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1. The Proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*: Eustathios' Hermeneutic Programme

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios introduces the programme that forms the foundation of his work and, as such, provides an inevitable starting point for the study of his rhetorical analysis of the *Iliad*. Broadly speaking, the proem consists of three parts:[1]

(i) an 'encomium' on Homer and his poetry (*in Il.* 1.1-2.16 = 1.1.1-2.38);
(ii) an introduction to the *Parekbolai* (*in Il.* 2.17-3.40 = 1.3.1-5.8), including programmatic statements on myth and allegory (*in Il.* 3.13-34 = 1.4.11-34);
(iii) an introduction to epic poetry, Homer, and the *Iliad* (*in Il.* 3.41-5.27 = 1.5.9-8.6).

The first and second parts in particular shed light on issues relevant for Eustathios' rhetorical analysis of Homeric poetry: his ideas on the relationship between Homer as poet, himself as exegete, and their respective readership (Section 1.1); on the intended audience of the *Parekbolai* and the didactic goals of poet and exegete (Section 1.2); and on myth and allegory in Homeric poetry (Section 1.3).

1.1 The Wise Homer and His Erudite Exegete[2]

In the margins of manuscript L, brief notes are included that serve as subheadings, as it were, and enhance the user-friendliness of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*. The first lines of the proem are accompanied by the words προοίμιον καί τι ἐγκωμιαστικὸν εἰς τὸν ποιητήν ('a proem and something encomiastic with regard to the poet').[3] To designate the proem as an encomium on Homer raises

[1] Appendix I provides a translation (with annotations) of the complete proem.

[2] An earlier version of Section 1.1 will be published as an article in *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* (2016).

[3] I have consulted the manuscript in digitised form and propose this reading instead of Van der Valk's προοίμιον καί τι ἐγκώμιον <ἀ>στικὸν εἰς τὸν ποιητήν.

expectations concerning its content. Rhetorical handbooks such as the *progymnasmata* present clear definitions and guidelines for the composition of encomia. Aphthonios, for instance, defines an encomium as 'a speech setting forth good attributes' (λόγος ἐκθετικὸς τῶν προσόντων καλῶν),[4] to which definition Nikolaos of Myra adds that the term 'encomium' refers to both encomia as complete speeches and elements of praise inserted into other speeches.[5] Though he did not intend to compose a full-fledged encomiastic speech, Eustathios nevertheless devotes a substantial part of his proem to praising Homer and emphasising the importance of his poetry, in line with the common tendency of commentators 'to defend, or even to exaggerate and to increase the importance of their source. It is not hard to guess why this should be so: Clearly, the more important the text you work on, the more relevant and valuable the commentary.'[6] Broadly speaking, Eustathios praises Homeric poetry for two 'good attributes', viz. its power to enchant the audience and its multifaceted usefulness. He underscores these attributes with four images: Homeric poetry is like the song of Sirens and an acoustic World Wonder (Section 1.1.1), and Homer is like an Ocean and a host (Section 1.1.2). Eustathios employs these images, together with the image of the *Parekbolai* as a lodging and a comparison of himself as exegete with cooks (Section 1.1.3), to delineate a coherent picture of Homer as the wisest of all poets and of himself as an erudite exegete.

1.1.1 Homer's enchantment: Homeric poetry as the song of Sirens and a World Wonder

The proem opens with an allusion to the Sirens episode in *Odyssey* 12, which relates how Odysseus manages to pass by the island of the Sirens unharmed by their enchanting and wisdom-providing, yet fatal song.[7] He blocks the ears of his companions with wax, whereas he himself listens to the song while safely tied to

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[4] Aphth. *Prog.* 8.1. See Theon, *Prog.* 9, 109.20-2; Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 7.1; and Nikol. *Prog.* 8, 48.19-49.1 for similar definitions.

[5] Nikol. *Prog.* 8, 48.4-10.

[6] Sluiter 1998: 13-4. Cf. Sluiter 1999: 173, where it is argued that commentators benefit from the social significance attached to tradition. For the idea that the authority of the source author reflects on the commentator, see also Most 1999a: ix and xi.

[7] *Od.* 12.158-200.

the mast of the ship. Homeric poetry, Eustathios claims in the first lines of the proem, is like this enchanting song of the Sirens:

> Τῶν Ὁμήρου Σειρήνων καλὸν μὲν ἴσως εἴ τις ἀπόσχοιτο τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ κηρῷ τὰς ἀκοὰς ἀλειψάμενος ἢ ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τραπόμενος, ὡς ἂν ἀποφύγῃ τὸ θέλγητρον. μὴ ἀποσχόμενος δέ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ᾠδῆς ἐκείνης ἐλθών, οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, οὔτε παρέλθῃ ῥᾳδίως, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ δεσμὰ κατέχοι, οὔτε παρελθὼν εἴη ἂν εὔχαρις. (Eust. *in Il.* 1.2-5 = 1.1.1-5)
>
> Perhaps it would be good if someone kept clear of Homer's Sirens altogether, by blocking his ears with wax or by steering another course, in order to escape the spell. But suppose he did not keep away, but made his way through that song, he would not, I think, easily disregard it, even though many chains bound him,[8] nor would he, when he has disregarded it, be graceful.

After Homer the Sirens were frequently used in literature and art, sometimes with positive connotations as representations of wisdom and beauty in speech, at other times with negative undertones as symbols of the dangers of sensual pleasure.[9] Particularly relevant to the current context is the reception of the Sirens in the ancient debate on the role of poetry in education, a role that was criticised by Plato, mainly because of the fictionality and frivolity of its mythical components.[10]

In response to Plato's criticism of poetry, many attempts were made to reconcile poetry and education, with Plutarch's essay *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* as a well-known example. According to Plutarch, poetry contains material that pleases and nourishes the mind of the young reader, but may also include misleading and disturbing elements. He presents his readers with a

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[8] Cf. *Od.* 1.204: οὐδ' εἴ πέρ τε σιδήρεα δέσματ' ἔχῃσι, 'not though bonds of iron hold him'.

[9] For the reception of the Sirens in literature and art, see e.g. Rahner 1957: 281-328, Wedner 1994, and Leclercq-Marx 1997. For the Sirens in ancient allegoresis, see Buffière 1956: 236, 385-6, 473-81. For the Sirens episode as a 'mode of literary communication' in twelfth-century Byzantium, see Cesaretti 2015. For the Sirens motif in Prodromos' poetry, see Zagklas 2014: 203-4. For the reception of the Sirens in an epigram by Leo the Philosopher and further references, see Van Opstall, forthcoming.

[10] See e.g. Pl. *R.* 376e-398b9 and 595a-608b10. See P. Murray 1996 for an introduction and commentary on these passages. On the 'quarrel between philosophy and poetry' in Plato and later authors, see e.g. Weinstock 1927, Gould 1990, and Levin 2001.

choice between two possible approaches towards poetry: to keep young students away from poetry altogether by blocking their ears with wax and steering another course, or to guide and guard their reading and tie them to the mast of reason in order to protect them from being carried away by pleasure.[11] Plutarch's essay, advocating the second option and offering a method of reading poetry in a safe way, was a source of inspiration for the programmatic treatise on studying ancient literature by Basil the Great.[12] Basil, too, contends that poetry consists of a mixture of good and potentially harmful material. While one should study and imitate the virtuous deeds of poetic characters, one should block one's ears with wax as Odysseus did when reading about their evil deeds.[13]

Like Plutarch and Basil, Eustathios presents his readers with two options: perhaps it would be best to avoid the possible dangers inherent in Homeric poetry altogether by blocking one's ears with wax as Odysseus' companions did or by steering another course. In other words, it might be safest not to read the Homeric epics at all. The alternative is to travel through the Sirens' song and read Homeric poetry, the preferred option, of course, of the author of monumental works on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Eustathios, however, warns those who decide to read Homer: it is difficult as well as undesirable to travel through the Sirens' song *without paying heed*; only if you pay proper attention to their song will you leave as a 'graceful' (εὔχαρις) person.[14] In my interpretation, Eustathios here advocates the serious study of Homeric poetry: only the person who devotes serious attention

[11] Plu. *Aud. poet.* 15CD.

[12] *Address to Young Men on Reading Greek Literature* (*ad adolescentes de legendis libris gentilium*).

[13] Bas. *Leg. lib. gent.* 4.3-11. It is remarkable that Basil changes the image and has Odysseus block his own ears instead of those of his companions. On this alteration see Kaldellis 2007a: 164-5 and Van Opstall, forthcoming, n. 45.

[14] The interpretation of the last part of the quoted passage is difficult. Van Opstall (forthcoming, n. 43) interprets εὔχαρις as 'grateful' and wonders: 'Why does Eustathius begin his commentary by stating that Homer is dangerous and *not rewarding*, instead of stating that Homer is dangerous, but nevertheless *rewarding*? This seems to put off rather than invite future readers of his own commentary.' Van Opstall argues that it would make more sense to read 'οὔτε … ἂν ἄχαρις' ('not ungraceful/ungrateful'), but refrains from emending the text since 'it is difficult to imagine that Eustathius himself has made an error in the very first paragraph of his commentary on the *Iliad*'. I have attempted to solve the problem by interpreting παρέρχομαι not just as 'to pass by', but as 'to pass without heeding, disregard' (LSJ IV) and εὔχαρις as 'graceful' rather than 'grateful'.

to Homer's poems and is willing to learn from them, will become graceful.[15] The gracefulness gained by this student of Homer is a rhetorical one, amounting to the knowledge of how to use Homeric poetry in a manner that proves him to be educated and eloquent.

The connection of grace and rhetoric has many parallels in ancient and Byzantine literature. A notable example is found in Plato's *Gorgias*, where Socrates claims that rhetoric is not an art but merely the 'skill' (ἐμπειρία) of 'producing a certain grace and pleasure' (χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας).[16] Whereas Plato thus downplays the status of rhetoric, for Psellos the grace of rhetoric is exactly what makes it an indispensable companion of philosophy. He claims to have studied ancient literature with two objectives: 'to train the tongue through rhetorical discourses with a view to eloquence, and to refine the mind through philosophy'.[17] In his view, rhetoric and philosophy are inextricably connected: on the one hand, the expert in philosophy who lacks eloquence remains 'without grace' (ἄχαρις); on the other hand, the words of the expert in rhetoric who lacks philosophical knowledge are deprived of content.[18] While philosophy needs the graces of rhetoric to sweeten the mind, rhetoric needs the profound thoughts of philosophy to elevate the tongue.[19] In a similar vein, Eustathios opens his *Parekbolai on the Iliad* by pointing to the indispensable rhetorical graces that can be gained from the thorough study of Homeric poetry, thus underscoring the relevance of his own work at the same time.

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[15] Eustathios makes a similar point in *in Il.* 1.32 = 1.2.9-10, where he refers to the unspeakable amount of 'prudence' (φρόνησις) that 'someone who is willing to pay attention' (τῷ προσέχειν ἐθέλοντι) can gain from Homeric poetry.

[16] Pl. *Grg.* 462c.

[17] Psell. *Chron.* 6.36: ῥητορικοῖς μὲν λόγοις τὴν γλῶτταν πλάσασθαι πρὸς εὐπρέπειαν, καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ καθᾶραι τὸν νοῦν. See Kustas 1970: 69.

[18] Psell. *Or. pan.* 17.224-6.

[19] See e.g. Psell. *Or. pan.* 17.244-6: τόν τε νοῦν καθηδύνας ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς χάρισι, τήν τε γλῶτταν σεμνύνας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις νοήμασι, 'having sweetened the mind with the charms from the art of rhetoric, and having elevated the tongue with philosophical thoughts'. The reciprocal dependency of philosophy and rhetoric and the grace of rhetoric are recurrent themes throughout Psellos' oeuvre. See Papaioannou 2013: 29-50 on Psellos' insistence on the need to mix philosophy with rhetoric, and 244-8 for the twelfth-century reception of Psellos' views.

Eustathios' allegorical interpretation of the Sirens episode in the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey* sheds further light on the implications of the image of Homeric poetry as the Sirens' song for the relationship between poet, exegete, and readership.[20] Eustathios interprets Odysseus as the ideal philosopher, whose philosophical knowledge provides him with the steadfastness – represented by the ropes tying the hero to the mast – that is required to listen to and enjoy the Sirens' song/poetry without any serious risks.[21] More specifically, Eustathios designates Odysseus as a true 'political philosopher' (πολιτικός φιλόσοφος) who combines theory and practice by putting his theoretical knowledge to good use for the sake of his fellow citizens.[22] In his commentary on Hermogenes, John Sikeliotes explains that the political philosopher is a philosopher-rhetor who uses his rhetorical skill to spur his fellow citizens to virtue.[23] Eustathios' specification of the 'theoretical knowledge' (θεωρία) to be gained from the Sirens' song/Homeric poetry displays a similar combination of rhetoric and philosophy: 'encomia [...], in which we take pleasure in particular, historical narratives, stories of old, discourses, compositions of myth and of other things, and all that is elevated in a philosophical way'.[24] From this theoretical knowledge, the philosopher should take what he needs in order to enrich his own 'work' (λόγος) in form and content, becoming, as a result, a Siren himself.[25] He should not stay

[20] Eust. *in Od.* 1706.24-1711.9 = 2.2.42-7.39 (on *Od.* 12.158-200).

[21] The interpretation of Odysseus as the perfect philosopher is commonly found in ancient and Byzantine allegoresis. For examples, see Van Opstall, forthcoming.

[22] Eustathios speaks about the political philosopher in *in Od.* 1709.18-24 = 2.4.35-9 (on *Od.* 12.192-3).

[23] Jo. Sik. *in Hermog. Id.* 376.1-17. Cf. Herm. *in Phdr.* 221.9-24. On the 'political philosopher' in Sikeliotes' commentary, see also Papaioannou 2013: 34.

[24] Eust. *in Od.* 1708.36-40 = 2.4.11-3 (on *Od.* 12.173): ἐγκώμια [...] οἷς μάλιστα χαίρομεν, ἱστορίαι, παλαιοὶ λόγοι, συγγραφαὶ, συνθῆκαι μύθων τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ὅσοι φιλοσόφως ἀνάγονται. On the term ἱστορία in the *Parekbolai*, see Section 1.2.3 below. It is clear that, in Eustathios' view, philosophy and rhetoric are closely connected. Like Psellos, Eustathios defines the ideal orator as someone who expresses profound philosophical thoughts in an attractive and clear style, as his image of Manuel in the funerary oration on the late emperor illustrates (see Van den Berg, forthcoming 2017a). See Magdalino 1993a: 331-4 on the close relationship of rhetoric and philosophy in twelfth-century Byzantium.

[25] Eust. *in Od.* 1708.42-50 = 2.4.14-8 (on *Od.* 12.173). Interestingly, Eustathios himself is repeatedly associated with the Sirens. In their funerary orations on Eustathios, Euthymios Malakes and

with the Sirens and linger in the realm of theoretical knowledge longer than necessary, but proceed to action. While Odysseus is the ideal philosopher, his comrades are inferior souls who have not yet reached the highest level of philosophical education. Since they are unable to resist the allure of the Sirens' song/poetry, their ears need to be blocked with wax, that is to say, with the lessons of the ideal philosopher.

In his interpretation of the Sirens episode, Eustathios further argues that Homer himself draws a parallel between the Sirens' song and his own poetry, since both share the twofold aim of teaching and giving pleasure.[26] This parallel invites us to connect the image in the proem with the positions of Eustathios as an exegete/teacher and his readers, who are to read Homeric poetry with the help of the *Parekbolai.* If Homer is the Sirens, Eustathios is Odysseus: he is the perfect political philosopher who is able to read Homeric poetry without being swept away by its enchanting beauty. He has gained knowledge by listening to Homer's Sirens and puts this knowledge to good use by transferring it to his readers. These readers, represented by the comrades of Odysseus, have not yet reached the highest levels of *paideia* and need guidance when reading Homer.[27] Eustathios provides this guidance in the form of his *Parekbolai*, by means of which he shows his readers how to safely read Homer, how to enjoy Homeric poetry and pass through it with more knowledge than before. More concretely, he teaches his audience how to put the 'theoretical knowledge' found in Homer to good use in practice, how to embellish their works in style and content by means of Homeric poetry, of which the Homeric allusion at the very beginning of the proem gives us a paradigmatic example.[28]

Michael Choniates, for instance, praise his eloquence and learning with references to the Sirens. Malakes (*Mon. Eust.* 4.1-5) argues that there was no need to block one's ears with wax when listening to Eustathios, while Choniates calls his former teacher 'you, temple of all Graces and more alluring than Iunges and Sirens' (χαρίτων ἁπασῶν ἀνάκτορον σὺ καὶ ἰύγγων καὶ σειρήνων ἐπαγωγότερε, *Or.* 16, 1.287.17-8). For a discussion of both passages, see Cesaretti 2015: 263-4.

[26] Eust. *in Od.* 1708.64-1709.10 = 2.4.26-32 (on *Od.* 12.191-2). On the goals of poetry, see also Eust. *in Od.* 1379.25-7 ed. Cullhed (with discussion in Section 1.3.1 below) and *in Od.* 1710.58 = 2.7.22 (on *Od.* 12.189).

[27] Cesaretti (1991: 225 and 2015: 260-1) proposes a similar interpretation. See also Van Opstall, forthcoming, n. 41. On the intended audience of the *Parekbolai*, see Section 1.2.1.

[28] On instructions for the creative re-use of Homeric poetry in the *Parekbolai*, see Section 1.2.3.

Immediately following the opening image of the Sirens, Eustathios once more emphasises the extraordinary beauty of Homeric poetry: if there was a list of acoustic wonders of the world, just as the seven famous 'visible' Wonders, Homeric poetry would be foremost amongst them.[29]

1.1.2 Homer's authority and usefulness: the Poet as Ocean and host

Turning from the enchanting beauty of Homeric poetry to the great authority of the Poet, Eustathios compares Homer to the Ocean, i.e. the river that surrounds the earth and provides all rivers, springs, and wells with water:[30]

> ἐξ Ὠκεανοῦ μὲν γὰρ ποταμοὶ πάντες, πηγαὶ πᾶσαι, φρέατα πάντα κατὰ τὸν πάλαι λόγον· ἐξ Ὁμήρου δέ, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσα, πολλὴ γοῦν παρεισέρρευσε τοῖς σοφοῖς λόγου ἐπιρροή. (Eust. *in Il.* 1.9-11 = 1.1.8-10)
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> For from Ocean flow all rivers, all springs, all wells, according to the old saying. And from Homer, if not the whole, at least much of the stream of learning flowed to the wise men.

This 'old saying' is in fact a passage from the *Iliad*, which makes the quoted passage another *leçon par l'exemple* of how to use Homeric poetry in one's own writings.[31] The image of Homer as Ocean was commonly used in antiquity and beyond to express the relationship between Homer and later authors: just as the Ocean provides all rivers, springs etc. with water, so does Homer provide all authors after him with learning. For example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus designates Homer, with his outstanding style, as the summit on which the gaze of

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[29] Eust. *in Il.* 1.6-8 = 1.1.5-7. Several Greek and Latin texts discussing the World Wonders are collected by Brodersen (1992).

[30] In *in Il.* 514.32-43 = 2.8.7-9.1 (on *Il.* 5.6), Eustathios discusses different perceptions of Ocean and argues that 'poetry desires that Ocean is a river flowing around the earth in a circle. True history, on the other hand, calls the exterior sea Ocean' (Ἡ δὲ ποίησις Ὠκεανὸν βούλεται εἶναι ποταμὸν περιρρέοντα κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν. Ἡ δὲ ἀληθὴς ἱστορία τὴν ἔξω θάλασσαν Ὠκεανὸν λέγει). The 'exterior' sea is the Atlantic Ocean, beyond the Pillars of Heracles (see e.g. Str. 1.3.13 and D.S. 4.18.4-5).

[31] *Il.* 21.195–7: [...] Ὠκεανοῖο, / ἐξ οὗ περ πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θάλασσα / καὶ πᾶσαι κρῆναι καὶ φρείατα μακρὰ νάουσιν· 'Ocean, from whom all rivers flow and the entire sea, and all the springs and deep wells.'

every author should be fixed and the ocean from which all rivers, the entire sea, all springs, and all wells are watered.[32] Closer to Eustathios' time, Michael Choniates advocates the relevance of studying Homer by arguing that 'those who flow with learning' (οἱ ῥέοντες τοῖς λόγοις) draw from Homer,[33] or 'rather, just as Homer himself says that from the Ocean spring all rivers and all wells, so does learning of every kind spring from Homer himself'.[34] Notice the reservation that Eustathios makes in the quoted passage: not *all*, but *much* of the stream of learning originates from the Homeric Ocean. This reservation may hint at that other important source of wisdom, the Holy Scripture as a source of Christian learning.

Eustathios also uses the image of Homer as the Ocean in the proem of the otherwise lost work on Pindar, where he argues that the small streams of lyric poetry remain far from the great Ocean of Homeric epic.[35] In a similar vein, the image refers to Homer's poetic power in the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*, which resembles the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad* in rhetorical refinement and partly addresses the same topics. In both proems, Eustathios argues that even though the subject matter of the *Odyssey* strictly speaking

[32] D.H. *Comp.* 24.4 quoting *Il.* 21.195-6. Other examples include two passages from Ps.-Longinus' *On the Sublime*, where Homer is designated as the 'spring' (νᾶμα) from which later authors drew (13.3) and, in a different context, is compared to an ocean: the old poet, with his talents waning, is like an ocean retreating into itself and laying quiet within its own confines (9.13). More examples of the same imagery in ancient literature are collected by Bühler (1964: 64-5) and Williams (1978: 87-9, 98-9).

[33] M. Chon. *Ep.* 111.256.

[34] M. Chon. *Ep.* 111.257-9: μᾶλλον δὲ ὡς ἐξ Ὠκεανοῦ πάντας ποταμοὺς καὶ φρέατα πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸς Ὅμηρος, οὕτω καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Ὁμήρου παντοδαποὶ λόγοι πηγάζουσιν. The image is repeatedly employed by Tzetzes, too. See e.g. *All. Il.* prol. 28-9, where Tzetzes states that he was commissioned to make accessible and passable for everyone the 'great and deep Ocean of Homer which tightly binds in a circle the whole world round' (τὸν μέγαν τὸν βαθὺν ὠκεανὸν Ὁμήρου, / τὸν πᾶσαν περισφίγγοντα κύκλῳ τὴν οἰκουμένην) and prol. 51-2, where he designates the poet as 'the all-wise Homer, the sea of learning, filled with nectar, not salt water' (ὁ Ὅμηρος ὁ πάνσοφος, ἡ θάλασσα τῶν λόγων, / πλὴν γέμουσα τοῦ νέκταρος, οὐχ ἁλμύρων ὑδάτων; translations are from Goldwyn & Kokkini 2015). The phrase ὁ Ὅμηρος ὁ πάνσοφος, ἡ θάλασσα τῶν λόγων is repeated in *H.* 13, 496.620. Cf. Tz. *All. Il.* 20.35 and 21.107. On the image of Homer as the Ocean in Tzetzes and Eustathios, see Cesaretti 1991: 181, 188-9, 214-5. See Nilsson, forthcoming, for water images concerning the rhetoricians' streams of words in return for the patrons' streams of gold in Komnenian literature.

[35] Eust. *in Pi.* 2.3.

concerns the *nostos* of Odysseus only, Homer still managed to make it into a great poem:[36]

> Ὁ δ' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα πολλὰ τεχνασάμενος τὴν στενὴν ἀτραπὸν τῆς τοῦ βιβλίου περιπετείας εὐρύναι πρὸς πεδιάδα λογογραφίας ἐξίσχυσε, καὶ ὡς ἐκ χειμαρρώδους λιβάδος πλήθοντας ῥητορείας ἐξέῤῥευσε ποταμούς, ὁποῖοι οὐχήκιστα καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα περιλιμνάζουσιν. εἰ καί τις Τιμόλαος, ὁ εἴτε Λαρισσαῖος εἴτε Μακεδὼν εἴτε καὶ ἄμφω, λειψυδρίαν οἷον ἐκεῖ καταγνοὺς τοῦ ποιητικοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ, ὠχετήγησε μισγαγκείας τινὸς δίκην, σιέλους ὥσπερ τινὰς ἢ μύξας τὰ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ. (Eust. *in Od.* 1379.46-50 ed. Cullhed)
>
> However, by devising these and many similar things Homer was able to expand the narrow path provided by the basic change of events[37] in the book into a plain of story writing and caused rivers to overflow with rhetoric as though from a swollen stream, the very same kind of rivers that surround also the *Iliad* in particular. And even if a certain Timolaus, either from Larissa or Macedonia or both, seems to have accused this poetic Ocean for lacking water and irrigated it by ditches as in a place where waters meet, his own additions were but drops of spittle or snot. (Transl. Cullhed 2014a: 7)

In Eustathios' view, Homer expanded the main storyline by adding additional episodes, as examples of which he lists Telemachus' journey, Odysseus' long conversation with his Phaeacian hosts, and the episode in Eumaeus' hut.[38] These and other episodes make the *Odyssey*, as much as the *Iliad*, into a river overflowing with rhetoric.[39] There is therefore no point in carrying more water to the sea – Timolaus' attempt to do so by making an *Iliad* in which each Homeric

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[36] Eustathios makes the same point in *in Il.* 4.46-5.7 = 1.7.7-15. On this characteristic of the *Odyssey*, see also Cullhed 2014a: 54*-5*.
[37] Eustathios' usage of περιπέτεια is more general than Aristotle's 'sudden reversal'. In the *Parekbolai* the term refers to the twists and turns of the narrative. The term is found in the same sense in the *scholia vetera*. See e.g. schol. bT *Il.* 1.195-6b and *Il.* 21.34b. Nünlist (2009a: 139, n. 16) briefly discusses the usage of the term in the *scholia*. See also Meijering 1987: 277, n. 106.
[38] Eust. *in Od.* 1379.44-6 ed. Cullhed.
[39] Eustathios considers the insertion of additional episodes or historical narratives to be a typically Homeric method: see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.2 below.

line is followed by one of his own, is nothing more than adding drops to the great poetic Ocean.[40]

After the image of the Ocean, Eustathios further stresses the great influence of the poet on all subsequent authors by presenting Homer as a host arranging abundant banquets for his guests, that is to say his readers, to dine on, an image which we encounter in other places in the *Parekbolai* as well. Homer is a 'versatile banqueter for his attentive listeners' (ποικίλος…τοῖς φιλακροάμοσι δαιταλεύς), who provides 'those who are eager to learn with a varied complete banquet' (ποικίλην…πανδαισίαν τοῖς φιλομαθέσιν).[41] In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Homer is presented as a host who not only feeds his guests but also offers them a place to stay:

> οὐδεὶς γοῦν οὔτε τῶν τὰ ἄνω περιεργαζομένων οὔτε τῶν περὶ φύσιν οὔτε τῶν περὶ ἦθος οὔθ' ἁπλῶς τῶν περὶ λόγους ἐξωτερικούς, ὁποίους ἂν εἰπῇ τις, παρῆλθε τὴν Ὁμηρικὴν σκηνὴν ἀξεναγώγητος, ἀλλὰ πάντες παρ' αὐτῷ κατέλυσαν, οἱ μὲν ὡς καὶ διάγειν παρ' αὐτῷ μέχρι τέλους καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ συσσιτίων ἀποτρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ὥστε χρείαν ἀποπλῆσαί τινα καὶ συνεισενεγκεῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῷ λόγῳ τι χρήσιμον. (Eust. *in Il.* 1.11-17 = 1.1.10-6)
>
> At any rate, not one of those who investigated the things above, nor of those who investigated nature, or ethics, or pagan literature in general,[42] whatever kind one would mention, passed by the Homeric tent without being entertained as a guest, but they all lodged with him, some to stay with him until the very end and

[40] On Timolaus, see *Suda* τ 626 and Pontani 2000: 29-31.

[41] Eust. *in Il.* 244.30 = 1.372.17 (on *Il.* 2.394-7) and 942.39 = 3.502.1-2 (on *Il.* 13.471-7) respectively. A similar image of Homer is found in e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 1.8 = 1.1.7 and 665.10 = 2.400.18-9 (on *Il.* 7.64).

[42] Expressions denoting 'outside' (here ἐξωτερικός) are commonly used by patristic and Byzantine authors to refer to literature, wisdom, people, etc. 'outside' Christianity and the Christian community and, hence, for 'Hellenic', pagan literature, authors, etc. See e.g. 1 *Ep. Cor.* 5.12-3, where Paul distinguishes between those outside the Christian congregation (τοὺς ἔξω) and those within (τοὺς ἔσω ὑμεῖς). In *Ep. Col.* 4.5, 1 *Ep. Thess.* 4.12, and *Ev. Marc.* 4.11 the expression is used in the same sense. See Malingrey 1961: 212-3 for the use of similar expressions by Gregory of Nazianzos, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nyssa. For examples from twelfth-century authors, see Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou 1971-1972: 55. Eustathios uses the term ἐξωτερικός in the same sense in e.g. *in Can. Jo. Dam.* acrost. 57 and *Emend. vit. mon.* 143.1.

> live off his banquets, others to fulfil a certain need and to gain something useful from him for their own work.

The parallel between banquets and literature, between the host and the author, is frequently drawn by authors before Eustathios, a well-known example of which can be found in Athenaeus' *The Learned Banqueters*.[43] One of the learned banqueters states that Aeschylus designated his tragedies as nothing but 'the leftovers of Homer's great dinners' (τεμάχη…τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων).[44] Similar imagery can be found in the Old Testament wisdom tradition, in which it is Wisdom personified who hosts a banquet of knowledge, as for instance in *Proverbs* 9, where Wisdom calls the ignorant to eat the food and drink the wine at her banquet of learning.[45] Similarly, Homer, as 'a nursling of wisdom' (ὁ τῆς σοφίας τρόφιμος),[46] feeds his readers with his learning, offering them a banquet that consists of the many useful things to be found in his poetry.

Eustathios expressly mentions astronomers, physicists, and ethical philosophers as Homer's guests, and he completes his list with all authors of pagan literature in general. With astronomy, physics, and ethics as the three traditional parts of philosophy, this list effectively divides Homer's guests into philosophers and other authors, with the philosophers receiving most emphasis. If we think back to Eustathios' allegorical interpretation of the Sirens episode as discussed above, this centrality of philosophy comes as no surprise: the ideal philosopher is the one who puts the theoretical knowledge gained from Homer's Sirens to good use. Eustathios thus seems to prefer the second option presented in the image of the host, i.e. to take something useful from Homer for one's own writings and move on, rather than stay with the poet for the rest of one's life. The

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[43] Athenaeus' work is an important source for Eustathios. See Van der Valk 1971: LXXIX-LXXXII.

[44] Ath. 8.347e. On the preparation and consumption of food as a metaphor for composing and reading literature in ancient literature and criticism, see e.g. Gowers 1993: 40-6, 78-87, and *passim*.

[45] On Wisdom as nourisher and host in Old Testament wisdom tradition, see e.g. Sandelin 1986 and MacKinlay 1996.

[46] Eust. *in Il.* 1.42 = 1.2.20. In *in Il.* 846.11-3 = 3.202.6-9 (on *Il.* 11.307), Eustathios explains the meaning of τρόφιμος, arguing that 'rhetors after Homer in another way call the one who was brought up by someone τρόφιμος and τρόφις' (οἱ μεθ' Ὅμηρον ῥήτορες ἄλλως τρόφιμον καὶ τρόφιν τὸν ὑπό τινος ἐκτραφέντα φασίν). For example: Euripides is a 'nursling of the Muses' (*in Il.* 846.12 = 3.202.8, cf. Men. Rh. 413.26).

ideal philosopher should not linger in the realm of theoretical knowledge, but put the acquired knowledge into practice.

That Homer's authority and usefulness extend to all disciplines is illustrated by a second – and longer – list of 'users' of Homer: Apollo's Pythian priestess, philosophers, rhetoricians, grammarians, poets, geographers, physicians, and even kings (Alexander the Great being perhaps the most prominent example) studied Homer.[47] In other words, following the recommendations for encomia as found in the *progymnasmata* of Ps.-Hermogenes and Theon respectively, Eustathios praises his subject by its users and supports his praise with the opinion of famous people.[48] The images of Homer as Ocean and host together with the enumeration of the many and manifold wise men of old that were influenced by the poet leave a clear impression of Homer's great authority and multifaceted usefulness. This authoritative status of Homer justifies Eustathios' *Parekbolai* and advertises reading Homeric poetry with the help of the *Parekbolai*, which aim to bridge the gap between Homer's theoretical knowledge and twelfth-century practice.

1.1.3 Eustathios as erudite exegete: the Parekbolai *as a lodging and the exegete as a cook*

In addition to the image of Homer as the wise man *par excellence* and of Homeric poetry as a source of all wisdom, the proem also sheds light on Eustathios' image of himself as an erudite exegete and the *Parekbolai* as a source of useful information. In the second part of the proem, introducing the content and method of the *Parekbolai*, Eustathios states that his work provides its readers with many useful things and that its originality lies in its design: he has not presented his material as one 'elaborate exegesis' (πλατεῖα ἐξήγησις) as others have done, but as a 'selection' (ἐκλογή) of useful material, arranged in a convenient order.[49]

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[47] Eust. *in Il.* 1.17-25 = 1.1.16-2.2. On Alexander as a fervent admirer of Homer, see e.g. Plu. *Alex.* 8.2. Michael Choniates, too, uses the example of Alexander when advocating the relevance of the study of Homer (*Ep.* 111.260-5).

[48] To praise a thing by its users: Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 7.12; to include the opinion of famous people: Theon, *Prog.* 9, 110.27-8.

[49] Eust. in *Il.* 3.2-4 = 1.3.35-4.2 (with discussion in Cullhed 2014a: 23*). The explicit rejection of the method of exegesis may be directed at Tzetzes, who designates his exegetical work on the *Iliad* as

Applying the image of a host receiving guests to himself and his readers, he explains that this useful material is not presented as one continuous whole, but consists of individual units that can be studied separately:

> πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐδὲ ἐκτέταται τὸ προκείμενον ἔργον εἰς ἓν ὕφος καὶ σῶμα κατὰ συνέχειαν ἀδιάστατον, ἵνα τῷ ἀδιακόπῳ ἀποκναίῃ τὸν ἐντυγχάνοντα καὶ δυσεύρετον ἔχῃ τὸ κατάλυμα, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τῶν χρησίμων καθ' αὑτὸ ἰδίᾳ κεῖται καὶ περατωθέντος αὐτοῦ μετάβασις ὡς ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπὶ ἕτερον γίνεται. καὶ οὕτως ὁ διὰ τοῦ συγγράμματος τούτου ἐρχόμενος συχνὰ οἷον καταλύων ἀναπαύεται. (Eust. *in Il.* 2.42-6 = 1.3.28-33)
>
> In addition to the other things, the present work has not been spun out to one web and body in a continuous sequence,[50] in order not to wear out the reader by its uninterruptedness and to provide a lodging that is difficult to find, but every useful thing stands apart, on its own, and the transition from something that was finished off to something else is as if starting afresh. Thus, the person who goes through this work often takes rest as if lodging.

The division of the work in separate units allows the reader an occasional breath and makes the *Parekbolai* more efficient to use, a point Eustathios formulates more explicitly in the proem on the *Parekbolai of the Odyssey*:

> Ἔσται δὲ ἡμῖν κἀνταῦθα, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι τῆς μεταχειρίσεως ἡ ἐπιβολὴ οὐ κατὰ ἐξήγησιν, ἧς ἄλλοις ἐμέλησεν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐκλογὴν τῶν χρησίμων τοῖς ἐπιτρέχουσι καὶ μὴ <ἐν> εὐχερεῖ ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπαφιέναι τῷ τῆς ποιήσεως πλάτει σχολαίτερον. (Eust. *in Od.* 1380.11-3 ed. Cullhed)
>
> Here [in the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*], just as in the *Iliad*, our method of handling the subject will not be through exegesis, which others have concerned themselves with, but through collecting useful passages for those who run

ἐξήγησις. Eustathios makes the same point in the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*: see *in Od.* 1380.11-3 (quoted below) with commentary in Pontani 2000: 41. For a possible polemic between Eustathios and Tzetzes, see Cullhed 2014a: 23*-4*.

[50] The expression ὕφος ἓν καὶ σῶμα may echo Ps.-Hermog. *Inv.* 3.8.2, where it is recommended that the 'proofs' (ἐπιχειρήματα) used in a speech be connected in order for 'the speech to become one web and body' (ὕφος ἓν ὁ λόγος γένηται καὶ σῶμα).

> through the work and cannot easily permit themselves to go leisurely into the breadth of the poem. (Transl. Cullhed 2014a: 11)

The *Parekbolai*, then, are presented as a useful and efficient tool for those who are competing in the intellectual arena of twelfth-century Byzantium, as a reference work that can be conveniently consulted by anyone looking for a learned allusion or wishing to imitate the poet in his own writings.[51] In terms of the image of the host, the design of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad* prevents the work from becoming a 'lodging that is difficult to find' (δυσεύρετον τὸ κατάλυμα) and enables the reader to take a rest from time to time as if 'lodging' (καταλύων) as the exegete's guest. In other words, like the men lodging with Homer, Eustathios presents his readers as lodging with him, suggesting that his own *Parekbolai* are a source of learning, too.

With another image, a comparison of exegetes and cooks, Eustathios underscores that the collection and arrangement of useful material is to *his* credit, even if much of this material is – inevitably – derived from ancient sources:[52] in Eustathios' view, neglecting the works of predecessors would be 'to seek empty glory' (κενὴν δόξαν θηράσασθαι).[53] He compares the endeavours of exegetes to those of cooks:[54]

> οὐ χρὴ δὲ ἀναπεσεῖν οὐδὲ νῦν τὸν ἀκούσαντα τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν, ὡς δυνατὸν ὂν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖθεν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐρανίσασθαι. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, καθάπερ τοῖς μαγειρεύουσι χάρις, οὐχ' ὅτι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δαιτρεύουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰ ἐπιπόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ συναγαγεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀγείραντες εἰς ἓν παρέθεντο, οὕτω καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται τι χάριτος, ὅτι πόνου δίχα οἱ περιτυχόντες ἔχουσι πολλαχόθεν ἐπισυναχθὲν τὸ

[51] On the functionality of the *Parekbolai*, see also Cullhed 2014a: 25*-6*. On the intended users of the *Parekbolai*, see Section 1.2.1 below.

[52] Byzantine historiographers, too, often claim in the proems to their works that the selection and arrangement of relevant material is the principal merit of their work. On this *topos* in Byzantine historiographical proems, see e.g. Grigoriadis 1998: 332-3, R. Scott 2010: 254.

[53] Eust. *in Il.* 3.12 = 1.4.10.

[54] Cf. the introductory epistle of the *Parekbolai on Dionysius Periegetes*, in which Eustathios presents himself as having mixed a crater of wine, and as serving his addressee, John Doukas, the marrow scraped from Dionysius' poetical bone (204.20-2). For culinary imagery in Eustathios, see F. Kolovou 2006: 57*-73* and Van den Berg, forthcoming (2016). Such culinary imagery evokes Plato's (in)famous analogy between rhetoric and cookery (*Grg.* 462c-463b). For the Byzantine reception of Plato's analogy, see F. Kolovou 2007.

ζητούμενον. εἶτα, εἰ καὶ ἀγέρωχόν τι καὶ γαῦρον ὁ λόγος ἔχει, οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ μή τινες τῶν ὑπονώθρων μόλις περιτύχοιεν ἐκείνοις, ἐξ ὧν πολλὰ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἠράνισται. εἰ δέ τι ἐν διαφόροις καὶ προσεπινενόηται, αὐτό, φασί, δείξει. (Eust. *in Il.* 3.34-41 = 1.4.34-5.8)

Also now, however, it is not necessary for the one who has heard that we follow the example of the ancients also in these matters [i.e. in allegorical interpretation] to lose interest, as if it is possible for him, too, to collect for himself such things from there [sc. ancient sources]. For first of all, exactly as there is gratitude for cooks not because they prepare things that did not prior exist, but because they have put together into one things that are toilsome to bring together, having gathered them together themselves, so too will there be some gratitude for us, because without toil the readers have at their disposal what they seek, gathered together from many sources. Next, – even though the statement contains something arrogant and haughty –[55] I think some somewhat dull people could hardly read those works from which much of the information here provided has been collected. But if in various places something has been invented in addition, it will, they say, be self-evident.

Cooks receive appreciation for bringing together ingredients into one delicious dish – ingredients that, moreover, are not always easy to find – rather than preparing what was not there prior to their efforts. In other words, they work with existing material and do not create new things. Eustathios' formulation may echo Diotima's definition of ποίησις ('poetry' or 'creation') in Plato's *Symposium*: poetry or 'creation' is the cause for everything whatsoever of passing 'from not being into being' (ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν).[56] The endeavours of exegetes, then, are similar to those of cooks rather than those of poets: Eustathios as exegete deserves praise for presenting his reader with material gathered together from many sources, some of which are only available to an expert like himself. In a similar vein, Tzetzes claims that he has brought together information from hundreds of books

[55] The terms ἀγέρωχος and γαῦρος also occur together in *Suda* γ 78 and τ 597 as a negative evaluation of the haughty and arrogant Timasius, in Plu. *Marc.* 1.2-3 as a positive evaluation of Marcellus, who displays great impetuosity and high-spiritedness in battles (and, moreover, is greatly interested in Greek *paideia*). The latter parallel may make Eustathios' statement here deliberately ambiguous. See Appendix I, n. 66 for more extensive references to the relevant passages.

[56] Pl. *Smp.* 205b8-206c1.

in his *Allegories of the Iliad*.[57] Both exegetes argue that, thanks to their efforts, the reader effortlessly has at hand all he needs when studying the *Iliad*.[58]

Eustathios concludes the above-quoted comparison of exegetes and cooks by stating that the *Parekbolai* also contain original material that he invented himself. He does not specify what this contribution is, perhaps on the premise that it is better not to speak about oneself too much and become like the proverbially arrogant tragic poet Astydamas, as Eustathios states elsewhere in a similar context.[59] Instead, with another proverb, he argues that his own contribution 'will be self-evident' (αὐτό δείξει). This proverb goes back to Plato's *Theaetetus*, where Socrates encourages Theaetetus not to give up the search for the definition of knowledge:

> Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειεν τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν. (Pl. *Tht.* 200e7-201a2)
>
> The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said: 'The result itself will show;' and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing. (Transl. Fowler 1921: 200)

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[57] Tz. *All. Il.* prol. 478-87 and 493-4.

[58] A parallel with Photios' description of Stobaios' anthology as providing the reader efficiently and without effort with all he needs, may point to a common *topos* in compilatory literature (see Phot. *Bibl.* 167, 115b22-31 with translation and discussion in Nilsson & Nyström 2009: 59). In a similar vein, with regard to ancient commentaries, Sluiter (1998: 13) speaks of 'the tendency of the genre to absorb (and hence make redundant) all earlier material'. On the striving of modern commentators to be comprehensive, see e.g. De Jong 2002: 50-1 and 53-4.

[59] See Eust. *in Il.* 3.6-8 = 1.4.4-6. The tragic poet Astydamas (fourth century BC) became proverbial for his self-praise. The story goes that he wrote an epigram for his own statue, which was turned down by the *boulē* because of excessive boastfulness. See e.g. Paus. σ 6, *Suda* σ 161, Zen. 5.100. In the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios repeatedly refers to the proverb. See *in Il.* 94.46-95.1 = 1.148.30-1 (on *Il.* 1.244), 121.46-122.2 = 1.188.14-6 (1.396-8), 665.59-61 = 2.403.13-5 (7.75), and 957.30-1 = 3.546.10-1 (on *Il.* 13.725). See Karathanasis 1936: 40-1 for a list of further occurrences in twelfth-century rhetorical works.

An ancient *scholion* on this passage explains the context of the proverb: when a man leading the way through a river was asked whether the water was deep, he answered 'it will be self-evident' (αὐτό δείξει), that is to say 'we will find out by trying'. According to the scholiast, the proverb thus applies to 'things that one comes to know by trying' (τῶν ἐκ τῆς πείρας γινωσκομένων).[60] With the proverb, then, Eustathios says in fact that anyone who wishes to find out about his original contribution to the exegesis of the *Iliad*, should read the *Parekbolai*.

While Eustathios compares himself to a cook in the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, throughout the work he repeatedly presents Homer as a cook, with his poems as delicious dishes.[61] The *Iliad* is 'like a remarkable dish of rhetoric' (θαυμασίαν οἷαν δαιταλουργίαν ῥητορείας), while the *Odyssey* still is 'a rich piece of cookery' (καρύκευμά τι), even though it is made of 'the leftovers of the *Iliad*' (τὰ τῆς Ἰλιάδος ἐλλείμματα), since the poet, as it were, completes the story of the *Iliad* by relating events such as the scheme of the wooden horse and the death of Achilles.[62] Homer used various poetical techniques as the 'spices' (ἀρτύματα or ἡδύσματα) of his delicious dishes, to which Eustathios draws attention throughout the *Parekbolai*.[63] By using the image of the cook both for himself as an exegete and for Homer as a poet, Eustathios again puts himself on a par with Homer and underscores the overall image of the relationship between poet, exegete, and their readership as presented throughout the proem: just as Homer feeds his readers with the well-seasoned food of his learning, so too does Eustathios serve his readers a rich dish, consisting of carefully selected and conveniently arranged information.

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[60] Schol. vet. Pl. *Tht.* 200e. I owe this reference to Kolovou 2006: 61* n. 64. For references to further occurrences of the proverb, see Kambylis 1991: 104, n. 374.

[61] For references to further occurrences of the image of dining and cookery in the *Parekbolai on the Iliad,* see Van der Valk 1976: XXVII, esp. n. 7 and 9. Tzetzes, too, speaks of Homer as a cook: Homer uses the nectar of myth as the dough of his poetry, leaving it to ferment so as to sweeten the poem (Tz. *All. Od.* 24.282-3). On culinary imagery in Tzetzes and Eustathios, see also Cesaretti 1991: 200-1 and 213.

[62] Eust. in *Il.* 829.47-8 = 3.148.27-149.1 (on *Il.* 11.45-6); *in Od.* 1380.10 ed. Cullhed.

[63] On the 'spices' of the *Iliad*, see Section 2.3.

1.2 Homer and Eustathios as Teachers of Rhetoric

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios conveys the traditional idea that information on every conceivable subject can be found in Homeric poetry,[64] for instance by means of his list of the manifold 'users' of Homeric poetry and the image of Homer as Ocean of learning (see Section 1.1.2). Eustathios articulates this idea once more by stating that, rather than the proverbial '*Iliad* of evils' ('Ιλιάς κακῶν),[65] Homer's *Iliad* is an '*Iliad* of every good' (καλοῦ παντός 'Ιλιάς).[66] It contains, Eustathios argues, a myriad of things considered good: 'philosophy, rhetoric, the fine art of military strategy, teaching on moral virtues, and, in short, every kind of art and branch of knowledge'.[67] However, in practice, as Cullhed argues, Eustathios 'never tries to extract an "art of war" from Homer, but he repeatedly identifies words and expressions that are useful when writing about this topic'.[68] In other words, Eustathios defines Homer's usefulness largely in terms of usefulness for imitation in rhetorical writings and, therefore, is especially interested in Homer as rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric. The present section explores this focus on rhetoric as it emerges from the proem by discussing Eustathios' statements on the intended users of the *Parekbolai* (Section 1.2.1), rhetoric in Homeric poetry (Section 1.2.2), and the contents of the *Parekbolai* (Section 1.2.3).

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[64] On Homer as a source of every type of learning in antiquity, see e.g. Verdenius 1970, Russell 1981: 84-98, and Hillgruber 1994: 4-35. The idea of Homer as encyclopaedia was repeated in modern times by e.g. Jaeger (1946 [1933]: 3-56) and Havelock (1963: 61-96).
[65] The expression 'an *Iliad* of evils' is used by Demosthenes (19.148) and later became proverbial (see e.g. Zen. 4.43, Diogenian. 2.93 ed. Von Leutsch and 5.26 eds. Von Leutsch & Schneidewin). Further occurrences of the proverb are listed in Karathanasis 1936: 35.
[66] Eust. *in Il.* 1.27 = 1.2.4.
[67] Eust. *in Il.* 1.29-30 = 1.2.6-7: φιλοσοφίας, ῥητορείας, στρατηγικῆς εὐτεχνίας, διδασκαλίας τῆς περὶ ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν, τεχνῶν ὅλως παντοίων καὶ ἐπιστημῶν. Van der Valk 1976: XXVII lists passages from the *Parekbolai* where Eustathios expresses the same idea. Tzetzes expresses a similar idea in e.g. *Ex.* 45.9-10 and 343.12-5. For a similar idea in Prodromos' *Sale of Poetical and Political Lives*, see Cullhed 2014a: 47*-8*.
[68] Cullhed 2014a: 48*.

1.2.1 The intended users of the Parekbolai on the Iliad

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios expressly denies having composed the work at the request of prominent patrons and reproaches intellectuals who claim to write on commission: such claims, he says, are fabricated by κομψοί ('pompous men'). Instead, Eustathios purports to have undertaken the project at the request of his ὁμιληταί, which must refer to both his disciples and the fellow literati who associated with him.[69] The fact that many powerful men were among Eustathios' students (e.g. Michael Choniates) as well as among his intellectual friends (e.g. Euthymios Malakes) renders his denial of working on commission ambiguous. As Cullhed argues, 'during his troublesome time in Thessalonike the continued dissemination of manuscripts containing them [i.e. the *Parekbolai*] would strengthen the old bonds and demonstrate that Eustathios had friends in high places'.[70] The main distinction between the works by the κομψοί and Eustathios' philological writings, then, seems to be the esoteric rather than exoteric nature of the latter: 'The rejection of the "pompous" (*kompsoi*) is thus a rejection of philological writers who addressed men and women in power and not fellow intellectuals, and perhaps of the simplifications inherent in scholarship presented under these conditions.'[71]

Tzetzes' *Allegories of the Iliad* are an example of such a simplified philological work, composed initially for empress Eirene and later for the aristocrat Constantine Kotertzes.[72] The different circumstances under which Eustathios and Tzetzes worked may have influenced the very different authorial

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[69] In the proem of the *Exegesis of the Iliad* (3.1-5), Tzetzes, too, claims to have been persuaded by friends to take up the work. Similar statements commonly occur in Byzantine historiographical proems, too (see Grigoriadis 1998: 328, 332, 340).

[70] Cullhed 2014a: 11*. See Browning 1995a: 86-7 for several influential aristocrats by whom Eustathios was supported in the course of his career, with emperor Manuel I Komnenos as the most prominent among them.

[71] Cullhed 2014a: 11*.

[72] Mullett and Grünbart provide different suggestions as to why Tzetzes changed sponsors. Mullett (1984: 181) suggests that Eirene died before the project had been finished, whereas Grünbart (2005: 306) suggests that the cooperation ended because of a conflict. Goldwyn & Kokkini (2015: viii-ix) discuss both options in relation to the date of the work. See Cullhed 2014a: 10* for various examples of 'exoteric' philological works. Van der Valk's suggestion (on *in Il.* 2.19) that Eustathios' rejection of 'pompous men' is directed at Tzetzes specifically must be dismissed as speculative.

personae that we encounter in their works: whereas Tzetzes goes out of his way to promote himself, Eustathios adopts a seemingly humbler and more modest attitude.[73] He claims that, for the sake of his friends, he would still complete his work, even if possible critics were right in denouncing his work as useless, derivative, and 'nothing sacred' (οὐδὲν ἱερόν).[74] However, as we saw above (Section 1.1.3), Eustathios does not actually question the value of his work. In fact, he dismisses such potential negative evaluations by stating that the person who holds such a negative opinion is 'not very sensible' (μὴ πάνυ εὐγνώμων) and 'must know that he judges badly' (ἴστω κακῶς κρίνων).[75]

The request of his friends was for Eustathios 'to go through the *Iliad* and provide the things useful for someone who makes his way through it' (διὰ τῆς Ἰλιάδος ἐλθεῖν καὶ ἐκπορίσασθαι τὰ χρήσιμα τῷ διεξοδεύοντι).[76] In doing so, he states to have aimed not at the 'learned' (λόγιος) man, since for such a man, equal to Eustathios in learning, the *Parekbolai* have nothing new to offer. Instead, it is the beginning student of Homer who is to benefit from Eustathios' work as well as anyone who has already studied Homeric poetry but needs a reminder – the intermediate reader, so to speak.[77] Eustathios thus distinguishes between three levels of learning, with the highest being only the truly learned men of Eustathios' stature who were already familiar with the material included in the *Parekbolai*. Anyone who has enjoyed grammatical and rhetorical education in order to pursue, for instance, a career in the imperial or patriarchal bureaucracy indeed is educated, but his learning is no match for Eustathios'.[78]

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[73] On Tzetzes' strong authorial presence and self-promotion, see e.g. Budelmann 2002: 150-3 and Cullhed 2014a: 11*.

[74] Eust. *in Il.* 3.5-10 = 1.4.2-8 with discussion in Cullhed 2014a: 11*-2*. The proverbial expression οὐδὲν ἱερόν ('nothing sacred', *in Il.* 3.6 = 1.4.4) is included in the collections by Zenobius (5.47) and Diogenianus (7.13 ed. Leutsch), as well as in lexica by, for instance, Pausanias (ο 31) and Hesychios (ο 1563). The proverb applies to things that are considered worthless. Zenobius ascribes it to the philosopher Clearchus of Soli (fr. 66b ed. Wehrli). Karathanasis 1936: 24-5 lists further occurrences.

[75] Eust. *in Il.* 3.5-7 = 1.4.2-5.

[76] Eust. *in Il.* 2.21-2 = 1.3.5-6.

[77] Eust. *in Il.* 2.22-3 = 1.3.6-8. On young students as the intended audience of the *Parekbolai*, see also Cullhed 2014a: 12*-3*.

[78] I distinguish between three groups of readers, unlike Kaldellis (2009: 34-5), who distinguishes between two groups, uneducated and educated, and argues that Eustathios, with a hint of irony,

1.2.2 Rhetoric in Homeric poetry

In the proems of both the *Parekbolai on the Iliad* and the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*, Eustathios discusses the difference between the two poems in rhetorical terms.[79] He argues that the subject matter of the *Iliad*, more than the *Odyssey*, provided the poet with 'many starting points for an abundance of oratory' (πολλαὶ ἀφορμαὶ εἰς ῥητορείας δαψίλειαν).[80] Moreover, the *Iliad* is more solemn and sublime than the *Odyssey*, as it deals with more heroic subject matter.[81] Eustathios judges the *Odyssey* to be more ἠθική ('rich in character'), an opinion also held by e.g. Aristotle and Ps.-Longinus. Ps.-Longinus contrasts the *Odyssey* as more realistic and closer to everyday life to the *Iliad*, which with its great stream of emotions is more παθητικός ('rich in pathos').[82] Whereas this brings Ps.-Longinus to the conclusion that the *Iliad*, written by Homer at the height of his talent, is artistically superior to the *Odyssey*, the more narrative character of which betrays the poet's old age and waning talent, Eustathios' eventual verdict is in favour of the *Odyssey*. In his view, this poem demonstrates the poet's power to its full extent, precisely because it includes less material and deals with a humbler subject matter.[83] Following a method that Eustathios considers to be typically

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immediately negates his first claim that the work is not useful for the learned man by claiming that it may serve as a reminder for those who have already studied Homer. At any rate, Eustathios' intended audience is heterogeneous, just as, in his view, Homer's audience is: see Cullhed 2014a: 35*-6*. See also Van den Berg, forthcoming (2017a).

[79] For Eustathios' views on the characteristics of the *Odyssey* as opposed to the *Iliad,* see also Cullhed 2014a: 54*-7*.

[80] Eust. *in Il.* 5.1-2 = 1.7.8-9.

[81] Hermogenes also connects σεμνότης ('solemnity') with great and glorious subject matter (Hermog. *Id.* 1.6.11). Ps.-Longinus argues that ὕψος ('sublimity') can be achieved by grand thoughts (Ps.-Longin. 8.1). Eustathios expresses the same idea in the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*. See Eust. *in Od.* 1379.41-2 ed. Cullhed, with discussion in Pontani 2000: 27-8 and Cullhed 2014a: 55*-6*.

[82] Arist. *Po.* 1459b13-6, Ps.-Longin. 9.11-5. Cf. Heraclit. *All.* 60.2: ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναγωνίου καὶ πολεμικῆς Ἰλιάδος ἐπὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν μεταβῶμεν Ὀδύσσειαν, 'let us move from the *Iliad*, a poem full of suspense and relating war, to the *Odyssey*, a poem rich in character'. For ἠθικός in the *Parekbolai*, see Van der Valk 1971: XCV-C.

[83] With a reference to *Ex.* 43.4-9, Van der Valk (on *in Il.* 4.46) and Pontani (2000: 27) argue that Tzetzes, too, prefers the *Odyssey* over the *Iliad.* Their conclusion seems to be based on a misinterpretation of *Ex.* 43.4-9, where Tzetzes does not discuss a difference between the two

Homeric, the poet wove much material into the basic story of Odysseus' *nostos* and, thus, was able to create an excellent poem, proving himself to be truly gifted and ambitious.[84]

As a result of Homer's great rhetorical skill, many lessons in rhetoric can be learned from his epics. Eustathios lists four such lessons in the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad:* 'praiseworthy deceptions' (δόλοι ἐπαινετοί), 'compositions of crafty falsehoods' (ψευδῶν κερδαλέων συνθέσεις), 'acerbic elements of ridicule' (σκωμμάτων δριμύτηται), and 'methods for encomia' (ἐγκωμίων μέθοδοι).[85] 'Praiseworthy deceptions' (δόλοι ἐπαινετοί), not to be confused with 'bad deceptions' (κακοί δόλοι), are Odysseus' specialty, which made him loved rather than hated by all people, as Eustathios explains in the *Parekbolai* on *Iliad* 4.[86] He considers it no cause for blame but rather for praise to cleverly use a deception in case of need, as Odysseus does and the skilful orator should do, for whom Odysseus traditionally was a model.[87] The second item on the list, crafty falsehoods, may refer to the mythical parts of Homer's poem in particular, which are fictitious by definition.[88] Aristotle, too, argues that Homer taught authors after him how to compose falsehoods and, like these post-Homeric authors, Eustathios'

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poems but explains that the subject matter of *both* Homeric poems is twofold, being mythical on the one hand and scientific and philosophical on the other.

[84] Eust. *in Il.* 5.2-7 = 1.7.9-15. On the typically Homeric method of weaving additional material into the basic storyline of his poems, see Chapter 2 (esp. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3). Eustathios expresses similar views on the meagre subject matter of the *Odyssey* in *in Od.* 1379.42-50 ed. Cullhed, with discussion in Pontani 2000: 28-9 and Cullhed 2014a: 54*-5*. See also Section 1.1.2 above.

[85] Eust. *in Il.* 1.31-2 = 1.2.8-9.

[86] Eust. *in Il.* 480.38-45 = 1.759.27-760.4 (on *Il.* 4.339). In three places in the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*, Eustathios designates Odysseus' lies as ἐπαινετοὶ δόλοι, which have brought him many victories: *in Od.* 1459.58-9 = 1.116.21-3 (on *Od.* 3.119), 1629.1 = 1.342.7 (on *Od.* 9.281), and 1862.60-1 = 2.199.35-6 (on *Od.* 19.212). Eidothea's wile by which she deceives her father Proteus in *Odyssey* 4 is likewise positively evaluated with the same adjective (see Eust. *in Od.* 1504.39 = 1.176.10 on *Od.* 4.441).

[87] See e.g. Hermog. *Id.* 2.9.7-12 and Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 172 with commentary by Hillgruber (1999: 371) for more examples. On Odysseus as 'virtuoso rhetor', see also Sandywell 1996: 126-8. For Eustathios' ideas on acceptable deception, see also Pontani 2000: 26.

[88] For Eustathios' definition of myth and the rhetorical lessons to be learned from it, see Section 1.3.1 below.

students can learn the same technique by studying Homeric poetry.[89] Thirdly, one can learn acerbic elements of ridicule from Homer, one of the devices that the poet employs in order to 'season' the basic storyline.[90] Again, the idea is that by studying Homer's acerbic ridicule one can learn how to compose such ridicule oneself and 'season' one's own writings.[91] Finally, Homeric poetry teaches one how to compose encomia, especially since, we may assume, Eustathios considers the *Iliad* to be an encomium of Achilles. While Eustathios repeatedly argues that Achilles' honour is one of the poet's main concerns,[92] Tzetzes explicitly designates Achilles as 'the mighty subject of his [sc. Homer's] encomium'.[93] Taken together, this list is indicative of one of the basic principles of the *Parekbolai*: a thorough understanding of Homer's rhetorical techniques enables the writer of rhetorical prose to implement them in his own writings. The function of Eustathios' *Parekbolai* is to identify and explicate these Homeric techniques.

1.2.3 The 'table of contents' of the Parekbolai on the Iliad[94]

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios states that he did not include everything that was written about Homer by others before him in his

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[89] Arist. *Po.* 1460a18-9.

[90] For σκῶμμα ('ridicule') as a 'spice' of the *Iliad*, see e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 1084.9-10 = 3.922.16-8 (on *Il.* 16.744).

[91] See Lindberg 1977: 241-5 on δριμύτης ('acerbity') in Hermogenes and Eustathios. Hermogenes discusses this type of style in *Id.* 2.5.1-15.

[92] On Achilles' central role in the composition of the *Iliad*, see Section 2.2.1. On the plan of Zeus (and the entire *Iliad*) revolving around Achilles' honour, see Section 4.2.2.

[93] Tz. *All. Il.* prol. 1152: τὸ κράτιστον κεφάλαιον αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐγκωμίων. The translation is from Goldwyn & Kokkini 2015: 87. In twelfth-century Byzantium, Achilles was considered the best of the Greeks and a symbol of power and courage. Authors, therefore, often compare persons of their own time with extraordinary military virtue or courage to Achilles. See Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou 1971-1972: 131 for examples. Cf. Ann. Komn. 7.2.6, where Anna Komnene expresses the intention to praise her husband in the *Alexiad* 'as Homer celebrated Achilles among the Achaeans' (οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὕμνησεν Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς). While Achilles in the modern reception of Homeric poetry was often evaluated in a negative way, Latacz 1997 argues for a revaluation of the hero as the embodiment of the Homeric heroism, which revolves around honour.

[94] I have discussed the seven categories of the 'table of contents' of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad* and Eustathios' projection of his didactic programme on Homer also in Van den Berg 2015.

work, 'for that would be a foolish, superfluous, and not easily attainable toil'.[95] Instead, he has selected relevant and useful things, which he lists by way of 'table of contents':

> ἐννοίας εὐχρήστους τῷ καταλογάδην γράφοντι καὶ βουλομένῳ ῥητορικὰς ποιεῖν εὐκαίρως παραπλοκάς· μεθόδους, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὠφελεῖταί τις μιμεῖσθαι θέλων καὶ τῆς εὐτεχνίας θαυμάζει τὸν ποιητήν· λέξεις, τὰς πλείους μὲν ὡς πεζῷ λόγῳ προσηκούσας, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ σκληρὰς καὶ τραχείας καὶ ποιητικάς, ἃς εἰ μὴ ἀναπτύξει τις ἐτυμολογικώτερον, οὐκ εὔγνωστον ἔσται τὸ χωρίον, ὃ παρεκβέβληται· γνώμας, αἷς καὶ αὐταῖς πολλαχοῦ ἡ Ὁμηρικὴ σεμνύνεται ποίησις· ἱστορίας, οὐ μόνον αἷς ὁ ποιητὴς χρᾶται κατὰ κανόνα οἰκεῖον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅπου καὶ πλατύτερον, ὡς ἐξ ὧν ἱστόρησαν ἕτεροι· ἔτι δὲ μύθους, τοὺς μὲν ἀκράτους καὶ ἀθεραπεύτους καὶ κατὰ μόνον θεωρουμένους τὸ προφερόμενον, τοὺς δὲ καὶ μετὰ θεραπείας ἀλληγορικῆς εἴτε καὶ ἀναγωγικῆς· καὶ ἕτερα μυρία καλὰ εἰς βίον χρήσιμα· (Eust. *in Il.* 2.27-36 = 1.3.12-22)

> useful thoughts for the one who writes in prose and intends to make rhetorical 'inweavings' at the right moment; methods, from which someone who wishes to imitate the poet benefits, too, and by virtue of which he admires him for his excellent technique; words, most of them as appropriate for prose writing, but often also austere and harsh and poetical ones; if someone will not explain them in a kind of etymological way, the passage that has been excerpted will not be easy to understand; gnomes, exactly through which Homeric poetry is solemn in many places; historical narratives, not only the ones that the poet employs according to his own rule, but in some places also in fuller detail, how others have related historical narratives based on the Homeric ones; furthermore, myths, some pure, 'incurable', and considered with regard to what is put forward only, but others also with an allegorical or anagogical 'remedy'; and countless other good things that are useful for life.

This 'table of contents' demonstrates that Eustathios defines Homer's usefulness first and foremost in terms of usefulness for imitation and creative re-use by authors of rhetorical prose.[96] The present section discusses the seven types of useful information included in the *Parekbolai*, which we will frequently encounter throughout Eustathios' analysis of the composition of the *Iliad* as

[95] Eust. *in Il.* 2.25-6 = 1.3.10-1: τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ μόχθος μάταιος καὶ περιττὸς καὶ οὐδὲ ῥᾴον ἀνύσιμος.

[96] See also Cullhed 2014a: 20*-1*.

explored in the following chapters. In Eustathios' view, moreover, these types of information are found not only in the *Parekbolai* but also in the *Iliad* itself: throughout the *Parekbolai*, Eustathios ascribes to the poet didactic goals similar to his own in a 'transhistorical mingling of pedagogical voices'.[97]

The first three items on Eustathios' list, 'thoughts' (ἐννοίαι), 'methods' (μεθόδοι), and 'words' (λέξεις), are identified in Hermogenes' *On Types of Style* as the main building blocks of a speech. With 'thought' or 'thoughts' Hermogenes refers to the content of the speech and the topics to be discussed, while 'method' is the way in which this subject matter is turned into a structured composition. Λέξις ('diction') is the formulation of a speech, with figures of speech, clauses, word order, pauses, and rhythm as its constituents.[98] For each of these three items Eustathios explains why he included them in the *Parekbolai*: he provides thoughts that are useful in particular for prose writers who wish to embellish their works with quotations of and allusions to Homer.[99] Throughout the *Parekbolai*, Eustathios gives numerous examples for the re-use of the Homeric lines under discussion, thus catering to the needs of these writers. These notes represent 'a systematic way of dealing with a very real phenomenon that was widespread in both theory and practice since long before Eustathios' days'.[100] Moreover, Eustathios repeatedly argues that Homer re-uses his own verses and, thus, teaches this technique to his readers. An example of such creative re-use by the poet is found in *Odyssey* 1, where Telemachus says to Penelope:

> ἀλλ' εἰς οἶκον ἰοῦσα τὰ σ' αὐτῆς ἔργα κόμιζε,
> ἱστόν τ' ἠλακάτην τε, καὶ ἀμφιπόλοισι κέλευε

[97] Cullhed 2014a: 30*. For Eustathios' ideas on Homer as teacher, see Cullhed 2014a: 29*-30*. Sluiter 1999 (esp. 173-4, 176-9) discusses a similar tendency of ancient commentators to ascribe to the source author didactic intentions similar to their own: see Introduction, p. 19 above.

[98] Hermog. *Id.* 1.1.19. On these elements and their relation to the types of style, see Hagedorn 1964: 19-23 and Lindberg 1977: 30-9.

[99] According to Hermogenes, such 'inweavings' derived from poetry produce pleasure in a speech (*Id.* 2.4.22). This phenomenon is discussed in Nünlist 2012 and Cullhed 2014a: 39*-46*.

[100] Cullhed 2014a: 39*-40*. With these words, Cullhed criticises Nünlist (2012), who considers this phenomenon in the *Parekbolai* to be an implicit encouragement to re-use Homeric poetry and a 'suggested method' rather than a widespread and common practice. See Cullhed 2014a: 40*-4* for examples of Homeric re-use in rhetorical works by Eustathios and his contemporaries.

> ἔργον ἐποίχεσθαι· μῦθος δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει
> πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ' ἐμοί· [...] (*Od.* 1.356-9)
>
> Now go to your chamber, and busy yourself with your own tasks, the loom and the distaff, and bid your handmaids be about their tasks; but speech shall be men's care, for all, but most of all for me.

In Eustathios' view, Hector 'used this thought' (τὸ νόημα τοῦτο μετεχειρίσατο), when he spoke the same words to Andromache in *Iliad* 6 (vv. 490-2), changing μῦθος ('speech') in πόλεμος ('war'). In this way, 'the poet teaches how epic verses must be adapted' (διδάσκοντος τοῦ ποιητοῦ ὅπως παρῳδητέον τὰ ἔπη).[101]

Eustathios' discussion of Homer's admirable methods and techniques, too, aims at writers of rhetorical prose. Throughout the *Parekbolai* he analyses and explicates the methods that the poet employed in composing his poem, some of which he considers to be typically Homeric.[102] A thorough grasp of these methods enables one to imitate The Poet and to implement his techniques in one's own writings. Again, Eustathios is assisted by Homer: in Eustathios' view, the poet frequently gives insight into his composition process and reveals the choices that he made when composing the *Iliad*, as examples throughout the following chapters will illustrate (see Section 4.3.1 in particular).

With the plural λέξεις instead of Hermogenes' singular λέξις, Eustathios refers to individual words rather than diction in general. He claims to discuss on the one hand words that are appropriate to use in prose, and on the other 'austere and harsh and poetical' words,[103] with the implication that these latter words are not appropriate for prose writings.[104] While Eustathios in the 'table of contents'

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[101] Eust. *in Od.* 1423.1-2 ed. Cullhed with discussion in Cullhed 2014a: 29*. See Cullhed's annotations at *in Od.* 1423.2 for references to similar notes.

[102] On the Homeric methods, see Chapter 2.

[103] In his discussion of the type of style called τραχύτης ('harshness') Hermogenes argues that metaphorical and austere words produce this style. Such words lead to obscurity, as do poetical ones, all of them being rare in common usage (*Id.* 1.7.14; cf. 2.12.24 on Thucydides' style). For a similar idea, see e.g. Theon, *Prog.* 5, 81.8-12.

[104] Repeatedly, Eustathios explicitly states that such poetical words are not appropriate for prose (e.g. *in Il.* 617.25 = 2.222.7-8 on *Il.* 5.876) or not useful for prose writers (e.g. *in Il.* 1064.64 = 3.865.4-5 on *Il.* 16.732).

announces to discuss the etymology of such words in order to explicate the passage in question, the *Parekbolai* demonstrate that his explanation of words often offers more than etymology and addresses, for instance, morphology, aspiration, accentuation, dialect forms, semantics, and prosody.[105] Such notes resemble the *epimerismoi* – the grammatical explanations and definitions – of Byzantine grammarians and provide the reader with grammatical and syntactical lessons that go beyond the elucidation of Homer's text only.[106] In other words, Eustathios weaves the didactic tool of the *epimerismoi* into his *Parekbolai* and teaches his reader grammar with the *Iliad* as his starting point. Moreover, throughout the work, he repeatedly points to grammatical lessons purposefully taught by Homer. To give one example: commenting on *Iliad* 22.67-8 (ἐπεί κέ τις ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ / τύψας ἠὲ βαλὼν ῥεθέων ἐκ θυμὸν ἕληται, 'when some man by thrust or cast of the sharp bronze has taken the spirit from my limbs'), he explains that Homer here teaches 'in didactic manner' (διδασκαλικῶς) that the verbs τύπτω ('to thrust') and βάλλω ('to cast') differ in meaning.[107]

The fourth useful subject on the list is 'gnomes, exactly through which Homeric poetry is solemn in many places'.[108] This connection between gnomes and solemnity of style again betrays Hermogenean influence: according to Hermogenes, 'solemnity' (σεμνότης) is produced by 'everything that is discussed in general or universal terms' (πάντα ὅσα ἐν τῷ καθόλου καὶ γενικῶς λέγεται).[109] Later commentators on Hermogenes refer to gnomes in particular,[110] which are

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[105] For the elaborate explanation of a poetical word, see e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 474.12-20 = 1.749.14-24 (on the poetical ἔτετμε in *Il.* 4.293) and *in Il.* 1064.64-1065.3 = 3.865.4-10 (on the poetical σφεδανόν in *Il.* 16.372).

[106] On *epimerismoi*, see e.g. Robins 1993: 125-42 and Dickey 2007: 27-8. For the idea that Eustathios' *Parekbolai* to some extent resemble grammatical *epimerismoi*, see also Cullhed 2014a: 13*.

[107] Eust. *in Il.* 1257.20-1 = 4.572.18-20 (on *Il.* 22.67-8). See also *in Il.* 1262.53-5 = 4.592.17-21 (on *Il.* 22.136-7), where Homer explains the meaning of a phrase, and 1272.40 = 4.627.10-1 (on *Il.* 22.341), where Eustathios argues that Homer teaches the etymology of a noun.

[108] Eustathios repeatedly connects gnomes with solemnity of style. See Cullhed 2014a: 48*, n. 120 for references. On Homeric gnomes, see e.g. Lardinois 1997.

[109] Hermog. *Id.* 1.6.10.

[110] Syrian. *in Hermog. Id.* 44.18-21, Anon. *in Hermog. Id.* 977.24-7. I owe these references to Cullhed 2014a: 49*, n. 122.

general and universal by definition.[111] We may assume that Eustathios' discussion of Homeric gnomes again is directed at re-use by prose writers in particular, an idea that is confirmed by notes in which Eustathios demonstrates how a gnome can be re-used with or without adaptions,[112] as well as examples indicating how a Homeric line can be reworked into a gnome.[113] In addition, with their wise content, gnomes add to the general polymathy of the reader: throughout the *Parekbolai*, Eustathios repeatedly refers to the didactic aspect of gnomes and uses the Homeric gnomes as an excuse to provide additional information himself.[114] With wisdom cloaked in gnomes, Homer and Eustathios teach the knowledge that is essential for a skilful rhetorician and successful intellectual.

Next on the list are historical narratives and myths, two essential components of Homeric poetry.[115] For Eustathios, these two types of discourse are opposites in terms of truth-value.[116] Ἱστορία, in Eustathios' conception, is true or

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[111] In the *progymnasmata* attributed to Hermogenes a gnome is defined as 'a summary statement in general terms that encourages or discourages to do something, or indicates how a certain matter is' (Γνώμη ἐστὶ λόγος κεφαλαιώδης ἐν ἀποφάνσει καθολικῇ ἀποτρέπων τι ἢ προτρέπων ἐπί τι ἢ ὁποῖον ἕκαστόν ἐστι δηλῶν, Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 4.1). Their universal character is a recurrent aspect of Eustathios' discussion of gnomes. See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 55.12 = 1.88.16 (on *Il.* 1.80).

[112] An example is found in Eust. *in Il.* 89.26-8 = 1.141.1-4 (on *Il.* 1.218). See Cullhed 2014a: 49* for a discussion of this passage and references to further examples. See Cullhed 2014a: 49*, n. 123 for references to examples of the re-use of Homeric gnomes in the letters of Michael Choniates.

[113] On Eustathios' adaptions of Homeric gnomes and transformations of Homeric lines into gnomes, see Cullhed 2014a: 49* and Andersen 2014: 103-12. Eustathios transforms a Homeric line into a gnome e.g. in *in Il.* 210.35-8 = 1.321.6-10 (on *Il.* 2.233-4).

[114] See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 55.10-3 = 1.88.14-7 (on *Il.* 1.80) and 1179.8-9 = 4.310.11-2 (on *Il.* 19.182-3). I agree with Andersen (2014: 113-4), who underscores that, for Eustathios, the usefulness of Homeric gnomes lies not in their re-use in rhetorical writings only, but also in their didactic function. She thus nuances Cullhed's emphasis on rhetorical re-use as the predominant purpose of Eustathios' discussion of gnomes (2014a: 48*-9*). Cf. Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 151-60: Homer was the first to use apophthegmata and gnomes, which are clear examples of Homer's wisdom. Ps.-Plutarch demonstrates by means of examples how later authors re-used Homeric gnomes.

[115] For Eustathios' ideas on history and myth in Homeric poetry, see Section 1.3.1.

[116] See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 514.38-9 = 2.8.13-5 (on *Il.* 5.6) as discussed in n. 30 above, where Eustathios distinguishes between the poetical/mythical Ocean and the 'true facts' (ἀληθὴς ἱστορία) about the Ocean. See also *in Pi.* 7.2: φιλοτιμεῖται δὲ καὶ μύθοις καὶ ἱστορίαις, ἐκεῖνο μὲν ποιητικώτερον, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἧς ἐφίενται οἱ σοφοί. 'He [sc. Pindar] presents his readers with myths as well as

historically accurate discourse – he uses the term for the history of the Trojan War that forms the basis of the *Iliad* (see Sections 1.3.1 and 2.2.1); for additional historical narratives or historical facts, often consisting of the biographical details about unfortunate warriors that Homer uses to 'season' his poetry (see Section 2.3.2); and for the 'scientific' information about animals, natural phenomena, etc. that the poet presents in similes in particular (see Section 2.3.3).[117] In the 'table of contents', Eustathios distinguishes between historical narratives included in the *Iliad* and historical narratives told by later authors, which elaborate on the Homeric ones. The historical narratives in the *Iliad* are said to be included 'according to his [sc. Homer's] own rule' (κατὰ κανόνα οἰκεῖον), that is to say, according to the characteristically Homeric method of inserting additional historical narratives into the basic storyline of the *Iliad*.[118]

In Eustathios' technical terminology, the term μῦθος consistently refers to myth,[119] which in his conception is stories about the gods. This is suggested, for instance, by his list of 'mythical topics' (μυθικά τινα): 'plans of the gods, their wars, schemes, love affairs, journeys, and manifold actions in general'.[120] Eustathios announces to discuss two types of myths: 'pure and incurable' (ἀκράτοι καὶ ἀθεραπεύτοι) myths that have no deeper allegorical meaning and should thus be

historical narratives, the former being more poetical, the latter being concerned with truth, which wise men desire.'

[117] See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 176.22 = 1.270.26 (with discussion in Section 2.3.3), where Eustathios argues that Homer sets forth 'various kinds of natural information' (φυσικὴ ἱστορία ποικίλη) in similes, and *in Il.* 177.42-3 = 1.272.29-30, where Eustathios explains that most of the details of the simile in *Il.* 2.87-93 are included 'with a view to the information about the bees' (πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἱστορίαν τῶν μελισσῶν). Both passages are part of Eustathios' programmatic discussion of similes in Homeric poetry. See Appendix II for a translation.

[118] See Section 2.3.2 for a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon.

[119] Aristotle's usage of μῦθος in the sense of 'plot' does not occur in the *Parekbolai* and is not commonly found in the *scholia vetera* either (see Nünlist 2009a: 24, n. 7). Cf. *in Il.* 29.24-7 = 1.47.27-30 (on *Il.* 1.25), where Eustathios explains that μῦθος in Homer simply means 'speech' (λόγος), a meaning it has retained in certain compounds, and that it later became used for 'a fictional story' (ψευδής λόγος). For the definition of myth as 'a fictional story', see Section 1.3.1 below.

[120] Eust. *in Il.* 11.7-8 = 1.18.9-10 (on *Il.* 1.1): θεῶν βουλὰς καὶ πολέμους ἐκείνων καὶ ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ ἔρωτας καὶ ἀποδημίας καὶ ὅλως πράξεις παντοίας. For the role of the gods in the composition of the *Iliad*, see Chapter 4.

read only as narratives,[121] and myths *with* an allegorical or anagogical 'remedy' (θεραπεία ἀλληγορικὴ εἴτε καὶ ἀναγωγική). In the *Parekbolai*, the terms ἀναγωγικός ('anagogical' or 'elevating') and ἀναγωγή ('anagoge' or 'elevation') are closely connected with – sometimes even identified with – the terms ἀλληγορικός ('allegorical') and ἀλληγορία ('allegory'), or, rather, with allegorical interpretation that is not historical, as the following passage from the *Parekbolai* on *Iliad* 1 indicates:[122]

> ὅλως δὲ εἰπεῖν, τερατωδέστερον μὲν διὰ σεμνότητα οἱ παλαιοὶ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐκ θείου γένους ἐγενεαλόγουν καὶ ἡμιθέους ἔλεγον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ λόγου αὐτόνομον ἀτοπίαν ἀλληγορία ἐθεράπευεν ἢ ἀναγωγικὴ ἢ καὶ ἱστορική· ἀλληγορία γάρ τις καὶ ἡ διὰ ἱστοριῶν θεραπεία τῶν μύθων εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς παλαιοῖς. (Eust. *in Il.* 18.46-19.2 = 1.31.5-9 on *Il.* 1.4)
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> Generally speaking, in a more marvellous way, the ancients gave kings a divine origin for the sake of solemnity and called them demigods, but allegory, whether historical or anagogical, remedied the autonomous absurdity of the story: for the ancients consider remedy of myths through historical facts to be a certain type of allegory too.

Eustathios here distinguishes between a rationalising or euhemeristic interpretation of myth in historical terms – what he, following ancient critics, designates as historical allegory – and anagogical allegory, which involves the interpretation of myth in, for instance, natural, astronomical, or ethical terms and, thus, elevates the meaning of the myth above the human and mundane.[123]

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[121] For examples of such 'unallegorical' myths in the *Iliad*, see Section 4.2.1. On the dichotomy between allegorical and unallegorical myths, see also Section 1.3.1 below.

[122] The terms ἀνάγω, ἀναγωγή, and ἀναγωγικός are common in biblical exegesis and refer to the anagogical, i.e. spiritual or mystical, interpretation or the anagogical meaning of Scripture (as opposed to its literal meaning). See Lampe s.v. ἀνάγω B.1; ἀναγωγή B; ἀναγωγικός 3. Cesaretti (1991: 234-5) explains Eustathios' use of the terms in the same way. For Eustathios' allegorical method and the different types of allegory, see Section 1.3.2 below.

[123] Cf. Eust. *in Il.* 20.22-5 = 1.33.25-34.1 (on *Il.* 1.5): ὡς δὲ Ζεὺς οὐ μόνον ὁ κατὰ μῦθον πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, οὐδὲ μόνον ὁ καθ' ἱστορίαν Κρητικὸς βασιλεύς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κατὰ ἀναγωγὴν ἀὴρ καὶ αἰθὴρ καὶ ἥλιος καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ εἱμαρμένη καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ καὶ πρόνοια καὶ ὁ νοῦς δὲ ὁ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, καθωμίληται τοῖς παλαιοῖς. 'That Zeus is not only the father of men and gods according to myth,

That Eustathios speaks of the 'absurdity' of myths and their allegorical 'remedy' must be understood against the background of rhetorical analysis and should not be taken to betray Eustathios' Christian background *per se*.[124] The events of Homer's myths are absurd in that they cannot possibly or plausibly happen in reality, and, as such, require a 'remedy' to make them acceptable within the *Iliad*, just as, for instance, unusual syntactical constructions or adventurous metaphorical expressions do.[125] The predicate 'autonomous' refers to the 'poetic autonomy' (αὐτονομία ποιητική) or poetic freedom that Eustathios grants Homer, which allows him to include such absurd inventions in his poetry.[126]

Eustathios concludes his 'table of contents' with 'countless other good things that are useful for life'. Under this category fall numerous passages in which Eustathios provides additional information about miscellaneous subjects, ranging from topography and geography to zoology, astronomy, and medicine.[127] The heterogeneous nature of Eustathios' notes appears to reflect his teaching practice; in the funerary oration on his former teacher, for instance, Michael Choniates praises Eustathios for not restricting his lessons to the text to be discussed that day, but treating relevant material from other texts as well. Moreover, he did not hesitate to introduce his students to topics that, strictly

and not only the Cretan king according to history, but according to anagoge also air and ether and sun and heaven and fate and the soul of the universe, both providence and the human mind, was a current idea among the ancients.'

[124] In fact, many of the *res Christianae* pointed out by Van der Valk in his edition of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad* and collected in Keizer's index (1995: 478) contain many instances in which Van der Valk dubiously sees Eustathios' Christian background reflected in his interpretation of the *Iliad*, as Cullhed (2014a: 44*) rightly concludes. We will encounter various examples throughout the following chapters (see e.g. Section 3.4 (vii) below).

[125] For the idea in Eustathios and Hermogenes that myths require a 'remedy' for the sake of plausibility, see Section 3.2.2. For the idea that implausible, impossible, improbable etc. events require a 'remedy', see Section 3.2.3. Eustathios speaks of the 'remedy' of unusual syntax e.g. in *in Il.* 93.16-21 = 1.146.24-9 (on *Il.* 1.236-7). For daring metaphors and their 'remedies', see Section 3.3.4.

[126] Cf. e.g. *in Il.* 1110.5-6 = 4.64.13-5 (17.366), where Eustathios argues that poetic freedom allows Homer to represent lifeless objects such as spears as being alive. Sections 1.3.1 and 4.2.1 discuss Eustathios' ideas on Homer's poetic freedom to invent and include myths in more detail.

[127] See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 1263.31-40 = 4.595.14-29 (on *Il.* 22.157), 1264.4-8 = 4.597.18-598.5 (on *Il.* 22.165), and 1283.25-35 = 4.667.8-668.3 (on *Il.* 22.499) for geographical, topographical, and medical background information respectively.

speaking, belonged to more advanced stages of their education.[128] Similarly, the goal of the *Parekbolai*, as of his lessons, reaches beyond explicating the Homeric text. Like Eustathios, Homer, too, teaches 'matters that concern life' (τὰ εἰς βίον) and is 'educational' (παιδευτικός) as well as 'useful for life' (βιωφελής).[129] In Eustathios' view, the poet provides much knowledge through the wide learning he displays in his poetry.[130] Eustathios appears to pursue the same goal by providing a wealth of background information in the *Parekbolai*: in displaying his own wide learning, he teaches more than just Homeric poetry, instructing his readers in the rhetorical imitation of Homer and contributing to their polymathy. Thus, as Cullhed concludes, '[t]he digressive nature of the *Parekbolai* is not an accidental defect, but a key feature of its functionality'.[131]

1.3 Eustathios on Myth and Allegory in Homeric Poetry

The intensified popularity of Homeric poetry in twelfth-century Byzantium (see pp. 6-7) went hand in hand with a renewed interest in mythology and allegory.[132] Ancient debates on the dangers of poetry's frivolous and fictional mythical content were revived, not because the position of Homeric poetry in the Byzantine school curriculum was threatened by and needed protection from 'Christian odium',[133] but as a *topos* of ancient Homeric criticism. Posing problems and finding solutions in this everlasting debate on the merits of poetry offered twelfth-century intellectuals many starting points for demonstrating their ingenuity and innovativeness, in order to prove themselves equal or even

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[128] Cullhed 2014a: 13* with references to M. Chon. *Or.* 16, 1.287.22-5 and 1.288.25-30.

[129] Eust. *in Il.* 38.27 = 1.62.11-2 (on *Il.* 1.43), 1010.2 = 3.714.18-9 (on *Il.* 15.146-8). A similar idea is expressed in e.g. *in Il.* 936.52 = 3.484.6-7 (on *Il.* 13.354-7) and 1295.50 = 4.711.7-8 (on *Il.* 23.194-8). In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey* (*in Od.* 1380.5 ed. Cullhed) Eustathios claims that all poetry is useful for life.

[130] Eustathios considers historical information and similes in particular to be means for the poet to display his own learning and impart knowledge to his reader. See Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 below.

[131] Cullhed 2014a: 26*.

[132] See e.g. Kaldellis 2007a: 244-7 and Cullhed 2014a: 14*-8*. On Middle Byzantine allegorists of Homer, see Cesaretti 1991 and Section 4.1.3.

[133] *Pace* Kaldellis 2007a: 246 and 2009: 32.

superior to their predecessors. Allegorical interpretation was embraced as a way of displaying 'hermeneutic complexity' and provided rhetoricians with material for adding extra layers to their Homeric allusions.[134] In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios expounds his views on Homeric myth and allegory. Like ancient allegorists,[135] he looks for the truth hidden beneath the fictional surface of myth: since Homer is the wise man *par excellence*, and since wisdom is defined as 'contemplation of truth' (θεωρία ἀληθευτική), Homer, too, must be 'truthful' (ἀληθευτικός) in his poetry, including the mythical parts.[136] The present section explores Eustathios' programmatic statements on the nature of poetry (Section 1.3.1) and on his allegorical method (Section 1.3.2) in order to delineate the theoretical background for his analysis of history and myth in the *Iliad*.[137]

1.3.1 To amaze and teach: myth and history in Homeric poetry

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*, Eustathios argues that historical truth constitutes the basis of poetry, to which the poet according to poetic custom adds myths in order to produce 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) and 'amazement' (ἔκπληξις).[138] The poet remains faithful to the historical facts while adding poetic 'marvel tales' (τερατολογία or τερατεία), with the result that 'falsehood' (ψεῦδος) and truth are mingled. In this way, poetry is able to achieve its aims of teaching and amazing or even enchanting. Eustathios identifies two methods for the poet to transform the historical material into poetic marvel: he can transfer historical events to

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[134] For this 'hermeneutic' approach to allegory in Byzantium, see Cullhed 2014a: 17*-8*.

[135] For references to relevant literature on ancient allegory, see the introduction of Chapter 4 (p. 190, n. 4). On ancient Homeric allegoresis, see also Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 with further references.

[136] Eust. *in Il.* 1.42-2.1 = 1.2.20-1. For the connection of truth with wisdom, philosophy, and theoretical knowledge, see e.g. Arist. *Metaph.* 993b19-21: ὀρθῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλεῖσθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας. θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον· 'It is correct that philosophy is called knowledge of the truth. For truth is the goal of theoretical knowledge, action of practical [knowledge].' In his commentary on the *Metaphysics* (146.4-6), Alexander of Aphrodisias explains Aristotle's notion of 'contemplation of truth' (ἀληθείας θεωρία, *Metaph.* 993a30) as 'wisdom and theoretical philosophy' (ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ θεωρητικὴ φιλοσοφία).

[137] On Eustathios' allegorical method, see Cesaretti 1991: 207-74, with additions and critical remarks in Cullhed 2014a: 59*-64* and 67*-9*.

[138] Eustathios sets forth his views on history and marvel tales as the essence of poetry in *in Od.* 1379.7-41 ed. Cullhed.

another location or exaggerate them so as to make them more 'unexpected' (παράδοξος).[139] As Pontani has demonstrated, Eustathios' views on myth are greatly indebted to Strabo and Polybius.[140] In the *Parekbolai* on *Iliad* 14, Eustathios applies the latter's well-known definition of poetry to the composition of the *Iliad*:[141]

> Σημείωσαι δὲ καί, ὅτι τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπόντων ὡς ἡ ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἢ καὶ οὐσία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἱστορίας καὶ διαθέσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, καὶ ὡς τῆς ἱστορίας μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὡς ἐν νεῶν Καταλόγῳ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος, τῆς δὲ διαθέσεως ἐνέργεια, ὡς ὅταν μαχομένους εἰσάγῃ, μύθου δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ἔκπληξις, τὰ μὲν προσεχῶς πρὸ τοῦ χωρίου τούτου ἐν τῇ ῥαψῳδίᾳ ταύτῃ ἀκράτως ἦσαν μῦθοι, τὰ δὲ ἐφεξῆς μετὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς ὕπνον διάθεσιν δραστηρίου μάχης ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἱστορίαις καὶ μύθοις κέκραται. (Eust. *in Il.* 988.63-989.4 = 3.652.8-15 on *Il.* 14.313-28)
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> Notice also that, since the ancients say that the poetic habit or very essence consists of history, disposition, and pleasure, and that truth belongs to history, as Homer produces in the Catalogue of Ships, and activity to disposition, as whenever he introduces men fighting, and pleasure and amazement to myth, the things that immediately precede the present passage in this rhapsody were myths in unmixed form, but the things that follow after Zeus' sleep contain a disposition of active battle, and these things in between are a mixture of historical elements and myths.

This quotation is indicative of the main rationale underlying Eustathios' views on the nature of poetry that largely determines his approach to the composition of the *Iliad*: essentially, poetry is a mixture of history and myth, of truth and fiction.

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[139] Pontani (2000: 25) argues that these two methods of creating poetic τερατεία are an original aspect of Eustathios' exegesis. See Section 4.2.1 for a more detailed discussion of Eustathios' views on Homer's method of inventing marvel tales. For Homer's penchant for the unexpected and surprising, see Section 2.3.5.

[140] Pontani 2000: 14-5. Throughout his commentary on the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*, Pontani (2000) identifies various (verbal) echoes of Strabo's *Geography.* For Strabo's (and Polybius') views on Homer, see e.g. Kim 2007 and 2010: 47-84. Cesaretti (1991: 233) also draws a parallel between Strabo's and Eustathios' views on myth. For Strabo as an important source for Eustathios' *Parekbolai* in general, see Van der Valk 1971: LXXIV-LXXVI and 1976: XLV.

[141] Plb. 34.4.1-3 (= Str. 1.2.17).

Twisting Aristotle's statement that μῦθος (in the *Poetics* referring to 'plot') is like the soul of tragedy, Eustathios elsewhere argues that μῦθος, i.e. myth, is like the soul of poetry.[142] That is to say, poetry without myth is no poetry at all.[143] The quoted passage, moreover, implicitly points to the freedom that Eustathios grants the poet to mix both elements at his own discretion and compose the *Iliad* as he thinks fit.[144]

In Eustathios' view, myth, though 'fictional' (ψευδής) by definition, reflects truth through the 'plausibility' (πιθανότης) of its invention.[145] Eustathios transposes to the poetical μῦθοι of Homer the definition of the rhetorical μῦθοι of the *progymnasmata*, i.e. the fables that orators employed to give advice and that formed students' first exercises in rhetorical composition. Aphthonios, for instance, defines fable as 'a fictional story reflecting truth' (λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν). His commentator John of Sardis explains that it is due to the plausibility of its invention that fable reflects truth.[146] Whereas rhetoricians like Aphthonios and his commentator John Doxapatres carefully distinguish between rhetorical and poetical μῦθοι,[147] or between μῦθος ('fable') and μυθικὸν διήγημα

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[142] Arist. *Po.* 1450a38-9: οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας; Eust. *in Il.* 252.27 = 1.385.6-7 (on *Il.* 2.450-2): ψυχὴ γάρ τις οἷον ὁ μῦθος τῷ τῆς ποιήσεως σώματι δι' ὅλου παρενεσπαρμένος αὐτοῦ, 'for myth is like a soul for the body of poetry, sown throughout it completely'.

[143] Tzetzes, too, considers myth to be one of the defining characteristics of poetry, in addition to metre, Muse-invocations, and poetic diction. See e.g. *Ex.* 45.3-5. Cullhed (2014a: 60*, n. 181) refers to various *scholia* on Dionysius Thrax' *Art of Grammar* where similar poetic characteristics (metre, myth or invention, language, history, a certain type of diction) are listed: schol. D.T. 168.8-10, 300.34-36, 303.36-304.1, and 449.4-6.

[144] On poetic freedom in the mythical parts of the *Iliad* in particular, see Section 4.2. For similar ideas on poetic freedom in Ps.-Plutarch and the *scholia vetera*, see Section 4.1.1 (iii) and 4.1.2 respectively. On poetic freedom to tell extraordinary events and include mythical marvels, see also Hermog. *Id.* 2.4.16 and 2.10.37-41.

[145] Eust. *in Il.* 3.25-6 = 1.4.25-6 with discussion in Cullhed 2014a: 63*-4*.

[146] Aphth. *Prog.* 1.1, Jo. Sard. *in Aphth. Prog.* 5.11-5. Cf. Nikol. *Prog.* 1, 6.9-15. For a more extensive discussion of plausibility in the *progymnasmata*, see Section 3.1.3. Eustathios' definition of myth as 'fictional by definition' thus is rhetorical and is not necessarily connected with his Christian background (*pace* Cesaretti 1991: 247). See Cullhed 2014a: 63* for the same criticism of Cesaretti.

[147] Aphth. *Prog.* 1.1 and Doxapatr. *in Aphth. Prog.* 150.18-28, with discussion in Cullhed 2014a: 61*-2*.

('mythical narrative') as, for instance, Aelius Theon does,[148] twelfth-century scholars like Eustathios and Tzetzes blur the boundaries between both types of μῦθος, on the premise that Homeric poetry *is* rhetoric.[149] As Cullhed explains: 'According to the rationale of *Homerus orator*, the rhetorical definition [of μῦθος *qua* fable] applies also to Homer's myths about the gods, and so Eustathios' student must not pass up the opportunity to carefully study the rhetorical crafting by which Homer renders his false stories convincing.'[150] Indeed, as Eustathios argues in the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Homer is 'such a master in the method of the plausible invention of myths, that he serves as a teacher of this, too, for those who are fond of learning'.[151] Throughout the *Parekbolai*, then, Eustathios draws his readers' attention to the various techniques by means of which the poet imbues his poem, the mythical parts included, with plausibility. While the importance of plausibility for Eustathios' views on myth and allegory has been recognised by Cesaretti in his seminal study on Middle Byzantine Homeric allegoresis, he largely neglects the rhetorical context of the concept as well as its significance for Eustathios beyond the mythical parts of the Homeric poems.[152] In Chapter 3, I examine in detail Eustathios' definition of plausibility as well as the means by which Homer, in Eustathios' view, imbues the *Iliad* with this most important virtue.[153]

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[148] See e.g. Theon, *Prog.* 5, 95.3-8. Ps.-Hermogenes (*Prog.* 2.3), too, lists mythical narratives as one of the types of narrative, while Nikolaos of Myra (*Prog.* 1, 7.7-11) distinguishes between fable and mythical narrative and argues that narratives about the gods should be called fables rather than mythical narratives, as others have done. On the distinction between 'fable' or 'myth' and 'mythical narrative' in the *progymnasmata*, see Meijering 1987: 79-82.

[149] For the idea that Homer, as the best poet, is the best orator and poetry is rhetoric, see Introduction pp. 13-5. On the blurring of the boundaries between poetical and rhetorical μῦθος in Eustathios and Tzetzes, see Cullhed 2014a: 62*-4*.

[150] Cullhed 2014a: 63*. Cullhed makes the same point in 2014c: 212-3.

[151] Eust. *in Il.* 2.5-7 = 1.2.25-7: μεθοδευτὴς οὕτω τῆς τῶν μύθων πιθανῆς πλάσεως, ἵνα καὶ τούτου τοῖς φιλομαθέσιν [...] καθηγήσηται.

[152] Cesaretti (1991) repeatedly refers to plausibility throughout his discussion of Eustathios' allegorical method. See e.g. pp. 217-20, 231-4, 246-7, and 256. See also Cesaretti 2014: 132.

[153] See also Sections 4.2 and 4.4 for the relations between myth, allegory, and plausibility.

The plausibility of myth is integral to its purpose, which it shares with poetry in general: to enchant and educate at the same time.[154] The idea that myth serves as bait for the inexperienced or youthful reader in particular, was widespread in antiquity as well as Byzantium and is, for instance, articulated in Plutarch's *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry*. Plutarch argues that poetry 'makes learning light and agreeable for the young' (ἐλαφρὰν καὶ προσφιλῆ παρέχει τοῖς νέοις τὴν μάθησιν) by its mixture of philosophy and myth.[155] Similarly, Strabo holds the view that the marvellous nature of myth creates the pleasure that seduces children to learn, a stimulant that they will no longer need when their minds have grown riper and are ready for the study of 'facts' (τὰ ὄντα).[156] Tzetzes, too, perceives myth as a poetic device to enchant the young reader, while in Eustathios' view myth aims to allure every inexperienced student of philosophy, or the uneducated 'masses' (οἱ πολλοί) in general:[157]

> ἔπειτα οὐδὲ ἔχαιρεν αὐτόθεν μύθοις ὁ τῆς σοφίας τρόφιμος. [...] ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαγωγὸν αὐτοὺς τῇ ποιήσει παρεμπλέκων τεχνάζεται, ἵνα δελεάσας καὶ θέλξας τῷ προφαινομένῳ δικτύων, ὅ φασιν, ἔσω λάβῃ τοὺς ὀκνοῦντας τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας γλαφυρόν, εἶτα καὶ γεύσας τῆς ἐν ἀληθείᾳ γλυκύτητος ἀφήσει σοφοὺς πορεύεσθαι καὶ θηρᾶσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἄλλοθεν. (Eust. *in Il.* 1.41-2.5 = 1.2.19-25)
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> This nursling of wisdom, then, did not simply gain pleasure from myths. [...] But he artfully weaves them into his poetry with a view to the allurement of the masses, in order that he, having enticed and enchanted them through the appearance, draws into his nets, as they say,[158] those who shrink from the subtlety of philosophy; and next, having given them a taste of the sweetness found in truth, he will set them free to go as wise men and pursue it elsewhere too.

[154] For a similar idea about plausibility enabling myth to serve didactic purposes, see e.g. Nikol. *Prog.* 1, 6.9-15 with discussion in Meijering 1987: 81.
[155] Plu. *Aud. poet.* 15F.
[156] Str. 1.2.8.
[157] Tz. *Ex.* 43.6-7, 44.5-6, 109.6-7; Cesaretti 1991: 153-4.
[158] The reference is to E. *Ph.* 263. Eustathios uses the same expression in e.g. *Emend. vit. mon.* 121.11.

Myth gives those who normally shun philosophy a first taste of truth, the philosopher's object of study, which cannot but make them want to taste more.[159] In other words, Eustathios presents the study of poetry as a first step on the path of philosophical education.[160] Homeric myths, then, not only provide rhetorical lessons in the construction of plausible discourse, but as 'shadows or veils of noble thoughts' (ἐννοιῶν εὐγενῶν σκιαί εἰσιν ἢ παραπετάσματα) introduce the student to philosophy.[161] Eustathios thus underscores that Homeric myths serve didactic purposes, so that 'for this reason, the ancients thought his poetry to be a certain primary philosophy, introducing them, as they say, to life from their youth and teaching character, emotions, and actions with pleasure'.[162] In order to benefit from the hidden wisdom, all you need to know is how to interpret myth correctly.

1.3.2 Eustathios' allegorical method

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios divides the many enchanting myths of Homeric poetry into two groups on the basis of two different criteria: on the basis of their origin, Eustathios distinguishes between myths invented by Homer and older myths, composed by others before Homer.[163] He

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[159] While in the quoted passage the truth in myth is considered sweet, elsewhere Eustathios argues that sweetness results from the insertion of myths themselves. See e.g. *in Il.* 717.45 = 2.596.2 (on *Il.* 8.366-73). Tzetzes, too, associates myth with stylistic sweetness. See Cesaretti 1991: 135 and 143, n. 46 for references to relevant passages.

[160] Similar ideas are expressed by e.g. Plutarch, who considers poetry to be an introduction to philosophy (*Aud. poet.* 15F) and Basil of Caesarea, who promotes the study of poetry as preliminary to theology (*Leg. lib. gent.* 2.26-45).

[161] Eust. *in Il.* 1.37 = 1.2.15. Terms like 'veil', 'shadow', and 'dream' are common in discussions of myth and allegory. Proklos, for instance, repeatedly uses 'veil' (παραπέτασμα) in relation to Homeric myth in his *Commentary on Plato's Republic* (e.g. 1.44.14, 1.66.7, 1.159.15-6). Clement of Alexandria speaks of veils, dreams, and symbols in *Strom.* 5.4.24.1-2. Psellos, too, refers to mythical stories as veils covering the mysteries of philosophy (e.g. *Phil. min.* 1.44.2-14).

[162] Eust. *in Il.* 35.38-40 = 1.58.15-7 (on *Il.* 1.39): διὰ τοῦτο φιλοσοφία τις πρώτη ἐδόκει τοῖς πάλαι ἡ ποίησις εἰσάγουσα, φασίν, εἰς τὸν βίον ἐκ νέων καὶ διδάσκουσα ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Eustathios here quotes Str. 1.2.3. For the idea that Homer is didactic in myths, too, see also Section 1.2.3 above.

[163] Cornutus similarly assumes that Homeric and Hesiodic epics contain traces of earlier mythology, in addition to inventions by the poets themselves. On Cornutus' allegorical method, see Section 4.1.1 (i). For the parallel between Eustathios and Cornutus, see also Cullhed 2014a: 67*-8*.

further perceives a dichotomy between myths *with* an allegorical meaning added by the author of the myth and meant to be revealed by the exegete, and myths *without* allegorical meaning to be studied for their pleasurable and plausible narrative alone. We have already encountered the latter dichotomy in Eustathios' 'table of contents' (see Section 1.2.3), in which he designates the non-allegorical myths as 'pure, incurable', the allegorical myths as having an 'allegorical or anagogical remedy'. These two dichotomies address different aspects of the myths and do not overlap.[164] That is to say, both Homeric and pre-Homeric myths can contain an allegorical layer according to their author's intention:[165]

> ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πρὸς γέλωτα οἱ Ὁμηρικοὶ μῦθοι ἀλλὰ ἐννοιῶν εὐγενῶν σκιαί εἰσιν ἢ παραπετάσματα, οἱ μὲν ὑπ'αὐτοῦ πλαττόμενοι πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα, οἳ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ οἰκείως ἀλληγοροῦνται, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν μὲν τεθειμένοι, ἑλκόμενοι δὲ χρησίμως καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτου ποίησιν, ὧν ἡ ἀλληγορία οὐ πάντῃ πάντως πρὸς τὰ Τρωϊκά, ἀλλὰ ὅπως ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾐνίξαντο οἱ αὐτοὺς πλασάμενοι. (Eust. *in Il.* 1.36-41 = 1.2.14-9)
>
> But first of all Homeric myths are not meant for laughter but are shadows or veils of noble thoughts, some invented by him with regard to the subject matter, which are properly allegorised with regard to it, but many also composed by older poets and usefully drawn into his poetry, too; their allegorical meaning does not always and in every way concern the Trojan War, but is such as those who invented them expressed enigmatically.

This quotation points to a key feature of Eustathios' allegorical method: in his view, the allegorical and literal meanings of myth are inextricably connected. In other words, the allegorical meaning of a myth is not unrelated to the mythical narrative, but rather corresponds to it.[166] Myths that Homer invented for the *Iliad*

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[164] *Pace* Cesaretti (1991: 228-9, 232), who argues that the methodological dichotomy corresponds to the dichotomy of origin: myths invented by Homer do not need to be scrutinised for a deeper allegorical layer, whereas traditional myths should. Pontani (2000: 19) follows Cesaretti. I agree with Cullhed (2014a: 67*-8*), who argues that both types of interpretation, with and without allegory, apply to both Homeric and pre-Homeric myths.

[165] On allegory and authorial intention in Byzantine allegoresis, see Cullhed 2014a: 64*-9*.

[166] Cf. Cesaretti 2014: 132: 'In Eustathios's eyes, the task of connecting the actual level of the story with the "unreal" level of myths belongs to allegorical interpretation.' To distinguish between the

have an allegorical meaning that directly applies to the subject matter of the *Iliad,* i.e. the Trojan War. Older myths were invented outside the context of the *Iliad*, with the result that their allegorical meaning does not necessarily concern the events of the Trojan War.[167] This is not to say, as Eustathios underscores in the above-quoted passage, that Homer indiscriminately included these myths in his poetry; rather, he did so 'in a useful way' (χρησίμως), which, in line with the statements on Homeric myth, I interpret as 'in such a way as to be relevant to the subject matter of the *Iliad*'.

The idea that some myths have an allegorical meaning and others do not is central to Eustathios' further programmatic statements on the interpretation of Homeric myth. He identifies three approaches to myth that were adopted by critics before him, the first two of which he rejects as too extreme.[168] The first group of critics allegorise every element of the Homeric poems, that is to say, mythical as well as historical elements such as the heroes, and thus do not allow Homer to speak 'in a human voice' (ἀνθρωπίνως), i.e. in a literal way and without enchanting his audience with marvels.[169] This criticism may be directed at Tzetzes in particular, whose allegorical method involves allegorising every element of Homeric epic in order to reveal its true meaning.[170] The second group of critics hold the opposite opinion and allegorise nothing at all, which indeed is the correct method for interpreting historical elements. As far as myth is concerned,

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two 'layers' of Homeric myth, I use 'mythical narrative' to refer to the story about the gods as told by Homer and 'allegorical meaning' or 'allegory' to refer to the deeper truth beneath the fictional surface. 'Myth' is the totality of mythical narrative and allegorical meaning. How Eustathios analyses the connection between mythical narrative and allegorical meaning in the practice of the *Parekbolai* is the subject of Section 4.4.

[167] Eustathios makes the same point in *in Il.* 123.13-6 = 1.190.11-5 (on *Il.* 1.401-4): some myths are older than Homer. Consequently, their allegorical meaning has nothing to do with the Trojan War, unlike myths that were invented at the time of the Trojan War.

[168] Eustathios discusses the three approaches in *in Il.* 3.13-29 = 1.4.11-29. This passage is also discussed in Cullhed 2014a: 59*-61*.

[169] Eustathios uses the expression 'to speak in a human voice' (ἀνθρωπίνως λαλεῖν) in a similar context in the *Parekbolai* on *Iliad* 6. See Eust. *in Il.* 621.40-5 = 2.231.18-232.5 (on *Il.* 6.1) as quoted and discussed in the concluding paragraph of Section 4.2.

[170] On Tzetzes' allegorical method, see Section 4.1.3 (iii) with references to relevant bibliography (notably, Hunger 1954, Cesaretti 1991: 127-204, Goldwyn, forthcoming). For a comparison between Eustathios' and Tzetzes' allegorical methods, see also Section 4.4.

however, they 'pulled out the Homeric feathers' (ἐξέσπασαν τὰ Ὁμηρικὰ πτερά), 'dragging the poet down from his anagogical height' (κατασπάσαντες τοῦ ἀναγωγικοῦ ὕψους τὸν ποιητήν).[171] As the founder of the second approach Eustathios mentions Aristarchus, who is repeatedly criticised throughout the *Parekbolai* for depriving Homer of universal wisdom.[172] Eustathios follows a third group of critics, 'the more accurate ones' (οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι), who hold a middle course between these two extreme approaches: both historical and mythical elements of Homer's poem should first of all be studied as they are presented by the poet; next, one can proceed to a deeper level of meaning by means of allegorical interpretation. The result is a two-stage approach toward allegory and myth as a recurring feature of Eustathios' allegorical practice.[173]

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios mentions three types of allegorical interpretation: 'natural' (φυσικῶς), 'ethical' (κατὰ ἦθος), and 'historical' (ἱστορικῶς).[174] He explains that in the case of historical allegory a historical event is transformed into something more marvellous, an idea that is

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[171] Eust. *in Il.* 3.18-9 = 1.4.17-9.

[172] E.g. Eust. *in Il.* 561.28-34 = 2.101.13-20 (on *Il.* 5.395-400) and 614.5-7 = 2.215.6-8 (on *Il.* 5.842-4). See also Cesaretti 1991: 243-8. In *in Il.* 40.28-34 = 1.65.22-9 (on *Il.* 1.46), Eustathios argues that Aristarchus allows only 'rhetorical allegory', i.e. a certain type of metaphorical language. On rhetorical allegory in Eustathios, see Cesaretti 1991: 251-4. See Van der Valk 1976: LXXVII, n. 1 for references to examples in the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*. Eustathios'/Aristarchus' rhetorical allegory must not be confused with Tzetzes' rhetorical, i.e. historical, allegory (see n. 174 below and Section 4.1.3, iii). Nünlist (2011) explores the evidence for Aristarchus' attitude toward allegorical interpretation and concludes that '[t]o picture him as a fervent and uncompromising opponent of allegory requires an inappropriately narrow understanding of the relevant evidence that takes its cue from Eustathius' (p. 117).

[173] On the two stages of Eustathios' interpretation of myths, see also Cesaretti 1991: 245-6. For its practical implementation in the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, see Chapter 4.

[174] Eust. *in Il.* 3.26-32 = 1.4.26-32. φυσικῶς = κατὰ φύσιν; κατὰ ἦθος = ἠθικῶς; ἱστορικῶς = καθ' ἱστορίαν. Tzetzes identifies similar types of allegorical interpretation, but uses different terminology. He designates historical allegory as 'rhetorical' (ῥητορικῶς, e.g. *All. Il.* 18.324) or 'practical' (πραγματικῶς, e.g. *All. Il.* 18.522); instead of ethical allegory, he more commonly speaks of 'psychological' (ψυχικῶς, e.g. *All. Il.* 20.153) or interprets the gods as 'psychological powers' (ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις, e.g. *All. Il.* 22.138 and 24.248). For natural allegory, he frequently uses στοιχειακῶς ('in terms of the elements'): see e.g. *All. Il.* 18.524, 20.152 and 155 (quoted in Section 4.4.2 below), *Ex.* 82.12-5.

also expressed in the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Odyssey*.[175] Eustathios' hermeneutic practice shows that natural allegory, occasionally referred to as στοιχειακῶς ('in terms of the elements'),[176] involves the interpretation of the gods as parts of the universe, whereas in the case of ethical allegory they stand for emotional or intellectual forces.[177] This tripartite classification of allegory exists next to the above-discussed dichotomy between historical and 'anagogical' (ἀναγωγική) interpretation, that is to say, between a rationalising, euhemeristic approach and an allegorical approach that elevates the mythical narrative to more lofty issues such as the universe or the human psyche. It is important to emphasise once more that, in Eustathios' view, it is the poet who has chosen one of the types of allegory during the composition process; it is the interpreter's, i.e. Eustathios', task to retrieve the poet's choice and reconstruct the meaning as intended by the poet.

Conclusion

It is impossible not to love Homer. Eustathios concludes his encomium on Homer by claiming that even those who pretend to hate Homer, who openly reject him, secretly enjoy his poetry. They are like the proverbial Scythian, who stayed away from his deceased horse while others were watching, only to return later.[178] Zenobius' explanation of this proverb is helpful in order to understand Eustathios' point: the Scythian wishes to strip the skin from the horse's hooves

[175] Eust. *in Od.* 1379.27-33 ed. Cullhed. The idea that poets turn historical events into more marvellous matters in myths ties in with Eustathios' general conception of the poetic invention of myth: see Section 4.2.1. For Eustathios, then, 'historical allegory' rather is the reversal of the poetic process than a form of allegory.

[176] E.g. Eust. *in Il.* 83.40 = 1.132.22-3 (on *Il.* 1.200) and 1193.1 = 4.356.21 (on *Il.* 20.7).

[177] Examples of natural and ethical allegory include Eust. *in Il.* 1194.27-30 = 4.361.18-23 (on *Il.* 20.40) and 1196.36-41 = 4.369.14-7 (on *Il.* 20.67): the battle of the gods in *Il.* 20 has a natural and ethical allegorical interpretation. Examples of ethical allegory are e.g. *in Il.* 1012.26-7 = 3.721.5-7 (on *Il.* 15.187): Cronus is an allegory of a young and pure mind; 1356.3-6 = 4.923.2-7 (on *Il.* 24.397-8): in historical terms, Hermes is a Myrmidon, in ethical terms he is good fortune; see Section 3.4 (ii) below.

[178] Eust. *in Il.* 2.9-11 = 1.2.29-32.

and head, and thus gain profit from it, but refrains from doing so publicly. The proverb, then, applies to those who secretly long for something that they openly reject and scorn.[179] By comparing those who seemingly scorn Homer to barbarians, Eustathios, moreover, seems to point once more to the lack of sophistication or χάρις of anyone who neglects the serious study of Homer. With this proverb, Eustathios thus returns to the irresistible attractiveness of Homeric poetry, while he summarises its multifaceted usefulness in a wordplay with words of the stem χρη-: 'If those who use something [οἱ χρώμενοι] are an indication of its usefulness [τὸ χρηστὸν πρᾶγμα], there is no denying that Homeric poetry is a thing [χρῆμα] that is useful for many purposes [πολύχρηστον].'[180]

In the proem of the *Parekbolai on the Iliad*, Eustathios defines Homer's usefulness as well as the usefulness of his own work largely in rhetorical terms and as directed at authors of rhetorical prose. Homer's poetry contains much material to re-use – e.g. thoughts, words, and gnomes – as well as excellent rhetorical methods and techniques to imitate. One important technique is the plausible invention of myths: by studying Homer's plausible myths – with the help of Eustathios' analysis – one can learn how to compose plausible discourse oneself. For Eustathios, every myth in Homeric poetry is plausible, though fictional by definition, as plausibility is a prerequisite for myth to fulfil its purposes of amazing and teaching. The didactic purposes of myths move beyond rhetorical lessons of plausibility: through correct allegorical interpretation, the exegete should reveal the philosophical lessons hidden in myth. Eustathios' approach to myth therefore involves two stages: first, it is necessary to study Homer's mythical narrative for rhetorical lessons of composing plausible discourse; next, one can proceed to allegorical interpretation (if applicable) to retrieve the deeper, philosophical meaning of the myth, as intended by its author.

Eustathios is a real Odysseus for his companions/readers, teaching them the useful lessons that he learned from the Sirens/Homeric poetry, and protecting them against potentially harmful content. Like Homer, he is a host receiving his guests and serving them a learned banquet of useful material, carefully selected and conveniently arranged in the *Parekbolai*. It is the aim of the following

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[179] Zen. 5.59 (with a reference to Pi. fr. 203).
[180] Eust. *in Il.* 2.12-4 = 1.2.32-5.

chapters to unravel the recipe of the remarkable dish of rhetoric of these two excellent rhetoricians.