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Paideia as Dialetheia?

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In celebration of Professor Nishihira, who retires this year, this piece examines to what his extent his work may be understood as dialetheism. In providing a view of paideia as dialetheia, we may elaborate the educational dimensions of a view of reality as contradictory, as captured in the key phrase Double Eyes. In this way, we may be able to connect long-standing traditions in clinical-philosophical pedagogy with a wider range of recent intellectual projects and problématiques worldwide.

The world is an infinite self-contradiction.

世界は無限なる自己矛盾である

- Nishida

INTRODUCTION: IN CELEBRATION OF PROFESSOR NISHIHIRA

Clinical-Philosophical Pedagogy (臨床教育人間学) at Kyoto University has an unusually rich history. Ueda Shizuteru (上田閑照), now recognized as the central figure of the Kyoto School's third generation, led the course in the 1960s-1970s, as did Kawai Hayao (河合隼雄), who later went on to become Director of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (国際日本文化研究センター) and then Head of Japan's Agency for Cultural Affairs (文化庁). Both Ueda and Kawai were highly global thinkers, reflecting deeply on "Japanese" thought from a wider perspective, and actively pursuing dialogue with the wider world. For example, both participated multiple times, whilst faculty of the course, in the famed Eranos Conference in Switzerland (see Ueda, 1976; Kawai, 1982), carrying forward the spirit of cultural dialogue via philosophical anthropology initiated there by scholars such as DT Suzuki, Mircea Eliade, Paul Tillich, Karl Jung, Karl Löwith, and Helmut Plessner.

This year Clinical-Philosophical Pedagogy will lose one of its unusually rich thinkers. Professor Nishihira Tadashi, who joined the course in 2007, will retire this year, leaving behind a rich contribution and legacy. In the European academy, it would be common to create a *Festschrift* on this occasion. Therein, Tadashi's colleagues and former students would normally contribute original contributions discussing the influence of his work, how it might be carried forward, and/or produce original research inspired by Tadashi's contributions. Since it appears that a full *Festschrift* will not be created at this time, to honor Tadashi's contributions, in European fashion, I would like to convey here what I might have written therein.

My intended contribution centers loosely around the question: *Is Nishihira Tadashi a dialetheist?* But in pursuing this question, I am seeking to raise these wider issues: *To what extent may we understand paideia as dialetheia?* And, within the globally-engaged legacy of our course outlined above: *Why might this matter for the global dialogue on education today?* As I relate below, recent years have seen growing interest in dialetheism, both outside Japan and within Japan. It is my claim that recognizing Tadashi's work as an instance of dialetheism drawn into the realm of

paideia would both gesture towards a new sort of pedagogical approach, and—at the very same time—link his work to a range of recent calls across multiple fields/approaches to think in radically new ways. Whether or not Tadashi “is” actually dialetheist is not something I cannot answer. As I suggest in conclusion, it is better to pose the question to him directly in coming years. Instead of defining Professor Nishihira then, my goal is to utilize dialetheism as a means of moving his path breaking work into a position where its wider global significance is recognizable. Herein the main ideas can only be sketched in a highly preliminary sort of way, leaving it to future work to deepen, refine, and challenge what I lay out here.

WHAT IS DIALETHEISM?

Dialetheism is a word recently coined from Greek roots (*di*-twice, *aletheia*-truth, or disclosure/unconcealedness, if we follow Heidegger), meaning that some statements are both true and false.¹ Put differently, it means that some contradictions may be true. Priest (2002), who helped coin the term in 1981, defines it and lays out the contemporary challenges to understanding what it entails:

That a contradiction might be true, or that dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions) make sense, may still be abhorrent, and even threatening, to many contemporary English-speaking philosophers. More likely than not, even the suggestion of it will be met with a look of blank incomprehension. How could a contradiction be true? After all, orthodox logic assures us that for every statement, α , only *one* of α and $\neg\alpha$ is true. The simple answer is that orthodox logic, however, well entrenched, is just a *theory* of how logical particles, like negation, work; and there is no a priori guarantee that it is correct. (p. 4, italics in original)

As revealed here, dialetheism arose as response to the elimination of contradiction in “orthodox” Western logic, and attempted to convey its case within the language of analytical philosophy, the overwhelmingly dominant tradition in most of the English-speaking world (see Priest, 1979). In doing so, it was able to draw on developments in logic over the past three decades, specifically the rise of paraconsistent logic (see Routley & Routley, 1985).² The term “orthodox” in the quote above mainly signifies the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) developed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics*. It was LNC that became the foundation of Western ontology, logic, and philosophy, and—according to Priest—was subsequently extended to social thought: “it is worth asking why dialetheism should be so outrageous to the sensibility of modern philosophers. The answer is, I am afraid, sociological rather than rational....Because of Aristotle’s magisterial authority in the Middle Ages, the subject [of contradictions] became closed” (Priest, 2002, p. 5).

Despite the closure to dialetheism in Western thought, recent scholarship has highlighted its centrality for East Asian thought. Although the term dialetheism itself was coined only recently and in the context of Western debates, the endorsement of paradox that the term signifies has been, it is argued, a central feature of East Asian thought for millennia. Deguchi et al. (2021) conclude their historical review of major dialetheists across East Asia thus:

We emphasize that these philosophers and traditions are not inadvertently committed

to contradictions in virtue of other things they say. Nor are they unaware of the contradictions to which they are committed. On the contrary, they deliberately assert and endorse contradictions, with their eyes wide open. That is, the East Asian philosophers and traditions whose work we have been addressing are explicitly dialetheist...the contradictions they endorsed are not peripheral to the philosophical perspectives in question. Rather, they are central to the views about the nature of reality and thought at issue. (p. 143)

Viewed in this way, the East Asian thought remains a more open tradition, albeit one “incomprehensible” to Western scholars still schooled into Aristotelian logic. The specific point of openness is to the possibility that some contradictions can be true, and—by extension—that paradox is a viable onto-epistemic option for understanding reality.

IS NISHIHIRA TADASHI A DIALETHEIST?

While recent developments in logic, the Anglo-American analytical tradition, and Aristotle may initially feel far removed from the contemporary concerns of Clinical-Philosophical Pedagogy, I hear considerable resonance. That is, I hear indications of a shared onto-epistemic reality, obscured only by the different languages, methodological approaches, and explanatory strategies one employs to get there. As quoted at the outset, Nishida Kitarō claimed “the world was an infinite contradiction,” and proceeded to offer many ways to understand it, including a notion of the absolutely paradoxical nature of self and sophisticated logical defense in some of his later writings (see Wargo, 2005). But what of Professor Nishihira? Is he a dialatheist? What is his approach?

Let us focus on *Philosophical Investigation Into Zeami's Teaching of Exercise and Expertise* [世阿弥の稽古哲学] (Nishihira, 2009). Throughout his master work, Nishihira highlights both the paradoxical nature of Zeami's writing—“paradox on top of paradox”³—and the inherently paradoxical nature of exercise and expertise (*keiko*) itself—“The Paradox of Keiko”⁴—generated by the “inherent contradiction entailed by the very question of extinguishing consciousness by means of consciousness” (p. 265). Nishihira goes on to explain:

...the aim here is not for equilibrium, nor for closure by dialectical sublation. Rather, it is to undergo a structural reversal and then chiasmic reversal at a paradoxical inflection point. Chiasmic reversal is neither a flow nor a generative change. It is something that intertwines and reverses into an opposite form in each instance. Its movement never stops. Or else, it is a movement that always carries within it a mechanism for producing a subsequent movement. And the fact that it does not stop mean that one is never imprisoned. One can master the act without being trapped therein—devote oneself entirely to intentional performative technique but not be stuck with it... “Extreme Yin leads to Yang and extreme Yang leads to Yin.” It is a dynamic inherent in the word *soku*. Examinations of the relationship between these points and ideas such as those of D.T. Suzuki's “logic of affirmation-in-negation” (*soku hi no ronrin*) and Tokuryu Yamaguchi's conception of the logic of tetralemma is the task we must address in the future. (Nishihira, 2009, p. 281 [Japanese version])

As shown here, Nishihira recognizes the inherent paradoxes in Zeami not as abhorrent or threatening, but as the very locus of generative change and creativity. Following Zeami himself, we find here an endorsement of these contradictions, with Nishihira explicitly gesturing to the Madhyamaka (tetralemma (Cautskoti)) and Zen (prajnaparamita, kegon) logics already highlighted above by Deguchi et al. (2021) as typical examples of dialetheism in East Asian thought.⁵

Nishihira further locates in Zeami a phrase that succinctly captures this: “Double Eyes” (*niju no ken*). He explains its significance like this:

Truth appears in the midst of dynamic tension. It reveals itself only at the “threshold” (edge, moment, rift) of the event of contradiction, reversal, and re-reversal. In fact, Zeami did not speak of truth. He spoke of consummation. A consummation is only established at the edge of a chiasmic reversal. Discernment of the “edge” is appropriate to given time and space. To that end, one sees with Double Eyes, not viewing things in simple opposition. In other words, it is seeing in a way that presupposes harmony in light of opposition, opposition in light of harmony...The aim of Zeami’s *keiko* was to discern the edge of chiasmic reversal. (Nishihira, 2009, p. 167 [Japanese version])

To further our understanding of Zeami’s Double Eyes, Nishihira refers to the work of Japanese philosopher Toshiko Izutsu. Izutsu suggested a common structure across the religious and philosophical traditions of the “East,” one that focused on the commonality of the dyad of articulation/non-articulation or pattern/patternlessness (*bunbetsu/mu-bunbestu*) across its multiple traditions (i.e., Islam, Daoism, and Buddhism). Nishihira writes: “My use of the term ‘Double Eyes’ follows Toshihiko Izutsu’s usage...[wherein] ‘articulation returns, but the original essence does not.’ A new articulation (a state of articulation lacking identity) is revived without any essence (intrinsic identity)” (p. 280). Nishihira clarifies this difficult phrase further elsewhere, explicitly defining Double Eyes as a non-resolved, constantly emerging dynamic of contradiction:

I use Double Eyes to refer to the dualistic states describes as a dyad “containing” both mastery of pattern and patternlessness. This is a double exposure of with-mind (*u-shin*; mindful attention and awareness) and no-mind (*mu-shin*; non-mindfulness, without awareness of intention) that lies beyond the state of no-mind. Or perhaps it is truly now that a new state of *u-shin* gradually emerges from the state of no-mind....There is a repeated movement back and forth between *u-shin* that differ in quality from what came before and no-mind. They intertwine and reverse in chiasmic reversal. They are not in harmony. They reverse while opposing and contradicting each other, intertwining (like a Mobius strip) as they continually replace each other while producing twists and turns. (Nishihira, 2009, p. 35 [Japanese version])

Even from this abbreviated summary, we see that Nishihira’s Zeami appears to provides us with an endorsement of contradiction, and thus a strikingly similar vision of truth held by the dialetheists reviewed above.⁶ At the same time, Nishihira appears to take us deeper than the philosophical work on logic outlined above: contemplating what this entails in *actual practice*. That is, by providing a pedagogical approach—Zeami’s *keiko*—to complement this vision of the

world, Nishihira supplies us with ways of going beyond dialetheism as merely a logical and/or linguistic option. Paideia expresses dialetheia: a practice of consummation as chiasmic reversal.

GLOBAL DIALOGUE: WHY MIGHT THIS MATTER?

In the sections above, I have highlighted recent work on dialetheism, then raise the possibility of viewing Nishihira's formulation of Double Eyes as a practice-focused approach to "seeing" the same onto-epistemic reality as that described by dialetheists. Undoubtedly differences remain, and—as I mentioned above—we await future work that precisely maps these. Yet, as stated at the outset, my primary interest in raising the possibility that recognizing Nishihira as a dialetheist is that it helps bridge his work with a larger global conversation. In this vein, this section turns to explore the sorts of recent conversations that Double Eyes-as-Dialetheism may matter within. Specifically, I look at recent developments in a highly diverse range of intellectual project unfolding globally: feminism, the analytical tradition (with an extended footnote about poststructuralism), and—in light of the fact that this is our Course Bulletin—within this history of Clinical-Philosophical pedagogy itself.

While feminist thought is diverse, recent years have witnessed the rise of eco-feminism, responding to the specter of catastrophic climate change. Eco-feminism remains interested in gender, but seeks to expand its analyses to more-than-human worlds, offering deep ontological critiques of the world as we know it. In the English-speaking world, the most recognizable thinkers are Carolyn Merchant, Vandana Shiva, Val Plumwood, Starhawk, Donna Haraway, and—in education—Iveta Silova. Plumwood (1993a) offers the most sustained critique of the effects of classical logic, followed through in her classic *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (1993b). She holds that classical Aristotelian logic supplies an account of reality that makes possible the "dualistic otherness" of Western metaphysics, the philosophical foundations for hierarchical and exclusionary at the cultural level. What then is her alternative? In papers in the mid-1980s, co-authored with her then-husband and logician Richard Routley (later Sylvan) who helped coin dialetheism⁷, she explicitly embraced a new understanding of negation and contradiction, arguing that "classical negation is a depauperate one-dimensional concept which distorts the functions of natural language and limits the usefulness of the logic it yields" (Routley & Routley, 1985, p. 216). In its place, Plumwood suggested embracing paraconsistent logic, which is—for our purposes herein—another name for dialetheism:

It at the same time evident that classical logic and classically-based logics rule out non-trivial inconsistent situations, and so exclude an important class of theories....the excluded class is that of paraconsistent theories. The core idea is that a paraconsistent theory is one that contains true contradictions without triviality. It is immediate that paraconsistent logics, logics that can serve as the basis for paraconsistent theories are, rather radically, non-classical. (p. 204)

What is fascinating here is that early Plumwood actually recognized that this richer understanding of contradiction and negation is a "crucial notion in much Buddhist philosophy" (p. 201). In other words, taken as a whole, Plumwood views paraconsistent logic as a starting point for development of a feminist logic, upon which a notion of otherness as non-hierarchical difference and non-exclusivity could flourish. This, she suggests, would be a prerequisite for

escaping from the hierarchical dualism that defines Western classical thought and society, including an inherent sexism that goes back to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and anthropocentrism as well. And yet, we should not forget, Plumwood recognizes that "Buddhist philosophy" is already there. This observation has subsequently been confirmed by Deguchi et al. (2021) among others (and Priest has been key to both discussions). To the extent these connections hold, we might reformulate the eco-feminist challenge to classical Western logic as a call to reinstate "true contradictions" and, moreover, to utilize this to act in new ways. Is this not precisely another call to Double Eyes, issued from within a different set of circumstances (i.e., feminist struggles within Western Metaphysics, now facing the climate crisis)? But what would be the pedagogy of eco-feminism? Will eco-feminists not eventually search for forms of learning that help make paraconsistency second nature?

Unfortunately, feminist thought, much less the more challenging eco-feminist strains, remains largely in the shadows of the same analytical philosophical tradition that also obscures dialetheism. This is why Wittgenstein's gestures toward dialetheism arguably carry greater weight, at least within mainstream Anglo-American philosophical circles. I am not sure I have fully understood Wittgenstein yet, but I will attempt to convey some recent work along these lines, as a preliminary way of furthering the dialogue we may envisage. Pears (2006) highlights that one central question for Wittgenstein was the mystery of the ego: "The I, the I, that is what is deeply mysterious" (p. 96). In pursuing this question, the *Tractatus* reveals Wittgenstein's view of a paradoxical self:

Where *in* the world is a metaphysical object to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. (Wittgenstein 5.632-5.6331)

The eye is indeed a useful analogy (borrowed from Schopenhauer, influenced by Indian and Buddhist thought), when trying to imagine something that makes possible a given field but does not appear within it. That is, the solitary ego does not exist *a priori* nor is it simply a myth. Instead, it stands in coincidence with the world.⁸

While Wittgenstein was primarily interested in language, logic, and meaning, and pursued a primarily therapeutic approach to philosophy, it may seem out of place to pose to him apparently metaphysical questions about the status of the self. Yet, according to Priest (2002), Wittgenstein's evolving conclusions that all meaning is rooted in "language games" meant that—when carried out to its conclusion—Wittgenstein's own solution could not be verified: "The price of Wittgenstein's solution is, therefore, that it shows his analysis to be false; or, better, it leaves him no language in which to express his claims about meaning..." (Priest, 2002, p. 213). This is why Wittgenstein would conclude *Tractatus* with the suggestion:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright. (6.54)

Commenting on this paradox, Deguchi et al. (2021) point how that “Wittgenstein even resorts to the desperate measure of calling the claims in his book literally meaningless, including, presumably, that one, resulting in a further paradox” (p. 5). The point is both that Wittgenstein, in seeking to draw a limit to the expression of thought *but yet expressing that limit with thinking*, had arrived at the very paradoxes that signal dialetheism. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein failed to fully own up to this and thus make the definitive move to become a dialetheist: “Some philosophers in the West—Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Nagel, for example—have flirted with paradox in their attempts to trace the contours of the self/world divide....But their analyses remain constrained by prevailing philosophical attitude that spurn paradox—to come out as a dialetheist is to risk ceasing to be taken seriously in the academy.” In light of this, might we envisage future work that helps move, perhaps through dialogue in *Double Eyes*, Wittgenstein’s insights a step further towards open dialetheism?⁹ Wouldn’t this sort of dialogue also allow us to re-read Wittgenstein through the lens of learning and paradox simultaneously, thus bringing a *paideia as dialetheia* approach to bear on discussion such as those initiated by Williams (2010) already gesturing toward *learning as paradox*?¹⁰

Finally, we may well return to Clinical-Philosophical Pedagogy. Ueda Shizuteru’s first talk at the Eranos Conference, delivered in 1976 whilst a professor in the course (at that time still 教育人間学講座), carried the ostensibly contradictory title of *Emptiness and Fullness: Sunyata in Mahayana Buddhism*. He explained:

This correlatedness of zero or emptiness—or in its other, philosophical term, absolute nothingness—on the one hand, and fullness on represents the fundamental relationship in Buddhist thought. It is in its authentic, original sense, an existential category that refers to the self-awareness of the self, not a self that has its existence in itself but a self that exists precisely within this correlatedness. (Ueda, 1976, p. 9)

One possible reading of “correlatedness” is *contradiction*, I would argue, but Ueda does not make this claim explicitly. However, Ueda does focus attention on a poem by Rilke wherein contradiction appears. Here is the poem:

Rose, *oh* pure contradiction, delight
to be the sleep of no one under so many
lids. (Rilke, as cited in Ueda, p. 30)

Ueda argues this poem illustrates Nishida’s notion of “pure experience,” focusing on how the Oh-event represents the moment at which we “*debecome*”:

To sum up: the Oh-event is a single and likewise a double event. In the single Oh!, rose and human subject alike have *debecome* the *Oh!* which is, as such, “neither subject or object.” And likewise, the same *Oh!* is the proper origin from which the structured totality unfolds. It is nothingness and everything in one, and that in a fully concrete way: “Oh!” If the Oh! actually occurs in this way, the Oh-event would constitute what Nishida understands as a pure experience, or in this case is in fact a pure experience itself. (p. 32)

Is it possible that the *Oh!*-event bears striking similarities with the *mushin* of Nishihira’s

Zeami model, as it represents the double event of *de*-becoming and becoming-anew? Ueda continues:

Pure experience, as just illustrated in the example of the *Oh!*, is neither experience linguistically apprehended nor is it simply nonlinguistic experience. It is the experience of a word being taken away and at the same time the experience of the word being born...Hence through the *Oh!* and as the *Oh!* there takes place a circular movement from one extreme to the other—away from the word and toward the word. And this movement likewise signals a “death and resurrection” of *homo loquens*, the human subject endowed with language. (p. 32)

Ueda’s “circular movement” appears quite similar, in my reading, to Nishihira’s description of the “chiasmic reversal” as “something that intertwines and reverses into an opposite form in each instance.” We may further confirm Ueda and Nishihira share a view of the world, by pointing out that Ueda also highlights the importance of the meaning of *soku* in the Mahayana sutras, claiming it signals: “an absolute coincidence of nothingness and form where the stress falls not on the identity of the two, which would be a further form of mistaken substantializing, but on an interrelated double perspective which relates then to ‘death and resurrection’ in the existentiell sphere.” (Ueda, 1976, p. 19). I suggest further that we may understand this “interrelated double perspective” devoid of substance as what Nishihira is referring to when he speaks of Double-Eyes. Perhaps Ueda preferred the language of correlatedness and coincidence to avoid the then-problematic term “contradiction.” But the defense dialetheism over the past three decades may now allow us to reformulate Ueda’s approach as this: The *Oh!* event reveals our self as contradiction, at once *de*becoming (death) and then being reborn (resurrection) in that same instant, and each instance thereafter. If such a reading is possible, Nishihira advances this insight to the level of pedagogy, making Ueda’s philosophical project emptiness/fullness paradox more “fully concrete” in pedagogy than Ueda himself managed to do.

CONCLUSION: DIALETHEISM, DIALOGUE, AND DOUBLE-EYES

Philosophy starts from the self-contradictory nature of our selves.

哲学は我々の自己の自己矛盾生から出立する

-Nishida

In the spirit of celebrating (*fest*) and advancing the work of Professor Nishihira’s contributions to our course on the eve of his retirement, this piece raised the question of whether or not we might understand his work as dialetheism. And, if so, what sorts of new connections and conversations could be generated through such a move? Having laid out the case that Double Eyes is an endorsement of contradiction and thus qualifies as dialetheism, I sought to show why this might matter: linking to leading work in Anglo-American circles calling for a jettisoning of traditional Western metaphysics and recognition of paradox, as well as to previous scholarship within Clinical-Philosophical Pedagogy itself. Ueda Shizuteru’s work advanced Nishida’s dialetheism into the realm of language, whereas Nishihira’s work—although not necessarily starting with Nishida—appears to locate a strikingly similarly worldview in the pedagogy of Zeami, advancing it into the realm of pedagogy. Recognizing these sorts of

connections, I wish to argue, would help us to move the unusually rich ideas generated in Clinical-Philosophical Pedagogy further into global dialogue, even while we reconnect with and reanimate work done by earlier generations of scholars in the course.

Taken as a whole, the diverse thinkers discussed herein are clearly gesturing toward a view of the world itself, and the philosophy and learning we undertake therein, as fundamentally self-contradictory. In recognizing the rise of dialetheism over the past three decades in the Anglo-American academy, we are no longer forced to believe that the self-contradictory nature of reality reveals problematic thinking. Instead, we may recognize this arrival at paradox as a deep insight. Forms of life blocked from view by LNC reemerge. This frees those of us interested in education in East Asia to move beyond the task of narrow philosophical justification, and more fully embrace the task of educational elaboration: contemplating forms of pedagogy that help us learn these insights. Nishida once wrote:

哲学は我々の自己の自己矛盾性から出立するのである。疑そのものが問題となるのである。私は我々の自己の自己矛盾性から相反する二つの方向に行くことができると思う。一つは自己肯定の方向であり、一つは自己否定の方向である。西洋文化は前者の方向へ行ったのであり、東洋文化は後者の方向にその長所を有つということが出来る。しかし今や我々は自己矛盾性の根元に返って、真の矛盾的自己同一の立場から出立せねばならぬと思う。そこに東西文化の融合の途があるのである。

Philosophy starts from the self-contradictory nature of our selves. Doubting itself is the issue. I think, given the self-contradictory nature of ourselves, we can go in two opposite directions from here. One is the direction of affirmation of self, and the other is the direction of self-negation. It can be said that Western culture went to the former direction, and Eastern culture has an advantage in the latter direction. However, we must now return to the roots of self-contradiction and (re)emerge from a position of true contradictory self-identity. This is where we can find the coming together of Western and Eastern culture. (Nishida, 1944, p. 14)

In light of a surge in recent work has shown just how important “self-negation” is for actual learning across Japan (Nakagawa, 2000; Sevilla, 2016, Ueno et al. 2018; Takayama, 2020; Chiba, 2021, Nishihira & Rappleye, 2021), coupled with the growing realization in the West of just how much Cartesian subjectivity remains the de facto basis of pedagogy there (Peters, 2017), the stage seems set to bridge the philosophical and pedagogical more strongly. Yet what is sometimes missing from this body of educational work is the deeper point: *how the nature of reality gives rise to that pedagogy*. In other words, by recognizing the self-contradictory nature of reality, and thus the paradoxical nature of philosophy itself (e.g., Wittgenstein), we may more deeply understand why and how pedagogy also tends towards a consummation “only established at the edge of a chiasmic reversal.” Devoid of the larger backdrop of reality and logic, it will not make sense. And, as it turns out, this “chiasmic reversal,” wherein we think from “a position of true contradictory self-identity” is what may allow our course to once again—in the footsteps of Ueda and Kawaii—be a leader in global dialogue, to become a place of “coming together of Western and Eastern culture” (and other cultures too).

One question raised at the very outset remains unanswered: *Is Nishihira Tadashi a Dialetheist?*

That questions remains open, and should remain open, in hopes Professor Nishihira will stay—even after his retirement—close by so that we may ask him directly, again and again. In imagining how he might respond to the question, some readers might imagine that Professor Nishihira would refuse the characterization outright because “to come out as a dialetheist is to risk ceasing to be taken seriously in the academy” (Deguchi et al., 2021, p. 170), or—more profoundly—simply “answer” like Vimalakīrti once did when faced with a similar question of what something ultimately “is.” However, I think, based on my many intimate dialogues with Professor Nishihira over the past several years, that he would respond *actively*, with his answers opposing me at times and at other time opposing himself: a continual and never-ending intertwining, filled with twists and turns, inevitably ending with his characteristically warm shrug, smile, and an agreement to continue the discussion another time. That is, his response would most likely lead us to *experience* the two truths concretely, demonstrating precisely the never-ending practice of bringing forth the world and being brought forth by it, which is the hallmark of dialetheism, dialogue, and Double Eyes alike. Thanks for your teaching, Nishihira-sensei.

NOTES

1. The Japanese translation has become 真矛盾主義. (see Deguchi, 2013)
2. Paraconsistent means to be tolerant of inconsistency.
3. As I was completing this piece, the English-language translation of Nishihira’s work became available. I have read the English (and Japanese versions), but since page numbers to the English version have not been assigned, I am unable to cite the page numbers here. In other words, I cite the forthcoming English translation, but have no way to append page numbers as it has not yet been typeset. As such, I only cite the Japanese page numbers for the major passages. Apologies to the reader, but given the forum is the course Bulletin, the current piece is viewed more of a work-in-progress.
4. In Japanese, Nishihira’s conclusion to the book makes this clear: 稽古の逆説、あるいは「二重の見」(p. 264)
5. With additional space, we might go further into the connections between Daoist and Zen thought in Zeami. Indeed, Nishihira argues “we must see the Performance Notes against the background of Kegon thought.”
6. With further space, we may have also explore Nishihira’s most recent work that centers Double Eyes further, see A Prolegomena to Eastern Philosophy: Toshihiko Izutsu and Double-Eyes [東洋哲学序説—井筒俊彦と二重の見] .(Nishihira, 2021)
7. Richard Routley worked closely with Graham Priest in the Canberra Logic Group, and the term “dialetheism” was coined by the both of them. (see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, entry for Richard Sylvan [Routley])
8. We may note that Nishitani Keiji also utilizes the analogy of the eye in Religion and Nothingness, Chapter 4, Section 7, as a means of making a similar point about the contradiction of self and world: “When we persist in our pursuit of what is truly true, among the things that are true, the truly true appears in the mode of paradox or absurdity, under conditions ordinarily considered as altogether contradictory to truth.” (Nishitani, 1965 [1982], p. 180)
9. See also Peters & Stickley (2017), who also seek to read Wittgenstein as a philosopher of pedagogy. It is worth noting that Priest (2002) follows Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein, but Cavell’s reading, wherein linguistic sense is inseparable from ethical questions about how we relate to others is also possible. The question I would like to think more about is this: What happens to Wittgenstein’s inherent paradoxes in Cavell’s reading? Is it possible that it takes us to the same sorts of existential realization of self-as-not-self gestured to by Nishihira, Zeami, and much of the Kyoto School (e.g. Nishitani, Ueda)? If so, this line of thinking, might lead to a richer dialogue within our course.

10. With more space, I would have included a paragraph on the possibility of Derrida's late dialetheism as well. Priest (2002, pp. 217-222) suggests that Derrida recognizes the limits of the expressible, and yet tries to go beyond it with the term *différance*: "claim about *différance* are not expressible; but Derrida's own texts would seem to be replete with such claims. Even to say that *différance* is inexpressible you have to refer to it to say what it is that cannot be expressed." Priest goes on point out that, faced with this contradiction, Derrida borrows Heidegger's strategy of writing under erasure, but ultimately "what Derrida is saying is that his own writing is meaningless. Hence, his reaction is exactly that of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus...a contradiction typical of a limit of thought" (p. 222). It is worth noting that Priest (2002) focuses on language because Wittgenstein and Derrida themselves do so, but Priest himself is actually pushing for an ontological claim like Deguchi et al. (2021), concluding his entire volume like this: "The philosophy of language took pride of place in twentieth-century philosophy. Certainly there is no going back to how things were before this. But maybe this century will see a return to the mainstreaming of a more traditional philosophical issue, the nature of reality—and if I am right, a nature that is contradictory." (p. 295)

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