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
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Population Representation in the Military Services

Fiscal Year 1990

July 1991



Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel)

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Appendix D

Population Representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Assessment

When America last went to war in Vietnam, data processing was still in its infancy and the term "representation" had not yet appeared in the military's lexicon. A lot has changed since then, and it is fair to say that this Nation will never again see a war where the military isn't dissected and analyzed in as many ways as imagination allows. Twenty years ago, many people would have questioned the purpose or importance of describing population representation in this fashion. Today, it is expected -- even demanded -- by special interest groups, the media, and Congress, and often used to evaluate the fairness or legitimacy of military or national policy.

On August 2, 1990, the Armed Forces of Iraq invaded Kuwait and seized control of its capital city. Five days later, President George Bush declared Saudi Arabia under imminent threat and ordered U.S. troops to the region. By August 13th, there were 10,000 U.S. ground troops in Saudi Arabia and another 20,000 sailors on more than 30 ships in the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. The flow of military personnel and equipment to the area continued as Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm on January 16th. Allied forces began their attack on Iraqi targets with a relentless air campaign that would eventually include more than 100,000 sorties. Following the largest American-led assault since World War II and just four days of ground combat, Iraq's army was declared defeated on February 27th and allied forces suspended their offensive operations.

From August 1990 through February 1991, the U.S. military sent approximately 570,000 personnel to the Persian Gulf region and supplied them with billions of tons of food, fuel, and equipment. This massive deployment engaged a large portion of the defense establishment and touched the lives of many Americans in many ways. The Nation's news media reported on all aspects of the deployment and a possible war that would be the first real test of our all-volunteer military. Confidence in U.S. success always remained high, although several authorities predicted that American casualties could number in the tens of thousands by the end of a brutal conflict.

A great deal of speculation and concern preceded the actual fighting, as evidenced in numerous public opinion polls and published commentary over the period. The Nation spent over five months preparing for war, and this offered an opportunity to examine the general readiness and well-being of America's defense structure. Indeed, the military itself was probably subjected to closer scrutiny over this brief time than during the entire period since the end of the draft. Considerable interest focused on the composition of the Armed Forces and the various differences between today's soldiers and those who fought in Vietnam. In fact, over the course of the deployment, public debate often centered on many of the same issues that surfaced during the Vietnam war -- including the longstanding question whether the burdens of national defense are distributed fairly across all segments of society.

Critics of the all-volunteer system pointed out that Blacks, in particular, would be overrepresented in the Persian Gulf; and that they were being forced through "economic conscription" to shoulder a disproportionate share of the fighting. Others maintained that the

socially or economically disadvantaged -- White and minority alike -- were being compelled to do the Nation's dirty work, while the privileged and wellborn could insulate themselves from the horrors of war and steer clear of any obligation to perform national service. The general assumption in these arguments, as in similar claims during the Vietnam era, is that citizenship duties can be distributed fairly across society through demographic balancing or "representation" within the military; and, though military service is limited to just a few, the few who are asked to fight should represent a cross section of specific groups within the general population.

Many observers also took note of the several changes that have occurred in the demographic composition of the military since the end of the draft. Substantial interest was directed at the fact that the proportion of Blacks is currently double what it was in 1972 and the proportion of women has grown fivefold. The expanded participation of women in a military headed for war stimulated a lively debate concerning present laws and policy that bar women from combat-related jobs.¹ In addition, the national news media highlighted other demographic differences between today's force and that sent to Vietnam. These included the "greying" of the modern military, which has resulted from somewhat older recruits and relatively more personnel remaining beyond their first term of service; shifting patterns of regional representation, as the Armed Forces attract more volunteers from areas of the country (such as the South) where acceptance of the military and the tradition of service are comparatively strong; the rising level of education and aptitude among new recruits and careerists, as service in the all-volunteer military has become increasingly attractive and competitive; and the growing number of personnel who are married, married parents, single parents, "dual-service" couples (when both husband and wife are in the military), and "dual-service" couples who are also parents.

DoD was conscious of the discussions regarding the demographic make-up of Service members in the Persian Gulf. The fact is that those who served in the Gulf were volunteers. Each member joined a Service for personal reasons. However, they joined with the knowledge they were accepting the challenge and responsibility to serve their country. The volunteers in the Persian Gulf demonstrated clearly that they were ready, willing, and able to defend freedom and deter aggression.

Many issues relating to population representation were widely discussed in the news media during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, often based on incomplete or inaccurate information. This was partly due to difficulties encountered by the Department of Defense in collating, combining, verifying, and reporting statistics from automated data files on personnel sent to the Persian Gulf. Precise records on all persons assigned to the theater of operations are not yet available for analysis. However, the Department of Defense has compiled information on all military personnel deployed from August 1990 through February 15, 1991 (which was one month after the start of Operation Desert Storm and a week prior to the ground war). This information was considered important enough to be included here, in preliminary form, as part of the annual report to Congress on "Population Representation in the Military Services." A

¹ Combat-related occupations are closed to women by law in the Navy and the Marine Corps (through 109 U.S.C. 6015) and in the Air Force (through 10 U.S.C. 8549); and by policy in the Army (through Secretarial authority granted in 10 U.S.C. 8012). The combat exclusion laws and policy are applied on the basis of the "risk rule," which also stipulates that non-combat missions can be closed to women if the risks are deemed to be equal or greater than those of the combat mission they support.

more comprehensive examination of population representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm will appear at a later date (when final data become available) as a supplementary volume to the annual report.

A Preliminary Assessment of Population Representation

The preliminary assessment of population representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm includes all Department of Defense military personnel assigned to the Persian Gulf region at any time from August 1990 through February 15, 1991 (as noted above). Some movement of personnel occurred during this period, and the data include a number of people who departed from the region before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm on January 16th. (Information on the arrival and departure of personnel is not yet available, but will be incorporated in the supplementary report. Peak strength in the region occurred during late February-early March 1991.)

Table D-1 shows the number and percentage distribution of military personnel (enlistees and officers combined) who were deployed to the Persian Gulf by their Service and active-duty or reserve status. As seen here, a total of 569,285 people were identified as having served in the theater of operations. About 102,000 of these people -- 18 percent of the total -- were reservists or National Guardsmen called to active duty. Further calculations reveal that over half of all active-duty personnel and 70 percent of everyone else were in the Army. In contrast, just 60,830 people -- less than 11 percent of the total -- were from the Air Force. (This is fewer than the 71,829 Army reservists and National Guardsmen. In all subsequent tables, reservists and National Guardsmen are combined under the heading of "Reserve.")

In this assessment of population representation, it was sometimes necessary to distinguish between military personnel assigned to "combat" and those utilized in a "support" capacity. The Department of Defense requested that each Military Service apply its own definition of "combat" and "support" in determining the occupational function of personnel assigned to the Persian Gulf. As seen in Table D-2, Service-provided definitions place about 43 percent of all military personnel in combat -- including just under half of those from the active-duty force and 16 percent of reservists. There are considerable differences between the Services in their designations of combat. For example, over 96 percent of all Marines are shown to have served in combat, compared with fewer than one in 20 Air Force personnel. At the same time, 65 percent of Navy personnel and just under 29 percent of those in the Army were designated as being in combat status.²

Seven subject areas were selected for study in the preliminary assessment of population representation. They include: 1) women; 2) race/ethnicity; 3) home of record; 4) median age; 5) aptitude test scores; 6) marital status and dependents; and 7) a demographic description of those who died. These subject areas or population descriptors were chosen on the basis of their relation to issues raised by the news media and various commentators during Operations Desert

² These differences reflect the separate missions of the Armed Forces as well as the definitions of "combat" status applied during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A more detailed discussion of these differences will appear in the full report on population representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Table D-1
Distribution of Military Personnel in Operation Desert Shield/Storm
by Service and Active, Reserve, and National Guard Status
(Number and Percent)

Service	Number			
	Active	Reserve	National Guard	Total
Army	246,682	38,988	32,841	318,511
Navy	98,652	7,038	0	105,690
Marine Corps	71,254	13,000	0	84,254
Air Force	50,571	4,563	5,696	60,830
All Services	467,159	63,589	38,537	569,285

Service	Percent			
	Active	Reserve	National Guard	Total
Army	77.5	12.2	10.3	100.0
Navy	93.3	6.7	0.0	100.0
Marine Corps	84.6	15.4	0.0	100.0
Air Force	83.1	7.5	9.4	100.0
All Services	82.1	11.2	6.8	100.0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes enlisted personnel and officers in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Shield and Desert Storm. It should be noted that data in this appendix often compare personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf with those in the military as a whole. This differs from the comparisons in the main body of the report, which focus on the statistical relationships between military personnel and the general population.

Table D-2
Military Personnel Assigned to Combat
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm by Service,
and Active and Reserve Status (Number and Percent)

Service	Active		Reserve		Total	
	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number
Army	34.6	85,281	7.6	5,424	28.5	90,705
Navy	69.7	68,776	2.4	171	65.2	68,947
Marine Corps	98.6	70,275	81.9	10,649	96.0	80,924
Air Force	4.9	2,460	2.0	203	4.4	2,663
All Services	48.5	226,792	16.1	16,447	42.7	243,239

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes enlisted personnel and officers in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Combat status is based on definitions provided by the separate Military Services.

Women

When the U.S. military last went to war in Southeast Asia, women accounted for fewer than two percent of all uniformed personnel. At the same time, two out of three enlisted women were serving as an administrative specialist or clerk and another 24 percent were assigned to a medical specialty -- leaving just a few thousand women (under 10 percent) distributed among the remaining, "non-traditionally-female" occupations. By the start of the Gulf War, almost 11 percent of all active-duty personnel were women, and fewer than half of female enlistees could be found in an administrative or medical specialty.

Clearly, the role of women in the military has expanded considerably over the past two decades, and they are participating in all facets of service life except those that would expose them directly to combat. The increased representation and wider integration of women in the military captured the attention of the media and other observers during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Some seemed surprised to find Service women working beside their male counterparts, accepting many of the same hardships and risks in preparing for war, working at their jobs, under harsh conditions, in a highly professional and capable fashion. The Gulf War did a lot to promote the image of women in the military and it also rekindled the debate over whether women should be barred from combat.

The last flurry of interest in the combat exclusion issue occurred soon after Operation Just Cause -- though the question has been studied and argued throughout the history of the All-Volunteer Force. The conspicuous presence of women in the Gulf also stimulated significant public commentary and legislative inquiry concerning current laws and policy. The war in the Middle East dramatized the fact that high technology has moved the location of a "front line" and blurred previous distinctions between "combat" and "support" operations. Our latest experience with modern warfare also demonstrated that female personnel, regardless of present restrictions, may be exposed to the hazards of battle: 13 women died (discussed below), including five under "combat" conditions, and two were taken as prisoner of war.

Approximately 41,000 women were deployed to the Persian Gulf between August 1990 and February 1991 for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as shown in Table D-3. This is over five times the number of military women who served in Vietnam during the Vietnam war. The vast majority of the deployed women (nearly 31,000) were in the Army, where they represented about one in 10 soldiers. Overall, women accounted for 7.2 percent of military personnel (officers and enlistees, active-duty and reserve combined) assigned to the theater of operations. The lowest proportions of women were in the Marine Corps (1.5 percent) and Navy (4.2 percent).

More detailed information on female representation is presented in Table D-4, which shows the percentage of women by Service, active or reserve designation, and officer or enlisted status. It is interesting to note here that the highest proportions of women are in the reserves (over 13 percent of the total, compared with 5.8 percent of active-duty personnel). This is especially evident for reserve officers, where one in five (21.3 percent) of those sent to the Gulf were women. Still, the greatest number of women -- over 23,000 -- could be found in the enlisted ranks of the active-duty force.

Female enlisted personnel (active and reserve combined) numbered 34,339, representing 6.8 percent of all enlistees identified as being in the region. Table D-5 shows the distribution of enlisted personnel, by gender, within each of 10 primary occupational areas. As seen here, women were overrepresented in three areas -- especially among medical and dental specialists (22 percent) and in functional support and administration (19 percent). On the other hand, women accounted for only about 3 percent of all enlisted personnel in electronic equipment or electrical/mechanical equipment repairer and those in the crafts. (It should be noted that these and subsequent tabulations dealing with occupational area show the official job designations of personnel, which may not correspond precisely with the operational duties of those in the Gulf.)

Table D-6 provides a closer look at the representation of enlisted women within occupational areas, separating the active-duty force from the reserves. As seen here, the patterns of female representation are similar for both the active and reserve populations -- though the proportions are higher within the reserves for all but one occupational area (service and supply handlers). Especially striking are the proportions of reserve medical/dental specialists and reserve administrative personnel -- 32 percent and 28 percent, respectively -- who are women.

Table D-3
Gender by Service: Distribution of Military Personnel
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm
(Number and Percent)

Service	Number		
	Male	Female	Total
Army	287,656	30,855	318,511
Navy	101,241	4,449	105,690
Marine Corps	83,022	1,232	84,254
Air Force	56,584	4,246	60,830
All Services	528,503	40,782	569,285

Service	Percent		
	Male	Female	Total
Army	90.3	9.7	100.0
Navy	95.8	4.2	100.0
Marine Corps	98.5	1.5	100.0
Air Force	93.0	7.0	100.0
All Services	92.8	7.2	100.0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes enlisted personnel and officers (active and reserve combined) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

Table D-4
Women in the Active Duty and Reserve Forces by Service:
Officers and Enlisted Personnel
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Percent)

Service	Percentage Who Are Women ^a		
	Active	Reserve	Total
ENLISTED			
Army	7.9	14.7	9.4
Navy	3.1	12.3	3.6
Marine Corps	1.6	0.1	1.5
Air Force	5.6	10.1	6.4
TOTAL			
Percent	5.6	12.2	6.8
Number	23,481	10,858	34,339
OFFICER ^b			
Army	8.8	22.4	12.4
Navy	7.1	26.7	9.4
Marine Corps	1.4	1.5	1.4
Air Force	7.3	21.0	10.2
TOTAL			
Percent	7.3	21.3	10.3
Number	3,585	2,858	6,443
TOTAL			
Army	7.9	15.7	9.7
Navy	3.5	14.9	4.2
Marine Corps	1.5	1.0	1.5
Air Force	5.9	12.4	7.0
TOTAL			
Percent	5.8	13.4	7.2
Number	27,066	13,716	40,782

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

a Includes military personnel in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

b Includes both commissioned and warrant officers.

Table D-5
Gender by Occupational Area: Distribution of Enlisted
Personnel in Operation Desert Shield/Storm
(Number and Percent)

Occupational Area *	Male	Female	Both	
			Percent	Number
0 Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists	99.3	0.7	100.0	114,739
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers	97.6	3.4	100.0	31,518
2 Communications and Intelligence Specialists	93.3	6.7	100.0	52,421
3 Medical and Dental Specialists	77.9	22.1	100.0	29,642
4 Other Technical and Allied Specialists	94.0	6.0	100.0	11,868
5 Functional Support and Administration	81.0	19.0	100.0	59,899
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	97.1	2.9	100.0	105,108
7 Craftsmen	97.1	2.9	100.0	20,793
8 Service and Supply Handlers	91.2	8.8	100.0	67,438
9 Nonoccupational	94.3	5.7	100.0	10,827
Unknown	94.4	5.6	100.0	2,369
ALL OCCUPATIONS COMBINED	93.2	6.8	100.0	506,622

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes enlisted personnel (active duty and reserve combined) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

* Based on the Department of Defense occupational classification system. One-digit code precedes the title of each occupational area shown here. This is drawn from official records and may not reflect the actual occupations of enlisted personnel serving in theater.

Table D-6
Women by Occupational Area in the Active and
Reserve Forces: Enlisted Personnel
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Percent)

Occupational Area *	Percentage Who Are Women	
	Active	Reserve
0 Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists	0.7	0.9
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers	3.3	3.8
2 Communications and Intelligence Specialists	6.5	9.1
3 Medical and Dental Specialists	16.2	32.2
4 Other Technical and Allied Specialists	5.7	7.3
5 Functional Support and Administration	16.4	28.4
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	2.8	3.3
7 Craftsmen	2.7	3.8
8 Service and Supply Handlers	9.1	8.2
9 Nonoccupational	3.4	13.0
Unknown	13.0	5.3
ALL OCCUPATIONS COMBINED		
Percent	5.6	12.2
Number	23,481	10,858

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes female enlisted personnel in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

* Based on the Department of Defense occupational classification system. One-digit code precedes the title of each occupational area shown here. This is drawn from official records and may not reflect the actual occupations of women serving in theater.

Table D-7 presents the occupational information in a different format, showing the distribution -- not representation -- of women across the various areas. As previously noted, women have traditionally served in two occupational areas, medical/dental specialists and functional support and administration. Enlisted women sent to the Persian Gulf were likewise concentrated in these two areas. However, about half of all women were assigned to the remaining, nontraditional fields (including 840 women in support positions under "infantry, gun crews, and seamanship specialties," an area otherwise reserved for "combat" personnel). The occupational distribution shown in Table D-7 is similar to that of enlisted women in the active-duty force (presented elsewhere in the report on population representation), with three notable exceptions: higher proportions of deployed women in service and supply and in medical/dental specialties, and a lower proportion of deployed women in functional support and administration. These differences may be influenced by the addition of female reservists.

Race/Ethnicity

In June 1973, when the last draftee reported to basic training, Blacks accounted for 12.4 percent of the active-duty military and 4.2 percent of the Selected Reserves. By the beginning of the 1980s, the proportion of Blacks in the active force had risen to nearly 20 percent (30 percent in the Army), and it stood at about 16 percent in the reserves (24 percent in the Army Reserve). In fact, Blacks have been overrepresented in the active-duty military since the first year following the end of the draft; and they have been overrepresented (to a lesser degree) in the total Selected Reserves for the past 14 years. This has been a subject of interest to many people, widely discussed in books, journals, magazines, newspapers, and the broadcast media since at least 1979, when one out of three Army enlistees was Black. Yet, as the military mobilized and deployed for Operation Desert Shield, the overrepresentation of Blacks became "news" once again, and it apparently caught several social commentators by surprise.

Most of the discussion revolved around the issue of fairness and the realization that, because Blacks were overrepresented in the military, they would probably be counted among the dead and wounded in disproportionately high numbers as well. Some recalled the early years of the Vietnam war when Blacks constituted 12 percent of Army enlistees and over one-fifth of the Army's combat losses. This was attributed to a system that favored the assignment of Blacks to high-risk combat units -- a situation that was soon corrected. As it turned out, Blacks suffered approximately 13 percent of the Army's combat deaths during the Vietnam war, which was close to the percentage of Blacks in the Army's enlisted ranks as well as to their percentage in the general population.

The fairness issue was often discussed in the 1980s, but the country was at peace and the perceived burdens of military service were far outweighed by the benefits of training, job experience, equitable pay, educational assistance, travel, and the like -- many things that were harder for minorities to obtain in civilian life. When the prospects of a large-scale war loomed in the Middle East, and experts predicted tens of thousands of U.S. casualties, the benefits of military service quickly faded in the shadow of a swelling burden. Several concerned observers now questioned the equity of all-volunteer recruiting. In addition, Black overrepresentation was linked with the perception that the Armed Forces were overfilled with the socially and

Table D-7
Women by Occupational Area: Distribution of
Female Enlisted Personnel in
Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Percent)

Occupational Area *	Percent	Number
0 Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists	2.4	840
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers	3.1	1,060
2 Communications and Intelligence Specialists	10.2	3,503
3 Medical and Dental Specialists	19.1	6,556
4 Other Technical and Allied Specialists	2.1	707
5 Functional Support and Administration	33.1	11,353
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	8.8	3,020
7 Craftsmen	1.8	609
8 Service and Supply Handlers	17.3	5,938
9 Nonoccupational	1.8	620
Unknown	0.4	133
TOTAL	100.0	34,339

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes female enlisted personnel (active duty and reserve combined) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

* Based on the Department of Defense occupational classification system. One-digit code precedes the title of each occupational area shown here. This is drawn from official records and may not reflect the actual occupations of women serving in theater.

economically disadvantaged, White and minority alike, because the military is "an employer of last resort."

Table D-8 shows the racial/ethnic composition of Active and Reserve Component military personnel sent to the Persian Gulf and that of the total force. Just under one-quarter of all personnel deployed for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were Black, and Hispanics accounted for about 5 percent. It is interesting to observe here that the proportion of Blacks in the deployed force (23.5 percent) is somewhat higher than their proportion of the force as a whole (16.6 percent). Indeed, Blacks were "overrepresented" in the Gulf based on this standard of comparison. Differences are found in both the active and Reserve Components. However, it should be noted that the figures for "Reserve" (and the total) include the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and other reserve branches. This tends to accentuate the differences, because the proportion of Blacks in the Selected Reserve is 17.4 percent; and personnel from the Selected Reserve accounted for 90 percent of all deployed reservists. When the active force is combined with the Selected Reserve only, the proportion of Blacks in the total is slightly higher (19.6 percent compared with 16.6 percent) and closer to the figure for all deployed personnel.

A more detailed description of the racial/ethnic composition of personnel assigned to the Gulf is presented in Table D-9. The substantial differences between the proportion of Blacks in the Army and those in the other Services reflect similar differences in the total active force and reserves. For example, Blacks currently account for about 31 percent of all enlisted personnel in the active Army; and, as seen in Table D-9, 31 percent of Army enlistees sent to the Gulf. At the same time, Blacks constitute 17 percent of enlistees in the active Navy and 19.5 percent of those in the Gulf.

It also is apparent from the information presented here that the "overrepresentation" of Blacks in the Persian Gulf (discussed above and depicted in Table D-8) can be attributed largely to the fact that the Army, where Blacks are concentrated, was likewise "overrepresented." Approximately 56 percent of personnel deployed to the Middle East were from the Army; yet, Army personnel make up just 46 percent of all people in the active-duty force and Selected Reserve as a whole. The "overrepresentation" of the Army is even more evident when the active force is isolated: 52 percent of the 467,000 active-duty personnel in the Gulf were soldiers, compared with 36 percent of total active strength.

One of the more interesting, though not unexpected, findings of this initial assessment of population representation is that Blacks were considerably less likely than Whites to be exposed to combat in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Table D-10 shows the percentage distribution of personnel in the Gulf by racial/ethnic group and their combat or support status. As seen here, 36 percent of Black enlistees and 31 percent of Black officers were assigned to a combat position. This compares with 45 percent of White enlistees and almost 42 percent of White officers. On the other hand, the proportion of Hispanics assigned to "combat" was the highest of all racial/ethnic groups: over 50 percent, compared with 36 percent of Blacks, about 45 percent of Whites, and 43 percent of those from other groups.

The primary reason why a relatively low percentage of Blacks were in "combat" can be found in Table D-11, which shows the distribution of racial/ethnic groups across each occupational area. The figures displayed here are roughly similar to those for the military as a

Table D-8
Racial/Ethnic Group by Active and Reserve Status:
Distribution of Military Personnel in Operation
Desert Shield/Storm and Total Department of Defense (Percent)

Racial/Ethnic Group	Desert Shield/Storm ^a			Total Dept. of Defense ^b		
	Active	Reserve	Total	Active	Reserve	Total
White	66.3	72.0	67.3	70.3	77.8	74.6
Black	24.1	20.7	23.5	20.7	13.4	16.6
Hispanic	5.0	4.6	4.9	4.7	6.0	5.4
Asian/Pacific Islander	2.3	1.0	2.1	2.4	1.5	1.9
American Indian/ Alaskan Native	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6
Other ^c	1.7	1.1	1.6	1.3	0.7	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

NOTE: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

a Includes enlisted personnel and officers in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

b Figures for total Department of Defense are current as of March 1991.

c Includes 529 personnel (less than one-tenth of one-percent of the total) who could not be identified by racial/ethnic group in the data file.

**Table D-9
Racial/Ethnic Group of Enlisted Personnel and Officers:
Distribution in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Number and Percent)**

Racial/Ethnic Group	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	All Services	
					Percent	Number
ENLISTED						
White	60.1	66.8	70.7	80.0	65.0	329,064
Black	31.2	19.5	18.7	14.3	25.4	128,687
Hispanic	4.6	6.6	7.3	3.2	5.2	26,581
Other ^a	4.1	7.1	3.3	2.5	4.4	22,290
Total						
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	--
Number	283,707	94,618	77,420	50,877	--	506,622
OFFICER ^b						
White	83.5	88.3	91.1	92.2	86.7	54,238
Black	11.1	4.3	4.5	3.7	8.0	5,027
Hispanic	2.1	2.7	2.5	1.6	2.2	1,368
Other ^a	3.3	3.3	1.9	2.5	3.1	2,030
Total						
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	--
Number	34,804	11,072	6,834	9,953	--	62,663
TOTAL						
White	62.6	69.1	72.3	82.0	67.3	383,302
Black	29.0	17.9	17.6	12.6	23.5	133,714
Hispanic	4.3	6.2	6.9	3.0	4.9	27,949
Other ^a	4.1	6.8	3.2	2.5	4.3	24,320
Total						
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	--
Number	318,511	105,690	84,254	60,830	--	569,285

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

NOTE: Includes military personnel (active duty and reserve combined) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

a Includes personnel who could not be identified by racial/ethnic group in the data file (a total of 288 enlistees and 241 officers).

b Includes both commissioned and warrant officers.

Table D-10
Racial/Ethnic Group by Combat and Support Status:
Distribution of Enlisted Personnel and Officers
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Number and Percent)

Racial/Ethnic Group	Combat ^a	Support	All Services	
			Percent	Number
ENLISTED				
White	45.0	55.0	100.0	329,064
Black	36.2	63.8	100.0	128,687
Hispanic	51.3	48.7	100.0	26,581
Other ^b	44.0	56.0	100.0	22,290
Total				
Percent	43.0	57.0	100.0	--
Number	217,933	288,689	--	506,622
OFFICER				
White	41.5	58.5	100.0	54,238
Black	31.4	68.6	100.0	5,027
Hispanic	39.7	60.3	100.0	1,368
Other ^b	32.7	67.3	100.0	2,030
Total				
Percent	40.4	59.6	100.0	--
Number	25,306	37,357	--	62,663
TOTAL				
White	44.5	55.5	100.0	383,302
Black	36.0	64.0	100.0	133,714
Hispanic	50.7	49.3	100.0	27,949
Other ^b	43.0	57.0	100.0	24,320
Total				
Percent	42.7	57.3	100.0	--
Number	243,239	326,046	--	569,285

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

NOTE: Includes military personnel (active duty and reserve combined) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

a Combat and support status is based on definitions provided by the separate Military Services.

b Includes personnel who could not be identified by racial/ethnic group in the data file (a total of 288 enlistees and 241 officers).

Table D-11
Racial/Ethnic Group by Occupational Area:
Distribution of Enlisted Personnel
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Number and Percent)

Occupational Area *	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	All Groups	
					Percent	Number
0 Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists	66.6	23.4	5.8	4.2	100.0	114,739
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers	75.7	16.4	4.4	3.4	100.0	31,518
2 Communications and Intelligence Specialists	66.2	25.9	4.7	3.2	100.0	52,421
3 Medical and Dental Specialists	61.3	27.0	6.0	5.8	100.0	29,642
4 Other Technical and Allied Specialists	66.1	24.6	5.2	4.2	100.0	11,868
5 Functional Support and Administration	50.2	38.6	5.7	5.5	100.0	59,899
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	70.8	19.7	4.7	4.7	100.0	105,108
7 Craftsmen	72.3	18.4	5.1	4.2	100.0	20,793
8 Service and Supply Handlers	59.6	31.7	4.8	4.0	100.0	67,438
9 Nonoccupational	62.0	25.2	8.1	4.7	100.0	10,827
Unknown	69.5	19.5	4.7	6.4	100.0	2,369
All Occupations Combined	65.0	25.4	5.2	4.4	100.0	506,622

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

NOTE: Includes enlisted personnel (active duty and reserve combined) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

* Based on the Department of Defense occupational classification system. One-digit code precedes the title of each occupational area shown here. This is drawn from official records and may not reflect the actual occupations of enlisted personnel serving in theater.

whole. As seen in Table D-11, Black personnel assigned to the Gulf were considerably "overrepresented" in functional support and administration (38.6 percent), compared with their proportion of the entire enlisted force (25.4 percent). Blacks also were overrepresented in service and supply jobs and, to a lesser extent, in the medical and dental specialties. At the same time, they were slightly underrepresented in the general combat skills. Further calculations (not presented here) reveal that one out of every five Black enlistees (27,000) was assigned to infantry, gun crews, or seamanship specialties. Yet, over half could be found working in one of three support jobs: functional support and administration (23,000 Black enlisted personnel), service and supply (21,000), and electrical/mechanical equipment repair (21,000).

The overrepresentation of Blacks in administrative and clerical jobs and in service and supply is hardly a recent phenomenon: Throughout World War I, Blacks were assigned almost exclusively to service and supply positions; and by the end of World War II, Blacks accounted for less than three percent of all soldiers in combat, as they continued to struggle for the "right to fight." Black overrepresentation in service and supply has been similarly tracked throughout the past twenty years under all-volunteer conditions of enlistment.

Unlike Blacks, White and Hispanic enlistees deployed to the Gulf were slightly overrepresented in infantry, gun crews, and seamanship specialties. The participation of Hispanics in the war received substantially less publicity than that of Blacks. Nevertheless, Hispanics were often included in many discussions concerning the overrepresentation of Blacks -- with frequent reference to the disproportionately high participation of all "minorities" in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Latin American press, following the U.S. news media, reported that Hispanic-Americans were being asked to carry an unjustly heavy burden of the war and that a disproportionately high number would fall in battle. Many members of the domestic and foreign press were unaware that Hispanics have been underrepresented in the U.S. military -- relative to their proportion of the general population -- for at least the past 20 years. Information on the race/ethnicity of deployed personnel also suggests that Hispanics were slightly underrepresented in the Gulf relative to their proportion in the total force; but that those who were deployed stood a relatively high likelihood of assignment to combat (Table D-10).

Home of Record

A less controversial issue, though one raised in several news reports, concerned the geographic affiliations of the men and women sent to the Middle East. Previous reports to Congress on population representation in the military have observed that the enlistment propensity of young men and women from the South is generally stronger than in other regions of the country, and that the South has traditionally provided the military with a relatively large number of new recruits from one year to the next. At the same time, the regional composition of the military is reasonably similar to that of the general population.

Participants in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were identified by their home of record at the time they entered military service. The regional distribution of these people is displayed in Table D-12 and compared with the regional distribution of the total force. With minor variations, it can be seen here that the geographic affiliations of active-duty personnel deployed to the Gulf are similar to those of their counterparts in the reserves. Furthermore, there

Table D-12
Home of Record (census Region) at Time of Entry Into
Military by Active and Reserve Status: Distribution of
Military Personnel in Operation Desert Shield/Storm and
Total Department of Defense (Percent)

Census Region ^a	Desert Shield/Storm ^b			Total Dept. of Defense ^c		
	Active	Reserve	Total	Active	Reserve	Total
Northeast	15.0	14.2	14.9	16.1	16.0	16.0
North Central	23.8	23.0	23.7	23.9	20.5	21.9
South	35.0	36.7	35.3	33.7	33.9	33.8
West	15.6	13.0	15.1	16.5	19.9	18.5
Other	10.6	13.1	11.1	9.8	9.6	9.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes both enlisted personnel and officers. Persons with "unknown" home of record were excluded from the percentage distributions. Figures may not add to 100 due to rounding.

a Regions as defined by U.S. Bureau of Census.

b Includes military personnel in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

c Figures for total Department of Defense are current as of March 1991.

are only minor differences between the distributions for Desert Shield/Storm personnel and the total force. These differences include: slight overrepresentation in the Gulf of personnel from the North Central, South, and "other" regions of the Nation; and, conversely, slight underrepresentation of personnel from the Northeast and West.

Median Age

As previously noted, the national news media often focused on the demographic changes that have occurred in the military since the end of the draft. Several reporters and commentators observed that the All-Volunteer Force has gradually been "greying," and speculated about the influence of aging on combat effectiveness. For example, a lengthy article on the front page of the Washington Post (February 8, 1991) asked in its title: "An Aging Fighting Force: Has It Got What It Takes?"

The median ages of enlisted personnel assigned to the Persian Gulf are displayed in Table D-13, by combat and support status, and compared with the median ages of enlisted personnel in the active-duty force over selected years. As seen here, the median age of enlisted personnel has been steadily increasing at a rate of about one year per decade -- from 22 in 1972, to 23 in 1982, to 24 at present. The median ages of combat personnel are lower than those in support positions; however, the gap has narrowed since 1972, as combat personnel have "aged" to a greater degree.

The median ages of reservists sent to the Gulf are generally higher than those of their counterparts in the active force -- with the oldest group (median age of 27) being reservists in support roles. At the same time, combat personnel in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were younger, on average, than their counterparts in the total active force.

Aptitude Test Scores

The All-Volunteer Force has been quite successful over the past decade in enlisting and retaining highly qualified men and women. These successes have been widely reported in the press. So, it came as no surprise to most people that military personnel sent to the Middle East performed their jobs admirably, generating numerous expressions of praise, respect, and appreciation.

In fact, as Table D-14 shows, 58 percent of all active-duty enlisted personnel deployed to the Gulf achieved a score of average or above on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) when they joined the military. (Figures in the table reflect the proportion of people within each group who achieved an AFQT percentile score of 50 or higher at the time of enlistment.) The percentages vary by Service -- from a high of almost 68 percent in the Air Force to a low of 55 percent in the Army -- and according to combat and support status. In all cases except the Navy, there are proportionately more people with above average scores in combat jobs than in support.

A comparison of Desert Shield/Storm personnel with enlistees in the total active force underscores the differences between combat and support elements of the deployed population. As seen in Table D-14, the percentages of personnel who scored average or above on the AFQT are consistently higher for enlistees assigned to combat in the Gulf than in the force as a whole; and, conversely, the percentages are lower for enlistees assigned to support roles in the Gulf than in the total active force. Overall, the comparison reveals that proportionately fewer deployed troops achieved a score of average or above on the AFQT -- thus indicating that higher-scoring enlistees were "underrepresented" in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

A review of information presented in previous tables helps to explain why this occurred. First of all, the definitions of "combat" and "support" used for the deployed population differ from those used for the standing force as a whole, which complicates the comparison based on these two groupings. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the deployed population stands apart from the total active force in various ways, including the "overrepresentation" of Army personnel, men, Blacks (especially in certain support occupations), and persons from other demographic groups. Generally, the overrepresented groups tend to have comparatively lower AFQT scores than their counterparts in the force as a whole. (That is, AFQT scores are lower in the Army than in the

**Table D-13
Median Age by Combat and Support Status: Comparison
of Enlisted Personnel in Operation Desert/Shield/Storm and
Total Duty Force During Selected Periods**

Forces and Periods of Comparison	Combat ^a	Support	All Enlisted Personnel
Desert Shield/Storm ^b			
Active	22	25	24
Reserve	23	27	26
Total	22	25	24
Total Active Duty ^c			
1972	20	23	22
1982	22	23	23
1991	23	25	24

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

- a "Combat" in total active duty force includes all positions under code 0 ("Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists") of the Department of Defense occupational classification system; and "support" includes all other (non-"combat") positions. Combat and support status in Operation Desert Shield/Storm is based on definitions provided by the separate Military Services.**
- b Operation Desert Shield/Storm population includes enlisted personnel in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.**
- c Median ages are as of June 1972, September 1982, and March 1991.**

other Services, lower for male enlistees than for female enlistees, lower for Blacks than for Whites, and so on.) The combined overrepresentation and mix of these groups in the Gulf has resulted in the observed differences in AFQT scores between the deployed population and the active force as a whole.

Marital Status and Dependents

As the number of deployed personnel climbed and hopes of a peaceful solution faded, the All-Volunteer Force was examined from many angles. All of a sudden, it seemed, there was the realization that today's military fighting men can no longer be characterized as "young and unattached"; that female personnel also may be wives and mothers; that military personnel,

Table D-14
Aptitude Test Scores by Combat and Support Status: Enlisted Personnel
Who Scored Average or Above on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Total Active Duty Force (Percent)

Service	Desert Shield/Storm ^a			Total Active Duty ^b		
	Combat	Support	Total	Combat	Support	Total
Army	56.1	54.5	55.1	54.8	59.4	58.1
Navy	54.9	58.8	56.0	51.7	65.1	63.8
Marine Corps	64.0	62.0	63.9	56.3	69.8	66.3
Air Force	80.4	67.6	67.8	69.7	73.1	72.9
All Services	58.2	57.7	58.0	56.0	65.9	64.2

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Figures reflect the proportion of people within each group who achieved an AFQT percentile score of 50 or higher at the time of enlistment.

a Includes active duty personnel in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Combat and support status is based on definitions provided by the separate Military Services.

b "Combat" includes all positions under code 0 ("Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists") of the Department of Defense occupational classification system. "Support" includes all other (non-"combat") positions. Figures are current as of March 1991.

mostly men, may be single parents; that male and female military personnel may be married to each other as "dual service" couples; and that these "dual service" couples may have children. Suddenly, it appeared, the country became aware of the fact that today's military is a family-oriented organization, with the same needs and demands found in civilian society.

Some personal problems were experienced by Service members involved in the deployment, but most of these were anticipated and quickly corrected. A few problems related to the long-term care of young children left behind by parents sent to the Gulf -- a situation that soon captured the attention of the Nation's media. For example, just two months after the deployment began, People magazine (September 10, 1990) ran a cover story on "Mom Goes to War," depicting a female pilot, "with tears and brave smiles," clutching her 11-month old daughter for a final farewell, as she departed "to face unknown dangers in the Gulf." Newsweek (November 12, 1990) called it "The Soldier-Parent Dilemma," as the issue invoked studies by the Department of Defense, a flurry of commentary, and even action in Congress to protect the young children of military parents from becoming "war orphans."

Table D-15 shows that over half of all deployed personnel were married, including 49 percent of enlistees and nearly 71 percent of officers. The lowest proportion of married personnel is in the Marine Corps (42 percent for enlistees and officers combined), and the highest is in the Air Force (about 65 percent). Some differences can be seen between deployed personnel and members of the total force. Generally, married enlistees were "underrepresented" in the Gulf when compared with their counterparts in the force as a whole (54 percent). On the other hand, married officers in the Gulf were somewhat "overrepresented" (apparently due to the large difference in the Army). Overall, there were proportionately fewer married Service members deployed to the Middle East (about 52 percent) than in the total force (57 percent). This was especially true in the Navy, where 47 percent of deployed sailors were married, in contrast to almost 58 percent of those in all Naval forces.

An attempt was made to tabulate the number of deployed personnel who were parents and to identify the ages of their children as well as their marital status and spousal type (that is, whether they were married to a civilian, to another military member not deployed, or to another military member in the Gulf). Because of problems in the personnel data files, these tabulations could only be done for the active-duty force. (It is expected that the data problems will be resolved in time for the full report on population representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.)

The analysis reveals that there were about 17,000 single parents (from the active force only) in the Gulf, including about 7,200 with at least one child below the age of 5 years. (At this stage, there is no way of specifying how many of these single parents were primary or sole providers of care for their children. Also, it should be noted that these data show the number of parents, not the number of children.) In addition, there were about 3,200 "dual-Service" couples (6,416 military husbands and wives) deployed to the Middle East; and over half (or 1,799 couples) of these had children. Approximately 39 percent of all active-duty personnel were parents -- including over 18 percent with at least one child below school age (five years old).

These percentages decline somewhat when combat personnel (men only) are isolated (Table D-17). Here, it is seen that 32 percent of personnel are parents, and the proportion of those with children below school age falls to 16.7 percent. It is also interesting to observe that combat personnel included 6,311 single parents. This represented 5.3 percent of all combat personnel.

Table D-15
Marital Status of Enlisted Personnel and
Officers by Service: Distribution in Operation
Desert Shield/Storm and Total Department of Defense (Percent)

Service	Desert Shield/Storm ^a			Total Dept. of Defense ^b		
	Single ^c	Married	Total	Single ^c	Married	Total
ENLISTED						
Army	49.0	51.0	100.0	48.3	51.7	100.0
Navy	55.5	44.5	100.0	47.6	52.4	100.0
Marine Corps	60.2	39.8	100.0	59.5	40.5	100.0
Air Force	37.0	63.0	100.0	33.2	66.8	100.0
Total	50.7	49.3	100.0	45.8	54.2	100.0
OFFICER						
Army	28.6	71.4	100.0	42.2	57.8	100.0
Navy	33.8	66.2	100.0	24.4	75.6	100.0
Marine Corps	28.6	71.4	100.0	29.6	70.4	100.0
Air Force	27.0	73.0	100.0	23.8	76.2	100.0
Total	29.3	70.7	100.0	32.5	67.5	100.0
TOTAL						
Army	46.8	53.2	100.0	47.1	52.9	100.0
Navy	53.3	46.7	100.0	42.4	57.6	100.0
Marine Corps	57.6	42.4	100.0	56.1	43.9	100.0
Air Force	35.4	64.6	100.0	30.7	69.3	100.0
Total	48.4	51.6	100.0	43.0	57.0	100.0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

a Includes military personnel (active and reserve combined) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991.

b Includes both active and reserve personnel. Figures are current as of March 1991.

c Includes divorced and widowed as well as never married.

Table D-16
Marital Status and Spousal Type by Age of Children:
Distribution of Active Duty Personnel in
Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Number and Percent)

Marital Status and Spousal Type	NUMBER				Total
	Children Less Than 5 Years	Children 5 Years or Older	Children Both Under and Over 5 Years	No Children	
Single	5,634	9,731	1,600	204,997	221,962
Married to Civilian	42,155	78,959	33,657	72,059	226,830
Married to Military Member	1,555	2,429	837	7,130	11,951
Married to Military Member in Desert Storm	1,224	1,650	724	2,818	6,416
Total	50,068	92,769	36,818	287,004	467,159

Marital Status and Spousal Type	PERCENT				Total
	Children Less Than 5 Years	Children 5 Years or Older	Children Both Under and Over 5 Years	No Children	
Single	2.5	4.4	0.7	92.4	100.0
Married to Civilian	18.6	34.8	14.8	31.8	100.0
Married to Military Member	13.0	20.3	7.0	59.7	100.0
Married to Military Member in Desert Storm	19.1	25.7	11.3	43.9	100.0
Total	10.8	19.9	7.9	61.4	100.0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes enlisted personnel and officers (active-duty only) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Table D-17
Marital Status and Spousal Type by Age of Children:
Distribution of Active Duty Combat Personnel in
Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Number and Percent)

Marital Status and Spousal Type	NUMBER				Total
	Children Less Than 5 Years	Children 5 Years or Older	Children Both Under and Over 5 Years	No Children	
Single	2,259	3,460	592	115,792	122,103
Married to Civilian	19,822	30,223	14,158	36,366	100,569
Married to Military Member	527	572	263	1,893	3,255
Married to Military Member in Desert Storm	143	165	74	483	865
Total	22,751	34,420	15,087	154,534	226,792

Marital Status and Spousal Type	PERCENT				Total
	Children Less Than 5 Years	Children 5 Years or Older	Children Both Under and Over 5 Years	No Children	
Single	1.9	2.8	0.5	94.8	100.0
Married to Civilian	19.7	30.0	14.1	36.2	100.0
Married to Military Member	16.2	17.6	8.1	58.2	100.0
Married to Military Member in Desert Storm	16.5	19.1	8.6	55.8	100.0
Total	10.0	15.2	6.7	68.1	100.0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Includes enlisted personnel and officers (active duty only) in theater any time between August 1990 and February 1991. Combat status is based on definitions provided by the separate Military Services. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

A Demographic Description of Those Who Died

The Nation spent over five months preparing for a possible war and contemplating the outcome. There was a lot of speculation and apprehension about both the number and demographic composition of casualties. By war's end, the number of fatalities was remarkably below most predictions.

As seen in Table D-18, 375 military personnel died in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm between August 1990 and April 1991. (In addition, one civilian in the Department of the Army died during Operation Desert Storm and 13 Service members died after the April 11th cease-fire.) About 39 percent of these deaths (a total of 147) were the result of hostile action. The Army's forces sustained more than half of the fatalities, with about 42 percent from the Army's active force alone.

The majority of all deaths (56 percent) occurred among personnel assigned to support operations. The deaths are not divided here between Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but the general finding is probably unusual in the history of wartime casualties.³ Proponents of allowing women in combat often talk about how the lines of battle are blurred in an age of missiles and high-tech weaponry. Indeed, as shown in Table D-18, 13 women, representing 3.5 percent of the total, died during the period of conflict. This is more than the entire history of the Vietnam war.

Blacks accounted for just under 17 percent of those who died, and Hispanics for 4.8 percent. Recall (from Table D-8) that Blacks represented 23.5 percent of all personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf, and Hispanics, constituted 4.9 percent of the total.

The regional distribution of Operation Desert Shield/Storm fatalities is similar to that of the force as a whole (see Table D-12), except for a higher proportion of deaths among Service members from the Northeast and a lower proportion from the "other" region.

Almost two out of three deaths occurred among Service members in their twenties. Nearly six percent of those who died were over 40 years old, and about nine percent were teenagers.

As previously noted (Table D-15), about half of all deployed personnel were married and approximately 38 percent had children. The information on Operation Desert Shield/Storm fatalities shows that 50 percent were married and just over 34 percent had a dependent child. Six of those who died were a single parent.

³ A more detailed summary of fatalities by hostile and non-hostile causes will be presented in the full report on population representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Table D-18
Distribution of Military Personnel Who Died in Operation
Shield/Storm Activities, by Selected Characteristics,
August 1990 - April 1991* (Number and Percentage)

Selected Characteristic	Percent	Number
Casualty Type		
Desert Storm		
Non-hostile	32.0	120
Killed in Action	38.7	145
Died of Wounds Received in Action	0.5	2
Subtotal	71.2	267
Desert Shield	<u>28.8</u>	<u>108</u>
Total	100.0	375
Service		
Army Active	41.9	157
Army National Guard	4.3	16
Army Reserve	<u>8.8</u>	<u>33</u>
Army Total	55.0	206
Navy Active	13.9	52
Navy Reserve	<u>0.5</u>	<u>2</u>
Navy Total	14.4	54
Marine Corps Active	15.5	58
Marine Corps Reserve	<u>2.4</u>	<u>9</u>
Marine Corps Total	17.9	67
Air Force Active	12.3	46
Air Force National Guard	<u>0.5</u>	<u>2</u>
Air Force Total	<u>12.8</u>	<u>48</u>
TOTAL	100.0	375

Table D-18 (Cont'd)

Selected Characteristic	Percent	Number
Assignment in Desert Storm		
Combat	44.0	164
Support	<u>56.0</u>	<u>211</u>
Total	100.0	375
Officer/Enlisted Status		
Enlistee	77.6	291
Warrant Officer	4.3	16
Commissioned Officer	<u>18.1</u>	<u>68</u>
Total	100.0	375
Gender		
Male	96.5	362
Female	<u>3.5</u>	<u>13</u>
Total	100.0	375
Racial/Ethnic Group		
White	75.7	284
Black	16.8	63
Hispanic	4.8	18
Other	<u>2.7</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	100.0	375
Census Region ^b		
Northeast	21.6	81
North Central	24.0	90
South	37.3	140
West	15.7	59
Other	<u>1.3</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	100.0	375

Table D-18 (Cont'd)

Selected Characteristic	Percent	Number
Age (years)		
Under 20	8.8	33
20-24	37.1	139
25-29	27.2	102
30-34	13.6	51
35-39	7.5	28
40 or Above	5.6	21
Unrecorded	<u>0.3</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	100.0	375

Marital Status and Dependents

Single		
No Dependents	38.7	145
Dependents	1.6	6
Unknown	<u>9.3</u>	<u>35</u>
Single Total	49.6	186
Married		
No Dependents	16.5	62
Dependents	32.8	123
Unknown	<u>1.1</u>	<u>4</u>
Married Total	50.4	189
Total		
No Dependents	55.2	207
Dependents	34.4	129
Unknown	<u>10.4</u>	<u>39</u>
Total	100.0	375

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center and "Desert Shield/Storm Casualties," Department of Defense Directorate for Information, Operations and Reports, Washington Headquarters Services.

Note: All figures are for military personnel who were reported as killed (hostile or non-hostile) as of 7 June 1991 (through casualty report no. 107). In addition, one civilian in the Department of Army died during Operation Desert Storm and 13 military members died after the 11 April cease-fire. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

- a Includes both enlisted personnel and officers.
- b See text for description of census regions. Personnel were assigned to regions on the basis of their home of record at the time of their death, which may differ from other tabulations that list home of record at the time of entry into military service.

Concluding Note

The preliminary assessment of data on population representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is provided here in the hope that it will help to illuminate certain issues raised during the war and promote a more informed discussion. It should be emphasized, however, that this is a preliminary assessment, based on statistics subject to change once the final tally is made. A much more comprehensive study of the subject will appear at a later date as a supplementary volume to this annual report on population representation in the Military Services.