
Collaboration in Hybrid Spaces: The Case of Nordic Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism

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Abstract

In this article, we analyze policy regulating the multiagency organizational approaches used in Nordic countries to prevent violent extremism. From an institutional logic perspective and a conceptualization of multiagency work as conducted in hybrid spaces, we analyze and develop a new theoretical framework to explain how central policies inhabit distinctive logics that compete, mix, and co-exist in these spaces, and how they inscribe specific power relations embedded in dominant discourses.

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Introduction

Much like in other parts of the world, recent violent events in the Nordic region have emphasized the need for governments to take action against violent extremism and terrorism at all levels of society (Cherney & Hartley, 2017; Andersson Malmros, 2019). Internationally, prevention in this area is termed PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) or CVE (Countering Violent Extremism). In this paper, we primarily use the latter term, to denote measures and actions that are suggested to safeguard society and individuals from extremist violence and terrorism.

The ways in which the problem of radicalization and extremism are understood, reflect on the actions and measures suggested in policy (Hardy, 2018). From a general perspective, CVE efforts are often described as striking a balance between security measures

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and social preventive measures (Mattsson & Säljö, 2018). Security measures are those that are supposed to reduce the *capacity* of already radicalized extremists and the vulnerability of potential targets (Bjørge, 2017). Adjustments made to legal frameworks and an intensification of security services' capacity for action are part of these measures, along with intensified border controls, the criminalization of acts related to preparations for or assistance to terrorist attacks, or financial support or assistance to terrorist groups (Malkki, 2016).

The main focus of social preventive measures is to prevent and reduce the *intention* to commit extremist acts. While security measures aim to protect infrastructure and citizens from impending attacks, social preventive measures have a longer-term perspective and focus on reaching “the hearts and minds” of risky and at-risk individuals (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Kundnani, 2014). In research and policy, there have been some disciplinary struggles between what have been described as more repressive approaches that emphasize restrictive and punitive measures, and welfare approaches, the so-called soft measures that mimic programs and methods designed to handle other forms of youth delinquency (Burnett & Appleton, 2004).

Nordic approaches to handling extremism

The Nordic approach is described as one that strives to combine social preventative and security perspectives by addressing the problem from various angles. It is clear that prevention of radicalization and violent extremism is a complex task that calls for complex solutions (Bjørge, 2011), and following this standpoint, preventive perspectives and approaches are best serving the aim if they are various and multifaceted. One of the problems with handling violent extremism is that, due to its inherent complexity, it comes with challenges that no individual actor or agency has the knowledge, capacity, or operational space to solve (Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2019). In the Nordic countries, one main organizational approach to handle the issue has, therefore, been to gather the key actors

needed for providing solutions into multiagency collaborative teams. These teams consist of professionals from different sectors and agencies (e.g., schools, social services, and police) with the purpose of working together in dealing with violent extremism.

Early and general intervention is at the core of the multiagency approach (MA) to violent extremism. Such collaboration between schools, social services, and the police is called the *SSP model* (school, social services, police) in Denmark, *SSP(f)* in Sweden (where the f stands for ‘*fritids,*’ or after-school care), *Anchor* (Ankkuri) in Finland, and *SLT* (coordination of local drug abuse and crime prevention measures) in Norway. Even if the backbone of this collaboration is the school, social services, and the police, an MA approach to CVE sometimes involves other professions, such as health care, psychiatry, employment services, correctional institutions, and civil society organizations, either as permanent partners or “on-demand.”

Hybrid organizations and institutional logics

An MA unit can be conceptualized as a hybrid: an organizational structure comprising actors with diverse professions, assumptions, values, beliefs, and practices that come together to handle a common task. Battilana, Besharov, and Mitzinneck (2017) describe how hybrids can be defined as organizations that “instantiate the values and practices associated with multiple distinct field- or societal-level logics” (p. 137). Since MA approaches are multidisciplinary hybrids, they incorporate elements from diverse institutional logics and may, therefore, become arenas for contradiction (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013). Thus, logics tend to mix, compete, and blend together, as they are activated in the collaborative MA spaces that are at the center of our attention. From this perspective, understanding multiagency collaboration as hybrid spaces is interesting, as the actors in such collaborative structures come from different institutional orders.

When trying to understand the conditions for different organizational actors to engage in multiagency collaboration, we turn to the sociological perspective that describes an

institution as a “more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-producing social order” (Greenwood et al., 2008, pp. 4–5). Consequently, institutions are “the rules of the game” (Scott, 1995), the regulative, normative, and cultural orders and constraints that guide social behavior in specific social spaces. They explain why Westerners know to shake hands (or bump elbows in pandemics) the first time they meet and why Nordics expect public authorities to be fair, objective, and just. In the methods section, we show how the institutional logics were operationalized for this paper.

Aim and research questions

The aim of this article is to explore the institutional logics that are prevalent in Nordic CVE policy aimed at MA and to compare how these are manifested in the respective countries. Also, and from a more empirical perspective, we map the organizational setups and difference actors, practices, and hierarches that are advocated in policy. Moreover, and from a theoretical standpoint, we critically discuss how the balance between these logics might impact power relations in MA approaches. This aim leads to the following research questions:

[1] What institutional logics can be identified in Nordic MA efforts to prevent violent extremism?

[2] How can the respective logics potentially impact practices concerning CVE efforts?

These questions are an important direction for research, since MA work is often viewed from a functionalist perspective, focusing on advantages, success stories, and “best practices” while neglecting potential conflicts and problems. Indeed, the hybridity inherent in multiagency collaboration makes them into “arenas of contradictions” (Pache & Santos, 2013, p. 972) and, thus, central for understanding the social reality of multiagency CVE efforts.

Method: Analyzing CVE policy

The article is based on an analysis of Nordic national policies for preventing or countering extremism published between 2009 and 2019 (Appendix 1). A common way of describing policy is that it is “a set of actions taken to solve a problem” (Walker, 2000, p. 14), or, in the simplest sense, policy is decisions about a course of action (Spickler, 2006). We define policy as *policy as text* (Ball, 1993) as a way of focusing on the manifested content in the policies without giving attention to how policy is enacted upon. We also ascribe to *policy as discourse* (Ball, 1993), which renders a more theoretical and critical analysis, enabling revelations of potential discrepancies, tensions, gaps, and bridges.

As a first step, relevant policy documents for preventing extremism were identified in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. These identified documents follow the common organizational structures addressing state, national, regional, or local levels; thus, policies from different levels of the organizational structures were incorporated. However, there are distinct differences between the local levels that make them notoriously difficult to compare. For instance, Denmark has 98 municipalities, Finland 311, Norway 356 (from 2020), and Sweden 290. While Denmark has 3 municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants, in Norway, there are 200 of these small municipalities. These internal differences make it hard to make valid local comparisons; instead, we have focused on national policy.

A policy that governs established multiagency approaches was also identified and collected, along with evaluations and assessments connected to these forms of cooperation. In this instance, some of the documented initiatives deal directly with CVE, while others might be more indirect. Hence, the identifying and collecting stage is inductive (Spickler, 2006).

To guide the analysis, we used a strategic tool based on the pentad analysis model developed by Kenneth Burke (1969). Burke’s pentad analysis traditionally rests on five aspects of interaction or dramatic episodes in texts: act, agency, actor, scene, and purpose (see Table 1).

AIM	<i>ANALYTICAL Q</i> How is multiagency work organized in the Nordic countries?
ACT	<i>What is supposed to be done? What is the multiagency work supposed to focus on and work with?</i>
AGENCY	<i>How is it supposed to be done? How are they supposed to perform their work? What methods are at hand?</i>
ACTOR	<i>Who is supposed to do it? Who is involved in the work? What are their roles and responsibilities?</i>
SCENE	<i>Where and when is it supposed to be done? In what arenas or forums is the actual work being done?</i>
PURPOSE	<i>Why is it supposed to be done? What is the purpose of the work? Why is it needed?</i>

Table 1. *Pentad analysis for MA.*

As a first step, the sections in which multiagency approaches are mentioned or referred to in the documents were singled out and manually coded in collaboration between the authors and in accordance with the pentad framework. This was a way to sort a large dataset and to visualize and explore the organizational structures and how roles, responsibilities, and expertise were assigned between the involved actors. This coding paid special attention to how the scene and purpose could shed light on how MA was advocated. To further identify the logics, we used what Reay and Jones (2016) called pattern inducing: a bottom-up process to discern patterns (logics).

Guided by the notion that institutional logic constitutes the formal and informal rules that govern, or guide, the practitioner's actions, interactions, and interpretations of situations, Thornton et al. (2012) claim that an institutional logic can be deconstructed by analyzing particular elements of the logic. *Collective identities* provide answers to actors about who they are and where they belong. The actor's sense of belonging to a collective helps them orient themselves and understand how to act in given situations. The connection to collective identities can be based on groups (e.g., ethnic, cultural, or interest groups), professions/occupations (for example, teachers or doctors), organizations, and industries. *Goals* are to be understood as what is desirable to achieve when you belong to a certain

collective identity. For example, most teachers strive for their pupils to develop as human beings, improve, and succeed in school. *Strategies* help actors understand which situations they should act upon and how they should act. Each logic resorts to different solutions and answers in a given situation. Consequently, some solutions are available in one logic but unavailable in another. The *ground for attention* explains why some questions/situations/problems are given a lot of attention in specific logics, while others are not. *The ground for authority* helps individuals orientate themselves in decision-making. According to some institutional logics, the manager makes all the decisions, while others are more decentralized or collective in their decision-making. To sum up, institutional logic helps an individual understand which type of collective he/she belongs to, what that type of collective is striving to achieve, which problems/situations to focus on, which strategies and tools are appropriate to apply in relation to the problem/situation, and who decides what type of action is appropriate.

The pentad analysis is consistent with, and supportive in, analyzing the collective identities, goals, strategies, ground for attention, and ground for authority that instruct patterns and logics (Thornton et al., 2012). The excerpts displayed in the following results section are meant to exemplify the findings; most of them are translated from Scandinavian languages by the authors.

Results

Building on the pentad, we initially describe the organizational approaches in each country and afford a comparison. This is followed by an analysis of how MA is advocated in policy. Thereafter, we present the distinct institutional logics that we found in policy and discuss how these logics are disseminated within and between the Nordic countries and the potential consequences of mixing logics.

Danish SSP

The Danish approach to violent extremism and radicalization is anchored in two agendas. “One is the protection of the state and society against terrorist attacks, while the other is the welfare state’s responsibility for the individual’s well-being” (Hemmingsen, 2015, p. 15). The Danish action plan (DK, 2016) explicitly positions collaboration and common understanding between authorities at the core of preventive efforts (ibid., p. 6). The prioritized areas in the action plan are centered on the strengthening of existing bodies, including the police, municipalities, schools, and international collaboration. Furthermore, it states that the prevention of extremism and radicalization is based on a crime prevention framework.

Multiagency approaches are an important part of CVE interventions in Denmark; Rambøll (2018) shows that SSP is the most prevalent form used in organizing local preventive actions. The starting point for SSP cooperation is the need for early multiagency preventive actions for children and young people at risk of ending up in criminal activity or drug abuse. Thus, the main objective of Denmark’s SSP efforts is crime prevention.

SSP is described as an interdisciplinary collaboration between schools, social services, and the police aimed at general crime prevention (see Table 2). The national action plan (DK, 2016) highlights that crime prevention collaborations between authorities are mainly for that purpose, and that SSP and other multiagency forms of collaboration can “draw on methods from the fields of social work and healthcare to prevent radicalization” (ibid., p. 14).

Agency level	Involved actors	Purpose
Area council - in 12 police districts (<i>Kredsråd</i>)	Chief of police, city mayor, key actors such as representatives from the probation service, healthcare system, psychiatry, and SSP coordinators; others when needed.	Develop strategic aims and priorities, and regulations for actions. Discuss cooperation between the police and the local community. Provide local overviews and share information with relevant actors.
Local council (<i>Lokalråd</i>)	Relevant actors include civil society organizations and representatives from government agencies and institutions and municipal administrations. The police chief and SSP consultant are most often involved. Other actors may be involved as required.	Operationalize decisions made in the area council. Coordinate SSP efforts in line with policy frameworks (child, health, and abuse policies). Provide local assessments of needs and for developing local strategies for SSP. Coordinate cooperation and align the local council with the operational level.
Operational level SSP (<i>Udførende niveau</i>)	Actors directly working with young people in the municipality such as the police, social workers, youth workers, and teachers. Other relevant actors may be involved as required.	Operationalize decisions made in the local council. Assess needs among young people in the local community. Inform about local individual or collective needs for support. Involve young individuals and families in crime prevention activities. Explore the need for methods and actions to be used in primary prevention.

Table 2. *Organization of Danish SSP.*

Finnish Ankkuri

In Finland, policies on counterterrorism and CVE are somewhat intertwined. The Finnish counter-terrorism strategy states that “Counter-terrorism in Finland is based on cooperation and partnership among all authorities and societal actors” (FI, 2018b, p. 14). One of the fundamental principles of prevention in the Finnish action plan is the interaction between different authorities, organizations, and communities. Such multiagency cooperation is assumed to contribute to an up-to-date awareness of the situation and contribute various means and solutions.

No single authority organisation possesses the means to put a stop to the radicalisation process among individuals or groups on its own. When the

different practitioners collaborate, they also gain access to a wide range of instruments (FI, 2016, p. 14).

With the multiagency approach as a fundamental principle, one of the short-term goals for actions is to (up until the end of 2018) establish national and local structures and procedures for multi-professional cooperation, making it possible for authorities, organizations, and communities to prevent violent radicalization and extremism.

The Finnish Ankkuri (Anchor) team approach is very much inspired by the Danish Aarhus model (Lenos & Keltjens, 2017), which tries “to be the anchor for young people who drift away” (ibid). The Anchor model’s purpose is to offer seamless services and accelerate interventions for adolescents in need of support and to offer a client-based service (Ministry of the Interior, 2013, 2014). The Anchor approach is described as an intersectoral early intervention model (FI, 2016, p. 19), consisting of mixed teams of professionals collaborating at the local level (Ministry of the Interior, 2014).

The Anchor team approach is firmly tied to the police, which has a special responsibility for preventing and countering radicalization and extremism; thus, all police departments must carry out activities in accordance with the Anchor team model (FI, 2016, p. 27). However, the capacity of the Anchor team model in different cities and settings relies on the local operating environment and circumstances (see Table 3).

In the *Handbook for the Anchor model* (Moilanen, Airaksinen, & Kangasniemi, 2019), the objectives of multi-professional work are to prevent crimes and strengthen the wellbeing of young individuals, offer young people and their families appropriate help in time, support participation and prevent exclusion, and prevent and identify radicalization resulting in violent extremism. In this way, internal security is strengthened through early intervention.

Agency level	Involved actors	Purpose
Anchor steering group	Police chief or mayor	Establish Anchor team efforts in the area, coordinating the work in a shared understanding.
Middle managers, steering group	Managers from the police, social services, youth work, and the health sector.	Responsible for the coordination and evaluation of Anchor team efforts. Ensure that the teams have adequate resources for doing their work, including guidance and support from management. Define target groups for the Anchor teams, and make sure that the team is aware of and follows the legislation and guidelines for sharing information.
Grassroots or shop floor level	Police officer, social worker, youth worker, nurse.	Operational work in shared office premises.

Table 3. *Organization of Anchor team efforts.*

Norwegian SLT

According to Bjørgero and Gjelsvik (2015), the emphasis in CVE efforts in Norway is on preventive measures rather than repressive ones. In the police strategy for crime prevention, mobilization, involvement, and mutual cooperation are key factors in prevention, and this is one of the reasons for expanding SLT initiatives (ibid., p.13). The Norwegian action plan, commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (NO, 2014), states that “early preventative efforts are a responsibility that rests with many sectors of society” (ibid., p. 7). Furthermore, it states that “General preventative efforts in many different fields can also help prevent people from choosing violence as a means of achieving their ideological or religious goals” (ibid., p. 7). The plan emphasizes that preventive work requires interdisciplinary efforts and thinking, along with established local cooperative models in which the municipalities, the Police Council, and the SLT model work together.

Norway's SLT model (Samordning av Lokale rus og kriminalitets-forebyggende Tiltak) is based on the Danish SSP model. A report (NIBR, 2016:12) states that even though the SLT model has a wider preventive and promotive purpose it is central in local efforts against extremism and radicalization.

SLT is a model for cooperation that primarily handles cases involving children and young people under the age of 18. SLT involves actors representing municipalities, the police, and other government agencies (see Table 4). Civil society organizations and local enterprises can also be involved. The model is intended to coordinate knowledge and resources between the police and relevant municipal units. In addition, SLT is recommended by the Norwegian Crime Preventive Council (KRÅD, 2011) as a structure to steer and increase the efficiency of preventive efforts (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014). The organization is based on three levels that allocate the responsibilities for governance, coordination, and implementation.

Agency level	Involved actors	Purpose
Steering committee (<i>Styrings-gruppe</i>)	Chief of police, the municipality, SLT coordinator, and/or police council.	Authority to safeguard the implementation of SLT. The task of the steering committee is to set clear objectives for drug and crime prevention and to make sure these are implemented in the municipal action plans. The committee needs to have relevant knowledge in the field in which SLT is operating and coordinate the network within the municipality.
Coordination group (<i>Koordinering sgruppe</i>)	Head of agencies/groups from the municipality and police with the authority to make decisions and with knowledge of the challenges related to their respective areas.	Make decisions and allocate resources in line with steering committee; highlight problems and challenges in the local community; provide knowledge on how challenges and problems can be handled; make sure that each sector contributes knowledge and expertise and that they are put into practice; ensure that resources are used efficiently.

Working committee (<i>Utførende</i>)	Actors directly working with young people through SLT in the municipality, police, schools, health services, and civil society.	Drug abuse and crime prevention. The working committee puts the objectives from the steering committee into practice and needs to have close and good communications with the coordination group.
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Table 4. *Organization of SLT.*

Swedish SSP(f)

Sweden's CVE policy has undergone some organizational and discursive shifts during the last few years, and the responsibility for handling issues concerning violent extremism has been transferred from the Ministry of Culture to the Ministry of Justice. In addition, action plans and strategic policies have been evaluated, revised, and replaced. In comparison with other national strategies, Sweden has previously put more rhetorical emphasis on the long-term strengthening and safeguarding of democracy than on security measures. In Sweden, there are no specific responsibilities for CVE efforts placed at the regional level. County administration boards cooperate with the seven police territories on crime prevention, and these territories coordinate smaller police districts or local police units.

In the Swedish case, local actors, such as first-line personnel (professionals working within education, afterschool leisure centers, social services, healthcare services, and local police), are often described as key actors in prevention. Civil society organizations and faith communities are also believed to play a crucial role in prevention work (Sivenbring & Andersson Malmros, 2022; Wimelius et al., 2020).

Even though SSP(f) is briefly described in the state official investigation (SOU, 2013, p. 81), there are no national regulations or recommendations for the establishment of specific multiagency approaches, in contrast to Denmark, for instance. However, there are other forms of multiagency approaches besides SSP(f), for instance, SIG (Social action groups), which are locally organized in municipalities. The SIG and SSP(f) teams are generally based on the same foundation, and their aim is crime prevention. The difference is that SIG teams are interagency collaborations (Burnett & Appleton, 2004), as they are put together based on

individual cases and assessments of the needs of a particular individual (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2016).

Organizing SSP(f) efforts at the local level depends on collaborative agreements between the police and social services in the municipalities (see Table 5). While being frequently mentioned in policy on CVE, it remains unclear how many municipalities in Sweden actually use SSP(f) as a multiagency structure for handling violent extremism. According to the Swedish police (2013), Gothenburg, Uppsala, and Malmö have established SSP(f) cooperation.

Agency level	Involved actors	Purpose
Local steering group or central cooperation team <i>(Local kontroll-grupp eller centralt samarbetsteam)</i>	SSP(f) coordinators from local divisions of the city. Executives from involved agencies. Headed by social services.	Organize and control the cooperation. Responsible for frameworks, objectives, and evaluation. Provide support and information.
Executive group <i>(Ledningsgrupp)</i>	Heads of agencies/groups, unit leaders, youth police, school principals from the municipality, and the police.	Coordinate, plan, and allocate actions and interventions.
Operative team <i>(Operativt team)</i>	Actors directly working with young people through SSP(f) in the municipality, school personnel, youth workers, the police, and civil society.	Operational work, everyday relational and social actions.

Table 5. *Organization of SSP(f).*

A Nordic MA model?

When looking at the *action*, *agency*, and *actors* (Burke, 1969) in MA policy, the multiagency approaches in all the Nordic countries follow a three-tier organizational structure where governance, coordination, and operational units are aligned. This structure is a chain of command connecting the political level with the executive and operational local levels. It is

also meant to enable a local situational overview and flexibility in adapting interventions to local needs and available resources.

There are some differences in how this cooperation is initiated and established between the agencies. In Finland, it is intended to be mandatory and implemented by and through the police. This is similar to Denmark, where the district police chief is required to establish councils consisting of the police chief and the mayors of the municipalities. In these councils, trends in crime and questions of crime prevention are to be discussed. Multiagency work through SSP cooperation has been established for a long time, and its placement in police districts makes it available when the need arises. In Sweden, multiagency work is preceded by an agreement between the municipality and the local police, but it is unclear who is to initiate it. SSP(f) work in Sweden is not widespread, and to date, no regulations or recommendations for the model exist. In Norway, establishment is reliant on local needs and resources, and SLT collaboration is initiated by an agreement of cooperation between municipalities and the police.

The police are the governing agency for multiagency efforts in Denmark and Finland, while this work in Sweden and Norway is governed by the municipalities in cooperation with the police (more so in Norway, less so in Sweden). In Sweden, social services in municipalities are coordinating these multiagency efforts. Although there are differences, the crime prevention discourse is very evident in Nordic policy documents. The police are in the position of being the agency in charge and are acknowledged as the institutional expert source of knowledge.

Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have all previously established multiagency cooperation for handling problems with delinquent children and young people. These hybrid collaborations are now being utilized to include interventions in the area of extremism and radicalization prevention. Finland and Norway have been inspired by the multiagency collaborations that have been successful in Denmark in particular (Lenos & Keltjens, 2017; KRÅD, 2011), and has established a structure for handling the somewhat novel problem of

extremism and radicalization. Sweden has chosen a more ambivalent and non-permanent solution.

The operational units that put into practice the actions and measures decided consist of actors representing different agencies and disciplinary expertise. The primary agencies involved in the Nordic multiagency approaches for handling violent extremism are the police, social services, and schools and educational services. In Sweden and Norway, youth workers, after-school center supervisors, and teachers are also involved. In Finland, psychiatric nurses are permanent partners in the Anchor teams, while school staff or youth workers are not mentioned to the same extent.

Advocating for MA

In the following section, we have identified the Pentad analysis scenes and purposes (Burke, 1969) and how collaborative approaches are advocated and motivated in national and local policy documents. We have identified three different types of purposes for using multiagency approaches in handling violent extremism (and other forms of delinquent or at-risk behaviors): 1) to use existing structures and organizations for extended purposes, 2) to gather and share knowledge and expertise, and 3) to coordinate actions for a more effective response.

To use existing structures and organizations

Collaborative approaches for CVE rest on already established organizational structures anchored in crime prevention efforts. In the Nordic case, the SSP, SLT, Anchor team, and SSP(f) approaches are very much inspired by one another. The use of existing arenas for cooperation is highlighted by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2016) as convenient, since it allows the utilization of established routines for issues such as reporting and following up on individuals who cause concern or who are regarded as being “at risk” (of radicalization). The same logics are used in Denmark, where the SSP structure and

multiagency cooperation have a long history of being used to prevent young individuals from doing or coming to harm (DKR, 2012).

The SSP, SLT, SSP(f), and Anchor team services were not initially established for countering or preventing radicalization and violent extremism, but by using additional expertise, they have been facilitated for those purposes. In Norway, the Police Council is one of the SLT's collaborating partners. In an evaluation of the collaboration between the two units, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (NO, 2014) stated that the Police Council may benefit from collaborating with SLT teams since this form of cooperation is so well established within its organizational structure. This is also the case for the Swedish *National Board of Health and Welfare* (Socialstyrelsen, 2018), which advocates cooperation in everyday practice to make cooperation easier when more "wicked problems" occur: "In other words, cooperation can be facilitated by using existing structures, for example general crime prevention work" (ibid., p. 26).

The Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2014) stated that multi-professional collaboration can be cost saving. One motivation for multiprofessional collaboration is that problems can be solved comprehensively and tackled in a purposeful way. With scarce resources, authorities need to prioritize their usage. Early intervention saves resources, as functional models produce benefits for all participants.

To gather and share knowledge and expertise

A common idea is that greater knowledge, insight, and understanding can more or less cultivate societies against violence. Cooperation between agencies is meant to bring together both knowledge and expertise about extremism and radicalization. The idea of collaboration between agencies is founded on discourses of expert knowledge, where knowledge about and "know-how" concerning radicalization and violent extremism is an advantage for the actors in possession of it.

Multiagency cooperation is primarily about integrating the various knowledge and decision-making capabilities that the involved partners individually represent for a common good (DKR, 2012, p. 18).

In the Danish SSP context, there is also an expressed need for the further development of knowledge among professional actors and for municipalities to acquire qualified knowledge and skills to be utilized at the operational level. Gathering expertise and knowledge in specific forums enables easy access for practitioners or public actors in need of guidance. Professional experts representing different disciplines and areas are equipped with different instruments, techniques, and tools for handling problems and challenges.

The multiagency approach is supposed to provide training to local authorities. In this sense, practitioners working within multiagency teams are experts within the field, and as such, they function as resources for other participants in prevention efforts and employees working in close contact with members of the public (DK, 2016). In Finland, the annual assessment of the national action plan (Ministry of the Interior, 2017) states that cooperation between agencies “promotes the development of skills and the dissemination of best practices” (ibid., p. 17). However, there are no specifications of what these “best practices” might be. It also seems that the police are often assigned the tasks of training and disseminating knowledge and best practices to other agencies.

In Norway, SLT coordinators are given the specific task of providing knowledge and information to the steering committee and allocating different disciplinary expertise in operational groups. Information, expert knowledge, and overview are some of the key components in the cooperation, and as it is formulated in Norwegian policy: “The ones who do not know where the problem really lies, can’t do anything about the problem” (KRÅD, 2011, p. 25). Multiagency operational units are also advocated as facilitators or providers of “necessary training to regional authorities and other actors,” making sure that these are informed of whom to contact when intervention is needed (FI, 2016).

Knowledge and expertise are also related to what function collaborative hubs can have regarding intelligence services and information about certain individuals or milieus that can be provided by and within multiagency networks. This kind of information or knowledge can be used for the identification of individuals who might constitute a risk to society, or for handling individual cases. As stated in the Danish action plan (2016), “The info houses are partly intended as knowledge sharing forums where challenges and methods in relation to the prevention of radicalization can be discussed, and partly function as a framework for the collaboration between the police and the municipalities in reviewing and managing actual cases.”

The need or desire to identify individuals at risk of becoming radicalized is evident among the objectives, measures, and actions in Nordic CVE. In the Finnish action plan, one of the prioritized measures is to “Increase skills, expertise and awareness as regards the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism” (FI, 2016, measure 4.5). To accomplish this, the following objective was formulated:

Professionals and the representatives of organisations who, in their everyday work, encounter people who have, or are about to, become radicalised are able to widely recognise the underlying signs of radicalisation and properly act in order to put an end to the development that leads to radicalisation. Developing capabilities and professional skills is supported by information obtained from research. (FI, 2016, p. 23).

A well-functioning multiagency approach, where knowledge and expertise are shared, can have synergistic effects. Not only does it strengthen one’s own agency or professional identity, but the effect of a hybrid organization might also strengthen and multiply the expertise and preparedness of the multiagency professional unit as such. The Danish DKR (2012) states that this is dependent on secure professional identities and a clear understanding of differences in ways of acting within different professions, and who is responsible for what. In line with this notion, the multiagency approach that accepts and acknowledges differences

and appreciates the plethora of solutions that may be available also promotes a more positive work environment.

To coordinate cooperation for a more effective response

Cooperation between agencies and actors is generally described as a more effective way of organizing preventive and interventive actions and as an organizational setup that allows for bypassing boundaries between agencies.

The operation of local cooperation groups has facilitated collaboration between the authorities and with organizations, and lowered the threshold for acting together across sectoral boundaries, where necessary. (FI, Ministry of the Interior, 2017, p. 17).

The Norwegian police's strategy for crime prevention stresses the need to expand SLT cooperation between Norwegian municipalities. Mobilization, involvement, and mutual cooperation are framed as key elements (National Police Directorate, 2018, p. 13).

The police are also defined as being more effective in their division of responsibilities and the various resources that can be utilized when needed. This effectiveness is also connected to competences, expertise, and knowledge that can be allocated within the cooperation unit:

Cooperation - we cooperate closely with other actors, share knowledge and have access to skills and tools that can be flexibly and efficiently utilized to get results. (NO, National Police Directorate, 2018 p. 5)^[3]

Coordination and effective responses to common problems are also economically advantageous. This is also an important incentive for multiagency approaches. For instance, in Finland, the Ministry of the Interior (2013) explicitly states that early intervention and support is more economical for society than helping adolescents when the situation has already

escalated and marginalization has increased. Collaboration between authorities is highlighted, especially on issues involving children and adolescents. As the approach integrates specific professional expertise, actions can rapidly be implemented and activated for young people in need of support (Ministry of the Interior, 2013).

A societal security logic and a social care logic

Finally, we turn to the analysis of institutional logics where we have identified two ideal types of institutional logics in national policies concerned with MA that influence CVE efforts in the Nordic countries (see Table 6): a Social Security Logic (SSL) and a Social Care Logic (SCL) (Sivenbring & Andersson Malmros, 2019).

	Societal Security Logic (SSL)	Social Care Logic (SCL)
Collective identity	Police, security services, security managers, etc.	Teachers, social workers, youth workers, mental health workers, etc.
Goals	The physical safety of citizens/employees/public facilities Order and maintain the law	The well-being of pupils/clients Safeguard individuals Ensure that the rights of pupils/clients are protected
Strategies	Authoritarian/repressive: prevent, detect, protect, surveil, arrest, incapacitate	Relational: prevent, detect, protect, support, strengthen, emancipate
Ground for attention	Cases of (potential) rule-breaking behavior	Cases of social/psychological/ physical concern
Ground for authority	Chain of command, centralized decision-making	Autonomous, decentralized decision-making

Table 6: *Institutional logics in work to counter violent extremism.*

As Table 6 shows, these logics reflect two distinctively different discourses representing what are often considered either firm or soft governing models.

Neither SSL nor SCL are exclusively developed for CVE efforts but can be found to be relevant for many other types of activities. For example, SCL is prevalent in schools, social services, and afterschool/youth centers, while the SSL is manifested in public and private sector security organizations. However, it is only in theory that logics are as “pure” and singular as in Table 6. Rather, it is recognized that one of the advocated benefits of multiagency work is that it allows a mixing of logics.

A logic is not static but is in fact translated locally and brought into being. In this process, it co-exists, mixes, and competes with other logics in everyday life (Pallas, Fredriksson, & Wedlin, 2016). A given social space is seldom completely homogenous (consisting of one logic or the other) but is heterogeneous, and the use of logics depends on the problem and context. With that said, some logics attain a hegemonic position in relation to others. In practice, this means that certain logics, and their attached discourses, become used more frequently and might become regarded as “common sense” and, therefore, constrain behavior.

The following Figure 1 provides a general description of some of the differences and commonalities in the prevailing logics and specific focal points found in the Nordic countries’ policies.



Figure 1. *Prevailing logics in the Nordic countries.*

Figure 1 illustrates how Denmark, Finland, and, to some extent, Norway are leaning toward a more decisive SSL than Sweden. The “Info Houses” in Denmark and the “Radicalization Contacts” in Norway are both prominent examples of the police having a central role in CVE efforts, often in close cooperation or as part of multiagency work. In contrast, Norway has municipal SLT coordinators to align different actors, and Sweden has CVE coordinators employed by the municipality, while the multiagency work is led by social services. Possibly connected to this, Sweden is also the Nordic country with the most restrictive attitude toward information sharing for crime prevention purposes, and the information flow is directed toward social services rather than the police or the SLT/SSP/Anchor team structures (Sivenbring & Andersson Malmros 2019). Finland is less guided by the SCL than the other Nordic countries, and its social services, afterschool/youth centers, and education services are given little attention in the analyzed policies. Instead, the involvement of mental health instances indicates that the Finnish approach is less inclined to consider the social and relational aspects of violent extremism and is more inclined to explain radicalization as a psychological phenomenon, which is also explicitly formulated in the national action plan (FI, 2016). To summarize and compare, Denmark and Norway seem to have a similar approach to CVE, while Finland and Sweden contrast each other.

Conclusions

As Heath-Kelley (2013) argued, the knowledge that enables and produces policy and actions rests on the discursive explanatory models for the problem at hand. From another angle, the policy text serves a more material function. It is a transmitter of language and discourse that “lends meaning and legitimacy to material practices and in doing so constructs the cognitive structures that underpin institutions” (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017, p. 402). Put differently, if a given CVE practice (e.g., multiagency information sharing) repeatedly gets acknowledged as important in policy, this perception becomes legitimized and might, over time, evolve into an “objective” truth—an institutionalized way of organizing CVE efforts. Once these cognitive

schemes have been established, they become self-regulating mechanisms for organizational activity (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

In this paper, we set out to explore what institutional logics can be discerned in Nordic CVE policies and what impact the logics have on multiagency efforts to combat extremism. Through a policy text analysis, we successfully identified two logics: societal security logic (SSL) and social care logic (SCL). Multiagency approaches are conceptualized as forms of hybrid organizations in which these logics are competing, co-existing, and mixing in everyday work. Our analysis indicates that SSL has a dominant position in relation to SCL. However, it also illustrates how typical SSL professions (i.e., the police) draw on the factors typically associated with SCL in certain situations. We believe that this example highlights one of the main benefits of our theoretical framing and analysis; it provides researchers with a set of concepts that help explain both heterogeneity and homogeneity in individual organizational settings as well as in international and national policy concerned with CVE. Furthermore, it provides new insights into why multiagency work can be conflicted. While the identified logics overlap in relation to some aspects, they also portray considerable differences.

A dominant logic in policy

Our analysis of policy show that the police is given a prominent role in multiagency work in all four countries. To a varying extent, the police are also the governing authority for this multiagency work and the experts who can provide knowledge to the other agencies. This is probably due to CVE efforts being incorporated into already established crime prevention structures. For example, in Denmark, the chief of police is, by law, instructed to initiate and plan crime prevention collaboration with other government agencies (Sivenbring & Andersson Malmros 2019). The hegemonic position of the police in the CVE arena is also evident in national action plans, where expertise, responsibility, and actions assigned to the police are prevalent. Put together, the police, to a large extent, have the authority to decide how the work is supposed to be organized. Hence, the goals of CVE efforts mainly involve preserving social safety and safeguarding democracy against threats. With that being said, this

analysis is based on policy. As recognized by new institutional theorists, policy is often decoupled from practice (Clarke, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and the police are probably also acting in line with an SCL approach in certain situations or roles (e.g., the Radicalization Contacts in Norway and police preventive units in Denmark).

CVE approaches in the Nordic countries traditionally rest upon crime prevention, and multiagency approaches are developed primarily to prevent future crimes from being committed. An example of this is that the Swedish Centre for Violent Extremism (CVE) firmly acknowledges that its point of departure is penal policy. This foundation can potentially make other agencies unsure of what their tasks are in relation to preventing crime. Such uncertainty is found in an evaluation of police council cooperation with SLT signed by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2014). The evaluation shows that representatives from agencies other than the police report uncertainties about formalities and the agenda of the cooperation. This indicates that the police have a more prominent position and that other actors experience a need to follow their lead.

Accordingly, a conclusion of our mapping is that the policy discourse indicates that SSL, in some respects, has prevailed and gained a hegemonic position in relation to SCL. In CVE and the hybrid space in which multiagency work is carried out, the central goals, objectives, and grounds for attention reflect SSL to a higher degree. In reference to the findings in this paper, a hypothesis is that the police in most countries become the ground for authority, the collective identity that makes the final decisions on how to act in the multiagency spaces. In practice, this would mean that most concerns about radicalization will be interpreted as a (potential) security problem, and thus lend legitimacy to SSL strategies as a solution. Hence, the hegemonic truth and knowledge explaining the problem also give seemingly rational solutions (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016). This hypothesis however, is not without exceptions or national differences. Moreover, and as mentioned previously, policy and practice tend to be decoupled to some degree, which suggests that our hypothesis needs further empirical studies using other methodological approaches to test its credibility.

Logics mixing and co-existing in everyday work

Drawing on our analysis, when a concern of radicalization is directed toward the multiagency collaboration structure, professionals can interpret it in relation to existing logics—SSL and SCL. There is an area of co-existence between the logics, as they both use the prevention and detection of problems as strategies to achieve their goals. This means that practices for handling concerns about young people are legitimate and important practices for both logics. However, it is apparent that the concern will be interpreted and handled differently, depending on the logic activated. The grounds for attention and the types of problems they focus on are distinctive, as cases of (potential) rule-breaking are central to SSL, while SCL instead focuses on signs of individual concern that might harm the individual in question. This difference in attention derives from their respective goals and the inherent meanings of their work. Such differences might provoke conflict when a concern is to be dealt with in a multiagency structure, as the SSL approach uses “hard measures” and control to reach its goals, while the SCL approach utilizes “soft measures” and relational work. Which type of solution is to be used? The character of the solutions also affects the grounds of authority: SSL rests on a more formal vertical chain of command where decision-making is more centralized, while the individual character of the work conducted by collectives connected to SCL is more horizontal and autonomous. Here, we see a potential risk of conflict, as, for example, the police are more inclined to give orders and are used to being listened to, while social workers have a more decentralized way of making decisions (i.e., Brown et al., 2010).

Even if arguing that social security logic (SSL) has a hegemonic status in relation to social care logic (SCL) and other logics that might exist, the most common situation is that logics mix in everyday life. Certainly, this comes as no surprise for most people involved in CVE efforts. The recommended practices in CVE policies show a strong emphasis on conversational techniques and building positive relationships with local communities and young people. For instance, in Denmark, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012 a,b) has published handbooks for relational work and mentoring in CVE, and in the Norwegian SaLTo

handbook (Politiet, 2014), conversation intervention, mediation, and reconciliation are considered to be relevant tools and seem typical for SCL. In Denmark and Norway, in particular, such practices are to be used by the police. By contrast, we also see how schools and other educational institutions are to 1) continue with business as usual, for example, teaching, developing democracy, and safeguarding their pupils; and 2) carry out risk assessments and identify individuals at risk of radicalization in their own classrooms. The latter task is a new one, derived from SSL, and is given to schools and educational services and reflects both the goals for SCL (business as usual) and SSL (detect potential threats). We can also see the potential for conflicts based on the distinctive goals for each logic in such cases: police want information in order to protect public security, while teachers want to protect the privacy of their pupils. As also recognized by Stephens and Sieckelinck (2019), issues of power and trust may pervade the relationships between the parties in collaboration. In practical multiagency collaboration, teachers and youth workers may have other roles in CVE efforts, such as those that most often entail a social relationship with the young individual. This may mean that these SCL relationships are activated to facilitate SSL interventions and actions.

Contributions

We believe that the concept of institutional logics helps to explain why different professional actors bring diverse perspectives on what the purpose of CVE is, what behavior is to be considered problematic, how CVE is to be countered, and how and by whom decisions are to be made. Hence, when these logics collide and compete, rather than mix and co-exist, it is likely that tensions and conflict will follow. Besides the organizational consequences, it is possible that a situation where one logic becomes hegemonic over the other can lead to misconceptualizations over radicalization cases and ineffective and contraproductive countermeasures. On the other hand, it is also possible that multiagency settings that successfully balance SSL and SCL can mobilize a diverse toolbox and sets of bodies of

knowledge that can be applied in both general strategies and individual cases. From a policymaking perspective, we argue that these insights would benefit the planning and implementation of new multiagency organizations, as they imply that inscribing clear roles and power relations between the involved actors from the beginning could help ease such tensions. Also, and following the same argument, the paper provides a theoretical ground to be used in the evaluation of this type of hybrid organization, but also for other researchers interested in exploring multiagency settings. The task of exploring how these logics play out in practice remains a highly important area of research.

With that said, there are empirical contributions worth stressing, since the paper provides a first systematic overview of similarities and differences between the Nordic countries in regard to multiagency approaches to CVE. Building on this comparison, we question the general referral to the existence of a “Nordic model” to CVE (see Norden, 2018; Ramböll, 2018). This is built on the identified differences concerning who participates in multiagency efforts, at what administrative level, which actor is to lead and coordinate efforts, what knowledge is important, and what practices are considered legitimate from both normative and regulative perspectives. From both a policy and research perspective, we believe that there is more to gain from elevating and comparing these differences and how they affect CVE efforts, rather than downplaying them and signifying a united approach that is more conceptual than empirical.

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