display the strongest associations to participation among all the variables in the model, knowledge ( $r = .36$ ) and interest ( $r = .34$ ). Among the communication variables, newspaper exposure mirrors the strength of knowledge ( $r = .36$ ), while television exposure also shows a significant relationship to participation ( $r = .20$ ). News use and efficacy just make the more stringent cutoff, with associations to participation around .15. Finally, the variable tapping the desire to stay in Philadelphia, as expected, exhibits a moderately strong relationship to participation ( $r = .19$ ).

Despite the large number of strong associations to participation, even stronger relationships exist between independent variables, as the prior literature suggests. Clearly, the two variables that exhibit the strongest associations with each other are knowledge and interest. Not only is the correlation between these two variables

substantive ( $r = .48$ ), but associations between knowledge and income ( $r = .40$ ), education ( $r = .32$ ), newspaper exposure ( $r = .45$ ) and television exposure ( $r = .32$ ) are quite strong, as are the relationships between interest and conversation ( $r = .36$ ), newspaper exposure ( $r = .63$ ), and television exposure ( $r = .51$ ). The good news is that one should expect these relationships assuming the constructs are valid. The bad news is that such strong correlations, when controlled for in a multivariate setup, will likely significantly alter a number of relationships between the independent variables and participation and increase the standard errors of many of these variables, making significance tests more stringent. Nevertheless, the very purpose of running a multivariate setup with this rather large list of variables is to see which variables, controlling for all others, remain in significant association to participation, given that few prior studies have done so.

Even with such strong associations between independent variables, the multicollinearity statistics in the regression analysis are not intolerable, with variance inflation factors ranging from 1.09 to 2.15. Among the independent variables, age exhibits the least tolerance (.466), unsurprising given its strong expected association with years as a resident ( $r = .58$ ,  $\text{tol.} = .566$ ). Of course, other low tolerance levels were found among income (.603), knowledge (.625), interest (.574), and attention to newspapers (.566) and television (.679). Given that for these variables the standard errors are inflated by a factor of approximately 1.5, many of the expected relationships to participation are likely to be somewhat attenuated.

Table 3b: Logistic Regression Analysis:  
Participation in Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact

Variable	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Income	-.25	.16	.78	-.29	.16	.75
Gender (1=Male)	-.28	.18	.75	-.28	.18	.76
Education	.31***	.09	1.37	.30***	.09	1.35
Age	.02*	.01	1.02	.06***	.02	1.06
Black	-.04	.20	.96	-.07	.20	.93
Neighborhood Participation	-.04	.07	.96	-.05	.07	.95
Number of Children	-.11	.21	.90	-.18	.21	.83
Employment Status	.44	.24	1.56	.35	.24	1.42
Knowledge	2.27***	.62	9.69	2.28***	.62	9.80
Interest	.24*	.10	1.28	.24*	.11	1.27
Ideological Strength	.10	.18	1.11	.11	.19	1.11
Efficacy	-.03	.10	.97	-.03	.10	.97
Political Conversation	.21*	.09	1.23	.20*	.09	1.23
Attention to Newspapers	.40**	.14	1.49	.40**	.14	1.49
Attention to Television	-.14	.14	.87	-.12	.14	.88
Use of News: Engagement	.77*	.38	2.15	.81*	.40	2.25
Use of News: Spectacle	.12	.42	1.12	.11	.42	1.12
Neighborhood Description	-.17	.21	.84	-.18	.21	.83
Years Resident of Philadelphia	-.16***	.04	.86	.06	.11	1.06
Want to Stay/Leave Philadelphia	.69***	.19	2.00	.72***	.19	2.05
Years Resident x Age				-.01*	.00	.99
Constant	-5.64***	.78		-6.94***	1.0	
Model $\chi^2$	196***			200***		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.32			.33		
N	706					

\*\*\* $p < .001$     \*\* $p < .01$     \* $p < .05$



Table 2b provides results of the logistic regression on participation in Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact. Overall, the model provides a good fit, with a Nagelkerke  $R^2$  of .33. This is in the range of similar analyses on political participation (Verba et al., 1995) and above what has been found in prior analyses using hypothetical measures of participation in a deliberative forum (McLeod et al., 1999).

Of the four demographic variables in the model, only age exhibits a significant relationship to participation. In addition, education is a substantively significant predictor, with an odds ratio (Exp(B)) of 1.37. Similar to the demographic variables, the resource variables used in this analysis do not show any significant relationships. Due to inflation in its standard error, income did not achieve significance, and in fact changed sign from its bivariate association with participation. In general, then, the demographic variables displayed results expected based on prior literature.

None of the opportunity variables displayed significant coefficients. This however, was not entirely unexpected, given the overall low Pearson correlation coefficients between these variables and participation.

However, two of the engagement variables, knowledge and interest, did show positive relationships to participation. Knowledge in fact is by far the strongest predictor in the model, with an odds ratio of 9.80. Despite its strength as a predictor, leaving knowledge out of the equation does not radically alter the relationships of the other variables to participation.

The next set of independent variables, concerned with news and conversation, also exhibit compelling results. As perhaps might be expected, attention to newspaper

stories concerning the Philadelphia mayor's race exhibited a significant positive relationship to participation. On the other hand, attention to television stories was not only insignificant but signed negative as well. Furthermore, those who participated in the deliberative forums are significantly different from nonparticipants in how they use the news, namely in that they use news to increase their ability to stay engaged in politics but not because of the spectacle of politics. It is perhaps unsurprising that participants are different than nonparticipants in that they are more likely to get news from a less spectacle-driven, more information rich medium (newspapers) and say that they use news *precisely for information and conversational motives*. Political conversation was also a significant predictor of participation.

Finally, two of the three role variables and the interaction between age and years as a resident displayed significant relationships to participation. The participants exhibited a strong desire to stay in Philadelphia rather than escape the city to the suburbs. Indeed, the odds ratio of this variable was around two (depending on whether the interaction was included in the model), the third strongest ratio in the model. Although years as a resident was significantly negative, as I have argued the interpretation of this variable is difficult if not impossible without testing an interaction between it and age. The graphing of this interaction is shown in figure 3a. As is expected given the positive main effect of age on participation, the older one generally gets the more likely that person is to participate. However, that relationship is modified by years as a resident such that the less one has lived in Philadelphia the more likely they are to participate.

Thus, older individuals with little time residing in the city have the highest probability to participate, in fact, a probability over .8 (for an admittedly small group of individuals).




Figure 3a: Probability of Attending a Deliberative Forum

### Regression Analysis Discussion

Again given the moderate to high level of multicollinearity between independent variables, it is not surprising that more variables did not show a significant relationship to participation. Indeed, most of the variables are signed as predicted. Certainly, the overall picture of the model is that of the participant as a member of the active public.

Participants are not only more educated but also far more knowledgeable and interested in politics than average. If one's identity is represented by what one talks about, the participants in the project clearly identify with politics. Participants not only prefer to talk politics more than nonparticipants, but actually use news to gain information with which to converse, and are more likely to use a medium that provides them that ability—newspapers—to the less information-rich medium of television.

A number of different models were tested using various forms of political efficacy, with little results. Again, however, efficacy has not been a consistent predictor of participation in prior research. The difficulty with efficacy in this and many other models has been in developing survey items that effectively and precisely measure the kind of efficacy that would motivate participation. While the first step toward developing more precise measures was put forward by Craig & Maggiotto (1982) with the separation of internal and external efficacy items, the present survey did not employ these items. Given the items employed, it is indeed difficult to determine how one would expect civic individuals to differ from other individuals. For any of the items included in the survey, participants might be expected to differ from nonparticipants regardless of their answer. For example, disagreeing with “city government is usually inefficient and wasteful” or with “city officials don’t care much what people like me think” might indicate a positive view of politics and one’s ability to affect politics, thus reflecting a civic-minded individual. On the other hand, agreeing to these questions might also indicate a “squeaky wheel” mentality, where citizens recognize a problem and perceive deliberation to be one way to contribute to a solution. Regardless, no combination of efficacy items or scales produced a measure that significantly differentiated participants from nonparticipants.

Although political knowledge is usually a strong predictor of other forms of participation, it has not always exhibited such a relationship in studies that ask about the willingness to participate in a deliberative forum. In this test of actual participation, however, knowledge was by far the most substantive predictor of participation. I would argue that this result is due to the specificity of questions asked in the knowledge battery

with regard to local politics. While most politically aware individuals would score well on a general national politics test (for example, the types of political knowledge scales reviewed in Price, 1998), only those in tune with local concerns would score well on the knowledge test used in the present survey.

Perhaps most interesting is the strength with which the dichotomous “want to stay in Philadelphia or move to the suburbs” question distinguished participants from nonparticipants. This relationship is important in developing the argument that participants are members of a group of individuals who identify with civicism in that it links participants—individuals who admittedly participate in deliberation to help solve civic problems—with a desire to commit themselves to be involved or connected to the entity under which civic problems exist: the city itself. As I will show in later analyses, this variable suggests not only that participants are committed to help fix the city’s problems, but in fact see themselves as stewards to the city, individuals responsible for the character of the community in which they live. Participants, in other words, are not only civic-minded; their very personalities center around a commitment to living a civic life.

Indeed, the outcome of the regression analysis mirrors exactly what would be expected of communalists (Verba and Nie, 1972). Again, compared to the five other types of participatory citizens, communalists are above average in their interest in politics; the most efficacious with the exception of complete activists; the most knowledgeable with the exception of complete activists; unremarkable in terms in partisan strength, the desire for conflict, and the extremity of their issue positions. Of

course, they are the most civic-minded of all groups. With the exception of efficacy, which I argue largely is due to poor measurement, the results of the analysis perfectly resemble the attributes of communalists<sup>16</sup>.

Clearly, participants are different from nonparticipants in many important ways. They are by far much more engaged, interested, and knowledgeable of politics. They are committed to a life of doing what they can politically and for the community. Given the differences established between participants and nonparticipants, the question with regard to deliberation that one might ask is the degree to which these differences in the identities of participants and nonparticipants significantly alters the ways in which they deliberate and on what they deliberate. Of course, this question cannot be answered given the data at hand. However, it is possible to explore the ways in which those who did participate, those with a strong sense of the civic identity, did deliberate. Simply asked, perhaps, but this question is increasingly complex in its answer. While later chapters will explore this question with regard to rationality, equality, and the character of argumentation, the following analyses will continue to focus solely on the civic identity and how it can be characterized by the discourse of deliberation.

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<sup>16</sup> While not reported in the final results, a model was tested that included the degree to which respondents tend to disagree in their political conversation with others and a number of importance measures for a number of different issues. In line with what one would expect for communalists, participants were not significantly different than nonparticipants in these two measures of conflict and issue extremity.

### Close Textual Analysis: Aspects of the Civic Identity

Like many qualitatively driven analyses, the present analysis explored the texts inductively, although given what is known from prior analyses and the above regression analysis, it was expected that a number of dimensions of the civic identity would be exhibited in deliberation. First, given the strong attachment of participants to the city of Philadelphia, it was expected that such attachment would be evident in the participants' discourse. Second, it was expected—despite the failure of the efficacy items to differentiate participants from nonparticipants—that there would be a significant amount of evidence in the texts of the efficaciousness of the participants. Not only has prior research on activists provided evidence of their belief in their own problem solving abilities (Teske, 1997), but research on communicative action has also posited and shown strong empirical support for belief in such abilities (Grunig, 1977, 1983).

In general, however, the research performed in this close textual analysis was inductive: Through an exhaustive reading and rereading of the text it was hoped that a number of different dimensions of role and the civic identity would become apparent. What I found was indeed further evidence that deliberation is an opportunity for civic-minded citizens to play out a role they relish, that of discussing and defining the public good. Again, such talk has drastic implications for the ways in which participants conversed and argued, something to be tackled in later chapters. What was telling and will be talked about in this chapter is the degree to which participants perceived their own role as citizens and the role of others in democracy to further the public good.

As with other elements of this project, my initial close textual analysis specifically investigated the April issues convention transcripts, although all available transcripts were explored, providing largely the same results. The most fruitful part of the forum was the opening segment in which moderators asked the participants to share why they chose to deliberate on the topics being discussed (e.g., crime, neighborhoods, government, education, or jobs). However, revealing and insightful comments were scattered all around the discourse, and can be generalized to four dimensions of the civic identity. The first set of comments reflect a perceived role of *stewardship*. Participants, in short, held some attachment, some sense of responsibility, to citizens in their community, neighborhood, or to future generations of Philadelphians.

I am interested because the future of our young people is the most important thing to consider as citizens of the City (Speaker 131).

I was a reading specialist and I am very interested in all children because they're the future of our race (Speaker 66).

When it was happening here, oh, that's typical -- urban, suburban -- but now, that it's happening, the reality is if we don't fix it *here* and we can be the ones to help turn it around (Speaker 48).

As I have grown, I learned to better myself and I feel as though I owe it to the children under me to try to change and help them so they can turn themselves around and get better in life (Speaker 123).

The comment above made by speaker 123 in fact is reflective of not only stewardship but of the next dimension of the civic identity, *responsibility to place*. Citizens expressed not a responsibility toward others in their community but a sense of responsibility to a geographical location ranging from the city of Philadelphia to a specific neighborhood.



I live in Center City and I am probably what I would describe as the typical stakeholder...everybody has a stake in what happens with the schools in this City (Speaker 124).

And for the first time in a long time, and I love this City, my wife and I have been talking about moving out of the City because of the education. That scared me and I felt like a coward (Speaker 48).

Actually I started her out in parochial school and I felt like that's not right. I went through the system (Speaker 147).

Speaking of flight to the suburbs, I lived in the city from...1966. I work in the city, two of my three sons live in the city. I'm deeply committed to the City of Philadelphia politically and emotionally (Speaker 106).

I love this town. I don't want to move and that's why I'm here (at this deliberative forum) (Speaker 200).

Like the first stewardship comment, many participants felt responsibilities to the next generation of Philadelphians. These statements reflect the degree of responsibility participants feel not only to their own children and family but to the children of the community around them. Similarly, participants clearly feel a strong sense of attachment to the city, and comments like those of speaker 106 seem to link the attachment and commitment to the city found in the regression analysis with the very core of the civic identity.

Participants not only exhibited a sense of responsibility to the city, but to its public schools, their neighborhoods, and their communities as well. The first two responsibility to place examples are particularly illustrative. In the first, speaker 124 describes his/her attachment to the city as a "stakeholder," that is, someone who is not just a resident, nor a resident with simple strong affect toward the city, but a resident who, *qua* resident, recognizes and feels the weight of responsibility as someone who not

only reaps the rewards of communal life but also has a requisite function in the quality of that community.

In the second comment, speaker 48 admits that the thought of leaving the city seems cowardly. Citizens living in a city have a private choice, to stay or to move to what is in most respects a higher quality of life in the suburbs. And, as has been well documented throughout the years, a significant percentage of people making this decision choose to go to the suburbs. And in some respects, why shouldn't they? There are usually little private costs to doing so, and little if no sense of communal costs or guilt in doing so. The move, for most people, is a private decision and others respect it as such. But for civic identifiers, there is evidence that they do feel a communal guilt, a cowardly feeling, in leaving the city for the suburbs. For these citizens, it is not a private decision devoid of pressure from the collective. They feel the presence of the collective and feel responsibility toward it. For these individuals, there are perceived public costs, and the decision is certainly not a strictly private one. In a sense, civic-minded individuals are activists, whether they are committed to any one particular cause or not. They are activists for the city, for the community, for the idea of community.

In addition to a sense of responsibility to other citizens and their general and specific communal locations, participants did make a number of efficacious comments, or comments that reflect personal *problem solving abilities* (PSA). While some individuals participated with the hope that deliberation would empower them to change things, others clearly believed in their own personal or citizen-wide efficacy, with or without deliberation; deliberation in this case often is seen as a catalyst to empowerment.

When I got the call here where I could put my two cents in and be a part of the solution, I said here we go (Speaker 177).

I'm here today because I've decided, even at this age, to be a part of the solution because we cannot have this problem continue (Speaker 98).

Yes, three, and two are upstate. But my own children, all had a good education and got it from the School District of Philadelphia and I know it can be turned around -- that's my feeling. We have good teachers and good principals, and I think Dr. Hornbeck should be given a chance to finish his plan. You notice they wanted to get rid of him a short while ago. But I'm very hopeful and glad to be here today (Speaker 66).

Basically, I'm here to see what can happen, what can we do to make it better or what can be done? I know something can be done (Speaker 271).

Whatever piece that we decide to put on that engine that it's only a piece of rebuilding that engine. That we are not, all of us here, whatever decision we come up with, it's not going to replace the system by the time my tenth grader graduates (Speaker 46).

I like the fact that it makes citizens stakeholders and that they recognize not only that they can affect the quality of life, but justice by participating in not only what's happening in their house, but in this community (Speaker 104).

What, then, are these citizens empowered or efficacious toward? It is the very essence of the civic identity which engenders these individuals with efficacy toward government and community change. As is clear in the following statement, if only more individuals held to the civic identity, such efficacy might reach a critical mass where change and improvement would be virtually assured:

If you look around the room and see how diverse we are and how interested we are. If we were to take that diversity and interest back to our communities, to our companies, to our friends and relations, and engender in them the same kind of interests, then we would accomplish what we seem to be setting out to do. And if we hold our elected officials accountable, as we hope to do with this process, and not have it end after the election or after the inauguration, then we will start to make the quality of life better for us and the next generation. So that is what is so crucial, that we keep it going (Speaker 131).

The participants also recognized the wealth of potential in every citizen to affect change. The participants differed in terms of their recognition of a difference between themselves and ordinary citizens. While some, like speaker 131, seem to give evidence to a recognition that the participants, those with the civic identity, are different than ordinary citizens, others were less willing to recognize that they were any different than any other citizen. For such individuals, the respectful and intelligent dialogue that took place in the deliberative forums was evidence of the people's efficacy and ability:

I don't believe they should be elected so much. But I think we're going to have to get some different people in there who are more cognizant of what the average person wants. I mean, we look around this table and we have some average people, basically, and I don't think that average people are stupid. I think that we need some average people on these boards so, when you make decisions about stadiums or where it's going to be, when you make decisions of whatever, the professional people, they haven't done such a good job in some of these things (Speaker 153).

[About the deliberative forum] There was a great range of issues that we talked about in the city government [group]. If there were more people like this, we have more of this type of community, the politicians listened more often, this would be a great city (Speaker 33).

The efficaciousness that the participants feel, as I have suggested already, is linked to the desire to stay in Philadelphia rather than move to the suburbs. The desire to stay in Philadelphia is not just a useful predictor of participation, as the regression analysis showed; it is again a sentiment that is indicative of the civic identity and the special type of efficaciousness that is part of that identity:

I see that people have come to a decision that it's either fight or flight from the City. And a lot of them take flight, and I thought before I have, you know, that decision, I like the City and wanted to get more educated and more involved to really stay here (Speaker 74).

The citizens who participated in Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact have a very clear sense of efficacy. First, they do not think, as the typical cynic might be described, as if people have little power to make a difference. The participants know that “something can be done.” Furthermore, they clearly believe that they specifically have the power to affect positive change. Many of the participants believe, furthermore, that the “decisions” made in the deliberations will have impact, will help change the status quo. On the other hand, some participants understand deliberation to be a forum where one finds specific efficacious actions that can then be taken outside of deliberation, as is evidenced in the comment made by speaker 131. Overall, there is a clear sense of efficacy within the comments of the participants. However, these comments do differ in where that efficacy is located. For some, it is in the deliberations, for others, deliberations provide actions that can be taken at a later time.

Perhaps the one area in which I believe role to be most evident in the transcripts is the topic of *accountability*. Regardless of the topic at hand, a surprisingly large number of conversations at some point lead to accountability or responsibility. There were clearly four different targets of responsibility: other citizens, all citizens, specific public officials, and all public officials / government in general. What seems interesting here is that, again, regardless of the topic, participants seemed to hold the same view as to how each of these entities should be accountable in general and to one another. “Other citizens,” for example, seem to be an entity different from “the people,” such that “the people” was used as the highest agency of accountability, that they, in a sense, have the

final say. However, there is also a clear vein of dialogue in which “other citizens” lack interest or involvement, in short, do not live up to what their role should be as watchdogs or shareholders in democracy.

There are, then, a number of aspects of accountability that reveal the nature of the civic identity. First, accountability to citizens is defined as a specific and concrete link between government and citizens. At its most basic level, this link is expressed by speaker 146 below. Yet immediately upon expressing this sentiment speaker 146 is ‘corrected’ by speaker 76. In this clarification is the heart of what the bulk of the participants express, or base their own statements upon: the recognition that accountability means streamlining or improving the method by which government officials determine what the people think. Regardless, the supposition both statements are predicated upon is that citizens are the final stop in the accountability chain, that a well functioning democracy is predicated upon the existence and strength of this link.

Two ends to belief, yet both hold the same essential definition of how democracy works: The politicians do what the citizens want them to do (Speaker 146). What they think the citizens think they want them to do (Speaker 76).

There are, of course, two ways the link between citizens and government officials can be improved: through a top-down and a bottom-up process. It can, in other words, be initiated by government officials or by citizens themselves. Below are some examples of the former:

And by having the superintendent report directly to the Mayor, that gives someone that he is accountable to who is accountable to us if things are not going the way we want them to go. So I think it gives us a more direct interaction (Speaker 118).

I think I'm concerned but there is still a level of overall disgust with how the system communicates with me and how the system functions with an explanation as to why this is the way it is (Speaker 188).

We have to start holding our officials, our government officials responsible. They have to learn how to listen to what the public wants, not what they think we should have because sometimes what they think that we should have is not good for all of us (Speaker 151).

I think that if the new Mayor is going to be sincere about rebuilding the city, it has to begin by making each level of each institution, each public official more and more accountable to the people. It's got to be community and public partnerships. It's got to be the role of the public sector in this. It relates to so many different things. I think if we focus on building accountability, we'll progress a lot (Speaker 100).

In addition to the top down ways that government can improve accountability are the bottom up processes. One process, as might be expected, is for citizens to simply have more collective activities amongst themselves. It is, at least according to one of the participants, in the interest of local government representatives to take heed of such meetings.

If you are in a neighborhood and you get together with people that have an interest in that neighborhood, you already have in place the mechanism to avail yourself of government interest and dollars because you have a city council representative in that neighborhood in which you have organized. It's that city councilperson's interest to pay attention to you, especially as you grow and drag other people into your group (Speaker 91).

Who truly represents the community? This is a national issue, having representatives in your government who have absolutely nothing to do with what the citizens want. You know, it kind of flows out. In terms of my own everyday life, I have to be concerned about what's going on with my block as a block captain, and then be concerned about my neighborhood school. It builds out from there. Politics is local (Speaker 192).

A second aspect of accountability moves beyond the link between government officials and citizens and focuses more narrowly on citizens and how they might act in a

normative communitarian environment. This aspect of accountability reveals a core belief of the civic identity of what citizenship means and what it takes. The civic identity is both civic-mindedness and civic duty:

First off, I would like to dispute the certain thing, I think, about citizenship that it may just be a duty. It also should be a privilege because we're born into citizenship (Speaker 14)

In the mind of the participants, citizens are responsible to care about two things: others in their community and politics. Each is one face of the same communal coin. Whereas the first three comments below reflect the responsibility to care for others and the community one lives in, the latter three reflect the need to care for politics. Note that with regard to politics, it is not just interest that counts: While speaker 8 reflects the need for citizens to be politically interested, speaker 33 argues for the importance of being knowledgeable politically while speaker 116 recognizes the difficulty, in fact, the rarity of citizens in attaining such accountability. Even for those with a civic identity, accountability is a tough job:

Since we are never going to have enough police to catch the people who are doing, especially minor crimes, we as a community have to take responsibility for noticing, reporting to the police, to the parents if you think they are accountable, but if not, then to the police. You can't ignore it and let the woman die on the sidewalk as she did on the street of New York (Speaker 106).

[In discussing the former issue framing workshop, and the choice of "people first" and what it meant] It wasn't just a word, like citizenship. It was about caring about your neighborhood. It was about knowing who your neighbors were. Coming together in your fellowship. It's not something artificial, it's something from your heart and soul that brings a community together (Speaker 192).

I feel that the neighborhood is only as good as the people that are there. If you care about your neighborhood then you will care about your neighbors also...If



you don't care about your neighbor, how can you care about your neighborhood (Speaker 196).

I think if people have more interest in government, they'll spot corruption much sooner, they'll see inefficiencies sooner, and it will allow, you know, it will sort of demand that things be run more efficiently (Speaker 8).

There's too many citizens that go in and pull that lever, that they're Democratic lever, every year, every election. They don't know nothing about any of them people (Speaker 33).

I have a question for everyone. How many people have actually attended a city council meeting, a zoning commission meeting, a planning meeting? They meet at night. I have never been to one. I have never watched one on TV. I find myself motivated by my neighborhood, and other neighborhoods, but I have never attended one. I'm sure I'm not alone in that. That's part of the accountability. If you are not taking part (Speaker 116).

It should be unsurprising, given the clear and strong perspective of accountability, that civic identifiers have a clear sense of the normative community. It is a community where communication and relationships matter most, where the communal ideal is achieved in everyday practice, and where government officials are not just accountable but responsible to ordinary citizens:

If the model is to protect and serve, how come we do not get to have a relationship with the people that are protecting and serving us? Because they cannot feel good about trying to save my life, save my children's life or help my community if they're not having any kind of relationship with them (Speaker 103).

I'm sorry. I just think the city employees are our employees. They work for us (Speaker 33).

In addition, the ideal community is one in which the link between citizens and government officials is direct and unambiguous. Just as civic identifiers are those who

participated in the deliberative forums studied in this project, they search out and are more likely to demand and take part in other public forums:

[About equal access] Our voice would be heard, our concerns would be heard. One of the problems is the City Council could have meetings at night so people that work during the day could attend (Speaker 33).

Indeed, some of the participants' comments clearly reflected their recognition of their own identities and how they are different from other citizens. As I and others have argued, the civic identity motivates individuals to participate because participation is an enactment of that identity. But another aspect, reflected in the exemplar below, is that while civic identifiers are different in their drive toward community action, given their belief in the power and equality of the people, this difference is seen as no difference in terms of who should provide a public voice:

There are no standards for participation. You don't get a greater voice just because you come to twenty-five meetings. I shouldn't have a greater voice because I get in these meetings. I'm doing a service because I want to. I get something out of it. I give something back and I think that's the other thing people feel, that they are getting something back. We're not all altruistic human beings. We also want to feel a sense of accomplishment (Speaker 138).

Nevertheless, there is also a clear sense in the transcripts that the participants acted as representatives of their communities and neighborhoods. Indeed, given the amount of attention civic identifiers give to communal concerns it is perhaps natural that such individuals would act as representatives at some level:

If they would not pay it's because I know a lot of citizens that are in North Philadelphia and a lot of them are hard working. So, I know if a good thing was coming to North Philadelphia they would definitely want to pay the five percent if it would help their section of the city (Speaker 14).

In summation, the civic identity provides a very clear sense of accountability of citizens, neighborhoods, and government officials of all levels. It is striking how homogenous is the vision of accountability within the participants, a vision that includes how neighborhoods should function, how elites and citizens should communicate, how citizens and politicians should conduct themselves. The civic identity is reflected in the comments made by the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact participants on a number of dimensions. First, the civic identity includes a sense of stewardship and a responsibility to where one lives at every level. This is borne out not only in the regression analysis but in the comments made by the participants as well. Second, the civic identity is defined by a strong sense of accountability, which includes not only very specific opinions on how government officials should conduct themselves and what government officials should do to increase the link between citizens and themselves, but also includes a very specific sense of how citizens should conduct themselves and what they can do to increase the link of accountability between themselves and government officials. These convictions are based upon a strong normative belief in democracy and its central tenet, that citizens should rule. It is perhaps this sentiment that drives civic identifiers, that defines who they are: A conviction that people do rule, and that the more local the issue, the more control, and input, they should have.

#### Open Ended Survey Analysis: Uses for Deliberation

In addition to the regression analysis and the close textual analysis, I also investigated the open ended questions in the various surveys conducted during the project. Most of these were part of pencil and paper surveys conducted after each

deliberative forum. Among the questions asked were what participants liked most and least about the process and what they learned. In addition, participants were asked why the deliberative process could lead to a greater understanding of the issues facing Philadelphia.

Like the close textual analysis, the analysis of the open ended questions was primarily an inductive one, although again with a number of areas to look for specifically, based on prior literature and the two analyses reported above. Of particular interest were not only stewardship comments, efficacious comments and the like, but also comments concerning the giving and taking of opinions. These are of particular importance because they reflect participants' willingness to listen, to have the public good defined as part of the deliberative process, in contrast to entering deliberations with concretized opinions with the sole intent of giving such opinions and persuading others to adhere to such opinions.

Table 3c: Aggregation of Participant's Comments, January

Category / Percentage	Liked most	% of Total	Learned Most	% of Total	Process	% of Total	% of All
Hear other's opinions	16	37%	2	2%	23	29%	19%
Different	5	12%	1	1%	8	10%	7%
Different and learning how issues affect others differently			2	2%	11	14%	6%
Same	2	5%	4	4%	1	1%	3%
Got to express own opinions	1	2%	0		2	3%	1%
Shape own opinions / helps me think	0		1	1%	10	13%	5%
General interaction	4	9%	0		0		2%
Learned about general topic(s)	1	2%	38	43%	3	4%	20%
Learned fact / subtopic	0		10	11%	0		
Learn about general topic from other's point of view	0		9	10%	0		
Efficacious impact, general efficacy	3	7%	5	6%	4	5%	6%
Stewardship	1	2%	2	2%	0		
Total number of comments	43		89		79		211

As is evident in table 3c, the vast majority of participants said that what they most liked about the process and what they most learned from it was the opinions of others. The results of the “liked most” question are typical of the others: 37% said because they got the opportunity to hear others’ opinions, another 12% added to that “hearing opinions *different* than their own,” and yet another 5% also most enjoyed hearing others’ opinions

*and* realizing how issues affect other citizens differentially. This is in stark contrast to the 2% of responses that said they simply liked getting the chance to express their own opinions the most. In addition, a few comments (6% overall) expressed some sort of agency or efficacy and one respondent expressed a stewardship function toward the city or other citizens.

### Summary

This chapter finds strong evidence for both the rational/instrumental framework and the communal/conversational framework. Political participators are highly educated, knowledgeable and interested in politics. But in addition, participators hold strong ties to their communities and engage in politics to enact civic sensibilities. The textual analyses conducted in this chapter reveals strong civic characteristics, including discussion of local concerns, community narratives, and communal values. Rather than speaking from self-interest, participators spoke for the communal interest in an efficacious and normative frame. With regard to the question of who participates, this chapter has shown that rational/instrumental variables are far from the only important variables to consider.

The results found in this chapter raise an interesting question with regard to deliberation. Deliberative forums in this and other countries have been initiated through a process of self-selection. Even in projects with strong incentives, like James Fishkin's National Issues Foundation forums (see Fishkin, 1996; Fishkin & Luskin, 1999), individuals still are left to decide themselves whether to participate. The evidence in this chapter shows, even with moderate incentives designed to lower the costs of deliberating (parking, child care, etc.), that the decision to deliberate is one dependent upon the self-

perceived gratifications that come from deliberation. The gratifications that come from deliberation have been difficult to assess. But recently, given the move away from strict rationalistic thinking about the costs and benefits of politics, scholars have begun to recognize that the benefits of deliberation to the individual are largely in identity-building. Deliberation offers a number of gratifications, again, a) fulfilling a responsibility of stewardship to the city and those in it, b) helping determine the responsibilities of the polity, c) enjoyment in engaging with others politically, d) believing that they can make a difference, e) hearing other opinions more so than having their own heard, and f) taking part in the search for the public good. But the most important thing to note here is that these are only gratifying actions for those whose identity is constructed and reified through such actions. As with any identity-connected activity, the activity is “fun” because it fulfills a part of who that individual is: One individual’s enjoyment is another’s tedium.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Can deliberative forums ever be representative of the general public? Likely, the latest round of NIF forums were more representative than the current project because of the incentives given to the NIF participants (free airfare, the chance to be on television, a generous stipend). Still, the NIF participants were not wholly representative, and the NIF analyses did not test for the degree to which its participants were more civic-minded than nonparticipants. Of course, there may be only a certain level of representativeness that organizers of deliberative forums wish to have in their events. Many Americans do not even know the name of the current Vice President of the United States, and there is a fair argument that such individuals should not be part of deliberation, despite the importance of representativeness and equality. While the question is not of particular concern for the current project, it should raise concern for those projects who claim to be producing a representative informed opinion. What is clear is that such

Participants very likely saw the potential of the deliberative events to satisfy many of the gratifications they seek out in their development and enactment of a civic identity. And if not, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* advertised the project as a chance to fulfill such gratifications. The *Inquirer* specifically mentioned that the deliberative forums would be a chance for citizens to “share their fears and dreams about their community and to deliberate on the issues they deem vital to the future” (Satullo, 1998, p. A19). All a citizen needed to participate, according to the *Inquirer*, was one’s own “values,” stories about “what its like to live in the city,” and a “willingness to listen to others tell their stories” (Satullo, 1998, p. A19). Indeed, throughout the process, the *Inquirer* seemed to hone in on the degree to which the participants were civically minded. Harris Sokoloff, the lead moderator of the project, noted that participants’ “sense of the power of citizen activism was genuine and waiting to be utilized” (in Satullo, 1999, p. A43). Other

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individuals (who don’t know the name of the Vice President of the United States) would not likely join a deliberative forum simply because they would not find it potentially gratifying.

With regard to normative claims of deliberative democracy and the hopes of Fishkin to have a representative deliberative poll, the news is thus both good and bad. I believe there is good reason to believe that the unrepresentativeness of participants in the Citizen Voices/Philadelphia Compact project is likely to exist in most deliberative forums. Simply stated, those who perceive deliberation to be most gratifying will be the most likely to attend. On the other hand, individuals with a civic identity are least likely to argue from self-interest and most likely to argue from the public good. What Fishkin might have done with the number of incentives his project provided was to move the mean of the self-interest - communal interest spectrum more toward the self-interested, or at the very least more toward ordinary citizens with ordinarily low levels of political interest and information.



moderators commented on the strong sense of attachment to the city, the “love felt toward the local neighborhood” (Rota, cited in Satullo, 1999, p. A43). What did the *Inquirer* say about the progress made on the particular issues discussed in the forums? Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the argument laid out in this chapter, the *Inquirer* found that virtually every conversation “hinged on ideas about citizen involvement” and the responsibilities of citizens to their city (Inquirer, 1999, p. E6).

It may be argued that the evidence provided in this chapter is suspect given that I have made claims about the civic identity and the participants generally using comments from individuals. However, the goal of this study is to make both individual and aggregate claims. While I am interested in the individual character and abilities of citizens, ultimately, what must be put forward in a project such as this, if even just to respond and frame this project’s findings with prior normative and aggregate claims of deliberation, is an aggregate claim about the character and utility of deliberation. As such, this chapter has put forward an argument not only about the deliberative character of individuals but also of deliberation itself.

The civic identity is a major motivator toward participating in a deliberative forum. Although there is no ability in this project to compare participants to non-participants, a civic dimension of one’s personality also appears to contribute to what is discussed in deliberation. However, the character of the dialogue of the participants raises other questions as to the overall objectives and character of the dialogue of deliberation. Do civic-minded citizens argue in a rational, Socratic manner, or is deliberation marked by more reciprocal explorations of issues? Is deliberation talk about

the costs and benefits of certain public policy actions, or is it instead talk about what it means to be civic, what each actor (politicians, citizens, etc.) can do to help solve the community's problems? The following chapter will address these questions by contrasting the argumentation model of deliberation with the civic model.

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## Chapter 4: The Dialogue of Deliberation

Knowing who actually shows up to deliberate, as the last chapter argued, is informative and consequential for what is said. Beyond participation itself, however, there are a multitude of other sources of information that shed light on what deliberation “looks like,” that is, what is said, and how it is said. As I have mentioned, of all that has been written of deliberation in the past decade (and before), the lion’s share has been situated upon rational/instrumental normative theoretical principles. Additionally, I have argued that this literature is incomplete in that while there is a preponderance of normative theoretical works, actual research dedicated to testing the claims made in such theories is lacking. This and later chapters aim to remedy these discrepancies, again by testing the tenability of the rational/instrumental framework in contrast to the communal/conversational framework of deliberation.

Perhaps the most important question undergirding this chapter is the following: Why is it important to know what deliberation looks like? First, knowing the character of actual deliberation provides useful, and to this point, essentially non-existent feedback to the normative theories of deliberation mentioned above as well as both the traditional and alternative expectation frameworks of deliberation being investigated in this dissertation. Empirical investigations of deliberation can test for equality, accountability, rationality, and other rational/instrumental normative principles currently entrenched in popular deliberative theory. Second, gaining an understanding of the character of deliberation is

interesting at “face value.” Description, however, is not only valuable for the sake of description, but also paves the way for further questions and can serve as useful data to inform those who organize and implement deliberative forums. If deliberation is meant to discuss the pros and cons of public policy, for example, it is useful to know whether a case of actual deliberation successfully met such a goal. Third, descriptive elements, empirically measured, allow for investigation on the inclination of certain individuals to make certain kinds of deliberative contributions, detailed in the next chapter. In the end, we need to know what actual deliberation is like so that we can use such information in the assessment of deliberation itself, to answer the question of whether deliberation serves the functions for which it has been theoretically linked and whether other more communal and conversational functions indeed exist and carry significant importance.

Chapter two reviewed a number of literatures pertinent to the question raised in this chapter. Traditional normative theoretical works on deliberation have been premised upon the Habermasian model of public speaking, guided by rationality, equality, and openness. However, other literatures, specifically concerned with argumentation, conversation, and reasoning suggest that deliberation may be less rational, reasoned, and argumentative as theorists expect. Instead, deliberation, based on an alternative framework, is more likely to be local, communal, and conversational, as opposed to being reasoned discussion on public policy.

The present chapter will explore the validity of the traditional and alternative frameworks of deliberation through an exploration of what is said and how it is said. In the process the analysis will touch upon the three traditional principles of deliberation,

namely, openness and engagement, equality, and reasoned argument, although, specific interest will be focused on reasoned argument as the key contrasting feature of the two expectation frameworks. These issues, frameworks and principles will be explored through descriptive, quantitative and qualitative analyses of the text, using the text itself as well as the coding scheme developed for this text detailed in chapter two.

### A Descriptive Analysis of Deliberation

Before exploring in what ways the data inform the principles of deliberation, it is useful to understand what the data look like and thus take a cross-sectional glance at deliberation. Furthermore, it is important to first see if the data produced by the coding scheme reflect the conceptual framework placed upon it. This is illustrated through a confirmatory factor analysis presented in Appendix B. The results clearly confirm the conceptual framework; similar types of statements load onto the same factor or highly correlated factors. Given the valid connection between theory and the data, the next step is to begin looking at the data interpret its dispersion. Table 4a below provides frequencies of thought statement types.

Table 4a: Frequencies of Thought Statement Types

Type	N	Percent
<b>Argumentative Elements</b>		
<i>Primary Statements</i>		
Reality Claims (Present Argument)	155	4.7
Problem Definition (Present Argument)	315	9.5
Future Vision	92	2.8
Solution (Action Linking Present and Future)	437	13.2
Linked Information Claims	906	27.4
<i>Secondary Statements</i>		
Agreements	163	4.9
Disagreements	105	3.2
Qualifiers	160	4.8
<i>Continuing Statements</i>		
Self-continuations	112	3.4
Elaborations	148	4.5
Secondary Statements to Moderator	65	2.0
<b>Conversational Elements</b>		
Relevancy Statements	97	2.9
Deliberative Meta-Talk	52	1.6
Informational Query	74	2.2
Solution Query	55	1.7
N/Rs (Not Relevant)	225	6.8
Interrupted	97	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>3301</b>	

As expected, based on the findings in the conversational argument project, primary argumentative statements comprise the majority of all thought statements. Just under one third of all thought statements were one of the four main types of claims; another third (roughly) were information linked to those claims. This leaves, of course, just over a third of all thought statement types as secondary argumentative statements or

conversational elements. Given Antaki's (1985) finding that an elite population did not use more than a few datum to support each claim, it is not surprising to find that the participants made 999 claims and used 906 distinct information links for those claims. In short, the ratio between claims and linked information (or in Toulminian terms, data) is roughly one to one.

Of the three primary argumentative statements (leaving out reality claims for the moment), it is clear that solutions are the most prevalent. Comparing these three types of statements, 52 percent were solutions, 37 percent problem definitions, and only 11 percent were future visions. Why the disparity? First, there is no expectation, nor reason, to expect that these three main elements should be equally dispersed.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, it makes sense that future visions would be the least frequent of the three, as in most cases, the future is clearly implied in the definition of a problem or the proposal of a solution. There is no need, for example, after one has claimed that "there are not enough police walking beats on the street" that the future vision attached to such a claim is a day where police are seen daily walking beats; it is implied in the prior problem definition.

Another interesting finding from table 4a above is the breakdown between elaborations and self-continuations. In short, only about half of all individuals, when prompted to elaborate, were able to provide any new information pertinent to their claim. Given that the ratio between linked information and claims is 1:1, it is consistent to find

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<sup>18</sup> Gunderson (2000) does claim however, that the prescriptive (talk about where we should be in the future) is the most important.

that just under half the time individuals cannot provide more linked information when prompted to do so.

Moving to secondary argumentative statements, the results show with the conversational argument project, that the overall level of agreement and disagreement is low, here accounting for thirteen percent of all thought statements. Perhaps it is surprising to the reader not to find more of this in actual deliberation, where citizens are encouraged to engage each other on issues of public policy. However, given the norms and tendencies of conversation, that claims are usually taken at face value, and that people try to be cooperative with one another, such numbers do not seem out of the ordinary. In addition, given the low ratios between claims and linked information and between self-continuations and elaborations, a reasonable explanation for the few number of secondary statements—disagreements in particular—is that individuals do not possess counter-arguments with which to engage others in relevant discourse. With the diversity of topics discussed, and points within each topic, it may be that individuals simply did not have many responses to the claims made by other participants.

Finally, the discourse exhibited a low number of conversational tangents (6.8%). Conversational tangents occurred when participants left the political aspect of deliberation and began conversing as they would in everyday life. They are moments when deliberation, in the proper sense of the word, temporarily ceases. This relatively low number shows that for the most part, citizens stayed on track, relevant to the task at hand, deliberation.



In addition to types of thought statements, the coding scheme looked at types of utterances. A breakdown of these types is provided in table 4b:

**Table 4b: Utterance Types**

	N	%	
Initial	92	5.1	
Response to Moderator	398	22.3	
Response to Adjacent Participant	615	34.4	
Response to Other Participant	571	31.9	
Interrupted	112	6.3	
Total	1788		

	Mean	Median	SD
Lines per Utterance	3.76	2.0	4.43
Thought Statements per Utterance	1.83	1.0	1.37

The breakdown of utterance types shows, first, that engagement was widespread, as just under 90 percent of all utterances were in response to some prior utterance or statement by the moderator. Participants nearly evenly responded to either the immediately prior utterance or an utterance that occurred before the prior utterance. Only five percent of utterances started a completely new topic.

Utterances varied greatly in length, ranging from a single word to 27 lines of text. Utterances averaged just under two thought statements each, although some utterances contained up to 10 thought statements. In short, most utterances contained small amounts of information; a plurality of utterances contained one primary argumentative statement and one thought statement of linked information. Again, however, these are averages; the range of utterance lengths shows that although many utterances were very short, they

were balanced by a significant number of above average utterances that contained multiple thought statements, most of them argumentative.

Given the high number of primary argumentative statements and linked information, it is of interest to see the relative frequency to which information was linked to specific types of claims. The same is true for secondary argumentative statements, as provided in table 4c:

**Table 4c: Argumentative Connections**

<b>Linked Information Link</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
To Reality Claim	46	5.0
To Problem Definition	439	48.2
To Future Vision	24	2.6
To Solution	402	44.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>911</b>	

<b>Secondary Statement Linkages</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
To Reality Claim	36	8.4
To Problem	64	14.8
To Future Vision	5	1.2
To Solution	234	54.4
To Linked Information	3	.6
To Option Provided by Choice Framework	87	20.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>430</b>	

The immediate trend noticeable in table 4c is the disparity in usage of information links and secondary links. Of course, there is no theoretical reason to expect parity in the dispersion of these variables. With regard to information linkages, almost half of these statements were used to support (or refute, although uncommon in comparison to support) the existence of a problem, and another 44 percent of the linkages went to

supporting a solution. Delving deeper, the degree to which certain types of information were used in comparison to certain types of primary argumentative statements was investigated. As was expected, experiential information was used more frequently for reality claims and solutions than for future visions and solutions. The reason for this is simple enough: Experiential information claims are by definition narratives of experiences that have occurred in the past or near present. As such, experiential information is used with reference to past or present realities or problems, rather than in support or refutation of a future vision or solution.

With regard to secondary statement linkages, the majority were used for solutions, with another fifteen percent going to problems. In other words, most people agreed, disagreed, or qualified the solutions proposed by others. In comparison, few of these links were directed toward other primary argumentative elements. A reasonable interpretation of this is that solutions are more varied than problems. That is, every problem has a number of possible solutions, giving rise to the necessity of using secondary statements to argue for or against various solutions. In the cases where problems elicited secondary argumentative elements, experiential information was prevalent. In other words, problems were tacitly accepted by the other participants unless their experience told them otherwise.

The final two types of descriptive univariate frequencies are the type of focus of primary statements and the type of information linkages. Table 4d provides the dispersion of these two variables.

**Table 4d: Types of Primary Statements and Information Linkages**

<b>Linked Information/Reality Claim Types</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Specialized	88	8.3
Experiential	248	23.3
Generalized	637	59.9
Global	91	8.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1064</b>	
<b>Focus of Problems, Visions, and Solutions</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Vague Action	159	15.8
Value	29	2.9
Street / Individual	267	26.6
Management / Structural	426	42.4
Policy	124	12.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>1005</b>	

Clearly, most linked information types were general, with eight percent being coded as specialized and another eight percent as global. When experiential and generalized types are combined (totaling 83 percent of linked information and reality claims), it becomes clear that most people are argumentative generalists. And, in many cases, it was evident in the text that the specialized knowledge used in information linkages was generated from personal experience, usually professional, such as the knowledge attained by working as a teacher, or in city government.

With regard to focus, a similar pattern emerged, with small tails (for policy and vague levels of focus) and over 68 percent falling in either the street / individual level or the management / structural level. However, here the tails are somewhat larger, with the number of vague action primary statements outweighing the number of policy level

statements. These two variables suggest that individuals are argumentative generalists, as neither produced a significantly large number of policy statements and the overall majority of both focus types and information linkages were at average levels.

Further information can be garnered by investigating the relative focus of each primary argumentative utterance, as shown in table 4d. What this table makes clear is first, that argumentative statements of value are most likely used for solutions and future visions. As should be expected, problems and solutions contain the highest percentage of policy statements (although also the highest percentage of vague statements). A majority of problems are at the managerial / structural level, while solutions show much more parity with regard to level of focus. The implication of this is that problems that are stated at the managerial level are provided solutions at the value level. This is the first hint that what people talked about was accountability, as a significant amount of deliberation was on how organizations (schools, government, etc.) need to operate based on principled values rather than specific behavioral remedies.

The univariate analyses of the variables, then, provide a number of valuable insights with regard to the principles of general argumentative ability, relevancy, and engagement. However, more can be garnered from investigating the relation of thought statement types to one another. One way to do this is to look at the correlations between

these types, as well as to investigate their relation to the number of thought statements in each utterance,<sup>19</sup> as shown in table 4e:

**Table 4e: Correlations of Statement Types to Size of Utterance**

Pearsons R	# of Thought Statements/Utterance
Linked Information	.78
Solutions	.56
Problems	.54
Relevancy Statements	.44
Future Visions	.29
Disagreements	.21
Qualifiers	.18
Agreements	.13
Elaborations	-.09
Self-Continuations	-.08
Informational Queries	-.07

A number of aspects of argumentation are apparent from the table. First, longer utterances are more argumentative, with the highest Pearsons correlations to number of thought statements per utterance from linked information, solutions and problems. As should be expected, utterances become longer when information is used to support or refute a claim. In addition, relevancy statements are strongly correlated with length of utterance. In other words, relevancy statements are usually in supplement to other statements. Relevancy statements make an explicit link from what is about to be said to

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<sup>19</sup> Of course, such an analysis required the aggregation of the thought statement level data to the utterance level. Later chapters will further aggregate the data to the level of the speaker.

what was already said by someone else. Utterances containing relevancy statements therefore continue arguments already made on a particular topic by another speaker. And because such utterances refine prior arguments, they require more verbiage and length.

In addition to primary argumentative elements, the secondary elements also show significantly positive, although only moderate, relationships to the length of utterance. Finally, the range of correlations to number of thought statements makes evident the natural “decay” of deliberation: Initial utterances (and their relevantly-linked follow-ups) are typically lengthy, and, provided that discussants remain on topic, the duration of subsequent utterances diminishes as the conversation moves from primary arguments to secondary utterances and elaborations. Further evidence for this is supplied in table 4f, which shows the correlation between utterance type and length of utterance. In fact, responses to adjacent utterances are on average the longest type of utterance, followed by initial utterances. The correlation matrix provides evidence for two lengths of utterances: short and long, on average, with initial utterances and responses to adjacent participants exhibiting significant lengths and other utterances remaining quite short.

**Table 4f: Correlation Matrix, Utterance Type to Length**

Utterance Types	Thought Statements	Lines
Initial	.21	.22
Response to Moderator	-.13	-.15
Response to Adjacent Participant	.34	.39
Response to Other Participant	-.26	-.28
Interrupted	-.14	-.16

All correlations significant at the  $p < .001$  level

While informative, the correlations between statement types and length of utterance is only one type of empirical comparison. Additionally, I investigated the relationship between statement types to each other (see table 4g). This table provides information on which thought statements are most likely to be found with other thought statements in the same utterance. As should be expected, linked information is highly correlated with problems and solutions, and to a lesser degree, future visions, and negatively associated to continuations and elaborations. While disagreements have a moderately significant association to linked information ( $r = .12$ ) and qualifiers ( $r = .09$ ), the correlation between agreements and linked information is not significant from zero. In other words, of the three main secondary argumentative elements, disagreements most require support. In contrast, agreements nearly always stood alone, without any elaboration for why one participant agreed to another participant's argument.

**Table 4g: Correlations Between Statement Types**

	Linked Information	Problems	Solutions
Reality Claims	.02	.00	-.07**
Problems	.37**		
Future Visions	.14**	.07**	.10**
Solutions	.36**	.17**	
Disagreements	.12**	.03	.07**
Agreements	.01	-.01	.01
Continuations/Elab.	-.13**	-.08**	-.10**

\*\*  $p < .01$

While the above correlations and their interpretation do not always directly inform the principles of deliberation, they are essential in providing an accurate and



informative picture of what occurs in deliberation. Deliberation generally contains three types of utterances. First, there is the argumentative utterance, which at best contains a problem, solution, and linked information, if not also a future vision. Disagreements might also contain linked information. Then there are secondary argumentative statements, containing, and usually only containing an agreement or continuation of a prior argumentative statement. Indeed, qualifiers, self-continuations, and elaborations are negatively associated with primary argumentative elements. Reality claims usually stand on their own and do not appear to be as 'argumentative' as other primary statements. Finally, there are non-argumentative utterances, which are average in length (having no significant correlation to the number of thought statements per utterance) and stand apart from argumentative utterances (having no significant correlations to primary or secondary utterances).

A final look at argumentation is provided by looking at correlations of significant argumentative utterances to types of utterances. Significant argumentative utterances are utterances which contain more than one thought statement where at least one of those thought statements is a primary argumentative element (see table 4h below).

Table 4h: Where Significant Arguments Are Found

Partial Correlations (Control Variable: Count of Utterances per Speaker)	Significant Argumentative Utterances
Initial Statements (Agenda Setting Statements)	.57**
Responses to the Moderator	-.06
Responses to Adjacent but not Immediately Prior Utterances	.42**
Responses to Prior Utterance	-.66**
Interrupted	-.88**

\*\* p < .001, N=115

As is evident in the table, significant argumentative utterances are found in initial statements as well as in responses to prior (but not immediately prior) utterances. The reason for this is that responses to immediately prior utterances are typically simple agreements, or respecifications of information. On the other hand, responses to adjacent but not immediately prior utterances typically continue arguing about a topic already discussed but on a different facet of that argument. For example, school vouchers might have been talked about overall as a good policy to pursue. The immediate response may be simple agreement. But later, someone else will raise her concern that school vouchers give money to religiously affiliated schools and thus do not separate church and state. Such an utterance will contain significant argumentative elements, and is not initial since it is still on the topic of school vouchers.

A final look at the data in this descriptive analysis was done by mapping out the discussion of topics through time to check the relative amount of discussion of each

topic. These maps are provided in Appendix C. The pattern that emerges is that there is no real pattern. Many topics are discussed at length while others are not even provided a response after the initial utterance. At some points the participants stayed on topic for some time; at other points topics were temporarily interrupted only to be continued the very next utterance. Finally, some groups discussed a multitude of topics while others stuck to relatively few. Overall, each group exhibited its own unique characteristics.

### Qualitative Interpretation and Discussion

The above analyses provide a number of insights into the prevalence and character of the principles of deliberation. As mentioned, the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation is based on three principles. Equality will be a focus of the next chapter. However, openness and engagement and rational argument will be explored through qualitative analysis. The analysis reported below specifically finds broad support for the existence of openness and engagement in deliberation but weak and mixed support for reasoned argument.

#### Openness and Engagement

There is much evidence to suggest that the deliberations were characterized by both openness and engagement. First, as was discussed in the prior chapter, a vast majority of the comments found in the open-ended survey questions revolved around the importance and frequency with which participants learned about the experiences of others. A relatively unopen dialogue would not likely exhibit this kind of interest in what others said but would rather be marked by the importance and frequency of being able to provide others with one's *own* opinions, not the other way around. Furthermore, in the

first half of this chapter the vast majority of utterances were found to be responding to what other participants said. Instances of initial utterances were quite low in comparison. Second, utterances were evenly distributed between responses to the immediately prior other and participants that spoke before the immediately prior utterance, suggesting an even balance between direct and immediate interaction and interacting with prior utterances. This type of distribution of utterance types suggests that Meyers et al. (1998) were right in describing argumentative discourse as containing at any one moment several possible topics and argumentative chains. With an average of fifteen members per group, one participant has on average only a 1/14 (plus moderators) chance of responding to the immediately prior other. It is encouraging, then, that nearly 35 percent of all utterances managed to make a response to the immediately prior other (and another 22 percent to an immediately prior utterance by the moderator). Engagement was, in other words, more often than not a strong characteristic of the deliberations. Much of the engagement, as described earlier, centered on solutions: Since any one problem can contain a multiplicity of solutions, solutions are most in need of engagement, and indeed, most secondary argumentative statements responded to solutions made by other participants.

In the text itself, many different statements exhibited a sense of openness and engagement. At the end of the deliberations, if there was time, moderators asked what the participants had learned. The number of positive examples raised by the participants made it clear that, for the most part, individuals came into the deliberations with an open

mind, paving the way for learning and opinion change. Some examples of participants' responses:

Yes. I think it is about change. I did not know that charter schools were public schools, so that was a change in my thinking (Speaker 133).

I think it was him over there, after I mentioned abandoned houses and you mentioned rehabbing them...I'm a recycler and I was amazed I hadn't connected that. So it's good to think about different opinions that you didn't think about before and to get a different viewpoint on use. There are many answers (Speaker 140).

Additionally, participants made a fair number of relevancy statements and in most cases made it clear who they were talking to:

And what Ray just talked about is very true. You know, children need—I'm a single parent. I need day care. I work (Speaker 203).

On what did people engage? As we saw in the last chapter, in most cases, engagement occurred as participants worked out who was accountable to whom, on the responsibilities of various political actors. They collectively defined present political realities and then specified how these realities differed from normative accountabilities and responsibilities:

(On schools) It's more than reading, writing and arithmetic. It's socialization. It's learning to get along with people who are different from you. I know that these are not classroom topics, but it's a core part of the school (Speaker 43).

Indeed, the most pervasive feature of the text was the sense of communality between the participants. The prior chapter, of course, provided evidence that those who participated were, on average, communitarian-minded citizens who spoke from a position of "community representative" on issues of accountability and responsibility. As such, it is not surprising that aspects of the civic identity pervaded the nature of engagement. As

the following segment details, communalism was even more pervasive in the character of the arguments that took place all morning long in April.

### Reasoned Argument and Use of Narrative

In short, what people discussed and argued and reasoned about was the accountability and responsibility of government and its individual and group players. In response to the question of what in summation was spoken about during the deliberations, one participant, for example, said:

What I heard today, I think, is that we need leadership, collaboration, whether it's on the—presently existing schools or the charter schools—and a collaboration across the board in society (Speaker 135).

The prevalence of accountability and responsibility as a subject for discussion is of particular interest if dialogue is seen as a zero-sum game. The greater the amount of communal discussions, according to this view, the less the discussions of public policy are able to become prevalent. As the analyses in this chapter make clear, explicit discussion of public policy was rare as measured in the focus variable. Instead, participants used the deliberations to become more communal, to share communal stories and (generally) to agree with one another on the normative communal norms of accountability and responsibility. The discussion was about defining a reality through a communal lens and offering communal solutions and sharing communal experiences. To quote at length,

I think that's a critical problem all over the city. It's not the old days. And there isn't somebody at home all the time who can take care of all of these things and go to these meetings. Everyone is working. If you're not working, it's because they're not interested in anything. And people will come out in force for a major issue. In our neighborhood there's a Burger King and a talk of a hotel on the

edges of the neighborhood and people are opposed to that. So they'll come out for something like that. But it's hard to get a whole group of people in a neighborhood to work on the neighborhood itself, because their lives are so complicated and involved as it is. I think one of the essential things that we have to do is to form coalitions of neighborhoods. I know there is one started, because my neighborhood association joined it, the Coalition of Neighborhood Associations...(Speaker 26).

The communal values spread, however, far beyond discussions of a communal nature and onto matters of public policy. The discussion was not, in other words, a zero-sum game between public policy talk and communal talk. Instead, public policy was situated in a communal frame. Public policy solutions were designed ultimately as ways to get more accountability, responsibility, and connections between citizens:

Sure. The government could help. They could help by encouraging the big business—when the big businesses come in and they offer incentives and everything, it would be part of the package like, along with—you know, you support our small businesses. Maybe we can, you know, have a list of some type of charter or something listing small businessmen who are interested in opening up and who have small franchises and different things like that (Speaker 89).

The values of communality not only pervaded the kinds of solutions put forward by the discussants on a public policy level, but, of course, also typified the structural and the individual level:

(On the privatizing of City Hall custodial staff) And I think its safe to say that a cause of that—and this is not meaning to be disrespectful to anybody—but there may have been an attitude previously at that staff, well, what do I care about it? I'll never lose my job. But now that it's a private company that does it, you know, they have to have results (Speaker 21).

Finally, it is interesting to note, in lieu of all the different discussions in the normative literature about consensus, that communality is a major player in what is collectively consented to and why. Certainly, when it came to public policy issues, there

was dissensus, for example, on school vouchers and charter schools. Indeed, for many public policy issues it seemed as if the discussions could not become informed enough for consensus or dissensus to even be possible. However, there was broad agreement on many different communal arguments. The attainment of any consensus is surprising given that groups averaged fifteen members each, a relatively difficult number from which to get unanimity. At the end of many of the discussions, moderators were instructed to ask the participants where consensus and dissensus occurred. A typical response is provided below:

I think we thought that there were major changes that needed to be made. I think that we thought we don't want to scrap the system. And that we want more accountability, a tighter sense of mission, and more involvement in the community (Speaker 132).

In fact, when asked by a moderator, "what do we feel we have in common as a group for policy?" the immediate responses were "more efficient government" (Speaker 32), "responsibility in our appointed officials" (Speaker 33) and "community involvement" (Speaker 7).

We need to remember that those who participated, as corroborated by other scholars (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, 1995), were very high in knowledge as compared to a representative sample of Americans. As such, there was a high degree of expertise in politics in general, but specifically with regard to being a civic citizen. The participants frequently exposed their communal nature. Seventeen participants mentioned their role as a member of a civic association or their status as a block captain. Thus, the deliberations could certainly be characterized as a combination of technical and



public spheres, but only if the technical sphere being used was that of the expertise gained from the years of being a communal activist or as someone who worked in the public domain (teachers, city employees, etc.). The manager of a charter school, in the example below, adds his/her experience to the conversation.

I mean, charter schools are out there. What I'm surprised about it, at our particular school, we have about seven hundred thousand dollars that we have at—we're a hundred and twenty five thousand dollars short on our operating fund. And it's like pulling teeth to get some support. I just wrote 80 letters to corporate people over the weekend to try and get some more money in. I mean it—I think that somebody mentioned corporate before. If corporations are going to get involved, let them get involved in the financial level. There really will make a difference in a school like a charter school that already has ownership from the people who are promoting and putting it together (Speaker 77).

This example importantly illustrates the way in which public policy is discussed. Rather than discussing charter schools as a national, political issue, the issue is brought down to the street level, as experiences and local information is shared by similarly concerned individuals. Thus, while some public policy was discussed and argumentation appears by the coding frequencies to be rather widespread, both argumentation and the subject of that argumentation were irrevocably colored by the communal identity, its values and concerns. This can be seen, depending upon one's point of view, as a negative characteristic, for taking away a degree of real public policy discussion, or it can be seen as a positive characteristic, in the sense that public policy discussions were not replaced but rather transformed by the communal or civic identity. This question will be returned to shortly, as it will be further informed by a discussion on the nature of opinion formation in deliberation and the subsequent character and quality of the argument contained therein.

Opinion formation is predicated on openness. Without openness, neither opinion change nor opinion formulation occur. Again, this project will not explore opinion change in any empirical fashion. However, much can be said about opinion formation by looking directly at the text itself.

There were numerous instances in the text where participants seemed to be forming an opinion as they were uttering it, a key feature of deliberation (Barber, 1994) and something expected by conversation theory (Lasch, 1995). Note the high number of qualifications and clear sense of “thinking out loud” present in the following exemplar:

I think what you are talking about is services. There are certain services that government should not be deciding. Maybe the tax issue is an offshoot of this issue, but that’s not what this is about. This is about should Philadelphia, for instance, be responsible for delivering a gas—I don’t mean gasoline—but, I mean, because as a perfect example and probably something we might be able to focus on is PGW. For instance, should they exist as a private or a public entity. There are arguments on both sides. I, for instance, wish they would just sell it to PECO or someone perhaps who would actually run it more effectively. On the other hand, PGW does have a heart that perhaps a private enterprise does not have. I’m talking about providing heat to those who can’t afford it. I know they do that on a regular basis. I’m sure PECO would handle that situation for people who can’t afford it. I don’t know (Speaker 31).

There were a number of cases, in fact, where the deliberations provided political alternatives but the participants were not sure which they preferred. The following exemplar is an excellent and quite sophisticated example of one participant weighing the alternatives, attempting to formulate preferred positions on a number of topics:

She raises management issues. One, should the police be transferred—rotated fairly frequently to different neighborhoods or should they stay in the neighborhood where they can get to know the people, the people can get to know them and a real cooperative feeling can be fostered? Two, should they be as much as possible taken out of patrol cars? She was talking about bike police actually having face-to-face interface with people in the neighborhood. That is pretty hard

to occur if they're in a patrol care. Of course, in a patrol care they can cover more ground. Three, what about recruitment? Right now, if you go to work for the City of Philadelphia in a civil service position, generally if you're not a resident, you can do that, you have six months to move in. A person who wants to be on the police force has to have already lived in the city for a year before they can enter the police academy. That seems to be an—in terms of hiring and recruiting an unlevel playing field. Certainly if a police officer lives—a want-to-be officer lives out of the city, he or she should have to move into the city within six months of taking the job...(Speaker 50).

As should be evident from the above exemplars, opinion formation was prevalent in the deliberations, further underscoring the satisfaction of the principle of openness and engagement, as well as framing a discussion on the nature of deliberative argumentation, its sources, its nature and its quality. Clearly, with a large degree of opinion formation occurring, one might think that the overall quality of argument is low, following the convention that preformed opinions lead to tighter and more informed arguments. However, as the last exemplar above illustrates, even those without an opinion can exhibit a high degree of argumentative sophistication. Of course, the degree to which citizens can argue is dependent upon the information held by the participants. This naturally leads to the question of what kinds of evidence were prevalent in the argumentation exhibited in the deliberation.

Citizens revealed that they used a wide variety of sources from which to base their arguments. These include the media, personal experience, 3<sup>rd</sup> person experience, professional experience, and the values that guide communality. Clearly, given that these were the most prevalent sources of argumentative information, storytelling was a prevalent form of discourse.

In many cases citizens mentioned stories that they remembered hearing about in the news media and subsequently used this information in their discussions and arguments. To underscore just how communal and politically interested these citizens were, on two occasions participants mentioned stories written by *Inquirer* writers who were at the time actually in the room!<sup>20</sup> Evidence one participant's utterance:

Yeah, Yeah. SCT Technologies, I think, was one of the companies specifically mentioned. They took advantage of all the grants and whatever, and started up in one of the science centers. But then they, as soon as they got up on their own, they moved out to, I think, Malvern, I'm not sure offhand. And now they've got like 2,000 employees. It's good to have that partnership. But it looks like there's a lack of a follow-up with it. You know, how to keep them here, how to encourage them to stay and grow (Speaker 21).

Another common source of information came from the experiences of the participants in their jobs, and many of them were in the political domain. This experience, again, brings discussion of public policy down to the level of the individual. Instead of high-browed argument on public policy, public policy was transformed to the level of individuals situated in their communities, with the community's needs in mind:

I worked for 30 years for the city. I retired two years ago. I remember the city almost went bankrupt, almost didn't make payroll a couple of times in my career at the end of the Wilson Goode administration. When the Rendell administration came in, one of the priorities they had was to re-configure the way management could manage the business of city government...(Speaker 129).

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<sup>20</sup> The *Inquirer* provided a "topical expert" from its staff to sit in on each deliberation. They were instructed not to speak of their own volition, but rather to be there to provide information if prompted by one of the participants.

In many cases, the participants “shot from the hip,” using their understanding of the situation to think on their feet and make important connections with but the most general of information:

I think that parts of this particular point of view are necessary but not sufficient. I think that reading, writing, and arithmetic are the result we want, but I’m not sure it’s how we get there. I think that we have to be real and know that it is not a few years ago, in fact, families are different right now. So this is a very large part of where I think we would want to go, but I think that even if you look at the best schools, the schools we would choose for our kids to go to school, they are, in fact, community and other things go on there other than the product of reading, writing, and arithmetic (Speaker 199).

By far one of the most prevalent sources of information was personal experience. Again, rather than discuss the relative benefits and drawbacks of a particular issue of public policy, for example, the wage tax, insurance rates, and other discrepancies between the city of Philadelphia and its suburbs, citizens discussed these topics through their own personal experiences, raising relevant points and important aspects of such issues:

I am in the process of opening my own business. It’s a used book store. I have looked at places right down the street from me a little strip mall in Northeast Philly towards Juniata. I ended up getting—saving money by going to Jenkintown. And just one cost alone, the cost that you pay the real estate people for the insurance that just covers your building was \$500 more per month to be in Philly than it is out in Jenkintown. So that’s a cost—as a small business owner, that’s where you need to address—you know, you can help if you are in a partnership. It’s little costs (Speaker 127).

As with other aspects of deliberation, storytelling was marked with a definite dimension of communalism. The participants shared stories of their own communities, spreading information and experiences from one community to another. Again, communalism affected not only what was said but guided what was deemed good and

bad policy. Experiences that occurred in one neighborhood were often used not only argumentatively but as moments where one participant could spread communally important information at a personal level to other participants:

Like what you are speaking on, I'm from Southwest Philly. I started an action to get drug dealers off my block, a drug house. And it took a long time. And I was surprised, you know, that it took less time than it did, but it only took six months. And I talked to police and everything. The number one thing was to get a petition from everybody on the block to sign (Speaker 10).

In sum, the claims made by the participants, including problems, solutions, and future visions, were supported by a high number of experiential statements. Their statements, like the claims themselves, were in many if not most cases generated within a communal framework, leading to specific types of claims and evidence for those claims. What does this mean for deliberation? Is deliberation marked by well-reasoned arguments with informed and knowledgeable evidence? Or is deliberation marked by poor reasoning, nonspecific claims, and less than completely coherent arguments and statements? The text provides evidence, in fact, that both descriptions were at different times well represented in the text. For example, there were a few cases where individuals argued for certain solutions without any knowledge that such solutions had long been tried or were already in place. In one case a speaker (16) emphatically argued for the creation of a kind of business bureau to help people learn how to start a business and find business-related incentives. The next speaker followed up this solution claim with detailed information of two types of city government business bureaus that were specifically created to address the concerns of Speaker 16. Other cases were encouraging where participants "fixed" the utterances of misinformation by other speakers. But again,

there were only a handful of such instances. Many more kernels of information may have gotten by without challenge.

At other points there was evidence that participants could not even offer solutions beyond the notion that communal values should guide such solutions. After a moderator prompted one participant for a solution, the participant was only able to say

It's very hard. And somehow our new Mayor needs to create a bond so that we have a louder voice and get more respect. And I'm not familiar with exactly where the conflict, personal or otherwise, exists, but there definitely is, and it's detrimental. I don't know if that answers the question (Speaker 58).

Such statements were not uncommon. In many cases, participants were simply not even able to be coherent. There were many cases where—in response to the moderator's prompt for more information—a speaker was clearly not able to provide any more relevant information. For instance, a participant who argued for reducing government expenditures was asked by the moderator for an example, but openly admitted he or she was not able to provide one (Speaker 149). And in quite a few cases, it was barely possible to even understand what participants were saying (let alone code the text):

One of the things—I like to look at things in a broader post-obstacle perspective. And I know all though this county, things are set up in a win-win situation. And I think the world is getting too small and this is like Star Trek and there's a life support system, and we don't have anywhere else to go. And we need to begin to work—we talk about global economy and things of that nature. We need to set up a win-win as opposed to a win-lose. The whole culture is going to win if we take our children and all of our citizens and look at each and every one of them as a resource...And if we don't take that approach, those who are taking it will surpass us and we will go the way England who used to rule the world. And now they're what a second, third-class country (Speaker 4).

Rather than making sophisticated claims, there were of course a number of instances where the arguments used purely global language, turning complex political realities into more or less black and white situations:

The police academy today is a joke. A forest. They are throwing cops out on the street who think they're in the Wild West...if a person coughs, they are reaching for a gun (Speaker 49).

Like scholars of reasoning have found in the past, individuals often do not explore issues thoroughly and in many cases argue even more strongly in the face of clearly contradictory information. At one point, an *Inquirer* representative cited a statistic that 80 to 90 percent of people in America's prisons are illiterate. Three utterances later a participant made the claim without even refuting what the *Inquirer* representative had said—from his experience of “talking to people in prison and stuff”—that “half of them went to college, have all kinds of degrees and everything.” (Speaker 144). Even when individuals did discuss public policy, often the statements revealed that the participant held very little (or was unable to access much) information on the topic:

I think charter schools are a waste of time also because it's taking up space and we already got too many private schools and public schools out in the city and the suburbs. And I think it's a waste of time because it depends on the students, the parents, the way they raise their child from day one as they grow up. So I think charter schools is a waste of time because you can get the same education in a public school as well as a charter school, and a charter school is—I ain't going to say it's useless, but you can—I think you can get the same education in a public school and in a charter school (Speaker 18).

In sum, there is evidence that individuals were not particularly capable of discussing public policy, or capable of having at times any kind of political discussion that could be described as informed or well-reasoned. Yet the news is not all bad. First,



there were many examples of quite sophisticated argument, to be reviewed shortly. Second, poorly informed individuals and individuals with less than satisfactory argumentative skills still provided a number of important conversational contributions. One particular participant, an individual below average in education and political knowledge, spoke only three times in April. This participant was involved in a discussion on neighborhoods. Interestingly, all of the groups that discussed neighborhoods at one point focused in on the matter of race relations and how it affected the quality of the neighborhoods. But in this particular group, there was only one reason why race relations was ever discussed: All three of this particular participant's utterances were designed to move the agenda away from the subject at hand and toward race relations and how that was related to neighborhoods. On the last try, she succeeded, and the group continued after her last utterance to deliberate on the subject for some time. In another example, a participant low in sophistication measures was able to find common ground between the positions of two others participants and was able to not only calm the discussion (the only instance where the discussions got tense) but also got the participants to see the commonalities between their positions (Speaker 144). Thus, even if they are not fully capable to argue deliberatively, such participants may still make important contributions to deliberation.

Furthermore, it would be inaccurate to describe the discourse as wholly uninformed and poorly argued. Far from it. On the whole, participants were far more knowledgeable about politics than the average Philadelphian. Such participants used the deliberations to inform others:

If we can discuss police collective bargaining, we all know how it works, the police and the fire and governed by state Act 111 which prevents them from going on strike, which says that if collective bargaining fails, which it always does, each side appoint an arbitrator and then the two arbitrators appoint a neutral arbitrator, and often, the neutral arbitrator generally writes the entire contract (Speaker 50).

Even when individuals did not have prior knowledge on a topic, they often exhibited the ability to quickly make connections and implications of political actions. In thinking about charter schools, one participant reasoned that such schools

Take the students out of the [public] school whose parents are most involved and most likely to be involved in education and it leaves those in public schools then, those students whose parents are least involved. It seems to me that we need to rework the system to involve the parent more, and then those parents are not going to get involved, their children have to be well-educated anyway, even if they're not involved (Speaker 47).

In addition, many of the statements made by the participants made it clear that they held nuanced views of the world and understood the situatedness of their political decisions:

I think that just underscores—the last few comments just underscores there are no simple solutions to any of these problems. In this case, the political appointment that has political connections is more capable to do the job than a person from the outside. But in the Police Commissioner's case, obviously they needed some new blood that didn't have connections. So, I think it's difficult to say what should we change other than being conscientious to make the choice which I really think Rendell has made (Speaker 42).

And again, the expertise of the communalist was apparent in much of the discussions. As the participants shared stories they passed on important information about the enactment of communalism:

Especially about zoning, we do it a little different in our part of the city. In Mt. Airy and Chestnut Hill we have volunteer groups that meet through the community associations that meet on the zoning issues, will actually go downtown to the Zoning Board to represent the community (Speaker 158).

Contrary to what some scholars have argued, the ability of individuals to effectively argue and reason seemed to be widely varied in the discussions. The deliberative capabilities with regard to argumentation and reasoning of the participants was a mix of highly capable and barely capable individuals. This finding supports the analysis provided earlier in the chapter. The deliberations exhibited a low ratio of claims to linked information. There was also a low ratio of self-continuations to elaborations as well as a low overall number of secondary argumentative statements, especially disagreements. For the most part, individuals were evidentiary generalists, with over 84 percent of information linkages general or experiential and 16 percent global or specialized. Finally, only twelve percent of primary argumentative elements were at the policy level; 68 percent were at the street or structural level. There were, in short, more primary argumentative elements at a complete nonspecific or vague level as compared to the policy level.

### Discussion

This chapter has detailed the centrality of three main principles of deliberation, openness and engagement, equality, and reasoned argument. Without satisfying these principles, we cannot say that deliberation has achieved the goals for which it was designed by deliberative theorists. Literature on argumentation, conversation, and reasoning, as reviewed in chapter two, simultaneously bolstered the possibility of finding engagement and openness in actual deliberation while calling into question the ability of citizens to provide sophisticated argument and reasoning on matters of public policy. Even if citizens can argue effectively, some scholars argue that they lack the necessary

specialized knowledge on politics to actually do so (Lippmann, 1922). The argument of the prior chapter furthermore suggested that the problem is specifically concerned with the proclivity of citizens to argue on public policy versus discussion on the communal side of what is political. Such discussion instead focuses on talk of values, most importantly, accountability and responsibility.

Chapter two reported the use of germane literatures on deliberation and its associated dialogic activities to design and implement a major coding instrument on actual deliberative texts. The evidence from this coding analysis, as well as data from the close textual analysis, lend support for the existence of widespread engagement and openness in deliberation, as reviewed earlier. Additionally, the coding analysis and close textual analysis found widespread influence of the civic identity, centering again on discussion of accountability and responsibility, with little direct talk on a policy level of sophistication. As for the reasoned argument principle, exemplars of both a high and low order of sophistication were found. In general, the data pointed to an average and unremarkable level of argumentation overall within the text and in the individual capabilities to argue at high levels of sophistication. Indeed, only 31 percent of all utterances included a primary argumentative statement, and only 13 percent had both a primary argumentative statement with linked information. Only 13 percent of all utterances, in other words, included a claim with data to support that claim. In many cases, individuals were not able to provide more than one coherent utterance on any given issue. Over half the time, individuals could offer no additional relevant

information when prompted to do so. Other facts pertaining to the overall average argumentative abilities of citizens have been documented throughout the chapter.

It is still difficult to claim from the analyses thus far that deliberation does not satisfy the reasoned argument principle central to the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation. In many cases participants exhibited highly sophisticated argumentation coupled with a surprising body of political knowledge. And while at the individual level deliberation might not always satisfy the reasoned argument principle, this is not to say that overall deliberation as an aggregate phenomenon did not display a remarkable level of reasonableness, rationality, and group argumentation.

Certainly, the citizens did not explore every issue thoroughly. Nor did the citizens allow every instance of poor reasoning and invalid argumentation to go unchallenged. In most cases, though, deliberation was a team effort. When someone offered misinformation as fact, or poor reasoning as valid inference, someone else in the group usually caught it. From this perspective, it is neither good nor bad if someone offers misinformation or poor reasoning. However, it is bad if it is not caught. Politics is no different than other trades in that many mistakes will be corrected performatively. Someone acts out (or in deliberation, speaks out) improperly, giving rise to the opportunity to fix such missteps.

Indeed, perhaps the most important role served by deliberation was that it provided a forum where banal popular political myths could be qualified or even dispelled entirely. In one example, a participant dispels the notion that it is impossible for a teacher to get fired because of the unions:

I was a teacher in Philadelphia. I was in the classroom for 24 years...It is not true that a teacher who is not performing cannot be fired. I want to assure you...I know what I am talking about. Teachers in Philadelphia, if you are unsatisfactory, the first thing that has to happen is that the principal has to come in and observe you and write you up. And I say this: That is the first step. If the principle does not observe you, you will never get written up and you will never get thrown out. But the principal must observe you. He or she must observe you twice and you have a hearing. If it happened twice, sir, you are out (Speaker 127).

Where did the original argument that it is impossible for a teacher to get fired come from? There is no way to tell, other than to limit the culprit to the only two possible suspects: another interlocutor in a past discussion, or the mass media. Regardless, when a generally popular argument is put forward in deliberation, it always runs the risk that someone might have the capability to dispel such an argument with reason or experience. The likelihood that someone else might be able to refute or qualify a generally popular argument is increased when the number of participants is high, as was the case in the groups of the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact (too many participants of course, makes conversation unwieldy and dilutes the contributions made by each speaker). Second, individuals who have spent their careers in the public domain, or whose communitarian personality has afforded them a wealth of public experiences, will have had more “political experiences” with which to gather data to refute or qualify such arguments.

I found a prevalent use of experiential information in the deliberations of this project. One possible fear that was raised is that there was not enough specialized and otherwise sophisticated discourse in the deliberations, which were instead marked by the simple telling of stories. Is it bad to have so much of the discourse be experiential?

Indeed, using experiential information may be more persuasive than using specialized information in deliberation. How can you refute the teacher quoted above? Do you not believe she knows what she is talking about? The fear with story based information is that it does not provide “base-rate” (Gibson & Zillman, 1994) information. The stories, in short, may not be representative of the population under consideration. But as the case above exemplifies, many of the stories are clearly grounded in political realities, and are designed to exemplify not an outlier of reality but the “everyday” of reality. Finally, using experiential information rather than base rate information is more personable (Baesler, 1997), creating a better chance for the development of community, an important character posited by deliberative theorists (Barber, 1994). And, it is likely to also lead to greater recall and recognition in future political conversation (Price and Czilli, 1996).

What of the prevalence of communal values as the primary foci of the conversations? Yes, citizens could have spent their time arguing the intricacies of public policy instead (if they are truly capable of doing so). But in not arguing sophisticated public policy, citizens did what they could: They brought public policy down to their level. The message of every single deliberation was in fact “OK, now we are going to talk about this matter of public policy from square one, asking first, what are the values upon which such policies should be guided?” Indeed, some argue this is exactly what citizens should be doing in deliberation. As stated by one scholar:

The American people aren't ignorant. That aren't non-participatory. They already play, for all the imperfections of the process, the role American democratic understanding has long posited... We don't want the general populace to be like elites. We want it to stand back from the hubbub of politics-as-game and assert broad, guiding values (Ladd, 1996, p. 43).

The civic identity, then, plays a central role in the deliberations that took place in Philadelphia in 1999, for it was the values they brought to the table, that, in essence, set the table, framed matters of public policy at the level of citizens rather than the level of policy analysts. Surely, the citizens made some mistakes in doing so, and in all likelihood traveled over ground already explored in detail by policy analysts. But even if that is all they did (which is certainly not the case), the fact that it was *individuals acting as ordinary citizens* who traveled such ground, and made impressive headway at that, is important nevertheless, for it satisfies the central tenant of democratic associational autonomy (Dahl, 1998).

The evidence supplied in this chapter as well as the prior chapter make clear that the communal/conversational framework of deliberation is not a replacement for the rational/instrumental framework. Instead, both can be seen as working in conjunction with one another. In chapter three, while there was some empirical evidence for the importance of the communal/conversational framework and strong qualitative evidence for the model, political sophistication variables were quite strong predictors of participation. Thus, the two models worked conjunctively to influence who participated. In the present chapter, evidence for the communal/conversational framework was widespread, as the characterization of how people talked found widespread use of narration, personal experience, communal experience, and the use of communal values. While there was substantive evidence for the rational/instrumental principle of openness and engagement, there was mixed support for rational and reasoned argument. This



chapter found that reasoned argument did occur in some utterances and not in others. Most importantly, the principle of reasoned argument worked through communal talk; instead of a zero-sum game between communal and rational talk, rational talk was found to be produced through or during communal talk. Thus the rational/instrumental framework was found to actually depend upon the enactment of the civic identity in what people said and how they said it.

The present chapter explored deliberation at the level of the utterance and thought statement. As mentioned, this allowed for the exploration of a number of different principles using various methodologies and operationalizations. This chapter, however, did not look at deliberation at an individual level, formally defined. As I have mentioned earlier, investigating deliberation at the individual level is not only something that has yet to be done in research but holds the possibility of exploring the two expectation frameworks of deliberation and their principles at the individual level, especially the principles of equality and reasoned argument. Not knowing what each individual contributes to deliberation is akin to being a car mechanic without understanding the roles played by an engine's separate components. A nuanced understanding of deliberation as an aggregate phenomenon is dependent upon an understanding of individual deliberative propensities, the topic discussed in the following chapter.

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## Chapter 5: Deliberative Dialogic Contributions

The question explored in each chapter necessarily leads to the next: Knowing who participates begs the question of whether that has any impact on what they say and how they say it. And knowing something of the aggregate character of deliberation leads to questions about who exhibits what dialogic characteristics, the question raised in this chapter. This question, especially, who says what, provides data on two principles of the rational/instrumental framework of deliberation, equality and reasoned argument. But more importantly, an investigation of who says what offers a substantive comparison of the rational/instrumental framework, which stipulates the importance of political sophistication, and the communal/conversational framework, which underscores the importance of conversational abilities.

The empirical goals of this chapter require an individual level analysis and require two sources of data: data from a survey of the participants, and data from what the participants said. Indeed, this project can boast being the first of its kind to combine both data sources for an individual-level analysis of deliberation.

Of course, the place to start such an investigation is with prior research, where available. This project has already tapped into a wide range of research, including participation studies, research on the communitarian, the theory of deliberative democracy, and the nature of deliberation, argumentation, conversation, and reasoning. This chapter does not provide much more than what has already been provided. What will be

discussed are the few studies that look at the covariation between individual level attributes and types of dialogue relevant to deliberation (argument, conversation, etc.). Again, to date, there are no studies that have specifically looked at the covariation between individual level attributes and deliberation as a unique type of dialogue.

How does one measure who says what in deliberation? Like many empirical questions, this one has two primary dimensions: quantity and quality. Quantity can further be broken down into depth and breadth. Together, then, the question of who says what can be investigated across three overall dimensions. Thus this chapter will investigate three different classes of dependent variables. Depth (quantity) is operationalized through various counts of the amount of speaking provided by each individual, including the number of lines of text, thought statements, and utterances. Breadth (quantity) is measured as the range of topics upon which each individual speaks. And finally, quality is empirically measured as the number of primary argumentative statements, or in some analyses, the ratio of argumentative statements to non-argumentative statements.

### Literature Review

Like the previous two chapters the present chapter will not provide a detailed literature review of the theory undergirding the overall rationale for the chapter or the two frameworks contrasted in this chapter, as chapter two already provided such information. That chapter underscored most theorists' expectation that individual levels of political sophistication will be most predictive of how much each individual speaks out in deliberation as well as the degree to which their talk is considered sophisticated. In

contrast, my alternative model argues this: It is not political sophistication, but political conversation, that leads to deliberative talk and, furthermore, sophisticated deliberative talk. In addition to these variables are of course a host of other variables that may show significant relationships to how much one speaks, on how many topics, and with how many argumentative elements. Below is a brief review of the variables that prior analyses have shown to be potentially important to the present analyses.

A number of studies provide at least indirect evidence of systematic variance on an individual's disposition to speak out in deliberation. Lasorsa (1991) found political outspokenness (at least, as tapped by survey self-reports) to be a function of education, age, opinion climate and certitude, efficacy, and interest. Like much of the research on the willingness to speak, Lasorsa's research was predicated on the spiral of silence theory. Noelle-Neumann's (1993) spiral of silence theory has certainly paved the way for a wealth of studies on the predilection to speak in different opinion climates and overall levels of political outspokenness. This research generally finds systematic variance in the willingness or predilection to speak with variables such as the perceived opinion climate and the speaker's own majority or minority position on a topic. In addition, however, are relationships with political interest, education and knowledge. Again, these studies are removed from actual political deliberation, leaving open the question whether such variables would predict the willingness to speak in this more formal setting. For one, these studies differ from the one I propose here in that they are either survey-based or study experimentally-based texts of small group communication or hypothetical communication environments. Second, the question typically asked in these surveys is

how likely the respondent would actually be to speak on political issues to a stranger, not whether, given the opportunity, he/she would speak in an organized political deliberation. Still, however, I believe these studies provide a strong rationale for testing whether similar relationships exist in political deliberation.

The spiral of silence theory states that individuals will suppress their opinions if they perceive themselves to be unsupported by others (Noelle-Neuman, 1993). It is a theory that depends on the assumption that individuals use the mass media in their search for support and that the mass media tend to speak monopolistically, as if with one voice (Katz, 1981). With regard to deliberation, individuals may enter discussions with pre-formed perceptions from the media about whether those with whom they interact will support their opinions. Additionally, individuals may use deliberation as an opportunity to try out their opinions in public in order to garner the support of other citizens. With regard to perceived opinion climates, Noelle-Neuman found that both gender (e.g., males) and education predicted the willingness to speak. Salmon and Neuwirth (1990) have also investigated the factors underlying the willingness to speak. Using structural equation modeling, the authors found a number of indirect effects on the willingness to speak on political issues. Only two variables exhibited significant positive direct effects, specifically, political knowledge and issue involvement. In addition, education was an indirect predictor of the willingness to speak. Other studies also suggest that education and political knowledge are significant predictors of political conversation. Scheufele (1999) again defined two types of political talk, the more formal of which was significantly predicted by political knowledge. The more informal type of political

discussion, opinion expression, was related to age, education, and opinion climate. Presumably, political knowledge prepares an individual to speak on politics, providing ammunition with which to build arguments and defend positions. Since information generated in political discussion is determined by an individual's level of "opinion preparedness" as partially created by high levels of political knowledge (Gerard & Orive, 1987), political knowledge should again be a significant predictor of the proclivity to speak in political deliberation.

Gender has also been found to be a significant predictor of some types of conversation. There is a wide range of evidence that men dominate discussion by significant amounts, primarily, though, in jury deliberations (Hans & Vidmaar, 1986; Marsden, 1987; Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). Most multivariate analyses of political conversation based on survey data, however, find few significant differences in gender. This discrepancy between the analyses of jury deliberations and political conversation research only underscores the importance of investigating gender differences in political deliberations.

The potential of gender differences in deliberation is of paramount concern with regard to the equality principle. Of course, equality may also be threatened by inequalities in race and, since deliberation is essentially a political discussion, political minorities. For this reason studies on the spiral of silence were reviewed above. These studies underscore the possibility that such inequalities may occur across a wide range of political discussion. As advertised, this chapter will focus closely on these concerns and test equality as a central and essential principle of deliberation.

In addition to equality, this chapter will again look at reasoned argument as a central litmus test of the two frameworks of deliberation discussed throughout this dissertation. The literature review of chapter two made it clear that the rational/instrumental framework's expectations are that sophisticated individuals will be most capable of speaking up in deliberation, and doing so in a sophisticated, or more rational, reasoned, and argumentative manner because of their high levels of political interest and attentiveness and thus high levels of knowledge (Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Wegman, 1994), non-neutral opinions (Krosnick & Telhami, 1995), greater store of knowledge with which to make sophisticated claims (Galotti, 1998; Perkins, Allen, & Hafner, 1983), more concretized opinions (Tesser, 1978), and prior experience in collective decision making and public speaking (Verba, Scholzman, Brady, & Nie, 1993). Politically sophisticated individuals, as measured by education, interest, and political knowledge, exhibit a greater level of cognitive complexity, leading to greater detail and breadth of appeal justification in persuasive discourse (O'Keefe & Delia, 1979) and are most accustomed to high levels of complex information exposure (Emler & Frazer, 1999).

Again, however, I must point out that none of the studies mentioned thus far explored these issues in the context of political deliberation. And, there are a handful of studies reporting conflictual findings (e.g., Ceci & Liker, 1986; Perkins, 1985; Wager and Sternberg, 1986). In contrast, the communal/conversational framework I have argued for throughout the dissertation claims that political sophistication will be subsumed under the importance of prior political conversation. Indeed, a wide range of literature suggests

that the only way to gain sophisticated opinions and comfort in talking politics is, in fact, to talk politics. Frequency of discussion brings about more critical thinking (Paul, 1992), more structured opinions (Lasch, 1995), associational intelligence (Dewey, 1954), more sophisticated utterances (Scott & Lyman, 1968), and political comprehension (Robinson & Levy, 1986). Political conversation, in short, organizes attitudes (Lalljee & Evans, 1998; Emler, 1990).

This chapter, then, will explore the validity of these two expectation frameworks primarily by looking at the relative weight of political conversation to political sophistication in the production of political talk, political topics, and the degree to which citizens offer sophisticated political talk. In addition, the principle of equality will be explored as a central normative principle of deliberation. Coming to a greater understanding of these two facets of deliberation is vital in making an overall assessment of the character of deliberation as well as its utility and the validity of each framework of deliberation.

### The Data

This analysis combines the coding instrument data with data from the baseline survey of deliberative participants and residents of Philadelphia. Given the theoretical review above, a number of variables from the survey are important either as control variables or variables of theoretical interest. Survey variables will serve as independent variables, as they are causally prior to the dependent variables of interest, namely, the amount of speaking, the number of topics discussed by each speaker, and the level of



argumentation by each speaker. Additional coding variables will be used as controls where applicable.

Although there are two main areas of interest, equality and argument, there are, as mentioned, three main dependent variables of interest. Of course, the amount of speaking is designed to primarily test the equality principle. It does, however, also provide a test of the determinants of deliberation, be they political sophistication or conversation. The number of topics also tests these two principles, and although perhaps more obliquely, this variable still has great importance. Would the equality principle be upheld if the number of issues members of each group were capable of raising unequal? Additionally, there is more reason, perhaps here than with the other two dependent variables to find covariation with both sophistication and conversation, as both are logically required to speak on a number of topics. Finally, the number of topics offered by each individual (controlled, of course, for overall amounts of speaking) is a direct test of whether certain types of individuals (that is, more sophisticated) are more capable and indeed more argumentative in deliberation. The final dependent variables of interest is a count (and ratio) of argumentative elements provided by each individual, to be used as the most important comparison between sophistication and conversation.

Since many of the survey variables used in these analyses were discussed in earlier chapters, they will not be reviewed here. Below are explanations of the coding variables used in this analysis, not yet described in previous chapters.

*Lines of text:* Measured by the quarter line, this measures the amount of speaking by each speaker and was used instead of words per speaker, first, for ease of

measurement by the coding team, and second, because number of words can be slightly misleading depending on the length of spoken words by each speaker. Mean = 44.8, Range = 0 - 132.25.

*Number of Utterances:* A count of the number of utterances by each speaker. Mean = 19, Range = 0 - 71.

*Number of Thought Statements per Speaker:* A count of the number of thought statements made by each speaker. Mean = 10, Range = 0 - 53.

*Number of Topics:* A count of the number of topics discussed by each speaker. Mean = 4.6, Range = 0 - 16.

*Number of Significant Argumentative Contributions:* Measures the number of utterances that contained at least two thought statements where at least one was a primary argumentative element. Mean = 5.3, Range = 0 - 17.

*Index of the Number of Argumentative Elements Minus the Number of Conversational Elements:* This measures the number of argumentative elements minus the number of conversational elements provided by each speaker. Mean = 8.5, Range = -3 - 37.

*Number of Discussants in Group:* A measure of the number of discussants in each individual's group. Used as a control variable for correlational analyses. Mean = 15, Range = 9 - 21.

The analyses used three methodologies: correlational analysis, regression analysis, and structural equation modeling. The first of these is designed to reveal the bivariate associations between the dependent and independent variables of interest. Of

course, there are a number of moderate to strong associations between a wide range of independent variables, as is the case in most political analyses. In many analyses, bivariate associations can be misleading or theoretically insignificant compared to multivariate relationships. Here, however, bivariate associations are important because many of the associations posited in the literature are important regardless of their correlation with other variables. For example, theorists have argued for the possibility of differences in deliberative equality on variables like gender and race (e.g., the equality principle), regardless of associations these two variables have with political knowledge and interest. Any inequalities that exist, with or without controls, are important to report. The regression analyses, then, show what occurs when these controls are introduced, and in this sense, show which variables are the primary motivators and predictors of speaking, arguing, and discussing a number of topics. Finally, structural equation modeling is employed to construct a model of the predilection and ability to deliberate. The structural equation model has many advantages over regression. In addition to including measurement error and the possibility of measuring correlated error terms, the model includes all the dependent variables of interest and shows many different direct and indirect paths from endogenous to exogenous variables.

Importantly, the data used in these analyses have multiple levels that have to be accounted for to properly measure the relationship between the variables of interest. Although the analysis is an individual level analysis, the participants in the deliberation were situated in twelve groups. As we saw in the topical maps discussed in the previous chapter, each group developed and exhibited its own unique characteristics. Moderators

also exhibited different styles: Some allowed discussion to range freely while others were more involved in the discourse. The coding of topics, to cite another example, varied by subject (subject denoting the five subjects discussed; education, jobs, government, crime, and neighborhoods). Some subjects, as is apparent in Appendix C, were coded for more topics than others. Twelve (actually, eleven since one group was not transcribed by court reporters) is too small an *N* to test for significant trends at the group level. Thus the macro level of the data, that of the group, need not be measured in any significant way. However, it must be controlled statistically. Of the different types of multilevel analyses available, the use of regression analysis with dummy variables for *k*-1 groups is the most effective at controlling for macro-level effects while leaving micro-level effects untouched (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998). As such, the correlational analyses reported here are not Pearsons R. Rather, partial correlations are reported, with *k*-1 dummies included, as well as additional controls where applicable. However, The use of dummy variables would create a quite burdensome structural equation model. Instead, each variable in the structural equation model is transformed from the variables used in the correlation and regression analyses in that, for each individual, the group (macro-level) mean for that variable was subtracted.

As reviewed earlier, the amount of speaking variables test both equality in discourse and test for political sophistication and conversation as motivators of speaking in a deliberative forum. Of course, violations of the equality principle would be the result

of significant associations between amount of speaking and individual level demographics, most importantly gender and race.<sup>21</sup>

In addition to these variables (and conversation and the sophistication variables of education, knowledge, and interest), the analyses reported here also tested for associations between the dependent variables and employment, age, income, efficacy, and neighborhood participation. Employment was included because it was suspected that this variable might have a significant association to speaking based on a review of the careers mentioned in the text. Unfortunately, the survey itself did not ask participants to specify their careers. However, 38 participants did mention their employment in the deliberations. Not surprisingly, the education groups included quite a few teachers, as well as administrative staff and charter school managers. Neighborhood groups included a few neighborhood planners; and city government groups included a number of city employees. Of course, an employment variable could not be constructed from the coding data since such data was only recorded for those who mentioned their careers in the text. As such, the data were incomplete. As an alternative, the survey-based employment status variable was included in the analysis, hoping that if enough of the careers were related to the topics being discussed in the deliberation, such an association might show up in the correlation and regression analyses.

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<sup>21</sup> Although not reported here, “political” minorities were also used in testing for the equality principle. Since there were very few conservatives and / or republicans in the deliberation, these two groups were considered political minorities. No significant differences were found on any of the dependent variables of interest.

Efficacy was included in the analyses for its potential theoretical association to the dependent variables of interest. That is, individuals who hold a positive view of their ability to affect change in government, and who believe that public officials care about them and what they have to say, will use their beliefs as motivation to actually have something to say when given the chance. Finally, age and income were included based on the wide range of literature finding associations to general measures of participation reviewed in chapters two and three, as well as for general control variables.

Throughout the analyses, neighborhood participation was included in the correlation matrices as a potential surrogate to political conversation. Although being a frequent neighborhood participant does not necessarily mean that a person will discuss politics with others, it does mean that such an individual is more frequently exposed to other individuals in his or her neighborhood, raising the possibility that that individual would be exposed to political talk or at the very least local talk about the neighborhood, which may include political content.

## Results

The results, then, are reported in the order of the three dependent variables described above. Each sub-analysis reports correlations and then regression analyses. Finally, the structural equation model is introduced and reported. Discussion of the findings will be provided in the next section.

**Table 5a: Correlation Matrix, Amount of Speaking in Deliberation**

Partial Correlations (Additional Control: Number of Discussants in Speaker's Group)	Lines of Text	Number of Utterances	Number of Thought Statements
Male	.13	.16	.18*
Black	-.04	-.06	-.09
Age	-.22*	-.07	-.18*
Income	.13	.21*	.17
Education	-.01	.04	.02
Employed	.24*	.19*	.24*
Political Conversation	.42***	.25**	.35***
Political Efficacy	.19*	.19*	.20*
Political Knowledge	.14	.14	.17
Political Interest	.09	.01	.09

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ ,  $N @ 110$

(Note: Lines and Utterances  $R = .73^{**}$ , Lines and T. Statements  $R = .90^{**}$ , Utterances and T. Statements  $R = .93^{*}$ )

Table 5a provides the partial correlations between the three speaking variables and the independent variables. While males have a slightly higher tendency to speak more than females, the correlation is only significant with the number of thought statements. There is no association between the amount of speaking in deliberation and race. Age has a moderate negative association to amount of speaking, and efficacy exhibits a moderate positive relationship.

On the debate between conversation and knowledge, the results show a stark and substantively significant contrast. By far, political conversation in everyday life, with friends, family and others, is a most powerful and substantively significant predictor of speaking in deliberation. In contrast, education, knowledge, and interest show no significant relationships to any of the three independent variables. As mentioned, a

number of these variables have moderate to strong associations with one another, giving rise to the importance of controlling between the independent variables in the model.

This is done with regression analyses, shown below in table 5b.

**Table 5b: Regression Analysis, Amount of Speaking In Deliberation**

	Lines		Utterances		Thought Statements	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Number of Group Discussants	.7	3.4	.3	1.1	.7	1.7
Gender (1 = male)	8.1	6.0	2.7	1.9	4.9	2.9
Race (1 = black)	-.5	6.8	-.1	2.1	-1.5	3.3
Education	-.2	2.7	.1	.9	-.2	1.3
Employed	10.4	6.3	2.8	2.0	5.4	3.1
Political Knowledge	-2.6	28.8	.0	9.0	.3	14.1
Political Efficacy	3.6	3.4	1.8	1.1	2.3	1.7
Political Interest	-6.1	9.2	-3.7	2.9	-3.5	4.5
Political Conversation	10.2***	2.7	1.8*	.8	4.1**	1.3
Intercept	-15.9	75.6	-3.2	23.7	-15.0	37.0
N	110		110		110	
F	2.0***		3.3***		2.7***	
R <sup>2</sup>	.30		.41		.36	
R <sup>2</sup> for Political Conversation	.11		.03		.07	

p < .05, \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001

When simultaneously controlling for the independent variables, the moderate effects for male, efficacy, age and employment disappear. However, conversation remains a substantively significant predictor. The overall model fit statistics are highly significant, and the models account for a fairly high percentage of the variance in the dependent variables. Conversation alone accounts for anywhere from three to eleven percent of this variance.



A different test for equality delves a little deeper beyond overall amounts of speaking to specific types of speaking. The other two main tests, as mentioned, will be the number of topics discussed by each speaker and the number of argumentative statements made by each speaker. Before reporting those analyses, however, it is useful to take a look at the tendency to make specific types of deliberative contributions. This to ensure that the non-findings with regard to equality and political sophistication in the above analyses on amount of speaking remain at more specific levels of talk.

**Table 5c: Specific Deliberative Contributions**

Partial Correlations (Control Variable: Count of Thought Statements per Speaker)	Problem	Future Vision	Solution	Info. Query	Self-Cont.	Elaboration
Gender	.09	.03	.07	-.13	-.07	.09
Race	-.14	-.10	.05	-.15	.15	-.07
Education	-.10	-.10	-.01	-.06	-.28**	-.04
Employed	.19*	.24*	.08	.10	-.14	-.06
Political Conversation	.24*	.08	.12	-.19*	-.03	-.08
Political Interest	.28**	.07	-.02	-.21*	-.19*	-.10
Political Knowledge	.12	-.06	-.07	.03	-.14	-.01

\*  $p > .05$ , \*\*  $p > .01$

Although no clear trends emerge, a number of specific findings are of interest. First, the table confirms the equality of discourse with regard to gender and race. Thus far, it appears that the deliberations were relatively equal with regard to the different groups tested in the analyses. Second, there is an interesting finding with regard to education in that it has a strong negative association with the tendency to make self-continuations, but no association to making elaborations. A similar result is apparent

with political interest. This is as might be expected: Self-continuations are moments when individuals are prompted to elaborate but are unable to provide any new information (they instead almost always restate what they already said). Thus, these significant correlations indicate that individuals who are unable to elaborate are also those low in at least two of the political sophistication variables, education and interest. Similar analyses were conducted with specific information types and primary statement types, with no consistent significant findings. Interestingly, though, political knowledge had a substantively significant and negative association to the use of experiential knowledge claims, suggesting that storytelling may be used in many cases in place of actual knowledge of politics.

The second model fitted in this chapter is similar to the first but is concerned with the number of topics discussed by each individual rather than the overall amount of speaking. The number of topics discussed still gives some insight, though perhaps more indirectly, toward the principle of equality, for just as we would hope that various groups would make rather equal contributions to the overall amount of speaking in deliberation, so too would we hope that different groups provide equitable contributions to the type and number of topics discussed. And of course, number of topics is a more direct measure of deliberative ability, for people who are able to contribute to deliberation no matter the topic being discussed subsequently provide greater and more significant contributions to the overall discussion.

Table 5d: Correlation Matrix, Number of Topics

Partial Correlations (Control Variable: Number of Discussants in Speaker's Group)	Number of Topics Discussed by Speaker	Number of Topics Discussed by Speaker (w/ number of utterances as additional control)
Male	.15	-.01
Black	-.05	.05
Employed	.13	-.13
Neighborhood Participation	.22*	.24**
Political Conversation	.36***	.13
Political Knowledge	.21*	.20*
Political Interest	.21*	.26**

\* p = .05, \*\* p < .01

Like the analysis on the amount of speaking, there does not appear to be significant inequalities between groups with regard to the number of topics discussed by individuals in such groups. As the table shows, political conversation at first appears to be a most substantively significant predictor of the number of topics discussed. However, when the overall number of thought statements is added as an additional control, political conversation falls just below the level of two-tailed significance. In contrast, both political knowledge and political interest remain significantly positive predictors of the number of topics (education, not shown in the table), was not significantly correlated to number of topics discussed. As shown in table 5d above, neighborhood participation also has a significant association to number of topics discussed, especially when overall amounts of speaking are being controlled.

Table 5e: Regression Analysis, Number of Topics

	Number of Topics Discussed by Speaker			
	B	SE	B	SE
Number of Group Discussants	.07	.32	.04	.16
Number of Utterances			.25***	.02
Gender (1 = male)	.85	.56	.13	.28
Race (1 = black)	.07	.63	.17	.31
Education	-.02	.26	-.06	.13
Employed	.42	.59	-.16	.29
Neighborhood Participation	.26	.20	.20*	.10
Political Knowledge	1.05	2.81	1.98	1.38
Political Interest	.43	.86	1.01*	.42
Political Efficacy	.17	.31	-.23	.16
Political Conversation	.67**	.25	.26*	.13
Intercept	-4.90	7.10	-4.97	3.48
N	110		110	
F	3.6***		27***	
R <sup>2</sup>	.64		.87	

p < .05, \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001

In the multivariate analysis, the results largely replicate those found in the bivariate analysis. When the amount of speaking is used as a control, neighborhood participation, political interest, and political conversation all exhibit significant and positive relationships to the number of topics discussed. The model is not only a significant fit of the data but explains most of the variance in the dependent variable.

The final dependent variable of interest is the degree to which individuals provide arguments in deliberation. Given that the range and level of argumentation is average

within and between individuals, the next question to explore is the degree to which individuals are able to provide political arguments at all.

**Table 5f: Correlation Matrix, Argumentativeness**

Partial Correlations (Control Variable: Count of Utterances per Speaker)	Number of Significant Argumentative Utterances
Male	.11
Black	-.13
Political Conversation	.18*
Political Knowledge	-.03
Political Interest	.09

\* p = .025

Similar to results found for overall amount of speaking and number of topics discussed by speaker, gender and race are not significant predictors of the number of argumentative statements made by each speaker. Again, political conversation, even when controlling for the overall amount of speaking, displays a significant and positive association to the frequency with which individuals make significant argumentative contributions.

Table 5g: Regression Analysis, Argumentativeness

	Number of Significant Argumentative Utterances		Significant Statement Index	
	B	SE	B	SE
Number of Group Discussants	.11	.25	.53	.67
Number of Utterances	.34***	.02	.36***	.06
Gender (1 = male)	.58	.43	.48	1.16
Race (1 = black)	-.74	.49	-.75	1.30
Education	-.01	.20	-.27	.54
Employed	-.02	.46	1.14	1.22
Political Knowledge	-2.03	2.05	-2.42	5.87
Political Interest	.41	.48	5.44***	1.79
Political Efficacy	-.22	.24	-.86	.66
Political Conversation	.37*	.18	1.03*	.53
Intercept	.95	5.17	-23.36	14.81
N	110		110	
F	17***		4.1***	
R <sup>2</sup>	.78		.49	
R <sup>2</sup> for Interest			.05	

p < .05, \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001

In the regression analysis, two different dependent variables were explored, the first, the same count of significant argumentative utterances used in the correlation analysis, the second, a measure of the number of significant argumentative statements minus the number of conversational elements (queries, elaborations, and tangents). In both cases, political conversation is again a significant and positive predictor. Although education, knowledge, and interest did not show any significant association to the number of primary argumentative statements made by each speaker, interest was substantively significant to the measure of significant to non-significant statements. Both models

significantly fit the covariance matrices of the data, and similar to the other models, both explain at least half of the variance of the dependent variable.

As was shown in the chapter on participation, those who participated were not representative of the overall population. Variables upon which differences occurred are now going to look very different in the present analyses. Luckily, most of these variables only show a higher mean; their dispersions are not abnormally skewed or kurtotic.

Political knowledge and interest, however, do show somewhat nonnormal levels of both skewness and kurtosis (see Appendix F for histograms of these variables). In addition, the independent variables also showed nonnormal indicators at levels that might lead to concern that the assumptions of regression analysis might be violated. However, it is the dispersion of the independent variables on the dependent variables, not the variables themselves, that need to remain normal to satisfy the assumptions of regression.

Appendix F reports tests for the regression assumptions for each model. Despite some nonnormality in the independent and dependent variables, the analyses strongly satisfy the regression assumptions of normality, linearity, and equality of variance.

### A Model of Deliberative Dialogue

Based on both theory and the results reported above in the correlational and regression analyses, I now present a final model of deliberative dialogue. Included in the model are the three main deliberative outcomes researched in the prior section, that is, amount of speaking, number of topics discussed, and number of arguments (here, measured as the ratio of significant argumentative contributions to non-argumentative contributions). Also included are two of the “sophistication” variables, political interest

and political knowledge, and of course, political conversation, which, as we have seen, plays a vital and central role in the predilection to deliberate at all on a wide range of topics and in an argumentative fashion. Other variables are not included in the model, for they do not have any direct effect on the three primary exogenous variables of the analysis, and their inclusion does not change any of the coefficients among the six variables mentioned above. Thus, they only serve to complicate the presentation of this model. Of course, I did run a model that included these variables, which performed largely as expected, namely that there are significant associations between gender and political knowledge, education and knowledge and interest, and race and interest.

The model was constructed as follows: As mentioned and shown in prior analyses, the “central” (both graphically in the model and conceptually) variable concerning deliberative dialogue is prior political conversation. Not only does it have a direct effect on the amount of speaking, argumentativeness, and number of topics, but also indirect effects to argumentativeness and number of topics through amount of speaking. This makes sense, for, as we have seen, the amount of speaking is logically and empirically the most powerful predictor of both the number of topics and level of argumentation. Given the strong association of interest to the ratio of significant argumentative contributions to non-arguments, there is a direct association between these two variables, as is also the case between political knowledge and number of topics. Amount of speaking in the model is an additive variable of the standardized measures of lines, number of thought statements, and utterances. Reliability of these three estimates was high ( $\alpha = .84$ ). Finally, there are indirect effects of both knowledge and interest



to the three main exogenous variables through political conversation. This model, then, effectively controls the three “prior” (the two endogenous variables, interest and knowledge, plus conversation) variables through these indirect effects, plus an association between the error terms for political interest and knowledge. The model is represented in the figure 5a below, with variances, covariances and coefficients from fitting the model to the data.

## A Model of Deliberative Dialogue




Figure 5a: A Model of Deliberative Dialogue

Table 5h: Model Fit

Chi-Square	2.744	
Degrees of Freedom	5	
RFI	.97	
IFI	1.0	
RMSEA	.00	
<b>Variables</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>S.E.</b>
Knowledge → Conversation	1.9*	.95
Interest → Conversation	1.1**	.30
Conversation → Amt. Of Speaking	.27**	.08
Conversation → Argumentativeness	.44*	.22
Conversation → # of Topics	.16*	.08
Knowledge → # of Topics	1.9	1.1
Interest → Argumentativeness	3.3**	1.1
Amt. Of Speaking → Argumentativeness	4.8***	.37
Amt. Of Speaking → # of Topics	2.1***	.11
R-squared, Conversation	.12	
R-squared, Amount of Speaking	.10	
R-squared, Number of Topics	.75	
R-squared, Argumentativeness	.63	
p < .05, ** p < .01. *** p < .001		

The structural equation model of deliberative dialogue presented here fits the data exceptionally well, with many of the fit measures not significantly different than their respective optimal measures (e.g., RMSEA = .00, IFI = 1.0). Every individual coefficient, not including the path from knowledge to number of topics, is at least marginally significant. Given the paths from amount of speaking to both number of

topics and argumentativeness, it is not surprising to see high r-squares for these two variables.

### Discussion and Conclusion

Despite the large number of analyses reported in this chapter, the results are consistent for both the equality and reasoned argument principle of deliberation. First, with regard to equality, there is no evidence here to support that deliberation is unequal across gender and race. This is true not only for overall amounts of speaking, but also the kinds of dialogic contributions made, the degree to which individuals argue, and the number of topics discussed. Although not represented in the tables provided here, similar insignificant findings were found for both political conservatives and republicans, both in short supply (with regard to attendance) and thus “political minorities” in the group deliberations.

Important to note, nevertheless, is that the signs of the bivariate coefficients of gender and race are in a direction of inequality, with slightly more whites than blacks and slightly more men than women talking, making arguments, and talking on a number of topics. With a larger  $N$  these trends would no doubt be significant at the bivariate level. However, they would not be substantive. Additionally, such bivariate associations would in all likelihood dissipate in multivariate analyses since they weakened from the bivariate to multivariate analyses reported here. The reason seems clear enough: differences in interest and knowledge across gender and race seem to account for most of the difference with regard to deliberative equality. Overall, then, the news here is good: I find no statistical evidence of inequality in the amount of speaking, the number of arguments

made, or the number of topics discussed. Charges that deliberation will lead to inequality (Sanders, 1997; Young, 1996) appear unwarranted.

With regard to the debate over sophistication versus conversation, the results are clear and consistent: Political conversation begets political deliberation. While this may seem commonsensical, it is not necessarily the case. People who are comfortable conversing with family and friends may not have necessarily been comfortable talking to strangers. Second, deliberation is a more formal and (supposedly) argumentative form of political dialogue than is political conversation. If the differences are anywhere near the differences found by McLeod et al. (1999) between opinion expression and political talk, the relationship between political conversation and deliberation are by no means automatic. Political conversation, especially when asked after being recruited for a project in which the respondent agreed to discuss politics, may be in some way invalid, for example, due to social desirability. If this was the case we might also see a weak if not altogether insignificant relationship between political conversation and deliberation. Finally, while political conversation is a self reported survey variable subject to social desirability and telescoping, the variables based on the coding instrument are actual measures of real discourse.

The relationships between various deliberative measures and political conversation are strong and consistent. There is strong evidence in these findings that the political conversation argument (remember Lasch's quote earlier in the chapter) is borne out: The formation of opinion occurs with the attempted utterance of such opinions. As such, the level and frequency of prior political utterances leads to greater and more

significant future utterances, or at least, given the opportunity to do so, prior political utterances equip one to make more substantive future political utterances, as individuals with high levels of prior political conversation (it is inferred) have more crystallized opinions ready and waiting to be vocalized.

As for the political sophistication argument, the evidence produced here is weak if not in opposition to the position that politically sophisticated individuals are best equipped to deliberate. Indeed, between education, interest, and knowledge, in six total regression analyses (thus 18 possible tests for significance), only two were substantively significant. There is little evidence here that political sophistication produces or predicts deliberative ability.

Of course, there are two ways in which these findings must be qualified. First, prior chapters have shown that deliberation is not a wholly argumentative endeavor, but rather tends toward discussion of accountability, responsibility, and community. While these topics may involve quite a bit of argumentation, they do not require much specialized knowledge, certainly to the degree required for topics more oriented toward public policy. If we were to force the participants to talk public policy, what would have happened? Would we have seen differences with regard to political sophistication? Or would it have been flat out impossible for the participants to talk public policy? Of course we cannot know the answer. Nevertheless, the participants did spend an entire day talking politics, with moderators trained to keep people on a predetermined agenda of talk that entailed the discussion of a number of political actions, each of which had serious public policy implications. Even if individuals did not talk at the level of elites,

surely some trends would still have been hinted at in the data. As it happened, no trends were apparent with regard to political sophistication and deliberation. Indeed, many of the insignificant coefficients between knowledge and the dependent variables were negatively signed.

Second, the data at hand might not have been capable of showing the findings I was looking for. This argument, however, does not stand up to facts: While it is true that there was a significant number of missing cases and an  $N$  that may seem small to some survey analysts, the overall  $N$  was indeed nowhere near so small as to preclude an acceptable amount of statistical power, as is evidenced by the particularly strong findings with regard to deliberation and political conversation. Certainly, better data, with less noise due to higher reliability scores, more coded data, and more cases would have certainly increased the statistical power of the analysis. However, for what gain? Such changes would not likely drastically alter the coefficients found in the analyses above, which, if significant, were moderate at best, and in many cases (e.g., knowledge) not even in the predicted direction.

The analyses presented in this chapter gives credence to three major findings. First, that deliberation exhibits equality, second, that prior political conversation best equips one to discuss politics, in depth, breadth, and quality. Finally, political sophistication as measured by education, political interest and knowledge, does not afford those with high levels of these qualities an advantage in deliberation. Indeed, political conversation serves as the portal through which political sophistication variables must travel in order to have any effect, as is evident in the model of deliberative dialogue. And

as we will see in the next chapter, its effect does not stop there, as conversation is not only predictive of what people do in deliberation but of what they get out of it as well.

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## Chapter 6: Deliberation and the Diffusion of Opinion Formation

Deliberation is a specialized form of political communication. As such it should not be altogether surprising that conversation predicts not only whether an individual is willing to participate in deliberation, but, and more substantively, how much they will say and argue for in deliberation. The differences between conversation and deliberation, however, are important to point out. First, deliberation is pre-planned. It is an event to which each individual asked to participate chose whether or not to do so. Chapter one defined the differences that arise in the self-selected process of joining deliberation. And while deliberation was significantly related to and predicted by an individual's prior levels of political conversation, the relationship was weak. Indeed, if the model of deliberative participation in chapter one is compared to models of political conversation reported elsewhere (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 2000; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Waldman, 2000), a number of differences become apparent. In chapter three I argued specifically that while engagement in political conversation is a widespread (but low-level) activity, deliberative participation is most likely to occur in communalists and civic identifiers.

A second difference between conversation and deliberation is that deliberation is a conversation with greater than two participants. While Gunderson (2000) argues that the ideal number of deliberative participants is two, I have suggested otherwise (Dutwin, in press), specifically that deliberation is a most effective mode of political conversation



*because* one is exposed to so many different perspectives and wide ranging information. In practical terms, though, Gunderson and all other deliberative theorists agree that deliberation is a group event. Political conversation, like deliberation, is almost never *directly* measured empirically. This is due, though, to the difficulty in direct observation, as compared to deliberation, where such measurement has simply rarely been undertaken. In surveys, political conversation is measured as a frequency, with questions such as “how many days in the week did you talk politics with friends and family?” Deliberation is not something that occurs with frequency, and thus is not measured in such terms but rather in dichotomous terms. While there is no empirical evidence that political conversation most often occurs in dyads, the most likely reality is that such conversations average just about two participants. Deliberation is a group process containing as many as 21 participants in the present project.

Theoretically, deliberation and conversation show a number of additional differences, as described throughout the dissertation. Deliberation is a more formalized method of political talk, and has been theorized to contain reasoned arguments on public policy and, as I have shown in earlier chapters, communal concerns and values.

Of course, despite the differences between political conversation and deliberation, these two measures are closely related. Given the existence of inter-relativity, the obvious interesting question is how. As mentioned, prior frequency of political conversation is weakly but significantly related to participation in deliberation, and strongly and consistently associated with the frequency to speak out in deliberation as well the likelihood to argue and speak on a wide range of topics.

However, perhaps the one potential association between deliberation and political conversation most important to democracy is the effect political deliberation may have on future political conversations. The specific goal of this chapter is to explicate the theoretical importance of this relationship as well as to test this previously unexplored effect.

The rational/instrumental framework of deliberation is rational in that it argues for the importance of political sophistication as a predictor of quality discourse and more importantly argues that deliberative discourse will be characterized by rational, reasoned discussion on public policy. The model is instrumental in that deliberation is designed to be an instrument by which citizens gain knowledge and informed opinions. Deliberation is also an instrument of policymakers, a way for policymakers to get a representative informed public opinion on public policy issues. This instrumental side of the framework is of paramount importance to this chapter.

The communal/conversational framework contrasts this perspective by underscoring the importance not of knowledge leading to informed opinions but of conversation leading to the very formation of opinion. Instead of serving as an instrument of representative public policy, thereby rendering deliberation as important not just for those who participate but for the polity at large, the communal/conversational framework of deliberation argues that deliberation will foster greater levels of conversation, leading to a diffusion effect of political conversation to those who did not participate. The goal of this chapter is to estimate this potential effect.

## The Effects of the Rational/Instrument and Communal/Conversational Frameworks

It is important to recall that chapter one detailed a wide variety of concerns with the empirical findings of the rational/instrumental framework on methodological grounds. The criticisms significantly call into question the degree to which deliberation changes opinions in the long term and in any way increases the positive efficaciousness of the participants. As I argued in chapter one, these extensive criticisms underscore that the rational/instrumental framework still has significant work to do to validate its claims.

Despite these criticisms, the complimentary finding by Labrie (2000) with the present data gives some indication at least that the knowledge effect of deliberation is genuine. While the knowledge effect can and has been tested with the present data, these data do not afford an opportunity to test opinion change, having only asked “issue importance” questions rather than opinion or issue positions outright. As for the importance measures queried in the projects, no significant changes have been found to date by this author and a number of other graduate students working with the same data.

Given Fishkin’s weak but significant findings in efficacy change, at least in the short term, efficacy change as a function of deliberation was checked with the present data. Given that Fishkin’s moderate effect sizes disappeared long term, effects were not particularly expected, and in conjunction with that expectation, none were found, using various scalings of the efficacy questions used in the present study’s surveys (see Appendix A) as well as individual items.

With regard to knowledge, the present project also tested for specific types of knowledge changes. Labrie’s thesis was on whether deliberation produced a “gap” in

knowledge (Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970) such that those who participated scored much higher than those who did not. The effect was significant and highly substantive. However, the literature on knowledge gaps also suggests a different kind of model. Formerly defined, the knowledge gap is a gap between high and low status individuals. The division here is defined with five elements. First, high status individuals have more advanced communication skills. Also, these individuals have larger networks of social contacts and are more selective in exposure to and retention of information. Higher status individuals are more oriented toward mass communication (and importantly, this relationship is reciprocal). Finally, and most importantly, higher status individuals, specifically those most attuned to public affairs and those most knowledgeable of public affairs, have larger amounts of stored information, enabling these individuals to better incorporate new information (Price and Czilli, 1996; Price and Zaller, 1995).

Thus, those with higher levels of knowledge should learn at a higher rate than those with lower stores of knowledge. This gives rise to a regression model predicting knowledge measured after a deliberative event, with an interaction between prior political knowledge and deliberation to test for whether knowledge did give rise to gaps within those who participated. The data, however, did not exhibit any such effect: The effect of knowledge and the effect of deliberation on gains in political knowledge were strong but separate.

As mentioned, the communal/conversational framework of deliberation posits that conversation is a substantive and important deliberative effect, producing higher levels of conversation in those who participate. The framework thus incorporates the two-step

flow model of communication as part of the process of deliberation (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Importantly, the two-step flow model defines “central” individuals as those most interested in a certain communication stimuli, be they opinion leaders found to be most interested in politics (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948) or individuals otherwise centrally located (Weimann, 1982). With regard to deliberation, then, at least one of two potential realities must hold. First, those who *participated* in deliberation are opinion leaders of a communal polity or, *within* deliberation, those who are most frequently the givers of opinions (see Robinson, 1976) will be most likely to create a two-step flow. In the first instance, one will find a main effect for participation in deliberation on further political conversations. In the second instance, an interactive effect will occur similar to those found in the knowledge gap literature such that those higher in prior political conversation (the opinion givers) will be most likely to increase their levels of conversation as measured after deliberation takes place.

Although the original conception of the two-step flow argued for the former definition, there is also much empirical evidence supporting the latter (Allen, 1969; Mendelsohn, 1964; Nafziger, Engstrom, & McLean, 1951). Allen, for one, defines these individuals as high in “gregariousness” while Weimann (1982) again calls them “opinion-givers.” Prior research has shown that the distinction between givers and receivers are small, especially in comparison to others (Robinson, 1976). In these comparisons, both receivers and givers were found to be much more likely to consume news media and participate in politics. Regardless of the term employed, the present study only has survey items that measure levels of political conversation with friends,

family, and others, and does not distinguish whether individuals are opinion leaders, givers, or receivers. While the survey has no formal measure of opinion receiving, conversation with friends, family, and others is a useful proxy to giving opinions, as one cannot give opinions without speaking. As such the present study defines the opinion givers in deliberation as those highest in frequency of political conversation.

The hypothesis that deliberation produces a two-step flow leads to the expectation, again, of a potential interaction between prior political conversation and participation in deliberation. A significant effect in this regard would constitute a “communication gap” similar to knowledge gaps found in prior research. Indeed, a number of scholars have suggested that such effects potentially exist. Rogers’ call for further research on the knowledge gap hypothesis centers around the inclusion of “the differential effects of interpersonal communication” (1976, p. 233, also Gaziano, 1983). In testing whether conversation can affect knowledge gaps, potentially “closing” them, Tichenor et al. (1980) found that high levels of community discussion lowered gaps on local issues.

Thus, although the present study cannot make significant contributions to opinion change due to lack of measurement, and knowledge change because such an effect has already been tested (Labrie, 2000), it is capable of testing the potential effect deliberation has on political conversation. Given the literature reviewed above, the main hypothesis of this study is as follows: That political deliberation creates a “diffusion effect” on political conversation, at least temporarily increasing its level above and beyond those that did not participate in deliberation. This effect may be direct, but it may also be

interactive with prior conversation. Evidence for either would support the claim that deliberation produces a two-step flow of communication from the participants to others in society and lends credence to the communal/conversational framework of deliberation. The following sections deal with the data, methods, and results of this hypothesis.

### Data and Method

The data for this project are of course the pre- and post-panel waves of data gathered around the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project. This chapter will report the results on bivariate and multivariate analyses using change in conversational levels from before to after deliberation and a post-panel wave measure of political conversation as the primary dependent variables of interest, controlling for, of course, prior political conversation and a number of other variables. These other variables will be determined by what literature and additional research using the present data find significantly associated to conversation in multivariate analyses. The cases included in the analysis are the same as those in the first chapter's analyses, that is, participants in deliberation plus those who were given the opportunity to deliberate but declined.

Given that political conversation alone has been subject to increased scholarly inquiry recently, there are a number of models predicting conversation. Many of these have been reviewed in earlier chapters. To briefly review, Scheufele (1999) found that political talk was associated with political knowledge. In addition, opinion expression, a form of conversation less formal than political talk, was significantly related to age, education, and opinion climate.

Conversation has also been found to be associated with news media use. Gabriel Tarde (1889/1989) and James Bryce (1888/1973) both posited that newspaper readership stimulates the individual to engage in conversation. This has since been supported by Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999). Controlling for a number of related variables, these scholars found that newspaper readership was significantly associated with political conversation, although television use was not. Similar findings have been reported by others (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy 1999; Burstein, 1972; Straits, 1991).

In a more recent study of political conversation, Waldman found similar predictors, namely, a battery of demographics plus television news (but, in contrast to Kim, Wyatt, and Katz, 1999, not newspaper readership), ideological strength, political interest and knowledge.

Using data from the present study provides confirmation that for this specific analysis we are controlling for variables that might relate to political conversation. Results of this analysis are presented in table 6a below.



Table 6a: Political Conversation

	B	S.E
(Constant)	1.07***	.17
Gender	.05	.06
Race	.18**	.06
Education	-.06*	.02
Age	-.01***	.00
Political Knowledge	.25	.17
Political Interest	.22***	.06
Attention to Newspapers	.16***	.04
Attention to Television News	.07	.04
Ideological Strength	.06	.06

N 890  
 F \*\*\*18  
 R<sup>2</sup> .16  
 p < .05, \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001

Similar to the literature reported above, political conversation in the present data is significantly predicted by demographic variables as well as newspaper exposure and political interest. Knowledge, interestingly, was not a significant predictor. The present study will include this variable, however, as well as ideological strength and television news exposure given both their important role as control variables and their significance in at least one of the studies reported above.

The variables that will be used in the present study remain the same that were constructed for previous chapters (see Appendix A). As such, only variables not previously reported will be detailed here. This analysis will include four models based on a 2 x 2 design. That is, the models will differ through the use of two different

dependent variables, post-panel political conversation and a difference score in conversation between pre- and post-panel waves of the survey, and they will also differ by reporting either main effects or interaction effects.

*Post-Panel Political Conversation:* A scale mirroring the one used in the pre-panel wave, this measure is an average between frequency of political conversation with family and friends, and with others (Chronbachs  $\alpha = .60$ ,  $M = 2.49$ ,  $SD = .96$ , Range = 4).

*Difference Score in Political Conversation:* Post-political knowledge scale minus the pre-panel wave scale. ( $M = -.05$ ,  $SD = 1.21$ , Range = 8).

*Participation in Deliberation:* Scored from zero participation to full participation (four events) ( $M = .6$ ,  $SD = 1.13$ , Range = 5).

*Participation x Conversation (and Participation x Conversation Difference):* The interaction terms for the models ( $M = .10$ ,  $SD = .96$ , Range = 11.45). The measure was computed by taking the main effect variables, subtracting their means, and then computing the interaction score. This process maintains the same coefficients as a normal interaction score but decreases the amount of multicollinearity between the main effects and the interaction term in the model. See Appendix A for more details on all the measures in the models.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Statistics in the above descriptions are based on individuals who answered both pre- and post-panel waves. Differences between groups that did and did not provide responses in the post-panel wave will be discussed shortly.

## Results

Table 6b reports the results of a bivariate analysis on the two dependent variables of interest. Of course, these relationships will not provide too much insight into what a multivariate setup might reveal, since controlling for prior political conversation in a multivariate setup on time-two conversation will in all likelihood change the coefficients of the other variables significantly. Nevertheless, the bivariate associations do provide some interesting results. First is the surprisingly low (yet still substantively significant) relationship between time-one and time-two conversation. While we might expect these measures to be more strongly associated, these numbers are encouraging because they hint at substantive individual change in conversational levels over time.

The second interesting finding is the general lack of predictors of time-two conversation. As was evident in the regression analysis presented in table 6a, time-one conversation, at least in a multivariate analyses, was significantly predicted by a host of variables, relative to time-two conversation. Finally, it is interesting to note the strong negative associations between the conversation difference score and political conversation, interest, newspapers and television news. These relationships provide initial evidence of a ceiling effect, in that individuals high in these variables already had ceiling-level scores on time-one conversation and could not advance as much as individuals who reported lower time-one conversational levels. Finally, the partial correlations of the dependent variables and the conversation – participation interaction term provide some initial evidence of a significant participation effect.

Table 6b: Bivariate Associations

	Political Conversation Time Two	Difference Score: Conversation Time Two - Time One
Gender	-.09*	-.06
Race	.06	-.05
Age	.09*	.14**
Education	-.08	-.04
Political Conversation	.14**	-.62**
Political Knowledge	-.04	.13**
Political Interest	.03	-.17**
Attention to Newspapers	.07	-.15**
Attention to Television News	.03	-.13**
Ideological Strength	-.01	-.09*
Participation	-.01	-.05
Talk x Participation Interaction <sup>a</sup>	.10**	.10**

p < .05, \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001

<sup>a</sup> A partial correlation with time-one conversation and participation as control variables

Of course, these results are preliminary and possibly even misleading in that they do not control for other variables and most importantly prior political conversation. To do this, we must look at the data in a multivariate analysis. Results of the four regression models are reported in table 6c.

Table 6c: Regression Analysis, Argumentativeness

	Post-Deliberation Conversation				Conversation Difference Score			
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	2.04**	.28	1.99**	.279	1.66**	.281	1.62**	.279
Gender (1 = male)	-.073	.08	-.070	.081	-.073	.082	-.070	.081
Race (1 = black)	.001	.08	.015	.087	.001	.088	.015	.087
Education	-.026	.03	-.031	.037	-.026	.037	-.031	.037
Age	.006*	.00	.006*	.003	.006*	.003	.006*	.003
Attn. to Newspapers	.010	.06	.017	.061	.010	.061	.017	.061
Attn. to Television	.004	.05	.011	.056	.004	.057	.011	.056
Partisan Strength	-.078	.08	-.083	.082	-.078	.083	-.083	.082
Political Knowledge	-.547*	.25	-.584*	.254	-.547*	.256	-.584*	.254
Political Interest	.081	.08	.088	.086	.081	.086	.088	.086
Political Conversation	.146**	.04	.169**	.048	-.85**	.048	-.83**	.048
Participation in Deliberation	.015	.03	-.002	.038	.015	.038	-.002	.038
Conversation x Participation			.142**	.043			.142**	.043
N	578		578		578		578	
F	2.3**		3.1**		35**		27**	
R <sup>2</sup>	.05		.06		.42		.44	

p < .05, \*\* p < .001.

The data indicate that while there is no main effect for participation on post-deliberative conversational levels, there is a strong and substantively significant interaction between pre-deliberative conversation and participation. Other significant measures in the main effects models include knowledge and age. With these data,

knowledge is substantively predictive of political conversation but was not predictive of conversational change. The models fit extremely well and account for up to half the variance in the dependent variables.

To get an accurate idea of what the interactions show, graphs were constructed and appear below as figures 6a and 6b.




Figure 6a: The Effect of Conversation

## Effect of Prior Conversation & Participation on Conversation




Figure 6b: The Effect of Conversation

The graphs show strong evidence of a deliberation effect on conversation.

However, this effect is modified through prior political conversation, such that only those high in political conversation display deliberative effects. Overall, individuals low in time-one conversation increased their conversation scores as compared to those high in time-one conversation. This may be due to a ceiling effect in that those high in time-one conversation had little room for improvement in their time-two scores. Despite this ceiling, those who participated in conversation and scored high in time-one conversation managed still to slightly increase their scores on political conversation, while those who participated with a low time-one conversational score actually talked less after deliberation. The important thing to note above all in these graphs is the strong split

produced by participation for those already high in conversation, since the levels of conversation change for high time-one conversationalists may not significantly differ from zero, a fact perhaps not surprising again given the strong likelihood of a ceiling effect.

### Discussion

The analyses presented in this chapter give strong evidence for a two-step flow of communication produced by deliberation, but only for those already highly conversive on politics to friends, family, and others. In a sense, deliberation produces a “conversation gap” in that deliberation widens the gap between the degree to which individuals converse based on prior levels of conversation.

It is interesting that the main effect of prior political conversation on the change in conversational levels between time-one and time-two is negatively signed. Overall, those low in conversation dramatically increased their level of conversation between time-one and time-two compared to individuals high in conversation, regardless of deliberation. Again, however, there is a strong chance this effect is due to a ceiling effect. By definition, those high in conversation at time-one, that is, those who say they talk politics “three or four times a week” (3 out of 4 on the scale) or “everyday” (4 out of 4) could only increase their score by a maximum of one point, if at all, while those low in time-one conversational levels were able to move up four entire spots. As such, overall levels of conversation change for high and low time-one conversational measures; that is, the main effect of conversation on conversation change, must be taken with a grain of salt. It is also important to keep in mind the timing of the study, namely, that it occurred during



the 1999 Philadelphia Mayor's race. The first wave of the panel was taken in January 1998 and the post-panel wave was conducted in November of 1999, just after the general election. Given the expected election "bump" in political conversation as shown by Waldman (2000), it is even more difficult to know what the overall main effect of time-one conversation is on time-two conversation, as we do not have data to show where the mean level of conversation was for any given day.

The important relationship for the present study, regardless of conversation's main effect on further conversation, is the difference produced by deliberation on further political conversation. If one assumes that those high in conversation are defined as the primary opinion givers, it would appear that deliberation stimulates these individuals to greater conversation than less conversive citizens. Why deliberation would not produce an effect for less conversive individuals as compared to non-participants is not clear. It may be the case, again, similar to the evidence found in the knowledge gap literature, that as individuals high in political conversation are naturally more practiced at conversation, deliberation allows such individuals to acquire more fuel for their conversive fire as compared to individuals unaccustomed to high levels of conversation.

Again, the measures of political conversation were created by scaling two separate questions. This produced a rather low reliability score with the time-two measure (Chronbachs *Alpha* = .60). As such, models were constructed and tested with separate measures rather than with the scaled item used in the analyses reported in this chapter. There were no significant differences in coefficients for the separate items as compared to one another and the scaled item.

The finding that opinion givers were positively affected by deliberation is a hopeful one. If deliberation can and does stimulate greater levels of conversation—especially in the context of an election—then nonparticipants close to the participants may also enjoy the benefits conversation provides even though they did not actually participate in the deliberations themselves. If political discussion indeed is the keystone in the formation of public opinion as many suggest (Lowell, 1914; Price, 1992; Price and Roberts, 1987), then deliberation can aid in the formation of public opinion, for both participants and for those who come into contact with the participants.

Coupled with other political “stimulants,” deliberation is much like both political discussion and media exposure. They are indeed complimentary to one another (Chaffee, 1986). Because greater access to any of these channels leads to greater knowledge acquisition based on those channels (Chaffee, 1986), deliberation can be viewed as a superior direct and indirect producer of political knowledge: It helps to produce a citizen-defined politics (Price and Roberts, 1987) and a truly “public” opinion.

The analysis presented in this chapter provides evidence that deliberation is not an end, but part and parcel of the ever continuing process of public opinion formation. Seen in the context of an election campaign, deliberation acts as a means to become better informed and helps create higher quality opinions through its direct and indirect effects, and through the diffusion of political information from participants to non-participants. In the words of at least one deliberative theorist (Manin, 1987), deliberation may not produce an outright expression of public opinion afterward. Nevertheless, it still produces many individual opinions generated through social means. Deliberation does

**this directly, and like a stone upon a pond, by creating ripples of further communication in the polity beyond the participants themselves.**

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## Conclusion

The past decade has seen a blossoming of theoretical knowledge about deliberation. I have characterized this body of theoretical knowledge as having a dominant perspective. According to this framework, political participants, ranging from donators of time or money to participants in a variety of forms of political conversation are more likely to be knowledgeable, educated, interested, and in some cases, partisan and civically skilled. Participants discuss public policy in a manner that is rational, reasoned, argumentative, equal, open, and engaging. Furthermore, this rational/instrumental framework argues that sophisticated discourse is done by the educated, knowledgeable, and interested. Finally, the model argues that deliberative participants will gain knowledge, become more positively efficacious, and shift in both aggregate and individual opinions, to presumably more stabilized and informed opinions. Deliberation itself is an instrument with which to establish a representative and informed public opinion.

In contrast, I offered a communal/conversational framework of deliberation, arguing that deliberative participants will be characterized by their strong personal identification to the community, based on the enactment of a life with a civic inclination, a civic voice, and a local focus. According to the communal/conversational framework, deliberation will be only obliquely argumentative, public policy focus will only arise through talk of the community, and the values of the citizen deliberator will be

widespread. The framework posits that those who are practiced in political conversation, rather than necessarily “equipped” with a vast array of knowledge and cognitive capability, will be most pervasively deliberative and deliberatively argumentative. Finally, deliberation is not an instrument of reasoned public opinion, but instead part of the politico-conversational environment, catalyzing the polity with higher levels of conversation, in conjunction with greater information gains by the participants themselves.

The Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact project in civic deliberation provided a wealth of data with which to investigate the tenability of these two expectation frameworks, and in the process, gain a broader understanding of deliberation itself. To meet these two ends, four primary research questions were developed:

- RQ1: Who participates?
- RQ2: What do they say and how do they say it?
- RQ3: Who says what?
- RQ4: How does it affect them?

These four questions provided a theoretically and empirically justified set of focal points, paving the way for an understanding of deliberation and validation of the frameworks. Each question was explored in its own chapter, whose major findings are summarized below.

1. *Participation in deliberation is a function of political sophistication and civic identification.* Regression analysis found significant relationships for all three “political sophistication” variables, education, political interest, and political knowledge. In addition, the analyses found that participants had significantly higher levels of political

conversation, the use of news for engagement purposes, and a desire to stay in Philadelphia rather than move to the suburbs. Within the typology of political participants presented by Verba and Nie (1972), the pattern of these variables' relationships to political participation fit best with the communalist. These "civic identifiers" were similarly explored in Bellah et al.'s (1985) classic study of the American identity. These authors found a voice of self-interest and individualism throughout the American populace, including the civic-minded citizen. But in contrast to other citizens, civic-minded citizens were also found to have a "second language of social commitment," exhibiting a sense that public commitment is "fun," where "a long term commitment to the community has led them to define their very identity in terms of it" (p. 175). Other scholars have made similar arguments. In short, that participating or committing to one's community is, for such individuals, a formative identity-building and identity-reifying activity (Rimmerman, 1997; Teske, 1997). The findings in this dissertation link this identity with the likelihood of participating in deliberation.

2. *Participants spoke in the language of the communalist.* While the findings from the regression analysis and the communalist patterns of the variables therein were suggestive, further support for the communal framework came by way of a qualitative analysis of the data. Supportive findings included the frequency with which participants gave indications of a positive efficaciousness, directed toward the city and its residents specifically, as well as toward their schools and neighborhoods. Collectively and very nearly as if with one voice, the participants defined two terms over and over again: accountability and responsibility. Throughout the deliberations these values were found

to be at the heart of citizens' political talk. Government was accountable to the citizens. Principals were responsible to the parents. Criminals should be accountable and thus did not deserve the privileges of citizenship. Police were accountable to the people on their beat. Wherever one turned in the text, citizens were enunciating a localized polity where power ultimately, and very nearly always, resided in the individual citizen. Should we privatize city services? Should we support "three strikes and you're out?" Should we advocate charter schools? Should the city hire exclusively from within the city limits? All of these questions had the same answer: whatever makes the situation most accountable to citizens, and whatever creates the strongest tie of responsibility from the actor (the principal, the criminal, the policeman, the mayor, the courts, etc.) to the citizen. This civic language was pervasive and in conjunction with the regression analysis offers strong evidence for the power of the civic identity to motivate citizens toward deliberative participation and talk.

Perhaps it is not so surprising that deliberation would be so strongly characterized by the language of communality or that civic identifiers were deliberation's avid participants. From a gratifications perspective, deliberation seems tailor-made to the civic identifier. Specifically, deliberation provided for these citizens a) the fulfillment of a responsibility of stewardship to the city and those in it, b) help in determining the responsibilities of the polity, c) enjoyment in engaging with others politically, d) a belief that they can make a difference, e) an opportunity to hear other opinions more so than having their own heard, and most importantly, f) a chance to take part in the search for

the public good. Deliberation served individuals as a vehicle of communal political contact.

3. *Deliberation satisfies the principles of openness/engagement and equality.* I have argued against many different aspects of the rational/instrumental framework. Still, the project found the principles of equality and openness—both central to the instrumental framework—to be widely prevalent in deliberation. After the deliberative events, participants most often remarked that the process was very helpful as an opportunity to hear others' opinions, experiences, situations, and needs. Many openly admitted that they had changed their minds on a number of issues. The vast majority of utterances were directed toward prior statements, engaging citizens together in political conversation. When an individual asked for more information or justification from others, there was clear evidence that respondents gave it their best, although nearly half of the time they were not able to elaborate. Openness was not only a principle of deliberation, but rather, in many cases, it was the only possible course of action. In fact, on numerous occasions participants seemed to be exploring issues for the first time without any previously held positions.

The equality principle was tested with both bivariate and multivariate analyses with a variety of dependent and independent variables. With regard to political minorities, gender differences, and racial differences, there were no significant differences in the overall amount of speaking, the number of topics discussed, or the number of arguments made in deliberation. Indeed, few inequalities were found in other variables except with respect to political conversation and to a lesser extent, interest.



Given that on average these two variables are often skewed toward men and whites, it was encouraging to see that even in bivariate relationships gender and race did not account for significant differences in deliberative talk.

4. *On average, citizens exhibited a generalized, mostly unexceptional ability to create reasoned arguments on public policy.* Citizen-generated political argument was framed in the language of community and personal experience. Again, participants used the deliberations to enact a communal identity, to share stories from the community and discuss with one another politics through the normative communal framework of accountability and responsibility. The discussion first defined reality and then offered solutions based on shared experiences. Communal values spread beyond purely local matters to questions of public policy. Thus, public policy solutions were assessed ultimately by whether they might help politics become more accountable and responsible. Communitarity served to produce a kind of consensus. This consensus did not extend beyond basic values. Arguments on public policy did not result in unanimous policy positions but did result in unanimity on the value-laden grounds for which such policies should be formed. But mostly, issues were brought down to the street level. Experiences and local information were shared with similarly concerned individuals. Both argumentation and the subjects of or argument were colored by the communal identity, its values and concerns. The discussions were dominated by narratives of local experience. The participants shared their own stories, spreading information and experiences across communities.

As for the ability of citizens to argue effectively, the news was both good and bad. In many cases, participants were not particularly coherent. On many occasions they were not able to add more to their own argument when prompted to do so. However, it would be inaccurate to describe the discourse as wholly uninformed and poorly argued. Generally, participants were far more knowledgeable about politics than the average Philadelphian. Participants spread their knowledge to other participants. The ability of individuals to effectively argue and reason seemed to be widely varied in the discussions. On average, the deliberative capabilities to argue and to reason were themselves average. Aggregate numbers furthermore support this finding. The deliberation exhibited a low ratio of claims to linked information. There was also a low ratio of self-continuations to elaborations as well as a low overall number of secondary argumentative statements, especially disagreements. For the most part, individuals were evidentiary generalists. Over 84 percent of information linkages were general or experiential while 16 percent of them were global or specialized. Only twelve percent of primary argumentative elements were at the policy level; 68 percent were at the street or structural level. There were more primary argumentative elements at a vague or generalized level as compared to the policy level.

*5. Prior frequency of political conversation prepares one to deliberate, leading to a greater number of claims on a wider variety of topics and with more argumentative elements. Political sophistication measures had little impact on these three dialogic characteristics.* Throughout the analyses of chapter three, bivariate or multivariate, political communication was a strong predictor of all three dependent variables. On the

other hand, political knowledge and education had no impact on these variables, although interest was positively associated with both the number of topics and the number of arguments made by each individual. In general, without knowing how to fire the weapon, discussants were not able to load it: Without conversational practice, knowledge did not matter. Indeed, the only significant fit of the data required knowledge to affect deliberative qualities through conversation, but not directly.

6. *Citizens high in prior political conversation showed the most positive effects of deliberation.* Although there was no significant main effect for participation on further conversation, the interaction between prior conversation and participation was substantively significant. This indicated that those who already had high levels of conversation were energized by deliberation to produce a greater levels of further conversation, over and above what nonparticipants at the same level of prior conversation produce. This has important consequences, for it illustrates that deliberation has effects beyond those who participate, in that those who do participate talk politics more to those who do not, creating the possibility of a two-step flow of political communication. As such, participants high in conversation act like opinion leaders, diffusing conversation to the general populace.

The research undertaken in this dissertation sheds new light on deliberation at every step, increasing our understanding of not only who is most likely to show up to such events, but, also of what is said, how it is said, and with what effect. The research holds strong implications for the larger domain in which deliberation resides, namely, democracy and public opinion. The outcomes of the analyses indicate that the

rational/instrumental and communal/conversational framework have some validity as models of deliberation.

Future research should continue to study the argumentative and conversational natures of deliberation, incorporating new coding elements with individual level measures. Hopefully, at some point scholars will get more serious about the issue of representativeness. Unfortunately, the designs used by both Fishkin (1996, 1999) and the present project exhibit the degree to which participants are unrepresentative of the overall population. Fortunately for this project, these differences did not extend into demographic measures, except for the interactive and moderate main effect of age (see Chapter 3). How would deliberation differ for a representative group as opposed to the more elite groups of participants used by both Fishkin and this project? This may be the most important unknown regarding research on deliberation.

#### Frameworks of Deliberation

Although the chapters in this dissertation represent different analyses with slightly different data, they do provide an overall picture of the road to and from deliberation. All along, this project has pit two different “candidates” against one another in a battle to see what would matter most: the rational/instrumental framework and its main components of knowledge, interest, education, reasoned argument, equality, engagement, and representative opinion-situated public policy, and the communal conversational framework, based upon the importance of civic identification and political conversation. In the first test, the rational/instrumental framework was afforded strong support: All three factors of political sophistication were positively associated with participation in

deliberation. However, I argued that the pattern of these variables, in conjunction with other variables, mirrored the pattern of communalists as described by a number of scholars (Milbrath, 1972; Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Verba & Nie, 1972). Nevertheless, the weights of the sophistication variables, in comparison to political conversation, held far steeper slopes at substantively more significant values.

However, from the point at which citizens began to deliberate, the effect of variables highlighted by the rational/instrumental framework virtually disappeared. At the same time, conversation took charge as the primary factor contributing to actual dialogue. Finally, both variables at the end carried near equal weight in being the receiver of deliberation's positive effects (knowledge as shown in Labrie, 2000, and conversation here in chapter six). Overall, then, the rational/instrumental framework and the communal/conversational framework both play key roles, but at different points in time.

There is a rich tradition of research on the schemas or frames produced by the news and other communication stimuli (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Gamson, 1992; Gamson and Modigliani, 1987; Kinder and Sanders, 1990). As reported throughout the dissertation, the frame in which citizens spoke was primarily a communal one. Without more data on the participants, the source of this frame is not entirely clear. There are, however, a number of suspects. Prior scholars have detailed the development of the civic identity in individuals (Funk, 1998; Youniss, McLellan, & Yates, 1997; Smith, 1999; Verba et al., 1995). This development may lead to the use of a communal frame in everyday conversation. Here, such

individuals would learn to talk about the values of accountability and responsibility. If deliberation affords the opportunity to talk politics, then these citizens will talk politics in the way they are most comfortable, as an experiential, communal discussion, never straying too far from the values to which they hold.

A different possibility is that the participants talked politics from experience—at the local level and with a strong value-laden framework—because it was the only way they knew how. With a relative lack of political knowledge, any nonspecialists will have no choice in a situation like political deliberation other than to revert to other ways of speaking (Lippmann, 1922). Given that the communal framework differed little from group to group, regardless of the topic, the moderator, or the size of the group, it is safe to say that the framework was pervasive. What is not known, specifically, is why it was there.

The communal frame again challenges the notion that deliberation is about discussing public policy and attains, if not absolute consensus, then consensus on where people disagree (Knight & Johnson, 1994). Deliberation is not largely about public policy *qua* political issues. Deliberation is a workshop for opinions. Forming opinions is less an end goal and more the process of opinion formation itself; that is, gaining knowledge, listening, learning to keep an open mind, coming into contact with a multitude of perspectives, experiences, ideas, and attitudes. In this setting, it is alright to have unformed opinions. Participants in deliberation are rarely if ever going to provide any serious input into matters of public policy. But they can reify the values under which

participants and nonparticipants alike should judge policies. In this regard, deliberation strongly reflects the communal/conversational framework.

### Deliberation In Aggregate

Deliberation, like other kinds of political conversation, produces “sociological intelligence” (Dewey, 1954). Deliberation is in every sense a team effort. In comparison to other types of political conversation, deliberation is a group activity, creating a more fruitful setting for the creation of sociological intelligence and public opinion. The more participants, the more likely someone will disagree, will know the answer to a question, or will have the necessary knowledge for that particular issue at that particular moment. Greater numbers (of course, within reason) increase the likelihood that someone will have had relevant personal experience and that misinformation will be corrected. Speaking to the advantages of group communication, Cooley argued that “everyone who has any fact, or thought, or feeling, which he thinks is unknown, and insufficiently regarded, tries to impart it; and thus not only one mind but all minds are searched for pertinent material, which is poured into the general stream of thought” (1909, p. 121). While there were many cases of poor reasoning and misinformation in the project texts, participants were open to correction. Indeed the text became “argumentative” because of such instances, as suspect claims underwent the scrutiny of other participants’ knowledge. Corrections were most often rebuttals based on personal experience. The communal nature of the discussions, therefore, helped to increase the quality of argument. By staying at the local level, participants could engage each other with knowledge, experience, and positions based on such knowledge and experience.

In aggregate, then, deliberation satisfies every one of its principles, including reasoned argument. Just as voting and presidential preferences, in aggregate, appear rational (Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, & Smith, 1976; Markus, 1988, Ostrom and Simon, 1985), so too does deliberation, because it is a non-aggregated form of public opinion (see Herbst, 1993). Thus, the rational/instrumental framework is to some degree dependent upon the communal/conversation framework.

Public opinion is a process. Deliberation facilitates this process by being a method within the process and a catalyst to produce further opinion formation. Price and Roberts (1987) suggest that “a public is not organized in any fixed fashion until forced to communicate in resolving an issue” and that “public opinion is decidedly not the distribution of opinions within a public, but is instead a complex function of processes where disparate ideas are expressed, adjusted, and compromised” (p. 784). Public opinion, in other words, is impossible without communication. Based on the findings of this dissertation, deliberation is a model communicative activity for stimulating the process of public opinion formation.

### Deliberation in Democracy

As reviewed in the introduction and elaborated in chapter one, democracy holds to a number of key principles, including vocal equality among citizens through free, fair, and frequent elections, the freedom of expression, alternative information, associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 1998). Put another way, democracy is built upon self-determination, free speech, press, association, and voting equality (Barry,



1979). Deliberation can provide democracy a vehicle with which individuals can associate, express themselves, and, in essence, *become* citizens.

Of all the definitions of deliberation put forward by theorists, perhaps the most accurate is provided by Dryzek (2000), when he stated that deliberation is “communication that induces reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion” (p. 2). While deliberation has been characterized with much greater complexity, and given powers far beyond what Dryzek included in his definition, it is “reflection upon preferences” that deliberation does best, and it is “reflection upon preferences” that democracy needs most.

A number of political theorists have consistently found that Americans’ political knowledge is widely dispersed over a generally low mean. These findings have caused great concern that citizens do not possess the knowledge with which to make informed judgments, including, importantly, voting decisions. Overshadowed in the concern over low knowledge has been another concern raised by a wide range of scholars. These scholars call, not for increased information as panacea to democracy, but more conversation. Lasch, as mentioned, has on more than one occasion called on more conversation to convert “half-formed” opinions into real positions (1995). In more empirical terms, conversation reduces cognitive inconsistencies (Zaller, 1992) leading to higher quality arguments (Kim, Wyatt & Katz, 2000; Kuhn, 1991). As Dewey succinctly put it, “no man or mind was emancipated merely by being left alone,” (p. 168). For Dewey this required the “improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion” (p. 208). Given the argument that “modern society has

divorced the pressure to have an opinion from the pressure to be informed; it has kept one and eroded the other” (Lane and Sears, 1964, p. 63), it makes sense to be more concerned about the lack of political conversation than a lack of political knowledge. “When people have information and discussion they will have a will,” argued Cooley, “and this must sooner or later get hold of the institutions of society” (1909, p. 86). Deliberation is a beginning rather than an ending of this process. Democracy begins with conversation (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 2000). And, deliberation is an effective tool in the democratic process.

In local elections and beyond, deliberation can be used to infuse the polity with greater interest in and attention paid to its campaigns. Deliberation not only serves as the catalyst for future conversation, it frames these conversations in the very language theorists had hoped for. Rather than argue in self-interest, deliberation is about putting on one’s public face (Bohman & Rehg, 1997). This occurs not just because public argument-making by its very nature encourages talk about the public interest (Elster, 1997), but instead because of the willingness of people to frame discussions with the public or community’s interest in mind. Whether through direct intervention, further conversation, or media coverage, deliberation can help spread what democracy seems to have lost: a sphere of public interest and a more informed and stable public opinion.

The Citizens Voices / Philadelphia Compact project illustrated that when citizens gather to talk politics, they do not carefully weigh alternatives of public policy in a rationalistic, deliberative manner. Rather, they talk about politics as it affects them, their communities, and their values. It is important to note that the deliberative event was

described by the organizers to the participants in specific terms, namely, as an event where citizens would a) gather together to set the agenda about what matters to them, and b) create clear lines of thought with regard to a number of public policy issues, in line with other deliberative projects conducted by the National Issues Forum and the Kettering Foundation. The citizens relished in the first goal, to gather together to talk about issues as they mattered to them, and for once, to set the political agenda. The problem arose in connection with the second task, whittling down their concerns to clear public policy issue frameworks. This was because the organizers of the project were allowing citizens to actually decide whether or not they wanted to do so. Nevertheless, the *Inquirer* published a set of issues frameworks despite the fact that many of the citizen groups never truly got to that stage of talking politics. The first goal simply took and kept the citizens' agenda, for that is the way, as this study has shown, citizens are most comfortable talking politics.

What does this say about democracy? Are citizens incapable of providing clear guidance for public policy through argument and debate? The data gathered for this project do not provide a definitive answer to this question, but given what this dissertation has found, I would argue that rationalistic, argumentative public policy discussion is the remarkable exception rather than the norm. The truly important question is, do citizens talk politics well enough? Again, the outcome of the project seems to underscore the argument made by Ladd (1996). Before insisting that citizens talk with a high degree of sophistication about public policy or provide clear, citizen-generated public policy options we ought to consider what they can do best: Namely,

stating broad, guiding values, asserting the need for politicians to consider these values, namely accountability and responsibility to citizens, and explicating how policies affect those on the street, at the job, and in the neighborhood.

Extended beyond a single instance like the Citizen Voices / Philadelphia Compact, deliberative democracy would draw upon the strengths of what Schudson (1998) has dubbed “the monitorial citizen.” But this work’s conception of deliberative democracy extends Schudson’s idea to create two forms of the monitorial citizen. First, there is the kind described by Schudson, that is, the individual focused on one particular interest who stands in for other citizens by using her enhanced understanding to filter the continual influx of information and developments with regard to her interests, subsequently giving or withholding her approval. Thanks to the Ralph Naders of the world, in other words, ordinary citizens can stand back from politics and decide whether politicians are doing the right thing.

But in a deliberative democracy, the monitorial citizen takes on a second meaning. Here, citizens, preferably all, but at least those motivated by communal concerns, monitor the influx of political information to reframe it and judge it based on communal values, local concerns, and the unique perspective of the average citizen. While these citizens may not *decide* public policy, they do *inform* one another by instilling their values in the political process. They provide the democratic process its ultimate authority (Walton, 1998). And, as Aristotle envisioned, they ultimately create political guidelines based on *phronesis*, that elusive “from the ground up” wisdom that can only be generated through political talk.

The findings of this research should encourage theorists of deliberative democracy. While citizens do not attain many of their normative standards, they successfully deliberated in a way that is equally if not more important to democracy. For only they, as citizens, could talk politics with such a local, basic, and American frame. American democracy could only benefit from this communal brand of political talk.

## **Appendix A: Survey Items and Scales**

### **Education**

1. Less than High School
2. High School
3. Vocations or some college
4. College graduate
5. Post-graduate

### **Media Attention (Both Newspapers and Television News)**

0. No attention at all
1. Not too much
2. Some
3. A great deal of attention

### **Neighborhood Description Scale Items**

I want to know what your neighborhood is like, so I am going to read some phrases that might or might not describe (NEIGHBORHOOD).

How about (READ ITEM)? Does that describe (NEIGHBORHOOD) very well, somewhat or not at all?

- A. Close-knit and friendly
  - B. People respect each other
  - C. Residents care about the neighborhood
- There are lots of active community organizations

### **Neighborhood Participation Scale Items**

We're interested in people's local or neighborhood activities. Do you ever personally participate in?

- A. A Town Watch program
- B. Neighborhood events like block parties or picnics
- C. Any club or recreation center for boys or girls
- D. A Home and School organization
- E. A group associated with a church, synagogue, or mosque

### **News Use Scale Items**

Here are some reasons why people follow local elections, like the mayor's race, in the media. Please tell me whether each reason applies to you a lot, sometimes, or not at all. First/next, I follow election news.

Does this apply to you a lot, sometimes, or not at all?

#### **News Use: Engagement**

- To have something to talk about with other people
- To use as ammunition in arguments with others
- To enjoy the excitement of an election race

#### **News Use: Spectacle**

- To learn who is ahead and who's behind
- To judge what local political leaders are like
- To help make up my mind how to vote in an election

### **Political Conversation Scale Items**

How often, if ever, do you discuss problems affecting Philadelphia and its neighborhoods with your family or your close friends? Every day, 3 or 4 times a week, once or twice a week, or less often than that?

Now what about outside your family and close friends, for example, acquaintances at work or other places? How often, if ever, do you discuss problems affecting Philadelphia and its neighborhoods with these people? Every day, 3 or 4 times a week, once or twice a week, or less often than that?

### **Political Efficacy Scale Items**

Next, I'd like to read you some things people tell us when we interview them. For each statement I read, please tell me whether you strongly agree with it, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with it.

- A. The city government is generally run for the benefit of all the people.
- B. When city government runs something, it is usually inefficient and wasteful.
- C. Most city public officials are trustworthy.
- D. City officials don't care much what people like me think.

E. Sometimes city politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't understand what is going on.  
People like me don't have any say about what the city government does.

### **Political Interest**

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?

What about local affairs? Some people are very interested in city government and the upcoming race for mayor, while others are not that interested. Would you say you are very interested in the upcoming race for mayor, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?

### **Political Knowledge Scale Items (Baseline Survey)**

Here are a few questions about government in the state and the city. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, so if there are some you don't know just tell me and we'll go on.

Who is Tom Ridge?

Turning now to the city, do you happen to know the name of the city council person who represents your neighborhood?

Why is Ed Rendell not running for Mayor in this election? Is it because polls show he is unpopular, because he is running for another office, or because he is not eligible to run for another term?

What percent of Philadelphia's budget comes from the wage tax? Is it closest to: 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, or 60%?

Which state has the least restrictions regarding the sale of hand guns: Pennsylvania, Delaware, or New Jersey?

About what percent of the city budget goes for police? Is it closest to 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50%?

I'd like to get your feelings towards some city leaders and local people who have been in the news. I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using



something called the feeling thermometer. You can choose any number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that person; the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward them. Some of these people are not that well known. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.

1. Lynn Abraham
2. John Timoney
3. David Hornbeck

Interviewer's Feedback: Respondent's overall level of knowledge (3 codings)




## Appendix B: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Coding Instrument






### *Factor Analysis of Thought Statement Types*






#### Rotated Principal Components Analysis

	1	2	3	4	5
Deliberative Meta-Talk	.75				
Solution Query	.66				
Choice Framework Meta-Talk	.61				
Relevancy Statement	.58				
Conversational Tangent	.47				
Agreement		.79			
Disagreement		.65			
Linked Information		.52			
Solution		.42			
Qualifier		.34			
Future Vision			.72		
Problem			.67		
Reality Claim			.62		
Information Query				.85	
Self-Continuation				.74	
Elaboration					.83
Agree/Disagree w/ Moderator					.56
Variance Explained	28.7%	11.9	10	7	5

## Appendix C: Topics Analysis Charts







## Appendix D: The Coding Instrument Codebook

### Coding Sheet, TS Level Coding Dataset

1. **Orderall:** Order of all thought statements (1 – 4346) in all conversations (ordered 1-12).
2. **Ordergrp:** Order of thought statements in each conversation.
3. **Text:**
  - 1 = deliberative element of each conversation
  - 2 = reflections stages of each conversation
4. **Conversation:**
  - 1 = Education Harris
  - 2 = Education Jane
  - 3 = Education Michelle
  - 4 = Government Mike
  - 5 = Government Tina
  - 7 = Jobs Rosa
  - 8 = Neighborhoods Dave
  - 9 = Neighborhoods Julie
  - 10 = Neighborhoods Louise
  - 11 = Crime Bob
  - 12 = Crime Ellen
5. **Subject**
  - 1 = Education
  - 2 = Crime
  - 3 = Jobs
  - 4 = City Government
  - 5 = Neighborhoods
6. **Coder ID**
  - 5 = David
  - 2 = Lisa
  - 3 = Leah
7. **Speaknum:** Number of each participant given during the April forum, matches “Apnumb” in Survey.
8. **Pagenum:** Page number in which the text is located.
9. **Uttnum:** Number of the consecutive utterance found by the same speaker on the same page.
10. **Tsnum:** Thought Statement number in each utterance.

11. **Utter:** The count of each utterance made for each speaker separately (blank after each first thought statement in the same utterance).

12. **Utter2:** The count of each utterance made for each speaker separately (no blanks).

13. **Topic:** Textual topic of each utterance

14. **Topic 2:** Secondary topic in each utterance if applicable.

15. **Topicnum:** Numeric designation of each topic:

Education:

1 = accountability

2 = adult programs

3 = afterschool programs

4 = busing (1)

5 = charters / vouchers

6 = choice framework

7 = class size

8 = community involvement

9 = curriculum

10 = curriculum standards

11 = dropouts (1)

12 = drugs (1)

13 = equality between schools, inter-city

14 = equity (equality between schools, suburbs vs. city)

15 = funding issues

16 = home schooling (1)

17 = leadership

18 = loans/scholarships (2)

19 = mission (the mission of schools)

20 = national priority of schools (3)

21 = parental involvement

22 = principals

23 = residency requirements

24 = resources

25 = rights

26 = school board / taxing authority

27 = school violence (3)

28 = standards, academic

29 = state control of city schools

30 = teacher role / policies

31 = unions / teacher turnover

Crime:

100 = abandoned housing (1)

101 = accountability

102 = alternative sentencing

103 = auxiliary police

104 = bench warrants (2)

105 = budget

106 = charter change

107 = collective bargaining/unions

108 = commissioner's power

109 = community involvement

110 = community organizations

111 = community police (incl residency)

112 = corruption / political patronage / fair advancement

113 = death penalty (3)

114 = drugs

115 = early intervention / education as prevention / raising kids

116 = fluidity (connection between departments)  
117 = get tough  
118 = gun control  
119 = jobs for excons (5)  
120 = mandatory sentencing  
121 = mapping  
122 = media  
123 = merit selection (incl elect commissioner)  
124 = operation sunrise  
125 = parental involvement  
126 = police accountability  
127 = police training  
128 = prison quality of life  
129 = privatization  
130 = recreation programs  
131 = redeployment (4)  
132 = taxes (2)  
133 = technology and police effectiveness  
134 = tougher judges  
135 = unions  
136 = victims

**Jobs:**

200 = better service / efficiency  
201 = big business incentives  
202 = business model  
203 = city business plan (2)  
204 = city charter  
205 = city hall (ease of starting a new business)  
206 = clean city  
207 = deregulation  
208 = education (1)  
209 = incentives  
210 = infrastructure  
211 = marketing / image of Phila.  
212 = mentoring  
213 = privatization  
214 = regional  
215 = relation (Harrisburg and Philadelphia)  
216 = small business incentives  
217 = streamline  
218 = taxes  
219 = training  
220 = unions

**City government:**

400 = 2 party system (1)  
401 = abandoned houses (3)  
402 = accountability  
403 = business and neighborhoods (1)  
404 = business model  
405 = campaign finance  
406 = charter change / mayoral appointments  
407 = committee structure (3)  
408 = community involvement (incl comm and civics)  
409 = corruption (incl deregulation)  
410 = ease of service standards  
411 = employee qualifications (1)  
412 = equality between neighborhoods  
413 = fluidity  
414 = homelessness (2)  
415 = incentives (3)  
416 = political leadership  
417 = poverty (2)  
418 = privatization

419 = referendum (6)  
420 = regional (incl sprawl)  
421 = relation  
422 = residency  
423 = streamline  
424 = sunshine  
425 = taxes  
426 = training  
427 = unions  
428 = voting machines  
429 = zoning (1)

Neighborhoods:

500 = abandoned houses (vacant)  
501 = accountability  
502 = big business incentives  
503 = cc vs neighborhood issues  
504 = city contact / govt connection to citizens / govt contact / city responsiveness (incl contact w/...)  
505 = city planning  
506 = civic associations  
507 = civility (2)  
508 = community centers  
509 = community development  
510 = community involvement / responsiveness / investing people...  
511 = community leaders (3)  
512 = community planning  
513 = community voices  
514 = economic development  
515 = economic incentives in neighborhoods (incl empowerment)  
516 = eminent domain  
517 = equal access across neighborhoods  
518 = funding neighborhood improvements  
519 = government role  
520 = greenery  
521 = job training  
522 = local neighborhood jobs  
523 = media representations (2)  
524 = minimum wage (2)  
525 = mom and pop  
526 = office of neighborhoods  
527 = oversight (1)  
528 = people matter (1) 999  
529 = politicians and neighborhood improvement  
530 = property ownership / taxes  
531 = quality of neighborhoods  
532 = race  
533 = regional  
534 = regulations  
535 = resources for community involvement  
536 = safety (1)  
537 = self planning of neighborhoods  
538 = small business assistance / startup  
539 = stadium  
540 = sunshine  
541 = taxes  
543 = tension between neighborhoods  
542 = zero tolerance / graffiti / clean neighborhoods / neighborhood cleanliness  
544 = zoning

**16. Uttype: Utterance Type**

1 = Initial (Agenda Setting)  
2 = Response to Moderator  
3 = Response to Adjacent Other(s)



4 = Response to Prior Other  
5 = Interruption / Continuation  
0 = n/a

**17. Topicold:** Old textual topic

**18. Gender:**

1 = Male  
2 = Female  
0 = n/a

**19. Careert:** textual career

**20. Commrole:** secondary pertinent organizational membership

**21. Career:** numeric career:

1 = school teacher  
2 = retired teacher  
3 = child care  
4 = school administration/general education  
5 = private industry/business  
6 = student  
7 = city employee, blue collar  
8 = media  
9 = city employee, white collar

**22. Org:** secondary pertinent organizational membership, numeric:

1 = home or school organization  
2 = community organization  
3 = rail organization  
4 = park volunteer  
5 = block captain

**23. Coher:** Coherence of utterance 1-10

**24. Relevanc:** Relevance of utterance 1-10

**25. Specific:** Specificity of each utterance 1-10

**26. Role:** Role in each utterance

1 = Stewardship / RTP  
2 = Efficacy  
3 = Accountability  
4 = Representativeness  
0 = n/a

**27. Line:** Lines of text for each utterance.

**28. Type**

1 = Relevancy Statement  
2 = Reality Claim  
3 = Problem Definition

- 4 = Future Vision
- 5 = Solution
- 6 = Linked Information
- 7 = Deliberative Meta-Talk
- 8 = Choice Framework Meta-Talk
- 9 = Informational Query
- 10 = Solution Query
- 11 = Agreement
- 12 = Disagreement
- 13 = Qualifier
- 14 = Self-Continuation
- 15 = Elaboration
- 16 = Agree/Disagree w/ Moderator's Summary
- 17 = Other
- 0 = Nothing

### **29. Aggto**

- 1 = Prior Reality Claim
- 2 = Prior Problem Definition
- 3 = Prior Future Vision
- 4 = Prior Solution
- 5 = Prior Information
- 6 = Option Provided only by Choice Framework
- 0 = n/a

### **30. Linktype**

- 1 = Specialized
- 2 = Experiential
- 3 = Generalized
- 4 = Global
- 0 = n/a

### **31. Linkedto**

- 1 = Reality Claim
- 2 = Problem Definition
- 3 = Future Vision
- 4 = Solution
- 0 = n/a

### **32. Focus**

- 1 = Value / Vague Action
- 2 = Street / Individual
- 3 = Management / Structural
- 4 = Policy
- 5 = Other
- 0 = n/a

### **33. Other: Notes**

**34. Uttct:** Dichotomous designator of new utterance

**35. Utt.ord:** Consecutive count of utterances, all conversations in order

**36. Utt1-10:** Used for aggregation purposes only

## Appendix E: Coding Rules

### 1999 Mayor's Race Deliberative Forums

**Introduction:** The practice sheets are designed to hold all codes for each participant, although we will be using the computer to enter our data and we will enter our data at the level of each individual utterance. The text will be unitized into thought statements. Each thought statement can potentially reflect one type of *central statement* (reality claim, problem definition, query, etc.). In addition, each thought statement can, but does not have to, contain information beyond but linked to the central statement. Each central statement and its respective information furthermore range in complexity and orientation. Details of these codes and instructions for coding are provided below.

**Utterance number:** denotes the simple order of utterances made by each speaker. Each utterance is of a specific **Type**: Mark a 1 for an utterance that does not respond to a previous utterance of any kind. These include initial problem defining statements as well as potentially other types of statements. Mark a 2 for responses to the moderator, defined as any statements whose only reason for being made is because the moderator said something immediately prior to such statement and the participant felt compelled to respond. Mark a 3 for a response to the immediately adjacent and prior statement of another participant, and, mark a 4 for any utterance that responds in some way to a remark made by a participant not adjacent but prior. Finally, mark a 5 for any statement which is incomplete but is continued in a latter utterance, and 6 for any other type of utterance. This is most often the case for interruptions. The most difficult decision to be made, then, is between an "initial" and a "response to previous" utterance. Mark a 4 if the participant is making a statement that in any way a) overtly appears to be a response to another statement or b) is clearly discussing a topic already brought up by another participant.

**Topic:** Although a seemingly simple concept, the concept of topic is muddled by the fact that topics fold into each other. Within the "topic" of education is the "topic" of school voucher under which is the "topic" of the rightness of using public money to pay for religiously affiliated schools. Of course, we are not interested in the overall topic. The rule here is to be comprehensive: if a topic moves from school vouchers down to the rightness of using public money, the write down "school vouchers (public funds for religious schools)."

**Statement Type:** Each thought statement can be of a specific type:

**Reality Claim:** A statement defining present or past reality without any *explicit* definition of such a reality being a problem that must be fixed. Reality claims are informational only...they contain no explicit claims of anything beyond the assertion that their reality is true.

**Problem Definition:** A statement defining present or past reality with an explicit definition of such a reality being a problem that must be fixed. As such, problem definitions are extensions of reality claims and thus one should not code both.

**Future Vision:** A statement that defines a normative political reality. Such statements generally contain one element and lack another: 1) should contain future tense and a sense of attainment (“we should get more jobs in the city”), but such a statement should point toward a future reality, not action (that is, the speaker will not be, in this example, advocating a way to get more jobs, simply that we should get more jobs, the former being a solution, the latter, a future vision). Future visions also include personal visions, of where one might want to end up professionally or personally.

**Solution:** A statement that provides a solution to a problem already given by the participant or another participant. In some instances, solutions are given where problems are never really defined but are rather assumed. In such cases, mark the solution code but not the problem code.

### **Guidelines:**

1. Present or past tense indicates a reality claim or problem definition; future tense indicates a future vision or solution.
2. Is there a valence (indication of support or opposition) in the utterance? If not, and if there is no clear indication of tacit agreement to a previous utterance’s support or opposition, the statement must be either a reality claim or a future vision.
3. What is the future solution the statement is trying to solve (or value attained)? If you can answer this question to a statement of future tense, then the statement is a solution. If not, it is a future vision.
4. Is there an action verb in future tense? If so, the statement is likely a solution.
5. An answer to a query is most likely either a claim (response to informational query) or a solution (response to a solution query).
6. Often, participants will make a claim, give some info to support it, then restate the claim. Do not code the restatement as anything.
7. Not sure if it is a solution? Ask, is the action designed to fix a problem.
8. Code as a reality claim claims that something *doesn’t* exist.
9. Often participants will reiterate an already defined problem and then offer a solution to that problem. In such cases, do not code the restatement of the problem as anything, just code the solution as a new solution.
10. If no valence is given in one statement, but then a solution is offered later in the utterance, by definition the first statement is a problem definition.

### **Category**

**Initial:** When a participant raises a topic not yet discussed in the deliberation. Often, the topic will pertain to a larger overall topic (that is, the participant is moving to a new, more specific level of topic). In such cases the utterance is still considered a new topic, as no prior participant has brought up such specific arguments/information.

*Elaboration*: Continuance of an already raised subject. In some cases, the speaker may be elaborating on his/her own prior utterance. In such cases, mark elaboration only if there is something additional within the statement: a different type of information, etc.

*Agreement*: agreement with a prior thought statement of another speaker.

*Disagreement*: disagreement with thought statement of a different speaker.

*Qualifier*: neither agreement nor disagreement but a modification of the truth, validity or utility of a previous statement (e.g., a solution that would only work in *x* case or instance). Basically, use whenever there is no clearly determinable agreement or disagreement to an utterance made by a different speaker.

*Self-continuation*: Used only when a speaker repeats an already supplied statement by him/herself without adding any new information or argumentative elements. If there is new information, code as an elaboration.

**Guidelines:**

1. Disagreement is can be provided on a number of grounds, including “it can’t be done” statements as well as “bad idea” statements.
2. Agreement / disagreement / qualifier must be toward an already coded central statement, or an explicit call for agreement to a central statement provided by a moderator. For example, the word “yes” used to agree with a moderator query of whether something should be put up on a sheet or a moderator’s query as to what a speaker is referring to is not agreement.
3. Agreement / disagreement / qualifier is only coded when one can point to a specific word that indicates such agreement / disagreement / qualification.
4. Agreement / disagreement / qualifiers are designed as “combination codes,” meaning they are a type of response to an already established claim – if a solution, for example, has not already been established by someone, even though the topic has been ongoing, then it is a new solution.
5. Often agreement will be tacit (“that’s a good point”): still code as an agreement. Simple reiteration is also agreement.
6. Agreement / disagreement / qualifiers to information use in a prior utterance is coded as agree/ dis/ qual to a reality claim.
7. Disagreement can also be implicit, as when a participant tells a story that points to an opposite conclusion than that made in a prior utterance.
8. The word “but” often will point to a qualifier of a prior statement.

*Focus*: Focus denotes the level at which the statement is being made: this can generally be conceptualized as ranging from value claims to specific policy claims:

*Value*: a statement type that remains at the value level (“we need more accountability in the schools”).

*Street*: a statement type that discusses things at the street level, that is, at the level of individuals acting as individuals with no official managerial or policy role, or of things generally (and literally) at the street level. Examples include the individual actions of police, teachers, government workers, etc. This code is generally a “not” code in that you

can usually distinguish the street level because it is NOT a value or some sort of problem/solution/reality/vision that focuses on managerial or policy concerns.

**Management/Structural:** a statement type that discusses things with regard to management or the structural level. A solution to a problem where a change in managerial policies or style will result in the solution (a problem defined as something managerial, etc). Too many cops in administrative roles; principals that can do x to improve the operation of their schools; training for city workers to help them interact with the public; managerial denotes arguments for rule changes that do not require new legislation.

**Policy:** a statement type that discusses things at a level where legislative action is required: changing the mayor's control over the school board; change in the city charter; basically anything that would require some sort of law change voted on by any type of legislative body. Has to be an explicit mention of policy.

**Information Type:** Used to denote the type of information linked to a particular statement type. Note that there does not have to be any information linked to a statement, and as such this code gives measure to the amount of information used and with what kind of statement.

**Specialized:** Any use of specialized information, that is, information that contains facts or statistics, that derives from the particular specialized experiences of an individual, or that makes particular claims as to "specialized" information (for example, talk of specific legislation, rule or guidelines)

**Experiential:** Information generated from personal or 3<sup>rd</sup> person experience.

**Generalized:** information that makes general claims that are not completely all encompassing and do not reflect any specialized or experiential information.

**Global:** The more non-specific type of information: can include maxims, common sayings, platitudes, and information claims that use terms like "all" or "every." Globalized statements make no exceptions.

#### **Guidelines:**

1. Is the speaker referring to things "on the books," proper nouns, specific policies, people, historical events, or is the speaker just talking about the way things are? If so, rule out global as an option.
2. What is information linked to a claim of reality? If the speaker is giving evidence that something exists, that evidence is considered information linked to that reality claim. Similarly, a reality can be a causality (because we have this, we also have this). In these cases, code the causal statement as the central reality claim and other information as linked information.
3. Not sure if a comment is one whole claim or a claim plus info? Ask, does one comment give reason or support to another? If so, it is a claim plus info.
4. One key indicator of information use: statements that "bolster" another statement. Info use often sets up, contrasts, even implicitly, a separate claim.
5. When a participant makes a claim that contain qualifiers that muddy the certainty of the statement, that statements focus will most likely be generalized.

6. Experiential must contain a referent, either “I,” “me,” “us,” “a friend,” etc. And the event had to happen to that referent (so, “I read in the paper x happened” is not experiential).

#### Other Codings

*Meta-talk:* Talk about the deliberation itself, or about the lists being created by the deliberation. If this item is checked for a particular thought statement, no other items should be checked (that is, even if people are making arguments about the process or the lists being created, do not check any argument codes like problem definition, etc.: just meta-talk). Meta-talk can either be about the deliberative process or about the choice frameworks being discussed.

*Queries:* Check once per thought statement for any number of questions that are asked. Code either as queries for information or for solutions.

*Role:* Role has four different elements. Check one only if such an element is explicitly provided in the text.

Self-Efficacy: Check if the participant gives any evidence of feeling empowered to solve problems.

Accountability: check if participant explicitly argues for increased accountability of citizens or a person in the role of citizens (3), a person in a role of his/her professional, non governmental position or of a non-governmental institution (4), or a government official or governmental institution (5).

*Career / Extra-curricular role:* Write down when a participant reveals either of these two codes. Example of extra-curricular roles would be as block captain, pta member, soccer coach, etc.

*Gender:* Some participants joined after we conducted baseline surveys; as such we have no info on them: code male or female (duh!), but only if a name is given that is clearly gendered.

**General coding method:** Read the entire utterance first! For each utterance, first determine the number of thought statements within the utterance. Although it is difficult to define, it is relatively straightforward to figure out different thought statements. They are essentially defined as explicit changes of topic. Second, try to determine if the thought statement has any problem definitional and solution statements. If so, mark these and move on to determine its/their categories, whether it/they are accompanied by information, and so on. If not, determine whether there are reality claims or future visions, and continue coding from there. Be very specific as to where information is being used if there are multiple elements in a thought statement.

### *Additional notes for Coding Rules:*

As for the coding of agreements, disagreements, and qualifiers:

In most cases we have discussed how person A defines a problem and gives information on that problem. You must be careful to code the agreement here depending upon what the person is agreeing with: the problem or the information linked to the problem. If it is the latter, then code it as agreement with a reality claim. Example: person A says cop training is a joke and provides as information the fact that, in essence, cops are running scared. Person B a few utterances later says "I agree with you, the police are outgunned on the street." This is agreement with the prior reality claim, not with the problem on training.

As to the hypothetical situation:

The hypothetical situation we discussed ("if I were a cop on that beat, I'd be scared too," to paraphrase) should be coded as an agreement with the former reality claim just mentioned above. Technically, it could be described as an agreement based on this person putting himself in the cop's shoes. For our purposes, we are just interested in the fact that the "in your shoes" strategy is just another way of agreeing with person A.

On qualifiers:

People can often make a statement and then realize it needs some sort of qualification later. In this case, mark the statement as a qualifier.

As for querying and offering the sides of an issue:

This is the infamous example we all got stumped on. Here is my thinking: Although it is not direct, this person is ultimately raising problems of a more issue related kind...that is, most problems we come across in the text are real world problems, as in the street are dirty and need to get cleaned. This person is raising "issues", not problems. But it is clear that the issues assume an underlying problem. As such we are going to take a leap and say that problems are being raised here. Specifically, the participant is raising three separate problems, and offers information that is linked to the second and information linked to the third.

### **Coherence Guidelines:**


1. A highly coherent statement will likely make a claim and support it with information that is clearly relevant to the claim being made. The claim will go beyond a black and white perspective of the world. Often people will present the way a good speech is presented: make a claim, offer information supporting it, possibly offer more information that qualifies when or how the problem / solution exists, or why the information is pertinent, and then provides a restatement of the claim.
2. Poor coherence clues: 1) when you can't figure out why a person brought up a particular bit of information (e.g., you have a hard time linking it to anything) 2) Where points begin to be made but are never finished 2) Where a number of claims are made with little connection between them and little or no linked information. 3)



Where it is difficult to figure out what the referents (“that,” “they,” “them,” etc.) refer to.

# Appendix F: Regression Analyses Assumptions


## 1. Univariate distributions



## 2. Regression assumption analyses


### Histogram

Dependent Variable: LINES



### Normal P-P Plot of Regression Star


Dependent Variable: LINES



Regression Standardized Residual


### Histogram

Dependent Variable: COHERCT



### Normal P-P Plot of Regression Star


Dependent Variable: COHERCT



Regression Standardized Residual


### Histogram

Dependent Variable: UTTSUM



### Normal P-P Plot of Regression Star

Dependent Variable: UTTSUM



Regression Standardized Residual

Observed Cum Prob

## ANOVA: Tests of Regression Assumptions

### *Residuals and Predicted Values (Non-linearity test)*

Regression D.V.	S. Squares	df	F	Sig.
Lines	1108	3	.56	.646
Sig.	5	3	.51	.678
Arguments				
Topics	72	3	.36	.785

### Variance of Residuals and Predicted Values

Regression D.V.	S. Squares	df	F	Sig.
Lines	1182	4	.44	.777
Sig.	9	4	.63	.639
Arguments				
Topics	78	4	.29	.884

## Appendix G: Missing Cases Analysis

### 1. Missing cases N

**Table 1: Number of Cases for Dialogue Study**

Total number of "April Numbers" in transcript	189
N "April Numbers" in transcript but not survey	53
• Successful "Hand Matches" of erroneous transcript cases to survey cases	24
• Probable court reporter typographical errors	9
• Probable unaccounted cases	20
Estimated valid N from transcript	175
Total number of cases in survey with an "April Number"***	181
• Cases with transcript data and no survey data	42
• Cases with survey data and no transcript data	14
VALID CASES: Both survey and transcript information	125

### 2. T-test of differences between missing cases and included cases

#### Means Comparisons: Transcript Cases with and without survey data

	F	t	Mean Difference
Lines	1.9	1.5	.15
Number of Thought Statements	1.1	1.2	.22
Number of Utterances	2.8	.94	.35
Coherence	.27	.70	.14
Number of Significant Statements	1.6	.78	.56
Number of Topics	.02	.46	.41
Ratio of Statement Types	4.12	.77	.59

(No test achieved statistical significance)

### 3. Multiple imputation analysis

#### Multiple Imputation Parameter Estimates

	Lines	Topic Count	Argumentative Statement Count
	t	t	t
Intercept	-.14	-.25	.39
Number of Group Members	.15	.35	-.30
Number of Utterances		18.99	15.4
Gender	1.64	-.02	1.72
Race	-.48	1.37	-1.27
Education	.19	-.91	.48
Employed	2.46	-.11	.54
Knowledge	-.88	2.09	-1.78
Efficacy	1.40	-1.39	-1.39
Interest	-.39	2.37	1.78
Conversation	4.06	2.01	2.02

## Appendix H: Panel Bias

### Means Test, Cases With and Without Post-Panel Wave Data

	In PostData	N	Mean	Levene's Test		t-test: Equality of Means	
				F	Sig.	t	Sig.
Knowledge	0	442	.65	5.19	.02	-4.62	.00
	1	695	.71				
Interest	0	442	3.30	15.77	.00	-4.40	.00
	1	695	3.49				
Conversation	0	442	2.07	.00	.99	-2.76	.01
	1	693	2.26				
Education	0	439	3.06	.96	.33	-3.12	.00
	1	690	3.30				
Race	0	508	.40	1.68	.19	.66	.51
	1	675	.38				
Age	0	515	43.59	.59	.44	-2.96	.00
	1	682	46.30				
Income	0	399	3.58	2.54	.11	-.94	.35
	1	642	3.71				
Male	0	522	.49	.02	.89	.07	.94
	1	695	.49				

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