
This is the **published version** of the article:

Gené Skrabec, Helena; Costa, Oriol, dir. Culminating sovereignty : the reasoning behind Slovenia's strategy for recognition. 2021. (818 Grau en Ciència Política i Gestió Pública)

This version is available at <https://ddd.uab.cat/record/249757>

under the terms of the  license



Facultat de Ciències Polítiques i Sociologia

Bachelor's Dissertation

Title: Culminating Sovereignty: The Reasoning Behind Slovenia's Strategy for Recognition

Author: Helena Gené Škrabec

Supervisor: Oriol Costa Fernández

Date: 20 May 2021

Degree on: Political Science and Public Administration

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	3
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK	5
UNDERSTANDING SLOVENIA’S SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION	8
THE END OF THE COLD WAR. A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	8
SLOVENIAN CULTURE	9
THE DECISION-MAKER	12
<i>Dimitrij Rupel’s mental constructs</i>	12
<i>Dimitrij Rupel’s personality</i>	14
ATTITUDES AND DECISIONS	17
CONCLUSIONS	19
REFERENCES	21
ANNEX I	25
VARIABLE RESULTS AND NORMALIZATION PROCESS	25

INTRODUCTION

On the 26th of June 1991, roughly half a year after Slovenia held a national plebiscite regarding the secession from Yugoslavia, the government declared its independence unilaterally. The until-then Federated Republic, met three of the four requirements to be considered a state: it had a delimited territory, a population census, and a clear political structure.¹ However, it still lacked the capacity to maintain foreign relations as a means of sovereignty, and so to be considered a fully independent state. Therefore, the strategy to accomplish international recognition was key to shape the future of the self-declared state.

Most of the literature surrounding the topic has focused on explaining why Slovenia was recognized from a foreign perspective. Similarly, Slovenian studies mostly focus either in the internal process when creating state structures, where foreign action is considered to be only another step in the state-building procedure, or it has been described as a historical review of the occurrence of events (see Zajc, 2014; Pesek, 2008; Bučar, 2007). Consequently, it is the aim of the following pages to study not only what actions were taken to be recognized, but also to understand why they were done in such a way; thus, focusing in the *verstehen* of the Foreign Policy, rather than simply following the *erklären* tradition of the International Relations (Hollis and Smith, 1990). The question becomes relevant in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis, because it provides information to a political process that is not often understood from the perspective of a key agent. Even though the historical context of the time and the unravelling war in the Balkan region seems to usually be the only explanation of the recognition, the agency of Slovenia needs to be taken into account as well. It looked for allies and it engaged sovereign states in ways that still need to be accounted for.

Restoring agency to Slovenian actors should also help address another gap in the literature. The quest for the recognition of Slovenia differed greatly from the position Croatia took contemporaneously. And yet, in most publications both have been interchangeably referred to. This is problematic and a reflection of the overwhelming presence in the literature of explanations rooted only in the historical context. West Balkan wars and secessions are thus all seen under the same light. However, although

¹ Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933

both Yugoslavian republics reached the same end, and some strategies can be established as planned together, most of the foreign action was done independently from one another.

The Slovenian foreign strategy from 1989 to 1992 is seen from the perspective of the decision-maker, by focusing on a cultural and psychological approach. These analytical lenses have been chosen in order to explain in a deeper manner what motivated certain ties to other countries. Key in understanding the future that Slovenia projected for itself in the context of the end of the Cold War is a cultural analysis of the strategy. Historical and cultural ties present a more comprehensive view to what brought Slovenia to change its vision towards Central Europe. As a country situated at the limit of two geographical regions—the Balkans and Central Europe—, it shows cultural relation to both. The decision for independence was not only a matter of political sovereignty; it also implied deciding which region Slovenia chose to be a part of and evolve with. In a historical moment riddled with uncertainty, and with a regional context very much in flux, cultural and psychological rules of the thumb played an oversized role for policy-makers, who could hardly engage in cost-benefit, strategic considerations with any confidence.

Highly intertwined with the cultural influence is the understanding of individual action of key political figures. The international recognition of Slovenia must be understood as the establishment of personal ties, linked by the several ideological positions that the Slovenian political elite had. More precisely, this analysis will be focused on the action of Dimitrij Rupel, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but it will also take into account the actions of Milan Kučan, president of the federal republic in 1990 and first president of the independent Slovenia, and Lojze Peterle, Prime Minister of Slovenia at the time of the secession.

In the following pages, some theoretical aspects will be described, in order to organize the analytic method that the project follows. Next, the analysis will provide a discussion of the ties between the two theoretical perspectives and the actual Slovenian foreign policy action, in order to show that the alliances and outside supports that Slovenia advocated for, were directly related to their conception of a renewed Central Europe and the personal characteristics of Dimitrij Rupel. To make such a specific analysis the research is based on the personal communication of the actors, the political statements produced, and the media coverage at the time of the events, retrieved from the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia; as well as interviews made to Dimitrij Rupel, Milan Kučan,

and the historian Peter Vodopivec, during the summer of 2020. The material based on direct sources is also combined with theoretical literature and previous publications.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The figure of Dimitrij Rupel, as the responsible for foreign action during the years surrounding the secession, is assumed to be the base to explain Slovenian foreign policy. Usually, when analyzing specific figures in foreign policy, the most important actor is the Head of State, but during the Slovenian independence process, Milan Kučan, president of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and later the Republic of Slovenia, had a disengaged approach towards Foreign Policy. Dimitrij Rupel thus had the role of planning how to become a sovereign nation in the international arena. In this specific case, Rupel is the decision-maker.

The analysis of what influenced the decision-making processes is based on Hudson’s theory of the Mind Model (2020). However, the scheme is adapted because of two main reasons. Firstly, due to the specificity of the case analyzed, the elements chosen vary from those proposed in a generalist theory. Hence, Hudson’s theoretical proposition were adapted to the Slovenian case. Secondly, due to extension limitations, not all of the elements could be thoroughly discussed and a simplification of the theory makes the analysis more coherent and graspable. The simplification can be seen in figure 1.




Figure 1: Theoretical scheme of the relation between the elements that influence a decision-maker’s attitude

The current analysis will take in account two kinds of factors, the external inputs that influence the actor's attitudes towards the decisions taken, which we call the *situation*. And the internal ones, that we call the *mental model*. The *situation* includes the historical context in which the events took place, and the Slovenian culture understood as the framing of the national-identity. A brief description of the historical context will be presented, as the project does not aim to study the causality that this had on the variables. Therefore, the main part of the external factors' analysis will center itself towards the Slovenian national identity through understanding its cultural construction.

A cultural analysis is essential in the topic, due to the need for differentiation from the Croatian case. The previous literature produced on Slovenia's secession has always paired up both independence processes. However, through a cultural analysis, the foreign action that Slovenia made will be clarified, and it will be more easily differentiated from its southern neighbor. Culture is the base to understand the "action templates", which could be defined as the generalized expectations of how the state should react in a given situation. These templates are constructed from the historical review that the nation does, usually in a dramaturgical or mythicized perspective of it (Hudson, 1999). Knowing what Slovenian culture represents is also useful in order to identify what are the in-groups and out-groups on the cause, being directly related with the states' identity (Banchoff, 1999; Giddens, 2006). In this case two in-groups can be identified. The basic one being the Slovenian national identity, that correlates with its history, the shared language, and its cultural production, in conjunction with a second one that implies a bigger picture: The European region where Slovenia belongs to. If Slovenia is a part of the southern Slavs, why did it choose to approach central Europe? Answering this question will bring us closer as well towards the support-seeking carried out in this region.

The *mental model* is the internal part that modulates the attitude of the decision-maker, and it's made of two separate elements. First, we find are the *constructs* of the individual, that include beliefs, values and memories. This element, although internal, is heavily influenced by the *situation*, and in the specific case of Dimitrij Rupel, the cultural framework is the most determining. In Hudson's (2020) Mind Model, she also includes *filters*, that are separated from the *mental model*, but in this case the biases, stereotypes and possible heuristics that characterized Rupel's cognition will be also included in the *constructs*. This is done so, as it is understood here that the filters an actor may have, directly correlate with his beliefs, values and memories, and do not need to be separated

from the *mental model*. Rupel's constructs will be explained by finding the correlations between his own beliefs and postures and those found generalized in the cultural production of the time. Same goes for his memories, that aside from including the probable impact that historical events had in his conception of the world, are also modeled by collective conception of Slovenia's past. But why is culture so important in Dimitrij Rupel's case? He was an active member of the Slovenian intellectual elite of the moment, before switching into the political world, thus it is expected to be a clear influence over his constructs.

The other element that makes up the internal influence towards the attitudes is the actor's personality. The study of his personality is based on Margaret G. Hermann's seven personality trait coding (2005). These traits are: (1) Belief in one's ability to control events; (2) Need for power; (3) Self-confidence; (4) Conceptual complexity; (5) Task-focus —whether the leader prioritizes problem-solving or satisfying the relationships of the group—; (6) In-group bias; and (7) Distrust for others —being others the out-groups that the leader does not identify with—. The scoring on these seven traits are then compared to the distribution that came out of her study applied to 122 political leaders giving a category to each trait (low, average-low, average-high and high) and correlating these categories provides what type of leader the politician is. Nevertheless, this systematization faces a problem, that is, the inability to compare the scores of the variables between them, as they function on different scales. To overcome such a problem, the scores in the variables have been standardized and normalized in a new scale. In other words, the category of each trait will be assigned comparing each trait to Hermann's analysis, but to compare the variables between them they have been re-scaled. The process of normalization is explained with further detail in the annexes.

For the personality analysis to have a trustworthy outcome several things have to be taken in account. The studying of the traits is applied on statements that a politician has made. Preferably, they should be applied to spontaneous interviews, so that the leader's answers will be the most truthful and closest to his personality. But as it is a textual analysis, if there is a lack of such kind of material, other textual sources can be used, such as letters or speeches. Hermann also suggests that the analysis should be made in a total of 50 responses of around 300 words, resulting in a 15.000 textual body. In this specific case, six letters have been analyzed, dating between 1990 and 1992, three appearances in Slovenian national television, one from 1990 and two from 2011—the 20th anniversary

of the declaration of independence—, and one interview made by the Institute of Cultural Diplomacy also in 2011. The last analysis is also applied to the personal interview I made to Dimitrij Rupel in summer 2020. The total textual body that this material provided is around 8.500 words. In this case it falls short to consider it as completely trustworthy, but the tendencies inferred from the results should not be underestimated.

Explaining these two elements will show the internal influence over Rupel's *attitudes*, influenced as well externally by the *situation*. The *attitudes* are what modulate the position that Rupel took in every given decision he made. All of these descriptives together will clarify the action and inaction in every set of events that was decisive to achieve recognition. Thus, providing a holistic understanding of the strategy that can bring a conclusion where Slovenia is studied in its singular process of secession.

UNDERSTANDING SLOVENIA'S SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION

THE END OF THE COLD WAR. A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The independence of Slovenia and subsequent Yugoslavian decay was immersed in a world system change, the ending of the bipolar world. Until the 1980s, Yugoslavia had found itself in a buffer zone between the two blocks, having normalized relations with the US after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, and with the USSR after the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956; leading the non-alignment initiative, and being a stable and consolidated socialist federation (Hobsbawm, 2016:233-242). Between 1980 and 1991 a number of parallel processes, that culminated with the end of the Cold War, changed the context in which Slovenian elites would have to take decisions. The FRG's *Ostpolitik* was already secured, and the idea of German reunification became a reality after the fall of the Berlin Wall, presented by Helmut Kohl as an act of self-determination (Judt, 2006: 569-574; Thumann, 1997). The eastern European states under Soviet influence started pressuring even more against Moscow. Gorbachev ultimately presented *Perestroika*, but could not stop the fall of the USSR, precipitating the Baltic independences. A precedent for the use of the right to self-determine (Judt, 2006: 632-633; Kinder, Hilgemann, Hergt, 2018: 316).

Yugoslavia established a plural structure of political government for the Federation in 1980, that consisted in a rotatory presidency. During the span of the decade the model became weaker, with the ever-growing demands for democratization in line with what was happening in the rest of Europe. The political structure did not satisfy the nationalistic

aspirations of the Serbian political elite, particularly those of Slobodan Milošević, who after being chosen President of the Serbian Republic, revoked the autonomy of Kosovo coinciding with the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Field Battle. That same year, 1989, when Janez Drnovšek was the Yugoslavian president, Slovenia seized the opportunity, accelerating the process towards independence (Vodopivec, 2010: 407-429).

In 1990, Slovenia held its first democratic elections that giving the government in the hands of DEMOS (the democratic coalition of Slovenia) and the presidency to Milan Kučan, member of the communist league that switched its name to Party for the Democratic Reform.² By the end of the year the Plebiscite regarding the secession was held with an overwhelming result in favor of independence (88,2%). From that point on, the Slovenian political path was difficult but had a clear goal, peaking with the declaration of independence on the 26th of June 1991 (Vodopivec, 2010: 430-452).

SLOVENIAN CULTURE

Slovenian national identity was formed, as it happened in most of Europe, with the romantic movement of the 19th century. Slovenia was lacking an independent statehood to refer to in the past—a common resource that other regions settled for in constructing their national conception (Greenfeld, 1992:1-26)—, so the base for a common Slovenian identity was to be found in the language and their cultural production, mainly literature. The literary production that appeared in the 19th century, around France Prešeren and Matija Čop set the base for a national conceptualization of Slovenian identity. They settled in favor of canonical literature, written in Slovenian language, that opposed the cultural supremacy of the German language (Pregelj, 2011:141). It was also the time when the roots traced the language back to the *Freising Manuscripts*³ and to the first translation of the bible, that Primož Trubar promoted during the 16th century (Pregelj, 2011:141). The Slovenian cultural production of the 19th century was mostly centered around national themes, and the revindication of its own identity. The Slovenes wanted to leave their traditional link to the Germanic Central Europe and integrate themselves in a southern Slavic league in the Balkans. Right before the start of WWI, the feeling of

² Original: Stranka za demokraticne prenove

³ Original: *Brižinski spomeniki*

belonging in the Balkan region can be synthesized in Ivan Cankar's 1913 essay "Slovenians and Yugoslavs":⁴

If not anyone knew until now, they have come to realize now that we are not only Slovenes, let alone Austrians, but that we are a member of a large family that lives from the Julian Alps to the Aegean Sea.⁵

(1967:316)

This positioning may be surprising, as this sentiment of brotherhood was roughly 70 years later abandoned returning to the renewed concept of Central Europe. The identity that was developed until Tito's death in Yugoslavia, aside from revolving around a communist ideology, was based in a Panslavic project that focused on certain shared traits with the other neighboring Yugoslavian socialist republics. The fact that after Tito's death, there was a lack of a functional coordinated leadership that could maintain a cohesive rule, showed the failure of the Panslavic utopia and probably speeded up the need for self-identification, mostly after the center of the SFRY seemed to look for a homogenization based on Serbian national characteristics (Vodopivec, 2010: 408).

It is in this historical context, that we can understand the shift that Slovenia took in identifying itself as center-European and no longer Balkan. This change of thought and identification was started —following the Slovenian cultural tradition— by the intellectual elite, and the cultural movements of the time. This expression and reclamation for democracy, political change and national questioning was mostly published in *Nova Revija*, and the weekly magazine *Mladina*. Dimitrij Rupel, before starting his political career, was editor in chief of *Nova Revija* between 1984 and 1987. He was ceased from this position after the publication of the volume number 57 "Contributions to the Slovenian national program", that included his essay called "Answer to the Slovenian National question" (Rupel, 1987: 57-73). Repeating the pattern of differentiation from the out-group —which were now the Serbian intellectuals and academy—, Slovenia advocated for a liberation by strengthening its relations with the West, but mostly with Central Europe (Vodopivec, 2010: 420). This idea to (re)approach Central Europe had its

⁴ Original: Slovenci in Jugoslovani (1913)

⁵ Original: "Če kdo doslej ni vedel, je odel spoznati zdaj, da nismo samo Slovenci, se manj pa samo Avstrijci, temveč da smo ud velike družine, ki stanuje od Julijskih Alp do Egejskega morja".

turning point with the publication of Milan Kundera's essay "The Tragedy of Central Europe" in 1984. Kundera's observation, aside from a singular specification, does not refer to Slovenia, but to the nations east of Germany that were under Soviet influence, like the Czechs, Slovaks or Poles. Nevertheless, this essay marked the start of a profound reflection concerning where to integrate the Slovenian identity.

From the cultural conceptualization, the Slovenian nation was defined as a basic in-group system, relatable to the language and common heritage. An identity that always evoked, however, for peaceful coexistence with its neighbors "All ours be free, and may those behind the borders not be enemies, but simply neighbors".⁶ That is why, when the basic Slovenian identity felt no longer belonging to a southern-Slavic brotherhood, and its in-group felt threatened to lose its roots, the sense of belonging to Kundera's multicultural Central Europe of small nations, became clearly more appealing. Together with the rejection of a trembling communist system, the Slovenian elite, everyday more ideologically liberal, could not detach from the conception that "the part of Europe situated geographically in the center [is] culturally in the West and politically in the East" and that "Central Europe is not a state: it is a culture or a fate. Its borders are imaginary and must be drawn and redrawn with each new historical situation" (Kundera, 1984:1; 6).

The conclusion to be drawn from this, is that the Slovenian identity created in the 19th century perdured, and was defined partly as a contraposition to another culture or outgroup (first the Austro-German and later the Balkan). However, and due to the material characteristics of the Republic, being small and almost powerless in comparison with its neighbors, it needed to be inserted in a bigger culture, with the underlying condition that Slovenia's basic identity should be respected in coexistence. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that a clear action-template when interacting with the bigger political powers around it has maintained itself similarly throughout the last two centuries. Central Europe was the new geographical belonging, the development of the European Communities was a goal, and the possible future integration in Europe a framework that would keep the elementary identity untouched.

Coming back to the impact that this had on the preferred approach towards Germany and Austria during the 1991 Secession, and them being the first two European Community

⁶ Adapted from the original: "Prost bo vsak, ne vrag, le sosed bo mejak!". This verse is extracted from France Prešeren's poem "Zdravljica", that was censored in 1844 by the Austrian rule and is today's Slovenian national anthem.

Countries to recognize Slovenia by the end of that same year, it now shows that the relation is far more complicated than the simplified explanation of a shared historical past under Austro-Hungarian rule. Rather, the non-imperial look that Post-cold War Central Europe offered, together with the idea of equally small, culturally rich, nations praised in Kundera's essay and the subsequent intellectual production that this triggered in Slovenia between authors like Drago Jančar, Aleš Debeljak, Dimitrij Rupel or Peter Vodopivec. These same intellectuals were then the ones either influencing or belonging to the political elite. Most importantly, Dimitrij Rupel integrated himself in politics during the secession as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and replicated this current of thought in his foreign strategy. That is why in the section that follows his persona will be analyzed, as he is the personified link between Slovenian culture and the impact that it had on the strategy in international support-seeking for independence.

THE DECISION-MAKER

After the victory of DEMOS in April 1990, Dimitrij Rupel established himself as the State Secretary of International Relations, later becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a newly created department, that allowed Slovenia to direct its proto-diplomacy towards seeking recognition. Even though he was not alone in this quest, he can be seen as the director of foreign policy in Slovenia. Following, his *Mental Model* will be described, as it shows the internal influence over the attitudes taken in the decision-making process.

DIMITRIJ RUPEL'S MENTAL CONSTRUCTS

Before his political career Dimitrij Rupel was engaged in an academic life. He was an undergraduate during 1968, and although unknown, the protests seen in the Prague Spring probably had an early influence in his political beliefs. He then graduated in both comparative literature and sociology. In 1976 he obtained a PHD in Massachusetts' Brandeis University on sociology, and worked the years prior to the start of the Slovenian secession as an associate professor in the University of Ljubljana, the Queen's University in Canada, The New School for Social Research in New York and the Cleveland State University. Clearly the American society had a profound impact on Rupel. In every letter he addressed to high-ranked US politicians, he made explicit emphasis praising the American political system (1. Rupel, 1988 & 9. Rupel, 1991).⁷ It was an experience that

⁷ All the references made to documents from Dimitrij Rupel's ARS collection have a number in front, to make them less confusing.

probably explains his political inclination towards a liberal ideology, and against the Yugoslavian socialist regime. It also shows the emphasis that Rupel made in the mediation processes of 1991 to get the US involved, even though, after acknowledging they were not interested in the destabilization of Yugoslavia, he advocated for a stronger relationship towards the reunified Germany and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Rupel, personal communication, August 26, 2020).

During those years, he also became an active member of Slovenia's intellectual elite. Before 1990 he had already published around 100 titles, including novels, research papers, essays and opinion pieces. He started writing his political texts in the second half of the 1980s. He also theorized about the cultural past of Slovenia, and the literary production, which made him a connoisseur of what has been shortly presented above (National University Library of Slovenia). As it was already mentioned, he worked as editor in chief in *Nova Revija*, publishing a great number of political essays during the 1980s and later on.

In 1989 he became a representative in the Central European Initiative —called Penatgonale in their first summit in 1990, later Hexagonale, before switching in 1992 to the current name— where he met with other regional intellectuals and theorized about the conception of Central Europe. During the first summit in mid-summer 1990, he made a speech where he talked about the newly elected democratic government in Slovenia and that they took their political duty as a “cultural one” (17. Rupel, 1990). There too, Rupel only spoke of the proposition of a Yugoslavian confederation, but as he said when interviewed: “we also did not say everything we had in mind” (Rupel, personal communication, 2020, August 26). The important point that he made in the conference was about the will of Slovenia to take part in the European integration.

As such, Rupel's mental constructs were based on the memories provided by his experience in the US, and his own engagement towards culture. His values were directly linked with those expressed in a liberal democracy: he was a fierce defender of human rights, including most importantly, freedom of expression and political participation, as well as a defender of the right of the people to self-determinate the fate of their nation. He believed in a possible multicultural and multiethnic Europe, but based in real nation-states, as he firmly thought that plurinational states cannot survive together and are doomed to failure (9. Rupel, 1992).

DIMITRIJ RUPEL'S PERSONALITY

In this section are found the results of applying Hermann's political personality test. The seven traits she establishes —(1) Belief in one's ability to control events; (2) Need for power; (3) Self-confidence; (4) Conceptual complexity; (5) Task-focus; (6) In-group bias; and (7) Distrust for others— are ranked from 0 to 1, each of them in a separate scale she provides in her study. Later the results were normalized to provide a graph with all of the variables (see Annex, and figure 2).

The perception that Rupel had in his *ability to control events* is found to be average-high (0,51), meaning that he was active in the policy-making process, and was highly interested in meeting leaders face-to-face (Hermann, 2005:188). This characteristic interacts with the second trait: *need for power*, in which he scored similarly (0,53), fitting in the average-high category on this trait. He did provide personal opinions when not solicited in the personal interviews, commenting his thoughts about the necessity for a US intervention in Bosnia at the beginning of the 1992 war (D. Rupel, personal communication, August 26, 2020), which also shows a proposition of forceful action. But on the other hand, he did not pursue to impress or gain fame from his actions. As Hermann puts it, leaders that are moderate in these two characteristics have the ability of either challenging or respecting constraints depending on the nature of the situation (Hermann, 2005:187).

When it comes to *self-confidence*, Rupel scored average-high (0,69). This score puts him in between being a leader not compelled to change the nature of their behavior, and someone who is influenced by “contextual winds”. The score indicates that Rupel is consistent with his sense of self, but can re-evaluate his attitude if the context demands doing so (Hermann, 2005:195). Concerning *conceptual complexity*, his score is high (0,65) when compared to the political scale. The fact of him being a doctor in Sociology and well acquainted with the literary world may be directly related to his capability to attend a “wider array of stimuli from [his] environment” (Hermann, 2005:196). These two traits interrelate and provide information on how open a political figure is to contextual information. Scoring higher in *conceptual complexity*, makes Rupel a figure open to pragmatism and responsive to the interests of others. Moreover, giving the reasonably high score in both traits it can be inferred that he worked his strategy thoroughly, being able to combine the benefits of both traits (Hermann, 2005:193). The characteristic drawn from this is the most relevant in Rupel's personality as a politician,

as it was seen in his negotiation in Brijuni; the capability to wait for a better context for pressuring recognition; and using his ideological characteristics and those of his colleagues in the government, mainly Kučan and Peterle, to establish friendly contacts with the governments that were ideologically alike: Peterle with the Vatican, Italy and Austria; Rupel with Germany and the USA; Kučan with the transitioning eastern countries, and the economic elites belonging to the communist party circles in the east (D. Rupel, personal communication, August 26, 2020).

To round the psychological profiling of Dimitrij Rupel we have to take in account three more factors concerning the motivation for seeking his political position. The first one we will refer to as *task focus*: whether the interest of the figure to take part in his duty is more drawn by the completion of tasks or by the relationships with the group (Hermann, 2005:197-198). In this case Rupel clearly scores average-high in *task focus* (0,65). Meaning that he was both able to prioritize issues, without leaving out the importance of the loyalty towards the in-group. The two resting variables construct the motivation of a political leader towards the world: (1) *In-group bias* and (2) *Distrust for others*. Taking in account that what is here analyzed is the Minister of Foreign Affairs during a secession process, it is no surprise that he scores high in the *in-group bias* trait (0,79). He clearly emphasized the importance of maintaining in-group culture and status, a position that felt threatened with the Serbian nationalist drift under Milosević's rule of the Serbian Republic. The trait being high also indicates a partitional view of the world, divided between "friends" and "enemies". Rupel was clearly open to summit conferences and positive diplomatic gestures to address the conflict, but it is important to clarify that he saw the mediators on the friendly side. In any case, he was not ready to renounce the Slovenian identity and the defense of self-determination, but less aggressive than the score might suggest. On the other hand, when it comes to *distrust for others*, he scored average-low (0,25). That would suggest that his distrust towards a possible menace in the international arena was based on more realistic assumptions (Hermann, 2005:203). It had an impact in the temporal conformity with the independence moratory established in Brijuni in an exchange for a cease-fire, which synthesizes very well the interaction between these three variables. Rupel proudly recalls avoiding an aggression against the retreating Yugoslavian Army that was suggested by Janez Janša, former Minister of Defense and current Prime Minister of Slovenia. He emphasizes the fact that he was the

only politician who trusted Europe, and especially Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs (D. Rupel, personal communication, August 26, 2020).




Figure 2: Dimitrij Rupel's *Active-Independent* personality spider-graphic, prepared from the data compilation

We can glean that Dimitrij Rupel's motivation to assume his position as Foreign Minister of Affairs, had a lot to do with the identification of his own group being the Slovenian nation the base-level, and his objective to make it be a part of Central Europe as a bigger framework. That is why, the partitioned reality of the old Yugoslavian State, but mostly the Serbian rule, represented a threat. On the contrary, Central Europe was seen as the friendlier region. There was also a clear sympathy for all the regions that had followed a similar path, such as the Baltic Republics, or Croatia. Nonetheless, the systematic rejection of violent escalation in Slovenia and also in the other Balkan (soon-to-be independent) republics, suggests the key difference with the Croatian case.

Rupel's profile as a political leader can be synthesized in figure 2, where all the variables are recodified in the same scale. According to Hermann's 2005 proposal, he fits in the category of an *Active-Independent* leader. "[His] focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both" (p.185) From this framework of Rupel's personality it seems that most part of the statement is clearly attributable to his actions, except the fact that he perceived the world as a constant constraint to the national

aspirations. It is more probable that he faced the initial opposition to recognition from the western countries and the European Communities as a challenge, more than as a threat against Slovenia.

ATTITUDES AND DECISIONS

During the process to achieve international recognition there were two key moments: the planning before the declaration of independence; and the international mediation process including the Brijuni Agreements, and the Yugoslavian Conference in The Hague.

Between the material that was produced from the State's Secretary for International Cooperation, a document from April 1991 reflects all the possible outcomes and reactions in the international level the declaration of independence may produce (Skupščina Republike Slovenije: Izvršni Svet, 1991). From the very start Slovenia advocated for a peaceful process, welcoming all kinds of international mediation. The accent is put mainly on Austria, as it was not expected for any western powers to recognize Slovenia directly. The first hope was to achieve a peaceful agreement with Yugoslavia, but it was marked as least probable. They contemplated two other options: a case of serious violent threats, or an economic failure of Yugoslavia. Slovenian representatives were being realistic with the possibilities after independence, and the need of external support for survival. The cultural values of Slovenia are directly represented in the planning. Defend human rights, protect minorities, advocate for a democratic system, and a peaceful process.

The day after the proclamation of independence on 27 June 1991, hostilities started. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who up to the start of the war argued against the recognition, became very concerned and organized the meetings in Brijuni with Hans van den Broek. Rupel played a key role when the propositions did not satisfy Slovenia's expectations. He managed to convince the European troika that (1) the border control had to be guarded by police, like in the rest of Europe; (2) that customs would be recollecting by Slovenian authorities, and agreed (3) that all armed forces should return to their barracks, as it did not have a regular army, but an armed civilian militia, this supposed the temporary retirement of the YNA, but the same readiness from the Territorialna Obramba.⁸ The rest of the agreement meant a compromise, with the three-month independence moratory for example. Rupel managed also to contain the internal friction in the Slovenian government

⁸ It refers to the Slovenian armed militias. In English: Territorial Defense

and avoid a growing violent escalation from the Slovenian side, temporarily convincing the government to cope with the settled conditions (18. Rupel, 1991).

(NON)NEGOTIABLE	
NOT resolvable changeable	(problems that can be resolved - CSCE, EC)
1.) <u>Dignity of nations</u> <u>Identity of nations</u> Plebiscite, popular will <u>SOVEREIGNTY</u> - <u>SOVEREIGN STATE</u>	1.) state of war, end of hostilities
2.) <u>History</u> - cultural continuation, linguistic differences - explosive, volatile region	2.) <u>political relations</u> 3 positions: - Fed, Ser, MW, BiH - Macedonia - Slov., Croat. - Reconciliation of these different positions - design a <u>system</u> - coexistence - federation - confederation - independence
3.) <u>Yugoslav crisis</u> - <u>end of federation</u> → ministers' conference → no support by the federation → however, federation asks the European authorities to support a <u>good cause</u> an <u>establishment</u> which was not capable of resolving the problem	<u>METHOD</u> 3.) <u>protection of human rights</u> - national rights - rights of minorities
4.) <u>preservation of YA</u> as a common defense	4.) <u>recognition</u>
5.) <u>victims of war</u> wounds	5.) <u>distinction of assets and debts</u>

Figure 3: Dimitrij Rupel's notes during the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia (19. Rupel, 1991)

After the European Communities recognized the Baltic republics, the new Yugoslavian Conference, popularly known as Badinter Arbitration Committee, was called together for the 7th of September, because the hostilities between Croatia and Serbia had not ceased. Lord Carrington chaired the conference, and asked Slovenia for a new post-position of the moratory, which was due to the 7th of October and was directly rejected by Slovenia.

Dimitrij Rupel made a speech categorizing which of the items were (non)negotiable (see figure 3). For him the European admission of the Slovenian identity and sovereignty, as well as accepting the cultural and linguistic differentiation was a must. His red lines included the defense of Yugoslavia, what he called a “lost cause”. He suggested the partition according to the Yugoslav affinity regions, where Slovenia and Croatia formed a sole block. This proposition favored the later outcome of the first opinion published in November 1991, that recommended an eventual recognition for Slovenia and Croatia. Rupel managed to convince Genscher, who by the end of October assured the German recognition before Christmas (Rupel, personal communication, 2020, August 26). The Germans settled in with the Austrians, both accepting Slovenian passports since October, thus, *de facto* recognizing Slovenian sovereignty. On 23 of December 1991, they announced their will to recognize Slovenia and Croatia on January 15th. A unilateral move that pressured the EEC and made them compromise in the recognition of both republics, to which slowly the whole world adhered (19. Rupel, 1991).

CONCLUSIONS

This study looked at the external and internal influence on the strategy for Slovenian recognition, and assumed that the most important external one was Slovenian culture. The reasons to look towards Central Europe, were not linked to mere historical ties that could be read as a will to return to the 19th century subjugation. Rather, it meant belonging in a region that would let Slovenia be acknowledged, respected and sovereign, in accordance with other small nations that had similar aspirations. The cultural elite, the one that took advantage of studying abroad a decade earlier because of Yugoslavia’s neutrality in the bipolar world, was now willing to fight for those ideas that they brought from the West. Democracy was the base in all of the demands the cultural world made, together with the defense of individual freedoms. This new mindset that became predominant in the end of the 1980s, was the signature of how Slovenia wished to be shown to the world. Slovenia’s culture proved to be the drive that linked Slovenia’s national identity and the region with which the country identified itself in. The cultural wave rejected belonging in the Balkan federation, strengthening its sense of self, and changed to the new natural framework: Central Europe.

Dimitrij Rupel, an active member of Slovenia’s cultural elite, was one of the examples of those people who decided to switch their careers towards the political path, and to put into practice all of those values that had been discussed for years in a theoretical sense.

He absorbed and advocated for the national identity that Slovenia had constructed. As Foreign Minister of Affairs, he never agreed to renounce the dignity and sovereignty of Slovenia, a feature represented in his very high ranked *in-group bias* score. But contrary to what such a characteristic would indicate, he did not evaluate the world simply, and could understand the importance of adequate speech and demands according to the situation, without forgetting what the main goal was. Nonetheless, the strong bias he had in wishing the US to support the cause was naïve; thus, it was smarter to point towards closer nations, that would mark a difference. It was his comprehension of the two-leveled game that every country plays when doing foreign policy that gave a real possibility for Slovenia's recognition.

He used in his favor the multi-ideological government to come to terms with some of the Central European countries, which was a strategic move. Not only did Slovenia get favored by the Christian-democratic countries like Austria or Italy, but the fact that Lojze Peterle met with the Vatican, also influenced the Catholic circles around the continent. Similarly, the contacts that Milan Kučan had with the economic elite, still tied to the communist structure, assured some economic stability when transitioning towards the new political and economic system. Rupel's personality also allowed him to make the key connection, that could be even called friendship, with Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Rupel took advantage of the German sensibility for self-determination at the time, and Genscher provided a firm help that would trigger the domino-effect recognition that came after the German announcement in December 1991.

The fact that he was an Active Independent leader type, was seen in all the process of negotiation and contact seeking. He assured the maneuverability when bargaining the conditions. Moreover, because he firmly trusted in the EEC and the western countries, he avoided a possible escalation of hostilities from the Slovenian side. Proving that Slovenia's cultural values, such as rejection of violence, prevailed, contrary to the position that Croatia took against the Serbian.

REFERENCES

Literature

- BANCHOFF, T. (1999) "German Identity and European Integration" *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(3), 259-289.
- BUČAR, F. (2007) *Rojstvo države* (1st Ed.) Radovljica: Didakta.
- CANKAR, I. (1967) Slovenci in Jugoslovani. Inside *Ivan Cankar Izbrano Delo* (314-326) Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga.
- GEENFELD, L. (1992) *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. (1st Ed.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press
- GIDDENS, A. (2006) "Estados Nacionales y Violencia" *Revista Académica de Relaciones Internacionales*, 5, November 2006, pp. 1-21.
- HERMANN, M. (2005) "Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis". Inside Post, J. M. *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders* (4th Ed. 178-214) Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- HOBBSAWM, E. (2016) *Historia del siglo XX*. (7th Ed.) Barcelona: Crítica
- HODGE, C. C. (1998) "Botching the Balkans: Germany's Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia" *Ethics and International Affairs*, 12(1), 1-18. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.1998.tb00035.x.
- HOLLIS, M. & SMITH, S. (1990) *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. (1st Ed.) City: Clarendon Paperbacks.
- HUDSON, V. M. & DAY, B. S. (2020) *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. (2nd Ed.) Lanham: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
- HUDSON, V. M. (1999) "Cultural Expectations of One's Own and Other Nations' Foreign Policy Action Templates" *Political Psychology*, 20(4), 767-801.
- JUDT, T. (2006) *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. (2nd Ed.) New York: Penguin Books.
- KINDER, H., HILGEMANN, W. & HERGT, M. (2018) *Atlas histórico mundial. De los orígenes a nuestros días* (22nd Ed.) Madrid: Akal.
- KUNDERA, M. (1984) "The Tragedy of Central Europe" *New York Review of Books*, 31(7), 1-14.
- PESEK, R. (2008) *Skupščinski koraki k samostojni državi* (1st Ed.) Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije.
- PREGELJ, B. (2011) "Civilización y cultura. Espacios de la nación en el contexto de la literatura eslovena contemporánea" *Eslavística Complutense*, 11, 139-154.

- RADAN, P. (1994) "Secessionist self-determination: The cases of Slovenia and Croatia". *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 48(2), 183-195. DOI: 10.1080/10357719408445131
- RUPEL, D. (1992) *Skrivnost države: Spomini na domače in zunanje zadeve 1989-1992*. (1st Ed.) Ljubljana: Delo, Slovenske novice.
- RUPEL, D. (1987) "Odgovor na slovensko narodno vprašanje" *Nova Revija*, 57, 57-73.
- ŠUMRADA, J. (2016) "Mednarodno priznanje Republike Slovenije – Pregled nekaterih ključnih vprašanj". Četrto stoletje Republike Slovenije – izzivi, dileme, pričakovanja, 9-16.
- THUMANN, M. (1997) Between Ambition and Paralysis—Germany's Policy Toward Yugoslavia 1991-1993. *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 25(3), 575-585. DOI: 10.1080/00905999708408525
- VODOPIVEC, P. (2010) *Od Pohlinove Slovnice do Samostojne Države. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. do konca 20. stoletja*. (3rd Ed.) Ljubljana: Modrijan
- ZAJC, D. (2014) "Uresničevanje človekovih pravic v obdobju slovenskega osamosvajanja". Inside Sarđoč, M. et. al., *Aktivno Državljanstvo in Domovina: Zbornik Prispevkov* (1st Ed. 45-60). Ljubljana: Zavod Republike Slovenije za šolstvo.

Direct sources⁹

Letters

1. RUPEL, D. (1988, February 20). [Letter to Professor John Meisel] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:1, 47) Ljubljana, Slovenia
2. RUPEL, D. (1990, November 26). [Letter to Milan Kučan] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:3, 116) Ljubljana, Slovenia
3. RUPEL, D. (1990, November 28). [Letter to Peter Millong] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:3, 116) Ljubljana, Slovenia
4. RUPEL, D. (1990, November 28). [Letter to the Federal Secretary of Yugoslavia] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:3, 116) Ljubljana, Slovenia
5. RUPEL, D. (1990, December 11). [Letter to US Senator Richard G. Lugar] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:3, 116) Ljubljana, Slovenia
6. RUPEL, D. (1990, December 11). [Letter to Professor Doctor A. L. Motzkin] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:3, 116) Ljubljana, Slovenia

⁹ All of Dimitrij Rupel's documentation, because of probable confusion in the text is numbered following the order of the Archive of the Republic of Slovenia's Organization.

7. RUPEL, D. (1991, July 16). [Letter to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:3, 135) Ljubljana, Slovenia
8. RUPEL, D. (1991, September 11). [Letter to Lord Carrington] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:3, 154) Ljubljana, Slovenia
9. RUPEL, D. (1992, January 2). [Letter to James A. Baker, US Secretary of State] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:4, 177) Ljubljana, Slovenia
10. RUPEL, D. (1991, January 1). [Letter to Phyllis Kaminsky] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:7, 214) Ljubljana, Slovenia
11. RUPEL, D. (1991, August 17). [Letter to Jacques Delors] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:7, 214) Ljubljana, Slovenia
12. RUPEL, D. (1991, December 19). [Letter to Hans van den Broek] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:8, 215) Ljubljana, Slovenia
13. RUPEL, D. (1992, September 16). [Letter to Arthur Dunkel] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:8, 216) Ljubljana, Slovenia
14. RUPEL, D. (1992, November 13). [Letter to Wolfgang Schuessel] Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (SIAS 2167, TE:8, 216) Ljubljana, Slovenia

Unpublished papers

15. RUPEL, D. (1987, March 5) *Pogovor z Matjažem Kmeclom* Dimitrij Rupel Papers (SIAS2167, TE:1, 37) Archives of the Republic of Slovenia. Ljubljana, Slovenia
16. RUPEL, D. (presumed). (1990, March 27) *O zunanji politiki suverene Slovenije*. Dimitrij Rupel Papers (SIAS2167, TE: 2, 88)
17. RUPEL, D. (1990, July 31- August 1) *Skupne zgodovinske in družbeno-kulturne korenine srednjeevropske področja. (Srečanje intelektualcev držav "Pentagonale")*. Dimitrij Rupel Papers (SIAS2167, TE:3, 109) Archives of the Republic of Slovenia. Ljubljana, Slovenia
18. RUPEL, D. (presumed). (1991, ca. July 7) *Further Modalities in Preparation of Negotiations*. [Unpublished manuscript]. Dimitrij Rupel Papers (SIAS2167, TE:3, 135) Archives of the Republic of Slovenia. Ljubljana, Slovenia.
19. RUPEL, D. (1991, October 17) *Notes on the "Arrangements for a General Settlement" in the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia*. Dimitrij Rupel Papers (SIAS2167, TE:3, 152) Archives of the Republic of Slovenia. Ljubljana, Slovenia.
20. RUPEL, D. (1992, April 22) *Dosežki in težave slovenske zunanje politike*. Dimitrij Rupel Papers (SIAS2167, TE:4, 183)

Collective Unpublished Papers

SKUPŠČINA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE: IZVRŠNI SVET. (1991, April 9) *Osamosvajanje Slovenije*. [Unpublished manuscript]. Ivan Oman Papers (SIAS2091, TE:2, 16) Archives of the Republic of Slovenia. Ljubljana, Slovenia

Rupel's public interviews and television appearances

21. RUPEL, D. & BUČAR, F. (1990, December 19) *Bučar in Rupel po Povratku z Dunaja pred Plebiscitom* [News Broadcast]. RTVSLO. retrieved from: <https://4d.rtv slo.si/arhiv/osamosvojit ev-slovenije/174739750>
22. RUPEL, D. (2011, November 4) *Inteview by PolitikisTV* [Tape recording] retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVmpK-hMNQA>
23. RUPEL, D. (2011, March 9-12) *Interview by the Academy for Cultural Diplomacy* [Tape Recording]. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_NCvMohotw
24. RUPEL, D. (2011, November 2) *Speech on the 20th anniversary of Slovenian independence* [Tape Recording]. Večer. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJ6Jk_bLSQ0
25. RUPEL, D. (2020, August 17) *Pogovori z osamosvojitelji: Interview by Rosvita Pesek* [Tape Recording]. RTVSLO. Retrieved from: <https://www.rtv slo.si/slovenija/30-let/pogovori/rupel-sogovorniki-so-mi-govorili-da-nikoli-ne-bomo-postali-drzava/533517>

ANNEX I

VARIABLE RESULTS AND NORMALIZATION PROCESS

Margaret G. Hermann systematization of the seven personality trait variables implicates that each one falls into a particular scale and category; thus, the value of each trait is independent from the others and their values cannot be compared between themselves. While applying Hermann's methodology, her categories were used, to not interfere with the results. However, it was interesting to provide a new scaling so the variables could be numerically compared with one another, and also to be able to present them in an accurate graphic. To do so, the following steps were made (see Table 1):

1. Taking the mean and standard deviation from each of the variables in Hermann's study.
2. To every result, the mean of that variable is subtracted, and then divided by its standard deviation, giving a standardized number per variable, that is already comparable to each other.
3. However, the scale is infinite, so to make it graspable a new scale is established. By defining the minimum and maximum values —0 to 1—, establishing the mean in 0,5, and determining a standard deviation of 2,5.

The numbers that appear in the *Normalized* column are all found in the same scale and are the values that were used to construct figure 2 that appeared in the personality analysis. As it shows on the *Category* that would apply after normalizing the variables, it can be observed that a change of category is produced in the *conceptual complexity* trait. Furthermore, the distance between the values are very close, due to the difference that made the *in-group* bias scale. Consequently, the normalization of the variables is only useful for the sake of making the personality trait more visual.

TABLE 1

Variables	Average score (Hermann, 2005) scale	Category (Hermann, 2005)	mean (Hermann, 2005)	std (Hermann, 2005)	standardized	Normalized	Category
<i>Ability to control events</i>	0,5177725118	Average-high	0,45	0,12	0,565	0,57	Average-high
<i>Need for Power</i>	0,530332681	Average-high	0,5	0,12	0,253	0,53	Average-high
<i>Self-confidence</i>	0,696969697	Average-high	0,57	0,13	0,977	0,63	Average-high
<i>Conceptual complexity</i>	0,6568627451	High	0,45	0,13	1,591	0,71	Average-high
<i>Task focus</i>	0,6582278481	Average-high	0,62	0,14	0,273	0,54	Average-high
<i>In-group bias</i>	0,7922077922	High	0,43	0,09	4,025	1,03	High
<i>Distrust for others</i>	0,25	Average-low	0,38	0,18	-0,722	0,40	Average-low
				Max.	3,783181187		
				Min.	-3,783181187		
				Std.	1,513272475		