Shame, Norms and Values as possible Resources in Preventing and Countering Radicalisation

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Abstract

This article draws on empirical research – 23 qualitative interviews and data from ethnographic observation – within the German marksmen's club milieu. There are over one million members of these clubs in Germany, where traditional customs, sociability and shooting sports are practised. Public perceptions of marksmen's clubs are that they are rather conservative. Marksmen's clubs look back to centuries-old traditions and, while they can be considered as part of the political mainstream or the social centre of society (*Mitte der Gesellschaft*), the milieu has attracted right-wing or extreme-right actors who have sought to influence, and appropriate certain aspects of, the milieu. This makes it an important environment for social scientific study in general and for radicalisation research in particular.

Rooted in the emic perspectives of the interviewed marksmen, this article explores a range of possible resources for preventing and countering radicalisation (P/CR) and facilitating non-radicalisation in the marksmen's club milieu and society more widely. Drawing on reflections and findings in the field of criminal justice research, the moral emotion of (anticipated) shame is identified as such a potential resource alongside norms and values within the marksmen's club and its communities. The article also discusses possible unintended, negative effects of (anticipated) shame, arguing that, if experienced as 'stigmatising shaming', such (anticipated) shame may also trigger or fuel radicalisation processes. The criminological concept of 'reintegrative shaming' is discussed as a potential way of avoiding such counterproductive 'backfire effects' and the notion of reintegrative dialogue – inspired by the emic perspectives of the interviewed marksmen – is explored.

Introduction

This article draws on emic perspectives elicited from interviews with young marksmen (*Schützen*) and markswomen (*Schützinnen*)[2]. Emic perspectives are views, categories, and

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concepts from the 'insider's view of reality' (Fetterman 2008). They represent the subjective and inter-subjective perspectives of the actors and their (milieu-specific) lifeworlds (Schutz and Luckmann 1974). In contrast, 'etic perspectives' refer to the external perspectives of 'outsiders', such as academics, practitioners, security authorities and policy makers. Emic and etic perspectives can frequently be very different, at times even contradict each other. This difference has been responsible for numerous general and subject-related epistemological and methodological problems and discussions in the social sciences (Beals, Kidman and Funaki 2020; Olive 2014). The difference between etic and emic approaches in the social sciences also affects research on radicalisation and extremism and can influence the social and political framing of particular groups and the prevention and countering of radicalisation (P/CR) or violent radicalisation[3]. For example, a security-focused etic approach to countering violent extremism, or the radicalisation process towards it, may run the risk of perceiving and stigmatising certain groups and communities as suspect, radical or extreme and thus as security problems per se, with possibly negative 'backfire-effects' (Lindekilde 2014). In addition, such an approach may obscure the fact that radicalisation is a social phenomenon with social causes, which takes place in social contexts and develops out of concrete social situations. To understand the roots of radicalisation, social science research needs to understand these causes, contexts and situations. Furthermore, such a context- and situation-sensitive approach, which follows a locally oriented bottom-up logic rather than a centralised top down logic, is crucial for countering radicalisation and extremism (Jurczyszyn 2019).

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[2] In the marksmen's club milieu, the terms 'marksman' (*Schütze*) or 'marksmen' (*Schützen*) are the terms mostly used to refer to members even by female club members, i.e. markswomen (*Schützinnen*). Unless referring explicitly to markswomen, this report will use these terms whilst recognising that they refer to people of two or more genders.

[3] Since the difference between violent and non-violent radicalisation does not play a major role in this article, in the following, when the term radicalisation is used, both types are meant - unless it is specified otherwise.
In the research project underlying this article (details about the project are given in the "Empirical basis" section), 'radicalisation' was broadly understood as a process 'by which individuals or groups come to embrace attitudes, or engage in actions, that support violence in the pursuit of extremist causes'. 'Radicalism' was broadly understood as 'the active support for fundamental - system-changing - political change' and 'extremism' as the 'the overzealous conviction that the survival or success of one's own group can only be achieved through active hostility towards 'other' group(s)' (DARE no date).

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Additionally, emic perspectives, especially through their contextual and situational embeddedness, can offer valuable insights into understanding the roots of radicalisation as well as potential resources for successful and sustainable local and global practices and policies for P/CR.

This article will explore potential resources for P/CR as well as possible factors of non-radicalisation in the marksmen's club (*Schützenverein*) milieu and more widely. To this end, the article draws on interview data, reflecting the emic perspectives of the marksmen in the study, as well as data from a marksmen's campaign against right-wing extremism. Expanding this empirical basis with theories and findings from criminal justice research, the moral emotion of (anticipated) shame is identified as such a potential resource. Specific norms and values within the marksmen's clubs, embedded in their communities and social bonds, it is argued, may also engender radicalisation-preventing and non-radicalising effects. The article goes on to discuss possible unintended 'backfire effects' of (anticipated) shame. Based on the emic perspective of many respondents that people are often inappropriately labelled, for example, as 'Nazi', it is argued that, if experienced as 'stigmatising shaming', (anticipated) shame may evoke a triggering or fuelling of radicalisation processes. A way to avoid this outcome is suggested, drawing on the criminological concept of 'reintegrative shaming' and dialogue. The conclusion summarises the main findings and recommends further research and practical P/CR work regarding emotions and norms and values in the context of P/CR.

Theoretical framework

To elucidate its empirical findings, this article mainly draws on theories and findings from criminal justice research, focusing on the relationship between certain emotions and norms and values and offending behaviour. The rationale for this is that, like criminal offending, radicalism, extremism and related phenomena (including racist and right-wing attitudes) can be conceived of as a violation of certain norms and values or as a moral violation. Thus, in

this article, radicalism, extremism and related phenomena are understood as a kind of offending; an understanding that has recently been advocated by Simi et al. (2019) who identify similarities between 'generic criminal offending' and 'violent extremism' and underscore the importance of negative feelings such as anger as a catalyst for disengagement from violent extremism.

Research into criminal justice has examined the effects that emotions such as (anticipated) shame as well as moral values or certain social bonds have on criminal offending. The study of these effects, for example in the context of control theory (Rebellon et al. 2010: 988–989; Svensson et al. 2013; Tibbetts 1997; Costello and Laub 2020), has demonstrated a negative correlation between these values and emotions and criminal offending in many studies (Costello and Laub 2020). A quantitative study among secondary school adolescents in the Netherlands carried out by Svensson et al. (2013), for example, found that, in line with previous studies, the dependent variable of 'offending' was negatively correlated with 'anticipated shame' (ibid.: 25-26), i.e. lower degrees of anticipated shame were associated with higher degrees of committed crimes (ibid.: 32). Such a negative correlation was also found for the relationship between 'offending' and 'moral values' (ibid.), which confirms other studies and argumentations within criminology (Silver and Silver 2021). A meta-analysis of 25 studies conducted by Spruit et al. (2016) also provides evidence for such correlations in terms of self-conscious moral emotions, like shame, and offending. Such empirical results from criminal justice research are crucial in interpreting and substantiating the empirical data from the marksmen's club milieu and the conclusions that are drawn from this data, namely that emotions, norms, values and specific social bonds could serve as possible resources for P/CR.

Braithwaite's (1989) theory of 'reintegrative shaming' , which has been influential in criminology and, in particular, the restorative justice approach (Kim and Gerber Jurg 2017), also helps interpret and substantiate the data presented in this article. The theory has been empirically tested in different contexts and has been partially confirmed in a large body of work (Braithwaite 2020; Harris 2006; Hay 2001; Murphy and Harris 2007; Tittle, Bratton and

Gertz 2003). At the core of Brathwaite's considerations is the emotion of shame. This emotion's social function is seen in ways in which offenders are sanctioned and social norms are reasserted (Rossner et al. 2014: 211). Braithwaite distinguishes between two concepts of shaming: 'disintegrative' or 'stigmatising' 'shaming' and 'reintegrative shaming'. 'Stigmatising shaming', according to Braithwaite, is most often practised in criminal justice. It irrevocably casts an offender as deviant (Rossner et al. 2014: 211) or labels them 'criminal' (Eifler 2002: 71). 'To be shamed in this manner is tantamount to being symbolically and physically banished from society' as Rossner et al. (2014: 211) put it. 'Stigmatising shaming' thus corresponds to shame-related fear of loss of face, social status and social bonds. In contrast to 'reintegrative shaming', stigmatising shaming may also lead to higher crime rates and a higher attraction to delinquent subcultures (Braithwaite 1989: 98; Clay-Warne 2014: 481). As in a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' (Braithwaite 1989: 18), other social ties, such as those to family, are broken and norms and values of 'respectable society' (Braithwaite 2001: 245) are rejected, as one was rejected oneself. The delinquent subculture neutralises the shame suffered or even inverts it into pride. This neutralisation or even inversion offers an alternative, re-respected identity and a new belonging (ibid.). Compared to 'stigmatising shaming', 'reintegrative shaming' focuses on the temporary behaviour rather than the individual and therefore offenders are not assumed to be morally deficient or deviant per se. As Braithwaite (1989: 55) states, '[…] the deviance label is applied to the behaviour rather than the person and that this is done under the assumption that the disapproved behaviour is transient, performed by an essentially good person'. Ultimately, the concept of 'reintegrative shaming' allows for reconciliation between society and the offender. This reconciliation would result in the offender's reintegration into society and their (renewed) commitment to its norms and values (Eifler 2002: 71–72; Rossner et al. 2014: 212). Supplemented by emic perspectives of the interviewed marksmen, Braithwaite's distinction between stigmatising and reintegrative shaming is used to give an indication of how shame, alongside norms and values, can became a resource for P/CR while avoiding labelling and stigmatising individuals in a way that triggers radicalisation-relevant backfire

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effects. With reference to Hirschi's (1969), partially empirically confirmed (Costello and Laub 2020; Eifler 2002: 46), argument that a range of 'social bonds' ('attachment', 'commitment', 'belief' and 'involvement') have potentially crime-reducing effects, this article ultimately also adopts a criminological control-theoretical perspective and sees the occurrence of such social bonds also in marksmen's clubs in which they may exert a radicalisation-preventing influence on their members.

Although drawing primarily on existing research in the field of criminal justice, this article also contributes to the study of radicalisation, deradicalisation and in particular non-radicalisation[4]. Specifically, the article seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role of emotions, norms and values in P/CR and non-radicalisation; a question that has been little addressed so far[5]. This article is thus based on qualitative empirical data and emic perspectives from a milieu, the study of which can bring new insight to the field of radicalisation and deradicalisation studies but has not received significant attention from a sociological or ethnographic perspective.[6]

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[4] Regarding non-radicalisation research see the ground breaking work of R.K. Cragin (2014), in which a conceptual model of non-radicalisation, regarding violent extremism, is developed. Regarding non-radicalisation research that draws on criminal justice research see also M.H. Becker (2019) , T.J. Holt et al. (2018), and S. Pritchett and K. Moeller (2021), which explore whether criminological social bond, control and learning theory can predict the difference between violent and non-violent extremism.

[5] See on this Ćosić et al. (2018), who describe how 'emotionally based strategic communications' can be used to mitigating negative group emotional states and facilitate antiradicalisation, counterradicalisation and deradicalisation and the already mentioned work of Simi et al. (2019).

On the question of the role of emotions and norms and values in radicalisation, see e.g., S.K. Rice (2009); N. Anastasio et al. (2021); H. Haq et al. (2020); C. Kinnvall and T. Capelos (2021); N. Bouhana (2021); H. Pilkington (2020), 119–125; T. Capelos and N. Demertzis (2018); M. Salmela and C. von Scheve (2017); E. Groß and S. Neckel (2020).

[6] Regarding this point, see the primarily quantitative study of J. Leineweber et al. (2020), which, among other things, addresses the question of the extent to which the relevance and acceptance of traditional marksmen's clubs values are subject to change in today's society; the ethnographic work by A. Niederbacher (2004), in which the question of what fascinates people about firearms is investigated in German marksmen's clubs; the ethnographic article by V. Utecht (2011), on traditions and rituals in marksmen's clubs and the author's DARE country level report on the marksmen's club milieu (Kerst 2021). See further the unpublished qualitative study of Palowski (2009), on the inclusion of women in a marksmen's club in the Lower Rhine region of Germany.

Empirical basis and method of analysis

The data in this article were collected within the framework of the *DARE* (Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality) *project*. The overall aim of the project was to broaden the understanding of radicalisation and non-radicalisation and to explore possible relationships between radicalisation and (in)equality[7]. One strand of the DARE research employed qualitative, including ethnographic methods, to understand young people's everyday encounters with, and responses to, radicalising messages. This research took place in milieus in which (extreme) right-wing messages and milieus in which (extreme) Islamist messages circulate. In total, 19 milieus were studied including the milieu of German marksmen's clubs, which is the focus of this article.

The empirical data on which this article is based were collected during field research in the marksmen's club milieu between December 2018 and August 2019. The data include 23 qualitative (audio recorded and transcribed) interviews with young members of German marksmen's clubs alongside ethnographic observation in the milieu and some online research. The semi-structured interviews employed a common DARE project interview guide as its starting point and interviews were carried out either in my office or at a location chosen by the respondents, such as their clubhouse. All respondents gave informed written consent prior to the interview in line with the ethical guidelines of the project.

The marksmen's clubs of the respondents are located in urban areas, in medium-sized and large cities, or particular districts of these cities, in a western German region where marksmanship is relatively strong. These districts generally have their own clubs and most respondents live in the cities or in the districts where their clubs are located. In total, respondents from five clubs were interviewed; 13 respondents came from a single club, six from a second club and the remaining four respondents were drawn from three other clubs. The average (mean) age of respondents was 23.5 years and the median age was 25 years. The

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[7] For more information about the project, see: http://www.dare-h2020.org/

youngest respondent was, at the time of the interview, 16 years old, and the oldest respondent was 32 years old. Twelve respondents were male and 11 respondents were female. It is worth noting that the gender and age profiles of research participants do not reflect the average gender and age profile of membership of the marksmen's clubs, which have a high proportion of male[8] and older members (Deutscher Schützenbund 2019; Leineweber et al. 2020: 58–59). The age profile of the study was dictated by the overall DARE project, which was focused on young people (aged 12-30 years) while the project also encouraged the elicitation of women's views and experiences in the milieus even where they were a minority. The study's sample does closely correspond with wider marksmen's club membership distribution in terms of religious affiliation and ethnic background. Twenty respondents were of German origin, and 23 respondents were Christian (although not all of them are practising) and white. This corresponds to a study by the Federal Institute for Sports Science, which shows that in 2009, only 5% of members of marksmen's clubs had an immigration background (Breuer and Wicker 2011: 151 ff.), but also to the statements of the respondents and my observations in the field.

Ethnographic field data were collected through participation in numerous events in the marksmen's milieu, especially marksmen's festivals and other events such as summer parties or shooting competitions. The clubs I researched, or key marksmen in these clubs, were informed about my research from the outset. I carried out my research as a 'participant observer' but also as an 'observing participant', that is through involvement in the activities and practices engaged in by others, including my respondents, at these events (Hitzler and Gothe 2015: 10–12). I recorded my observations and experiences in the field in over 100 pages of field diary.

The field diary entries, the interviews, and other data were analysed according to the agreed procedure for data analysis in the wider DARE project. This meant that transcripts of

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[8] Traditionally, marksmen's clubs were largely men-only clubs. Even in the recent past, women were often not allowed to become active members. This has gradually changed, but some marksmen's clubs still do not allow women as active members, which was also the case in one of the clubs I researched.

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all interviews, the field diary entries and additional materials (such as flyers, manifestos, leaflets, or websites) obtained at observed events or found online were coded and analysed using NVivo 12 software. For this purpose, level 1 codes were formed in an open coding procedure of data segments ('references') from the data base. These codes were grouped under Level 2 codes, which were agreed upon within the DARE consortium and which also formed the basis of the interview guidelines (Pilkington and Vestel 2020: 12–13). If Level 1 codes did not fit the predefined Level 2 codes, e.g., because they were milieu-specific codes, new Level 2 codes were created. In total, the interviews and other data were coded using 29 Level 2 codes and 205 Level 1 codes, to which a total of 4,411 data segments were assigned.

German marksmanship and German marksmen's clubs

'Marksmanship' (*Schützenwesen*) exists in different forms in various European countries with a centuries-old history. From the late Middle Ages through to the eighteenth century, marksmanship served the function of securing defence, protection and order but also developed into a form of social life (Leineweber et al. 2020: 19–27). This social aspect of marksmanship became the main focus of modern civic marksmanship from the 19th century onwards, in which the civic idea of sociability was initially in the foreground (ibid., 26-43)[9]. In this context, the marksmen's festivals are particularly noteworthy.[10] In Germany, where marksmanship has continued to thrive through to the present day, the German marksmanship was declared as an 'Intangible Cultural Heritage' by the German UNESCO Commission in December 2015. According to the Commission '[i]n many regions, marksmanship is an important and vibrant part of the regional or local identity. It incorporates many customs and traditions, which manifest themselves in different ways' (Deutsche UNESCO-Kommision

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[9] See in more detail on the history of (German) marksmanship and its various stages of development besides the short summary in Leineweber et al. (2020).; T. Reintges (1963); D. Sauermann (1983); S. Kreyenschulte (2016); L. Crombie (2016); B. Stambolis (1999) . On the interesting history of German marksmanship during National Socialism, see H. Borggräfe (2010).

[10] Today also, many marksmen's clubs organise annual festivals and celebrations often with the participation of the local population and other guests and visitors.

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n.d.). The marksmen's club milieu, with its over one million marksmen throughout Germany, can be characterised as a milieu with a strong sense of community and a Christian and middle-class or civic self-understanding. In the public perception, marksmen's clubs are considered to be rather conservative (Burger 2014) and this is reflected in the importance placed by many clubs on values, history, customs and traditions[11] and their often hierarchical or military organisational structure. While in some clubs the focus is placed on so-called 'cultivation of tradition and customs' (*Traditions und Brauchtumspflege*), others emphasise shooting sports[12]; a differentiation that began in the Weimar Republic in which the number of club memberships and newly founded clubs increased sharply (Leineweber et al. 2020: 30). Regarding their political positioning marksmen's clubs in general can be understood as a milieu of the political mainstream or the social centre of society (*Mitte der Gesellschaft*), which is also reflected in the milieu's self-understanding.

Thus, in selecting the marksmen's milieu[13] for research, it is not suggested that the wider milieu, or individual clubs, are either radical or extreme right-wing in a classically defined sense. Rather, it recognised that the milieu exhibits various characteristics attractive to right-wing and extreme right-wing agents, which makes it a target for such actors who may seek to influence or appropriate elements of it. These characteristics include its membership profile (being predominantly white, male and Christian) as well as the traditionalist orientation of many marksmen's clubs and strong attachment to 'home' (*Heimat)[14]* (so-called

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[11] The high value attached to tradition is evident in one of the few empirical studies on marksmanship, which found that 69% of the surveyed marksmen (n=3,871) thought the term 'tradition' is 'strongly associated' to marksmen's clubs, and 28% that it is 'associated' with them (Leineweber et al. 2020: 60; 70).

[12] The clubs I researched can be categorised more as clubs that focus on traditions, customs and sociability, although they also engage (to various degrees of professionalism) in shooting sports.

[13] In the DARE project a milieu was defined as 'the people, the physical and the social conditions and events and networks and communications in which someone acts or lives and which shape that person's subjectivity, choices and trajectory through life'. An appropriate milieu for becoming a case in the DARE research should also be a space of encounter with radical or extreme messages (Pilkington and Vestel 2020: 4–5).

[14] The German word '*Heimat*' does not have an English equivalent. Here it is important to note that home (*Heimat*) does not necessarily have to be a person's country of origin or this person's homeland (*Heimatland*). It can refer to a country, to a specific region, a city, the place of growing up but, for example, also to a specific group of people. '*Heimat*' is a literal or abstract place where somebody feels at home (German Language Blog 2020).

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'Heimatverbundenheit'). The marksmen's club milieu is also known for its structures and rituals borrowed from the military, the training in the use of firearms and the practising of shooting sports. Indeed, one of the few means to legally acquire and possess small firearms and ammunition in Germany is through engagement in shooting sports, through the issuing of a 'gun ownership card' (*Waffenbesitzkarte*). A number of perpetrators of racist and right-wing terrorist attacks and killings, including the murderer of the district president of the German city of Kassel Walter Lübcke in 2019 and the racist Hanau attacker in 2020, who killed nine people of immigration background, as well as his own mother, were members of marksmen's clubs, although their reasons for joining these clubs are not clear.[15]

While any broad discussion of these findings is beyond the scope of this article, the field research and interviews revealed that respondents did indeed encounter attitudes, statements, persons or groups that can be classified as racist, right-wing or even extreme right-wing both within the marksmen's club milieu and in their wider everyday lives.[16] These data also suggest that certain phenomena leaning towards racism or right-wing beliefs and actions (such as racist jokes and right-wing slogans in the marksmen's club) were normalised within the milieu (see Kerst 2021). In selecting the marksmen's milieu, however, it was also envisaged that some characteristics of this milieu – including (Christian) values, a strong sense of community, and a set of democratic and participatory structures – might work to prevent young people from becoming radicalised, at least to the point of violent political extremism. Thus, the milieu seemed to be a promising site to explore not only radicalisation

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[15] Media coverage on the murderer of Walter Lübcke reported that he had taken part in shooting trainings with sharp weapons as a guest in another marksmen's club. He did this training together with a person from his club who was initially accused of complicity in this murder but has since been acquitted of this charge (Lohr et al. 2019; Majić 2021). It is also known from the media that the perpetrator of the Hanau attack had legally acquired and possessed the weapons used on the basis of his gun ownership (Weber 2020; Köpke 2020).

[16] As far as the set of respondents is concerned, attitudes were found that included biases towards various (minority) groups (especially towards Muslims) and, in individual cases, attitudes that could be attributed to radical right-wing or extreme right-wing patterns of attitudes. However, none of the respondents can be classified as radical or extreme and, to my knowledge, none of the respondents was a member or supporter of radical or extreme right-wing groups or movements at the time of the interviews.

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but also non-radicalisation pathways and factors or characteristics that prevent and counter young people's radicalisation.

Moral emotions and norms and values as potential resources for P/CR

In the following empirical section potential resources for P/CR are explored, as well as possible factors for non-radicalisation in the marksmen's club milieu and more widely. The basis for this are interview data, and the emic perspectives of the interviewed marksmen they reflect, as well as data from a marksmen's campaign against right-wing extremism. The discussion starts by looking at the emotion of (anticipated) shame as a positive resource for P/CR and non-radicalisation. This is followed by the exploration of certain norms and values found in the marksmen's club milieu, that may constitute such resources, as well as the social bonds of the marksmen's communities that make a violation of these norms and values less likely. Based on the premise set out above – that radicalism, extremism and related phenomena can be understood as a kind of offending that, like criminal offending, can be conceived as a violation of certain norms and values – these interview data and research findings are interpreted and substantiated by theories, concepts and findings from criminal justice research.

(Anticipated) shame as possible resource for P/CR and non-radicalisation

In the interviews, some respondents told me about situations of shaming or expressed embarrassment in relation to right-wing to extreme right-wing individuals and groups and social media content and certain thoughts about immigration and migrants. Based on this interview data, it will be argued that such emotional appraisals, for example expressed in episodes of shame as well as norms and values can be understood as a possible resource for P/CR and non-radicalisation.

For example, Anne[17] explained that she knew a few members of a right-wing extremist group from her district of the city but saw them as 'totally embarrassing'. She expressed relief that nobody associated her with this group: 'I know them about 1000 degrees of separation. But I would be totally embarrassed if someone were to ask me, "Oh, do you know someone in this group?" THAT would be embarrassing, I'll be honest' (Anne). The emotion Anne refers to can be interpreted as 'embarrassment' (Bortolan 2020; Lewis 2008) or as the related emotion of 'shame' (Lewis 2008; Zahavi 2020)[18]. The logic underpinning Anne's description of her emotional response is her judgment that affiliation with this group would constitute a violation of certain social/moral 'standards, rules or goals (SRG)' (Lewis 2008: 742) or, what is referred to here as norms and values. Specifically, it is rooted in the norm that one must not have anything to do with right-wing extremists. In fact, Anne's description can be interpreted as 'anticipated shame' (Tibbetts 1997) as a result of exposure. This is evident from Anne's statement that she *would* feel embarrassed *if* she were to be associated with right-wing extremists or with violating the corresponding norms and values. In this respect, she anticipates her feeling of embarrassment or shame.

Camilla expresses the anticipation of shame more directly. In a passage of interview dialogue with her, she provides a reflective commentary on how she imagines others might think about her if they saw that she was reading far-right party content on social media: 'I think to myself: "Wow. Are you really clicking that now? If anyone saw you looking at this". So, at that point I am really thinking, "What would others think [...]?"'. Camilla also describes how her negative thoughts about immigration and migrants made her feel ashamed and ask herself whether she had become 'too right-wing'. Clarifying why this concerned her, she explains that, for her, 'being right-wing is bad'.

The interview data also suggest that Camilla's feelings of (anticipated) shame might have shifted her towards a more nuanced opinion about migrants and immigration as well as

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[17] The names used in this article are pseudonyms to protect the identity of the respondents.
[18] The fine distinctions that Lewis (2008: 750) draws between these two emotions (he considers the higher intensity level of shame as most distinct from embarrassment) are not evident in Anne's statements and thus not incorporated into the interpretation here.

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towards rejecting any thought of voting for the far-right AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*) party despite the fact that her social on- and offline environment was one in which rather negative images of migrants and immigration were promoted and there was support for parties like the AfD.

What these examples show is that shame, or anticipated shame, is a very powerful, intense and self-conscious moral emotion. It directly affects the social self and is closely linked to the fear of loss of social status (loss of 'face') and social bonds (Goffman 1967; Salmela and Scheve 2017: 579–580; Svensson et al. 2013: 23; Tracy and Robins 2008: 3). Based on the negative correlation found in criminal justice research between the feeling of (anticipated) shame, related emotions as well as norms and values *and* offending behaviour (see above), the (anticipated) shame and norms and values that emerged in interview data might also be seen as explaining why respondents remained, at least partly, cognitively, emotionally, behaviourally, and socially distant from certain agents (e.g., extreme right-wing groups), thoughts and opinions (e.g., negative opinions towards migrants), feelings (e.g., grievance about unjust treatment compared to migrants) and decisions (e.g., voting for parties across the right wing of the political spectrum). For respondents, not to distance themselves in this way would imply their violation of certain norms and values (as Camilla states, 'being right-wing is bad'), which could be interpreted as a kind of offending in relation to radicalism/extremism and related phenomena. Moreover, the failure to distance themselves might indicate a process of radicalisation. To take, for example, the anticipated shame about supporting the AfD (see above), empirical studies suggest that potential AfD voters had above average extreme right-wing attitudes as well as biases towards various (minority) groups (Küpper et al. 2019a: 137–140; Zick et al. 2019: 94–96) and that such attitudes correlate significantly with acceptance of violence and willingness to use violence against immigrants and other groups (Küpper et al. 2019b: 194; Zick et al. 2011: 118–121; Zick et al. 2019: 99–102). In this respect, it might be argued that (anticipated) shame as well as norms and values might be a possible resource for P/CR and a factor contributing to pathways of non-

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radicalisation. The potential for this to backfire if the shaming is stigmatising, however, is discussed below.

Norms and values in the marksmen's club milieu: potential resources of P/CR?

The role of norms and values in marksmanship, and their potential to become resources for P/CR and non-radicalisation, is illustrated by the motto 'For Faith, Morals, Home' (*Für Glaube, Sitte, Heimat*) adopted by the Catholic umbrella organisation 'Historic German Marksmen's Brotherhood' (*Bund der Historischen Deutschen Schützenbruderschaften, BHDS*) and its member clubs (but used also by more secular marksmen's clubs). The youth organisation of this umbrella organisation (BdSJ) runs a campaign against right-wing extremism called 'Marksmen against the Right' (*Schützen gegen Rechts*), including a brochure (BdSJ-Bundesverband n.d.). In this brochure[19] and on the campaign's website, the youth organisation distances itself from right-wing extremism, and political extremism in general, by referring to these values. On the website it is stated:

> We want to show that our guiding principle ['For Faith, Morals, Home'] is more relevant today than ever before. Together we set an example against the right wing and for a colourful country.
>
> Faith (*Glaube*) means Christian charity and mercy for us. We stand for peaceful coexistence and justice and reject violence in any form.
>
> Among other things, morals (*Sitte*) for us is the commitment to living democracy and the protection of human dignity. We reject political extremism always and everywhere.

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[19] A similar brochure was published by the 'German Shooting and Archery Federation' (*Deutscher Schützenbund, DSB*), the largest German umbrella organisation of marksmen's clubs with 1.35 million members, distributed across more than 14,200 member clubs (Deutscher Schützenbund n.d.). This in the course of the campaign 'Marksmen against Extremism – for Diversity and Democracy' (*Schützen gegen Extremismus – für Vielfalt und Demokratie*) (Deutscher Schützenbund 2020). According to this organisation, the project was motivated by the right-wing terrorist murders of Walter Lübcke, the racist killings in Hanau, and further right-wing terrorist and racists attacks (ibid., 7), some of which were committed by marksmen.

For us, home (*Heimat*) is the place where all people are welcome; regardless of their skin colour, religion, gender or whom they love. We do not exclude anyone and are open to diversity.

For these reasons, we clearly stand for peaceful coexistence in a diverse society in which every person is regarded as equal and consistently reject all forms of racism, sexism and nationalism as well as all forms of discrimination against people[20]. (BdSJ-Bundesverband n.d.)

Shifting the perspective from the umbrella organisation level to the individual level, some respondents spoke very openly about the possible ways in which the marksmen's milieu could facilitate P/CR. For example, Peter, who had been involved in a Neo-Nazi group in the past, mentioned his marksmen's club and the club life as one of the reasons for gradually distancing himself from this group. He particularly emphasised the club's Christian values, which he recognised had left him feeling conflicted about the 'extremist ideas' within the neo-Nazi group; he concluded that he could not 'be so extreme to people'. In the marksmen's club, he said, he learned to help and stand up for other people, challenge bullying and voice his views in a democratic way. His own experiences with right-wing extremism had led him to 'prevention work' with the young marksmen of his club on a voluntary basis[21].

Anne also volunteers with the youth of her marksmen's club. She believes that membership in the club can protect against radicalisation:

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[20] Translated by the author.

[21] Many marksmen's clubs, as the researched club sample reflects, engage in intensive youth work. One example is the so-called 'marksmen's youth' (*Schützenjugend*), which exists in many marksmen's clubs, and in which 'young marksmen' (*Jungschützen*) of a certain age range (e.g., from 12 to 24 years) are automatically members. In this organisation, club members volunteer to look after the young people, e.g., in the form of a youth board, and organise various activities, for example shooting training and, depending on the club, other sports or youth trips. Some respondents were such young marksmen and/or active in the youth work of their club. Some other respondents did voluntary work in other sections of their clubs – for example, sitting on the management board.

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I believe that when you are in such a strong community, it is much harder to radicalise someone. Or to encourage someone to radicalise. But also because… For example, if I had told the group that someone had approached me [she means a right-wing person], the others would have said, 'no, don't do that, better stop it'. Or they would have talked to me about it and in that sense, they would have protected me from it. Absolutely.

Another respondent, Michael, sees the democratic participation opportunities and the committed involvement of many respondents in their clubs as ways to prevent radicalisation. Michael and other respondents agree that clubs offer a rather open, partly Christian, and non-radical environment:

That means that marksmen also have a lot of people around them who are not radical. As I said, that's not one hundred per cent of the people. Of course not. But there are a lot of people who are not radical, and you move around in many, uhm yes also at many events that are open, that are Christian, that have nothing to do with radicalisation. I think that if people see this and are anchored in it, I believe that they are less at risk of becoming radicalised or of going down radical trajectories. (Michael)

The values promoted within the marksmen's club milieu, alongside other norms and rules of the milieu, can thus be understood as one component of the wider set of the norms and values described above such as 'being right-wing is bad', whose (anticipated) violation may evoke (anticipated) shame. Indeed, the specific norms and values of the marksmen's club milieu are seen by some respondents as contributing directly to P/CR and facilitating pathways of non-radicalisation of young people in marksmen's clubs[22] and in general. From a criminological control theory perspective concerned with factors that prevent individuals from deviant and offending behaviour (Britt and Rocque 2017; Eifler 2002: 44–

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[22] The same would presumably apply to occurrences of (anticipated) shame in marksmen's clubs that would be triggered by (anticipated) violations of these clubs' norms and values.

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47), moreover, the marksmen's community itself might be considered a potential resource for P/CR and membership of it a factor in non-radicalisation. If Hirschi's (1969) above mentioned argument that a range of 'social bonds' ('attachment', 'commitment', 'belief' and 'involvement') have potentially crime-reducing effects is extended to the case of the marksmen and P/CR, it would suggest that the strong attachment of many marksmen to their community, often reinforced through inter-generational and friendship connections[23], heightens conformity to its norms and rules, since violation of these norms risks discreditation by community members (fear of which might also underlie (anticipated) shame) (Costello and Laub 2020; Eifler 2002: 45–46; Hirschi 1969). Moreover, club members seem to display the kind of 'commitment' to what they have invested and achieved in their marksmen's communities described by Hirschi (1969: 20–21) as being important in preventing norm and value violating behaviour (see also Eifler 2002: 45). Strong attachment to communities may be reflected in members' 'belief' in the communities' norms and values (Hirschi, 1969: 29–30) or a result of the socialising effects of this community (see footnote 23). Hirschi (1969) also notes the important bonding effect of temporal 'involvement' in 'conventional activities', which reduces availability for criminal or deviant behaviour (Costello and Laub 2020; Eifler 2002: 45–46). Confirmation of this was found in this study where, for example, Michael (cited above) explicitly expressed the view that committed involvement in club life did not leave time or capacity to engage in radical/extremist thoughts or behaviour.

It is also worth noting that the marksmen's community appears to fulfil similar needs for members as groups and movements across the right-wing of the political spectrum in that they provide a community with a strong sense of belonging. Some empirical studies actually suggest that the search for communities and belonging can be an important pull factor into

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[23] Most of the parents of the respondents (or at least one of them) as well as, in some cases, grandparents or other siblings are/were members of the same marksmen's club. Additionally, many of the respondents' friendships were made and developed, often from childhood, in the context of one's own marksmen's club or the marksmen's environment and marksmanship in general. In this respect, it can be argued that marksmen's clubs are also places of primary and secondary socialisation, but also of tertiary socialisation, e.g., because of the youth work carried out in it.

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groups and movements of the right-wing political spectrum, but also into groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Doosje et al. 2016: 81; Kimmel 2007: 210; Pilkington et al. 2018). Thus, the marksmen's club milieu (like other milieus with a strong sense of belonging) might have a deradicalising or non-radicalising effect because those who experience community and belonging are less likely to seek this in groups and movements across the more extreme right-wing of the political spectrum. This is articulated by Hanna as she explains what she thinks attracts young people to right-wing extremist groups:

> It is the same that is theoretically so attractive about the marksmen's club. This belonging and, uhm, in principle you just find people in this group who also have your opinion and, uhm, you start to meet them more frequently. It's like a circle of friends that you find. Similar to biker gangs or something. (Hanna)

From stigmatising shaming to dialogue

In the previous sections, it has been argued that (anticipated) shame, values, and norms as well as the marksmen's community and its social bonds can be a possible resource for P/CR and might be a factor contributing to non-radicalisation (in the marksmen's club milieu). In this part, it will be suggested, however, that if (anticipated) shame takes the form of 'stigmatising labelling' or 'stigmatising shaming' – in the sense of Braithwaite's (1989) theory of 'reintegrative shaming' – such shame could have possible negative or 'backfire effects'[24]. This argument is based on respondents' reflections on the potential backfire effects of the application of terms such as 'Nazi', which can be perceived as being used as a 'policy

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[24] A form of shame whose effects, or 'backfire effects', are described by some authors as 'stigmatising' and constituting a form of 'soft repression' against certain social movements and groups that may be used to prevent or counter radicalisation. Such 'soft repression' are often applied by civil society, whereas 'hard repression' mainly instituted by the state (Ferree 2004; Jämte and Ellefsen 2020; Lindekilde 2014).

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of silencing', or even as potentially triggering or fuelling of radicalisation processes. Finally, the concept of 'reintegrative shaming' and dialogue is suggested as a possible resolution.

Backfire effects of labelling and stigmatising shaming

About half of the respondents believed that many people use terms like 'right-wing' ('radical'/'extremist') or 'Nazi' too often and too quickly. They also felt that these terms are often used too broadly or even incorrectly when describing individuals and/or political opinions, especially around the topics of 'refugees, 'immigration' and coexisting or living with 'migrants'. For example, in Maurice's opinion, the terms 'radicalism'' and 'extremism' are justified because 'one cannot always describe everything however you want'. At the same time, he also criticises the frequency with which the terms 'Nazi', 'radicalism', and 'extremism' are used:

> Uhm, I have the feeling that Nazi is also used far too much. [...] You are not a Nazi if you say something bad against a foreigner. Then you are often called a Nazi and that is not so, that is not a Nazi. A Nazi is much more extreme, much worse, and I think it's similar with the two terms extremism and radicalism. [...] That you are quickly labelled just because you have a different opinion, which of course is usually not right. But everyone is allowed to form their own opinion and then you are far from being a racist or a Nazi or from extremism or whatever. (Maurice)

Some of the respondents expressed a kind of fear of being labelled a 'Nazi' or as 'extreme' or 'radical', whilst also noting that you have to be careful about expressing political opinions publicly on some issues. Frederik, for example, considers himself 'a little bit right-wing' but not as 'extreme' regarding some of his opinions towards 'foreigners', 'because I, I don't do anything'. This distinction between having a right-wing opinion about foreigners (which is for Frederik not radical/extreme) versus hostile actions towards foreigners (which is

for Frederik radical/extreme) seems to be so important to Frederik that, at the end of the interview, when I asked him what impact he would like the research conducted by the DARE project to have, he replied: 'Maybe, I don't know. Maybe it'll shake people up a bit. So that people don't see us as Nazis or whatever, if you are a little bit right-wing, like I am now […]'. Hanna reflects more concretely on the possible effects of being labelled 'radical' or 'extreme' as she imagines whether these terms might be applied to a group of young marksmen from her club whom she herself describes as 'a little bit right-wing':

> [...] If you then claim that someone is uhm extremist or uhm radical. Then they are labelled as such, so you already know, it's going in that direction, but it's just like someone who's addicted to alcohol, I think. I think that's a good comparison, when you say he's an alcoholic, then he's almost directly labelled. Even if it's just for you. And uhm, that's like with the prejudices against foreigners […]. [...] '[H]e's radical now' or 'he attacks children', 'he has beaten him and him'. That goes around much faster than anything nice and that's why I think you have to be so damn careful with that. And especially on such topics you have to pay attention who you talk to about it, or whether you give names at all [...]. (Hanna)

Finally, Peter described how he has been called a 'Nazi' himself; an experience reported by five other respondents. This labelling, he feels, can create alienation and even affect people's voting behaviour:

> This has happened to me several times in my life. I was a Nazi because I listened to [the band] 'Freiwild'[25]. I was a Nazi because I do this, I am a Nazi because I do that, I am a Nazi because I am a marksman. The thing is, I haven't even expressed an opinion or done anything in any other area. I just have a hobby, I am a marksman: 'Nazi'. I hear 'Freiwild': 'Nazi', I listen to [the band] 'Onkelz': Nazi. [...] Then you have people who keep quiet because they don't want to be

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[25] On this band, see: Rammerstorfer (2015); Seeliger (2019).

called a Nazi [...]. [...] I have been put in a right-wing corner just because I am conservative: 'Then you are a Nazi, then you are shit'. That is a reaction you find all the time. […]. Because if you are called a Nazi, you will be shunned by many. The thing is that it has become a weapon that people like to use very, very much. […] And this shunning strategy is just one of the things that makes you have a lot of people who now think, 'then I can vote for the AfD if I'm a Nazi anyway'. And so many people accuse me of this and I really know many who would actually rather vote for CDU or CSU or FDP, who say, 'then I will think about it [voting for the AfD], I'm a Nazi anyway'. (Peter)

Respondent narratives thus suggest that labelling takes place in concrete everyday situations and matters to them because it carries with it stigmatising effects and associated dangers of loss of social status, social ties and face as well as corresponding shame-related fears. They also reflect a more general perception of a social and political 'policy of silencing' (Grimm and Pilkington 2015; Pilkington 2016: 203–221), which is also found in broader social strata (Häusler and Küpper 2019; Köcher 2019). This can also lead to stigmatisation fear that can trigger 'self-silencing' (Lindekilde 2014: 60) or 'keeping one's mouth shut' (Pilkington 2016: 204–206). Ultimately, it can result in real problems and legitimate concerns (even if articulated in a problematic way) not being adequately represented in local, public and political discourses (see also Pilkington, 2016: 220). Indeed, agents in the right-wing spectrum, such as the AfD party, seek to exploit this by presenting themselves as representatives of silenced people. Most importantly, feeling silenced, possibly leading to 'self-silencing', can also lead to the failure to identify emic perspectives as potentially important resources for P/CR. Lindekilde (2014) considers 'self-silencing' as one kind of possible 'backfire effect' or 'perverse effect of radicalization prevention' (60) that can result in a loss of potential allies in counter radicalisation efforts; in his example the loss of orthodox but not violence prone Muslim actors (ibid.). In the milieu studied in this article, the possibility that such labelling can backfire insofar as it can trigger or fuel radicalisation

processes instead of having a deradicalising or non-radicalising effect, is also evident as, for example, in Peter's perspective outlined above. So how can (anticipated) shame become a possible resource for P/CR without labelling individuals (i.e. as 'radical'/'extreme' ('right-wing') or 'Nazi') and possibly triggering radicalisation-relevant backfire effects?

Reintegrative shaming and dialogue

To answer this question, Braithwaite's (1989) theory of 'reintegrative shaming' is returned to. This theoretical approach would consider such labelling as a kind of 'stigmatising shaming' and therefore as a form of punishment for certain (political) views, feelings, statements, behaviours or even group and community affiliations. In contrast, the concept of 'reintegrative shaming' separates views and behaviours from the persons expressing them; as Braithwaite (2001) puts it, 'the offender is treated as a good person who has done a bad deed'. This distinction between (political) views of individuals and these individuals themselves is supported by respondents in this study. As Anne puts it, 'I cannot allege that everyone who has a certain political opinion is extremist'. Similarly, Maurice says 'you are quickly labelled [as 'radical' or 'extreme'] just because you have a different opinion, which of course is mostly not right. But everyone is allowed to form their own opinion and then you are far from being a racist or a Nazi or from extremism or whatever'. From the respondents' perspective, labelling in the manner of 'stigmatising shaming' should also be avoided because it can lead to backfire effects, such as (further) radicalisation. This was illustrated above in Peter's claim that one might as well vote for an extreme right-wing party, 'as I'm a Nazi anyway' and reflects the process Braithwaite (1989) describes as turning away from the rejecting society and towards the delinquent subculture.

Other statements from respondents speak to the power of not rejecting people because of their opinions but, rather, engaging in a dialogue. For example, when confronted with right-wing statements and views, Michael suggests talking about his conversation partner's reasons for their right-wing views. He says that in such conversations, he sometimes seeks to

discuss these issues instead of not engaging. In so doing, Michael also aims to rethink his own views, if necessary, or to convey a different perspective to his conversation partner. Similarly, Peter believes in dialogue around critical views on German refugee policy in 2015/2016 and generally conservative views. Instead of just playing the 'Nazi card' or using other right-wing labels, he says, dialogue should be sought:

> Because otherwise you are not able to meet them where they are. You are not able to argue, 'I can understand your position in principle, but...' And then I bring you into the dialogue, because in a dialogue we are together. If I tell you, 'You're shit', then we have separate positions. (Peter)

While labelling in the manner of 'stigmatising shaming' shuts down dialogue, such dialogue provides an opportunity to understand why other people say, feel and think certain things, behave in certain ways and affiliate themselves with certain groups. Dialogue allows the recognition of people's statements and behaviours as expressions of real problems and legitimate concerns. Similarly, to the theory and concept of 'reintegrative shaming', dialogue also offers the possibility of criticising the other person without rejecting them based on norms and values. At the same time, dialogue can offer the opportunity to state the points of criticism, for example racist thinking, but in a non-stigmatising way, and can recommit individuals to social norms and values as well as to society at large. In this way, emic perspectives suggest, through dialogue[26], non-radicalisation can be preserved and radicalisation can be countered without unintended and counter-productive effects[27]. After all, dialogue is not only meant as dialogue between individuals; dialogue also takes place when politics, science, or society at large engages in exchanges with certain individuals and groups instead of speaking about, and judging, them.

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[26] Regarding the relationship between dialogue and radicalism/extremism and the call for dialogue as a response to radical messages, see the DARE country level report of Pilkington (2020) and also Pilkington (2021). Regarding dialogue as a tool for practical P/CR work, see the work of Hussain et al. (2019) reflecting on the possibilities of mediated dialogue as a tool for secondary level countering of violent extremism (CVE).

[27] At the same time, there may of course be cases where dialogue is not an option and maybe 'stigmatising shaming' would be more appropriate, for example in the case of ideologically entrenched individuals, extreme right-wing groups or parties.

Conclusion

This article has drawn on insights from research with young marksmen and markswomen and their emic perspectives to identify potential capacities and resources for P/CR within the marksmen's club milieu as well as possible factors of non-radicalisation in the marksmen's club milieu and more widely.

The article discussed how emotions such as (anticipated) shame and certain norms and values appeared to have steered some respondents towards distancing themselves, cognitively, emotionally and behaviourally from certain agents, thoughts, opinions, feelings, and decisions (e.g., extreme right-wing groups or voting for right-wing to extreme right-wing parties). Drawing on findings from criminal justice research, which have demonstrated a negative correlation between 'offending' and 'anticipated shame'/'moral values', the article concludes that (anticipated) shame as well as norms and values might be a possible resource for P/CR. An additional resource for P/CR could also be the specific norms and values (such as Christian values) found in the marksmen's club milieu or in marksmen's clubs and their communities and whose significance was expressed by respondents. It has been argued that the (anticipated) violation of such norms and values could trigger (anticipated) shame and, based on respondents' statements and supported by existing findings from the field of criminal justice research, such possible episodes of (anticipated) shame as well as the norms and values of the milieu could serve as a possible resource for P/CR. Furthermore, the criminological concept of 'social bonds', whose crime-reducing effect has been partially confirmed empirically, might also help position the marksmen's community as a possible resource for P/CR. This, it has been suggested, is because the 'attachment' to the marksmen's community, the 'commitment' to the personal investments and achievements made in this community, the 'belief' in its norms and values and the temporal 'involvement' in it make it less likely that the norms and values of the marksmen's community will be violated through right-wing related behaviour. In addition, the article has highlighted the community and belonging that marksmen can experience in their clubs, which in turn might reduce the danger

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of seeking community and belonging in groups and movements across the right-wing of the political spectrum. Thus, one finding of this article is that emotions such as (anticipated) shame as well as norms and values (of the marksmen club milieu) and the marksmen's community and it's social bonds can be possible resources for P/CR and might be a contributing factor in explaining non-radicalisation within the marksmen club milieu.

However, it is also recognised that negative labelling of others may create possible backfire effects, such as perceived 'policy of silencing', or even trigger or fuel radicalisation processes rather than having a deradicalising or non-radicalising effects. This was demonstrated with reference to the perspectives of some of the interviewed marksmen that some people or certain political opinions were associated too often, too quickly, and too broadly, and at times even incorrectly as 'right-wing' ('radical'/'extreme') or 'Nazi'. It was shown that the criminological concept of 'reintegrative shaming' offers some solutions for the negative effects of labelling. At the core of 'reintegrative shaming' is the idea that the behaviour of offenders should be considered as temporary misbehaviour rather than labelling or stigmatising the whole person as morally deficient or deviant. In this context, some respondents suggested distinguishing, for example, between the (political) views of individuals and these individuals themselves in order to avoid 'stigmatising shaming' by labelling them as 'radical/'extreme' ('right-wing') or 'Nazi' because of these (political) views. It was argued that entering into a dialogue in the spirit of 'reintegrative shaming' can be seen as a chance to understand others, to recognise their problems and concerns as legitimate, and to criticise, without rejecting, them. In contrast to 'stigmatising shaming', dialogue might reduce or even avoid possible backfire effects, thereby reducing the risk of misrecognising and not adequately addressing real problems and legitimate concerns in local, public and political discourses as well of misrecognising and losing valuable emic perspectives and possible allies in countering and preventing radicalisation and of triggering or fuelling radicalisation processes. Thus, in summary, it has been argued that (anticipated) shame may be a potential resource for P/CR but can also lead to negative backfire effects when it takes the form of 'stigmatising shaming'. However, forms of 'reintegrative shaming'

or the engagement in common dialogue could mitigate, possibly even eliminate these negative backfire effects. Finally, the article has shown that emic perspectives offer valuable insights for PC/R and can help to explain pathways of non-radicalisation. In this way, the milieus where these perspectives originate may provide sources to prevent and counter radicalisation.

Further empirical research should systematically address the role that extra-ideological factors, such as (moral) emotions, norms, and values, play not only in radicalisation processes, but also for P/CR and non-radicalisation processes. Such research should also focus on the milieus and communities with their social bonds in which such emotions, norms and values are embedded and experienced and which in turn could be sites of reintegrative dialogue. As far as practical P/CR work is concerned, milieus with strong communities and norms and values that for example contradict right-wing radicalism and right-wing extremism should be strengthened. Those norms and values could be key resources for P/CR to be used against radical or extreme messages and their messengers within these milieus. This applies especially to milieus that, like the marksmen's club milieu, cannot be understood as radical/extreme right-wing in a classically defined sense, but in which encounters with right-wing to extreme right-wing messages nevertheless occur. It is particularly important not to label and stigmatise such milieus or their members per se as radical/extreme. Like their norms and values, the emic perspectives of these milieus should be understood as a possible resource for P/CR. Members in these milieus can be allies in P/CR, and it is crucial to identify and avoid possible backfire effects. Dialogue (in the spirit of reintegrative shaming) should be sought and carried out with and within the milieu when it is reasonable and possible. Further work is needed to facilitate the design and implementation of such dialogue in appropriate milieu-specific ways.

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