

# **Approaching Sleep and Dreams in Early Greek Thought**

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## **Declaration of Authorship**

I, Stephanie Magowan, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## **Abstract**

This thesis examines how sleep and dreams together were understood in early Greek thought as part of the growing investigation into natural phenomena. Starting with Heraclitus and continuing up until – but not including – Plato, this thesis shows how Presocratic philosophers and early Hippocratic writers developed theories which drew from wider investigations into physiology and psychology, the natural world and the self, while also utilising wider literary depictions and established cultural beliefs. Thus while the focus of the thesis is predominantly on Presocratics and Hippocratic writers, this is not exclusive, and attention is devoted at the outset to Homer and the mythic tradition, as well as to common depictions in poetry and drama (Chapter 1). Discussion then moves to Heraclitus, the first Presocratic to approach the topic, and how he uses sleep and the dream experience to express his epistemological ideas (Chapter 2). This leads into a thorough review of subsequent physiological theories on the cause and effect of sleep, with emphasis on bodily substances and qualities (Chapter 3). Examination of how the soul is involved in dreaming then follows, with an extended discussion on the Hippocratic *On Regimen* and its depiction of the soul's activities during sleep (Chapter 4). This focus is continued with a close text-based analysis of *On Regimen IV*'s guide to the proper interpretation of medical dreams (Chapter 5). Closing the thesis is an overview of how these early Presocratic and Hippocratic ideas persisted and resurfaced in oneirology in Greece, Rome and beyond.

Presocratic and Hippocratic ideas on sleep and dreams are often only briefly and – sometimes misleadingly – summarised as a means of introducing later ancient works on the topic. Rather than use these early theories merely as a preface, this work seeks to present a comprehensive account of their ideas outwith the shadows of their successors.

*for Hector*

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## Conventions and Abbreviations

All Greek names are generally given in their Latinised form, thus Asclepius rather than Asklepios, Achilles rather than Akhilleus. Where common Greek words are discussed at length (e.g. *logos*, *psukhe*), they are given in their transliterated form.

All quotations from Greek follow the text as given by the *TLG*, except for the Hippocratic Corpus, where the text of the *Loeb Classical Library* volumes have been used. Latin quotations are also from the *Loeb Classical Library*. Any exceptions will be signalled in the text.

Abbreviations of ancient authors follow the conventions listed in the *OCD*. Journal names, where abbreviated, are in keeping with the conventions of *L'année Philologique*. For the fragments of the Presocratic philosophers, I have followed the DK numbering system.

All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

The following abbreviations are used in this thesis:

<i>DK</i>	H. Diels & W. Kranz (rev. 1952), <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 6th edition, Berlin.
<i>DRN</i>	Lucretius <i>De rerum natura</i> .
<i>HC</i>	The Hippocratic Corpus (generalising)
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , 1873 --
<i>KRS</i>	G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven & M. Schofield (1983), <i>The Presocratic Philosophers</i> , Second Edition, Cambridge.
<i>LCL</i>	<i>The Loeb Classical Library</i> digital version <a href="http://www.loebclassics.com">http://www.loebclassics.com</a>
<i>LSJ</i>	Liddell-Scott-Jones, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> .
<i>OCD</i>	S. Hornblower & T. Spawforth (2003), eds, <i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> (3 <sup>rd</sup> edition rev.), Oxford.
<i>TLG</i>	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Graecae</i> , 1972 – University of California online database <a href="http://www.tlg.uci.edu">http://www.tlg.uci.edu</a>



# Approaching Sleep and Dreams in Early Greek Thought

## Introduction

*"...we cannot know all the best thoughts and sayings of the Greeks unless we know what they thought about natural phenomena."*

--Thomas Henry Huxley

### I. Aims of the Current Study

In 2007-8, The Wellcome Collection held its second exhibition, simply entitled *Sleeping and Dreaming*.<sup>1</sup> Over 300 objects were displayed: medical paraphernalia were combined with art, literature, folklore, social history and even music in order to examine several themes relating to the unconscious state in which, it was claimed, we spend one third of our lives submerged.<sup>2</sup> *Sleeping and Dreaming* captured the historical, socio-cultural dimensions to sleep and dreams alongside the biomedical and the neurological, and showed that these two fundamental biological processes continue to remain an elusive part of human experience - a "dark, mysterious and oft-neglected space of dormancy."<sup>3</sup> Of most note however, was that the exhibition was firmly rooted in Ancient Greece, declaring that 'the first person to consider sleep in a methodical way was Aristotle' - a testimony to the cultural longevity, as well as the continual privilege, of ideas from the classical past. But Aristotle here gained praise where lesser-known writers had already made progress: the Presocratic philosophers had been hypothesising on the causes of sleep since the late sixth-century BC, and the Hippocratic writers of the fifth-century BC were not far behind. Beyond the 'scientific' Greek roots, the exhibition also considered the

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<sup>1</sup> A summary of the exhibition, along with a selection of displays related to the five themes ('Dead Tired', 'Traces of Sleep', 'Dream Worlds', 'Elusive Sleep', 'A World Without Sleep?') can still be accessed through the Wellcome Collection website [last accessed: 01/09/2017] <https://wellcomecollection.org/exhibitions/sleeping-dreaming>.

<sup>2</sup> Martin (2007), 1216.

<sup>3</sup> Scrivner (2008), 289.

mythic impact, in the context of the ancient personification of sleep, and its close association with death: Johann Gottfried Schadow's paired sculptures of Hypnos and Thanatos – twin brothers mentioned as early as Homer – at either side of the entrance to the 'Traces of Sleep' gallery ushered visitors in to find out the answer to one simple yet complex question: what happens when we sleep?

Situated also as an investigation into sleeping and dreaming, this current study uses a similarly inclusive approach in considering the same question, with an important addendum: what happens when we sleep, according to those philosophers and physicians writing before Aristotle, and indeed, before Plato? The ideas proposed by the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers are often reductively summarised, or entirely overlooked. But in discussing that which might be categorised as 'Greek science', effort must still be taken to highlight that these writers, exploring the nature of sleep and dreams, did not live a separate, removed existence to the personified Hypnos, or the incubatory practices of the Asclepian sanctuaries. They were not isolated from other works of literature, nor indeed from each other. The line between 'rational' Greek medicine and 'irrational' ideas is often drawn too sharply – not that it is even a line which should be drawn at all, but this is another matter entirely – and does not account for the nuances of Greek cultural life. Thus this current study seeks not only to prioritise the writings of those who came before Plato and Aristotle, but also situate them appropriately within their cultural context when answering the questions of how we sleep and dream. It should also be emphasized that the study seeks to examine *both* sleeping and dreaming. Although the latter would be impossible without the former, it is a peculiarity that studies on the dream (and especially the Greek dream) are popular, but little attention is paid to the theories or beliefs surrounding sleep.<sup>4</sup> Therefore this thesis is intended to counteract two problems: the overlooked state of sleep alongside dreams, and the overlooked writers before Plato and Aristotle.

## **II. A Note on Universality and Culture**

Studies of sleep and the dream, whether anthropological or literary, often view the latter as a universal human experience. As people across cultures and across time have laid down to sleep, they have experienced dreams. Dreams appear in the earliest literatures, and continue to be a focus of study in the modern world. But does ubiquity necessarily translate into universality? It seems excessively simplistic to group all

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<sup>4</sup> A notable exception is a study which was published during the course of writing this thesis – Montiglio's 2016 monograph *The Spell of Hypnos*, discussed further below.

human dream experience together in one broad category. The role of dreams, their perceived origins, their interpretation, even their vocabulary –all of these aspects can differ between individuals, cultures, and periods of time.<sup>5</sup> Dividing all dream experience into ‘genres’ is only of superficial worth.<sup>6</sup> Roper and Pick, in the introduction to their edited volume on the history of dreams, are dubious of the universal dream experience, but nevertheless, despite the acknowledgement that cultures encode dreams in different orders of symbolism, they claim that there remains some deeper underlying shared process.<sup>7</sup> In this way, the dream experience continues even in modern research to be often almost mythologised. But pushing for any universality of the dream experience risks oversimplifying or overlooking the significance of this ‘cultural encoding’. The same concept had previously been articulated by Dodds, with lasting influence, in his classic 1951 study *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Drawing directly on the work of the anthropologist J.S. Lincoln, Dodds discussed the dream and its contents as dependent on socially transmitted patterns of belief – the ‘culture-pattern’.<sup>8</sup> This cultural encoding, or culture-pattern, is not immovable; as societies evolve, their priorities and beliefs naturally change. Acculturation has been highlighted as having particular impact on the culture-pattern dream, but this should not be translated into a movement towards universality.<sup>9</sup> Instead it reflects the fluidity and mutability of cultural beliefs; this is especially pertinent for the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers who were dispersed across various parts of the Greek world.

It is important to recognise the significance of cultural context ahead of a study which seeks to examine the dreams of another culture, far-removed in time, not only for clarity but also to highlight why this current study synthesizes a range of evidence rather than rely on any one isolated text, and why it will also refrain from using any later theories – such as Levi-Strauss, or Freud – to inform the readings.

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<sup>5</sup> For example, on reading the Mass-Observation report on dreams, collated in 1939, it becomes clear that there is already a recognisable cultural difference between the dream experiences of the participants back then, and dream experiences of today.

<sup>6</sup> Spaulding (1981), 331 highlights that most studies which attempt to impose a ‘universal’ framework do so as a result of a methodologically unsound comparison of only two cultures.

<sup>7</sup> Roper & Pick (2003), 16-17.

<sup>8</sup> Dodds (1951), 103-4. Lincoln, in his 1935 study of Native American culture, had proposed a distinction between the dream of the individual, and the culture-pattern dream. The individual dream was unsought, i.e. not deliberately induced, and had a typically mundane or ordinary content. The culture-pattern, on the other hand, was actively sought, and confirmed to an established stereotype. In applying the term to the study of the Greek dream, Dodds seems only to be importing its meaning in regard to content rather than origin.

<sup>9</sup> Spaulding (1981), 338-9.

### III. Setting the Parameters: Presocratic Philosophy

Traditionally, Thales of Miletus is heralded as the first Presocratic philosopher, bringing the investigation of nature into Greek intellectual life in the early sixth century BC. While the focus in the current study is primarily on the ideas presented by the Presocratic and early Hippocratic writers, this is not exclusive, and in addition to contemporary ideas from poetry and drama, it is necessary to go beyond this starting point, and often all the way back to Homer as a means of anchoring cultural or religious ideas in the distant Greek past. Not all the Presocratic philosophers have addressed the topics of sleep and/or dreams, and so not all will be discussed – indeed, the starting point will be Heraclitus, in the late sixth century BC. Precisely dating the work, or indeed even the writers, of the Presocratic period is consistently problematic. Unless expressly noted, I follow the generally accepted date range and chronology for the Presocratic writers as drawn from KRS and Curd, with very minor emendations and *floruit* information based on Warren.<sup>10</sup>

The nature of the evidence for the Presocratics is fragmentary, but not so much as to impede interpretation. The overtly physiological investigations of the Presocratic writers are not often the focus of a dedicated study, and suffered in scholarship of the 19<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> century which sought only to show their mistakes. Their (extant) medical observations are often side-lined in favour of the grander and more complex philosophical theories. This is particularly the case for Alcmaeon of Croton, for example, who is much under-represented in scholarship and rarely features in works on Presocratics; indeed, the only published edition of his work remains the 1896 Latin edition by Wachtler.<sup>11</sup> This current study is not intended to provide a thorough examination of the philosophy of the Presocratics which are featured; for such a background, there are many excellent existing studies – the Toronto Presocratics series, for example, provides a highly accessible means of familiarising oneself with the main fragments, *testimonia* and main theories of each natural philosopher. KRS, too, remains a stalwart in any study of Presocratic philosophy; the two-volume *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy* by Graham is also indispensable.

In citing the fragments and testimonia of the Presocratics, I have retained the original DK numbering system for ease of reference. Unless otherwise indicated, the Greek text used is from TLG. The recent Loeb Classical Library series on Early Greek

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<sup>10</sup> KRS (1983); Curd (2011); Warren (2007).

<sup>11</sup> In the sections which analyse Alcmaeon's theories, I build upon work from my own unpublished MSc thesis, an edition and commentary on his fragments and *testimonia*.

Philosophy came out just in time to be consulted, but, unfortunately, not extensively used.<sup>12</sup>

#### IV. Setting the Parameters: Hippocratic Corpus

For the Hippocratic Corpus, the question of precise dating is similarly troublesome. The Corpus of around sixty works is for the most part concentrated in the Classical period, though some works have been potentially identified as having originated as late as the 1<sup>st</sup> – 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries AD. The HC is not one homogenous mass, though some overlap in content and even authors can be identified. Theories change between authors, as does style. The ‘Hippocratic question’ has dominated scholarly debate since antiquity, as it was acknowledged early on that the collection of works grouped together as ‘Hippocratic’ were not written by one individual; the assumption that there were two separate schools in operation – the Koan and Knidian – has also been largely dismissed.<sup>13</sup>

For the current study, I have chosen to draw mostly upon those works which date *circa* fifth-century BC. Rather than select Hippocratic works on the basis of their reputation, I have used those from the prescribed period which are simply of most interest for their comments on sleep and dreams – *On Breaths*, for example, has a particularly denigrated reputation in older scholarship, when in fact it is one of the most interesting texts of the Corpus. Similarly, *On Regimen IV*, a key text for this study, has suffered from a poor reception, though van der Eijk’s extensive discussion in a 2004 article, along with Bartos’ dedicated 2015 study *Philosophy and Dietetics in the Hippocratic On Regimen*, have helped its rehabilitation.<sup>14</sup> In narrowing down the texts based on their dates, I am greatly indebted to Craik’s 2015 overview of the Hippocratic Corpus, which provides context as well as dates general and specific for all of the works contained therein.<sup>15</sup>

As with the methodology outlined for the treatment of the Presocratics, the same applies for the Hippocratics: the current study is not intended to provide a thorough examination of all Hippocratic medical theories, or provide any analysis in terms of the Hippocratic question. That is far beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather,

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<sup>12</sup> A. Laks & G. Most (2016). Had it been published as this thesis was in its initial stages, I would have no doubt used their innovative and clear renumbering system.

<sup>13</sup> Lloyd (1991), 192-223; Nutton (2004), 74; cf. Jouanna (1999).

<sup>14</sup> P. van der Eijk (2004), ‘Divination, prognosis and prophylaxis: the Hippocratic work ‘On Dreams’ and its Near Eastern background’, *Stud. Anc. Med.* 27: 187-218; H. Bartos (2015), *Philosophy and Dietetics in the Hippocratic On Regimen*, Leiden.

<sup>15</sup> E.M. Craik (2015), *The ‘Hippocratic’ Corpus: Context and Content*, London.

the works are treated in the same manner as the Presocratic texts: the focus remains on how the various Hippocratic writers dealt with sleep and dreams, whether pathology or prognosis, diagnosis or prophylaxis. For areas which need further elaboration – as with Chapter 4’s exploration of the soul, for example – context will be provided as part of the discussion.

For the text of the Hippocratic Corpus, unless otherwise noted, all Greek is taken from the Loeb Classical Library. These editions have been greatly extended by Smith and Potter’s recent contributions, and I follow the numbering of the LCL throughout.

## **V. Sleep and Dreams in Modern Scholarship**

Dreams in classical antiquity are a popular subject of study in scholarship, with increasing focus having been paid to the intricacies of the Greek literary dream over the years. Despite being dependent on the state of sleep however, there has been significantly less attention paid to the theories and beliefs surrounding sleep, and it is, by comparison, a lesser-represented topic of investigation. There are relatively few monographs which tackle the subject of sleep in its philosophical and medical context; several articles examine, for example, Heraclitus’ fragments on sleep but these are obviously limited in their scope and usually have a monolithic approach. For the Hippocratic Corpus, Byl’s brief 1998 article is worth highlighting for making its primary focus sleep rather than dreams, and it usefully details all occurrences of sleep-related vocabulary across the Corpus.<sup>16</sup> Again, though, the confines of an article cannot possibly do justice to the topic at hand, and the six pages only scratch the surface of the Hippocratic interest in sleep. He does however recognise the Presocratic precedence in such interest, in a short concluding paragraph, though there is no deeper analysis beyond this recognition.

A 2003 edited volume by Dowden and Wiedemann, simply entitled *Sleep*, went some way to remedying the tendency for sleep to be treated on a genre-by-genre basis.<sup>17</sup> Taking a wide approach to sleep across the Greek and Roman periods, it features analysis on Homer and Pindar alongside Heraclitus and Aristotle, while also accounting for Sleep himself as a mythic figure. But, noticeably absent are the

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<sup>16</sup> Byl (1998), 31-36.

<sup>17</sup> Dowden & Wiedemann (2003), with articles including Empson ‘The Psychology of Sleep’, van der Eijk ‘Aristotle on Cognition in Sleep’, Polito ‘Sextus and Heraclitus on Sleep’, Stafford ‘Brother, Son, Friend and Healer: Sleep the God’, Dowden ‘Lullaby for an Eagle (Pindar *Pythian* I)’.

Hippocratics, and the focus remains on the whole that of literary analysis, rather than questions of aetiology.

The pathology of sleep has however benefitted in more recent years from studies on the Hippocratic attitudes to dreams; the most notable contribution being Hulskamp's unpublished 2008 doctoral thesis, *Sleep and Dreams in Ancient Medical Diagnosis and Prognosis*, and associated articles.<sup>18</sup> Hulskamp's thesis remains the most comprehensive examination of sleep in a medical context (namely in Hippocrates, Aristotle and Galen), and indeed provides the first systematic account of Galen's theory of sleep. However, despite many of the Hippocratic writers being active at the same time as the Presocratics, and proposing similar theories, the latter are entirely absent from the study. The separation of medicine and philosophy continues.

The latest dedicated study on sleep is Montiglio's 2016 *The Spell of Hypnos: Sleep and Sleeplessness in Ancient Greek Literature* which explicitly resituates the focus from dreams onto sleep. The scope of the work is, lamentably, focused on literature, and restricted to the usual suspects, with particular weighting on Homer. Of the five chapters, two are Homeric: (1) the *Iliad*, (2) the *Odyssey*, (3) Drama, (4) *Argonautica*, and (5) the Novel. Of particular note is the conclusion that literary insomnia always has a recognised cause; literary characters are never kept awake at night for no reason.

The first in-depth studies of the Greek dream were focused on the literary evidence: Hey, Messer and Hundt all laid the foundations for approaching the dream in Greek literature.<sup>19</sup> The latter's work on the dream in Homer gave rise to two useful terms which will be employed at times in this thesis – *Aussentraume* and *Innentraume* – which differentiate broadly yet effectively between the two basic experiential patterns of dreams, those considered 'external' and separate from the individual, and those considered to arise internally, as mental experiences, either from the individuals themselves or provoked by external causes.

Kessels, recognising a fairly large post-Hundt gap in scholarly examinations of the dream, wrote his 1978 *Studies on the Dream in Greek Literature* as a means of supplementing Hundt's own study. Based on his doctoral thesis, the title may be considered something of a misnomer, as it is primarily an examination of the dream in Homer. He sets out with two aims: to clarify how Homeric conceptions of the dream

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<sup>18</sup> Namely, her 2013 'The Value of Dream Diagnosis in the Medical Praxis of Hippocrates and Galen' and 2016 'On Regimen and the Question of Medical Dreams in the Hippocratic Corpus'.

<sup>19</sup> O. Hey (1908) *Der Traumglaube der Antike*, Munich; W. Messer (1918) *The Dream in Homer and Greek Tragedy* New York; J. Hundt (1935) *Der Traumglaube bei Homer*, Greifswald.

differed from our own, and to establish the Homeric use of dream as a literary motif. It is an exceptionally thorough study, and an essential starting point for any work concerned with the literary functions of the dream. The final section, which takes a broader look at the Greek terminology for dream, is especially useful. Heraclitus makes an appearance as part of this section in a brief interpretative discussion of B26, but unfortunately the Hippocratics are nowhere to be seen. This was quickly followed by Van Lieshout's 1980 *Greeks on Dreams*, which took a much more comprehensive look at several features of the dream from a philosophical and cultural-historical standpoint. He acknowledges the dream's literary potential, while still recognising the representation of how the Greeks themselves understood the dream experience. Setting out to answer a range of questions pertaining to what he divides as oneirological and oneirocritical, the work has a tendency toward collation of information rather than analysis. As such it constitutes an excellent reference work for anyone interested in dreams, and his treatment of literature alongside philosophy and medicine is especially unique for treatments of the dream up until that point. His examination of Heraclitus, for example, is extremely thorough, though it has a tendency towards over-interpretation and over-Stoicizing. For oneirology, the 'medical scientists' on dreams are given their own chapter, though this totals only four pages, and addresses only the theories from *On the Sacred Disease* and *On Regimen*. On the oneirocritical side, *On Regimen IV* is examined and identified as the first Western dream-book (this is not often recognised, as shall be seen). However, Van Lieshout follows the dubious trend of separating Book IV from the rest of *On Regimen*, attributing it to a 'Compiler' rather than approaching it as a coherent treatise. Furthermore, *On Regimen IV* becomes pigeon-holed in the old Pythagorean/Orphic trap. These two misinterpretations will be discussed later in the current study (4.1; 5). Surprisingly, given the wide range of evidence included, Van Lieshout consciously chooses not to include any evidence from the Asclepian sanctuaries, which leaves quite a gap in an investigation defined as 'cultural-historical'.

More recent attempts have situated the dream as a part of the Greek scientific tradition. Holowchak's 2002 work, *Ancient Science and Dreams: Oneirology in Greco-Roman Antiquity* sought to evaluate oneirology and oneirocriticism in light of 'Greco-Roman science'. He takes on a wide chronological range spanning from the Classical period (5<sup>th</sup> century BC) to the Roman Republic (4<sup>th</sup> century AD). This in itself is not a problem, but the tendency towards over-generalisation makes the innovations of each specific period unclear. It also results in some misleading assertions – for example, that



'Greco-Roman oneirologists recognised two sorts of dream involving the soul', stated without reference to the changing notions of soul across the span of 900 years, is particularly vexing.<sup>20</sup> He singles out a handful of specific authors to examine, under an oddly-termed framework drawn from the once again privileged Aristotle:

'And so it is from Aristotle's philosophy of science that we find the best guidelines to enable us to answer the question: were the ancient oneirologists doing science (at any level) consonant with their time?'

Aristotle once more is placed front and centre in an evaluation of dreams, and indeed is one of the 'neglected' figures analysed in the course of the work, alongside Plato (!), Lucretius, Galen and Synesius.<sup>21</sup> Unsurprisingly, there is little engagement with the Presocratic philosophers beyond a brief overview at the beginning of the work. There is, however, a chapter dedicated to the 'Diagnostic Dream in Hippocratic Medicine', which fortunately qualifies as 'science' under the rather proscriptive categorisation. Totalling nine pages, the discussion is focused entirely on *On Regimen IV*, and takes a fairly narrative approach, with the addition of some unnecessary philosophical equations to articulate the basic premise that all dreams are indicative of the state of the body. It also discusses *On Regimen IV*'s contents in comparison to Artemidorus' *Oneirocritica*, but provides little in the way of contextualisation of either text.<sup>22</sup> As Walde has noted, there is also a clear preference for the supposedly 'rationalistic' accounts of dreams in philosophy and medicine, and the scepticism expressed for any type of mantic activity undermines the study as an investigation into Greek or Roman beliefs.<sup>23</sup>

Other studies have approached the dream from a similarly wider scope, examining both Greek and Roman traditions simultaneously. Walde's 2001 work *Die Traumdarstellungen in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung* focuses exclusively on the literary representations of dreams. Covering a long stretch of roughly 700 years from Homer to Lucan, her systematic approach considers the intentions behind the use of dream scenes in Greek and Roman poetic texts. The narratological approach highlights standard conventions, such as the use of nightfall to signal a break in the plot. Her strict

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<sup>20</sup> Holowchak (2002), 22.

<sup>21</sup> Holowchak (2002), xiii 'to give neglected works – like those of Plato, the Hippocratics, Lucretius, Galen and Synesius – their full deserve, I have passed over other important authors such as Tertullian, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine and Macrobius.'

<sup>22</sup> His treatment of *On Regimen IV* in the book is surprising, given his excellent article on the treatise, published in the previous year.

<sup>23</sup> Walde (2003).

delineation between the *literarischer Traum* and *spontaner Traum*, as well as the sometimes severe restrictions on what she considers a literary dream, leave it a slightly isolated study. Harris' 2009 *The Dream Experience in Classical Antiquity* has taken on the insurmountable task of accounting for all types of dreams, in all types of literature, in an even longer 900-odd-year stretch from Homer to Late Antiquity. Frustratingly however, there is an immediate recourse to value judgements; on the first page of the first chapter, where the format of the earliest Greek dreams are decried as both "strange" and "peculiar". Dodds is then criticised by Harris for not dating the demise of what the latter terms the 'epiphany' dream - an entirely arbitrary approach, which overlooks the complexities and interactions of dreams in Greek culture in favour of imposing a neat linear - and one must assume rationalising - progression. Harris covers an impressive range of material, and singles out many dream episodes which other scholars have overlooked - e.g. the many different dreams in Aristophanes - but discussion rarely ventures beyond a narrative summary of the episode. Given the wide scope of the work, deeper analysis is not logistically possible. This leaves unanswered questions and sometimes unclear interpretative methodologies. Of particular note for the content of this thesis is that, despite the fairly inclusive approach, and a chapter entitled 'Naturalistic Explanations', Heraclitus still warrants only a cursory and somewhat dismissive glance - 'we can scarcely take this any further', while Empedocles and Democritus fare only slightly better.<sup>24</sup> The Hippocratic attitudes to dreams are discussed mostly in light of the 'atypical' *On Regimen IV*, which itself becomes the yardstick of medical interest in dreams: 'after *On Regimen*, doctors took the study of dreams no further' is a questionable conclusion, especially given Galen's well-known belief in their potential for diagnosis and prediction.<sup>25</sup>

Harrisson's 2013 monograph *Dreams and Dreaming in the Roman Empire*, based on her 2010 thesis, approached the topic from the theoretical perspective of cultural memory and imagination. Although nominally a study of Roman culture, there are extensive discussions of the dream in Greek culture; this amalgamation often leads to grand conclusions as to the beliefs of 'the ancient world of Greece and Rome' - a fairly unsympathetic conflation, for any subject in the classical past. Most problematic however is the treatment of psychological vocabulary: it is claimed that dreams were understood as coming from the 'mind', a questionable assertion made more complicated by the lack of reference as to what particular Greek term is being

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<sup>24</sup> Harris (2009), 237ff.


<sup>25</sup> Harris (2009), 249.

understood here (*nous? phren? psukhe?*), and thus entirely missing the nuances of Greek psychophysical innovation – similarly, the oft-mentioned soul, for example, is not a fixed concept by any means in Greek thought, especially not from the broad sweep of the Archaic to Hellenistic period. The treatment of Roman dreams in light of studies in cultural memory and imagination may be an innovative approach, but the mishandling of Greek dreams can only exacerbate their continued misrepresentation in scholarship.

Oberhelman's 2013 edited volume *Dreams, Healing and Medicine in Greece: From Antiquity to the Present* approaches the medical side of dreams from a diachronic perspective, spanning three broad periods: 'Antiquity', 'Byzantium' and 'Post-Byzantium'. The author of several excellent articles on Greek dreams, Oberhelman is well-placed to bring together such a large range of material and it is synthesized well. It also sets out in the introduction, by Oberhelman himself, the necessity of a pluralist approach in dealing with aspects of medicine from Ancient Greece and beyond; this is reflected in the title, and the included chapters, which for the ancient world discuss the Hippocratic corpus alongside Asclepian healing and the oneirocritical Artemidorus. Oberhelman usefully illustrates both Kleinman and Gentilcore's medical pluralist models by way of Venn diagrams: Kleinman's model maps the interaction between popular, professional and folk sectors; Gentilcore's the popular, ecclesiastical and medical.<sup>26</sup> It is the latter whose model is adopted by Oberhelman as the most akin to the Greek world, owing to the separate distinction of religious healing. The medical sphere encompasses physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, midwives and itinerant doctors; the ecclesiastical by comparison inclusive of priests, exorcists, living saints, healing shrines and religious objects. The 'popular' category is slightly less clear, comprised of 'cunning folk' such as village women with knowledge of healing, whose skills derive from herbal knowledge, empiricism, and a shared network of information.

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<sup>26</sup> Oberhelman (2013), 4ff.



**Fig. i: Gentilcore's Medical Pluralism, after Oberhelman.<sup>27</sup>**

It is easy to see how this could be extrapolated to the competitive 'medical marketplace' of Ancient Greece, and Oberhelman justifies his use of the model well. The overall approach of the volume is very successful, and the collected chapters complement each other well. Naturally, however, given the volume's express interest in healing and medicine only, philosophy and literature fall somewhat by the wayside.

Despite this gradual movement towards inclusive and pluralist treatment of nominally 'medical' sources then, there often remains a division between the 'philosophical' and 'other' in scholarship. This can produce skewed – and often entirely incorrect – representations of fifth-century thought on the topic of dreams. A recent example is Bittrich's 2014 chapter 'Outline of a General History of Speculation about Dreams' which prefaces an edition of Synesius' *De insomniis* and, choosing to focus on 'philosophical' theorists only, begins with the bold claim that the 'pioneer of the oneirocritical tradition was certainly Antiphon'.<sup>28</sup> A brief discussion follows, which acknowledges the lack of any sufficient extant evidence yet hypothesizes on the content of the Antiphon's 'dreambook' before then moving on to a cursory glance at Democritean *eidola*, and from there on to Plato and Aristotle. That Antiphon even

<sup>27</sup> Oberhelman (2013), 6.

<sup>28</sup> Bittrich (2014), 72.

composed an entire treatise on the interpretation of dreams is highly doubtful, and the extant references to his opinions on dreams highlight his sophistic agenda rather than any serious oneirocritic interests.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps most surprising to this general history of dream speculation however is the complete absence of any even passing reference to the Hippocratic *On Regimen IV*, the oldest extant dream book in Greek literature, which provides a detailed guide to the interpretation of dreams and places its author in a more legitimate oneirocritic position than Antiphon. Presumably *On Regimen* was deemed irrelevant owing to its status as a 'medical' text, a particularly grievous interpretation given the text's potential Presocratic influences (4 & 5). Any reader then of this 'history' of dream speculation will be left with the unfortunate yet common impression that before Plato and Aristotle, little attention was paid to dreams, and that no dedicated guide on interpreting dreams – except the lost pioneering treatise of Antiphon – existed in the Classical period.<sup>30</sup>

The phenomenon of dreaming is often subject to closer attention in scholarship devoted to the investigation of divination in the ancient world. Dreams were one method by which the gods could communicate with men, both directly and indirectly, and oneiromancy was one of the many paths to uncovering answers about present and future circumstances. As such, dreams make appearances in many key works on divination, where the focus is on their religious contexts, and how the ancients came to interpret them.<sup>31</sup> The broad and religious scope of these works, while often very illuminating into the wider practices of Greek religious and cultural life, have a tendency to pull very chronologically disparate evidence together in a summative fashion. This can distort the evidence to some degree, or place rather more emphasis on certain authors – particularly Plato and Cicero – at the expense of others. The Hippocratic *On Regimen IV* is seldom examined to its full extent, if at all. On discussions concerning divination in which it does appear, the content can sometimes be summarised in such a way as to be slightly misleading. Struck, for example, writing in a

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<sup>29</sup> Gagarin (2002), 99-101 presents a coherent examination of the claims regarding Antiphon's dream treatise, appropriately concluding 'we can confidently reject the view that Antiphon was a serious interpreter of dreams ... far from showing deep respect for dreams, his primary aim was to display his sophistic ingenuity in refuting traditional interpretations of dreams, and showing that any dream could yield any meaning to a clever interpreter.'

<sup>30</sup> The same claim as to Antiphon's founding role in oneirocriticism has been repeated most recently in Dillon's 2017 *Omens and Oracles in Ancient Greece* which, coming out just as this thesis near completion, has not been able to be extensively used. However, it situates Antiphon in the introductory overview as the first in Greek history to write a guide to dream interpretation – followed immediately by Aristotle (p.24); it is not until page 280 that the claim 'Hippokrates himself' was interested in the medical interpretation of dreams appears.

<sup>31</sup> Bouche-Leclercq (1879); Halliday (1913); Bonnechere (2007); Iles-Johnson (2008).

volume on *Prayers, Magic and the Stars in the Ancient and Late Antique World*, puts forward a compelling account of the relationship between viscera and the divine as accounted for through dreams.<sup>32</sup> However, in his sweep of the guide to dream interpretation provided by *On Regimen IV*, he claims that in the work, ‘dreams manifest bodily conditions, by showing us images of larger cosmological phenomena.’<sup>33</sup> This is not incorrect – many of the dream images encountered feature cosmological bodies – but it does fail to mention *On Regimen IV*’s other dream imagery, including reiteration of daily activities, appearances of the dead, and even the gods themselves. This leads to a slightly unfair contrast being drawn by the author between incubation dreams in which the divine god Asclepius appears, and *On Regimen IV*’s not-really-as-divine cosmological dreams; the cosmos of the latter, he writes, is ‘not a proper divinity, as Asclepius is, but still carries some trace of the divine.’<sup>34</sup> This construes a limited picture of the types of dreams *On Regimen* accounts for, leading to a skewed polarity between the religiosity of the Asclepian cult and the lesser-religiosity of the Hippocratic work.

## V. Terminology: An Overview

### i. Sleeping

The vocabulary for sleep and sleeping in Greek is straightforward; though a great number of choices in specific terminology exists, the meaning and usage is the same as English, in that it can be referenced either by a single verb or by a complex predicate (N+V).<sup>35</sup> The most common terminology for sleep as a state and activity across all genres of literature is through the noun, ὕπνος. This is used alongside a wide variety of verbs to indicate all stages of the sleep experience: going to sleep, being asleep, and waking up. Alongside the actual activity of sleep, it is the name of the god of sleep, Hypnos, who will be discussed in more detail in 1.1. The verbal form, ὑπνᾶω/ὑπνῶω, is also very common. Other regularly encountered verbs which can denote sleep and rest: κοιμάω, used of the activity of either going to sleep, or being asleep; εὔδω/καθεύδω, to lie down to sleep; καταδραθάνω, to fall asleep or pass the night in sleep; ἰάω, to sleep or pass the night. Given their close association, the terms for sleep are often also used as expressions for death, both literally and metaphorically.

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<sup>32</sup> Struck (2003), 124 – 136.

<sup>33</sup> Struck (2003), 128.

<sup>34</sup> Struck (2003), 128.

<sup>35</sup> A reverse-search of LSJ finds 196 entries whose definition includes the word ‘sleep’; this obviously includes much repetition of core terms in compound words, as well as *hapax legomenon* such as νυκτολάλημα (‘a spell to make a woman talk in her sleep’) or the *tris legomenon* ἔνωτοκοίτης (‘with ears large enough to sleep in’).

Insomnia, a common symptom in the Hippocratic Corpus, is denoted by a simple negation of any of the regular sleep vocabulary, use of the  $\alpha$ -privative ( $\acute{\alpha}\nu\pi\nu\omicron\varsigma$ ,  $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\iota\mu\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$ , etc.), or by the term  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\rho\upsilon\pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ , to pass sleepless nights.

## ii. Dreaming

The vocabulary for dreaming in ancient Greek is more varied than its English counterpart, both in the exact terms used and the verbal constructions. The following is intended as an overview only; excellent work has already been done by Kessels (1978) and more recently Hemingway (2008) in establishing the meaning as well as the usages of all words for dream and dreaming.

There are three nouns that appear most frequently as ‘dream’ –  $\acute{\omicron}\nu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma/\omicron\nu$ ,  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\omicron}\pi\nu\iota\omicron\nu$ , and  $\acute{\omicron}\nu\alpha\rho$  – and while much effort has been made to find some meaningful differentiation between these terms (even between the masculine and neuter forms of  $\acute{\omicron}\nu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma/\omicron\nu$ ) it is not until well after the classical period, with Artemidorus, that any terminological distinction can really be convincingly made. All three of the terms mean ‘dream’, and can be used interchangeably, though of course this does not mean that certain authors did not have particular preferences. All three terms appear as early as Homer, though notably  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\omicron}\pi\nu\iota\omicron\nu$  at this stage is used rather literally, in an adverbial sense to indicate the state of being in sleep.<sup>36</sup>

$\acute{\omicron}\nu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma$  is perhaps the most well-known of the dream words. As will be examined in more detail in the first chapter, it is a term which carries the strongest inherent sense of personification and externality. It is *the* Homeric dream, standing over the sleeper in a specific position to deliver a specific message. It is a recognisable figure in literature, as well as in art. Given its strong depiction in epic,  $\acute{\omicron}\nu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma$  becomes a term which can be used to reflect the ‘traditional’ conceptualisation of a dream as found in Homer, divinely sent and wholly external to the sleeper. However, this should not be taken as stating that  $\acute{\omicron}\nu\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma$  exclusively refers to a dream figure and no other dream type: it has an inherent epic sense which can be invoked – and will be by later authors who write in a consciously archaicizing style – but it also remains the term for a dream in the broadest sense. In tragedy, for example, it is commonly used to reference the symbolic-episodic dream, one which demands interpretation based on imagery and action rather than provides clear instruction.

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<sup>36</sup> Kessels (1978), 190; Hemingway (2008), 69; the lines in question being *Il.* 2.56; *Od.* 14.496.

ἐνύπνιον is the term that the Hippocratic writers prefer to use, and later, in his own treatise on the topic, Aristotle. It has limited appearance in earlier literature. This has led to it being labelled as a more ‘scientific’ term, and commentators often place it in opposition to the ‘traditional’ ὄνειρος. But this is overly restrictive. While it may not be a common term in Archaic literature, this type of forced distinction does not credibly apply until the time of Artemidorus, who, for his own work, sets it clearly apart from ὄνειρος in the opening of *Oneirocritica*.<sup>37</sup> Undeniably, ἐνύπνιον’s usage increases in the Classical period in the works of the medical writers, but it also appears as the main term for a divinely-sent dream in Herodotus, Aeschines and Xenophon, and is used entirely interchangeably with other dream-words by Plato.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the Epidaurian *iamata*, which will be discussed in more detail in 5, consistently use ἐνύπνιον rather than ὄνειρος, in describing divinely-sent ‘traditional’ dream types. Hemingway’s remarks on the matter are worth citing:

During the Classical period there was not an explicit, fixed difference in meaning between *oneiros* and *enupnion* ... What literature does illustrate, however, is that *enupnion* was more suited to the ‘scientific’ style – or perhaps more accurately that *oneiros* (and *onar*) were *less* suited.<sup>39</sup>

This is a far more sympathetic – and realistic – interpretation than that of Kessels, who interprets the differentiation in terminology as attributable to whether it was employed in ‘higher’ literature of tragedy and lyric (ὄνειρος), or, by implication, ‘lower’ literature, comprising of historiography, oratory, medicine and philosophy (ἐνύπνιον).<sup>40</sup>

Despite ὄνειρος’ Homeric frequency, it is actually ὄναρ that appears in the *Iliad* as the first word for dream.<sup>41</sup> ὄναρ does not seem to be quite as established a term for dream as either ὄνειρος or ἐνύπνιον in that it seems to express something slightly more abstract. It often appears alongside ὕπαρ – ‘waking vision’ – in statements of contrast or comparison. It is used to express the illusory, ephemeral quality of the dream experience, and often used figuratively in poetry – for example Mimnermus’ lament on

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<sup>37</sup> Artem. *Oneir.* 1.3.

<sup>38</sup> Hemingway (2008), 71-2.

<sup>39</sup> Hemingway (2008), 75.

<sup>40</sup> Kessels (1978), 190.

<sup>41</sup> *Il.* I, 63.



youth as a fleeting dream, or Pindar's pessimistic expression of man as a dream of a shadow – designating a class of reality beneath that of waking.<sup>42</sup>

It is not until the fifth century that specific verbs to denote the activity of dreaming begin to appear. There are three terms which can be used, and reflect the patterns of usage above: (1) *όνειροπολέω*, the most frequently encountered, and first attested in Aristophanes, (2) *ένυπνιάζω*, which first appears in the Hippocratic Corpus, and there denotes a dream of a troubled sort, and (3) *όνειρώσσω*, which is the least common, though it does also appear in the HC to denote wet dreams.<sup>43</sup> These examples will all be discussed in more detail in the course of the thesis. However, these straightforward verbal forms are uncommon as a means of articulating the dream experience itself, and notably, the individual will never describe his or her own dream using a verb – as Hemingway notes, the phrase 'I dreamed that ...' does not exist in Greek.<sup>44</sup> Rather, there is a preference in Greek for this to be articulated periphrastically, usually by way of a complex predicative (N+V). While in English we would naturally speak of *having* a dream, the Greeks instead speak more with emphasis on the visual rather than the possessive, i.e. I *see* a dream (e.g. *εἶδον ὄναρ*), or *it seems* a dream appears (*δόκει ὄναρ...*). In this way, the subject of the dream is separated from the individual themselves; the dream is witnessed, not created, by the dreamer. The use of *δόκει* in particular underscores the unreality of the experience. These objective constructions are evidently rooted in the earliest literary dream scenarios, which as we will see in the next chapter, often – but not always – treat the dream as a wholly externalised figure.

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<sup>42</sup> Mimnermus fr.5: *ἀλλ' ὀλιγοχρόνιον γίνεται ὡσπερ ὄναρ ἤβη τιμήεσσα*; Pindar *P.8.89* *σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος*; cf. Hemingway (2008), 63-4.

<sup>43</sup> *Ar. Eq.* 809; *Hipp. VM* 10.36; *Hipp. Vict.* I, 35.

<sup>44</sup> Hemingway (2008), 80.

# 1

## The Greek Dream in Context

Above all, don't fool yourself, don't say  
it was a dream, your ears deceived you:  
don't degrade yourself with empty hopes like these..  
--C.P. Cavafy

Before considering the ideas of the early philosophical and medical writers on sleep and dreams, a broader look at both their context and their precedents is required to properly situate these emerging ideas within wider cultural beliefs, as well as establishing their relationship – if any – to pre-existing and contemporary opinions, ideas, and depictions of these two phenomena.

As already highlighted in the introduction, there are many dedicated studies on the Greek dream, especially as it appears in Homer and in wider literature across the Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic periods. It is not my aim to repeat these chronological studies, nor do I intend to cover every single instance of sleeping or dreaming in the entirety of Greek literature. Rather than take a straight chronological narrative through dreams in particular, approaching each author separately, this chapter adopts a more thematic approach and examines several different thematic aspects of sleep and dreams across 'popular' literature of the Archaic and Classical periods – i.e. epic, lyric and drama – to elucidate not only the literary features, but also the inherent cultural beliefs which underlie the various depictions of both processes. A brief discussion on mythic tradition precludes the literary discussions to clarify some background issues on sleep and dreams in Greek society more broadly.

As with many other areas of the 'Greek miracle', the progressivist narrative of rationality overcoming irrationality is not as neatly straightforward as might have previously been suggested. This linear model of development is equally applicable to the literary Greek dream, which is often misunderstood as a clean move from the external epic machinery of Homer to the internal psychological dream of tragedy. As this chapter attempts to highlight, sleep and dreams in Greek popular literature are fluid and dynamic experiences, drawn from a variety of differentiated yet co-existing beliefs.

## 1.1 Sleep and Dreams in the Mythic Tradition

Sleeping and dreaming are personified early in the Greek mythic tradition as the figures Hypnos and Oneiros respectively: Children of Nyx (Night), herself the progeny of Chaos, Hypnos and Oneiros are thus related as brothers and have a range of siblings who reflect other personified aspects of the human condition – of these, Thanatos (Death) is Hypnos' twin brother, reflecting on a mythic level the perceived similarities between the states of sleeping and being dead.<sup>1</sup>

While there is variation in the personification of Oneiros – sometimes as a singular figure, sometimes a pluralised group – Hypnos is a standard mythological character in literature and art who directly engages with both gods and mortals in his own role as the god of sleep. His earliest appearance is in *Iliad* 14, where he is visited by Hera on Lemnos. Her flattering address – prefacing her request to Hypnos that he lull Zeus to sleep as part of the *Dios apate* - begins:

Ὕπνε, ἄναξ πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων ...<sup>2</sup>

O Hypnos, Lord of all immortals and all mortals ...

As ἄναξ, Hypnos is able to exert power not only over mortals, but also over other gods; in their highly anthropomorphised conceptualisations, the gods, too, are affected by sleep. Hypnos reflects then an established personification of a state which is experientially shared by men and gods alike. Through reference to the extent of this power over both immortals and mortals, Hera is not just attempting to flatter Hypnos into agreeing to her subsequent request, but rather she is also underscoring the power Hypnos has specifically over Zeus – a power which elevates him even beyond his twin brother Thanatos, for, while death can hold no sway over the immortal gods, sleep is a means by which they can be temporarily subdued, and thus it is the closest possible state to death to which they can be subjected.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hes. *Th.* 211-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Il.* 14.233. A similar address can be found at the opening of the Orphic Hymn to Hypnos, which lauds the god's power over immortals, mortals, and indeed all living things more broadly: Ὕπνε, ἄναξ μακάρων πάντων θνητῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντων ζώων.

<sup>3</sup> Montiglio (2016), 19; cf. also earlier in Vermuele (1979), 147. The idea that Hypnos has power over Zeus is not accepted by all writers – in Sophocles' *Antigone* 604-610 it is declared that sleep, along with time, is unable to defeat the power of Zeus: τεάν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν | ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι; | τὰν οὔθ' ὕπνος αἰρεῖ | ποθ' ὀ τ' παντογῆρωσ† | οὔτ' ἀκάματοι θεῶν | μῆνες, ἀγήρωσ δὲ χρόνωσ δυνάστας | κατέχεισ Ὀλύμπου | μαρμαρόεσσαν αἴγλαν.

Hypnos is not the only figure to wield soporific power over the mortal realm. In Homeric epic, one of Hermes' abilities is to induce sleep with his golden staff, and his powers extend to the opposite state too: in the *Iliad* he is described as being able to lull to sleep those he wishes, while others he can rouse out of sleep, and in the *Odyssey* this develops into the ability to 'wake' the ghosts of the suitors to lead them to the Underworld.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Poseidon and Athena are able to send mortals to sleep; Athena in particular uses it as a way to temporarily ease the sufferings of Penelope and Odysseus.<sup>5</sup> However, while the Olympian gods are able to exert this influence over mortals, they do not seem to be able to directly send another immortal to sleep; Hypnos holds this power alone in Homeric epic.<sup>6</sup> His ability to influence the immortal gods is comparable to those of other primordial deities whose identities are drawn from the personification of various human emotions and experiences – Eros, for example, is another immortal force able to wield power over even Zeus.<sup>7</sup>

The close association between sleep and death is further reflected in the duties Hypnos carries out with Thanatos: together, they transport the corpse of Sarpedon away from the battlefield at Troy back to Lycia, and are often also associated with the transport of Memnon's corpse.<sup>8</sup> This activity seems to have been separate from Hermes' role as *psychopompos* in that the pair deal only with the removal of the physical corpse rather than the conveyance of the soul to the Underworld. The scene appears on vase paintings at the end of the Archaic period; Hypnos and Thanatos, dressed in armour and Corinthian helmets, lean down to lift the despoiled corpse of Sarpedon. Their positioning at the legs or the shoulders alternates between depictions, but the overall composition of the scene between the three figures – Hypnos, Thanatos and Sarpedon/Memnon - remains otherwise consistent during this period. In an artistic deviation from the textual evidence, Hermes is also often in attendance.<sup>9</sup> Overseeing their actions, his figure further highlights the eschatological context of the scene:

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
<sup>4</sup> *Il.* 24, 343-4; *Od.* 24,1-5; cf. Hipponax fr.177, Ἑρμῆ μάκαρ, <ὄς καὶ> κάτυπνον οἶδας ἐγρήσσειν. <sup>5</sup>*Od.* 5.491-3, 19.603-4, 20.52-54; see further discussion below.

<sup>6</sup> There are other divine, albeit more indirect, methods by which the immortals can be sent to sleep – Pindar, for example, praises the golden lyre of Apollo and the Muses for its ability to send Ares, as well as the eagle of Zeus, to sleep (*Pi. Pyth.* 1, 5-15).

<sup>7</sup> Breitenberger (2007), esp. 67-104; cf. Calame (1999).

<sup>8</sup> *Il.* 16.681-83; Burgess (2009), 29ff on the 'translation' of Memnon by Hypnos and Thanatos which he includes as part of 'Motif C' in the Achilles' *fabula*; cf. 77-78, which provides a useful overview of the debates on which episode – the removal of Sarpedon's body or the removal of Memnon's – came first.

<sup>9</sup> Neither the scene in the *Iliad* nor Bacchylides 20e mention Hermes as being involved. Shapiro (1994), 24 views the presence of Hermes in the context of his role as the messenger of Zeus, and thus as conveying the idea that the actions are being carried out specifically at Zeus' request – a detail which is emphasized in both the Homeric and Bacchylidean accounts.



**Fig. 1.1** Euphronios Krater c.520-505BC, Rome Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia L.2006.10. Hypnos (L) and Thanatos (R) lift the heavy corpse of Sarpedon, watched over by Hermes.<sup>10</sup>

As funerary customs changed and developed during the Classical period, white-ground *lekythoi* become a characteristic fifth-century funerary offering.<sup>11</sup> These were decorated with explicitly funerary motifs more personal to the deceased; among these designs, depictions of Hypnos and Thanatos carrying the corpses of ordinary Greeks began to appear – including women, in a particularly striking development, contemporary to the production of Euripides’ *Alcestis*.<sup>12</sup>



**Fig.1.2** White-ground *lekythos* c.450-400BC, Athens National Museum N1009 Hypnos and Thanatos lift the corpse of a woman, watched over by Hermes (R)

<sup>10</sup> Barringer (2014) includes this among the group of Pioneer Painters, whose interest in human anatomy and the effect of movement on the body is attested to by their anatomically detailed and fluid two-dimensional figures.

<sup>11</sup> Hoffman, (1985/6), 175 describes them as an ‘oil jar made exclusively for the dead.’

<sup>12</sup> Vermuele (1979), 150.

Out of their epic-heroic context, the two figures now appear dressed in loose flowing chitons rather than full armour. Both retain their wings, a means of visually differentiating them from mortal figures and a symbolism of the transportation and thus transition between life and death.<sup>13</sup>

While his visual appearance alongside Thanatos varies between that of a young beardless boy and that of a youthful warrior, and the subjects with which he dealt gradually expanded beyond the heroes of epic, Hypnos nevertheless remained a recognisable and defined figure in art and literature. He makes several appearances on vases by himself in the Late Archaic/Early Classical period, without Thanatos, in an unknown scene from the Herakles cycle.<sup>14</sup> He is depicted as a winged miniature, crouching on the chest of the reclining giant Alkyoneos to presumably indicate that he is sleeping and not dead.<sup>15</sup> In rare appearances in Hellenistic and Roman sculpture, he becomes more stylised and youthful, with wings sprouting from his temples or in his hair.<sup>16</sup> Pausanias describes a scene from the chest of Kypselos at Olympia in which Hypnos is depicted again alongside his brother Thanatos, both as small children – one white (Hypnos) and one black (Thanatos) – asleep in their mother's arms.<sup>17</sup> The variations in age in depictions of Hypnos seems to have had little effect on their interpretation, as Pausanias remarks that the figures' identification was evident even without the inscriptions.<sup>18</sup> This clarity in his personification, beginning in the *Iliad*, along with his well-established genealogy in Hesoid's *Theogony* suggests that Hypnos was an established figure in the older mythic tradition before Homer; his consistent 'stock' depiction alongside Thanatos in the transportation of corpses in particular has been seen as indicative of a prefigured image which existed before even their appearance in the *Iliad*.<sup>19</sup>

The earliest appearance of Oneiros is also in the *Iliad*, though his personification is not as clearly defined as that of Hypnos. Similarly to Hypnos' initial

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<sup>13</sup> Breitenberger (2007), 83.

<sup>14</sup> The vases show Herakles sneaking up on the sleeping Alkyoneos, an evident departure from stories of the gigantomachy; it has been suggested this cluster of vases reference a specific Herakles/Alkyoneos tale from one shared literary source which has not survived (Stafford 2011, 118).

<sup>15</sup> Met. Museum 34.11.6; Melbourne 1730.4; Getty Malibu 84.AE.974.

<sup>16</sup> The two best examples being the 'Bronze Head of Hypnos' in the British Museum (1868.0606.9), and the statue of Hypnos in the Museo del Prada (E00089).

<sup>17</sup> cf. Hesiod *Theog.* 758 in which Nyx is described as carrying Hypnos in her arms.

<sup>18</sup> Paus. 5.18.1

<sup>19</sup> Breitenberger (2007), 83; cf. West (1966), 267-70 on Hypnos as modelled on Hephaestus, and Kullmann (1956) on the Iliadic appearance presupposing Hypnos' participation in a Herakles epic; this Heraklean association is further supported by the unidentifiable scenes in which he is depicted in the Late Archaic/Early Classical vases discussed above.

appearance in the *Dios apate*, Oneiros is also recruited as part of a deception – Zeus wishes to send a ‘destructive dream’ (οὔλον ὄνειρον) to Agamemnon, to convince him into launching a new attack upon the Trojans without Achilles. Zeus addresses Oneiros – speaking at him, rather than with him – and gives his instruction; there is no eloquent flattery or invocation as in the conversation between Hypnos and Hera, instead Zeus speaks authoritatively and brusquely through imperatives:

καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·  
 “βάσκι’ ἴθι, οὔλε ὄνειρε, θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν  
 ἐλθὼν ἐς κλισίην Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἄτρεΐδαο  
 πάντα μάλ’ ἀτρεκέως ἀγορευέμεν ὡς ἐπιτέλλω.”<sup>20</sup>

He addressed the dream, and spoke in winged words:

“Hurry away, go on, destructive *oneiros*, towards the swift ships of the Achaeans!

Having reached the hut of Atreus’ son Agamemnon

Repeat to him everything exactly as I command you ... “

The dream immediately sets off to fulfil this duty, and having positioned himself in the guise of Nestor by Agamemnon’s head – the standard position for dreams in Homer – he delivers the message and departs.<sup>21</sup> The interactions and descriptions of ‘Oneiros’ in Book 2 exemplify a most basic personification. Oneiros remains fairly featureless; there is little reference to his own appearance beyond that he is able to adapt it to resemble other characters, and there is no allusion – direct or indirect – to any previous mythic exploits, or specific powers. In this way then, the personification of the dream is evidently already quite different to that of Sleep. Rather than be considered as a singular established mythic figure, like Hypnos, it seems more likely that the Homeric *oneiros* reflects a generic dream – one among many – in its personified state. It is simply *a* dream, rather than *Dream*; *oneiros* rather than Oneiros. This is reflected elsewhere in Homeric epic where dreams are referred to in a more loose and generalised manner of personification, and while the vocabulary used to refer to a dream is not always consistent, it is clear that *oneiros* in its personified capacity is conceived of as a visible anthropomorphic figure who interacts directly with gods and men.<sup>22</sup> Unlike the majority of divine figures, there is not only one single dedicated

<sup>20</sup> *Il.* 2.7-10

<sup>21</sup> The formulaic pattern of Homeric dream appearances will be further discussed below.

<sup>22</sup> Achilles describes the *onar* as from Zeus, immediately after calling for the guidance of an *oneiropolos* in *Il.* 1.63 καὶ γάρ τ’ ὄναρ ἐκ Διὸς ἐστίν; cf. 10.496 κακὸν γὰρ ὄναρ.

entity; a multitude of ‘dreams’ instead are able to be called upon to fulfil any oneiric duties.<sup>23</sup> The dream itself does not seem capable of acting independently.

As a collective group, *oneiroi* are also situated in a specific and explicitly chthonic *demos* passed by Hermes as he escorts the ghosts of the slain suitors in *Odyssey* 24:

πάρ δ' ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην,  
ἥδὲ παρ' Ἡελίοιο πύλας καὶ δῆμον ὄνειρων  
ἦισαν· αἴψα δ' ἴκοντο κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα<sup>24</sup>

Past the streams of Ocean and Leukas rock they went,  
Past the gates of Helios and the land of dreams.  
Suddenly they came to the Asphodel meadow ...

Geographically, this situates dreams in a liminal location; that they therefore must travel from the underworld to visit mortals is indicative of their mythic and chthonic status. This underworld location is also hinted at by the lyric poet Alcman who more enigmatically refers to ‘the dreams that dwell beneath the rock’, a possible reference to the same underworld topography outlined here by Homer.<sup>25</sup>

Describing the *oneiroi* as inhabiting their own designated *demos* subtly connects them together at a fundamental level, which is further elaborated upon by Hesiod. *Theogony* attests to the lack of one singular divine figure of dreams in that it references dream, as progeny of Nyx, as part of a pluralised group, but it also is emphatic on the collective and familial relationship of the dreams themselves:

Νύξ δ' ἔτεκε στυγερόν τε Μόρον καὶ Κῆρα μέλαιναν  
καὶ Θάνατον, τέκε δ' Ὑπνον, ἔτικτε δὲ φῦλον Ὀνειρών.<sup>26</sup>

And Night bore hateful Fate and black Doom  
and Death; she bore Sleep, and birthed the tribe of Dreams.

Dreams are personified along with the other aspects of the human condition, and the collective noun φῦλον is further indicative of their multiplicity: they are a tribe, a race of their own, which implies both a group of fairly large number and a closely shared identity.

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<sup>23</sup> Oppenheim (1956), 191 thus calls the *oneiros* a ‘dream-demon’.

<sup>24</sup> *Od.* 24.11-13

<sup>25</sup> Alcman fr.1, 49 τῶν ὑποπετριδίων ὄνειρων, a partitive genitive referencing the subject of his poem (a particularly distinguished horse); on this as a reference to the underworld, and a detailed analysis of the line itself – especially on reading ὑποπετριδίων as ‘dwelling under a rock’ rather than a metathesis for ὑποπετριδίων ‘winged’ – see Ferrari (2008), 74-75.

<sup>26</sup> *Theog.* 212-3



Later in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, the character of Aeschylus parodies Euripides' style with an exaggeratedly gloomy address to Night. In mock high-tragic language, he caricatures the dream while also making reference to its mythic and chthonic origins:

ὦ Νυκτὸς κελαινοφαῆς ὄρφνα,	
τίνα μοι δύστανον ὄνειρον	
πέμπεις, ἀφανοῦς Αἶδα πρόμολον,	
ψυχὰν ἄψυχον ἔχοντα,	
Νυκτὸς παῖδα μελαίνας	1335a
φρικώδη δεινὰν ὄψιν	1335b
μελανονεκυεῖμονα	1336a
φόνια φόνια δερκόμενον,	1336b
μεγάλους ὄνυχας ἔχοντα. <sup>27</sup>	

O darkness of Night gloomily gleaming,  
 what baleful dream do you send me,  
 an emanation from obscure Hades,  
 a thing of lifeless life,  
 ghastly child of black Night,  
 a fearful sight,  
 shrouded in cadaverous black,  
 with murderous murderous stare  
 and big claws?<sup>28</sup>

In his parody, baleful dream (δύστανον ὄνειρον) is first described as being sent by Night; this is then followed a few lines later by the identification of dream as also being her progeny. In keeping with the Homeric location, this dream is said to come out of Hades – the verb πρόμολον from προβλώσκω, carrying an inherent sense of movement out of the house and thus implying Hades is dream's usual place of residence. This passage plays not only with Euripidean language, but also with the Hesiodic passage above – the exaggerated black and gloomy language echoing and parodying the dark phrasing of the *Theogony* family tree.

In contrast to Hypnos, 'Oneiros' as an individual makes little appearance in Greek art, which perhaps further reinforces the literary presentation of the 'dream' as a multiplicity rather than a singularly conceived divine figure. There is little material evidence extant which testifies to the figure's representation; an account from Pausanias mentions statues of Oneiros and Hypnos located in the sanctuary of Asclepius in Sikyon, but gives little detail on any features of Oneiros; Hypnos again benefits from more elaboration, as he is described as depicted lulling a lion to sleep,

<sup>27</sup> Ar. *Ran.*1331-37

<sup>28</sup> Transl. Henderson (2002).

bearing the epithet 'Epidotes'.<sup>29</sup> That there would have been a statue of Oneiros at the sanctuary of Asclepius is of course not surprising, given the incubation ritual and the prominence of the 'dream figure' visitation narrative (cf. 5.3). Whether the depiction was of a specific god of dreams, or a generic personification of a dream, is unclear.

## 1.2 Sleep and Sleeping in Greek Literature

### 1.2.1 Attributes of Sleep

The clarity of sleep's personification as the figure of Hypnos in art is paralleled in the literary evidence, although it is often ambiguous whether it is Hypnos himself who is being referenced or whether it is the activity of sleeping which is being described with poetic flourish. Nevertheless, there are several recurring epithets attributed to both the figure and the state, which emphasize sleep's clear conceptualisation and in some cases also provide some insight into how sleep was understood to affect the individual.

The most common epithet applied to sleep is 'sweet'. This is expressed by a variety of similar adjectives rather than one repeated formulaic phrase: γλύκυσ appears most frequently as sleep's attribute in Homeric epic, followed closely by νήδυμος and ἡδύς, and the three terms continue into lyric and dramatic poetry fairly interchangeably.<sup>30</sup> While γλύκυσ and νήδυμος are both applied to the sleeping state – sometimes even together, as in the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* – νήδυμος alone is explicitly invoked when Hypnos himself is spoken about, both in the narrative and in reported speech.<sup>31</sup> This does not seem to be a differentiation by status of divinity generally, as Zeus' own sleep is described as γλύκυσ in *Il.* 1.610. This Homeric depiction of sleep's sweetness – and also more subtly, its overpowering characteristics – is further emphasized in less frequently occurring epithets based on honey, such as μελίφρων ('honey-minded', *Il.* 2.34), later repeated by Bacchylides, and μελιηδής ('honey-sweet', *Od.* 19.551).<sup>32</sup> One Homeric epithet even incorporates a hint of divinity with the sweetness, as Agamemnon's sleep in *Il.* 2.19 is described as ἀμβρόσιος ('ambrosial').<sup>33</sup> Other positive qualities of sleep from an experiential perspective include its description as 'soft' (μαλακός/μαλθακός) in Homer and later Theognis, a

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<sup>29</sup> Paus. 2.10.2-3.

<sup>30</sup> Some use the form ἡδυμος, omitting the ν – cf. Simonides fr.599, Antimachys fr.94 Wyss.

<sup>31</sup> *H.H.Aphr.* 170-171 τῆμος ἄρ' Ἀγχίση μὲν ἐπὶ γλυκὺν ὕπνον ἔχευε | νήδυμον. For νήδυμος ὕπνος: *Il.* 14.242, 14.354, 16.454.

<sup>32</sup> μελιηδής *Il.* 4.348, 6.258, 8.506, 10.579, 12.320, 18.546; *Od.* 3.46, 9.208, 14.78, 16.52; Theog. 475; cf. μελίφρων *Il.* 8.506, 8.546, 24.284; *Od.* 7.182, 10.356, 13.53, 15.148.

<sup>33</sup> Bacchylides fr.13, 76 οὐδὲ συλᾶται μελίφρων | ὕπνος ἀπὸ βλεφάρων | ἄωιος ὃς θάλπει κέαρ.

characteristic which Aristophanes perhaps alludes to in *Frogs* with a passing remark on sleep as being in reality a ‘fleecy blanket’ (τὸ δὲ καθεύδειν κώδιον).<sup>34</sup>

On a handful of occasions, sleep is λυσιμελής – ‘limb-loosening’ – a nod towards the evident physiological effect it has on the body, as well as to its power as comparable to that of death and love which also bear the same epithet.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, sleep is a recognisably powerful force upon both gods and men, as seen already in the above discussion at 1.1 on Hypnos’ ability to even affect Zeus, and beyond Hera’s flattery of Hypnos in *Iliad* 14, sleep is twice also referred to as πανδαμάτωρ (‘all-subduing’ *Il.* 24.5, *Od.* 9.372). It is only in Homer that this epithet is explicitly applied to sleep, though Simonides does not stray far with his δαμασίφωτα.<sup>36</sup> Sophocles later also resurrects sleep’s Homeric characterisation, though with un-Homeric language, in an *a fortiori* argument presented by Ajax that acknowledges even the most powerful natural forces must themselves yield, including ὁ πανκρατῆς Ὕπνος (‘all-powerful Sleep’), who releases those he has bound, for they cannot be kept under his control forever.<sup>37</sup> Sophocles thus resituates the Homeric depiction of ‘all-subduing’ sleep which wields power over even the highest of immortals – although, of course, only temporarily: Zeus may be overpowered by Hypnos, but only for a short while – within a recognisably Presocratic world of balance, order, and opposites.<sup>38</sup> In *Antigone*, the same idea is more explicitly termed in relation to Zeus by the Chorus, who declare that despite sleep being ‘all-subduing’<sup>39</sup>, it is still unable to seize fully the power which Zeus wields over all.<sup>40</sup> It should also be noted that at the end of *Philoctetes*, the eponymous character

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<sup>34</sup> *Il.* 10.2, 24.678; *Od.* 15.6; Theognis 470; Arist. *Fr.* 1479.

<sup>35</sup> Sleep: *Od.* 20.57, 23.343; Love/desire: Hes. *Th.* 121, 911; Alcman fr.3; Sappho fr. 44, fr. 130; Death: Eur. *Suppl.* 47.

<sup>36</sup> Simonides fr. 601. On the use of this epithet in particular, Eustathius criticises Simonides for speaking συμκροπρεπῶς (‘shabbily’) in comparison to the epic vocabulary (*Comm. ad Hom. Il.* 4.858.1).

<sup>37</sup> *S.Aj.* 666-78, esp. 675-76. Sleep is given as one example of this, after more frequently invoked cyclical patterns from nature such as changing of the seasons, night giving way to day, and storms ceding to calm. For general commentary on the *Ajax* passage, see both Kamberbeek (1963) and Finglass (2011).

<sup>38</sup> Esp. Heraclitus DK94, Parmenides B1, 11-14, B9, 3-4, and the Hippocratic *Vict.* 1.5; for similar ideas in tragedy cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 543-5.

<sup>39</sup> παντογῆρος, the final and crucial word in *Ant.* 606 which describes sleep, has been considered ‘unquestionably corrupt’ by Jebb, who instead suggests πάντ’ ἀγρεύων, though this still fails to capture the extent of sleep’s power that the text evidently wants to emphasize in a manner similar to *Ajax*. Griffith’s more recent commentary (1999) also recognises that παντογῆρος ‘though metrical, can hardly be right’ and lists some alternatives, including παντοδμάτωρ (Emperius) and παντοθήρας (Bamberger). It is difficult to determine which suggestion is most appropriate, however given the context, the sense of sleep’s power that Sophocles wants to emphasize here is less questionable, and so the translation ‘all-subduing’ remains suitable.

<sup>40</sup> *S.Ant.* 604-14. The emphasis on Zeus is evidently a product of the play’s own themes.

cries out to the πανδαμάτωρ δαίμων who has brought about his newly enforced journey to Troy; Griffith interprets this as a reference to Hypnos, while Jebb reads it as ‘clearly’ Zeus, but it remains rather unclear.<sup>41</sup>

That is not to say sleep is only ever characterised in seemingly positive terms; it can also be ‘cruel’ (σχέτλιος, *Od.* 10.68), or ‘terrible’ (δεινόν, Eur. *Her.* 1034), and although it may be more commonly assigned a ‘sweet’ epithet, this does not always necessarily translate to the sleeper always having a positive experience: as will be explored further below, any kind of sleep involves a certain state of vulnerability which opens the sleeper up to harm. This dichotomous nature of sleep is highlighted in a study by Foley which looks at different *semata* in Homeric epic, and argues that by reading *glukus hypnos* as an expressive semiotic whole rather than a simple adjectival qualification – i.e. reading it as single “word” composed of two parts, rather than two fully separate words – it becomes clear that *glukus hypnos* is one of the ‘approved pathways’ which leads to the idiomatic double meaning of sleep in the epic register.<sup>42</sup> More fully:

‘We can successfully read not just one, but all of its occurrences, and still retain the irony ... Because the phrase refers as a whole to the twin possibilities of release and vulnerability ... its usage is both predictive and ironic – but at a *traditional level*. That is, ‘sweet sleep’ keys a double expectation, one half of which is fulfilled and one half of which is controverted.’

Foley (1999), 232

This inherently double-sided nature of sleep is thus signalled on a very fundamental level through the language itself, and as Foley shows, this is applicable not only to the most frequently occurring sign *glukus hypnos*, but rather the broad and varied morphology of the *hypnos* sign invokes the endemic tension between release and vulnerability in all of its forms. This endemic tension becomes more apparent in the wider narrative context of each *hypnos* sign. The Homeric characters themselves are especially aware of *hypnos*’ double nature, which further emphasizes that these *semata* are not just utilised to inform the reader, but rather that they also signify an inherent belief which in turn influences decisions and actions.

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<sup>41</sup> Jebb (1888), 227; Griffith (1999), 227. An alternative (and perhaps over-) reading proposed by Austin (2011), 204 takes a completely different direction and interprets the ‘all-powerful Daimon’ as one of the powers Philoctetes must ground his ‘new Being’ in now that he has left Lemnos, his previous ‘Ground of Being’.

<sup>42</sup> Foley (1999), 231-2.

### 1.2.2 Sleep as Vulnerability and Release

Sleep is recognised as a way by which the individual renders himself vulnerable to others. This is of course contextually appropriate in an epic context: sleeping during an escalated period of war, as in the *Iliad*, evidently has very immediate dangers, as Nestor highlights when he praises the night watchmen on not being overcome by sleep, for this prevents them becoming ‘a cause of rejoicing for our enemies’ (*Il.* 10.192-93).<sup>43</sup> Hermes similarly warns Priam not to stay in the Greek camp after his encounter with Achilles for fear some evil might befall him, reminding him that he is still ‘sleeping among enemies’ (*Il.* 24.683-84). Later, Euripides’ *Hecuba* describes the quiet and unguarded moment before Troy is sacked when the Trojans lie overcome by ‘sweet sleep’ after dinner (ὑπνος ἡδὺς *E. Hec.* 915), unaware of the great disaster about to befall them. Using the epic language of sleep is not only obviously appropriate to the topic of the Trojan War, and a means of increasing the *pathos* of the scene more broadly, but it also exemplifies in a particularly striking context sleep’s inherent simultaneous potential for both vulnerability and release.<sup>44</sup>

There is also an underlying emphasis in certain points of the *Iliad* that a warrior should not be capable of sleeping soundly the whole night through in times of heightened danger. This emerges most prominently in *Iliad* 10, a book in which the warriors are either unable to sleep (Agamemnon and Menelaus), or awakened from sleep by their comrades, and night brings no rest to the activity on either the Greek or Trojan sides. Sent to rouse those who are still asleep, Nestor finds Diomedes and his men slumbering outside their tents. He shakes Diomedes’ foot to wake him, while rebuking him:

“ἔγρεο, Τυδέος υἱέ· τί πάννουχον ὕπνον ἄωτειῖς;  
οὐκ αἴεις ὡς Τρῶες ἐπὶ θρωσμῶ πεδίοιο  
ἦαται ἄγχι νεῶν, ὀλίγος δ’ ἔτι χῶρος ἐρύκει;”<sup>45</sup>

Wake up, son of Tydeus! Why are you sleeping the whole night through? Do you not notice how the Trojans on the rising ground of the

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<sup>43</sup> The ‘wakeful watchman’ is perhaps most famously depicted in the opening scene of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*.

<sup>44</sup> Gregory (1999), 156 describes the scene as the Trojans ‘trustingly’ succumbing to the sleep which will be their undoing.

<sup>45</sup> *Il.* 10.159-161

plain are encamped close to the ships, yet little space holds them in check?

Nestor makes clear that now is not the time for prolonged sleep, for this obscured perception – Nestor specifically calls out Diomedes for having not ‘perceived’ (ἀίεις) the developments – is a means by which the enemy can gain an advantage. This obscured perception is certainly an advantage both Diomedes and Odysseus will put to use during their ambush of the sleeping Trojan camp later in Book 10.<sup>46</sup>

Conversely, Bacchylides’ description of peace-time, in a fragmentary poem Stobaeus labelled as a ‘Hymn to Peace’ (fr.13), highlights the calm and comforting environment surrounding men who are no longer in the throes of war, and describes how this allows for a more enjoyable and uninterrupted state of sleep:

χαλκεᾶν δ’ οὐκ ἔστι σαλπίγγων κτύπος, [75]  
οὐδὲ συλᾶται μελίφρων  
ὑπνος ἀπὸ βλεφάρων  
ἄωιος ὃς θάλπει κέαρ.<sup>47</sup>

There is no din of bronze trumpets,  
Nor is honey-minded sleep  
which comforts the heart at dawn  
Stripped from men’s eyelids.

In contrast to both the noise and anxiety of war, peace offers the chance for undisturbed sleep; it can even continue beyond daybreak now that there is no necessity to either stay alert throughout the whole night, or rouse the forces at dawn to prepare for battle.<sup>48</sup> This kind of peaceful and comforting sleep appears from time to time in the *Iliad* as part of a distant ‘pre-war past ... inscribed in the Trojan landscape or evoked in a simile’ which serves to highlight the sharp and immediate contrast between periods of peace and war, where even the most basic human processes come to be fundamentally altered.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Hesk (2013), 43-59 discusses more broadly the difficulties caused throughout Book 10 by obscured perception – especially sight – which, as the nightly dark ambush progresses, enhances the significance of what can be heard and creates an unsettling environment of suspense and fear.

<sup>47</sup> Bacch. fr.13, 75-8

<sup>48</sup> Martins de Jesus (2010), 34.

<sup>49</sup> Montiglio (2015), 10.

In the *Odyssey*, removed from the immediate dangers of war, sleeping in unknown lands or among strangers still creates a similar potential for harm. Odysseus is consciously aware of the dangers of lying down to rest when he is washed up on the Phaeacian shores: he fears that being overcome by *glukus hypnos* creates the possibility that he might become ‘prey and spoils’ for wild beasts (*Od.* 5.470-73). This fearfulness over sleep is later articulated from a different perspective: having been given a beautiful chest full of gifts by Queen Arete, he is immediately warned to secure it in fear of someone stealing it from him as he lies in *glukus hypnos* (*Od.* 8.443-45). However these fears over the vulnerability of sleep come to be most graphically realised in Odysseus’ recollection of the Cyclops episode in *Odyssey* 9, where it is the Greeks – led by Odysseus himself – who actually take advantage of *glukus hypnos*:

αὐτὰρ τοὺς ἄλλους κλήρω πεπαλάσθαι ἄνωγον,  
 ὅς τις τολμήσειεν ἔμοι σὺν μοχλὸν ἀείρας  
 τρῖψαι ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, ὅτε τὸν γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἰκάνοι.<sup>50</sup>

And I advised the others to draw lots among themselves  
 as to which of them might have the courage, alongside me, to lift the  
 stake and drive it into his eye, whenever sweet sleep overcame him.

Inducing Polyphemus’ ‘sweet sleep’ by means of excessive ‘sweet wine’ (ἡδὺ ποτὸν, *Od.* 9.354) Odysseus and his men are then able to very easily inflict harm upon him and complete their escape. This episode more explicitly illuminates the tension behind sleep’s ‘sweet’ epithet, and the inherent potential that sleep, as a state, possesses for both release and harm. It also repeats the idea from *Iliad* 14 that the sleeping state can be plotted, induced and manipulated – however this time, it is not through direct action of the gods. Odysseus here replaces a divine agent as the bringer of sleep, albeit in a more indirect manner than Hypnos, or even Athena. Nonetheless, he is able to deliver Polyphemus into the same state of being entirely overcome by ‘all-subduing’ sleep (πανδαμάτωρ, *Od.* 9.372) and thus able to take advantage of this vulnerability directly.<sup>51</sup> The use of wine in particular as the sedative here has been remarked upon as one of the several distinct Homeric departures from the ‘usual folk-tale’ of the blinding of and escape from a giant shepherd: usually, the giant falls asleep after having consumed a great meal, and is then attacked.<sup>52</sup> Homer instead has Odysseus

<sup>50</sup> *Od.* 9.331-33

<sup>51</sup> Thus while in *Iliad* 14, Hypnos directly causes Zeus to sleep with the indirect result (and ultimate goal) being that Hector is wounded, here Odysseus indirectly causes Polyphemus to sleep, with the result that he directly wounds him.

<sup>52</sup> Page (1955), 7-8 and Schein (1970), 77-79.

consciously decide against this course of action – although he is very close to carrying it out, as Polyphemus slumbers after his first meal of flesh and milk – and come up with a more ‘intelligent’ plan (*Od.*9.296-306). Odysseus’ strategy to induce this specific type of drunken sleep is later repeated in Euripides’ retelling of the same episode: Polyphemus should be ‘sleeping, overcome by Dionysus’ (ὑπνώσση Βακχίου νικώμενος, *Cyc.* 454).

However, aside from utilising this type of sleep as a potential for delivering harm, several poets reference this association between wine and sleep in relation to the more positive potential for ‘release’, and a means by which one can temporarily escape harm. From this angle, sleep is portrayed as a method of psychological relief that can be induced upon oneself – in situations where sleep would perhaps be otherwise unachievable – through the consumption of wine, the ‘usual sleeping-draught of antiquity.’<sup>53</sup> Sleep commonly follows after a banquet, and we have already seen in the Polyphemus episode how excessive wine was known to induce a deep sleep. Several accounts highlight the perceived psychological benefits of this kind of deep and drunken sleep as a way of gaining a temporary release or even a ‘cure’ from troubles.

Having delivered advice to his host on neither waking those already asleep nor forcing to sleep those still awake, Theognis announces his departure from a symposium, admitting:

αὐτὰρ ἐγώ, μέτρον γὰρ ἔχω μελιδέος οἴνου, [475]  
ὑπνου λυσικάκου μνήσομαι οἴκαδ’ ἰών.<sup>54</sup>

As for me, I am at my limit of honey-sweet wine,  
and am heading home to give heed to ill-loosening sleep.

Familiar vocabulary reappears in a slightly different context – it is the wine which is described as ‘honey-sweet’, and sleep is instead presented as λυσικάκου rather than λυσιμελής. The relief which sleep delivers is here thus predominantly psychological, rather than any overtly physiological relaxation alone, and provides a way for Theognis to take leave of his troubles. A fragment of Critias similarly illustrates how drinking wine in moderation was utilised as a psychological ‘boost’ by the Spartan youth, and he considers such drinking to be particularly well suited to sleep, which he calls ‘the refuge from troubles’ (τὸν καμάτων λιμένα, fr.6). The subduing and soothing effect of both wine and sleep thus converge to allow the individual to be able to fall sleep, and therefore also be released from any present worries or troubles.

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<sup>53</sup> Dodds (1960), 105.

<sup>54</sup> Theog. 475-6



In Euripides' *Bacchae*, this causal relationship of wine and sleep is well-recognised, and the Chorus reference the wine-jug as itself casting sleep all around the drinker (κρατήρ ὕπνον ἀμφιβάλλη, *Ba.* 385).<sup>55</sup> Using this drunken soporific state as a form of pain-relief is outlined in especially direct terms by Tiresias:

... ὃ παύει τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς [280]  
 λύπης, ὅταν πλησθῶσιν ἀμπέλου ροῆς,  
 ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν κακῶν  
 δίδωσιν, οὐδ' ἔστ' ἄλλο φάρμακον πόνων.<sup>56</sup>

It is this which brings an end to the pain of suffering mortals,  
 whenever they fill themselves with the fruit of the grape-vine,  
 it delivers sleep to make them forget the ills of the day:  
 there is no other cure for troubles.

The sleep that comes after drinking wine is especially effective as a means of forgetting any current problems, thus offers a temporary release to suffering. This is called a *pharmakon* by Tiresias, referencing more explicitly the curative power of this type of self-induced deep sleep, and he claims it is the only way for mortals to relieve themselves of their troubles.<sup>57</sup>

Sleep often also occupies the same type of curative role which Theognis and Tiresias ascribe to it, albeit without the aid of wine. It delivers the sleeper into an unconscious state which grants an ignorance of any troubles in the waking world. This kind of removal from the 'outside' world and its associated suffering is strikingly visible in the *Eumenides*, as the ghostly Clytemnestra attempts to rouse the Furies from their slumber. She appears on stage with them as they sleep and dream, urging action and warning them not to be 'softened' by sleep into an ignorance of miseries (μηδ' ἀγνοήσης πῆμα μαλθαχθεῖς ὕπνω, 134).

This 'forgetful' state of sleep can be induced by the gods, to provide temporary respite from suffering, as when Athena sends sleep upon Penelope while she weeps for her husband in *Od.* 21.357-8, or when she similarly sends sleep upon Odysseus, two books later, 'loosening the cares of his *thumos*' (λύων μελεδήματα θυμοῦ, 23.343). On several occasions however, it becomes a source of relief not only in terms of general psychological distress, but also in terms of alleviating suffering caused from more explicitly physiological afflictions. This is most prominent in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*: not only must the eponymous character sleep to rid himself of the pains of his sickness

<sup>55</sup> cf. *Od.* 1.363, 21.357

<sup>56</sup> *E. Ba.* 280-83

<sup>57</sup> Ruck (1986), 179 describes it as 'the supreme anodyne'.

brought about by his injured foot (766-769), but the Chorus also deliver a hymn to Sleep which highlights its association with pain-relief and healing more explicitly – and is especially devoid of any vinous influence as with the examples of pain-relief above.

The hymn opens the strophe:

Ὑπν' ὀδύνας ἀδαής, Ὑπνε δ' ἀλγέων,  
εὐαῆς ἡμῖν ἔλθοις, εὐαίων,  
εὐαίων, ὦναξ· ὄμμασι δ' ἀντίσχοις  
τάνδ' αἴγλαν, ἃ τέταται τανῦν. [830]  
ἴθι ἴθι μοι, Παιῶν<sup>58</sup>

O Sleep, unknowing of pains, O Sleep, unknowing of suffering!  
May you come to us in favour, fortunate,  
Giver of happy life, lord! May you continue to hold before his  
eyes  
This light, which now has been spread over them.  
Come, come, Healer!

As Schein has noted, the hymn to Sleep delivered here by the Chorus incorporates several characteristics of a *paean*: beyond the invocation of Παιῶν specifically in 831 and the general structure, the hymn here also mimics a *paean* through specific language, and in particular by using the vocabulary of brightness and light (rather than darkness) which is ritually associated with healing.<sup>59</sup> As the Chorus sing to Sleep, they celebrate two aspects of Sleep above all others – its ignorance of pain, and its ignorance of suffering – which lead into their specific identification of Sleep with the power of healing.

It has been suggested that the hymn delivered by the Chorus here is all part of the deception of Philoctetes, and that it is not to be considered as genuinely intended, for the Chorus are not at all interested in Philoctetes' wellbeing but only their own potential gain.<sup>60</sup> For Schein, it is a less explicit deception; the prayer calling upon Sleep amounts to a betrayal, rather than instigating it, and he links it to the Chorus' earlier exploitation of religion as a means to betray Philoctetes.<sup>61</sup> Webster, on the other hand, considers the ethic datives as evidence that the prayer was 'genuine but not disinterested', while Austin more emphatically sees the Chorus pre-empting their role as Philoctetes' 'therapist' by singing 'not of deceit but healing'.<sup>62</sup> Yet it need not be the case that the Chorus are speaking entirely disingenuously or entirely innocently: the

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<sup>58</sup> *S.Phil.*827-831

<sup>59</sup> Schein (2013), 249.

<sup>60</sup> Paulsen (1989), 95-7.

<sup>61</sup> Schein (2013), 250.

<sup>62</sup> Webster (1970), 121; Austin (2011), 127.

Chorus are able to utilise Sleep's inherent potential for both release and harm, and remain in a position of ambiguity in respect to their intentions. Sleep has already been recognised as a form of escape for Philoctetes when he is plagued by his pains, but it obviously remains the case that it also leaves him entirely vulnerable and cut off from the outside world (which will be emphasized later, at 855-61). The Chorus need not push for either healing or deceit exclusively: release and vulnerability are co-existing as outcomes of sleep, but the potential to successfully enact any deceit or harm remains dependent upon sleep's capacity to first provide a release, and in the case of Philoctetes, this is only achievable if sleep is able to alleviate his pains.

That sleep took on a particularly curative role in tragedy is more explicitly phrased in a brief fragment from Sophocles' *Eriphyle* which draws upon the direct language of 'physician': κινεῖς ὕπνον ἰατρὸν νόσου.<sup>63</sup> It is also alluded to in the *Trachiniae*, as the Old Man warns that Heracles must not be woken from his sleep as it will stir and rouse up the 'dreadful sickness' that is afflicting him (δεινὴν νόσον, 980-1).<sup>64</sup> Once he has been awoken, he is overcome by the suffering and pains which had been temporarily suspended in his unconscious state, and he begs to be asleep once more.<sup>65</sup> Euripides' *Orestes* echoes both Homeric and Sophoclean depictions of sleep: Electra scolds the Chorus for making noise while Orestes is enjoying the delight of 'sweetest sleep' (ὑπνου γλυκυτάταν, 159), a gift to 'much-suffering mortals' (τῶν πολυπόνων βροτῶν, 175) after his own act of murder, and when Orestes does awaken he calls out to sleep as 'friend and helper against sickness' (ὦ φίλον ὕπνου θέλητρον, ἐπίκουρον νόσου, 211).<sup>66</sup> Sleep, unaided by gods or wine, undoubtedly comes to have a more explicitly curative potential in tragedy, though its effectiveness seems to be of similarly temporary nature.

### 1.2.3 Insomnia

That a state of 'release' in times of duress often needed to be induced by the gods, or through drinking excesses of wine, is perhaps also a reflection then of another commonly depicted feature of sleep: it is particularly elusive in times of stress. From

<sup>63</sup> Soph. Fr. 201g.

<sup>64</sup> Soph. *Trach.* 978-98; cf. Eur. *Her.* 1013 and 1034 where Heracles' sleep after having committed the murders is described by the epithets τλήμων ('wretched') and δεινὸν ('dreadful') respectively, hinting that it is no longer the case that his sleep is untroubled.

<sup>65</sup> Soph. *Trach.* 1004-8 ἔατέ με ἔατέ με | δύσμορον εὐνᾶσθαι, | ἔατέ με δύστανον. | πᾶ <πᾶ> μου ψαύεις; ποῖ κλίνεις; | ἀπολεῖς μ', ἀπολεῖς.

<sup>66</sup> Clement cites this line from *Orestes* with the above fragment of *Eriphyle* as examples of plagiarism between 'those who flourished together and were rivals of each other' [*Stromata* VI, I].

Homer onwards, characters suffer from insomnia on account of their overactive psychological organs. This is an affliction which besets both immortals and mortals indiscriminately – at the beginning of *Iliad* 2, for example Zeus is unable to fall asleep as he was ‘pondering in his *phrēn*’ (κατὰ φρένα, 2.3) how best to honour Achilles and harm the Greek forces. These opening scenes of wakefulness in a key character are echoed both elsewhere in the *Iliad* and again in the *Odyssey*: *Iliad* 10 finds Agamemnon unable to sleep as similarly to Zeus before him he ‘pondered so many things in his *phrēnes*’ (πολλὰ φρεσὶν ὀρμαίνοντα, *Il.* 10.4), while *Odyssey* 15 opens with a sleepless Telemachus, anxious in his *thumos* about his father (ἀλλ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ | νύκτα δι’ ἀμβροσίην μελεδήματα πατρὸς ἔγειρεν, *Od.* 15.7-8) On many occasions the specific emotional state identified as the root of this insomnia and increased psychological discomfort is fear, and those kept awake in thought are often most fearful of future suffering. Menelaus, for example, is kept from sleep by a trembling fear over the harm which might befall the Greeks whom he had brought to Troy (*Il.* 10.25-28) while only a few lines later Agamemnon explains his sleeplessness as a result of his own fear over the fate of the Greek forces and recounts in detail both his psychological and physiological symptoms: his *ētor* is infirm, he is tossed to and fro, his *kradiē* leaps from his chest, and his limbs tremble (10.91-99). The psychological interaction between fear and the body remains similarly pronounced in *Seven Against Thebes*, as fear is identified by the Chorus as directly affecting their *kear*: fear will not allow it to sleep, and worries close to the *kardia* only inflame the terror more (287-289).

While male characters frequently face insomnia because of excessive psychological activity – plotting, deliberating or fearing sufferings to come – female characters are often found enduring long nights of either disturbed sleep or sleeplessness entirely on account of their grief and the worry that it inspires. Penelope spends much time mourning the prolonged absence of her husband, as well as lamenting her future and fearing the suitors, and while she often does manage to fall into a slumber it does not always appear to be a sleep of release: she is wailing and lamenting (ὄδυρομένην γοόωσαν, *Od.* 4.800) when Athena sends the image of Iphithime to her in a dream, and in Book 19, Penelope describes to the disguised Odysseus how her daily suffering continues long into the night:

αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ νύξ ἔλθη, ἔλθῃσι τε κοῖτος ἅπαντας,  
 κεῖμαι ἐνὶ λέκτρῳ, πυκινὰ δέ μοι ἄμφ’ ἀδινὸν κῆρ  
 ὄξειαι μελεδῶνες ὄδυρομένην ἐρέθουσιν.<sup>67</sup>

But whenever night comes, and sleep seizes all,

<sup>67</sup> *Od.* 19.515-17

I lie on my bed, but severe pains, close-packed around my fast-beating heart  
Unsettle me, as I lament.

In Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, Deianeira similarly spends many wakeful nights anxious over her husband's absence, longing and fearful of her own fate (*Trach.* 106-111). This scenario of long, sleepless, grief-filled nights is not confined only to the wives of absent husbands: Electra herself bemoans the nights she spends unable to sleep because of her own sorrows (*S. El.* 92-94).

There are however those female protagonists in tragedy who bear a more 'masculine' characterisation, and their sleep patterns subtly reflect this. Clytemnestra is a particularly notable example as someone who, across different accounts, is kept awake at night both because of her scheming and because of fear. In the *Agamemnon* 889-94, her description to the newly returned Agamemnon of the worries and fears she endured over the course of his absence, especially her sleepless nights, is delivered as the expected words of a faithful and long-suffering wife, similar indeed to those of Penelope to Odysseus above. Instead of building a picture of wifely devotion however, there is a duplicity in Clytemnestra's speech, and it is clear – although not to Agamemnon, of course – that her sleeplessness has undoubtedly been a result of her plotting to murder her husband upon his long-awaited return.<sup>68</sup> Clytemnestra then experiences a new type of insomnia in Sophocles' *Electra*, where she is unable to sleep either by night or even by day as she fears Orestes' sworn revenge upon her (*El.* 777-82). Hers, then, is not an insomnia of lament or grief but rather, as with the male characters in the *Iliad*, it is one of plotting, then later of fear.

In cases of extreme emotional or psychological turbulence then, sleep is emphatically elusive for those who do not benefit from the intervention of the gods. There is no temporary release, and their inability to sleep mirrors the unrest in their waking lives, becoming a cause for further distress both of the psychological organs and of the body itself. While the sleeping state has inherent potential for release and harm simultaneously, sleeplessness is a reflection of ongoing suffering. As the middle ground of these two opposed states, disturbed or unsettled sleep retains the dualistic nature of release and harm: Penelope makes clear in *Odyssey* 20 that while being overcome by sleep brings a pause to lamenting, and a forgetfulness of all things, good

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<sup>68</sup> Clytemnestra's actions and reactions thus position her as entirely opposite to Penelope, and the wider paragon of a good wife – a contrast which the ghost of Agamemnon himself raised with Odysseus in their meeting in *Odyssey* 11, 385-464.

and bad, it also leaves the sleeper vulnerable to another experience entirely: the dream.<sup>69</sup>

### 1.3 Dreams and Dreaming in Greek Literature

Dreams, and their interpretation, are frequent in Greek literature from Homeric epic onwards. The following section highlights key features of the Greek literary dream from several authors across the Archaic to Classical period. It should perhaps again be reiterated that this overview is not intended by any means as a full history of the dream in any one author, or indeed Greek literature as a whole. Rather, it is hoped that a thematic discussion will provide a more suitable basis upon which to then introduce philosophical and medical discourse on sleep and dreams. This approach is not only based upon the chronological difficulties in dealing with Presocratic and Hippocratic writers, but it is also adopted as a way of establishing wider contextual cultural beliefs on sleep and dreams which will continue to be referenced throughout the subsequent discussions.

Categorising dreams is problematic. It is culturally manipulative to try and force universal categories upon dreams from ancient to modern societies; there are, of course, similarities in content but this can be culturally subjective, i.e. that which symbolises good fortune in one culture may mean the complete opposite in another. This could arguably extend to the individual, too: a fearful dream to one may not be troublesome at all to another, due to the subjective and personal nature of some dream content. Thus in creating the categories below, I have been careful to avoid imposing excessively modern ideas on the ancient evidence – this is not the place for Freudian frameworks, for example. The dream ‘types’ arranged below are thus fairly loose in their conception, and do not attempt to force value judgements or over-interpretation on the actual dreams themselves. Rather, they are intended to highlight the varying conceptions of the dream experience as indicated by the literary evidence.

Discussions of the Greek dream commonly make the distinction between internal and external dreams, the former taken as being those dreams whose content is symbolic or episodic while the latter those which feature more direct interactions with a visiting figure.<sup>70</sup> These two basic dream categories encapsulate most of the Greek dream experience, but become slightly restrictive for the more unusual scenes, such as

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<sup>69</sup> *Od.* 20.83-90.

<sup>70</sup> Though the terminology used to distinguish between such dream experiences varies greatly between authors.

Rhesus' dream in *Iliad* 10 or Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 19. As such, they have been expanded upon in the discussion below, with additional types added to account for more specific dream scenarios. These categories are fluid, and should not be considered entirely mutually exclusive.

### 1.3.1 The Visitation Dream

The first – and arguably most well-known – dream type to appear in Greek literature can be broadly referred to as the 'visitation' dream. Beginning in the *Iliad*, the visitation dream scene follows a fairly standard formula: night falls, and the individual in question has retired to bed. A dream-visitor arrives, and positions itself by the head of the dreamer: the formula  $\sigma\tau\eta\delta\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\prime\ \upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\ \kappa\epsilon\phi\alpha\lambda\eta\varsigma$  occurs in all the straightforward Homeric visitation dreams (as indicated in the table below). This positioning has been suggested as specifically allowing the sleeping mind to behold the visitor, even though the eyes are shut in sleep.<sup>71</sup> It could also simply be an attempt to verbalise the appearance of the figure in the mind of the dreamer, 'by the head' being the closest the Homeric psychology can get to explaining the localisation of imagined experience. The dream-visitor speaks directly to the individual as he or she sleeps. Often, their message immediately begins with an affirmation or interrogation that the recipient of the visitation is in fact asleep ( $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\dots$ ), which is then followed by a message of instruction or advice about the future. The dreamer may not respond at all during the visit, as with Agamemnon in *Iliad* 2 (thus creating a 'monologue' visitation), or they may engage in a conversation with the visitor directly, as with Penelope in *Odyssey* 4 (a 'dialogue' visitation).<sup>72</sup> Once their message has been appropriately conveyed, the dream figure departs, the dreamer awakens and reacts, and dawn arises shortly thereafter.<sup>73</sup> There are slight variations to this pattern, but on the whole the core sequence of dream-visitor > message > action remains the same:

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<sup>71</sup> Kessels (1973), 162; Brown (1982), 27.

<sup>72</sup> The terms monologue and dialogue from Morris (1983), 45.

<sup>73</sup> Arend (1933), 61-63 finds that the dream scene is a variant of an 'arrival' scene in Homer; cf. Gunn (1971) and Morris (1983) for further analysis of the scene's typology. Contrary to Gunn and Morris, I do not count *Od.* 15.9-45 and 20.5-30 as dreams; these encounters occur when Telemachus and Odysseus respectively are explicitly awake, and the emphasis on their inability to sleep must be interpreted as emphasis too on these being waking visitations from Athena rather than any dream encounter.

Text	Visitor	Dreamer	First address	Position	Exchange
<i>Il.</i> 2.1-40	Disguised 'dream' (as Nestor)	Agamemnon	εὐδεις Ἀτρέος υἱὲ δαΐφρονος ἵπποδάμοιο:	στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς Νηληϊῶ υἱὲ εἰκῶς   Νέστορι,	Monologue
<i>Il.</i> 23.62-101	Ghost of Patroclus	Achilles	εὐδεις, αὐτὰρ ἔμεῖο λελασμένος ἔπλευ Ἀχιλλεῦ.	στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καὶ μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν	Dialogue
<i>Il.</i> 24.673-690	Hermes	Priam	ὦ γέρον οὐ νύ τι σοί γε μέλει κακόν, οἶον ἔθ' εὐδεις   ἀνδράσιν ἐν δηΐοισιν,	στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καὶ μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν	Monologue
<i>Od.</i> 4.795-841	<i>Eidolon</i> of Iphthime	Penelope	εὐδεις, Πηνελόπεια, φίλον τετιημένη ἦτορ;	στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς, καὶ μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν	Dialogue
<i>Od.</i> 6.13-50	Disguised Athena (as daughter of Dymas)	Nausicaa	Ναυσικάα, τί νύ σ' ὤδε μεθήμονα γείνατο μήτηρ;	στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς, καὶ μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν	Monologue

**Fig. 1.3 Overview of visitation dreams in Homer** Those which deviate more significantly from the standard visitation model (e.g. Rhesus' dream in *Il.* 10 or Penelope's dream in *Od.* 19) will be treated further in separate sections below.

The overall passivity of the dreamer is emphasized by the limited reactions (speaking, and even stretching out as Achilles attempts in *Iliad* 23, are highlighted by Dodds as objective physical actions which one may be observed carrying out during sleep), and importantly, the dreamer does not imagine that he or she is anywhere other than in bed asleep.<sup>74</sup>

In these visitation dreams, the main action is performed wholly externally to the dreamer themselves, thus leading to their designation by Hundt, in his dedicated

<sup>74</sup> Dodds (1951), 105.



work on the dream in Homer, as *Aussenträume*.<sup>75</sup> This term is useful as it defines their externality without imposing an interpretation – Harris’ use of ‘epiphany’ dream, for example, to describe these scenes suggests some agency on the part of the dreamer and adds an excessively religious aspect to the experience.<sup>76</sup> Van Lieshout labels these ‘enstatic’ dreams, making a distinction in the category of objective dreams between the dreamer passively experiencing a visitation and the dreamer himself paying a visit to another (active, or ‘ecstatic’).<sup>77</sup>

Whether *Aussentraume*, enstatic or visitation is used to describe this type of dream experience, it should be emphasized that that the visiting dream figure is not a product of the dreamer’s internal psychological faculties; it is explicitly sent by the gods, and appears as a separate and independent entity entirely apart from the sleeper. These dreams may also be said to be objective in their nature: as it is through the narrative itself that the audience also bears witness to the dream as it happens, any potential subjectivity on the part of the dreamer in their later reporting of the dream is negated.<sup>78</sup> These dreams are frequently – if not always – a precursor to the instigation of action, and as such they naturally serve an important narrative function.

This type of dream continues beyond Homer and the epic tradition. Pindar’s *Pythian* 4 alludes in part to a visitation dream, though the specific details are lacking. Segal’s verdict that this is not a divine dream, and that “unlike the traditional dreams of early Greek poetry, it lacks a personal shape, human or divine”<sup>79</sup>, may be overcomplicating the scenario: while Pelias does announce that a θαυμαστός ὄνειρος has come to him at line 163, this does not necessarily indicate an amorphous dream. Immediately preceding at 159 – 161, Pelias has explained that the instruction to recover the golden fleece has come from Phrixus – he has ‘ordered’ it of Pelias directly (κέλεται). The subsequent revelation that it is these things (ταῦτα) the dream has come and told him, serves only as further explanation regarding these instructions.<sup>80</sup> *Olympian* 13 has a more straightforward visitation dream account involving a standard

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<sup>75</sup> Hundt (1935), 44-96.

<sup>76</sup> Harris (2009), *passim*.

<sup>77</sup> Van Lieshout (1980), 12-13.

<sup>78</sup> Or in cases where the dreamer does misconstrue their dream experience, as Agamemnon in *Iliad* 2 when he reports the deliberately incorrect dream to the gathered troops, the reader is aware of the deception occurring as they have themselves ‘witnessed’ the dream first-hand.

<sup>79</sup> Segal (1986), 46.

<sup>80</sup> Notably this is the first account in which Pelias’ dream is presented as the motivation behind the quest.

divine figure (Athena), which will be treated below in the section on ‘actualised’ dreams for its transference of an object from the dream world into reality.

Visitation dreams become less frequent in tragedy, though not entirely absent. Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Bound* includes a description of visitation dreams experienced by Io: she is plagued at night by repeated visits from unnamed figures encouraging her to indulge Zeus’ desire.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, the *Eumenides* creates an explicit externalisation of the visitation dream, as will be considered in more detail in the next section. The limited appearance of the visitation dream in tragedy does not attest to an overall disappearance of the type in the fifth-century. Herodotus features several visitation dreams in his *Histories* which follow the basic visitation dream pattern: a figure appears standing over the sleeping individual and delivers a message. Thus Hipparchus, for example, is visited by a dream immediately before his death:

Ἡ μὲν νυν ὄψις τοῦ Ἰππάρχου ἐνυπνίου ἦν ἦδε· ἐν τῇ προτέρῃ νυκτὶ  
τῶν Παναθηναίων ἐδόκεε ὁ Ἰππάρχος ἄνδρα οἱ ἐπιστάντα μέγαν καὶ  
εὐεϊδέα αἰνίσσεσθαι τάδε τὰ ἔπεα.  
τλήθι λέων ἄτλητα παθῶν τετληότι θυμῷ·  
οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ἀδικῶν τίσιν οὐκ ἀποτίσει.<sup>82</sup>

Now this was the vision which was in Hipparchus’ dream: in the night before the Panathenaea, Hipparchus thought a man, tall and handsome, stood over him speaking in these riddles:

O lion, endure the unendurable, suffer by enduring heart  
Not one wrong-doing man will not pay retribution in full.

Herodotus recounts this dream retrospectively, already informing the reader before the dream report of Hipparchus’ death and the dream which foretold ‘most clearly’ (ἐναργεστάτην, 5.55) the evil which would befall him. With fulfilment and meaning reported before the actual dream, Herodotus provides the reader with a privileged position on the outcome of what is a fairly obscure ‘riddle’ of a dream message; though he remarks on the clarity of the dream’s foretelling of Hipparchus’ death, he unusually does not provide any interpretation of the dream’s message either from his authorial perspective or from the interpretation of another character.<sup>83</sup> The scene nevertheless retains the basic characteristics of a visitation dream, and the description of the dream

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<sup>81</sup> Aech.PV. 645-685.

<sup>82</sup> Hdt. 5.56

<sup>83</sup> Dodson (2009), 91; Mikalson (2003), 19 finds Hipparchus’ dream ‘uncharacteristically enigmatic’.

figure's appearance in particular will be employed again during Xerxes' dream in Book 7 - ἐδόκει ὁ Ξέρξης ἄνδρα οἱ ἐπιστάντα μέγαν τε καὶ εὐειδέα εἰπεῖν (7.12).<sup>84</sup>

The visitation dream does not entirely diminish in its influence after Homer, and unlike many of the 'literary' dream types it has an explicit presence in the real world in the form of *iamata*, dedicated in sanctuaries of Asclepius where healing incubation was practised. These accounts attest explicitly to external objective visitations by the god – or a representative of the god – to a passive sleeper, a message of some form is delivered, and action is pursued upon waking. The incubation visitation dream has an early literary presence in Pindar, while its use in a healing context is subject to parody in Aristophanes' *Wealth*. The Asclepian incubation process – and several of the *iamata* - will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

Discussions of the Greek dream can often over-generalise the visitation dream type: citing Agamemnon's dream in *Iliad* 2, one author claims it as "a single example from the *Iliad* ... representative of an entire class of dreams found in Homeric and other early Greek literature."<sup>85</sup> While there is certainly a standard formula to the majority of dreams in Homer, the dream of Agamemnon should not be held as representative of all visitation dreams as there are not only subtle differences between it and all visitation dreams which follow, but there are also cases which deviate from its pattern more substantially.

### 1.3.2 The Actualised Dream

The visitation dream also has the potential to go beyond the standard scenario outlined above, and transgress the boundaries between dream and waking reality. This transgression unambiguously attests to the dream's objectivity, and there are three particular incidents worth highlighting from early Greek literature.

The first, is a brief encounter in *Iliad* 10 between Rhesus and Diomedes. As already discussed above, sleep is a pervasive force in this book; this scene occurs as part of the *Doloneia* in which Diomedes and Odysseus raid the Trojan camp by night. Rhesus is asleep in his tent when Diomedes strikes:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ βασιλῆα κιχήσατο Τυδέος υἱός,  
τὸν τρισκαιδέκατον μελιιδέα θυμὸν ἀπηύρα                      495  
ἀσθμαίνοντα· κακὸν γὰρ ὄναρ κεφαλήφιν ἐπέστη

<sup>84</sup> Cf. the other visitation dreams in *Histories*: 2.39; 2.141; 3.30.

<sup>85</sup> Brennan (1993), 91.

τὴν νύκτ', Οἰνεΐδαο πάϊς, διὰ μῆτιν Ἀθήνης.<sup>86</sup>

But when the son of Tydeus reached the king, he took the honey-sweet life of his thirteenth, breathing heavily, for an evil dream stood by his head that night, the son of Oeneus' son, by the device of Athena.

For Rhesus, the reality of what is happening in the waking world converges with what he is experiencing in his sleep. His *κακὸν ὄναρ* – which assumes the standard position by his head – is actualised in the figure of Diomedes, looming over him as he sleeps; Οἰνεΐδαο πάϊς appearing in apposition to ὄναρ may even suggest that Rhesus is dreaming of Diomedes himself at that very moment.<sup>87</sup> The evil dream becomes a reality, and as a result Rhesus is cast from the state of sleeping into the state of death – two very closely related states, as seen in the above discussion. The scene skilfully blurs the boundaries between dream and reality, sleep and death.<sup>88</sup>

A more explicit transference from the dream space into the waking world occurs in Pindar *Olympian* 13, when Bellerophon experiences a visitation dream from Athena:

πρὶν γέ οἱ χρυσάμπυκα κούρα χαλινόν                      65  
Παλλὰς ἦνεγκ', ἐξ ὄνειρου δ' αὐτίκα  
ἦν ὕπαρ, φώνασε δ'· "Εὐδεις Αἰολίδα βασιλεῦ;  
ἄγε φίλτρον τόδ' ἵππειον δέκευ ... "

Until the maiden Pallas brought the golden-fronted bridle, then at once it moved from a dream into a reality, and she spoke: "Are you sleeping, prince of the Aeolians? Come, take this horse charm ... "

Once Athena has finished speaking, Bellerophon immediately reacts – ἀνὰ δ' ἔπαλτ' ὀρθῶ ποδί. | παρκεῖμενον δὲ συλλαβῶν τέρας (72-73) – the golden bridle from the dream is now lying beside him, and he is able to pick it up. Unlike Rhesus' dream of Diomedes, it is a specific part of this visitation dream that is transferred into the waking world – in this case, the golden bridle is left as an 'apport' which evidences the reality of the divine encounter in the dream.<sup>89</sup>

Aeschylus' *Eumenides* offers an actualised dream of a slightly different sort, though it warrants specific mention here for its emphatic presentation of the externality and reality of the dream figure. In this case, the dream figure is the ghost of

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<sup>86</sup> *Il.* 10.494-97

<sup>87</sup> Messer (1918), 10-11.

<sup>88</sup> Sels (2013), 565.

<sup>89</sup> 5.3

Clytemnestra – once more subtly blending the realms of sleep and death together. Clytemnestra’s ghost appears on stage and immediately addresses the Furies, who are asleep, thus implicitly the dreamers in this scenario. In a variation of the standard visitation dream interrogative - εὔδεις – she instead more scornfully questions:

εὔδοιτ’ ἄν. ὤή. καὶ καθευδουσῶν τί δεῖ;<sup>90</sup>

Might you be sleeping, oh-ho, and what is the need for you to be asleep?

Clytemnestra’s ghost also makes explicit that she is addressing the Furies in a dream, as she declares:

ὄναρ γὰρ ὑμᾶς νῦν Κλυταιμῆστρα καλῶ<sup>91</sup>

For now, I, Clytemnestra, a dream, summon you.

Therefore, notably, we have an inversion of the majority of visitation dreams from the epic tradition: a mortal appears as the visitant to the divine. However this too is innovated upon: Clytemnestra’s ghost as a dream does not just appear to one slumbering figure, but (at least) three. She is a collective dream experience. In a further exaggeration of the expected visitation dream exchange, Clytemnestra’s ghost continually chastises the Furies for being asleep, while passionately encouraging them to take action against Orestes.<sup>92</sup> Thus, Clytemnestra as the dream of the Furies has been fully actualised into an active and present figure on the stage. The audience are able to both see and hear her, and so witness the dream as it occurs first hand.<sup>93</sup> Aeschylus has made the previously invisible remarkably visible, both in the active figure of Clytemnestra and the sleeping – but present – Furies.<sup>94</sup>

Throughout the scene, as Clytemnestra’s ghost berates them, the Furies remain passive recipients of the dream visitation; they initially respond by moaning or crying out (μυγμός, ὄγμος as general noises in response at 117, 120, 123, 126, 129), but they remain asleep and do not engage in any active or extended dialogue with their visitor.

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<sup>90</sup> *Eum.* 94

<sup>91</sup> *Eum.* 116

<sup>92</sup> Cf. especially the visitation dream of Patroclus’ ghost to Achilles, *Il.* 23.62-101.

<sup>93</sup> Flickinger (1939), 357-9 argues that Clytemnestra’s ghost was only heard by the audience, and did not appear on stage at all. This seems extremely unlikely given the contents of her speech – cf. Brown (1982), 27, Sommerstein (2008), 101. On aspects of staging the *Eumenides* more broadly, see Taplin (1977) and Brown (1982).

<sup>94</sup> Much, much more could be said about the evolution of dreams – particularly in relation to Clytemnestra – within the *Oresteia*: Clytemnestra initially dismisses them in *Agamemnon* as the *doxa* of a sleeping mind (275), experiences her own prophetic dream in *Choephoroi* which is fulfilled, and finally becomes a dream herself in *Eumenides*. This is unfortunately beyond the scope of this contextual introductory study. For an examination of some of these themes, see Catenaccio (2011).

Their final response to Clytemnestra's goading, however, presents an unusual scenario; as their moaning becomes louder they suddenly shout:

λαβέ, λαβέ, λαβέ, λαβέ· φράζου.<sup>95</sup>

Seize, seize seize, seize! Look out!

Clytemnestra immediately responds:

ὄναρ διώκεις θῆρα, κλαγγαίνεις δ' ἄπερ  
κύων μέριμναν οὔποτ' ἐκλείπων φόνου.  
τί δρᾷς; ἀνίστω· μή σε νικάτω πόνος,  
μηδ' ἀγνοήσης πῆμα μαλθαχθεῖς ὕπνω.<sup>96</sup>

You are pursuing a dream beast, giving tongue as  
a hound who never abandons its care for slaughter.  
What are you doing? Get up, lest toil overcomes you,  
Do not be softened by sleep into ignoring calamity!

Clytemnestra herself seems to suggest – and commentators agree – that the exclamation from the Furies indicates they are dreaming here of the chase of Orestes.<sup>97</sup> This would constitute an episodic dream (more on this dream type below), as they themselves are evidently involved in a continuously unfolding action. But Clytemnestra's ghost, in her role as a dream visitor, remains on stage. This creates an anomaly: the Furies are dreaming two scenarios at once. How is this possible? Aeschylus manipulates the opportunities afforded by dramatic staging to allow these two dreams to occur simultaneously – Brown calls it the 'logic of dramatic presentation'; the audience focus on Clytemnestra as an active visitant, a ghost, a visible and tangible figure, allowing the Furies to experience a different type of dream which could not be so easily staged and more readily accepted as out of their perception.<sup>98</sup> Clytemnestra's ghost is in this way the most extreme *Aussentraume*: her objectivity is exaggerated to the point of visibility.

### 1.3.4 The Symbolic-Episodic Dream

The visitation dream was not the only type experienced in any period of antiquity. Dreams were not always direct messages bestowed by a looming figure; dreams could be more subjective experiences, featuring imagery of a symbolic nature,

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<sup>95</sup> *Eum.* 130

<sup>96</sup> *Eum.* 131-4

<sup>97</sup> Pizzato (2006), 37; Brown (1983), 31; O'Flaherty (1984), 247; Sommerstein (2008), 100.

<sup>98</sup> Brown (1983), 31; cf. Catenaccio (2011), 227. Devereux (1976), 150 Clytemnestra's appearance is both 'a dream and a haunting'.

or scenes in which the dreamer is involved, thus creating more of a personal and visual ‘dream space’ than those encounters in which a figure appears at the head of, and speaks directly to, the sleeper. This type of dream was referred to as *Innentraume* by Hundt, as a reflection of the dream’s more internalised nature, placing it in a clear opposition to the objective externalised visitation of an *Aussentraume*.<sup>99</sup> This helps counteract the problem encountered when using ‘symbolic’ as a categorisation, as not all the dreams are focused on interpretative symbolism. Harris suggests instead ‘episodic’ to describe these non-visitation encounters.<sup>100</sup> An amalgamation of both terms seems most appropriate. The symbolic-episodic dream has been widely discussed in Greek literature – especially tragedy – and it is imperative to separate our own post-Freudian understanding of this type of dream from the evidence at hand.<sup>101</sup>

While Homeric epic evidently favoured the visitational dream, the symbolic-episodic type is not entirely absent. It is referenced briefly in a simile during Achilles’ pursuit of Hector in *Iliad* Book 22:

ὥς δ’ ἐν ὄνειρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν  
οὔτ’ ἄρ’ ὁ τὸν δύναται ὑποφεύγειν οὔθ’ ὁ διώκειν.<sup>102</sup>

Just as in a dream one is not able to pursue one who flees –  
neither can one get away nor the other pursue ...

The simile utilises the ‘dream space’ in describing its contents: the dreamer is involved in the immediate action, and are thus part of a wider scene. This maps on to the action immediately unfolding in the narrative and encapsulates the frustration, as well as the near-unreality, of the stasis that the two warriors have reached.<sup>103</sup> The symbolic-episodic type occurs again in the *Odyssey* when Penelope reports her dream of twenty geese and an eagle in Book 19 – this particular scenario will be discussed in greater detail below, as it is not as straightforward as it may initially seem. Similarly, a dream

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<sup>99</sup> Hundt (1935), 44-96.

<sup>100</sup> Harris (2009), 49.

<sup>101</sup> Devereux’s 1976 work *Dreams in Greek Tragedy: An Ethno-Psychoanalytical Study* is the clearest example of how this approach is unsuccessful; Lefkowitz (1977), 306-7 highlights the tendency for the study to ‘interpret almost everything in terms of sexual intercourse’, and notes the painful relentless reductionism and general confusion forced upon the Greek texts in question.

<sup>102</sup> *Il.* 22.199-200

<sup>103</sup> Porter (1993), 34 calls it an ‘eerie inconclusiveness’. Weiderhorn (1967), 69 identifies this as an anxiety dream; he argues that this ‘natural’ dream has entered the epic ‘through the back door’. The imagery from this dream may be more recognisable to a modern audience, but the brevity and intention of the reference can neither rule out a divine origin nor attest to the Homeric understanding of an outright ‘natural’ dream.

reported by Penelope in Book 20 may be considered more as a symbolic-episodic dream type than a visitational – though again only a brief report, Penelope laments:

αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄνειρατ' ἐπέσσευεν κακὰ δαίμων.  
τῆδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῶ,  
τοῖος ἐὼν οἷος ἦεν ἄμα στρατῶ· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ  
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἤδη.<sup>104</sup>

But to me a god sends evil dreams also.  
For this night beside me slept one like him [Odysseus],  
Just as he looked when he left with the army. But my heart  
Rejoiced, since I did not think it to be a dream, but a waking reality.

Though it has a commonality with the visitational dream, namely in the appearance of a figure described as in the 'likeness' of someone, it does not adhere to the standard positioning and does not appear to have imparted any message or advice. Instead, the more youthful Odyssean likeness lies with Penelope in her bed in a scene of matrimonial closeness. Penelope is involved in the scene herself; she recounts her immediate emotional response during the dream experience – ἐμὸν κῆρ χαῖρ' – and the encounter to her was so realistic, she believed it to be a reality thus causing her more sorrow upon waking. Penelope's involvement points to a dream which is more of the episodic type than visitational, as it invokes the visual experience of the dreamer rather than focus on an auditory message.

In tragedy, symbolic-episodic dreams are more frequently employed, and thus the dream report and interpretation too becomes by necessity a common feature. In the extant texts, Aeschylus and Euripides feature dreams within their dramas several times; Sophocles by comparison employs the dream only once.<sup>105</sup> Notably, Euripides' three emphatic dream scenes occur in plays based on the epic cycle – *Hecuba*, *Iphigenia at Tauris*, and *Rhesus*. The dreams may depend on imagery and hidden meanings, much the same as oracular or prophetic messages delivered by other means. In *Choephoroi*, for example, the contents of Clytemnestra's dream which had disturbed the whole household in the Parodos (32-27) are finally revealed to the audience in a stichomythic exchange between Orestes and the Chorus (526-535): she dreamed she had given birth to a snake (τεκεῖν δράκοντ' ἔδοξεν, 527) which she swaddled like a baby, and on putting it to her breast, it drew off a clot of blood in her milk (θρόμβον αἵματος, 533). The symbolism here is thus weaved into the action, involving Clytemnestra herself as

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<sup>104</sup> *Od.*20.87-90

<sup>105</sup> *Soph.*OT.981-82 and even then, the dream here has no real interaction with the plot.



the main ‘actor’ in the dream scene, allowing Orestes to subsequently interpret each stage of the dream imagery and conclude ‘I become the snake and I kill her, as this dream so tells’ (ἐκδρακοντωθεὶς δ’ ἐγὼ | κτείνω νιν, ὡς τοῦνειρον ἐννέπει τόδε, 549-50).<sup>106</sup> Jocasta’s infamous consolatory remark to Oedipus that ‘many have lain with their mothers in dreams’ also attests – albeit briefly – to dreams of a more episodic nature that were apparently commonplace in Greek dreaming life.<sup>107</sup>

In some cases, these dreams can blend several features from the Homeric dreams – both visitational and symbolic-episodic. In *Persians*, for example, Atossa has a dream which initially seems to recall the manifest figures of a visitation dream: two well-dressed women appear to her, beautiful and larger than life, one dressed in Persian robes and the other in Doric. But they do not have a direct message for Atossa, and do not engage her in dialogue. Instead, Atossa witnesses an unfolding scene which comes to also involve her living son Xerxes and her dead husband Darius: the two women begin to quarrel, and so Xerxes tries to yoke both to his chariot. One woman submits to her harness while the other struggles against it, tearing it from the chariot and dragging it along, smashing the yoke in half. Xerxes falls from the chariot, Darius appears beside him showing pity, but when Xerxes sees him he tears his robes.<sup>108</sup> Atossa is wholly removed from the action. The dream content is evidently symbolic, and as Oberhelman highlights, the interpretation of the imagery is ‘a simple matter for anyone with knowledge of the historical circumstance of the play’ – this, too, would extend to an Athenian audience: Xerxes’ expedition is doomed to fail.<sup>109</sup> The dream report blends several features of different Homeric dreams: it plays with the expectation of the visitation dream, features a symbolic scene of competition, and includes an appearance from a deceased person. Unlike the Homeric dreams however, Atossa is in no way involved with any aspect of the dream activity; the ‘dream space’ in this instance seems to only be there for her to observe as a removed spectator.

### 1.3.5. The Misinterpreted Dream

The symbolic-episodic dream fits well with the world of tragedy. Placed alongside other divine methods of communication - oracles, prophecies, etc. – dreams offer an inevitable truth.<sup>110</sup> Yet, like oracles and prophecies they are also vulnerable to

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<sup>106</sup> On Orestes here assuming a “threefold prophetic role” as fulfilling portents, interpreting portents, and himself being a portent see Roberts (1985), 291.

<sup>107</sup> Soph.*OT*.981-82 πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κὰν ὀνειράσιν βροτῶν μητρὶ ζυνηυάσθησαν.

<sup>108</sup> Aesch.*Pers*.181-99.

<sup>109</sup> Oberhelman (1991), 26.

<sup>110</sup> Rehm (2017), 75.

misinterpretation. The ambiguity of the symbolic-episodic dream is more natural for the tragic world, where the gods do not always communicate their intentions directly and human agency – and error – is rather more in focus. What does remain consistent throughout however is that these dreams are understood as being divinely sent and imparting – as other oracular sources – significant messages about present or future events. As a more indirect form of communication from the divine, the symbolic-episodic dream is more subject to easy misinterpretation than the visitation dream. However, that is not to say that the latter type is never misinterpreted – this is certainly not the case, as shall be shown below in the case of Croesus’ dream. Ultimately, with both dream types, as with other oracles, it is the responsibility of the (mortal) recipient to correctly understand the message from the (immortal) sender.

The ambiguity of interpreting signs from the gods in any medium was well recognised.<sup>111</sup> The symbolic-episodic dream presents an interesting method of divine communication as it combines aspects from both inductive and inspired divination: it relies on the identification and interpretation of signs from the gods (more akin to inductive divination) but these are communicated directly in the private experience of a dream (more akin to inspired divination).<sup>112</sup> This reliance on the dreamer to correctly report any dream content and subsequently correctly interpret it, as with other oracles, exposes the message from the gods to human error in comprehension.

At the beginning of Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Tauris*, Iphigenia recounts her strange dream, though rather than tell it to another person for interpretation, she simply reports it to the ‘upper air’ (πρὸς αἰθέρ’). In this dream she is back home in Argos when an earthquake strikes; having fled from the palace, and watches as the entire building collapses to the ground in ruins (44-49). One feature remains:

μόνος δ’ ἐλείφθη στῦλος, ὡς ἔδοξέ μοι, 50

δόμων πατρῶων, ἐκ δ’ ἐπικράνων κόμας

ξανθὰς καθεῖναι, φθέγμα δ’ ἀνθρώπου λαβεῖν<sup>113</sup>

But one pillar of my ancestral home, it seemed, was left standing; from its capital flowed fair hair, and it took the voice of a man ...

<sup>111</sup> Bonnechere (2007), 147.

<sup>112</sup> Bonnechere (2007), 149, 153; cf. the categories Plato and Cicero refer to in describing divination – ‘natural’ (=inspired) and ‘technical’ (=inductive), dreams ostensibly being included in the former but again overlapping with features of the latter (*Phaedrus* 244; *De. div.* 1.6; 18; 2.11).

<sup>113</sup> Eur.*IT*.50-52

Acting then in the role she has at Tauris of ritually cleansing Greeks before their sacrifice, Iphigenia then sprinkles water on the column, weeping, preparing it for slaughter (53-55). This is the end of the dream report. Unusually for tragedy, Iphigenia then immediately interprets the dream for herself: Orestes is dead (τέθνηκ' Ὀρέστης, 56), it is he whom she prepared for sacrifice. She explains her interpretation of the column imagery: στῦλοι γὰρ οἴκων παῖδες εἰσὶν ἄρσενες (67), and is sure it is Orestes and not another relative for there were no other sons in the palace when she left (59-60). The dream imagery reflects a mixture, then, of her past in Argos and her present in Tauris and the symbolism of the column is clearly intended as Orestes. But Iphigenia has mistaken the message conveyed by her own actions within the dream – unlike the column's identity, she fails to interpret the meaning of its lone survival and her own interaction with it, instead only understanding the act as what it is representative of in her waking life: her purification of victims before their slaughter. The act of purification itself, rather than what it leads to, seems to be key here, as the purification of Orestes is a persistent theme in the play, a theme which is ultimately introduced by Iphigenia's dream.<sup>114</sup>

The dream's misinterpretation is short-lived for the audience, as Orestes arrives on stage immediately afterwards at line 67, but Iphigenia does not discover his identity for another five hundred lines. When she does finally realise that Orestes is alive (568), Iphigenia does not reinterpret her dream but rather hastily dismisses it as having been false:

ΙΦΙΓΕΝΕΙΑ

ψευδεῖς ὄνειροι, χαίρετ'· οὐδὲν ἦτ' ἄρα.

ΟΡΕΣΤΗΣ

οὐδ' οἱ σοφοί γε δαίμονες κεκλημένοι 570

πτηνῶν ὄνείρων εἰσὶν ἀψευδέστεροι.<sup>115</sup>

IPHIGENIA

Farewell, false dreams! It seems you were nothing.

ORESTES

<sup>114</sup> Gagné (2013), 422-5 provides a thorough and convincing discussion of the dream, its meaning for the audience and its relation to broader themes within the play, as well as the play's role as an anti-*Eumenides*.

<sup>115</sup> Eur.*IT*.569-571

Yes indeed, nor are the gods who are called wise more truthful than winged dreams.

Iphigenia is unable to see that the error lies not with the dream itself but in her own misinterpretation, and Orestes' response highlights that this is not a problem restricted to dreams themselves but any communication from the gods. Both exemplify the difficulties encountered in tragedy by mortals attempting to understand immortal designs, in whatever manner they are communicated. Iphigenia's misinterpretation of the dream at the outset affects her actions in the scenes which follow, yet this still leads to a fulfilment of the dream's actions in that she does perform the purificatory rites upon Orestes, though before she knows his real identity. Her refusal to reinterpret the dream on discovering Orestes is not dead, and acknowledge her own mistake, is indicative of the wider failure of mortals within the play to understand the will of the divine and make informed decisions based upon it and their own accumulated knowledge.<sup>116</sup> There is no falsehood in Iphigenia's dream – nor usually in any dream or oracle in tragedy.<sup>117</sup> The misinterpretation is entirely mortal.

Herodotus often invokes the ambiguity of dreams in his *Histories*; characters misunderstand, ignore, or generally underestimate dreams, and then engage in activity which leads to the dream's very fulfilment. Notably, Herodotus uses the visitational as well as the symbolic-episodic dream type in this way. The dream of Croesus, for example, begins with the standard appearance of an anonymous dream figure (ὄνειρος) standing over him (ἐπέστη) as he sleeps (1.34); the narrative suggesting that the dream was sent as a result of divine vengeance (ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις) following Solon's visit.<sup>118</sup> This dream reveals to Croesus that his favoured son Atys will perish by a spear of iron. Upon awakening, Croesus is naturally frightened by his dream and sets about devising ways in which Atys might avoid injury: he does not allow him to lead the armies, nor does he allow any weapons in the house but instead removes them all to the floor of the storehouse, 'lest any should fall upon his son from its hanging place.'<sup>119</sup> In the meantime, Croesus has also received Adrastus as a suppliant, who has been banished from his home for accidentally killing his brother; Croesus purifies him of the pollution of this murder and welcomes him as a *xenos*. Atys later wishes to be sent on

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<sup>116</sup> Kyriakou (2006), 63.

<sup>117</sup> Gagné (2013), 422.

<sup>118</sup> Hollmann (2011), 77 'in the account of Croesus' downfall, the first manifestation of divine nemesis begins with a dream.'

<sup>119</sup> ἔωθότα δὲ στρατηγέειν μιν τῶν Λυδῶν οὐδαμῆ ἔτι ἐπὶ τοιοῦτο πρῆγμα ἐξέπεμπε· ἀκόντια δὲ καὶ δοράτια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα τοῖσι χρέωνται ἐς πόλεμον ἄνθρωποι, ἐκ τῶν ἀνδρεῶνων ἐκκομίσας ἐς τοὺς θαλάμους συνένησε, μή τί οἱ κρεμᾶμενον τῷ παιδί ἐμπέση. *Hist.* 1,34,3.

the Mysian boar hunt; to persuade his father to allow this, he specifically criticises his interpretation of the dream:

39. “Συγγνώμη μὲν ὧ πάτερ τοι, ἰδόντι γε ὄψιν τοιαύτην, περὶ ἐμὲ φυλακὴν ἔχειν· τὸ δὲ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀλλὰ λέληθέ σε τὸ ὄνειρον, ἐμὲ τοι δίκαιον ἔστι φράζειν. φῆς τοι τὸ ὄνειρον ὑπὸ αἰχμῆς σιδηρῆς φάναί ἐμὲ τελευτήσειν· ὕδς δὲ κοῖται μὲν εἰσὶ χεῖρες, κοίη δὲ αἰχμῆ σιδηρῆ τὴν σὺ φοβέαι; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ ὀδόντος τοι εἶπε τελευτήσειν με, ἢ ἄλλου τευ ὄ τι τούτῳ ἔοικε, χρῆν δὴ σε ποιέειν τὰ ποιέεις· νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ αἰχμῆς. ἐπεῖτε ὧν οὐ πρὸς ἄνδρας ἡμῖν γίνεται ἡ μάχη, μέτεες με.”<sup>120</sup>

“Father, none can blame you for protecting me, having seen such a vision; but it is my right to show you this which you do not perceive, and wherein you mistake the meaning of the dream. You say that the dream told you that I should be killed by a spear of iron; but has a boar hands? Has it that iron spear which you dread? Had the dream said I should be slain by a tusk or some other thing belonging to a boar, you had been right in acting as you act; but no, it was to be a spear. Therefore, since it is not against men that we are to fight, let me go.”<sup>121</sup>

Croesus concedes, and on the boar hunt Atys is struck and killed by the spear of Adrastus, who his father had sent to watch over him, ‘so fulfilling the prophecy of the dream’ (1.43). It is Atys’ misunderstanding of his father’s dream then, based on his inability to see the wider picture, that leads to his own downfall. But, in a move of dramatic irony that would not be out of place in a tragedy, despite all of Croesus’ efforts to circumvent fate, it is his *xenos* Adrastus, the purified accidental fratricide sent specifically on the hunt to look after Atys, who throws the fatal spear. Both Croesus and Atys have thus been compared to Sophocles’ Oedipus: Croesus, for his efforts to avoid the coming disaster about which the gods have warned, and Atys, for his active part in the decision which results in his death.<sup>122</sup> What is especially clear with the visitation dream being used in this scenario is that the dream itself is not at fault, and the error lies in human misunderstanding. The dream is thus not intentionally deceitful – as Agamemnon’s is in *Iliad* 2 – rather, it is entirely transparent as to what the future holds. Atys insists upon a reinterpretation of the dream, which, underestimating the warning which it provided, directly places him on his fatal path.

The misinterpreted dream then can be either visitational or symbolic-episodic, the message being communicated either directly imparted or more indirectly alluded to through imagery. The dream itself is not false; the onus lies with the dreamer to

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<sup>120</sup> Hdt.1.39

<sup>121</sup> Transl. adapted from Godley (1920).

<sup>122</sup> Saïd (2002), 135; on the overall tragic nature of the story, and its ‘Greekness’, see Mikalson (2003), 163-4.

understand the message which is being imparted. This differs entirely from the false dream of the *Iliad* as deception is not the intention. However, as we shall see next, there is another category of dreams in which deception does not come from the immortals, but is rather more mortal in origin.

### 1.3.6 The Invented Dream

There is often debate over whether literary dreams can ultimately be considered 'real' in discussions of the dream in ancient Greece.<sup>123</sup> This is not a question I am interested in pursuing as it seems unnecessary; dreams in literature may not have happened – they exist in works of fiction. It is their representation and characteristics that are of interest, not their reality. However, there is a fine distinction which can be made within the literature itself: occasionally, it is possible to identify dreams which are invented by their reporter rather than truly experienced. These 'invented' dreams manipulate the inherent subjectivity of any dream experience told from the perspective of the dreamer themselves.

While the *Iliad* exemplified the false dream, the *Odyssey* plays with the invented dream. A small scene in *Odyssey* 14 subtly highlights this contrast, when Odysseus, in the guise of a beggar (hereafter b-Odysseus), recounts a 'blameless tale' to Eumaeus the swineherd.<sup>124</sup> In this tale, set in Troy, b-Odysseus describes being out on an ambush along with the Greeks - including Odysseus, as a now separate character. Night falls, and having forgotten his cloak, b-Odysseus tells Odysseus he fears he will not last the night. Fortunately, the latter 'immediately' has an idea to remedy the situation:

“ἦ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀγκῶνος κεφαλὴν σχέθεν εἶπέ τε μῦθον·  
‘κλῦτε, φίλοι· θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος.      495  
λίην γὰρ νηῶν ἐκάς ἦλθομεν· ἀλλὰ τις εἶη  
εἰπεῖν Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι, ποιμένι λαῶν,  
εἰ πλέονας παρὰ ναῦφιν ἐποτρύνειε νέεσθαι.’<sup>125</sup>

With this, he propped his head up on his elbow, and spoke this tale:  
‘Hear me, friends. A divine dream came to me in my sleep.  
We have come too far from the ships. Would that there were anyone

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<sup>123</sup> e.g. Kessels (1973), 1 opens his thesis on the Greek dream by highlighting that ‘it might be argued that all Homeric dreams are literary dreams and that as such they do not inform us about the real experience of the early Greeks.’

<sup>124</sup> αἴνος ἀμύμων, *Od.* 14.508; Lowe (2000), 145 illustrates the narrative complexity of this scene in his summary of it as ‘a dream within a lie within a lie within a masquerade within a fiction.’

<sup>125</sup> *Od.* 14.494-8

to tell Agamemnon, son of Atreus, shepherd of the people,  
so that he might urge more men beside the ships to come.'

As soon as he finishes speaking, Thoas springs up, drops his cloak and runs to the ships thus leaving b-Odysseus with a cloak to wrap himself in.<sup>126</sup> The story is told by b-Odysseus in an attempt to gain a cloak for the night from Eumaeus, by providing an example of his master's behaviour under similar circumstance.<sup>127</sup> The story is situated within the Iliadic world, not only by virtue of being located in Troy, but through the actions – nightly ambush, crafty Odysseus, a divine dream, movement to and from the ships. However, what is of most note here is Odysseus' ruse within the story: he utilises the divine dream as a device to necessitate urgent action, with immediate success. In this self-conscious poetic scenario, Odysseus has become the narrator within a narration, and employs the dream – as the epic poet does throughout the *Iliad* especially – as a technique to compel activity from the characters in his own story, while on a separate level using the story itself as a technique to influence Eumaeus.<sup>128</sup>

Odysseus' dream report echoes that of Agamemnon in *Iliad* 2. When the latter has gathered the elders together, he also begins: κλῦτε, φίλοι· θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος (*Il.* 2.56). Agamemnon recounts his false dream alongside a plan to test the loyalty of his men, just as b-Odysseus tells his invented dream as a means to test Eumaeus.<sup>129</sup> However it is the outcome of Agamemnon's false report to his men that perhaps reveals the inspiration for Odysseus' ruse in the story within *Odyssey* 14 – as the men rush back to the ships and begin preparations to leave, Athena urges Odysseus to prevent their departure. Immediately, Odysseus sets off running, tossing his cloak away - βῆ δὲ θέειν, ἀπὸ δὲ χλαῖναν βάλε – and heads for Agamemnon.<sup>130</sup> This parallels neatly with the action in b-Odysseus' Iliadic scene; thus in the tale, Odysseus knows from his own experience how to manipulate a specific action – but it requires a divine endorsement. As he cannot replicate the voice of a god, he instead invents a divine dream. The question of whether it is real or not evidently does not at all occur to his

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<sup>126</sup> *Od.* 14.499-503: ὡς ἔφατ', ὤρτο δ' ἔπειτα θόας, Ἄνδραίμονος υἱός | καρπαλίμως, ἀπὸ δὲ χλαῖναν θέτο φοινικέσσαν | βῆ δὲ θέειν ἐπὶ νῆας: ἐγὼ δ' ἐνὶ εἴματι κείνου | κείμην ἀσπασίως, φάε δὲ χρυσόθρονος Ἥως.

<sup>127</sup> Segal (2001), 168 sees the cloak story as Odysseus testing the limits of Eumaeus' hospitality; Pratt (1993), 89 summaries the message of the story as 'I need a cloak and if you are anything like your master, you will get me one, by hook or by crook.' Further, she suggests that whether Eumaeus actually believes the story took place or not is neither relevant for the story's message, nor its effectiveness.

<sup>128</sup> Eumaeus recognises Odysseus-as-beggar's storytelling ability in his conversation with Penelope, *Od.* 17.513 - 527.

<sup>129</sup> Newton (1997-8), 144.

<sup>130</sup> *Il.* 2.182-7.

listeners, as Thoas' actions are instantaneous. The invented dream thus here serves as a useful and unquestionable substitute for divine intervention.

This is not the only example of an invented dream in the *Odyssey*; its intention to 'test' Eumaeus shares a common goal with another more detailed invented dream – the next dream to appear in the narrative, that of Penelope in Book 19.<sup>131</sup> The situation is reversed: Odysseus, still in his disguise, is now told an invented dream by Penelope which again, features Odysseus (dream-Odysseus, hereafter d-Odysseus). She asks him to listen, and offer his own interpretation, as she recounts a dream unique in Homeric epic:

χῆνες μοι κατὰ οἶκον εἴκοσι πυρὸν ἔδουσιν  
 ἐξ ὕδατος, καί τέ σφιν ἰαίνομαι εἰσορώσα·  
 ἐλθῶν δ' ἐξ ὄρεος μέγας αἰετὸς ἀγκυλοχήλης  
 πᾶσι κατ' ἀχένας ἤξε καὶ ἔκτανεν· οἱ δ' ἐκέχυντο  
 ἄθροοι ἐν μεγάροισ', ὃ δ' ἐς αἰθέρα δῖαν ἀέρθη. 540  
 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κλαῖον καὶ ἐκώκυον ἔν περ ὄνειρῳ,  
 ἀμφὶ δέ μ' ἠγερέθοντο ἐϋπλοκαμίδες Ἀχαιαί,  
 οἴκτρ' ὀλοφυρομένην, ὃ μοι αἰετὸς ἔκτανε χῆνας.  
 ἄψ δ' ἐλθῶν κατ' ἄρ' ἔζετ' ἐπὶ προὔχοντι μελάθρῳ,  
 φωνῆ δὲ βροτέῃ κατερήτυε φώνησέν τε· 545  
 'θάρσει, Ἰκαρίου κούρη τηλεκλειτοῖο·  
 οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὃ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται.  
 χῆνες μὲν μνηστῆρες, ἐγὼ δέ τοι αἰετὸς ὄρνις  
 ἦα πάρος, νῦν αὖτε τεδὸς πόσις εἰλήλουθα,  
 ὃς πᾶσι μνηστῆρσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐφήσω.<sup>132</sup> 550

I have twenty geese at home, they eat grain  
 out of the water, and I take delight in gazing at them.  
 But a great eagle with curved beak came from the mountain,  
 broke their necks and killed them all. They lay heaped  
 in a pile in the house, while the eagle rose into the heavenly sky.  
 But I cried and wailed, though in a dream,  
 and fair-haired Achaean women gathered around me,  
 as I was piteously lamenting that the eagle killed my geese.  
 But he came back and perched on a jutting beam,

<sup>131</sup> Newton (1997-8), 145 groups Penelope's dream with that of Odysseus in the Thoas story and Agamemnon in the *Iliad* as type-scenes of 'testing via false dreams'.

<sup>132</sup> *Od.* 19.536-50



In human voice he held me back [from tears] and spoke:  
“Fear not, daughter of far-famed Icarius,  
this is not a dream, but a happy waking vision which will be fulfilled.  
The geese are the suitors, and I was an eagle before,  
Now I have come again as your husband,  
Who will send terrible death upon all the suitors.”

Penelope’s dream has been subject to many and varied interpretations, given its marked deviation from the standard formula of Homeric dreams. There are two halves to the dream report: the first half relies on a symbolism drawn from the use of the birds – geese and an eagle – while the second half features a delivered speech from Odysseus in the guise of the eagle, giving an interpretation of the earlier scene himself, while also declaring it is in fact not a dream. Altogether this makes for a highly unusual dream scenario; in a further departure from the standard Homeric dream, Penelope herself features in the dream an active participant, rather than a passive recipient. Furthermore, since the audience does not witness the dream as it occurs – as with Odysseus’ invented dream in 14 – its related contents are thus impossible to validate.<sup>133</sup> These peculiarities hint that this dream is not as straightforward as it first may seem, and indeed scholarship has moved away from the basic interpretation of the dream in two key respects: the twenty geese are not intended to symbolise the suitors, and the dream itself is a fabrication by Penelope.<sup>134</sup> Instead, the twenty geese reference the twenty years Odysseus has been absent and Penelope has been guarding the household; their death by the eagle interpreted as an omen that these twenty years have been in vain and that Odysseus will not return – this then more appropriately accounts for Penelope’s reaction, as her excessive mourning is suggestive of the death of a family member rather than of the suitors she has been spurning.<sup>135</sup> However, then the eagle returns and in the voice of Odysseus presents an interpretation intended to

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<sup>133</sup> Bulkeley (1998), 235.

<sup>134</sup> Kessels (1973), 1 had distinguished this as a literary rather than a ‘dreamt’ dream, though such a distinction is quite blurred. Recent scholarship has been more definitive in claiming that this is not a dream at all but an invention of Penelope’s – see esp. Winkler (1990), Newton (1997-8) and Levaniouk (2011). For the geese understood as the suitors: Austin (1975), 229–31; Katz (1991), 146–147; Felson (1994), 32; Crotty (1994), 194-5; Ahl & Roisman (1996), 235–36; McDonald (1997):16. Devereux (1976), 382 especially goes to great lengths to attribute the dream to Penelope’s subconscious pleasure with the suitors, despite her character and actions in the poem clearly signalling the opposite – cf. also Russo (1982), 8-10.

<sup>135</sup> Pratt (1993), 150-152. 20 is a significant number in the *Odyssey*, not for the number of suitors (whose number totals 108), but as an often-repeated tally of the number of years Odysseus has been absent. This interpretation is also compared to Calchas’ prophesizing in *Iliad* 2.308-20, where the number of creatures equals the number of years rather than the number of dead. See also Bulkeley (1998), 237; Levaniouk (2011).

soothe Penelope's grief: this is not a dream after all, but a waking vision in which the geese are to be seen as the suitors, and he as Odysseus will bring death upon them.<sup>136</sup>

Why does Penelope tell the beggar this intricately-constructed dream scenario? We have already seen how Odysseus used a dream to manipulate and instigate action; here, the aim is similar. She creates this tale to subtly communicate with Odysseus; just as b-Odysseus attempted to influence Eumaeus' actions through his tale featuring Odysseus, Penelope cleverly weaves together a portentous narrative, which also features Odysseus himself. Before dream-Penelope recognises that the eagle is d-Odysseus, she is bereft at what she sees as the loss of her household – a potential reflection of her current situation. However once d-Odysseus does away with his disguise, he announces his plan to rid her of the suitors – a potential reflection of what Penelope wants to happen. Throughout the *Odyssey*, Penelope's cleverness is emphasized just as Odysseus' is. She is able to use Odyssean tactics herself to communicate her message: in *Odyssey* 14's dream, Odysseus created for himself the divine voice within a dream to instigate action. Here, Penelope instead creates a mantic vision for herself. Therefore, just as b-Odysseus hoped Eumaeus would replicate the actions narrated in his tale, Penelope hopes Odysseus will ensure her constructed prophetic dream-turned-vision will come to fruition.<sup>137</sup>

Invented dreams also appear in other literary genres. Dreams are a valuable tactic in the political world: dreams can spur action, or legitimise it, and as such are very useful tools for those either in power or seeking it. Aristophanes pokes fun at this type of subjective dream-prophesizing in *Knights* (424BC). That dreams may be in fact be invented rather than legitimately experienced is hinted at first in line 809, when the Sausage-Seller criticizes Paphlagonian-Cleon for misleading Demos:

ἄ σὺ γινώσκων τόνδ' ἔξαπατᾶς καὶ ὄνειροπολεῖς  
περὶ σαυτοῦ.

You know this, so you keep fooling him and rigging up dreams about yourself.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> Levaniouk (2011), the eagle's interpretation is 'presented as a reversal, and therefore cannot apply to the first part of the dream.'

<sup>137</sup> Levaniouk (2011), Penelope is performing for Odysseus a *muthos*, a prophetic dream narrative.

<sup>138</sup> Aristoph. *Kn.* 809; transl. Henderson (1998); his n.64 highlights that Thucydides uses a similar explanation for why Cleon was so aggressively opposed to peace, though he does not specify anything regarding the use of dreams - ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ἦσσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐγγένητο καὶ ἔτεθνήκει Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδης, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα

Later, in competing for the favour of their master Demos, Paphlagonian-Cleon and the Sausage-seller compare dream-oracles of Athena.<sup>139</sup> These reported dreams combine basic familiar dream components with ridiculous imagery, for immediate comedic effect:

ΠΑΦΛΑΓΩΝ

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εἶδον ὄναρ, καὶ μούδοκει ἡ θεὸς αὐτὴ [1090]  
τοῦ δήμου καταχεῖν ἀρυταίνῃ πλουθυγίεινα.

ΑΛΛΑΝΤΟΠΩΛΗΣ

νὴ Δία καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ· καὶ μούδοκει ἡ θεὸς αὐτὴ  
ἐκ πόλεως ἐλθεῖν καὶ γλαῦξ αὐτῇ 'πικαθῆσθαι'  
εἶτα κατασπένδειν κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀρυβάλλω  
ἀμβροσίαν κατὰ σοῦ, κατὰ τούτου δὲ σκοροδάλμην.<sup>140</sup> [1095]

PAPHLAGON

Wait, I've had a dream: I saw the Goddess [Athena] herself pouring healthy wealthiness over Demos with a big ladle.

SAUSAGE-SELLER

By god I've had one too: I also saw the Goddess herself, coming from the Acropolis with an owl sitting on her helmet; then down she poured a pitcher of ambrosia over your head, and over his, a pitcher of garlic sauce.<sup>141</sup>

The abruptness of the dreams' introduction – without any interval of night – and their conveniently specific subject matter are fair indicators that these are not 'real' dreams experienced by the two characters. Athena features in both dreams: as the patron goddess of Athens, she is closely associated with the city's political life.<sup>142</sup> Any divine endorsement would be favourable, but for Athena herself to feature in the dream and interact with Demos is a sure strategy for the two competitors to win Demos' favour. The activity of Athena is, naturally for an Aristophanic comedy, odd; the intended

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ἦναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ... ὁ δὲ γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων (Thuc. 5.16.1).

<sup>139</sup> Anderson (1991), 149 some argue that this contest is an insertion or interpolation. For other scenes in Aristophanes which involve characters comparing their dreams, cf. the opening of *Wasps* in which Sosias and Xanthias report similarly 'symbolic' types of dreams to each other, then provide their own interpretations.

<sup>140</sup> Arist.*Kn.*1090-95

<sup>141</sup> Transl. Henderson (1998).

<sup>142</sup> Lauriola (2006), 76 considers this association 'peculiar and unique'.

positive symbolism is crudely constructed for maximum effect. Here, the emphasis is on the ‘seen’ actions rather than any delivered message. Harris argues that this passage reflects a reality in Athenian political oratory – i.e. the use of dreams to gain favour – and considers its comedic value, and vulgarity, as an attestation that there would have been a group of citizens who looked down on such rhetorical tactics.<sup>143</sup> *Knights* casts a critical eye on the use of divination to manipulate the *demos*; as Smith highlights, it is not that Aristophanes is encouraging the distrust of dream interpreters, but rather, he strives to show how easily one can cheat others by dishonest use of various forms of divination – not just dreams.<sup>144</sup>

There is little surviving evidence from the Classical period of the political use of dreams which Aristophanes derides. Although beyond the focus of this current study, the end of the Classical period has two interesting examples worth noting here for reference. In his *Against Ctesiphon* of 330BC, Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of falsifying a dream which told him of Philip’s death; the reality, he claims, was that scouts of Charidemus had reported the news to him, but before anyone else could be told, Demosthenes utilised the information to his own advantage:

τῶν μὲν θεῶν συμπλάσας ἑαυτῷ ἐνύπνιον κατεψεύσατο, ὡς οὐ παρὰ Χαριδήμου τὸ πρᾶγμα πεπυσμένος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, οὓς μεθ’ ἡμέραν ἐπιτορκῶν νύκτωρ φησὶν ἑαυτῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι προλέγειν,<sup>145</sup>

He fashioned together a dream for himself and lied about the gods, claiming he had not heard of the event [Philip’s death] from Charidemus but from Zeus and Athena, the gods by whose name he swears falsely by day, he says that they converse with him at night and tell him of things to come.

The language used is emphatic as to Demosthenes’ fabrication of the dream, and Aeschines is evidently highly critical of his misuse of the gods’ names in this manner. Demosthenes’ claim that Zeus and Athena converse with him at night and predict future events for him suggest he is claiming the experience of a visitation dream, rather than one composed of interpretative symbolism. Though vague, and of course with the

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<sup>143</sup> Harris (2009), 150-151.

<sup>144</sup> Smith (1989), 149.

<sup>145</sup> Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 77

acknowledgement that the accusation is made by a rival, the invention of a visitation dream seems a particularly striking and bold move.

Another speech from the same period more explicitly addresses the political use of dreams: Hypereides' *For Euxenippus*. In this defence, the latter is accused of having falsely reported a divine dream which he experienced while incubating in the temple of Amphiaraus.<sup>146</sup> The speech is dated between 330-324BC, so again falls somewhat outside the boundaries of the current investigation; however, it is worth noting that one of the arguments made by Hypereides in defending Euxenippus situates the dream in the political world – Euxenippus is ordered to incubate (i.e., seek out a dream in the temple) by the *demos* to obtain a resolution to a dispute over land, and he reports back his findings to them.<sup>147</sup> Moreover, it acknowledges the potential for false reporting:

[14] ... ὁ δῆμος προσέταξεν Εὐξενίππῳ τρίτῳ αὐτῷ ἐγκατακλιθῆναι εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, οὗτος δὲ κοιμηθεὶς ἐνύπνιον φησὶν ἰδεῖν, ὃ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπαγγεῖλαι. τοῦτ' εἰ μὲν ὑπελάμβανες ἀληθὲς εἶναι, καὶ ὃ εἶδεν ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ τοῦτ' αὐτὸν ἀπαγγεῖλαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, τί καὶ ἀδικεῖ, ἃ ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ προσέτατε ταῦτ' ἐξαγγείλας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους;

[15] εἰ δέ, ὥσπερ νυνὶ λέγεις, ἡγοῦ αὐτὸν καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ χαριζόμενόν τισι μὴ τάληθῆ ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ ψήφισμα ἐχρῆν σε πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον γράφειν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὁ πρότερος ἐμοῦ λέγων εἶπεν, εἰς Δελφοὺς πέμψαντα πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.<sup>148</sup>

The people ordered Euxenippus, along with two others, to lie down in the temple; and he says that he fell asleep and had a dream, which he reported to the people. If you assumed that this was true and that he reported to the people exactly what he saw in his sleep, what crime does he commit in reporting to the Athenians the instructions the god gave him?

But if, as you now claim, you thought that he lied about the god and sought to curry favour with certain individuals by not telling people the truth, you should not have proposed a decree opposing the dream but should have made an enquiry at Delphi and learned the truth from the god, just as the previous speaker said.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Amphiaraus was appropriately a seer, favoured by both Zeus and Apollo.

<sup>147</sup> Cooper (2001), 102 elaborates on the context of the land dispute: after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338, Philip had awarded the town of Oropus to Athens, and its territory was divided between the ten Athenian tribes. A hill, sacred to the god Amphiaraus, was handed to the tribes too, but this was considered to have been unlawfully allocated. Therefore, to determine whether the land actually belonged to the god, the Athenians sent Euxenippus and two others to sleep in Amphiaraus' temple to receive direct instruction from the god himself.

<sup>148</sup> Hyp.4.14-5

<sup>149</sup> Translation Cooper (2001).

On the one hand, Hyperides argues, it could have been that the information from the god himself was problematic rather than the subsequent report given by Euxenippus – a nod perhaps to Agamemnon’s false dream from *Iliad* 2. If this is the case, then Euxenippus cannot be held accountable; rather, the blame then rests on the god himself. On the other hand, if Euxenippus had made a false report of his dream and conveyed information which was not obtained from the god in an attempt to deliberately mislead the *demos*, Hyperides suggests that there is a solution to such a problem: sending to Delphi, to inquire the truth ‘from the god’, i.e. Apollo. As the dream is divine in origin, the original message from Amphiaraus can be corroborated by another divine oracular source. That this corroboration comes by way of Apollo at Delphi is an attestation to that oracle’s authority in matters of divine communication. This is an interesting argument from Hyperides, emphasizing a perceived continuity across the different methods by which the divine communicate with mankind, while also on a practical level highlighting a way to ‘verify’ messages received from the gods in such a highly personal and subjective context as dreams.<sup>150</sup> That the oracle at Delphi can be used to determine the validity of a dream also suggests that the former method of divination bears more legitimacy than the latter.

#### 1.4 Dreams True and False

These varied and often overlapping dream types serve to highlight a broader issue of the dream experience itself: reliability. How can the dreamer know if the dream is true, or false? The debate over the truthfulness of dreams appears as early as Homer, and persists into the fifth century BC alongside some of the dream scenes already discussed. A brief look at these discourses is useful for further exploring the attitudes towards dreams, particularly in their existence as conduits for divine – and portentous – communication, and how they related to other means of prophecy.

Following her invented dream report in Book 19 (see **1.3.6**), Penelope warns not only of the baffling and unclear (ἀμήχανοι ἀκριτόμυθοι, 19.560) nature of dreams, but also of their unreliability as indicators of what is to come, for not all dreams come to pass for man (19.561). She then delivers an intriguing exposition on the trajectories of the dreams themselves, and each individual dream’s legitimacy is attributed to whether it travels through one of two gates:

δοιαὶ γὰρ τε πύλαι ἀμνηνῶν εἰσὶν ὄνειρων·

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<sup>150</sup> Cf. Pindar’s *Pythian* 4, 163-164 in which Pelias consults the oracle to confirm his dream, which leads to the voyage of the Argonauts.

αἱ μὲν γὰρ κεράεσσι τετεύχεται, αἱ δ' ἑλέφαντι·  
τῶν οἱ μὲν κ' ἔλθωσι διὰ πριστοῦ ἑλέφαντος,  
οἳ ῥ' ἑλεφαίρονται, ἔπε' ἀκράαντα φέροντες· 565  
οἱ δὲ διὰ ξεστῶν κεράων ἔλθωσι θύραζε,  
οἳ ῥ' ἔτυμα κραίνουσι, βροτῶν ὅτε κέν τις ἴδῃται.

For there are two gates of fleeting dreams,  
One is made from horn, the other from ivory.  
Those dreams which come through the sawn ivory,  
They are deceptive, since they tell unfulfilled things.  
But the dreams which come out through the polished horn,  
They come true, whenever seen by any man.

Though not made explicit, it is reasonable to assume the gates Penelope describes here are in the underworld where, as mentioned above (1.1), the Homeric *demos* of dreams is located; ἀμνηνῶν especially hints at this location, as it is an adjective most associated with the shades of the dead in Homer.<sup>151</sup> Penelope's description of the two gates is a puzzle which has gained much attention in scholarship, and the use of ivory and horn to designate those dreams which are false and those which are true has been given an array of explanations from both ancient and modern commentators: simple punning wordplay of κεράεσσι/ κραίνουσι and ἑλέφαντι/ ἑλεφαίρονται; an association of horn with the eye and ivory with the teeth leading to a broader commentary on the validity of sight over speech; horn as transparent and ivory opaque; a geographical equivalent in the caves of Ithaca which then equates to astronomical features (horn – south – Notus – Capricorn; ivory – north – Boreas – Cancer); an association of horn with Odysseus and ivory with Penelope; horn as common and inexpensive, ivory as rare and costly.<sup>152</sup> The explanations are vast, and a proper analysis is beyond the scope of this study. For our purposes, however, the meaning of the Gates' material composition is not as important as the message which Penelope conveys. She makes a clear distinction between the two genres of dreams experienced by the dreamer: those which tell of things to come, and those which tell of things that will not. The former then, a truthful portent, while the latter is sent as a deliberate deception. And so, Penelope presents

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<sup>151</sup> LSJ s.v. ἀμνην-ός [α^], ὄν, also ῆ, ὄν Opp.H.2.58: (ἀ- priv., μένος): —poet. Adj., in Hom. chiefly of ghosts or shades.

<sup>152</sup> Eustathius *Commentarii* V, II, 219; Macrobius *Commentarii* 12. Of the many discussions in modern scholarship from which these conclusions are drawn, see esp. Highbarger (1940); Amory (1966), 1-59; Kessels (1973), 65-75; Russo (2002), 224-27; Noegel (2007), 199-206; Haller (2009), 397-417.

two layers of problems facing the use of dreams: they are obscure in their meaning, and then even when understood, their message may or may not come to pass. Dreams are thus a difficult mixture of unclear and ambiguous, and this sentiment is perhaps further reinforced by Penelope's verbalisation of the concept in an equally unclear and ambiguous way. The difficulty in understanding the meaning of the Gates is also a useful paradigm for the modern interpretation of ancient dreams more broadly: symbolism from a culture so far-removed from our own is often entirely inaccessible.

In a fable of Aesop, which has been regarded as one of the older types from the fifth-century BC, the existence of two types of dreams, true and false, is once more brought into focus but given a different aetiology and trajectory.<sup>153</sup> Aesop takes on Apollo's "mantic monopoly"<sup>154</sup> in the fable: Apollo asks Zeus for *mantike*, so that he might become the most prominent of all oracles; having been granted it however, Apollo's arrogance is exacerbated and he believes himself superior to all the other gods (*Vita G* 33, 5-7). Zeus' solution is to create *όνείρους ἀληθεῖς* – true dreams – that reveal the future to men in their sleep, thus making consultation with Apollo unnecessary (33, 9). Apollo, realising what has happened, asks Zeus for reconciliation; on forgiving Apollo, rather than take away the true dreams, Zeus instead has another plan: he creates and introduces deceitful (*ψευδῆ*) dreams to appear when men are asleep, too (33, 11-15). And so, Apollo, as the original source of prophetic divination, once more becomes the go-to for people wishing to know the future, as their dreams can no longer be considered as reliable. As with Penelope's story of the Gates, there are two distinct dream categories: true and false. Here, however, the dreams are literally created by Zeus himself, as a response to Apollo's mantic skills. The subordination of the dreams, once they have become unreliable, to Apollo indicates an unquestioned trust in his oracle – i.e. Delphi – and its ability to corroborate or dispute other forms of prophecy. This belief, as we have seen above, appears in the roughly contemporary Pindar, and then Hyperides (1.3.6).

A similar account of the use of dreams to undermine Apollo's prophetic monopoly occurs in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 1270-82. The Chorus describe how

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<sup>153</sup> Perry (1962), 299-302; Kurke (2003), 83-4: the context of this 'first full-scale fable' in the *Life* being that Aesop has been purchased as a slave by the philosopher Xanthos; on arriving home Xanthos' wife is annoyed at his ugliness, as she had a dream in which her husband acquired a handsome slave instead. The fable Aesop thus tells is a consolation to her on the origin of true and false dreams. All Greek excerpts from *Vita G* are taken from TLG.

<sup>154</sup> Kurke (2003), 83; on Aesopic disrespect to Apollo more broadly, see Jennings (2017), 189-207.



Apollo, having killed the serpent at Delphi, becomes ‘conqueror’ of the oracle. He sends Themis away (from Delphi), and in response, her mother Earth takes action:

... νύχια  
Χθών έτεκνώσατο φάσματ’ όνειρων,  
οἱ πολέσιν μερόπων τά τε πρώτα  
τά τ’ έπειθ’ όσ’ έμελλε τυχεῖν 1265  
ύπνω κατά δνοφεράς χαμεύ-  
νας έφραζον· Γαῖα δέ τάν  
μαντείων άφείλετο τι-  
μάν Φοῖβον φθόνω θυγατρός.<sup>155</sup>

Earth begot nightly dream visions, which revealed to the many men both things present and things destined to happen thereafter, while asleep in their dark beds. And so Earth took away Apollo’s honour of prophecy, out of envy on account of her daughter.

Therefore, as with the account in the Aesopic fable, another immortal decides to undermine Apollo’s prophetic power by creating and introducing dreams to men as they sleep. In this case, Earth issues forth the dreams herself as her progeny, and they are able to tell men of present and future events, thus taking away Apollo’s τιμή. Apollo immediately petitions Zeus to intervene and restore his authority; Zeus happily obliges, by stopping the nightly voices (νυχίους ένοπάς, 1276) and taking the truthfulness of these nightly appearances away from men (ύπό δ’ άλαθοσύναν νυκτωπόν έξεῖλεν βροτῶν, 1277). The Aesopic creator of dreams is thus here the one who takes them away.

The sixth-century BC *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* had also recounted a challenge to Apollo, though this time only by means of a request from the infant Hermes.<sup>156</sup> What is of note for our current discussion is that in the *Hymn*, Hermes is hailed as the ήγήτορ’ όνειρων, ‘leader of dreams’ (14). This title is unusual for its lack of subsequent qualification; there is almost nothing else recounted about his role in relation to dreams except a small reference near the end:

πᾶσι δ’ ό γε θνητοῖσι καί άθανάτοισιν όμιλεῖ  
παῦρα μὲν οὔν όνίνησι, τὸ δ’ άκριτον ήπεροπεύει

<sup>155</sup> Eur.*IT*.1262-69

<sup>156</sup> For dating the hymn: Allen, Halliday & Sykes (1936), 183-6; Janko (1982), 99-150; Kurke (2003), 82; cf. Brown (1947), 4: ‘the *Hymn* is universally recognised to be no older than 7<sup>th</sup> century.’

νύκτα δι' ὀρφναίην φῦλα θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.<sup>157</sup>

He consorts with all mortals and immortals,  
He brings little advantage, but incalculably often<sup>158</sup> cheats  
the tribes of mortal men throughout the murky night.

This short account of Hermes' activities during the night could be read as reference to his previously mentioned role as the leader of dreams. The vocabulary certainly alludes to it – beyond the dark description of night, ἄκριτον brings connotations of the difficult interpretation of dreams, while φῦλα itself recalls the Hesiodic tribes of dreams (1.1). If such a reference can be understood, then the hymn makes clear that Hermes' interactions with mortals via dreams are deliberately deceitful. This duplicitous potential in prophecy has already been described in the hymn in relation to the bee-oracle which Apollo gives to the young Hermes: when the bees have consumed honey, they will readily speak the truth (προφρονέως ἐθέλουσιν ἀληθείην ἀγορεύειν, 561), but when they have not then they speak falsely (ψεύδονται, 563). Determining the truthfulness of any oracle then, is as paramount as its subsequent interpretation.

### 1.5 Closing Remarks

This chapter is intended as an overview to both sleep and dreams in Greek literature, from Homer until the fifth-century BC; as such, it is hopefully both a useful starting point and a helpful reference for the rest of the discussion. By discussing sleep and dreams in the mythic tradition, as well as in a range of literature across the period (and in some cases, beyond), it becomes clear that there is no single defining model for either. Furthermore, both sleep and dreams possess an inherent duplicity to their nature: the former has the potential for both release and harm, while the latter can be truthful or deceptive, clear or obscure. The various overlapping dream types show that there is no simple monolithic dream in Greek literature; the nuances to each dream episode illuminate the context in which it appears. Above all, though, the contents of the dream – whatever type it may be – hold a special significance, and given the many ways in which interpretation could go awry, it is not then surprising that the position of *oneiropolos* in Greek life reaches professional status.

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<sup>157</sup> HH.18, 576-8

<sup>158</sup> Translation of τὸ δ' ἄκριτον after Vergados (2013).

# 2

## Sleep, Dreams and Heraclitus

*The distress of the whole Heraclitean interpretation is to be seen in the fact that what we call fragments are not fragments, but citations from a text in which they do not belong.*  
--Heidegger

It has been said that in dealing with Heraclitus, the Homeric-Hesiodic context should always be taken into account.<sup>1</sup> Appropriately then, following on from the previous chapter's extensive discussion of the characteristics of sleep and dreams from Homer onwards, this chapter narrows the focus entirely onto Heraclitus. As noted in the introduction, he is often hastily dismissed in studies of sleep and/or the dream. This chapter, then, seeks to give him the space he deserves.

While natural philosophy had arisen with the investigations of Thales of Miletus in the early sixth-century BC, it is not until Heraclitus – active in the late sixth/early fifth centuries BC – that our current areas of interest begin to quietly appear as part of wider philosophical investigation. Heraclitus himself does not investigate either phenomenon explicitly; rather, as we shall see in this chapter, he makes use of the states of sleeping and dreaming to elucidate his own philosophical ideas. Unsurprisingly for Heraclitus, who is renowned for his obscure style, these are neither basic nor simple comparative remarks. His depiction of how an individual experiences the sleeping state interacts closely with his investigations into epistemology, the *logos* and indeed even the universe more broadly. Described as everything from a 'philosophical maverick' in antiquity to the more sympathetic modern interpretation of 'humanist with scientific interests'<sup>2</sup>, Heraclitus' fragments on sleep and dreams are the first appearances of both phenomena outside of a purely literary context and as such merit a closer investigation. I should note that in discussing Heraclitus, I do not attempt to reconstruct larger theories by combining several fragments into a narrative. This is not a method which lends itself to Heraclitus' work,

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<sup>1</sup> Hussey (1991), 521.

<sup>2</sup> Graham (2010), 135-36.

particularly those aspects in which, as in this case, there are only a handful of fragments extant. Rather, the fragments relating to sleep and dreams are discussed in turn, and any useful comparisons or similarities noted.

## 2.1 On Epistemology

Heraclitus took great interest in the epistemological condition of man, which is often the focus of criticism in the extant fragments. For him, understanding the world is a fundamental requirement which he finds the majority of men to be lacking. Their inability to understand how things really are and possess true wisdom is a result of their inability to grasp the *logos*, the primary object of knowledge.<sup>3</sup> In Heraclitus' philosophy, the meaning of *logos* has been well-recognised as a subject of much debate among commentators – 'few issues in the study of early Greek philosophy have drawn as much attention or provoked as much disagreement'.<sup>4</sup> The suggestion that *logos* means more than simply 'word' or 'account' is convincing, given the epistemological content of fragments DKB1, 2 and 50 in particular. But the emphasis on *logos* as an established cosmic law swings too far the other way, and risks imposing anachronistic (usually Stoic) concepts on an early natural philosopher; nonetheless, it is clear that the *logos* is related to the arrangement of all things.<sup>5</sup> A recent analysis by Johnstone has provided an excellent and highly plausible reading of Heraclitus' *logos*, which seeks to reconcile the two extremes of interpretation; by analysing the extant contemporary usages of *logos* he finds that its meaning is often that of an orderly and intelligible presentation of the spoken or written word, and suggests that Heraclitus innovatively utilises this meaning on a cosmic scale.<sup>6</sup> Thus:

Heraclitus denotes by the term '*logos*' neither his own discourse nor a cosmic law, but rather the world's orderly and intelligible (i.e. comprehensible, understandable) presentation of its nature to us throughout our lives. On this view, to understand 'this *logos*' is to understand the world as it presents itself to us – that is, as it becomes available to us in our experience – much as one might understand (or fail to grasp) the meaning of a written or spoken account.

Johnstone, 'On Logos in Heraclitus', 21

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<sup>3</sup> See esp. Curd (1991), 531ff.

<sup>4</sup> Johnstone (2014), 1.

<sup>5</sup> After KRS (1983), 187; contra West (1971), 124-9; Barnes (1982), 59.

<sup>6</sup> Johnstone (2014), 20-26; cf. Kahn (1979), 102: '*logos* means not simply language, but rational discussion, calculation, and choice: rationality as expressed in speech, thought and action ... The concept of *logos* as a self-subsistent power or principle is foreign to the usage of Heraclitus.'

This understanding of the *logos* fits appropriately within the world of natural philosophy, and for Heraclitus in particular it allows for a clearer understanding of his epistemological investigations and criticisms. The *logos* can be suitably described by Heraclitus as common (ξυνός, B2), then, as there is only one shared way in which all things in the world present themselves to us. Therefore, when Heraclitus criticises men for their inability to grasp the *logos*, he is attacking their failure to understand ‘what is always and everywhere before their eyes’ rather than their inability to understand the transmission of his own philosophical doctrines.<sup>7</sup>

With this meaning of the *logos* in mind, we can turn now specifically to fragment B1, the opening of Heraclitus’ work. Here, Heraclitus invokes a metaphor of sleeping to highlight man’s epistemological deficit in a wider discussion of the *logos*. I quote the fragment in full, to avoid misreading due to lack of context. This is the longest extant fragment of Heraclitus; emphasis in bold is on the lines concerning sleep specifically:

τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι, καὶ  
πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων  
κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπειροῖσιν εἰκόασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ  
ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον  
καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. **τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα  
ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.**<sup>8</sup>

Of the *logos* that is always, men are always uncomprehending, both before they hear it and when they have first heard it. For, although all things happen according to this *logos*, they are like the inexperienced, when they have experience both of words and deeds such as I explain, when I distinguish each according to its nature and show forth how it is; **but other men fail to notice what they do when awake, just as they forget all they do when asleep.**

Heraclitus criticises men for their consistent incomprehension of the *logos* before they heard it, then also when they have heard it and experienced such things as he sets forth. Given Johnstone’s reading of the *logos*, Heraclitus’ criticism here is clearer in its meaning: men are oblivious to the *logos*, to that which constantly surrounds them, and has been there all along. Their oblivion however reaches to such an extent that even direct experience and revelation from Heraclitus yields no understanding. Men are familiar with ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων – literally, words and deeds, but feasibly a polar

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<sup>7</sup> Johnstone (2014), 23.

<sup>8</sup> DK22B1

expression meant to indicate ‘the whole of human experience’<sup>9</sup> – but nevertheless, they continue to be uncomprehending and are thus compared to the ‘inexperienced’. Their experience has not resulted in knowledge.

To emphasize man’s continual epistemological inferiority, Heraclitus employs a chiasmic metaphor to contrast the sleeping state with the waking. Rather than focus on the states as oppositional however, Heraclitus instead likens men’s failure to understand waking activity to the failure of remembering what happens during sleep. These states may be opposed, but the epistemological condition of man remains the same in both: he is in a position of ‘cognitive alienation.’<sup>10</sup> Man does not understand the world around him, but Heraclitus himself has grasped the *logos* - ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι contrasting with τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους to emphasize Heraclitus’ own epistemic isolation.<sup>11</sup> He alone possesses this knowledge that all others continually fail to comprehend.

Of most note for the current study is that if men are unable to recall their experiences while sleeping, the underlying assumption is that they are, in fact, carrying out some form of activity during their sleep. Is this a reference to dreaming? It seems plausible, especially given the emphasis on comparative action through the shared use of ποιοῦσιν; the action referenced not being strictly literal in terms of the physical, but rather encompassing mental and emotional activity too.<sup>12</sup> This makes man’s inability to grasp the *logos* comparative with his inability to remember a dream. This criticism is sometimes glossed as meaning men are sleepwalking through life, but this may slightly over-read, or anachronize, the sentiment being conveyed here in B1; or, it may conflate it with Marcus Aurelius’ later likely paraphrase καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὡσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν – [Heraclitus says] that we must not act and think like the sleeping [B73].<sup>13</sup>

The text of B1 does not specifically claim that men are sleeping through their lives, but rather draws a close parallelism between two contrasting yet similar states of epistemological inferiority. Van Lieshout has focused on the parallelism between the two states to such an extent that he finds the most plausible reading to be that men

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<sup>9</sup> Taran (1986), 10; cf. Reinhardt (1916), 218.

<sup>10</sup> Kahn (1979), 99.

<sup>11</sup> Kahn (1979), 100.

<sup>12</sup> Taran (1986), 13 ‘it certainly does not refer primarily to the motions or gesticulations we may perform while we are asleep’, cf. Kirk (1954), 44.

<sup>13</sup> Marcus Aurelius is not reliable as a source for any verbatim philosophical account, as he often quotes from memory – cf. Kahn (1979), 104.

‘don’t know (when asleep), what they are doing after falling asleep’.<sup>14</sup> But, this fails to read the line in the context of the rest of the fragment. Furthermore, as Kirk highlights, the choice of words in the Greek does not actually so fully commit to such an oblique parallelism – though he finds this to be a point of criticism: ‘for men while awake fail to recognise an ever-present truth, yet they are said to forget what they did in their sleep ... The latter fault is that of forgetfulness rather than impercivence.’<sup>15</sup> Kirk chalks this up to a general inconsistency in expressions of archaic thought, but given the earlier criticism of Heraclitus – that men do not know the *logos* even when they do have experience, in addition to his description of them not as themselves inexperienced but rather ἀπείροισιν εἰκόασιν – the use of ἐπιλανθάνονται as comparative to λανθάνει is not entirely inexplicable. Both situations involve a lack of knowledge, but both also involve some exposure to experience by which they can gain this knowledge. The comparison then more subtly picks up on the criticism from the previous lines that men are unaware of the *logos* even when they have experienced it: men are unable to recall their dreams upon waking, even though these activities which they have themselves carried out, i.e. experienced. One cannot forget that of which one does not have prior knowledge. By using dreams in particular as the object of forgetfulness, Heraclitus is able to utilise a unique epistemological situation in that one might recall having dreamed, but be unable to remember any features of the dream itself. In more stylistic terms, the play on similar-yet-different vocabulary is also typically Heraclitean.

The criticism is also suggestive of a potentially cyclical recurrence of man’s ignorance between waking and sleeping, especially when read alongside B88:

ταυτό τ’ ἔνι<sup>16</sup> ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορός καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι, κάκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.<sup>17</sup>

The same thing in us are living and dying, waking and sleeping, young and old; for these things, changed around, are those, and those, changed in turn, are these.

<sup>14</sup> Van Lieshout (1980), 68-9.

<sup>15</sup> Kirk (1954), 54. Taran (1986), 13ff finds similar fault with the comparison, based on the argument that ‘it is not the case that men always forget their dreams; quite frequently they do not forget them.’ Such an assumption is fairly anecdotal, even speaking in a modern context, never mind accounting for the impossibility of substantiating such a claim for the experience of men over 2,000 years ago. It certainly does not give strong enough basis for arguing that the comparison is a *non sequitur* if interpreted as above.

<sup>16</sup> τ after Robinson (1987), Graham (2010).

<sup>17</sup> B88

The three pairs of opposites draw on three fundamental conditions of the human experience; Heraclitus views these opposites – and others, throughout his fragments – as all being essentially connected as part of a wider universal flux. Waking/sleeping are the most familiar as naturally successive states: one follows the other, continuously, there is no other possible alternate. As such, Heraclitus portrays them not as separately opposed and isolated states, but rather as the two stages of a single, continuous and invariable process. There is an underlying unity, as the opposites are of the ‘same genus’.<sup>18</sup> Thus, if waking gives way to sleeping, and *vice versa*, and activity from neither sphere is properly noticed and understood by the men who experience them, their incomprehension has the potential to be continually recurring.

Can men ever understand the *logos*, then? Heraclitus’ criticism in B1 may give a pessimistic account of man’s epistemological condition, but it is not without an agenda. For B1, said to be found at the beginning of Heraclitus’ work, appropriately sets him up in his own privileged epistemic isolation as being uniquely experienced to give an account of the world and direct men towards true knowledge.<sup>19</sup>

## 2.2 Sleeping as Separation: Memory

Before quoting the fragmentary B1 in his *Against the Logicians*, Sextus Empiricus gives an extended account of what he claims to be Heraclitus’ theory as to why men are separated from the power of memory when asleep. This is categorised by DK as a testimonium, rather than a fragment; the style and language make it quite clear that these were not Heraclitus’ own words. Though Sextus Empiricus, writing in the second or third century AD, was himself a Pyrrhonian skeptic, the account given here of Heraclitus’ theory bears an evident Stoic influence, suggesting transmission through at least one intermediary source. How much is recoverable from this testimonium has been the subject of debate: Kahn finds the entire passage more or less useless for any information on Heraclitus’ own theories, and often commentaries skip over it with little to say.<sup>20</sup> Claus argued that the Heraclitean provenance is suggested by the text’s imagery, though does little to really establish the case.<sup>21</sup> More recently, Polito and Betegh have argued that the Stoic influence is not as invasive or distortive as

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<sup>18</sup> Kirk (1954), 143; cf. KRS (1983), 189.

<sup>19</sup> On B1 as the opening of Heraclitus’ book, see both Sextus (*M.* 7.132) and Aristotle (A4). Heraclitus’ more direct criticism of others further emphasizes the position of epistemic privilege he establishes for himself – e.g. B40 πολυμαθήν νόον ἢ οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτίς τε Χενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἐκαταῖον; B108 ὀκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅτι σοφὸν ἐστὶ πάντων κεχωρισμένον.

<sup>20</sup> Kahn (1979), 293-6.

<sup>21</sup> Claus (1981), 128.



previously suggested; while the concept of divine cosmic *Logos* discussed in the text may be undoubtedly Stoic, little else actually is.<sup>22</sup> This seems to be a reasonable conclusion; certainly, Heraclitus' thought is not irrecoverable. The account in question describes sleep in the following manner:

[129] τοῦτον οὖν τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι' ἀναπνοῆς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν ὕπνοις ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμφορονες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφυΐας ὃ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μόνης τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσφύσεως σωζομένης οἰονεῖ τινος ῥίζης, χωρισθεὶς τε ἀποβάλλει ἢν πρότερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύναμιν· [130] ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγόρσει πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ διὰ τινῶν θυρίδων προσκύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβαλὼν λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.<sup>23</sup>

[129] So according to Heraclitus, it is by inhaling this divine *logos* when we breathe that we become intelligent, and whereas we forget it when we sleep, we become mindful again when we are awake. For when we sleep, the channels of perception are closed and the mind within us is separated from its natural connection with what surrounds, and only the point of attachment, respiration, subsists like a kind of root, and when it is separated it loses the faculty of memory that it had before; [130] but then when it awakens, leaning toward the channels of perception as though toward windows and encountering what surrounds, it takes on the faculty of reason once again.<sup>24</sup>

The association of sleep and forgetfulness appears as part of a discussion on the role of the *logos* in Heraclitus' philosophy, and rather than using sleep's forgetfulness as a means of discussing man's epistemological state, the account here is more straightforward and approaches it from a psychophysiological perspective.

The initial statement which is directly attributed to Heraclitus claims that intelligence can be gained by the inhalation of divine *logos* through breathing. Thus *logos* is not merely ever-present and all-surrounding, it also acquires an interactive nature in that men are able to, in a way, assimilate it, by the natural process of

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<sup>22</sup> Polito (2004), 149-72; Betegh (2007), 25-28.

<sup>23</sup> A16

<sup>24</sup> Transl. adapted from Most (2016)

inhalation. This contributes to intelligence, but, it is specified, this is only applicable when awake; in sleep, man forgets (ληθαῖοι, a variation of the terminology used in B1). Upon awaking, the process is reversed and man regains his senses (ἔμφορονες). Thus sleep as an impediment to contact with the *logos* impacts both the general intellectual ability of man, and his memory. This is notable in that it suggests men do not need to actively try and participate in the *logos*: it is an automatic natural process. However, respiration cannot endow man with full intelligence; Heraclitus is clear both later in this account, and elsewhere, that men fail to understand the *logos* and are epistemologically lacking. Thus, breathing must be viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for becoming intelligent.<sup>25</sup>

The text then proceeds to elaborate on this statement in more detail, providing an explanation that focuses on the technical processes underlying sleep. While men sleep, their 'channels of perception' (τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων) are closed off from the outside world; a simple empirical observation, given the shutting of the eyes in sleep. But then, the physiological description takes a more psychological turn, as the νοῦς is identified as being separated from its natural connection with 'what surrounds' (τὸ περιέχον). The only remaining link is through respiration, which is compared to 'some kind of root' (οἰοεὶ τινοσ ῥίζης). The separation of the νοῦς is then explicitly linked to the loss of memory; when awakened the recovery of intellectual ability is reiterated with a striking image comparing the reopening of the channels of perception to peering through windows; the emphasis evidently on the power of sight. Being able to once more exercise sensory perception and reconnect with the surroundings (presumably the *logos*), the faculty of reason is again restored. Betegh, after Polito, reads the statement as the mind becoming 'inactive' in sleep, which is categorised as 'un-Stoic'.<sup>26</sup> Neither note however that the emphasis on memory being inactive during sleep is instead a later Epicurean notion, as expressed by Lucretius: 'in sleep, memory lies dormant and is languid' (*meminisse iacet languetque sopore*, 4.765). It certainly contrasts sharply with the Hippocratic *On Regimen's* depiction of the *psukhē* and its active role during sleep; this passage will be discussed more fully in 4.3.

The testimonium then switches to a metaphor of charcoal, which employs some rather more identifiable Heraclitean imagery, though the context itself does not read like an original Heraclitean fragment:

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<sup>25</sup> Betegh (2007), 26.

<sup>26</sup> Polito (2004), 149-72; Betegh (2007), 25.

ὄνπερ οὖν τρόπον οἱ ἄνθρακες πλησιάσαντες τῷ πυρὶ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν  
διάπυροι γίνονται, χωρισθέντες δὲ σβέννυνται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ  
ἐπιξενωθεῖσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα κατὰ  
μὲν τὸν χωρισμὸν σχεδὸν ἄλογος γίνεται, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διὰ τῶν  
πλείστων πόρων σύμφυσιν ὁμοιοειδῆς τῷ ὄλῳ καθίσταται.<sup>27</sup>

In the same way as coals brought near to a fire are kindled according to a transformation but are extinguished when they are removed from it, so too the portion coming from what surrounds, which resides with our bodies, in the state of separation becomes almost irrational, but in the state of union by most of the channels it is restored to its affinity with the whole.<sup>28</sup>

Fire is obviously a recognisably Heraclitean substance, and the use of the imagery of kindling and extinguishing fire has parallels in his fragments – especially B26, which will be examined in more detail below. The main focus of this section is unity vs. separation: coals brought close to a fire will themselves catch fire, but on moving them away the fire dies out. This is mapped on to the activities of the *logos* in sleep: the portion of the *logos* which is internal to the body loses contact with the surrounding external *logos* during sleep, this loss of contact results in a loss of rationality. Not a total loss, keeping in line with the earlier comments on respiration subsisting as the only connection between the internal and external in sleep.

Looking at the account of sleep specifically then, as a whole, the most obvious point to be made is that the explanation which follows ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις is not attributed to Heraclitus specifically, nor transmitted in reported speech. Its technical language and psychophysiological focus make it suspicious as a direct reproduction of Heraclitus' own thought. The vocabulary is a mix of plausible Heraclitean words and anachronisms – συμφύιας, for example, as a term appears no earlier than Philo of Alexandria's first century AD doxography of Chrysippus, a Stoic philosopher of the third century BC.<sup>29</sup> It is cited by LSJ as a variant of σύμφυσις, a term found in mostly technical works; its first appearance is in the Hippocratic *On Joints*, dated to the late

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<sup>27</sup> A16

<sup>28</sup> Translation adapted from Most (2016).

<sup>29</sup> In an advanced lemma search of all forms of συμφύιας through TLG; out of 372 results, Chrysippus is the earliest extant usage – Frs. 646, 14; 458, 15; 759, 3.

fifth-century and it later reappears extensively in Galen. It also appears once in Plato, before being more frequently used by Aristotle.<sup>30</sup>

In terms of the imagery which Claus found to be convincing of Heraclitean provenance: the imagery of a window (θυρίς) only appears in one other instance in a Presocratic context: a testimonium of Democritus, recorded by Aristotle in his *De Anima*, in which the spherical atoms are compared to ‘just like the so-called particles in the air, which one sees in sunbeams that pass through windows’ (οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν, 67A28). As a term in itself, θυρίς, as a diminutive of θύρα, only has its first non-doxographical appearance in Aristophanes.<sup>31</sup> It seems an unlikely Heraclitean choice, either in terms of imagery or vocabulary. The only comparative metaphorical usage is in the philosopher Philo, writing in the first century AD: ‘the progressive man, as if looking from a window, sees it but not the whole of it, and not the mingling of both alone’.<sup>32</sup> The imagery of the kindling and extinguishing coals however, as already mentioned, is more recognisably Heraclitean: more on this below, in 2.4.

Can the respired, intellect-giving, internal portion of *logos* be of Heraclitean origin? Polito highlighted the Hellenistic origins of the breathed-in soul doctrine, as well as the problem of equating the account here with the Heraclitean soul, given the latter’s ‘fiery’ nature.<sup>33</sup> But is the Heraclitean soul fiery? Kahn denied such a description, pushing for air instead; most recently, Betegh argues that for Heraclitus, ‘everything from the lowest part of the atmosphere to the heavenly fire counts as soul’.<sup>34</sup> With this approach, the account from A16 could plausibly be a reference to a Heraclitean conception of the soul, especially given the emphasis on the retention of life through the ‘root’ of breathing. Furthermore, the diminishing capabilities of the soul as it loses contact with the *logos* – as expressed by the ‘kindling’ charcoal – is indicative of the cognitive function Heraclitus ascribes to the soul. For Heraclitus, the soul is lifted from its basic Homeric sense of an animating life-force to something rational, cognitive, active – ‘the centre of self-consciousness’.<sup>35</sup> This will be worth keeping in mind for the below discussion on B26.

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<sup>30</sup> Pl. *Tim.* 77d1.

<sup>31</sup> Ar. *V.* 379; *Th.* 797 (both literal).

<sup>32</sup> *Gen.*4, 188. Trans. Marcus (1956).

<sup>33</sup> Polito (2004), 146-8.

<sup>34</sup> Kahn (1979), 249 ‘nothing whatsoever is said about it [the soul] being fiery’; Betegh (2007), 28.

<sup>35</sup> Trepanier (2010), 287.

## 2.2 Sleeping as Separation: Experience

Given that one possible characteristic of sleep, then, is a loss of memory, it is not surprising that Heraclitus does not have any explicit descriptions of dreams themselves anywhere in his extant fragments or *testimonia*. But, as seen in B1, it is apparent that he conceived of there being some form of activity occurring while man is asleep. This is also alluded to in B89 which uses the opposition of waking and sleeping once more to depict the commonality of *logos*, and by extension, man's epistemological state:

ὁ Ἡράκλειτος φησι τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεται.

Heraclitus says that for those who are awake there is a single and common universe, but that each sleeper turns to his own private universe.

The authenticity of this fragment has been the topic of debate, owing to the vocabulary: ξυνόν is the more usual choice for 'common', while, based on the other sleep fragments, a derivation of καθεύδω would perhaps be expected. κόσμον too has come under some suspicion, though this is only by reading the meaning of it in Heraclitus more broadly in an excessively restrictive manner.<sup>36</sup> Given the unusual word choice, commentators all appropriately refer to the fragment as a 'paraphrase' by the much later source in which it is recorded.<sup>37</sup>

Vocabulary aside, the content here is clearly Heraclitean: the antitheses between sleep and waking, common and private, participation and isolation are all recognisable. The sentiment echoes that of B1, and the emphasis on the separation man experiences while asleep corresponds well with the basic message of A16. It is not hard to see how this paraphrase fits in the larger picture of sleep in Heraclitean thought. When awake, man is present in the same objective *kosmos* as everyone else, a common and shared universe which is experienced collectively and allows for full contact with the *logos*. When asleep, man is separated from this *kosmos* and is isolated in his own private, subjective universe instead; any experiences which he has in sleep are restricted to him alone, cut off as he is in terms of both sensory perception and contact

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<sup>36</sup> As Kirk (1954), 63. His reading is well refuted by Marcovich (1967), 99.

<sup>37</sup> Kirk (1954), 63; Marcovich (1967), 99; Kahn (1979), 104; Robinson (1987), 138. The fragment derives from a work originally thought to be by Plutarch, now not considered genuine; hence Laks/Most (2016) in their textual categorisations call the fragment 'An Anonymous Paraphrase'.

with the *logos*. The two states of waking and sleeping are contrasted in terms of man's experience *of* them and participation *in* them. The 'private universe' of B89 is another plausible reference to dreams, and implies to some extent an internalisation of the phenomenon: man turns towards his own experiential space, removed from the common and collective experience of all others. This is perhaps more suggestive of the 'dream space' encountered in Chapter 1, though the evidence for Heraclitus' views on dream typologies is well beyond our reach with this limited fragment.

One aspect of Heraclitus' views on dreams which has been suggested from this fragment is that the clear division between the common/objective and private/subjective universes is indicative of a certain scepticism towards prophetic dreams.<sup>38</sup> This is further highlighted by comparison with another comment from the account in A16:

[131] τοῦτον δὴ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ θεῖον, καὶ οὗ κατὰ μετοχὴν γινόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν κοινῇ πᾶσι φαινόμενον, τοῦτ' εἶναι πιστόν (τῶι κοινῶι γὰρ καὶ θεῶι λόγῳ λαμβάνεται), τὸ δέ τι μόνῳ προσπίπτον ἄπιστον ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν αἰτίαν.

[131] Heraclitus says that this *logos*, which is common and divine, and by participation in which we become intellectual, is the measure of truth; thus that which appears in common to all men is itself trustworthy (for it is grasped by the common and divine *logos*), but that which comes to only one man is untrustworthy for the opposite reason.

Could A16 be a paraphrase or elaboration of B89? It does follow the detailed account of sleep (as discussed above), so the context is certainly similar, and the argument presented relies on the same basic premise of common experience while awake vs. private experience while asleep. This part of the testimonium immediately follows on from the 'coals' simile quoted above, and so is intended to be read as a further explanation of man's loss of reason and previously stated 'almost irrational' state in sleep. The *logos* is the focus of the explanation: reiterated once more as common and divine, it is clarified that sharing in, or participating in, the *logos* allows for intellectual capability. It is also described in anachronistic - potentially Stoic - terms as κριτήριον ἀληθείας, which nonetheless reflects Heraclitus' conception of its objectivity. This is

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<sup>38</sup> Dodds (1951), 118; Harris (2009), 237; Gregory (2013), 111.

then used as basis by which one can judge the truthfulness of certain appearances: that which is common to all men must be that which is experienced in the waking world, and so is also be grasped by the *logos*, and is therefore to be trusted. Those things which appear only to one man – a reference back to the sleeping state just discussed – cannot be trusted as it is neither a shared experience nor grasped by the *logos*. It is an isolated and subjective experience.

While the actual content of and activities of dreams are not elaborated upon to any extent in B89, it remains clear that the basic Heraclitean dream experience is one of isolation: the sleeper remains in a private *kosmos* far-removed from the *logos*. This, by implication, certainly casts doubts on the validity of any form of prophetic dream. But surely the conclusion should rather more broadly be a scepticism towards all dreams, not just those of a prophetic nature: man is far removed from contact with the *logos*, as we have seen earlier in A16, and his sensory perception and intellectual capabilities are severely impaired. This then compromises anything which he may experience in sleep. It is not an overstatement, then, that for Heraclitus there is nothing of a positive epistemic value to be gained from a private *kosmos*.<sup>39</sup> For Heraclitus, it is not a question of the reliability of prophecy, or a scepticism over religious beliefs – the passage is often matched with Xenophanes' religious scepticism, but this is an entirely different investigation altogether.<sup>40</sup> He does not reject the dream but instead depicts it as an inferior experience, which may undermine its cultural role as informing present or future events, but this is not the aim of his investigation. Rather, it is an exploration once more of man's inferior epistemological state, which arises from lack of engagement with the *logos*. More simply, Heraclitus' focus remains on man himself.

#### **2.4 On the Sleeper's Own Experience**

Clearly Heraclitus is, then, more interested in man's experience – perhaps more so than any of his Presocratic predecessors. It has been established from the passages already discussed that he considered the sleeping man to be separated from the common, shared experience of the waking world. His connection with the *logos* is compromised. The sleeping man is isolated. But what actually happens when he is

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<sup>39</sup> Granger (2000), 264 'Heraclitus, unlike antiquity's majority, does not credit dreams or sleep with the possibility of yielding anything of positive epistemic value.'

<sup>40</sup> Xenophanes' famous scepticism on matters of divination is usually taken as evidence for his similar disbelief in prophecy through dreams; Harris 2009, 51 n.142 references Cic. *De. div.* i. 5 specifically as making this "clear", although the text itself is far from specific. On Xenophanes' scepticism, see both Leshner (1978) and Tor (2013).

asleep, when he is in his private universe? What does he experience – if anything – in his isolation?

There is one extant fragment which specifically discusses the experience of the sleeper *in* sleep. It is perhaps the most Heraclitean of all the sleep fragments, in that it simultaneously both reveals and obscures what the individual experiences when he is sleeping. Of all the Heraclitean accounts of sleep, it is also the one which most plausibly discusses dreaming in any substantial way. The fragment, B26, reads:

ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἄπτεται ἑαυτῷ [ἀποθανῶν], ἀποσβεσθεὶς  
ὄψεις, ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεῶτος εὐδῶν, [ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις],  
ἐγρηγορῶς ἄπτεται εὐδοντος.<sup>41</sup>

A man in the night kindles a light for himself, his eyes having been extinguished; living, he touches that which is dead while sleeping; having woken, he touches that which is sleeping.

This fragment is preserved by Clement in his *Stromata*, and has been subject to consistent revisions and edits over the years, owing to its puzzling nature. Following most editors, ἀποθανῶν has been excised as a gloss of Clement’s own addition, rather than being originally part of the text of the fragment. The repeated ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις is also removed as a suspected dittography.<sup>42</sup> In *Stromata*, Clement had cited this fragment as evidence for the departure of the soul on death; it is inserted as part of a somewhat haphazard discussion on night, and the parallels between sleep and death.<sup>43</sup> Rather than following Clement’s reading of this fragment as referring metaphorically to death however, it seems more likely, given the nature of the sleep fragments already considered, that Heraclitus is here actually referencing man’s experience in sleep – and so possibly giving an insight into his opinions on dreams – as well as broader associated ideas such as his interaction with the *logos*, interaction of opposites, and even potentially activity of the *psukhe*. Rather than focus B26’s interpretation, as Clement does, on only one conclusion, it should instead be read on several levels, with no one meaning having primacy over the others.

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<sup>41</sup> B26

<sup>42</sup> Robinson (1987). Laks/Most (2016) reinstates ἀποθανῶν in the text itself, though highlights it as a gloss by Clement.

<sup>43</sup> Clement, *Stromata* IV, 141, 2. Robinson (1987), 93 follows Clement’s original interpretation of the text, agreeing that the reference to night should be taken as the ‘night of death’.



The lack of sensory ability is immediately established with reference to sight and light, and in keeping with previous fragments there is a separation and comparison in perspective of experience for each state. Again, there is a clear break between the communal waking experience and the private individual sleeping experience, phrased here in terms of the kindling of a light. The arrangement of the fragment exemplifies Heraclitean *coincidentia oppositorum*; the chiasmic structure emphasises three opposite pairs of light and dark, dead and alive, awake and asleep.<sup>44</sup> These oppositional states seem to have some form of interaction, and overlap and alternate accordingly. In typically Heraclitean style, the passage further conveys its inherent meaning through the underlying play on etymology in addition to the oppositions; much relies on the different meanings of ἄπτεται, and the vocabulary used is all closely related to ideas of light and sight.<sup>45</sup> The three successive repetitions of ἄπτεται allow for the text to be divided into three separate yet linked stages:

[1] ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἄπτεται ἑαυτῷ, ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις  
A man in the night kindles a light for himself, his eyes having been  
extinguished

[2] ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεῶτος εὐδῶν  
living, he touches that which is dead while sleeping

[3] ἐγρηγορῶς ἄπτεται εὐδοντος  
having woken, he touches that which is sleeping.

Stage 1 sets the scene for us: man, during the night, is plunged into darkness. His eyes are no longer able to function, owing to the complete absence of light, leaving him isolated. To counteract the disappearance of natural light, he is able to create for himself his own light. This artificial light illuminates his own space; it is not a shared light, but one for the individual alone. But there is obviously a deeper meaning than this. Notably, it is not the light of day itself that is extinguished in the night, but rather, it is the eyes of man which are described as ἀποσβεσθεὶς. The primary sense organ, which links man most directly with the surrounding world, and serves as his reliable witness, is submerged into darkness.<sup>46</sup> Kahn aligns B26 with the other Heraclitean sleep fragments through the interpretation of daylight itself as a “fire that is *shared*”; thus in describing man as kindling his own light when the shared light is inaccessible,

<sup>44</sup> On *coincidentia oppositorum*, Stenzel (1931), 59; for an examined deconstruction of the chiasmic structure, see Marcovich (1967), 244.

<sup>45</sup> Hussey (1982), 55 cites this passage in particular as “a remarkable assemblage of artfully arranged contrasts and puns, on any reading” as part of a discussion on Heraclitean cryptic style.

<sup>46</sup> B101a

the reference poetically invokes the removed and personal experience of sleep, entirely shut off from the common universe – and thus, the *logos* itself.<sup>47</sup>

If then read in relation to man's own isolated, private experience in sleep, the fragment could also be interpreted as a depiction of the underlying process of dreaming: the light kindled being that by which man 'sees' in dreaming, when the darkness thus appears to be illuminated.<sup>48</sup> This process is also mirrored in the activity of the seemingly mundane night-time scene. When the eyes are shut in sleep and the normal process of vision cannot be used, man must kindle an inner light by which to 'see' subconsciously in dream activity; man himself internally recreates this illumination, and thus is able to mirror sight in the waking world.<sup>49</sup> But there is a phenomenological distinction to be made: it is not the sleeping man (who, in turn, is also then the dreaming man), but the man of the dream world, the 'dreamed' man, who must kindle the light.<sup>50</sup>

Stage 2 comments on the interaction between conscious states. During life, man is able to touch upon the dead, but only through sleep. This follows naturally from what we have seen as to the close cultural association between the twin brothers Hypnos and Thanatos: the two are similar, but not identical. The sleeping man resembles the dead man, and so it is not difficult to imagine how the two states were understood as being next-door to each other. The inherent harm in sleep, examined in **1.2.2**, could easily result in the movement of man from one state to the other. This stage could also be interpreted as a reference to 'traditional' dreams, since from Homer onwards the appearance of the dead to the sleeper is possible during sleep, and as seen in **1.3.1** the appearance of any such figure occurs expressly in sleep, and man stays asleep throughout the exchange. The sleeping state, as intermediary, is able to bring the living man into direct contact with the dead man. These two oppositional states are thus able to interact, though for Heraclitus, in an inversion of the literary scene, the action lies with the sleeper. The dead is not an active force. Heraclitus manipulates the expected 'culture-pattern' dream of encountering the dead to express his own beliefs on man's experience in sleep; touching the dead is not intended literally, but his articulation of

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<sup>47</sup> Kahn (1979), 215.

<sup>48</sup> KRS (1983), 205.

<sup>49</sup> Schofield (1991), 27.

<sup>50</sup> Heidegger & Fink (1966/7), 137 'Although the sleeper does not see, still, as a dreamer, he has a dreamed I that encounters... Only because we customarily do not make the distinction between the sleeping-dreaming I and the I of the dream world can one say that the sleeper kindles a light in the dream. Seen phenomenologically however, that is not correct. The I of the dream world, not the sleeping I, kindles a light.'

his theory in this manner underscores his move away from the traditional Homeric presentations of such processes. Furthermore, as stipulated in Stage 1, the movement from waking to sleeping involves a diminution of light; daylight is replaced by artificial light. As Heraclitus positions the three states here as successive and interactive, it is not far-fetched to conclude death is a total absence of all light.

Stage 3 resituates the relationship for when man is awake. In his waking state, he is as far removed as possible from contact with death; waking and death are not able to interact with each other without the intermediary of sleep. While awake, man is only able to touch upon that which is sleeping. Whereas Stage 2 was articulated primarily in respect of the living and the dead, this stage is articulated in terms of the two other oppositional states of waking and sleeping. Unlike Stage 2, these two states are obviously cyclical, but as with the sleeper who touches death but not *vice versa*, the sleeper here does not seem to be able to ‘touch’ that which is awake. This is perhaps the most difficult stage of the fragment to interpret. How can the waking man ‘touch’ the sleeper, beyond the basic physical sense? It has been proposed that this is a reference to memory: the waking man is just about able to remember the sleeping experience.<sup>51</sup> What Stage 3 does do in its composition however is take the reader back to where they started: the state of sleeping.

Considering the fragment as a whole, the clear differentiation between the separate yet linked conscious states suggests that the privately kindled light itself is indicative of the preservation of life within man, for it is the ability of man to kindle this light that alone differentiates the state of being asleep from being dead. The progression underscored by the imagery when all three stages are read together is that of a movement from the shared bright daylight of waking life, to a lesser private light in sleep, to finally the complete darkness in death. B26 is thus often read as a fragment about the soul and the ‘psychic descent into the underworld.’<sup>52</sup> With Heraclitus, the soul is for the first time depicted as a cognitive principle, not just one of animation or emotion.<sup>53</sup> Thus any talk of man’s conscious state will extend to his cognitive capacities: these are best in the waking world of the shared *logos*. The diminishing light reflects a diminishing power of the soul. It is not simply the case that the kindled fire is itself the soul; rather, for Heraclitus, the soul is best described in terms of an airy

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<sup>51</sup> Granger (2000), 273.

<sup>52</sup> Kahn (1979), 216.

<sup>53</sup> Robinson (1986), 305.

spectrum, ranging from dampened moist air to the hottest, purest *aither*.<sup>54</sup> The soul is directly affected by qualitative changes: in drunkenness, its cognitive powers are compromised owing to being 'wet'. It seems plausible that in the night then, with access to the shared light extinguished, it experiences a similar type change – darkening, potentially also moistening? – which results in an inferior conscious state. This links with the account by Sextus Empiricus above, and may perhaps provide the basis for the original idea which he later elaborated upon with anachronism.

The actions of 'kindling' and 'extinguishing' should be noted in particular for drawing upon Heraclitus' ideas about both the nature of the 'primary substance', and the nature of the cosmos. For Heraclitus, it is not just that all things are fire, but as B30 indicates, it is that all things come to be and perish by the successive and ordered kindling and extinguishing of this fire:

Κόσμον <τόνδε> τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων  
ἐποίησε, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεζῶν, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα  
καὶ ἀποσβεσσόμενον μέτρα.<sup>55</sup>

This ordered world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now and ever shall be an ever-living fire, with measures kindling and measures extinguishing.

For Heraclitus, the *cosmos*, here in the sense of an 'ordered world', has not been fashioned by anyone at all but rather is eternal in the clearest sense of the word: past, present and future are all in the same state of existence. For him, there is no such thing as cosmogony.<sup>56</sup> In this ordered world, in keeping with, but also responding to, the hylozoic tradition of his predecessors, fire is established as the basic underlying substance of all things.<sup>57</sup> Given the emphasis on change and flux, fire is not usually considered to be an *arche* in the same manner as that of Thales or Anaximander.<sup>58</sup> This ordered world is the same to all, i.e. it is shared and common for everyone and everything. The vocabulary used to express the cosmological kindling and extinguishing of fire is the same as that found in B26, which lends support to interpreting man's kindled fire there as the microcosmic reflection of the activities of

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<sup>54</sup> Robinson (1987), 308 'to describe the nature of soul in Heraclitus either as simply 'air' or 'fire' is somewhat misleading.'

<sup>55</sup> B30

<sup>56</sup> KRS (1983), 198; Gregory (2007), 61-2.

<sup>57</sup> Robinson (1987), 96; Marcovich (1967), 259.

<sup>58</sup> Kirk; Sweeney (1972), 71ff; Graham (2006), 137ff proposes it is not an *arche* at all but merely symbolic of change.

the *cosmos* itself, though in the move from macrocosmic to microcosmic this kindled fire becomes private and individual. Again, then, this stresses the isolation as well as the unreliability of the dream world.

Heraclitus plays with the interaction and continuity between the states of waking, sleep and death elsewhere, too. On first glance, B21 might seem to contradict the stages of B26:

θάνατός ἐστιν ὀκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὀρέομεν, ὀκόσα δὲ εὐδοντες ὕπνος.<sup>59</sup>

Death is all we see when awake, while all we see when sleeping is sleep.

The same three states are once more articulated in the context of vision and experience: all we literally see, no circumlocution, while we are in the waking state is death; the two states that were separated by the intermediary state of sleep in Stage 3 of B26 are here directly connected. Contrary what might be expected for the second half of the clause, while we are asleep, quite plainly, all we see is sleep. It has no interaction here with death or waking. The fragment intentionally does not have the symmetry which one might expect: given the arrangement of the first half, one would expect the second half to end with the word 'life'.<sup>60</sup> But the second half is perhaps easier to interpret than the first, given what we know already about Heraclitus' views on sleep. The separation of the sleeper from the rest of the world is explicit, and in his isolation from the common world, and the *logos*, all he is able to see is that which is in his private domain of sleep. This is nothing controversial for Heraclitus in light of the other accounts already considered. But how do we see death when awake? His cosmological flux may be the interpretative key for this: all things seen when awake are part of the shared fiery world, in which all things are continually coming to be (kindling) and perishing (extinguishing). In that sense, everything we witness in the shared world is ultimately passing away.<sup>61</sup> In the private world of sleep, once more, we are cut off from this entirely.

## 2.5 Concluding Remarks

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<sup>59</sup> B21

<sup>60</sup> Kahn (1979), 213.

<sup>61</sup> Dorter (2013), 41 n13.

This chapter has established Heraclitus as a figure not to be quite so hastily overlooked in discussions of the Greek attitudes towards sleep and dreams. From the extant evidence, he does not address the topic as explicitly as later writers; this would not be in keeping with either his philosophical or compositional style. For Heraclitus, the transition and interaction between the states of waking, sleeping and death are effective illustrations for the epistemological inferiority of men, as well as for depicting issues relating to man's place in the *cosmos* more broadly. Harris' summary of Heraclitus' beliefs on sleep, which simply states: 'the major difference between waking experience and sleeping is that in sleep we are forgetful' can thus be dismissed as somewhat of an injustice to Heraclitus' innovative and multi-layered approach to the states of sleeping and dreaming.<sup>62</sup>

As will be seen in the next chapter, Heraclitus' articulation of sleep is itself in a way an intermediary between the traditional literary depictions, which focus on its close association with death, and the theories which seek to explain sleep as a matter of physiology. The depiction of the transition between waking, sleep and death as a gradually diminution of both the quantity and quality of light especially, from B26, will set a long precedent for the way in which these three experiential states are described.

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<sup>62</sup> Harris (2009), 237.

# 3

## Physiological Approaches to Sleep and Dreams

*“A dream is nothing else but a bubbling scum  
or froth of the fancy, which the day hath left  
undigested; or an after-feast made of the  
fragments of idle imaginations.”*

-- Thomas Nash

This chapter examines the aetiology of sleep and dreams from a physiological perspective, in that it considers theories proposed by the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers which focused on material qualities inherent to the body. We have seen how Heraclitus utilises the dream experience as metaphor, and how he plays with the physiological processes in B26 to express his own epistemological ideas. Yet several Presocratics go further than Heraclitus' interest in the experience of sleep, and are more specifically interested in reaching a better understanding of the internal workings of the body. Evidently with the Hippocratic writers, this interest in physiology becomes much more pronounced, but different Hippocratic authors have different perspectives on the significant components to the process of sleep and dreams. Beginning with the Presocratic writers who also had evident medical interests – Alcmaeon and Empedocles, as well as Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia – before moving on to the Hippocratic writers of the fifth century BC, this chapter analyses the prevalent idea of sleep as a matter of bodily actions and interactions. A range of Hippocratic case studies is appended to provide further insight into the various ways in which sleep and dreams were reported, alongside other physiological ailments or symptoms, as part of the patient's medical experience.

### 3.1 EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

#### 3.1.1 Alcmaeon of Croton

Alcmaeon of Croton was the first of the Presocratic writers to approach the process of sleep from an emphatically physiological perspective. It is difficult to date his work precisely, but it is likely that he was active during the late sixth to early fifth

century, thus making him roughly contemporary with Heraclitus.<sup>1</sup> He was an inhabitant of Croton in Magna Graecia, a significant intellectual centre in the south of Italy, owing to both its medical reputation – it was home to a famed medical ‘school’ – and Pythagorean association.<sup>2</sup>

Like Heraclitus, Alcmaeon is interested in the interaction of opposites, though his interest is of a more straightforwardly physiological nature. His discussion of bodily health as an *isonomia* in B4 is perhaps the most well-known of his doctrines and provides a useful overview of his broader ideas regarding the body and its interactions:

Ἀλκμαίων ἔφη τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικὴν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναρχίαν. καὶ νόσον συμπίπτειν ὡς μὲν ὑφ’ οὗ ὑπερβολῆι θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος, ὡς δὲ ἐξ οὗ διὰ πλῆθος τροφῆς ἢ ἔνδειαν, ὡς δ’ ἐν οἷς ἢ αἷμα ἢ μυελὸν ἢ ἐγκέφαλον. ἐγγίνεσθαι δὲ τούτοις ποτὲ κάκ τῶν ἕξωθεν αἰτιῶν, ὑδάτων ποιῶν ἢ χώρας ἢ κόπων ἢ ἀνάγκης ἢ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίω. τὴν δὲ ὑγείαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσιν.<sup>3</sup>

Alcmaeon holds the sustaining cause of health is the equality of the powers: wet and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet and all the rest; the sole rule of one is productive of disease, for this predominance produces destruction. He claims that disease arises in some cases due to an excess of heat or cold, in some from abundance or deficiency of nourishment, and in others on account of the blood, marrow or brain. Added to these are sometime exterior causes, quality of water or soil or toil, or anything relatable. Health is an even blending of the qualities.

Alcmaeon’s interest in the body is evidently much greater than any of his Presocratic predecessors; in contrast to Heraclitus, his investigation into the interaction of opposites has an explicitly physiological application.<sup>4</sup> The metaphor he uses is striking:

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<sup>1</sup> The three individuals to whom Alcmaeon’s work is dedicated (Βροτίνωι καὶ Λέοντι καὶ Βαθύλλωι, B1) have been identified as Pythagorean, contemporary with Pythagoras himself; Brotinus in particular as the husband or father of Theano, who was either the wife or daughter of Pythagoras. He is listed by DK as the author of two Orphic poems and Iamblichus records the name in his list of Pythagoreans. This at the very least gives an indication that Alcmaeon, too, was contemporary with Pythagoras – perhaps just slightly younger, given his reactions to Pythagorean teachings – and so a general date of late sixth/early fifth century can be reasonably suggested.

<sup>2</sup> Heidel (1940), 4; the medical expertise of the Crotonians was praised by Herodotus, who claimed that ‘the best physicians in the Greek countries were those of Croton, and those of Cyrene second’ - Hdt.3.131.

<sup>3</sup> DK24B4

<sup>4</sup> Owing to this interest in opposites, and a further discussion in Arist. *Met.*A.5.986a22, Alcmaeon is often – in my opinion, mistakenly – called a Pythagorean. It is clear from Aristotle’s narrative that he intends to present the two theories in rivalry with each other; that the opinions derive from separate schools of thought is specifically emphasized with the chiasmic οὗτος παρ’ ἐκείνων ἢ ἐκεῖνοι παρὰ τούτου, the text purposefully reflecting the similarity



as a term, *isonomia* predominantly refers to the sharing of political equality, and was the early term for Athenian *demokratia*.<sup>5</sup> Alcmaeon's use of it here relies on it being recognised primarily in its political sense; the nearest comparative use in Herodotus places it in direct comparison to both tyranny and democracy.<sup>6</sup> Equilibrium of oppositional powers, then, is what sustains health,<sup>7</sup> and the political metaphor is furthered in the claim that the *monarchia* of any one quality is entirely destructive.<sup>8</sup> The choice of opposites cited here are a reflection of Alcmaeon's own emphasis on the importance of discernible, material qualities. The rearticulation at the end of the fragment of health as a *krasis* ('blend') is particularly notable as a further emphasis on balance but also on interaction of opposites. It will also come to feature in Empedocles' investigations, as will be seen later in the chapter.

Alcmaeon also understands, however, that disease is not solely based on the underlying oppositional balance in man. He singles out the blood, marrow and brain as active factors, as well as the impact of entirely external circumstances such as the quality of water and the soil. This combination of internal and external causes blends together the physical and more metaphysical explanations for disease, appropriately reflecting Alcmaeon's philosophical and medical experience.

With this in mind, we can turn now to his remarks on sleep. Albeit brief, and classified by DK as a testimonium rather than a fragment, the extant account recorded in A18 draws upon many features of Alcmaeon's style of investigation, blending together the physiological and philosophical:

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between their opinions yet placing them in a form of direct opposition. This highlights the meaning of the text itself: their similarity to each other has resulted in an inability to distinguish who proposed the theory first. Should Alcmaeon have belonged to the Pythagorean school, such a problem would simply not exist. This is further emphasized by the comment ἀπεφίνατο παραπλησίως τούτοις; Aristotle treats Alcmaeon and the Pythagoreans as separate, but acknowledges there was a degree of similarity between them. Aristotle's opinion was based on a familiarity with both figures; he was certainly aware of the Pythagorean philosophy, and a work Against Alcmaeon has been attributed to him.<sup>4</sup> Far from suggesting that Alcmaeon was a Pythagorean, Aristotle makes a clear distinction between the two philosophical theories. Scholarship is still divided over the issues - advocating Alcmaeon's Pythagoreanism most recently has been Zhmud (2012); Ceesia (2012); Drozdek (2012); against the conclusion Primavesi (2012), Schofield (2012).

<sup>5</sup> Raaflaub (2000), 47.

<sup>6</sup> Hdt. 3.80-3.

<sup>7</sup> εἶναι συνεκτικὴν denotes the concept of a sustaining cause, though a predominantly Stoic term, and thus unlikely to have been used by Alcmaeon himself – cf. Mansfeld (2013), 78.

<sup>8</sup> Vlastos (1955), 363 interprets this usage as indicative of Alcmaeon's own political beliefs.

Ἀλκμαίων ἀναχωρήσει τοῦ αἵματος εἰς τὰς αἰμόρρους φλέβας ὕπνον  
γίνεσθαι φησι, τὴν δὲ ἐξέγερσιν διάχυσιν, τὴν δὲ παντελεῖ ἀναχώρησιν  
θάνατον.<sup>9</sup>


Alcmaeon says that sleep comes about when blood retreats into the blood-carrying vessels, that we awaken on its dissolution, but absolute retreat is death.

The account makes clear that for Alcmaeon the state of sleep is brought about by a specific physiological change within the body, namely the movement of the blood. The verb used to denote the blood's movement – ἀναχωρήσει – is notable for its meaning of return, or retreat. This implies that the blood as distributed throughout the whole body is not its permanent state, rather, it is a temporary and even potentially repetitive displacement up until a definitive point: absolute retreat, which is clearly equated with death.

In terms of the actual process by which man falls asleep, the emphasis is on the varying degrees by which the blood withdraws into the vessels. As its total withdrawal results in death, there must only be a partial movement for sleep to occur. Sleep is thus understood as a gradual process, brought about by a gradual internal change. It is perhaps surprising that this is not explicitly attributed to internal oppositional qualities, but rather, is expressed in terms of the activity of the blood. However, if we recall the discussion of health more broadly in B4, blood was one of the bodily constituents identified as a potential active force which could upset the body's internal *isonomia*. As blood, and by implication heat, recede, so cold must increase, until death is the final irreversible outcome. This 'sliding scale' of conscious states from awake – asleep – death is comparable to the depiction in Heraclitus B26: the diminishing degrees of light suggested by Heraclitus is replaced by a diminishing quantity of blood in Alcmaeon's theory:

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<sup>9</sup> A18



**Fig 3.1 Stages of consciousness in Alcmaeon** where awake is full dispersal of blood, asleep is partial withdrawal of the blood inwards, and death is a complete retreat (i.e., no blood remaining). Alternation between the first two stages is evidently possible, whereas the last stage is irreversible.

The interpretation of A18 varies, but the focus is primarily on the description of the blood-carrying veins rather than on the depicted process of sleep. It has been argued that Alcmaeon here shows an innovative distinction between the artery and the vein, and that his comments concerning the ‘absolute retreat’ of blood in death evidence some sort of dissection in which he observed the empty arteries post-mortem.<sup>10</sup> Owing to the nature of the evidence it is obviously difficult to ascertain if Alcmaeon carried out post-mortem dissection, or made a specific medical distinction between arteries and veins. Looking at the specific terminology used in the testimonium, the problem of drawing any firm conclusions as to the exact meaning is only further complicated by the word αἰμόρρους, a fairly unusual word for this period, which is also actually an emendation, from the transmitted ὁμόρρους (neighbouring).<sup>11</sup> The only other appearance of this particular term before Alcmaeon is in a fragment of Hesiod, preserved by Fulgentius, a Late Latin author, though the context is that of describing the colour of trampled grapes rather than anything bodily.<sup>12</sup> It becomes more frequently used in the HC, which supports the emendation as a medical word with which Alcmaeon would have been familiar.

<sup>10</sup>Harris (1973), 8-9 cf. Lloyd (1991), 177; Longrigg (1993), 62; Prioreschi (1996), 172. This observation of the arteries is often considered responsible for the longstanding belief that the veins contained both blood and air.

<sup>11</sup> ὁμόρρους (vel - ρρους) MSS., corr. Reiske.

<sup>12</sup> Hes. Fr.381 (Fulgentius *Mitol.* 3.1)

The term *phlebas* however is less unusual, and could feasibly have been used by Alcmaeon himself. It appears as early as Homer to denote some kind of internal vessel in the body:

Ἀντίλοχος δὲ Θόωνα μεταστρεφθέντα δοκεύσας  
οὔτασ' ἐπαΐξας, ἀπὸ δὲ φλέβα πᾶσαν ἔκερσεν,  
ἢ τ' ἀνὰ νῶτα θέουσα διαμπερὲς αὐχέν' ἰκάνει·  
τὴν ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἔκερσεν.<sup>13</sup>

Then Antilochus, watching for a chance, leapt at Thoön when he turned his back, and struck him with a thrust, and wholly severed the vessel that runs all along the back until it reaches the neck; this he severed wholly...

Antilochus' attack on Thoön is described in great detail, down to the location of the wound inflicted and the area affected. Here, it is the φλέψ (sg.) – often translated as vein, though vessel is a less misleading translation – which has borne the full brunt of the blow with fatal consequence. According to Homer, this vessel runs continually from the back to the neck; a location which prompts some to interpret it as referencing the spinal cord, rather than a particular blood vessel, especially when considered in light of the complete absence of any sanguinary effusion. Yet, it has also been noted that Homer elsewhere displays a thorough knowledge of medical terminology pertaining to the spine and the spinal marrow, thus such ambiguity over these particular features would be unlikely.<sup>14</sup> Aristotle cited this Homeric passage specifically in discussion of 'the great vein' and its branched trajectories through the body, agreeing that it runs from the vertebrae of the neck and extends throughout the spine.<sup>15</sup> Thus it seems likely that in its initial form, it already appears to have connotations of blood transport; though in the Homeric description the particular vessel under discussion seems only to run in a continuous trajectory along the spine rather than penetrate or branch out further inside the body.

The term's next appearance is not until post-Alcmaeon in the fifth century. Herodotus does not explicitly associate it with the blood. Rather, it seems to merely

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<sup>13</sup> *Il.* 14.545 – 54

<sup>14</sup> Tasker (1798) writes an interesting letter debating this specific matter as part of his Homeric wounds series. For a full discussion, see Craik (2009).

<sup>15</sup> Arist. *Hist.an.* 3.513b27-30; this Aristotelian mention was noted by the Homeric commentator Spondanus, who references this as evidence for the vessel mentioned in *Il.* 13 as being identifiable with the *vena cava*.

indicate some type of passageway within the body.<sup>16</sup> Sophocles, Euripides and even Aristophanes however are much clearer as to the term's association with the movement of blood, and in a departure from the Homeric use, it is not at all limited to the area around the spine.<sup>17</sup> Seemingly then by the late fifth century, the idea of these particular vessels as blood-carrying had become more refined.<sup>18</sup> Sophocles in particular in the *Philoctetes* presents an inversion of Alcmaeon's association between blood and sleep; whereas Alcmaeon posits that sleep occurs due to the retreat of the blood via the veins into the body, here it is the expulsion of blood from Philoctetes' body – via the vessel – which is listed by Neoptolemus as one of the symptoms which will result in the former being carried off by sleep:

**Νεοπτόλεμος**

τὸν ἄνδρ' ἔοικεν ὕπνος οὐ μακροῦ χρόνου  
 ἔξειν: κάρα γὰρ ὑπτιάζεται τόδε:  
 ἰδρῶς γέ τοί νιν πᾶν καταστάζει δέμας,  
 μέλαινά τ' ἄκρου τις παρέρρωγεν ποδὸς  
 αἰμορραγῆς φλέψ. ἀλλ' ἐάσωμεν, φίλοι,  
 ἔκηλον αὐτόν, ὡς ἂν εἰς ὕπνον πέσῃ.<sup>19</sup>

825

**Neoptolemus**

It seems that sleep will shortly bear this man away:  
 for his head is slumping back,  
 sweat is trickling down his whole body,  
 and a black haemorrhaging vein has burst forth  
 from the extremity of his foot. Let us leave him, friends,  
 at rest, so that he may fall asleep.

In this graphic description of Philoctetes' condition, the vessel (again φλέψ) is described as αἰμορραγῆς, literally 'bleeding violently', leaving no doubt as to its contents. Neoptolemus lists the symptoms in an almost medical fashion, but rather than provide any diagnosis or prognosis, he instead encourages the others to leave Philoctetes to sleep – as seen in Chapter 1, sleep as a state was often considered a type of release.<sup>20</sup> This is certainly the case for Philoctetes, who takes refuge from his pain in sleep. The association of the black haemorrhaging vein with oncoming sleep provides

<sup>16</sup> Hdt. 4.2 & 4.87; the latter passage references a custom in which the veins on the temples of children are burned in order to prevent an affliction from phlegm draining out of the head, suggesting perhaps that these veins were thought to be a conduit for the phlegm.

<sup>17</sup> Soph. *Phil.* 821-6; Arist. *Thes.* 692-5; Eur. *Ion* 1011.

<sup>18</sup> It should also perhaps be noted that during the fifth century there was a marked development in the depiction of veins in art, particularly prominent on the limbs in sculpture and reliefs of male figures. For a full examination of this, and how it relates to the wider intellectual activity of the period in both philosophy and medicine, see Metraux (1995).

<sup>19</sup> Soph. *Phil.* 821-6

<sup>20</sup> 1.2.2

another link between blood in the veins and the variance of conscious states; rather than a gradual internal retreat of the blood within the veins however, for Philoctetes there is a sudden external expulsion of the blood out of the veins. This dramatic opposite action leads to the same result though: a diminution of blood, and a change in conscious state to sleep. It does not seem implausible that a continuation of the condition would result in death for Philoctetes.

Returning to Alcmaeon's account of sleep, then, it is clear that he has identified a specific physiological movement occurring inside the body – specifically in terms of the blood – and directly linked this to the change in conscious state. Rather than being analysed in vain for evidence of a complex understanding of the circulatory system or dissection, the testimonium should instead be valued for its depiction of the role of the blood in the body, as well as the intricate relationship between life, sleep and death. That the blood is transported by veins specifically, pathways which can quite clearly be seen without the necessity of dissection, shows nothing more than that Alcmaeon possesses a basic understanding of the means by which blood is able to move within the body.

The close relationship of sleep and death as part of a continuum reflects, and indeed expands upon, wider cultural beliefs; as we have already seen in Chapter 1, Hypnos and Thanatos were personified as brothers in the early mythic tradition.<sup>21</sup> Alcmaeon maintains this relationship by articulating the process in terms of the two closely related states, and emphasizes their proximity by situating them along the one continuum. Alcmaeon's only other discussion of death is B2, a slightly more enigmatic reflection on the reason for man's mortality, which in a way confirms the process described in A18:

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φησὶν Ἀλκμαίων διὰ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅτι οὐ  
δύνανται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ τέλει προσάψαι.<sup>22</sup>

Alcmaeon says that humans die because they are not able to attach the beginning to the end.

Alcmaeon's claim here may at first glance seem to contradict his own belief that the soul was immortal: he recognises the mortality of man, and attributes this to the lack of

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<sup>21</sup> 1.1

<sup>22</sup> A18

circularity and continuity in their existence.<sup>23</sup> This account could be read as a physical response to the metaphysical argument, in which the mortality of man, i.e. the material body, can be affected by death and thus is placed in contrast to the immortality of the immaterial soul.

The sentiment that immortality is circular is plausibly related to Alcmaeon's observations on the motion of heavenly bodies.<sup>24</sup> He had derived the immortality of the soul from its eternal movement, and found a comparative model in the cosmos; thus it could be proposed that the comparison may have extended to patterns of movement, as Alcmaeon maintains some association here between circularity and immortality. Indeed, his astronomical observations hint at an understanding of cosmic rotations, thus it can be concluded that the heavenly bodies are able to continue in their eternal motion through repetitions.<sup>25</sup> This immortality is not possible for man because he is unable to participate in circularity. The body grows old and cannot become young again. His account of man's mortality is not incompatible with his belief in the soul's immortality, for the soul, as an immaterial substance, is not subjected to the same physical degradation as the body. Pythagorean metempsychosis cannot be far from Alcmaeon's mind here; he has converted the mystical and semi-religious claims of the cyclical Pythagorean process into a basic statement on circularity.<sup>26</sup>

This brief fragment provides a confirmation of the underlying nature of the process suggested in A18: the change from life to death is linear. Men cannot join the beginning to the end – i.e. it is not a circular process. While it may be possible to move between the first two states of waking and sleeping, as in Heraclitus' depiction, it is not possible to return from the final stage in the continuum.

### 3.1.2 Anaxagoras

In the testimonium derived from Aetius, there is also a brief overview of Anaxagoras' explanation as to the cause of sleep. This account rarely features in discussions on ancient theories of sleep, perhaps due to Anaxagoras' reputation as holding views that 'even in the context of early Greek thought seem strange'.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> On Alcmaeon's belief in an immortal soul: A1, A12, as well as two passages not listed in DK: Porphyry, *Against Boethus on the Soul*, fr. 243 Smith, and Theodoret of Cyrus, *Graecarum affectionum curatio* 5.16-17.

<sup>24</sup> B14, B18.

<sup>25</sup> KRS454, 463; Celesia (2012), 418.

<sup>26</sup> Cameron (1938), 57-58 calls Alcmaeon's expression here "scientific."

<sup>27</sup> Curd, (2007), 3.

Nevertheless, his account of sleep should be highlighted for its deviation from the other accounts being put forward by the natural philosophers in the fifth century.

Anaxagoras' date is usually given as c.500-428BC, placing him very slightly earlier than Empedocles, though evidently active as his contemporary. He was the first of the Presocratic philosophers to live in Athens. As his extant fragments and *testimonia* show, in addition to his physical and metaphysical principles and focus on *Nous*, he also had a keen interest in scientific matters, including those of the body: embryology, nutrition and physiology all feature as part of his investigations. His comments on sleep in A103 are in a way indicative of his broad interest in physiology, rather than in acute medical aetiology:

Ἀναξαγόρας κατὰ κόπον τῆς σωματικῆς ἐνεργείας γίνεσθαι τὸν ὕπνον·  
σωματικὸν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πάθος, οὐ ψυχικόν· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς θάνατον  
τὸν διαχωρισμόν.<sup>28</sup>

Anaxagoras says that sleep happens due to weariness from bodily activity; for it is an experience of the body, not of the soul. Furthermore, death is also a separation of the soul.

There is no specific investigation of the internal workings of sleep, beyond its being ascribed to the body; unlike his contemporaries, there is no association with bodily substances, or inherent qualities. Commentators suggest that everything from οὐ ψυχικόν after is an additional commentary of the doxographer rather than Anaxagoras himself, which seems reasonable, given the lack of continuity.<sup>29</sup> For Anaxagoras, then, sleep is an emphatically physiological process in which the psychological organs are not involved at all. It comes about quite simply due to weariness, which is itself caused by the activities of the body. There is no complexity here: the body is active, becomes tired, sleep naturally follows. There is not enough evidence to conclude if this emphatic bodily experience extends to dreams, too.

As with other Presocratics, and indeed literary tradition more broadly, Anaxagoras also situates sleep, in experiential terms, in close relation to death:

Ἀναξαγόρας δύο ἔλεγε διδασκαλίας εἶναι θανάτου, τὸν τε πρὸ τοῦ  
γενέσθαι χρόνον καὶ τὸν ὕπνον.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> DK59A103

<sup>29</sup> Laks & Most (2016), 115.

<sup>30</sup> Stobaeus *Anth.* 4.52b.39; A34 Curd.



Anaxagoras says that there are two rehearsals of death: the time before being born, and sleep.

Notably in this case, sleep is articulated neither in terms of a fraternal relationship nor as part of a continuum. Rather, sleep is seen as a sort of ‘practice run’ for death – the term διδασκαλίας related to teaching, or lessons, but also rehearsals in the theatre. It is also grouped for the first time with the period before being born, i.e. when *in utero*, and together these two states come close to death itself. Presumably, this association is based on these states all sharing a similarly perceived lack of consciousness, and by extension a lack of awareness as to the experience. Sleep and death, as we have seen, can be fairly easily equated owing to their visible similarities in how they affect the body. The addition of the foetal state alongside this is interesting, and perhaps a reflection of Anaxagoras’ own interest in embryology.<sup>31</sup>

### 3.1.3 Empedocles

That there was an association of the onset of sleep with the blood and its inherent heat can be ascertained more firmly in Empedocles’ comments on the process, which bring us back to Alcmaeon’s theory on the same. Empedocles was active in the fifth-century BC, thus slightly later than Alcmaeon; his dates are usually given as somewhere around 490BC – 430BC, with a suggested *floruit* of 460BC.<sup>32</sup> Like Alcmaeon, Empedocles was an inhabitant of Magna Graecia, and alongside his reputation as a mystic, a mage and a miracle-worker it is also claimed that he was a doctor, founding the Sicilian medical tradition which rivalled the Hippocratic school in Kos.<sup>33</sup> Whether this was true or not, it is clear from his fragments that he at the very least had an interest in medical matters.

There are two extant accounts preserved in the testimonia which give an insight into Empedocles’ theory on the aetiology of sleep. The first follows on from account of Alcmaeon’s theory as quoted above, as part of Aetius’ discussion on the causes of sleep, and begins by setting out Empedocles’ theory in fairly basic terms:

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν μὲν ὕπνον καταψύξει τοῦ ἐν τῷ αἵματι θερμοῦ  
συμμέτρῳ γίνεσθαι, τῇ δὲ παντελεῖ θάνατον.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> For a comprehensive account of Anaxagoras’ ‘masculinist’ embryological theory, see Leitao (2012), 18-57.

<sup>32</sup> Warren (2007), xiii.

<sup>33</sup> McKirahan (2010), 281, cf. Inwood (2001), 7 ‘on much of the tradition, a non liquet is the only reasonable verdict.’

<sup>34</sup> A85

Empedocles, that sleep occurs by a proportionate cooling of the heat in the blood, and death by a total cooling.

These opening lines of A85 may be grouped with an even more summative account provided by Tertullian:

*somnum... Empedocles et Parmenides refrigerationem*<sup>35</sup>  
Empedocles and Parmenides ... sleep is a cooling off.

For Empedocles then, the basic premise remains the same as Alcmaeon, and even to an extent Heraclitus: sleep occurs as part of a wider process in which a particular quality or characteristic diminishes.



**Fig 3.2 Stages of consciousness in Empedocles** where awake is a full mix of heat in the blood, asleep is proportionate cooling of the heat, and death is a complete cooling (i.e., no blood or heat remaining). Alternation between the first two stages is evidently possible, whereas the last stage is irreversible.

Here, as in Alcmaeon, it is directly related to the activity of the blood; however rather than a specific directional movement of the blood within the body, Empedocles instead relates the change as a variance in the blood's temperature. A 'proportionate' amount of cooling to the heat of the blood affects the body to such an extent that sleep occurs, whereas a complete cooling of the blood results in death. This particular sentiment has often been associated with the evident observation that a corpse loses all bodily heat; moreover, it has been proven that the temperature of the body does actually experience a drop during the sleep cycle which is often significant enough to be noticeable to the touch.<sup>36</sup> As with Alcmaeon's investigation then, the extent to which

<sup>35</sup> A46b

<sup>36</sup> It has been conclusively shown in modern sleep analysis studies that the core body temperature drops during NREM sleep as part of thermoregulation, often by several degrees, causing a noticeable cooling to the skin temperature. This is even more pronounced in certain mammals, with some falling into a state of torpor for several hours – see esp. Chokroverty (1994), 57-78.

the empirical approach involved any dissection need not be forced out of proportion; the statements reflect an observational methodology which do not necessarily demand any type of invasive medical procedure.

Rather than focus on the purely physiological movement of the blood, Empedocles' focus on the inherent qualities of hot and cold reflects his own philosophical interest in balance and *krasis* (blend or mixture). In a *krasis*, the four elements of which everything is composed – air, water, fire and earth – are brought together to form a new uniform whole. For Empedocles, all things exist as a *krasis* with different ratios of mixture. Each exists on a scale of increasingly harmonious blends, culminating in the divine (One, or Sphairos) which has a perfect 1:1:1:1 blend of the four elements under Love.<sup>37</sup> Notably for our current investigation, the only mortal replication of this divine blend is to be found in the blood, which must be composed of an equal blend to allow for perception of all four elements (B98).<sup>38</sup> Thus the specification that sleep occurs from a 'proportionate' cooling of the heat in the blood must reference Empedocles' belief that blood was composed of the best *krasis*; any change to this impacts the individual's functioning, and in this case that is exemplified by a change in conscious state from waking to sleeping. More on the link between ratio of the blood and man's cognitive abilities will be discussed in 3.2.2 below.

This emphasis on temperature fluctuation may also explain why Parmenides has been brought into the discussion in the later doxography. While nothing explicit on sleep and death survives in respect to heat or blood in the extant Parmenidean evidence, there are some hints at wider ideas concerning heat and the decline of life which are of notable relevance:

Παρμενίδης γῆρας γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ ὑπόλειψιν.<sup>39</sup>

Parmenides: old age results from a failure of heat.

This could plausibly be understood as an alternative expression of the idea of death as a total loss of heat; put simply, as age increases, heat decreases. Taken alongside the previous claim in A46b, that Parmenides believed sleep to be a cooling, this again presents the transition between awake – asleep – death as part of a continuum of decreasing heat. The notable difference for Parmenides is that the gradual loss of heat is also a by-product of aging; A46a hints at a wider theory of vitality and life as directly

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<sup>37</sup> Trepanier (2004), 93.

<sup>38</sup> Graham (2006), 196 adds that the ratio is arrived at in an unscientific way, as 'blood must have equal measure to satisfy the role assigned to it a priori in Empedocles' theory'.

<sup>39</sup> DK28A46a

associated with heat.<sup>40</sup> That it had an impact on intellectual capabilities is addressed in A46, where it is claimed that the process of thought varies according to whether the hot or the cold prevails, but that thought which is due to the hot is better and purer.<sup>41</sup> The same *testimonium* also elucidates the absence of heat in death; Parmenides, it is claimed, is clear that a corpse cannot possibly perceive light, heat or sound owing to its lack of fire, but it can perceive their opposites.<sup>42</sup> Mansfeld describes Parmenides' account of sleep and old age as 'physicalist', underlining the behaviour and effects of the two physical elements.<sup>43</sup> In articulating sleep as a cooling, old age as a failure of heat, and death as a total lack of heat, Parmenides emphasizes the association of heat with life. Empedocles' use of heat in a similar physicalist way then could be potentially attributed to his predecessor Parmenides.<sup>44</sup>

Returning to A85, Aetius follows the initial summary quoted above by recounting the Empedoclean theory of sleep in more detail. Phrased in response to a doxographical question of whether death affects the body or soul, these lines offer further insight into the microcosmic interactions underlying the different conscious states. The text is evidently subject to some corruption, as the first line lacks a plural antecedent for ὧν, but the ideas are nevertheless clearly communicated.<sup>45</sup>

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν θάνατον γίνεσθαι διαχωρισμῶι τοῦ πυρώδους ἐξ ὧν ἢ σύγκρισις τῶι ἀνθρώπῳι συνεστάθη· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς· ὕπνον δὲ γίνεσθαι διαχωρισμῶι τοῦ πυρώδους.

Empedocles: death occurred as a separation of the fiery from those things whose combination was put together for man, so according to this, death is common to body and soul; sleep occurs as a separation of the fiery.

<sup>40</sup> An idea which had a Pythagorean background, as Alexander via Diogenes Laertius claims a Pythagorean tenet to have been καὶ ζῆν μὲν πάνθ' ὅσα μετέχει τοῦ θερμοῦ, 'all things live which partake of heat' D.L. 8, 25-6 – cf. Guthrie (1962), 69.

<sup>41</sup> A46 [3] Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ ὄλως οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοι στοιχείοι κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις. ἐάν γὰρ ὑπεραίρη τὸ θερμὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχρὸν, ἄλλην γίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν, βελτίω δὲ καὶ καθαρωτέραν τὴν διὰ τὸ θερμὸν·

<sup>42</sup> A46 [4] ὅτι δὲ καὶ τῶ ἐναντίω καθ' αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν φανερόν, ἐν οἷς φησι τὸν νεκρὸν φωτὸς μὲν καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ φωνῆς οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἐκλειψιν τοῦ πυρός, ψυχροῦ δὲ καὶ σιωπῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων αἰσθάνεσθαι ..

<sup>43</sup> Mansfeld (2015), 22.

<sup>44</sup> Guthrie (1962), 227 'in making heat the vehicle of life Empedocles was no doubt following Parmenides, but the notion was pretty well universal in Greek thought then and later.'

<sup>45</sup> Guthrie (1962), 226.

Empedocles' theory is expanded beyond the identification of the heat contained in the blood as the causative force within the body; instead, using more elemental terms, the active force behind the change in conscious states is now the 'fiery'.

Diels' emendation of the text expanded the causation of death to a separation of all the elements constituting man, inserting <καὶ ἀερώδους καὶ ὕδατώδους καὶ γεώδους> after πυρώδους, whereas sleep remains only a separation of the fiery.<sup>46</sup> This may perhaps be overlooking, or even overstating, the sentiment preserved in the previous account in which Empedocles identifies sleep and (bodily) death as occurring at specific points along a scale of heat loss. Evidently, with the reduction of heat, the ratio of elements is thrown off balance; yet it is clear that it is primarily the action of the fiery which exercises the reaction within the body. Notably, there is no explicit reference here to the blood, and no clear indication of how much separation causes sleep compared to how much causes death. The comprehension of another sliding scale, as hinted at in the previous lines' identification of a 'proportionate' amount of cooling, is likely intended.

One anomaly to be highlighted in this testimonium is the use of *psukhe*: this would have been an unlikely term for Empedocles to use.<sup>47</sup> It appears only once in the extant fragments, in which, appropriately to its content, it bears the more archaic epic meaning of life.<sup>48</sup> Instead, in discussions of the soul, Empedocles speaks of the *daimon*. The context however, and the subsequent claim that the soul is mortal, are appropriately Empedoclean. For him, the *daimon* is capable of transmigration and possesses an extremely long life (B115), but it is not immortal. It is subject to the same death as other composites of the *krasis*, when Strife regains its ascendancy and all elements in all things become totally separated once more. Aetius' summary is unclear – hence the proposed emendation by Diels – but only in respect to the separation which leads to the death of the soul. The death of the body as attributed to the separation of the fiery is in line with his wider beliefs on heat and life. The gulf between the *daimon* and the body is best captured in his description of the latter wrapping the former in an 'alien coat of flesh', which the *daimon* wears and discards; the death of the

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<sup>46</sup> The proposed emendation appears in DK; while the earlier Dox.Gr. 437 merely acknowledged the lacuna, and noted Reiske's existing addition of καὶ γεώδους. Bollack chooses a different path completely, based on MS A preserving τῶν ἄνω instead of τῶι ἀνθρώπῳ, while Inwood, whose text I follow here, excises the emendation entirely.

<sup>47</sup> Guthrie (1962), 226.

<sup>48</sup> B138 χαλκῶι ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας.

body, then, is unlikely to have been considered on the same level of cosmic destruction as that of the *daimon*.<sup>49</sup>

Overall, the message being conveyed is clear enough: for Empedocles, the continuum between the three main states (awake – asleep – death) is dependent upon a quantitative change at the elemental level. Imbalance eventually results in death. And unlike Alcmaeon, this is not restricted to the body alone. Eventually the psychological life of the individual expires, too.

A85 is not the only physiological discussion of blood preserved in the extant Empedoclean evidence. One of the more well-known fragments of Empedocles, B100, articulates the process of respiration, and its vascular action, by way of the clepsydra.<sup>50</sup> From this account, it is apparent that Empedocles believed the vessels which contained blood to also contain air – something which had been hinted at in Alcmaeon – but whether this theory was connected to the changes of the blood in sleep is difficult to ascertain.

For Empedocles then, sleep is ultimately held to be the result of a physiological alteration of internal bodily components. There are echoes here of his predecessors, especially Alcmaeon, and even Heraclitus; while the latter expressed the conscious states in terms of a more abstract light, and the former focused on a more physical heat, there remains a commonality in the depiction of such states as successive, and dependant on inherent change to the quantity of light/heat available. The prevalent conception of how the conscious state comes to be influenced finds common basis in the alteration of internal qualities.

### **3.1.4 Diogenes of Apollonia**

Continuing into the latter half of the fifth century, Diogenes of Apollonia is the next Presocratic writer to comment specifically on the process of sleep. Also active in the fifth century, he is considered to have been active after c.440BC which places him as a (slightly) younger contemporary to both Anaxagoras and Empedocles.<sup>51</sup> Like Anaxagoras, he spent time in Athens. Often referred to as the last of the Presocratic

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
<sup>49</sup> B126 σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι; McKirahan (2010), 286.

<sup>50</sup> Furley (1957), 31-34 remains one of the best analyses of B100, and its many interpretative problems.

<sup>51</sup> Curd (2011), 138.

philosophers, Diogenes returned to the model of material monism: for him, all things arise from air, and are air.<sup>52</sup>

As with Alcmaeon and Empedocles, Diogenes also associates the change in conscious state from waking to sleeping with a physiological change in the blood, and further links this process to death. More so than his predecessors however, Diogenes' extant fragments reveal a marked interest in vascular physiology, detailed enough to be mapped onto anatomical diagrams:



**Fig 3.2 Illustration from Krause (1908)**, showing Diogenes of Apollonia's vascular system. The lines in bold signify the two major vessels, with the smaller branching vessels shown in regular and dotted lines.

His expansive and detailed account of the blood vessels maps out specific (albeit incorrect) trajectories of various veins throughout the body: he proposes there are two 'main' veins located on the right and left side of the body which extend from the head to the leg along the backbone; from these, other blood vessels branch off throughout the body on the right and left hand side respectively, from which smaller vessels then branch off to cover all extremities and organs, even including the spinal marrow and testicles as a reflection of a continued Presocratic interest in embryology.<sup>53</sup> This

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<sup>52</sup> Graham (2006), 277; Laks (1983) labels him 'la dernière cosmologie présocratique' in the title of his monograph, cf. Barnes (1982) who titles his Diogenes chapter 'The Last of the Line'.

<sup>53</sup> DK64B6

detailed account is often compared to the discussion in the Hippocratic *Nature of Man*, which outlines the four pairs of ‘thick’ veins running throughout the body by similar, though not by all means identical, trajectories.<sup>54</sup>

Diogenes’ account of sleep builds upon his interest in the movement of blood within the body. Echoing Alcmaeon’s account, the veins are again specifically cited as the conduits through which the blood moves. Unlike his predecessors, Diogenes is explicit as to the contents of the veins in sleep:

Διογένης ἐὰν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ αἷμα διαχεόμενον πληρώσῃ μὲν τὰς φλέβας, τὸν δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς περιεχόμενον ἀέρα ὥσῃ εἰς τὰ στέρνα καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην γαστέρα, ὕπνον γεγενῆσθαι καὶ θερμότερον ὑπάρχειν τὸν θώρακα· ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαν τὸ ἀερῶδες ἐκ τῶν φλεβῶν ἐκλίπη, θάνατον συντυγχάνειν.<sup>55</sup>

Diogenes says if blood as it circulates completely fills the veins, and it pushes the air contained in them into the chest and belly beneath it, sleep arises and the abdomen becomes warmer; but if all the airy material leaves the veins, death ensues.

For Diogenes then, the veins contain a mixture of both blood and air, and it is the varying quantities of these which are directly related to the conscious state. If the blood occupies the veins to the extent that it displaces the air to the chest and belly region, sleep arises; if all the air is displaced entirely, then death occurs. The blood again is situated as an active factor within the veins, but it is the reactionary movement of the air in Diogenes’ account that is critical to the individual’s state. Notably, for the first time, it is neither blood nor heat which is equated with life; indeed, it seems that blood here may actually remain in the body after death. Instead, it is air which is held as the life-giving quality within the body. Only on the complete movement of all things airy out of the veins does death occur.

Evidently Diogenes’ material monism plays a significant part in his conception of the interaction between blood and air, as he held air to be the principle element of

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<sup>54</sup> Hipp. *Nat. Hom.* 11. This fragment of Diogenes of Apollonia is preserved as part of a wider discussion by Aristotle in his *Hist. Anim.* of the vascular theories of three fifth century writers. Included alongside Diogenes are Syennesis of Cyprus, a possible disciple of Hippocrates, and Polybus, thought to be Hippocrates’ son-in-law. Of these, Polybus’ account has also been linked to *Nat. Hom.* 11 (with Jouanna (1993), 32 suggesting the latter work should in fact be re-attributed to Polybus rather than Hippocrates), in addition to a passage from *On Nature of Bones* 9; while Syennesis’ extract has also been linked to *On Nature of Bones* 8 (where several lines appear almost verbatim), and more widely, to the Egyptian concept of metu – see esp. Prioreshi (1996).

<sup>55</sup> A29



which all things are made. Moreover, it held a significant role in the constitution of men:

ἄνθρωποι γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶια ἀναπνέοντα ζῶει τῷ ἀέρι. καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις, ὡς δεδηλώσεται ἐν τῆιδε τῆι συγγραφήι ἐμφανῶς, καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀπαλλαχθῆι, ἀποθνήσκει καὶ ἡ νόησις ἐπιλείπει.<sup>56</sup>

For men and other animals live by breathing the air. And this is both soul and understanding for them, as will be clearly shown in this book. And if this departs, the understanding fails and they die.

The lack of *noesis* used as a noun before the fragment of Diogenes of Apollonia may be a hint that this particular phrasing is anachronistic, especially since the fragment is derived from the much later Simplicius (6<sup>th</sup> century AD), and the term certainly was well used by both Plato and Aristotle, with whom he was most familiar. However, despite this, what is explicitly clear is that the departure of air results in death. Air is an animating force within the body, and it constitutes both the soul and the *noesis* – best interpreted as the intellectual faculty, allowing for understanding. It is by virtue of breathing the air that all living things are indeed alive, which supports the claim above that the departure of the air from the veins would result in death. The association of the intellectual capacity of the person and the quality of air is also further elaborated upon in another testimonium by Theophrastus, in an account which also touches briefly on sleep:

φρονεῖν δ' ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῷ ἀέρι καθαρῷ καὶ ξηρῷ· κωλύειν γὰρ τὴν ἰκμάδα τὸν νοῦν· διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς μέθαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλησμοναῖς ἦττον φρονεῖν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ ὑγρότης ἀφαιρεῖται τὸν νοῦν.<sup>57</sup>

Thinking, as has been said, is by virtue of pure and dry air, for moisture hinders the mind; wherefore thinking is inferior in sleep, in drunkenness, and in surfeit of food. Furthermore, moisture also diminishes the mind ...

From this account, Diogenes' belief in the cognitive processes as reliant on air is once again reiterated. Pure and dry air is optimal, for it is claimed that moisture hinders the mind, and sleep is listed as one of the examples which prove this – alongside drunkenness, and a surfeit of food: these are examples which we will see repeated in

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<sup>56</sup> B4

<sup>57</sup> A19

later discussions on the causes of sleep – particularly those of Aristotle.<sup>58</sup> For Diogenes then, sleep is considered an inferior state in terms of intellectual ability; the moisture referenced, for sleep at least, given the previous account would be a reference to the blood which pushes out the air. So, in opposition to the Empedoclean claim that thought occurs by the optimal blend of the blood (discussed below, 3.2.2), Diogenes actually posits that the blood itself is a hindrance to cognitive process. His remark on moisture affecting the faculty, along with the given example of drunkenness, is reminiscent of Heraclitus' fragments on how water affects the cognitive faculty – for him, the soul (*psukhe*) – and his accounting of the impairments of the drunk man owing to the wetness of the soul.<sup>59</sup> The use of drunkenness and sleep as exemplifying the impact of the blood on *phronesis* also appears in the Hippocratic *On Breaths* (3.2.2). These interactions suggest a vibrant area of investigation.

For his theory of sleep, Diogenes is working from a combination of the quantitative and qualitative types of change seen in Alcmaeon and Empedocles respectively: the blood, in forcing the air out of the veins and into the chest and belly, has caused a change in the quantity of blood but also in the quantity of heat. For rather than remain within the veins, this warmth has now been relocated to the abdominal area with the movement of the air. It seems reasonable to suppose that the total loss of the air which results in death thus also equates to a total loss of warmth in the body. In this respect, Diogenes also breaks away from Empedocles' supposition that the warmth is contained within the blood; his alternative conception of air as containing inherent heat draws it particularly close to the archaic ideas of the soul, which focused on the life-breath as the animating force of the individual.

Perhaps even more so than Alcmaeon and Empedocles then, Diogenes' account relates specifically to Heraclitus' initial remarks on sleep and death as a diminution of the quality and quantity which constitutes their materialist elemental soul – for Heraclitus, this was represented as a qualitative change to the hottest purest air, while for Diogenes it is the gradual loss of air. Diogenes pushes this approach in a more explicitly materialist – and psychic – manner than Heraclitus, and continues to expand upon the existing physiological investigations of Alcmaeon and Empedocles. By combining his precise ideas on vascular anatomy with the characteristics of his principle element, he is thus able to propose a clearer psychophysical aetiology for the

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<sup>58</sup> See **Closing Remarks**.

<sup>59</sup> B36 and B117 respectively, cf. B118 αῦη ψυχῆ, σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη ('a dry soul, wisest and best').

phenomenon of sleep. This type of approach seems to have been particularly appealing to several writers of the HC, and Diogenes' ideas on blood and air are among a handful of Presocratic theories with which the Hippocratic writers engage.

## 3.2 FIFTH CENTURY HIPPOCRATIC THEORIES

### 3.2.1 *Epidemics*

The Hippocratic authors discuss matters of sleep most commonly in the context of patient symptoms, and this chapter is appended by a range of these accounts from across the HC. However, in addition to these more straightforward patient reports, there are several brief comments interspersed throughout the corpus which allow some insight into how particular Hippocratic authors understood the process sleep to occur in relation to the body. In the collection of multi-authored case notes known as the *Epidemics*, the sixth book preserves some rather familiar ideas; it is the sixth book especially which has been argued as having a markedly philosophical influence in its pursuit of more didactic aims.<sup>60</sup> The first extract is from a collection of brief notes, which reference the process of sleep with reference to the qualitative change from hot to cold:

12. Ἐμφανέως ἐγρηγορώς θερμότερος τὰ ἔξω, τὰ ἔσω δὲ ψυχρότερος, καθεύδων τάναντία.
13. Ἐνθέρμῳ φύσει, ψύξις, ποτὸν ὕδωρ, ἐλινύειν.
14. Ὑπνος ἐν ψύχει ἐπιβεβλημένῳ.
15. Ὑπνος ἐδραΐος, ὀρθονυσταγμός.
16. Αἰ ἀσθενεῖς δίαιται ψυχραί· αἰ δὲ ἰσχυραὶ θερμαί.<sup>61</sup>

12. Evidently when awake, the exterior is warmer and the interior is colder; when asleep, the opposite.
13. For someone of a warm nature, cooling, drinking water, rest.
14. Sleep while covered in the cold.
15. Deep sleep, dozing in an upright position.
16. Weak regimens are cold; strong regimens are warm.

Previous examinations have attempted to force the notes into more of a coherent narrative, though the additions and presumptions needed to achieve this fluency

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<sup>60</sup> Nikitas (1968) provides the most thorough examination of *Epidemics* and its didactic character; cf. also Alessi (2010), 119-136 which identifies in the author of *Epidemics* 2, 4, 6 the "personality of a master who shared – and probably led – with several colleagues a research program focused on a few topics which were used for teaching purposes." *Epidemics* is a compendium of information from various authors, written up at a later date – the composition of Book VI is usually dated to the late fifth century. Galen considered Books I-III and VI to be genuinely Hippocratic, and wrote thorough commentaries on these four books which survive partially in Greek and almost entirely in full via Arabic translations by Hunayn ibn Ishaq.

<sup>61</sup> *Epid.* 6.4.12-16

render the account rather inauthentic to the Greek text.<sup>62</sup> Nonetheless, despite the aphoristic style of composition, this Hippocratic writer evidently is working from a clear conception of the mechanics of sleep. Not only do the notes provide an insight into the author's understanding of the theory behind the process, but they also illustrate how this understanding then becomes integrated in a medical context with other bodily actions, constitutions and even regimens. Most striking perhaps is the statement at point 12; it echoes the Presocratic theories of sleep as a process during which the blood, or the heat within the blood, withdraws further inside the body and away from the exterior. The particularly Alcmaeonic conception of how sleep occurs resurfaces later in the same book in even more similar terms which invoke the directional alteration of the blood specifically:

τὸ αἷμα ἐν ὕπνῳ ἔσω μᾶλλον φεύγει.<sup>63</sup>  
 In sleep, blood retreats further into the interior.

Such similarity in account suggests that the author of *Epidemics 6* was aware of the ideas of, at the very least, the more medical of the Presocratic writers. Returning to the earlier notes from *Epidemics 6.4* then, the mechanics of such a process are not quite so specifically elaborated in terms of the activity of the blood, but it is entirely plausible that this is the process which the author has in mind; furthermore, his comment that this idea is Ἐμφανέως indicates that it certainly was neither a controversial nor perceptibly ill-founded premise. This alteration of qualities is expanded upon in the subsequent point with an evident focus on the idea of balance, as the prescription for someone Ἐνθέρμῳ φύσει involves cooling, water and rest – suitable applications to counteract a warm and fiery nature. Points 14 and 15 speak more directly of sleep. The rather sensible advice that one should sleep under a cover in cold temperatures may sound basic, but again it is not difficult to see how this draws upon the premise of the body losing external heat during sleep. There is evidently an understood risk to the body if it is then subjected to excessive amounts of cold both internally and externally during sleep, and this harmful aspect of excess of cold is further attested when read alongside Point 16 which explicitly associates weakness with cold.

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<sup>62</sup> Langholf (1990), 142-3 opts for this approach, translating the notes: 'Evidently, when one is awake, one is warmer outside and colder inside; asleep, the opposite. For a person warm by constitution, [therapeutic measures] for cooling: water as beverage, rest. Sleep in a cold place, covered [with a blanket]. Sleep while sitting, nap in an upright position. Weak foodstuffs are cooling, strong warming.'

<sup>63</sup> *Epid.* 6.6.15

Point 15's remarks on sleeping in an upright position and its relation to sleeping well strike a slightly more elusive note: are the two to be directly related, or are these simply didactic prompts for the Hippocratic writer as to which two types of sleep he should discuss next? The text of this short line is not without problems. Smith opts for ὀρθονυσταγμός; Galen, Littré, Manetti/Roselli and most recently Hulskamp all prefer ὀρθῶ νυσταγμός on syntactic grounds.<sup>64</sup> Contention over the translation of ἔδραϊος has split the choice of translation between two sides: those who think it should be 'sitting', and those who think it 'deep sleep'.<sup>65</sup> The explicit reference to ὕπνος should be enough reason for the latter choice.<sup>66</sup> The brevity of the line leaves drawing any definitive interpretative conclusion on the specifics most difficult. Langholf reads this as advice, along with the other notes in this section, as having been devised by a medical instructor to teach the effect of sleep and food on those 'warm' by nature: deep sleep warms the body, whereas little sleep cools it.<sup>67</sup> For an individual of a warm nature then, every effort should be made to avoid excessive or additional warmth.

This physiological emphasis on the nature of sleep within the body is essential to keep in mind before turning to the mechanics of dreams. How, if at all, are the two processes related? And in particular, how does the prominent role of the blood in sleep become incorporated into the process of dreaming?

### 3.2.2 *On Breaths*

It was not only *Epidemics VI* which drew an association between the blood and sleep. The Hippocratic text *On Breaths* more clearly emphasizes the effects on sleep caused by the cooling of the blood, as part of a wider identification of air as responsible for causing illness in the body. The text as a whole is often dismissed on account of its style; the highly rhetorical composition - an epideictic speech - has led several scholars to deny the work was in fact Hippocratic in origin at all.<sup>68</sup> The work is evidently intended for delivery in front of an audience, and it has many sophistic flourishes, yet this does not immediately render its contents inauthentic or useless. There is no single type of Hippocratic writer, and it seems overly critical to dismiss content on the basis

<sup>64</sup> Galen (K17b.175), Littré 5.311 n.7, Manetti/Roselli 94-95; Hulskamp (2008) 77 n.22.

<sup>65</sup> Hulskamp (2008), 77 n.22 provides an overview of the different translation choices here, concluding that the meaning of 'deep sleep' improves the logic of the aphorism.

<sup>66</sup> LSJ sv. ἔδραϊος 2.II

<sup>67</sup> Langholf (1990), 142-143.

<sup>68</sup> Allbutt (1921), 243 calls it "as windy in its rhetoric as in its subject matter"; Jones (1923), 224-5 in particular is derisive of the work and its "crudities", and thinks it more likely it a sophistic presentation copy which was sent to the Hippocratic school in Kos. Segal (1970), 180 recognises it as "remarkable for its Gorgianic figures and sophistic rhetoric."

of style in a period which saw no clearly defined boundaries of genre in either philosophical or medical writing. Jouanna provides a thorough defence of *On Breaths'* position in the HC and shows convincingly, through careful linguistic and thematic analysis, that "it is not the work of a sophist mislaid in the library of a medical centre, but of a Hippocratic doctor in the wider meaning of the word."<sup>69</sup>

The short treatise is dated to the late fifth century, and the author certainly seems aware of contemporary philosophical trends as he declares wind to be the most powerful substance both inside and outside the body – a theory which, as seen above, had been reinvigorated by Diogenes of Apollonia in the mid to late 5<sup>th</sup> century BC. Any direct reference to the divine or to the gods is consciously avoided.<sup>70</sup> Instead, *On Breaths* alludes to basic cosmological ideas: wind is assigned a dominant role in both the microcosm of the body and the macrocosm of the wider universe. There are echoes of both Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia in the presentation of wind as an almost Presocratic material principle, and the treatise shares several common features with the philosophers' accounts: (1) it is everywhere and is in all things, (2) everything is derived from it, (3) it is soul, (4) specific differentiation is made between air inside and outside the body. Since the Hippocratic author makes clear the distinction between the different subcategorizations of wind, the Greek and English equivalents should be kept in mind throughout the discussion for their particular applications in this specific context:

πνεῦμα δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν τοῖσι σώμασι φύσα καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἔξω τῶν  
σωμάτων ὁ ἀήρ.<sup>71</sup>

Wind inside bodies is called 'breath', but outside of bodies is 'air'.

Subordinate to the central thesis is a small discussion of the significance of the blood in relation to psychological afflictions. The blood is evidently itself understood to be affected by and interact with the breath within the body; an idea prevalent in the contemporary thought of Diogenes of Apollonia, as well as in the earlier respiratory theories of Empedocles. Seeking to establish his own aetiology for epilepsy, the author

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<sup>69</sup> Jouanna (2012), 51 – cf. 39-54 for a full analysis of the rhetorical aspects of *On Breaths* and another extant Hippocratic epideictic speech *The Art*, including a comparison with Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*.

<sup>70</sup> Langholf (1990), 244 cites the use of the term *miasma* in chapters V and VI, to denote the impurity of air, as indicative of its position as an almost divine element; this is the only implicitly religious aspect to the text, and may even further support the idea that the author is modelling it in the style of a Presocratic *arche*.

<sup>71</sup> *Flat.3*

first presents examples of other ways in which cognitive function may be impaired by a change in the blood; the two examples he chooses are sleep and drunkenness.<sup>72</sup> It is worth citing the relevant passage in full:

ἡγεῦμαι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔμπροσθεν οὐδενὶ εἶναι μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι συμβαλλόμενον ἐς φρόνησιν ἢ τὸ αἷμα· τοῦτο δὲ ὅταν μὲν ἐν τῷ καθεστῶτι μένη, μένει καὶ ἡ φρόνησις· ἑτεροιομένου δὲ τοῦ αἵματος μεταπίπτει καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, πολλὰ τὰ μαρτυρέοντα· πρῶτον μὲν, ὅπερ ἅπασιν ζώοις κοινόν ἐστιν, ὁ ὕπνος, οὗτος μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοισιν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐπέλθῃ τῷ σώματι, τὸ αἷμα ψύχεται, φύσει γὰρ ὁ ὕπνος πέφυκεν ψύχειν· ψυχθέντι δὲ τῷ αἵματι νωθρότεροι γίνονται αἱ διέξοδοι. δῆλον δὲ· ῥέπει τὰ σώματα καὶ βαρύνεται (πάντα γὰρ τὰ βαρῆα πέφυκεν ἐς βυσσὸν φέρεσθαι), καὶ τὰ ὄμματα συγκλείεται, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἀλλοιοῦται, δόξαι δὲ ἕτεραί τινες ἐνδιατρίβουσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐνύπνια καλέονται. πάλιν ἐν τῆσι μέθησι πλέονος ἐξαίφνης γενομένου τοῦ αἵματος μεταπίπτουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῆσι ψυχῆσι φρονήματα, καὶ γίνονται τῶν μὲν παρεόντων κακῶν ἐπιλήσιμονες, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν εὐέλπιδες. ἔχοιμι δ' ἂν πολλὰ τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν, ἐν οἷσιν αἱ τοῦ αἵματος ἐξαλλαγαὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἐξαλλάσσουν. ἦν μὲν οὖν παντελῶς ἅπαν ἀναταραχθῆ τὸ αἷμα, παντελῶς ἡ φρόνησις ἐξαπόλλυται· τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα καὶ τὰ ἀναγνωρίσματα ἐθίσματα ἐστίν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ εἰωθότος ἔθεος μεταστέωμεν, ἀπόλλυται ἡμῖν ἡ φρόνησις.<sup>73</sup>

I hold that not any constituent in any body is more contributory to *phronesis* than the blood. Whenever it remains in order, so too *phronesis* remains; but when the blood undergoes a change, so too does *phronesis*. Many things bear witness that this is so. Firstly, sleep, which is common to all living things, testifies to my proclamations. For whenever it comes upon the body, the blood is cooled, for sleep by nature begets cooling. When the blood is cooled, the passages become more sluggish. This is clear: the body sinks and is weighed down (for all heavy things are borne naturally downwards), the eyes close, *phronesis* is altered, and certain other fancies linger which are called dreams.

Again, in drunkenness, when the blood has suddenly become more abundant, the soul and the thoughts of the soul undergo a change: of present ills they are forgetful, of future joys they are hopeful.

I could have mentioned many such cases in which changes of the blood change *phronesis*. So, if all the blood is wholly stirred up, then *phronesis* is wholly destroyed. For things learnt and things recognised are habits; whenever we alter the habits we are accustomed to, our *phronesis* is destroyed.

<sup>72</sup> Van der Eijk (2005), 133 'a non-pathological state is employed to illustrate a more serious disorder resulting from the same physiological mechanism', cf. the discussion on Diogenes of Apollonia above (3.1.4). Aristotle also draws comparison between sleep and epilepsy, as well as alcohol consumption, in *De somn.* 457a3-21.

<sup>73</sup> *Flat.*14

In terms of sleep, the conceptualisation of the process draws upon the same core idea we have already seen in both the philosophical and medical accounts: cooling of the blood. However, on this occasion, sleep is the active force upon the body. The stylised composition mimics a forensic speech in the personification of ὁ ὕπνος, called upon in the nominative, as a witness to the speaker's claims, which emphasizes the active and forceful role it is given here. Rather than the cooling of the blood causing the state of sleep in the body, the inverse is described: sleep comes upon the body as an externalised force, and as a result, the blood is cooled. Indeed, sleep itself is understood here to cause cooling by its very nature. Everything within the body becomes slowed and weighed as sleep descends, and the author specifically remarks on the closing of the eyes, another side effect of the 'sinking' brought about by the cold, making clear that the normal method of visual perception is impeded. This account blends medical opinion with literary style, reversing cause and effect in order to depict sleep as a more traditional, and perhaps more audience-friendly, personification.<sup>74</sup>

In addition to the physiological assertions of the cold slowing and weighing down the body as explanations for the movement and paralysis-like state of sleeping, the Hippocratic author references psychological interference: *phronesis* (ἡ φρόνησις) is repeatedly identified as the process impaired by the blood's own changes. Here, the author seems to have a clear conception of what he means by reference to this process but it is often difficult to convey the concise meaning in translation, and differentiate it from other cognitive or intellectual faculties referenced elsewhere. A direct translation of "intelligence" in English seems to gloss the range of activities ascribed to it; *phronesis* is involved in several complex psychological processes here including learning and recognition, and the soul itself can be in possession of τὰ φρονήματα.<sup>75</sup> The brief reference to the eyes which precedes the identification of *phronesis* being altered further imbues the term with the notion of involvement in sensory perception. The reference to a process rather than a dedicated faculty (ἡ φρήν) suggests there was no restriction to a specific location within the body in which it could take place. In his discussion of *Regimen*, van der Eijk has highlighted the need for an expansive definition of *phronesis* which "clearly means more than thinking or intelligence, it means 'having one's sense together'" and suggests it refers to a 'universal force' which contributes to

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<sup>74</sup> Keeping in mind one of the main aims of this type of Hippocratic treatise may have been to attract customers, *On Breaths* certainly employs a range of stylistic and thematic tactics to appeal to a wider, non-medical audience.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *Vict.* I, 35 for the discussion of *phronesios psuches* which, as will be examined more closely in the next chapter, is influenced by the balance between fire and water of which the soul is entirely composed.



perception, movement and is found throughout the body; this certainly seems applicable to the use in *On Breaths*.<sup>76</sup> This still leaves a problem of appropriate and concise translation for this context; for the aims of this particular discussion, retaining the transliterated form with the emphasis on the encompassing definition beyond straight intelligence, seems most appropriate.<sup>77</sup>

The influence from Diogenes of Apollonia on *On Breaths* is clear from the latter's conception of the relationship between the soul and cognitive processes, and their ultimate dependence upon air as the material principle. One distinguishing feature is the difference in terminology; in Diogenes of Apollonia, as seen above in 3.1.4, it is not the term *phronesis* but rather *noesis* which expresses the intellectual involvement of air. This term is also construed as 'intelligence' or 'understanding' in translation.<sup>78</sup> Terminology aside however, the implicit idea has evident similarities with *On Breaths*; of note, the soul is distinguished from *noesis* in the account of the psychological activities within the body, and this intellectual activity is communicated as a process rather than a specific faculty.

Returning then to the above passage from *On Breaths*, the author discusses the dreaming process specifically – or rather, what “are called” dreams – in rather poetic terms.<sup>79</sup> The sleeper is subject to δόξαι which are not described as passively being seen by the sleeper, but rather more actively lingering themselves (ένδιατρίβουσιν). There are hints at the unreliability of such images when the phrasing is more closely considered. Do these δόξαι only arise now that *phronesis* has been altered in some way, thus rendering proper learning and recognition unattainable? It seems a plausible interpretation. Notably, the use of δόξαι in this particular sense and context does not occur elsewhere in the HC.<sup>80</sup> Rather than present a straightforward medical, physiological or even philosophical evaluation, these lines instead seem to evoke a

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<sup>76</sup> van der Eijk (2005), 127-128.

<sup>77</sup> The more definitive meaning of *phronesis* as practical knowledge would become fixed in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (I and VI esp.) – see Dottori (2009), 301-310 for an overview of this 'terminological fixation' in relation to Plato, as well as Kierkegaard and Gadamer.

<sup>78</sup> LSJ sv. νόησις categorises it as 'mental perception', superior to *dianoia*.

<sup>79</sup> The wording echoes the way in which the Hippocratic doctors reference epilepsy, i.e. 'the disease that is called sacred', which seems to impart a certain archaism to the term ένύπνια; however, as discussed in the introduction, ένύπνια did not have the meaning of 'dream' in Homer, is used rarely in tragedy, and only really came into prominence in the Hippocratic and Aristotelian writings – cf. Kessels (1978), 134 'this change in frequency seems to be connected with a change in attitude towards the dream-phenomenon that occurred during the period from Homer till Plato/Aristotle.'

<sup>80</sup> There are 26 other occurrences of δόξαι in the entire Hippocratic corpus; these all appear to make use of the more common meaning of notion, opinion, or expectation rather than the meaning implied here.

tragic presentation of δόξα in the sense of ‘fancies’ associated with the dreaming process.<sup>81</sup> Given the dating of *On Breaths* to the latter half of the fifth century, and considered in light of the highly stylised use of language throughout, it certainly seems possible that the Hippocratic author in this instance is drawing from the language of the tragedians.<sup>82</sup> Two brief extracts from Aeschylus provide useful comparison; the first, from the *Agamemnon*, references in striking juxtaposition two very different approaches to the understanding of dreams:

ΧΟΡΟΣ  
πότερα δ’ όνειρων φάσματ’ εύπειθῆ σέβεις;

ΚΛΥΤΑΙΜΗΣΤΡΑ  
ού δόξαν άν λάβοιμι βριζούσης φρενός.<sup>83</sup>

CHORUS  
Have you been awe-stricken by a persuasive apparition in a dream?

CLYTEMNESTRA  
I would not heed the mere fancy of a sleeping mind.

Here, Clytemnestra scorns the Chorus’ suggestion that she has gained her information on the Achaean success at Troy through a vision in a dream; her language is clearly derisive as she dismisses what the Chorus initially refer to in their questioning as φάσματα as only the δόξα which she explicitly identifies as arising from a sleeping φρην, and to which she claims she would pay no attention.<sup>84</sup> The implication from Clytemnestra here is that the dream-vision is unreliable as it is *only* a creation from the sleeper’s own mind; it is not to be considered significant or influential. A similar sentiment can be found in *Libation Bearers*, as Orestes struggles with being pursued by the Furies:

ΧΟΡΟΣ  
τίνες σε δόξαι, φίλτατ’ ανθρώπων πατρί,  
στροβοῦσιν; ἴσχε, μή φοβοῦ, νικῶν πολύ.  
ΟΡΕΣΤΗΣ

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<sup>81</sup> It should of course be noted that discussions of δόξα appear in Plato in reference to his theory of knowledge; for the definition of δόξα as arising from a combination of memory plus sense perception cf. *Phileb.* 38bff, *Theaet.* 191c-194b.

<sup>82</sup> Said (1985). Elsewhere in the text parallels have been drawn with Euripides, specifically between a prayer in *Troades* 884-888 and *On Breaths* 3. Jones (1923), 222 n.1 considers that these lines in *On Breaths* ‘cannot be independent of the famous lines in *Troades*’ and deems it most unlikely Euripides copied the Hippocratic corpus; cf. Langholf (1990), 244 n.71.

<sup>83</sup> *Ag.* 274-5

<sup>84</sup> Harrison (2013), 61 argues that the Chorus’ “religious” language implies that they are asking about divine dreams specifically while Clytemnestra’s response is irreligious, but she concludes only that this shows both views on dreams “were known to be held by various people at the time.”

οὐκ εἰσὶ δόξαι τῶνδε πημάτων ἐμοί·  
σαφῶς γὰρ αἶδε μητρὸς ἔγκοτοι κύνες.<sup>85</sup>

CHORUS

What are these fancies, dearest of men to your father,  
that are distressing you? Hold fast, do not be afraid, you have much  
prevailed.

ORESTES

To me these calamities are no mere fancies,  
For clearly these are the spiteful hounds of my mother.

To Orestes, the Furies cannot be described as only δόξαι as he can see them clearly and is convinced of their very real and physical presence. The Chorus, however, cannot see them and therefore suppose them to be only a type of illusion; specifically, the manner in which the δόξαι are thus presented here indicate the word carries a particular connotation of an illusion only experienced by one individual. Orestes' dismissal of their choice of words again shows that there is a certain unreliability or unreality associated with δόξαι; he is adamant they cannot be classified as such, as he sees them as most certainly real. The Hippocratic author seems to be relying on this inherent quality of unreliability and unreality in his description of dreams themselves as δόξαι. By invoking the tragic sentiment associated with the terminology, he subtly reinforces the depiction of dreams as product of the psychological change undergone by the individual in his sleeping state and, quite contrary to the author of *On Regimen IV*, our Hippocratic author here implies that there is nothing of import to be taken away from such appearances. He specifically emphasizes that it is as a result of *phronesis* being altered for the worse that such fancies can even come about, thus further undermining their potential for having any epistemological worth.

How can *phronesis* be altered? The blood is again the focus: its slowed movement around the body is recognised as having an effect on intellect in addition to consciousness. The cooling of the blood results in the slowing down of the body, both psychologically and physically. The range of cognitive processes which this can affect, in addition to interaction with the soul and the individual's emotional state, gives a particularly remarkable importance to blood in a text which is nominally about wind. It is notable that the blood had also been assigned a similar cognitive agency by Empedocles in B105:

[καρδία] αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀντιθρόντος,  
τῆι τε νόημα μάλιστα κικλήσκειται ἀνθρώποισιν·  
αἶμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

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<sup>85</sup> Cho. 1051-54

[The heart] nourished in a sea of blood flowing back and forth, and certainly it is there which is called thought by men, for thought to men is the blood around the heart.

The blood itself, not the heart as some later doxographers would record, is identified by Empedocles as the seat of human thought.<sup>86</sup> Taking into account several other Empedoclean fragments, and subsequent comments by Theophrastus, it is generally agreed that Empedocles is speaking in reference to the elemental composition of the blood; thought is able to be carried out in the blood around the heart due to an equal blend of the four elements within the blood itself in this specific location.<sup>87</sup> This equal blend (1:1:1:1) allows for the blood to act as the agent through which thought can occur, as, following the Empedoclean like-by-like principle, the blood now possesses the appropriate condition by which to attract and properly comprehend the external world.<sup>88</sup> It is important to distinguish this from a basic conclusion that the blood itself is in some way conscious and thinks; it seems clear that Empedocles is not claiming that the blood is the physical apparatus with which man thinks, but rather it is by virtue of the balanced qualities of the blood that thinking can occur. The intricacies of operation may differ slightly from the Hippocratic discussion of *On Breaths*, but the sentiment remains the same: blood allows for thought when it is in its best condition, and any disruption to this directly affects the individual's cognitive function. Sleep and dreams are integrated by the Hippocratic author within this system as the psychological outcome of these physiological changes; ultimately, he argues, these changes are themselves brought about directly by changes in the blood.

Read in relation to the Empedoclean haematocentric theory of cognition, it is also clearer to see how the Hippocratic δόξαι are emphatically illusive in their nature. *Phronesis* has been impeded as the blood begins to cool in response to being thrown out of balance by air; with this impeded it is therefore no longer possible for the individual to properly perceive and comprehend any stimuli. That the Hippocratic theory also explicitly accounts for the closing of the eyes when the blood cools further draws upon the disruption to sensory perception, emphasizing that these δόξαι are

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<sup>86</sup> That it is the heart is reported in Censorinus (31A84DK), Theodoret (Aetius, *Plac.Phil.* 4.5.8). As noted by von Staden (1989) 170 n.97, Cicero comes closest to recording the original Empedoclean sentiment in *Tusc.Disp.* 1.9: *Empedocles animum esse censet corde suffusum sanguinem.*

<sup>87</sup> Esp. B17, B98, B107, B109 and Theophrastus *De Sensibus* 10; cf. Rusche (1930), 127 and Solmsen (1950), 438; Kamtekar (2009), 223; Kahn (2013), 210.

<sup>88</sup> Especially when taken together with B98, 107 and Theophrastus *De Sensibus* 10.

only visible on an internal context to the sleeper – occurring, as Heraclitus would have termed it, within their own private world.

### 3.2.3 *On the Sacred Disease*

It should not of course be assumed that all Hippocratic writers adhered to the exact same theories, as there are certainly marked differences in the many texts of the HC. Of particular note are both the contrasts and similarities between *On Breaths* and *On the Sacred Disease*, both fifth century texts which seek to redefine the aetiology of epilepsy and reference a range of other psychological phenomena in the process. While *On Breaths* may emphasize dreams as arising due to actions and interactions of the blood and air in an unspecific location in the body, *On the Sacred Disease* makes clear that there is one key organ involved: the brain. Having identified it as the source of a range of emotional and perceptual phenomena, the author continues to elaborate on the other psychological afflictions for which it is responsible:

τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ μαινόμεθα καὶ παραφρονέομεν, καὶ δείματα καὶ φόβοι παρίστανται ἡμῖν, τὰ μὲν νύκτωρ, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέρη, καὶ ἀγρυπνίαι καὶ πλάνοι ἄκαιροι, καὶ φροντίδες οὐχ ἰκνεύμεναι, καὶ ἀγνωσίαι τῶν καθεστώτων καὶ ἀηθία. καὶ ταῦτα πάσχομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πάντα, ὅταν οὗτος μὴ ὑγιαίνει, ἀλλὰ θερμότερος τῆς φύσιος γένηται ἢ ψυχρότερος ἢ ὑγρότερος ἢ ξηρότερος, ἢ τι ἄλλο πεπόνθη πάθος παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ὃ μὴ ἐώθει.<sup>89</sup>

By the same thing [sc. the brain] we are both driven mad and become delirious, and both terror and fear are aroused in us - whether in the night or during the day - as well as sleeplessness and troublesome wanderings, inappropriate worries, absent-mindedness and strangeness in habit. All these things we suffer from the brain, whenever it is not healthy, but becomes warmer than usual, or colder, or moister, or dryer, or is affected by any other unnatural condition to which it is not accustomed.

These encompass a range of troubling psychological afflictions which blend together both intellectual and emotional upsets. It is also specified that they may occur during the day or night. Whether the night-time troubles are related to dreams is unclear, though the subsequent reference to sleeplessness as an additional problem perhaps suggests the reference to occurrences during the night is intended to mean during sleep; a range of parasomnias recorded elsewhere in the HC is appended to the end of this current chapter, and may provide some indication as to the intended afflictions. The author explicitly identifies the brain as the source of these problems when it is not

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<sup>89</sup> *Morb Sacr.*.17

in its natural condition, but is thrown off balance by a surfeit of one or more of its qualities. It is evidently not simply a case of the brain autonomously determining the extent of the psychological afflictions then, and a later passage on the aetiology of more fearful dreams specifically brings back a familiar driving force to the problems, the blood:

ἐκ νυκτῶν δὲ βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, ὅταν ἐξαπίνης ὁ ἐγκέφαλος διαθερμαίνεται ... ἔρχεται δὲ κατὰ τὰς φλέβας πολὺ τὰς προειρημένους, ὅταν τυγχάνῃ ὠνθρωπος ἐνύπνιον ὀρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ φόβῳ ἧ' ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐγρηγορότι τότε μάλιστα τὸ πρόσωπον φλογιά, καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐρεύθονται, ὅταν φοβῆται, καὶ ἡ γνώμη ἐπινοῇ τι κακὸν ἐργάσασθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ πάσχει. ὅταν δὲ ἐπέγρηται καὶ καταφρονήσῃ καὶ τὸ αἷμα πάλιν σκεδασθῇ ἐς τὰς φλέβας πέπαυται.<sup>90</sup>

Shouts and screams arise at night whenever a sudden heating of the brain occurs ... It overheats when blood rushes into the brain in abundance and it boils. This comes in abundance by the aforementioned vessels, whenever the patient happens to see a fearful dream and is himself in fear. Just as when awake the face is flushed and the eyes are red whenever he is afraid and his intellect contrives some evil to work at, so too he suffers in sleep. It ceases whenever he awakens, having come to his senses, and the blood once again is dispersed in the veins.

A parallel is drawn between the waking and sleeping states of the individual; the Hippocratic author is able to explain how the patient is afflicted during sleep by reference to the similarities with waking symptoms. In this instance however, it is not the heating of the brain which causes the fearful dream and shouting. Rather, it is the fearful dream which causes the blood to rush through the veins to the brain itself; such a state is evidenced by the reddening of the face and the eyes.<sup>91</sup> The causal role of the blood is reversed: the patient's dream is now the instigator of the bodily imbalance via its influence on the blood. He 'happens to see' the fearful dream (τυγχάνῃ ἐνύπνιον ὀρῶν φοβερὸν) and it is this apprehension of the oneirological stimulus causes the blood to rush into the brain where it boils (ἐπιζέση), creating a physiological external reaction on the face and in the eyes similar to that which is caused when the patient experiences fear while awake. Notably, when the patient is awake, the fear is attributed to the actions of the intellect (ἡ γνώμη) which is held responsible for creating the source of anxiety through its own contrivance; the general statement that the patient

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<sup>90</sup> *Morb.Sacr.* 18

<sup>91</sup> Hulskamp (2013), 49 points out that 'bloodshot' eyes would be difficult to deduce when the patient is asleep; however, in the appended case studies at 3.3.7, there are accounts which describe specifically inspecting the patient's eyes in sleep.

suffers similarly in his sleep could be indication that the fearful dreams are themselves also contrived by the intellect. There is a clear psychological presentation of the oneirological affliction which extends also to an emotional response from the patient; both the fear as an emotional state, and the source of the fear itself, have arisen due to internal disturbances within the patient. As in previous accounts, upon waking, the affliction ceases as the blood re-disperses throughout the body and the patient is described as having regained his senses (καταφρονήση). The fitting idiomatic English translation of καταφρονήση as ‘come to one’s senses’ also gives a fuller picture of the activities of *phronesis*.<sup>92</sup> If the patient is only able to regain this upon waking when the blood is re-dispersed, then notionally the type of cognitive involvement during sleep and dreams is similar here to its depiction in *On Breaths*. *Phronesis* is altered once more.

The author of *On the Sacred Disease* spends more time than the author of *On Breaths* clarifying his choice of vocabulary. As he reiterates his encephalocentric position in section 20, he directly addresses the belief that it was the *phrenes* which were responsible for mental activity. His argument spans several paragraphs. Four extracts from this section are of note:

Διὸ φημὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν ἐρμηνεύοντα τὴν σύνεσιν. αἱ δὲ φρένες ἄλλως ὄνομα ἔχουσι τῇ τύχῃ κεκτημένον καὶ τῷ νόμῳ, τῷ δ’ ἐόντι οὐκ, οὐδὲ τῇ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἶδα ἐγωγε τίνα δύναμιν ἔχουσιν αἱ φρένες ὥστε νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν,

Wherefore I proclaim that the brain is the translator of consciousness. The *phrenes* otherwise bear a name acquired by chance and custom, and not by reality, nor nature, and I for my part do not know what powers the *phrenes* possess so as to apprehend as well as to comprehend.

ἐπεὶ αἰσθάνονται γε οὐδενὸς πρότερον τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐόντων, ἀλλὰ μάτην τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔχουσι καὶ τὴν αἰτίην, ὥσπερ τὰ πρὸς τῇ καρδίῃ ὦτα καλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἐς τὴν ἀκοὴν συμβαλλόμενα. λέγουσι δὲ τινες ὡς καὶ φρονέομεν τῇ καρδίῃ καὶ τὸ ἀνιώμενον τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ τὸ φροντίζον·

<sup>92</sup> LSJ sv. καταφρονέω 4.III cites the Latin *resipiscere* as a synonym.

Since they [sc. *phrenes*] perceive nothing before the other constituents of the body, but without reason they are named the cause; just as the parts near the heart are called “auricles” but have no contribution to hearing. Some even say that we comprehend with the heart, and it is this which is distressed and anxious.

ἔξ ἅπαντος τοῦ σώματος φλέβες ἐς αὐτὴν τείνουσι, καὶ συγκλείσασα ἔχει ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἣν τις πόνος ἢ τάσις γίνηται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἀνιώμενον φρίσσειν τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντείνεσθαι, καὶ ὑπερχαίροντα τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάσχειν· ὅτι ἡ καρδίη αἰσθάνεται τε μάλιστα καὶ αἱ φρένες.

Veins reach into it [the heart] from the whole body, and having closed it in it holds so that it perceives whatever toil or force happens to man. It is necessary that the body too, when in distress, shivers and is strained, and this is just the same as when rejoicing excessively since the heart and the *phrenes* are the best endowed with feeling.<sup>93</sup>

τῆς μέντοι φρονήσιος οὐδετέρῳ μέτεστιν, ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων αἴτιος ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστίν· ὡς οὖν καὶ τῆς φρονήσιος τοῦ ἡέρος πρώτος αἰσθάνεται τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐόντων, οὕτω καὶ ἣν τις μεταβολὴ ἰσχυρὴ γένηται ἐν τῷ ἡέρι ὑπὸ τῶν ὠρέων, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐωυτοῦ διάφορος γίνεται ὁ ἐγκέφαλος.

Neither [the heart nor the *phrenes*] has any share of *phronesis*, but the brain is the cause of all such things. As therefore it is the first out of all the constituents of the body to perceive the *phronesis* of the air, so too if any violent change happens in the wind on account of the seasons, then the brain itself also becomes different.

There is a clear dissociation between the emotional faculty of the *phrenes* and the cognitive action of the similar verbal form *phronein*; the writer acknowledges the terminology of *phrenes* as entirely apart from their actual function.<sup>94</sup> The *phrenes* are neither associated with the action of thinking nor comprehending, and they are expressly not given a hegemonic role within the body. The author also references those

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<sup>93</sup> Translation of αἰσθάνεται here following Jones (1923).

<sup>94</sup> The term is usually translated as ‘diaphragm’ in editions of the Hippocratic corpus which negates any potential confusion with the Homeric or tragic *phrenes*..



who posit a cardiocentric model, and similarly rejects the opinion that the heart is involved in perception with nod to similarly misleading etymology.

Rather, it is the brain which is responsible for these actions; the heart and the *phrenes* are to be considered only as emotional faculties, through which an individual experiences feelings in response to the perception and understanding which is carried out by the brain. The need for the writer to indulge in this detailed explanation implies that the *phrenes* must have been considered by a significant amount of people to be responsible for thought and understanding, although unlike in other Hippocratic polemic against the early philosophers, it is not clear who specifically the criticism is intended for beyond those generally who assigned cognitive primary to the *phrenes* and those who posited a cardiocentric model. The haematocentric theories of Empedocles and *On Breaths* are not drawn into the discussion, although it seems plausible from the remarks concerning *phronesis* and the air that the author was familiar with, or at least contemporary with, the ideas expressed in *Breaths*.

*On the Sacred Disease* reflects how sleep and dreaming were understood in an encephalocentric system, and how, methodologically, the Hippocratic author reached his conclusions through both comparison with activity in the patient's waking state and through wider hypotheses on the interactions of substances. Notably, despite the overreaching argument being that of encephalocentricism, the author retains the persistent notion that both the quantity and the movement of the blood are imperative to the individual's cognitive state. This treatise, as with *On Breaths*, was intended for delivery to an audience. It too retains many stylistic and even sophistic flourishes, yet the content (and in particular, the terminology) has certainly not been compromised. How do the more medically-focused texts present similar cases? Several other Hippocratic accounts which reference disturbances to the sleep are worth considering more closely, as the breakdown of functions can often further clarify how processes were understood. Working from the pathological to the normal is often employed in the reconstruction of modern structural models of cognition, as the pathological becomes a "clue" to an understanding of normal function.<sup>95</sup>

### **3.3 Parasomnia in the Hippocratic Corpus: An Appendix**

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<sup>95</sup> Brown (1977), ix: "The pattern of dissolution in the normal system determines the symptoms of pathological behaviour." Brown's evidence in support of this methodology derives from his work in modern human neuropsychology, following initial development in relation to language disorders in 1972.

The following accounts are intended to highlight a number of parasomnias, and observations on sleep, which appear throughout the HC. It is by no means an exhaustive list, and is intended only to provide an overview of the variety of ways in which sleep and dreams are presented in the corpus. A detailed study of all such cases is beyond the scope of this thesis.<sup>96</sup>

Parasomnia is a modern medical term which neatly encapsulates the wide range of disruptive behaviours which can occur during all stages of sleep: nightmares, night terrors, sleepwalking (somnambulism), sleeptalking (somniaquy), teeth grinding (bruxism), open eyes (nocturnal lagophthalmos) are the most familiar, along with the less common REM sleep behaviour disorder (RBD). This latter condition is characterised by patients acting out vivid and intense (often violent) dreams during REM sleep, when their body is usually paralysed, and unlike other parasomnias which occur in non-REM sleep, the patient when awake is typically alert and has vivid recollection of dream content and mental activity.<sup>97</sup>

In applying the term parasomnia it should be highlighted that it is not enforcing any overall unity to the various Hippocratic accounts below, but rather is used to collectively draw together similar accounts of disorder to sleep and/or dreams. Given the Hippocratic use of *para-* as a prefix to denote disorder, however, parasomnia is in a way an unusually apt word here.

### 3.3.1 INDIGESTION

#### *On Ancient Medicine 10*

ταῦτα δὲ πάντα, καὶ ὅταν δειπνεῖν ἐπιχειρήσῃ, ἀηδέστερος μὲν ὁ σῆτος, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ οὐ δύναται ὅσα ἀριστιζόμενος πρότερον ἐδείπνει. ταῦτα δὲ αὐτὰ μετὰ στρόφου καὶ ψόφου καταβαίνοντα συγκαίει τὴν κοιλίην, δυσκοιτέουσί τε καὶ ἐνυπνιάζουσι τεταραγμένα τε καὶ θορυβώδεα. πολλοῖσι δὲ καὶ τούτων αὕτη ἀρχὴ νόσου ἐγένετο.

Besides all this, whenever he attempts to eat, food is nauseous, he is not able to consume what he formerly used to eat for breakfast. This food, descending into the stomach with colic and noise, burns, bringing a bad night's sleep, and dreams troubling and turbulent. Many experience such things at the onset of an illness.

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<sup>96</sup> Hulskamp's 2008 doctoral thesis makes good headway in providing this type of study.

<sup>97</sup> Markov et al (2006), 69-76.

This description from *On Ancient Medicine* is clear as to both cause and effect here. The patient is unable to eat, owing to a disruption of his usual meal pattern. When he does attempt to eat, even foods which he is normally accustomed to, it causes him both physiological and psychological discomfort in that he experiences severe indigestion – described as burning – and then is unable to sleep well, plagued by unsettling dreams. This is also then identified by the Hippocratic writer as a common experience at the onset of any disease. There is no specific details as to the content of the dream beyond its ‘troubling and turbulent’ nature – possibly then more suitably referred to as a nightmare, rather than a dream – but the disturbed sleep and disturbed dreams are reflective of the disturbed state of the body itself. Indigestion is thus linked directly to poor sleep and nightmares.

### 3.3.2 PHRENITIS

#### ***Coan Prenotions 89***

Ἐνύπνια τὰ ἐν φρενίτιδι, ἐναργῆ.

Dreams in phrenitis are vivid.

#### ***Prorrhetic I***

Ἐνύπνια τὰ ἐν φρενιτικοῖς ἐναργέα.

Dreams in phrenitis are vivid.

#### ***Diseases II, 72***

Φρενίτις· δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖσι σπλάγχνοισιν εἶναι οἷον ἄκανθα καὶ κεντέειν, καὶ ἄση αὐτὸν λάζυται· καὶ τὸ φῶς φεύγει καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τὸ σκότος φιλέει, καὶ φόβος λάζεται. καὶ αἱ φρένες οἰδέουσιν ἐκτός, καὶ ἀλγέει ψαυόμενος. καὶ φοβεῖται, καὶ δείματα ὄρα καὶ ὄνειρατα φοβερά καὶ τοὺς τεθνηκότας ἐνίοτε.

Phrenitis: it seems that something is in the inward parts, just like a thorn, and stabs them; loathing seizes him [the patient], he flees the light and men, and he loves the dark, and fear seizes him. His diaphragm swells outwards, and is painful when touched. He is afraid, and sees terrible things, frightful dreams, and sometimes the dead.

The earliest reference to *phrenitis* as an affliction is in the HC, where it appears across many different works; there seems to be a shared understanding of its basic features,

giving some indication of its acknowledgement as a disease before the texts were written.<sup>98</sup>

The first two brief references make clear that the dream experience for the patient suffering from *phrenitis* is heightened to such an extent that it is a discernible symptom. The author here has no interest in the dream's imagery, rather it is only the means by which one can identify or verify the patient's case of *phrenitis*. The vividness of the dream experience is picked up in the longer passage from *Diseases III* which also elaborates further as to the dream contents: in his sleep, the patient sees dreams which are frightening, and even may include appearances from the dead. This picks up on a common cultural belief about dreams, established as early as Homer, that it is one context in which the dead may visit the living, and be able to communicate directly with them. Rather than bear any cultural significance here, this dream has been reintegrated into a medical context as a symptom of *phrenitis*. The same imagery of the dead in dreams will also make a reappearance in the diagnostic dream guide *On Regimen IV* - see 5.5

### 3.3.3 THE LIVER & THE PHRENES

#### *Internal Affections 48* [repeated in *Critical Days 3*]

Τὰ δ' ὀξέα γίνεται τῶν νοσημάτων ἀπὸ χολῆς, ὀκόταν ἐπὶ τὸ ἥπαρ ἐπιρρυῆ, καὶ ἐς τὴν κεφαλὴν καταστῆ ... καὶ ὀκόταν τὸ ἥπαρ μᾶλλον ἀναπτυχθῆ πρὸς τὰς φρένας, παραφρονέει· καὶ προφαίνεσθαι οἱ δοκέει πρὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρπετὰ καὶ ἄλλα παντοδαπὰ θηρία, καὶ ὀπλίτας μαχομένους, καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς δοκέει μάχεσθαι· καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγει ὡς ὀρέων, καὶ ἐξέρχεται, καὶ ἀπειλεῖ, ἢν μὴ τις αὐτὸν ἐὼν διεξιέναι· καὶ ἢν ἀναστῆ, οὐ δύναται αἶρειν τὰ σκέλεα, ἀλλὰ πίπτει. οἱ δὲ πόδες αἰεὶ ψυχροὶ γίνονται· καὶ ὀκόταν καθεύδῃ, ἀναΐσσει ἐκ τοῦ ὕπνου, καὶ ἐνύπνια ὀρῆ φοβερά. τῷδε δὲ γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ ἐνυπνίων ἀναΐσσει καὶ φοβέεται· ὅταν ἐννοος γένηται, ἀφηγεῖται τὰ ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα ὀκοῖα καὶ τῷ σώματι ἐποίηέ τε καὶ τῇ γλώσση ἔλεγε. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὧδε πάσχει.

Acute diseases happen due to bile, whenever it floods the liver, and settles in the head ... And whenever the liver expands further against the diaphragm, he [the patient] is delirious, and it seems that before his eyes there appears creeping reptiles and all other beasts, and fighting heavily-armed soldiers, and it seems to him that he is among them fighting; he talks as though he sees such things, and he attacks forth, and keeps away, if anyone prevents him from going outside; if he does stand up, he is not able to lift his legs, and falls. His feet are always cold, and whenever he lies down in bed, he jumps up from his sleep, and he

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<sup>98</sup> Jouanna (1999), 142 argues that the diseases which are first described in the HC were already well-known to physicians of the period.

sees fearful dreams. We know that he jumps up and is afraid due to his dreams, because: whenever he is in his right mind, he reports such dreams that correspond to the actions of his body and the words of his tongue. These things he suffers thus.

This account (and its duplicate in the compilation *Critical Days 3*) details the effect wrought on the patient by an influx of bile to the liver, which then causes the liver to push out against the diaphragm (*phrenes*). This impact on the *phrenes* creates a state of extreme psychological disturbance for the patient, both while awake and while asleep; the disruption to normal psychological functioning is signalled by παραφρονέει, the prefix παρα- commonly used by the Hippocratic writers to denote damaged thought.<sup>99</sup> The described affliction has been likened to a case of *phrenitis*, and the parallels with the previous section are clear, particularly the emphasis on the vivid nature of the dreams.<sup>100</sup>

The hallucinatory nature of the visions he experiences is emphasized by the repetitive use of δοκέει – it seems – highlighting the patient experience from the perspective of the onlooker. These strange waking visions are carried over into sleep, where they are described as inducing fear in the patient, to the extent that they cause a physical response – he jumps up out of his bed. Once the patient is awake and in his ‘right mind’ – presumably, no longer afflicted by the bilious excess – he can recall his dreams, and their content maps on to the actions and words he spoke in his sleep. This allows the physician to determine that it is the contents of the dream itself which are troubling the patient in sleep. Through the patient’s actions and speech in his sleep, the dream content is thus in a way discernible to the outside world; the body physiologically replicates what the patient is experiencing in his private dream world.

This particular account is also a notable description in relation to the modern parasomnia RBD: the patient acts out his intense dreams, but also, remarkably, has full recollection of his dream content on waking. Comparison of the the Hippocratic account above to a clinical account from a 2006 study highlights some clear areas of overlap:

‘RBD individuals do not seem to enact their customary dreams; dreams that end up being enacted are altered and more threatening. Individuals with RBD also report increased violent content of dreams. Behaviours in individuals with RBD include limb and body jerking, punching,

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<sup>99</sup> Byl & Szafran (1996), 99.

<sup>100</sup> Hulskamp (2013), 43n27

kicking, talking, shouting, swearing, leaping from bed, running into walls or furniture.’<sup>101</sup>

Thought retrodiagnosis is often a futile exercise, the similarities between the Hippocratic patient and the description above are striking; it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that these physicians are both describing the same affliction.

### 3.3.4 EPILEPSY AND CONVULSIONS

#### *Coan Prenotions 20*

Τὰ δ’ ἐπιρριγέοντα, καὶ ἐς νύκτα μᾶλλον τι παροξυνόμενα, ἀγρυπνα, φλεδονώδεα, ἐν τοῖσιν ὕπνοισιν ἔστιν ὅτε οὔρον ὑπ’ αὐτοὺς χαλῶντες, ἐς σπασμὸν ἀποτελευτᾷ.

Those [diseases] which chill, in the night are more virulent; sleeplessness, loquaciousness, and urinary incontinence in sleep, ends in convulsion.

#### *Coan Prenotions 81*

Ἐν ὀξέσι κίνησις, ῥιπτασμός, ὕπνος ταραχώδης, σπασμὸν ἐνίοισι σημαίνει.

In acute cases, movement, tossing about in bed, troubling sleep, sometimes signal a convulsion.

#### *Coan Prenotions 587*

Ἐπιληπτικοῖς οὔρα λεπτὰ καὶ ἄπεπτα παρὰ τὸ ἔθος ἄνευ πλησμονῆς, ἐπίληψιν σημαίνει, ἄλλως τε κῆν τις ἐς ἀκρώμιον ἢ τράχηλον ἢ μετάφρενον πόνος ἢ σπασμὸς ἐμπεπτῶκη, ἢ νάρκη περιγίνηται τοῦ σώματος, ἢ ταραχώδες ἐνύπνιον ἐωράκη.

In epileptics: thin and unconcocted urine, unusual, without surfeit, indicates an attack, or else a pain or convulsion attacking the shoulder, neck or back, or numbness coming over the body, or he sees troubling dreams.

These three accounts clarify that disturbance during sleep was a symptom to be taken seriously. The type of disruption to sleep and dreams varies, and can be anything from tossing and turning in bed to complete insomnia. Dreams themselves are highlighted rather than the state of sleep in the last extract; their placement alongside other

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<sup>101</sup> Markov et al (2006), 73.

expressly physical symptoms is indicative of the Hippocratic author's treatment of them as a legitimate form of medical prognosis.

It is not sleep or dreams which have a harmful impact on the body in these cases, but rather they are indicative of the type of illness afflicting the patient. The type of sleep experienced by the patient is ultimately an outward manifestation of the internal state of the body, and thus disruption to it broadly indicates a problem; the specific nature of the sleep disturbance can then be used to interpret the potential outcome, or for diagnosing a current affliction. For dreams to be used as a symptom is slightly different however, as they are not an outward manifestation *per se*, but rather they are themselves internal, and un-observable by anyone other than the patient. Nevertheless, as the above extract shows, they were not regarded as any less informative than the physical symptoms with which they are grouped.

### 3.3.5 WET DREAMS

#### *Generation I*

Καὶ οἱ ἐξονειρώσσοντες διὰ τὰδε ἐξονειρώσσουσιν· ἐπὴν τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι διακεχυμένον ἔη καὶ διάθερμον, εἴτε ὑπὸ ταλαιπωρίας, εἴτε καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου τινός, ἀφρέει· καὶ ἀποκρινομένου ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὀρᾶν παρίσταται οἷη λαγνεΐη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν τοιοῦτο ὅπερ λαγνεύοντι· ἀλλ' οὐ μοι περὶ ὄνειρατων καὶ παντὸς τοῦ νοσήματος ἔτι ἐστὶ, καὶ ὀκόσα ἐργάζεται, καὶ διότι πρὸ μανίης.

Wet dreamers have emissions of semen during sleep for the following reasons: when the moisture in the body is dispersed and heated through, either because of exercise or from anything else, it foams; and ejaculation from the patient occurs with visions of sexual intercourse, for the moisture is just like that of someone having intercourse. But I have nothing further about dreams and the whole affliction, and all such things it leads to, and for what reason it precedes madness.

#### *Epidemics IV, 57*

Νίκιππος ἐν πυρετοῖσιν ἐξωνείρασε, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπέδωκεν ἐπὶ τὸ χειρὸν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οἱ τοῦτο πλεονάκις ἐγένετο καὶ οὐδὲν ἔβλαψε. προερρέθη ὅτι παύσεται ὅταν οἱ πυρετοὶ κριθῶσι, καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτω. Κριτίας ἐν πυρετοῖσιν ὑπὸ ἐνυπνίων ὠχλεῖτο ὑφ' οἴων οἰδέομεν. ἐπαύσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἅμα κρίσει.

Nikippos had a wet dream during fever, and it made nothing worse. And the same thing happened several times, and caused no harm. It was predicted that it would stop whenever the fever reached crisis, and so it did. Critias, during fever, was troubled by arousing dreams; he also stopped at the same time as the crisis.

#### *Epidemics VI, 29*

Σάτυρος, ἐν Θάσῳ, παρωνύμιον ἑκαλεῖτο γρυπαλώπηξ, περὶ ἕτεα ἐὼν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν, ἐξωνείρωσσε πολλάκις· προῆει δ' αὐτῷ καὶ δι' ἡμέρης πλεονάκις· γενόμενος δὲ περὶ ἕτεα τριήκοντα, φθινώδης ἐγένετο καὶ ἀπέθανεν.

Satyros in Thasos, was nicknamed Griffin-fox, he was almost twenty-five years, and often had wet dreams; it also frequently continued into the daytime. As he approached thirty years, he became consumptive and died.

Wet dreams feature in Hippocratic patient cases as a specific sub-category of dream experience. In the examples above, the first account from *Generation* outlines a general aetiology for wet dreams: they are linked to the effect of heat on the body's inherent moisture. Exertion or activity causes the moisture to be both diffused and heated, which in turn causes it to foam, and thus be ejaculated from the patient. This occurs alongside the dream visions of intercourse, which are adduced due to the emission being the same as that which occurs in actual intercourse.<sup>102</sup> There is little actual explanation as to why these specifically sexual dreams themselves come about in terms of the imagery itself, other than that it is related to the quality of moisture, and the action of heat. The Hippocratic author quite abruptly ends his discussion on dreams, intimating at a connection between these types of dreams and *mania*, but unfortunately providing no further information either here or elsewhere in the text.

In *Epidemics* 4 and 6, wet dreams are presented as the focus of two patient cases: one charting the pathology of fever, and the other reporting the dreams themselves as an affliction. In *Epidemics* 4, Nikippos and Critias both experience wet dreams during fever: for the former, these wet dreams are described as harmless, though they occur repeatedly, and it is reported that they come to an end, as suspected, when the fever had reached its crisis. For the latter, less detail is provided as to the dreams' frequency, but the course of the affliction is the same: the wet dreams stop when the fever breaks. In the case of Critias, the sparsity of physiological detail combined with the word choice – ὥχλεῖτο – has prompted the suggestion that his case is more focused on psychological disturbance, with ὥχλεῖτο qualifying Critias' own perception of the experience.<sup>103</sup> For the pathology of fever to involve wet dreams is not surprising, given the explanation provided in *Generation* that the cause is the effect of heat on the body's moisture, it follows, then, in these cases that a fever would

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<sup>102</sup> Lonie (1981), 108 'the pattern of argument here is characteristic of the author: he adduces an apparent exception which in fact supports his case.'

<sup>103</sup> Thumiger (2017), 246.



exacerbate such an action. When the fever breaks and the constitution of the bodily qualities regains its balance, the wet dreams cease.

In the report of *Epidemics* 6, the patient Satyros (his name does not seem to be connected to his affliction<sup>104</sup>) also suffers from wet dreams, though here they are themselves the affliction. As with Nicippus they are described as occurring repeatedly, though for Satyros this is not explicitly associated with fever. It is noted that his dreams often continue during the daytime, a particularly irregular sign, until finally five years later he becomes consumptive and dies. It is difficult to ascertain a clear pathology from such a brief account; a recent interpretation has followed Galen in diagnosing Satyros with consumption and thus interpreting the wet dreams as symptomatic of consumption, rather than causing it.<sup>105</sup>

### 3.3.6 FEVER

#### *Epidemics I, 26 η'*

Ἐρασῖνος ὤκει παρὰ Βοώτεω χαράδρην. πῦρ ἔλαβεν μετὰ δεῖπνον, νύκτα ταραχώδης. ἡμέρην τὴν πρώτην δι' ἡσυχίης, νύκτα ἐπιπόνως. δευτέρῃ πάντα παρωξύνθη, ἔς νύκτα παρέκρουσε. τρίτῃ ἐπιπόνως, πολλὰ παρέκρουσε. τετάρτῃ δυσφορώτατα· ἔς δὲ τὴν νύκτα οὐδὲν ἐκοιμήθη· ἐνύπνια καὶ λογισμοί· ἔπειτα χεῖρω, μεγάλα καὶ ἐπίκαιρα, φόβος, δυσφορία. πέμπτῃ πρὸς κατήρητο· κατενόει πάντα· πολὺ δὲ πρὸ μέσου ἡμέρης ἐξεμάνη, κατέχειν οὐκ ἠδύνατο, ἄκρεα ψυχρὰ ὑποπέλια, οὔρα ἐπέστη· ἀπέθανε περὶ ἡλίου δυσμάς.

Erasinus lived by the gully of Boötes. Fever seized after his meal; a troubled night.

*First day* quiet, night painful.

*Second day* all irritated, delirium in the night.

*Third day* pain, much delirium.

*Fourth day* most grievous; no sleep in the night, dreams and wandering.

Then worse, pressing and serious, fear and vexation.

*Fifth day* early in the morning recovered sense, understanding all things; long before midday he was driven mad, unable to control himself, extremities cold and discoloured, urine halted. He died around sunset.

#### *Aphorisms 2*

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<sup>104</sup> Though Galen takes great interest in his nickname, extrapolating from it the features which the man must have had, and subsequently proposing a diagnosis of organ weakness and consumption – cf. Gal. *Comm. Hipp. Epid.* VI 503.31ff.

<sup>105</sup> Ando (2009), 667. This interpretation has been questioned, given the text's emphasis on the five year period between the wet dreams and the onset of consumption. But, given consumption's nature as a disease of longevity it does not seem too far-fetched – cf. esp. Lawlor (2007).

LXVII. Ἐν τοῖσι πυρετοῖσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων φόβοι, ἢ σπασμοί, κακόν.

In fevers, fears from sleep, or convulsions, are bad.

Sleep – and potentially dreams, in the second account – are here associated with the patient experiencing a fever. As before, the disruptions to sleep in these accounts are listed as pathological. These parasomnias themselves do not cause fever. Why the fever brings such disturbance to sleep is not explicitly discussed, though given the previous section’s discussion on wet dreams caused by the effects of heat, it is possible the dream content itself could be a cause of disturbance. Furthermore, general discomfort from the sharp increase in temperature evidently plays a large part; if sleep is broadly considered to be dependent on some type of drop in bodily temperature, then the increased temperature of fever will interfere with the state’s natural onset.

The patient case notes of Erasimus provide a useful insight into what the physician regarded as notable in observing the course of the illness. Erasimus is struck by fever after a meal, and thereafter his patterns of sleep and state of mind are evidently of great interest to his physician. At the beginning of the affliction, the first day is passed quietly but the night brings much pain. By the second day, the pain has moved into the daytime, and the night brings psychological distress too, as he becomes delirious. By the fourth day, the night-time afflictions have further deteriorated into an array of disruptions: sleeplessness, dreams, wandering and fear, an emotion commonly associated with parasomnia. He seems to recover temporarily on the morning of the fifth, but dies soon thereafter. The increasingly disturbed behaviour during the night then can be more reliably taken as indicative of the severity of the fever, whereas in the daytime his condition becomes misleading, as on the final day he appears to be improving before fatality hits.

The second brief note reiterates the diagnostic message of Erasimus’ case: fears from sleep, during the course of a fever, are a bad sign. It seems plausible that this should be interpreted as referring to a fearful dream. This parasomatic symptom is notable for its psychological nature, in that it is the emotional response (fear) of the patient’s experience that is diagnostically useful here. On imagery which is beneficial for the feverish patient to see in their dreams, see **4.3**.

### 3.3.7 THE EYES

#### ***Aphorisms 2***

LII. Σκοπεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ τὰς ὑποφάσιαι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐν τοῖσιν ὕπνοισιν· ἦν γάρ τι ὑποφαίνεται τοῦ λευκοῦ, ὁ συμβαλλομένων τῶν βλεφάρων, μὴ ἐκ διαρροῆς ἐόντι ἢ φαρμακοποισίης, φλαῦρον τὸ σημεῖον καὶ θανατῶδες σφόδρα.

It is necessary to examine the half-opened eyes in sleep. For if some of the whites can be seen, when the eyelids are closed, and it is not from diarrhoea or purging, it is a bad sign, even certainly fatal.

#### ***Coan Prenotions 64***

Οἱ ἐκφυσῶντες καὶ ἀνακεκλασμένοι ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοισιν ὑποβλέποντες, ἰκτερώδεες κατακορέες θνήσκουσιν· λευκὸν διαχώρημα τούτοισι προδιέρχεται.

Those who snore loudly and are weakened in their sleep with eyes half opened, die of intense jaundice. They pass white stools.

#### ***Coan Prenotions 214***

καὶ βλέφαρα μὴ συμβάλλειν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν, ὀλέθριον·

For the eyelids not to come together in sleep is fatal.

These accounts highlight a physiological aspect to sleep which can be used as a prognostic tool: the healthy sleeper will have his or her eyes closed, but in the above cases the half-opening of the eyes can spell disaster for the patient. Obviously, the patient will not be able to report on such behaviour, thus it necessitates observation from someone else. In *Aphorisms*, it is clarified that such an occurrence is a bad sign specifically if the whites of the eyes are visible while the patient is asleep, and it is not due to diarrhoea or purging, though the author does not give any further explanation. In *Coan Prenotions*, the phenomenon is first grouped together with loud snoring, and is also described as 'weakening' the patient, leading to death by jaundice. It is also noted that these patients pass white stools, which, when combined with the reported jaundice is suggestive of an underlying liver problem.

All three accounts are clear about the fatality of patients exhibiting this particular symptom. Rather than it being cited as the cause of death, the eyes open in sleep is instead taken as an indication that the patient's condition – whatever it may be – is fatal. Indeed, sleeping with the eyes open has been noted in modern palliative care as a common occurrence in the later stages of wasting and chronic diseases.<sup>106</sup>

### 3.3.8 SLEEPING PATTERNS

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<sup>106</sup> Fontaine (2007), 10.

## ***Aphorisms 2***

III. Ὕπνος, ἀγρυπνία, ἀμφοτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ μετρίου γινόμενα, κακόν.

Sleep, insomnia, either happening more than normal measure, is bad.

### ***Coan Prenotions 487***

Ἀνάκλισις βελτίστη μὲν, ὡς εἴθισται τις ὑγιαίνων· ὕπτιον δὲ κεῖσθαι, τὰ σκέλεα ἐκτεταμένον, οὐκ ἀστεῖον· εἰ δὲ καὶ καταρρέοι προπετιῆς ἐπὶ πόδας, χεῖρον· θανάσιμον δὲ καὶ καθεύδειν αἰεὶ· καὶ τὰ σκέλεα ὑπτίου κειμένου συγκεκριμένα τε εἶναι ἰσχυρῶς καὶ διαπεπλεγμένα· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γαστέρα κεῖσθαι οἷσι μὴ σύνηθες, παραφροσύνην σημαίνει καὶ πόνους περὶ κοιλίην· πόδας δὲ γυμνοὺς ἔχειν καὶ χεῖρας, μὴ θερμὸν ἔοντα ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ τὰ σκέλεα διερριφθῆναι, κακόν, ἀλυσμὸν γὰρ σημαίνει· ἀνακαθίζειν δὲ βούλεσθαι, κακόν ἐν τοῖσιν ὀξέσι, κάκιστον δὲ ἐν περιπλευμονικοῖσι καὶ πλευριτικοῖσιν. καθεύδειν δὲ χρὴ τὴν νύκτα, τὴν δὲ ἡμέρην ἐγρηγορέναι· τὸ δ' ἐναντίον, πονηρόν· ἥκιστα δ' ἂν βλάπτει τὸ πρῶτ' κοιμώμενος ἕως τοῦ τρίτου τῆς ἡμέρης· οἱ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὕπνοι, πονηροί· κάκιστον δὲ μὴ καθεύδειν μήτε ἡμέρης, μήτε νυκτός, ἢ γὰρ ὑπὸ ὀδύνης τε καὶ πόνου ἀγρυπνοίη ἂν, ἢ παραφρονήσει ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ σημείου.

The best way to sleep is how one is accustomed to whenever healthy; but to lie on one's back, with legs stretched out, is not good. If he [the patient] sinks down in bed towards the foot, it is very bad. It is fatal to yawn and always sleep, and for the legs of someone sleeping on their back to be forcefully bent together and twisted. To lie on the stomach if not accustomed to, signals derangement and pains in the abdomen. To have the feet and hands uncovered, when not strongly heated, and to kick around the legs, is bad, for it signals anguish. To want to sit up is bad in acute cases, and the worst in pneumonias and pleurisies. One should sleep at night, and be awake during the day. The opposite is grievous. It would be least harmful to sleep from dawn to the first third of the day; those who sleep after this are in a sorry way. Worst is to sleep neither in the day nor at night, for if he is kept awake by bodily pain and distress, he will be deranged because of this sign.

For the Hippocratic physician, a good regimen is the foundation for maintaining health, since it can be affected so easily by the foods eaten, drinks consumed, exercise taken and, as is evident from the above accounts, the patterns of sleep.

The brief warning in *Aphorisms* makes clear that any deviation from the regular course of sleep is a bad sign; this applies both to sleep and insomnia. The problem lies in the excess of a 'normal measure' – i.e., sleeping too much, too often, or conversely, not being able to sleep at all. Any upset to one's basic sleeping patterns is thus indicative of an underlying problem.

*Coan Prenotions* provides a more thorough account of the various irregularities that may occur during sleep, and their prognosis. The Hippocratic author works through many different scenarios, beginning with the actual positioning in sleep. Rather than specify a particular pose which should be used, the best way to sleep is instead simply described as being whatever position the patient normally adopts when healthy. An array of sleeping positions which yield a negative prognosis are then listed, with several focused on the legs and feet: lying on the back with legs outstretched, bent or twisted, uncovered feet, kicking of the legs – these are all categorised as bad, or even fatal. The reasoning behind this is not clarified, but evidently stems from patient observation. The author also clarifies the best times for sleep, warning that any deviation from the established pattern of sleeping at night and being awake during the day is harmful. He makes a concession that it would be of the least harm – but not completely harmless – for sleep to occur in the earliest portion of the day, should it be necessary. The very worst scenario is for a patient however is to sleep neither during the day nor night; if the patient is kept awake by his physiological pain, he will become ‘deranged’ – so, experience psychological disturbance – as a consequence.

# 4

## Psychological Approaches to Sleep and Dreams

*"I must learn that the dregs of my thought, my  
dreams, are the speech of my soul."  
-- Carl Jung*

Having identified the overtly physiological aspects of sleep and dreaming in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to examine more closely the role ascribed to the *psukhē* in the dreaming process, and the psychological processes underlying sleep and dreams. Using the term 'psychological' presents inherent anachronistic difficulties, thus it is important to clarify the parameters of its application in this context: most prominently, taking the term at its most literal, it will be used to describe activities of the soul (*psukhē*). But it also encompasses the range of activities operating within the body which are attributable to other cognitive, intellectual and emotional actions from the *noos*, *phrēn*, *thumos*, *gnōmē* or, in some instances, those of a more concrete physiological nature, such as the *kradia*, *kēr* and even the *enkephalos*. These must not be overlooked, as they offer valuable insight into the nuances in the understanding and presentation of psychological function. It should also be clarified that discussing psychology here does not necessarily equate with a concept of immaterial or incorporeal substances within the body. As will become clearer in the following discussion, there is not one single psychological model for either the philosophical or medical writers at this point; the nuances between each reflect the range of individual theories which develop and interact during this period. Significant attention will be devoted to the depiction of the *psukhē* in *On Regimen*, for both its prominent role during sleep, and its philosophical characteristics, ahead of the next and final chapter which provides a thorough account of *On Regimen's* guide to dream interpretation. Before moving on to the Hippocratic material however, a problematic fragment of Pindar is reassessed and resituated in the wider story of the Greek *psukhē* and its involvement in dreams before the Hippocratic writers. The key terminology from this discussion – *eidōlon* – will then reappear at the end of the chapter, as the materialist theories of the atomists are examined for their emphatic re-externalisation of the

dreaming process, in contrast to the wider contemporary trend towards psychological internalisation.

#### 4.1 *Eidōlon*: Pindar and the dreaming ‘soul’

The idea that dreams are in some way associated directly with the soul has been commonly referenced as having Pindar as its earliest proponent.<sup>1</sup> In a fragment derived from a letter in Plutarch’s *Moralia*, the topic of dreams is addressed in a manner which seems quite unlike the more formulaic-epic depictions already seen in the Pindaric odes.<sup>2</sup> The fragment is brief, and worth quoting in full:

σῶμα μὲν πάντων ἔπεται θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ,  
ζῶν δ’ ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἶδωλον·  
τὸ γὰρ ἔστι μόνον  
ἐκ θεῶν· εὕδει δὲ πρᾶσσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὐδόντεσσιν  
ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις  
δείκνυσι τερπνῶν ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν.<sup>3</sup>

And while the body of all men is encumbered by overpowering death, a living *eidōlon* of life yet remains, for it alone is from the gods. But it sleeps, while the limbs are active; yet to the sleeping, in many dreams, it shows an interpretation of future delights and pains.

Recognised commonly as also situating the ‘soul’ in an immortal context, Pindar’s fragment has usually been considered to have been influenced by Orphic-Pythagorean ideas, which in turn have been suggested as deriving from imported shamanistic cultural ideas pertaining to the soul.<sup>4</sup> The latter half of this claim in particular has been

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<sup>1</sup> Adam (1908), 131; Dodds (1951), 104; Weidhorn (1970), 17; Bremmer (1983); Parman (1991), 23; Nagy (1991); Gallop (1996); Holowchak (2002), 22; Sugg (2013), 60; Bartös (2015), 202.

<sup>2</sup> The authenticity of the letter, *Consolation to Apollonius*, has been questioned. Collected as part of the *Moralia*, it was likely not written by Plutarch himself, but is considered contemporary to his own letters in the *paramuthetike* genre (Pomeroy 1999, 77) and preserves several quotations from Pindar, as well as Aeschylus, Euripides and other writers from the Classical period.

<sup>3</sup> Pind. fr.131b

<sup>4</sup> Orphic-Pythagorean reading of the passage: Rohde (1925), 415-7; Dodds (1951), 119; Nagy (1991), 44; Brenk (1999), 104; Greenspan (2008), 54; Bartös (2015), 202. Roots in shamanism: Dodds (1951), 135--156, and more recently Parman (1991), 23 who claims the fragment can be used to date ‘this new concept of soul’. It should perhaps be clarified that I am not concerned here with Pindar’s overall beliefs on the *psukhē* – though I am sceptical that a definitive one can be assigned to him, anyway – and while he may reference the concept of the Orphic-Pythagorean immortal *psukhē* in *Olympian 2*, the context and audience of this victory ode will have undoubtedly influenced this. Willcock (1995), 138-9 highlights this in particular with reference to *Olympian 2*’s association with Akragas in Southern Italy, the home of Empedocles, and undoubtedly an area which would have been very familiar with Pythagoreanism, and he more than reasonably concludes that ‘the isolated assertions of such a doctrine [of the soul] in

undermined by Bremmer, who finds the aetiological recourse to shamanism to be especially unsubstantiated.<sup>5</sup> Setting the question of influence aside for now, it remains that most interpretations of the passage focus on it as an early articulation of the independent psychological function of the soul during sleep. But from reading the fragment closely, with attention to terminology and an absence of any post-Pindaric psychological theories to shape the text, another reading can be discerned which neither speaks of the immortality of the soul nor the soul's involvement in dreams. And this is particularly important for when we do encounter the *psukhē* and its activities during sleep later in the fifth century, in the Hippocratic *On Regimen*.

Firstly, it should be highlighted that the terminology used in the fragment is not as straightforward as most English translations like to convey: what is commonly taken to mean 'soul' is, in the Greek, not *psukhē* but *eidōlon*. The identification of *eidōlon* as *psukhē* comes as early as Pseudo-Plutarch, in the letter from which the fragment is derived, who before quoting the lines, remarks:

καὶ μικρὸν προελθὼν ἐν ἄλλῳ θρήνῳ περὶ ψυχῆς λέγων φησὶν

And shortly afterwards in another *threnos*, speaking of the soul he says...

Here, the author sets up what will become a common approach in modern scholarship, and interprets the passage as dealing with the *psukhē* based on what he, as a much later reader of the text, has recognised as a potential philosophical soul – made more apparent in the letter itself by the cited fragment being immediately followed by a discussion on the 'divine Plato' and his very discussions on the immortal soul.

Van Lieshout at first seems to be a minor exception to the common interpretative push towards the identification with the soul in that he specifically separates Pindar's *eidōlon* from any doings of a *psukhē*, as well as from a *daimon* or even *theos*.<sup>6</sup> Instead he reads it as reference to a human 'double' fallen from god into the body of the human. Nevertheless, his conclusions are fairly typical of the *psukhē* interpretation: a 'double' of man exists inside him, which is independently responsible for dreams, and so the dream 'no longer originates from the outside'. Instead, he concludes, man has now become both the agent and recipient of the dream. The

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*Olympian* 2 has more to do with Theron than with Pindar, and the Empedocles connection supports this. Such ideas being current, perhaps we are hearing an echo of a local cult in Akragas.'

<sup>5</sup> Bremmer (1983), 52.

<sup>6</sup> Van Lieshout (1980), 37-38.



'double' then carries with it a significant psychological capacity, separate from the body, and is also considered to be immortal. It is difficult to see how, aside from terminology, this is fundamentally different from the straightforward *psukhē* interpretations. The immediate pairing of the idea with a later account in Xenophon provides an insight into the anachronism in action: in ensuring Xenophon's later account 'echoes Pindar' it is necessary to read an interpretation on the latter which will allow it to fit into a neat linear progression, and grouping Pindar and Xenophon together as 'natural' theorists leaves little room for any other interpretation. The use of the term *eidōlon* is, surprisingly, not even highlighted by Van Lieshout, despite a later discussion on Democritus and his employment of the term, which remarks:

Without special effort we recognize in Demokritos' *eidōla* ... the Homeric *eidōla*, twice standing for the dream-appearance, once for the appearance of the dead Patroklos, once for Aeneias' seeming presence in the battle, after Apollo withdrawing him from the scene, and once for Herakles' Hadic existence as opposed to his *autos* existence on Olympos. [...] It might be suggested then that in both terminology and elaboration Demokritos' epistemology links up with a mythological description of the dream-phenomenon, which was qualified as 'Aussentraume', 'entire externality' and 'exoterisch'.<sup>7</sup>

If the Democritean *eidōlon* here is so easily reminiscent of Homer, and by extension, the *Aussentraume*, why does an *eidōlon* in Pindar translate to exactly the opposite?

It seems conceptually problematic to presuppose a direct and potentially misleading meaning of 'soul' in the context of the Pindaric fragment without giving proper consideration to the variations in both concepts and terminology in the pre-Platonic period in which Pindar writes; the fifth century is an intellectually busy time of investigations into the self and the *psukhē*, in both physiological and psychological terms. Thus, the appearance of *eidōlon* here is in a sense rather anomalous if it is to be taken psychologically, especially when *psukhē* could have been an entirely viable choice to convey a clearer meaning of soul in a post-Heraclitean context; Pindar elsewhere does not shy away from using the term in a variety of psychological and philosophical contexts.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Van Lieshout (1980), 96-97.

<sup>8</sup> *Pyth.* 4.122, *psukhe* is a seat of emotion (joy); *Pyth.* 1.48, *Nem.* 9.39 and *Is.* 4.53 it is a seat of courage. *Olym.* 2 and fr.113, 1-3 place *psukhe* in the world of transmigration. Padel (1992), 31

Reading *eidōlon* as synonymous with *psukhē* goes some way towards making sense of the fragment as the description of an immortal dream-generating soul if an anachronistic approach is forced upon the terminologies. Usually, this fragment is grouped with the later statements from the Hippocratic *On Regimen* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which specifically describe the *psukhē*'s activities while the body is asleep, and when set alongside these other two accounts it is easy to overlook the inherent problems of the word *eidōlon* and opt for a neater progressivist model.<sup>9</sup>

But to argue the complete interchangeability of *eidōlon* and *psukhē* is in itself problematic, as up until this point in the fifth century, beyond Homeric epic, there are no occasions in which *eidōlon* is specifically and directly used as a synonym for the kind of *psukhē* being read into the Pindar fragment. It is a ghost, a statue, an object created in the likeness of something living. It is an atomist emanation. It is not itself a *psukhē* in any psychological or philosophical sense. Therefore, should the terms *eidōlon* and *psukhē* be accepted as synonymous in Fragment 131b, they cannot refer to anything beyond what the *psukhē* represents in archaic Greek thought on the matter, as it is only in the Homeric context that the two terms can be understood as similar, if not identical.<sup>10</sup> This earlier Homeric *psukhē* is not at all identifiable with the conceptually developed immortal and expressly psychological 'soul' that will gain prominence in later Greek thought. The Homeric *psukhē* is not a psychological faculty, and unlike the 'family' of psychic organs – such as *thumos*, *noos*, *kradia*, *phrēn* – it has little direct involvement in any emotional or intellectual activities.<sup>11</sup> Instead, the Homeric *psukhē* has three unifiable but distinguishable meanings: (i) breath which endows the body with life, (ii) post-mortem existence, and more broadly, (iii) life itself, in terms of the force or energy that animates a living person.<sup>12</sup> It has no specific location in the person, and in Homeric epic the *psukhē* of a living person is only referenced when life is

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'the first time *psukhe* means soul, the essential 'you', potentially immortal, is in Heraclitus in the sixth century, followed by Pindar in the fifth century.'

<sup>9</sup> *Vict.* 4.86; *Xen.Cyr.* 8.7.21-22.

<sup>10</sup> Snell (1953), 9; Vernant (1991), 186 – 7; Bremmer (2002), 3; Krummen (2014), 28 '[Homeric] *psukhai* are *eidōla*: very convincing *eidōla* indeed.'

<sup>11</sup> Snell (1953), 8 'Homer has no one word to characterise mind or soul. *Psukhe*, the word for soul in later Greek, has no original connexion with the thinking and feeling soul'. On the range of other psychologically-functioning entities in Homer, cf. Bremmer (2002), 1; Krummen (2014). 34 'The usage of words denoting the so-called 'psychic organs' ... reflects neither the specificity of the organ's physiological function nor any semantic difference, but merely metrical shape ... In these adverbial usages the terms are semantically interchangeable, and their psychological function is single – at most, they capture something of the phenomenology of the psychological experience in question.' On the Homeric soul more specifically, see Cairns (2014) & (2016).

<sup>12</sup> Sullivan (1995), 78-79.

jeopardised.<sup>13</sup> The *psukhē* is all that survives after an individual's death, the point at which it leaves the body and flits to Hades, though its existence there is not the same as immortality.<sup>14</sup> It retains the features and likeness of the individual.<sup>15</sup> It alone survives, rather than any of the 'family' of psychic organs.<sup>16</sup>

With the Homeric precedent in mind, we can turn back to Pindar. Breaking the fragment into two halves allows for some reconsideration over who is witnessing the *eidōlon* and when, as well as the broader rereading of the fragment as more in line with standard epic-poetic depiction.

The first two lines are straightforward and particularly suited to the original context of a *threnos*.<sup>17</sup> The expressly mortal condition of the *sōma* is emphasized by the inevitable conquest of death. However, the perished *sōma* is not the end of the individual altogether. The initial pessimism is – perhaps surprisingly for Pindar – mitigated by the claim that there continues to be some form of life after death in the form of the *eidōlon*. It remains behind after the *sōma* has been overpowered by death, and is unaffected by death owing to its divine origins. So far, the lines read appropriately for the context: the mortal *sōma* and deathless *eidōlon* provide a poetic balance of sorrow and hope on the topic of death. But in making the *eidōlon* able to survive after death, has Pindar really set forth here a dualistic immortal soul? The seemingly tautological designation of the *zoon eidōlon* as being *aiōnos* has presumably further led the passage's interpretation towards such conclusions, as *aiōnos* has been highlighted as 'Orphic' vocabulary.<sup>18</sup> Such an assertion seems to overlook the several other appearances of the term in Pindar, where it repeatedly conveys the meaning of

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<sup>13</sup> Bremmer (2002), 1; Greenspan (2008), 54 pushes this further with the perhaps over-zealous claim that 'soul in Homer only becomes active in death. It has no function in a living man except to leave him.'

<sup>14</sup> e.g. *Il.* 16.855ff; Vermuele (1979), 8.

<sup>15</sup> *Il.* 23.64 - 66 is a clear example of this, as Patroclus' *psukhe* in its appearance to Achilles is described as πάντ' αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' εἰκυῖα, καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἶματα ἔστο·

<sup>16</sup> Thus Achilles after the ghost of Patroclus departs: ἦ ῥά τι ἔστι καὶ εἰν' Αἴδαο δόμοισι | ψυχὴ καὶ εἶδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν' (*Il.* 23. 103-4). Tiresias however proves an exception to this – *Od.* 10.493 – 495.

<sup>17</sup> There were several types of funeral songs, namely *threnos*, *epikedeion*, *ialemos* and *goos*. Several *threnoi* of Pindar and Simonides survive; these were the more formal songs composed for performance by the professional mourners, and characterised by 'calm restraint, gnomic and consolatory in tone rather than passionate and ecstatic' - Alexiou (2002), 102-3, cf. Hughes (2004), 14.

<sup>18</sup> Brenk (1999), 104 remarks 'aiōn is closely associated with Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine, and with the Eleusinian mysteries' but provides no textual evidence in support of these claims.

the life of a mortal, i.e. a lifetime of living existence.<sup>19</sup> It is a markedly 'living' word, and its appearances in passages which declare a particularly Greek pessimism on the ephemeral nature of mortal life define it as a term which can be used to create pointedly emphatic contrast between life and death.<sup>20</sup> It bears an inherent sense of finite temporality. Reading it in the fragment then, it could rather be an indication of the *eidōlon*'s post-mortem appearance: the *eidōlon* which is left is that of the individual's lifetime in that it is an image of them before life ended, and not their final appearance in death.<sup>21</sup>

The second half of the fragment is where the interpretation becomes more problematic. The usual reading is that Pindar is describing the *eidōlon* as dormant inside the body in waking hours, and active during sleep. It is during this activity that the *eidōlon* delivers its prophetic messages. Is there a viable alternative? The *eidōlon* is asleep while the limbs are 'active' – rather than referencing daily activity, this could also be a poetic expression of life more broadly: an inversion of the common 'loosened limbs' of death.<sup>22</sup> The *eidōlon* is inactive while the individual is alive, similarly to the Homeric *psukhē* which has little role in daily psychological activities and rather only features at times when life is either extinguished or under threat of being so. The focus of the passage then switches from the singular sleeping *eidōlon* to the plural collective 'sleepers' to whom the *eidōlon* is able to appear. Why is it now active? Is it only a change in the individual from being awake to asleep? Here, it is imperative to consider the context of the fragment, and not to overlook the message from the previous lines: an *eidōlon* remains after death. Yet here, it might be argued that the *eidōlon* is dormant during life. On this reading then, the oneirological activity of the *eidōlon* must only take place in the post-mortem stage of the individual of whom it is an *eidōlon*. This also accounts more comfortably for the plural 'sleepers' – the *eidōlon* is not appearing to its own sleeping originative individual, but rather in its existence after death it is able to appear in dreams to others and deliver prophetic messages. Pindar is not espousing a

<sup>19</sup> Pi. *Pyth* 3.86; 4.186; 5.7; 8.97; *Isth.* 3.17b; 7.42; *Olym.* 2.67. Not to mention its regular use in Homeric epic, where it conveys a similar meaning to Homeric *psukhē* of an individual's 'life-force' – cf. Claus (1981), 11 – 13.

<sup>20</sup> See especially *Pythian* 8, 95-97 and *Isthmian* 7, 40-43.

<sup>21</sup> That the *eidōlon* took the appearance of the deceased prior to their death is reflected in archaic Greek art; differentiating the deceased from the common artistic representations of the *psukhē* as a small winged featureless shadow in the Underworld. See esp. Vermeule (1979), 30-31. Iconographical terminology, however, rarely draws any distinction between an *eidōlon* and a *psukhē* – even in depictions of scenes from Homer in which the text is clear that the apparition is a *psukhē*, the catalogued information will refer to the figure as an *eidōlon*.

<sup>22</sup> A regular stock phrase in Homer for death, e.g. *Il.* 4.469, 11.240, 16.400, 16.465 λῦσε δὲ γυῖα; *Il.* 7.12, 16 λύντο δὲ γυῖα; cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 46 θανάτῳ λυσιμελεῖ.

self-prophetic immortal soul here which conducts its activities during the sleep of the body. Otherwise, what use would the *eidōlon* be after the death of the body, if it can only prophesize and interact with the sleeper from whom it originates? The *eidōlon* of Fragment 131 may not be a philosophical or religious *psukhē*. Pindar may not be describing the first dream-generative immortal soul, trapped in an Orphic-Pythagorean *sōma*. Rather, through a non-psychological reading which avoids conflation and anachronism with later more developed concepts on the *psukhē*, it is possible to identify the fragment as falling fairly neatly in line with the epic depiction of ‘images’ of the dead and their appearance in dreams to impart messages about the future. This statement, in the context of a *threnos*, is a means of consolation: the *sōma* of the deceased may be gone, but their *eidōlon* survives and has the capacity to appear to the bereaved in their sleep, and still exert influence on their daily life.

The dreaming ‘soul’ here in Pindar fr.131b then, if read in this way, cannot be the inspiration of what shall be the focus of our examination in the Hippocratic *On Regimen*, but rather emphasizes the continuation of epic machinery in the poetic portrayal of dream experiences in the fifth century. The Pindaric dream on this interpretation thus remains external, visitational, and without any direct involvement from a ‘soul’.

#### **4.2 Hippocratic *psukhai***

How does a physician incorporate the soul within his wider understanding of the body? This is a question which still arises even in modern discourse on the philosophy of medicine, and the idea of a ‘soul’ has been subject to investigation throughout the history of medicine.<sup>23</sup> In evaluating the soul in fifth-century Greek thought it should be emphasized that the care of the *psukhē* was by no means exclusively considered to be the domain of the philosopher alone. There was no strict delineation between philosophical writing and that which might be deemed more ‘scientific’ to modern interpreters. While the early philosophers tackled more ‘medical’ subjects such as physiology and embryology, the medical writers also often dealt with

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<sup>23</sup> The medical question of soul was perhaps most famously explored by the Victorian physician Duncan MacDougall in his experiments to ‘weigh’ the soul; by recording the exact weight of six patients immediately before and after death, he claimed that there was a loss of ‘three-fourths of an ounce’. (MacDougall 1907). There are a handful of works which consider the relationship between doctor and soul more broadly in medicine, cf. esp. Frankl (1946) *Arztliche Seelsorge*.

more ‘philosophical’ ideas such as perception, psychology, and even the *psukhē* itself. Consequently, questions of the body and *psukhē* were a matter of interest to both.<sup>24</sup>

Just as the Hippocratic writers’ theories and speculations on physiology cannot be said to be wholly uniform, neither do the ideas and beliefs concerning the *psukhē* or wider psychological function follow any one particular conception throughout the corpus. Even within periods there is variation, with some works showing a more marked philosophical interest while others reject such approaches. Concerning the dream as a psychological phenomenon, there is also little agreement among the few Hippocratic passages in which the topic is addressed, though there is a clear understanding of such phenomena as wholly internalised.

Beyond *On Regimen*, which directly deals with the soul and its composition, *psukhē* has a generally limited appearance within the fifth-century works of the Hippocratic corpus, although it is not quite as limited as has been previously suggested. In his dedicated monograph on the meaning of soul before Plato, Claus cites just two Hippocratic works from this period as mentioning *psukhē*: *On Regimen I* and *Airs, Waters, Places*.<sup>25</sup> Already, the rest of *On Regimen* – particularly the fourth book – can be added to this.<sup>26</sup> But there are also several other brief references to the *psukhē* which, although limited, should not be immediately overlooked. In addition to *Airs, Waters, Places* and *On Regimen* there are nine other texts from the fifth century in which *psukhē* is explicitly mentioned.<sup>27</sup> It is of course by no means a dedicated focus of study – with an exception perhaps for *On Regimen* – in these early Hippocratic texts, but its occasional appearance without any detailed elaboration or justification of use shows it was considered by the writers in question as a viable terminological option, another recognisable part of the human machinery which was, as the opening of *On Flesh* outlines, to be questioned as a standard and expected part of medical investigation:

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<sup>24</sup> Harris-McCoy (2012), 106 “The physician, as much as the philosopher, might be concerned with the nature of the soul, whose problems could also be addressed by a medicinal regime. It would be a mistake, for example, to suggest that the philosopher tends to the soul, while the doctor to the body, in the Greek mindset more generally.”

<sup>25</sup> Claus (1981), 142-155. He specifically references *Regimen I* as being, after *Airs, Waters, Places*, ‘the only other early text in which *psukhe* is found’, though he later mentions its appearance in *Epidemics VI* and *On Humours* – presumably associating them with a later date.

<sup>26</sup> Claus (1981), 152 n.22 clarifies that he omits *On Regimen IV* from his discussion due to an absence of date, though, this is a fairly blanket problem with the Hippocratic corpus and not restricted to *On Regimen IV* alone. Recent scholarship, as already mentioned, has successfully argued for the rehabilitation of IV with the rest of the text.

<sup>27</sup> *Affect.* 47; *Aph.* 87; *Artic.* 33; *Carn.* 1; *Epid.* VI, 5; *Flat.* 14; *Hum.* 9; *Nat. Hom.* 6; *Prorrh.* II, 12.

περὶ δὲ τῶν μετεώρων οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν μὴ τοσοῦτον ἐς  
ἄνθρωπον ἀποδείξω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, ὅπως ἔφυ καὶ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὅ τι  
ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ὅ τι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ ὅ τι τὸ κάμνειν, καὶ ὅ τι τὸ ἐν  
ἀνθρώπῳ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅθεν ἀποθνήσκει.<sup>28</sup>

I have no need to speak concerning the heavens, unless to point out  
how man and the other living creatures are brought forth and come into  
being, what the soul is, what health and sickness are, what in man is bad  
and good, and from where arises death.

The other appearances of *psukhē* are altogether varied, and it has a range of functions ascribed to it by the different fifth century Hippocratic writers. In one of the earlier appearances in *Airs, Waters, Places* (mid-late fifth century BC) it is referenced alongside the *sōma* to denote the person as a whole, both physiologically and psychologically, as the text examines how both the *ēthos* and *eidos* of man can ultimately come to be affected by the climate of the area in which he lives.<sup>29</sup> Throughout the passage (*Aer.* 23) the *psukhē* is associated with several qualities of man's *ēthos*, usually appearing in loose pairings in relation to the dichotomous picture the writer wishes to present of the Asian and European peoples.<sup>30</sup> Sluggishness (ῥαθυμία) and endurance (ταλαιπωρία) of the *psukhē* are related to the climate, and in turn these characteristics themselves lead directly to the formulation of cowardice (δειλία) and courageousness (ἀνδρεῖα) in men. Thus according to the Hippocratic writer, the disposition of the Asian peoples is environmentally shaped to be more cowardly, while that of the Europeans is more courageous. This is also then remarked upon as being further impacted by their political institutions, and it is the *psukhē* in particular which becomes 'enslaved' under the rule of kings.

αἱ γὰρ ψυχαὶ δεδούλωνται καὶ οὐ βούλονται παρακινδυνεύειν  
ἐκόντες εἰκῆ ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίας δυνάμιος.<sup>31</sup>

For the souls (of men) are enslaved and are unwilling to take  
risks purposefully to grant power to another.

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<sup>28</sup> *Carn.* 1

<sup>29</sup> Bartōs (2006), 65.

<sup>30</sup> An area of great interest to the contemporary Herodotus, writing c.440BC. Thomas (2000), esp.75-101 provides a detailed study of the ideas of environmental determinism and the Greek-barbarian divide in both *Airs, Waters, Places* and Herodotus.

<sup>31</sup> *Aer.* 23

The idea of the *psukhē* as able to be ‘enslaved’ in some way will reappear, though in a different context, in *On Regimen*. Here however, for the author of *Airs, Waters, Places*, it is evident that the *psukhē* has a strong ethical association; it is closely linked with characteristics and qualities of man’s *ethos* in a manner reminiscent of early lyric poetry.<sup>32</sup> Yet rather than separate the *psukhē* from the *sōma* as fundamentally different, the Hippocratic writer presents them as both identically affected by the natural environment to emphasize that the whole of man – both physiologically and psychologically – is subject to his surroundings.<sup>33</sup>

*Prorrhetic 2* seems at first to take *psukhē* as synonymous with *gnōmē*, as the writer switches between the two in an extended discussion of the impact of wounds upon the physiological and psychological health of man. But *psukhē* is used only when speaking very broadly, while *gnōmē* is used to detail an identifiable symptom:

ὄσοι γὰρ ἂν ἡ τὸ σῶμα πυρετῶδες ἔχουσιν ἢ τὰς γνώμας θορυβώδεας,  
τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχουσιν. ἀλλὰ χρὴ μήτε ταῦτα θαυμάζειν, μήτε  
ὀρρωδέειν κείνα, εἰδότα ὅτι αἱ ψυχαί τε καὶ τὰ σώματα πλεῖστον  
διαφέρουσιν αἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ δύναμιν ἔχουσι μεγίστην.<sup>34</sup>

For they suffer such things, whether they have a fevered body or confused thoughts. But one must neither be perplexed by the former nor dread the latter, knowing that the souls and the bodies of men differ to the greatest extent, and have the greatest power.

There seems to be a very subtle but identifiable distinction between the use of *gnōmē* and *psukhē* in that the former is used when referencing a recognisable symptom – confused thoughts – while the latter is invoked as part of a more generalising maxim on the two main ‘components’ of man’s health, in a fashion similar to that of *Airs, Waters, Places*. That both appear as counterparts to *sōma* does not immediately translate into their complete synonymy as the references to *sōma* follow the same pattern between symptom and maxim: τὸ σῶμα πυρετῶδες is the identifiable individual symptom, while τὰ σώματα switches the focus to a broader generalisation. Thus *psukhē* again seems to be the faculty which encapsulates all psychological activity in man while the *sōma* is representative of the physiological, though in contrast to the

<sup>32</sup> See esp. Pindar *Pyth.* 1.47-8 & *Pyth.* 3.40-2, Tyrtaeus 12.18; cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 27-28.

<sup>33</sup> Reiss (2003), 81-82 also highlights the switch in this text, as well as in *On the Sacred Disease* and *Nature of Man*, to speaking of the *psukhe* in terms of ‘universalities’ rather than specific individualities.

<sup>34</sup> *Prorrh.* 2.12



author of *Airs, Waters, Places*, the author here is emphatic of the great differences between them rather than the similarities – Bartōs refers to this as the first example of a *psukhē* -*sōma* contrast in post-Homeric literature.<sup>35</sup> In *Affections* 46, the advice that the best help for patients is to administer food and drink in accordance with τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν also highlights this employment of the two terms in juxtaposition as a reference indicative of man as a whole, as well as the implicit acknowledgement that the physician is responsible for both physiological and psychological care of the individual.

Later into the fifth century, *On Breaths* moves away from generalisations and, as covered in the previous chapter (3.2.2), the Hippocratic author discusses more specifically the intellectual and emotional capacity of the *psukhē* as subject to physiological change within the body.<sup>36</sup> When there is an increase in the amount of blood in the body, due to drunkenness, both the *psukhē* and the *phronēmata* in the *psukhē* undergo change which results in an altered emotional state. In *Nature of Man* 6, brief and dismissive reference is made to those who believe that blood is the *psukhē* in man – perhaps a reference to *On Breaths*, or even Empedocles – which again highlights the strictly physical nature which some proposed of the *psukhē*.

*On Joints* 23 mentions the *psukhē* in passing, in perhaps a more Homeric context of risk to life. This brief reference occurs in a long discussion on the treatment of dislocation to the upper and/or lower jaw, and the necessity of correcting any unnatural extension which has arisen through injury or accident as it may prove fatal:

ἦν δὲ μὴ ἐμπέση, κίνδυνος περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπὸ πυρετῶν συνεχέων καὶ  
νωθρῆς καρώσιος —καρώδεες γὰρ οἱ μύες οὔτοι, καὶ ἀλλοιούμενοι καὶ  
έντεινόμενοι παρὰ φύσιν—φιλεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ γαστήρ ὑποχωρεῖν τούτοισι  
χολώδεα ἄκρητα ὀλίγα.<sup>37</sup>

But if this [the dislocation] is not reduced, the soul is endangered by acute fever and deep coma – for these muscles when displaced and stretched beyond their nature cause coma – and usually also the belly passes off small amounts of pure bilious matter.

If the dislocation to the jaw is not corrected then there is a mortal danger: patients with these symptoms will die after around ten days. The writer clarifies however that

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<sup>35</sup> Bartōs (2006), 66.

<sup>36</sup> *Flat.* 14

<sup>37</sup> *Artic.* 23

this endangerment of the *psukhē* is specifically linked to the onset of acute fever and deep coma, which associates, albeit very loosely, the *psukhē* once again with heat, as well as with consciousness more broadly.

This association with feverish disease reappears in *Epidemics VI*, as does the link between the quality of heat inherent in the *psukhē* and the consequential damage inflicted on the *sōma*:

Ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύεται μέχρι θανάτου· ἦν δὲ ἐκπυρωθῆ ἅμα τῆ νούσῳ  
καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, τὸ σῶμα φέρβεται.<sup>38</sup>

The soul of man grows until death; if the soul is burning hot with disease, it consumes the body.

The *psukhē* is in a state of continual growth throughout a man's life, alluding to its potentially physical nature. It can also be afflicted by disease, and this affliction can extend from the *psukhē* to the body through the excess of a quality – and again it is the quality of heat that is associated with the *psukhē*. The author of *Epidemics VI* thus seems to have a particularly physiological view of the *psukhē* – however, a few sections later, his rather obscure remark ψυχῆς περίπατος φροντὶς ἀνθρώποισιν highlights that it retains some association with the intellectual capacity of man.

*Humours*, a treatise considered to be closely allied with *Epidemics VI*, is especially useful as it details a wide range of psychological symptoms underneath the simple category heading Ψυχῆς.<sup>39</sup> These encompass a number of different Hippocratic ideas on the *psukhē* that have been hinted at elsewhere, from the physiological and perceptual to the emotional and ethical. It is composed as a list of notes rather than any detailed account, and various different symptoms appear in quick succession with little space for elaboration. The first half deals with matters of character and habit, with reference to emotional as well as intellectual preoccupations, and basic functions such as eating, drinking and sleeping:

Ψυχῆς, ἀκρασίη ποτῶν καὶ βρωμάτων, ὕπνου, ἐγρηγόρσιος, ἡ δι'  
ἔρωτάς τινος, οἶον κύβων, ἡ διὰ τέχνας ἡ δι' ἀνάγκας καρτερίη πόνων,  
καὶ ὄντινων τεταγμένη ἢ ἄτακτος· αἰ μεταβολαὶ ἐξ οἶων ἐς οἶα. ἐκ τῶν

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<sup>38</sup> *Epid.* 6.12

<sup>39</sup> Craik (2015), 90-91 – alongside *Epidemics II* and *IV*, which, along with *VI*, form one collection dating to the very end of the fifth century. *Epidemics I* and *III* together date to 410BC, while *Epidemics V* and *VII* are mid-fourth century.

ἠθέων, φιλοπονίη ψυχῆς, ἢ ζητῶν, ἢ μελετῶν, ἢ ὀρῶν, ἢ λέγων, ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο, οἷον λῦπαι, δυσοργησίαι, ἐπιθυμίαι.<sup>40</sup>

Of the soul: intemperance in food and drink, in sleep and in wakefulness, or endurance of toil due to either certain passions – such as dice – or due to work, or necessity, and whether these are fixed or irregular in pattern. Changes from such things into the others. Of character, laborious of soul, whether in inquiry, practice, sight or speech, or if of another sort, inclined to pains, bad tempers and strong desires.

The *psukhē* has close association with ethical matters, similarly to the depiction in *Airs, Waters, Places*; it also links problems with the *psukhē* to more visible manifestations through behaviour in relation to patterns of regimen – of which food, drink and sleep are of key importance in the dedicated treatise *On Regimen*, and as will be explored later in the chapter, are inextricably linked to the *psukhē* and its condition. The comment on sleep and wakefulness is especially notable, as it shows that in some cases both hypersomnia and insomnia are considered indicative of a problem originating in the *psukhē* specifically, which can then impact on physiological health, rather than simply being symptoms of a physiological disturbance.<sup>41</sup>

The passage then moves on to discuss several different psychophysical scenarios. In contrast to the brevity of previous remarks, the Hippocratic writer here recounts in specific detail the physical reactions of the body to various psychological stimuli:

οἷα τὰ σώματα, μύλης μὲν τριφθείσης πρὸς ἑωυτήν, ὀδόντες ἠμώδησαν, παρά τε κοῖλον παριόντι σκέλεα τρέμει, ὅταν τε τῆσι χερσί τις, ὧν μὴ δεῖται, αἶρη, αὐται τρέμουσιν, ὄφρις ἐξαίφνης ὀφθεις χλωρότητα ἐποίησεν. οἱ φόβοι, αἰσχύνη, λύπη, ἡδονή, ὀργή, ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὕτως ὑπακούει ἐκάστῳ τὸ προσῆκον τοῦ σώματος τῆ πρήξει, ἐν τούτοισιν ἰδρῶτες, καρδίας παλμός, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.<sup>42</sup>

How the body reacts: when the mill thrashes itself the teeth grind; when standing by a ravine the legs tremble; whenever one lifts up something which one should not by the hands, they tremble; the sudden sight of a snake causes pallor. Fears, shame, pain, pleasure, anger and all

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<sup>40</sup> *Hum.9*

<sup>41</sup> Hulskamp (2008), 89 ‘if there is a prolonged situation of too much sleeping or too much waking, this in turn is likely to affect physical symptoms. In such a scenario then, insomnia or troubled sleep can become the cause of physical problems rather than a symptom of them.’

<sup>42</sup> *Hum.9*

other such things, to each the members of the body thus answers by activity, in this way thus also sweats, palpitation of the heart, and other such things.

The Hippocratic author portrays a parallelism in the actions of the body and the *psukhē*.<sup>43</sup> Situations which provoke an emotional reaction from the *psukhē* also cause a physiological reaction from the body.<sup>44</sup> Fear is perhaps the most clearly articulated of these: standing by a great drop in height causes the legs to tremble, while suddenly seeing a potential danger – in this case a snake - drains all colour from the face. Each different emotion can have an impact on the body, illustrating the interactive nature of the psychological and physiological aspects of man as well as the psychosomatic nature of emotions.

*Aphorisms* – particularly section 87 - is notable for its depiction of the *psukhē* as possessing an inherent heat capable of movement within the body, which causes a loss of moisture and ultimately leads to death. The *psukhē* seems again to possess a fairly active role in the ‘living’ aspect of the individual, and is possibly associated in some way with the *pneuma* though the passage is rather unclear, and has been subject to rearrangement over the years. The Hippocratic author alludes to the *psukhē* at death briefly, albeit still in a somewhat obscure manner:

ἀπολείπουσα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τοῦ σώματος σκῆνος τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν εἶδωλον ἅμα καὶ χολῆ καὶ αἷματι καὶ φλέγματι καὶ σαρκὶ παρέδωκεν.<sup>45</sup>

And the soul, leaving the encasement of the body, hands over the cold and mortal *eidōlon* along with the bile, blood, phlegm and flesh.

The depiction of the *psukhē* here has an almost philosophical portrayal; the description of it as being temporarily encased inside τὸ τοῦ σώματος σκῆνος suggests that the Hippocratic author considers the *psukhē* to be able to both leave and survive the *sōma*. The association of the *psukhē* with the quality of heat is once again alluded to by reference to the cold condition of the *eidōlon* post-mortem, when the *psukhē* has departed; furthermore, it is suggested that the *psukhē* is separate from the humoral substances of the mortal body.

The wider discussion in *Aphorisms* concerning the qualities of heat and cold and the dissipation of *pneuma* through pores of the body in death, in addition to the use

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<sup>43</sup> Pigeaud (2006), 44.

<sup>44</sup> Gundert (2000), 29 ‘psychological factors influence somatic processes.’

<sup>45</sup> *Aph.*8.88

of σκῆνος in particular – often translated as ‘tabernacle’<sup>46</sup> – is perhaps a reflection of some interaction with Democritus.<sup>47</sup> As a term, σκῆνος is in itself rare in the medical and philosophical literature before this point: it is not used by any Presocratic writer before Democritus, and in the Hippocratic corpus it only appears in two other texts: the loosely contemporary *On Anatomy* (late fifth/early fourth century BC) and the later Hellenistic treatise *On the Heart* (300-250BC).<sup>48</sup>

Overall though, while there may not be a single model which accounts for *psukhē* in terms of specific functioning, responsibilities, or even aetiology, it is clear that the fifth-century Hippocratic writers were all working within the same general understanding of psychological activity – especially psychological afflictions – as wholly internalised and a natural component of man. As neither daemonic nor a means of divine punishment or retribution, these psychological afflictions run their course in the body the same as any physiological disease, and similar preventative and curative methods can be used. The *psukhē* and the *sōma* represent two parts of one whole – man himself – and it is understanding the nature of man as a whole that is of interest to the physician, thus separating the *psukhē* from the *sōma* entirely would be impossible.<sup>49</sup>

It is this emphasis on internalisation which raises the question of how dreams, as another traditionally ‘daemonic’ type of activity, are understood both as an internal psychophysical process and as a quasi-perceptual experience for the dreamer. *On Regimen* deals with the topic of dreams, as well as the *psukhē*, most extensively within the Hippocratic corpus and as such will form the main focus of the rest of the chapter. Considering the physiological interferences in sleep and dream already discussed in the previous chapter, how does the Hippocratic author align the *psukhē*’s new role in

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<sup>46</sup> Guthrie (1965), 436 in his discussion on its use in Democritus, highlights that ‘the word [*skenos*] survived to represent a very different relationship between the soul and body in the New Testament’ – which seems to have also been transferred to the English ‘tabernacle’, making its use in translation potentially misleading. The Hippocratic and Democritean usages are highlighted in passing by Lindgard (2005), 141 n.129 in his discussion of *skenos* as the body in 2 *Corinthians* 5, after he argues at 140-1 that ‘the noun has the sense of a tent, but is very rarely used of real tents. The normal usage is the transferred use as denotation of living or dead bodies.’ In the quotation from the Hippocratic *Aphorisms*, it is clear from both the vocabulary and its emphatic positioning – τὸ τοῦ σώματος σκῆνος – that the *skenos* is intended to signify the enclosure of the body.

<sup>47</sup> B87 especially.

<sup>48</sup> Vlastos (1945), 579 n.11 highlights these two occurrences (though he does not mention *Aphorisms*), and refers to *skenos* as ‘Democritus’ characteristic term for the body’. He also remarks upon a further Democritean influence in additional terminology employed in *On Anatomy*.

<sup>49</sup> Gundert (2000), 35; Bartōs (2006), 70-71; Harris-McCoy (2012), 110.

both dreams and the body more widely with expressly materialist physiological concepts?

### **4.3 ON REGIMEN**

#### **4.3.1 On Regimen and the *psukhē***

Before moving on to the relationship between dreams and the *psukhē* within *On Regimen*, it is important to establish what kind of *psukhē* the Hippocratic author is working with in this particular context, especially given the lack of definitive *psukhē* in any of the earlier or contemporary medical texts. The prolonged discussion of the *psukhē* in *On Regimen* is unique within the Hippocratic corpus, and the author assigns an evident importance to both the composition and capabilities of the *psukhē*, in addition to its interaction with the body and its relationship with the wider cosmos. The work has often been recognised as having a strong Heraclitean influence, and there are certainly several identifiable features from Presocratic philosophy more broadly. At the beginning of the work, the Hippocratic author sets forth his agenda and announces that to treat human regimen properly, it is necessary to know and understand the *phusis* of man. This not only refers to the physiological aspects of man, but also requires that the physician have a proper knowledge of the *psukhē* – an approach not limited to *On Regimen*, as evidenced by the opening statement of *On Flesh* seen in the previous section, but nevertheless still emphatic in its specific identification of the *psukhē* as a matter of great importance to the physician.

The *psukhē* of *On Regimen* is the most conceptually developed of all the Hippocratic discussions on soul.<sup>50</sup> That is not to say it is to be considered as completely separate to the other accounts of *psukhē* circulating in the Hippocratic writings of the fifth century; there are several features of the *psukhē* in *On Regimen* which are shared with, and indeed expand upon, the previous descriptions. It also shows a close affinity with the speculations of the natural philosophers, hinting at times a familiarity with Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, Empedocles and Anaxagoras.<sup>51</sup> The influence of natural philosophy is however perhaps most evident in the claim that the *psukhē* – and even the cosmos more widely – is composed of two basic elements, fire and water, in a balanced *sunkrēsis*.<sup>52</sup> This gives the *psukhē* a more formal and clearly defined relationship with the quality of heat, and by positing a balanced *sunkrēsis* it allows for

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<sup>50</sup> Hankinson (1998), 28 characterises *On Regimen* I in particular as ‘severely theoretical’; Jouanna (2012), 203 calls it a ‘very dynamic and concrete conception of the soul’.

<sup>51</sup> Hankinson (1998), 29

<sup>52</sup> *Vict.* 1.7 & 25.

the possibility of imbalance as the cause of disease and ill-health. There is also an emphasis throughout on the proper ordering and arrangement – *diakosmeitai* – of the parts and constituents of man by fire, the organising principle, and the basic elements from which everything is composed.<sup>53</sup> *On Regimen* I provides an extensive discussion of the *psukhē* in terms of its material constitution, and also gives further insight into the wider nature of the *psukhē* within the body. Significantly, the *psukhē* is given a physical presence and location in the body as part of this orderly arrangement of man, which itself is arranged in an imitation of the organisation of the wider cosmos.<sup>54</sup> Having described the structure of the body in terms of the abdomen (aligned with the sea) and the surrounding dense mass - i.e. the flesh - in which it is enclosed (aligned with the earth), the Hippocratic author details how there are three similarly micro-macrocosmic circuits located in this dense mass:

αἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα τῶν ὑγρῶν, σελήνης δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω περιφορὴν, πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον, ἄστρων δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ μέσαι καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι. τὸ θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ, ὅπερ πάντων ἐπικρατεῖται, διέπον ἅπαντα κατὰ φύσιν, αἰκτον καὶ ὄψει καὶ ψαύσει, ἐν τούτῳ ψυχὴ, νόος, φρόνησις, αὔξεισις, κίνησις, μείωσις, διάλλαξις, ὕπνος, ἔγερσις<sup>55</sup>

Those towards the hollows of the moist [i.e. the abdomen], the power of the moon; those towards the outermost circumference, beside the enclosing flesh, the power of the stars; those in the middle, limited on both the inner and outer sides, the hottest and strongest fire, the very thing which prevails over all, organising everything according to nature, unyielding to sight and touch. In this are soul, intellect, sense, growth, motion, decrease, mutation, sleep, waking.

Though evidently not precise in its anatomical location, the account of the circuits nevertheless illustrates how the Hippocratic author conceives of the broader organisation and machinations inside the body. *Psukhē* itself, along with a range of psychological and physiological processes with which the soul is associated, resides in the middle of the three circuits. From both the account here and a later passage in the fourth book of *On Regimen*, it is clear that, just as the inner and outer circuits are

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<sup>53</sup> *Vict.* 1.6 & 10.

<sup>54</sup> Boylan (2015), 15 argues that the link between the circuits of the body and the heavenly bodies is ‘a stretch’ in materialist *phusis* terms, and rather sees it as indicative of a ‘magical’ *phusis* view. This seems hasty, especially given the emphasis throughout *On Regimen* of the material dualism - in the *sunkrēsis* of fire and water - which forms all things. Moreover, his brief and generalising approach to blood and the soul in the Hippocratic corpus leads to a rather misleading and confused depiction of Hippocratic opinions on both.

<sup>55</sup> *Vict.* 1.10

associated with the power of the moon and stars respectively, this middle circuit is linked to the power of the sun.<sup>56</sup>

Throughout the treatise, the *psukhē* is referred to as ‘entering’ the body of man, and is subject to the same growth and nourishment that the body experiences:

ἔσέρπει δὲ ἐς ἄνθρωπον ψυχὴ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν ἔχουσα, μοίρην σώματος ἀνθρώπου· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ θήλεια καὶ ἄρσενά πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα τρέφεται τε καὶ αὖξεται διαίτη τῇ περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πάντα τὰ ἐσιόντα.<sup>57</sup>

Into man enters soul, possessing a blend of fire and water, a portion of the body of man. These, both female and male, many and of all sorts, are nourished and increased by human regimen; so it is necessary that the things which enter possess all the parts.

Other living things are not denied *psukhē*, rather it is argued that the human *psukhē* is only suitable to grow within man as this is the locus to which it is naturally adapted.<sup>58</sup> For this reason the author concludes that the *psukhē* of man cannot grow in any other living creature – a possible refutation of other well-known contemporary theories which suggested the transmigration of souls between humans and other animals.<sup>59</sup>

The *psukhē* is not only influenced by regimen in the context of physiological matters such as nutrition and growth. *On Regimen I* ends with a protracted account of the impact that even the most subtle variation in the *sunkrēsis* of fire and water can have on each individual man, particularly in relation to intellectual ability of the *psukhē* itself – Περὶ δὲ φρονήσιος ψυχῆς ὀνομαζομένης καὶ ἀφροσύνης - inquiry into which was a popular topic in fifth-century philosophical discourse.<sup>60</sup> That the *psukhē* (via the

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<sup>56</sup> *Vict.* 4.89.

<sup>57</sup> *Vict.* 1.7

<sup>58</sup> *Vict.* 1.6 διὰ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ αὐξάνεται, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. That he accepts other creatures to possess a soul is further suggested in the opening of the subsequent section, in which he clarifies that it is the *psukhe* of man rather than of any of the other living creatures which is of most immediate interest to him.

<sup>59</sup> Both Pythagoras and Empedocles believed in the transmigration of soul into other animals, and even plants, as Empedocles’ infamous declaration on his own reincarnations had claimed: ἦδη γὰρ ποτ’ ἐγὼ γενόμεν κοῦρός τε κόρη τε θάμνος τ’ οἰωνός τε καὶ ἔξαλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς (B117) – though it should be clarified that Empedocles preferred the term *daimon* to *psukhe*. For a full account of Pythagorean and Empedoclean beliefs on human-animal transmigration, in addition to those of Plato’s *Timaeus*, see esp. Osborne (2007), 45-64.

<sup>60</sup> In *Phaedo* 96b, Socrates gives a famously anonymised account of the different theories he had encountered of his predecessors on the question of ‘what it is in us that thinks’, alluding in turn to Empedocles, Diogenes of Apollonia/Anaximenes, Heraclitus and Alcmaeon: καὶ πότερον τὸ αἶμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ’ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁσφραίνεσθαι ...; cf. Rowe (1993), 230; Gallop (1993), 94; Jouanna (2012), 200.



elemental blend) is the part of man which is responsible for intellectual processes had already been hinted at 1.21 in a reference to statue-makers:

Ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ μίμησιν σώματος ποιέουσιν πλὴν ψυχῆς, γνῶμην δὲ ἔχοντα οὐ ποιέουσιν.<sup>61</sup>

Statue-makers fashion a copy of the body without the soul, so they do not make things which have intelligence.

A statue may be an exact *mimēsis* of the external visible body, but the statue-maker is unable to replicate the internal and invisible aspects of the body and so will always fall short of a complete replication – in this case the Hippocratic author focuses on the lack of *psukhē* which in turn is characterised by a lack of intelligence. This direct connection between the *psukhē* and intelligence is then extensively picked up at 1.35. Taking up once more man’s fundamental material dualism, the author posits that the most intellectually capable *psukhē* is naturally that which is composed of the most balanced *sunkrēsis* of fire and water; this *psukhē* is the most sensible, and has the best memory. The varying degrees of mixture have specific consequences depending on whether it is fire or water that is in excess:

<b>Blend Composition</b>	<b>Characteristic</b>
Fire   Water in equal blend	Most intelligent <i>psukhē</i>
Fire < Water by a small degree	Intelligent but with slowed senses
Fire < Water by a larger degree	<i>Psukhē</i> slowed, foolish
Fire < Water by the largest degree	Senseless and stupid; madness
Fire > Water by a small degree	Intelligent but with quickened senses
Fire > Water by a larger degree	<i>Psukhē</i> rushed; inconsistent in perception and judgement
Fire > Water by the largest degree	<i>Psukhē</i> too quick; ‘hypo’-madness

Even from a summative overview, it is apparent that within the *sunkrēsis* of the *psukhē*, fire and water are associated respectively with quickness and slowness. This manifests in different levels of intellectual capability, influencing the operation of the senses as well as wider psychological functions. A *psukhē* in which water is the dominant force is slowed and as such it experiences sluggish perceptual and intellectual function. It is this slowness that has adverse effects on function; the distortion it causes to perception and judgement results not only in a characterisation of the individual as senseless (ἄφρων) and stupid (ἐμβρόντητος), but is also attested to by their activity:

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<sup>61</sup> *Vict.* 1.21

οὔτοι κλαίουσί τε οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, δεδίασί τε τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ, λυπέονται  
τε ἐπὶ τοῖσι μὴ προσήκουσι, αἰσθάνονται τε ἔτεῃ οὐδενὸς ὡς προσήκει  
τοὺς φρονέοντας.<sup>62</sup>

These people weep on account of nothing, they fear the unfearful, they are pained by things of no concern to them, and they perceive in a manner not at all akin to those in their right mind.

Thus the variation in the blend of the *psukhē* becomes visible and identifiable through abnormal psychological responses in which the individual's reaction is entirely opposed to the expected standard behaviour. By contrast, an excess of fire results in an over-acceleration in perception and judgement, creating a 'skittish' *psukhē* which also leads to madness.<sup>63</sup>

The approach in accounting for differing levels of intellectual ability bears strong similarity to the psychological theory of Empedocles.<sup>64</sup> For him, intelligence is based on the *krasis* of the four primary elements in the blood – earth, wind, fire and water – and it is the blood itself which is held to be the source of all thought. An account from Theophrastus (A86; *De sensibus* 10-11) illustrates how variations in the composition of this *krasis* have similar outcomes to the individual's intellectual and perceptual capabilities to those described above:

<b>Blend</b>	<b>Characteristic</b>
All elements in balance	Most intelligent, sharpest perception
All elements out of balance	Very least intelligence
Loose and intermittent elements	Slow and laborious
Dense and closely-packed elements	Quick and impulsive
Evenly spaced elements	Clever and skilled

The underlying elemental blend is obviously slightly different in Empedocles as he considers it to be composed of all four elements rather than only fire and water, however the basic premise as well as the descriptions of subsequent impact on intellectual ability remains the same. Degrees of intelligence and perception depend upon the constituent elements in the psychological organ – for Empedocles, the blood, for *On Regimen*, the *psukhē* itself. Appropriate to the context of *On Regimen* however, is the Hippocratic author's noteworthy claim that the variable blends of the *psukhē* can be directly altered by implementing specific changes to regimen, thus making it possible

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<sup>62</sup> *Vict.* 1.35, 80

<sup>63</sup> Holmes (2013), 17-18.

<sup>64</sup> As identified by many, most prominently Joly (1960), 88-89; Jouanna (2012), 215.

to obtain the most intelligent *psukhē* via diet and exercise - ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ φρονιμωτάτη ἂν εἴη.<sup>65</sup>

Exercises as part of regimen can include simple tasks such as walking and running, which target the ‘inner’ parts of the *psukhē*, but the author also clarifies that processes of sensory perception are considered to be ‘natural’ exercises.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, the *psukhē* is not only involved with, but also directly affected by, the actions of the sensory organs. In sight, the *psukhē* turns its attention to that which is visible, and in doing so is moved and warmed, with this warmth then having a drying effect which empties out moisture. In hearing, the *psukhē* is itself struck by noise, which again results in movement and warmth, and thus a drying out of moisture. Sound has a similarly direct effect:

ὁκόσοι δὲ πόνοι φωνῆς, ἢ λέξεις ἢ ἀναγνώσεις ἢ ᾠδαί, πάντες οὗτοι κινέουσι τὴν ψυχὴν.<sup>67</sup>

Exercises of the voice, whether by speech or by reading aloud or by song, these all move the soul.

Listed alongside these sensory processes is also the ‘care’ (μέριμνα) of man, which too is listed as a form of natural exercise, and this results in the same physiological reaction on the *psukhē* of movement – warmth – drying, once again emphasizing the dynamic nature of the *psukhē* as well as its physiological presence within the body.

By formulating a method of therapeutic intervention by which the individual can improve their own *psukhē*, the Hippocratic writer in *On Regimen* creates another niche for himself in the medical marketplace. It is not only in cases of physical afflictions or maladies that the physician is able to intervene to restore a normal and balanced state of health to the individual, but now the intellectual and perceptual capabilities of each individual are able to be augmented towards a better – or rather, the best – state.<sup>68</sup>

However, unfortunately for the Hippocratic patient, not all human characteristics can be so easily altered by attention to regimen. Having explained the

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<sup>65</sup> *Vict.* 1.35.

<sup>66</sup> *Vict.* 2.63 διότι τοῖς εἴσω τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσιν οἱ πόνοι ὄντες; *Vict.* 2.61 οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν εἰσιν ὁψιος πόνος, ἀκοῆς, φωνῆς, μερίμνης.

<sup>67</sup> *Vict.* 2.61

<sup>68</sup> Holmes (2010), 183 highlights the potentially problematic impact on medical discourse from this type of intervention: ‘if physiological approaches to human nature guarantee not simply living but living well, the concepts of pathology and norm come under pressure [...] The more broadly health is understood, the more complicated the idea of pathology becomes.’

benefits to the *psukhē*'s intelligence of alterations in regimen, the Hippocratic author then cautions:

τῶν δὲ τοιούτων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ σύγκρησις αἰτίη· οἷον ὀξύθυμος, ῥάθυμος, δόλιος, ἀπλοῦς, δυσμενής, εὖνους· τῶν τοιούτων ἀπάντων ἡ φύσις τῶν πόρων δι' ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ πορεύεται, αἰτίη ἐστὶ·<sup>69</sup>

But the blend is not the cause of the following things: irascibility, apathy, deceitfulness, silliness, hostility and kindness. The cause of all such things is the nature of the passages through which the soul moves.

These particular features chosen by the author are more associated with emotion and behaviour than with intellectual ability, and thus already in some way operating in a separate sphere from the area in which the blend of the *psukhē* has direct influence. It is not the case however that these characteristics are simply beyond the control of the *psukhē* and thus immutable; rather, they are ultimately derived from the individual nature of the passages through which the *psukhē* itself moves, as well as the objects it encounters and things with which it mixes in the process.<sup>70</sup> This kind of internal physiological composition cannot be altered by simple changes to regimen, indeed the Hippocratic author deems this impossible, positing that such things of an 'unseen nature' cannot be remoulded.<sup>71</sup>

It should be apparent that the *psukhē* of *On Regimen* then marks a significant development from the earlier scant accounts which were scattered throughout the other fifth century Hippocratic works. It is a complex and fully integrated part of man, and is involved in a wide range of activities with responsibility for numerous functions, both physiological and psychological. Understanding how the *psukhē* operates in the waking life of the individual will help further elucidate the actions ascribed to it in sleep, and in particular will be a useful point of reference for understanding its role as a communicator in dreams.

#### **4.3.2 *On Regimen* and the dreaming *psukhē***

That the *psukhē* is involved in the dreaming process is especially of interest to the author of *On Regimen*, for it is through this involvement that there arises specific imagery during sleep which can be interpreted in relation to the health of the patient,

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<sup>69</sup> *Vict.* 1.36

<sup>70</sup> *Vict.* 1.36

<sup>71</sup> *Vict.* 1.36 φύσιν γὰρ μεταπλάσαι ἀφανέα οὐχ οἷόν τε. Hankinson (1991), 205 relegates this remark to its 'native obscurity'. It does raise the question of how the *sunkrēsis* of the soul is not counted among that which is 'unseen', although this is a question which the Hippocratic author does not answer.

using his own detailed guide in Book IV, and to which a tailored regimen can then be applied. The interpretation of these different dream scenarios and their symbolism will be looked at more closely in the next chapter; here, the focus is on the descriptions of the *psukhē* itself, and the explanations offered as to how it comes to be involved in the dreaming process.

The first reference to the *psukhē* as explicitly responsible for dreaming is the well-known metaphorical depiction from the opening of *On Regimen IV*, which invokes a picture of household management and control to articulate the *psukhē's* responsibilities:

ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐγρηγορότι μὲν τῷ σώματι ὑπηρετέουσα, ἐπὶ πολλὰ μεριζομένη, οὐ γίνεται αὐτῇ ἐωυτῆς, ἀλλ' ἀποδίδωσί τι μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκοῆ, ὄψει, ψαύσει, ὁδοιπορίῃ, πρήξει παντὸς τοῦ σώματος· αὐτῇ δὲ ἐωυτῆς ἢ διάνοια οὐ γίνεται. ὅταν δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἡσυχάσῃ, ἡ ψυχὴ κινεομένη καὶ ἐγρηγορέουσα διοικεῖ τὸν ἐωυτῆς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος πρήξιας ἀπάσας αὐτῇ διαπρήσεται.<sup>72</sup>

For the soul is servant to the body when it is awake, and divided among many things, she does not engage in her own affairs, but instead gives away some part of itself to each process of the body: to hearing, to sight, to touch, to walking and all the actions of the body; but thought does not belong to itself. Whenever the body is at rest, the soul, set in motion and awake, manages her own household, and herself accomplishes all the actions of the body.

The language is immediately clear as to the position of *psukhē* as subservient – or obedient – to the body when it is awake. *ὑπηρετέουσα*, meaning to be servant to (particularly with the dative, as here), can also be used for referring to someone carrying out service on board ship as a rower.<sup>73</sup> The Hippocratic author then emphasizes his point further by developing the metaphor into one of Greek domestic life, making clear that the *psukhē* may have a subordinate role to the body but yet it can still exert influence in a particular sphere of its own. Thus, the *psukhē* is only able to operate autonomously when the body is at rest, for during waking hours the *psukhē* is busy working under the aegis of the body to fulfil all of the latter's functions, and as such is divided across many tasks relating to both perception and more straightforward physical activity. The comment that ἡ διάνοια is also never able to act

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<sup>72</sup> *Vict.* 4.86

<sup>73</sup> Though the rower/ship and soul association is not developed any further by the Hippocratic author, the parallel is helpful in illustrating the work done by the soul to ensure the body can function. It should not be conflated with later metaphorical descriptions of the soul as the helmsman of the body; the emphasis here is evidently on the soul in a subordinate position, far from any governing or steering role.

independently is slightly puzzling; as a term it has not been used in the previous accounts of the *psukhē* and intelligence, and it is not referenced again in the discussion of the ascendancy of the *psukhē* during sleep. ἡ διάνοια may perhaps most suitably be understood as the process of thinking, or simply a thought or notion itself, rather than anything as overtly physiological as a designated psychological ‘organ’ within the body.<sup>74</sup> On this reading it is the act of thought rather than any specific organ or faculty which is impeded; thinking does not have any freedom from the other processes within the body while it is awake. It is as involved as the *psukhē* is in matters of waking perception and activity.

It is worth more closely considering the household metaphors at play here to further refine the picture being presented by the Hippocratic writer. The domestic portrayal of the *psukhē* ascribes to it an emphatically gendered, feminine characterisation in its management of the household affairs when the body is at rest. This picture of domestic responsibility between *sōma* and *psukhē* bears resemblance to descriptions of the ordering of the household in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*.<sup>75</sup> Particularly with respect to the external and internal nature of how *sōma* and *psukhē* function, a comment from *Oeconomicus* on how the gender roles were considered at the time more fully develops what this domestic metaphor would have meant to a contemporary Greek audience:

τῆ μὲν γὰρ γυναικὶ κάλλιον ἔνδον μένειν ἢ θύραυλεῖν, τῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ αἰσχίον ἔνδον μένειν ἢ τῶν ἔξω ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.<sup>76</sup>

Thus for the woman it is better to stay inside than to venture outside, but for the man it is more reproachful to remain indoors than to manage external affairs.

Read in respect to this idea then, the *psukhē*’s metaphorical management of household affairs is intended to reflect the concept of a wholly internal mode of operation. The *sōma* is primarily concerned with the external, outdoor world just as a Greek patriarch, while the *psukhē* in her autonomous activity is restricted to the internal, indoor world, just as a Greek matriarch.

The *psukhē* of *On Regimen* IV then, in managing her own internal ‘household’ while the body sleeps, acts autonomously and is herself able to replicate the actions

<sup>74</sup> Joly (1984) similarly opts to translate it as *l’intelligence*, rather than *l’esprit*.

<sup>75</sup> Although a slightly later text (Pomeroy 1994, 8 suggests it was still being composed c.362BC), Xenophon encapsulates the wider cultural attitudes in the Classical period towards such domestic situations.

<sup>76</sup> Xen.*Oec.*30

which the body accomplishes during waking life – clarified by the Hippocratic writer as including sensory perception as well as physical activity. Sensory perception is still considered to occur during sleep in an imitation of that which occurs during the day, presumably accounting for the appearance of dreams:

τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα καθεῦδον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἡ δὲ ἐγρηγορούσα  
γινώσκει πάντα, καὶ ὄρῃ τε τὰ ὄρατὰ καὶ ἀκούει τὰ ἀκουστά, βαδίζει,  
ψαύει, λυπεῖται, ἐνθυμεῖται, ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὀκόσαι τοῦ σώματος ὑπηρεσίαι ἢ  
τῆς ψυχῆς, πάντα ταῦτα ἢ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διαπρήσσεται.

For while the sleeping body does not perceive, the awakened soul knows all things—it sees that which is visible, hears that which is audible, walks, touches, is distressed, reflects. In short, as many as the services of the body or of the soul, all such things the soul effects for itself in sleep.<sup>77</sup>

ἐνθυμεῖται is difficult to concisely convey in translation; it retains more of an emotional quality than the previously discussed *διάνοια*, owing to the obvious etymological link with *θυμός* and its association with not only the idea of soul, but the heart and prevalent emotions of anger and passion. Here, it should perhaps be best understood as the ability of the *psukhē* to internally reflect on matters independently of the body with an emotional rather than purely intellectual aspect. The sense of servitude referenced previously is here continued with the nominal form *ὑπηρεσία* to describe the tasks the *psukhē* carries out, emphasizing again its position as subservient to the body when it is awake.<sup>78</sup> But while the body itself physically cannot participate in any perceptual activity during sleep, the *psukhē* is capable of carrying out a wide variety of tasks which includes sensory perception – in this instance, seeing and hearing – and the author is clear that there are sensory stimuli available to the *psukhē* in the sleeping body. Activity during sleep also extends to physical movement – walking and touching – as well as psychological processes – experiencing high emotions and reflecting on matters.

Before moving on to consider the role of the *psukhē* as communicator, a brief note on *On Regimen IV*'s 'household' *psukhē* should be made: this particular depiction of *psukhē* has, like the earlier Pindar fragment examined at the beginning of this chapter, also been closely linked to teachings of Pythagoreanism and Orphism.<sup>79</sup> The

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<sup>77</sup> *Vict.* 4.86

<sup>78</sup> The nominal form thus also referencing the rower on board a ship.

<sup>79</sup> Palm (1933), 62-69; Jaeger (1938), 56-7; Detienne (1963), 140ff; Laín Entralgo (1970), 161; Pigeaud (2006), 45; cf. Nagy (1991), 44 who refers to this passage as the 'doctrine of the body as a prison-house of the soul'.

emphasis on the many actions of the *psukhē* clearly establishes that the Hippocratic author considers it as more than a simple animating force: it is able to carry out perceptual and intellectual activities, experience emotion and even contribute to physical bodily actions such as walking for the body when it is awake, and for itself when the body is asleep. It has a specific psychophysiological role within the individual, and certainly functions independently from the body when necessary, but this independence does not equate it with the Orphic-Pythagorean *psukhē* – especially when it possesses neither any religious or purificatory relevance, nor is it ever expressed that the *psukhē* is superior to the body or ‘held’ there in a temporary prison. The Hippocratic understanding of the *psukhē* -*sōma* relationship here, as well as in the majority of the texts considered in the previous section, maintains the belief that the *psukhē* and *sōma* do not act in opposition to each other but rather function together as part of a whole. This is particularly emphasized in their identical material composition: both *psukhē* and *sōma* are composed of fire and water, thus at a fundamental level they are the same, and neither one has the kind of supremacy over the other which is needed to align this view with Orphic beliefs.<sup>80</sup>

That the *psukhē* was involved in sensory perception more broadly has already been noted in the discussion of its role in *On Regimen* above. An additional reference to the ‘internal’ perception of the *psukhē* appears in Book III in a passage which is also worth drawing attention to for its relevance to the specific context of sleep and dreams. The Hippocratic author describes the effects of an imbalance in which exercise is overpowered by the intake of food. This surfeit is eventually secreted inwards, causing a disturbance to the *psukhē* which is identifiable by the individual’s disturbed quality of sleep:

ὀκόταν δὲ μὴ δέχεται ἔτι τὸ σῶμα τὴν πλησμονήν, ἀπόκρισιν ἤδη ἀφίησιν εἴσω ὑπὸ βίης τῆς περιόδου, ἣτις ὑπεναντιουμένη τῇ τροφῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν σίτων ταρασσει τὴν ψυχὴν. οὐκ ἔτι δὴ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἠδεῖς οἱ ὕπνοι, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ταρασσεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ δοκεῖν μάχεσθαι· ὀκοῖα γάρ τινα πάσχει τὸ σῶμα, τοιαῦτα ὀρῆ ἢ ψυχῇ, κρυπτομένης τῆς ὄψιος.<sup>81</sup>

But whenever the body can no longer manage the surfeit, it emits a secretion inwards under the strength of the circuits, which, being opposed to the nourishment from food, disturbs the soul. At this point, sleep is no longer pleasant, instead the man is forcibly disturbed, and

<sup>80</sup> Cambiano (1980); van der Eijk (2005), 198-99.

<sup>81</sup> *Vict.* 3.71



thinks he is fighting; for just as the body experiences something, so the soul sees, when the eyes are cloaked.

The *psukhē* is clearly stated as being able to ‘see’ despite the eyes themselves being ‘κρυπτομένης’ – cloaked, buried – a descriptive choice which emphasizes their being entirely cut off from the outside world while closed in sleep. The *psukhē*’s ability to see independently is only possible under these conditions; as the physical channels of bodily perception are inhibited, the *psukhē* is able to carry out her own psychological perception. The author attributes the disturbance of the *psukhē* to a physical cause: the imbalance of the surfeit cannot be contained by the body, and so the excess matter is physically moved and thus comes into direct contact with the circuits (cf. indigestive parasomnia in 3.3.1). It is by this movement that the *psukhē* is affected, itself already having been previously accounted for as ‘moving through’ passages of the body (*Vict.*1.36), and so it seems likely that the surfeit here causes a literal obstruction to the normal movement of the *psukhē* and thus impairs its function.

Immediately, sleep is disrupted by nightmares – the description of which is similar to those parasomnias accounted for in other Hippocratic texts, particularly the reference to the individual believing that he is in some kind of conflict (3.3.3). It is not just the case that sleep becomes intermittent, or the individual is awakened, instead it is that which he experiences ‘perceptually’ during sleep that has been negatively affected. The object of the *psukhē*’s autonomous sleeping vision has been distorted in some manner, ultimately due to a physical change in the body, suggesting that it possibly does not always have complete and total control over its own domain in sleep. Bartōs convincingly accounts for this type of interaction between *psukhē* and body during sleep in his argument for the continued activity of a ‘nutritive bond’ between them, rather than the *psukhē* being entirely cut off from the body altogether since this would counteract the basis of *On Regimen IV*’s interpretative guide – the *psukhē* is disturbed by the condition of the body and communicates the specifics of such a disturbance through dreams.<sup>82</sup>

This specific type of nightmare generated from a surfeit of food is accounted for again later in Book IV, where the author provides further detail on what the sleeper sees in his sleep, as well as again referencing the disturbance to the circuit and suggesting the appropriate corrective regimen:

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<sup>82</sup> Bartōs (2015), 205-206; cf. earlier Peck (1928), 73-74.

Ὅκόσα δὲ ἀλλόμορφα σώματα φαίνεται ἐν τοῖσιν ὕπνοισι καὶ φοβεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, σιτίων ἀσυνήθων σημαίνει πλησμονὴν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν καὶ χολέραν καὶ νοῦσον κινδυνώδεα<sup>83</sup>

Monstrous bodies appearing in sleep and frightening the individual indicate a surfeit of unaccustomed food, and a secretion, and bile, and a dangerous disease.

ὅσα δὲ μάχεται ἢ κεντεῖται ἢ συνδεῖται ὑπ' ἄλλου, ἀπόκρισιν σημαίνει ὑπεναντίην τῇ περιόδῳ γεγονέναι ἐν τῷ σώματι<sup>84</sup>

Whenever he fights, or is stabbed or bound by another, it signifies that a secretion has happened inside the body which is contrary to the circuit.

What is made clear from the 'nightmare' accounts in *On Regimen* is that the *psukhē* is explicitly capable of perception even when the physical faculty of sight is not available; it mirrors the activity carried out during the day by the body but in a wholly internal context. This internal origin and action of dreams has much in common with Heraclitus' depiction of the dreamer turning away into their own private world in sleep. It is thus plausible to interpret the actions of the Hippocratic *psukhē* here during sleep as confined to a similarly private internalised world. Internal afflictions make themselves known through a private discourse which can only occur during sleep, when no external perception is at work. These inner workings of the *psukhē* explain – in a general sense - how dreams occur to the sleeper, and why they may contain such significant information on the state of the body and the *psukhē*. The object of the *psukhē*'s perception during sleep, with no access to the external world, can only be the physical body itself.<sup>85</sup> The *psukhē* thus perceives in two different ways while awake and asleep, handling both external and internal stimuli respectively.

#### 4.3.3 *On Regimen IV: the internal gaze of the psukhē*

Ahead of the next chapter which deals specifically with the methodology used by the author of *On Regimen IV* to interpret the signs which arise in dreams, there are two particular oneiric episodes described which are worth a closer examination for their depiction of the *psukhē*'s expressly psychological rather than physiological activity. These episodes both have a specific focus on the vision of the *psukhē* in terms of its gaze, and account for its interaction with internal and external stimuli. The first of

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<sup>83</sup> *Vict.*4.93

<sup>84</sup> *Vict.* 4.93

<sup>85</sup> Dodds (1951), 119 thus calls the dreams of *On Regimen* 'egocentric' and an anticipation of Freud; cf. Cambiano (1980), 93. The idea will be more clearly articulated by Galen, who claims that 'in sleep the soul seems to sink into the depths of the body, withdrawing from external sense-objects, and so becomes aware of the bodily condition.' (Kühn VI.8340 tr. Dodds).

these episodes in IV, 93 focuses on the manifestation in dreams of the desires of the *psukhē*. The author begins with an explanation of dreams about eating or drinking:

ὀκόταν δὲ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ ἐσθίειν δοκῆ ἢ πίνειν τῶν συνήθων ποτῶν ἢ σιτίων, ἔνδειαν σημαίνει τροφῆς καὶ ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίην<sup>86</sup>

Whenever in sleep it seems that the dreamer is eating or drinking their accustomed drinks or food, it signifies a lack of nourishment and a desire of the soul.<sup>87</sup>

The construction used to express the dreamer's experience of the scene is emphatic of it not literally taking place in the waking world, but only seeming to happen in the sleeping world in which the *psukhē* can replicate waking actions. The dream which involves eating or drinking things with which the dreamer is familiar, and presumably consumes on a regular basis, is indicative of a lack not only in the body – i.e. hunger – but also in the *psukhē*. This psychological lack is articulated through the emotional response of desire, and through the imagery of the dream the *psukhē* is able to communicate to the sleeper the object of its desire, in this case food or drink. Thus states such as hunger have a psychological as well as a physiological effect on the individual, and the initial scenario-specific statement is followed a few lines later by the more generalising comment which echoes the same vocabulary of familiarity and desire:

ὀκόσα δὲ δοκεῖ ἄνθρωπος θεωρεῖν τῶν συνήθων, ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίην σημαίνει.<sup>88</sup>

Whenever a man seems to gaze upon familiar things, it signifies a desire of the soul.

To see things which are familiar within a dream is indicative more broadly of a desire of the *psukhē*, i.e. the *psukhē* can not only experience emotional reactions such as desire, but is even able to communicate its own state through the oneiric imitation of looking at easily recognisable objects. For the *psukhē* to be the location of desire – rather than the supposition of a separate *thumos*, for example – is in keeping with both *On Regimen's* earlier books as well as the wider Hippocratic corpus in which *thumos* rarely appears as a separable emotional faculty.<sup>89</sup> In this section however the Hippocratic author expresses the activity of the dreamer as being specifically the act of seeming to gaze upon something - δοκεῖ θεωρεῖν – rather than merely seeming to carry

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<sup>86</sup> Following the emendations of Joly (1967).

<sup>87</sup> *Vict.* 4.93

<sup>88</sup> *Vict.* 4.93

<sup>89</sup> Other uses of ἐπιθυμία in the Hippocratic corpus conform to the literal and straightforward definition of a 'desire', including sexual desire – cf. *Aer.* 21 ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς μεΐξιος.

out a particular action, suggesting that the author intends the meaning to move beyond that of nutritional replenishment. Accounting for the general expression as indication that the overall activity is that which takes place within the dream, it is clear the act of the 'gaze' is directly linked to the desire of the *psukhē* as it is only by the action of the gaze that the underlying desire is made known.

Provençal's description of *epithumia* helps further elucidate the Hippocratic action, in which he claims 'generally in *epithumia*, the soul's desire for an object, we experience an attraction toward the object of our desire which results, for instance, in our reaching for an apple'.<sup>90</sup> The desire of the *psukhē* thus provokes an immediate reaction from the body. Restricted to the internal world of the sleeping body, the *psukhē* is able to recreate the emotive act of gazing to communicate its own condition, employing the visual vocabulary of the familiar to identify what is needed.<sup>91</sup> In Freudian psychoanalytical discourse, this type of dream experience might be recognisable under the categorisation of wish-fulfilment: the dream itself is an expression of a desire, and those arising from a particular privation – especially hunger or thirst – were considered to exemplify the concept most straightforwardly.<sup>92</sup> In this system, the dream does not only communicate the desire, but simulates the satisfaction of the wish, and this is reflected in the Hippocratic dream experience of eating and drinking familiar foods.<sup>93</sup>

This association of the gaze with desire, and indeed the *psukhē*, reflects wider contemporary Greek ideas on the subject beyond medical and philosophical discourse; care should be taken not to conflate the vocabulary – especially *epithumei* and *theōrein* – with its later more technical philosophical use in Plato and Aristotle.<sup>94</sup> The depiction

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<sup>90</sup> Provençal (2005), 131.

<sup>91</sup> Provençal (2005), 131.

<sup>92</sup> Freud (1900), IV, 123 recounts for example the frequent dream he experienced after eating salted foods in which he would be drinking water, and upon waking, find himself to be thirsty and in need a drink of water; cf. Hopkins (1991), 96-7.

<sup>93</sup> Pataki (2014), 30 claims that Greek dreams are only 'wishfully prognostic' in that they are directive as to what should be done, rather than themselves being 'substantive satisfactions in the Freudian sense', but in the Freudian system, and in relation to dreams of eating/drinking in particular, the dreamer still experiences the desire when they have awakened, thus the representative action in the dream was not substantive – as Hopkins clarifies, 'the satisfaction of a wish to drink cool water would be an actual drink, not a dream, and in fact the dreamer's real underlying thirst remains unslaked.' (1991: 97)

<sup>94</sup> Levin (2014), *passim* reaches some questionable conclusions based on this assimilation, particularly at 52-61 in her direct comparison of the *epithumiai* (which she refers to as 'The Big Three') of the *Gorgias* with a jumbled array of its appearances of the Hippocratic corpus, though this particular passage is not among those referenced. On Plato on *epithumia* in the tripartite soul, but also as non-technical general term for desires, cf. Kahn (1997), 262; cf. Aristotle's later division of pleasures without *epithumiai* as including *theōrein* – cf. Pearson (2012), esp. 91-110.

in *On Regimen* shares more of an affinity with the desirous gaze of poetry, but of particular relevance is the discussion in Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* which details the psychological impact of sight on the individual, including the claim in section 19 that it was the eyes of Helen which, through their perception of Alexander's body, transmitted desire (*prothumia*) and strife of love to the *psukhē*.<sup>95</sup> Thus in the case of Helen, it is the *psukhē* which experiences a direct emotional reaction to that which has been perceived by the body's sensory faculties. *On Regimen* IV's *psukhē* recreates this environment for itself in sleep but in reverse: without access to the normal waking mode of perception, the *psukhē* simulates the act of gazing as well as the object upon which the gaze is focused to communicate what it itself desires. In this way, it is able to carry out entirely internalised forms of sensory perception and communication while the body is asleep.

#### 4.3.4 *On Regimen* IV: the external gaze of the *psukhē*

By comparison, there is a useful comment in the therapeutic recommendation in Book IV which references the perceptual activity of the waking *psukhē*:

ὀκόσα δὲ τούτων πλανᾶται ἄλλοις ἄλλως, ψυχῆς τάραξιν τινα σημαίνει ὑπὸ μερίμνης· συμφέρει δὲ τούτῳ ῥαθυμῆσαι τὴν ψυχὴν τραπέσθαι πρὸς θεωρίας, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τὰς γελοίας, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλας τινὰς ἅς ὃ τι μάλιστα ἠσθήσεται θεησάμενος, ἡμέρας δυο ἢ τρεῖς, καὶ καταστήσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, κίνδυνος ἐς νοῦσον πίπτειν.<sup>96</sup>

Whenever the heavenly bodies wander about this way and that, it signifies some disturbance of the soul resulting from anxiety. For this, it is beneficial to take things easy: turn the soul towards contemplation, the best is of comic things, but if not this, then to other such things which will bring great delight when they have been looked at, for two or three days, and this will settle down. If not, there is a danger of falling into sickness.

This type of dream, which will be explored further in the next chapter, is presented as indicative of a disturbance in the *psukhē* caused specifically by an anxiety rather than any physiological imbalance to the *sunkrisis*. But that is not to say the idea of balance is not invoked here at all, for now it is pursued in terms of a psychological state within the individual. The best counteraction to the distressed and anxious soul is for the patient to take in some comedy, presumably by attending the theatre – θεωρίας appearing here in the nominal retains a sense of gazing upon or watching as a

<sup>95</sup> Gorgias, *Hel.* 19 εἰ οὖν τῶι τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα ἠσθὲν προθυμίαν καὶ ἄμιλλαν ἔρωτος τῆι ψυχῆι παρέδωκε, τί θαυμαστόν; The association of the *psukhe* with desire is fairly uncommon in tragedy until Euripides.

<sup>96</sup> *Vict.* 4.89

spectator, as well as perhaps, appropriate for the particular context, an element of aesthetic contemplation.<sup>97</sup> However should this type of therapy not be available, the author provides a second option which also invokes the idea of spectacle: looking upon something which brings delight works similarly to comedy in combatting the *psukhē*'s anxious disturbance as it creates a positive emotional state. This 'psychotherapeutic' approach seeks to treat the *psukhe* itself through exclusively psychological rather than physiological methods, and the methods proposed - watching comedies, viewing pleasurable things - is unique within the Hippocratic corpus.<sup>98</sup>

In comparison to the previous section which focused on the internal gaze as part of the *psukhē*'s articulation of desire and thus lack within the sleeper, this section moves the gaze out into the external world as part of the corrective therapy which should be applied to the waking *psukhē*. This type of psychotherapy evidently relies upon the *psukhē* being able to itself engage with the external world through sight.

Recommendations to improve both bodily disturbances and the composite blend of the *psukhē* have - unsurprisingly - focused on diet and exercise. But here, it is not the body but the *psukhē* which is troubled, and furthermore, the nature of the disturbance itself is not physical. Thus, accordingly, the prescribed action itself is not focused on physical change, but rather on a mental change. It is worth noting that the way to re-balance the mental state is through activities which are reliant on a combination of perception and some measure of internal reflection: watching comic things, or simply looking at delightful things. Mental illness is as easily accounted for in this prognostic exercise as physical illness; it marks another example of not only the naturalisation of such problems but also their internalisation as there is no indication that this state has come about through any external influence.

#### **4.4 On the Sacred Disease: psychological dreams without the *psukhē***

Before moving on to the final section which considers the materialist dreams of Democritus, a brief note should be made on a different 'psychological' theory which

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<sup>97</sup> Nightingale (2004), 40; Kindt (2012), 40 discusses its application for the activity of the 'aesthetic' gaze, which focused on aesthetic qualities of artistic objects and seems the most likely context for the advice which follows. Rutherford (2013), 6696-7 explains its cultural applications: 'the Greek *theoria* means watching, and has two special senses in Greek culture: first, a religious delegation sent by a Greek city, to consult an oracle or take part in a festival at a sanctuary outside its territory, and second, philosophical contemplation', though it is evident that neither such specified meaning applies here.

<sup>98</sup> Laín Entralgo (1970), 163-170 is emphatic that psychotherapeutic methods had little significance to the Hippocratics, and cites this passage as giving a potentially misleading picture of the importance of psychotherapy to Hippocratic theory and practice.

occurs in *On the Sacred Disease*. Rather than posit the *psukhē* as the dominant psychological organ within the body, the Hippocratic author of this text opts instead for an encephalocentric approach, declaring that it is the brain which is the source of all psychological function, by virtue of its privileged relationship with air.<sup>99</sup> The passage accounts for both positive and negative experiences which arise owing to the brain and its condition, and a range of emotional, psychological and perceptual activities are cited. The cause of any problems to regular function is identified as being a direct effect of any imbalance to the qualities within the brain itself – hot, cold, moist and dry – and this imbalance becomes manifest through a range of psychological afflictions:

τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ μαινόμεθα καὶ παραφρονέομεν, καὶ δέϊματα καὶ φόβοι παρίστανται ἡμῖν, τὰ μὲν νύκτωρ, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέρη, καὶ ἀγρυπνίαι<sup>100</sup> καὶ πλάνοι ἄκαιροι, καὶ φροντίδες οὐχ ἰκνεύμεναι, καὶ ἀγνωσία τῶν καθεστώτων καὶ ἀηθία. καὶ ταῦτα πάσχομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πάντα ...<sup>101</sup>

By the same thing [the brain] we become mad and senseless, and terrors and fears are set in our minds, whether in the night or during the day, as well as sleeplessness, troublesome wanderings, improper worries, ignorance of the way things are, and acts contrary to habit. All these things we suffer from the brain ...

These afflictions are presented together as potentially occurring either during the day or during the night, continuing the parallelism between the two spheres of activity which has already been seen in the other Hippocratic texts, and thus accounting for a range of parasomnias including nightmares, night-terrors, insomnia and even perhaps sleep-walking. These identifiable pathological actions are almost all expressed by privative  $\alpha$  compounds, emphasizing their complete opposition to regular activity. The physiological imbalance to the psychological organ thus becomes manifest and can be determined by observing the patient. While in *On Regimen* the *psukhē* is only able to communicate imbalances to its own blend through dreams, here an underlying problem in the balance of qualities in the brain can be recognised through particular abnormal actions which may include fearful dreams but is in no way restricted to this

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<sup>99</sup> Gundert (2000), 22.

<sup>100</sup> Jouanna's 2003 edition emends this to ἐνύπνια based on the text of MS (M), but I continue to follow the text of MS ([Gk] theta) instead; the author here seems to be enumerating a range of disturbances, and having already covered nightmares, it seems unlikely that he would then repeat the more neutral 'dreams' as part of his list.

<sup>101</sup> *Morb.Sacr.*17

alone.<sup>102</sup> Agitation during the night, in its many forms, is clearly and expressly attributed to the brain alone, as the sole psychological agent in the body.

In the section which immediately follows, the Hippocratic author again attests to the occurrence of nightmares for the patient, and associates the emotional experience of fear more precisely with an increase of heat within the brain. Initially, he describes how the influx of heat to the brain causes fear to attack the patient, but then follows with an account of the inverse action with particular reference to sleep:

διαθερμαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ αἷμα ἐπέλθη ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον πολὺ καὶ ἐπιζέση. ἔρχεται δὲ κατὰ τὰς φλέβας πολὺ τὰς προειρημένας, ὅταν τυγχάνη ὄνθρωπος ἐνύπνιον ὀρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ φόβῳ ἢ ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐγρηγορότι τότε μάλιστα τὸ πρόσωπον φλογιᾶ, καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐρεύθονται, ὅταν φοβῆται, καὶ ἡ γνώμη ἐπινοῆ τι κακὸν ἐργάσασθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ πάσχει. ὅταν δὲ ἐπέγρηται καὶ καταφρονήσῃ καὶ τὸ αἷμα πάλιν σκεδασθῆ ἔς τὰς φλέβας πέπαυται.<sup>103</sup>

He also overheats when blood rushes into the brain in abundance and boils. This comes in abundance by the aforementioned veins, whenever the patient happens to see a fearful dream and is in fear. Just as in the waking state the face is flushed and the eyes are bloodshot, whenever he is afraid, and his intelligence conceives of something bad being done, so too he suffers in sleep. Whenever he awakens, both having come to his senses and when the blood is dispersed again into the veins, it ceases.

The passage is slightly unclear in its initial remarks on blood-flow to the brain, and consequently it is the abundance of blood to and thus heat within the brain which is often cited as the cause of nightmares.<sup>104</sup> However it actually seems to be the opposite case in this particular scenario: the patient seeing a fearful dream and experiencing the emotion of fear appears to be the impetus for the influx of blood to move to the brain. The Hippocratic author parallels this cause and effect with the individual's experience in waking life, and recounts physiological symptoms of fear such as the flushing of the face and reddening of the eyes in a manner comparable to the passage considered earlier in *Humours* 9 on psychosomatic symptoms – though here, presumably to align with the influx of heat, the face reddens rather than pales.

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<sup>102</sup> That the author ascribed dreams to the brain seems more certain than Harris suggests (2009:153), when he writes 'the author of *On the Sacred Disease* probably wrote that dreams are products of our brain.'

<sup>103</sup> *Morb.Sacr.* 18

<sup>104</sup> Hulskamp (2008), 183; Barbera (2015), 51 summarises *On the Sacred Disease* as only positing 'excessive blood-flow to the brain which heats it is the cause of nightmares.'



Notably when the patient is awake, the change in emotional state to one of fear is depicted as involving the participation of his *gnōmē*. This is slightly obscurely referred to as conceiving of ‘something bad being done’ when the individual experiences fear, suggesting that it is responsible for the wider understanding of a situation as fearful: it is able to interpret its surroundings and instigate a particular emotional response. Following his general methodology of paralleling waking and sleeping activities, the Hippocratic author must also understand this activity of the *gnōmē* to occur both in waking and sleeping cases of fear, linking it closely then to the images which are perceived in dreams – for it must be through interaction with these images that it is able to determine whether something bad is happening or not – and hinting then that the action of ‘seeing’ within a dream is broadly understood as functioning the same as ‘seeing’ in waking life. Whether the Hippocratic author in *On the Sacred Disease* conceives of this vision as being restricted to the internal, and only having the body itself as its object, is not made as clear as in *On Regimen*, though the description of the patient as recovering from this state of oneiric fear by waking up and thus recovering his senses implies a clear demarcation between the waking and sleeping spheres of activity.

#### 4.5 *Eidōla* revisited: Democritus and materialist dreams

While this approach of ‘closing off’ the dream world to any influence from the external world had support from several different writers, it should not be assumed that the shift towards a heavily internalised depiction of dreams was commonplace to all fifth-century writers. The most notable departure from the approach adopted by the philosophical and medical writers, examined in both this and the previous chapter, is found in the extant theories of Democritus, and to a lesser extent, Leucippus. In keeping with their wider philosophical system, their proposed theory on sleep and dreams is closely linked to their materialist and atomist account of perception. In the only extant example of Leucippus’ ideas about sleep, in which he references both sleep and death in a manner reminiscent of the earlier natural philosophers, there is particular emphasis on the contrast between the experience of the body and the *psukhē*:

Λ. ὕπνον σώματος γίνεσθαι ἀποκρίσει τοῦ λεπτομεροῦς πλείονι τῆς εἰσκρίσεως τοῦ ψυχικοῦ θερμοῦ· (ἧς) τὸν πλεονασμὸν αἴτιον θανάτου· ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι πάθη σώματος, οὐ ψυχῆς.<sup>105</sup>

Leucippus says not only that sleep is bodily, but also that it comes about when the excretion of fine-textured atoms is greater than the accretion

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<sup>105</sup> DK67A34

of psychic heat; an excess of this is the cause of death. These things are experiences of the body, not the *psukhē*.<sup>106</sup>

The language used is evidently not originally Leucippian, and seems particularly influenced by later Hellenistic Epicurean vocabulary. The idea being construed is that, for Leucippus, sleep is a primarily physiological process in that it results from an imbalance, but that this imbalance involves the *psukhē*. The loss of fine-textured atoms becomes greater than the gain of warmth in the *psukhē*, which in the atomist system is composed of spherical fiery atoms permeating throughout the body.<sup>107</sup> Although expressed in terms of atomist mechanical operation, the inherent idea is no different to that of several of his predecessors: sleep results from a cooling in the body. The remark attributing the excess of this to death is also reminiscent of the doxographical accounts of both Alcmaeon and Empedocles' theories on sleep. The overall emphasis of the account is that sleep and death are bodily experiences, and not direct activities of the *psukhē*. The corruption to the text makes it difficult to extract any detailed theory however, and there is obviously nothing explicit with regards to dreaming.

Democritus' ideas on the process of dreaming fortunately survive in several more informative accounts. He proposes a system based on *eidōla*, which in his context are now to be understood as films of atoms which emanate from an object. Cicero places Democritus in direct opposition to those who had proposed an internalised origin of dreams:

*Utrum igitur censemus dormientium animos per sese ipsos in somniando moveri, an, ut Democritus censet, externa et adventicia visione pulsari?*<sup>108</sup>

Shall we believe that the minds of sleepers are internally stimulated in dreaming, or as Democritus believes, disturbed by images coming from outside?

It is obviously difficult to extract any substantial information on Democritus' beliefs from such a brief and chronologically-removed reference, but it is at least clear that

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<sup>106</sup> Originally from Ps-Plutarch *Epitome* V.25.3 [=Aetius V.25.3], this problematic passage has been lamented as *misere corruptum* (Heimsoeth 1835, 5) In translating, I have followed Diels' emendation based mostly on Heimsoeth's initial reconstruction. Taylor (1999) renders the emended forms of *krasis* very effectively and thus I have kept his translations of accretion and excretion.

<sup>107</sup> Taylor (1999), 77. Beare (1906), 255 claims that the "vital heat" retreats further inside the body to the area around the heart, though the location is not made quite so specific in the extant evidence.

<sup>108</sup> *De div.* II.58.120; Cicero elsewhere references the Democritean theory of *eidola*; in a letter to Cassius (after Cassius had become Epicurean) he preserves the Greek terminology in a brief dismissive discussion of the idea, which culminates in his mockingly inquiring *si insulam Britanniam coepero cogitare, eius εἰδωλον mihi advolabit ad pectus?* (*Ad. Fam.* XVI 2-3)

there had been a distinctly externalised theory of dreaming attributed specifically to him, and that he stood apart from his contemporaries in claiming such. Three doxographical accounts in particular provide further information on how he conceived of these externalised dreams:

Δημόκριτος τοὺς ὄνειρους γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν εἰδώλων  
παραστάσεις.<sup>109</sup>

Democritus says that dreams occur through the presence of *eidōla*.

τοιόνδ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ἢ ὥσπερ λέγει Δημόκριτος εἶδωλα καὶ ἀπορροίας  
αἰτιώμενος.<sup>110</sup>

The following would be better than how Democritus explains dreams by attributing them to *eidōla* and effluences.

ὑποθέμενος τοῦτο δὴ τοῦπιδήμιον ὃ φησιν Δημόκριτος  
ἐγκαταβυσοῦσθαι τὰ εἶδωλα διὰ τῶν πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ποιεῖν  
τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ὄψεις ἐπαναφερόμενα· φοιτᾶν δὲ ταῦτα  
πανταχόθεν ἀπιόντα καὶ σκευῶν καὶ ἱματίων καὶ φυτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ  
ζώων ὑπὸ σάλου πολλοῦ καὶ θερμότητος.<sup>111</sup>

Taking as his starting point this familiar saying of Democritus: the *eidōla* penetrate through the pores into the bodies and, rising up, cause visions during sleep; they come from things of every kind, artefacts, clothes, plants, but especially from animals, because of the quantity of motion [of the atoms] and heat they contain.

Democritus understands the act of dreaming as similar to, but not a straightforward replication of, the waking perceptual activity of vision. The most significant differentiation between the two processes is that while sight is a result of images flowing off objects and entering the eye specifically, dreams come about because they are able to enter the body through the pores. This neatly accounts for the potential problem of the eyes, as the main receptor of these images in his theory of vision, being closed during sleep. The language is slightly elusive in the Plutarchan account as to the mechanics of this inner sight after the *eidōla* have entered the body; we are simply told that by the action of rising upwards they are able to create visions (τᾶς ὄψεις) while the individual sleeps, the terminology making clear that this process is conceived as mimicking the waking process of sight.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> DK68A136

<sup>110</sup> Arist. *De Div.Somn.* 464a5

<sup>111</sup> DK68A77 (Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* VIII.10.2 734f – 735a)

<sup>112</sup> ὄψεις particularly in the plural often used to refer to the eyes themselves – cf. Heraclitus B26; S. *OT* 1328.

It is made clear that such effluences can arise from any kind of object, both animate and inanimate. The quality of heat is again referenced, as previously encountered in the account of Leucippus, though this time it is cited as a factor by which animals are able to emit more effluences than other objects; this presumably is linked to the idea of living things possessing a soul composed entirely of fire-atoms. The Plutarch extract continues to describe the activities of the *eidōla* in respect to the information they are able to carry with them.

They do not merely reproduce the shape of the body (which was the view of Epicurus who follows Democritus so far but departs from his theory subsequently) but they also pick up images of each person's psychic motions, desires, habits, and emotions, and when, together with these images, they collide with people they talk as if they were alive, and tell those who receive them the opinions, words and actions of those who emitted them, provided that they preserve the images articulated and distinct on arrival. They do this most when they have a swift, unobstructed passage through smooth air.

Favorinus, as the speaker in this section of Plutarch's dialogue, claims that the *eidōla* are not only physical replications of their subjects but that they are also able to retain psychological information to the extent that it too can be passed on to the dreamer. He offers this as explanation of how dream images are able to talk as if living, introducing more aspects of sensory perception involved in dreaming beyond merely how sight functions. Again, the mechanisms of the process are not precisely explained but the general idea is clear; the *eidōla* themselves contain all the information necessary to create the dream once they have entered the body of the dreamer to the extent that they can depict other individual's thoughts and emotions – aptly compared to the action of images on a cinema screen.<sup>113</sup> This process has been referred to as a kind of telepathic theory which relies on the wider materialist beliefs of Democritus; thoughts and emotions are able to be transmitted because they are ultimately composed of atoms, and as entirely physical structures they are thus able to emanate these *eidōla* of themselves.<sup>114</sup>

The accuracy of Favorinus' testimony is not only made difficult by the obviously significant passage of time between Democritus and Plutarch, but also by the fact that the discussion itself comes about as part of an answer by Favorinus to the tenth

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<sup>113</sup> Taylor (1999), 207.

<sup>114</sup> Barnes (1982), 158.

question, entitled “why we trust our dreams less in the autumn.”<sup>115</sup> Favorinus is described in the text as the most marvellous admirer of Aristotle and the Peripatetics; yet, rather than quote from Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia* treatises on dreams he introduces “some old argument of Democritus” which is vividly described as having been dimmed by smoke and subsequently cleaned up and polished by Favorinus.<sup>116</sup> Could he be reading (or even “polishing”) the Democritean theory through an Aristotelian lens? Democritus is certainly referenced directly in Aristotle’s own discussion of how prophetic dreams arise. Notably however Aristotle describes how dreams are better suited to night on account of the favourably calm air.<sup>117</sup> In the passage above, Favorinus similarly concludes that dreams are best preserved when the air is smooth, allowing for a swift and unobstructed passage; a potential indication that he is not only working from the ideas of Democritus and Epicurus in his response. While Favorinus’ account has been described as entirely “atomistic”, it seems likely that the account is subject to some Aristotelian infiltration.<sup>118</sup>

In the Democritean system, the passivity of the dreaming process is emphasized through the active force of the *eidōla*, and the choice of term may itself help clarify this. Burkert suggests that by choosing to represent the emanations involved in dreaming as *eidōla*, Democritus originally intended this to be understood as reference only to abnormal occurrences of vision. He draws particularly upon the more conventional translation of *eidōla* as a ghost, i.e. an image of the dead, as evidence for this intended sense of abnormal functioning which he categorises as a form of Democritean “parapsychology”.<sup>119</sup> More recently, Gregory has argued that the term *eidōla* is deliberately used by Democritus as an example of what he identifies as a Presocratic “targeting” of Homer, claiming that Democritus applies the term broadly as a subversion of Homeric beliefs.<sup>120</sup> Democritus’ materialist psychology refocuses the origin of dreams back to the external and the physical; the individual’s passivity is reinstated as part of a dreaming process which draws heavily from the atomist

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<sup>115</sup> Plutarch *Quaest. Conv.* VIII, 10, 1 734D.

<sup>116</sup> As above. König (2011), 200 - 201 proposes that this highly metaphorical description indicates Favorinus’ relationship with Democritus’ text is “very far removed from personal exchange”, and that the striking metaphor is intended to emphasize that the referenced argument is an object to be controlled and mastered by the participants. Teodorsson (1996), 285 sees the metaphor as effectively portraying Democritus’ theory as “antediluvian”, referencing a possible allusion to *Odyssey* XIX, 7-20.

<sup>117</sup> Aristotle *Div. Somn.* 464a15.

<sup>118</sup> Teodorsson (1996), 281 considers Favorinus to be presenting an Atomistic account, in contrast to the Peripatetic argument of Autobulus which follows.

<sup>119</sup> Burkert (1977), 108.

<sup>120</sup> Gregory (2013), 195-196 relates it to wider questions of theology, creating a link between Democritean and Homeric dreams.

conception of waking sensory perception. This return to a wholly externalised source of dream content is then actually emphasized by the use of the term *eidōla*; rather than attempting to subvert the traditional archaic and classical literary sense, perhaps Democritus is instead using it to reinforce the re-externalisation of the received dream figures.

#### 4.6 Concluding Remarks

In continuation of the previous chapter's examination of physiological theories surrounding sleep and dreams, this chapter illustrates how several writers had also proposed a specifically psychological basis for such phenomena. A reinterpretation of the earliest supposed depiction of the 'free' dreaming soul in fr.131b of Pindar is offered, which resituates it within its epic tradition and the *Aussentraume* dream experience.

Based on the readings above, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Hippocratic internalisation of the dreaming process in *On Regimen* has roots in the Heraclitean depictions explored in Chapter 2. There, man's sum experience in sleep is so emphatically isolated that it could not have involved any aspect of the external shared world. Furthermore, through the kindled light of B26 man has the ability to recreate waking activities – namely, sight – while asleep. This has some equivalence in the depiction of soul's activities in *On Regimen*: in sleep, as it becomes autonomous from the body, it is specifically described as being able to carry out sensory perception while the body cannot. Sight in particular is emphasized as a mirrored experience in sleep, and as in Heraclitus the eyes were ἀποσβεσθείς ('extinguished'), in *On Regimen* they are κρυπτομένης ('cloaked'); both expressions alluding to the darkness through removal of light.

But it should be emphasized that unlike Heraclitus, who places no epistemological value in dreams, the author of *On Regimen* is very much invested in the content of the dream. As we shall see in the next chapter, dream imagery itself becomes rehabilitated within the prognostic toolkit of the physician.

# 5

## The Interpretation of Dreams

*“The most highly educated of our contemporaries hasten to report their dreams to the specialist with as grave an anxiety as the Superstitious Man of Theophrastus.”*  
--E.R. Dodds

The fourth book of *On Regimen* is unique in the Hippocratic corpus – and wider Greek literature in this period – in that it is composed specifically as a manual for the interpretation of dreams. The author provides an expansive treatment of how the individual might correctly interpret their dreams for their own diagnostic and even prognostic benefit. The relationship of these dreams to the individual’s *psukhe* has already been considered in the previous chapter, through an examination of the soul more broadly in both *On Regimen* and the wider Hippocratic corpus, and the activities it was thought to carry out during sleep. Moving now to consider the actual contents of a dream more closely, the primary focus of this chapter is the specific dream scenarios which are described in *On Regimen* IV. There are several key areas which need to be addressed before and throughout the discussion, and it will be contextually useful to consider the role of oneiromancy in ancient divinatory practice more broadly, both in older cultural traditions of the Near East (5.1) and Greek religion (5.2), as well as in the popular healing cult of Asclepius and its cultic incubation rituals (5.3). And considering the praise Hippocratic medicine often receives for its secular and rational perspectives, it is also important to think about how dream divination – and indeed, *On Regimen*’s attitudes towards the gods and prayer – fits within the Hippocratic medical approach (5.4), as scholarship can often approach these questions dismissively, and outdated Hellenocentric views of the ‘Greek Miracle’ still sometimes persist. The dream scenarios themselves are of particular interest for their use of philosophical and cosmological imagery, in addition to the Hippocratic author’s significant methodological use of micro-macrocosmic constructions, while various motifs from traditional literary depictions are also incorporated by the author as part of his prognostic system. Thus a careful reading of each scenario and their proposed interpretation is essential for unravelling the complexities of the imagery being used as

well as its wider significance (5.5). Having already seen how both sleep and dreams are treated within other Hippocratic texts provides a strong base from which to consider how dream interpretation could not only be assimilated within a Hippocratic context but also how and why these particular dream scenarios and their meanings were used.

### 5.1 Near Eastern Dream Books

Sleep and dreams as experiential processes figured prominently in several aspects of Greek religious and cultural life. Dreams in particular are the subject of widespread cultural interest and investigation which stretches back far beyond Archaic and Classical Greece. As with many areas of Greek culture – especially those with religious connotations – several aspects of the dream experience have been considered as borrowed, or inherited, from other neighbouring older cultures, particularly Mesopotamia and Egypt. Both these cultures have a marked interest in dreams as a means of communicating with the gods and as a source of information about the future, if the dream content is interpreted correctly. Interpreting the information held in dreams – oneiromancy – was one among many accepted methods of finding answers to present and future queries.

The practice of oneiromancy itself has a long history, and dreams occupied an important role in older Near Eastern magico-religious belief. Several key texts have survived which provide evidence from these cultures on the specific practice of interpreting dream contents, the most famous perhaps being the Ramesside dream book from Egypt (also known as the pChester Beatty r<sup>o</sup>/III) which dates to the reign of Ramses II in the 13<sup>th</sup> century BC.<sup>1</sup> The Ramesside dream book has survived in remarkably good condition, and a number of columns are preserved which list different types of dreams followed by their specific interpretation. The arrangement of dreams is somewhat haphazard, and there does not appear to be any thematic grouping to the descriptions beyond a basic separation into the overall designation of auspicious and ominous. However, it is the textual structure that is worth noting ahead of a closer look at *On Regimen IV*. A general heading runs vertically between the Ramesside columns which reads “if a man sees himself in a dream” (transliterated as: *ir m33 sw s m rsw.t*), forming a conditional protasis to be read before each of the corresponding lines of horizontal script.<sup>2</sup> These horizontal lines list a description of the

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<sup>1</sup> Bulkeley (2008), 127. The papyrus now belongs to the British Museum, who date it to c.1220BC [object reference EA10683,3]. The standard edition remains A.H. Gardiner (1935), *Hieratic Papyri in the British Museum 3<sup>rd</sup> Series: Chester Beatty Gift*, London.

<sup>2</sup> Prada (2011), 169.



dream (subordinate protasis), a summative judgement of it being either good or bad, and finally a more detailed prediction of the dreamer's fate in the future tense (apodosis). This format in itself is notable, as other fragmentary hieratic dream books do not preserve the immediate 'good/bad' pronouncement nor the conditional sentence structure.<sup>3</sup> In terms of content, the Ramesside dream book is not confined to one area of interpretation, and the scenarios reflect the socio-cultural anxieties of the people during this period. There are no strictly medical dream scenarios or interpretations; the human body features only as a symbol to be interpreted:

[If a man sees himself in a dream] after his penis has enlarged; good, it means an increase of his possessions.

[If a man sees himself in a dream] when his teeth are falling out under him; bad, one of his underlings will die.

The method of dream interpretation employed often maintains a discernible underlying association between image and meaning, whether thematic, psychological, analogical or paronomastic.<sup>4</sup> Specific elements of the dream are picked out as key interpretative symbols, and as such there is no need for reporting extended dream narratives. These dreams could thus be considered as falling under the categorisation of *Innentraume*, and are indicative of those inductive divinatory practices which relied on everyday imagery rather than any explicit pronouncement from a deity directly. The Ramesside dream book is the oldest evidence both for the actual practice of oneiromancy, and for the way in which this type of dream manual could be structurally formatted. This is especially worth keeping in mind for the subsequent discussion of *On Regimen IV*, for its structure and organisation is perhaps one of the main reasons for the now outdated claim that the fourth book was a separately composed treatise to the other three books, and largely compilatory in structure.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The pBerlin P29009 (XXVI dynasty) and the pBerlin P23058 (XXX dynasty). They do however preserve a much more organised thematic structure. These papyri fragments have both been published by Quack (2010), cf. also discussions of their content in Quack (2006) and Prada (2011).

<sup>4</sup> Bukeley (2008), 127 identifies the linguistic features as "word play, punning, metaphor, cultural references and religious symbolism" as similar to that of many other cultures. See also Noegel & Szpakowska (2007), 193-212 which examines in much more detail the many usages of 'word play' in the text.

<sup>5</sup> Friedrich (1899), 81-230; Palm (1933), 99ff. More recent scholarship has reinstated Book 4 as a coherent part of *On Regimen's* discussion and defended it against 'pre-scientific' criticisms – see esp. van der Eijk (2004), 189-190.

Unlike the Egyptian dream books, Babylonian dream books from Nineve, dating to the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC, feature oneiromantic interpretations which predict different types of illnesses or bodily afflictions:

If [a man dreams that] he eats the meat of the gazelle, he will be affected by a prickling sensation of the skin.<sup>6</sup>

If one gives him a seal with the name of [???], he will fall sick either of dropsy or of leprosy.<sup>7</sup>

These physiological ailments can be predicted from particular interactions within the dream which both involve some form of receiving: the first dreamer actively takes the meat of the gazelle inside his body, while the second dreamer is more passively the recipient of a specific seal. Despite being phrased as ailments which will befall the dreamer in the future, the author gives no advice as to how the dreamer may avoid such an outcome. In this context, these are fates which are strictly unavoidable. As with the Ramesside book these references are only few among many interpretations which reflect wider socio-cultural anxieties, and it should be emphasized that these dream interpretations are taking place within a divinatory magico-religious context – there is no specific prognostic or prophylactic aim. Evidently in terms of composition, there are similarities with the Ramesside text: the present conditional protasis is preserved, with the corresponding apodosis in the future tense.

These scenarios are worth keeping in mind ahead of a closer look at *On Regimen IV*. Recent work has identified close similarities between the Babylonian dream books and *On Regimen IV* in terms of both structure and content, and it has been persuasively argued that there ultimately must be some derivation from these older Near Eastern practices at work in the Hippocratic text.<sup>8</sup> As will become apparent from reading *On Regimen IV*, the Hippocratic author is very careful not to represent himself as part of this tradition, but rather promotes his prognostic dream manual as a unique and singularly effective addition to the growing medical marketplace in the Classical period.

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<sup>6</sup> Provisional translations into English taken from van der Eijk (2004), 210; based on Bottero (1992), 11; Oppenheim (1956), 270.

<sup>7</sup> van der Eijk (2004), 211; Oppenheim (1956), 276.

<sup>8</sup> van der Eijk (2004); Asper (2014) also considers the polemic remarks in both *On Regimen IV* and other Hippocratic texts as evidence of a gradual ‘acculturation’, rather than a direct and instantaneous transmission of information, of medical practices from the Near East.

## 5.2 Greek traditions of oneiromancy

Analysing the symbolism of omens to reveal information about present ills or future action was, of course, nothing strange or unusual in the Greek religious world. Communication from the gods could come in many forms, direct and indirect, through designated religious figures or simply to the individual themselves. There was no one formal channel of communication between gods and men, and practices varied widely. As discussed in the opening chapter, divination is often categorised as falling under two broad categories: inductive and inspired.<sup>9</sup> Inductive divination relied upon the correct decoding of the signs sent by the gods, while inspired divination was a more direct communication from the gods through a prophet or prophetess. The signs of inductive divination were found in a variety of ways: they could be drawn from nature, such as ornithomancy (divination by birds), or drawn from a specifically religious context, such as hieroscopy (inspection of sacrificial entrails) and empyromancy (divination by the flames on the sacrificial altar).<sup>10</sup>

Although Bonnechere categorises oneiromancy as a type of ‘inspired’ divination, dreams are a particularly unique channel of communication between gods and men as they can often fall under both categorisations of inductive and inspired, or one or the other, depending on their type and context. The dreams above, for example, from the Near Eastern texts which rely heavily on the interpretation of key symbols would be more suitably categorised as inductive, while dreams sought from a sanctuary – such as that of Asclepius, which we will consider further shortly – would certainly be more appropriately placed in the inspired category.

The layman was not expected to know how to interpret the important signs of inductive divination correctly. Consultation was often required, and each particular type of divination could have its own specialists. In Homer we find reference made to an individual with a designated responsibility for the interpretation of dreams in relation to the actions of the gods:

ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ τινα μάντιν ἐρείομεν ἢ ἱερῆα  
ἢ καὶ ὄνειροπόλον, καὶ γὰρ τ’ ὄναρ ἐκ Διός ἐστιν,  
ὅς κ’ εἴποι ὃ τι τόσσον ἐχώσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,  
εἴτ’ ἄρ’ ὃ γ’ εὐχολῆς ἐπιμέμφεται ἠδ’ ἐκατόμβης,  
αἶ κέν πως ἀρνῶν κνίσης αἰγῶν τε τελείων

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<sup>9</sup> 1.3; Bonnechere (2007) after Bouche-Leclercq (1879).

<sup>10</sup> Bonnechere (2007), 151-2.

βούλεται ἀντιάσας ἡμῖν ἀπὸ λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι.<sup>11</sup>

But why not consult some priest, some diviner, some interpreter of dreams, since dreams too come from Zeus, one who can tell why Phoebus Apollo shows such anger to us, because of some broken vow perhaps, or some missed sacrifice; in hopes the god might accept succulent lambs or unmarked goats, and choose to avert our ruin.

Achilles urges Agamemnon to discover why they are being afflicted with the plague and suggests he consult with someone who can interpret dreams – an *όνειρόπολος* – so that they might learn the affront they have made against Apollo and thus be able to correct it. The view of disease is that it is a divinely-sent punishment for a transgression, i.e. an unmistakable sign from the gods that they have acted impiously, and the plague in particular comes to symbolise this throughout Greek literature. Here though, what is important is that there is a figure specifically identified as an authority for the interpretation of dreams. This specificity has been the source of much debate in both ancient commentaries and modern scholarship, as the *όνειρόπολος* is distinguished from the more common *ἱερεύς* (priest) and *μάντις* (diviner). Yet this distinction of the specific dream interpreter does not persist in the language of Greek religious practice; later uses of *μάντις* depict it as the role whose divinatory practices are inclusive of dream interpretation.<sup>12</sup> The term *όνειρόπολος* itself is relatively uncommon in comparison with the other two positions; beyond Homer, its next appearance is not until Herodotus, who provides the term's only extant usages in the Classical period: first in reference to the Magi responsible for interpreting dreams (1.128.2) and later in a Greek context when Hipparchus tells a group of *όνειροπόλοι* of his dream (5.56.2).

While some have quickly dismissed the Homeric reference as meaningless, others have convincingly argued for the *όνειρόπολος* as “part of a conventional group of divination experts” whom one would consult in this type of critical situation.<sup>13</sup> The brief reference does however raise the question of whether this designated Homeric *όνειρόπολος* was responsible for inductive or inspired divination. Is Achilles alluding to some unmentioned portentous dream sent by the gods that needs to be interpreted, or is it rather the case that the *όνειρόπολος* must himself seek out a dream in a designated

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<sup>11</sup> *III*.62-7.

<sup>12</sup> Renberg (2015), 236.

<sup>13</sup> Flower (2008), 36 simply labels these specifications as Achilles' engagement in “rhetorical amplification” and denies it is evidence of any kind of separation of divinatory functions. For the argument against this, see Metcalf (2015) – the full chapter ‘Sumerian and Hittite notes on *Iliad* 1.62-67’ pp.191-220 provides a thorough discussion on similar formulations in other cultural practices, particularly between the formulation of Achilles' request and the plague prayers of Mursili.

religious space in order to communicate with the gods directly? The Herodotean uses of the term, as the nearest (though still very far removed) examples, make clear that the *όνειρόπολος* is consulted *after* a dream has taken place, and based on the report of the dream itself is able to provide interpretation and guidance. However, given that the *όνειρόπολος* is not consulted after any of the divinely-sent dreams throughout the *Iliad*, it may be more likely that a scenario of inspired divination is to be understood.

The dream episode in general forms an integral part of Homeric narrative; this brief yet specific reference at the opening of the poem may be ambiguous in terms of how the dream-interpreter in this period functioned, but it does serve to underscore the wider religious significance attached to the dream and its potential relationship with what is happening in the waking world, as well as its expressly divine origins. Narratively, it also prepares for the dream which Zeus will send to Agamemnon at the beginning of the next book, as Achilles emphatically reminds Agamemnon here that ‘dreams come from Zeus’.<sup>14</sup>

Moving into the fifth century, the interpretation of dreams occupies a clearer position within the wide and inclusive category of *mantikē*. In *Prometheus Bound*, the eponymous character speaks of the ways in which he has benefitted mankind:

τὰ λοιπά μου κλύουσα θαυμάση πλέον, οἴας τέχνας τε καὶ πόρους ἐμησάμην. τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, εἴ τις ἐς νόσον πέσοι, οὐκ ἦν ἀλέξημ’ οὐδέν, οὔτε βρώσιμον, οὐ χριστόν, οὐδὲ πιστόν, ἀλλὰ φαρμάκων	480
χρεῖα κατεσκελλόντο, πρὶν γ’ ἐγὼ σφισιν ἔδειξα κράσεις ἡπίων ἀκεσμάτων, αἷς τὰς ἀπάσας ἐξαμύνονται νόσους. τρόπους τε πολλοὺς μαντικῆς ἐστοίχισα, κᾶκρινα πρῶτος ἐξ ὄνειράτων ἄ χρη	485
ὑπαρ γενέσθαι, κληδόνας τε δυσκρίτους ἐγνώρισ’ αὐτοῖς ἐνοδίους τε συμβόλους; <sup>15</sup>	

When you hear the rest from me, you will be more amazed at what skills and pathways I devised. The greatest of them: if any man fell ill, there was nothing in defence, either to eat or rub in, but men were wasting away for lack of medicines until the time I showed them the mixing of gentle remedies with which they drive away all sickness. Also I set out in order many ways of divination, and I first judged from dreams that which has necessarily comes to be a waking vision, and I

<sup>14</sup> The only other use of the term *όνειρόπολος* in Homer occurs at *Iliad* 5.149-50, in reference to aged Eurydamas, father of Abas and Polyidus, who is able to interpret dreams.

<sup>15</sup> Aesch.PB.476-487

explained to them difficult omens from people's remarks, and signs met on their journey –<sup>16</sup>

The list continues, and he makes reference to other common methods of inductive divination including augury, the reading of entrails and divination through fire. There are several features to highlight here. Firstly, the text hints at a subtle distinction between the skills that Prometheus taught mortals in the medicinal sphere and those which he taught for divinatory understanding. His skills in relation to curing illnesses are in no way prognostic; these are not illnesses which may strike in the future, but those which are already affecting men in the present. They are not incorporated within the realms of *mantikē*. In this context, dreams bear no relevance to problems of a medical nature; rather, they are prominently featured as one of the many options available for predicting the future and as such are expressly incorporated within the realms of *mantikē*. This notable assimilation of the various different types of divinatory practices has been highlighted as indicative of *mantikē* having, by the fifth century, become a conceptual category and a unified field.<sup>17</sup> In terms of the dream content which Prometheus has taken it upon himself to interpret, he claims to have discovered a way to judge (κᾶκρινά) from the dream itself that which has become a waking vision (ὑπαρ), or even more broadly translated, 'reality'. Thus, he is able to distinguish that which is oneiromantically significant from that which is not within the dream itself, implying that not all the contents of a dream were always deemed relevant; the skill in dream interpretation was to learn how to identify those elements which were symbolically significant. The dichotomy between sleeping and waking visions, dreams and reality, is commonly invoked in literary depictions of the dream experience, though there may be some variation in terminology: more usually, the contrast is drawn between ὄναρ and ὑπαρ evidently with greater linguistic effect.<sup>18</sup> In his description of the various ways in which he has helped mankind, Prometheus also emphasizes a transferral of agency to general mankind themselves. They are no longer helpless in the face of disease, or ignorant in the interpretation of portentous signs. Through his actions, Prometheus has helped them overcome ailments by their own *tekhnē*, but he has also opened up a means of communication between gods and general mankind – in either case, there is no urgent need for the consultation of a specialist. This is a sentiment which will be echoed in *On Regimen*, with its extensive guidance on how to

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<sup>16</sup> Tr. Collard (2008), with minor adaptations.

<sup>17</sup> Iles Johnston (2008), 8: 'a thing that could be treated ontologically as a whole.'

<sup>18</sup> Kessels (1973), 129-132.

decode one's own inductive dream and care for one's own regimen without the necessity for constant consultation with a specialist.

However, that is not to suggest that by the end of the fifth-century divination had started to become a personal exercise. On the contrary, there was a growing market of diviners, sages, and fortune-tellers competing for business. The state itself had experts in divination under its employ, and political decisions were rarely made without recourse to the gods' opinion. Inspired divination retained a prominence and prestige over inductive divination, not only through the great oracles such as the Pythia at Delphi, but also more specifically in relation to dreams, as the cult of Asclepius in particular began to experience a vast increase in popularity.

### 5.3 Asclepius: inspired and curative dreams

Asclepius remains one of the more widely recognised figures from the Greek mythological canon even today for his role as the god of medicine. His is an interesting mythic trajectory: he begins his career as a local hero (possibly from Trikke) renowned for his skill in healing, then becomes a more expressly divine figure, with a significant Panhellenic cult and several large religious sanctuaries where miraculous rather than technical healing was reported to take place.<sup>19</sup>

Asclepius' earliest appearance is in the *Iliad*, where he is referenced as the father of the two skilled physician-warriors Machaon and Podalirius.<sup>20</sup> Theirs is an expressly practical form of healing: the sons clean up battlefield injuries and apply healing medicines to the open wounds, with Machaon treating Menelaus himself after he is wounded by Pandarus.<sup>21</sup> Homer tells us Asclepius had passed on these skills – as well as his store of *pharmaka* – to his sons, both of which he himself had received from Chiron – the famous instructor of heroes – suggesting Asclepius' heroic rather than divine status at this point.<sup>22</sup> Pindar similarly describes Asclepius with emphatic reference to his practical skills, and again attributes his knowledge of healing to Chiron.<sup>23</sup> But Pindar then elaborates this story much further to include the paternal

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<sup>19</sup> Temkin (1991), 79 sees Asclepius' change in status as an amalgamation of two separate traditions: the saga of the hero and the myth of the god.

<sup>20</sup> *Il.* 2, 729-33, later referenced in the same manner by Neoptolemus in Soph. *Phil.* 1332-35. Edelstein (1998), 16 'there must have been a legend of Asclepius, the physician, before the time of Homeric epic.'

<sup>21</sup> *Il.* 4, 192-219.

<sup>22</sup> *Il.* 4.218-19. Mackie (1997), 6 remarks that the Iliadic depiction of Asclepius is representative of Homer's 'avoidance of magical healing in favour of a much more conservative and respected form of medicine'.

<sup>23</sup> Pindar, *Pythian* 3.1-58; cf. *Nem.* 3.54-56.

divine parentage of Apollo, and recounts the story of his divine punishment from Zeus for daring to raise the dead.<sup>24</sup> Asclepius continues to attract more specifically divine attributes in literature, and the *Paeon of Sophocles* references him simply as ‘the god who wards off pain’.<sup>25</sup> Meanwhile, his cult had already been established as early as the sixth century BC in Epidauros, and over the fifth and fourth centuries the Asclepian cult spread widely in popularity across the Greek world.<sup>26</sup> Epidauros is perhaps the most renowned of the Asclepian sanctuaries; other locations included Piraeus, Pergamon, Corinth, Aegae, Pellae, Kos, Lebena and Athens.<sup>27</sup>

The sanctuaries offered visitors a cure to their illnesses through incubation, a highly ritualised process which may have also had possible links to more ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian practices.<sup>28</sup> This type of oneiromancy falls under the categorisation of ‘inspired divination’ – as discussed in Chapter 1 – for it involved a more direct type of contact with the god than the deconstruction of the symbols and scenarios which arose through inductive divination.<sup>29</sup> The incubant, while sleeping in the *abaton* of the temple after undergoing ritualised purification, would be the recipient of a curative dream. This could involve an appearance from the god himself, or various representatives from Asclepian mythology. It could be a dream during which the patient was cured, or it could be the delivery of a set of instructions for the patient to carry out when awake which would lead to their being cured of their ills.

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<sup>24</sup> Already briefly referenced by Hesiod fr.125; on being punished by Zeus for raising the dead, cf. also Aesch *Ag.*1019-24 and Eur.*Alc.*1-7 & 122-29 and on his parentage being that of Apollo and Coronis, cf. H.H.16. For a full account of Asclepius, the standard work remains Edelstein & Edelstein (2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1998).

<sup>25</sup> Edelstein (1998), 199-200, with text at T. 587. For a full reconstruction of the paeon with images of the original inscription and its reconstruction, see Oliver (1936).

<sup>26</sup> Panagiotidou (2016), 5; Epidauros being a region in which Apollo was also worshipped.

<sup>27</sup> Petridou (2014), 292 holds that the arrival of Asclepius in Athens can be dated, thanks to the Telemachos monument (SEG 47.232), to 421/0BC, and argues that his introduction to Athens gave Asclepius’ career as a ‘divine physician’ a ‘decisive boost’. Mitchell-Boyask (2008), 106-7 finds it unlikely that there was no cultic activity of Asclepius before this in Athens – especially given the plague the city suffered through – and argues that private religious activity at least is ‘plausible, if not probable’. He also highlights the cult’s arrival at Piraeus before Athens, the former being the very place to which Thucydides ascribed the first outbreak of plague (2.48.2). His wide-ranging popularity across the Greek world is also evidenced by his appearance on a wide geographical spread of coins – cf. Hart (1966), 80 – indicative of the clear public aspect of his worship (Mili 2015, 143).

<sup>28</sup> Butler (1998), 268 lists an excerpt from a Babylonian dream book which advises on how to interpret the dreams resulting from some kind of incubation ritual process, however scholarship more generally is reticent to ascribe too much significance to older incubation practices, and they certainly were nowhere near as institutionalised as the Asclepian practices.

<sup>29</sup> Bonnechere (2007), 149 inspired divination was generally more tied to a sanctuary, and was often held to be a more valuable type of divination than inductive.



Many accounts of the efficacy of the incubation process were recorded on inscriptions which surrounded the sanctuary. Set up by the priests, these highly visible stelai acted as an attestation (or perhaps more appropriately, advertisement) of both the god's power and his success in healing. A number of these stelai – known as *iamata* – have survived from Epidauros, recording the cures which visiting patients had received. Dated to the mid-fourth century BC, these *iamata* are useful in that they detail the different types of ailments from which patients sought relief at the sanctuary, as well as providing an account of the different types of dream scenarios experienced by each patient. Most common was the straightforward 'visitation' dream which followed the fairly typical *Aussentraume* pattern in which an external figure (in this case usually the god himself) appears to the sleeper and is able to interact and speak with them:

(VIII) Εύφάνης Ἐπιδαύριος παῖς. οὗτος λιθίων ἐνε[κά]θευδε· ἔδοξε δὴ αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιστὰς εἰπεῖν· "τί μοι δώσεῖς, αἴ τύκα ὑγιή ποιήσω;" αὐτὸς δὲ φάμεν "δέκ' ἀστραγάλους". τὸν δὲ θεὸν γελάσαντα φάμεν νιν παυσεῖν· ἀμέρας δὲ γενομένης ὑγιῆς ἐξῆλθε.

8. Euphanes, a boy of Epidauros. Suffering from stone he slept in the temple. It seemed to him that the god stood by him and asked: "What will you give me if I cure you?" "Ten dice," he answered. The god laughed and said to him that he would cure him. When day came he walked out sound.

(XVIII) Ἀλκέτας Ἀλικίος· οὗτος τυφλὸς ἐὼν ἐνύπνιον εἶδε· ἐδόκει οἱ ὁ θεὸς ποτελθὼν τοῖς δακτύλοις διάγειν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ἰδεῖν τὰ δένδρη πρᾶτον τὰ ἐν τῷ ἱαρωῖ. ἀμέρας δὲ γενομένης ὑγιῆς ἐξῆλθε.

18. Alcetas of Halieis. The blind man saw a dream. It seemed to him that the god came up to him and with his fingers opened his eyes, and that he first saw the trees in the sanctuary. At daybreak he walked out sound.<sup>30</sup>

In the latter case, it is notable that the vocabulary of experiencing a dream, i.e. 'saw' a dream (ἐνύπνιον εἶδε), does not change to account for Alcetas' visual impairment, nor does his condition impede or prevent the visual component of the dreaming process *before* the god 'opens' his eyes. This could, however, owing to the religious context, be yet another miraculous effect attributable to Asclepius' power. The externality of this type of dream was often evidenced by the leaving behind of an apport, a physical token which was left as 'proof' of the dream encounter:

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<sup>30</sup> All Greek text for the Epidauros *iamata* is taken from IG IV<sup>2</sup>,1, 121-123; translations from Edelstein (1998).

(XII) Εὐίππος λόγχαν ἔτη ἐφόρησε ἕξ ἐν τᾷ γνάθῳ· ἐγκοιτασθέντος δ' αὐτοῦ ἐξελών τὰν λόγχαν ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὰς χῆράς οἱ ἔδωκε· ἀμέρας δὲ γενομένας ὑγιῆς ἐξῆρπε τὰν λόγχαν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων.

12. Euhippus had had for six years the point of a spear in his jaw. As he was sleeping in the Temple the god extracted the spearhead and gave it to him in his hands. When day came Euhippus departed cured, and held the spearhead in his hands.

(XIII) ἀνὴρ Τορωναῖος δεμελέας. οὗτος ἐγκαθεύδων ἐνύπνιον εἶδε· ἔδοξε οἱ τὸν θεὸν τὰ στέρνα μαχαίραι ἀνσχίσσαντα τὰς δεμελέας ἐξελεῖν καὶ δόμεν οἱ ἐς τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συνράψαι τὰ στήθη· ἀμέρας δὲ γενομένας ἐξῆλθε τὰ θηρία ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων καὶ ὑγιῆς ἐγένετο· κατέπεε δ' αὐτὰ δολωθεὶς ὑπὸ ματρυιᾶς ἐγ κυκᾶνι ἐμβεβλημένας ἐκπιών.

13. A man of Torone with leeches. In his sleep he saw a dream. It seemed to him that the god cut open his chest with a knife and took out the leeches, which he gave him into his hands, and then he stitched up his chest again. At daybreak he departed with the leeches in his hands and he had become well.

This type of dream had longevity in both the literary and historical tradition.<sup>31</sup> In the earliest literary example of the apport-dream, Pindar's *Olympian* 13, the dream itself notably occurs in a religious context not dissimilar from that of the Asclepian incubation process. The hero Bellerophon wishes to harness the winged horse Pegasus but has been so far unsuccessful in his attempts.<sup>32</sup> He is instructed to sleep on the altar of Athena, and during the night he is visited by the goddess herself:

πρὶν γέ οἱ χρυσάμπυκα κούρα χαλινόν  
Παλλὰς ἤνεγκ', ἐξ ὄνειρου δ' αὐτίκα  
ἦν ὕπαρ: φώνασε δ': 'εὐδεις, Αἰολίδα βασιλεῦ;  
ἄγε φίλτρον τόδ' ἵππειον δέκευ,  
καὶ Δαμαίῳ νιν θύων ταῦρον ἀργᾶντα πατρι δεῖξον.'  
κυαναιγὶς ἐν ὄρφνα  
κνώσσοντί οἱ παρθένος τόσα εἰπέῖν  
ἔδοξεν: ἀνὰ δ' ἐπᾶλτ' ὀρθῶ ποδί.  
παρκεῖμενον δὲ συλλαβῶν τέρας,  
ἐπιχώριον μάντιν ἄσμενος εὔρεν.<sup>33</sup>

...until the maiden goddess Pallas brought to him a bit with its golden headstall, and his dream at once turned to a waking vision. She spoke

<sup>31</sup> It was a popular dream motif in literature, and was commonly invoked in the later historiographical tradition as a means of legitimisation and divine endorsement – cf. *Appian Syrian Wars* 284-5, Justin 15.4.2-9.

<sup>32</sup> Pindar's retelling differs from the Homeric account of the tale; notably in this version it is Bellerophon himself who is an emphatically active participant: by his own will he sets out to achieve his goal of harnessing Pegasus. For a full examination of the narrative differences and techniques at work, cf. Boeke (2007), esp. 149-152.

<sup>33</sup> Pind.O.13.64-74

forth: “Are you sleeping, prince of Aeolus’ race? Come, take this charmer of horses; and, sacrificing a white bull to your father the horse-tamer [Poseidon], show it to him.” So it seemed that the maiden of the dark aegis had spoken to him as he slept, and he leapt straight to his feet and seized the marvellous bit that lay beside him, and joyfully sought out the seer (*mantis*) of the land ...<sup>34</sup>

The seer advises Bellerophon to follow Athena’s instructions immediately, and also set up an altar to her. Having carried out the instructions of the dream, as well as being in possession of the golden bit, he is thus able to bridle and mount Pegasus. There are several important aspects to highlight in this dream narrative. It is significant as it is not only the first account of an ‘apport’ type of visitation dream, but it is also the first extant scenario in which an individual actively seeks a dream through a process of incubation.<sup>35</sup> The Homeric conventions are still identifiable; Athena arrives and immediately asks Bellerophon – using his patronym – if he is asleep before delivering her specific instructions. Yet there are new additions to the stock epic scenario, most evidently the leaving of the golden bridle as an affirmation of the reality of the experience, but also the transition of the experience from *oneiros* to ὕπαρ once this token has initially been delivered. This emendation to the terminology takes place once the apport has been transferred from the divine sphere into the mortal sphere; the depositing of a physical object has transgressed a boundary which fundamentally alters the nature of the episode. Yet, despite it being now described as a ‘waking vision’, the lines which follow suggest Bellerophon was still asleep as Athena spoke to him.<sup>36</sup>

Once he has awoken, Bellerophon immediately consults a μάντις for guidance regarding the dream which positions the contents of the dream once again within the religious domain. He is given further instruction, and it is only once he has performed the necessary acts, of sacrifice and the erection of an altar, that he will be able to benefit from the apport left by Athena.<sup>37</sup> This portrayal of the divine power communicated in dreams as dependent on the actions conducted by the individual once they awaken features in several of the inscribed reports from Epidauros.

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<sup>34</sup> Trans. with minor adaptations from Verity (2007).

<sup>35</sup> Harris (2009), 39 comments that “there is no real evidence [of incubation] earlier than the passage of Pindar”, but acknowledges that the practice itself must have already been in use by this point (464BC) if it is referenced in such a way by Pindar.

<sup>36</sup> Van Lieshout (1980), 23 argues that this ‘waking vision’ in which an apport is given over should still be classified as an objective type of dream rather than a vision occurring in an actual waking state.

<sup>37</sup> Boeke (2007), 152.

Asclepius is quick to reverse the cure he has bestowed should he not be properly honoured:

(XXII) Ἑρμων Θ[άσιος. τοῦτο]ν τυφλὸν ἐόντα ἰάσατο· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ἴατρα οὐκ ἀπάγοντ[α ὁ θεός νιν] ἐπόησε τυφλὸν αὖθις· ἀφικόμενον δ' αὐτὸν καὶ πάλιν ἐγκαθε[ύδοντα ὑγι]ῆ κατέστασε.

22. Hermon of Thasus. His blindness was cured by Asclepius. But since afterwards he did not bring the thank-offerings, the god made him blind again. When he came back and slept in the Temple again, [the god] made him well.

The inscriptions from Epidauros also stress the experiences of the unbelievers and sceptics, for whom a visit to the sanctuary can still have beneficial results providing they rightfully acknowledge the power of the god after their encounter.<sup>38</sup> The emphasis, as in the Bellerophon episode, lies in the establishment of divine power, and the prerogative of the divinity themselves to allow mortals to benefit from it. This is especially fitting, given the physical location of the inscriptions around the sanctuary.

The incubation encounter could also take the form of a more symbolic dream drawing upon imagery from Asclepian mythology rather than a direct visitation of the god in person:

(XXXIX) — — —]δα ἐκ Κέου. αὐτα περὶ παίδων ἐγκαθεύδ[ουσα ἐνύπνιον εἶδε· ἐδό]κει οἱ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δράκων ἐπὶ τᾶς γαστ[ρὸς κεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐκ τούτου] παῖδές οἱ ἐγένοντο πέντε.

39. Agamedea of Ceos. She slept in the Temple for offspring and saw a dream. It seemed to her in her sleep that a serpent lay on her belly. And thereupon five children were born to her.

The serpent was prominent in Asclepian iconography from the fifth century BC, and, as has been pointed out, the relationship between the serpent and the god was multifaceted: the snake could be used as a symbol, an avatar, an embodiment or even a pet.<sup>39</sup> There are several accounts in which the intervention by a serpent is not at all symbolic, but rather a literal interaction between the patient and the snakes which were kept at the sanctuary as the “god’s assistants.”<sup>40</sup> Different dream types were not

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. IG<sup>2</sup> 1, 121, 3 in which the man in question is even renamed ‘Apistos’ by the god, owing to his incredulity at the inscriptions themselves.

<sup>39</sup> Ogden (2013), 311. For a full account of the iconographical association between serpents and the gods of healing, cf. 311-346; on interventions by serpents within the sanctuary, the chapter ‘A Day in the Life of a Sacred Snake’, 347-382 is particularly thorough.

<sup>40</sup> Gilhus (2006), 109; there were also records of successful interventions by the temple dogs, and even one account of the beneficial actions of a goose [23, 114-15]

mutually exclusive; the more symbolic type of dream could also be backed up by the addition of an apport as a more physical way of validating the dream's meaning:

(XIV) ἀνὴρ ἐν αἰδοίῳ λίθον. οὗτος ἐνύπνιον εἶδε· ἐδόκει παιδὶ καλῶι συγγίνεσθαι, ἐξονειρώσσω δὲ τὸν λίθον ἐγβάλλει καὶ ἀνελόμενος ἐξῆλθε ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων.

14. A man with a stone in his membrum. He saw a dream. It seemed to him that he was lying with a fair boy and when he had seminal discharge he ejected the stone and picked it up and walked out holding it in his hands.

Altogether, the reported Epidauros dreams all follow the same literary formula of an intervention by the god – in some form or another – in which he either performs the healing process within the dream, and thus upon waking the patient finds himself cured, or he provides directions for the patient to complete when awake, the completion of which will result in the restoration of health. This ritualistic use of the dream as part of the healing process evidently differs from the way in which dreams come to be employed in their prognostic context in *On Regimen*; for the Hippocratic author, the dream itself is not a force of curative power.<sup>41</sup>

#### 5.4 The Hippocratic claim to dreams

Despite the scattered references to dream interpretation in both archaic and classical literature, the fourth book of the Hippocratic *On Regimen* comprises the first extant Greek dream book, and provides a comprehensive guide to the reader on how to interpret the various symbols or encounters one might experience in a dream. It is to be used for the particular purpose of what can be generally categorised as self-care, rather than as part of any magico-religious practice. It is intended as a means by which the patient themselves can not only identify their ailment, but also carry out a recommended course of action to restore, or prevent harm to, their health. *On Regimen*, as a whole, maintains the position declared from the start that anyone who aspires to use regimen correctly must first acquire knowledge and discernment of the nature of man in general: he needs to know the primary constituents and the components by which it is controlled. In addition to this though, he must also know the powers of food and drink, benefits of exercise, and how to proportion everything to the patient's specific circumstances (geography, age, season). But even this isn't always enough as it is difficult to be exact in matters regarding the patient. In the opening of *On Regimen* I,

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<sup>41</sup> van der Eijk (2004), 194: "He [the author of *On Regimen*] is not using dreams for curing the sick."

the Hippocratic author is emphatic that, improving on the theories of his predecessors, he has found a way to predict illness *before* the patient even falls sick, and so he is able to provide a specific recommended regimen which will prevent the body from being ‘mastered’ (κρατεῖσθαι) by an oncoming disease.<sup>42</sup>

The work as a whole gives a full description of methods in reading the body in relation to what have been labelled as ‘pre-sufferings’, and in doing so provides a manual for self-care.<sup>43</sup> The nature of this manual has been best summarised by Foucault:

“*Regimen* should not be understood as a corpus of universal and uniform rules; it was more in the nature of a manual for reacting to situations in which one might find oneself, a treatise for adjusting one’s behaviour to fit the circumstances.”<sup>44</sup>

Book 4 of *On Regimen* thus builds upon the guidance given in reading the body from the previous three books. It opens with the claim that by learning how to properly interpret the signs which appear in dreams, one may gain not only wisdom but the ability to proactively exert influence on the course of present or future events.<sup>45</sup> The first section (chapter 86) is emphatic about the interpretation of the dream content in both its opening and closing lines:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν τεκμηρίων τῶν ἐν τοῖσιν ὕπνοισιν ὅστις ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκε,  
μεγάλην ἔχοντα δύναμιν εὐρήσει πρὸς ἅπαντα.

Whoever has correctly learnt about the sure signs happening in sleep,  
will discover that they have a great influence upon all things.

ὅστις οὖν ἐπίσταται κρίνειν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς μέγα μέρος ἐπίσταται  
σοφίης.<sup>46</sup>

Whoever, then, is acquainted with interpreting these things correctly, is  
acquainted with a great part of wisdom.

This type of prognostic work evidently bears a fundamental similarity with divination, as in the most basic sense it is concerned with predicting what will happen in the

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<sup>42</sup> *Vict* I, 2, 66-67.

<sup>43</sup> Holmes (2010) uses the term ‘pre-sufferings’ throughout her discussion of ‘symptoms’ in a variety of Greek literature to refer to that which the body experiences as it falls ill, which draws attention to the very presence of illness. For her discussion of *On Regimen* IV cf. esp. 171-191.

<sup>44</sup> Foucault (1990), 106.

<sup>45</sup> van der Eijk (2004), 213 emphasizes such dreams signify “a future which is not inescapable.”

<sup>46</sup> *Vict*.4.86

future.<sup>47</sup> But here it is wholly removed from any ritualistic practice, and the dream forms only part of the process in identifying what is happening internally within the patient's body. The choice of τεκμήριον here as reference to dreams plays on the meaning of it both more generally as a sign or a proof, but also its place in the medical vocabulary as symptom. It emphasizes the definitive, visual, and perceptible nature, while also setting up the argument to follow, for a μάντις is certainly not as useful as a physician in interpreting a medical symptom. The Hippocratic author particularly stresses the inability of others to correctly interpret these internalised medical dreams:

Ὀκόσα μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐνυπνίων θεϊά ἐστι καὶ προσημαίνει ἢ πολέσι ἢ ἰδιώτησι ἢ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ† μὴ δι' αὐτῶν ἀμαρτίην,† εἰσὶ οἱ κρίνουσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τέχνην ἔχοντες· ὀκόσα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα προσημαίνει, πλησμονῆς ἢ κενώσιος ὑπερβολῆν τῶν συμφυτῶν, ἢ μεταβολῆν τῶν ἀθέων, κρίνουσι μὲν καὶ ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ μὲν τυγχάνουσι, τὰ δὲ ἀμαρτάνουσι, καὶ οὐδέτερα τούτων γινώσκουσι δι' ὅ τι γίνεται ...<sup>48</sup>

So then, on the one hand, for as many dreams as are divine, and foretell to cities or to the layman either ominous or auspicious things [about which they are not at fault], there are those who possess a skill in interpreting them. On the other hand, for as many sufferings as the soul foretells of the body, of excess surfeit or depletion of things natural or of change of things unnatural, these things too they interpret, sometimes getting it right, sometimes getting it wrong, but in neither case do they know the cause of anything.

Rather than a straight polemic denial of there being any validity to a divine dream, or a criticism of superstitious practices as can be found in other Hippocratic texts, the author here instead delineates very sharply between divine dreams and prognostic dreams. He is careful not to use any specific vocabulary – there is no specific ὄνειρόπολος or μάντις here – leaving the identity of the opponents he is diminishing as broad as possible. He recognises that these divine-dream interpreters have a *tekhnē* in their own field, and acknowledges that they may even be able to interpret prognostic dreams from time to time – but, recalling the claims which opened the chapter, he is clear that these interpreters do not *know* the causes of such dreams. And the cause is perhaps the most important aspect of a prognostic dream, so the Hippocratic author has created an oneiromantic specialisation for himself in both dream-type and agenda. The brief comment which removes the aetiology of the divine dream from any human agency is notable despite its grammatical problems (which often renders it excised

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Lloyd (1987), 41-46.

<sup>48</sup> *Vict.* 4.87

from the text), for it creates a further contrast between an externally independent dream experience which acts of its own accord (presumably with the literary *oneiros* in mind), and the communication which will come from the soul of the internal condition of the body. The Hippocratic author is offering the opportunity to learn the causes behind such dreams so you can interpret and facilitate the health of your own body. The divine-dream interpreters have thus skilfully been rendered obsolete for this category of dreams; the Promethean method is of no use here.

Yet that is not to suggest that by the late fifth century BC, the belief in a dream's divine nature or religious significance was being in any way replaced or overshadowed by the secular medical dream. On the contrary, as seen in the previous section, it was during this same period that the healing cult of Asclepius became immensely popular and sanctuaries to the god spread throughout Greece. This type of religious healing would likely have been one of the several 'interpreters' from which the Hippocratic authors were hoping to turn people away.

### 5.5 Decoding the Prognostic Dream

It seems to be the case then that the Asclepian dream shares much in common with the wider literary dream narrative. How does the Hippocratic dream compare? Having discriminated between the divine dream and the medical dream, and their appropriate interpreters, the Hippocratic author launches into a catalogue of various dream scenarios and their prognostic relevance. An overview of the dream types in each chapter can be summarised as follows:

Section	Content	Dream Type
88	Day Residue	Symbolic-Episodic
89	Cosmological bodies	Micro-macrocosmic
90	Natural environment	Micro-macrocosmic
91	Clothing	Symbolic-Episodic
92	The Dead	Symbolic-Episodic
93	Miscellaneous	Symbolic-Episodic

As is apparent, there are a mixture of dream-types at play here which draw upon a range of cultural as well as cosmological imagery. The majority of guidance is based on a symbolic inference, or the identification of one particular important feature within the dream; the only predominantly episodic dream related is Chapter 88's re-enactment of daily life while sleeping. This range of dream types has prompted some scholars to argue that the work is that of a compiler, especially as the more symbolic 'static' dream is abundant in older dream literature and as these increase in the work,



the prophylactic details decrease.<sup>49</sup> It seems excessively reductive to label the author simply a ‘compiler’, especially given the coherency with which the fourth book follows from the rest of *On Regimen*. Evidently the author is making use of older material, but this seems to be precisely his aim: he intends to show that only *he* is able to correctly interpret these common dreams in order to benefit one’s own health and well-being. Should he have avoided reference to any common dream *topos*, he would have been isolating himself from the precise marketplace in which he wishes to promote his own unique skill. That the prophylactic measures decrease in detail seems only to correspond to the general move towards brevity and generalisation as the chapters proceed; symbolic (or, static) dreams by their very nature do not necessitate the same elongated analysis as the episodic or micro-macrocosmic dream types.

### 5.5.1. ‘Day Residue’ Dreams [IV, 88]

The first category of dreams identified by the Hippocratic author is that in which the various activities undertaken in the daytime are then simply replayed back during the night to the sleeper:

ὁκόσα τῶν ἐνυπνίων τὰς ἡμερινὰς πρήξιας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ διανοίας ἐς τὴν εὐφρόνην ἀποδίδωσι δίδωσι κατὰ τρόπον γινομένης ὥσπερ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπρήχθη ἢ ἐβουλεύθη ἐπὶ δικαίῳ πρήγματι, ταῦτα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ· ὑγιείην γὰρ σημαίνει, διότι ἡ ψυχὴ παραμένει τοῖσιν ἡμερινοῖσι βουλευμασιν, οὔτε πλησμονῆ κρατηθεῖσα οὔτε κενώσει οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔδενι ἕξωθεν προσπεσόντι.<sup>50</sup>

Such dreams as render in the night the very actions or thoughts of men during the day, coming to pass according to habit – just as were carried out or deliberated on during the day already in genuine actions – these things for man are good. For this signifies health, because the soul abides by the purposes of the day, and is mastered neither by surfeit or depletion, nor by any other matter attacking from the outside.

In prognostic terms, for the patient to dream of their daily activities unfolding true to form – the “day residue effect” – is indicative of the body’s good health.<sup>51</sup> These daily activities do not only relate to physical actions, but even include thoughts which the patient has had during the day and so accounts for both the external and the internal bodily experiences; the internal in this case perhaps being especially relevant as the

<sup>49</sup> van Lieshout (1980), 186.

<sup>50</sup> *Vict.* 4.88

<sup>51</sup> This phenomenon continues to be a topic of interest to modern psychologists. Nielsen (1992), 67-77 details an experiment to determine the temporal delay between the experience in waking life and the appearance in the dream; if it is less than two days this is classed as the ‘day-residue’ effect, while any longer is the ‘dream-lag’ effect. Freud emphasized the role of such day residue in the instigation of dreams, and incorporated it extensively into his system of the manifest expression of repressed desires in the famous monograph *On the Interpretation of Dreams*.

more primary locale of activity in sleep. There remains a slight hint of the older oneiromantic textual tradition in the structure of the first sentence. The description of the dream scenario is followed immediately by a one-word pronouncement of whether it is favourable or unfavourable; here, the dream is considered favourable (ἀγαθά), and this pronouncement occupies an emphatic position at the end of the line without any accompanying verb. The author then continues on to elaborate upon the dream's significance in relation to the patient. This preserves the basic framework which, as we have seen above, existed in the earlier dreambooks from Egypt; though the author here chooses to incorporate it within prose, rather than using a list.

The Hippocratic author draws upon wider ideas of equilibrium and blends in explaining his interpretation. There is a balance within the soul indicated by this type of dream, which in turn reflects a balance within the body. In these situations, the soul has not been mastered (κρατηθεῖσα) by surfeit or depletion – presumably of the qualities which the Hippocratic author has previously identified in Book 1 as both the primary constituents of the soul, and indeed, of all living things:

Συνίσταται μὲν οὖν τὰ ζῶα τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀπὸ δυοῖν,  
διαφόροι μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, συμφόροι δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος.<sup>52</sup>

And moreover, all living things, even man, are composed of two things, different in power but companions in practice, namely fire and water.

Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐάσω, περὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπου δηλώσω. ἐσέρπει δὲ ἐς  
ἄνθρωπον ψυχὴ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν ἔχουσα, μοίρην σώματος  
ἀνθρώπου.<sup>53</sup>

I will leave alone the other living things, and instead focus on man. Into man there enters a soul, having an equal blend of fire and water, a portion of man's body.

For the author of *On Regimen*, everything is composed of a blend of fire and water, including the soul itself which is understood as a materialist component within the body. It is clear here that the soul specifically and directly affects the dream contents by following and reproducing the sleeper's daily activities and experiences; any disturbance to this daily reiteration quite literally indicates a disturbance in the body. As examined in previous chapters, this overtly physiological view of the soul, which itself is composed of an equal blend of fire and water, evidently has Presocratic colourings; not just in Heraclitean matters of the soul, but also in the typically

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<sup>52</sup> *Vict.* 1.3

<sup>53</sup> *Vict.* 1.7

Empedoclean ideas of *krasis*.<sup>54</sup> But in terms of what the soul sees while asleep, the ‘day-residue’ dream also has some Presocratic, as well as wider literary, parallels.

There appears a brief remark by John Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle’s *De Anima* which references a similar Empedoclean notion:

ὁ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ὄνειράτων λέγων φησὶν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐνεργημάτων αἱ νυκτεριναὶ γίνονται φαντασίαι· ταύτην δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν φρόνησιν καλεῖ ἐν οἷς φησὶν ὅθεν σφισιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται. ἰδοὺ γὰρ τηλαυγῶς τὴν νῶσιν τῆς ἀλόγου, τὴν φαντασίαν φημί, φρόνησιν καλεῖ.

For when saying what differentiates dreams Empedocles says that from day-time activities come night-time images. He calls this image a *phronesis* when he says ‘Whence their thought always presents different things.’ For you can clearly see that cognition by the non-rational soul, which I call imagination, he calls *phronesis*.<sup>55</sup>

Although included in DK, these lines remain contentious in Empedoclean scholarship.<sup>56</sup> Harris has recently argued for this passage as a coherent addition to Empedocles’ system of vision through effluences, and accepts it as a genuine Empedoclean thought despite the markedly Hellenistic vocabulary.<sup>57</sup> There are no other direct references in the rest of the surviving Empedoclean evidence which account for the dreaming process in this way; but it is possible that Philoponus is summarising an earlier theory, albeit rather anachronistically, which was not simply derived from Aristotle.<sup>58</sup> What is interesting for the current discussion is that it specifically identifies activities carried out during the day as the source for the contents of the dream. This clear cut aetiology leaves little room for any divine intervention, and reflects Empedocles’ own interest in the physiological and psychological processes taking place in the body which underlie perception. It also hints at some kind of involvement on the part of the soul – much like that which has been discussed in the previous chapter in *On Regimen* IV – though it is difficult to draw too much from such a scant account.

The idea of activity during the day filtering into dream content also has several notable parallels in writing roughly contemporary with the composition of *On Regimen*, besides from the investigations of the medical writers and philosophers. Aristophanes

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<sup>54</sup> cf. 3.1.4; 3.2.2

<sup>55</sup> Philoponus *On Aristotle on the Soul* 486, 13-17; text and tr. Lee (2005), 141.

<sup>56</sup> Wright (1981), 236 finds it unlikely that it can be attributed to Empedocles, while the passage simply does not appear in Inwood’s 1992 edition of the fragments and testimonia.

<sup>57</sup> Harris (2009), 238-239 also recognises that *energēmata* obviously does not fit into Empedoclean hexameter.

<sup>58</sup> O’Brien (1969), 203 n.4; for Aristotle’s account of Empedoclean dreams, cf. *De Anima* 486.13-17.

plays on the idea in the opening scene of *Clouds* in which Phidippides in his sleep cries out as if racing horses, a past-time he is most occupied with during the day.<sup>59</sup> Herodotus, too, makes reference to the phenomenon in Book VII of his *Histories*, although perhaps surprisingly this ‘rational’ viewpoint is given a Persian advocate. King Xerxes is visited by a dream which admonishes him for choosing not to march against the Greeks. Perturbed by the dream’s warning, he sends for his advisor Artabanus, who attempts to allay the king’s fears with a familiar explanation:

Now when you have turned to the better opinion, you say that, while intending to abandon the expedition against the Greeks, you are haunted by a dream (ὄνειρον) sent by some god, which forbids you to disband the expedition. But this is none of heaven's working, my son. The roving dreams that visit men are of such nature as I shall teach you, since I am many years older than you. Those visions that rove about us in dreams are for the most part the thoughts of the day; and in these recent days we have been very busy with this expedition.<sup>60</sup>

Artabanus’ empirical approach is further emphasized by his proposition of an experiment, in which he will dress himself in Xerxes’ robes and sleep in his throne in order to test the existence of the alleged *oneiros*.<sup>61</sup> Far from establishing the validity of this rational position however, the *oneiros* instead appears now to Artabanus and chastises him for his advice to Xerxes. This ‘day-residue effect’ is also extensively picked up in later philosophy by Lucretius, who, in providing a detailed account of the origins of dream content, in addition to discussion of both human and animal physiological experiences during sleep, goes beyond the Epicurean doctrines and hints at a familiarity with not only the work of Empedocles, as is commonly recognised, but also that of the Hippocratics on the topic of dreams.<sup>62</sup>

Returning to our Hippocratic oneirologist, the ‘day-residue’ dream is a sign from the soul that everything is as it should be within the body. However, should the dream not unfold according to the day’s events, this is medically a cause for concern:

ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἡμερινὰς πρήξιας ὑπεναντιῶται τὰ ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐγγίνηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ μάχη ἢ νίκη, σημαίνει τάραχον ἐν τῷ σώματι· καὶ ἦν μὲν ἰσχυρὴ ἢ, ἰσχυρὸν τὸ κακόν, ἦν δὲ φαύλη, ἀσθενέστερον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς πρήξιος εἴτ’

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<sup>59</sup> Ar. *Nub.*25-28

<sup>60</sup> Hdt.7.16b1-2

<sup>61</sup> This also hints at the older idea of portentous dreams as only being the experience of royalty (or similarly important individuals).

<sup>62</sup> DRN 4.962-999. Analysis of Lucretius’ work in relation to the vast Hippocratic corpus has little dedicated scholarship beyond a short article by Segal (1970). There is however an expansive bibliography on the relationship between Lucretius and Presocratic philosophy, especially Empedocles, cf. esp. Furley (1970) and Sedley (2003), as well as more recent work by Trepanier (2007) and O’Rourke (2014).

ἀποτρέπειν δεῖ εἴτε μή, οὐ κρίνω· τὸ δὲ σῶμα θεραπεύεσθαι συμβουλεύω·  
πλησμονῆς γάρ τινος ἐγγενομένης ἀπόκρισις τις γενομένη ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχὴν.<sup>63</sup>

But whenever dreams are contrary to the habits of the day, and there appears in them a struggle or victory, it signifies a disturbance in the body. A severe sort indicates a severe ill, a more feeble sort only a slight ill. Certainly concerning these actions, I do not judge whether it necessary to prevent them or not. Rather, I advise paying attention to the body. For a secretion having occurred, borne from some surfeit, has troubled the soul.

The focus here for the Hippocratic author remains entirely on the underlying bodily affliction. He is clear about the type of advice he is skilled to give, and that is advice centred on the body itself rather than any decision about whether the actions within the dream be pursued or not.<sup>64</sup> A surfeit of something within the body – again, there is no specification as to which substance it might be, though it presumably relates to the four humours and their qualities – has caused a secretion somewhere in the body. This in turn has then unsettled the soul. That it is expressed in the dream contents in terms of a struggle or victory is reflective of the internal ascendancy of whichever substance happens to be in surfeit.<sup>65</sup> There is a corresponding scale between the severity of the struggle and the severity of the bodily disturbance; this generalised depiction of the dream's interpretative significance allows the patient to easily determine the extent of their ailment based on a basic sliding scale. This method of dream interpretation follows one of the most basic oneiromantic patterns of regular = good / irregular = bad, while the struggle/victory motif is a straightforward representation of the inner state of the body communicated by the soul.<sup>66</sup> There is no complicated mantic significance, and what unfolds within the dream does not relate to a potential future occurrence, but is rather a reflection of the present state of what is happening inside the body.

### 5.5.2 Cosmological Dreams [IV, 89]

The next chapter moves away from the individual, and focuses on dreams which have as their main content various representations of the cosmos. These dreams feature a range of cosmological bodies, and it is not just their appearance but their behaviour

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<sup>63</sup> *Vict.* 4.88

<sup>64</sup> Bartos (2015), 220 sees this as the Hippocratic author making clear that he is not in the practice of giving instruction on any social matters.

<sup>65</sup> This concept of an equilibrium of power within the body recalls Alcmaeon's well-known fragment on *isonomia* - Ἀλκμαίων ἔφη τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικὴν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναρχίαν (*Aetius* v 30, 1).

<sup>66</sup> Holowchak (2001), 394-95; Michalos (2015), 32-33.

within the dream which is significant. As in the 'day-residue' dreams, normalcy is a key indicator of good health:

Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ ἄστρα καθαρὰ καὶ εὐαγέα, κατὰ τρόπον ὀρεόμενα ἕκαστα, ἀγαθὰ· ὑγιεῖν γὰρ τῷ σώματι σημαίνει ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ὑπαρχόντων· ἀλλὰ χρὴ διαφυλάσσειν ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν τῆ παρρούση διαίτη.<sup>67</sup>

Seeing the sun and the moon and the heavens and the stars, clear and bright, each in the right course, is good. For it signifies bodily health by all accounts, but it is necessary to maintain this state by the present regimen.

The first sentence echoes that of the previous section, and again preserves the older Ramesside style of referential structure with the emphatic conclusive ἀγαθὰ. As with before, the basic interpretative method remains of normal = good: imagery which is reflective of the normal state of affairs in the waking world is indicative of good health inside the body. However the author is careful to remind the reader of the necessity of following a proper regimen to maintain this condition, evidently an important concept in the context of the work as a whole. The similarities with the previous section continue; disruption to the normal order is again generally a sign of some kind of physiological problem which has a discernible scale of effect:

εἰ δέ τι τούτων ὑπεναντίον γένοιτο, νοῦσόν τινα τῷ σώματι σημαίνει, ἀπο μὲν τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων ἰσχυροτέραν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων κουφοτέραν.<sup>68</sup>

But if the contrary of any of these things should occur, it signifies a bodily sickness; the more severe indicative of a severe sickness, while the more slight, only a feeble sort.

So far, the author follows a predictable pattern which closely resembles the deductive processes from the previous section; the only small departure here is that he has introduced the use of the conditional structure – another common feature of oneiromantic treatises. Details are kept to a minimum for now, and the straightforward reflection of a severe state in the body as a severe state in the cosmological imagery retains the generalising style from before.

That there was an analogous relationship between the human body (microcosm) and the wider world (macrocosm) was an idea which was often invoked throughout the investigations of early Greek philosophy and science, as well as within other texts from

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<sup>67</sup> *Vict.4.89*

<sup>68</sup> *Vict.4.89*

the Hippocratic corpus. Indeed earlier in *On Regimen* itself, in Book 1, the author references this type of relationship as part of his discussion on the internal structuring of the human body. Having outlined that the body is composed of a competing and interactive blend of fire and water, he elaborates further on the proactive force that is Fire, within the universe and consequently the body:

Ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ πάντα διεκοσμήσατο κατὰ τρόπον αὐτὸ ἐσωτῶ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ πῦρ, ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου, μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς μικρά.<sup>69</sup>

In a word, all things were set in order by Fire in the way of itself within the body, an imitation of the Whole, the small on the basis of the great and the great on the basis of the small.

The micro-macrocosmic relationship depicted here is subordinate to the actions of Fire, and is highly reminiscent of Anaxagoras' depiction of Mind as responsible for cosmic ordering.<sup>70</sup> For the Hippocratic author, Fire is the active force which ordered all things within the body in an imitation of the 'whole' – though not simply in the expected manner that the small was modelled on the large. The large, too, was modelled on the small. How does this micro-macrocosmic relationship work within the context of dream interpretation? The author is certainly using the general premise of such a connection as the basis for his interpretative methodology of dream imagery. But to what extent does the micro-macrocosmic imagery here actually demand the relationship between the cosmos and the body to be entirely analogous? Close reference to the cosmological ideas of Book 1 throughout the discussion of dream imagery in Book 4 should highlight the micro-macrocosmic theories at work here, and help elucidate a more nuanced understanding of the author's conception of both the universe and the body.

Unlike the previous section on day-residue dreams, there follows a much more detailed account on the intricate variations of the dream images in question and their meaning, which also allows for further insight into the Hippocratic author's own cosmological ideas:

ἄστρον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἡ ἕξω περίοδος, ἡλίου δὲ ἢ μέση, σελήνης δὲ ἢ πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα. ὅ τι μὲν οὖν δοκέει τῶν ἄστρον βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ἀφανίζεσθαι ἢ ἐπίσχεσθαι τῆς περιόδου, ἦν μὲν ὑπ' ἡέρος ἢ νεφέλης, ἀσθενέστερον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕδατος ἢ χαλάζης, ἰσχυρότερον· σημαίνει δὲ ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγρὴν καὶ φλεγματώδεα γενομένην ἐς τὴν ἕξω περιφορὴν ἐσπεπτωκέναι.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> *Vict.* 1.10

<sup>70</sup> DK59B12 πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ: εἴτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε.

<sup>71</sup> *Vict.* 4.89

The outer circuit is that of the stars, the middle that of the sun, and the one nearest the hollow is that of the moon. And so, should any of the stars seem to be hindered, to be missing, to cease from its circuit, or be through haze or cloud, it signifies a feebler ill; but if through rain or hail, a more severe sort. It signifies that a moist and phlegmatic secretion, having come about within the body, has fallen into the outer circuit.

The depiction of the arrangement of the cosmos features three circuits in which each type of heavenly body resides. The stars are furthest away in the outermost circuit, the sun resides in the middle circuit, and the moon occupies the circuit which is nearest the 'hollow'. This cosmological circuitry recalls the micro-macrocosmic discussion in *On Regimen's* first book of the internal organisation of the body:

έν δὲ τούτῳ ἐποιήσατο τὸ πῦρ περιόδους τρισσάς, περαινούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω· αἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα τῶν ὑγρῶν, σελήνης δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω περιφορὴν, πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον, ἄστρων δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ μέσα καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι <ἡλίου δύναμιν.><sup>72</sup> τὸ θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ, ὅπερ πάντων ἐπικρατεῖται, διέπον ἅπαντα κατὰ φύσιν ...<sup>73</sup>

And in this space, fire made for itself three circuits, both the inside and outside of each confined by the other; that nearest the moist hollow, the power of the moon, while that nearest the outer circuit towards the fixed enclosure, the power of the stars, and finally that in the middle, confined by both the inside and outside [sc. the power of the sun]<sup>74</sup>. The hottest and strongest fire, which controls all things, ordering all according to nature...

He continues to describe how this fire is responsible for soul, mind and thought, as well as growth and movement, and finally sleep and waking. It governs everything, and itself is never at rest. This 'hottest and strongest fire' is presumably resident within the middle circuit, though owing to some textual distortion this is unclear.<sup>75</sup> However it seems a logical assumption that this fire is comparatively placed in the sun's position, and this is the only circuit left uninhabited by a named cosmological body; indeed, if we compare with the macrocosmic account in 89, it is certainly clear that the sun is the corresponding resident of this middle circuit.<sup>76</sup> If we return to the dream interpretation based on the cosmological imagery then, the advent of rain or hail which is equated literally with

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<sup>72</sup> Here following Joly's emendation; Diels adds < πρὸς τὰς ἐτέρας, ἡλίου δύναμιν >.

<sup>73</sup> *Vict.* 1.9

<sup>74</sup> Jouanna (1998), 164 supplies the missing clause as part of this section's translation; cf. Joly (1967) who restores it fully in the translation: celle de milieu enfin, qui atteint l'intérieur et l'extérieur, correspondant au soleil. Jones (1931) removes it entirely, leaving 'the middle circuits, bounded both within and without.' It seems a reasonable addition here given the formulaic structure of the preceding sentences.

<sup>75</sup> Diels adds < πρὸς τὰς ἐτέρας, ἡλίου δύναμιν > before τὸ θερμότατον, which he makes the end of the sentence.

<sup>76</sup> Jouanna (1998), 163: il est évident que ce circuit médian est l'équivalent de celui du soleil.



moisture would be problematic indeed, given the significant range of activities that fire is therefore responsible for within the body. Moisture, in both the micro and macrocosmic depictions, seems to have a restricted presence in or near the 'hollow'. In the cases where it has somehow fallen towards the outer circuit, the recommended course of action is to counteract the moistness through long, cloaked runs to encourage perspiration – thus moving the excess moisture from the body completely through the skin, the closest boundary to the outer circuit. This method of purging the excess substance outwards through the skin is considered the most expedient for such circumstances.<sup>77</sup> Conversely, should the excess be located in the innermost circuit, the direction of expulsion should be further inwards via an emetic owing to this circuit's location as nearest the abdomen. If the problem is in the middle circuit attempts should be made to force the excess out in both directions.

Looking ahead a few paragraphs in the cosmology section to where the author addresses cosmological movement allows for a better picture of how this connected system is conceived inside the body and relates to the micro-macrocosmic theory presented in Book 1. For a heavenly body to fall out of its orbit, clear and bright, in an easterly direction within the dream is in fact an indicator of health not only owing to the auspiciously pure condition of the heavenly body but because of the direction of movement:

ὅ τι δ' ἂν ἐν τῷ σώματι καθαρὸν ἐνεὸν ἐκκρίνηται ἐκ τῆς περιόδου κατὰ φύσιν ἀφ' ἐσπέρας πρὸς ἡῶ, ὀρθῶς ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐς τὴν κοιλίην ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐς τὴν σάρκα ἀπερευγόμενα πάντα ἐκ τῆς περιόδου ἐκπίπτει. ὅ τι δ' ἂν τούτων μέλαν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐσπέρην δοκῆ φέρεσθαι, ἢ ἐς θάλασσαν ἢ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἢ ἄνω, ταῦτα σημαίνει τὰς νούσους· τὰ μὲν ἄνω φερόμενα κεφαλῆς ῥεύματα· ὅσα δὲ ἐς θάλασσαν, κοιλίης νοσήματα· ὅσα δὲ ἐς γῆν, φύματα μάλιστα σημαίνει τὰ ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ φυόμενα.<sup>78</sup>

Whenever a pure substance in the body is secreted from the circuit naturally away from the west towards the east, it does so correctly; for those things secreted into the abdomen and those things disgorged into the flesh all fall away from the circuit. But whenever a heavenly body seems dark and faint, and is borne towards the west, or into the sea, or into the earth, or upwards, this signifies sicknesses. Of course, the movement of things upwards indicates fluxes of the head, while those into the sea indicate a sickness of the abdomen, and those into the earth most certainly a tumour growing inside the flesh.

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<sup>77</sup> *Vict.*4.89

<sup>78</sup> *Vict.*4.89

Moving from the west towards the east is the most favourable direction for the substances within the body; the substance is secreted out of the circuit in some fashion, and can move beyond the circuit into the abdominal area or into the surrounding flesh. This corresponds well to the dietetic advice in the previous section – moisture can be expelled through either the skin (perspiration) or through the abdominal system (emetic). There is a clear conception of the internal motions which can deliver those substances which are internal and thus invisible, into the external and thus visible realm. In this respect the micro-macrocosmic construction is more direct and perhaps also more clear concerning the circuits – this is evidently aided by the matter at hand corresponding closely to the previous micro-macrocosmic depictions from Book 1.

For a heavenly body to be dark and faint in appearance, and moving in the reverse direction, i.e. towards the west, is unfavourable; and the dream imagery here corresponds directly to parts of the body. Upwards movements indicate problems located in the head, whereas the sea is indicative of a sickness of some sort within the abdomen. Movement into the earth is linked to a tumour or growth under the skin, again invoking a common comparison between the earth and the human body in its most physical sense. These associations will be further expanded upon in the section following, which deals explicitly with imagery derived from the natural environment, but already here it is notable that the author is evidently using a systematic pairing of cosmological features and specific physiological features. Again, if we look back to Book 1 and the discussion of how Fire arranges all things within the body, these later associations become clearer:

κοιλίην μὲν τὴν μεγίστην, ὕδατι ξηρῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ ταμεῖον, δοῦναι πᾶσι καὶ λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, θαλάσσης δύναμιν, ζώων συμφόρων τροφόν, ἀσυμφόρων δὲ φθορόν· περὶ δὲ ταύτην ὕδατος ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ σύστασιν, διέξοδον πνεύματος ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ· ἀπομίμησιν γῆς, τὰ ἐπεισπίπτοντα πάντα ἀλλοιούσης.<sup>79</sup>

The abdomen is [made] the greatest, a storehouse for dry water and moist, to give to all and to take from all, the power of the sea, that which nourishes the living things accustomed to it, but destroys those which are unaccustomed. Around this, an accumulation of cold and moist water, a passage for hot and cold air; an imitation of earth, which changes all things that fall upon it.

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<sup>79</sup> *Vict.* 1.10

The abdomen is linked to the sea, and the accumulation of water within it is emphasized by its equation to a 'storehouse', indicating that this is the place within that body that is expected to possess this substance and its associated qualities. The earth is linked, rather more obscurely here, to the flesh – an interpretation also made clearer by reference to the preceding comments from section 9.<sup>80</sup>

Returning to the cosmological dream imagery, and especially those of the circuits, they are consistently depicted as having the same inherent qualities as those within the physical body. Familiar vocabulary is used to draw a close relationship between the macrocosmic imagery and the microcosmic effect:

εἰ δὲ αἰθρίης εὐούσης θλίβεται, καὶ ἀσθενέα δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ξηρασίης τῆς περιόδου κρατεῖσθαι, σημαίνει κίνδυνον ἐς νοῦσον ἐμπεσεῖν.<sup>81</sup>

But if a heavenly body is compressed while in a clear sky, and it both seems to be feeble and to be mastered by the dryness of the circuit, it signifies a danger of having fallen into sickness.

Any type of damage inflicted to a heavenly body, even if the skies are in an auspiciously clear state, is a sign of sickness within the physical body. For the heavenly body has become weakened and mastered by an increase in dryness, and this situation of imbalance maps very easily onto the physical state of the body to warn of sickness as any imbalance is naturally detrimental to health. The qualities reflected in the cosmological activity have a direct counterpart within the body, and for the most part then, anything which impacts on them negatively will be indicative of the same effect inside the body. The language of oppositional forces and mastery remains prominent:

εἰ δὲ πυροειδὲς τὸ ὑπεναντιούμενον δοκοίη εἶναι καὶ θερμόν, χολῆς ἀπόκρισιν σημαίνει· εἰ μὲν οὖν κρατοίη τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, νοῦσον σημαίνει· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀφανίζοιτο τὰ κρατούμενα, κίνδυνος ἐς θάνατον ἐκ τῆς νούσου ἐλθεῖν. εἰ δὲ

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<sup>80</sup> *Vict.* 1.9: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐσωτάτω καταφραχθὲν πῦρ καὶ πλεῖστον ἐστὶ καὶ μεγίστην τὴν διέξοδον ἐποιήσατο· πλεῖστον γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐνταῦθα ἐνῆν, ὅπερ κοιλίη καλεῖται· καὶ ἐξέπεσεν ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχε τροφήν, ἕξω, καὶ ἐποιήσατο τοῦ πνεύματος διεξόδους καὶ τροφῆς ἐπαγωγὴν καὶ διάπεψιν· τὸ δὲ ἀποκλεισθὲν ἐς ἄλλο σῶμα περιόδους ἐποιήσατο τρισσάς, ὅπερ ἦν ὑγρότατον τοῦ πυρός, ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι χωρίοισιν, αἵτινες φλέβες καλέονται κοίλαι· ἐς δὲ τὰ μέσα τούτων τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον τοῦ ὕδατος συνιστάμενον πηγνυται, ὅπερ καλεῖται σάρκες. See Jouanna (1998), 169-170 for a much fuller examination of this association between earth and flesh in *On Regimen*, with discussion of the earlier interpretations of Kranz, Olerud and Joly, as well as elsewhere in the HC - his conclusion from the relevant passages in *On Regimen* Books 1 and 4 is that 'il est donc clair que les chairs ont été formées à l'imitation de la terre.' More recently, Hulskamp (2008), 163 has argued for the earth here as equated with the "stomach and lungs", which seems an unlikely level of specificity from the Hippocratic author here regarding bodily organs.

<sup>81</sup> *Vict.* 4.89

τροφθῆναι δοκοίη ἐς φυγὴν τὸ ὑπάρχον, φεύγειν δὲ ταχέως, τοὺς δὲ διώκειν, κίνδυνος μανῆναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢν μὴ θεραπευθῆ.<sup>82</sup>

Should the Oppositional Thing seem to be fiery and hot, it signifies a secretion of bile. And then, should the force gain mastery, it signifies a sickness. But should those things which are mastered also be destroyed, there is a danger that from the sickness comes death. But should the force seem to be put to flight, and to flee quickly, followed by the rest, there is a danger of the patient being driven mad, lest he is treated.

Similarly, a surfeit of heat is detrimental within the body, and this is simply indicated by an opposing force which itself is fiery and hot. It is indicative of an excess of bile, and can lead not only to sickness but in some cases death or madness depending on what course the dream takes. In this way it also mirrors the waking reality of the Hippocratic physician's work in prognostics, which has a high dependence on understanding and interpreting the course of a disease.

The problems being communicated by the soul during sleep are not always exclusively physiological in nature. The soul can also relate any disturbances to its own condition through the dream imagery:

ὀκόσα δὲ τούτων πλανᾶται ἄλλοις ἄλλως, ψυχῆς τάρραξιν τινα σημαίνει ὑπὸ μερίμνης· συμφέρει δὲ τούτῳ ῥαθυμῆσαι· τὴν ψυχὴν τραπέσθαι πρὸς θεωρίας, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τὰς γελοίας, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἄλλας τινὰς ἃς ὁ τι μάλιστα ἠσθήσεται θεησάμενος, ἡμέρας δυο ἢ τρεῖς, καὶ καταστήσεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, κίνδυνος ἐς νοῦσον πίπτειν.<sup>83</sup>

Whenever the heavenly bodies wander about this way and that, it signifies some disturbance of the soul resulting from anxiety. For this, it is beneficial to take things easy: turn the soul towards contemplation, the best is of comic things, but if not this, then to other such things which will bring great delight when they have been looked at, for two or three days, and this will settle down. If not, there is a danger of falling into sickness.

Thus where the heavenly bodies appear in a dream to be wandering, it is to be understood as indicative of a disturbance in the soul of the individual caused specifically by anxiety or worry rather than any physiological imbalance. But that is not to say the idea of balance is not invoked here at all, for now it is pursued in terms of a psychological state within the individual. The best counteraction to the distressed and anxious soul is for the patient to take in some comedy, presumably by attending the theatre – θεωρίας

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<sup>82</sup> *Vict.4.89*

<sup>83</sup> *Vict.4.89*

retains a sense of watching as a spectator as well as an element of contemplation.<sup>84</sup> However should this not be available, the author provides a second option which also invokes the idea of spectacle. Looking upon something which brings delight or pleasure works similarly to comedy in combatting the soul's anxious disturbance.

So far in the text, the recommendations to improve the bodily disturbances indicated through the dream imagery have – unsurprisingly – focused on dietetics and exercise. But here, it is not the body but the soul which is troubled, and furthermore, the nature of the disturbance itself is not physical. Thus accordingly the prescribed action itself is not focused on physical change, but rather on a mental change. It is worth noting that the way to re-balance the mental state is through activities which are reliant on a combination of perception and some measure of internal reflection: watching comic things, or simply looking at delightful things. Mental illness is as easily accounted for in this prognostic exercise as physical illness; it marks another example of not only the naturalisation of such problems but also their internalisation as there is no indication that this state has come about through any external influence.

That the appearance of the heavenly bodies in this wandering state is indicative of a more psychological disturbance also plays on the characterisation of those suffering from madness as themselves wandering. This particular equation between madness and wandering appears as early as Hesiod, and is a popular depiction within tragedy – Ajax, Orestes, Herakles and several others are driven to 'mad wandering'.<sup>85</sup> This description of such haphazard movement thus emphasizes the irregularity of such action in the normally invariant and well-ordered cosmos, in a particularly human way. Attributing such anthropomorphic qualities to cosmological bodies is typical of the micro-macrocosm descriptions used before Democritus.<sup>86</sup> The imagery of 'wandering' itself will reappear later in Book 4 in the context of activities seen to be undertaken by the dreamer himself in sleep.

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<sup>84</sup> Nightingale (2004), 40; Kindt (2012), 40 discusses its application for the activity of the 'aesthetic' gaze, which focused on aesthetic qualities of artistic objects and seems a likely context for the advice which follows.

<sup>85</sup> Montiglio (2005), 38 in these cases, the mad wandering is a "compulsive response to an external agent that either pursues or possesses the mad." Montiglio only deals specifically with wandering in respect to madness briefly (37-41), but the entire monograph (*Wandering in Greek Culture*) is most useful and gives a thorough account of the many different types of 'wandering' across genres. Padel (1995), 99-123 also provides a convincing discussion of the socio-cultural origins of the relationship between madness and wandering.

<sup>86</sup> Guthrie (1962), 472: "Atomists freed themselves from the anthropomorphic conception of the universe with which the microcosmic theory is most naturally linked."

Finally, towards the end of this section in Book 4, there remains a brief remark that does not strictly fall within the category of cosmological, but rather references the gods:

ὅ τι δ' ἂν παρὰ θεοῦ δοκῆ λαμβάνειν καθαροῦ καθαρὸν, ἀγαθὸν πρὸς ὑγείην· σημαίνει γὰρ τὰ ἐς τὸ σῶμα ἐσιόντα εἶναι καθαρὰ. ὅ τι δ' ἂν τούτου ἐναντίον δοκῆ ὀρῆν, οὐκ ἀγαθόν· νοσηρὸν γάρ τι σημαίνει ἐς τὸ σῶμα ἐσεληλυθέναι.<sup>87</sup>

Should one seem to receive something pure from a pure god, this is good for health, for it signifies that that which is entering the body is pure. But should one seem to see the opposite, it is not good, for it signifies that something diseased has entered the body.

In the midst of the cosmological imagery, the Hippocratic author inserts this short sentence on the appearances of divinities within a dream. For a 'pure' god to appear and bestow a 'pure' gift upon the dreamer is good: this is interpreted as a basic sign that something is entering the body – the transference of the 'thing' between the divine and mortal sphere becomes paralleled with the movement of a substance from outside the body to the inside – and that it is not harmful but rather pure, or clean. The opposite, presumably receiving something 'impure' from an 'impure' god, is indicative of a disease that has already entered the body. This idea of an object transferred from the divine to the dreamer in a way plays upon the 'apport' scenarios we have seen in both the literary tradition as well as the Asclepian temple inscriptions; rather than the specification of the object itself carrying an interpretative significance however, the emphasis is placed on the very act of transference, as well as the general condition (rather than the specific identification) of the divinity in question and the general condition of the object. The understanding that something pure is symbolically beneficial is evidently culturally and religiously informed – particularly given the terminology used (καθαρός), which can have the sense not only of physical cleanliness but also a ritual purity and freedom from pollution.<sup>88</sup>

Notably this section (89) then closes with a recommendation that with this knowledge gained from the heavenly bodies, one should not just follow the correct regimen, but also pray to the gods to maintain or improve the current state of health. Certain deities are then listed, to whom prayers should be directed in either the case of

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<sup>87</sup> *Vict.4.89*

<sup>88</sup> *Aesch.Eum.473-5* in particular emphasizes the association of ritual purity with harmlessness, as Athena acknowledges that by coming to her as a 'pure and harmless suppliant' Orestes does not bring any harm to the city: ἄλλως τε καὶ σὺ μὲν κατηρτυκῶς ἐμοῖς / ἰκέτης προσῆλθες καθαρὸς ἀβλαβῆς δόμοις. / οὕτως δ' ἄμομφον ἔντα σ' αἰδοῦμαι πόλει.

good signs within the dreams (Helios, Zeus Ouranos, Zeus Ktesios, Athena Ktesia, Hermes and Apollo), or in the case of bad signs (the Apotropaics, Gē, and the Heroes). Rather than be taken as proof that this is simply a compilation of old material, with these 'leftover' religious bits appearing from time to time, this religious advice follows quite naturally from the beginning of Book 4.<sup>89</sup> Prayer is recommended alongside regimen, and given the context of the work as a manual for the patient to use to help themselves, it would certainly be lacking if the author was to direct the reader to pray without providing any guidance on this to complement the extensive guidance on regimen. Such religious acknowledgements appear throughout the text from time to time, and further guidance on prayer will also appear in the closing of the next section. The divinities named here are also especially appropriate for the context of the manual as many of them are cosmic deities with clear associations to imagery featured in the preceding chapter, or protective household gods, more indicative of private religious practice within the household.<sup>90</sup> This specific tone of personal rather than public activity sits particularly well within *On Regimen's* aims of providing the individual with the means by which to interpret their own dreams and thus be responsible for their own personal healthcare. The advice to pray to the Apotropaics, Gē and the Heroes in the case of bad signs received within the dreams could plausibly be understood as drawing on older, more established cultic practices. Hero sanctuaries were believed to be places of healing; the heroes, the dead and Mother Earth have also been specifically identified as powers most associated with curing disease through incubation at their holy wells.<sup>91</sup> By referencing these powers in particular, the Hippocratic author has also found a way to recommend a familiar method of religious healing - incubation - without having to name Asclepius, a main rival in the business of healing by way of dreams.

### 5.5.3 Natural Environment [IV, 90]

Following on from the discussion of the heavenly bodies and the organisation of the cosmos, the Hippocratic author moves now to imagery based on the natural world. Here too there exists a special relationship between the geographical features of the earth and the internal workings of the body; thus the micro/macrocosm approach is continued in the context of the immediate surrounding world rather than the heavens. Why feature a section on the natural environment? The Presocratic philosophers had

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<sup>89</sup> Joly (1960), 171 argues that the prayers have simply been transferred across from the Hippocratic author's original 'source' - cf. his remarks on 4.89 in his 1967 edition of the text; cf. Cambiano (1980), 88.

<sup>90</sup> van der Eijk (2004), 204 categorises Helios, Zeus Ouranos and Apollo as 'celestial' deities.

<sup>91</sup> Halliday (1913), 130-1.

already begun their investigations into the natural world in the sixth century BC, and this quickly became a popular area of interest in intellectual discourse. Interaction between the natural environment and the human body was a topic which was very familiar to this Hippocratic author given his micro-macrocosmic sentiments in Book 1 which focus on the earth and the sea rather than the heavenly bodies. The natural environment was certainly a common feature of many other Hippocratic texts, and was a relationship that formed the basis of many therapeutic directives. Aspects of the natural environment were also recognised as a potential medium of disease, and thus this was a relationship that often went beyond a theoretical micro-macrocosmic observation within a Hippocratic context and became a core focus in the care of health, as well as the prediction of illnesses.

The natural environment could directly influence the health and constitution of an individual in many different ways; *Airs, Waters, Places* is perhaps the best Hippocratic account of this complex causal relationship between man and his environment, and as one of the earlier Hippocratic texts it dates to the same period as *On Regimen*.<sup>92</sup> For the author of *Airs, Water, Places* especially, understanding the many different elements of this relationship with the natural environment is the key to a proper understanding of medicine, and he begins his discussion by listing several of the most important factors including the seasons, the hot and cold winds, the properties of waters in each region, even the direction of the rising of the sun, and later the movement of the stars.<sup>93</sup> While this evidently goes far beyond the scope of *On Regimen*, it illustrates the many ways in which a Hippocratic physician utilised the natural and celestial environments for predicting, diagnosing and treating illnesses. As *Airs, Waters, Places* makes clear, these things were entirely within the remit of the Hippocratic physician:

εἰ δὲ δοκεῖοι τις ταῦτα μετεωρολόγια εἶναι, εἰ μετασταίη τῆς γνώμης, μάθοι ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος συμβάλλεται ἀστρονομίῃ ἐς ἰητρικὴν, ἀλλὰ πάνυ πλεῖστον. ἅμα γὰρ τῆσιν ὥρησι καὶ αἱ νοῦσοι καὶ αἱ κοιλίαι μεταβάλλουσιν τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισιν.<sup>94</sup>

If it might seem that these things belong to the *meteorologoi*, it should change this opinion if one learns that it is not the smallest part that astronomy contributes to medicine, but rather the greatest. For together with the seasons,

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<sup>92</sup> Jouanna (1999), 373-416 proposes that the same mid-5<sup>th</sup> century author of *Airs, Waters, Places* also wrote *On the Sacred Disease*, as well as *Prognostics* and *Prorrhethics* II; in terms of specific dating, he places the former treatise “between Herodotus and Thucydides”. *Epidemics* I and *Aphorisms* also provide further insight into the relationship between the natural environment and medical prognosis.

<sup>93</sup> *Aer.* 1, 1-17; 2, 15-16.

<sup>94</sup> *Aer.* 2.21-26



the diseases of men, as well as their intestines, undergo change.

Returning to the discussion of dreams in *On Regimen* then, the Hippocratic author begins by considering imagery which involves both the natural environment and the individual's interaction with it:

τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ὄξυ ὀρῆν καὶ ὄξυ ἀκούειν, ὀδοιπορεῖν τε ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τρέχειν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ ταχὺ ἄτερ φόβου, καὶ τὴν γῆν ὀρῆν λείην καὶ καλῶς εἰργασμένην, καὶ τὰ δένδρεα θαλέοντα καὶ πολὺκαρπα καὶ ἡμερα, καὶ ποταμοὺς ῥέοντας κατὰ τρόπον καὶ ὕδατι καθαρῷ μῆτε πλέονι μῆτε ἐλάσσονι τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ὡσαύτως. ταῦτα πάντα σημαίνει ὑγείην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τρόπον πάσας τε τὰς περιόδους καὶ τὰς προσαγωγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις εἶναι.<sup>95</sup>

To clearly see and clearly hear those things upon the earth, to run without faltering and walk without faltering, quickly, without fear, to see the earth smooth and well tilled, and flourishing trees with much fruit and cultivated, and flowing rivers on their course, and pure water neither higher nor lower than is fitting, and springs and wells the same; all of these things signify health to the individual, and that the body and all the circuits, diet and secretions are normal.

γῆ δὲ τραχεῖη οὐ καθαρὴν τὴν σάρκα σημαίνει<sup>96</sup>

Rough earth signifies an impurity in the flesh.

Earth – as in, the physical substance of the land surface rather than a cosmological body or deity – is once more closely associated with ἡ σὰρξ, presumably intended to reference the physical enclosure of the body as a whole, i.e., the flesh. The micro-macrocosmic relationship between these two features has already been briefly touched upon in the previous section, and, as we have seen, their association was specified as part of the author's cosmological discussion in Book 1. The symbolism here is direct, too: seeing a roughness to the earth in the dream is an indication of the flesh being similarly unsettled by something impure or unclean, whereas previously seeing the earth as smooth in surface and well tilled was a sure sign of health. Earth then expressly reflects the condition of a physical, outer, visible part of the body; following on from this then, other aspects of the natural environment reflect aspects within the body. The other natural features mentioned here are given a generalised interpretation of being indicative of good health for the patient: flourishing trees and pure waters are collectively referenced as signs that body, circuits, diet and secretions are all regular.

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<sup>95</sup> *Vict.* 4.90

<sup>96</sup> *Vict.* 4.90

The Hippocratic author then elaborates further on the significance of various features from the natural environment which may appear within a dream, and their bodily correspondences are semantically straightforward:

δένδρων άκαρπία σπέρματος τοῦ άνθρωπίνου διαφθορήν δηλοῖ· ἦν μὲν οὔν φυλλορροοῦντα ἢ τὰ δένδρα, ὑπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν βλάπτεται· ἦν δὲ τεθήλη μὲν, ἄκαρπα δὲ ἦ, ὑπὸ τῶν θερμῶν καὶ ξηρῶν.<sup>97</sup>

Unfruitfulness of trees indicates thorough damage to the human seed. However, if the trees are shedding leaves, it is harmed by the moist and cold; if the leaves thrive but without their fruit, it is harmed by the hot and dry.

For the dreamer to see trees which do not bear fruit is a sign that there is substantial damage to the human seed. This interpretation relies on the depiction of a certain parallelism of the reproductive processes within living things – including plants - as well as drawing upon the basic shared vocabulary of generative ‘seed’.<sup>98</sup> If the trees appear to be losing their leaves, this is indicative of a harm being caused to the seed by both of the qualities moist and cold. Seasonally, the imagery in this scenario of the trees devoid of leaves is most closely related to winter, a season which was considered to be moist and cold, and in turn, became associated with humoral phlegm in *Nature of Man*.<sup>99</sup> That moist and cold were harmful qualities in the context of the reproductive seed had already been briefly considered by Alcmaeon, who had theorised on the infertility of mules as a result of a ‘thinned and cold’ sperm.<sup>100</sup> If the trees appear in the dream to be in the opposite state, with an abundance of leaves but this time a noted lack of fruit, this indicates that the harm caused to the seed is due to some excess of both the qualities hot and dry together – conditions which elsewhere in the reproductive process can also bring about harm.<sup>101</sup>

Moving on to imagery related to water, the Hippocratic author first considers the significance of dreams which feature rivers:

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<sup>97</sup> *Vict.* 4.90

<sup>98</sup> *Nat.puer.* 22 has an extended account of the growth of a seed within the soil as analogous to the growth of a foetus within the womb; 23-25 elaborates in great detail on the reproductive habits of plants and trees.

<sup>99</sup> *Nat.Hom.* 3.4.

<sup>100</sup> DK24B3 τῶν ἡμιόνων τοὺς μὲν ἄρρενας ἀγόνους παρὰ τὴν λεπτότητα τῆς θορῆς καὶ ψυχρότητα, τὰς δὲ θηλείας παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἀναχάσκειν τὰς μήτρας· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸς εἴρηκε.

<sup>101</sup> *Vict.* I.31 has already explained the occurrence of superfetation and subsequent miscarriage as owing to the hot and dry conditions within the womb: ὅταν αἶ τε μήτραι θερμαί τε καὶ ξηραὶ φύσει ἔωσιν, ἢ τε γυνὴ τοιαύτη, τό τε σπέρμα ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν ἐμπέσῃ οὐκ ἐπιγίνεται ἐν τῆσι μήτρησιν ὑγρασίῃ οὐδεμίῃ, ἥτις τὸ εἰσπίπτον σπέρμα κρατήσῃ·

ποταμοὶ δὲ κατὰ τρόπον μὴ γινόμενοι αἵματος περίοδον σημαίνουσι, πλέον μὲν ῥέοντες ὑπερβολήν, ἔλασσον δὲ ῥέοντες ἔλλειψιν.<sup>102</sup>  
Rivers not flowing naturally is indicative of the circulation of blood, an overflowing signifies excess, while low waters signify a defect.

For the dreamer to see a river which is not in its normal state is indicative, as one would expect, of a problem. Here, the flow of the river is equated to the flow of the blood inside the body; the latter is designated by the now familiar περίοδος, suggesting the author has in mind a circuitous movement of the blood within the body.<sup>103</sup> The imagery is clear and straightforward: a high rising river indicates an excess, a low river a deficiency. Neither substance nor quality is specified. The association with blood flow inside the body is interesting; the only similar comparison appears in the much later anatomical Hippocratic text *On the Heart* in a discussion of the ventricles through which ‘rivers’ (ποταμοὶ) pass into the body, bringing life. If these ‘rivers’ dry up, the patient dies.<sup>104</sup> There is no further elaboration on the equation of the two in *On Regimen*, but it seems to be a natural development from the nutritive role assigned to water in the cosmological discussions in Book 1, in addition to the micro-macrocosmic association of earth and the physical body.<sup>105</sup> As a river flowing through the earth provides it with moisture and nutrition, so too does blood possess a nutritive force as it flows through the physical body.<sup>106</sup>

But this is not to say that all water in the natural environment is to be equated with the blood. The Hippocratic author differentiates between various different channels of water, and each has a specific physiological correspondence within the body:

μὴ καθαρῶ δὲ ῥέοντες ταραχήν σημαίνουσι.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> *Vict.*4.90

<sup>103</sup> Jouanna (2012), 217 argues that this circuit of blood cannot be separate from the circuit of the soul.

<sup>104</sup> *Cord.* 7 αὐτὰι πηγαὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου, καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀνὰ τὸ σῶμα, τοῖσιν ἄρδεται τὸ σκῆνος, οὗτοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ζωὴν φέρουσι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κῆν ἀνανθέωσιν, ἀπέθανεν ὠνθρωπος. The analogous pairing of blood and rivers is an important feature of ancient Chinese medicine, and is discussed in the *Huángdì Nèijīng* (475-221BC) in relation to problems caused by excesses of cold and hot.

<sup>105</sup> It should also be clarified here that in humoral theory, blood was linked with air rather than water; however, the actual popularity and use of humoral theory in the early Hippocratic corpus is often vastly misrepresented. It was first detailed in *On Nature of Man* (400BC), and it remained simply one physiological theory among many – cf. van der Eijk (2011), 29-31 on medical ‘pluralism’.

<sup>106</sup> Blood’s nutritive force is commonly attributed in Greek thought, even beyond the medical corpus, to the idea that blood itself is derived from food – cf. King (2004), 95.

<sup>107</sup> *Vict.*4.90. Contextually, the meaning of ταραχήν here can be narrowed to problems of the bowel, owing to its use in this manner throughout the HC.

Impure streams are indicative of a disturbance of the bowels.

κρήναι καὶ φρέατα περὶ τὴν κύστιν τι σημαίνει<sup>108</sup>  
Springs and wells signify concerns of the bladder.

θάλασσα δὲ ταρασσομένη κοιλίης νοῦσον σημαίνει<sup>109</sup>  
A troubled sea signifies disease of the abdomen.

Quite apart from indicating problems with the circulation of blood, the imagery related here focuses on problems located in the abdominal region. There is a clear differentiation between the different bodies of water which might appear in the dream, and each has a precise relation to a functional bodily organ. Streams which are impure indicate that there is a problem located in the bowels, springs and wells are linked to the bladder, and finally the sea – as we have already seen in the previous section’s discussion – is closely linked to the abdomen. There is little elaboration; both symbol and interpretation are kept brief and relatively generalised though, as with the other natural environment features, there may be some kind of underlying connection to medical ideas concerning different types of water and their effect on man.<sup>110</sup> While this is difficult to ascertain, it is certainly apparent that the general interpretative pattern used in previous examples is adhered to: any impurity or abnormality is indicative of a disturbance within the body.

Having established then some basic associations between features from the natural environment and the human body, the Hippocratic author then returns once more to dreams which feature the earth in various states of unrest:

γῆ κινευμένη ἢ οἰκίη ὑγιαίνοντι μὲν ἀσθενεῖν σημαίνει, νοσέοντι δὲ ὑγείην καὶ μετακίνησιν τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος.

The shaking of the earth or of a house signifies sickness when the patient is healthy, but when sick it signifies a shift of the current circumstances to health.

κατακλυζομένην γῆν ἀπὸ ὕδατος ἢ θαλάσσης ὄρην νοῦσον σημαίνει, ὑγρασίης πολλῆς ἐνεούσης ἐν τῷ σώματι·

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<sup>108</sup> *Vict.*4.90

<sup>109</sup> *Vict.*4.90

<sup>110</sup> Campbell (2012), 343 has a useful summary of the more literal Hippocratic beliefs regarding rivers and diseases: “Men who drank from big rivers with tributaries rather than from smaller streams often suffered from gallstones, kidney problems, and hernias. But flowing rivers that drew off rainwater were healthy and clear and good to drink. Men might have to drink spring water, or water from stagnant pools and swamps, which could lead to distended stomachs and problems with the spleen.”

To see the earth inundated by water or sea signifies disease, owing to prevailing moisture inside the body.

οὐδὲ μέλαιναν ὄρην τὴν γῆν οὐδὲ κατακεκαυμένην ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κίνδυνος ἰσχυροῦ νοσήματος ἀντιτυχεῖν καὶ θανασίμου· ξηρασίης γὰρ ὑπερβολὴν σημαίνει ἐν τῇ σαρκί·<sup>111</sup>

Neither seeing the earth blackened nor completely burnt is good, but a danger of falling into severe and even fatal disease, for it signifies an excess of dryness in the flesh.

Shaking of either the earth or a house indicates a complete change, and the interpretation depends on the existing condition of the patient. If healthy then, such a dream would signify a change to ill-health, and vice-versa. It is not any particular quality or substance that is singled out, instead the symbolic importance lies in the unnatural activity which the earth or house experiences, and relies on the equation of the earth once more with the flesh, in the sense that the latter is representative of the body as whole – and presumably also the house. A flooded earth is a sign that the body has a detrimental excess of moisture, and unlike before, it is not the specific type of water which is important, but the act of flooding which carries the significance here. Finally, to see the earth made black or completely burnt is a sign of danger in the body, and is closely linked to death. This scenario is the symbolic opposite of the flooded earth, as it indicates an excess of dryness within the body, and this is a state which is evidently considered to be much more dangerous for the patient.

The Hippocratic author then adds a further scenario based on water, which highlights the different types of waterways but draws one generalised conclusion:

εἰ δὲ κολυμβῆν ἐν λίμνῃ ἢ ἐν θαλάσῃ ἢ ἐν ποταμοῖσι δοκεῖ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ὑπερβολὴν γὰρ ὑγρασίης σημαίνει<sup>112</sup>

If one seems to dive into a pool, into the sea or into a river it is not good, for it signifies an excess of moisture.

Excess of moisture is once again the underlying problem. The emphasis remains on the activity, as before, and so it is the act of diving into water which signals a problem - the type of water in question becomes irrelevant to this interpretation. The current state of the individual dreaming continues to have influence on the interpretation of the dream contents, as following the dream above the author states:

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<sup>111</sup> *Vict.* 4.90

<sup>112</sup> *Vict.* 4.90

πυρέσσοντι δὲ ἀγαθόν· σβέννυται γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν.<sup>113</sup>  
But this is good for a fever patient, for the heat is being quenched by the moisture.

So the dream contents can not only provide an insight into the current or future state of the body but are also an active representation of how the body is attempting to counteract any existing illnesses within itself. An excess of moisture is an unfavourable state for the healthy patient, as this would throw off the balance within the body and moisture would be dominant; but an excess of moisture is a favourable state for the patient suffering from a fever (i.e. too much heat), for it shows that the imbalance caused by the excess of heat is being counteracted by an oppositional substance. There is a continuity in the stylistic composition of the text in this section compared to the previous discussion on cosmological dream imagery, though the content here reads in a slightly more formulaic manner. The connection between the dream imagery and the interpretation is usually fairly straightforward, perhaps simply owing to the more familiar and immediate type of macrocosm invoked, and explanation is focused on the balance of qualities.

This section, too, ends with a recommendation of the best divinities to pray to, a directive which should be undertaken in addition to the directions provided on regimen:

εὐχεσθαι δὲ Γῆ καὶ Ἑρμῆ καὶ ἥρωσιν.<sup>114</sup>  
Pray to Gē, Hermes and the heroes.

The list of options is shorter than before, but draws upon the same pool of chthonic divinities. Gē is certainly an appropriate choice given the context of the natural environment, especially as there has been a particular focus on imagery concerning the earth, while Hermes and the heroes again offer protection for the future.

#### 5.5.4 Clothing [IV, 91]

The next brief section has an even smaller scope which focuses more closely on the individual than on their environmental or cosmological surroundings. The dreams here are those whose imagery features clothing, with particular reference to either their size or their colour. It is perhaps most convenient to cite the whole section in full:

Ὅτι δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρῆ κατὰ τρόπον γινόμενον πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἐωυτοῦ  
μήτε μέζω μήτε ἐλάσσω, ἀγαθὸν πρὸς ὑγείην σημαίνει· καὶ ἐσθῆτα λευκὴν τὴν

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<sup>113</sup> *Vict.* 4.90

<sup>114</sup> *Vict.* 4.90

ὑπάρχουσιν καὶ ὑπόδεσιν τὴν καλλίστην, ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δ' ἂν ἢ μείζον τῶν μελέων ἢ ἔλασσον, οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλὰ χρὴ τὸ μὲν αὔξειν τῆ διαίτη, τὸ δὲ μειοῦν. τὰ δὲ μέλανα νοσερώτερα καὶ ἐπικινδυνώτερα· ἀλλὰ χρὴ μαλάσσειν καὶ ὑγραίνειν. καὶ τὰ καινὰ μεταλλαγὴν σημαίνει.<sup>115</sup>

Whenever one sees something about themselves true to form, neither too big nor too small for their own physique, it signifies good things for health; possessing white clothes and the most beautiful shoes, is good. But should anything be too big or too small around the limbs, it is not good. It is necessary in the latter case to increase regimen, in the former to decrease. Those clothes which are black, a more severe and more dangerous sickness. It is necessary to soften and to moisten. New clothes indicate a change.

Some common interpretative patterns reappear. Seeing oneself in properly fitting clothes, i.e. in a normal condition, is a sign of good health for this evidently reflects the waking state most closely. The oppositional states are invoked as both indicators of a problem: if the clothes are too big, this indicates a physical lack of the body and thus the prescribed regimen is one of augmentation; if the clothes are too small, this indicates an excess and the prescribed regimen is one of reduction.

The colour of the clothing is of particular relevance to the prognostic interpretation. White clothes, along with the most beautiful shoes, are symbolically good while clothes which are black are indicative of a severe and dangerous type of sickness – much as in the previous section where a blackened and burned earth was a potentially fatal sign. These chromatic symbolisms might align with medical accounts elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus in which the colour black, when appearing in the context of a symptom, is a sign that the patient's condition is deteriorating. However, it is not simply the case that black = disease homogeneously throughout medical discourse, and in some cases, it is a sign of good health in the patient. Rather, the emphatic opposition drawn between white clothing as symbolically positive and black clothing as negative plays upon wider cultural semiotics, in which white was the colour of ritual dress and purity, and black was often associated with avenging spirits and the underworld. But the depiction of the clothing dream type seems to draw particularly from the world of tragedy, for it is here that a similar dichotomy is drawn between white and black clothing, often directly, and usually in the context of mourning. So, in Euripides' *Helen*, when Helen describes how she will trick the Egyptians into thinking she has received confirmation of Menelaus' death, one of the first things she plans to do is change her clothing as she knows it will have a visible and communicable significance:

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<sup>115</sup> *Vict.* 4.91

ἐγὼ δ' ἐς οἶκους βᾶσα βοστρύχους τεμῶ  
πέπλων τε λευκῶν μέλανας ἀνταλλάξομαι<sup>116</sup>

I will go into the house, cut my hair  
and change from my white clothes into black

And indeed, the change is immediately noticed by Theone, who as soon as she sees Helen, first asks:

τί πέπλους μέλανας ἐξήψω χροὸς λευκῶν ἀμείψασ' <sup>117</sup>  
Why have you changed out of white, and fastened on black clothes?

These changes in themselves are part of the overtly symbolic 'language' of tragedy.<sup>118</sup> The close relationship between black clothing and mourning further typifies the colour's association with death, and its negative connotations are emphasized in tragedy by association with the Furies and aspects of the underworld.<sup>119</sup> The colour white, on the other hand, in descriptions of clothing, retains a positive connotation as celebratory, or as part of a ritual which demands purification.<sup>120</sup> Given this cultural perspective on colours then it is easy to see how the Hippocratic author has associated white with good health, and black with the most dangerous illness. By utilising these perceptions, he is able to reposition a more traditional oneiromantic reading of black – negative/white – positive into a specifically medical framework.

### 5.5.5 The Dead (92)

Another short section then follows which deals with a popular literary topos: the appearance of the dead in dreams. The very brief account of this type of dream indicates that this is not one in which the Hippocratic author is overly interested, and the analysis of the dream imagery shares much in common with the previous section on clothing:

Τοὺς δὲ ἀποθανόντας ὀρῆν καθαρὸς ἐν ἱματίοισι λευκοῖσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ λαμβάνειν τι παρ' αὐτῶν καθαρὸν ὑγείην σημαίνει καὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐσιόντων· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἀποθανόντων αἱ τροφαὶ καὶ ἀυξήσεις καὶ σπέρματα γίνονται· ταῦτα δὲ καθαρὰ ἐσέρπειν ἐς τὸ σῶμα ὑγείην σημαίνει. εἰ δὲ τούναντίον τις ὀρῶη γυμνοὺς ἢ μελανοεῖμονας ἢ μὴ καθαρὸς ἢ λαμβάνοντάς τι ἢ φέροντας

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<sup>116</sup> Eur.*Hel.*1087-88

<sup>117</sup> Eur.*Hel.*1186

<sup>118</sup> Cleland (2003), 169-170.

<sup>119</sup> Black clothes as a sign of mourning: Aesch.*Choeph.*10-12; Eur.*Phoen.*322-26, 371-72; Eur.*Iph.Aul.* 1437-38; Eur.*Alc.*922-3; in descriptions of the Furies' clothing: Aesch.*Sept.*856-58; Aesch.*Eum.*353; associated with Hades: Aesch.*Sept.*699-701 on a ship dressed in black sails.

<sup>120</sup> Eur.*Phoen.*322-26; Aesch.*Eum.*353; Aesch.*Suppl.*334; Eur.*Alc.*922-23.



ἐκ τῆς οἰκίης, οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον· σημαίνει γὰρ νοῦσον· τὰ γὰρ ἐσιόντα ἐς τὸ σῶμα βλαβερά.<sup>121</sup>

To see the dead clean and in white clothing is good, and to receive something clean from them signifies health both of the body and the things which enter it. For from the dead comes nourishment, growth and seed; so for these things to enter into the body pure signifies health. But if on the contrary one should see them naked or wearing black or not clean, or taking something, or bringing something out of the house, it is not favourable, for it signifies disease, for the things entering the body are harmful.

The emphasis centres upon some basic visible attributes of the dead's appearance – are they clean, what colour are their clothes – in addition to simple actions of transference, which picks up on the previous interpretations related to seeing a god within a dream in section 89. Adhering to the interpretative model of the section which came immediately before, seeing the dead in white clothing, is a good sign, to see them black is a bad sign. In addition to black, this time, a naked or unclean appearance is also indicative of disease.

While the analysis may be brief and in some respects quite repetitive from the previous section, discussing the appearance of the dead in dreams would have been important for the Hippocratic author as a potential point of differentiation from his competitors. To see the dead within a dream holds a culturally portentous symbolism, and also has a strong literary precedence; the first encounter with the dead in a dream in Greek literature comes from *Iliad* 23, when the sleeping Achilles is visited by the ghost of Patroclus. The dream follows the standard Homeric *Aussentraume* pattern of an *oneiros* appearing to the sleeper with instructions; there is no need to rely on interpretation of symbolism or static features, for this dream speaks directly about its intentions. The significance is not in the visible appearance of Patroclus but in his verbal interaction with Achilles, and his request gives the necessary motivation to pursue what is already Achilles' own desire.<sup>122</sup> But here the Hippocratic author makes clear that in this context, seeing the dead within a dream is simply another communication of the physical state of the body. The focus on colour and actions of giving or receiving, rather than any specifics of the deceased themselves, is perhaps another indication of the author creating a niche for himself in dealing with this dream type – the conflation of both imagery and interpretation of dreams featuring the gods and dreams featuring the dead only emphasizes the move away from a magico-religious significance. These

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<sup>121</sup> *Vict.*4.92

<sup>122</sup> Richardson (1993), 172-3 sees it as typical Homeric reflection of psychological activity through divine motivation.

scenarios which have striking literary parallels which bear great meaning in their respective contexts are here simply reduced down to their core features; the identity of the *oneiros* figure becomes irrelevant.

### 5.5.6 Miscellaneous [IV, 93]

The final section of the guide to interpreting dreams deals with a handful of other common dream imagery which does not have a specific category and do not belong in any of the previous groupings. This ‘miscellaneous’ section can be sub-divided into three main areas: Monsters, Nutrition, and Physical activities.

#### Monsters

The section begins with a brief reference to dreams which feature the monstrous, again drawing from imagery which would perhaps be expected more from the magico-religious type of dream than the medical:

Ὅκόςα δὲ ἀλλόμορφα σώματα φαίνεται ἐν τοῖσιν ὕπνοισι καὶ φοβεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, σιτίων ἀσυνήθων σημαίνει πλησμονὴν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν καὶ χολέραν καὶ νοῦσον κινδυνώδεα.<sup>123</sup>

As many monstrous bodies as appear in sleep and frighten a man, it signifies a surfeit of unaccustomed food, a secretion, a cholera and even a dangerous disease.<sup>124</sup>

To see monsters, or misshapen bodies, in a dream which in turn then causes a fearful reaction on the part of the dreamer can have several potential medical meanings, all of which are indicative of a problem in the body that seems to have some association with the digestive system. However, that is not to say such dreams did not feature elsewhere in the medical corpus, and indeed the nightmares which induced fear within the sleeper have already been examined in 3.3, while fear itself will reappear again in Book 4’s repertoire. The monstrous bodies are not themselves explained in terms of their origin, but only in respect to their diagnostic significance.<sup>125</sup> Similarly, their identity is unimportant; the significance seems to lie in the fear caused by their appearance.

#### Nutrition

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<sup>123</sup> *Vict.*4.93

<sup>124</sup> A ‘cholera’ was whenever the humours of the body were violently discharged through either the vomit or the stool – cf. *Hipp.Coac.* 117.

<sup>125</sup> Compare, for example, Lucretius’ account in DRN 5.741 on how monstrous images are formed by an amalgamation of effluences.

Picking up from the mention of food, there then follows an account of the significance of dreams about ingesting particular kinds of food or drink which evidently has a particular relevance to *On Regimen's* dietetic advice more generally. Here, these products appear in the context of nutritional sustenance rather than in the context of produce arising from the natural environment, and so it seems to be a reasonable separation from the content of 91. Similar to the dreams of the dead, the diagnostic significance lies in the act of receiving these items within the body:

ὁκόταν δὲ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ ἐσθίειν δοκῆ ἢ πίνειν τῶν συνήθων ποτῶν ἢ σιτίων, ἔνδειαν σημαίνει τροφῆς καὶ ψυχῆς ἀθυμίην. κρέα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρότατα, μεγίστης ὑπερβολῆς, τὰ δὲ ἀσθενέστερα ἦσσαν ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐσθιόμενον ἀγαθόν, οὕτω καὶ ὀρεόμενον<sup>126</sup>

Whenever in sleep it seems that the dreamer is eating or drinking their accustomed drinks or food, it signifies a lack of nourishment and a despondency of the soul. The strongest meats indicate the greatest excess, while the weaker, a lesser excess. For just as eating is good, so is seeing oneself do so.

The interpretative pattern here might at first seem to differ from before, for despite the food and drink being those with which the dreamer is accustomed, the prognostic outlook is still unfavourable. However, the emphasis is not upon the familiarity of the items being consumed, but rather the meaning lies in both the act of eating or drinking, as well as the type of food in more dietetic terms. Thus to be consuming familiar foods or drinks is interpreted as indicative of a lack of nourishment within the body; the visualisation of eating or drinking is a simple communication from within the body that these are actions which need to be undertaken to counteract the nutritional lack. This type of dream could therefore be seen as having a partly psychological motivation, as it is a visualisation within sleep of what is fundamentally a desire and a want occurring on an internal subconscious level. This is also a dream that has a diagnostic significance for the soul itself, which is consequently described as being ἀθυμία – a particularly unique word in the context of the wider Hippocratic corpus – which has evident psychological significance. So, while the body's condition is communicated as a physical lack of nourishment, the soul's condition is of a more psychological lack; it is not expressed in the materialistic sense which one might expect from the author, given soul's composition of fire and water.

There is also a brief remark on dream imagery relating to drinking:

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<sup>126</sup> *Vict.*4.93

ὕδωρ πινόμενον καθαρὸν οὐ βλάπτει· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα βλάπτει.<sup>127</sup>  
Drinking clean water is not harmful, but it is harmful to drink all the rest.

Again, the interpretative method here is straightforward and follows previous instances in which something καθαρὸν is good. The wording is perhaps a little unusual, with emphasis on the outcome in terms of harm rather than the more usual ‘good’ or ‘not good’ judgement; continuing from previous accounts of seeing or receiving pure things as good, it certainly seems logical here that to imbibe clean water is indicative of nothing harmful. That everything else is designated as harmful is given no further explanation.

### Physical activities

Finally, the closing section features a handful of examples of different activities which the individual might have undertaken during the dream but which ostensibly do not belong to any of the other categories for their primarily individualistic agency:

ὀκόσα δὲ δοκεῖ ἄνθρωπος θεωρεῖν τῶν συνήθων, ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίην σημαίνει.<sup>128</sup>  
Whenever a man seems to gaze upon familiar things, it signifies a desire of the soul.

Although this part of the text has already been examined in the previous chapter for its relation to the *psukhe* (4.3.2), it is worth revisiting it here for its relationship to the wider method of dream interpretation. The scenario follows on particularly well from the interpretation of dreams focused on food and drink above, for it maintains the same pattern as before. To see things which are familiar within a dream is indicative of an ἐπιθυμία of the soul; there is no pronouncement on whether this is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The key aspect here is that of familiarity as indicative of an internal need or desire. Previously, seeing oneself eating familiar foods in a dream is understood to be a communication of a specific physical lack within the body and psychological lack within the soul. Here, the focus is expressly on the soul alone, and the interpretative model remains the same. The terminology also echoes the previous discussion, where the soul before was described as ἄθυμία, it now is actively in possession of an ἐπιθυμία. Thus the soul can not only experience desire, but is even able to communicate its own state through the imagery of gazing upon that which is familiar. For the soul to be the location

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<sup>127</sup> *Vict.* 4.93; cf. Heraclitus DK22B61 θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαιώτατον, ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον

<sup>128</sup> *Vict.* 4.93

of desire – rather than the supposition of a separate *thumos*, for example – is in keeping with both *On Regimen's* earlier books as well as the wider Hippocratic corpus.<sup>129</sup>

The author then moves on to discuss more active types of physical exertion within a dream, in which the imagery itself bears psychological relevance but the diagnostic interpretation is purely physical:

ὅσα δὲ φεύγει πεφοβημένος, ἐπίστασιν τοῦ αἵματος σημαίνει ὑπὸ ξηρασίης· συμφέρει δὲ ψῦξαι καὶ ὑγρῆναι τὸ σῶμα. ὅσα δὲ μάχεται ἢ κεντεῖται ἢ συνδεῖται ὑπ' ἄλλου, ἀπόκρισιν σημαίνει ὑπεναντίην τῇ περιόδῳ γεγονέναι ἐν τῷ σώματι.<sup>130</sup>

Whenever he flees in fear, it signifies that the blood has been set upon by dryness. It is beneficial to cool and moisten the body. Whenever he fights, or is stabbed or bound by another, it signifies that a secretion has happened inside the body which is contrary to the circuit.

The dream imagery here explores situations which are more akin to nightmares, and it involves some basic generalised scenarios stemming from some form of hostile interaction. Fear has a particular semiotic significance here, for if we recall the earlier mention of the individual's physical movement within a dream at section 90, it was specified that this was only a good sign if it was occurring *without* fear.

As we have seen in more detail in 3, references to fearful dreams or nightmares within the Hippocratic corpus tend to associate them with an influx of some sort – often heat or blood (3.2.3), or as a result of excess bile or hepatic disturbance (3.3). Here, the specifics might be slightly different – in this instance, the blood is set upon by dryness – but the subsequent actions to redress the imbalance which has caused the problem indicate that at the core one issue is the same: there is an excess of heat. To be involved in some kind of violent action is more simply generalised as a secretion within the body, acting contrary to the circuit in which it has occurred. This draws upon the semiotic link established previously which identifies imagery of violence or struggle with that of bodily harm, but expands it slightly further by highlighting the notion of contraries.

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<sup>129</sup> Other uses of ἐπιθυμία in the Hippocratic corpus conform to the literal and straightforward definition of a 'desire', including sexual desire – cf. Hipp. *Aer.* 21 ἢ ἐπιθυμῆ τῆς μείζιος.

<sup>130</sup> *Vict.* 4.93

The final dream interpretations which the Hippocratic author lists again relate to activities actively undertaken by the dreamer themselves, and feature some familiar scenarios from previous sections in a slightly different context:

καὶ πλάνοι καὶ ἀναβάσεις χαλεπαὶ ταύτᾳ σημαίνουσιν. ποταμῶν διαβάσεις καὶ ὀπλίται πολέμοι καὶ τέρατα ἀλλόμορφα νοῦσον σημαίνει ἡ μανίην.<sup>131</sup>

Both wandering and difficult ascents mean the same thing. Crossing rivers, heavily-armed enemies, and strange-shaped monsters signify a madness.

Wandering reappears once more, though this time the focus has shifted from the activities seen by the dreamer of the cosmological bodies to simply that of the individual. It is not explicit if this too is equated with madness, though here, perhaps even more so than the section before in which the heavenly bodies were seen to be wandering, it has evident literary parallels. Difficult ascents are grouped together with wandering in their meaning though what this is exactly is not specified. Rivers make a final reappearance, though it is the act of crossing them which carries the interpretative significance. This imagery has a certain cultural resonance to it, particularly in conjunction with the imagery of heavily-armed enemies which is listed afterwards, for the practice of sacrifice before crossing a river is well-attested in military contexts.<sup>132</sup> To cross the river without proper sacrifice was to go against religious custom, and thus a potentially ominous act. Here, it is indicative of poor health in that it is a sign of a madness within the patient. Monsters too make a reappearance, and are also linked to madness – unlike the previous account, there is no description of the impact on the dreamer in terms of fear which may account for the differing diagnoses.

## 5.6 Concluding Remarks

With the interpretation of these various dream scenarios now completed, the Hippocratic author ends the text with reference to the help that using the manual he has written can bring, as well as a brief nod once more to the idea of complimentary assistance from the gods:

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<sup>131</sup> *Vict.* 4.93

<sup>132</sup> *Il.* 11.727; *Hdt.* 6.76; *Xen.An.* 1.4.5; 4.3.17-19; 5.8.2. This was also a frequent custom which Alexander the Great practiced throughout his campaigns, as even if he did not always heed the omens which arose from the sacrifice, it was evidently considered a necessary action to undertake - cf., amongst many other examples, *Arr.Anab.* 3.7.6; 4.4.3; 5.3.6; 5.28.14; 5.29.5.

τούτοισι χρώμενος ὡς γέγραπται, ὑγιανεῖ τὸν βίον, καὶ εὐρηταί μοι δίαιτα ὡς δυνατὸν εὐρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἔόντα σὺν τοῖσι θεοῖσιν.<sup>133</sup>

Using these means as I have written down, one will have a healthy life; indeed, I have discovered regimen, together with the gods, as much as is possible for man to discover.

And so that concludes *On Regimen*, and with this advice to hand the patient is expected to be fully-equipped to care for his own body and interpret the internal signs communicated through dreams. By providing a guide which the patient is able to consult independently of the physician, the Hippocratic author has found another way by which to distinguish himself from the other interpreters, such as the Asclepians or simply the religious priest, in the dream marketplace. He also marks himself out in the medical marketplace more broadly: the authority over the body has been transferred to the patient themselves, and throughout *On Regimen* the expectation that the patient is responsible for their own health and self-care is continually reiterated.

By considering the imagery and interpretative methods employed by the Hippocratic author in his work on dreams, the link between Book 4 and the rest of *On Regimen* becomes much clearer. What may seem like a haphazard selection of imagery at first, upon closer evaluation highlights the many intricacies of cultural patterns, religious traditions, philosophical ideas and medical observations that the author is employing in his aim of providing a prognostic use for dreams. Criticisms of the text which focus on this expansive nature then as a negative feature of the work, such as Weidhorn's claim that it "combines fantastic notions with concrete observations, twisting facts and wildly using analogy to fit arbitrary hypotheses", are therefore in a way missing the point of the Hippocratic author's attempt to create a niche for himself by utilising common symbolisms in a new way.<sup>134</sup> Similarly, accusations of Book 4 as a compilation of random older material seem to ignore the coherent cosmological thought running throughout the dream interpretations, and do not consider the context in which this text was produced.

The Hippocratic author's targeted use of the micro-macrocosmic imagery relating to both the wider universe as a whole and the natural environment provides another clear link to the earlier theories expounded in *On Regimen* as well as highlighting an engagement with contemporary philosophy. In several of the parallels fire is the key

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<sup>133</sup> *Vict.*4.93

<sup>134</sup> Weidhorn (1970), 26.

link – though both it and water are the primary constituents of the universe and everything in it, fire as the directive organising force has a particularly prominent role to play in both the universe and the body. Having the same basic constituents is also presumably what allows for such close *mimesis* between the human body and the cosmos.<sup>135</sup> In this way, Book 4 relies heavily on the cosmological theory expounded in Book 1; the dream interpretations make use of the micro-macrocosmic theory but do not postulate a direct causal correlation between the macro and the micro. Instead, Book 4 simply puts the established correlation into practice, and utilises the theory to deliver a unique interpretative methodology for dreams. The Hippocratic author is able to provide something new and different, but at the same time he can benefit from imagery, meanings, and even compositional structures which already have an established cultural presence.

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<sup>135</sup> Bartos (2015), 133.



# Conclusion

## Innovation and Longevity

This thesis has intended to show how the theories of the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers on the phenomena of sleep and dreams are more varied, complex and substantial than is usually credited. The same could also be said of the literary Greek dream: it is neither a linear progression from the external visitational dream to the internal symbolic-episodic dream, nor a clear dualism of these two 'types' alone. Early Greek thought on both sleep and dreams – from philosophy, medicine, and literature – establishes several key ideas which will persist not only into the later Classical period, but throughout the Hellenistic period, resurfacing in the Early Modern and Victorian periods, and even finding a place in contemporary scientific discourse. In concluding this thesis, some of the ways in which the approaches examined in this thesis survive in later literature will be signposted. This is not intended as a thorough analysis or study in reception, but rather as an indication of the many recognisable ways in which sleep and dreams came to be discussed in the period which followed that of the current study. Many of the referenced works in the Introduction provide far more learned and detailed accounts than are given here. Nevertheless, the longevity of core Presocratic and Hippocratic ideas, even if through many intermediaries rather than any direct reception, is testament to their innovation.

The first chapter, **The Greek Dream in Context**, set out the variety of ways in which both sleep and dreams are depicted in Archaic and Classical literature. In the mythic tradition, the personifications of Hypnos and Thanatos as twin brothers convey the understood resemblance between the two states of sleep and death from as early as Homer. The epithets used of sleep reflect its capacity to be both a positive and negative experience, and it becomes clear that it possesses an inherent duality of benefit and harm. Characters often experience insomnia due to excess of psychological activity; internal unrest has a physiological impact. Already in Homer, there exists more than one type of dream: the visitation dream is a standardised scene, but hints of a more internalised dream type are also to be found. Likewise, in tragedy, dreams of symbolic-episodic nature are more frequent, but we also encounter perhaps the most

externalised dream of all, when Clytemnestra takes to the stage to berate the sleeping Furies. Variations in dream scenarios stretch these two basic typologies beyond their monolithic definitions. This visitation dream has a longevity in literature owing to its association with the epic tradition, though later writers build upon the basis of the stock Homeric scene with their own innovations. Virgil, for example, in his *Aeneid* makes extensive use of the dream; recognisably Homeric in operation, dreams often occur at key moments in the narrative to drive forward the action. Yet Virgil's dreams reflect his own engagement with a long tradition that includes not just Homer and the Greek epic tradition, but Ennius, his own poetic predecessor, as well as the Epicurean philosophy of Lucretius – particularly his account of 'day-residue' dreams (5.5.1).<sup>1</sup> Later, Lucian enjoys playing with the epic typologies of sleep and dreams, both in their geo-mythical depictions and their dualistic nature, in his satirical writing of the Second Sophistic. He often references Homer as a way of both highlighting and subverting the longstanding epic authority on the subject of dreams.<sup>2</sup> In *The Dream, Or Lucian's Career*, he also plays with dream's aetiologies to imbue the work with a sense of ambiguity and paradox: the titular dream is first announced as divine, using the same pronouncement as Agamemnon when he announces his (false) dream in *Iliad* 2.56 (5); then, once it has been laboriously recounted, he relegates its cause to a mere case of psychological disturbance (16).<sup>3</sup>

This twofold nature of dreams is reflected in many different ways, from Penelope's two Gates of Horn and Ivory in the *Odyssey* (1.4), to Zeus' creation of the false dream to counteract the true dream in Aesop (1.4), to *On Regimen's* distinction between the dreams for the diviners and the dreams for the physician (6.4). But it is reductive to speak of this as a distinction purely between a 'rational' and an 'irrational' dream in these periods. Cultural beliefs evolve, develop and interact; in *On Regimen IV* just as in the literary examples, ignorance of the importance of dreams – or even simply a failure to properly understand them – leads to trouble. The onus lies with the dreamers to interpret the dream – divine, or otherwise – for their own benefit. From the collected dreams in 1.3 and 1.4, it is clear that there were many ways in which dream interpretation could go awry. It is not then surprising that the position of the dream-interpreter reached professional status in Greek daily life.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See esp. Horsfall (2008); cf. Hardie (1993) and Kragelund (1976), 52-6 who identifies dreams in Virgil as being 'day residue' dreams, but misses the Lucretian link.

<sup>2</sup> *Verae.Hist.* 2.34-5;

<sup>3</sup> Kruger (1992), 17.

<sup>4</sup> Clay (1980), 343; Lang (2013), 70.



**Fig.6.1 Advertisement for a Cretan dream-interpreter**  
 Stele from Serapeum c.200BC | Egyptian Museum Cairo 27567

As the above stele shows, dream interpretation was a business to be advertised in Hellenistic Egypt; but notably, despite the long Egyptian tradition of dreams (cf. 5.1), the dream interpreter here is advertising his Greek-ness:

ένύπνια κρινῶ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσταγμα ἔχων τύχ' ἀγαθαί Κρής ἐστίν ὁ κρινῶν τάδε.

I interpret dreams bearing orders from the god. Good fortunes. A Cretan is this interpreter.<sup>5</sup>

The stele is flanked by two caryatids, and the accompanying illustration of the Apis bull and a stepped horned altar emphasizes the Ptolemaic religious domain in which this Greek interpreter operates. The language and specific identification of his identity at the very least suggests that by the Hellenistic period, the Greeks had developed some repute for the interpretation of dreams. Incubation and dream accounts in both Greek and demotic have been recovered from the same area as the stele which attests to the site's busy bilingual religious and oneirocritic community.<sup>6</sup> Thus it is not just the literary dream which has significance; this is already seen in the rapid spread of the Asclepian cult and its incubation practices (5.3). But here it is the interpretation of dreams specifically which continues to be as marketable as the writer of *On Regimen* had alluded to in his depiction of the medical marketplace (5.4). It is important to

<sup>5</sup> On translating Kres as a personal name – Lang (2013), 69; cf. 'of Crete', Thompson (1984); La'da (2002).

<sup>6</sup> Thompson (1984), 12; on bilingualism in Ptolemaic dream divination, see Prada (2013).

recognise that the Greek dream did not exist only in literature; it was a part of socio-cultural, religious – and even economic – life.

The second chapter, **Heraclitus on Sleep and Dreams**, was intended to shine a light on Heraclitus' extant remarks on both phenomena. As the first of the Presocratics to discuss either sleep or dreams in any respect, he occupies an important role in the transition between the 'traditional' cultural depictions and those which could be categorised – broadly – as scientific. For Heraclitus, sleeping is used as a way to express man's epistemological inferiority; it exemplifies a state of total separation, as man is entirely cut off from the world around him. With no access to the shared *logos*, his experiences in sleep are wholly unreliable. Sleeping is also positioned as an intermediary state, between life and death. Expressed in terms of the diminishing quantity and quality of light, the sleeper is in the closest proximity possible to death while still alive. For Heraclitus, the experiential state of sleep – and by association, dreaming – has a clear metaphorical potential, and its use to express epistemological inferiority specifically is later adopted by Plato. Plato does not write any dedicated treatise or extended account of dreams, but references to dreaming (usually contrasted to waking) are scattered throughout the dialogues. No one 'theory' on dreams can realistically be deduced, as his remarks are so varied, and often contradictory.<sup>7</sup> But if we look at how he uses the dream experience as metaphor in *Republic* V-VII, he uses the oppositional states of waking vs. dreaming to clearly separate those who have knowledge of the Forms from those who do not on a conscious level:

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<sup>7</sup> See esp. Kessels (1978), 236-42.

<i>Book V</i>		<i>Books VI-VII</i>	
"Objects"	"Cognitive States"	"Objects"	"Cognitive States"
Forms A	Philosopher "Waking"	Forms Aa	Dialectician νόησις "Waking"
Sensibles B	φιλοθεάμων "Dreaming"	Verbal Images Ab	Mathematician διάνοια "Dreaming"
		Material Things Ba	Natural Scientist πίστις "Waking"
		Images Bb	Plain Man εἰκασία "Dreaming"

**Fig.6.2** Gallop's table of the Waking vs the Dreaming in *Republic V-VII*<sup>8</sup>

Those in the B/b groups are living in a state of permanent unawareness as they fail to distinguish between Forms and Sensibles (and their associated equivalents above); they are thus collectively placed on a lesser epistemological level, while those in the A/a groups are described as philosophically 'awake'. The B/b group do not comprehend the true nature of reality; thus, as with the man in B1 who does not comprehend the *logos*, they are separated from true knowledge. The dichotomy of waking and dreaming, then, is here used to illustrate both separation and epistemological inferiority in the context of a shared philosophical knowledge. Heraclitus' sleeper becomes Plato's dreamer. The same use of dream as epistemological metaphor has also been identified in the Hellenistic Philo of Alexandria, and situated in light of both Heraclitus and Plato.<sup>9</sup>

Taking a leap forward into Late Antiquity, Gregory of Nyssa provides an account of sleep and dreams in the thirteenth chapter of his *De Hominis Opificio* entitled 'A Rationale of Sleep, Yawning and Dreams', which should be highlighted for its striking use of Heraclitean imagery. His investigation opens with an extended discussion of life in terms of flux and succession of opposites, including waking and sleeping, which has been identified as drawing particularly on Heraclitus' use of *coincidentia oppositorum*.<sup>10</sup> This is the only Heraclitean imagery highlighted by Miller,

<sup>8</sup> Gallop (1971), 194. Passages referenced *Rep.*476c-d; 520c; 533b.

<sup>9</sup> Reddoch (2011), 283-302.

<sup>10</sup> *De.hom.*13.1-2; Miller (1994), 47.

but there are two more of note: life's eternal state of flux is illustrated by way of a river in 13.1, and then in 13.8, Gregory's depiction of the idle state of the *nous* in sleep by an extended metaphor of kindling. Just as fire is not entirely extinguished (κατασβέννυται) when heaped upon by chaff, so the mind when hidden by the action of the senses in sleep is not entirely extinguished, but continues to operate to a minimal extent.<sup>11</sup> This is reminiscent of the description in A16 (2.2) of the Heraclitean *nous*, which, similarly impeded by the closing of the senses, burns with a low flame, having been separate from the external *logos*. Gregory is often linked with Greek philosophical and scientific writings as far back as Plato, and indeed his later comments on day-residue dreams (13.11), and the ability for physiological afflictions to make themselves known through dreams (13.16) attest to an interaction with Greek theories on sleep and dreams in particular. It does not seem implausible, then, to suppose an interaction with Heraclitus' account of sleep – even if only by way of Sextus Empiricus.<sup>12</sup>

The third chapter, **Physiological Approaches to Sleep and Dreams**, examined the proposed theories of the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers concerning the bodily processes and impacts of sleep and dreams. For the former, the theories of sleep concentrate on the quality or quantity of heat within the body – mostly by way of the blood – and they often express the sleeping state as part of a continuum, of which death is the next stage. For the latter, sleep maintains a similar association with heat and the blood in several treatises; dreams themselves – and their implied unreliability – in *On Breaths* are associated with the cognitive impairment brought about by sleep's inherent cooling of the blood. In a break from the other accounts, *On the Sacred Disease* proposes an encephalocentric origin of dreams. The appended accounts of parasomnia from across the HC illustrated the various ways in which sleep and dreams could be of significance to the physician. The fourth chapter, **Psychological Approaches Sleep and Dreams**, took a closer work at those internal operations which were not primarily attributed to bodily substances but rather were expressed in terms of the *psukhe*. Pindar's 'dreaming soul' was reconsidered, and resituated in its recognisably epic

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<sup>11</sup> *De.hom.*13.8: Οἷον δέ τι περὶ τὸ πῦρ γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ὅταν μὲν ὑποκρυφθῆ τοῖς ἀχύροις ἀπανταχόθεν, μηδεμιᾶς ἀναπνοῆς ἀναρρίπιζούσης τὴν φλόγα, οὔτε τὰ προσπαρακείμενα νέμεται, οὔτε παντελῶς κατασβέννυται, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ φλογὸς ἀτμός τις διὰ τῶν ἀχύρων ἐπὶ τὸν ἀέρα διέξεισιν, εἰ δέ τινος λάβοιτο διαπνοῆς, φλόγα τὸν καπνὸν ἀπεργάζεται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆ ἀπραξίᾳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον συγκαλυφθεὶς, οὔτε ἐκλάμπειν δι' αὐτῶν δυνατῶς ἔχει, οὔτε μὴν παντελῶς κατασβέννυται· ἀλλ' οἷον καπνοειδῶς κινεῖται, τὸ μὲν τι ἐνεργῶν, τὸ δὲ οὐ δυνάμενος.

<sup>12</sup> See esp. Wessel (2009), 24-46 who discusses his reception of Greek science, particularly Aristotle and Galen.

tradition; this helped to mark out a more plausible interaction between the way in which Heraclitus discussed sleep and dreams, and the depiction of the same processes in *On Regimen*. The *psukhe* in the Hippocratic Corpus was then considered, before a closer examination of its independent role during sleep in *On Regimen*. Thus, while the *psukhe* can be influenced by bodily changes and surfeit, it is also capable of independent action; this is further illustrated by its internal and external gaze. In considering the theories from both chapters, it is clear that there is no one model for either physiological or psychological functioning. Nor are these two types of approaches to be read as separate, as their artificial differentiation for the purposes of discussion only highlights the primary type of function under which the processes are grouped. As is clear from the evidence, physiology and psychology are interactive, and often treated simultaneously. A notable exception is found in the atomist approach, where the physical and bodily nature of dreaming constitutes a break from the internalising dialogues of the time. In articulating his dream theory by use of *eidola*, Democritus borrows from the well-established epic-poetic vocabulary to emphasize dream's re-externalisation.

Plato further magnified the role of the soul in the contents of the dream in *Republic IX*, where variations in the dream come about due to the action and primacy of the different *parts* of the soul itself:

When the rest of the soul is asleep, that is to say the rational, civilized, controlling side of it, the untamed savage side, full of food or drink, darts about and when it has shaken sleep off seeks to go and satisfy its own natural tendencies. You know that in such circumstances it is emboldened to do everything, as it's free and rid of a sense of all shame and intelligence. It does not shrink from trying to have sex with a mother, as it fancies, or with any other human being, or god, or wild beast; it will commit any kind of bloodthirsty murder, and there is no food it won't touch. In a word, it isn't lacking in any folly or shamelessness.<sup>13</sup>

The relationship between an indulgence of food or drink and disturbance in dreams is once more proposed, in that such surfeit keeps the 'untamed' part of the soul awake and eager to satisfy its own desires. These dreams of incest and murder are indicative of man's underlying and unchecked desires; this intimation towards a theory that

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<sup>13</sup> *Rep.*571d; transl. Emlyn-Jones/Preddy (2015).

repressed urges manifest themselves in sleep reads, to the modern audience, as an anticipation of Freud.<sup>14</sup> For the incestuous dream in particular, we recall Jocasta's remarks to Oedipus on the commonality of such a vision in sleep (1.2.4). As Plato goes on to explain, the parts of the soul must be kept in balance through exercise and moderate indulging of desires. Should this be the case, then, the man in sleep will be able to reach perception of past, present and future truths.<sup>15</sup> A balanced soul, then, not only results in pleasant dreams, but also prophetic. Dreams thus continue to have a pluralistic nature.

It was with Aristotle that the psychophysical approach to sleep and dreams was most fully explored, in three dedicated treatises from his *Parva Naturalia* addressing these phenomena: *On Sleeping and Waking*, *On Dreams* and *On Divination in Sleep*.<sup>16</sup> Aristotle had no interest in decoding the meanings or symbolism of dreams; for him, dreams were merely illusions (*phasmata*) and as such had no purpose, function or meaning.<sup>17</sup> In discussing the cause and effect of both sleep and dreams, Aristotle adheres to his hylomorphic theory: soul and body are jointly affected by both phenomena. It is not possible to examine these treatises in detail here, but there are a few points worth highlighting, as in his psychophysical account of sleep, Aristotle builds upon the longstanding tradition of associating the onset of sleep with a diminution in heat. He also draws on the Hippocratic association between digestion and sleep. The third chapter of *On Sleep* thus attributes sleep to the intake of food. Digestion has an exothermic effect: when food has been consumed, it moves to the stomach and 'steams up into' the blood vessels due to the heat created (456b17-20).<sup>18</sup> It is then transformed into blood, and travels towards the heart. It is this exothermic 'steaming' which links digestion with sleep, for this heat naturally rises through the body up to the head/brain and then, cooling off, starts to come down again, in mass, repelling the heat back further inwards as it retreats (456b21-28). This internal movement weighs the body down – evidenced by nodding off (456b27) and the eyelids closing (457b4). This is summarised later as sleep being an inward concentration of hot matter: the upper and outer areas of man are cooled, while the inner and lower

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<sup>14</sup> Gallop (1996), 11.

<sup>15</sup> cf. the different explanation given in the *Timaeus* (71a7-61) for prophetic dreams, based on the desiring part of the soul's proximity to the smooth and reflective liver.

<sup>16</sup> All text and translations here have been taken from Gallop's 1996 edition *On Sleep and Dreams*. Scholarship on these three treatises has been steadily increasing in the past 20 years – see esp. van der Eijk (1994) & (2005); Everson (2007); Grellard & Morel (2010); Lo Presti (2015).

<sup>17</sup> Gallop (1996), 28.

<sup>18</sup> Hulskamp (2008), 139.



areas become more heated (457b1-7). Furthermore, the digestive process also creates an intermingling of the blood within the body – the rarer and purest blood resides in the head, while the thicker and most turbid is in the lower parts. The blood created by the ingested food is not separated until it reaches the heart; thus, for a period, the two types are mixed together and thereby also cause sleep. Waking occurs on their complete separation (458a10-26). Wiesner and Gallop both identify the mixed state of the blood as the cause of impediment to the sensory faculties, prohibiting perception in sleep.<sup>19</sup> Although obviously far more developed than the fragments of the Presocratics, there are nevertheless identifiable roots to these theories. Sleep, from the very first metaphorical examinations in Heraclitus and physiological discussions in Alcmaeon, has been portrayed as a diminution of heat in the body. This is often associated with the blood, as in Alcmaeon and Empedocles, or as part of the interaction between blood and air, as in Diogenes of Apollonia and *On Breaths*. The latter is of particular note here, for as we saw in 3.2.2, *On Breaths* had stated that any change to the blood impacts *phronesis* – an expansive term, inclusive of perception – and the example with which he depicts this is sleep. Furthermore, *On Breaths* also accounts for the closing of the eyes and sinking of the body in sleep, as part of the weighing down caused by the blood's cooling.

The common underlying thread to these theories continued to Galen's time, where the attribution of sleep to the inherent qualities of heat seems to not warrant any detailed explanation beyond:

Even the mad, they say, would not think anything other than it [sleep] comes about when heat is somehow subdued weighed down by the quality of moisture.<sup>20</sup>

In his commentary on the Hippocratic *Epidemics VI*, it is clear that Galen connects this movement of inherent heat to the action of the blood, as he joins the generalising comment on changes in body temperature to the view that in sleep blood retreats into the interior of the body:

For the things you have heard in regard to the warmth of the movement and the change of waking and sleeping, consider to have heard them too

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<sup>19</sup> Wiesner (1978), 266-7; Gallop (1996), 134.

<sup>20</sup> *Temp.2.2*; transl. adapted from Hulskamp (2008).

concerning the blood. For the innate heat consists for the most part in the blood, and in those things which are nourished from it.<sup>21</sup>

Galen connects this inward movement of the body's innate heat to the digestion of food, another concept rooted in earlier Greek thought. He also borrowed from Aristotle's theory of 'steam' or vapours arising during digestion, and resituated it in his own account of sleep as recuperation of the *dunameis*.<sup>22</sup>

The depiction of sleep as a cooling, as well as its association with digestion and a resting of the psychological faculty, persisted as a scientific belief well beyond the ancient world. Early Modern examinations of sleep often drew their theories from classical sources, as is evident from the account of the 16<sup>th</sup> century German physician Wilhelm Scribonius:

Sleepe is a resting of the feeling facultie: his cause is a cooling of the braine by a pleasant abounding vapour, breathing forth of the stomacke and ascending to the braine. When that vapour is concocted and turned into spirits, the heate returneth and the sences recovering their former function, cause waking.<sup>23</sup>

Haydock (1570-c.1642) in his *Oneirologia* similarly identifies sleep as 'performed in times of concoction [digestion], by meanes of certain hott and moist vapours, ascending upp by ye jugular veines and arteries ...'<sup>24</sup> It is not difficult to see the Aristotelian influence here. Of note for the current study's approach, is that these theories were not restricted only to scientific or philosophical treatises, but also appear in more 'popular' literature of the time. The anonymous *The Wisdom of Doctor Dodypoll* is a particularly striking example:

AMBASSADOR: But dreames (my lord) you know growe by the humors  
Of the moist night, which store of vapours lending  
Unto our stomaches when we are in sleepe...  
And to the bodis supream parts ascending,  
And thence sent back by coldnesse of the braine,  
And these present our idle phantasies  
With nothing true, but what our labouring soules  
Without their active organs, falselie worke.

ALPHONSO: My lord, know you, there are two sorts of dreams,  
One sort whereof are onely phisicall,

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<sup>21</sup> *In.Hip.Epid.VI.30*; transl. Hulskamp.

<sup>22</sup> For a full account, see Hulskamp (2008), 116.

<sup>23</sup> Riviere (2017), 23-4. Scribonius lived 1550-1600.

<sup>24</sup> Riviere (2017), 25

And such are they whereof your Lordship speakes,  
The other Hiper-phiscall: that is,  
Dreames sent from heaven, or from the wicked fiends,  
Which nature doth not forme of her owne power  
But are intrinsecate, by marvaile wrought.<sup>25</sup>

The Ambassador recounts the Aristotelian theory of sleep in response to Alphonso's alleged fearful dream, attempting to prove to him its lack of meaning – similarly to the way in which Artabanus recites the day-residue theory for Xerxes (5.5.1). These types of dreams are not more than idle fancy; a product of the soul when it is without the senses. Alphonso acknowledges the existence of these 'phiscall' dreams but references too the 'Hiper-phiscall': dreams which are of more supernatural origins.

Moving even further ahead to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the activity of the blood continued to be a focus of sleep studies. In a paper read to the Psychological Society of Great Britain in 1877, it was asserted that the physiological explanation for sleep was a collapse of fibres from the brain, related to the 'expulsion of a portion of blood from the capillaries'.<sup>26</sup> Obviously very far removed from the ideas of our Presocratic and Hippocratic writers, this theory is referenced simply to underscore the exceptionally long lifespan of the association between the movement of the blood and the state of sleep; indeed, it was not until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century that the vascular theory of sleep began to fall out of popularity.

The theories of the Presocratics on sleep have also experienced somewhat of a resurgence in contemporary scientific discourse. Alcmaeon, Empedocles and Diogenes of Apollonia are frequently cited in monographs, research papers and encyclopaedias for their views on sleep.<sup>27</sup> These references vary in their accuracy – a discussion in a 2005 volume on *Sleep Disorders and Neurological Disease*, repeated in the 2010 *Encyclopaedia of Sleep and Sleep Disorders*, credits Alcmaeon with the first 'rational' theory of sleep as he 'believed that sleep is caused by blood filling the brain, a concept consistent with the notions of ancient times.'<sup>28</sup> These references – as strange as they may be – highlight the continuing trend of anchoring even contemporary scientific development in the privileged Greek intellectual past.

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<sup>25</sup> II.3.110-21; Krajnik (2013), 52.

<sup>26</sup> Cox (1877), 166.

<sup>27</sup> E.g. Finger (1994), 243; Drucker-Colin (1995), 1; Barret & McNamara (2012), 610; They also enjoy praise for their works more broadly – Diogenes is lauded as a 'pioneer of vascular anatomy' (Crivellato et al, 2006) while Alcmaeon is credited with a discovery 'comparable to that of Copernicus and Darwin.' (Doty 2007).

<sup>28</sup> Thorpy (2000), 14; repeated in 2010.

The fifth and final chapter of the thesis, **The Interpretation of Dreams**, took a much closer look at the first extant Greek dream-book: *On Regimen* IV. This was prefaced by a discussion of Near Eastern traditions, as well as an overview of Greek oneiromantic traditions and how the dream more generally fit into mantic practice. This was followed by a brief examination of the popular Asclepian ‘curative’ dreams whose *iamata* testify to an ongoing narrative of visitation and actualisation dreams (cf. **1.3.1 & 1.3.2**) as well as the symbolic-episodic (**1.3.3**), sometimes combined. This helped set the scene for the discussion of *On Regimen*’s guide to dream interpretation, situating the Hippocratic author within the wider medical marketplace. The chapter then turned to a closer reading of the dream scenarios and their Hippocratic interpretations; the combination of symbolic-episodic and micro-macrocosmic dreams signalled an approach drawing upon both socio-cultural and intellectual spheres. The ‘day-residue’ dream started off the Hippocratic guide: in prognostic terms, to dream of normal daily life was good. This type of dream is worth highlighting in particular for the odd tendency for it, despite its longevity, to be consistently positioned in relation to Freud. These dreams, which recount aspects of the dreamer’s own waking daily life, are quite commonplace in both Greek and Roman discussions of dreams; we have seen them potentially in Empedocles, as well as in Herodotus, and Aristophanes (**6.5.1**). As is perhaps to be expected, they are adopted by both Aristotle and Galen.<sup>29</sup> They also appear in passing in Cicero – not only for the cause of Scipio’s dream, but also as an attestation that Ennius recognised a similar aetiology for the content seen in dreams:

The following dream came to me, prompted, I suppose, by the subject of our conversation; for it often happens that our thoughts and words have some such effect in our sleep as Ennius describes with reference to Homer, about whom, of course, he frequently used to talk and think in his waking hours.<sup>30</sup>

Scipio explains his dream of Africanus as arising on account of his having discussed him at great length before sleep – the conversation had lasted all day and stretched long into the night, we are told.<sup>31</sup> The ‘day-residue’ explanation is made by way of Ennius, and offers a unique perspective on the poetic-succession dream. Lucretius utilises them colourfully as part of his Epicurean philosophy, relating them to all living creatures rather than man alone, as he recounts that in dreams:

Pleaders plead their cause and collate laws, generals to contend and engage battle, sailors to fight out their war already begun with the

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<sup>29</sup> van der Eijk (1995); Oberhelman (1987).

<sup>30</sup> Cic.*Rep.*6.10 transl. Keyes

<sup>31</sup> Cic.*Rep.*6.9-10

winds ... In fact, you will see horses of mettle, stretched out, nevertheless sweating in their sleep and for ever panting, as though they were exerting their last strength to win the palm, or as though bursting out from the opened cells. Hunters' dogs, often in soft sleep all at once jerk their legs and suddenly give tongue, and often sniff up the air, as though they had found and were holding the track of a wild beast; and if awakened they often chase the empty images of stags ... Kings win victories, are captured, join battle, cry aloud as if their throats were being cut on the spot. Many struggle violently, groan with pain, and, as if they were being gnawed in the jaws of a panther or cruel lion, make the place ring with their cries. Many in sleep talk of important matters, and they have often borne witness against themselves. Many meet their death. Many are terrified with the notion that they are being hurled bodily down to earth from a lofty mountain ... Again, one athirst often sits beside a stream or a pleasant spring, and all but swallows the whole river.<sup>32</sup>

Lucretius thus covers a wide range of scenarios in quick succession, with some other familiar dream typologies appearing – the thirsty man who dreams of devouring water, for example, recalls the basic typology of the wish-fulfilment in which the soul is able to communicate a lack (4.3.3). For Lucretius, all these dream visions can be traced to mundane causes; there is no allowing for even a medical interpretation, though the inclusion of the 'thirsty man' dream does concede to the bodily condition manifesting through dream imagery. This evidently exemplifies his Epicurean aim to loosen man's mind from the knots of superstition – dreams should not be feared, for they have no real import.<sup>33</sup> By the time of Artemidorus, then, never mind Freud (who is often attributed with their identification) they have a fairly well-established precedent.

On the interpretation of dreams, then, we see from 5.5, the author of *On Regimen* is far from sceptical; including the day-residue dream among these scenarios allows him to resituate them from mundane to meaningful, just as he relocates cultural topoi – such as dreams of the dead – in his prognostic framework. Aristotle's already-noted criticism of dreams as bearing any significance came with one minor exception: dreams which can be of use to the physician.<sup>34</sup> Cicero, another sceptic of the dream's interpretative potential, who claimed interpretation was instead 'all about the interpreter', makes the same exception.<sup>35</sup> For both, the medical use of the dream was to be set apart from the oneiromantic tradition and given exclusive validation; a position which the author of *On Regimen* had intimated at through subtle criticism of his

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<sup>32</sup> Lucr. 4. 962-1025 – excerpts, trans. Rouse/Smith.

<sup>33</sup> Lucr.1.931-2

<sup>34</sup> Arist. *Div.somn.*463a4-6; on this as a potential reference to *On Regimen*: Segev (2012), 111 n.8, cf. van der Eijk (1995), 447-59.

<sup>35</sup> Cic. *de.Div.*2.142

competitors, though he had not been so extreme as to deny the validity of the divine dream altogether. With Galen, however, the medical and the 'cultural' dream came to be on equal footing once more; alongside the dream's prognostic potential, he also believed in the divinely-sent dream – the Asclepian dream, in particular. He reports on how he received instruction from Asclepius through his dreams at various points in his life; this included medical advice which Galen claims saved his life, and led to him becoming the god's servant.<sup>36</sup>

Despite these variations in beliefs on the validity of different dreams, it was not until Artemidorus' *Oneirocritica* that any formal approach to their classification was really thoroughly set down. Writing in the second century AD, his expansive treatment of both the classification of dreams and their interpretation spans five volumes. He adopts an overarching dualistic approach to dreams as he differentiates between two main classifications using common terms, familiar from the current study: ὄνειρος and ἐνύπνιον. For Artemidorus, an ὄνειρος is a dream which is capable of predicting the future, while ἐνύπνιον is only capable of relating the present; the former is a movement or composition of the soul, whereas the latter can belong to the body, or the soul, or both (1.3). Within these two main classifications, there are further subdivisions: χρηματισμός (oracle) and ὄραμα (vision) are predictive of the future, while φάντασμα (apparition) is not; the volumes however are most devoted to the interpretation of the ὄνειροι.<sup>37</sup>

Of the hundreds of dream scenarios presented, many overlap in content with those discussed in *On Regimen* IV. The interpretations may share some basic similarities, but are often much more elaborate. Thus, while *On Regimen* IV interprets dreams of the dead wearing white clothes as a positive sign indicative of purity and health, and wearing black clothes as a negative sign indicative of disease (6.5.5) Artemidorus explains:

For a sick man to wear white clothing signifies death due to the fact that dead men are carried out in white. But a black garment signifies recovery. For not the dead but those who mourn the dead wear garments of this sort. And I know of many poor men and slaves and prisoners, who, being sick and imagining they were wearing black clothes, died. For it was fitting that these men were not carried out in

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<sup>36</sup> Oberhelman (1987), 50-51 – on the story of how Asclepius saved his life with bloodletting instructive through a dream, see his *Therapeutic Phlebotomy* 23.

<sup>37</sup> Harris-McCoy (2012), 13. All text and translation of *Oneirocritica* is taken from this excellent edition.

white due to their poverty. And, in a different way, black clothing is grievous for all except those engaging in secret activities.<sup>38</sup>

The subject of the dream has changed: it is the sick man who wears the clothes, rather than the dead; but more notably, the interpretation of the colours has also changed. White clothing is a negative sign, for it is associated with the colour the dead wear *in death*; black clothing is a positive sign – but only in certain circumstances. This illustrates one interesting development exemplified by Artemidorus: the meaning of a dream is not the same for everyone. Thus, the identity of the dreamer becomes an important part of interpretation, bringing the dreamer and dream closer together. This can be seen in the example cited above, for it does turn out after all that black *can* be a negative colour and signify death – the opposite of the initial statement – only when dreamed by particular persons of low social status.

Artemidorus’ dream scenarios are formulaic in construction, allowing easy consultation for the reader. Six elements can be identified in each report: 1. Dream; 2. Outcome; 3. Verb of signification; 4. Verb of dreaming; 5. The type of dreamer to which the interpretation applies; 6. Explanation.<sup>39</sup> The vast encyclopaedic nature of the *Oneirocritica*, in addition to its methodical categorisations and more ‘personal’ interpretations, no doubt contributed to its popularity. Calcidius and Macrobius both later developed hierarchies of dream types based on Artemidorus, the latter positioning the dream’s Latinised equivalents as part of a graded process:

<b>Highest value</b>	<i>oraculum</i>	True <b>Revelation by authoritative or otherworldly figure</b>
	<i>Visio</i>	<b>True</b> Revelation through a vision of mundane events
	<i>somnium</i>	<b>True</b> True, but couched in fiction
	<i>Visum</i>	<b>False</b> Spectral
<b>Lowest Value</b>	<i>insomnium</i>	<b>False</b> Mundane

**Fig 6.3** Macrobius’ table of dream classification, after Kruger<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Oneir.*2.3

<sup>39</sup> Harris-McCoy (2012), 9-10.

<sup>40</sup> Kruger (1992), 23.

As is clear from their classifications, they similarly regarded dream experience as being a dualism of the divine and revelatory (*divinae potestas*) and the mundane (*vestigial doloris*).<sup>41</sup> On reflection, however, it is not difficult to see how these classifications have roots in the earliest Greek cultural depictions on dreams.

Artemidorus later enjoyed a revival: between 1606 and 1786 there were twenty-six editions of *Oneirocritica* published in England.<sup>42</sup> But, there is evidence that even before this renewed popularity, the classical contributions to the interpretations of dreams had not been forgotten – particularly, the contribution of the *On Regimen's* book on dreams. Rabelais' Pantagruel thus recommends:

“A good one [method of divination], ancient and authentic; that's by dreams; for by dreaming under the conditions prescribed by Hippocrates in his book περί ἐνύπνιον, Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Synesius, Aristotle, Xenophon, Galen, Plutarch, Artemidorus, Herophilus, Theocritus, Pliny, Athenaeus, and others, could often foresee future things.”<sup>43</sup>

A most appropriate attribution, indeed.

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From the concluding remarks above and the thesis as a whole, the approaches in early Greek thought to both processes of sleeping and dreaming are hopefully to be deemed deserving of their own study and attention. By examining the theories of the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers in their own standing – rather than only as a precursor or introduction to later theorists, or read retrospectively through later theories – we can more readily recognise their innovative contributions to the ways in which sleep and dreams were understood. This study also intends to show that examining these works in their cultural context can provide a more holistic and interactive picture of Greek intellectual life in the Classical period, reflecting the reality

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<sup>41</sup> Kruger (1992), 19, 26.

<sup>42</sup> Riviere (2013), 3. The first English translation in 1606 entitled: *The Judgement of Exposition of dreames, written by Artemidorus, an auntient and famous author, first in Greeke, then translated into Latin, after into French, and now into English.*

<sup>43</sup> Rabelais 3BK13, trans. Frame (1999). Critics had thought Rabelais to be mocking the interpretation of dreams in this chapter and the one which follows, but this has been questioned for its lack of foundation (Cooper 2004, 59) Nevertheless, it shows an awareness of the classical oneirocritic tradition, and explicitly traces it back to the extant Greek dream book – *On Regimen* IV.



that the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers were not writing in a 'rational' vacuum. Most importantly, however, in tracing the intellectual development of the questions which the Wellcome Collection's exhibition *Sleeping and Dreaming* proposed, then, it is hoped that this thesis has provided a justification for the reorientation of their origins: Aristotle may well have written most extensively on the phenomena, but his ideas were rooted in and shaped by the explorative work of the Presocratic and Hippocratic writers. Without these investigations, it may have been a completely different story.

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