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# Daring to vote right: Why men are more likely than women to vote for the radical right 

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## CHAPTER 5

Appendix N Descriptive statistics of core variables

| Level | Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Individual | Gender (male) | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
|  | Left-Right position | 5.23 | 2.35 | 0 | 10 |
|  | Left-Right distance | 2.80 | 2.39 | 0 | 10 |
| Party | Stigma (\%) | 12.42 | 10.08 | 0.49 | 63.78 |
|  | Extremity | 1.95 | 1.26 | 0.00 | 4.75 |
|  | Size (\%) | 13.64 | 10.25 | 3.08 | 79.79 |

Source: CSES
Appendix O Individual level regressions

|  | H1 |  | H2 |  | H3 |  | Full model |  | Full model (standardized) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | b | $p$ | b | p | b | p | b | $p$ | b | $p$ |
| Male | -0.12 | 0.00 | -0.11 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.19 | -0.08 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.27 |
| Stigma | -0.03 | 0.00 |  |  |  |  | 0.45 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.01 |
| M X Stigma | 0.01 | 0.00 |  |  |  |  | 0.61 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Extremity |  |  | -0.01 | 0.80 |  |  | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.00 |
| M X Extremity |  |  | 0.05 | 0.00 |  |  | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.05 |
| Party size |  |  |  |  | 10.85 | 0.00 | 10.78 | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.00 |
| M X Party size |  |  |  |  | -0.65 | 0.00 | -0.36 | 0.10 | -0.02 | 0.08 |
| Party size ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  | -7.06 | 0.00 | -6.71 | 0.00 | -0.07 | 0.00 |
| M X Party size ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  | 0.75 | 0.06 | 0.49 | 0.22 | 0.01 | 0.22 |
| controlled for income, education and left-right distance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Intercept | -1.52 | 0.00 | -1.74 | 0.00 | -2.24 | 0.00 | -2.53 | 0.00 | -0.89 | 0.00 |
| N | 392906 |  | 392906 |  | 392906 |  | 392906 |  | 392906 |  |

[^0]Appendix P Party-level regressions

## Explanatory notes

The dependent variable in the party-level analysis is the share of male voters as a percentage of all voters for each party. I correct for any overrepresentation of either men or women in the sample. ${ }^{43}$ This yields a dependent variable which ranges from just over 30\% male voters for the Green SF in Denmark to almost 80\% male voters for Christianconservative New Slovenia and the radical right Greater Romania Party. Interestingly, the mean of this measure is $50,7 \%$, indicating that on average parties are somewhat maledominated. This already shows that men are more likely to vote for small parties: a concentration of women in larger parties is accompanied by an overrepresentation of men in a larger number of small parties.

Because the dependent variable is a percentage, theoretically OLS regression can be problematic. Predicting proportions in OLS carries the risk of non-linearity, heteroscedasticity and impossible predictions due to the truncated nature (Smithson \& Verkuilen, 2006). However, if most or all of the proportions are between 0.2 and 0.8, the bias of OLS regression is minor (Judd \& McClelland, 1989: 525-526). Because all the observations are within this range (and a vast majority lies within the even narrower range of $0.4-0.6$ ), we report OLS estimates. As a robustness check, the models were re-analyzed on the basis of beta distributions (Buis, 2006), which yielded the same substantive conclusions.

Table 1 reports all models; Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationships between the variables. The vertical axis reflects the percentage of a party's electorate that is male. A regression line has been added indicating the best fitting line between the points (with a squared term in the case of size). The correlation (in terms of Pearson's $r$ ) is added to the graphs of hypothesized linear relationships. A dotted line indicates the average percentage of male voters.

[^1]Figure 1 Bivariate relations


Source: CSES

Table 1 Regression tables (party level)

|  | H1 |  | H2 |  | H3 |  | Full model |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | b | p | b | $p$ | b | p | b | $p$ |
| Social stigma | 0.23 | 0.00 |  |  |  |  | 0.24 | 0.00 |
| Extremity |  |  | 0.90 | 0.01 |  |  | 0.12 | 0.73 |
| Party size |  |  |  |  | -0.03 | 0.76 | 0.11 | 0.50 |
| Party size ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.00 | 0.65 |
| Intercept | 47.72 | 0.00 | 48.85 | 0.00 | 50.18 | 0.00 | 46.47 | 0.00 |
| (adjusted) R2 | 9.4\% |  | 2.3\% |  | 0.0\% |  | 8.7\% |  |
| N | 340 |  | 340 |  | 340 |  | 340 |  |

Note: $b$ is the regression coefficient; $p$ the $p$-value

| Appendix Q | Interactions |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Model 1 |  | Model 2 |  | Model 3 |  |
|  | b | p | b | p | b | p |
| Male | -0.12 | 0.00 | -0.08 | 0.12 | -0.15 | 0.00 |
| Social stigma | -2.94 | 0.00 |  |  | -2.26 | 0.00 |
| M X Social stigma | 0.41 | 0.18 |  |  | 1.35 | 0.00 |
| Extremity | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.97 |  |  |
| M X Extremity | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.21 |  |  |
| Party size |  |  | 7.30 | 0.00 | 6.13 | 0.00 |
| M X Party size |  |  | -0.17 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.07 |
| M X Stigma X Extremity | 0.00 | 0.99 |  |  |  |  |
| M X Extremity X Size |  |  | 0.14 | 0.36 |  |  |
| M X Stigma X Size |  |  |  |  | -3.79 | 0.10 |
| controlled for income, education and left-right distance |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Intercept | -1.57 | 0.00 | -2.96 | 0.00 | -2.87 | 0.00 |
| N | 392906 |  | 392906 |  | 392906 |  |

Note: two-way interactions that are constituent parts of a three-way interaction but not relevant for the analysis are not shown in the table for reasons of space

Source: CSES

|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Male | -0.117 | -0.133 | -0.154 |
|  | (0.090) | (0.082) | (0.222) |
| Social Stigma | -0.013 |  |  |
|  | $(0.009)$ |  |  |
| Male X SocialStigma | 0.010** |  |  |
|  | $(0.003)$ |  |  |
| Controls ( y -hat) | 8.612*** | $8.609^{* * *}$ | $8.377^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.465) | (0.465) | (0.464) |
| Left-Right distance | $-0.400^{* * *}$ | $-0.400^{* * *}$ | $-0.400^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.011)$ | $(0.011)$ |  |
| Extremity |  | -0.009 |  |
|  |  | (0.087) |  |
| Male X Extremity ${ }^{3}$ |  | 0.105*** |  |
|  |  | (0.028) |  |
| Size |  |  | 0.135* |
|  |  |  | $(0.056)$ |
| Male X Size |  |  | 0.068 |
|  |  |  | (0.037) |
| Size X Size |  |  | -0.002 |
|  |  |  | (0.002) |
| Male X Size ${ }^{2}$ |  |  | -0.003* |
|  |  |  | (0.001) |
| Intercept | $-0.942^{* *}$ | $-1.276^{* * *}$ | $-2.447^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.290) | (0.259) | (0.306) |
| Pseudo ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |
| N | 26880 | 26880 | 26880 |
| Note: ${ }^{*} p<0.05,{ }^{* *} p<0.01,{ }^{* * *} p<0.001$ |  |  |  |
| Source: CSES |  |  |  |


[^0]:    Source: CSES

[^1]:    43
    Assuming the electorate to be half male, halffemale, the precise calculation is as follows: \% support among men\% support among women $+\%$ support among women*100. In reality, electorates are not completely equally divided into males and females, as women are slightly overrepresented in the population and turnout rates differ between the genders. However, the former hardly affects the ratio and the latter cannot be quantified in a general way. Our results turned out to be insensitive to alternative calculations of the gender gap.

