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Collaboration In Anti-Corruption Work: Who To Work With And How?

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Abstract

The multifaceted nature of anti-corruption work demands a sophisticated account of ways in which organizations can collaborate. This article seeks to develop a framework for studying collaborations of anti-corruption work. Based on interviews and document analyses, it investigates Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Finland, and Norway on their experiences. The article provides a discussion on types of collaboration based on five dimensions: the type of corruption; the kind of anti-corruption work; the purpose of collaboration; the nature of collaboration; and the actors of the collaboration. The article argues that going forward we should build anti-corruption networks by deliberately linking existing organizations through the idea of collaborative governance.

Keywords

Anti-corruption, collaboration, networks, anti-corruption institutions

Introduction

Corruption continues the most complex and wicked problems of our time. It is no longer simple bribery by officials but involves diverse actors operating in complex exchanges using sophisticated mechanisms (Sousa et al 2009). It can be related to international trade in arms and oil, infrastructure investments, humanitarian aid, for instance, using offshore accounts. It is often, also, related to policy-making, political campaigns, budget frauds, and multinational companies (Hiatt 2007; Fletcher and Herrmann 2012). While, most governments have established anti-corruption agencies and laws, practitioners and scholars have, surprisingly, failed to integrate collaborative governance in curbing corruption. How some countries, which are perceived to have low levels of corruption, are handling this problem is what interests the author. How can agencies collaborate to work on anti-corruption? The complex nature of corruption and the multifaceted nature of anti-corruption work demands for a framework for answering such question.

This article seeks to answer two questions. First, what kinds of collaboration exist in anti-corruption work? Second, how does collaboration enhance anti-corruption effectiveness and what are the challenges? This article provides a fresh analysis of issues on who to collaborate with, when to collaborate, what to collaborate on, and how to sustain the collaboration.

The next section introduces literature on anti-corruption and collaboration, followed by rationale for country selection in the methods section. I, then, provide a descriptive overview of the six countries – Japan, Finland, Singapore, Sweden, South Korea, and Norway - and some comparative analysis. Based on inductive-reasoning from the cases, a new framework is introduced and utilized in the section that follows. This is followed by a discussion of the key lessons for anti-corruption collaboration work. The last section concludes with ideas for future research.

What do we know about anti-corruption and collaborative governance?

Studies on anti-corruption agencies have not taken adequate consideration of the collaborative relationships among institutions. Similarly, studies on collaboration do not adequately encompass the issue of corruption vis-à-vis other issues like social and health services.

Anti-Corruption

There is a large number of studies on corruption, that includes types of corruption, definitions of corruption, decision-making in corruption, cultural aspects of corruption, socio-economic aspects of corruption, and demand and supply of corruption (e.g. Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Graycar and Smith 2011). **This article will not attempt to describe all types of corruption. However, it is important to mention key typologies. The first is based on the amount of money involved – petty or grand amounts. The second is based on the frequency of occurrence – ad hoc or systemic cases. And the third is based on which part of the policy process it occurred – policy-making or implementation or evaluation.**

The nature of corruption is changing in five aspects, which makes it more difficult than ever to work in silos. **They are the intensity of corruption, the cyclical nature of corruption, the growing complexity of corruption, the high profile and systematic nature of corruption, and the transnational nature of corruption (Sousa, Larmour, and Hindess 2009).**

The importance of having ‘political will’ to curb corruption is often mentioned in literature (Quah 1999; Pope and Vogl 2000; Kpundeh and Dininio 2006). However relying to political will is unrealistic because politicians are often the culprits (Fritzen 2005). As the institutional approach has become predominant, increasing importance is given to comprehensive design of institutions with appropriate level and scope of power (Fritzen 2005). The most prominent debate is on the design of national anti-corruption agencies (ACAs).

Through the work of Transparency International (TI) since 1993, anti-corruption work is brought to the forefront of many international organizations (Sousa et al 2009; Larmour and Hindess 2009). The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003 advocated for establishment of an agency or several agencies to prevent corruption and enforce anti-corruption laws. The EU also recommends all members to set up ACAs (Sousa 2009). Currently there are over 80 ACAs in the world (Charron 2008).

ACAs are often thought of as stand-alone institutions. Charron (2008) describes ACAs to be distinct from other government agencies, permanent in nature, publicly funded, accountable to at least one other government body, has preventive and repressive functions of corruption control, centralize information on domestic corruption, accessible to the public. There are several types of ACA arrangements: single agency, multiple agencies, no agency, ad hoc agency (Quah 2001; Meagher 2005). Based on functional analysis, there are four models: universal model, investigative model, parliamentary model and multiple-agency model (Heilbrunn 2004). Meagher (2005) states six factors that enhance the success of ACAs: clear authority; accountability mechanisms; adequate power; adequate resources; support from civil society; and cooperation from other public agencies. Doig (2009) argues to match workload, management and resources for newly setup ACAs.

In response to traditional ways of organizing public sector services and regulatory approaches, recently scholars are beginning to observe the 'governance' of anti-corruption work. This is to look at using hierarchies, markets, and communities as social organizations to form the architect of anti-corruption institutions (Sousa et al 2009). For example Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and TI have advocated for anti-corruption institutions to work with civil society organizations (CSOs). Sousa et al (2009) have coined the term 'integrity warriors' to mean official anti-corruption agencies and civil societies. The links between these actors is a form of 'network governance' as defined by Rhodes in 1997 (Sousa et al 2009).

With regards to what these actors do, there are three aspects of anti-corruption work (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2007; Meagher 2005).

- 1) Punishment or prosecution of corruption. These include response to complaints, intelligence monitoring and investigation, evidence gathering, case management, recovery of assets, and updating laws.
- 2) Prevention of corruption. These includes work on codes of conduct, transparent procurement and financial systems, auditing and public reporting, declaration of asset and income, whistle blower protection and conflict of interests laws, and research
- 3) Promotion of awareness of corruption in society. These include activities of providing public information, education and outreach, training officials, sharing of knowledge, campaigning through mainstream media and social media.

There is a great need to systematically study how more than one agency can come together to combat corruption. For the purpose of building a framework, we now turn to the literature on collaboration and network.

Collaboration and Network

Studies of inter-agency relations are not new in the field of public administration. Initial studies focused on intergovernmental relations (e.g. Wright 1988). It has always been a challenge for public agencies to coordinate programs across agencies. Problems that arise are such as power struggle over resources, turf protection, authority, and credit for outputs and outcomes (Bardach 1998). Currently, studies of inter-organization coordination have evolved into studies of multi-organizational settings, public-private-partnerships, networks, and collaboration (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Milward and Provan 2006; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997b; Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010; O'Toole 1997; Mandell 2001).

Covering all type of relationships and entities, the overarching concept of *collaboration* refers to the process of operating in multi-organizational arrangements, including both vertical and horizontal relations, to solve problems that cannot be solved by single organizations (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Collaborative governance emphasizes participation by stakeholders, members of the collaboration in joint decision-making (Koliba, Meek, and Zia 2011; Bingham and O'Leary 2008; Ansell and Gash 2007).

Networks are multi-organizational arrangements that have multiple-nodes, multiple-linkages, and non-hierarchical arrangements between organizations (O'Toole 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001;

McGuire 2006). Aspects of networks that can be studied include: the types of networks differentiated by depth, scope, function, stickiness - how close are members, and objectives; management of networks; design of networks; effectiveness of networks. Agranoff and McGuire (1998) identifies three types of networks: 1) policy making and/or implementing; 2) resource exchange, sharing of funding, information, manpower; 3) project-based, partnerships for planning and implementation of projects. In this paper, network is considered a form of collaboration.

Public agencies that can be a part of anti-corruption collaborations include: ACAs; police; public prosecutors; courts; Ombudsman; independent commissions; advisory groups; presidential or parliamentary committees; and audit institutions. Other agencies are such as anti-money laundering agency; customs and immigration; fair competition committees; and special investigation agencies. More international reports are covering the need to network or build coalitions.

Existing international institutions for governments to collaborate are such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), The United Nations Global Program Against Corruption (GPAC), the United Nations International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination (IGAC), The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and Council of Europe: Group of States Against Corruption (Fletcher and Herrmann 2012). Examples of private and CSO actors are such as professional associations, chamber of commerce, business groups, local TI chapters, local NGOs. Global Transparency Initiative (GTI), Trace International, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Global Witness, Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF), and Global Integrity are examples of international NGOs working on corruption (Fletcher and Herrmann 2012).

Existing research on anti-corruption collaboration includes a study of city-level anti-corruption network (Anechiarico 2010) and the study of official and unofficial actors in the anti-corruption landscape in Southeastern Europe (Sampson 2009). Transparency International (TI) has been studied as the builder of large-scale social engineering of coalitions to fight corruption, which is called National Integrity Systems – NIS (Lindsey and Dick 2002; Hindess 2009; TI 2000). Unfortunately, NIS has also been criticized for being a checklist and for not giving workable models to tackle powerful individuals and political forces (Hindess 2009).

Problems regarding collaboration emanate from the classic dilemma of how to balance the division of authority and labor between agencies and the collaboration among them. These include debates on hierarchical orders of the relationships and the level of independence from each other (Pope and Vogl 2000). We can expect anti-corruption networks to face the same problems as any other type of network, such as funding, trust, information and power sharing, goal alignment, accountability, and day-to-day management. It would also face technical challenges in detecting corruption and collecting information, as well as, resistance from a long list of culprits in society. After a brief explanation of the methods, the following sections will elaborate on these issues.

Methods

This research adopts the information-oriented case selection strategy by choosing outstanding cases of highly effective anti-corruption work (Flyvbjerg 2006). This ‘extreme case sampling’ method allows for parameters to investigate success cases in-depth and is suited for getting the point across in a dramatic way (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229). The sampling method does not allow for generalizing the findings, but it greatly contributes to initial understandings of collaboration in anti-corruption work. The aim of this article is not to count frequencies of occurrences nor is it to prove theory on collaboration but rather to start a discourse on collaboration for anti-corruption work.

The countries were selected based on their perceived low levels of corruption measured by surveys of TI¹, location, and ACA arrangements (See table 1). Three are in Asia - Japan, South Korea, and Singapore - and three are in Europe - Sweden, Finland, and Norway.

| Table 1: Country Cases | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Institutions | Country |
| No agency | Japan, Finland |
| Single agency | Singapore, Sweden |
| Multiple agencies | South Korea, Norway |

Japan and Finland do not have specific ACAs. Singapore and Sweden each have one strong ACA. South Korea and Norway explicitly rely on multiple agencies. This variety allows us to explore collaborations in different scenarios. Of the cases, South Korea seems an anomaly because of its not-

so-low perception index. However, it has improved greatly over the years and can provide lessons for other countries. **Lastly, we must take note that these countries are all unitary systems.**

Data derives from official documents, secondary sources and in-depth interviews collected between 2007-2010. The agencies studied vary from country to country. They include ACAs, prosecutors, police, media, private sector, and CSOs. Questions were asked on general anti-corruption strategies and on whether they collaborated with other agencies, what was done, how it worked and why.

It is arguable that it is unclear whether the rankings by TI show the 'effectiveness of policies or just the consequence of a favorable context' (Vries 2010). There is no doubt that there are factors that contribute to the perceived success that probably has very little to do with collaboration. They are such as high level of economic development, strong accountability systems, and culture of openness for the Scandinavian countries. However, I have chosen to start with these atypical cases to form initial understandings the existing collaborations. The following section describes an overview of the six countries.

Overview of the Countries

1) Japan

Japan does not have an ACA and a special anti-corruption law. Traditionally the police have been the main agency to enforce laws and order, include corruption cases. **One interviewee explained that during the Meiji Restoration period many samurai became policemen so the high integrity culture was carried over to the modern police force (Interview Japanese journalist, 21 December 2007).** Other agencies that play an indirect role are the Fair Trade Commission and the National Personnel Authority.

The most prominent aspect from the Japanese case is the strong network of a large civil society group called the Citizens Ombudsman Group (TI 2006). Established since 1994, this network comprises of 60 sub-groups located in the prefectures. Members are mainly volunteer lawyers and accountants. **Its aim is to push for transparency at the local level by enforcing the Information Disclosure Act 1999.**

2) Finland

Finland, also, does not have an ACA. Corruption is not a public problem grave enough to draw the attention of lawmakers (Interview Finnish official, 24 May 2008). Factors that enhance a corrupt-free society in Finland, includes the legalistic administrative culture and clear laws prohibiting civil servants to receive gifts, as the saying goes “to accept a warm beer and cold sandwich is ok, to accept a cold beer and warm sandwich is not” (Email interview Pasi Polonen, 26 March 2009).

However, as there is a rise in corruption involving Finnish nationals and problems of conflict of interests or ‘trading in influence’, anti-corruption strategies are beginning to emerge (Interview TI Finland, 23 May 2008; Salminen, Viinamäki, and Ikola-Norrbacka 2007). As of 2009, the fight against corruption is a mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliament Ombudsman monitors actions of civil servants. In addition, the police and the public prosecutors also have important roles. Similar to Japan, in Finland, the public highly trusts the police (Kääriäinen 2008).

Despite not having an ACA, Finland has a network called the Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Group. This network has representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, Trade and Industry, the Confederation of Finnish Industries, the Central Chamber of Commerce, the Finnish Municipal Association, the Office of Prosecutor-General, the Controller’s Office, and TI Finland, in total 18 members and a secretary (Email interview Pasi Polonen, 26 March 2009). Its aim is broad including joint planning and coordination of execution at the highest level; provision of guidelines to State, municipal, and private sectors; promote detection investigation and prosecution; coordinate implementation of international agreements.

3) Singapore

Perceived as the least corrupted in Asia, Singapore has had a long history of tackling corruption. As early as 1871, it enacted the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements, and in 1960 came the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Singapore has a strong agency called the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (since 1952). Due to the presumption that the police were corrupted this bureau emanated from an older police unit. Comprehensively focusing on public and private corruption, it has evolved into an

intelligence unit on all kinds of corruption (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). It focuses predominantly on deterrence strategies.

As an outcome of the 'whole-of-government' approach, where horizontal collaboration is mandated, CPIB regularly collaborates across government agencies, including the police. It also collaborates loosely with the private sector, such as the Singapore Business Federation, the Medical Council, the construction industry, and multinational corporations. It raises awareness through collaborations with the Civil Service College and the ministry of education as well as universities and the media. These collaborations enhanced CPIB's expertise on corruption (Interview CPIB official, 22 April 2008).

4) Sweden

The image of clean Sweden is an outcome of good political and legal systems, efficient and transparent bureaucracy, and high trust between public officials and citizens (Andersson 2008). However, recent studies indicate that Swedes perceive the politicians and public officials to be more corrupted than before (Linde and Erlingsson 2013).

Like Norway and Japan, corruption in Sweden is a serious economic crime. Dating back to 1734, the first law against bribery among judges and state governors was promulgated. The principle that all government documents are considered public documents has been in place since the 18th century.

The main ACA is the National Anti-Corruption Unit (NACU). Established in 2003, it has only 5 prosecutors. Other agencies include the Swedish National Economics Crime Bureau (ECB), the National Council for Crime Prevention, the Committee of the Constitution, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, the Swedish National Audit Office, and the Administrative Development Agency (VERVA). Together with VERVA, NACU set up a network called National Anti-Corruption Network to foster anti-corruption culture and share best practices (GRECO 2005). Sweden's web of institutes above 'plays an extraordinary supervisory role' in making sure civil servants comply with laws and that citizens are treated correctly (GRECO 2001, pp.23).

5) South Korea

South Korea suffered from large-scale corruption throughout its developmental stages but over the years it has improved considerably in curbing corruption (Kang 2002; You 2009). Since 2008, Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of Korea (ACRC) have been leading anti-corruption strategies. This institution was a merger of three institutions: the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC), the Ombudsman, and the Administrative Appeals Commission. This reflects the fact that South Korea has always distributed anti-corruption work to multiple agencies.

Pushed by CSOs², activities of Korean Pact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency or the K-PACT network (set up in 2005) suggests that South Korea has very active collaboration between public, private and civil society sectors.³ The network was setup in response to the criticism that there was lack of coordination, which led to the hegemonic struggle of relevant organizations (Kim 2003). The network promulgated the Citizen's Charter for a transparent society and helped pushed for prevention of corruption laws and guidelines.

6) Norway

Domestically, Norway is concerned with 'conflict of interest' at the local level. "Because we are very small, there seems to be potential conflict of interest everywhere" said one interviewee (Interview with TI Norway, 19 May 2008). Internationally, Norway is concerned with the growing cases of private sector investments, and development aid (Interview with TI Norway, 19 May 2008).

The main ACA is the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime or Okokrim (since 1989). It has only 7 people that manage corruption cases. Okokrim has a unique design that it is under both the National Police Directorate (especially for budget and management) and the Director General of Public Prosecution (especially for file court cases). It focuses on deterrence by making sure that important criminal proceedings send effective signals to the public. Corruption has never been a main issue thus anti-corruption work is also distributed to other agencies such as the Financial Supervisory Authority, the Directorate of Taxes, the Customs and Excise, and the Competition Authority, and the economic crime unit of the police force. Thus this country is categorized as having multiple agencies.

In sum, the dominant type of collaboration is among public agencies. Singapore, Sweden, South Korea, and Norway showed high levels of this, especially Singapore where the government is very strong. Despite not having an ACA, unlike Japan, with external pressure from EU, Finland has managed set up an anti-corruption network.

In the Scandinavian countries, many loose collaborations with CSOs were found. As for in Asia, CSOs are part of formal collaborations only in South Korea. This is due to the relatively higher level of corruption that has drawn the attention of South Korean CSOs. In Singapore CSOs are not as vibrant and there is very minimal culture of working with CSOs on corruption. In Japan, while the CSOs are vibrant but there is little channel for collaboration with government. This is partly due to the lack of a government-led network, a core agency, and external pressures to change the status quo.

In addition, European countries demonstrate wider collaboration with other governments and international organizations than Asian cases. This is due to the influence of the EU community and the absence of an equivalent in Asia. GRECO⁴ in Europe plays an important role to push for collaboration. Furthermore, Scandinavian countries focus on corrupt practices by their nationals overseas. Thus they have more examples of international collaborations. Lastly, transparency in government is deep-rooted in the Scandinavian countries' culture, while it is relatively new for Asians.

Framework: Varieties of Collaboration for Anti-Corruption Work

Beyond descriptions, based on the proposed framework, this section analyzes selected collaborations found in each country. Drawing from the typologies of anti-corruption work and the models of collaboration, table 3 illustrates five dimensions of how anti-corruption collaborations can be designed. They are 1) the types of corruption; 2) the kind of anti-corruption work; 3) the purpose of collaboration; 4) the nature of collaboration; and 5) the actors of the collaboration.

| Table 2: Possible combinations of collaboration for anti-corruption work | | | |
|--|---|---|---|
| 1. Types of Corruption (TC) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Petty or Large • Ad hoc or Systemic • Policy-making or Implementation or Evaluation | 2. Anti-corruption Work (AW) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Punishment, Investigation • Prevention of corruption • Promotion of anti-corruption awareness | 3. Purpose of Collaboration (PC) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sharing power • Sharing resources • Joint planning • Joint execution • Joint evaluation | 4. Nature of Collaboration (NC) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vertical or horizontal relations • Loose or tight relations • Network governance |
| 5. Actors in the Collaboration (AC) International: International NGO, International Organizations, Regional bodies: EU, ASEAN, and other governments. Domestic: ACAs, Police, Prosecutor, Courts, Ombudsman, Commissions such as the Fair Competition Commission, Business associations, Media, CSOs. | | | |

Practitioners can utilize this framework for designing anti-corruption collaborations and scholars can use it for analytical purposes. There are numerous ways to combine the five dimensions. Each combination serves differing purposes and is suitable for different contexts. This is not an equation nor a model but rather a suggested framework to dissect anti-corruption collaborations.

$$\text{Collaboration in Anti-Corruption Work} = \text{TC} + \text{AW} + \text{PC} + \text{NC} + \text{AC}$$

Table 4 shows selected key collaborations and assessments of effectiveness. The cases illustrate the same spectrum of possibilities for collaborative anti-corruption work regardless of whether they had an ACA, multiple agencies, or no agency.

| Table 3: Examples of Collaboration for Anti-Corruption Work from the Country Cases | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| Country | Description of the collaboration | Combination of the collaboration for anti-corruption work | Assessment of collaborative effectiveness |
| Japan (no ACA) | Citizens Ombudsman | TC = implementation of policies AW = punishment and investigation PC = sharing resources and joint planning | A collection of lawyers, the collaboration has succeeded to prosecute a number of local politicians. The goal for the collaboration is clear and the collaboration grew organically. |

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|--|--|
| | | <p>NC = Horizontal, loose network that has a small secretariat</p> <p>AC: CSOs and media</p> | <p>In close collaboration with investigative journalists, it focuses on transparency of public spending and collection of evidence to file court cases.</p> |
| Finland (no ACA) | Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Group. | <p>TC = All types of corruption, specifically acts of corruption by Finish nationals abroad</p> <p>AW = Mainly punishment and prevention</p> <p>PC = Sharing resources and joint planning</p> <p>NC = Horizontal, tight relations, with a network secretariat.</p> <p>AC: Key government agencies and CSOs</p> | <p>This collaboration reincarnated 3 times in 2002, 2005 and 2008. It has been strengthened with endorsement from the Council of Europe's Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). Formed mainly under external pressure from the EU, this collaboration is at the early stages of development. It aims to conduct strategic planning at the high-level and coordinate activities among ministries.</p> |
| Singapore (single ACA) | Corruption Prevention and Investigation Bureau's (CPIB) bilateral & horizontal collaborations. | <p>TC = Petty and large scale cases, mainly ad hoc cases, focuses on the policy implementation stage</p> <p>AW = Mainly punishment and prevention. Some promotion of awareness.</p> <p>PC = Only to share resources</p> <p>NC = Vertical, tight relations, with CPBI taking a clear lead role</p> <p>AC: Key government agencies</p> | <p>Singapore has been praised for effective corruption control due to CPIB's capacity and scope of power – investigative and punishment. CPIB's collaboration with other agencies reflects Singapore's Whole-of-Government approach, which emphasizes the no-wrong-door policy where agencies are mandated to collaborate and coordinate at all time.</p> |
| Sweden (single ACA) | NACU and the National Anti-Corruption Network. | <p>TC = All types of corruption</p> <p>AW = Focuses on promotion of anti-corruption awareness and change in certain cultures</p> <p>PC = Sharing resources and joint planning</p> <p>NC = Vertical, loose relations with NACU taking the lead</p> <p>AC: Key government agencies, private sector, CSOs</p> | <p>Sweden's anti-corruption work reflects a system that is ideal, where there is an agency that is effective and is open to working with other agencies. Similar to Finland, through GRECO, Sweden was externally pushed to setup a network. Since it had NACU, the network thrived because there was a clear leading agency compared to Finland's case.</p> |
| South Korea (multiple ACAs) | K-PACT is a network of private, public, political, and | <p>TC = Large, systemic, policy-making and implementation levels of corruption</p> <p>AW = Prevention of corruption, and promotion of anti-corruption awareness</p> | <p>K-PACT was largely successful in pushing for legislative change, incentivizing reporting of corruption among the public, and raising awareness. The</p> |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|
| | NGO actors. | <p>PC = Share power, resource, joint planning, execution, and evaluation</p> <p>NC = Horizontal, tight relations, with strong secretariat and clear division of labor</p> <p>AC: Key government agencies, political units, private sector, and CSOs</p> | collaboration was designed carefully by specifying proportion of shared resources, power, and each member's duty. |
| Norway (multiple ACAs) | Okokrim and private sector collaborations. | <p>TC = Large, systemic type of corruption, focuses on the policy-making and implementation levels</p> <p>AW = Prevention of corruption by setting new norms and rules</p> <p>PC = Share resources and joint planning</p> <p>NC = Horizontal, loose relations with Okokrim as point of contact</p> <p>AC: Key government agency, international NGO, and the private sector</p> | Okokrim's collaboration with Transparency Norway and the private sector has led to the setting up of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007, to advocate transparency and integrity in the oil, natural gas, and mining industries. This has changed the norms and rules internationally for these industries, which are considered very corrupted. |

Even when agencies want to collaborate, often they start the collaboration without really knowing who to work with, what to work on, and how to carry out the collaboration. The selected cases provide insights into how some collaboration have been more successful than others.

How collaboration can lead to better effectiveness of anti-corruption work?

Collaboration can lead to effectiveness in four ways. First, collaboration can be used for sharing knowledge, expertise, information that is related to anti-corruption work. It can be used for joint planning, execution, and evaluation of anti-corruption strategies. Second, collaborations foster learning across organizations, sectors, and countries. Third, new values and definitions can arise from collaborations. And fourth, collaborations can help withstand changes in political will towards fighting corruption. It provides a safety net so that anti-corruption work does not rely on prominent individuals or any single agency.

For example, in the past there was high incidence of corruption among police personnel in Singapore, so CPIB never worked closely with them (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). CPIB saw itself as the cop to catch all the bad guys and saw the need to remain independent from other agencies (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). Around the year 2000, realizing the

need to engage others, rather than thinking of others as the 'target' of their work, CPIB began to see them as 'stakeholders' (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). "The bad guys do not divide their corruption according to the bureaucratic structure" he said (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). CPIB then began to build close collaborations with others, including the police, the immigration bureau, and the central narcotics control.

Furthermore, CPIB realized that the public and private sectors are so closely intertwined that it did not make sense to focus only on the public sector. Taking on both sectors is a more 'holistic approach' (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). Thus Singapore's ACA is one of the few in Asia that comprehensively studies all types of corruption. These mindset changes to collaborate more led to new values and definition of corruption, which has contributed to Singapore's success in punishing and preventing corruption of all kinds.

Concrete activities of CPIB's collaborations include training of new employees, seminars for policemen on ethical issues, joint meetings with the police at the middle and executive levels, and exchange of information on criminal cases. As a result insiders detected more cases because they were more knowledgeable. "In a way, it created a self-detection system within the public sector" said an official (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). The collaboration is understood to have prevented corruption among new junior police officials and within 10 years the culture of corruption among policemen was eradicated (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008).

We can draw another example from Sweden's NACU. NACU's scope of work covers the entire country, including international cases that involve Swedish nationals. NACU relies mainly on its own funding except for occasional special funding from the Ministry of Justice and Foreign Office for joint work with OECD (Interview via email with NACU, 1 April 2009). It has only 5 prosecutors and 2 economists. Each prosecutor takes about 25 cases per year. Thus, the only way they can work effectively is through collaboration with other agencies in a network (Interview NACU officials, 21 May 2008). In fact, NACU itself is kept very small and is mandated to collaborate. 'Our work is focused on identifying which external resources are needed, where they can be found, and who best to collaborate with' said a NACU representative (Interview NACU official, 21 May 2008). NACU collaborates with the local and regional police, public prosecutors, procurement agencies, insurance agencies, immigration department, and regulators of finance markets and exports. For example in a

criminal case, the investigation team would comprise of at least one prosecutor from NACU and two police officers. (Interview with NACU officer, 21 May 2008).

The National Anti-Corruption Network was established to enhance collaboration among public agencies, analyze risk areas for corruption, and work out anti-corruption strategies (Email interview with NACU, 1 April 2009). Its focus is on several aspects including procurement processes, overseas aids, social insurance, immigration, court processes, the capital market, and the export industries. Also NACU collaborates in strategic matters with an institute specialized in research on crime and takes part in OECD's strategic work in the implementation of Anti-Bribery Instruments. It also works with other governments through the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) to augment investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organized crime; and through International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) (Interview via email with NACU, 1 April 2009). All of these collaborations are part of the web for anti-corruption work, which makes Sweden's network very strong and sustainable.

Is it better to have an ACA or not for collaborations?

It is easier to start collaborations if there is a focal point in government working on the issue. Sweden's NACU and its National Anti-Corruption Network is a case in point (described above). However, in cases where the state is very strong, it might be difficult for CSOs to take part in the collaboration. Singapore as a success case for horizontal collaboration among government agencies is a good example of this problem. Where there is a single ACA, it is more likely that government-led collaborations are formed.

In places where there are multiple agencies, such as South Korea and Norway, there are more opportunities to include CSOs and the private sector. These collaborations usually aim to have long-term impact by changing laws and raising awareness.

Compared to other countries, Japan's CSOs faced difficulties in collaborating with government. Not having an ACA was one of the reasons. But in Finland's case, despite not having a key agency, they were able to set up an anti-corruption network. However, this was due mainly to external pressure from the EU. Even though it is a good starting point, the collaboration was not very strong.

In sum, it is useful to have a focal agency on anti-corruption. But in order to include CSOs and private sectors in multiple layers of collaborations, it might be best to have multiple agencies in charge of corruption in addition to the focal agency. This allows for more organic emergence of collaborations across sectors.

Is it better to work on certain types of corruption and anti-corruption work?

Collaborations are more effective when members know exactly what kind of corruption they are working on and what they want to specifically achieve. The fact that the Japanese Citizens Ombudsman network focused only on law enforcement (i.e. punishment/ enforcement of rules) and only on scrutinizing expenditure of politicians at the local level (i.e. petty and systemic corruption during implementation of policies), gave them great results to prevent corruption and to bring law suits against corrupted officials. They demanded to see receipts of payments made to politicians for meeting attendances. Despite the relatively small amount of money, the principle of transparency and integrity penetrated to the society and local politicians (Interview Japan Ombudsman, 21 December 2007).

Another example is Norwegian Okokrim's collaboration with TI Norway and the oil businesses to change the practice of oil, natural gas, and mining industries. They focused on prevention by making the effort to change laws and standards on large systemic problems of the oil industries. The result is the setup of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007. With Okokrim's support, TI Norway also developed the "Business Principles for Countering Bribery" with companies worldwide. The target is to prevent corruption by Norwegian nationals overseas.

Thus it is better to have a clear idea on the types of corruption (e.g. ad hoc/systemic, petty/large, policy-making/implementation/evaluation) and the kind of anti-corruption work (punishment, prevention, promotion of awareness) for the collaboration. Certain kind of work will be more difficult to measure success. For example Sweden's anti-corruption network aims to change cultures and promote awareness for all types of corruption. Their goal is broad but that is ok, as long as the partners understand the goals clearly. Lastly, one caveat is that most types of corruption are interrelated. Thus it is advisable to use collaborations for tackling large systemic types of corruption and for punishing influential culprits for deterrence purposes. Norway and Singapore's practices are good examples of this approach.

Who is best to collaborate with and how to manage the collaboration?

For punishment and investigation, collaboration usually occurs between key government agencies. Varyingly, collaboration goes beyond working as usual but requires management of joint programs with some degree of resource and power sharing. For prevention and promotion of raising awareness work, collaboration across all sectors, government agencies, the private sector, and CSOs, would be more effective.

For instance on punishment and investigation, in response to Sweden's bankruptcy and tax fraud problems the Economic Crimes Bureau was setup in 1998. GRECO acknowledge this is an 'excellent example of how prosecutors, police officers and experts – highly specialized and trained in combating economic and financial crimes – can work together' (GRECO 2001, pp. 23). Formed out of the Unit for Special Crime within the Prosecutors-General 's Office, NACU is also an outcome of the network of government agencies working on corruption. Then NACU, itself, became the core node of the anti-corruption network.

Another example is the how the Norwegian export agency and Norwegian embassies collaborated to provide advice that reliance on agents to gain access to certain markets by paying customs, regulators, and politicians is unacceptable (Søreide and Abramo 2008). These are 'facilitation payments' i.e. informal payments offered 'to get things done'. Companies were in favor of this because it helped to reduce costs for the companies (Søreide and Abramo 2008). Eventually in 2003 the Anti-Corruption Law changed. It used to be that bribery overseas was tax deductible but now it is 10 years in prison (Interview Swedish officials, 21 May 2008). In addition, Norway's ministry of foreign affairs collaborated with the ministry for development assistance to open a hotline service in Norwegian embassies for people to report corruption of Norwegian development aid and businesses, which in effect helps to enforce the law.

Prevention work, like drafting codes of conduct, is best to work with the private sector because of their sectorial expertise. There is passive and active bribery that involves public officials and private companies. Not only public interests are compromised but market incentives and fair competition is also jeopardized in the event of corruption. Also, many companies want to maintain a clean reputation for credit purposes. Failure to comply with regulations can cause a risk to their

reputation. Thus, it is in private companies interest to collaborate, if they are given the right incentives and direction.

An example of collaboration with the private sector is when the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise began addressing the issue of corruption in foreign countries since 1990s. This has motivated Norwegian firms to adopt preventive strategies (Søreide and Abramo 2008, pp. 12). As a result, Norway has spun off its work to include collaborating with private sector and CSOs overseas. The testimony to its efforts at collaboration comes from training workshops on dilemmas in decision-making held in Africa. Dilemma scenarios are such as what to do when government officials of a particular country demand bribe from you before you are allowed to bring in development projects and humanitarian aid (Interview TI Norway, 19 May 2008).

Another success case is how the Swedish Institute to Combat Corruptive Practices, a non-profit, provided advice to the business sector and public authorities on bonuses in frequent flier schemes and payments by drug companies to medical experts. They eventually drew “The Use of Benefits to Promote Business Contacts and Relationships” for Sweden (GRECO Sweden, 2001).

It is also possible to design a complex set of collaborative relationships. South Korea’s K-PACT network illustrates collaboration between politicians, ACA, private companies and CSOs that aims to achieve multiple goals. The members understood clearly that efforts to combat corruption must be made in collaboration with all sectors, rather than creating a surveillance system of particular sectors (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007).

KICAC, the main ACA at the time, was willing to collaborate with TI Korea to form K-PACT network because it hoped to have more power for prosecution and investigation similar to Singapore’s CPIB. It wanted TI Korea to help raise this issue to the public. The collaboration was so close that the former head of TI Korea became the Secretary General of K-PACT. But it was emphasized that TI Korea played a limited role in the network indicating that all actors were of equals in the collaboration (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007). Aside from sharing information, this shows how collaboration can enhance power of members and create opportunities to exchange personnel, which in turn can foster tight relationships between members.

Differing from other networks, K-PACT was set up as a permanent body. It had a council, an administrative office, a steering committee, an executive committee, and sub-committees to follow through the activities that included corruption in local government; codes of conduct of parliamentarians; social corporate governance; citizen participation and education. The aim was to work on punishment, prevention, and promotion all at once.

The funding came from the government 25%, the parliament 25%, and the private companies 50%. While advocacy work and groundwork was carried out by CSOs. They also had a logo to brand the collaboration. It consists of four stripes in four colors of blue, sky blue, red and orange, representing the four sectors. The stripes crisscross and the diamond shaped hole in the middle depicted close ties among the sectors and transparency (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007).

K-PACT's case amplifies the importance having network core, a permanent office and stable streams of funding, aside from clear division for responsibilities and network goals. These factors made the collaboration continuous rather than ad hoc. The network made a highly visible impact by changing legislation and improving the perception of corruption in South Korea.

When can cross-country collaborations be useful?

Aside from providing learning opportunities for people from different contexts, international collaboration is useful to standardize laws, to push for compliance, and to solve particular cases (Søreide and Abramo 2008). For instance, Japan's Ombudsman network was actually adopted from models in the U.S. and Sweden (Interview Japan Ombudsman, 21 December 2007). The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is, in itself, an outcome of international collaboration.

Regional networks, such as GRECO, play an important role to help form domestic networks.⁵ Critiques of the GRECO include the fact that it lacks enforcement power (Warner 2007, p.161). However they have made key milestones recommendations such as Codes of Conduct for Public Officials, Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Politics Parties and Electoral Campaigns, and the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. These help to standardize laws and practices among member states.

Some collaboration is bilateral cooperation between governments. For instance, K-PACT of Southern Korea has close collaboration with the Indonesian government to transfer knowledge, especially on conducting corruption surveys (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007).

The close collaboration between Norwegian and Zambian governments is another prime example. Concerned about accountability of humanitarian aid, TI Norway started to build relationships in Africa and Asia. In 2002, the Zambian government established the Task Force on Corruption (TFC) to investigate cases against the former President Dr. Chiluba (Yambayamba 2006). Norway, together with Cooperating Partners (CPs) such as the Department for International Development (DFID), the Netherlands, Danish, Swedish, and Irish Embassies, supported the TFC financially, technically, and politically (Interview via email Norway Embassy in Zambia, 30 March 2009). In particular, Norway helped built the Financial Intelligence Unit and supported the Anti-Corruption Commission and other CSOs (Interview via email Norway Embassy in Zambia, 30 March 2009). This collaboration has accrued lasting dividends. Dr. Chiluba and others were tried in criminal court and the permanent secretary of the health ministry is serving a 5 years term. Zambia was also able to recover large amounts of stolen money (Interview via email Norway Embassy in Zambia, 30 March 2009).

Challenges to anti-corruption collaboration

If collaboration seems like the right thing to do, why have agencies not collaborated more? Some of the reasons are the following. First, most punishment work deals with sensitive information that agencies are reluctant to share. This stems partly, from the lack of trust between agencies and the reality that some of the key agencies, like the police, are often culprits themselves. It can also be due to the need to protect sources of information and whistleblowers, and the competitive culture between agencies.

Furthermore, working on international cases can hamper relations among nations. Advice and programs on anti-corruption funded or supported by another country can be interpreted as intervention in domestic affairs or violation of sovereignty. If the results are not favorable to the general public, it can cause long-term negative effects for the foreign countries involved.

Second, most preventive work requires advocating for changes in legislations, regulations, and codes of conduct that goes beyond the capability and authority of organizations. It is very difficult

to get agencies to see eye-to-eye on issues and agree on priorities when it comes to ways to counter corruption, especially when there are overlaps and complexities regarding the type of corruption. Often a lead agency is missing or the incentive to collaborate is nonexistent. Furthermore, agencies are often pressured to show tangible results in a short-time frame but most awareness work takes a long time to yield results leading to organizations not wanting to invest resources.

Lastly, CSOs are reluctant because they fear being co-opted by government. Many would rather remain as watchdogs than to take part in decision-making processes. As for the private sector, they need to see clearly how the collaboration would benefit their bottom-line – profit or reputation. Otherwise there is no incentive to collaborate.

Implications for Practice

Key lessons for practitioners are the following:

1. The characteristic of the anti-corruption collaboration should match the types of corruption that it aims to tackle. This includes who to work with and how to work together. Sharing of resources, power, and information can go a long way.
2. It takes time to build relationships, align goals, build trust, and gather resources for any kind of collaboration. The parameters of the collaboration must be clearly set and understood by all members. There should be an administrative structure or coordinating body to sustain the collaboration and maintain some formal presence.
3. International bodies, funding agencies and governments can add collaboration to public agencies' mandate. The funding can go to collaboration or network rather than a single agency. Performance information should reflect collaborative work.
4. The collaboration should not rely solely on the political side of government and be influenced by the ups and downs of certain political factions. Anti-corruption work is usually highly political. Resilience to political change is key.

Conclusion

This article argues that we cannot wait for political will to magically appear nor can we rely on a single agency to combat corruption. In this era of governance, the focus should shift to collaboration of anti-corruption institutions. We are now interested to design a web of actors in government, private and civil society sectors to be the architect of anti-corruption networks. This article has provided a more precise lens to understand the possibilities of anti-corruption collaboration. It has answered the questions of who the members can be, what they can work on, how the network can be managed and what are the challenges. The suggested framework is useful for analytical purposes as well as for practice. It is important to work with existing agencies and to have a clear idea of the type of corruption, the type of anti-corruption work, the purpose of collaboration and the nature of collaboration that one wishes to form. Each arrangement has its peculiar strengths and arises out of different contexts.

Further research should be conducted to determine how to enhance collaborative capacity for anti-corruption work. Comparative analyses of less successful countries and **countries with federal systems** would also be beneficial to validate the assumption that more collaboration contributes to better effectiveness of anti-corruption policies.

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- Interview Finish official, 24 May 2008, by author, Helsinki.
- Interview Japan Ombudsman, 21 December 2007, by author, Tokyo.
- Interview Japanese journalist, 21 December 2007, by author, Tokyo.
- Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007, by author, Seoul.
- Interview NACU officials, 21 May 2008, by author, Stockholm.
- Interview Swedish officials, 21 May 2008, by author, Stockholm.
- Interview TI Finland, 23 May 2008, by author, Helsinki.
- Interview via email Pasi Polonen, 26 March 2009, by author.
- Interview via email with NACU, 1 April 2009, by author.
- Interview via email with Norway Embassy in Zambia, 30 March 2009, by author.
- Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008, by author, Singapore.
- Interview with TI Norway, 19 May 2008, by author, Oslo.

¹ In 2013 the rankings were as follows: Finland and Sweden 3rd, Norway and Singapore 5th, Japan 18th, South Korea 46th.

² The CSOs are the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. In 1999 CSOs formed the Anti-Corruption Network in Korea, which later became Korea's Chapter of TI.

³ Follow-up interviews reveal that K-PACT has not been supported by the new regime in 2008. But the network continues to have impact such as on the anti-corruption law for election.

⁴ GRECO stands for Group of States against Corruption (since 1999). As of 2013 it had 49 members states.