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Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation

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Publication date 1999

Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):

Schmeits, A. (1999). *Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation*. Thela Thesis.

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ESSAYS ON CORPORATE FINANCE AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapt	ter 1: Introduction and Outline of Dissertation
1.1	Introduction and Motivation
1.2	Approach and Background
1.3	Outline of the Dissertation
1.4	Concluding Remarks
Chapt	ter 2: Information Asymmetry in Financial Markets: Implications for Financial
Contr	acting and the Firm's Funding Source Choice
2.1	Introduction
2.2	Asymmetric Information, Investment Incentives and Market Failure in Debt and
	Equity Markets
2.3	Solutions to Informational Problems: Financial Contracting
	2.3.1 Solutions to Adverse Selection
	2.3.2 Solutions to Moral Hazard
2.4	Solutions to Informational Problems: The Firm's Funding Source Choice 37
	2.4.1 Bank Financing
	2.4.2 Financial Market Financing
	2.4.3 Venture Capital Financing
2.5	Concluding Remarks

Chapter 3: Discretion in Bank Contracts and the Firm's Funding Source Choice between Bank and Financial Market Financing

3.1	Introduction
3.2	Related Literature
3.3	The Basic Model
	3.3.1 Production Possibilities for Firms
	3.3.2 Information Structure, Types of Contracts and Funding Sources 68
	3.3.3 Sequence of Events in Lender-Borrower Interaction
3.4	Model Analysis
	3.4.1 Determination of Interest Rates
	3.4.2 The Borrower's Choice of Contract Type and Funding Source 78

	3.4.3 Discussion
	3.4.4 A Numerical Example
3.5	Model Extensions and Further Analysis
	3.5.1 Ex Ante Investment Incentives, Project Types and the Borrower's
	Contract Choice
	3.5.2 Long-Term versus Short-Term Contracts
	3.5.3 Information Production in Financial Markets and Reputation Formation . 96
	3.5.4 Implications for Comparative Financial Systems
	3.5.5 Application to Bank Contracts: Loan Commitments 100
3.6	Conclusions
Appe	ndix:
A.1	Proofs of Propositions 102
Chap	ter 4: Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in Conglomerate Banks
4.1	Introduction
4.2	General Framework and Intuition 121
4.3	The Model: Setup and Analysis 123
	4.3.1 Specification
	4.3.2 Analysis 126
	4.3.3 A Numerical Example
	4.3.4 Discussion
4.4	Internal Allocation of Cost of Capital and Incentive Contracting Issues 137
	4.4.1 Internal Allocation of Cost of Capital
	4.4.2 Incentive Contracting Issues 140
4.5	Proprietary Trading versus Relationship Banking 143
	4.5.1 Introduction
	4.5.2 Specification and Analysis 144
4.6	Further Implications and Empirical Evidence
	4.6.1 The Diversification Discount
	4.6.2 Conglomeration in Developed and Developing Economies 149
	4.6.3 Applications to Corporations: Spinoffs and Equity Carve-Outs 150
4.7	Conclusions
Apper	ndix:
A.1	Proofs of Propositions

Chapter 5: Issues in Venture Capital Financing

5.1 Introduction	166			
5.2 Main Problems in the Financing of Entrepreneurial (Start-Up) Firms	168			
5.2.1 Informational Problems between Entrepreneurial Firms and Financiers	169			
5.2.2 The Supply Side of the Market for Risk Capital; Policy Issues	171			
5.3 Solutions to Informational Problems in the Financing of Start-Up Firms	173			
5.3.1 Information Production	173			
5.3 2 Contractual Features	175			
5.3.3 Other Features of Venture Capital Financing	189			
5.4 Shortcoming in Financing Forms and Institutional Arrangements; Government				
Intervention	190			
5.4.1 Rationales for Government Intervention in the Market for Venture				
Capital	191			
5.4.2 A Simple Model of Government Intervention in the Market for Risk				
Capital	194			
5.4.3 Measures of Government Intervention	198			
5.4.4 Potential Caveats and Possibilities for Extensions	205			
5.5 Overview and Evaluation of Dutch Measures of Government Intervention in				
the Market for Venture Capital	207			
5.5.1 Key Arrangements; Government Guarantees	208			
5.5.2 Recent Measures	211			
5.5.3 Evaluation	212			
5.6 Concluding Remarks and Avenues for Future Research	213			
Appendix:				
A.1 Proofs of Propositions	217			
Summary	223			
References	227			
Summary (in Dutch)				

