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## Table of Contents

Volume I

Foreword .....	vii
Foreword to the Revised Edition .....	viii
Essays .....	1
States .....	3
Germany	
WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN .....	5
France	
JEAN-JACQUES BECKER .....	18
Belgium	
LAURENCE VAN YPERSELE .....	28
Great Britain	
JAY WINTER .....	33
Austria-Hungary	
MANFRIED RAUCHENSTEINER .....	44
Russia	
DITTMAR DAHLMANN .....	63
Italy	
MARIO ISNENGI .....	72
United States	
RONALD SCHAFFER .....	78
Social Aspects of the War .....	87
Women	
UTE DANIEL .....	89
Children and Adolescents	
STÉPHANE AUDOIN-ROUZEAU .....	103
Workers	
DICK GEARY .....	108
Soldiers	
BENJAMIN ZIEMANN .....	118
Scientists	
JÜRGEN VON UNGERN-STERNBERG .....	129
War Literature	
BERND HÜPPAUF .....	135
Religion	
ANNETTE BECKER .....	146
Propaganda	
MICHAEL JEISMANN.....	151
Medicine	
WOLFGANG U. ECKART & CHRISTOPH GRADMANN .....	161
War Economy	
HANS-PETER ULLMANN .....	169
The Course of the War .....	181
The Way into War	
JOST DÜLFFER .....	183

From a European War to World War STIG FÖRSTER .....	190
The Military Strategy of the Central Powers WILHELM DEIST .....	195
The Military Strategy of the Entente HEW STRACHAN .....	213
Martial Law and War Crimes ALAN KRAMER .....	220
The End of the First World War KLAUS SCHWABE .....	230
Historiography .....	239
Writing the History of the First World War GERD KRUMEICH & GERHARD HIRSCHFELD .....	241
The World War Research Program of the GDR FRITZ KLEIN .....	250
Encyclopedia A-G .....	253
Volume II	
→ Encyclopedia H-Z .....	589
Timeline 1914–1918 .....	1051
Contributors .....	1065
Subject Index .....	1067
Persons .....	1075
Places .....	1089
Image Credits .....	1107

## Haase, Hugo

(September 29, 1863, Allenstein – November 7, 1919, Berlin [murdered]), German politician. One of the two chairmen of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD; Social Democratic Party of Germany) from 1911 onward, Haase opposed the *Burgfrieden* (Fortress Truce) policy that had been adopted by the majority of his party. He nonetheless bowed to party discipline. Speaking before the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, he read out the declaration in which the SPD approved the war credits – against his own conviction. Until the last moment, Haase attempted to uphold the unity of the party and to simultaneously secure a majority for his rejection of the war credits. In the face of the growing public debate over war objectives in 1915, Haase and his party colleagues Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein issued a proclamation entitled *The Demands of the Time* (*Das Gebot der Stunde*, June 1915) in which he called for the abandoning of the *Burgfrieden* policy and simultaneously disassociated himself from the government's war objectives. On March 24, 1916, after finally losing all hope of winning over the party's majority for his oppositional politics, Haase justified the rejection of the

social democratic support policy for an SPD minority. His withdrawal from the SPD faction and his resignation from the party chairmanship were the logical consequence of his strong pacifistic commitment. Together with Georg Ledebour, Haase then assumed the leadership of the Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (USPD; Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany), which was founded in April 1917. Following the November Revolution, Haase was one of three representatives of the USPD in the Council of the People's Deputies (Rat der Volksbeauftragten), to which he belonged until late December 1918. Less than a year later, he was assassinated by a mentally disturbed man.

(→ Peace Movements)

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WALTER MÜHLHAUSEN

## Haber, Fritz

(December 9, 1868, Breslau – January 29, 1934, Basel), German chemist. Prior to the World War, Haber developed the scientific principles for the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen in the form of ammonia (NH<sub>3</sub>), which was then technically realized by Carl Bosch (Haber-Bosch process). However, ammonia was not only used as a base substance for the manufacturing of artificial nitrogenous fertilizers, but also for the production of explosives and was thus of crucial importance for the war economy.

In 1911, Haber was appointed director of the newly founded Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry. From this position, he also supervised the use of chemi-

cal warfare agents after the outbreak of the war. Haber was the initiator as well as the organizer of chemical warfare for the Germans and was the main instigator of the chlorine gas attack at Ypres on April 22, 1915. From 1916 onward, his institute devoted its entire work to military projects and was placed under the authority of the war ministry at the end of the same year. In 1918, Haber was finally awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for the synthesis of ammonia. This was also the reason why the Entente Powers abstained from indicting Haber as a war criminal ("father of gas warfare") after the war. During the following years, Haber devoted much of energy to the promotion of science and research (Notgemeinschaft

devotion, selflessness, devotion to duty and ceaseless toil." Owing to their universal familiarity, within the context of the endurance mentality which soon set in, the nerve's developed their propagandistic potential together with the "Will."


Nonetheless regarding this rush to capitalize on the nerves, it must not be forgotten that discourse concerning the nerves, even in propaganda, also was a continuation of the human dialogue regarding the mental effects of war. The danger was not that the nerves were discussed so incessantly – why it eventually could no longer be hidden, to what extent they were lost – so much as the tendency to pathologize "bad nerves," and to make ever more intensive attempts to "overcome" them with the most brutal methods imaginable.

The nerves also remained the further subject of military medicine and neurology in their medical-physiological form. The weakening of the nervous system resulting from infectious disease or – especially during trench warfare – by rheumatic neuralgia, or else damage from bullet, shrapnel, or bayonet wounds, stood at the center of their attention.

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BERND ULRICH



## Netherlands

On the eve of the World War, the Netherlands held the same neutral stand regarding international relations as it had for the preceding three-quarters of a century. The Netherlands thus stood apart from the international alliances. This decision rested as much upon the safeguarding of Netherlands's economic and military-political interests, as upon considerations of civil rights and liberties. The deciding question, however, was whether the Great Powers would respect Netherlands's neutrality in case of war. An additional question was whether and how Netherlands would be able to resist a military annexation by the other camp, should the Netherlands be unexpectedly attacked by a Great Power. Netherlands's national defense was based on the assumption that if attacked, the Great Powers would rush to help militarily. The Netherlands was hemmed in between Germany and France, an important position within Europe. As tensions increased, practically everything depended upon how these two military and economic rivals would respond to a crisis. It was therefore crucial to maintain good relations with both lands. Since

the end of the 19th century, Germany had been extremely important for the greatly expanding Dutch economy. For ages, Netherlands had also maintained very close economic relations with Great Britain. Moreover though there were no explicit agreements, England's predominance on the high seas did represent a guarantee of security for the Netherlands's connection with the extensive Dutch colonial empire.

In Germany before the World War, certain hegemonial claims to Netherlands circulated, without their being translated directly into plans for either attack or annexation. Yet in 1905 Chief of the General Staff von Schlieffen had ordered the creation of a deployment plan which did foresee the violation of Dutch neutrality. However, his successor von Moltke saw the Netherlands' neutrality as more of an advantage than a disadvantage, especially in economic respects. The importation of goods and provisions either from the Netherlands, or else across the Netherlands' territory, could help Germany indirectly to withstand an industrialized war and to circumvent the anticipated English blockade. By contrast England, which had a strategic interest in maintaining Dutch neutrality, did plan a blockade.

To be sure this would be set up at some distance from the German coast so that Netherlands could be included in the blockade, making it possible to control contraband on Dutch ships.

Once the war began, the Netherlands sought to maintain its political, military, and economic neutrality. This was difficult in practice, successful only because numerous incidents and (mostly negligible) violations of Dutch neutrality were handled so guardedly by the warring parties. The Netherlands did not actually become militarily entangled in the war largely because Germany and Great Britain decided not to invade the country. Nevertheless, in no way should the role and significance of Netherlands's military and diplomacy be underestimated. Throughout the war the Netherlands maintained a fully combat-ready army of some 200,000 men, which could be strengthened by 250,000 reservists in a matter of days. Netherlands's diplomats operated with aplomb, as instructed by Prime Minister P.W.A. Cort van der Linden and Minister of Foreign Affairs John Loudon in a series of difficult situations. Nevertheless every time Dutch ships were torpedoed by German submarines, or struck English mines, the public became greatly agitated.

With the establishment of the Netherlands Overseas Trust (NOT) in fall 1914, economic agreements could be obtained from Great Britain. The Dutch government also had to remain strictly neutral in this regard. The NOT therefore maintained the character of a private organization to which important trade representatives belonged under its chairman, President and Director C.J.K. van Aalst of the Netherlands Trading Society. Naturally there was still considerable, mostly informal contact between the NOT and the Dutch government. The NOT made arrangements with the Allies, especially England, under which essentially the conveyance of goods from overseas could continue as long as the Allies were guaranteed that no onward transport to Germany would ensue. Meanwhile besides a flourishing smuggling trade, great quantities of domestic agricultural products were being delivered to Germany, for which Netherlands obtained indispensable coal in return.

The situation worsened in every respect in 1917, once Germany had encircled Netherlands in the East and South. Indeed, in Belgium a high-voltage fence was installed along the Dutch border in order to prevent desertions and illegal

border crossings. Then the German navy began unlimited U-boat warfare, to which numerous Dutch ships fell victim. As a counter measure, the Allies intensified their blockade, whereby not just imports from overseas came ever closer to a standstill. Additionally in March 1918, in English and American ports that had already been closed to the Entente, Dutch ships were embargoed as well. The danger of a military invasion by Germany into Netherlands steadily grew. Only at the price of considerable, often secret concessions to the German Reich could this danger be averted. In practice, the Netherlands tolerated that Dutch inland navigation afforded logistical support to Germany, and that Germany was transporting ever more sand and gravel through Limburg Province to the Western Front. Even the provisioning of German troops via a strategically important railroad line through Netherlands was allowed. Moreover, the Dutch government promised Germany that Netherlands would strike no further agreements with England and America.

Despite all the problems and incidents, the Netherlands actually remained neutral both militarily and politically until the war's end. However, the concessions made to Germany had increased considerably. In London and Washington, the Netherlands thus came to be seen as a German vassal state. In London Prime Minister Lloyd George nicknamed Cort van der Linden "Cort Under the Linden." As a consequence of the Entente victory, Netherlands naturally found itself in a difficult situation. The fact that the Dutch government had granted hospitality to the German Kaiser during his flight in November 1918, instead of agreeing to Allied emergency demands, did not make the situation any easier.

Belgium, which also belonged to the victors, was in a camp after the war, sought to exploit the Netherlands's weak position. At the Peace Conference Belgium tried to realize its long-standing desire for coastal waters: the oceanic territory of Flanders and South Limburg. The demand failed, mainly owing to American resistance but also to competent handling by the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.A. van den Broek. After 1918, the Netherlands naturally abandoned its traditional neutrality policy as well as its reliance policy once more. In honor of the League of Nations, contributing - actually - to Germany's economic recovery.

The neutrality policy of the Government at first found broad support from the populace, although certain groups and individuals entertained more or less sympathy for one or the other sides in the war. Many Social Democrats and members of the conservative Anti-Revolutionary Party had, for example, always been strongly oriented toward Germany.

The outbreak of the war itself had been accompanied by panic reactions, including hoarding and withdrawing one's bank savings, accompanied by overall anxiety for the collapse of economic and financial life. The state combatted these reactions, in that it very soon engaged substantially in economic and social life. In so doing, it broke with its previous, largely liberal organizational form into the socio-economic sphere. The extra-parliamentary cabinet formed in 1913, which actually embraced the liberal Ministers and stood under the leadership of the independent liberal, Cort van der Linden, proved equal to this mission. On the *Königlich Nationale Unterstützungskomitee* ('Royal National Support Committee,' KNS), established in 1914, representatives from all walks of life worked together, seeking to mitigate the social effects of the war wherever necessary.

As far as the economy and the corresponding social effects are concerned, damage in the first two years was limited. In fact several industrial plants earned a significant amount. Quantitatively the greatest social problem occurred in 1914 after the fall of Antwerp, when hundreds of thousands of refugees - and among them, many soldiers - arrived from Belgium. Most of them departed shortly afterward, but a considerable number remained in the Netherlands throughout

the war. The greatest problem for the inhabitants was the availability and the prices for food and other everyday needs. The ill-functioning distribution system could not prevent serious economic problems from resulting in the Netherlands, particularly later in the war. This led to a social unrest, which was further stirred up by the activities of socialist groups. In November 1918 in Rotterdam a revolt. In October soldiers at a prisoner-of-war camp staged a mutiny with any political impact, and there were several other incidents. Leader Pieter Troelstra and the Social Democratic Workers' Party,

who had backed the government in summer 1914 now felt that "the revolution [would] not stop a Zevenaar." He was not alone in this opinion.

There were occasional panic reactions by the state - such as disarming the fleet, since it was uncertain whether the seamen could still be trusted. Nonetheless, the fear of revolution proved unwarranted. To the contrary, in The Hague the political tension was released in an otherwise controlled mass demonstration, which made a pledge of loyalty to Queen Wilhelmina. Troelstra had to retreat, admitting that he had made a mistake. The incident would weaken the position of the Social Democrats in national politics for some time. Wartime conditions and the feeling of national unity which they promoted led, instead, in another direction, to the solution to two pressing problems of the previous decade: the decades-long school issue, and universal male suffrage. This resulted in 1917 after careful preparation by the Pacification Committee, which initially looked at the school issue, but then expanded to also consider voting rights.

In conjunction with the growing cooperation between employers and employee unions, in which the state was also heavily involved, the "pacification" of the confessional, liberal, and socialist parties laid the cornerstone for the relative stability of Dutch society after the First World War. The small country maintained itself as a West European nation-state, with a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy. Compared with international practice the Netherlands had conspicuously intense and widespread religious and political-ideologic divisions (metaphorically speaking, "pillarization"), which with the help of a well thought out compromise policy was shifted to relative peaceful cohabitation.

The fact that the Netherlands had taken no military action in the World War distinguished the land clearly from its neighboring state. Although the Netherlands was not able to escape the war's effects despite this, they did turn out to be comparatively minor. Possibly it was therefore a much greater shock than for the other lands when the Netherlands was occupied by Germany in the Second World War. Perhaps this explains the special place that this experience has held in Dutch society since 1945, as well as the fact that the historical experience of the First World War was missing.

(→ High Voltage Fence; → Neutral States; → Schlieffen Plan)

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