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Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset

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Abstract

Research on UN peacekeeping operations has established that operation size and composition affect peacekeeping success. However, we lack systematic data for evaluating whether variation in tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping mandates matters and what explains different configurations of mandated tasks in the first place. Drawing on UN Security Council resolutions that establish, extend, or revise mandates of 27 UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 1991-2017 period, the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset fills this gap. It records 41 distinct tasks, ranging from disarmament to reconciliation and electoral support. For each task, the PEMA dataset also distinguishes between three modalities of engagement (monitoring, assisting, and securing) and whether the task is requested or merely encouraged. To illustrate the usefulness of our data, we re-examine Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon's (2013) analysis of operations' ability to protect civilians. Our results show that host governments and rebel groups respond differently to civilian protection mandates.

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Introduction

UN peacekeeping has become a central instrument of international conflict resolution. From its Cold War focus on ceasefire monitoring in interstate conflicts, peacekeeping has evolved to become increasingly ambitious. Contemporary peacekeeping operations are asked to undertake a wide variety of different tasks, such as establishing security, supervising elections, reforming security sector institutions, and reconciling communities. While the growing importance of peacekeeping is usually highlighted using the number of deployed troops (95,500 in 2020), costs ($6.51 billion in 2019-2020), or fatalities (130 in 2020), the role of peacekeeping operations are ultimately defined by their mandates.

Since mandates regulate what peacekeepers are expected to do, they shape the ability of UN operations to manage conflict and assist governments and populations of conflict-affected countries. For example, in line with their mandate to protect civilians, peacekeepers in South Sudan guarded several sites sheltering those displaced by violence, the largest of which equalled the Swiss capital Bern in population. The current operation in Mali, among other tasks, included strong gender mainstreaming language in its mandate and worked on issues ranging from sexual and gender-based violence to women's participation in civil society.

Moreover, peacekeeping mandates may not only affect what peacekeepers can achieve, but also reflect the evolution of international norms. Peacekeeping mandates are the result of a complex decision-making process involving the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN Secretariat, and the parties to the conflict. Debates on concrete peacekeeping tasks often reveal deep-seated disagreements about the international community's operational and normative priorities. For instance, by the end of the 1990s, only one operation had a mandate to protect civilians (the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone). Over the past two decades, the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations have revealed that civilian protection had become a manifestation of international norms of human security.

Beyond these examples, however, comprehensive cross-national and time-varying data on tasks in UN peacekeeping mandates are not yet available. As a result, researchers have made assumptions about mandate homogeneity, relied on simplified proxy measures, or overlooked mandates completely. To rectify this situation, this article introduces the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset covering all UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 1991-

2017 period.[1] The PEMA dataset provides systematic, human-coded data on a comprehensive set of peacekeeping tasks that are mandated by UNSC resolutions.

The PEMA dataset extends existing data collections on peacekeeping mandates in three important ways. First, the PEMA dataset captures the evolution of mandated tasks over the full lifespan of a peacekeeping operation. Almost all existing datasets focus on initial mandates and do not cover mandate modification once peacekeepers deploy (Mullenbach 2017; Diehl and Druckman 2018; Benson and Tucker 2019; Clayton, Dorussen, and Böhmelt 2021; for an exception see Lloyd 2021).

Second, it records a more complete set of mandated tasks than existing data collections. For instance, the dataset by Diehl and Druckman (2018) records 11 distinct peacekeeping-specific tasks.[2] The PEMA dataset is more disaggregated: for instance, it splits the task of "promoting rule of law/civil society" recorded by Diehl and Druckman into 7 tasks, namely (i) police reform, (ii) military reform, (iii) justice sector reform, (iv) transitional justice, (v) prison reform, (vi) civil society; and (vii) media.

Finally, the PEMA dataset captures the modality of peacekeepers' engagement (monitoring, assisting, or providing security) for each task. For instance, PEMA distinguishes whether peacekeepers are mandated to merely monitor elections, assist with their organization, or provide electoral security. It also records whether each task is required or merely encouraged. This provides 116 unique configurations of task-modality-strength combinations. This distinguishes PEMA from Lloyd's (2021) Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset, which records 50 tasks, although some of these tasks are, in fact, modalities of the same task.[3]

The PEMA dataset will help advance scholarship on UN peacekeeping and international politics in two principal ways. First, the PEMA dataset allows analyzing how mandates affect peacekeeping and peacebuilding outcomes. Studies in this tradition have so far focused on the number of uniformed personnel, such as troops and police (e.g., Hultman, Kathman, and

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[1] The data collection is currently ongoing and future versions will include non-African missions and cover the years up until 2021.

[2] Unfortunately, the dataset by Diehl and Druckman (2018) is not publicly available.

[3] For instance, TAMM records monitoring and assisting disarmament as separate *tasks*, and the securing *modality* is absent. In the PEMA dataset, disarmament is recorded as one task, with three modalities: monitoring, assisting and securing the disarmament process.

Shannon 2013, 2019), mission composition (e.g., Karim and Beardsley 2017; Bove, Ruggeri, and Ruffa 2020; Belgioioso, Di Salvatore, and Pinckney 2021), and subnational geographic deployment of peacekeepers (e.g., Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Phayal and Prins 2020). However, whether and how mandate configurations affect stability, human rights, reconciliation, economic recovery and other outcomes remain open questions. Thus, scholars interested in answering these questions may find our data valuable for their work. Indeed, we argue and show in our replication of the analysis by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) that, beyond personnel numbers, mandated tasks can also influence the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians in important ways.

Second, the PEMA dataset sets the stage for several new research avenues on peacekeeping mandates as a product of UNSC decision-making and the inclusion of specific mandate provisions, such as human rights or local reconciliation-related tasks. This research will be relevant beyond the study of UN peacekeeping and of interests to scholars of international organizations (IOs) and foreign policy. Moreover, since UNSC members negotiate over each task that is included in new and revised mandates, with input by the UN Secretariat and under pressure from civil society, the PEMA dataset will be of interest to those who study multilateral negotiations from a variety of perspectives.

The rest of this article has five parts. In the first section, we explain why peacekeeping mandates are important by describing how they are negotiated and connected to global political processes. In the second section, we review existing qualitative and quantitative research on peacekeeping mandates, establishing the need for a comprehensive and disaggregated dataset of mandated tasks like ours. In the third section, we present the PEMA dataset, including the variables, sources, and main coding procedures. In the fourth section, we provide an overview of descriptive patterns in the data. In the fifth section, we discuss two major research avenues that the PEMA dataset opens: as briefly mentioned above, the first one treats mandates as an independent variable that influences peacekeeping outcomes, while the second one treats mandates as a dependent variable that is influenced by institutional dynamics at the UN. In the sixth section, to illustrate the usefulness of PEMA, we replicate and extend Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon's (2013) study of UN peacekeepers' ability to reduce violence against civilians, showing that mandates matter and have different implications for governments and rebels perpetrating violence against civilians. We conclude by discussing how ongoing and future research can further benefit from the PEMA dataset.

Why Study UN Peacekeeping Mandates?

The UNSC negotiates peacekeeping mandates, which specify the duration and tasks of peacekeeping operations. In addition to the initial mandate, the Council regularly issues resolutions either to extend the peacekeeping operation's mandate or to withdraw the operation. Extensions are frequently accompanied by mandate revisions to include new tasks and discontinue old ones. The mandate serves as a framework for peacekeepers' activities on the ground. Although UN officials and commanders have some scope for interpreting their mandates (Karlsrud 2013), Security Council resolutions serve as the legal and political basis for their actions.

Mandates serve as an important source of legitimation for peacekeepers' activities internally within the UN bureaucracy, in the eyes of host state counterparts, and among member states who support peacekeeping politically or materially.[4] The UN Capstone Doctrine (UN 2008, 39, emphasis added) attests to the importance of peacekeeping mandates:

> "The nature and scale of a particular United Nations peacekeeping operation's role will depend *on its mandate*, the gravity of the situation on the ground, the resources the international community is willing to invest and an assessment of the availability of capable, credible and legitimate partners within the host nation."

The mandate is named the primary factor that determines peacekeeping operation's role, as well as two other important elements – the resources made available by the international community and the partnership with actors in the host country[5] – are also strongly influenced by the content of the mandate.

The three decades of post-Cold War peacekeeping witnessed several cycles of expansion and contraction. Presently, peacekeeping mandates have become so complex that they have been compared to "Christmas trees", which various actors seek to "adorn" with their preferred

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[4] As the Capstone Doctrine (UN 2008, 36) notes, "[t]he international legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is derived from the fact that it is established after obtaining a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."

[5] Some mandate provisions, for example, those related to power-sharing or regional reconciliation, can empower or disempower certain actors, such as the host government, ethnic constituencies, or armed groups, thus impacting the level of cooperation with all of these actors.

provisions (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021).[6] In parallel, negotiations on both revised and new mandates became increasingly contentious in the late 2010s. Russia and China started questioning liberal provisions in peacekeeping resolutions, for example, by resisting aspects of the women, peace and security agenda (Security Council Report 2017). Western states also downscaled peacekeeping ambitions from nation-building, democratization, and reconciliation to focus on narrower priorities, such as stabilization (Karlsrud 2019). Peacekeeping mandate negotiations offer a window into normative priorities of the international society as well as power dynamics within it.

The substantive content of peacekeeping mandates has crucial implications for a wide variety of stakeholders. First, mandates affect UN peacekeeping operations themselves and particularly their resources. Although their budgets are decided in the UN General Assembly's committees, the tasks outlined in UNSC mandates broadly shape the size and composition of their uniformed and civilian components. For example, the inclusion of a mandated task on protection of civilians (POC) has implications for the force generation process, which in this case should prioritize personnel trained and equipped to patrol, liaise with the local population, and use force, if necessary, to prevent, preempt, or stop civilian victimization. Mandates also affect countries' willingness to contribute troops to specific operations. For example, Brazil prefers participating in operations with tasks that focus on reconstruction and development (Da Fontoura and Uziel 2017).

Second, peacekeeping mandates affect countries where operations are deployed. They determine the types of assurance and assistance that peacekeepers can offer to the host government, rebel groups, neighboring countries, and the local population. Mandates are consequential for peacekeeping success. For instance, research shows that traditional and monitoring operations are less effective in reducing the risk of war recurrence than those with a multidimensional mandate (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008). Mandates are an important factor to consider when evaluating the effectiveness of multidimensional operations, and we need more research into links between specific tasks in mandates and success or failure of peacekeeping operations.

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[6] Attempts to reign in this tendency in the second half of the 2010s were met with limited success.

Third, operations' mandates affect the UN's partners. For example, humanitarian and development NGOs have expressed concerns that peacekeepers who are tasked to assist refugees or protect children encroach on the formers' policy domain and threaten the independence of humanitarian action (Marín 2017). As such, what peacekeepers are mandated to do influences relationships between the various international actors engaged in conflict-affected countries.

Overall, systematic, empirical analysis of mandates is necessary and timely. The PEMA dataset allows researchers to investigate 1) how variation in mandates comes about and affects peacekeeping outcomes; and 2) how mandates are negotiated, illuminating changes in peacekeeping politics caused by normative and power shifts in the Security Council. In the following section, we review steps that have already been taken in the direction of studying mandates and their variation.

Existing Data on Peacekeeping Mandates

While scholars have begun collecting information on UN peacekeeping mandates, we show below that the existing datasets leave important gaps in our knowledge: (i) they are incomplete in terms of the increasingly wide variety of mandated tasks; (ii) they do not systematically capture whether peacekeepers are requested to monitor these tasks or provide assistance and security; and (iii) they mostly cover only initial mandates and thus fail to capture the evolution of tasks over the lifespan of a peacekeeping operation.

Several qualitative studies, situated within the research tradition interested in factors shaping mandates, have focused on in-depth single-mission analyses of intergovernmental negotiations on the tasks of specific operations, such as the UN transitional administration in East Timor (Weinlich 2014) or the UN operation in South Sudan (Dijkstra 2015). Some projects have endeavored to map at all peacekeeping mandates: the *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Koops et al. 2015) reproduces the texts of all peacekeeping resolutions on new operations. There have been attempts at classification, too: Franke and Warnecke (2009) suggest four broad categories of peacekeeping tasks, such as security and public order, socio-economic well-being, governance and participation, and justice and reconciliation. However, while these studies have collected valuable information on mandates, they have not turned this information into data that can be used in quantitative, comparative

studies. Moreover, they give a "snapshot" view of peacekeeping mandates, focusing on the initial resolutions.

Early quantitative studies have categorized peacekeeping operations into broad types, such as traditional, monitoring, enforcement, and multidimensional ones (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008). However, these categories are ambiguous. For example, the difference between traditional and monitoring operations has more to do with their equipment and posture than actual tasks: monitoring operations are "typically less well armed (or unarmed) and focused on monitoring and reporting," but traditional operations also "monitor a truce" (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 13-14). At the same time, there is a considerable variation in tasks that multidimensional operations perform, which may include electoral support, reconciliation, ex-combatant reintegration, and justice reform (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 16). The "multidimensional" category calls for additional disaggregation.

More recent quantitative studies have taken further steps to classify peacekeeping mandates into more specific functions. Yet, none of these efforts captures the breadth of peacekeepers' tasks as detailed in UNSC resolutions. Clayton, Dorussen, and Böhmelt (2021) provide a classification of UN peace initiatives (UNPI), including peacekeeping operations but also sanctions committees, mediators, tribunals, and investigative bodies. The UNPI dataset covers some functions that peacekeepers may perform, (e.g. election support or security sector reform) but it also includes those that they do not perform (e.g. intergovernmental decision-making, fact finding, and decolonization). Moreover, all functions remain at a high level of aggregation. For instance, for security sector reform, the data does not tell us whether peacekeepers only assist military reform or also engage with police personnel, the justice sector, and the penitentiary system. It should be noted that UNPI focuses on all UN peace initiatives, hence its categories are inevitably broad. While it is a well-suited source to understand UN's wider approach to conflict resolution, it does not provide fine-grained information on peacekeeping mandates.

Benson and Tucker (2019) code seven categories of tasks in initial peacekeeping mandates. These tasks are security for civilians or aid operations; the protection of women and children; implementation of peace agreements; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); implementation of ceasefires; implementation of elections; and army and police training. While these broad categories fulfill the purpose of their analysis, there are crucial differences within

each task category. For example, peace agreements usually contain a series of complex provisions. Therefore, whether peacekeepers support the implementation of peace agreements does not tell us much about what peacekeepers are requested to do on the ground.

Mullenbach (2017) provides an overview of peacekeeping responsibilities in the *Third Party Peacekeeping Missions* dataset, coding six "purposes" of initial mandates of UN and non-UN operations: maintaining law and order; monitoring or verifying ceasefires; monitoring or verifying DDR; protecting or delivering humanitarian assistance; providing security for refugee camps, airports, elections, government buildings, and UN facilities; and maintaining buffer zones. While this dataset is valuable for understanding the tasks of uniformed personnel, it does not capture the peace- and state-building responsibilities of civilian personnel in contemporary operations. Moreover, important tasks that researchers may want to analyze separately are grouped together in broad categories. For example, the category "providing security" includes security for UN facilities, which implies protecting the operation itself and security for elections or government buildings, which entails a much more substantial contribution to the restoration of state authority.

Diehl and Druckman (2018) record 11 sets of peacekeeping functions, which they label "missions", in initial and subsequent resolutions mandating peacekeeping operations. Table 1 lists their categories of tasks and shows how they compare to the tasks in the PEMA dataset. For example, the PEMA dataset disaggregates democracy assistance into activities targeted at parliaments (democratic institutions), voters (voter education), political parties (political party assistance), and elections (electoral security and assistance).

Table 1. Comparison between Diehl and Druckman (2018) and PEMA.

Diehl and Druckman 2018	PEMA
Traditional	Ceasefire
	Peace Process
Humanitarian Assistance	Humanitarian Relief
	Refugee Assistance
Election Supervision/Democratization	Democratization

	Electoral Security
	Electoral Assistance
	Voter Education
	Political Party Assistance
Preventive Deployment[7]	N/A
DDR	Disarmament and Demobilization
	Reintegration
Pacification/Coercive Peacekeeping	Arms Embargo
	Offensive Operations
	Use of Force
Human Rights Protection/Protect Threatened Groups	Civilian Protection
	Human Rights
	Child Rights
	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
	Gender
Local Security/Law and Order	Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
	Demilitarization
	Demining
Promoting Rule of Law/Civil Society	Police Reform
	Military Reform
	Justice Sector Reform
	Transitional Justice
	Prison Reform
	Civil Society Assistance
	Media
	Public Information

[7] Preventive deployment refers to the timing of the operation, which arrives before hostilities begin, rather than its tasks. The only preventive deployment in the UN's history, in Macedonia, had tasks that could be found in the mandates of other operations as well, chiefly border control in the monitoring modality.

	Legal Reform
Local Governance/Government Services	Border Control
	Resources
	State Authority Extension
	Economic Development
	Public Health
	Cultural Heritage Protection
Restoration/Reconciliation	Power Sharing
	National Reconciliation
	Local Reconciliation
	Regional Reconciliation

Finally, Lloyd's (2021) TAMM dataset records 50 tasks based on initial mandates and those that extend an operation. The advantage of PEMA over the TAMM dataset is that PEMA distinguishes between three modalities of engagement (monitoring, assisting, and securing) and whether the task is requested or merely encouraged. By contrast, for the majority of TAMM tasks, modalities are not recorded. For instance, TAMM does not distinguish between assisting, monitoring, and providing security for civilian protection, although there are significant differences between UNSC requests for: (i) "identify[ing] threats to civilians…and accelerat[ing] the coordinated implementation of relevant monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements" ((MINUSMA *S/RES/2295*, coded as monitoring civilian protection in PEMA); (ii) "[a]dvising and assisting the Government…in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians" (UNMISS *S/RES/1996*, coded as assisting civilian protection in PEMA); and (iii) "ensur[ing] effective, timely, dynamic and integrated protection of civilians under threat of physical violence" (MONUSCO *S/RES/2556*, coded as providing security for civilian protection in PEMA). The coding of modalities of engagement is described in detail in the following section.

In summary, the PEMA dataset can make three key contributions. First, many existing studies opt for a high degree of aggregation of peacekeeping tasks. This conceals important variation between operations and has led to a proliferation of classification schemes that are not easily comparable. The PEMA dataset offers highly granular data on specific tasks in peacekeeping

mandates. Second, the PEMA dataset unpacks tasks not only in relation to the specific policy domain (e.g., police reform and military reform rather than aggregate security sector reforms) but also their level of engagement: for each task, we code whether peacekeepers assist, monitor, or provide security. Third, the PEMA dataset records not only tasks that appear in initial mandates but also whether and how they change over the operation's lifespan. Most operations go through several stages, often starting with an initial monitoring role, expanding into an ambitious programme of support to the political transition, and switching to a capacity-building and advisory mode closer to drawdown. Understanding these changes is essential, as we demonstrate using the example of the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) below.

In short, existing data sources are, to different extents, incomplete in terms of mandated tasks, do not differentiate between modalities of engagement, or cover only initial mandates. They do not provide a solid basis for answering questions about the effects of mandates on peacekeeping outcomes, for example, or the politics of mandate negotiations.

The PEMA Dataset: Selection, Variables, and Coding

The current version of the PEMA dataset codes UN Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping operations in Africa authorized from 1991 to 2017. This temporal and geographical scope covers all recent multidimensional peacekeeping operations and makes the PEMA dataset compatible with other existing data collection efforts, which often focus on post-Cold War peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bromley 2018; Cil et al. 2020, Hunnicutt and Nomikos 2020). To create the data, we downloaded UNSC resolutions on peacekeeping operations from the Council's website [8] and coded 365 resolutions in total, covering 27 peacekeeping operations over time.[9] Each document has been coded twice independently by two authors and then each discrepancy has been discussed to agree on the final coding. The Codebook in the Appendix discusses the coding rules and decisions in detail and with examples. The dataset includes the resolution and exact paragraph number on which each coding decision is based, which allows users to check and replicate the data collection.

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[8] https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0. Accessed March 2020.
[9] List of coded missions in alphabetical order: MINUCI, MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNISFA, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMIL, UNOMOZ, UNOMSIL, UNOMUR, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II.

The PEMA dataset records information on mandated tasks at the operation-resolution level. In PEMA, each row of data thus corresponds to a new Security Council resolution. The tasks of peacekeeping operations are governed by a single resolution at a time. A change in the tasks or an extension of the same mandate requires a new resolution. For instance, Resolution 2100 (2013) specified the initial mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), while the subsequent Resolution 2164 (2014) was the first revision of the mandate. This resolution extended some existing tasks, such as assisting disarmament and demobilization, but also added new tasks, such as securing the elections, disseminating public information, and assisting in ceasefire implementation. Subsequent resolutions in 2015 and 2016 made further adjustments to MINUSMA's mandated tasks.

Beyond a set of identification variables, including the acronym of the operation, the host country, the number of the resolution, and its publication date, the PEMA dataset includes two main sets of substantive variables.

The first set of variables in the PEMA dataset indicates whether the resolution stipulates a complete adjustment of the mandate, a minor adjustment, or a simple extension of the operation. We code a complete adjustment when a new peacekeeping operation is first authorized or when at least one new task is added or dropped. Often, the resolution makes this change explicit by stating that "from the resolution onwards, [the peacekeeping operation] shall have the following mandate." We code a minor adjustment when there is a change in the requested modality of engagement or the strength of the mandate provision, but no new tasks are added.

The second set of variables relates to the content of the mandate. We code 41 different types of tasks. We arrived at this list inductively by reading a sample of all new and revised UN resolutions on peacekeeping operations and recording the tasks listed in these resolutions in our coding scheme. If we encountered a new task in one of the resolution, we added it to our coding scheme. In this way, we arrived at the most complete list of tasks requested by the UN resolutions in the sample. An operation can potentially have all tasks assigned. The tasks include stability-related tasks such as disarmament and demobilization or the use of force, peacebuilding-related tasks such as electoral assistance or legal reform, and rights-based tasks such as human rights and child rights. The Codebook in the Appendix provides the full list of

tasks (also in Table 1) and examples from UNSC resolutions that illustrate the substantive differences between them.

We can demonstrate the need for this fine-grained disaggregation of peacekeeping tasks using two examples. The first example is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, often analyzed as one category, DDR. In the PEMA dataset, disarmament and demobilization are coded separately from reintegration. Disarmament and demobilization have been established features of peacekeeping mandates since the early 1990s. Reintegration has been more contested: it requires additional funding in peacekeeping budgets, and member states have proven reluctant to spend money on ex-combatants who might have committed war crimes. UN officials managed to secure the addition of this task to some peacekeeping mandates by reframing it as "reinsertion" and requesting funds only in the operation's first year (Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann 2011). Disaggregating DDR into two categories allows us to capture such nuanced differences.

The second example is reconciliation. Only few studies list it as a separate category and none differentiate between national, local, and regional reconciliation. However, as for example noted by Autesserre (2010) examining the case of the DRC, peacekeeping operations tend to be ineffective because of their focus on national-level reconciliation and ignorance of local conflicts. In the late 2010s, the UNSC instructed an increasing number of peacekeeping operations to also engage in local reconciliation. For example, the operation in the DRC was tasked "to engage and facilitate mediation efforts at local level to advance sustainable peace" (*S/RES/2348 (2017)*). By including categories for different types of reconciliation, the PEMA dataset enables research into its differential effects.

For each of the 41 tasks, the PEMA dataset also records the *modality of engagement* expected from the operation. Modality refers to the form of peacekeepers' involvement in a policy field. We code three different modalities: monitoring, assisting, and securing. We code a task as *monitoring* if it engages peacekeeping personnel as observers and there is no direct involvement in implementation. We code a task as *assisting* if peacekeepers are requested to help implement a task, for example, by providing support to electoral management bodies. Assistance includes coordinating activities and supporting their implementation, including by offering good offices, technical assistance, or logistical support. Finally, we code a task as *securing* if it involves peacekeepers providing security (relying on the direct or indirect use of

military means), such as establishing humanitarian corridors or guarding polling stations. It should be noted that PEMA codes the authorization to use force (or "all necessary means") separately; the "securing" modality should not be considered as an explicit authorization for the use of force because security can also be achieved through non-coercive means, like de-escalation or deterrence.

Moreover, we record the *strength of the mandate provisions* by specifying whether the UNSC *requests* a task or merely *encourages* it. For example, the Council can request an operation to use public information campaigns to increase awareness of the operation's activities, but oftentimes this task is only encouraged. For requested tasks, we code whether the Council asks peacekeepers to monitor, assist, or secure the activities. By contrast, for encouraged tasks, resolutions normally do not explicitly refer to the modality of engagement, and we thus do not record it.

To further illustrate our coding scheme, Table 2 reports the exact wording of UNSC resolution paragraphs that either request peacekeepers to monitor, assist, or secure disarmament and demobilization or encourage engagement with this task. Table 3 shows how those paragraphs are specifically coded in the PEMA coding sheet. The Codebook provides detailed explanations on several coding decisions. In general, we rely on the frequent use of certain verbs or expression in UNSC resolutions to code modalities of engagement. For example, as also evident from Table 2, verbs such as "to encourage" or "to call upon" are coded as encouragement, while verbs that imply security provision include "to protect" or "to secure." Similarly, we code the monitoring modality when a task involves verification and reporting.

Table 2. Coding examples for Disarmament and Demobilization.

Strength of mandate provision

		Requested	Encouraged
Modality of engagement	*Monitoring*	Contribute to the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) […] by monitoring the disarmament process[10]	Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan […] [to] support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts[11]
	Assisting	Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative […] who shall […] coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration[12]	
	Securing	To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme[13]	

Table 3. Coding spreadsheet for variables related to Disarmament and Demobilization (excerpt). The symbol "§" indicates the paragraph in the Resolution.

Mission	Resolution	Year	Disarm. & Demob. Monitoring	Disarm. & Demob. Assistance	Disarm. & Demob. Securing	Disarm. & Demob. Encouraged
MONUC	S/RES/1756	2007	§2n			
UNMISS	S/RES/2057	2012		§19		
UNAMSIL	S/RES/1289	2000			§10c	
MINUSMA	S/RES/2100	2013				§11

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[10] MONUC, S/RES/1756, §2n.
[11] MINUSMA, S/RES/2100, §11.
[12] UNMISS, S/RES/2057, §19.
[13] UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289, §10c.

Security Council resolutions commonly include provisions that are not directly related to peacekeepers' tasks. Three types of such provisions are excluded from our data. First, we do not code tasks that the Council requests from entities other than the peacekeeping operation. For example, the Council may request the UN Secretary-General rather than a peacekeeping operation to support an arms embargo, which we do not record in PEMA. Second, we do not code tasks based on the expected outcome. For example, if a resolution requests an operation to assist with the re-establishment of state authority in order to enable economic recovery, we code only assistance to state authority extension and not economic recovery, unless the resolution requests peacekeepers to assist with economic recovery elsewhere. Third, we exclude vague references that lack clearly identifiable tasks, the "welcoming" of progress and ongoing tasks, and references to the capacities needed to carry out certain tasks. More details are available in the Codebook.

Patterns in the Data: Variation in Mandates Across and Within Operations

This section provides a descriptive overview of peacekeeping mandates using the PEMA data. It introduces some key patterns of variation and illustrates the heterogeneity that exists in UN peacekeeping mandates, both across and within operations. Despite the frequent criticism that peacekeeping mandates are very similar and follow a template approach (UN 2015; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013; Howard and Dayal 2018), a closer inspection reveals considerable variation.

Figure 1 exhibits the mandated tasks of the operations in the sample, as coded *at the outset* of each operation. Mandated tasks are marked as present (dark grey) if the relevant resolution included any modality of engagement in these tasks. Even this fairly simple overview allows us to corroborate three key patterns discussed in the literature on peacekeeping. First, there has been considerable growth in the scope of UN mandates. The five oldest operations in the sample, established in the early 1990s, included an average of 5.8 tasks per mandate, considerably fewer than the average of 20.8 tasks for five operations established in the 2010s. This trend reflects the widening expectations placed on UN operations by the Security Council.

Figure 1. *Mandate specification at operation*'s *establishment. Operations ordered chronologically.*

Second, we observe an expansion of mandates into new areas. Most clearly, this is reflected in the growth of tasks relating to enhancing state capacity, reconciliation, and economic development. None of the earlier operations in the sample were requested to carry out these activities, but in the 2000s and the 2010s, such tasks were present in the majority of newly launched operations. While researchers have already noted the expansion of mandates into new areas (Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova 2016; Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021), our data present a systematic picture of how it has evolved, across specific missions and tasks, resolution by resolution.

Third, we observe a trend towards the disaggregation of tasks within broader policy areas. For example, what was previously described as "security sector reform" has become divided into a series of more specified tasks, such as "military reform" and "police reform," which are not always mandated simultaneously.[14] Furthermore, security sector reform can also be coupled with related tasks like "justice reform" and "prison reform" in some recent resolutions. Importantly, our data allow us to identify whether the much-discussed expansion of peacekeeping mandates is mostly attributable to the disaggregation of older tasks or the addition of completely new tasks.

Since the PEMA dataset is structured as panel data, with multiple observations on each operation over time, it allows us to track the evolution of specific mandates. This may be particularly relevant for researchers carrying out single-mission case studies or investigating mission-specific patterns, but it may also be useful for researchers considering variation in the longitudinal impact of operations.

As an illustration of how the PEMA dataset incorporates mission-specific data, Figure 2 shows the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, established in 1999 as the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and since 2010 known as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Resolution S/RES/1925 marks the beginning of MONUSCO.

We observe the nuanced picture of peacekeeping mandate evolution that the PEMA data make possible. In the case of MONUC/MONUSCO, the mandate has evolved over six phases. In the first short phase, it was a small liaison operation with a few core tasks, most centrally assistance with ceasefire observation. The second phase, starting in early 2000, saw the establishment of a larger operation with a wider mandate, including reconciliation and disarmament. With some smaller modifications, this mandate remained the same until 2003, which ushered in the third phase. Following the signing of the Sun City Agreement and the beginning of the political transition period, MONUC saw its mandate expanded to include yet more tasks, such as support to the electoral process, state capacity, and arms embargo monitoring.

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[14] To accurately reflect this disaggregation in our dataset, when a resolution mentions "security sector reform," we code for both military and police reform.

Figure 2. *Mandate of MONUC/MONUSCO (1999-2017).*

In 2004, the fourth phase saw another widening of the mandate, now crucially also including offensive operations. After the 2006 elections, the fifth phase that began in 2007 implied that some previous tasks, such as assistance for legal reform, were discontinued, whereas tasks relating to reconciliation, public information, and civil society were added, reflecting the operation's increasingly multidimensional profile.[15] The sixth and final phase saw the initiation of a reduction of the operation's mandate, starting in 2016.

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[15] The change from MONUC to MONUSCO was not associated with significant changes to the mandate.

This brief description underlines the importance of having mandate data that can be temporally disaggregated. It is clear that MONUC, as established in 1999, was a very different operation from MONUC of 2004 or MONUSCO of 2017. These changes reflect the Security Council's evaluation of the operation's changing political and military environment, as well as the general evolution of UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice. Thus, the MONUC/MONUSCO example clearly illustrates the potential pitfalls of overlooking the dynamic nature of peacekeeping operations and using simplified measures of mandates or, even more problematically, overlooking them entirely.

Research Avenues Opened by the PEMA Dataset

The PEMA dataset opens two principal avenues for research. The first avenue looks at peacekeeping *as an instrument* used by the international community to stop violence and promote peace, human rights, reconciliation, and development. Studies have started evaluating whether specific mandated tasks affect peacekeepers' performance. Murdie (2017) argues that mandates that focus on humanitarian assistance or civilian protection improve the human rights situation in the host country. Heldt (2011) contends that mandates with democracy-related provisions enable peacekeepers to contribute to democratization. PEMA can help expand this research into other policy areas.

Thus, the PEMA data can serve as a basis for nuanced assessments of peacekeeping outcomes, which can become a contribution to the growing literature on the effects (for an overview, see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017) and legacies (Gledhill 2020) of peacekeeping operations. While studies have focused on important yet externally-derived criteria, such as peacekeeping operations' ability to stop violence (e.g., Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014, 2019), a more accurate evaluation of their success needs to look at whether they achieve the objectives set in their mandates. While the findings on the violence-reduction effects of peacekeeping are generally positive, this does not appear to be the case for other tasks: for instance, von Billerbeck and Tansey (2019, 702) argue that UN peacekeeping operations might enable authoritarian forms of governance "despite their mandates to promote democracy." A similar assessment of peacekeeping operations' ability to achieve their mandated objectives would greatly enhance our understanding of peacekeeping *as an instrument* of the international community.

Of course, only when mandates get implemented by peacekeepers, they can have maximum effect. It is an important question in itself whether and when peacekeeping operations carry out all of their tasks, and investigations into this issue built on PEMA (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2020).[16] We encourage scholars to use the PEMA mandate data in conjunction with data on actual activities of peacekeeping operations. Studies already exist that use data on peacekeeping activities, as reported by the UN (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013; Smidt 2020a; Smidt 2020b; Smidt 2020c).

The second avenue looks at peacekeeping *as an international institution* (for this approach to UN peacekeeping, see, for example, contributions to Oksamytna and Karlsrud 2020). Peacekeeping mandate negotiations are a site of global power struggles, with the five permanent members of the Security Council, the elected members, and non-state actors vying for influence (Oksamytna 2017). Since the UNSC is the embodiment of a great power concert, studying its approach to mandates can reveal the international society's normative priorities. Howard and Dayal (2018) used the persistence of the use of force provisions in initial peacekeeping mandates to develop a psychological theory of UNSC functioning and called for investigations into similar dynamics around other mandate elements, like as rule-of-law programmes.

Scholars who study the evolution of specific mandate provisions, such as human rights (Månsson 2006), security sector reform (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008), protection of civilians (Mamiya 2016), protection of children (Bode 2018), gender mainstreaming (Karim and Beardsley 2017), public information and strategic communications (Oksamytna 2018), or environmental protection (Maertens 2019), could benefit from a comprehensive overview of their evolution across and within peacekeeping operations. Studies could also investigate internal factors (UNSC composition and power differentials or members' foreign policies and relations with the host government) and external pressures (civil society activism or media attention) shaping the Council's approach to mandated tasks. Kreft (2017) discovered that sexual violence, a salient conflict characteristic that attracts media attention and civil society activism, makes peacekeeping mandates more likely to mention gender. By differentiating sexual and gender-based violence-related tasks from other gender-related tasks, PEMA opens the door for more nuanced studies of different aspects of the "women, peace and security"

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[16] The PEMA data was complemented by Blair and Smidt's Peacekeeping Activities dataset (PACT), which codes information on peacekeeping missions' activities using UN Secretary-General's reports.

agenda. More generally, scholars can use the PEMA dataset to explain the choice and the timing of sets of mandated tasks throughout the lifespan of the mission.[17]

In addition, Otto (2019) notes that multidimensional mandates include numerous tasks that are performed by civilian rather than military or police peacekeepers, and investigations are ongoing into how mandates are matched with civilian staff resources. Studies of how mandates influence the type and number of uniformed personnel deployed also represent a promising avenue for future research, especially considering that PEMA records task modalities: troop and police requirements will naturally depend on whether peacekeepers, for example, have full responsibility for electoral security, assist the host government with it, or merely monitor the situation.[18] Scholars could also investigate the UN Secretariat's reactions to the expansion and disaggregation of mandates to complement recent research on UN officials' role at the mandate formulation stage (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021): there are indications that UN peacekeeping officials dislike UNSC micromanagement (von Billerbeck 2020), which in other IOs has been shown to have a negative effect on performance (Honig 2019).

While these two avenues for further research are our suggestions on how the PEMA data can be used, they are not exhaustive. We can also imagine that the data can be useful for comparative research on IOs. Many IOs have also experienced an expansion of their tasks. For example, the International Monetary Fund has been tasked with monitoring a growing list of conditions in its agreements with borrowers, which currently include almost two dozen policy areas, such as central bank reform or privatization (e.g., Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2015). Some scholars (e.g., Reinsberg, Stubbs, and Kentikelenis 2021) have suggested that the amount of conditions in IMF programmes makes them "unimplementable by design." Considering how persistent the problem of task complexity appears to be across different IOs beyond the case of UN peacekeeping, the PEMA dataset can serve as inspiration for comparative studies of several IOs.

Re-examination of Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013)

To further illustrate the value of the PEMA data, we replicate the study by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013; henceforth HKS) on the effects of peacekeeping deployments on civilian

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[17] We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
[18] We are grateful to a reviewer for this suggestion.

victimization, using the exact same model specifications, data sources and sample as HKS and then adding measures of civilian protection mandates from our PEMA dataset. As one of the first studies to systematically assess the UN's ability to deliver on a headline ambition, the HKS article has been influential in the peacekeeping literature. HKS argue that peacekeepers can mitigate violence against civilians by altering belligerents' incentives and by physically shielding civilians from attack. Peacekeepers' ability to do so, HKS argue, depends on the size and composition of the force across the categories of troops, police, and military observers.

The key contribution of HKS concerns the importance of operations' size and composition. While HKS mention the potential relevance of mandates, the lack of available data limited their ability to provide a detailed test of how mandates affect protection of civilians. Instead, they use two dummy variables, one coding robust mandates and another one coding Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates. HKS are not explicit about which resolutions they code, but comparing their coding of POC mandates to PEMA's coding of civilian protection provisions in mandates, it seems that only the *initial* resolutions authorizing an operation were coded to identify POC mandates. This means that, for example, the UN operations in Burundi or Rwanda are *not* coded as PKOs with POC mandates, even though they had such mandates during considerable portions of their lifetimes but not at authorization.

To evaluate the impact of mandates and demonstrate the utility of our data, we re-evaluate and extend HKS. We use an identical, multivariate research design to examine variation in the count of civilians killed in a conflict month as a function of a set of independent variables.[19] Like HKS, we use a negative binomial model on their sample of all intrastate armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2008 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009; Melander and Sundberg 2013). We replicate the main specification without fixed-effects, as in the original HKS article, but like the authors, we also provide robustness models including conflict fixed-effects in the Appendix (Tables A.4-A.6). The HKS data covers 20 peacekeeping operations, 18 of which are included in our dataset.[20]

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[19] To transform the document-operation data into a panel data at the operation-month-year level, we assume that mandated tasks continue until the operation's mandate records a "complete adjustment." In this case, the new resolution replaces the previous tasks. If, on the other hand, the mandate experiences a "minor adjustment," we add the new tasks to the previous ones. Finally, if the operation is just extended, we continue to code the same tasks authorized in the previous resolution.

[20] BINUB in Burundi and UNOA in Angola are not coded in PEMA because these are Special Political Missions.

Beyond the HKS variables, which are exactly as in the original study, we enter three POC mandate variables based on the PEMA dataset. The first, *POC mandate*, has the same logic as the POC mandate measure provided by HKS – it is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a mandate includes POC tasks where peacekeepers either help the government in protecting civilians or are requested to carry out POC without any reference to the government's support. As mentioned above, our POC mandates variable is slightly different because we account for the fact that mandates can change after initial authorization of the PKO. Second, we disaggregate our POC mandate dummy into *POC active* and *POC passive* types. HKS only record the former active type, where the operation is requested to actively protect civilians alone or in coordination with the government. PEMA also records POC mandates of the passive type, which requests the monitoring of protection or merely encourages the protection of civilians. This distinction between a passive and active POC mandate (compared to the baseline of no POC mandate at all) is our extension to the model specification of HKS. Whether a PKO can reduce civilian victimization, after all, depends not only on its size and composition, but also on *whether* and *how* the operation is specifically mandated to pursue this objective.

To facilitate comparison, we report coefficient plots with estimates across different models; full tables are available in the Appendix. We begin with negative binomial models of the sum of civilian killings in a given conflict-month. Coefficients in Figure 3 largely confirm the HKS finding that both the size of the operations and a civilian protection mandate matter. Indeed, the estimated coefficient of HKS's POC mandate variable and our POC mandate variable are virtually identical and associated with fewer civilian deaths. Interestingly, when disaggregating passive and active POC mandates, the violence-reduction effect is largely due to active POC provisions.

Figure 3. *Coefficient Plot from Table A.1 (Appendix).*

In Figure 4, we follow HKS in disaggregating violence against civilians as perpetrated by either rebels or the government. When focusing on rebels (top panel, Figure 4), we see that mandates are largely irrelevant in explaining peacekeepers' capacity to protect civilians. Except for active POC that is weakly associated with less one-sided violence ($p < 0.1$), peacekeeping operations seem to effectively deter rebel violence only via large military deployments. The literature on peacekeeping effectiveness has proposed deterrence and signalling as key mechanisms of operations' success (e.g., Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019). It is possible that rebels are more likely to be deterred and refrain from using violence when they are confronted with a large military deployment, regardless of the specificities of its mandate. Indeed, rebels may be undeterred even by strong POC mandates if they do not understand the subtleties of the legal formulas in UNSC resolutions or are unaware of the mandate altogether, especially at lower levels of the chain of command. Conversely, a visible presence of a sizeable military contingent sends a clear and unambiguous message. Governments, on the other hand, may behave differently, not the least because they, as operations' hosts, are aware of mandate specificities.

The centrality of mandates in the UN-host state relation is mirrored in the findings in the bottom panel in Figure 4, where we focus on government-sponsored violence against civilians. First, we find that the size of the deployment is irrelevant to operations' ability to protect civilians against violence perpetrated by the government. Second, POC provisions in mandates now

largely explain the violence-curbing effect of peacekeeping. In particular, POC mandates decrease violence against civilians perpetrated by the government, but only if mandated with active POC. This means there are two scenarios under which a peacekeeping operation is effective at preventing civilian victimization by government forces: when it has the authorization to act alone to stop it or when it is instructed to assist the host government in protecting civilians, which implies a cooperative relationship with the national army and police. This relationship can both increase the capacity of national security actors and allow peacekeepers to advocate against abusive behaviour by local partners. By contrast, passive POC mandates that involve monitoring others' protection activities or simply encourage the operation to engage in POC are likely to exacerbate violence against civilians perpetrated by the government. It is plausible that the mechanism linking passive POC to increases in civilian victimization is similar to the HKS's finding showing that UN observers, who lack military capacity, are associated with more civilian deaths. This is because the deployment of observers, probably like passive POC provisions, signals the possibility that more robust actions will be implemented soon, hence pushing parties to escalate and consolidate their advantage.

In their extended tests, HKS use matching to improve covariate balance between cases of conflict years with PKOs (treated) and without PKOs (untreated). Their post-matching results align with their main findings. We do not replicate the matching procedure because our "treatment" is whether the PKO has a POC mandate rather than whether PKO personnel is present. If we matched on PKO presence as HKS do, resulting matching weights would distort the distribution of our main variable of interests, i.e., whether a PKO *with a POC mandate* is present. This is because the matching would discard this and assign matching weights to reduce differences between cases with and without a PKO independent of the content of its mandate. This distortion would consequently preclude any interpretation of the effect coefficient on POC mandates. Furthermore, developing a matching model for whether a PKO is assigned a POC mandate would go far beyond this replication exercise.

Our results do not undermine the general validity of HKS findings but clearly illustrate how the nature of peacekeeping mandates shapes the UN's ability to diminish civilian victimization, depending on who perpetrates the violence. Governments and rebels engage with peacekeeping operations in different ways, and their incentives to cooperate with peacekeepers differ. For rebels, size matters more than the mandate, but this is not the case for host governments. Our re-evaluation and extension of HKS thus demonstrate that the ability to incorporate nuanced

data on mandates is an important development in peacekeeping research not only for empirical reasons, but also for our understanding of *how* peacekeeping works. This is especially valuable in light of the recent interest in the nuanced mechanism through which peacekeeping operations produce effects (Howard 2019; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2019; Bove, Ruggeri, and Ruffa 2020). Absent disaggregated mandate data, scholars run the risk of exaggerating the effects of variables or underplay the importance of different actors with whom peacekeepers deal.

Figure 4. *Coefficient Plot from Table A.2 (top panel) and A.3 (bottom panel). Tables in Appendix.*

Viewed independently, the finding that mandates matter underlines the importance of the UNSC thinking carefully about mandate design. If POC is part of the Council's ambition, it must ensure that this is reflected in clearly formulated mandates, and that POC, if possible, is requested at the most demanding modality of engagement, i.e., assisting local security actors or providing security for protection of civilians.

Conclusion

The Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset covers initial and revised mandates of 27 peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 1991-2017 period. It codes 41 tasks at three modalities of engagement, specifying whether an operation is instructed to monitor, assist, or secure the task. The data also record whether the mandate requests or merely encourages engagement in a given task. It therefore goes beyond any of the existing efforts to classify or code peacekeeping tasks in terms of its detail and coverage.

The descriptive patterns in the data clearly show the expansion, diversification, and increasing granularity of peacekeeping tasks. They demonstrate heterogeneity in UN peacekeeping mandates across and within operations, which challenges the widely held assumption that mandate design follows a template approach. They also point to the importance of analyzing not only initial but also revised mandates, considering that some operations last for decades and experience significant alterations of their role and purpose.

Our re-evaluation and extension of Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) illustrates the research utility that flows from having highly disaggregated mandate data. We show that mandate design has important implications for the UN's ability to decrease violence against civilians. While the peacekeeping force's size and composition do matter, as Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) argue, the addition of finely disaggregated mandate data reveals two new findings. First, peacekeepers' ability to minimize violence against the local population is strengthened only when they are mandated to engage in active protection of civilians, as opposed to passive modalities of engagement. Second, the effect of such mandates varies across potential perpetrators. Whereas violence against civilians by rebel groups appears to be unaffected by strong mandates, civilian victimization by the government is more sensitive to nuances in the mandate language. These results indicate that disaggregated mandate data can

help identify the conditions under which peacekeepers can prevent and mitigate violence against civilians and address other problems they are deployed to ameliorate.

We have identified two major research avenues based on the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset. The first avenue is the analysis of peacekeeping as an instrument used by the international community to achieve specific outcomes. It entails focusing on how mandates strengthen peacekeepers' resolve and translate into peacekeeping activities on the ground. The second avenue is the study of UN peacekeeping as an international institution. It entails analyzing how peacekeeping resolutions reflect the priorities of, and frictions within, the international community. The Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset will be useful to scholars of international security, peace studies, IOs, and foreign policy.

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Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset

<u>Online Appendix</u>

<u>Table of Content</u>

Tables with Full Models

Table A.1. Negative Binomial Models; DV: All One-Sided Violence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
HKS POC 0/1	-0.479**		
	(0.192)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.503**	
		(0.197)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.303
			(0.225)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.602***
			(0.215)
UN Troops	-0.081**	-0.077**	-0.068**
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
UN Police	0.380	0.231	-0.033
	(0.428)	(0.445)	(0.497)
UN observers	0.958*	1.139**	1.097*
	(0.531)	(0.568)	(0.579)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.000*	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
OSV (all)	2.070***	2.078***	2.071***
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Incompatibility	0.741***	0.726***	0.741***
	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Episode Duration	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (log)	0.359***	0.347***	0.356***
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Observations	3746	3746	3746
AIC	11392.388	11392.019	11392.216
BIC	11467.129	11466.760	11473.186

* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Table A.2. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Rebels One-Sided Violence

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
HKS POC 0/1	-0.329		
	(0.208)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.350*	
		(0.210)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.290
			(0.255)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.428*
			(0.225)
UN Troops	-0.084**	-0.083**	-0.075**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
UN Police	0.350	0.294	0.046
	(0.458)	(0.466)	(0.526)
UN observers	0.939*	1.020*	0.970
	(0.565)	(0.583)	(0.593)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rebels OSV	2.174***	2.173***	2.170***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Government OSV	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incompatibility	0.619***	0.619***	0.628***
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.221)
Episode Duration	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (log)	0.150***	0.147**	0.153***
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Observations	3746	3746	3746
AIC	8103.900	8103.596	8104.312
BIC	8191.098	8190.795	8197.739

* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Table A.3. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Government One-Sided Violence

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
HKS POC 0/1	-1.498***		
	(0.347)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.703**	
		(0.298)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			1.651***
			(0.341)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-1.149***
			(0.355)
UN Troops	-0.073	-0.072	-0.036
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.048)
UN Police	1.332**	1.405**	0.158
	(0.627)	(0.597)	(0.724)
UN observers	2.026**	0.839	0.383
	(0.888)	(0.854)	(0.943)
Battle-Deaths (side B)	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rebels OSV	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incompatibility	1.242***	1.168***	1.223***
	(0.165)	(0.164)	(0.163)
Episode Duration	0.001	0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (log)	0.989***	0.946***	0.977***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Observations	3746	3746	3746
AIC	6166.550	6183.216	6159.768
BIC	6247.519	6264.186	6246.966

* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Tables with Fixed-Effects Models

Table A.4. Negative Binomial Models; DV: All One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects.

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
HKS POC 0/1	-0.432**		
	(0.189)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.475**	
		(0.194)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.322
			(0.223)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.579***
			(0.212)
UN Troops	-0.084**	-0.080**	-0.072**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)
UN Police	0.426	0.273	0.008
	(0.422)	(0.439)	(0.487)
UN observers	0.918*	1.127**	1.073*
	(0.521)	(0.557)	(0.570)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
OSV (all)	1.990***	1.997***	1.989***
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Incompatibility	0.703***	0.691***	0.708***
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Episode Duration	0.003***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (log)	0.330***	0.318***	0.328***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Observations	3264.000	3264.000	3264.000
AIC	10881.147	10880.244	10880.170
BIC	10942.054	10941.151	10947.168
Conflict FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Std. Err. clustered by Conflict
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Table A.5. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Rebels One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects.

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
HKS POC 0/1	-0.321		
	(0.208)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.344	
		(0.210)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			0.298
			(0.254)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-0.423*
			(0.224)
UN Troops	-0.085**	-0.083**	-0.075**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
UN Police	0.357	0.299	0.047
	(0.456)	(0.465)	(0.524)
UN observers	0.940*	1.023*	0.971
	(0.563)	(0.581)	(0.591)
Battle-Deaths (all)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rebels OSV	2.154***	2.153***	2.149***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Government OSV	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incompatibility	0.556**	0.556**	0.566***
	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.217)
Episode Duration	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (log)	0.148**	0.145**	0.151***
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Observations	2498	2498	2498
AIC	7725.592	7725.256	7725.888
BIC	7795.471	7795.135	7801.590
Conflict FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Std. Err. clustered by Conflict
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Table A.6. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Government One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects.

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
HKS POC 0/1	-1.564***		
	(0.353)		
PEMA POC 0/1		-0.755**	
		(0.302)	
PEMA Passive POC 0/1			1.644***
			(0.345)
PEMA Active POC 0/1			-1.194***
			(0.361)
UN Troops	-0.091	-0.085	-0.041
	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.050)
UN Police	1.530**	1.539**	0.183
	(0.680)	(0.635)	(0.757)
UN observers	2.235**	1.017	0.532
	(0.913)	(0.881)	(0.959)
Battle-Deaths (side B)	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Battle-Deaths (side A)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rebels OSV	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incompatibility	1.270***	1.191***	1.248***
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.166)
Episode Duration	0.000	0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (log)	0.971***	0.922***	0.955***
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Observations	3063	3063	3063.
AIC	5719.267	5736.557	5714.043
BIC	5785.566	5802.856	5786.368
Conflict FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Std. Err. clustered by Conflict
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Codebook for the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset (v. June 2021)

This document describes the coding criteria used to collect data on the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) resolutions that authorize, extend or modify the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO) from 1991-2017. The 27 PKOs currently included are (in alphabetic order) MINUCI, MINURCA, MINURCAT (in Chad), MINURSO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMIS, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNISFA, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMIL, UNOMOZ, UNOMSIL, UNOMUR, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II.

Tasks in our dataset

We code a comprehensive list of tasks (i.e. policy areas) that the PKO is mandated to do:

1. Disarmament & Demobilization
2. Reintegration
3. Control of small arms and light weapons (SALW)
4. Demilitarization
5. Arms Embargo
6. Civilian Protection
7. Human Rights
8. Child Rights
9. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
10. Police Reform
11. Military Reform
12. Offensive Operations
13. Justice Sector Reform
14. Transitional Justice
15. Prison Reform
16. Border Control
17. Demining
18. Resources
19. State Authority Extension
20. Democratization
21. Electoral Security
22. Electoral Assistance
23. Voter Education
24. Political Party Assistance
25. Civil Society Assistance
26. Media
27. Public Information
28. Power Sharing
29. National Reconciliation
30. Local Reconciliation
31. Regional Reconciliation

32. Economic Development
33. Humanitarian Relief
34. Public Health
35. Refugee Assistance
36. Gender
37. Legal Reform
38. Ceasefire
39. Peace Process
40. Cultural heritage protection
41. Use of Force

Modalities of engagement and strength of mandate provisions

Conceptually, we code both a) the modality of PKO engagement (monitoring, assisting and securing) and b) the strength of the UNSC request (requesting and encouraging). The table below clarifies this conceptualization:

		Strength of mandate provision	
		Requesting	Encouraging
Modality of engagement	Monitoring	Contribute to the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) […] by monitoring the disarmament process[21]	Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan […] [to] support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts[22]
	Assisting	Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative […] who shall […] coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration[23]	
	Securing	To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme[24]	

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[21] MONUC, S/RES/1756, §2n.
[22] MINUSMA, S/RES/2100, §11.
[23] UNMISS, S/RES/2057, §19.
[24] UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289, §10c.

There are three modalities of engagement that can be mandated by the Security Council for a PKO. All three modalities of engagement can occur if the strength of UNSC request is "requesting" rather than "encouraging" the PKO to do something.

- Monitoring: It includes tasks related to engagement of peacekeepers as observers of compliance and/or implementation. Good indicators for mandated **monitoring tasks** are sentences that start with *request the PKO to / decides that the PKO should / approves the PKO will / monitor / report / observe / verify / establish an early warning system / follow-up* etc.

- Assisting: It includes active involvement of the PKO personnel in the implementation of a task, **including coordination of activities and support for implementation of policies**. In this category, peacekeepers can both implement and carry out the tasks autonomously or help the government to implement a task (including by providing good offices). Thus, we also code PKO tasks if the mandate states that the government shall do a task (e.g. small arms control) with the support of the PKO. A good indicator for mandated **assistance tasks** are sentences that starts with requests *the PKO to / decides that the PKO should / approves the PKO will **assist in the task X or support the government in carrying out the task X.*** We also code assistance tasks if the resolution says that "the mandate of the PKO states that the PKO will assist [the task X]" or if the resolution states that it "*encourages the government to work with the PKO"*. However, we do not take the phrase "liaise with the government" as indicator of assistance.

- Security provision: It includes tasks in which peacekeepers provide security in the context of one of the mandated tasks. A good indicator for mandated **security tasks** are sentences that start with *request the PKO to / decides that the PKO should / approves the PKO will **help establish a secure humanitarian corridor/environment, provide security for X, secure*** and similar phrases.

In some case, the mandate does not request to carry out a specific task, but it encourages the engagement in this task. We capture these instances with the encouragement modality. If the UNSC encourages the PKO to do something, then we do not distinguish between the different modalities of engagement but only code the type of task that is encouraged by the UNSC:

- Encouraging: A good indicator for **encouraged tasks** are sentences that start with *encourages / urges / calls upon / emphasize need to consider* etc. We do not code praise for past tasks of the PKO, e.g. if the UN Security Council *expresses its appreciation / commends / welcomes / expresses its support / endorses etc.* a task. While monitoring, assisting and securing relate to the PKOs' degree and type of engagement in the tasks, encouraging relates to the degree of obligation to fulfil the mandated tasks (independent of whether the resolution encourages the PKO to monitor, to assist or to secure a task).

Important general notes:

We also code tasks that are mandated *conditionally* because they indicate that the UNSC is authorizing the PKO to perform the tasks to some extent. For example, we code *Arms Embargo_Monitor* here:

> *"Requests the Government of Sudan and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to propose by 20 July modalities for implementation of the 29 June agreement on border monitoring, and in case the parties fail to do so, requests UNMISS to observe and report on any flow of personnel, arms, and related materiel across the border with Sudan" (S/RES/1996, 2011).*

We only code tasks that the UNSC mandates for the PKO or the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General because the latter is the PKO's head. We **do not code** task mandated to any other entity, neither the Secretary General nor other UN agencies (e.g. UNDP).

> *"Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict" (S/RES/918, 1994). **Here we do not code 'Transitional Justice: Monitor' because the UNSC resolution mandates the Secretary General rather than the PKO.***

We do not code monitoring tasks that are directed at international rather than domestic actors and when it is not clear from the text that the UN PKO must actively do something to monitor / gather information on the peacebuilding policy. For example, we do **not** code any monitoring task for the paragraph below because the monitoring is directed at the "United Nations system support" rather than domestic actors or efforts.

> *"reiterate its request that UNMISS report back to the Council on a plan for United Nations system support in this regard and update the Council through the Secretary-General's regular reports on progress of United Nations system support to specific peacebuilding tasks, especially security sector reform, police institutional development, rule of law and justice sector support, human rights capacity-building, early recovery, formulation of national policies related to key issues of state building and development, and establishing the conditions for development, consistent with national priorities and with a view to contributing to the development of a common framework for monitoring progress in these areas" (S/RES/2109, 2013).*

We do not code requests to the UNSG to report on progresses made toward the implementation of the mandate (usually found at the end of the resolution). For example, it is common to have paragraphs starting "Requests the Secretary-General to continue reporting to the Council every 90 days on progress made towards implementing UNAMID's mandate"

followed by a long list of policy areas. This is coded as evidence for any task or engagement modality since this reporting has the PKO itself as target.

We do not code phrases that merely states the importance or priorities of the PKO, such as "reiterates that the PKO should" or if the resolution "stresses the importance of" or "reaffirms [task] should be a priority".

We do not code expected outcomes of a task. An example from a MONUSCO resolution is the following:

> *"Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation with other international partners, to build on the Government's STAREC and revised ISSSS to support the establishment of a minimum level of sustainable state authority and control in conflict-affected areas in eastern DRC, including through area-based efforts to improve security, state authority and enable the commencement of sustainable socio-economic recovery" (S/RES/2098, 2013).* **The only task coded from this paragraph in the MONUSCO resolution is assistance to state authority (State Authority: Assist); but there is no evidence of assistance to economic development (Economic Development: Assist) as an explicit task for the PKO. Economic development is just the expected outcome.**

> *"Assisting also in the ongoing political process in Somalia, which should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected government" (S/RES/897, 1994).* **The paragraph from an UNOSOM II resolution is not coded as election assistance task (ElectionAssistance_Assist) because "the installation of a democratically elected government" is the expected outcome of the mandated task "assisting in the ongoing political process" and not the task itself.**

Related, we do not code tasks related to the content of the peace agreement. For example, the paragraph below is **not** coded.

> *"To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General" (S/RES/872, 1993).*

We do not code paragraphs where the UN Security Council merely expresses its appreciation for a task, commends the PKO for a task, welcomes progress in a task, expresses its support to a task, endorses a task, etc. For example, the paragraph below is **not** coded as Child Rights Task:

> *"Welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the Action Plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children by the FARDC" (S/RES/2277, 2016).*

We do not code vague references to state-building, early recovery, widening popular participation, and effective governance. For example, the paragraph below is not coded.

> *"[S]trengthening the capacity of the* Government of the *Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically" (S/RES/1996, 2011).*

We do not code references to the capacity to perform tasks or requests concerning the composition and planning of the PKO, or coordination with other external actors (states, IOs, NGOs or UN agencies). For example, we do not code requests to contribute to the PKO (financially and with personnel) or the following request for UNMISS to deploy:

> *The Security Council requests… "appropriate civilian component, including technical human rights investigation expertise" (S/RES/1996, 2011).*

> *"Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel referred to above; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution" (S/RES/997, 1995).*

We do not code requests to fill vacancies such as the following:

> *"Requests the Secretary-General to ensure all human rights monitoring positions within UNAMSIL are filled in order to address the concerns raised in paragraphs 44 to 51 of the report of the Secretary-General" (S/RES/1346, 2001).*

The description of each field below further specifies other less general instances that we do or do not code.

Coding system

We record the exact paragraph number as evidence. For example, if paragraph 4 and paragraph 4a(i) contain evidence for 'Civilian Protection: Assist', then we record "4, 4a(ii)" in the variable field in the excel spreadsheet. If the paragraph is not numbered, we use page number (e.g. p5). We code the following variables.

Signature
The resolution code as usually indicated in the left corner of each document. For example: S/RES/1000.

Year

The year the resolution was passed, usually indicated in the left corner of each document or the title. For example: 2000.

Date

The full date the resolution was passed, usually indicated in the left corner of each document. For example: 1/1/2000. The format is dd/mm/yyyy.

PKO_Name

The acronym of the PKO the resolution refers to. For example: UNMIL. The acronym is missing if the resolution is not specifically on a PKO's mandate but includes some potential tasks for the PKO. Resolutions on arms embargoes, for example, may include tasks for a PKO if deployed. When these resolutions are coded, the PKO_Name field is empty.

Mandate_Renewal

This variable takes the value 1 if the resolution extends the duration of the PKO, that is, if it is not establishing a new PKO. It takes the value 0 otherwise, including when the resolution authorizes a PKO for the first time. Note that first resolution of all PKOs records 0 on all the three Mandate variables. If there is no evidence on whether this mandate is a renewal or not, then we **do not** code anything. Note that when a PKO is renewed, we do not copy-paste the tasks originally mandated in previous resolutions.

Mandate_MinorAdjustment

This variable takes the value 1 if the resolution modifies the mandate, usually adding new tasks. It takes the value 0 otherwise. In most cases, resolutions list tasks that are probably new so oftentimes both *MinorAdjustment* and *Renewal* take value 1. For PKOs authorized for the first time, both variables are 0. This also holds for new PKOs that directly proceed already established UN PKOs, e.g. UNAMIR after UNOMUR is a new PKO (*Mandate_Renewal* = 0; *Mandate_MinorAdjustment* = 0, *Mandate_CompleteAdjustment* = 0). Changes in deployment levels (e.g. size of the PKO) are not coded as Adjustments. Note that when coding a *MinorAdjustment*, we code the new tasks that are mentioned in the resolution, and we do not copy-paste the tasks originally mandated in previous resolutions.

Mandate_CompleteAdjustment

This variable takes the value 1 if the resolution gives a completely new mandate to the PKO. Often, the resolution also explicitly states this, for example, by stating that "from the resolution onwards [the PKO] shall have the following mandate to prioritize the following tasks …". If not explicitly mentioned, we infer complete adjustments when a substantial number of new tasks are added or dropped compared to the previous resolution. Note that when coding *CompleteAdjustment*, we code all tasks included in the adjusted mandate and we do not copy-paste the tasks.

Note that it logically follows that *we code Mandate_Renewal = 0, Mandate_MinorAdjustment = 0 and Mandate_CompleteAdjustment = 0 for the first resolution that established a PKO.* An example for a "founding" resolution is below:

"*Decides to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization PKO in Mali (MINUSMA), requests the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MINUSMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of UNOM's mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, further decides that the authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 at which point MINUSMA shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, for an initial period of 12 months*" (S/RES/2100, 2013).

DisarmamentDemobilization

The disarmament part of *DisarmamentDemobilization* is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons **from combatants**. The demobilization part of *DisarmamentDemobilization* is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed groups. If DDR (i.e., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) or variations of this (e.g., DDRR, DDRRR) are mentioned, then we code both *DisarmamentDemobilization* and *Reintegration* (see variable description below).

"*Calls upon the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to fully implement the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) strategy, to expedite the ongoing DDR program in a coherent manner, and requests UNMISS to work closely with the Government of South Sudan and in coordination with all relevant United Nations actors and other international partners in support of the DDR process*". (S/RES/2057, 2012). **We code this as DisarmamentDemobilization_Assist (and also as Reintegration_Assist).**

"*Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and participate in regional coordination and information mechanisms to improve protection of civilians and support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in light of the attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Republic of South Sudan*" (S/RES/2057, 2012). **We code this DisarmamentDemobilization_Encouraged (and also as Reintegration_Encouraged).**

This is not an example for DisarmamentDemobilization because the mandated tasks is targeted at the PKO personnel: "*to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, including in particular those engaged in PKOs of observation, verification or DDRRR*" (S/RES/1493, 2003).

When the mandate refers to DDR and to child soldiers, we code *DisarmamentDemobilization*, *Reintegration* and *ChildRights*.

> *"Welcomes the progress made on the demobilization of child soldiers, and the signing of an action plan to end child recruitment by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on 12 March 2012 reaffirming the commitment to release all children from the SPLA, acknowledges the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to implement the action plan, calls for the further implementation of this action plan, requests UNMISS to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in this regard" (S/RES/2109, 2013).* **We code DisarmamentDemobilization_Assist, Reintegration_Assist and ChildRights_Assist.**

Reintegration

Reintegration is the process in which ex-combatants turn into civilians; attempt to find employment; integrate into the national police/military. Reintegration can also include a phase of "reinsertion" which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants. Reintegration is often part of disarmament and demobilization programs. But PKOs may be involved in disarmament and demobilization without engaging in the reintegration process. If DDR is mentioned, then we code both *DisarmamentDemobilization* and *Reintegration*.

> *"[U]rges the Government of the Central African Republic to fulfil these commitments, in particular: [...] To continue to implement with the support of MINURCA the demobilization and reintegration programme funded by UNDP" (S/RES/1230, 1999).* **This is coded as DisarmamentDemobilization_Assist and Reintegrations_Assist.**

ControlSALW

Control of small arms and light weapons (*ControlSALW*) refers to small arms and weapons collection, storage and destruction programs that are sometimes conducted parallel to or after the conclusion of the disarmament and demobilisation process. Efforts to control SALW may also target specific groups in society, such as youth gangs, village elders, neighbourhood associations, defence councils, etc. They can also be mentioned together with requests to monitor and assist an arms embargo. *ControlSALW* is distinct from *DisarmamentDemobilization* because it does not only target combatants or it targets combatants after the official disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is concluded. The variable is different from *Demilitarization*, which is territorially bounded in a specific area of the country and usually also refers to the withdrawal of heavy weapons and soldiers. Finally, *ControlSALW* is distinct from ArmsEmbargo because it is also concerned with arms and weapons that did not recently travel across national borders and that are not part of an international arms embargo.

"Calls for continued national efforts to address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through ensuring the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO, as appropriate and within existing resources" (S/RES/2277, 2016). **This is evidence for ControlSALW_Assist.**

"Requests UNMISS to observe and report on any flow of personnel, arms, and related materiel across the border with Sudan" (S/RES/2057, 2012). **While the PKO is requested to monitor cross-border flows of arms, the monitoring does not take place as a result of an arms embargo. Therefore, we code ControlSALW_Monitor rather than ArmsEmbargo_Monitor.**

"To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other support, in mine action and weapons and ammunition management". (S/RES/2100, 2013). **This is coded as ControlSALW_Assist.**

"to seize or collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel whose presence in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493, and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate" (S/RES/1533, 2004). **This is coded as ArmsEmbargo_Assist and ControlSALW_Assist.**

*"To continue to assist the national authorities, including the National ComPKO to fight against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in collecting, registering, **securing** and disposing of weapons and in clearing explosive remnants of war, as appropriate, in accordance with resolution 1980 (2011)"* (S/RES/2000, 2011). **This is evidence for ControlSALW_Security.**

Demilitarization
Demilitarization refers to the withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from specific areas of the country. For example, the PKO in Angola monitored the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet troops, heavy weapons (grenade launchers), and tanks. *Demilitarization* thus also includes establishing a weapon-free zone around Protection of Civilians site. In contrast to *ArmsEmbargo* and *ControlSALW*, *Demilitarization* indicates removal of weapons form specific areas.

"to supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces; within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war-related matériel to the field, including to all armed groups" (S/RES/1291, 2000). **This is coded as Demilitarization_Monitor.**

"[S]tresses that such actions include, but are not limited to, within UNMISS's capacity and areas of deployment, defending protection of civilians sites, establishing areas around the sites that are not used for hostile purposes by any forces, addressing threats to the sites, searching individuals attempting to enter the sites, and seizing weapons from those inside or attempting to enter the sites, removing from and denying entry of armed actors to the protection of civilians sites" (S/RES/2406, 2018). **This is coded as Demilitarization_Assist:**

"To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city" (S/RES/872, 1993). **This is coded as Demilitarization_Security.**

ArmsEmbargo

Arms embargo (ArmsEmbargo) refers to international restrictions or bans on the import of weapons and technology that could be used to organise violence. In contrast to *ControlSALW* and *Demilitarization*, it is used if there is a reference to an arms embargo. For example, the paragraph below is coded *as both ArmsEmbargo_Monitor and ArmsEmbargo_Assist.*

"Requests MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and without prejudice to its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2083 (2012)" (S/RES/2100, 2013). **This is coded as ArmsEmbargo_Monitor.**

"Request the SG to support from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992) utilizing as available and appropriate the UNSOM II forces authorized by this resolution and to report on this subject" (S/RES/814, 1993). **This is coded as ArmsEmbargo_Assist.**

CivilianProtection

The protection of civilians (*CivilianProtection*) refers to strategies by UN troops, police, and civilian personnel to protect civilians from physical harm. Note that *CivilianProtection_Assist* refers to mandated task which ask the PKO to assist the host government, while *CivilianProtection_Security* refers to mandated tasks which demand the PKO to provide security for civilians without the input of the host government. We do not code civil disturbances here and we do not code references to general stabilization (unless civilian protection is mentioned).

"[C]onduct regular reviews of its geographic deployment to ensure that its forces are best placed to protect civilians" (S/RES/2147, 2014). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Monitor.**

"Collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population" (S/RES/2112, 2013). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Monitor**

"Requests MINUSMA to update its protection of civilians strategy, consistent with paragraph 19 (c) and (d) above and, in this regard, to identify threats to civilians, implement prevention plans and accelerate the coordinated implementation of relevant monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements" (S/RES/2295, 2016). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Monitor**

"Advising and assisting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, including military and police at national and local levels as appropriate, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law" (S/RES/1996, 2011). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Assist.**

*"Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, **including through active patrolling**, paying particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, in the context of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, and mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation"* (S/RES/2147, 2014). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Security.**

"To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda" (S/RES/918, 1994). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Security.**

"Deterring violence including through proactive deployment and patrols in areas at high risk of conflict, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular when the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is not providing such security" (S /RES/1996, 2011) **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Security.**

"Authorizes UNMISS to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate as set out in resolution 1996 (2011), paragraphs 3 (b) (iv), 3 (b) (v), and 3 (b) (vi)" (S/RES/2057, 2012). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Security. This is also coded as UseOfForce because of ther reference to "use of all necessary means".**

"[U]rges UNMISS to deploy its assets accordingly, and underscores the need for UNMISS to focus adequate attention on capacity-building efforts in this area, welcomes

the development of a protection of civilians strategy and early warning and early response strategy" (S/RES/2057, 2012). **This is coded as CivilianProtection_Encouraged.**

HumanRights

Human rights (HumanRights) is coded if the PKO engages in the promotion and protection of human rights. The category is only coded if the resolution mentions the phrase "human rights". Usually, the focus of the human rights work by PKO lies on physical integrity rights.

"Monitor, report and follow-up on human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including in the context of elections, and support the United Nations system in-country to ensure that any support provided by the United Nations shall be consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law and refugee law as applicable;" (S/RES/2211, 2015). **This is coded as HumanRights_Monitor.**

"Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the tasks of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;" (S/RES/1029, 1995). **This is coded as HumanRights_Encouraged because the Special Representative (part of the PKO) is mentioned.**

When mandates refer to the protection of human rights activists/advocates, we code *CivilSocietyAssistance_Security* rather than HumanRights_Security. We **do not** code protection provided to UN human rights officers, because we generally do not code activities that target the PKO itself or other international actors.

ChildRights

ChildRights refers to tasks and policies designed to protect children from harm during or after armed conflict, including efforts to prevent recruitment of children into armed groups, to facilitate the reintegration of ex-child soldiers into their home communities, and to mitigate other forms of child abuse and neglect. We **do not** code *ChildRights* if the paragraph only refers to girls.

"To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and implementing programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation and taking into account the specific needs of demobilized children" (S/RES/2100, 2013). **This is coded as ChildRights_Assist.**

"To exercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of the PKO's protection strategy, especially in regard to women and children, including to facilitate inter-communal reconciliation in areas of high risk of conflict as an essential part of long-term State-building activity" (S/RES/2187, 2014). **This is coded as ChildRights_Assist.**

We do not code this in this category because the reference to violence against girls is a reference to gender-based violence: *"To contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity…"* (S/RES/1528, 2004).

SGBViolence

Sexual and Gender-based Violence (*SGBViolence*) is a special category of the human rights task category where PKOs are asked to monitor sexual and gender-based violence or assist with measures to combat it. If the paragraph refers to tasks related to sexual and gender-based violence, we **do not** code the genera HumanRights category. We also do not code references to violations committed by UN PKO personnel. We infer from a reference to violence against women (and girls) that the resolution refers to tasks related to sexual and gender-based violence.

"To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict" (S/RES/2164, 2014). **This is coded as SGBViolence_Assist (reference to general needs) and SGBViolence_Security (reference to protection).**

PoliceReform

Police reform (*PoliceReform*) refers to reforming, restructuring and rebuilding police and other law enforcement institutions. This also includes instances of training programmes or coordinated operations involving the national police and the PKO. If it is not clear whether the agent is the police or the military, then code the paragraph as both *MilitaryReform* and *PoliceReform*. If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no specific reference to either the police or the military, then we code both police and military. We **do not** code *JusticeReform* unless it is specifically mentioned. We also code *PoliceReform* in combination with *Reintegration* in reference to tasks where former combatants are integrated into the national police forces. When the task refers to national army or generally to defense forces, we use *MilitaryReform* instead of *PoliceReform* (see below).

"To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the

*prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law" (S/RES/814, 1993). **This is coded as PoliceReform_Assist.***

MilitaryReform

Military reform (*MilitaryReform*) refers to reforming, restructuring and rebuilding military institutions. If it is not clear whether the agent is police or military, then we code the paragraph as both *MilitaryReform* and *PoliceReform*. If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no specific reference to either police or military, then we code both *PoliceReform* and MilitaryReform. *MilitaryReform* is also coded in two additional instances. First, we code it when military justice is mentioned. For example, the paragraph below refers to both civilian and military justice system, hence we code both *MilitaryReform* (for the latter) and *JusticeSector* (for the former). Second, we code *MilitaryReform* in combination with *Reintegration* in reference to tasks where former combatants are integrated into the national security forces.

> *"Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing a military justice system that is complementary to the civil justice system". (S/RES/1996, 2011).* **This is coded as MilitaryReform_Assist (and JusticeSector_Assist)**

> *"To support the CAR Authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of defence and security elements (FACA, police and gendarmerie) which includes human rights vetting, in particular to promote accountability of violations of international and domestic law amongst security forces and in the context of any integration of demobilized armed groups elements into security sector institutions" (S/RES/2448, 2018).* **This is coded as MilitaryReform_Assist (and Reintegration_Assist).**

OffensiveOperations

Offensive Operations (*OffensiveOperations*) refer to offensive interventions by the PKO. The UN Security Council must mandate the UN PKO to specifically use force against threats and armed groups, to counter attacks with force, or to forcefully arrest, to conduct "cordon and search" operations. This category **excludes** mere patrolling (which the PKO commonly carries out in most deployment areas), stabilization and deterrence tasks, including tasks that mention "active patrolling" or "proactive deployment". It thus strictly focuses on offensive actions against armed actors. Sometimes, these tasks are associated with the deployment of special forces attached to the PKO, such as the Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *OffensiveOperations_Assist* is coded if the UNSC resolution asks the PKO to conduct offensive operations with the government forces. *OffensiveOperations_Security* is coded if the UNSC resolution asks the PKO to conduct offensive operations without government.

> *"In support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk, notably in the North of Mali, including through long-range patrols, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas" (S/RES/2227, 2015).* **This is**

coded as OffensiveOperations_Assist due to the references to "take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements."

*"Requests MINUSCA ... To actively seize, confiscate and destroy, as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of armed elements, including all militias and non-state armed groups, who refuse or fail to lay down their arms" (S/RES/2217). **This is coded as OffensiveOperation_Security due to the reference.***

*"Requests MINUSMA, in pursuit of its relevant priority tasks and active defence of its mandate, to continue anticipate and deter threats and to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel, to ensure prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians and to prevent a return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats" (S/RES/2423, 2018). **This is coded as OffensiveOperation_Security to the reference to robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks.***

*"Encourages MONUC [...] to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to support the FARDC integrated brigades with a view to disarming the recalcitrant foreign and Congolese armed groups". (S/RES/1794, 2007). **This is coded as OffensiveOperations_Encouraged due to the reference to disarming recalcitrant (uncooperative) foreign and Congolese armed groups which presumable includes force.***

*"To deter violence against civilians, including foreign nationals, especially through proactive deployment, active patrolling with particular attention to displaced civilians, including those in protection sites and refugee" (S/RES/2187, 2014). **This is <u>not</u> coded as OffensiveOperation_Security because "proactive" deployment might not entail the use of force against non-state armed actors.***

JusticeSectorReform

Justice sector reform (*JusticeSectorReform*) compromises tasks to re-establish and strengthen judicial and legal systems (e.g. the ministry of justice, courts, magistrates, judges, etc.). We **do not** code justice sector unless it is specifically mentioned. However, when justice sector is used in reference to military justice, this is coded as *MilitaryReform*. When no distinction is made, *JusticeSectorReform* is coded.

*"Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing a military justice system that is complementary to the civil justice system" (S/RES/1996, 2011). **This is coded as JusticeSectorReform_Assist.***

TransitionalJustice

Transitional justice (*TransitionalJustice*) refers to efforts to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed over the course of an armed conflict. Transitional justice can include war crime prosecutions, truth commissions and reparations, among other mechanisms. Often these mechanisms are designed to operate separately from the rest of the justice system. Examples include the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. If the PKO is asked to support prosecutions by the International Criminal Court (ICC), this evidence is also be coded here. We code reporting or monitoring on humanitarian law violations only if they related to explicit transitional justice mechanisms.

> *"Request the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law"* (S/RES/814, 1993). **This is coded as TransitionalJustice_Assist because it refers to the investigation of serious violations of humanitarian law. We code this evidence for a PKO task because the "Special Representative" is mentioned, who is part of the PKO. We would not code this evidence if the paragraph would not refer to the Secretary-General.**

> **We do not code *TransitionalJustice_Monitor* in this paragraph:** *"To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General"* (S/RES/866, 1993).

> **We do not code protection provided to tribunals and their personnel since these are not domestic actors.** *"Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need".* (S/RES/997, 1993). **However, this is coded as HumanitarianAssistance_Security and CivilSocietyAssistance_Security**

PrisonReform

Prison reform (*PrisonReform*) includes tasks that aim at improving the conditions in domestic detention facilities (e.g., jails at local police stations, prisons).

> *"To help reinforce the independence of the judiciary, build the capacities, and enhance the effectiveness of the national judicial system as well as the effectiveness and the accountability of the penitentiary system".* (S/RES/2387, 2017). **This is coded as PrisonReform_Assist.**

BorderControl

Border control (*BorderControl*) comprises tasks that help states secure their borders and collect import taxes. Engagement with custom agents and with immigration services should most likely be coded here.

> *"Address remaining security threats and border-related challenges: [...] To monitor and deter the activities of militias, mercenaries and other illegal armed groups and to support the Government in addressing border security challenges consistent with its existing mandate to protect civilians, including cross-border security and other challenges in the border areas". (S/RES/2162, 2014).* **This is coded as BordedControl_Assist and BorderControl_Security.**

Demining

Demining (*Demining*) comprises tasks related to detecting and removing mines and other explosive devices.

> *"To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination". (S/RES/1590, 2005).* **This is coded as Demining_Assist**.

Resources

The category *Resources* refers to tasks related to natural resources, including timber, rubber, oil, diamonds, gold, iron, and other minerals. It can also include providing security for extracting natural resources. In addition, providing support to the government in addressing illicit exploitation and smuggling of natural resources is also coded in this category.

> *"Use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources" (S/RES/1856, 2008).* **This is coded as Resources_Monitor.**

StateAuthority

State authority (*StateAuthority*) comprises tasks aimed at re-establishing government control over the territory and extend government control geographically, including border demarcation. It aso include tasks aimed at strengthening the basic administrative capacity of the state, for example, in terms of rehabilitating (1) infrastructure (roads, government offices, custom checkpoints); (2) or providing administrative services, e.g. conducting marriages, providing birth certificates, passports and identity cards, registering new citizens. Providing or re-establishing security, however, **should not** be coded here. Only if the PKO is mandated to provide security for **government personnel** (e.g. ministers, head of state), then we code *StateAuthority_Security*.

"To support the implementation of the defence and security measures of the Agreement, especially its Part III and Annex 2, notably … to support the redeployment of the reformed and reconstituted Malian Defence and Security Forces especially (MDSF) in the Centre and North of Mali," (S/RES/2295, 2016). **This is coded as StateAuthority_Assist.**

"Decides to adjust the mandate of UNMEE, in order to assist the Boundary Commission in the expeditious and orderly implementation of its Delimitation Decision, to include with immediate effect: […] b) administrative and logistical support for the Field Offices of the Boundary ComPKO." (S/RES/1430, 2002). **This is coded as StateAuthority_Assist.**

"To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country." (S/RES/2100, 2013). **This is coded as StateAuthority_Assist.**

"To support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation" (S/RES/1528, 2004). **This is coded as StateAuthority_Security.**

Democratization

Democratization (*Democratization*) refers to tasks that relate to strengthening democratic institutions and building capacity of elected representatives in terms of making them more accountable and responsive to citizens. Examples of democratic institutions might include the parliament, the office of the ombudsman, parliamentary committees, etc. Anti-corruption efforts targeting elected representatives in democratic institutions should be coded here. If the mandate refers to political institutions in general, then we **do not** code it as *Democratization*.

"Provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the national, provincial, regional and local levels" (S/RES/1756, 2007). **This is coded as Democratization_Assist.**

"[…] with a particular emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions" (S/RES/1906, 2009). **This is coded as Democratization_Assist.**

"Contribute to the promotion of good governance and respect for the principle of accountability". (S/RES/1756, 2007). **This is not coded because it is too vague.**

**"Decides that the mandate of UNMISS shall be to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its*

*neighbours, and accordingly authorizes UNMISS to perform the following tasks;…
Promoting popular participation in political processes, including through advising and
supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on an inclusive
constitutional process". (S/RES/1996, 2011).* **We do not code this because it is not
directly aimed at specific democratic institutions and the first part does not actually
authorize the PKO to do something.**

ElectoralSecurity

Electoral security (*ElectoralSecurity*) tasks refer to tasks to protect voters, candidates and
election workers as well as the integrity of the election process (or referendum), including
election material and infrastructure, from physical attacks. We code *ElectoralSecurity*_Monitor
if the PKO is mandated to investigate / monitor / follow-up … with the elections. We **do not**
code *ElectoralSecurity_Security* at all. Instead, we code both (1) assisting the government in
providing security for elections or (2) providing security for elections as
ElectoralSecurity_Assist because it is usually impossible to infer whether or not the
government is supposed to be involved in the mandated electoral security tasks.

> *"To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional
> government's mandate, leading up to the elections" (S/RES/872,1993).* **This is coded
> as ElectoralSecurity_Monitor.**

ElectoralAssistance

Election assistance (*ElectionAssistance*) refers to tasks to assist the organization of free and
fair elections which go beyond assisting electoral security (assisting peaceful elections).
Referendums on independence (e.g. Western Sahara and South Sudan) can be coded here, too.
If the PKO is mandated to verify and certify an election (as UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire or
UNAVEM in Angola), then we code this under *ElectionAssistance_Monitor*. We do not code
ElectoralAssistance_Security because it basically codes the same as *ElectoralSecurity_Assist*.

> *"The conduct of a limited but reliable international observation of the first and second
> rounds of the legislative elections" (S/RES/1201, 1998).* **This is coded as
> ElectoralAssistance_Assist.**

VoterEducation

Voter education (VoterEducation) is coded for tasks that relate to informing voters and
candidates on the modalities of the elections and on the importance of fair and peaceful
behaviour.

> *"Notes with appreciation the ongoing support provided by the Public Information
> Section of UNAMSIL to the National Electoral ComPKO in designing and
> implementing a civic education and public information strategy, and encourages
> UNAMSIL to continue these efforts". (S/RES/1389, 2002*). **This is coded as
> VoterEducation_Encouraged.**

PoliticalPartyAssistance

Political party assistance (*PoliticalPartyAssistance*) refers to tasks in support of political parties and the transformation of former armed groups into professional, efficient, and effective political party organizations.

> *"To provide good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties;" (S/RES/1159, 1998).* **This is coded as PoliticalPartyAssistance_Assist.**

CivilSocietyAssistance

Civil society assistance (*CivilSocietyAssistance*) refers to support for domestic civil society organizations to represent citizens' needs more efficiently and effectively and to control government behaviour. Civil society organizations are often also called NGOs, women's groups, youth groups, human rights defenders, etc. In any case, the targeted civil society needs to have some degree of organization, so that we can code the evidence as *CivilSocietyAssistance*. *CivilSocietyAssistance* is **not** used when there are vague references to widening popular support or popular participation. We also **do not** code *CivilSocietyAssistance* if the UNSC resolution only refers to "sectors of society". Notice also that *CivilSocietyAssistance_Security* is coded when the PKO is mandated to protect human rights activists/advocates (but not UN human rights officers).

> *"Support for the mediation of inter-communal conflict, including through measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with the Government of Sudan, the United Nations Country Team and civil society" (S/RES/2363).* **This is coded as CivilSocietyAssistance_Assist.**

Media

Media (*Media*) refers to tasks that include economic, technical, and financial assistance to build and strengthen and provide independent domestic media.

> *"[A]uthorizes UNMISS to perform the following tasks: [...] promoting the establishment of an independent media". (S/RES/1996, 2011).* **This is coded as Media_Assist.**

PublicInfo

Public information (*PublicInfo*) describes tasks to inform residents in the host country about the PKO's tasks, the peace process and other political relevant events. This **excludes** voter education campaigns (for which we have a separate category).

> *"To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the UN activities in Somalia" (S/RES/814, 1993).* **This is coded as PublicInfo_Assist.**

"Welcomes the UNMISS initiative to launch an outreach campaign throughout the country, and encourages the PKO within existing resources to further develop its communication with local communities to improve understanding of the PKO's mandate" (S/RES/2057, 2012). **This is coded as PublicInfo_Encourage. Notice we do not code "welcomes" but only "encourages".**

PowerSharing

Power-sharing (*PowerSharing*) refers to any arrangement that divides political power between former belligerents or stakeholders in the peace process. This can include coalitions of national unity; power-sharing within specific state institutions (e.g. the military); geographic forms of power-sharing (e.g. establishment of autonomous regions); etc.

We do not have examples of this in our current sample.

National Reconciliation

National reconciliation (*NatReconcil*) means fostering dialogue between people from different communities and bringing them together to discuss their differences in a peaceful environment. Often the resolution refers to building social cohesion and national unity or to "good offices" in relation to reconciliation tasks. Nation-wide reconciliation follows under this category (see below for more local initiatives).

"To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning" (S/RES/1270, 1999). **This is coded as Reconciliation_Assist.**

"Commends the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for her good offices efforts and political support and requests that such important efforts and support continue, in particular with a view to the presidential election to be held in October 2015, in line with paragraph 19 (b) of this resolution". (S/RES/2226, 2015). **This is coded as Reconciliation_Assist.**

"Requests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to use her good offices role including to facilitate dialogue between all political stakeholders". (S/RES/2112, 2013). **This is coded as Reconciliation_Assist.**

LocalReconciliation

Local reconciliation (*LocReconcil*) refers to reconciliation tasks that involves local communities, including local traditional authorities. These initiatives include local conflict resolution, local peacebuilding, strengthening confidence and trust among communities.

"Exercising good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation at the national, state, and county levels within capabilities to anticipate, prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict". (S/RES/1996, 2011). **This is coded as LocalReconciliation_Assist.**

RegionalReconciliation

Regional reconciliation (*RegReconcil*) refers to reconciliation tasks that involve neighbouring states. These initiatives include mandated task of the UN PKO to convene regional conference, mediate between neighbouring states and their host state, and help with concluding agreements on good neighbourly relations.

> *"To continue to play a role as observer with UNAMID in the Contact Group that was established under the 13 March 2008 Dakar Accord to monitor its implementation and assist, as necessary, the Governments of Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic to build good neighbourly relations". S/RES/1861, 2009).* **This is coded as RegionalReconciliation_Monitor.**

EconomicDevelopment

Economic development (*EconomicDevelopment*) refers to tasks to restore the economy and financial situation of the country. This includes mandates to acquire funding for economic development and reconstruction. We do only code this category if the report uses terms such as "economic", "financial", "economic restoration", "economic reconstruction". As already mentioned, we **do not** code "efforts for early recovery" as requested engagement in the category *EconomicDevelopment* since it could also refer to state-building or other tasks.

> *"Urgently requests the Government to develop in close coordination with MONUC, as a matter of priority as part of its effort to extend its authority throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a plan to ensure security in the eastern part of the country, particularly by carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation or resettlement, as appropriate, and reintegration of foreign and Congolese combatants, and by promoting national reconciliation, recovery and development in the region". (S/RES/1756, 2007).* **This is i.a. coded as EconomicDevelopment_Assist.**

> *"[E]ncourages UNAMID, within its current mandate, to facilitate the work of the UN Country Team and expert agencies on early recovery and reconstruction in Darfur, inter alia through the provision of area security". (S/RES/1935, 2010).* **This is coded as EconomicDevelopment_Encourages.**

> *"Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers". (S/RES/1029, 1995).* **This is not coded as the reference to development is too vague and general.**

> *"Request the SG to seek, as appropriate, pledges and contributions from States and others to assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institution and economy of Somalia." (S/RES/814, 1993).* **This is not coded because the SG is not part of the peacekeeping operation.**

HumanitarianRelief

Humanitarian relief (*HumanitarianRelief*) refers to intervention in emergency situations and humanitarian crises, such as natural disaster relief as well as responses to short-term man-made disasters. Notice that *HumanitarianRelief* also includes humanitarian aid. We always code *HumanitarianRelief_Assist* if the PKO is mandated to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid. We **do not** code *HumanitarianRelief_Assist* but **do** code *HumanitarianRelief_Security* if the PKO is only mandated to assist the delivery of aid by providing security (but not with logistical support).

> *"… including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas…". (S/RES/929, 1994).* **We code this as HumanitarianRelief_Security.**

> *"Support the provision of humanitarian aid". (S/RES/997, 1995).* **We code this as HumanitarianRelief_Assist.**

> *"To continue to facilitate unhindered humanitarian access and to help strengthening the delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, notably by contributing to enhance security conducive to this delivery" (S/RES/2000, 2011).* **We code this as HumanitarianRelief_Assist.**

> **This other example from MINUSCA is not coded because it refers to coordination on international assistance, not clearly humanitarian assistance:** *"To coordinate international assistance as appropriate". (S/RES/2217, 2015).*

PublicHealth

Public health (PublicHealth) refers to tasks aimed at preventing or addressing the consequences of endemic diseases, e.g. Ebola, cholera, *HIV/AIDS, etc.*
> *"To coordinate with UNMEER, as appropriate". (S/RES/2215, 2015).* **This is coded as PublicHealth_Assist, UNMEER was the Ebola Emergency Response PKO in Liberia.**

RefugeeAssistance

Refugee assistance (*RefugeeAssistance*) includes the creation, management and maintenance of refugee and IDP camps, as well as the provision of assistance for returnees. This can include assistance to the government to ratify or/and implement treaties on refugee assistance. For the category of *HumanitarianRelief* the phrase "creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian relief" can ONLY mean *Humanitarianrelief_Security*. In contrast, for the category *RefugeeAssistance*, the phrase "creating conditions conducive to the return of refugees and IDPs" can be both *RefugeeAssistance_Assist* and *RefugeeAssistance_Security* because the UN PKO can help refugee return through services other than providing security, e.g. building houses. We do not code references to repatriation of foreign fighter/combatants as *RefugeeAssistance*.

"Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks". **(S/RES/997, 1995). This is coded as RefugeeAssistance_Assist and RefugeeAssistance_Monitor.**

"Support government effort… to create an environment conducive to voluntary, safe and dignified return". (S/RES/1925, 2010). **This is coded as RefugeeAssistance_Assist and RefugeeAssistance_Security.**

"In support of Malian authorities, to contribute to creation of secure environment for safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance […] and the voluntary, safe, and dignified return […] of IDP and refugees". (S/RES/2164, 2014). **This is coded as RefugeeAssistance_Security.**

Gender

Gender (Gender) refers to gender mainstreaming in the tasks, policies and approaches of international actors. It means that the PKO promotes equality between men and women, including empowerment of women. This can include assistance to the government to ratify or/and implement treaties on women's rights. This can also include meetings with women's representatives. We **do not** code *Gender* if the resolution only mentions women as one among other targets of physical protection efforts or as example of especially vulnerable groups of persons. For example, we code child soldiers under *ChildRights* but **do not** code *Gender* for women combatants. This is an example for *Gender_Assist* because it refers to human rights treaties that enshrine gender equality.

> *"Encourages the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to ratify and implement key international human rights treaties and conventions, including those related to women and children, refugees, and statelessness, and requests UNMISS, with other United Nations actors, to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in this regard;" (S/RES/2057, 2012).* **This is coded as Gender_Assist (but also HumanRights_Assist and ChildRights_Assist).**

This is an example for **NOT coding** *Gender_Assist* because it refers to physical protection rather than equality between men and women:

> *"To exercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of the PKO's protection strategy, especially in regard to women."(S/RES/2187, 2014).* **This is not coded as Gender.**

This is also an example for not coding *Gender* because it refers to women as category of combatants (but notice that we code *ChildRights_Assist* here): *"Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing and implementing a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, in cooperation with international partners with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants". (S/RES/1996, 2011).* **This is not coded as Gender.**

LegalReform

Legal reform (LegalReform) refers to tasks whereby international actors become involved in law-making processes. This category **does NOT** include assistance by international actors in formulating "regulations" or "policies" that do not have the force of law. Cue words to distinguish laws from other policies are legislation, law, legislative process, constitutional process, act, draft act, parliament, etc

"To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies". (S/RES/1778, 2007). **This is coded as LegalReform_Assist.**

Ceasefire

Ceasefire (Ceasefire) refers to peacekeepers or other international actors' engagement for agreements between belligerents to stop the fighting (e.g. attacking each other on the ground, by air strikes, etc.). If the resolution states that the PKO is mandated to monitor the (peace) process with the goal of getting to a ceasefire agreement, we only code *Ceasefire* and **do not** code *PeaceProcess*. The example text below is evidence for coding *Ceasefire_Assist* because the peacekeeping PKO is tasked with assisting the Somali parties to respect the ceasefire.

"Assisting the Somali parties in implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements", in particular in their cooperative efforts to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease-fire" (S/RES/ 897, 1994). **This is coded as Ceasefire_Assist.**

"To observe and monitor the implementation of the joint declaration of the end of the war of 6 April 2005 and of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, to prevent, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, any hostile action, in particular within the Zone of Confidence, and to investigate violations of the ceasefire" (S/RES/1609, 2005). **This is coded as Ceasefire_Monitor and Ceasefire_Security. Examples of *Ceasefire_Security* involve deterring and preventing hostile action in the areas where the ceasefire is being implemented.**

PeaceProcess

Peace process (*PeaceProcess*) refers to any international engagement for reaching a peace agreement (not a ceasefire) between belligerent parties. We only code this category if the paragraph clearly refers to the process of getting to a peace agreement. Key words are "peace agreement" and "peace process".

> "Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;" (S/RES/918, 1994). **This is coded as PeaceProcess_Encouraged.**

> **This is not coded as *PeaceProcess_Assist* (although it is coded as *Ceasefire_Assist*) because it deals with the *implementation* of the Peace Agreement (Addis Ababa Agreements) and not with getting / maintaining it:** "Assisting the Somali parties in implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements", in particular in their cooperative efforts to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease-fire" (S/RES/ 897, 1994).

> **Again, this is not coded because it refers to implementation.** "To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;" (S/RES/872, 1993).

CulturalHeritage

Cultural heritage (CulturalHeritage) includes mandate provisions that encourage or request the PKO to protect and preserve cultural and historic sites from destruction, including against attacks and violent destruction. It also includes provisions that encourage or request the PKO to train domestic actors (e.g., state security forces, administrative staff) in protection and preservation of cultural heritage sites.

> "To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO" (S/RES/2100). **This is coded CulturalHeritage_Security as the PKO is explicitly asked to help with the physical security provision to sites of cultural heritage.**

> "Encourages all relevant United Nations agencies, as well as regional, bilateral and multilateral partners to provide the necessary support to contribute to the implementation of the Agreement by the Malian parties, in particular its provisions pertaining to socioeconomic and cultural development" (S/RES/2295). **This is not coded because it is not clear whether "cultural development" refers to the protection and preservation of cultural and historic sites.**

UseOfForce

Use of force (*UseOfForce)* reflects the authorization of using of all necessary means. The mentioning of a Chapter VII mandate is not enough to code *UseOfForce*. The use of force can be mandated for self-defense or for defense of the mandate. References to Chapter VII are not sufficient to code *UseOfForce*. This is the only task category, for which we do not distinguish between different modalities of engagement and different strength of mandate provisions.

> *"Underscores the importance of MONUC implementing its mandate in full, including through robust rules of engagement" (S/RES/1843, 2008).*

> *"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities" (S/RES/1313, 2000).*

> *"To deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force" (S/RES/1313, 2000).*

> *"Authorizes MONUSCO, in pursuit of the objectives described in paragraph 3 above, to*
> *take all necessary measures to perform the following tasks" (S/RES/2147, 2014).*

> *"Underscores that UNMISS' protection of civilians mandate as set out in paragraph 3 (b) (v) of resolution 1996 (2011) includes taking the necessary actions to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of such violence" (S/RES/2109, 2013).*