

**The Socialist International and the Design of a Community
Policy in Latin America During the Late 1970s and 1980s: The
Case of Spain and Italy**

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Introduction

This text is the result of my trajectory during the last three years as PhD student at LUISS University (Rome). Several reasons led me to reflect on this matter. In the first place, my heritage is a mixture of Italian, Colombian, Chilean and Belgian; therefore, the knowledge and analysis of Europe and Latin America were at the center of my interests, and my concern regarding the relations between these two regions started to rise as I began to notice their current stalemate. My educational background as a historian was also fundamental and determined my research topic, as well as the manner through which I addressed it. Furthermore, my professional training provides me the awareness that no society is able to orient its future by denying and forgetting its past.

Likewise, as a historian, I began to reflect on the origins of the stalemate and heydays of the European and Latin American links. When I thought about the times of greater rapprochement, I had to reflect on the 1980s when the European Economic Community (EEC) made, for the first time, truly political attempts to connect with the other side of the Atlantic. By exploring this in depth, I was able to notice strong efforts made by European social democracy since the late 1970s (of course, facilitated by the convergence of socialist governments in Europe) in supporting developing countries and in particular Latin America. Furthermore, the international context at the time and the Cold War's turning point made this easier and encouraged Latin American interest in Europe rather than in their traditional ally, i.e. the United States.

The fact is that the current political relationships between the European Union (EU) and Latin America display a high level of “routinization” in terms of their links; indeed, today, as during the 1980s, democracy, human rights and development cooperation are and were at the core of European priorities in Latin America. Nevertheless, during the late 1970s and 1980s (the period of rapprochement between the two continents) several efforts were made in order to give impetus to these links (e.g. the Social International's (SI) efforts in Latin America, the Pact of San José, etc.). At that time, new mechanisms were planned in order to create new opportunities through the reinforcement of the integration process across the

Atlantic. However, throughout history several changes in the international arena have challenged these relationships. For instance, in Spain and Italy, the EU acquired an increasing role in their external actions. Likewise, the conflicts in the Middle East and the Mediterranean have occupied a central place in their foreign policy, especially since 2001 when the topic of security has become increasingly important. Furthermore, for the EU, the displacement of the global economy towards the Asia-Pacific region has reduced the primacy of the Atlantic region.

Nevertheless, the EU needs Latin America just as Latin America needs Europe because in conditions in which “sovereign” actors (e.g. the U.S., China, Russia, India, and Turkey) tend to dominate the international agenda and make efforts to increase their national power within the international system, Latin American and the EU must work together to better defend their interests. They should act at a regional level since their influence would be significantly lower if they take action at the state level. In this sense, both regions share common positions to promote greater interdependence in the world. Moreover, as the political scientist Zaiki Laïdi claims, both Europe and Latin America require a strong multilateral system “to survive” on the international level and to contrast such “sovereign” actors. Therefore, both should aim to construct a new world order based on “shared sovereignty” and ruled by specific norms (since they do not trust in “power politics”) in such a way as to balance the world system. They really need joint action.¹

Therefore, this research is framed during the late 1970s and 1980s when the fundamentals of the relations between the EEC-UE and Latin America were forged. At that time, social democracy played a key role by supporting and promoting the establishment of formal links between the two continents. Indeed, due to the fact that they started to lose electorate in the early 1970s, the European social democracy had to react. The social democratic leaders, the German Willy Brandt, the Swedish Olof Palme and the Austrian Bruno Kreisky, realized that they had to intervene to regain people’s support². As Palme wrote to Brandt and

¹ Zaiki Laïdi, “¿Sobrevirá Europa en la globalización? *Estudios Internacionales*, 37, 146, (2004): 105-115 doi:10.5354/0719-3769.2011.14546

² Willy Brandt: former German Chancellor of the West Germany from 1969 to 1974 and leader of the German Social Democratic Party –SPD- from 1967 to 1987. Olof Palme: Swedish Social Democratic politician and Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

Kreisky in 1972, the main objective of social democracy must be to find solutions to citizens' real problems.³ Furthermore, the intervention should be at global level because the crises faced during the 1970s could not be solved within the national borders anymore. As a result, the idea of being international players and geopolitical actors began to thrive among the European Social Democrats. Within this context, the interest in the Third World started to rise and, therefore, the interest in Latin America.

Thus, in times like the present, when these relations should be reviewed because of its stalemate, the analysis of this juncture matters to identify what are the continuities and perhaps the discontinuities between the current time and the period of growing rapprochement (i.e. the 1980s); hence, with this awareness and by knowing their strengths and weaknesses, perhaps the current “routinization” of the relations between the EU and Latin America could be overcome. Likewise, in order to understand the current crisis of social democracy, it is necessary to look at the causes of some of the guidelines that the social democrats made once they came to power rather than in certain philosophical weaknesses. Indeed, various elements (structural and circumstantial) intervened in this “wear” of social democracy. In this respect, it is worth recalling that at the time neoliberalism became the benchmark of social, economic and political transformations as social democracy increasingly espoused free trade and capitalism. In regards to this last point, social democracy somehow tried to “correct” capitalism by including social matters but it never aimed to “replace or transform it”. This has led social democracy to “adapt” to capitalism and this “adaptation”, however, in the end, has contributed to its weakening⁴.

Coming back to the period of great rapprochement, it is worth noting that some of the SI objectives were more visible when socialists assumed power. This is why this research

twice Prime Minister of Sweden: from 1969 to 1976 and from 1982 to 1986. Bruno Kreisky Social democratic politician, Chancellor of Austria from 1970 until 1983.

³Olof Palme, letter to Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, 17 March 1972, in *L'Internazionale Socialista. Storia, protagonisti, programmi, presente, future*, edited by Mario Telò, (Roma: L'unità, 1990), 69.

⁴As regards the crisis of the social democracy, see: Perry Anderson, “El centro puede aguantar. La primavera francesa”. *New Left Review*, 195, (2017): 7-31; Christian Blasberg, *Sinistra una storia di fantasmi* (Roma: LUISS University Press, 2019); Fernando Manuel Suárez, “¿Qué le pasa a la socialdemocracia en América Latina?”, *Nueva Sociedad*, November 2018. Retrieved from <https://nuso.org/articulo/que-le-pasa-la-socialdemocracia-en-america-latina/>

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focuses on the case of Spain and Italy. This, however, does not mean that they were the only ones who were interested in Latin America. For example, Portuguese, German and Nordic Social Democracy played a key role in establishing transatlantic contacts and the French socialist government was very sensitive in regard to Latin American matters (e.g. the Franco-Mexican initiative that recognized the FMLN-FDR movement as a legitimate force in El Salvador)⁵.

With respect to Spain, the role that the SI and German Social Democracy (SPD) played in redefining the objectives of the Spanish socialist party is well known along with their involvement in the Spanish democratization. There is no doubt that the SPD's interest increased because of the fear that what had happened in Portugal (i.e. a turbulent period after the fall of the dictatorship) could be repeated in Spain.⁶ Additionally, the close relationship established between Willy Brandt, President of the SI, and Felipe González (General Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party -PSOE) encouraged and facilitated their contacts. This relationship had repercussions not only in the Spanish transition, but also within the SI itself, since González became one of its closest collaborators. Brandt would later recognize the central role played by the PSOE in expanding the SI in the New Continent.⁷

Even if the interest of Felipe González in Latin America became an emblematic case, it was not the only one. Other European governments, parties and movements strived to intensify relations with Latin America. Examples of this can be seen in their efforts to support the initiatives of the Contadora Group (i.e. Colombia, México, Panamá, Venezuela) and the San José Pact, which sought to become a paradigm of world order organized on the basis of the North-South axis to the detriment of the East-West axis.

⁵ The SI supported the Franco-Mexican initiative, condemned the Napoleon Duarte's military Junta and the USA involvement. Likewise, the SI reaffirmed its full support for Guillermo Ungo, political head of the FMLN-FDR. "Declaration du Bureau de L'Internationale Socialiste sur Le Salvador, September 25, 1981". Fondazione Craxi, (F.1 Sz.1 S.10 Ss.5 F.3 L.2 D1).

⁶ Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, *El Amigo alemán. El SPD y el PSOE de la dictadura a la democracia*, (Barcelona: RBA Libros. 2012), 399.

⁷ Bernd Rother, "Willy Brandt y España" Texto presentado en la jornada titulada *Willy Brant en su centenario. La huella alemana en Aragón*, organizada por la Fundación Domínguez y la Fundación Ebert, Zaragoza, March, 13 2014.

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Italy took a position along this same line of action and actively sustained the establishment of democracy in Latin America. Despite his loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, Bettino Craxi, the Vice President of the SI, General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and Prime Minister of Italy (1983-1987), opposed US policies and interventions in Latin America and actively supported socialist movements in countries subjected to dictatorial governments. Likewise, the friendship between Craxi and González favored the rise and consolidation of common policies and objectives.

Thus, why are the cases of Spain and Italy at the core of this research? For Spain, Latin America represented a political capital, which enabled Madrid to increase its “prestige” within the EEC and could favor the quick internationalization of the Spanish economy. Additionally, even if the Mediterranean was the most important political action area for Italy, it has historically been close to Latin America. Indeed, since the end of the Second World War, Rome was interested in the intensification of the links with Latin America, not only because of the common culture, religion, ethnicity and language (*Latin* people) but also because this could be a way to overcome the isolation caused by the Fascism⁸. In fact, during the 1960s, the relationships between the two countries increased since Italy strived to include Latin American problems in the EEC’s debates by presenting itself as a kind of “bridge” between the two regions. In this same line of thought, the *Instituto Italo-Latinoamericano* (IILA) was launched in 1966. The IILA aimed to coordinate and promote Italian initiatives (cultural, scientific, social, economic, etc.) in Latin America.⁹ As a result, both Italy and Spain shared a common interest towards the region on the other side of the Atlantic. Obviously, the great migratory flow facilitated and pushed the nexus between the two sides. Furthermore, this election of two case studies allows the assessment and comparison of the international policies of two socialist parties towards Latin America.

Although this research often will refer to all of Latin America, it will in particular focus on the cases of Chile, Venezuela and Nicaragua (respectively an authoritarian country, a

⁸ Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (ed), *Manuale della politica estera italiana 1947-1993*, (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1996), 82.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

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“social democratic” country, and a country which experienced a civil war). As seen in this research, given their local circumstances, the relations between both sides of the Atlantic were diverse: mainly transnational relations (and through the SI) in Chile because of the dictatorship, governmental relations in Venezuela and international/transnational relations in Nicaragua.

The selection of Chile is because this country was somehow the first “social democratic” experiment (with Salvador Allende) in Latin America as it achieved this victory through democratic elections. Afterwards, the coup d’état in Chile led the European social democracy, and the whole world in general, to think about the mistakes and weakness of the Allende’s government to keep the power. Hence, the first real interest of European social democracy in Latin America emerged from the Chilean experience. This has greatly impacted social democracy although it has scarcely been studied. Literature, in fact, has mainly focused on the links between the Chilean Communist party and the European Communist party (in particular the Historic Compromise of Berlinguer), as well as those between the Chilean Christian Democratic party and European Christian democratic parties¹⁰.

The selection of Venezuela as case study was mainly due to the role played by Carlos Andrés Pérez who strived for the rapprochement with the European social democracy (as the meeting in Caracas in 1976 testified) and for consolidating a Latin American identity and integration. Pérez, by sharing the same SI postulates (he actually was one of the most “socially democratic” leaders in Latin America), encouraged the Latin American dialogue with the European social democracy. Furthermore, the choice of Nicaragua as a case study was mostly because the European Social democracy to some extent saw in that country an opportunity for it to become a kind of “third way” outside the bipolar scheme. The fear of the “Cubanization” of the country, the American interferences in the region and the triumph of the Sandinista movement in 1979 captured the attention of the SI. Hence, all of this gave

¹⁰ For instance see the studies of Raffaele Nocera, *Acuerdos y desacuerdos. La DC italiana y el PDC chileno 1962-1973* (Chile: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2015); Santoni Alessandro, *Il PCI e i giorni del Cile. Alle origini di un mito politico* (Roma: Carocci, 2008); Onofrio Pappagallo, *Verso il nuovo mondo. Il PCI e l’America Latina (1945-1973)*. (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2017).

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the European social democracy the opportunity to act and demonstrate that they were the “better option” to go beyond and overcome the Cold War’s order.

For the supporters of the SI in Latin America, the European social democracy was the key to the modernization, democratization and transformation of their political parties. In terms of ideology, Europe is closer to Latin American than the United States. In the opinion of Beatrice Rangel, the former vice president of the Women’s Socialist International and Carlos Andrés Pérez’s right hand, the SI was indispensable for the modernization of Latin American parties and the consolidation of democracy in the region¹¹. They took inspiration from Europe because the history and the democratization process of the old continent were the closest to the Latin American process. Prior to the achievement of democracy, Latin Americans underwent wars as well as dictatorships. On the contrary, the USA was a *sui generis* case. In fact, it is interesting to note how Europe in terms of culture, ideas, and beliefs was always closer to Latin Americans than the USA. Only since the nineteenth century did the U.S. become a key actor mainly in terms of trade, the economy, finance, and security. This same pattern is replayed in the years that interest us here.

Accordingly, this research aims to explore the role played by the European social democracy (mainly focusing on the PSI and the PSOE) and the SI in the rapprochement between the EEC and Latin America during the late 1970s and 1980s. This barely researched chapter of history is very important because it constitutes the foundation on which the entire framework that currently governs Euro-Latin American relations was built. Therefore, this research targets to clarify the factors, the conditions and the actors that facilitated this bi-regional rapprochement.

Moreover, as stated above, the relationship between the EEC and Latin America reached a new stage during the late 1970s-1980s, in which the SI and the socialist governments of Spain and Italy mattered. Indeed, under the scheme of the Cold War, the SI found the opportunity to establish a sort of “third way” against the bipolar script (Cold Wars’ order). This took place in a context in which the economic transformation of capitalism

¹¹ Interview with Beatrice Rangel, Miami, March 12, 2018.

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encouraged the strengthening of the international relations between countries. Within this context, Europe began to take an interest in Latin America, since: i) they were culturally close; ii) certain democratic political parties (e.g. Democratic Action from Venezuela) thrived in Latin America; iii) there were important affinities between Europeans and Latin American leaders; iv) to some extent they shared common interests; and v) democracy became an important target for them. Thus, the interests of Latin America and Europe were similar. However, these ideals and principles were transformed throughout time thanks to: i) the logic of power; ii) the restrictions imposed by the EEC and its logic itself; iii) the liberalizing ideals promoted by the Anglo-Saxon countries and; iv) the consolidation of the capitalism model.

Hence, this study is structured as follows. First and foremost, it is important to underline that the text contains three macro-sections containing more chapters. Moreover, given the large dimension of the matters addressed here and for the sake of clarity, this research is approached by scales (i.e. worldwide, regional, transnational, and local scales). As may be expected, these scales overlap and intertwine with each other.

The first two chapters (Chapter 1 and 2) constitute the first “macro-section”. Both sections focus on the path of research and the contextualization of the matter. In other words, they concentrate on understanding how and why this happened. The first chapter, therefore, discusses: i) the sources available for this study and the obstacles encountered during its development; ii) the best way to tackle a matter such as this, namely large-scale research that combined local willingness with international/transnational effects.

Six subsections form the next section (Chapter 2), which deals with the historical context. The first three parts (i.e. the worldwide scale) attend to some of the structural changes (economic, political and social) that occurred during the 1970s and led to the Cold War’s turning point. The occurrences that developed in those years were so profound that they changed how we understand the world and how we deal with it. Hence, phenomena such as globalization, interdependence and transnational cooperation, by acquiring a new impetus, affected the entire world; previous policies were not able to respond to these changes.

Therefore, the understanding of global transformations during the 1970s allows us to grasp how and why new relations could develop between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The following three subsections tackle the regional scale: the EEC and Latin America. Firstly, the EEC constitutes a crucial point of this analysis since one of the objectives of this study relies on examining the bi-regional rapprochement during the 1970s-1980s by means of the European social democracy and the socialist governments of Spain and Italy. Given the fact these two countries are embedded in the EEC (Italy as a full member and Spain on the road to accession), these two countries had to respect the EEC guidelines and had to take into account the European orientations when they devised their foreign policies. As a result, the regional scale cannot be underestimated if we address the Spanish and Italian policy. Likewise, it is important to bear in mind that political parties played a key role in the transnational sphere of the EEC, as transnational parties emerged and performed at the heart of the Community. For example, the socialist group reached an important weight inside the EEC at the time.¹² Another fact to be underlined is the growing sensitivity on external matters that the EEC experienced at the time. This spurred the Community to adopt a new attitude in terms of foreign policy. In this context, greater integration (e.g. the Common Single Act) and enlargement (the accession of Denmark, UK, and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986) were carried out.

Secondly, a brief overview of the Latin American situation is provided. In this way, it is possible to understand the SI's goals and actions in the region, the interests of Latin America in establishing ties with Europe, the situation in the U.S. "sphere of influence", and the EEC position towards the region. Furthermore, examining the Latin American context enables us to understand how and why the Latin American leftist movements changed and started to be increasingly interested in social democratic principles. The final part of this second chapter briefly examines bi-regional relations.

A reader with some notions of the history of twentieth century will be aware of the issues discussed here, and therefore to them this section probably will not be so novel. However,

¹² François Borella, *Les partis politiques dans l'Europe des Neufs* (France: Édition du Seuil, 1979), 233.

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the historical context and the events of the years studied here were fundamental for the development of the European and Latin American relations as well as for the SI's performance. This means that in other circumstances these events could not have been evolved, or at least not in the same manner. That said, one of the virtues of History is that it allows us to understand what, how and why issues happened, to observe their continuities and breaks, and to link the past to the present. In other words, "History matters".

This brings us to the third chapter (the second "macro-section") in which the role played by the European social democracy in Latin America is examined on a transnational scale. The linkage between social democracy and the SI are analyzed as well as how transnational networks between parties, governments and organizations from both continents began to be established. Moreover, this section focuses on: (i) how the international dimension influenced the local and vice versa; (ii) how the SI acted in Latin America taking into account its principles, ideals and objectives; (iii) the limits and extents of the SI's performance; and (iv) the assessment of the European and Latin American interests by keeping in mind the growing awareness and acceptance of global interdependence among people.

The fourth and fifth chapters constitute the third "macro-section" (national and transnational scale). In the fourth section, we concentrate on the Spanish case. This section examines the links between the PSOE, González, the European Social democracy, the EEC, the SI and the Latin American politicians and political parties (with great interest in the relations with Venezuela, Chile and Nicaragua). The causes, limits, interests and advantages of these ties are also explored. Likewise, this chapter takes into account both the evolution (ideological turn) of the PSOE as well as the dichotomy that emerged between the initial speeches of González and the policies effectively implemented by him. Furthermore, the impact of Spain's accession to the EEC will be assessed.

The fifth section focuses on the Italian case. The election of Italy as a case study was due to: i) the historic and cultural ties shared with Latin America that resulted from mass migrations; ii) Craxi's concern and support for democracy and human rights as well as his

interest in “internationalizing” his party; and iii) the role played by the exiles who contributed to increasing the understanding regarding the Latin American problems. In this regard, it is also important to keep in mind that the SI was an organization that facilitated the dialogue between the two continents, in particular since the 1970s, when it overcame its Eurocentric character and allowed the participation of many Latin American leaders and entities. Obviously, the Italian action was carried out within the EEC’s framework. Therefore, the links between the EEC, Italy and Latin America are a constitutive part of this chapter.

All this information converges in the sixth and last part in which final remarks are presented. Likewise, this section tries to link the past (the relationships during the late 1970s-1980s) with the present by showing the continuities and possible discontinuities between the past and the current world. Why? The study of the period of further rapprochement (1980s) matters to identify the key factors to overcome the current “routinization” (stalemate) of their relations. As previously mentioned, it is important to rethink these relationships “to balance” the power that “sovereign” countries (those currently dominate the international scene, i.e. USA, China, Russia, etc.) have in the world today. These are simply final reflections aimed at showing why this study is relevant in current times.

PART I

1. The Research: A Long Road

1.1 Sources and Some Obstacles

This research addresses different actors, including the SI, various political parties, the Italian and the Spanish government, the Latin American reality (in particular the case of Nicaragua, Venezuela and Chile), as well as different levels (national, international, transnational). As a result, this study required the simultaneous analysis of different issues. The first step in the development of this research was the exploration of the SI.

In the development of this research, it was first noted that there has been little exploration about this issue, in spite of the fact that the SI played a significant role in the constructions of relations between the EEC and Latin America. Some factors explain this historiographical vacuum, for instance the previous confidentiality of the information and the centrality given to the study of the revolutionary leftist movements, in particular those that were inspired by the Cuban revolution. Moreover, most of the existing literature of the SI published during the 1980s was mainly institutional or descriptive rather than analytical. This literature includes: i) speeches; ii) memories of the protagonists who participated firsthand in the SI's activities which end up being very subjective; iii) reports; iv) statements from the SI's conferences and meetings; and v) documents published by the reviews *Socialist Affairs* (the SI magazine) and *Nueva Sociedad*, an Ebert Foundation project that since 1972 has worked on democratic issues and on the political, social and economic development of Latin America. Furthermore, none of these works have dealt with the operability of the SI's principles in the foreign policies of European Socialist governments. Moreover, the literature that has focused on the relations between Latin America and the European social democracy has mainly privileged the German action in the region as well as the global principles of the European social democracy without, however, going in-depth on the Latin American case.

That said, the following step was the exploration of the SI files held by the International Institute of Social History (IISG) in Amsterdam. The IISG counts around 1250 boxes of SI documents, pictures, videos, official and private correspondence, declarations, personal notes, NGO notes, press releases, and the entire *Socialist Affairs* review covering the entire existence of the organization, since its emergence in 1951 until the late 1980s. The files are catalogued by countries, meetings, congresses, main leaders, as well as significant topics. Amazingly enough, extensive documentation regarding the relationship between the SI and Latin America was found. Given the dimension of the archive, it was applied the following criteria: (i) time frame (1973-1989); (ii) official SI documents issued during these years (conferences, meetings, bureau circulars, member circulars, documents of the congresses, party leaders conferences, Ebert Foundation); (iii) records related to Latin America, including from the SI's mission in Latin America, socialist strategy, study group for the Third World, Regional Conference on Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Latin America and the Caribbean Committee; (iv) leaders (Willy Brandt, Hector Ouelí, Felipe González); (v) countries (Italy, Spain, Nicaragua, Chile, Venezuela); (vi) matters related to the EEC; (vii) reviews (Socialist Affairs). In spite of the meticulous work, it can not be excluded that other files may contain additional and valuable information for this research. Hence, this could be a subject of study for future analyses.

Afterwards, the archival work was continued by gathering the information regarding Spain and Italy. With respect to Spain, the *Fundación Pablo Iglesias* was visited, which is the institution that holds the documentation of the Spanish socialist party (PSOE). Contrary to the IISG, the Pablo Iglesias Foundation does not have an effective catalogue system. Hence, the research was very challenging. However, it was possible to note that the documents concerning the SI were mainly copies of those that the IISG holds. In spite of this, official documents of the PSOE, personal annotations (e.g. trips in Latin America), correspondence, press communications, and so forth, were also found there. In addition to the Spanish political speeches (e.g. in the Congress of Deputies) and Spanish internal affairs, the archive holds valuable sources regarding: i) relations with the Sandinistas (in particular the financial and humanitarian aids); ii) the actions against the Chilean military

regime (e.g. Felipe Gonzalez' advocacy for the liberation of some Chilean socialist leaders and solidarity movements); iii) the contacts with *Acción Democrática* from Venezuela; iv) the contacts with Willy Brandt and Bettino Craxi; iv) the Contadora's support and; v) the EEC's Spanish target. Likewise, the recent opening of the Felipe González Foundation allowed for the review of personal correspondence between the Spaniard and other prominent leaders (e.g. Brandt, Pérez, etc.), as well as handwritten notes and pictures. Nevertheless, while the main target of the Foundation has been to make the entire Felipe González archive public and accessible to all¹³, for now it remains a work in progress. Therefore, much of the valuable information that the archive may contain may be explored in the coming years.

Furthermore, the Spanish Foreign Affairs (MAEC) library was also visited in order to review the document collections related to Spanish foreign policies and their goals (*Archivos, textos y documentos de la política exterior española*). Concerning Italy, the files published annually by the Foreign Affairs Ministry (*Testi e documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*) were examined. Unfortunately, in both Italy and Spain, the access and exploration of documents produced by the respective Foreign Ministries are very restricted; the available information often preceded the period that is addressed in this research¹⁴.

In Italy, the documents held by Craxi's foundation, by the Foundation of the Italian socialist Party (*Fondazione Filippo Turati*), and by the *Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso* (the Basso Foundation, which holds the magazine *Chile-America*, a publication issued by Chilean exiles in Rome) were explored. Even if a lot of information is not available yet, it is worth underlining the efforts of the Italian government to digitize the documents and to put them available online,¹⁵ thereby facilitating the work of researchers. Likewise, it is worth noting the value of *Radio Radicale*, an excellent source of information since it makes such resources as Parliamentary debates, conferences, and press releases available to the

¹³ All the information is available online <https://archivo.fundacionfelipegonzalez.org/es/inicio/inicio.do>

¹⁴ For the Spanish case see: Juan Carlos Pereira and Carlos Sanz Díaz, “‘Todo secreto’. Acuerdos, secretos, transparencias y acceso a los documentos históricos Asuntos Exteriores y Defensa”. *Ayer* 97, 2015 (1): 243-25

¹⁵ The available documentation is searchable in the following websites: <http://www.archivionline.senato.it/html/istituzioni.htm> and <https://www.lazio900.it/oggetti/?id=542>.

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public¹⁶. Moreover, the Italian-Latin American Institute (*Organizzazione Internazionale Italo-Latinoamericana- IILA*), having the largest specialized Italian library in Latin America, contains numerous publications, magazines and reviews in this region; therefore, it offers valuable information that is useful for completing the overall picture. In addition to this, the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence was also visited in order to review the documentation regarding the international activity of the Socialist Group at the European Parliament (GPSE) and their links with the SI, the Angel Viñas Funds, the European Parliament resolutions on Latin America as well as the press cuttings on this region published by the EU newspapers (the CPPE fund).

Moreover, my stay as a visiting scholar in the European Union Center at the University of Miami allowed me to review the extensive resources about Latin America held by the University library. The close proximity with the region as well as the massive migration of “Latinos” has implied greater interest in Latin American issues. Besides, I used my trips “home” (Colombia and Chile) to gather information from the public libraries (e.g. National Library of Chile)¹⁷ and bookstores in order to increase my knowledge concerning the region, the nexus with the SI, the EEC, Spain and Italy, and to stay informed of all the latest research. In Colombia, for instance, I visited the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery) where I found valuable information regarding the Contadora and San José Process as well as the Russian Cultural Institute (*Instituto de Cultura León Tolstoi*) with the aim of knowing how the Soviet Union saw the SI performance. To this end, I reviewed the Russian magazine *America Latina*, which published articles in Spanish about Latin America. At this point it is worth noting that the availability of information in Latin America is much smaller than in Europe, which is often a great obstacle for researchers. As Bernd Rother has pointed out, there is a large asymmetry between the written documentations that have been produced and conserved: “European party officials wrote more memoranda and preserved their documents better

¹⁶ See: <https://www.radioradicale.it>

¹⁷ Valuable information is also available online <http://www.archivochile.com>

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than the Latin Americans did”¹⁸.

In addition to the archival information, secondary sources were used in order to complete the picture of the matter. These referred to the following issues: i) the relations between the EEC and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s; ii) Latin American foreign relations; iii) the links between the SI and Latin America; iv) social democracy, its evolution and relations with Latin America; v) the relations between Spain and Latin America; vi) the triangulation between the EEC, Spain and Latin America; vii) the Italian and Latin American dealings; and viii) regional bodies, e.g. SELA (*Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe*) and the Contadora Group. All of these were useful to complete the vacuums and to understand where the literature has gaps regarding this subject, and therefore where the novelty of the research could be found.

Moreover, given the fact that this topic is part of “recent history” and there has been little exploration on this matter, journals and magazines provided fundamental information as well. Hence, in this research, there was a review of: *El País and El Socialista* (from Spain); *La Stampa, Corriere della Sera, Avanti!, and La Repubblica* (from Italy); *Le Monde and Le Monde Diplomatique* (from France); and *The New York Times* (from the United States).

Last but not least, the most valuable source of information likely comes from the interviews that were carried out during the development of this writing. The people interviewed were: (i) the Spanish Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Secretary of International Relations from 1975 till 1979, Secretary of State for International Cooperation Ibero American from 1985-1991 and member of the European Parliament for the PSOE; (ii) Elena Flores Valencia, Secretary of International Relations of the PSOE, right hand of Felipe González, and member of the European Parliament; (iii) Manuel Medina, member of the European Parliament and Chair of the Delegation for relations with the countries of South America; (iv) Beatrice Rangel, former Vice President of the Women Socialist International and right hand of the Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez; (v) Silvio Prado, former militant of the Sandinista Front; (vi) Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo, head of the International Department

¹⁸ Bernd Rother, “Cooperation between the European and Latin American Moderate Left in the 1970s and 1980s. In *Willy Brandt and International Relations. Europe, the USA and Latin America (1974-1992)*, edited by Bernd Rother and Larres Klaus (Britain: Bloomsbury, 2019), 195.

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of the Prime Minister's Office (1982-1991) in Spain; (vii) Margherita Boniver, Head of the PSI International Relations Office; (viii) Walter Marossi, PSI regional vice-secretary for Lombardy and Observer of the PSI in meetings of the Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean; (ix) Pentti Väänänen, Secretary General of the SI 1983-1989; and (x) Carlos Parra Merino, former International Secretary of the Radical Party of Chile. Thanks to the information provided by them, it has been possible to bridge the gaps in terms of knowledge.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

It is clear that to approach a matter such as the one at stake here, it is necessary to conjugate different kinds of dimensions, i.e. national, international, transnational and global. Therefore, the best way to address this research is to proceed by levels or scales since it is a multi-level study. As a result, there is not a proper single, general or global theory or model to carry out this analysis. Rather, it will be necessary to refer to several views in order to address partial issues that will be linked through the historical approach. To put it differently, History will give meaning to this research by putting together the pieces of the puzzle, and by also taking into account that its goal does not rely on the formulation of one generalization, nor on a theory's confirmation or assessment.

In the first place, the sociologist Saskia Sassen provides an interesting approach that enables us to understand the world from different levels, which in turn are connected by the notion of "assemblages". Sassen argues that throughout history, a set of assemblages has configured the world. However, with the denationalization of what has been historically constructed as national, the world cannot only be analyzed by referring to the state or to the global level. In fact, the contours of these dimensions have been blurred. They are not distinct spheres anymore. As a result, the notion of assemblages enables us to analyze each scale, which are also intertwined, interdependent and overlap each other. This key of interpretation is useful for this research since it involves different scales, including political parties, national realities, international relations, democratization, and human rights that are

intertwined and interconnected with each other.¹⁹ However, even if this approach is beneficial for this study (i.e. to address a myriad of topics), it really needs a historical lecture in order to obtain a complete picture of the matter and to grasp the process itself (how it happened).

Taking into account this information, the transnational approach (a perspective that focuses “on relations and formations, circulations and connections between, across, and through the units, and how they have made, not made and unmade”)²⁰ became a useful tool. One of its major contributions relies on the understanding of the nation not as something immutable and essential, but as an entity that develops interconnections and mutual influences with different societies.²¹ In this line of thought, the growing interdependence was a feature of this “new world” that began to emerge in the 1970s. Moreover, the intensification of globalization and transnational cooperation has increased the rapport between global actors. Simultaneously, transnational networks have been developed. These transcend the national borders and no governmental institutions are able to control them. Therefore, the analysis of transnational networks becomes very important in order to understand “contemporary world politics”²² as well as to grasp what and how are the links between the SI, the parties and the European and Latin American governments.

Likewise, it is relevant to keep in mind that these transnational networks involve both the impact and influence of international rules and principles on domestic policies. Similarly, domestic policies influence the states’ foreign policies and the definition of their international preferences. Thus, according to the political scientist Thomas Risse Kappen, national and transnational networks have been effective in producing bottom-up/top-down

¹⁹ Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. (US: Princeton University Press, 2006), Kindle edition, 4.

²⁰ Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 2.

²¹ Hugo Fazio Vengoa and Luciana Fazio Vargas, “La historia global y la globalidad histórica contemporánea”, *Historia Crítica*, n. 69, (2018): 14 doi: <https://doi.org/10.7440/historicrit69.2018.01>

²² Keohane Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (eds). *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University press, 1971.

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pressures²³. Therefore, local and global are two interlinked dimensions. Hence, the approach of Risse-Kappen is useful here to understand how activists and the local leaders might influence governmental preferences as well as how the international context affects national policies. This, in this case, enables the understanding of how the SI, the EEC and the international context influenced the domestic policy of Craxi and González, and how Craxi and González influenced the SI, the EEC, and the international context.

These global transformations also included the development of a global civil society. This implies that the domestic is moved toward the external and the national took over from the global. To some extent, one could say that a denationalization of the civil society was carried out. However, the latter does not mean the end of the national state but it alludes to its transformation. As the political scientist Mary Kaldor argues, the global civil society implies the overcoming of the national frontiers, the strengthening of transnational networks and the empowerment of global and domestic rules.²⁴ This is related to what the political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call the “boomerang pattern”, i.e. the manner by which the social groups appeal to transnational networks, international institutions and foreign governments instead of appealing to their own national governments²⁵. Accordingly, this approach allows us to comprehend how González, Craxi and Latin American leaders advocated the principles of the SI as well as to grasp how the exiles impacted the SI and the social democracy.

Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind that the transnational implies the dialogue between the global and the national. Moreover, the global and national ceased to be opposing categories. Rather, in an increasingly interdependent world, they are two entities that complement and need each other. Therefore, the study of transnational networks requires the simultaneous analysis of the international, the global, and the local. As a result, this ends up being a multilevel research in which the local is connected with the global. As

²³ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norm into Domestic Practices: Introduction”. In *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, edited by Risse-Kappe T. and Sikkink K, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-38.

²⁴ Mary Kaldor, *La sociedad civil global. Una respuesta a la guerra*. (Barcelona: Tusquets, 2005), 35.

²⁵ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

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Sassen argues, the “global” is developed in the “local” and vice versa. Indeed, parallel actions in context that are contemporary, local, and global became common practices. Examples of this are the international organizations, which acted globally even if they are embedded in the national structures.²⁶ Hence, this approach provides the proper tools to develop this research. Considering that the goal is to analyze the operability of the SI’s principles in the government of Gonzales and Craxi regarding Latin America, this perspective allows a clear view of how the global could be developed in the local (e.g. the SI’s postulates in the Spanish and Italian socialist parties). The fact is, however, that the foregoing considerations are fruitful for the analysis of specific phenomena. These approaches offer useful tools to address each of them. Nevertheless, they fail in explaining how the subject developed, how it occurred and how the time and spatial scales are combined.

Hence, the historical dimension (and the historical approach) should be taken into account as an essential condition to understand each phenomenon studied here. If this is not included in their social, political, cultural, economic, and international context, it will be impossible to grasp their novelty, dimension, and impact in Euro-Latin American relations. Therefore, two clarifications must be made. First, this research will consider the historical context as this is a constitutive part of the analysis. Second, this research will not limit the years in which the action of the SI was more intensive, but it will adopt a wider historical approach because this is best way to understand the phenomenon as a whole. The insistence to provide a broader historical view relies on the fact that only the approach that takes into account the passage of the time is able to reveal the key point of the phenomena, their developments, and dimensions. It is for this reason that the first chapter addresses some of the historical process that marked the second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the study of international relations and foreign policies cannot be circumscribed in a fixed time frame since politics usually contains its own rates and speeds²⁷.

²⁶ Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights*, 8504/12465.

²⁷ Belen Blázquez Vilaplana, *La proyección de un líder político: Felipe González y Nicaragua 1978-1996*. (Sevilla: Centro de Estudios Andaluces Consejería de la Presidencia, 2006), 127.

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Why do we emphasize the historical approach? Why is the historical approach so important for the development and understanding of this research? According to Charles Tilly, “not only do all political processes occur in history and therefore call for knowledge of their historical contexts, but also where and when political processes occur influence how they occur. History thus became an essential element of sound explanations for political process”.²⁸

As a result, in this research, context constitutes a substantial part of the analysis. It is very important to understand the transformations that shook the world during the 1970s. There were changes that have led us to rethink the interactions between domestic, international, and transnational dimensions. Based on this, Charles Maier proposed a new periodization. According to him, territoriality explains the global transformations at the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s. In fact, Maier theorized the existence of a "long time", i.e. from the 1850s to the 1970s. During this period, humanity was territorially organized.²⁹ However, since the 1970s, the world witnessed a territorial change, by transforming worldwide identities, decisions, economy, society, and culture. Territoriality lost its monopoly power to organize society.³⁰ Hence, this shift in terms of territoriality could be a possible answer to the transformations that occurred during the 1970s. This allows us to explain and understand: i) the turn experienced by European social democracy; ii) the transformations in terms of nationality, internationality, and transnationality; iii) the intensification of globalization; and iv) the growing interdependence of the world. All of these were phenomena that were experienced and intensified during that time period.

Moreover, this kind of analysis requires a particular approach for its complete understanding. Given the interaction between different dimensions (i.e. national,

²⁸ Charles Tilly, “Why and how History Matters”, In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Robert E. Goodin. (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2011) 13108, Kindle Edition.

²⁹ Charles S. Maier, “Secolo corto o época lunga? L’unità storica dell’età industriale e le trasformazioni della territorialità” in *Novecento. I tempi della storia*, edited by Claudio Pavone (Roma, Donzelli Editore, 2008), 34.

³⁰ Nation states as the “space” changed: the area of identity was separated from the decision’s area, namely, the elite’s control of territory did not guarantee/not mean control of public life. Furthermore, social organization (i.e. the social classes) was not anymore pyramidal but it assumed a new form (in Maier words: concentric circles) where the relations between center and periphery changed. There was a global stratification. Ibid. 51-53.

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international, and transnational), this research must be addressed by referring to multiple levels of observation (*jeux d'échelle*). In this way, the analysis of such scales and their interrelationships could be carried out without the risk of falling into any possible contradiction between them (e.g. local versus global).³¹ Obviously, the spatial scales are linked to time.

Indeed, according to Fernand Braudel, history must be addressed from different temporalities. According to him, historical process has different time velocities: *longue durée* (i.e. long time scale), *histoire événementielle* (i.e. very short time scale, for example referring to everyday life), and the “conjunctural time” in which historical change occurs according to slow cycles or movements, while also being perceptible³². Hence, all of these are considered in this research, e.g. a wider historical approach (*longue durée*), the shock of the 1970s (*conjunctural time*), as well as policies, decisions, and actions of political parties and governments (*histoire événementielle*). Hence, it is possible to understand the necessity to refer to a wider time frame rather than to fit or to limit the analysis into a rigid and specific time frame. Furthermore, it is this broad historical temporality that enables us to grasp the historical juncture of the 1970s.

The entanglement of different temporalities demonstrates the lack of a linear and rigid process and therefore implies a “hybridization” of these scales. Accordingly, a multilevel analysis and the use of different paradigms become indispensable for the understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. Indeed, thanks to the tools provided by contemporary historiography, nowadays it is possible to comprehend this trend. Retaking Maier’s notion, the deterritorialization of the world has led scholars to think about it in different terms. In fact, it was during the 1970s when the world experienced a turning point and events such as the social movements of 1968 demonstrated that new theoretical frameworks and new ways of thinking to analyze our society were required³³. For this reason, the “new

³¹ Jacques Revel, “Microanálisis y Construcción de lo social”. *Un momento historiográfico. Trece ensayos de historia social*, Jacques Revel. (Buenos Aires, Manantial, 2005), 41-62.

³² Eric Helleiner, “Reflexiones Braudelianas sobre globalización económica: el historiador como pionero”, *Análisis Político*, n° 39, enero-abril 2000.

³³ Maier, “Secolo corto o época lunga?; Jeremy Suri, *Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente*. (USA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Ferguson Niall (ed), *The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in* Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

historiography” started to question the traditional paradigms of the social sciences: (i) Marxism which gave priority to production and social conflicts; (ii) modernism theory which focused on the processes of technological development, on the growing density of communication, on the differentiation of knowledge, and on the increasing power of the state by considering the differences between modern and traditional societies; (iii) the school of “Annales” which favored economic and demographical studies; and (iv) identity studies which took into account social inclusion of minorities as imperative to achieve democratization.³⁴

At this point, it is worth remembering Braudel’s concern, as he wondered “if history is daughter of its time [...], if we are in a new world, why not in a new history?” Indeed, in his writing *Histoire et Sciences Sociales*, the French historian noted that an old world was left behind and warned that the previous intellectual concepts were “bent or simply broken”. According to him, social scientists were now deep into another “adventure of the spirit” and for this reason he invited people to undertake a new academic and intellectual incursion.³⁵

Hence, as Braudel noted, all the changes of the late twentieth century required a new level of analysis. In fact, new concepts, perspectives, and ways of historicizing were necessary. Even if the conception of the world continued to be linked to the order of national states, other kinds of approaches were developed, e.g. transnational history. As a matter of fact, thanks to this “new understanding” and awareness, this research can be developed. As noted above, the existence of multiples levels of analysis, the interaction and entanglements between the different dimensions could not be confined in the nation states. Furthermore, the worldwide transformations during the 1970s nourished the historiographical turn as well as implied a new way of understanding since these changes could not be grasped from the previous theoretical approach.

Perspective, (USA: The Belkap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). Eric Hobsbawm, *Historia del Siglo XX*, (Buenos Aires: Crítica Grijalbo Mondadori, 1998)

³⁴Lynn Hunt, *La storia culturale nell’età globale*, (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2010), 11-14.

³⁵Fernand Braudel, *Historia y Ciencias Sociales*, (Madrid: Alianza, 2002), 19 and 22.

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How can we connect and tackle all these issues? Even if the historian Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou aims to understand our historical present, some of the categories addressed by him are useful to answer this question. According to him, the notion of *trajectoire* should help us to map the deterritorialization of the nation state by considering a wider historical context. Moreover, the notion of *hybridité* should enable us to grasp the exchanges since the transnational interactions affect/penetrate them and vice versa.³⁶ Therefore, this research follows a *trajectoire* since it considers the historical approach and the historical process of the issue, since “history is rarely simply *ex nihilo*”. It is deeply imbricated with the past, notably through path dependence”.³⁷ Furthermore, given the worldwide deterritorialization/denationalization, it explores the interconnections, transnational links, and exchanges between parties, governments, and organizations that are not subject to national borders, therefore examining their *hybridité*.

In sum, from a theoretical point of view, this research focuses on the following themes. Firstly, the 1970s marked a turning point in world history due to the intensification of globalization and transnationality that, in turn, impacted our present. Hence, many scholars have theorized the emergence of a “new historical period”.³⁸ In this context, the transformations of European social democracy and its openness towards the Third World took place. Secondly, all of these changes have made the world increasingly interdependent. In fact, the national dimension is intertwined with the international, the global, and the transnational. As Keohane and Nye argued in 1971, this issue is what characterizes the contemporary political world. Therefore, Europe needs Latin America and vice versa. Thirdly, the local influences the global as well as the global affects the local. In this regard, it is possible to observe the operability of the SI’s principles in Craxi and Gonzalez’s foreign policies towards Latin America. Finally, due to the fact that different dimensions converge simultaneously, it is necessary to carry out a multilevel analysis. Thus, in order to understand the phenomenon as a whole –and with this, in order to avoid a partial analysis- one should proceed by examining each scale. Hence, the study of the

³⁶ Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Penser l’Histoire transnational”, in *Globe*, The graduate institute Geneva, N.16, (Autumn 2015): 15. https://issuu.com/graduate_institute/docs/globe16_web_1/16

³⁷ Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights*, 4.

³⁸ Charles S. Maier, “Secolo corto o época lunga?”,. Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest*.

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international sphere requires the addressing of multiple approaches (scales), and therefore the theoretical framework of this research is extensive. At this point, it is worth remembering the words of the historian John Lewis Gaddis who claims:

“It seems to me, is yet another area in which history is closer to the natural sciences than to the social sciences. Historians are –or ought to be- open to diverse ways of organizing knowledge: our reliance on micro-rather than macro-generalization opens up for us a wide range of methodological approaches. Within a single narrative we can be Rankeans, or Marxist, or Freudians, or Weberians, or even postmodernists, to the extent that these modes of representation bring us closer to realities for which we are trying to account”.³⁹

³⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History. How Historians Map the Past*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 2002), 108-109.

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2. History Matters

This chapter aims to show the transformation of the world during the 1970s, including: i) the awareness of growing interdependence; ii) the turning point of the Cold War; iii) the economic crises; iv) the defense of human rights; v) the wave of democratization in developing countries; vi) the “erosion” of the bipolar scheme. Among other things, the shock of the 1970s allowed the rapprochement between Europe and Latin America by building transnational networks and influencing social democracy. As a result, a brief review of the historical context is indispensable to better understand the whole process and it will be addressed in this chapter.

2.1. What Happened to the Economy?

As said, the 1970s marked a turning point in world history and, in this, the economic process played a significant role. Indeed, in those days the models (Fordism and the Keynesian) that have shaped the world after the Second World War entered into a deep crisis. At that time, a new economic model began to be devised and since then it has been defining the world. As a matter of fact, the shift of the economic model from the industrial system to financial occurred in those years. In fact, several scholars agree that the economic crisis of 2008-2009 is extremely connected with the transformations and liberalization of the economy that occurred in the 1970s-1980s⁴⁰. Moreover, other issues could be linked to these years, including the recent crises of the EU, the decline of social democracy, and the current relations between the EU and Latin America. Thus, a sort of continuity has characterized our world since then.

However, in order to better understand the turn of the 1970s, it could be useful to briefly mention the economic situation and features in the years after the Second World War, which Eric Hobsbawm defined as the “golden years” (i.e. 1950-1973). This time period was

⁴⁰ Wolfgang Streeck, *Tempo guadagnato. La crisi del capitalismo democratico* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2013), 124. Oliver Nachtwey, *La sociedad del descenso: precariedad y desigualdad en la era posdemocrática*, (España: Paidós Estado y Sociedad, 2017) Kindle edition.

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a global phenomenon; the industrial world involved capitalist, socialist and Third World countries, although the levels of richness and opulence did not touch a large part of the global population.⁴¹ For instance, in Western Europe the real GDP per capita between 1950-73 increased at an annual rate of 4.1%, in contrast with the long-term growth (1970-1998) that was 1.7%.⁴² Understandably, after the Second World War the political, economic and social worldwide situation was not easy at all. Well, new mechanisms were required to overcome the difficulties that emerged after the War. The recovery had to encompass all the dimensions (i.e. economy, politics, society, etc.).

A new model was required that was different from the previous one that was not able to bypass the reality of the War and, therefore, not able to avoid the severe hardships that characterized the era. This model, in fact, began to thrive, and industrialization, intensive growth, a system of accumulation, mass consumption and interrelation between productivity and wages defined this template. An important issue of this new consumerism was its credit basis. Mortgage and credit cards (the first one was “Diners”, which began to operate in 1949) were spread among the population.⁴³ Hence, the Fordist model, and with this democratic capitalism, were developed. People’s ordinary lives were revolutionized due to new technological advances, such as the car, television, telephone, and refrigerator. Also during this time, cities changed since they became industrial centers. Indeed, city outskirts were highly developed and the industrial philosophy reached the housing constructions. As a matter of fact, the idea of building several rooms, cheaply and quickly, changed urban spaces: extensive building was carried out. This is why Eric Hobsbawm talked about the rise of “anonymous apartments” in the suburbs⁴⁴.

Furthermore, within this context, the state acquired a central role in the system. The state became the regulator of the proper functioning of economy as well as the guarantor of socio-economic stability. In fact, in order to contain economic and social imbalances,

⁴¹ Hobsbawm, *Historia*. 262

⁴² Dan Stone, *Goodbay to All That? The Story of Europe Since 1945*. (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 120.

⁴³ Josep Fontana, *El Siglo de la Revolución: Una Historia del Mundo desde 1914 a 2017*. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2017) Kindle Edition, 6594.

⁴⁴ Hobsbawm, *Historia*, 265.

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welfare policies, such as government subsidies, education, and health coverage, were introduced. Those were the years of the height of the welfare state, which was accompanied by the rise of a moderate left (social democracy) that embodied the welfare state's main principles. In addition to the welfare model, the inspiring template of economic policies throughout the post-war period was Keynesian. This implied the control of capital flows, tariff regulations, a system of taxation, and it aimed for full employment. Therefore, the Keynesian model, Fordism and the Welfare State (traits of the “glorious years”) required the active intervention of the state and for this reason, they were models to be developed within the national borders and extremely linked to the national state.⁴⁵ These orders, however, were challenged during the 1970s due to the intensification of globalization.

The strong presence of the nation state in the second post-war period favored the internationalization of economy (the 1970s, instead, experienced a transnationalization of economy). In fact, in those years, the reciprocal exchanges (international trade) between countries were significantly enhanced. Similarly, free trade, the redefinition of capital, free movement of capital and exchange rate stability also marked the era. This was also promoted by the predominant role of the United States in the international arena as well as the place that dollar, which was linked to the gold (i.e. the Bretton Woods system), took in global economy.⁴⁶

Even if the historian Jean François Sirinelli mainly refers to the French case, he provides us with some features that characterized the “glorious years” and therefore are useful to obtain an overview of this period. As Sirinelli notes, *les trente glorieuse* were characterized by peace, prosperity, full employment, progress, economic (industrial) and demographic development, sustained wage growth, increasing urban population and decreasing rural population, changes in ordinary life (car, telephone, television), the definition of the middle class, the increase of both skilled labor and an active population, higher living standards, better hygienic conditions, healthcare provision, improvement of life expectancy, mass culture, and collective ideals. According to the French scholar, all of these features

⁴⁵ Hugo Fazio Vengoa, *Los setenta convulsionan el mundo Irrumpe el presente histórico*, (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Historia, 2014), 52-55.

⁴⁶ Hobsbawm, *Historia*, 277.

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characterized the “previous world” (*la fin du “mode d’avant”*), because since the 1970s the world experienced a real turn that launched a “new era”.⁴⁷

That said, full employment and the steady increase of production and wages cannot last forever. In fact, in the late 1960s some fissures in the system began to appear. Furthermore, the end of the convertibility of the US dollar to gold (the Bretton Woods system fixed in 1944 the following exchange: 35 US dollars for one ounce of gold) and the destabilization of the U.S. in economic and political terms had negative consequences in the global economy. The “golden age” has been also characterized by the supremacy of the United States and the U.S. dollar in the international stage, which to some extent operated as an international regulator for global stability. This system worked during the time that the U.S. kept a surplus in their trade balance until the 1970s when American foreign commerce began to decline and the emission of currency was enhanced exponentially. The rising inflation was uncontrollable. The convertibility of dollars into gold did not correspond anymore. In fact, there were around 40 billion dollars in circulation respect of the 10-12 billion of gold of the Central Bank’s reserve. In order to contain the high inflation, the U.S. dollar was untied from gold by producing monetary fluctuations. According to Josep Fontana, the consequence of this was the increase of external debts that governments started to accumulate. In the long run, this was what contributed to the economic crisis of the early twenty-first century.⁴⁸

But, how did this happen? How did such a “long recession” take place? Oliver Nachtwey provides an interesting overview of the recession of the 1970s. Indeed, during the 1970s, capitalism could not maintain the same levels of growth that it reached in the previous epoch. Even big economic thinkers, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx, were aware of the fact that over long periods of economic growth, the economy could stagnate. However, regardless of the specific factors that could lead to economic deadlock, all these big thinkers expected the transition to “a stationary economy that would mean diminishing returns and therefore a reduction of the

⁴⁷ Jean-François Sirinelli, *Les vingt décisives: Le passé Proche de Notre Avenir (1965-85)*, (France, Fayard, 2007).

⁴⁸ Fontana, *El Siglo de la Revolución*, 6900 and 6921.

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accumulation of capital”⁴⁹. Nevertheless, a fall of the rate of profit was experienced as well as an over-accumulation of capital that led to the emergence of financial capitalism. Indeed, what occurred was the emergence of a clear gap between the logic of pre-financial capitalism and financial capitalism since the logic of the former, i.e. “long-term goals” (companies’ main target relied on the business’ growth and on the sales volumes), was dispelled. In this context, financial capitalism was developed and its logic was based on “ensuring the minimum income in short-term”. Hence, financial capitalism arose because of the growth crisis. Nowadays, however, financial capitalism has become one of the main causes of the current economic crisis.⁵⁰

Thus, in the second half of the XX century, a widespread fear regarding the limitation of economic growth began to spread quickly. In fact, the Keynesian model and the Welfare systems were viable during the time the sustained economic growth was guaranteed. When the latter started to be stymied, the Keynesian model began to crumble. Indeed, economic fears were materialized in 1972, when the Club of Rome (a global nonprofit organization) published the *Limits to Growth*, which had a global impact. The notion that earth’s resources could not support a sustained economic and population growth was at the core of the analysis. In fact, this study examined the implication of the continued worldwide growth. And, in this context, the petroleum crisis aggravated the situation.

The oil shock meant rising oil prices, which continued to increase until 1986. This was the result of the Yom Kippur War (the first oil crisis in 1973) and the Iranian crisis (the second oil crisis in 1979). The producers of petroleum could multiply the prices (e.g. from 3 USD per barrel to 6 USD in six months, and in early 1974, the OPEC countries quadrupled the price) given the fact that industrial countries imported the energy source. The oil crisis worsened the economic situation and nourished the fears regarding the limits of the continued growth, which the world was already experiencing for some time. As Josep Fontana notes, the fuel crises accelerated the economic slump and contributed to

⁴⁹ Nachtwey, *La sociedad del descenso*, 574.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 758.

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demonstrate the flaws of the existing model.⁵¹ As a result, the oil crises, the end of the Bretton Woods system, the global decrease of productivity, profits and wages, and the rise of global unemployment led to the increase of inflation. The stagflation (the result of the inflation, stalemate, and unemployment) touched all the corners of the globe. In words of Charles Maier, a widespread *malaise* was produced.⁵²

All these difficulties affected the world in the early 1970s. Accordingly, the economic experts and intellectuals started to criticize the existing model, namely that one that marked the “golden years”. Since the 1970s, doctrines that promoted the *Free Market System* increased and a turn towards financial capitalism was experienced. The liberalization was a response of the economic and political stagnation of the time and, to some extent, this embodied the principles of the “new liberalized” culture spread by the generation of the 1968, which was more open to changes, autonomy, and freedom, and more prone to favor individual needs. Thus, a liberalization of economy and the internationalization of institutions characterized the epoch.

The first leaps towards economic liberalization and the development of the financial system took place in the 1970s. This allowed the subsequent institutional renewal that was carried out since the 1980s onwards. In other words, economic needs led to the institutional renovation⁵³, or as the economist Fuentes Quintana stated, the economy is inevitably political economy and the political economy (which guides the economy of the states) is part of politics in general. Furthermore, the economy cannot be understood without taking into consideration the context in which it is developed.⁵⁴

The ideological turn was the product of the economic and political shifts of that time. In fact some factors led to this ideological twist: 1) the increasing inflation, unemployment and the sluggish economic growth; and 2) the pressure from the rising economic forces,

⁵¹Fontana, *El Siglo de la Revolución*, 736.

⁵² Charles S. Maier, “‘Malaise’: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s”, In *The Shock of the Global*, 27

⁵³ See Maria Rosaria Ferrarese, *Promesse mancate. Dove ci ha portato il capitalismo finanziario*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2017), Kindle Edition, 1287.

⁵⁴ Quote of Fuentes Quintana in Rafael Calduch (ed), *La política exterior española en el siglo XX* (Madrid: Educaciones Ciencias Sociales, 1994), 170.

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which was favorable to international integration and to the limitation of the governmental intervention in economy. Thus, the Monetarism trend started to grow at that time and, with this, the ideas of Milton Friedman. According to the monetarists, the monetary control exercised by the state (Keynesianism) could only be for a short time because in the long run this kind of behavior would produce price just as the events of the 1970s have shown.⁵⁵ In fact, monetarists claimed that inflation problems derived from money accommodations that policymakers and bankers have carried out in order to guarantee employment, high wages and the welfare policies.⁵⁶

Hence, the economic difficulties undermined both the Keynesian system because it was not able to solve and face the difficulties of the time and the welfare state because governments were not able to maintain the high welfare spending anymore. Therefore, as mentioned above, there was increased criticism against the state's intervention in the economy in those years. Within this context, monetarism and neoliberalism, which was launched in the early 1970s by some American think tanks, quickly developed. Among the principles that defined neoliberalism were: the deregulation of markets, rise of commercial competitiveness, decrease of state interventions in economy, privatization of public services, fights against the trade unions, adjustments to the welfare state, and tax reductions. It is important to keep in mind that the turn and triumph of neoliberalism, as was already anticipated with monetarism, was not simply ideological but was the result of some practical shifts, that is to say the financialization of the global economy in which privatization and marketization substituted nationalization and regulation of the economy.⁵⁷

All of these changes testified the transformations of the national states because economic measures and policies could not be contained inside the national borders. As a result, the changes in terms of territoriality because the economic “denationalization” (liberalization of markets and financialization), the spread of global interdependence, and the intensification of globalization and transnationalization began to thrive in those years. All

⁵⁵ Jeffrey Frieden, *Capitalismo Global. El trasfondo económico de la historia del siglo XX*, (Barcelona: Memoria Crítica, 2007), 522-526.

⁵⁶ Maier, “Malaise”, 33.

⁵⁷ Göran Therborn, “Class in the 21st Century”, *New Left Review* 78, (Nov.-Dec 2012): 11.

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of these concepts are linked but refer to different phenomena. Given the fact that some of them are often confused, clarification in this regard could be useful. Taking into account that both territorialization and transnationality have been in some way addressed throughout this research (and in order to avoid repetition) we will now only refer to interdependence, which in these pages has been less explored. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. provide us with some definitions regarding interdependence, globalism and globalization. According to them, “interdependence refers to a condition, a state of affairs (...) to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors of different countries”. Moreover, “globalism is a type of interdependence, which refers to networks of connections and it must include multicontinental distance”, while, “globalization implies that something is increasing”, in particular this refers to the increase of globalism.⁵⁸ Furthermore, globalization is linked to the increasing success of the financial economy at the expenses of the industrial economy.⁵⁹ Globalization, in other words, is a process that implies interdependence and convergence. These are conditions that came to the light in the 1970s.

Therefore, during this time period, there was an intensification of economic transnationalization. In fact, this implied the overcoming of national borders since these did not allow the free economic development but, on the contrary, these built barriers to economy. As a matter of fact, at that time, a “global economy” began to be defined and the national borders began to be blurred. Hence, the space of economy (national states) changed. For instance, the transnationality of the economy entailed the rising of multinational corporations, the new international division of labor, and tax havens.⁶⁰

Likewise, interdependence started to be experienced more frequently in the 1970s. The emerging relations between pluralist democracies as well as the monetary flows testified to that situation. In this new context, politics, governmental policies, and objectives must

⁵⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?). In *The Global Transformations Reader. An Introduction to the Globalization Debate 2 Ed.* Edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew, (UK: Polity Press, 2003), 75.

⁵⁹ Ferrarese, *Promesse mancate*. 203.

⁶⁰ Hobsbawm, *Historia*, 280.

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change due to the fact that the national state ceased to be the basic structure of the global economy.⁶¹ The latter meant the liberalization of markets and the openness to the world (the Third World).

Likewise, capital was redefined. In fact, there was a transformation of the mechanism in which the capital flows. The liberalization of economy was accompanied by the influence of new technological innovations, as testified by the emergence of Nasdaq in 1971 (the first electronic stock market), indicating a high level of dematerialization of the *New Economy*.⁶² Thus, the liberalization of capital implied the overcoming of national barriers because of the international debts and the financialization that, in turn, demonstrated the increasing interdependence of the world and its transnationalization. The capital ceased to be anchored at the national dimension. Hence, at that time, structural shifts were experienced in economy and therefore became a key point in this research since these new winds led political parties and governments to look outwards. This was when Latin America became interesting to Europe.

Within this context, market oriented policies were extremely linked to global interdependence. Considering that all the countries around the world were involved, what happened in “A” affected “B” and vice versa. In a market-oriented policy, the exclusion of one country of the economic system became unthinkable as well as the belief that the policies carried out inside the national frontiers would not affect the entire system. Conversely, in a Keynesian perspective, with the focus on the nation state, the pressures outside the borders were not fully contemplated by thinkers.

In addition to this, the increasing globalization and global interdependence came to light with the oil crisis. In fact, as Daniel J. Sargent argues, the petroleum crisis has shaken the prosperity of the West and has moved the balance of power of the world towards oil exporters.⁶³ Hence, as Sargent makes clear, “‘globalization’ is an appropriate word for the

⁶¹ Keohane and Nye Jr., “Globalization” 81.

⁶² Ferrarese, *Promesse mancate*, 292.

⁶³ Daniel J. Sargent, “The United States and Globalization in the 1970s”. In *The Shock of the Global*. 49.

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1970s [and] [...] it was in the 1970s that the imperatives of an integrating world came to weigh decisively on national policies”.⁶⁴

Furthermore, transnationalization, globalization, and interdependence allude to a spatial change and with this to territoriality, due to the fact that national borders started to be blurred. However, it is relevant to note that the transformations in terms of territoriality do not mean the end of this phenomenon, rather it entails a shift in terms of the significance of this category. Indeed, as Jan Aart Scholte notes, what often has occurred has been a process of “re-territorialization”. The latter has been verified when some “territorial units decline in significance and other territorial configurations obtain increasing importance”⁶⁵. An example of this would be the supranational entities or the regional bodies such as the EEC, the *Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe* –SELA- (1975), and the Andean Pact (1969).

In brief, the economic transformations during the 1970s meant a turning point in the world, since somehow the economic shifts aroused economic globalization and called into the question the Cold War’s order. Indeed, as Charles Maier claims, the 1970s was not only a decade of economic crises, but it also involved a set of older and newer values since what occurred in that time was the transformation of “spontaneity into institutional challenge and durable organizations”⁶⁶. Without these disruptions, the topic of this research probably could not have taken place.

2.2. Towards a Global Society?

The shock of the 1970s implied changes in the economic structures. Accordingly, the configuration of the world was modified, and with this, new guidelines were required. Likewise, the social sphere experienced a similar shift. The issues that took place during the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s (e.g. the Vietnam war and the American defeat;

⁶⁴ Ibid., 52-53.

⁶⁵ Scholte, “What is ‘Global, 90.

⁶⁶ Maier, “Malaise”. 39

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the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion; student movements in France, USA, UK, Germany, Italy, Mexico; and the Chinese cultural revolution) led to the emergence of a counter-culture (the so-called “third front”) that challenged the established Cold War’ scheme.⁶⁷ As a matter of fact, a New Left emerged that was closer to the Third World rather than to Leninism and Stalinism⁶⁸ and a new generation of people (with different values than their parents who lived under Fascism and two World Wars) populated the world. Thus, a “generation gap” was experienced.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, the most important issue refers to the fact that all these changes occurred both in a synchronized manner and simultaneously in different countries. As Dan Stone claims, 1968 was significant in terms of transnational links between the West and the East: “1968 in both east and west was not only ‘an anti-authoritarian revolt on both sides of the Iron Curtin’; it was also ‘a rebellion against the grip of the war generation, founded on silences about the recent past, especially about the World War II’⁷⁰. Thus, the sharing of ideas, feelings, cultures (i.e. music, television, and literature), made the world more interconnected. Within this context, the bipolar scheme and the territorial boundaries started to lose their omnipresent character. For these reasons, “1968” is currently known as a symbolic year that provided the first signals of a “new” future that was starting to be shaped.⁷¹ Accordingly, these transformations were so significant that they meant a change in the social and cultural structure and therefore a new worldwide organization. They were structural because they determined and conditioned the development of the “future society”, including our own.

As a result, all these fissures and changes in the world’s configuration led to the beginning of the internationalization of society. As outlined above, concepts like transnational, interdependence, international, global have often been used to describe this decade. It is for

⁶⁷Jeremi Suri, “Counter. Cultures” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II. Edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (UK: Cambridge University Press 2010) 470 and 480.

⁶⁸ Stone, *Goodbay to All That?*. 112.

⁶⁹Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe: 1850-2000*. (UK: Oxford University press, 2002),354-355. Hobsbawm, *Historia del siglo XX*.

⁷⁰ Stone, *Goodbay to All That?*. 142.

⁷¹ Eley, *Forging Democracy*. 362-363.

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this reason that some scholars, such as Akira Iriye, alluded to the emergence of a “world community”. According to Iriye, this community was the result of the force acquired by globalization at that time.⁷² Hence, this left room for more autonomous international relations in spite of the Cold War’s bipolar structure.

Indeed, new forms of international action were developed:

- 1) The first plan for European Political Cooperation (EPC) was advanced in October 1970. This aimed to establish a common international policy that would lead and allow the EEC – and the EEC member states- to play a key role in the international arena.
- 2) The creation of a Trilateral Commission in 1973 aimed at establishing close relations between the United States, Western Europe and Japan in order to solve common problems and to face the challenges of the future, given the growing awareness of the global interdependence at that time.⁷³ Rule of law, democratic government, human rights, freedom of speech and free enterprise were and are the founding principles of the Commission⁷⁴. The Trilateral was an attempt to coordinate a common policy since problems could not be solved anymore within the national borders.
- 3) The Group of Six in 1975 formed by France, West Germany, Italy, the United States, United Kingdom and Japan (since 1976 Group of Seven–G7 with the accession of Canada) aimed at creating a common strategy to better face the economic and financial crises. In the first meeting (15-18 November 1975), the leaders of the six countries agreed on two initiatives to stop the currency fluctuation and to ensure fiscal and budgetary disciplines;⁷⁵
- 4) The Helsinki Final Act which focused on and linked human rights, international security and free movement of people and information. In 1978, the Helsinki Watch (funded by the Ford Foundation) was instituted with the objective of controlling the

⁷² Akira Iriye, *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making the Contemporary World*, (USA: University of California Press, 2002), 128,

⁷³ In the Trilateral Commission the Third World is not represented.

⁷⁴ See the information about the Trilateral Commission in the following website: <http://trilateral.org/page/3/about-trilateral>

⁷⁵ Fazio Vengoa, *Los setenta*, 135-136.

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fulfillment of what has been established in the Helsinki agreement. Similarly, human rights were enshrined by the Copenhagen summit (in 1973), in which European members states established that democracy, the protection of human rights and promotion of rule of law were fundamental requirements to demand the accession to the EEC.

It is interesting to note that the Final Act, being a transnational document and protecting human rights, became an incentive for the Eastern European dissidents like Michael Cotey notes for the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland. For instance, in the former, a group of writers demanded the government to comply with the commitment signed in Helsinki. Likewise, in Poland the KOR (Workers' Defense Committee) and the Solidarity trade union pressed the government to ensure their respect.⁷⁶ The truth is that human rights was a phenomenon that involved all over the world, in fact, it was included in the language and in the requests that dissidents across world made, as one can notice in the work of Chilean activists after the coup d'état in 1973. The point is that the diffusion and the power that human rights reached in the 1970s confirmed to some extent the internationalization of society that in terms of guardianship, they were starting to be invoked instead of just local or national protection. Furthermore, human rights in those years began to be included in the common language and ceased to be notions used only by political actors. Thus, according to Samuel Moyn their spread occurred in the 1970s-1980s because in those years they entered in the everyday language, remained neutral ("moral utopia") and preserved their apolitical character. The last two features, however, have changed over the years. In fact, Moyn regrets the fact that in recent times politics has been constraining them.⁷⁷

Hence, as we know human rights did not rise in the 1970s, but there is no doubt that in those decades there were a turn that favored their great explosion. Some authors argued that the explosion of human rights were enabled by: 1) the European decolonization and the subsequent mobilizations in favor self-determination, 2) the American civil rights movements; and 3) the new perception/understanding of the Second World War and the

⁷⁶ Michael Cotey Morgan, "The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights" in *The Shock of the Global*, 247-249.

⁷⁷ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia, Human Rights in History*, (USA: Belknap Press, 2010), 213-214.

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refusal of genocide⁷⁸. However, it is also relevant to point out the following. Firstly, human rights were not a response to genocide and/or to the awareness of the horrors that occurred during the war, in fact it was only in recent years that memory of holocaust has gained ground among scholars. Secondly, ‘self-determination’ and ‘anticolonial’ movements, for themselves, cannot be considered the causes of the explosion of human rights because, as Samuel Moyn emphasizes, these notions were developed in the years immediately after the Second World War (actually, even before, if one considers the Wilson’s 14 points) and they were extremely linked to the concept of nation state.

The political scientist Mary Kaldor also moves in the same direction. In fact, she underlines that literature often tends to distinguish between “old” and “new” social movements. She claims that the former are usually connected with self-determination or workers movements, and the latter has been the result of the 1968 unrests. These “new” social movements are interested in “new” matters such as human rights, gender equality, environmental issues, worldwide peace, security, solidarity towards the Third World, etc. As a result, they constitute the “new” dilemmas that the “new” middle class (which emerged from the post-industrial world and welfare state) has to face. Furthermore, the particularity of these “new” social movements is their global character. This makes them different the “new” from the “old” social movements.⁷⁹

As a result, other factors led to the outbreak of this phenomenon at global level. In fact, the emergence of a global society, by causing a proliferation of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, contributed to the diffusion of human rights around the world. As the historian Akira Iriye underlines, intergovernmental organizations increased from 280 entities in 1972 to 1530 in 1984 and nongovernmental grew from 2795 to 12,689 in the same period.⁸⁰ It is also important to keep in mind that civil society bodies emerged on both sides of the Iron Curtain, where the violent behavior of governments was highly criticized on behalf of human rights. Likewise, new technologies such as television and improvements in which the transmission of information became faster and cheaper made

⁷⁸ Cotey Morgan, “The Seventies and the Rebirth” 240.

⁷⁹ Mary Kaldor, *La sociedad civil global. Una Respuesta a la guerra*. (Barcelona: Tusquets, 2005), 114-115.

⁸⁰ Iriye, *Global Community*, 129.

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people more aware of humanitarian crises. Indeed, the new technologies, in particular television, revolutionized space and time. In the first place because events could be seen globally and simultaneously (when they occurred) and in the second place, because the global space became a political space since the live broadcast represented and was associated with the truth. As Kaldor says, the local instantly became global, and which was far away immediately started to be close.⁸¹

Without denying the importance of human rights in terms of morality, humanity, and justice, the centrality that we give to them in this text is because they are useful to testify the shifts experienced in the world during the 1970s, in which national borders were blurred and globalization and transnationality were intensified. Likewise, human rights was one of the goals evoked by social democracy in its fight outside the European borders. Their international interventions often were in name of human rights.

Moreover, given the intensification of globalization and territoriality, civil society re-emerged in the 1970s and 1980s by involving the entire world (not only the USA or Europe) since similar ideas and practices were developed at global level. Indeed, global civil society implies the overcoming of the national frontiers, the strengthening of transnational networks, and the empowerment of global and domestic rules.⁸² As said, this is related to what Keck and Sikkink call “boomerang pattern”.

In addition to the requests regarding human rights, other kinds of demands reached great visibility during the 1970s. Gender parity and the environment were two of them. In fact, in this decade the feminist and ecologist movements achieved their pinnacle. Hence, those years were designated by the United Nation as the “International Decade of Woman” and the 1975 as the “International Women’s Year”. Similarly, the 22 of April was nominated as the Earth Day in 1970 and since then it has been commemorated. Therefore, in the 1970s both environmental and women rights became part of the globalization process more than ever. Thus, the increasing attention that women’s rights received in the 1970s testified and

⁸¹ Kaldor, *La sociedad civil global*. 138.

⁸² Ibid 135

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reflected the following issues: 1) the changes of mentality around the world; 2) global transformations in terms of society, culture, economy and politics; 3) the fact that women's rights became a central theme of discussion in the world affairs; and 4) the intensification of globalization and transnationality since women's movements transcended national borders. An example of this was the debut of the journal "Women's International Network News" in 1975.⁸³ Moreover, one can note the growing inclusion of women in the working world and their increased role in public society. In fact, the public discussion of "new" matters like abortion, divorce, and contraceptive methods was for the first time possible. In some way, the "private" began to overlap "the public" and with this, transcended national borders.

Likewise, global environmental activism rose in those years. Environment, pollution, and greenhouse emissions were among the focus of their actions. Like the feminist movements, the green movement became a transnational actor with political consequences on the local, national and international level.⁸⁴ For instance, it was in those years that agreements regarding water contamination, climate change, and acid rain were established.

In sum, the 1970s were a decade in which several movements with different goals (e.g. human rights, environment, and gender parity) spread around the world. The intensification of transnationality and globalization in this epoch was tested in two ways: firstly, with the proliferations of such international/transnational movements that encompassed the entire world; secondly, with the connections that these organizations established between different issues. For example, Greenpeace, founded in 1970 in Vancouver, linked two apparently distant notions, i.e. peace and the environment, in which it focused its activism. Therefore, distant notions became closer and for this reason they were interconnected. Recalling the words of Akira Iriye, during the 1970s, a "global community" and a global consciousness began to be shaped. All of this explains the action and interest of the SI in global matters and the overcoming of its traditional Eurocentric behavior. Likewise, as

⁸³Iriye, *Global Community*, 135-136.

⁸⁴J. R. McNeill, "The Environment, Environmentalism and International Society in the Long 1970s", in *The Shock of the Global*, 263.

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outlined below, environment, equality, solidarity, disarmament, and human rights were, at that time, some of the main priorities and cornerstones of the SI all over the world.

2.3. Cold War as a Turning Point

The shock of the 1970s meant a structural shift in the economic and social stage. Accordingly, and this had significant repercussions on politics. However, despite the political fissures that were produced, the bipolar scheme did not allow a real structural shift in political terms (this will occur years later with the fall of the Eastern regimes). Nevertheless, relevant breaks occurred by entailing a Cold War turning point. This is addressed in the following paragraph in order to understand these cracks, and therefore the “weak points” of the system through which some “winds of change” or new actors (in this case the SI) were able “to infiltrate” the bipolar scheme.

The 1970s were a turning point during the Cold War. The collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, the incapacity of the reproduction of the Fordist model, the massive devaluation of U.S. currency, the Watergate Scandal in 1974, the two oil crises (1973 and 1979), and the Vietnam defeat (1974) were considered at the time to be the years of the Western decline and the end of the “glorious years”⁸⁵. Although the Eastern bloc was facing a stern test due to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the fracture with China, it somehow benefited from the Western crises. This was interpreted by the USSR (at least in terms of propaganda) as a decline of capitalism and the triumph of Communism, but the truth is that these events marked the outset of the Soviet decay. Hence, the Eastern Bloc failed because of its rigidity in economic, political, and social terms. The USSR was not able to keep up with the global changes, whilst the Western bloc was already at work.

⁸⁵ Stone, *Goodbay to All That* 123.

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As mentioned, the erosion of bipolarity and détente took place during 1970s. In this context, other “paths” were evident just as the SI’s efforts to become a sort of “third way” beyond the bipolar scheme. Hence, the economic difficulties stemming from the oil crises, the socio-cultural transformations, and the intensification of the human rights movements marked the West. Thus, people were more interested in global events, the Third World, and civil and human rights rather than weapons and power. Therefore, bottom-up forces developed considerably at the time. Capitalism and communism ceased to be the regulatory axis, leaving room for society and human beings.⁸⁶ This was nourished by the loss of faith in governments that people experienced and with the birth of global civil society. As Akira Iriye notes:

“In many parts of the globe, civil society was asserting itself, willing to challenge the authority of the state and to undertake tasks the latter was either unwilling or unable to perform. In the democratic states of Europe as well as in the United States and Japan, political commentators began discussing the question of governability—the ability of the state to cope with the increasing demands of society”.⁸⁷

Therefore, during the 1970s, a widespread mistrust started to develop not only towards the institutions but also towards U.S. leadership, especially after the Vietnam defeat. In addition to this, the U.S. had to face the rise of other economic powers, for instance Germany and Japan. However, this was solved by the instauration of mutual dependency, e.g. for the U.S., Japan became important in economic terms (industry and finance) while for Japan, the U.S. was vital for international protection.⁸⁸

Likewise, the West as a bloc was somehow undermined by Western European behavior. Since the end of the 1960s, the German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) launched the *Ostpolitik* (Eastern policy) with the attempt to establish contacts with the East and to achieve German reunification⁸⁹. Furthermore, the events of the early 1970s encouraged Western Europe, in particular the European Economic Community (EEC), to act more

⁸⁶ Jeremi Suri, “Counter Cultures”. 469.

⁸⁷ Akira Iriye, *Global Community*. 130.

⁸⁸ Giovanni Arrighi, “ The World economy and the Cold War, 1970-1990), in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. III. edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (UK: Cambridge University Press 2010), 42.

⁸⁹ Previously, Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963) moved to the same direction.

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independently from the U.S. Until then, the Atlantic institutions, such as NATO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ruled and maintained the Western bloc as united. Nevertheless, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the Western economic crises as well as the Vietnam defeat had consequences on the EEC behavior at that time. Indeed, they encouraged EEC integration and they pushed the EEC to establish institutions aimed at coordinating its foreign policy and cooperating on monetary terms.⁹⁰ In fact, in order to avoid currency fluctuations, in 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) was introduced and the European Currency Unit (ECU) was established. Actually, in 1969 an institution for the European Political Cooperation (EPC) had been founded at the meeting in The Hague. At this point, it is important to stress that these attempts of the EEC did not mean rejection or distancing itself from the Atlantic institutions but rather they constituted an endeavor to act more independently.

Moreover, the meeting of the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSEC) held in Helsinki in 1973 underlined the relevance of Europe in those years. In fact, in addition to the Soviet Union and the United States, all the European countries (with the exception of Albania) participated⁹¹. The CSEC accords concluded in July 1975 with the Helsinki Final Act that dealt with all the issues related to European security (inviolability of borders, economic issues, international movements of people and information, and human rights). The CSEC meeting also was an instrument to foster European East-West relations. This also made it clear that the world was changing. As Jussi Hanhimäki points out, the international arena focused on human security rather than on states.⁹² Nevertheless, the interpretation of the U.S. and USSR regarding the Helsinki Final Act were different. The U.S. underlined the centrality of human rights, while the USSR understood it as the ratification of the status quo. However, within the Eastern bloc, dissident movements rose

⁹⁰ N. Piers Ludlow, “European integration and the Cold War”, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II, 192-193.

⁹¹ Stone, *Goodbay to All That? 171*.

⁹² Jussi M. Hanhimäki “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II. 213-216.

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by alluding to the Finland agreement.⁹³

In this respect, human rights brought additional fissures between the two superpowers. As a matter of fact, the American president Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) used the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to attract the electorate. In fact, the U.S. became more sensitive to these issues by responding and trying to fix the negative American involvement in international affairs (e.g. Vietnam War, the coup d'état in Chile, and the intervention in Central America and South Africa) that had unleashed several critics and protests from international movements, NGOs, and international public opinion. Hence, a human rights bureau within the American State Department was established. On the other hand, the Soviet Union underestimated the global movements and it was only in 1986 when it accepted the requests for the respect of human rights. At that time, the USSR began to stop the political arrests within its borders.⁹⁴

As mentioned above, the Soviet Union interpreted the 1970s as communist success over the Western system. However, these same considerations led to the collapse of the USSR in the following decade. In those years, the Soviet Union did not question its policies. This period coincided with the government of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982), and with the détente (i.e. the improvement of the relations between the USA and USSR, trade agreements, nuclear arms control [Salt treaty] and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty).

In economic terms, even though the Soviet Union started to open its market outside the bloc, the structure of its model stymied its economic development. Import/export products, the maintenance of the bloc, and security affected the Soviet economy. In fact, the USSR imported technology and machinery from industrial countries and foodstuffs from the Third World, but gas and oil remained its main export goods over time. Therefore, to some extent, the Soviet Union became more dependent on international trade. Furthermore, their economic growth fell significantly: in the 1950s the rate of growth was 5.7%; in the 1960s it was 5.2%; in the 1970s it fell to 3.7%, and finally to 2% in 1980-1985. Likewise, while the West benefited from the Third Industrial Revolution, the Soviet economy, on the

⁹³ Stone, *Goodbye to All That?* 171.

⁹⁴ Rosemary Foot, "The Cold War and human rights" in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. III 457 and 462

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contrary, remained not only linked to the extensive model but also it suffered the primarization of its economy. For instance, the export of energy and mineral resources increased from 35% in the 1970s to 58% in 1982.

Moreover, if one considers the electronics sector, it is possible to observe the following: on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 indicates the lowest and 10 the highest, the USA was at 9.9 level, Japan at 7.7, Western Europe at 4.4 and the USSR at 1.5. Similarly, regarding the production of new materials, the USA reached 7.7, Japan at 6.3, Western Europe at 6.0, and the USSR at 3.3⁹⁵. The problem was that the Soviet economic backwardness was experienced in all the economic sectors. Soviet productivity could not grow anymore because the USSR model never changed, while the conditions of the USSR, like those in the world during the 1980s, were quite different from the 1930s when the model was developed. Thus, the USSR was not able to move from an extensive economic growth to an intensive one as the West did. Furthermore, since the 1970s, the cornerstones required for the maintenance of the extensive scheme (e.g. workforce, investment, and energy sources) started to weaken, therefore exacerbating the situation.⁹⁶

Another element that must be taken into account is the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Third World. This is important because during the 1970s, the USSR increased its presence in this part of the world since it believed that it was very close to winning the war. The rapprochement between China and the U.S. in 1978 also pushed the Soviet Union to foster its presence in other parts of the world. In addition to this, the U.S. decision to deploy missiles on Western soil and the acceptance of Western Europe, and the confrontation between the two superpowers in the Middle East, encouraged the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan in 1979. In this way, the détente era definitively came to an end. This led to the so-called “Second Cold War” in the 1980s.⁹⁷

Additionally, during the 1970s and 1980s, globalization intensified. In this regard, the West was able to adapt itself to the new order, while the East was not. As Stephen Brooks and

⁹⁵ Hugo Fazio Vengoa with the collaboration of Luciana Fazio and Daniela Fazio Vargas, *Rusia, de los zares a Putin (1880-2015), segunda edición corregida y aumentada*. (Bogota, Ediciones Uniandes, 2015), 178

⁹⁶ Ibid 178-181.

⁹⁷ Stone, *Goodbay to All That?* 198.

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William Wohlforth note:

“[...] the Soviet Union had faced significant economic handicaps from the moment its foreign policy became equated with economic isolation in the 1920s. But these handicaps greatly increased in relative importance as the cost, complexity, and difficulty of technological development spiraled upward in the late 1970s and 1980s and as the globalization of production concomitantly accelerated. It is easy to see how isolation from the globalization of production increased the difficulty of keeping up with the West in terms of general economic and technological productivity, likely the key concern of many new thinkers”.⁹⁸

Furthermore, during the 1970s, the economic decentralization and the opening of the Soviet bloc to the international economy (market and capital) had positive, albeit asymmetrical, consequences in the world. In fact, the USSR took advantage of the first oil crisis by increasing oil prices. However, in the 1980s the situation changed. The international prices of oil diminished leading the USSR to take out several loans.

Unlike the USSR, the Western bloc was able to adapt to the new circumstances. A neoliberal turn was carried out, leading to the liberalization of economic policies. In addition to this, the following issues favored Western development and hampered the Eastern bloc: the large loans that the Eastern bloc borrowed from Western banks; the invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian crisis that produced a collapse in the price of the main Soviet sources, namely gold, oil and some raw materials;⁹⁹ and lastly, the bottom-up pressures for modernization inside the USSR.

Hence, the 1970s was a stern test for the West and the Eastern bloc interpreted the Western situation as the triumph of communism over capitalism; however, since the late 1970s the USSR started to realize that victory could not be taken for granted. As a matter of fact, the Soviet rigidity as well as the inability to adapt to new contexts, like globalization, led to the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, what seemed to be the crisis of the West was, in retrospect, the beginning of the Soviet decline. The truth is that Western crises in the 1970s

⁹⁸ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas, *International Security*, Vol. 25, n. 3 (Winter 2000-2001), 36.

⁹⁹ Giovanni Arrighi, “The world economy” 39-40.

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led to the shift of Western identity.¹⁰⁰ This allowed the Western bloc to adapt itself to the new globalized world. Otherwise, the initial illusion of victory of the Soviet Union did not contribute to its transformations. The Soviet leaders tried to preserve the status quo. It was only with the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) with his policies of *glasnost and perestroika* that the USSR started to change. However, although Gorbachev tried to solve the Soviet dilemmas, the implosion of the USSR was inevitable.

That said, the “erosion” of the bipolar scheme (the belief of the “decay” of the West and then of the East) led to the rise of movements with “new” interests (e.g. human rights, democracy, etc..) and gave room for the development of new conceptions (“third way”) to face the reality outside the two blocs. In this context, the SI rose and developed.

2.4. The Community’s Policy during the 1970s and 1980s: a Turning Point?

The EEC represented a crucial external dimension for both Italy and Spain –the case studies of this writing. The differences in terms of status within the Community, i.e. Italy as a full member of the EEC and Spain as an applicant country, represented an added value for this research because it allows us to observe two policies of two Mediterranean countries inside and outside the EEC, the influence of the Community on these states and vice versa, and their relations, objectives and intentions towards Latin America. As said, in those years a rapprochement and intensification of the relations between the two regions were produced. Why? In order to answer this, it is necessary to take into account the challenges that the EEC faced at that time and its subsequent changes because since then the Community started to exert a significant influence on external matters and to experience and to move towards significant transformations (enlargement and integration).

¹⁰⁰ Robert Jervis, “Identity and the end of the Cold War”, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II. Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

Considering the situation of the 1970s, the EEC had to carry out some changes in order to adapt itself to the new context. As a matter of fact, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the EU countries were aware of the necessity to adopt a monetary system in order to prevent currency fluctuations. As already stated, the EMS was created and the ECU established. Given that Germany had the strongest economy (i.e. the main trading partner of the EEC members with a stable currency), the German *Bundesbank* and the German Mark quickly became the landmarks for the EEC, reaching high international prestige.

Furthermore, other measures were undertaken in order to contain the international economic threats: the acceptance of United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark as members of the Community (the EEC became the “Europe of Nine”) and the development of a new project aimed at the definition of the single market (the 1986 Single European Act -SEA) that ended in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty. The SEA consolidated the process of institutionalization that has been initiated with the Rome Treaty.¹⁰¹ Therefore, during those years the idea of a common currency had emerged. Italy and France particularly supported this project in order to contain the German power and the Bundesbank, since the latter acted as the European Central Bank. At the beginning, Germany hesitated to adopt a common currency fearing negative consequences on the domestic economy. However, the idea of losing the support of the EEC in the reunification of the country led it to accept the new policy.¹⁰² Nonetheless, the truth was that with the reunification in 1990, Germany became the biggest country in the area in terms of demography and economy,¹⁰³ therefore keeping its prior status.

The abovementioned EEC project required great cohesion between the EEC members and some institutional changes. Indeed, transformations in terms of policy-making were carried out since the new electoral mechanism and decision-making rules shifted from the

¹⁰¹ Sergio Fabbrini, *Which European Union Europe After the Euro crisis*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2015) Kindle Edition, 823.

¹⁰² Wolfgang Streeck, “¿Por qué el euro divide a Europa?” *New Left Review*, 95, (Nov-Dic- 2015): 19-20.

¹⁰³ Sergio Fabbrini, “The constitutional conundrum of the European Union”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, (2016): 90.

unanimity to qualified majority voting; likewise, the SEA led the EEC towards a single political body. In these changes, the European Parliament achieved the right to veto in the international policy and its approval was necessary for the single market. The SEA and the SME, in other words, required greater cohesion, cooperation, coordination, and a single/common policy among the member states. Indeed, both the SEA and the SME meant the reduction of the role and decision-making of the nation-states in the economy, and this became the peak of the EU supranational entity, at least in economic terms. Hence, the national borders were blurred and the liberalization of markets reached its heyday. As a result, the nation-states were not able to control and manage the market. Consequently, the chasm between both the economic and social prerogatives increased considerably.

Hence, these transformations inside the EEC marked the decision-making of the two cases studies analyzed here because both have to adapt themselves to the EEC's prerogatives. As a result, their foreign policies were influenced along with the fundamentals of the governments in chair. Moreover, all of these EEC's transformations were linked with its ambition to establish a single voice in several fields and not only in the economic sphere. It is important to underline this "ambition" because it is for this reason that the EEC started to develop political interests inside and outside the region. The idea of the EEC as a "third way" in the international arena started to thrive in those years.

In regard to the EEC's foreign policy, the truth is that the international context during the 1970s (the oil crises, the Arab-Israeli War, the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnam war, etc.) pushed the Community to accept a growing role in the international arena. A common European response became necessary. In spite of the fact that the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, claimed 1973 to be the "year of Europe" (a statement that implicitly meant the EEC as an entity with regional extent, in opposition to the American entity, which was global), in December 1974, the EEC foreign ministers adopted the "Declaration on European Identity" in Copenhagen as an effort to establish its

responsibilities and tasks in relation to the world.¹⁰⁴ However, it was with the second enlargement (with the inclusion of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, i.e. “the Europe of Twelve”), when the EEC realized the necessity of internal transformations in order to achieve the fulfillment of the single market.

Likewise, members also pushed towards the reform of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), since Europe should have a central role in the international arena. With this goal, in October 1981 the EEC members adopted the London Report and in June 1983 adopted the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration, which stated for the “progressive development and definition of common principles and objectives [and] the possibility of joint actions in the field of foreign policy”¹⁰⁵. All of them were actions aimed toward the transformation of the EEC. The materialization of these new impulses and the first great reform of the Treaty of Rome were reached with the SEA. Indeed, in terms of foreign policy, the SEA formalized its intergovernmental cooperation and the European Council assumed the leading role. The intensification of the cooperation with the Third World countries became a prerogative of the EEC and a goal to carry out.¹⁰⁶

Furthermore, it is relevant to underline that both enlargement and increasing integration were two mechanisms of EEC external policies, since the Community adopted these two strategies (enlargement and SEA) in order to respond to the scenario of the 1970s. Hence, the greater integration implied to the Community’s members both further convergence in different matters (not only in economic issues) and further alignment with the EEC policy. Additionally, the international context and increasing globalization had consequences on

¹⁰⁴ Federiga Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview”. In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s role in the World*, edited by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, Brooking Institution Press, 2012, 19.

¹⁰⁵ The section 3.1.5 of the Stuttgart Declaration stated the following: “Given the importance of the Community’s external relations, strengthening of the common commercial policy and development of its external economic policy on the basis of common positions; the Community will, in this way, give effects to its special responsibility as the principal world trader and to its commitment to a free and open trading system. In this context, improvement and coordination of national and Community development cooperation policies are needed in order to reflect more fully the needs of the developing countries and the interdependence between them and Europe, and so that Europe plays a stronger and more stimulating role in relations between the industrialized and developing countries”. “Solemn Declaration on European Union, European Council”, Stuttgart, 19 June 1983, Bull. EC 6-1983, http://aei.pitt.edu/1788/1/stuttgart_declaration_1983.pdf

¹⁰⁶ Bindi, “European Union Foreign Policy”, 22-23,

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European integration. Thus, the SEA has been considered a response to increasing global competition and the SEA's project itself has fostered the internationalization of certain economic sectors, and therefore it meant a market opening.¹⁰⁷ Other goals relied on the search of a common external identity, which implied external policy and matters related to defense and security.

Another aspect worth highlighting here is the role played by the socialist group (an issue of interest for the purpose of this study) at the EEC, since the European socialists, through transnational networks, tried to influence the Community's policy and its decision-making (e.g. to shape an EEC development policy). Indeed, during the 9th Congress of parties in 1973, the socialist group revealed some of the matters that concerned them: (i) direct election of the European Parliament; (ii) assistance programs for developing countries; and (iii) the fight against dictatorships in the name of democracy and social aims of the EEC.¹⁰⁸

The existence of the Socialist group within the Community is long-standing (i.e. the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties); however, it was only institutionalized when the project of direct election of the European Parliament (EP) took place in 1979 when the first direct elections were held. As a matter of fact, in 1974 the Confederation of Socialist Parties was founded¹⁰⁹. Nevertheless, according to Christian Salm, formal actions, dialogues, and cooperation between European socialist parties remained weak during the 1970s due to institutional, funding, and staff reasons. Accordingly, in this context, the SI maintained a significant role in terms of transnational connections and networks among Western socialist parties in their efforts to define socialist policies in the Community. In line with this, both the SI and socialist parties strived to give a new dimension to the EEC development policy since they were supporters of the need to globalize the EEC

¹⁰⁷ Ian Bartle, "Transnational Interests in the European Union: Globalization and Changing Organization in Telecommunications and Electricity," *Journal of Common Markets Studies*, 37 n. 3 (1999): 365.

¹⁰⁸ James May, "Is there a European Socialism?," *Journal of Common Markets Studies*, 13, n. 4 (1975), 492-493

¹⁰⁹ The Socialist group was extremely linked to the German SPD. According to Geoffrey Pridham, the Socialist group cannot make any decision without the endorsement of the SPD. This mainly determined the nominations for chairmanships as well as other positions in the Parliament. Geoffrey Pridham, "Transnational Party groups in the European Parliament," *Journal of Common Markets Studies*, 13, n. 3 (1975): 274. Likewise, the SI was extremely close to the SPD.

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development assistance. In fact, through regular meetings, forums, socialist press, raising public awareness, and by taking the United Nation's development strategy as a blue print, they have been successful in giving a new impetus to the relationships between the EEC and the developing countries.¹¹⁰

Furthermore, the existence of files in the SI archives related to the regular participations of European socialists at the SI meetings, as well as the exchange of information, reports, and letters between the Socialist Group and the leaders of the SI, display their proximity¹¹¹. One issue related to the Nicaragua situation (just to quote one example linked to a matter of interest in this writing) could be useful to grasp the extent of the dialogues between the Socialist Group and the SI as well as the role of the latter as a meeting point for parties, countries, and organizations. For instance, in a cable from Brussels to London, the Socialist Group informed the SI's General Secretary Bernt Carlsson (26 July 1979) about its efforts at the EEC's meetings to convince the Community to support the provisory government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan refugees. Two years later, the Secretary of International Relations of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Julio Lopez Campos, wrote to Carlsson (21 June 1982) asking for support from the socialist deputies of the European Parliament in order to rectify the EP's decision aimed at ceasing the European assistance towards Managua. Carlsson forwarded the request to the Socialist Group at the EP and he received the response on August 16, 1982 in which the General Secretary of the Socialist Group, Paolo M. Falcone, confirmed the fact that a small minority has joined the resolution regarding the Nicaraguan aid, mainly because the situation of human rights in Nicaragua has become questionable in recent times.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Christian Salm, "Shaping European Development Policy? Socialist Parties as Mediators from the International to the European Level. In *Societal Actors in European Integration. Polity –Building and Policy-Making 1958-1992*, edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jan Henrik Meyer, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 41 and 51.

¹¹¹ The box 593 ("European Parliament Socialist Group") housed in the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam (Socialist International Archives), documents the regular contacts between the SI and the Socialist group.

¹¹² Documents from the Socialist International Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 593

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Therefore, this information allows us to note: i) the regular contacts between the parts; ii) the modality of the networks between them; iii) the interest of the Socialist Group to reframe the EEC development policy and to enhance the external presence of the Community in name of worldwide solidarity and assistance for the Third World; and iv) how the SI was a meeting point between the “socialist” (or aligned) parties as well as the mechanism to reach the Socialist Group, and therefore, the European Parliament (EP). Hence, at that time the SI was relevant in the configuration of transnational political networks and activities of socialists in Europe and beyond. Additionally, the close links with the Socialist Group at the European parties allowed, to some extent, for the SI to have a voice in the European institutions as well as to receive a support from the inside. However, even if it is not always easy to assess the real impact of the Socialist groups in the EEC’s policy and decision-making, what remains clear it is that at that time transnational political networks were effectively constituted and sometimes played a significant role in some matters, i.e. EEC development policy, often through the influence of public opinion and social awareness.

In regard to the European development policy, socialist parties and the SI sought to enhance public awareness and to influence public opinion. The purpose was to raise development assistance and to encourage the EEC external action. Likewise, they tried to devise an agenda around such development policy and to coordinate the performance of the socialist parties.¹¹³ These issues were part of the SI-Socialist Group joint action at the EP.

2.5 What could be said about Latin America?

Among the issues in Latin America that captured the SI’s attention, one could note the following: the wave of dictatorships throughout the continent and the Cuban “threat”. Both were somehow framed in the Cold War scheme: Cuba was linked to the Soviet Union, while the conservative or right-wing forces, often authoritarians, to the United States (which acted in name of the anti-communist struggle and because of national security).

¹¹³ Salm, “Shaping European Development”, 46.

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Cuba became a *sui generis case* if one considers that Latin America belonged to the U.S. sphere of influence. Therefore, the authoritarian regimes and the Cuban revolution marked the history of Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century.

As a matter of fact, during the 1960s and 1970s, Latin America was characterized by a series of military coups (e.g. Argentina in 1955 and 1976, Brazil in 1964, Uruguay in 1974, and Chile in 1973) and by a subsequent authoritarian turn that ruled the continent. Civil war, violence, and corruption marked Central America as authoritarian regimes shaped the Southern Cone.

Why was Latin America embedded in that situation? Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith quoted the two sets of answers that specialized literature has usually provided to answer this question. On one hand, a set of scholars argued that the development of authoritarian regimes had been due to a misinterpretation of the Latin American policy and institutions because political parties and constitutions were never as democratic as they appeared. On the other hand, another set of scholars explained the Latin American situation as the result of its economic dependence. This affected and limited Latin American development and growth by leading to an economic crisis, which, in turn, implied the establishment of a “hard” line in terms decision-making. As Skidmore and Smith claimed, the authoritarian regimes in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina actually came about because of economic development and not in spite of it.¹¹⁴

Hence, some evidence of the Latin American awareness regarding the limitations and damage that external dependency produced in the region was testified by the joint efforts that the continent began to make in order to diversify their external relationships and to break free from the United States. One example of this was the agreement of a group of Latin American Foreign Ministers (which also included the participation of renowned European personalities such as Willy Brandt in this summit) to hold a meeting in Chile in June 1969 that set out the “Chart or Consensus of Viña del Mar”. With this document, Latin Americans looked for a revision of the North-South economic relations and for an

¹¹⁴ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 7-9.

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international openness. Furthermore, they emphasized the fact that the regional underdevelopment and the lack of progress were extremely linked to the external control and intervention in the local affairs, especially from the United States.¹¹⁵

It is interesting to note that following the publication of the Viña's Consensus as well as after the memorandum presented by the Italian government to the European Council in November 1968¹¹⁶, the Commission sent to the Council a report. This record aimed to extend the EEC activities on the other side of the Atlantic¹¹⁷.

Having said that, let us briefly note another issue that characterized Latin American history during the second half of the twentieth century, namely the Cuban experience. This country definitively influenced the political climate of the entire region and contributed to the definition of the revolutionary *New Left*.¹¹⁸ However, in regard to what interests us here, Cuba was extremely active in the Central American issues and therefore in the Nicaraguan revolution. This is why (at the international level) the fear that Nicaragua could become a "new Cuba" was aroused, as it was thought that it could lead to an exacerbation of the Cold War (and Europe was geographically located in the middle of the two superpowers).

In 1959, the uprising in Cuba started under the leadership of the brothers Fidel and Raul Castro, who assumed power. It is important to remark that this was an insurrection of the Cuban people (mainly from the middle class) and not a socialist revolution. It took another two years before Castro's movement shifted to a radical socialist revolution. The Cuban experience represented a real turn in Latin America since it became the benchmark of all the "revolutionary wars" throughout the continent, namely the "*guerrillas guevaristas*" during the 1960s and "protracted popular wars" during the 1980s. Hence, the Cuban government interpreted the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua as the continuity of its

¹¹⁵ Pierre Schori, *Conversaciones con el enemigo*, (Uruguay, Editorial Nordan-Comunidad, 2015), 178.

¹¹⁶ This memorandum asked the EEC greater clarity regarding relations towards Latin America. Likewise, it was critical of the EEC Common Agricultural Policy since, according to the Italian government, the latter jeopardized the Latin American economies.

¹¹⁷ Blanca Muñiz, "EEC-Latin America: a relationship to be defined". *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 19, n. 1 (1980): 56-57.

¹¹⁸ Igor Goiconivic Donoso, "Transición y violencia política en Chile (1988-1994)", *Ayer* 79/3 (2010): 65.

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legacy and its direct footprint.¹¹⁹

Indeed, the Nicaraguan uprising was a kind of re-awaking for the Cuban revolutionaries after the times of “lower intensity” in the 1970s. In fact, although the “*Departamento de América del Comité Central del Partido Comunista*” (the so-called “*Ministerio de la Revolución*”) was founded in 1974 with aim of spreading the Cuban experience, their continental influence had been radically diminished. Thus, the relationships with the other countries were normalized and there was a reduction of any interference in the internal issues of the other states. The truth is that the failure of Chilean experiment had dispelled the possibility to spread the revolution throughout the continent.¹²⁰ Therefore, the Sandinistas re-gave to Cuba the hopes to re-switch on the revolution in Latin America. In this context, the Cuba provided its full support to the Nicaraguan revolutionary movements. For instance, the Castro regime supplied military equipment and intelligence services to the Sandinistas, and Havana trained part of the Sandinista leadership and connected them with other revolutionary movements and organizations. The Cuban support to the Sandinistas was in line with its main precepts and goals in the region: (i) the assumption that the armed struggled was essential for the Latin American revolution; (ii) the quest of unity and cooperation among all the revolutionary forces in the continent; and (iii) the need to establish alliances with others movements.¹²¹ Thus, Cuba was really interested in fostering its ideology and action beyond its geographical borders and Nicaragua became a great opportunity in this project.

It is interesting to note that in order to increase its international role and diffuse its own doctrine, Cuba undertook other kind of mechanisms. Hence, in addition to the military support to the Sandinistas as well as to the myriad of revolutionary movements in the Third World, Havana made significant efforts in order to spread its own health care system. This to some extent became an instrument to underline the benefits that Communism included over Capitalism, which in turn increased the Western fears about the diffusion of Cuban sway around the world (“Cubanization”). For instance, in developing countries, groups of

¹¹⁹ Pierre Vayssi re, *Les r volutions d’Amerique Latine*, (France:  ditions du Seuil, 2001), 16.

¹²⁰ Jorge G. Casta eda, *La Utop a desarmada. Intrigas, dilemas y promesas de la izquierda en Am rica Latina*, (M xico: Joaqu n Mortiz- Planeta, 1993), 69-70.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 72-75.

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doctors, nurses, and teachers were sent in order to replicate the Cuban medical system. In this way, Havana was able to achieve major international visibility and international presence through transnational operations. Within this context, after the victory of the Sandinista Movement, Nicaragua became a country in which the Cuban program was introduced.

According to K. Cheasty Anderson, Cuba interpreted its medical mission in Nicaragua as part of its global purpose to disseminate its health policy and to oppose to the hegemonic, imperialistic, and capitalistic policy of the United States in Latin America. Likewise, Anderson pointed out an additional task that the Cuban government sought to accomplish with these kinds of missions. This became a kind of reminder as well as a mechanism to legitimize the government itself since Castro encouraged Cuban health missionaries to reflect about the benefits of living in a communist system in comparison with the “public health disaster that “capitalist” Nicaragua had become under the Somoza dictatorship”¹²².

By some means, the Cuban revolution inspired insurgencies and guerrillas, whose main place of action was Central America. The Cuban action and interference in all Latin American issues was, on one hand, because of their self-consideration of great knowledge regarding the revolution and, on the other, because the Latin American revolutionary forces perceived Cuba as a model, and in accordance with this they accepted and even requested the intervention of Castro in their own local affairs. Hence, several international actors (especially the United States) interpreted, framed, and observed the Latin American uprisings through the lens of the East-West confrontation, since the “Cuban model” has always been present.

As a result, in Latin America mutual dialogues, interests, and cooperation between Havana and the revolutionary movements influenced both regional policies and international issues. In fact, in Latin America since the Cuban revolution, positions, actions, and interventions by international actors –like the SI- were often subject to the action and non-actions of both

¹²² K. Cheasty Anderson, “Doctors Within Borders. Cuban Medical Diplomacy to Sandinista Nicaragua”, in *Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War*, edited by Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, Julio E. Moreno, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 203

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the United States and Cuba. Hence, one cannot discuss the Latin American situation, its context, its history, its relationships, and its matters since the 1960s onwards without referring to both “the Colossus of the North” and Castro’s movement. Cuba became an effective mechanism to counterbalance the power of U.S. regional hegemony.

Nevertheless, it is also important to bear in mind that the Cuban revolution did not increase all the revolutionary movements in the continent, but it was more of a catalyzer. Indeed, the insurgency forces in Latin America have been long standing (e.g. the emergence of the *guerrilla* in Colombia) and the violence and armed forces’ uprising have not been a novelty (e.g. civil wars during the nineteenth century throughout the continent). However, even if Havana did not directly intervene in external issues, it constituted a reference point. Likewise, it is worth stressing here that Cuba did not only export a revolution but also a counterrevolution. As a matter of fact, several movements were formed, often, but not always, with the support of the United States that fought from abroad against the Castro regime. Even if the study of these groups goes beyond the aims of this research, it is important to keep in mind their existence because they really put together dozens of counterrevolutionary movements outside Cuba (in particular in Miami, New York, and New Jersey) and nourished the hatred towards the Cuban government.¹²³

2.6 The relations between the EEC and Latin America

The specialized literature has insisted that Western Europe increased its interest towards Latin America during the 1970s, and the 1980s was a decade of rapprochement between the two regions particularly because of the wave of democratization in Latin America that captured the attention of the Old Continent. Moreover, it was in those years that Europe presented itself as an alternative to the United States in the New Continent. This was possible since both Europe and Latin America began to develop more autonomous relationships in the international arena.

¹²³ See: Jonathan C. Brown, *Conterrevolution in the Caribbean. The CIA and Cuban Commandos in the 1960s*, in *Beyond the Eagle’s*, 103-128.

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That said, how were these relationships? Did these relations change in the 1970s and 1980s? Why? The aforementioned transformation of the 1970s affected and influenced the relations between the two continents. It is known that contacts between the two sides of the Atlantic are long standing, especially if we think about: (i) the period of colonization; (ii) the nineteenth century with the lines of thought from Europe; (iii) the influence of Enlightenment; (iv) the European migrations; (v) the French Empire in Mexico; and (vi) the term *Latin America* itself, which was disseminated in the middle of the nineteenth century by the French. At that time, France considered their culture, like the Spanish and Portuguese, as “Latin” (i.e. Romance language-speaking), and therefore, they retained themselves as the country destined to assume the leadership through the continent¹²⁴. Likewise, as Odd Arne Westad argues, the hegemony of the US in Latin America was a slower process. In fact, until the end of the 1930s, the European countries were more important than the U.S. for all Latin American trade¹²⁵. Nevertheless, it was only in the 1970s-1980s when formal links –not only for economic purposes- between the two regions began to be constructed.

Since the 1960s, both Latin America and the EEC started to be more interested in developing more open policies. In fact, in 1963 the “Special Committee for Latin American Cooperation” (*Comisión Especial de Coordinación Latinoamericana -CECLA*) was founded as a group of contact between the two regions. However, although some European countries (in particular Italy) during those years pushed towards enhancing economic and political policies with Latin America, the relations were limited and mainly in the economic sphere. Thus, the traditional European perception about Latin America remained the same, namely as a region for export markets. In fact, Latin America did not occupy a special place in the EEC policy regarding developing countries, as the Lomé

¹²⁴ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3.

¹²⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A Global History*, (UK: Allen Lane, 2017), Kindle Edition, 5530.

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Convention (a trade and aid agreement between the EEC and the ACP, i.e. Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific) demonstrated.¹²⁶

Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1970s and during the 1980s, the relationships between Latin America and the EEC started to be reshaped. Hence, the contacts ceased to be exclusively in economic terms as room was left for political interests. Several issues led to this new stage of the relations, among them:

- i) The importance of political and ideological parties, including the rise in Latin America of political parties with ideological purposes similar to European ones, particularly social democratic ones (and with these the SI), facilitated the connections between the two sides of the Atlantic. Additionally, European political parties started to change since they started to include new issues on their political agenda such as ecology, the emancipation of women, control of the arms race, global equality, and the protection of human rights.¹²⁷;
- ii) The new interest of Europe to open itself towards the Third World;
- iii) The crises of the 1970s pushed Europeans to search for new markets and raw materials outside their traditional economic partners;
- iv) Relations were facilitated by changes in the world economy and the erosion of import-substitution models and their replacement with others that were more open;
- v) The democratization of Southern Europe and Latin America were useful for their rapprochement. The wave of democracy in Latin America increased the political interest of the EEC in the region. In fact, this phenomenon offered a special dimension to the relations¹²⁸;
- vi) The conflicts in and the pacification of Central America captured the European attention;

¹²⁶ Gerhard Drekonja Kornat, “El redescubrimiento de América Latina por parte de Europa” in *América Latina, Europa Occidental y Estados Unidos*, edited by Wolf Grabendorff and Riordan Roett, (Buenos Aires, Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1984), 119.

¹²⁷ Alberto van Klaveren, “Europa Occidental y el sistema internacional: cambios internos y desafíos externos” in *El Mundo en transición y América Latina*, edited by Carlos Portales (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1989), 141.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 181-182.

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- vii) Advances in the process of EEC integration changed the rules of game (e.g. the development of EPC policy). Additionally, some Latin American identities, e.g. the Andean Pact, took inspiration from the Community;
- viii) Fissures that appeared in the Cold War scheme led to more autonomous relations. For instance, Latin America started to be interested in increasing its presence in the international arena by diversifying its external links. The latter occurred through increasing autonomy of external governmental policy (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela) and through multilateral policies, as the Contadora's efforts and the North-South dialogue revealed.¹²⁹ In fact, in the years that followed the Second World War, the cooperation was mainly bilateral. Conversely, since the late 1960s and during the 1970s, multilateral cooperation emerged and developed (e.g. Central American Common Market, Andean Pact, Caribbean Community and SELA) and organisms such as the EEC, IMF, GATT, etc., contributed to the evolution. Nevertheless, multilateralism did not mean the end of bilateralism, rather their coexistence and action.¹³⁰
- ix) The mutual awareness of the interdependence of the world increased. According to Wolf Grabendorff, the relationships between Western Europe and Latin America were globalized at the time. In fact, the conflicts such as democratization, the external debt problem, and the conflicts in Central America displayed a global character because all of them could not be solved without considering and involving the entire international system. Furthermore, he noted that this kind of globalization between both continents implied an ideologization of their relationships, namely the conception of the North-South order and the *particularization* of their relationships into three different levels: (a) supranational (EEC-Andean Pact; EEC–Central America), (b) national

¹²⁹ Monica Hirst, "Las políticas exteriores latinoamericanas frente a la crisis subregional: puntos de comparación" in *América Latina y la crisis centroamericana: se busca una solución regional*, edited by Cristina Eguizábal, (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1988), 264 and 272.

¹³⁰ Alberto Zelada Castedo, "América Latina: cooperación económica y cooperación política in *La Vulnerabilidad externa de América Latina y Europa*, edited by Eural (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1985), 217-218.

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(Germany-Brazil, France-Mexico, Spain-Argentina), (c) and transnational level (contacts between parties, trade unions, enterprise and other actors);¹³¹

- x) The 1970s was characterized by a change of the global “structures”. In fact, the “denationalization” of the world has been accompanied by the transformation of the hegemonic powers. As previously mentioned, the end of Bretton woods system and the oil crises, among others, put the U.S. hegemony into discussion.

Hence, as Heraldo Muñoz pointed out, during the 1970s the world experienced a cleavage in terms of “power and order” in the international arena since the hegemonic role of the U.S. started to show features of decay. This left room for a greater diversification of power, albeit the institutions linked to the international system remained practically the same. Accordingly, these fissures enabled the increasing presence of other actors in the region. Within this context, Latin America sought for a place in the international arena while the Europeans enhanced their interest in the region, which would have been unimaginable during the first two decades after the Second World War. Consequently, the great interest of Reagan in the continent during the 1980s (as demonstrated by the conflict of Central America) could be linked to the aim of re-conquering the previous US power in the region.¹³²

Moreover, the evident rapprochement between the two continents was also displayed by the proliferation of writings that at that time described the phenomenon and theorized the benefits that this proximity could produce. From a European point of view, the Italian economist Sandro Sideri underlined some reasons that justified the closer cooperation between the EEC and Latin America and the interest of the former towards the latter. Sideri provided three kinds of explanations:

- (i) Economic reasons: the EEC openness towards Latin America could help Europe overcome the economic crisis of the epoch, and it could be the first step towards a joint policy. In fact, according to Sideri, the EEC’s necessity of new markets,

¹³¹ Wolf Grabendorff, “Doce tesis sobre la vulnerabilidad de Europa y América Latina”, in *La Vulnerabilidad externa de América Latina*, 35-38.

¹³² Heraldo Muñoz, “Reflexiones sobre el orden mundial y América Latina” in *La Vulnerabilidad externa*, 51-66.

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the import of consumer goods at attractive prices (that, in turn, could lead to controlling inflation and wages) and the possibility of importing raw material (at least to balance the increasing dependence on Africa and the Middle East) were excellent reasons for the EEC to strengthen ties with the other side of the Atlantic.

- (ii) Political reasons: the EEC would be interested in the democratization of the continent, an issue that gained great relevancy as demonstrated by the behavior of European social democracy. Additionally, the rapprochement of the two continents would be useful to overcome the North-South conflicts as well as to facilitate the establishment of a new autonomous policy from the two superpowers (especially from the U.S.).
- (iii) Political and economic reasons: the relations of the EEC and Latin America would help the former to balance and to avoid the American/Japanese preeminence in the international arena and the subsequent economical prevalence of the Pacific area. Sideri concluded his dissertation by stressing that it was the appropriate time to improve the relationships between the two continents since both regions could help each other because “if the Latin American hope of independence passes through Europe [...] the European economic future involves Latin America”¹³³. The insights of the Italian economist provided a clear overview of the new stage of the relations of the time, as well as the benefits that the EEC and Latin America could gain by closing their ties.

Besides the reasons and opinions provided by the specialized literature regarding the rapprochement between the two regions, did the EEC and Latin America establish concrete ties? During the 1980s, the EEC started to carry out policies regarding Latin America. In this context, for instance, the Van Aerssen Report was drafted on behalf of the Committee on External Relations (European Parliament) on July 15, 1983 in order to define a European project to assist Latin America. The report “reaffirms its resolve to bring Latin America and the Community ever closer to a new and lasting partnership” and identified

¹³³ Sandro Sideri, “Europa y America Latina en la crisis mundial”, in *La Vulnerabilidad externa, 176-177*
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the following goals: (i) to improve the links with the SELA making the two regions closer; (ii) to conclude agreements of regional interest (e.g. the pacification of Central America); (iii) to develop bilateral agreements on the basis of the existing ones with Mexico and Brazil; (iv) to promote the cooperation agreements with the Andean pact; (v) to carry out specific sectorial accords (e.g. with the energetic sector), which was in the interest of both sides (i.e. for Latin American industrialization and for the lack of energy sources and raw materials in the Community; vi) to create a group of experts in order to assist the development of small businesses in Latin America; (vii) to suggest the creation of a Euro-Latin American bank with the aim of financing trade between the two regions and favoring investments projects; and (viii) to promote a peace policy in order to achieve social justice, democracy in Latin America, and to avoid the violation of human rights.¹³⁴

Likewise, this report synthesized the multilateral relations between the EEC and Latin America. It is worthwhile to stress that all the relations underlined by the record were actually established in the 1970s, just to name a few: (1) since 1970, regular meetings were held between Latin American Ambassadors accredited to the Community and the Permanent Representatives of the Member States and the Commission; (2) since 1977, the EEC established contacts with the SELA; (3) since 1979, the EEC and the Group of Latin American Ambassadors (GRULA) started to communicate with each other, and the SELA tasked GRULA to act as a bi-regional interlocutor; (4) since 1979, constant meetings with the Central American Common Markets were held; (5) in 1979, the Community began to negotiate with the Andean Pact, and the first ministerial meeting was carried out in May 1980 in which the Italian Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, headed the EEC delegation and the Ecuadorian Alfredo Pareja headed the Latin American one; and (6) since 1974, the European Parliament and the Latin American one started to meet every two years in order to discuss about political and economic issues (Inter Parliamentary meetings). In addition to this, the EEC signed some bilateral agreements, including with Brazil in 1980 (commercial

¹³⁴ European Parliament, J. Van Aerssen, *Working Document 1983-1984 drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External relations on economic and trade relations between the European Community and Latin America*, 78.713 fin (15 July 1983)

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and economic cooperation agreement), with Mexico in 1975, and with Uruguay in 1973 (non-preferential trade agreement).¹³⁵

In addition to the above, the EEC support regarding the Contadora Group and the subsequent signing of the Pact of San José (1985) demonstrated the greater awareness of the EEC in the region. Indeed, with the agreement of San José, the EEC stipulated 500 millions dollars as a grant for Central America for the following ten years and it offered itself as mediator for the renegotiation of the Central American external debt (i.e. 14 billions dollars). Quoting Klaus Bodemer, the real value of this pact was connected with the political aspect rather than economic because for the first time Central America was recognized as an independent region with its own interests.¹³⁶

Furthermore, the EEC took distance from U.S. action and even opposed some of its policies in the region. In this light, the Europeans framed the conflict in Central America as a North-South confrontation instead as an East-West conflict (which was the American perception). Moreover, the Europeans were also moved by the awareness that what could happen in Central America directly involved and affected Europe.¹³⁷ The following statements exemplified these conflicting positions. On one hand, Olof Palme recognized the attempts of the Contadora Group since it was useful to achieve an understanding of the regional situation and peace. Additionally, he stressed that it was an opportunity that must not be missed. According to him, this is why both Central American countries and the International Community accepted the Contadora's proposals since it included demilitarization, non-intervention and democratic development.¹³⁸ On the other hand, Henry Kissinger claimed that Contadora Group has been made a bold experiment, the interests and policies of these countries were not always coherent and they did not always converge with the American interests and policies. As a result, "the United States cannot

¹³⁵Ibid. 43

¹³⁶ Klaus Bodemer "La política de desarrollo de la CEE hacia Latinoamérica. ¿una política simbólica?. In *La Vulnerabilidad externa*, 204

¹³⁷ Klaus Bodemer, *Europa Occidental, América Latina. Experiencias y desafíos*, (Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Alfa, 1987), 96.

¹³⁸ Olof Palme, "Discurso pronunciado por Olof Palme en las Rivas (Nicaragua) con motivo de la inauguración de un hospital construido con ayuda sueca, 10 febrero 1984, In *Olof Palme Suecia y América Latina. Antología de documentos políticos*, edited by José Goñi (Buenos Aires: Punto Sur Editores, 1987), 134.

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use the Contadora process as a substitute for its own policies”. Hence, he insisted that “a successful counter-insurgency effort [...] is a necessary condition for a political solution”¹³⁹.

Notwithstanding, the Contadora group’s efforts and the San José Pact were of great significance for the region because for the first time a group of countries (i.e. the Contadora group) faced the aggressive policies of the U.S. However, even if some European parties (in particular those linked with the SI) had begun to adopt political positions in Central America since the 1970s, it was the San José Pact which led to strengthening and formalizing the political relationships between the EEC and Latin America by opposing US policies and gaining presence in a region traditionally controlled by Washington.¹⁴⁰ As a result, this confirmed the worldwide transformations, in terms of foreign interest, policies, objectives, and positions, developed in the 1970s and 1980s.

However, although the Contadora Group and the San José Pact were good starting points, several international matters undermined the Latin American policies and disturbed their development. While it is true that during the 1970s the Western European economies began to change, it was in 1980s when this transformation process touched Latin America. In fact, during the 1980s several international issues affected Latin America, including: 1) the sluggish growth of the developed economies and global economic instability; 2) the downturn concerning the expansion of the world trade; 3) the fall in price of primary products that negatively affected the exchanges; and 4) the fall of direct investment. All of these worsened the Latin American external debts, which in turn meant regional economic destabilization and a decline in living conditions.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, *National Bipartisan Report on Central America*, February 7 and 8 1984, (USA: Government Printing Office, 1984), 50; Antonio Montilla Saldivia, *Estados Unidos, América Latina y el Caribe continuidad histórica de una política de dominación*, (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1988), 81.

¹⁴⁰ Atilio A. Barón, “América Latina y Europa: ¿Hacia una profundización de las relaciones? In *Las políticas exteriores latinoamericanas frente a la crisis*. Edited by Heraldo Muñoz, (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano: 1985), 448-449.

¹⁴¹ Carlos Ominami, “América Latina en la economía mundial: tendencias recientes y escenarios alternativos” In *El Mundo en transición* 245-251.

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The truth is that following the first oil crisis several funds were made available to developing countries. The result was the exponential growth of the external debt. In fact, Latin American external debt quadrupled by increasing from 45,2 billion dollars in 1975 to 176,4 billion dollars in 1982. Hence, 1982 is the most critical moment for the Latin American downturn because the total debt of the region (which included short-term debt and the IMF credit) reached 330 billion dollars.¹⁴²

Table 1.

*Macroeconomic indicators for Latin America, 1973-1982*¹⁴³

Year	GDP %	Inflation %	External debts (\$ Billions)
1973	8.4	32.1	44.4
1974	6.9	37.5	58.2
1975	3.1	52.0	68.6
1976	5.5	66.1	82.0
1977	5.3	49.9	124.6
1978	4.1	41.9	154.9
1979	6.1	46.5	187.2
1980	5.3	53.7	229.4
1981	1.0	58.2	285.6
1982	-0.9	64.6	325.5

Consequently, Latin American countries started to adopt adjustment policies, which led to the acceleration of regional inflation. The economic situation in Latin America was very critical until the end of the 1980s when the governments started to understand that the model followed since the 1940s did not work anymore. At this point, Latin American

¹⁴² Sebastian Edwards, *Crisis y Reforma en América Latina del desconsuelo a la esperanza*, (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1997), 29.

¹⁴³ *Source*: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, *Anuario Estadístico*, various years. Table taken from Jeremy Adelman, “International finance and Political legitimacy”, n *The Shock of the Global The 1970s*, 123.

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leaders increasingly turned to the economic openness, free markets, deregulation, and privatization.¹⁴⁴

Therefore, Latin America also experienced a break in terms of behavior of the international finance during the 1970s-1980s. In fact, in this region both the external investments and multinational companies grew exponentially at that time. Hence, the explosion of external debt affected both Latin American states and international bankers because the first were not able to pay the international loans. Indeed, the fact that since the late 1970s and during the 1980s, 80% of the Latin American debt derived from the private bankers worsened the situation. Thus, the substitution of credits from official sources to private bankers during the 1970s accelerated the external loans in an uncontrollable manner. In fact, between 1960 and 1973, the capital flows towards Latin America have been equally distributed: the external investments corresponded to 31% of the total, official credits to 42%, and private credits to 27%; an issue that radically changed since 1975.¹⁴⁵

As a result, during the 1980s, Latin America experienced both the fall of per capita income (10%) and the fall of real prices (30%), as well as the sharp increase of inflation (up to 1000% in several countries). The economic difficulty of the region was evident. However, as Jeffry Frieden notes, in spite of the economic problems, Latin America also experienced two striking issues at the time: firstly, a wave of democratization (in the 1990s there were no dictatorships); secondly, the liberalization of economy that led to the complete integration of Latin American economies in the global market.¹⁴⁶

The Latin American economic difficulties nourished the concern about the North-South order and the idea of the global interdependence. Willy Brandt exposed the North-South dichotomy and the Brandt Commission was the first entity in the global discussion to underline the uncontrollable increase of the external debt and its worrying consequences. Indeed, the Brandt Commission, by noting the interconnection and interdependence of the world (e.g. the successful development of developing countries meant the success of

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 68.

¹⁴⁵ Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza, “Deuda externa, comercio exterior y los esfuerzos de concertación política en América Latina” in *Las políticas exteriores latinoamericanas*, 386.

¹⁴⁶ Frieden, *Capitalismo Global*, 493-494.

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developed countries), anticipated the increasing chasm between rich and poor. According to this record, the problem depended on the political decisions and actions as well as on the huge monetary amount used for military spending¹⁴⁷. As a matter of fact, the Brandt Commission was an example of the macro-philosophy of the SI. It is striking to note how it was so visionary regarding the problems of the future, since many of the current problems derived from the politic and economic decisions taken at that time.

Furthermore, Latin Americans also noted the interdependence of the world, the relevancy of obtaining a place in the international arena, and the benefits that a joint performance will bring to the region. In fact, the importance of developing a joint action rose since the emergence of the SELA (1977). In fact this organization emerged with a political aim, i.e. to improve the capacity of external negotiation in order to reach great development and to reduce the external dependence and vulnerabilities.¹⁴⁸ Likewise, in the *Conferencia Económica Latinoamericana* held in Ecuador on the 9-13 January 1984, the Latin American countries (based on recommendations of the SELA and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean –ECLAC-) adopted a series of commitments aimed at fortifying the financial cooperation and the interregional commerce, facing the external crisis, and reaching a major external bargaining position.¹⁴⁹ As said, the SELA' performance resulted as worthwhile since it was useful to consolidate a Latin American identity, which in turn enabled people to have a major weight in the international arena, the possibility of balancing the dialogue with the U.S., the EEC, GATT, etc., and the consolidation of Latin American solidarity. The efforts of the Contadora Group, the joint assistance after the Guatemala earthquake, and the common position and support to Argentina after the Falkland war were examples of this new regional solidarity.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Palme, *Olof Palme Suecia y América Latina*. 61-75.

¹⁴⁸ Carlos J. Moneta, “La acción del SELA frente a los problemas económicos de América Latina, *Las políticas exteriores latinoamericanas*, 401.

¹⁴⁹ Rodríguez Mendoza, “Deuda externa”, 388

¹⁵⁰ Carlos Andrés Pérez, *El SELA: presente y futuro en la cooperación económica intralatinoamericana*, (Buenos Aires: INTAL, 1986).

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This chapter aimed at illustrating how the juncture of the 1970s strongly affected worldwide policy, economy, society, and culture in a radical manner. In this light, the EEC and Latin America started to create new ties and become more interested each other. Moreover, the shock of the 1970s converged with the European confluence of socialist/social democratic governments and with the consolidation in Latin America as left wing, but less revolutionary and closer to “social democratic” tenets. Therefore, social democratic parties, movements, the SI, and the party’s intensification of transnational links at that time mattered. As a result, the better understanding of the global context (the turning point of the Cold War and the shifts during the 1970s) entailed the comprehension of the national, regional, international situations, and with this the bilateral, multilateral, and transnational relations. Hence, the exploration of the shock of the 1970 became a *sine qua non* condition for grasping the new stage of the relationships between the EEC and Latin America, the SI performance, parties and government action; namely how and why their policies, actions and interests were aroused and/or changed.

PART II

3. The Socialist International (SI)

In the fist a rose, the fist for the fight, the rose for happiness.
François Mitterrand

3.1 The SI: a Brief History

3.1.1. Origins

As expected from the upheavals of the 1970s, the SI experienced a radical turn in terms of performance and ideology at that time, as the SI overcame its Eurocentric character and increased its interests in Third World countries. However, the SI's history is long-standing. In fact, the SI re-emerged in 1951 in London (not as an International revolutionary organization but linked to the European social democracy) where several political groups were exiled. England became a center of the antifascist resistance movement and hosted several social democratic exiles. Thus, the differences from the former SI (i.e. the "Second International" which existed from 1889 until the First World War and the "Labour and Socialist International" that lasted from 1923 until the Second World War) were: (i) the traditional revolutionary foundation was replaced by a collaborative and cooperative action; (ii) the new SI was more moderate than the previous ones; (iii) the new SI had new goals, e.g. peace, social justice, democracy, and international cooperation. A few years later, the SI will have a new international project, that is, enhancing its presence in the Third World just as becoming a sort of "third way" vis-à-vis the Cold War bipolar order. Solidarity, equity, and development will be at the base of its action.¹⁵¹

Therefore, during those years (1950s-1960s), the SI was extremely influenced by the British Labor Party and maintained a political and ideological position aligned with the United States. Hence, the first steps towards the SI's foundation took place during the spring of 1946 (following the Socialist International Conference held at Clacton-on-Sea,

¹⁵¹ Lucio Pesetti, *L'Internazionale Socialista dal 1951 al 1983*. (Venice: Marsilio Editori, 1989), 120-123
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close to London) with the birth of the *Socialist Information and Liaison Office* (SILO), whose main goal relied on the exchange of information between the socialist parties and in the coordination and organization of socialist international meetings, although at the beginning the main aspiration relied on the establishment of common policies in order to solve common problems.

During the Clacton-on Sea meeting, one may note the heterogeneity of the socialist parties. The political scientist Guillaume Devin provides an interesting classification of the three types of socialist parties that emerged from the Second World War who attended the first international conferences. The first group, the “social democratic” pole (i.e. the British Labour Party and the Nordic social democratic parties), was characterized by the experience acquired once in power, the pragmatic ideology, their great organization, and the rejection of the alliance with the communists. The “European socialists” constituted the second pole (i.e. the French Section of the Workers’ International- SFIO- and the Belgian Socialist Party), which implied: pacifist and internationalist policy, great Marxist influence, and openness regarding the alliance with the communists for specific purposes. The last group or “the socialist of the left” (i.e. Eastern Europe Socialists and the Italian Socialist Party) was characterized by their refusal of the “bourgeois” model of the Western democracies in name of the establishment of a “new democracy” based on the common action with the communists and the definitive break from the “capitalist system”.¹⁵² All of them were the parties that met in England during the first attempt to consolidate an international dialogue. Their clear heterogeneity was translated into absence of shared objectives. As a result, the fuzzy international situation, the divergent positions between political parties and the Cold Wars’ dawn did not allow the development of this international project. Even so, this was the first attempt for the creation of a socialist international organization.

Later on, a second meeting was held in November 1946. This time the venue was Bournemouth where a consultative committee with administrative tasks was established.

¹⁵²Guillaume Devin, *L’Internationale Socialiste*, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation National des Sciences Politiques, 1993), 19 -20.

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This committee would manage all the issues that would come to light during the time between the conferences. Likewise, an international bulletin was created (the SILO Bulletin) as a mechanism to exchange information and to promote the development of the socialist organization at the international level.¹⁵³ Since the Bournemouth meeting, one of the key questions at the core of the discussion was the potential entrance of the German social-democratic party (SPD) in the international socialist movement. The effects of the Second World War and the opposition of the countries dominated by Hitler diluted the decision until the Conference of Antwerp in November 1947. In this occasion, the SPD was finally accepted in the international organization despite the opposition of some countries (i.e. Palestine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary).¹⁵⁴ On the contrary, the British Labour Party with the great support of the Nordic, Belgian, Dutch and Austrian socialists pushed towards the SPD's acceptance because they considered it the best way to integrate and to affiliate the German party into Western society, and therefore to avoid its inclusion in the Eastern bloc¹⁵⁵. Thus, the Cold War scheme greatly affected international decision-making.

Additionally, in the Antwerp Conference, it was decided to transform the SILO into a permanent institution. In this way, the Committee of International Socialist Conferences (COMISCO) was founded. The COMISCO went beyond the SILO because the new body included political functions in addition to the administrative tasks. The venue, however, remained in London and Morgan Phillips from the British Labour Party held the position of General Secretary. Therefore, during the dawn of the Socialist International, the British Labour played a key role in the organization, management, and promotion of the international union. Additional members that joined the British secretary were the delegates of the Belgian, French, Dutch, Austrian, and Nordic socialist parties. Still, in general terms, the power of the COMISCO was limited. Indeed, the emergence of the COMINFORM, the

¹⁵³ Pesetti, *L'Internazionale Socialista*, 14.

¹⁵⁴ Antonio Missiroli, "1945-1990 Quando Bandt disse "ricominciamo da capo", in *L'Internazionale Socialista. Storia, protagonisti, programmi, presente, future*, edited by Mario Telò, (Roma: L'unità, 1990), 141.

¹⁵⁵ Devin, *L'Internationale Socialiste*, 26.

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Communist Information Bureau, in the same year hampered the development of the COMISCO and implied the rupture with the communists.

The definitive break between the socialist and the communists took place with the coup d'état in Prague in 1948. This episode led the socialists to radically condemn the communist policies and thus to move apart from them. As the historian Fernando Pedrosa argues, in 1948 the socialists understood that the enemy had changed. The fight ceased to be against capitalism since now the target was associated with Eastern Communism.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, the SI's members claimed: "International Communism is the instrument of a new imperialism. Wherever it has achieved power it has destroyed freedom or the chance of gaining freedom".¹⁵⁷ And freedom was one of the SI's cornerstones. Accordingly, the anti-communist spirit (and therefore the alignment with the U.S.) influenced and played a key role in the evolution and position of COMISCO during the first decades of the Cold War.

Hence, the International Socialist Conference held in London in 1948 marked the definitive breakdown. During this meeting, it was opted to expulse all the socialist parties with links and agreements with the communist parties, e.g. the socialists from Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Of great importance was the fracture between COMISCO and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the subject of this writing, which demonstrates the division in the Western socialism. Since the PSI was in the midst of a joint electoral campaign with the Italian Communist party, the former was invited to choose the socialist way and to step aside from the agreement with the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

The truth is that, until then, the dialogue and possible alliance between PCI-PSI had not been an obstacle in terms of the PSI's membership of the COMISCO. Indeed, until that date, the COMISCO had not intervened in the internal affairs of the countries. According to the Italian socialist newspaper, *L'Avanti!*, the British Labour Party was the party that pushed the division with the communist movements further. The Czechoslovakian coup

¹⁵⁶ Fernando Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda: la socialdemocracia en América Latina*, (Buenos Aires, Capital Editorial, 2012), Kindle Edition, 1234.

¹⁵⁷ Declaration of Socialist International, I Congress of Socialist International, Frankfurt-on-Main, 30 June-3 July 1951, Retrieved from <http://www.socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=39>

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d'état was one of the reasons but not the only one. The economic situation of Britain led them to take sides with the U.S., therefore an anti-communist position, and to adopt the Marshall plan.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Italian newspaper added that the British Labour party influenced the position of the other socialist parties since it was at the head of the organization. Therefore, the PSI blamed the British Labour Party of shifting its orientation and to force the other parties to distance themselves from the communists.

Hence, in the light of this scenario, the Italian Socialist Party decided to leave the meeting as a form of protest. In addition to this, the PSI sent a memorandum to the COMISCO in which it rejected the separation from the PCI and accused the Socialist Group, based in London, for interfering in internal affairs. This discussion continued over time. Thus, during the next Conference held in Vienna (in June 1948), the COMISCO gave an ultimatum to the Italian Socialist Party by suspending their membership in order to force them to distance themselves from the communists, to return to democratic socialism, and to collaborate in the unity of socialism in their own country.¹⁵⁹ The Italians replied to the provocation by writing a letter in which they rectified their position. In fact, they underlined that the alliance with the communists was due to the national situation where the union between workers was at the core of Italy's priorities. It was only in this way that they were able to face all the imperialist forces.¹⁶⁰

In December 1948, the COMISCO tried one last time to persuade the PSI members by sending them a communication. On that occasion, however, a deadline (March 15th, 1949) had been established. During this period, the PSI had to solve their internal differences, unify the socialist party, and detach itself from the communist party since according to the COMISCO, the PCI reported to the COMINFORM, and therefore acted against socialist

¹⁵⁸ “La relazione di Basso alla direzione del PSI”: *Avanti!*, (1/06/1948) Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF/Avanti-Lotto2/CFI0422392_19480601_128.pdf

¹⁵⁹“Dopo la decisione del COMISCO. Guardiamo le carte a chi esce e a chi entra”, *Avanti!*, (5/06/1948), Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF/Avanti-Lotto2/CFI0422392_19480605_132.pdf

¹⁶⁰ See the PSI's reply to the COMISCO in “La lettera del PSI al Comisco”, *Avanti!*, (20/07/1948), Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF/Avanti-Lotto2/CFI0422392_19480720_169.pdf

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precepts. Nevertheless, the PSI rejected the ultimatum and insisted on the alliance with the PCI. Consequently, the Italian Socialist Party was banned from the COMISCO during the conference held in the Netherlands in May 1949.¹⁶¹

In the following year (1950), some European Socialist parties (in particular, the Belgian, Dutch, and French socialists) started to imagine the re-foundation of the Socialist International on the basis of COMISCO. The truth is that prior to the COMISCO's establishment, the socialists from France and the Benelux countries pushed towards the reconstruction of the SI. However, the British, Nordic and German opposed this because, according to them, the rise of the International could be interpreted as a direct challenge to the USSR at that time. COMISCO's foundation was the compromise reached by all the parties. The initial rejection of the Anglo-Scandinavian group could partly be explained by their will of maintaining certain autonomy in terms of decision-making and to avoid the rigidity as well as the leading character that France and Benelux sought in accordance with the previous SI.¹⁶²

Indeed, it was after the commitment reached with the British party (i.e. a certain autonomy of the member parties and non-imposition of the organization's policies in the national decisions) that the re-birth of the SI took place on the basis of COMISCO, which implies a kind of continuity between the two organizations. As a matter of fact, a COMISCO resolution claimed the following: the Socialist International Conference should change its name into the Socialist International, the Committee of the Conference should turn into the Socialist International Council, and the COMISCO should turn into the SI's Bureau.¹⁶³ The Secretary-General did not change, but a real Congress was introduced. In this way, during the Frankfurt meeting (30 June-3 July 1951), the SI's foundation was formalized¹⁶⁴. It is

¹⁶¹ Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, *Storia del PSI. Dal dopoguerra a oggi III*, (Bari, Editori Laterza, 1993), 113-116; Antonio Missiroli, "1945-1990 Quando Bandt", 140-141. Ettore Costa, "The Socialist International and the Italian Social Democracy (1948-50): cultural differences and the 'internationalisation of domestic quarrels', *Historical Research*, vol. 91, n. 251, (2018): 160-184.

¹⁶² Devin, *L'Internationale Socialiste*, 41-43.

¹⁶³ Pesetti, *L'Internazionale Socialista*, 21.

¹⁶⁴ "Social democracy evolved after World War II into a political ideology that focused on working inside the overall framework of a mixed market economy while trying to protect and make life decent for those who were economically the most vulnerable". Jonas Hinnfors, "Social Democracy", In *International Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio*, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

interesting to note, especially after the initial controversy regarding the SPD's membership, that a German city was elected as the venue for the meeting. According to Fernando Pedrosa, three reasons explained this decision: (i) the first is historical since Frankfurt was the city of the first socialist thinkers; (ii) the second is a reminder of the victory over Fascism; (iii) the third is assumed to be a warning message for East Berlin¹⁶⁵.

3.1.2 Evolution of the SI

From the Frankfurt meeting, the Declaration of Frankfurt was created. In this way, the ideological basis of democratic socialism (i.e. distance from Marxism and acceptance of democracy and capitalism as the acting framework)¹⁶⁶ and the SI's institutional organization were devised. The institutional framework was defined as follows:

- (1) The SI Congress referred to full members and observer members. It was the supreme body which met every two years. It was responsible for the acceptance and rejection of members; for the SI guidelines, cornerstones, and resolutions;
- (2) The SI Council dealt with full members (even if sometimes observer parties were invited), it usually met twice per year and debated ongoing activities;
- (3) The Bureau referred to a limited amount of member parties, those with major weight. Meetings were held on a regular basis (at the beginning every year, later on every two years, nowadays every five years). It was the executive body and was responsible for actions between the Congress, conferences, the creation of study groups, the venues of the meetings, the approval of budget, etc.;
- (4) The SI Secretariat was the administrative institution and it was in charge of the definitions of the political and executive functions. The majority of participants were Europeans (out of 34 parties, 27 of them were European socialist parties),

Encyclopedia of political Science, edited by Badie Bertrand and Dirk Berg-Schlosser, (USA: Thousand Oaks, 2011), 2424.

¹⁶⁵ Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda*, 1256.

¹⁶⁶ Fernando Pedrosa, "La redefinición de la agenda socialdemócrata entre la crisis del petróleo y el fin del socialismo real (1973-1992)", *Colección*, N. 22, (2012): 20.

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which gave a Eurocentric character to the SI.¹⁶⁷ As a result, during the first twenty years of the SI, the Eurocentric trend was at the heart of the organization, not only in terms of members (who were only European socialist), but also in terms of the venues of the their meetings.¹⁶⁸

In the Oslo meeting in 1962, the SI's members reaffirmed the guidelines of the Frankfurt Declaration. In addition to this, principles were underscored, such as the right to self-determination of peoples, the fight against colonialism, the rejection of the Communist tyranny as well as the wasteful injustice of Capitalism and the invitation to the worldwide youth to fight in the name of a better world¹⁶⁹. Hence, even if the effective actions of the SI's members remained anchored to the European borders, they started to experience a new sensibility towards people under colonial regimes.

As expected, the events of the 1970s had consequences on European social democracy. Since the end of the Second World War, the welfare state was the model *par excellence* of the social democracy. As a result, in the 1970s the social democrats had to face the new reality and to search for new alternatives in relation to the policies that they had carried out during the “golden years”. Thus, the liberalization of capital and globalization changed the rules of game. In fact, the markets became the ruler of the economic policies of the national states. Within this context, i.e. increasing free and global markets, the original social democratic policy, which aimed to activate the economy through national spending, ceased to work.¹⁷⁰ Hence, the European social democracy had to adapt itself and search for solutions by following a global perspective. Moreover, they had to respond to the requirements of the voters since people sought and demanded concrete solutions to real problems that often overcame the national borders. Thus, the SI's leaders became

¹⁶⁷Christian Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s. European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 12 -13. “The New Face of the Socialist International”, From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 997

¹⁶⁸Until the 1970s, the SI had in Latin America only two full members (*Partido Socialista* in Argentina and *Partido Nacional del Pueblo* in Jamaica). Carlos Morales Abarzúa, *La Internacional Socialista. América Latina y El Caribe*. (México: Editorial Patria Grande, 1981), 56.

¹⁶⁹Declaration of the Socialist International endorsed at the Council Conference, Oslo (2-4 June 1962). Retrieved from <http://www.socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=2133>

¹⁷⁰Ludolfo Paramio, *La socialdemocracia*, (Argentina: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2010), 64-65.

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exponents of the philosophy of the “one world” that linked people of all cultures. In fact, equality, international solidarity, common security, democracy, global peace, global disarmament and worldwide development became the cornerstones of their political philosophy.¹⁷¹

Furthermore, the new international stage of the 1970s pushed the SI to a greater openness. In other words, the SI started to go beyond the European borders. That said, the truth is that under the leadership of the British Labour Party, the head of this organization also sought to spread the SI’s influence outside the European continent. The difference, however, relied on the target of the British SI policy because they aimed to fight and disseminate principles against Communism. This was opposed to the French socialism, which saw in the SI the opportunity to improve the integration of the European socialist parties. Nonetheless, the membership of the SPD and its increasing power and fame inside the SI (largely due to the efforts of Willy Brandt who was a key figure in the appointment of the German Enrich Ollenhauer as president of the SI, which marked the end of the British hegemony) constrained the British intentions and demonstrated that the SI’s aspirations have been changed in the name of a neutral position regarding the East-West conflict¹⁷².

Nevertheless, there were also some elements that favored the continuity of the Eurocentric character in the initial decades: (i) the institutional rigidity; (ii) the fact that decision-making was based on the principle of unanimity in a context where common agreements were very difficult to reach; and (iii) staff members and funds were very limited, even if the SI maintained a continuous operation by holding meetings every year during the first thirty years of activity. However, in addition to what has been outlined above, during the 1970s the links, dialogues, and cooperation between the socialist parties were enhanced, and the informal cooperation and transnational activities achieved significant weight in the SI’s

¹⁷¹ B. Vivekanandan, *Global Visions of Olof Palme, Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt. International Peace and Security, Co-operation, and Development*, (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 4.

¹⁷² Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda*, 1467-1474. After the Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community (1973), the British Labour Party refused to nominate members for the European Parliament. This produced tensions between the British Labour Party and the European socialist. Salm, *Transnational Socialist*, 19.

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performance. Indeed, at the time, such informal and transnational relations were more significant for the SI's policy rather than formal ones.¹⁷³

The SI's turning point came in the middle of the 1970s when Willy Brandt was appointed president. The charge was formalized during the 13th Congress of the SI held in Geneva on November 26-28, 1976 in which around 200 delegates from over 40 affiliated parties and organizations were in attendance. During this meeting, Brandt underlined his objectives and projects as chair of the SI. He emphasized the need for a *fresh start* in the SI's cooperation and expressed his global aims inside the organization because he would strive to globalize the SI transnational cooperation. Furthermore, Brandt set out the main points that would characterize the SI international performance: firstly, an "offensive for a secure peace"; secondly, an "offensive for new relations" between the North and the South; and thirdly, an "offensive for human rights". In this way, the Geneva Congress established the new setting of the SI¹⁷⁴.

Besides the nomination of Brandt as president, the Congress appointed: (i) fourteen Vice-presidents who were responsible for concrete policy fields (including Bettino Craxi from Italy, Bruno Kreisky from Austria, François Mitterrand from France, Daniel Oduber from Costa Rica, Olof Palme from Sweden, Anselmo Sule from Chile, and Mario Soares from Portugal); (ii) an Honorary Committee constituted by thirteen eminences from social democratic parties (including Daniel Oduber Carlos Andrés Pérez, Mario Soares, Bruno Kreisky, Helmut Schmidt); and (iii) the designation of a General Secretary, Bernt Carlsson, from the Swedish Social Democratic Party.¹⁷⁵

Brandt, in his inaugural speech, also defined what the SI was and what was not. In this regard, he said:

¹⁷³Ibid., 15.

¹⁷⁴The 13th Congress of the SI, Geneva, *Socialist Affairs (Jan-Feb. 1977)*, 4 and 8. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 23.

¹⁷⁵Ibid

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“This is a working group of sovereign parties based on a number of common fundamental convictions and –in some cases for many decades – with a bond of common feelings. It is not instructions, nor unrealistic majority decisions that determine our cooperation, but ideas and moral impulses and not least the search for common solutions. And this in a world that increasingly depends on new and transnational answers to problems involving destructive threats on the one hand, and survival in freedom and dignity on the other”¹⁷⁶.

The venue of the following meeting was in line with such openness, as Vancouver was the location of the second Congress under Brandt’s presidency. It was the first congress outside the European borders, which was seen as a signal of the new era. Even if the Frankfurt Declaration was confirmed in Geneva, a New Declaration of Principles was devised in Canada and it was commissioned by the Spaniard Felipe González. The election of González confirmed the power and respect that he had achieved inside the organization before becoming Prime Minister. This point is relevant since his closeness with the heads of organization would influence his actions, but his interests and points of views swayed the committee’s projects in the same manner. Indeed, his personal links with some of the Latin American politicians and his sympathies towards the region would favor both the SI’s interest in the region and the actions of the organization there. This makes it clear that personal links and transnational relations may have a significant weight when doing politics.

Furthermore, in Vancouver, the future goals of the organization were disclosed, i.e. “the SI undertaking a new mission in order for the member parties to obtain firsthand information on various areas of the world and to formulate socialist policies”. In light of this statement, the SI indicated Latin America as the first region for its action, since this region was suffering a wave of violent dictatorships and human rights were largely violated¹⁷⁷. Therefore, some winds of change began to emerge after this meeting.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 5

¹⁷⁷ Socialist International Congress, 1978, Vancouver, *Socialist Affairs (Jan-Feb. 1979)*. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 23

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That said, the SI became a meeting point for discussion and coordination of political matters. In this sense, the SI became a kind of “laboratory” of political thought that operated as a political conscience.¹⁷⁸ As Willy Brandt affirmed during an interview, the SI was not a “superparty”, but it was a “working community” formed by different parties that learned from each other and aimed to reach a point of contact through discussion and exchange of ideas. That was the Chairman’s opinion, but how did member parties view the SI? Reimund Seidelmann synthesized their assessment: (i) the SI should not be considered as a substitute for national foreign policy but it “could assist in its simulation, preparation, and complementation”; (ii) the SI could influence global politics by spreading its major goals; (iii) the SI constitutes an “informal, flexible and high-level meeting place to inform, to develop common actions, and to initiate global cooperation”; (iv) the SI supports “regionalization through transfer of know-how”; and (v) the SI “constitutes a mutual learning process” in which members share information, ideas and policies and they seek to develop joint regional and global initiatives and; (vi) the SI could be considered as a politically valuable supplement for government policies, as an opportunity to improve and enrich party activities”¹⁷⁹.

Likewise, in line with the increasing influence of Felipe González, Madrid hosted the SI Congress on 13-16 November 1980. “The fact that the venue in Madrid was evidence that the hope and steadfastness of the International’s Spanish comrades was amply rewarded”.¹⁸⁰ The Congress’s topic was “Peace, Freedom and Solidarity” and the main issues addressed were: the international situation, arms control, disarmament, human rights, North-South relations, and discussion about the draft for the new declaration of principles. What was interesting was the presence and speeches of non-European leaders (e.g. Guillermo Ungo from Uruguay, Carlos Gallardo from Guatemala, Jaime Paz from Bolivia, Bayardo Arce from Nicaragua) that testified the extent of the SI’s reach. In the same manner, their attendance (often as observers from non-member parties and non-

¹⁷⁸Reimund Seidelmann “Come Funziona. I Partiti membri gli osservatori le adesioni” in *L’Internazionale Socialista. Storia*. 93.

¹⁷⁹Reimund Seidelmann, *The Socialist International*, Working Document, 1, April 1998, Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

¹⁸⁰Socialist International Congress, 1980, Madrid, “Milestone in Madrid” *Socialist Affairs (Jan-Feb. 1981)*, 4. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 23

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organizations) was useful for raising awareness and public sensitivity regarding the problems outside Europe because they often talked about the situation of their countries. It was a mechanism to bring peoples together, to increase awareness regarding their dilemmas and to emphasize that intervention in those areas was indispensable. Indeed, at this meeting the presence of non-Europeans was higher since among the 42 participants (without considering the observers), 25 came from outside. Accordingly, González stressed the relevancy of the Congress since one of the SI's goals relied on abandoning its Eurocentric character. The openness towards the world and in particular towards Latin America was one of the main targets to achieve.¹⁸¹

Likewise, during the Congress in Madrid, Felipe González referred to the state of his “task”, namely the renewal of the Declaration of Principles. He estimated four or five years for its conclusion and claimed that the Frankfurt Declaration had been a good starting point and remained valid since it referred to equality, human rights, freedom, and democracy, but it was lacking in terms of the solutions to the problems of the time (e.g. economic growth). Additionally, he underlined the need to include new global matters (e.g. pollution, ecology, quality of life, and disarmament) in the record's update since they had not been considered in the original document.¹⁸² Their inclusion and possible solutions became a priority in the elaboration of the New Declaration. Hence, in the words of González, the SI “will acquire greater rigor and will become more identifiable for the world”.¹⁸³

Furthermore, González received an additional assignment at this meeting: the constitution of a Committee for Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution in which he assumed the chairmanship of the group based on the suggestion of Willy Brandt. This confirmed the following: the relevancy of the PSOE's Secretary-General in the SI, his links with Latin America, and the SI's will of acting in this region even if it meant coming out in opposition

¹⁸¹ “Felipe González propone volver a definir la doctrina socialista internacional”, *El País*, (12/11/1980), “Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1980/11/12/internacional/342831607_850215.html

¹⁸² Speech of Felipe González, Socialist International Congress, 1980, Madrid, 16; “La Nueva Declaración de Principios”, *El Socialista*, n. 180/19, (25/11/1980), 9.

Retrieved from <http://www.elsocialista.es/hemeroteca/archivo-papel.html>

¹⁸³ “Felipe González propone volver a definir la doctrina socialista internacional”, *El País*, (12/11/1980), “Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1980/11/12/internacional/342831607_850215.html

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to the American strategy in Central America, particularly after the victory of Ronald Reagan. This issue will be further addressed later.

Moreover, the realization of the SI Congress in Madrid contributed to the assertion of the PSOE's international status and to its definition as a model for democratic transition, especially for the Latin American countries that looked closely at the Spanish situation. Likewise, it was of great relevance for Felipe González and in general for socialism in Spain because, as the Spanish newspaper *El País* recognized, the celebration of this meeting symbolized the increased rapprochement with the countries of Southern Europe and Latin America and represented a sort of homage to the Spanish democratic success, in which the SI had actually played a key role.¹⁸⁴ With reference to the latter, it is important to remark that the SI strived to bring the democratic process to a successful conclusion. Indeed, they acted as an external agent against the Franco dictatorship and they looked to enhance European awareness and support in the condemnation of the authoritarian regime.

Last but not least, the SI was a “working community” that aimed to exchange ideas between the members, experts, and NGOs in several fields. In this sense, transnational networks were at the core of the SI. Hence, they acted through study groups, commissions, missions, reports, and meetings. Formal and informal relations shaped the SI as well as the strong personal relations between its leaders, for example Brandt, Palme, Kreisky, González, Soares, and so on. But, how could the meetings and travel be carried out? How was the SI financed? There were main two funding mechanisms, including organizations such as trade unions and associations of private contributors that provided financial support to the SI, and memberships fees which were the formal mechanism for ensuring financial capacity. For instance, the SPD contributed \$111,000 USD per year, the Swedes \$75,000, the Austrians \$66,600, the Italians \$37,000, the Norwegians \$25,900 and the French \$22,200.¹⁸⁵ Likewise, the parties were also aware of the benefits that the membership gave them. Having said that, as these figures show, the contribution and therefore the

¹⁸⁴ “El Congreso de la Internacional Socialista”, *El País*, (14/11/1980), Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1980/11/14/opinion/343004401_850215.html

¹⁸⁵ Pedrosa, *La Otra Izquierda*, 7346/9416.

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involvement of the Northern countries in the SI was extremely meaningful, which is why the following section will address this issue.

3.2 The Northern European Socialists

It is undeniable that the so-called socialists of Northern Europe had a special place in the development and extent achieved by the SI. Focusing on the events of the 1970s, and even if the international context influenced and encouraged the SI's performance, it is impossible to deny that the socialists from the Scandinavian countries, as well as from Austria and from Western Germany, in some way promoted and strengthened the SI.

Personalities such as Olof Palme, Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky became symbols of the international social democracy by giving the SI a new global dimension. Ties of friendship linked them, which implied great significance to the informal nexus. As seen throughout this study, these kinds of links often weighed more than formal actions in terms of SI's performance because they nourished the transnational networks and in consequence the SI itself. Accordingly, their common past as political exiles in Sweden fed their proximity. According to Pierre Schori, the International Secretary in the Sweden Socialist Democratic Party and right hand of Olof Palme, Stockholm became a sort of "Little International" because during the Second World War political refugees from the socialist parties of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland and the Scandinavian countries were hosted by this city. Thus, they recreated a kind of Social Democrat network that was not only useful in the re-emergence of the SI but also for maturing common projects throughout the century and spreading them in Europe.¹⁸⁶

Indeed, the friendship between Brandt, Palme and Kreisky flourished during the years that they shared in exile. Their contacts endured throughout time and their political ideas, positions, and projects were materialized through the SI to some extent. Their exchange of

¹⁸⁶ Pierre Schori, *Escila Caribdis. Olof Palme, la Guerra Fría y el poscomunismo*, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994), 103.

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letters became famous in the early 1970s since they devised the SI's guidelines from these¹⁸⁷. Likewise, their political status in their own countries easily allowed the definition of common objectives as well as implied the strengthening of the SI and the increase of its extent. Moreover, during the first half of the 1970s, they took advantage of the “common political crisis” in their own nations (Brandt's resignation, the electoral failure of Sweden's social democracy, and the weakening of Kreisky in Austria) because from it they started to devise a common international platform. This would allow them to occupy crucial positions in order to maintain certain influence in the international arena as well as in their own countries. The designation of Brandt as president of the SI led them to this direction.¹⁸⁸ As a result, even if the SI was formally presented as a common community for the exchange of ideas and opinions, they aimed to go beyond.

As said, since the early 1970s they were aware of the transformations that social democracy should carry out such as adapting to the times and obtaining more power and quality. At the time, Brandt underlined the need to build a strong SI that should be formed not only by European memberships, but also directed to the world in order to obtain “consistent” and “qualitative” results.¹⁸⁹ Hence, the idea of creating specific study groups with the aim of working and examining specific worldwide matters and consequently to try to solve them was thriving. All of them should work alongside organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that already had significant experiences in these kinds of activities.¹⁹⁰

As a result, different commissions were created in which the macro-philosophy of the SI was clearly presented. These committees and reports (e.g. Brandt, Palme, and Brundtland) constituted the script of the relationship since the parties and organizations affiliated to the SI adopted these principles as their own. Thus, a mixture of formal and informal activities characterized the SI's performance because it also acted through study groups in which

¹⁸⁷ See Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme, *La Alternativa socialdemócrata*. (España: Editorial Blume, 1977).

¹⁸⁸ Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda*, 1520.

¹⁸⁹ Letter from Brandt to Palme and Kreisky (17 September 1972), in Brandt, Kreisky and Palme, *La Alternativa*, 59-61.

¹⁹⁰ Letter from Kreisky to Palme and Brandt (8 May 1973), in Brandt, Kreisky and Palme, *La Alternativa*, 74
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experts from different disciplines participated. In this way, the exchanges of information were not only in political terms or between politicians. In this light, the networks were spread throughout the world.

The Brandt report aimed to study the problems that generated the existing economic and social inequalities in the world and to design strategies to construct an interdependent world economy. This approach entailed the delineation of a new conception of the worldwide order, in which the North-South contraposition was supposed to substitute the East-West bipolar scheme. This was the first entity that formally recognized the interdependent character of the world because it aimed to underline the risks that threatened the stability of many societies and to show how the national interest of each country could become an issue of common interest. With this in mind, the report provided a number of recommendations. Prominent among them were the following: to support the poorer countries, to bring an end to famine, to carry out development policies, to promote disarmament, to foster equal conditions between the North and the South, to find new energy resources to replace the non-renewable resources, and to reform the international monetary system. On September 28, 1977 this report was finally presented under the umbrella of the United Nations.¹⁹¹

In this regard, Olof Palme (who also took part in the working group) referred to the Brandt Commission by remarking that such a report has demonstrated that the issues of the time could be solved since the main problem relied on the lack of political will. Furthermore, the Swedish politician blamed governments on spending a lot of money on military expenditures instead of investing them in matters that really affected people. To this end, he recalled the report and provided some examples. At the Swedish Parliament he claimed the following: (i) with the cost of only one war tank, governments could built classrooms for 30,000 children; (ii) the price of one fighter plane was equivalent to 40,000 pharmacies; (iii) half a day of military expenditures would be sufficient to eliminate malaria; and (iv) 0.5% of the global military spending would be enough to pay all the equipment and

¹⁹¹ Willy Brandt, *Norte Sur un programa para la supervivencia. Informe de la comisión independiente sobre problemas internacionales del desarrollo presidida por Willy Brandt*, (Bogotá: Editorial Pluma, 1980).

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machinery necessary for the development of poorer countries.¹⁹² Therefore, military expenditure did not only cause tension, international instability, economic crisis, and all the problems related to war, but it also implied the waste of sources that harmed the entire world since each part of earth and each matter were actually interconnected. Hence, public awareness had to be increased. This became one of the SI main targets because it might be capable of influencing both national decision-making and international organizations in this way.¹⁹³

The Brandt Commission generated a great interest at international level¹⁹⁴. In fact, in 1981 the first meeting between the rich and poor countries with the aim of solving common problems was held in Cancun (however early efforts for a North-South dialogue had taken place in Paris in 1975-1977 without any concrete result). Hence, a new report was prepared (“Common Crisis, North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery. The Brandt Commission 1983”) which complemented the previous one. In this report, the German politician claimed again the importance of a “global approach” that “cannot be limited to economic problems”. However, “without solving the economic [problems] we can hardly overcome the other difficulties”¹⁹⁵. He also underlined that “problems are now darker”, but he also added, “national problems could be solved, but only with a degree of collaboration and wider vision, which is still lacking in international affairs”. Moreover, he said: “nations should perceive their mutual interest in taking joint action”.¹⁹⁶ Hence, Brandt’s idea of mutual assistance, the inclusion of the Third World, interdependency, cooperation between the North and South, and common responses to common problems endured throughout time. Perhaps his suggestions did not materialize effectively, but he was able to capture public attention and to understand that both timing and the structures of the world somehow have been changed in recent times, even if the bipolar script was still latent.

¹⁹² Speech of Olof Palme at the Parliament 12 March 1980, in Olof and Goñi, *Suecia y América Latina*, 61-63.

¹⁹³ Pedrosa, “La redefinición de la agenda socialdemócrata, 38.

¹⁹⁴ According to Brandt, the novelty of the Brandt Commission relied on the fact that it concerned more on approaching problems than on formulating solutions. It did not only aim to push the developed countries to assist the developing ones since what was at stake was the global survival. Willy Brandt, *Mémoires*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), 308.

¹⁹⁵ Willy Brandt, *Common Crisis. North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery. The Brandt Commission 1983*. (London: Pan books, 1983), 8.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 11.

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Afterwards, at Albufeira, the Socialist International Economic policy (under suggestion of Bruno Kreisky) was created and the *Global Challenge* report was the result of its labors. The relevancy of this work relied on the fact that the SI, for the first time, decided to adopt common economic policies and they agreed to act according to them by establishing new patterns for international action and cooperation. In this way, although this was based on previous Brandt reports, the *Global Challenge* went further. Furthermore, this displayed the mechanism by which the SI must act, namely: (i) by promoting awareness of the commitment of the member parties to the report; (ii) by guaranteeing that references to the SI strategy were present in electoral programs and were part of the election campaigns; (iii) by creating public support for the development of the program; and (iv) by holding conferences, congress, workshops in order to spread the SI's strategy and the report. Additionally, the document claimed that the SI parties in government had to: (i) start joint action to implement the "Emergency Program"; (ii) strengthen the multilateral system and begin propositions within these multilateral organisms; and (iii) take action in cooperation with other governments even in those places where international consensus regarding a specific matter of the Report was lacking. It was also underscored that the Third World countries must create conditions for South-South cooperation.¹⁹⁷

Likewise, other significant commissions headed by the Northern leaders were the following. To name just a few: (i) the Palme report sought to promote the reduction of the arms race in the world in order to establish a lasting peace; (ii) the Brundtland report (headed by the Norwegian Gro Harlem Brundtland) focused on the preservation of the environment; (iii) the Study Group on Disarmament (chaired by the Finnish Kalevi Sorsa), which later became the Social International Disarmament Advisory Council (SIDAC), was responsible for devising strategies aimed at preventing the arms race and guaranteed disarmament; and (iv) the Kreisky report looked to fight against unemployment since

¹⁹⁷ Internacional Socialista. Comité de Asuntos Económicos. *El Reto Global*. Venezuela, Ediciones Centauro, 1986. The main aspects of the *Global Change*, are summarized in the speech of Michael Manley, "Common economic approaches", in *Socialist Affairs* 3/86. Retried from <http://www.socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=79>

according to him, full employment was linked to social peace. The relevancy of these commissions relied on the development of the concept of “shared responsibility” since they were common problems that affected all the sectors and all the populations of both rich and poor nations. Recalling the notions of Keohane and Nye, the world was on the road to interdependency and globalism, as noted by these studies. Besides all of these commissions, as discussed below, others were created to work on specific areas, for instance, the Third World Commission, the Spanish and the Chilean Commission, and so on. Some of their objectives were to learn about these areas, to promote democracy, to avoid violation of human rights, and to raise awareness among the worldwide public opinion in order to obtain support and to legitimize the SI’s actions.

As said, the study groups of the SI often work together with the United Nations. In fact, the SI sought to operate and to obtain support from the UN because it was the mechanism to internationalize the problems, to achieve a global impact, to legitimize its actions, and to try to solve them by taking distance from the two superpowers and from the interest of the transnational companies.¹⁹⁸ In addition to this, some political foundations played a key role in the internationalization of certain political principles and served as a vehicle to reach every corner of the world, but without intervening directly in domestic policies. In this, the German political foundations played a key role. Their activism was probably due to their efforts to improve their international reputation after the Second World War. It also included the Third World.

In regards to Latin America, during the 1950s and 1960s the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (a political foundation associated with the German Christian Democratic party) achieved a strong presence in the region. These were the “golden years” of the Christian Democracy in Latin America (e.g. Eduardo Frei in Chile and Rafael Caldera in Venezuela). However, in following decades, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (in German Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, or FES), a German political foundation associated with the SPD, prevailed. Why? Some reasons must be looked on the winds of change during the 1970s and the alignment of the

¹⁹⁸ Speech of Olof Palme, Mexico, 21 June 1975. In Palme and Goñi, *Suecia y América Latina.*, 110.
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Christian Democracy with the U.S. that increasingly led Latin Americans to be more skeptical.

As a matter of fact, the efforts of the Ebert foundation were significant around the world. During the 1970s (when Germany increased its international role and was involved in the global democratic process), the German government started to largely finance these kinds of organizations. The FES became a German instrument to promote democracy across the world and to avoid the spread of Communism in Third World countries.¹⁹⁹ Likewise, since its foundation, it operated mainly in the regions subject to dictatorships and it often differed from U.S. policies because the latter frequently produced internal tensions.²⁰⁰ It must not be forgotten that all this took place in the framework of the Cold War. In Europe, for instance, the FES played a key role in the democratic transition of Spain (e.g. the FES financially assisted the PSOE by paying for the rent of premises, for the establishment of cultural foundations and socialist think tank, as well as for the staff).²⁰¹

Furthermore, the FES was also responsible for establishing and maintaining political relations with all types of institutions across the world (by creating a global network of actors, particularly political parties, trade unions, and international organizations), and for reducing global inequalities and conflicts. Development assistance in Third World countries and the maintenance of contacts with all the institutions (political and non-political) were the other two of its priorities in the EEC.²⁰² In Latin America, the FES had strong links with regional associations, such as the Costa Rican CEDAL (*Centro de Estudios Democráticos de América Latina*) and the Venezuelan ILDIS (*Instituto*

¹⁹⁹ Muñoz Sanchez, *El amigo alemán*. 225 and 227,

²⁰⁰ Dakowska Dorota, “Des experts en democratization face aux changements révolutionnaires: le cas des fondations politiques allemandes”. *Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 38, (2007): 11.

²⁰¹ See: Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, “La Fundación Ebert y el socialismo español de la dictadura a la democracia.” *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 29, (2007): 257-278. Abdón Mateos, *Historia del PSOE en transición. De la renovación a la crisis, 1970-1988*. (España: Silex, 2017), 55 According to Joan E. Graces, after Franco’s death, the FES continued to finance secretly the PSOE. Banks and large companies were often subsidized by the FES, by allowing building up millions of pesetas for the PSOE. Joan E. Garcés, *Soberanos e intervenidos. Estrategias globales Americanas y españolas*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI Editores, 2008), XX.

²⁰² Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks*. 33-34.

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Latinoamericano de investigaciones sociales)²⁰³. Additionally, it created the revue *Nueva Sociedad* and established local offices in most countries. The FES became a guide as well as an instrument for the SI action around the world.

Since Brandt was linked and supported by the SPD, the FES gained considerable power in the SI. In fact, both institutions frequently developed joint actions. To give just one example, in 1979 they agreed on the following: (i) the FES would support and assist the SI on press matters at meetings and the expenses would be borne by the German foundation; (ii) the FES would assist with technical and organization issues the Socialist International Regional Conference for Latin America to be held in Santo Domingo (26-29 March 1980); (iii) at the SI Congress in Madrid (13-16 November 1980), the FES would seek to contribute to the payment of some guests' tickets and through other forms of organizational and technical assistance; (iv) since January 1980 the FES would be in charge of the collection of all the articles, documentation and writings related to the SI at global level; and (v) the FES would technically and organizationally support the SI in preparations for the Conference on Environment.²⁰⁴ Therefore, the FES assisted the SI in different ways and this behavior endured throughout time. Likewise, the SI participated in many of the initiatives of the FES achieving in this way a permanent presence in many parts of the world.

Another institution that was similar to the FES was the Vienna Institute for Development and Cooperation (VIDC), an organization founded by Bruno Kreisky (at the time, Minister of Foreign Policy of Austria) and other politicians in the aftermath of the “Conference for Economic Cooperation and Partnership” held in Vienna in 1962. Like the FES, the VIDC was inscribed in a global conception since it implied the cooperation between developed

²⁰³ The FES itself recognized that Latin America was one of the areas where it was more active in the Third World. In addition to ILDIS and CEDAL, the FES also established close links with two centers for agrarian development: CENCIRA (*Centro de Capacitación e Investigación para la Reforma Agraria*), INCA (*Instituto de Capacitación Agraria*), and with other two centers interested in examining how the communication was broadcast in Latin America; CIESPAL (*Centro Internacional para Estudios Superiores de Comunicación para América Latina*) and CANA. Jean-Michel Palmier, “La fondation Friedrich-Ebert, un instrument organisé et efficace, dans la tradition du mouvement ouvrier allemand. *Le Monde diplomatique*, June 1980.

²⁰⁴ Letter from Bernt Carlsson to Dr. Guenther Grunwald, General Secretary of the FES (December 28, 1979). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1169
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and developing countries. The main goals of the Institute were to assist developing countries by providing them with the necessary resources removing the barriers that were placed between rich and poor countries at the time and by offering them capital assistance.²⁰⁵ Therefore, it focused on development policy and assistance programs. They carried out these objectives by spreading information on the situation of Third World and by raising public awareness. As a matter of fact, congresses, panel discussions, exhibitions, publications of papers on development policy, and educational sources were used in order to make the situation public and to obtain support²⁰⁶. This became the mechanism to involve public opinion from the developed countries.

The nexus between VIDC and Kreisky as well as between the FES and the SPD (and, hence, with Brandt), and the friendship between both politicians, entailed in some way the development of common links between both foundations. In fact, joint seminars were held, information was regularly exchanged, a representative of the FES usually attended the VIDC meetings and vice versa. According to Christian Salm, in 1969 a board meeting of the VIDC was even held on the premises of the FES in Bonn (the FES also financially supported the VIDC) where a close network of international secretaries and general secretaries of the European socialist parties was strengthened. Indeed, they started to exchange regular information regarding Europe and international politics.²⁰⁷

Therefore, the FES and the VIDC were two institutions that to some extent fortified the transnational networks between the European socialists, and thus worked in tandem with the SI. The truth is that, since the creation of the Working Group for Development inside the SI framework in 1969 (after the UN Conference on Trade and Development- UNCTAD II in 1968), most of its members came from the aforementioned transnational network of international party secretaries who aimed to foster the SI because in this way they could have a direct impact in the upcoming UN Development meetings. Hence, both the VIDC and the FES worked together as experts in the field for the SI Working Group for Development. These actions, however, were mainly framed inside the European borders

²⁰⁵ Vivekanandan, *Global Visions*, 141.

²⁰⁶VIDC' History <http://www.vidc.org/en/institute/history/>

²⁰⁷ Salm, "Shaping European Development policy?" 43 and 47.

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because, after all, the SI maintained an Eurocentric character until the second half of the 1970s, when this organization really sought to expand itself internationally.²⁰⁸

Salm also underlines the fact that the VIDC was the institution that mainly pushed for the joint work of all European institutes of development research in order to “accelerate the founding of a European umbrella organization”. Hence, the efforts of the Vienna Institute helped to launch the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI). In fact, this was founded in 1975 in Austria and its Secretariat office was initially based in Vienna (nowadays, it is based in Bonn).²⁰⁹ Hence, both, the FES and the VIDC were extremely linked between them and they had shared interest in Third World countries. They became a means for the German SPD and the Austrian SPÖ to materialize some of their policies.

Throughout these pages, it has also become clear that the common positions of Brandt, Kreisky, and Palme regarding the North-South dialogue, the interdependence of the world, the need to support and assist developing countries, and hence their support of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which precisely underlined the interdependence between industrialized and Third World countries²¹⁰. NIEO was tight linked to the power that the developing countries started to acquire since the 1960s when the Group of 77 (G-77), the biggest group of Third World countries, was established inside the UN framework. Palme synthesized his point of view in the following statement:

“The world is now so interdependent that international organizations like the SI have a special role to play [...] There are very complex causes of the crisis today. Explanations have to be looked for way back in the sixties and seventies. [...] What then can be done? The solution is really very simple and yet so difficult to

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 44.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 47.

²¹⁰ The NIEO was established in 1974 by the UN General Assembly. This aimed to “correct inequalities and redress existing injustices [...] to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development in peace and justice for present and future generations”. General Assembly, Sixth Special Session, Supplement n. 1 (A/9559) United Nations, 1974, 3201 (S-VI). Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, quoting by Glenda Sluga, “The transformation of International Institutions. Global Shock as Cultural Shock”, In *The Shock of the*, 224.

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implemented. International economic interdependence means that the world economic crisis is not the separate crises of a large number of nations. This is a common crisis. Its solution is concerted action in order to step up growth and employment. [...] That programme for growth and full employment must include the requirements of the Third World”²¹¹.

Within this perspective, the Swede Olof Palme was fundamental in the launch and implementation of the Six Nations Five Continents in 1984. This was an initiative that, as the name suggested, implied the joint work of six political leaders from four continents: Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín from Argentina, Miguel de la Madrid from Mexico, George Papandreou from Greece, Rajiv Gandhi from India, Julius Nyerere from Tanzania and Olof Palme himself from Sweden. This initiative was the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and the allocation of resources for social and economic development rather than for arms expenditure²¹². As the Swede Pierre Schori suggested, the novelty of this project relied on the fact that for the first time a group of politicians from different continents appealed the superpowers to change their policy.²¹³ It is worth mentioning the involvement in this initiative of two Latin American leaders (i.e. Alfonsín and De la Madrid). This was probably linked to Palme’s appreciation of the Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco, i.e. the Treaty for the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean that was signed in the 1960s.²¹⁴ The worldwide peace and disarmament were some of the main efforts carried out by Palme in the SI.

Palme’s position was in fact framed in the Swedish political line of thought since it included: the promotion of peace and disarmament, the contribution of poorer countries, the fight for environmental protection, the democratization of the international community, and the commitment for the establishment of strong international organizations²¹⁵.

²¹¹ Olof Palme, “A challenge for the International” In *Socialist Affaires 1/84*, 18 From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 23

²¹² In 1985, Spain joined the Palme’s Project. “Rueda de prensa del Presidente del Gobierno, Don Felipe González, tras su entrevista con el Presidente de México en Palma de Mallorca (21/1/1985)”. *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 89.

²¹³ Schori, *Escila*, 33-37.

²¹⁴ Palme and Goñi, *Suecia y América Latina*, 103.

²¹⁵ Speech of Olof Palme, 4 August 1974, Pitea, in Palme and Goñi, *Suecia y América Latina*, 105-106.

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In regard to Latin America, the links between Sweden and this region began to arise since the 1960s when a student exchange program was launched with the aim of showing the living conditions in Sweden to Latin Americans, as well as for Swedes to become familiar with the situation on the other side of the Atlantic and to create a favorable atmosphere in Latin America for Sweden. According to Pierre Schori, the goal was successfully reached in Chile when the leaders of the Radical Party, who took inspiration from Swedish social democracy, aligned their party to social democratic cornerstones by abandoning the traditional liberal pattern. Indeed, the Radical Party was one of the first Latin American parties to take part of the SI as full member. This membership drew SI attention to the region.²¹⁶

Hence, Swedish involvement in Latin America and its role as a sort of “mouthpiece” for Latin American countries increased with the economic and political support of Allende’s government and then, after the Chilean coup d’état, with the radical opposition to Pinochet’s regime. Likewise, the initial support of the Cuban Revolution (in fact, until 1976 Cuba received development aid from Sweden) and the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua nourished and kept alive the conception of Sweden as an anti-imperialist country, and therefore close to Latin American leftist concerns²¹⁷.

Furthermore, Palme’s personal interests and trips during his youth nourished the contacts with Latin America, which were fortified once he came to power²¹⁸. Indeed, in 1975, he carried out his first visit as Prime Minister in Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba, with which he fortified relationships across the Atlantic. Since then, and during the following two decades, the Swedish social democracy increased its contacts with Latin America. In addition to this, it is important to underline the Swedish policy regarding political refugees. Just as Sweden was a center for political refugees during the Second World War, the

²¹⁶ Schori, *Conversaciones*, 68-70.

²¹⁷ Kenneth Hermele, “The End of a Road Swedish Social Democracy and Third World Society”. In *Social Democracy in Latin America. Prospects for change*, edited by Menno Vellinga, (USA: Westview Press, 1993), 64.

²¹⁸ Palme, being a student, visited Latin America. He in particular stayed in Mexico, where worked for a while in the hardware store of his cousins. Schori, *Escila*. 8.

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country also received several Latin American exiles that escaped from authoritarian regimes. Therefore, a “Latin” community was constituted which struggled from their exile for freedom and democracy; this also contributed to increasing European public awareness of the political situation in Latin America.

Moreover, Palme was so influential in Sweden that his positions resulted in becoming real policy, i.e. the so-called Palme Doctrine that anticipated the strategy addressed by the Brandt Commission some years later. In fact, Palme’s position followed the notion of global interdependence and stressed the relevancy of the dialogue with the “small states” (i.e. the Third World), since the solution of the crisis of the North was connected with the solution of the problems in the South. As a result, North and South were complementary and not opposed entities.²¹⁹

For his part, Brandt established contacts with Latin America even before he became president of the SI. Indeed, as a representative of the SPD in the SI since 1963, he was interested in the problems related to the establishment and operability of the Latin American Secretariat. Additionally, he made a trip to Latin America in 1968 where he visited several countries and established contacts with different organizations and parties, making it clear that this journey constituted the beginning of a political and diplomatic German offensive in the region²²⁰.

Hence, Germany also increased its contact with Latin America during the 1970s. Besides the interest in terms of the North-South dialogue in which Latin America became a sort of symbol, the region became an interesting area for German private investments. Indeed, at the end of the 1970s, 64% of the private investments of Germany were placed in this region.²²¹ Additionally, a close transnational network between Western Germany and Latin America was built since most of the German parties, enterprises, trade unions, cultural and religious institutions, and economic groups established links and contacts with their Latin

²¹⁹ Hermele, “The End of a Road Swedish Social Democracy”, 69.

²²⁰ Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda*, 1757-1775.

²²¹ Drekonja Kornat, “El redescubrimiento”, 101.

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American counterparts.²²² However, it is worth underlining that even if German direct investment in Latin America notably increased during the 1970s, these interests do not explain and could neither justify the “offensive” of the SI in the region, although Germany played a key role inside this organization. Why not? Because, as Evers Tilman has claimed, Germany also exerted similar economic policies in other parts of the world; therefore, this does not explain the political interest of the SI. Moreover, several actions were carried out in smaller countries such as Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, countries that could not offer any economic attractiveness to the development of a real policy²²³.

Consequently, one can say that economic interests in Latin America possibly attracted more Europeans to the region, especially after the crises of the 1970s when the Old Continent had to recognize its dependency on raw materials from the Third World,²²⁴ but one cannot “blame” the economy as the real “motive” of the offensive. It was, instead, the juncture of different factors, such as the weakening of the American image in the region, the campaign against imperialism, the North-South perspective, and the internationalization of politics that increasingly favored European social democratic intervention in the area. In regards to this subject, the General Secretary of the SI, Bernt Carlsson, said a few words regarding the SI opening towards the Third World that synthesized the shift of the SI and the perceptions of its leaders:

“The SI has been concentrated mainly in Europe. The reason for that is because the process of industrialization started first in Europe and so, the capitalist system created strong Labour Movements to fight the evils in it. The Third World did not have, up to this century, an industrialization process, so the working class organizations were weak in terms of European standards. Today it is impossible to forget the importance of the Third World, which comprises THREE-QUARTERS of the world population. The

²²² Alfred Mols, *El marco internacional de América Latina*. (Barcelona: Editorial Alfa, 1985), 70. Bodemer, *Europa Occidental*, 88.

²²³ Evers Tilman, *La socialdemocracia alemana en América Latina. ¿Ofensiva o huida hacia delante?* (Bogotá: CINEP, 1983), 29.

²²⁴ James F. Petras, “La socialdemocracia en América Latina. Una papel creciente para objetivos limitados”. In *El juego de los reformismos frente a la revolución en Centroamérica. Socialdemocracia, la Democracia Cristiana y el reformismo Yanqui*, edited by Hugo Assmann, (Costa Rica: Colección Centroamérica-Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones, 1981), 60.

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Third World as a whole plays today an important role in international politics. In this sense, the Socialist International is aware of the need to break out from its European ghetto and become more of an international organization. The concern of the Socialist International to work for peace, development and disarmament implies that it must get all the support it can from all over the world. We cannot forget that both the industrialized and underdeveloped countries have much to learn from one another".²²⁵

In sum, the socialists of the North played a significant role in the definition of SI's policies since they occupied most of the leading positions. Their local and global concerns (that were often linked to the interdependence approach) were analyzed and spread through working commissions and reports. The inclusion of developing countries in their strategies responded to the awareness of globalization's effects and the new rules that defined the world. Hence, Brandt was interested in expanding the interest and actions of the SI in the Third World countries. This initiative counted on the support of Olof Palme and Bruno Kreisky, i.e. the socialists of the North. Even if they worked together, there were some specific subjects that drew their attention in particular. For instance, Brandt gave a lot of importance to the North-South dialogue and to the Eastern countries, Palme was very interested on the African issues, and Kreisky on those related to the Middle East. Similarly, Felipe González and Mario Soares focused on the relations with Latin America and Bettino Craxi gave special attention to the Southern Cone.²²⁶ François Mitterrand (First Secretary of the French Socialist Party 1971-1981; President of France 1981-1995) was also interested in Latin American issues (e.g. the Franco-Mexican initiative)²²⁷. Hence, the "Southern" social democracy played a key role in this area. Furthermore, the juncture of socialist governments in Southern Europe contributed to the growing prestige of the

²²⁵ Comment from Bernt Carlsson to Hector Oqueli (1979). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1129.

²²⁶ Pesetti, *L'Internazionale Socialista*, 92.

²²⁷ The PSOE completely support the Franco-Mexican initiative. Indeed, the PSOE claimed on September 27, 1981: "In relation to the important declaration made by the French and Mexican Governments... the Spanish Socialist Workers Party declares its satisfaction about the adoption of this position that legitimates the struggle and representativeness of the El Salvador opposition [...] the PSOE thinks that the Franco-Mexican declaration opens new hopes for a political solution to the civil war, putting the bases for the creation of a climate of peace and détente not only in El Salvador but also to all the region of Central America and in this we express our hope that other governments will join the initiative [...] our parliamentary group has presented a proposal in Parliament by which we call to the Spanish Government to subscribe the mentioned declaration". Telex from the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1172-

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socialist movement on both sides of the Atlantic. This matter will be addressed in the next section.

3.3. The Southern European Socialists

Recalling the classification of the scholar Guillaume Devin, there was an emergence of three different social democratic poles in the years after the Second World War. Indeed, during this past century and even today, significant differences inside the social democratic model can be perceived and three types can be distinguished: (i) the Scandinavian, German and Dutch model, (ii) the Italian, Spanish and French model, and (iii) the British and Belgian model, which in the words of Menno Vellinga, are somewhere in between the previous two categories. All of them, however, share the strong initial links with the labor movement and the idea that the State must warrant citizen equality and general welfare, and therefore that State must play an active role in economy and society.²²⁸ For this reason, the socialists of the North were often a benchmark for the socialists of the South. Their long tradition and consolidation in government gave them a predominant position and a good reputation.

Nevertheless, to some extent, the distinctions between the socialists of the North and those of the South were confirmed at the meetings held by the Southern countries. In fact, Mitterrand took the initiative and in May 1975 invited the socialists of Southern Europe, including Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Belgium (even if the Belgian socialist party did not belong to this group, they were invited because of the affinities with the French party²²⁹), to his house at Latché with the aim of balancing the weight exerted by the Northern countries (the homeland of Kreisky, Brandt, and Palme). Mitterrand also considered the Southern countries to share a common domestic reality, which often was very distant from the national contexts in which the socialists of the North acted.

²²⁸ Menno Vellinga, “The Internationalization of Politics and Local Response: Social Democracy in Latin America”. In *Social Democracy in Latin America*, 8.

²²⁹ From Italy, it was invited the PSI (Bettino Craxi and Pietro Lezzi attended the meeting) but not the PSDI (partito socialista democratico Italiano).

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Furthermore, Mitterrand disagreed with the Northern countries about their relationship with the Communist parties. The French socialist claimed that there was a need for joint action with the Communist parties since the Southern countries shared a strong presence in this movement. On the contrary, the Northern parties rejected any dialogue and cooperation with Communism. Indeed, at almost the same time, Palme, Kreisky, and Brandt held an encounter in Vienna where they made their position clear regarding other political and ideological movements. Notwithstanding, Brandt also recognized that each country had a specific situation, and therefore he invited the other Northern countries to take into account local realities, in particular the local realities of the Southern countries where the communist party had a strong presence. As a matter of fact, he also held meetings with the communist movements but the difference was that he was able to keep them secret. Thus, these contacts were never declared nor formalized because he, as the Northern socialist, firmly refused to do so.²³⁰

Nevertheless, even if Mitterrand proposed regular meetings between the socialists of the Southern Europe due to their specific and common realities, he made it clear that the target was not the establishment of a parallel SI.²³¹ In this regard, Bettino Craxi stressed that all the parties that attended the informal meeting at Latché agreed to act inside the SI frame and to move towards the strengthening of this organization at the international level, especially where the SI would be able to carry out a strong political influence²³².

After their meeting at Mitterrand's house, the Southern parties agreed to hold another meeting to be held in Paris on January 24-25, 1976 in order to strengthen their relations. In

²³⁰ Salm, *Transnational Socialist*,. 118-121.

²³¹ "Una conferenza" *Avanti!*, (25/05/1975). Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19750525.79-119_0001_d.pdf

²³² "Interview with Bettino Craxi", *Avanti!*, (27/05/1975). Retrieved from

http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19750527.79-120_0001_d.pdf

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this second encounter (although it was the first real conference since Latché was basically an informal reunion), the relevancy of establishing contacts with the communists was again at the core of the reunion. They recalled the power and dimension that the communist parties had in Southern Europe, and therefore they stressed that this issue could not be avoided. Hence, Mitterrand prepared a meeting with Willy Brandt in order to overcome their differences and to try to find a solution addressing the contact with the communist movement. In these meetings, the common perception regarding the differences of the Southern European parties in relation to the Nordic countries was always latent; however, they often stressed the common willingness to move towards the path of European socialism alongside the SI.²³³

On May 7, 1977, a second conference of the Southern European socialists was held at Madrid. At this meeting, besides the attendance of Soares, Mitterrand, Craxi, and González, Santiago Carrillo, the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party, was invited by the PSOE as an observer. The main topics discussed in the meeting were cooperation, peace, and security in Europe, democracy and socialism in Southern Europe, cooperation between Europe and Third World countries, and perspectives on the Spanish, Greek, Portuguese accession to the EEC. It is worth underlining that at the same time, the PSOE began its electoral campaign, taking advantage of the visit of these international personalities.²³⁴ As a matter of fact, the international endorsement was an essential aspect of the PSOE strategy since it allowed them to gain international recognition and publicity as well as the domestic electorate.

Furthermore, as in the previous encounters, the attendees underlined the existence of essential common factors that tied together the Southern countries and differentiated them from the North. In this respect, González underlined the importance of religion in the

²³³ Document presented by the PSI at the meeting of the Socialist of the South (Paris). “Aperto dibattito fra i socialista all’incontro di Parigi”, *Avanti!*, (27/01/1976). Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19760127.80-22_0001_d.pdf

²³⁴ Joaquín Prieto, “El PSOE inicia su campaña con asistencia de Mitterrand y Soares”, *El País*, (7/05/1977). Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1977/05/07/espana/231804015_850215.html

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South, the power of the communist parties, and the fact that in this area, economies were completely different. For his part, Craxi added that socialism must overcome the European borders and must establish international connections.²³⁵ Furthermore, this meeting contributed to the PSOE's popularity because public opinion welcomed the attendance of such personalities as Mitterrand, Craxi, and Soares as it became a useful mechanism for legitimizing, supporting, and encouraging the PSOE's candidacy for the election that would be held in June of that year. In fact, both Craxi and Mitterrand emphasized and claimed their complete support to the PSOE, and even the French socialist dared to say that, at least in political terms, the Spanish accession to the EEC was almost achieved. However, Mitterrand expressed some doubts in the economic agreements since the French and the Italian agriculture corresponded to the Spanish one and, therefore, feared that Spanish accession could hamper the French economy.²³⁶ Therefore, despite the support of González's party, Mitterrand made it clear from the outset his skeptical position regarding the Spanish membership of the EEC.

Nonetheless, the idea of a "Southern Socialist" as a united force with common objectives (in the context of the European socialist cooperation), a convergent approach, and shared constituent elements persisted over time. In fact, any meeting was considered as an opportunity to dialogue, to define, to update, and to discuss topics that they, as the "Southern force", faced together. For instance, during the conference on the "Process of Democratization in the Iberian Peninsula and in Latin America" held in Lisbon in the autumn 1978, Soares, Craxi, and González found time to exchange information, ideas and to discuss matters with the purpose of devising a "common action in Southern Europe".²³⁷

²³⁵ "Conferencia de los partidos socialistas del sur de Europa", *El Correo Español y el Pueblo Vasco*, 8/05/1977. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1166

²³⁶ "Mitterrand, Soares y Craxi en apoyo al PSOE" (May 9, 1977); "François Mitterrand en la conferencia de partidos socialistas" (*El País*, 10/05/1977). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1166

²³⁷ "Verso un'azione comune nell' Europa del Sud", *Avanti!* (3/10/1978) Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19781003.82-235_0001_d.pdf#page=1

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In this same line of thought, an encounter between Mitterrand and Craxi was arranged after the SI Bureau meeting in 1978 with the same objectives as were previously mentioned.²³⁸

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that although Mitterrand and González tried to maintain “harmony” between them, they did not agree on certain points, such as: (i) Mitterrand’s desire for closer ties with the Communists, as he maintained contacts with Santiago Carrillo from the PCE; (ii) the scarce support in the Spanish negotiation for EEC membership; and (iii) the lack of understanding regarding the Basque situation and ETA terrorism. As a result, the relationship between these two parties was not so close for a while. However, their relationships would change once Spain became an EEC member²³⁹.

That said, even if Spain will be discussed later as a case study, it is worth underlining that since the late 1960s, Spanish socialism was extremely divided. The relevancy of this issue relied on the fact that the SI was very involved in the affair but chose to support González’s faction in the end. The SI’s endorsement favored party empowerment, international recognition of the PSOE, and the rapprochement between González and the SI before he came to power. Hence, the socialism inside Spain could be depicted in the following manner:

- (i) The Madrid group of Enrique Tierno Galván (*Partido Socialista en el Interior-PSI*, an alternative to the PSOE in exile, who later in 1974 founded the *Partido Socialista Popular*) who at the beginning received the support of the SPD and the Ebert Foundation. Ideologically, Tierno’s party experienced a particular shift since it moved from a kind of socialism with strong liberal influences to an heterodox Marxism;
- (ii) The Group of Valencia and the Basque country coordinated by the Catalan socialists (they formed the *Federación de Partidos Socialistas- FPS*). Given the

²³⁸ “Pieno Accordo tra italiani e francesi”, *Avanti!* (1-2/10/1978) Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19781001.82-234_0001_d.pdf#page=1

²³⁹ Fernando Morán, *España en su sitio*. (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes/Cambio 16, 1990), 56-59.

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strong trade union tradition, Basque socialism was one of the groups that somehow endured during Francoism;

- (iii) The Sevillian group, which from the beginning showed itself as a homogeneous group with strong international skills, particularly in France since their members were very close to the youth group of the French socialist party.²⁴⁰
- (iv) There were other socialist-inspired movements that emerged in the late 1950s in order to fight against the dictatorship (these influenced the PSOE later). Among them, there are *Agrupación Socialista Universitaria (ASU)*, which rose from some student movements (1956), and *Frente de Liberación Popular (FLP)*, commonly known as “Felipe”, which took inspiration from the national liberation movements of the Third World and the Cuban revolution. They were relevant during the Spanish transition, and some of their leaders entered into the ranks of the PSOE (and also some of them to the Spanish communist party) by nourishing the party with their previous experiences of struggle.²⁴¹

Besides the Spanish socialist fragmentation and the amount of “socialist” parties in the country, the PSOE itself experienced an important split. Two factions emerged: the PSOE *renovado* (modernizers) and the PSOE *histórico* (old guard). The first was mainly ruled by the “Sevillians” and was the group of Felipe González that fought from the inside by establishing contacts with the other socialist groups from other regions. The latter was the “traditional” group ruled by Rodolfo Llopis from the socialist exiles who rejected the transfer of party leadership to those who ruled from the inside (i.e. the Sevillian group). The first real confrontation occurred during the XI Congress of the party in Toulouse, when the Sevillian faction asked for the autonomy of the party inside Spain as well as for greater

²⁴⁰ Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo says that he took the opportunity of his education grant in Paris not only for studying but also to meet political exiles and to spread and to promote the PSOE in France. According to him, the Sevillian group and Felipe González were rather unknown outside Andalucía in the early 1970s, while the PCE of Santiago Carrillo already enjoyed an important status and it had already established relevant public relations in France. Accordingly, his first task was actually to explain, to promote and to publicize the “new PSOE”, i.e. the PSOE *renovado*, firstly in France and then in Europe and Latin America. The SI was also one of his targets because during the early 1970s the SI maintained relations with the other Spanish Socialist groups, i.e. Tierno Galván and different association of regional socialist parties. However, the SI recognized soon the PSOE of Felipe González as the real speaker of the Spanish socialisms. Interview with Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid, June 20, 2018.

²⁴¹ Juan Antonio Andrade, Blanco, *El PCE y el PSOE en la Transición*. (España: Siglo XXI de España editores, 2012) Kindle Edition, 1835-1897.

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representation on the Executive Committee due to the fact that until then the seats had been equally distributed between the socialists in exile and those inside the Iberian country. They agreed that there should be 9 members from inside the country and 7 from outside. Additionally, in this meeting Llopis was re-elected.²⁴²

However, the contrasts between the two factions endured over time and cooperation with communists was at the heart of their discussion²⁴³. Llopis's group rejected any collaboration with the Communist party and to some extent also with the group of the interior. González's group instead joined the resolution of the trade union UGT (*Unión General de Trabajadores*) that appealed to all the parties opposing Franco's dictatorship, including the Communist party. Therefore, the PSOE *renovado* established close contacts with the trade union UGT. With the purpose of solving the dilemma, the two factions of the PSOE convened a party meeting. Even if the Llopis group tried to postpone the meeting until the end of the year, the group of the interior (with the support of the UGT) held a meeting in Toulouse (August 1972)²⁴⁴ where some of the exterior representatives also attended the meeting, even if in large minority. On the contrary, Llopis's faction decided to hold its own Congress at the end of the year. As the scholar Pilar Ortuño Anaya underlines, the twofold meetings symbolized the formal emergence of two parties and the formal split of the PSOE: the *renovado*, which held the Congress in August, and the *histórico*, which met in December²⁴⁵.

²⁴² Pilar Ortuño Anaya, *European Socialists and Spain. The transition to Democracy 1959-77*, (Great Britain: Palgrave, 2002), 25.

²⁴³ Even in 1976 cooperation with the Communist party remained a point of contention between the PSOE *histórico* and the PSOE *renovado*. The first complained that the impediment to Party's union relied on the relations and contacts with the Communist party. Letter from Ovidio Salcedo and Victor Salazar (*PSOE histórico*) to the SI, September 18, 1976. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 813

²⁴⁴ At the beginning, the PSOE established a close relationship with the trade unions, in particular with Nicolás Redondo from the UGT who recognized the common objectives between the PSOE and the UGT. This behavior, however, will change once González came to power, namely, when the Spaniard launched the program for country's modernization that implied specific economic adjustments. Given the fact that often the latter did not correspond anymore with the initial postulates and since Spain had to accept some economic sacrifices with the aim of entering into the EEC, the good relation between Redondo and González was broken.

²⁴⁵ Ortuño Anaya, *European Socialists*. 27.

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The opposition between these two fronts was also demonstrated when the PSOE *histórico* tried to reach an agreement in May 1973 with the group of Tierno Galván (even if years before, Llopis opposed to the membership request from the Tierno group as SI observer) in order to halt the international recognition of the PSOE *renovado*. Within this context, in August 1972, a Special Commission of the SI was created with the aim of unifying Spanish socialism. In August 1973, the Commission seemed to reach an agreement for the recognition of the party that had held its last Congress in Toulouse, namely the PSOE *renovado*.²⁴⁶ However, the Special Commission decided to postpone the final decision after the celebration of the SI Bureau meeting. This decision led Tierno Galván to relinquish the agreement with the PSOE *histórico*. At this moment, Tierno's party turned to the left by establishing an agreement with the PCE. Accordingly, in 1974 he would rename his party *Partido Socialista Popular*²⁴⁷.

Conversely, the PSOE *renovado* was recognized by the SI as the only representative of socialism in Spain²⁴⁸. Hence, on January 1974, during the meeting of the Bureau, the SI took distance from the *históricos*. Why? The truth is that at the beginning the SI looked for the unification of the party. However, because the chasm between the two factions increased over time, the SI sent delegations to Spain in order to assess the situation and support one of them. The delegations mainly made contact with the *renovados* since they performed from the inside, and therefore they were more active and present in the country. Hence, despite the fact that the German, Austrian, and Dutch socialists expressed some doubts, the delegation opted for the group of the interior. The reluctance of these parties encouraged the PSOE *renovado* to exert increasingly international presence in order to obtain great support. With this objective, the PSOE *renovado* made efforts to attend most of the international meetings and Congresses of different European socialist parties. This

²⁴⁶ Rodolfo Llopis resigned after de XII Party Congress (August 1972), when González was named General Secretary. The *históricos* did not recognize the appointment by splitting the party.

²⁴⁷ Mateos, *Historia del PSOE*, 256-260.

²⁴⁸ Some years later, Bert Carlsson qualified González as the successor of Pablo Iglesias and stressed that any potential legalization of the PSOE *histórico* would not change the fact that the only party member of the SI was the PSOE of González. "La Internacional Socialista reitera su apoyo al PSOE", March 6, 1977. From From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1166

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was the strategy followed by the PSOE *renovado* while, as previously mentioned, the *histórico* tried to establish an agreement with the party of Tierno Galván.²⁴⁹

The XIII Congress at Suresnes in October, 1974 was the last congress of the PSOE in exile, in which the PSOE *renovado* invited important international personalities such as Mitterrand, Carlos Altamiro from the Chilean PS, and Bettino Craxi²⁵⁰. Here the SI position was made clear along with the support of the German SPD because, until then, the German party had been reluctant to choose the PSOE of González as the sole representative of Spanish socialism. However, the fear of a communist triumph in the Iberian country as well as the efforts inside the SI of the parties that advocated for the PSOE *renovado* (e.g. the Italian Socialist Party, the French socialist party, and the British Labor party), pushed the SPD to completely support the González group.²⁵¹ In fact, on more than one occasion, the other Spanish socialist factions complained and blamed the SI of maintaining contacts only with one group, and in their opinion this worsened and increased the internal division of the PSOE. They also asked the SI to be an impartial mediator in the unification of Spanish socialism.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ See: Ortuño Anaya, *European Socialists*, 27-33.

²⁵⁰ Craxi (at time, Deputy Secretary, in charge of the PSI foreign relations) claimed at the PSOE's Congress the following: Italy needs the Spanish democratization in order to consolidate its own democracy since, in the last years, Italy has been experienced high levels of political instability and many terrorists attacks. Craxi underlined the support of the PSI to the PSOE and even invited a PSOE's delegation in Italy with the aim to start a joint action and to define an aid program for the Spanish socialist action. All of this was framed in the solidarity scheme of the SI. See: speech of Bettino Craxi at the PSOE Congress, (14/10/1974) "Discorso 2 Congresso del PSOE", Fondazione Craxi (F.1.Sz.1, S.9.Ss.1. D.2).

²⁵¹ According to Abdón Mateos, the PSOE *renovado* received from the PSI support and economic assistance thanks to the mediation of Bettino Craxi and Nerio Nesi. In this way, the PSI helped the PSOE in its renewal process. Mateos, *Historia del PSOE*, 33 See also: report wrote by Nerio Nesi regarding the Spanish and PSOE's situation. Nesi underlined the requests that the PSOE addressed to the PSI: (1) to provide monthly financial assistance; (2) to contribute to the transfer of the organization responsible for propaganda from France to Spain; (3) to facilitate credit operations with an Italian Bank for when the party would carry out the transition from illegality to legality. Likewise, Nesi synthesized the reasons why the PSI should accept them: (i) the PSI had real interest in the triumph of socialism in Spain; (ii) this is a common interest with other European parties, e.g. German SPD and the French Socialist Party that had already started their assistance program; (iii) the Italian Communist Party was very active in Spain; (iv) for Italy, the establishment of close ties with the potential government party of Spain will be meaningful. "Lettera 1 Nerio Nesi a Craxi", 30/09/1974. *Fondazione Craxi*, (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.52 L.1).

²⁵² See, for instance, the letter from Enrique Tierno Galván and Raul Morondo to Hans Janitschek, SI General Secretary", (1976). Letter from Raul Morondo a Janitschek (January 15, 1976); letter from José Prat and Manuel Murillo (PSOE *histórico*) to the SI. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 813.

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After the approval of the law that allowed political association (May 1977), at least 111 parties requested formal recognition, in particular, in view of the electoral elections to be held this year. The PSOE, however, was able to carry out its first meeting in Spain in December 1976, in which famous personalities from the SI attended the Congress. Although the PSOE grew exponentially with González (from around 3000 members at times of the meeting at Suresnes to around 15,000 during the elections in June 1977),²⁵³ the PSOE was not a big party at the time of the first democratic election. Hence, in 1977, other leftist parties also aspired to obtain a good result in the Spanish general elections. Nevertheless, as Santos Juliá claims, the PSOE strategy of rejecting any coalition with other parties and the requirement of uptake under the PSOE rules and structures contributed to the PSOE's success in the long run. In fact, little by little, all the Spanish socialist parties reached an agreement with the PSOE, and in the end all of them ended up joining the PSOE. Thus, the PSOE was strengthened and spread across the country²⁵⁴.

Additionally, personal relationships also played a significant role in political development. After Suresnes, the Congress of the Portuguese Socialist Party was held. This meeting meant the rapprochement between González and Brandt since, in the words of Yáñez-Barnuevo, “the German politician saw himself in González and he found in him what he was waiting for in the Iberian country”. Since then, their close relationship started to thrive. Consequently, when it was the moment to elect the new president of the SI, the González group supported Brandt's candidacy. This led to the openness of the SI to the Third World. Likewise, Yáñez-Barnuevo notes that the last disagreement between González and Mario Soares occurred during this Congress. The divergence between them arose because Soares maintained contacts with the Spanish Communist Party (probably as a mechanism to contrast the power achieved by the General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist party, Alvaro Cunhal) and González precisely feared that their contacts could harm the PSOE's

²⁵³ Mateos, *Historia del PSOE*, 53.

²⁵⁴ Santos Juliá, “Democracia”. In *La España del Siglo XX*, edited by Santos Juliá, José Luis García, Delgado, Juan Carlos Jiménez and Juan Pablo Fusi. (Madrid: Marcial Pons Ediciones de Historia, 2007), 242.

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accession to power.²⁵⁵ However, despite this disagreement, the Portuguese participated in most of González's initiatives.

It is also important to keep in mind the ideological turn experienced by the PSOE in 1979. In fact, until then, González's party had embraced Marxist ideology. According to Paul Kennedy, after Franco's death the *renovados* espoused the Marxist label and hence rejected any link with capitalism by calling themselves a "Class party, Marxist and democratic". He explains their position by arguing that the international context led them to adopt this radical posture since the Portuguese Revolution and Allende's death in Chile (a democratically elected leftist government) were still fresh.²⁵⁶

Likewise, some scholars have also argued that the initial PSOE alignment with Marxism was probably due to its needs and quest for identity, since the internal fragmentation of the party and Francoism had blurred its ideology. Therefore, the initial adoption of Marxism as the ideological guideline responded more to the PSOE's need to forge an identity, to its necessity to find a mechanism of internal identification, and to create cohesion inside the party rather than to be the real guideline of the PSOE's political approach.²⁵⁷ However, one cannot forget that at the time 78% of the party supporters were workers and only 22% of them were professionals. As a result, this likely conditioned the ideological orientation of the party. This configuration changed in the early 1980s when the "middle class" prevailed inside the party (36% were workers, 20% non-salaried employees, 16% clerks, 4% teachers, 4% salaried professionals, and 18% farmers).²⁵⁸

Consequently, 1979 represented a key year for the PSOE. To put simply, the aforementioned ideological turn during the XXVIII Party Congress (May 17-20, 1979), González and the Sevillian group asked for the attenuation of the Marxist ideology in the

²⁵⁵ Interview with Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid, June 20, 2018. Soares also mentioned this argument in his autobiography. Mário Soares, *Un Político assume-se. Ensaio autobiográfico, político e ideológico*. (Portugal: Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, 2011). 233-234.

²⁵⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Spanish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain*, (UK: Manchester University Press, 2013), 21 and 24.

²⁵⁷ Andrade Blanco, *El PCE y el PSOE*, 529.

²⁵⁸ Josep Picó, *Los límites de la socialdemocracia europea*. (Madrid: Siglo XXI Editores, 1992), 198 and 212. Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

PSOE's program and speech in order to attract voters outside the worker groups. The rejection inside the party of this proposal led González to resign to his charge. However, the power and influence reached by the Sevillians in those years was very high. Thus, on September 28-29, 1979 an Extraordinary Congress was convened and González's suggestion won. For this reason, he returned to the General Secretariat much stronger²⁵⁹.

Regarding the international presence in Spain, it is important to note that besides the previously mentioned meetings of the socialists of Southern Europe, there were other international visits directed to support González's party (which at the time continued to be illegal). Indeed, since the first PSOE meetings held in Madrid, personalities such as Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, Olof Palme, and Pietro Nenni were always present in these reunions by producing a media impact. As a matter of fact, their support had a local and international effect since it was important to legitimate González's party, to contribute to its strengthening, and to promote it internationally even if the ideological program of the PSOE was one of the most radical inside the European social democracy at the time.²⁶⁰ González hoped that through the establishment of strong international relations, he would be able to achieve his national ambitions.

Additionally, for the PSOE, the SI support was also extremely important since this often meant not only political endorsement but also financial and technical aid, which became indispensable in times of electoral campaigning as well as "to open the road towards Socialism in Spain". Hence, on their part, the members of the Spanish socialist party committed themselves to help the SI and the SI parties in whichever way they could be useful.²⁶¹ In other words, a reciprocal assistance was built between the SI and Spain.

²⁵⁹ Julio Aróstegui, "La transición política y la construcción de la democracia", In *Historia de España Siglo XX 1939-1996*. Edited by Jesús A. Martínez, (Madrid: Cátedra 1999), 291-292. It is possible to appreciate the ideological change of the PSOE (Political Resolution of the XXVIII PSOE Congress and the Political Resolution of the PSOE Extraordinary Congress 1979) on the website:

<http://www.psoe.es/transparencia/informacion-politica-organizativa/resoluciones-de-congresos-y-conferencias-politicas/>

²⁶⁰ Mateos, *Historia del PSOE en transición*, 39.

²⁶¹ Letter from Carmen García (Administrative Secretary) and Luis Yáñez- Barnuevo (International Secretary) to Bernt Carlsson, February 11, 1977. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1166

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Like the Spanish case, in Portugal the SI, and in particular the SPD through the Ebert foundation, played a key role in the accession of Mario Soares (leader of the small and clandestine Portuguese Socialist Party) to power. Even if the development of this issue goes beyond the goals of this research, it is important to underline that the SI also strived for the warranty of a democratic transition in Portugal in face of the Carnation Revolution in April 1974, in order to avoid the victory of Communism (in a Cold War climate) which at the time was very strong. However, the experience of the SI in Portugal mostly led them to act more intensely in Spain. The objective relied on preventing a crisis like the Carnation Revolution in Spain. Thus, the SI supported Soares financially and by raising international awareness of the Portuguese situation. Like in Spain, the SI's endorsement was useful in terms of the increase of electoral supporters and in the strengthening of the international contacts of Soares.²⁶²

Besides the contribution of the SI inside the country, the leader of the Portuguese socialist party forged close relationships with the leaders of the SI and became vice president of this organization. His role in Latin America as representative of the SI was also significant. As shown below, Soares headed some of the SI's missions on the other side of the Atlantic. It is relevant to note that the SI chose González and Soares as leaders of the Latin American missions because they could establish connections more easily with Latin Americans thanks to their cultural, linguistic, and ideological proximity²⁶³. In addition to the historical legacy, Latin Americans felt close to the Spaniards and Portuguese due to their authoritarian recent past: Francisco Franco in Spain and Antonio Salazar in Portugal.

The Italian Socialist Party, like the Spanish, presented some weaknesses mainly because of its fragmentation. Indeed, The Italian Socialist Party had a long tradition of splits and reunifications. The last attempt of unification was experienced in 1966 when the PSI and

²⁶² See: Ana Mónica Fonseca, “Os partidos socialistas e as transições democráticas europeias. A transição portuguesa como lição para a Revolução Europeia de 1989”, *Relações Internacionais*, 43, (2014): 051-063. Ana Mónica Fonseca, “O apoio da social-democracia alemã a democratização portuguesa (1974-1975) *Lev História*, 63, (2012): 93-107.

²⁶³ Soares himself said that at the time Brandt understood that Latin America had become very important for the European socialists. Hence, Latin American parties should be invited to join the SI and in this process the Iberian representatives would carry out the task better than Germans. Soares, *Um Político assume-se*. 155-156. Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

the PSDI (*Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano*) agreed to form the PSU (*Partito Socialista Unificato*) in light of the following elections (at the time, the most important political forces in the country were the Christian Democratic party and the Communist party). With this reunification, the PSI was automatically readmitted to the SI (it had been banned from the COMISCO in 1949) since the PSDI was already a member party. However, despite the formal fusion, the PSU lacked unity. The differences between the party leaders were demonstrated by the coexistence of two Secretariats and by the electoral results (1968) because it was a real fiasco.

As a matter of fact, after many internal differences, the PSU split in 1969²⁶⁴. Besides the internal divergences, some international events accelerated the rupture. For instance, domestic disputes regarding the Italian membership to NATO took place. These were justified by the worsening of the Vietnam War and the tricky situation in the Middle East within the frame of the Arab-Israeli conflicts. In this context, the fracture was unstoppable. The PSI resumed its name and the PSDI maintained the acronym PSU until 1971, when it reacquired its initial name: PSDI.²⁶⁵ Hence, since 1969 both parties became two different members within the SI.

At this point, it is important to stress the reasons why this research focuses on the PSI rather than on the PSDI since both parties were members of the SI:

- 1.) The 1970s and 1980s were the “golden years” for the PSI and a decline for the PSDI since it was involved in political scandals (e.g. the Lockheed scandal in 1979 involving the leader of the PSDI, Mario Tanassi, and the Masonic lodge P2 in 1984 involving the General Secretary, Pietro Longo). The PSI, for its part, experienced a deep transformation starting from the renewal of its leaders. Indeed, with Bettino Craxi appointed as General Secretary of the party in 1976, the PSI went through an

²⁶⁴ The insurmountable differences inside the PSU were also reflected in the existence of two factions within the party that perfectly corresponded to the previous political groups: *Rinnovamento* which was associated to the PSDI and *Autonomia Socialista* to Nenni.

²⁶⁵ See. Degl’Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*. 383-394. Gianfranco Pasquino, Julien Pr  au, “Pourquoi il n’y a pas de social-d  mocratie en Italie”. *P  le Sud*, n.27, (2007)143-157.

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important phase of redefinition. The PSI's targets changed and the Executive of the party experienced an evident generational change.

2.) In terms of electoral performance, the PSI was stronger than the PSDI (Table 2).

Table 2

*Electoral Performance PSI and PSDI*²⁶⁶

Year	PSI		PSDI	
	% Votes	% Seats	% Votes	% Seats
1972	9.61	9.78	5.14	4.60
1976	9.64	9.05	3.37	2.38
1979	9.81	9.84	3.84	3.33
1983	11.44	11.59	4.08	3.65
1987	14.26	14.92	2.96	2.70
1992	13.61	14.60	2.71	2.53

3.) Craxi launched a modernization project that included party “de-ideologization” and an autonomous socialism inside the European frame. Thus, an active role in the international arena and closer links with foreign socialist parties were at the heart of his objectives. As a matter of fact, Craxi gave great relevancy to personal relations. He, in contrast with the “old” leadership of the PSI, worked on strengthening contacts with important European personalities from the left wing, e.g. Willy Brandt, Felipe González, Mario Soares, François Mitterrand, and Bruno Kreisky.²⁶⁷ Examples of this were the socialist meetings between the countries of Southern Europe, the active support towards Felipe González, and Craxi's speech at the 30th Anniversary of the reopening of the Karl Marx House Museum in Trier where, at the invitation of Brandt and the SPD, Craxi spoke. Freedom and democracy were the topics as well as an analysis about the development of Marx and Engels' thoughts. Moreover, Leninism was

²⁶⁶ Pascal Delwit, “Les partis socialistes d'Europe du sud: Des organisations performantes?”, *Pôle Sud* n. 27, 2, (2007): 25.

²⁶⁷ Giuliano Tardivio, *Los socialismos de Bettino Craxi y Felipe González ¿Convergencia o divergencia?* (Madrid: Editorial Fragua 2016), 165. Degl'Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*. 428.

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criticized because of its inconsistency with democracy. The speech concluded by emphasizing that modern socialism should avoid Marx and Engels' mistakes by following a revisionist approach²⁶⁸. Craxi, therefore, started to approach Brandt who was somehow skeptical about establishing relations with Western communism. Within this context, the "Eurosociologist" project came to light. According to Spencer Di Scala, the international activism of Craxi during the 1970s and his will of establishing close ties with European socialist parties helped him to reach the position of Secretary of the party as well as contributed to his aspiration of being able to counterbalance the Berlinguer's "Eurocommunism" with his own "Eurosociology".²⁶⁹ As a result, the network of international contacts (e.g. the SI) contributed to the appointment of Craxi and González as General Secretariat of their own parties and to attain an important place in the international arena.

4.) Craxi was named vice president of the SI.

5.) A close relationship was established between Craxi and González that facilitated and encouraged joint actions in foreign policy.

In this regard, the scholar Giuliano Tardivio worked on the definition of their convergences and divergences. According to him, Craxi and Gonzalez share an ideological transformation since they moved from an initial radicalism to a more moderate position. As said, the PSOE carried out its ideological shift during the Extraordinary Congress Party (1979) while the PSI made it during the XLI Congress Party held in Turin on March 29-April 3, 1978. Craxi's writing published by *L'Espresso* on August 27 (*Il Vangelo Socialista*)²⁷⁰ also contributed to this ideological change. Furthermore, Tardivio points out

²⁶⁸ Bettino Craxi, "Discorso. 30° anniversario della ricostruzione della casa di Karl Marx distrutta dai nazisti, Treviri, 4/5/1977" From Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 Ss.3 S, 18).

²⁶⁹ Spencer Di Scala, *Renewing Italian Socialism. Nenni to Craxi*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1988), 177.

²⁷⁰ Craxi published *Il Vangelo Socialista*, ("The Socialist Gospel"), a text that has actually been written by Luciano Pellicani but signed by him. This text was considered the tipping point of the Italian left wing. Craxi attacked Communism by arguing that Leninism and pluralism (the latter should be at the heart of democracy, which must be both liberal and socialist) are two antithetical notions and, therefore, Communism and Socialism are incompatible. On the contrary, he embraced the ideology of Proudhon. Bettino Craxi "Il Vangelo Socialista" in *In 1892-1982 PSI Novanta anni di storia. Almanacco Socialista. Cronistoria, schede, commenti, documentazione sul socialismo italiano. Partito socialista Italiano (Roma, Rotostilgraf)*, 405.

In the XLI Congress party, the new "Socialist Project" (*Progetto Socialista*) was launched, in which *the socialist goals that every socialist government must follow* were devised. This project was in line with the Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

that the Spanish socialists were very interested in the evolution of the PSI: they closely followed their publications (e.g. the socialist magazine *Mondoperaio*, which deeply influenced some Spanish magazines such as *Sistema* and *Leviatan*) as well as the Italian policy in order to learn more about the Italian system²⁷¹. The scholar also underlined that Felipe González viewed an analogy between the unification of his party with the PSP of Tierno Galván (1978) and the PSI Congress party held at Turin the same year. Likewise, Tardivio recalled that even when Craxi was involved in one of the greatest scandals of corruption (*Tangentopoli*) in the 1990s, González had not failed to express the good bonds of friendship that linked them and his unconditional support.²⁷² It is also worth mentioning that they shared further common features, namely the emphasis on leadership, the personal power inside their parties, and the strong cult of personality²⁷³.

Abdón Mateos, for his part, welcomed the PSI renewal process under Craxi's Secretariat and highlighted its influence on Spanish socialism. He stressed that the Spanish socialist ideology was extremely influenced by Italian socialist thinkers, such as Norberto Bobbio and Luciano Pellicani, the same intellectuals who together with Proudhon swayed Craxi's position. Accordingly, Craxi and González took distance from Marxism and were influenced by the same line of thought.²⁷⁴ Hence, not only personal ties but also common positions in terms of ideology and aims encouraged the relationships and contacts between them. Furthermore, they shared an almost simultaneous seizure of power (González came

Craxi's speech at Trier and, years later, with *Il Vangelo Socialista*. Democratic pluralism, the reestablishment of the economic system (containment and debt program), and the fight against unemployment were at the basis of the PSI program. Francesco Gui, "Dal progetto socialista al programma" In *1892-1982 PSI*, 388-389. In this Congress, the PSI claimed the will of acting inside the SI frame. Furthermore, they started to develop joint actions with the European socialist parties. It was also underlined the interest of the party in establishing contacts, through the SI, with the socialist parties from the Southern Europe and from the Third World in order to develop a common policy in terms of cooperation, peace and progress. Gui, "Dal Progetto Socialista". 404. For the discussion on Craxi's speech, see: *Avanti!* from 30 March till 3 April 1978. http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/controller.php?page=result_solr&term_search=congresso%20di%20torino&day_start=31&month_start=03&year_start=1978&day_end=03&month_end=04&year_end=1978&start_search=0&sort=Title_search%20asc

²⁷¹ Ugo Intini (from the PSI) also claimed that the PSOE learned from the PSI and Felipe González recognized it. Ugo Intini (interview). In *Il crollo. Il PSI nella crisi della Prima Repubblica* edited by Gennaro Acquaviva and Luigi Covatta. (Venice: Marsilio, 2012), 363.

²⁷² See: Tardivio, *Los socialismos*.

²⁷³ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 750-751

²⁷⁴ Mateos, *Historia del PSOE en transición*, 199-200.

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to power in 1982 and Craxi in 1983) and the support of the Spanish accession to the EEC. Italy actively backed Spain's membership to the EEC as a mechanism to balance the French-German axis, and González was aware of the Italian support on this matter. In fact, he recognized and publicly thanked Craxi and the Italian Foreign Minister for their contribution and endorsement²⁷⁵.

In a sense, an additional point of contact between Craxi and Gonzalez was the relationship established with the SPD and the Ebert Foundation. As mentioned, the Spaniard and the Italian were very interested in closing relations with international actors in order to achieve and to increase external credibility and support. This, in turn, would be useful in their own domestic policies since this gave them greater credibility. The SI, the SPD, and the FES shared these interests. Part of such attention relied on their will of closing contacts with “friendly” governments with which they could share common policies and objectives. The links established between the PSOE, Brandt, and the FES have already been discussed, which is why now the focus is on the Italian case. Indeed, the leader of the SPD and the FES were interested in the Italian peninsula. How? Firstly, the Ebert Foundation opened its offices in Italy in 1973. Secondly, Brandt aimed to build a good relationship with Craxi and considered him a good example for the embodiment of the socialist guidelines (in fact, Craxi was nominated vice president of the SI). Hence, they started to nourish their relationship through meetings, joint actions, and speeches. In this context, Rome hosted the SI Bureau meeting in 1977, which had a significant impact on the Italian party as well as on Italian public opinion.

Furthermore, several meetings were held between both parties and even the SPD expressed its intention to fully assist the PSI in order to devise a common socialist program. Likewise, the German party expressed its readiness to become the main speaker of the PSI in light of the upcoming European election.²⁷⁶ For instance, on November 11, 1977, Craxi visited

²⁷⁵ “Palabras Pronunciadas por el Secretario General del PSOE en la apertura del XIC Congreso de la Unión de Partidos Socialistas de la Comunidad Europea” From the Archive: *Fundación Pablo Iglesias*. Alcalá de Henares, España.

²⁷⁶ Giovanni Bernardini, “La SPD e il socialismo democratico europeo negli anni settanta: il caso dell’Italia”, *Ricerche di Storia Politica* 1, (2010): 3-22.

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Bonn and met Brandt and the Chancellor of the Federal Germany, Helmut Schmidt. Quoting Craxi, the aims of the trip were to increase the relations between the two parties, to improve international cooperation, and to define the Eurosocialist project²⁷⁷. In light of all this, one could understand why the PSI and Craxi are at the core of this study.

In brief, it is possible to state the following. Firstly, despite the attempts of building a Socialist Southern Pole (e.g. through the meeting of socialists from Southern Europe), and even when the gravity axes of the EEC seemed to have changed to the Southern countries because of the coming to power of Spanish, French, Italian, and Portuguese socialists, the influence from the Northern parties remained significant.²⁷⁸ Secondly, Craxi and González, for their part, considered the SI as a useful tool to strengthen their foreign relationships and to achieve international acknowledgement, which in their view was crucial for acquiring greater renown and weight in their own countries. Indeed for them, modernity meant: “adopting a foreign model”.²⁷⁹ Within this context, their party renewals were carried out. Thirdly, they often recall the SI when they referred to their international goals as revealed by their speeches given at conferences parties, resolutions, and press articles.²⁸⁰ Fourthly, development cooperation, worldwide peace, arms control, and democracy were notions included in the foreign programs of Craxi and González. All of them were associated with the SI efforts and were linked to the opening towards the Third World. This last point will be discussed in the following section.

²⁷⁷“ Comunicato 54. Viaggio di Craxi a Bonn (7/11/1977)”, Fondazione Craxi, (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 C.54).

²⁷⁸ Willy Brandt, during an interview, talked about the possibilities (*risks*) that an “*olive International*” (expression that alluded to the “Southern Socialism”) could oppose the SI where the Nordic social democracy still prevailed. Devin, *L’Internationale*, 274. Giovanni Bernardini, “Too litte, too late? The Socialist International, German reunification and the Transition in Easter Europe”. In *Europa und die deutsche Einheit. Beobachtungen, Entscheindungen und Folgen im gesamteuropäischen Kontext*, edited by Michael Gehler and Maximilian Graf. Vandenhovck & Ruprecht, 2017, 780.

²⁷⁹ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*, 751.

²⁸⁰ For instance, see: PSOE Resolutions 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984. <http://www.psoe.es/transparencia/informacion-politica-organizativa/resoluciones-de-congresos-y-conferencias-politicas/> PSOE electoral program 1979,1982, 1984, 1986, 1989. <http://www.psoe.es/transparencia/informacion-politica-organizativa/programas-electorales/> XLI PSI Party Congress in Turin (March 30, 1978) <http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/controller.php?page=archivio-pubblicazione-anno-edizione-mese&anno=1978&edizione=Edizione%20Nazionale&mese=3> XLII PSI Party Congress in Palermo (April 23 and 27, 1981) <http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/controller.php?page=archivio-pubblicazione-anno-edizione-mese&anno=1981&edizione=Edizione%20Nazionale&mese=4>

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3.4 The SI becomes Global: Latin America

Since the first dialogues, the Northern leaders made their position clear and they suggested the path that the SI must undertake. They stressed the need to launch a joint action and to define common targets: democratic socialism, a strong trade union movement, full employment, social services, good living conditions, equal rights for women, and international solidarity.²⁸¹ However, their materialization occurred with the appointment of Brandt as President in 1976. Moreover, since Willy Brandt became the president of the SI, the latter obtained a geopolitical role in the international arena. In fact, with the former German Chancellor, the SI overcame its Eurocentric character and became a meeting point and a benchmark for those countries that sought international support.²⁸²

As a result, the SI defined its goals. The SI aimed to: (i) overcome its Eurocentric character; (ii) to achieve global democratization and worldwide peace; (iii) to guarantee international/common security; (iv) to remove inequality; (v) to get over the global dichotomy of North-South (development versus economic backwardness; richness versus poorness); (vi) to protect human and civil rights; (vii) to assist in the control and solution of the international dilemmas; and (viii) to contain the arm race (this was a point of contact between the Soviet Union and the SI).

Hence, the power of the SI was reexamined. The SI became a tool to improve international relations as well as a mechanism to overcome the political stalemate that the European social democracy was suffering. According to Fernando Pedrosa, the SI allowed the European social democracy to renew their policies, to increase their alliances outside Europe, and to regain social and electoral support within their own countries.²⁸³ The European social democracy through the SI aimed to become a global actor, and to become

²⁸¹ Letter from Olof Palme to Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, (24 April 1974) in Brandt, Kreisky and Palme, *La Alternativa*, 138-140.

²⁸² Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda*, 1702-1729/9416.

²⁸³ Pedrosa, "La redefinición de la agenda socialdemócrata", 25.

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an alternative to the Cold War's bipolarity.²⁸⁴ Furthermore, the International was considered as a mechanism by which the European social democracy could be strengthened. Why? The main reason relied on the fact that the SI implied an active and large international network. In this context, cooperation between European parties and external ones began to thrive. The European social democracy looked for parties with similar purposes because finding organizations with their same traits could not be possible abroad.²⁸⁵ Common features, in fact, were identified in some of the Third World's parties. As a result, the SI began to play a more active role in that direction. It is important, however, to bear in mind that these new ambitions and policies would probably not have taken place without the already mentioned shifts of the 1970s, which nourished the external dimension of the SI.

Accordingly, it can be said that all the baggage from the SI's experience impacted the policies of the socialist parties and influenced their leaders. In other words, the understanding reached during the 1970s as members of the SI was in some way put into practice once the leaders came to the power. For instance, Craxi and González strived to establish international relations in order to increase their national power and legitimation. As a matter of fact, the relations acquired during the 1970s allowed them to obtain greater international recognition, prestige, and knowledge, which was translated into media impact and, hence, more local votes. Moreover, this *modus operandi* impacted the external projects and goals of the SI member parties. The latter started to use the same rhetoric employed by the SI in terms of foreign policy. In other words, the SI goals were included in the SI members' foreign projects as the political pamphlets or leaders' speeches have revealed²⁸⁶.

In this way, the SI opening towards the Third World entailed the opening of the European socialist parties (i.e. the member parties of the SI). As a result, by studying the SI and the network constructed around it, it is possible to observe somehow the foreign policy of the

²⁸⁴ Ibid, 27.

²⁸⁵ Letter from Kreisky to Brandt and Palme (15/04/1975) and Letter from Brandt to Palme and Kreisky (25/05/1975) In Brandt, Kreisky and Palme, *La Alternativa*, 161-162 and 181-184.

²⁸⁶ For instance, see: the PSOE Resolutions 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984. PSOE electoral programs 1979,1982,1986; XLI PSI Party Congress in Turin (March 30, 1978), XLII PSI Party Congress in Palermo (April 23 and 27, 1981) -just to name a few.

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SI members. It, however, does not mean that the SI acted as a hierarchical force that imposed its principles. On the contrary, as the SI was a transnational network of parties and organizations, the dialogue was two-sided. To put it differently, the “international” impacted the “national” and, similarly, the latter influenced the former²⁸⁷.

At this point, it is important to stress that even if the SI actions practically embraced all of the Third World, this text will refer mainly to the Latin American case. Why Latin America? Latin America and Europe shared a common past. Moreover, for Europe, Latin America became an opportunity to expand markets and to obtain raw materials.²⁸⁸ Furthermore, the lack of democracy, the economic backwardness, the leftist revolutionary movements, and the violation of human rights in the region coincided with the SI global objectives. The wave of dictatorships that characterized Latin America in the 1970s and the conflicts in Central America led to a more belligerent socialist position regarding such regimes and to the rise of movements of solidarity among the Latin Americans. In particular, the crisis of Central America was considered by the European social democrats a product of the North-South scheme in contraposition to the considerations of the United States that inscribed it within the East-West conflict.²⁸⁹

Latin America somehow was a sui generis case.²⁹⁰ Did Latin America have social democratic parties? What was the situation of political parties in Latin America? Was the Latin American left wing similar to Europe? First of all, it is fundamental to take into account that during the Cold War, Latin America belonged to the sphere of influence of the United States. Hence, all the impulses from the leftist movements were repressed because they were interpreted inside the bipolar context. This contributed to the proliferation of revolutionary movements, the *guerrillas*, in particular after the Cuban revolution in 1959. In fact, during the 1960s a wave of guerrillas characterized the decade and the left wing

²⁸⁷ Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights*. Risse-Kappen, “The Socialisation of International Human Rights”.

²⁸⁸ Eusebio Mujal-León, “The West German Social Democracy Party and the Politics of Internationalism in Central America, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol 29, N. 4, (Winter 1987-1988): 112.

²⁸⁹ Jose Antonio Sanahuja. *Los EE.UU. en Centroamérica, 1980-1990 ¿Ayuda económica o seguridad nacional?* (Bilbao: Cuaderno de Trabajo Hegoa 1992).

²⁹⁰ It is important to stress that at the time there were also some attempts to create centrist governments. Suffice it to quote the Christian Democratic governments in Chile and Venezuela: respectively with Eduardo Frey Montalva (1964-1970) and Rafael Caldera (1969-1974).

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was always associated with these movements and/or with the Cuban influence. In the 1970s, the rise of Salvador Allende to power seemed to offer to the left wing the possibility of introducing socialism through a peaceful manner (i.e. democratic elections and a constitutional method). For this reason, the Chilean experience captured the attention of the global left wing. To give but one example, on March 11, 1973 in Copenhagen, the SI General Secretary (Hans Janitschek) gave a lecture on “Socialism in Chile” at the “Latin American Day”. This event was organized by the Danish Social Democratic party with the aim of “making party members more aware of development in that continent”²⁹¹. Even though the overthrow of Allende destroyed the initial socialist hopes, what followed nourished other kind of conundrums. The global left started to think about what could be learned from the Chilean case in order to avoid repeating its mistakes.²⁹²

Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that when one talks about the Latin American left wing it cannot be equated to Europe. In fact, as political scientist Jorge Castañeda claims, it is extremely difficult to define the Latin American left. It is interesting to note how he tries to solve this question by offering some key dates, which are helpful to describe and understand it, namely: 1) the Cuban Revolution in 1959 in which Fidel Castro came to power; 2) the death of the two “heroes” of Latin American left, i.e. Che Guevara in Bolivia (1967) and Salvador Allende in Chile (1973); 3) the success of the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979 with the Sandinistas; and then 4) their electoral defeat in 1990²⁹³.

Additionally, in the attempt to define the Latin American left, Castañeda argues that this group could be classified in four political/ideological categories: i) the communist parties that emerged in the 1920s and that were strongly linked with the Soviet Union; ii) the nationalist or populist left (e.g. Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Torrijos in Panama); iii) “the political-military organizations” that rose in the continent since the Cuban revolution,

²⁹¹ “Latin America Day in Copenhagen”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 169.

²⁹² Alan Angell, “La izquierda en América Latina desde c. 1920”, in *Historia de América Latina. Política, y sociedad desde 1930*. Edited by Leslie Bethell, vol. 12 (Barcelona: Crítica, 1997): 73-132.

²⁹³ Castañeda, *La Utopía desarmada*. 26-27.

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which were inspired by the Cuban experience and anti-Americanism; and 4) the reformist left that took their distances from the U.S. and Communism.²⁹⁴

As a result, the heterogeneity of the Latin American left wing becomes clear which, in turn, makes it hard to give a single definition. It is for this reason that a variety of Latin Americans parties, who were not perfectly social democratic, became members of the SI. What mattered was the sharing of similar ideas such as democracy, even if they were not real social democrats. In fact, during the seventies and eighties, a reformist left rose in Latin America that was closer to the European social democracy and distant from the “traditional” revolutionary movements that were typical of the prior decades. According to Jorge Arrate, the rise of this “new” left and the social democratic trend was because of the following reasons: i) the growing European social democracy action in the continent; ii) the issue that several populist and national-conservatives groups assumed a social democratic tendency in those years; and iii) the relevancy and centrality that democracy acquired at the time.²⁹⁵

In addition to this, the shift of the Latin American left, from radical to more moderate, was favored by the wave of dictatorships that hit the continent. Indeed, the leftist movements, by suffering authoritarian repression and persecutions firsthand, started to increasingly appreciate the value of democracy, freedom, and human rights. As a result, they approached the European social democratic cornerstones since they began to identify them as mandatory conditions for the development of the continent.

However, even if during the 1970s the SI began to be more active in the region, some contacts took place in the previous decades. Firstly, the Labour and Socialist International, i.e. the SI before the Second World War, counted two Latin American members: the socialist parties from Uruguay and Argentina. Both memberships endured during the life of the SILO and COMISCO but their roles and impacts were very limited. Indeed, the first real attempt to expand the SI in Latin America occurred in the middle of the twentieth

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 162.

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century with the founding of the Latin American Secretariat (*Secretariado Latinoamericano*) in 1955, in which Montevideo became the headquarters. Contrary to what happened in Asia (i.e. just one Asian Socialist Conference was held), in Latin America the SI founded a real organization that depended directly on the SI. The Uruguayan Humberto Maiztegui was named General Secretary and the Argentinian and Chilean socialist parties shaped the “advisory committee”²⁹⁶.

Nevertheless, this entity was short-lived as it existed only until 1970. Some explanations for this include the fact that very few Latin American parties were really interested in joining this organization, as well as the fact that Latin American’s left wing movements were extremely close to communism (in particular to the Cuban revolution) and therefore against imperialism. Indeed, in those years, the SI was not able to implement a Latin American leftist force characterized by not being founded on anti-American and anti-imperialism principles.²⁹⁷ In fact, during the 1950s and 1960s the factors that inhibited a stronger presence of the SI in Latin America were the SI’s strong spirit of anticommunism, the European unconditional support for the Atlantic Alliance, and the powerful influence of the United States in Latin America. Moreover, the fall of the socialist Salvador Allende after the coup d’état in Chile in 1973 emphasized the weak influence of the SI and crystalized the distance from U.S. foreign policy.

However, during the 1970s a turning point was experienced. Both Europe and Latin America looked to reach greater autonomy despite the bipolar structure devised by the Cold War. Thus, the European social democrats, without denying the influence of the United States, became more proactive and had an autonomous orientation in the region. The SI started a political offensive in Latin America to create a political field of action/direct intervention and networks of specific relations at an equal distance from the vicissitudes of the Cold War and from the US policies in the region.²⁹⁸ In this regard, the U.S. support for

²⁹⁶ Devin, *L’Internationale*, 97.

²⁹⁷ Michael Löwy, “Trayectoria de la Internacional Socialista” *Cuadernos políticos*, (México: Ed. Era, Jul-Sept 1981), 5. According to Guillaume Devin, the Italian PSDI was the first European party to denounce the “demagogic line” of the Latin American Secretariat since it was very close to communism and to Cuban revolution. Accordingly, the PSDI called for its dissolution. Devin, *L’Internationale*, 101.

²⁹⁸ Michael Löwy, “La social-démocratie en Amérique Latine”, *Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps*, n° Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

the authoritarian regimes in Latin America represented the main point of disagreement between the European social democracy and the “colossus of the North”.

Although the SI explicitly refrained from discussing the foreign policies of Latin American countries, one of its most important objectives was to keep them out of the East-West confrontation as Pentti Väänänen (Secretary General of the SI 1983-1989) has pointed out for the case of Nicaragua. Thus, it could be said that to some extent the SI “tried” to present itself as a “third way” vis-à-vis the bipolar order. However, the SI did not attempt to spread anti-Americanism and neither wanted “new Cubas”. They simply believed that the Social Democracy would offer the right alternative to communism and to the radical left.²⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Europe feared an escalation of the U.S.-USSR confrontation in Central America. This situation could exacerbate the tensions in Europe (Euro-missiles). For this reason, besides the SI’s postulates of solidarity, security was at the core of the discussion. Furthermore, quoting Fiamma Lussana, during the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America became an interesting “observatory” that captured the attention of the European parties because apart from underdevelopment, poverty, and inequality, the socialist hope persisted over time in the region. This constituted an area where socialist principles could be applied but, above all, this was the place where the possibility of a “socialist path” continued to be feasible.³⁰⁰

Hence, during the 1970s the interest of the SI in Latin America significantly increased. Why? After a period of low activism (1950s and 1960), the European social democracy started to be interested in the continent by becoming a sort of benchmark for them. A convergence of different issues explained the phenomenon:

- (i) The crisis of the U.S. in the early 1970s, which was worsened by the oil crises, led both Latin American and European countries to try to diversify their economic partners. In this way, an opening was produced from both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, Latin America looked to overcome American dominance in the

54. Regards sur l’Amérique latine 1945-1990, (1999): 28.

²⁹⁹Pentti Väänänen, *The Rose and The Fist*, (Helsinki: SYS Print, 2014), 92.

³⁰⁰Fiamma Lussana, “Il confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell’ultimo Berlinguer”. *Studi Storici*, 45. N. 2, (2004): 485.

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region and to expand itself economically to other zones. Likewise, Europe was interested in establishing a dialogue with Third World countries in order to diversify its oil sources, to expand exports, and invest capital. According to Löwy, this one was one of the reasons why the first European trips in Latin America were towards Mexico and Venezuela, i.e. the main oil producers of the continent. However, as the same author also stresses, economic reasons were not the main motive that captured the European attention. In fact, if one considers the Latin American economic situation at the time and its deterioration in the following decade, one can state that the continent was not able to contribute to the European recovery.³⁰¹ However, in the late 1970s, they understood the need to include the Third World in European matters since interdependence ruled the world. As said, the European social democracy was very aware of this matter. Indeed, it was in this context that the Brandt Commission arose and the concept of North-South order was developed. Nevertheless, on the contrary, one must recognize that political and ideological reasons played a key role in the rapprochement. In fact, European political parties, mainly the socialist but also the Christian Democratic, looked to establish contacts with “similar” parties and organizations outside the European borders since they increasingly became aware of the relevancy of development, international cooperation, and global interdependency.

- (ii) The military coup in Chile against Salvador Allende deeply impacted European politics and public opinion. As a matter of fact, the Chilean events “opened people’s eyes” and enhanced public awareness. Consequently, the European public opinion began to be interested in Latin American matters, i.e. the violation of human rights, the lack of democracy, and underdevelopment. Moreover, the Chilean exiles contributed by nourishing the European consciousness regarding the situation on the other side of the Atlantic. The same occurred at the level of political parties. Indeed, the events of Chile (both the Allende’s presidency and his fall) were those that really caught the SI’s attention (actually, other political forces were also affected by the Chilean experience,

³⁰¹ Löwy, “Trayectorias”, 9.

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e.g. the “Historic Compromise” of Berlinguer)³⁰². Since then, the SI started to be interested in the continent and started to organize its “offensive” there. This, however, became more concrete with the election of Brandt as president of the SI. Moreover, the unconditional American support for the Chilean dictatorship as well as the American involvement in the military coup became a sticking point between the “Old Continent” and the United States. This state of things encouraged the development of European autonomous policies in Latin America.

- (iii) Latin American suffering and problems (e.g. violations of human rights, inequality, poverty, etc.) coincided with the international program of the SI and the external goals of the socialist governments that were in power.
- (iv) The Ebert Foundation together with its partner institutions in Latin America (e.g. ILDIS, CEDAL) increased their labors. In this same line of thought, the SI sent many delegations, held conferences about Latin America, and prepared missions.
- (v) As said, in Latin America a more moderate left wing began to rise that found points of contact and hope in European social democracy. Therefore, these forces encouraged their rapprochement. On one hand, the SI found in these movements a valid intermediary inside the region. On the other, the Iberian transition to democracy was hailed as a hope and model for the “New continent” just like the arrival in power of some of the SI member parties in Europe. This demonstrated to Latin Americans that socialism could be effective and could reach the power. Furthermore, as Löwy claimed, since 1970s a worldwide “social-democratization” process started to be experienced, in which different countries undertook a social democratic path at the time or else social democracy established close links with parties with shared objectives. In this way, an international/transnational network of social democratic parties was constructed all over the world.³⁰³

³⁰² Schori, *Escila Caribdis*.

³⁰³ See: Löwy, “Trayectoria de la Internacional Socialista”, 36-45.

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The “SI offensive” in Latin America and in the world in general was translated into missions, conferences, study groups, etc. With this regard, the SI worked in the following manner:

- (i) Through Party Leader Conferences, i.e. meetings between the leaders of the SI member parties and the SI bureau in order to discuss political matters and to coordinate joint actions. These conferences were normally held every two years.
- (ii) Regional committees, i.e. organizations that worked regionally in order to solve local problems, to foster a regional identity, and to promote a regional cooperation. By working with local parties and organizations, the SI aimed to be more present in every part of the world and to act more effectively. The regional organizations established were: EEC/EU, the SI Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Asian Pacific region, the Middle East Committee, the Committee for Eastern Europe, and the African organization.
- (iii) Working and study groups were the main instrument used by the SI for the development of its projects and goals. Each study group addressed a specific matter (e.g. human rights, disarmament, employment, etc.,) and drafted papers, reports, resolutions, and suggestions with the purpose of solving current problems. All of these writings were to become a guideline for the SI member parties since they looked to devise common actions.
- (iv) The SI organized and sent missions to specific areas in order to supervise, control, explore, and know about local situations firsthand. The participants of these missions elaborated reports and presented them to the SI bodies. On the basis of these documents, the SI tried to devise common action as well as to define and encourage a common policy.³⁰⁴

Indeed, in Latin America the SI employed such *modus operandi*. In fact, study groups were shaped, summits were held, missions were sent, and a regional committee was created. These points will be further deepened in the following sub-chapters.

³⁰⁴ Seidelmann, *The Socialist International*.

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3.4.1. Study groups

Latin America was a subject of interest for the SI Study Group for the Third World. Although under Brandt's presidency the SI materialized and fostered its action in developing countries, the interest in them started in the early 1970s. On November 13, 1971 the first meeting of the Study Group on Socialist Strategy for the Third World was held in London. In this meeting, José Francisco Peña, General Secretary of the Dominican Revolutionary Party, denounced U.S. interferences in the area. Since then, the study group suggested that Peña Gómez must receive support and that the issue must be discussed during the next SI bureau meeting. Therefore, the SI decided to establish another study group for the definition of the strategy in Latin America and in Africa. The Swedish socialists were responsible for conducting the studies on Latin America (Pierre Schori became the referent) and the British Labor Party on Africa. At the time, the SI had two Latin American full member parties (the Chilean Radical Party and the Argentine Socialist Party) and several observer members (i.e. Democratic Action and the People's Electoral Movement of Venezuela, the National Liberation Party of Costa Rica, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance [APRA] of Peru and the Febrerista Revolutionary Party of Paraguay).

Relevant for the increase of the SI interest in Latin America was the victory of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) in Chile. As a matter of fact, the SI General Secretary, Hans Janitschek, pointed out that Allende's government could be a tipping point for the continent since this could be a model for other countries. He underlined the need for the unity of the parties as an indispensable condition for their survival and for opposing imperialism and capitalism. He firmly stressed this point since the parties in Latin America were very heterogeneous. Therefore, Janitschek recognized the twofold value of the UP in Chile: the victory of socialism through the democratic path and the union of different parties with the aim of reaching socialist goals. As a result, the SI completely supported the UP government and

saw in this a possible solution for the future of the continent. According to him, the regional solution should be founded on the consolidation of socialism and democracy³⁰⁵.

Likewise, the General Secretary stressed the necessity of the SI to take a clear position on Latin America. The SI had to decide whether to be involved or step aside and he firmly voted for the first option. He justified his position by saying that the SI should intervene given the shifts in the region and the world in general, as well as the fact that Latin America was a region with “vast resources and tremendous potential” where socialism and democracy would be the solution for all its “social-economic and political conditions”³⁰⁶.

In addition to this, Janitschek underlined the fact that Latin America also wanted and needed a regional organization, and for this reason they sought to maintain a strong dialogue with Europe. Latin Americans considered these relationships the way “to regain economic independence and full political sovereignty and authority”. Thus, European parties had to review their links with Latin America because “there would not be many chances as good as this one”. Accordingly, the SI must act and “accept new members as full members from Latin America” the SI also should “support the socialist and democratic parties”, as well as to “establish a regional organization, independent but associated with the SI, granting it financial support”. Finally, he said, the SI should create a Secretariat in the region “to run the organization and maintain links with the SI”³⁰⁷. Therefore, the interest in Latin American started to grow since the early 1970s and the Chilean experience was the starting point and the catalyzer of this performance.

Thus, the relevancy that Chile gained in the SI led them to hold the following meeting of the Study Group for the Third World in Santiago. The meeting had to be organized together with the meeting of the SI Bureau (February 5-8, 1973). The goals of the study group relied on determining the organization in the Third World with which the SI could establish further links, and analyzing the economic, political, and social situation in this region with

³⁰⁵ Hans Janitschek, “Socialist Strategy for the Third World: Latin America” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

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the aim of preparing the SI policy in the continent.³⁰⁸ Although the meeting of the study group was cancelled in the end due to technical and financial reasons (it had to take place before the SI Bureau meeting), the issues that should have been addressed there were discussed at the Bureau meeting.

Accordingly, the Bureau meeting dealt with matters on Latin America, namely some of the problems that the continent experienced (e.g. development, dictatorships, relationships with the U.S., and the spread of multinational monopolies) and the relations with the SI as well as between Europe and Latin America. Likewise, it was the manner to express solidarity and completely support Allende's government. Representatives from both continents attended the meeting and the Chilean Radical Party covered 40% of the expenses³⁰⁹. It is important to note that it was the first time that a SI bureau meeting was held outside European borders. As a result, one can say: firstly, Chile and Latin America began to be a goal for the SI; secondly, several expectations regarding these relations thrived; and thirdly, as discussed later, Chile became a turning point for SI external policy since the Chilean experience led the SI to look towards these lands.

3.4.2 International Conferences

There were other initiatives that demonstrated the increasing awareness of Latin American's needs developed by the SI since the early 1970s. For instance, an international conference was scheduled in order to gain knowledge about the region and to establish new contacts with Latin American parties and organizations. Hence, the SI would be able to define a new policy towards this territory, to spread some of the social democratic guidelines as well as to strengthen its presence there, in particular after Allende's overthrow. The Conference's venue would be Jamaica, it was going to be held in 1974 and

³⁰⁸ The information is available in the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420.

³⁰⁹ "Proposals concerning meetings of Bureau an Socialist strategy study group in Chile on February, 5-8 1973". From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420.

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the topic would be the following: “Emancipation and Social Justice in Latin America and the Caribbean, what are the pre-requisites”.³¹⁰

The SI would contribute financially to the organization of the meeting because to them Latin American issues were a priority, even in relation to African and Asian matters. However, despite the good intentions of the SI and Pierre Schori’s advice concerning the European need to learn more about the region (he stressed that the varying situation in Latin American and the difficult relations between the U.S. and certain Latin American countries made this time the proper moment to intervene),³¹¹ the conference had to be postponed for technical reasons. A new date had to be arranged and the topic was redefined (“Prospects for progressive forces in Latin America and the Caribbean”).³¹² The seminar, however, was canceled several times. This issue led Pierre Schori to resign from his post as Chairman of the Study Group.³¹³ The Austrian Arne Haselbach became the new head of the group.

In spite of this impasse, the SI was very active and interested in increasing its knowledge on the region. In fact, since the creation of the Study Group for Latin America, the body met several times (some of the venues were London, Rome, Vienna, and Brussels).³¹⁴ Additionally, the SI acted by requesting regular reports from many regional or expert leaders in order to learn more about the territory as well as to prepare all the missions and activities to be held there. For instance, José Francisco Peña, leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party, had to report back about Puerto Rico while Robert Pontillon from the French Socialist Party about French Guiana, Dutch Harry Van Bergh on Surinam and

³¹⁰ Letter from Rodney Balcomb (Assistant SI General Secretary) to Michael Manley (November 16, 1973). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420.

³¹¹ Pierre Schori, “Socialist Strategy in Latin America. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420.

³¹² SI Circular N. Y/3/1975 “Seminar planned to take place in Latin American-Caribbean region (October 10, 1975) From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420

³¹³ Letter from Pierre Schori to Rodney Balcomb (Assistant SI General Secretary), (September 25 1975) From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420.

³¹⁴ For instance, the Study Group met ten times at the end of 1975.

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Netherlands Antilles, and Costa Rican Oscar Arias about Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, and El Salvador.³¹⁵

Therefore, the SI interest in the region was remarkable and they really sought to enhance their presence there. As said, Chile became the starting point by calling the attention of SI in two ways: first with Allende's government and later with his overthrow. The membership of the Chilean Radical Party displayed a significant role due to its encouragement of the rapprochement. It is worth stressing that the Radical Party was one of the first parties to become a full SI member and for this reason it played a leading role. The relevancy of Chile was demonstrated by the decision to hold the Bureau meeting in this country in 1973 and by the involvement of the Radical Party in the study group. However, it should also be recognized that the SI at the time had certain weaknesses and limitations. This was clearly demonstrated by the rescheduling of the Seminar and the initial cancellation of the study group meeting in Chile (in the end, this was carried out together with the SI bureau). The SI global action and the SI Latin American policy were better defined and launched since the SI Geneva Congress in 1976 when Brandt was formally nominated president of the organization. In Geneva, Brandt announced his main objectives: peace, human rights, and new North-South relationships³¹⁶.

Within this framework, the SI finally decided to organize a regional seminar aimed at defining the strategies for the establishment of a social democracy in Latin America, to increase close ties among the participants, to foster the exchange of information, and to ensure mutual assistance. On April 4-9 1976, the first meeting was held in Costa Rica. The Ebert Foundation, CEDAL, ILDIS, and the Costa Rican National Liberation Party organized the conference. The attendees were some of the Latin American "social democratic" parties and the German SPD. Reports concerning the local situation were presented and they pointed "to achieving a regional formula to be applied in a global policy". Accordingly, organizations such as the FES, CEDAL, and ILDIS with the support of the German SPD pushed towards the establishment of a regional union. This was seen as

³¹⁵ The requests of the SI for regular reports to many experts or leaders, it is available in the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420.

³¹⁶ Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda*, 2076.

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the most effective way to ensure social democratic deployment in the area³¹⁷ as well as to strengthen the nexus between both sides of Atlantic. Therefore, the strategy launched in the area was twofold. This meant that they must work from the inside (regionally) but they should also be accountable to the SI. In this way, the “local” was intertwined with the “global” and the SI was becoming able to develop its purposes.

Besides the formal encounters, most of the contacts between the Latin Americans and the Europeans occurred off the records. Hence, the intentions and projects devised in some informal meetings and seminars led the Venezuelan Carlos Andrés Pérez and Willy Brandt to organize a conference where “socialist” representatives from both sides of the Atlantic would be encountered³¹⁸. In this conference, Latin American and European leaders would meet in order to formalize their connections, to refine common projects, and to work towards the same socialist goals. Caracas was indicated as the venue of the conference, which was arranged on May 23-25, 1976.³¹⁹

This conference represented the first real step in the Latin American social democratic path. From then on, social democracy began to increase its active presence on the continent and Caracas became the symbol of the SI global policy³²⁰. This was a high-profile meeting that for the first time counted with the participation of Latin American and European parties, including Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky, Mario Soares, Felipe González, Bettino Craxi, Michael Rocard, Aniceto Rodríguez (Chilean PS), Anselmo Sule (Chilean Radical Party), Haya de La Torre (APRA), Carlos Andrés Pérez (Venezuelan Democratic Action), Muñoz

³¹⁷ “Convocation. Seminar held in the Campus of Cedal, Santa Barbara de Heredia, Costa Rica from April 4 to 19, 1976”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 420.

³¹⁸ For Pérez, “it seemed almost impossible that there had been no dialogue between the socialist of the two continents until then”. Paolo Soldini, “Brandt propose una moratoria del debito estero”. *L’Unità*, (20/07/1986). Retrieved from <https://archivio.unita.news/issue/1986/07/20>

³¹⁹ Fernando Pedrosa, “Redes transnacionales y partidos políticos. La Internacional Socialista en América Latina (1959-1991), *Iberoamericana*, XIII, 49, (2013): 36.

³²⁰ “Da Caracas una nuova dimensione per la Internazionale Socialista”, *Avanti!*, (27/05/1976). Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D/-D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19760527.80-124_0001_d.pdf#page=1

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Ledo (Mexican PRI), and Dudley Thompson (Jamaican PNC)³²¹. The main topic was *Reunión de dirigentes políticos de Europa y América en pro de la solidaridad internacional* (*Meeting of political leaders from Europe and America for international solidarity*); therefore, all the interventions, including the final declaration, focused on topics such as democracy, equality, freedom, and international solidarity³²².

It is interesting to note that this conference aimed to foster the dialogue between leaders rather than political parties because there were no real socialist parties in Latin America. As a result, the discussion was opened to all the forces that aspired for social justice. Although this was an informal meeting, it was highly symbolic and thus marked the starting point of the joint project.³²³ Furthermore, the meeting entailed the consolidation of the existing relationships between leaders from both continents and the establishment of new personal links. Likewise, greater European awareness regarding Latin America increased and it was even publicized, leading Europeans to imagine common projects in the “New Continent”. It is also interesting to note that Carlos Andrés Pérez stated that Latin America could work as a bridge between Europe and the developing countries. Indeed, according to him, Latin America was the appropriate interlocutor in this reciprocal dialogue.³²⁴ Moreover, Pérez sought to emphasize the contribution that this region could provide to European socialism in its attempt to overcome Eurocentrism.

³²¹ François Mitterrand did not attend the meeting. According to Daniel Waksman Schinca, expert of the SI at that time, Mitterrand and Brandt during the socialist meeting held in Denmark in January 1976 had a serious disagreement because of their position regarding Communism (Brandt was anticommunist and Mitterrand sought a sort of alliance with the communist party). This disagreement possibly entailed the non-participation of the French socialist to the Summit of Caracas. However, Mitterrand visited Latin America (Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela) inside the SI frame the following year (January 28- February 2, 1977). Daniel Waksman Schinca, “Mitterrand, La Internacional Socialista y América Latina, *El Día*, México, 7/02/1977). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1129.

³²² Anónimo, “Reunión de Dirigentes políticos de Europa y América en pro de la solidaridad Democrática Internacional”, *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 24, May-June 1976, 67-69 The Jamaican Foreign Minister, Dudley Thompson, started his speech with the following statement: “I am glad that Western Social democrats have been finally discovered Latin America. But above all else, I am delighted that this discovery was not made through New York.” Dudley Thompson, “¿Una última oportunidad al socialismo democrático?, *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 24, May-June 1976, 19-22.

³²³ Löwy, “Trayectoria”, 7.

³²⁴ “Socialdemocratici: polemico l’incontro degli Europei e dei Sudamericani” *Corriere della Sera* (25/05/1976).

Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/slider.html#!Caracas/23-05-1976/26-05-1976/NobwRADghgtgpmAXGAJIALIMAAmAZAJwHsYkwAmAZgHoAGAVmoEYBOAdgDYcx0izyOdRq05gAvtnDR4ZANZwAngHciBFN3RwAHujIBhKASgBjKAGdxAXSA>

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Likewise, at the Caracas meeting, the attendees denounced both the American support towards the Latin American dictatorships as well as the power of the American multinationals in the region. Accordingly, the quest for a new economic order was devised that implied a fairer relationship between industrialized countries and producing ones. Moreover, the participation of prominent European leaders demonstrated their understanding of the importance of the conference.³²⁵ This led them to develop an agreement in which they looked for the inclusion of all the Latin American parties as well as for the definition of a new policy in this territory. With this in mind, they decided to transform the former Chilean committee, which was established because of the military coup, into a Latin American committee.³²⁶

The Congress of Geneva formally launched the SI policy towards Latin America. Since then, Latin America assumed an increasing weight in the SI aims and in democratic socialism in general. In fact, at the Congress, the following was stated: Latin American dictatorships must be condemned due to their destruction of “political and cultural freedoms”; thus, the SI should contemplate economic sanctions since “they are dependent on foreign trade and therefore sensitive to any measures taken against them by their trading partners”. In addition to this, the SI was aware of the potential power that it should exert in order to be able to influence American policy in the region. They should persuade the U.S. to review its policies towards authoritarian regimes and multinational companies. Furthermore, the SI claimed its intention to implement some measures in order to help Latin Americans financially and socially. With this policy, the SI aimed to redistribute wealth, to overcome poverty, and to warrant basic human rights.³²⁷ Likewise, the designation of some Latin Americans as SI Vice-presidents revealed the new status of the

³²⁵“Socialismo e Terzo Mondo” *Avanti!*, (25/05/1976).

Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19760525.80-122_0001_d.pdf#page=6

³²⁶ Antoine Blanca “The Socialist International and Latin America.” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1125.

³²⁷ “Resolutions of the Geneva Congress: Latin America”, *Socialist Affairs (Jan-Feb. 1977)*. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 23.

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region inside the SI (e.g. the Costa Rican Daniel Oduber, the Chilean Anselmo Sule, the Jamaican Michael Manley, and the Venezuelan Gonzalo Barrios).³²⁸

Along the same line of the Caracas conference, some European leaders (e.g. Brandt, González, Soares, Craxi, and Kreisky) met again in Lisbon on September 30-October 3, 1978 (for many observers the Lisbon meeting was the continuation of the Caracas one)³²⁹. The main topic was: *Procesos de democratización de la Península Ibérica y América Latina (Process of Democratization in the Iberian Peninsula and in Latin America)*. As a result, this led to devising a mechanism whereby the construction of a democratic system could take place in Ibero-American countries. Although the number of participants was lower than the Caracas conference, thirty-three parties from Latin America, Europe and Africa attended the meeting.

Lisbon constituted the continuation of the Caracas encounter because it aimed to define common strategies for the democratic transition in the Iberian Peninsula and in Latin America and to devise a common policy against colonialism, fascism, and imperialism; They also fought on behalf of freedom with the purpose of overcoming all the systems that hid their real authoritarian character (i.e. the “limited democracy”). This launched a democratic process in Latin America and ensured support for the political exiles and all the Latin American refugees. This meeting was the first official appointment between Latin Americans and Europeans on European soil (while Caracas was the venue of the first official meeting in the New World, as previously mentioned).

Similarly, the democratic transition of the Iberian countries became a necessary condition for the viability of the rapprochement between Europe and Latin America as it was indispensable for the establishment of democracy and a source of inspiration for Latin

³²⁸ Morales Abarzua, *La Internacional Socialista*, 11-12.

³²⁹ “Declaración de Lisboa”, From the Archive: *Fundación Pablo Iglesias*. Alcalá de Henares, España. The delegation of the PSI included: Bettino Craxi, Gianni De Michelis, Michelle Achilli, Nerio Nesi and Francesco Gozzano. “L’internazionale Socialista riunita oggi a Lisbona”, *Avanti!* (30/09/1978) Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19780930.82-233_0001_d.pdf#page=12

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American. Moreover, during the Lisbon meeting, the participants claimed their support for the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua and their rejection of the Somoza dictatorship (*Nicaraguan Declaration*). Since then, the situation of the country started to become a central issue on the SI global agenda.³³⁰ Nicaragua, therefore, became an emblem of the pains of Latin American (the Latin American people, being aware of the European concern about Nicaragua, often appealed to the situation of this country in order to request interventions and assistance for the entire continent) and a matter that unified the socialist projects in the region (they projected themselves as a “Third way”). The European representatives understood the distress and the clear request that Latin Americans made for democracy, and they realized that there were an urgent need to carry out concrete actions in these territories. In this regard, Willy Brandt stressed the relevancy of the North-South dialogue, and therefore the fact that Latin America and Europe should intensify this discourse since, according to him, it was the instrument that would ensure the establishment of a concrete collaboration between them and would secure freedom.³³¹

In addition to the *Nicaraguan Declaration*, the Conference also approved the *Lisbon Declaration*. This affirmed the full commitment of all the parties and SI organizations to the Latin American democratic process. The *Lisbon declaration* had to be adopted the same year of the XIV Congress of the SI (i.e. the SI Congress in Vancouver). Likewise, a new meeting was scheduled to be held in Mexico on April 9-12, 1979, on the occasion of the 116th anniversary of the Chilean Radical Party. All the SI Vice-presidents for Latin America and the Caribbean, including Bernt Carlsson, Felipe González, and Mario Soares attended the reunion. The *Declaration of Mexico* was the result of this last encounter, which rectified the agreement achieved at the Conference of Caracas, the meeting of Lisbon and the Vancouver Congress. Matters such as solidarity, pluralism, democracy, the overcoming

³³⁰ Ibid. 150-154.

³³¹ “L’impegno dei socialisti per l’America del Sud”, *Avanti!* (1-2/10/1978). Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19781001.82-234_0001_d.pdf#page=1

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of the North-South divisions, human rights, and development of a New Economic Order remained at the heart of their objectives.³³²

3.4.3. Missions

As mentioned, part of the SI strategy in Latin America was carried out throughout the dispatch of missions. These missions (headed by important European socialist leaders such as Mario Soares, Felipe González, Bruno Kreisky, and Olof Palme) aimed to check the local situation and sometimes to pressure the national authorities to respect human rights and to enhance the openness of democracy. Often the SI's missions were sent during the local elections in order to ensure electoral transparency. In this way, the SI intervened directly in Latin American politics.³³³ Among the most relevant missions one led by Felipe González in South America.

After the Geneva Congress (when Spanish was introduced as an SI official language), some SI bureau meetings were held in London (March 1977), in Rome (June 1977), and Madrid (October 1977) where the SI leadership stressed the relevancy of the SI mission in Latin America. They justified this policy by arguing that this was the second region (after Europe) in terms of SI member parties³³⁴. The Portuguese Soares headed the first mission, which was initially scheduled in October 1977. However, due to important commitments in Portugal as head of government, Soares had to postpone their date of travel. Eventually, the mission took place throughout March 1978 and the SI representatives visited Mexico,

³³² “View from Portugal” *Socialist Affairs (Sept.-Oct 1979)*. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 23.

³³³ Fernando Pedrosa, “Redes transnacionales y partidos políticos. La Internacional Socialista en América Latina (1959-1991), *Iberoamericana*, XIII, 49, (2013): 38.

³³⁴ At the time, the following Latin American parties were affiliated to the SI: the National Liberation Party (Costa Rica), People's National Party (Jamaica), Dominican Revolutionary Party (Dominican Republic), Radical Party (Chile), Popular Socialist Party (Argentina), Revolutionary Febrerista Party (Paraguay), Democratic Action (Venezuela), People's Electoral Movement (Venezuela), National Revolutionary Movement (El Salvador), Labor Party (Barbados). The last two parties should be accepted during the Vancouver Congress. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1127.

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Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Venezuela.³³⁵ The main goals of this assignment relied on overcoming the SI Eurocentric character, learning about the Latin American situation in order to be able to face the problems of the developing countries *vis-à-vis* the developed ones in the future, strengthening the SI contacts in the region, and expressing their solidarity. The costs of the mission amounted to £47,436 pounds sterling.

In Mexico, the SI delegation met on March 16 with the Mexican President and a group of exiles from Bolivia, Chile, and Peru since Mexico played a key role in receiving political refugees and displaced persons. Likewise, they established contacts with the representatives from El Salvador and Nicaragua. In the SI conclusive report, the participants stressed that the visit has been useful for reaffirming the significance of democratic socialism in Latin America.

On March 17, they arrived to the Dominican Republic by the invitation of the Dominican Revolutionary Party. In spite of this, the President Joaquín Balaguer (from the right-wing party Social Christian Reformist Party) was who received the SI delegation. Indeed, a private meeting between Soares, Carlsson, and Balaguer was scheduled in order to stress the SI concern regarding the upcoming elections. The SI representatives asked for free and fair elections and stated that future elections would be monitored. In this regard, the SI kept its promises. In fact, the pressures exerted by the SI in the country were useful to ensure transparent political elections after the risk of electoral fraud and the possible coup d'état.

On March 20, they met in Jamaica where Michael Manley received the SI representatives. Matters such as the links with the SI, the North-South dialogue, and the new economic order were approached. Manley justified his passivity in the SI by placing the blame on the Eurocentric character that the SI had maintained until then. However, on this occasion, he recognized the new steps forwards carried out by this organization and he became

³³⁵ Mission participants. From the SI: Mario Soares (leader of the mission) and Bernt Carlsson; from the PSI Enrica Lucarelli; from the SI Secretariat: Hector Oqueli; from the Federal Republic of Germany: Volkmar Gabert, Klaus Lindenberg; from Spain: Celestino del Arenal (Secretary of the Mission); from the USA: Larry Birns who only visited Costa Rica and Venezuela; from Finland: Kaj Laxen; from France: Yves Lebas; from Norway: Torvald Stoltenberg; from Portugal: Rui Mateus; from Senegal: Obeye Diop.

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convinced that the SI really could be an alternative inside the bipolar scheme. Likewise, he suggested naming Carlos Andrés Pérez as spokesman of the new economic order and underlined the good work performed by both the SELA and the Non-Aligned Movement in overcoming colonialism.

On March 21, the delegation arrived in Costa Rica where they met with President Oduber and visited CEDAL. Lastly, Venezuela received the SI committee on March 22. In Caracas, they met with some members of the Government cabinet, the ex-president Betancour, and a group of exiles from other countries (in particular, Chileans). The entire SI mission had been carried out in the Venezuelan presidential plane which had been offered by Carlos Andrés Pérez. The final outcome was very good indeed. They had the opportunity to learn about the Latin American situation firsthand and to meet and dialogue with members from other territories, although they had only visited five countries. Most importantly, they concluded that a favorable feeling towards the SI existed in the region, therefore enabling the establishment of democratic socialism.³³⁶

Likewise, the delegacy provided the following final recommendations: (i) to give greater attention to Latin America; (ii) to make further missions in the continent; (iii) to launch new initiatives; (iv) to be more receptive to Latin American problems (inequality, economic issues, dictatorships, and multinationals); (v) to increasingly support the Latin American members of the SI; and (vi) to study the possibility of establishing a Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean as well as an center for information and propaganda in order to spread the SI guidelines and to organize seminars, meetings, etc.³³⁷

In August 1979, a new SI mission headed by Soares was sent to Nicaragua. During this trip, the SI delegates visited the prisons where Somoza detained his political opponents and met with the Sandinista leaders. As usual, after the mission the head of the delegacy drew up a report. In this record, he described the Nicaraguan situation prior to the Sandinista

³³⁶ “Informe de la misión de la Internacional Socialista a América Latina”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1125.

³³⁷ “Caracteres y objetivos de la misión”, From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1127.

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revolution and underlined the propaganda-offensive launched against the FSLN government. In this regard, without referring to specific movements, the final document suggested the involvement of right-wing forces, in particular from the U.S., in the campaign against the Sandinistas. Within this context, the SI was called to assist the Nicaraguan people and to commit to the country's reconstruction by promoting democracy, equality, and respect for human rights. Thus, according to them, the SI really could play a pivotal role in this area. In this regard, the following recommendations were issued:

(i) "The SI and its member parties should express their support for the new Government of Nicaragua; [...] (ii) they should build bilateral relations with the FSLN; [...] (iii) they should reject any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Nicaragua; [...] (iv) the Social Democratic parties, and their governments, should give emergency aid, bilateral development aid as gifts and favorable loans to Nicaragua. In particular support should be given to the development of fishery, agriculture, construction industry, education and health care sectors. This should be done in bilateral development aid and as multilateral aid, including via the framework of the United Nations. The SI parties should organize solidarity campaigns to counterbalance campaigns of Somoza supporters; [...] (v) the international financial institutions should renegotiate Nicaragua's loans; [...] (vi) Somoza should be brought to Nicaragua to face the trial; (vi) the SI should show solidarity to its fraternal parties in the region"³³⁸.

According to Pentti Väänänen, even if it was not made clear in the report, one of the main goals of the SI was to keep Nicaragua out of the East-West conflict. This report became the basis of the SI action and behavior towards Nicaragua³³⁹.

Around the same time, the SI organized another mission to be held in South America, in particular in the Southern Cone (Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina), under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez.³⁴⁰ The decision was made during the SI Bureau meeting

³³⁸ Väänänen, *The Rose*, 91-92.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ The delegation should be formed by: i) Felipe González (leader of the mission) and Bernt Carlsson from the SI; ii) Hector Oqueli from El Salvador; iii) Volkmar Gabert and Klaus Lindenberg from the Federal Republic of Germany; iv) Jean-Pierre Cot from France; v) Maarten van Traa from the Netherlands; vi) Thorvald Stoltenberg from Norway; vii) Bernardino Gomes from Portugal; viii) Luis Yáñez and Yana Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

held in Estoril, Portugal on October 30-31, 1979. The mission was supposed to be carried out from November 23 until December 2, 1979, but did not take place since the Chilean and Uruguayan governments prohibited the entry of the delegation.³⁴¹ However, the SI assumed the failure of the planned mission in two ways. On one hand, it was a demonstration of the “growing influence the Socialist International had in Latin America”³⁴². On the other hand, they regretted not having been able to fulfill the mission’s goals, including knowing firsthand the situation of the Southern Cone and assessing it; supporting its sister parties and all the organization that struggled for democracy in the region³⁴³; promoting civil and human rights in those countries; and establishing new contacts there³⁴⁴.

Nevertheless, the refusal on the part of these authoritarian governments was not surprising. Indeed, the SI bureau had considered beforehand the possible scenarios that they could find in each of these countries. Hence, they devised three kinds of intervention strategies: (i) a high profile strategy that included all the political forces and organizations and should be advertised, even though they were aware that a public and declared performance could jeopardize the mission; (ii) a low profile action that implied little activism and publicity in

Navarro from Spain; ix) Hans Goeran Franck from Sweden; x) Vera Matthias from the Socialist International Women; xi) Oscar Britez from the International Union of Socialist Youth.

³⁴¹ The SI was aware about the difficulties to carry out a mission in Chile because of the authoritarian regime. Indeed, on November 16, 1979, Carlsson sent a telex to Anselmo Sule (from the Chilean Radical Party) in which he informed the latter that the SI delegation would not be able to enter Chile. Accordingly, Carlsson said that “decision [was] to attempt to arrive in spite of news, and therefore, he asked Sule to inform [his] contacts to try to arrange press conference at Santiago Airport”. “Telex from Bernt Carlsson to Anselmo Sule. November 16, 1979”, From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1066. As a matter of fact, meetings in the Santiago’s airport between the SI members and the Chilean opposition occurred more than once. Pentti Väänänen by referring to a mission in South America together with Willy Brandt in Autumn 1984, sated: “Our visit to Chile was short but memorable. Legally we did not enter Chile at all [...] we remained at the airport. We did not go through immigration where we would have presented our passports to Chilean authorities, Legally we were in transit to our next destination and spent time in Santiago airport’s VIP room. [...] All the important leaders [...] came to the airport VIP room to see us and we attended an important meeting of the Alianza as guests of honor”. Väänänen, *The Rose*, 106.

³⁴² “SI release” (13 January 1980), From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1128

³⁴³ In Chile, for instance, they planned to meet official members (i.e. The head of the Air Force, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, the Justice Minister, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Cardinal Raul Silva Enriquez) and non-official member, namely, clandestine groups (i.e. Radical Party, Socialist Party, Popular Unity, Christian Democracy, the coordinator of the trade unions and the Vicariate of Solidarity). “Misión de la Internacional Socialista al Cono Sur, 23 noviembre-2 diciembre 1979”, PSOE, From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1128

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

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order to obtain as much information as possible; (iii) the combination of both profiles, namely to use a high profile in Paraguay and a low profile in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina.³⁴⁵

The Chilean rejection of the SI delegation entry into the country was justified due to the following reasons. Firstly, the Chilean Minister for Internal Affairs, Sergio Fernandez, argued on November 15, 1979 that the country would not allow the entry of the SI representatives since their real intention was to investigate the political evolution of the country. Furthermore, he added that Santiago would not accept that a delegation of parties would carry out an inquiry since Chile was a sovereign state. Fernandez also justified the Chilean position by alluding to the Brandt declaration issued at Rotterdam (August 1977)³⁴⁶. He referred to the fact that Brandt argued in that occasion that the SI should make maximum efforts to overthrow the Chilean government. Hence, the Minister for the Internal Affairs alleged that the SI sought a specific political goal rather than an objective inquiry in the country as it had asserted.³⁴⁷

As a matter of fact, the Chilean regime considered the SI as an enemy and it did not hesitate to express its position publicly. An article published in the Chilean newspaper *El Mercurio* on November 25, 1979 illustrated the government's position. For instance, the SI reference to the "Chilean road to socialism" was disproved, which was indicated by the SI as an important source of inspiration. Likewise, the idea that both the SI and the Chilean Radical Party (an SI full member) had close ties to the Soviet Union was diffused. Moreover, Bettino Craxi was blamed for holding the meeting of the SI bureau in Rome in 1977, in particular because there the SI took more concrete positions against the Chilean government and reiterated its support to all the initiatives aimed at establishing an alternative government. Additionally, the SI projects, such as the Solidarity Conference for

³⁴⁵ "Socialist International Mission to South America November 23-December 2, 1979 (November 14, 1979) From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1128

³⁴⁶ The Institute for the New Chile was founded in Rotterdam in 1977 with the aim of stimulating the study of the Chilean situation, disseminating information and maintaining the contacts among all the Chilean opposition. They founded the magazine *Plural* and organized meetings, international conferences in order to discuss about the Chilean and Latin American situation. The Dutch Labor Party supported the Institute.

³⁴⁷ "Telex Chile prohíbe el ingreso de la comisión de la Internacional socialista" November 22, 1979. From SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1128.

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Chile held in Rotterdam on August 29-31, 1977 and the Chilean Committee, were interpreted as mechanisms of international pressure linked to Soviet Communism. Similarly, the position assumed by Felipe González in defense of human rights was criticized because it was considered to be a hoax that actually concealed his real motives, which were political objectives. This aspect was at the core of the SI missions because the SI delegates looked for contacts in the country in order to overthrow the government and therefore were not driven by humanitarian goals³⁴⁸.

Accordingly, the Chilean government justified its rejection of the SI into the country. It argued that the SI had an “imperialistic” intention since they intended to interfere in local matters and Santiago accused the SI of having “strong ties” with the Soviet Union. In this way, the Chilean administration explained to the public why the SI was unwelcome there.

At this point, it may be worth noting some of the Soviet opinions on the SI and its actions in Latin America through the views of some Soviet scholars. With this in mind, the Soviet review in Spanish *América Latina*, which was published in Moscow by the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union (USSR), became a valuable source of information since it devotes at least two volumes to this issue by including opinions from Soviet scholars regarding the SI performance³⁴⁹. For instance, some of them believed that the European social democracy was actually an expression of imperialism, namely the “Trojan Horse” of the Western imperialism in Latin America.

For others, the social democratic parties were instead Labor parties and therefore they often alluded to opportunistic right wing and anti-communist views. According to this perspective, social democratic parties had contradictory positions in terms of policy and ideology, which is why they also referred to anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist postures. As

³⁴⁸ Juraj Domic K. “La IS y Chile”, *EL Mercurio*, 25/11/1979. From The SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1128.

³⁴⁹ Academia de la Ciencia de la URSS, Inessa Danilevich et. al., “La socialdemocracia internacional y América Latina” In *América Latina*, edited by Academia de Ciencias de la URSS, Instituto América Latina (Moscow: Editorial Progreso, 1978), n.3, 51-74. Academia de la Ciencia de la URSS, Vladimir Shveitser, et al., “La socialdemocracia internacional y América Latina” In *América Latina*, edited by Academia de Ciencias de la URSS, Instituto América Latina (Moscow: Editorial Progreso, 1978), n. 4, 88-125.

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a result, the SI performance in Latin America could lead towards two contradictory conditions. Firstly, there was the growth of the Latin American labor party, trade unions, and democratic forces. This, therefore, could be useful in the struggle against fascism. Secondly, social democracy could contribute to the rise of the right-wing tendencies in the Latin American workers movements. This, by fostering anti-communist prejudices, would damage the revolutionary struggle and hence all the Latin American communist forces and organizations. Accordingly, the revolutionary movements should try to establish a dialogue with the social democratic parties in order to take joint action in the region, to eliminate communist preconditions, but, above all, to avoid social democracy from assuming an increasingly right-wing criteria. The main objective should be to create a leftist united-front³⁵⁰.

To other Soviet scholars, the European social democracy acted selfishly in Latin America because it looked for strategies in order to solve its own economic and social problems³⁵¹. Therefore, albeit the Soviet positions were varied, one can conclude that the USSR viewed the SI presence in Latin America with some skepticism. Some of these scholars were more optimistic; others, conversely, warned about potential risks that the SI policy could entail in the worldwide bipolar balance.

Taking up the issue of the SI missions, besides the formal trips³⁵², the SI also acted throughout the dispatch of SI observers during some of the Latin American elections. In addition to the Dominican election, as referred to above, the SI attended the straw polls in Guatemala (March 1978), Bolivia (July 1978), and Panama (August 1978). Even if in these three last cases no SI member party won the elections, the International fulfilled its mission

³⁵⁰ Nikolai Sibiliov. "Discusiones y criterios. La socialdemocracia internacional y América Latina" In *América Latina* n. 4, 132-134.

³⁵¹ Inessa Danilevich, "La socialdemocracia internacional y América Latina" In *América Latina*, n.3, 56.

³⁵² In addition to those mentioned above, further SI trips were carried out in Latin America during the 1980s. For instance, the SI mission headed by Carlsson and Edward Broadbent at the end of May 1981. In that occasion, the SI delegation visited Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Cuba. The main issue addressed by the SI deputation was the delicate situation in El Salvador. Likewise, it is possible to recall the SI mission in Paraguay in February 5-6, 1987 or that one in Chile in July 1988, to mention just a few of them.

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since it was able to monitor the situation in these countries and it was viewed as a symbol of democracy in doing so³⁵³.

Likewise, the SI did seize any opportunity to visit Latin America. For instance, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) foundation in Mexico on March 2-18, 1979, the SI organized a mission to visit all the SI member parties in Central America and the Caribbean. Their goals relied on:

“Hearing from the member parties their opinions on the internal political process in those countries and the prospects for democratic socialism there. To hear from the member parties, the opinions on the SI work. To discuss the affiliation fees. To discuss with the member parties the idea on the regional organization for the Americas: their opinion on a Committee versus Regional Organization, possible officers, possible countries for the headquarters, boundaries of such regional organization”³⁵⁴.

In Mexico, the SI deputation expected to meet the representatives from the Chilean Radical party, the Sandinistas in Costa Rica, as well as from other organizations, e.g. the Ebert Foundation, CEDAL, ILDIS, and Nueva Sociedad³⁵⁵. Therefore, the SI missions were not only aimed at spreading the SI guidelines, establishing new contacts, ensuring free elections, or gaining working knowledge on the region, but the SI was also interested in understanding how Latin Americans saw its performance and their feelings, perceptions and opinions about it.

3.4.4. Regional Committee and Regional Conferences

During the SI Bureau meeting in Dakar (on May 12-13, 1978), the “issue” of “Latin America” was discussed. Besides underlying the need to increase the SI presence in the

³⁵³ “General Secretary’s Report” *Socialist Affairs* (Jan. -Feb. 1979). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, 12-13, box 23.

³⁵⁴ “Visit to Central America and the Caribbean” (14/02/1979). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1129

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

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area (because of the critical situation in Latin America) through missions, conferences, taking a clear position against dictatorship, and demonstrating greater understanding of the economic and political problems in the region (these suggestions were mainly addressed to the member parties that were in power at the time), the SI bureau re-launched the proposal to create a Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean (SICLAC)³⁵⁶. This proposal was unanimously accepted during the SI Bureau meeting held in Estoril (Lisbon) on October 30-31, 1979. The main objectives of such Committee were:

“To carry out a permanent study of the Latin American situation, to strengthened solidarity with the democratic liberation movements of the area, to promote the consensus for a socialist and democratic alternative in the region and in general to carry out in common agreement with the General Secretariat all activities resulting from resolutions adopted by the Socialist International with regard to the area”³⁵⁷.

Although the SI President and the SI general Secretary were members of the Committee, a local chairman was appointed (José Francisco Peña from the Democratic Republic), as well as an Executive Secretary (Hector Oquelí from El Salvador) and some regional SI Vice-presidents (e.g. Gonzálo Barrios and Carlos Andrés Pérez from Venezuela, Michael Manley from Jamaica, Daniel Oduber and Luis Alberto Monge from Costa Rica and Anselmo Sule from Chile). Likewise, a managing team formed by important Latin American leaders was also created, and the Dominican Republic was chosen as the seat of the Committee. Hence, the SI really looked to establish a strong and influential body in the region. In addition, the European SI member parties were urged to participate actively in all the regional activities.³⁵⁸ The FES, for its part, became a key piece for technical, organizational, and even financial matters since it largely financed the SICLAC labors.

³⁵⁶ The idea of creating a Regional Committee came up during the SI Bureau meeting at Madrid in 1977. “Bureau Meeting in Dakar 12-13, 1978”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1128.

³⁵⁷ “Proposal laid down before the Lisbon Bureau for the Integration of the Latin American Committee of the Socialist International” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1129.

³⁵⁸ “Proposal laid down before the Lisbon Bureau for the Integration of the Latin American Committee of the Socialist International” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1129.

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In this context, the first SI Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean (the first formal reunion in Latin America) was held on March 26-28, 1980 in Santo Domingo.³⁵⁹ A hundred and sixteen participants represented forty-two countries³⁶⁰. The main purpose was to discuss progress made in Latin America and the Caribbean and the SI strategy in the region. It was “an event of unique political importance [because] for the first time in the continent’s history authentic representatives of socialists, democratic and anti-imperialist parties and movements of Latin America, Europe and Africa have convened in this territory”. During the meeting, it was also stressed that “isolation and lack of communication” has hindered the establishment of a full relationships between Latin Americans and like-minded parties. Hence, with this encounter, remarkable progress was made in the field of integration and cooperation between the socialist parties.³⁶¹

Among the subjects discussed were: (i) policy perspectives for democratic socialism in the region; (ii) the Latin American economies and their relationship with the industrialized countries; (iii) democratization; (iv) the fight against the dictatorships in the Southern Cone; (v) the full commitment with the revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala³⁶²; (vi) women rights; (vii) the creation of a New Economic Order; (viii) the overcoming of the Cold War climate; (ix) the responsibility of developing alternatives to the superpower policies; and (x) the rejection of the US intervention in the regional affairs. In this regard, the SI radically blamed the US political and economic support for

³⁵⁹ Other meetings followed it: e.g.. Caracas (12-13 September 1980), Panamá (28 February- 1 March 1981), Grenada (24 July 1981). Matters as the rejection of the US influence, fight against imperialism, support to the Nicaraguan Revolution and El Salvador, were stated in all these meetings. According to Fernando Pedrosa, during the Caracas’ meeting, an altercation between Peña Gómez and the SI members occurred because the Dominican stated during a press conference the holding of a secret meeting between the SI and Fidel Castro in Nicaragua. This was an example of certain frictions and misunderstandings occurred between Peña Gómez and the SI bureau at the time because, in Pedrosa’s words, the former believed that since he was the President of the SICLAC he enjoyed certain autonomy vis-à-vis the SI, but it was not like that. Pedrosa, *La otra izquierda*, 5987.

³⁶⁰ Among the participants were: Willy Brandt, Mario Soares, Felipe González, François Mitterrand, Carlos Andrés Pérez, Anselmo Sule, José Francisco Peña, Daniel Oduber, Hector Ouelí. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1130.

³⁶¹ “Declaration of Santo Domingo”, From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1130.

³⁶² Morales Abarzúa, *La Internacional*, 219-220.

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authoritarian regimes that fueled armed violence and hampered the regional democratization.³⁶³

Furthermore, the Regional Conference was interpreted as “the beginning of an era of unity among anti-imperialist and socialist forces in Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia”,³⁶⁴ as well as “the first of its kind and marks further step in the direction of the creation of a truly global International”³⁶⁵. Thus, it was conceived as the starting point of a reciprocal collaboration between socialist parties from all over the world in the struggle for freedom and independence, which in turn were prerequisites for economic development.

This meeting was followed by another prominent SI appointment in the region. In 1986, the SI decided to hold a Congress in Latin America (the XVII SI Congress) for the first time in its history. Lima was chosen as the venue (June 20-23, 1986). The theme at the heart of this meeting was *Peace and economic solidarity* and issues such as peace, disarmament, economic development, ecological protection, and worldwide welfare were defined as the objectives to be followed in future. Hence, a close cooperation with the UN was emphasized and suggested.

Furthermore, the regional performance of the SI was assessed at the summit of Lima and it was declared that “democracy is today a reality in most of the countries of the region. The contribution made by the parties and governments of the Socialist International to the heroic struggle of the Latin American people have been decisive”³⁶⁶. It was also stressed that finding a solution to the Latin American debt crisis was a mandatory condition for the consolidation of its democracy. The Congress concluded with a final statement in which the SI, being aware of the differences between its members in terms of ideology, emphasized

³⁶³“Dalla conferenza socialista di Santo Domingo. Condannati gli aiuti USA ai militari in Salvador”. *Avanti!* (28/03/1980), http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20a%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19800328.84-72_0001_d.pdf#page=7

³⁶⁴ “Declaration of Santo Domingo”, 11

³⁶⁵ Letter from Bernt Carlsson to Antonio Guzmán, President Dominican Republic. (May 26, 1980) From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1130.

³⁶⁶ Socialist International, *XVII Congreso, 20-23 Junio 1986, Peru*, 32 Retrieved from <http://www.socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=79>

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its pluralistic character since “there is no one model for socialism, but there are basic values and fundamental conceptions of political, economic and social rights which are common to all the parties in the International”.³⁶⁷ Accordingly, the SI justified the differences between its members as well as its global performance since any party could take part in the organization as long as they shared some basic principles.

Turning to another issue, it is worth pointing out that the SI contributed to increasing Latin American awareness on regional matters and to establishing a connection between the SI member parties in the continent. Within this context, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) from Mexico instituted the *Conferencia Permanente de Partidos Políticos de América Latina* (COPPPAL) in 1979, namely a Latin American platform aimed at combating imperialism by encouraging regional democratization to establish a more effective coordination between Latin American parties and to define a joint action.³⁶⁸

The first meeting was held in Mexico on October 10-12, 1979 and the *Declaración de Oaxaca (Declaration of Oaxaca)* formalized the foundation of COPPPAL. In this document, the attendees committed themselves to the struggle against external intervention and the elimination persistent inequalities; they also agreed that a common action would be the only way to halt imperialism³⁶⁹. Many of the parties that joined this initiative were part of the SI or were observers in the SI Congress. However, although COPPPAL and the SI tried to maintain a fraternal relationship (e.g. representatives of COPPPAL attended the SI congress and vice versa), the PRI really sought to promote this initiative in order to balance the performance of the SI in the region. That said, the Mexican party intended to reach a leading role in the continent.

Consequently, this behavior of the PRI somehow demonstrated the increasing influence achieved by the SI in Latin America at the time. According to Wolf Grabendorff, although

³⁶⁷ Ibid. 35.

³⁶⁸ At the time, the PRI was a SI Observer from non-member parties. Similarly, COPPPAL became a SI Observer from non-member organizations. Some years later, during the SI Congress in Lima (1986), the PRI attended the meeting as Guest Party and not anymore as Observer party.

³⁶⁹ “Reunión de Partidos Latinoamericanos”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1129

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COPPPAL and the SI had a friendly relationship, both organizations sought to gain influence in the region. He also argued that the foundation of SICLAC (one year after COOPPAL's creation) should be viewed as the response to pressures for regional representation that Latin American members of the SI exerted within COPPPAL.³⁷⁰ Latin Americans understood that this group could provide them with stronger bargaining power inside the SI; in fact, it was within this context that the creation of the Latin American Committee was promoted. Therefore, the SI encouraged the foundation of COPPPAL but also this influenced and perhaps accelerated the SI action in the region.

In brief, the SI “globalized” its policy during the second half of the 1970s. Many factors contributed to this new behavior: firstly, the already quoted transformations on the world stage; secondly, the election of Brandt as president of the SI; thirdly, the Chilean experience; and fourthly, the fact that Latin America started to see Europe as a model, and that Europe conceived Latin America as an opportunity. All of these were some of the reasons that encouraged the dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic. This chapter, therefore, has addressed the evolution of the SI, the differences and the points of contact between the socialism of the North and the South. It has also explained why the Spanish PSOE and the Italian PSI have been the case studies of this research and why, in relation to the Third World, Latin America and not Africa or Asia has been the region addressed in this writing. Hence, a broad picture of the matter has been outlined. Now, it is time to increasingly focus on the objective. This will be addressed the following section.

³⁷⁰ Wolf Grabendorff, “International Support for Democracy in Contemporary Latin America: The Role of the Party Internationals”. In *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, edited by Laurence Whitehead, (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003), 209 and 211.

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PART III

4. The External Dimension of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): Latin America and the EEC

As has been shown throughout these pages, Spain played a key role in the establishment of links between the European social democracy and Latin America. As a matter of fact, the PSOE was an interlocutor of the SI on the other side of the Atlantic and this behavior, above all, contributed to the definition of its foreign policy. Hence, the PSOE implemented many of the SI guidelines both on national policies (the Spanish transition) and on international ones (Spain towards Latin America). It is also worth pointing out that Felipe González found great support in Latin America (for instance, Carlos Andrés Pérez, the SI vice president, became an important reference for him) that gave him international endorsement and tools for international action³⁷¹.

Likewise, González learned from his Latin American experiences and sometimes implemented what he had learned locally. For instance, by recalling the first municipal election during the 1980s, Enric Juliana stated that during these elections the PSOE used communication techniques that were unknown in Spain at the time but that were well known in Venezuela. Indeed, people who had worked in Venezuela, and therefore who were familiar with these techniques, were called to participate in those electoral preparations. Thus, in Juliana's words, González's policies and actions were helped by the Latin American character of his leadership.³⁷²

Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that since the government of Calvo Sotelo (1981-1982), a high level of presidentialism characterized Spanish foreign policy, which was strengthened once Felipe González came to power in 1982 (under the Suarez' leadership, the Spanish foreign policy was marked by a continuity with the Franco's regime).³⁷³ Given the fact that González was very sensitive about Latin American issues, he

³⁷¹ Pablo Iglesias, Enric Juliana, *Nudo España*. (Barcelona: Arpa, 2018), Kindle Edition, 1138/5340.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 1217/5340.

³⁷³ Carlos Sanz Díaz, "Algo más que un instrumento. Servicio exterior, apertura, internacional y cambio político en España". In *Apertura internacional de España. Entre el Franquismo y la democracia (1953-1986)*, Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

devoted a lot of importance to this region. Accordingly, Spain became a key element in the relationships between the EEC (the accession to the EEC was one of the main objectives of the Spanish) and Latin America. All the international missions and trips organized by the SI in Latin America enabled Gonzalez and the PSOE to gain endorsement, to obtain recognition, and to create closer links with their Latin American peers. The latter, once González came to power, contributed to the definition of Spanish external policy in Latin America. In this way, the Iberian country would be able to become a middle power of international stature, which, in turn, would also allow it to maximize its negotiating capacity in the EEC.

This chapter will address this issue and to this end, this section will be structured as follows. Firstly, an overview will be provided of the PSOE and González policy that takes into account their posture before and after the electoral success. Secondly, the Spanish foreign policy regarding Latin America will be addressed and this will be exemplified through the Venezuelan, Chilean, and Nicaraguan cases. Thirdly, the Europeanism of the Gonzalez government will be discussed by considering the position of Spain as a “liaison” between the EEC and Latin America. It is worth stressing that all of this was largely developed thanks to the close ties that he and the PSOE had with the SI. Accordingly, the role played by the SI in the evolution of the PSOE as well as in the definition of the Spanish external policy will be also one of the points addressed in this chapter.

4.1. The Evolution of the PSOE

4.1.1. The SI and the External Dimension of the PSOE

The triumph of democracy in Southern Europe was one of the greatest success stories in European history during the 1970s. Portugal, Spain, and Greece were able to build democratic States almost at the same time. Nevertheless, their experiences in terms of

edited by Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Ricardo Martín de la Guardia and Rosa Pardo Sanz. (Madrid: Silex, 2016), 367 and 370.

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democratic transitions were very different. For instance, the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships collapsed as a result of external failures, i.e. the former because of the useless and expensive colonial wars (in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau) and the latter due to the failure of the coup d'état in Cyprus. The Spanish dictatorship, however, was not overthrown but it experienced a transition process via the legislation of the Franco regime. In this process, contrary to the Greek experience, the monarchy was an essential factor in the democratic transition.³⁷⁴ A common point, however, between these three countries was the aspiration to the EEC membership throughout their democratic process. The truth is that the accession to the EEC was considered for all of them as the guarantee for democratic consolidation, international inclusion, and the mechanism for national modernization. As a result, the EEC became a benchmark in their local experiences, and therefore foreign policy became a neuralgic point in their political behavior and strategies. Hence, the establishment of a close international nexus and international prestige played a key role in these countries since this contributed to the definition and “normalization” of their external policies after their dictatorial past and isolationism.

In the Spanish case, for instance, it was under the socialist government (1982-1996) that the country regained a prominent international role. Accordingly, as Francisco Villar argues, the internal transition of Spain concluded in 1982 with the victory of the PSOE, but the external transition was achieved later with the consolidation of the socialist government.³⁷⁵ The truth is that when Felipe González came to power, he had important international experience and baggage that has been acquired since his appointment as General Secretary of the PSOE in 1974. Furthermore, his nexus with the SI strengthened his external position and gave room for the development of new international contacts. As a matter of fact, the socialist came to power with a strong international prestige, great experience in foreign matters, and with a much more coherent and realistic project of external policy, including global guidelines, compared to the previous post-Franco governments (these mainly

³⁷⁴ Juan Pablo Fusi, “España la variable Europea”. In *Historia de España. España y Europa Volumen 11* edited by José Luis García Delgado, Juan Pablo Fusi and José Manuel Sánchez Ron, España, Crítica-Marcial Pons, 2008, 132-133 .

³⁷⁵ Francisco Villar, *La Transición exterior de España. Del aislamiento a la influencia (1976-1996)*, (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2016).

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focused on domestic matters or in the Spanish materialization of its Western and European character).³⁷⁶ Likewise, as González recognized in 2015, foreign affairs, defense, and the economy became the major priorities of his government, even if these were not clearly evinced.³⁷⁷

Moreover, the growing interest and awareness developed by the Spanish public during the democratic transition regarding countries ruled by authoritarian regimes contributed to the definition of Spanish foreign policy and González's goals. In this regard, the words of Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo are useful to understand this phenomenon as a whole. According to him, the Spanish public opinion began to realize that their country shared common problems with Latin America, namely underdevelopment and dependency. Furthermore, the Spaniards started to look for an identity in the Hispanic-American world and to express solidarity in topics that were close to them, such as the end of dictatorships and the democratic transition.³⁷⁸

As mentioned, the participation of Felipe González in the SI was remarkable. However, it is worth noting that the SI also deeply influenced the PSOE. For instance, Elena Flores, before becoming International Secretary of the Spanish socialist party, was PSOE's representative within the SI; Felipe González was Vice President of the SI and close collaborator of Willy Brandt³⁷⁹. Likewise, the SI's endorsement was fundamental for the Spanish Socialist Party because it gave it prestige, international recognition, and contributed to its growth. As Donald Sassoon stated, between 1946 and 1974 the PSOE had never had more than two thousand activists. However, the SI gave an enormous impetus to

³⁷⁶ Celestino del Arenal, *La política exterior de España hacia Iberoamérica*, Madrid, Editorial Complutense, 1994, 89.

³⁷⁷ Felipe González, "Prólogo" In Villar, *La Transición exterior de España*. 17.

³⁷⁸ Luís Yáñez-Barnuevo, "Transición democrática en España y proyección de su política exterior". Paper presented at the XI Congreso Internacional de la Asociación de Estudios Latinoamericanos (LASA), México, 1983.

³⁷⁹ Brandt even considered appointing Elena Flores as SI General Secretary in 1983. "Carta sobre la posibilidad de dejar la Presidencia de la Internacional Socialista" (17/02/1983). Fundación Felipe González, AFG.2.3.D.b.1.e.Willy Brandt (Alemania). ES. MD. 28079.FFG/AFG 2.3.D.b.1.e//AFFG FER0044703.

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this party, and the overt support of the SI helped the PSOE to receive the endorsement of entrepreneurs who pushed for its inclusion in the EEC³⁸⁰.

Furthermore, since the late 1960s and mainly during the 1970s, the SI acted as an external actor in the fight against Franco's dictatorship with the purpose of promoting Spanish democratization. Indeed, the involvement of such international actors as the SI or the Ebert Foundation in Spain was so profound that Spaniards did not feel these actions as inappropriate. On the contrary, as Charles Powell has noted, once their own democracy had been consolidated, Spanish actors tried to imitate these actions elsewhere as their policies and behaviors towards Latin America have shown us.³⁸¹

According to Pilar Ortuño Anaya, a moral obligation encouraged the SI action in Spain since the SI morally and materially assisted the democratic socialist forces that struggled to achieve democracy in the country from both the inside and from the exile.³⁸² The SI stepped up efforts to enhance awareness among the European socialist parties regarding the Spanish situation in order to mobilize them towards joint cooperation.³⁸³ Indeed, the European social democratic parties, which were less active and powerful individually, viewed the opportunity to act internationally as well as to reach an international voice. For instance, they used the SI as a mechanism to oppose to the dictatorial regimes of Southern Europe and to campaign against them³⁸⁴.

As a result, one could say that the SI acted as an “incubator” of ideas in order to promote international dialogue, international relations, and to arouse the actions of some states both at the national and at the international level. The latter, for instance, was exemplified in the 1981 PSOE Resolution (XXIX PSOE Congress), in which it was stated that the PSOE, as a SI member, valued and considered this organization as a pivotal element for fostering

³⁸⁰ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 598-599.

³⁸¹ Charles Powell, “International Aspects of Democratization: the case of Spain”. In *The International Dimensions Of Democratization: Europe And The Americas*, Edited By Laurence Whitehead, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003, 314.

³⁸² Ortuño Anaya, *European Socialists*, 505.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Viveknandan, *International Concerns*, 121.

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peace, freedom, and solidarity among people. Moreover, it was also affirmed that the PSOE would maintain and develop relations with all the Socialist and progressive parties and movements from all over the world, and it would participate in the dissemination of the SI principles and suggestions.³⁸⁵

The SI concern for the Spanish situation actually led them to establish a Special Committee for Spain at the SI Bureau meeting on December 9-10 1972 “the purpose of which was to provide the Bureau with more information about the situation within the PSOE, and to explore what possibilities might exist for promoting reconciliation amongst the Spanish socialist”. Under the chairmanship of Bruno Pitterman, this committee met three times and concluded that the meeting that held in Toulouse in August 1974 was a “proper, legitimate, and legal Congress”, and hence, the “Executive Committee elected by that Congress [was] therefore the legitimate representative of the Socialist International’s Spanish member Party”.³⁸⁶

The SI Bureau meeting accepted this recommendation and, as said before, recognized and supported González’s faction, i.e. the PSOE *renovado* (Chapter 3.3). The Committee was reconvened by the SI at the Bureau meeting on March 31, 1974, with the aim of examining the national situation in the Iberian country, contributing to Spanish democratization, and assisting the socialist party. Jenny Little, International Secretary of the British Labour party, headed the Committee, which recommended to the SI to send a mission to Spain. This took place on January 14-17, 1976.³⁸⁷ The delegation was composed by six SI members who were all invited by the Spanish Socialist Party, namely Hans Janitschek (SI General Secretary), Jenny Little (British Labour Party), Abraham Allon (Israel Labour Party), Verónica Isember (German SPD), Jaime Gama (Portuguese Socialist Party), and Pierre Guidoni (French Socialist Party). The delegation visited different regions and could assess the national growth of the PSOE as well as its strength. Recalling that Spanish socialism lacked unity at the time, the SI group concluded that the Spanish party was the

³⁸⁵ 1981 PSOE Resolution, 29.

³⁸⁶ “Spain, Special Committee”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 813.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

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cardinal feature of such cohesion and that it counted on a great deal of support from the SI.³⁸⁸ The mission was welcomed by the PSOE, which on January 14, 1976 stated the following:

“The role that the Member Parties of the Socialist International may play is fundamental. The best way to strengthen the Spanish Socialism, enabling the existence of a strong Socialist Party, is to intensify the solidarity with the PSOE, and to invite the persons or groups who feel to be Socialists and are not in the PSOE, to enter into contact with us and to integrate themselves in the democratic debate which is taking place in our party”.³⁸⁹

Therefore, the PSOE recognized the relevancy of the SI support as well as the significance of its endorsement since it could fortify socialism. Furthermore, the PSOE took this opportunity to stress the need for unity as well as to invite people to join the party.

In addition to sending missions to the Iberian country (which cannot have any contact with the Franco Regime), the SI tried to go beyond by calling the SI member parties into action. Indeed, on October 10, 1975 in a Confidential Circular (i.e. only for SI Members), the SI expressed its decision to create a solidarity fund (SI Spanish Solidarity Fund) in order to assist the PSOE. The SI leadership decided that £4,000 should be taken from the Reserve Fund of the SI, in which half of this amount should be given directly to the PSOE and half should be deposited in a bank account in order to start the new Spanish Solidarity Fund. Additionally, the SI Bureau requested the member parties “to give financial and material aid” to the PSOE by backing their contributions to the Solidarity Fund or by contacting the Spanish Socialist Workers Party directly. Likewise, the SI Bureau encouraged member parties to invite a small delegation of the PSOE, headed by Felipe González, to visit their countries in order “to make the First Secretary of the PSOE more well known”. Moreover,

³⁸⁸ “The PSOE Reports. January 14, 1976” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 813.

³⁸⁹ The PSOE Reports (Madrid, 14th January 1976). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 813.

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the SI Bureau stressed that Spanish democracy should be a condition *sine qua non* for its accession into the EEC and NATO.³⁹⁰

Hence, the SI endeavored to assist the PSOE in different manners. As one can note, the international recognition of Felipe González was made part of the SI strategy. The PSOE also considered that, in addition to enhancing national legitimacy, contacts with the SI members and visiting their countries would be useful to learn about European socialism and all the related fields. Likewise, the Spanish Socialist party believed that it would be helpful for creating bonds of friendship with the European countries, which, in turn, would be useful for Spanish inclusion in the international arena.³⁹¹

International support contributed to the PSOE's assumption of a prominent role inside the country and to obtaining certain autonomies before its legalization. In fact, after Franco's death, the Spanish Socialist Party continued to be a clandestine party. However, the internal changes and the growing "power" acquired by the PSOE at the time led them "to threaten" Arias Navarro's administration to hold their Congresses outside Spain after the government's refusal to carry out the XXVII Congress in Madrid. This defiant attitude was possible since the PSOE felt the support from the outside, and therefore they felt self-assured. Nevertheless, on November 18, 1976 the "Cortes" (Courts) approved the Law of Political Reform, which transformed the institutional bases of the country by stating that Spain would be a democratic country with a bicameral parliament and universal suffrage. Likewise, the Government yielded to the pressure from the PSOE, which was able to convene its Congress in Madrid. In this way, the Spanish parties were legalized and prepared for the 1977 legislative elections (Table 3)³⁹².

³⁹⁰ Circular No. M26/75, "Spain. Decisions and Recommendation by Bureau of Socialist International. Establishment of Spanish Solidarity Fund. October 10, 1975". From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 813

³⁹¹ For instance, in October 1975, the press Secretary of the PSOE, Helga Diekhoff- De Soto asked to visit some countries (e.g. Sweden, Austria, Germany) in order to study their press department. The request was made through the SI Secretariat. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 813.

³⁹² Picó, *Los límites*, 198.

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Table 3*Legislative Elections (June 15, 1977)*³⁹³

Party	% Votes	N. Seats
Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD)	34.61	166
PSOE	29.27	118
Popular Alliance (AP)	8.33	16
PCE	9.38	20
PSP	3.47	6
Christian Democracy (DC)	1.10	-
Catalan Nationalists (CiU)	3.60	12
Basque Nationalists (PNV)	2.05	9
Other	-	3
Voters 23.543.000		Voters turnout 18,307,000

4.1.2. Domestic Developments

After the 1977 legislative elections, the main Spanish political forces, i.e. the UCD, PSOE, PCE, and AP agreed to the Moncloa Pacts in October 1977. This was an attempt to handle the socio-economic crises inside the country that could jeopardize democratic stability. Thus, Spain was in the midst of internal political transformation and of international crises that affected the country. Although the 1970s were a period of economic recession for all of Europe, in Spain the crisis hit the economy severely and it was much longer and deeper than in Europe in general.³⁹⁴ Hence, the oil crises, the U.S. trade deficit, and the cracks in the monetary system led to high inflation, among other things. Spain, a country highly dependent on oil imports, foreign investments, and income from tourism was highly affected by the inflation (in the middle of the year, inflation was almost 40%) and by falling

³⁹³ Ibid. 200.

³⁹⁴ Carlos Alonso Zaldívar and Manuel Castells, *España fin de siglo*. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992), 77. Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

investments. This was accompanied by high rates of unemployment and many social demands.

As a result, the Moncloa Pacts aimed to redress these economic upheavals. This worked on two fronts: i) correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and ii) institutional and structural reforms in order to adapt the Spanish economy to the new circumstances.³⁹⁵ Indeed, the agreement included economic aspects (i.e. monetary, financial, and fiscal measures) as well as social aspects (i.e. reforms of the education system, the functions of trade unions, social security reform, free expression, judicial reform, etc.). While the economic aspects had better outcomes (inflation dropped to 16% and the external deficit was improved), the social matters had less success even if the fiscal reform was launched. The relevancy of these pacts relied on the fact that they were the first real attempt to change the structures of the Iberian country, even in the absence of a Constitution. Therefore, these legitimized the political transformation that Spain had been experiencing at the time.³⁹⁶

In addition to the Moncloa Pacts, the real challenge and target of the courts that were elected in June 1977 was the drafting of the Constitution. Indeed, after fulfilling their objectives, they were dissolved in 1979. The courts started to work on the Constitution on July 26, 1977 when a Constitutional Commission was created. Seven delegates formed the Commission (three from the UCD, the majority party, and one representative from every other party, with the exception of the Basque). After the approval of the Senate and the Congress, the definitive text was published on November 6, 1978, which was endorsed by popular referendum on December 6, 1977. On December 29 of the same year, the King sanctioned the document. The text was remarkable since it was very progressive, particularly the bill of rights, and was the outcome of a political *consensus*. Accordingly, the text included basic requirements that should be accepted by all the political parties. Therefore, this *consensus* had two opposite sides: on one hand, it ensured the establishment of the Constitution; on the other, it entailed vagueness or ambiguity in some aspects, since the political parties were very different from each other. Nevertheless, despite these

³⁹⁵ José Luis García Delgado, “La modernización económica”, in *Historia de España. España y Europa Volumen 11*, 276.

³⁹⁶ Aróstegui, “La transición política”. 282-283.

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weaknesses, the Constitution demonstrated its validity and effectiveness over the course of time.³⁹⁷

After the promulgation of the Spanish Constitution, Adolfo Suárez, the Prime Minister (from the UCD), decided to disband the courts and to hold general elections (1979). The electoral climate in 1979 was very different compared to 1977 because only two parties (UCD and PSOE) had a real chance of winning the elections. In spite of the fact that amount of smaller parties had not diminished, the UCD and the PSOE came to the election with more strength. As a result, the electoral campaign was more competitive and mutual accusations became regular. For instance, the PSOE accused the UCD of corruption while the UCD sought support from the Catholic right wing. With this aim, the UCD blamed the former of being pro-abortion, of being in favor of laic education, and of looking for the establishment of a collective economy. Nevertheless, these new political struggles did not change the Spaniard's political preferences. Indeed, the 1979 results (Table 4) remained almost the same of the 1977 even if the turnout diminished since the rate of abstention increased (from 21% in 1977 to 32% in 1979). The cause for this is the disenchantment that some Spaniards felt regarding the two major parties and their incapacity of finding solutions to economic problems and terrorism (from the extreme left ETA as well as from the extreme right).³⁹⁸

Table 4

*General election (March 1979)*³⁹⁹

Party	% Votes	N. Seats
UCD	35.5	167
PSOE	30.8	121
PCE	10.9	23
CD (AP)	5.8	9
CiU	2.7	9

³⁹⁷ Ibid., 283-284.

³⁹⁸ Juliá, "Democracia". In *La España del Siglo XX*, 260-261.

³⁹⁹ Picó, *Los límites*, 201.

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PNV	1.6	7
PSA (Socialist Party of Andalusia)	1.9	5
HB (Popular Unity)	1.0	3
Other	9.8	6
Total	100.0	350

Within the PSOE, the high rate of abstentionism was interpreted in different manners. Some of the critics argued that the moderate policy of the PSOE had taken distance from workers, therefore losing those electors. According to them, this moderate position led them to the defeat. Others, among them the leaders of the party, considered the abstentionism as consequence of the PSOE's radical ideology. For them, the PSOE's basis of Marxism had pushed the moderate left away from the party. They also underlined the risks of the party's ambiguity, since it professed a moderate dialogue but remained anchored in a radical ideology that was rooted on class systems and addressed mainly to workers. Within this context, the ideological basis was at the heart of the XXVIII Congress of the PSOE. As discussed earlier, on one hand, Felipe González and the Sevillian delegation advocated for deleting the term "Marxist" from the party's program, and for becoming more moderate, namely a kind of center-left party in order to appeal the centrist electorate (Chapter 3.3). On the other hand, members such as Francisco Bustelo, Gómez Llorente, and Pablo Castellano reiterated the PSOE character as a class party, which had to preserve its Marxist essence. In this way, they opposed González's request who ended up being defeated by 62% of the votes of the delegates. Against this background, González submitted his resignation. Bustelo, Llorente, and Castellano claimed that a social democratic policy (advocated by González) was not proper for Spain since, according to them, the country needed radical transformations and the starting point should be the class struggle. However, when Llorente proposed himself as the alternative to Felipe González, he was not supported. This was demonstrated during the PSOE Extraordinary Congress, in which he obtained 7% of the votes while González received 86%. Hence, since this Congress a greater social democratic character of the Spanish socialism was defined and

their real goals were outlined: the modernization of the country, the welfare state, the reduction of inequality, and the consolidation of representative democracy.⁴⁰⁰

As noted earlier, since the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, European social democracy (in particular the German SPD but also many others SI members) sought to support the PSOE economically, technically, politically, and diplomatically. It should be recalled that the international scenario was the Cold War; thus, the equilibrium in the Iberian Peninsula meant for them maintaining the international status quo and détente. For this reason, they tried to limit advances of Communism. The result was the progressive moderation of PSOE ideology, at least of the González group (which was closer to the SI). Therefore, the combination of both international and domestic factors were crucial in the ideological transformation of the PSOE.

It is worth underlining that French socialism tried to establish a close nexus with the PSOE and influence the PSOE's ideology⁴⁰¹, and the Spanish socialism had to claim its proximity to French socialism during the first post-Franco years due to the fragmentation of the left-wing in the country and the high rates of competition (at the time there were several left-wing parties in the Iberian country). However, the power that the SPD and the SI achieved somehow overcame the French efforts. Accordingly, although the PSOE used some ideological traits from the French until 1977, the PSOE had been increasingly adopting some of the social democratic features from the Northern countries (formally since 1975), which resulted from international pressures as well as from the dynamic of the democratic transition.⁴⁰² To put it in other words, the contacts with European social democracy contributed to the ideological moderation of the PSOE's postulates and to redefining its political strategy.⁴⁰³ Hence, the SI leadership was invited to attend the Extraordinary

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid 202-205. Xosé M. Núñez Seixas., Lina Gálves Muñoz, Javier Muñoz Soro, *España en democracia, 1975-2011: Historia de España, vol. 10* (España: Crítica, 2017), Kindle edition, 2923

⁴⁰¹ That means the establishment of a Left Front that implied the inclusion of the Communist party. Within this context the meetings of the Socialist of the Southern Europe were held.

⁴⁰² Alan Granadino, “¿Socialismo democrático o socialdemocracia? Escribir la historia de la península ibérica en un contexto europeo y global”. In *Cahiers de civilisation espagnole contemporaine* (18/2017).

⁴⁰³ Núñez Seixas, *España en democracia*, 614.

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Congress because this meeting meant a radical shift of embracing of social democratic postulates for the PSOE. Since then, the SI contributions increased.⁴⁰⁴

Moreover, the UCD, i.e. the ruling party, started to decay at that time. The internal fragmentation, the reduction of Suarez's charisma, and the lack of a coherent and effective program led the party to its dissolution in 1983. In those years, the effective consolidation of Spanish democracy was also measured. Indeed, the failed coup attempt in February 1981 demonstrated the unanimous rejection that Spaniards had on returning to dictatorship as well as the power that the Spanish Crown had acquired regarding the military forces. As a matter of fact, the image of the King was strengthened since the Spanish people began to consider him as the warrantor and savior of democracy. Thus, the levels of democracy in the country were tested and the constant threat of military coups in Spain had been left behind.⁴⁰⁵

Notwithstanding, Spain experienced a challenging economic situation at the time. The small progresses obtained since the Moncloa Pacts were hampered by a further escalation of prices in the wake of the second oil crisis at the end of the 1970s. In spite of the new economic imbalances that started to emerge, Suárez did not continue with the economic adjustment project. He was mainly concerned about the political situation of the country and about the division inside his party. Hence, between 1979 and 1981, the Spanish GDP grew by only 0.7% while the unemployment rate reached 16.5%. Likewise, the public deficit increased to 6% of GDP, the inflation overcame that one of the OECD countries, and the foreign deficit amounted to 5 billions. Therefore, the period 1974-1982 was not positive for Spain in terms of economic growth.⁴⁰⁶

Within this context, the PSOE stood as an unified and coherent party for the elections in 1982. The Spanish party sought to overcome the economic and political crises that affected Spain at the time. They sought to ensure democratic principles and the rights stipulated by the Constitution as well as to fight against unemployment and social inequalities. In other

⁴⁰⁴ From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1169.

⁴⁰⁵ Zaldívar and Castells, *España*, 24.

⁴⁰⁶ Picó, *Los límites*, 218.

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terms, the PSOE aimed for economic adjustment and the social modernization of the country. During the electoral campaign, the PSOE promised new jobs, early retirement, the reduction of the working week, the expansion of schooling, the raising of the compulsory education age, and the strengthening of freedoms. With these objectives, it would carry out a fiscal reform and the taxes would be updated. In foreign policy, the PSOE advocated for denuclearization, the strengthening of the Spanish external presence, the active cooperation for International Economic Order, the defense of human rights, and the promotion of solidarity for those peoples who struggled for freedom. It also devised its priority tasks in foreign matters: (i) accession to the EEC; (ii) enhancing the political, economic, and cultural cooperation with Latin America; (iii) developing a Mediterranean policy that would enable Spain to become a regional power; (iv) defining its relationship with the USA inside the Western frame; (v) opposing the bloc policy on behalf of the North-South dialogue instead of the East-West; and (vi) calling a referendum in order to determine Spanish membership to NATO.⁴⁰⁷

With this electoral program and because the Spaniards looked for political stability after the coup attempt in 1981 and the decline of the UCD and the PCE, the PSOE won the general elections in 1982 (Table 5) and the Municipal elections six months later. Ricardo de la Cierva (a Spanish historian and politician, member of the UCD, and defender of many aspects of the Franco dictatorship) explained the UCD decadence and underlined the differences between Suárez and González, which led the latter to the victory. He stressed that the first signal of crisis of Suárez and the power of González should be observed in the reactions of both leaders to internal crises in their own parties. De la Cierva said that both González and Suárez had to face internal division and oppositions within their parties, the former in 1979 and the latter in 1980-1981, but both leaders responded differently to the internal critics. The Sevillian socialist was able to impose himself in the party by achieving the ideological transformation of the PSOE. Suárez, instead, was unable to maintain a firm position regarding the different political tendencies that had emerged inside the UCD at the time because at different moments of his political career he had declared himself in favor of

⁴⁰⁷ Programa Electoral Partido Socialista Obrero Español. “Por el cambio” 1982. Retrieved from <http://www.psoe.es/transparencia/informacion-politica-organizativa/programas-electorales/>

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each of these tendencies. Furthermore, De la Cierva also argued that some of the differences between Suárez and González could be appreciated in other aspects. The former had always received the power from above (upon designation by his immediate superior) while the latter from below (from the street). Even if both politicians received external assistance (Suárez from the Opus Dei and González from the SPD and the SI), the Secretary of the PSOE worked and gained his promotion from the streets.⁴⁰⁸ This last point was important for the success of the PSOE since the Spaniards looked for a real change and distance from Franco's regime, and they also expected the fulfillment of social demands, the modernization of the country, and the solution of real problems (e.g. unemployment) that heavily affected the nation at the time. All of these issues were embodied by the PSOE.

Table 5

*General elections 1982*⁴⁰⁹

Party	% Votes	N. Seats
PSOE	48.2	202
AP	26.6	106
UCD	6.1	12
PCE	4.1	4
CDS (Democratic and Socialist Centre) ⁴¹⁰	2.9	2
PNV	1.9	8
CiU	3.9	12
Other	5.6	4
Total	100.0	350

The firmness of Felipe González depicted by Ricardo de la Cierva came again to light once in power, when in the economic field he launched an increasingly liberal program, thus

⁴⁰⁸ Ricardo de la Cierva, *El PSOE de Felipe González. Adiós al Marxismo*. (Madrid:ARC Editores, 1997), 27-28.

⁴⁰⁹ Picó, *Los límites*, 206.

⁴¹⁰ Adolfo Suarez and some dissidents from the UCD founded this party in July 1982. This foundation demonstrates the levels of decadence of the UCD at the time.

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changing the direction of the Spanish economy. This new economic orientation was also linked to the Spanish aspiration for accession to the EEC since Spain needed to fulfill EEC requirements in order to be able to apply to the Community. Within this context, González launched an economic adjustment program aimed at modernizing the country, which was a mandatory condition for the Spanish membership in the EEC. Hence, in the mid-1980s, the PSOE increasingly tended to liberal and neoliberal approaches, leaving many economic social democratic principles behind. In the same way, any type of reformism lost strength and even the Welfare State began to be questioned.⁴¹¹

The truth is that when the PSOE won the 1982 elections (by an absolute majority), the country was in the midst of a complex situation. After the attempted coup d'état on February 23, 1981, solidarity within the country increased due to the elaboration of the National Employment Agreement (*Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo*) in June 1981, although the rates of unemployment remained very high. As a matter of fact, when the Socialist government was formed, inflation was partly controlled (14.5%), as well as the external deficit (2.6% of GDP), but unemployment continued to increase (16.8%).

In this context, the PSOE faced this situation in two ways. Firstly, the PSOE took advantage of the support of the electorate to launch an economic adjustment program. Therefore, the PSOE distanced itself from the key messages of the campaign, which had focused on the creation of new jobs (800,000 new positions had been promised) and the expansive policies defended by the socialist movements during the 1970s. Secondly, the PSOE aimed to fix the date for the Spanish accession to the EEC. This was considered a high strategic priority for Spain. However, the Spanish membership of the Community was not only an exclusive objective of this government, but the Socialist party also based its policy on this aspiration and turned it a national will. With this purpose, the PSOE strived to reduce: (i) the inflation differential with the EEC members by moderating wage growth and by implementing a restrictive monetary policy; (ii) the external imbalance by devaluing the Spanish peseta and promoting competitiveness and exports; (iii) public deficit in order to improve domestic saving rates and make fiscal policy compatible with monetary policy.

⁴¹¹ Aróstegui, “La transición política”.314.

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Therefore, the objective of the EEC involved the development of policies that in practice had consequences on foreign and economic matters. During the first years of these economic efforts, it was possible to appreciate the economic progress.⁴¹² In fact, in 1985 the external imbalance diminished by becoming positive (1.2% of GDP), inflation decreased (8.2%) as consequence of the monetary policy and wage moderation, and public deficit reached 6.9% of GDP. All of them contributed to the victory of the PSOE in the 1986 elections (Table 6). Although the PSOE lost 18 seats, it kept the absolute majority. Nevertheless, there was a tricky issue that worried the government, thus, the labor system mainly paid the price of this economic adjustment since the unemployment rate continued to grow (Table 7).⁴¹³

Table 6*General elections 1986⁴¹⁴*

Party	% Votes	Seats
PSOE	44.0	184
UCD	9.3	19
AP	26.2	105
PCE	4.6	7
PNV	1.5	6
CiU	5.0	18
Other	9.4	11
Total	100.00	350

Table 7*Employment and unemployment rate in relation to the Spanish labour force⁴¹⁵*

⁴¹² Real GDP growth (Annual percent change) International Monetary Fund
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/ESP?year=2018

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
SPAIN	1.2	-0.4	1.2	1.7	1.7	2.4	3.4	5.7	5.3	5	3.8

⁴¹³ Alonso Zaldívar and Castells, *España, 78-80-*

⁴¹⁴ Picó, *Los límites*, 209.

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	% Employment	% Unemployment
1976	51.1	4.7
1977	50.5	5.7
1978	49.7	7.6
1979	49.3	9.4
1980	48.5	12.4
1981	48.3	15.1
1982	48.3	16.8
1983	48.2	18.1
1984	47.7	21.3
1985	47.6	21.7
1986	48.0	20.9
1987	48.8	19.9
1988	48.8	18.4
1989	49.2	16.8
1990	49.3	16.0

Consequently, the PSOE government launched a program in order to encourage the recruitment of unemployed people by making contracts more flexible. These policies were criticized by the trade unions because they feared labor market segmentation and precarization. Hence, some friction between the PSOE and the trade unions started to emerge. In particular the UGT (the old ally of the PSOE) was very critical about the employment policies and openly disagreed with the government. Indeed, the UGT called a general strike in 1985, although it was never carried out.⁴¹⁵ However, discrepancies persisted over time and in December 1988 the same trade union successfully called for another general strike. This marked the division between the UGT and the PSOE. That said, for the first time during the 1989 General Elections, the UGT did not ask its members to vote for the Socialist party. In addition, the mandatory membership of party supporters in

⁴¹⁵ Alonso Zaldívar and Castells, *España*, .289.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

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the UGT was canceled.⁴¹⁷ This behavior confirmed the transformations of the PSOE once in power because the trade union support had been very meaningful for the party over time. Possibly, this fracture contributed to the reduction of the voters in favor of PSOE in 1989. At the end of the decade, the PSOE won the elections again, albeit by a not very large majority (Table 8).

Table 8

*General elections 1989*⁴¹⁸

Party	% Votes	Seats
PSOE	39.56	176
PP (People's Party) ⁴¹⁹	25.84	106
IU (United Left) ⁴²⁰	9.05	17
CDS	7.91	14
CiU	5.04	18
PNV	1.24	5
Other	11.36	14

However, despite some difficulties such as the high rate of unemployment that hit the country, since Franco's death political forces strived to modernize the Spanish economy. According to José Luís García Delgado, political forces defined five key challenges to first open the country to modernization and then ensure its development. Firstly, the commitment to "collective bargaining" was the basis of democratic transition. For instance, the Moncloa Pacts were the outcome of this bargain. All this was related to the *consensus*. As a matter of fact, all political forces pointed to the Spanish transition and Spanish modernization. Consequently, they sought solutions to face all kinds of problems in the country (from terrorism to social matters). Secondly, "stability was an objective". Political forces recognized that economic stability was a mandatory condition to the general

⁴¹⁷ Mateos, *Historia del PSOE*, 93.

⁴¹⁸ Picó, *Los límites*, 243.

⁴¹⁹ The PP (former AP) was refounded in 1989. In addition to the AP, it included small Christian democratic and liberal parties.

⁴²⁰ IU: Political coalition organized in 1986 by several left parties and organizations. The IU included the PCE.

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steadiness of the country. Thirdly, there was the commitment in favor of the companies and the entrepreneurs since the economic opening, and the increasing dominance of the markets put the businessman as the cornerstone of the economic development. Next, there was a commitment to education, namely enhancing the rates of schooling at all the educational levels. A final challenge was “fixing the territorial divide”. With these aims, the administrative organization of the territories of the state in the autonomous regions was included as an article of the 1978 Constitution⁴²¹.

As a result, although political forces were different in their essence, they shared the above-mentioned objectives that led them to achieve a *political consensus*. According to them, these constituted the mechanism to ensure the successful political transition of Spain and the modernization of the country, which, in turn, constituted a mandatory condition for the Spanish accession to the EEC.

Nonetheless, it should also be noted that some scholars have interpreted this *consensus* as a sign of continuity among post-Franco Governments. Moreover, they have argued that this *consensus* was reached because there was a continuity between the UCD government and the PSOE. According to them, this continuity has been demonstrated by the fact that the Constitution has remained unchanged and the economic policy has somehow accepted the free market system and the international status quo.⁴²² For instance, Jean-François Revel has claimed that since the Spanish democratic transition, “Spain has been ruled from the center”; that is, the policies of the center-right or center-left have been linked to liberalism. In addition to this, Revel has said that the resounding victory of the PSOE in 1982 has been linked to the absorption of voters from the UCD, electors who opted for a “change in the continuity”.⁴²³ Furthermore, Abdón Mateos, focusing on the success of the PSOE, affirmed that the historical explanation of such triumph should be founded in the linear trajectory of the party because the party did not experience any rupture over the democratic transition.

⁴²¹ García Delgado, “La modernización”, 266-270.

⁴²² Hugh Thomas, “Los años socialistas en España”. In *La década socialista. El ocaso de Felipe González*, edited by Javier Tusell and Justivo Sinova. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1992), 21-26.

⁴²³ Jean-François Revel, “Diez años del socialismo en España”. In *La década socialista*, 27-30.

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Conversely, the PSOE was able to develop “renewal elements in the continuity” since party renovations began from the exile and continued during the 1970s.⁴²⁴

4.1.3. Ideological Principles Versus Economic Requirements

It must be recognized that the EEC membership was an incentive to modernize the country and to ensure its democratization, democracy being a mandatory condition to join the Community. With this aim, the government had to launch a specific economic program for economic adjustment. This implied the establishment of rigid rules that several times did not correspond with the initial postulates that the PSOE had advocated before its electoral success in 1982. Consequently, a divergence can be noted regarding the materialization of the initial political and economic postulates since this tends to change. That means that the initial “political” social democratic values were concretized while the economic values were not fully implemented. In fact, some of the social democratic principles (i.e. SI values) such as democracy, peace, international democracy, and the defence of human rights were not only at the basis of the initial speech of the SI and, therefore, of Felipe González, but also they were materialized. For instance, Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America became an example of this. However, although some of the SI economic postulates (e.g. the reduction of poverty, full employment, and the diminution of inequality as well as the chasm between the rich and poor) were always included in the meetings, reports, and conferences, in the end they encountered many difficulties to be materialized since going beyond projects, reports, and words was not a simple task.

Therefore, during the 1980s there was an asymmetry between Spanish political and economic developments in Latin America because during those years the economic impact of the Iberian country on the other side of the Atlantic was lower compared to the political one.⁴²⁵ It is important to keep in mind that at that time Latin America was in the middle of a harrowing external debt crisis, which to some extent limited the economic interests of Spain

⁴²⁴ Mateos, *Historia del PSOE en transición*. 191.

⁴²⁵ Arenal, *La política exterior de España*, 108.

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and Europe in the region. Furthermore, Madrid was very focused on how to modernize the country and how to devise a program for economic development in order to be accepted to the EEC. Therefore, Spain was not in a position to handle the serious economic problems that hit Latin America at the time. Despite this, the Spanish government expressed concern about the economic situation in Latin America. In fact, during the 1980s Spain tried to negotiate a debt rollover with the largest creditors (“Club of Paris”) in order to achieve more flexible agreements. In this negotiation, not only did solidarity mark the Spanish interest in solving the debt crisis but also national wishes to some extent. This came to light during the speech of Felipe Gonzalez at the Plenary Session of the Congress of Deputies on September 20, 1983, when he claimed the following:

“We will try to carry out coordinated actions with the Ibero-American countries that allow us some initiatives in problems such as the external debt [...] for two reasons: one, of solidarity; another –if you like more- of national interest, even of national selfishness. Because a part of our investment is projected there, and there has been a significant part of Spanish financing. Therefore, we will be there”.⁴²⁶

Moreover, the European social democracy had to adapt itself to the new global context, which had led many social democratic governments to distance themselves from the traditional economic postulates⁴²⁷ (see Chapter 2 and 3). In this context, the government of Felipe González was not the exception. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that González’s victory coincided with the reign of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (1979-1990) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) in the U.S. who pledged to implement, although with different nuances, a neo-liberal program. Besides this, a wave of “right turn” was verified in many of the countries of Northern Western Europe (Sweden and Austria were the exception) that favoured the conditions for launching different versions of neoliberal programs since they were considered to be a mechanism to overcome the economic crisis. This, to some extent, contrasted with the leftist governments in Southern

⁴²⁶ “Referencias a la política exterior en la intervención del Presidente del gobierno, Don Felipe González Márquez, en el debate sobre el estado de nación, Congreso de Diputados (20/09/1983)”. *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1983*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 464

⁴²⁷ Paramio, *La socialdemocracia*, 84.

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Europe coming to power (François Mitterrand, Mario Soares, Felipe González, Bettino Craxi, and Andreas Papandeu).

However, as Perry Anderson noted, although these governments tried in some way to implement a model analogous to the one applied by the social democracy of Northern Europe after the Second World War, they actually failed because “the international stock market constraint” radically changed their projects. France under Mitterrand became a good example of this because the French Government tried to launch a policy of redistribution, full employment, and social protection that collided with reality. Indeed, the evident failure in terms of the economic model of the French socialist government influenced the Spanish socialist approach since it coincided with the PSOE coming to power. Anderson goes even further by arguing that González, when he came to power, never looked to implement a redistributive policy. On the contrary, Anderson points out that, since taking office, monetarism was always the dominant position.⁴²⁸ Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that when Spain acceded to the EEC, the Single European Act project was in progress, which added further restrictions to the definition of an autonomous economic policy at national and international level (Chapter 2.4).

As the Minister for Education of the first González mandate (1982-1988), José María Maravall, noted:

“The truth is that, when we joined the government, the reflection made towards the realism remained in some fields with clear social democratic traits. But the reflection made in other fields, for example in the economic policy that gave rise among other things to the economic purposes of the electoral program, was partly tempered. There was a very serious economic situation with severe flight of capital and a public deficit far greater than we imagined. Therefore, the spending policies that we plan to undertake have to wait a while in some areas, for example in health and pensions”⁴²⁹.

⁴²⁸ Perry Anderson, “Historia y lecciones del neoliberalismo”. In *El otro Davos: globalización de resistencias y de luchas*, edited by François Houtart and François Polet, (España: Editorial popular, 2001), 13-30.

⁴²⁹ Maria Antonia Iglesias, *La memoria recuperada, lo que nunca han contado Felipe González y los dirigentes socialistas de sus años de gobierno*. (Madrid, Aguilar, 2003), Kindle Edition, 300.

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Similarly, the former Spanish Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja (1976-1980), claimed that the socialist government “has not represented a line of demarcation between two divergent conceptions of foreign policy, since what some defended in the opposition stopped postulating it later when they were in government”.⁴³⁰ Consequently, the PSOE, once in office, relinquished from many of the principles, mainly of an economic nature, that had been defended and promulgated during the centrist administration when they were in opposition.

Therefore, the initial economic programs had to change over time because Spain had to adapt itself to the new global situation as well as to the EEC requirements. Indeed, the initial reformist program of the PSOE focused on the welfare state and aimed at improving public services, increasing social protection, and redistributing income could not be fully developed (although important progresses were accomplished) since these were “in conflict” with the economic policies imposed by the EEC.⁴³¹ In this light, on January, 15, 1985, Fernando Morán, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1982 to 1985, synthesized the ideological change in the following manner:

“A lot of people say that Keynes is dead; I put it in doubt, but if it was the case, we should find another Keynes. The crisis forces the left to find pragmatic solutions and in the long term this can create an ideological vacuum. The left has yet to arrive at a new reading of the economic crisis [...] Perhaps, we will have to wait for the beginning of our next mandate to see a genuine renewal and to relaunch the ideological aspects of our program”.⁴³²

The statement responded to the provocative question posed by a journalist from the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica*, who asked for an opinion on the idea that also in Spain, the left withdrew its programs once in power.

⁴³⁰ Felipe Sahagún, “España frente al Sur”. In *La política exterior española en el siglo XX*, edited by Rafael Calduch. (Madrid: Ediciones Ciencias Sociales, 1994), 238.

⁴³¹ Aróstegui, *La transición*. 319.

⁴³² “Entrevista al Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Don Fernando Morán, en el diario italiano *La Repubblica* (15/01/1985)”, *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 96.

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Conversely, in *political* terms, the PSOE tried to maintain greater continuity. The policy towards Latin America to some extent exemplified this behaviour. Indeed, the PSOE made efforts to keep the same guiding principles regarding this region even after its electoral success. González was even of the opinion that “where the government could not intervene for obvious reason of political interference, the party had to do it”. Thus, many times, meetings or journeys in Latin America or with Latin Americans took place through the PSOE and even sometimes through the Pablo Iglesias Foundation when they considered that it was better to not involve the party. For instance, some of the meetings with the Cuban government or the Cuban opposition were formally organized through the Pablo Iglesias Foundation since the direct encounter between them and González (as head of the government) or the PSOE itself could lead to misunderstandings⁴³³.

However, neither the historical and cultural proximity or the solidarity towards the region, nor the struggle for democracy or defense of human rights were the only reasons why González strived to maintain the same *policy*, but also because it was the opportunity to achieve an international voice and power after decades of isolationism and also because the country was in view of the EEC target. In this way, Europe and Latin America could be considered as complementary policies of the Spanish Government. Thus, since the Iberian country started to negotiate its membership in the Community, Spain tried to foster the interest the Community towards the other side of the Atlantic. Within this context, Spain sought to promote the international cooperation that led it to reach a new international profile and enrich the external relations of the EEC.⁴³⁴ As a result, it can be argued that Spain played a key role in enhancing the *political* interest of the EEC in Latin America. Undoubtedly, the democratic experience of Spain influenced Latin American democratizations, which were also favored by the prestige reached by the King Juan Carlos I and Felipe González in the region, that in the 1980s captured the attention of the EEC.

⁴³³ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁴³⁴ Villar, *La transición exterior*, 131.

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This interest became visible in 1984 with the first meeting for the San José Dialogue between the EEC, Spain, Portugal, the five Central American countries (Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala), and the Contadora Group (México, Panamá, Colombia and Venezuela). Thus, for the first time, Latin America was recognized as an autonomous region rather than a U.S. backyard.⁴³⁵ Support was provided by Spain to the Contadora initiative, which contributed to its success and international endorsement. Likewise, Madrid played a part in increasing the interest of the EEC in the Central American crises. Within this framework, for instance, Felipe González proposed to hold a Conference in Spain (known as “mini-Helsinki”) with the aim of “adding an European dimension to the Contadora process” and to reduce the East-West tensions in the region. This envisaged the participation of both Cuba and the U.S. since Spanish politicians considered that a dialogue between these two countries was indispensable for regional pacification. After this meeting, González and the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán, launched intense diplomatic activity in the region.⁴³⁶

As will be seen in this text, the Central American pacification was a long and thorny procedure that endured throughout the 1980s. In this process, as Villar has claimed, both Spain and the EEC demonstrated their unconditional support for democracy, the protection of human rights, development cooperation, and international solidarity. That means that the *political* postulates of social democracy were applied in its policy towards Central America. This was expressed in the already mentioned support for the Contadora Process, the San José agreement, as well as in the endorsement, years later, of the Arias Plan and the Esquipulas treaties in 1986 and 1987, respectively.⁴³⁷

Therefore, the PSOE in the late 1970s approached social democratic values. However, once the PSOE came to power it faced new challenges and complexities. As a result, there was a net difference between the economic and political elements. The former had to change

⁴³⁵ Bodemer, *Europa Occidental*.

⁴³⁶ Eusebio Mujal-León, “Iberoamérica en la nueva política exterior de España. In *Realidades y posibilidades de las relaciones entre España y América en los ochenta*, edited by Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1986), 147-

⁴³⁷ Villar, *La transición exterior*, 207.

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while the latter had the chance to materialize. As noted above, the Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America was based on *political* postulates of social democracy. That said, it is important to note that the Spanish aspiration to the EEC influenced policies and determined changes in the PSOE position besides economic policy. Indeed, during the electoral campaign, the Spanish Socialist party stated that Spain should position itself as a middle power, strengthening its independence from the West and fostering its links with Latin America. Thus, the PSOE prior the 1982 elections promised a referendum on the Spanish membership to NATO since Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo from the UCD (1981-1982) had acceded to NATO, although a large part of the population had disagreed with it.

As a matter of fact, in the early 1980s, the international issue that created divergences between the political parties was the Spanish accession to NATO; the left wing rejected it due to its historical anti-Americanism and its preference of remaining neutral in the East-West confrontation.⁴³⁸ Similarly, a large percentage of Spaniards opposed NATO. Data confirmed the widespread mistrust about the North Atlantic Alliance as in 1981, 43% of Spaniards expressed their disagreement.⁴³⁹ The American support for Franco's dictatorship, as well as the fear among Spaniards that joining NATO meant deployment of US missiles on the national soil, led to a large part of the public refusing the accession. This consideration was strongly supported by all the left wing (by both the Communist Party and PSOE) at least until the election of Felipe Gonzalez as Prime Minister in October 1982.

Although Gonzalez rejected NATO during his political campaign, he changed his mind once in power. His international contacts (e.g. Helmut Kohl) likely influenced his opinion and led him towards a more Atlantic view. Likewise, this view was strengthened by the possibility that NATO's rejection could stymie the entry of Spain into the EEC, even if it was not a requirement to access the Community. However, with the exception of Ireland,

⁴³⁸ In order to understand the evolution of the anti-Americanism in Spain and in the PSOE see: Maria Elena Cavallaro, "L'evoluzione dell'antiamericanismo nel Partito socialista spagnolo dal franchismo alla transizione democratica". In *L'antiamericanismo in Italia e in Europa nel secondo dopoguerra*, edited by Piero Craveri e Gaetano Quagliariello (Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2004), 519-538.

⁴³⁹ Fernando Rodrigo, "La inserción de España en la política de seguridad occidental", in *Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática* edited by Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo and Jonathan Story, (Spain: Alianza Editorial 1995). 96.

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all the EEC member states (even Portugal and Greece) joined NATO. Hence, although there is not a direct link between NATO membership and the EEC, many scholars interpreted it as a pre-condition for the Spanish accession to the EEC. For example, the German and the British government expressed their desire for Spain to join NATO.⁴⁴⁰ In this light, the referendum was finally held, but with some delays since it took place in March 1986, after Spain was already a member of the EEC.

Therefore, the EEC was a crucial element in the definition of the Spanish policy. It is undeniable that the EEC was a benchmark for the democratic transition of Spain because the Community acted as a catalyst for democratization through a wide range of economic, political, and social incentives linked to democracy. Furthermore, the EEC was seen as a factor of convergence among Spanish leaders since the Community was a shared goal⁴⁴¹. As a result, the “power” that the EEC had in the definition and formulation of policies in Spain was very meaningful, just as Madrid demonstrated its preference for a European policy rather than an Atlantic one. The NATO process confirmed (first rejection and then acceptance) this orientation. Indeed, it was in this context that the economic adjustment program and the decision to join the NATO, among others, were carried out. This issue, however, will be subsequently addressed.

In brief, this chapter has reconstructed the evolution of the PSOE from its clandestine situation to its ascension into power in 1982 and its following victories. Furthermore, throughout these pages, it has been observed that a combination of national and external factors as well as a historical juncture (the international political context of the mid-1970s was definitively more favourable to democratization than in previous times) has led to the democratic transition of the country. This section has also shown how Western actors (e.g. parties, foundations and transnational party organizations like the SI) played a key role in this process, since transnational party networks existed.

⁴⁴⁰ Julio Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration 1957-85*. (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 169.

⁴⁴¹ Damián A. González Madrid, “Actores y factores internacionales en el cambio político español. Una Mirada a la historiografía”. In *Claves Internacionales en la transición española*, edited by Óscar José Martín García and Manuel Ortiz Heras (eds), (Madrid: Catarata, 2010), 55-61.

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Moreover, this chapter has addressed the ideological shift of the PSOE (resulted again from the combination of domestic needs and international clouts) just as it has shown how some of the postulates (mainly the economic ones) have changed while others (mainly political ones) have materialized. In the first, the target of the EEC membership has contributed to this turn, since Spain has considered the EEC as a benchmark for its own democratization and modernization. The economic adjustment, necessary for the accession to the EEC, led the government to undertake some policies that sometimes were contrary to the initial postulates, i.e. those promised during the electoral campaign. Therefore, the PSOE has experienced asymmetry in terms of materialization of political and economic elements. This behavior, although it contributed to the Spanish accession to the EEC, was considered by the trade unions and part of the population as a betrayal to the initial party pledges. Within this context, a general strike was carried out, which adversely impacted the party.

Additionally, this section has discussed how Spanish foreign policy has been “normalized” under the PSOE government as well as how the PSOE has benefited from international prestige and contacts acquired in the 1970s for its own national legitimation, electoral success, and international inclusion. Likewise, during these years, the Spanish government defined the external policy of the country, in which some of the original PSOE’s *political* postulates were materialized. Indeed, Madrid somehow tried to emulate at the other side of the Atlantic such of the practices that the SI had carried out inside its own national borders. This was also achieved thanks to the contribution that the PSOE exerted inside the SI as well as the historical, cultural, and social proximity between the two regions. This, however, will be addressed in the following chapter.

4.2. Latin America in the Spanish Foreign Policy

As noted previously, under the PSOE Government Spanish external transition was achieved. As a matter of fact, the socialists made efforts to deploy a coherent, efficient and global foreign policy that they demonstrated once in power. According to Ángel Viñas,

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there were some guidelines that determined the relations between Spain and the rest of the world: (i) laying foundations for the long-term economic recovery; (ii) contributing to the global balance; (iii) preserving the status quo in the Spanish security environment; and (iv) contributing to peace and democratization processes, particularly in Latin America.⁴⁴² Moreover, the PSOE was very interested in including Spain on the international stage and concluding the period of international isolation. Likewise, it is important to recall once again that the PSOE in the 1970s strived to establish an international nexus in order to achieve greater legitimacy, support, and recognition. This behavior was particularly carried out towards Europe and Latin America, where the SI facilitated these practices.

Indeed, the SI helped the Spanish Socialist party in building international contacts prior to coming to power. In this way, the PSOE and notably González became an important benchmark on the other side of the Atlantic. Quoting Wolf Grabendorff, the interest of the SI and the PSOE in Latin America were complementary since on one hand the PSOE requested the support of the SI to renew its contacts with Latin America and on the other, the Spanish socialist party, being directly involved in the successful democratic transition of the Iberian country, became a sort of masterpiece for the SI project, namely the Latin American democratization.⁴⁴³ Additionally, it should also be noted that given the cultural affinities with Latin America, Spain would become an effective and real interlocutor in the eyes of the SI.

Within this context, the SI prepared several missions headed by González and some of the PSOE members. Others were personal journeys that González made in the region. In any case, the press noted the high frequency of their trips and their impact on international relations. For instance, the Latin American Political Report (London, October 27, 1978) reported and emphasized the strengthening of links between Europe and Latin America thanks to the SI actions. Furthermore, the text alluded to the fact that González had already visited the region four times that year and other missions were yet to come (e.g. twice before Christmas). According to this article, the reason of these trips relied on the will of

⁴⁴² Viñas, “La política exterior y de seguridad del gobierno socialista español” In *Realidades y Posibilidades*, 220.

⁴⁴³ Grabendorff, “International Support for Democracy”, 213.

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González as well as of all the European social democracy to overthrow all the fascist dictatorships in the region, just like in the Iberian Peninsula.⁴⁴⁴ Therefore, such missions did not go unnoticed.

Indeed, within the SI missions and the PSOE and González trips, one could recall:

- (i) In 1976, Felipe González and Willy Brandt asked Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo to visit Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay in order to explore the possibility of establishing a SI commission in those countries. This trip was carried out before the first Conference of Caracas held on May 23-25, 1976. Yáñez-Barnuevo visited Chile (where he met other socialists and even went to Allende's grave) and Argentina, but he was not allowed to enter Uruguay because he was declared *persona non grata* there. He prepared a report in which he warned Brandt and González of all the difficulties that they might have if they tried to visit this area; thus, he did not recommend them to travel there. However, this trip was important since Yáñez-Barnuevo was able to observe first hand and notice the violation of human rights in those countries. As he said, international public opinion did not talk about the *desaparecidos* (missing people) or about the violation of human rights at the time. In those years, the international public opinion considered the dictatorships of the Southern Cone as a consequence of terrorism and lack of order but nobody was really concerned or knew about the real human condition there. According to Yáñez-Barnuevo, thanks to this trip, he was the first person to deal with the problem of *desaparecidos* and was able to obtain information regarding the local situation and the real conditions of people, information that he could not have accessed from outside. Accordingly, this journey was very important to “discover” the human rights violations there and for the subsequent worldwide concern.⁴⁴⁵
- (ii) The mission formed by Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Rafael Escuredo, Guillermo Galeote, and Monica Threlfall who on July 8-21, 1978 visited Bolivia, Chile,

⁴⁴⁴ Informe periodístico en Londres, “La Internacional Socialista intensifica los contactos entre Europa y América Latina” (27 October 1978). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1128.

⁴⁴⁵ Interview with Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid June 20, 2018.

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Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. The aims of the trip varied according to the political situation in each country. In Bolivia, they supported the candidature of Hernán Siles Zuazo from the UIP (*Unión Democrática Popular*) in the elections that were to be held on July 9, 1978, and were going to act as international observers of the electoral procedures. In Chile, they tried to carry out an inquiry regarding the missing prisoners, in particular they focused on the case of Carlos Lorca, leader of the Chilean Youth Socialists. In Argentina and Uruguay, the delegation looked to have talks with the local authorities regarding violation of human rights and to try to visit certain Spanish detainees. In Brazil, they aimed to learn about the political situation in view of the elections that will be held the following year;⁴⁴⁶

- (iii) The trip of Guillermo Galeote to Bolivia in June-July 1978 with the aim of assisting the electoral campaign and ensuring free and transparent elections;⁴⁴⁷
- (iv) The mission headed by Miguel Ángel Martínez in August 1978 in Panama in order to monitor the elections. Martínez observed voting not only as a PSOE delegate but also as an SI representative;⁴⁴⁸
- (v) The mission discussed above in the Southern Cone (scheduled for November 1979), which was a real fiasco since the authoritarian regimes refused the visit;
- (vi) On July 24-27, 1979 González visited Caracas to comply with the invitation made by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). During his stay, González met Carlos Andrés Pérez with the aim of discussing the Nicaraguan and Bolivian situation;
- (vii) On July 27-29, 1979 General Secretary of the Spanish socialist party travelled to Panama in order to meet Omar Torrijos;

⁴⁴⁶ Luis Yáñez Barnuevo: PSOE International Secretary, PSOE Executive Committee (1975-1979), President of the PSOE in Andalusia (1980-1985), Secretary of State for International Cooperation and for Ibero-America (1985-1991). Rafael Escuredo: member of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party of Andalusia and President of Andalusia (1979-1984), 4th Secretary to the Congress. Guillermo Galeote: PSOE Propaganda Secretary and deputy for Córdoba (1977-1993); Monica Threlfall: Member of the PSOE International Commission. Letter from Carmen Rodríguez to Bernt Carlsson (Madrid, July 4 1978). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1168.

⁴⁴⁷ Memorandum from Rodney to Bernt (July, 4, 1978). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1168.

⁴⁴⁸ Telex from Felipe González to Bernt Carlsson (August 2, 1978). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1168.

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- (viii) The mission in Nicaragua in July-August 1979 headed by González and Martínez.⁴⁴⁹ In Managua, they saw how the Junta of National Reconstruction was formed and they observed the local situation firsthand, i.e. health problems, food shortages, and public order matters. After this trip, Felipe González and Miguel Ángel Martínez agreed to a cooperation plan in which the PSOE offered the Junta of National Reconstruction (which was appointed by the Sandinistas in July 1979) medical assistance in Spain and psychological and material support to the victims of the war. The expenses were covered with the money collected by the PSOE in the bank account of Solidarity with Managua. In addition to this, in 1981 the Defense Committee of the Nicaraguan Revolution was created, which was chaired by González himself. The support of González, as well as of European social democracy in general, towards the Sandinista movement was mainly because it presented itself as a reformist and pluralist group with a non-aligned position (i.e. neither Soviet and nor Cuban) that fought for human rights.⁴⁵⁰ To some extent, the Nicaraguan Revolution was perceived as a political experiment closer to social democratic conceptions, aspirations, and ideals, at least in the beginning;
- (ix) The journey of González to Cuba, Panama, and the United States on 4-9 December 1980, where he met Fidel Castro, Torrijos, and political actors from El Salvador;
- (x) The tour of Felipe González to Central America in December 1981 in order to draft a report for the SI before its meeting the following February in Caracas. During this trip, González visited Panama, Cuba, Nicaragua and Mexico. The Spaniard criticized the elections planned for March 28, 1982 in El Salvador since, according to him, they were a “farce” and he also blamed the support given to these elections by the Organization of American States during its last meeting in St. Lucia. Additionally, in Panama, González met the President Aristides Royo as well as diverse socialist democratic leaders of the region,

⁴⁴⁹ Miguel Ángel Martínez: member of the PSOE He also represented [Ciudad Real Province](#) in the [Spanish Congress of Deputies](#) from 1977 to 1999. Telephone Communication, from F. to B & H. (July 30, 1979). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1170.

⁴⁵⁰ Castañeda, *La utopia*, 126-127.

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including Carlos Andrés Pérez from Venezuela and José Francisco Peña from the Dominican Republic, with whom he prepared a proposal for peace in Central America. In Nicaragua, González visited some of Sandinista's leaders, with whom he reiterated the SI's support for the revolutionary process in this country. Before leaving Spain, he actually had stated the following: "the Nicaraguan revolution was one of the most generous in modern history and was inspired by the aim of creating a progressive and society, including all the necessary elements for a mixed marked economy". From Nicaragua, he also added that he was worried about the behavior of the USA that "polarized the opinion in that country and pushed tensions in the region". Furthermore, in relation to stability and progress in the region, the leader of the PSOE met with Fidel Castro and Lopez Portillo, President of Mexico, who reiterated the support of the SI for the Franco-Mexican declaration and recognized the legitimacy of the FMLN-FDR opposition in El Salvador.⁴⁵¹ The trip was carried out in view of the SI Party Leaders' Conference that was to be held in Caracas on February 24-25, 1982. With this aim, Felipe González and Carlos Andrés Pérez had to prepare a report on the situation in Central America in order to discuss this matter during the meeting in Caracas.⁴⁵²

Thus, Felipe González was often in charge of Latin American issues because of his proximity, interest, and knowledge about this region. Not only did he represent the SI several times in meetings and matters related to Latin America, but he was also called to prepare reports in order to keep the SI informed and was often consulted on all aspects that involved Latin America and the Caribbean.⁴⁵³ Hence, it can be said that González acted as an interlocutor between the SI and Latin America, visited the region several times allowing

⁴⁵¹ "Felipe González tours Central America" From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1173.

⁴⁵² Letter from Bernt Carlsson to Elena Flores (February 2, 1982) From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1173.

⁴⁵³ For instance, González represented the SI at the meeting in Granada (23-24 July 1981). Telex from Bernt Carlsson to the PSOE (3 June 1981). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1172. Likewise, Carlsson asked the PSOE to represent the SI at "the Seminar on the Uruguayan Case in the Context of other Dictatorships in Latin America (Barcelona, 5-7 June 1980). Telex from Bernt Carlsson to Felipe González (5 June 1980). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1171.

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him to enhance his knowledge in this area, established links with these territories, and gained prestige and international recognition. As a matter of fact, the SI did not hesitate to recognize all his efforts and commitments during its activities.⁴⁵⁴

Therefore, Spanish socialism (as well as Portuguese socialism) worked as a “liaison” between the two sides of the Atlantic, in particular once González came to power⁴⁵⁵. Portugal with Mario Soares also contributed to this dialogue although it was less intense and mainly limited to Central American issues.⁴⁵⁶ Hence, some questions arise here: Why was Latin America so important for Spain? Why was there desire to strengthen relations? The available information suggests that this was largely due to the Spanish political purpose of Europeanizing its links with Latin America and Ibero-Americanizing those with Europe. Thus, Latin America could be useful for Spain because it would allow them to acquire prestige and influence within the EEC. The Spanish entry into the EEC, in turn, would also allow it to play a more important role in Latin America.

Hence, it should be remembered that Felipe González, as Vice President of the SI, was involved in Latin American affairs and played a fundamental role in the Spanish transition itself. His objective was to promote democracy inside and outside Spain, a strategy that was known as “new Spanish diplomacy”.⁴⁵⁷ With the aim of promoting democracy in Latin America, the Spanish Socialist government launched cooperation policies towards the

⁴⁵⁴ Letter from Bernt Carlsson to Felipe González, (6 June, 1979). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1170.

⁴⁵⁵ Related to this, the *Latin America Political Report* (Vol. XII, N. 41, 20 October 1978) published an article in which the following was stated: “A number of different factors can be found to explain this furious round of visits and conferences. Perhaps the most important single factor has been the emergence of social democratic parties as powerful political forces in the Iberian Peninsula following the collapse of fascist dictatorship in Portugal and Spain. [...] At a more serious level, there is an idea that Spain should become a kind of bridge between Latin America and the European Economic Community”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1129. In August 1978, Marcelino Oreja (Minister of Foreign Affairs from the UCD) pointed out the guiding principles that ruled relations between Spain and Latin America: interdependence, continuity and non-discrimination. In Oreja’s words, there is “a tie that linked us as sister communities, the vocation of Spain to offer itself as a bridge between Latin America and Europe, and the will to fight to be a factor of integration”. In Silvia Enrich, *Historia Diplomática entre España e Iberoamérica en el contexto de las relaciones internacionales (1955-1985)*. Madrid: Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica, 1989, 150

⁴⁵⁶ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid (June 20, 2018)

⁴⁵⁷ Jean Grugel, “España y Latinoamérica”. In *Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática*, edited by R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo, J. Story. (Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1995), 108-208.

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region and promoted social democratic values such as democracy and the protection of human and civil rights.⁴⁵⁸ Thus, this shows once again that the SI became a meeting point and a benchmark for both the PSOE and Latin American related parties. As a matter of fact, under the PSOE administration, the Latin American policy of Spain achieved a continuity and intensity as never before. In this sense, the SI played an important role in the construction of the PSOE external position as well as in the definition of some of its international objectives (foreign policy) that the Spanish action in Latin America revealed.⁴⁵⁹

However, it would be worth pointing out that the policy towards Latin America was not a completely new project because during Franco's regime certain actions were developed in a similar way. Here one can recall the notion of *Hispanidad*, which aimed to recover the image of an imperial Spain in order to legitimize the regime and consolidate a national identity with international reach. Similarly, during the government of Adolfo Suárez (1976-1981), a new stage of Ibero-American relations began to be constructed. Within this context the Declaration of Caracas in March 1979 and the Declaration of Quito in August 1979 were signed. The former aimed at maintaining reasonable terms of international exchange between Spain and some Latin American countries after the rising of oil prices; the latter, signed by Suárez and the Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru, expressed their will to continue with the institutionalization of freedom and democracy in the region.⁴⁶⁰

Although Suárez understood the importance of rethinking Latin American politics in the late 1970s, it was only under the first socialist government that the region clearly became one of the central axes of the Madrid's foreign policy. As Celestino del Arenal points out, however, the efforts carried out by the centrist leader should not be underestimated since they contributed to increasing the Spanish presence and role in the continent and to providing a new climate in the relationship between Spain and Latin America. Notwithstanding, during this phase of the transition, the policy towards Latin America gave

⁴⁵⁸ Arenal, *La política exterior de España*, 102.

⁴⁵⁹ Blasquez Vilaplana, *La proyección*, 82-83.

⁴⁶⁰ Enrich, *Historia Diplomática*, 153-154.

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the impression of being more a “substitution policy” against the blockades and difficulties that Spain was experiencing on its way to the EEC rather than a priority policy as it was during the González government.⁴⁶¹

The main concern of Calvo Sotelo in terms of external policy consisted in ensuring national security and the integrity of the national territory. As he claimed during his swearing-in ceremony on February 18, 1981, “foreign and defense policy were inseparable”. As a result, he based his external policy on the following: (i) ensuring security and national defense, (ii) safeguarding ethical and spiritual values; and (iii) defending Spanish individual and collective principles. Accordingly, he aimed to achieve a clear definition of the European policy inside a democratic and Western frame. Even if Calvo Sotelo recognized the added value that Latin America could provide to Spain, he gave primacy to the European policy by strengthening bilateral relations with Portugal and France and joining NATO.⁴⁶²

With that being said, the great capital that the socialists had in relation to Latin America consisted of the fact that since the 1970s they had been working in and with Latin American countries. Personal ties with both European Social Democrats and their Latin American peers were of fundamental importance.⁴⁶³ Indeed, since the meeting of Caracas in 1976 in which Europeans and Latin Americans participated, González established close links with practically all the Latin American leaders.

On his part, Emilio A. Rodríguez explained the difference between the UCD and the PSOE policy towards Latin America in the following manner. According to him, the UCD looked to Latin America with the aim of legitimizing and supporting the Spanish transition to democracy, while the PSOE (“the Government of consolidation”), once in power, embarked on the task of exporting the democratizing process in that region. Within this

⁴⁶¹ Celestino del Arenal, “La política exterior española en Iberoamérica (1982-1992)”, In *La política exterior española en el siglo XX*, edited by Rafael Calduch, (Madrid: Ediciones Ciencias Sociales, 1994), 283.

⁴⁶² “Discurso de Don Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo en la sección de Investidura. Referencia a la Política Exterior (18/02/1981)”, *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1981*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 103-105.

⁴⁶³ Mujal-León, “Iberoamérica en la nueva política exterior”, 139.

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context, the following elements defined the transatlantic relations: (1) the government endorsement of the democratic processes; (2) the personal role of President González; (3) the Spanish support for the Contadora's efforts; and (4) the strong and constant support of King Juan Carlos I for the Latin American democratization. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Juan Carlos I was the first King of Spain who visited Latin America (the first trip was on May 31, 1976). He, along with Queen Sofia, visited almost all of the Latin American States.⁴⁶⁴ This also confirmed the greater readiness and commitment that Spain reached at the time on establishing strong relationships with Latin America.⁴⁶⁵ Likewise, Rodríguez also pointed out that González started his administration proposing to the SI (February 1983) that the Spanish transition could be a model for Latin America.⁴⁶⁶

Indeed, following the will of the PSOE and Latin American “socialist” parties, joint actions began to be carried out with the aim of explaining and promoting what had been the Spanish democratic transition. Within this context, the meetings “Encounter in Democracy” began to be held in Madrid, where the PSOE and the Latin American progressive parties met to discuss the Spanish democratic transitions.

Besides this, the PSOE was also considered a successful example in terms of ideological transformation since, as stated earlier, it passed from a rigid Marxism to a social democracy. This had a great impact in Latin America since the Latin American left wing

⁴⁶⁴ The interest and presence of the Spanish Crown in Latin America was also formalized by the Constitution of 1978. Indeed, the Constitutional article 56.1. stated that: “The King is the Head of State, symbol of its unity and permanence. He arbitrates and moderates the regular working of the institutions, assumes the highest representation of the Spanish State in international relations, especially with those nations belonging to the same historic community, and performs the functions expressly conferred on him by the Constitution and the law”. Retrieved from <http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=56&tipo=2>

⁴⁶⁵ Juan Antonio March Pujol, “The making of Ibero-American Space”. In *The Ibero-American Space. Dimension and Perceptions of the Special Relationship between Spain and Latin America*, edited by Joaquín Roy and Albert Galinsoga Jordá. (Miami: Iberian Studies Institute. University of Miami-University of Leida, 1997), 7-8.

⁴⁶⁶ Emilio A. Rodríguez, “Transición a la democracia en España. ¿Hacia una nueva política Iberoamericana?”. In *Realidades y posibilidades*, 164. The Venezuelan Carlos Andrés Pérez confirmed the Spanish proximity to Latin America since the end of the 1970s as well as the relevancy of the Spanish transition for the regional democratization. Indeed, in 1978 he stated: “Just three years ago, our Ibero-American world suffered the presence of a silent Spain, alien and distant. In two years, we have witnesses with fraternal enthusiasm the splendid birth of a democratic Spain called to play a transcendent role on a planetary level. The Iberian Peninsula, located at a crucial crossroads of the geography of the world, is today forged to be a determining nation in the destinies of peace and universal fellowship”. Statement made by Carlos Andrés Pérez in Enrich, *Historia Diplomática*,. 152.

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has always been associated with the Cuban case and *guerrillas*. Latin Americans, therefore, understood that an ideological shift could be possible (see Chapter 3.4) just as the establishment of a stable government for a longer period was proven the PSOE. Additionally, the idea of the PSOE as a model was also clear from the assistance and training that some Latin American groups received from the Spanish Socialist party. For instance, James F. Petras claimed that some of the members of the Panamanian PRD (*Partido Revolucionario Democrático*), the party of Omar Torrijos who maintained a close relationship with Felipe González, were sent to Spain to be trained by the PSOE.⁴⁶⁷ It was perhaps not by chance that the PRD was founded after the first meeting between Torrijos and González in 1978.⁴⁶⁸

Likewise, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán, highlighted the relevancy of the PSOE in the Latin American democratization. According to him, “the political legitimization of Spanish socialism has served in some measures as a catalyst for the Latin American Left’s opening to more Western-style definitions. The importance of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party in the process, both before and after its assumption of power, is widely recognized”⁴⁶⁹. In addition, Moran had very clear the roles that Spain, as a democratic country and middle power, could play in the international arena. Firstly, Spain could overcome or reduce the international matters produced by the world division into two blocs. Secondly, Spain could exert a moderate influence on the tensions between the two superpowers. Thirdly, Spain should articulate some concepts such as human rights, the North-South issue, and arms control. But above all, Morán considered that Spanish democratization should contribute to the development of a new political language at the international level. Latin America fit into this conception.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁷ Petras, “La socialdemocracia en América Latina”, 74.

⁴⁶⁸ Manuel Alcántara Sáenz, “Spanish Social Democracy and Latin America” In *Social Democracy in Latin America.*, edited by Menno Vellinga, 108

⁴⁶⁹ Fernando Morán, “Europe’s Role in Central America: A Spanish Socialist View”. In *Third World Instability Central America as a European Issue*, edited by Andrew J. Pierre, (USA: Council of Foreign Relations, 1985), 37.

⁴⁷⁰ Jean Grugel, “Spain’s Socialist government and Central America dilemmas”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 63, N. 4, Autumn 1987, 604

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Moreover, Felipe González showed great sensitivity to the lack of democracy in the Southern Cone countries and in Central American (particularly in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala). The Spanish leader, following the guidelines of the SI, developed actions in this region and even came to recognize publicly that these actions (e.g. meetings with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua) were outside the competence of the Spanish diplomacy.⁴⁷¹ There were mainly two mechanisms used by the PSOE to promote democracy: firstly, through policies that included cooperation and economic modernization (e.g. stimulating economic ties between Spain, the EEC, and the Latin American countries that embarked on a democratization process); and secondly, through the promotion of the moderation of the Latin American left (in this last issue the SI played a part and the the PSOE's experience was considered as a model).⁴⁷² Furthermore, Spain was able to play a key role in these territories since it also had a great diplomatic presence in the region (representatives in every Latin American country) and a large myriad of structures (e.g. enterprises, banks, religious communities, language academies, etc).⁴⁷³

Accordingly, under the PSOE Administration, Latin America became one of the key dimensions, or a central axis, of Spanish foreign policy. The PSOE, in relation to the Spanish policy towards Latin America, aimed to convert the traditional rhetorical statements into a real, structured, effective, constant and long-term daily policy.⁴⁷⁴ The government was aware that it needed to make efforts at all levels in order to develop this dimension. Thus, many strategies came to light. For instance, Foreign Minister Fernando Morán proposed to allow Spaniards to choose between the payment of the planned religious tax or a contribution to Third World development. Likewise, in early 1983, he suggested the foundation of a development agency for gathering all the initiatives from the associative

⁴⁷¹ Grugel, "España y Latinoamérica". 202.

⁴⁷² Grugel, "Spain and LA: "The Special Relationship" in Democracy". In *The Ibero-American Space*, 143-144.

⁴⁷³ A. Jr. Moss, "España y Estados Unidos en la problemática Iberoamericana" In *Realidades y posibilidades*, 131.

⁴⁷⁴ "Intervención del Ministro de AA.EE, Don Fernando Morán, en el debate sobre política exterior en el Congreso de los Diputados (25/10/1983)" *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1983*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 532.

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movements since, according to him, “external relations were not made between chancelleries but from society to society”.⁴⁷⁵

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that besides the Spanish commitment to defend democracy and human rights throughout the entire continent, the Spanish Government worked to increase cooperation. As a matter of fact, the PSOE government strived to establish institutions for development cooperation. According to Francisco Villar, until the mid-1980s, there was no real Spanish development cooperation policy. However, after the restructuring of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Secretariat for International Cooperation and Ibero-America (SECIPI) was created in August 1985 (Decree 1484/1985), and one year later the Inter-Ministerial Commission for International Cooperation (CICI) was founded. These joined the Institute for Latin American Cooperation (ICI) created in 1979 and now headed by Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo. The ICI (since 1988 AECID- Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation) had the following tasks: (i) to prepare the Annual Plans of International Cooperation (PACI); (ii) to control, plan, and assess the Foreign Ministry’s action on all the issues concerning cooperation; and (iii) to coordinate all the cooperation activities carried out by other institutions. According to the President of the ICI, the Institute was conceived by Spain as the main instrument to bring people from both sides of the Atlantic closer together⁴⁷⁶.

Yáñez-Barnuevo also underlined the fact that it was the proper time (in terms of historical and political conditions) to deepen relations because the Hispanic world, as a collective, had to build an increasingly integrated and intertwined reference center that could defend itself and face other poles and other reference centers. To this end, the cooperation project was to be developed in three dimensions:

- (i) Cultural cooperation, which meant increasing the number of scholarships, the defense of the Spanish language, and the promotion of exhibitions, music, etc.

⁴⁷⁵ “Entrevista concedida por el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Don Fernando Morán, al Diario “La Vanguardia” (13/02/1983). *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1983*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 135

⁴⁷⁶ In this context, since 1988 Spain started, little by little, to establish Friendship and Cooperation treaties with the Latin American countries.

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Indeed, the exchange of information, knowledge, and communication between both sides of the Atlantic became very important; hence, the ICI made efforts to strengthen contacts with the Spanish News Agency EFE, Spanish National Radio, Spanish National Television, and with public and private press. The aim was to increase the presence and extent of the Spanish media in Latin America as well as to improve the availability of Latin American information in the Iberian Peninsula.

- (ii) Scientific and technical cooperation that implied improvement in terms of health, education, and literacy. Moreover, part of the project envisaged sending unemployed experts to train and assist those in need in Latin America. With the aim of avoiding any criticism, it was specified that it was not an alternative to overcome unemployment, but a good option for young professionals to gain work experience and knowledge.
- (iii) Economic cooperation. The objective of the ICI was to create the framework and conditions for economic cooperation since the Ministry of Economy and Finance had the concrete tools (funds) to develop this policy. Therefore, the ICI encouraged the exchange of economists, experts, entrepreneurs, and meetings between multilateral organizations, such as ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) and FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations). Moreover, the institution edited the magazine *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* (“Ibero-American Thought) with the aim of contributing to the promotion of this policy.⁴⁷⁷

The first meeting organized by the ICI was held in April 1983. The topic was “Ibero-America: Encounter in Democracy” and for the first time representatives from both sides of the Atlantic attended the meeting. The objective was to reflect together about their socio-political relations as well as on their cultural and economic bonds. Likewise, they agreed to

⁴⁷⁷ “Intervención del Presidente del Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, Don Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo García ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Congreso para informar sobre las actividades del Instituto (9/03/1983)”. *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1983*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 192-218.

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endorse the initiative of the Contadora Group⁴⁷⁸. Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo argued that since the Socialist administration came to power, Spanish foreign policy changed, especially in terms of behavior towards Latin America because paternalism was abandoned and principles such as equality and solidarity between nations were adopted as cornerstone of the Spanish policy towards Latin America. As a result, social democratic values such as democracy, peace, and respect for human rights became the central axes of the Spanish foreign policy. The relevancy of this encounter and the efforts made by Spaniards in fortifying the relationships between the two regions were due to the perception of the Spanish government that only by Spaniards and Latin Americans working together, Spain can become an important benchmark in the international arena. With this objective, González's government aimed to develop a long-term state policy towards Latin America.⁴⁷⁹

These encounters were accompanied by bilateral agreements and meetings held in Latin America, in particular in those countries ruled by authoritarian regimes. The objective was to discuss Spanish democratization and share this experience with local people. According to Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Sao Paolo, Santiago, Asuncion, and Montevideo were some of the venues of these meetings. Some of the main actors of the Spanish democratization attended these reunions. The PSOE often invited some of the militaries that have contributed to the transition in order to make their position known in those countries where the armies were committed to the dictatorships. Furthermore, politicians, entrepreneurs, and professors attended these encounters with the aim of sharing their own experiences and underlining the benefits of democratization. According to Yáñez-Barnuevo, these encounters had a great impact and enormous media power (e.g. newspapers published several articles on these meetings) in such a way that they influenced public opinion and contributed to the fight against dictatorships.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁸ “Resolución sobre América Central del encuentro “Iberoamérica en la Democracia” Madrid April 29, 1983. From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box 38372, file 8.

⁴⁷⁹ Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, “Iberoamérica: encuentro en la democracia”, *El País*, 26/04/1983. Retrieved from: https://elpais.com/diario/1983/04/26/opinion/420156011_850215.html

⁴⁸⁰ Interview with Luis Yáñez Barnuevo, Madrid, 20 June 2018.

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Therefore, the PSOE administration combined two policies towards Latin America: on one hand, international solidarity, democratization, and defense of human rights; on the other, the definition of a cooperation policy by the Iberian country. In the same line of thought, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI), an agency that depended on the SECIPI, was created in 1988.⁴⁸¹ The Spanish cooperation addressed specific sectors in Latin America: health, education, agriculture, and nutrition. The first area that benefited from this assistance was Central America in 1984. Indeed, this year, Spain spent almost 80% of the cooperation on the other side of the Atlantic.⁴⁸² This was carried out through the Plan for Integrated Cooperation (*Plan de Cooperación Integral*), a PSOE project, which was implemented by the ICI in order to assist Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras. This initiative was a blueprint for the following cooperation projects and for the SECIPI. According to Jean Grugel, the election of these countries was not accidental because the PSOE government aimed to demonstrate its support and real commitment to the region. This could also have been a response to the pressures of the Contadora Group, which had called for greater involvement and real presence in the region.⁴⁸³

In any case, Latin America was the area that benefited most from Spanish development aid. For instance, in 1989, 53.16% of the total Spanish aid was allocated to Latin America (21.67 % to Africa, 7.23% to Asia and Oceania, and 7.61% to the Arab countries)⁴⁸⁴ and in 1992, Latin America received 80% of the Spanish cooperation assistance. Notwithstanding, the official development assistance of Spain remained fairly lower of GDP⁴⁸⁵. In this sense, the already mentioned asymmetries between the “political progresses” in Latin America (e.g. democratization or, as described below, the Five-Hundredth Anniversary) and the “economic progresses” came to light once again.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸¹ Villar, *La Transición exterior de España*, 119 and 208. Antonio Gabriel Roson Alonso, “Un decenio de cooperación española al desarrollo”. In *La política exterior española*, 335-367.

⁴⁸² Enrich, *Historia Diplomática*, 174.

⁴⁸³ Grugel, “Spain’s Socialist government”, 610-611.

⁴⁸⁴ Alonso Zaldívar and Castells, *España*, 419.

⁴⁸⁵ According to Celestino del Arenal, throughout the 1980s, there was no clear relation between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the GDP, for instance in 1982 the relation ODA/GDP was 0.13%, in 1983 it was 0.04% and from 1984 until the relation remained around the 0.09%. Arenal, *La política exterior de España*, 194.

⁴⁸⁶ Julio Sanz López, *Las Conmemoraciones del V Centenario y su valor internacional para España en 1992, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 40, (2018): 334.

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The Spanish and Latin American connections also became visible through the preparation of the “Five-Hundredth Anniversary of the Encounter between the Two Worlds” (to be held in 1992).⁴⁸⁷ With the idea of being an instrument for the future in which cooperation would be at the heart of this project, this commemoration was seen as the opportunity to achieve further Ibero-American integration by taking advantage of the historical dimension of the date.⁴⁸⁸ Although the creation of a National Commission for the Commemoration was actually ordered by the former government (April 10, 1981), the first meeting between representatives of the two sides of the Atlantic took place in 1983 (under the PSOE’s Administration), which presented some changes in relation to the original version.⁴⁸⁹

With the purpose of preparing such an event, ten meetings were held and representatives from both sides of the Atlantic participated; the first meeting was held in Santa Fé (Granada, Spain) in 1983 and the last one in Veracruz, México in 1992. These aimed to seek common ground and to find a way to strengthen the ties between Spain and Latin America. It was a meeting point among Ibero-American countries where a set of common interests started to be defined. This evolved along with the cooperation policy that the ICI tried to develop, which those who planned the Five-Hundredth Anniversary considered crucial in order to facilitate the bi-regional proximity and to avoid any disagreement. Within this context, Spain, with the collaboration of the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), created the Cooperation Fund for the Five-Hundredth Anniversary, which reached a budget of 500 million dollars⁴⁹⁰.

⁴⁸⁷ In the beginning, Chicago proposed itself to host the Five-Hundredth Anniversary. This in some way encouraged Spain to rush into the preparations for the commemoration.

⁴⁸⁸ “Artículo firmado por el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Don Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez, en la Revista ‘Mundo Internacional’ sobre La Efemerides del Quinto Centenario, Semptember 1988” In *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1988*, Madrid, MAE, OID, p 276. “Declaraciones del presidente del Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, Don Luis Yáñez al diario Informaciones” (10/02/1983), *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1983*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 130.

⁴⁸⁹ “Contestación del Gobierno a la pregunta del diputado Don Pedro Schwartz Giron sobre la Comisión Nacional para la Conmemoración del V Centenario del Descubrimiento de América (8/11/1984). *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1984*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 338.

⁴⁹⁰ Alonso Zaldívar and Castells, *España*, 236

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Additionally, all of this contributed to the definition of the notion of the Ibero-American Community of Nations, i.e. links, interdependencies, interests, and values that have been built up over the years between Latin America, Spain, and Portugal. It is important to note that the term Ibero-America itself referred to the notion of “community” since it meant the aggregate Spanish and Portugues-speaking countries of Europe, i.e. Spain, Portugal, and Andorra, as well as Latin America. The interest in such entities was demonstrated during the conference of the Rio Group in 1990 when many countries made clear their desire to join such a project.⁴⁹¹ Hence, this sense of community found its highest expression in the launch of the Ibero-American Summits. The first was held in 1991 in Guadalajara, Mexico, where a multilateral dimension of Ibero-American policy began to emerge, since it aimed to go beyond the economic and political differences of the countries on behalf of that community.⁴⁹² The election of Mexico instead of Spain as the venue for the first Ibero-American Summit was due to the desire of the organizers to avoid any possible misunderstanding (i.e. the association with the historical conquest) over the image that the choice of Spain could produce.⁴⁹³

Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, in addition to leading the ICI, was responsible for the organization of the Five-Hundredth Anniversary. According to him, he proposed carrying out the commemorative activities and including all the countries of Latin America, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Indeed, in his words, the participation of Italy was important since there has always been controversy and misunderstanding regarding the Latin American discovery between the two countries. Many people (mainly Italians) asserted that Columbus’s expedition was actually Italian because the explorer was from Genoa. For others, particularly the Spaniards, they claimed that the ship was a Spanish venture. Nevertheless, Italy and Spain agreed that working together would be more fruitful instead of opposing each other. In this context, the 23 organizing commissions were successfully created and

⁴⁹¹ Antonia Martínez, Ismael Crespo and Ariel Jérez, “Between Europe and Ibero-America: The Political Discourse of the Spanish Government”. In *The Ibero-American Space.*, edited by J. Roy and A. Galinsoga Jordá, 113.

⁴⁹² For specific information on this topic, see: Celestino del Arenal, “La Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones”, D.T. 2009/1; Tomás Mallo, “De las Cumbres Iberoamericanas a la articulación de una Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones, In *España y América Latina. Relaciones y cooperación en el cambio de siglo.* (Madrid: Síntesis, 1997), vol. 27-28, 101-108; Sanz López, *Las Conmemoraciones del V Centenario.*

⁴⁹³ Sanz López, “Las Conmemoraciones del V Centenario”, 333.

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agreed to meet once a year. In words of Yáñez-Barnuevo, these meetings were useful to “lubricate” the relationship between Spain, Italy and Latin America.

Furthermore, Yáñez-Barnuevo also highlighted that the Five-Hundredth Anniversary was a great excuse for having several events in 1992, including the Universal Exposition (EXPO) hosted by Seville in which the theme was “The Age of Discovery”; the Barcelona Olympic games; the Ibero-American Summit of Heads of Government and State held in Madrid (II Ibero-American-Summit); the foundation of Casa America in Madrid with the purpose of strengthening bonds between Spain and Latin America; and the designation of Madrid as the European Capital of Culture.⁴⁹⁴ Accordingly, one can note that: (i) the Five-Hundredth Anniversary and the Ibero-American Summits were some of the initiatives that resulted from the projects and activities developed during the 1980s; (ii) it was not only Spain who tried to fortify bonds with the other side of the Atlantic; and (iii) there were different ways to approach Latin America.

Additionally, it could be said that all the activities carried out in 1992 were the materialization of the international position achieved by Spain under the PSOE administration during the 1980s, which at the same time was the result of all the international baggage accumulated during the 1970s through the SI activities. Therefore, as Celestino del Arenal has pointed out, 1992 represented the end of a stage in the Spanish-Latin American relationships since the Ibero-American community ceased to be a dream and started to become a reality.⁴⁹⁵ Therefore, it is possible to notice here an evolution over the years of the actions launched during the 1970s.

Additionally, there is another element that cannot be overestimated: the role of exiles. Spain experienced a first wave of migration in the early twentieth century when many Spaniards emigrated to Latin America in search of better living conditions and opportunities. However, years later, Franco’s regime led to a “differential migration”, since those who mainly migrated were the opponents of the government. Therefore, the countries

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁴⁹⁵ Arenal, *La política exterior de España*, 10.

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that received people from this second wave of exodus (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay) broadly supported the Republican cause⁴⁹⁶. As a result, during the democratic transition the PSOE established contacts with many of the Socialist Spanish exiles in Latin America who encouraged and facilitated the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. Some of the top destinations were: Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile⁴⁹⁷. Furthermore, the parties that ruled Venezuela and Costa Rica at the time were members of the SI; thus, these two governments became a benchmark for the PSOE and the SI in the region.

According to Manuel Alcántar Sanz, the party of Carlos Andrés Pérez even financially supported the PSOE, which was important for the growth of the Spanish socialist party.⁴⁹⁸ In addition to the Spanish migration in Latin America, during the democratic transition the Iberian country received many refugees from the countries that were under authoritarian regimes (mainly from the Southern Cone). For example, a strong connection with Chile was developed thanks to its exiles who were able to establish a large international network. In this way, they were able to influence international public opinion and increase great sensitivity within the international community to Chilean suffering.

As mentioned, when Spain embarked on the road to democracy, many Latin Americans arrived in the Iberian country. Indeed, the number of the Latin American refugees was so high that the PSOE prepared a memorandum on this matter in February 1978. In this document, the massive influx of Latin American migration after Franco's death as well as

⁴⁹⁶ For an overview of the Spanish migration, see: Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, "La política latinoamericana de España en el siglo XX", *Ayer*, 49, (2003): 121-160.

⁴⁹⁷ For instance, according to the Spanish Institute for migration in 1985, 1.180.957 of Spaniards resided in Latin America: 515.000 in Argentina, 3.201 in Bolivia, 236.396 in Brazil, 19.621 in Colombia, 2.500 in Costa Rica, 7.042 in Cuba, 30.000 in Chile, 3.280 in Ecuador, 606 in El Salvador, 1.476 in Guatemala, 49 in Haiti, 618 in Honduras, 31.362 in Mexico, 1.800 in Nicaragua, 12.000 in Panama, 3.500 in Paraguay, 8.040 in Peru, 3.069 in Puerto Rico, 9.030 in Dominican Republic, 65.000 in Uruguay, 297.207 in Venezuela. Data obtained from: "Contestación del Gobierno a la pregunta del diputado Don Arturo Escuder Croft sobre emigrantes españoles residentes actualmente en cada país de Iberoamérica", *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 463.

⁴⁹⁸ Alcántara Sánz, "Spanish Social Democracy" 108. According to Bernd Rother, during the Spanish transition to democracy, AD became one of the main funding sources for the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). Bernd Rother, "Cooperation between the European and Latin American Moderate Left in the 1970s and 1980s. In *Willy Brandt and International Relations. Europe, the USA and Latin America 1974-1992*. Edited by Bernd Rother and Klaus Larres. (Great Britain, Bloomsbury, 2019), 200.

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the desire of the Spanish socialist party to endorse the Latin American refugees was made clear. Moreover, this record stated:

- (i) The present government (UCD) strived to limit and to decrease the amount of foreigners due to the harrowing unemployment situation.
- (ii) The difficulty in determining the amount of Latin Americans in Spain was stressed since there was no asylum status there. As a result, it was also impossible to estimate the number of political refugees. Likewise, the report blamed the UCD Administration of “systematic and deliberate violations of the legal rights of Latin Americans” since in the absence of political asylum, “Latin American refugees in Spain are in theory able to benefit from a number of legal dispositions favoring citizens of the Hispanic world” (work permits, resident permits, and tourist visas).
- (iii) Some committees of Latin American refugees have been established without representing a political leadership. The exception was Chile since a UP committee was based in both cities Barcelona and Madrid.
- (iv) The main source of assistance and the support groups for Latin American refugees were: UNHCR –United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Red Cross, the Catholic Church, the Ebert Foundation, the Catholic Third World Group called CIDOB, and the PSOE.
- (v) Despite the economic situation, the integration was easier in Spain than in other countries thanks to the cultural affinities. Therefore, the memorandum suggested improving and increasing scholarship programs because they could be a good option in order to offer refugees long-term personal stability.⁴⁹⁹

In this regard, a mechanism used by the PSOE and the SI was to offer scholarships to help those who suffered political persecution and to pressure the authoritarian regimes for their release. For instance, according to the PSOE,

⁴⁹⁹ “Latin American Refugees in Spain: February 1978” On April 10, 1978, Luis Yáñez Barnuevo sent this memorandum to Bernt Carlsson. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1168.

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“The first priority for our scholarship should be those refugees who are actively engaged in solidarity work and guidance for other refugees with a view to improving the organization of these services. Our “scholar-workers” should be set to the task of orienting refugees to other possible sources of assistance, securing help for their documentation problems, advising them on work possibilities etc... This approach is especially relevant in Madrid and Barcelona, where a basis for this sort of work already exists”⁵⁰⁰.

Indeed, the PSOE received many applications for grants from people suffering political persecution in Latin America, since it became a means to reach freedom. To some extent it became a mechanism to obtain the release of political prisoners.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that grant applications as “means” for freedom was not exclusively a Spanish policy, since the SI (and the PSI, as will be pointed out below) acted in the same manner. However, both the asylum seeker and the SI itself often contacted the Spanish socialist party since Madrid offered greater opportunities for social inclusion because of the common language and culture. In order to obtain large educational grants and ensure fundings, both asylum seekers and the host countries often applied for the grant at the IUEF (International University Exchange Fund), an institution mainly financed by the Western European Governments. An example of this was the case of Juan Martín Guevara, the youngest brother of the Che Guevara. His case showed one of the SI’s ways of acting in relation to the refugees, as well as how an international/transnational network was built. On March 10, 1978, Bernt Carlsson contacted the IUEF in order to obtain a scholarship for Juan Martín Guevara who was accused of:

“‘Illegal association and arms possession’ but his real crime [was] that he [was] the youngest brother of Ernesto ‘che’ Guevara. Hence the possibility of offering him a scholarship will make it easier to approach the Argentinian authorities through

⁵⁰⁰Ibid. 5.

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diplomatic channels for his release [...] in order to get him out it seems necessary to be able to prove that a scholarship [was] waiting for him”.⁵⁰¹

On August 17 1978, Bernt Carlsson wrote to Celia Guevara (sister of Juan Martín Guevara) in order to inform her that the Socialist Party of Austria would guarantee a resident visa for him. To this end, the Austrian party requested the IUEF to transfer the scholarship from Madrid to Vienna and the Austrian Embassy in Buenos Aires to contact the Argentinian authorities for his release.⁵⁰² A few months later, Carlsson wrote to Felipe González with the aim of informing him that several sister parties pushed for the liberation of Guevara and the IUEF awarded him a scholarship. However, he needed a guarantee of admission into a European University. Hence, Carlsson asked González to collaborate on this because, sharing the same language, Spain could be the right place to streamline the application process. Accordingly, Carlsson asked González and the PSOE to intervene in this case.⁵⁰³

Consequently, the PSOE and the SI members tried to assist the political refugees by offering them some grants. This showed the commitment that these parties had towards the victims of political persecutions and their solidarity, as well as the fact that Latin American victims appealed to the SI parties in order to ask them for help. Furthermore, all of this testified the influence that exiles had in Europe as well as the European mobilization to aid them. A real network was built in order to press the authoritarian regimes in Latin America to release the political prisoners.

Besides this kind of assistance, the PSOE and the SI members in general made public declarations in order to pressure Latin American governments to liberate the victims of political persecution and to call for democratization and respect of human rights. Several times the families or friends of victims appealed to the SI asking for help. At this point, it is interesting to note the network established between the parties. For instance, the

⁵⁰¹ “Letter from Bernt Carlsson to Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, Director IUEF (10 March, 1978)”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1170.

⁵⁰² “Letter from Bernt Carlsson to Celia Guevara (17 August, 1978)”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1170.

⁵⁰³ “Letter from Bernt Carlsson to Felipe González (6 September, 1978)”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1170.

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imprisonment of José Pedro Cardoso, leader of the Uruguayan Socialist Party, is a good example of this network. Indeed, the external representation of the Uruguayan Socialist Party (based in Barcelona) contacted the SI secretary, Bernt Carlsson, with the aim of informing him of the incarceration of Cardoso and asking him to make public declarations for his release (this declarations should also be done by Willy Brandt as president of the SI).⁵⁰⁴ Willy Brandt, in fact, contacted the Uruguayan President, Aparacio Mendez, to express his concern on Cardoso's situation.⁵⁰⁵ Nonetheless, it was the PSOE which carried out concrete actions in the end. Indeed, on October 30, 1980, Elena Flores sent a telex to Carlsson informing him that Pedro Cardoso had been released after the negotiations held by a lawyer of the PSOE (with the collaboration of the German SPD) who had travelled to Montevideo to accomplish this task. Flores asked Carlsson to spread this good news to all the parties that have been interested in this matter.⁵⁰⁶ Accordingly, this was also another manner of action that the PSOE and the SI parties used in order to be present in Latin American issues. Moreover, this reflected the “power” and international recognition that the SI achieved at the time. Likewise, it revealed the commitment that the SI parties had in the region and how this transnational network worked.

As a matter of fact, the PSOE made many efforts to liberate Latin American prisoners on behalf of the respect for human rights. Nevertheless, many times these endeavors were carried out secretly. For instance, during the PSOE missions, the delegation of the Spanish socialist party often delivered a document to the local authorities with a list of prisoners who should be released. What often happened next was that in the days after the mission, some of the names on the list were effectively released “for no reason”. For example, Chile, Nicaragua and El Salvador were some of the places where this “policy” was accomplished. This whole process had to be handled with caution and without giving it much visibility or

⁵⁰⁴ Letter from Reinaldo Gargano (external representative of the Uruguayan Socialist Party) to Bernt Carlsson (26 August 1980). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1171

⁵⁰⁵ Telex from Willy Brandt to Aparacio Mendez (27 August 1980). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1171.

⁵⁰⁶ Telex from Elena Flores to Bernt Carlsson, (30 October 1980). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1171.

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publicity since it was a delicate issue that required caution; Latin American authorities should not feel attacked⁵⁰⁷.

Notwithstanding, there were other occasions when the release of prisoners was made public, e.g. the trip to Chile of Felipe González and Leopoldo Torres (the PSOE lawyer) on August 28-30, 1977 with the aim of asking for the liberation of Carlos Lázaro (former vice president of the Central Bank) and Erich Schnake (former socialist senator) who were accused of treason. Even if González and Torres visited Chile as their lawyers, their journey was meaningful and had great political impact. In this regard, there was an anecdote related to their visit that also reveals the absurdity of the regime, in which the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monica de Mandariaga, affirmed that she would study the request of the lawyers to visit the prisoners because “she loved Spain”. Therefore, apparently, they were allowed to meet their clients because of the Minister’s “love of Spain”. In the end, they were also able to meet with some members from the democratic forces and Gonzalez could reiterate the solidarity of the PSOE with them.⁵⁰⁸ Likewise, he spoke with the families of the *desaparecidos* and detainees who asked him to help with the release of their loved ones through legal assistance.⁵⁰⁹

Therefore, many “means” were used to help prisoners, to request the respect of human rights and to “intervene” in Latin America both publically and secretly. Scholarships, public declaration, public demonstrations, training to political parties and publicity were some of the methods used by the PSOE and by some of the SI members in their solidarity aid.

While the SI was formed by parties, they often acted following SI lines but not necessarily on behalf of it. An example of this was the behavior of the PSOE in Latin America, which

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁵⁰⁸ Fundación Pablo Iglesias . “Gira de Felipe González a Suramérica. Crónica de una gira difícil”, *El Socialista*, n. 21, 11/11 1977, Retrieved from <http://archivo.fpabloiglesias.es/index.php?r=hemeroteca%2FEISocialista&HemerotecaDAO%5Bpublication%5D=&HemerotecaDAO%5Bday%5D=&HemerotecaDAO%5Bmonth%5D=&HemerotecaDAO%5Byear%5D=1977&yt0=> .

⁵⁰⁹ “Felipe González recibe a familiares de presos políticos y desaparecidos en Chile”, *El País*, 31/08/1977, Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1977/08/31/internacional/241826403_850215.html

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was definitely determined by González's character and aims. According to Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo, head of the International Department of the Prime Minister's Office (1982-1991), González, once he was in government, spent a lot of time, energy, and effort on Latin American issues. His main concern in this region was its democratization and assurance for the respect for human rights. In this sense, Yáñez-Barnuevo recalled the fact that before sending ambassadors to their respective embassies, González always met them and urged them to work cautiously on the construction of local networks. As ambassadors, their real mission was to promote the respect for human rights and to spread democracy. To this aim, they had to work carefully without facing the local regimes. This task was embedded in a broad regional strategy aimed at promoting democratic values.⁵¹⁰

All of this revealed the importance and impact that the PSOE, like the SI, achieved in Latin America. Likewise, the PSOE became a benchmark for the SI in all things related to Latin America. Hence, many times the SI asked the Spanish Socialist party (in particular, González) for suggestions on Latin American matters since the SI was aware of the great knowledge that the PSOE's leaders had on the region as well as of the close contacts that the Spanish party established with many local leaders. According to Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, during the meetings between the leaders from the European socialist parties or during the European Council when Latin America was the subject to be addressed, the representatives from these institutions always turned to González for advice. For them, the views of the Spanish Prime Minister were a very valuable input, his opinions had great political weight, and on many occasions these were translated into government policies.⁵¹¹

In addition, the PSOE's notoriety and international dynamics were also noted by the United States, which several times tried to know the posture and targets of the Spanish party. Within this context, it is possible to recall the meeting between Felipe González and the United States Secretary of State under President Ronald Reagan, Alexander Haig, in Washington on January 8, 1982 when they discussed the situation in Central America. As a matter of fact, the Nicaraguan arms race and the Cuban influence in this country caused

⁵¹⁰ Interview with Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid, 14 January, 2019.

⁵¹¹ Interview with Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid, June 20, 2018

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great concern. Haig proposed many options to solve the matter but in the end he accepted the González's view since, in his opinion, the PSOE and the SI had far greater credibility with the Latin American leftist forces than the U.S.⁵¹² The truth is that González's knowledge about the region and his opinion became of great importance to the U.S.. Indeed, the American administration (even the Reagan one) more than once called the Spanish socialist secretary in order to consult with him about Latin American matters.⁵¹³

González to some extent was also aware of the “power” that his country had in Latin America. Indeed, as he claimed during the meeting at the Spanish Congress of Deputies, on September 9, 1983, “Spain had been the only European country that in relation to the U.S. had been able to clearly state its position in the Ibero-American continent”⁵¹⁴. Accordingly, although González recognized the U.S. power and influence in Latin America and he respected it, he was convinced that he should play a key role in the area and believed that Latin Americans would support him. Indeed, a sort of “Yankee-phobia” had been spreading in the continent, which had replaced the former “Hispanic-Phobia” typical of the nineteenth century. Thus, a joint desire to reformulate Spain-Latin America relations was developed in both regions.⁵¹⁵ In addition, Gonzalez did not hesitate to claim that he would be willing to attend any Latin American Summit that aimed to contrast U.S. measures that could harm Central America.⁵¹⁶

In sum, this chapter has addressed the role of Latin America in tPSOE foreign policy. An evolution of the Spanish-Latin American relationships has been noticed and a qualitative leap in their relationships has been observed during the 1980s, that is once the Spanish socialist party came to power. Likewise, the SI influence and contribution to strengthening the relationships between González and the Latin American leaders has been depicted.

⁵¹² Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁵¹³ Interview with Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁵¹⁴ “Referencias a la política exterior en la intervención del Presidente del gobierno, Don Felipe González Márquez, en el debate sobre el estado de nación, Congreso de Diputados” (20/09/1983)”. *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1983*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 464.

⁵¹⁵ Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, “La política latinoamericana”, 127.

⁵¹⁶ “Entrevista del diario mexicano “Excelsior” al Presidente del Gobierno Español, Don Felipe González (Madrid, 12-13 mayo 1985)”, *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 105.

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Nevertheless, it was also noticed that while during the 1970s the SI gave an important impetus to González and the PSOE in their internationalization, legitimacy, and in establishing close links with Latin Americans, during the 1980s things changed since it was the SI which asked González for opinions, suggestions, and reports on Latin America. Accordingly, an evolution and greater definition of the PSOE external policy on Latin America was carried out.

However, it was also noted that this policy was limited mostly to the *political* field and that the PSOE continued to embody the traditional political social democratic values (i.e. the SI values). The truth is that during the first approaches towards Latin America and when the first bonds were established with this region (late 1970s and first half of the 1980s), the PSOE was very ideologized, at least in political terms, and because of that, the PSOE actors focused on the development of their “political” goals (freedom, democracy, human rights, etc.). The economic benefits that Latin America could mean for Spain will be developed in a second stage (in the late 1980s and in particular during the 1990s). As a result, it could be stated that the links built between the two regions through the SI in the 1970s were consolidated during the 1980s, and in the following decade these opened up other kinds of possibilities to Spain (mostly, economic ones); however, this is an issue that goes beyond this research. Hence, the understanding of the rapprochement between Spain and Latin America is very important to comprehend part of the Spanish external dimension, their role achieved at international level, the contribution to the national legitimation, as well as the understanding of the future Spanish economic development.

Moreover, throughout these pages, it was also observed that the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic were developed in bilateral and multilateral terms, in which a transnational network was constructed, but where the PSOE played a leading role in “building ties” between parties and actors from both regions. The PSOE and particularly González’s behavior impacted the Latin American parties and their nexus with the SI, and later with the EEC. All of this, in turn, allowed the Iberian party to maximize its external policy and obtain a new status in the international arena.

Having said that, we would like to provide further details on the relations between the PSOE and Nicaragua, Chile, and Venezuela as explained in the introductory section. Since some elements in respect to these countries have already been stated, the following sub-chapters will aim to clarify certain specific points. Lastly, it is also important to stress once again that until the PSOE did not come to power, it often worked jointly with the SI in Latin America. Therefore, detaching the PSOE policy in those countries from the SI action, at least before 1982, would be a difficult task. As a result, in those countries the SI action cannot be put aside, which is why the policy of the SI in this region would also be considered in the following sub-chapters.

4.2.1. Nicaragua

*I am revolutionary.
Revolutionary means that I want to change the world.*
Ernesto Cardenal⁵¹⁷

Central America and in particular Nicaragua was a subject of great interest for the PSOE. It is undeniable that the role played by the Spanish Socialist party was meaningful and its activism gave them greater international recognition. It can be said that Nicaragua, and with this Central America in general, represented the highest point of the relationships between Spain/the SI and Latin America. To put it in another way, this represented the greatest challenge in the European-Latin American relationships, which is why the SI launched a real “offensive” in such an area that directly involved both the U.S. and Cuba (Chapter 2.5). Accordingly, it certainly was a thorny issue, where the social democratic perspective (e.g. North-South) opposed to the U.S. view (e.g. East-West).

It is interesting to note that the revolution in Nicaragua became a myth for the European and Latin American left since it was interpreted and identified as a movement that embodied several social democratic elements in a European way. Indeed, at the beginning, the Nicaraguan revolution took a pluralist character because it included different political

⁵¹⁷ Ernesto Cardenal in “Science Fuels the Writing, and Faith, of a Nicaraguan Poet”. 2/01/2015, *The New York Times*. Retrived from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/03/world/americas/science-fuels-writing-and-faith-of-a-nicaraguan-poet-.html>

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tendencies, including Marxists, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats. Furthermore, the Sandinista Movement involved the Church, trade unions, farmers, women, as well as black, white and indigenous people.⁵¹⁸ Hence, this pluralism, their inter-class character, and their attempts called the attention of the SI/PSOE. Regarding these characteristics, the Sandinista program included the following issues: popular power, the protection of individual liberties, land for peasants, fighting against inequalities, social welfare, emancipation of women, labor reform, combating illiteracy, religious respect, independence from US rule, international solidarity, and free and transparent elections. Consequently, the Sandinista goals coincided with the social democratic values. This program was followed by a new version drafted in 1981, which differed from the previous one since it removed part of the original language linked to the class struggle.⁵¹⁹

Besides the fact that these principles coincided with European social democracy, two additional elements should be emphasized. Firstly, the fact that the Sandinista Revolution was internationalized, i.e. the Sandinistas understood that they needed international support in order to be locally legitimized and to overthrow the dictatorship of Somoza. Hence, the Sandinistas strived to develop an international strategy and a real and strong foreign policy.⁵²⁰ This internationalization of local matters was even considered as one of the major differences from the Cuban experience since Managua appealed to the outside world to help its own country, and they also invited political forces from outside. They looked to maintain the external alliances and to stay in the international arena.

In an article published by *The New York Times*, it was even stated that this attitude made Nicaragua not depend on Cuba and the Soviet Union.⁵²¹ They avoided repeating the Cuban experience in terms of isolationism. Moreover, this approach, by including the development

⁵¹⁸ Castañeda, *La Utopía desarmada*, 125-126.

⁵¹⁹ Dennis Gilbert and David Block (eds), *Sandinistas Key Documents*, (USA: Cornell University-Latin American Studies Program), 1990, 3-21.

⁵²⁰ Cristina Eguizábal and Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Política exterior y procesos de decisión en Centroamérica: elementos para una aproximación a los procesos de una negociación regional?”. In *Política exterior y toma de decisiones en América Latina*, edited by Roberto Russell. (Argentina: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano-Rial, Argentina 1990), 237.

⁵²¹ Tad Szulc, “Relax Nicaragua Isn’t Cuba”, *The New York Times*, 7/08/1979. Retrieved from <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1979/08/07/112045941.html?pageNumber=15>

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of a real external policy and the quest for international recognition and external endorsement, was a point in common with the policy adopted by Felipe González and Bettino Craxi in their own countries. As a result, this external activism favored the establishment of ties and links between both sides of the Atlantic.⁵²² Furthermore, the external activism of the Sandinistas was accompanied by an increase of the international actors in the region. The murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in January 1978, the leader of a coalition of parties and anti-Somoza trade unions, represented the starting point of the increasingly international attention and solidarity on regional matters.⁵²³ The victory of the Sandinista Revolution in July 1979 fostered these relationships since the Sandinistas apparently had a non-aligned posture and the European left saw in this country the opportunity to become a “third way”. Thus, one could say that the revolution was characterized by twofold internationalization, i.e. from inside (Sandinistas aimed for international support) and from outside (international actors multiplied and became interested in region).

Secondly, personal ties played again a key role in the rapprochement between the two regions. Likewise, the writing of Ernesto del Cardenal (a Nicaraguan poet), and Sergio Ramírez (a Nicaraguan novelist), both part of the revolutionary movement, were spread throughout the world and became testimony of the Nicaraguan situation. Therefore, leftist protests groups around the world welcomed their texts with enthusiasm.⁵²⁴ As a result, all of this nourished the idea of the Nicaraguan revolution as a “myth” since it was associated

⁵²² For instance, the Sandinistas traveled to Paris on August 25, 1978 in order to meet Lionel Jospin who, after the Sandinistas' departure, expressed the complete solidarity from the French PS towards this movement and rejected the regime of Somoza. “Communique de Lionel Jospin, Secrétaire National du P.S. (August, 25, 1978)”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 762

⁵²³ Within this context, the issue of Nicaragua was for instance discussed during the Lisbon meeting: “Process of Democratization in the Iberian Peninsula and in Latin America” (see chapter 3) or during the meeting held in Caracas on October 27, 1978. Besides the SI, members from Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic participated to the encounter. The theme was “Emergency meeting on Nicaragua” and the result was the definition of a joint solidarity action with Nicaragua. This included: (i) financial aid to maintain cadres in Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua; (ii) aid in clothes, blankets, shoes and tents, medicines; (iii) specific fund for orphans; (iv) fund for scholarships for university and secondary school in Costa Rica and Panama; (v) political training for Nicaraguans in Costa Rica through the FES. “Notes from Emergency Meeting on Nicaragua (October 27, 1978)”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 762.

⁵²⁴ José Esteban González, *La Internacional Socialista y la Revolución Nicaragüense*, Venezuela, Centro Internacional de Información y Documentación sobre Nicaragua, 2.

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with the fight against imperialism and oppression as well as the struggle for freedom⁵²⁵ because it was a popular movement in which thousands of young people (*los muchachos*) were the main protagonists of change.

Furthermore, the Nicaraguan revolution had great international resonance by becoming a sort of “shared utopia” at the international level. As Sergio Ramírez stated, the Sandinista Revolution represented the culmination of the “era of rebellions” and the triumph of the beliefs and feelings shared by that generation that have participated and have witnessed the Cuban revolution, the end of colonialism in Africa and Indochina, the movements of 1968, and the fall of Allende. Indeed, regarding this last point, Nicaragua was conceived as a sort of “revenge” for those shattered dreams in Chile. Ramírez also added that the national revolution transformed people since it created an “ambition of identity”, which led to the development of new customs, values, and culture. This produced, in turn, a generational break with the past.⁵²⁶

Nevertheless, it is important to stress that despite the international solidarity and the international support, the Sandinista Revolution was perceived differently from the Cuban Revolution because the latter has been considered as an exportable revolution, at least beyond Central America. For the international public opinion, instead, the Sandinista Revolution worked inside the national borders since it responded to specific local matters. Hence, this revealed the transformations undertaken by the Latin American left since the Cuban experience.⁵²⁷

That said, in order to understand these relationships and the different levels of interaction, it would be useful to briefly introduce the Sandinista Front. It is important to stress that at the beginning, the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) was divided into three groups: (i) *Guerra Popular Prolongada* (“Prolonged People’s War) headed by Tomás Borge,

⁵²⁵ For more details regarding the symbolism of the Nicaraguan revolution, see: Gilles Bataillon, “Los *Muchachos* dans la Révolution Sandiniste (Nicaragua 1978-1980)”, *Eska-“Problèmes d’Amérique Latine”*, n. 94, (2014/3): 91-124.

⁵²⁶ Sergio Ramírez, *Adiós muchachos*. (Barcelona: Del Bolsillo, 2018), 26-27.

⁵²⁷ Angell, “La izquierda”, 115.

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Bayardo Arce, and Henry Ruiz who aimed to use the guerrilla warfare tactics in the long-term; (ii) *Proletaria* (“Proletarian”) headed by Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrión, and Carlos Núñez which sought to ideologize the student, popular, and urban sectors; (iii) *Tercerista* (“third party”) led by the brothers Daniel and Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado López who aimed to have a popular uprising in the short-term with the support of the Church and the middle class. The *tercerista* movement formed the Group of the Twelve (*Grupo de los Doce*) in October 1977 that assumed the political representation of this sector. Given the previously mentioned personal ties established between both sides of the Atlantic, the SI was convinced that this third group could be most influenced by the social democratic values. Accordingly, the SI supported them.⁵²⁸ In March 1979, the three forces agreed to come together in order to stimulate the struggle. Hence, the National Directorate of the FLSN was created and formed by three representatives from each group.

After months of war, on July 19, 1979, the Sandinista Revolution triumphed over the Somoza dynasty. A convergence of factors explained this victory: (i) it was a popular uprising that involved all the social classes; (ii) the young revolutionaries received support from all the social sectors as the formation of the Group of the Twelve, being shaped by intellectuals, priests, members of the bourgeoisie, and entrepreneurs, were crucial to providing a political, national, and international weight to the guerrilla force; and (iii) a Latin American Alliance was forged around the Sandinista movement. This was important because the countries involved (mainly Mexico, Venezuela, Panamá, Cuba, and Costa Rica) were from different political models that gave greater impetus to the movement. These countries supported the Sandinistas not only in moral terms but also through the provision of military assistance, material resources, and capital.⁵²⁹

Once Somoza was overthrown, a Junta of National Reconstruction (Provisional Government) was established. Five members formed the Junta: Violeta Chamorro, Moisés

⁵²⁸ Esteban González, *La Internacional Socialista*, 2-4. Furthermore, the SI only recognized the FSLN as well as the Provisional Government formed after the Sandinista Revolution. For instance, the so-called Socialist Democratic Party of Nicaragua several times asked to be admitted to the SI but the latter always rejected its request. See SI Archives, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, box 1144 and 1145

⁵²⁹ Sergio Ramírez, “La libertad, causa común. En América Latina nada es nunca hacia dentro.” *El País*, 25/01/2019. Retrieved from https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/01/24/opinion/1548351187_174788.html.
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Hassan, Daniel Ortega, Sergio Ramírez, and Alfonso Robelo. According to Ernesto Cardenal, the most original feature of the revolution was that the triumph was achieved without a real boss. There was a strong leadership, of course, but it was a collective leadership that avoided having a cult of personality (e.g. nine people shaped the National Directorate of the FLSN and five were part of the Junta). After long years of dictatorship, the idea of having one president was hated by everybody.⁵³⁰ The popular feature possibly determined some of the Sandinistas goals. Indeed, after the revolutionary triumph, they started a real literacy campaign (the National Literacy Crusade), an initiative to educate the Nicaraguan people. Within this context, around 100,000 literacy volunteers participated in this project leading to the reduction of illiteracy from above 50% to below 12%. This initiative led to a social and cultural shift as well as a transformation in terms of the relationship between the city and the countryside. This favored the exchange between these two realities.⁵³¹

The Junta was immediately recognized and endorsed by the Spanish government.⁵³² Likewise, the SI also quickly expressed its support for the Junta. Many SI actors visited the country, e.g. Felipe González, Mario Soares, Bernt Carlsson, Daniel Oduber, and Carlos Andrés Pérez, and voiced their support and solidarity. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the day before the Sandinista's triumph (July 18), the SI issued a press release in which claimed that “two representatives of the Provisional Government of National Reconstruction will attend in an official capacity the SI Party Leaders' Conference to be held in Bommersky, Sweden, on July 20-21, 1979”. Moreover, Bernt Carlsson, who issued the press release, even stated that the Provisional Government will succeed the regime of Somoza and that “the SI had already demanded the recognition of this Provisional Government as the legitimate representative of the Nicaraguan people” (Carlsson, on behalf of the SI, had welcomed the constitution of the Provisional Government and invited the SI member parties to demand its recognition on June 20, 1979).⁵³³

⁵³⁰ Ernesto Cardenal, *La Revolución perdida. Memorias 3*. (Madrid: Trotta, 2004), 245.

⁵³¹ Iosu Perales, *Los buenos años, Nicaragua en la memoria*, (Barcelona: Icaria, 2005), 92-93.

⁵³² Angel Luis de la Calles, “España Reconoce al Nuevo Gobierno”, *El País*, 20/07/1979. Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1979/07/20/internacional/301269612_850215.html

⁵³³ “Socialist International Press Release N. 15/79, July 18, 1979” and “SI Press Release N. 11/79, June 20, 1979”. From the SI Archives, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, box 1144.

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The proposal came from the awareness that the recognition of the Provisional Government would only be possible during the SI Party Leaders Conference. To put in in other words, they were conscious that this kind of recognition could not be made at the governmental level, although it was necessary since the interference of the U.S. Administration grew and grew.⁵³⁴ Despite this, the PSOE did not hesitate to state its support and recognition of the Provisional Government before the SI declaration. Indeed, on June 18, 1979, the Spanish socialist party issued a press release in which it condemned the Somoza dictatorship, expressed its support towards the Sandinista Front, recognized the Provisional Government, and invited the Spanish Government to adopt a clear position against the authoritarian regime by recalling the Spanish Ambassador from Managua.⁵³⁵

The position of the Spanish Government (during UCD administration) was considered ambiguous at the time because it had not clearly condemned Somoza's rule. Indeed, the FSLN alleged that the regime used Spanish weapons against the revolutionary movement. In this regard, the PSOE intervened and criticized the UCD policy towards Nicaragua during a meeting of the Congress of Deputies on January 27, 1979. Indeed, Martínez underlined the government's passivity regarding Nicaragua and that it not only harmed the Nicaraguan people and the relationship between Spain and Nicaragua, but also the Spanish role in the international arena. The PSOE deputy argued that an active policy in all the Latin American countries would lead to Spain gaining international prestige and to be able to become a "bridge" between Europe and Latin America.⁵³⁶ He even added that since the leftist parties had maintained and "saved" the political honor of Spain in Managua through

⁵³⁴ "Telex from Hector Oquelí to Bernt Carlsson (July 9, 1979)" From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1144.

⁵³⁵ "Comunicado de prensa PSOE, June 18, 1979". From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1144.

⁵³⁶ Felipe González rejected more than once the notion of Spain as a "bridge" between Europe and Latin America. Indeed, he argued that the countries of Latin America had their own interest, sufficient weight and their own representation mechanisms as to make them directly their own bridge. José Escribano Úbeda-Portugués, *La dimensión europea de la política exterior española hacia América Latina. Política Internacional de los Primeros Gobiernos Socialistas*. (España: Editorial Visión Net, 2005), 25.

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their actions and support, it was time to carry out concrete policies and it could only be made by the Spanish government.⁵³⁷

In addition to the public recognition of the Provisional Government, Felipe González submitted more concrete proposals to improve the SI solidarity work in Nicaragua during the SI Bureau Meeting held in Luxembourg on April 27-28, 1979. Among the most important initiatives were:

“The increase in the SI solidarity work in Nicaragua in both morally and materially ways, renewed diplomatic pressure on the USA government; actions by parties against arm sales to the dictatorships; support of a worldwide trade union boycott against Nicaragua; to protest against loans made by IMF to the [Somoza’s] regime”.⁵³⁸

In Luxembourg on April 28, 1979, even the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community recognized the centrality of Nicaragua as a priority in Latin America and launched some strategies that could be held in the country: (i) calling for a concrete solidarity that included economic, medical, and food assistance; (ii) diplomatic pressures against the U.S.; (iii) fight against arms supplies; (iv) protesting against the IMF loans which would favor Somoza’s regime; and (v) submitting a platform to the SI members which would contribute by providing a democratic solution for Nicaragua.⁵³⁹

For instance, among the concrete actions that the SI took regarding Nicaragua, the creation of the International Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution was one of them. It was a proposal made by Willy Brandt during the SI Congress held in Madrid in November 1980, which passed unanimously. Felipe González was elected as Chairman of the Committee and Pierre Schori as Secretary. This body aimed to express the solidarity

⁵³⁷ “Intervención en la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores, Congreso de Diputados, en presencia del Ministro Marcelina Oreja, 27 June 1979, Archivo Fundación Pablo Iglesias- Alcalá de Henares; Karmentxu Marín “Entrevista Ernesto Cardenal: La Teología de la liberación no ha sido condenada”, *EL País*, 6/05/1979. Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1979/05/06/sociedad/294789612_850215.html

⁵³⁸ “List of questions and answers about Nicaragua” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1144.

⁵³⁹ “Union des Partis Socialistes de la Communauté Européen, Nicaragua: Une priorité à l’Amérique Latine, April 28, 1979”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1144.

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towards Nicaragua as well as made clear the real support of the SI and its opposition to any external interference (from the U.S., Cuba, and the USSR).⁵⁴⁰ At this Congress, a representative from the FSLN was invited as an observer. It is worth noting the terms used to name the Commission. According to Elena Flores, González pushed to name it, “Committee for the Defense *of the Nicaraguan Revolution*” rather than “*of the Sandinista Revolution*” because this aimed to the support of Nicaraguan people as a whole and not only the Sandinista movement.⁵⁴¹

The first real meeting took place in Washington D.C. on December 6, 1980, in which additional objectives were devised, including spreading information about Nicaragua and its democratization process, developing an aid strategy for Nicaraguan development, and ensuring the respect for Nicaragua’s right to self-determination. Besides González, some of the attendees were Mitterrand, Brandt, Schori, Carlsson, Kreisky, Palme, Peña Gómez, and Carlos Andrés Pérez. Moreover, the Chairman suggested adding three new members: Bettino Craxi, Mario Soares, and Joop den Uyl.⁵⁴² It is interesting to note that most of these members came to power at the time.

The venues of the following reunions were Managua on June 25, 1981 and Madrid on November 27, 1981. In Managua, the delegation was able to observe the local situation firsthand as well as the progresses of the country which led them to state in Madrid their concerns regarding the regional situation, the constant external threats in the area, and its increasing economic downturn. Hence, they agreed to prepare a mission headed by González in order to be able to draw up concrete proposals and to convene a conference/meeting with the aim of studying the ways to increase European cooperation and economic aid for Nicaragua.⁵⁴³ They were aware that Nicaragua represented a sort of test case for the region, which also explained all their efforts deployed in this country.

⁵⁴⁰ Willy Brandt, “Solidaridad con Nicaragua y la no intervención en Centroamérica”. In *El juego de los reformismos*, 147.

⁵⁴¹ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁵⁴² “International Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution, December 12, 1980”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1145.

⁵⁴³ “Reunión en Madrid Comité de Defensa de la Revolución Nicaraguense de la Internacional Socialista, November 27, 1981” and “SI Press Release N. 17/81, June 25, 1981”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1146.

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Although Managua promoted a series of securities regarding the development of the revolutions inside the frame of pluralism and mixed economy, Felipe González made it clear that if pluralism disappeared, they would no longer identify themselves with Nicaragua, although they would respect its project as they had done with Cuba. Likewise, the U.S. thesis that argued that the Sandinista project would inevitably lead to Communism was rejected and criticized.⁵⁴⁴

As mentioned, after the triumph of the Sandinista revolution several representatives from fourteen different parts of Europe and Latin America visited Nicaragua. Even the EEC sent a delegation headed by M. Manfredo Mancioti and decided to cooperate by providing 5.1 million dollars by 1979 (2.5 million dollars for food aid and 2.5 million dollars for the reconstruction assistance), which would be increased to 8.5 million dollars (5.5 million dollars for food aid and 3 million dollars for the reconstruction) by 1980.⁵⁴⁵

Likewise, Sandinistas were aware of the relevancy that the international recognition meant for them. As a matter of fact, representatives from the Junta travelled around the world to strengthen political and diplomatic ties as well as to increase public awareness on the local situation and on their fears regarding a possible U.S. military intervention. Furthermore, the FSLN was invited as an observer member in many of the SI Congresses and meetings even though it had applied on more than one occasion for the SI membership, which was a request that was often discussed at the SI meetings. For example, Felipe González and the PSOE supported the idea because for them it would be better to have the FSLN inside the SI so the Sandinistas could know the SI principles firsthand, and therefore they could be more attracted to the social democratic values instead of the Cuban-Soviet line. Indeed, the fear of González was that their exclusion would foster the radicalization of the Sandinistas as they were more exposed to Cuban influence. However, the SI did not accept the FLSN request. However, it became normal that when the FSLN was not formally invited as an SI

⁵⁴⁴ Jesus Ceberio, “La Internacional Socialista aprueba el proyecto político pluralista de Nicaragua”, *El País*, 27/06/1981. https://elpais.com/diario/1981/06/27/internacional/362440815_850215.html

⁵⁴⁵ “Nicaragua”, *Le Monde*, 18/08/ 1979.

https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1979/08/18/nicaragua_2771817_1819218.html?xtmc=nicaragua&xtcr=92

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observer, representatives of the Sandinista Front went over anyway. In this way, informal ties could still be built.⁵⁴⁶ In the same manner, the Cubans were also at the SI meetings because, after the reunions, the Sandinistas informed them about the issues discussed. According to Silvio Prado, former militant of the FSLN, it was typical that after a SI meeting, the Cubans arrived to the International Department of the FSLN to be updated on the reports, decisions, and discussions of the SI. To some extent, the FLSN became a channel of information for Cuba.⁵⁴⁷ Therefore, the relevancy and weight of the SI could be also measured through these kinds of interests.

Over time, however, the Nicaraguan developments cast doubts on the real democratic pluralism of the country and on the real democratic essence of the Sandinistas. Some of the issues that led to these conclusions include the murder of the prominent businessman Jorge Salazar Argüello on November 19, 1980 by the Sandinista forces. The news was broadcast by the Spanish news agency EFE that denounced the disappearance of 60 entrepreneurs from the private industry. As a result, Felipe González, as Chairman of the Commission for Nicaragua, was urged to take action to halt these violations. The FSLN justified this issue arguing that these businessmen were involved in arms imports and they feared a counterrevolution.⁵⁴⁸ Other issues include the closing of the Permanent Commission of Human Rights (CPDH) in February 1981 and the violence against the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN).⁵⁴⁹

Accordingly, all of this led Spain and the SI in general to undertake a “critical solidarity” towards Nicaragua, i.e. they were aware that this country really needed assistance and that that the US interference was real, but at the same time they could not obviate the complains from the entrepreneurs and the media that accused the FSLN of wrongful acts. Hence, the situation was extremely complex. Therefore, while the European social democracy tried to be very incisive in the Nicaraguan issues (e.g. with the creation of the Committee for the

⁵⁴⁶ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018.

⁵⁴⁷ Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019.

⁵⁴⁸ “Últimos acontecimientos en Nicaragua.” Madrid November 19, 1980. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1145

⁵⁴⁹ Esteban González, *La Internacional*, 10.

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Nicaraguan Revolution), the local developments led them to be cautious and to act through such “critical solidarity”.⁵⁵⁰

Anti-imperialism was always the basis of the FSLN struggle, even more than Marxism-Leninism. Hence, the support for other revolutionary movements in the region became the rule. The truth is that for the Sandinistas the mechanism to face U.S. influence and to oppose it was through the development of a militant internationalism. It was worth remarking that Ronald Reagan’s victory fostered fear in the region; thus, “the election of Reagan has sped up polarization of left and right in the region, contributing to the first stages of disintegration of Carter Administration’s policy of promoting social and economic reforms to stave off more leftist revolution”.⁵⁵¹ Therefore, the Sandinistas considered the proximity to Cuba, and hence with the Soviet bloc, as the way to maintain the revolution and keep out imperialism. According to Sergio Ramírez, this explained why the leaders of the revolution viewed the capitalist countries with certain suspicious. They believed that in the end these countries would align with the U.S. Nevertheless, at the same time, they recognized that in the 1980s, being in the middle of a war of aggression, the European socialist governments and the SI represented a vital counterweight to Reagan’s policy which they benefited from.⁵⁵²

Thus, the interest of the FSLN in the SI was more “instrumental” since in terms of ideology the Sandinista Front was not a social democratic movement, but they “used” the SI as a space for self-defense inside the bipolar scheme against U.S. imperialism and as a mechanism to remain on the world stage. They took advantage of the political weight that the SI reached at the time of the East-West struggle. They also were able to maintain equilibrium on all fronts, since different local bodies handled their external relations, e.g.

⁵⁵⁰ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018,

⁵⁵¹ Terri Shaw, “Central America’s Future”, *The New York Times*, 20/11/1980. Retrieved from <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1980/11/20/111312103.pdf>. It would also useful to recall the Reagan’s speech on April 27, 1983 at the US Congress: “The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put in jeopardy”. Presidential Speeches, Ronald Reagan, “Address on Central America, April 27, 1983”. Retrieved from <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-27-1983-address-central-america>

⁵⁵² Ramírez, *Adiós muchachos*, 141-143.

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the FSLN as a party dealt with the SI and with other international forums like the Non-Aligned Group, while the relations with Cuba or the USSR were dealt mainly at government level.

Notwithstanding, the SI and the close relationships with some of its members (including the PSOE) were crucial in terms of their support during the uprisings against the Contras as well as during the electoral campaigns. It is also important to bear in mind that although during the SI meetings the democratization of Nicaragua was always on the SI agenda, the pressure exerted by the parties for the democratization of Nicaragua was often greater and more incisive than the pressure exerted by the SI itself. Besides the external dimension that the SI entailed, the Sandinistas were interested in this organization because it was formed by parties in government, and therefore by parties with real power to act. For obvious reasons (culture and language) the meetings and contact with the PSOE (before and after coming to power) were the most frequent, and there were different types of relations, i.e. direct contacts with Felipe González, PSOE delegations, deputies, etc.⁵⁵³

For instance, few months before the Spanish Socialist Party won the election, González referred to Nicaragua in the following terms:

“When it is said there are no freedoms in Nicaragua, it should really be said that there are more freedoms now than there have ever been before. It should also be said that the Nicaraguan revolution has been extraordinarily generous from the human point of view [...] There is an international dimension that is greatly conditioning the Nicaraguan problem. It would be very grave error on the part of the West and especially the US to attempt to isolate Nicaragua. This would mean increased radicalization, greater misery for the population and a greater temptation to follow the Cuban model”.⁵⁵⁴

Similarly, when the party came to power, the Nicaraguan issue remained a subject of greater concern. For example, at the XXX PSOE Congress, Madrid, December 13-16,

⁵⁵³Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019

⁵⁵⁴Felipe González (interview), “We Reject All Dictatorships”, *Newsweek The International Newsmagazine*, N. 7, February 15, 1982. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1147a.

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1984, the PSOE stressed its support for the Nicaraguan revolution and it was even emphasized that thanks to the efforts of the PSOE, the SI had kept its solidarity and understanding towards the region. The Spanish party also confirmed its commitment in the evolution of the Nicaraguan democratization as well as rejected any kind of external influence.⁵⁵⁵ Thus, it is possible to say once again the following: on one hand, the PSOE benefited from SI policies and facilities to enhance its presence in Latin America; on the other, the Spanish party became an interlocutor of the SI on the other side of the Atlantic and when came to power, it tried to be more incisive. Obviously, from its new position in government, its possibility to be more influential increased. The PSOE victory, moreover, was well received by the FSLN and nourished the Nicaraguan hopes, in particular since the subject was addressed in most of the PSOE resolutions. Nevertheless, as pointed out below, this “new activism” was gradually transformed in the light of the EEC membership. Hence, Spain started to gain and exert greater influence through more indirect channels than through direct ones.⁵⁵⁶ As Fernando Morán stated, Spain had “influence” in this area but not “power”, and the “influence” could be only improved if it was exercised within the European framework. However, Morán also warned Spain that, in this action, it should not lose primacy.⁵⁵⁷

During the PSOE administration, however, some issues disrupted the bilateral relation. In first place, the possibility that the Sandinistas’ original project could change, which would be a deviation from democratic pluralism. Notwithstanding, Felipe González did not withdraw his support. He believed that any “slide” from the initial project could be reconstructed if Managua really wanted it. He even qualified the original Sandinista program as “brilliant” and even stated that he was fully identified with its main postulates: pluralism and non-alignment.⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁵ Resolution of the XXX PSOE Congress, December 13-16 1984, 80.

⁵⁵⁶ Joan Piñol I. Rull, “Las relaciones españolas con Centroamérica: el periodo de los gobiernos socialistas (1982-1989)”. In *Las Relaciones entre España y América Central (1976-1989)*, Jordi Solé Tura, et al. (Barcelona, CIDOB, 1989), 35.

⁵⁵⁷ In Blasquez Vilaplana, *La proyección*, 202.

⁵⁵⁸ “Entrevista del Diario Mexicano “Excelsior” al Presidente del Gobierno Español, Don Felipe González” (11-12-13/05/1985) *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 104.

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Secondly, the issue of the ETA (an acronym for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, i.e. a separatist organization in the Basque Country) eroded the relations since there were some rumors and also intelligence reports (in particular in 1983) that alluded to the existence of some nexus between ETA and the FSLN, an issue that generated mistrust of the Sandinistas among the PSOE. Hence, the Spanish ambassador to Nicaragua, Luciano Balsega (1980-1983), was asked to make a report on this matter. He claimed that he was not certain about the presence of ETA terrorist cells in Nicaragua. Likewise, he stressed that the FSLN did not protect ETA but rather the latter sought to train the former. Nevertheless, the ambassador also mentioned some events in 1983 that had led to the speculation of the existence of these kinds of links (e.g. banners with references to ETA or the rumor that they intended to burn an American and Spanish flag in front of the US embassy). However, he said, these doubts were overcome after the Spanish administration threatened to withdraw its ambassador from Managua. Since then, Balsega stated, the Nicaraguan government excused itself and began to be more cautious regarding the possible presence of these terrorist cells.⁵⁵⁹

Thirdly, since 1982 the PSOE contacts with Eden Pastora were not viewed favorably by the Sandinistas because some deviations from the Sandinista's original project were reported by Pastora from Costa Rica.⁵⁶⁰ This caused widespread consternation in the international arena and upset the Nicaraguan administration. However, the PSOE and the SI maintained contacts with both Pastora and the representatives from the FSLN. According to Silvio Prado, there were some "frictions" due to the nexus between the European social democracy and the group based in Costa Rica, and the Sandinistas asked the PSOE why they denied these contacts. However the Sandinistas "took advantage" of this behavior, since in this way they "felt free" to do the same, that is, to lie and hide their own

⁵⁵⁹ "Informe ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Congreso del Embajador Don Luciano Balsega sobre la existencia de elementos de ETA en Nicaragua (14/3/1984)", *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1984*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 385-387.

⁵⁶⁰ Eden Pastora ("Commander Zero" was his nickname) was leader of the Southern Front in the years prior to the overthrow of Somoza. The Southern Front, later, accepted the Alliance with the FSLN. Pastora gained recognition being the protagonist of the assault on the National Palace of Nicaragua and maintained links with the FSLN until 1982 when he moved to Costa Rica in order to continue from there the guerrilla struggle. Actually, since then Pastora started to question the Nicaraguan Government and in this way he definitely brought with the FSLN.

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international contacts/partners (e.g. Cuba and the USSR).⁵⁶¹ In this way, they kept a balance in their relations and overlooked some problematic issues.

Another thorny issue was the relationship between Carlos Andrés Pérez and the FSLN. The truth is that this nexus experienced a turnaround 1982, when Pérez openly remarked the lack of democratic guarantees in Nicaragua and condemned the local government for not respecting the initial prerogatives. The truth is that, until then, the former Venezuelan president played a key role in the triumph of the Sandinista revolution by supporting them morally, politically, and economically. According to Ernesto Cardenal, the Sandinista's representatives met Carlos Andrés Pérez thanks to the efforts of the Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez. Since then, Pérez was committed to the Sandinista cause and was the first person who recognized the Sandinista government (he was also informed about all the upcoming uprisings). At the beginning, he also provided monthly monetary assistance through Costa Rica.⁵⁶² Nevertheless, this full support was challenged over time.

The representatives of Democratic Action from Venezuela denounced that the FSLN undertook a Cuban and Marxist/Leninist alignment and that the Nicaraguan government did not respect the original commitments of democratic pluralism and respect for freedom and human rights⁵⁶³. The height of the crisis was experienced during the preparative for the Conference of SI Party Leaders to be held in Caracas on February 24-25, 1982 when Democratic Action rejected the FSLN participation in the meeting.⁵⁶⁴ This position caused many concerns at the international level. However, although this raised many doubts

⁵⁶¹ Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019

⁵⁶² Cardenal, *La Revolución perdida*, 29-33. According to the CIA, “Perez is a sharp critic to Washington’s policies in Nicaragua and El Salvador, opposes the exclusion of Cuba from hemispheric deliberations, and may succeed in moving Venezuela’s position on Central America closer to that of the Socialist International, of which he is vice president. CIA, Venezuela’s Changing Role in Central America”. June 1983, iv (CIA-RDP84S00553R000300010002-5)

⁵⁶³ In this regard, Humberto Ortega stated: “we say that Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our Revolution [...] without Sandinism we cannot be Marxist-Leninists and Sandinism without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolutionary”. This was the first version of one of his speeches, which had to be reviewed after the wave of criticism that he received. The second version omitted the references to Marxism Leninism by referring only to Sandinism as source of inspiration. Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018.

⁵⁶⁴ Letter from Acción Democrática to Willy Brandt (February 3, 1982). From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1147a.

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regarding the Nicaraguan situation and the meeting of Caracas was canceled in the end, the SI support of the Sandinista movement was ratified during the SI Bureau meeting held in Bonn on April 1-2, 1982. During this encounter, the Central American situation was discussed and the SI pledge to the Nicaraguan revolution was underlined as long as they respected pluralism, democracy, and social justice.⁵⁶⁵ Likewise, the SI was committed to the economic development of the region and rejected any source aimed to destabilize the local situation and to interfere against Nicaraguan sovereignty.⁵⁶⁶ Furthermore, at the meeting it was even agreed that representatives from the FSLN should be invited to SI meetings in which matters concerning Central America or concerning them would be discussed.⁵⁶⁷

Moreover, a new SI mission headed by González was planned. In spite of the fact that González together with the French Jospin had to visit Central America, an additional aim of their trip was to meet the representatives from Democratic Action in order to clarify and to find a solution after the failure of the Caracas Conference in February of that year. From Venezuela, González confirmed the support of the SI to the “Nicaraguan revolutionary project” since Managua was committed to the establishment of a “pluralistic policy, mixed economy, and it was not aligned with any bloc on the international level”. Even though the SI had certain concerns about some specific events that occurred in Nicaragua, it reaffirmed its steadfast support.⁵⁶⁸ For them, Nicaragua only had to clarify some issues, such as the meaning of the statement: “the 1985 elections will not be a bourgeois elections”.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁵ “Declaración del presidente de la Internacional Socialista en Bonn”, April 2, 1982. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1175.

⁵⁶⁶ Statement by the meeting of the presidium of the SI, Bonn April 1-2, 1982. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1147c.

⁵⁶⁷ “Letter from to Lionel Jospin, Felipe González, Carlos Andrés Pérez, Ed Broadbent, Michael Manley and Kalevi Sorsa”, April 23, 1982. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1147^a.

⁵⁶⁸ “Critiche a Managua ma i socialisti rimangono amici”. *Avanti!* (1/03/1982). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820228.86-43_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=17)

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⁵⁶⁹ Jesús Ceberio, “España clarifica su postura política sobre Centroamérica”. *El País* (18/02/1982). Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1982/02/18/internacional/382834802_850215.html

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Accordingly, although Carlos Andrés Pérez distanced himself from the FSLN, the European social democracy did not do so. One likely explanation could be because they had been very committed to the Nicaraguan revolution since the beginning. This was added to the fact that they really believed they would be able to become a “third way” in that area by ensuring the pacification of the region. They were somehow convinced, or rather they hoped, that if the Sandinista project was able to thrive, other people could also fight and achieve their own liberation⁵⁷⁰. It is for this reason that while something changed in their positions and policies towards Nicaragua, they did not really perceive it. Obviously, the links to some European parties and governments were closer than with others, but in general they remained stable with everyone.⁵⁷¹ Indeed, according to Silvio Prado, the SI truly played a key role in setting the date of the 1984 Nicaraguan elections, as well as those of 1990 and in the institutionalization of the Sandinista revolution.⁵⁷²

One example of this respect comes from the pressure exerted by some SI members in order to push the FSLN government to hold elections in 1984. Indeed, Felipe González, Willy Brandt, Daniel Oduber, Carlos Andrés Pérez, and Elena Flores met in Madrid with the aim of discussing the Nicaraguan situation and delays in the elections. They agreed to send a letter to Ortega in order to remind him about his commitment of holding free elections in his country. This letter was not supposed to be made public, but it was in the end. Indeed, it caused certain concern in some circles, including Cuba⁵⁷³. Therefore, Elena Flores was commissioned to solve the impasse with the government of Cuba since the situation in

⁵⁷⁰ Ceberio, “La Internacional Socialista”.

⁵⁷¹ In this regard, Silvio Prado claimed that until 1989 (included), year of the last tour of Daniel Ortega in Europe before the 1990 elections when the FSLN lost, the representatives of the FSLN were always welcomed by the European socialist parties. According to him, the links between the FSLN and the European socialists remained always the same. Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019. Moreover, Spain participated (and even headed) in the UN project, ONUCA (United Nations Observer Group in Central America), which was established in 1989. The main aim was to verify the fulfillment of the regional pacification. ONUCA also played a part in controlling the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance.

⁵⁷² Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019

⁵⁷³ Brandt and González agreed to send a letter to some SI members (L. Jospin, O. Plame, B. Kreisky, R. Steen, A. Jörgensen, M. Manley, A. Sule, J.F. Peña Gómez and G. Ungo) in August 1983, in order to explain them the reasons why they had been submitted this letter to Ortega and, therefore, to eliminate any misunderstanding on it. “Carta dirigida a diversas personalidades aclarando el mensaje enviado a la Dirección del FSLN de Nicaragua, por Felipe González, Carlos Andrés Pérez, Willy Brandt”, August 1, 1983. Fundación Felipe González. AFG.2.3.D.b.1.e.Willy Brandt (Alemania). ES. MD. 28079.FFG/AFG 2.3.D.b.1.e//AFFG FER0044703.

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Central America was very risky and U.S. interference was very high. Therefore, she travelled to Cuba (July 28-August 4, 1983) and met Castro who at the beginning questioned the letter and accused the SI of interfering with Nicaraguan issues. He, however, did not really know the contents of the message. Indeed, when Flores delivered the original text, Castro's attitude changed.⁵⁷⁴

Therefore, the SI tried to halt the U.S. interference and to limit Cuban interference as well. Thus, the European social democratic parties sought to balance and to reduce the tensions in Central America. This was their actions that were positive and decisive in the convening of elections.

In connection with this, the efforts made by the Contadora Group should not be forgotten,⁵⁷⁵ which aimed to intensify the political dialogue among the countries of Latin America as an effective means for facing political, economic, and social matters that harmed peace, democracy, stability, and development.⁵⁷⁶ While some issues have been already mentioned (Chapters 2.6 and Chapter 4.1), it is important to pinpoint some matters. First of all, the reciprocal interest between the members of the Contadora to internationalize the issue as well as the interest of international actors (e.g. the PSOE) to achieve Contadora's proper functioning. Indeed, Felipe González always stressed the importance of working from inside, that is to say he made it clear that the PSOE as the SI should not directly intervene since it could be interpreted as an external interference. Hence, Carlos Andrés Pérez became the spokesman of Felipe González, and therefore of the SI in the

⁵⁷⁴ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁵⁷⁵ According to Pierre Schori, the Colombian writer, Gabriel García Márquez, affirmed that the idea of the Contadora's Group actually emerged during the Peace dinner held in Harspund, Sweden on December 9, 1982 by the invitation of Olof Palme. Schori said, that when García Márquez returned to Bogotá, he met the Colombian president and expressed the idea. Few days later, the Colombian president convened the meeting in which the Group was formally created. Schori, *Escila*, 277. Indeed, García Márquez himself noted that the idea of calling six countries from Central America to create a joint action for regional peace came up during the Sweden's dinner, from his speech on Central American matters, Gabriel García Márquez, "Cena de paz en Harsund" 22/12/ 1982, *El País*, https://elpais.com/diario/1982/12/22/opinion/409359606_850215.html

⁵⁷⁶ "Texto del comunicado conjunto emitido hoy en la Isla Contadora, República de Panamá, por los ministros de relaciones exteriores de Panamá Juan José Amado, Colombia Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, México, Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor y Venezuela José Alberto Zambrando, divulgado en México por la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Tatletolco D.F. January 9, 1983". From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box38343, file 7.

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region⁵⁷⁷. Similarly, Contadora, a group shaped by Latin Americans, provided the opportunity to act from inside. Indeed, a few months before the creation of the group, on January 9, 1983, Felipe González answered a question during an interview about how the SI could end the violence in Central America:

“The Socialist International should provide a framework for action aimed at peace in which the main protagonists, as well as the interested parties should be countries like Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and, if possible, some other nations belonging to the Andean Pact group”.⁵⁷⁸

Thus, to some extent, González foresaw the emergence of the Contadora Group one year before its effective creation and even he guessed its members (i.e. Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and from the Andean Pact group, Colombia).

On the other hand, for Central America and for the Contadora Group, the support of González and the SI was fundamental for the development of the initiative. In fact, without the SI and the PSOE endorsement, the Contadora probably would not have succeeded because it needed the international political support.⁵⁷⁹ At this point, one might question the position and role of the Organization of American States (OAS), the continental organization founded in 1948 with the aim of promoting cooperation, solidarity, and peace throughout the entire continent. However, during the 1980s, the OAS proved to be incapable for handling the most significant problems of the region: the Central American crises, the external debt problem, and the Falklands War in 1982.⁵⁸⁰ In regards to the Central American dilemma, it is important to bear in mind that the U.S. was part of this organization and had a prominent weight in it. Hence, it was not surprising that the OAS

⁵⁷⁷ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁵⁷⁸ Felipe González (interview), “We Reject All Dictatorships”.

⁵⁷⁹ Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019

⁵⁸⁰ The Falkland War was struggle between Argentina and UK in 1982. It started when Argentina invaded and claimed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, a United Kingdom colony located in the South Atlantic on April 2, 1982. The war finished on June 14, 1982 after the Argentina’s surrender. To find out the SI position in this struggle, see: Fernando Pedrosa, “La Internacional Socialista y la guerra de las Malvinas”, *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 49, n. 2, (2014): 47-66. For the Spanish position see: Esther Barbé, “Entre Europa y América Latina: La diplomacia española frente al conflicto de las Malvinas”, *Estudios Internacionales*, n. 106/27 (1994): 222-251.

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could not handle the regional crises in a balanced way.⁵⁸¹ This gave an enormous impetus for launching the Contadora's initiative which sought other means for its internationalization.

In this light, Felipe González and the PSOE contributed to the initial impulse of the initiative. According to Oyden Ortega Durán, the former foreign minister of Panama, when the Contadora Group was shaped it remained in a sort of deadlock. This is why the Panamanian President, Ricardo de la Espriella, called Felipe González and asked him to travel to Colombia in order to talk with the Colombian President, Belisario Betancur, who could be more suitable to make progress on the Contadora project due to his greater autonomy as well as his great dynamism at both the national and international level. Furthermore, Betancur had established a close relationship with the General Secretary of the PSOE during his stay in Madrid as Colombian ambassador to Spain (1975-1977); therefore, he could be the proper person to approach. According to Morán, Betancur was a good informer and adviser of González regarding the topics of the Americas.⁵⁸²

González, not being able to travel because he was very busy in other issues (he had only just come to power), proposed that Elena Flores carry out a mission in the Contadora countries. Her goal was to analyze the local situation with the presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama in order to evaluate which one of them would be the most suitable to restart the Contadora project. With the exception of the Mexican president because he was on holiday, she met the other three and concluded, as Ricardo de la Espriella had already suggested, that the most capable would be Belisario Betancur. Once in Bogotá, her mission was to talk with Betancur in order to schedule a tour that the Colombian President would carry out in Panama, Mexico, and Venezuela with the aim of keeping the initiative alive. During her stay, Flores underlined the Spanish commitment to Contadora and the unconditional support that the Spanish administration would provide

⁵⁸¹ Luis Mendez Asensio, *Contadora las cuentas de la diplomacia*, (Mexico: Plaza y Janés S.A., 1987),18. Flavio Bravo, "Paralizada e inoperante la OEA con la presencia de EU, *Día*, 8/12/1985. From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery),box 38346, file 3

⁵⁸² Fernando Morán, *España en su sitio*. (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes/Cambio 16, 1990), 95.

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toward this effort. Ortega also highlighted the success of the mission because of the same day of the departure of Flores, Betancur travelled to the countries that formed the Contadora Group.⁵⁸³ Hence, as the Panamanian Foreign Minister recognized, Spain and in particular Felipe González played a key role in launching this project.⁵⁸⁴

González's contribution to the Contadora's process was also underlined and recognized by the SI. Indeed, the SI described the Spaniard as the main protagonist of this project and underlined the fact that the convergence of the SI efforts with the Contadora were mainly due to his work.⁵⁸⁵ Thus, the Spanish commitment and influence in the area became very visible as well as the recognition that Latin American governments attributed to it. Likewise, it is possible to appreciate the Spanish policy in the Latin American matters because, although the Iberian country was pledged to the Latin American cause, González often stressed that actions should be undertaken and carried out by the local forces. Spain was not looking to play a first-class role, it just wanted to participate, advise, and support. Recalling the words of Fernando Moran, Spain had more "*influence*" than "*power*" in the region.⁵⁸⁶ Often through indirect action, Spain was able to enhance its influence and to contribute significantly in the local issues, even though it often worked behind the scenes. One example of this is that in spite of González not being able to exert his duties as president of the International Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution because they did not formally meet after 1982, he continued his work of aiding Nicaragua and the region as a whole by other means.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸³ Indeed, Betancur visited the presidents of Panamá, Venezuela and México on April 8-10, 1983. Betancur and the Mexican president stated that the Central American matters harmed both countries as well as the pacification of the region was fundamental for the Colombian and Mexican security. On April 12-13, 1983, the four presidents visited Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua in order to launch the Contadora's activities. On April 20-21, the first meeting between the Contadora Group and the five Central American countries was held. In this, they agreed to develop a joint action for solving the regional matters. "Reuniones del Grupo Contadora. Resumen de los comunicados". From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box38343, file 7.

⁵⁸⁴ Oyden Ortega Durán, *Contadora y su verdad*, (Madrid: Rufino García Blanco, 1985), 20-21; Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018.

⁵⁸⁵ "Mensaje de la Internacional Socialista a Nicaragua". July 25, 1983. From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box 38372, file 7.

⁵⁸⁶ Morán, *España en su sitio*. 86.

⁵⁸⁷ Piñol I. Rull, "Las relaciones españolas con Centroamérica", 35. "Contestación del Gobierno a la pregunta del senador don Javier Ruperez Rubio sobre actuaciones del Gobierno de Nicaragua en España (Senado Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

The commitment of González towards Contadora came also from his belief that it represented the sole and last option to overcome and solve Central American problems. Hence, Spain became the main support to Contadora outside the Americas.⁵⁸⁸ Madrid focused its attention on this Group since this provided the Spanish government the frame in which they could act. Without this framework, the Spanish action would probably remain rhetoric or would be considered as an international interference. In this sense, in February 1984 González, Morán, and many Latin American presidents met in Venezuela on the occasion of the inauguration ceremony of Jaime Lusinchi from Democratic Action. During their stay, Spain and the Latin American countries signed the Declaration of Caracas, which aimed to stress their growing involvement with the Contadora's activities⁵⁸⁹.

During an interview in May 1985, in fact, González made it clear that even in the face of U.S. interference in the region and more specifically in Nicaragua, Spain would always support Latin America⁵⁹⁰. For instance, when Reagan announced an economic embargo on Nicaragua, González and Morán immediately contacted the Contadora Group in order to exchange views and to find a solution to this problem. Furthermore, the Spanish Foreign Minister received a representative from the Nicaraguan Government as well as discussed the issue with the U.S. representatives in Madrid.⁵⁹¹ The aim was to reduce the tensions between the two countries and to resume the bilateral relations because they had been suspended. A few months later, the UN, France, and Greece joined Spain and condemned

9/4/1984)" *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1984*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 256

⁵⁸⁸ On October 17, 1984, the members of the Contadora Group won the Prince of Asturias Award for *their efforts to avoid, through diplomatic channels and political negotiation, the intensification and generalization of the conflicts that affect Central America*. "Comunicado Conjunto", Madrid October 17, 1984. From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box 38343, file 7. Since 1985 some of the South American countries that satisfactorily made the transition to democracy began to provide support to the Contadora Group. This was known as the Contadora Support Group and it was shaped by Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Peru.

⁵⁸⁹ Morán, *España en su sitio*, 88, 92 and 332.

⁵⁹⁰ "Entrevista del Diario *México* a Felipe González (13-14/05/1985)". *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 105.

⁵⁹¹ "Declaraciones del Ministro de Asuntos exteriores, Don Fernando Morán, a Cambio 16 (20/6/1985)". *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 212.

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the U.S. embargo.⁵⁹² Moreover, the Spanish Administration reassured Nicaragua and in general the entire region about its commitment to the area by ensuring the maintenance of economic relations according to the principle of non-discrimination. In this way, the Spanish government sought to contribute by limiting the economic damages that the Central American countries were experiencing.⁵⁹³

While Spain often tried to act through the Contadora Group and, as said, the Spanish administration preferred to proceed in this way, the unfolding of events sometimes required a more direct intervention, in particular in those occasions when Contadora seemed to be at a standstill. One example of this was the efforts made by Felipe González during the second half of 1985 in order to promote local negotiations between the Sandinistas and the opposition. The Spanish government considered this agreement as a starting point and as an essential precondition for the pacification of Nicaragua. According to a European diplomat in Managua, this policy derived from the “feeling that Contadora was in a dead end and Spain decided to fill the vacuum” and from González’s concern regarding the lack of alternatives to Contadora.⁵⁹⁴

It is also important to note that even if Nicaragua often stressed its anti-Americanism, some efforts were made in order to establish direct contacts with the U.S. While Spain recognized the importance of dialogue between these two countries, Fernando Morán in some way worried that this interest could lead Managua to relinquish or take distance from Contadora, which would be a huge mistake for the Nicaraguan people. He was aware that both countries had fixed ideas that would never peacefully change and mediation was quite necessary. A secret meeting was carried out by the end of June 1984 in Manzanillo, Mexico between Daniel Ortega and the U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who had already made an

⁵⁹² *El Socialista*, 1-15/01/1989, n.396. Retrieved from <http://historico.elsocialista.es/hemeroteca/archivo-papel.html>

⁵⁹³ “Comunicado del Gobierno Español sobre el deterioro de las relaciones Nicaragua-USA (3/05/1985)” *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1985*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 399.

⁵⁹⁴ Francisco G. Basterra, “España promueve negociaciones entre Managua y la oposición Sandinista” *El País*, 26/12/1985. Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1985/12/26/internacional/504399613_850215.html
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unannounced visit to Managua in June 1984.⁵⁹⁵ Nevertheless, issues were not properly developed and the dialogue between both countries was interrupted at the end without providing any comment.⁵⁹⁶

Furthermore, the Kissinger Report for Central America had begun to circulate and, according to the press of the time, it was fostering the conflict.⁵⁹⁷ Indeed, with the Kissinger report, the U.S. posed its considerations regarding the Central America dilemmas. On one hand, the report alluded to the Communist threat and the Cuban and Soviet support for the Central American guerrillas; on the other, it mentioned the lack of democracy, inequality, and poverty as the causes of the crises.⁵⁹⁸ This disturbed Fernando Morán because the document considered the Spanish cultural heritage as the main cause of the Central American problems. Morán firmly affirmed that the report was completely unfair with Spain.⁵⁹⁹

In this context, Nicaragua began to increasingly commit to the Contadora action. Furthermore, Ortega believed that Contadora would be a good opportunity to solve matters and to involve additional international actors. Hence, he called Latin American countries to join the process. Indeed, Ortega considered that Nicaragua's accession to Contadora would lead the region to signing an agreement and to allow the involvement of external actors. In this sense, he underlined that the USSR also sought a regional solution through the Contadora's framework. Likewise, Nicaragua recognized the support provided by Spain in

⁵⁹⁵ Morán, *España en su sitio*, 333. Viron P. Vaky, from *The New York Times*, referred to this visit in the following manner: "The Administration is still not sure whether containment or elimination is the best – and most feasible – way to deal with the Sandinista regime [...] What the Administration appears to have in mind, therefore, is simply to press the Sandinistas until they cry "uncle" – until they agree largely without conditions to our demands. For the White House, "negotiations" would be about working out the details- in effect, the continuation of confrontations by other means". "What Do We Want in Nicaragua?", *The New York Times*, (18/01/1984). Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/18/opinion/what-do-we-want-in-nicaragua.html>

⁵⁹⁶ "U.S. Parley with Nicaragua Ends in Mexico." *The New York Times*, (28/06/1984). Retrieved from <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1984/06/28/030976.html?pageNumber=6>

⁵⁹⁷ "Contadora frena la guerra, pero, en su informe, Kissinger la impulsa" *Proceso* (14/01/1984), Retrieved from <https://www.proceso.com.mx/137814/contadora-frena-la-guerra-pero-en-su-informe-kissinger-la-impulsa>

⁵⁹⁸ Sanahuja. *Los EE.UU. en Centroamérica*, 17.

⁵⁹⁹ Juan González Yuste, "Morán califica de 'injusto con España' el 'informe Kissinger' sobre Centroamérica" 18/01/1984, Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1984/01/18/internacional/443228402_850215.html

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the pacification of Central America and, in this regard, Ortega highlighted the Nicaraguan desire to increase Western European involvement in the region⁶⁰⁰. Nevertheless, he was also aware that the U.S. could not be ignored; this is why Managua expressed its will to resume the dialogue of Manzanillo more than once.⁶⁰¹ Despite Moran's doubts that were mainly linked to the possibility of Nicaragua of abandoning Contador), the Contadora Group and Spain were always aware that both the U.S. and Cuba must be included in the negotiation process. Both countries should cooperate in order to break the deadlock.

Therefore, the Nicaraguan situation was a complex issue that was at the heart of the interest of Spanish foreign policy. Although some issues have been raised in these pages, there are many problems that remain unanswered. However, it is possible to observe the main reasons that led the SI and the Spanish Socialist Party and government to become interested in this region, including: i) the belief that the Central America issue should be considered as the result of the North-South contradictions rather than as a East-West conflict; ii) the fear that this area would become a "hot issue" inside the frame of the Cold War; iii) the awareness that a regional conflict would harm the entire world according to the notion of interdependence (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2); and iv) the possibility of social democracy to become a "third way" in this region (Chapter 3). Furthermore, it is worth stressing once again that the relationships between Spain, the countries of Contadora, and the Spanish commitment in Central America were so important that they provided a lot of prestige to the Spanish government in the European dimension. However, this issue will be further discussed later.

4.2.2 Venezuela

So far, the turbulent situation affecting Central America has been discussed. However, the Venezuelan reality was completely different in those years. Indeed, it was one of the most modern, egalitarian, urban, and richest countries of Latin America with a strong presence of

⁶⁰⁰ Carta de fecha 28 febrero de 1985 dirigida al Secretario General por el Representante Permanente de Nicaragua ante las Naciones Unidas. February 28 1985. From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box 38346, file 1.

⁶⁰¹ "Resumen noticioso político matutino. Maderid, EFE (May 13, 1985)". From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box 38346, file 3

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the state, but above all it was a democratic country. Venezuela together with Costa Rica and Colombia were the only examples of democracy in Latin America at the time. Indeed, between 1920 and 1980, its economy grew rapidly by reaching an annual average rate of 6%. Its main source of wealth was derived from oil (it was one of the founding countries of OPEC), which was both its strength and weakness since the entire Venezuelan economy, society, and fiscal system were based on oil. Nevertheless, negative effects began to be felt mostly after Black Friday in February 1983, when the price of fuel dropped and the currency devalued. The external debt affected Venezuela just as it affected in the entire region (Chapter 2.6).⁶⁰²

Therefore, unlike other Latin American countries, the relationship between the European and Venezuelan actors were at another level. They not only shared common objectives, but also their relations could be developed at the governmental level, an issue that should not be underestimated in the Latin America at the time. To some extent, Socialist Europe could not say anything about Venezuela because it was a democratic country with good standards of living.⁶⁰³ As noted earlier, the role played by Carlos Andrés Pérez in the establishment of ties between European Social Democracy and Latin America was remarkable. During his first government (1974-1979), he strived for the nationalization of the oil and iron industry, the creation of a investment fund, reforming public administration and education, and advancing the health system.⁶⁰⁴ However, although the creation of a modern welfare state was one of the cornerstones of his policy, some difficulties emerged. The main reason concerned the incapacity of the government to reduce its dependency on oil revenues. Notwithstanding, Pérez was able to enhance the role of the state in the economy thanks to the profits coming from the rise of oil prices in the 1970s.

Additionally, Pérez sought to raise human capital and labor productivity levels through the scholarship program launched in 1974 by the Fundación Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho. The

⁶⁰² Michal Reid, *El continente olvidado. Una historia de la nueva América Latina*, Colombia: Crítica, 2018, 209

⁶⁰³ Interview with Manuel Medina, Madrid, June 19, 2018.

⁶⁰⁴ Carlos Hernández Delfino, “Carlos Andrés Pérez (Primer gobierno 1974-1979)”. *Tierra Nuestra: 1498-2009* Edited by Fundación Venezuela Postiva, (Caracas: Fundación Venezuela Postiva, 2009), vol.2, 329-333
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main goal was to train and to expand qualified staff in order to fulfill economic and industrial development goals⁶⁰⁵. In his foreign policy, he revealed a clear dedication to Latin American integration in order to develop a single Latin American voice in the international arena (e.g. the SELA was created in this context - Chapter 2) just as he aimed to become the spokesman of the Third World countries.⁶⁰⁶ Besides these, his other goals in foreign policy were international solidarity, international cooperation, the struggle against inequalities, the differences between the developing and developed countries (North-South notion), worldwide peace, respect for human rights, ideological pluralism, and the establishment of a new international division of labor and new international economic order. All of these were inside the framework of interdependence. Therefore, his external aspirations coincided with many of the SI principles which led them to becoming closer.

However, it is important to emphasize, once again, that even though the policy of Carlos Andrés Pérez seemed to be the closest to European social democracy, he was not a Social Democrat, at least in a “pure European way” (Chapter 3). Their affinities were primarily the result of a political-economic juncture rather than a full ideological commitment.⁶⁰⁷ Hence, the Venezuelan president sought a proximity towards the European governments in order to establish alliances with the North, which was necessary for the development of the new international economic order, as well as their solidarity and cooperation in overcoming worldwide economic and trade imbalances. He believed that that foreign policy should be a prolongation of the national policy and that local and international developments were intertwined. He gave high priority to external issues because he interpreted them as the key for solving national dilemmas.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁵ Michael Tarver (ed), *The Rise and Fall of Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez. The later years 1973-2004*. (USA: The Edwin Ellen Press – Latin American Studies, 2004), vol. 2, 16 and 18.

⁶⁰⁶ Carlos Andrés Pérez, “Discurso durante el acto de la firma del convenio constitutivo del Fondo Andino de Reservas.” Caracas, November 12, 1976 In Carlos Andrés Pérez, *Manos a la obra. Textos, mensajes, discursos y declaraciones del Presidente de la República 16 noviembre 1976-11 marzo 1977*. (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1978), T.3, vol. 2, 389.

⁶⁰⁷ Raquel Gamus, *La fugaz convergencia de C.A.P y la IS en Centroamérica*. (Caracas: Consejo de desarrollo científico y humanístico de la Universidad Central de Venezuela fondo editorial Acta Científica venezolana, 1990), 12.

⁶⁰⁸ Elsa Cardozo de Da Silva, “El proceso de toma de decisiones en política exterior de Venezuela”. In *Reforma y política exterior en Venezuela*, edited by Carlos A. Romero, (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1992), 81-82.

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According to him, the future of developing countries depended on the international environment. In this light, Pérez encouraged holding the SI Conference in Caracas in 1976. He aimed to create a channel of communication between Europe and Latin America through the SI that according to him has been favored by the democratization of the Iberian Peninsula and the strengthening of the French and Italian presence in Europe, since this had led to resizing the SI (previously the SI was mainly linked to the Northern countries).⁶⁰⁹ His interest in the SI was also connected with Pérez's desire of enhancing the Venezuelan presence in international and multilateral organisms, such as the Contadora Group, SELA, OAS, UN, and the Group of 77. He saw in the SI the opportunity to consolidate the Venezuelan position at the international level, which according to him would provide economic, financial, and trade benefits for the country.⁶¹⁰ It should not be forgotten that Venezuela's entire system was based on oil, and therefore international links were fundamental.

Thus, Carlos Andrés Pérez worked to create an active foreign policy as well as to establish close links with international actors. As noted earlier, this behavior "lacked novelty", since it corresponded to the endeavors of the FSLN, González, and Craxi. For instance, between 1974 and 1975, Pérez visited more than 35 countries. His goal was not only to establish or develop closer bilateral links, but he was also looking for greater progress for Venezuela on the international stage because, as he said more than once, problems linked to economy, trade, or finance could only be solved from outside.⁶¹¹

Furthermore, he looked for the democratization of the continent and the respect for human rights, which would be reached only through the modernization of the Latin American political system. Thus, the relationship with the SI would contribute to the modernization of the Latin American political parties, and therefore to regional democratization. For this purpose, personal ties became an added value. According to Beatrice Rangel, the right-hand

⁶⁰⁹ Gamus, *La fugaz convergencia*, 120-152 and 200-202.

⁶¹⁰ Carlos Andrés Pérez, "Prólogo". In *¿Qué es el socialismo democrático? La socialdemocracia en Venezuela*, Demetrio Boersner (Venezuela: Editorial Nueva Sociedad Ildis, 1988), 12.

⁶¹¹ José Consuegra, *Carlos Andrés Pérez diplomacia directa*. (Venezuela, Ediciones presidencia de la República, 1991), 19.

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of Carlos Andrés Pérez, he had very good relationships with Willy Brandt and thanks to him, Pérez forged a close relationship with Felipe González. According to her, when Franco died, Brandt asked the Venezuelan politician to assist and to support the Spanish socialist and Pérez kept his promise.⁶¹² In this regard, Fernando Morán underlined the fact that Democratic Action (AD) really helped the PSOE and the PSP during the democratic transition⁶¹³. Hence, as Pérez once claimed, just as Brandt was González's right-hand in Europe, he became the González's right-hand in Latin America.⁶¹⁴ The truth is that they developed a friendly relationship.

In this sense, on the occasion of Pérez's death a few years ago (in 2010), González recalled some memorable moments of their relationship. Not only has he referred to him as a *friend*, but he also underlined the following: (i) Pérez's unconditional support before and after his first government; (ii) Pérez's courage in bringing him to Madrid on the Venezuelan presidential plane before the legalization of the parties; and (iii) Pérez's criticisms regarding the policies of economic adjustment introduced by the PSOE government between 1983 and 1985 (although criticisms were mainly directed at the Minister of Economy and the Minister of Industry). Pérez was deeply concerned about the economic decisions that the PSOE undertook once in power and he did not hesitate to make it known. That is, in González' words, Pérez was a "friend beyond agreements and disagreements, and, therefore, a friend"⁶¹⁵.

Within this context, Pérez became the spokesman of the SI and González in Latin America (he headed the Latin American Committee of the SI), and at the same time he was Latin America's spokesperson in the international arena. According to Silvio Prado, this aspiration combined with Pérez's desire of being the key piece in the development of the continent contributed in the long-run to his break with the FSLN. Why? From the Sandinista point of view, Pérez tried to be the mentor of the Sandinista revolution, but he

⁶¹² Interview with Beatrice Rangel, Miami, March 12, 2018

⁶¹³ Morán, *España en su sitio*, 328.

⁶¹⁴ Carlos Andrés Pérez talked about Felipe González in Caupolicán Ovalles, *El otro Pérez. Antimemorias*. (Venezuela: Taller de ediciones y editorial Libros Maracaibo, 1996), 159.

⁶¹⁵ Felipe González, "Carlos Andrés Pérez, homenaje al amigo". *El País*, 28/01/2010. Retrieved from https://elpais.com/internacional/2010/12/28/actualidad/1293490801_850215.html

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lost the struggle to Cuba at the end. The influence and assistance provided by Fidel Castro were higher compared to Venezuela.⁶¹⁶

Concerning the participation of AD (the party of Carlos Andrés Pérez) in the SI, two clarifications will be made. Firstly, for ten years (1966-1976) AD was an SI observer member, its status changed in 1976 when it became full member. Secondly, AD was not the only party that belonged to the SI. In fact, it shared the membership with the People's Electoral Movement (MEP) a left-wing party which had split from AD in 1967. However, although both parties acceded to the SI, this writing focuses on AD because it was the party that represented the "social democratic" option in Venezuela and because it was the party of Pérez, who played a pivotal role in the SI-Latin America relationship since he exerted strong personal leadership and established close ties with the main actors of the international stage. He also came to power and therefore could be more incisive in terms of policy-making. Moreover, Pérez was able to locate AD in a prominent position within the SI as well as in Latin America in general. In addition, in electoral terms, AD always prevailed over MEP, which during the 1970s experienced a sharp decline. It is interesting to note that MEP's decay was interpreted by the SI as a consequence of the Chilean experience. According to the SI, during the Venezuelan elections in December 1973 when Pérez won, "many thousands of people who essentially sympathized with the MEP or other leftist and progressive groups decided that if democratic socialism failed in Chile with its long and noble civic traditions, it was still more likely to fail in rough Venezuela".⁶¹⁷

Likewise, it is important to bear in mind that since the introduction of democracy in Venezuela in 1958, the two main parties, AD and COPEI (Christian Democratic party), came to a compromise with the aim of excluding the Communist party from the political

⁶¹⁶ Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019. The problems between AD and Castro came from the past. During the government of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964), from AD, certain hostility was developed between Cuba and Venezuela due to the ideological rivalry (Cuban socialism against Venezuelan reformism). Both countries aimed to be an ideological model in Latin America. Nevertheless, during the first Pérez' Administration, the economic and diplomatic relationships between Cuba and Venezuela were relaunched. Pérez began to sell oil to Cuba. Robert D. Bond, "Venezuela, la Cuenca del Caribe y la crisis en Centroamérica". In Lebastida Jaime, Centro de Capacitación para el Desarrollo, *Centroamérica. Crisis y política Internacional*. (México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1984), 258.

⁶¹⁷ "Socialist Affaires 2. Reasons for the Left Defeat". From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 847.

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scene and of establishing limits in the political competition. This commitment (*Pacto de Punto Fijo*) ensured a shared power and it worked well for four decades.⁶¹⁸ Therefore, after the Pérez Administration, COPEI came to power with Luis Herrera Campins (1979-1984), who in turn was followed by Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989) and Carlos Andrés Pérez again (1989-1993), both from AD.

Herrera Campins aimed to establish a market economy, but his project was blocked by negative reactions from workers (who would be affected by the liberalization of prices) and employers (whose protection would be reduced). Therefore, to some extent, he continued the line of Pérez, which was the pursuit of a new international economic order, the defense of human rights, and regional integration. Some shifts were visible in foreign matters since he indicated a more moderate approach to certain issues, for instance in Nicaragua.⁶¹⁹ However, what Herrera Campins really had to face were the imbalances of the second oil crisis that led Venezuela to increase imports, worsen the external debt, increase the flows of capital abroad, and therefore lead to the so-called “Black Friday”. As a result, AD returned to power. In spite of the obstacles from the complex economic situation, Lusinchi was relatively successful in controlling inflation and in producing a modest growth rate. Notwithstanding these improvements, these policies had two negative effects: the fall of the international currency reserves and corruption caused by the system of differential rates in currency. Within this context, Carlos Andrés Pérez was re-elected and had completely changed his policy from his former administration. Austerity, technocratic policies of adjustment, and neoliberalism marked his second government.⁶²⁰ To some extent, he ended up applying similar policies to those implemented by González when he came to power in 1982, although at the time Pérez had criticized the posture of the Spanish Prime Minister. Therefore, Pérez himself underwent the impact of the international context (neoliberalism flows), which redirected his original plans and postulates. Nevertheless, the victory of his second administration was considered by European Social democracy as a confirmation of

⁶¹⁸ Reid, *El continente olvidado*, 210.

⁶¹⁹ “Venezuela: all change” *Political Report*, December 8, 1978. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1204.

⁶²⁰ Luis Gómez Calcaño, “Venezuelan Social Democracy: From Populism to Pragmatism”, In *Social Democracy*, edited by Menno Vellinga, 191-199.

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the progress made by democratic socialism in Latin America, which was still seen as the most viable alternative to face the problems that still affected the region.⁶²¹

While Venezuela had to face the effects of the second oil crises and the growth of external debt, the commitment and relationship between AD and the PSOE/SI remained more or less the same, even under the government of Herrera Campins who as a Christian Democrat tended to be closer to Washington. Nonetheless, the international context and in particular the Central American situation led the Venezuelan President to moderate his “pro-American policy”. The fall of the oil prices and the huge external debt led the Christian Democratic government to focus mainly on domestic matters. This is one of the reasons that explained the slowness in which Contadora emerged. However, Contadora also allowed the Venezuelan administration “to save energy” to focus on local problems, as it also provided the framework through which it could act outside⁶²². When AD returned to power, Lusinchi’s priority remained searching for a solution to the debt problem. Therefore, in some way he continued Herrera Campins’s line. In foreign matters, although his government maintained Pérez’s pro-Third World policy, he channeled the action through Contadora. In this sense, he avoided individual risks and was able to focus more on domestic matters.⁶²³

Notwithstanding, the personal action and interest of Carlos Andrés Pérez endured over time. His personal contacts and close ties with prominent actors ensured his presence and incidence in international matters. As Felipe González stated:

“With Carlos Andrés Pérez, I experienced the crucial moments of the fall of Somoza and the Sandinista triumph, the terrible war in Central America, the efforts to make

⁶²¹ Meeting of the Council of the Socialist International, Resolution on Latin America, Paris, December 6-7, 1988. From the Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, Italy, box GPSE 708.

⁶²²It is interesting to note that, at the time, the USA interpreted in this way Herrera Campins’ policy. Indeed, in a record from the CIA it is possible to read: “The country’s serious problems [...] have reduced administration interest in Central America [...] The Herrera government will probably become less active in Central America and more inclined to shift from bilateral approaches to safer multilateral channels- such as the Contadora Central American peace initiative - that will expose the administration to less political risk at home. For the same reason, Herrera will be more reluctant to appear associated with Washington’s policies in the region”. CIA, “Venezuela’s”, iii.

⁶²³ Mendez Asensio, *Contadora*, . 47-49.

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peace, the support for the elections that led to the Violeta Chamorro's victory in Nicaragua [in 1990], the efforts to ensure her safety [...] With him I shared the first anniversary of the Sandinista triumph and his reencounter with Fidel Castro”⁶²⁴.

Thus, they shared many experiences and their relationship endured over time. Many other issues could be added to this list that are discussed throughout this text, but since they have already been mentioned, it is not necessary to repeat them again.

Last but not least, another aspect worth highlighting here is that Chilean community in Venezuela (formed by mass migrations after the overthrow of Allende) served as a “liaison” between European and Latin American social democracy and fostered their ties. Therefore, the exiles again played a key role in the network forged between both sides of the Atlantic. Within this context, the first meeting (under the auspices of the FES and ILDIS) between the Chilean DC and members from the Popular Unity was held in Colonia Tovar (Venezuela) on July 7-10, 1975. The goals of this secret meeting were to examine the Chilean situation (including the Latin American involvement and the assessment of the national and international factors) and to explore the possibility of developing a real democratic alternative for the political future of Chile⁶²⁵.

Furthermore, the Chilean Radical party, the first Latin American party to become a full member of the SI, established an office in Caracas. Later, many of them moved to Mexico, including the Direction of the Chilean Radical Party in 1979. *Casa de Chile* was also founded in Mexico by Chilean exiles.⁶²⁶ Given the large number of Chilean exiles, two offices were established in order to coordinate all the activities: both Caracas and Rome

⁶²⁴ González, “Carlos Andrés Pérez, homenaje”.

⁶²⁵ A copy of this “confidential report” of this meeting (“Estrictamente confidencial- solo para ser conocido por los dirigentes del partidos dentro y fuera del país y por los elementos de base que se estimen indispensables para el manejo de la información”) is available in the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 561.

⁶²⁶ On February 20 1975, Alejandro Montesino (Radical Party Representative and responsible for Chile Democrático), from Rome reported to Janistchek the liberation of the Radical Party's president Anselmo Sule, together with both former Radical Party's Presidents Carlos Morales and Hugo Miranda. All of them arrived in Caracas. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 561.

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(*Chile Democrático*) hosted the Chilean community⁶²⁷. From there, they looked to fight against Pinochet and for the defense of democracy and human rights, and also to raise awareness in the international arena.

Additionally, the Coordinating Committee of Democratic Forces of the Southern Cone was also founded in Caracas, which aimed to restore democracy and democratic pluralism in the Southern Cone,⁶²⁸ as well as the Chilean Committee against Fascism which included all the refugees. Indeed, from Caracas, Aniceto Rodríguez (from the Chilean Socialist Party), maintained contacts with the SI, even though his party was not an SI member (only in 1992, it became a consultative member of the SI).⁶²⁹ Furthermore, their activism within the SI and the weight of the Radical Party because of its full membership, allowed them to be more incisive in the establishment of an SI Office in Latin America. Since they were based in Caracas, they supported the idea that the Office should be opened in Venezuela. The close relationships that the Chilean community established with AD contributed to launching this initiative as well as allowing the AD to strengthen contacts with the SI and to increase its international presence⁶³⁰.

It should not be forgotten that this was during the epoch of the first government of Carlos Andrés Pérez who strived to have a growing international reach. Hence, Caracas became a meeting place between the SI and the Chilean exiles, which in turn also favored the relationships between AD and the SI. From there, the network between the European and Latin American social democracy was fostered. Therefore, personal ties, reciprocal interest, and charisma as well as the community of exiles and the national reality (a democratic country close to the European social democracy) contributed to the entrenchment of their relationships. That said, in the following sub-chapter the Chilean experience will be further examined.

⁶²⁷ “Letter from Carlos Parra to Bernt Carlsson”, February 21, 1977 From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1065.

⁶²⁸ “Letter from Aniceto Rodríguez to Bernt Carlsson”, August 30, 1977. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1204.

⁶²⁹ “Letter from Aniceto Rodríguez to Bernt Carlsson”, January 21, 1977 From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1065.

⁶³⁰ “Letter from Carlos Morales to Hans Janitschek, Caracas, June 30, 1975”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 561.

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4.2.3. Chile

*The option No won the plebiscite.
People were euphoric, they celebrated in the streets,
while those who had ruled the country for sixteen years
were unable to convince themselves about what was happening.
Nobody had imagined that such strong dictatorship
could end “with a ballot box.”⁶³¹*

Although a growing rapprochement between Europe and Latin America occurred during the late 1970s, in particular since the Conference of Caracas in 1976, the Chilean coup d'état was the turning point of their relationships.⁶³² Hence, “the victory of the Popular Unity in Chile, and subsequently the painful events of September 1973, compelled the European Socialist to look towards these faraway lands”.⁶³³ Allende's overthrow, the violation of human rights, and the damages caused by imperialism (e.g. underdevelopment) captured the attention of the European social democracy, which in turn led the Europeans to begin to take an interest in Latin America as a whole⁶³⁴. Chile became a “political laboratory” since it was a subject of discussion around the world and the novelty of Allende's project led the European social democracy to identify itself in this.⁶³⁵ Thus, the Chilean events became a permanent concern for the SI; indeed, it was addressed in many of the SI meetings and resolutions as the documents hosted by the SI archive have confirmed. They supported the efforts made by the Chilean people to restore democracy by calling the Junta to put an end to dictatorship and to re-establish freedom and democracy.⁶³⁶ In this

⁶³¹ Ariel Lizana Rojas and Sol Rojas Lizana. *Historias clandestinas*. (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 2014)

⁶³² Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁶³³ Antoine Blanca, “The International and Latin America”, *Socialist Affairs*, Vol. 28/1, January/February 1978. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 22.

⁶³⁴ Ibid.

⁶³⁵ Santoni, *Il PCI e i giorni del Cile*, 106.

⁶³⁶ “Minutes of the Bureau Meeting of the Socialist International. Resolution on Chile. Brussels, Belgium-November 24-25, 1983”, 40. From the Historical Archives of the EU. Florence Italy, Box GPSE 707. The SI support persisted over time. For instance, in September 1986 Brandt wrote to Felipe González the following: “Given the grave deterioration in the internal situation in Chile in recent weeks, I ask you, as the leader of a SI member party in government, to take whatever action you might deem appropriate on this issue in order to assist our Chilean comrades in their search for a peaceful transition to democracy in their country”. Willy Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

way, the full membership of the Radical party (1971) contributed to the SI impetus in the region.

Regarding the Spanish-Chilean connection, some issues have already been discussed, e.g. the case of Enrich Schnake, the centers for refugees in Spain, some of the missions, the subject of scholarships, the meetings organized by the ICI (e.g. “Ibero-America: Encounter in Democracy”), and the participation in the SI activities (e.g. Chilean Committee, conferences, and so on.). In addition to this, the PSOE strived to support the entire Chilean opposition’s front. For instance, the Spanish Socialist Party supported the creation of a “convergence group” formed by members from inside and outside Chile with the aim of promoting democratic socialism in the area. For obvious reasons, the members based in Chile were kept secret, but Felipe González, Bettino Craxi, and the General Secretary from PASOK knew their names. This showed the close contacts established between them and the support that the Socialists from Southern Europe provided to the Chilean opposition.⁶³⁷ Thus, the PSOE, as well as some of the SI members, tried to create an alliance between the progressive forces in order to have more chances to defeat the authoritarian regime. As a result, the transnational network built by the exiles contributed to such alliances and enhanced international support. Many exiles worked from the outside, and others were able to return to Chile after 1983. Until then, the opposition movements had been severely repressed. Nevertheless, the nexus constructed by the exiles within the countries that have hosted them played a key role in shaping the opposition’s force. The experiences acquired during the exile really influenced them, namely abandoning the class approach and being willing to construct wide political and social alliances with the middle classes in order to carry out social, political, and economic transformations.⁶³⁸

Although the Radical party was the only SI member party and although sometimes it showed some reticence because it expected to be the sole interlocutor inside the SI, the

Brandt, “Telegrama de Willy Brandt sobre la situación en Chile” (18/11/1986). Fundación Felipe González AFG.2.3.D.b.1.e.Willy Brandt (Alemania). ES. MD. 28079.FFG/AFG 2.3.D.b.1.e//AFFG FER0044703.

⁶³⁷ Letter from Erick Schnake to Felipe González, October 20, 1980. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1171.

⁶³⁸ Igor Goicovic Donoso, “La transición política en Chile. Especificidades nacionales y puntos de referencia con el caso español (1988-1994)”. In *Claves Internacionales*, 297.

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PSOE and in particular Elena Flores (on the instructions of Felipe González) supported the union of the entire Chilean democratic front. This also was due to the fact that the Radical Party was actually a small party which had only a secondary significance in Chile⁶³⁹.

Besides this, as already stated, the PSOE and the SI organized several missions in order to assess the local situation, to visit the prisoners, and to ask for their release. Moreover, Flores also stressed the commitment of González in the Chilean matter and underlined the call made by the Socialist Secretary to the EEC institutions with the aim of asking them how they, as the Community, could contribute to the democratization of the country through the support of the Chilean opposition. The EEC replied to González that he was the one who knew the Chilean situation best; therefore, all his actions and decisions would be fully supported.⁶⁴⁰

Giving assistance to the Chilean opposition became the mechanism by which they could publicly contribute to the democratization of the Third World. It is also important to keep in mind that the concept of democracy had by the Chilean opposition was quite similar to the Europeans, i.e. free and fair elections, social justice, and human rights. Therefore, the support of the Chilean opposition meant for European social democracy the support and faith in their own democratic cornerstones.⁶⁴¹ Additionally, both the Chilean and European political spectrum had always been very close, which favored the establishment of meaningful links between the Chilean and European parties. In this way, a great network of bonds and contacts had been constructed between both sides of the Atlantic.⁶⁴²

Furthermore, the communities of Chilean exiles established in Europe implied two types of influences. On one hand, they increased the awareness about the Chilean situation in the

⁶³⁹ According to Pentti Väänänen, Chile was one of the SI's main focuses in Latin America. This was partly due to the Radical Party of Chile, which was an active member of the SI. During the Pinochet regime the SI supported cooperation between the democratic parties in the country and it also had some contacts with the Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats. That was with the agreement of the Radical Party. Interview with Pentti Väänänen, June 26, 2019.

⁶⁴⁰ Interview with Elena Flores, Madrid, June 20, 2018

⁶⁴¹ Alan Angell, "International Support for the Chilean Opposition 1973-1989: Political parties and the Role of Exiles". In *The International Dimensions*, edited by Laurence Whitehead, 193.

⁶⁴² Alberto van Klaveren, "Chile y Europa Occidental: entre el apoyo y la democracia unidireccional". In *Chile: Política exterior para la democracia*, edited by Heraldo Muñoz, (Chile: Pedhuen Editores, 1988), 190. Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

Old Continent by closely following it; on the other hand, they were influenced by their host countries and from the transformations that marked the European left at the time, namely the crises of the “real socialism” (Chapter 2), the growth of social democracy in the Southern Europe, and the democratic transition of Spain and Portugal, which strived to combine neoliberal policies with social protectionism and targeted interventions of the State in the economy.⁶⁴³ Therefore, from the exile and from the traumatic experience produced by Pinochet’s coup, a “new democratic socialism” started to grow among Chileans.⁶⁴⁴ As was the case in Spain, the exiles’ experiences contributed to the definition of new strategies that the Chilean opposition adopted to face the dictatorship and to promote the democratic transition.⁶⁴⁵ In words of the Chilean Carlos Altamirano from the Chilean Socialist Party, “the exile was an opportunity to evolve. That means knowing [...] the European social democracy”.⁶⁴⁶

In Spain, Enrich Schnake (who after his release migrated to Madrid) played a key role in defining the so-called “socialist renewal”, whose objective was to approach the postulates of the SI. In this way, he established a close relationship with the PSOE and with Felipe González. According to him, the PSOE and González really influenced the Chilean socialist path in exile. He worked closely with Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo in the ICI and he strived to create a democratic front in order to face Pinochet. Indeed, during his journey in Argentina to fulfill some of the tasks of the ICI in Buenos Aires in 1984, he secretly visited Chile in order to attend the meeting of the Chilean Socialist Party that sought solutions to defeat the dictatorship⁶⁴⁷. In fact, he returned to Chile a few years later in 1987 with the aim of taking part of the Commission for free elections. Moreover, he worked with the Spanish Embassy in Santiago to devise strategies that would allow the return of the Chilean exiles.

⁶⁴³ Alex Fernández Jilberto, “Internatinalization and Social Democratization of Politics in Chile”. In *Social Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Menno Vellinga, 169.

⁶⁴⁴ Ignacio Walker, “Un nuevo socialismo democrático en Chile”, *Colección de Estudios Cieplan*, n. 24, (1988): 14 and 5.

⁶⁴⁵ Carmen González Martínez and Encarna Nicolás Marín, “Presentación. De la dictadura a la democracia en España y Chile, nuevas perspectivas” *Ayer*, 79 (3), (2010): 18.

⁶⁴⁶ Gabriel Salazar, *Conversaciones con Carlos Altamirano*. (Chile: Debate, 2011), Kindle edition, 6699.

⁶⁴⁷ Indeed, the Spanish ambassador in Chile, Miguel Solano, sent a letter to Fernando Morán to inform him about the secret trip of Schnake in Chile. Solano even claimed that the Spanish embassy monitored the Schnake’s trip to know the outcome of the mission as well as the possible difficulties that may arise. “Sobre la entrada y salida de Eric Schnake en Chile” (13/07/1984). Fundación Felipe González A.F.G.2.3.D.d.2.t. Fernando Morán López, ES.MD.28079.FFG/ADG.2.3.D.b.2.t//AFFG FER0044769.

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In addition to the complaints made by the Spanish government against the military Junta in Chile due to the violation of human rights and the requests made by Madrid for the democratization of the country, Spain demonstrated its full commitment to the cause of the Chilean opposition during the whole process of the plebiscite and support for the “Command for the No”. This plebiscite aimed at the approval or rejection (promoted by the “Command for the No”) of voters for the extension of Pinochet’s term as President for eight years. On October 5, 1988, Chilean people voted and “No” won with 55% of the votes. Hence, Pinochet had to leave power and free elections were to be held. It is interesting to note that the fall of dictatorship occurred inside the framework of the institutional system created by the Junta itself because the Constitution promulgated in 1980 contemplated a plebiscite with the aim of determining the future of the country. Pinochet based his campaign for the plebiscite on the economic policy because he believed that the economic improvements (increase in exports, consumerism, and foreign investment) would help him win the referendum. The opposition, instead, pointed to the violation of human rights, disappearances, killings, and the tortures committed by the dictatorship.⁶⁴⁸ The opposition created the group *Concertación por la democracia* and Patricio Aylwin was elected President in November 1989.

Following Chile’s announcement of the plebiscite, the EEC expressed its desire for the restoration of democracy in the country and asked for ensuring freedom and transparency in the voting procedure.⁶⁴⁹ Spain played a key role in this process. Indeed, before the celebration of the plebiscite: (i) Spanish officials visited the country (e.g. in July 1988 Elena Flores and José María Benegas visited Santiago in order to attend the meeting of the SI Committee for Chile, the third visit of Elena Flores that year); (ii) demonstrations against the Chilean dictatorship were held in Spain; (iii) Alfonso Guerra claimed that he would like to be Chilean in order to be able to vote “No”; (iv) the Spanish Chamber of Deputies underlined their full support for the restoration of democracy, pluralism, and

⁶⁴⁸ Shirley Christian, “Foes of Pinochet win Referendum; Regime Concedes” *New York Times*, 6/10/1988. <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/06/world/foes-of-pinochet-win-referendum-regime-concedes.html>

⁶⁴⁹ “Declaración de los Doce sobre: África Austral, Chile, Afghanistan, relaciones Este-Oeste” In *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1988*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 684.

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respect for human rights; and (v) the Spanish Embassy in Chile made efforts to establish contacts with the opposition's forces.⁶⁵⁰

According to Ricardo Lagos (from the socialist party, who was elected President of Chile from 2000 until 2006), the campaign for the “No” was assisted by the PSOE and other international organizations that carried out training sessions devoted to democracy⁶⁵¹. The truth is that more than 400 foreign observers participated in the referendum but the Spanish delegation was the most numerous. Why? According to Cristina García there were two main reasons: (i) the Spanish-Chilean cultural proximity; and (ii) the Spanish experience in terms of transition to democracy and its commitment and full support for the “No” force⁶⁵².

It is interesting to note that the literature has found nexus between the democratization of Spain and the Chilean process. On one hand, it worth emphasizing that while the Chilean “Socialist renewal” and its proximity to social democratic values occurred in exile (the groups in the interior mostly maintained their radicalism and orthodoxies), in the Spanish case the opposite occurred; the group of the interior looked for a renewal by taking distance from Marxism, while the group ruled by Llopis from outside (PSOE *histórico*) kept more orthodox positions.⁶⁵³ Furthermore, to some extent, the Spanish socialist renewal was also influenced by the failure of Allende's democratic path to socialism. Political actors highlighted the importance of learning from this experience and, in view of the democratic transition, they tried to be very prudent and moderate in the face of a risk of a military coup d'état.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵⁰ Cristina Luz García Gutiérrez, “Exportando democracia: la implicación española en el plebiscito chileno de 1988”. *Revista de Historia Social y de las Mentalidades*, Vol. 19, nº1, (2015): 68. See the Institutional Declaration of the Spanish Chamber of Deputies, September 29, 1988. in *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1988*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 612.

⁶⁵¹ Ricardo Lagos, *Mi vida: de la infancia hasta la lucha contra la dictadura*. (Chile: Penguin Eandom House Grupo Editorial Chile, 2013, 23.

⁶⁵² García Gutiérrez, “Exportando democracia”, 71.

⁶⁵³ Goicovic Donoso, “La transición política”, 300-301.

⁶⁵⁴ Rosa Pardo Sanz, “De puentes y comunidades: balance historiográfico sobre las rleaciones con América Latina”, In *Apertura internacional* edited by Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 154.

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On the other hand, the *Concertación por la democracia* was inspired by the Spanish democratization.⁶⁵⁵ All of this was influenced by the flows that led to the “renewal of socialism” as well as by the fact that Spain (as the PSI) was exponent of a moderate socialism (social democracy) that included neoliberal policies; Chile, having a neoliberal legacy from the dictatorship, sought to combine real democracy with its neoliberalism. Indeed, after the Chilean plebiscite, Aylwin made it clear that the economic policy would not suffer a radical change since it had worked (for this reason Pinochet had been basing his campaign on the economic field).⁶⁵⁶ As a matter of fact, Chilean democratization was characterized by the maintenance of the economic model, which had been launched during the dictatorship. All the governments ruled by the *Concertación por la democracia* maintained more or less the same policy.⁶⁵⁷

Nevertheless, some differences should be underlined about the Spanish and Chilean transition. As Elena Flores argued, during the SI meeting held in Santiago in July 1988, the Chilean opposition achieved a degree of unity before the plebiscite while the Spanish one only achieved it a few years after Franco’s death (with the so-called “Platajunta”). Likewise, Spain was only able to hold free elections in 1977 while Chilean opposition did it under Pinochet’s dictatorship. Hence, the Chilean transition occurred under the dictatorship while in Spain it occurred only after the dictator had died. Furthermore, she firmly stressed that the PSOE and the SI support for the “Command for the No” could not be interpreted as an external interference since they looked for the establishment of freedom, democracy, and the respect of human rights, namely for universal principles. The support of the SI and the PSOE to the Chilean opposition corresponded to their aims; therefore, their intervention

⁶⁵⁵ In the Spanish newspaper *El País*, the Chilean people are called upon to follow the Spanish experience (*model*) since all the Spanish opposition worked together and strived to democracy. “Chile Vive”, *El País*, 7/10/1988. https://elpais.com/diario/1988/10/07/opinion/592182007_850215.html

⁶⁵⁶ José Comas “La derrota de una dictadura. Pinochet ‘acepta y respeta’ su derrota en las urnas”, *El País*, 7/10/1988. https://elpais.com/diario/1988/10/07/internacional/592182002_850215.html

⁶⁵⁷ For an overview of the Chilean history and the governments ruled by the Concertación, see: Rafael Sagredo Baeza, *Historia mínima de Chile*. (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 2014), Kindle edition. As a matter of fact, the Chilean democratization had specific characteristics: (i) the continuity of the Pinochet’s Constitution, which had been proclaimed in 1980; (ii) after the Aylwin’ election, Pinochet maintained his position of commander of the Army for 8 years and his appointment as life senator; (iii) continuity of the economic system and, (iv) continuum of the political élite. For this reason, Carlos Huneeus defined the Chilean democratization as a “semi-sovereign democracy”. See: Carlos Huneeus, *La democracia semisoberana. Chile después de Pinochet*. (Chile: Taurus, 2014).

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became a sort of “duty” for them. Furthermore, they even contemplated supporting the “Command for the No” with financial backing.⁶⁵⁸

The victory of the “Command for the No” was seen by Spain as its own triumph in view of the efforts that it had made to democratize the country and to promote the respect for human rights. Likewise, it marked the beginning of a new stage in Spanish-Chilean relations. The attendance of Felipe González at the inauguration of President Patricio Aylwin in March 1990 and the signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Cooperation between the two countries in October that same year meant the establishment of a formal relationship between them and this depicted the full commitment that Spain had been carrying out for the Chilean democratization.⁶⁵⁹

4.3. Spain, Latin America and the EEC

*The relation with Latin America gives Spain
an extraordinary singular European dimension.
Without it, Spain would be a shrunken country.
It would be a sad country.*
Enric Juliana⁶⁶⁰

As discussed, the relationships between the EEC and Latin America preceded Spanish democratization (Chapter 2.6). Nevertheless, it is also well known that Madrid gave them greater impetus. To some extent, Latin America represented a target for Spain in two ways. Firstly, in ideological terms since the Iberian country would be able to fulfill its social democratic values in the area, although little by little the initial ideological basis of the Spanish government would start to change and would give room to more concrete and

⁶⁵⁸ Elena Flores, “Pese a los abusos, la oposición no debe retirarse del plebiscito”, *Cauce*, n. 166, July 11-17, (1988): 12

⁶⁵⁹ Ignacio Cembrero, “Chile y España firman un tratado de cooperación y amistad” *El País*, 20/10/1990. https://elpais.com/diario/1990/10/20/espana/656377212_850215.html

⁶⁶⁰ Juliana, *Nudo España*,. 1076/5340.

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realistic policies that sometimes would differ from the original tenets. Secondly, Latin America provided to Spain a greater weight and role in the international arena that, in turn, became useful in increasing the interest of Spain inside the EEC. This intensification of the relationships was also nourished by an international context characterized by increasingly liberalizing economic models, in which the external dimension also acquired greater significance. Therefore, one could also say that the nexus with Latin America enabled Spain to present itself as a middle power with international reach. Thus, Spain could assume the role of a “liaison” between the two regions.

Similarly, Latin America considered Spain as a model to follow due to its successful democratic transition as well as the way to approach the EEC. The revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 and the conflicts in Central America renewed the political interests inside the Community towards Latin America.⁶⁶¹ Accordingly, this sub-chapter will focus on discussing the EEC political interest in Latin America starting from the Central American dilemmas. It should be taken into account that before becoming members of the EEC, Spain and Portugal played a key role in the signature of the San José Pacts, and therefore in fostering the EEC attention in this area. This chapter will also examine the continuity or discontinuity marked by the Spanish accession to the EEC in their relationships with Latin America. Both points are of course interrelated.

The triangular strategy of Spain-Latin America-EEC started to grow in the early 1980s, when the Community showed concern about the Central American situation (at the time the EEC was working on the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration, see Chapter 2.4). Indeed, the Community offered different methods of development assistance in the region: technical and financial aid, research funding, food aid, and facilities for trade promotion.⁶⁶² The EEC interest in the region was further spurred by the international context, the nexus established during the 1970s between the European social democracy and Central American, the desire of the Western Europe to increase its presence in the Third World, and the Spanish and SI efforts in the area. Likewise, the reciprocal proximity between Spain and Central America

⁶⁶¹ Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process*, 177-178.

⁶⁶² Bodemer, *Europa Occidental*, 69.

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enabled the former to play a leading role in building links between the two sides of the Atlantic. The support provided by the Spanish public opinion favored governmental policy: in 1984, 51% of Spaniards agreed that Madrid should do something to solve the Central American dilemma and in 1986 this consensus rose to the 66%.⁶⁶³ As Fernando Morán clearly stated:

[...] events in Central America in general have a greater impact on public opinion in Spain than in other European countries. Hence, the sensitivity of the Spanish political leaders to the present crisis is also greater. One could also say that what happens in Spain is more closely followed in Central America and better known than what happens in other European countries. In particular, the Central American countries, just as the rest of Latin America, have followed the political transition in Spain with considerable intensity.⁶⁶⁴

As a matter of fact, in 1983 Willy Brandt, following the advice of the Spanish Government that at the time was not an EEC member, presented a motion to the Community with the aim of asking for political and economic assistance for Central America. Likewise, Felipe González presented the same request at the Council of Europe.⁶⁶⁵ Greater involvement by the EEC in Central American issues as well as the greater autonomy of Europe in the international arena were some of the topics discussed in Madrid by Brandt, Kreisky, and González in April 1984⁶⁶⁶. A few months later (September 1984) the San José Summit was held. In a personal interview, Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo confirmed that González spent a lot of time supporting Contadora Group and the creation of the Contadora Support Group. He also pointed out the fact that González, together with the Italians, led the San José Process within the European institutions.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶³ JoAnn Fagot Aviel, "The Role of Spain in the Pacification Process of Central America". In *The Reconstruction of Central America: The Role of the European Community*, edited by Joaquín Roy. (Miami: University of Miami North-South Center, 1992), 290.

⁶⁶⁴ Morán, "Europe's Role in Central America", 35.

⁶⁶⁵ Blásquez Vilaplana, *La proyección*, 205-206.

⁶⁶⁶ Bodemer, *Europa Occidental*, 94.

⁶⁶⁷ Interview with Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo, Madrid, January 14, 2019.

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Hence, González was always present in Central American (and Latin American) issues, but above all he was able to establish contacts with almost all the actors. As already stated, the support to the Contadora Group marked a turning point in the relationships between Spain and Central America. Prior to Contadora, Spain tried to develop policies that allowed it to act directly. Contadora, however, enabled Spain to delegate responsibilities to the Group, but at the same time it was a sort of opportunity to act from inside without being directly enmeshed in it. For this reason, the Pacts of San José meant a step forward for the Contadora project since it involved Europe. Indeed, Latin Americans interpreted this engagement as the end of the Monroe Doctrine⁶⁶⁸. Fernando Morán synthesized these issues:

“Contadora has been decisive [...] it has weakened the global and military approach and has significantly influenced European positions on Central America over the last two years, making it possible to the Europeans to express their disagreements with the United States gracefully [...] Contadora Group has been important because it has established intense and continuous negotiation among the Central American countries, negotiation that were unthinkable two years ago. It created a curious solidarity among the leaders and awareness of their common interests, and some mechanisms for reducing the tensions of the all-too-frequent border crises, thus making escalation more difficult [...] The San José conference showed clearly that the Central Americans and Contadora nations expect a concrete European contribution and that Europe is prepared for this [...] The San José Conference showed that a European contribution to the stabilization of the region is possible and that the European countries are also prepared for this. Not only the planned agreement on economic cooperation, but also, and above all, the agreement to conduct a political dialogue between Europe and Central America should be a key component of this”.⁶⁶⁹

The San José process was institutionalized one year later in Luxembourg in November 1985, where the objectives of the dialogue were defined. Besides the contribution that González made to launch the dialogue between the EEC and Central America, there were

⁶⁶⁸ Alan Rouquié, *América Latina. Introducción al Extremo Occidente*. (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1989), 408.

⁶⁶⁹ Morán, “Europe’s Role in Central America”, 26 and 131.

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other reasons that partly explained the interests of the former. Firstly, Europe feared U.S. policy in Central America and it was concerned about a U.S. military intervention.⁶⁷⁰ Likewise, Europe feared that the U.S. intervention could produce an escalation of the East-West conflict, as Europe is geographically in the middle of the two blocs. Secondly, the EEC support for the UK in the Falklands conflict caused resentment in the continent; therefore, the Community had to do something in order to counter the effects of this action. Additionally, the democratization process in Latin America awakened interests in the EEC. Moreover, Central America became a sort of test case for the Community where it could put into practice its inputs in order to push the region towards the pacification. Finally, the EEC enlargement during the 1980s made the Community more heterogeneous and more open to different realities. In this, Portugal and Spain contributed with their Latin American tradition. Furthermore, the relationships established by the EEC in Central America contributed to increase the effectiveness and influence of the EEC foreign policy and to fortify the European identity in the international arena as well as the EEC was able to formally obtain information on important current issues.⁶⁷¹

The European Parliament even described the EEC action in Central America as one of the greatest successes achieved by the EEC in terms of single foreign policy.⁶⁷² This was possibly due to the fact that it is always easier to define a common policy regarding relevant issues that do not directly affect the interests of the EEC member states. This was the case for Central America. In addition to this, the European interest in Latin America was also due to structural reasons: shared language, culture and religious traditions; the

⁶⁷⁰ Actually, the EEC could draw on the divisions inside the US Congress regarding the US policy in Central America. Indeed, many Democrats were closer to Brussels than to Reagan's policy. Laurence Whitehead, "The Identity of the New Europe And The San José Process". In *The Reconstruction of Central America*, 147.

⁶⁷¹ Ángel Viñas, "The Role of Central America in the European Community's Foreign Policy". In *The Reconstruction of Central America*, 80-81.

⁶⁷² José Luis Ángel Sotillo Lorenzo, "Las relaciones de la Unión Europea en Centroamérica". In *Las Relaciones externas de la Unión Europea*, edited by Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez Rivera. (México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales- Plaza Valedés, 2001), 252.

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presence of European migrants in the region; historical ties; educational exchange programs, etc.⁶⁷³

The Community's efforts in Spain, therefore, were concretized with the San José process. The relationship with the Contadora Group and the proximity established between them enabled the Spanish government to gain prestige, power, and influence as middle power at other levels, mainly in Europe.⁶⁷⁴ After the Spanish accession to the EEC, the Iberian country pushed the Community to assist the region economically. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, even stated that the EEC assistance to Central America was largely due to Spanish efforts and requests. Indeed, from 1987 and 1989 the cooperation aid increased from \$72.7 million to \$102.5 million.⁶⁷⁵

Therefore, once in the European Community, Spain strived to communitize its policies towards Latin America by leading the EEC to carry out concrete actions in the region as the attempts of the Central American Pacification had showed. The Spanish Foreign Minister underlined that several resolutions adopted by the EEC in the region were thanks to the Spanish intervention, such as the program of preferential treatment regarding the price of coffee that favored Latin America.⁶⁷⁶ Ordoñez, without hesitation, asserted that Spain was the country which created the conditions for the construction of the political and economic nexus between Europe and Latin America.⁶⁷⁷

Within this context, the relationships between Europe and Central America took a step forward in February 1987, namely after the signature of the Esquipulas II Accord

⁶⁷³ Laurence Whitehead, "Pacification and Reconstruction in Central America: the International Components". In *Central America: Fragile Transition*, edited by Rachel Sieder (USA-UK:San Martin's Press-Macmillan Press, 1996), 233.

⁶⁷⁴ Morán *España en su sitio*, 95.

⁶⁷⁵ Fagot Aviel, "The Role of Spain", 293.

⁶⁷⁶ Coffee was one of the products exported by the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group States (ACP), therefore, for these countries the tariff on coffee was zero. Contrary, the duty on the Latin American one, at least before the Spanish accession into the EEC, was 5%. Ángel Gomez Fuentes, *Así cambia España. La batalla del Mercado Común*. (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1986), 237.

⁶⁷⁷ "Comparencia del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Francisco Fernandez Ordoñez, ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Senado, a petición propia, para informar sobre la política del Gobierno en Iberoamérica y Oriente Medio. Senado 13/03/1987". In *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1987*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 273-274.

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(Guatemala)⁶⁷⁸, a treaty spearheaded by the Costa Rican Óscar Arias that ended the local conflicts and brought stability to the region. Spain played a part in this process, thus, Madrid knew in advance about the Arias' peace project since it has been a topic discussed during the meeting held in Madrid with the Contadora Group in January 1987. Likewise, the Spanish Foreign Minister stressed more than once that Madrid's intervention had been fundamental in convincing the EEC to join the Esquipulas agreement. Indeed, since Esquipulas II, the frequency of the ministerial meetings on the San José process was finally scheduled. As a matter of fact, the EEC and Latin America had not met since the Luxembourg reunion (1985).⁶⁷⁹ Furthermore, in April 1987, at the meeting between the Contadora Group and the Support Group in Bariloche (Argentina), Madrid was recognized as the intermediary of Latin America within the EEC.⁶⁸⁰

All of this illustrates that Latin America was always at the heart of Spanish foreign policy. As expected, the entry of Spain into the EEC reduced the intensity of the Spanish-Latin American relationships since Madrid as an EEC member had to accomplish measures and follow the EEC guidelines. Notwithstanding, Latin American was always a cornerstone in the Spanish external policy because the former allowed the latter to assert itself as a middle power with international reach. In other words, Spain tried to Europeanize its links with Latin America and Ibero-Americanize those with Europe. Hence, the notion of Spain as a "liaison" between Europe and Latin America rose.

It should also be kept in mind that the PSOE, and in particular González, were very close and sensitive to this continent. The Spanish Prime Minister even stated that one of the main goals of Spain in terms of foreign policy was the construction of a new framework in the European-Latin American relationship. All of this was evident during the EEC negotiation process ("Treaty on accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC", June 12, 1985) when Madrid asked for the inclusion of an annex aimed at increasing and ensuring the

⁶⁷⁸ On May 25, 1986, the Central American countries had already signed in Guatemala the agreement known as Esquipulas I. They committed to work together in order to find solutions for the regional conflicts.

⁶⁷⁹ The venues of the following meetings were: Hamburg in 1988, San Pedro Sula (Honduras) in 1989, Dublin in 1990, Managua in 1991, Lisbon in 1992, San Salvador in 1993, Athens in 1994, Panama in 1995. These were also known as San José IV, San José V, etc.

⁶⁸⁰ Piñol I. Rull, "Las relaciones españolas con Centroamérica", 46.

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intensification of the relations between the two continents (“Joint declaration of intent on the development and intensification of relations with the countries of Latin America”).⁶⁸¹

In addition to this, González was able to include the Latin American matter at the meeting of the European Council held in The Hague on June 25-27, 1986 (the first meeting with Spain as a full member), where the EU Commission and the Council of Foreign Ministers were instructed to prepare a document aimed at studying how they could increase political, economic, and cooperation policies in Latin America.⁶⁸² In spite of the slow progress, a Directorate-General for Latin America (in the EC Commission) was created within the EEC, financial resources increased, and the dialogue with the Rio Group was institutionalized. Also in December 1988, the Spaniard Abel Matutes was appointed European Commissioner responsible for Latin America and the Mediterranean, and Manuel Marín responsible for Development, Cooperation and the Common Fisheries.⁶⁸³

Among the issues that Spain had to accept as an EEC member were the rules that favored the ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group States) and the Mediterranean area over Latin America. However, Madrid tried to balance this by increasing bilateral assistance and cooperation with the Latin American countries as well as by fostering, inside the Community, policies to intensify the European cooperation towards the other side of the Atlantic⁶⁸⁴. Indeed, Madrid expected that by enhancing its budget for bilateral cooperation, it would have more influence inside the Community, who would allocate more funds

⁶⁸¹ España- Comunidad Europea. *Documentos relativos a la adhesión del Reino de España y dela República Portuguesa a las comunidades Europeas, Acta Final, Declaración común de intenciones relativa al desarrollo y a las intensificaciones con los países de América Latina*. OJL 302. 15.11.1985. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/ALL/?uri=CELEX:11985I/AFI/DCL/01>

⁶⁸² Celestino del Arenal, “La triangulación España-Unión Europea-América Latina: sinergias y contradicciones”. *Pensamiento Iberoamericano*, N. 8, (2011): 80.

⁶⁸³ Villar, *La Transición Exterior*, 131. The EEC and some Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) launched a political dialogue in 1987: the Rio Group. It was an informal dialogue between them that aimed to find solutions to the Central American conflict through cooperation and political consultation. Besides this, in the meetings held in New York (during the UN General Assembly in September 1987), Hamburg (March 1988), New York (September 1987) and Granada (1989), they also addressed some of the issues that affected Latin America and, therefore, their relationships with the EEC: economic difficulties, the external debt, commercial matters, the East/West conflict as well as their consequences in terms of democratic stability. “Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas. Relaciones Comunidad Europea/Latinoamérica” December 1989, 23-24 From the Archiaves of the European Union, Florence, Italy, box. AV 103.

⁶⁸⁴ Sahagún, “España frente al Sur”, 265.

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towards Latin America.⁶⁸⁵ As stated, Spain fulfilled its mission to some extent and thanks to its efforts, a specific part of the budget for the cooperation program in 1989 was exclusively reserved for Latin America. Moreover, the amount of the funding increased from 25% to 35% of the total budget.⁶⁸⁶

Furthermore, the appointment of the Spaniard Abel Matutes was very well received by Latin Americans because they expected greater collaboration with the EEC. Indeed, some of his objectives included: (i) defining a policy directed to promote the economic interpenetration of Central America, the Andean countries, and the Southern Cone; (ii) launching a political dialogue between the EEC and Latin America, as they were close in terms of values and culture; and (iii) establishing the necessary conditions to ensure that the Community's action served as a pressure group on Latin American external debt in the IMF and the Group of Paris.⁶⁸⁷

Additionally, Spain took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Communities in January 1989 (Madrid gave high priority to the European Political Cooperation's agenda during its presidency), which produced great expectations in Latin America, and in particular in Central America, since they considered this appointment as a step forward in European cooperation. These feelings were also nourished by Ordoñez's statement since he claimed that the role of Spain did not rely on being a representative or spokesman of Latin America but rather in being the "Latin American consciousness of Europe". Moreover, he stressed the fact that Spain had never been as close to Latin America as it was by being a member of the European Community. But above all, Ordoñez said, Europe really approached Latin America only when Spain joined the European forums.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁵ "Comparecencia del Secretario de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y para Iberoamérica, Don Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo ante la comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Senado. 20/4/1988". In *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1988*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 430.

⁶⁸⁶ Martínez, Crespo and Jérez, "Between Europe" 111.

⁶⁸⁷ Felix Monteiro and Ignacio Cembrero, "Entrevista Matutes: 'Mi cartera es la política'". *El País*, (18/12/1988). https://elpais.com/diario/1988/12/18/internacional/598402810_850215.html

⁶⁸⁸ Fernando Jauregui, "Entrevista. 'España pretende ser la conciencia latinoamericana de Europa'". *El País*, (28/02/1988), https://elpais.com/diario/1988/02/28/espana/573001205_850215.html

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As a result, Spain both prior and after its accession to the EEC tried to maintain a coherent dialogue with Latin America and strived to include it in the European priorities. The reasons have been presented more than once. The progresses made in the relationships between Europe and Latin American were significant even though some of them ended up being limited. Indeed, the Community policy and the Spanish policy towards Latin America have sometimes been described as poor, symbolic, and without concrete incidence. Likewise, Spain has sometimes been criticized of prioritizing the EEC policy at the expense of Latin America, in such a way that has affected its relations with the other side of the Atlantic.⁶⁸⁹

Many people expected greater dynamism from the EEC in its Latin American policy as well as greater incidence of Spain in the Community's policy. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that during those years a real rapprochement between both sides of the Atlantic took place. Hence, one could try to respond to those criticisms by recalling that at the time the EEC was governed by very strict rules (*politique de la règle*) and that it was not a political institution.⁶⁹⁰ Thus, the maneuverability of Spain into the Community ended up being extremely limited, and therefore González's endeavors could go no further. For instance, the attempt of González to launch a "European Marshall Plan" (1988) to assist Latin America did not evolve because some EEC members hesitated to take part in this and because the bureaucracy of the EEC itself did not enable it.⁶⁹¹

Other issues that should be taken into account are the fact that in the late 1980s, a large part of the EEC attention was turned toward Eastern Europe. González was concerned about this because he was aware that the openness to the East would affect the EEC-Latin American relationships. As a result, he sought to stress at the European level that, contrary to what was happening in Latin America, Eastern European countries were unrelated to the Western culture, economy, and politics. As a result, he restated again the importance and the contributions that Latin America could provide to the Old Continent. Nonetheless, he was

⁶⁸⁹ Pardo Sanz, "De puentes y comunidades", 170-171.

⁶⁹⁰ Luuk van Middelaar, *Quand l'Europe Improvise. Dix ans de crises politiques*, (France: Le Débat Gallimard 2018), Kindle Edition, 224.

⁶⁹¹ Piñol I. Rull, "Las relaciones españolas". 53.

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conscious of the fact that just few countries, e.g. Italy, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, had been sensitive to Latin American matters, while other EEC countries had been reluctant to open a new Latin American dimension in EEC external policy.⁶⁹²

It is also possible that González' doubts arose from the logic that governed the Community's foreign policy, i.e. a intergovernmental character (Chapter 2.4). For instance, the fact that among all the EEC members, only Spain supported the UN resolution aimed at condemning the intervention of the U.S. in Panama in 1989, showed some of the flaws in the European Political Cooperation's frame.⁶⁹³ However, despite some of the structural limits or the poor results, it is undeniable that for the first time Europe considered and saw Latin America from a different point of view and tried to commit itself as much as possible to aid the continent and to establish a political dialogue. For that reason, the European social democratic parties, the SI, and above all Spain played a key role.

This chapter has focused on the relationship between Spain (the PSOE) and Latin America during the late 1970s and 1980s by taking into account the European dimension. The evolution of the PSOE has been discussed as well as its relations with Latin America (with emphasis on Nicaragua, Venezuela and Chile) and its continuities and discontinuities once it came to power and once Spain joined the EEC. Transnational networks that included the role of the exiles and the SI efforts have also been examined, since they contributed to the rapprochement between both sides of the Atlantic by building transnational links. Likewise, the relationships between the PSOE and the SI were further addressed since they created the frame of action between the two regions, in particular before 1982.

⁶⁹² “Intervenciones del presidente del Gobierno, Don Felipe González, en las Jornadas “América Latina y Europa en los años 90. Madrid 5/6/1989)” In *Actividades, textos y documentos de la política exterior española, año 1989*, Madrid, MAE, OID, 152-153.

⁶⁹³ Esther Barbé, “Política exterior y de defense: análisis de las grandes fracturas en el porceso de construcción europea”, *RIFP/5*, (1995.), 59.

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Indeed, the links that the Spanish Socialist Party established through the SI during the 1970s were consolidated during the 1980s when a European dimension was also added. Hence, Spain looked to “Europeanize” its links with Latin America and “Ibero-Americanize” those with Europe in order to become a middle power with international reach. It is undeniable that some progress was achieved in that direction, although they were largely limited by the *politique de la règle* of the EEC as well as by the EEC intergovernmentalism on foreign policy. Notwithstanding, the basis of the Transatlantic relations was forged in those years, in which the PSOE and the SI played a crucial role by creating the platform for the forthcoming relations.

5. The External Dimension of the Italian Socialist Party: Latin America and the EEC

This chapter will focus on the external dimension of the PSI. With the words “external dimension”, we refer to the interests, actions, and policies addressed by the PSI towards Latin America and the SI and also consider the EEC framework. Moreover, as in the Spanish case, this chapter aims to determine if some of the party’s policies were translated into public policies and if so, what was their extent. In order to maintain the same line of analysis, this section will follow the same structure of the previous chapter. Therefore the first part will consider the evolution of the PSI; the second will address the relationships between Italy (the PSI) and Latin America by focusing in particular on the Nicaraguan, Venezuelan and Chilean cases; and in the third part, the European framework will be discussed. As in the Spanish case, the international/transnational network established by the SI played a key role in the links between the PSI and Latin America. Accordingly, the role and nexus between the SI and the PSI will be also considered.

5.1 The evolution of the PSI

Some issues related to the evolution of the PSI have already been tackled (e.g. the accession of the PSI to the SI, its relationships with the PSDI, the close ties established between Craxi and Brandt as well as Craxi and Felipe González, and the PSI’s “ideological shift” since 1976, see Chapter 3.3). Nevertheless, some matters will be further examined since it is important to keep in mind that the international context, as well as its rules and actions, influenced domestic policies and in turn affected countries’ foreign policies and the definition of their international preferences (Chapter 1.2.). In this way, one could understand the relationships between Italy, the PSI, and Latin America and assess their extent by taking into account, of course, the European frame.

A short glance at Italy's Republican history since June 2, 1946 reveals that the PSI did not play a leading role in Italian political history while the Christian Democracy (DC) and the PCI did. For this reason, the PSI strived to become the “third pole” of the Italian politics. According to Maurizio Degl’Innocenti, the *conventio ad excludendum*⁶⁹⁴ required the participation of the PSI because in this way governance was ensured. Indeed, the PSI actions and attempts (the quest for alliances, the demand for autonomy, the quest for unity, the search for dialogue, etc.) were mainly the product of the Italian political system rather than the outcome of its ideology; thus, the PSI became a “party-zipper” in which the external and internal tensions of the entire political system converged.⁶⁹⁵

Furthermore, the proportional electoral system fostered the division within the left-wing since each party had to stress its own specificities and differences in order to increase its own votes during the electoral period.⁶⁹⁶ Moreover, the refusal of Pietro Nenni to take a step back from the PCI in the aftermath of the Second World War not only entailed the exclusion of the PSI from COMISCO (Chapter 3.1), but it also marked the history of Italian Socialism and the Italian system itself since it was an anomaly in relation to the political scheme of Western democratic societies. Nenni's admiration for the Soviet Union and the financial contributions that the PSI received from Moscow led them to lose ground in the left front by conditioning its own history.⁶⁹⁷

Indeed, as stated by Marc Lazar, the great influence exerted by the PCI as the main leftist force on one side and by the DC on the other led sociologists to talk about “territorial subcultures” in the country. With this notion, they referred to a real “political ecosystem” in which the DC (white subculture) on one hand, and the PCI (red subculture) on the other exercised their hegemony. Thus, in the red subculture (i.e. the regions of Central Italy,

⁶⁹⁴ I.e. “agreement to exclude”, an unwritten but well-known agreement that since the end of the Second World War excluded the PCI from the Government. The exclusion also affected the far right movements. Indeed, the *conventio ad excludendum* to the left and to the right entailed political immobility. In this light, therefore, the primacy of the DC was more a consequence of the bipolar script rather than of the political establishment or the consensual democracy.

⁶⁹⁵ Maurizio Degl’Innocenti, “Sul paradigma socialista o del ‘terzo’ partito”. In *I partiti politici nell’Italia Repubblicana*, edited by Gerardo Nicolosi. (Italia: Rubbettino Editore, 2006), 191.

⁶⁹⁶ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*, 572.

⁶⁹⁷ Simona Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica. 1943-2006. Partiti, movimenti e istituzioni*. (Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 2007), 93 and 125.

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including Emilia Romagna, Umbria, and Tuscany), the PCI fulfilled the material interests of the people it managed and proposed a collective identity of social, political, and territorial belonging. Accordingly, the PCI produced local identities that, in turn, enhanced regional particularisms, and therefore conflicted with the central power (i.e. the DC). Thus, the sense of belonging to the left-wing (PCI) was strengthened. All of this fostered the idea regarding the specificity of Italian politics within the Western European societies. Furthermore, as Lazar claimed, from the antagonism of these two subcultures and from the political and cultural structure that they implied, a weak nationalism emerged in the country. Nevertheless, it was the rivalry between red and white that allowed both parties to exist. Italy, therefore, was shaped by this incessant and mutual tension.⁶⁹⁸ The interaction between parties (which interpreted people's needs and demands) was what enabled the working of the political system that in turn was fundamental for the survival of the State itself⁶⁹⁹. It is worth emphasizing at this point that even if foreign matters deeply affected the Italian politics (e.g. the Cold War system entailed the *conventio ad excludendum* and the primacy of the DC), it is undeniable that also the national setting (i.e. the “territorial subcultures” and “political ecosystem”) deeply determined the political development of the Peninsula (in this light, for instance, the PSI always remained as the “third political force”).

In 1953, the PSI ran in the elections as an autonomous party by breaking away from the Popular Front. The PSI understood that in order to keep its identity, its autonomy, and to acquire full legitimacy, all of which were necessary to join the government, it had to separate from the PCI. International events such as the death of Stalin and the end of the Korean War contributed to creating a calmer climate in the Cold War. Besides this, the PSI's acceptance of NATO for defensive reasons not only provided them an increasingly neutral position, but also allowed them to achieve greater legitimacy, at least in the eyes of the DC, which at the time was the main party (the election of Amintore Fanfani as secretary of the DC favored the overture towards the left side). There were, however, pro-Communists forces inside the PSI that opposed to the separation. Notwithstanding, the

⁶⁹⁸ Marc Lazar, “La gauche, la République et la nation”. In *L'Italie, une nation en suspense*, edited by Ilvo Diamanti, Alain Dieckhoff, Marc Lazar and Didier Musiedlak (Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 1995), 81-84.

⁶⁹⁹ Agostino Giovagnoli, *La Repubblica degli italiani: 1946-2016*. (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2016), Kindle edition, 185-188.

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violent repression against the Hungarian and Polish uprisings that the USSR carried out during the second half of the 1950s fostered the rupture.⁷⁰⁰

Even if there were some clashes, since the late 1950s and during the 1960s, the economic, political, and social transformation of the country spurred the DC to leave the centrist period behind and to become open towards the left. Accordingly, during the 1960s, a center-left government was formed. The DC acceptance of the PSI was also due to the rapprochement that Nenni's party started to carry out with the PSDI, i.e. the moderate left and the distance that the party took from the radical left. Indeed, the PSI radical left detached from the party and formed a new group in 1964 headed by Lelio Basso: the PSIUP, i.e. *Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità proletaria* (the PSIUP, however, was short-lived as it existed only until 1972).⁷⁰¹ Thus, this group retook the name that the Italian Socialist had prior 1947. Nenni, who was followed by Francesco De Martino in the party's secretariat, welcomed the center-left government by claiming that PSI participation would lead to the end of the party isolation and he replied to criticisms by saying that they have followed the natural sense of history by anticipating workers' future wishes and aspirations.⁷⁰²

Although it was short-lived (until 1969), the maximum approach between the PSI and PSDI was produced in 1966 with the formation of the PSU (see Chapter 3.3). The PSU was an attempt by which these two parties aimed to acquire greater weight in the government since with their union they reached around 20% of the constituency support. At the end of the 1960s, the bumpy road that had characterized the relationship of the PSI-DC led the latter to open a dialogue with the PCI. Their rapprochement would concretize over the following decade with the well-known Historic Compromise (*Compromesso-storico*). However, although the PSI was able to introduce some initiatives passed by the Senatem such as the

⁷⁰⁰ Lazar, "La gauche", 151-153.

⁷⁰¹ The first signs of a crisis were perceived in 1970 when part of its electorate chose the PSI, which had just ended the PSU experience. In 1972 elections, the PSIUP got only 1,9% of the votes and, therefore, it disappeared.

⁷⁰² Pietro Nenni, "Da oggi ognuno è più libero. Una dichiarazione di Nenni". *Avanti!*, (6/12/1963). Retrieved from http://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF/Avanti-Lotto2/CFI0422392_19631206_290.pdf

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Statute of Workers, regional funding law and the divorce law, the internal divisions, disagreements and critics from the left-wing and right-wing parties determined the PSI electoral debacle in May 1972 when the PSI obtained 9.6% of the total votes, the worst electoral result since the Second World War.⁷⁰³

The divorce law demands a special remark since it was a “hot topic” in Italian politics. The PSI and the Italian Liberal Party promoted this initiative (*legge Fortuna-Baslini*), while the DC and the Catholic faithful opposed it. The PCI supported the idea but it acted with caution because it aimed to avoid a direct conflict with the DC. The PSI, in fact, saw in this motion the opportunity to regain autonomy ceasing its subordination to the DC. The divorce law was introduced in December 1970. The DC, however, tried to turn the tables on divorce by calling a referendum to repeal the divorce law and May 12, 1974 was the date set for the voting. Even if the 1972 elections favored the DC, they lost the referendum: 19 million (59.3%) voted against the abolition of the law and 13 million in favor. The PSI interpreted the results as a success of the party, as a transformation and renewal of Italian customs and as a resizing of the DC power. They interpreted the referendum as the victory of the civil society over the religious (and, therefore, over the DC), in which the bases of the new socialism could emerge.⁷⁰⁴ In other words, the outcome of the ballot boxes showed the societal transformations (secularization) that Italy had achieved at the time. This ended up jolting the Italian party system⁷⁰⁵.

Nevertheless, 1972 ended with the holding of the PSI XXXIX Congress (Genoa, November 9-14) when the 80th anniversary of the party was commemorated as well as a greater collaboration and unity between the party members were agreed. The PSI aimed for a revival of the center-left since it feared a “turn to the right-wing” (the PSI, for instance, feared the growth of the far-right party MSI-DN, Italian Social Movement-National Right, during the 1972 elections or the fact that the PSI did not participate in the governments of

⁷⁰³ Picó, *Los límites*, 152.

⁷⁰⁴ Aldo Piro, “Referendum sul divorzio”. In *1892-1982 PSI Novanta anni di storia*, 366.

⁷⁰⁵ Paolo Pombeni, “Il sistema dei partiti dalla Prima alla Seconda Repubblica”. In *L'Italia contemporanea dagli anni Ottanta a oggi. III. Istituzioni e politica*, edited by Simona Colarizi, Agostino Giovagnoli, Paolo Pombeni. (Roma: Carocci editore, 2014), 314-315.

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Giulio Andreotti from the DC, between 1972 and 1973) and they looked for a balance of the democratic forces. They continued acting on two levels, namely from the government and as an opposition force. This behavior, however, penalized them because the electorate did not perceive a clear position of the party.

Nenni was appointed as president of the party, De Martino as secretary, and Bettino Craxi and Giovanni Mosca as Deputy Secretaries. Indeed, when Mariano Rumor from the DC resumed the Chair of the Council of Ministers (1973-1974 - his fourth and fifth term), the socialists entered again to the cabinet. The fact that the PSI in the last years had created its own network of clientele possibly spurred the PSI to stay in power.⁷⁰⁶ Nonetheless, the last PSI participation in the center-left Italian administration was in 1974 after the referendum on divorce. As a matter of fact, the center-left experience was destined to end after the lack of agreements between the parties and the attempts of some of them to dominate, without any interference, certain areas of power. The DC was not able to renew the coalition with the PSI since the PSI started to cooperate with the PCI. De Martino was pressured by some PSI members to leave the government after the defeat of the DC regarding the referendum on divorce.

Within this context and in view of the 1976 General elections, the PSI held the XL Congress party, a meeting where, for the first time in a long while, the party presented itself as a “united” force although the reality was quite different as divisions persisted inside the party. Notwithstanding, the PSI looked to shape a “left-wing alternative” for Italy (mainly, a project of the socialist Riccardo Lombardi), in particular since the DC and MSI had experienced a slight decline losing 2% of the votes in 1975 compared to the previous elections, and the sum of the votes of the PCI and the PSI would be 45.4% of the total votes. Moreover, the sum of the PSI with the PSDI and the Radical Party would lead them to achieve a majority in Parliament, and therefore to be an alternative to DC centrism. In addition to obtaining the PSDI support again, the PSI members were aware that two conditions were necessary to comply with this goal: PCI’s greater autonomy from Moscow and the rebalancing of the Italian left since the PCI was stronger than the PSI (e.g. in the

⁷⁰⁶Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*, 574.

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1975 regional elections, the PCI got 33.4% votes while the PSI got only 12%). Nevertheless, as Craxi underlined, these conditions were not easy to fulfill, in part also because the PCI was more interested in establishing links with the DC rather than seeking a “left alternative”. As written in the French newspaper *Le Monde*, Berlinguer did not aim to create a “unity of the left as it had been done in France” (the French model), but he strived to come into power through the Historic Compromise, which was opposed to the socialist project.⁷⁰⁷ With the historic compromise, Berlinguer looked to overcome the *conventio ad excludendum*.

The DC was actually shaken by the social transformations as the divorce law showed, but also by the economic situation and the scandals of corruption in which it had been implicated. Indeed, at the time, several scandals hit Italian politics, particularly concerning the DC and the PSDI (Chapter 3.3.). The truth is that the nature itself of the Italian political system contributed to the spread of corruption; parties divided among them the positions of power (presidencies, vice-presidencies, etc.) and managed each area of the State (finance, industry, services, radio, television networks etc.). Hence, those who were elected to occupy a position were more responsive to the demands of their parties than to the citizens, and thereby the selection criteria was mainly based on loyalty rather than on merit. Likewise, this system as well as the political immobilism (the same parties had ruled the country for decades) favored the spread of hidden financing within the Italian parties. For obvious reasons, all of this aroused a sort of disenchantment of the party system among civil society and Italian public opinion.⁷⁰⁸

In 1976, Francesco De Martino relinquished his post and Bettino Craxi became the Secretary of the PSI. With the purpose of renewing the party, Craxi decided to get away from the DC and the PCI by assuming a “human face” over the two “ideologies” of Catholicism and Communism, in particular since a wave of terrorism was hitting the

⁷⁰⁷ Robert Solé, “Le parti socialiste veut définir les conditions d’une “alterantive de gauche”. *Le Monde*, (3/03/1976). Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1976/03/03/le-parti-socialiste-veut-definir-les-conditions-d-une-alternative-de-gauche_2962356_1819218.html

⁷⁰⁸ Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*. 294-297.

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country.⁷⁰⁹ Indeed, since 1969, Italy was struck by acts of terrorism from the far-right and the far-left movements (Red Brigades); from 1969 until 1980, there were 7,866 violent acts. Terrorism of the far-right differed from terrorism of the far-left, since the former tended to be indiscriminate (bombs were placed in public places) while the latter was targeted (i.e. against journalists, intellectuals, and politicians) and was linked to Communism by its opponents.⁷¹⁰ The kidnapping and murder of the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro on March 16, 1978 by the Red Brigades radically changed the political situation. The attempt to achieve the “historical compromise” had definitively ended with Moro’s death. Likewise, this dramatic event marked a transformation in the behavior of Craxi and the PSI. As said, Craxi tried to distance himself from the PCI and the DC. At the beginning, he assumed the same position of the government, i.e. rejected negotiations with the terrorists. Notwithstanding, he changed his behavior shortly after Moro’s kidnapping (this new position enabled him to approach civil society, where the DC and PCI were losing ground). He strived to end the immobility of the government (which had adopted a firm line-*fermezza*) by negotiating with terrorists about Moro’s release. In addition to the humanitarian aim (i.e. saving the life of Moro), some scholars interpreted Craxi’s attitude as an attempt of the Socialist to break with the DC-PCI, and hence to rebalance the Italian left, making the PSI more autonomous and powerful.⁷¹¹

Besides terrorism, Italy had to face a complex economic situation. As Claudio Signorile stated, in those years inflation peaked at double digits.⁷¹² Between 1974-1975, inflation reached 20-25%, public spending rose from 31.2% in 1960 to 62.5% in 1983 of the GDP, and in these same years the tax revenue rose from 26% to 41.3%, mainly affecting employees. Moreover, tax evasion increased as well as massive capital flight. Additionally,

⁷⁰⁹ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*, 585.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 587.

⁷¹¹ Marco Centorrino, Eduardo Díaz Cano, Sebastiano Nucera, Giuliano Tardivio, “Craxi e le Br, González e l’Eta: due strategie di comunicazione a confronto”. *Humanities*, VII, n. 14, (2018), 40. The change of the PSI position on the treatment with the Red Brigades has been illustrated by Claudio Signorile, former Deputy Secretary of the PSI between 1978-1981, who referred to “initiative” and “national solidarity” rather than “negotiation” with the terrorists. Commissione Parlamentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi, *Inchiesta sugli sviluppi del Caso Moro: Audizione dell’Onorevole Claudio Signorile*, 51 seduta, April 20, 1999. Retrieved from <http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/bicam/terror/stenografici/steno51.htm>

⁷¹² *Ibid.*

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the Italian currency (*lira*) depreciated continuously between 1973-1977, and therefore inflation grew. All of this was anchored in the worldwide “shock of the 1970s”. Indeed, the oil crisis entailed the increase of the Italian external debt from 41.2% in 1971 to 60.3% in 1975.⁷¹³ The high rate of unemployment that the country experienced at the time was added to this, and it was one of the worst of the OECD-Europe countries (Table 9). Just as the economic boom or “golden years” was more significant in Italy than in other countries due to its backwardness, in the same way the worldwide crisis hit it harder.⁷¹⁴

Table 9

*The unemployment rate in fourteen European countries 1973-89 (%)*⁷¹⁵

	Unemployment	
	1974-1979	1979-1989
OECD-Europe	5.1	9.1
Austria	1.8	3.3
Belgium	5.7	11.1
Denmark	6.0	8.0
Finland	4.4	4.9
France	4.5	9.0
Greece	1.9	6.6
Holland	4.9	9.8
Italy	6.6	9.9
Norway	1.8	2.8
Portugal	6.0	7.3
Spain	5.3	17.5
Sweden	1.9	2.5
UK	4.2	9.5

⁷¹³ Guido Crainz, *Il paese mancato. Dal miracolo economico agli anni ottanta*. (Roma: Donzelli, 2005), 425-427.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid., 417.

⁷¹⁵ OECD, *Economic Outlook, Historical Statistics 1960-1989*. In Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*, 450.

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West Germany	3.5	6.8
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Within this complex context, the 1976 general elections took place. The results of the 1975 regional elections gave hope to the PSI, which claimed the death of the center-left government. As mentioned above, during the XL PSI Congress the “Left-wing alternative” was imagined but it was not concretized. The PSI hopes were broken during the 1976 elections. Whilst the DC was able to recover the votes lost in the 1975 regional elections, the PSI remained deadlocked in percentage of votes and the PCI instead achieved good results (Table 10).

Table 10

1972 and 1976 Political elections (%)⁷¹⁶

Party	1972	1976
DC	38.7	38.7
PCI	27.1	34.7
PSI	9.6	9.7
PSDI	5.1	3.4
PRI (Italian Republican Party)	2.9	3.1
PLI (Italian Liberal Party)	3.9	1.3
MSI-DN	8.7	6.1
DP (Proletarian Democracy)	-	1.5
PSIUP	1.9	-
PR (Radical Party)	-	1.1

Hence, disappointment grew among the PSI members. Some of them regretted not having allied with radicals. Indeed, the radicals were even considered winners, being seen as an expression of the renewal of the left. Moreover, the bipolar trend in the Italian politics was confirmed (DC versus PCI) while the defeat of the PSI was associated with its ambiguity

⁷¹⁶ Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*. 347.

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(subordination to the DC or to PCI) and shyness regarding its political choices. It was also interpreted as result of general disapproval regarding its closed lists.⁷¹⁷ In addition, the loss of workers as part of its electorate, the low attraction of young voters, the progressive “Southernization” of the party (that somehow was opposed to the development of the tertiary sector and the party orientation to this), and the excessive party bureaucracy contributed to the PSI electoral defeat.⁷¹⁸

The voting results led De Martino to resign as the Secretary in July 1976. At the Midas Hotel, the PSI met to choose the new Secretary. Antonio Giolitti and Bettino Craxi were the main candidates. The former was supported by the party’s left, i.e. the group of Riccardo Lombardi, while the latter by the *autonomisti* (Nenni’s group), *manciniani* (Mancini’s group) and part of the *lombardiani* (Lombardi’s faction)⁷¹⁹. De Martino’s faction opposed Craxi’s candidature.⁷²⁰ Nevertheless, the PSI chose Craxi, who was appointed General Secretary of the party. Craxi, the right-hand man of Nenni, was considered the best person to renew the party (Chapter 3.3). The election of Craxi possibly was due to a convergence of factors, among them: (i) the proximity with Nenni; (ii) the possibility of a generational change in a context in which the renewal of the party was necessary; and (iii) the fact that he had a clear project by maintaining distant from the party base. Indeed, his supporters underlined the fact that Craxi created his own role outside the PSI structure by fostering

⁷¹⁷ Alfonso Madeo. “PSI: Mosca si dimette nella delusione generale”. *Corriere della sera* (22/06/1976). Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/NTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AxMjY2ODM%3D>; Massimo Teodori, “La timidezza dei socialista”. *Corriere della sera*. (23/06/1976). Retrieved from

<http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/MzovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AxMjYyMzA%3D>

⁷¹⁸ Degl’Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*. 422. Between 1961 and 1975, the registered members of the PSI went from 44% to 41% in the North of Italy, from 22.1% to 16.1% in the central regions and from 32.9% to 41.7% in the South of the country. *Ibid.*, 423.

⁷¹⁹ Mancini’s support was decisive for Craxi’s election. Nevertheless, who launched Craxi to the Secretariat was Franco Gerardi, co-director of Avanti!. According to Gerardi, Mancini did not want to oppose directly to De Martino, hence, he allowed that the co-director of Avanti! proposed Bettino. Moreover, Gerardi claimed that Mancini probably hoped to guide Craxi and then, to break free from him. However, when it was clear that the leader of the PSI was Craxi, Mancini disappeared. Andrea Spiri, *La svolta socialista: Il PSI e la leadership di Craxi dal Midas a Palermo (1976-1981)*. (Catanzaro, Rubbettino Editore, 2012), Kindle Edition, 1346-1356.

⁷²⁰ Antonio Padellaro, “Duello tra Giolitti e Craxi”. *Corriere della sera*. (15/07/1976). Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/MzovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AxMjc0OTg%3D>

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relationships with international actors such as Brandt, Soares, Allende, and González in order to maintain Italian socialism in the “international circuit”. That is why, they claimed, the election of Craxi would not correspond to a network of patronage.⁷²¹

Moreover, it is worth remembering that Craxi had been Deputy Secretary of the party since 1970, namely since Giacomo Mancini (General Secretary of the PSI from 1970 to 1971) launched three Deputy Secretariats in order to oppose the internal fragmentation of the party. Indeed, each Deputy Secretary represented one of the PSI factions. Craxi represented the *autonomist* faction and he was appointed Foreign Secretary. Mancini adopted this formula after the fiasco of the PSU, which had not been able to overcome the internal divisions. Indeed, in 1970 the PSI was split into several groups: *Presenza Socialista* led by Mancini; *Riscosa* led by De Martino; *Rinnovamento* led by Tanassi; *Sinistra* led by Lombardi; and *Impegno* led by Giolitti. Nenni (*Autonomia Socialista*), however, held an important position inside the party as he was the President.⁷²²

5.1.1 The Craxi era

When Craxi assumed the Secretariat, he was aware that for the relaunching of the party, and thus its survival, he had to carry out some clarifications in terms of ideology, internal institutions, and factions. Craxi strived to build bridges between the theory and practice of the PSI action and to approach the SI values. He was the first PSI member who questioned the Marxist basis of the party. For instance, Saragat and Nenni never doubted this.⁷²³ Additionally, one of his first measures included the overcoming of the internal fragmentation because according to him, such a division limited the party’s evolution and activities. With this purpose, he encouraged a system in which democratic centralism and local clienteles had to be surmounted in the name of a party closer to society.

⁷²¹ Alfonso Madeo, “Craxi, un figlio del partito”. *Corriere della sera*. (16/07/1976). Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/MzovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AxMjc1Nzk%3D>

⁷²² Picó, *Los límites*, 155-156.

⁷²³ Luciano Cafagna, Luciano Pellicani, “Il revisionismo di Bettino Craxi”. *Critica Sociale*. N. 11, (2006): 8. Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

Moreover, he invited his party to focus on external activities in order to reach people because he was aware of the existing gap between the PSI program/ideology and its reach, which in turn would be translated into votes. Hence, the party had to be reorganized and its political effectiveness needed to be rethought.⁷²⁴ In other words, he aimed to renew the structures of the party, its methods of action, the PSI platform for struggle, and the political leaders because the party “had to enter into a new phase [...] in line with the socialist renewal”. Hence, Craxi devised four types of modernization: at the statutory level, at the programmatic level, in terms of partnership relations, and mass media communications as the type of information and language should change. The PSI political action had to be reviewed, updated, and deepened. He also urged the introduction of an “open-party”, since the oligarchical aspect that characterized the PSI did not allow a linear proximity with people. Thus, he suggested a “socialist alliance”, which should go beyond the political parties, since it would include all kind of social and cultural associations with a democratic character.⁷²⁵ Indeed, Craxi modified the Italian left since for the first time he addressed the new social sectors, e.g. entrepreneurs and managers. Whilst De Martino and Berlinguer had generally spoken to producers, Craxi looked for the consensus of entrepreneurs and managers by launching policies addressed to these groups and including them in party’s organization⁷²⁶.

The internal reform was intertwined with the challenges posed by the crisis of the welfare state at the end of the 1970s. Criticisms against public spending that at the time were linked to political patronage for welfare policies, affecting mainly the left parties. All of this had consequences in the consensus and in the recruitment of new voters. These challenges concerned the entire European social democracy. The overcoming of these constraints occurred once each of these parties grasped the problem and faced them through a renewal

⁷²⁴ Di Scala, *Renewing Italian Socialism*. 179.

⁷²⁵ “La Direzione socialista ha approvato le proposte della Segreteria. Le basi organizzative per un partito moderno”. *Avanti!* (11/11/1981). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810911.85-212_0001_d.pdf\(7/05/2019\)](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810911.85-212_0001_d.pdf(7/05/2019))

⁷²⁶ Marco Gervasoni, “L’immagine della società italiana nel ceto politico: PCI e PSI alla fine della Prima Repubblica”. In *L’Italia contemporanea dagli anni Ottanta a oggi. III. Istituzioni e politica*, edited by Simona Colarizi, Agostino Giovagnoli, Paolo Pombeni. (Roma: Carocci editore, 2014). 241.

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process. As a result, this happened with different timings. The socialists from the Northern Europe suffered the consequences of the delay by losing the electorate, while the socialists from Southern Europe (e.g. Mitterrand, González, and Craxi) undertook a renewal process that led them to win at the polls. Craxi joined this last group even if in the long run his victory was not as he had expected.⁷²⁷

Southern European socialism, moreover, was characterized by the presence of strong leaders at the head of the party who were considered the basis of the “new State”. For instance González, Soares, and Papandreu were associated with the “revival of the party” after the end of the dictatorships, while Mitterrand and Craxi as the “last hope” of socialism.⁷²⁸ As mentioned in Chapter 3.3, Craxi launched a modernization project that included the party’s “de-ideologization” and an autonomous socialism inside the European frame. Moreover, he aimed at reducing the influence of communism in Italian politics in order to overcome the gap existing with other European countries (where the socialist parties were stronger than communist ones) because according to him, these differences slowed down Italy’s modernization⁷²⁹.

Furthermore, Craxi started to consolidate his power over time. When he assumed the Secretariat, a generational shift was carried out inside the party. Indeed, 40 years old people shaped the Executive party committee of the PSI.⁷³⁰ Craxi strived to quickly obtain a leading role inside the party. Accordingly, he sought to weaken the “old guard” and to consolidate his position inside the trade union UIL (*Unione Italiana del Lavoro* -Italian

⁷²⁷ Simona Colarizi, “La trasformazione della leadership. Il PSI di Craxi (1976-1981). In *Gli anni ottanta come storia*, edited by Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons, Gaetano Quagliariello. (Italia: Rubbettino Editore, 2004). 39.

⁷²⁸ Ibid, 47.

⁷²⁹ Spencer M. Di Scala, “Bettino Craxi e la normalizzazione della politica italiana: sfida al PCI e riorientamento della politica estera”. In *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, edited by Andrea Spiri. (Venice: Marsilio, 2006), 50.

⁷³⁰ Berlinguer and the Communist party underestimated the PSI generational shift. Nevertheless, this change had significant consequence in the historical process since the new arrivals were young people, who had grown up during the center left government. Unlike their predecessors, they did not leave the opposition period and, therefore, they did not establish close ties with the PCI. Hence, they could easily broke with the Communism party. Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni. *La cruna dell’ago. Il partito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica*. (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 2005), 26.

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Labor Union), and was able to appoint the socialist Giorgio Benvenuto as General Secretary of the UIL in 1976. Therefore, his goals were devised since the beginning.

During the XLI PSI Party Congress held in Turin (March 29 - April 3, 1978), the coalition of Craxi and Enrico Signorile obtained 65% of votes while the *Alternativa* headed by De Martino and Manca (who supported the dialogue with the PCI) obtained 25.9% of votes. Mancini's faction added to the latter contributing with 7% of votes. At the end of the XLI Congress, the coalition of Craxi as Secretary and Signorile as Deputy Secretary was strengthened. Soon afterwards, De Martino's group was dissolved in May 1978 and Mancini's group lost a lot of votes. Hence, Craxi, little by little, started to spread his power and gain control inside the party.⁷³¹

It is important to keep in mind that during the XLI Party Congress, the new "Socialist Project" (*Progetto per l'alternativa socialista*) was formally launched (the first steps for party renewal were actually taken in Trier in 1977). Hence, notions such as democratic pluralism, reestablishment of the economic system (containment and debt program), and the fight against unemployment became cornerstones of the PSI program.⁷³² Furthermore, at this Congress, the PSI claimed its willingness to act inside the SI frame in order to increase its contacts with the socialist parties from all over the world, since it also looked to launch common policies at the international level (see Chapter 3.3). The PSI renewal was also emphasized with the shift of the party symbol from the hammer and sickle to a red carnation. All of this occurred in a context in which intellectuals started to play a key role by publishing several critical articles in foremost left-wing journals and reviews in newspapers like *Mondoperaio* and *Avanti!* against the PCI and the Historical Compromise. Craxi benefitted from these new intellectual flows in carrying out the party renewal.⁷³³ Intellectuals to some extent became a mechanism for self-legitimacy. Nevertheless, over the years, once Craxi acquired control of the party, their role was resized.

⁷³¹ Picó, *Los límites*, 159-160.

⁷³² For the entire program, see: Bettino Craxi, *L'alternativa dei socialisti. Il progetto di programma del PSI presentato da Bettino Craxi*. (Roma: Mondo Operaio-Edizioni Avanti!, 1978).

⁷³³ Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna*, 53-56.

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Within this context, *Il Vangelo Socialista* was published in August 1978, in which Craxi embraced the Proudhon approach by arguing that Leninism and pluralism were contrasting issues (Chapter 3.3.)⁷³⁴. Afterwards, on September 1979, the PSI Secretary disclosed in the newspaper *Avanti!* his proposal of *grande riforma* (“great reform”) for the legislature that according to him, should include different fields (institutions, administration, society, economy, and morality). He stressed the fact that Italy was at a “historical crossroads”, and therefore the governmental system should be modified (“great reform”) in order to prevent grave political risks and to cancel the governance’s crisis.⁷³⁵ “Great reform” meant “decision”, Giuliano Amato stated. According to him, Italy needed a new governmental system that would be able to achieve consensus as well as to make decisions in order to handle the country’s transformations. This was the “great reform”⁷³⁶. As a result, concepts such as “renewal”, “reform”, and “socialist alternative” became part of the PSI rhetoric since the election of Craxi as PSI Secretary. It was possible to note a real party transformation during the Craxi era because since then, the PSI would not accept a subordinated role to the PCI, nor reproduce the same kind of alliance that it had with the DC in past years⁷³⁷.

A significant event that was considered as a “socialist victory” was the election of the socialist Sandro Pertini as President of the country (the first socialist President) after the resignation of President Giovanni Leone on June 15, 1978 following the Lockheed scandal. Pertini was elected with a broad consensus of the parliamentary groups; he obtained 852 votes out of 995⁷³⁸. Even if he was not the first option for Craxi, Pertini quickly gained

⁷³⁴ “Bettino Craxi: Leninism and Prularism” was the magazine cover of *Socialist Affairs*. N.3/79, May/June 1979. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 22.

⁷³⁵ Bettino Craxi, “Ottava Legislatura. *Avanti!* (28/09/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20a1%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790928.83-224_0001_d.pdf#search=grande%20riforma

⁷³⁶ Giuliano Amato, “Il PSI e la riforma delle istituzioni”. In *La “grande riforma” di Craxi*, edited by Gennaro Acquaviva and Luigi Covatta. (Venezia: Marsilio Editore 2010), 41.

⁷³⁷ Giovagnoli, *La Repubblica degli italiani*, 3871 and 3907.

⁷³⁸ Even if it was recognized Pertini’s prestige, cordiality, humbleness and good relationships with the other parties, the newspaper *Corriere della sera* stressed that the unanimous vote was mainly due to: on one side, Pertini became the best Craxi’s candidate for the PSI, on the other, he was considered by the DC as the sole Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

people's support (he became one of the most popular Presidents that Italy ever had), and therefore he contributed to increase the support of the Italian people towards the PSI⁷³⁹. Pertini's election, coupled with Craxi's behavior against the policy of *fermezza* during Moro's kidnapping, were two episodes in which the Socialist Secretary tried to break the linkage of DC-PCI. According to him, the latter hampered the modernization of the country⁷⁴⁰.

That said, after the 1979 electoral results (the PSI remained below the 10%), the axis Craxi-Signorile started to decline (Table 11)⁷⁴¹. Part of the problem relied on the fact that Craxi tried to limit the action of all the real or potential opponents inside the party, including Signorile. Accordingly, he was blamed for trying to personalize the party and for not having fully complied with the goals devised at the XVI party Congress: a modern, democratic and pluralistic party. He replied to these criticisms by accusing his critics (the main thinkers of the party) of belonging to the "old guard" and being a sort of "cast of intellectuals".⁷⁴²

option to ensure an agreement in the opposition after the left-wing's refusal to the formal candidacy of a DC representative. "Con molti consensi senza obblighi verso nessuno". *Corriere della sera* (9/07/1978). Retrieved from

<http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/MTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MyL0AzNTU5Nw%3D%3D>

⁷³⁹ Degl'Innocenti. *Storia del PSI*, 443.

⁷⁴⁰ Spiri, *La svolta socialista*, 86

⁷⁴¹ One week later, however, the first European elections was held and the PSI obtained a "better" result (11%), at least if it is compared with the political elections and the electoral outcome of the PCI (29.6%) and DC (36.4%). Craxi gave great relevancy to this electoral campaign since he aimed to show that the PSI was an autonomous party also beyond the national boundaries and that the Italian socialism was in line with the European social democracy (in fact the slogan was *Se parli socialista, in Europa ti capiranno* - "If you speak socialism, in Europe they will understand you"). Moreover, Brandt took part in the opening ceremony of the electoral campaign at Turin and Craxi participated in an election rally in Paris together with Mitterrand. Furthermore, Craxi stressed more than once, the contribution that the PSI gave for the development of a common electoral platform since "Eurosocijalism" should become the *biggest political reality of Western Europe*. Andrea Spiri, *La svolta socialista*, 3688.

⁷⁴² The letter was signed by: Giuliano Amato, Norberto Bobbio, Luciano Cafagna, Giuseppe Carbone, Federico Coen, Paolo Flores D'Arcais, E. Galli Della Loggia, Gino Giugni, Roberto Guiducci, Lucio Izzo, Federico Mancini, Guido Martinotti, Franco Momigliano, Antonio Perdone, Luciano Pellicani, Giorgio Ruffolo, Massimo L. Salvadori, Luciano Vasconi. See "Un documento di intelletuali socialisti". *Avanti!* (21/10/1979) Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19791021.83-244_0001_d.pdf

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Table 11*1979 Political elections (%)*⁷⁴³

Party	1979
DC	38.3
PCI	30.4
PSI	9.8
PSDI	3.8
PRI	3.0
PLI	1.9
MSI	5.3
DN (National Right)*	0.6
ES (Far Left)**	2.2
PR	3.5

The 1970s ended with the death of Pietro Nenni (January 1, 1980), president of the PSI and mentor of Craxi. Soon after, the “old guard” of the PSI launched an “attack” against Craxi. They proposed Lombardi as new president of the party. Nevertheless, the Italian political events in March 1980 favored Craxi; the Prime Minister, Francesco Cossiga from the DC, resigned (this was the first administration of Cossiga that lasted from August 1979 until April 1980). Within a context marked by terrorism, economic emergency, and political instability, the topic of *governance* became a central issue and a subject of concern. More or less at the same time, Lombardi relinquished (on March 13, 1980) and Craxi announced his availability to enter into the government in order to ensure *governance*, and therefore administrative efficiency by overcoming the state of deadlock and political vacuum (De Martino’s approach, “most advanced balance”, was abandoned by enabling the party to break the political immobility)⁷⁴⁴.

⁷⁴³ Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*. 383. *DN split from MSI-DN. ** ES included Nsu (Proletarian Unity Party) and Pdup (Proletarian Unity Party for Communism).

⁷⁴⁴ Gennaro Acquaviva, “Craxi, la politica, la riforma”. In *La “grande riforma” di Craxi*, edited by Gennaro Acquaviva and Luigi Covatta. (Venezia: Marsilio Editore 2010), 26.

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The Secretary of the PSI was able to face and overcome the “attacks” from his party thanks to the endorsement given by Gianni De Michelis at the Central Committee on March 21, 1980. Thanks to his support, Craxi obtained the majority of the party (58%). According to Maurizio Degl’Innocenti, the victory of Craxi was fulfilled on April 3rd when the Committee approved the formation of a new government. After six years of being outside the government, the PSI participated in the second Cossiga Administration (April-October 1980) with the achievement of nine Ministries (the DC had 15 and Republicans with 3). With the number of governmental positions obtained by the PSI, the party acquired major weight inside the government⁷⁴⁵. Furthermore, in October 1980 following Craxi’s suggestion, the Central Committee elected a new party leadership that confirmed the weight that the General Secretary had achieved inside the party: two-thirds of the party leadership was formed by his supporters (Signorile was excluded from the Secretariat).⁷⁴⁶ Craxi justified his action by claiming that the PSI needed a new and more representative leading body in order to address Italian needs following the governmental crisis.⁷⁴⁷ Craxi’s influence inside the party was confirmed at the XLII PSI Congress held in Palermo on April 22-26, 1981, in which the PSI really became the party of Craxi (hence, the labels: *craxiano/craxismo*). It is interesting to note the venue of the Congress since it took place some months before the Sicilian elections, which had been scheduled for June the same year. At this meeting, Craxi was able to modify the elections system of the party secretary

⁷⁴⁵ It is interesting to note that Carlo Ripa di Meana (from the PSI) wrote for the magazine *Socialist Affairs* about the PSI and about Italy’s situation. He justified the return of the PSI to the government and the agreement with the DC by saying that the Italian DC was less “conservative” than the DC of the other countries. Hence, the political coalition PSI-DC-PRI was based on equal rights between them and the PSI was not considered as a “younger brother”. He alluded to the SI system (it was shaped by different parties with similar objectives) in order to explain and justified the governmental agreement in Italy. Carlo Ripa Di Meana, “Una interpretación acerca de la participación del Partifo socialista en la fórmula del Gobierno Italiano”. This document was sent to Carlsson in August 1981. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1115.

⁷⁴⁶ Degl’Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*. 434-435. Several issues contributed to the rupture Craxi-Signorile, among them: the differences in terms of political program (Craxi strived for changing the political structure of the country while Signorile focused mainly in national solidarity and he did not refuse the traditional political system); the divergences regarding the Euro-missiles; the Eni-Petroleum scandal, i.e. a corruption affair in which Signorile was involved. Craxi reported the case and at the same time firmly rejected the charges of conspiracy. Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna*, 101-107.

⁷⁴⁷ For the discussion among PSI leaders regarding Craxi’s proposal, see: “Craxi: rafforzare direzione politica e chiarezza delle impostazioni”. *Avanti!* (2/10/1980). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19801002.84-222_0001_d.pdf#search=craxi)

[1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19801002.84-222_0001_d.pdf#search=craxi](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19801002.84-222_0001_d.pdf#search=craxi)

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by introducing the direct election. Indeed, literature has agreed that Palermo was a turning point for the PSI because it became an “individual party”.⁷⁴⁸ This shift was also perceived inside the party. For instance, during the Congress, Salvatore Lauricella (from De Martino’s faction) referred to Craxi as the man who was preparing to assume all the power of the PSI.⁷⁴⁹

Craxi was the first PSI Secretary who obtained the absolute majority with 75% of party’s support, and he was the first Secretary in PSI history to be elected directly by the Congress delegates. Indeed, at this Congress, direct elections for the Secretary were established with the aim of ensuring Italian *governance*. The topic of the Congress, “Socialist renewal for the renewal of Italy” (*Il rinnovamento socialista per il rinnovamento dell’Italia*), captured people’s attention. For the first time, according to the newspaper *Avanti!*, public opinion was following the development of the Congress with great interest⁷⁵⁰. The relevancy of this summit was also noticeable in the large international attendance. Hence, the great internationalization of the party was recognized, which for the first time had become visible and concrete.

Moreover, the close personal links between international socialist personalities from all over the world and the PSI were interpreted as the result of the PSI global efforts and abilities to establish new ties that would lead it to fulfill common objectives, such as worldwide peace, economic development, and democracy (i.e. the same cornerstones and attempts of the SI)⁷⁵¹. In Palermo, Craxi addressed several topics: the struggle against inflation, corruption, unemployment, poverty, the reforms in Southern Italy, the fight against terrorism, and the launching of a “great reform that should include economy, institutions, and the problem of governance.” In other words, he aimed to have “party

⁷⁴⁸ Colarizi, “La trasformazione della leadership”, 62; Degl’Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*, 436.

⁷⁴⁹ Massimo Pini, *Craxi. Una vita, un’era politica*. (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 2006), 192.

⁷⁵⁰ Incidentally, from 1978 to 1981, Bettino Craxi was the executive editor of the newspaper *Avanti!*. Ugo Intini followed him.

⁷⁵¹ Francesco Gozzano, “L’Internazionale e i partiti amici intorno ai socialisti italiani”, *Avanti!* (26-27/04/1981). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810426.85-98_0001_d.pdf#search=internazionale)

https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810426.85-98_0001_d.pdf#search=internazionale

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renewal for the renewal of Italy”⁷⁵². In regard to the Third World, he urged Italy to enhance its international cooperation and to struggle against global inequality. Like Europe, he claimed that Italy had the duty to uphold development in the Third World, and therefore to become a benchmark for them ⁷⁵³. In the bipolar scheme, in fact, Europe was called to play an active role in the construction of the global balance that would be directed to solve the economic crises, underdevelopment, and widespread conflict. Accordingly, the EEC would carry out an institutional renewal and would accelerate the integration process in order to attain a balance approach ⁷⁵⁴.

Craxi interpreted this new process as a natural leftist phenomenon since it was part of the new frame that had recently transformed Europe. It was in line with the project of the French Socialist Party, the orientation of the German SPD, the governmental project of the Greek PASOK, and the project approved at the last PSOE Congress. Therefore, the PSI goals were part of a wider movement that went beyond the Italian bonds⁷⁵⁵. This was inscribed in the process of personalized leadership and “making politics spectacular” that at the time characterized many Western European countries, and therefore meant a “standardization” of the Italian politics. This “standardization” implied the increase of the leader’s power (e.g. Mitterrand, González, Thatcher, Kohl, Craxi, etc) at expenses of the

⁷⁵² Nicola Zotti, “Congressi: Una proposta di rinnovamento e di speranza”. In *1892-1982 PSI Novanta anni di storia*. Almanacco Socialista, 386. Craxi’s proposals or “thesis”, as they were known, were articulated in the following manner: 1) to consolidate the socialist path; 2) to defeat the front of the conservative and bureaucratic forces; 3) to establish a coherent approach for stability, governance, renewal and reforms; 4) to reform institutions and public life; 5) to create a new economic method that included development, security, efficiency, social equality; 6) to struggle against poverty; 7) to ensure a trade-union movement that would play a leading role in the economic management as well as in the job market and in the definition of the rights and duties of workers; 8) to struggle for human, media and cultural freedom; 9) to defeat terrorism; 10) to rebuild an international role for Italy and to fight for peace, freedom and worldwide solidarity; 11) to defend woman’s rights as well as civil rights; 12) to provide an open dialogue and democratic cooperation in order to ensure governance and the success of the reforms; 13) to carry out an internal renewal with the aim of creating a party for workers, although it would be also open to all the reform social movements. “Le 13 tesi del 42° Congresso del PSI”, *Avanti!* (18/02/1981). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810218.85-41_0001_d.pdf#search=craxi

⁷⁵³ Bettino Craxi, “Il rinnovamento socialista per il rinnovamento dell’Italia. Redazione Congressuale 42° Congresso PSI. Palermo, 22 aprile 1981. In *Il socialismo di Craxi. Interventi e documenti del PSI*. Edited by Ugo Finetti (Milano: M&B Publishing, 2003), 150.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid. 152.

⁷⁵⁵ Luigi Covatta “Dal progetto socialista al programma”. In *1892-1982 PSI Novanta anni di storia*, 484.

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party's power since the party started to be associated with the leader⁷⁵⁶. In this process, the media and in particular television played a key role.

5.1.2. The road to power

Arnaldo Forlani (from the DC) followed Cossiga's second administration in October 1980. Nevertheless, delicate issues occurred during his government (e.g. the earthquake in Irpina, the referendum on abortion, and the scandal of the P2)⁷⁵⁷ that weakened it and led Forlani to resign few months after he had been appointed (June 1981). Giovanni Spadolini (from the PRI, the party less enmeshed in the P2 scandal) was called to succeed him. Even if Craxi desired to be elected (and Pertini considered appointing him)⁷⁵⁸, the involvement of many socialists in the P2 Lodge and the DC opposition led Pertini, in the end, to choose Spadolini (the first non-DC member in the history of the Italian Republic) who formed the new government: the *pentapartito*, i.e. five party governing coalition that included the DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, and PLI.

Hence, the centrality of the DC in the Italian political system started to crumble during those years. The DC had not been able to solve some of the problems that arose over the past decade, e.g. no generational shift, no party renewal, deep rivalries, and the inability to resize and balance the powers and weights inside the party between the North and the South as around 63% of affiliates were from Southern Italy.⁷⁵⁹ Furthermore, the P2 scandal severely affected the DC since many DC members were involved in the Lodge, but above

⁷⁵⁶Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna*, 130.

⁷⁵⁷The P2 (*Propaganda 2*) was a Masonic Lodge headed by Licio Gelli. Its members included several politicians from different parties, secret services, prominent figures in the armed forces, journalists, businessmen, professors, three Ministers and the secretary of the PSDI. After the Parliamentary inquiry it was concluded in 1984 that the P2 had been strived for intervening in politics with the aim of altering the proper functioning of institutions and democracy. A second inquiry carried out in 1994 by the Court of Assisi, however, gave a different conclusion since it argued that the P2 had been just a Masonic Lodge. Paul Ginsborg, *L'Italia del tempo presente. Famiglia, società civile, Stato. 1980-1996*. (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), 471.

⁷⁵⁸Craxi said that the first time that Pertini appointed him Prime Minister (1980), he was taken by surprise. Nevertheless, when it was time for the investiture (one hour later their meeting), Pertini nominated Spadolini because the DC opposed Craxi's designation. "Intervista Craxi al 'Corriere della Sera'" (28/2/1990). Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.1 I.160).

⁷⁵⁹Ginsborg, *L'Italia del tempo presente*, 473.

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all because the P2 had acted undisturbed for a long time. Likewise, pressures from the mafia, the terrorist attacks, and the decline of the Catholic Church as the guarantor of the morality of the Italian politics determined the end of the DC centrality (with the election of Ciriaco De Mita as DC secretary in May 1982, the party aimed at launching an internal modernization)⁷⁶⁰.

Likewise, the PCI also had to face some obstacles at the time and even some of its weaknesses came to light. For instance, the increase of the tertiary sector in Italy implied new working methods. Hence, the working class (proletariat) and the trade union of workers, namely the class represented by the PCI and which endorsed it, went into a crisis. The successful strike (*Marcia dei quarantamila*) in 1980 organized by Fiat's managers and technicians against the occupation of the factories (mostly supported by the PCI) revealed the transformations of the working class. Thus, the bulk of the class that the PCI represented had been resized. This was added to the defeat, some years later, of the referendum aimed to overturn the cuts in Italy's wage indexation system in 1985. Consequently, in those years the Italian bipolarity (DC versus PCI) had some difficulties since both parties showed some of their weaknesses⁷⁶¹. Within this context, Spadolini was appointed and the PSI undertook the "great renewal" process.

Indeed, during the PSI Rimini Congress (March 31- April 4, 1982) the Italian socialist party completed the process that it had started some years before (i.e. at Trier). Indeed, Rimini was the first PSI "Programmatic conference" that completed the former "Socialist Project". "Govern the change" (*Governare il cambiamento*) was the topic of the meeting and the following was proposed: greater governmental stability, abolition of the secret vote in the Parliament, different functions for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, reviewing the civil rights legislation, less bureaucracy, increasing efficiency and equality in the justice system, eliminating poverty, economic improvements (reducing inflation), full

⁷⁶⁰ Giovagnoli *La Repubblica*, 4026.

⁷⁶¹ Alberto De Bernardi, *Un paese in bilico: L'Italia degli ultimi trent'anni* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2015), Kindle edition, 1787-1798.

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employment, and educational reform in order to fulfill the cultural gap in the country⁷⁶². Moreover, the international dimension assumed greater importance because to some extent the leftist party left behind the old ideas that had identified the West as “the evil of the World”⁷⁶³.

Craxi saw in the *pentapartito* a good opportunity for gaining autonomy and distancing from the traditional bipolarity embodied by the DC and PCI power. To some extent, he was right because after two Spadolini governments (June 1981-August 1982; August- December 1982) and the brief administration of Amintore Fanfani, in which the Republican Party was excluded (December 1982-August 1983), Craxi’s turn arrived⁷⁶⁴. The 1983 electoral results did not allow the DC to halt the formation of a Socialist government (the establishment of a centrist administration without the PSI would be unthinkable), even if the PSI did not obtain the result that it expected (Table 12).

Table 12

*1983 political elections (%)*⁷⁶⁵

Party	1983
DC	32.9
PCI	29.9
PSI	11.4
PSDI	4.1
PRI	5.1
PLI	2.9

⁷⁶² Di Scala, *Renewing Italian Socialism*, 200. For the speech of Craxi see *Avanti!* (6/04/1982). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/Avanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820406.86-72_0001_d.pdf#search=rimini

⁷⁶³ Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna*, 142-143.

⁷⁶⁴ Pertini chose Craxi as Italian Prime Minister even if he was not so close to him. Indeed, the Italian President saw some flaws in the Socialist Secretary: he was too young, so close to Nenni’s faction and extremely *autonomista* (in particular regarding the PCI). Acquaviva, “Craxi, la politica”, 23. For the relationship between Pertini and Craxi, see: Alessandro Giaccone, “Le parti socialiste des années quatre-vingt, de Pertini à Craxi”. *Cahiers d’etudes italiennes*, n.14 (2012): 47-64.

⁷⁶⁵ Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*, 416.

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MSI	6.8
DN	-
DP	1.5
ES	-
PR	2.2
League	0.6

Although there were just 5 Socialist Ministry against the 15 positions that corresponded to the DC, Craxi was able to stay in power over a relatively long period of time (two consecutive government from 1983 till 1987), at least for the “standards” of the Italian politics. From the head of the government, Craxi expected a resizing of the left wing in which the PSI would prevail over the PCI, namely to introduce in Italy the Mitterrand model.

Indeed, Craxi’s image as a charismatic leader reached its peak on May 11-14, 1984 during the XLIII Socialist Congress (the topic was: “A Just Society. A Governing Democracy”- *Una società giusta. Una democrazia governante*) held in Verona. Hence, at this meeting, not only the rift of Craxi with the PCI became increasingly evident, but above all he received support from a large part of the party and even from the pro-communists. Even those who had criticized him (mainly “the old guard”) recognized that he had achieved great power. Giacomo Mancini, for instance, said, “we have built a leader’s party”⁷⁶⁶. Nevertheless, not everyone was critical to Craxi leadership; for instance, the pro-communist, Giorgio Strehler rejected the comparison that the opposition was making about Craxi (Craxi as Mussolini) and affirmed that the Socialist Secretary was a genuine Democrat. Similarly, Valdo Spini recognized that the PSI’s evolution and renewal had taken place thanks to the efforts made by Craxi as well as to the party’s recapture of unity, which in fact had opened new spaces in the political arena. Moreover, at Verona, a significant transformation of the party was carried out since the traditional Central Committee was replaced by the National Assembly, which enabled the involvement of new actors as financiers or cultural figures. Craxi’s speech aimed to pinpoint that his new

⁷⁶⁶Tardivio, *Los socialismos de Bettino Craxi*, 378.

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political position (Prime Minister) should consolidate the socialist area. Indeed, according to him, the PSI was the force able to balance stability and renewal, governability and reformism, Atlanticism and autonomy⁷⁶⁷. In a few words, as Norberto Bobbio stated, Craxi became a charismatic leader⁷⁶⁸.

That said, when Craxi came to power, the Italian economic situation was not in the best shape. As a matter of fact, the Italian economic growth slowed down in the beginning of the 1980s, and inflation, the public deficit, and the Italian external debt all increased. Nevertheless, as many scholars have agreed, Craxi would benefit from certain economic improvements that Italy experienced under his administration. Indeed, Craxi's government coincided with an "optimistic season" that nourished people's illusions. Indeed, during his administration: (i) inflation decreased (from 20% in 1980 to 6% in 1987); (ii) the GDP grew approximately 2.5% (in the former period, the average rate was less than 1%); (iii) the balance of trade turned in favor of Italy; (iv) Italian firms ("made in Italy") improved their performance from 1984 onwards⁷⁶⁹; (v) the Milan stock-market increased its capitalizations from 1982-1986; and (vi) Italy entered into the group of the most industrialized countries in February 1987,.

Even if Craxi was not able to face and solve all relevant economic dilemmas (for instance, the small reduction of public deficit from 14.3% of the GDP in 1983 to 11.6% in 1987 and the increasing of public debt from 72% to 93% of the GDP in the same years), all the above mentioned together with the decline of terrorism, the growing international standing⁷⁷⁰, and the reviewing of the agreement with the Church (*Concordato*) in 1984⁷⁷¹ gave him greater national recognition. In fact, some people went further and talked about a "second economic miracle"⁷⁷². Hence, in Craxi's first one thousand days, he achieved significant successes, including Galasso's law (environmental legislation in order to prevent

⁷⁶⁷Ugo Finetti, "Introduzione", In *Il socialismo di Craxi. Interventi e documenti del PSI*. Edited by Ugo Finetti (Milano:M&B Publishing, 2003), 63-64.

⁷⁶⁸Tardivio, *Los socialismos de Bettino Craxi*, 379.

⁷⁶⁹Crainz, *Il paese*, 592.

⁷⁷⁰For example, the position of Craxi during the Sigonella crisis was very welcomed by the Italian people.

⁷⁷¹*Concordato*: the full secularization of society and the reciprocal recognition and respect by the Church and the State of their own sphere of competence.

⁷⁷²Ginsborg, *L'Italia del tempo presente*, 484.

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degradation of environmental goods), Visentini's fiscal reform in 1985 which aimed to exert control on the taxable profit of traders and artisans (although at beginning this measure was heavily contested, it became law), and the victory of the referendum on abolishing the wage escalator in 1985⁷⁷³. He enacted 163 decree-laws (91 of which were made law), carried out 13 international missions, and was able to overcome 163 attacks from the opposition in the Parliament⁷⁷⁴. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the small PSI representation in Parliament greatly limited Craxi's space for maneuver, and therefore his political and economic incisiveness.

However, the illusion of the "second economic miracle" started to decline. The economic maneuver was less incisive than how Craxi had expected. Indeed, some problems came to light. On May 26, 1986 for instance, the Milan Stock-Exchange dropped down to 4% and even to 9.3% a few days later. Things got worse and panic amongst investors increased because the Republican Minister of finance, Bruno Visentini, had suggested the introduction of earning taxes. In view of this scenario, Craxi invited the Minister to retract. The truth is that at the time, the PSI did not really understand the extent of this "fiscal crisis", but as Luciano Cafagna noted, it became the first step in the dismantlement process that overwhelmed the first Republic⁷⁷⁵.

After the 1985 regional elections, the relationships between the DC and the PSI got worse. The DC interpreted the PSI results (13.3%) as proof that Italians did not fully endorse the Socialist government, and therefore that Craxi had not really been able "to take a great leap forward" in terms of electoral results for the PSI after two years in power. Hence, the DC tried to take advantage from the evident PSI fragility. Thus, the DC felt free to assume a more conflictive position towards the PSI than years before (1983) when it had accepted to

⁷⁷³ This referendum was called by the PCI (with the support of the *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro- CGIL*) in 1985 in order to overturn the cuts in Italy's wage indexation system that has been established by the PSI decree-law (decree of San Valentin) in 1984 (with the endorsement of the other trade unions: UIL and CISL). The outcome (the 54% of voters rejected the repeal of the law) was the major victory for the PSI (also in symbolic and psychological terms) and the major defeat for the PCI. According to Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, this referendum marked the end of an era, namely, the end of the veto right for labor issues that traditionally had been in the hands of the PCI. Degl'Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*, 455.

⁷⁷⁴ Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna*, 190.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 194.

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adopt a more collaborative approach with Craxi's government⁷⁷⁶. The tensions between these two forces led to the downfall of the Socialist government in July 1986 (the failure of some measures regarding local finances was the straw that broke the camel's back). Nevertheless, a second Craxi government followed the first one. The new administration, however, was based on an agreement (*la staffetta*) with the DC: the DC would return to power in 1987. Hence, Craxi strived to delay the *staffetta* as much as possible. As Maurizio Degl'Innocenti noted, *governance* was increasingly assumed as holding on to power and State's *stability* prevailed over the socialist program⁷⁷⁷. However, problems persisted leading Craxi to resign on March 3, 1987 and early elections were called on June 14, 1987 (Table 13). Having said that, many people interpreted Craxi's acceptance of the *staffetta* agreement as his first great error, which inevitably led him to defeat. Why? In the end, he accepted the existing system and gave up on trying to change the *staus quo*⁷⁷⁸.

Table 13

*1987 political elections (%)*⁷⁷⁹

Party	1987
DC	34.3
PCI	26.6
PSI	14.3
PSDI	3.0
PRI	3.7
PLI	2.1
MSI	5.9
DP	1.7

⁷⁷⁶ Giovagnoli, *La Repubblica*, 4303-4322.

⁷⁷⁷ Degl'Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*, 457.

⁷⁷⁸ Acquaviva and Covatta (eds), *Il crollo*, 21. It is interesting to note that even from the outside, Craxi was considered unable to change the Italian system. For instance, the USA recognized Craxi's political skills but at the same time he was seen as incapable of transforming the Italian political structures. Gaetano Quagliariello, "Oltre il 'terzaforzismo'. Craxi e le relazioni transatlantiche (1976-1983). In *Bettino Craxi*, edited by Andrea Spiri, 44.

⁷⁷⁹ Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*,. 448.

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PR	2.5
League	1.8
Green	2.5

When Craxi concluded his administration, the GDP went from 1.2% in 1983 to 2.5% in 1986, the household consumption from 0.5% to 3.4%, the exports from 3% to 2.4%, inflation from 15% to 6.1%, unemployment rate from 9.9% to 11% and public debt from 70% to 82.2%, all in the same period of time. Hence, unemployment and public debt were the weak points of Craxi's government just like they were for González's administration⁷⁸⁰. Notwithstanding, Craxi ended his government with the support of 65% of Italians who would have preferred the continuity of his administration⁷⁸¹.

Within this context, the XLIV PSI Socialist Congress took place on March 31-April 5, 1987 in Rimini. At this meeting, Craxi underlined that during his government, Italy achieved "stability and governance", significant economic improvements were obtained (he said: "Italy was not in crisis anymore"), and the country increased its prestige and recognition at the international level. He grasped that Italy, like the entire world, was changing (e.g. he even foresaw the possibility of the elimination of the Berlin wall); therefore, Italy needed to adapt itself to the new times. Likewise, he recognized the weakness of the country, such as the differences between the North and South as well as the high rates of unemployment, in particular in the South. Hence, these became some of the goals of his political campaign⁷⁸².

After all, the 1987 political elections (Table 13) represented a good result for the PSI (comparable to the best period of the PSI, namely the 1958 elections) in particular because the PCI had lost large part of its electorate. Even if Craxi's desire of resizing the left wing was far from being achieved, the outcome of this election seemed to give grounds for hope.

⁷⁸⁰ Tardivio, *Los socialismos*, 394.

⁷⁸¹ Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna*, 199.

⁷⁸² For the Craxi's speech during the XLIV Congress in Rimini 1987, see Bettino Craxi, "L'Italia che cambia e i compiti del riformismo. Relazione congressuale del 44° Congresso PSI, Rimini, Marzo 1987". In *Il socialismo*, edited by Ugo Finetti. 271-297.

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This was nourished by the fact that a large part of the PSI's growth happened in many of the pro-communist areas as well as in Southern Italy, which traditionally had been pro-DC. Nevertheless, despite the electoral improvements, the PSI remained the third force in Italian politics. Craxi, therefore, relinquished his struggle for the position of Prime Minister and accepted supporting a DC government in return for the PSI participation (50%) in it. As Simona Colarizi noted, he agreed to take part in the government without being fully aware of the scale and magnitude of what could come nationally and internationally⁷⁸³.

Indeed, Craxi to some extent was naïve and extremely optimistic since he believed in a victory of the PSI over the PCI after the fall of the Berlin wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union. Hence, he did not really understand that this event would affect the entire left wing and not only Communism⁷⁸⁴. According to Giuliano Amato, the 1991 crisis seemed to give to the PSI the opportunity for a decisive turning point. However, it did not work out that way because Craxi accepted a new DC government (Andreotti's administration) and he did not realize what was really happening. The "alternative" was not launched and the PSI, Amato said, seemed to focus more on the definitive defeat of the former PCI rather than on assuming the effective leadership of the left wing and on striving for the union of the left force. This together with Craxi's request to the electorate to abstain from voting in the 1991 Referendum⁷⁸⁵ showed a lack of Craxi's clear thinking.⁷⁸⁶ As the scholar Giovanni Gozzini stated, Craxi failed because he was not able to establish a real alternative to the DC government. The explanation should be looked on the project itself because he strived to

⁷⁸³ Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*. 471.

⁷⁸⁴ Since 1989, the PCI embarked on a process to reform the party that concluded in 1991, namely, at the Congress held in Rimini. At this meeting the emergence of a "new party", the PDS (*Partito Democratico della Sinistra* -Democratic Party of the Left), was formalized. Different political parties requested the change of the name. "Il PCI deve cambiare nome". *Avanti!* (12/11/1989). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/controller.php?page=result_solr&term_search=%20Amato%20Giuliano&day_start=01&month_start=11&year_start=1989&day_end=10&month_end=03&year_end=1990&start_search=0&sort=Title_search%20asc&start_search=10. A group of traditionalists, instead, split and formed a new party: *Rifondazione comunista* (Communist Refoundation Party).

⁷⁸⁵ A group headed by Mario Segni, with the support of the Radical Party, promoted the Referendum on the electoral law. It aimed to modify the electoral system by supporting only one preference, instead of multiple choices in the elections of the representatives for the House of Deputies. The referendum was interpreted as a direct attack against the traditional parties and against the "old politics". The high turnout of Italians in the poll showed people's strong desire for change. Hence, it was a heavy blow for Craxi since he had chosen to abstain and asked people to do the same (he urged Italians *to go to the beach instead to the polls*).

⁷⁸⁶ Giancarlo Bosetti, "Io e Craxi. Il libro che non ho mai scritto. Intervista con Giuliano Amato. *Reset*. (Sept-oct 2000) 5-18.

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reverse the bipolar trend of DC-PCI and to find a leading position for the PSI, but he tried to do it adopting the ready-made model of the DC. As a result, the system remained unvaried and he was unable to fully understand the transformation of the civil society and their requests⁷⁸⁷.

Craxi probably underestimated the new challenges that occurred at the end of 1980s and early 1990s because the 1990 regional elections were a good result for the PSI after all. Similarly, during the 1989 European elections, the results of the PSI had improved (the PCI, instead, declined) and its number of affiliates had increased. Indeed, he concluded his speech at the XLV PSI Congress (Milan, May 13, 1989) underlining the growth of the party since 1976 in terms of electorate and registered members. In particular, he noted that 61% of the PSI members had joined the party in the last five years (42% of them had enrolled in the last two years and the 74% this year).⁷⁸⁸ Hence, Craxi chose the line of immobility after all.

Nevertheless, the result and the high turnout of the 1991 referendum was the first heavy blow for Craxi. Given the fact he had assumed a high profile during the referendum's campaign, he ended up being considered as one of the main players against it, although other people had also objected. If the 1985 referendum affected Berlinguer and the PCI, the 1991 vote harmed Craxi and the PSI. After the 1991 referendum, the XLVI PSI took place in Bari on June 27-30, 1991, in which Craxi talked about the electoral reform, but first and foremost about the union of the left (i.e. the union of the two full SI members, the PSDI and the PSI, with the PSD which had achieved the status of observer in the SI⁷⁸⁹). Even if

⁷⁸⁷ Giovanni Gozzini, "La televisione tra due Repubbliche". In *L'Italia contemporanea dagli anni Ottanta a oggi, II Il mutamento sociale*, edited by Enrica Asquer, Emanuele Bernardi, Carlo Fumian. (Roma: Carocci editore, 2014), 235-236.

⁷⁸⁸ Bettino Craxi, "Dieci punti per una riflessione ideale e politica. Relazione congressuale 45° Congresso PSI- Milano 13 maggio 1989). In *Il socialismo*, edited by Ugo Finetti, 330.

⁷⁸⁹ The PDS acquired the full membership status during the SI Congress (Berlin) on September 15, 1992. The accession represented for them a legitimating device. Craxi presented the request for the PDS accession as full SI member and underlined that this membership should be the starting point for the united left in Italy. He also stressed that they needed to look to the future in which the basis of the convergence of the programs should be the democratic socialism. Francesco Gozzano, "Internazionale: sì al PDS". *Avanti!* (15/09/1992). Retrieved from <https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF/17.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201990-1993%20OCR/Ocr%20-D->

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during the XLVI Congress, there were signs of misunderstandings, tensions, and divergences among the party's members, Craxi was able to maintain his leading position in the PSI, at least for a couple more years⁷⁹⁰.

The second heavy blow for Craxi occurred in February 1992 when a scandal of corruption (*tangentopoli*) came to light after the detention of the socialist Mario Chiesa. *Tangentopoli* affected the entire political system and particularly harmed Craxi. According to Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, despite Craxi recognizing the illegal party funding on the part of both ruling and opposition parties as well as of entrepreneurs, the Secretary of the PSI conveyed the impression that he sought to challenge the investigators. Hence, he was seen as a direct enemy of Antonio Di Pietro who had led the Milan sting operation against Chiesa (it was the first step in wide government corruption scandal).⁷⁹¹ Paradoxically, Craxi's "stronghold", namely Milan, became the place where his decline started. Besides all the consequences that *tangentopoli* produced in Italian politics and in the PSI (e.g. internal divisions, lost electorate, Craxi's resignation to the Secretariat, and later the party's dissolution), there was a third heavy blow for Craxi and the PSI, i.e. not being able to overcome the PCI/PSD in the polls (not even in the early 1990s). Additionally, Craxi made a huge mistake by supporting the PDS accession to the SI (the PDS needed Craxi's endorsement to become a member of the SI). He believed (also at the suggestion of De Michelis) that PSD's SI membership would lead to the establishment of better relationships between them. Nevertheless, it was a PSI illusion because once the PDS joined the SI, it did

/CFI0422392_19920915.97-218_d.pdf#search=internazionale%20socialista. According to Achille Occhetto, from the PCI/PDS, at the beginning Craxi opposed to the accession of the PDS to the SI. De Michelis, instead, supported the idea. Few days later, however, Craxi gave also his assent. In Tardivo, *Los socialismos*, 446. For further details, see also: Pini, *Craxi. Una vita*, 486-489. For the opinion on behalf of some PSI protagonists see Acquaviva and Covatta (eds), *Il crollo*. It is interesting to note, however, that since the early 1982 the international press reported the willingness of Craxi to allow the PCI accession to the SI as observer. Of course, the PCI would embrace the Democratic Socialism. Juan Arias, "Craxi ofrece al PCI la integración en la Internacioanl socialista", *El País*, (31/01/1982). Retrieved from https://elpais.com/diario/1982/01/31/internacional/381279609_850215.html

⁷⁹⁰ Bettino Craxi, Intervista al Tg2. "Dibattito nel segno dell'unità socialista". *Avanti!*.(30/06/1991). Retrieved from

https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF/17.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201990-1993%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-CFI0422392_19910630-19910701.95-132_d.pdf#search=bari

⁷⁹¹ Degl'Innocenti, *Storia del PSI*, 471.

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not need any contact with the socialist party. Hence, the idea of a united Italian left faded away⁷⁹².

In brief, this chapter has reconstructed the evolution of the PSI by taking into account its trajectory from a close nexus to Communism until the Craxi era. This long timeframe was chosen because it has led us to be able to really understand the party's turning point under Craxi's Secretariat. Likewise, it has been possible to appreciate an "Italian anomaly" since the PCI always prevailed over the PSI, even after the implosion of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin wall. Moreover, this chapter has discussed the different passages of the PSI since its participation in the government as part of a coalition until its coming to power. Furthermore, the ideological shift of the PSI was also disclosed as well as its proximity to the European social democracy. In other words, this section aimed at observing the evolution of the PSI in order to understand how and why it increasingly aligned to the position of the European social democracy (SI). Both Craxi's and González's leadership coincided, along with the presidency of Willy Brandt in the SI, with the period of greater openness towards the Third World, and therefore towards Latin America. The following chapter will address this issue.

5.2. The external dimension of the PSI and Latin America

*The age-old bonds of blood, history, culture and traditions
that bind Italy to Latin America require us to play an active and committed role there.*
Bettino Craxi⁷⁹³

Not only did Bettino Craxi strived for the party's renewal, but he also made efforts to shift the PSI's external dimension. For instance, a brief review of the SI Archives showed that even before his appointment as General Secretary of the PSI, Craxi worked to establish a network of international contacts. The truth is that during the period before his leadership (i.e. the ages of Mancini and De Martino in the PSI Secretariat), the PSI did not provide

⁷⁹² Marco Gervasoni, *La guerra delle sinistre: socialista e comunista dal 68' a Tangentopoli (I nodi)*. (Venice: Marsilio, 2013), Kindle edition, 2731.

⁷⁹³ "Craxi a 'Elite' (settimanale venezuelano)". Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.2 S.2 Ss.6 Ss.1 I.23).

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particular attention to the SI. Indeed, the Secretaries did not personally attend the SI meetings; instead, they sent party representatives. Bettino Craxi was appointed as the person responsible for foreign policy within the PSI (1972-1976). These experiences and international networks allowed Craxi to play a more prominent role inside the party as “in that office, he built large part of his fortune”⁷⁹⁴.

Likewise, his road towards the Secretariat coincided with the new SI project devised by Brandt, Palme, and Kreisky. Accordingly, the PSI of Craxi further committed to the SI activities and to foster bilateral relations. In other words, during Craxi’s Secretariat, the SI regained a prominent role inside the PSI policy and the SI endorsement also acquired relevant significance for national affairs⁷⁹⁵. According to Francesco Gozzini, Craxi “rediscovered” the relevancy of the international dimension for the PSI after a period in which it had been subordinated to national issues. Craxi understood how the PSI participation in the international arena would be fruitful for improving its own image and its own role in national matters as well as for playing a more active role in the international stage, which would mean greater international recognition and legitimacy⁷⁹⁶. As a result, he strived to establish a large network of international contacts by traveling all over the World. According to Craxi, a new PSI approach in foreign policies would demonstrate the real renewal of the Italian socialism. In order to overcome the PSI’s “original sin” (i.e. proximity to the PCI), the party needed a new international approach⁷⁹⁷.

As a matter of fact, Craxi really believed that the Italian problems could not be solved within the national borders and he considered foreign matters extremely linked to domestic issues. Hence, the SI became a point of reference for the socialist party and for addressing some of Italy’s affairs⁷⁹⁸. Following his appointment, Craxi sent a telex to the SI in which he reported his new position inside the PSI and confirmed “the continuous friendship”

⁷⁹⁴ Pini, *Craxi*, 77.

⁷⁹⁵ Interview with Walter Marossi, July 1, 2019.

⁷⁹⁶ See Francesco Gozzini, “Prefazione”. In *L’internazionale Socialista*, by Bettino Craxi and edited by Claudio Accardi. (Milano: Rizzoli Editori, 1979), 12.

⁷⁹⁷ Lelio Lagorio, “Anni Ottanta: i mutamenti di politica estera e la svolta di politica militare”. In *Bettino Craxi*, edited by Andrea Spiri, 68.

⁷⁹⁸ Pini, *Craxi*, 106.

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between the SI parties and the “common solidarity inside the Socialist International”⁷⁹⁹. In similar terms, the SI General Secretary, Hans Janitschek, wrote to Craxi after the meeting held in Rome on August 6, 1976. In this letter, Janitschek not only referred to the strong ties of friendships forged between them, “but also pledged the full support of the Socialist International to the Italian Socialist Party under [his] leadership”⁸⁰⁰. Therefore, there was a mutual interest in improving the relationships between the PSI and the SI under the leadership of Bettino⁸⁰¹. Furthermore, as Craxi’s leadership was very proactive, his presence was very appreciated in the SI. Hence, the PSI was always present and actively engaged in all the SI activities, in all the places the SI visited, and in all the topics it addressed. According to Margherita Boniver, the Italian Socialist Party contributed in giving a decisive impetus for the growth and prestige of the SI⁸⁰². Within this context, the meeting in Rome aimed at discussing:

“the Italian political situation and the future relationship between the Socialist International and the PSI. Craxi in this connection emphasized his interest in closer ties with the member parties of the International and with the Secretariat of the International and requested that the Bureau at its next meeting discusses the holding of a high level Conference of the Socialist International in Rome before the end of the year. He also expressed concern about the public criticism in the past of the Italian Socialist Parties’ political strategy. He finally requested the Bureau to consider the subject of moral and material assistance the Italian Socialist Party”⁸⁰³.

⁷⁹⁹“Telex from Bettino Craxi to Hans Janitschek, July 6, 1976”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682.

⁸⁰⁰“Letter from Hans Janitschek to Bettino Craxi, August 22, 1976”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682.

⁸⁰¹ In 1976, Craxi answered the question about the aggregation process of European socialist parties in the following manner: (i) he underlined the agreement achieved in terms of common program for the European elections; (ii) At the inauguration of Marx’ House (Trier), the European socialist parties will exchange experiences and ideological discussion among them will took place; (iii) many conferences will be held on largely shared issues (East/West dialogue, progress of socialism in Southern Europe, European economy, North/South order. Craxi concluded by underlining the efforts made for strengthening the “Eurosocialism”. “Interview Craxi Libera Stampa” (14/3/1977). Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.1 I.24).

⁸⁰² Interview with Margherita Boniver, Rome June 26, 2019.

⁸⁰³ “Meeting with Bettino Craxi, General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party. Rome, August 6, 1976”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682.

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Moreover, at this encounter, Craxi urged the SI to overcome its Eurocentric character by embracing parties and progressive movements with Socialist nature from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Likewise, he exhorted the SI to renew its internal structures⁸⁰⁴.

Indeed, the second SI Bureau meeting of 1977 was held in Rome on June 2-3 at the invitation of the PSI and PSDI⁸⁰⁵. Brandt headed the meeting, which was attended by more than fifty delegates and several guests (among them a delegation from Venezuela, Mexico, the United States, El Salvador, and a Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community). The main themes discussed were: Europe and the Mediterranean (introduced by Craxi), human rights (introduced by Mitterrand), and Chile (introduced by the Chairman of the Chilean Radical Party, Anselmo Sule). The final remarks of the meeting included: (i) to double the budget of the SI; (ii) to establish a SI Study Group on Multinational Corporations; (iii) to establish an SI Committee for Solidarity with Chile; (iv) to discuss the issue of “Eurocommunism” at a later Bureau Meeting; and (v) to prepare a SI mission in order to visit Latin America (Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Dominican Republic) on October 17-27, 1977. Mario Soares was appointed head of this mission and the delegation for this trip included representatives from the Austrian Socialist party, the French Socialist Party, the German SPD, the Italian PSI and PSDI, the Spanish PSOE and the SI General Secretary (the mission was carried out in March 1978, see Chapter 3.4.3). Furthermore, at the Congress a report on preparation for the Conference on Chile to be held in Rotterdam in August 1977 was presented and discussed (Chapter 3.4.3)⁸⁰⁶.

⁸⁰⁴ “Fraterno scambio di idee tra Craxi e Janitschek” (7/08/1976). *Avanti!*. Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19760807.80-183_0001_d.pdf#search=janitschek&page=6

⁸⁰⁵ Representatives from the PSI that participated in the meeting: Bettino Craxi, Mario Zagari, Pietro Lezzi, Gianni Finocchiaro, Enrica Lucarelli, Gino Bianco.

⁸⁰⁶ “SI Bureau Meeting Rome” *Socialist Affairs*, vol. 27, N. 4. July/August 1977. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 22. Willy Brandt thanked Bettino Craxi for his efforts in the preparation of the Meeting and he underlined that it was a great success thanks to the contribution of the PSI. “Letter from Willy Brandt to Bettino Craxi, June 8, 1977”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 970.

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Craxi's interest in foreign matters came to light at the XLI PSI Party Congress (Turin, March 29-April 3, 1978) since in his speech (*La pace è il problema dei problemi – Peace is the problem of problems*) he put special emphasis on the international dimension. For instance, he stressed the benefits of belonging to the SI for a new worldwide solidarity as well as for increasing global understanding and greater cooperation. Furthermore, he claimed that the PSI's external action should work on two levels: inside both the SI and Western European framework, and also developing bilateral actions outside the SI frame. Moreover, he urged the Italian government to overcome its traditional policy based on political expediency because policy should be based on principles. Likewise, he emphasized his commitment on the defense of human rights (in particular towards Chilean people) and reaffirmed his conviction on the development of "Eurosocijalism"⁸⁰⁷. Furthermore, according to the international press, the harmony between Brandt and Craxi and the links built between their parties demonstrated that the Eurosocijalist project was not an electoral slogan but a concrete program.⁸⁰⁸ Indeed, according to Craxi, "Eurosocijalism" aimed to establish a common platform between European socialist parties in which common objectives and actions should be devised against conservative and reactionary forces. Hence, it was not simply a response to "Eurocommunism"⁸⁰⁹.

Moreover, Carlsson's words during the Turin Congress were in accordance with the "new international impetus" of the PSI. The SI General Secretary, in fact, welcomed the new political line adopted by the Italian Socialist Party and he underlined its coincidence with the "new SI" that had emerged from the Geneva Congress (it looked to overcome the Eurocentric character in an effort to spread its actions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa). As a result, Carlsson claimed that on behalf of the SI he thanked the PSI for what it was planning to do and he wished them full success in its renewal process⁸¹⁰. Hence, the SI

⁸⁰⁷ See: Bettino Craxi, "La pace è il problema dei problemi" XLI PSI Congress, Turin, March 29, 1978. In *Internazionale*, by Bettino Craxi, 41-53.

⁸⁰⁸ Giovanni Bernardini, "The German SPD and the Rising Star of Bettino Craxi". In *Italy, Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany in Europe*, edited by Michael Gehler, Maddalena Guiotto. (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011), 221.

⁸⁰⁹ Bettino Craxi in Tardivo, *Los socialismos*, 187.

⁸¹⁰ "Discours deliver par le Secretaire Generale de L'Internationale Socialiste, Bernt Carlsson. Au cours du Congres du parti socialiste Italien, du 29 Mars jusqu'au 2 Avril 1978, Turin". From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682.

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Bureau noted and recognized the turning point of the PSI under Craxi's leadership. Indeed, one year later (January 1, 1979), Carlsson stated:

“In my opinion, secretary Craxi has given a new dynamic drive to the party. The result is the international credibility of our Italian comrades is growing. Their commitment to the battle for ‘Eurosocialism’ is enthusiastic and convinced. If today this is surpassing ‘Eurocommunism’ is also thanks to the firm determination of the new leaders of the PSI”⁸¹¹.

It is also possible to note the importance placed on the SI by Craxi⁸¹² and on the external dimension, for instance, in the acceptance of devising a “common Socialist International strategy” with the PSDI on November 6, 1980. Based on a “mutual declaration of intent, both parties looked to adopt common political and social stands” and they reviewed several issues related to the SI. They agreed on a mutual support in the following SI Congress (Madrid, November 13, 1980) regarding the nomination of Giuseppe Saragat (from the PSDI) as honorary chairman and Craxi as vice-chairman of the SI. Moreover, they affirmed that at the Madrid Congress, the PSI and PSDI “will constantly strive for a common policy in the face of the international political question which are to be included in the congressional debate”⁸¹³.

The truth is that the SI presence in the PSI Congresses was always viewed as a means for enhancing prestige to the socialists' meetings as well as a confirmation of the new internationalism of the party. As Francesco Gozzano claimed, the process of renewal that the PSI was experiencing at the time was also expressed in this new internationalism that overcame national borders in order to embrace political forces from the Third World. With them, the PSI looked to maintaining and develop close links of friendship and

⁸¹¹ Daniel Moro, “Interview with Bernt Carlsson. The new Season of the Socialist International”. *Mondoperaio*, n. 5, art 78, January 1, 1979. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1114.

⁸¹² From a SI perspective, Pentti Väännänen said about the SI/PSI relationship the following: “Craxi and the PSI certainly were active in the SI and I cannot recall any occasion where they would have expressed disagreement with the overall SI policy. The PSI was present in all major SI meeting participating in the debate. Craxi certainly gave great importance to the SI membership”. Interview with Pentti Väännänen, June 26, 2019.

⁸¹³ “Longo-Craxi meeting for a common socialist international strategy. November, 6 1980”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1115

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cooperation⁸¹⁴.

Furthermore, Craxi's international opening was also displayed in the SI framework. For instance, at the Geneva Congress in November 1976 he welcomed the progresses achieved in terms of greater presence of the SI in the world (i.e. the inclusion of political parties and movements from all over the world in the organization), but at the same time he criticized the scarce weight that non-European regions had inside this organization. Similarly, he called for protection and defense of the interest of humankind rather than just focusing on some social sectors (i.e. workers). Hence, internationalism was mixed with globalism. As a matter of fact, he wanted to launch a peace offensive at the global level, to spread worldwide solidarity, to fight against imperialism in name of democracy and on behalf of human rights, to work for development cooperation and equality all over the world, and to plan a joint action in order to solve common matters⁸¹⁵. Thus, he was in line with the "new" postulates of the SI. These principles became part of his rhetoric; in fact, they would be mentioned in his next speeches⁸¹⁶. As a result, the Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party

⁸¹⁴ Francesco Gozzano. "42° Congresso. Il rinnovamento socialista per il rinnovamento dell'Italia. In arrivo le delegazioni straniere". *Avanti!*. (21/04/1981). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810421.85-93_0001_d.pdf#search=carlsson&page=3. At the XLII PSI Congress (Palermo, April 22, 1981), Carlsson addressed the following issues: (i) expansion of the SI; (ii) emphasis on arms control and North-South dialogue; (iii) attention to areas outside European borders; (iv) the crisis of El Salvador and Central America; (v) Afghanistan, (vi) drafting of a new Declaration of Principles; (vii) role of the PSI in the SI. "Notes for address to Congress of Socialist Party of Italy by Bernt Carlsson, Socialist International". From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1115.

⁸¹⁵ Speech of Bettino Craxi ("Per un nuovo internazionalismo") at the XIII SI Congress, Geneva, November 26-28, 1976. In Craxi, *L'Internazionale*, 37-39. The original copies (in typescript and in handwriting) and the French version are available in Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.10 Ss.1 D.1).

⁸¹⁶ For instance see Craxi's speech at the SI Congress held in Vancouver in 1978 or the speech held during the Congress of the European Socialist Group (1979). In Craxi, *L'Internazionale*, 57-73 and 87-96. Moreover, during the SI Congress of Vancouver, Craxi made his position clear regarding Marxism. By associating the latter with Eurocentrism, he urged the SI to increasingly expand itself outside the European borders and to enhance its presence in all the continents. He also underlined that non-European movements should have the weight that expected them inside the SI. Bettino Craxi, "Relazione L'eurocentrismo nel pensiero marxista", 1978. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.2 Ss.4 Ss.2 F.16 R.9). See also the speech at the XV SI Congress (Madrid, 1980) in which solidarity with the pacifist forces and self-determination of peoples became some of the cornerstones of socialist external dimension. Moreover, the scarce interest of the government in assisting the Third World was underlined and heavily condemned by him. "Discorso 5. Intervento al 15° Congresso dell'Internazionale Socialista (13/11/1980) Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.10 Ss.1 F.3 D.5). Freedom, development, democracy and defense of human rights were the main notions used by Craxi when he referred Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

encouraged internationalism both inside the PSI and in international/multilateral platforms.

Hence, the external dimension became a paramount issue of Craxi's policy. In addition to lending legitimacy to the PSI, the contacts with the European socialism contributed to devising their own policy away from the DC and PCI. Thus, he aimed at launching a credible policy in line with Western social democracy. According to Sergio Romano, Craxi sought to present the PSI as a European and Atlantic party with a particular sensitivity on different topics that made it different from the DC. Among these were the particular interest in the developing countries, support for the Palestinian cause, and the simultaneous condemnation of communist and Latin American dictatorships. Once in power, Craxi had to implement these principles and strike a balance between his Europeanism, Atlanticism, pro-Palestinian views, and his closeness to Latin American democratic movements. Thus, the installation of the US cruise missiles in Sicily, the Achille Lauro hijacking⁸¹⁷, his reservations about the Falkland conflict, or the endorsement for the pacification of Central America were examples of his quest for balance⁸¹⁸.

That said, issues such as the protection of human rights, ensuring freedom, international solidarity, development cooperation, and democracy were some of the principles that the PSI tried to promote in Latin America, often in close collaboration with the SI. The Third World entered into the PSI rhetoric. Within this context, the PSI and Craxi as SI vice-president were invited to all the SI meetings on Latin America. For instance, at the SI

to Latin America. "Discorso 63. Sul ruolo dell'Italia nei confronti dell'Africa, dell'Asia e dell'America" (1983?). Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.3 D.63).

⁸¹⁷ Achille Lauro hijacking (October 7, 1985) referred to the kidnapping of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro by a group of Palestinian who asked the release of some of their compatriots from the Israeli jail. The issue was further complicated by the fact that hijackers murdered one of their hostages: an American citizen. On October 9, however, the captors surrendered on the condition that they would have a plane to escape to Egypt and the immunity from prosecution. Nevertheless, on October 10, the USA intercepted the plane and forced it to land at a NATO base in Sigonella, Sicily. Even if Washington expected to have the custody of kidnapers, Italy refused their extradition to the USA. The firm line adopted by Craxi in this delicate issue fostered nationalist feelings. Craxi obtained the consensus of all political forces, even the PCI. At the end, however, the tensions that had arisen between Italy and the USA were dissipated. Craxi, in fact, alluded to this "happy ending" at the Italian Parliament on November 4, 1984. In his speech, the Italian Prime Minister summarized the problem but, above all, he emphasized that it had been already overcome. Afterwards, he demanded a vote of confidence in the government. See Bettino Craxi, "Discorso 21. Comunicazione al Parlamento per il superamento della crisi aperta sul caso 'Achille Lauro'" Rome, November 4, 1985. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.2 S.2 Ss.1 Ss.1 D.21).

⁸¹⁸ Sergio Romano, "Eurosocialismo e politica estera del governo Craxi". In *Bettino Craxi*, edited by Andrea Spiri, 81.

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Conference for Latin America (Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, March 26-28, 1980), the PSI members underlined the importance that this conference had for them. This is why the PSI attended this meeting, created a Latin American branch inside the PSI Department for foreign relations, and sought to foster the relations that Party's General Secretary had already started. It was even recognized and emphasized that the PSI's first real interest and rapprochement to the continent occurred when Allende was overthrown. Hence, the Chilean tragedy was somehow the beginning of the European socialists' concern about Latin American dilemmas.

Moreover, the PSI members claimed that by attending the Santo Domingo meeting, they sought to increase their knowledge on Latin American issues in order to strengthen and to improve PSI actions and presence in the continent, to enhance bilateral contacts, and to devise common objectives for global matters (e.g. détente, peace, disarmament, and the right to economic and political independence). Nevertheless, the main goal was to contribute to Latin American democratization, freedom, and autonomy. Likewise, the PSI emphasized that it belonged to Latin Europe, and therefore it came from the area closest to Latin America. Furthermore, the Italian socialist party urged both regions to devise common projects with the purpose of establishing further and fairer relationships. Accordingly, it exhorted all SI members to improve solidarity towards Latin America. To this end: (i) European socialist parties had to break off all contacts with the authoritarian regimes; (ii) in those countries that recently had achieved democracy, the SI would foster any kind of assistance in order to ensure its consolidation; (iii) the SI Committee for Latin America would organize and spread information with the aim of improving European knowledge on Latin America; (iv) the number of the conferences and the number of exchanges of people between both continents should increase; and (v) the SI must be more emphatic in the defense of human rights and fight for the release of political prisoners from the Southern Cone and Central America⁸¹⁹.

The growing Italian interest in Latin America could be also noted in the trip of President

⁸¹⁹ “Intervención del PSI para la Conferencia de la Internacional Socialista, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana 26-28 Marzo, 1980”. From the SI Archives, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, box 1115.

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Pertini to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia on March 25-April 3, 1981. As a matter of fact, Pertini was the first Italian President who visited these countries. President Saragat and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Fanfani had been the last members of the government that visited Latin America (Argentina, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Brazil) in 1965. Indeed, from Fanfani's trip, the Italian-Latin American Institute had been founded in Rome, which nourished hopes of mutual cooperation at the time. Nevertheless, many of the projects devised in the late 1960s did not really prosper. Hence, the voyage of President Pertini sought to relaunch the interest of the Italian diplomacy in Latin America. The election of these three democratic countries was due to Pertini's desire of exalting the value of democracy and the respect for human rights, namely two principles that must be spread throughout the continent.

Within this context, the subjects discussed were: (i) the complex situation in El Salvador and the need to devise possible solutions to avoid a domino effect in Central America; (ii) the state of affairs in Nicaragua, in which the importance of continuing to provide assistance to Managua and to not interrupt the political dialogue was stressed; (iii) the possibilities for improving economic relations between the two regions; and (iv) the resizing of the North-South order. Pertini's trip, in the end, was interpreted as a good starting point for reestablishing Italy's relations with Latin America and even European-Latin American relations.⁸²⁰ Indeed, the cultural and historical background as well as the presence on the other side of the Atlantic of influential European communities facilitated European involvement; the Old Continent needed to bring its influence to promote democratic development⁸²¹.

Considering that the Third World policy (and therefore, also Latin America) became a central axis of the PSI external policy, topics that were largely discussed by the PSI included the devising of a New Economic policy, the resizing of the North-South order, the quest for global peace and global equality, development cooperation, arms control,

⁸²⁰ Gianfranco Pasquini, "Pertini in America Latina, un rapporto da recuperare", *Politica Internazionale-IPALMO*, n. 4-6, (Florence: La Nuova Italia editrice, 1981), 175.

⁸²¹ Dino Frecobaldi, "Il viaggio di Pertini ha rilanciato il ruolo dell'Europa nel Centro America" (7/04/1981), *Corriere della Sera*. Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/MTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MxL0A1MjU4Mg%3D%3D>

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democracy, and human rights⁸²². For instance, in mid-September 1979, the PSI presented a motion to the Chamber (signed by Craxi, Achilli, Lombardi, Manca, and Singorile) in order to urge the government to commit itself in the fight against worldwide famine and for development assistance⁸²³.

In the same line of thought, in November 1980, Craxi, alluding to Brandt's report, underlined that the absence of peace and inequality should be the main point of concern for humankind, and he added that peace meant security and equality denoted progress. All of this implied, of course, respect for civil and human rights. As a result, an efficient and balanced multilateral system was required since the existing bipolar order lacked efficiency. To this end, Europe was called to intervene along with all the socialist forces or progressive movements (in government or in the opposition to the government office)⁸²⁴. Being aware of the North-South gap, the need to implement a coherent international cooperation policy was stressed. Moreover, as inequality was one of the most critical worldwide matters, the Italian government was called to intervene in this issue, possibly by enhancing the resource for international aid⁸²⁵.

In this regard, the socialist Luciano De Pascalis, by referring to the first Craxi government, pointed out the relevancy that this administration provided to matters related to

⁸²² For instance, on May 11, 1983, during a press conference "Istituto Internazionale Sud-Nord" organized by the PSI (Rome), those participants discussed about: the gap existing between the North and the South of the world, global peace, underdevelopment and the problem of hunger in the world. Margherita Boniver stated that to attain global peace, development had become a sine qua non condition. Moreover, she alluded to the debt problem (in particular in Latin America) and expressed the PSI concern on this issue and its commitment to devise effective strategies for its solution. Likewise, she underlined the potential of human resources for international cooperation and, therefore, the importance of volunteerism. PSI, "Conferenza stampa, Istituto internazionale Sud-Nord", Rome May 11, 1983. *Radio Radicale*. Retrieved from <https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/4801/istituto-internazionale-sud-nord>

⁸²³ "Fame: la mozione presentata dal PSI". *Avanti!* (19/09/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20a%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790919.83-216_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=2

⁸²⁴ "Discorso 5. Intervento al 15° Congresso dell'Internazionale Socialista" Madrid, November 13, 1980. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.10 Ss.1 F.3 D.5).

⁸²⁵ "Discorso 57. Sui rapporti economici Nord-Sud e la definizione di una politica di cooperazione interazionale dell'Italia", (1983?). Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.3 D.57).

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international development and international cooperation⁸²⁶. He noted that the first socialist government strived to define a new assistance policy that would be implemented at the multilateral and bilateral level. Accordingly, this would be carried out on two levels. Firstly, it was necessary to implement an international action plan in order to reduce the debt burden of the poor countries and to adopt more balanced economic rules, which would favor the Third World's exports. Secondly, a more concrete and specific aid policy was devised which included greater resources and better organization of the Department for development policies (it formed part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Furthermore, food programs for specific areas and volunteerism assumed greater relevancy at the time⁸²⁷. A letter written by Roberto Palleschi, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on February 19, 1982 confirmed the chaotic state of the Italian Department for development policies. Indeed, before coming to power, Craxi asked Palleschi about the functioning of the Italian development cooperation. The Undersecretary responded by outlining not only the disorder of the Department's administrative policy but also the little room for maneuver and his limited influence⁸²⁸.

In this regard, in 1982 Craxi asked the socialist Lelio Lagorio (Minister for Defense 1980-1983) for information (i.e. statistical data) regarding global military spending⁸²⁹. As said, arms control was also one of Craxi's main concerns. The truth is that all these concepts were extremely intertwined since peace was linked to development, and therefore to equality, the North-South order, defense of human rights, arms control, etc. In an interdependent world, the lack of one of those elements immediately affects the other areas. As Craxi stated in 1984 during the first joint meeting between Brandt's and Palme's

⁸²⁶ Actually, the Italian development cooperation increased significantly during the 1980s. Indeed, Italian people started to be more sensitive to this matter at that time as well as certain political sectors (Radical Party, PSI, PCI, DC) pushed to define a clear cooperation policy. Three laws were passed (in 1979, 1985 and 1987) and the budget for cooperation increased from ITL 300 billion in 1970 to 3666 in 1986, to 4000 in 1987, to 4389 in 1988. According to Marco Zupi, the interantional context determined the trend of the Italian public aid for development. Marco Zupi, *L'Italia e la cooperazione multilaterale*, n. 146 (Italia: Camera dei deputati-Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale: 2018).

⁸²⁷ Luciano De Pascalis, "Il primo governo a presidenza socialista", *Politica Internazionale -IPALMO*, n.9 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1983),128.

⁸²⁸ "Letter 20. Roberto Palleschi, sottosegretario di Stato per gli affari esteri a Craxi" (19/02/1982). Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.5 Ss.1 L.20)

⁸²⁹ "Letter 23. Lelio Lagorio, ministro della difesa a Craxi" (28/7/1982) Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.5 Ss.1L.23)

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Commissions (Chapter 3.2) held in Rome, common security was linked to common welfare. Moreover, the Italian Prime Minister, recalled the complex situation in the Third World and regretted the high military spending in those countries despite their delicate economic situation; “misery rearmed people”, he said⁸³⁰.

Therefore, Italy was called to intervene and Craxi was quick to point out how. Indeed, Craxi suggested to act in the following manner: (i) receiving a lot of workers from the Third World; (ii) confirming its commitment with the UN project aimed at delivering funds for the developing countries; (iii) providing assistance to primary goods in the Third World as well as providing assistance for the improvements of infrastructures and maintenance of existing facilities in which the work of volunteers was extremely important; (iv) confirming the increasing of International Monetary Fund quotas in order to set new days for the payment of debt from the Third World countries. Craxi concluded his speech in this joint meeting claiming his commitment to peace, disarmament, development, equality, and defense of human rights⁸³¹.

As said, human rights and freedom became cornerstones of Craxi’s policy. Craxi’s concern on this issue encompassed the East and West as well as the North and South (he even established a commission for human rights in 1984, which had to inform him about human rights’ issues around the World⁸³²). In spite of poor information (often this kind of assistance occurred outside official policies), it is possible to notice his full commitment and interest on this issue. Just as Craxi gave a boost in the Party’s internationalization and interest in the external issues, he introduced the human rights matter in the PSI rhetoric. Human rights, in fact, were not a matter of concern during the PSI Secretariats of Mancini and De Martini⁸³³. Craxi’s worry about human rights was instead intertwined with the

⁸³⁰ Bettino Craxi, “Pace e sicurezza: le Commissioni Palme e Brandt”. *Uno sguardo sul mondo: Appunti e scritti di politica estera*” edited by Fondazione Craxi, (Segrate: Mondadori, 2018) Kindle Edition, 1693-1764.

⁸³¹ Ibid.

⁸³² “Lettera 6: Craxi a Giulio Andreotti, Ministro degli affari Esteri”, February 22, 1984. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.2 S.2 SS.5 Ss2 F.4 L.6).

⁸³³ For instance, at the Congress organized by the French Socialist party (December 1972) about the Prague Spring, the only representatives from the Italian left that attended this meeting were Craxi and Martelli. In this Congress, the dissident problem was also addressed. Indeed, Jirí Pelikán stated that Craxi was the main referent from the Italian left. Jirí Pelikán, “Il racconto di Jirí Pelikán l’ospite scomodo della sinistra italiana”, *Reset*, n. 158, April 3, 2015. Retrieved from <https://www.reset.it/articolo/jiri-pelikan>. Likewise, in October 1979, Pelikán highlighted the transformation that the European Parliament experienced (from a Bureaucratic Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

increasing SI interest on this issue (for instance, particular space was reserved for human rights in the final resolution of the SI Vancouver Congress) and, of course, with the Helsinki Final Act. In this regard, Craxi, by alluding to the SI Congress held in Stockholm in August 1975 (the Helsinki Final Act and the Portuguese situation were the main topics of this meeting), stated that socialists believed in the full connections of the following issues: peace, disarmament, East-West relations, economic and social progress, new relationships with the Third World, human rights, and collective and individual freedom⁸³⁴. As seen throughout these pages, the concept of interrelation between these concepts persisted in Craxi's thought over time.

Accordingly, Craxi's position and action in Latin America could only be based on these principles. Indeed, Craxi defended the freedom of the Latin American people, promoted democracy and economic development, condemned dictatorships, and struggled for the defense of human rights. For this reason, Craxi made use of the network built through the SI since it had allowed him to establish close relationships and contacts with many Latin American dissidents. Moreover, the SI facilitated the establishment of personal links all over the world. As Massimo Pini noted, Craxi, as Vice President of the SI, strengthened ties of friendship with the Uruguayan Sanguinetti, the Peruvian Alan Garcia, the Venezuelan Carlos Andrés Pérez, the Salvadorian Ungo, the Dominican Peña, and the Brazilian Lula da Silva. According to Pini, all of them received assistance from the PSI, as Craxi political and financially supported the liberation movements of Latin America⁸³⁵. Salvo Andò also

institution into a body of political strategy) thanks to the efforts of the socialist party and the European Socialist Group. Indeed, he underlined the motion presented by the socialist group in order to denounce the repression against dissent in Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, and Easter Germany. "Jiri Pelikan". *Avanti!* (7/10/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19791007.83-232_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=8

⁸³⁴ Interview with Bettino Craxi, "Rilanciare la solidarietà fra partiti socialisti", *Avanti!*. (6/08/1975). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19750806.79-181_0001_d.pdf#search=stoccolma&page=1

⁸³⁵ Pini, *Craxi*, 297 and 608. Margherita Boniver confirmed the political and economic support of the PSI to the Latin American liberation movements. Being a delicate issue, it was not sponsored. Interview with Margherita Boniver, Rome June 26, 2019. Regarding the financial assistance provided to liberation groups all Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

remembered that even when the financial resources were limited, the PSI was very active in international affairs. In addition to assisting the liberation movements and dissidents, it hosted a large number of refugees⁸³⁶.

Although the following sub-chapters will address the case of Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, it is possible to refer to other cases where Craxi's sensibility on Latin American issues was also visible. For example, Craxi received a standing ovation from Argentinians during the inauguration of President Raul Alfonsín (Craxi's friend) in December 1983. Antonio Ghirelli, who accompanied the Italian Prime Minister on this trip, asked Argentinians about the reason for their behavior. They answered that he had been supported them both politically and financially in the last ten years.⁸³⁷ Craxi also had good relationships with Guillermo Ungo (head of FMLN-FDR) from El Salvador. According to Margherita Boniver, the PSI was the only party that really supported Ungo and opposed any collaboration with the military Junta⁸³⁸. The PSI also had expressed its full support for the French-Mexican Declaration during a meeting of party leaders in September 1981. Furthermore, Craxi even placed the case of El Salvador at the heart of the Italian foreign policy and urged the DC to exert pressure on Duarte⁸³⁹. In October 1984, the day before the meeting between the government and the opposition in El Salvador, Bettino exhorted Duarte and Ungo to find a political agreement, as this was the only option for country's real peace, justice, and democracy⁸⁴⁰. The PSI also supported Argentina during the Falkland issue. Indeed, the PSI and the PSOE were the only European parties inside the SI that opposed the military intervention of the UK. According to Boniver, this position proved

over the World "Spunta il Craxi anti-Pinochet" *La Stampa* (15/01/2010). Retrieved from <https://www.lastampa.it/2010/01/15/italia/spunta-il-craxi-antipinochet-BZAHEyipSi9RZpm1jzAU0M/pagina.html>. Craxi's support was not limited to Latin America but extended to many countries of the World. Special attention, for instance, was given to Poland and Hungary. Likewise, the PSI supported the Portuguese and Spanish socialist parties during the transition to democracy. Pierre Schori also recalled that the PSI financed the printing of "Portugal Socialista" while the Swedes ensured their distribution. Schori, *Escila*, 208.

⁸³⁶ Salvo Andò, "Intervista a Salvo Andò 22 giugno 2011". In *Il Crollo*, 218.

⁸³⁷ Antonio Ghirelli, "La solidarietà internazionale nella strategia di Bettino Craxi". In *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo* 188.

⁸³⁸ Margherita Boniver (interview) "La dimensione internazionale del PSI". *Politica Internazionale-IPALMO*, n. 6, (Florence: La Nuova Italia editrice, 1983), 18.

⁸³⁹ Felice Besostri, "L'Internazionale Socialista e il Centro America", *Critica Sociale*, March 1982. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1116.

⁸⁴⁰ Antonio Badini, "Intervento introduttivo". In *La politica estera negli anni ottanta*, edited by Ennio Di Nolfo. (Venice: Marsilio editore, 2007), 36

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that the PSI commitment towards the Third World was real since many times they were accused of instrumentalizing external matters to achieve national goals⁸⁴¹. Moreover, the question of the importance of a common position inside the EEC was raised. However, the PSI exerted pressure on the government in order to avoid Italy's alignment with the common line advocated by Europe. In this regard, Craxi argued that the Falkland conflict was not a European issue, and therefore Europe did not have to take sides in this confrontation⁸⁴².

Last but not least, it is worth underlining Craxi's appointment in December 1989 as Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to devise a strategy for the reduction of the debt burden of the developing countries. According to the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica*, the following factors determined Craxi's election: (i) the desire of Javier Pérez de Cuellar (fifth Secretary-General of the UN) to appoint an SI member as the SI was an organization that had certain influence in the concerned countries; (ii) the great prestige that Craxi had in the international arena as well as his strong ability to negotiate and mediate with different actors; and (iii) the fact that other prominent SI members like Brandt, Mitterrand, or González were not available for different reasons (Brandt because of his age, Mitterrand and González because of their government position in their own countries)⁸⁴³.

As the representative of the UN Secretary-General, Craxi had to contact debtor countries and credit institutions in order to draw up a report with recommendations. In regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, such record suggested that creditor countries should decrease the burden as the retail banks had did with the Brady plan. The latter should be strengthened and development aids should be increased in order to improve infrastructures and boost the market. As the debt burden was the major problem, it was recommended to establish a specific office responsible for these matters inside the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the report pinpointed three elements of paramount importance which without them the report's recommendation would be useless: economic development, peace, and

⁸⁴¹ Margherita Boniver (interview) "La dimensione internazionale del PSI". 18

⁸⁴² Bettino Craxi (Interview), "Craxi a Tribuna política" (15/6/1982). Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.1 I.94).

⁸⁴³ Sebastiano Messina, "Craxi super ambasciatore dell'ONU". *La Repubblica*, (10/12/1989). Retrieved from <https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1989/12/10/craxi-super-ambasciatore-dell-onu.html>

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the respect for people's rights. These were the cornerstones of the project, and therefore international community was invited to fully commit to the achievement of these objectives⁸⁴⁴.

As a result, Craxi's concerns in terms of foreign policy remained more or less the same over time. He gave great importance to the PSI external dimension and was interested in obtaining a prominent role in the international arena. Like Felipe González, Craxi looked for international support and legitimation in order to increase his "national weight". In this, the SI was helpful since it provided a contact network and spaces for exchanging opinions, views, knowledge, and strengthening personal ties. Of course, Craxi also acted outside the SI framework, but it is undeniable that this organization contributed to the party's internationalization. The strong links of friendship established between Craxi and some of the SI leaders, together with the fact of sharing common goals, facilitated the PSI/SI engagement and synergy.

5.2.1. Nicaragua

As previously mentioned, the Nicaraguan revolution was observed by international actors, and the European social democracy was particularly interested in these events. As a matter of fact, the SI considered the Sandinistas as an acceptable alternative to Somoza's regime and recognized them as the legitimate government. At the same time, however, the SI tried to push them to democracy (preferably to Social Democracy) and to promote dialogue between all the democratic parties in Nicaragua⁸⁴⁵. Within this context, what was the position of the PSI and Craxi on Nicaragua?

A brief overview of the newspaper *Avanti!* revealed that the Nicaraguan events were carefully followed by the press and the Sandinista revolution was welcomed because it was considered as synonymous of freedom. For instance, the day of Somoza's overthrow, the newspaper *Avanti!* reported "it is time for freedom in Nicaragua [...] democratic exponents

⁸⁴⁴ Bettino Craxi, "Uscire dalla crisi del debito". In *Uno sguardo, 1789-1929*.

⁸⁴⁵ Interview with Pentti Väänänen, June 26, 2019.

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were in Managua”. Likewise, it was underlined that “for the first time, the USA has resisted the temptation to intervene through the use of force”⁸⁴⁶. Furthermore, the socialist party, in line with the SI, recognized the Junta formed after Somoza’s overthrow. Hence, in 1979, at the Italian Camera of Deputies, the socialist Michele Achilli asked the Prime Minister the reasons why the Italian government had not formally recognized the new government in Nicaragua yet. Achilli underlined that such recognition represented the first step toward developing a policy of solidarity in Italy. In addition to this, the Socialist Deputy called for Rome’s concrete actions in Nicaragua in order to contribute to the country’s reconstruction⁸⁴⁷.

Likewise, socialists, including Francesco Spinelli, Domenico Pittella, and Roberto Spano, asked the government how it would address the Nicaraguan request of medical supplies since it was an urgent appeal. A proper and immediate governmental response was necessary, they urged⁸⁴⁸. In regard to this issue, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arnaldo Forlani, stated that Italy made its position known by signing the EEC Joint Declaration on

⁸⁴⁶ “Per il Nicaragua è giunta l’ora della libertà. Caduto Somoza, insediato il governo provvisorio”. *Avanti!*. (18/07/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790718.83-162_0001_d.pdf#search=sandinista&page=14

⁸⁴⁷ “I Sandinisti precisano il loro programma”, *Avanti!*. (20/07/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790720.83-164_0001_d.pdf#search=sandinista&page=7. The Radical Party also asked the Italian Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign affairs about the actions that the government intended to perform in Nicaragua and about Managua’s request for aid (Chamber of Deputies, July 25, 1979). Italia Camera dei Deputati, *Atti Parlamentari*, VIII Legislatura- Discussioni- seduta del 25 luglio, 1979, 669. Furthermore, the Italian Radical Party tried to support some initiatives to manage the hunger crisis in Nicaragua. In name of the town twinning Rome-Managua, the Radical Party asked the Rome Mayor’s Office to allocate a billion lire (at least until February 1980, normal harvest period for grain) to reduce hunger in Nicaragua. Given the rejection of Rome Mayor’s office (it was argued that Rome did not have sufficient resources) and the waste of money for not fundamental events, the radical Francesco Rutelli started a fasting as a means of protest. “Il problema della fame in Nicaragua” November 14, 1979. *Radio Radicale*. Retrieved from <https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/379/il-problema-della-fame-in-nicaragua>

⁸⁴⁸ Senato della Repubblica, VIII Legislatura, “Spinelli, Ferralasco, Signori, Pittella, Spano al Presidente del Consiglio di Ministri” September 17, 1979. 19. Seduta Pubblica, Resoconto stenografico. Tipografia del Senato, 975.

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June 29, 1979⁸⁴⁹. Moreover, humanitarians aid (ITL one billion and 200 million addressed to the Red Cross and 3000 tons of cereal and medicines) were sent to Nicaragua from Rome along with what was sent by the EEC⁸⁵⁰.

In those years, the PSI was very active in the international arena and part of its dynamism was carried out together with the SI. Given the fact the SI supported the Sandinista cause, the Italian Socialist Party broadly followed the SI lines, although sometimes the PSI was critical about certain issues (but so were many other SI parties in Europe and Latin America). Nevertheless, contacts between the PSI and the Sandinistas were established from the beginning. For instance, a Sandinista delegation met the PSI in Italy a few days after the overthrow of Somoza. On that occasion, the PSI representatives (Carlo Ripa di Meana and Enrica Lucarelli) underlined the efforts that the Italian party planned to do for the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua as well as the commitment showed by the SI in supporting the Nicaraguan struggle. The Latin Americans, for their part, thanked the PSI for their support and stressed the importance of their assistance in the reconstruction process.

Within this context, an SI mission to Nicaragua was announced, which was headed by Mario Soares (it was preceded by the already mentioned trip of Felipe González and Miguel Ángel Martínez), aimed at stressing their solidarity and full endorsement⁸⁵¹. This trip was organized thanks to the invitation of Eduardo Kùhl, a member of the Nicaraguan reconstruction government, who released an interview to the newspaper *Avanti!* after the SI Party Leaders meeting in Bommersvik, Sweden (July 1979). He not only declared himself to be a Social Democrat but he also affirmed the wish of establishing a social democratic government in Managua; therefore, he stressed that the SI endorsement was extremely

⁸⁴⁹ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Il ministro degli Esteri, on. Forlani, alla Commissione esteri del Senato della Repubblica (25 luglio, Resoconto sommario)”. *1979 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell’Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1981), 78.

⁸⁵⁰ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Il ministro degli Esteri, on. Malfatti al Senato della Repubblica (17 settembre. Resoconto stenografico). *1979 Testi e Documenti*, 91.

⁸⁵¹ “Positivo incontro tra PSI e Fronte sandinista”. *Avanti!* (28/07/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790728.83-171_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=7

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important for them. Indeed, Kühl considered the SI as the most important political organization at that time since it had 15 million registered people and 80 million voters. Furthermore, he mentioned the PSI support and was thankful for it, and he called on the Italian government to recognize the Junta. For this reason, he remembered the strong ties between both countries and particularly pointed out the large number of Italians living in Nicaragua⁸⁵². Enrica Lucarelli, who participated in the SI mission, expressed her concern and called on the Italian government to increase the humanitarian aid since until then Italy's contribution has been very low and only through the Red Cross, especially compared to the Spanish aid⁸⁵³.

The truth is that the Nicaraguan revolution had a great impact around the world which implied the mobilization of different actors, e.g. politicians and trade unions. For instance, an Italian Committee for solidarity with Nicaraguan People was created and supported by all the Italian democratic parties as well as trade unions. Another example might be the meeting organized by a Venezuelan trade union, under the auspices of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), with the aim of discussing the problems of democracy, human rights and freedom in Latin America and in particular the Nicaraguan and Chilean situation (they called for a boycott of Pinochet's regime) at the end of July 1979. Giorgio Benvenuto (UIL) and Pierre Carniti (CISL) were the representatives of Italy in the meeting. Moreover, Willy Brandt, Felipe González, and Bettino Craxi were also invited to the encounter (Craxi, however, was not able to attend due to political commitments in Rome). The importance of this forum, however, relied on the fact that for the first time, concrete actions in Latin America were displayed and a real interest was demonstrated towards the region. The classic "ritualism", typical in these kinds of

⁸⁵² Vincenzo Lanza. "Il Nicaragua chiama l'Europa socialista". *Avanti!*. (29-30/07/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790729.83-172_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=20

⁸⁵³ Daniele Moro, "L'Internazionale è con i sandinisti", *Avanti!* (10/08/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790810.83-183_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=9

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encounters, was in some way left aside because of the new state of things; there were some signals that indicated the real possibility of democratic transition in Latin America and the efforts that international/transnational organizations started to make in the region together with the Latin American openness towards “social democratic” views⁸⁵⁴.

There were other demonstrations similar to these, like the one carried out in Rome that had members from the three Italian trade unions (CISL, UIL, and CGIL) and with the Italian leftist parties. In this meeting, Daniele Moro (responsible for the foreign affairs of the PSI) underlined the important role played by the SI in Latin America that, according to him, helped Latin Americans to take the first steps towards a real change of their policy. Nevertheless, Moro also stressed that in order to consolidate these transformations, the Italian government’s commitment had to be modified. He urged the State to enhance its solidarity in this region and to undertake concrete actions there⁸⁵⁵.

Increasing solidarity was also the objective of the different trips made by some Nicaraguan delegations in Italy. Indeed, the Sandinistas visited Rome several times. It is worth mentioning, for instance, the meeting held by the Italian President Pertini, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (Giuseppe Zamberletti) and a Sandinista delegation on March 3-7, 1980 in Rome. The most important political result of this meeting was Pertini’s announcement of the inclusion of Nicaragua in the program of his next mission in Latin America. Moreover, it was agreed in Rome that Italy would finance the construction of a a geothermal power plant and it would also provide the necessary assistance. Rome would

⁸⁵⁴ Giorgio Lauzi. “Appuntamento a Caracas”, *Avanti!* (23-24/07/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19790722.83-166_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=1

⁸⁵⁵ “Manifestazione unitaria a Roma” *Avanti!* (21/12/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19791221.83-295_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=6

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also examine how it could further help Nicaragua in improving means of transport⁸⁵⁶.

Besides the Sandinistas' voyages to Italy to demand assistance and endorsement from the government, there were other reasons which explained their trips. Firstly, they attended the PSI meetings, among them the XLII PSI Congress in Palermo in 1981 and the PSI "programmatic Conference" held in Rimini in 1982. In the latter, the Latin American situation (in particular Central America) was specifically addressed by the PSI. The Italian socialism looked to launch a global strategy aimed at reaching worldwide peace on the other side of the Atlantic, particularly since Central American matters could create a ripple effect⁸⁵⁷. In addition, the meetings of the SI and the PSI on a number of occasion received Sandinista's delegation in Italy; for instance, in November 1981, representatives from the PSI and FSLN met in Italy where they exchanged opinions regarding the Central American situation. The PSI confirmed its commitment on this issue both at the bilateral level and through the SI framework. The Sandinistas, for their part, invited Craxi to visit their country⁸⁵⁸.

⁸⁵⁶ Stefano Pierantoni, "Aiuti e interesse per il Nicaragua". *Politica Internazionale- IPALMO*, n. 3-4, (Florence: La Nuova Italia editrice, 1980), 145-146. In November 1979, a Sandinista delegation (headed by Eden Pastora) visited Rome in order to bring the situation of Nicaraguans to the Italy's attention. Indeed, a press conference was organized. It is available in the following website "La situazione in Nicaragua", November 8, 1979, *Radio Radicale*. Retrieved from <https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/377/la-situazione-in-nicaragua>. In addition to this, in February 1980 the Sandinistas visited different European countries (including Italy). During this voyage, the Sandinista delegation, by referring to their project for enhancing literacy in Nicaragua, asked the Italian government to assist them. Alberto Ninotti, "Nicaragua: una nuova rivoluzione che comincia partendo dall'ABC". *Avanti!* (19/02/1980). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19800219.84-41_0001_d.pdf#search=cabeza%20sandinista&page=7

⁸⁵⁷ "Interesse anche all'estero per la conferenza socialista. Numerose le delegazioni straniere presenti" *Avanti!* (1/04/1982). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820401.86-68_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=9

⁸⁵⁸ "Delegazione del Nicaragua ricevuta dalla direzione del Parito". *Avanti!* (11/11/1981). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19811111.85-264_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=4

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In addition to the humanitarian issues, including development, peace, democracy, and respect for human rights, the interest in Nicaragua was also due to the fear of having a “second Cuba” in Latin America. In Craxi’s words: “assisting recent revolutions are our task. We must contribute in the fight against dictatorships and we must not make the same mistake again, namely the error made in Cuba”⁸⁵⁹. Hence, on one hand, the PSI, like the SI, acted because of humanitarian reasons and because they tried to push them towards social democracy or at least democracy; on the other, they also aimed to contain Cuban influence as one of the main goals of the SI was to keep Nicaragua out of the East-West confrontation. In fact, Eduardo Kühl in Bommersvik had actually warned that the Sandinistas would turn towards Communism if the SI turned their backs on them⁸⁶⁰. The probability of a “new Cuba” in Central America was therefore very high.

Accordingly, Nicaraguan democratization was always at the heart of the SI discussion, in particular since a ripple effect in Central America was feared. The U.S. position and its constant attacks against Cuba and the USSR interference in this region (for example, Alexander Haig, US Secretary of State, often accused Cuba and the USSR of providing arms to El Salvador through Nicaragua) was often rejected by the SI and Craxi’s position was in line with it⁸⁶¹. According to Mario Zagari (socialist and vice-president of the European Parliament), during the meeting of the SI Party Leaders held in Amsterdam at the end of April 1981, Craxi helped the SI to define a clear framework for the regional development. Zagari noted that the PSI General Secretary, through a number of contacts, contributed to establishing the conditions in which the state of affairs in Nicaragua could

⁸⁵⁹ Bettino Craxi, “Pace nel mondo, rinnovamento nel nostro paese”. *Avanti!* (4/12/1979). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19791204.83-281_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=8

⁸⁶⁰ Väänänen, *The Rose*, 89.

⁸⁶¹ For instance see, Franco Carbonetti, “Gli interessi italiani nel dialogo Nord Sud” *Avanti!* (20/07/1981). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810730.85-177_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=14
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evolve in the sense that the SI leaders expected⁸⁶².

As a result, Craxi was interested in the Nicaraguan and Central American situation. Indeed, he was appointed by Felipe González as a member of the Committee for Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Therefore, Nicaragua was a subject of discussion among them. Within this context, on March 17, 1982, they met in Rome where Craxi expressed his concern regarding the worsening situation in Nicaragua and the possibility of its spread throughout the region. They agreed on supporting the initiative of the Mexican López Portillo who had initiated a mediation process for regional pacification and submitted this issue in the next SI meeting (Bonn, April 1982) in which González, as President of the Committee, would present new proposals to address this case⁸⁶³.

The following year, in 1983, the Committee submitted a proposal to the SI in order to solve the Nicaraguan and Central American crisis. Among the issues raised in this report, it is worth pointing out the following: (i) they stressed the principles that had inspired the Nicaraguan Revolution (democratic pluralism, non alignment in international policy, and a mixed and marked economy); (ii) it was agreed that the solution of the Salvadorian crisis will contribute to regional stability; (iii) Craxi suggested calling an international conference in order to determine specific aid for Nicaragua; (iv) they rejected any international involvement that harmed the sovereignty of the Central American countries; and (v) they underlined some of the positive aspects that Nicaragua had implemented in defense of human rights. All of these were aimed at improving the democratic process which would

⁸⁶² Alberto Ca' Zorzi, "Decisivo per la pace il dialogo Nord Sud". *Avanti!* (1/05/1981). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19810501.85-102_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=20)

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⁸⁶³ "Un incontro a Roma tra Craxi e González. I partiti socialisti e la situazione in Nicaragua". *Avanti!* (18/03/1982). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820318.86-58_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=6)

[dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820318.86-58_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=6](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820318.86-58_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=6)
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culminate with the holding of free elections in 1985⁸⁶⁴.

It is worth pointing out, however, that on a number of occasions the PSI was also critical regarding the Sandinistas. With this in mind, it is possible to state again that there were two sides of the same coin. On one hand, the Cuban influence, the potential USSR interference in Nicaragua, and Ortega's hesitation in holding free elections led the PSI (like other SI parties) to doubt the Nicaraguan position⁸⁶⁵. For instance, in 1982 the socialist Carlo Ripa di Meana underlined that his party, like the SI, had welcomed the triumph of the Sandinista revolution. However, he also expressed his concern about the relationships that Managua had established with Cuba in recent times since it was threatening the country's peace and undermining the freedom reached through the revolution⁸⁶⁶.

Along the same lines, Margherita Boniver highlighted that the PSI generally had always followed the SI lines. Nevertheless, the Sandinistas' connections with Castro and with the USSR had awakened some concerns among Italian socialism⁸⁶⁷. For his part, Roberto Palleschi, after visiting Jamaica, Mexico, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, gave his opinion regarding the nexus between Managua, Havana, and Moscow and the behavior that the Socialists had to assume. Although he affirmed that Sandinistas were communists, he emphasized the fact that the SI had to help Managua in order to prevent its displacement towards the Soviet line. Moreover, Palleschi added that the Moscow's assistance was different from Europe, since the former gave arms and the latter provided real development cooperation. He finally justified the Ortega mission in the USSR (Ortega was in Moscow while Palleschi was in Central America) by claiming that he

⁸⁶⁴ "Promemoria 5 Linee generali della risoluzione dell'Internazionale socialista sulla situazione in Nicaragua e America Latina". Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.10 Ss.5 P.5).

⁸⁶⁵ The perception of a Soviet and Cuban interference in international politics was always latent and caused a lot of fear in the West. Within this context, it was denounced that Latin American revolutionary parties together with the Sandinistas and Cubans conspired to infiltrate into the SI both Communist and Leninist principles. Furthermore, it was even stated in 1983 that the SI was being maneuvered by Cuba and the USSR. Gino Bianco, "L'Internazionale Socialista manovrata da Russi e Cubani", *Il Giornale* (12/12/1983). From the Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, Italy, box CPPE 2399.

⁸⁶⁶ Carlo Ripa di Meana, "Ferma difesa dei diritti dell'uomo e lotta per vincere il sottosviluppo". *Avanti!* (1/04/1982). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820401.86-68_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=5

⁸⁶⁷ Boniver "La dimensione internazionale", 18.

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looked for assistance everywhere⁸⁶⁸. In fact, Kühl had clearly illustrated the Sandinista position from the beginning. In Sweden, he had stated that given the complexity of the Nicaraguan situation, the Sandinistas would receive and accept assistance from everyone and from everywhere, from the right, from the center, from the left-wing, even from Pinochet if he would aid them⁸⁶⁹.

Further perplexities, however, rose when there was the suspicion –like what happened with ETA- of the presence of terrorists from the Red Brigade in Nicaragua. Indeed, on February 7, 1985, Craxi, in talking about international terrorism, claimed in the Chamber of Deputies that there were Red Brigade members hiding in Nicaragua. He stated that 117 terrorists were in France, 13 in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and the rest spread in other parts of the world. Those who were now in the Central American countries had formerly resided in France and had recently reached Latin America via Madrid or Moscow. Moreover, the Italian Prime Minister pointed out that although the Sandinista government had denied any involvement and terrorist protection (such as the Red Brigade Barbara Balzarani who was wanted for the kidnapping of Aldo Moro), it had not provided the collaboration requested by the Italian administration yet⁸⁷⁰. According to Craig Wrebb, a journalist from the *United Press International* (UPI), Craxi mentioned that he had directly asked the Sandinista government about the Italian terrorists hidden in Nicaragua.

⁸⁶⁸ Carlo Correr, “Un’intervista al sottosegretario agli Esteri, On. Roberto Palleschi. America Latina: uno shock la solidarietà degli occidentali alla Thatcher”. *Avanti!* (22/05/1982). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19820522.86-104_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=16

⁸⁶⁹ Lanza. “Il Nicaragua”.

⁸⁷⁰ Camera dei Deputati, IX Legislatura, “Bettino Craxi, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri”, February 7, 1985, Atti Parlamentari. Resoconto Stenografico 249. 23539-23540. The CIA paid special attention to Craxi’s accusation and even stated: “more than 1000 Italians have traveled to Managua to participate in work brigades involved in economic and public health projects. Since 1983 Italian leftist extremists and unemployed workers have been recruited for this program under the auspices of the Italian-Nicaragua Association. The work brigada participants travel by Aeroflot to Managua via Moscow and Havana; it is unclear whether their traveling expenses are covered by Sandinistas or by Soviets [...] Most of the paramilitary trainees named by the Italians are known members of Red Brigades and at least five group leaders are now reportedly serving as instructors in the Nicaraguan armed forces. The training reportedly is conducted at two Nicaraguan camps, where Cuban, Spanish and Nicaraguan staff members are said to instruct the trainees in small unit raid tactics, use of explosives, sabotage, weapons familiarization, assassination and Marxist-Leninist doctrine... Following the 25-to30 days course, most trainees reportedly return to their native countries”. CIA Report, *Terrorism Review*, May 20, 1986. 17 (CIA-RDP 87T00685R000100140002-2)

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“I spoke about this a few days ago with Ortega in Montevideo –Craxi said- [...] The government of Nicaragua has said it has no knowledge of the situation and, as far as we are concerned, we will supply them with more information. They have committed themselves to meeting our request, and we will see how the matter is resolved”⁸⁷¹.

Both leaders were in Montevideo in March 1985 to attend the inauguration of Julio Sanguinetti as new president of Uruguay⁸⁷². This suspicion, however, threatened to undermine the good relationships that until then both countries had enjoyed. Nonetheless, in August the same year, a Costa Rican newspaper reported the presence of 22 Red Brigades in the Sandinista army and in the Sandinista government⁸⁷³. This news caused a stir in Italy. However, few days later, the Italian newspaper contradicted the Costa Rican statement. Some of the suspected terrorists were actually members of an Association for Solidarity with Nicaragua based in Bergamo, a place where they really resided⁸⁷⁴. Along the same lines, other “suspects” were actually living in Nicaragua to work on issues not related to terrorism. Similarly, other Italians that had been denounced by the “Contra” Radio,⁸⁷⁵ were in reality residing in Turin⁸⁷⁶.

⁸⁷¹ Craig Webb, “Italian leader says suspected terrorists may be hiding in Nicaragua”. *UPI* (5/03/1985). Retrieved from <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/03/05/Italian-leader-says-suspected-terrorists-may-be-hiding-in-Nicaragua/3740478846800/>

⁸⁷² In Uruguay, Craxi met the Nicaraguan President Ortega and the Costa Rican Monge. During these meetings, the Italian Prime Minister expressed his concern on Central American situation and looked forward to find a political solution. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Visita del Presidente del Consiglio on. Craxi, Montevideo, 1-2 marzo”. *1985 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1990), 336.

⁸⁷³ Sergio Stimolo, “BR italiani militerebbero nell’esercito sandinista” *Corriere della sera*. (19/08/1985). Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/NTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MxL0AxMDM0MTY%3D>

⁸⁷⁴ Press release with one of the supposed member of the Red Brigade: Roberto Pogna. Pogna was actually member of the Association for Solidarity with Nicaragua. In this release, he rejected any accusation and connection with the terrorists. “Intervista. Brigate Rosse i nomi dei terroristi latitanti in Nicaragua”. August 21, 1985, *Radio Radicale*. Retrieved from <https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/11795/brigata-rosse-la-lista-dei-terroristi-latitanti-in-nicaragua>

⁸⁷⁵ The “Contras” were the right wing group (backed by the USA) that struggled against the Sandinistas. Reagan stated that Sandinistas had given asylum to international terrorists. He even reiterated the presence of Red Brigades in this country. Alberto Pasolini Zanelli, “Reagan: ferminamo i sandinisti”. *Il Giornale* (18/03/1986). From the Historical Archives of the EU. Florence Italy, Box CPPE 1466. Nevertheless, there was no clear evidence that showed and confirmed the nexus between Red Brigades and Sandinistas. Quoting Eli Karmon, *unlike the RAF* [Red Army Faction, i.e. a West German far left faction] *the BR* [Red Brigades] *focused its struggle in Italy, the weak link in the imperialist chain, not on the Third World*. Eli Karmon, *Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, and Islamists* (Leiden-Boston: Marinus Nijhoff, 2005), 128.

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Furthermore, the support for Nicaragua was often recalled. In addition to the above, Craxi underlined the attention paid by his government to the Nicaraguan and Salvadorian situation in the consolidation of their democracy. Although he recognized that the unsolved crisis in this region could raise some suspicions, they should support constructive dialogue between all the interested parties. As a result, the mediation efforts of the Contadora Group should be highly encouraged in order to reach peace, progress, and democracy in the region. In addition to the full endorsement of the Contadora Group, Craxi urged the EEC to provide concrete evidence of its commitment to find solutions for the regional pacification. Hence, Craxi said that Italy contributed to the successful first meeting in San José between the EEC and Central America and he proposed Rome as the venue of the second encounter. To this end, the Italian Prime Minister claimed that Italy had started an intense diplomatic activity⁸⁷⁷. Some criticisms, however, arose (in particular from the PCI) in Italian politics, since the Prime Minister was accused of being quite vague regarding Nicaragua in the face of the U.S.. A comparison was even made between Italy's determined position towards Chile and the weak position towards Nicaragua in the U.S. Congress⁸⁷⁸.

Notwithstanding, Craxi opposed Reagan's policy more than once. In addition to the endorsement given to Contadora, he often was critical of U.S. policy in Central America and in the Southern Cone. In this light, for instance, in October 1983 (after the U.S. intervention in Grenada)⁸⁷⁹ the Italian government supported the joint proposal of

⁸⁷⁶ “Altre smentite dall'Italia sui terroristi in Nicaragua”. *Corriere della sera*. (22/08/1985). Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/ntovzxmvaqxvcmmnzzgf0awrhy3mx10axmdmlote%3D>

⁸⁷⁷ Camera dei Deputati, IX Legislatura, “Bettino Craxi, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri”, March 14, 1985, Atti Parlamentari. Resoconto Stenografico 291, 25938-25939.

⁸⁷⁸ Camera dei Deputati, IX Legislatura, “Aldo Tortorella” March 14, 1985, 25968

⁸⁷⁹ The Italian Government rejected the USA interference in Grenada and as the all the EEC members, in October 1983, it called for the immediate withdrawal of the USA Army. Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, “Le reazioni all'intervento degli Stati Uniti”.)”. *1983 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1987), 150-151.

In December 1983, José Francisco Peña met a PSI delegation (i.e. Valdo Spini, Margherita Boniver, Giuseppe Scanni). All of them (as the SI had already done) refused the USA intervention in Grenada. Moreover, they talked about the Nicaraguan and Salvadorian situation (their context were increasingly interconnected) and the PSI representatives reaffirmed their commitment on the Central American democratization by facilitating a political and negotiated solution. “Nel Centroamerica occorre una ‘soluzione negoziata’”. *Avanti!* (1/12/1983). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201982%20-

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Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, and Guyana in the UN that called for an end of U.S. involvement in the island in the name of the right to autonomy of countries and to no external interference.⁸⁸⁰

Likewise, Craxi confirmed Italy's commitment in the process for the pacification of Central America during his meeting with the President Daniel Ortega (Rome, May 14-15, 1985). As Felipe González stated more than once, Craxi also believed that the solution of the Central American crisis should be carried out from inside, namely the negotiation process should be managed from Latin American actors in order to avoid any external interference. Accordingly, the efforts of the Contadora Group were crucial in light of solving the regional impasse⁸⁸¹. Since the beginning, therefore, Craxi welcomed this initiative. For instance, when he travelled to Buenos Aires for the inauguration of President Alfonsín in December 1983, he invited those who were present to valorize and support Contadora's projects. Likewise, in Argentina, he met Ortega and suggested him to call elections as soon as possible⁸⁸². As a matter of fact, the convening of free elections in Nicaragua was a request that Craxi, along with other SI members, constantly made (González, Brandt, and Carlos Andrés Pérez, among others, repeatedly invited Ortega to hold free elections). Hence, when Antonio Ghirelli, head of the press office, informed the Italian President about the holding of free elections in Nicaragua, he wished to emphasize that the Sandinistas had finally followed Craxi's suggestion⁸⁸³.

Furthermore, returning to the meeting with Ortega in Rome (May 1985), the Italian Prime Minister underlined Italy's readiness to continue its programs of collaboration with

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4%20Febbraio%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19831201.87-283_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=13

⁸⁸⁰ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Ripercussioni all'ONU dell'intervento degli Stati Uniti" *1983 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1987), 152.

⁸⁸¹ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Visita del Presidente Daniel Ortega, Roma 14-15 maggio". *1985 Testi e Documenti*, 239.

⁸⁸² "Ora libertà per il Cile e l'uruguay". *Avanti!* (14/12/1983). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201982%20-29%20Dicembre%20pag.%2001%20a%20%201986%20-4%20Febbraio%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19831214.87-293_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=3

⁸⁸³ "Promemoria 26. Rapporti Scalfari Spinelli e Sitiazione in in Nicaragua e USA". July 25, 1984. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.2 S.2 Ss.6 Ss.3 F.2 P.16)

⁸⁸³ "Promemoria 26. Rapporti Scalfari Spinelli e Sitiazione in in Nicaragua e USA". July 25, 1984. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.2 S.2 Ss.6 Ss.3 F.2 P.16)

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⁸⁸³ "Promemoria 26. Rapporti Scalfari Spinelli e Sitiazione in in Nicaragua e USA". July 25, 1984. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.2 S.2 Ss.6 Ss.3 F.2 P.16)

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Nicaragua and its full commitment to develop and push the San José Pact, as it was absolutely indispensable to avoid the transformation of the Central American crisis into a East-West confrontation.⁸⁸⁴ Moreover, he invited Ortega and Reagan to take up the conversations of Manzanillo, since these would contribute to creating a favorable environment for the achievement of positive results inside the frame of Contadora⁸⁸⁵.

In regard to Italy's position towards Latin America, it is also interesting to note the words stated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Giulio Andreotti, during the ratification of the Spanish and Portuguese accession to the EEC (Rome, Senate, November 13, 1985) because Italy was at the same level as the Iberian countries regarding Latin America. They shared the same posture and would work together inside the EEC. Andreotti claimed:

“The fact that we are together, for example, in the Community - Spain, Portugal and Italy - with regard to the countries of Latin America offers the possibility of being not mediators - which is a stupid word - but of being States that seek to help, by accentuating the common characteristics, to overcome existing forms of struggle and even of incommunicability”⁸⁸⁶.

Furthermore, in his speech, Andreotti especially highlighted the Spanish case since the Iberian country was good example of a successful democratic transition as well as his full commitment to the pacification of Central America. Hence, Madrid was able to provide valuable and concrete support –not rhetorical- to Contadora and to combine both local and international democratization⁸⁸⁷.

As a result, the relationship between Craxi (and the PSI) and Ortega (and the Sandinistas) had its ups and downs. Indeed, it is possible to quote further examples of their “oscillatory” relationship. For example, in his letter to Ortega in October 1984, by Craxi revealed his perplexities and concerns about the persistent tension in Nicaragua, which not only harmed people but also jeopardized regional stability. Accordingly, Craxi said that he, along with the Italian government, hoped that Managua could soon introduce a genuine democracy

⁸⁸⁴ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Visita del Presidente Daniel Ortega”.

⁸⁸⁵ Craxi a ‘Elite’,

⁸⁸⁶ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Il ministro degli Esteri, on. Andreotti, Roma, 13 novembre”. *1985 Testi e Documenti*, 355.

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid.

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supported by a broad domestic consensus. To this end, he stressed once more that the solution should come from inside, and therefore the efforts of the Contadora group must be encouraged over again as well as any other attempt aimed at establishing a climate of confidence in the area. Trust and respect became two *sine qua non* conditions for reaching peace and stability, as well as for democratic growth. This would automatically reduce any external interference as well as any armed opposition⁸⁸⁸. In this letter, therefore, the Italian Prime Minister made his position clear and expressed his concern on the slow democratic development.

Furthermore, on January 28, 1988, Craxi met Ortega who at the time was travelling around Europe (Spain, Italy and Sweden). The Nicaraguan president asked Craxi to encourage Italian participation in the control committee for Central American pacification and to have more active involvement on the part of the SI. The PSI Secretary, for his part, stressed the interest that his party, as well as the SI, had in the development of Nicaraguan issues and he also underlined the full commitment of the PSI towards the platform adopted by the Central American governments (i.e. the Arias Plan and Esquipulas treaties). Furthermore, Craxi said:

“We have taken note of the renewed commitment of President Ortega to continue along the path of consolidation of an effective political pluralism, the restoration of fundamental freedoms and their guarantee for the future, and the openings that were necessary to make it possible to overcome the serious wounds and conflicts that were still open and, for our part, we have encouraged it to develop this perspective consistently. Our conviction remains – Craxi concluded - that many difficult situations will never be able to find a solution by pursuing the logic of armed actions and their strengthening, but only following a political logic based on agreements, guarantees for all of good democratic principles and of progress”⁸⁸⁹.

⁸⁸⁸ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Messaggio del Presidente del Consiglio on. Craxi al Presidente della Repubblica del Nicaragua Daniel Ortega (Roma, 4 ottobre)”. *1986 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell’Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1990), 214-215.

⁸⁸⁹ “Pace, Craxi, incoraggia Ortega”. *Avanti!* (29/01/1988). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D- Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

Hence, despite some tensions and a certain amount of disbelief on the part of Craxi towards the Sandinista government, at the end of the day he did not fail to support and encourage the development of peace and democracy in this country (as well as the region) throughout the years. In this light, for instance, it is possible to recall Gianni De Michelis's words who claimed that Craxi's "pro-Sandinism" was one of the main subjects of dissension among them when he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1989. He considered the Sandinistas as a product of the Cold War while Craxi did not. In fact, he always expressed his disagreement with the U.S. interference in Nicaragua, and therefore he agreed with the Italian left wing and the PCI in this regard. Hence, De Michelis explained this "friction" in terms of different ways of thinking between them: his own approach was a great example of "realpolitik" while Craxi had more of a "value approach". This fits in with "Garibaldi's policy" of the PSI's Secretary, i.e. the struggle over values and ideals (romantic dreams) that often challenged the "realpolitik", since being democratic and a defender of freedom were some of the elements that they both embodied and shared. This is why Craxi's policy often resembled Garibaldi's⁸⁹⁰.

Along the same lines, at the end of the 1980s, Craxi stated that the SI and Managua asked him to carry out a mission in Nicaragua in order to check the situation, particularly in light of the elections in early 1990⁸⁹¹. These elections surprisingly led to the victory of Violeta Chamorro in early 1990, and therefore to the Sandinistas' defeat⁸⁹². Moreover, as representative of UN-Secretary, he addressed the debt problem of the developing countries and hence Nicaragua. In this regard, Managua welcomed the report and expressed its

/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201988%20-02%20Gennaio%20pag.%20001%20al%20%201989%20-31%20dicembre%20pag.%2040/CFI0422392_19880129.92-24_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=7

⁸⁹⁰ Gianni De Michelis, "Relazione Gianni De Michelis". In *La politica estera*, edited by Ennio Di Nolfo, 43.

⁸⁹¹ Francesco Gozzano, "Dichiarazioni di Craxi negli USA", *Avanti!* (9/12/1989). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-)

https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-
/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201988%20-02%20Gennaio%20pag.%20001%20al%20%201989%20-31%20dicembre%20pag.%2040/CFI0422392_19891209.93-289_0001_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=1

⁸⁹² Margherita Boniver underlined the fact that Chamorro's victory had defied the forecast of the electoral results. *Nobody would have been willing to put a dollar on Chamorro's victory*, Boniver said. "Boniver: I giochi sono ancora aperti". *Avanti!* (20/03/1990). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/17.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201990-1993%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-)

https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/17.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201990-1993%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-
/CFI0422392_19900320.94-67_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=1

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agreement with Craxi's recommendation since it included concrete solutions that went beyond "theory".⁸⁹³

In brief, Craxi and the PSI position towards Nicaragua and the Sandinistas was supportive in general terms. As seen above, there were some ups and downs in these relations and different reasons motivated or discouraged the PSI action and endorsement. This behavior, however, probably also conditioned the Sandinistas' perceptions towards them. Hence, the Sandinistas did not feel as close to the Italian Socialist Party as they felt to the PSOE, for instance. As a result, their links were to some extent weaker than those with the Spanish socialism and the PSI mistrust towards the Sandinistas also worked in reverse. Managua, for instance, had some doubts about the possible nexus between some PSI members and the "Contra".⁸⁹⁴ Accordingly, there were some issues that conditioned their relations and did not allow their full development. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the PSI did monitor the Nicaraguan situation closely, supported the Contadora group, and really hoped for its democratization, pacification, and respect for human rights.

5.2.2. Venezuela

Venezuela [...] country that plays a key role for regional stability, from the Andean countries to Central America and the Caribbean.
Bettino Craxi⁸⁹⁵

It is undeniable that Venezuela was included in the group of the Latin American countries in which Italy maintained regular contact. Why? As said in Chapter 4.2.2, Venezuela was one of the most modern, rich, and egalitarian countries of Latin America at the time. Moreover, it was a democratic country that strived to grow its international reach and that

⁸⁹³ "Debito, non solo questione di numeri". *Avanti!* (3/11/1990). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF/17.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201990-1993%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-CFI0422392_19901103.94-260_d.pdf#search=nicaragua&page=14

⁸⁹⁴ Interview with Silvio Prado, Madrid, January 16, 2019

⁸⁹⁵ "Craxi a 'Elite'".

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also hosted a large Italian immigrant community. Besides this, it is important to keep in mind the large petroleum stocks that Venezuela had, in particular if we consider the context of the time in which these relations developed, i.e. the period of the oil shock.

Accordingly, regular contacts were established between these two countries as well as between parties and movements. For example, Loris Scricciolo, socialist and vice president of the Italian Bank *Monte Dei Paschi di Siena* visited Venezuela in 1971 in order to meet the parliamentary leaders and to learn about this country. Although at the time the Christian Democrat Rafael Caldera was at the head of the government, in a letter addressed to the PSI Secretariat, Scricciolo affirmed that he had met representatives from AD since they were social democrats as well as the majority in the Parliament. Scricciolo said that AD was very concerned about the possibility that the vast Italian community could vote for the former dictator. Moreover, he stressed the importance of a quick assessment of the situation, a formal visit of the PSI in Venezuela, as well as a meeting in Rome between both parties. AD, he said, really believed that a mutual collaboration between them would contribute to increasing the number of its supporters, and therefore the number of votes. Scricciolo concluded his letter by underlining the good opportunity that the PSI had to close links with AD, the party that strived for democratic stability and already had close ties with the Chilean Salvador Allende. Above all, it was a party which could become the “speaker” of the PSI in Latin America⁸⁹⁶. Hence, since the early 1970s, the idea of AD as an “interlocutor” between both sides of the Atlantic started to come up.

Having said that, the truth is that in the early 1970s, the Italian government was actually quite interested in increasing bilateral and Communitarian relations with Venezuela and other Latin American countries (in particular those from the Andean pact). Indeed, in March 1973, there was discussion about the possibility of an agreement for technical and scientific cooperation between the countries of the Andean Pact (at the time it included

⁸⁹⁶ “Loris Scricciolo (PSI) a De Martino e Mancini (PSI)”, May 14, 1971. Fondazione Studi Storici Filippo Turati, Florence, Italy, box. 58. 11SS.F.197. Some contacts between the PSI and the Venezuelan leftist parties could be noticed since 1970. For example, in October 1970, Luciano De Pascalis wrote the Venezuelan Demetrio Boesner (from MEP) in order to thank him for the documentation on MEP that he had sent to the PSI as well as to stress the PSI desire to better understand about the Venezuelan situation. Accordingly he suggested a trip of a PSI delegation in Venezuela. “De Pascalis a Demetrio Boesner”, October 9, 1970. Fondazione Turati, box. 58. 11SS.F.197.

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Venezuela) and Italy⁸⁹⁷. This agreement was signed in January 1974. Along the same lines, the socialist and Deputy-Minister for Foreign Trade, Attilio Ferrari, in January-February 1974 visited Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, and Argentina with the aim of increasing economic and trade relationships between Italy and these countries. A few months later, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Luigi Granelli, traveled to Caracas on June 1-8, 1974 in order to explore the situation of Italians living in Venezuela. There was a plan to sign agreements aimed at improving social security, cultural exchanges, and school attendance. Afterwards, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, the socialist Cesare Bensi, visited the countries of the Andean Pact (July 22-August 3, 1974) and affirmed that Italy could benefit from the contacts with those countries, in particular with Venezuela because of its prominent position in the continent. Thus, Italy, he said, was very interested in establishing joint working groups and developing common industrial programs with Venezuela and in encouraging financial and commercial agreements with Caracas (new markets and arrangements regarding oil)⁸⁹⁸. Moreover, during the stay in Venezuela, the Italian delegation discussed foreign affairs with the local leaders, particularly about the EEC debates on security and European cooperation that directly involved Latin America⁸⁹⁹. All of this is just to illustrate how a new stage in their relations was starting to be developed at this time. As said, the political and economic condition, the large number of Italians living there (it was the third biggest Italian community in Latin America), and the willingness of Carlos Andrés Pérez to increase Venezuelan presence in the international arena encouraged these bilateral relationships.

Indeed, Pérez's internationalism, his position inside the SI as vice-president, and his close links with Brandt and González explained the good relationship that he established with Craxi. Margherita Boniver, in talking about the parties outside Europe that the PSI had

⁸⁹⁷ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Commissione di lavoro". March 27. *1973 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Servizio Storico e Documentazione, 1974), 268-269.

⁸⁹⁸ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "America Latina" *1974 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Servizio Storico e Documentazione, 1975), 193-196.

⁸⁹⁹ "La visita dell'On. Bensi. Accordo di cooperazione tra Italia e Venezuela". *Avanti!* (28/07/1974). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19740728.78-172_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=3

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excellent relations with, named AD, the party of Ungo in El Salvador, and the Senegalese Socialist Party⁹⁰⁰. As a matter of fact, AD and the PSI shared common objectives and had similar position in different issues (among them the doubts towards the political developments in Nicaragua). As a matter of fact, Craxi and Pérez met during the SI Conference held in Caracas in May 1976 (the meeting that Brandt described as having “historical significance”) in which the Venezuelan looked forward to opening up new relations between Europe and Latin America. Pérez stressed the fact that both continents needed each other, and therefore a new economic order was required. Craxi’s speech focused on the the gap between developed and Third World countries. Indeed, he stated that the main aim of real international socialism was to reduce the social distance between the industrialized and developing countries⁹⁰¹.

A few months later, on November 17-19, 1976, President Pérez visited Italy (it was the first formal visit from a Venezuelan President in office in Italy)⁹⁰². The headline of an article published by the newspaper *Avanti!* said that this visit was “Not only a visit”, since Pérez, besides meeting political leaders, had scheduled to encounter representatives from some important Italian companies like ENI, IRI, FIAT, EFIM, and ENEL⁹⁰³. In fact, during Pérez’s journey some bilateral agreements were achieved, which included technical and scientific cooperation as well as economic and industrial collaboration. Moreover, during Pérez’s tour, the deposit of part of Venezuela’s foreign exchanges in the Bank of Italy was announced (a few months later, Venezuela announced the deposit of additional funds and in December 1979, an agreement was signed which assured fuel supply from Caracas) which he said implied a “sign of the confidence that Caracas had on the Italian economic

⁹⁰⁰ Margherita Boniver (interview) “La dimensione”, 17.

⁹⁰¹ “Conferenza internazionale euroamericana con i leader dei partiti socialisti, Caracas Maggio 1976”. Fondazione Craxi. (F.1 Sz.1. S.9 Ss.1 F.4)

⁹⁰² For the documents related to the visit of Carlos Andrés Pérez (i.e. meetings with: the President of Italy, the Italian Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bettino Craxi, Enrico Berlinguer, businessmen, etc), see: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Visita ufficiale in Italia del Presidente della Repubblica, Pérez,” *1976 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell’Italia*. (Roma: Servizio Storico e Documentazione, 1977), 398-415.

⁹⁰³ “Perez a Roma, Non solo una visita”. *Avanti!* (17/11/1976). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19761117.80-263_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=7

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recovery”⁹⁰⁴.

Such “confidence” meant for Venezuela increasing international credibility, a means for approaching Europe, and a mechanism for ensuring Italy’s support in Venezuela’s struggle for a new economic order. Besides this, such behavior was also sign of the strong ties that linked both countries. The high rate of qualified Italian immigrants also contributed to this who in part controlled 50% of the small and medium-size Venezuelan enterprises and the large number of business contracts with the leading Italian companies⁹⁰⁵. During his visit, Pérez also met Craxi with whom he talked about the relationship between the PSI and AD, the international situation and the following SI meetings. Moreover, Pérez claimed that his party and country had strong feelings of friendship towards the PSI⁹⁰⁶. Within this frame, for instance, in October 1977 during a press release in Caracas, the candidate of AD defined Craxi as “a young and important leader not only for the Italian socialism”. Additionally, he underlined the interest of AD in further developing contacts with the SI and in particular with Italy and other European countries⁹⁰⁷.

As expected, contacts between Craxi (and the PSI) and Pérez (and AD) were developed throughout the SI meetings since both leaders gave particular emphasis and significance to this organization. Indeed, they met at Geneva, Vancouver, Lisbon, Madrid, and other venues of the SI meetings. From a socialist point of view, Antonio Carrello said the PSI had a twofold responsibility towards Pérez. The first responsibility concerned the socialist international community since AD was one of most representative parties of the so-called

⁹⁰⁴Ministero degli Affari Esteri, “Conferenza stampa del Presidente Pérez” November 19, 1976. *1976 Testi e Documenti*, 407-408. “Petrodollari all’Italia”. *Avanti!* (20/11/1976). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19761120.80-266_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=8

⁹⁰⁵ According to Beatrice Rangel, the vast Italian community in Venezuela not only contributed to strengthening the relations between Rome and Caracas but they played a paramount role in all aspects related to road development, infrastructure, trade, etc. Interview with Beatrice Rangel, Miami, March 12, 2018.

⁹⁰⁶ “Il Venezuela punta sulla ripresa italiana” and “Incontro Craxi con il presidente del Venezuela Perez”. *Avanti!* (21/11/1976). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19761121.80-267_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=1

⁹⁰⁷ “Venezuela”. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.62).

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“democratic socialism” in Latin America and Pérez “assumed the continent-wide leadership”. It was for this reason, he said, that Caracas was the venue of the SI meeting in May 1976. Craxi, in fact, underlined once more the bonds of friendship that linked both parties in at a meeting in Rome the same year. Secondly, Venezuela became the first financial power of the continent and was one of the major promoters of regional integration (e.g. through the SELA). Moreover, Carrello highlighted the ability of Pérez in challenging the power of multinationals through the nationalization of the oil and iron industry. Taking all of the above into account, Carrello concluded his writing saying that the PSI had the responsibility to explore how it could improve Italy’s relations with Venezuela. Accordingly, the Italian Socialist Party, he said, had to take the opportunity that the SI meeting of Caracas provided and go forward. In this, he stated, the PSI had to play a leading role⁹⁰⁸.

Moreover, the PSI was aware of the importance of Venezuela for Latin America since it recognized and welcomed all the efforts that Pérez and AD addressed for the regional democratization and its consolidation and even feared that the AD electoral defeat in 1979 could harm this situation⁹⁰⁹.

In spite of the victory of the Christian Democratic party (COPEI) in Venezuela, the PSI maintained close contacts with Pérez because of his position inside the SI and because they shared common objectives and positions. For instance, in the SI meeting held in Madrid in November 1980, Pérez (as the representative from Chile, El Salvador, Austria, Dominican Republic, and Senegal) supported the PSI and PSOE motion regarding the Palestinian situation. They agreed that to reach a definitive solution on the Palestinian matter; it was

⁹⁰⁸ Antonio Carrello, “Il Venezuela paese ‘leader’ per una nuova America Latina”. *Avanti!* (27/11/1976). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/15.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201969-1976%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/D-%20dal%201972%20-04%20Luglio%20pag.%2001%20al%201976%20-19%20Dic.%20pag.%2008/CFI0422392_19761127.80-272_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=2

⁹⁰⁹ “Caracas prevale il candidato dei moderati”. *Avanti!* (5/12/1978). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201977%20-01%20Giugno%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201980%20-12%20Aprile%20pag.%2016/CFI0422392_19781205.82-289_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=6

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necessary to recognize their rights (which were legitimate) and the encouragement of the negotiations in the area. It was the way to achieve peace and regional stability. Moreover, they also agreed on several issues, such as the defense of human rights and the North-South order. Regarding the latter, the socialist Michele Achilli observed and invited the EEC to be coherent on its policies. The Community, he said, had to commit on this matter, and therefore had to avoid the introduction of protectionist policies since these did not solve anything. Additionally, Achilli called on overcoming the East-West divisions in order to establish a dialogue with developing countries⁹¹⁰.

The North-South issue also was one of the main concerns of Pérez. Indeed, in Madrid he focused his speech on this subject. For instance, he stressed that this dialogue, and thus the understanding between the North and the South, would lead to the achievement of worldwide peace and global prosperity. Likewise, he specified the fact that worldwide interdependency (a concept that mainly arose from the energy problem) implied both the interdependence of problems but also of solutions. Hence, after the failed attempts of the North-South dialogue (Paris, 1975-1977) he said that the SI, being formed by parties and movements with common objectives from all over the world, became the proper body for the definition of the fundamental principles for a new North-South cooperation. This had to be one of its main objectives⁹¹¹. In fact, this subject was one of the main principles of the SI rhetoric and therefore, of the PSOE and PSI.

Along these lines, in June 1986, Craxi traveled to South America in order to attend the SI meeting in Lima (Chapter 3.4.4). Before reaching his destination, however, he had to stop in Caracas. In Venezuela, Craxi had to meet President Lusinchi with whom he had to discuss topics of common concern, and the Italian Prime Minister had to confirm Italy's support for the Contadora efforts. Moreover, other issues on Craxi's agenda included the debt problem (talking about the policy adopted by Italy during the G7 Summit held in

⁹¹⁰ Francesco Gozzano, "L'Internazionale Socialista raccoglie la sfida" and F. Go "Due mozioni per la pace". *Avanti!* (16-17/11/1980). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201980%20-13%20Aprile%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201982%20-28%20Dicembre%20pag.%2020/CFI0422392_19801116.84-261_0001_d.pdf#search=venezuela&page=21

⁹¹¹ "Discorso 14. Carlos Andrés Pérez, ex presidente del Venezuela, sui rapporti Nord/Sud. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.10 Ss.1 F.3 D.14).

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Tokyo in May that year), the Italian cooperation policy, trade relations, and the Italian community living in Venezuela. All of these subjects had to be discussed with the Venezuelan President⁹¹². However, although a large delegation from the PSI attended the SI meeting, Craxi had to cancel his trip at the last moment for security reasons (Lima was experiencing episodes of violence at that time).

Notwithstanding, it is interesting to note the PSI view regarding the venue of the Congress. According to Valdo Spini, the fact that this meeting had taken place in Latin America was due to the new political climate that this region had already started to experience. The SI and its members, he said, had particular interests and strong ties in this area, and therefore it was logical that they focused their efforts there. Having said that, Spini warned that Latin America alone would not be able to consolidate and complete the path undertaken in recent years (many issues were still unsolved). Accordingly, Europe, being interested in the regional stability, had to make concrete actions. He claimed that Europe had to move from theory to practice. All of this explained why this meeting was so important for the SI and for Latin Americans. It represented a step forward in the Latin American policy of the SI⁹¹³.

Besides the contacts that AD and the PSI had through the SI, the “ideological” proximity was also displayed by the attendance of AD at the PSI Congresses (e.g. PSI Congress in Palermo in 1981 and the PSI Congress in Rimini in 1982). Moreover, personal ties played a key role again. For instance, even when Craxi and Pérez were not in power, communications and visits between them took place. For example, on March 22, 1988, Pérez sent a telex to Craxi in which he regretted not being able to accept his invitation due

⁹¹² “I rapporti Nord-Sud tema di fondo del viaggio di Craxi in Venezuela e Peru”. *Avanti!* (17/06/1986). Retrieved from [https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-)

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⁹¹³ Valdo Spini, “Perché a Lima il Congresso dell’Internazionale Socialista”. *Avanti!* (18/06/1986). Retrieved from <https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs->

[dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-](https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-)
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to urgent commitments in his country. However, the Venezuelan asked the PSI Secretary about his willingness to travel to Caracas in April that same year at the invitation of AD since he wanted to talk with him⁹¹⁴.

Likewise, their proximity could also be noted in the request for mediation that Pérez addressed to Craxi in November 1990. The issue was linked to the decision of the Italian government to cease the conventions related to the Inter Press Service (IPS) although some accords were already under way. This agency, which was based in Rome, had been recognized internationally by different countries and organizations (included the UN) and until then, Italy had been assisting it with financial resources. According to Pérez, Craxi personally supported it and even one of his delegates, Giuseppe Scanni, had been a member of the IPS Management Board. As a result, Pérez asked Craxi to intervene and help him in this situation because the withdrawal of Italy's support would affect the entire system of information and communication in the Third World⁹¹⁵.

Last but not least, it is worth mentioning the mission of Bettino Craxi as representative of the UN-Secretary at the meeting of the SELA held in Venezuela on June 21, 1990. The main topic addressed at the SELA reunion was the debt problem in which it was agreed to establish a steering committee among all the Latin American countries. The main goal was reducing the negative effects resulting from their indebtedness. In his speech, Craxi talked about “four pillars” that the North had to ensure in order to contribute to the recovery and development of the South: (i) the governments had to reduce the official bilateral credits (as the banks already did with the Brady Plan) and to improve their terms and conditions; (ii) the International Financial Institution (IFI) had to ensure assistance by using special tools like those adopted to help the poorest countries; (iii) governments had to allocate, through concessions, resources to improve facilities and infrastructures; and (iv) the Brady Plan had to be refinanced and strengthened. According to Craxi, the implementation of these “four pillars” would allow the region to forget the “lost decade” (i.e. the 1980s) and to open up a

⁹¹⁴“Telex Carlos Andrés Pérez a Bettino Craxi”, March 3, 1988. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss. 2 F.62)

⁹¹⁵ “Lettera: Carlos Andrés Pérez. Presidente della Repubblica di Venezuela, a Craxi”, November 20, 1990. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.62)

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prospect for progress and hope in the 1990s⁹¹⁶. Craxi's speech and attendance in this symposium were welcomed by the Latin American countries and gave them confidence and optimism. As Pérez said:

“The presence among us of a world-famous European politician, Bettino Craxi, encourages us. He was one of the protagonists of the Italian economic miracle. In the past years the resumption of Italian development has been a real miracle. He encouraged us with his words to look optimistically at our future, the future of Latin America and the Caribbean”⁹¹⁷.

Hence, contacts between both leaders and parties were more or less regular and these were developed in different scenarios, including in the SI frame and in bilateral encounters, both formally and informally. They not only shared common interests but also the fact of giving great relevancy to the international dimension, which led them to become close international contacts and to pay greater attention to what concerned them. Of course, additional issues such as the political, economic, and social situation of Venezuela contributed and further encouraged this contact. It is worth emphasizing at this point that besides the good relationships between Craxi and Pérez and the idea that the Venezuelan could be the “spokesman” between both sides of the Atlantic, the Italian government was very interested in establishing relations with Caracas. Hence, unlike Nicaragua and Chile, governmental bonds were constructed between them. Indeed, in addition to the democratic status of Venezuela, economic reasons strongly stimulated their relations. That said, in a context of oil crises, the petroleum reserves of Venezuela became a great incentive for the Italian administration (as well as for the Italian entrepreneurs) to promote transatlantic relations. Accordingly, both governments built relations that included concrete economic agreements. Thus, economic purposes represented a real “engine” in their dealings.

⁹¹⁶ Bettino Craxi, “Per il terzo mondo si apre un decennio di speranza”. *Avanti!* (22/06/1990). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF/17.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201990-1993%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/CFI0422392_19900622.94-146_d.pdf#search=perez&page=12

⁹¹⁷ Francesco Gozzano, “Craxi: sul debito si delinea una soluzione”. *Avanti!* (23/6/1990). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF/17.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201990-1993%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/CFI0422392_19900623.94-147_d.pdf#search=perez&page=20

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Nevertheless, the problem here is that when these kinds of incentives decrease, their relations tend to move in the same direction⁹¹⁸.

5.2.3. Chile

*Life in exile is not for weeping, nor for sad memory:
it is for struggling, for hope, for faith
in the future of the country to which one can not return.*
Bernardo Leighton⁹¹⁹

As said, the Chilean experience was a turning point in the SI position and relation towards Latin America. Indeed, few days later the Allende's overthrow, the SI formally rejected the coup since it was:

“The result of reactionary and imperialist forces inside and outside Chile against the lawfully elected government of President Salvador Allende. Moreover, the SI sees these events not only as a threat to Chilean and Latin American democracy, but as a part of a wider threat to the rule and law and human rights, which demands an urgent response from democrats the world over”⁹²⁰.

Hence, the SI Bureau urged the SI members to refuse the military Juanta and try to exert pressures to enforce the observance of human rights. Furthermore, the SI not only offered political, humanitarian, and financial assistance to the Chilean people but also it “would undertake an immediate investigation of the events in Chile, including the sending of a mission to Chile”⁹²¹. This mission was really carried out (September 30- October 5, 1973) and Bettino Craxi was one of the SI delegates⁹²².

⁹¹⁸ Incisa Di Camerana, “Il risveglio della democrazia in America Latina”. In *La politica estera italiana*, 158.

⁹¹⁹ Bernardo Leighton's speech, Bologna, May 2, 1975. *Quaderni Chile-America*, March, April, May 1976, n. 16-17-18, 55.

⁹²⁰ “Statement issued by the Socialist International in Chile, London, September 22, 1973”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 560.

⁹²¹ Ibidem.

⁹²² In addition to Craxi, the SI delegation was formed by: Hans Janitschek (General Secretary of the SI), Andre Van der Low (Netherlands Labour Party), Antoine Blanca (French Socialist Party), Anne-Marie Sudbom (Nordic Social Democratic and Labor Parties)

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After the coup d'état, Craxi expressed his solidarity towards the Chilean people and called on the Italians to learn about the Chilean experience⁹²³. He considered the Chilean DC and Eduardo Frei largely responsible for the coup. Hence, even if he underlined that Italy was not in the same position as Chile (the Italian DC had also rejected the military Junta), he called the DC to be aware of the fact that if it broke with the democratic parties on the left, it would possibly be absorbed by the far right wing as it happened in Chile⁹²⁴.

During the SI mission, the international delegation looked for the release of those suffering political persecution.⁹²⁵ It was able to meet some members of the Popular Unity (people fleeing persecution called the international community in order to avoid being forgotten) and to note the following issues: (i) the state of fear in which Chileans lived after Allende's overthrow; (ii) the massive deportation of the opponents of the regime to Dawson Island; (iii) different forms of torture and violation of human rights; (iv) the responsibility by imperialist forces in the victory of the military Junta; and (v) the destruction of the Chilean palace of government (*La Moneda*). Moreover, they also asked to visit the National Stadium where many prisoners were being interrogated, but their petition was not accepted. At his return, Craxi talked about his stay in Chile at the *Teatro Nuovo* in Milan where he invited everyone to mobilize in order to keep hope alive for the Chilean people; thus, he called for international solidarity. The regime had to be defeated, and therefore the international community had to denounce breaches of human rights and had to condemn any kind of collaboration with the Junta⁹²⁶. His speech was very suggestive and appealing.

⁹²³ On the same day of the coup d'état, Janitschek sent a telex to the PSI Secretariat by asking it, on behalf of the Chilean Radical Party, a public statement of solidarity to the Allende's government. "Telex from Janitschek to the PSI" September 11, 1973. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682.

⁹²⁴ Bettino Craxi, Ignazio Contu (interviewer) "Una minaccia sempre latente", *Gente*, September 28, 1973. See also, Bettino Craxi Massimo Fini (interviewer), "5 giorni a Santiago", *L'Europeo*, November 25, 1973. 52-53 In *Socialimo da Santiago a Praga*, Bettino Craxi, (Milano Sugargo Edizioni, 1976). A fragment of the interview conducted by Fini is also available in "Craxi all' Europeo", Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.1 I.4)

⁹²⁵ For example, Carlo Mussa Ivaldi, sent a telex to Craxi (through the embassy) and asked him, on behalf of the Turin comrades, to put pressure in favor of Paolo Hutter who was being detained in the Santiago Stadium. "Telex from Mussa Ivaldi to Bettino Craxi", October 2, 1973. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682.

⁹²⁶ Bettino Craxi, "Rapporto sul Cile, Teatro Nuovo, Milano Ottobre 1973". In *Socialimo da Santiago* 24-45 Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

Indeed, Janitschek thanked him for his participation in the mission but above all for the publicity that he gave to their trip and for his commitment to spreading the facts about Chilean situation⁹²⁷.

Craxi, along with the other SI members of the delegation, were reminded of a particular incident that they witnessed in Viña del Mar (a city close to Santiago), where the grave of Allende was located. Everyone agreed on the fact that they went there peacefully, only with the aim of laying flowers on the grave. Despite their pacifism, they were encircled and threatened at gun point by the armed forces. This episode, which Craxi recalled more than once in his speeches,⁹²⁸ was denounced to the UN by the SI General Secretary and signed by all the members of the SI delegation on October 6, 1973⁹²⁹. In addition to this complaint, the SI report to the UN stated the following: (i) there was never any plot by Allende against the armed forces (i.e. the so-called “Plan Z”)⁹³⁰ and statements of this sort were invented by the Junta; (ii) a crude propaganda machine was launched by the Junta in order to discredit Allende’s government; (iii) the economic crisis that affected Chile “was deliberately brought on and intensified by those very forces who form or sustain the new regime”; and (iv) the new regime banished all freedoms and was persecuting leaders and activists from the Popular Unity. With this report, the SI looked to call the UN’s attention since it was in the name of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁹³¹.

⁹²⁷ “Letter from Hans Janitschek to Bettino Craxi”, October 12 1973. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682.

⁹²⁸ Even at the XLIV PSI Congress in Rimini on March, 31, 1987. Bettino Craxi, “L’Italia che cambia e i compiti del riformismo” in *Il Socialismo*, edited by Ugo Finetti, 289.

⁹²⁹ “Text of telegram sent on Saturday 6 October 1973 to Jurt Waldheim General Secretary of the United Nation Organization by the Socialist International Delegation to Chile (30 September-5 October, 1973)”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 560. Craxi also talked about this episode during an interview released to *L’Europeo*, see: Bettino Craxi Massimo Fini (interviewer), “5 giorni”, 48. Now it is also available in Craxi, *Uno Sguardo*, 657. The notes of Craxi and the picture taken by the SI delegation at the Allende’s grave are available in “Sulla missione in Cile dell’Internazionale Socialista”. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 C.8).

⁹³⁰ I.e. The so-called “Plan Z”. The “Plan Z” was the principal reason given by the Junta in order to justify the coup. Indeed, the Junta affirmed that Allende’s supporters had organized a plot to kill some members of the army at the Independence Day (September 18). According to them, Allende’s supporters sought to start a new regime based on Marxism.

⁹³¹ “Text of telegram sent on Saturday 6 October 1973”.

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The SI along with Craxi's commitment on Chilean affairs was remarkable. As said, the SI established a Committee for Chile and tried to raise global awareness on the local situation through conferences, meetings, and banners (Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the Chilean experience particularly touched Italy and it was a feeling shared by different political forces, movements, entrepreneurs, trade unions, etc. The Italian government firmly condemned the coup d'état and expressed deep regret for Allende's death⁹³². Likewise, at the Chamber of Deputies, the authoritarian regime was rejected and it was underlined that an intense diplomatic activity to prevent repression was under way⁹³³. All the political forces agreed on condemning the coup, but as might be expected, some of them were more critical to the Junta (e.g. PSI, PCI, PSDI) than others (MSI, PLI), who asked clarifications on the Plan Z. The DC strongly condemned the new regime but did not blame the Chilean DC of contributing to Allende's overthrow, underlining its democratic character (the Italian left wing blamed the Chilean DC while the Italian DC shuffled off responsibility onto the far left-wing)⁹³⁴. Nevertheless, in terms of human rights and the rejection of violence, this experience linked all of them to some extent⁹³⁵.

Indeed, the Italian Embassy in Santiago hosted several refugees (the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs reported on December 17, 1973 that 170 individuals had asked for asylum) and the Italian government asked the Embassy to assist them with the expatriation⁹³⁶. Therefore, the Italian Legation in Santiago had to help them to reach Rome where the government would provide them the necessary support⁹³⁷. Nonetheless, in a letter to the SI

⁹³² Quoting Antonio Leal (exiled in Italy and member of *Chile Democrático*), Italy was the only country to break, at Embassy level, the diplomatic relations with Chile. Indeed, since the first day, all the Italian political forces condemned the military regime. In Paula Zaldívar, "Tracce e frammenti: la sua vita politica in Cile e i suoi rapporti con l'Italia, 1960-1990. In *Settantatré. Cile e Italia, destini incrociati*. Edited by Raffaele Nocera and Claudio Rolle Cruz. (Napoli: Think Thanks edizioni, 2010), 91.

⁹³³ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Italia-Cile". *1973 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Servizio Storico e Documentazione, 1974), 29 and 31.

⁹³⁴ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Il dibattito alla Camera dei Deputati", September 26. *1973 Testi e Documenti*, 164-169.

⁹³⁵ In spite of this, Craxi denounced and regretted the behavior of the Italian Community living in Chile. According to him, some of them supported the military regime and some of them had even expressed to the Chilean press (they paid for this publication) *their full solidarity with the army and the coup d'état of Pinochet*. Craxi and Fini (interviewer), "5 giorni", 53.

⁹³⁶ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Rifugiati nell'ambasciata italiana in Cile", *1973 Testi e Documenti*, 172.

⁹³⁷ On October 10, 1973, Emo Egoli sent a letter to Bruno Lepre (Undersecretary - Foreign Affairs), in which by referring to the asylum requests, he asked the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the border police to Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l'Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell'Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

Secretariat, Emo Egoli (International Representative of the PSI) warned that the instructions that the Italian State gave to its Embassy were to assist refugees for their temporary expatriation in Italy. According to Egoli, only some of them would actually stay in Italy, while the majority would travel then to other Latin American countries or other European nations⁹³⁸.

Notwithstanding, the Chilean experience raised awareness everywhere, both internationally and nationally, and the PSI performance was developed into these two levels. For instance, at the international level, many conferences were held, including the meeting for “World Solidarity with Chilean people” (Helsinki, September 29-30, 1973) where representatives from all over the world attended (from Italy, representatives from the PSI, the PCI, and the CGIL). The main goal was to raise global awareness on this issue (denouncing the repression and violation of human rights through campaigns and different kinds of demonstrations against the military junta)⁹³⁹. Along the same lines, the “World Solidarity Conference with Chilean People” on November 13-16, 1975 was held in Athens⁹⁴⁰ and the “World Solidarity Conference for Chile” (September 9-12, 1978) in Madrid. This conference was organized by *Chile-Democrático* and the social and political forces of Spain. The international community was asked to renew initiatives towards the Chilean people’s efforts, in particular considering the murder of the Chilean Orlando Letelier in Washington in which the involvement of Pinochet had been confirmed⁹⁴¹.

be understanding on the Chilean situation since it was a political matter, but above all, a human issue. Fondazione Turati, box 36. S. 11. F. 23, cc. 225.

⁹³⁸ “Letter from Emo Egoli to Hans Janitschek”, November 20, 1973. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 682. Loreto Rebolledo González examined the Chilean exile in Italy. According to her, during the first six months of the exile food and accommodation were guaranteed. However, Rebolledo underlined the fact that the Italian government did not give any assistance in terms of language learning and finding a job. Hence, many refugees decided to migrate to other countries after these six months. Loreto Rebolledo González “L’esilio cileno in Italia”. In *Settantatré*, 124.

⁹³⁹ “International Conference in Solidarity with the Chilean people. Helsinki 29-30, 1973”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 558.

⁹⁴⁰ In addition to reject the Junta and to discuss about how enhancing international solidarity, it was rejected the Pinochet’s attack against Bernardo Leighton in Rome. “Letter from Chile Democratico to the SI”, October 23, 1975”. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 561. A note about this Conference is also available in Fondazione Turati box 36, S. 11. F. 25. Cc. 305.

⁹⁴¹ World Solidarity Conference for Chile”, Madrid, September 9-12, 1978. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1065.

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Similarly, after the SI Bureau meeting held in London in late September 1973, the French Socialist Party together with the Italian democratic forces (and in the name of the European Socialist parties) suggested holding an International Conference on Chile⁹⁴². Although Rome was initially chosen to be the venue, in the end it was carried out in Paris on July 6-7, 1974, i.e. the so-called “Pan European Conference Chile Solidarity”⁹⁴³. Even though this conference followed the guidelines established during the Summit of Helsinki in September 1973, it is interesting to note the symbolic value of this meeting, at least at the beginning, because it foresaw the participation of different forces (including for instance the CPSU from the USSR). Nevertheless, in the end, another path was chosen and the issues addressed were just those linked to solidarity and to the condemnation of the military regime (i.e. those established at Helsinki). However, it had the participation of prominent leaders from the French, Italian, and Chilean left wing⁹⁴⁴. The PSI considered this meeting to be a mechanism to intensify the solidarity with the Chilean people and a proof of its commitment with them. Indeed, the PSI was aware of the importance of increasing the worldwide campaign for the release of political prisoners and for the end of the war in Chile. This is why the Italian Socialist Party accepted to join the Paris Conference, namely an initiative that aimed to bring all the democratic and socialist forces together just to enhance solidarity with Chile⁹⁴⁵.

In regard to international activism, it is important to keep in mind that often the PSI acted through the SI framework⁹⁴⁶. Given the fact many issues have already been stated, only certain interesting aspects will be brought up here. For instance, it is worth recalling that

⁹⁴² “Letter from François Mitterrand and Robert Pontillon to the SI” November 23, 1973. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1065.

⁹⁴³ “Conferenza Paneuropea Cile”. Fondazione Turati box 37 s. 11. Ss. 4. F. 26

⁹⁴⁴ Among them: Bettino Craxi, Aldo Tortorella (from the PCI), the Chilean Carlos Altamirano and Beatriz Allende. See: Alessandro Santoni, “El partido comunista italiano y el otro ‘compromesso storico’: los significados políticos de la solidaridad con Chile (1973-1977). *Historia*, n. 43, vol. II, (2010): 538.

⁹⁴⁵ “Lettera del PSI al Popolo Cileno”. Fondazione Turati box 36. S. 11. F.25. cc. 305

⁹⁴⁶ To mention just a few examples, Craxi talked about the PSI position and linked them with the SI lines. “Comunicato sul discorso di Craxi al Festival dell’Avanti di Mangenta”, between September 1973 and July 1976, Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 C.6). Likewise, Alejandro Montesino, in a letter addressed to Pietro Lezzi, noted the strengthening of the links between the PSI and the Chilean Radical Party at bilateral level but also inside the SI framework. “Alejandro Montesino to Pietro Lezzi”, June 18, 1975. Fondazione Turati, box 36, s. 11 f. 24. cc 116. In September 1977, Craxi reaffirmed the PSI and SI commitment on the defense of human rights in Latin America. “Comunicato 52. Interventi di Craxi ai Festival dell’Avanti! Di Rovereto, Verona e Magenta. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 C.52).

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after the mission in which Craxi participated, in mid-1974 it was suggested (in a confidential document) to carry out another mission in order to “demonstrate the interest, the concern, and the Solidarity of the Socialist International with the defendants”. Moreover, it needed “to achieve maximum impact on public opinion on the world”⁹⁴⁷. Hence, contemporary to the mission,

“Parties should launch a publicity campaign including posters, public rallies and party statements to draw the attention to the brutal suppression of basic human rights in Chile and to the phony nature of the trials which were staged for the sole purpose of discrediting the duly elected representative of 43% of the people and the constitutional government they had formed”⁹⁴⁸.

Furthermore, the establishment of a Radical Party office in London was also recommended with the aim of facilitating the coordination of their activities and enhancing the fundraising campaigns. In this regard, the granted consultative status inside the UN would be extremely useful; thus, they had to make an effort “to co-ordinate action by Social Democratic government at the United Nations”⁹⁴⁹. In relation to this, the SI archive hosted a document bearing the letterhead of the Italian Chamber of Deputies that contained Janitschek’s proposals. In this document, the SI actions against the Chilean Junta were pointed out, including: (i) public protests; (ii) calls for the release of the political prisoners; (iii) no economic aid for the Junta; (iv) assistance for the refugees; and (v) public support for the resistance movement of the united Chilean Left. It was suggested that instead of sending a formal SI mission, it would be better that each SI member travelled separately and after each other. In this way, the probability of the mission’s success would be higher. Nevertheless, all of this was to be carried out under the umbrella of the SI⁹⁵⁰. These

⁹⁴⁷ “Socialist International Action on Chile. Proposals by the Secretariat”, June 7, 1974. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 560.

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid

⁹⁵⁰ “SI committee on Chile”. Rome June 7, 1974. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 560.

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propositions were probably at the heart of the discussion during the first meeting of the SI Committee on Chile, which was actually held in Rome on June 8, 1974⁹⁵¹.

At the national level, it is worth to recall the following themes. Firstly, the great solidarity expressed by different social, economic, and political sectors in Italy. Indeed, after the coup, solidarity demonstrations were held in different parts of the country. It is important to keep in mind that the Chilean experience to some extent linked different positions in Italy; in fact, members from different parties and trade unions attended these demonstrations. In this regard, the PSI, for instance, asked various PSI Provincial Committees (circular letter n. 88) to carry out manifestations against the “Chilean fascist coup”. Hence, in different cities (e.g. Undine, Bari, Terni, Asciano, Fucecchio, etc.) the Provincial Committees expressed their disagreement with the military Junta and their solidarity with the Chilean people⁹⁵². Likewise, many entrepreneurs expressed their solidarity with the South American country (e.g. “Hidroirma italiana”, “Industria italiana pistonni”, “Cooperatori muratori medicina”, “Edison Giocattoli”, “NAS della Cassa per il Mezzogiorno”, just to name a few of them)⁹⁵³.

Sometimes these rallies went beyond “national unity” and borders. For example, the Socialist and Deputy Mayor of Florence, Ottaviano Colzi, wrote a letter to Carlsson in which he informed the SI Secretary about a Conference on Chile (to be held in Florence on January 21-22, 1978) in order to raise awareness about its dramatic situation. This conference aimed at bringing mayors from all over the world together (indeed, the topic of the conference was *Cities of the world for Chile's freedom - Le città del mondo per la libertà in Cile*) as a proof of solidarity towards the Chilean people. Colzi stated that mayors from the five continents would attend but asked Carlsson to spread this initiative through

⁹⁵¹ “Letter from Hans Janitschek to Jenny Little”, July 2, 1975. In this message, the SI Secretary asked Little to prepare the minutes of the first meeting of the Standing Committee on Chile, which was held in Rome on June 8. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 560.

⁹⁵² Some documents regarding these demonstrations can be found in the Fondazione Turati, box 36, S. 11. F. 24. Cc. 116 Egoli.

⁹⁵³ These documents are available at the Fondazione Turati, box 36, S. 11. F. 24. Cc. 116 Egoli.

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the SI channel since SI member parties had always voiced concern and commitment on this issue⁹⁵⁴.

At this point, it is interesting to note that similar to what occurred with the PSOE and other SI member parties, scholarships and work visas were the easy way to assist asylum seekers since they allowed for the legal introduction into the European society. As a matter of fact, the PSI asked the Italian government more than once to grant scholarships as well as working visas to Chilean refugees. Sometimes the PSI applied for these “permits” spontaneously, and sometimes the PSI performance was due to specific pleas by Chilean people and Chilean parties (there were also support requests for the maintenance of Chilean families)⁹⁵⁵. Sometimes *Chile-Democrático* asked the PSI to serve as a liaison between the Italian government for submitting their demands and sometimes the PSI tried to intercede directly in Santiago through the Italian Embassy⁹⁵⁶. The PCI even asked the PSI to act as an intermediary with the SI. The PCI looked for the SI intervention and pressure on the military Junta for the release of political prisoners, among them the liberation of the Chilean Secretary of the Communist Party, Luis Corvalán⁹⁵⁷.

Additionally, a large number of Chilean refugees arrived to Italy. Although there are no official data about the number of émigrés, it was estimated that around two to three thousand Chileans asked for asylum in the Italian Embassy and then reached Italy⁹⁵⁸. Hence, the Chilean exiles impacted Italian politics as well as Italian society (e.g. the effect that had the Chilean music group *Inti-Illimani* in Italy)⁹⁵⁹. This contributed to increasing solidarity and awareness among the Italian people, in particular since they shared the experience of having lived under fascism.

⁹⁵⁴ “Letter from Ottaviano Colzi to Bernt Carlsson”, November 8, 1977. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 1065.

⁹⁵⁵ “Lettera Egoli a Grassi (27/10/1975)”. “Lettera Egoli a Santoro (18/7/1975)”. Fondazione Turati box 36, S. 11. F. 25, cc. 305; “Lettera Fredy Cancino a Craxi” May, 8 1985. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.13 L.6).

⁹⁵⁶ “Lettera Montesino a Lezzi (26/04/1976)”. Letters from Chilean to the PSI asked for working visa, in Fondazione Turati, box 37. S. 11. F. 27.

⁹⁵⁷ “Lettera PCI a De Martino” Fondazione Turati, box 36, s 11. F. 23, cc. 225.

⁹⁵⁸ Rebolledo González, “L’esilio”, 122. In 1988 a EEC report pointed that sixty thousand of Chilean had already migrated to the EEC countries. *Ibid.*, 121.

⁹⁵⁹ For further details on *Inti Illimani* see Claudio Rolle Cruz. “Gli Inti-Illimani in Italia. I primi mesi”. In *Settantatré.*, 165

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Likewise, it is important to bear in mind that the Chilean exile was due to political reasons; thus, most of the émigrés tried to develop their militancy abroad⁹⁶⁰. In this context, the magazine *Chile-América* was published in Rome. It is interesting to note that this journal was founded by members of the Popular Unity and the Chilean Christian Democracy, groups with different political views who now shared a common goal: the return to democracy in Chile. This magazine had about one thousand subscriptions from all over the world and it was distributed in more than sixty countries. Being produced and published in Italy, this publication was also influenced by Italian political developments⁹⁶¹.

Furthermore, as already stated, given the large number of exiles, two offices were established to coordinate the opposition's activities, namely one in Caracas and one in Rome (*Chile-Democrático*)⁹⁶². *Chile Democrático* was the Coordination Office of the Chilean left forces. Its main goal was to coordinate the international solidarity (all the solidarity committees), to obtain the condemnation of the military Junta at the UN and at other organizations, and to maintain links between the Chilean opposition around the World (they had a newsletter which included global demonstrations). Being in charge of international solidarity, *Chile Democrático* maintained more or less regular contacts with the SI.

⁹⁶⁰ According to Antonio Leal, the renewal of the Chilean Socialist Party started in Ariccia (Rome), in which, the PSI, Craxi and his SI membership were of great importance for them. To this list of “influencers”, he also added: the socialist trade unions, the Italian political climate, the Berlinguer's thoughts, and Gramsci's political culture. In Zaldívar, “Tracce e frammenti”, 101. For the reports of the Summit held in Ariccia, see: Raul Ampuero, “Informes introductorios a las reuniones para configurar el ala socialista. Los seminarios de Ariccia, *Ampuero 1977-1996. El Socialismo Chileno*, (Santiago de Chile, Ediciones Tierra Mía, 2002). It is available online in the *Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, Chile*. https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=documentos/10221.1/19606/1/Ampuero_1917_1996.pdf&origen=BDigital According to the historian Sebastian Jans, Craxi encouraged the holding of the Ariccia's meeting. Sebastian Jans, *El desarrollo de las ideas socialistas en Chile*, (Chile: CEME-Centro de Estudios Miguel Enríquez- Archivo Chile), 71. Retrieved from

http://www.archivochile.com/Historia_de_Chile/trab_gen/HCHtrabgen0016.pdf

⁹⁶¹ Zaldívar, “Tracce e frammenti”, 100; Angell, “International Support”, 187-188

⁹⁶² The influence achieved by this group of exiles was noted by the head of the DINA (the Junta's political police force), Manuel Contreras, who asked the Junta for larger funds for “neutralizing” the opposing forces in Italy, Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, the USA and France. “Letter from Manuel Contreras to the President of the Republic of Chile”. September 16, 1975. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 L.41).

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In this time frame, *Chile Democrático* requested the SI resolutions on Chile as they planned joint meetings and activities and exchanged information regarding solidarity action as well as about the status of the detainees⁹⁶³. Indeed, the former thanked the latter for its commitment and actions with Chilean people around the world, and to some extent, the Chilean Radical Party served as a “liaison” between both organizations⁹⁶⁴. The fact that Benjamin Teplitzki from the Radical Party coordinated the organization as Executive Secretary contributed to this, at least in a second phase (at the beginning Jorge Arrate headed *Chile Democrático*). Moreover, Alejandro Montesino played a key role inside this organization and established a close relationship with Craxi. According to Alessandro Santoni, thanks to Craxi, Montesino became a key actor for the Chilean resistance. He had a privileged position managing many of the financial resources of the opposition⁹⁶⁵.

Regarding the Chilean Radical Party, it is worth noting that in Europe they had an office in Bremen, Germany. However, some documents alluded to the idea that the Radical Party sought to create a stable center in Rome (which should be linked to the work of Montesino) in order to carry out party activities from there. Thereby, some doubts arose in regards to the continued financing by the PSI to the Radical Party in Rome. According to Egoli (in a letter to Luciano De Pascalis), he suggested providing them with one-off special assistance grants since permanent financing could be interpreted as a form of discrimination towards the other Chilean leftist parties⁹⁶⁶. Notwithstanding, the financial situation of the Radical Party was also a subject discussed in the SI frame. Indeed, in November that year, Janitschek wrote to De Pascalis in order to inform him about the establishment of a

⁹⁶³ “Letter from Jorge Arrate to the SI” October 10, 1974; “Circular a los Comités de Solidaridad, August 17, 1974” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box. 558; “Letter from Alejandro Montesino to Janitschek” June 19, 1975, From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box. 561; “Letter from Benjamin Teplitzki to Bernt Carlsson, February 14, 1978”; “Letter from Benjamin Teplitzki to Bernt Carlsson, March 9, 1978” From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box. 1065

⁹⁶⁴ For instance, Jorge Arrate from *Chile Democrático* informed Pitterman (SI President) that the Secretary of the Radical Party, Arcalaús Coronel, would talk with him in name of *Chile Democrático* about the activities planned for the next few months. “Letter from Arrate to Pitterman”, June 24, 1974. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box 558.

⁹⁶⁵ Alessandro Santoni, “Comunistas y socialistas italianos frente a la causa chilena: solidaridad y renovación (1973- 1989), *Revista www.izquierdas.cl*, N° 19, (2014): 126.

⁹⁶⁶ “Letter from Egoli to Luciano De Pascalis”, April 28, 1975, Fondazione Turati box 36. S. 11. F. 24. Cc. 116.

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committee (linked to the SI Committee for Chile) for the Radical Party's financial arrangements and his appointment as member of such committee⁹⁶⁷. One year later, Alejandro Montesino presented a budget in which he illustrated the necessities and expenses of the Radical Party in Italy. It was estimated that the total monthly expenditures were 570,000 lira which included accommodation, maintenance of party's representatives in Italy, office expenses, and party publications⁹⁶⁸.

Thirdly, the *Associazione Italia-Cile* was founded in Italy on the initiative of the PSI and PCI. The goals of this Association were: (i) to collect and coordinate all the information on Chile and to make it available to the general public; (ii) to gather funds to support the struggle of Chilean people; (iii) to ensure solidarity for the Chilean and Latin American migrants who were seeking asylum and work in Italy; and (iv) to guarantee an international network with similar associations around the world. Moreover, both the involvement of different forces and organizations at the local level was deeply encouraged in order to foster solidarity⁹⁶⁹. Within this framework, Bettino Craxi, in the name of the *Associazione*, gave a speech to commemorate the second anniversary of Allende's death. In addition to remembering the sufferance of the Chilean people since the military coup d'état, he asked to glorify the memory of the great martyr for Chilean liberty and socialism, Salvador Allende. Hence, he expressed his full solidarity to all the resistance forces in exile since "the current resistance will become the Chile of tomorrow, and added, solidarity today, tomorrow, forever, until the victory, long live free Chile!"⁹⁷⁰.

Along the same lines, the *Comitato di solidarietà Salvador Allende* was founded by the PSI party in Milan⁹⁷¹. The aim was always the same, namely to express solidarity with the

⁹⁶⁷ "Letter from Hans Janitschek to Luciano De Pascalis", October 28, 1975. From the SI Archives, International Institute from Social History, Amsterdam, box. 562.

⁹⁶⁸ "Promemoria 3. Necessità del Partito radical de Chile" September 7, 1976. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.13 P.3).

⁹⁶⁹ "Circolare 93, Associazione Italia Cile" October 23, 1973, Fondazione Turati, box 36, S. 11. F. 23, cc.225.

⁹⁷⁰ Bettino Craxi "Discorso sul Cile a nome dell'Associazione Italia-Cile, Roma". Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.3 D.12).

⁹⁷¹ The *Comitato di solidarietà Salvador Allende* was formed by Bettino Craxi, Giovanni Mosca, Riccardo Lombardi, Michele Acchili, Mario Artali, Francesco Colucci, Agostino Viviani, Luigi Vertementi, Carlo Tognoli, Gabriele Baccalini, Enrico Porro, Carlo Polli, Claudio Martelli, Arialdo Balfi, Carlo Ripa di Meana, among others.

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Chilean people and to carry out concrete actions for their struggle. This Committee agreed to deposit the funds collected in the *Associazione Italia-Cile* as well as it called the PSI Secretariat to enhance the party commitment with the Chilean cause and with the Association. To this end, they encouraged the PSI Secretariat to act through the newspaper *Avanti!* and to push Italian TV to provide increased united support for this initiative⁹⁷². Furthermore, it asked the Secretariat to serve as a liaison between the *Associazione* and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to define the legal and solidarity terms with the Chilean exiles⁹⁷³.

As a result, it is worth noting that unity and solidarity against the military Junta was always a key point for the PSI. Moreover, as Craxi more than once stated, the international isolation of the regime was a *sine qua non* condition for its weakening. The PSI, in fact, always urged the Italian government to take a firm stand against the military Junta⁹⁷⁴. Becoming Secretary of the PSI, Craxi maintained a firm line on the Junta but also on U.S. involvement. Since the coup on September 11, 1983, Craxi heavily criticized the U.S. involvement in Allende's overthrow⁹⁷⁵. His steadfastness, however, did not change when he was appointed Secretary of the Party and then Prime Minister, when he could have greater incidence, but also when his behavior could have prominent impact and consequences at the international level.

With this in mind, it is possible to recall some of Craxi's behaviors regarding U.S. actions. For instance, when he welcomed the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the U.S. (November 1976), he did not hesitate in recalling the "injury" provoked by American involvement and urged Carter to support the return of democracy to Chile. In this way, he

⁹⁷² Regarding the TV, the PSI committee from Senigalia submitted a complaint to the TV-RAI after the Chilean coup d'état. It blamed the RAI of *democratic deficiency* since for them the RAI had made efforts on the news to avoid using the word *fascism* in reference to the putsch. Fondazione Turati, box 36 . S. 11. 24. Cc. 116.

⁹⁷³ "Lettera Luigi Vertemati (segretario della Federazione Milanese) a PSI", November 21, 1973; "Lettera Federazione Milanese a Giancarlo Pajetta", November 28, 1973. Fondazione Turati box 36, S. 11. F. 23. Cc. 225.

⁹⁷⁴ "Intervista Craxi all'Avanti!". Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 SS.1 I.10)

⁹⁷⁵ For instance, see: "Comunicato 18. Sull'articolo di Craxi per l'Avanti!" September 9, 1974, Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 C.18); Fini (interviewer), "5 giorni", 45.

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said, Carter “could have many friends around the world”⁹⁷⁶. Along the same lines, Craxi met some of the members of the Chilean Radical Party (Annibale Palma and Alejandro Montesino). They not only agreed on the benefits of the Junta’s isolation, but also in asking Willy Brandt (on the occasion of his trip to Washington) to talk about the “Chilean fascist government” in Washington and to demand the suspension of the economic, political and military aids to Chile from the U.S. administration and the American public opinion. Additionally, in this encounter, Craxi underlined the PSI’s solidarity towards the resistance movements and in particular towards the Radical Party which was a member party of the SI⁹⁷⁷. iii) Furthermore, Craxi was even able to express his disapproval regarding the American performance while he was in the USA. At the U.S. House of Representatives, he stated: “the Chilean people's demand for freedom, which is a request that must precede everything else. This appeal needs the unconditional support of all of us”⁹⁷⁸. Furthermore, after his speech in the U.S. Congress, where he addressed the global food problem and the North-South order, he stated at the National Press Club that “Pinochet had to go away and Chilean democracy had to be restored at any cost”⁹⁷⁹. According to Antonio Ghirelli, the Italian Prime Minister, he also expressed his disagreement in the Oval Office where he directly said to Reagan: “you cannot continue to support Chile’s General Pinochet”⁹⁸⁰. For his part, Pietro Lezzi claimed that, with due reservations, Craxi tried to show the U.S. that Italy sought to find the road to democracy for Chile and to promote the dialogue between Washington and Managua since it was fundamental for the pacification of the region. Thus, “without presumptions and wishful thinking, Italy gave its contribution for the rebirth of democracy and for the understanding of peoples”⁹⁸¹.

⁹⁷⁶ “Comunicato 32: Dichiarazione sull’elezione del Presidente statunitense Jimmy Carter”. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 C.32).

⁹⁷⁷ “Comunicato 41. Sull’incontro di Craxi con i dirigenti del Partito Radicale del Cile”. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.7 Ss.2 C.41).

⁹⁷⁸ Bettino Craxi, “Ma l’America è lontana”. In *Uno sguardo*, 637.

⁹⁷⁹ Dino Frescobaldi, “Un appello di Craxi al Congresso di USA per la democrazia in America Latina”. *Corriere della sera*, (7/03/1985). Retrieved from <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/view.shtml#!/NTovZXMvaXQvcnNzZGF0aWRhY3MxL0A5Mjc1Ng%3D%3D>

⁹⁸⁰ Ghirelli, “La solidarietà”. 187

⁹⁸¹ Pietro Lezzi, *Pagine socialiste*, (Napoli: Alfredo Guida Editore, 2002), 251.

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As expected, Craxi's public speech in the U.S. was welcomed and appreciated by Chilean dissidents. Indeed, the Chilean Socialist Party considered Craxi's speech as a "pronouncement of great authority to induce the U.S. government to give up its support for the Pinochet regime" as well as proof of Craxi's continued commitment to freedom and democracy in Chile, commitment that had been maintained since his visit to Allende's grave in 1973⁹⁸². Similarly, Ricardo Lagos claimed:

"Every time we passed through Rome, both when he [Craxi] was Prime Minister and Parliamentarian, he always welcomed us in an affectionate and committed way. His intervention at the U.S. Congress in 1985 was a demonstration of his support, in which he invited the government of that country to promote 'the struggle for the freedom of the Chilean people'"⁹⁸³.

One year later on his trip to Washington, Craxi himself recalled his speech and said: "the Chilean issue could not be removed from the agenda of the responsibilities of the free nations [...] demands for freedom can only succeed through international support"⁹⁸⁴. Hence, he appealed for the support of all the European and Latin American democratic forces because only in this way would Chile experience the return of democracy.

That said, during Craxi's tenure as Prime Minister, the diplomatic relationships with Chile were far from being "normalized", as his Foreign Minister clearly stated during a meeting with his Chilean counterpart in Rome in 1984, democracy was a *sine qua non* condition to develop and improve their relations⁹⁸⁵. Craxi also addressed this issue during a meeting with Felipe González that year. During their encounter, the Italian Prime Minister stressed the importance of a strong international political support for a democratic solution in Chile. According to him, international pressure could bring down the regime in a short time. Hence, he suggested intensifying their initiatives in order to raise global awareness and the

⁹⁸²Lettera 7: Fredy Cancino a Craxi", April 15, 1985. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.13 L.7).

⁹⁸³Bettino Craxi "'Grazie Bettino'. Ricardo Lagos su Craxi". In *Uno sguardo*. 2982.

⁹⁸⁴Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Dichiarazioni programmatiche al Senato del Presidente del Consiglio on. Craxi, 5 agosto" 1986 *Testi e Documenti*, 112

⁹⁸⁵Ministero Degli Affari Esteri "Giulio Andreotti: i colloqui con i Ministri degli esteri Argentino e Cileno" 1984 *Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Servizio Storico e Documentazione, 1987), 84.

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understanding of the real Chilean situation by taking into account that a democratic political alternative was actually ready. In this sense, he added: “Madrid [was] a very authoritative capital to strengthen this action. Time is pressing”.⁹⁸⁶ Likewise, Craxi expressed his concern on Latin American issues to the Peruvian President and he also reaffirmed his solidarity commitment to this region. In the latter, Chile remained a focus of particular worry for him⁹⁸⁷.

Accordingly, both before and after coming to power, Craxi always maintained a firm position against the regime and expressed his solidarity with the Chilean people. Within this context, although he could not attend the meeting of the SI Committee for Chile in July 1988 because of political issues in Italy, he sent a message to the attendees in which he noted that the PSI solidarity towards Chile had increased over time and he pledged that in a near future he would celebrate liberty with them. Despite Craxi’s absence, the PSI, however, participated at the SI Committee being represented by Giorgio Benvenuto (UIL’s leader) and Walter Marossi⁹⁸⁸. Alejandro Montesino, for his part, wrote a letter to Craxi in which he reported on the local situation and expected Craxi’s instructions on the international monitors. He pointed that the “Committees for the No” had risen sharply after the meeting of the SI committee. The announcement of the referendum had led to the reactivation of political willingness at grassroots level, an issue that contributed to enhancing his optimism on the plebiscite as well as leading to the opposition to request international observers during the referendum⁹⁸⁹.

Moreover, in public speeches, he often talked about the arrival of “Freedom Day” for Chile and he even compared it to the Spanish experience by noting that he will be present on that

⁹⁸⁶ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri. “Visita del Presidente del Consiglio on. Craxi, Madrid 24-25 maggio), 1984 *Testi e Documenti*, 362.

⁹⁸⁷ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, “Visita del Presidente della Repubblica Alan García Pérez, Roma, 9 Settembre”, 1986 *Testi e Documenti*, 217.

⁹⁸⁸ Bettino Craxi “Craxi ai Cileni siamo con voi”. *Avanti!* (2/7/1988). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201988%20-02%20Gennaio%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201989%20-31%20dicembre%20pag.%2040/CFI0422392_19880702.92-141_0001_d.pdf#search=cile&page=1

⁹⁸⁹ “Lettera 6 Alejandro Montesino a Craxi” Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.2 Ss.4 Ss.2 F.32 L.6).

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day as he was in Spain, and he fulfilled his promise⁹⁹⁰. After the plebiscite (“a day that fills us with joy”, he said⁹⁹¹), he returned to Chile by invitation of the Radical Party and the Chilean Socialist Party (his agenda also included the visit of Allende’s grave)⁹⁹². Likewise, the day of the victory of Patricio Aylwin, he immediately sent his congratulations to the new President and expressed his happiness towards the Chilean people, in particular towards the Radical and Socialist party. Now, he claimed, Italy and Chile were able to establish a new kind of relationship: real friendship, cooperation, and concrete solidarity. These were issues that all the Italian democratic forces strongly supported⁹⁹³.

That said, given the proximity between Craxi and Giorgio Benvenuto, it is interesting to note that the UIL founded the NGO *Progetto Sud* (“Southern Project”) in 1984 with the aim of carrying out international cooperation and the fight for human rights. As Benvenuto pointed out, the UIL played a key role in the international arena at the time. It established important links with Third World countries and developed cooperation policies, in addition to assisting the Latin American movements that fought for democracy⁹⁹⁴. In Chile, for instance, this NGO financed different projects related to the media, in particular the expansion of the radio network throughout the country during the democratization process of Chile. This program sought to give a “voice” to all the opposition forces that had been emarginated during Pinochet’s regime⁹⁹⁵. Some years later, however, in the middle of the *Tangentopoli* scandal, *Progetto Sud* was investigated because of suspected administrative irregularities. It appears that the NGO had used unlawful funds in order to favor and

⁹⁹⁰ “Discorso 139: Conferenza internazionale per la democrazia in Cile, Bologna” March 13, 1987.

⁹⁹¹ Bettino Craxi, “Un giorno che ci riempie l’animo di gioia”, *Avanti!* (7/10/1988). Retrieved from https://avanti.senato.it/avanti/js/pdfjs-dist/web/viewer.html?file=/avanti/files/reader.php?f%3DAvanti%201896-1993%20PDF_OUT/16.%20Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%201977-1989%20OCR/Ocr%20-D-/Avanti%20Ed.%20Nazionale%20dal%201988%20-02%20Gennaio%20pag.%2001%20al%20%201989%20-31%20dicembre%20pag.%2040/CFI0422392_19881007.92-223_0001_d.pdf#search=cile&page=1

⁹⁹² “Comunicato 14 Viaggio Craxi in Cile” Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.13 C.14).

⁹⁹³ “Fascicolo 125. Riunione della Direzione del 15 dicembre 1989”. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.2 Ss.2 Ss.3-F.125)

⁹⁹⁴ Giorgio Benvenuto, “Intervista a Giorgio Benvenuto, 10 giugno 2011”, *Il Crollo*, 86.

⁹⁹⁵ The information concerning the expansion of the Chilean radio network is available in “Progetto, Istituzione di una rete radiofonica in Cile” December 9, 1988. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.13 L15). Agostino Conte updated Craxi on the submission of the projects of *Progetto Sud* to Giuseppe Santoro, vice president for cooperation. “Lettera 15 Agostino Conte a Craxi”. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.9 Ss.2 F.13-L.15).

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finance some opposition parties all over the World, in particular in Chile (during the dictatorship) and in South Africa⁹⁹⁶. This, however, was somehow interconnected with the political and financial support that the PSI gave to the dissident groups, which was later known as *Conto protezione*. Apparently, the latter was a sort of “international policy instrument” that involved financial resources directed to the opposition groups and to the weakest democratic parties⁹⁹⁷.

In short, the support of the PSI and Craxi towards the Chilean cause was always present and it was also expressed in different ways. Craxi’s commitment was really noted and appreciated by Chileans. Within this context, for instance, the *Universidad de Concepción* in Chile granted him a *Honoris Causa* degree for his engagement in the international cooperation, his interest in the debt problem, and his fight for human rights⁹⁹⁸. In the same line of thought, the Chilean government paid tribute to the work of the PSI Secretary in the defense of Chilean human rights by naming a square in Santiago “Bettino Craxi”. During this ceremony, Ricardo Lagos recalled Craxi’s support and the fact that he together with the PSI assisted a lot of Chileans who saw him as an important political reference point⁹⁹⁹.

In this regard, it is worth recalling the words of Carlos Altamirano and Jorge Arrate. Altamirano indicated that the relations established with Bettino Craxi were interesting since they had similar concerns¹⁰⁰⁰. Similarly, Jorge Arrate highlighted both the strong commitment that Craxi had towards Chile (e.g. Craxi even “suggested” to Alitalia to not respect Pinochet’s instructions to international aviation, which was not to sell tickets to

⁹⁹⁶ “Inchiesta sulla cooperazione ‘avvisato’ anche Benvenuto”. *La Repubblica*, (5/5/1994). Retrieved from <https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1994/05/05/inchiesta-sulla-cooperazione-avvisato-anche-benvenuto.html>

⁹⁹⁷ Giuseppe La Ganga, “Intervista a Giuseppe La Ganga 20 giugno 2011. In *Il Crollo*, 146.

⁹⁹⁸ “Lettera 1297. Università di Concepción a Craxi” August 16, 1990, Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.13 A.1990 L.1297). This recognition had to be granted during the Craxi’s trip in Chile in late 1991 when he will attend the SI meeting there. He, however, was not able to take part in the meeting and Margherita Boniver traveled as representative of the PSI. “Fasciolo 169. Riunione dell’esecutivo 22 novembre 1991”, November 22, 1992. Fondazione Craxi (F.1 Sz.1 S.2 Ss.2 Ss.3 F.69).

⁹⁹⁹ Bettino Craxi “Grazie Bettino”. Ricardo Lagos, 2856.

¹⁰⁰⁰ According to Altamirano, Craxi organized a seminar to study the Chilean case (Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Régis Debray were some of the attendees). In reality, several activities were held in which Chile and the solidarity with the Chilean cause were the subjects of discussion. Salazar, *Conversaciones*, 7074. Tesi di dottorato di Luciana Fazio, discussa presso l’Università LUISS, in data 2020. Liberamente riproducibile, in tutto o in parte, con citazione della fonte. Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e didattici, con citazione della fonte.

those who had been banned from Chile¹⁰⁰¹), and the political influence that he had in the group *Concertación por la democracia* since they followed very closely Craxi's maneuvers to exclude the PCI from the government¹⁰⁰². Hence, the *Concertación* took inspiration from the Italian center-left experience and configured itself as a center-left group that precluded the Chilean communist party (because of its lack of renewal). Therefore, quoting Arrate, "the Berlinguer's breath, typical of the 'Chilean renewal', vanished over time to be replaced by Craxi's inspiration"¹⁰⁰³. In Chile, Craxi's option prevailed successfully (the *Concertación* ruled Chile for over twenty years), something that did not happen in Italy¹⁰⁰⁴. In the end, therefore, Craxi's influence and contribution went beyond solidarity and defense of human rights in Chile and it lasted for over twenty years.

5.3. Italy, Latin America and the EEC

The objective of this subchapter is twofold. Firstly, it aims to show how most of the Italian-Latin American relations were mainly developed under the umbrella of the EEC (Europeanization). This, however, does not mean that bilateral relations have not been developed. Secondly, it aims to examine Italy's behavior towards Latin America after the Spanish accession to the EEC. As already stated, the interest of Italy in Latin America was long-standing and on some occasions Rome even strived to include Latin American problems in the EEC's debates by presenting itself as a kind of "liaison" between the two regions.

To better understand the first point, a few examples will be addressed:

¹⁰⁰¹ Jorge Arrate, *Pasajeros en Tránsito*, (Santiago: Catalonia, 2018), Kindle edition, 3119.

¹⁰⁰² According to Sebastian Jans, Craxi and the PSI policy inspired, encouraged and influenced the agreement between Altamirano (Socialist Party), the Radical Party and the Chilean Christian Democrat Party. In this way, the first attempts to shape a real political opposition to the regime started to be devised. Jans, *El desarrollo*. 73. Alejandro Montesino also recognized the influence in terms of program that Craxi had on them. According to Montesino, for instance, they should take example of the Craxi's proposal to transfer part of the military expenditure to development cooperation; *this should be a first-rate programmatic flag*. Alejandro Montesino Heyer, *Entre historias*. (Santiago: Editorial Imprenta Ñielol S.A., 1993), 67.

¹⁰⁰³ Arrate, *Pasajeros*. 3131-3136.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Ibid*, pos. 3152.

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- (i) The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Bompard, visited Peru in order to strengthen the relationship between these two countries. This trip, however, formed part of a series of contacts that Italy had already established with the major Latin American countries. Indeed, Italy's main goal was to get to know their situation firsthand and their position with respect to the EEC. Moreover, Bompard underlined that since the presentation of the memorandum in November 1968¹⁰⁰⁵ on the relations between the EEC and Latin America, Italy had always supported their requests in the EEC and it would continue to do so.¹⁰⁰⁶ That said, this memorandum would be brought up more than once in the official speeches since it included the Italian government's request to develop EEC-Latin American relations. Furthermore, on the initiative of the Italian government, meetings between Latin American and the EEC representatives in Brussels were institutionalized in 1971. As a result, a meeting point for the dialogue between these two regions was achieved. In this way, as Mariano Rumor, the Foreign Minister, disclosed that Italy sought to promote and improve these transatlantic relations¹⁰⁰⁷.
- (ii) The Undersecretary of Commerce, Ferrari, traveled to Latin America in early 1974. During his stay, he met the President of the Andean Pact with whom he highlighted the role that Italy could play in the reinforcement of the economic links between both continents¹⁰⁰⁸.
- (iii) The Minister Matteotti, during a Summit of the IILA (the main topic was the trade relations between the EEC and Latin America), stressed the alignment of interests between these two groups of countries that would lead to improving their ties. Moreover, Matteotti emphasized the constant action of Italy in favor

¹⁰⁰⁵ Italy addressed this document to the EEC in which stressed the need to clarify the relations with Latin America. Likewise, the memorandum included a critic assessment of the effects of the PAC on the Latin American exports, in particular on the Argentinian exportations. Ángel Viñas, *Al servicio de Europa*, (Madrid: editorial complutense, 2004), 48.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Commissione di lavoro italo-peruviana, 27 marzo". In *1973 Testi e Documenti*, 268-269.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Discorso del ministro degli Esteri, on. Rumor, 1 giugno". In *1976 Testi e Documenti*, 125

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Convenzione tra l'Italia e i Paesi dell'accordo di Cartagena, 19 gennaio". In *1974 Testi e Documenti*, 192-193

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of Latin America within the EEC and urged the IILA to devise some programs aimed at improving the relations between these two regions¹⁰⁰⁹.

- (iv) In Caracas, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Granelli, informed the recent conference for European security about the developments and cooperation in which the relations towards Third World countries had been discussed (in particular towards Latin America). Likewise, he reviewed with the Venezuelans the action of Italy inside the EEC with the aim of enhancing the EEC interest on Latin America in the future¹⁰¹⁰.
- (v) In Lima, Granelli clearly affirmed: “Italy can and wants to be a real bridge between Latin America and Europe”. He also stressed that overcoming the underdevelopment in Latin America would coincide with the European efforts to build its own political unit at the service of a new world order, which would be based on equality, pluralism, and respect of human rights¹⁰¹¹.
- (vi) The first formal meeting between the EEC and the representatives from the Andean Pact was held in Brussels in May 1980. During this encounter, Colombo, who was heading the EEC delegation, claimed that for Italy it has been a great privilege chairing the European Council at the time that this ministerial meeting was taking place. Moreover, he urged those present to consider this appointment as the prelude of a dialogue between these two regions and not as the end point¹⁰¹².
- (vii) Colombo, during the meeting of the OSA in February 1982, stressed that Italy aimed at improving the relationships with Central American countries in a more

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, “Intervento del ministro Matteotti nella sede del Istituto Italo-Latino-americano, 15 ottobre”. In *1974 Testi e Documenti*, 195

¹⁰¹⁰ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, “Visita del sottosegretario agli esteri on. Granelli”. In *1974 Testi e Documenti*, 343.

¹⁰¹¹ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, “Riunione dei direttori degli istituti italiani di cultura a Lima, 2-8 dicembre”. In *1975 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Ufficio Studi), 103.

¹⁰¹² Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, “Prima riunione ministeriale CEE-Gruppo- Andino, Bruxelles, 5 maggio”. *1980 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1983), 376.

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committed way. Given the fact that Italy aimed at ensuring economic prosperity in the region, Colombo called the EEC to devise a joint project¹⁰¹³.

- (viii) As said, Italy strongly supported the Contadora's efforts and the San José Pact. Indeed, Colombo wrote a letter to the Colombian Foreign Minister, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, in which he informed Lloreda that Rome had already expressed its support to Contadora into two levels, initially on the bilateral plane (June 6, 1983) and immediately after in the EEC¹⁰¹⁴.
- (ix) In December 1984, Andreotti talked about the challenges and issues that Italy must address during its Presidency of the European Council. In his speech, he claimed that the Italian President would give special attention to Latin America and in particular to the developments of the San José Pact, to the defense of human and civil rights, and to the spread of democracy in the region (and in particular in Chile)¹⁰¹⁵.
- (x) In the period between 1986-1987, Central America became the third area for the Italian cooperation. Besides the bilateral assistance, Italy pushed the EEC to provide additional funds¹⁰¹⁶.
- (xi) In 1985, Craxi, as current President of the EEC and therefore as EEC representative, exhorted Ortega to reduce the tension in Central America and to restart the dialogue with the Contadora Group¹⁰¹⁷.

That said, these are just a few of examples (others have already been pointed out) that show how Italy turned to the EEC more than once to develop its external dimension. This, however, was actually part of the real nature of its foreign policy. Indeed, Italy has always been between a multilateral concept of international policy (to which it could delegate every decision) and the quest of its own scheme (i.e. an "Italian initiative"). However,

¹⁰¹³ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Il ministro degli Esteri on Colombo alla Camera dei Deputati, 3 marzo. In *1982 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1985), 71.

¹⁰¹⁴ "Letter from Emilio Colombo to Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo", July 28, 1983. From the archive of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chancellery), box38372, file 8.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Il ministro degli Esteri, on. Andreotti alla Commissione Esteri della Camera dei deputati, 12 dicembre). In *1984 Testi e Documenti*, 240

¹⁰¹⁶ Camera dei Deputati-Senato Italia, X legislature. "America Latina" *X Legislatura, Disegni di Legge e relazioni- Documenti* (Roma. 1987), 567.

¹⁰¹⁷ Lezzi, *Pagine*, 251.

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devising a solution to this dilemma was not an easy task because no one was willing to challenge the multilateral framework since it worked in Italy¹⁰¹⁸. Moreover, the EEC has always been a priority for all the Italian leaders because it has been the framework where Rome has been better able to perform and where it has enjoyed some success. In the other frames, Italy has had limited room for maneuver¹⁰¹⁹. This is why a large part of the Italian foreign policy (in particular regarding those areas where Rome had less contacts because they were more distant) ended up being Europeanized.

Nevertheless, non-EEC countries and movements also took advantage of the Europeanization of Italian foreign policy because in a number of occasions they asked Italy to intervene at the EEC level or to act as an “intermediary” between them and the Community. Just to give an example, in 1983, Felipe González asked Craxi for there to be greater involvement by the EEC in the Chilean situation. In fact, after ratifying his own commitment with Chilean people, Craxi urged the EEC to speak in favor of the Chilean forces that were struggling against Pinochet’s dictatorship¹⁰²⁰. The truth is that many EEC member countries, besides acting individually, worked inside the EEC and tried to push it to condemn Pinochet’s Junta, which they did. According to Alan Angell, in 1986 the European Parliament allocated ECU 2 million for the work of the NGOs in Chile. Also, it was strongly opposed to the Pinochet regime by welcoming the formation of an opposition alliance¹⁰²¹. Ángel Viñas, for his part, underlined the efforts made by the European Commission in supporting the democratization in Chile. According to Viñas, the Commission established an office in Santiago from where Dieter Oldekop informed the European institutions every day about the Chilean situation, the vicissitudes that the Chilean opposition experienced, the labors of the NGOs, and how the EEC funds were used. Thus, the EEC really tried to contribute to the Chilean democratization¹⁰²².

¹⁰¹⁸ Ferrari, *Manuale della politica estera*, 319.

¹⁰¹⁹ Giuseppe Mammarella, “Il Consiglio Europeo di Milano del giugno 1985”. In *La politica estera*, edited by Ennio Di Nolfo, 203.

¹⁰²⁰ “Craxi: inviteremo la CEE a pronunciarsi contro il regime”. (10/10/1983), *Il Giornale*. From the Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, Italy, box CPPE 2399

¹⁰²¹ Angell, *International Support*, 192.

¹⁰²² Viñas, *Al servicio*, 119.

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Likewise, the Latin American countries often aimed at going beyond the bilateral nexus with Italy, and therefore they were able to get closer to the EEC. For example, after the Falkland crisis, intense dialogues were held between some of the South American countries (e.g. Brazil and Colombia) and Italy (the only EEC member country besides Ireland that did not support the UK) in order to solve the UK-Argentina conflict. For many people, Italy acted as a good mediator between both regions. Indeed, many of the Latin American countries believed that close political dialogue with Italy and the EEC would avoid some political dilemmas (such as the Falkland crisis) as well as would favor greater economic collaboration among them¹⁰²³.

Having said that, with the Spanish accession to the EEC, Madrid became the point of contact between both regions. In this regard, Italy differed from Spain because despite having sometimes talked about becoming a sort of transatlantic “liaison”, it did not succeed or its impact was not so evident and effective. Why? The most likely explanation has been mentioned above, namely in the end Italy preferred to act through multilateral channels. Besides this, in the decades preceding the Spanish request for accession to the EEC, the U.S. had great influence and “power” in Latin America and no one sought or even imagined to challenge it. Furthermore, the Latin American situation was very complex at the time. At this point, however, it is interesting to note that when the global scenario began to change (which coincided with the democratization process in Spain), Italy “delegated” Latin American issues to Spain.

Even before the Spanish accession to the EEC, Italy started to envisage this scenario. Indeed, among the reasons why Rome supported Spanish membership in the Community, greater rapprochement with Latin America was one of them. By way of illustration, the Foreign Minister Forlani said in October 1977 that Europe could contribute to Latin American economic development and social improvement. In this context, the Spanish and

¹⁰²³ “L’Italia buona mediatrice tra Europa e America Latina”, *L’Unità*, (8/08/1982). Retrieved from https://archivio.unita.news/assets/derived/1982/08/08/issue_full.pdf

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Portuguese accession would become a useful tool for strengthening transatlantic relations; therefore, Italy welcomed and supported it.¹⁰²⁴

Likewise, during a meeting between Craxi and González in October 1984, the Italian Prime Minister reaffirmed his support for the Spanish accession and stressed that this would help Italy with some sensitive issues: the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Latin America. This last area was in fact depicted as a region towards which both countries were linked and towards which both were extremely committed. In this case, it is interesting to note that González (not a EEC member yet) urged Rome to work together with the aim of helping to bring Europe closer to Latin America¹⁰²⁵. González knew that he could count on Craxi regarding this issue.

In this line of thought, one year later, Craxi claimed that the Spanish accession to the EEC would give a fresh impetus to the EEC-Latin American partnership and he expected it to happen. Indeed, in Craxi's idea of Europe (i.e. a Europe of solidarity which would be mindful of its role and its responsibility to the world in general), Spain could make a great contribution. Cultural and historical bonds allowed Madrid to have a special relationship with Latin America; hence, the EEC would be able to establish greater links and further rapprochement with that region as soon as the accession was carried out¹⁰²⁶. Accordingly, it is possible to state that both Craxi and González shared similar positions with respect to Latin America; they were on the same side of the table¹⁰²⁷.

In sum, Italy maintained a close interest on Latin American issues throughout the years which even led it to express its willingness of becoming a "liaison" between them and

¹⁰²⁴ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Il ministro degli Esteri on. Forlani al Senato de la Repubblica, 18 ottobre". In *1977 Testi e Documenti sulla politica estera dell'Italia*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Srato, 1979), 88.

¹⁰²⁵ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, "Visita del Presidente del Governo Felipe González, Roma 14-15 Ottobre". In *1983 Testi e Documenti*, 260-261.

¹⁰²⁶ Similarly, Craxi remarked that Italy also enjoyed profound human and cultural linkage with Latin America; bonds that were still alive, he said. Ministero Degli Affari Esteri. "Visita del Presidente del Consiglio on. Craxi, Madrid 24-25 maggio), *1984 Testi e Documenti*, 364.

¹⁰²⁷ Many of those interviewed (e.g. Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo, Margherita Boniver, Walter Marossi) for this study confirmed that Craxi and González agreed on many things and Latin America was certainly one of them.

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Europe. Notwithstanding, the nature of Italian foreign policy implied that most of its initiatives ended up being developed under the umbrella of the EEC. In this regard, the Spanish accession was very welcomed by Italy since it considered that it would provide greater momentum to the EEC-Latin American relations. Both countries agreed on this issue since “the EEC and Latin America shared the values of our civilization”¹⁰²⁸.

This chapter has focused on the relationship between the PSI and Latin America, considering the EEC dimension also. The evolution of the PSI has been discussed with the aim of noting how it was unable to dominate the Italian left, how it participated in the government, and how it shifted under Craxi’s Secretary since it implied an ideological turn and a greater interest in the international dimension. In this regard, the SI was a good opportunity for Craxi’s PSI to extend its network of international contacts with which it shared common goals, and therefore allowed it to achieve great international prestige. Given the fact the national and international dimension are interconnected, this “new PSI internationalism” had effects on national politics. Hence, issues like human rights, development cooperation, North-South order, democracy, equality, and the arms race became part of the PSI’s rhetoric as they were for the SI. Within this context, the PSI interest in the Third World arose, and therefore its concern towards Latin America. In this light, this chapter addressed the relationships between the Italian socialist Party and Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Chile where the aforementioned principles ruled. Furthermore, the Party’s purposes and actions were often examined by alluding also to the government’s position since the PSI was not the majority party in Italy. The final part of this section dealt with the EEC dimension. Indeed, by referring to some examples, it aimed at showing how many of Italy’s actions in Latin America were carried out within the Community’s framework and how following Spanish accession, Italy’s “bridging role” was somehow blurred.

¹⁰²⁸ Ministero Degli Affari Esteri “Discorso del Presidente del Consiglio on. Craxi, Strasburgo, 17 aprile, *1985 Testi e Documenti*. 394.

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6. Final Remarks

Human rights, democracy, development, equality, and the North-South order were some of the concepts addressed more than once in this writing. All of these notions became the cornerstones of the SI's actions as well as of González and Craxi's external policy. However, these concerns, which implied going beyond national borders, were the result of the "erosion" of the bipolar scheme during the 1970s that, in turn, involved the economy, society, culture, and politics. Hence, phenomena such as globalization, interdependence, and transnational cooperation acquired a new impetus: the 1970s showed that most of the new challenges could not be faced within national boundaries anymore. This was something that the Socialists from the Northern countries understood; in fact, as they stated in the early 1970s, the main objective of social democracy must be to find solutions to citizens' real problems and intervention should be at a global level.

Accordingly, this new vision fell within the "shock of the 1970s", since not only were new sensitivities aroused, but also the awareness of the worldwide interdependence increased. As a matter of fact, places, cultures, and issues that apparently seemed to be very different, were actually interconnected by forming the *Global Community*. Adding to this, the Cold War's turning point enabled the emergence of "more autonomous policies" such as those devised by the European social democracy in Latin America (a sort of "Third Way"). Furthermore, the wave of dictatorships in Latin America contributed to the shift of the left wing forces since most of them started to increasingly appreciate democracy and to espouse the values of the European social democracy. All this facilitated the transatlantic dialogue, and therefore encouraged SI action outside the European borders.

Within this context, the SI "globalized" its policy during the second half of the 1970s, and therefore the interest on Latin America particularly grew since Allende's overthrow in Chile. Missions, study groups, international conferences, and even the establishment of a

regional committee became the SI *modus operandi* in Latin America. Moreover, one of the strong points of the SI was that it was a meeting point between different forces that encouraged the exchange of ideas and the establishment of contacts between parties and people from all over the world. This network contributed to raising awareness about problematic issues (inequality, violation of human rights, etc.) around the world and to strengthen ties of friendship and personal contacts between prominent leaders. As said, both González and Craxi, like Pérez and the Sandinistas, took advantage of this network to build up their international linkage, to identify international benchmarks (e.g. Brandt and Palme), and to increase international prestige that in turn contributed to enhancing their weight and legitimacy at national levels.

Besides the friendly ties that González and Craxi established among them, they shared similar experiences, e.g. their appointment as party secretaries, the ideological shifts inside their own parties, the challenge to face strong communist parties, the personalization of their leadership, the coming to power almost at the same time, and the importance that both leaders gave to the international dimension. Moreover, they were able to grasp in time the transformation that social democracy and the crisis of the welfare state had experienced in the 1970s (they possibly also learned by the “errors” or delays made by the Socialists from Northern Europe) and were able to adapt to it by even breaking with the traditional path of their own parties. Furthermore, their own national situation and position led both leaders to look for a change and therefore a rupture with the past. It is here that the international dimension assumed a relevant weight for them by providing them support, legitimacy, as well as a reference point. Thus, this renewal process led them to come to power in the 1980s.

Among the issues that Craxi and González shared, it is possible to point out their interest in Latin American matters. Of course, these interests were expressed in different manners and they had different impacts in their own international policies. At this point, it is also important to bear in mind that, among other things, the PSOE became a powerful and majority party inside Spain while the PSI was always the “third party” in Italy (even when Craxi came to power). This obviously implied that the efforts made by the PSI outside Italy

have been mainly developed at party level, and therefore that they had a limited impact in terms of public policies. At the government level, most of the Italian initiatives were carried out within the Community's framework. Indeed, since the 1960s Italy tried to expand and improve the Euro-Latin American relations by proposing itself as a sort of "liaison" between both continents. Nevertheless, with the Spanish accession to the EEC, Madrid somehow "assumed this task" while Italy mainly acquired a supportive attitude towards the initiatives developed by Spain on the other side of the Atlantic.

Having said that, however, it is also important to bear in mind that joining the EEC implied that Madrid had to respect the Community's directives (*"politique de la règle"*). Thus, the maneuverability of Spain inside the Community (which was not a political institution) ended up being extremely limited, and therefore González's endeavors could go no further. Notwithstanding, it is undeniable that important advances were carried out and they led to a greater and real rapprochement between the two regions.

That said, in regard to the PSOE, it is possible to "identify" three "periods" in the construction of relations with Latin America. Firstly, the PSOE established many contacts and links with Latin Americans in the late 1970s largely thanks to the SI action and policy. Secondly, those linkages started to be materialized in the early 1980s, namely once Felipe González came to power ("new Spanish diplomacy"). Indeed, under the PSOE administration, the Latin American policy achieved continuity and intensity as never before. Finally, after the Spanish accession to the EEC, Madrid looked to Europeanize its links to Latin America and Ibero-Americanize those with Europe. In this "third phase", the SI lost ground (but not disappeared) since the EEC became the main framework for Spanish action. Furthermore, in view of joining the EEC, some of the initial postulates of the PSOE changed (mainly the economic ones), while others (mainly political ones) were put into practice.

In regards to the PSI, it is undeniable that the SI had contributed to the party's internationalization by providing the spaces for enhancing its international contacts. Craxi, in fact, understood that in order to succeed, the PSI would have to change its course. As a

matter of fact, the political state of things in Italy (the DC and the PCI were the strongest parties) and its immobility would not allow the PSI to thrive if it did not reshape itself. Hence, Craxi strived for the party's renewal and within this context the international dimension acquired great relevancy. As said, Craxi looked for international support and legitimation in order to increase his "weight" at the national level and to renew the party. Thus, he attached importance to the SI's action and activities by sharing many of the SI principles (e.g. defense of human rights, democracy, development, and the North-South order). Indeed, most of them were the same principles advocated by the PSI during the time of Craxi's secretariat.

Overall, Craxi and González's position towards Latin America was broadly similar as illustrated by the following three case studies. In Nicaragua, for instance: (i) both leaders broadly supported the Sandinistas; (ii) both of them were members of the Committee for Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution; (iii) they called Ortega to hold free elections; (iv) they supported Contadora and the San José Pact, (iv) they believed that the pacification of Central America had to be carried out from inside; (v) they called Ortega and Reagan to continue the conversations of Manzanillo; and (vi) in certain occasions they also hesitated about the state of things in Nicaragua (for example, some of the issues that increased their mistrust were the delay in the elections, the proximities with Cuba, and the rumors that members of ETA and the Red Brigades were being hidden by the Sandinistas). Of course, their performance had different nuances and intensities since González's actions were more incisive, concrete, and visible while Craxi was more limited, subtle and more fluctuating.

In Venezuela, both leaders established good relationships with Carlos Andrés Pérez who also gave a lot of importance to the Venezuelan external dimension and to the SI membership (they shared common goals). Besides the personal links, the situation in Venezuela allowed for the development of relations at the government level. Within this context, the Italian administration and Italian entrepreneurs were very well disposed to close ties with Caracas. For his part, during the 1970s González formed a friendship with Pérez who was already very close to Brandt. Indeed, like the German SPD, AD really supported the PSOE during the democratic transition.

In Chile, González and Craxi strived for the respect of human rights and the democratization of the country. Not only did the meaning itself of Allende's overthrow led them to pay attention to Chile, but also they were interested in the mass exodus caused by the dictatorship. It is interesting to note that in Italy, the Chilean experienced linked all the political parties, trade unions, and companies; all of them, regardless of their own political credo, organized common demonstrations and collections to help the Chilean opposition to Pinochet's government. The fact that Spain was under Franco's regime during the first years of the Chilean dictatorship probably contributed to the election of Italy as an important destination for the victims of political persecution. However, the PSOE commitment with the Chilean cause was always present. Indeed, missions, conferences, and collections were carried out with the aim of promoting the democratization of the country and the respect of human rights. Direct criticisms against the Junta, requests for the release of political prisoners, public declarations on the violation of human rights in Chile, the provision of scholarships and jobs, and full support to the opposition group were some of the methods used by the PSOE, the PSI and the SI to help Chilean opponents. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the reciprocal influence in terms of ideology that the Chilean experience had on the PSOE and the PSI and vice versa. The European parties did not want to repeat the Chilean events, and therefore they sought to learn about it. The *Concertación por la democracia*, for its part, somehow took inspiration from the renewal of socialism that both González and Craxi carried out in their own parties. The *Concertación* learned about those movements that were exponents of a moderate socialism but that also included neoliberal policies since Chile had a neoliberal legacy. Similarly, the *Concertación* took inspiration from the Spanish democratization as well as from the Italian center-left experience and configured itself as a center-left group that precluded the Chilean communist party.

To put it in other words, it is possible to say that the SI played a key role in terms of the coordination of programs as well as the devising of common objectives; thus, it ensured an ideological alignment between these movements at the national (renewal of socialism and remoteness from Marxism) and international level (interest in the Third World). The PSOE

and the PSI, for instance, were part of this wave and during the 1980s in particular the former became a reference for the SI (as well as for other organizations, parties, and governments) in all issues concerning Latin America.

It is also worth remembering, however, that some international factors (i.e. the Cold War) conditioned the SI performance in the long run. As a result, despite the good intentions and certain international impact, the SI could not “compete” and “overcome” the bipolar order, and therefore it was unable to become a real “third international force”. Hence, the EEC became increasingly important for the materialization of the objectives. Of course, the EEC was already a central axis in the PSOE and PSI foreign policies, thus both parties sought to include the Latin American concerns at the Community level. The truth is that, the EEC started to paid attention to Latin America at the time by considering not only the economic aspects (the 1980s was a complex decade for Latin America because of the high debt burden), but also the political and social ones. Hence, a major rapprochement was experienced between them in which the socialist parties (many of them in government) and the SI played a great part in it. Accordingly, although many of the EEC-Latin American initiatives launched at the time did not take a leap forward in terms of real advances, it cannot be denied that important groundwork was established at the time. This explains why the study of this period became relevant.

That said, the events that took place at the end of the 1980s probably contributed to the slowdown in the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union led the EEC to mainly focus on Central and Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding, thanks to Spain’s continuous effort¹⁰²⁹ and to some relevant international transformations (e.g. liberalizing and globalizing dynamics, the Latin American democratization, and the Maastricht Treaty with the definition of the Common Foreign and Security Policy), certain cooperation projects in Latin America and economic

¹⁰²⁹ According to Ángel Viñas, besides the Spanish Members of the European Parliament, a group of Italians and Germans have tried for a number of years to awake the interest of the European Council and Commission on the Latin American matters. Within this context, during an informal meeting between the Ministers from the EEC and those from the Rio Group (in late 1990), De Michelis urged his partners to hold a special encounter in Rome in order to revive the dialogue between both regions and to demonstrate the existing political will to move the EEC/Latin American relations. Viñas, *Al servicio*, 143-144.

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relations were included in the EEC/EU agenda. These were added to the “political” principles developed in the previous decade.

In this regard, some achievements were registered: (i) the EEC Regulation n. 443/92 for international cooperation, which was the action and financing of projects in Latin America by the European Investment Bank; (ii) the increase in foreign direct investments in Latin America, especially since the mid 1990s (the Iberian countries encouraged these EU investments)¹⁰³⁰; (iii) the signing of a third-generation cooperation agreement with various Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Paraguay, and Brazil) and sub-regions (Andean Pact and Central America)¹⁰³¹ as well as those of the fourth-generation in mid the 1990s (Mexico, Chile, and Mercosur); (iv) the IV Ministerial Meeting of the Rio Group that was held in 1994; and (v) the summits of the European Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean (EU-LAC) launched in Rio in 1999.¹⁰³²

However, despite good intentions, many of the initial expectations could not be fully accomplished. Some factors contributed to the weakening of the state of relations between

¹⁰³⁰ Quoting the 2018 ECLAC report, “in the second half of the 1990s, the European Union became the main source of foreign direct investment inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean [...] the new conditions allowed the entry of new actors, mainly from Spain and Portugal. As a result, Latin America and the Caribbean became the main destination for European investments in emerging and developing economies and their second largest non-European destination after North America. For example, over 80% of Spanish and Portuguese investment in emerging markets went to Latin America and the Caribbean”. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018* (LC/PUB2018/13-P), Santiago, 2018, 168. In recent years, the foreign direct investment in Latin America continues to be dominated by Spain (which represented the 29% of EU investments), being it in turn followed by Germany (16%), United Kingdom (13%), Italy (12%) and France (11%). *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁰³¹ According to Incisa Di Camerana, Italy introduced a democratic clause in 1987 as a preliminary condition for the bilateral accords; this later became a *sine qua non* requirement of the EEC in the “third generation” agreements with Latin America. Di Camerana, “Il risveglio della democrazia” 160.

¹⁰³² See: Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y relaciones con América Latina. Iberoamericanidad, europeización y atlantismo en la política exterior española* (Madrid, Fundación Carolina-Siglo XXI, 2011). The EU–LAC generated great expectation among the actors involved. Nevertheless, the results of these summits (which were held every two years since 1999 to 2010) did not always meet the initial expectations. Since 2013, these summits have been held inside the framework of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). For a brief overview of these summits see: Lourdes García Rodríguez and Fernando Jiménez Valderrama, “Balance de la asociación entre América Latina y el Caribe y la Unión Europea. La nueva agenda”. *IUS*, n. 33, (2014): 7-33. Moreover, within this context it was inaugurated the Euro-Latin American Parliament Assembly (Eurolat), i.e., a parliamentary institution of the Bi-regional Strategic Association established in the first EU-LAC Summit in 1999. Eurolat was created in 2006 with the purpose of adopting and submitting resolutions and recommendation to all the actors in charge of development of the Bi-regional Strategic Association. All the information and documents of Eurolat are available in the following website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/menu_en.htm

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the two regions, just to name a few: (i) the enlargement of the European Union as the “new members” are less interested in Latin America than those of the former EU of only fifteen countries; (ii) for the European Union, the displacement of the global economy towards the Asia-Pacific area has reduced the primacy of the Atlantic one; and (iii) security has become a serious matter (in particular since 2001), which has led the European Union to pay more attention to the conflicts in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Hence, there has been a deadlock in Euro-Latin American relations and thus a sort of “routinization” in their dealings is currently being experienced.

In addition to the above, Carlos Malamud also noted: (i) the asymmetries between the two regions (in terms of economy, technology, military, integration, etc.); (ii) the political changes in Latin America in the new millennium (e.g. Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales); (iii) the lack of clear proposals by both regions; (iv) the reduction in the EU’s development assistance following the 2008 crisis; and (v) the shared feeling of an economic and political superiority of the European Union over Latin America. All of these have created additional constraints in the development of the relations at the bi-regional level¹⁰³³. Moreover, asymmetries, poor integration in Latin America (and even the different types of regionalism)¹⁰³⁴, the lack of a real European foreign policy, and the existence of different interests have entailed the prevalence of bilateral relations over the regional ones. Many of the purposes of the late 1970s/1980s (development, respect for human rights, democracy, etc.) have endured over time without making real progress, and therefore often remain embedded in the “framework of good intention” to be developed later.

¹⁰³³ Carlos Malamud, “Las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América Latina en el siglo XXI: entre el voluntarismo y la realidad”. *Working paper*, n. 6, 2010.

¹⁰³⁴ During the 2000s different initiatives were launched in Latin America formed by different countries: the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Pacific Alliance. According to Cintia Quiliconi and Raúl Salgado Espinoza, “regional initiatives in Latin America have proliferated in a sort of à la carte mode in which new institutions have been created to address different topics related to political and strategic objectives of regional leaders instead of deepening or adapting traditional regional integration initiatives focused on trade [...] three types of regionalism have emerged in Latin America. These are: Post-Liberal Regionalism as exemplified by UNASUR and ALBA; Open Regionalism Reloaded, which takes place in the Pacific Alliance; and Multilateral Regionalism as represented by the role that CELAC is playing in the region”. Cintia Quiliconi and Raúl Salgado Espinoza, “Latin American integration: Regionalism à la Carte in a Multipolar World? *Colombia Internacional* (92), 2017, 18. As we known, over time, these initiatives have also undergone important transformations since in a number of occasions the members have left the organizations e.g. Unasur.

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This state of things is broadly recognized. For example, in the European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2017 (Strasbourg) on EU political relations with Latin America, it was clearly stated: “the Bi-regional Strategic Partnership between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) that was launched in June 1999 to strengthen relations between the two regions is not yet a consolidated achievement”¹⁰³⁵. Likewise, it was also stressed:

“The long-lasting partnership between the EU and LAC countries is founded on historical, cultural, human and economic ties, which must not be taken for granted and should be more horizontally oriented [and] underlines that the EU-LAC bi-regional partnership is based on common principles, values and interests such as democracy, human rights, peace and solidarity, the rule of law and an independent judiciary as well as a commitment to uphold them in a horizontal relationship and has become critical to the advancement of the bi-regional and cooperation exchanges; stresses that in the wake of the economic crisis, the EU and LAC countries are facing common challenges in the areas of sustainable economic growth and the fight against unemployment, digital transformation, social inclusion and gender equality, while at the same time sharing common values”¹⁰³⁶.

Accordingly, not only is there an awareness of the poor achievements in bi-regional relations, as well as in the immobility of principles and goals, but also the consciousness that both sides “are facing common challenges”. Here lies the importance of overcoming the current “routinization” in their relations, besides the fact that both Europe and Latin America should establish a counterweight since the “sovereign” actors currently tend to dominate the international agenda¹⁰³⁷. Recalling again the words of Zaiki Laïdi, both

¹⁰³⁵ European Parliament, “Resolution of 13 September 2017 on EU political relations with Latin America (2017/2027(INI))”. Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0345_EN.html?redirect

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁷ According to Luis Simón, the great challenge for the EU lies in understanding how to reconcile the idea of being both a subject (i.e. having ‘strategic autonomy’) and an object (i.e. being the ‘battleground of great-power competitions). Luis Simón, “Subject and object: Europe and the emerging great-power competition”. Elcano Royal Institute. Expert Comment n. 17/2009, (30/05/2019). Retrieved from: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/commentary-simon-subject-object-europe-and-the-emerging-great-power-competition

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Europe and Latin America require a strong multilateral system “to survive” on the international level and to contrast such “sovereign” actors¹⁰³⁸. They “need to find new allies in the face of its growing loss of geopolitical influence in the world, in particular since the current global challenges [...] offer new opportunities and cooperation channels for the EU-LAC partnership to operate where a common vision and agenda should be shared”.¹⁰³⁹

As a result, the bi-regional dialogue assumed greater importance as well as the awareness that it is important to act as regions and not as single states. Clearly, there are many local situations that are hindering and challenging the development of a common bi-regional action (e.g. the current situation in Venezuela or Nicaragua, the EU intergovernmentalism in foreign matters, and the increasingly Eurosceptic movements that have put the EU itself to the test, etc.). However, although the present political and economic situation around the world is quite complex, both regions should provide content to their relations, for instance, by defining common projects to tackle global problems. Within this context, the achievement of multilateral agreements assumed relevancy, such as the European Council concluded on May 13, 2019, “joint action by the two regions has been instrumental in the achievement of landmark multilateral agreements such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and the Paris Agreement”¹⁰⁴⁰. This could be a starting point in order “to overcome” the large asymmetries.

Likewise, both regions should know how to take advantage of the EU foreign direct investment in Latin America (over the past few years, Latin America received over 50% of its foreign direct investment from Europe) in particular since there are three fields “in which the European companies have great potential to contribute to sustainable development in the region through quality foreign direct investment”¹⁰⁴¹ (renewable energies [green technologies], telecommunications [digital economy], and the automotive

¹⁰³⁸ Laïdi, “¿Sobrevirá Europa..?”

¹⁰³⁹ European Parliament, “Resolution”.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions of the Joint Communication on EU relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘Joining forces for a common future’”. Brussels, May 13, 2019. Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39346/eu-lac.pdf>

¹⁰⁴¹ Economic Commission, *Foreign Direct*, 168.

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sector). Nevertheless, as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report underlined, “these are opportunities not automatic process that will come to fruition on their own”¹⁰⁴². Hence, “cooperation between Latin America and the European Union should target a significant part of its efforts on developing strategic partnerships between firms and institutions on the two continents”¹⁰⁴³. In other words, there are opportunities to strengthen the bi-regional relations, and it is just time to seize them.

In this regard, certain progresses seem to have been made with the agreements between the EU and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). After twenty years, the accord was finally reached on June 28, 2019. This agreement lies within the framework of increasing protectionism launched by U.S. President Donald Trump and his threat of blocking the World Trade Organization (WTO). Additionally, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU (“Brexit”) in 2016 probably has become an additional factor that has encouraged the EU to seek new commercial agreements (e.g. Canada, Japan, Mercosur). Since the Brexit, in fact, the EU has expanded its free trade zone to 500 million people¹⁰⁴⁴. Likewise, the Mercosur accord falls within a mutual interest between the two sides. On one hand, the current Mercosur governments, being more open to globalization and free trade (the previous administrations were more prone to protectionism), have played a key role in the development and achievement of the agreement. On the other, countries like France and Ireland for the first time accepted liberalizing their agricultural sector with the Mercosur States. Of course, their acceptance was not an easy task and Spain played an important role in this.

¹⁰⁴² Ibid. 195.

¹⁰⁴³ Ibid. 196.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Rebeca Grynspan Mayufi, “Acuerdo UE-Mercosur: un poderoso mensaje” *El País* (5/07/2019). Retrieved from https://elpais.com/economia/2019/07/03/actualidad/1562170553_664559.html Among other things, “Brexit” has also opened a debate on high education, innovation and research in the UK and the EU. In this regard, it is interesting to note the position of Fernando Galván, President of the Academic Permanent Forum for Latin America, Caribbean and the EU (FAP ALC-UE), who argues that Latin America should occupy the vacuum that “Brexit” would leave in terms of higher education and research mobility. According to him, “Latin America and the Caribbean education is one of the great global challenges we need to face, not only versus the Brexit and within the European Union, but also at an intra-regional level”. Fernando Galván, “After Brexit: the challenges of higher education in Europe and Latin America”. *Europolity*, vol. 11, n.2, 2017.

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Indeed, Madrid with the support of Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Czech Republic, Sweden, and Lithuania pushed the EU to conclude the agreement in particular since France together with Ireland, Belgium, and Poland showed some skepticism about the accord. These hesitations were not only linked to the agricultural field but also with environmental issues and worker's rights. Nevertheless, the impasse was overcome (the Mercosur governments joined the Paris Agreement on climate change) and the supporters of the accord underlined that besides the economic and environmental advantages, this deal would demonstrate at the global level that international trade is beneficial to everyone if it is based on "dialogue, cooperation, and fair rules"¹⁰⁴⁵. According to Luis Doncel, the novelty of this treaty relies on the fact that it provides complementarity between the two blocs, i.e., agricultural products (a strong point for Mercosur countries) and manufacturing and service sectors (the EU's strength)¹⁰⁴⁶. Certainly, the commitment of the Mercosur countries to the Paris agreement is a success for the EU, since the latter is making efforts to include an environmental engagement in all its commercial treaties¹⁰⁴⁷. Thus, an important target was achieved. Now the two parts should strive for its full implementation as well as to overcome the challenges posed by the Argentinian current economic situation (and the recent presidential elections) and the problem of deforestation in the Amazon.

Accordingly, on the basis of these brief remarks (with no intention or illusion of covering this issue comprehensively), it is possible to say that the EU and Latin America are today in a critical juncture. They could become closer by giving greater substance to their "traditional" relations or they could move in different directions. International matters and mainly the radical position of the "sovereign" actors could encourage them to undertake the first path just as the Mercosur agreement has demonstrated. Likewise, the sharing of

¹⁰⁴⁵ Luís Pellicer, "España impulsa una petición para que Bruselas culmine las negociaciones con Mercosur", *El País* (22/06/2019). Retrieved from

https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/21/actualidad/1561114089_891080.html

¹⁰⁴⁶ Luis Doncel, "España ante el acuerdo UE-Mercosur: júbilo en las fábricas de coches, preocupación en el campo". *El país* (14/07/2019). Retrieved from

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¹⁰⁴⁷ Carlos Malamud and Federico Steinberg, "El Acuerdo UE-Mercosur: ¿Quién gana, quién pierde y qué significa el acuerdo? Elcano Royal Institute. 78/2019 (1/7/2019). Retrieved from: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari78-2019-malamud-steinberg-acuerdo-ue-mercosur-quien-gana-quien-pierde-que-significa-el-acuerdo

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common values and goals (often linked to global concerns) has become a good point of contact between them. Nevertheless, internal issues (that reveal the great heterogeneity between the two regions and often inside themselves) could potentially undermine the achievements reached to date and those that could come. Perhaps, the appointment of the Spaniard Josep Borrell as Head of the EU Diplomacy, with his extensive political experience, could somehow foster the bi-regional dialogue by bridging new links¹⁰⁴⁸. However, as history has taught us, anything can happen.

¹⁰⁴⁸ In order to know the real opportunities (administrative and political resources) that the Head of the EU diplomacy has to lead the international action of the EU, see Paula Lamoso González, “Un nuevo liderazgo en política exterior para una Europa más fuerte en el mundo”, Elcano Royal Institute 85/2019 (15/05/2019). Retrieved from http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari85-2019-lamosogonzalez-nuevo-liderazgo-politica-exterior-para-europa-mas-fuerte-mundo

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- 6/12/1963
- 28/07/1974
- 25/05/1975
- 27/05/1975
- 6/08/1975
- 27/01/1976
- 25/05/1976
- 27/05/1976
- 7/08/1976
- 17/11/1976
- 20/11/1976
- 21/11/1976
- 27/11/1976
- 30/03/1978
- 31/03/1978
- 1/04/1978
- 2/04/1978
- 3/04/1978
- 30/09/1978
- 1-2/10/1978
- 3/10/1978
- 5/12/1978
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- 20/07/1979
- 23-24/07/1979
- 28/07/1979
- 29-30/07/1979
- 10/08/1979
- 19/09/1979
- 28/09/1979
- 7/10/1979
- 21/10/1979
- 4/12/1979
- 21/12/1979
- 19/02/1980
- 28/03/1980
- 2/10/1980
- 16-17/11/1980
- 18/02/1981
- 21/04/1981
- 26-27/04/1981
- 1/05/1981
- 20/07/1981
- 11/11/1981
- 1/03/1982
- 18/03/1982
- 1/04/1982
- 6/04/1982
- 22/05/1982
- 1/12/1983
- 14/12/1983
- 17/06/1986
- 18/06/1986
- 29/01/1988
- 2/7/1988
- 7/10/1988
- 12/11/1989
- 9/12/1989
- 20/03/1990
- 22/06/1990
- 23/6/1990
- 3/11/1990
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Corriere della Sera

- 25/05/1976

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- 22/06/1976
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El Correo Español y el Pueblo Vasco

- 8/05/1977

El Día

- 7/02/1977
- 8/12/1985

El Mercurio

- 25/11/1979

El País

- 7/05/1977
- 10/05/1977
- 31/08/1977
- 6/05/1979
- 20/07/1979
- 12/11/1980
- 14/11/1980
- 27/06/1981
- 31/01/1982
- 18/02/1982
- 22/12/ 1982
- 26/04/1983
- 18/01/1984
- 26/12/1985
- 28/02/1988
- 7/10/1988
- 18/12/1988
- 20/10/1990
- 28/01/2010
- 25/01/2019
- 22/06/2019
- 5/07/2019
- 14/07/2019

El Socialista

- 11/11/1977
- 25/11/1980
- 1-15/01/1989

Il Giornale

- 10/10/1983
- 12/12/1983
- 18/03/1986

L'Unità

- 8/08/1982
- 20/07/1986

La Repubblica

- 10/12/1989
- 5/5/1994

La Stampa

- 15/01/2010

Le Monde

- 3/03/1976
- 18/08/ 1979

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- 14/01/1984

The New York Times

- 7/08/1979
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