



Ukrainian Youth and Ukraine in Europe

Document Version

Accepted author manuscript

[Link to publication record in Manchester Research Explorer](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Onuch , O., & Arkwright, C. (2021). Ukrainian Youth and Ukraine in Europe: A Cohort Analysis of the Drivers of Attitudes toward the EU. *Demokratizatsiya*, 29(4), 409. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/805820>

Published in:

Demokratizatsiya

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Ukrainian Youth & Ukraine in Europe:

A cohort analysis of the drivers of attitudes towards the
EU

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Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization
Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies,
Volume 29, Number 4, Fall 2021
pp. 409-448

<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/805820>

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Acknowledgements

We acknowledge funding associated with this research. Data employed in this paper come from the Open Research Area funded MOBILISE project (www.mobiliseproject.com) Grant Ref ESRC ES/S015213/1. And we also acknowledge a NWDTP ESRC Case Studentship Grant awarded to Onuch and The British Council in Kyiv and held by Arkwright at the University of Manchester. This grant is titled: “Youth Engagement in Young Democracies.”

We would like to thank the editors and other contributors of this Special Issue - who have all offered constructive feedback on our earlier drafts. But we would especially, and very sincerely, like to thank anonymous Reviewer 2 for their extremely kind words on our submission.

Finally, we would like to thank the whole MOBILISE project team “family,” and namely Country PIs and Co-Is (David Doyle, Evelyn Ersanilli, Gwendolyn Sasse, Sorana Toma, and Jacquelin Van Stekelenburg), Post-Doctoral Researchers (Piotr Goldstein, Felipe Gonzalez-Santos, and Sébastien Michiels), and PhD Students/PhD Research Assistants (Astrid Bodini, Kostiantyn Fedorenko, Anna Glew, and Alina Nychyk).

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A cohort analysis of the drivers of attitudes towards the EU

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Accepted for publication in “*Demokratyzatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*” as part of a special issue.

July 07, 2021

ABSTRACT: Using the original MOBILISE survey dataset (Onuch et al. MOBILISE 2019), we conduct statistical analyses accounting for between-cohort patterns in support for Ukraine’s EU accession. Whilst controlling for age, we devise two sets of political event cohorts: the first, testing the so-called “EuroMaidan Generation” hypothesis, we create cohorts based around major moments of mass mobilization; the second testing established political science theory around political socialization during critical elections. Based on our analysis, we demonstrate that surprisingly the “2019 election cohort” (those who could first vote when Zelenskyy won the Presidency) and not the “2014” (Proshenko election) or “EuroMaidan” cohorts are most likely to support EU accession, even when we control for period and age effects, as well as, other notable correlates. Moreover, unlike the effect of age, which all but disappears once we control for geographic ‘region of residence’ and socio-economic variables, the effect of belonging to the “the 2019 cohort” (Zelenskyy election) persists and only dissipates when we control for migration intention. Additionally, in line with expectations about common drivers of holding pro-EU policy preferences in the literature - we also confirm that one’s socio-economic situation, geographic residence, and their holding pro-democratic views are also correlated to and explain variation in preferences for Ukraine’s EU accession. Notably, we find no evidence that either language or ethnicity are key driving factors.

Introduction

Are youth in post-communist contexts, more likely to hold pro-European Union (EU) foreign policy views? And does the political socialization experience of living through a national pro-EU mass protest play a critical role in shaping future foreign policy preferences towards the EU? More specifically, in countries such as Ukraine, that have experienced multiple pro-EU mass mobilizations, should we expect to see the rise of “generations” of “youth” who are more likely to support EU accession, as some observers suggest¹ - or - is the process of political socialization more much complicated, going beyond the experience of living through critical mass events during one’s “youth” and more likely to be linked to experience of other critical political events? And thus, in-line with key social science theory, should we instead expect to see a development of diverse political cohorts that also differ on policy preferences even when controlling for age? Looking at the case of Ukraine, we test the above competing hypotheses to assess which types of political socialization, if any, are related to pro-EU foreign policy views among Ukrainians and how this relates to youth specifically.

Although it is popularly assumed that those born after transition to democracy in 1991 are more likely to hold foreign policy preferences that favor EU membership, recent research shows that Ukrainian “youth” (often also referred to as “generations” of “youth”) are increasingly less likely to be supportive of accession.² These findings are perhaps unsurprising as what it means to be young in a given society, and conversely the opportunities afforded to and obstacles faced by this group, change over time. In fact, social science research has repeatedly highlighted that we have to go beyond the presumed effects of “age” or “life cycle” stage and instead, focus on political “cohort” effects which different from “generation” effects (see footnote 2) and may not follow

¹ We only use these terms (generations and youth) here in reference to how they are used by some observers and scholars: DW. 2016. “The Maidan Generation.” November 9, 2016. At <https://www.dw.com/en/the-maidan-generation/a-36325609/>, accessed February 2021; Diuk, Nadia. 2014. “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.” *World Affairs* 176 (6): 9.; Korbut, Anna. 2017. “The Young and the Restless of the Maidan Generation.” *The American Interest* (blog). October 31, 2017. At <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/10/31/young-restless-maidan-generation/>, accessed February 2021; Polakiwsky, Yuri. 2020. “Where Are the Transformational Leaders of Ukraine’s Maidan Generation?” *New Europe* (blog). October 22, 2020. At <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/where-are-the-transformational-leaders-of-ukraines-maidan-generation/>, accessed February 2021 (see also footnote 2). In this piece we focus on and distinguish “cohorts” (those who during their impressionable years – were exposed to and socialized during a critical political moment like a key election or moment of mass mobilization) from a focus on “youth” (a life cycle effect) and period effects (the temporality of generalized political experiences in a particular year or cluster of years). We also note that there is a debate about the difference between “generation” and cohort in the extant literature (see: Baltes, Paul B. 1968. “Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Sequences in the Study of Age and Generation Effects.” *Human Development*. 11:3, pp145–71. Brown, Robyn Lewis, and Deana A. Rohlinger. 2016. “The Effect of Political Generation on Identity and Social Change: Age Cohort Consequences.” *Journal of Women & Aging*, 28:2, pp 96–111. Kupper, Lawrence L., Joseph M. Janis, Azza Karmous, and Bernard G. Greenberg. “Statistical Age-Period-Cohort Analysis: A Review and Critique.” *Journal of Chronic Diseases*, 38:10. pp 811–30. Markert, John. 2004. “Demographics of Age: Generational and Cohort Confusion.” *Journal of Current Issues & Research in Advertising*, 26: 2) and that not all scholars of the APC approach find it useful to distinguish between the two, but in this paper we distinguish also cohort (as defined above) from “generation” which we understand to capture age-based groups of individuals clustered around sequenced years of birth. We also address this in the framing of the analysis section for full details of our conceptualization please see that section.

² Gaidai, Daria, Kateryna Zarembo, Leonid Litra, Olga Lyman, and Sergiy Solodkyy. 2017. “Ukrainian ‘Generation Z’: Attitudes and Values.” *Tsentr “Nova Ievropa”* (blog). November 22, 2017. At <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/ukrayinske-pokolinnya-z-tsinnosti-ta-oriyentyry/>, accessed February 2021; Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2018. “Ukraine’s Youth: Politically Disinterested and Low Trust in the EU.” *Carnegie Europe*. January 29, 2018. At <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/75372/>, accessed February 2021.

linear trajectories over time³. Accordingly, political socialization (into cohorts) is believed to occur when citizens are in their “impressionable years” (between 18-25).⁴ It is the experience of key political events that require direct political engagement of a large proportion of citizens, which is believed to shape future political behavior and dispositions across the cohort (even among those who did not participate).⁵ More specifically, highly competitive (high turnout/close outcome), polarizing (party platforms or electorate), or controversial (scandalous or fraudulent) elections are expected to be most influential. But a question remains, can the experience of living through mass-mobilization during one’s impressionable years also have the same effect as a critical election? And if so, in the case of Ukraine, can we observe a EuroMaidan cohort effect? Or, are we likely to only observe electoral cohort and not mass protest cohort effects?

Popular discourse on Ukraine highlights the role of key mass mobilizations in shaping political divides in the country and specifically pro or anti EU policy orientation.⁶ Many even highlight (what *they* term) a “EuroMaidan Generation” – a political cohort of youth socialized during the protests thought to be more supportive of EU accession.⁷ Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the political experience of living through the EuroMaidan could have an important formative effect shaping future policy dispositions. Not only is the EuroMaidan popularly acknowledged as a critical juncture,⁸ youth engagement in it seems to correlate with support for the protest demand of closer ties with the EU.⁹ Thus, if experiencing mass-mobilization in one’s impressionable

³ Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2014. “Communist Socialization and Post-Communist Economic and Political Attitudes.” *Electoral Studies* 33: 77–89; Smets, Kaat, and Anja Neundorf. 2014. “The Hierarchies of Age-Period-Cohort Research: Political Context and the Development of Generational Turnout Patterns.” *Electoral Studies* 33: 41–51.

⁴ It is now relatively established (although not without some debate) in psychology that socially and politically “impressionable years” of an individual’s life are those between 18 and 25. For seminal studies that unpack this pattern please see: Newcomb, Theodore Mead. 1943. “Personality and Social Change; Attitude Formation in a Student Community.” Dryden Press; Newcomb, Theodore Mead, Kathryn E. Koenig, Richard Flacks, and Donald P. Warwick. 1967. *Persistence and Change: Bennington College and Its Students after Twenty-Five Years*. New York: Wiley; and Alwin, Duane Francis, Ronald Lee Cohen, and Theodore Mead Newcomb. 1991. *Political Attitudes over the Life Span: The Bennington Women after Fifty Years*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

⁵ Barnes, Samuel H., et al. 1979. “Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies,” At <http://pocarisweat.umdl.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/99194>, accessed February 2021; Bartels, Larry M., and Simon Jackman. 2014. “A Generational Model of Political Learning.” *Electoral Studies* 33: 7–18; Hyman, Herbert. 1959. *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

⁶ Katchanovski, Ivan. 2014. “East or West? Regional Political Divisions in Ukraine since the ‘Orange Revolution’ and the ‘Euromaidan.’” In *Regional Political Divisions in Ukraine since the ‘Orange Revolution’ and the ‘Euromaidan’*. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2454203/ accessed February 2021; Walker, Edward W. 2014. “Ukraine: Divided Nation, Divided State.” *Eurasian Geopolitics* (blog). March 14, 2014. <http://eurasiangeopolitics.com/2014/03/14/ukraine-divided-nation-divided-state/>, accessed February 2021.

⁷ See: DW. 2016. “The Maidan Generation.” November 9, 2016. At <https://www.dw.com/en/the-maidan-generation/a-36325609/>, accessed February 2021; Diuk, Nadia. 2014. “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.” *World Affairs* 176 (6): 9; Korbut, Anna. 2017. “The Young and the Restless of the Maidan Generation.” *The American Interest* (blog). October 31, 2017. At <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/10/31/young-restless-maidan-generation/>, accessed February 2021; Polakowsky, Yuri. 2020. “Where Are the Transformational Leaders of Ukraine’s Maidan Generation?” *New Europe* (blog). October 22, 2020. At <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/where-are-the-transformational-leaders-of-ukraines-maidan-generation/>, accessed February 2021. This should not be confused with what psychology or political science literature would term a “generation.”

⁸ Ikani, Nikki. 2019. “Change and Continuity in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Ukraine Crisis as a Critical Juncture.” *Geopolitics* 24 (1): 20–50.

⁹ Onuch, Olga. 2014. “Who Were the Protesters?” *Journal of Democracy* 25 (3): 44–51; Onuch, Olga. 2014. “Social Networks and Social Media in Ukrainian ‘Euromaidan’ Protests.” *Washington Post* (blog). January 2, 2014. At <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/02/social-networks-and-social-media-in-ukrainian-euromaidan-protests-2/>, accessed February 2021; Onuch, Olga. 2015. “Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks.” *Problems of Post-Communism* 62: 1–19.

years was a socializing and political *cohort* coalescing event, the EuroMaidan is a perfect test case and being part of the EuroMaidan *cohort*, should specifically align with pro-EU accession views.

Alas, as we show below, the story may be less straightforward and expectations around the relationship between “youth,” “EuroMaidan” socialization, and “pro-EU accession” preferences do not align. Following political socialization literature, we propose that that living through moments of mass protest, like the EuroMaidan is unlikely to have a greater impact on impressionable youth than key elections would.¹⁰ We instead argue that critical elections are more powerful political cohort building events creating shared imagined policy realities, perspectives, and preferences within *cohorts*.

Using the original MOBILISE survey dataset (Onuch et. al. 2109), we conduct statistical analyses accounting for between-cohort patterns in support for Ukraine’s EU accession. Whilst controlling for age, we devise two sets of political cohorts. First, testing the “EuroMaidan Generation” cohort hypothesis, we create political cohorts based around major moments of mass mobilization. If the above-mentioned popular expectations of socialization in a “EuroMaidan” cohort are correct we should observe that *those who were of an impressionable age (18-25) at the time* would be more likely to align with its main claims and support EU accession. The second set of cohorts is based around critical elections post-1991 - whereby *those who were first able to vote in a given election* (and thus, were 18-22 accounting for the fact that there is a 5 year election cycle period in Ukraine¹¹) are grouped together. If popular expectations are correct, and there is a EuroMaidan cohort effect that also translates into the electoral cycle – we should not only observe that the EuroMaidan but also that the 2014 election cohort (those first eligible to vote in the immediate aftermath of the EuroMaidan) would also be most likely to support EU accession. But, if the theory around critical election cohorts is correct, we would expect more socially and/or electorally polarizing elections like those in 2004 or 2010, and 2019 to produce a coalescing effect.

Based on our analysis, we demonstrate that contra to popular narratives Ukrainians who belong to the “2019 election cohort” (when Volodymyr Zelenskyy won the Presidency) and not the “2014 election” (when Petro Proshenko won) nor “EuroMaidan” cohorts are most likely to

¹⁰ Bartels and Jackman, “A Generational Model of Political Learning.”; Key, Valdimir Orlando. 1955. “A Theory of Critical Elections.” *The Journal of Politics* 17 (01): 3–18

¹¹ This is common approach as it allows us to capture whether the the *first election an individual was eligible to vote in during their impressionable years was a critical election and not the second. Whilst there could be a compounding effect of two critical elections in one impressionable years and we run robustness check for this (with 18-25 as the age grouping) but we do not find any such compounding effect.*

support EU accession (whilst controlling for age and other known correlates).¹² Moreover, whilst it might be “too early” to be certain about the longevity of a 2019 election cohort – our analyses show quite clearly that this *is not an age effect alone*. Unlike the effect of age, which disappears once we control for geographic “region of residence” and socio-economic variables, the effect of belonging to the “2019 election cohort” persists. Prompting us to suggest that whilst “younger” electoral cohorts are more likely to support Ukraine’s EU accession there is no evidence that being *socialized* during the EuroMaidan makes an individual any more likely to do the same. We also find perhaps counter intuitive evidence that belonging to the Orange Revolution cohort correlates rather strongly to being *less likely* to support Ukraine’s EU accession, further supporting our argument that living through pro-EU mass mobilization in one’s impressionable years does not result in positive attitudes toward EU accession *per se*. Additionally, in line with expectations about common drivers of holding pro-EU policy preferences in the political science literature - we also confirm that one’s geographic residence, believing one is a winner of transition, wanting to migrate abroad, and holding pro-democracy views are highly correlated to, and explain variation in, preferences for EU membership. We find no evidence that either language (preference or embeddedness), ethnicity, or nationality (civic identity) are key driving factors shaping support for EU accession. We also find little evidence to support instrumentalist materialist arguments and instead find support for values based and ideational underpinnings of support for EU accession in Ukraine.

In what follows we first revisit the broader empirical puzzle of youth support for EU accession, further questioning the rise of a “EuroMaidan Generation” cohort. Second, we examine the theoretical basis for our analysis and elucidate our key empirical hypotheses. Third, we present our data and describe our analytical approach. And, finally, we present findings, drawing out key conclusions, and highlighting directions for future research.

“EuroMaidan Generation” Cohort & Support for Joining EU: Puzzle & Critical Case

Observers of democratizing contexts have supported the idea that younger “generations” will be more likely to hold pro-democracy, pro-liberal, pro-globalization views and preferences – and in Ukraine’s case, also pro-EU views.¹³ In Ukraine, a group who were under 30 in 2014 and

¹² We also find some evidence for both 2004 and 2010 “election cohort” effects – but this coalescing effects dissipate when we include controls.

¹³ Blum, Doug. 2014. “The next Generation in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan: Youth, Politics, Identity, and Change.” *Nationalities Papers*, no. ahead-of-print: 1–2.; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2011. “Revolutionary Youth Coalition.” *Guide to Egypt’s Transition* (blog). At <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/11/revolutionary-youth-coalition/>, accessed February 2021.; Diuk, Nadia.

socialized during the EuroMaidan, also known colloquially as “GenMaidan,” are assumed to be not only pro-EU but also more liberal and pro-democratic.¹⁴ Such observations often take for granted that Ukrainian “youth” – mistakenly seen as the *central* driving force behind the 2013/2014 protests (see: Onuch 2014; 2015) - were more likely, than their older compatriots, to want their country to foster closer ties with its EU neighbors.

Table 1: Support for Ukraine Joining EU by Age Group in 2014 & 2019 [about here]

	18- 29	%	30- 39	%	40- 49	%	50- 59	%	60- 69	%	70 +	%	Total	Total l
May 2014 Agree Ukraine Should Join the EU	187	54%	175	53%	174	53%	207	49%	140	48%	125	41%	1,008	49%
Total	345		328		327		419		293		303		2,015	
April 2019 Agree Ukraine Should Join the EU	139	65%	154	54%	159	55%	169	57%	157	56%	112	48%	890	56%
Total	215		286		288		294		282		235		1,600	

(2014 data from Hale et. al. UCEPS 2014¹⁵; 2019 data from Onuch et. al. MOBILISE 2019.¹⁶)

Yet, empirical data from a nationally representative survey (Hale et al. UCEPS 2014) show that - even in the months immediately following the EuroMaidan - when asked if they “agree or disagree with the statement that Ukraine should join the European Union” respondents under 30 were *no more likely* to support EU accession than individuals between 30-49 were (see Table 1). Five years later, employing the exact same survey item, collected using the same method and interviewer network by Onuch et al. (MOBILISE 2019), we find that among those 18-29 support for joining the EU grew to 65% (a statistically significant increase). We see a similar increase in support (7-8%) among those over 50. But we see no such post-EuroMaidan “bump” for those 30-39 and 40-49. Thus, even when examining descriptive data, evidence suggests that there is no clear *linear relationship* between support for EU accession and age. Of course, we must be careful not to overstate a trend by comparing two different cross-sectional surveys with different samples - but

2013. “Youth as an Agent for Change: The next Generation in Ukraine.” *Demokratizatsiya* 21 (2): 179; Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. JHU Press.; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, “Communist Socialization and Post-Communist Economic and Political Attitudes.”

¹⁴ Polakowsky, “Where Are the Transformational Leaders of Ukraine’s Maidan Generation?”; Shearlaw, Maeve. 2016. “Three Years after Euromaidan, How Young Ukrainians See the Future.” *The Guardian*. November 22, 2016. At <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/22/three-years-after-euromaidan-ukrainians-russia-future/>, accessed February 2021.


¹⁵ Hale, Henry E., Timothy Colton, Olga Onuch, and Nadiya Kravets. 2014. *Ukrainian Crisis Election Panel Survey (UCEPS)*.

¹⁶ Onuch, Olga, David Doyle, Evelyn Ersanilli, Gwendolyn Sasse, Sorana Toma, and Jacquelin Van Stekelenburg. 2019. “MOBILISE 2019: Ukrainian Nationally Representative Survey Wave One. (Version 1 (without Oversample, N=1600).”

knowing that the margin of error for each was no higher than 3.3% and that the data were collected using the same methodology, this opens up room for questioning “age” effects or even any “generation” effects related to EuroMaidan socialization.

Our suspicion is only strengthened when (using logistic regression analysis) we account for geographic region of residence and individual level socio-economic variation in addition to age and find that the ‘effect’ of age all but disappears (see: Figure 1). Suggesting once more that it *might be* erroneous to assert that youth in Ukraine be it in 2014 or 2019 are *more likely* than their older counterparts to support EU accession. It is possible that the same factors that drive foreign policy preferences of older Ukrainians also drive the dispositions of youth.

Figure 1 [About Here]



These findings align with Gaidai et. al. (2017)¹⁷ who report that in the aftermath of the EuroMaidan, Ukrainian youth *do not trust* the EU, are *less committed* to pro-EU policy, and are generally *more disengaged* from democratic politics as whole. We propose that the focus on age or generation (as accounted by age groups in analyses) instead of *political cohort* is central to explaining these “counterintuitive” findings. And, it is likely that we are not only over-estimating the effect of age but that we are also over-estimating the socialization effect of mass mobilization, and specifically the EuroMaidan.

¹⁷ Gaidai, Zarembo, Litra, Lyman, and Solodkyy, “Ukrainian ‘Generation Z’: Attitudes and Values.”

Moreover, the case of Ukraine should be understood a “critical case” for the mass protest “generation” cohort hypothesis. The case is particularly interesting because it offers a double-test of the mass-mobilization effect. Ukraine has experienced at least two “pro-EU” accession mass-protest events: the 2004 “Orange Revolution” often dubbed as signaling of “Ukraine’s European choice”¹⁸ and the 2013/2014 EuroMaidan. If cohort building, we would expect youth who were in their impressionable years during these protests to be influenced by the pro-EU narrative. But looking at Table 1, we have no empirical reasons to suspect this to be case.

Our suspicions are not only born out of the above empirical puzzle but also connect to recent scholarly debates. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017), examine the attitudes of differently *socialized* political cohorts and find that some ‘younger’ post-communist cohorts are actually less supportive of democratic transition and appear to be disconnected from liberal democratic norms on the whole.¹⁹ Following on from Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014) and combining their findings with that of Smets and Neundorf (2014), we suspect that the above data also suggest that it is more important to examine the role of political socialization specifically during critical elections - those which have higher rates of turnout, are polarizing, redraw key policy battle lines, or are generally controversial.²⁰ Thus, we have reason to believe that critical elections could be more important than mass-protest events in coalescing cohort effects as a great proportion of citizens are not only directly exposed to but also participate in these political events. One might though expect that elections that follow on from moments of mass mobilization are also ‘critical’ and there might be a compounding effect creating strongly bounded cohorts.

Here is where our empirical puzzle of youth foreign policy dispositions in Ukraine gets even more interesting and the case offers even further leverage to test this thinking. If the *popular narratives* described above are correct, we could also expect that those who were socialized during the 2014 Presidential election cohort to be more likely to support EU accession. Not only was the 2014 campaign predominantly focused on the final signing into law of the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement, the election itself followed: a seemingly polarizing mass-mobilization triggered by Ukraine’s foreign policy to the EU, as well as heightened Russian aggression. Thus, we could expect that if one’s first electoral engagement took place in this

¹⁸ Kubicek, Paul. 2005. “The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Ukraine: Elections and Democratization, 38 (2): 269–92.; Kuzio, Taras. 2010. “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43 (3): 285–96.; Wolczuk, Kataryna. 2004. “Ukraine’s European Choice.” *Centre for European Reform*.

¹⁹ Pop-Eleches and Tucker, *Communism’s Shadow*.

²⁰ Smets and Neundorf, “The Hierarchies of Age-Period-Cohort Research: Political Context and the Development of Generational Turnout Patterns.”

context it would have a significant effect on their policy preferences and increase the likelihood of future support for EU accession. Yet, we should also remember that this election was marked by significant elite coordination and electoral rallying around Petro Poroshenko.²¹ Poroshenko won the presidency in the first-round, a result not seen since Ukraine's first democratic election. In addition to the onset of conflict, the 'done deal'/'clear would-be-winner' feature of the election, may have also led to a demobilization of voters. Although post-protest youth mobilization continuity was assumed for the May 2014 - there is no evidence that youth turnout was systematically higher.²² Quite the opposite, voter turnout - as a national average²³ - was historically low, lower than average in the center, and especially low across eastern and southern oblasts.²⁴ Similarly there is also no evidence that those who were in their impressionable years in 2013/2014 and were first able to vote in 2014, were any more likely to turn out in 2019 than other youth cohorts. For these reasons, according to the literature cited above, we might question the cohort building capacity of this election. Simply put, although the election was happening at a *critical time* - after mass mobilization and the onset of conflict – it perhaps was not *itself critical in nature*.

Instead, it is in the aftermath of the EuroMaidan and the on-going war in the east that we observe a much more polarizing election in 2019. Interestingly, in 2019 even though incumbent Poroshenko was a war-time President he had little national support and there was no evident front runner for most of the period leading up to the first round held on 31 March. Yet, not only did Poroshenko stress the significance of the 2019 election, candidates even suggested that voting for certain opponents would lead to an immediate and full invasion by Russia. This rhetoric undoubtedly contributed to a sense of broader civic duty among many voters. At the same time, Zelenskyy - emerging as the main opponent - used more modern campaigning tools, employing social media to reach youth, and mass rallies and concerts to reach 'ordinary' Ukrainians residing in peripheral towns, rarely visited by major Presidential candidates. This tactic is believed to have had a mobilizing effect on voters in the center, east, and south specifically. Thus, it was unsurprising when initial reports highlighted an increase in youth voter

²¹ Hale, Henry E., Olga Onuch, Timothy Colton, and Nadiya Kravets. 2018. "Rallying' Round The Oligarch: 2014 Presidential Election." In *PONARS Eurasia Workshop*. LSE and Kings College, London UK.

²² Central Election Commission of Ukraine. 2014. *Central Electoral Commission: Results of the 2014 Presidential Election Held on May 25, 2014*. <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vp2014/wp300pt001f01=702.html>.

²³ this being said, some western oblasts (like Lviv oblast) saw a slight increase in turnout but only when compared with 2010 and not 2004 figures.

²⁴ Clem, Ralph S. 2014. "The Ukrainian Election: It's All About Turnout." *IPI Global Observatory* (blog). June 12, 2014. At <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/06/ukrainian-election-all-about-turnout/>, accessed February 2021.; Kudelia, Serhiy. 2014. "Ukraine's 2014 Presidential Election Result Is Unlikely to Be Repeated." *The Washington Post*, June 2, 2014. At <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/02/ukraines-2014-presidential-election-result-is-unlikely-to-be-repeated/>, accessed February 2021.

turnout.²⁵ We might even call the two-round election a Ukrainian electoral “*youthquake*” - with record high numbers of youth engagement correlating to higher rates of support for Zelenskyy.²⁶

But not only was turnout significantly higher in 2019 than in 2014, the campaign rhetoric was also highly polarizing. Whilst, incumbent Poroshenko, marred by corruption accusations decided to shift his electoral campaign to a contentious nationalist and conservative discourse, Zelenskyy, his run-off opponent, sought to employ a unifying frame presenting an imagined future Ukraine united across its cleavages and tightly bound to Europe and by European values. Whilst Poroshenko focused on “civilizational” European identity, Zelenskyy focused on EU values which respect diversity (linguistic and/or ethnic). And, even though pro-Poroshenko media outlets (like 5Kanal, EspressoTV among others) attempted to incite fear aligning Zelenskyy with the idea of a “Russian Revanche,” this hyper politicized tactic did not gain traction among many voters. In response, Zelenskyy often linked the rampant systemic corruption of the “old guard” to “non-European” behavior, even saying that “Europe is not out there but in here” [pointing to his head] - implying that *europeanness* is a state-of-mind and not just a destination. This positive message was highly appealing to voters (especially younger ones) and unsurprisingly led to Zelenskyy’s landslide win on 21 April. The highly polarized but also highly competitive nature of the 2019 election would suggest that the 2019 election cohort, when Zelenskyy won, and not the 2014 cohort should be understood as critical and more “pro-EU” focused. And we note that it is in this context that our nationally representative survey data were collected. Not only were *all respondents* “primed” on the critical nature of the elections and the import of *europeanness* – those who were *eligible first time voters* should be particularly *impressionable* when exposed to this rhetoric. Leading us to expect that this particular “youth” cohort of eligible first time voters should distinguish themselves from other “youth” who are *very* close in age and in for the most part in same stage of their life cycle (like those who were between 18-25 during the EuroMaidan or could first vote in 2014) because of the *critical nature* of the 2019 elections. We note that any effect would actually be the immediate effect of the election campaign on political preference and cohort formation and thus, we have no expectations about the *longevity*²⁷ of this cohort effect. Our data do not allow us to examine the longevity of this socialization but do allow us to

²⁵ KIIS. 2019. “Press Releases and Reports - Social and Political Attitudes of the Population of Ukraine on the Eve of the Second Round of the Elections of the President of Ukraine: April 2019.” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). At <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=851&page=1/>, accessed February 2021.; Shandra, Alya. 2019. “Sociology of Ukrainian Elections: Who Votes for Zelenskyi/Poroshenko and Why.” *Euromaidan Press*, April 18, 2019. At <http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/18/sociology-of-ukrainian-elections-who-votes-for-zelenskyi-and-poroshenko-and-why/>, accessed February 2021.

²⁶ KIIS, “Social and Political Attitudes of the Population of Ukraine on the Eve of the Second Round of the Elections of the President of Ukraine”.

²⁷ In future analyses - when the second wave of our the panel data are available - we will be able to test for the immediate longevity of this cohort coalescence.

interrogate whether a 2019 election cohort exists and if this “youth” (18-22) belonging to this cohort distinguish themselves from “youth” (23-27 years of age) belonging to the 2014 election cohort in terms of support for Ukraine’s EU accession.

The above descriptive findings and contextual aspects suggest that we need to take a deeper look at age and socialization effects to be better understand if and how they shape different cohorts of youth support for Ukraine’s EU accession. To better frame our analysis we turn to social science theory on socialization and common drivers of pro-EU public opinion.

Framing the Analysis I: Youth Political Engagement & Policy Preferences in Ukraine

From the late 1990s, studies²⁸ of youth political behavior in Ukraine tended to focus on the young people’s participation in social movement organizations, the social movements they form over time, and in protest events.²⁹ Underpinning most analyses, lies a prominent assumption that if either of the “youth” generations could only gain access to government, Ukraine would surely follow on a more liberal and European path.³⁰ Notable recent work by Howlett (2020) has examined how those not yet 18 at the time of the EuroMaidan imagined and understood Ukraine and its geopolitical place in the post-EuroMaidan era.³¹ Using a unique qualitative dataset, Howlett finds that these youngsters do in-fact repeatedly draw a direct line between a sense of European place (geography), European being (values) and Ukraine itself, when discussing the EuroMaidan. Nonetheless, few scholars have examined the drivers of youth attitudes or political behavior more systematically in Ukraine, even fewer focused on the effects of generational let alone cohort socialization over time, and to our knowledge none have done so focusing specifically on attitudes to the EU. Yet, in broader social science literature the study of age, lifecycle/biographical availability, and cohort political socialization effects, are auspicious areas of study.

²⁸ There have been notable policy reports on youth in Ukraine by the UNDP and British Council – but they do not focus specifically on political behavior (British Council et al. 2017; UN in Ukraine 2019).

²⁹ Diuk, “Youth as an Agent for Change: The next Generation in Ukraine.”; Nikolayenko, Olena. 2007. “The Revolt of the Post-Soviet Generation: Youth Movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine.” *Comparative Politics*, 169–88.; Nikolayenko, Olena. 2008. “Contextual Effects on Historical Memory: Soviet Nostalgia among Post-Soviet Adolescents.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41 (2): 243–59.; Predborska, Irina, Katya Ivaschenko, and Ken Roberts. 2004. “Youth Transitions in East and West Ukraine.” *European Sociological Review* 20 (5): 403–13.; Topalova, Viktoriya. 2006. “In Search of Heroes: Cultural Politics and Political Mobilization of Youths in Contemporary Russia and Ukraine.” *Demokratizatsiya* 14 (1).

³⁰ Diuk, Nadia. 2012. *The next Generation in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan: Youth, Politics, Identity, and Change*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

³¹ Howlett, Marnie. 2020. “Playing Near the Edge: An Analysis of Ukrainian Border Youths’ Engagement with the Euromaidan.” *Problems of Post-Communism* 0 (0): 1–12.

Framing the Analysis II: Cohorts & Age as Drivers of Dispositions & Preferences

Social science scholarship generally agrees that older and younger citizens not only have divergent patterns of political engagement but also differ in their policy preferences.³² *But what drives youth policy preferences at the individual level? And what shapes different generational cohorts' policy preferences over time?*

General Cohort Hypothesis

Scholars have sought to unpack exactly when, how, and on the basis of which experiences youth voters “learn” and mature politically into progressive or conservative older voters.³³ And whilst there is extensive literature about “at home” and “educational” socialization,³⁴ there is evidence that first political experiences have a significant effect on future political dispositions and behaviors and coalesce as political *cohorts*.

A particular challenge for scholars has been the difficulty in disentangling these “socialization” effects, from other variables such as age of a given individual and the context or period when the data was collected. To do so many have advocated an analytical approach that takes into consideration “age,” “period,” and “cohort” (APC).³⁵ In this approach, the effects of age, also known as “life cycle effects,” refer to one’s life long biological progression, whereby individuals accumulate socio-psychological experience at different stages throughout their entire life cycle. “Period effects” apply to all generational groups in a given population and include a combination of contextual variables such as the socio-economic situation in a given country as well as any distinctive events of a particular temporal period. Finally, “cohort effects” are produced through different types of experiences of political socialization – such as participating in or experiencing key elections - which are understood to influence future political engagement patterns, policy

³² Blais, André. 2006. “What Affects Voter Turnout?” *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 9: 111–25.; Douglass, Elizabeth B., William P. Cleveland, and George L. Maddox. 1974. “Political Attitudes, Age, and Aging: A Cohort Analysis of Archival Data.” *Journal of Gerontology* 29 (6): 666–75.; Powell Jr, G. Bingham. 1986. “American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective.” *The American Political Science Review*, 17–43; Rhodebeck, Laurie A. 1993. “The Politics of Greed? Political Preferences among the Elderly.” *The Journal of Politics* 55 (2): 342–64; Smets, Kaat. 2010. “A Widening Generational Divide? Assessing the Age Gap in Voter Turnout between Younger and Older Citizens.”;

³³ (Goerres 2007; Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Dassonneville 2013)

³⁴ Banks, Michael H., and Debra Roker. 1994. “The Political Socialization of Youth: Exploring the Influence of School Experience.” *Journal of Adolescence* 17 (1): 3–15.; McLeod, Jack M., and Dhavan V. Shah. 2009. “Communication and Political Socialization: Challenges and Opportunities for Research.” *Political Communication* 26 (1): 1–10.; Simon, James, and Bruce D. Merrill. 1998. “Political Socialization in the Classroom Revisited: The Kids Voting Program.” *The Social Science Journal* 35 (1): 29–42.; Terriquez, Veronica, and Hyeyoung Kwon. 2015. “Intergenerational Family Relations, Civic Organisations, and the Political Socialisation of Second-Generation Immigrant Youth.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (3): 425–47.

³⁵ Baltes, Paul B. “Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Sequences in the Study of Age and Generation Effects”; Brown, Robyn Lewis, and Deana A. Rohlinger. “The Effect of Political Generation on Identity and Social Change.”; Kupper, Lawrence L., Joseph M. Janis, Azza Karmous, and Bernard G. Greenberg. “Statistical Age-Period-Cohort Analysis;”

preferences, and broader systems of belief among individuals.³⁶ *But how do we identify and calculate critical events in order to discern a cohort effect?*

Critical Election Cohort Hypothesis

Following on from Newcomb (1943), Bartels and Jackman (2014) highlight the important impressionable stage in an individual's life, when they are between 18 and 25 years of age and are thus, more likely to form political habits and begin to subscribe to political views, ideologies, and policy preferences.³⁷ Smets and Neundorf (2014) have argued that if an individual's first political engagement is in a *critical* election, this experience is likely to have a stronger effect on their future engagement patterns.³⁸ Others, as noted above, have extended this to having shaped future policy preferences of a cohort. As this thinking is focused on a *cohort effect* emphasis here is placed on the first elections individuals are *eligible to vote in* and not necessarily the first elections they participated in *personally*. In the case of Ukraine, if such a critical election was fought on particular policy divides, *we would expect that individuals would strongly support or oppose these policies in future years. In relation to our study, those who were in their impressionable years (operationalized as those 18-22 when accounting for Ukrainian election cycle periods) during, and were first able to vote in, a given critical election (where EU policy was central to the electoral campaign) would then later belong to a particular 'electoral cohort' and we would expect there to be some patterning in how this cohort would behave. We specifically, expect that those Ukrainians who were 18-22 during these key critical election cycles, will not only belong to distinct political cohorts but will also be more or less likely to support Ukraine's EU accession.*

In Ukraine, since independence in 1991 there are several critical elections to choose from. Focusing on presidential elections (as they have higher rates of turnout and engagement and have tended to be more significant/controversial politically) we identify five critical elections. But our critical elections need not only to have high turnout, be polarizing, and/or be controversial - for the purposes of our study - they also need to have been fought on EU policy lines. Thus, in all five of our critical elections there was significant EU policy polarization and/or campaign rhetoric was EU focused. The first, is the 1991 Presidential election, which saw Leonid Kravchuk elected as the first president of independent Ukraine. The campaign coincided with popular rhetoric around the re-unification of Europe and future EU enlargement. The second, is the politically polarizing 1994 election, following which President-elect Leonid Kuchma made

³⁶ Dassonneville, Ruth, Marc Hooghe, and Bram Vanhoutte. 2012. "Age, Period and Cohort Effects in the Decline of Party Identification in Germany: An Analysis of a Two Decade Panel Study in Germany (1992–2009)." *German Politics* 21 (2): 209–27.; Fosse, Ethan, and Christopher Winship. 2019. "Analyzing Age-Period-Cohort Data: A Review and Critique." *Annual Review of Sociology* 45: 467–92.

³⁷Bartels and Jackman, "A Generational Model of Political Learning."

³⁸Smets and Neundorf, "The Hierarchies of Age-Period-Cohort Research: Political Context and the Development of Generational Turnout Patterns."

the first formal statement of Ukraine's intention to join the EU. The third is the 2004 election of Viktor Yushchenko, understood by many as signaling Ukraine's 'European Choice.' The fourth, is the post-EuroMaidan 2014 election of Petro Poroshenko. With a campaign largely focused on Ukraine seeking closer ties with the EU, the election also coincided with the onset of war and an insurgent ban on elections in parts of Russian occupied Donetsk and Luhansk, and in all of Crimea. Finally, we identify the 2019 Ukrainian *youthquake* election as it saw a significantly higher turnout among younger voters and resulted in one of the most decisive and unparalleled wins for Volodymyr Zelenskyy. As already noted above, liberal notions of *europeanness* were at the core of 2019 campaign rhetoric. It is vital to note that almost all these elections were polarizing or highly decisive wins and three (1991, 2004, 2014) overlapped with or directly followed a major mass-mobilizations, marking highly contentious periods in the political and democratic development of the country.

In addition, we identify two post-independence elections which were not "critical" as they did not mark either major electoral battles, major shifts in EU policy during the campaigns, nor were they seen as highly polarizing. These are: the 1999 re-election of Kuchma; and the 2010 election of Viktor Yanukovich. Ironically, these two relatively "calm and quiet" elections brought in Presidential regimes that swiftly turned authoritarian and ended in the two largest moments of mass-mobilization in Ukraine's history.

For our analysis, we construct 7 binary variables, where 1 denotes that someone was a) in their *impressionable years* during and 2) *first eligible to vote* in the given election and thus, accounting for five year election cycles in Ukraine between the age of 18-22. In line with the theories above, *we hypothesize that those cohorts who were politically socialized³⁹ during these critical elections that specifically frontloaded EU association and accession as major campaign foci would be more likely to support Ukraine's accession to the EU.*

If the *popular narratives* of a "EuroMaidan generation" cohort is correct, we would expect that belonging to the 2014 election cohort to be correlated with support for Ukraine's EU accession. But, our own thinking is different. Recalling our empirical puzzle above: 1) that younger Ukrainians were no more likely to support EU accession in 2014 than their older compatriots; 2) that youth turnout was low in 2014 but high in 2019; 3) that the 2019 election was focused on value based ideas of "Europeaness" and EU; and 4) seeing that Howlett (2020) finds a clear

³⁹ Understood here as first possible engagement in an election or being 18-22 at the time of the election.

pattern that those who were not yet 18 in 2014 were highly supportive of Ukraine's place in Europe, *we instead expect that those who came to political maturity after 2014 and thus, those who could first vote in 2019 might be particularly more likely to support Ukraine's EU accession.*

Moment of Mass-mobilization Cohort Hypothesis

Taking into consideration popular narratives about a possible "EuroMaidan generation" cohort, the question remains whether mass-mobilization can equally (as critical elections) have a major socializing effect.

If mass-mobilizations can produce a coalescing cohort effect, we could expect that other mass protest in Ukraine also could produce cohorts. Ukraine saw at least four *major* mass mobilizations from 1990 onwards. These are: 1) the 1990 Revolution on the Granite and 1991 mass national strikes and demos for independence; 2) the 2000-20001 Ukraine without Kuchma campaign or UBK; 3) the 2004 Orange Revolution; and the 4) 2013/14 EuroMaidan. Specifically, the 2004 and 2014 protest waves have been seen as highly significant. Interestingly, both mass protests have a distinctive pro-EU undertone, with 2004 being understood as Ukraine making its "European choice" and 2014 being triggered by the non-signing of a Trade and Association agreement with the EU. Seeing that these mass protests are highly significant in Ukraine - for our analysis - we construct 4 binary variables, where 1 denotes that someone was between the age of 18-25 at the time of each mass mobilization.⁴⁰ If mass-mobilization has a cohort shaping effect *we would expect that people who were in their impressionable years (18-25) during the year when the mobilization took place would be highly influenced politically by these contentious episodes and would coalesce into political cohorts.* The EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution cohorts should stand out most strongly - as these were highly significant protest events. Following this thinking, if popular discourse is correct, we would specifically *expect that the EuroMaidan cohort would be most strongly supportive of Ukraine's EU accession (we would expect the Orange Revolution cohort to also be supportive of the pro-EU position).*

But seeing that, in the immediate aftermath of the protests those in their 20s were no more likely to support EU accession than their older compatriots, that the master narratives of the EuroMaidan protest were as much about the negative claim calling for Yanukovich to resign as they were about the positive claim for closer ties to the EU,⁴¹ and because the EU did not

⁴⁰ For full details of coding please see Appendix Table A3.

⁴¹ Onuch, Olga, and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2014. "What Does Ukraine's #Euromaidan Teach Us about Protest?" *Washington Post* (blog). February 27, 2014. At <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/27/what-does-ukraines-euromaidan-teach-us-about-protest/>,

immediately come to Ukraine's defense, as the conflict with Russia unfolded, *our own thinking is that the EuroMaidan cohort would be no more likely to support EU accession.*

Controlling for Other Known Drivers of Pro-EU Policy Preferences

To be assured that any effects of cohort or age are robust it is vital to control for major correlates of pro- and anti- EU policy preferences. Studies of public opinion towards the EU membership and accession, including in post-communist states, have tended to engage with two dimensions: economic vs. political.⁴² Specific research on popular dispositions among Ukrainians towards the EU has considered notions of European identity and its interaction with liberal political and economic values.⁴³ More broadly speaking, the main “drivers” of pro-EU policy both in Ukraine and across eastern Europe, have mostly highlighted: economic factors, liberal/pro-democratic values, political participation and partisanship, and nationalism and ethno-national identities as important correlates. We address each in turn below.

Controls I: Economic Drivers

The economic instrumentalist approach proposes that attitudes to EU accession/membership are based on strong elite and mass commitment to market values and favorable economic calculations for potential entrants. At the individual level, these studies propose that citizens assess the costs and benefits associated with EU membership, and that this calculus drives their support or opposition.⁴⁴ More specifically, studies suggest that those who positively evaluate both *sociotropic* economic conditions (among EU member state populations) and *egotropic* economic conditions (among populations in neighboring countries seeking membership) are more likely to support EU accession/membership and hold positive views of the EU more generally. But, since economic costs and benefits of EU integration/membership are not borne equally across a population, such socio-economic factors as education and household economic

accessed February 2021.; Onuch, Olga and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2016. “Maidan in Movement: Protest Cycles, Diversity of Actors, and Violence.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 68 (4): 556–87.

⁴² Rohrschneider, Robert, and Stephen Whitefield. 2006. “Political Parties, Public Opinion and European Integration in Post-Communist Countries: The State of the Art.” *European Union Politics* 7 (1): 141–60

⁴³ Chaban, Natalia, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin. 2019. “Understanding EU Crisis Diplomacy in the European Neighbourhood: Strategic Narratives and Perceptions of the EU in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine.” *European Security* 28(3). Taylor & Francis.; Chaisty, Paul, and Stephen Whitefield. 2017. “Citizens’ Attitudes towards Institutional Change in Contexts of Political Turbulence: Support for Regional Decentralisation in Ukraine.” *Political Studies* 65 (4): 824–43.; White, Stephen, and Valentina Feklyunina. 2014. *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.; Korosteleva, Julia, and Stephen White. 2006. “‘Feeling European’: The View from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.” *Contemporary Politics* 12 (2): 193–205.

⁴⁴ Boomgaarden, Hajo G., Andreas RT Schuck, Matthijs Elenbaas, and Claes H. De Vreese. 2011. “Mapping EU Attitudes: Conceptual and Empirical Dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU Support.” *European Union Politics* 12 (2): 241–66.; Tverdova, Yuliya V., and Christopher J. Anderson. 2004. “Choosing the West? Referendum Choices on EU Membership in East-Central Europe.” *Electoral Studies* 23 (2): 185–208.; Flood, Christopher. 2002. “The Challenge of Euroscepticism.” *The European Union Handbook 2*: 73–84.; Lubbers, Marcel, and Peer Scheepers. 2005. “Political versus Instrumental Euro-Scepticism: Mapping Scepticism in European Countries and Regions.” *European Union Politics* 6 (2): 223–42.; Anderson, Christopher J., and M. Shawn Reichert. 1995. “Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis.” *Journal of Public Policy*, 231–49.

security, are also known to drive support for EU integration. That is, citizens high in human capital are best placed to benefit from emerging market-related opportunities, and these socioeconomic factors may have predictive power.⁴⁵ Connectedly, Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) find that in the post-communist space specifically, those who have benefited economically, from the post-communist economic transition (transition winners) are more likely to support EU membership than those who have been hurt by it (transition losers).⁴⁶

We operationalize socio-economic experience with a seven-point scale capturing the respondent's family's financial situation and a binary variable to capture transition winners relative to 1991. Next, converting a five-point evaluation scale - asking individuals to evaluate if they had become personally better off in the twelve months; and if Ukraine's economy as a whole has gotten better in those same 12 months – into a binary variable, we capture and control for positive *egotropic* and *sociotropic* economic evaluations. To control for human capital, we include the respondent's education level (3 categories) in our controls.

Building on the above logic, another socio-economic variable related to the instrumentalist calculus is that of one's intention to emigrate.⁴⁷ Social science research holds that youth would specifically be more likely to not only want to emigrate but also that they would see EU integration as facilitating this move.⁴⁸ And thus, those who want to migrate abroad (specifically to the EU) might also be more likely to support EU accession. We control for this factor with a binary variable whereby all those who said they would like to go abroad for school or work, receive a 1 and all others a 0. Similarly, we create two binary variables denoting whether the individual selected an EU country or Russia as their preferred destination, each receiving a 1 respectively and all other respondents are coded as 0.

Controls II: Political Dispositions and Values

Alas, there is some disagreement in the literature on the role of economic factors, for instance, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2004) show that political values are more important than economic reasoning. Connected to this thinking, Wolczuk (2016) dissects the cultural salience of

⁴⁵ See: Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel, 1998

⁴⁶ Tucker, Joshua A., Alexander C. Pacek, and Adam J. Berinsky. 2002. "Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries." *American Journal of Political Science*, 557–71.

⁴⁷ Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Enrique Aldaz-Carroll, and Paulina Holda. 2020. "Migration and Socio-Economic Transition: Lessons from the Polish Post-EU Accession Experience." *East European Politics and Societies*, May.; Warin, Thierry, and Pavel Svaton. 2008. "European Migration: Welfare Migration or Economic Migration?" *Global Economy Journal* 8 (3): 1850140.

⁴⁸ King, Russell, and Parvati Raghuram. 2013. "International Student Migration: Mapping the Field and New Research Agendas." *Population, Space and Place* 19 (2): 127–37.; Raymer, James, and Andrei. Rogers. 2007. "Using Age and Spatial Flow Structures in the Indirect Estimation of Migration Streams." *Demography* 44 (2): 199–223.

the EU in Ukraine, noting that the cultural boundary has become blurred through references to Europe as a discursive benchmark of “normality” in Ukraine and Ukraine’s Europeanness (as evidenced in the public’s support for so-called European values). Similarly, Chaban and Chaban (2018) note positive value orientations to the EU - good governance, the rule of law, anti-discrimination, liberty, social solidarity, and meritocracy. *Thus, we should also control for liberal pro-democratic value dispositions.* We capture this “EU values” disposition as a preference for democratic systems. Those respondents who selected “Democracy is preferable to any kind of government” are coded 1, and the rest 0.

Controls III: Protest Participation & Partisanship

It is accepted that past political participation and partisanship (or in the absence of strong partisanship ID, then voting behavior) – are important correlates of holding pro-EU accession views. To this end, even though we already noted that we do not hypothesize a coalescence of public disposition from living through a mass mobilization, we would still expect that personal participation in the EuroMaidan, the master narrative of which included support for EU association (if not also full accession), should be positively correlated to support for pro-EU policy preferences. Thus, we include a EuroMaidan protest participant control, with those having participated receiving a 1 and all others a 0.

Moreover, political parties in Ukraine are also often publicly depicted as being either pro-EU or anti-EU (even if most fall somewhere in the middle on actual policy), and we would expect that those that voted for Poroshenko’s Party European Solidarity as opposed those who voted for Party of Regions successor party Opposition Block (seen as pro-Russian) would be more supportive of EU accession. Because partisanship is weak in Ukraine and because we are concerned with Presidential election cohorts, we include a control capturing being a Poroshenko, Boiko, and Zelenskyy voter with three binary variables of prospective vote intention in 2019.⁴⁹

Controls III: National Identity

Finally, when it comes to cultural and collective identities as predictors of pro-EU foreign policy preferences Hooghe and Marks (2004), have distinguished between exclusive ethno-national identity which correlates with Euroscepticism as opposed to a strong sense of civic national

⁴⁹ To test that we are not missing some party/partisan variation, we also run robustness checks with binary variables controlling for prospective vote intention for Poroshenko’s Party Block - European Solidarity (Pro-EU), Opposition Block/Platform for Life (pro-Russian), and Servant of the People in 2019. We also, in separate robustness checks, control for reported *retrospective* vote for Poroshenko’s Party Block - European Solidarity and Opposition Block in 2014, and for reported retrospective vote for Poroshenko and Boiko in 2014. Due to issue of recall our main model include only *prospective* vote intention in the 2019 Presidential campaign.

identity – which may increase support for EU membership. Following this thinking, we should control for a potentially strong but negative link between Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-EU policy and a strong and positive link between Ukrainian civic identity and support for EU accession. But, with respect to pro-EU dispositions in the post-communist context, Whitefield et al. (2006) have argued that, EU membership may be seen as a means to consolidating national independence - explaining why strong ethno-national identities actually overlap with “European” ones.⁵⁰ The questions around geopolitical independence also explain why when considering the accession of hostile neighbors (that of Russia by Ukrainians) or of countries whose accession to the EU may pose a regional economic or security threat (that of Ukraine and Moldova for Russians), strong national identities would correlate with negative views of such EU integration. In the case of Ukraine, support for EU accession has been positively correlated to Ukrainian ethno-linguistic group identities and to a strong sense of homeland attachment or civic identity, but it is not clear whether this policy preference also aligns with more exclusive “ethno-nationalist” orientations.⁵¹

This brings us to Ukraine context specific controls. Scholars have focused on at least three central ‘identity’ divides as important correlates of behavior and opinion. These include: a *regional* divide, with extreme poles in Ukraine’s East (Donbas) and West (Galicia);⁵² a *linguistic* divide (Ukrainophones and Russophones);⁵³ and an *ethnic* divide (Ukrainian and Russian).⁵⁴ This research would expect pro-EU accession preference to align with some combination of geographic location (West), identifying oneself as a Ukrainophone, and ethnically Ukrainian. *We expect to find similar correlations and control for these factors in-turn.*

⁵⁰ see: Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2007).

⁵¹ Chaisty and Whitefield. “Citizens’ Attitudes towards Institutional Change in Contexts of Political Turbulence”; Pop-Eleches and Robertson, “Identity and Political Preferences in Ukraine”.

⁵² Barrington, Lowell W., and Erik S. Herron. 2004. “One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences.” *Nationalities Papers* 32 (March): 53–86.; Kubicek, Paul. 2000. “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 (2): 273–94.; O’Loughlin, John. 2001. “The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 42 (1): 1–33.; Osipian, Ararat L., and Alexandr L. Osipian. 2012. “Regional Diversity and Divided Memories in Ukraine: Contested Past as Electoral Resource, 2004-2010.” *East European Politics & Societies*; Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2010. “The Role of Regionalism.” *Journal of Democracy* 21 (3): 99–106.

⁵² Arel, Dominique. 1995. “Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?” *Nationalities Papers* 23 (3): 597–622.; Colton, Timothy J. 2011. “An Aligning Election and the Ukrainian Political Community.” *East European Politics & Societies* 25 (1): 4–27.; Kulyk, Volodymyr. 2011. “Language Identity, Linguistic Diversity and Political Cleavages: Evidence from Ukraine.” *Nations and Nationalism* 17 (3): 627–48.

⁵³ Arel, Dominique. 1995. “Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?” *Nationalities Papers* 23 (3): 597–622.; Colton, Timothy J. 2011. “An Aligning Election and the Ukrainian Political Community.” *East European Politics & Societies* 25 (1): 4–27.; Kulyk, Volodymyr. 2011. “Language Identity, Linguistic Diversity and Political Cleavages: Evidence from Ukraine.” *Nations and Nationalism* 17 (3): 627–48.

⁵⁴ Arel, Dominique. 1993. “Language and the Politics of Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. <http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/23297>.; Bremmer, Ian. 1994. “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 46 (2): 261–83.; Hale, Henry E. 2008. *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.; Kulyk, Volodymyr. 2001. “The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Beyond Brubaker.” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 26 (1–2): 197–221.

Alas, recent research has shown that Ukrainians are less divided by ethno-linguistic variables than previously thought. Scholars have even noted that there are new emerging identities in Ukraine. Connected to these new findings, Onuch and Hale (2018) find that different measures of Ukrainian ethnicity, previously thought to capture the same thing are actually capturing distinct things, pointing out that past research on Ukraine might have been getting things slight wrong, when it comes to the importance of ethnic and linguistic identities.⁵⁵ They identify four dimensions of ethnicity: *personal language preference* (the language one chooses to conduct a survey in); *language embeddedness* (the language spoken by respondents in their private lives or that which they use at their place of employment); *ethnolinguistic identity* (a standard question asking people to report their mother (native) tongue (as practiced by Ukrainian census takers); and *National [civic] identity*, a “forced choice” measure where people are required to choose the single category with which they most strongly identify.

Adapting the Onuch and Hale (2018) approach in our analysis, we capture language preference with a measure of the language the respondent chose to conduct the survey in (1 for Ukrainian). We capture language embeddedness by coding all respondents who reported that they primarily use Ukrainian at their place of employment. To capture ethnic identity, we employ reported mother (native) tongue, coding 1 for people who select Ukrainian. We capture national identity (civic identity) by employing a “forced choice” item, whereby respondents were required to choose the single category with which they most strongly identify.

Finally following standard political behavior practice, all of our models also control for sex (female) and residence in an urban environment (a population point of at least 50,000 residents). We now move on to present our data and discuss our operationalization of the above theoretical expectations.

Data

The data used in this paper derives from the first wave of a two-wave survey collected by a group of Principal Investigators (MOBILISE project), led by Dr Onuch, and in collaboration with our local survey partner the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). The survey was fielded between March 27 and April 1, 2019. It consists of a random sample (N = 1,600) representative of the adult population of Ukraine. The response rate of (32.5%) is respectable and in line with other similar surveys conducted in the country. The sample excludes some

⁵⁵ Onuch, Olga, and Henry E. Hale. 2018. “Capturing Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34 (2–3): 84–106.

regions of Ukraine that are not currently under the control of the Ukrainian government (Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). The margin of error of our frequency estimates is no greater than 3.3%.

Dependent Variables

Among the questions in the first wave of the MOBILISE survey, we asked respondents about their support for Ukraine’s EU accession (Table 2).⁵⁶ We code this survey item to capture all those who responded positively to the question. All those who responded that they *completely agree* or *somewhat agree* with statement that “Ukraine should join the EU” are denoted by 1 – all others are denoted by a 0. As a robustness check we also ran all of our analyses with the dependent variable as a scale of agreement 1-4 (with the hard to say and refuse to answer categories both coded as missing) and a scale of agreement 1-5 (with hard to say coded at the middle category between agree and disagree and refuse to answer coded as missing) the results of our analyses are the same. But we still feel that the binary coding approach is clearer and makes effects easier to interpret.

Table 2. Support for Ukraine Joining the EU [about here]

Coded Variable	Frequency	% of the Population ⁵⁷
Those who agree Ukraine should join the EU (1)	890	56.36
All others (0)	710	43.64
Total	1600	100
Original Survey Item		
Completely agree	559	35.08
Somewhat agree	331	21.28
Somewhat disagree	156	9.58
Completely disagree	236	14.38
Hard to say	302	18.64
Refuse to answer	16	1.05
Total	1600	100

⁵⁶ “please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements: Ukraine should join the European union responses include 1. - completely agree; 2- somewhat agree; 3- somewhat disagree; 4 completely disagree; 97- h/s; 98- ref.

⁵⁷ this statistic is weighted to the population.

Modelling Strategy

For our analytical approach, we run two sets of logistic multivariate regressions on our binary dependent variable – the first set incorporating mass-mobilization cohorts (with all the above-discussed controls) and the second set incorporating the critical election cohorts (with all controls). Because logistic regression coefficients (and odds ratios) are difficult to interpret, we report the estimated *full effects* of each factor on our dependent variables. A *full effect* is better understood as an *average marginal effect* when all variables are scaled from 0 to 1. Thus, the results should be interpreted as the *average change* a factor produces in an individual's *estimated likelihood* of supporting EU accession of Ukraine, when one *raises any given factor from its minimum to its maximum value* while holding all other variables *at their actual values*.

Although our dependent variables are binary and it is typical to use logistic regression in such cases - due to the difficulties with interpretation of the results and recent political science agreement on the adaptability of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to binary DVs , we also ran our models as linear probability models to estimate *the marginal effects* of our independent variables of interest on our two binary dependent variables. The results were fully comparable.

Finally, we also carefully considered the ordering of and stepwise inclusion of our independent variables and controls. Because we are primarily interested with the age and cohort political socialisation hypotheses, we first run our models with only age and a respective set of cohort variables (mass-mobilization or election). After we can show some initial patterns of socialization effects, we then expand our model to include all the various controls as listed above.

Furthermore, since some factors are known to ‘causally’ precede others (such as age or gender), when estimating effects of each factor, we follow Campbell's⁵⁸ and Colton's⁵⁹ causal stages approach.

Informed by the theoretical expectations outlined above, we include the predictors at different steps into our model. This stepwise causal sequencing requires us to report the full effects of each factor on our dependent variables *at the stage in which the predictor was added*. Following on from Campbell (1980) and Colton (2000), in Stage 1, we include demographic factors (region of residence, urban residence, level of education, gender, age, and family financial situation) unlikely

⁵⁸ Campbell, Angus. 1980. *The American Voter*. Unabridged ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

⁵⁹ Colton, Timothy J. 2000. *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

to be driven by other factors of interest. In Stage 2, we include the main ethnic, linguistic, and nationality [civic identity] variables for Ukraine - following Onuch & Hale's (2018) approach. In Stage 3, we include our subjective economic evaluation variables (*sociotropic*, *egotropic*, and transition winner) - more likely to be influenced by earlier-stage factors. In Stage 4, as guided by the above literature, we include our first set of behavioral factors: past-political participation (EuroMaidan protest participant, and (pro-EU or anti-EU) vote choice). In Stage 5 and 6 we include our second set of prospective behaviors that capture a different aspect of the socio-economic instrumentalist hypothesis (migration intention and migration preference to EU or Russia). And finally, in Stage 7, we include "liberal"/ "EU Values" political dispositions often found to correlate to Pro-EU accession policy preferences (support for a democratic system).

In what follows, Figures 2-12 show the statistically significant full effects of each factor on our dependent variable, with only the results from the logistic regression models reported. In Tables 3 and 4 we also provide full coefficients and confidence intervals but only for statistically significant factors – for full model results please see the Appendix.

Table 3. Full Effects of Critical Election Cohorts on Preference to Join EU [about here]

This table only reports the statistically significant factors - for full model table please see Appendix. The significant effects at stage of inclusion are highlighted in grey.

	Age & Cohort	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5	Stage 6	Stage 7
2019 Cohort Zelenskyy	0.17* (0.02, 0.32)	0.16* (0.03, 0.29)	0.17* (0.04, 0.30)	0.17** (0.04, 0.30)	0.18** (0.05, 0.30)	0.16* (0.04, 0.29)	0.16* (0.03, 0.28)	0.15* (0.02, 0.28)
Female		-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.09, 0.00)	-0.04 (-0.09, 0.00)
Family financial situation		0.25** (0.08, 0.42)	0.24** (0.07, 0.41)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.30)	0.13 (-0.03, 0.30)	0.10 (-0.06, 0.27)
East residence		-0.12** (-0.19, -0.04)	-0.08 (-0.17, 0.01)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.13, 0.06)
West residence		0.20*** (0.11, 0.29)	0.19*** (0.10, 0.28)	0.18*** (0.09, 0.27)	0.17*** (0.08, 0.26)	0.16*** (0.07, 0.25)	0.16*** (0.07, 0.24)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.24)
South residence		-0.27*** (-0.37, -0.18)	-0.25*** (-0.36, -0.15)	-0.23*** (-0.33, -0.12)	-0.20*** (-0.30, -0.09)	-0.20*** (-0.30, -0.10)	-0.19*** (-0.29, -0.09)	-0.19*** (-0.30, -0.09)
Transition winner				0.18*** (0.11, 0.26)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.16*** (0.09, 0.24)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.24)	0.15*** (0.07, 0.22)
Vote for Poroshenko 2019					0.15** (0.05, 0.25)	0.15** (0.06, 0.25)	0.15** (0.06, 0.25)	0.13** (0.04, 0.23)
Vote for Boiko 2019					-0.15* (-0.26, -0.04)	-0.14* (-0.26, -0.03)	-0.13* (-0.25, -0.02)	-0.14* (-0.25, -0.03)
Euromaidan participant					0.10* (0.00, 0.20)	0.09 (-0.00, 0.19)	0.09* (0.00, 0.19)	0.09* (0.00, 0.18)
Migration intention						0.10*** (0.05, 0.16)	0.11** (0.03, 0.18)	0.11** (0.04, 0.19)
Migrate to Russia							-0.19*	-0.17 (-0.34, 0.00)

Democracy is the Best System							(-0.35, - 0.02)	
								0.12*** (0.07, 0.17)
N=	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600

95% confidence intervals in brackets. Note: Calculated using logit model. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4. Full Effects of Mass-mobilization Cohorts on Preference to Join EU [about here]

This table only reports the statistically significant factors - for full model table please see Appendix. The significant effects at stage of inclusion are highlighted in grey.

	Age & Cohort	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5	Stage 6	Stage 7
Orange Revolution cohort	-0.08 (-0.18, 0.02)	-0.09* (-0.18, -0.00)	-0.10* (-0.19, -0.01)	-0.11* (-0.20, -0.03)	-0.11* (-0.20, -0.03)	-0.11* (-0.20, -0.02)	-0.11* (-0.19, -0.02)	-0.10* (-0.19, -0.01)
Age	-0.16* (-0.32, -0.01)	-0.08 (-0.22, 0.06)	-0.06 (-0.20, 0.08)	-0.08 (-0.21, 0.06)	-0.07 (-0.21, 0.08)	0.01 (-0.14, 0.16)	0.01 (-0.14, 0.17)	0.01 (-0.14, 0.16)
Female		-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.01)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.04 (-0.10, 0.01)	-0.04 (-0.09, 0.00)
Family financial situation		0.25** (0.08, 0.42)	0.24** (0.07, 0.41)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.32)	0.13 (-0.04, 0.31)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)	0.13 (-0.04, 0.30)	0.10 (-0.07, 0.27)
East residence		-0.12** (-0.19, -0.04)	-0.08 (-0.17, 0.01)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.07)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)
West residence		0.20*** (0.11, 0.29)	0.19*** (0.10, 0.28)	0.18*** (0.10, 0.27)	0.17*** (0.08, 0.26)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.25)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.25)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.24)
South residence		-0.28*** (-0.38, -0.18)	-0.26*** (-0.36, -0.15)	-0.23*** (-0.33, -0.12)	-0.20*** (-0.31, -0.09)	-0.20*** (-0.30, -0.10)	-0.19*** (-0.29, -0.09)	-0.19*** (-0.30, -0.09)
Transition winner				0.18*** (0.10, 0.26)	0.15*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.14*** (0.07, 0.22)
Vote for Poroshenko 2019					0.15** (0.05, 0.25)	0.15** (0.05, 0.25)	0.16** (0.06, 0.25)	0.13** (0.04, 0.23)
Vote for Boiko 2019					-0.15* (-0.26, -0.04)	-0.15* (-0.26, -0.03)	-0.14* (-0.25, -0.02)	-0.14* (-0.26, -0.02)
Euromaidan participant					0.10* (0.01, 0.20)	0.10* (0.00, 0.19)	0.10* (0.00, 0.19)	0.09* (0.00, 0.18)

Migration intention						0.11*** (0.05, 0.16)	0.12** (0.04, 0.19)	0.12** (0.05, 0.20)
Migrate to EU							0.00 (-0.08, 0.08)	-0.01 (-0.09, 0.08)
Migrate to Russia							-0.21* (-0.37, -0.05)	-0.19* (-0.36, -0.02)
Democracy is the Best System								0.12*** (0.07, 0.17)
N=	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600


95% confidence intervals in brackets. Note: Calculated using logit model. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Results & Discussion

Our analyses are highly robust and support our main proposition that political cohorts and not age alone are better predictors of support for EU accession. When we examine the *full effects* of mass-mobilization and critical election cohorts independently of other known correlates but controlling for age, our analyses clearly show that belonging to; a) the 2019 (Zelensky) election cohort increases and b) the 2004 (Yushchenko) election cohort decreases the estimated likelihood of supporting EU accession of Ukraine (see Figure 2). We also see a statistically significant negative effect of belonging to the c) 2010 (Yanukovich) election cohort – which according to the theory above we do not consider a critical election.


Of note for Ukraine focused scholars, we find no effect of belonging to the 1991 (Kravchuk), 1994 (Kuchma), 1999 (Kuchma), or even the 2014 post-EuroMaidan (Poroshenko) critical election cohorts. Thus, coming of age politically (being 18-22) and first voting in either of these elections does not increase or decrease the estimated likelihood of supporting EU accession of Ukraine at a statistically significant level. The lack of any significant effect of the 2014 election (Poroshenko) cohort is highly interesting, as this is the second youngest cohort in the model, and we would expect an inverse effect among people who were between 23-27 at the time of our survey – after all they are still by most accounts ‘youth.’

Figure 2 [About Here]



Furthermore, when we combine the cohorts together in one model, we only find a consistent and stable cohort effect for the 2019 election cohort (Zelensky) (see Figure 4). Belonging to this “Zelensky” cohort substantially increases the estimated likelihood that an individual will support Ukraine’s accession into the EU by 15% at the 95% statistical confidence level. Some might think that the 2019 critical election (Zelensky) cohort effect is an “age effect” capturing the “youngest” group in our sample. To this we note that we control for age in the model and that we also ran robustness checks coding age as six groups to further test the competing hypothesis of an age-based or “generation” effect. We do not find this to be the case. Moreover, we consistently find that age effects dissipate when we control for other standard variables whilst the effect of belonging to the 2019 election (Zelensky) cohort persists.

Figure 3 [About Here]




To further underscore that there are cohort and not simply age effects at play, we note that in robustness checks, where we continued to account for and include non-critical elections, we also find that those who belong to the 2010 (Yanukovich) cohort are *less* likely to support joining the EU. This is surprising as Yanukovich notoriously campaigned on signing the EU association and free-trade agreements and even more so since this group would have been 22-26 at the time of the EuroMaidan in 2014 and were aged 27-31 at the time of our survey in 2019 (thus, still relatively young if we consider that 36 is the cut off for many demographic and political definitions of “youth”). This unexpected secondary finding suggests that future studies may

benefit from a deeper exploration of the a) EU focused campaign rhetoric in 2010, and b) the possibility of cohort disenchantment with the EU.

Second, and in-line with our expectations, we find no consistently significant mass-mobilization cohort effect and specifically, we do not find that belonging to the “EuroMaidan” cohort increases or decreases the estimated likelihood that an individual would support joining the EU (see figures 3, 4, 5, & 6). We do note that when we add controls - we also find a *negative* effect of belonging to the Orange Revolution cohort on support for EU accession (10%). Thus, we can not only reject the popular hypothesis that there is a political and social generational coalescing around youth experience of the EuroMaidan, this double pro-EU mass-mobilization cohort test suggests that there is no-to-little evidence of a positive socializing effect of coming of age during a pro-EU mass-mobilization on future support for EU accession. In fact, there is some limited evidence that coming of age during a pro-EU mass protest, notably followed by a period of disappointment and back-sliding, might have the inverse effect after hopes based on lofty promises once held so dear subside for disenchantment. A finding that EU practitioners and pro-EU politicians should not take lightly. But we also note that we do not find any effect for 2004 election cohort.

Figure 4 [About Here]




As noted, the 2019 election (Zelensky) cohort effect does not dissipate when we include our first stage controls (see Figure 6). In line with expectations in the literature, we do see some substantial effects of family financial situation. A better family financial situation increases the

likelihood that someone will support Ukraine’s accession into the EU by 25% (at 99% confidence level). We also see evidence that region of residence has a large and statistically significant effect. Residing in the west of the country increases the likelihood that someone supports EU accession by 20% and residing in the east and south decreases that likelihood by 12% and 27% respectively.

Figure 5 [About Here]

Figure 5. Preference for Ukraine to Join EU: Political Cohorts & Demographics (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)




In stage two of our analysis we control for ethnic and linguistic identity. This allows us to explore whether past findings that ethno-national identities align with pro-EU policy preferences in Ukraine as noted by Whitefield et al. (2006) and Chaisty and Whitefield (2017) or whether as postulated by Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2018) a strong sense of homeland attachment or civic identity is more closely correlated with support for EU accession. Notably, we find no evidence that national (civic or ethnic) identity increases or decreases the likelihood that someone supports Ukraine’s EU accession (see Figure 6).⁶⁰ These findings lend support to recent scholarship by Guiliano (2018) and Onuch and Hale (2018), which suggests that policy preferences do not neatly align with ethnolinguistic identities in Ukraine. But most importantly, we find no support for the notion that EU accession could be seen as a pathway for complete independence nor that those with strong ethno-national orientations and identities are sceptical of the EU.

⁶⁰ In our robustness checks, when we run the analysis with the dependent variable as a 1-5 scale (with the hard to say responses as the middle category – thus, in our view distorting the variable substantially) we find a positive effect only for language preference. notably when we run the models with the dependent variable as a 1-4 scale we have the same results as with our binary dependent variable modelling.

Figure 6 [About Here]


Figure 6. Preference for Ukraine to Join EU: Political Cohorts & Nationality (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)



In stage three of our analysis we control for economical focused hypotheses (see Figure 7). First, in line with the logic presented in Tucker et. al. (2008), we find that those who consider themselves to be economic winners of transition are more likely to support Ukraine’s EU accession. Believing that one has “won” from transition from communism increases the estimated likelihood that they also support EU membership by 18% (at the 99% confidence level). This effect is highlighted in our robustness checks where it is even larger (up to 30% positive marginal effect). Moreover, in all of our models this outcome is consistent even when controlling for all other variables. At face value this can be interpreted as supporting the instrumentalist approach - that those who have benefit from economic liberalisation also see that these benefits would continue upon joining the EU. Yet, there is some evidence that this effect should not be interpreted as (only) economic in nature and that it likely is also capturing a sentiment of “winning” from political liberalisation since transition.

Figure 7 [About Here]

Figure 7. Preference for Ukraine to Join EU: Political Cohorts & Econ Evaluation (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)



Our conclusion that the instrumentalist economic theory is not supported here lies in how the other two economic variables behave in our model. Perhaps surprisingly, we do not *consistently* find that positively evaluating retrospective *sociotropic* economic conditions increases the likelihood that an individual supports Ukraine joining the EU. Here we note a caveat, whilst we find no effect in the electoral cohort models, in those concerning mass-mobilization cohorts we do find an initial - but small - effect of positively evaluating the country's economic situation over the last 12 months on being more likely to also hold pro-EU policy preferences. In this case, positively evaluating Ukraine's economic context increases the likelihood that someone holds a pro-EU position by 9% (at the 95% confidence level). Alas, unlike the effect of believing one is a transition winner, this effect is completely absorbed when we control for political variables such as partisanship (and also in later stages when we include migration intention and support for democracy). This is in line with long standing political behaviour research on the relationship between partisanship and economic evaluation.⁶¹ But it points to fact that this economic effect is not robust.

Crucially, and further countering the instrumentalist economic expectations, positive *egotropic* economic evaluations (of one's own financial circumstances over the last 12 months) have no significant effect on our variable of interest. Thus, our findings do not support the research that

⁶¹ Gerber, Alan S., and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. "Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?" *American Political Science Review*, 407–26.; Enns, Peter K., Paul M. Kellstedt, and Gregory E. McAvoy. 2012. "The Consequences of Partisanship in Economic Perceptions." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76 (2): 287–310.

proposes that instrumental economic priorities drive Ukrainians' support for EU accession. This finding may also suggest that ideational and values-based explanations are more important when determining support for EU accession reflecting the ongoing debate in the broader literature on attitudes to the EU.⁶² A further important element to keep in mind when noting the lack of evidence to support economic drivers of pro-EU attitudes in Ukraine is that the positive effect of belonging to the 2019 election (Zelenskyy) cohort remains persistently strong (as does the negative effect of belonging to the 2010 election [Yanukovich] cohort). Signalling, that these election cohorts are capturing something more specific to the political socialisation that occurred during those elections.

In stage four of our analysis, we control for political behaviour and partisanship (see Figure 8). We find that partisanship or electoral support (as measured by both retrospective (2014) and prospective (2019) vote declarations for either parliamentary parties or party leaders as presidential candidates) has a significant and expected effect. Declaring having voted for, or intending to vote for a pro-EU candidate or Party (Poroshenko in our main model) increases the likelihood that an individual will support EU accession by 15% (at the 99% confidence level) and decreases this likelihood by 15% (at the 95% confidence level) when someone has declared that they will vote for an anti-EU candidate like Boiko in 2019. This effect is persistent when we control for other variables at later stages. We note that including these political variables in our model also decreases the effect of region but does not alter the effect of either electoral or mass-mobilization cohorts. In fact, the inclusion of this control strengthens the 2019 election cohort effect and the negative effect of belonging to the 2004 Orange Revolution cohort.

We also note that although belonging to the "EuroMaidan" or the 2014 election cohort does not increase or decrease the likelihood that an individual supports EU accession – actually having participated in the EuroMaidan mass-mobilization does increase this likelihood by 10% (at the 95% confidence level). Some readers might be tempted to interpret this result as evidence of socialization effects among those between 18-25 who actually participated in the EuroMaidan protests. But this would be incorrect. Firstly, it is important to note that the protest participant variable includes respondents of *all ages* and *all cohorts*. The majority (83%) of the EuroMaidan protest participants were in fact older than 25 at the time of the protests (13% were between 18-

⁶² Garry, John, and James Tilley. 2009. "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes towards the EU." *European Union Politics* 10 (3): 361–79.; Christin, Thomas. 2005. "Economic and Political Basis of Attitudes towards the EU in Central and East European Countries in the 1990s." *European Union Politics* 6 (1): 29–57.

25, and 4% were under 18). Thus, the median protester was approximately 36 and fell outside of the bounds of the impressionable years for political socialization.


This being said, to ensure that we are correct in our interpretation that those between 18-25 at the time of the EuroMaidan as a cohort (regardless of whether they were protest participants or not) are not any more or less likely to support Ukraine joining the EU we reran a series of robustness checks. We created a new binary variable “EuroMaidan cohort II” which incorporated *both*: a) all those who were in their impressionable years (18-25) at the time of the EuroMaidan *as well as* b) all those who were actual protest participants. We name this variable “EuroMaidan Protest Participant cohort.” We then ran a series of univariate and full model logistic regressions (checking with OLS) comparing the two EuroMaidan cohorts (I and II).⁶³ We are pleased to report that there is no difference between these two models and the results confirm our thinking that even when re-operationalized, being part of the EuroMaidan cohort does not correlated to hold pro-EU foreign policy preferences (see figures A1, A2, and A3 in Appendix). Thus, we can be even more certain that being socialized during major protest events, a major claim of which was strong and closer ties with the EU, does not necessarily have an effect on holding pro-EU views in the future.

This finding lends more support to our thinking about the effect of political socialization and cohorts – and further underscores that living through critical juncture type events like a mass-mobilization but not participating in or being directly affected by them does not have the same coalescing and socializing cohort effect as actual participation does. Alas, because elections are more likely to include a broader proportion of the population directly - and may have a broader effect on society as a whole even among those who do not engage directly – those elections which are seen as highly competitive, polarizing (or when participation in them is seen as being more critical) are more likely to socialize citizens in their impressionable years creating bounded political cohorts. On the other hand, only 15-20% of the population ever participate in mass mobilizations. And whilst these events look spectacular and can even result in major policy or institutional shifts there is little evidence to suggest that they have a direct effect on broader society in the same way that critical elections do.

⁶³ As a further check resulting from concerns around endogeneity we also ran the full model with and without a EuroMaidan protest participant control.

Figure 8 [About Here]

Figure 8. Preference for Ukraine to Join EU: Political Cohorts & Political Behavior (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)



In stage five and six of our analysis, we further interrogate the likelihood that those who declare their support for pro-EU policy (and specifically youth and/or the 2019 election [Zelensky] cohort) consider the instrumental benefits of EU accession by exploring migration intention as a correlate of support for Ukraine’s EU accession. That is, Ukrainians may calculate that they will benefit from EU accession through freedom of movement for employment, study, and leisure. But again, we see no evidence to support an instrumentalist argument – whilst migration intention increases the estimated likelihood that an individual will support EU membership 9/12% (at the 95 and 99% statistical levels respectively see Figure 9) – when we control for where those who declare an intention want to migrate to we see no evidence that wanted to migrate to the EU increases or decreases the likelihood that an individual will support Ukraine’s accession. We do see a negative effect on support for accession by those who declare that they want to go to Russia, but in robustness checks we do not find that this effect holds for other countries in the region. Again, we stress that the inclusion of this control does not alter the positive effect of belonging to the 2019 election cohort or the negative effect of belonging to the Orange Revolution and 2010 election cohorts. Thus, again suggesting that some other factor is responsible for this socialisation effect. This finding is highly significant as it stresses that not only are the cohort effects not based on age alone, that support for EU membership is not driven by instrumentalist benefits for disenchanted post-transition or post-EuroMaidan youth.

Figure 9 [About Here]

Figure 9. Preference for Ukraine to Join EU: Political Cohorts & Migration Intention (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)





Figure 10 [About Here]

Figure 10. Preference for Ukraine to Join EU: Political Cohorts & EU/RuSS Migration (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)




In the final seventh stage, we control for the political dispositions and values hypothesis (see Figure 11) and find robust and consistent evidence to support the notion that ideational and values-based drivers are more significant in determining support for pro-EU policy in Ukraine than instrumentalist/economic factors. In particular, the full effect of believing democracy is the best system for Ukraine on the estimated likelihood that an individual supports Ukraine's EU accession is 12% (and is significant at the 99.9% confidence level). This suggests in-line with Wolczuk's (2016) and Chaban and Chaban's (2018) work that, citizens assess foreign policy preferences, guided by ideological values, and that the EU may be conceptualised as pro-democratic in the cultural imagination, or, more broadly, that the EU is understood in value-based terms. We note that again the cohort effects as described above remain significant.

This finding underscores our thinking about the nature of socialisation taking place during elections – we expect that further qualitative analysis of the content of campaign discourses specifically on the EU and policy towards the EU by different candidates during the 2019 and 2010 presidential elections (as well as others which are not significant) might help us better understand why we see this socializing effect. But our analysis highlights that we should focus on how political values around democracy rather than economic benefits of integration were discussed in these campaigns. It would also be prudent in future study to look at youth attitudes at the time of the elections and specifically gauge any temporal patterns between youth groups overtime.

Figure 11 [About Here]

Figure 11. Preference for Ukraine to Join EU: Political Cohorts & Pro-Democracy (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)



Conclusions

Our findings clearly show that a) pro-EU policy preferences are not only the domain of youth in Ukrainian society, b) popular discourse around a “EuroMaidan generation” cohort of youth having coalesced in Ukraine since 2014 is erroneous, and c) that there is little or at best inconsistent evidence of political socialisation taking place as a result of living through a moment of mass-mobilization during one’s impressionable years as compared to being in one’s impressionable years during a critical election. To this end, in our double test of the EuroMaidan and the Orange Revolution, we find that having “come of age” politically (18-25) at the time of mass-mobilization even one that was focused around pro-EU accession claims does not result in a) cohort coalescence or b) increasing the likelihood that one will support pro-EU membership policy in the future. This is significant because it goes against both popular and policy expectations that youth experience of protest is particularly formative. Also, considering the other papers in this special issue – our’s presents a hard test about the generational – here understood as cohort - cultural impacts of mass-mobilization in boarder society.

Again, we note that while we do not find significant effects for all of the critical election cohorts considered, we do find initial evidence for cohort clustering around the 2019 (Zelensky) and 2010 (Yanukovych) cohorts, aligning with positive and negative support for Ukraine’s EU

accession, respectively. Significantly, the effect of age disappears when control variables are added, and competing hypotheses tested, while cohort effects persist. The 2019 election (Zelenskyy) cohort effect is particularly tenacious, retaining significance in all model specifications, as further variables are added to test competing hypotheses, and a series of robustness checks are run. This gives weight to theoretical expectations that more polarizing and high turnout elections should be considered “critical.” Of course, one limitation to our findings is the notion of durable effect. Considering our data is from 2019, we are unable to assert whether the 2019 election cohort effect will persist with time – and will only be able to test the longevity of this effect when further data is available.

While being part of the Zelenskyy cohort does appear to drive support for EU accession, notably, the variables for geographic residence, family financial situation, winning from transition, believing democracy to be the best system, and migration intention also guard a significant effect. Thus, ideation around the EU as a democratic political ideal appears to hold traction in Ukraine. We see no to little evidence that support for EU accession follows an instrumental pathway (seeing personal benefit in accession) and rather argue that a values-based pro-democratic sentiment is more important than economic evaluations. This should not be interpreted as a democratic disillusionment factor but rather as a commitment to pro-democratic norms which are likely to be perceived as being embodied by the EU.

Thus, our findings are fully in line with the now increasingly dominant thinking around the import of first elections on one’s political socialization and more specifically the first elections one was eligible to participate in. Although we admit that in order to better unpack the mechanism behind the cohort effects we need more in-depth qualitative research focusing on campaign discourses – our analysis is also able to point out that we should pay more attention to how political values and other ideational aspects were addressed in the campaign discourses and perhaps not focus on how instrumentalist economic factors of EU accession were discussed.

Appendices

Table A1. Full Effects of Critical Election Cohorts on Preference to Join EU

	Age & Cohort	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5	Stage 6	Stage 7
1991 Cohort Kravchuk	0.06 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.06 (-0.03, 0.16)	0.05 (-0.05, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.05, 0.15)	0.04 (-0.06, 0.14)	0.03 (-0.06, 0.13)	0.03 (-0.07, 0.13)	0.03 (-0.07, 0.12)
1994 Cohort Kuchma	-0.01 (-0.14, 0.11)	0.01 (-0.11, 0.13)	0.01 (-0.11, 0.13)	0.01 (-0.10, 0.13)	0.01 (-0.11, 0.13)	0.02 (-0.10, 0.14)	0.02 (-0.10, 0.14)	0.03 (-0.09, 0.15)
2004 Cohort Yushchenko	-0.04 (-0.14, 0.05)	-0.05 (-0.14, 0.04)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.07 (-0.16, 0.02)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)
2014 Cohort Poroshenko	0.08 (-0.07, 0.22)	0.09 (-0.05, 0.23)	0.10 (-0.04, 0.24)	0.11 (-0.03, 0.25)	0.11 (-0.02, 0.25)	0.11 (-0.02, 0.25)	0.11 (-0.03, 0.24)	0.09 (-0.04, 0.22)
2019 Cohort Zelenskyy	0.17* (0.02, 0.32)	0.16* (0.03, 0.29)	0.17* (0.04, 0.30)	0.17** (0.04, 0.30)	0.18** (0.05, 0.30)	0.16* (0.04, 0.29)	0.16* (0.03, 0.28)	0.15* (0.02, 0.28)
Age	-0.03 (-0.19, 0.14)	0.07 (-0.08, 0.23)	0.10 (-0.05, 0.26)	0.09 (-0.07, 0.24)	0.10 (-0.05, 0.26)	0.17* (0.01, 0.33)	0.16 (-0.00, 0.32)	0.15 (-0.01, 0.30)
Female		-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.09, 0.00)	-0.04 (-0.09, 0.00)
Education (3 levels)		0.07 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.03, 0.18)	0.06 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.04 (-0.06, 0.15)
Family financial situation		0.25** (0.08, 0.42)	0.24** (0.07, 0.41)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.30)	0.13 (-0.03, 0.30)	0.10 (-0.06, 0.27)
Urban residence		0.02 (-0.05, 0.09)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.03, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.09)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.09)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.09)
East residence		-0.12** (-0.19, -0.04)	-0.08 (-0.17, 0.01)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.13, 0.06)
West residence		0.20*** (0.11, 0.29)	0.19*** (0.10, 0.28)	0.18*** (0.09, 0.27)	0.17*** (0.08, 0.26)	0.16*** (0.07, 0.25)	0.16*** (0.07, 0.24)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.24)

South residence		-0.27*** (-0.37, -0.18)	-0.25*** (-0.36, -0.15)	-0.23*** (-0.33, -0.12)	-0.20*** (-0.30, -0.09)	-0.20*** (-0.30, -0.10)	-0.19*** (-0.29, -0.09)	-0.19*** (-0.30, -0.09)
Ukrainian Nationality (civic identity)			0.07 (-0.02, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.02, 0.16)	0.05 (-0.03, 0.14)	0.06 (-0.02, 0.15)	0.06 (-0.03, 0.14)	0.06 (-0.03, 0.15)
Ukrainian ethnicity			0.06 (-0.01, 0.14)	0.05 (-0.03, 0.12)	0.04 (-0.03, 0.11)	0.04 (-0.03, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.04 (-0.03, 0.11)
Language preference Ukrainian			-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)
Language embeddedness Ukrainian			0.06 (-0.01, 0.13)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.06 (-0.01, 0.13)	0.05 (-0.01, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.01, 0.12)
Economic evaluation egotropic				0.06 (-0.05, 0.16)	0.03 (-0.07, 0.14)	0.04 (-0.06, 0.14)	0.04 (-0.06, 0.14)	0.04 (-0.06, 0.15)
Economic evaluation sociotropic				0.09 (-0.01, 0.18)	0.07 (-0.03, 0.16)	0.07 (-0.03, 0.16)	0.07 (-0.03, 0.16)	0.06 (-0.03, 0.15)
Transition winner				0.18*** (0.11, 0.26)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.16*** (0.09, 0.24)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.24)	0.15*** (0.07, 0.22)
Vote for Zelensky 2019					0.00 (-0.08, 0.07)	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.07)	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.07)	-0.02 (-0.09, 0.06)
Vote for Poroshenko 2019					0.15** (0.05, 0.25)	0.15** (0.06, 0.25)	0.15** (0.06, 0.25)	0.13** (0.04, 0.23)
Vote for Boiko 2019					-0.15* (-0.26, -0.04)	-0.14* (-0.26, -0.03)	-0.13* (-0.25, -0.02)	-0.14* (-0.25, -0.03)
Euromaidan participant					0.10* (0.00, 0.20)	0.09 (-0.00, 0.19)	0.09* (0.00, 0.19)	0.09* (0.00, 0.18)

Migration intention						0.10*** (0.05, 0.16)	0.11** (0.03, 0.18)	0.11** (0.04, 0.19)
Migrate to EU							0.01 (-0.08, 0.09)	0.00 (-0.08, 0.08)
Migrate to Russia							-0.19* (-0.35, -0.02)	-0.17 (-0.34, 0.00)
Democracy is the Best System								0.12*** (0.07, 0.17)
N=	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600

95% confidence intervals in brackets. Note: Calculated using logit model. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.00$

Table A2. Full Effects of Mass-mobilization Cohorts on Preference to Join EU

	Age & Cohort	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5	Stage 6	Stage 7
Revolution on the Granite Cohort	0.03 (-0.05, 0.10)	0.02 (-0.06, 0.09)	0.00 (-0.07, 0.08)	0.00 (-0.07, 0.07)	-0.00 (-0.08, 0.07)	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.06)	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.06)	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.06)
Ukraine Without Kuchma UBK cohort	-0.04 (-0.14, 0.06)	-0.05 (-0.15, 0.04)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.04)	-0.07 (-0.16, 0.02)	-0.08 (-0.17, 0.01)	-0.07 (-0.17, 0.02)	-0.07 (-0.17, 0.02)	-0.07 (-0.16, 0.03)
Orange Revolution cohort	-0.08 (-0.18, 0.02)	-0.09* (-0.18, -0.00)	-0.10* (-0.19, -0.01)	-0.11* (-0.20, -0.03)	-0.11* (-0.20, -0.03)	-0.11* (-0.20, -0.02)	-0.11* (-0.19, -0.02)	-0.10* (-0.19, -0.01)
EuroMaidan Cohort	-0.00 (-0.11, 0.11)	-0.01 (-0.12, 0.09)	-0.01 (-0.12, 0.10)	-0.00 (-0.11, 0.10)	-0.00 (-0.11, 0.10)	0.00 (-0.10, 0.11)	0.01 (-0.10, 0.11)	0.00 (-0.11, 0.11)
Age	-0.16* (-0.32, -0.01)	-0.08 (-0.22, 0.06)	-0.06 (-0.20, 0.08)	-0.08 (-0.21, 0.06)	-0.07 (-0.21, 0.08)	0.01 (-0.14, 0.16)	0.01 (-0.14, 0.17)	0.01 (-0.14, 0.16)
Female		-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05* (-0.11, -0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.01)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10, 0.00)	-0.04 (-0.10, 0.01)	-0.04 (-0.09, 0.00)
Education (3 levels)		0.06 (-0.05, 0.17)	0.06 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.06 (-0.04, 0.16)	0.06 (-0.04, 0.16)	0.06 (-0.04, 0.16)	0.04 (-0.07, 0.14)
Family financial situation		0.25** (0.08, 0.42)	0.24** (0.07, 0.41)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.32)	0.13 (-0.04, 0.31)	0.14 (-0.03, 0.31)	0.13 (-0.04, 0.30)	0.10 (-0.07, 0.27)
Urban residence		0.02 (-0.05, 0.09)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.10)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.09)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.09)	0.02 (-0.04, 0.09)

East residence		-0.12** (-0.19, -0.04)	-0.08 (-0.17, 0.01)	-0.06 (-0.15, 0.03)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.07)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)
West residence		0.20*** (0.11, 0.29)	0.19*** (0.10, 0.28)	0.18*** (0.10, 0.27)	0.17*** (0.08, 0.26)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.25)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.25)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.24)
South residence		-0.28*** (-0.38, -0.18)	-0.26*** (-0.36, -0.15)	-0.23*** (-0.33, -0.12)	-0.20*** (-0.31, -0.09)	-0.20*** (-0.30, -0.10)	-0.19*** (-0.29, -0.09)	-0.19*** (-0.30, -0.09)
Ukrainian Nationality (civic identity)			0.07 (-0.02, 0.16)	0.07 (-0.02, 0.16)	0.05 (-0.04, 0.14)	0.06 (-0.02, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.03, 0.14)	0.06 (-0.03, 0.15)
Ukrainian ethnicity			0.07 (-0.01, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.13)	0.05 (-0.03, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)
Language preference Ukrainian			-0.04 (-0.13, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	-0.03 (-0.13, 0.06)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)
Language embeddedness Ukrainian			0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.04 (-0.03, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)
Economic evaluation egotropic				0.07 (-0.04, 0.17)	0.05 (-0.06, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.05, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.05, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.06, 0.16)
Economic evaluation sociotropic				0.09* (0.00, 0.19)	0.07 (-0.02, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.02, 0.17)	0.07 (-0.02, 0.17)	0.06 (-0.03, 0.16)
Transition winner				0.18*** (0.10, 0.26)	0.15*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.16*** (0.08, 0.23)	0.14*** (0.07, 0.22)
Vote for Zelensky 2019					0.00 (-0.07, 0.07)	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.07)	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.07)	-0.02 (-0.09, 0.06)

Vote for Poroshenko 2019					0.15** (0.05, 0.25)	0.15** (0.05, 0.25)	0.16** (0.06, 0.25)	0.13** (0.04, 0.23)
Vote for Boiko 2019					-0.15* (-0.26, -0.04)	-0.15* (-0.26, -0.03)	-0.14* (-0.25, -0.02)	-0.14* (-0.26, -0.02)
Euromaidan participant					0.10* (0.01, 0.20)	0.10* (0.00, 0.19)	0.10* (0.00, 0.19)	0.09* (0.00, 0.18)
Migration intention						0.11*** (0.05, 0.16)	0.12** (0.04, 0.19)	0.12** (0.05, 0.20)
Migrate to EU							0.00 (-0.08, 0.08)	-0.01 (-0.09, 0.08)
Migrate to Russia							-0.21* (-0.37, -0.05)	-0.19* (-0.36, -0.02)
Democracy is the Best System								0.12*** (0.07, 0.17)
N=	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600

95% confidence intervals in brackets. Note: Calculated using logit model. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3. List of Survey Items and Coded Variables Used in Main Model

Grey=original survey item & White=coded variables

Variable Name, Survey Item & Description	Outcomes	Freq.	% of Population
DEPENDENT VARIABLE			
Join EU			
Q60_3: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements: Ukraine should join the European Union	1 Completely agree	559	35.08
	2 Somewhat agree	331	21.28
	3 Somewhat disagree	156	09.58

	4 Completely disagree 7 H/S 8 Ref	236 302 16	14.38 18.64 01.05
Join EU [0,1]	1 Completely and Somewhat Agree Ukraine Should Join EU 0 All Others	890 710	56.36 43.64
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES			
YoB: Calculated from: Please tell me what year and month you were born.	Min: 1924 Max: 2001	-	-
Age	Min: 18 Max: 95 Age mean is 50.03		
1991 Cohort Kravchuk [0,1] (First election eligible to vote) <i>Election 1 December 1991 - those who were not yet 18 in 1985. Code 1 for those who spent most of the years 18-22 in this period: DOB Dec 1969 - Nov 1</i>	1 Belongs to Cohort 0 All Others	108 1492	6.44 93.56
1994 Cohort Kuchma 1 [0,1] (First election eligible to vote) <i>Election 1994 (31 July 1994) - those who were not yet 18 in 1991. Code 1 those who spent most of the years 18-22 in this period: DOB 12/1973 - 07/1976).</i>	1 Belongs to Cohort 0 All Others	81 1519	5.15 94.85
1999 Cohort Kuchma 2 [0,1] (First election eligible to vote) <i>Election 1999 31 Oct - those who were not yet 18 in 1994. Code 1 for those who spent most of the years 18-22 in this period: DOB August 1976 - October 1981</i>	1 Belongs to Cohort 0 All Others	139 1461	9.30 90.70
2004 Cohort Yushchenko [0,1] (First election eligible to vote) <i>Election 2004 (November 23 & 26 December) - those who were not yet 18 in 1999. Code 1 for those who spent most of the years 18-22 in this period: DOB Nov 1981 - Dec 198</i>	1 Belongs to Cohort 0 All Others	168 1432	11.38 88.62
2010 Cohort Yanukovich [0,1] (First election eligible to vote) <i>Election 2010 (17 January - 1992) - those who were not yet 18 in 2004. Code 1 for those who spent most of the years 18-22 in this period: DOB Jan 1987 - Jan 199</i>	1 Belongs to Cohort 0 All Others	124 1476	8.93 91.07
2014 Cohort Poroshenko [0,1] (First election eligible to vote) <i>Election in 2014 (25 May - 1996) - those who were not yet 18 in 2010. Code 1 those who spent most of the years 18-22 in this period: DOB Feb 1992 - May 1996</i>	1 Belongs to Cohort 0 All Others	83 1517	6.74 93.26
2019 Cohort Zelenskyy [0,1] (First election eligible to vote) <i>Election May 2019 - those who were not yet 18 in 2014. Code 1 those who spent most of the years 18-22 in this period: DOB June 1996</i>	1 Belongs to Cohort 0 All Others	88 1512	7.39 92.61
Cohort Revolution on the Granite [0,1]⁶⁴ (Perestroika and Revolution on the Granite)	1 Belongs to Cohort	246	14.19

⁶⁴ Coded as young people aged 18-25 at the time of the mass mobilization.

<i>DOB Dec 1975 - March 1981 *with end 1981 to account for fact those who spent most of 18-25 period after UBK in 2001</i>	0 All Others	1354	85.81
Cohort UBK [0,1] (Ukraine Without Kuchma) <i>DOB April 1983 - Dec 1986</i>			
	1 Belongs to Cohort	95	6.22
	0 All Others	1505	93.78
Cohort OR [0,1] (Orange Revolution) <i>DOB April 1981 - Dec 1986 most time 18-25 after 2001</i>			
	1 Belongs to Cohort	142	9.65
	0 All Others	1458	90.35
Cohort EM [0,1] (Euromaidan) <i>DOB Nov 1988 - Feb 1996</i>			
	1 Belongs to Cohort	80	6.40
	0 All Others	1520	9.36
Macro Region of Residence I10: What region was the interview conducted in			
	2 Kyiv City	104	06.61
	3 Kyivska	72	04.65
	4 Vinnytska	64	04.12
	5 Volynska	40	02.38
	6 Dnipropetrovska	128	08.24
	7 Donetska	80	04.54
	8 Zhytomyrska	56	03.58
	9 Zakarpatska	56	03.40
	10 Zaporizka	72	05.02
	11 Ivano-Frankivska	56	03.35
	12 Kirovohradska	40	02.44
	13 Luhanska	24	01.42
	14 Lvivska	104	05.90
	15 Mykolayivska	48	03.34
	16 Odeska	96	05.75
	17 Poltavska	64	03.87
	18 Rivnenska	48	02.87
	19 Sumska	48	03.12
	20 Ternopilska	48	02.79
	21 Kharkivska	104	07.10
	22 Khersonska	40	02.64
	23 Khmelnytska	56	03.40
	24 Cherkaska	56	03.64
	25 Chernivetska	48	02.87
	26 Chernihivska	48	02.94
Kiis East [0,1] (Region of Residence 6 10 21 7 13)			
	1 East	408	26.32
	0 All Others	1192	73.68
Kiis South [0,1] (Region of Residence 22 15 16)			
	1 South	184	11.73
	0 All Others	1416	88.27
Kiis Center [0,1] (Region of Residence 2 3 4 8 12 17 19 24 26)			
	Center	552	34.96

	0 All Others	1048	65.04
Kiis West [0,1] (Region of Residence 5 9 11 14 18 20 23 25)	1 West	456	26.98
	0 All Others	1144	73.02
Sex	1 Male	636	45.22
	2 Female	964	54.78
Female [0,1]	1 Female	964	54.78
	0 Male	636	45.22
Urban Rural Residence <i>As provided by KIIS</i>	1 Urban	1057	66.29
	2 Rural	543	33.71
Urban [0,1]	1 Urban	1057	66.29
	0 Rural	543	33.71
Education Level Q61: What is your level of education?	1 No formal education	2	00.11
	2 Prima Education	10	00.57
	3 Some High School/ Secondary Education	51	02.81
	4 High School/ Secondary School	391	23.99
	5 Professional tertiary education	660	41.00
	6 Incomplete higher or tertiary or university education	58	04.49
	7 Higher or tertiary or University Education	410	26.01
	8 PhD	8	00.47
	97 H/S	2	00.11
	98 ref	8	00.45
Education 3 [1,3] <i>(plus missings replaced with mean)</i>	1 Primary	12	0.68
	2 Secondary	442	26.95
	3 Tertiary	1136	72.37
Family Financial Situation Q74: Which of the following statements best describes the financial situation of your family?	1 We do not have enough money even for food	220	12.95
	2 We have enough money but only for the most necessary things	594	35.81
	3 We have enough money for daily expenses, but to even buy clothes is difficult	434	27.62
	4 Usually, we have enough money, but to buy expensive things, such as, for example, a refrigerator, a TV and a washing ma	282	18.66
	5 We can afford expensive purchases without too much difficulty, but buying a car is still beyond our means	30	2.09
	6 We can buy a car without much effort, but buying a home is still difficult	5	0.31
	7 At the present time we can afford anything we want	5	0.39
	97 H/S	14	0.99
	98 ref	16	1.17
Family financial situation [1,7] <i>(worst off to most comfortable, (plus missings replaced with means)</i>	1	220	13.24

	2	594	36.60
	3	434	28.23
	4	282	19.07
	5	30	2.14
	6	5	0.32
	7	5	0.04
Employed Q71: What is your current employment situation?	1 Self-employed	113	07.60
	2 Salaried employee in a state company	312	19.53
	3 Salaried employee in a private company	335	22.98
	4 Temporarily out of work	128	08.59
	5 Retired/pensioner	507	27.65
	6 Don't work/responsible for shopping and housework	148	09.13
	7 Student	38	03.25
	97 H/S	7	00.47
	98 ref	12	00.80
Employed [0,1]	1 Employed	760	50.10
	0 All Others	840	49.90
Nationality (Civic Identity) Q68: If you had to register only one nationality, which one would you choose?	1 Russian	90	05.63
	2 Ukrainian	1434	89.41
	3 Other	31	01.83
	7 H/S	39	02.69
	8 ref	6	00.44
Nationality (Civic Identity) Ukrainian N [0,1]	1 Ukrainian	1434	89.41
	0 All Others	166	10.59
Language Preference <i>Language of Survey Questionnaire – KIIS Methodology Opening Statement (interviewer assessment based on hoe respondent replies)</i>	1 Ukrainian = interviewer select Ukrainian questionnaire	820	49.72
	2 Russian = interviewer select Russian questionnaire	631	40.96
	3 Speaks Ukrainian More = interviewer select Ukrainian questionnaire	60	03.90
	4 Doesn't matter, speaks both, answer in Ukrainian = interviewer select Ukrainian questionnaire	12	00.72
	5 Speaks Russian more = interviewer select Russian questionnaire	61	03.78
	6 Doesn't matter, speaks both, answer in Russian = interviewer select Russian questionnaire	16	00.92
Language Preference Ukrainian [0,1]	1 Ukrainian	1002	61.84
	0 All Others	598	38.16
Language Embeddedness Q70_2: Which language do you typically speak at work?	1 Ukrainian	470	30.31
	2 Russian	246	16.75
	3 Other	1	00.11
	6 Ukrainian and Russian equally	168	11.37
	7 H/S	712	41.31
	8 ref	3	00.16
Language Embeddedness Ukrainian [0,1]	1 Ukrainian	470	30.31
	0 All Others	1130	69.69

Native Language (Ethnicity) Q70_3: What language do you consider your native language?	1 Ukrainian	1002	61.84
	2 Russian	368	23.12
	3 Other	14	00.78
	6 Ukrainian and Russian equally	204	13.35
	7 H/S	9	00.66
	8 ref	3	00.24
	Native Language (Ethnicity) Ukrainian [0,1]		964
		636	45.22
Socioeconomic Evaluation Q73: Do you think that over the last twelve months, the economy of Ukraine has improved, has somewhat improved, remains unchanged, has deteriorated somewhat, has gotten worse?	1 Has significantly improved	27	01.75
	2 Has somewhat improved	147	09.45
	3 Remains unchanged	367	23.37
	4 Has deteriorated somewhat	386	24.49
	5 Is much worse	582	35.33
	7 H/S	87	05.37
	8 ref	4	00.25
	Sociotropic economic evaluation [0,1]		174
		1426	88.81
Egotropic Economic Evaluation Q74: How has your family's financial situation changed over the past twelve months?	1 Has significantly improved	220	12.95
	2 Has somewhat improved	594	35.81
	3 Remains unchanged	434	27.62
	4 Has deteriorated somewhat	282	18.66
	5 Is much worse	30	02.09
	7 H/S	5	00.31
	8 ref	5	00.39
	Egotropic economic evaluation [0,1]		14
		16	01.17
Egotropic economic evaluation [0,1]		122	8.00
		1478	92.00
Transition Winner Q75: In general, have you gained/won or lost as a result of the economic changes that have taken place since the independence of Ukraine?	1 Gained/Won	90	05.52
	2 Mostly gained/won	150	09.57
	3 Mostly lost	255	15.78
	4 Lost	536	32.69
	6 Something was gained/won, something was lost	226	13.79
	7 It's hard to compare, i was too young then	106	07.66
	97 H/S	220	13.95
	98 ref	17	01.03
	Transition Winner [0,1]		240
		1360	84.91
Prospective Presidential Vote Q32: Here is a list of candidates for the upcoming Presidential elections on March 31. Please tell me for whom/which you are going to vote?	1 Balashov Hennadii Viktorovich (Partiia '5.10')	97	06.78
	2 Bezsmertnyi Roman Petrovych	247	20.83
	3 Bohomolets Olha Vadymivna	161	11.30
	4 Bohoslovska Inna Hermanivna	27	01.99
	5 Boiko Yurii Anatoliiovych	417	30.32
	6 Bondar Viktor Vasylovych (Partiia 'Vidrozhennia')	76	05.18

	7 Vashchenko Oleksandr Mykhailovych 8 Vilkul Oleksandr Yuriiovych (Partiia 'Opozytsiinyi blok - Partiia myru ta rozvytku') 9 Haber Mykola Oleksandrovych 10 Hrytsenko Anatolii Stepanovych (Partiia 'Hromadianska pozytsiia') 11 Danyliuk Oleksandr Volodymyrovych 12 Derevianko Yurii Bohdanovych (Partiia 'Volia') 13 Zhuravlov Vasyl Mykolaiovych (Partiia 'Stabilnist') 14 Zelenskyi Volodymyr Oleksandrovych (Partiia 'Sluha narodu') 15 Kaplin Serhii Mykolaiovych (Sotsial-demokratychna partiia) 16 Karmazin Yurii Anatoliiovych 17 Kyva Illia Volodymyrovych (Sotsialistychna partiia Ukrainy) 18 Kornatskyi Arkadii Oleksiiovych 19 Koshulynskyi Ruslan Volodymyrovych (Vseukrainske obiednannia 'Svoboda') 20 Kryvenko Viktor Mykolaiovych (Partiia 'Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy') 21 Kuprii Vitalii Mykolaiovych 22 Lytvynenko Yuliia Leonidivna 23 Liashko Oleh Valeriiovych (Radykalna partiia Oleha Liashka) 24 Moroz Oleksandr Oleksandrovych (Sotsialistychna partiia Oleksandra Moroza) 25 Nalyvaichenko Valentyn Oleksandrovych (Hromadsko-politychnyi rukh Valentyna Nalyvaichenka 'Spravedlyvist') 26 Nasirov Roman Mykhailovych 27 Novak Andrii Yaremovych (Partiia 'Patriot') 28 Nosenko Serhii Mykhailovych 29 Petrov Volodymyr Volodymyrovych 30 Poroshenko Petro Oleksiiovych 31 Ryhovanov Ruslan Oleksandrovych 32 Skotsyk Vitalii Yevstafiiovych 33 Smeshko Ihor Petrovych 34 Soloviov Oleksandr Mykolaiovych (Partiia 'Rozumna syla') 35 Taruta Serhii Oleksiiovych (Partiia 'Osnova') 36 Tymoshenko Yuliia Volodymyrivna (Vseukrainske obiednannia 'Batkivshchyna') 37 Tymoshenko Yurii Volodymyrovych 38 Shevchenko Ihor Anatoliiovych 39 Shevchenko Oleksandr Leonidovych (Partiia 'UKROP') 96 I plan to spoil the ballot 97 H/S 98 ref		
Prospective vote Zelenskyy in 2019 [0,1]	1 Vote Zelenskyy	247	17.36
	0 All Others	1353	82.64
Prospective vote Boiko in 2019 [0,1]	1 Vote Boiko	97	5.65
	0 All Others	1503	94.35
Prospective vote Proshenko in 2019 [0,1]	1 Vote Poroshenko	161	9.42
	0 All Others	1439	90.58

EuroMaidan Participant Region Q40_2: Let us think back to the period of the EuroMaidan protests, between November 2013 and May 2014 did you participate in any of the following demonstrations? Euromaidan in your region of residence?	1 Never 2 Once 3 More than once 7 H/S 8 ref	1302 72 76 26 20	87.40 04.86 04.87 01.60 01.28
EuroMaidan Participant Kyiv Q40_1: Let us think back to the period of the EuroMaidan protests, between November 2013 and May 2014 did you participate in any of the following demonstrations? Euromaidan in Kyiv	1 Never 2 Once 3 More than once 7 H/S 8 ref	1427 60 66 25 22	89.11 03.87 04.20 01.54 01.27
Euromaidan Participant (in either Kyiv or home Region) [0,1]	1 EM Participant 0 All Others	225 1375	14.06 85.94
Migration Intention Q45: Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to go abroad to live or work some time during the next 2 years, or would you prefer staying in Ukraine?	1 Go abroad 2 Stay in Ukraine 7 H/S 8 ref	571 906 105 18	38.40 54.03 06.57 01.00
Migration Intention [0,1]	1 Migrate 0 All Others	571 1029	38.40 61.60
Q46. Which country would you like to go to?	1 Russia 2 Belarus 3 Israel 4 Kazakhstan 5 Uzbekistan 6 Poland 7 Canada 8 us 9 Italy 10 Germany 11 France 12 Czech Republic 13 Hungary 14 Portugal 15 Other 16 Spain 17 Austria 18 Bulgaria 19 Georgia 20 Finland 21 Switzerland 22 Turkey 97 H/S 98 ref	28 10 21 3 1 103 32 40 41 105 16 42 3 11 12 9 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 77 4	4.33 1.49 3.56 0.42 0.14 18.3 5.24 6.88 6.98 18.87 2.78 7.78 0.7 1.78 2.4 1.59 0.3 0.36 0.27 0.34 0.67 0.36 13.56 0.89
Migration Intention Russia [0,1]	1 Migrate Russia 0 All Others	571 1029	38.40 61.60
Migration Intention EU [0,1]	1 Migrate EU	571	38.40

	0 All Others	1029	61.60
Democracy is the best System			
Q11: With which of the following statements do you agree most? Please select only the most applicable option.	1 Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	665	41.20
	2 Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one	240	15.00
	3 For people like me, it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime	376	23.39
	97 H/S	308	19.69
	98 ref	11	00.72
		1	
Democracy is the best system [0,1]	1 Agree Democracy is Best	665	41.20
	0 All Others	935	58.80

Figure A1

Figure A1. Joining EU: EuroMaidan Cohorts I & II Univariate Model (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)




Figure A2

Figure A2. Joining EU: EuroMaidan Cohorts I & II Full Model (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)




Figure A3

Figure A3. Joining EU: EuroMaidan Cohorts I & II (MOBILISE 2019, N = 1600)
Full model minus EuroMaidan protester variables to avoid edogeneity

