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Virtual Symposium:

I WANT YOU!

America's All-Volunteer Force Stands in Review



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July 2007

Virtual Symposium: *I Want You!* America's All-Volunteer Force Stands in Review

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In late 2006 and early 2007, a panel of experts on defense manpower policy was convened to review a newly published book, *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*, by Bernard D. Rostker.¹ The symposium was “virtual” in the sense that it was conducted exclusively by Internet and by telephone (in one case). Panel members were invited from a variety of fields to capture possibly different perspectives. A secondary objective of the panel was to assess the present status and prospects of America's All-Volunteer Force (AVF), drawing upon themes found in the book. The summary of the virtual symposium begins by describing the social and political landscape of the time. This is followed by a brief description of the approach and the participants. Answers to the several questions posed to the panel members are then integrated, evaluated, and discussed, incorporating verbatim responses as much as possible.

The Setting

“Absolutely Superb!” So states the cover page of *Navy Times*, 11 March 1991, as “the swift and certain blitzkrieg that crushed Saddam Hussein's army and liberated Kuwait demonstrated to the world—and to Americans—that the United States is a power

¹ Bernard Rostker, *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006).

without peer.”² Flip open the *Navy Times* and in large, bold type is the title of the lead article: **“Resounding Victory! Ghost of Vietnam Fades as United States Demonstrates Unrivaled Military Might.”**³

Deeper within this “Desert Storm Victory Edition” of the *Navy Times*, one finds a more sobering commentary and assessment of the AVF:

The post-war appraisal will assuredly find as many questions as answers in the events since August. For one thing, would we have been prepared to sustain a much longer deployment and a rotational policy for the more than 500,000 personnel sent to the Gulf? . . . Johnny will come marching home to a grateful nation from a war that has enjoyed a high level of public approval. The military’s sparkling halo may light up recruiting offices throughout the land. On the other hand, the reality of war has never been faced before in the all-volunteer environment . . . Staffing problems are likely to hit harder in the reserves, where weekend warriors now hold a more complete understanding of “the total force concept.” . . . Desert Storm has turned over the proverbial rock in our path, reminding us of unresolved issues while revealing a few new ones for the 1990s.⁴

Two years later, at a conference celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the AVF, General Maxwell Thurman, a legendary architect of the Army’s revamped recruiting programs in the 1980s, led a chorus of praise for “the superb fighting competency of the US armed forces in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm,” confirming that “a volunteer force can fight and win.” Thurman continued:

The magnificent performance of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guard personnel—active, National Guard, and Reserve—demonstrated in those fights that courage, fidelity, and valor do not reside only with draftees. These traits also reside in the quality armed forces of today.⁵

Martin Binkin, a renowned authority on military manpower, echoed these sentiments at the same government-sponsored conference and found the nation “fielding

² William Mathews, “Resounding Victory! Ghost of Vietnam Fades as United States Demonstrates Unrivaled Military Might,” *Navy Times*, 11 March 1991, p. 3.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Mark J. Eitelberg, “AVF’s Success in War Will Generate Praise and Appraisal,” *Navy Times*, 11 March 1991, p. 25.

⁵ Maxwell R. Thurman, “On Being All You Can Be: A Recruiting Perspective,” in J. Eric Fredland, Curtis Gilroy, Roger D. Little, and W. S. Sellman, eds., *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force* (Washington, DC: Brassy’s, 1996), p.53.

the best-trained and most highly qualified force in US history.” Nevertheless, as Binkin observed, indicators of force quality are merely inputs:

The “proof of the pudding” is in the *output*; that is, in how well the force performs the combat mission for which it is designed. While the Persian Gulf War, the first major combat involvement for the AVF, was not a complete test, there is an overwhelming consensus that the assembled US force was probably the most capable one in US history.⁶

The 1991 war in the Persian Gulf was hardly a complete test for the draft-free military, as Binkin points out, but it was a great source of pride for the military among many Americans. This was the same military that had symbolized American dominance over Soviet communism a couple years earlier. It was the same military that had enjoyed record levels of public approval in annual surveys by Gallup, as it sent the “world’s fourth largest Army” to swift defeat in a hugely popular cause. Indeed, it seemed as though there was no end to the parades and public adulation heaped upon the all-volunteer warriors. Popular tributes to the war and the military abounded in the form of posters, magazines, books, car magnets and bumper stickers, action figures, TV documentaries, ball caps, T-shirts, computer games, and Desert Storm trading cards.

A dozen years later, the AVF again performed major combat operations in Iraq. Many asked, would this be a more challenging and definitive demonstration of combat capabilities for the “most capable [military] in US history?” In March 2003, as US forces began to deploy, a CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup Poll suggested that the American people expected no less success in Operation Iraqi Freedom than in Desert Storm. About 80 percent of those surveyed felt Iraqi Freedom would last no longer than six months; 75 percent thought the number of Americans killed and injured would be “several hundred”;

⁶ Martin Binkin, “Commentary,” in Fredland et al., eds., *Professionals*, p. 124.

and 87 percent believed it “somewhat likely” (28 percent) or “very likely” (59 percent) that the US would find weapons of mass destruction.⁷

By 2007, as hostilities in Iraq continued, the number of US personnel killed and injured totaled in the tens of thousands, estimates of Iraqi dead reached as high as one-million, and the unsuccessful search for weapons of mass destruction had long ended.⁸

Four years of war—with no end in clear sight—had led to:

- protracted armed conflict and the emergence of violent insurgent groups,
- rising expenses and evolving missions,
- multiple and extended deployments of troops,
- mounting difficulties in Army recruiting despite large bonuses and relaxed enlistment standards (e.g., raising the maximum age to 42 years, easing requirements for moral waivers, accepting more high school dropouts),
- heavy use of reserve units and otherwise-discharged members in ready-reserve status,
- increasing troop strength,
- dependence on “contract warriors,”
- changes in command at the highest levels,
- reports of failures in medical care for veterans,

⁷ CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup Poll, 22-23 March 2003. Results reported at <http://pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>.

⁸ As of the end of June 2007, 36,000 military personnel were wounded or evacuated for medical reasons. US military fatalities numbered over 3,600, and total casualties (wounded and killed) exceeded 26,000. Additionally, the military reported 116 suicides and the war-related death of 400 civilian contractors and 130 journalists. See “Iraq Coalition Casualty Count” at <http://icasualties.org/oif/>. The estimated number Iraqi civilians killed by violence ranged from about 67,000 to 73,000, depending on the methodology applied. For this number, see: <http://www.iraqbodycount.org>. Also, see Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Iraq* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 5 July 2007), available at <http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>.

- reports of prisoner mistreatment,
- reports of fraud by defense contractors,
- reports of atrocities against civilians and their subsequent concealment,
- high-profile cases of killing by “friendly fire,”
- disintegration of international support,
- a rising tide of criticism from former military leaders and civilian officials, and
- renewed political debate concerning the fairness, representativeness, and sustainability of an all-volunteer military.

The long conflict in Iraq eventually became vastly unpopular as well as the greatest challenge to America’s all-volunteer military. Poll after poll showed public opposition to the war running from 67 to 73 percent, with equally large numbers questioning various aspects of the conflict, from its likelihood of success, to its civilian and military management, to its strategic goals, to its cost, and even to its moral justification.⁹

National surveys also indicated that a sizable majority of parents (up to 66 percent) would discourage their child from joining the AVF, as similarly large proportions (70 percent) opposed reinstatement of the military draft.¹⁰ Meanwhile, a nationwide poll by the Associated Press/AOL News found that over one-third of US adults expected to see the draft reintroduced in 2007.¹¹

In a May 2007 study of “the link between our national security and our National Guard,” Lawrence Korb and Sean Duggan quote the Chief of the Army National Guard:

⁹ Polling results can be found at <http://pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Associated Press-AOL News Poll of adults nationwide. Reported in *ibid*. In the same poll, 25 percent of respondents believed it “very likely” or “somewhat likely” that “Jesus Christ will return to earth” in the year 2007.

“What we’re working out right now is a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to death.”¹² The authors then offer a complementary view:

However controversial this escalation [sending an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in 2007] may be, proponents and opponents of the war have reached a consensus on an equally important issue: nearly six years of war in Afghanistan and over four years in Iraq have pushed the total Army (Active, Guard, and Reserve) to the *breaking point*.¹³

The military’s heavy dependence on the Guard and Reserves created a crisis, claim the authors, arousing significant concern over whether these units can continue to be effective both at home and abroad.¹⁴ According to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, “current indicators cast considerable doubt on the future sustainability of recruiting and retention [in the reserve components], even if financial incentives continue to increase.”¹⁵

If one were to design a simulation of a “worst case scenario” for maintaining an all-volunteer military, it would be as follows:

1. stretch the Army to the breaking point in a violent and unexpectedly long foreign deployment;
2. rely heavily on reserve forces for operational support abroad;
3. use multiple and extended deployments that create hardships and special sacrifices for military members and their families;
4. deploy Navy and Air Force personnel to Army units that desperately need support;

¹²Lawrence J. Korb and Sean E. Duggan, *Caught Off Guard: The Link Between Our National Security and Our National Guard* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, May 2007), cover page.

¹³ Ibid, p.1. Emphasis added.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Strengthening America’s Defense in the New Security Environment*, Second Report to Congress, 1 March 2007, p. 30. An online copy can be found at: <http://www.cngr.gov/resource-center.CNGR-reports.asp>.

5. spend a great deal more on military operations than originally estimated;
6. hire civilian “mercenaries” to fill strategic gaps in the war zone;
7. alienate segments of the international community;
8. fan the flames of public opposition to the conflict, placing severe strains on military recruiting and retention; and, more hypothetically,
9. become involved in a second or third foreign conflict or a national emergency that requires another significant deployment of armed forces personnel.

What better time to convene a symposium to assess a major study of the AVF and evaluate the future of all-volunteer recruiting, calling upon several of the nation’s most knowledgeable authorities?

A Virtual Symposium: *I Want You!*

The panel consisted of ten persons with considerable expertise regarding America’s AVF. Additionally, Bernard Rostker, author of *I Want You!*, served as the panel discussant. In alphabetical order, the panel included the following: Martin Anderson; Phillip Carter, Mark Eitelberg (panel chair); Eli Flyer; Robert Goldich; Paul Phillips; Robin Pirie; Chris Jehn; Patricia Shields; and John Warner. (Thumbnail biographies of the panel members appear in the appendix.)

The symposium was conducted almost entirely by email. One panel member (Martin Anderson) was interviewed by phone. The symposium began in November 2006. Most panel members responded by December or January 2007. The discussant remarks were written some months later, after a draft summary of the symposium was completed.

Panel members were asked to answer ten questions. Six of the ten questions focused on the book itself; the remaining questions asked panel members to evaluate the AVF. The ten questions were relatively detailed and provocative, and they included 28 follow-up queries that probed for extended responses. As expected, responses from individual panel members varied in length, ranging from twenty-six, doubled-spaced, typed pages to about five or six pages. Due to space limitations, this summary only captures a small portion of the material submitted. Nevertheless, the summary attempts to integrate the verbatim comments of panel members as much as possible to convey a sense of each individual's response to the questions.¹⁶ The summary discussion is presented in two parts: an assessment of Bernard Rostker's book and an evaluation of the AVF. This is followed by Bernard Rostker's discussant remarks and his general reactions to comments by the panel members.

Assessment of *I Want You!*

I Want You! is a tome at over 830 pages (including 31 pages of front material), with scholarly references, over sixty figures and tables, and extensive footnotes that include sources as well as additional, explanatory comments. The book is organized unconventionally, as it presents separate chapters, by period, on the history of the AVF and on the research used during the period to inform decision-makers. Also included in the mix are three chapters (one on research centers, another on selective service, and a third on the role of women) that examine special topics. According to the author, the

¹⁶ Quotations are drawn from text submitted by the panel members and are not cited separately. Quotations attributed to Martin Anderson are from handwritten notes taken during two telephone interviews.

history and the research need to be presented in separate chapters to tell the story of the AVF properly; further, this format of alternating chapters allows general readers to skip the more technical chapters on research and still follow the history.¹⁷

Two editions of the book are available, the more expensive of which includes a DVD. The DVD itself is a storehouse of over 1,700 primary documents, linked to the text. Many of these documents are available in institutional archives or private collections, but rarely as a group. Rostker describes the process that led to creating the DVD in the book's "Acknowledgments."¹⁸

As Rostker states in *I Want You!*, the book is intended to "create a comprehensive record of the more than 30 years of policy and economic analysis that was responsible for today's all-volunteer force."¹⁹ Further, as the author points out, "many have spoken of the all-volunteer force as a classic marriage of political decision-making and policy analysis."²⁰ Indeed, this is a running theme throughout the book: "the importance of analysis in asking the right questions and providing decision-makers with the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action."²¹

What's in the Book and What's Not

The consensus of the panel is that Rostker's book meets the stated objective—and then some. "Comprehensive," "tour de force," "overwhelming and impressive," "excellent," "highly engaging," "incredible," "fascinating," "extraordinary," "remarkable level of detail," and "amazing history" are words that appear consistently in the

¹⁷ Rostker, *I Want You!*, p. 12

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xxx.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

members' assessments of the book as a whole. Nevertheless, panel members were also prompted to identify any notable gaps, misstatements, or omissions in the book's record of analysis and its application. Most panel members mention such shortcomings, but all seem to feel that these are "forgivable," according to one reviewer, in light of the book's overall achievement.

One reviewer, Robin Pirie, observes that *I Want You!* is actually three books: "The first is as [the author] intended; the second a comprehensive and technical review of the analytical work focused on the public policy issues involved; and the third a shorter review of the organizational and political maneuvering by the various actors." Phillip Carter appreciates the division of the sections, noting that the author "did a good job of cross-referencing the research in the history chapters, and vice versa, to build a coherent narrative." Whereas Pirie finds the treatment of "political maneuvering" covered briefly in the book, Carter sees this particular area as a "significant gap," most evident in the author's choice of literature:

Rostker cites almost exclusively the economic and policy articles relating to the AVF, as well as a few op-eds and memos. He does not delve into the extensive political science discussion of the subject, nor the legal discussion of the subject. The adoption of the AVF raised fundamental political and philosophical questions for this country about the nature of collective service and the obligations of citizenship, and I see very little of that discussion reflected in the book beyond some discussion of the racial composition of the AVF.

By ignoring these "two important sets of issues," Carter continues, the book is ultimately incomplete in telling the true story of the AVF. For example, "at its core, President Nixon's decision to end the draft was animated by politics, not policy":

President Nixon did not end the draft because Milton Friedman told him to do it, nor did he do so because the economists at RAND or IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] indicated it could be done successfully. Nixon ended the draft because it was politically unviable and because he wanted to secure the votes of those who would give him credit for doing so. Rostker does not develop [this point] in detail. Nor does he discuss the political environment that shaped this presidential decision. There is a vast body of

literature on this subject, including newspaper columns, political science literature, and public opinion polling. But very little of that makes its way into the book. One comes away from reading *I Want You!* with the impression that policy analysis actually caused the United States to adopt the AVF instead of conscription, but that is not the case. Electoral politics drove this decision, just as electoral politics today ensure there will be no return to conscription in the absence of some massive attack on U.S. soil.

Martin Anderson confirms that political considerations were paramount, at least in the beginning. Anderson first raised the notion of ending the draft with Nixon when he was campaigning for president in the summer of 1967. According to Anderson, Nixon was intrigued with the idea and instructed Anderson to “write it up.” Anderson composed a concept paper on the subject around December 1967, produced 40 or 50 copies, and circulated the paper for comment. At this point on the campaign trail, Nixon would introduce a “different issue of the day.” Anderson suggested that Nixon use the AVF as such an issue, to test its popular appeal. Nixon liked the idea, although a number of others in the campaign disagreed strongly. Later, after Nixon’s election, the problem was “selling and maintaining it politically,” especially among powerful Democrats in Congress as well as with the military itself, “which couldn’t seem to adjust.”

Perhaps the most telling measure of Nixon’s own motives in ending the draft was his complete reversal of position some few years later. “I had considered the end of the draft in 1973 to be one of the major achievements of my administration,” he wrote in *The Real War*. “Now, seven years later, I have reluctantly concluded that we should reintroduce the draft.”²² Anderson sees Nixon’s changing view as tied to his pragmatic nature—recognizing the widely publicized recruiting difficulties of the AVF during the

²² Richard Nixon, *The Real War* (New York: Warner Books, 1980), p 201. Nixon further explains: “Even so, it will cause hardships, and whatever its form, the draft is inherently unfair; it can only be justified by necessity. But, as we look at the 1980s, necessity stares us in the face: we simply cannot risk being without it. To put off that hard decision, could prove penny wise and pound foolish; our reluctance to resume the peacetime draft may make us weak enough to invite war, and then we will find ourselves imposing a wartime draft instead.”

late 1970s at a time of heightened tension internationally. Yet, as Anderson also points out, Nixon was never a “true believer”; that is, he was never so attached to the concept of all-volunteer service that he could see ways of *fixing* problems, rather than simply returning to conscription.²³

Paul Phillips, who worked in the Army’s Secretariat when the draft ended, adds that “a full discussion is needed of the reasoning behind the [Secretary of Defense’s] decision to end the draft [earlier than expected in] January 1973, which was a blow to the Army and got the project off to a terrible start.”²⁴ Again, Phillips implies that political considerations overshadowed any true analysis:

I think the decision was made without deep analysis and for political purposes by the outgoing Secretary. Not enough thought was given to the “sea change” that was about to occur: recruiting went from the least important function in the Army to the most important; the job of recruiting went from the easiest and least demanding to the most demanding and hardest; and the quality required in officers and enlisted men in the recruiting force went from poor to the very best and most imaginative. The Army was too slow to realize this.

“Politics always trumps analysis,” writes Chris Jehn.²⁵ “And that’s a principal omission from the book.” The most significant example, Jehn observes, is the heated opposition to the AVF during the first ten years . . . by senior military leadership, especially, but not only, in the Army”:

²³ An interesting contrast, Anderson finds, is Ronald Reagan, who maintained a close relationship with Nixon over a span of many years, from as early as 1960. “The military,” Anderson comments, “was always a top priority for Reagan.” Reagan was also more of a “true believer” in the AVF, and he actually announced his own support for ending the draft as early as 1964.

²⁴ The draft law expired on the last day of the fiscal year, 30 June 1973. However, draft calls actually concluded earlier, in the preceding January. Phillips feels that the earlier end to draft calls “deprived the Army of an additional 5 months of preparatory time, denied the Army 5 months worth of draftees, and was immediately before the two worst recruiting months of any year.” Some feel that political purposes outweighed “deep analysis” of the potential consequences and long-term impact.

²⁵ Goldich similarly states: “In short, when politics conflicts with analysis, politics always wins—and I would argue that, in a democracy, it should. RAND, IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses], CNA [Center for Naval Analyses], LMI and a host of profit-making companies aren’t political jurisdictions, and nobody voted them into office.”

This opposition took several forms and continued into the 1980s. The “sabotage” (a term used by [others], aptly I believe) ranged from deliberate mismanagement (malfeasance) and misrepresentation of facts and conditions –politics within DoD—to lobbying against the AVF on Capitol Hill—fostering and exploiting tension between Congress and the Administration. This began to abate with Max Thurman’s arrival at the US Army Recruiting Command in 1979 and the tenures of Louis Wilson (1975-79) and Robert Barrow (1979-83) as Commandant of the Marine Corps.²⁶

Jehn provides several other examples of politics influencing decisions over and above those of analysis, even to the detriment of policy. “That fact is not often recognized and discussed,” Jehn writes; “that is, the influence of politics, not partisan Republicans versus Democrats . . . , but politics born of tension within DoD, or in Congress, or between the Congress and the Administration.” At the same time, “we in the business, I believe, are often guilty of a certain conceit about the influence and relevance of our work. [M]y experience . . . leads me to believe our influence, the influence of analysis and its importance to policy outcome, is usually way less than we would like to believe.” Jehn sees this view reflected, as well, in Melvin Laird’s foreword to *I Want You!*: “The times were complex; the changes were significant; and our efforts had to be orchestrated carefully.”²⁷

As noted previously, in addition to minimal material on the influence of politics, Phillip Carter identifies a set of “legal” questions as generally missing from *I Want You!*. In discussing the Constitutional separation of powers for decisions about war, Carter points to the understanding that these vested powers are intended to give citizens a say in

²⁶ Anderson agrees that certain high-level officials in the Army preferred to see the AVF fail, and feels that “sabotage” is an accurate description. He relates an anecdote that one senior military official was particularly outspoken against the AVF. Someone in the Administration (Nixon or Laird) informed him, in no uncertain terms, that he needed to “demonstrate” his full support of the AVF post haste or depart the job; and that his successor would surely be a supporter of all-volunteer service. Within days, the military official delivered a speech declaring his newfound support and confidence in the AVF.

²⁷ Melvin Laird was Secretary of Defense from 1969-1973 and Counselor to the President from 1973-1974. See “Foreword,” in Rostker, *I Want You*, p. xxiv.

when their nation goes to war. “Political participation,” Carter adds, “can only be meaningful if it is *informed* participation, and it is often only meaningful when voters have a personal stake in the outcome.” Yet, “the end of the draft has fundamentally altered the relationship between America and her military.” The net result is that fewer people understand the military and fewer still have a personal stake in debates over military policy. “The fewer voters who know or care about military matters,” writes Carter, “the less Congress will act in this area.” The book “does not address these questions, nor does it cover the literature that has developed in the legal and political arena to answer them.”

What seems to be lacking most, in the opinion of several panel members, is a more extensive review of “the public debate,” which has become a staple, almost obligatory, in many treatments of the Vietnam-era draft and the all-volunteer military. Clearly, *I Want You!* has a different objective. As Robin Pirie points out: “The book is already massive. Of course, you could always have more, perhaps even interleaved chapters on the public debate on the AVF. [The author’s] index has two entries for *The New York Times*, and none for the *Washington Post*.” What seems most interesting in the panel member’s reviews is universal praise for the book and its achievement—yet, even recognizing the self-stated limitations of the work, many express a strong yearning for extended treatment of social, political, and even legal issues that have forever followed the debate of how a nation should best design its army.

Major Gaps in a Minor Way

It is difficult to imagine an 800+ book having very many omissions or oversights. Panel members expressed their views on the topic more as a matter of *emphasis*, than as a

criticism. Robert Goldich, for example, identifies “3 ½ major gaps that I think any evaluation of the AVF and related analysis would have to take into account—but I think that the book is a finished product without them.” According to Goldich:

The first [gap] is that the discussion of the reserve components is very thin, almost nonexistent. . . . Second, and related to the first, is that the entire discussion contains almost no mention of the possible use of the AVF—wartime scenarios, deployments, mobilization, and the like. . . . The third omission is, I think, more important. This is the comparative—and I emphasize comparative—lack of attention given to the qualitative/sociological/historical/professional military analyses of the AVF, [when weighed against] quantitative analyses. . . . Finally, my “half gap” is the lack of treatment of the homosexual issue in the 1992-1993 period. Much of OSD and service manpower officials’ time was taken up with this matter, often to the exclusion of things considered much more important. And quantitative—if not economic—research by none other than the RAND Corporation figured very prominently in the matter, even if that research was ultimately batted aside by Congress.²⁸

Even with these major gaps, Goldich describes the book as “very good on the history of the draft in the US, my special area of expertise.” Indeed, Goldich writes, “I might quibble here and there, but just in terms of professional discussion and dialogue.” In sum, the book “pings like Waterford crystal on the subjects it treats.” As Goldich states: “I think the book is a success as is. Much longer, in one volume or more, would have created a monument or a doorstop, not a book.”²⁹

Chris Jehn, although finding the book “most remarkable for its comprehensiveness and breadth,” is less forgiving on the “almost completely missing” treatment of the reserve components. “Check out the index,” Jehn suggests, and you will find “not one entry for ‘Total Force,’ and only a half-dozen for reserve components.” In contrast, the author devotes a complete chapter to “The Selective Service Sideshow,”

²⁸ Goldich observes elsewhere that RAND wrote the “monumental study of the [homosexual] issue at congressional direction, which essentially said, when boiled down, that the military would survive the admission of open and admitted gays. And the Congress, for better or worse, said thanks but no thanks, and decided to use rolled up copies of the RAND study for firewood.”

²⁹ To be fair on the issue of gaps, Goldich observes, the book does not pretend to be more than it is. “That is, it has a thematic unity between AVF policies and quantitative/economic analyses. It could have included more material on qualitative issues and had a different unity, but if one accepts it for what it is, it is comprehensive and authoritative.”

compared with “the virtual absence of discussion of the reserve components, much less the other two components of the Total Force, civilian government employees and contractors.” As Jehn observes, “the Total Force has become much more important and the model for using the reserves is completely different today than it was in the Cold War years.”

Maybe it wasn't a bad decision to exclude material on the Total Force, Jehn reasons, echoing Goldich and the sentiments of some others, “since it would have increased significantly the size of the book and may have made organizational decisions [regarding the book's content] even more difficult.” Still, Jehn concludes:

What this all means for an assessment of the book is unclear. It does not in any way diminish the achievement, but it does further emphasize that this is a book with a particular focus. And that means the book is not quite the complete record it purports to be, especially in light of policy developments since the end of the Cold War.

Minor Gaps in a Minor Way

Several panel members mentioned relatively minor omissions. Patricia Shields, for example, notes that the book addresses “civilianization,” or the process by which civilians substitute for military personnel. However, the contracting out of services through privatization—where market mechanisms replace entire organizational functions—is apparently overlooked. As Shields observes, “the earlier roots of these policies” would have formed another interesting aspect of the history, “given the high level of contracting out of functions” that has become common practice.

Paul Phillips lists a number of items that he feels should have been included. Among these are an assessment (from the research) as to why the first-term attrition rates of high school dropouts are so much higher than those of high school graduates, and a more detailed examination of population representation (by race, high school completion,

and enlistment test scores) in each of the armed services.³⁰ On the latter item, Phillips writes: “During the early years of the AVF, for public consumption, OSD usually consolidated the performance results of recruiting for all Services, thereby concealing the unfavorable Army data on the racial, educational, and mental category content of recruits. Dr. Rostker’s treatment does the same.” Additionally, states Phillips, a very important aspect of the “quality issue” is missing:

Nowhere do I find the notion that one of the most important reasons for needing high-quality people is due to the gross imperfections in the personnel system that must estimate losses by date and by skill, recruit people who are able to be trained to fill the losses, and then get the properly trained persons to the proper places at the proper time. The inability to do this perfectly creates skill imbalances in the Army as a whole and, of course, in units. Unit commanders in the field must then improvise. . . . [and], obviously, the better the quality of the people they have been sent, the better the results.

Eli Flyer is similarly disappointed with the relatively slim treatment of issues and research relating to first-term attrition. Flyer writes that this particular factor, a focus of his own research for over fifty years, “does not receive the attention it deserves as a key factor in sustaining a volunteer force.” As Flyer observes:

High attrition rates accompany a volunteer force. During the draft, most misbehaving military personnel were not rewarded with a separation, but were subject to punishment through the stockade and retraining. With the ending of the draft, the Military Services appear to have adopted a vastly different philosophy: “volunteer in, volunteer out”; “you don’t want us, then we don’t want you”; and “misbehave, and out you go!”

Flyer then asks (and answers):

Can attrition be managed? Rostker cites OSD quotas as not working. My experience suggests the opposite [Further], numerous studies have shown that first-term attrition can be reduced with improved applicant screening. Traditionally, the Services’ recruiting commands have been opposed to any additional restrictions on applicant supply, even during favorable recruiting periods. But enlistment screening can work in two directions. It can also increase supply, as well.

³⁰ “First-term attrition” refers to military recruits who are discharged before completing a first term of enlistment. In recent years, one-third of recruits in any given cohort (all recruits during a particular year) have failed to complete their first term. Discharge rates vary by certain demographic characteristics, and most notably by high school completion.

Economics Rules

From the outset, in the Author Preface, Rostker singles out “policy and economic analysis” (as noted above) in stating the purpose of the book. On the same page, “military sociologists” are identified as “particular” critics of the AVF, “dismayed at the very thought that the nation would give up conscription”.³¹ The author would likely be among the first to observe that military sociologists have contributed much to the success of the AVF—and that the vast majority have been staunch supporters of the concept since the draft ended. Nonetheless, it is no secret that a war of words has been waged for the past several decades between a few outspoken sociologists and economists on the topic of military service. At the same time, one could say, in the present story, “military sociologists” are often depicted as antagonists.

Indeed, Rostker describes a “new paradigm” for studying military manpower and the shift from psychology and sociology to analytic dominance by labor economists. This shift can be seen in studies by the Gates Commission and in earlier analyses aimed at ending the modern draft, including the notable work of Milton Friedman, whom Rostker dubs the “intellectual father” of the AVF.³² Given the book’s overriding emphasis on economics and its role in the evolution of the AVF, panel members were asked to comment on whether the book is overly “biased” toward economics.

Patricia Shields, a non-economist, captures the panel’s consensus, although with somewhat less fervor than others display. “I think there was a bias, and the bias is

³¹ Rostker, *I Want You!*, p. iii.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 749. The Gates Commission, named after its chair, Thomas Gates, is The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The Gates Commission published its final report in February 1970.

reasonable At the same time, I think it underestimates the role of sociologists such as Charles Moskos, David Segal, and Mady Segal.” As Shields further comments:

This book may show the true dominance of economists and of research arms that are almost attached to DoD (RAND, General Research Corporation, Hoover Institution) in the world of policy. . . . The emphasis was not scholarly (university-based) research. It was really dominated by Think-Tank research. And, perhaps it shows how important this kind of research is in practice.

“At the same time,” Shields adds, “there is something very sterile about economic analysis. Sociologists and psychologists have contributed much to our larger understanding of why and how the AVF works. They have also investigated important issues dealing with the integration of minorities and women, as well as making connections between military human resource policy, institutional structure, and societal trends.”

At the more extreme end of the discussion is John Warner, a professor of economics:

Of course the book has an economic bias, and well it should. The economic issues of cost, efficiency, and relative effectiveness of draft versus volunteer forces were the big picture, and hence dominant, issues in the debate about conscription, and these issues are the purview of economists. This is not to say that the contributions of researchers in other disciplines were unimportant—just that much of it deals with second-order questions rather than big picture issues of cost and force effectiveness.

Robert Goldich, a history major in his university days, similarly claims that the economic bias is intentional and well-deserved. “It is important to remember that while psychology and sociology had lots to say *about* the AVF as a military force,” Goldich observes, “it was economics that was related to the administration of the manpower in the AVF, or that the AVF wanted to recruit. The bias, of course, wasn’t [the author’s] in writing the book—it was in the extent to which economists and quantitative analysts did AVF recruiting, retention, and compensation work to the near exclusion of other

disciplines.” Goldich qualifies his point in a separate discussion, raising again the notion that politics and associated social forces inevitably trump analysis:

I think it is important to note that, no matter what one thinks about excessive concentration of economic analysis in AVF policymaking, by definition, if the AVF was going to recruit volunteers, it *had* to use a lot of labor economic analysis Furthermore, while the labor economists may have been the major analytical community involved in the Gates Commission, and while Friedman’s neurons may have accounted for a lot of the intellectual support for the AVF, the fact remains that the ultimate fathers of the AVF were not analytical, but political and social. The United States went to an AVF because of what came to be perceived as a morally corrupt draft in the middle of a war the Administration was unwilling to win and which seemed to be incoherently fought, combined with an extraordinary range of other types of social change. Absent Vietnam, what the labor economists said or did would not have mattered much.

Evaluation of the AVF

Robert Goldich’s point about the combination of factors that led to the end of the modern draft in 1973 is a useful segue toward evaluating the present status and prospects of the AVF—as well as any combination of possible factors that might lead to the draft’s revival. In the summer of 2007, “as the US military is engaged in its largest and longest operations since the Vietnam War,” the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was asked to study “the armed forces’ ability to recruit and retain the personnel they need to carry out those missions.”³³ The impetus for another such study was an expanding debate over “whether a draft would be more desirable than an all-volunteer force . . . as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to require substantial numbers of military personnel.”³⁴ According to CBO analysts, “the last time debate about the desirability of the draft was prominent and protracted was during the Vietnam War.”³⁵

³³ Congressional Budget Office, *The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance*, Pub. No. 2960 (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, July 2007), Preface.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁵ *Ibid.* This observation is arguable. Indeed, the “AVF versus draft debate” preceded the war in Vietnam and has never truly ended. In 1979, at the peak of the so-called “hollow force” years, several major studies

If one were to look for clues that might foretell failure in the AVF, where best than in the factors that were largely responsible for its creation and long-term durability? Bernard Rostker identifies four major reasons why the AVF succeeded in *I Want You!*: (1) leadership; (2) research (and its applications); (3) managing and developing successful programs; and (4) adequate budgets. He also chronicles the ability to learn, adapt to change, and overcome many difficult problems during the past forty years. Yet, in closing the book, Rostker poses a question: “Is the all-volunteer armed force sustainable?” His answer to this question is simply, “Only time will tell.”³⁶

Panel members were asked to evaluate the AVF itself, in light of the author’s own appraisal and closing statement, which seem to imply that the future of all-volunteer service is essentially uncertain. Martin Anderson, to whom Nixon gave “the major credit for conceiving the idea and implementing” the AVF,³⁷ observed that only a catastrophe would compel the nation to reintroduce a draft—and this, according to Anderson, is basically “unthinkable.” Consequently, Anderson puts the odds of returning to conscription at “one-hundred to nothing.”

Chris Jehn shares Anderson’s perspective, commenting that, “if we *want* an AVF, we can *have* it.” Jehn explains:

Every crisis that has confronted the AVF so far is a self-inflicted wound. And all have been easily (in retrospect) overcome by application of one or more of Rostker’s four factors. So, once we accept [Milton] Friedman’s assertion that conscription is inconsistent with our country’s principles of freedom, and we have the will to apply

were undertaken on the issue, and calls for a return to conscription were considerably more widespread than in 2007. These studies, the ongoing debate, recruiting difficulties, and continuing concern about the nation’s preparedness led to the renewal of draft registration, a number of changes to reinvigorate the AVF, and the formation a Presidential Commission on an All-Volunteer Force. *I Want You!* covers this period in considerable detail. Also see Mark J. Eitelberg, “The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years,” in Fredland et al., eds., *Professionals*, pp. 68-98.

³⁶ Rostker, *I Want You!*, p. 756.

³⁷ These are Nixon’s words, as quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 748. Rostker adds that “the credit Nixon gave to Anderson was well deserved.”

Rostker's four factors, especially leadership, there are no imaginable circumstances short of total mobilization, as for World War II, that would require resumption of conscription.

John Warner expresses a similar opinion, finding that the future of the AVF "will require the commitment of politicians to support it adequately." Further, he believes that the research community must "continually inform them [politicians] about the state of the AVF and the consequences of ending it." At the same time, although Warner sees a "lack of political will to provide the resources needed" as a factor that could threaten the AVF, he considers a return to the draft unlikely. When pressed to describe the first signs that the AVF might be unraveling, Warner is nevertheless able to pinpoint a possible scenario, which is not necessarily catastrophic:

The main thing that would make the AVF a failure is an ineffective fighting force. By all accounts, US forces in Iraq have done everything asked of them, but a decline in combat effectiveness or unwillingness to fight would be the AVF's Achilles heel, more than supply-side difficulties. So far, the AVF has performed superbly in conflict and has the perception of being a much more effective fighting force than a conscripted force would be. If this perception were lost, I think there would be more calls for conscription. But I don't see that happening.

The notion of ineffectiveness, or at least a perception of it, is not mentioned by other panelists. However, most do agree, as Jehn and Warner find, that a critical element in the future of the AVF is the continuing support of the American people and their leaders. For example, Phillip Carter writes:

Rostker's four factors are all necessary to the development and sustainability of the AVF, but they are not themselves sufficient. In my opinion, the key variable is will. The American people must have the will to support the AVF, and this will must be expressed in concrete terms by the willingness of young, qualified Americans to join the military. This will must be nourished by America's political leaders, and it must be sustained through effective use of the military and through victory. But if and when this will evaporates, so too would the AVF.

"Even if the AVF had outstanding leadership, brilliant research, excellent management, and adequate resources," Carter continues, "it still could fail." Indeed, he sees "a limit to the AVF's ability to recruit American men and women." Theoretically,

Carter states, “it may always be possible to pay one more dollar for the next most costly recruit. But in practice, there exists a point where the AVF becomes too costly, and where the American public (and Congress) may be willing to consider conscription as the proper course of action.”

Paul Phillips likewise draws less on theory than on practice and experience in evaluating the near-term prospects of the AVF. As Phillips points out, “the Army part of the AVF seems not to work in long, unpopular wars.” Meanwhile, in 2006, “the Army had to take drastic steps to meet its recruiting goals. It had to recruit non-US citizens with the promise of a quick track to citizenship, waive criminal records, reduce quality standards, offer bonuses up to \$40,000, enlarge the enlisted force by 1,000, and extend the eligible age for enlisting to 42, a time when most career soldiers are qualified to retire.” Although the prospects of the AVF are still “probably good” and “we will muddle through,” Phillips believes “the next two years will tell us whether to continue with the AVF or return to a draft”:

By then, we will either be mostly out of Iraq or still committed with large forces there. If we are out and are satisfied that an Army of about 500,000 is right, that there will be no more Iraqs—at least not without allies sharing the ground combat mission—and that we will not have to go it alone in any other matter affecting our national interests, the AVF can continue.

“The AVF is about as secure as anything in public policy,” Robin Pirie states, “because none of the alternatives can command enough of a following to swing a change—and rightly so.” In any event, Pirie continues, even if the political setting becomes “ugly,” it is difficult to imagine that conscription would emerge as more desirable than the AVF:

Completely incompetent and foolish leadership may stress the force beyond tolerable limits, but even then it is hard to see how a draft would help. The time will come when we have withdrawn from Iraq, and there is a clamor for a “peace dividend” when the

armed forces will be in pretty sorry shape. Then the Outs will start accusing the Ins of letting readiness slide, and the Ins will try to fix readiness without spending any money, and things will be generally ugly; but I doubt if the country will believe we need to start up conscription to make things better.

Pirie's conclusion is based on historical trends and what has become a typical, cyclical pattern of politics and defense spending. Robert Goldich additionally looks to history in evaluating the longer-term prospects of a return to the draft, but he is far less optimistic:

At some point in the future, there *will* be a big, manpower-intensive war. We *will* have to enlarge the force to the tens of millions. Casualties *will* be in the millions. We'll need to draft then. When will it happen, I cannot say. . . . We'll do what we have to do. We fought two land wars in Asia from 1950 to 1973, costing us 500,000 casualties, and we're fighting a smaller one in Eurasia that's cost us 26,000. One member of Congress asked Woodrow Wilson, shortly after the declaration of war in 1917, "You're not going to send soldiers over there, are you?" Wilson. . . . knew that the currency of international politics was the lives of American soldiers, and so off went the American Expeditionary Forces—two million of them.

This scenario brings the discussion full circle, to the catastrophic event that Martin Anderson termed "unthinkable." "If history is any guide," Goldich observes, "the absolutely inevitable nature of international political competition means that we will face, if not a peer competitor, at least a regional competitor in an area of the world important to us." Without a dependence on nuclear weapons, this type of warfare would call for massive ground forces and a return to military conscription. Goldich proceeds to describe two broad scenarios—both requiring a massive, total, or near-total mobilization—that would likely lead to conscription. "What I do *not* see as happening," Goldich asserts, "is a return to the draft just to deal with troublesome recruiting. Whether or not it ought to happen is unimportant. It won't." As Goldich and others observe, "any conscription regime ultimately depends on popular, voluntary compliance" or "a strong popular consensus that a draft is necessary," which will not occur, absent extreme scenarios.

Throughout the comments on this topic, panel members emphasize that decision-makers and the body politic continually need research to inform them and to help find solutions to the AVF's inevitable problems. In over thirty years of experience (as of 2007) with the AVF, there has never been a time when all ran smoothly, when one could sit back, basking in the glory of the moment and not be concerned about some major issue or future crisis looming on the horizon. It is in the nature of public policy that problems are minimized and never fully resolved. Patricia Shields captures this sentiment best by quoting Aaron Wildavsky from *Speaking Truth to Power* (1979):

The reforms of the past lay like benign booby traps, which could make one stumble even if they did not explode. . . . More and more public policy is about coping with consequences of past policies. . . . The more we do, therefore, the more there is for us to do, as each program bumps into others and sets off consequences all down the line. In this way, past solutions, if they are large enough, turn into future problems. . . . Instead of thinking of permanent solutions, we should think of permanent problems in the sense that one problem always succeeds and replaces another.³⁸

The Contribution of *I Want You!*

It is in Wildavsky's words, too, that we find the major contribution of *I Want You!* Obviously, aside from any perceived flaws in the book, any misgivings about aspects of topics treated too extensively or too lightly, the work as a whole is a remarkable resource for those interested in observing the union of economic analysis and policy—and the products of their marriage—over a span of decades. To the extent that history repeats itself, this information offers invaluable insight toward resolving the inevitable problems of the present and the future. Indeed, as Martin Anderson comments, when anyone starts questioning the AVF or its performance, they need only open this book to find the answers, the solutions to sustaining an effective force. Phillip Carter, in similar fashion,

³⁸ Aaron Wildavsky, *Speaking Truth to Power* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), pp. 4-5.

sees the book's greatest contribution as providing "historical context for the hard questions about military manpower." It is "the best kind of history—one that illuminates the problems of today."

This is a rather dense work, as one would expect from a volume of over 800 pages that focuses on thirty years of military manpower policy and economic analysis—accompanied by a DVD with a library more than 1,700 linked sources in their totality. Consequently, it probably goes without saying that *I Want You!* is not for the casual reader. As Robin Pirie states, "not many readers will have the patience and interest to plow through the whole thing." Given its "encyclopedic nature," Chris Jehn finds, "it's highly readable"—but "this isn't Faulkner." John Warner agrees: "The book will be a good read for people who lived through the period and knew the people and the issues. . . . The book will be heavier going for the uninitiated." Universally, panel members agree that *I Want You!* is "an incredible reference book" (Patricia Shields) and should appeal mostly to libraries, students in public policy courses (particularly at the graduate level), policy analysts, policymakers, researchers, and "all persons in government dealing with manpower and personnel policies and operations" (Paul Phillips).

The book has its share of drama, intrigue, and fascinating anecdotes, which add even more interest for scholars and practitioners drawn to the subject. It is clearly a labor of love and a lasting legacy for its author. One would only hope that a more condensed, companion volume could be created to reach a wider audience—or perhaps a series of related works, including a book that gleans the political and bureaucratic elements of the story.³⁹ In fact, RAND has already published a monograph, *America Goes to War:*

³⁹ Robin Pirie offers this particular recommendation twice in his comments on the book.

Managing the Force During Times of Stress and Uncertainty, by Bernard Rostker, that ties the topic more closely to current events and draws bits and pieces from *I Want You!*—most noticeably, with an almost-identical closing line.⁴⁰

In summary, *I Want You!* receives qualified accolades from the panel. Robert Goldich was most enthusiastic in commenting on the book's lasting achievement. Although not all panel members shared Goldich's level of enthusiasm, all shared his appreciation of the book's importance toward advancing our knowledge and understanding and illuminating the road ahead. Colorfully, Goldich offers a honeyed prediction that spans generations:

Long after Rostker and all of us symposium participants are pushing up daisies, people should and will read this book when they study American history in the last third of the 20th Century; the evolution of the US armed forces; and how Western developed countries generally, and the US in particular, viewed the military as an institution. It'll be praised in the dissertations of people whose parents are yet unborn.

Those of us centered on personal and practical needs tend to be more sparing in our praise. We are simply pleased to find, as Patricia Shields observes, “a great case study of the interplay between politics, implementation issues (and the public administrator's role), and policy research,” along with a mammoth collection of source documents. “I will likely rely on Rostker's book for years as a resource for research about military manpower questions,” states Phillip Carter. According to Chris Jehn: “It will certainly make literature searches easier!” Yes, a *lot* easier.

⁴⁰ Bernard D. Rostker, *America Goes to War: Managing the Force During Times of Stress and Uncertainty* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007). As Rostker writes: “As it has from the beginning, the all-volunteer force remains fragile. . . . However, only time will tell.” This appears in the monograph's summary on p. xxi and again in its conclusion on p. 85.

Discussant Remarks by Bernard Rostker

First, I want to thank Mark Eitelberg for taking on this project.

Many of the comments by panel members suggest that I neglected the role of politics and public opinion in discussing the fortunes of the AVF. I accept this criticism as an error of commission rather than omission. Moreover, having served—as several of the panel members have also served—in senior positions in the Department of Defense, I would be the last person to suggest that politics does not rule. Nevertheless, in no way does this negate the need for good analysis to help decision-makers understand the likely consequences of their actions. Thankfully, analysts do not make decisions, but those who do should always have the benefit of good analysis so they can understand the consequences of their options. In almost all cases cited by the panel members, the book discusses the issues they raised, though obviously not in the detail that some panel members might want or would have included themselves. I hope that they or others will fill in these gaps, building on the story I tell and using the many source documents that are currently available on the accompanying DVD. These source documents are linked to the text, putting them in context, thereby helping current and future scholars understand the importance and impact of a particular letter, memorandum, study, or report.

Mark mentioned my subsequent monograph, *America Goes to War*, which more clearly addresses whether the current situation could lead to a return of the military draft. For good or bad, I did not want to take this issue head on in *I Want You!*, because I did not want the book to focus on the current situation. In *America Goes to War*, the arguments are strictly political, stressing the different views concerning service to the state that one finds in the English-speaking world and on the European continent. I also

note that we have used the draft four times: twice it failed and twice it succeeded. The two times we had a successful draft, during the two World Wars, the draft enjoyed popular support. The draft was problematic when public support was lost, as it was during the Civil War and the Vietnam War. It was successful only when it had strong backing from the American people. I also argued that the very same condition allowing the AVF to succeed, popular support, is required to make a draft successful. Without the support of the people, why should anyone assume that the government could resort to the use of force to conscript the unwilling to fight in an unpopular war? What Congress would vote for that!

Future of the AVF

The current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan is the most difficult challenge for the AVF so far. The AVF is being tested on several fronts. First, will the military be able to recruit enough young men and women to maintain the ranks? To date, it seems that force size can be maintained, though not expanded. Some people have commented that bonuses are unpatriotic. In fact, bonuses were used as far back as the founding of the republic. For example, after the first battle of Trenton, General Washington enticed his troops to remain after their contracts expired by offering “ten dollars hard currency” to anyone who would sign up for six more weeks of campaigning. The troops stayed, and the Army subsequently won victories at the second battle of Trenton and then at Princeton.

Second, will Army members stay, given their repeated deployments? Again, the answer appears to be that, despite a drop in personnel retention, the overall results remain

positive. Third, will the Army's performance remain high? Here, again, the answer seems to be yes. One of the biggest surprises as the AVF matured was a sharp increase in the size of the career force and the reduced need for new recruits, along with a commensurate increase in enlistment standards and the overall performance of the force. While reduced retention and a lower enlistment standards do not bode well for the future, to date, the changes are relatively minor based on the size of the force.

Arguably, the most controversial aspect of the AVF is the same today as it was when the Gates Commission convened in the late 1960s—that is, the philosophical differences between those who see military service as the legitimate responsibility of all citizens and those who do not. To me, the question to draft or not to draft is less philosophical and more pragmatic; given the size of the population and the needs of the military, can the goals of those who long for universal service ever be met, and at what cost? The cost is not only in terms of the budget needed to support universal service, but the loss of efficiency in the military resulting from shorter enlistments and higher turnover that would inevitably follow the reinstatement of conscription. The example of France is relevant here; no country seemed more committed to universal service than France, and yet, when faced with the realities of a modern state and the demands of a technologically sophisticated military, France abandoned conscription in favor of a professional, voluntary force.

Appendix

Biographical Information on Symposium Participants (In Alphabetical Order)

Martin Anderson is the Keith and Jan Hurlbut Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. His previous positions include the following: Director of Research, Nixon presidential campaign; Senior Policy Adviser, Reagan presidential campaigns; member, Defense Manpower Commission; member, Defense Policy Board; and numerous others. He is author or coauthor of several books, including two on the military draft.

Phillip Carter is an associate in the law firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge and a frequent contributor of articles on national security issues to *Slate*, the *Washington Monthly*, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Chicago Tribune*, *Legal Affairs*, and other publications. He was mobilized by the US Army for service in Operation Iraqi Freedom from July 2005 to December 2006.

Mark Eitelberg (Panel Chair) is Professor of Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Previously, he was a senior scientist with the Human Resources Research Organization. He has studied and written extensively on topics relating to the all-volunteer military since 1975. He has consulted with many government agencies and private organizations on defense manpower issues, and is a former editor of the journal, *Armed Forces & Society*.

Eli Flyer is a personnel psychologist and military manpower authority who has worked for over 50 years in the manpower and personnel arena, including senior positions with the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as a private consultant. He created a repository for military manpower data (in the 1970s) that later became the Defense Manpower Data Center. He was also instrumental in creating the Defense Personnel Security Research Center.

Robert Goldich recently retired from federal service as Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. He has published widely, including numerous CRS Issue Briefs, and is an authority in military manpower and personnel issues as well as other defense areas. At the time of the symposium, his son was serving with the US Marine Corps in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Paul Phillips served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of the Army from 1971-1979. He retired from the Army in 1979 as Brigadier General. At the time of the symposium, his grandson was serving with the US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Robin Pirie has an impressive career in federal service, including the following positions: Acting Secretary of the Navy; Under Secretary of the Navy; Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Assistant Secretary of Defense. His previous positions in the private sector include the following: President of Essex Corporation and Vice President of the Center for Naval Analyses.

Chris Jehn is Vice President-Government Programs with Cray Incorporated. His previous positions include the following: Assistant Director for National Security in the Congressional Budget Office; member of the Commission on Servicemembers and Veterans Transition Assistance; executive positions at the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Center for Naval Analyses; and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel.

Patricia Shields is Director of the Texas State University Master of Public Administration Program. She is editor of the journal, *Armed Forces & Society*. She has more than 40 publications in scholarly journals such as *Administration and Society*, *American Review of Public Administration*, *Public Administration Quarterly* and the *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*.

John Warner is Professor of Economics at Clemson University, and is author of numerous publications on military manpower issues. He is widely regarded as an authority on the all-volunteer military, and is North American Editor of *Defence and Peace Economics*. Previously, he was a staff economist at the Center for Naval Analyses and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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Bernard Rostker (Book's Author) is a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. His previous positions include the following: Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Under Secretary of the Army; Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and Director of Selective Service. He is author of numerous other publications.