

Home Style:  
Governments, Parties, and the Domestic  
Presentation of European Integration

A dissertation presented by:

Tom Hunter

to

The London School of Economics'  
European Institute

in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

London  
September 2021

Home Style:  
Governments, Parties, and the Domestic  
Presentation of European Integration

Abstract

Tom Hunter

September 2021

National governments are accused of being evasive and opportunistic in their presentation of European integration, thereby exacerbating the EU's crisis of legitimacy. Yet empirical evidence on how governments present Europe at home is limited to a small handful of qualitative studies. This thesis provides the first comparative, quantitative study of how governments - and the parties that form them - present Europe in their domestic public spheres, and what these presentational strategies mean for representation and legitimacy in the EU. Inspired by Fenno's 1978 classic, I call this their 'home style'.

Through innovative text as data methods combining machine translation, automated text analysis, and hand coding, I show that rather than adopting a *nationalist* home style marked by evasiveness and opportunism, governments have responded to EU politicization by adopting a home style I label *technocratic-patriotic*. *Technocratic*, in the sense that governments actually talk frequently about the EU, but avoid clear position taking on the issue by defusing it with complex language. *Patriotic*, in the sense that governments extensively claim credit for defending the national interest on the European stage, but in fact rarely blame or criticise the EU directly. I argue that despite not fitting the stereotypical image of evasive, opportunistic blame shifters, this technocratic-patriotic home style still poses deep problems for democratic accountability in Europe's multilevel system of governance. The thesis also contributes two resources to the academic community: *EUCOSpeech*, an original dataset of over 6,000 statements by national leaders in the aftermath of EU summits, and *EUParlspeech*, an original dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made in parliamentary speeches between 1989 and 2019.

## Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I confirm that Chapter 4 (Ignore or Defuse? Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition) was co-written with Sara Hagemann and Sara B. Hobolt. I was the article's lead author and contributed significantly to the research design, development and testing of hypotheses, and drafting of the final text.

I declare that this thesis consists of **74,609** words.

# Contents

<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>10</b>
1.1 The Eurocrat's Complaint . . . . .	10
1.2 Home Style in a European Context . . . . .	12
1.3 Original Data to Study Home Style . . . . .	24
1.4 Evasive and Opportunistic? . . . . .	28
1.5 Structure and Contribution . . . . .	35
<b>2 Credit Claiming in International Organizations: Evidence from EU Council Summits</b>	<b>40</b>
2.1 Introduction . . . . .	41
2.2 Credit and Blame in International Organizations . . . . .	43
2.3 Credit Claiming at International Summits . . . . .	45
2.4 Research Design . . . . .	51
2.5 Analysis and Results . . . . .	56
2.6 Discussion . . . . .	61
2.7 Conclusion . . . . .	63
<b>3 A New Dataset of Over 1 Million References to European Integration</b>	<b>65</b>
3.1 Introduction . . . . .	66
3.2 Data on the Communication of EU Integration . . . . .	67
3.3 Introducing EUParlspeech . . . . .	69
3.4 Face Validity: Cross Party Differences . . . . .	74
3.5 Convergent Validity: Comparison with Expert Data . . . . .	77
3.6 Predictive Validity: Intra Party Divisions . . . . .	78
3.7 Conclusion . . . . .	82
<b>4 Ignore or Defuse? Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition</b>	<b>84</b>
4.1 Introduction . . . . .	85
4.2 Mainstream Parties and the Avoidance of Wedge Issues . . . . .	86
4.3 Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition . . . . .	89
4.4 Research Design . . . . .	94
4.5 Results . . . . .	97
4.6 Discussion . . . . .	102

4.7	Conclusion . . . . .	103
<b>5</b>	<b>Disintegration and Party Competition: Evidence from Parliamentary Speeches on Brexit</b>	<b>105</b>
5.1	Introduction . . . . .	106
5.2	Established Strategies in EU party competition . . . . .	107
5.3	Disintegration and its Impact on Party Strategies . . . . .	109
5.4	The Case of Brexit . . . . .	111
5.5	Research Design . . . . .	115
5.6	Analysis and Results . . . . .	120
5.7	A Permanent Reversal? . . . . .	126
5.8	Conclusion . . . . .	128
<b>6</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>130</b>
6.1	Summary of Findings . . . . .	130
6.2	Home Style and the EU's Legitimacy . . . . .	132
6.3	The Generalisability of Home Style . . . . .	136
6.4	Moving Forward . . . . .	143
6.5	Revisiting Fenno . . . . .	145
	<b>Appendix</b>	<b>147</b>
A.1	Chapter 2 Appendix . . . . .	147
A.2	Chapter 3 Appendix . . . . .	161
A.3	Chapter 4 Appendix . . . . .	180
A.4	Chapter 5 Appendix . . . . .	186
	<b>References</b>	<b>196</b>

## List of Tables

1.1	Who Speaks Most About Europe? . . . . .	17
1.2	Europeanist and Nationalist Home Styles in the European Union . . . . .	22
1.3	Summary of EUCOSpeech and EUParlspeech . . . . .	27
1.4	The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style . . . . .	34
1.5	Summary of Chapters . . . . .	38
2.1	Governments' Optimal Rhetorical Strategies . . . . .	49
2.2	Exemplary Statements . . . . .	54
2.3	Fixed and Mixed Effects Regression Results . . . . .	59
3.1	Overview of the EUParlspeech corpora . . . . .	72
3.2	Exemplary EU references . . . . .	73
3.3	Mixed Effects Regression Results (Party Type) . . . . .	76
3.4	Logistic Regression Results (Referendum Position) . . . . .	81
4.1	Issue Avoidance Strategies . . . . .	88
4.2	Exemplary EU Statements by Mainstream Party Leaders . . . . .	96
4.3	Mainstream Parties' EU Cues are less clear than Challenger Parties' EU Cues	98
4.4	Multilevel Linear Regression Results - Mainstream Parties . . . . .	101
5.1	Codes for Brexit Strategy Category . . . . .	117
5.2	Challenger Parties - Handcoded Brexit Statements . . . . .	118
5.3	Mainstream Parties - Handcoded Brexit Statements . . . . .	119
5.4	OLS Regression Results - Mainstream and Challenger Parties . . . . .	122
5.5	Challenger Parties - Mixed Effect Logistic Regression Results . . . . .	125
5.6	Mainstream Parties - Mixed Effect Logistic Regression Results . . . . .	125
6.1	The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style: Mechanisms of Legitimation and Delegitimation . . . . .	136
6.2	Home Styles in International Organizations . . . . .	139

## List of Figures

1.1	Number of EU References in National Parliaments . . . . .	16
1.2	The Politicization of European Integration . . . . .	31
2.1	The Politicization of International Cooperation in Europe . . . . .	46
2.2	The Increase in Credit Claiming in National Leaders' EU Rhetoric . . . . .	57
2.3	Balance of Credit Sharing and Credit Claiming in Leaders' EU Rhetoric . . . . .	58
2.4	The Balance of Credit Sharing and Credit Claiming Differs for High Salience and Low Salience Issues . . . . .	60
2.5	Marginal Effects of Issue Salience on Credit Claiming and Credit Sharing . . . . .	61
3.1	Mixed Effects Regression Results (Party Family) . . . . .	76
3.2	Convergent Validity: EUParlspeech and the CHES . . . . .	78
3.3	Position Estimates of Conservative MPs (2010 - 2015) . . . . .	80
4.1	Mainstream Parties' Communication of EU Integration is More Complex than the Rest of their Political Communication . . . . .	99
4.2	Salience of EU Integration in Mainstream Party Leaders' Communication . . . . .	100
5.1	The UK's Negative Brexit Experience Post Referendum . . . . .	112
5.2	Number of Brexit Statements in National Parliaments . . . . .	121
5.3	Challenger Parties - Handcoded Categories . . . . .	123
5.4	Mainstream Parties - Handcoded Categories . . . . .	123
5.5	Salience of Google Searches for 'Brexit' Relative to the UK . . . . .	127
6.1	Senior Governing Parties in the EU . . . . .	141
6.2	Public Opinion Towards the EU . . . . .	141
6.3	Heads of Government Use Less Negative when Talking About the EU . . . . .	143

## Acknowledgements

I have accumulated a heap of intellectual debts in the process of writing this thesis. First and foremost, let me express my gratitude to my supervisors Sara Hagemann and Sara Hobolt. They selflessly invested their time and energy into this project and my development as a scholar, whilst also giving me the space to pursue my own ideas. I am lucky to have had such a brilliant team overseeing my work.

The European Institute has been as advertised: collegial, interdisciplinary, and a fantastic place to pursue a PhD. Waltraud Schelke was as an outstanding DPD, caring, protective, and exacting. My thanks extend to Kevin Featherstone, Spyros Economides, Jonathan White, Jonathan Hopkin, Adam Judge, Fiona Lok, and Florence Samuels. Dan Berliner provided encouragement and excellent feedback at crucial stages in the project. Moritz Osnabrügge and Ken Benoit introduced me to the text as data methods used in this thesis and were always generous with their time. Most of all I am grateful to my friends and colleagues at the LSE for making the PhD such an enjoyable experience: Toon, Chris, Dustin, Daphnée, Kira, Diane, Marta, Hilke, Venera, Michael, Philipp, Angelos, Sean, Yonathan, Katerina, Virginia, Thelma, Tommaso, Friedrich, Tahir, Jacob, Sarah, and in particular Jared, without whom I would never have started this journey. The Disintegration team in Zurich has been warm and welcoming and I am excited about the next stage in my career.

I am thankful to Chris Anderson and Christian Rauh for acting as examiners. Their work inspired many of the ideas in the thesis and I am lucky to face such a distinguished committee. The thesis itself would not have been written without the financial support of the Economic and Research Council, which also allowed me to employ the brilliant Zachary Wong, Ilona Cenolli, April Goulding, Caroline Maschka, Nathalie Bredberg, and Marco Brolli as research assistants. Many of them were also my students. Teaching the LSE's bright undergraduates has been a privilege and one of the highlights of my time at the school.

Outside of academia, the Saunders Lounge has been a constant source of relief. I am particularly grateful to Jimmy and Lise for all the time spent in lockdown. Thanks to my friends in London who kept me sane: Connie, Christophe, Jim, Nick, Ryo, Chris, Jack, Arun, Susannah, Baptiste, Alexia, the Ex-Libris gang, and the Kawadris. I have missed my Brussels friends during the pandemic, and hope to see Jess, Alex, Darren, Petra, Fredrik, Arno, Fabrice, and Louise soon.



Sporting Duet was a huge part of my PhD. I am grateful to the whole team, and particularly to Mat, Maxime, Dave, and Cyrille with whom I spent weekend after weekend. Last but not least, thank you to my family, my siblings Ben and Rosie, and their partners Dani and Huw. My parents have been - as always - interested, encouraging, and loving throughout. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

# Introduction

*The Eurocrat's Complaint – Home Style in a European Context –  
Original Data to Study Home Style – Evasive and Opportunistic? –  
My Contribution*

## 1.1 The Eurocrat's Complaint

In the summer of 2019, the departing president of the European Commission sat down with German newspaper Bild to reflect on his time in office. It had been a turbulent few years for Jean-Claude Juncker. Having overseen some of the most serious crises in the EU's history, from the Greek bailout negotiations to Brexit, he had also had to contend with the growing influence of Eurosceptic parties whose success at European elections had translated to national politics (Schulte-Cloos 2018). As he contemplated this increase in Euroscepticism, Juncker was unsurprisingly critical of populist leaders who offered no workable solutions to Europe's multiple challenges. Yet more surprisingly, he was equally critical of the leaders of ostensibly pro-European parties with whom he had worked so closely in the previous five years. "National governments have a habit of congratulating themselves for what goes right and blaming Brussels for what goes wrong" he complained "it's no wonder that anti-European tendencies are on the rise."

This complaint had been a feature of the Juncker presidency. In his first State of the Union address, he decried the EU's blame game where "fingers had been pointed from national capitals towards Brussels" (2015). If national governments weren't blaming Europe, then they were avoiding the issue of European integration altogether, retreating inwards to small minded domestic considerations: "Never before have I heard so many leaders speak only of their domestic problems, with Europe mentioned only in passing, if at all," he complained in a speech to the European Parliament (2016). As his interview with Bild drew to a close, Juncker contrasted the current batch of national leaders with the great European leaders of the past. Recounting the late Helmut Kohl, Juncker noted that at EU summits, Kohl would broker agreements for which he would be criticised by his domestic electorate. This willingness to unambiguously defend Europe at home, even in the face of short term electoral costs, is the standard to which Juncker judged current national governments. He found them desperately wanting.

However, if pronouncements by previous Commission presidents are anything to go by, Juncker's nostalgia seems misplaced. Indeed, his exact concern had been articulated consistently by previous holders of the most powerful office in Brussels. At the height of the economic crisis, President Barroso placed the plunge in EU popularity firmly at the hands of national governments who had "failed to defend European integration when it was needed the most" (2010). Even Jacques Delors, Commission President at the time of Helmut Kohl, admonished governments for their cynicism: "Yes, we can be more transparent" he admitted in Strasbourg (1995) "but to make Europe the scapegoat for the democratic malaise we find ourselves in - that is crossing the line."

This voiced concern that governments are *evasive* and *opportunistic* in their presentation of European integration is what I call the *Eurocrat's Complaint*. The Eurocrat<sup>1</sup> understands that he cannot reach European citizens directly and that he depends on national governments to present and defend European integration to voters. According to the Eurocrat, governments fail in this communicative function, and in doing so contribute to rising Euro-scepticism. The Eurocrat's complaint is not new, nor is it exclusively the preserve of Brussels technocrats. In the following section, I show how scholars of European integration also raise concerns about the evasiveness and opportunism of national governments. I also explain how a concept borrowed from American political science - that of home style - can help us conceptualize the presentational strategies employed by national governments when communicating EU integration in their domestic public spheres.

---

<sup>1</sup>I do not mean 'Eurocrat' in any disparaging sense, simply as a memorable term to refer to senior EU officials.

## 1.2 Home Style in a European Context

How do national governments - and the mainstream parties that form them - present European integration in their domestic public spheres? Why do they present it in this way? And what are the consequences of these presentational strategies for the legitimacy of the European project? These are the broad questions addressed in this thesis. The conventional view on this question, both amongst policymakers and scholars, is that governments are evasive and opportunistic in their presentation of EU integration, and thereby exacerbate the EU's crisis of legitimacy. Yet this widely held belief is based on surprisingly little empirical evidence. In this thesis, I will use original datasets and innovative text as data methods to show that despite not fitting the stereotypical image of evasive, opportunistic blame shifters, the way national governments and mainstream parties present the EU to domestic audiences still poses deep problems for democratic accountability in Europe's multilevel system of governance. In doing so, I make the case for placing the concept of home style at the heart of debates on democratic representation in the EU.

### 1.2.1 The Concept of Home Style

'Home Style' is a classic of American political science. In his 1978 study, Richard Fenno makes the case for studying the ways members of Congress present their work in Washington back to their constituents. Like most pathbreaking contributions, Fenno's central insight was both simple and illuminating: he outlined the central role of communication in the process of democratic representation. Representation is not simply about the votes representatives cast, nor how they invest their time and resources in national capitals (Grimmer 2014, 2015); it is also about how the work of the representative is presented back to constituents. Home style - defined by Fenno as the way 'representatives present themselves and explain their work' (1978, p. 34) matters so much to representation because it is the primary tool representatives use to connect with, and ultimately gain reelection from, their constituents.

The impact of Fenno's 'Home Style' is undeniable (1978). With over four-thousand citations, it remains one of the most regularly cited books in political science and is present in most classrooms, regularly taught at both the undergraduate and graduate levels (Lipinski 2004). Furthermore, the advances in computational methods has led to a resurgence in the study of home style in national politics, complementing Fenno's anthropological approach with quantitative textual analyses of how elected representatives communicate with their constituents (Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012, 2014). And home style is not limited to American politics - it has become a widely used tool of comparative politics,

applied across different national cultures and contexts (Ingall and Crisp 2001; Samuels 2002; Bonoli and Shinkawa 2006).

In sum, home style refers to how representatives communicate and present their work back to constituents in order to gain reelection. Home style in a European context then, refers to how representatives in EU policymaking - national governments - present their work in Brussels back to their constituents - national electorates. This thesis rests on two fundamental premises. The first is that this concept of home style *can* be applied to national governments in the EU. The second is that studying home style is a worthwhile endeavour for scholars interested in democratic representation, accountability, and legitimacy in Europe's multilevel system of governance. Let me address these in turn.

*Concept Definition: Home Style*

The presentational strategies employed by national governments when communicating European integration in their domestic public spheres.

At first glance, it may seem puzzling to apply home style in the EU to national governments rather than to MEPs who represent citizens in the European Parliament. And indeed, one could apply the concept of home style both to the 'European' and to the 'domestic' routes of citizen representation in the EU. Whilst the European route links citizens preferences to policy outputs through EP elections, the domestic route links preferences with EU policy outputs through the election of national governments in the Council (Wrátil 2016). I focus on the domestic route, both because the Council is widely considered the most powerful institution in the EU (Costello and Thomson 2013; Franchino and Mariotto 2012; Thomson 2011d), and because European elections are still considered second order contests, with MEPs that have little to no recognition in domestic public spheres (Hix and Marsh 2008). By contrast, the Council and its high profile summits dominate the coverage of EU affairs by bringing together the most recognisable political figures on the continent (Moravcsik 1999; Menon 2008; Alexandrova 2014)

It is worth noting that the literature has already established that the EU *can* be treated as political system, and that the analytical tools of comparative politics - of which home style is one - *can* be applied to its multilevel polity (Hix 2016). Yet my justification for applying home style to national governments in the EU goes further still. I argue that the application of home style to a multilevel system must satisfy a number of conditions. First, home style implies some distinction between the *policymaking venue*, where policies are made, and the *communication venue* where policies are presented back to the constituents

who are affected by them. In Fenno’s work, representatives make (or obstruct) policy in Capitol Hill and then communicate this work back in their home state through local media, press releases, newsletters, and the like. This distinction is also applicable to EU policymaking. Policies are made in Brussels in a complex process involving commissioners, bureaucrats, national governments, and MEPs. Yet these policies are then communicated largely through domestic channels, with national media particularly interested in how governments have defended the national interest in the Council (Alexandrova 2014). Fenno’s initial work distinguishes between *Hill Style* (the way representatives allocate their resources in Washington) and *Home Style* (how this work is communicated back to constituents in the district). Likewise, we can distinguish between national governments’ *Brussels’ style* (the way they conduct their policymaking in Europe’s capital) and their *home style* (the way they present EU policymaking to domestic audiences).

In fact, in many ways this distinction between policymaking and communication venues is even more pronounced in the EU than in other multilevel systems. Whilst multilevel polities usually share a coherent public sphere with universal media outlets and a common language, this European public sphere is largely lacking in the EU (Riise 2014). Despite hopes that further integration would lead to the creation of a genuine transnational public sphere in Europe, this has largely failed to materialise save for a few elite circles (Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2016; Downey and Koenig 2006). Due to cultural and linguistic barriers, it is still the case that most European citizens receive information on the EU and its policies through domestic channels, rather than pan-European ones (van der Brug and de Vreese 2016; Menon 2008).

The application of home style also requires some sort of *electoral connection* (Mayhew 1974). That is to say, that the reelection of a representative depends at least in part on their performance in the policymaking venue. The existence of this electoral connection at the EU level was once questionable, as governments benefited from a ‘permissive consensus’ where voters were broadly supportive but generally uninterested in European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). No longer. European integration now matters to national electorates, who are increasingly divided on the issue, and reward governments that ‘bring back the bacon’ from major European summits (Zurn, 2014; Rauh 2016; Schneider 2018; Hooghe and Marks, 2019; De Vries 2012). One of the clearest manifestations of this electoral connection is the growing literature on responsiveness in the EU, with evidence that national governments in the Council signal that they are defending the interests of domestic audiences through votes, negotiation positions, and their use of formal policy statements (Schneider 2018; Hagemann et al 2017; Wratil 2016, 2017; Hobolt and Wratil 2020).

To be clear, I am not saying that governments depend solely on their EU positions and

their performance in Brussels for reelection, nor that this is even the principal criteria on which voters judge their performance in office. What I am saying, and what the evidence points toward, is that the positions they take and defend at the European level are far from insignificant in their prospects for reelection. The electoral connection linking citizens' preferences and the behaviour of national governments in EU policymaking is real. The concept of home style - the way representatives present and defend their work to constituents - is therefore applicable to national governments in the EU. Of course, it is one thing to argue that the concept of home style can be applied to the European context, quite another to argue that it should be the focus of a whole thesis. In the following section I explain why home style matters by presenting the major contributions its study can make to the literatures on cue-taking, representation, and democratic legitimacy in the EU.


### 1.2.2 Why Home Style Matters

Home style matters because national governments are the central messengers of European integration in domestic public spheres. The way they present and cue Europe to voters shapes how public opinion towards the EU is formed, is central to the representation they offer their constituents in Brussels, and plays an important role in legitimising (and delegitimising) EU authority in the eyes of European citizens.

First, it is well established that political elites shape public opinion, as most voters lack the time and willingness to develop deep political knowledge. To overcome these informational shortfalls, voters rely on cues and heuristics from politicians (see, e.g., Brady and Sniderman 1985; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Sniderman et al. 1991; Lupia 1992, 1994; Sniderman 2000). This role of elites as cue-givers is even more relevant in the context of European integration because while voters generally have little knowledge of national political affairs, they are even more ignorant about affairs at the European level (Hobolt 2007). Amongst these EU cues, the home style of national governments is particularly central. This is because national governments dominate the domestic coverage of political affairs (Roberts 2006). As they wield power and are in a position to deliver policies, the media pay close attention to what governments do and say. Indeed, opposition politicians often complain about governments 'hogging the spotlight' and the difficulties they face in receiving coverage that match that conferred onto national governments.

To illustrate the centrality of national governments as cue-givers on European integration, I draw on the dataset that is the centrepiece of this thesis. *EUParlspeech* is a dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made in ten national parliaments between 1989 and 2019. The third chapter in this thesis presents more details on the methodology employed to create the dataset, and Figure 1.1 below outlines the share of EU

Figure 1.1: Number of EU References in National Parliaments



Source: EUParlspeech (see Chapter 3 for details on the construction of the dataset)

communication made by mainstream governing parties, mainstream opposition parties, and challenger parties<sup>2</sup>. The figure demonstrates not only the increased salience of European integration in domestic parliamentary debates, but also the dominance of governments (and mainstream parties more generally) in the domestic presentation of EU affairs. Indeed, the mainstream parties that tend to form governments are responsible for 73 per cent of the EU communication that takes place in parliamentary debates. Governing parties, which make up just a handful of the parties in parliaments, are responsible for half.

As further evidence of the centrality of national governments and leaders as cue-givers on EU, I also pick out the speakers who make the most references to European integration in each of the ten parliaments in *EUParlspeech*. Table 1.1 shows how seven of the ten speakers with the most EU references in parliamentary debates held senior positions in government. In fact, in five of the ten parliaments, the speaker who makes the most references to European integration is or was a head of government (Merkel, Aznar, Rutte, Sobotka, Cowen). Even in a relatively permissive communication venue, where parliaments are expected to divide speaking time in a proportional manner, governments still end up dominating the communication of European integration.

<sup>2</sup>Figure 1.1 does not include the Irish Dail as data is only available until 2013.



Table 1.1: Who Speaks Most About Europe? (National Parliaments, 1989 - 2019)

<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Speaker with most EU references</i>
AT - Nationalrat	<b>Herbert Scheibner (Minister in Government)</b>
CZ - Poslanecká sněmovna	<b>Bohuslav Sobotka (Head of Government)</b>
DE - Bundestag	<b>Angela Merkel (Head of Government)</b>
DK - Folketing	<b>Per Stig Møller (Minister in Government)</b>
ES - Congreso	<b>José María Aznar (Head of Government)</b>
GR - Hellenic Parliament	Nikolaos Karathanasopoulos (Member of Parliament)
IRL - Dail	<b>Brian Cowen (Head of Government)</b>
NL - Tweede Kamer	<b>Bohuslav Sobotka (Head of Government)</b>
SE - Riksdag	Ulf Holm (Member of Parliament)
UK - House of Commons	Bill Cash (Member of Parliament)

Source: EUParlspeech (see Chapter 3 for details on the construction of the dataset). Speakers who held senior positions in government are in bold.

Of course, governments do not exist in a vacuum in national politics: they also compete with opposition parties to gain reelection and maintain power. A growing literature emphasises the conflict in Europe between mainstream parties (centre right and centre left pro EU parties that dominate national elections and are therefore likely to form governments), and challenger parties (parties without government experience who mobilise new issues). Whilst the concept of home style applies specifically to governments, researchers interested in the domestic presentation of European integration should also consider more broadly how national parties frame and communicate the issue ‘at home’. This thesis will therefore consider not simply how governments present Europe, but how national parties - and in particular how the mainstream parties that tend to form governments - present the issue in their domestic public spheres. This is important *empirically* because citizens receive most of their cues on international cooperation from their own national governments, politicians, and parties. But home style also matters *normatively*, because citizens are represented in the EU by their governments, and because communication plays a central role in this process of representation.

The literature on citizen representation is one of the richest in EU scholarship. Initial concerns about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ have since been subsumed by a growing literature demonstrating responsiveness by national governments in the EU (Wratil 2014, 2017,

2018; Hagemann et al 2017; Schneider 2020). Yet as we have seen in the previous section, representation is not simply about what representatives *do* in policymaking venues; it is also about what they *say* about this activity in their own domestic public spheres. Indeed, scholars have made the case that communication - and in particular home style - is central to a broader notion of democratic representation (Grimmer 2010, 2014).

Home style matters to representation in two fundamental ways, both of which are applicable to the EU. First, home style is important on its own, because it allows representatives to strategically define how they are responsive to constituents. To create this image, legislators adopt diverse and stable home styles, for example by focusing on their ability to bring in funds from federal budgets (appropriators) or on defending clear policy positions at the federal level (position takers). Likewise, national governments can adopt diverse home styles in the EU. Governments of smaller member states may emphasise their ability to receive generous structural funds for example; whereas the governments of larger member states may want to emphasise their ability to place their own national priorities at the top of the European agenda.

Second, home style is important because it both reflects and affects what representatives can do in policymaking venues. Scholars outline the correspondence between legislators' home style and their 'Hill style': the issues they emphasise in their communication at home are likely to be those they spend time on in Washington DC. For example, legislators introduce more bills on issues they discuss frequently at home and articulate similar positions in floor speeches and press releases aimed at their domestic audiences (Grimmer, 2014). Likewise, the home styles adopted by national governments in the EU may constrain the goals they pursue in negotiations in the Council. A government who is fiercely critical of the EU in its public communication for example, may find its room for manoeuvre restricted in the Council, as domestic audiences expect their tough talk at home to be reflected by tough stances in Brussels.

Ultimately, home style matters because it speaks to a question that goes to the very heart of the European project: that of democratic legitimacy. The EU is of course legitimised through institutional channels like national and European elections, and major integration events such as treaties are also legitimised through national referendums (Hobolt 2006). Yet legitimation (and delegitimation) is also a *discursive* process. Participants in the public sphere establish and cultivate the belief in the legitimacy of systems of authority through their discourse and public statements (Habermas 1976; Van Leuween 2007). In the case of the EU, this discourse has been marked by a tension between legitimisation down the 'input' and 'output' routes (Scharpf 1999) and a balancing act between forces actively politicizing and deliberately depoliticizing the stakes of EU politics (Sternberg 2013).

If we accept that discourse is central to the legitimation and delegitimation of European integration, then we must accept the centrality of home style to the legitimacy of the EU. National governments are naturally not the only actor to participate in the public debates that legitimise and delegitimise systems of authority - but they are certainly an important one (as are national political parties more generally). Their privileged and prominent position in domestic public spheres means their words are likely to be influential, and their position as elected representatives confers their speech with a certain democratic legitimacy that is unavailable to most contributors to the public sphere.

Home style therefore matters. It matters because elites cue public opinion towards integration, and because governments and the mainstream parties that form them are amongst the most influential cue-givers in domestic public spheres. It matters because home style is central to the representation offered to citizens in EU policymaking. And it matters because home style is central to the legitimation and legitimacy of the European project. In the following section I show how major EU scholars have contemplated the question of home style and that their conclusions largely mirror the concerns articulated in the Eurocrat's complaint.

### 1.2.3 Europeanist and Nationalist Home Styles

While the term 'home style' is currently absent from the EU literature, the concept itself has been contemplated by some of the most important scholars of European integration. Let us begin with neofunctionalists. Whilst Ernst Haas (1958) defended an elite perspective on European integration, later neofunctionalists had the profound insight that international integration as a purely elite-driven project was a temporary state of affairs (Hooghe and Marks 2009). As functionalist pressures meant more and more issues shifted to the European level, this would eventually lead the mass public to engage with European integration (see also Zurn 2014). Rather than acting as a constraint on elites, this would in fact speed up the process of integration, as citizens would eventually transfer their allegiances from the national level to the European one, and increasingly direct popular pressures for welfare to the international stage. In a much quoted article in *International Organization*, Schmitter (1969) hypothesised that the politicization of international cooperation would lead not to a constraining dissensus but to "a shift in actor expectations and loyalty toward the new regional center" (1969, p.166).

According to this view, far from being punished for presenting integration clearly and defending it in public, governments and parties would therefore benefit from adopting what we might call a *Europeanist* home style. As domestic interest groups and electorates support the further pooling of sovereignty, national governments and mainstream parties do not need

to mask their pro-integration preferences and in fact benefit electorally from showing what they have done (or would do) to pursue further integration on the international stage.

In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists argued that governments use the communication of international cooperation opportunistically, as a way to redistribute power resources in their favour (Moravcsik 1994). Specifically, they argue that international cooperation creates domestic informational asymmetries which executives can use to manipulate domestic public opinion. By shifting domestic perceptions about the technical and political constraints under which states act, executives shift domestic expectations about responsibility for and alternatives to government policy. The practice of blaming unpopular policies on international constraints is common (see Putnam 1988; Cruz and Schneider 2017; Menon 2008) and Moravcsik's conclusion in a 1994 presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) is reminiscent of the Eurocrat's complaint quoted in this chapter's introduction:

“EC executives have grown adept at claiming credit and shifting blame. Former national representatives testify that majority voting in the Council of Ministers serves a useful political function by permitting executives to scapegoat their foreign counterparts by being ‘outvoted’ on certain issues. Supranational officials offer an even more inviting scapegoat. When things go badly, a technocratic Commission receives the blame; when things go well, national leaders claim the credit.” (Moravcsik 1994, 23)

The instincts of liberal intergovernmentalists on the presentational opportunities offered by EU integration would later be formalised in the blame avoidance literature (see Weaver 1984, Hood 2004; Hood et al. 2009, 2011). This literature argues that given the desire by the media, the public, and politicians to find scapegoats, executives exhibit a ‘negativity bias’ and focus on avoiding blame at all costs. To do so they employ both operational strategies that delegate authority to non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs), and presentational strategies that shift responsibility onto these NMIs for negative policy outcomes (Hood 2006). Hood makes the compelling case that the EU's multilevel polity facilitates this behaviour, by blurring competencies and creating a regulatory regime of such complexity that anyone who is not thoroughly steeped in such matters will struggle to identify who is responsible when adverse events occur. Shifting blame towards the EU's supranational institutions is therefore an appealing strategy for reelection seeking executives whose main objective is less about claiming credit when things go right, than about avoiding responsibility when things go wrong.

Unsurprisingly, discursive institutionalists have also paid close attention to the home style of national governments. In her seminal ‘Democracy in Europe’ (2005), Schmidt

recognises the central communicative role of governments in the legitimation of Europe's new multilevel polity. However, rather than adopting Europeanist home styles which engage citizens in a meaningful discourse on how Europeanization alters democracy within the nation state, Schmidt argues that executives have largely avoided the issue because of short-term political costs. She concludes that rather than a democratic deficit at the *European* level, EU integration has led to a democratic deficit at the *national* level precisely because governments have adopted evasive home styles that fail to legitimize Europe's new multilevel polity in the eyes of its citizens:

“The democratic deficit thus results not so much because national governance practices have changed as because national leaders have bungled their *communicative* role. So far they have failed to generate ideas and *discourse* that engage national publics in deliberations about the EU-related changes to national democracies. Nor have they generated the ideas and *discourse* that would enable each member-state to fashion its own new, distinct ‘democratic compromise’ to legitimize the new realities of its more Europeanized polity.” (Schmidt 2006, 5, emphasis added)

Finally, scholars of party competition have also made the case that mainstream parties are highly incentivised to avoid the issue of European integration in their public communication (De Vries and Hobolt 2020). Because their success is built on the left-right axis of political competition, and because European integration cannot easily be integrated into this dimension of political conflict, mainstream parties (and thus executives) will seek to lower its salience by blurring their position or downplaying the issue's importance.

This combination of *opportunism*, as outlined by liberal intergovernmentalists and the blame avoidance literature, and *evasiveness*, as outlined by discursive institutionalists and scholars of party competition, is what we might call a *nationalist* home style. Table 1.2 summarises the two home styles described in this section. While the Europeanist home style emphasises a clear unambiguous defence of integration, governments and mainstream parties who adopt a nationalist home style contribute to the delegitimation of the EU by failing to engage citizens in a meaningful discourse on Europe, and by using the EU's supranational institutions as scapegoats to avoid responsibility for negative outcomes.

Table 1.2: Europeanist and Nationalist Home Styles in the European Union

<i>Home Style</i>	<b>Europeanist</b>	<b>Nationalist</b>
<i>Evasiveness</i>	<b>Low:</b> government communicates frequently on EU integration with clear, unambiguous, and positive cues.	<b>High:</b> government does not engage its citizenry in a meaningful discourse on European integration.
<i>Opportunism</i>	<b>Low:</b> government rarely blames the EU and frequently shares credit with the EU and its institutions for salient policy issues.	<b>High:</b> government does not share credit for collective policies and shifts blame onto the EU and its supranational institutions.
<i>Effect on EU Legitimacy</i>	<b>Legitimation</b>	<b>Delegitimation</b>

Scholars of European integration, then, have undeniably been interested in the concept of home style despite not using the term directly. Their conclusions also largely mirror the concerns articulated in the Eurocrat’s Complaint: governments are incentivised to adopt nationalist home styles that damage the legitimacy of the EU and contribute to rising Euroscepticism. In the following section, I show that despite the widespread popularity of this view, empirical evidence on how governments present Europe at home is limited to a small number of qualitative studies. I then show that this empirical neglect is not as justified as it once was, as advances in automated text analysis and machine translation have significantly lowered barriers to the comparative, quantitative study of home style.

#### 1.2.4 The Empirical Neglect of Home Style

Despite the conviction amongst EU scholars and policymakers that governments adopt evasive, opportunistic home styles, empirical work that investigates what governments and parties *directly* say about Europe is surprisingly limited. Some scholars have explored blame-shifting during the economic crisis by hand coding speeches, and find that governments rarely shift blame onto the EU, instead employing other blame avoidance strategies, in particular historical blame-shifting that places responsibility at the hands of previous governments (Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Ladi and Tsagkroni 2019). Other researchers also use

hand coding and find evidence of blame shifting towards the EU by national governments (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020; Heinkelmann-Wild and Zangl, 2020). This research focuses on a small number of member states, on specific policy areas and proposals, and includes only brief investigation periods that allow for little variation in the independent variables that may affect the home styles adopted by national governments<sup>3</sup>.

The relatively small samples included in these studies are perhaps unsurprising when we consider how time consuming the ‘gold standard’ of human handcoding can be (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Scholars have therefore made use of advances in automated text analysis to investigate the language used by national leaders in association with the EU. This research makes important contributions to our understanding of executive communication of European integration, but is limited as evidence of the adoption of nationalist home styles. Whilst they show how leaders use more complex and negative language about the EU during crises (Rauh et al., 2020, Traber et al., 2019), it is highly debatable whether negative language equates to blame-shifting.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, by failing to measure the salience of European integration in governments’ communication, this research also fails to address the central accusation of evasiveness levelled at national governments.

Finally, scholars have also used discourse analysis to explore how Europe is presented and framed in domestic public spheres (see Sternberg 2013, 2014 Schmidt 2005, Howarth 2004). Yet this work also makes it difficult to draw inferences about the home style of national governments. Discursive institutionalists in particular draw on a dynamic conceptualization of ‘discourse’, which emerges from the interaction and debates between political actors. These actors of course include national leaders and governments, but also party activists, media pundits, community leaders, social activists, public intellectuals, experts, think-tanks, organised interests and social movements, amongst others (Habermas 1989, Schmidt 2008). This can make it difficult to distinguish discourse on the EU that comes directly from governments (home style) from the discourse that comes from other elites that are not in government. Overall, we can conclude that the empirical neglect highlighted by Hobolt and Tilley in *Blaming Europe* (2014), still holds true today.

“There is currently little work that examines, theoretically or *empirically*, how the EU institutions facilitate blame avoidance. While it is generally assumed

---

<sup>3</sup>The research of Heinkelmann et al. for example focuses largely on migration in Germany and Austria; Ladi and Tsagkroni (2019) focus exclusively on bailouts in Greece; Hobolt and Tilley’s conclusions are based on 211 statements that refer to the financial crisis by heads of government in the UK, Ireland, and Germany.

<sup>4</sup>Consider the statement: ‘The EU is going through difficult, turbulent, and uncertain times’. According to the methodology employed by Traber et al. this would qualify as blame shifting due to the proximity of negative words to the token ‘EU’. Yet the statement does not attribute responsibility for this negative situation to the EU or its institutions.

that the EU facilitates blame-shifting by politicians, we have very little *evidence* of how national governments actually behave.” (Hobolt and Tilley 2014, 5, emphasis added)

The EU literature is yet to offer a systematic, quantitative, comparative study of how national governments and mainstream parties present Europe in their domestic public spheres. This neglect is in many ways unsurprising given the large resources required to conduct comparative studies of political communication across countries. In the following section, I show how progress in computational methods in the social sciences - particularly the advances in machine translation - means these barriers are not as insurmountable as they once were and allow me to develop original datasets of elite communication to study home style, and the domestic presentation of European integration more generally.

## 1.3 Original Data to Study Home Style

### 1.3.1 Overcoming Obstacles

The comparative study of home style is made challenging by a number of obstacles. First, and most obviously, the difficulties in collecting data. While governments frequently publish their communication such as speeches, press conferences, and press releases, they also archive these materials and most official websites delete the speeches of outgoing premiers or presidents, leaving only communication from incumbents (Schumacher et al 2016). However, ingenious ‘hacks’ such as the Wayback machine, web scraping, and platforms that distribute tasks across workers allow researchers to overcome these difficulties and create machine readable datasets of communication by national executives and legislatures in Europe (see in particular Rauh and Schwalbach 2020; Schumacher et al 2016; Merz et al 2016; Martini and Walter 2020; De Bruyker 2017).

Second, researchers now have a wide range of sophisticated automated text analysis methods at our disposal that make possible the previously impossible in political science: they allow us to systematically analyse large-scale text collections without massive funding support (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). The usefulness of techniques such as dictionary methods, supervised methods, unsupervised algorithms and scaling is evident from their widespread adoption in political science. Automated text analysis has been employed to capture, amongst other things, the tone, simplicity, emotiveness, familiarity, sentiment, substantive topics and sophistication in communication by political elites (see e.g. Rauh 2016, 2021; Spirling 2016; Schumacher et al. 2016; Bischof 2018; Benoit et al 2019; Kosmidis et al 2019; Lin and Osnabrügge 2018). This thesis will make use of these wide range of



methods to draw inferences about the home styles of national governments and the domestic presentation of European integration.

Third, arguably the largest barrier to the comparative study of home style is the diversity of languages spoken on the continent. Following successive rounds of enlargement, the EU now has three alphabets and 24 official languages, with 60 other languages currently spoken in particular regions or by specific groups (European Commission 2020). In order to make comparisons across countries, researchers first need to translate texts into one language. The costs of doing so are often eye-wateringly expensive. The EU institutions, for example, translate documents at great expense, with an army of around 4,300 translators and 800 interpreters on its permanent staff (CdT 2017). The costs of translation for the European Parliament alone is estimated at over 12 million euros. It goes without saying that these budgets are out of reach for most academic institutions, let alone individual PhD students.

However, advances in machine translation may provide a solution, as social scientists validate the use of automated translation tools for the comparative study of political communication. De Vries, Schoonvelde and Schumacher (2018) use the europarl data, a set of documents that consists of the proceedings of the European Parliament, to evaluate the quality of machine translation compared to the ‘gold standard’ professional human translation of identical documents. Their results confirm that Google Translate is a useful tool for researchers using bag-of-words text models for comparative questions. By providing researchers with the ability to translate the communication of multiple governments in different countries into one single language, this freely available tool therefore allows us to overcome the ultimate hurdle in researching home style.

In sum, the three barriers that once made the comparative study of home style difficult, if not impossible, are not as insurmountable as they once were. Scholars now have access to a wide range of machine readable datasets on communication by national governments. They can use a wide range of automated text analysis tools to evaluate the complexity, sentiment, emotion, and substantive topics in this communication. And crucially, automated translation of political speech is a valid way for them to provide cross-national comparisons of how national governments cue their citizens on a variety of issues, including European integration. These developments allow me to develop two original datasets of elite communication that are the cornerstone of my research.

### **1.3.2 Two Original Datasets : EUCOSpeech and EUParlspeech**

This thesis takes advantage of the advances described in the section above to create two original datasets to study home style and the domestic presentation of EU integration more generally. The first is *EUCOSpeech*, a dataset of speeches by national leaders in press

conferences after European Council (EUCO) summits. There a number of reasons why this data provides a particularly satisfactory way to study home style. First, by controlling for the substance of the message, the data allows me to conduct a genuine comparison of presentational *style*. The EUCO conclusions are agreed by all member states and a written record of what was discussed and agreed is made publicly available (Alexandrova 2014). It therefore provides a significant constraint for *what* national leaders can present, while allowing them leeway on *how* they present it. Second, EUCO summits are amongst the most high profile events of European integration widely covered by national media, which means the cues sent by governments at these summits are particularly likely to reach citizens. Altogether, EUCOSpeech provides an ideal way to ‘compare what national politicians say in a similar situation in response to similar events’ (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, p.108)

The second original dataset is *EUParlspeech*, a dataset of over 1 million references to EU integration made in parliamentary speeches between 1989 and 2019. The EU references are windows of three sentences in which the speaker makes a direct reference to the EU, its politics and/or policies. The data is created using machine readable transcripts of parliamentary debates and validated dictionaries of EU-level terms (Rauh et al. 2019; Konstantina 2018; Rauh and De Wilde 2014). Put simply, the method recognises key EU level terms such ‘European Union’, ‘European Commission’, or ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ and extracts a three-sentence window around these markers. These text windows therefore capture all instances in which any speaker in national parliaments makes an explicit reference to the process of European integration. Parliaments are a key arena of political contestation for national governments, one where opposition parties attempt to hold them to account, and therefore provide another ideal communication venue for the comparative study of home style. *EUParlspeech* also covers an investigation period of thirty years, allowing us to analyse longitudinal changes in home style and in how national parties frame and present European integration domestically.

To allow for cross-national comparisons, the data are available both in the speaker’s native language and translated into English using Google Translate. The data includes seven member states in the case of EUCOSpeech, and ten in the case of *EUParlspeech*, covering important structural divisions within the European Union. These datasets are the cornerstone of my research and the third chapter in this thesis, a research note, provides a detailed methodology on the construction of *EUParlspeech* as well as demonstrating the data’s face, convergent, and predictive validity. Table 1.3 provides a summary of EUCOSpeech and *EUParlspeech*. The example statements highlight the quality of the automated translation into English, giving researchers coherent, fully interpretable statements on the EU by national leaders and politicians.

Table 1.3: Summary of EUCOSpeech and EUParlspeech

<i>Dataset</i>	<b>EUCOSpeech</b>	<b>EUParlspeech</b>
<i>Venue</i>	Press Conferences after EU summits	Debates in National Parliaments
<i>Period</i>	2005 - 2018	1989 - 2019
<i>Member States</i>	7 member states	10 member states
<i>Speakers</i>	Heads of Government	Heads of Government, Ministers in Government, Members of Parliament
<i>Language</i>	Original language and English (machine translation)	Original language and English (machine translation)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	6,027 statements (paragraphs)	1 million + EU references
<i>Example</i>	<p>“In relation to youth employment - another very important point for us - concrete measures were also adopted. The six billion euros dedicated to the Youth Employment Initiative will be disbursed in 2014 and 2015. This initiative, as you know, was agreed in February and was a proposal of the Spanish government. For Spain this means receiving almost two billion Euros.”</p> <p>(M.Rajoy, ES, 2013/06)</p>	<p>“Why would we want to veto this treaty? It provides the means for a more effective working of the EU. Let us be clear about this: my hon. Friend and some Opposition Members, would call for a referendum even if we added a comma to the constitutional treaty, because what they really want is to take us out of Europe, and they might as well be honest about it.”</p> <p>(T.Blair, UK, 2007/06)</p>

## 1.4 Evasive and Opportunistic?

National governments, then, are accused by both EU policymakers and scholars of adopting nationalist home styles in which they are evasive and opportunistic in their presentation of European integration. In this thesis, I will use the original datasets described in the previous section to show that this widely held view is based on a simplistic reading of the incentives of national governments and mainstream parties and does not hold up to empirical scrutiny.

The alternative theoretical argument I present draws on a number of literatures but starts from the premise that governments are *office seeking* (Downs 1957, Mayhew 1974): their principal goal is to secure reelection<sup>5</sup>. It can broadly be summarised in the following five statements: (1) Governments' main goal is reelection: they therefore adopt the home style that offers the highest electoral return. (2) Far from being a costless rhetorical strategy, adopting a nationalist home style imposes a series of costs which make it a risky choice for national governments. (3) With the politicization of European integration, governments (and mainstream parties more generally) therefore face a *rhetorical dilemma*: on the one hand, the need to signal responsiveness to more sceptical and interested domestic audiences; on the other the reluctance to take clear positions on EU integration and to explicitly criticise the EU. (4) Governments solve this rhetorical dilemma by adopting a home style I label 'technocratic-patriotic'. *Technocratic*, in the sense that governments actually talk frequently about the EU, but avoid clear position taking on the issue by defusing it with complex language. *Patriotic*, in the sense that governments extensively claim credit for defending the national interest on the European stage, but in fact rarely blame or criticise the EU directly. (5) The effect of this 'technocratic-patriotic' home style on the legitimacy of the EU is unclear: whilst the EU is rarely criticised by governments and mainstream parties directly, the lack of clarity in their cues and their tendency to claim credit for policies of collective responsibility is problematic for democratic accountability in Europe's multilevel system of governance.

### 1.4.1 The Costs of a Nationalist Home Style

The nationalist home style, where governments are evasive and opportunistic in their presentation of EU integration, is often presented as a costless rhetorical strategy (see Section 2.3). I argue instead that it imposes a series of costs which makes it a risky choice for national governments. Crucially, adopting it risks damaging their *competence*, which is central to their prospects for reelection (see e.g. Green and Jennings 2017). First, gov-

---

<sup>5</sup>Governments of course have other other objectives: they want to implement certain policies for example. Yet gaining reelection has primacy in the sense that it precedes these other objectives: it is the first objective that must be satisfied in order to achieve these other related goals.

ernments will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to completely evade the issue of EU integration. As governments are expected to deliver solutions to a huge number of policy problems facing modern societies, they find it difficult to ignore issues that have emerged on the political agenda and risk seeming unresponsive and incompetent if they do (see Green Pedersen 2015). The logic behind this argument is intuitive: imagine a government that stays silent about what it hopes to achieve and what it has achieved in the multiple EU summits that take place every year. This government would be accused of being laughably out of touch given the centrality of EU policymaking to salient issues such as the economy, migration, and climate change (Zurn 2014). Governments therefore talk about European integration, not because they particularly want to, but because they *have to* given how central EU policymaking has become in their own domestic politics.<sup>6</sup> (Hix, 2011)

Beyond evasiveness, shifting blame on to the EU also damages a government's reputation and credibility with the EU and other member states, which may damage their ability to achieve their goals in international negotiations, and therefore the impression of competence they attempt to convey. Indeed, scholars have modeled international agreements as a series of repeated games in which players have to take into account the impact of their current action on the future actions of other players (Putnam, 1988; Barrett, 1992; Finus and Rundhsagen, 1998). Governments in the EU are thus incentivized to build and maintain their reputation with other member states and scholars have shown how reluctant governments are to antagonize their fellow member states - for instance, opposition votes in the Council are very rare (Hagemann et al., 2017). Explicit criticism of the EU may thus be undesirable because it is costly to their reputation - and thus their ability to achieve their goals in future negotiations (Alexandrova et al., 2012). Blame shifting is also difficult to do credibly given national governments' position at the heart of the EU through their seat in the Council (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014. McGraw and Dolan, 2007).

Even if we exclude costs to competence and focus exclusively on position taking, nationalist home styles are also unlikely to offer particularly high electoral returns. This is because, for the mainstream parties that tend to form governments, 'Brussels-bashing' is likely to antagonize as many domestic audiences as it pleases. In shifting blame towards the EU, national leaders signal congruence with their country's growing sceptical constituency but also alienate the substantial chunk of their electorate that is supportive of integration. Public opinion data shows that while skepticism towards EU integration has grown, it remains a minority position in the majority of EU countries . A more accurate description is one of polarization. This is important because research in other multilevel systems shows

---

<sup>6</sup>Whilst this is true of mainstream parties generally (given that competence is central to their electoral appeal), this constraint is not as prevalent for opposition parties, who are less constrained by the party system agenda and are freer to emphasise the issues they would like. See Chapter 4 for further details

that state senators representing divided constituencies tend to avoid clear position taking because it offers limited electoral returns (Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012). For mainstream parties on the right and the left, European integration constitutes a wedge issue that cuts across the dimension of political conflict where they are dominant, and scholars have shown that these mainstream parties therefore aim to avoid taking clear positions on the issue (Hobolt and De Vries, 2020). The nationalist home style, as a clear form of Eurosceptic position taking, is thus unlikely to offer high electoral returns for governments and mainstream parties with domestic audiences that are divided on the issue of the EU.


To be clear, I am not saying that governments will *never* adopt a nationalist home style and *never* offer explicit criticism of the EU. Certain mismanagements or scandals by EU institutions may be impossible to defend, and - hypothetically - domestic electorates may be so negatively disposed towards the EU to make blame shifting a desirable choice. What I am saying is that the nationalist home style, rather than being a rhetorical strategy used constantly by governments to shift responsibility for negative outcomes, is in fact largely a rhetorical strategy of last resort that governments and mainstream parties will use in exceptional circumstances only.

#### 1.4.2 Governments' Rhetorical Dilemma

The nationalist home style therefore imposes a series of costs which make it a risky choice for national governments and the mainstream parties that form them. Evading the issue of EU integration completely is almost impossible for a party who wishes to appear competent; and opportunistically blaming the EU for problems is likely to antagonise other member states and a large chunk of their electorate. In the era of the permissive consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) the solution was clear: governments could simply adopt Europeanist home styles which reflected their citizens' broadly supportive views on integration. However, the politicization of European integration places national governments and mainstream parties in a difficult situation when presenting Europe at home.

The politicization of European integration is subject to a rich literature (see for example Kriesi 2007, Zurn et al 2012, Borzel and Riise 2018). Despite disagreement on its root causes, there is a clear convergence on its empirical components (De Wilde et al. 2016; Rauh 2016: Chapter 2). EU politicization brings together the increased salience and visibility of integration in public debates, the polarization of public opinions on the EU, and the increased mobilization on the issue by political actors - particularly parties. Figure 1.2 illustrates this threefold conceptualisation and shows how European integration has been politicized particularly since the Maastricht Treaty, which placed a range of salient policy issues under the control of the EU's supranational institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

Figure 1.2: The Politicization of European Integration



A growing literature investigates the consequences of this politicization for policymaking in the EU. Most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, a growing literature argues persuasively that EU politicization incentivises governments to signal *responsiveness* on the European stage, as domestic audiences are paying increasing attention to what goes on in EU policymaking. Scholars have shown how national governments in IOs signal responsiveness to domestic audiences through their voting behaviour (Hagemann et al., 2017; Muhlbock and Tosun, 2018), their use of formal policy statements (Wrátil, 2018), and the positions taken in negotiations with international partners (Schneider, 2018; Schneider and Slantchev, 2018).

Instinctively, one might think that governments would respond to EU politicization by adopting nationalist home styles that are more critical of the EU in their communication. After all, not only does this rhetorical strategy signal congruence with increasingly sceptical domestic audiences, it also offers a useful scapegoat to avoid responsibility for negative outcomes, particularly in times of crisis. However, as I argue in the section above, this nationalist home style remains a risky choice for governments. At the domestic level, it is still the case that a significant part of the electorate remains supportive of integration. At the international level, elites are still likely to look unkindly onto attempts to shift the blame onto them, and it is still the case that ‘Brussels bashing’ may damage their ability

to achieve their goals in subsequent negotiations.

This difficult balancing act is what I call the *rhetorical dilemma of home style*. On the one hand, increased public discontent towards integration and the successful mobilisation of this discontent by challenger parties (see De Vries et al 2020) makes it difficult for governments and mainstream parties to adopt purely Europeanist home styles that uncritically laud the EU at home. On the other, adopting nationalist home styles remains a risky strategy, particularly for governments formed by mainstream parties that have many pro-European voters, and are likely to be involved in negotiations with EU partners for many years to come.<sup>7</sup>

*Concept Definition: The Rhetorical Dilemma of Home Style*

EU politicization incentivises governments to signal responsiveness to more sceptical domestic audiences; yet governments and mainstream parties are reluctant to adopt nationalist home styles that are explicit in their criticism of the EU.

The rhetorical dilemma of home style means governments and mainstream parties are reluctant to adopt either Europeanist home styles, which make them seem unresponsive, or nationalist home styles, which are still likely to antagonise a wide range of international partners and domestic audiences. In the following section, I argue that governments solve this dilemma by adopting what I call a *technocratic-patriotic* home style.

### 1.4.3 Solving the Dilemma: The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style

The rhetorical dilemma of home style has two parts. First, governments and mainstream parties would prefer to avoid the issue of EU integration but find it impossible to ignore. Second, governments and mainstream parties must signal responsiveness to more sceptical domestic audiences but are reluctant to blame the EU and antagonise international partners and pro-European voters. Adopting what I call the ‘technocratic-patriotic’ home style helps them solve both parts of this dilemma.

First, national governments and mainstream parties facing domestic EU politicization want to avoid clear position taking on the issue of integration, but find it risky to ignore the issue altogether as it risks damaging their competence and/or making them seem unresponsive (see Green-Pedersen and section 1.4.1 above). Is there a solution to this problem?

---

<sup>7</sup>In the thesis’ conclusion, I consider whether this argument is generalisable to the small number of non-mainstream parties who have formed governments in the EU.



I argue that as much as possible, governments and mainstream parties will aim to avoid clear position taking on Europe by defusing the issue with complex technocratic language. Indeed, whilst the avoidance literature often equates issue avoidance with simply ignoring an issue (see Rovny 2012), scholars of party competition have also shown how politicians can obfuscate their positions by changing the *substance* of their communication. The simplicity and complexity of language used by politicians can influence voters' perceptions of their positions, and voters particularly struggle to place the positions of politicians whose language is more complex (Bischof and Seninger 2019). Language complexity is therefore a tool that governments and parties can use strategically to obfuscate their position and I argue that governments and mainstream parties are particularly likely to use this tool to defuse the issue of European integration with technocratic, scientific or managerial language (Rauh et al 2020).

This defusion strategy is particularly appealing to governments, as they are sensitive to their reputation for competence and welcome opportunities to demonstrate it on a variety of issues (Green and Jennings 2012, 2017). A large literature shows how public evaluations of government performance impact vote choice (Hellwig, 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007) and strong asymmetries in information mean voters update their performance evaluations more for incumbents than for opposition parties (Fiorina 1977, 1981, Butt 2006; Green and Jennings 2012; Green and Jennings 2018). The ability to frame issues as ones of managerial, technocratic competence is therefore likely to appeal to parties in government. By framing European integration as an issue as one that is principally about capable management, they can reap the electoral benefits that come with a reputation for competence whilst avoiding clear position taking on the issue itself.

Second, national governments facing domestic EU politicization need to signal responsiveness to more sceptical domestic au but are reluctant to explicitly criticise the EU. How do governments solve this part of the dilemma? I argue that they do so by focusing on *credit claiming* in their communication of European integration: showing what they have achieved for their country on the European stage, without articulating clear positions on European integration either way. Credit claiming is particularly relevant in the context of the EU, because research in other multilevel systems shows how this communication strategy is favoured by representatives of polarized constituencies, for whom articulating clear positions is risky (Grimmer et al., 2012; Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b). As Figure 1.2 has shown, polarization is an accurate description of views on European integration, with both an electorate and a party system that is often bitterly divided on the issue. Credit claiming is therefore an appealing way for governments to present themselves as effective representatives in the EU without articulating a clear pro or anti positions on European integration.

Table 1.4: The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style

<i>Home Style</i>	<b>Technocratic-Patriotic</b>
<i>Evasiveness</i>	Government communicates frequently on EU integration but avoids clear position taking by defusing the issue.
<i>Opportunism</i>	Government claims credit for collective policies but is reluctant to criticise or blame the EU directly.
<i>Effect on EU Legitimacy</i>	Government does not delegitimize the EU directly but sends obfuscating cues on integration.

Table 1.4 summarises what I call the *technocratic-patriotic* home style. Its name draws on a conception of technocracy as a managerial style of politics where issues are depoliticised and deliberately placed outside the realm of political contestation (see Hood, 2002, 2016; Wood and Flinders, 2014). It also draws on a conception of patriotism in which one's nation is put first, but distinguishes itself from nationalism by not being antagonistic towards other nations and supranational institutions (Bar-Tal, 1997; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989, Li and Brewer 2004). The technocratic-patriotic home style is not completely evasive: governments that adopt it are likely to talk frequently about European integration (although their cues are complex and often unclear). Nor is it completely opportunistic: governments that adopt it rarely, if ever shift blame onto the EU (although neither do they share credit with the EU for salient policy issues). The effect of this technocratic-patriotic home style on the legitimacy of the EU is unclear: the EU is not delegitimised directly by criticism from governments but the failure to credit the EU for salient issues it is responsible for and the lack of clarity in governments' and mainstream parties' EU cues is likely, at the very least, to harm democratic *accountability* in Europe's complex, multilevel system of governance. In the final section of this introduction, I explain how this thesis tests the observable implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style and provide a summary of the thesis' chapters.

## 1.5 Structure and Contributions

### 1.5.1 A Theory of Home Style

The central contribution of this thesis is to challenge conventional wisdom about how governments present European integration in their domestic public spheres. In doing so, it provides a novel theoretical account of why governments and mainstream parties present Europe as they do, one that is grounded in existing literatures from international relations and party competition. The argument builds on Putnam's idea of two level games (1988) and shows how governments manage a careful balancing act between signalling responsiveness at the national level and maintaining trust and credibility with international partners at the European level. This balancing act also exists domestically as mainstream parties increasingly face voters that are polarized on the EU issue, with one section which is sceptical of integration, but an equally important section that remain supportive of the EU and international cooperation. This *rhetorical dilemma of home style* is not only an important concept to understand why governments - and the mainstream parties that form them - present Europe as they do, but also applies when presenting international cooperation more broadly<sup>8</sup>.

The thesis also builds on the growing literature on the consequences of EU politicization (see Zurn 2014, 2016, Rauh 2015, 2019; Hagemann et al 2017; Schneider 2019). While scholars has explored how politicization changes governments' behaviour on the European stage, there has been less emphasis about how politicization changes what governments say about Europe in their domestic public spheres. This thesis demonstrates clearly how domestic EU politicization affects governments' communication of European integration, with governments adopting more patriotic home styles in their domestic public spheres when domestic EU politicization is high. By contrast, governments facing low domestic EU politicization are more comfortable adopting Europeanist home styles.

More generally, the thesis contributes to debates on the legitimacy of European integration. The legitimation of EU integration is both an institutional and a discursive process, and national governments play a key role in legitimising and delegitimising systems of authority due to their prominent positions in domestic public spheres. While governments and mainstream parties do not delegitimize the EU directly, the lack of clarity in their cues and their reluctance to credit the EU for issues their citizens care about are likely, at the very least, to damage democratic accountability in the EU, as accountability in multilevel systems depends on citizens being able to clearly and correctly allocate responsibility across

---

<sup>8</sup>At least for IOs that are politicized. The conclusion discusses the generalizability of home style in further detail.

multiple levels of government.

Finally, the thesis contributes useful resources to the academic community in the form of massive, openly accessible datasets of EU communication by political elites. The use of EUCOSpeech (over 6000 observations from seven member states) and in particular of EUParlspeech (over 1 million observations from ten member states) is not limited to the study of home style. Scholars of EU integration, party competition, political communication, international relations, and general text as data scholars are likely to find alternative uses for these rich resources,

### 1.5.2 Three Articles and a Research Note

The thesis consists of three articles and a research note that explore the evasiveness and opportunism of national governments in their presentation of European integration. Chapter 2 explores the *opportunism* of governments' home style. I use handcoding of over 6,000 statements in EUCOSpeech to capture credit and blame in national leaders' presentation of EU summits back to domestic audiences. The paper shows how despite increased domestic EU politicization, governments very rarely explicitly blame the EU and/or other member states and instead respond to EU politicization by increasing their use of credit claiming. The paper also outlines the central role of issue salience in the likelihood of national leaders sharing or claiming credit. National leaders are more likely to share to credit with the EU for issues their citizens care little about, and claim credit for issues that are electorally salient.

Chapter 3 is a research note that provides details on the construction of the EUParlspeech data - the empirical basis of subsequent chapters - and demonstrates its face, convergent, and predictive validity. Automated analysis of EU statements yield meaningful and well-known cross party differences, with challenger parties more likely to send clear cues on integration than mainstream parties. Moreover, these automated measures correlate highly with expert assessments (CHES) and - in the case of the UK's Conservative Party - individual MPs' ideal point estimates based on EU statements in plenary debates can predict their subsequent vote and campaign position at the 2016 referendum.

Chapter 4 uses the EUParlspeech data to explore the *evasiveness* of governments' home style. I use a variety of automated text analysis tools to analyse over 70,000 statements on the EU by party leaders between 1989 and 2019. The paper shows first how mainstream parties - and in particular governing mainstream parties - consistently use more complex, less emotive language than challenger parties when discussing the EU. Furthermore, their EU communication is consistently more complex than the rest of their parliamentary communication. The paper also shows how governments in particular find it difficult to ignore

the issue of EU integration, and are therefore particularly likely to employ an alternative strategy of avoidance that defuses the issue with complex, technocratic language.

Chapter 5 explores whether disintegration episodes such as Brexit change the home style of the mainstream parties that tend to form governments. I use a combination of automated and hand coded text analysis methods to identify and analyse over 2,000 Brexit statements made in parliamentary debates in six member states. I show that mainstream parties do indeed adopt more Europeanist home styles in the wake of Brexit and that disintegration episodes - if they are salient and appear negative for the departing state - reverse the dynamics of party competition on the EU between mainstream and challenger parties. However, I also provide evidence that these scope conditions are unlikely to hold in the medium term as the salience of Brexit recedes and as the monumental impact of the COVID 19 crisis, combined with the bounded rationality of voters, obfuscates the negative economic impact of Brexit for the UK.

Chapter 6 considers the implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style for the legitimacy of the European project. I argue that the technocratic-patriotic home style fosters three mechanisms of EU delegitimation by i) damaging accountability in Europe's multilevel system of governance, ii) leaving the floor open to Eurosceptic challengers to frame the debate on Europe with clear, unambiguous cues, and iii) stymieing the development of a European identity. The chapter also considers external validity of the results and whether the concept of home style introduced in this thesis can travel to other international organizations.

Table 1.5 summarises the three articles and research note in thesis. As a final note, it is important to point out that the chapters in this thesis (bar the conclusion) have been developed as standalone articles and are therefore not explicitly framed around home style. They all however make important contributions to our understanding of the concept and, together, the results they present are consistent with the observable implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style. In my concluding remarks I summarise my argument and contribution, before revisiting the Eurocrat's Complaint with which I opened this thesis' introduction.

Table 1.5: Summary of Chapters

Chapter	Type	Key Findings	Original Evidence
2. Credit Claiming in International Organizations: Evidence from EU Council Summits	Research Article	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Heads of Government rarely explicitly blame the EU, even when they face severe EU politicization at home. Instead, they increase their use of credit claiming.</li> <li>- The EU does receive credit from governments, but for issues citizens care little about.</li> <li>Governments claim credit for issues that are electorally salient.</li> </ul>	Handcoding of credit and blame in EUCOSpeech
3. A New Dataset of Over 1 Million References to EU Integration in Parliamentary Speeches	Research Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EUParlspeech has high levels of face validity, convergent validity with expert data (CHES), and predictive validity.</li> </ul>	Automated text analysis in EUParlspeech
4. Ignore or Defuse? Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition	Research Article	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Leaders of mainstream parties actually talk frequently about the EU, particularly when they are in government</li> <li>- However they also send obfuscating cues on integration: their EU communication is consistently more complex and less emotive compared to their usual parliamentary communication</li> </ul>	Automated text analysis in EUParlspeech (party leaders)
5. Disintegration and Party Competition: Evidence from Parliamentary Speeches on Brexit	Research Article	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Exogenous shocks can lead to large changes in home style: politicians from mainstream parties outside the UK adopt more Europeanist home styles after the Brexit vote.</li> </ul>	Handcoding of Brexit statements from EUParlspeech

### 1.5.3 Concluding Remarks

This thesis offers the first comparative, quantitative study of home style in the European Union. It goes beyond the existing largely qualitative studies of how national governments and domestic parties present Europe by making use of the advances in text as data methods and machine translation to develop and analyse massive, original datasets of EU communication. The results presented across the three papers are consistent with the observable implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style: national governments actually talk frequently about European integration but avoid clear position taking by defusing the issue with complex technocratic language; and they rarely shift blame onto the EU directly, but are extensive credit claimers who are particularly reluctant to share credit for salient policy issues. The results also highlight domestic EU politicization as my central explanatory variable: the higher (lower) the levels of domestic EU politicization, the higher the likelihood that governments adopt patriotic (Europeanist) home styles.

The thesis naturally cannot provide answers regarding *all* aspects of home style in the EU. It also raises a host of questions for further research. Do these insights hold true for the small number of non-mainstream parties that enter and/or form governments? When and why might a government adopt a nationalist home style (if ever)? And are the results generalisable not simply to governments' and parties' presentation of European integration, but to their communication of international cooperation more widely? The thesis' conclusion offers some tentative answers to these questions, provides an integrative perspective on the results of the three papers, and discusses their contribution to the debate on the EU's crisis of legitimacy.

This introduction opened with the *Eurocrat's Complaint*, the concern that governments' evasive and opportunistic presentation of European integration contributes to rising Euro-scepticism. Throughout this thesis, I will show that this concern is *descriptively* largely incorrect and that the fears that governments adopt nationalist, openly critical home styles prove largely unfounded. Yet this isn't to say that the Eurocrat's Complaint is *inferentially* completely off the mark. Indeed, governments' reluctance to credit the EU for salient policy issues, as well as their rather ambivalent cues, may not delegitimise the EU directly - but they do leave the floor open for challenger parties to frame the debate on Europe with clear, unambiguous communication. The upcoming papers will show that governments' home style does not fit the stereotypical image of evasive blame shifters. Yet the technocratic-patriotic home style, through its ambiguous cues and opportunistic credit claiming, is still likely to pose problems for democratic accountability and legitimacy in Europe's complex and contested multilevel system of governance.

## Credit Claiming in International Organizations: Evidence from EU Council Summits

*Introduction – Credit and Blame in International Organizations*  
*Credit Claiming at International Summits - Research Design*  
*Results - Discussion - Conclusion*

**Abstract:** Governments in international organizations (IOs) are assumed to exploit uncertainty of responsibility by claiming credit and shifting blame, yet little is known about when and how they engage in these rhetorical strategies. This article draws on the example of the European Union (EU) to argue that domestic electoral incentives determine governments' presentation of IOs in their domestic public spheres. I use an original dataset of over 6,000 classified statements in speeches by heads of government presenting the outcomes of EU Summits to their national media and parliaments between 2005 and 2018, and find that governments are more likely to claim credit when international cooperation is politicized, and for issues that are salient to domestic audiences. Findings challenge the conventional view that IOs receive little recognition from politicians in domestic public spheres, and that governments frequently shift blame onto IOs. Rather, IOs are credited for policy issues citizens care little about, whereas governments claim credit for issues that are electorally salient. Findings have implications for citizens' attributions of responsibility in global systems of governance. The article also makes the case for placing the concept of *home style* at the heart of debates on accountability and legitimacy in IOs



## 2.1 Introduction

International institutions are assumed to facilitate national governments' attempts to claim credit and shift blame. The division of competencies across local, national, and international levels of governance make it difficult for citizens to attribute responsibility correctly, and a large literature argues that politicians exploit this uncertainty through the strategic use of communication (see Remmer, 1986; Vaubel, 2006; Moravcsik, 1994; Schmidt, 2006; Hood, 2010; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Schneider, 2018; Zürn et al, 2012). This behaviour is assumed to be pronounced in the world's most advanced international organization (IO), the European Union (EU), where policy areas involve overlapping responsibilities of the national and the EU level, and where the lack of a transnational public sphere places national governments in an ideal position to claim credit for policies agreed collectively. Overall, governments in IOs are presented as deeply opportunistic: they will frequently claim credit, rarely credit IOs directly, and frequently shift blame onto supranational institutions to avoid responsibility for negative outcomes (see Putnam, 1988; Cruz and Schneider, 2017; Menon, 2008; Rauh et al, 2020; De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter, 2021).

Yet despite the conviction with which this view is held, empirical evidence on the extent of credit claiming and blame shifting in international institutions is surprisingly limited. The contribution of this article is to focus on which actors are *attributed responsibility* for positive or negative outcomes on the international stage. This is important because there is good evidence that responsibility evaluations act as an important moderator of retrospective voting (Anderson, 2006; De Vries et al., 2011). Democratic accountability therefore depends on citizens' ability to correctly attribute responsibility across multiple levels of government.

To what extent, and under what conditions, do national governments claim credit for the work of IOs, and shift blame onto IOs to avoid responsibility themselves? In this article, I argue that variations in domestic electoral incentives determine governments' presentation of international institutions in their public spheres. My argument is as follows: the politicization of international institutions creates a *rhetorical dilemma* for national governments. On the one hand, politicization incentivizes them to signal responsiveness to a more sceptical electorate and party system. On the other, blame shifting and explicit criticism of IOs is costly: it antagonizes voters that are supportive of international cooperation, damages their reputation with international partners, and signals impotence on the international stage. I argue that national governments solve this rhetorical dilemma through the use of *credit claiming* – showing what they have achieved for their country without articulating clear positions on international cooperation either way. As citizens reward governments for 'bringing home the bacon' for issues they care about, governments are also more likely to claim credit for issues that matter most to their electorate.

I test these claims with an original dataset: heads of governments' presentation of European Council (EUCO) summits back to domestic audiences. I focus on the EU as it is considered the world's most advanced IO (Hagemann et al., 2017), one whose politicization is subject to a rich literature<sup>1</sup> (see Zürn 2016; Walter, 2021). After each EUCO summit, all twenty-seven EU member states collectively sign off on the EUCO's Conclusions, but then present them to their own national media, in their own language, and in their own way. Each statement in national leaders' speeches is classified for credit and blame by human hand coders. The result: a dataset of over 6,000 statements (paragraphs) from national leaders' presentation of EU summits classified for credit and blame. This original and targeted dataset allows me to conduct 'within-case' comparisons, in the sense that all leaders are presenting the same stimulus.

The findings demonstrate that executives respond to EU politicization at home by increasing the use of credit claiming in their communication, rather than criticizing and blaming the EU. They also challenge the conventional view that the EU receives little recognition from politicians in domestic public spheres. National governments frequently share credit with the EU, but do so for policy issues of low public salience, whereas governments are more likely to claim credit for issues that are electorally salient to their domestic voters.

The article makes three contributions to the literature on IOs and political communication. First, it challenges the view of national governments as opportunistic blame shifters. IO-bashing is in fact a costly rhetorical strategy, and governments are more likely to respond to the politicization of international cooperation by claiming credit rather than shifting blame. Second, it shows that despite not fitting this stereotypical image, strategic communication by national governments *does* threaten democratic accountability in IOs. Governments may not be blame shifters but they are strategic in their communication and reluctant to share credit with IOs for issues their citizens care most about, even when IOs have clear competence in this area. Finally, the article makes the case for placing the concept of *home style* (Fenno, 1978) at the heart of debates on the legitimacy of IOs. Public opinion on international cooperation depends to a significant degree on elite cueing, and while Fenno's initial conceptualization referred to how representatives present their work in national politics, home style is increasingly applicable to the way representatives (governments) present the work of international institutions back to domestic audiences. Scholars researching the behaviour of national governments in IOs have largely focused on what they *do* on the international stage. Of equal importance to accountability and representation in global systems of governance is what national governments *say* about this work in their own domestic public spheres.

---

<sup>1</sup>Importantly, IO politicization is not limited to the EU and scholars have shown that other IOs, including the IMF, the WTO, the WHO, and the World Bank have also been politicized (see Zürn 2014).

## 2.2 Credit and Blame in International Organizations

Credit claiming is one of the key activities incumbents engage in to increase their likelihood of reelection (see Mayhew, 1974). By generating the belief that they are personally responsible for a decision or policy deemed desirable, incumbents increase their standing amongst voters (Lipinski, 2001). A large literature on economic voting shows that governments are judged on their performance in office, and that governments therefore have high incentives to claim responsibility for positive developments in the economy (Anderson 2006; Green and Jennings 2017). While the effectiveness of credit claiming depends crucially on whether voters deem the message credible and legitimate (Dolan and Kropf, 2002; Grimmer et al., 2014), credit claiming is widely used by elected officials across political systems and cultures (Samuels, 2002; Giger and Nelson, 2011; Cruz and Schneider, 2017; Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2006).

Global systems of governance are assumed to facilitate these attempts to appropriate credit. The division of competencies across local, national, and international levels affects citizens' ability to allocate responsibility and therefore to reward or punish incumbents on the basis of past performance. Because voters' attribution of responsibility impacts their decision at the ballot box, national governments will seek to influence these attributions by claiming personal credit for positive outcomes and shifting blame for negative ones onto other levels of government (Hood, 2010; Weaver, 1986). Scholars have shown how governments in international institutions exploit foreign aid from IOs to gain reelection, and use ties to IOs to shift responsibility (Remmer, 1986; Vaubel, 2006; Schmidt, 2006, 2020; Cruz and Schneider, 2017, Alcaniz and Hellwig, 2011, Capelos and Wurzer, 2009). The lack of a transnational public spheres also means the debate about international cooperation take place in domestic public spheres, and is dominated by national rather than supranational politicians (Risse, 2015). The message presented to citizens about activity in IOs therefore comes not from supranational institutions, but from member state governments who are incentivized to frame it to their advantage. As Moravcsik (1994, p. 24), referring to the European Union, notes: 'when things go badly, a technocratic Commission receives the blame; when things go well, national leaders claim the credit.'

While this view is widely held amongst scholars of international cooperation, actual empirical evidence on the extent of credit claiming by governments in IOs is surprisingly limited. Hobolt and Tilley (2014) and Ladi and Tsagkroni (2019) explore blame shifting during the economic crisis by hand coding speeches, and find that governments rarely shift blame onto IOs, instead employing other blame avoidance strategies, in particular historical blame-shifting that places responsibility at the hands of previous governments. Others have found evidence of blame shifting (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020; Heinkelmann-Wild and

Zangl, 2020). Scholars have also used automated text analysis to show that language used by national leaders in association with IOs became more negative during crises (Rauh et al., 2020; Traber et al., 2019). This work provides rich insights into how executives respond rhetorically to crises, but does not tell us about the attribution of responsibility for positive or negative situations. It therefore does not allow us to make definitive conclusions about credit and blame in politicians' rhetoric.

In this article, I provide an alternative approach to identify credit and blame in international institutions: heads of governments' presentation of major international summits to their domestic audiences. I focus in particular on European Council (EU) summits. Several times a year, the heads of state of all twenty-seven member states meet to set the EU's political direction and priorities. These summits receive considerable media coverage, reflecting the institution's huge agenda setting power and determining role in shaping the future of the European project (Alexandrova et al., 2014; Schneider, 2018; Puetter, 2012). While the Council publishes its own conclusions after each summit, the role of presenting them to European citizens falls to Heads of State who report back to national media and parliaments on what has been achieved. This provides significant leeway to tailor their presentation to domestic audiences. These presentations of major international summits outcomes not only provide an almost ideal way to compare 'what national politicians say in a similar situation in response to similar events' (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, p.108), they also allow us to investigate which national leaders claim credit for outcomes decided and agreed on collectively by the member states of international institutions.

It is important to highlight that governments can use international institutions to claim credit in two distinct ways, and that the data collected for this article means our focus is limited to one of these strategies. National leaders can claim credit through *omission*: they can simply fail to mention international institutions for a positive outcome where these institutions played a key role, thereby implying sole responsibility. Schmidt (2006) for example states that 'national politicians take credit for [the EU's] popular policies often without mentioning the EU's role'. The focus of this article however is on how governments claim credit by cultivating an impression of *influence* (Grimmer et al., 2014): they showcase their ability to achieve policy outcomes on the international stage that benefit their member state. While these two strategies are distinct, the incentives that compel national leaders to claim credit through omission and through influence are the same: influencing voters' attributions of responsibility to gain reelection. In the following section, I develop a theoretical argument for explaining when and why national governments engage in credit claiming in international organizations.

## 2.3 Credit Claiming at International Summits

To what extent, and under what conditions, do national governments claim credit for the work of IOs, and shift blame onto IOs to avoid responsibility themselves? In this theoretical section, I present my argument. It goes as follows: (1) the politicization of international institutions incentivises governments to signal responsiveness in their rhetoric to more sceptical domestic audiences. (2) However, blame shifting and explicit criticism of IOs is costly: it antagonizes voters that are supportive of international cooperation, damages relationships with international partners, and signals impotence on the international stage. (3) This need to signal responsiveness to more sceptical domestic audiences, but reluctance to explicitly criticize and blame IOs creates a *rhetorical dilemma* for national governments. (4) Governments solve this rhetorical dilemma through the use of *credit claiming* – showing what they have achieved for their country without articulating clear positions on IOs either way. (5) As citizens reward governments for ‘bringing home the bacon’ for issues they care about, governments are also more likely to claim credit for issues that matter most to their electorate. Importantly this suggests that national executives have incentives to respond to the politicization of international institutions by claiming credit rather than shifting blame: ‘look what I have achieved for us’, not ‘look at what IOs are doing to us’.


### 2.3.1 Politicization and Government Responsiveness in IOs

If international cooperation was once characterized by a ‘permissive consensus’ (Haas, 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Keohane, 1984), today it is characterized - at least in certain cases - by a politicization that constrains elites on the international stage and has implications for their standing in national politics. Citizens now use politically meaningful channels like elections to express their preferences on international cooperation, often rewarding parties that share their more sceptical views (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Tillman, 2004; De Vries, Edwards, and Tillman, 2010). Figure 2.1 showcases the increase in public and partisan skepticism towards international cooperation in Europe during a period of successive crises, plotting both the percentages of those attributing a negative image to the EU in the biannual Eurobarometer surveys, as well as the vote share of Eurosceptic parties<sup>2</sup>. Importantly, this politicization of global governance is not limited to the EU, with a wide literature showing other international institutions, including the IMF, the WTO, the WHO, and the World Bank, have also been politicized and face

---

<sup>2</sup>The bi-annual Eurobarometer question asks whether ‘in general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?’. The figure plots the share of those answering ‘fairly negative’ or ‘very negative’. The vote share figure is drawn from *the PopuList*, a data of support for populist, far right, far left, and Eurosceptic parties that has been used in numerous publications in academic journals (Rooduijn et al 2019).

Figure 2.1: The politicization of international cooperation in Europe



increasing challenges to their legitimacy (Zürn, 2004, 2014, 2018; Zürn and Ecker-Ehradt, 2013; Ecker-Ehradt, 2014; Zürn et al., 2012; Rixen and Zangl, 2014; Hooghe and Marks, 2019; Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Stephen and Zürn, 2019; Walter 2021).

This politicization of international institutions is changing the behaviour of governments on the international stage. Scholars have shown how national governments in IOs signal responsiveness to domestic audiences through their voting behaviour (Hagemann et al., 2017; Muhlbock and Tosun, 2018), their use of formal policy statements (Wratil, 2018), and the positions taken in negotiations with international partners (Schneider, 2018; Schneider and Slantchev, 2018). An emerging literature also shows how politicization impacts the rhetoric of national leaders, with the conclusion that politicization affects the sentiment and complexity executives attach to references to international cooperation in their public communication (Rauh et al., 2020; Traber et al., 2019).

Instinctively, one might also think that governments would respond to more sceptical domestic audiences by attributing more negative outcomes to IOs in their communication. After all, not only does this rhetorical strategy signal congruence with an increasingly sceptical electorate, it could also offer a useful scapegoat to avoid responsibility for negative outcomes, particularly in a time period marred by a succession of crises. However, I argue

instead that far from being a costless rhetorical strategy, IO scapegoating can in fact impose significant costs on national governments operating in complex global systems of governance.

### 2.3.2 The Costs of Shifting Blame

While blame shifting towards international institutions is often presented as a costless rhetorical strategy (Menon, 2008; Hood, 2010), I argue instead that it imposes a series of costs that make it a risky choice for national governments. First, and most obviously, it can damage their reputation and credibility with other member states. Scholars have modeled international agreements as a series of repeated games in which players have to take into account the impact of their current action on the future actions of other players (Putnam, 1988; Barrett, 1992; Finus and Rundhsagen, 1998). Governments in IOs are thus incentivised to build and maintain their reputation with other member states: scholars have for example shown how reluctant governments are to table opposition votes in international institutions (Hagemann et al., 2017). As criticism of collective decisions may be costly to their reputation – and thus their ability to achieve their goals in future negotiations - member states have an incentive to hold their tongue even when communicating the outcomes of international cooperation they deem unsatisfactory. This is particularly the case at major international summits, high profile events where the concentration of media from across the continent means member states and supranational institutions are more likely to be made aware of how member states communicate summit conclusions to their own domestic audiences (Alexandrova et al., 2012).

Second, IO scapegoating could antagonize as many domestic audiences as it pleases. In shifting blame towards international institutions, national leaders signal congruence with their country’s growing sceptical constituency but also alienate the substantial chunk of their electorate that is supportive of international cooperation. Public opinion data shows that while skepticism towards international cooperation has grown (see Figure 2.1), it remains a minority position in the majority of countries whose attitudes to international cooperation are regularly monitored in surveys. A more accurate description is one of *polarization*. This is important because research in other multilevel systems shows that state senators representing divided constituencies tend to avoid clear position taking because it offers limited electoral returns (Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012). For mainstream parties on the right and the left, international cooperation constitutes a wedge issue that cuts across the dimension of political conflict where they are dominant, and scholars have shown that these mainstream parties therefore aim to avoid clear taking clear positions on the issue (Hobolt and De Vries, 2020). Blame shifting towards IOs, as a clear form of IO-sceptic position taking, is thus unlikely to offer high electoral returns for governments

with domestic audiences that are divided on the issue of international cooperation.

Third, blame shifting may act as a signal of impotence, if not incompetence, on the international stage. After all, shifting blame suggests a negative outcome - and therefore the failure of national leaders to achieve what they set out to. Blame shifting is also difficult to do credibly, given national governments' position at the heart of the international institutions they might want to scapegoat, and because IOs lack a clearly identifiable government to point the finger at (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014. McGraw and Dolan, 2007).

To be clear, this isn't to say that IOs don't receive criticism in domestic public spheres, nor that national governments will never criticize or blame international institutions. Opposition politicians have stronger incentives to criticize IOs (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020), and national leaders' domestic audiences may be sufficiently negatively aligned towards international cooperation to make blame shifting their optimal rhetorical strategy. Yet it does show that far from being a costless rhetorical strategy, 'IO-bashing' is unlikely to offer high electoral returns even for governments facing high levels of contestation over international cooperation at home.

### **2.3.3 Credit Claiming as the Solution to Governments' Rhetorical Dilemma**

National governments in international institutions therefore face a *rhetorical dilemma*. On the one hand, increased politicization and party level contestation around international cooperation incentivizes them to signal responsiveness in their rhetoric. On the other, explicitly criticizing IOs and other member states comes with high costs. I argue that national governments solve this dilemma by adopting a more patriotic *home style* when presenting international cooperation in their domestic public spheres.

'Home Style' is a classic of American political science. In his 1978 landmark study, Richard Fenno makes the case for studying the ways members of Congress present their work in Washington when they are back in their home state. The advances in quantitative text analysis and computational methods allowing scholars to scrape vast amounts of text on the web, has led to a resurgence in the study of home style in national politics (Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012, 2014). I argue that the concept of *home style* is also applicable to international politics. Given the lack of a transnational public sphere, the presentational strategies employed by governments when presenting IOs in their domestic publics are of crucial importance for the messages citizens receive and the views they develop on international cooperation. A patriotic home style then, is one that focuses on the benefits of international cooperation to the speaker's home country, rather than to the world as a whole and/or other countries. To be more precise, a patriotic home style will involve a strong focus on *credit claiming* in a leader's communication: showing what they have



achieved for their country on the international stage, without articulating clear positions on international cooperation either way.

Credit claiming is particularly relevant in the context of global governance, because research in other multilevel systems shows how this communication strategy is favoured by representatives of polarized constituencies, for whom articulating clear positions is risky (Grimmer et al., 2012; Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b). As Figure 2.1 has shown, polarization is an accurate description of views on international cooperation, with both an electorate and a party system that is often bitterly divided on the issue. Research on executives' rhetorical responses to this shift has largely focused on position taking, with the conclusion that national leaders take more sceptical positions about international cooperation as their electorate becomes more divided over the issue (Rauh et al., 2020). Yet this research ignores a strategy available to governments who want to present themselves as effective representatives in IOs without articulating a clear pro or anti position on international cooperation: credit claiming.

Table 2.1: Governments' optimal rhetorical strategies when presenting international cooperation

<i>Domestic Politicization of International Cooperation</i>	Low Domestic Politicization	High Domestic Politicization
<i>Home Style</i>	Internationalist	Patriotic
<i>Attributional Strategy</i>	Credit Sharing	Credit Claiming
<i>Strategy Description</i>	Credit international institutions and other member states for positive outcomes	Credit themselves or their government for outcomes that benefit their member state

It is also important to point out that sharing credit with IOs is not a pointless rhetorical strategy for national governments. In doing so, they signal congruence with internationalist domestic audiences, and maintain trust with IOs and other international partners, many of whom will be keeping an eye on how they communicate. Table 2.1 summarises the optimal rhetorical strategies for leaders facing high or low levels of domestic IO politicization. National leaders facing low levels of IO politicization adopt an *internationalist* home style in which they *share credit* with IOs and other member states. National leaders facing high levels of domestic IO politicization adopt a *patriotic* home style, in which they *claim credit* themselves without sharing credit with other international partners, but also without ex-

PLICITLY blaming or criticizing international institutions.<sup>3</sup> Of course, national leaders are not limited to one strategy: those facing low domestic IO politicization will also look to claim credit, and leaders facing high levels of IO politicization will also engage in credit sharing. Yet the relative electoral returns of these styles predicts that the balance in leaders' rhetoric will differ depending on the levels of politicization of international cooperation in their domestic public spheres. My first hypotheses therefore read as follows:

**Hypothesis H1a:** Governments are more likely to respond to the politicization of international cooperation by increasing their use of credit claiming strategies, than by criticizing or blaming IOs.

**Hypothesis H1b:** Governments are more likely to claim credit at international summits if they face high levels of domestic IO politicization, than if they face low levels of IO politicization.

Other work on political competition argues that parties compete by emphasizing certain issue dimensions (Budge, 2015; Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996). Some issues matter more to voters than others, and governments are rewarded for delivering on those that matter most (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien, 2004). The electoral return of credit claiming therefore depends on the salience of the issues for which governments claim credit. Of course, for national leaders to frame the outcomes of international summits in a way that emphasizes what their citizens care most about, the agenda of these summits needs to be diverse. Analyses of the EUCO agenda from 1975 - 2014 show that while it has traditionally been dominated by Foreign Affairs and Macroeconomics, it has also become more diverse over time, and increasingly includes issues that are salient to the public (Alexandrova et al., 2014). The diversity of the competencies delegated to international institutions, combined with the salience of the issues discussed therefore provides the preconditions for governments to tailor their presentation according to citizens' priorities, not simply according to their views on international cooperation.

Crucially, issue salience matters for the electoral return of credit claiming in a way that it doesn't for credit sharing. When communicating to highlight their internationalist credentials to domestic audiences and international partners, it matters relatively little whether governments are crediting IOs for a high or low salience issue. By contrast, the electoral return from credit claiming will be higher if leaders can credibly convince domestic audiences that they have 'brought home the bacon' for issues their citizens care about. The

---

<sup>3</sup>One might also imagine a nationalist home style in which leaders combine credit claiming with numerous instances of blame shifting and explicit criticism of IOs. I argue that a home style focusing on blame shifting is unlikely except as a rhetorical strategy of last resort for the reasons outlined in the 'Costs of shifting blame' section. A nationalist home style may also be desirable for a leader whose reelection constituency has an aligned, negative (rather than polarized) view of international cooperation.

effectiveness of credit claiming also depends on plausibility (Grimmer et al., 2014; Dolan and Kropf, 2004). Experiments from communication research show that over claiming can damage credibility (Rossiter, 1997) and survey evidence shows that citizens are capable of making sound judgments about responsibility in IOs (Wilson and Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). A national leader that presents the outcome of an international summit by taking credit for every single positive outcome runs the risk of damaging the plausibility of their credit claiming. Governments therefore make strategic decisions about the issues for which to claim credit. How is this decision made?

I argue that this choice is based on the salience of issues to their domestic electorates. To maximize the credibility and impact of their credit claiming, governments ‘save’ their use of credit claiming strategies for the issues their citizens care most about. For issues of high public salience, governments are more likely to credit claim; for issues that matter little to their citizens, governments are happy to credit international institutions as a whole. My second hypotheses therefore relate to how the rhetoric of heads of government at international summits is responsive to the issue priorities of their citizens.

**Hypothesis H2a:** Governments at international summits are more likely to claim credit for policy issues that are salient to their domestic electorates.

**Hypothesis H2b:** Governments at international summits are more likely to share credit for policy issues that are of low salience to their domestic electorates.

## 2.4 Research design

### 2.4.1 An original dataset

To evaluate these hypotheses, I draw on a unique dataset: all publicly available speeches from heads of government presenting the outcome EU Council summits to national media and parliaments. Speeches are scraped from dedicated website that stores information on the press conferences and statements of members of government across seven member<sup>4</sup> states between 2005 and 2018. As speeches are frequently archived by these websites, I use the Wayback Machine that allows us to travel back to the governments’ website prior to archiving (see Rauh et al., 2020 for other uses of this technique). This way I was able to retrieve most speeches, although a number of missing speeches is unavoidable.<sup>5</sup> I also drop speeches from interim prime ministers and independents because they are less likely

---

<sup>4</sup>Germany, France, UK, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Denmark

<sup>5</sup>The Wayback Machine makes occasional snapshots of websites. In some cases, there are a few months between the last snapshot and the change of government, thus leading to some gaps in the data. The countries where the gaps in snapshots are longest are the countries with more missing data.

to respond to electoral incentives, and drop speeches from the British Prime Minister after the referendum result of June 2016 given the uniqueness of member state exit.

The countries in this sample cover important structural divisions within the European Union: they are located in both the northern and the southern parts of Europe; include powerful member states and smaller ones; and include Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. The sample covers both the economic and migration crises that have placed the European Union – and EUCO Summits in particular – firmly in the public spotlight (van Middelaar, 2013). Overall, the countries and time period represent high variation regarding the key independent variables of the study, namely the politicization of international cooperation and the most salient policy issues facing the country. In the process of parsing text data from dedicated websites, I maintain the same paragraph structure as raw HTML documents. Speech subdivision into short paragraphs often proves beneficial in quantitative text analysis (Ferrara, 2019). Paragraphs are coherent units of text and, in this case, I judge them preferable to the use of single sentences, which might miss out relevant information; and to the use of full speeches, that encompass multiple policy issues and would therefore complicate testing hypotheses H2a and H2b. The Appendix provides a table summarizing the 414 speeches in our dataset, divided into 6,012 individual paragraphs or ‘statements’.

There are a number of reasons why this dataset provides a more satisfactory way to compare how national leaders allocate credit and blame than other datasets on executive communication in the EU (see for e.g. *EUSpeech* by Schoonvelde et al. (2016)). First, by controlling for the substance of the message, I conduct a genuine comparative study of presentational *style* (Grimmer, 2013). The EUCO Conclusions are agreed by all member states and a written record of what was discussed and agreed is made publicly available (Alexandrova et al., 2012, 2014, 2016). It therefore provides a significant constraint for *what* national leaders can present, while allowing them leeway on *how* they present it. Put simply, this original and targeted dataset allows for within-case comparisons, in the sense that all leaders are presenting the same stimulus. Second, *EUSpeech* includes all publicly available speeches by heads of government, the majority of which include references to European integration, but are not specifically about Europe. If *EUSpeech* allows us to analyze how executives refer to the EU when audiences may not be paying particular attention to their government’s position on Europe, our dataset allows us to investigate the communication strategies of heads of government in the public spotlight of EU summits.

### 2.4.2 Classifying credit and blame

In this article, I use hand coding to classify each statement (or paragraph) in national leaders’ speeches for credit and blame, in a way that takes into account attribution. I use

human hand coding rather than automated methods for three reasons. First, human hand coding remains the ‘gold standard’ of content analysis (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013) and if its costs are not prohibitive, it should be the default when performing content analysis. While the dataset used in this article is large, it is not so massive as to make full hand coding impossible. Second, the categories for classification are relatively nuanced, in a way that makes automated content analysis more challenging. Third, a large, fully hand coded dataset on responsibility attributions could be a useful resource for the academic community, for example as a training set for supervised learning models on much larger datasets where hand coding would be prohibitively expensive.

Statements are classified into four categories for attribution. The first is ‘descriptive’ where there is no attribution. The second is ‘credit claiming’, where governments credit themselves or their government for a positive action or outcome. The third is ‘credit sharing’ where a positive action outcome is attributed collectively to Europe, the EU’s institutions, or other member states. The final category is ‘blame shifting’, where responsibility for a negative situation is attributed to the EU or other member states. Table 2.2 presents exemplary statements and shows the various ways national leaders can claim credit for actions on the international stage. While Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy claims credit for bringing home revenues for Spain from the EU’s budget, the example from Sarkozy highlights his ability to place France’s economic agenda at the top of the EUCO’s priorities.

Table 2.2: Exemplary Statements

<i>Date</i>	<i>Speaker</i>	<i>Statement</i>	<i>Attribution</i>	<i>EB Policy Issue</i>
2011/10	N.Sarkozy (FR)	France has called for the integration and convergence of economic and fiscal policies. And that is what was decided today.	Credit Claiming	Economic Situation
2007/06	B.Ahern (IRL)	The Council welcomed the outcome of the G8 summit on combating climate change, in particular the commitment to the UN process and reducing emissions by at least 50 per cent by 2050. This is an area where the EU is providing real global leadership and will continue to do so.	Credit Sharing	Environment
2013/06	M.Rajoy (ES)	In relation to youth employment - another very important point for us - concrete measures were also adopted. The six billion euros dedicated to the Youth Employment Initiative will be disbursed in 2014 and 2015. This Initiative, as you know, was agreed in February, was a proposal of the Spanish Government. For Spain this means receiving almost two billion Euros.	Credit Claiming	Unemployment
2014/10	D.Cameron (UK)	That's the frustration. But that leads me on to frankly the downright anger about something that has come about at this EU Council. And that is the completely unjustified and sudden production of a bill for Britain of 1.7 billion pounds, that is supposed to be paid by by the 1st December. This is completely unacceptable.	Blame Shifting	EU Affairs
2015/03	A.Merkel (DE)	As far as the foreign policy agenda is concerned the issues of Kosovo, Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa were on the agenda.	Descriptive	Foreign Affairs

In order to test hypothesis H2, statements are also classified according to their policy area in the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys.<sup>6</sup> The Appendix presents the codebook used, as well as our definitions for credit and blame and further examples of coded attributions. To validate the classification, I run inter-coder reliability tests with native speakers of the language on 15 per cent of the sample.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.4.3 Independent variables and controls

IO politicisation is widely considered to incorporate both public discontent toward international cooperation and the mobilisation of this discontent by political actors, most notably parties (De Vries et al., 2020; De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Rauh, 2019). To operationalise the main independent variables to test H1a and H1b, I therefore consider both public opinion on European integration (public Euroscepticism), and the seat share of Eurosceptic parties in national parliaments (partisan Euroscepticism). I measure public Euroscepticism with the Eurobarometer survey question which asks respondents whether the EU conjures a positive or negative image.<sup>8</sup> The measure of public Euroscepticism is the survey-weighted mean of all valid responses by country, and gives us the proportion of respondents with a negative image of the EU. I use linear interpolation to cover time points between surveys (see Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). To operationalise partisan Euroscepticism, I use the seat share of Eurosceptic parties in parliament. Eurosceptic parties are identified using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which contains an EU position question on a scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour). I consider a party Eurosceptic if it has a lower score than 3.5, and capture the seat share of these parties in parliament, replicating a methodology used in previous studies (Rauh et al., 2020).

The independent variable for H2 refers to the salience of policy issues to domestic electorates. To capture this, I use the Eurobarometer question ‘What do you think are the two most important issues facing our country at the moment?’ This question has been used to capture the issue priorities of European citizens (Alexandrova et al., 2014), and is widely used in studies of agenda setting (see Alexandrova et al., 2014; Baumgartner et al., 2009).

Finally, the models also contain a number of political and economic controls that might

---

<sup>6</sup>The EB has a long running question on the Most Important Issue facing your country. Its policy areas are: Economic Situation, Unemployment, Inflation, Environment, Energy, Immigration, Crime, Terrorism, Pensions, Foreign Affairs/Defence, Inflation, Education, and Government Debt.

<sup>7</sup>I calculate the inter-coder reliability score Krippendorff’s alpha separately for each country, and for each coding category (attribution and policy issue). Krippendorff’s alpha varies from 0.72 to 0.91 and averages 0.78 (for the attribution category) and 0.82 (for the policy issue category) across the full sample.

<sup>8</sup>While public opinion on the EU is usually operationalized using the question on whether membership is a good or bad thing, this question has not been asked since 2011. Scholars in previous works have shown how the EU image question is closely related to the question on membership.

impinge on the rhetoric of elites. First, I control for economic indicators by including a measure of annual unemployment. I also capture the timing of elections by using a binary variable for election years, and include dummies for whether a country holds the EU presidency at the time of the speech. My controls also include the governing party's EU position and EU dissent from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, as well as public opinion on trust in the national government from the Eurobarometer survey.

## 2.5 Analysis and Results

Given the nature of the data, where statements are nested within speeches by national leaders, I run a series of multilevel logistic models to test my propositions. First, I use the hand coded dataset to create the dependent variables for my regression models. The dependent variables for models 1, 3 and 5 is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the statement is an instance of credit claiming and 0 if not. The dependent variables for models 2 and 4 is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the statement is an instance of credit sharing and 0 if not. Models 1 to 4 include fixed effects for countries, and model 5 is a restrictive model including fixed effects for countries and random effects for leaders.

Before analyzing the results of the logistic regression models, I first explore interesting patterns in the data. Figure 2.2 plots the proportion of statements classified as credit claiming, credit sharing, or blame shifting and highlights the increase of credit claiming in national leaders' EU rhetoric between 2005 and 2018. It also shows that despite the pronounced politicization of European integration during the investigation period (see Rauh, 2019) statements that explicitly blame or criticize the EU are rare, the only exception coming from a handful of critical statements by Chirac in 2005, Cameron in 2014 and Tsipras in 2018.<sup>9</sup>


Figure 2.3 plots the balance of credit sharing and credit claiming in governments' rhetoric – a leader that shares credit more than she claims it would therefore have a positive balance, whereas a leader that claims credit more than she shares it would have a negative balance. It shows that far from all being opportunistic credit claimers, national leaders often adopt mixed attributional styles in which they share credit with the EU almost as much as they claim credit themselves (and sometimes more). The figure provides additional face validity for the hand coding: known internationalists such as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron

---

<sup>9</sup>Out of 6,012 statements, only 41 are instances of criticism and blame. The majority of these come from British PM David Cameron, particularly in response to Juncker's appointment as President of the Commission, and in response to demands for £1.7bn in top-up EU budget payments, from Greek PM Alexis Tsipras, and from French President Jacques Chirac when negotiating the Multiannual Financial Framework in 2005. Note that figures 2 and 3 only include 5,943 statements as classified statements from interim Greek Prime Ministers (Papademos and Pikrammenos) are removed.




Figure 2.2: The increase in credit claiming in national leaders' EU rhetoric



share credit with the EU and other member states significantly more than they claim credit themselves. The plot also confirms that national leaders who face high levels of EU politicization in their domestic public spheres such as the UK's Conservative leader David Cameron, under significant pressure from within his own party on the issue of integration, or Greek leaders involved in bailout negotiations with the Troika, claim credit significantly more than they share credit with the EU, its institutions, and other member states.

Table 2.3 displays the results of our mixed effects logistic regression models. It provides strong evidence for the hypotheses outlined in the previous section. There is a strong and robust relationship between the seat share of Eurosceptic parties in national parliaments (partisan Euroscepticism) and the attributional strategy employed by national leaders. Increases in partisan Euroscepticism increase the likelihood of leaders claiming credit (model 1), and decrease the likelihood of leaders sharing credit with the EU (model 2). Likewise, there is a strong and robust relationship between public Euroscepticism and credit claiming in leaders' rhetoric. Interestingly though, public Euroscepticism does not have a statistically significant negative effect on credit sharing in national leaders' rhetoric, and the statistical significance of the effect on credit claiming drops when including random effects for leaders. These findings suggest that public discontent towards international cooperation needs to be mobilised by challenger parties (see De Vries, Hobolt and Walter, 2020) to have a particu-

Figure 2.3: Balance of credit sharing and credit claiming in national leaders' EU rhetoric



larly strong influence on national governments' rhetoric towards international cooperation. Finally, increases in salience increase the likelihood of leaders claiming credit (model 3), and decrease the likelihood of leaders sharing credit with the EU (model 4). These relationships remain robust and significant even when specifying more restrictive models, with fixed effects for countries and random effects for leaders (models 5 and 6). The control variables are also worth commenting on. National leaders with high levels of public trust are more likely to share credit whereas those with low levels of trust are more likely to claim credit, consistent with the view that domestic electoral pressure is likely to influence governments' home style when presenting international cooperation. Finally, holding the rotating presidency increases the likelihood of leaders sharing credit with the EU and other member states. In the Appendix, I also run robustness checks: models with fixed effects for both countries and leaders (A1.5); models with random effects for both countries and leaders (A1.6); and models that include summit-specific random effects (A1.7). These robustness checks confirm the significant effect of the politicization of international cooperation and issue salience on credit claiming by national governments.

To further illustrate how the salience of issues affects the rhetorical strategies of national leaders, I plot the balance of credit sharing and credit claiming for two policy issues that are amongst the most discussed at summits during the investigation period: the Economic


Table 2.3: Fixed and Mixed Effects Regression Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Claim	Share	Claim	Share	Claim	Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Partisan Euroscepticism	0.028*** (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)	-0.022** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.012)	-0.022** (0.009)
Public Euroscepticism	3.165*** (0.900)	0.192 (0.806)	2.125** (1.016)	0.976 (0.930)	1.412 (1.107)	0.976 (0.929)
Issue Salience			1.046*** (0.178)	-0.541*** (0.187)	1.294*** (0.195)	-0.541*** (0.187)
Public Trust in Government	-0.864*** (0.315)	0.702** (0.307)	-0.902** (0.354)	0.863** (0.345)	0.148 (0.411)	0.863** (0.345)
Governing Party EU position	-0.262*** (0.098)	-0.181* (0.105)	-0.560*** (0.118)	-0.013 (0.120)	-0.182 (0.188)	-0.013 (0.120)
Governing Party EU dissent	-0.005 (0.053)	-0.203*** (0.048)	-0.118* (0.062)	-0.095* (0.054)	-0.012 (0.080)	-0.095* (0.054)
Rotating Presidency	-0.267 (0.209)	0.713*** (0.174)	-0.418* (0.244)	0.582*** (0.209)	-0.276 (0.251)	0.582*** (0.209)
Unemployment	-0.057*** (0.018)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.020)	0.020 (0.019)	-0.044* (0.022)	0.020 (0.019)
Election Year	0.098 (0.085)	-0.248*** (0.084)	0.029 (0.097)	-0.189** (0.095)	-0.027 (0.101)	-0.189** (0.095)
Constant	-2.257*** (0.815)	1.026 (0.819)	-0.115 (0.962)	-0.444 (0.943)	-2.699* (1.435)	-0.444 (0.942)
Observations	5,943	5,943	4,544	4,544	4,544	4,544
Country Fixed Effects (7)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Leader Random Effects (21)	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01


Figure 2.4: The balance of credit sharing and credit claiming differs for high salience and low salience issues



Situation and the Environment. While the former was a hugely salient issue in a time period marked by the financial and Eurozone crises, the latter was a low priority for citizens for the duration of the time period (except for Denmark, where the Environment consistently ranks highly as a priority for citizens – see EB survey data). Figure 2.4 shows how the balance of credit sharing and credit claiming differs for these two issues. In Figure 2.4.1, the majority of leaders have negative balance, meaning the share of statements in which they claim credit is higher than those in which they share credit with the EU. By contrast, in Figure 2.4.2, the majority of leaders share credit with the EU and its institutions more than they claim credit themselves.

Finally, Figure 2.5 plots the marginal effects of increases in issue salience on the probability of claiming and sharing credit. The effects are clear. As issues become more salient, this increases the probability of leaders claiming credit and decreases the probability of leaders sharing credit with Europe, its institutions, and other member states.

Figure 2.5: Marginal effects of issue salience on credit claiming and credit sharing



## 2.6 Discussion

The previous section provides evidence of a strong relationship between domestic electoral incentives and the home style employed by governments in the EU. In this penultimate section, I discuss the generalisability of these results. First, the findings may be *EU-specific*. After all, a large literature describes the EU as 'sui generis', an entity whose unparalleled development makes it difficult to compare with other international institutions (Phelan, 2012). I argue that these findings *are* applicable to other IOs. First, the argument's key independent variables are not exclusive to the EU but shared by many international institutions. IOs as diverse as the IMF, the WTO, the WHO, and the World Bank are also contested domestically and face challenges to their legitimacy (Zürn, 2004, 2014, 2018; Zürn and Ecker-Ehradt, 2013; Ecker-Ehradt, 2014; Zürn et al., 2012; ; Rixen and Zangl, 2014; Hooghe and Marks, 2019; Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Stephen and Zürn, 2019). Additionally, the fact that international summits cover issues that are salient to domestic electorates is also not limited to EUCO summits. Issues that voters care about such as the economy, trade, and the environment are frequently covered at international summits and have in some cases been delegated to supranational institutions (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks, 2019). These two independent variables are of course related: international cooperation

is politicized precisely because the issues that are delegated to supranational institutions matter to voters (Zürn, 2018) . This is not to say that we should expect these patterns in governments' presentation of *all* IOs. Many - indeed the majority of - IOs are not politicised, but some are, and these are precisely the ones where we should expect these rhetorical strategies. The point here is not that other IOs are as politicised as the EU, but that if they *were*, a far from inconceivable feat given the rise of national populists across the globe, we should expect the empirical patterns described above.

One could also wonder whether the findings in this article are *summit-specific*. Governments may be reluctant to criticise IOs in the spotlight of international summits, but may revert to a much more nationalist home style when back in the comfort of their nation-state. This is a valid point of discussion that I address in two ways. First, *even if* these results are only applicable to summits, they still remain significant. This is because summits are amongst the highest profile events of international cooperation, attracting considerable media coverage (Alexandrova et al., 2012, 2014; van Middelaar, 2013). What national leaders say around these summits is therefore likely to be amongst the most important cues that citizens receive on international cooperation. However, I would go further still and argue that the 'summit' home styles described in this article are likely to be replicated in governments' home styles more widely. This is because the costs of shifting blame towards IOs, while diminished outside the spotlight of international summits, remain significant. Scapegoating IOs is still likely to antagonise voters that are supportive of international cooperation, and criticising IOs and the outcomes of summits is still likely to cast doubt on a government's competence at achieving its goals on the international stage. The literature on home style in domestic contexts shows that politicians' presentational strategies are remarkably consistent across venues (Fenno, 1978; Grimmer, 2013b). I suggest for the reasons outlined above that this is also likely to be the case in international politics.

These discussion points naturally merit further investigation. Scholars should investigate whether governments' presentation of other IOs reflect the credit claiming patterns identified in this article. Yet given the politicisation of international cooperation generally, the salience of issues delegated to IOs, and the relative consistency in the costs of shifting blame towards IOs across venues, I argue that these findings are likely not EU-specific nor summit-specific, but a more generalisable description of national governments' *home styles* when presenting international cooperation in their domestic public spheres.

## 2.7 Conclusion

International institutions provide opportunities for politicians to claim credit for themselves and to shift blame onto other levels of government, yet there is little empirical work on when and how politicians engage in these rhetorical strategies. In this article, I addressed this gap by examining strategic communication by heads of government in the EU. The findings challenge the conventional view that IOs receives little recognition from politicians in domestic public spheres, and that national leaders frequently shift blame onto international institutions. Instead, I show that governments' communication of international cooperation in a period of increased politicization is marked by credit claiming: 'look at what I have achieved for us', not 'look at what IOs are doing to us'.

This study highlights the key role of domestic electoral incentives in shaping governments' strategic communication in international institutions. As public discontent towards international cooperation rises, and as it is mobilized by political entrepreneurs, national leaders claim credit more. I also highlighted the key role of issue salience in leaders' attributional style. As national leaders cannot reasonably claim credit for every single positive outcome at the international level, they make strategic decisions on which ones to claim credit for to maximize their impact. For issues of low salience, such as the environment and foreign affairs, national governments are happy to share credit with international institutions; for issues of high salience, such as the economy or immigration, national leaders are more likely to claim credit for themselves.

These findings build on the growing literature on responsiveness in international organizations (IOs). The pressures for accountable and transparent decision-making at the international level, combined with IOs gaining competences to effectively manage such trans-border cooperation, means domestic electorates are likely to form more explicit preferences over such international engagements. The literature to date has showed how governments signal responsiveness in the international arena through their *behaviour*, mainly votes in the Council (see Schneider, 2018; Hagemann et al., 2017). I show that this responsiveness on the international stage also manifests itself in governments' *rhetoric* at key international summits.

Communication has been at the heart of studies of representation in national polities (see Grimmer, 2013b), yet is largely absent from debates on representation and accountability in international institutions. This study has aimed to place communication – and more specifically the concept of *home style* (Fenno, 1978) - at the heart of these debates. National governments are not simply the main actors of international institutions; they are also the main *messengers* of IOs in domestic public spheres. What these national governments say (and don't say) about international institutions is therefore of consequence.

Finally, this study has implications for democratic accountability in IOs, which rests on citizens' ability to correctly attribute responsibility across multiple levels of government. Public opinion towards international cooperation depends to a considerable degree on elite cueing and these findings suggest national leaders use strategic communication to shape citizens' evaluations to their advantage. Future research should explore the consequences of these presentational strategies for citizens' attributions of responsibility and evaluations in global systems of governance. On the one hand, by rarely crediting international institutions for issues citizens care about, governments' communication is likely to be detrimental for public opinion towards IOs. On the other, framing IOs more explicitly according to the national interest may give citizens more confidence that decisions made at the international level are in the interest of their home country. This article has shown how governments use IOs to shape attributions of responsibility to their advantage without resorting to the rather simplistic method of shifting blame 'upwards'. It therefore suggests that standard notions of electoral accountability based on performance voting are not just threatened by the complexity of global systems of governance, but by the strategic communication of politicians within that institutional setup.



## A New Dataset of Over 1 Million References to European Integration in Parliamentary Speeches

*Introduction – Data on the Communication of EU Integration*  
*Introducing EUParlspeech – Face Validity – Convergent Validity*  
*Predictive Validity – Conclusion*

**Abstract:** This research note introduces EUParlspeech, a dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made in the plenary debates of ten national parliaments between 1989 and 2019. The dataset has applications for scholars of EU integration, party competition, political communication, and international relations. This research note explains the construction of the dataset, describes its features, and demonstrates its face, convergent, and predictive validity. Automated analysis of parties' EU statements in parliament yield meaningful and well-known cross party differences, with challenger parties more likely to send clearer, more sceptical cues on integration than mainstream parties. Moreover, these automated measures correlate highly with expert assessments (CHES) and - in the case of the UK's Conservative Party - individual MPs' ideal point estimates based on EU statements in plenary debates can predict their subsequent vote and position at the 2016 referendum. I conclude that EUParlspeech data provide a promising new approach to studying party contestation over European integration.

### 3.1 Introduction

Having once been characterised by a ‘permissive consensus’, EU integration is now one of the central issues of political contestation in Europe (see Lindberg 1970; Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2019; Hobolt and De Vrires 2020; Zurn 2014; Rauh 2018). The EU is salient in domestic political debates, divides public opinion, and has been mobilised by Eurosceptic entrepreneurs who have successfully introduced the issue into the arena of political contestation. This contestation naturally takes place through the medium of *language*. Parties outline their positions on European integration in speeches, manifestos, press releases and the like. European institutions also increasingly participate in public debates to defend integration (De Bruyker 2017). Scholars interested in conflict and contestation over Europe have therefore developed and drawn on a number of rich datasets most notably the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and party manifestos. These data sources have generated key insights on the dynamics of contestation over European integration (see Rovny 2012, 2013; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and De Vries 2020).

Yet these datasets also present limitations for scholars interested in how Europe is presented and contested in public. The CHES does not capture direct communication from parties, and manifestos provide only infrequent data on how parties present Europe, as well as obfuscating intra-party divisions on the issue. Whilst a growing literature investigates how EU institutions directly communicate to citizens and legitimate themselves in the face of politicization (see De Bruyker 2017; Rauh 2020, 2021; Rauh et al 2020; Schoonvelde et al 2019), it is debatable how much of this communication actually reaches citizens given the absence of a European public sphere and the limited resources of EU institutions. It is still the case that citizens are more likely to receive their cues on European integration from national politicians, than from supranational ones (Menon 2008).

In this research note, I introduce an original dataset for researchers interested in the presentation of EU integration and contestation over Europe in domestic public spheres. *EUParlspeech* is a dataset that captures over 1 million references to European integration made in the plenary debates of ten national parliaments between 1989 and 2019. The EU references are windows of three sentences in which the speaker makes a direct reference to the EU, its politics and/or policies. These references are available both in the parliament’s native language and translated into English.

I demonstrates EUParlspeech’s face, convergent, and predictive validity. Automated analysis of parties’ EU statements in parliament yield meaningful and well-known cross party differences, with challenger parties more likely to send clearer, more sceptical cues on integration than mainstream parties. Moreover, these automated measures correlate highly with expert assessments (CHES) and - in the case of the UK’s Conservative Party - indi-

vidual MPs' ideal point estimates based on EU statements in plenary debates can predict their subsequent vote and position at the 2016 referendum. I conclude that EUParlspeech data provide a promising new approach to studying party contestation over European integration and that the dataset has many applications for scholars of EU integration, party competition, international relations, and political communication.

### 3.2 Data on the communication of EU integration

Politics and political conflict, both on the domestic and international stage, take place through the medium of *language* (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Parties articulate positions on issues and communicate them to citizens in manifestos, campaign speeches, and electoral advertisements. Once elected, representatives write and debate legislation. News reports document the day-to-day affairs that provide a detailed picture of conflict and cooperation. On the international stage, nations regularly negotiate treaties, with language that signals the motivations and relative power of the countries involved. These international agreements are legitimised domestically through discourse and debates (Sternberg et al. 2017). Given the centrality of communication to political science and international relations, and the advance in computational methods and automated text analysis generally, it is unsurprising that researchers have constructed a growing collection of datasets that capture the communication of actors engaging in political contestation.

In Europe, one of the central issues of this political contestation is the issue of *European integration*. The gradual transfer of authority to supranational institutions has led to an increase in salience of EU integration, polarization of opinions towards the EU, and mobilization on the issue by political actors, most notably parties. Whilst both the causes and consequences of this politicization are contested, scholars agree both that European integration *has* been politicized and that the features mentioned above - polarization of opinions, salience of EU affairs, and the mobilization of political actors - are its main empirical components. This politicization of European integration fits into a wider literature arguing that new transnational cleavages are replacing the traditional left-right dimension of political conflict (Hooghe et al, 2002; Kriesi et al, 2008).

European integration then, has become one of the central issues of political contestation in Europe, and a number of datasets of EU communication<sup>1</sup> are available to scholars interested in how European integration is presented and contested by political actors. Scholars of party competition, for example, regularly use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to capture parties' positions on EU integration. The CHES is a hugely valuable expert

---

<sup>1</sup>By EU communication I mean communication on the issue of European integration by any political actor, rather than communication by the EU and its institutions.

survey that captures the positions parties have managed to convey on a number of issues. However, as it does not capture direct communication from parties, it does not allow us to investigate *how* these impressions are created. Scholars have also used manifestos to capture parties' EU communication (Abou Chadi 2016). Whilst these manifestos do provide a more direct measure of what parties are saying about Europe, they are relatively infrequent, only being released during or in the run up to elections. Furthermore, European integration is a wedge issue that has led to conflict *within* as well as between parties, and manifestos provide only a single piece of EU communication for the whole party, therefore obfuscating intra-party divisions. Scholars have also used the advances in computational social science to scrape the web for executive and parliamentary communication. *EUSpeech* (Schoonvelde et al, 2016) captures speeches made by national executives, whereas *Parlspeech* (Rauh et al, 2020) provides transcripts of all plenary debates from several European parliaments. These are incredibly rich text resources but capture the *totality* of communication by parties and executives, rather than the subset of their communication that relates directly to the EU and European integration. Finally, a growing literature investigates direct communication from EU institutions, for example through press releases of the Commission or the conclusions of the European Council (Alexandrova 2014; Rauh 2021; De Bruyker 2018). However, given the absence of a European public sphere and the limited resources of supranational institutions, it is debatable how much of this communication reaches citizens. It is indeed much more likely that citizens will receive cues on Europe from their own national politicians than from supranational ones. Finally, a vast literature investigates EU communication in the media, but these studies usually cover limited time periods, do not always provide publicly available datasets, and the communication within them is often difficult to directly attribute to specific actors (De Vreese 2007; 2014, 2016; Helbling et al. 2010)

The existing datasets on EU communication are therefore rich but incomplete. Some capture the positions of parties, but do not convey how those positions are created and communicated through language. Others provide direct communication by parties on Europe, but communication that is infrequent. Some provide frequent communication by parties and executives, but on issues that are not specifically about EU integration. Others provide frequent communication from supranational institutions, but ignore the domestic political actors that are more likely to reach European citizens. This research note aims to address the limitations of existing data sources by introducing a large, original dataset of parliamentary communication on European integration that spans significant temporal and geographic variation.

## 3.3 Introducing EUParlspeech

### 3.3.1 Dataset construction

*EUParlspeech* is a dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made in ten national parliaments between 1989 and 2019, available both in the parliament’s native language and translated into English. The dataset allows for more precise, granular analysis than previously possible and overcomes key limitations of existing data sources. Most obviously, the dataset provides a direct, frequent measure of how parties in government and in opposition present European integration over a significant investigation period, covering the shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009). By providing speaker details for each EU reference, it also attributes clear responsibility for EU communication, and allows scholars to investigate differences *within* as well as between parties. Finally, *EUParlspeech* covers speeches from key domestic politicians such as party leaders, from whom citizens are more likely to take their cues than from supranational elites. The rest of this section outlines how the dataset was constructed.

To construct *EUParlspeech*, I draw on the growing range of machine readable datasets of parliamentary speeches in Europe. Most notably, I use *Parlspeech*, a dataset that includes speeches from the plenary debates of eight European Parliaments. I complement *Parlspeech* with a dataset of speeches in Ireland’s lower house, the Dail (Slavin and Kop 2012), and a dataset of plenary debates made in the Hellenic Parliament (Katsouganis 2019). I apply the same pre-processing to all speeches, removing very short speeches of less than 10 tokens and removing full stops that do not denote the end of the sentence<sup>2</sup>. I then use validated dictionaries of EU level terms to capture references to European integration. To do so, I first draw on existing validated dictionaries in German, English, Dutch, and Spanish (Rauh, 2015; Rauh and De Wilde 2018). The original German dictionary, by Rauh (2015), was created by reading one verbatim record of a plenary debate with an explicit EU issue on the agenda and one without such an agenda in each year of the investigation period. Each term-level EU reference found was then stored in the dictionary. The dictionaries in English, Dutch, and Spanish were created by taking Rauh’s initial German dictionary and translating it with the help of native language speakers. These dictionaries include terms relating to the EU polity (e.g. ‘european union’, ‘european community’), EU politics (e.g. ‘european commission’, ‘european elections’ ) and EU policies (e.g. ‘eurozone’, ‘stability and growth pact’).

For the countries in the sample who do not yet have validated dictionaries of EU level

---

<sup>2</sup>Whilst the package *quanteda* recognises some full stops that do not signal the end of a sentence, it does not recognise them all. For example, I remove the full stop from ‘hon. member’ in the House of Commons as *quanteda* recognises the “hon.” abbreviation as the end of a sentence.

terms, namely Sweden, Denmark, Greece, and the Czech Republic, I replicate the methodology used by Rauh and De Wilde and translate the original German dictionary with help from native speakers. The Appendix contains the full list of term-level EU references used to construct *EUParlspeech*. It is important to note here that these dictionaries of EU level terms maximize *precision* over *recall*. That is to say, they include only terms for which an EU references is evident without further context to avoid ‘false positives’. For example, the dictionaries exclude terms such as ‘Brussels’ or ‘Schengen’ which have additional meanings. The choices made here mean I capture EU references rather conservatively but guard against false positives that might occur as many terms have rather ambiguous meanings in different national contexts. And while this method most likely underestimates the absolute number of EU references this is unproblematic for research purposes if we assume this bias to be consistent over time and parties within a given country (Rauh and De Wilde 2018).

The EU references are available both in their original language, and translated into English. To translate the references into English, I make use of Google’s automated translation service, which has proven to deliver similar results to full professional translation for comparative bag-of-words approaches (see de Vries et al 2018). Finally, I remove any duplicate EU references that may occur if a speaker mentions more than one EU level term in a sentence.

Why settle on three-sentence windows as the length of these EU references? One could for example extract the full speech in which European integration is mentioned, or identify debates that are explicitly about Europe and extract all the speeches from these debates, or even use tokens rather than sentences for the length of the window. I opt for three-sentence windows for a number of reasons. First, European integration is now so integrated into the national politics of its member states that references to the EU frequently appear in debates that are not explicitly about Europe. Only including EU-labelled debates would therefore run the risk of ignoring a significant number of references to European integration. Furthermore, the labelling of parliamentary debates is sometimes incomplete (see Rauh and De Wilde 2018), whereas the speeches themselves are consistently well captured. Three-sentence windows also replicate the methodology from other studies (Traber et al 2020; Rauh et al 2020) that experiment with one-sentence windows and windows based on number of tokens and opt for three-sentence windows because they are a natural context unit for human listeners, and because the resulting data windows are empirically most well-behaved in distributional terms.

Table 3.1 provides an overview of *EUParlspeech*, including the number of EU references in each national parliament. The sample covers important structural divisions within the European Union: they are located in both the northern, southern, and eastern parts

of Europe; include powerful member states and smaller ones; and include Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. Naturally there is cross-country variance in the number of EU references in each parliament, reflecting the different nature of 'speaking' and 'working' parliaments in the sample.<sup>3</sup> Table 3.2 provides examples of the translated EU references. Worth noting here is the quality of the automated translation into English, giving coherent, fully interpretable statements on EU integration by speakers in parliament.

### 3.3.2 Variables

All ten corpora have an identical structure with 15 variables. As the data is mainly drawn from ParlSpeech (Rauh and Schwalbach 2020), it often replicates the variables included in those corpora. The variable **date** stores the day the reference to European integration was made in a character vector (YYYY-MM-DD). I also include variables for the **year**, the **quarter**, and the **month** in which the speech was made to facilitate aggregation.

The column **speaker** holds a character vector with the full name of the person having made the EU reference as provided in the official protocol or other parliamentary sources. As with ParlSpeech, researchers should consider that speaker names might slightly diverge from external lists, e.g. with regards to nicknames, middle initials or titles. In Germany for instance, a member of cabinet may be referred to by their name and ministry position. The variables **parliament** and **iso3country** contain character terms for the name of the parliament and the member state's three letter country code respectively.

The variable **speech** provides the full speech from which the EU reference is taken in its original language, which provides additional context and may be useful and for qualitative researchers using EUParlSpeech. I also include a variable that captures the number of **terms** in this speech. The variable **reference** provides the three sentence EU reference in the original language, and the variable **translation** provides an automated translation of this reference into English. The variable **keyword** is the EU level keyword that was used to identify the reference, in the original language. The variable **agenda** indicates the name of the agenda item under which an individual speech was held, again as provided in the respective parliamentary archive. For technical reasons mostly lying in the structure of the respective online databases, this information is unfortunately not available for all speeches in the corpora.

Finally, the variable **party** contains a character vector storing the partisan faction of the speaker as given in the plenary protocol; and to facilitate linkage with party-level data

---

<sup>3</sup>For instance, plenary debates from the British House of Commons include over 2 million speeches between 1989 and 2019, whereas those from the Czech Chamber of Deputies include just under 330,000 between 1993 and 2016.

Table 3.1: Overview of the *EUParlspeech* corpora

<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>EU references</i>	<i>Unique speakers</i>	<i>Unique parties</i>
AT Nationalrat	1996-01 2018-12	58,536	776	BZÖ, FPÖ, Grüne, LIF, NEOS ÖVP, PILZ, SPÖ, STRONACH
CZ Poslanecká sněmovna	1993-01 2016-06	28,762	771	ANO, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM, Nezařazení, ODA, ODS, SPR-RSČ, TOP09, US, US-DEU, Úsvit, VV
DE Bundestag	1991-03 2018-12	100,518	412	AfD, CDU, FDP, GRUENE PDS/LINKE, SPD
DN Folketing	1997-10 2018-12	85,511	609	ALT, CD, DF, EL, FF, FP, FRI, IA, KD, KF, KRF, LA, LH, NQ, NY RV, S, SF, SIU, SP, T, UFG, UP, V
ES Congreso	1996-05 2018-12	56,112	1,161	GC, CiU, DL, GCC, NC, GCUP, EC, EM, GER, ERC, IU, ICV, GIP, GIU GMX, GPP, GPSOE, GUPyD, GV, EAJ,
GRC Hellenic Parliament	1989-07 2019-02	75,881	1,300	KKE, LAOS, ND, Alt. Ecol., PASOK, OP, POL.AN, SYRIZA, ANEL, DIMAR, GD, PATRIS, KINAL
IRL Dail	1989-01 2013-03	262,307	431	DL, FF, FG, GP, PBPA, PD, SF, SP, LP, WP
NLD Tweede Kamer	1994-12 2019-07	84,081	911	50PLUS, CDA, CU, D66 , DENK FvD, GL, GPV, LPF, PvdA PvdD, PVV, RPF, SGP SP, VVD
SE Riksdag	1990-10 2018-12	155,626	1,547	C, FP, KD, L, M, MP, NYD S, SD, V
UK House of Commons	1989-01 2019-11	260,285	1,876	Con, DUP, GPEW, Lab, LibDem Plaid, SNP, UKIP, UUP, Change
<b>Total</b>	<b>1989-01 2019-11</b>	<b>1,167,619 72</b>	<b>9,794</b>	<b>135 parties</b>



Table 3.2: Exemplary EU references

Date	Speaker	Translated EU Reference
1993/04	Josef Zieleniec (CZ - VV)	The nations of Western Europe must gradually get used to the idea that one day we will live together. The European Communities, to a large extent the creation of the past bipolar world, must seek their new place in the new world, they must seek a new vision. Efforts to adjust the economy must be made on both sides of the former Iron Curtain.
2014/11	Angela Merkel (DE - CDU)	Nonetheless, as difficult and lengthy as the path may be, overall we are on the right course in Europe. The average budget deficit in the euro area fell below the Maastricht limit for the first time since 2008, at 2.9 per cent of gross domestic product. The Federal Government supports the European Commission in strictly checking the budget plans of the member states.
2014/05	Mariano Rajoy (ES - PP)	The first thing I want to emphasize is that, in relation to the crisis in Ukraine, the European Union has been able to maintain a united position and to convey a clear and resounding message on behalf of the Member States and their institutions. This is one of the priorities of the EU, that Europe is a leading player on the international scene and that scene and that it speaks with one voice. From the content of the conclusions I want to highlight the following elements.
2012/05	Geert Wilders (NL - VPP)	The Dutch wanted less Europe and more Netherlands. The political elite, however, ignored this and forced the Treaty of Lisbon on us. This extract from the European constitution completely ignored the wishes of the Dutch population.
2001/05	Caspar Einem (AT - SPÖ)	Mr. Chancellor! We Social Democrats therefore advocate that the next European summit, which is supposed to be about institutional reforms, is prepared differently. We therefore advocate that parliamentarians - national and European - and representatives of the governments work together in a convention, because it is necessary to ensure that this policy of cockfighting amongst little men is finally overcome.

I also include the **party.facts.id** variable. This points to the numeric identifier for the respective party in Doring and Regel’s (2019) Party Facts database which in turn offers straightforward linkages to the CHES (Bakker et al 2015), the Manifesto Data (Volkens et al 2020) or the ParlGov database (Doring and Manow 2021).

### 3.3.3 Applications of EUParlspeech

*EUParlspeech* provides many uses for researchers in political science and international relations. IR scholars can explore how international cooperation is framed in domestic debates. Scholars interested in intraparty division and dissent can use the dataset to investigate how different factions within parties compete and contest over Europe. Scholars of party competition can explore how parties rhetorically execute their strategies. Mainstream parties, for example, are assumed to employ strategies of avoidance on European integration as it constitutes a classic wedge issue that cuts across the left right dimension. Yet despite the variety of avoidance strategies available to parties, we know little about which one they employ. Importantly, the dataset also has uses for qualitative scholars who have access to the full speech for additional context. In the following sections, I use automated text analysis to demonstrate the face, convergent, and predictive validity of EUParlspeech.

## 3.4 Face validity: Cross party differences

I first assess *face validity*, i.e. the extent to which automated text analysis of EUParlspeech appears to capture known differences in the communication of European integration by political parties. To do so, I estimate three measures of parties’ EU communication. I capture the *simplicity* of an EU statement through the Flesch Reading Ease score, a metric widely used to capture the sophistication of text (Benoit et al 2019). I capture the *tone* of an EU statement with the Lexicoder sentiment dictionary and calculate the net sentiment for each EU statement (Young and Soroka 2012). Finally, I capture the *emotiveness* of an EU statement through the ANEW dictionary. The ANEW dictionary was developed by a team at the Center for the Study of Emotion Attention at the University of Florida, and rates 3,188 words on three dimensions of affective meaning on a scale from one to nine (Bradley and Lang 2017). The ANEW dictionary has been used to measure emotive rhetoric in parliament (Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon. 2021). I replicate the methodology from Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon (2021), which identifies emotive words as those with a score below 3 and above 7 on the ANEW dictionary’s valence measure, and excludes words

with a large standard deviation<sup>4</sup>.

Political parties are assumed to employ different strategies when presenting European integration. Mainstream parties, those that have formed governments in the past and are likely to do so in the future, generally hold pro-European positions that they attempt to obfuscate, for example by defusing the issue with complex technocratic language (Rauh et al 2019). By contrast challengers parties, those who challenge established parties by emphasising new issues (see Hobolt and De Vries 2020), aim to mobilize the issue of European integration and place it on the political agenda. The Appendix provides details on the parties in EUParlspeech classified as mainstream or challenger, and I run linear mixed effects models using the classification of parties as mainstream or challenger as binary independent variables, with random effects for countries and for individual speakers. Table 3 presents the regression results and shows that, as expected, mainstream and challenger parties use different language when presenting European integration in parliament. Mainstream parties use a more positive tone when presenting European integration, but use less simple, and less emotional language. By contrast, challenger parties use more simple language, more emotive language, and have a more negative tone in their communication of European integration. The effects are robust to different specifications, including fixed effects for countries and speakers (see Appendix).

Challenger parties are not a homogenous group and incorporate diversity. Regionalist and green parties, for example are generally supportive of European integration whereas radical right parties generally support withdrawal from the EU (Hobolt and De Vries 2020). To provide further details on the differences between challenger parties, I repeat the mixed effects regressions using party family from the CHES as the categorical independent variable. Figure 3.3 summarises the estimation results. The results show how not all challenger parties mobilize the issue of integration with clear communication on Europe. In particular, radical right parties are more likely to send clear, sceptical cues on European integration. Their communication is more emotive, has a more negative tone, and is more simple than all other parties. Altogether, these results provide strong face validity for the usefulness of EUParlspeech to capture cross-party differences on European integration. As expected, challenger parties send clearer cues on European integration than their mainstream counterparts. And this difference is not driven by the challenger parties that are supportive of integration, but largely by radical right parties who oppose the EU and who have been most successful at mobilising the issue at national and European elections (Schulte-Croos 2018).

---

<sup>4</sup>The use of ANEW distinguishes itself from Lexicoder sentiment analysis, by studying the degree to which politicians use rhetoric with positive or negative emotions versus rhetoric with technical language without affect.


Table 1: Table 3.3: Mixed Effects Regression Results (Party Type)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Simplicity (Flesch)	Tone (Lexicoder)	Emotiveness (ANEW)	Simplicity (Flesch)	Tone (Lexicoder)	Emotiveness (ANEW)
Mainstream Party	-1.099*** (0.146)	0.012*** (0.0005)	-0.002*** (0.0002)			
Challenger Party				0.925*** (0.152)	-0.012*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.0002)
Constant	41.305*** (2.616)	0.030*** (0.002)	0.043*** (0.002)	40.275*** (2.611)	0.042*** (0.002)	0.041*** (0.002)
Observations	1,084,123	1,084,123	1,084,123	1,084,123	1,084,123	1,084,123
Country RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Leader RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Figure 3.1: Mixed Effects Regression Results (Party Family)



### 3.5 Convergent validity: Comparison with expert data

Next, I assess *convergent* validity, i.e. the convergence of information retrieved from EUParlspeech with existing measures that capture the positions of parties on European integration. To do so, I draw on the CHES. The CHES is an expert survey that has been running since 1999 and captures the positions of parties on EU integration at three or four year intervals. I aim to assess the extent to which automated measures of parties' EU communication in parliamentary debates converge with expert evaluations. In particular, I draw on the CHES' evaluation of parties' EU positions (how strongly they are in favour/opposed to EU integration) and their EU salience (the salience they accord to EU integration in their public campaigning)<sup>5</sup>.


I capture parties' EU positions and EU salience for each year of the CHES survey namely 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. I aggregate all EU references by a party in these same years into a single text document and use automated analysis to capture the *tone* of parties' EU communication, and the *share* of their parliamentary communication they dedicate to EU integration. I capture EU tone by using the Lexicoder sentiment dictionary (Soroka and Young 2012) to capture the net sentiment of their communication. A higher value corresponds to a more positive tone, whereas a lower value corresponds to a more negative tone. I capture the EU share of parliamentary communication by a party by dividing the cumulative length of their EU statements (in tokens) by the cumulative length of their total parliamentary communication. Each observation refers to one party in each of the CHES survey years and contains data both from the CHES survey and from my automated measure of tone and EU share of parliamentary communication.

Figure 3.2 plots the data and demonstrates the correlations between the CHES' expert evaluations and the automated measures derived from EUParlspeech. Parties who are strongly in favour of EU integration (according to the CHES) use a more positive tone when communicating European integration in parliamentary debates. Likewise, parties who have a high EU salience (according to the CHES) dedicate a higher share of their parliamentary communication to European integration. While the correlation is less strong for the salience measure than for the tone one, both these correlations demonstrate that measures derived from automated analysis of EUParlspeech converge with the measures captured in expert surveys.

---

<sup>5</sup>The exact EU position question from the CHES asks experts about the 'overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration' from 1 (Strongly Opposed) to 7 (Strongly in Favour). The EU salience question asks experts about 'the relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance' from 0 (European integration of no importance) to 10 (European integration of great importance).

Figure 3.2: Convergent validity: EUParlspeech and the CHES



### 3.6 Predictive Validity: Intra Party Divisions

One of the advantages of *EUParlspeech* as a dataset of EU communication is that it facilitates not only comparisons *between* parties, but also allows us to investigate differences and divisions *within* parties. As a final validation step, I assess *predictive* validity: whether positions of individual legislators from divided parties captured in *EUParlspeech* can help predict their subsequent behaviour at elections and/or referendums. For this specific use of *EUParlspeech*, I draw on a party that has been particularly divided by the issue of European integration: the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. The Conservative Party has consistently been divided by Europe, with a vocal group of backbenchers campaigning for withdrawal from the EU (Bale 2010). More recently, the difficulties of Theresa May in ratifying her Withdrawal Agreement is testament to the deep and historical divisions on Europe within the party.


To estimate the ideological positions stated in each Conservative MP's EU rhetoric, I use the Wordscores procedure (Laver et al 2003). The central idea behind Wordscores is to estimate a 'virgin' text document's position by using two documents whose positions are 'known' to act as reference documents. As the Wordscore procedure is less useful to

capture longitudinal trends (see Martin and Vanberg 2008; Benoit and Laver 2008), I draw on a single parliamentary term to test whether the use of EUParlspeech can accurately capture the positions of Conservative party MPs on the issue of integration, and predict their subsequent behaviour at the 2016 referendum. To do so, I draw on EU statements from Conservative MPs in the fifty-fifth legislature of the House of Commons, between the 25 May 2010 and 30 March 2015. This fifty-fifth legislature is highly pertinent to estimate MPs' EU positions, as Cameron's announcement of his intention to hold an in/out referendum in his Bloomberg speech of January 2013 was followed by an intense period of negotiation and EU politicization in the House of Commons.

The correct application of the Wordscores approach depends on the validity of the reference documents. In this case, we need as reference documents individual speakers who represent the two extremes of the Conservative party on the issue of EU integration (pro-European on the one hand, hard Eurosceptic on the other). To do so, I draw on the figures of Ken Clarke and Bill Cash. Ken Clarke is a consistent and staunch Europhile - president of the Conservative Europe Group, Co-President of the pro-EU body British Influence and Vice-President of the European Movement UK - who consistently clashed with his party over his more pro-European views. Bill Cash by contrast has been described as the "most Eurosceptic" Member of Parliament and the leader of the Eurosceptics during the Maastricht Rebellion (Blake 2010). The reference texts are therefore an aggregation of all EU references made by Ken Clarke (pro-European reference text), and all EU references made by Bill Cash (hard Eurosceptic reference text) in the fifty-fifth legislature. These reference texts have clear face validity: few would argue that Bill Cash is not on the extreme Eurosceptic end of the Conservative party (and vice versa for Clarke). This is confirmed by the discriminatory tokens for each reference text: as expected we find that the Eurosceptic reference text (Bill Cash) is more likely to mention 'sovereignty', 'over-regulation', 'centralisation', 'undemocratic', and 'renegotiation'. By contrast, the pro-European reference text (Ken Clarke) is more likely to reference the 'economy', 'markets', 'competition', 'civilisation', and 'stabilisation'.

The virgin documents are the aggregation of EU statements for all for all other remaining MPs, which each MP having one virgin document. I drop MPs who speak little of European integration and whose cumulative length of EU communication is less than 200 tokens long, as excessively short virgin documents can invalidate the results (Martin and Vanberg 2008). This leads me to estimate the positions of 264 virgin texts (MPs). Figure 3.2 plots the positions of Conservative MPs in the 2010-2015 parliamentary term. The x axis plots the Wordscore position estimate, and the y axis plots the speakers' salience of EU integration by dividing the cumulative length of their EU communication during the parliamentary term, by the cumulative length of their total parliamentary communication in the same

Figure 3.3: Position Estimates of Conservative MPs (2010-2015)



term. The data show how Wordscores is useful in estimating the positions of prominent Eurosceptics and Europhiles. Known Eurosceptics who lobbied strongly for a referendum and campaigned for Brexit, such as Peter Bone, Priti Patel, and Jacob Rees Mogg are placed on the Hard Eurosceptic side of the scale, as are the two MPs who would eventually defect to UKIP (Mark Reckless and Douglas Carswell). Softer pro-Europeans, such as Anna Soubry, Philip Hammond, and Michael Fallon are placed on the pro-European side of the scale. The salience measure provides interesting insights into the dynamics of EU communication: it shows how Eurosceptics in the party were consistently more likely to mention EU integration in their communication, whereas pro-Europeans were less likely to. Interestingly, the Wordscore scaling places the Prime Minister of the time, David Cameron, on the Eurosceptic side, reflecting his need to rhetorically appease the dissenting Eurosceptic faction of his party.

To assess the predictive validity of EUParlspeech, I test whether MPs' estimated position from the Wordscore procedure could later predict their vote and position at the 2016 referendum. To do so, I create a binary dependent variable *EUrefposition* that captures each individual MP's stated position at the 2016 referendum. The Appendix contains details on each MP's position. I run logistic regression models with *EUrefposition* as the dependent variable. The independent variable is each MP's Wordscore estimate from the 2010-2015



parliamentary term. I control for a number of factors. As government loyalty usually leads cabinet members to side with the PM’s position, I control for whether an MP was part of the cabinet. I also include a variable to capture whether the MP held a ministry position such as ministers of state or parliamentary under secretaries<sup>6</sup>. As recent MPs may also feel loyalty towards the leadership, I also include a continuous variable which captures the number of months they have been an MP. Finally, as bottom-up pressures are likely to impact an MP’s stated position, I capture each constituency’s UKIP vote share at the 2015 general election.

Table 3.4: Logistic Regression Results (Referendum Position)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WordScore Estimate	1.474*** (0.495)	1.423*** (0.499)	1.653*** (0.530)	1.665*** (0.518)
Months as MP		0.001 (0.002)	−0.0002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
UKIP Vote Share (2015)		0.026 (0.026)	0.024 (0.029)	0.011 (0.027)
Ministry			−1.549*** (0.328)	
Cabinet				−1.467** (0.608)
Constant	−0.149 (0.140)	−0.641 (0.449)	0.064 (0.496)	−0.358 (0.464)
Observations	225	225	225	225
Log Likelihood	−149.625	−148.948	−136.377	−145.486
Akaike Inf. Crit.	303.250	305.896	282.754	300.971

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

<sup>6</sup>These ministers and parliamentary under secretaries are considered part of the PM’s ministry, but do not attend cabinet meetings.

Table 3.4 summarises the logistic regression results. I report the results from a baseline model (Model 1) and models adding the controls (Models 2, 3, and 4). The results demonstrate that the Wordscore Estimate using EUParlspeech data is a strong predictor of MPs' campaigning positions during the 2016 referendum, even when controlling for other factors from the literature. The closer their EU parliamentary communication approached the reference document of Bill Cash, the higher the likelihood they campaigned for Leave. Conversely, the closer their EU parliamentary communication approached the reference document of Ken Clarke, the higher the likelihood they campaigned for Remain. The controls show how both members of Cameron's cabinet and his ministry more widely were more likely to campaign for Cameron's position of Remain. In sum our our results demonstrate that the positions of individual legislators derived from EUParlspeech can help predict their subsequent behaviour at referendums, even when controlling for a range of relevant factors. EUParlspeech not only has high levels of face and convergent validity, but also high levels of predictive validity.

### 3.7 Conclusion

In this paper, I have introduced and validated a new dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made in the plenary debates of ten parliaments between 1989 and 2019. The EUParlspeech approach uses validated dictionaries of EU level terms and keyword-in-context to identify EU references in parliamentary speeches that are three sentences in length. These references are translated into English with Google Translate, which allows for cross-national comparisons of how parties present, frame, and compete over European integration. The paper also addressed the face, convergent, and predictive validity of data gathered with this approach.

EUParlspeech provides certain advantages over other datasets of EU communication such as the CHES or party manifestos. Most importantly, it is the most direct way of measuring speakers' positions during actual political debates, and does not rely on the recollection or interpretation by third parties such as experts. The data is also captured more frequently than manifestos, which only appear at election time. And by capturing the data at the level of individual speaker, EUParlspeech allows us to address not only comparisons *between* parties, but also allows us to investigate differences and divisions *within* parties.

Our choice of data sources and collection strategies should be guided by the questions we ask. EUParlspeech adds itself to the rich - but incomplete - existing collection of datasets of EU communication. It provides many uses for researchers in political science and interna-

tional relations. IR scholars can explore how international cooperation is framed in domestic debates. Scholars interested in intraparty division and dissent can use the dataset to investigate how different factions within parties compete and contest over Europe. Scholars of party competition can explore how parties rhetorically execute their strategies. By making the EUParlspeech dataset publicly available, I hope that researchers will be able to answer some of these questions, and deepen our understanding of how European integration is presented, framed, and contested in national politics and domestic public spheres.

## Ignore or Defuse? Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition

*Introduction – Mainstream Parties and the Avoidance of Wedge Issues*

*Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition - Research Design*

*Results - Discussion - Conclusion*

**Abstract:** It is well-established in the literature on issue competition that parties seek to compete on issues they ‘own’. Yet, less attention has been paid to what strategies parties employ to avoid issues they would prefer not to compete on. This paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding the avoidance strategies available in party competition on issues that parties wish to make less salient to voters. Empirically, this is tested using the wedge issue of European integration. We analyse an original dataset of over 70,000 statements on the EU by mainstream and challenger party leaders in national parliaments between 1989 and 2019, and use automated text analysis to demonstrate that mainstream parties in government and opposition employ different avoidance strategies. The findings show that mainstream government parties are more likely to use an avoidance strategy that *defuses* EU integration through the use of complex technocratic language. In contrast, mainstream opposition parties are more likely to employ an avoidance strategy that *ignores* EU integration. We also show that when wedge issues are successfully mobilized by challenger parties, mainstream parties stop ignoring the issue but continue to avoid it with alternate strategies of avoidance. Our findings have important implications for the literature on party competition and democratic representation.

**Note:** This article is co-written with Sara Hagemann and Sara B.Hobolt. I was the article’s lead author and contributed significantly to the research design, development and testing of hypotheses, and drafting of the final text.

## 4.1 Introduction

Issue avoidance is a central strategy for parties engaged in political competition. Whilst the ‘obfuscation’ literature initially concluded that taking ambiguous positions is costly in uni-dimensional competition, scholars have since shown that in multidimensional competition, avoidance can in fact be a rational strategy for parties who seek to de-emphasize issues where they do not hold a competitive advantage (Rovny 2012; 2013; Han 2018; Heinkelmann-Wild et al 2020; Abou-Chadi 2016). Mainstream parties are particularly likely to employ this strategy on wedge issues that do not fit onto the dimension of political conflict where they are dominant and risk intra party divisions and voter defection. Indeed, avoidance is listed as one of the key ‘strategies of dominance’ available to mainstream parties to maintain their dominant position in the political marketplace (Hobolt and De Vries 2020).

However, whilst this literature has deepened our understanding of why parties avoid issues and with what consequence; it has largely neglected how parties manage to avoid them in the first place. This neglect is not trivial. Mainstream parties can avoid issues in a number of different ways, and the choice between these avoidance strategies is likely to be consequential. Parties can avoid issues by ignoring them altogether (Hobolt and De Vries 2020) or by defusing them with complex technocratic language (Rauh et al 2019, Bale et al 2010). The difference in these strategies highlights that the choice between them is likely to be non-trivial, yet it is rarely systematically investigated by scholars of party competition.

How do mainstream parties avoid wedge issues they would prefer not to compete on? Put otherwise: which *strategies* of avoidance do they employ in their pursuit of (re)election? This article draws on the literature of agenda setting and issue competition (see e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015) to present three central arguments. First, it argues that mainstream parties’ communication of wedge issues is likely to be both more complex than challenger parties’ communication of wedge issues, and more complex than the rest of their own political communication, as complexity allows them to obfuscate their position. Second, it argues that while they both use more complex language when presenting wedge issues, mainstream parties in government and in opposition are likely to employ different avoidance strategies. Because parties in government are more constrained by the party system agenda they find it difficult to ignore wedge issues altogether and are more likely to employ avoidance strategy of *defusion*, whereas, mainstream parties in opposition are more likely to employ an avoidance strategy that *ignores* wedge issues. Third, it argues that mainstream parties are likely to change their avoidance strategies when political entrepreneurs successfully mobilise a particular wedge issue. Successful mobilisation by entrepreneurs increases the risk of ignoring a wedge issue, but this does not mean that mainstream parties begin competing on the issue. Instead, mainstream parties continue to avoid it through the

deployment of alternate avoidance strategies.

We test these expectations with an original dataset of communication by mainstream and challenger party leaders on a central wedge issue in European democracies: that of EU integration. We use the *EUParlspeech* dataset (Hunter 2021 - see Chapter 3) to capture 79,379 EU statements made by party leaders in parliament and use a variety of automated text tools to provide evidence for the hypotheses above. Mainstream parties consistently use less clear language than challenger parties when discussing European integration (*defuse*). They dedicate less of their communication to European integration when in opposition (*ignore*), but depoliticise EU integration with complex, less emotive language when in government (*defuse*). Finally, mainstream party leaders talk about Europe more when Eurosceptic niche parties have successfully mobilised the issue in elections.

Findings have implications both for democratic legitimacy in the EU, and for the party competition literature more widely. Political legitimacy is a fragile and contested concept, particularly for emerging polities, and needs to be re-established continuously (Gallie 1956; Collier et al 2006; Sternberg 2013). National governments and the mainstream parties that compose them play a crucial role in legitimating European integration in the eyes of citizens. Yet the results presented here show how mainstream parties often send obfuscating cues to their citizens. The article also makes the case for studying the multiple avoidance strategies in party competition. Parties can avoid issues in a number of different ways, and the choice between these is likely to be consequential. This article has shown how parties can avoid clear position taking despite mentioning an issue frequently in their communication. Indeed, they are often rather skilled in doing so.

## 4.2 Mainstream Parties and the Avoidance of Wedge Issues

The ‘obfuscation’ literature in American politics initially concluded that taking ambiguous positions is a costly strategy in the uni-dimensional context of American politics (Shepsle 1972; Enelow and Hinich 1981; Bartels 1986). Since then however, scholars of party competition have shown that in multidimensional competition, avoidance can in fact be an effective electoral strategy, particularly for parties’ secondary issues where they do not hold a competitive advantage (Rovny 2012; 2013; Abou-Chadi 2014; 2015, Han 2018). By blurring their positions on these issues, parties misrepresent the distance between the party and its potential voters and maintain a broader coalition of electoral support.

Mainstream parties are particularly likely to employ this strategy on *wedge issues* – those that cut along party lines and are intentionally mobilized by challengers to spark intra-party divisions (Wiant, 2002; Heinkelmann-Wild et al 2020; Hollihan 2001 Sieberer

2006; Kam 2009; Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Because these wedge issues do not fit neatly onto the dimension of political competition where they are dominant, mainstream parties will aim to keep them off the agenda and lower their salience (Parsons and Weber 2011; Green-Pedersen 2012; van de Wardt 2014; Hutter et al. 2016; Adam et al. 2017). Examples of wedge issues that mainstream parties have largely tried to avoid include immigration and European integration. As the power of the EU's supranational institutions has increased, European integration has become ever more contested within domestic politics, and this has led to tensions within parties on both the mainstream left and right that party leaders seek to deemphasize. This avoidance of wedge issues is electorally beneficial: Meguid (2005, 2008) shows that mainstream parties perform better against niche parties when they refuse to compete on the niche party's issues, and Hobolt and De Vries (2020) list issue avoidance as one of the three central 'strategies of dominance' available to mainstream parties to maintain their leading position in the political marketplace.

This literature has deepened our understanding of when parties avoid issues and with what consequences. However, it is less clear which *strategies*<sup>1</sup> of avoidance are actually employed by parties in the first place. Whilst one could argue that the particular ways in which parties avoid issues is of little importance, we argue instead that studying the multiple *strategies* of avoidance is a valuable contribution to the literature on party competition. After all, parties can avoid and de-emphasise issues in a number of ways, for example by ignoring them altogether (Hobolt and De Vries 2010), or depoliticizing them with complex technocratic language (Rauh et al 2019). These strategies share the same strategic goal but are likely to have differing effects in their attempt to de-emphasize an issue. Neglecting the multiple avoidance strategies available in party competition could also lead to misinterpretations about whether a party is really avoiding or engaging with an issue. For example, scholars have used frequency of communication on a particular issue as a measure of a party's emphasis on it (Adam et al 2017). Yet failing to investigate the substance of this communication could lead to imperfect conclusions about whether they are really engaging with the issue. Parties often avoid clear position taking despite mentioning an issue frequently in their communication.

This lack of precision surrounding strategies is reflected in the multiplication of terms used to describe avoidance. Avoidance is referred to in the literature to as 'ignoring' (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015 ); 'neglecting' (Heinkelmann-Wild et al 2019); 'blurring' (Rovny 2012, 2013); 'obfuscating' (Bartels 1982); 'silencing' (Adam et al 2017); 'muffling' (Parsons and Weber 2011), 'obscuring' (Hobolt and De Vries 2020), 'dismissing' (Meguid 2005, 2008), 'beclouding' (Han 2018), 'distracting' (Heinkelmann-Wild et al 2020), and

---

<sup>1</sup>The plural here is deliberate: avoidance or obfuscation is often described as a singular strategy, but can in fact be executed in many different ways

‘defusing’ (Bale et al 2009, Rauh et al 2019). Importantly, these terms are not exact synonyms and often reflect the various, intricate ways in which parties can avoid taking positions on issues they want to de-emphasise.

Whilst these terms suggest a multiplicity of avoidance strategies, a more careful reading of the authors’ usually brief descriptions reveals that parties can avoid issues in two principal ways. First, and most obviously, mainstream parties can avoid issues by *ignoring* them. By refusing to present a stance or mention an issue in their public communication, parties can ensure the salience of the issue remains low. Ignoring in this case captures both the idea that parties might simply stop discussing an issue (Rovny 2012; Hobolt and De Vries 2020), or might politicise other issues to create a distraction (Heinkelmann et al 2020). The crucial point here is that parties decrease the *share* of their communication dedicated to the issue they want to avoid, either by talking less about the issue in question, or by talking more about other issues.

Second, mainstream parties can avoid wedge issues by *defusing* them (Rauh et al 2019). This active form of depoliticisation emphasises the use of technocratic, scientific or managerial language so as to avoid signaling political choice and to shield functionally necessary decisions from the vagaries of political competition (Wood and Flinders 2014, Mair 2013). This strategy also uses less emotive appeals, which have been shown increase participation and activate existing loyalties (Brader, 2005) - precisely what mainstream parties seek to avoid for wedge issues. The key point of this defusion strategy is that it entails framing the issue in question as one which is about technocratic competence, rather than an issue which entails political choice.<sup>2</sup>

Table 4.1: Issue Avoidance Strategies

<i>Strategy</i>	Ignore	Defuse
<i>Description</i>	Communicate on issue as little as possible. Refuse to present a stance.	Depoliticise with complex technocratic language. Use less emotive communication.

<sup>2</sup>In their 2019 article, Rauh et al suggest that their conceptualisation of defusion is ‘very similar to the idea of position blurring in party competition as studied by Rovny (2012)’. It is important to note that the two strategies outlined in this section are not intended as an exhaustive list. However they do describe the types of avoidance strategy that are mentioned most frequently in the literature.



Table 4.1 summarises the two key avoidance strategies available to mainstream parties. It shows that avoidance can be executed in different ways, each of which could have differing effects on discourse in the public sphere, and is likely to be more or less successful in helping mainstream parties blur their positions. In the following section we present our theoretical argument on which avoidance strategies are likely to be employed in which contexts, before testing the argument on an original dataset of communication by political parties on a central wedge issue in European democracies: that of EU integration.

### 4.3 Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition

How do mainstream parties avoid wedge issues? Do they do so by ignoring them altogether? Or do they defuse wedge issues with complex technocratic language? This article aims to address this question, and in doing so makes three central claims. First, it argues that mainstream parties use more complex language in their communication of wedge issues, as complex language allows them to obfuscate their position. Second, it argues that mainstream parties are likely to employ different avoidance strategies when they are in government compared to when they are in opposition. Because parties in government are more constrained by the party system agenda (see Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010 2015) they find it difficult to ignore wedge issues altogether and are more likely to employ avoidance strategy of *defusion*, whereas mainstream opposition parties are more likely to employ an avoidance strategy that *ignores* wedge issues. Third, it argues that mainstream parties are likely to change their avoidance strategies when a wedge issue is successfully mobilised by political entrepreneurs. This successful mobilisation increases the risk of ignoring they wedge issue, but this does not mean that mainstream parties begin competing on the issue. Instead, mainstream parties continue to avoid it with alternate avoidance strategies.

It is important to note here that whilst this article focuses on avoidance, we do not deny that mainstream parties are also likely to adjust their *position* on wedge issues, particularly in response to the success of issue entrepreneurs. Indeed, a rich subset of the party competition literature already explores how mainstream parties adjust their positions in response to the success of niche parties (Meguid 2005, 2008; Abou Chadi 2016, 2020). Avoidance and adjustment strategies though are *mutually inclusive*: mainstream parties can adjust their position on an issue whilst also deciding to avoid and deemphasise it in their communication.

#### 4.3.1 Defusion through Complex Language

A growing literature has taken an interest in the complexity of politicians' communication (see Haselmayer and Jenny 2017; Young and Soroka 2012; Rauh 2015; Spirling 2015). Re-

search on the linguistic habits of American and British politicians shows that conservative politicians make less complex statements than liberal ones, and that populist parties use simple language to convey their messages compared to the more complex messaging of mainstream parties (Tetlock 1983, 1984; Schoonvelde et al 2018). Crucially, scholars have also shown that the simplicity and complexity of language used by political parties matters. Voters find it easier to place the positions of parties that use simple language, and struggle to place parties whose language is more complex (Bischof and Seninger 2018). The simplicity or complexity of language used is therefore an important tool that parties can use to clarify or obfuscate their positions.

Linguistic complexity is also assumed to help defuse issues and avoid blame. The literature on blame avoidance shows how complexities in institutional setups and presentational styles are useful mechanisms for governments to avoid blame for negative outcomes (Hood 2011, 2014; Wood and Flinders 2014). Furthermore, scholars have shown how the complexity of national leaders' discourse increased during the years of EU crises, a technique the authors describe as 'defusing political debates by resorting to technocratic, scientific or managerial language' (Rauh et al 2020). Are mainstream parties therefore likely to alter the complexity of their language when communicating on wedge issues? We argue that they are: by using more complex language when discussing an issue, they can obfuscate their position on it. By contrast, challenger parties will attempt to mobilize wedge issues by using less complex, more emotive language when discussing them. Our first hypotheses therefore relate to how the complexity in parties communication is likely to differ systematically when they discuss wedge issues. They read as follows:

**Hypothesis H1a:** Mainstream parties' communication of wedge issues is more complex and less emotive than challenger parties' communication of wedge issues

**Hypothesis H1b:** Mainstream parties' communication of wedge issues is more complex and less emotive than the rest of their political communication.

Whilst mainstream parties both in government and in opposition are likely to use more complex language when discussing wedge issues, this isn't to say that they employ the same strategies of avoidance. In fact, we argue that mainstream governing parties (MGPs) and mainstream opposition parties (MOPs) are likely to employ quite different avoidance strategies. Central to this argument is the concept of the 'party system agenda'. Whilst the study of issue competition tended to focus exclusively on the intended emphases of various political parties or candidates, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2005, 2010) present a model of issue competition that incorporates elements from the agenda setting literature. The party-system agenda emerges from the continuous political debate among political parties. This party political debate is a crucial element in a democratic society that often takes place

in the mass media (see Zaller 1999), but is also institutionalised in various other ways. For example, all democratically elected bodies, such as parliaments, have institutionalised the party system agenda through ‘question hours’ and hearings (see Baumgartner 1989). This agenda therefore influences and constrains political parties: they must address the issues that are prominent on it, whilst competing to influence its very composition. In particular, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen show how government parties and opposition parties are not equal in their ability to ignore issues introduced onto the party system agenda.

### 4.3.2 Avoidance Strategies in Government and in Opposition

The literature on issue competition and agenda setting frequently distinguishes between parties in government and parties in opposition. Whilst both will seek to focus debate on the issues that are advantageous to themselves, MOPs enjoy a structural advantage over MGPs in doing so (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). This is because governments - and therefore government parties - are expected to deliver solutions to a huge number of policy problems facing modern societies, even if the government bears no direct responsibility for these problems, and even though many of them may not be amenable to government solutions in the first place. If a government does not respond to issues, it is automatically accused of being in trouble and unable to deliver the expected policy solutions. They are therefore forced to respond to issues as soon as they emerge onto the party agenda. Their room for manoeuvre is more restricted: Green-Pedersen and Mortensen conclude that ‘ignoring issues (on the party-system agenda) is almost impossible for government parties’ (2015).

Opposition parties by contrast are much freer to ignore issues they would prefer not to discuss. Unlike government parties, they are not to the same extent held responsible for policy solutions, and can instead focus on criticising the government on whatever issue they deem advantageous. For MOPs, this issue is unlikely to be any of the wedge issues that may destabilise MGPs: scholars have shown that in multiparty systems, mainstream opposition parties are also reluctant to engage in wedge issue competition as it may divide their own voters and jeopardise relationships with future coalition partners (van der Wardt et al 2014). Employing an avoidance strategy that *ignores* wedge issues altogether is therefore a relatively straightforward decision for MOPs.<sup>3</sup>

Whilst mainstream parties in government will find it difficult to ignore wedge issues altogether, particularly if they are already on the party-system agenda, this does not mean they cannot employ alternate strategies to avoid them. We argue that *defusion* is likely to be a particularly attractive avoidance strategy for MGPs. Governing parties are particularly

---

<sup>3</sup>At least until the issue is successfully mobilised by political entrepreneurs (see Section 4.3.3)

sensitive to their reputation for competence and welcome opportunities to demonstrate it on a variety of issues (Green and Jennings 2012). A large literature shows how public evaluations of government performance impact vote choice (Hellwig, 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007) and strong asymmetries in information mean voters update their performance evaluations more for incumbents than for opposition parties (Fiorina 1977, 1981, Butt 2006; Green and Jennings 2012; Green and Jennings 2018). The ability to frame issues as ones of managerial, technocratic competence is therefore likely to appeal to mainstream parties in government. By framing the wedge issue as one that is principally about capable management, they can reap the electoral benefits that come with a reputation for competence. Our second hypotheses therefore refer to how avoidance strategies are likely to differ for MOPs and MGPs. They read as follows:

**Hypothesis H2a:** Mainstream opposition parties are more likely to employ an avoidance strategy that *ignores* wedge issues

**Hypothesis H2b:** Mainstream government parties are more likely to employ an avoidance strategy that *defuses* wedge issues

Not only do we argue that MGPs and MOPs are likely to employ different avoidance strategies, we also argue that this difference is likely to be larger than the difference in strategies between mainstream parties of different party families. Whilst mainstream parties hold different positions on the left-right dimension, they frequently hold aligned views in their positions on wedge issues. For example, researchers have shown how mainstream parties hold very consistent pro-European views on the wedge issue of EU integration. This has resulted in unusual patterns of party competition in a number of countries, where parties on both the left and right extremes advocate an anti-Europe position, while centrist parties are predominantly pro-European (Marks and Wilson 2000, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). This isn't to say that we expect no differences between mainstream parties: party leaders have personal intricacies and preferences in their presentational styles, and certain mainstream parties may seek to accommodate the positions of niche parties who have successfully mobilised wedge issues (Abou Chadi 2016, 2020). Nevertheless, as the incentives to avoid a wedge issue remain similar across mainstream parties, it is presence in government and its constraining effect with respect to the party system agenda which is likely to be the largest determinant of strategies employed. Our third hypothesis therefore reads:

**Hypothesis H3:** The difference in avoidance strategies between MGPs and MOPs is larger than the difference in avoidance strategies between mainstream parties of different party families.

### 4.3.3 Avoidance Strategies in the Face of Issue Entrepreneurs

The previous section, building on the issue competition and agenda-setting literature argues that MGPs are particularly responsive to issues on the party-system agenda and are therefore less likely to ignore wedge issues than MOPs. Naturally, these issues do not simply appear on the party system-agenda by chance. They are introduced for example through major events such as crises. (Baumgartner and Jones 1990, 1992). They are also strategically introduced by parties who compete to shape the party-system agenda. Of particular importance here is the role of issue entrepreneurs (De Vries and Hobolt 2012, 2020), who aim to raise the salience of previously dormant issues for electoral gain.

A large literature investigates the conditions under which these issue entrepreneurs are likely to be successful (Meguid 2005, 2008; Mudde et al. 2017; Dennison and Guedes 2019; Kriesi et al 2012). Given that entrepreneurs are crucial to the introduction of wedge issues on the party-system agenda it is therefore highly pertinent to ask whether and how the success of issue entrepreneurs impacts the avoidance strategies employed by mainstream parties. We argue that the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs is likely to have an impact. Most importantly, the successful mobilisation of wedge issue by entrepreneurs makes an avoidance strategy of *ignoring* the issue more difficult and risky. First, it is difficult for parties to completely ignore issues that other successful parties discuss because there are institutionalised debates in, for instance, parliaments, where attention to an issue is unavoidable. In the same way, the media will approach parties and ask for their positions on issues to which other parties pay attention. Furthermore, ignoring an issue is potentially dangerous because a party then loses influence on how it is framed in the public debate when the party might later have to address it (Jerit, 2008).

Importantly, this is true of both MGPs and MOPs. Whilst it is true that government parties are more responsive to the party-system agenda than opposition parties (Green-Pedersen 2010), it is also true that mainstream parties *as a whole* are more likely to respond to the issues introduced onto the party agenda (Green-Pedersen 2015). Mainstream parties have a much broader and flexible issue appeal and need to be closely aligned with the broader party system agenda to maintain their pivotal role and support in the electorate. Once issue entrepreneurs have successfully introduced a wedge issue onto the party system agenda, it is therefore unlikely that mainstream parties will ignore it altogether, even those in opposition that are less constrained by incumbency. Our fourth and final hypothesis therefore reads as follows:

**Hypothesis H4:** Mainstream parties are less likely to employ an avoidance strategy that *ignores* a wedge issue when the issue has been successfully mobilised by challenger parties.

## 4.4 Research Design

### 4.4.1 Data

Testing these hypotheses necessitates an empirical focus on what parties *directly say* about wedge issues. The datasets traditionally used in the party competition literature, such as the CHES or electoral manifestos, are therefore of limited use for our research question. The CHES captures only the impressions conveyed by parties amongst experts, and manifestos provide an only infrequent look at how parties frame and present issues. Instead, we draw on an original dataset of communication by the leaders of mainstream parties on the wedge issue of European integration.

EU integration is widely considered one of the most divisive wedge issues for mainstream parties in Europe. On the right, conservative and right-wing liberal parties, such as the Conservatives in the United Kingdom and the People’s Party in the Netherlands tend to favour market integration in Europe, but oppose the transfer of authority to supranational actors in other policy areas. The issue of European integration has been equally divisive for parties of the left. For socialist parties, economic integration in Europe is often seen to jeopardize national socialist achievements by facilitating international free trade. At the same time, however, further political integration in Europe offers an opportunity to regulate labor markets and advance social equality (Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Furthermore, this wedge issue has been successfully mobilized by challenger parties, and a vast literature explores the electoral success of these Eurosceptic issue entrepreneurs (Hooghe and Marks 2009, De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Kriesi et al. 2012, De Vries et al 2020).

This article therefore uses the *EUparlspeech* dataset to test its hypotheses on the avoidance of wedge issues. *EUparlspeech* is an original dataset of over 1 million statements on European integration made in the plenary debates of ten national parliaments between 1989 and 2019 (Hunter 2021). Parliaments are an important venue for communication by political parties (Bagehot 1893), and plenary debates are among the most important instruments of parliaments to fulfil this communication function. The dataset was developed using validated dictionaries of EU level terms. It uses keyword in context from the *quanteda* package (see Benoit 2012) to capture EU statements that are three sentences in length and are subsequently translated into English. Further details on the methodology employed to create the dataset are available in Chapter 3.

We focus our analysis on the references to European integration made by *leaders* of mainstream and challenger parties in six member states: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The leadership of political parties is central in determining the strategies employed in party competition, and focusing on party

leaders ensures the analysis is limited to higher profile communication, rather than the more technical work taking place in parliamentary committees. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a descriptive overview of the dataset, including the countries, parties and leaders included. In total, it includes 79,379 references to European integration made by 111 leaders of mainstream political parties and 40 leaders of challenger parties between 1989 and 2019. Table 4.2 below provides examples of EU statements by mainstream party leaders both in government (Tony Blair and Angela Merkel) and in opposition (Jan Peter Balkenende), as well as an EU statement by a challenger party leader (Geert Wilders). The German and Dutch examples highlight the quality of the automated translation.

#### 4.4.2 Dependent Variables

To operationalise the avoidance strategies outlined in the theory section, we use a variety of automated text analysis tools to estimate features in leaders' speech that are associated with each strategy. By capturing i) the salience of EU integration in their communication, ii) the complexity of their EU communication, and iii) the emotiveness of their EU communication, we offer analysis of replicable and interpretable indicators of the strategies we are interested in. For multivariate analysis, the data are aggregated to yearly panel data for each individual leader.

First, mainstream party leaders can be said to ignore the wedge issue of EU integration if they dedicate a low amount of their communication to the issue. We therefore capture the *EU salience*<sup>4</sup> in their parliamentary communication by dividing the cumulative length (in words) of their EU statements in a given year, by the cumulative length of their parliamentary communication within that same year. An avoidance strategy of defusion meanwhile, implies the use of complex technocratic language. We capture the *complexity* of each EU statement with the Flesch Reading score (Flesch 1948), a measure widely used to capture the complexity of political speech (see Bischof and Senninger 2018, Schoonvelde et al 2016, Rauh et al 2019). We measure *emotiveness* of EU rhetoric using a dictionary-based approach. Specifically, we use the Affective Norms of English Words (ANEW) dictionary to identify emotive words. The ANEW dictionary was developed by a team at the Center for the Study of Emotion Attention at the University of Florida, and rates 3,188 words on three dimensions of affective meaning on a scale from one to nine (Bradley and Lang 2017). The ANEW dictionary has been used to measure emotive rhetoric in parliamentary (Os-nabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon 2021) and is thus particularly well suited for our purpose. We

---

<sup>4</sup>We take the narrow definition of salience as usually employed in political science, meaning the frequency of communication on a particular issue.

Table 4.2: Exemplary EU statements by mainstream party leaders

Date	Speaker	EU Statement
2007/06	Tony Blair (UK - LAB)	Why would we want to veto this treaty? It provides the means for a more effective working of the EU. Let us be clear about this: my hon Friend, and some Opposition Members, would call for a referendum even if we added a comma to the constitutional treaty, because what they really want is to take us out of Europe, and they might as well be honest about it.
2014/11	Angela Merkel (DE - CDU)	Nonetheless, as difficult and lengthy as the path may be, overall we are on the right course in Europe. The average budget deficit in the euro area fell below the Maastricht limit for the first time since 2008, at 2.9 per cent of gross domestic product. The Federal Government supports the European Commission in strictly checking the budget plans of the member states.
2001/10	Jan Peter Balkenende (NL - CDA)	I come to talk about the future of the EU in relation to the convention. Sometimes you get the impression that the cabinet is somewhat avoiding the real choices, because the documents show that they argue for strengthening the European Commission and at the same time for a further refinement of the role of the Council of Ministers. I would like to point out that the CDA group finds it very valuable that in the Europe of tomorrow we have a balanced relationship between countries.
2012/05	Geert Wilders (NL - VPP)	The Dutch wanted less Europe and more Netherlands. The political elite, however, ignored this and forced the Treaty of Lisbon on us. This extract from the European constitution completely ignored the wishes of the Dutch population.



replicate the methodology from Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon (2021) , which identifies emotive words as those with a score below 3 and above 7 on the ANEW dictionary’s valence measure, and excludes words with a large standard deviation. As an illustration, positive emotive tokens include words such as ‘terrific’ and ‘hope’ , whereas negative emotive tokens include words such as ‘terror’ and ‘hate’. The Appendix provides further face validity for the use of the Flesch Reading score and the ANEW dictionary.

#### 4.4.3 Independent Variables and controls

We use a simple binary variable to capture whether a party is in government or in opposition. To operationalise successful mobilisation of EU integration by niche parties, we use the seat share of Eurosceptic parties in parliament. Whilst it is technically possible for niche pro-EU parties to emerge, it is widely acknowledged that only Eurosceptic parties have managed to successfully mobilise the EU issue due to their proximity to a public which is more sceptical towards integration than mainstream political elites. Eurosceptic parties are identified using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which contains an EU position question on a scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour). We consider a party Eurosceptic if it has a lower score than 3.5, and capture the seat share of these parties in parliament, replicating a methodology used in previous studies (Rauh et al 2019).

### 4.5 Results

This section presents analysis and results. It provides compelling evidence for the hypotheses presented above. First, to test the hypothesis that mainstream parties send less clear cues than challenger parties on the wedge issue of European integration, we run a simple OLS regression using party type (mainstream or challenger) as the independent variable. The results, presented in Table 4.3, show that mainstream parties’ EU cues are less clear than challenger parties’ EU cues. Their references to European are harder to understand (Flesch Kincaid) and use less emotive language (ANEW). As expected, this difference is due to challenger parties using significantly more negative emotive language, rather than more positive emotive language, where the difference between the two party types is statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the results also show that mainstream parties dedicate *more* of their parliamentary communication to European integration. This confirms the view that mainstream parties - particularly when they are in government - struggle to ignore the issue of European integration, even though it can create a wedge within their own party. It also suggests that challenger parties mobilize the issue of European integration through the clarity of their EU cues, rather than the frequency of them.

Table 4.3: Mainstream parties' EU cues are less clear than challenger parties' EU cues

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Complexity (1)	Emotion (2)	Neg.Emotion (3)	Pos.Emotion (4)	Salience (5)
Mainstream Party	0.482*** (0.155)	-4.454*** (1.307)	-3.434*** (0.561)	-1.020 (1.126)	0.037*** (0.006)
Constant	14.486*** (0.212)	50.722*** (1.788)	13.620*** (0.767)	37.102*** (1.542)	0.151*** (0.009)
Observations	786	786	786	786	811
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.374	0.064	0.064	0.055	0.283

*Note:*


\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

To test the hypothesis that mainstream parties use more complex language when discussing wedge issues (H1b), we calculate the difference between the Flesch Kincaid score for party leaders' EU communication and the Flesch Kincaid score for the whole of their parliamentary communication. This *EU complexity differential* captures the extent to which leaders use more (or less) complex language when discussing EU integration. The results, presented in Figure 4.1, are clear: the leaders of mainstream parties consistently use more complex language in their communication of EU integration than in the rest of their communication. This finding is consistent across countries and leaders, and the size of this effect is substantial. We find that on average, EU communication is more complex than the rest of mainstream parties' communication by 3.11 units on the Flesch Kincaid scale. Given that Flesch-Kincaid is generally interpreted as the number of years of education required to understand a text (Williamson et al 2010), this represents a far from insignificant difference in the complexity of EU integration compared to the rest of mainstream parties' political communication.<sup>5</sup>

To test the hypothesis that MGPs and MOPs are likely to employ difference avoidance strategies, (MOPs are more likely to ignore wedge issues), we also explore the salience of

<sup>5</sup>The Flesch Kincaid method was first used by the US Army for assessing the difficulty of technical manuals in 1978, and soon after became a United States Military Standard. For example a number of U.S. states use Flesch Kincaid to require that insurance policies be written at no higher than a ninth-grade level of reading difficulty.


Figure 4.1: Mainstream parties' communication of EU integration is more complex than the rest of their political communication



EU integration in the communication of mainstream party leaders. Figure 4.2 plots the salience of EU integration in the communication of MGPs and MOPs. The figure presents an interesting and unambiguous trend: mainstream opposition parties are more likely to ignore the wedge issue of EU integration than mainstream governing parties. Importantly, the figure plots the *share* of parliamentary communication dedicated to integration, so controls for the fact that governing parties have more speaking time within parliaments. We find that governing parties talk about Europe not simply in absolute terms, but in relative terms also. These results substantiate concerns about the ‘opposition deficit in EU accountability’ (De Wilde 2011, Rauh and De Wilde 2018). Whilst the gap in EU salience amongst governing and opposition parties has always existed, it has been exacerbated since the European crises that have institutionalised a form of emergency politics marked by executive rule (White 2015, 2019). The results presented suggest that leaders of governing parties not only dominate decision making in Europe, they also dominate the presentation of European integration in domestic public spheres.

Finally, we also present results from multilevel linear regression models in Table 4.4. Given the nature of our nested dataset, we run a mixed effect model with random effects for speakers, parties, and countries. To test the hypothesis that the difference in avoidance

Figure 4.2: Saliency of EU integration in mainstream party leaders' communication



Source: Communication by mainstream party leaders in parliament (DE, UK, IRL, NLD, AT,DK)

strategies between MGPs and MOPs is larger than the difference in avoidance strategies between parties of different party families (H3), we also include fixed effects for each mainstream party family. The hypothesis that MOPs are more likely to ignore wedge issues than MGPs are corroborated by the data. Being in government has a strong and significant effect on the saliency of EU integration in party leaders' parliamentary communication. On average, being in government increases the number of yearly tokens (words) dedicated to EU integration by 6,335, all else being equal. This isn't simply down to the fact that governing parties speak more in parliament: being in government also increases the share of communication dedicated to EU integration by 4.6 percentage points, all else being equal. Results show how the effect is similar for senior governing and junior governing parties in coalitions. It is also important to note here that party families have little to no effect on the saliency mainstream parties dedicate to EU integration. What matters here seems to be the MGP / MOP distinction.

There is also evidence that governing parties are particularly likely to employ a strategy of defusion. Clearly mainstream parties use more complex language when presenting EU integration (see Figure 4.1) but results show that being in government also decreases the emotiveness of mainstream parties' EU rhetoric. The effect of niche Eurosceptic party success is substantial, and shows how mainstream parties dedicate more of their parliamen-

Table 4.4: Multilevel Linear Regression Results - Mainstream Parties

	<i>Ignore</i>			<i>Defuse</i>		
	EU Salience (No. of tokens)	EU Salience (Share of Com)		EU Complexity (Flesch Kincaid)	EU Emotion (ANEW dic)	
Government Party	6,335*** (614)	0.046*** (0.007)		-0.157 (0.374)	-0.004*** (0.001)	
Senior Gov. Party			0.044*** (0.009)			-0.003** (0.002)
Junior Gov. Party			0.048*** (0.010)			-0.006*** (0.002)
Eurosceptic Seat Share	9,971* (5,283)	0.129** (0.066)	0.130** (0.066)	-2.106 (3.116)	0.014 (0.009)	0.014 (0.009)
Conservative Party Family	2,132 (2,100)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.027)	-1.961* (1.021)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Liberal Party Family	-840 (1,645)	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.022)	-1.091 (0.811)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Socialist Party Family	235 (1,674)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.022)	-0.289 (0.816)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Constant	-276 (2,435)	0.086*** (0.029)	0.086*** (0.030)	20.134*** (1.366)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.003)
Observations	575	575	575	558	558	558
Leader RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

tary communication to EU integration when more challenger parties are in parliament (p lower than 0.05). Whilst these results do not allow us make causal claims about the effect of niche party success on mainstream party discourse, they are descriptively interesting: as Eurosceptic parties successfully mobilise European integration at elections, mainstream parties find it difficult to ignore the issue, but continue to employ high complexity, low emotion rhetoric rather than engage challenger parties in a emotive debate about the EU.

## 4.6 Discussion

One remaining question concerns the generalisability of the micro-level findings. The previous section provides strong evidence for the article's hypotheses using the case of European integration. But do these findings apply to other wedge issues? In this penultimate section, I discuss the argument's generalisability to the other central wedge issue for mainstream parties in Western Europe: that of immigration (Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Whilst this section does not provide original empirical evidence on how parties compete on the issue of immigration, it will draw on existing research on party competition and framing to suggest the patterns described in this article are not limited to the case of European integration but also extend to the wedge issue of immigration.

First, scholars have shown that mainstream parties have struggled to ignore the issue of immigration as the migration crisis has placed the issue on the party agenda and as the issue has been mobilised by challenger parties. In their analysis of party competition in Germany, Kortmann and Stecker (2019) show how mainstream parties have had to significantly increase their attention toward immigration with the advent of the refugee crisis. This has left them facing 'a hard time in finding the best strategy to deal with the issue' (see also Odmalm and Super 2014). The difficulty in ignoring immigration is also evidenced by research demonstrating how it has become a central issue of party competition (see e.g. Abou Chadi, 2016; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019). This suggests, as Hypothesis 4 does above, that mainstream parties struggle to *ignore* the issue once it has successfully entered the arena of political contestation. But researchers also show how mainstream parties can still employ other strategies to avoid taking clear positions on immigration.

One central strategy mainstream parties employ is to reframe the issue. Research shows how mainstream parties frame immigration in very different ways to challenger parties. In an analysis of party manifestos, Odmalm (2012) shows how challenger parties attempt to frame it according to what he describes as the 'New' conflict dimension (socio-cultural). By contrast, mainstream parties consistently attempt to frame immigration according to what he describes as the 'Old' conflict dimension (economic). Oldmalm's article quotes

extensively from manifestos: the UK's Labour Party, for example, frame immigration as a 'way of ensuring those who come and work here continue to make a major contribution to our economic and social life' (2001). Oldmalm's findings are consistent with the argument presented in this article, that mainstream parties attempt to *defuse* wedge issues, by turning a positional issue into one which is principally about left-right concerns of economic distribution.

In his research on the framing of immigration in Western Europe, Helbling also analyses the strategies employed by parties based on Habermas' (1993) distinction between identity-related, moral-universal, and utilitarian frames. Through handcoding over 5,000 references to immigration in the media of six European countries (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK), he shows how mainstream parties (social democratic, liberal, conservative) use more utilitarian frames than challenger parties (radical left and populist right), and that the frames are similar amongst different mainstream party families (as in our own Hypothesis 3). He concludes that "major political actors appear to pursue a more pragmatic discourse" (p. 35), a strategy which is closely related to the idea of defusion we develop in this article.

A short review of the literature on party strategies on the issue of immigration is consistent with the argument presented in this article. It shows that mainstream parties struggle to ignore the issue of immigration once it enters onto the party system agenda. Instead of engaging with the issue with clear positional cues, these mainstream parties will aim to reframe it onto the left-right dimension and pursue a more pragmatic discourse. Of course, the text as data methods employed in this paper can and should be employed on other wedge issues - particularly immigration - to provide even more robust evidence for the generalisability of the argument<sup>6</sup>. Yet this short review has shown that existing literature suggests the theory has external validity and applies to wedge issues beyond EU integration.<sup>7</sup>

## 4.7 Conclusion

Party competition is about more than simply adjusting positions on a unidimensional scale. Instead, parties also compete on *issues*, emphasising those where they hold a competitive advantage, but also deliberately avoiding those where they do not. Whilst it is acknowledged that this issue avoidance is a central strategy in party competition, particularly for main-

---

<sup>6</sup>It is also worth noting that the studies quoted in this section rarely distinguish between governing and opposition mainstream parties, a distinction which is important in our own argument.

<sup>7</sup>To be clear, I also believe that European integration, as an often dry, mainly legal process is a 'most likely case' for the argument presented. Defusing the issue of EU integration is likely to be more straightforward than defusing the issue of immigration. But this section shows that mainstream parties have at least attempted to do the latter. It is less clear whether, when, and how these attempts at defusion are successful.

stream parties, the ways in which parties avoid issues is theoretically underspecified and empirically understudied. This article addressed this gap by focusing on the plural *strategies* of issue avoidance. The article makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution. Theoretically it presents a simple typology of avoidance strategies available to mainstream parties and draws on the agenda setting and issue competition literature to present an argument on which strategy is likely to be employed in which context. Empirically, it tests these expectations with an original dataset of mainstream party communication on an issue they are assumed to want to avoid: that of EU integration.

The results corroborate the article's hypotheses. Mainstream parties consistently use more complex language when discussing EU integration, but also employ quite different strategies in government and in opposition. MOPs employ a strategy of *ignoring* the issue by dedicating less of their communication to European integration whereas MGPs *defuse* EU integration with comparatively more complex language. Mainstream party leaders also talk about Europe more but use comparatively more complex language when Eurosceptic niche parties have successfully mobilised the issue in elections (question marks remain over the size of these effects). Importantly, the differences between parties of different families are minor: what really matters is the MOP / MGP distinction. A short review of party strategies on another central wedge issue, immigration, suggested that the argument presented is not unique to the issue of European integration but extendable to other wedge issues that place mainstream parties in a delicate situation (though of course, this should be tested with further original evidence and data).

This research also has implications for the EU's crisis of legitimacy as national governments and the mainstream parties that compose them play a crucial role in legitimating European integration in the eyes of citizens. Worryingly for supporters of the European project, this research shows how mainstream parties send obfuscating cues to their voters on EU integration rather than defending the EU in simple, straightforward language. Finally, further research should explore the effectiveness of different avoidance strategies. Are governing parties less successful at avoiding issues in the eyes of voters, because they are less likely to ignore them? Or is their strategy of defusion equally effective? This article has shown how parties can and do execute strategies in very different ways. These different strategies of avoidance are not a minor feature of party competition, but are in fact a crucial component that merit further consideration.



## Disintegration and Party Competition: Evidence from Parliamentary Speeches on Brexit

*Introduction – Established Strategies in EU Party Competition*  
*Disintegration and its Impact on Party Strategies - The Case of Brexit*  
*Research Design - Results - A Permanent Reversal? - Conclusion*

**Abstract:** Disintegration episodes such as Brexit represent a major exogenous shock for the process of European integration. Do they lead parties to alter their strategies when competing on the EU issue? This article argues that pro-European mainstream parties and Eurosceptic challenger parties reverse their usual strategies after Brexit, as the UK's negative experience reveals new information about the desirability of EU membership. I use a combination of automated and hand-coded methods to identify and analyse 2,223 Brexit statements in the parliaments of five member states between 2013 and 2018. I show how in the aftermath of the Brexit vote the strategies of issue entrepreneurship and issue avoidance usually employed by challenger and mainstream parties are indeed reversed. Challenger parties avoid Brexit and significantly moderate their Euroscepticism; by contrast, mainstream parties emphasise Brexit and significantly increase their pro-Europeanism. Results show that party conflict on European integration is not static but a dynamic competition that responds to outside circumstances and events. They also show that the advantage of issue ownership can be quickly and dramatically reversed when exogenous shocks lead to large changes in public opinion.

## 5.1 Introduction

Disintegration episodes such as Brexit represent a major exogenous shock for the process of European integration. Scholars have shown how Brexit has restructured party competition in the UK (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020; Glyn and Menon 2017), had a significant impact on public opinion (De Vries 2017, 2018), and strengthened the cohesiveness of the remaining EU27 member states (Chopin and Lequesne 2020). Others have highlighted the risks of contagion (Walter 2021). In this article, I consider whether and how Brexit affected the strategies of mainstream pro-European and Eurosceptic challenger parties in other member states: did this major disintegration episode lead them to alter their strategies when competing on the EU issue?

This article argues that Brexit had a major effect and that pro-European mainstream parties and Eurosceptic challenger parties reversed their usual strategies after Brexit, as the UK's negative experience reveals new information about the desirability of EU membership. I argue that challenger parties reverse their usual strategy of *entrepreneurship* (see Hobolt and De Vries 2015) to one of *avoidance* and *obfuscation* (see Rovny 2012; Hobolt and De Vries 2020) after the referendum. Likewise, mainstream parties reverse their usual strategy of avoidance to one of entrepreneurship, increasing their use of clear pro-EU position taking and criticising populists.

These hypotheses are tested with an original dataset of 2,223 statements on Brexit in five national parliaments: the Austrian Nationalrat, the German Bundestag, the Danish Folketing, the Dutch Tweede Kamer, and the Swedish Riksdag<sup>1</sup>. The time period ranges from the 23rd January 2013, when David Cameron first announced his intention to renegotiate the UK's membership terms and put these to voters in a referendum, to the 31st December 2018. I first use automated dictionary methods to identify Brexit statements<sup>2</sup>. I then use hand coding to capture parties' stated Brexit strategy, and the EU tone of their communication. I show that in the aftermath of the Brexit vote challenger parties avoid Brexit, significantly moderate their Euroscepticism, and obfuscate their stance on following in the UK's footsteps. By contrast, mainstream parties emphasise Brexit and send clearer, supportive cues on European integration.

However, I also consider whether these changes are likely to be a temporary or permanent reversal in party strategies. I argue that the former is more likely, for two reasons. First, Brexit is unlikely to remain as salient in other member states, and I provide evidence from Google searches that the salience of Brexit in other member states relative to the UK

---

<sup>1</sup>As parliaments with strong formal powers, hosting both mainstream pro-European and Eurosceptic challenger parties, these provide good venues of party competition to test hypotheses about strategy reversal.

<sup>2</sup>This method is validated with human hand coders.

has significantly declined over time. Second, I also argue that the monumental economic impact of COVID-19 and the 'slow puncture' nature of Brexit, combined with the bounded rationality of voters, is likely to obfuscate the negative economic impact of Brexit for voters both in the UK and the rest of the EU.

Despite the likely temporary nature of these reversals in party strategy, findings have a number of important implications. First, they add to the body of evidence showing how Brexit has strengthened the sociological legitimacy of the EU in other member states<sup>3</sup>. Not only has it made public opinion more supportive of integration and expanded the cohesiveness of the EU27 governments, it has also led mainstream parties - the traditional defenders of EU integration in national party competition - to clarify their pro-Europeanism and go on the offensive against Eurosceptic populists. Second, these findings show that party strategies on the EU issue are not stable but *dynamic*: they respond to circumstances and events outside their own country. Third, it shows that the advantage issue ownership (see Petrocik 1996) can be quickly and dramatically reversed when exogenous shocks lead to large short term changes in public opinion. I conclude that events and exogenous shocks in one member state can have a large effect abroad and 'turn the tables' on party competition in other member states.

## 5.2 Established Strategies in EU party competition

Having long been characterised by a 'permissive consensus', EU integration has since been politicized and is now an important feature of political contestation in Europe. (see Lindberg 1970; Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2019; Hobolt and De Vries 2020; Zürn 2014; Rauh 2018). The EU is now salient in domestic political debates, divides public opinion, and has been mobilized at both national and European elections. However, the structure of contestation over European integration differs from the dominant dimension of political conflict in Western Europe as it cannot easily be aligned with the dominant left-right dimension (Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Parties on the right tend to favour economic integration in Europe but oppose the transfer of authority to supranational actors. For parties on the left, economic integration in Europe is often seen to jeopardise national socialist achievements by facilitating international free trade, but further political integration offers an opportunity to regulate labour markets and advance social equality. EU integration is therefore considered a cross cutting wedge issue (see van de Wardt et al 2014) which risks intra party divisions for both mainstream parties of the left and right. The lack of fit has resulted in unusual patterns of party competition where parties on both the left right extremes advocate an

---

<sup>3</sup>By sociological (rather than normative) legitimacy, I refer to the *belief* that an exercise of authority is appropriate (e.g. Weber 1922/1978; Tallberg and Zürn 2019).

anti-Europe positions, while centrist parties are predominantly pro-European. The main structure of competition on the issue of EU integration is therefore not between parties of the left and parties of the right, but between mainstream and challenger parties who employ different strategies when competing on the issue.

The main strategy employed by mainstream parties on the issue of EU integration has been characterised as one of *avoidance* and *obfuscation* (Rovny 2012, De Vries and Hobolt 2020). Mainstream parties prefer to redirect onto issues that fit onto the left right dimension of conflict where they are dominant, and because voters are generally more sceptical about European integration than mainstream party elites, these parties generally aim to downplay the issue's importance and/or obfuscate their position on it. They can do so by ignoring the issue but also by depoliticising it, for example by using complex, technocratic language when discussing the EU (Rauh et al 2018; Hunter 2021 cf Chapter 4).

By contrast, the main strategy employed by challenger parties on the issue of EU integration is one of issue *entrepreneurship* (De Vries and Hobot 2020). Theories of issue evolution and issue manipulation (Rikker et al 1996) argue that challenger parties are highly incentivized to mobilize issues that can disturb the political equilibrium. Because they are newcomers to the system or hold marginal positions, any potential vote gain will constitute an improvement of their current electoral position, and by mobilizing high appropriability issues which are not easily subsumed into the dominant dimension, challengers can drive a wedge within mainstream parties and change the basis on which voters make political choices. Challenger parties execute their entrepreneurship strategy by emphasising European integration it in their communication and using clear, uncomplicated communication and cues that usually combine opposition to EU integration with nationalist messages (Bischof and Wagner 2019).

The structure of party competition on Europe therefore differs from the dominant structure of party competition in Western Europe. It is not between left and right wing parties but between mainstream parties who aim to avoid and obfuscate the issue, and challenger parties who aim to mobilize it through issue entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the series of crises that have hit the EU in the twenty first century have cemented this latent dimension, with challenger parties both on the extreme left and extreme right successfully mobilizing the issue at elections in the aftermath of the Eurozone and migration crises (Hernandez and Kriesi 2016). In the following section, I argue that one particular form of exogenous shock - disintegration episodes - can in fact lead parties to alter their strategies when competing on the EU issue

## 5.3 Disintegration and its Impact on Party Strategies

### 5.3.1 European Disintegration

The study of the EU has historically been the study of European *integration*. From the 1950s to the 2010s, the theoretical literature, both in international relations and comparative politics, focused on the process of convergence between the policies, politics and polities of the EU's member states (Bulmer and Lequesne 2013; Chopin and Lequesne 2020). However, recent contributions have recognised the limitations of a narrow focus on convergence and aimed to rectify the 'pro-integration bias' in EU studies (Borzel 2018). Central to this rethink about have been the disintegration episodes that have hit the EU, defined here as 'selective reductions of a state's level and scope of integration' (Schimmelfenig 2018).

While scholars have been careful to distinguish between a slowdown of integration and actual disintegration (see e.g. Borzel 2018), there have nonetheless been clear cases of European disintegration in the past decade. The most high profile of these disintegration episodes is undeniably Brexit. The British decision to leave the EU following a referendum shocked the political establishment in London, Brussels and beyond (De Vries 2017). Yet Brexit is not the only example of European disintegration. Greenland, having achieved self-rule from Denmark, also left the EC after a referendum in 1982. Disintegration is also not limited to exiting the EU, but also applies to states that remain in the EU but exit from specific policies. For example, the EU's refugee crisis is seen as having led to a form of renationalization and disintegration in security policy (Tassinari 2016; Morsut and Kruke 2018). And whilst European disintegration has only been *realised* in a handful of cases, it has been considered and discussed in the domestic politics of EU member states. Serious suggestions that Greece could leave the euro in the wake of the Eurozone crisis were made by both academics and policymakers (Krugman 2012). And as we have seen in the previous section, Eurosceptic parties have frequently called for exit from certain EU policies, and in certain cases for withdrawal from the EU altogether (Vasilopolou 2018; Heinisch et al. 2020; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008). Borzel concludes that whilst *actual* cases of disintegration are limited, nationalist discourses and practices of non-compliance have reinforced each other in creating heightened *potential* for significant disintegration (2018). Given this heightened risk, it is therefore pertinent to ask whether and how actual disintegration episodes may affect party competition on the EU in other member states.

### 5.3.2 Impact on Party Strategies

Do disintegration episodes lead parties in other member states to alter their strategies when competing on the EU issue? In this theoretical section, I draw on the literatures of

policy diffusion, public opinion formation, and party competition to argue that European disintegration in one member state can indeed lead to changes in the strategies employed by parties.

First, disintegration episodes provide *new information* to publics and parties in other countries about the costs and benefits associated with European disintegration. The policy diffusion literature shows how governments and parties in one country learn from the experiences in others, particularly from countries who are early adopter of policies (Shipan and Volden 2004). Early pieces of new evidence thus provide the greatest information value, which is why the initial examples of European disintegration are likely to be particularly influential in providing new information about the desirability of such policies (Walter and Martini 2020).

Second, this new information affects *public opinion* towards European integration. Whilst theories of public opinion formation have ranged from utilitarian to identitarian explanations (see Anderson 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2009), scholars have since settled on a benchmark theory of public opinion towards the EU (De Vries 2017). According to this theory, support for the EU essentially boils down to a comparison between the benefits of the current status quo of membership and those of an alternative state, namely one's country being outside the EU. Under this theory, disintegration episodes are central to public opinion on the EU because they provide more information about the economic and political costs and benefits associated with the alternative state. If the disintegration experience seems difficult and painful, this will increase support for the EU. By contrast, if the disintegration experience seems positive, the public is likely to find the status quo less desirable, and support for the EU decreases.

Finally, this new information and its impact on public opinion are likely to change *party strategies* on the issue of EU integration. This because parties are sensitive and responsive to changes in public opinion (Page 1994). This is true both of mainstream parties, who as 'catch all' parties have to be responsive to public opinion on a wide range of issues (Mair 2013; Katz and Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer 1966) but also of challenger parties as who as 'issue owners' on the issue of European integration (see de Wardt 2014; Green-Pedersen 2007) will be particularly sensitive to how public opinion evolves on the issue of the EU. In particular, increased public support for the EU is likely to be problematic for challenger parties, who usually benefit electorally from mobilising widespread discontent towards the EU.

Beyond simply responding to these shifts in opinion, parties are also likely to rethink their strategies after disintegration episodes as the departing state's experience of disintegration provides parties in the rest of Europe with a form of *transnational learning*. As this learning tends to be particularly strong among ideologically similar governments (e.g.,

Grossback et al. 2004), Eurosceptic challengers in one country are likely to be particularly receptive to information generated by the experience of disintegration elsewhere, particularly as this is a policy they have historically called for themselves (Gilardi 2010; van Kessel et al. 2020). Additionally, given the well documented feedback loop between party cues and public opinion (see Hooghe and Marks 2005), these mechanisms are likely to have a compounding effect: as parties and the public and both update their priors about the desirability of EU membership, and in turn respond to one another's views/cues, the changes in both public opinion and party strategies on the issue of European integration is likely to be substantial.

In sum, disintegration episodes provide new information to parties and voters on the desirability of the status quo and affect parties' calculus when deciding to emphasise or deemphasise their positions on Europe. In the following section, I consider how the case of Brexit, the most high profile disintegration episode to date, affected the strategies of challenger and mainstream parties in other member states.

## 5.4 The Case of Brexit

### 5.4.1 The UK's Negative Brexit Experience


Brexit is undoubtedly the most substantial and high profile form of European disintegration to date. The British decision to leave the EU following a referendum shocked the political establishment in London, Brussels and beyond and reverberated in the public spheres of other member states (De Vries 2017). The immediate Brexit experience for the UK was undoubtedly negative, and perceived as such by citizens in other member states (see Hobolt et al. 2021; Malet and Walter 2020). Although some of the more pessimistic predictions were not realised, the pound fell sharply as uncertainty among investors about Britain's economic future started to grow. Politically, the situation was also difficult. The UK's Prime Minister David Cameron resigned and the referendum result unmasked deep divisions between different regions and amongst the constituent components of the UK, as well as within the two major political forces in Westminster. Finally, Brexit has also put into peril the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom, by raising the Irish border question and reinvigorating the Scottish independence movement (Walter and Martini 2020).

Figure 5.1 summarises the Brexit experience using two measures. The first is an objective measure based on the daily spot exchange rate of the British Pound against the Euro. The second is a subjective measure, a human-coded assessment of Brexit events from Walter and Martini (2020)<sup>4</sup>. These measures are highly correlated and show how in the aftermath

---

<sup>4</sup>This measure codes individual events in the Brexit negotiations over time by assigning values on a

Figure 5.1: The UK's negative Brexit experience post referendum



of the referendum vote in 2016 both markets and informed observers concluded that the Brexit experience had been painful and difficult for the UK.

Unsurprisingly, the difficulties experienced by the UK in the aftermath of the Brexit vote significantly increased support for the EU in the remaining 27 member states (De Vries 2018). As the economic and political uncertainty of withdrawal was made clear, publics in other member states updated their priors about the desirability of the status quo of EU membership and the alternative state outside of the EU. Opinion polls conducted after the British referendum showed that public opinion had become more favourable to EU membership in all EU member states including the UK (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016; Pew Research Center 2017). Other survey data (European Parliament 2018; Eurobarometer 2018; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2018) show in the same way that support for EU membership increased significantly after the Brexit referendum.

De Vries (2018) concludes that the UK's Brexit experience to date has set a negative precedent for exiting the EU (see also Hobolt et al 2021; Walter and Martini 2020). Whilst

---

seven point scales from -3 for very negative to +3 for very positive events. Positive events are defined as developments that – from a perspective of the UK government – align with or are helpful for achieving stated sovereignty-related policy goals (e.g., EU reform under Cameron, Brexit under May and Johnson). Negative events are developments that hinder or contradict such goals.



it is important to note that this may not last indefinitely<sup>5</sup>, it is clear that the immediate effects of Brexit were significant, largely negative, and destabilised the UK. I argue that this led to considerable changes to the usual strategies employed by challenger and mainstream parties in other member states.

#### 5.4.2 Challenger Party Strategies After Brexit

The UK's negative Brexit experience places Eurosceptic challenger parties in a difficult position when competing on Europe. Whilst these parties usually benefit from mobilising the issue and calling for a renegotiation in membership terms (see Taggart 1998; Hobolt and De Vries 2020), Brexit shows the difficulties inherent in such a policy. Furthermore, as the public update their priors about the desirability of the alternative state outside of the EU, their opinion towards integration becomes more supportive. Mobilizing discontent towards the EU becomes difficult for challengers, as the in their usual position - a renegotiation of terms and/or a referendum - becomes untenable. Mobilising discontent towards the EU is also significantly less effective when there are simply less discontented voters.

Existing accounts corroborate the view that challenger parties moderated their Euro-scepticisms after Brexit. Whilst these are usually based on individual case studies, they do confirm the view that the electoral calculus of individual challenger parties was affected. After her failure at the 2017 presidential election, le Rassemblement National's leader Marine Le Pen no longer defended the project of leaving the EU and the Eurozone, and refocused her criticisms about the EU on the issue of immigration (Perrineau 2017). Similarly, Alternative für Deutschland, created in 2013 as a response to the Eurozone crisis, abandoned the project that Germany should leave the Eurozone and return to the Deutsche Mark (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017; Paterson 2018).

My first hypothesis is that challenger parties reverse their usual EU strategy of issue entrepreneurship after the referendum. Emphasising the issue is undesirable as Brexit highlights the potential risks of their hard Eurosceptic positions. Instead, I argue that challenger parties will largely seek to avoid Brexit in their communication. To be clear, I am not saying that these challenger parties will suddenly become pro-European. Instead, they are likely to abandon 'hard' calls for exiting the EU, and focus instead on 'softer' forms of criticism, such as demanding reforms or slowing down the process of integration. My first hypotheses about the effect of Brexit on party competition in other member states therefore read as follows:

---

<sup>5</sup>Institutions like the IMF and the Bank of England have already upgrade their outlook on Britain's economic future.

**H1:** Challenger parties reverse their EU strategy from one of entrepreneurship to one of avoidance after the Brexit referendum.

To be more precise, I argue that this reversal takes the following form:

**H1a:** Challenger parties moderate their Euroscepticism after the referendum.

**H1b:** The salience of Brexit relative to mainstream parties decreases after the referendum.

### 5.4.3 Mainstream Party Strategies After Brexit

By contrast, the UK's negative Brexit experience strengthens mainstream pro-European parties' hand when competing on Europe. These parties traditionally aim to avoid competing on the issue, as EU integration is a wedge issue that can divide their voters. Furthermore, EU integration is considered an issue 'owned' by challengers and mainstream parties usually suffer when competing on these (Meguid 2005). However, the large shift in public opinion makes emphasising their pro-Europeanism advantageous: it allows them to demonstrate congruence with an electorate which is suddenly made aware of the benefits of EU membership and the costs of the alternative state.

Brexit also gives mainstream parties an opportunity to go on the offensive and attack Eurosceptic challengers. As an illustration of the costs of a policy challengers have long campaigned for, it allows mainstream parties to make a wider point about the risks these parties pose to stable, competent government. Indeed, Eurosceptic challengers such as le Rassemblement National, the Swedish Democrats, the Danish People's Party and the Dutch Party for Freedom had all called for following the UK and holding their own referendum when David Cameron first announced the UK government's plans at his Bloomberg Speech (Chopin and Lequesne 2020). As these parties also build their electoral appeal through an anti-establishment rhetoric that 'tells it like it is' and 'has firm convictions', Brexit provides an opportunity to criticise challenger parties if and when they moderate their stance.

Finally, Brexit also provides opportunities for more federalist pro-EU parties to push for further integration. The UK's obstructionism for integration in the field of security and defence and fiscal capacity in Europe is well documented (see for example Buller 1995; Daly, 2019). Their departure therefore emboldens federalists to put these issues on the agenda once more. My second hypotheses about the effect of Brexit on party competition on the EU issue in other member states therefore read as follows:

**H2:** Mainstream parties reverse their EU strategy from one of avoidance to one of

entrepreneurship after the Brexit referendum.

To be more precise, I argue that this reversal takes the following form:

**H2a:** Mainstream parties increase their pro-Europeanism after the referendum

**H2b:** The salience of Brexit relative to challenger parties increases after the referendum

## 5.5 Research Design

### 5.5.1 Original Data

To test the hypothesis about the reversal of party strategies after salient disintegration episodes, I draw on an original dataset of Brexit statements in national parliaments. As mentioned in the previous section, Brexit is the most high profile, substantial disintegration episode to date, one that reverberated in public spheres across the EU. It is therefore a highly pertinent case to test the impact of disintegration episodes in other member states. The dataset covers parliaments in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark. Each of these parliaments included both mainstream pro-EU and Eurosceptic challenger parties during the investigation period.

To identify Brexit statements I draw on the EUParlspeech dataset which captures EU references in national legislatures (see Chapter 3). I identify Brexit statements through a series of search strings from Walter and Martini (2020) and classify EU as Brexit statements if they include any of these strings. These strings include mentions of ‘Brexit’ or the presence of strings like the ‘UK’, ‘leave’ and ‘EU’ within five tokens of one another. The Appendix contains the full list of search strings used to identify Brexit statements. I apply this methodology to EU references made between 23 January 2013, when David Cameron first announced in his Bloomberg speech the intention to renegotiate the UK’s membership terms and put these to voters in a referendum; and the 31st December 2018, which is the latest date in EUParlspeech dataset. I drop any Brexit statement made by non-Eurosceptic challenger parties, as these parties historically do not mobilize on the EU issue as their position is similar to that of mainstream parties<sup>6</sup>. Altogether the dataset contains a total of 2,223 Brexit statements by pro-European mainstream parties (1,637 Brexit statements) and Eurosceptic challenger parties (586 Brexit statements). I validate this methodology with human hand coders, who were given a sample of 200 statements to code. This sample included 80 randomly selected statements that the automated method classified as Brexit

---

<sup>6</sup>I identify parties’ EU position with the Capel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). I consider a party Eurosceptic if they receive less than 3.5 on the ‘EU position’ variable (see Rauh et al 2018). The Appendix also contains a list of the parties classified as mainstream and those classified as Eurosceptic challengers

statements, and 120 randomly selected EU references that the automated method did not classify as Brexit statements. Handcoders are asked to code whether the statement made reference to the UK's withdrawal from the EU. The results demonstrates high levels of accuracy (0.98), precision (0.938) and recall (1.000) (see Benoit 2014)<sup>7</sup>, confirming that my automated, search string based classifier can identify Brexit statements with high levels of accuracy.

### 5.5.2 Hand coding Brexit Statements

To classify these Brexit statements, I then use human hand coding, which is considered the 'gold standard' of content analysis and is particularly desirable for nuanced coding categories (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Hand coders are asked to code Brexit statements into two classification categories which together give a sense of the positions mainstream and challenger parties are taking on Brexit and on European integration more widely. The first category is the speaker's *Brexit Strategy*, which captures the overall strategy pursued by the speaker in light of the disintegration episode. The coding categories are developed in an inductive manner, following methods emphasising rigour in thematic analysis (Fereday et al 2006). Altogether, 15 different Brexit strategies are identified. The second category is speaker's *EU tone*, which captures the tone towards the EU specifically. This tone can be negative, neutral, or positive.

Table 5.1 outlines the codes for the Brexit Strategy category<sup>8</sup>. For the purpose of testing the article's hypotheses, the explicitly pro-European and Eurosceptic Brexit strategies in the first and third columns are of particular interest. As we are interested in a moderation of Euroscepticism (for challenger parties) and increase in pro-Europeanism (for mainstream parties), I highlight the Brexit strategies that fall explicitly into these categories. Note that to test H1, Eurosceptic Brexit strategies include harder or 'exit' forms of scepticism such as *following the UK* (code 1). They also include 'softer' forms of Euroscepticism (Taggart 2006) such as *slowing integration* (code 2), *criticising the EU* (code 3), *emphasising harm to the EU* (code 4) and *accommodating the UK in negotiations* (code 5) . I expect challenger parties to move from harder forms of Euroscepticism (code 1) to softer forms of Euroscepticism (codes 2, 3, 4, 5) after the Brexit referendum.

To test Hypothesis H2, the third column in Table 5.1 highlights the Brexit strategies that are explicitly pro-European. I expect these to increase amongst mainstream parties after the Brexit referendum. Finally, with regards to EU tone I expect challenger parties to use less

---

<sup>7</sup>Accuracy is the ratio of correctly predicted observation to the total observations. Precision is the number of true positives over the true positives plus the false positives. Recall is the number of true positives over the true positives and the false negatives.

<sup>8</sup>Note that the table excludes the 'Other' category (code 15).

Table 5.1: Codes for *Brexit Strategy* category

Eurosceptic Strategies	Non-positional Strategies	Pro-EU strategies
Strategies that are supportive of the UK's disintegration bid and critical of the EU.	Strategies that avoid position taking on Brexit.	Strategies that are critical of the UK's disintegration bid and/or defensive of the EU.
<b>1. Follow UK:</b> Follow UK with unilateral renegotiations and/or referendum	<b>6. Orderly Brexit:</b> Prioritise a non disruptive UK withdrawal	<b>10. Harms UK</b> Emphasise Brexit's harm to the UK.
<b>2. Slow Integration:</b> Demand reform in way that slows down integration (e.g. shrink budget)	<b>7. UK Remain:</b> Express desire for UK to remain (e.g. no cherrypicking)	<b>11. Defend EU:</b> Defend EU achievements and unity of member states.
<b>3. Criticise EU:</b> Use Brexit as example of distant ineffective EU	<b>8. Brexit Regret:</b> Express sadness at the UK leaving	<b>12. Criticise Populists:</b> Use Brexit as illustration of dangers of populism.
<b>4. Harms EU:</b> Emphasize Brexit's harm to the EU	<b>9. New Beginning:</b> Use Brexit as a new beginning Different from code 2 and 13 as no explicit call for more or less integration.	<b>13. Further Integration:</b> Use Brexit as opportunity to further integration.
<b>5. Accommodation:</b> Accommodate the UK's disintegration bid		<b>14. Non-Accommodation:</b> Refuse to make concessions to the UK (e.g. no cherrypicking)

Table 5.2: Challenger Parties - Handcoded Brexit Statements

Speaker	Brexit Statement	Brexit Strategy	EU Tone
H.Linde Left Party Sweden	It is still our conviction that it would have benefited our country if Sweden had voted no in that referendum and not joined the EU. But as long as we are members of the EU, we work constructively in the Riksdag and the European Parliament to develop the EU in a more democratic direction. We therefore believe that Sweden should follow the example of the UK and initiate a process to renegotiate our EU membership.	Follow the UK	Negative
D.H. Bisschop SGP Netherlands	Brexit is also a direct result of too far-reaching integration, too far-reaching claims and too far-reaching European arrogance. This lack of awareness is the greatest threat to the survival of the EU itself.	Criticise the EU	Negative
P.Boehringer AfD Germany	Regarding Brexit: we call on the government to finally stop the constant increase in EU contributions. The EU is seriously planning to increase German contributions from 30 to 31 billion euros in 2018 to 45 billion euros per year in the seven year plan.	Slow Integration	Negative
J.Nissinen SD Sweden	On the other hand, Minister of Finance Magdalena Andersson emphasised yesterday that it is important that we oppose protectionism. The United Kingdom has as I said in my speech, presented an action plan to leave the EU in a reciprocal manner. Then my question to the Social Democrats is this: is the government prepared to accommodate Britain in order not to create protectionism and not to harm European trade?	Accommodation	Neutral

Table 5.3: Mainstream Parties - Handcoded Brexit Statements

Speaker	Brexit Statement	Brexit Strategy	EU Tone
D.Schlegel SPD Germany	Much of it has already been mentioned: Brexit, the aftermath of the financial crisis, the high number of refugees and the rise of nationalists and right wing populitsts. Nevertheless: Europe is a success story and the European project is alive Young people between Vienna, Warsaw, Budapest, Lisbon, and also London appreciate peace and freedom.	Defend EU	Positive
Van H. Buma CDA Netherlands	But the world around us has changed. And Mr Wilders is now talking about becoming independent and that we have to leave the European Union. I wonder if he is aware of the fact that Britain has been working on that since 2016, and that has turned into one big drama.	Criticise Populists	Neutral
D.Verhoeven D66 Netherlands	It is fine that Cameron is proposing a reform of the European Union, but Europe should not let itself be blackmailed by Britons who want to get the most out of it. Membership of the EU is not a menu for us either. Of course it is better if Great Britain remains a member, but not at all costs.	Non Accomodation	Neutral
P. Niemi S Sweden	I also strongly believe that the EU's common foreign and security policy will become clearer, stronger, and more aggressive with Brexit and the accession of the Trump administration.	Further Integration	Neutral

negative tone, and mainstream parties to use more positive language when discussing the EU after the Brexit referendum. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide examples of these hand-coded Brexit statements, with Table 5.2 showing Brexit statements by challenger parties and table 5.3 showing Brexit statements by mainstream parties. These examples highlight the quality of the automated translation.

### 5.5.3 Testing Hypotheses

Given the nature of the data, where statements are nested within speakers, which are nested within parties, which are nested within countries, I use multilevel logistic regressions to test the hypotheses statistically. Individual Brexit statements are my unit of observation and a binary independent variable captures whether the statement is made before the referendum date of 23 June 2016 ('pre-referendum') or after that date ('post referendum'). As Figure 5.1 has already shown, the UK's Brexit experience was considered positive before the vote, as Cameron successfully renegotiated the UK's membership and with the UK remaining in the EU seeming the most likely outcome. However, it turned immediately negative after the vote, with the pound exchange rate against the Euro dropping steeply after the referendum and remaining low in subsequent years.


To test the hypotheses about the relative salience of Brexit amongst mainstream and challenger parties I capture and plot the number of Brexit statements made by each party per semester, as well as the number of MPs who make at least one reference to Brexit. I use semester rather than month or quarter, as parliaments are in recess during certain months, and the lack of statements during these months can significantly skew the plotting of longitudinal data. This allows me to create semester-panel data for each party with the number of Brexit statements and number of Brexit speakers as the variable of interest.

## 5.6 Analysis and Results

To analyse the salience dedicated to Brexit by mainstream and challenger parties, I first plot the number of Brexit statements made by both party types. Figure 5.2 shows how the salience of Brexit amongst both mainstream and challenger parties is relatively low in the years preceding the referendum, with little difference between party types. However, in the aftermath of the vote the salience of Brexit unsurprisingly increases amongst both groups, but particularly amongst mainstream parties. To test the hypothesis statistically, I run an OLS model with FEs for countries and parties on two measures of Brexit salience: the number of Brexit statements and the number of speakers who make at least one reference to Brexit (Table 5.4). The results shows clearly how, unsurprisingly, parties speak more



Figure 5.2: Number of Brexit Statements in National Parliaments



of Brexit after the referendum. What is more interesting are the effect sizes, which show how the increase in salience is more substantial amongst mainstream parties than amongst challengers. On average, and all else being equal, mainstream parties make an additional 42 statements per semester after the vote, compared to just 16 additional statements for challengers. Similarly, an extra 11 speakers make a Brexit statement per semester after the vote for mainstream parties, compared to an additional 4 speakers for challengers.

To demonstrate the differences in Brexit strategies before and after the referendum, I plot in Figure 5.3 the share of statements that fall into the different categories for challenger parties<sup>9</sup>. The legend colours reflect the Eurosceptic (purple) and pro-EU (blue) strategies mentioned in the previous section. Figure 5.3 shows how challenger parties adopt less explicitly Eurosceptic Brexit strategies after the referendum. Most noticeable is the large drop in the share of statements in which Eurosceptic parties call for following the UK, either by leaving the EU or a holding a membership referendum of their own. Whilst 45 per cent of Brexit statements before the referendum results called for following the UK, only 4 per cent of Brexit statements after the referendum result did the same.

<sup>9</sup>Note that for these histograms I drop the ‘Other’ coding category (code 16) which largely refers to procedural descriptions of the negotiations.

Table 5.4: OLS Regression Results - Mainstream and Challenger Parties

	<i>Mainstream</i>		<i>Challenger</i>	
	Brexit Statements	Brexit Speakers	Brexit Statements	Brexit Speakers
Post Referendum	41.714*** (6.128)	11.354*** (1.402)	16.034*** (2.711)	4.046*** (0.538)
Constant	45.417*** (7.642)	13.040*** (1.749)	14.853*** (3.381)	4.693*** (0.671)
Observations	60	60	60	60
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Instead, the focus of challenger parties after the referendum is to emphasise softer Eurosceptic Brexit strategies such as slowing integration (28 per cent of statements), criticising the EU (26 per cent) and pushing for accommodation of the UK in negotiations (22 per cent). This transition from demanding a referendum to focusing on reform and accommodation is perhaps best illustrated by Kristian Thulesen Dahl, leader of the Danish People’s Party who in the run up to the referendum made multiple statements asking to follow the UK (see statements 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35 and 97 in the dataset of Brexit statements). After the vote however, he makes not a single reference to following the UK and focuses instead on ensuring the UK is not ‘punished’ for its decision, stating for example in a speech to the Folketing in December 2016 that “the Danish People’s Party has not proposed a Danish withdrawal from the EU. Instead, the Danish People’s Party has proposed that it will work actively to ensure that the United Kingdom, which has decided to withdraw from the EU, gets a sensible agreement.”

Figure 5.4 plots the same histogram for mainstream parties. It shows that whilst the level of soft Eurosceptic positions remains similar before and after the referendum, mainstream parties significantly increase the share of their statements which can be characterised as pro-EU. The proportion of statements defending the EU and achievements of European integration doubles from 8 to 16 per cent, and whilst very few call for further integration before the referendum (2 per cent of statements), this increases significantly after the referendum (8 per cent of statements).

Mainstream parties are particularly likely to use the referendum to attack populists both

Figure 5.3: Challenger Parties - Handcoded Categories





Figure 5.4: Mainstream Parties - Handcoded Categories



at home and abroad. They are quick to criticise populists in the UK, whose “lies and smear campaign have taken hold in the motherland of political debates, where judges are labeled enemies of the people” (C.Muttonen, SPÖ, April 2017). They also use Brexit as a way to attack populists in their own member state and ask them to clarify their position on the EU. Emil Kallstrom from the Swedish Centre Party, for example criticised Ulla Anderson from the Eurosceptic Left Party for her obfuscating stance on EU membership stating that “the Left Party at least know not too speak loudly about the fact that they want to leave the EU” (June 2018). More generally, mainstream parties use the UK’s negative Brexit experience to make a wider point about the lies and incompetence of Eurosceptics in their own country, as evidenced by Matthias Strolz, leader of the Austrian Liberal Party NEOS: “When we voted in Austria in the nineties to be part of the EU, the right-wing nationalist forces in Austria said that we shouldn’t do so because we would all have scale insects in our yogurt and blood in our chocolate! Now I ask you: which of you has eaten blood chocolate in the past few years and who has scale insects in their yogurt? Nobody!” (July 2016).

Multilevel logistic regression results in tables 5.5 (challenger) and 5.6 (mainstream) confirm the hypothesis that Eurosceptic and mainstream parties respectively moderate their Euroscepticism and increase their pro-Europeanism after the referendum. Challenger parties are significantly less likely to call for leaving the EU after the referendum and instead are more likely to criticise its functioning. They are also significantly less likely to use a negative tone about the EU after the referendum. Mainstream parties are significantly more likely to call for further integration, to defend the EU, and to criticise populists after the vote. Finally, the results show how mainstream and challenger parties call for completely different negotiation strategies with respect to the the UK. Mainstream parties are significantly more likely to call for non-accommodation, whereas challenger parties are significantly more likely to call for accommodation, which is likely to minimise economic harm to the UK and thus make exit from the EU seem more desirable in the long term (Walter and Martini 2020).

Altogether these results corroborate the article’s central hypothesis. The exogenous shock of Brexit significantly impacted on the strategies employed by mainstream and challenger parties on the EU issue. Challenger parties significantly moderated their Euroscepticism and stopped demanding to follow the UK with a referendum of their own (their dominant Brexit strategy before the referendum). Mainstream parties significantly increased their use of pro-EU strategies such as defending the EU and demanding further integration, and went on the offensive, criticising Eurosceptic populists at home and abroad. In the following discussion I contemplate the generalisability of the results and whether the trends observed are likely to be a temporary or permanent fixture of party competition on European integration.

Table 5.5: Challenger Parties - Mixed Effect Logistic Regression Results

	<i>Brexit Strategy</i>				<i>EU Tone</i>
	Follow UK	Slow Integration	Criticise EU	Accommodation in Negotiations	Negative Tone
Post Referendum	-3.477*** (0.578)	0.084 (0.335)	1.160*** (0.440)	1.750*** (0.497)	-0.703** (0.273)
Constant	-4.833*** (1.734)	-1.611*** (0.343)	-2.557*** (0.447)	-4.442*** (0.661)	0.217 (0.318)
Observations	586	586	586	586	586
Country RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Speaker RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 5.6: Mainstream Parties - Mixed Effect Logistic Regression Results

	<i>Brexit Strategy</i>				<i>EU Tone</i>
	Further Integration	Defend EU	Criticise Populists	Non-Accommodation in Negotiations	Positive Tone
Post Referendum	1.771** (0.781)	1.108*** (0.364)	0.854** (0.433)	0.853*** (0.001)	-0.043 (0.287)
Constant	-5.810*** (0.911)	-3.535*** (0.440)	-5.182*** (0.993)	-5.021*** (0.001)	-2.558*** (0.316)
Observations	1,637	1,637	1,637	1,637	1,637
Country RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Speaker RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 5.7 A Permanent Reversal?


The results above provide evidence that Brexit led to a reversal in EU party strategies amongst mainstream and challenger parties in the years immediately following the referendum. Mainstream parties reversed their strategy from one of avoidance to one of entrepreneurship, and challenger parties reversed their usual strategy of entrepreneurship to one of avoidance and obfuscation. Yet given the evolving nature of Brexit it is worth considering whether the changes described are temporary or a more permanent reversal of party strategy. In this discussion section, I argue that it is more likely to be the former for two reasons.

First, the permanent reversal of party strategies depends on Brexit remaining salient in public spheres outside of the UK. Scholars have shown that party and government responsiveness to public opinion is largely conditional on the issue being salient (see Wlezien 1995, 2004; Franklin and Wlezien 1997) and without remaining salient, Brexit fails to provide new information to publics and parties on the desirability of the status quo. To explore the evolution of Brexit salience outside of the UK, I use Google Trends data. This data are particularly appealing to capture salience, as they aggregate daily billions of instances in which a particular term is searched on Google. Consequently, these searches can be considered good proxies for the public's interests and concerns (Pahontu 2020; Choi and Varian 2012). Google does not reveal absolute levels of searches, rather it normalises search data to facilitate comparisons between terms or regions. Figure 5.5 plots the Google Trends data for the search term 'brexit' relative to the UK, which is unsurprisingly the country with the highest number of searches (ref = 100). The figure shows results for the year immediately after the vote (June 2016 - June 2017) and the latest equivalent corresponding year (June 2020 - June 2021).

Figure 5.5 shows clearly how the salience of Brexit relative to the UK has dropped over time. For example whilst the number of 'brexit' Google searches in Germany was approximately a third of the number of 'brexit' searches in the UK for the period 2016-2017, that figure had dropped to less than a fifth for the period 2020-2021. This shows that whilst Brexit is likely to remain a pivotal issue for the UK for many years to come, it is already receding as a priority in other member states, as other issues such as climate change and the post-COVID economic recovery begin to dominate the EU agenda. As the disintegration episode becomes less salient, it is therefore less likely to alter the strategies employed by parties in other member states.

Second, I argue that a combination of the momentous economic hit of COVID-19, the 'slow puncture' nature of Brexit, and the bounded rationality of voters will make it harder for them to estimate the impact of Brexit on the UK, and therefore the desirability (or not)

Figure 5.5: Salience of Google searches for ‘Brexit’ relative to the UK



of their country’s alternative state outside of the EU. Indeed, whilst economists agree that Brexit has already caused the UK significant economic harm<sup>10</sup>, this effect has been dwarfed by the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, whose lost economic output escalates into trillions of dollars worldwide (McKibbin and Fernando 2020). COVID-19, which has affected all economies in the EU in similarly major ways, is likely to play an obfuscating stance when it comes to evaluating the UK’s Brexit experience over the long run. Indeed, academics have commented that disentangling the economic effects of Brexit from those of Covid-19 is ‘almost impossible’ and have suggested that Brexit will be a ‘slow puncture’ that harms the UK’s economy gradually over the long term rather than the ‘cliff edge’ Brexit many commentators had predicted (Menon 2021; Grey 2021).

These confounding effects are particularly important to consider when combined with the bounded rationality of voters (see Simon 1990). Bounded rationality asserts that decision makers want to make rational decisions, but cannot always do so because they suffer from a number of biases that make it difficult to identify causal relationships. A range of experiments have shown that people can make blatant errors when judging causal relations (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Lagnado and Sloman, 2015; Msetfi

<sup>10</sup>For example, studies published in 2018 estimated that the economic costs of the Brexit vote were 2.1 per cent of GDP (CEPR 2018)

et al., 2007; Blanco et al., 2015). This is particularly the case when faced with multiple confounders or if the effect of the policy is felt over the long run rather than shortly after implementation. Whilst the short term effects of Brexit were clear, immediate, and negative; the longer term effects of Brexit are harder to discern, even when the evidence suggests they might be just as harmful. This is likely to re-embolden challenger parties, who can point to leaving the UK as something other than a complete disaster; and deter mainstream parties, who can less obviously point to Brexit as a clear source of harm for the UK.

The results presented in this article have shown how party strategies on the issue of EU integration are far from fixed and highly responsive to exogenous shocks. Nonetheless, on balance, I expect that the patterns described are likely to be temporary state of affairs and that a return to the more traditional patterns of EU party competition, where challengers mobilise the issue and mainstream parties aim to obfuscate their stance, is more likely in the medium term.

## 5.8 Conclusion

In the wake of the most significant EU disintegration episode to date, this article has considered whether Brexit led mainstream and challenger parties in other member states to change their strategies when competing on the EU issue. My central argument is that the UK's negative experience revealed new information about the desirability of EU membership, which made parties revise their calculus about the costs and benefits of mobilising the issue. This led parties to reverse their usual strategies: challenger parties reversed their usual strategy of entrepreneurship to one of avoidance, and mainstream parties reverse their usual strategy of avoidance to one of entrepreneurship. However, I also argued that this shift is likely to be temporary rather than permanent as Brexit declines in salience, and as the monumental economic impact of COVID-19 combined with the bounded rationality of voters obfuscates the negative economic impact of Brexit.

The article makes three contributions to the literature on party competition. First, it adds to the body of evidence showing how Brexit strengthened the legitimacy of the EU in the short term. Not only did it significantly public support for the EU (De Vries 2017) and increase the cohesiveness of EU27 governments (Chopin and Lequesne 2020), it also led mainstream pro-EU parties to clarify their stance on integration and go on the offensive against populists. Second, the article has shown that party strategies on the EU issue are not stable but dynamic and respond to events and circumstances outside of domestic public spheres. Third, it shows that the advantage of issue ownership can quickly be reversed when exogenous shocks lead to large changes in public opinion: in this case it suddenly



led challenger parties' strong Eurosceptic positions from being an electoral advantage to an electoral liability.

Future research could explore these contagion effects in greater detail. The experience of the British government in the aftermath of the referendum was shambolic and failed to live up to the promises of Brexiteers. Yet more recently, as the EU muddled its vaccination procurement, the UK delivered the fastest vaccination rates in Europe, a success that Brexiteers - somewhat disingenuously- put down to their new status outside of the EU. This situation is a fascinating case study to test benchmarking theories of elite cueing and public opinion formation towards European integration. As an illustration of the benefits of EU withdrawal, has it emboldened nationalist populists to (re)advocate withdrawal from the EU? How do pro-European elites balance criticism of the EU's response to COVID-19 with the need to deter national populists from reigniting Eurosceptic public opinion? More generally, the article invites scholars to consider how Brexit's status as a 'model' for EU withdrawal affects public opinion and party strategies on the EU in other member states.

## Conclusion

*Summary of Findings – Home Style and the EU’s Legitimacy –  
Generalizability - Moving Forward - Revisiting Fenno*

### 6.1 Summary of Findings

This thesis opened with the *Eurocrat’s Complaint*: the concern that governments’ evasive and opportunistic presentation of European integration exacerbates the EU’s crisis of legitimacy. This concern is articulated both by senior EU officials and scholars of European integration, yet empirical evidence on how governments present the EU at home is limited. In this thesis, I have made use of the advances in text as data and machine translation to address this gap and present an original argument that challenges the stereotypical image of governments as evasive, opportunistic blame shifters.

The central argument presented in this thesis is that governments - and the mainstream parties that form them - face a *rhetorical dilemma* when it comes to presenting European integration at home. On the one hand, the politicization of EU integration incentivises them to signal responsiveness to more sceptical domestic audiences. On the other, the nationalist home style which criticises and scapegoats Brussels is in fact a costly strategy because it antagonises EU partners at the international level and risks antagonising the significant part of the electorate which remains supportive of integration at the national level.

Instead, governments respond to the politicization of European integration by adopting a *technocratic-patriotic* home style. This home style is *technocratic*, in the sense that governments actually talk frequently about the EU, but avoid clear position taking on the issue by defusing it with complex language. And it is *patriotic*, in the sense that governments extensively claim credit for defending the national interest on the European stage,

but in fact rarely blame or criticise the EU directly. My central explanatory variable is the domestic politicization of European integration. When domestic EU politicization is high (the EU is salient, public opinion is polarized, and Eurosceptic challengers mobilize the issue at elections), national governments are more likely to adopt the technocratic-patriotic home style. When domestic EU politicization is low, governments are more comfortable adopting a Europeanist home style. The papers in this thesis are dedicated to testing the observable implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style using original datasets of EU communication by political elites. Below is a summary of the core findings.

*Opportunistic Home Styles (Chapter 2):*

- Heads of government rarely explicitly blame the EU, even when they face severe EU politicization at home. Instead, they increase their use of credit claiming. See Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3.

- The EU does receive credit from governments, but for issues citizens care little about. Governments claim credit for issues that are electorally salient. See Figure 2.5.

*Evasive Home Styles (Chapter 4):*

- Leaders of mainstream parties actually talk frequently about the EU, particularly when they are in government. They also talk more about the issue when it has been mobilised by challenger parties. See Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3.

- However they also send obfuscating cues on integration: their EU communication is significantly more complex and technocratic than that of challenger parties. See Table 4.3.

*Stable Home Styles (Chapter 2 and 4):*

- Heads of government and leaders of mainstream parties consistently use more complex, less emotive language when they talk about the EU compared to their usual parliamentary communication. See Figure 4.4.

- Governments facing low domestic EU politicization consistently share credit with the EU more than they claim credit themselves. Governments facing high domestic EU politicization consistently claim credit more than they share credit. See Figure 2.4.

*Dynamic Home Styles (Chapter 5):*

- Exogenous shocks can lead to large changes in home style: politicians from mainstream parties outside the UK - including members of government - adopt more Europeanist home styles after the Brexit vote. See Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3.

Collectively, these results overturn common conceptions about how governments and parties present European integration in their domestic public spheres. Governments are not the opportunistic blame shifters outlined in the Eurocrat’s Complaint. They talk frequently about European integration in their domestic public spheres, and frequently share credit with the EU and its institutions in the aftermath of major EU summits.

Conversely, we should also be wary of letting governments and ostensibly pro-EU mainstream parties off the hook with respect to the legitimation of European integration. Governments and mainstream parties may talk frequently about the EU, but they do so in language which is complex, technocratic and ultimately difficult for citizens to grasp. And whilst they do share credit with the EU, they do so for issues citizens care little about, claiming credit for those that matter most. When Juncker claims that governments’ presentation of EU integration means “it’s no wonder anti-European tendencies are on the rise” (Bild, 2019 - see Introduction), he may indeed have a point. In the following section I consider the effects of the technocratic-patriotic home style on the legitimacy of the EU, its institutions and the process of European integration more widely.

## 6.2 Home Style and the EU’s Legitimacy

If the Eurocrat worries so much about governments’ home style, it is because he understands the centrality of home style to the legitimation of European governance. In this thesis’ introduction, I outlined a threefold typology of home styles. For the *Europeanist* and the *nationalist* home style, their effects on the legitimacy of the EU are straightforward. Europeanist home styles legitimize European integration with clear, supportive cues on integration and by sharing credit with the EU for salient policy issues. Nationalist home styles delegitimize European integration by failing to engage citizens in a meaningful discourse about EU integration and by scapegoating EU institutions. Yet the evidence presented in this thesis shows that governments mainly adopt a technocratic-patriotic home style whose effects are likely to be more nuanced. What are the implications of this technocratic-patriotic home style for the legitimacy and legitimation of European integration?

### 6.2.1 Mechanisms of EU Legitimation

In this conclusion, I consider three mechanisms of legitimation and three mechanisms of delegitimation that stem from the technocratic-patriotic home style. First, if successful, this home style manages to depoliticize the process of European integration and *place it beyond the realms of political contestation*. In many ways, this can be seen as the ultimate form of legitimation. Institutions that are successfully placed beyond the realms of party

politics, such as the army, the legal system, or independent central banks are more trusted in public opinion surveys than those subject to democratic control (OECD, Eurobarometer). Crucially though, the ability to do so depends on cross-party consensus. In her fascinating history of EU legitimation discourses, Sternberg (2013) shows how attempts to depoliticize the stakes of integration and EU action were consistently met by forces actively repoliticizing them. De Wilde and Zurn also considered whether attempts by the Commission and member state government to combat EU politicization are viable. They conclude not, as the high levels of authority exercised by the EU, combined with incentives for challenger parties to mobilize the issue make this an unlikely solution in the long term (2012). This isn't to say that the form of depoliticization described in the technocratic-patriotic home style might not be an effective short term strategy when faced with crises. White for example, shows how emergency politics and its technocratic discourse of exception allowed Europe's political elites to "advance and defend spectacular changes of lasting significance" (2015) without the form of contestation usually seen from opposition parties. Yet overall, I am personally sceptical that legitimation through depoliticization is a viable long term strategy for the process of European integration.

Second, the technocratic-patriotic home style legitimises the EU by *strengthening (perceptions of) representation in EU policymaking*. Scholars have provided convincing evidence of responsiveness in the EU, both down the European route through the election of MEPs in the Parliament, and down the domestic route through the election of governments in the Council (Hagemann et al 2017; Wratil 2016). Yet citizens are often unconvinced that governments or MEPs represent their preferences on the European stage: MEPs have low levels of recognition in domestic public sphere and national media rarely cover votes in the Council. By contrast, the media *does* pay attention to what governments - and in particular national leaders - say about Europe. By emphasising the ways they defend and represent the interests and priorities of their voters, national leaders crucially shape *perceptions* of responsiveness and representation in EU policymaking. As the thesis' introduction hopefully made clear, communication is central to the process representation and has often been the missing link in representation studies of EU policymaking. The technocratic-patriotic home style makes clear to the public what political scientists have known for a while: that the electoral connection linking citizens' views and EU policymaking is real. For that alone, it is an important, potentially powerful mechanism in legitimising the EU as a functional, responsive form of democratic government.

Finally, a linked - but distinct - mechanism of EU legitimation stemming from the technocratic-patriotic home style is that it *frames European integration according to the national interest*. Survey data shows consistently how European citizens feel a stronger sense of attachment to their country than to Europe and framing EU institutions as venues where

this national (rather than European) interest is pursued might well be one way to ensure they remain legitimate in the eyes of voters<sup>1</sup>. Scholars have also argued that a ‘felt distance’ between EU institutions and the more confrontational nature of their own domestic politics contributes to the EU’s democratic deficit (Follesdal and Hix, 2006). The technocratic-patriotic home style shows that far from being a venue of consensus and backroom deals, the EU is an arena of real political contestation where governments vigorously defend their country’s views and interests on the European stage.

### 6.2.2 Mechanisms of EU Delegation

The technocratic-patriotic home style also triggers clear mechanisms of EU delegitimation. Most obviously (and most worryingly) it *damages democratic accountability in Europe’s multilevel system of governance*. Democratic accountability, the process by which voters use the ballot box to reward or punish incumbents for their performance, depends on voters knowing where parties stand on issues. In a multilevel system, it also depends on voters having a sense of which level of government is responsible for which issues. The technocratic-patriotic home style poses problems for both.

First, the technocratic-patriotic home style damages accountability by obfuscating governments’ stance on European integration. To make informed choices at the ballot box, voters most know where parties, and perhaps most crucially governing parties, stand on issues. But their use of complex, technocratic language to defuse European integration makes it difficult to know their position (see also Bischof and Seninger 2018). Scholars have outlined the risk of this form of depoliticization to democracy, particularly in the context of global governance (Fawcett et al. 2015; Flinders, and Wood 2017). In his treatise on ‘Why We Hate Politics’, Hay for example concludes that “disaffection and disengagement would seem a most natural response to the conscious and deliberate depoliticization of democratic governance” (2007).

Second, the technocratic-patriotic home style damages accountability by manipulating attributions of responsibility in the EU. We already know that the division of competencies across local, national, and international levels of governance make it difficult for citizens to attribute responsibility correctly (see e.g. Anderson 2006). What this thesis has made clear is that this problem is exacerbated by the opportunistic communication of national executives. Governments may not be blame shifters but they are strategic in their communication and reluctant to share credit with the EU for issues their citizens care most about, even when the EU has clear competence in this area. Democratic accountability

---

<sup>1</sup>The counter argument is that this stymies the development of a European identity that many consider necessary for legitimizing EU integration. See section 6.2.2 and Table 6.1

depends on voters knowing who is responsible for what. The technocratic-patriotic home style muddies these waters and manipulates attributions of responsibility to the advantage of national executives and to the detriment of European institutions.

The technocratic-patriotic home style also risks delegitimizing the EU by *leaving the floor open for Eurosceptic challengers to frame the debate* on Europe. In the absence of clear cues from governments and mainstream parties, citizens who are increasingly interested in EU politics are likely to seek cues elsewhere. Challenger parties are more than happy to oblige. As Chapter 3 has shown, their EU communication is defined by simple and emotive language which has been shown to significantly influence voters (Brader 2005; Wirz 2018; Weeks 2015; Kuhne et al 2011). This general pattern was perhaps best illustrated in the Brexit referendum, where a highly emotive Leave campaign outmanoeuvred a bloodless Remain campaign that was consistently playing catch up (Shipman 2016). The outcome serves as a stark reminder of the difficulties in combating stirring, emotive appeals with complex, technocratic messages.

One final way the technocratic-patriotic home style fails to legitimize the EU is the reverse side of the third mechanism described in section 6.2.1. By framing European integration according to the national interest, governments *stymie the development of a European identity* that many consider central to the legitimacy of the European project. Indeed, theorists have long recognised the importance of European identification (Reif,1993; Kaelbe, 2009) and that, in the words of Weber: “without identity, there can be no true, durable legitimacy attached to a political entity” (1946). Despite hopes that further integration would eventually lead to attachment with the new European community, this shift has largely failed to occur: longitudinal survey data confirms that levels of European identification have barely increased over time, and remain significantly lower than levels of national identification. Scholars of identity formation have shown how socialization (Fligstein 2008) and persuasion (Medrano 2009) play an important role in developing new identities, and it strikes me that through their home styles, national governments and mainstream parties have had opportunities to engage these channels for the development of European, as well as national, pride and identification. They have, however, largely failed to do so (see Schmidt 2005). In particular, the unwillingness of governments to frame achievements as European for the issues that matter most to citizens (see Chapter 2) seems to me a significant factor in the (relative) lack of identification with the European project.

Table 6.1: The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style: Mechanisms of Legitimation and Delegation

<i>Mechanism of EU Legitimation</i>	<i>Mechanism of EU Delegation</i>
1. Places EU integration beyond the realm of political contestation	1. Damages Accountability in Europe's Multilevel System of Governance
2. Strengthens (perceptions of) representation in EU policymaking.	2. Leaves floor open for Eurosceptic challengers to frame debate.
3. Frames EU integration according to the national interest.	3. Stymies development of a European identity

Table 6.1 summarises the mechanisms of EU legitimation and EU delegitimation described in this section. Whilst my hunch is that the mechanisms of EU delegitimation dominate, as social scientists we owe it to ourselves to rigorously test the causal effects of our descriptive inferences. Through conjoint and vignette experiments, future research can discover whether and how the technocratic-patriotic home style legitimizes or delegitimizes the process of European integration. Indeed, I consider this question *the* priority for future research, an agenda which I develop in further detail later on in the conclusion (section 6.4).

### 6.3 The Generalisability of Home Style

One central remaining question concerns the generalisability of the micro-level findings. This thesis is effectively an extended comparative study of how governments and parties in Europe present the EU at home. I believe this focus was necessary given the intensity of debates about the politicization and legitimacy of the EU, but it is worthwhile to consider the external validity of these findings, and in particular whether they travel to other international organizations (IOs).

#### 6.3.1 Home Style beyond the EU

Are the findings presented in this thesis - in particular governments' adoption of technocratic-patriotic home styles - generalisable to other IOs beyond the EU? Whilst this question undoubtedly merits further empirical scrutiny (see section 6.4), I argue first and foremost that



home style *is* a useful concept to apply when studying legitimation of global systems of governance and international institutions more broadly. Home style in global governance matters for much of the same reasons that home style in the EU does. The lack of transnational public spheres (see Nanz and Steffek 2004) means citizens receive most of their information from domestic rather than international actors. Scholars have shown that cues from governments are more credible, and thus more effective in shaping legitimacy beliefs, than cues from international institutions (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). And bureaucratic elites from IOs frequently admonish governments in a manner similar to the Eurocrat’s complaint. In a recent interview for example, professor Kickbusch from the World Health Organization admonished governments for “throwing blame about” and “scapegoating the WHO” during the COVID-19 crisis (2020).

Furthermore, the central explanatory variable in this thesis - the domestic politicization of international cooperation - is not limited to the EU. Indeed, a wide range of IOs such as the IMF, the WTO, the WHO and the World Bank are also contested domestically and face challenges to their legitimacy (Zurn 2004, 2014, 2018; Zurn and Ecker-Ehrardt 2014; Zurn et al 2012; Rixen and Zangl, 2012; Stephen and Zurn 2019). And whilst a growing literature explores *how IOs legitimize themselves* in the face of this politicization (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018; Zurn 2014, Dellmuth 2018), at least as important a factor in the legitimation of global governance is *how governments legitimize IOs* in their own domestic public spheres.

Naturally there are many IOs, most of them small and largely irrelevant to the electoral fortunes of national governments. The most authoritative source to date, a dataset from the Correlates of War (COW) project, outlines 561 international organizations between 1815 and 2005 (Pevehouse et al 2020). Governments are hardly going to be rewarded for ‘bringing back the bacon’ from the World Tourism Organization or the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF). However, I do expect governments to adopt the technocratic-patriotic home style under certain scope conditions. To be precise, I would expect national governments to adopt a technocratic-patriotic home style in international organisations that meet the following criteria:

1. The IO is politicized in domestic public spheres.
2. The IO deals with issues that are salient to domestic electorate.
3. The IO has been legitimised through diverse narratives (not just problem-solving)
4. Domestic public opinion towards the IO is divided rather than universally sceptical.

Conditions 1 and 2 are fairly straightforward. Without this politicization, governments are comfortable adopting what we might call a broadly ‘internationalist’ home style, sharing

credit with the IO and its members. Conversely, if the IO has competence for issues that matter to domestic electorates, governments will face pressure to ‘bring back the bacon’ for these issues. These two conditions are related. Scholars have argued that it is precisely the delegation of salient issues to IOs that leads to their politicization (Zurn 2014).

Condition 3 requires more explanation. A growing literature explores the legitimacy of IOs and argues that IOs are not legitimised simply through institutional mechanisms such as the elections of governments but also through various legitimisation ‘narratives’ (see Bernstein, 2011; Brassett and Tsingou, 2011; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2014, Zurn 2014). These narratives can emphasise the problem-solving capacity of the IO, or be more normative, emphasising features such as fairness or participation (Rauh and Zurn 2020). The intuition is that governments will have less qualms about criticising an IO whose legitimisation is based purely on problem-solving competence, compared to IOs who have been legitimized through more diverse narratives. Indeed, if the IO’s legitimacy is based purely on performance then it can be fairly criticised if and when its performance is lacking. In practical terms, what this means is that governments are likely to be more reluctant to criticise an IO like the UN, whose legitimisation has been built on emotive narratives emphasising ‘keeping peace throughout the world’, ‘developing friendly relations among nations’, and ‘conquering hunger, disease and illiteracy’ (UN charter) than one like the IMF whose legitimacy is built on achieving dry economic goals such as ‘fostering global monetary cooperation’ and ‘securing financial stability’ (IMF Charter)<sup>2</sup>.

Condition 4 refines my definition of IO politicization. Crucially, politicization is not about public opinion towards the IO being universally unpopular, but divided. If domestic public opinion is universally aligned against the IO, governments will have little qualms in adopting a more nationalist home style. This has been the case for several IOs in the past: for instance, surveys have shown how two thirds of Argentinians held negative views of the IMF in 2018 (Wilson Center). This condition also explains why governments with reelection constituencies that are universally sceptical of international cooperation are likely to adopt nationalist home styles. President Trump, for example, whose voters are aligned in their criticism of IOs, explicitly attacked NATO, the United Nations, the WHO, and the WTO during his time in office. Table 6.2 presents a typology of home styles in international institutions, with candidate IOs for each. Naturally, cross-national differences in the domestic politicization of different international institutions means home styles with vary considerably across countries and across IOs, but overall the table provides a good summary of my thinking on the generalisability of home style.

---

<sup>2</sup>The intuition behind this argument is corroborated by research showing that IOs adopt more diversified legitimisation narratives (i.e. less focused on problem-solving justification) when they face higher levels of politicisation (Rauh and Zurn 2014)

Table 6.2: Home Styles in International Organizations

<i>Home Style</i>	Internationalist	Technocratic-Patriotic	Nationalist
<i>Description</i>	Government defends IO and shares credit with international partners.	Government claims credit for actions in the IO but avoids clear position taking on the IO itself.	Government criticises and shifts blame onto the IO.
<i>Most Likely Amongst..</i>	IOs that are not politicised and/or benefit from widespread domestic support	IOs that are politicised and have been legitimized through diverse narratives (normative as well as problem solving).	IOs that are universally unpopular at home.
<i>Candidate IOs</i>	African Union NATO	World Bank UN (certain agencies)	IMF

Questions naturally remain. Is the relationship between home style and IO legitimation similar to the mechanisms described in section 6.2? In the absence of the electoral connection, what explains the home styles of governments from authoritarian regimes? I see the abundance of questions raised by home style as reflections of the richness of the concept rather than its limitations, and remain convinced that home style is useful to understand not simply the legitimation and delegitimation of the EU, but the legitimation and delegitimation of global governance more widely.

### 6.3.2 Home Style Beyond Mainstream Parties


This thesis has focused on the home style of governments drawn from *mainstream* parties. Yet a large literature illustrates the growing electoral success of nationalist populists in Europe, many of whom advocate explicit Eurosceptic positions (Cudde 2007; Goodwin and Eatwell 2014). Are the results presented across the papers - particularly the reluctance of governments to adopt nationalist home styles that are openly critical of the EU - generalisable to populist leaders? First - and this is important to point out - whilst national populists have undoubtedly improved their electoral fortunes in the twenty first century, this electoral success has only rarely translated into government experience (Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Potential coalition partners are often put off by these parties' extreme

positions, and in certain cases they are themselves reticent to enter government in order to preserve their anti-establishment credentials (Mair 2007). Figure 6.1 plots the number of pro-European (above 5.5 on the CHES), Euroagnostic (between 3.5 and 5.5 on the CHES) and Eurosceptic (below 3.5 on the CHES) heads of government in the EU's member states since 2004. It shows how despite the increased vote share of populist parties, heads of government continue to be overwhelmingly made up of the mainstream, broadly pro-European parties that have dominated party competition in the twentieth century. This thesis has therefore focused on mainstream parties because the story of home style *is* the story of how mainstream party leaders - those who overwhelmingly form and lead governments - present Europe to domestic audiences.

With that being said, a small minority of national populists such as Viktor Orbán (Fidesz, Hungary) or Mateusz Morawiecki (Law and Justice, Poland) *have* managed to form governments and maintain power as heads of government. Do these governments adopt the nationalist home styles that mainstream party leaders have been so reluctant to adopt? Whilst these questions merit further empirical scrutiny, I argue that national populists in government face their own version of the *rhetorical dilemma of home style* presented in the thesis' introduction. Figure 6.2 illustrates public opinion towards the EU in each of the EU's 27 member states. It shows that in the two states currently led by explicitly Eurosceptic heads of government, public opinion is actually significantly *more* supportive of the EU than in other member states. This suggests that these Eurosceptic heads of state also have to tread carefully when presenting European integration in their domestic public spheres: Brussels-bashing (which their instincts and preferences point toward) may in fact antagonize a large part of the electorate, which has benefited economically from membership to the EU (Belka 2013). Even for leaders of populist Eurosceptic parties, adopting the nationalist home style is far from a costless rhetorical strategy.


For both leaders of mainstream and Eurosceptic populist parties then, the rhetorical dilemma of home style stems from a disconnect between leaders' preferences and the preferences of voters on the EU issue. Leaders of mainstream governing parties (particularly in Western Europe) are significantly more supportive of integration than their more sceptical voters. Leaders of Eurosceptic governing parties (particularly in Eastern Europe) are significantly more sceptical of integration than their more supportive voters. To be clear, I do think national populists are more likely to adopt a nationalist home style than their mainstream counterparts. However, on entering government they face their own difficulties and constraints - including their own *rhetorical dilemma of home style*. I would posit that this rhetorical dilemma pushes them - on the whole - to adopt patriotic rather than nationalist home styles.

Figure 6.1: Senior Governing Parties in the EU



Source: CHES. Pro-EU parties are those who score above 5.5 on their EU position, EU-agnostic are those between 3.5 and 5.5, and EU-sceptic are those below 3.5.

Figure 6.2: Public Opinion Towards the EU



Source: Eurobarometer (Autumn 2020). Pro-EU parties score above 5.5 on their CHES EU position, EU-agnostic score between 3.5 and 5.5, and EU-sceptic score below 3.5.

### 6.3.3 Home Style Across Venues

Finally, one could question whether the thesis' findings travel to other communication venues beyond press conferences after EU summits (Chapter 2) and parliamentary debates (Chapters 3 to 5). To be more precise: could governments not be reluctant to criticise or blame the EU at press conferences in Brussels, but revert to more nationalist home styles when back in the comfort of their own member state?


To be clear, the argument presented across this thesis is *not* intended as venue-specific. I believe a general theory of home style is possible and important, and one that does not travel well to multiple communication venues would not be particularly useful. Whilst the nationalist home style is *particularly costly* when governments present the outcome of summits, the central argument is that it remains costly even at home because of the divided (not universally sceptical) nature of domestic public opinion on the EU. Studies of home style in domestic contexts also corroborate the view that elected representatives adopt home style that are remarkably consistent across venues (Grimmer 2010, 2012). Fenno himself noted the consistency with which representatives presented their message as one of the most of his most surprising findings (1978).

To go beyond corroboration from existing research, I provide additional, original evidence for the consistency of home style across venues. If it is indeed the case that we should expect more blame shifting outside the spotlight of EU summits, then national legislatures, as a purely domestic communication venue, seem like an obvious place we might observe it. To test this hypothesis, Figure 6.3 uses EUParlspeech to plots the difference in the share of negative sentiment by heads of government in their EU communication and their total communication. Whilst more negative EU communication could not be considered definite evidence of blame shifting towards the EU<sup>3</sup>, a lack of meaningful difference between the two would suggest that the EU isn't particularly used as a scapegoat by national leaders. As 'most likely' cases, I include leaders from countries where we might expect blame shifting due to high levels of Euroscepticism and successful Eurosceptic challenger parties: Austria, the UK, and the Netherlands. Figure 6.3 shows that there is no meaningful difference between the amounts of negative language used by national leaders when they talk about Europe, compared to their usual parliamentary communication. In fact, they are likely to use *less* negative language when talking about the EU. Combined with what we already know about the consistency of home styles in domestic settings, this suggest that the findings in this thesis travel across venues.

---

<sup>3</sup>This would also require attribution of responsibility for the negative situation, which is notoriously difficult to capture with automated methods - see Chapter 2.

Figure 6.3: Heads of Government Use *Less* Negative Language when Talking About the EU



Source: Parlspeech and EUParlspeech

Where I do think venues are likely to make a significant difference is through the role of the media. As a gatekeeper, media plays a key function in filtering down the home style of national governments into the cues that eventually reach citizens, and therefore shape their public opinion. In fact, I consider *home style in the media*, together with *the consequences of home style*, and *home style in global governance* to be the three central avenues for further research. I outline these in more detail in the section below.

## 6.4 Moving Forward

The findings in thesis bring a new set of questions and an agenda for further research. Naturally, testing the generalisability of the results to other IOs, populist parties, and other venues is important, but I will limit myself to three avenues that I consider most pressing and - crucially - most feasible given the methods and data currently available to social scientists. First, future research should explore the *consequences of home style* for legitimacy beliefs in the EU. This thesis has outlined in detail how governments present European integration and why they present it this way, and the conclusion has hinted at possible consequences for the legitimacy of the EU. Testing these mechanisms through rigorous social science experiments is key though, and I consider it the priority for further research. Encouragingly,

conjoint and vignette experiments provide a cost-effective way of isolating the effects of elite cues on legitimacy beliefs, and is in fact a method that has been used previously to estimate the effect of government cues on the legitimacy of IOs (Tallberg and Dellmuth 2020). What is particularly interesting about testing the consequences of the technocratic-patriotic home style is that the experimental cueing literature<sup>4</sup> largely test the effect of clear positional cues. Yet this thesis has shown that governments often employ deliberately obscure language to avoid taking clear positions, a strategy that we know is also widespread in domestic politics (see Rovny 2012, 2014). Investigating the consequences of the technocratic-patriotic home style will therefore yield insights not only into how governments shape the popular legitimacy of the EU, but also about the consequences of obfuscation more widely.

A second important avenue for further research is *home style in the media*. By media, I refer both to mass media, which remains influential in framing debates despite falling circulation, and social media, which politicians increasingly use to communicate directly with voters. Home style in the media matters so much because as a gatekeeper (see Shoemaker and Vos 2009) media filters the home style of national governments into the cues that reach citizens every day, and ultimately shape their public opinion. Whilst this thesis has provided valuable insights into what governments and parties *directly say* about Europe, it is less clear which of these messages *directly reach* citizens. Indeed, the often long press conference statements from EUCOSpeech are usually boiled down into a handful of key quotes by publications with their own incentives and agenda. Exploring home style in the media could explain one of the puzzles uncovered in this thesis, namely why EU bureaucrats are so convinced of the prevalence of nationalist home styles, whilst my data reveals that Brussels-bashing is in fact rare. I would posit that the media is central to this explanation. Whilst statements explicitly blaming the EU are rare, they are particularly likely to be picked up by journalists who welcome the chance to inject drama and conflict to the often dry process of EU politics (Riise 2015). Using the validated dictionaries of EU level terms developed in this thesis, in combination with databases of media reporting like LexisNexis would be an excellent starting point and provide a rich dataset to explore the link between home style, the cues that eventually reach citizens, and public opinion towards the EU.

A third, immediately actionable avenue for further research concerns *home style in global governance*. As section 6.3.1 has suggested, the concept of home style is not limited to the EU and seems important to other international institutions, particularly those that face questions about their legitimacy. The first step here would be to develop a list of global governance terms that can then be used to identify references to international cooperation in various communication venues, in a method similar to that employed for EUParlspeech. This should incorporate not only the names of IOs but other forms of international cooper-

---

<sup>4</sup>‘Experimental’ in the sense that it uses experiments to identify the causal effects of cues.



ation such as major international treaties and trade agreements. Existing datasets, such as the Correlates of War (COW) data or the UN's list of multilateral treaties provide a usual starting point. As Rauh and De Wilde (2018) have noted this is an inherently collective activity, one that can lead to intense debates about what and what not to include. Whilst no list can ever be definite (and indeed as all quantitative models for text are 'wrong' - see Grimmer and Stewart 2013), creating first a dictionary, and then a dataset of references to international cooperation in national legislature should be possible for a group of motivated and linguistically diverse researchers. This would allow scholars to explore differences in home style not only across countries, but also across IOs, and should provide them with the means to eventually develop and rigorously test a more general theory of home style in global governance.

## 6.5 Revisiting Fenno

Classics have a habit of rearing their head in surprising new ways. This thesis has adapted Fenno's classic concept of 'home style' to a new era and environment, one where significant political authority has shifted beyond the nation state and where citizens are represented in these international institutions by their governments. *Home style in national politics* is central to representation in domestic policy making and to the legitimation of domestic institutions (see Grimmer 2010, 2013; Fenno 1978). Likewise, *home style in the European Union* is central to representation in European policy making and to the legitimation of the EU and its supranational institutions.

Fenno's work concludes with a plea to the Congressmen he had spent weeks observing and fraternising with. Through his time in town halls and public forums across the country, he grew concerned with a phenomenon that has since been labeled 'Fenno's Paradox': that whilst individual Congressmen are popular, Congress is not, and members rarely (if ever) speak up for their institution. Fenno understood that democratic legitimacy is fragile, and that through their home styles, the Members he observed so closely risked delegitimizing an institution that Americans desperately needed for the functioning of their political system. Given the events of the past year, where protestors in January 2021 stormed the US Capitol in a violent and shocking attack, his warning seems all the more prescient and poignant and is worth quoting in full. The emphasis added in italics is my own:

“From our home perspective it appears that most members of Congress have enough leeway at home, if they have the will, to educate their constituents in the strengths, as well as the weaknesses, of their institution. They have more leeway than they allow others - even themselves - to think. They can, in other

words, identify themselves with their own institution even at the risk of taking some responsibility for what it does. They can, that is, if they will view the trust of their supportive constituents as working capital - not just to be hoarded for personal benefit but to be drawn on, occasionally, for the benefit of the institution. It will be a risk. But by taking that risk, they avoid a possibly greater risk: *that Congress may lack public support at the very time when the public needs Congress the most.*"

It is difficult not to see the parallels with the EU and with global systems of governance more widely. The largest issues of our day, from climate change to global inequality, traverse national borders and cannot be solved without forms of international cooperation. Yet the ability of IOs to solve these issues is challenged by their lack of public support. Legitimacy will be central for IOs' long- term capacity to deliver and make a difference in world politics. This legitimacy is likely to be built and rebuilt not simply through the ways international institutions legitimise themselves in the face of contestation, but through the way national governments present, explain and defend international cooperation in their own domestic public spheres: their *home style*.

# Appendix A1

This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 2 (Credit Claiming in International Organizations: Evidence from EU Council Summits).

## **A1.1 Descriptive Statistics**

The table below presents the descriptive statistics for the data collected for the article. It includes the national leaders of France, Germany, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, and Greece. Overall, the dataset consists of 6,012 statements (paragraphs) taken from 414 speeches by twenty-three national leaders in the aftermath of EU summits.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Speeches</i>	<i>Statements</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Time period</i>
France	Macron, Hollande Sarkozy, Chirac	43	548	elysee.fr	12.2005 - 03.2018
Germany	Merkel	74	725	bundestkanzlerin.de	12.2005 - 03.2018
UK	Blair, Brown, Cameron	51	659	parliament.uk	03.2005 - 03.2016
Ireland	Varadkar, Kenny Cowen, Ahern	61	1,092	oireachtas.ie	12.2005 - 06.2018
Denmark	L.Rasmussen, Thorning-Schmidt, A.Rasmussen	52	703	ft.dk	10.2006 - 10.2018
Spain	Zapatero, Rajoy, Sanchez	83	1,524	lamoncloa.gob.es	03.2005 - 10.2018
Greece	Tsipras, Samaras, Papademos Papandreou Pikramennou	50	761	primeminister.gov.gr	10.2009 - 12.2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>Twenty-three leaders</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>6,012</b>	<b>n.a.</b>	<b>03.2005 - 12.2018</b>

## A1.2 Codebook

Thank you for helping to code EUCOSpeech, a dataset of statements in speeches by national leaders communicating the outcomes of European Council (EU CO) summits to their national media and national parliaments. This codebook explains how to code these statements. Whilst your coding will be done in English, the statements you are presented with (in column G) will be in the language for which you are a native speaker (German, Greek, French, Danish, Spanish).

Please code directly into the EXCEL file, where speeches have already been divided into separate statements. Note that the first and last paragraphs of each speech have been removed from the text corpus when these simply refer to introductions and conclusions of press conferences. A ‘statement’ refers to an individual paragraph in leaders’ speeches. Occasionally, due to the way in which speeches were collected, you may encounter clear formatting errors, for example a sentence that suddenly cuts off halfway through a statement. In these rare cases please correct and re-format the statement by merging it with the relevant cell and mentioning this in column J (dedicated to notes). Generally speaking, please leave the statements in the format in which national leaders have presented them.

The EXCEL file contains nine columns. Your role is to code Attribution in column H and Policy Issue in column I after reading the full statement (in the original language) in column G.

### A1.2.1 Coding Attribution (Column H)

In Column H, we would like you to code the statement’s attribution of responsibility. Responsibility can be attributed for both positive outcomes (credit) and negative ones (blame). Responsibility can also be attributed to one’s self (e.g. claiming credit) or to others (e.g. sharing credit or shifting blame). We would like you to categorise the statements according to one of the four categories below. There are further details on each of these categories, with examples, later on in the codebook:

When coding statements, please take into account the following:

- When coding statements, please base your evaluation on what national leaders are communicating at face value, rather than on any subtext based on your knowledge of the country. For example, you may think that a statement has Eurosceptic undertones, but if the speaker is not explicitly criticising the EU, and /or its institutions then it should not be coded as an instance of blame shifting.
- Classification categories are mutually exclusive. Occasionally, there will be statements

<i>Credit Claiming</i>	<i>Credit Sharing</i>	<i>Blame Shifting</i>	<i>Descriptive (No Attribution)</i>
Statements where governments <i>explicitly</i> credit themselves, their government or their country for positive outcomes or decisions.	Statements where governments <i>explicitly</i> credit the EU, its institutions, or other member state(s) for positive outcomes or decisions	Statements where governments <i>explicitly</i> criticize the EU, its institutions and/or another member state for negative outcomes or decisions.	Statements where there is no explicit attribution for credit or blame for a positive or negative situation

that you feel contain more than one of the attributions identified above. In this case, use your personal judgement and knowledge of the native tongue to decide what seems to be the dominant tone of the message (e.g. is this more an instance of credit claiming, or more an instance of credit sharing).

- When coding, please consider both retrospective and prospective attributions of responsibility. For example, “we will overcome the economic crisis thanks to the EU” should still be coded as instances of credit sharing. Likewise, statements such as “I will continue to fight to defend my country’s national interest on the European stage” should be coded as an example of credit claiming).
- Generally, when defining codes, let your decisions be guided by parsimony and reliability. The rest of this section provides more detailed descriptions of the four categories for classification, and examples of statements for each.

### **i) Credit Claiming**

Our first category refers to statements where national leaders credit themselves, their government, or their country for a positive intervention, action or outcome. This includes, but is not limited to:

- National leaders highlighting their influence on the international stage by putting an item on the agenda and/or making an important contribution or intervention in the meeting
- National leaders claiming to achieve their country’s desired outcome through their negotiations with European partners

- National leaders using communication on the international stage to highlight their domestic achievements. This may be by benchmarking themselves against other European member states (e.g. showing that their economic growth rate is the highest in continent)
- National leaders communicating how an idea they have defended over the long term has become an EU policy
- National leaders explicitly highlighting their or their member state's leadership or contribution on specific issues in EU policymaking

Examples:

“So, I welcome the steps that Eurozone countries are committing to take today, but I have also said that Britain isn't in the Euro, Britain isn't going to be joining the Euro, and so it is right that we shouldn't be involved in the Euro area's internal arrangements. That is why I secured in December a commitment which carves Britain out of future Eurozone bailout arrangements, and why we are not joining the pact that the Euro area countries have agreed today.” (D.Cameron (UK) 2015/1)

“For this reason, Spain has insisted from the beginning that this European Council takes decisions with real impact on three issues that I consider fundamental: unemployment, especially that of our young people; the financing of our small and medium enterprises, and, thirdly, the Banking Union. I know that this last issue is not easy for people to understand, but believe me it is fundamental to restore the flow of credit to the real economy.” (M.Rajoy (ESP) 2013/1)

”In the area of Defense, we have agreed on the European Defense Fund's pilot project and the launch of the European intervention initiative on 25 June in nine countries, including France and Germany. This is a proposal I had personally made at La Sorbonne last autumn and Europe is thus endowed with real strategic capacity, and autonomy.” (E.Macron (FR) 2018/6)

“What contribution has the Government of Spain made? The Government of Spain has made the following contribution: we have put the issue of the banking union firmly on the agenda, we have to talk about the financial system, but we also have to start talking about the fiscal union.” (P.Sanchez (ESP) 2018/6)

## **ii) Credit Sharing**

Our second category refers to statements where governments credit the EU, its institutions and/or other member states for positive outcomes or decisions. This includes, but is not limited to:

- National leaders highlighting Europe’s or the EU’s leadership in a particular policy domain
- National leaders congratulating the European Council or the EU collectively for decisions and actions (not simply discussions) on the European stage
- National leaders explicitly highlight benefits brought by the EU and/or European integration. This includes historical achievements such as peace or prosperity, democracy in Europe’s sphere of influence etc
- National leaders thanking, congratulating or praising the work of the EU’s institutions or its representatives or employees, for example the president of the Commission, the High Representative etc.
- National leaders jointly claiming credit with another member state (for e.g. national leaders from France and/or Germany Franco-German alliance)

Examples:

“The Council welcomed the outcome of the G8 summit on combating climate change, in particular, the commitment to the UN process and reducing emissions by at least 50 per cent by 2050. This is an area where the European Union is providing real global leadership and will continue to do so.” (B.Ahern (IRL) 2015/3)

“This is, in the end, the crucial prize. It is important that we take action here in Britain, as tomorrow’s climate change Bill will show. It is critical for the EU then to show leadership, as it did at the summit in a remarkable and ground-breaking way. For those who doubt the relevance of the European Union to today’s world, last week’s Council meeting and its historic agreement on climate change is the best riposte. It shows Europe following the concerns of its people, and giving real leadership to the rest of the world.” (T.Blair (UK) 2007/7)

”At this summit, Europe has really come together on Libya. Today’s conclusions endorsed the UN resolution agreed last week. They set out Europe’s determination to contribute to that implementation of that resolution and the conclusions also recognise that lives have been saved by the action we have taken so far.” (D.Cameron (UK) 2011/3)

“I am grateful to the Commission and would like to extend thanks to President Juncker for the speed and quality of their proposals on migration. That so many people come to us, shows that the distress in the world is great that there are terrible wars that drive people to flee, and other horrible situations in many countries, where people are forced to flee from great suffering out.” (A.Merkel (DE) 2015/10)



”The value of the European Union once again becomes clear. This is a crisis that comes from the United States, from the financial system of the United States, and it is a crisis that will be overcome thanks to the European Union, its coordination capacity and its leadership capacity.” (J.Zapatero (ESP) 2010/10)

### **iii) Blame Shifting**

Our third category refers to statements where governments criticize, express frustration at, or blame the EU, its institutions and/or other member state(s). This includes, but is not limited to

- National leaders communicating their disappointment or frustration at the outcomes of a summit, or of slow progress on particular issues
- National leaders expressing that an EU decision or policy will harm their member state and/or Europe as a whole
- National leaders criticising and questioning the benefits of European integration more widely
- National leaders ‘blaming Europe’ for a negative outcome or issue

Examples:

”That’s the frustration. But that leads me on to frankly the downright anger about something that has come about at this European Council. And that is the completely unjustified and sudden production of a bill for Britain of 1.7 billion pounds, over 2 billion euros, that is apparently supposed to be paid by 1st December. This is completely unacceptable.” (D.Cameron (UK) 06/2014)

”The Council nominated to vote Jean-Claude Juncker as the next president of the European Commission. Britain and Hungary opposed. We must accept the result and Britain will now work with the Commission president, as we always do, to secure our national interest. But let me be absolutely clear, this is a bad day for Europe. It risks undermining the position of national governments. It risks undermining the power of national parliaments and it hands new power to the European Parliament. It is therefore important that the European Council has agreed today to review what has happened and to consider how we handle the appointment of the next Commission president next time around.” (D.Cameron (UK) 08/2014)

### **iv) Descriptive (No Attribution)**

Our fourth category refers to statements where none of the above is present. These will largely be descriptive statements, where there is no attribution for credit and blame. This

includes, but is not limited to”

- National leaders listing the policy issues and items that were discussed and/or noted in the EUCO meeting
- The announcement of a policy or decision without clear attribution for responsibility, nor an explanation of how the decision will benefit Europe or a member state,
- Expressions of desired actions or desired policy outcomes, rather than ones that have actually been taken (e.g. Europe ‘must’ or ‘should’ do something)
- National leaders announcing that the European Council has discussed, made a statement on a policy issue or reaffirmed its stance on said issue

Examples:

“We have a mandate for the spring summit, which is to develop a strategy to secure the energy supply. This is related to communications that the Commission will be doing on energy policy in early January. As far as the foreign policy agenda is concerned, the issues of Kosovo, Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa were on the agenda.” (A.Merkel (DE) 2015/3)

“In addition to those issues of international security and development, the Council conclusions and the special declaration on globalisation set out the challenges that the European Union must address on globalisation. We agreed to maintain our focus on economic reform, with a renewed focus on modernising the single market so that it enhances Europe’s ability to compete in the global economy. We must continue to work towards further liberalisation in energy, post and telecoms, where market opening could generate between 75 billion and 95 billion euros of extra benefits and contribute 360,000 jobs. Investment in research, innovation and education—and removing barriers to enterprise—are also essential.”

“Discussions also touched on the recent conference on the western Balkans migratory route and on the upcoming Valletta summit. This latter summit will aim to find agreement with African partners in a fair and balanced manner on how to tackle the root causes of the crisis, how to support development, how to provide for effective return and readmission and how to dismantle the criminal networks that are exploiting this situation and putting lives in danger. The European Council noted the importance of funding for international efforts to support refugees in Turkey and other countries. (E.Kenny (IRL) 2015/3)

### A1.2.2 Coding Policy Issue (Column I)

In Column I, we would like you to code the statement according to the 15 policy issues mentioned below. This includes all the policy issues from the Eurobarometer’s ‘Most Important Issue’ survey question, plus two additional ones. These additional policy issues are:

- **EU Affairs:** for issues that relate to the internal workings and functioning of the EU and its institutions – for e.g. Treaty Negotiation, the EU budget, appointment of Commissioners, discussions of other EU institutions (e.g. Parliament), etc
- **N.A.:** statements where no policy issues are mentioned at all, or where so many are mentioned that it makes it impossible to pick just one (e.g. “today the Council discussed the economy, the environment, taxation, and energy”)

Classification categories are mutually exclusive. As the EU has competencies in certain areas more than others, and because the EUCO has a rather focused agenda (see Alexandrova, 2014; 2016) you will notice that certain policy issues (e.g. the Economic Situation, Foreign Affairs ...) come up more than others. Some of the policy issues above may not come up at all. As when coding attribution in column H, you may also encounter statements that cover more than one policy issue. In this case use the same approach: use your personal judgement to decide what seems to be the main policy issue mentioned in the statement. The table below reuses the examples from Section I of the codebook, and shows how statements could be coded for both Attribution and Policy Issue. Your job is to recreate something similar in the attached Excel. Thanks so much for your help!

### A1.2.3 Notes(Column J)

Column J is reserved for notes. Feel free to use this column for anything you would like to bring to the attention of the researcher, but there are two notes in particular we would like to capture:

- If you have coded column H as Credit Sharing, and the unit being credited is not the EU or one of its institutions but another member state please use this column to note which member state(s) is (are) being credited
- If you have coded column H as Blame Shifting, and it is not the EU or one of its institutions being blamed but another member state, please note which member state is being blamed /criticized.

<b>Policy Issue</b>	<b>Likely topics / keywords</b>
<i>Economic Situation</i>	Growth, Eurozone, economic policy, monetary policy, crisis, saving, investment, free trade
<i>Foreign Affairs/ Defence</i>	Peace, war, Libya, Balkans, EU enlargement, Afghanistan
<i>Environment and Climate Change</i>	Green, climate, CO2, climate, global warming
<i>Immigration</i>	Schengen, refugees, migrants, migration, smugglers
<i>Unemployment</i>	Jobs, unemployment, jobless, employment, work
<i>EU Affairs</i>	Lisbon, budget, QMV, MFF, Commissioner, President
<i>Government Debt</i>	Debt, deficit, Stability Growth Pact
<i>Terrorism</i>	Terror, attack, ISIS,
<i>Taxation</i>	Tax, Revenue,
<i>Education</i>	Schools, Universities, Research
<i>Health and Social Security</i>	Welfare, health, age, welfare state
<i>Rising Prices/ Inflation</i>	Cost of living, inflation, prices,
<i>Pensions</i>	Retirement, savings, pensions
<i>Energy</i>	Supply, gas, energy,
<i>N.A.</i>	n.a.

## A1.4 Interrater Reliability Tests

Interrater reliability tests were conducted over three rounds, with one handcoder coding the statement in its original language, and the other handcoder coding the translated statement (into English). The handcoders were PhD students at the London School of Economics who were also native speakers of the language (so for example, a French native speaker coded the statements by French leaders, a Greek native speaker coded the statements by Greek leaders etc). The codebook was tweaked after each round following discussion with the handcoders. The table below presents the results of Krippendorff's alpha and Cohen's kappa. These results correspond to 'substantial' agreement amongst coders (Landis and Koch 1977). Overall 920 statements were coded by two hand coders, which is just over 15 per cent of the total sample of 6,012 statements

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of statements</i>	<i>Krippendorff's <math>\alpha</math> for Attribution</i>	<i>Krippendorff's <math>\alpha</math> for Policy Issue</i>	<i>Cohen's <math>k</math> for Attribution</i>	<i>Cohen's <math>k</math> for Policy Issue</i>
France	100	0.72	0.80	0.69	0.76
UK	110	0.85	0.84	0.78	0.78
Germany	120	0.75	0.73	0.70	0.73
Denmark	110	0.76	0.76	0.74	0.73
Spain	220	0.83	0.88	0.78	0.81
Ireland	150	0.84	0.82	0.79	0.74
Greece	110	0.71	0.79	0.67	0.70
<b>Total</b>	<b>920</b>	<b>0.78</b>	<b>0.81</b>	<b>0.74</b>	<b>0.76</b>

## A1.5 Robustness Tests: Fixed Effects Regression Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Claim (1)	Share (2)	Claim (3)	Share (4)	Claim (5)	Share (6)
Partisan Euroscpticism	0.028*** (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)	-0.022** (0.009)	0.040* (0.021)	-0.035* (0.021)
Public Euroscpticism	3.165*** (0.900)	0.192 (0.806)	2.125** (1.016)	0.976 (0.930)	1.406 (1.161)	1.559 (1.061)
Issue Salience			1.046*** (0.178)	-0.541*** (0.187)	1.427*** (0.201)	-0.554*** (0.200)
Public Trust in Government	-0.864*** (0.315)	0.702** (0.307)	-0.902** (0.354)	0.863** (0.345)	0.483 (0.448)	0.688 (0.440)
Governing Party EU position	-0.262*** (0.098)	-0.181* (0.105)	-0.560*** (0.118)	-0.013 (0.120)	0.393 (0.263)	0.217 (0.308)
Governing Party EU dissent	-0.005 (0.053)	-0.203*** (0.048)	-0.118* (0.062)	-0.095* (0.054)	-0.100 (0.114)	-0.037 (0.122)
Rotating Presidency	-0.267 (0.209)	0.713*** (0.174)	-0.418* (0.244)	0.582*** (0.209)	-0.275 (0.255)	0.584*** (0.220)
Unemployment	-0.057*** (0.018)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.020)	0.020 (0.019)	-0.030 (0.024)	0.009 (0.023)
Election Year	0.098 (0.085)	-0.248*** (0.084)	0.029 (0.097)	-0.189** (0.095)	-0.026 (0.103)	-0.173* (0.098)
Constant	-2.257*** (0.815)	1.026 (0.819)	-0.115 (0.962)	-0.444 (0.943)	-6.082*** (1.807)	-1.986 (2.068)
Observations	5,943	5,943	4,544	4,544	4,544	4,544
Country Fixed Effects (7)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Leader Fixed Effects (21)	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## A1.6 Robustness Tests: Random Effects Regression Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Claim (1)	Share (2)	Claim (3)	Share (4)	Claim (5)	Share (6)
Partisan Euroscpticism	0.026*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.007)	0.030*** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	0.031** (0.012)	-0.018** (0.009)
Public Euroscpticism	2.685*** (0.908)	0.768 (0.821)	1.604 (1.026)	1.765* (0.938)	0.204 (1.083)	2.080** (0.970)
Issue.Salience			1.047*** (0.177)	-0.562*** (0.186)	1.349*** (0.196)	-0.570*** (0.191)
Public Trust in Government	-0.847*** (0.312)	0.586* (0.305)	-0.877** (0.351)	0.676** (0.345)	0.179 (0.406)	0.558 (0.387)
Governing Party EU position	-0.257*** (0.096)	-0.210** (0.103)	-0.538*** (0.116)	-0.081 (0.120)	0.152 (0.193)	-0.096 (0.149)
Governing Party EU dissent	-0.014 (0.052)	-0.199*** (0.047)	-0.126** (0.061)	-0.103** (0.052)	-0.023 (0.084)	-0.096 (0.062)
Rotating Presidency	-0.261 (0.209)	0.712*** (0.174)	-0.410* (0.243)	0.574*** (0.208)	-0.283 (0.252)	0.593*** (0.214)
Unemployment	-0.045** (0.018)	-0.0001 (0.018)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.022)
Election Year	0.088 (0.085)	-0.236*** (0.083)	0.018 (0.097)	-0.171* (0.095)	-0.051 (0.101)	-0.153 (0.096)
Constant	-0.894 (0.811)	0.813 (0.795)	1.086 (0.955)	-0.229 (0.927)	-2.905** (1.378)	-0.225 (1.119)
Observations	5,943	5,943	4,544	4,544	4,544	4,544
Country Random Effects (7)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Leader Random Effects (21)	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## A1.7 Robustness Tests: With Summit Random Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Claim (1)	Share (2)
Partisan Euroscepticism	0.033*** (0.013)	-0.020** (0.010)
Public Euroscepticism	2.244* (1.361)	1.716 (1.087)
Issue Salience	1.427*** (0.206)	-0.545*** (0.197)
Public Trust in Government	-0.016 (0.446)	0.818** (0.366)
Governing Party EU Position	-0.266 (0.194)	-0.027 (0.125)
Governing Party EU Dissent	-0.028 (0.085)	-0.114** (0.058)
Rotating Presidency	-0.242 (0.269)	0.532** (0.221)
Unemployment	-0.063** (0.026)	0.009 (0.021)
Election Year	0.069 (0.118)	-0.145 (0.103)
Constant	-2.337 (1.488)	-0.464 (0.993)
Observations	4,544	4,544
Country Fixed Effects (7)	Yes	Yes
Leader Random Effects (21)	Yes	Yes
Summit Random Effects (86)	Yes	Yes

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## Appendix A2

This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 3 (A New Dataset of Over 1 Million References to European Integration in Parliamentary Speeches).

### **A2.1 List of Tokens used to Develop EUParlspeech**

This section provides a list of tokens used to identify references to European integration. The tokens in English, German, Spanish, and Dutch are drawn from Rauh and De Wilde (2018). The initial German dictionary was developed by Rauh (2015) who developed the dictionary by reading one verbatim record of a plenary debate with an explicit EU issue on the agenda and one without such an agenda in each year of the investigation period. Each term-level EU reference found was then stored in the dictionary. Afterwards, the individual terms were generalised by regular expressions to include all possible inflections, plurals and derived compound terms possibly used in the German language.

The tokens in Czech, Danish, Swedish, and Greek were developed using the same methodology as Rauh and De Wilde (2018). That is to say, that Rauh's initial dictionary was translated into the relevant language using native speakers with knowledge of EU politics.

Table A2.1: List of English tokens (House of Commons and Dail Eireann)

---



---

european constitutional treaty; rome treat(y/ies); maastricht treat(y/ies);  
 amsterdam treat(y/ies); nice treat(y/ies); lisbon treat(y/ies);  
 ec; economic and monetary union; eec; emu; eu; euratom; european integration; european unification;  
 european cooperation; european communit(y/ies); european economic communit(y/ies);  
 european atomic energy communit(y/ies); european institution(s);  
 european project(s); european treat(y/ies); single european act;  
 treat(y/ies) of rome; treat(y/ies) of maastricht; treat(y/ies) of amsterdam;  
 treat(y/ies) of nice; treat(y/ies) of lisbon;  
 treaty establishing a constitution for europe; ecb; ecj; ep; european official(s);  
 european union ; european civil servant(s); european executive;  
 european politics; european polic(y/ies); european central bank; european commission(er);  
 european competenc(e/es/ies); european council; european court of justice; european election(s);  
 european level(s); european member state(s); european parliament; european procedure(s);  
 european summit(s); mep(s); policy on europe; csdp; esdp; common foreign and security polic(y/ies);  
 common security and defence polic(y/ies); european security and defence polic(y/ies); eurozone;  
 euro zone; euro area; cfsp; european act(s); european bill(s); european law(s);  
 european legislation(s); european statute(s); european aim(s); european goal(s);  
 european target(s); european decision(s); european directive(s);  
 european engagement(s); european guideline(s); european measure(s); european action(s);  
 european provision(s); european prescription(s); european requirement(s);  
 european allowance(s); european standard(s); european norm(s); european market;  
 european agenda(s); european budget(s); european fund(s); european fond(s);  
 european programme(s); european regulation(s); european strategie(s); european case-law;  
 european jurisprudence; european legal; european single market; european internal market;  
 european currency; european mandate(s); police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters;  
 single currency; stability and growth pact; europe's constitutional treaty; ec's; eec's; eu's; euratom's;  
 european union's; european ([a-z]\*){0,1} integration; european ([a-z]\*){0,1} unification

---



---

Table A2.1 (Continued): List of English tokens (House of Commons and Dail Eireann)

---



---

european ([a-z]\*){0,1} cooperation; european ([a-z]\*){0,1} polic(y/ies);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} act(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} bill(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} law(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} legislation(s)  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} statute(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} aim(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} goal(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} target(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} decision(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} directive(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} engagement(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} guideline(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} measure(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} action(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} provision(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} prescription(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} requirement(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} allowance(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} standards; european ([a-z]\*){0,1} norm(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} agendas; european ([a-z]\*){0,1} budgets;  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} fund(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} fond(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} programme(s); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} regulation(s);  
 european ([a-z]\*){0,1} strateg(y/ies); european ([a-z]\*){0,1} union;

---



---

Table A2.2: List of Spanish tokens (Congreso)

---

unión europea; comunidad europea de la energía atómica; comunidad económica europea  
 comunidad(es) europea(s); ue; cee; euratom; tratado(s) constitutivo(s); tratado de maastricht  
 tratado de ámsterdam; tratado de niza; tratado de lisboa; tratado de roma; tratado de fusión  
 tratado de funcionamiento; acta única europea; tfue; tue; aue; constitución europea  
 tratado por el que se establece una constitucion para europa; tratado constitucional  
 ampliación de la ce; ampliaciones de la ce; unión económica y monetaria; uem; proyecto europeo  
 proyecto común europeo; unificación europea; integración europea; marco institucional de la ce  
 instituciones europeas; constitución europea; comisión europea; parlamento europeo; consejo europeo  
 banco central europeo; comisario(s) europeo(s); funcionario(s) europeo(s); ejecutivo europeo  
 elecciones europeas; eurodiputado(s); consilium; tjue; bce; política europea; mandato europeo  
 alto representante de la unión para asuntos exteriores; competencias de la ce  
 política exterior y de seguridad común; cooperación policial y judicial; presupuesto europeo  
 programa(s) europea(s); regulación(es) europea(s); reglamento(s) europeo(s)  
 reglamento(s) europeo(s); norma(s) europea(s); objetivo(s) europeo(s); medida(s) europea(s)  
 instrumento(s) europeo(s); estándar(es) europeo(s); cooperación(es) europea(s); derecho europeo  
 directiva(s) europea(s); reglamento(s) europeo(s); reforma(s) europea(s); normativa(s) europea(s)  
 compromiso(s) europeo(s); estrategia(s) europea(s); política europea de seguridad y de defensa  
 esdp; pcsd; ordenamiento jurídico europe(o/a); jurisdicción europe(o/a);  
 procedimiento de infracción; cuestión prejudicial; moneda(s) europea(s); moneda única;  
 moneda común europea; zona euro; eurozona; zona del euro; fondo europeo;  
 pacto de la estabilidad y de crecimiento; mercado(s) ([a-z]\*){0,1} europeo(s);  
 agenda ([a-z]\*){0,1} europea; legislación(es) ([a-z]\*){0,1} europea(s); ley(es) ([a-z]\*){0,1} europea(s)  
 derecho(s) ([a-z]\*){0,1} europeo(s); procedimiento(s) ([a-z]\*){0,1} europeo(s)  
 procedimiento legislativo europe(o/a)

---

Table A2.3: List of Dutch tokens (Tweede Kamer)

---



---

europese unie; europese economische gemeenschap(pen); europese gemeenschap(pen);  
 europese atoom gemeenschap(pen); eu; eg; eeg; euratom; e(u/g)-verdrag(en); europese verdrag(en);  
 verdrag(en) van rome; verdrag(en) van maastricht; verdrag(en) van amsterdam; verdrag(en) van nice;  
 verdrag(en) van lissabon; rome-verdrag(en); maastricht-verdrag(en); amsterdam-verdrag(en);  
 nice-verdrag(en); lissabon-verdrag(en); europese eenheidsakte; europese grondwet;  
 grondwet voor europa; e(u/g)-uitbreiding; europese monetaire unie; europese project(en);  
 europese integratie; europese eenwording; europese samenwerking; e(u/g)-institutie(s);  
 europ(ese/ees) institutie(s); economische en monetaire unie; emu; europees grondwettelijk verdrag;  
 e(u/g)-commissie; europese commissie; e(u/g)-commissaris(sen); europese commissaris(sen);  
 e(u/g)-ambten(aar/aren); europese ambten(aar/aren); europese executive; europ(ese/ees) parlement(s);  
 e(u/g)-parlement; ep; (europese/eg/eu) verkiezingen; (euro/eu-/eg-)parlementarier(s);  
 raad van ministers; europese president; (eu/eg)-voorzitter(schap); europese raad; (eu/eg)-top;  
 euro(pese) top; e(u/g)-lidst(aat/aten); europ(ees/ese) hof van justitie; europ(ees/ese) gerechtshof;  
 europese centrale bank; ecb; hoge vertegenwoordiger van de unie voor buitenlandse;  
 europ(ees/ese) beleid; europ(ese/ees) niv(o/eau); e(u/g)-niv(o/eau); europ(ees/ese) proces(sen);  
 europ(ees/ese) besluit(vorming); e(u/g)-bevoegdheid(en); europese bevoegdh(eid/eden);  
 europ(ese/ees) mand(aat/aten); gemeenschappelijke markt;  
 europ(ese/ees) buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid; politieële en justieële samenwerking in strafzake;  
 gemeenschappelijk(e) veiligheids- en defensiebeleid; evdb;  
 gemeenschappelijk(e) buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid; vweu; europese munteenheid;  
 gemeenschappelijke munt; eurozone; stabiliteits- en groeipact; ecb-[a-zèèéëïöü]\*;

---



---

Table A2.3 (Continued): List of Dutch tokens (Tweede Kamer)

---

e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}beleid; europ(ees/ese) ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}beleid;  
 europ(ees / ese) ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}unie; europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}markt(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}agenda(s); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}budget(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}begroting(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}programma(s);  
 e(ug)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}regeling(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}voorschrift(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}eis(en); europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}eis(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}doel(en / stelling(en)); europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}doel(en / stelling(en));  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}maastrege(s); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}aktie(s);  
 europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}maastrege(s); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}instrument(en);  
 europ(ees/ese) ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}instrument(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}standaard(en);  
 europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}standaard(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}norm(en);  
 europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}norm(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}samenwerking;  
 europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}samenwerking; e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}wett(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}wetgeving; europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}wetgeving;  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}recht(spraak / sorde ); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}richtlijnen(en);  
 europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}richtlijnen(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}verordening(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}beslissing(en); europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}beslissingen;  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}besluit(en / vorming(sprocess(en)); e(u/g)-[1-9]{1,2};  
 europ(ees / ese) ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}fonds(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}fonds(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}strategie(n); europese ([a-zèèèiöü]\*){0,1}strategien;

---

Table A2.4: List of Swedish tokens (Riksdag)

---

europeiska unionen; europeiska gemenskaperna; europeisk gemenskap; eu; eg; eu:s; eg:s;  
 europeiska konstitutionella fördraget; europas konstitutionella fördrag; romfördrag(et/en);  
 maastrichtfördrag(et/en); amsterdamfördrag(et/en); nicefördrag(et/en); lissabonfördrag(et/en);  
 ekonomiska och monetära unionen; europeiska ekonomiska gemenskap(en/erna);  
 europeiska ekonomiska samhällen; eeg(:s); beuratom(s); europeisk integration;  
 europeisk enhet; europeiskt enande; europeiskt samarbete;  
 europeiska atomenergi(gemenskapen/samhällen/gemenskaperna); europeisk(a) institution(er);  
 europeisk(a/t) projekt; europeiska fördrag(et); europeiska unionens; enda europeisk handling;  
 europeiska enhetsakten; romfördrage(t/n); maastrichtfördrage(n/t); fördrag i maastricht;  
 amsterdamfördrage(n/t); fördrag av trevligt; nicefördrage(n/t); trevliga fördrag;  
 lissabonfördrage(n/t); fördrag(et) om upprättande av en konstitution för europa;  
 europeiska centralbanken; ecb; (europeiska/eu-)domstolen; (europa/eu-)parlamentet; ep;  
 europeisk(a) tjänsteman; europeisk politik; europeisk(a) kommission(en/ar); eu-kommission(en/ar);  
 europeiska kommissionärer; europeisk kompetens; europeisk befogenhet; europeiska kompetenser;  
 europeiska befogenheter; eu:s befogenheter; europeiska rådet; europeiska domstolen;  
 europeiska vane(n/t); eu-val(en); europeisk verkställande direktör; europeisk(a) nivå(er);  
 europeisk(a/t) medlemslän(erna); europeiska förfarande(n/t); (europeiska/euro/eu-)toppmötet  
 medlem(mar) av det europeiska parlamentet; ledamot(er) av det europeiska parlamentet  
 eu-parlamentariker; politik för europa; (europesik/gemensam) utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik;  
 (europeiska/gemensam) säkerhets- och försvarspolitik; euroområdet; eurozone(n);  
 gusp; (europeisk/eu-)politik; europeisk(a) handling(ar); europeisk förteckning; europeisk(a) lag(ar);  
 europeisk(a) lagstiftning(ar); europeisk(a) stadg(ar); europeisk(t/a) mål(et); europeisk(a/t) beslut(et);  
 (eu-/europeisk(a/t)) direktiv(et); europeisk(a/t) engagemang; europeiska uppdrag; europeisk(a) riktlinje(r);  
 europeisk(a) åtgärd(er); europeisk(a) bestämmelse(r); europeisk(a/t) recept; europeisk(a) föreskrift(er);  
 europeiska recept; europeiska föreskrifter; europeisk(a/t) krav(et); europeisk ersättning;  
 europeisk(a) utsläppsrätt(er); europeisk(a) standard(er); europeisk(a) norm(er);  
 europeisk(a) budget(ar); europeisk(a) fond(er); europeisk förtjust; europeisk(a) fond(s);  
 europeisk(a/t) program(met); europeisk(a) regler(ing(ar)); europeisk(a) strategi(er);  
 europeisk rättspraxis; europeisk jurisprudens; europeisk laglig; europeiska inre marknaden;  
 europeisk(a) valut(a/or); europeisk(a/t) mandat(et); polis- och rättsligt samarbete i brottmål;  
 polissamarbete och straffrättsligt samarbete; gemensam valuta; stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten;  
 europeiska dagordning(ar/en);

---

Table A2.5: List of Danish tokens (Folketing)

---

---

europæiske union; europæisk(e) fællesskab(er); eu(s); ef(s); europæisk forfatningstraktat;  
europas forfatningsmæssige traktat; romtraktaterne; maastrichttraktaterne; amsterdamtraktaterne;  
nicetraktat(en/erne); lissabontraktat(en/er); økonomiske og monetære union;  
europæiske økonomiske fællesskab; eøf('s); euratom; euratom; europæisk integration;  
europæisk forening; europæisk samarbejde; europæisk atomenergifællesskab;  
europæiske atomenergifællesskab; europæisk(e) institution(er); europæisk(e) projekt(er);  
europæisk(e) traktat(er); europæiske unions; europæiske fælles akt; traktat om en forfatning for europa;  
europæisk centralbank; ecb; eu-domstolen; europæiske union domstol; europa-parlamentet;  
ep; (europæisk(e)/eu) embedsmand; europa politik; europæisk(e) kommiss(ion/aer(er));  
europæisk(e) kompetence(r); europæiske råd; der; eu-domstolen; europæisk niveau;  
europæiske niveauer; europæiske medlemslande; europæisk procedur(er); europæisk(e) topmøde(r);  
europaparlamentsmedlem; mep; fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik; fusp;  
europæisk(e) udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik; fælles sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik;  
europæisk(e) sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik; europæiske love; europæisk(e) lovgivning(er);  
europæisk lov; europæiske vedtægter; europæisk(e) mål; europæisk(e) beslutning(er);  
europæisk(e) direktiv(er); europæisk(e) engagement(er); europæisk(e) retningslinje(r);  
europæisk(e) foranstaltninge(r); europæisk(e) handlinger; europæisk(e) bestemmelse(r);  
europæisk angivelser; europæiske krav; europæisk(e) standard(er); europæisk(e) norm(er);  
europæisk(e) dagsorden(er); europæisk(e) budget(ter); europæisk(e) fond(e); europæisk(e) program(mer);  
europæisk regulering; europæisk(e) strategi(er); europæisk retspraksis; europæisk juridisk;  
europæiske indre marked; det europæiske indre marked; europæisk(e) valuta(er);  
europæisk(e) mandat(er); politisamarbejde og retligt samarbejde i kriminalsager; fælles valuta;  
stabilitets- og vækstpagt(en);

---

---



Table A2.6: List of Greek tokens (Hellenic Parliament)

ΕΕ; Ευρωπαϊκή Συνταγματική Συνθήκη; Συνθήκη της Ρώμης; Συνθήκη του Μάαστριχτ  
 Συνθήκη του Άμστερνταμ; Συνθήκη της Νίκαιας; Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας;  
 Συνθήκες της Ρώμης; Συνθήκες του Μάαστριχτ; Συνθήκες του Άμστερνταμ;  
 Συνθήκες της Νίκαιας; Συνθήκες της Λισαβόνας; Οικονομική και Νομισματική Ένωση;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή Οικονομική Κοινότητα; ΕΟΚ; οικονομική και νομισματική ένωση;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση; Ευρατόμ; Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα Ατομικής Ενέργειας;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή ολοκλήρωση; Ευρωπαϊκή ενοποίηση; Ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα; Ευρωπαϊκές Κοινότητες; Ευρωπαϊκά θεσμικά όργανα;  
 Ευρωπαϊκοί θεσμοί; Ευρωπαϊκό εγχείρημα; Ευρωπαϊκή συνθήκη;  
 Ευρωπαϊκές συνθήκες; Ενιαία Ευρωπαϊκή Πράξη; ΕΕΠ;  
 Συνθήκη για τη θέσπιση Συντάγματος της Ευρώπης; Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης;  
 Ευρωπαϊκό στέλεχος; Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα; ΕΚΤ;  
 Δικαστήριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης; ΔΕΕ; Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο;  
 Ευρωπαίοι αξιωματούχοι; Ευρωπαϊκές πολιτικές; Ευρωπαϊκές πολιτική;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα; ΕΚΤ; Ευρωπαίος Επίτροπος; Ευρωπαίοι Επίτροποι;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή αρμοδιότητα; Ευρωπαϊκές αρμοδιότητες; Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο;  
 Ευρωπαϊκές εκλογές; Ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο; Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή διαδικασία; Ευρωπαϊκές διαδικασίες; Ευρωπαϊκή Σύνοδος;  
 Μέλη του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου; Μέλος του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου;  
 πολιτική για την Ευρώπη; ΚΕΠΠΑ; Ευρωπαϊκή εξωτερική πολιτική και πολιτική ασφάλ;  
 Κοινή εξωτερική πολιτική και πολιτική ασφάλειας; ζώνη του ευρώ; Ευρωζώνη του ευρώ;  
 Κοινή Εξωτερική Πολιτική και Πολιτική Ασφάλειας; Ευρωπαϊκές πολιτικές; Ευρωπαϊκή πράξη;  
 Ευρωπαϊκές πράξεις; Ευρωπαϊκό νομοσχέδιο; Ευρωπαϊκά νομοσχέδια; Ευρωπαϊκός νόμος;  
 Ευρωπαϊκοί νόμοι ή Ευρωπαϊκό δίκαιο; Ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία; ευρωπαϊκό καταστατικό;  
 Ευρωπαϊκός στόχος; Ευρωπαϊκοί στόχοι; Ευρωπαϊκή απόφαση; Ευρωπαϊκή οδηγία;  
 Ευρωπαϊκές δεσμεύσεις; Ευρωπαϊκό μέτρο; Ευρωπαϊκά μέτρα; Ευρωπαϊκή δράση;  
 Ευρωπαϊκές δράσεις; Ευρωπαϊκή παροχή; Ευρωπαϊκές παροχές; Ευρωπαϊκή απαίτηση;  
 Ευρωπαϊκές απαιτήσεις; Ευρωπαϊκές δικαιώματα; Ευρωπαϊκά πρότυπα; Ευρωπαϊκή ατζέντα;  
 Ευρωπαϊκός προϋπολογισμός; Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο; Ευρωπαϊκά Ταμεία;  
 Ευρωπαϊκό πρόγραμμα; Ευρωπαϊκά προγράμματα; Ευρωπαϊκός Κανονισμός;  
 Ευρωπαϊκοί Κανονισμοί; Ευρωπαϊκή στρατηγική; Ευρωπαϊκές στρατηγικές;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή νομολογία; Ευρωπαϊκή νομική; Ευρωπαϊκή ενιαία εσωτερική αγορά;  
 Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση; Ευρωπαϊκό νόμισμα; Ευρωπαϊκή εντολή; Ευρωπαϊκές εντολές;  
 αστυνομική και δικαστική συνεργασία σε ποινικές υποθέσεις; ενιαίο νόμισμα;  
 Σύμφωνο Σταθερότητας και Ανάπτυξης

Table A2.7: List of Czech tokens (Poslanecká sněmovna)

---



---

evropsk(á/é) uni(e/i); evropsk(á/é) společenství; evropsk(á/é) komunit(a/y); eu; es;  
 římsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y); maastrichtsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y); smlouv(a/y) z nice; nicejsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y);  
 lisabonsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y); hospodářská a měnová unie; hmu; evropsk(á/é) hospodářsk(á/é) společenství;  
 euratom; evropsk(á/é) společenství pro atomovou energii; evropsk(á/é) integrace; evropsk(é/á) sjednocení;  
 evropsk(á/é) spolupráce; evropsk(é/á) instituce; evropsk(ý/é) projekt(y); evropsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y);  
 jediný evropský zákon; římská smlouva; smlouvy říma; maastrichtská smlouva; smlouvy z amsterdamu;  
 smlouva zakládající ústavu pro evropu; smlouva o ústavě pro evropu; evropsk(á/é) centrální banka; ecb;  
 evropský soudní dvůr; esd; evropský parlament; ep; evropsk(ý/á) úředn(ík/ice); evropští úředníci;  
 evropský státní úředník; evropští státní úředníci; evropsk(á/é) politik(a/y); evropsk(á/é/ý) komis(e/ař);  
 evropští komisaři; evropsk(á/é) kompetence; evropsk(á/é) rada; evropsk(á/é) volby; evropsk(á/é) exekutiva;  
 evropsk(á/é) úroveň; evropsk(ý/á/é) člensk(ý/é) stát(y); evropsk(ý/á/é) postup(y);  
 europoslan(ci/ec); europoslankyně; společná zahraniční a bezpečnostní politika;  
 společná bezpečnostní a obranná politika; evropská bezpečnostní a obranná politik(a/y); eurozóna; szbp;  
 evropsk(ý/á/é) zákon(y); evropsk(á/é) účty; evropsk(á/é) právo; evropsk(á/é) legislativ(a/y);  
 evropsk(á/é) stanovy; evropsk(ý/é) cíl(e); evropsk(á/é) rozhodnutí; evropsk(á/é) směrnice;  
 evropsk(á/é) závazky; evropsk(ý/á/é) pokyn(y); evropsk(á/é) opatření; evropsk(á/é) akce;  
 evropsk(é/ý) předpis(y); evropsk(é/ý) požadav(ek/ky); evropsk(é/ý) příspěv(ek/ky);  
 evropsk(á/é) norm(a/y); evropsk(á/é) agend(a/y); evropsk(é/ý) rozpoč(et/ty); evropsk(é/ý) fond(y);  
 evropsk(á/é) ústavní smlouva; ehs; evropsk(ý/á/é) summit(y);  
 evropsk(á/é) právní předpisy; evropsk(á/é) angažovanost; evropská zahraniční a bezpečnostní politik(a/y);  
 evropsk(á/é) ustanovení; evropsk(é/ý) standard(y);

---



---

Table A2.7 (Continued): List of Czech tokens (Poslanecká sněmovna)

---



---

evropsk(é/ý) program(y); evropsk(á/é) nařízení; evropsk(é/á) strategie; evropsk(á/é) judikatura  
 evropsk(á/é) jurisprudence; evropsk(á/é) právní; evropský jednotný trh; evropský vnitřní trh  
 evropsk(á/é) měn(a/y); evropsk(ý/á/é) mandát(y); policejní a soudní spolupráce v trestních věcech;  
 jednotn(á/é) měna; pakt o stabilitě a růstu; jednotný evropský akt; eurokomisařk(a/y); eurokomisařk(y/i);  
 řádný legislativní postup; evropsk(é/ý) akt(y); evropsk(é/ý) návrh(y) zákon(a/ů); evropsk(é/ý) záměr(y);  
 evropsk(é/ý) závaz(ky/ek); evropská činnost; evropský požadav(ek/ky); evropsk(é/ý) příspěv(ek/ky);  
 evropsk(á/é) regulace; evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} politik(a/y); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} uni(i/e);  
 evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} akt(y); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} zákon(a/ů/y);  
 evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} ustanovení; evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} cíl(e); evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]\*){0,1} záměr(y);  
 evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} cíl(e); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} rozhodnutí; evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} směrnice;  
 evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} závaz(ek/ky); evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} pokyn(y);  
 evropská ([a-z]\*){0,1} činnost; evropsk(é/y/á) ([a-z]\*){0,1} předpis(y);  
 evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]\*){0,1} příspěv(ek/ky); evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]\*){0,1} standard(y);  
 evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]\*){0,1} agend(a/y); evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]\*){0,1} rozpoč(et/ty);  
 evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]\*){0,1} program(y); evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]\*){0,1} regulace;  
 evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} legislativ(a/y); evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]\*){0,1} opatření;  
 evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]\*){0,1} požadav(ky/ek); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]\*){0,1} norm(a/y);  
 evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]\*){0,1} fond(y); evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]\*){0,1} strategie;

---



---

Table A2.8: List of German tokens (Bundestag)

---



---

europäisch(e/en/er) union; europäisch(e/er/en) gemeinschaft(en);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) atom gemeinschaft(en); europäisch(e/en/er) wirtschafts gemeinschaft(en);  
 eu; eg; ewg; euratom; e(u/g)-vertrag(s/es); vertrag von (amsterdam/maastricht/nizza/lissabon);  
 vertrag(s/es) von (maastricht/amsterdam/nizza/lissabon); (lissabonner/amsterdamer) vertrag(s/es);  
 einheitlich(e/en/er) europäisch(e/en/er) akte; römisch(e/en) verträge; aeu-vertrag(es/s);  
 eu-verfassung(svertrag(es)); europäisch(e/en/er) verfassung(svertrag(s)); e(u/g)-erweiterung(en);  
 europäisch(e/en/er) währungsunion; europäisch(e/en) projekt(s/es); europäisch(e/en/er) einigung;  
 europäisch(e/en/er) integration(sproze(ss/ß)(e/es)); e(u/g)-institution(en);  
 europäisch(e/en/er) institution(en); wirtschafts- und währungsunion; ewu; wwu; ewwu;  
 e(u/g)-kommission; europäisch(e/en/er) kommission; e(u/g)-kommissar(e);  
 europäisch(e/en/er) kommissar(e/en); e(u/g)-beamte(e/en/er); europäisch(e/en/er) beamte(e/en/er);  
 europäisch(e/en) exekutive; europäisch(e/en) parlament(s/es); europaparlament(s/es);  
 e(u/g)-parlament(s/es); ep; europawahl(en); europaabgeordnet(e/en/er); eu-abgeordnet(e/en/er);  
 e(u/g)-ministerrat(s/es); ratspräsidentenschaft; e(u/g)-ratspräsidentenschaft; e(u/g)-gipfel(n);  
 europagipfel(n); europäisch(e/er/en) gipfel(n); e(u/g)-mitgliedstaat(en);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) mitgliedstaat(en); eu-mitglieds(land/länder); europäisch(e/es/er/en) mitgliedsländ(er)  
 e(u/g)-staat(en); e(u/g)-länd(er); europäisch(e/er/en) gerichtshof(s/es); eugh; e(u/g)-gericht(shof(s/es)) ;  
 europäisch(e/en/er) zentralbank; ezb; ezb-direktorium; ezb-rat;  
 hoh(e/er/en) vertreter(s/in) für außen- und sicherheitspolitik; europapolitik; europäisch(e/er/en) ebene;  
 e(u/g)-ebene; europäisch(e/en/er) verfahren; europabühne; e(u/g)-kompetenz(en);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) kompetenz(en); europäisch(e/en/er) mandat(e/s);  
 europäisch(e/en/er) binnenmarkt(s/es); gemeinsam(e/en/er) außen -und sicherheitspolitik;  
 polizeilich(e/en/er) und justizielle zusammenarbeit; europäisch(e/en/er) ziel(e);  
 e(u/g)-instrument(en); europäisch(e/er/en) standard(s); europäisch(e/er/en) zusammenarbeit;  
 europarecht(s/es); e(u/g)-engagement(s); europäisch(e/en/er) sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitik;  
 esvp; europäisch(e/er/en) sicherheits- und verteidigungsunion; esvu;  
 gemeinsam(e/en/er) sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitik; europäisch(e/er/en) recht(sprechung);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) recht(setzung/sordnung); vertragsverletzungsverfahren;  
 vorabentscheidungsverfahren; aeuv; europäisch(e/en/er) währung(en); e(u/g)-währung(en);  
 gemeinschaftswährung; eurozone; euro-zone; euroraum(s); euro-raum(s);

---



---

Table A2.8 (Continued): List of German tokens (Bundestag)

---



---

stabilitäts- und wachstumspakt(s/es); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}minister;  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}politik(en); europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}politik(en);  
 europäisch(e/en/er) ([a-z]\*){0,1} union; europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}integration;  
 europäisch(e/en/er) ([a-z]\*){0,1}markt(e/s/es); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}agenda;  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}programm(s/es); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}regulierung(en);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}regulierung(en); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}vorschrift(en);  
 europäisch(e/en/er) ([a-z]\*){0,1}vorschrift(en); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}vorgabe(n);  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}ziel(e); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}maßnahmen; europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}maßnahmen;  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}standard(s); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}norm(en); europäisch(e/en/er) ([a-z]\*){0,1}norm(en);  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}zusammenarbeit; e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}gesetz(e/gebung);  
 europäisch(e/en/er) ([a-z]\*){0,1}gesetz(e); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}rechts(e/es/etzung);  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}richtlinien; europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}richtlinie(n);  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}verordnung(en); europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}verordnung(en);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) entscheidung(en); e(u/g)-leitlinie(n); europäisch(e/er/en) leitlinie(n);  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}reform(en); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}strategie(n);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}recht(s/es); europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}fonds;  
 e(u/g)-[1-9]{1,2}; europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}rat(s/es);  
 e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}haushalt(s/es); e(u/g)-entscheidung(en);  
 europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]\*){0,1}strategie(n); e(u/g)-([a-z]\*){0,1}fonds;

---



---

## A2.2 Classification of Parties

Table A2.9: Party Classification for Face Validity

Country	Party Name (Party Family in Brackets)
AT	BZÖ (rad right); FPÖ (rad right); Grüne (green); independent (other); JETZT (rad left) Jetzt – Liste PILZ(rad left); <b>LIF (liberal)</b> ; <b>NEOS (liberal)</b> ; <b>ÖVP (christ dem)</b> ; PILZ (rad left); <b>SPÖ (socialist)</b> ; STRONACH (other)
CZ	ANO (other); ČMUS (regionalist); <b>ČSSD (socialist)</b> ; HSD-SMS (regionalist) <b>KDU-ČSL (christdem)</b> ; KSČM (rad left); LB (rad left); LSNS (other) ; <b>LSU (liberal)</b> ; Nez.-SZ (other); Nezařazení(other); <b>ODA (cons)</b> ; <b>ODS (cons)</b> ; ONH (other); SPR-RSČ (rad right); SZ (green); <b>TOP 09 a Starostové (conservative)</b> ; <b>TOP09-S (conservative)</b> ; <b>US (conserv)</b> ; <b>US-DEU (conservative)</b> ; Úsvit (rad right); <b>VV (liberal)</b>
DE	AfD (radical right); <b>CDU/CSU (christian democratic)</b> ; <b>FDP (liberal)</b> ; GRUENE (green); independent (other); PDS/LINKE (rad left); <b>SPD (socialist)</b>
DN	ALT (green); <b>CD (liberal)</b> ; DF (rad right); EL (rad left); <b>FF (cons)</b> ; <b>FP (liberal)</b> <b>FRI (liberal)</b> ; IA (regionalist); <b>KD (christ dem)</b> ; <b>KF (conservative)</b> ; KRF (confessional); <b>LA (liberal)</b> ; LH (other); NQ (regionalist); NY (rad right); <b>RV (liberal)</b> ; <b>S (socialist)</b> ; SF (rad left); SIU (regionalist); <b>SP (cons)</b> ; T (regionalist); UFG (other); UP (other); <b>V (liberal)</b>
ES	GC-CiU (regionalist); GC-DL (other); GCC (regionalist); GCC-NC (regionalist); <b>GCs (liberal)</b> ;GCUP-EC-EM (rad left); GER (regionalist); GER-ERC (regionalist); GER-IU-ICV (rad left); GIP (rad left); GIU (rad left); GIU-ICV (rad left); GMX (regionalist) <b>GPP (conservative)</b> ; <b>GPSOE (socialist)</b> ; GUPyD (other); GV EAJ-PNV (regionalist); GV-PNV (regionalist)

Table A2.9 (continued): Party Classification for Face Validity

---



---

Country	Party Name (Party Family in Brackets)
GR	ANEL (rad right); DIKKI (rad left); <b>DIMAR (socialist)</b> ; KKE (rad left); LAOS (rad right); <b>ND (cons)</b> ; OP (green); <b>PASOK (socialist)</b> , <b>POLA (cons)</b> ; <b>Potami (socialist)</b> ; SYN (rad left); SYRIZA (rad left); XA (rad right)
IRL	Clann na Poblachta (regionalist); <b>Democratic Left (socialist)</b> ; <b>Fianna Fáil (cons)</b> ; <b>Fine Gael (christ dem)</b> ; Green Party (green); Independent (other); Ind. Fianna Fáil (other); Independent Labour (other); People Before Profit Alliance (rad left); <b>Progr. Dem. (liberal)</b> ; Sinn Féin (regionalist); Sinn Féin the Workers' Party (rad left); Socialist Party (rad left); <b>The Labour Party (socialist)</b> ; The Workers' Party (rad left)
NLD	50PLUS (other); <b>CDA (christian dem)</b> ; CU (confessional); <b>D66 (liberal)</b> ; DENK (other); FvD (rad right); GL (green); GPV (confessional); LPF (rad right); other (other); <b>PvdA (socialist)</b> ; PvdD (green); PVV (radical right); RPF (confessional); SGP (confessional); SP (radical left); <b>VVD (liberal)</b>
SW	<b>C (liberal)</b> ; <b>FP (liberal)</b> ; <b>KD (christian democratic)</b> ; <b>L (liberal)</b> ; <b>M (conservative)</b> ; MP (green); NYD (rad right); <b>S (socialist)</b> ; SD (radical right); V (radical left)
UK	APNI (liberal) Birkenhead Social Justice (other); <b>Change UK (liberal)</b> ; <b>Con (conservative)</b> ; DUP (regionalist); GPEW (green); Independent (other); <b>Lab (socialist)</b> ; <b>LibDem (liberal)</b> ; other (other); PlaidCymru (regionalist); Referendum (other); Respect (rad left); <b>SDLP (socialist)</b> ; <b>SDP (liberal)</b> ; SNP (regionalist); Indep. (other); UKIP (rad right); UKUP (regionalist); UPUP (regionalist); UUP (regionalist)

---



---

## A2.3 Conservative MPs' Referendum Positions

Table A2.10: Remain Conservative MPs

---

---

Alan Duncan; Alan Haselhurst; Alan Mak; Alberto Costa; Alec Shelbrooke; Alex Chalk; Alistair Burt  
Alok Sharma; Alun Cairns; Amanda Milling; Amanda Solloway; Amber Rudd; Andrew Griffiths  
Andrew Jones; Andrew Mitchell; Andrew Selous; Andrew Tyrie; Angela Watkinson; Anna Soubry  
Antoinette Sandbach; Ben Gummer; Ben Howlett; Ben Wallace; Bob Neill; Brandon Lewis  
Byron Davies; Caroline Dinenage; Caroline Nokes; Caroline Spelman; Charlie Elphicke; Chloe Smith  
Chris Philp; Chris Skidmore; Chris White; Claire Perry; Craig Whittaker; Craig Williams; Damian Collins  
Damian Green; Damian Hinds; Daniel Poulter; David Cameron; David Evennett; David Gauke  
David Lidington; David Mackintosh; David Morris; David Mowat; David Mundell; David Rutley  
David Tredinnick; Dominic Grieve; Ed Vaizey; Edward Argar; Edward Garnier; Edward Timpson  
Elizabeth Truss; Eric Pickles; Flick Drummond; Gary Streeter; Gavin Barwell; Gavin Williamson  
George Freeman; George Hollingbery; George Osborne; Graham Evans; Graham Stuart; Grant Shapps  
Greg Clark; Greg Hands; Guto Bebb; Guy Opperman; Harriett Baldwin; Heidi Allen; Helen Grant  
Helen Whately; Hugo Swire; Jackie Doyle-Price; Jake Berry; James Berry; James Brokenshire  
James Cartlidge; James Heapey; James Morris; Jane Ellison; Jeremy Hunt; Jeremy Lefroy; Jeremy Quin  
Jeremy Wright; Jo Churchill; Jo Johnson; John Glen; John Howell; John Penrose; John Stevenson  
Johnny Mercer; Jonathan Djanogly; Julian Knight; Julian Smith; Justine Greening; Karen Bradley  
Keith Simpson; Kelly Tolhurst; Kenneth Clarke; Kevin Foster; Kevin Hollinrake; Kris Hopkins; Lucy Frazer  
Luke Hall; Maggie Throup; Marcus Jones; Margot James; Maria Miller; Mark Field; Mark Garnier  
Mark Harper; Mark Lancaster; Mark Menzies; Mark Pawsey; Mark Prisk; Mark Pritchard; Mark Spencer  
Mary Robinson; Matt Warman; Matthew Hancock; Mel Stride; Michael Ellis; Michael Fallon  
Michelle Donelan; Mike Freer; Neil Parish; Nicholas Boles; Nicholas Soames; Nick Gibb; Nick Herbert  
Nick Hurd; Nicky Morgan; Nicola Blackwood; Nigel Huddleston; Oliver Colvile; Oliver Dowden  
Oliver Heald; Oliver Letwin; Patrick McLoughlin; Paul Beresford; Peter Aldous; Peter Bottomley  
Peter Heaton-Jones; Philip Dunne; Philip Hammond; Phillip Lee; Rebecca Pow; Richard Benyon  
Richard Graham; Richard Harrington; Rob Wilson; Robert Buckland; Robert Goodwill; Robert Halfon  
Robert Jenrick; Robin Walker; Roger Gale; Rory Stewart; Sajid Javid; Sam Gyimah; Sarah Newton  
Sarah Wollaston; Seema Kennedy; Shailesh Vara; Simon Burns; Simon Hart; Simon Hoare; Simon Kirby  
Stephen Crabb; Stephen Hammond; Steve Brine; Tania Mathias; Theresa May; Thomas Tugendhat  
Tobias Ellwood; Victoria Atkins; Victoria Prentis; Wendy Morton; Neil Carmichael (Stroud)

---

---



Table A2.11: Leave Conservative MPs

---

---

Adam Afriyie; Adam Holloway; Andrea Jenkyns; Andrea Leadsom; Andrew Bingham; Andrew Bridgen  
Andrew Murrison; Andrew Percy; Andrew Rosindell; Andrew Stephenson; Andrew Turner; Anne Main  
Anne-Marie Trevelyan; Bernard Jenkin; Bill Cash; Bill Wiggin; Bob Blackman; Bob Stewart  
Boris Johnson; Caroline Ansell; Charles Walker; Charlotte Leslie; Cheryl Gillan; Chris Davies  
Chris Grayling; Chris Green; Chris Heaton-Harris; Christopher Chope; Christopher Pincher  
Conor Burns; Craig Mackinlay; Craig Tracey; Crispin Blunt; Daniel Kawczynski; David Amess  
David Burrowes; David Davies; David Davis; David Jones; David Nuttall; David Warburton  
Derek Thomas; Desmond Swayne; Dominic Raab; Edward Leigh; Fiona Bruce; Gareth Johnson  
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown; Geoffrey Cox; George Eustice; Gerald Howarth; Glyn Davies; Gordon Henderson  
Graham Brady; Greg Knight; Heather Wheeler; Henry Bellingham; Henry Smith; Iain Stewart  
Ian Liddell-Grainger; Jack Lopresti; Jacob Rees-Mogg; James Cleverly; James Davies  
James Duddridge; James Gray; James Wharton; Jason McCartney; John Baron; John Hayes  
John Redwood; John Whittingdale; Jonathan Lord; Julian Brazier; Julian Lewis; Julian Sturdy  
Justin Tomlinson; Karen Lumley; Karl McCartney; Kit Malthouse; Kwasi Kwarteng; Laurence Robertson  
Liam Fox; Lucy Allan; Marcus Fysh; Maria Caulfield; Mark Francois; Martin Vickers; Matthew Offord  
Michael Fabricant; Michael Gove; Michael Tomlinson; Mike Penning; Mims Davies; Nadhim Zahawi  
Nadine Dorries; Nigel Adams; Nigel Evans; Nigel Mills; Nusrat Ghani; Owen Paterson; Paul Maynard  
Paul Scully; Penny Mordaunt; Peter Bone; Peter Lilley; Philip Davies; Philip Hollobone; Priti Patel  
Ranil Jayawardena; Rebecca Harris; Rehman Chishti; Richard Bacon; Richard Drax; Richard Fuller  
Rishi Sunak; Robert Syms; Scott Mann; Sheryll Murray; Stephen Barclay; Stephen McPartland  
Stephen Metcalfe; Stephen Phillips; Steve Double; Steven Baker; Stewart Jackson; Stuart Andrew  
Suella Fernandes; Theresa Villiers; Tim Loughton; Tom Pursglove; Victoria Borwick; Will Quince  
William Wragg; Zac Goldsmith; Iain Duncan Smith; Mike Wood; ; Anne Marie Morris; Royston Smith  
Michael Gove

---

---

Table A2.12: Publicly Undeclared Conservative MPs

---

---

Anne Milton; Eleanor Laing; Huw Merriman; Jesse Norman; John Bercow; Pauline Latham;  
Tracey Crouch;

---

---

Table A2.13: Members of Cameron Cabinet (Control Variable for Regressions in Table 3.4)

---

---

Alun Cairns; Amber Rudd; Chris Grayling; David Cameron; David Mundell; George Osborne;  
Greg Clark; Iain Duncan Smith; Jeremy Hunt; John Whittingdale; Justine Greening;  
Michael Fallon; Nicky Morgan; Oliver Letwin; Philip Hammond; Sajid Javid; Stephen Crabb;  
Theresa May; Theresa Villiers

---

---

Table A2.14: Members of Cameron Ministry (Control Variable for Regressions in Table 3.4)

---

---

Alistair Burt; Alun Cairns; Amber Rudd; Andrea Leadsom; Andrew Selous; Anna Soubry;  
Ben Gummer; Ben Wallace; Brandon Lewis; Charlie Elphicke; Chris Grayling; Claire Perry;  
Damian Hinds; David Cameron; David Gauke; David Lidington; David Mundell;  
Desmond Swayne; Dominic Raab; Ed Vaizey; Gavin Barwell; Gavin Williamson;  
George Eustice; George Freeman; George Hollingbery; George Osborne; Greg Clark;  
Guto Bebb; Guy Opperman; Harriett Baldwin; Hugo Swire; Iain Duncan Smith;  
Jackie Doyle-Price; James Brokenshire; James Duddridge; James Wharton; Jane Ellison;  
Jeremy Hunt; Jeremy Wright; Jo Johnson; John Hayes; John Penrose; John Whittingdale;  
Julian Brazier; Julian Smith; Justin Tomlinson; Justine Greening; Karen Bradley; Kris Hopkins;  
Marcus Jones; Margot James; Mark Francois; Mark Harper; Matt Hancock; Mel Stride;  
Michael Fallon; Mike Penning; Nicholas Boles; Nick Gibb; Nicky Morgan; Oliver Letwin;  
Philip Dunne; Philip Hammond; Priti Patel; Richard Harrington; Rob Wilson; Robert Buckland;  
Robert Goodwill; Robert Halfon; Rory Stewart; Sajid Javid; Sam Gyimah; Sarah Newton;  
Stephen Barclay; Stephen Crabb; Theresa May; Theresa Villiers; Therese Coffey;  
Tobias Ellwood; William Hague

---

---

## Appendix A3

This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 4 (Ignore or Defuse? Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition).

Note that as the units of observation for Chapter 4 are aggregated EU references into one large document for each leader per year, these documents are often very long, and are therefore inappropriate to provide face validity. Instead, tables A3.2, A3.3, A3.4, and A3.5 provide face validity for the complexity (Flesch-Kincaid) and emotiveness (ANEW) measures using individual EU references from EUParlspeech by the party leaders, from a randomly selected year (2004).

Table A3.1: Mainstream and Challenger Parties and their Leaders

Parliament	Parties	Leaders
AT Nationalrat	<b>ÖVP, SPÖ, LIF, NEOS</b> <i>BZÖ, FPÖ, STRONACH</i>	<b>Kurz, Mitterlehner, Spindelleger, Proll, Molterer</b> <b>Schussel, Kern, Faymann, Gusenbauer, Klima</b> <b>Vranitsky, Mlinar, Schmidt, Meinl, Strolz, Bucher,</b> <i>Westenthaler, Strache, Haupt, Riess, Haider, Lugar, Dietrich</i> <i>K.Jacobsen,</i>
DE Bundestag	<b>CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP</b> <i>PDS/LINKE, AfD</i>	<b>Kohl, Schauble, Merkel, Engholm, Scharping,</b> <b>Lafontaine, Schroder, Muntefering, Platzeck</b> <b>Beck, Gabriel, Schulz, Nahles, Lambsdorff, Kinkel ,</b> <b>Gerhardt, Westerwelle, Rosler, Lindner, Gysi,</b> <i>Bisky, Lafontaine, Lotzsch, Ernst, Kipping, Gauland</i>
DK Folketing	<b>KF, V, RV, LA, S, CD</b> <i>SF, DF, EL, FP</i>	<b>P.S.Moller, P.C.Moller, Bendtsen, Espersen, Barfoed</b> <b>Poulsen, Ellemann, A.Rasmussen, L.Rasmussen,</b> <b>Jelved, Vestager, Ostergaard, Khader, A.Samuelsen,</b> <b>P.N.Rasmussen, Lykke, Thorning-Schmidt,</b> <b>Frederiksen M.Jakobsen, Nielsen, Sovndal, Vilhelmsen,</b> <i>Dyhr, Kjaersgaard, Thulesen-Dahl, Schmidt-Nielsen,</i> <i>Skipper, K.Jacobsen</i>
IRL Dail	<b>FF, FG, LP, PD</b> <i>PBPA, PD, SF, SP, WP</i>	<b>Haughey, Reynolds, Ahern, Cowen Martin, Dukes</b> <b>Bruton, Noonan, Kenny, Spring, Quinn, Rabbitte,</b> <b>Gilmore, O'Malley, Harney, McDowell, Cannon</b> <i>Adams, Higgins, Barrett, De Rossa</i>
NLD Tweede	<b>CDA, PvdA, VVD,</b> <b>D66, PVV, SP, GPV,</b> <i>LPF, RPF, SGP</i>	<b>Heerma, Scheffer, Balkenende, Verhagen,</b> <b>Buma, Kok, Melkert, Bos, Cohen, Samsom,</b> <b>Asscher, Van Mierlo, De Graaf, Dittrich,</b> <b>Pechtold, Bolkestein, Dijkstal, Zalm, Van Aartsen</b> <b>Rutte, Wilders, Marijnissen, Kant, Roemer,</b> <i>Schutte, Herben, Van As, Van Dijke, Van der Staaij,</i> <i>Van der Vlies</i>
UK House of Commons	<b>Con, Lab, Lib Dem,</b> <i>UKIP</i>	<b>Thatcher, Major, Hague, Duncan Smith,</b> <b>Howard, Cameron, May, Johnson,</b> <b>Kinnock, Smith, Blair, Brown, Miliband, Corbyn,</b> <b>Ashdown, Kennedy, Campbell, Clegg, Farron</b> <b>Cable, Swinson, Carswell</b>
Total	24 mainstream parties 21 challenger parties	111 mainstream party leaders 40 challenger party leaders

Note: Mainstream parties are in bold, challenger parties are in italics. On the few occasions where the party leader is not in parliament, we use the party's parliamentary leader (e.g. Douglas Carswell in the case of UKIP).

Table A3.2: Face Validity: Low Complexity EU Statements

Country and Date	Speaker	EU Statement	Flesch-Kincaid
DK 2004-07	A.Rasmussen (V)	We stand with a new and united Europe. The EU which Denmark has spearheaded, is now becoming a reality. The new EU must be a success, and that is why we need the EU's new Constitutional Treaty.	6.423
NLD 2004-12	Balkenende (CDA)	We can look back on a very successful meeting. If I compare last week's European Council with that of December, the difference is night and day. But actually, we have to go back to June 2003	6.441
UK 2004-06	M.Howard (Con)	So what happened? We have just had elections to the European Parliament during which the Prime Minister did not make a single speech on Europe. That is what he means by leadership.	6.423
DK 2004-10	P.Kjærsgaard (DF)	I take that discussion with the Social democrats very seriously. Now, we do not intend to give up our opposition to the EU. However, it was a strange question.	7.293

Table A3.3: Face Validity: High Complexity EU Statements

Country and Date	Speaker	EU Statement	Flesch-Kincaid
NLD 2004-06	Wilders (PVV)	I also do not need a referendum to say that, which is why I am submitting the following motion. The House after hearing the deliberation, expresses its opinion that Turkey should never become a member of the European Union and therefore no negotiations on a possible European accession of Turkey should be conducted with that country; calls on the cabinet to vigorously oppose both Turkey's EU accession and the start of accession negotiations with that country and to veto any possible attempt by the EU to start negotiations with Turkey.	19.40929
DK 2004-12	Rasmussen (V)	We must make an effort to strengthen our dialogue with the Arab countries on the development of democracy and with more respect for human rights, on the protection of women's rights in society and their participation in public life and the labour market, on the development of better education systems, development of better social care systems, a broad effort to create societies with greater political stability. To this end, the government has taken a number of initiatives and we have also done so in collaboration with the other Nordic and Baltic EU countries. We are pushing the EU to strengthen its partnership with the Arab countries in this area, and we also hope that it can enter into a partnership with the United States, so that significant forces in the Western world and the Arab countries there can be an intensified dialogue on such a development of democracy and the safeguarding of human rights as a means of preventing terrorism in the longer term.	26.045

Table A3.4: Face Validity: High Emotiveness EU Statements

Country and Date	Speaker	EU Statement	ANEW score
DE 2004-07	Schroder (SD)	For the people in the old, but also in the new member states, accession is linked to the hope of life in freedom and prosperity, in peace and security. Peace through integration is part of the European Union's recipe for success. But we have to recognize that peace is by no means a matter of course everywhere in Europe, namely in the Balkans, which is why it is still necessary and will continue to be necessary to continue our commitment there.	0.2307
NLD 2004-12	Balkenende (CDA)	The European Council in December was actually a failure. In comparison, things went a lot of better this year: the official enlargement of the EU, the major event in Ireland on May 1, and now an ambitious constitutional treaty. So we are working to heal last year's wounds.	0.1351
UK 2004-03	M.Howard (Con)	Let me make it clear: any proposal for a new constitution must be put to the British people. At least seven other member states fo the European Union are giving their people a say. The Irish Government will trust the Irish people; the Dutch Government will trust the Dutch people; the Danish Government will trust the Danish people; and the Portuguese Government will trust the Portuguese people.	0.1621



Table A3.5: Face Validity: Low Emotiveness EU Statements

Country and Date	Speaker	EU Statement	ANEW score
DK 2004-03	Rasmussen (V)	The proposal entails, among other things, a liberalization of the ownership regulations applicable to real estate brokerage companies, a reduction in the number of mandatory services in real estate brokerage and pricing of the sub-services in a real estate brokerage. Amendment of the Companies Act, the Financial Statements Act and the Securities Trading Act. The Proposal implements the Takeover Directive 2004/25 which aims to create a uniform transparent framework for takeover bids in Europe. The directive is part of the EU financial action plan , which aims to promote the integration of European financial markets.	0.000
NLD 2004-05	Balkenende (CDA)	In the European Union, the European Commission is the institution that independently supervises the proper application of EU treaties and rules, makes proposals for legislation and carries out executive activities, within the specified powers. The members of the European Commission, the treaty states, perform their duties completely independently, in the general interest of the community. In the performance of their office, they do not accept instructions from any government, it says explicitly.	0.002

## Appendix A4

This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 5 (Disintegration and Party Competition: Evidence from Parliamentary Speeches on Brexit).

### A4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A4.1: Brexit Statements - Descriptive Statistics

Country	Mainstream Parties (MP)	MP Brexit Statements	Challenger Parties (CP)	CP Brexit Statements	Total Brexit Statements
Austria	NEOS, OVP, SPO	243	BZO, FPO, STRONACH	63	306
Denmark	KF, LA RV, S, V	228	DF, EL	157	385
Germany	CDU, FDP SPD	408	AfD, LINKE	88	496
Netherlands	CDA, CU, D66 DENK, PvdA, PvdD, VVD	360	50PLUS, FvD PVV, SGP, SP	171	531
Sweden	C, FP, KD, L, M	398	SD, V	107	505
<b>Total</b>	<b>23 mainstream parties</b>	<b>1,637</b>	<b>14 challenger parties</b>	<b>586</b>	<b>2,223</b>

## A4.2 Codebook

Thank you for helping to code this dataset of statements on Brexit by parliamentarians in five European legislatures (AT, DE, DK, SW, NL). This codebook explains how to code these statements.

Please code directly into the EXCEL file. A ‘Brexit statement’ refers to a three sentence reference to Brexit within a speech. Occasionally, due to the way in which speeches were collected, you may encounter clear formatting errors, for example a sentence that suddenly cuts off halfway through a statement. In these rare cases please correct and re-format the statement by merging it with the relevant cell and mentioning this in column J (dedicated to notes). Generally speaking, please leave the statements in the format in which MPs have presented them. The EXCEL file contains nine columns. Your role is to code *Brexit Strategy* in column H and *EU tone* in column I after reading the full statement in column G.

### A4.2.1 Coding Brexit Strategy (Column H)

In Column H, we would like you to code the statement’s *Brexit Strategy*, which captures the overall strategy pursued by the speaker in light of the disintegration episode. Altogether, 14 different Brexit strategies are identified. There are further details on each of these categories, with examples, later on in the codebook:

When coding statements, please take into account the following:

- When coding statements, please base your evaluation on what speakers are communicating at face value, rather than on any subtext based on your knowledge of the country.
- Classification categories are mutually exclusive. Occasionally, there will be statements that you feel contain more than one of the strategies identified below. In this case, use your personal judgement to decide what seems to be the dominant strategy presented in the statement.
- Generally, when defining codes, let your decisions be guided by parsimony and reliability. The rest of this section provides more detailed descriptions of the categories for classification, and examples of statements for each.

1) **Follow the UK:** Follow example of the UK by unilaterally negotiating membership terms with the EU and/or putting these terms to voters in a legally binding referendum.

*e.g.* “But as long as we are members of the EU, we work constructively in the Riksdag and the European Parliament to develop the EU in a more democratic direction. We therefore believe that Sweden should follow the example of the United Kingdom and initiate a process to renegotiate our EU membership.” (H.Linde, Left Party, SE)

**2) Slow Integration:** Use Brexit to demand reform within the EU in a way that slows down the process of integration, for example by shrinking the size of the EU budget.

*e.g.* “The Finance Committee is today delivering harsh EU criticism of the Commission regarding EU finances. Sweden has for a long time criticized the EU budget for being outdated. In the light of Brexit, this would be an excellent opportunity to reform the EU budget.” (H.Svenneling, Left Party, SE)

**3) Criticise EU:** Use Brexit as an illustration of the consequences of an ineffective, distant EU. This differs from the previous coding category by not explicitly calling for any EU reforms in the wake of Brexit. Also includes criticism of the EU not explicitly linked to Brexit.

*e.g.* “There is no credible response to the widely felt Euroscepticism here. I do hear another call for more Europe, while a member state is leaving the EU for the first time in some 60 years. Brexit is partly a direct result of too far-reaching integration, too far-reaching claims and too far-reaching European arrogance.” (De heer Bisschop, SGP, NL)

**4) Emphasise harm to the EU:** Emphasise the fact that the UK’s exit of the EU will/has caused harm to the EU and/or more harm to the EU and/or the speaker’s member state than to the UK. Also includes mentions that the damage to the UK was overstated / any mentions of ‘Project Fear.

*e.g.* “The worst that could happen to the EU has become reality: Brexit. The second economic force of the European Union, the EU’s first military force, has decided with a majority of 52 per cent to leave the EU. This has led the EU to the edge of the abyss and that will not improve in the future.” - (De heer Beertema, PVV, NLD)

**5) Accommodation in negotiations:** Accommodate the UK’s disintegration-bid. This includes, but is not limited to, granting the exceptions demanded and ensuring the UK isn’t ‘punished’ for its vote. Includes both accommodation of David Cameron’s demands pre-referendum and accommodation of the UK’s demands post-referendum

*e.g.* “Now people in Brussels, Paris and Berlin are afraid that the example could set a precedent, that other states in Europe will regain their sovereignty. That is also the reason

*why the EU Commission is planning to arbitrarily restrict British access to the internal market during the transition phase if necessary; You have to imagine this. By supporting these plans for the exclusion of Germany's most important foreign trade partner in the EU - you all support these exclusion plans - you are making free trade and competition within Europe hostage to a failed EU ideology - a foolish mistake, a mistake with grave consequences European cohesion; for the historical good economic relations between Great Britain and the rest of the continent must be preserved; otherwise Europe will fall behind in the global economy.” (Alice Weidel, AfD, DE)*

**6) Non-accommodation in negotiations:** Refuse to make concessions or grant exceptions to the UK. This includes, but is not limited to, tying the benefits of cooperation to the existing agreement and references to no ‘cherry picking’ of membership terms. Includes both non-accommodation of David Cameron’s demands pre-referendum and non-accommodation of the UK’s demands post-referendum

*e.g: “The primary goal, dear colleagues, for the Brexit negotiations is to preserve the unity of the European Union. Germany has a special responsibility for European integration and has benefited from it in its own way: historically, politically, economically. For Great Britain there must be no cherry-picking in the negotiations.” (Norbert Spinrath, SPD, DE)*

**7) Orderly Brexit:** Prioritise a non-disruptive UK withdrawal, for example one that avoids a ‘no deal’ Brexit and maintains links with the UK in key policy areas. No clear mention of accommodation or non-accommodation

*e.g: “In any case, we have the greatest interest in ensuring that the relationship between the European Union and Great Britain remains as close as possible in the future. Not only in terms of economic policy - Great Britain is a large and important market, but vice versa, the European Union is also a large and important market for Great Britain - but also in terms of security policy, the British are of course very, very important, especially when it comes to neighborhood policy.” (G. Blumel, OVP, AT)*

**8) UK remain:** Express desire for the UK to remain a member state both in the run up to the vote, and in its aftermath.

*e.g: “Again, I would like to say: we want Britain to remain part of the European Union. It is in our interest that Britain is part of the European Union. We have many, many different views in common and a strong and unbreakable friendship with Britain.” (H. Thorning-Schmidt, S, DK)*

**9) Brexit regret:** Express sadness and regret at the UK leaving the European Union.

Includes descriptions of Brexit as a ‘lose-lose’ situation

*e.g.*: “We would probably all have wished for a nicer present for the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, a nicer present than March 29, the day Brexit was officially announced. We too, many of us, regretted it very much, and as a European I personally regret this decision very much, because it also takes away a piece of my identity - this is my feeling.” (C.Muttonen, SPO, AT)

**10) New beginning:** Use Brexit as a new beginning and/or a wakeup call for the EU. Differentiates itself from categories 2 (Slow Integration) and 13 (Further Integration) in that it does not explicitly say whether this new beginning means a smaller or larger role for the EU and its institutions.

*e.g.*: “There are discussions about both Brexit and other countries where people become more skeptical of the EU. I think it’s like this because people think that the EU may be doing something wrong. That is why I think it will be even more important that we sharpen the EU and do it much better.” (C.Barenfeld, M, SW)

**11) Emphasise harm to the UK:** Emphasise the fact that the UK’s exit of the EU will cause harm to the UK and/or more harm to the UK than to the EU

*e.g.*: “No matter how wrong Britain’s exit from the EU is, no matter how much it will, I believe, in the end do more harm to the United Kingdom than to us.” (S.Gabriel, SPD, DE)

**12) Defend EU/ EU unity:** Defend achievements of European integration and emphasise the unity and coherence of remaining member states.

*e.g.*: “If you had asked me at the beginning of the year how things would go with the EU in 2017, I would not have been so sure of the answer. But then came Trump, Erdogan and Putin, and it was discovered that the idea of a common Europe might not be so bad after all.” (C.Korber, CDU, DE)

**13) Criticise Populists:** Use Brexit as an illustration of the dangers and false promises of populists. This includes both populists in the UK (e.g. lies in the referendum campaign) and populists in the speaker’s member state.

*e.g.*: “But the world around us has changed. And Mr Wilders is now talking about becoming independent and that we have to leave the European Union. I wonder if he is aware of the fact that Britain has been working on that since 2016, and that has turned into

one big drama” (Van H.Burma, CDA, NL)

**14) Further Integration:** Use Brexit as an opportunity to further European integration. Includes, but is not limited to, increases in the EU budget, or further integration in the area of security and defence.

*e.g:* “Asymmetrical shocks - which are currently being talked about again and again with a view to Brexit - are a danger that we really shouldn’t underestimate, especially in politically uncertain times. From our point of view, the euro zone should therefore be given its own fiscal capacity - if possible integrated in the EU budget - in order to be able to effectively cushion risks. In my opinion, a European digital tax could serve as a single source of funding.” (Johannes Schraps, SPD, DE)

**15) Other:** Statements that do not correspond to any of the thirteen Brexit strategies above. For example, simple descriptions of the negotiation points to go through in upcoming/previous summits.

*e.g:* “Mr President, first of all I would like to approve the committee’s proposal and rejection of all reservations. Mr President, the four freedoms of the European Union have been put under scrutiny by the United Kingdom’s Brexit decision. We all know that they include the free movement of goods, services, people and capital.” (P.Niemi, S, SE)

#### A4.2.2 Coding EU Tone (Column I)

In Column I, we would like you to code the statement according to its *EU tone*: the tone the speaker adopts with respect to the EU, its institutions, and/or European integration more widely.

**1) Positive EU Tone:** Speaker adopts a warm/positive tone when referencing the EU, its institutions, and/or European integration more widely.

*e.g:* “With the decision on Brexit, I am firmly convinced that Great Britain has taken the wrong path. If you had asked me at the beginning of the year how things would go with the EU in 2017, I would not have been so sure of the answer. But then came Trump, Erdogan and Putin, and it was discovered that the idea of a common Europe might not be so bad after all.” (C.Korber, CDU, DE)

**2) Neutral EU Tone:** Speaker adopts a neutral tone when referencing the EU, its institutions, and/or European integration more widely.

*e.g: “Mr President, first of all I would like to approve the committee’s proposal and rejection of all reservations. Mr President, the four freedoms of the European Union have been put under scrutiny by the United Kingdom’s Brexit decision. We all know that they include the free movement of goods, services, people and capital.” (P.Niemi, S, SE)*

**3) Negative EU Tone:** Speaker adopts a cold/negative tone when referencing the EU, its institutions, and/or European integration more widely.

*e.g: “There is no credible response to the widely felt Euroscepticism here. I do hear another call for more Europe, while a member state is leaving the EU for the first time in some 60 years. Brexit is partly a direct result of too far-reaching integration, too far-reaching claims and too far-reaching European arrogance. ” (De heer Bisschop, SGP, NL)*

### **A4.2.3 Notes (Column J)**

Column J is reserved for notes. Feel free to use this column for anything you would like to bring to the attention of the researcher, for example if you are hesitating between two coding categories.



### A4.3 Identifying Brexit Statements

To identify Brexit statements I draw on the EUParlspeech dataset which captures EU references in national legislatures (Hunter 2021). I identify Brexit statements through a series of search strings from Walter and Martini (2020) and classify EU as Brexit statements if they include any of these strings:

*Identifying Brexit statements from EUParlspeech: Text-Corpus Search terms*

```
(Brexit OR (UK OR United Kingdom OR Britain) w/5 (EU OR European Union)
w/5 (withdraw* OR leav* OR ((remain* OR continu*) w/5 member*)) OR (UK
OR United Kingdom OR Britain) w/5 ((referendum OR renegotiat*) w/5 mem-
ber* w/5 (EU OR European Union)) OR (UK OR United Kingdom OR Britain)
w/5 (relations OR relationship w/1 (with OR to)) w/5 (EU OR European Union
OR Europe) )
```

I validate this methodology with human hand coders, who were given a sample of 200 statements to code. This sample included 80 randomly selected statements that the automated method classified as Brexit statements, and 120 randomly selected EU references that the automated method did not classify as Brexit statements. Handcoders are asked to code whether the statement made reference to the UK's withdrawal from the EU. The results demonstrates high levels of accuracy (0.98), precision (0.938) and recall (1.000) (see Benoit 2014), confirming that my automated, search string based classifier can identify Brexit statements with high levels of accuracy. The dataset with full hand coding used to validate the automated method of identifying Brexit statements available upon request

## A4.4 Interrater Reliability Tests

Interrater reliability tests were conducted over two rounds, with two handcoders coding the same random sample of 220 Brexit statements. This represents approximately 10 per cent of the total sample of 2,223 statements. The codebook was tweaked after each round following discussion with the hand coders. The table below presents the results of Krippendorf's alpha and Cohen's kappa. These results correspond to 'substantial' agreement amongst coders (Landis and Koch 1977).

---

---

<i>Number of statements</i>	<i>Krippendorf's <math>\alpha</math> for Brexit Strategy</i>	<i>Krippendorf's <math>\alpha</math> for EU tone</i>	<i>Cohen's <math>k</math> for Brexit Strategy</i>	<i>Cohen's <math>k</math> for EU tone</i>
220	0.75	0.82	0.71	0.77

---

---

## A4.5 Robustness Tests - Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

Table A4.3: Mainstream Parties - Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

	<i>Brexit Strategy</i>				<i>EU Tone</i>
	Further Integration	Defend EU	Criticise Populists	Non-Accommodation in Negotiations	Positive Tone
Post Referendum	1.370* (0.751)	0.885** (0.378)	0.833** (0.415)	0.462 (0.512)	0.016 (0.254)
Constant	-4.098 (7.256)	-1.595 (8.043)	-1.216 (4.352)	-4.346 (17.185)	-2.454*** (0.290)
Observations	1,637	1,637	1,637	1,637	1,637
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4.4: Challenger Parties - Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

	<i>Brexit Strategy</i>				<i>EU Tone</i>
	Follow UK	Slow Integration	Criticise EU	Accommodation in Negotiations	Negative Tone
Post Referendum	-1.880*** (0.435)	0.228 (0.388)	0.898* (0.461)	1.249** (0.530)	-0.617** (0.244)
Constant	-6.060*** (0.398)	0.124 (0.351)	-0.534 (0.409)	-9.225*** (0.495)	0.231 (0.225)
Observations	586	586	586	586	586
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## References

Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2016. ‘Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact’. *British Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 417–36.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Werner Krause. 2020. ‘The Causal Effect of Radical Right Success on Mainstream Parties’ Policy Positions: A Regression Discontinuity Approach’. *British Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 829–47.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Lukas F. Stoetzer. 2020. ‘How Parties React to Voter Transitions’. *American Political Science Review* 114(3): 940–45.

Adam, Silke et al. 2017. ‘Strategies of Pro-European Parties in the Face of a Eurosceptic Challenge’. *European Union Politics* 18(2): 260–82.

Alcañiz, Isabella, and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. ‘Who’s to Blame? The Distribution of Responsibility in Developing Democracies’. *British Journal of Political Science* 41(2): 389–411.

Alexandrova Petrova, Petya. 2014. *Agenda Setting in the European Council*. Faculty Campus the Hague, Leiden University.

Alexandrova, Petya. 2015. ‘Upsetting the Agenda: The Clout of External Focusing Events in the European Council’. *Journal of Public Policy* 35(3): 505–30.

———. 2017. ‘Institutional Issue Proclivity in the EU: The European Council vs the Commission’. *Journal of European Public Policy* 24(5): 755–74.

Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, Sebastian Princen, and Arco Timmermans. 2014. ‘Measuring the European Council Agenda: Introducing a New Approach and Dataset’. *European Union Politics* 15(1): 152–67.

Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, and Arco Timmermans. 2012. ‘Policy Punc-

tuations and Issue Diversity on the European Council Agenda'. *Policy Studies Journal* 40(1): 69–88.

Alexandrova, Petya, Anne Rasmussen, and Dimiter Toshkov. 2016. 'Agenda Responsiveness in the European Council: Public Priorities, Policy Problems and Political Attention'. *West European Politics* 39(4): 605–27.

Allan, Lorraine G, and H. M Jenkins. 1983. 'The Effect of Representations of Binary Variables on Judgment of Influence'. *Learning and Motivation* 14(4): 381–405.

Alloy, Lauren B., and Lyn Y. Abramson. 1979. 'Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and Nondepressed Students: Sadder but Wiser?' *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 108(4): 441–85.

Anderson, Cameron D. 2006. 'Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis'. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 449–63.

Anderson, Christopher J. 1998. 'When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration'. *Comparative Political Studies* 31(5): 569–601.

Anderson, Christopher J. 2000. 'Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative Perspective'. *Electoral Studies* 19(2): 151–70.

Bagehot, Walter. 1893. *The English Constitution, and Other Political Essays*. Appleton.

Bakker, Ryan et al. 2015. 'Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010'. *Party Politics* 21(1): 143–52.

Bale, Tim et al. 2010a. 'If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe'. *Political Studies* 58(3): 410–26.

———. 2010b. 'If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe'. *Political Studies* 58(3): 410–26.

Bar-Tal, Daniel. 1997. *Patriotism: In the Lives of Individuals and Nations*. 1997. Chicago, IL, US: Nelson-Hall Publishers.

Barroso, J.M. 2010. 'Barroso blames capitals for plunge in EU popularity', euobserver, 1 September 2010.

Barrett, Scott. 1992. 'International Environmental Agreements as Games'. In *Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources*, Microeconomic Studies, ed. Rüdiger Pethig. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 11–37.

———. 1994. 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements'. *Oxford Economic Papers* 46: 878–94.

Bartels, Larry M. 1986. 'Issue Voting Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Test'. *American Journal of Political Science* 30(4): 709–28.

Baumgartner, Frank R. 1989. *Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policymaking*. 1st edition. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.

———. 2009. 'Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective'. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3): 603–20.

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1991. 'Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems'. *The Journal of Politics* 53(4): 1044–74.

———. 2010. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, Second Edition. University of Chicago Press.

Bearce, David H., and Brandy J. Jolliff Scott. 2019. 'Popular Non-Support for International Organizations: How Extensive and What Does This Represent?' *The Review of International Organizations* 14(2): 187–216.

Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2008. 'Compared to What? A Comment on "A Robust Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political Text" by Martin and Vanberg'. *Political Analysis* 16(1): 101–11.

Benoit, Kenneth, Michael Laver, and Slava Mikhaylov. 2009. 'Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions'. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 495–513.

Benoit, Kenneth, Kevin Munger, and Arthur Spirling. 2019. 'Measuring and Explaining Political Sophistication through Textual Complexity'. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(2): 491–508.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2016. “Brexit Has Raised Support for the European Union.” November 21.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2017. “A Source of Stability? German and European Public Opinion in Times of Political Polarisation.” 2017/3.

Binzer Hobolt, Sara, and Robert Klemmensen. 2008. ‘Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective’. *Comparative Political Studies* 41(3): 309–37.

Bischof, Daniel, and Roman Senninger. 2018. ‘Simple Politics for the People? Complexity in Campaign Messages and Political Knowledge’. *European Journal of Political Research* 57(2): 473–95.

Bischof, Daniel, and Markus Wagner. 2019. ‘Do Voters Polarize When Radical Parties Enter Parliament?’ *American Journal of Political Science* 63(4): 888–904.

Blanco, Fernando, and Helena Matute. 2015. ‘Exploring the Factors That Encourage the Illusions of Control’. *Experimental Psychology* 62(2): 131–42.

Bonoli, Giuliano, and Toshimitsu Shinkawa, eds. 2006. *Ageing and Pension Reform Around the World: Evidence from Eleven Countries*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and Claes H. de Vreese. 2016. ‘Do European Elections Create a European Public Sphere?’ In *(Un)Intended Consequences of EU Parliamentary Elections*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Börzel, Tanja A. 2018. ‘Researching the EU (Studies) into Demise?’ *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(3): 475–85.

Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2002. ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. (April 19, 2020).

Brader, Ted. 2005. ‘Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions’. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 388–405.

Bradley, Margaret M., and Peter J. Lang. 2017. ‘Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW)’. Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, Technical Report C-3 UF.

van der Brug, Wouter, and Claes H. de Vreese, eds. 2016. (Un)Intended Consequences of EU Parliamentary Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Budge, Ian. 2015. 'Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis'. *West European Politics* 38(4): 761–77.

Bulmer, Simon. 2020. *The Member States of the European Union*. Oxford University Press.

Buller, J. 1995. 'Britain as an Awkward Partner: Reassessing Britain's Relations with the EU'. *Politics*, 15(1): 33–42.

Burstein, Paul. 2003. 'The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda'. *Political Research Quarterly* 56(1): 29–40.

Butt, Sarah. 2006. 'How Voters Evaluate Economic Competence: A Comparison between Parties in and out of Power'. *Political Studies* 54(4): 743–66.

Capelos, Tereza, and Johannes Wurzer. 2009. 'United Front: Blame Management and Scandal Response Tactics of the United Nations'. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 17(2): 75–94.

Choi, Hyunyoung, and Hal Varian. 2012. 'Predicting the Present with Google Trends'. *Economic Record* 88(s1): 2–9.

Chopin, Thierry, and Christian Lequesne. 2020. 'Disintegration Reversed: Brexit and the Cohesiveness of the EU27'. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 0(0): 1–13.

Collier, David, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo, and Andra Olivia Maciuceanu. 2006. 'Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications'. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11(3): 211–46.

Costello, Rory, and Robert Thomson. 2013. 'The Distribution of Power among EU Institutions: Who Wins under Codecision and Why?' *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(7): 1025–39.

Cruz, Cesi, and Christina J. Schneider. 2017. 'Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming'. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2): 396–408.

Daly, M. 2019. 'The Implications of the Departure of the UK for EU Social Policy'. *Social Policy and Society*. 18(1): 107–17



Delors, J. 1995. 'Intervention de Jacques Delors devant le Parlement Europeen', Address to the European Parliament, 19 January 1995.

De Bruycker, Iskander. 2017. 'Politicization and the Public Interest: When Do the Elites in Brussels Address Public Interests in EU Policy Debates?' *European Union Politics* 18(4): 603–19.

De Vries, Catherine E. 2017. 'Benchmarking Brexit: How the British Decision to Leave Shapes EU Public Opinion: Benchmarking Brexit'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 55: 38–53.

De Vries, Catherine E., and Sara B. Hobolt. 2012. 'When Dimensions Collide: The Electoral Success of Issue Entrepreneurs'. *European Union Politics* 13(2): 246–68.

De Wilde, Pieter. 2011. 'No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration'. *Journal of European Integration* 33(5): 559–75.

Dellmuth, Lisa M., and Jonas Tallberg. 2021. 'Elite Communication and the Popular Legitimacy of International Organizations'. *British Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 1292–1313.

Dennison, James. 2019. 'A Review of Public Issue Salience: Concepts, Determinants and Effects on Voting'. *Political Studies Review* 17(4): 436–46.

Dennison, James, and Andrew Geddes. 2019. 'A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe'. *The Political Quarterly* 90(1): 107–16.

Dolan, Julie, and Jonathan S. Kropf. 2004. 'Credit Claiming from the U.S. House: Gendered Communication Styles?' *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 9(1): 41–59.

Döring, Holger, and Sven Regel. 2019 'Party Facts: A database of political parties worldwide'. *Party Politics* 25(2): 97-109.

Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2021. *Parliaments and governments database (Parl-Gov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies*. Development version.

Downey, John, and Thomas Koenig. 2006. 'Is There a European Public Sphere?: The Berlusconi–Schulz Case'. *European Journal of Communication* 21(2): 165–87.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. 1st edition. Boston: Harper and Row.

Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy*. London UK: Penguin UK.

Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias. 2014. 'Why Parties Politicise International Institutions: On Globalisation Backlash and Authority Contestation'. *Review of International Political Economy* 21(6): 1275–1312.

———. 2018. 'Self-Legitimation in the Face of Politicization: Why International Organizations Centralized Public Communication'. *The Review of International Organizations* 13(4): 519–46.

Enelow, James, and Melvin J. Hinich. 1981. 'A New Approach to Voter Uncertainty in the Downsian Spatial Model'. *American Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 483–93.

European Commission. 2020. *The Commission's use of languages*. Accessed on 3 Sep 2021.

Eurobarometer Survey 90. 2018. "European Parliament." October.

European Parliament. 2018. "Brexit Effect: Public Opinion Survey Shows that EU Is More Appreciated than Ever." (EP press release on Eurobarometer data).

Evans, Geoffrey, and Anand Menon. 2017. *Brexit and British Politics*. John Wiley and Sons.

Fawcett, Paul, Matthew Flinders, Colin Hay, and Matthew Wood, eds. 2017. *Anti-Politics, Depoliticization, and Governance*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Fenno, Richard F., and John R. Hibbing. 2002. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Longman Classics edition. New York: Pearson College Div.

Fereday, Jennifer, and Eimear Muir-Cochrane. 2006. 'Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development'. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 5(1): 80–92.

Finus, Michael, and Bianca Rundshagen. 1998. 'Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient'. *Environmental and Resource Economics* 12(3): 275–306.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1978. 'Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis'. *American Journal of Political Science* 22(2): 426–43.

———. 1989. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. Yale University Press.

Flesch, Rudolph. 1948. 'A New Readability Yardstick'. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 32(3): 221–33.

Fligstein, Neil. 2009. *Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Follesdal, Andreas, and Simon Hix. 2006a. 'Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(3): 533–62.

———. 2006b. 'Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(3): 533–62.

Franchino, Fabio, and Camilla Mariotto. 2013. 'Explaining Negotiations in the Conciliation Committee'. *European Union Politics* 14(3): 345–65.

Franklin, Mark N., and Christopher Wlezien. 1997. 'The Responsive Public: Issue Salience, Policy Change, and Preferences for European Unification'. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9(3): 347–63.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 2018. "What Holds Europe Together? the EU in the Wake of Brexit."

Gallie, W.B. 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1956) 167-198.\*

Giger, Nathalie, and Moira Nelson. 2011. 'The Electoral Consequences of Welfare State Retrenchment: Blame Avoidance or Credit Claiming in the Era of Permanent Austerity?' *European Journal of Political Research* 50(1): 1–23.

Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2016. 'Four Ways We Can Improve Policy Diffusion Research'. *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 16(1): 8–21.

Green, Jane, and Sara B. Hobolt. 2008. 'Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices in British Elections'. *Electoral Studies* 27(3): 460–76.

Green, Jane, and Will Jennings. 2012. 'The Dynamics of Issue Competence and Vote for Parties in and out of Power: An Analysis of Valence in Britain, 1979–1997'. *European Journal of Political Research* 51(4): 469–503.

———. 2017. *The Politics of Competence: Parties, Public Opinion and Voters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2012. 'A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and the Politicisation of European Integration'. *Political Studies* 60(1): 115–30.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2010. 'Who Sets the Agenda and Who Responds to It in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Competition and Agenda-Setting'. *European Journal of Political Research* 49(2): 257–81.

———. 2015. 'Avoidance and Engagement: Issue Competition in Multiparty Systems'. *Political Studies* 63(4): 747–64.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Simon Otjes. 2019. 'A Hot Topic? Immigration on the Agenda in Western Europe'. *Party Politics* 25(3): 424–34.

Grey, Chris. 2021. 'Britain's Brexit Slow Puncture'. *Brexit and Beyond*. 6 August 2021

Grimmer, Justin. 2013a. 'Appropriators Not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation'. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 624–42.

———. 2013b. *Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters*. Cambridge University Press.

Grimmer, Justin, Solomon Messing, and Sean J. Westwood. 2012. 'How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation'. *The American Political Science Review* 106(4): 703–19.

Grimmer, Justin Ryan. 'Representational Style: The Central Role of Communication in Representation'. Ph.D. Harvard University.

Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. 'Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts'. *Political Analysis* 21(3): 267–97.

Grossback, Lawrence J., Sean Nicholson-Crotty, and David A. M. Peterson. 2004. 'Ide-

ology and Learning in Policy Diffusion'. *American Politics Research* 32(5): 521–45.

H. De Vreese, Jochen Peter, Holli A. Semetko, Claes. 2001. 'Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News'. *Political Communication* 18(2): 107–22.

Haas, Ernst. 1958. *Uniting Of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. New Ed edition. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press.

Haas, Ernst B. et al. 1971. *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Habermas, Juergen. 1975. *Legitimation Crisis*. 1st edition. Boston, Mass: Beacon Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. 5th or later Edition. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.

———. 1994. *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*. MIT Press.

Hagemann, Sara, Sara B. Hobolt, and Christopher Wratil. 2017. 'Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting'. *Comparative Political Studies* 50(6): 850–76.

Han, Kyung Joon. 2020. 'Beclouding Party Position as an Electoral Strategy: Voter Polarization, Issue Priority and Position Blurring'. *British Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 653–75.

Haselmayer, Martin, and Marcelo Jenny. 2017. 'Sentiment Analysis of Political Communication: Combining a Dictionary Approach with Crowdcoding'. *Quality and Quantity* 51(6): 2623–46.

Hay, Colin, and Professor of Political Analysis Department of Political Science Colin Hay. 2007. *Why We Hate Politics*. Polity.

Heinisch, Reinhard, Duncan McDonnell, and Annika Werner. 2021. 'Equivocal Euro-scepticism: How Populist Radical Right Parties Can Have Their EU Cake and Eat It'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 59(2): 189–205.

Heinkelmann-Wild, Tim, Lisa Kriegmair, and Berthold Rittberger. 2020. 'The EU

Multi-Level System and the Europeanization of Domestic Blame Games'. *Politics and Governance* 8(1): 85–94.

Heinkelmann-Wild, Tim, Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, and Bernhard Zangl. 2020. 'Divided They Fail: The Politics of Wedge Issues and Brexit'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 27(5): 723–41.

Heinkelmann-Wild, Tim, and Bernhard Zangl. 2020. 'Multilevel Blame Games: Blame-Shifting in the European Union'. *Governance* 33(4): 953–69.

Helbling, Marc. 2014. 'Framing Immigration in Western Europe'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(1): 21–41.

Helbling, Marc, Dominic Hoeglinger, and Bruno Wüest. 2010. 'How Political Parties Frame European Integration'. *European Journal of Political Research* 49(4): 495–521.

Hellwig, Timothy, and David Samuels. 2007. 'Voting in Open Economies: The Electoral Consequences of Globalization'. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(3): 283–306.

Hellwig, Timothy T. 2001. 'Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Voting'. *The Journal of Politics* 63(4): 1141–62.

Hernández, Enrique, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. 'The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe'. *European Journal of Political Research* 55(2): 203–24.

Hix, Simon. 2013. *What's Wrong with the Europe Union and How to Fix It*. John Wiley and Sons.

Hix, Simon, and Bjørn Høyland. 2011. *The Political System of the European Union*. 3rd ed. 2011 edition. Basingstoke: Red Globe Press.

Hix, Simon, and Michael Marsh. 2007. 'Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections'. *The Journal of Politics* 69(2): 495–510.

Hobolt, Sara B., Thomas J. Leeper, and James Tilley. 2021. 'Divided by the Vote: Affective Polarization in the Wake of the Brexit Referendum'. *British Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 1476–93.

Hobolt, Sara B, Sebastian Adrian Popa, Wouter Van der Brug, and Hermann Schmitt. 2021. 'The Brexit Deterrent? How Member State Exit Shapes Public Support for the

European Union'. *European Union Politics*: 14651165211032766.

Hobolt, Sara B., and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2012. 'Motivating the European Voter: Parties, Issues and Campaigns in European Parliament Elections'. *European Journal of Political Research* 51(6): 701–27.

Hobolt, Sara B., and James Tilley. 2014a. *Blaming Europe?: Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union*. OUP Oxford.

———. 2014b. 'Who's in Charge? How Voters Attribute Responsibility in the European Union'. *Comparative Political Studies* 47(6): 795–819.

Hobolt, Sara B., and Catherine E. de Vries. 2015. 'Issue Entrepreneurship and Multi-party Competition'. *Comparative Political Studies* 48(9): 1159–85.

———. 2016. 'Public Support for European Integration'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19(1): 413–32. Hobolt, Sara B., and Christopher Wratil. 2020. 'Contestation and Responsiveness in EU Council Deliberations'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 27(3): 362–81.

Hobolt, Sara Binzer. 2007. 'Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration'. *European Journal of Political Research* 46(2): 151–82.

Hollihan, Thomas A. 2008. *Uncivil Wars: Political Campaigns in a Media Age*. 2nd edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's.

Hood, Christopher. 2007. 'What Happens When Transparency Meets Blame-Avoidance?' *Public Management Review* 9(2): 191–210.

———. 2010. *The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government*. Princeton University Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks. 2019. *A Theory of International Organization*. Oxford University Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2003. 'Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance'. *The American Political Science Review* 97(2): 233–43.

———. 2005. 'Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration'. *European Union Politics* 6(4): 419–43.

———. 2009. ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining’. *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 1–23.

———. 2018. ‘Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage’. *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 109–35.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Gary Wolfe Marks. 2001. *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Rowman and Littlefield.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson. 2002. ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?’ *Comparative Political Studies* 35(8): 965–89.

Howarth, D., and J. Torfing, eds. 2005. *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*. Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781403917195> (September 19, 2021).

Hutter, Swen, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2019. ‘Politicizing Europe in Times of Crisis’. *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(7): 996–1017.

Ingall, Rachael E., and Brian F. Crisp. 2001a. ‘Determinants of Home Style: The Many Incentives for Going Home in Colombia’. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(3): 487–512.

———. 2001b. ‘Determinants of Home Style: The Many Incentives for Going Home in Colombia’. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(3): 487–512.

Jerit, Jennifer. 2008. ‘Issue Framing and Engagement: Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy Debates’. *Political Behavior* 30(1): 1–24.

Juncker, J.C. 2015, ‘State of the Union 2015’, Address to the European Parliament, 9 September 2015.

Juncker, J.C. 2016, ‘State of the Union 2016: Towards a better Europe - a Europe that protects, empowers, and defends’. Address to the European Parliament, 14 September 2016.

Juncker, J.C. 2019, ‘Interview with Jean-Claude Juncker: How was that with the Greeks?’, *Bild*, 23 May 2019 .

Kaelble, H. 2009. ‘Identification with Europe and politicization of the EU since the 1980s’. In Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) *European Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 8



Kam, Christopher J. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party'. *Party Politics* 1(1): 5–28.

Keohane, Robert O. 2005. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press.

van Kessel, Stijn et al. 2020. 'Eager to Leave? Populist Radical Right Parties' Responses to the UK's Brexit Vote'. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 22(1): 65–84.

Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. 'The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems'. In *Political Parties and Political Development*. (SPD-6), Princeton University Press, 177–200.

Kortmann, Matthias, and Christian Stecker. 2019. 'Party Competition and Immigration and Integration Policies: A Comparative Analysis'. *Comparative European Politics* 17(1): 72–91.

Kosterman, Rick, and Seymour Feshbach. 1989. 'Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes'. *Political Psychology* 10(2): 257–74.

Konstantina, Drista and Louridas, Panagiotis. 2018. 'Greek Parliament Proceedings 1989-2019'. Accessed from Zenodo.org.

Kriesi, H. et al. 2008. Kriesi, H; Grande, E; Lachat, R; Dolezal, M; Bornschier, Simon; Frey, T (2008). *West European politics in the age of globalization*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1998. 'The Transformation of Cleavage Politics The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture'. *European Journal of Political Research* 33(2): 165–85.

———. 2007. 'The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns'. *European Union Politics* 8(1): 83–108.

———. 2012. *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Krugman, Paul. 2012. *End This Depression Now!* W. W. Norton and Company.

Kuhne, Rinaldo, Christian Schemer, Jorg Matthes, and Werner Wirth. 2011. "Affective Priming in Political Campaigns: How Campaign-induced Emotions Prime Political Opinions." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 23 (4): 485–507.

Ladi, Stella, and Vasiliki Tsagkroni. 2019. 'Analysing Crisis Parliamentary Discourse in Greece: Whom Should We Blame?' *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 57(4): 729–48.

Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry. 2003. 'Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data'. *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 311–31.

Li, Qiong, and Marilyn B. Brewer. 2004. 'What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American Identity After 9/11'. *Political Psychology* 25(5): 727–39.

Lin, Nick, and Moritz Osnabrügge. 2018. 'Making Comprehensible Speeches When Your Constituents Need It'. *Research and Politics* 5(3): 2053168018795598.

Lindberg, Leon N. Scheingold. 1970. *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Lipinski, Daniel. 2009. *Congressional Communication: Content and Consequences*. University of Michigan Press.

Mair, Peter. 2007. 'Political Opposition and the European Union'. *Government and Opposition* 42(1): 1–17.

———. 2013. *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy*. Verso Books.

Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank. 1996. 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance\*'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 34(3): 341–78.

Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson, and Erica Edwards. 2006. 'Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality'. *Comparative Political Studies* 39(2): 155–75.

Marks, Gary, and Carole J. Wilson. 2000. 'The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration'. *British Journal of Political Science* 30(3): 433–59.

Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2008. 'A Robust Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political Text'. *Political Analysis* 16(1): 93–100.

Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection, Second Edition*. Yale University Press.

McGraw, Kathleen M., and Thomas M. Dolan. 2007. 'Personifying the State: Consequences for Attitude Formation'. *Political Psychology* 28(3): 299–327.

McKibbin, Warwick., and Fernando, Roshen. 2020. 'The Economic Impact of Covid-19'. *Economics in the Time of COVID-10*. Edited by Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro. CEPR Press.

Medrano, Juan Díez, and Paula Gutiérrez. 2001. 'Nested Identities: National and European Identity in Spain'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(5): 753–78.

Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. 'Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success'. *The American Political Science Review* 99(3): 347–59.

———. 2008. *Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. Illustrated edition. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Menon, Anand. 2008. *Europe: The State of the Union*. Atlantic.

Menon, Anand. 2021. 'Brexit: What's Happened and What Does the Future Hold?'. Public Lecture at Aberystwyth Univeristy. 22 April 2021.

Merz, Nicolas, Sven Regel, and Jirka Lewandowski. 2016. 'The Manifesto Corpus: A New Resource for Research on Political Parties and Quantitative Text Analysis'. *Research and Politics* 3(2): 2053168016643346.

Middelhaar, Luuk van. 2020. *The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. 1st edition. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

———. 'Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation'. : 79. Morsut, Claudia, and Bjørn Ivar Kruke. 2018. 'Crisis

Governance of the Refugee and Migrant Influx into Europe in 2015: A Tale of Disintegration'. *Journal of European Integration* 40(2): 145–59.

Msetfi, Rachel M., Robin A. Murphy, and Jane Simpson. 2007. 'Depressive Realism and the Effect of Intertrial Interval on Judgements of Zero, Positive, and Negative Contingencies'. *The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology* 60(3): 461–81.

Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.

Mühlböck, Monika, and Jale Tosun. 2018. 'Responsiveness to Different National Interests: Voting Behaviour on Genetically Modified Organisms in the Council of the European Union'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(2): 385–402.

Nanz, Patrizia, and Jens Steffek. 2004. 'Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere'. *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 314–35.

Odmalm, Pontus. 2012. 'Party Competition and Positions on Immigration: Strategic Advantages and Spatial Locations'. *Comparative European Politics* 10(1): 1–22.

Odmalm, Pontus, and Betsy Super. 2014. 'Getting the Balance Right? Party Competition on Immigration and Conflicting Ideological "Pulls"'. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 37(3): 301–22.

Osnabrügge, Moritz, Sara B. Hobolt, and Toni Rodon. 2021. 'Playing to the Gallery: Emotive Rhetoric in Parliaments'. *American Political Science Review* 115(3): 885–99.

Page, Benjamin I. 1994. 'Democratic Responsiveness? Untangling the Links between Public Opinion and Policy'. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27(1): 25–29.

Pahontu, Raluca L. 2020. *The Democrat Disaster: Hurricane Exposure, Risk Aversion and Insurance Demand*. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.

Parsons, Craig, and Till Weber. 2011. 'Cross-Cutting Issues and Party Strategy in the European Union': *Comparative Political Studies*.

Paterson, W. E. 2018. "Germany and the Brexit Crisis." In *Brexit and Beyond. Rethinking the Futures of Europe*, edited by B. Martill and U. Staiger, 88–96. London: UCL

Press.

Perrineau, Pascal. 2017. *Le vote disruptif: Les élections présidentielles et législatives de 2017*. Presses de Sciences Po.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. 'Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study'. *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 825–50.

Pevehouse, Jon C.W., Timothy Nordstrom, Roseanne W McManus, Anne Spencer Jamison. 2020. 'Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets', *Journal of Peace Research*.

Pew Research Center. 2017. 'Post-Brexit, Europeans More Favorable Towards EU.' June.

Puetter, Uwe. 2012. 'Europe's Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and European Council in EU Economic Governance'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(2): 161–78.

———. 'The European Council – the New Centre of EU Politics'. : 16.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games'. *International Organization* 42(3): 427–60.

Rauh, Christian. 2015. 'Communicating Supranational Governance? The Salience of EU Affairs in the German Bundestag, 1991–2013'. *European Union Politics* 16(1): 116–38.

———. 2016. *A Responsive Technocracy?: EU Politicisation and the Consumer Policies of the European Commission*. Colchester, United Kingdom: ECPR Press.

———. 2019. 'EU Politicization and Policy Initiatives of the European Commission: The Case of Consumer Policy'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(3): 344–65.

———. 2021a. 'From the Berlaymont to the Citizen? The Language of European Commission Press Releases 1985-2020'.

———. 2021b. 'Supranational Emergency Politics? What Executives' Public Crisis Communication May Tell Us'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 0(0): 1–13.

Rauh, Christian, Bart Joachim Bes, and Martijn Schoonvelde. 2020. 'Undermining, De-fusing or Defending European Integration? Assessing Public Communication of European

Executives in Times of EU Politicisation'. *European Journal of Political Research* 59(2): 397–423.

Rauh, Christian, and Pieter De Wilde. 2018. 'The Opposition Deficit in EU Accountability: Evidence from over 20 Years of Plenary Debate in Four Member States'. *European Journal of Political Research* 57(1): 194–216.

Rauh, Christian and Schwalbach, Jan, 2020, "The ParlSpeech V2 data set: Full-text corpora of 6.3 million parliamentary speeches in the key legislative chambers of nine representative democracies"

Rauh, Christian, and Michael Zürn. 2014. 'Zur Politisierung der EU in der Krise'. In *Krise der europäischen Vergesellschaftung Soziologische Perspektiven*, ed. Martin Heidenreich. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 121–45.

———. 2020. 'Authority, Politicization, and Alternative Justifications: Endogenous Legitimation Dynamics in Global Economic Governance<sup>1</sup>'. *Review of International Political Economy* 27(3): 583–611.

Reif, K. 1993 'Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European Identity' in Garcia S. (ed.) (1993) *European identity and the Search for Legitimacy*. London: Pinter Publishers, Chapter 8

Remmer, Karen L. 1986. 'The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984'. *Comparative Politics* 19(1): 1–24.

Riker, Riker, William Harrison, William H. Riker, William H. Riker, and John Paul Mueller. 1996. *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*. Yale University Press.

Risse, Thomas. 2015. *European Public Spheres*. Cambridge University Press.

Rixen, Thomas, and Bernhard Zangl. 2014. *The Politicization of International Economic Institutions in US Public Debates*. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. SSRN Scholarly Paper.

Roberts, Alasdair. 2006. *Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Rossiter, John R. 1997. *Advertising Communications and Promotion Management*. Subsequent edition. ed. Larry Percy. New York: McGraw-Hill College.

Rovny, Jan. 2012. 'Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? Party Strategies in Multidimensional Competition': *European Union Politics*.

———. 2013. 'Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand? Position Blurring in Multidimensional Competition'. *European Political Science Review* 5(1): 1–26.

Rovny, Jan, and Erica E. Edwards. 2012. 'Struggle over Dimensionality: Party Competition in Western and Eastern Europe'. *East European Politics and Societies*.

Samuels, David J. 2002. 'Pork Barreling Is Not Credit Claiming or Advertising: Campaign Finance and the Sources of the Personal Vote in Brazil'. *Journal of Politics* 64(3): 845–63.

Scharpf, Fritz. 1999. *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2001. 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union'. *International Organization* 55(1): 47–80.

———. 2018. 'Brexit: Differentiated Disintegration in the European Union'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(8): 1154–73.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2009. 'Re-Envisioning the European Union: Identity, Democracy, Economy'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47: 17–42.

———. 2020. *Europe's Crisis of Legitimacy: Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers in the Eurozone*. Oxford University Press.

Vivien A. Schmidt. 2006. *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics*. OUP Oxford.

Schneider, Christina J. 2018. *The Responsive Union: National Elections and European Governance*. Cambridge University Press.

Schneider, Christina J., and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2018. 'The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation: Germany and the European Debt Crisis'. *International Organization* 72(1): 1–31.

Schoonvelde, Martijn, Anna Brosius, Gijs Schumacher, and Bert N. Bakker. 2019. 'Liberals Lecture, Conservatives Communicate: Analyzing Complexity and Ideology in 381,609

Political Speeches'. PLOS ONE

Schulte-Cloos, Julia. 2018. 'Do European Parliament Elections Foster Challenger Parties' Success on the National Level?' *European Union Politics* 19(3): 408–26.

———. 2019. 'The Effect of European Parliament Elections on Political Socialisation'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(7): 1094–1111.

Schumacher, Gijs, Daniel Hansen, Mariken A.C.G. van der Velden, and Sander Kunst. 2019. 'A New Dataset of Dutch and Danish Party Congress Speeches'. *Research and Politics* 6(2).

Schumacher, Gijs, Martijn Schoonvelde, Denise Traber, and Tanushree Dahiya. 'EU-Speech: A New Dataset of EU Elite Speeches'. :

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1972. 'The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition'. *The American Political Science Review* 66(2): 555–68.

Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. 2008. 'The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion'. *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 840–57.

Shipman, Tim. 2016. *All Out War: The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain's Political Class*. William Collins. Shoemaker, Pamela J., and Timothy Vos. 2009. *Gatekeeping Theory*. New York: Routledge.

Sieberer, Ulrich. 2006. 'Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis'. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 12(2): 150–78.

Simon, Herbert A. 1990. 'Bounded Rationality'. In *Utility and Probability*, The New Palgrave, eds. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 15–18.

Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Phillip E. Tetlock. 1993. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. Reprint edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Soroka, Stuart N., and Christopher Wlezien. 2010. *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy*. Cambridge University Press.

Spirling, Arthur. 2016. 'Democratization and Linguistic Complexity: The Effect of Franchise Extension on Parliamentary Discourse, 1832–1915'. *The Journal of Politics* 78(1):



120–36.

Steenbergen, Marco R., Erica E. Edwards, and Catherine E. de Vries. 2007a. ‘Who’s Cueing Whom?: Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration’. *European Union Politics* 8(1): 13–35.

———. 2007b. ‘Who’s Cueing Whom?: Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration’. *European Union Politics* 8(1): 13–35.

Stephen, Matthew D., and Michael Zürn. 2019. *Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-State*. Oxford University Press.

Sternberg, Claudia, Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni, and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. 2018. *The Greco-German Affair in the Euro Crisis: Mutual Recognition Lost?* Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Sternberg, Claudia Schrag. 2013. *The Struggle for EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 1950-2005*. 2013th edition. Palgrave Macmillan.

Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart. 2008. *Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism: Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys*. OUP Oxford.

Taggart, Paul. 1998. ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’. *European Journal of Political Research* 33(3): 363–88.

Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szczerbiak. 2018. ‘Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of the Eurozone and Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States’. *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(8): 1194–1214.

Tallberg, Jonas, Karin Bäckstrand, and Jan Aart Scholte. 2018. *Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences*. Oxford University Press.

Tallberg, Jonas, and Michael Zürn. 2019. ‘The Legitimacy and Legitimation of International Organizations: Introduction and Framework’. *The Review of International Organizations* 14(4): 581–606.

Tassinari, Fabrizio. 2016. ‘The Disintegration of European Security: Lessons from the Refugee Crisis’. *PRISM* 6(2): 70–83.

Tetlock, Philip E. 1983. ‘Cognitive Style and Political Ideology’. *Journal of Personality*

and *Social Psychology* 45(1): 118–26.

———. 1984. ‘Cognitive Style and Political Belief Systems in the British House of Commons’. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46(2): 365–75.

Thomson, Robert et al. 2012. ‘A New Dataset on Decision-Making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements (DEUII)’. *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(4): 604–22.

Thomson, Robert, and Madeleine Hosli. 2006. ‘Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission, Council and Parliament in Legislative Decision-Making\*’. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(2): 391–417.

Tillman, Erik R. 2004. ‘The European Union at the Ballot Box?: European Integration and Voting Behavior in the New Member States’. *Comparative Political Studies* 37(5): 590–610.

Traber, Denise, Martijn Schoonvelde, and Gijs Schumacher. 2020. ‘Errors Have Been Made, Others Will Be Blamed: Issue Engagement and Blame Shifting in Prime Minister Speeches during the Economic Crisis in Europe’. *European Journal of Political Research* 59(1): 45–67.

Translation Centre of the European Parliament (CdT). 2017. Cost effectiveness of translations in the EU. Question for written answer E-003167-17. 5 May 2017.

Van Leeuwen, Theo. 2007. ‘Legitimation in Discourse and Communication’. *Discourse and Communication* 1(1): 91–112.

Vasilopoulou, Sofia, Daphne Halikiopoulou, and Theofanis Exadaktylos. 2014. ‘Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame’. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(2): 388–402.

Vaubel, Roland. 2006. ‘Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations’. *The Review of International Organizations* 1(2): 125–38.

Volkens, Andrea, Burst, Tobias, Krause, Werner and Lehmann, Pola and Matthieß Theres and Merz, Nicolas and Regel, Sven and Weßels, Bernhard and Zehnter, Lisa (2020): *The Manifesto Data Collection*. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

de Vreese, Claes H., Susan A. Banducci, Holli A. Semetko, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden.

2006. 'The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries'. *European Union Politics* 7(4): 477–504.

Vreese, Claes H. De, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2006. 'Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union\*'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(2): 419–36.

Vreese, Claes Holger de. 2003. *Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

de Vries, Catherine E. De. 2018. *Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration*. Oxford University Press.

de Vries, Catherine E., Erica E. Edwards, and Erik R. Tillman. 2011. 'Clarity of Responsibility Beyond the Pocketbook: How Political Institutions Condition EU Issue Voting'. *Comparative Political Studies* 44(3): 339–63.

de Vries, Catherine E. , and Sara B. Hobolt. 2020. *Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe*. Princeton University Press.

Vries, Catherine E. De, Sara B. Hobolt, and Stefanie Walter. 2021. 'Politicizing International Cooperation: The Mass Public, Political Entrepreneurs, and Political Opportunity Structures'. *International Organization* 75(2): 306–32.

Vries, Erik de, Martijn Schoonvelde, and Gijs Schumacher. 2018. 'No Longer Lost in Translation: Evidence That Google Translate Works for Comparative Bag-of-Words Text Applications'. *Political Analysis* 26(4): 417–30. Walter, Stefanie. 'The Accommodation Dilemma.' : 44.

Walter, Stefanie, and Marco Martini. 2020a. 'Learning from Precedent: How the British Brexit Experience Counteracts Populism Outside the UK'.

Wardt, Marc van de. 2015. 'Desperate Needs, Desperate Deeds: Why Mainstream Parties Respond to the Issues of Niche Parties'. *West European Politics* 38(1): 93–122.

van de Wardt, Marc, Catherine E. De Vries, and Sara B. Hobolt. 2014. 'Exploiting the Cracks: Wedge Issues in Multiparty Competition'. *The Journal of Politics* 76(4): 986–99.

Weaver, R. Kent. 1986. 'The Politics of Blame Avoidance\*'. *Journal of Public Policy* 6(4): 371–98.

Weber, M. (1922/1978). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Weeks, Brian E. 2015. "Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How Anger and Anxiety Moderate the Effect of Partisan Bias on Susceptibility to Political Misinformation." *Journal of Communication* 65 (4): 699–719.

White, Jonathan. 2015. 'Emergency Europe'. *Political Studies* 63(2): 300–318.

———. 2019. *Politics of Last Resort: Governing by Emergency in the European Union*. Oxford University Press. Wiant, Fredel M. 2002. 'Exploiting Factional Discourse: Wedge Issues in Contemporary American Political Campaigns'. *Southern Communication Journal* 67(3): 276–89.

de Wilde, Pieter. 2012. *Why the Early Warning Mechanism Does Not Alleviate the Democratic Deficit*. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. SSRN Scholarly Paper.

Wilde, Pieter De, and Michael Zürn. 2012. 'Can the Politicization of European Integration Be Reversed?'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50(s1): 137–53.

Williamson, J. M. L., and A. G. Martin. 2010. 'Analysis of Patient Information Leaflets Provided by a District General Hospital by the Flesch and Flesch–Kincaid Method'. *International Journal of Clinical Practice* 64(13): 1824–31.

Wilson, Traci L., and Sara B. Hobolt. 2015. 'Allocating Responsibility in Multilevel Government Systems: Voter and Expert Attributions in the European Union'. *The Journal of Politics* 77(1): 102–13.

Wilson Center. 2018. 'Argentina Pulse Poll . Argentine's Perceptions of the World Order, Foreign Policy, and Global Issues.' 10 October 2018.

Wirz, Dominique. 2018. 'Persuasion Through Emotion? An Experimental Test of the Emotion-Eliciting Nature of Populist Communication'. *International Journal of Communication* 12: 1114–38.

Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. 'The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending'. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 981–1000.

———. 2004. 'Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy'. *The Journal of Politics* 66(1): 1–24.

Wood, Matt, and Matthew Flinders. 2014. 'Rethinking Depoliticisation: Beyond the Governmental'. *Policy and Politics* 42(2): 151–70.

Wrátil, Christopher. 2016. 'Governing Europe for the People? Citizen Representation in European Union Policy-Making'. phd. The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

———. 2018. 'Modes of Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council Negotiation Positions'. *European Union Politics* 19(1): 52–74.

———. 'Territorial Representation and the Opinion–Policy Linkage: Evidence from the European Union'. *American Journal of Political Science* 0(0).

Wrátil, Christopher, and Sara B Hobolt. 2019. 'Public Deliberations in the Council of the European Union: Introducing and Validating DICEU'. *European Union Politics* 20(3): 511–31.

Young, Lori, and Stuart Soroka. 2012. 'Affective News: The Automated Coding of Sentiment in Political Texts'. *Political Communication* 29(2): 205–31.

Zaller, John. 1999. *A Theory of Media Politics: How the Interests of Politicians, Journalists, and Citizens Shape the News*. University of Chicago Press.

Zürn, Michael. 2000. 'Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State:: The EU and Other International Institutions'. *European Journal of International Relations* 6(2): 183–221.

Zürn, Michael. 2004. 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems'. *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 260–87.

———. 2016. 'Opening up Europe: Next Steps in Politicisation Research'. *West European Politics* 39(1): 164–82.

———. 2018. *A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation*. Oxford University Press.

Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt. 2012. 'International Authority and Its Politicization'. *International Theory* 4(1): 69–106.

Zürn, Michael, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt. 2013. *Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik: Umkämpfte internationale Institutionen*. Suhrkamp Verlag.