

**MEMORY, RECONCILIATION AND CHOSEN TRAUMAS: THE  
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHINESE STATE, MEDIA  
AND PUBLIC ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS**

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## SUMMARY

Since 1972 when China and Japan established their formal diplomatic relationship, considerable ruptures and disputes have been haunting the reconciliation between these two countries. The increasing complexity of the differences between the Chinese state and public in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations indicates that the historical memory and how people perceive and respond to memory has become a crucial factor impeding the reconciliation. Notwithstanding the ideological and victory narrative that once suppressed the traumatic memory, the inherent suspicion of Japan still largely outweighs any positive attitude. Nevertheless, the prevailing negative attitude of the Chinese public is essentially the result of state narrative even if the Chinese government has actually been making salient efforts to ameliorate the relationship with Japan. Thus the central factor for the Chinese is *chosen traumas*, a mental representation transmitted at a trans-generational level of past historical events, varying with the three actors of state, media and public. Three case studies including Fukuda's visit to China in 2007, the 2003 New Thinking, and the 1998 Jiang Zemin visit to Japan will further elaborate the argument.

My interpretation sheds light on the complicated variation of the interaction of the Chinese government, media and public concerning Sino-Japanese relations along with the historical evolvement from the foundation of the PRC to some current events. The future reconciliation of China and Japan, if possible, is connected more with the

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solution of historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan derived from the traumatic memory than the negotiation and balance of strategic interests.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CRC	CASS Research Center
KMT	Guo Min Dang
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council



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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since 1972 when China and Japan established their formal diplomatic relations, considerable collisions and disputes have been haunting this peculiar bilateral relationship. Yasukuni Shrine visit, Diaoyu Island dispute, East China Sea oil conflict and many other issues, big or small, salient or unnoticeable, have been continuously overshadowing the relations between China and Japan. Contrary to some expectations, increasing economic interdependence between the two countries over the last twenty years has not engendered a closer political relationship. The mutual mistrust, evident on the Chinese side in dealing with the historical problem, has hampered the reconciliation and diplomatic interchange. Hence the significance of the research on this topic is that the two countries have not yet fully reconciled the past, and this has broader repercussions in the region. The tension caused by diplomatic disagreements has the potential to impact the stability and the development of the East Asian region.<sup>1</sup> According to Allen Whiting's assessment in *China Eyes Japan*, negative images of Japan have thwarted China's interest in closer relations with its Asian neighbor.<sup>2</sup>

In contrast with the situation in Europe where most states seem to have overcome nationalist hatreds to arrive at political reconciliation, and even a grand vision of regional integration, nothing remotely so ambitious exists in the Asia-Pacific region.

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<sup>1</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations: Facing the past, looking to the future?* (Routledge Curzon, c2005).

<sup>2</sup> Allen Whiting, *China eyes Japan*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.19.

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Suspicious and resentments rooted in history continue to dominate political reconciliation efforts in the region. The residue of Japanese aggression and atrocities is deeply embedded in the Chinese national consciousness and has, despite the normalization of inter-state relations, continued to resurface intermittently to the present day. A political psychology perspective could be particularly valuable in understanding the difficulty of China-Japan reconciliation in that the public's hostile attitude has been much stronger than the official reaction on Japan during the past decade, despite the recent efforts made by Chinese and Japanese leadership.

### ***PERSPECTIVE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT OF THE RESEARCH***

The factors overshadowing the Sino-Japanese relationship spans a large spectrum. One of the most crucial factors is the power politics concern between China and Japan. Many scholars in this field have shed light on China's foreign policy thinking and setting process, assessing Chinese government's perception of the international environment, the theory of "China Threat", and the delicate variation of U.S.-China-Japan triangular relations.<sup>3</sup> For example, scholars such as Ming Wan, J.Pollack, Ishii Akira argue about a downward Sino-Japanese relationship since the

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<sup>3</sup> See Kalder, Kent. China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2, (2006). Sutter, Robert, *Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Tsuji Kogo, "Chugoku ni okeru Yoron Keisei to Tainichi Yoron Kozo" ("The Process of the Public Opinion Formation in China and the Structure of the Public Opinion on Japan"), *Kokusai Mondai*, No.492, 2001.

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1990s.<sup>4</sup> “China and Japan have had a cyclical, dispute-prone but confrontation-averse political relationship, which has operated between clear boundaries.”<sup>5</sup> As K.Kent points out, the contest for regional leadership between China and Japan today is creating new security dilemmas, prompting concerns over Chinese ambitions in Japan and fears of renewed Japanese militarism in China. Kent argues that such an increasing confrontation also exacerbates the fueling nationalism on both sides.<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, China is concerned about Japan seeking a greater role, in particular a military role, in world politics. Jian Yang claims that worries on the Chinese side have increased over the past decade due to Japan’s gradual strategic shift away from “homeland defense.”<sup>7</sup> Some scholars have even predicted a simmering Sino-Japanese rivalry based on the competition and frictions in such issues as the leading role in Asian regional organizations, Japan’s bid for UNSC permanent seat, and the power projection in Southeast Asia, Russia, India and the Korean Peninsula.<sup>8</sup>

The security concern, in line with the engagement of the U.S. as a dominant player in the region, is also pivotal in the picture. Many scholars have paid considerable attention to the security dilemma between China and Japan, as well as

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<sup>4</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006). Ash Robert, Shambaugh David, Takagi Seiichiro, *China watching : perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States* (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007).

<sup>5</sup> Ishii Akira, “Shiren ni tatsu ‘Sekai no naka no Nicchu Kankei’” (“Japan-China Relations in the World’ in the Moment of Truth”), *Kokusai Mondai*, No.418 (1995). p.12.

<sup>6</sup> Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2, (2006).

<sup>7</sup> Jian, Yang, China’s security policy towards Japan, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.)

<sup>8</sup> See Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2, (2006). Sutter, Robert, *Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Robert Ash, David Shambaugh, Seiichiro Takagi. (Eds.) *China watching: perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States*, (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007).

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the role of the U.S. in this aspect. For example, Robert Sutter states that both China and Japan are concerned to a limited extent with the military modernization of the other, and both see the actions of the other as having changed the strategic environment. A breakdown in the relationship would have serious implications for regional security.<sup>9</sup> From a realistic view, Mochizuki asserts that the emergence of a new great power can lead to a cycle of hegemonic rivalry and war. The rise of China inevitably presents such a systemic challenge to Japan.<sup>10</sup> Considering the role of the U.S., “a Japan that continues to align with the United States will enhance US leverage and help sustain its preponderant power even as Chinese capabilities grow”.<sup>11</sup> Heazle states that the US-Japan Security Alliance will still remain at the core of the Northeast Asian security. China would therefore consider the rationale of the continued existence and expansion of such an alliance as a threat to China’s Taiwan strategy.<sup>12</sup> In particular, Sutter points out that Taiwan and North Korea are two potential flashpoints and long-term uncertainties in Sino-Japanese relations. In both cases, China and Japan loom as the strategic concern for each other. The emergence of a North Korea crisis or Taiwan crisis may easily and seriously damage the Sino-Japanese relationship.<sup>13</sup> Heazle also focuses on energy security as a possible

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<sup>9</sup> Sutter, Robert, *Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

<sup>10</sup> Mochizuki, Mike, *Dealing with a Rising China*, in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama. (Eds.) *Japan in international politics: the foreign policies of an adaptive state*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers: Published in association with the Japan Forum on International Relations, 2007).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p.229.

<sup>12</sup> Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.177.

<sup>13</sup> Sutter, Robert, *Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

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source of the political tension between China and Japan as both countries are striving to gain access to reliable oil and gas supplies.<sup>14</sup>

The economic interdependence between Japan and China makes another leading variable in Sino-Japanese relations. China has surpassed the U.S. as Japan's largest trade partner. Japan's Development Assistance (ODA) to China has been playing a positive and significant role in China-Japan economic cooperation ever since 1979.<sup>15</sup> Many scholars have seen such an increasing economic interdependence as an optimistic indicator regarding Sino-Japanese relations.<sup>16</sup> For example, Ming Wan claims that although there remain certain economic frictions, both sides have been attempting to resolve this through increased consultation. Nevertheless, Min Wan, along with other scholars in the field, share the notion that the course of Sino-Japanese relations has been following a track of *hot economy* and *cold politics* for many years.<sup>17</sup> Heazle also argues that "Increasing economic cooperation and integration have occurred in tandem with growing levels of political discord and animosity between the two governments over a broad range of problems".<sup>18</sup> Christopher Howe incisively points out that the exchange of commodities between China and Japan "has followed a predictable pattern, based on close proximity and

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<sup>14</sup> Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.198.

<sup>15</sup> Liping, Xia, *Living in the past? The politics of nationalism in China*, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.)

<sup>16</sup> See Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.)

<sup>17</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006)

<sup>18</sup> Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.179.

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obvious differences in resource endowment and comparative advantage, while the scale and institutional framework of trade have reflected the tortuous evolution of political relations...”<sup>19</sup>

China's rise posing a threat to Japan, fueling nationalism on both sides, the U.S. role in strengthening alliances with Japan and defending Taiwan, as well as the increasing economic interdependence and deepening Asian regionalism have all played as pivotal variables in the picture of China-Japan relations. The variation of the relationship, however, has been through significant fluctuations since year 1972 of diplomatic normalization.<sup>20</sup> Roy claims that the Sino-Japanese relationship has not gone through a real complete reconciliation whereas in purely economic terms, Sino-Japanese relations appear to be at an all time high.<sup>21</sup> The inconsistency of the development of Sino-Japanese relations illuminates the significance of non-economic factors and also the strong influence of perceptions rooted in the troubled and often violent interaction between the two countries. Kojima, for example, points out simultaneous progression of exchanges on the surface and frictions and conflicts underneath, and examines mutual perceptions at popular level as the cause of the friction and conflict.<sup>22</sup> Scholars including Michael Heazle, Hidenori Ijiri, Yinan He,

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<sup>19</sup> Howe Christopher, *China, Japan and Economic Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region*, in Christopher Howe (Eds.) *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*. (Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.) p.98.

<sup>20</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006)

<sup>21</sup> See Denny Roy (2004), “Stirring samurai, disapproving dragon: Japan’s growing security activity and Sino-Japanese relations”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 31(2), Summer, Expanded Academic ASAP Plus. Söderberg Marie, *Chinese-Japanese relations in the twenty-first century : complementarity and conflict*. (London ; New York : Routledge, 2002.).

<sup>22</sup> Kojima Tomoyuki, “Gendai Nicchuu Kankeiron” (On Contemporary Japan-China Relationship), in Hirano Ken’ichiro, ed., *op.cit.* 1994.

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and Peter Gries insist that the bewildering Sino-Japanese relationship is the result of both governments pursuing interests such as energy security, greater political and economic influence, and the consolidation of strong, contemporary national identity. The interests are significantly being shaped by concerns over future intentions and existing notions of national identity.<sup>23</sup> Heazle particularly indicates that “The history of the Sino-Japanese relationship, and the differing perceptions of this history on both sides, has contributed in a very major way to a widespread sense of suspicion, resentment, and hostility between the two nations.”<sup>24</sup>

What is the core of the Chinese national identity, if it is crucial to the variation of China-Japan interaction, on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations? What is the influence of history or past memory on such a national identity, the mutual perceptions between China and Japan, and the development of China-Japan relations as a consequence? Considering the subtlety and complexity of the nature of stagnant Sino-Japanese relations, this paper will look into “Chosen Traumas”, namely a mental representation that is transmitted at a trans-generational level of past historical events, to examine the situation. It is a shared mental notion of a traumatic past event during which large groups suffered loss and experienced helplessness, shame, and humiliation in conflict with another large group. “The trans-generational transmission

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<sup>23</sup> Ijiri Hidenori, Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization, in Christopher Howe (Eds.) *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*. (Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.) Yanan He, *History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007. Peter, Gries, *China's New Nationalism* (University of California Press, 2004). Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.)

<sup>24</sup> Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) *China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.2.

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of such a shared traumatic event is linked to past generation's inability to mourn losses of people, land or prestige, and indicates the large group's failure to reverse narcissistic injury and humiliation inflicted by another large group, usually a neighbor."<sup>25</sup> In other words, the memory of a particular trauma was chosen, not necessarily in an intentional manner, to consolidate the national identity and affect certain international relations of a particular nation. Aside from Professor Vamik Volkan who actually conceptualizes chosen traumas as an instrumental framework that can be applied to certain areas in political science, some psychologists and political scientists have also been introducing the knowledge of memory and trauma to analyze certain political issues. In addition to Volkan, there is a growing literature on trauma and politics crossing disciplinary boundaries. Peter Novick's *The Holocaust and Collective Memory* emphasizes the political expediency of trauma discourse.<sup>26</sup> Following Novick's claim, K.M.Fierke focuses on understanding trauma as a social-political concept and argues that trauma may be expressed in the habitual memory of a culture, providing social legitimation for performative acts.<sup>27</sup>

In this thesis, I will try to link the status-quo of Sino-Japanese relations to the chosen traumas of the three actors, namely the state, media and public in China. The major problem of stagnant Sino-Japanese relations should be attributed to the failure of reconciliation. Such a failure is caused more by the inability to deal with the past

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<sup>25</sup> Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity. *Group Analysis*, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80.

<sup>26</sup> See Peter Novick, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory: the American experience* (Bloomsbury, 1999).

<sup>27</sup> See Duncan, Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.117.



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than a failure to settle contemporary issues. Thus the absence of a shared memory underlines the difficult status quo of Sino-Japanese relations.

As far as the Chinese side is concerned, people could not successfully relinquish the past and look forward to a more rational and future-oriented relations due to the chosen trauma effect in their collective memory. Such a trauma varies according to different historical phases with the coherent variation of the different actors at different times. Chosen traumas, as a result of state ideological restraint to an increasingly independent factor prevailing in the public opinion, not only confine the possibility of complete reconciliation, but also impede the future development of Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the wish of Premier Zhou Enlai that “the friendship between our two great nations shall pass on from generation to generation”<sup>28</sup> in 1972, what actually passed over generations was the chosen traumas of the old war. The Chinese viewed the Japanese as the paradigmatic “devils” during World War II, and they continue to view them that way today.<sup>29</sup>

Specifically, four core research questions are to be answered. Firstly, in an attempt to promote societal stability and unity, the Chinese government is determined to create a harmonious atmosphere and vigorously advocates maintaining stability at all costs. Yet the drastic anti-Japan sentiment, best represented by the 2005 anti-Japan riots sweeping the major metropolises in China, is obviously contradictory to the priority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), i.e. maintaining social stability and deepening reform and opening. Although some people may still insist that such

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<sup>28</sup> Huan Tian, ed. *Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1997), Vol.2. p. 109.

<sup>29</sup> Peter, Gries, *China's New Nationalism* (University of California Press, 2004), p.10.

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xenophobia is indeed the tactic the CCP adopts to deflect attention from the sensitive domestic politics, the government crackdown following the 2005 riots seemed to imply a worry about collective and spontaneous movement action.

Secondly, we are still unable to provide a sound explanation about why in the 1980s the relations were surprisingly in tune and the government tried to popularize the slogan “Friendship forever between China and Japan”. More importantly, such a slogan appeared to be tolerated by the people at that time and was echoed by the well-known popularity of certain Japanese products and TV dramas.

Thirdly, for the past thirty years, huge efforts have been made in dealing with the historical issues but the past, crystallized around the Yasukuni Shrine visit and the textbook conflict, still weighs the most on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, time did not wash away the mark of the anti-Japanese war and the crimes of Japanese troops; on the contrary, the Chinese public has been used to perceiving Sino-Japanese relations as a collection of unresolved history problems.

Last but not the least, in contrast with the older generation who had actually experienced the war, the younger generation seems to have an even tougher stance and a more visceral negative attitude towards Japan and Japanese people.<sup>30</sup> Such an inexplicable phenomenon has added more difficulty for China and Japan to settle the past.

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<sup>30</sup> For the analysis of the different generations of the Chinese post-war society, the “founding fathers”, like Mao and Deng, and the people at the same age are generally regarded as the first generation. The second generation was considered to be the people who lived their youth around 1950-1978. The third generation referred to the people whose thoughts and ideas were drastically refreshed after the opening and reform decision. For details, see Orville Schell, *Mandate of heaven: a new generation of entrepreneurs, dissidents, bohemians, and technocrats lays claim to China's future*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, c1994.)

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## ***THE FUNCTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STATE, PUBLIC AND MEDIA***

A functional definition of *state* is necessary. Despite the general definition of state as a supreme social association or organization within whose frame politics will determine its legislation and policies, the definition of the Chinese state on Sino-Japanese relations, especially when a political psychology view is taken, is special.<sup>31</sup> Its authoritarian and non-democratic nature determines that the definition in this case will mostly involve the dominant decision makers in a highly centralized and hierarchical political structure as well as their foreign policy setting.<sup>32</sup> It includes an authoritarian political ideology or belief system providing and reinforcing authoritarian conventional beliefs. It is also the main instrument through which dominant decision makers acquire power on foreign policy making.<sup>33</sup>

It is equally crucial about the definition of *public* in this case. So is the leading concern of at what level of analysis the political psychology perspective can best apply to Sino-Japanese relations. I will suggest that it will mostly include the intellectuals and urbanites, who have the access to the compulsory education, the opportunities of exposure to mass media, and who have some basic historical knowledge of the anti-Japanese war, considering the diversification and the

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<sup>31</sup> Wiseman, H.V. *Political Systems* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967)

<sup>32</sup> Levy, Jack, Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (Eds.) *Oxford Handbook of political psychology* (New York : Oxford University Press, c2003).

<sup>33</sup> Meloen, Jos. *The Political Culture of State Authoritarianism*, in Stanley Renshon (Eds.) *Political Psychology: Cultural and Cross-Cultural Foundations*. (New York : New York University Press, 2000).

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complication of the concept of “Chinese public.”<sup>34</sup>

Another pivotal issue is about the real function of mass media and in which way they can actually transmit the memory. Alison Landsberg underlines the possibilities for a progressive politics of memory in our mass-mediated era. Through subtle and theoretically informed readings of autobiographies, novels, films, and museum exhibits about martyrs and the holocaust, monuments, she shows us how what she revealingly calls “prosthetic memories” can produce empathy and social responsibility (or antagonism and instability in this case). How we think about the past matters in the present.<sup>35</sup> As far as the Chinese media is concerned, it is thus evident that the tremendous legacy composed of high school history books, numerous anti-Japanese films, prevailing stories of anti-Japanese heroes in the novels and other forms of media have made a synergy to continuously remind the people of the war. On the other hand, the media are not merely passive transmitters of the far-reaching chosen traumas but have actively engaged in the evolution of traumas based on the different patterns the mass media adapt to and the lucrative commercial interests involved. “Media tabloidism” may also go hand in hand with the audience’s growing appetite for sensationalism in the commercial market.<sup>36</sup> The memory of trauma may not always be *traumatic*, as it is likely to mix with the indulgence in the excitement of potential belligerence.

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<sup>34</sup> See Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan. *In search of civil society: market reform and social change in contemporary China*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.) William C. Kirby ed. *Realms of freedom in modern China*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.)

<sup>35</sup> Alison Landsberg. *Prosthetic memory: the transformation of American remembrance in the age of mass culture*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). p.26.

<sup>36</sup> Yu Huang and Chin-Chuan Lee, *Peddling Party Ideology for a Profit: Media and the Rise of Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.49.

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## ***RESEARCH METHODOLOGY***

Based on the nature of my study and the data available, my research will adopt a substantially qualitative approach and analytical description. This thesis requires intensive knowledge on the topic and therefore the analysis of historical data is particularly important.

Besides the secondhand data from newspapers, journals, online resources and of course the studies of other researchers, my research is also based on the firsthand data collected in my fieldtrip. During December 2007, I spent two weeks in Shanghai, China and six days in Japan, conducting surveys about the mutual perceptions in these two nations, especially for the up-to-date Chinese public opinion on Sino-Japanese relations. The questionnaire has covered several crucial issues including the Senkaku island dispute, the Nanjing Massacre and the Yasukuni Shrine Visit. Moreover, other than these necessary standard questions in such a survey, it also includes questions about how the people of each nation perceive the people of the other. The survey in China totally collects 123 effective samples out of 130 surveys (Business 48 Freelancer 6 Scholars 3 Students 46 Others 20). 75% of the interviewees are males. 90% of the interviewees range from 18-45 years old.<sup>37</sup> Most of the questions designed are quite similar to those surveys conducted by the major news agencies in Japan and China.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, I will also compare the result of my surveys with the past surveys'. Such a comparison is important, as Sino-Japanese

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<sup>37</sup> See Appendices for details.

<sup>38</sup> The most well-known related surveys are from *Asahi Shinbun* (2002,2003), *Yomuiiri Shinbun* (2003), and *Chinese Social Sciences Academy*(2002-2004).

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relations are said to improve considerably after 2005, and accordingly testing whether there has been a coherent variation in the public opinion could be essential to my research. Nevertheless, my surveys have also added some updated questions directly related to the case study of the 2007 Fukuda visit. Chapter Five will address most of the results.

### ***LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY***

Political psychology is a multi-disciplinary field that has developed for more than thirty years. “What unifies political psychology and makes it distinct from other forms of political analysis is the search for explanation, description, and prediction at the individual level of analysis.”<sup>39</sup> The individual level of analysis informs and affects the kinds of questions that are asked, the forms of evidence that are sought, and the natures of inferences about causality that are made by political psychologists. “Not just limited to the individual level, it also provides a particularly humanistic slant on politics, asserting the importance of psychological processes to political outcomes, by extending to organizational, bureaucratic, international and other levels of analysis”.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, there are still some central questions or limitations of political psychology as a developing approach. Some argue that it is too *insensitive* to political demands and pressures. “In attempting to introduce psychological

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<sup>39</sup> See Rober Jervis *Perception and misperception in international politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1976).

<sup>40</sup> Rose McDermott, *Political psychology in international relations*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, c2004). p.3.

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explanations into political analysis, many political psychologists inadvertently (or otherwise) end up privileging psychological processes over political realities”.<sup>41</sup> The other crucial question involves the extent to which findings from controlled experiment in a psychological laboratory can be applied to real-world decision making.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the work on the political psychology approach, my research still has several other limitations that need to be highlighted. First of all, although the chosen trauma literature gives us a fresh thinking about the case of China-Japan relations, its application would be more precise if relevant experiments in China are possible based on sufficient time and funding. Due to the practical limits of a Master’s research, this thesis can hardly provide enough detailed psychological analysis consistent with my scope. Hopefully the future Ph.D. study could offer more chances to make up for the absence of a well-designed experiment.

Moreover, as I have little access to the real policy making and media agenda setting process, the research also lacks specific data of how the state officials and media editors actually think and act on the issue. Nevertheless, the specific data collected from the Chinese mass media from 1949 to 2007, the analysis of the mutual-perception surveys held by various Chinese and Japanese institutions, and the surveys in my field trip would hopefully be sufficient to reflect the popular opinion on Sino-Japanese relations and its interaction with the state and media.

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<sup>41</sup> Fred I. Greenstein *Personality and politics; problems of evidence, inference, and conceptualization* (Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. 1969).

<sup>42</sup> See Fred I. Greenstein *Personality and politics; problems of evidence, inference, and conceptualization* (Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. 1969). Robert Jervis, Political Psychology: Some Challenges and Opportunities. *Political Psychology* No.10 (1989). pp. 481-93.

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## ***ORGANIZATIONS OF THESIS***

My thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter defines the research questions, gives a brief introduction to the theoretical framework and literature review, and indicates the general argument.

In Chapter Two, I will introduce the reconciliation framework in the first section to interpret the predicament of contemporary China-Japan relations. After that, I will highlight the unique and pivotal role of collective memory in such a framework. Finally, I will further elaborate the chosen trauma factor in the Chinese collective psychology in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations.

Combined with the literature review of the three parts above, I will also shed light on the literature of Chinese nationalism as well as some similar research in this field in terms of both their strengths and weaknesses. Despite the persuasive and insightful part of the nationalism literature, it seems still inadequate to enunciate the real causes of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and its implications for Sino-Japanese Relations. Almost all the scholars in this area tend to combine the analysis of China-U.S. relations with China-Japan relations, which may mistakenly confuse the endeavors for regaining national identity and pride with the pursuit of historical justice and the remembering of the traumatic past.

Chapter Three, focusing on the different patterns of the three actors in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations, will be composed of two parts. The first part addresses the history from 1949 to the 1980s and in particular the period from 1972; the second



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part examines the situation from 1980s till today. With such a division of time frame, I will not only show the different role of each actor, but also analyze the interactions among the state, media and public. From a top-down chosen glory, to a conditioned collective amnesia, and finally a strong nationalistic and history sensitive memory, there has gradually been a larger gap of perceptions between the state and public, with the media intermediating with their needs and voices at different times. This chapter will apply the chosen trauma perspective to the historical evolvement of China-Japan relations.

With three specific case studies, Chapter Four will further elaborate the chosen traumas affecting the Chinese perception on Japan as well as its influence on their real behavior. From 1998 Jiang Zemin visit, 2003 New Thinking, to the 2007 Fukuda visit, this chapter will provide more empirical evidence to support the argument. Jiang's visit explains how the chosen traumas throughout the state and public could dramatically hinder the normal bilateral meeting and the negotiation on a few strategic priorities. The New Thinking case can help us understand the way chosen traumas affect the public perception and behavior in response to a fresh idea significantly contradicting people's established mindset. Finally, the Fukuda visit will further elaborate the degree to which chosen traumas root in people's psychological scheme, by contrast with the actual efforts made between the two governments.

Chapter Five will be the final conclusion.

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## CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF TRAUMAS IN MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION

### *INTRODUCTION*

This chapter will firstly address the way *traumas* take part in characterizing *collective memory* by linking the past to the present political issues. Furthermore, it will highlight the role of shared memory influencing the *truth of history* and *justice* that are essential to the *reconciliation* process. With a general literature review regarding reconciliation, memory study, and chosen traumas, this chapter will explain the interconnections among these different factors.

From a *reconciliation-memory-trauma* framework, I will try to position the chosen trauma factor in the variations determining Sino-Japanese relations. The major problem of the stagnant Sino-Japanese relations should be attributed to the failure of reconciliation. Such a failure is more of the inability to deal with the past, precisely the traumatic memory, than the failure to settle the contemporary issues. This chapter will provide a clearer picture about why a political psychology perspective is analytical and insightful in the study of China-Japan relations. In addition, I will also try to elaborate the differences of my perspective from the literature of Chinese nationalism.

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## ***MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION***

Inquiries into shared memory have been considerably influential in the study of identity politics and stimulating the possible proliferation of inter-group tension, conflicts, and even hostilities. By contrast with the existing literature elucidating the German-Jewish, Bosnian-Kosovar, and other historically ethnical or national conflicts, it is still uncommon to analyze the psychological schemes of the Chinese on China-Japan relations.

Comparing with these scenarios, this paper will claim that the Chinese memory of traumas related to Sino-Japanese relations has always been indeterminate and contestable. Hence it is equally likely to be controlled by state manipulation, in the name of nationalism, as it is employed in the opposition as a challenge to the dominant official narratives.<sup>43</sup> The role of trauma is thus also vital to the influence of memory on contemporary international politics. A collective memory with trauma and another without are distinctively different as they could fundamentally determine how a nation perceives relations with another.

The belief that the way groups of people perceive the past shapes the nature of political communities is far from novel. John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville and Ernest Renan all identify the necessity of a community of recollections as a prerequisite for the development of a strong sense of nationality and emphasize the importance of

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<sup>43</sup> Peter Gries has established a scholarly perspective about the “state nationalism” and “popular nationalism” in contemporary China, in particular concerning the Sino-Japanese relations. “The dominant narratives” refer to “official ideology” and the later “state nationalism”.

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forgetting in order to provide a sense of longevity and continuity. Moreover, an increasing number of International Relations scholars have also investigated the role of collective identity to explain the composition of national interests, the development of foreign policy positions and the evolution of international norms and institutions.<sup>44</sup> Thus it will be inadequate to investigate national interests without understanding how they are shaped by certain values and norms of societies, including the memory of past historical events.

Some of the observers in this field of China-Japan relations have tried to shed light on an overarching framework of reconciliation.<sup>45</sup> Such a framework mainly focuses on the way two former enemies attempt to reconcile the past and is largely composed with an acknowledgement of wrongdoing, acceptance of legal and moral responsibility, retribution, apologies and forgiveness. Other key elements of reconciliation, particularly concerning Sino-Japanese relations, include shared collective memory, healing of the grief, sorrow and sense of victimhood, apology, public trials, education, and joint projects.<sup>46</sup> The reconciliation between two parties is not guaranteed and is prone to setbacks and numerous obstacles as the case of China and Japan highlights. In addition, Rose indicates such patterns as the “memory boom”, the “rush for restitution”, and the “age of apology” that can contribute to explain the situations whereby China and Japan have tried, and in what instances failed to come to terms with the past. Nonetheless, just as she admits in the same chapter, there is no

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<sup>44</sup> See Peter Katzenstein, 1996; Friedrich Kratochwil and Yosef Lapid, 1996; Alexander Wendt, 1999.

<sup>45</sup> See Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (RoutledgeCurzon, c2005)

<sup>46</sup> See Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub, *Patriotism*, (Wadsworth Publishing, 1999).

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single, ideal model for reconciliation and in some cases reconciliation is impossible to achieve.<sup>47</sup>

In light of the broad framework of reconciliation, it is also understandable that all the strategic concerns from the perspective of rational choice, including the prominent disputes over territory and resources, the role of USA and Taiwan, and many other economic issues, are also essential in the array of variables. Moreover, the profound social and political changes that have engaged in the post-war history of China and Japan, particularly the relaxation of ideology and the transformation of state-society dynamics, have equally played a pivotal role in determining the trend of Sino-Japanese relations.

On the other hand, the failure of China and Japan's increasing economic interdependence to prevent rising political tensions illuminates the significance of non-economic factors and the troubled and often violent mutual interactions. Even the benefits of economic cooperation cannot neutralize Chinese emotions of historical grievances or ensure smooth political relations. The Chinese government cannot afford to make concessions on bilateral controversies on the grounds of economic interests. "This does not mean the government would not take ad hoc measures to limit the economic damages of political disputes, but the concerns about public opposition still preclude any bold diplomatic moves that would generate a harmonious mutual perception."<sup>48</sup> For example, in 2003, when a new high-speed

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<sup>47</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (RoutledgeCurzon, c2005)

<sup>48</sup> Yinan He, *History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007, p. 19

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railroad project was ready to accept the technology support from Japan's *Shinkansen*, strong public pressure expanded through the Internet warning about the consequences of such a decision. As a result, the deal was not made and the Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei disclosed the real reason: "We are facing high anti-Japanese sentiment in China. If our government adopts the *Shinkansen* technique in the railway project, the people would have opinions."<sup>49</sup>

Nevertheless, the majority of the reconciliation research still largely neglects the psychological basis that can be and actually has been internalized through the reconciliation practice between China and Japan. For example, in the insightful work of Yinan He,<sup>50</sup> she points out the national mythmaking in the history of Sino-Japanese relations and how it created the different patterns of dilemmas of the state, media and public. She also highlights the importance of a shared memory with regard to the reconciliation. Nevertheless, without digging deeply into the collective psychology and the identity factor on the Chinese side, her conclusion just seems relatively pale and stereotyped, contending that a healthy dialogue between the historians of China and Japan and more cooperative historical research can gradually wipe off the shade of trauma.

Fueling nationalism and exacerbating a mutual threat perception, the collective psychology factor could catalyze the possible conflict in other *hard* issues, i.e. island disputes, maritime oil competition and even the Taiwan problem. Rose also points out

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<sup>49</sup> *Taipei Times*, (31 December 2004).

<sup>50</sup> Yinan He, *History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007.

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that certain “collective amnesia”<sup>51</sup> was obviously evident in this case and the action of seeking, remembering and uncovering truth in both China and Japan has still been profoundly dominating people’s memory of the traumatic past. Reconciliation requires basic psychological changes in large segments of both groups. Some scholars also suggest that the process of reconciliation, to be effective, requires collective healing, and even forgiveness of the adversary’s misdeeds.<sup>52</sup> For the hope of reconciliation, often between two previously antagonistic communities, mourning and remembrance have naturally become an essential part as memory continues to circumscribe the reconciliation. Exploring the case of Kosovo, for example, Larry Ray demonstrates the problems of “dwelling on, and in, the past by identifying the danger of how commemoration may take the form of *melancholia* whereby grief and anger predominate”.<sup>53</sup>

## ***TRAUMA VS. NATIONALISM***

Unlike the studies on how memory shapes people’s political perceptions and behaviors, I will mainly explore the traumatic memory from the psychology literature, extending from the individual level to the collective level. Memory, whether accurate or otherwise, is a potent ingredient in the brew of factors that, when combined,

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<sup>51</sup> See Rigby, A. *Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

<sup>52</sup> See Asmal et al., 1997; Bar Tal, 2001; Kriesberg, 1998a; Lederach, 1997; Arthur, 1999; Hayner, 1999; Lederach, 1998; Staub & Pearlman, 2001; Ervin Staub and Daniel Bar-Tal, 2004.

<sup>53</sup> Larry Ray, Mourning, melancholia and violence in F.M. Fierke, *Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations*, Chapter in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). p.137.

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constitute the evolving relationship between China and Japan. Thus the assumption of the analysis of this paper is that habitual memory shapes the interactions of certain countries with other countries. The re-enactment of the traumatic past takes an important role in a relationship between countries.<sup>54</sup>

Furthermore, the hurt and resentments are reproduced from generation to generation into the future-a future that is determined by the remembered past.<sup>55</sup> In this conception, memory substantially denies the past of its objects and instead insists on their continuing presence. A memory once established defines an eternal truth and identity for members of a certain group.<sup>56</sup> As Duncan Bell points out, memory is not always beneficial; it can be counter-productive. It can obstruct the potential for moving forward, for envisaging alternative futures.<sup>57</sup>

In Figure 2.2, it indicates the interconnection of the key variables of my study and the place of chosen traumas in the big picture of China-Japan relations.

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<sup>54</sup> F.M. Fierke, *Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations*, Chapter in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). p.131.


<sup>55</sup> Peter, Novick, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory* (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), p.4.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Duncan, Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.24.



**Figure 2.2 How chosen traumas pattern Sino-Japanese relations**



Finally, it is necessary to state why the nationalism literature will have little to do with my theoretical framework as a large amount of scholarly attention given to Chinese nationalism ranges widely and is believed to be credible and valuable. Peter

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Gries defines “nationalism” as referring to any behavior designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images of that national community. He also assesses on how the nationalistic public opinion in China could pose some significant constraints on the diplomatic policy establishment of the government. His persuasive argument has actually been well proven by the case of China-Japan relations.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, he also argues that central to the Chinese nationalism is the superiority of Confucian civilization. In addition to Gries’ identification of China’s new nationalism, Yongnian Zheng’s distinction between popular and official nationalism is also worth attention in that he asserts about how nationalism could become a double-edged sword.<sup>59</sup> Segal argues that Chinese nationalism has developed from an affirmative to an assertive position, while S.Zhao interprets it as a “situational” and “defensive” reaction to external challenges.<sup>60</sup>

Despite the persuasive and insightful part of the nationalism literature, it seems still inadequate to enunciate the real causes of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and its implications for Sino-Japanese Relations. Almost all the scholars in this area tend to combine the analysis of Sino-American relations with Sino-Japanese relations. It may mistakenly confuse the determination for regaining national identity and pride with the pursuit of historical justice and the remembering of the traumatic

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<sup>58</sup> See Peter, Gries and Rosen, Stanley. Ed. *State and society in 21st century China: crisis, contention, and legitimation*. (New York: Routledge. 2004).

<sup>59</sup> Zheng, Yongnian, *Nationalism, Globalism, and China's International Relations* in Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, Daojiong Zha *China's international relations in the 21st century: dynamics of paradigm shifts*. (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000.)

<sup>60</sup> See David S. G. Goodman, Gerald Segal *China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence* *The China Journal*, No. 45 (Jan., 2001), pp.226-228. Zhao S. Chinese intellectuals quest for national greatness and nationalistic writing in the 1990s, *China Quarterly*, 152, (1997) pp.725-45.

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past. In other words, regarding the noticeably different motivations and backgrounds of the anti-American and anti-Japanese emotions, it would be questionable about whether it is still appropriate to use the same *Chinese nationalism* to fully investigate the whole picture.

Equally important, the Chinese nationalism literature also tends to overemphasize the state-society mechanism including the democratization appeal and the partially harsh voice of a renascent Chinese empire. Such an oversimplification runs the risks on overly stressing the state legitimacy reborn from the debris of the withering old ideology of Marxism and Maoism and thus misinterprets the uniqueness of Sino-Japanese relations. For example, the anti-Japanese slogans that accompanied virtually every democratic movement in post-Mao China have been oversimplified as “anti-regime manifestations” or “expressing the sentiment that today’s rulers of the Chinese state are in fact traitors to the Chinese nation”.<sup>61</sup> Apparently, such claims are vulnerable to the accusation of indiscriminately applying the interpretation of nationalism to contemporary China-Japan relations.

Finally, Chinese nationalism has been characterized as xenophobic, anti-Western, anti-American, potentially irredentist, and even dangerously chauvinistic and war-prone.<sup>62</sup> Other scholars, meanwhile, have applied the concepts of “racial

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<sup>61</sup> Edward, Friedman. *National identity and democratic prospects in socialist China*. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 1995).

<sup>62</sup> See Lucian.Pie, “After the Collapse of Communism: The Challenge of Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatism”, in Eberhard Sandschneider (ed.), *The Study of Modern China*, London: Hurst & Co., 1999, pp.31-51; Edward Friedman, “Still Building the Nation: The Causes and Consequences of China’s Patriotic Fervor”, in Shiping Hua (ed.), *Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, pp.103-132.

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nationalism”, and “face nationalism”, in their studies of Chinese nationalism.<sup>63</sup> While such a conventional focus on state nationalism in this field of literature is not unwarranted, it tends to overstate the influence of the party-state and its intellectual supporters in shaping Chinese nationalism. To some extent, rising nationalism could constrain the party-state’s foreign policy options. Due to the authoritarian nature of China’s political system, however, the party-state ultimately has the power to restrain any radical mobilization of nationalists. On the other hand, the extent of state-society relations is not only influenced by the nationalistic expression, but also affected by the changing socio-economic conditions, the relaxation of ideology, and people’s changing perception upon their living environment as well as their group identity. Chinese nationalism, under many circumstances, is far from the only or most crucial source of all the problems encroaching CCP’s legitimacy or altering its foreign policy strategy. Rather than seeking a single lodestone of the PRC legitimacy, analysts should focus on context: “certain events make certain claims salient at certain times”.<sup>64</sup>

### ***CHOSEN TRAUMAS: DEFINITIONS***

Chosen Traumas is a mental representation that is transmitted at a trans-generational

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<sup>63</sup> See Barry Sautman, “Racial Nationalism and China’s External Behavior”, *World Affairs*, Vol. 160, No.2 (Fall 1997), p.78-95. Peter Gries, “A China Threat? Power and Passion in Chinese ‘Face Nationalism’”, *World Affairs*, Vol. 162, No.2 (Fall 1999), pp.63-75.

<sup>64</sup> Peter Gries, Popular nationalism and state legitimation in China, Peter, Gries and Rosen, Stanley. (ed.) *State and society in 21st century China: crisis, contention, and legitimation*. (New York: Routledge. 2004).p181.

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level of past historical events. “Within virtually every large group there exists a shared mental notion of a traumatic past event during which the large group suffered loss and experienced helplessness, shame and humiliation in conflict with another large group. The trans-generational transmission of such a shared traumatic event is linked to the past generation’s inability to mourn losses of people, land or prestige, and indicates the large group’s failure to reverse narcissistic injury and humiliation inflicted by another large group, usually a neighbor”. Chosen glories, on the contrary, means the mental representations of past shared successful events that lift up the large group’s self esteem.<sup>65</sup>


In Figure 4.2, it shows the process of how chosen traumas can be created, reshaped, passed, oppressed, reactivated and fermented, under the circumstance of a state-state conflict. With a trans-generational transmission, the trauma will change its function from a simple historical fact to an ethnical marker imprinted on the national identity of a large group. Furthermore, the reactivation of chosen traumas will serve as a channel to link the past traumas to the current political events. Such a past-to-present mechanism will therefore further foster people’s hatred and resentment for getting even, and considerably magnify the significance of present political conflicts. Finally, such a trauma imprisonment may boil down to irrational decision making, and even large group mobilization.

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<sup>65</sup> Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity. *Group Analysis*, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001) p.80.

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**Figure 2.3 The evolution of Chosen Traumas**



Chosen traumas is a concept developed from individual psychoanalysis to a group or social memory study and essentially fills up the distinction between unconscious and conscious based on a conditioned social and political environment. This paper illustrates how chosen traumas are related to the complex variation and motivations of the Chinese in dealing with contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. Hence the state ideological narrative and the public story telling will be incorporated into one interpretation of chosen traumas.

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## ***CHOSEN TRAUMAS: HYPOTHESES***

Chosen traumas act like a fuel to maintain large-group conflicts, even if the conflicts have their origins in economic, legal, political or military controversy. Since a large group does not choose to be victimized or to suffer humiliation, some take exception to the term “chosen” traumas. Volkan believes that it reflects a large group’s “choice” to add a past generation’s representation of an event to its own identity, and the fact that, while groups may have experienced any number of traumas in their history, only certain ones remain live over centuries.<sup>66</sup>

The first hypothesis is that the representation of history in the chosen traumas is closely bound up with the foundation of each group member’s identity. Hence the chosen traumas in Sino-Japanese relations are difficult to pin down vis-à-vis specific events because they are not simply connected to one well-recognized past historical event. As far as the political aspect is concerned, the memory of trauma has transcended from a pure historical fact to an essential part of a nation’s group identity. Such an identity, based on suspicion, resentment and hatred, will crucially blind the Chinese public from viewing Japan from a second angle. China’s political discourse repeatedly refers to the idea of China as subject to hostile external and internal predators.<sup>67</sup> It to some extent smolders with other traumas that have been inflicting the self-esteem identity of the Chinese and therefore calls for a renascent one

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<sup>66</sup> Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity. *Group Analysis*, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001) p.80.

<sup>67</sup> Cao, Q. (with Renwick, N.) *Modern Political Communication in China* In G. Rawnsley & M. Rawnsley (eds) *Political Communication in Greater China: The Construction and Reflection of Identity*, pp. 62-82, London & New York: Routledge Curzon 2003.

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saturated with strong nationalism.

Another crucial hypothesis is that the government once artificially mixed the resurrection of chosen traumas with chosen glories in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations. By chosen glories, it refers to the mental representations of past shared successful events that lift up the large group's self-esteem.<sup>68</sup> This is not to say that historical research was not underway or that the wound of the war was not discussed at all. On the contrary, the Communist Party's grand narrative in which the Communists were victorious in the anti-Japanese war became the mainstay of the party's legitimacy, forming the core of the country's collective memory and identity.<sup>69</sup> It is important to recognize that chosen traumas are much stronger ethnic or large-group markers than chosen glories. Reviewing how the CCP fought against the Japanese troops or recalling the glorious ancient Chinese history cannot raise the national spirit as much as the anti-Japanese sentiment or nationalism.

Moreover, chosen traumas would not be stationary and unchangeable through all times. Quite on the contrary, it will gradually evolve from a notion of historical myth to a motivation to get revenge in the present life under the name of truth or justice. Individual participants in the dialogue of Sino-Japanese relations, regardless of his or her personal organization, professional or social standing, or even political orientation, may feel that his or her side, i.e., China, should discharge the sense of humiliation

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<sup>68</sup> Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity. *Group Analysis*, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80.

<sup>69</sup> Cao, Q. (with Renwick, N.) *Modern Political Communication in China* In G. Rawnsley & M. Rawnsley (eds) *Political Communication in Greater China: The Construction and Reflection of Identity*, pp. 62-82, London & New York: Routledge Curzon 2003, p.1.



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through oppressing Japan and become its spokesperson. This psychological notion can decipher the strong emotional expression about Sino-Japanese relations on the Internet and the growing negative statistics according to the mutual perception polls.

The effect of the past traumatic memory would make people impelled to inadvertently link the present political issues to the past history, and thus distort their perceptions on contemporary politics by overusing the mirror of history. Such an intricate past-to-present scheme will therefore make the public more rejected to disconfirming information contradictory to their established mindset toward Japan. Volkan also provides us an appropriate concept to explain the interaction of the contemporary events of Sino-Japanese relations with people's accumulative chosen traumas, i.e., a "time collapse". When a chosen trauma is fully awakened within a large group by stressful and anxiety-inducing circumstances (for example, the memorial anniversary of 918 incident, the Yasukuni visit, or other random but influential events posing a negative sense), a time collapse typically occurs.<sup>70</sup> This term refers to the fears, expectations, fantasies and defenses associated with a chosen trauma that reappears when both conscious and unconscious connections are made between the mental representation of the past trauma and a contemporary threat. This process magnifies the image of current enemies and current conflicts, and an event that occurred centuries ago will be felt as if it happened yesterday. An old enemy will be perceived as a new enemy, and the sense of entitlement to regain what was lost, or

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<sup>70</sup> Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity. *Group Analysis*, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80.

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to seek revenge against the contemporary enemy, becomes exaggerated.<sup>71</sup> By invoking the past humiliations, the party could also be determined to prevent the same from happening again. Such *preventing them from happening again* propaganda, which has been the pivotal element of the Chinese state and official media discourse, as well as the traditional historical value of the Chinese culture (*Yi Shi Wei Jian*), naturally attached any present incident with the historical lessons. Many of the current actions of the Japanese government, such as the conflict with China over the Senkaku Island and Japan's bid for UNSC, would easily be regarded as the reappearance of what happened in the 1930s and thus be considered as a sign of a reviving Japanese militarism.

One inconspicuous but indispensable factor is that most of the leaders and officials in the Chinese government who are the decision makers of Sino-Japanese relations are also part of the public. In other words, the leaders and officials themselves do have their own chosen traumas on Japan also. Even though one could argue that their primary concern is still centering on how to lead Sino-Japanese relations to a direction that will maximize China's strategic interests, their own chosen traumas determine that it is fairly difficult for them to explore certain pragmatic and innovative ways to change the status-quo and to truly break the deadlock. In the Jiang Zemin era, some Japanese analysts argue that Jiang's reasons for dwelling so much on the history problem had much more to do with an attempt to score points at home than a genuine desire to resolve the problem.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations: Facing the past, looking to the Future?*

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Moreover, chosen traumas may or may not be readily evident at all times; it may lie dormant for a long period of time. Through the deliberate framing of the state and official media, little space was available for the massive investigation on war crimes. Nonetheless, through the change of time and ideology, as well as the relaxation of media control, the chosen traumas on Sino-Japanese relations can be reactivated to exert a powerful psychological force on the Chinese again. The chosen traumas could become more influential with a period of dormancy and repression.

Last but not the least, not only will chosen traumas significantly influence the reconciliation regarding the strategic concerns, but also constrain the possibility for understanding different sides and the complexity of Sino-Japanese relations . In that sense, it may cause considerable discrepancies among different actors regarding their views, beliefs and behavior. Such a fixation on particular grievances will make it impossible to accept opposite points of view. Differently put, while certain actor in the case of Sino-Japanese relations has shown the intention to drive the relationship realistically, the chosen traumas will make it difficult for other actors to understand the motivation. Far from a uni-dimensional constant, the chosen trauma factor will vary differently among different actors.

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## **CHAPTER THREE: STATE-MEDIA-PUBLIC INTERACTIONS AND CHOSEN TRAUMAS**

### ***INTRODUCTION***

Next two chapters will pay more attention to the state-media-public interaction dynamics. Crucial to the application of chosen traumas to China-Japan relations, the analysis of such interaction can systematically explain why certain memories become amnesiac at some times, repressed, or reenacted at others. Moreover, I will divide the time frame after 1972 into two parts and try to interpret the evolution of chosen traumas based on the historical evolvement of China's perception on Japan. The first will be about *the dormancy period* from 1949 to the early 1980s when the chosen traumas were initially suppressed. The second will be the period from 1980s till today, concentrating on the activation and evolution of chosen traumas and its variations among the three actors.

### ***THE STATE-MEDIA-PUBLIC DYNAMICS ON CHOSEN TRAUMAS***

Initially, the Chinese state tried to get some political credit for the progress of the relationship with Japan, such as mutual visits of top leaders to demonstrate diplomatic triumph. On the other hand, the authoritative nature of the Chinese government and its persistent intense control over free speech and media has largely fostered its

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neglect over the chosen traumas deeply rooted in the public. Nevertheless, it was the government itself that reawakened the anti-Japanese sentiment ever since the 1982 history textbook issue<sup>73</sup> and confected state-to-state agendas exemplified by the Yasukuni Shrine visit. Propaganda that the state produced to maintain the general perception of Sino-Japanese relations among the public is passively lost in the pattern between interest-based choices and the chosen traumas that the state wove itself. On one hand, it is obligated to consider the implications from other aspects such as economic factors, the Taiwan issue, and other strategic variations. On the other hand, it has to distinguish the concerns for the above aspects from the historical issues and the strong but still intangible public opinion. For that reason, in all the cases covering Sino-Japanese relations since 1972, the Chinese government has always been in a relatively passive position to pick up its cards in response to Japan's moves.

As far as the *media* is concerned, the Chinese mass media is under the full-scale control, if not as strict as it used to be, of the government. Despite the liberalization trend, Chinese mass media are still being heavily censored. Although the leaders have acknowledged the organic connection between the reduced ability to control communications flows and the basic line of the post-Mao economic reform and opening, the party has been struggling to reassert its control over media reports.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> The Japanese history textbook controversies are about government-approved history textbooks used in the secondary education (junior high schools and high schools) of Japan. The controversies primarily concern what some international observers perceive to be a systematic distortion of the historical record propagated in the Japanese educational system, which seeks to whitewash the wrongdoings of Imperial Japan during WWII. Kathleen Woods Masalski (November 2001). "Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies". Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education. Retrieved on 2008-10-11.

<sup>74</sup> Daniel C. Lynch, *After the propaganda state : media, politics, and "thought work" in reformed China*, (Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, c1999.), p.177

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Most evident is its emphasis on “thought work”, “the importance of political consciousness”, as well as the strict media censoring system, from central media to local ones.<sup>75</sup> Compared with the content of media outlets at the provincial level and especially at the sub-provincial, which may have relatively more autonomy, the content of the central outlets generally adheres to political correctness. It is not surprising given the fact that Beijing’s propaganda cadres monitor the central outlets relatively easily and directly appoint the outlets’ leading personnel.<sup>76</sup> The problem, however, is that Chinese citizens no longer need to consume the offering of the central media as they had no choice but to do under the *communication compression* of the Maoist propaganda state. Today the Chinese people have a much wider variety of message sources from which to choose.<sup>77</sup> Thus the public would not necessarily lay too much account on these reports, whether in broadcasting, print, or telecommunications, to know exactly the information in depth about Sino-Japanese relations.

Nevertheless, both the increasing influence of financial considerations and in consequence the inevitable needs to cover the stories from multi-dimensional views have made things flexible. Thus the official view would have to adjust accordingly if the state hopes its propaganda can still maneuver the public opinion on the China-Japan issue. Likewise, the media editors or reporters are able to absorb different comments and points from scholars, net surfers and even western media.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. p139.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Zhang Weiguo, Reporters and Editors on the Mainland Fight for a Larger Margin of Journalistic Freedom, *Pai Hsing* 283, Mar. 1, 1993, pp.44-45.

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In fact the various ways to report international affairs have been accepted and welcomed by most audience, which will make the official central government discourse even less adorable to people. Moreover, advocating patriotism could be the safest language for the social elites or intellectuals to openly promote their own political agenda regarding diplomatic policies. Consequently, in such a half-open yet still intensely monitored media system, nationalist sentiment, expressed by tabloid writers, freelancers and even influential academics, have flourished.<sup>79</sup>

The problem of chosen traumas is not so much that people are condemned to relieve the past for failing to remember it, but more that the way of remembrance involves a compulsive attachment to unrelieved trauma. The mass media is the most important instrument that the government utilizes to awaken the chosen trauma of the public. It is also a potential and major means by which the Chinese public could discover and confront their chosen traumas through remembering and recalling. In dealing with the traumatic memory, the therapy has traditionally involved the transition from traumatic memory to narrative memory.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, the conventional therapy from an old psycho-analytical view is not enough to treat how people are trapped by the traumatic memory and recycle their negative feelings. Every time a Nanjing massacre victim tells his story on television bursting with tears, every time the Japanese soldiers in old uniforms appear on the screen, every time the picture of a new prime minister bowing in the Yasukuni Shrine is highlighted by the

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<sup>79</sup> Yinan He, *History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007, p. 18

<sup>80</sup> F.M. Fierke, *Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations*, Chapter in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

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lens or words, the chosen traumas are not only awakened, but reshaped and further solidified.

Moreover, the financial concern, namely the viewership rate or circulation number, is also critical. The producers, journalists and editors realize that the coverage provoking anti-Japanese outrage is actually a high-profile and profit-related *business*. Hence the extensive focus on such reports and a considerable echo from the society is highly promising. Accordingly, neither the government propaganda nor the new thinking on Sino-Japanese relations raised by certain Chinese scholars is sufficient to change the public's perception.

If the Chinese government's reaction is still a reflection irradiated by the chosen traumas, the public is indeed the driving force of the transmission of the traumas. Remembering is most often partially voluntary, spurred by some need or demand, and is determined by the signals and demands of the situations that trigger it.<sup>81</sup> Forgetting, amnesia or dormancy is indeed the result of censorship, or more accurately repression, or more profoundly the overall social background in the history. The transmission of chosen traumas is not only the transmission from generation to generation but also from the social sphere into the psychic life and then back into social life through participation and expression. Considering most cases in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, it is not difficult to argue that the chosen traumas of the public have been reawakened by the state, framed and modified by the mass media, and finally consolidated by the deep-seated memory in a trans-generational way. Even if the state

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<sup>81</sup> Stephan Feuchtwang *Memorials to injustice* in Duncan, Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). p.180



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is able to be moderate between the strategic interests and the historical issue, the Chinese people have never learned to draw a clear line between past images and present scenarios. We can consider it as a state in which fear and hyper-vigilance become ingrained in the consciousness of most Chinese to treat any seemingly excessive movement of Japan as a signal of a reviving Japanese militarism. In that sense, it is reasonable to define the chosen traumas being dormant in the memory of the Chinese as the implicit trigger that led to the status-quo of the seemingly irreconcilable Sino-Japanese relationship.

With the support of the new victim narrative, the reactivation of chosen traumas triggered the outpour of people's emotions of self-pity and grievances. The majority of the public was thus preoccupied with a sense of suffering and felt little sympathy for Japan. Although the government and official media are still able to create a slogan of friendship, chances are slim for the public to backup a genuine Chinese friendship with Japan. Even if the public can be persuaded by immediate interests to be conciliatory and restrained, they would neither forget nor forgive the Japanese invasion; in the long run, their grievances against Japan would only explode with greater scale and intensity. Due to the strong grievances and humiliation boosted by the chosen traumas, the unconstrained public emotions can even politicize and escalate trivial frictions into major diplomatic disturbances.

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**Table 3.2 Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations: 1982-2006**

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<b>1982 Jul.-Sep.</b>	Textbook issue (also 1984 and 1986)
<b>1985 Aug.</b>	PM Nakasone visits Yasukuni Shrine
<b>1989 Jun.</b>	Tiananmen Square incident: Japan reluctant to isolate China
<b>1992 Oct.</b>	Visit of Emperor Akihito to PRC
<b>1995 May</b>	Chinese nuclear tests-Japan freezes aid
<b>1996 July</b>	PM Hashimoto visits Yasukuni Shrine
<b>Sep.</b>	Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute
<b>1997 Sep.</b>	China protests about revised US-Japan Defence Guidelines
<b>1998 Nov.</b>	Jiang Zemin visits Japan.
<b>2000 Oct.</b>	Zhu Rongji visits Japan, adopts forward-looking stance on history
<b>2001 Apr.</b>	China criticizes approval of The New History Textbook; Japan sends delegations to explain
<b>Aug.</b>	PM Koizumi visit the Yasukuni Shrine (also Apr. 2002, Jan. 2003, Jan. 2004)
<b>Oct.</b>	PM Koizumi visits China, visits Marco Polo Bridge and Anti-Japanese War Museum, offers “heart-felt apology”
<b>2002 Sep.</b>	Ceremonies to mark the 30 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of normalization
<b>2004 Mar.</b>	The Senkaku Island dispute intensifies.
<b>July.</b>	East China Sea oil dispute
<b>Aug.</b>	The Asian football cup final riot in Beijing. (Japan beats China winning the Champion)
<b>2005 Apr.</b>	Anti-Japanese riots sweep the major cities in China.
<b>2006 Sep.</b>	Abe Shinzo becomes New PM and visits China and ROK
<b>2007 Nov.</b>	Fukuda Yasuo visits China

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***THE DORMANCY PERIOD—FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO THE “HONEYMOON”***

Almost no dialogue about the war between China and Japan happened until the normalization. Even then, the issues of apology and reparations seemed to be resolved quickly and amicably. Such an expeditious resolution actually masked an intractable problem that would emerge in the 1980s and 1990s derived from the different ways in remembering history.<sup>82</sup> From the birth of the PRC in 1949 to the end of the 1970s,

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<sup>82</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (Routledge Curzon, c2005.) p107.

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the frequency of press reporting on Japan was much less than what it has been since the reform and opening.<sup>83</sup> The only image of the Japanese that the Chinese could get was the brutal Emperor soldiers speaking broken Mandarin mixed with annoying Japanese on the silver screen. War movies, the majority of which reflected how the Chinese army fought against the Japanese invaders, ubiquitously imposed this popular stereotype. In fact, due to the shortage of televisions during that period of time and the small quantity of the reports about Japan, the films became almost the only available source from which the Chinese public could be informed of Japan besides their memory of the anti-Japanese war.

This distinct historical condition was predominant because the CCP endeavored to indoctrinate the ideology that it was the party that led the people to expel the enemies out of the country. Thus the CCP should absolutely possess the legitimacy of the new PRC and must be served as the only leader to bring back prosperity and strength to the country. Furthermore, regarding the war responsibility and the following compensation, which is actually an integral part of the process of reconciliation, the Chinese government held the so called *twofold thinking*. That is, criticizing the handful of Japanese militarists that inflicted suffering on the Chinese and Japanese people and are still continuing to distort historical facts and hurt the feelings of Chinese people. As a country and people, therefore, Japan and Japanese are not to be blamed.

Focusing on replacing the hatred with selfless internationalism, not yet looking

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<sup>83</sup> Cui Baoguo, *Zhong Guo Bao Zhi De Ri Ben Bao Dao (The press reports in China about Japan)*, COMRC 2004 <http://www.comrc.com.cn/> It is from the research forums created by CRC.

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forward to a reconciled Sino-Japanese relationship, the party underlined such thinking to consolidate the party legitimacy. The party strove to avoid awakening the nationalism as it would obscure the victory narrative and the proletarian internationalism of Marxist doctrine. As a result, much of the war memory was deliberately suppressed under the name of moving forward. Moreover, the remission of the war responsibility was also caused by the strategic pressure composed of the civil war and the external attainment to the fledgling communist regime, casting the needs to create a new sense of national identity and patriotism recovering from the memory of humiliation. For example, research on the Nanjing Massacre by Nanjing University academics was held “hostage to political ideology” in the 1960s, and was kept classified so as not to focus attention back on a time of weakness and invasion, thereby drawing away from China’s revolutionary progress.<sup>84</sup> In addition, art works dwelling on human suffering were denounced as preaching defeatism or bourgeois humanitarianism. Most of the relevant literature investigating this particular period of time, unfortunately, has neglected the psychological impact that the state manipulation could impose on the cognitive framework of generations of Chinese, including the contemporary political leaders who lived their youth at the same time.<sup>85</sup>

Despite that few disputes existed before the 1980s in China-Japan relations, this

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<sup>84</sup> Eykholt, M. (2000) Aggression, victimization, and Chinese historiography of Nanjing massacre, in J.A. Fogel (ed.) *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. p.103

<sup>85</sup> Zheng, Yongnian, *Nationalism, Globalism, and China's International Relations* in Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, Daojiong Zha *China's international relations in the 21st century: dynamics of paradigm shifts*. (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000.) David S. G. Goodman, Gerald Segal China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence *The China Journal*, No. 45 (Jan., 2001), pp.226-228. Zhao S. Chinese intellectuals quest for national greatness and nationalistic writing in the 1990s, *China Quarterly*, 152, (1997) pp.725-45.

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period was essential in the establishment of the chosen traumas in China. The representation of history is contingent upon the demands of dominant elites and is written and rewritten according to the prevailing political structures of power. With regard to the state and mass media, the historical truth about the event is no longer important for the large group, but what is influential is that through sharing the chosen traumas, members of the group are linked together. Individuals might be inclined to adopt the interpretation close to that of the authorities, in order to survive and get accustomed to the new communist social environment. In that sense, the Chinese government utilized this scheme through the mass media propaganda at that time, to transform, instead of reawaken, the war memory into an intrinsic element of the national identity.

The memory is grounded on cultural formations and artifacts such as ideological narratives, music, literature, poetry, drama, cinema, and the symbolic forms of flag, as well as memorial exhibitions and museums. This is consistent with much contemporary research on human memory. “People’s memories are not like computer files, retrieved from the unconscious, but are always constructed by combining bits of information selected and arranged in terms of prior narratives and current expectations, needs and beliefs”.<sup>86</sup> We can define it as a temporary amnesia of traumas. Chosen traumas may lie dormant for a long period of time. Referring to the concept of *collective amnesia*,<sup>87</sup> the older generation of Chinese people in fact

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<sup>86</sup> Martha, Minow, *Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law and Repair* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). p.74.

<sup>87</sup> See Rigby, A. *Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

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suppressed their sense of suffering and humiliation towards Japan in response to the shifting situations including the four-year civil war, the birth of communist China at the threshold of Cold War, and the following dramatic political turbulences such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

On the other hand, objectively, because of the tightly controlled mass media at the time, Chinese people had no way to learn about Japan's distortion of the war history such as the worship at the Yasukuni Shrine that later became the focal point of Sino-Japanese contentions. Most young Chinese had minimal knowledge about Japanese war atrocities as the textbook seldom mentioned the war crimes.

Entering the 1980s, both the quantity and diversity of the reports on China-Japan relations experienced a boom thanks to the thawing of ideology. According to the volume of *People's Daily* (the largest official press in China) 1995-2000, the number of the Japan reports kept constant from twenty to thirty per month, second only to the coverage about America.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, as to the content of Japan reports, it has achieved the variety of involving political, economic, cultural and technological levels. Based on the surveys examining the reports about Sino-Japanese relations of the leading press in China, *People's Daily* covers the broadest range of issues and is certainly the most cautious one, focusing mainly on the diplomatic and military activities of Japan and the mutual visits between the leaders. Other provincial or city press paid equal attention to Japan's economy, culture, sports and entertainment

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<sup>88</sup> Cui Baoguo, *Zhong Guo Bao Zhi De Ri Ben Bao Dao (The press reports in China about Japan)*, <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

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business.<sup>89</sup>

In the political world, denial, rather than a function of unconscious repression, can be understood as a political act for the purpose of creating a unity of interpretation.<sup>90</sup> Such denials usually concern pragmatic political concerns and the consequent alteration of the old narrative. It is crystallized with the *honeymoon* period between China and Japan in the early 1980's.<sup>91</sup> During that period of time, a highly positive attitude on Japan even outweighed the negative. At the state, this argument could best be supported by the slogan "Friendship forever between China and Japan" proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai when he met the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in an effort to normalize the bilateral diplomatic relationship.<sup>92</sup> This statement echoed the early comments made by Mao Zedong that China should put the unpleasant past aside and should stop repeatedly demanding an apology.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, given the strategic importance of a solid bilateral relationship to confront the common Soviet threat, the two governments were happy to subdue contentions over the war history and other related issues such as reparations.

After that, Deng Xiaoping restated the same opinion several times in 1982, 1984 and 1987 when he met the Japanese political leaders.<sup>94</sup> To some extent, this slogan propagated all over the country at that time. Even if Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao still

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<sup>89</sup> COMRC, *Zhong Guo Bao Zhi Dui Ri Bao Dao De Nei Rong Fen Xi (The content analysis of the reports of China on Japan)* <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>90</sup> F.M. Fierke, *Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations*, Chapter in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 132.

<sup>91</sup> Liu Zhiming, *Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yu Lun De Bian Qian Ji Mei Ti De Zuo Yong (The change of the mutual propaganda of China and Japan and the influence of the media)* <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>92</sup> [http://news3.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-04/20/content\\_2854588.htm](http://news3.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-04/20/content_2854588.htm)

<sup>93</sup> Jiang Xiyuan and Xia Liping (2004), *Zhongguo heping jueqi (Peaceful Rise of China)*, Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, pp. 349-50

<sup>94</sup> [http://news3.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-04/20/content\\_2854588.htm](http://news3.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-04/20/content_2854588.htm)

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kept such political discourse alive, with the change of the situation, many additional bounds and modifiers have been appended. For example, “under the circumstance of facing the past and remembering the history”, “the friendship between the *people* of China and Japan” and “Japan should make more efforts to maintain the friendship between China and Japan”.<sup>95</sup> The media were naturally and firmly in line with this principle. The fervor for certain Japanese TV dramas, movie stars and popular songs, which would seem absolutely unbelievable during the last decade, unexpectedly prevailed over the country. Thus the media played a major role in forming this flash in the pan, in terms of closely following the guidance from the government for the sake of policy needs.

The catalyst of the *honeymoon* could be either the strategic reshuffle of China after splitting with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, or the demands of the domestic economic reform, because Japan’s economic wonder during that time was considered as a possible example that China could learn from when it just opened the gate and strove to materialize modernization. There have been ups and downs even within the reform period, however, with “a brief flush of enthusiasm in the 1979-81 period, a slight drop in 1982-84, a substantial revival in 1985-86, then achieving a plateau until the early 1990s, followed by another increase in interest in Japan”.<sup>96</sup> These periods are not absolutely demarcated, nonetheless, and represent overlapping tendencies within a larger debate over the Japanese political economy, the Chinese political

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<sup>95</sup> Liu Zhiming, *Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yu Lun De Bian Qian Ji Mei Ti De Zuo Yong (The change of the mutual propaganda of China and Japan and the influence of the media)* <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>96</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (RoutledgeCurzon, c2005), p.108.



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economy and two countries' broader relations.<sup>97</sup>

On the other hand, the import of the fund, technology and direct investment from Japan was essential. As the top-down agendas to lift up the new patriotic spirit, the momentous 1982 controversy over the Japanese text book and the 1985 Yasukuni Shrine Visit dispute did not draw as much attention as the following problems after 1995. Both the government and media tended to explore a more positive and valuable Japan rather than a country of war criminals' unwillingness for apology according to its instant needs, namely the rapid economic development and an imperative reform.

As much as a transition, yet still worth careful research, it may be possible to analyze this period with the rational choice explanation and government propaganda requirements. Nonetheless, a vital link is missed in the framework, i.e., the *public*, the public who had no effective avenues to express their will and opinion due to the strict ideological constraints. As a result, the absence of such a central factor made the problem more complicated after the 1990s when the situation appeared to take a sudden turn and worsened dramatically.

According to Andrew Rigby's view, we can identify three *ideal-type* modes for dealing with the past: forget it for the sake of peace and security, seek out the perpetrators in pursuit of justice, and acknowledge the suffering of the victims and their stories so that their truth might be known.<sup>98</sup> In the particular case of Sino-Japanese relations, people appear to partially forget the crime of the war under

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<sup>97</sup> Steven, Jackson, *Lessons from a Neighbor: China's Japan-Watching Community* Chapter in *China and Japan: History, Trend and Prospects*, edited by Christopher Howe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)

<sup>98</sup> Rigby, A. *Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2001).

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the circumstance of party propaganda and proletarian ideology. Lastly, only when the scholars and intellectuals gained more autonomy and the media were entitled more free space did the massive investigation and concentrating reports begin to shed light on the specific crimes of the Japanese troops. On the surface, people have made considerable efforts to reconcile the relations but failed to satisfy the key requirements of it.

Political denial can take many different forms and become a normal practice. The repression is less a matter of banning unwanted material to the individual awareness, than the repression of alternative interpretations of reality that would threaten the existing order.<sup>99</sup> Over thirty years, however, it seemed the older generation that experienced the war was about to be a part of the past. Furthermore, after the reform and opening, both the national and international environment have allowed a more free space for the resurgence of the war memory, while the improvement of material life and national economy became the priority of the public and government. Under this situation, it provided the best ambience for eliciting the transgenerational identification with anti-Japanese sentiment and the activation of chosen traumas. By contrast with the old time when people somehow entered the amnesia, the whole nation finally realized it has still been in the post-trauma session of the war ended in 1945. In a word, the memory of the anti-Japanese firmly imprinted the chosen traumas onto the Chinese identity, rather than distancing it as in the past.

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<sup>99</sup> F.M. Fierke, *Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations*, Chapter in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 132.

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## ***THE REGRESSION UNDER THE RESULTANT FORCES—AFTER 1989***

Since 1989, the Sino-Japanese relationship has experienced a huge setback, exacerbated by the fiftieth-anniversary commemoration of World War II in 1995 when Japan and USA modified the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* and the Yasukuni Shrine visit by Koizumi in 2001. The public attitude is edging toward a more stubborn and resentful position on Japan, while the state has to take a case-sensitive stance in dealing with the Beijing-Tokyo interaction. 1995 and 2001 could be viewed as the watersheds whereby not only the degree of dwelling on the negative side of Japan significantly increased, but the anti-Japanese sentiment soared again and reached a peak in 2005 as well. It indicates that both the frequency of negative keywords and the proportion of the negative coverage on the main newspaper rocketed at the time.<sup>100</sup>

### ***STATE: AMBIVALENT AMONG MULTIPLE SIDES***

Looking at the *state*, the Tiananmen incident in 1989 had put China into a quandary of deteriorating relations with most western countries including Japan. Although the Emperor's visit to China in 1992, the twentieth anniversary of the 1972 normalization, seemed to detain the trend of deterioration, further conflicts, disputes

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<sup>100</sup> COMRC, *Zhong Guo Bao Zhi Dui Ri Bao Dao De Nei Rong Fen Xi (The content analysis of the reports of China on Japan)*, COMRC, <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

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and problems still made the reconciliation rather unreal.

During the 1990s, a new and popular *victimization narrative* superseded the official Maoist *victor narrative*.<sup>101</sup> The so called *Chinese nationalism* for the purpose of prompting patriotism appeared to fill in the vacuum left by the fading communist ideology of Marxism and Maoism. By focusing on the patriotism, the regime could also divert the potential public discontentment away from some domestic issues. Moreover, the government also needed a new framework of ideas to strengthen intra-party consolidation, catering to the voice of the old conservative faction in the party, or to rallying the public support from the grassroots level. On the other hand, the state intention of proposing patriotism also unexpectedly evoked the chosen traumas and in consequence a prevalent anti-Japanese sentiment, as the economic reform had turned the Chinese society increasingly open and pluralistic.

From a political psychology perspective, however, nationalism is an efficient way of repairing the rupture in collective memory brought about by the traumas. The patriotism campaign, as meant to instill nationalism to legitimize the state's political dominance, has enhanced China's identity as a country that was once victimized by Japan. Such a *victim identity* constitutes the core of the acknowledgement of chosen traumas. In fact, the representation of history in the chosen traumas is intimately bound up with the foundation of each group member's identity. By no means could the Chinese government ignore all the new challenges as well as the importance of establishing a more cohesive national identity, whereas it still prioritized the

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<sup>101</sup> Peter, Gries, *China's New Nationalism* (University of California Press, 2004), p.48.

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economic development, a stable regional environment and the continuity of the reform and opening.

Moreover, the positive assessment of China's strategic environment and the intention to take full advantage of a benign environment urges Beijing to avoid conflict with other countries, unless China's core national interests are fundamentally challenged. Thus there comes up a saying that China tends to play history cards when confronting any economic conflict with Japan or the potential pressure from the Taiwan issue caused by the subtle change of the Japan-US alliance. This argument does make some sense when we try to understand the ups and downs of Sino-Japanese relations. By the late 1990s, however, when it became apparent that both governments were increasingly willing to put the history problem aside (or, more cynically, when they began to realize that the history card lacked the potency of previous years), they had to deal with the heightened expectations of people who had become accustomed to the government taking a hard stance on Japan. If the government adopts a too pragmatic stance, it runs the risk of being criticized for being weak.<sup>102</sup> Ex-Premier Zhu Rongji once told a Japanese television audience during his October 2000 visit to Japan that he had received 200 letters criticizing him as being too soft on Japan after he told Japanese journalists before his visit that he would not make a big issue of history.<sup>103</sup> As the domestic and international atmospheres turned increasingly favorable to the war redress movement, it was difficult for the Chinese government to suppress the claims of the public.

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<sup>102</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (RoutledgeCurzon, c2005), p.13.

<sup>103</sup> China News Agency, October 13, 2003, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-10/>

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Nevertheless, instead of relentlessly promoting nationalism, the Chinese government has actually taken great efforts to orchestrate the expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment to prevent them from disrupting the government's overall foreign policy agenda. During the two Senkaku Island disputes in the 1990s, Beijing had to go out of its way to stop students and social activists from staging open protests against Japan.<sup>104</sup> In both the visits of the Emperor in 1992 and the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, the government mobilized cadres or drove the official media to dissuade the possible demonstration of students.<sup>105</sup> With the growing need for the party to accommodate popular nationalist demands for the sake of legitimacy, however, popular opinion has actually become an important consideration before the Foreign Ministry negotiates foreign policy. According to the interviews conducted by the Chinese media, each of the several heads of departments or bureaus in the ministry indicated that they check the Internet every day to seek what the public is concerned about and what the public wants.<sup>106</sup> For that reason, the sensitivities to Chinese public opinion in the government are only likely to increase. State propaganda and public feelings are significantly different in many ways but also interconnected. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the former is strong enough to challenge the latter or fundamentally divert the general course of Sino-Japanese relations. As China's mass media become more open to the transmission of

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<sup>104</sup> Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands", *International Security* 23(3), (1998/1999)

<sup>105</sup> "China: students urge PRC's declaring stand on Japan issues", *Hong Kong Ping Kuo Jih Pao*. (3 September 1997), FBIS-CHI-97-246.

<sup>106</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.148.

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information about social resentment and unrest, the government cannot afford to ignore the public opinion transmitted by the media in its policy making.

### ***MEDIA: COMMERCIALIZING ON THE MARGIN***

The best way to have a clear picture of the state position on China-Japan relations is to understand the output of the Chinese mass media. Contemporary media technology, and mass cultural forms such as television and cinema, contains radical possibilities as they allow for the transmission across society of empathy for the historical experience of others.<sup>107</sup> As to the chosen traumas, it is more than just how the next generation mimics the behavior of their parents or hears the stories they told them. In fact, in the collective political psychology, the media transmission element plays a crucial role in that no transmission of the event's representation can take place unless it is associated with deposited self- and object-images, because these are the only representations that can pass from one generation to another. In general, the official media stood firmly on a position in line with the state discourse, while also trying to include the public agenda; the popular media often provided the background information that could excite a more nationalistic attitude towards Japan while alternating between the party line and the bottom line.

Rather than a strictly top-down communication of political dogma, a more sophisticated media environment actually structured the image of Sino-Japanese

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<sup>107</sup> Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in an Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

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relations. History textbooks started to include detailed treatment of the KMT (Guo Min Dang) military campaigns against Japan, which were largely omitted before. Meanwhile, along with the textbooks, publishers also covered past war crimes more comprehensively than before, catering vivid descriptions, concrete figures, gruesome pictures, and even naming individual victim villages or persons. The film industry dedicated at least three movies to the Nanjing Massacre alone.<sup>108</sup> Numerous popular books on this topic were published, many of which were products of the initiatives of local governments and individual publishers and writers rather than the central government.<sup>109</sup> Even periodicals sponsored by the state published articles sympathetic to individual demands for war reparation.<sup>110</sup>

Facing these delicate changes in people's opinion on Japan, the government took a moderate position to co-opt rather than suppress the popular sentiment. Such a move significantly determined the reporting pattern of the media. In terms of the quantity of the reports, besides the fact that the Sino-Japanese relationship has always been a focus of the media second only to the U.S.-China relationship, it is also true that the extent of coverage will accordingly increase when there emerge certain issues in the relationship.<sup>111</sup> Regarding the content of the reports, with a brief examination, the proportion of articles that embraced the negative side went up tremendously, especially after 1995.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Yinan He, *History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007, p. 7.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Cui Baoguo, *Zhong Guo Bao Zhi De Ri Ben Bao Dao (The press reports in China about Japan)* (COMRC), <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.



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However firmly the official media stayed in line with the state, other unprecedented factors brought certain variations to their manipulation of the agendas. Even the official media, for example, *Xin-Hua*, had to play a more subtle game than before when faced with the diplomatic issues. Thus generally the official media voice on Japan juxtaposes an attitude of building a reconciled Sino-Japanese relationship and a tough position on sensitive war related issues. Meanwhile, the public tendency to *addict* to negative information about Japan and the increasing influence of nationalist sub-elites through the unofficial media strengthen the power of a radical aggressive anti-Japanese voice. The variations also encompass the financial concern that the more choices of media people have, the quicker information flow that drives the media to provide higher-quality reports. Most importantly, the editors and reporters tend to have new perspectives to produce the reports due to the replacement of the old generation by the young. Young people appear to be more hostile against Japanese though.

Intriguing is the role of cyberspace and how much it has contributed to the transmission of anti-Japanese message. The World Wide Web, online news, blogs, and BBS in China facilitate a broader range of discussion and postings of critical articles on China-Japan relations than the traditional media, even if they are still not enough to be called safe heavens for dissidents.<sup>113</sup>

Media commercialization and diversification have ended the state monopoly on the information supply and enabled pluralistic expression of divergent opinions,

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

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including those on foreign affairs.<sup>114</sup> Some media study scholars made the interesting point that nationalism in today's China has considerable consumption value, that the media sells packaged nationalism at huge profits and with official blessing.<sup>115</sup> Unofficial media seem to be more thoughtful of people's emotions on this issue rather than complying with the government completely.<sup>116</sup>

Such trend is somehow inevitable in that the government itself has not considered it a problem if it still preserves a rather pragmatic pattern on China-Japan relations. In other words, a better China-Japan relationship is actually what the Chinese government desires but it opts for maintaining the status-quo because both the objective situations in the two countries have made such a possibility dangling. Thus the approach of Beijing toward anti-Japanese nationalism is a new *twofold*: withholding its unyielding stance on the history issues while keeping the diplomatic relations with Japan on the right track by restraining the popular actions at home. Similarly, the official media have always been riding on the fence too. The difference, though, is due to the obsolete and passive institutional function the media implements. Generally the media still instruct the public opinion in line with the government. In this regard, the party sets the tone, while the media can attach their own sub-agendas and present them in a more dramatic, eye-catching and assertive manner. There is no direct evidence implying that the state propaganda guide the commercial mass media

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<sup>114</sup> Barret L. McCormick, "Recent trends in mainland China's media: political implications of commercialization", *Issues & Studies* 38(4)-39(4), (2002/03).

<sup>115</sup> See Yu Huang and Chin-Chuan Lee, *Peddling Party Ideology for a Profit: Media and the Rise of Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp.41-61.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

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to carry negative reports about Japan.<sup>117</sup>

### ***PUBLIC: RALLYING BEFORE TRAUMAS***

Unlike the intricate dilemma both the government and mass media have to live with, the public perception was rapidly inclining to an extreme. Studies show that negative reporting of Japan has exceeded favorable coverage in the Chinese media since the late 1990s. Some official mouthpieces such as the *People's Daily* have a much lower rate of negative reporting than non-propaganda newspapers though.<sup>118</sup> This indicates that the public has gone far beyond the official line in demonizing Japan. A greater social involvement has complicated the management of the relationship. Whenever there is a conflict of interest with Japan, the Chinese people always expect Japan to make concessions as they take it for granted that Japan owes China too much through history. Any public rituals, symbols of commemoration and recalls of the historical traumas, no matter by individual narrative or mass media transmission, deeply inscribed a collective anti-Japanese memory into the whole nation, strongly oppressing any unreal attempt of forgiving. The leaders, journalists, media editors and most Chinese people are linked together by a persistent sense of sameness in this particular case. In this respect, the traumatic past is so overwhelming that it continues to shape the interactions. Far from being forgotten, the past is

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<sup>117</sup> Yinan He, *History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007, p. 13.

<sup>118</sup> James Reilly and Daqing Yang, "Memory and reconciliation in East Asia: Chinese perspectives", unpublished manuscript, June 2005, pp. 20-23.

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continually relieved in the present.<sup>119</sup>

A group of historical activists who have gained increasing academic independence and political autonomy from the state have largely driven the growing public attention for the past two decades on Japanese war atrocities.<sup>120</sup> Their rediscovery of the traumatic history also further inspired the media investigation.

What further complicates the issue is the transformation of memory itself—from public narrative to hybrid forms of individualized and publicly contested memories that are subject to mobilization via multiple media of communication.<sup>121</sup> The prevalence of the Internet, along with the fact that the Chinese public could have fairly strong reactions on certain international political events, has made it imperative to look at the public opinion. Eykholt points out that “criticism of government concessions to Japan had appeared clandestinely” in the early 1980s.<sup>122</sup> Individual victims also refer to the government’s magnanimous policy (i.e., the decision to waive reparations in 1972), but insist that the debts of blood must still be repaid by the Japanese government.<sup>123</sup>

As for the young people who have much tougher stances on issues of Sino-Japanese relations, it should be highlighted that children inheriting the traumas

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<sup>119</sup> F.M.Fierke, *Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations*, Chapter in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 125.

<sup>120</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.128

<sup>121</sup> Larry Ray, Mourning, melancholia and violence in F.M. Fierke, *Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations*, Chapter in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). p.137.

<sup>122</sup> Eykholt, M. Aggression, victimization, and Chinese historiography of Nanjing massacre, in J.A. Fogel (ed.) *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.2000), p.103

<sup>123</sup> See letter to Hashimoto from Ma Yingzi, quoted in Su, Z.Weianfu yanjiu (Studies on comfort women), (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian.1999),p.273.

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from the old generation are compelled to perform, such as conducting the mourning that the mother cannot, perform, or repairing the mother so that she will regain psychological health.<sup>124</sup> Logically, the first generation who actually experienced the war or the second generation who lived their youth during the 1950s and 1960s should be more sensitive and resentful about the history issues. Quite on the contrary, the younger generation who has little direct war memory turns out to be the driving force in the anti-Japanese protests and held a more extrusive nationalistic stance.<sup>125</sup>

After the old generation, the chosen traumas were not only reawakened but further fostered among the young generation who inherited the trans-generational traumas by means of historical records, mass media reports and other forms of reminders. Unlike the old Chinese, though, the so called fourth generation has never been directly victimized. Cathy Caruth, for example, argues that trauma is capable of being passed on not only between people, but also across generations and cultures.<sup>126</sup>

Nowhere is this hyper-hostility of Japan more visible than in Chinese cyberspace. In absence of an aggressive official media, students and other youth descend on internet cafes and sought out other sources of information.<sup>127</sup> In some cases, it is beyond the government's capacity to police cyberspace in the way it controls the traditional print press. Hence in light of free flow of information, some may predict

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<sup>124</sup> Legg C, Sherick I, Wadland W. Reaction of preschool children to the birth of a sibling. *Child Psychiatry Hum Dev.* 1974 5(1):3–39.Fall. Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity. *Group Analysis*, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80.

<sup>125</sup> Christopher R. Hughes, *Chinese nationalism in the global era*, (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2006). p.57.

<sup>126</sup> Cathy, Caruth. *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History*, (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

<sup>127</sup> Stan Rosen, *Chinese Media and Youth: Attitudes toward Nationalism and Internationalism*, in Chin-chuan Lee, ed., *Chinese Media, Global Contexts* (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 97-118.

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that the public opinion could become relatively objective caused by the diversity of messages they accept. Instead, regarding the acquired paradigm of the Chinese public, the effect of free information is limited. Such a paradigm is the result of the convergence of old paradigms and interpretations of current international situations among different sections of Chinese society,<sup>128</sup> mixed with the conceptual help from the west. In fact, the easier information transmits in the cyberspace, the more nationalistic the Chinese people could become. It is because the established chosen traumas would push the information receivers to accept the negative news that would reconfirm their perception, while ignoring or even accusing the information contradictory to their interpretative framework.

According to the Public opinion investigation by *Daily Yomiuri*, from 1988-1992, the percentage of the Chinese respondents who like Japan was even a little larger than that in Japan and actually increased during the four years.<sup>129</sup> Almost 69% of the interviewees claimed confident of the development of Sino-Japanese relations into the next five years.<sup>130</sup> Nevertheless, according to an investigation organized by the International Politics Research Association of Beijing University, 60% of the respondents expressed their views that the formalization in 1972 when China gave up compensation sacrificed the national interests.<sup>131</sup>

While it is still possible for the government to create a slogan of friendship,

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<sup>128</sup> Yongming, Zhou, *Informed Nationalism: military websites in Chinese cyberspace*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 14, Number 44, August, 2005, pp. 543-562

<sup>129</sup> Liu Zhiming, *Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yi Shi Diao Cha Gai Shu (The investigation of the mutual perception of Chinese and Japanese)*, (COMRC), <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

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chances are slim for the public to speak about a sincere Chinese friendship with Japan. Even if the public can be persuaded by immediate interests to be conciliatory and restrained, they would neither forget nor forgive Japanese invasion; in the long run, their grievances against Japan would only explode with greater scale and intensity, just like what has happened since the 1980s.

After 1995, the situation seemed to be far more disappointing. With the support of the new victim narrative, the reactivation of chosen traumas triggered the outpour of people's emotions of self-pity and grievances. The public was thus preoccupied with a sense of suffering and felt little sympathy for Japan. Both the percentage of interviewees who thought Japan was trustable had declined significantly to below 40%, as was shown by the investigation of *Daily Yomiuri* in 1996.<sup>132</sup> In 1997, 25 years after the formalization of the diplomatic relations, *Asahi News* organized another poll showing that 34% of the respondents in China dislike Japan.<sup>133</sup> In 2001, for the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the diplomatic formalization, *Asahi News* initiated the second poll on mutual perceptions and the outcome indicated that the percentage of people who dislike Japan rose to about 54%. The first-ever joint poll, carried out by CASS and *Asahi News* in 2002 indicated that 50% of the Chinese respondents thought the Sino-Japanese relationship was only going "okay", and when asked to qualify this answer, the major reason on the Chinese side was the Japanese failure in

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<sup>132</sup> Liu Zhiming, *Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yi Shi Diao Cha Gai Shu (The investigation of the mutual perception of Chinese and Japanese)*, (COMRC), <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>133</sup> Li ShuangLong, Zhang Guo, *Da Zhong Chuan Mei De Bao Dao He Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yin Xiang De Xing Cheng (The reports of the mass media and the formulation of the mutual perception of Chinese and Japanese)*, <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

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understanding history.<sup>134</sup>

During the recent years, the Chinese people have even put their enmity into radical protests in which they could fight for the historical justice, the sovereignty of Diaoyu Island, and against whatever was done by the Japanese government offending their feelings. Chinese students even link the economic issues to the history problem. They see the flooding of Japanese goods into the Chinese market as Japan's renewed attempt of an *economic invasion*, and accuse it of holding back China's technological development.<sup>135</sup> The "time collapse" in traumatic memory creates a current image mixed with the past facts, which makes the economic or strategic issues inseparable from the historical memory. In 2005, ignited by Japan's bid for UNSC, spontaneous and sporadic actions resulted, far from ending, into an anti-Japanese riot exploding in several major cities in China.

Supported by the strong grievances and humiliation boosted by the chosen traumas, the unconstrained public emotions can even politicize and escalate trivial frictions into major diplomatic disturbances. In 2003, about 1,000 Chinese college students marched into the streets of Xi'an protesting an obscene skit performed by several Japanese students during a university festival. This incident led to widely spread online attacks across the nation and caused deep concern of the local government.<sup>136</sup> Concerning other major issues that China and Japan seem to disagree

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<sup>134</sup> Liu Zhiming, *Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yi Shi Diao Cha Gai Shu (The investigation of the mutual perception of Chinese and Japanese)*, COMRC, <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>135</sup> A Detailed Instruction on the Protest Against Right Wing Japanese [http://www.shanghaidiaries.com/archives/2005/04/15/a\\_detailed\\_instruction\\_on\\_the\\_protest\\_against\\_right\\_wing\\_japanese/](http://www.shanghaidiaries.com/archives/2005/04/15/a_detailed_instruction_on_the_protest_against_right_wing_japanese/)

<sup>136</sup> "Culture clash: curtain still raised on Chinese protests over obscene skit." *Asahi.com*, (3 November 2003).



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on, public pressure could hamper smooth and expeditious settlement of bilateral disputes. It is not warranted that Chinese people can distinguish the hatred toward the militaristic and right-wing minority from the dislike towards Japanese people, as what the government propaganda always addresses in accordance with the past proletarian internationalism.

In conclusion, the awkward China-Japan relationship is not so much due to the political or economic imbalance as the national chosen traumas deeply rooted in this partially reformed country. Such a traumatic memory significantly constrains the possibility of forgetting the past and the emergence of an alternative view on Japan and Sino-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, a new thinking from the Chinese academics, arguing for an analytical and emotion-free approach to Japan, has unnoticeably emerged to challenge the established mindset.

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## CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES

### *INTRODUCTION:*

In this chapter, three case studies, i.e. 1998 Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan, the failure of the New Thinking, and the 2007 Fukuda visit to Beijing, will be employed. Jiang's case will show us that the chosen trauma factor could become a barrier to the normal progress of reconciliation between China and Japan, and even affect leaders' personal decision making. The New Thinking case will help us understand why certain explorative rational opinions picturing a future-oriented Sino-Japanese relationship failed, consistent with the evolution of the chosen traumas among the public. I will also try to decipher the causes of the challenges facing the new thinking. Confronting the rooted psychological scheme of the Chinese people, or asserting that people could downplay the role of their traumatic memory, the new thinking would actually generate more anger and dissidents from the Chinese public. The final case study of Fukuda's recent visit to China in 2007 will explain the variation of chosen traumas among the state, media and public on a particular event and the impact on the gradually larger difference between the state and public in dealing with Japan. Despite the state efforts to rebuild the dynamics of the Beijing-Tokyo interaction, the public has further made their stance on Japan distant from the state.

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## ***1998 JIANG ZEMIN'S VISIT TO JAPAN***

Beijing began the 1990s with a strongly conciliatory approach toward Japan as it sought to break out of its diplomatic isolation from Western nations. It also accommodated Japanese sensitivities and avoided controversies, keeping potentially touchy issues off the agenda.<sup>137</sup> The evolution of China's approach toward the old memory gradually transformed from the chosen glory myths (the proletarian thought) to a more practical new diplomatic thinking. Rather than aiming at the bilateral relations, the government mainly used some sporadic emerging agendas like the text book issue to stir up patriotism for the sake of internal stability.

In many ways, Jiang Zemin closely followed such a diplomatic strategy toward Japan, which was actually created and consolidated by Mao and Deng. Aside from the visits of PM Kaifu, Emperor Akihito, and PM Hosokawa, whereby the history issues were deliberately obscured, Jiang even said "It is important for the Chinese to forget about the past and turn their eyes to the future...We should recognize that continuing to hark back to the unfortunate events of the past will not benefit Sino-Japanese relations".<sup>138</sup>

Before the 1998 visit, Jiang was confident about a more conciliatory Sino-Japanese relationship. There was no sign that Jiang would behave like a spokesperson for the chosen traumas or acted like the generation whose identity was imprinted with the war memory. To a large extent, Jiang seemed to signal that he

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<sup>137</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.128

<sup>138</sup> Tanno Sakutaro, The Imperial Trip: A Goodwill Mission, *Japan Echo* 19, no.4 (Winter 1992):10.

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intended to step away from the memory puzzle and act rationally in response to China-Japan relations, or in my analysis, be immunized from the trans-generational chosen traumas.

The 1998 visit, however, also known as the first formal visit of Jiang Zemin as the PRC President to Japan, turned out to be undermined by the impossibility of both leaders to agree on the wording of a joint declaration. By contrast with former leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, due to both his personal reason and the 1995 Murayama statement,<sup>139</sup> Jiang actually appeared much tougher on the history problem, despite generally inheriting the old strategy. As a result, the 1998 visit of Jiang ended up doing long-term damage to the bilateral relationship unnecessarily, even though the initial intention was to improve it.<sup>140</sup>

Shortly after an ice-breaking visit by Kim Daejung, when the ROK president agreed to settle the past in exchange for a written apology, Jiang's visit was expected to achieve the same goal in both China and Japan. To some extent, as one of the two major countries that suffered from Japan's invasion, Korea's success in getting a written apology caused potential pressure to the Chinese government. Chosen traumas in Sino-Japanese relations are largely comparison based, interaction based, socially shared, and reinforced.<sup>141</sup> South Korea, also a major victim of the Japanese imperialism, affects deeply the Chinese emotions on the traumatic memory. Some

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<sup>139</sup> On August 15, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War, Murayama stated that: "Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy."

<sup>140</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.129.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.* p.154.

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Chinese nationalists complain that their fellow Chinese are not as aggressive as South Koreans. Chinese should be more emotional and less of forgiving.<sup>142</sup> The victory of another group that might have suffered from the same traumas could not necessarily appease the potential motivation of a group to forget about revenge; quite on the contrary, it may actually provide a strong signal to further illicit the focus on the past traumas.<sup>143</sup> Prior to his visit, Jiang emphasized the need for a solution to the haunting history problem. Obuchi, the Japanese Prime Minister at that time, also hoped a successful summit with Jiang could facilitate his future-oriented diplomacy with China.

Before the final visit, Jiang outlined his principle on the matter. He stated that “Japan’s invasion of China made huge suffering to the Chinese people.”<sup>144</sup> Initially the Chinese side asked for Japan’s re-confirmation of the validity of Murayama’s 1995 statement. Following Jiang’s postponement of his visit and then Kim Daejung’s state visit, however, by mid-October the Chinese side requested an apology in the China-Japan declaration just as with the Japan-Korea declaration. Rejected by the Japanese government with only a willingness to face the history problem straightforwardly, Jiang responded by acknowledging the difficulty of reaching a consensus but he was still adamant that a “correct attitude” should be shown by the Japanese side first.<sup>145</sup>

During the first two-day round of sessions held in Hakone, Jiang and Obuchi

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Kinvall, Catarina. Nationalism, religion and the search for chosen traumas: Comparing Sikh and Hindu Identity Construction. *Ethnicities*, 2, (2002), pp.79-106.

<sup>144</sup> *Asahi Shinbun*, 24 November 1998:5

<sup>145</sup> *Asahi Shinbun*, 27 November 1998:1

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settled down smoothly. Furthermore, both agreed to conduct annual mutual visits from then on. In the framework of my thesis, it is evident that most of the strategic concerns at that time did not impede conference progress. Nevertheless, nothing could be resolved on the past history and the matter was left to the last moment between the two Foreign Ministers. They reached a general agreement after consuming discussion: while the word “aggression” would be incorporated into the joint declaration, “apology” would not. Similar to the Japan-Korea declaration, PM Obuchi was said to secretly offer a written apology in the statement in exchange for an assurance that China would not raise the history problem again. He also took a verbal apology as plan B after Beijing turned down the offer.<sup>146</sup>

The partial compromise of the Japanese side, however, was far from enough to satisfy the needs of Jiang Zemin who already established a firm mindset about the summit meeting. Unlike the moderate statement before the visit, Jiang gradually changed his mild and rational tone before the visit. His position and following behavior was more like a spokesperson for the chosen traumas, clinching on making the history problem as the hinge of his visit, while downplaying other positive aspects.

Jiang’s personal memory of history is an interesting element in this case even though it alone may not be sufficient to determine the course of the 1998 Japan visit. According to his official biographical sketch published in 1998, Jiang was born in August 1926 to a traditional intellectual family in Yangzhou. His uncle and foster

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

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father, Jiang Shangqing, who exerted a great influence on the younger Jiang becoming a revolutionary later, “led a regional anti-Japanese armed force in the northeast of Anhui Province and north of the Huai River, and sacrificed his life for the country in a battle.”<sup>147</sup> It is not unwarranted to claim that Jiang’s unpleasant experiences with Japanese occupation and the memory of his personal traumas somehow shaped his dislike of Japan.<sup>148</sup> As a “child” experiencing huge loss in the war, Jiang inherited the traumas, along with many other Chinese, from the old generation.<sup>149</sup> It is hard to predict how much influence individual psychological factor could have on international politics. As the top leader of the PRC, however, Jiang’s decision making and performance with regard to the 1998 visit seemed sophisticated in terms of whether normal state interaction could be disturbed and influenced by the individual psychological factor of a decision maker.

In a report on the issues of history and Taiwan, Jiang stated that he was opposed to the general feeling that the history issue had been resolved, and he referred to Japan’s militarist past and the suffering inflicted upon the Chinese people.<sup>150</sup> Such a position was reiterated at the banquets with the Emperor and Prime Minister Obuchi. Surprising to the Emperor and Obuchi who actually addressed little about the past, disappointed, Jiang seized every opportunity to reiterate Japan’s past aggression

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<sup>147</sup> *Chinatoday.com*, <http://www.chinatoday.com/who/j/jiangzemin.htm>

<sup>148</sup> China’s Japan experts know about Jiang’s negative attitudes and often joke about it. Jiang reportedly began the very first foreign affairs meeting he chaired by talking about Japan negatively, which set the tone for China’s Japan policy. Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.396.

<sup>149</sup> Legg C, Sherick I, Wadland W. Reaction of preschool children to the birth of a sibling. *Child Psychiatry Hum Dev.* 1974 5(1) Fall. pp.3–39. Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity. *Group Analysis*, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80.

<sup>150</sup> *Asahi Shinbun*, 28 November 1998:2

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against China and the tremendous Chinese loss of human life and property.<sup>151</sup> As a result, Jiang's statement led to a strong reaction from the Japanese media and public. The Japanese media raised all these scenarios shortly after Jiang's statement that by playing history card, Jiang scored points at home and drummed up support from the conservative factions in Beijing.<sup>152</sup>

Such disputes did not hurt the inclusion of the word "aggression" in the joint declaration and it was the first time the word was used in an official document in the history of Sino-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, opposing the request of the Chinese side, the word "apology" was not included, unlike what happened in the Korea-Japan declaration. In consequence, the choice of wording of Obuchi in response to Jiang's request totally overshadowed other positive results of negotiation such as the loan package and the cooperation plan.<sup>153</sup>

As usual, the mainstream Chinese media glossed over what was being described as a public relations disaster, as they considered it an absolute principle that the entire public attention should be led to the positive sides of diplomatic activities.<sup>154</sup> The newspaper did not disclose the dissatisfaction with the lack of a written apology other than Obuchi's oral apology and Jiang's strong position on the history problem.<sup>155</sup> Subsequent coverage in *People's Daily* naturally only reported some amicable tone from Jiang's speech at Waseda University and a following press conference. Indicated

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<sup>151</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.130.

<sup>152</sup> *Asahi shinbun*, 24 November 1998:2

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> Dreyer, J.T. "Sino Japanese Relations", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10(28): pp 373-85.

<sup>155</sup> *People's Daily*, 27 November 1998:1



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in the reports later, however, in response to a question about the failure of both sides to sign the joint declaration, Jiang stressed the fact that the declaration represented a solemn pledge regardless of whether the document had been signed or not.<sup>156</sup>

Despite Jiang's dissatisfaction, the issue did not appear to have a lasting adverse effect on the relationship as far as the official Chinese discourse is concerned. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs references the visit in the history section and its tone is still fairly positive. By sharp contrast, the meeting between Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and Prime Minister Obuchi in Beijing in July 1999 was characterized by an avoidance of history-related matters. Zhu even acknowledged that the history problem was a sensitive issue. One year later, in 2000, he restated his position that "China will not keep demanding apologies from Japan".<sup>157</sup> It proved us the possibility for the Chinese state to avoid making sharp comments on the history issue but instead focus on the bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, Zhu's initial goodwill was undermined by a series of blatant Yasukuni Shrine visits of Koizumi after 2002 and such a recession again reminded the Chinese of the old war trauma and further agitated the anti-Japanese sentiment.

Jiang's 1998 visit shows perfectly how the past weighs on the present. Under the overarching framework of reconciliation, the central problem of China-Japan relations, i.e. the history issue, can be conceptualized as dealing with the past. Jiang's 1998 visit was widely viewed as a failure because of his overemphasis on the details

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<sup>156</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (RoutledgeCurzon, c2005), p.107.

<sup>157</sup> *Japan Times Online*, 15 October 2000.

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of the apology that caused a major backlash.<sup>158</sup> Jiang's performance was considerably off the track in terms of treating his first visit to Japan as a tour of getting Japanese acknowledgment on their past crimes. The success of the Korean PM visit also encouraged him to prioritize getting a written apology.

In general, such a diplomatic failure could not only be attributed to the individual chosen trauma of Jiang, but also the potential pressure in Beijing that China could not lose face for getting nothing from the Japanese government while the Korean government partly achieved its goals. As indicated in the previous chapters, chosen traumas could be most ignited with the help of some particular event or case. As a best example for comparison, ROK could make some Chinese feel embarrassed about what they see as a far less emotional response to the Japanese. A seemingly and temporary success of another group in getting even would thus further incite the consciousness of past injustice and the determination for revenge.<sup>159</sup>

Such a paradoxical position, caused by overly focusing on the history problem, seriously troubled the already downward Sino-Japanese relations and the possibility of facilitating reconciliation. Fully aware of the anti-Japanese resentment and the uncertainty of such a national emotion, Jiang felt it a legitimate and necessary action to persist on the apology issue.<sup>160</sup> All in all, such a diplomatic disaster proves that the chosen trauma factor could act as a barrier for the China-Japan reconciliation.

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<sup>158</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.130.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid. p.166.

<sup>160</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (RoutledgeCurzon, c2005), p.109.

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## ***THE PREDICAMENT OF “NEW THINKING”***

Around 2003-2004, there emerged some Chinese scholars who believe that perhaps Japan has apologized enough. These scholars are not influenced by the traumatic memory and significantly take a unique rational approach in understanding the history problem. Such a different thought in support of a more conciliatory approach was labeled as a “New thinking toward Japan”. When these scholars tried to break out of the limit of memory, however, their voice, as a result, was harshly criticized among the intellectuals and popular opinions, regardless of whether their points make sense or not.

As revealed earlier, the Chinese state has recently held a more ambiguous position in dealing with Japan. In many cases, the top leaders and foreign ministers understand that sometimes putting history aside would secure a much easier diplomatic atmosphere for the Beijing-Tokyo interaction. Such an understanding, or more precisely a pragmatic approach, was not only discussed behind closed doors at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and *Zhong Nan Hai*, the leadership compound in central Beijing, but also debated with passion by both academic experts and popular nationalists.<sup>161</sup>

A well-known *People’s Daily* editor, Ma Licheng, asserted that “the Japanese apology issue has been resolved. There is no need to be inflexible on the form of

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<sup>161</sup> Peter Gries, China’s “new thinking” on Japan, *The China Quarterly*, no.184, (December 2005). p.831.

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apology.” He also argued that the current anti-Japanese feelings were grounded not only in misperception but also were detrimental to China’s efforts to develop amicable relations with neighboring countries.<sup>162</sup> Echoing Ma’s unprecedented statement, a leading international relations scholar, Shi Yinghong, published an article calling for a diplomatic revolution in China’s relationship with Japan. Ma and Shi’s views indicated the problem of dwelling too much on the past and its possibility of hurting China’s international reputation as well as its social stability.

Ma and Shi, along with their minority supporters, have shown an example of how independent intellectuals can be somehow immunized from the chosen traumas and try to break the history dilemma through their explorative ideas. Not as much as a treatment, the new thinking proposed by Ma and Shi suggests a latent concern for the danger to a certain group by overly dwelling on the past and avoiding the future. In an essay that launched thousands of critical commentaries on the Internet and in print outlets, Ma suggested boldly that China should move beyond the shadow of history and improve its relations with Japan. Thus, opposing the drowning in negative war memories, Ma’s essay tried to cast the understanding of China and Japan differently: Japan as a developed, peaceful country and China as no longer a victim.<sup>163</sup>

Shi Yinhong, employed as a professor of People’s University, published another article shortly afterwards, advocating a diplomatic revolution to seek a closer

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<sup>162</sup> Ma Licheng, *The apology issue has been resolved*, [www.blog.sina.com.cn/malicheng](http://www.blog.sina.com.cn/malicheng).

<sup>163</sup> Ma Licheng, New thinking toward Japan: Worries of Chinese and Japanese private citizens, *Strategy and Management*, no.6 (2002).

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relationship between China and Japan.<sup>164</sup> His perspective from the broad international balance of power was from a different angle than Ma's. "It will be extremely beneficial to China," he writes, "if, through improving relations with Japan, China can improve its security environment and its diplomatic position".<sup>165</sup> Determined not to be strangled by the memory burden, he argued that "We cannot forget history, but we cannot stagnate in history either." "We cannot slip into emotion," Shi pleaded, "but must focus on strategic relations".<sup>166</sup> Both Ma and Shi advocated that China's Japan policy should focus on the strategic and economic benefits of their cooperation and avoid being bogged down by the history quarrels that only involve secondary interests.<sup>167</sup>

Even if Ma and Shi's real goal was trying to explore a third way of breaking the deadlock of the reconciliation, their unique position elicited huge debates and fervent personal attacks on the Internet. Some observers claimed that their position was indeed tacitly supported by the top leaders.<sup>168</sup> Even though Ma and Shi's new thinking was not a revolutionary change in Chinese government's Japan policy, some analysts believed that both Ma and Shi had political connections within the Hu Jintao leadership. Some people, including many Japanese researchers focusing on China,

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<sup>164</sup> Shi Yinhong, A closer Sino-Japanese relations and diplomatic revolution, *Strategy and Management*, no.3 (2003).

<sup>165</sup> Ibid. p.71-72.

<sup>166</sup> Shi Yinhong, Strategic thinking in Sino-Japanese relations, *World Economics and International Politics*, No.9 (2003), p.10-11.

<sup>167</sup> Peter Gries, China's "new thinking" on Japan, *The China Quarterly*, no.184, (December 2005).

<sup>168</sup> Feng Shaokui, "Dui Ri guanxi de jiannan qiusuo" (Searching for solutions to Sino-Japanese relations), *Shiejie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economic and Politics, 2004) p.5.

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speculated that the “new thinking” represented a “trial balloon” from Hu on the Japan policy.<sup>169</sup>

As this paper has claimed previously about the public, however, the massive resentment towards the Japanese could not tolerate such a heterodoxy point. Compared with the accumulated heritage of anti-Japanese movies, publishers, TV documentaries, exhibitions, and museums, the new thinking appeared both accidental and antipathetic to the public.

Ma’s controversial position that the history question be put to rest quickly came under fire. A summer 2003 *War of Resistance* contained over a dozen essays strongly disagreeing with Ma.<sup>170</sup> One of those voices that attracted the most attention was Feng Zhaokui who is a famous scholar in Japan studies. He insisted that the history question is “difficult, complex, emotional and long-term” and therefore is likely to persist for a long time.<sup>171</sup> Likewise, Shi also quickly came under heavy and sustained attacks. One of his first and most ferocious critics was from Lin Zhibo of *People’s Daily*. Lin was indignant about Shi’s “irresponsible” attitude towards the history problem. “People have memories, and a nation’s memory cannot be erased...Instead

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<sup>169</sup> See Hiroyuki Sugiyama, “People’s Daily slams anti-Japan rhetoric,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 14 December 2002. Peter Gries, China’s “new thinking” on Japan, *The China Quarterly*, no.184, (December 2005). p.843

<sup>170</sup> Peter Gries, China’s “new thinking” on Japan, *The China Quarterly*, no.184, (December 2005). p.838.

<sup>171</sup> Feng Shaokui, “Dui Ri guanxi de jiannan qiusuo” (Searching for solutions to Sino-Japanese relations), *Shiejie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economic and Politics, 2004) p.78.

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of asking the Chinese government to be tolerant and magnanimous, it should be more important to ask the Japanese government to restrain its ugly behaviors”<sup>172</sup>

The critiques from intellectuals were still quite mild compared with Ma and Shi’s treatment on the Internet and in real life from the public. Ma was repeatedly called a “traitor”. His address and phone numbers were posted on the web along with a call to burn down his house.<sup>173</sup> In a post entitled “Ma Licheng, we say no to you!” on *Xinhua.net* Forum, an anonymous netizen concluded with the line: “Ma Licheng, it doesn’t matter how much you kiss Japanese ass, we have only one thing to say to you: the devils will be back!”<sup>174</sup> Ma even received death threats. In the summer of 2003, Ma requested and received early retirement from the *People’s Daily* and left Beijing.<sup>175</sup> Both Ma and Shi were labeled as “Japan-lover”, “Traitors”, and “Pro-Japan People” (*qinri*).<sup>176</sup> Even more strikingly, the new thinking did not stem the swelling tide of anti-Japanese popular opinion in 2003-2004. The new thinking proved totally unacceptable in academic circles and to the broader public, while at the same time the diplomatic performance of the Chinese state have in many cases followed the new thinking by cooling down the heat towards Japan.

Ma and Shi’s points, to a large extent, were actually in line with the tendency of the state discourse, especially after Hu Jintao’s accession. Most of the ideas were also

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<sup>172</sup> Lin Zhibo, “Questioning the ‘new thinking’”, *The People’s Net*, p.217.

<sup>173</sup> Liu Xiaobiao, “Hezhe aiguo, hezhe haiguo?” (“Who loves their country, and who harms their country?”), *Waitan Huabao* (The Bund), 14 August 2003.

<sup>174</sup> “Ma Licheng, women dui ni shuo bu!” (“Ma Licheng, we say no to you!”), Xinhuanet Forum, 17 December 2002. Peter Gries, China’s “new thinking” on Japan, *The China Quarterly*, no.184, (December 2005). p.838

<sup>175</sup> Peter Gries, China’s “new thinking” on Japan, *The China Quarterly*, no.184, (December 2005). p.839.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.* p. 838.

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endorsed by many Japanese and Western scholars.<sup>177</sup> Nevertheless, the major cause of the failure of their rational and prospective proposals is exactly what this paper has tried to argue, i.e. chosen traumas, when evolved into an ethnical marker of the Chinese identity, virtually constraints the change of the popular opinion on China-Japan relations.

The crushing defeat of Ma and Shi's attempts proved that it was substantially against the evolution of people's chosen traumas to simply provide a seemingly innovative policy consideration while actually returning to the old strategy of the 1970s, and brushing the concerns about history aside for practical purposes. It was evident that starting from the activation of the traumas in the 1980s, toward the time collapse of linking the present event to past traumas, the chosen traumas of the Chinese people has already evolved into considerable irrational discourse and behavior. No matter how insightful the views actually were, when they appeared to drastically confront the rooted psychological scheme of the Chinese people, or to imply that people could erase their traumatic memory, the reawakening of long suppressed suffering could understandably generate enormous anger toward Japan. Sporadic and trivial accidents could be magnified as an immediate and proximate presence under the name of remembering history. Likewise, rational and practical approaches could be misinterpreted as traitors' language and ridiculous opinions.

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<sup>177</sup> See Xue Li, "ZhongRi guanxi nengfou chaoyue lishi wenti?" ("Can Sino-Japanese relations overcome the history question?"), *Zhanlue yu guanli*, No.4 (2003), pp.28-33. Pan Zhongying, Increasing co-operation or confrontation? Foresightedness is needed in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations, *World Economics and International Politics*, No.9 (2003), pp.15-17.



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The case of the 2003 New Thinking also highlights another part of the chosen trauma perspective. That is, unless people could forsake their determination to get even or get justice, there can be no new beginning and no transformation of the relationship. Everyone will remain imprisoned in a particular history, recycling old crimes and hatreds while the present is dominated by a particular past collective memory. Most posts in the online forums covering the political or social news about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations would naturally be followed by nasty attacks and profanity.<sup>178</sup> It is not difficult for us to understand why the new thinking would be swiftly criticized, scolded, and ridiculed by the netizens. Being the subject of the chosen traumas and the major force in the protests, this generation of young Chinese has transformed their dissatisfaction with Japan into attacks and violent actions.

Once established, public resentment against Japan also creates social pressure on what might be called *deviant* ideas or behaviors. As a Chinese journalist notes correctly, comments on the Internet push each other to become more extreme, and those who voice moderate opinion (even not as provocative as the new thinking) get lambasted. This verbal tyranny has silenced moderates and encouraged those in the middle to become more extreme.<sup>179</sup>

One step further than merely “the intention to get even” or “irrational expression and behavior”, the whole hatred and anger toward Japan finally evolved into a mass

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<sup>178</sup> Ming Wan. *Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) p.141.

<sup>179</sup> Liu Xiaobo, “Fangzhi jiduan minzuzhuyi qingxu jiechi zhongguo” (Prevent extreme nationalist sentiment kidnap China), *People.com*, January 8, 2004.

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riot sweeping major cities in 2005. The Anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005 were a series of demonstrations, some peaceful, some violent, sparked off by a number of issues, including the approval of a Japanese history textbook and the proposal that Japan be granted a permanent seat on the UNSC. Some businesses with connections to Japan were vandalized by protesters, as were billboards advertising Japanese goods and stores stocking Japanese made products.<sup>180</sup> Before being mobilized into such a mass movement, the anti-Japanese sentiment had actually brewed for a long period of time, with the support of numerous online articles that are more accessible than paper work through cyber forums and bulletin systems. College students, a few grassroots nongovernmental anti-Japanese nationalists, and some passionate intellectuals became the major force that inspired the massive anti-Japanese sentiment and finally stepped up to initiate the protests.

In general, it is proper to define the new thinking event as an interlude interrupted in the heated anti-Japanese sentiment around 2003-2005. It is likely that Ma and Shi, along with a few other intellectuals who supported their ideas, consciously felt the danger of such strong and largely irrational anti-Japanese sentiments among the public. Unfortunately, the result of their proposals has offered us a best case to test how the public's established chosen trauma scheme would respond to something that virtually challenges their mindset. To sum up, the well-advised new thinking was easily knocked out by the activated chosen traumas.

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<sup>180</sup> *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, "China orders halt to anti-Japanese protests-Singapore paper", 5 April 2005.  
*BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, "Anti-Japanese activist put under house arrest in China", 16 April 2005.

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## ***2007 FUKUDA'S VISIT TO CHINA***

Before Fukuda's accession to power, Chinese PM Wen had already established a more amicable diplomatic channel with Abe Shinzo. Despite the mutual visits between the two leaders, however, Abe's hawkish background and ambiguous position on the Yasukuni Shrine Visit did not really dispel the worries. As far as the Chinese side is concerned, Fukuda's arrival in office heralded a break from the ambitious nationalist politics promoted by Abe, who repeatedly invoked the need for a more assertive Japan that is less apologetic about its imperial history. Fukuda's friendly China policy, in line with Abe's stance, could thus be more practical and less worrying as his background seemed to make him more approachable than Abe.

Early in the first meeting between Fukuda and Wen Jiabao in Singapore, they agreed on that the two nations have entered a new stage of deepening strategic ties, with Fukuda planning a China visit as early as next month and Wen's promising efforts to resolve a long-running gas exploration dispute in the East China Sea. Apparently his vow to not visit the Yasukuni Shrine paved the way for both the leaders to put aside disputes about history. 2007 is the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and both leaders agreed to take the chance to accelerate the conciliation steps that began in 2006.

With the positive atmosphere created by Wen and Abe, Fukuda took this visit as an opportunity to constructively contribute to the forging of "strategically reciprocal

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relations”.<sup>181</sup> Negotiating the East China Sea oil dispute and promoting business opportunities for Japanese companies were the major points of his visit. Wen and Fukuda reached consensus on the East China Sea issue, agreeing to continue the consultation at the vice-ministerial level to seek workable solutions. Aside from talks with Chinese leaders, Fukuda delivered a speech at Beijing University and played baseball with Premier Wen, as Wen showed his baseball interest and skills during his visit in Kyoto. Fukuda not only visited Qu Fu-the birth place of Confucius-as a sign of respect for the Chinese cultural heritage in Japan, but also a portal in Tianjin that might be open to considerable Japanese investment. The two sides agreed that President Hu will pay a visit to Japan next spring, which would be the first visit to Japan by Chinese head of state in ten years since Jiang Zemin in 1998. As to the Taiwan issue, Fukuda stated four “NOs”, saying Japan would give no support to the claims of “one China, one Taiwan”, “Taiwan independence” or “Taiwan authorities” attempts to seek UN membership through “referendum”.

When Fukuda wrapped up his four-day tour in China, his visit was seen as a “herald of spring” for China-Japan ties.<sup>182</sup> From “ice-breaking” to “a herald of spring”, at least at the governmental level, the umbrage of 2005 seemed to have been dissipated effectively by the diplomatic efforts. The media reports naturally went along with the state by highlighting the positive elements of Fukuda and the possibility of a future-oriented Sino-Japanese relationship. Concerning the history issue, Fukuda said Japan would “very earnestly” reflect on the “agonizing part of

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<sup>181</sup> *Xinhua News Agency*, September 29, 2007

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*

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history” and continue to follow the path of peaceful development in the hope of establishing “forward-looking China-Japan relations”.<sup>183</sup>

Concerning the history issue, Fukuda said Japan would “very earnestly” reflect on the “agonizing part of history” and continue to follow the path of peaceful development in the hope of establishing “forward-looking China-Japan relations”.<sup>184</sup> Nonetheless, Fukuda’s mild position, with the efforts made by Wen and Abe for the last two years did not really change the way Chinese people look at Sino-Japanese relations. According to some online polls investigating the public opinion on Fukuda’s visit, the negative image of Japan and China-Japan relations did not make huge change whereas the media reports kept on highlighting the positivities. Major TV networks including CCTV and Phoenix paid significant attention to Fukuda’s visit in terms of consecutive reports for days. In addition to the electronic media, print media also produced such titles as “Warm Spring Trip”, “Ice-Breaking Trip” to highlight the importance of this visit.<sup>185</sup>

Such a positive signal and encouraging tone, however, did not effectively reach the public. Based on the poll of *Phoenix TV online*, 69.5% of the respondents supported that “The progress is limited. The major problems of the relations remain unsolved.” Only 24.3% of the respondents thought “Considerable progress has been made.” When asked about the major problems that impeded Sino-Japanese relations,

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<sup>183</sup> *Xinhua News Agency*, September 29, 2007

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> For details, see the official websites of CCTV, People’s Daily and Xinhua News. <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/113357/index.html>  
<http://news.cctv.com/special/C20380/01/index.shtml>  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-11/19/content\\_7107468.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-11/19/content_7107468.htm)

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71.6% of the respondents still persisted on the “history issue” and the “Yasukuni Shrine Visit.” By contrast, 28.4% of the respondents voted for the East China Sea oil disputes, which was the key agenda of the meeting between Wen and Fukuda.<sup>186</sup>

Likewise, according to the poll of *Wen Hui Daily Online*, 41.6% of the respondents chose “the history issue” over 15.6% who chose the “oil dispute”.<sup>187</sup> In order to have a more direct and specific view of the mutual perception change after Fukuda’s visit, taking advantage of the field trip to China, I also conducted a survey in December 2007 of how the Chinese people perceive the change in Sino-Japanese relations (See Table 4.3). When asked “In your opinion, what is the general attitude of the Chinese on Japan and Japanese?” 30.1% of the respondents chose “relatively hostile” and 22.8% chose “Very hostile.” When asked “How do you think of the future trend of Sino-Japanese relations?” only 23% of the respondents chose “Toward Reconciliation” while 49% of them considered that “No rapid change could be made.”<sup>188</sup> 56.6% of the respondents still considered the history problem unsolved. The results of the surveys, whether from the mass media or the author’s fieldwork, indicate that the public’s attitude was not yet affected by the efforts of both governments, despite the official drumbeating and propaganda. Also, no improvement was witnessed in comparison with the popular opinion on Japan during the Koizumi period. In 2002, the China-Japan Mutual-Perception poll showed 43.3% felt

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<sup>186</sup> <http://news.ifeng.com/special/futianfanghua/> The sample number of the survey is 2520.

<sup>187</sup> [http://survey.wenweipo.com/know.php?vote\\_id=417](http://survey.wenweipo.com/know.php?vote_id=417)

<sup>188</sup> The survey in China totally collects 123 effective samples out of 130 surveys (Business 48 Freelancer 6 Scholars 3 Students 46 Others 20). 75% of the interviewees are males. 90% of the interviewees range from 18-45 years old.

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unfriendly or very unfriendly towards Japan.<sup>189</sup>

**Table 4.3 \* The 2008 China-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (China)<sup>190</sup>**

	Positive	Relatively positive	Negative	Relatively negative
<b>General attitude</b>	7%	12%	22%	30%
<b>Future trend</b>	23%	20%	49%	/
<b>History problem resolved</b>	12%	14%	27%	29%

Ever since the 1998 Jiang Zemin visit to Japan, the Japanese's popular opinion on relations with China has been suffering from an "apology fatigue." Even after 2007, 70% of the Japanese respondents (in Japan) in my survey expressed their impatience about the apology demand of the Chinese. Coming to terms with the past pain by forgiving history would free people from a particular collective memory, and form a new memory that creates the symbolic space for people to orient themselves towards a new future. Such a new future would promise the possibility of reconciliation with past opponents. Based on the current efforts made by both Japanese and Chinese leaders alone, in sharp contrast with the popular animosity, the disappearance of the history problem still seems rather idealistic. One of the major reasons that cause such a forgiveness dilemma is the failure to set aside the traumatic memory.

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<sup>189</sup> Liu Zhiming, *Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yi Shi Diao Cha Gai Shu (The investigation of the mutual perception of Chinese and Japanese)*, COMRC, <http://www.comrc.com.cn/>

<sup>190</sup> This figure does not include other choices toward the questions like "Not sure".

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From the public perspective, cynicism becomes inevitable as it is almost impossible to draw a clear line between the history problem and contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. The media shares a part in terms of pushing the boundary of a new approach in dealing with Japan by spreading the new thinking. Nevertheless, having been heavily exposed to the details of Japanese war atrocities broadcasted by all kinds of media, the Chinese public has been highly receptive to negative news about Japan and tends to reject any disconfirming information. In consequence, as long as the chosen trauma is still reflected by the media and the historical memory still remains, it is impractical to achieve a complete reconciliation, let alone a future-oriented Sino-Japanese relationship.

In conclusion, the case of Fukuda visit, in comparison with the Hu visit, verifies the dramatic gap between the state and public in dealing with the chosen traumas on China-Japan relations. While the government could still be less emotional and demagogic on Japan, or in other words tackle the puzzle of historical memory, the chosen traumas of the public have considerably evolved into a constant and bone-deep suspicion on Japan.



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## CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

### *FINDINGS OF THE STUDY*

Among all the foreign relations of China, the Sino-Japanese relationship has been somewhat unique in terms of the frequent conflicts over history issues and war memory. The degree and intensity of the mutual mistrust also attracted much attention to this topic. In Chapter One and Two, in addition to introducing the importance of my research, the general scope and the overarching argument, I have also analyzed the Sino-Japanese relationship in the view of *reconciliation*. Particularly from the Chinese side, this thesis has tried to decipher the situation in China in dealing with the “shared memory” and “historical justice” elements of reconciliation. To lead Sino-Japanese relations to a more constructive direction, therefore, the two countries must achieve the goals internalized in the process of reconciliation. As the essence of reconciliation, the impact of the collective memory underlines the various difficulties for China and Japan to reach a real rapprochement.

The failure of the Chinese to settle down the history problem, which is largely related to the “shared memory” and “justice” of reconciliation, not only magnifies the negative side of the history, but also implicates the difficulty for both the governments to deal with the strategic issues. This thesis also sheds light on understanding the collective memory of the Chinese people on Sino-Japanese relations.

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In Chapter Three, “Chosen traumas”, a concept from the insights of psychoanalytic theory is positioned as a key of the collective memory, helping us understand the psychological inducement of the history problem. It gives us a more explanatory and analytical way than the general Chinese nationalism literature to interpret the hinge of the China-Japan quandary, i.e. the past weighs too heavy on the present. It may seem odd to discuss reconciliation in the context of a relationship between two countries which ceased hostilities nearly sixty years ago, which normalized relations thirty years ago, and which are actively pursuing a friendly, cooperative partnership at the beginning of the twenty-first century.<sup>191</sup> Chosen traumas, imprinted on the group psychology of the public and significantly determining the political discourse and diplomatic practice of the state, have become the central factor restraining the possible reconciliation between China and Japan.

The chosen traumas also varied among the three actors, i.e. the state, media and public, along with the historical progress of Sino-Japanese relations. The period from 1949, when the PRC was founded, to the early 1980s, which witnessed a benign bilateral relationship, makes huge contrast with the time period from the mid-1980s till today. With different patterns in dealing with Japan, the chosen trauma factor altered the expression and behavior of the three actors, by evolving from a dormant historical fact to a necessary part of national identity.

In Chapter Four, in order to support the arguments in the previous chapters, three cases studies provide the empirical evidence of my thesis. From a decision making

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<sup>191</sup> Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future?* (Routledge Curzon, c2005), p.15.

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perspective, the 1998 Jiang case shows us how the trauma factor could influence the strategic discussion, as well as leaders' personal decision making. In the case of 2003 New Thinking, it provides a clear picture of the different patterns of the state, media and public in response to a rational and memory-free opinion tacitly endorsed by the state. It thus serves as an excellent benchmark to measure the effect of chosen traumas on the Chinese society. The final case study draws the contours of the recent public opinion and media line when facing an amicable state relationship. It further proves the huge gap today between the Chinese state and public in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the statement that Sino-Japanese relations have been on the right track due to the governmental efforts since 2006, this case indicates that the underlining memory element still significantly threatens the future development.

### ***POLICY IMPLICATIONS***

Around the middle of May in 2008, President Hu Jintao paid his first formal visit to Japan. Not surprisingly, similar to the Fukuda visit in 2007 and the mutual visit of PM Wen to Japan afterwards, this visit was also defined as a “Warm Spring Visit.”<sup>192</sup> Numerous positive reports broadcasted about how the Japanese officials and citizens warmly greeted the visit of Hu and the significant meaning of his visit to the normal development of Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the major argument of this thesis, the media reports attached huge importance to the notion that the biggest hope for

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<sup>192</sup> See <http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/hjt200805/>

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peaceful co-existence of the two countries still rooted in the public.<sup>193</sup> From the assessment of this piece, however, whether such a diplomatic reconciliation promises a real and future-oriented rapprochement of these two nations is still highly questionable, and would have to be tested by time.

Coincidentally, when this piece of work was under final revision, the outbreak of the dispute over Senkaku (*Diao Yu*) Island between Japan and Taiwan, triggered by an incident of fish boat crushing, added another interesting consideration.<sup>194</sup> Surrounded by strong nationalistic resentment, both from the public and the governing party KMT, the island dispute seriously overshadowed the cooperative relations between Japan and Taiwan for the past decade.<sup>195</sup> Despite the complicated international dynamics involved among the chief players in the region, i.e. China, Taiwan, Japan and the U.S., the anger upon the “bullying” over the Taiwanese fishing boats was considerably related to the history, and the general image of Japanese as past invaders. Such a case may help us understand better the chosen traumas among the Chinese (as a people). With the Taiwanese case, more factors are available to test the influence of chosen traumas on Taiwan-Japan relations, including the colonization heritage, the more pluralistic and open state-society dynamics, and the implicit pro-Japan power and voice in Taiwan,

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid. Also see the consecutive TV reports (News Weekly) on Hu’s visit at CCTV9 (News Channel), April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2008.

<sup>194</sup> *Asia-Pacific News*, Jun 13, 2008

<sup>195</sup> *People’s Daily*, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/22/eng20050622\\_191602.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/22/eng20050622_191602.html)

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## ***ACADEMIC IMPLICATIONS***

From a much broader scope, chosen traumas, or other insightful literature from the political psychology field, may also help understand the *soft* side of other international relations concerning the PRC, for example, Sino-American relations, Sino-Russian relations, and even Sino-Indian relations, to name a few. Not necessarily related to the traumas in memory, it may be interesting to focus on the memory of war with respect to the military conflicts between each other in history. Such studies may help us further elaborate the nationalism among the Chinese public. Far from the result of xenophobia, or any kind of pride of a stronger nation, it may be necessary to shed light on the historical memory and how the particular memories shaped the public perception. In general, rather than get rid of the nationalism scholarship, by taking a political psychology approach, it could be helpful to narrow down, and specify the scope of the Chinese nationalism literature in investigating different cases. In other words, it still has enough space to restructure the knowledge of Chinese nationalism by focusing on more specific fields.

By contrast with the scholarship of nationalism, which pays significant attention to the series of xenophobic activities of the public, the political psychology insights could elaborate more profoundly the variation of collective memory in accordance with the change of state-society dynamics since the reform and opening. Rather than the interpretation of seeking the resurrection of the old glory of Chinese Empire, the study on memory may remind us of the negative sense of past history, as well as its influence on the Chinese public opinion about certain foreign nations. Among the

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most important foreign relations of China, the PRC almost had military conflicts, big or small, with all the important players in the region including America, Russia, India and Japan. Although the degree of negative memory may vary differently regarding these relations, the reminder and emphasis on such conflict history would implant considerable suspicion and enmity toward a particular country.

What makes such a research more alluring is the combination of the analysis on civil society evolution and media function change. Whereas the Chinese public has been opened to more external information and western thoughts, the generic distrust on western nations has actually further spread and deepened. Moreover, such a paradoxical development would make the media environment more delicate in handling the growing nationalism. Last but not the least, in combined with the two factors above, another question is about the generation factor, i.e. the younger generation appears more nationalistic over certain international relations than the older generation who had actually experienced the history. With all these considerations involved, the literature on nationalism would have to expand its scope to incorporate more research on the Chinese as individuals and groups.

## ***CONCLUSION***

The chosen trauma factor dampens enthusiasm for cooperation between parties, even if it alone is not sufficient to cover the whole picture of why two countries fail to reconcile in various areas. The contemporary Sino-Japanese relations are thus built

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upon both the material or strategic interests and the political psychology inducement. It is hard to assess and predict whether the chosen traumas that make the Chinese project a negative self-image onto the Japanese will gradually disappear, be alleviated, or keep lingering. Given the point made by Cooley in *Human Nature and the Social Order*, in a pessimistic sense, “A man in a rage does not want to get out of it...An enduring hatred may also be a source of satisfaction to some minds”.<sup>196</sup> In general, the future reconciliation of China and Japan, if possible, is connected with the resolution of historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan more than the negotiation and balance of strategic interests. The influence of chosen traumas over generations will still continue, even though the economic relations and growing interdependence seem to generally advance regardless of the history problem. As the psychological influence is implicit and perplexing, however, it will remain essential to investigate Sino-Japanese relations from a political psychology perspective.

Based on the findings in my thesis, I conclude that the chosen traumas, as a result of state ideological restraint to an increasingly independent factor prevailing in the public opinion, not only confine the possibility of complete reconciliation, but also impede the future development of Sino-Japanese relations.

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<sup>196</sup> Quote Charles Horton Cooley, *Human nature and the social order*. (New York , Chicago , C. Scribner's sons 1922). Peter, Gries, *China's New Nationalism* (University of California Press, 2004), p.51.

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## APPENDICES

### 2008 China-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (China)

1. In your opinion, what is the general attitude of the Chinese on Japan and Japanese?  
A. Friendly B. Relatively Friendly C. Relatively Hostile D. Very Hostile E. Not Sure
2. What do you think is the mainstream perception of the Japanese public on Chinese?  
A. Friendly B. Prevailing despise C. Hostile D. Complicated E. Not Sure
3. How do you think of the future trend of Sino-Japanese Relations?  
A. Toward reconciliation B. No rapid change could be made C. Exacerbation D. No Comments
4. In your opinion, what is the main factor disturbing the normal development of the Sino-Japanese Relations? (MCQ)  
A. Japan's attitude in dealing with the history and Taiwan problem  
B. The pro-right trend and the frequent visits of the leaders to Yasukuni Shrine  
C. The rise of China gives pressure to Japan  
D. China's toughs stance demanding the apology from Japan and Japan's reluctance to satisfy the requests of the Chinese government  
E. Others
5. What do you think of the reports of the mainstream Chinese media on Japan?  
A. Too negative B. Quite objective C. Not enough to disclose the full picture of the Japanese atrocity D. Not Sure
6. What was the role of Japan in the World War Two?  
A. Victimizer B. Victim C. The Loser D. Not Sure
7. What do you think is the role of Yasukuni Shrine Visit in Sino-Japanese relations?  
A. Very important B. Important C. Normal D. Neglectable E. No Comments
8. What is the key of the Sino-Japanese Relations in the future?  
A. China should withstand the economic development and keep strong and stable  
B. Japan must apologize  
C. Japan should overcome its nationalism (militarism)  
D. China should be more tolerant and stop going after Japan for the history problem  
E. No comments
9. What are the merits of Japanese that Chinese should learn from?  
A. Persevering  
B. United

- 
- C. Ambitious
  - D. Valorous
  - E. The respect for traditional culture
  - F. Willing to accept the advanced foreign culture
  - G. Having collective belief
  - H. Others:

10. What do you think of the Japanese people that you have contacted with before? (MCQ)

- A. Polite B. Fashionable C. Diligent D. Clever E. Brave F. Kind G. Arrogant E. Others (or No contact).

Job Description: A. Business employer B. Public Service C. Students D. Freelancer E. Others\_\_\_\_\_

Age\_\_\_\_\_ Gender\_\_\_\_\_

Thank you very much!