



UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

Frame of mind: How predispositions moderate framing effects and contribute to politicizing EU immigration policy

van Klingeren, M.

Publication date

2011

Document Version

Submitted manuscript

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

van Klingeren, M. (2011). *Frame of mind: How predispositions moderate framing effects and contribute to politicizing EU immigration policy*. Paper presented at 6th ECPR General Conference, University of Iceland.

<https://ecpr.eu/Events/PaperDetails.aspx?PaperID=10329&EventID=1>

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

Frame of Mind: How Predispositions Moderate Framing Effects and Contribute to Politicizing
EU Immigration Policy

Marijn van Klingeren (M.vanklengeren@uva.nl)
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), University of Amsterdam.

Abstract

This study investigates the role of news frames and individual predispositions in the politicization of European immigration policy in the public sphere. By means of a two-wave experimental set-up, collected in June and July 2011 among a representative sample in the Netherlands, no direct framing effects are found. It is only when individual predispositions about European immigration policy are taken into account that significant framing effects become visible. Higher levels of incongruence between the tone of the message and individual attitudes causes the negative to decrease in issue salience and the positive to increase through (respectively, a decrease and increase of) risk perceptions. Incongruence also yields significant change in the direction of the message for the initially negative. Among the positive an insignificant change in the direction of the message shows. The results indicate how important it is not only to look at direct framing effects, but also to take predispositions into account.

Keywords: Politicization, EU immigration policy, Salience, Framing, Public opinion

Acknowledgements: I acknowledge the support of the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR). I would like to thank Simone de Droog and Sanne Oprea for their methodological contribution to this paper.

Paper prepared for presentation at the 6th ECPR general conference
Do not cite without the permission of the author

Frame of Mind: How Predispositions Moderate Framing Effects and Contribute to Politicizing EU Immigration Policy

Several societal processes have led to a common European migration policy: “Migration has increasingly been presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability; [...]” (Huysmans, 2000: p.752). The foresight of social disturbance, financial and cultural deprivation, deterioration of living conditions in cities gave rise to xenophobic parties and movements, and added to the fear and danger of a changing status quo. The politicization of the issue of immigration developed into a security and safety issue, as shows at the domestic level (e.g., fear of losing national identity or changing welfare standards), the international level (e.g., The Third Pillar of Justice and home affairs, Schengen agreements and the Dublin Convention)(Huysmans, 2000) and in the media (greater visibility of negative frames like the Islam-as-a-threat frame)(e.g., Vliegthart & Roggeband, 2007).

Nevertheless, a clear consensus amongst European countries on how to deal with immigration appears to be nonexistent. This showed only recently when the European authority on migration policies was placed under scrutiny when the Danish People’s Party (DPP) pleaded for border controls between Schengen countries. Acting against the 1995 Schengen agreement Denmark introduced custom-controls on (among other things) illegal immigration later that year (BBC, 2011). Another recent event on the Italian Island Lampedusa revealed the undermining of EU authority. After president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s resignation, thousands of mostly Tunisian immigrants arrived on the Island. The Italian president Berlusconi operated against EU regulations by not offering the immigrants a fair trial and handing out temporary Schengen-visa to some of them. Thereby allowing them to travel freely to other Schengen countries (nu.nl, 2011a, nu.nl 2011b). Both events added to the politicization of the European immigration issue.

Still, Politicization is a quite a vague term with a wide variety of meanings, which mostly depends on the direction and aim of the researchers. In general it may refer to a certain level of conflict or disagreement about a political issue that needs dealing with (Hooghe & Marks, 2008),

the degree to which rules and regulations are openly contested, (Epstein, 2005) or to individual awareness and involvement in politics (Goldrich, 1979). My aim is to study the causal link between politicization in the media and public domain. Hence, in this research politicization refers to public awareness of the issue's political importance and the level of open debate and/ or polarization on the issue.

The linkages between the public, political and media domain are not always direct or clear (Hayes, 2008). Though politicians aim responsiveness to the public, the opinion of this same public is often driven by a group of select elites who use *media* as an arena to expose their opinion. Thereby, politicians' responses to the media are not a response to the public, but to the powerful elites. In order to know who politicians are really responsive to (the public or the elites as their opinions are mirrored by the public), I need to find out how susceptible the public is to elite opinions (made public through the media) and in what way they respond to it.

Media are known to be a main source of political information, especially with concern to European political matters (European Commission 2004a, 2004b; Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999). Deliberately or not, every decision made or angle chosen to describe an incident in the media can encompass different effects on public opinion (Valkenburg, Semetko & de Vreese, 1999). Hence, the way media shape or position the truth can affect the way people think about immigration, the importance they assign to it, or in what way they discuss it with others. Media literature distinguished various news frames (e.g., Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Valkenburg, Semetko & de Vreese, 1999; Vliegthart & Roggeband, 2007); however, *conflict* (or *competition*) framing will receive specific attention in this article.

Conflict framing is widely apparent in news on political elites and is easily applicable during presidential election campaigns (Patterson, 1993) as it emphasizes disagreement between the elites who are portrayed in the message (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) showed how conflict framing in the Netherlands was the second most visible news frame (after the attribution of responsibility frame) of the five they investigated.

Nevertheless, there has been an almost universal ignorance among scholars of the importance of elite competition in today's media (Hayes, 2008). Though framing effects are frequently found in one-sided stories (see for example Chong and Druckman, 2007a), it is much more realistic to confront people with multiple sides. That way people encounter several political arguments of an issue by different elites, which is more representative to real life. Zaller (1992) argued that through competition the public gets divided over the issue and this limits framing effects. The theoretical importance seems overwhelming (see for example Sniderman & Theriault, 2004), yet there is little empirical evidence of the role of this conflict and the tone of the elites in media messages. That is why I aim to answer the following question: *Do conflict framing and the tone of the elites in the news message play a role in the politicization of the issue of European Union migration policy?*

Iyengar (1991) stated that political problems are particularly susceptible to framing effects, as politics are complex and constantly varying. In general, framing was found to affect issue interpretation, emotional elements, lines of thought and recall (de Vreese, 2004; Price, Tewksbury and Powers, 1997; Valkenburg, Semetko & de Vreese, 1999). Framing mobilizes, hence; stimulate the inactive into action in order to avert risk (Lau, 2007; Schuck and de Vreese, 2009; Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). It can have a stronger or weaker effect, depending on issue importance (Lecheler, de Vreese and Slothuus, 2009). However, in most of these studies the focus has been on framing effects across the board.

However, it is well known that individual morals and beliefs are on the basis of framing effects. Individual predispositions such as values and opinions are known for constraining framing effects (Barker, 2005; Chong & Druckman, 2007c, and Shen & Edwards, 2005). Especially in an era where media exposure has become more individualized individual differences need to be taken into account (McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002). In this study individual values are used as moderators of framing effects. Even though, this is not the first study to do so (see for example Brewer, 2003; Chong & Druckman, 2007b; and Gross, 2000), there is not much

knowledge about how incongruence between the message and individual predispositions affects one's attitudes. Hence, it is in desperate need of further exploration. Therefore, I wonder: *Can predispositions moderate framing effects and thereby enhance politicization of the issue?* The innovation in this paper is that I control for the moderating individual values and I do so by the use of a longitudinal experimental set-up.

In succinct summary, this research focuses on how conflict framing in newspaper articles affects saliency of, and attitudes toward European Union migration policy among the public. Additionally, it looks at how individual predispositions tone can moderate these framing effects. My aim is to understand how people respond to conflicting elites in the media, how the tone of conflict framed messages interacts with personal attitudes, and under which conditions framing effects do, or do not take place.

Theory and Hypotheses

Conflict and the Public

Simple unobtrusive alterations in form and wording of survey questions can drastically affect opinions. These effects were found among all layers of society, hence framing effects are not limited to a certain group of ignorant or naïve (Iyengar, 1991). For example, Iyengar showed that people are generally tolerant towards dissent when it is framed as a democratic right, however tolerance drops when the questions are directed to dissenting groups (hence, conflict now has a face). Whenever a media message is framed in terms of conflict two or more sides to a story are discussed. The lack of a single clear direction in a newspaper article should challenge readers to think about their own opinion, at least more so than when there is a clear and single ready-made position to replicate. The side to which one feels most attracted may differ depending on personal preferences background and context, or even the person, party or other type of actor that represents the position.

Meanwhile, people are more likely to ponder over the issue a while longer because of this division of positions portrayed on the issue, especially when they do not have a strong

predisposition. However, when they do have an opinion about the issue there is this initial uncertainty of how to relate the views represented in the newspaper to one's own attitudes. Which means readers will have to invest more time and thought into an issue, making it more likely for them to give greater importance to the issue than before. In short, conflict stimulates contemplation about your own viewpoint on an issue; thereby you will give the issue more emphasis than in a situation where no conflict is present.

H1a: People who are exposed to a higher level of conflict will judge the issue as being more salient.

If Zaller (1992) was right and if competition reduces framing effects, greater conflict should do so to a larger extent, as the positions are wider apart. However, this should also create a more polarized audience. If this is so, and if random distribution over the two sides of a story takes place, greater levels of conflict in a news story should lead to greater levels of disagreement among the public. Hence, I formulate the following hypotheses:

H1b: A greater level of conflict in a news story about EU migration reduces framing effects, and *c)* will lead to a more polarized audience.

Tone and the Public

The list of criteria for newsworthiness of an event by media and audience as set in the 1970s by Galtung and Ruge (1973), though often subject to scrutiny (e.g., Harcup & O'Neill, 2001), is still commonly mentioned in modern Western societies as a basis to set aside news from "less relevant events". It is a crude predictor of the attention that will be given to an event by the media and the audience¹. Perhaps, one of the most important criteria in their list is negativity, as bad news is considered to be good news. Let me explain: When an event scores high on negativity one can almost guarantee a good result on some of the other Galtung and Ruge criteria, since bad news is: "[...] generally *unexpected* [...], *unambiguous* [...], it happens *quickly* [...], it is *consonant* [...] with general expectations about the state of the world, and hence its *threshold* [...] is lower than that for positive news." (Hartley, 1982: p 79). Subsequently, bad news is

considered to be more important by the media, at least more so than good news and found more salient by the audience, hence it is more often put on the public agenda.

So, does newsworthiness imply that the issue is considered to be more salient in general and thereby add to the politicization of it? And subsequently, if the *same* event is described in a positive way will the audience consider it as less salient than when it is framed in a negative way? And thereby, can the tone by which an issue or event is described add to the politicization of it? I argue that it could, since discussing EU migration policies in a positive manner is less exciting, less unexpected and does not fit the social norms of how political news is discussed as well as negativism. Hence the threshold to publish or read it becomes higher. Taking a negative tone could add to the newsworthiness of the issue and therefore to the salience that people assign to it.

H2: A negative tone in a news message will positively moderate the positive effect of conflict framing on issue salience.

Personal Values as Moderators

Up to now the focus of this paper has been on what framing can do to the public as a whole. In accordance to Coleman (1986) who argued in his article on micro foundations and macro-social behavior that in order to fully comprehend the bigger picture we need to explore the mechanisms at the lower level, the focus will now shift to individual attitudinal transitions as a consequence of news frames and tone. Further exploration is necessary on how the public form their opinion about an issue and how this can or cannot lead to greater emphasis on, change in attitude and consequently more or less polarization of the issue in the public sphere. The next section comprises issue salience; where after attitudinal divergence on the issue will be discussed.

Issue salience and risk perception. In 1979 Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated how effects of framed messages relate to people's risk averting. When a problem is framed in potential gains, people are more likely to avert from risk; however, they tend to seek risk when a problem is framed in potential losses. One of the scholars' most infamous examples is that of the

“Asian disease” where people were asked whether to apply a (risky) treatment or not. Both treatment groups were told the exact same information but in different words. Some were told the treatment would lead to a certain number of survivors (positive framing), while others were told the same outcome in terms of deaths (negative framing). The researchers found the majority of the people who were exposed to the positive frame more inclined not to implement treatment (risk-avert), whilst people exposed to the negative frame were more likely to implement treatment (risk-seeking).

In the Kahneman and Tversky study the focus of attention was on human lives, deceases and eventually deaths or survivors. One could argue that by putting the same facts in a *risk-less* and a *risky* frame, they are bound to create anxiety and emotional response when it concerns human lives. However, risk-less and risky frames proved right in various occasions and situations, related and unrelated to life and death situations (e.g., Dunlop, Wakefield & Kashima, 2008; Morton & Duck 2001; Schuck & de Vreese, 2009). Schuck and de Vreese (2009), for example, found that perceived risk mobilizes people to vote during EU elections. They found that with the potential implementation of a new policy the change in status quo is perceived as a risky. In order to avert this risk people have to come into action and vote against it. With this research they confirmed Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000) and Martin’s (2004) findings that people more easily get mobilized to avoid risk rather than to achieve possible gains.

Adding to existing research, I am particularly interested in if and how, through a mechanism of risk perception, a news frame can put an issue on the public agenda. The influence of tone of the message and any incongruence between the respondent’s attitude and this tone could induce risk. In this case the direction of the respondent’s predisposition is important. Greater risk is induced when the message is negative relative to your own opinion, as things are worse than you expected. Greater risk induces higher levels of salience. So, when media portray an image that is more positive to one’s attitude this will result in a lower risk perception (things are better than expected) and therefore decrease issue salience. Among those who read a message

that is more or less in line with their predispositions there will not be a shift in salience prescribed to the issue, as their risk perception is not affected.

H3a: Incongruence between one's attitudes and the tone of the newspaper will enhance salience among those initially positive *b)* and reduce salience among those initially negative about European immigration policies.

Attitudes and cognitive dissonance. There are two potential things that could happen after someone has read an article about the topic European migration. Either they change their opinion or they do not. As simple as this may seem, trying to understand who does what and under which circumstances is much harder to capture. Also, if they do change their opinion, what's the direction they change it to? Nevertheless, the aim of this paper is to understand exactly that. First, because I have measured respondents' attitudes and the strength of those attitudes, much information is already known about the respondents before they were exposed to any sort of manipulation. This is valuable information as it is the key to understanding whom, how and why people change their opinion after manipulation has taken place.

We know from marketing communication theories that negative attitudes, under certain circumstances, can provoke even more negative attitudes towards products and brands. When people are repeatedly confronted with a product or brand of which they already have a negative attitude, this repetitive confrontation may cause agitation, which produces even more negative attitudes towards the product (Pechmann & Stewart, 1988). On the base of these effects lays the cognitive dissonance theory. The bottom-line of Pechmann and Stewart's findings is that people do not like to be confronted, especially not repeatedly, with something they disagree with. The clash between one's own cognition and the portrayed image causes feelings of irritation and aggravation, which causes people to feel even more negative than before. Especially when these predispositions are very strong (Chong & Pechman, 2007c).

Cognitive dissonance, according to Festinger (1957), is a condition in which a person holds two opposing cognitions. The inconsistency between these cognitions causes pressure,

which acts as a motivator to remove the dissonance. This can be done in various ways, people can simply remove one of the two cognitions by ignoring or avoiding the opposing message, or by waving it away by saying it is just not truthful, right or as unimportant. A second option to decrease cognitive dissonance is to change one's own cognition by resigning towards the direction of the message. If, in accordance to Pechmann and Stewart (1988), cognitive dissonance creates aggravation, the reading of an opposing argument in a newspaper article should make negative opinionated people less negative, and positively opinionated people less positive.

H4a: Incongruence between one's attitudes and the tone of the message will pull existing attitudes towards the direction of the message.

However, seeing how attitudinal strength could moderate the incongruence effect, it needs to be taken into consideration. Not all attitudes are of the same quality (Krosnick & Smith, 1994); this quality tells us something about the level of attitudinal adaptability. Hence, people with very strong attitudes are less likely to switch sides than people who feel less strongly about something. Consequently, cognitive dissonance may result in different effects, depending on the strength of the predisposition. Incongruence can make people with weaker attitudes not feel exasperated but rather insecure about whether their initial attitude was right, which is another element of cognitive dissonance. Insecurity is an unpleasant feeling; hence, it creates an urge to solve the dissonance between one's attitude and the message. Given the lack of strength of your predisposition, the easiest way to relieve yourself of this feeling is to adapt to the message. However, people with strong attitudes are less flexible and less likely to change position. They should be more likely to see the message in the media as wrong or misleading and will either retain or even strengthen their attitude as a counter reaction to the tone in the message.

H4b: The weaker one's attitudes the more likely it is that incongruence between one's attitudes and the tone of the stimulus material will cause you to change your opinion.

Method & Design

Sample

The data were collected by TNS-Nipo, who set out the online survey among a representative sample of the Dutch population drawn from their online-web panel. The first wave was collected between the 17th and the 23rd of June, the second from the 11th to the 19th of July 2011. 700 Respondents were invited to participate in a two-wave survey of which the response rate was 91% ($n=637$) at t_1 . The non-response at t_2 was 116, resulting in a total response rate of 74.4% ($n=521$) with a gender division of 51% men and 49% women between the age of 18 and 91. Financial incentives were given to avoid non-compliance at wave 2.

Stimulus Material

The stimulus was given in the form of a newspaper articles on the issue of European Union migration (see appendix a for stimulus material). There were two different types of conflict and three different types of tones to the four articles that were shown to the respondents. Each article started with the exact same introduction, summing up simple facts on the current situation of how the EU is dealing with immigration. Then I created two people who gave their opinion on this situation and the EU. Both were highly educated people in the field of European politics and no claim was made about their age, gender or background. Again, the final paragraph of the newspaper article was the same in every condition. To increase ecological validity, the material looked as though they were cut out and scanned articles from a real newspaper (see appendix a).

Conflict framing and tone were combined in the stimulus material, resulting in an article with: condition A) High conflict which reflects in the attitudes of the actors in the message: One taking a very negative position towards the topic and another taking a very positive position ($n=97$); condition B) low conflict, again with a positive and negative position of the actors in the newspaper message, but this time the taken positions were slightly more mild ($n=105$); condition C) low conflict which shows in a mildly negative against a very negative position of the actors ($n=109$); and condition D) low conflict with one actor being mildly positive and another being very positive ($n=101$). (See a schematic overview of the conditions in appendix a, Figure 1).

Design

The mixed-factorial design used for this paper is not a clean 2x3 design, since the two factors (conflict and tone) could not be combined in each article, (it is impossible to create a high level of conflict whilst the general tone of both actors needs to be positive) tone could only vary in low-conflict articles. The frame/tone combination differs per condition and this is the between-subject factor. The level of congruence between one's predisposition and the tone of the message differs per person and is therefore the within-subject factor.

Procedure

During the first observation the respondents were asked (with no prior manipulation) to fill out a small online questionnaire about their opinion on the main topic (EU migration policy) and other political related topics. Two and a half weeks later, at t_2 the participants were randomly assigned to a treatment. Directly after they were requested to fill out a second questionnaire, which contained a condensed version of the first questionnaire with additional stimulus-check and control questions. The control group received a shorter version of the questionnaire, without the questions that were related to the stimulus material. All groups were comparable with regard to background characteristics.

Manipulation Check

One argument against the approach I have taken is that conflict in itself can be perceived as negative and therefore the tone of the issue is irrelevant. Therefore, after being exposed to the material people were asked to indicate on an eleven-point scale whether they thought the tone of the article was rather negative (1), balanced (6), positive (11) or completely neutral (coded separately)².

Results show significant differences between the four stimulus groups ($F=29.32, p < .001$). Respondent of condition A ($M=5.94, SD=1.51$) and B ($M=6.16, SD=1.12$) should and do hover around the mid-category, as both negative and positive positions show in these conditions. Condition C shows significantly more negative results ($M=5.53, SD=1.32$) and condition D

($M=6.88$, $SD=1.51$) more positive. So far the tone of the message seems to be picked up as expected. Secondly, the respondents were asked whether they experienced any disagreement within the article (conflict) and if they could indicate on a ten-point scale whether they thought this disagreement on the topic between the two people in the article was little (1) or large (10).

The differences between the four groups are significant ($F=47.64$, $p < 0.01$). In line with my expectations, those who read scenario A noticed the most conflict (66%). The participants in this condition indicated that the conflict was fairly strong ($M=7.22$, $SD=1.46$). In condition B 38.1% of the participant noticed disagreement, the average level of conflict was significantly lower than in condition A ($M=5.86$, $SD=1.31$). A somewhat larger portion of the participants of condition C indicated they noticed conflict (56%), the average was again somewhat higher than in condition B ($M=6.13$, $SD=1.20$). In the final condition (D) only 28.7% indicated disagreement, with the lowest average of all ($M=5.00$, $SD=1.55$).

These results imply that there is a link between the tone of the message and the level of disagreement between the actors in the material. Though the experiment was set up to have similar levels of conflict in condition B, C and D and a higher level in condition A, significant differences show also between the first three. Conflict is noticed less often and is perceived as less strong whenever the tone of the actors is more positive. This could lead to smaller results in conditions B and especially D. Luckily there is still a large difference between conditions A and the other three. It is however wise to give more weight to the differences between condition A against B/C, as a larger portion of the participants noticed the conflict in these conditions.

Measures

Dependent variables. This study has two main dependent variables, one single item and one latent variable. The salience of our main issue (EU immigration) was answered on a ten-point scale (1 “no attention at all”, 10 “a lot of attention): “How much attention should the European Union give to the following policy issues?” Each person got a different set of policy issues, but all got the issue “immigration”. The second dependent variable was created out of two questions

about EU's current performance with regard to immigration, ("The European Union has not taken enough measures to handle immigration towards Europe", and "The European Union is adequately dealing with the immigration issue"). The questions were asked on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree). The confirmatory factor analysis showed a clear dimension (eigenvalue >1) and factor loadings above .75 during both times of measuring. Both variables were recoded into the same (positive) direction and a mean value was calculated of the two items that loaded on the same scale, now measuring EU's current performance.

My interest is however not only in predicting attitudes, the flexibility of these attitudes is of grave importance as well. Hence the latter variable—measured at the two time points—was recoded into two change variables, the first being change to either the positive or negative (ranging from -9 "maximum change to the negative" to 9 "maximum change to the positive"). The second change variable ranges from 0 to 9 and is an indicator for the level change in either directions. Both variables are used in the last part of the results chapter.

Grouping variable. Two more grouping variables were created next to the four conditions the participants were already divided into. Inconsistency between the message and individual predispositions plays a huge role in this paper; therefore, I created an incongruence measure for each individual, leading from 0 (total congruence) to 8 (total incongruence). This continuous variable was based on the distance between the tone of the article (negative, balanced and positive) and one's own predisposition about EU's performance on immigration (ranging from 1 "very negative" to 10 "very positive"). As this scale did not have a mid-point, I had to group together the people who scored a 5 or 6 to create a balanced category. Every step of attitude away from complete congruence (0) was added to the new incongruence measure (adding up to 8). This means that those who got a negative article and were completely negative scored a 0 on the incongruence scale, those who were balanced a 4 and those who were absolutely positive an 8, the opposite held for the positive article. Those who read the balanced article and were completely negative scored a 4, as did those who were completely positive. So, the distance from

the article to your attitude determined your position of the scale. This variable was used on various occasions throughout the analysis.

Mediating and moderating variables. To figure out the underlying mechanisms of how incongruence effects come into play, two potential mediating variables were included in the analyses. The first is risk perception, measured by asking the respondents to indicate on a ten-point scale “To what extent do you think that the policies that were mentioned in the newspaper article will have negative consequences for Europe?” with 1 meaning “No negative consequences at all” and 10 “Very negative consequences”.

The second mediator is cognitive dissonance, which is a latent-construct generated out of three variables that are connected to three different elements of cognitive dissonance:

Uncertainty about the decision, annoyed with the incongruence, and doubting about the truth.

The respondents were asked to indicate on a ten-point scale whether they thought their attitudes about the EU were in line with the image presented in the newspapers and how this made them feel. They were asked if they could indicate on a ten-point scale to what extent they agreed with the following statements “I wondered if I had made the right decision” (decision), “I find it annoying that my attitude was (not) consistent with the newspaper article” (annoyance) and “After having read the article, I wondered if this portrayed the truth” (truth). The answer categories ranged from 1 “this statement does not apply to me at all” to 10 “this statement completely applies to me”. The factor loadings of these items all showed to be above .8³.

As an addition to the mediating variables there are two moderators, which are the direction of the predisposition and attitudinal strength. For analytical purposes the respondents were divided into three categories, namely positive (attitudes ranging from 6.1 through 10; 4.6% of the sample), negative (attitudes ranging from 1 through 4.9; 34.7% of the sample) and balanced (attitudes between 5 and 6; 35.5% of the sample). Attitudinal strength was measured (again on a ten-point scale) by asking the respondents after every attitudinal question at t_i how strongly they felt about it. The higher they scored the stronger they felt about it. Hence, I

calculated the average strength for each of the dependent variable “performance of the EU”. Alike the direction of attitudes people, attitude strength was also divided into three: Weak (1 through 4.9; 10.9% of the sample), average (5 and 6; 46.6% of the sample) and strong (6.1 through 10; 17.3% of the sample).

Results

In this part the results are shown of how conflict framing and the tone of media messages affect the politicization of the EU immigration issue. Following the same line as in the theory section, I will first give attention to direct framing effects and how these influence attitudes and potentially the increase or decrease of issue salience among the public. Second, the role of predispositions comes into play, when I look at the conditions under which people are the most or least likely to change their attitudes and increase or decrease in issue salience.

Conflict and the Public

The first test is based on direct framing effects on the public as a whole. To test whether people who are exposed to a higher level of conflict will judge the issue as being more salient (*H1a*), and whether a greater level of conflict reduces framing effects, but will lead to a more polarized audience (*H1b*). Though the absolute difference (see Table 1) in issue salience between condition A and the other conditions is larger and in the expected direction, the effect is marginal and insignificant ($F= 0.43, p= .65$); hence, it these results do not support the very first hypotheses. Significant differences in the mean scores are found between all groups in EU performance, however this seems to be unrelated to the level of conflict in the message. There is no decrease in the framing effect on EU performance when conflict framing becomes more extreme ($F= 1.62, p= .20$). Also against expectation, there is barely any change in the standard deviation of attitudes between t_1 and t_2 , which should show the amount of polarization among the respondents. The minor change that is visible shows within each condition. This means Hypothesis 1c is also refuted.

In the second hypothesis I expected there to be a main effect of conflict on issue salience, which would be positively moderated by the tone in the message. However, no main effect was found and looking at the effects of the different tones, the differences between t_1 and t_2 for each condition is tiny, not in the expected direction and highly insignificant ($F= 0.32, p= .81$)

Table 1 *Salience and attitudes of European Union migration policy by type of frame and tone*

		Salience (n=425)			EU's performance (n=376)		
		<i>M</i>	$\mu_2 - \mu_1$	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> ^{a, x}	$\mu_2 - \mu_1$	<i>SD</i>
Control	t_1	7.00	0.11	0.203	4.47	-0.13	0.180
	t_2	7.11		0.197	4.34		0.182
A: Large conflict	t_1	6.88	0.23	0.224	4.36	0.30	0.191
	t_2	7.11		0.217	4.66		0.193
B: little conflict, balanced tone	t_1	7.36	-0.20	0.211	4.18	0.49	0.182
	t_2	7.16		0.204	4.67		0.184
C: little conflict, negative tone	t_1	7.03	0.05	0.207	4.54	-0.20	0.177
	t_2	7.08		0.201	4.34		0.179
D: little conflict, positive tone	t_1	7.19	0.06	0.217	4.66	-0.48	0.192
	t_2	7.25		0.211	5.14		0.194

Note. ^a The differences in the means between t_1 and t_2 are significant over the conditions at least at $p < .01$ (one-tailed). ^b The differences in the means between t_1 and t_2 are significant over the conditions at least at $p < .10$ (one-tailed). ^x The differences in the means between t_1 and t_2 are significant between conditions A against B, C and D at least at $p < .10$ (one-tailed).

Issue Salience and Risk Perception

As Zaller (1992) said, conflict reduces framing effects and maybe this is what we are witnessing in this analysis with the complete absence of framing effects as all conditions had a certain level of framing in them. However, I expect more effects will appear when individual predispositions on the issue are taken into account. I predicted that incongruence between one's attitudes and the tone of the newspaper would enhance issue salience among those initially positive, and reduce salience among those initially negative about European immigration policies (hypothesis 3a and 3b). These hypotheses were tested with the use of structural equation modeling, which enables me to clearly see the different mediating and moderating effects.

The total n of this model is 275, and in order to test the different effects for the people who were positive, balanced and negative I calculated separate models for each group, with an n of 16 in the positive category, 126 in the balanced and 133 in the negative. The CFI of the entire

model without the moderating effect of attitudinal direction taken into account was 1 with an RMSEA of .067, which is a reasonable model fit. No visible direct effect of incongruence showed on issue salience ($\beta=0.02$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.40$), there was however an indirect significant effect through risk, which could explain the absence of the direct effect. Apparently incongruence between message and attitude decreases risk perceptions ($\beta=-0.10$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.05$), while risk significantly increases issue salience ($\beta=0.12$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.02$).

As our data mainly consists of people who are either balanced or negative about the way the EU is handling the immigration issue, this could explain these findings. To be completely sure, I tested the moderating effect of tone in the model. The CFI of this model was 1 and the RMSEA 0.049, which indicates a very good model fit. The results provide the expected information: Two out of the groups (with the exception of the people who are balanced ($\beta=0.12$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.09$)) show a significant direct effect of incongruence on issue salience. Among the positive it shows a significant positive effect of incongruence on perceived risk ($\beta=0.36$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.06$), which is significantly negative for the balanced ($\beta=-0.15$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.04$) and the negative ($\beta=-0.12$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.08$). These effects showed to differ significantly between the three groups at $p=.07$. The estimates of risk on issue salience was insignificant for the positive ($\beta=-.21$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.21$), and significantly positive for the balanced ($\beta=0.12$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.095$), and negative ($\beta=0.11$, $p_{(one-tailed)}=.095$).

These results comply with hypothesis 3b and 3c, since for those who are positive incongruence leads to higher risk perceptions. Even though this does not translate into higher issue salience among the positive (possibly due to the small n), we did see a positive effect of risk perception among the entire group. It is therefore more likely that in general a higher risk perception does lead to higher salience⁴.


Attitudes and Cognitive Dissonance

Considering the effects cognitive dissonance can have, I hypothesized that incongruence between one's attitudes and the tone of the message would pull existing attitudes towards the

direction of the message (H4a). Meaning it will cause positive to become more negative and negative to become more positive and balanced to become either negative or positive, depending on the direction of the message they got. This was first tested with a repeated measures model by comparing the difference of incongruence between the article and all predispositions at t_1 and t_2 among the three types of predispositions. Confirming results of our hypothesis show a decrease in the average incongruence among the negative ($M=2.89, SD=.17$ to $M=2.41, SD=.16$) and positive ($M=2.90, SD=.45$ to $M=2.84, SD=.43$); however, also a minor increase among the balanced ($M=2.19, SD=.17$ to $M=2.30, SD=.16$). The results showed significant over categories and time ($F=5.65, p<.01$).

However, this method does not show the mediating role of cognitive dissonance, and the results are fairly difficult to interpret. This is why the model is also tested with the use of structural equation modeling (see Figure 1). Separate models for each group, with an n of 19 in the positive category, 135 in the balanced and 143 in the negative. The dependent variable was calculated by subtracting the attitudinal scores (EU's performance) at t_1 from that of t_2 . The CFI of this model is above .95 and the RMSEA is .037, which indicates a good model fit. A significant direct effect of incongruence levels on attitudinal change was seen only among people in the negative category, which indicated a significant change towards a more positive attitude with the rise of incongruence ($\beta=0.24$). Among the positive and balanced there was an insignificant and minor change towards the negative side ($\beta=-0.07$ and $\beta=-0.07$). Though there is a minor direct effect, no mediating effect of cognitive dissonance showed and no significant effects of incongruence on cognitive dissonance were visible for any of the categories. However, a significant negative effect of cognitive dissonance was visible for those who were initially positive and those who were negative. Which indicates that independent of the direction of one's predisposition, higher levels of cognitive dissonance lead to significantly more negative attitudes towards the European Union.

Figure 1 Path model: moderated mediation of predisposition, cognitive dissonance and incongruence on attitudinal change (EU performance)




Note. $n=297$; Significant at $P < .10$ (one-tailed) is bolted; significant at $P < .05$ (one-tailed) is iterated; significant at $P < .01$ (one-tailed) is underlined.

Though H4a is partly confirmed, since higher levels of incongruence do lead to adaptation in the direction of the message (although not always significantly so) mainly for people with negative predispositions, it is not because people feel higher levels of cognitive dissonance. And if people do feel higher rates of cognitive dissonance, this does not lead to adaptation, but to relatively more negative attitudes.

Last, I hypothesized that the attitudinal strength of the respondents would explain why incongruence would lead to attitudinal strength from some but not for others. I expected that weaker attitudes would lead to bigger attitudinal changes. Hence, I created an absolute change variable (the higher you score the bigger the change either positive or negative) out of the directional one, which was used to test the previous hypothesis with. The exact same respondents who were included in the previous analysis are included in this one; again structural equation modeling was performed. The model fit was good with CFI above .95 and an RMSEA of .049. The results show some unexpected effects in Figure 2. Incongruence leads to more change among people with strong attitudes than among the one's with average attitudes.

Figure 2 Path model: moderated mediation of attitude strength, cognitive dissonance and incongruence on attitudinal change (EU performance)



Note. $n=297$; Significant at $P < .10$ (one-tailed) is bolted; significant at $P < .05$ (one-tailed) is iterated; significant at $P < .01$ (one-tailed) is underlined.

Again we can see that incongruence does not lead to bigger cognitive dissonance for any of the groups and that a higher level of cognitive dissonance leads to significantly less attitude change only among those who have an averagely strong opinion. Consequently, the final hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

Conclusion & Discussion

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to figure out about how and under what conditions people are more or less susceptible to framing effects, and by doing this to find out more about the politicization of an important European issue: immigration. Since the Dutch are already quite skeptic about the EU (Harmsen, 2004), and as positive attitudes are crucial to the success of a new institution like the EU (Cichowski, 2000) negativism among the public can essentially induce unwanted stagnation of EU development. Hence, it is important to find out how the media play a role in creating and/ or maintaining this public attitude. For this I have looked at the role of conflict framing and the tone of news messages about European immigration policy. Conflict

framing as a common used frame of political issues in the news, and (in accordance to Hayes, 2008) to make the situation more realistic as people are usually exposed to different sides of a story. The presence of tones enabled me to look at the level of incongruence between people's predisposition and how this affected their judgment.

So, do conflict framing and the tone of the message in the news play a role in the politicization of the issue of European Union migration policy? No, it does not. At least not directly. Though the participants were able to set aside great disagreement from less fairly well, greater conflict did not lead to significantly different attitudes, greater diversity in attitudes, nor a shift in salience. Consistently, tone did not show any significant direct effects. However, indirectly tone did show an effect when interacting with predispositions. And, can predispositions moderate framing effects and thereby enhance politicization of the issue? Yes they can! First, I found how risk perception acted as a suppressor of incongruence on issue salience for those with negative predispositions. Though the effects of higher risk perceptions were not significant among the positive (probably due to the low power of this group) there is some ground to say that negative framing decreases issue salience when the initial attitude on the topic is positive. Second, I found how greater incongruence led to greater adaption towards the message—again especially among the negative—and how this had nothing to do with cognitive dissonance.

In summary, knowing that more people were negative about the way the EU handled European immigration than positive, if you want to put the issue on the public agenda the worst thing you can do is to spread the news in a positive manner. This will only make the negative think of the issue as less salient. However, if you spread negative news among the positive it is likely that the average salience level will increase. So, in case one aims to increase salience, putting it in a negative tone will show the best results. However, should you aim to create more polarization then spread a variety of different tones among the people who are balanced. They are most likely to change towards the direction of the tone and so the bigger the variety in the

news the greater the variety of attitudes among the public. However, one should not spread positive news among the negative or negative news among the positive. They will adapt in accordance to the message and end up more balanced than before. As polarization and salience both add to the politicization of an issue among the public, it is difficult to say what type of frame would enhance it the most. One thing I do know is that it will have the biggest effect among the strongest minded.

Discussion

The final sentence in the conclusion sounds like a joke and though I wish that it was, it is not. Though on average people with weak attitudes changed their opinion the most, (followed by the people with strong and people with average attitudes) the incongruence-on-change effect was the biggest among the strongest minded. I did not anticipate on finding this effect; however, it could be due to the bigger shock effect. When you are so certain that what you think is right an opposite message will hit you harder than it will others, which causes you to change more than others.

Which brings me to the second unexpected finding and that is the lack of a mediating effect of cognitive dissonance. Apparently incongruence does not lead to higher levels of cognitive dissonance. But that might be because people are not always aware of the fact that there is incongruence between their attitudes and the message. Which shows in a rather weak correlation between people's own indication of experienced incongruence and real incongruence (Pearson $R = .13, p = .03$). The former also shows bigger correlation with cognitive dissonance (Pearson $R = .24, p < .001$) than the latter (Pearson $R = -.01, p = .83$). I would not say that the perceived incongruence would be a good indicator to use instead of real incongruence in future research, because apparently unconsciously real incongruence most certainly effects you. I would say that cognitive dissonance is simply not why people change their attitudes and an alternative mechanism must be at play. We know for now that incongruence can change attitudes, since I

was not able to uncover the underlying mechanism of how this takes place it gives ground to subsequent research.

The experimental set-up that was used in this paper, as it is not very straightforward approach, needs some reflection. The two-wave approach creates problems that every panel study has and that is that people get used to the questions they were asked before and therefore change their opinion on it. Especially with political topics people are likely to feel embarrassed if they do not know anything about it or have no clear opinion about it. Knowing that they will be questioned about it again could make it more likely for them to either look up information or make up an opinion so they do not have to tick the “don’t know” box again. However, since these were no face-to-face interviews but online questionnaires the feeling of anonymity is much higher and therefore people are less likely to feel ashamed. Which reflects in the results of the control group in Table 1. They showed only a marginal insignificant change between t_1 and t_2 in both issue salience and attitude.

A final warning is in order. This research shows only short term framing effects and we cannot say anything about what happens in the long run. We live in a mediatized society and people are exposed to messages every day. It is hard to say if any long-term effects exist of these framing effects, as I did not test for it. Even if I did send out a third questionnaire, there are too many things that can influence the results that I could not control for. This does not mean that the results should not be taken seriously; it only means that I cannot say anything about the duration of the effects that were found in this study.

Conclusively, even though it is well known that individual morals and beliefs form the basis of framing effects, not many scholars made the effort to control for this before. This study exemplifies the importance of individual values in framing research. The fact that no framing effects were not found directly but only when digging deeper and controlling for individual inclinations, is enough evidence to show that ignorance is no longer an option. People take with their predispositions when reading their newspapers. It is likely they also do so when listening to

the radio, watching television or while visiting a news website. These predispositions interact with thereby moderate framing effects.

Notes

¹ For a full description of the twelve news criteria please consult the article by Galtung and Ruge (1973).

² Even though 'neutral' was not one of the options for one of the manipulations the respondents were given, I wanted to hand them this option in order to be able to distinguish between balanced and neutral. If I had not given them this option since there was no "don't know" option, these people (13.8 %) would have probably ended up somewhere in the mid-region. Forcing them to give a response they would not have felt comfortable about and would adding noise to the data.

³ Everyone was asked the same questions, which causes some difficulties for the second question, as the content of this question differs depending on the experience of people. And the experience of people did not always mirror reality. The problems this may cause are discussed more thoroughly in the discussion.

⁴ No apparent differences appeared between the balanced and negative, their results were very similar and both showed what I hypothesized for the negative category. Incongruence reduces feelings of risk for everyone who did not have positive predispositions. However, it is harder to interpret the results for the balanced category, as the level of incongruence for them could be due to either a negative or a positive message.

References

- Barker, D. C. (2005). Values, frames, and persuasion in presidential nomination campaigns. *Political Behavior, 27*, 375-394.
- BBC News Europe (2011, July 5). Schengen state Denmark beefs up border controls. BBC News Europe. Retrieved July 5, 2011, from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14028112>
- Brewer, P. R. (2003). Values, political knowledge, and public opinion about gay rights: a framing-based account. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 67*(2), 173-201.
- Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007a). Framing public opinion in competitive Democracies. *American Political Science Review, 101*, 637-655.
- Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007b). A theory of framing and opinion formation in competitive elite environments, *Journal of Communication, 57*, 99-118.
- Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007c). Framing theory. *Annual Review of Political Science, 10*, 103-126.
- Cichowski, R.A. (2000). Western dreams, eastern realities: Support for the European Union in central and eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies, 33*, 1243-1278.
- Coleman, J. S. (1986). Social theory, social research, and a theory of action. *The American Journal of Sociology, 91*, 1309-1335.
- de Vreese, C. (2004). The effects of strategic news on political cynicism, issue evaluations and policy support: A two-wave experiment. *Mass Communication and Society, 7*(2):191-215.
- Dunlop, S., Wakefield, M., & Kashima, Y. (2008). Can you feel it? Negative emotion, risk, and narrative in health communication. *Media Psychology, 11*:52-75.

- Epstein, R. (2005). Diverging effects of social learning and external incentives in Polish central banking and agriculture. In F. Schimmelfenning & U. Sedelmeier (Eds.), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (pp.178-198). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- European Commission (2004a). Eurobarometer 61. Brussels: DG Press and Communication, European Commission.
- European Commission (2004b) Eurobarometer 62. Brussels: DG Press and Communication, European Commission.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1973). Structuring and selecting news. In S. Cohen & J. Young (Eds.), *The manufacture of news: deviance, social problems and the media* (pp. 62-72). London, UK: Constable.
- Goldrich, D. (1979). Peasants as activists: A reevaluation of political participation in the countryside. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12, 29-59,
- Gross, K. (2000, April). *The limits of framing: How framing effects may be limited or enhanced by individual level predispositions*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Hayes, D. (2008, April). *Media frames and the immigration debate*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Harcup, T., & O'Neill, D. (2001). What I news? Galtung and Ruge revisited. *Journalism Studies*, 2, 261-280.
- Harmesen, R. (2004). Euroscepticism in the Netherlands: Stirring or dissent? *European Studies*, 20, 99-126.
- Hartley, J. (1982). *Understanding news*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2008). The neo-functionalists were (almost) right: Politicization of European integration. In C. Crouch & W. Streeck (Eds.), *The diversity of democracy: corporatism,*

- social order and political conflict* (pp. 205-222). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Huysman, J. (2000). The European Union and the securitization of migration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 28, 751-777.
- Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica*, 47(2), 263-291.
- Lau, R., Sigelman, L., & Rovner, I. B. (2007). The effects of negative political campaigns: A meta-analytic reassessment. *Journal of Politics*, 69, 1176-1209.
- Lecheler, S., de Vreese, C., & Slothuus, R. (2009). Issue importance as a moderator of framing effects. *Communication Research*, 36(3), 400-425.
- Marcus, G., Neuman, W., & MacKuen, M. (2000). *Affective intelligence and political judgement*. Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press.
- Martin, P. (2004). Inside the box of negative campaign effects: Three reasons why negative campaigns mobilize. *Political Communication*, 25(2), 545-562.
- Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). Mediatization of politics: A challenge for democracy? *Political Communication*, 16, 247-61.
- McLeod, D. M., Kosicki, G. M., & McLeod, J. M. (2002). Resurveying the boundaries of political communications effects. In J. Bryant & D. Zillman (Eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 215-267). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67(4), 371-378. doi:10.1037/h0040525
- Morton, T., & Duck, J. (2001). Communication and health beliefs: Mass and interpersonal influences on perceptions of risk to self and others. *Communication Research*, 28:602-26.

- Neuman, W. R., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. N. (1992). *Common Knowledge*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Nu.nl Algemeen & Buitenland (2011a, Maart, 30). Berlusconi ontruimt Lampedusa in 60 uur. Retrieved July 19, 2011, from <http://www.nu.nl&buitenland&2480465&berlusconi-ontruimt-lampedusa-in-60-uur.html>
- Nu.nl Dossier Midden-Oosten (2011b, April, 18). EU heeft geen problemen met tegenhouden Tunesiërs. Retrieved July 19, 2011, from <http://www.nu.nl&onrust-midden-oosten&2495329&eu-heeft-geen-problemen-met-tegenhouden-tunesiers.html>
- Patterson, T. (1993). *Out of order*. New York, NY: Knopf.
- Pechmann, C., & Stewart, D. W. (1988). A critical review of wearin and wearout. *Current Issues and Advertising, 11*, 285-330.
- Price, V., Tewksbury, D., & Powers, E. (1997). Switching trains of thought: The impact of news frames on readers' cognitive responses. *Communication Research, 24*, 481-506.
- Schuck, R. T., & de Vreese, C. H. (2009). Reversed mobilization in referendum campaign: How positive news framing can mobilize the skeptics. *International Journal of Press&Politics, 14*(1), 40-66.
- Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news, *50*(2), 93-109.
- Shen, F., & Edwards, H. H. (2005). Economic individualism, humanitarianism, and welfare reform: A value-based account of framing effects. *Journal of Communication, 55*, 795-809.
- Sniderman, P. M., & Theriault, S. M. (2004). The structure of political argument and the logic of issue framing. In W. E. Saris & P. M. Sniderman (Eds.), *Studies in public opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change* (pp. 133-165). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Valkenburg, P. M., Semetko, H. A., & de Vreese, C. H. (1999). The effects of news frames on readers' thoughts and recall. *Communications Research, 26*(5), 550-569


Vliegthart, R., & Roggeband, C. (2007). Framing immigration and integration: Relationships between press and parliament in the Netherlands. *International Communication Gazette*, 69, 295-313.

Zaller, J. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendices

Appendix A - Stimulus material

Figure 1: The different positions and levels of conflict in the four scenarios



Scenario A and B (manipulated areas are marked):

Resultaten Europees migratiebeleid zaterdag bekend

AMSTERDAM – De Europese commissie publiceert zaterdagmiddag de langverwachte resultaten van het beleidsonderzoek Europese migratie. Hierin worden concreet de resultaten vermeld van de EU maatregelen op het gebied van immigratiehandhaving.

De Europese Unie heeft de afgelopen jaren nieuw beleid gevoerd met op het gebied van migratie naar Europa. Dit onder meer door het invoeren van een nieuw Europees beleid. Hierbij zijn de controles die vroeger tussen de Europese landen plaatsvonden naar de buitengrenzen van Europa verplaatst. Binnen Europa zijn de systematische controles dus niet langer aanwezig. Een tweede maatregel is dat mensensmokkelaars steeds intensiever worden vervolgd. Daarnaast zijn er afspraken gemaakt met aan Europa grenzende landen, om zo meer controle te houden op migrantenstromen richting de EU.

De EU heeft enkele zeer goede ontwikkelingen op het gebied van immigratie op gang gezet, aldus Dr. F. Lering, oud-Europarlementariër. 'De Europese maatregelen zijn erg adequaat als u het mij vraagt. Door de problemen reeds bij de buitengrenzen van Europa aan te pakken, kampen we met veel minder zorgen binnen Europa en daardoor ook minder met de problemen in latere stadia van het immigratieproces. Door met buurlanden samen te werken wordt de Europese grens van twee kanten bewaakt. Hierdoor krijgt mensensmokkel een nog kleinere kans.' Professor Dr. P. Reijnders, hoogleraar politologie in Leiden geeft aan het hierover totaal niet met Dr. Lering eens te zijn: 'De EU maatregelen werken compleet averechts, door een te harde aanpak bij de grens drukt de EU illegale grensoverschrijding nog verder ondergrond, dit zorgt weer voor veel nieuwe problemen. Bovendien, in tegenstelling tot Dr. Lering geloof ik niet dat de EU momenteel bezig is met probleemoplossing, maar met probleemverschuiving. Door aangrenzende landen bij de grensbewaking te betrekken schuift de EU zijn verantwoordelijkheid af naar landen buiten de EU en dat is onacceptabel.'

'Daarnaast', zegt Reijnders, 'heeft de EU nog geen oplossing geboden voor de aanpak van illegale immigratie binnen Europa. Door de landgrenzen binnen Europa niet te bewaken of door geen systematische controles uit te voeren wordt de druk op de buitengrenzen van Europa steeds hoger.'

Een land als Nederland heeft tegenwoordig nauwelijks nog grenzen om te bewaken. Alleen op Schiphol en in de havens van Amsterdam en Rotterdam komen mensen van buiten Europa aan en daar vinden nog ouderwetse grenscontroles plaats. De compensatie die landen zoals Nederland verwachtte na het deels wegvallen van hun grensbewaking wordt nu door de EU opgevangen.

Resultaten Europees migratiebeleid zaterdag bekend

AMSTERDAM – De Europese commissie publiceert zaterdagmiddag de langverwachte resultaten van het beleidsonderzoek Europese migratie. Hierin worden concreet de resultaten vermeld van de EU maatregelen op het gebied van immigratiehandhaving.

De Europese Unie heeft de afgelopen jaren nieuw beleid gevoerd met op het gebied van migratie naar Europa. Dit onder meer door het invoeren van een nieuw Europees beleid. Hierbij zijn de controles die vroeger tussen de Europese landen plaatsvonden naar de buitengrenzen van Europa verplaatst. Binnen Europa zijn de systematische controles dus niet langer aanwezig. Een tweede maatregel is dat mensensmokkelaars steeds intensiever worden vervolgd. Daarnaast zijn er afspraken gemaakt met aan Europa grenzende landen, om zo meer controle te houden op migrantenstromen richting de EU.

'De EU heeft nog een lange weg te gaan', zegt Dr. F. Lering, oud-Europarlementariër. 'De maatregelen bij Europese grensovergangen en de hardere aanpak van smokkelaars zullen weinig veranderen aan illegale mensensmokkel. Zolang hier geld mee te verdienen is zullen mensensmokkelaars hun gang blijven gaan.' Lering geeft ook aan dat het prima is om met aangrenzende landen samen te werken, mits er duidelijke afspraken worden gemaakt. 'De EU moet echter niet vergeten dat aangrenzende landen niet dezelfde verantwoordelijkheid zullen voelen richting Europa als de Europese landen dat doen.'

Professor Dr. P. Reijnders, hoogleraar politologie in Leiden geeft aan het gedeeltelijk met Dr. Lering eens te zijn: 'De EU heeft de zware taak om een Europees migratiebeleid te maken wel goed op zich genomen. Zo lijkt me de maatregel om mensensmokkelaars harder aan te pakken, in tegenstelling tot Dr. Lering, een zeer noodzakelijke en nuttige regeling. Hiermee kan veel leed worden tegengegaan.'

Ook de samenwerking met buurlanden van Europa vindt Reijnders een slimme zet. 'Samen sta je daarin sterker. Echter zijn er ook binnen Europa nog altijd problemen rondom illegale migratie, deze dient de EU niet uit het oog te verliezen.'

Een land als Nederland heeft tegenwoordig nauwelijks nog grenzen om te bewaken. Alleen op Schiphol en in de havens van Amsterdam en Rotterdam komen mensen van buiten Europa aan en daar vinden nog ouderwetse grenscontroles plaats. De compensatie die landen zoals Nederland verwachtte na het deels wegvallen van hun grensbewaking wordt nu door de EU opgevangen.

Scenario C and D (manipulated areas are marked):

Resultaten Europees migratiebeleid zaterdag bekend

AMSTERDAM - De Europese commissie publiceert zaterdagmiddag de langverwachte resultaten van het beleidsonderzoek Europese migratie. Hierin worden concreet de resultaten vermeld van de EU maatregelen op het gebied van immigratiehandhaving.

De Europese Unie heeft de afgelopen jaren nieuw beleid gevoerd met op het gebied van migratie naar Europa. Dit onder meer door het invoeren van een nieuw Europees beleid. Hierbij zijn de controles die vroeger tussen de Europese landen plaatsvonden naar de buitengrenzen van Europa verplaatst. Binnen Europa zijn de systematische controles dus niet langer aanwezig. Een tweede maatregel is dat mensensmokkelaars steeds intensiever worden vervolgd. Daarnaast zijn er afspraken gemaakt met aan Europa grenzende landen, om zo meer controle te houden op migrantenstromen richting de EU.

De EU heeft nog een lange weg te gaan', zegt Dr. F. Lering, oud-Europarlementariër. 'De maatregelen bij Europese grensovergangen en de hardere aanpak van smokkelaars zullen weinig veranderen aan de illegale mensensmokkel. Zolang hier geld mee te verdienen is zullen mensensmokkelaars hun gang blijven gaan.' Lering geeft ook aan dat het prima is om met aangrenzende landen samen te werken, mits er duidelijke afspraken worden gemaakt. 'De EU moet echter niet vergeten dat aangrenzende landen niet dezelfde verantwoordelijkheid zullen voelen

richting Europa als de Europese landen dat doen.'

Professor Dr. P. Reijnders, hoogleraar politicologie in Leiden geeft aan het gedeeltelijk met Dr. Lering eens te zijn: 'De EU maatregelen werken compleet averechts, door een te harde aanpak bij de grens drukt de EU illegale grensoverschrijding nog verder ondergronds. Dit zorgt juist weer voor veel nieuwe problemen. Ik geloof zeker dat we op moeten passen met het inzetten van niet-Europese landen, maar in tegenstelling tot Lering, geloof ik niet dat de EU momenteel bezig met probleemoplossing. Door aangrenzende landen bij de grensbewaking te betrekken schuift de EU zijn verantwoordelijkheid af naar landen buiten de EU en dat is onacceptabel.'

'Bovendien,' zegt Reijnders 'heeft de EU nog geen oplossing geboden voor de aanpak van illegale immigratie binnen Europa. Door de landgrenzen binnen Europa niet te bewaken of door geen systematische controles uit te voeren wordt de druk op de buitengrenzen van Europa steeds hoger.'

Een land als Nederland heeft tegenwoordig nauwelijks nog grenzen om te bewaken. Alleen op Schiphol en in de havens van Amsterdam en Rotterdam komen mensen van buiten Europa aan en daar vinden nog ouderwetse grenscontroles plaats. De compensatie die landen zoals Nederland verwachtte na het deels wegvallen van hun grensbewaking wordt nu door de EU opgevangen.

Resultaten Europees migratiebeleid zaterdag bekend

AMSTERDAM - De Europese commissie publiceert zaterdagmiddag de langverwachte resultaten van het beleidsonderzoek Europese migratie. Hierin worden concreet de resultaten vermeld van de EU maatregelen op het gebied van immigratiehandhaving.

De Europese Unie heeft de afgelopen jaren nieuw beleid gevoerd met op het gebied van migratie naar Europa. Dit onder meer door het invoeren van een nieuw Europees beleid. Hierbij zijn de controles die vroeger tussen de Europese landen plaatsvonden naar de buitengrenzen van Europa verplaatst. Binnen Europa zijn de systematische controles dus niet langer aanwezig. Een tweede maatregel is dat mensensmokkelaars steeds intensiever worden vervolgd. Daarnaast zijn er afspraken gemaakt met aan Europa grenzende landen, om zo meer controle te houden op migrantenstromen richting de EU.

De EU heeft enkele zeer goede ontwikkelingen op het gebied van immigratie op gang gezet', aldus Dr. F. Lering, oud-Europarlementariër. 'De Europese maatregelen zijn erg adequaat als u het mij vraagt. Door de problemen reeds bij de buitengrenzen van Europa aan te pakken, kampen we met veel minder zorgen binnen Europa en daardoor

ook minder met de problemen in latere stadia van het immigratieproces. Door met buurlanden samen te werken wordt de Europese grens van twee kanten bewaakt. Hierdoor krijgt mensensmokkel een nog kleinere kans.'

Professor Dr. P. Reijnders, hoogleraar politicologie in Leiden geeft aan het gedeeltelijk met Dr. Lering eens te zijn: 'Inderdaad, de EU heeft de zware taak om een Europees migratiebeleid te maken zeer goed op zich genomen. Zo lijkt me de maatregel om mensensmokkelaars harder aan te pakken een zeer noodzakelijke en nuttige regeling. Hiermee kan veel leed worden tegengegaan.'

Ook de samenwerking met buurlanden van Europa vindt Reijnders een slimme zet. 'Samen sta je daarin zeker sterker. Echter zijn er ook binnen Europa nog altijd problemen rondom illegale migratie, deze dienen de EU en Dr. Lering niet uit het oog te verliezen.'

Een land als Nederland heeft tegenwoordig nauwelijks nog grenzen om te bewaken. Alleen op Schiphol en in de havens van Amsterdam en Rotterdam komen mensen van buiten Europa aan en daar vinden nog ouderwetse grenscontroles plaats. De compensatie die landen zoals Nederland verwachtte na het deels wegvallen van hun grensbewaking wordt nu door de EU opgevangen.