

LITERATI ENTREPRENEUR:

WEI ZHIYAN IN THE TONKIN-NAGASAKI SILK TRADE

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SUMMARY

This study attempts to discern the nature of the Chinese junk trade during the seventeenth century by examining social, religious and cultural ties among Chinese maritime traders and the influence of these ties on the organization of trade. Based on Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese sources, it will investigate the activities of the Wei brothers in the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade from the 1630s to the 1680s. In doing so, it will argue that Chinese maritime networks were developed on the basis of economic, kinship, religious and cultural affiliations embedded in the social and commercial development of the late-Ming gentry society in China, and therefore that the nature of the early modern Chinese junk trade was in essence private and informal. It will demonstrate the shifts that took place around the rim of the East and South China Seas in the seventeenth century and point to the Qing conquest of Taiwan as a watershed in the maritime history of East and Southeast Asia. Lastly, it intends to show that biographical study can be a useful tool for writing history, as it complements the limitations of the approaches defined by the modern nation states.

Part One delineates the landscape of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade and introduces Wei Zhiyan as a key subject of this thesis. Chapter One is dedicated to a description of the natural, political and economic environment for trade in Tonkin during the seventeenth century. Chapter Two portrays the rise and fall of Tonkinese

raw silk exports to Japan in the seventeenth century by combining the perspectives of Chinese junk traders with what is already known of the trade from VOC and English sources. This chapter intends to provide an alternative view that complements the hitherto Dutch-centered narrative of the early modern seaborne commerce between northern Vietnam and Japan. Chapter Three is a survey of Wei Zhiyan's activities. Plowing through Dutch, English, Chinese and Japanese sources, it presents fragments of his life in a chronological sequence.

Part Two is the analytical accompaniment to Part One. Existing materials on Tonkin are scarce. Owing to the unparalleled wealth of Japanese and Chinese materials, Chapters Four and Five are set in Nagasaki. Chapter Four examines the Wei brothers' involvement in the Sōfukuji monastic community and illustrates the roles of Buddhist monasteries and monks in commerce. Chapter Five is an extended case in point of how informal and private connections with the local elites helped the Wei brothers gain the upper hand in trade at Nagasaki. Chapter Six provides a quantitative analysis that will show how the factors that were in operation at the time in Chapter Four translated into efficient trade.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BEFEO</i>	<i>Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient</i>
DB	<i>Dagh-register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India</i>
DN	Daghregister des Comptoirs Nagasaki
<i>DVSKTT</i>	<i>Đại việt sử ký toàn thư</i>
EIC	the English East India Company
<i>GM</i>	<i>Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie</i>
<i>JSEAS</i>	<i>Journal of Southeast Asian Studies</i>
<i>KH</i>	<i>Kai hentai</i>
<i>NMHC</i>	Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture
NFJ	Archives of the Nederlandse Factorij in Japan te Hirado en Deshima or the Dutch Factory in Japan at Hirado and Deshima
<i>TI</i>	<i>Tsūkō ichiran</i>
<i>TKN</i>	<i>Tōtsūji kaisho nichiroku</i>
<i>TK</i>	<i>Tokugawa kinreikō</i>
VOC	Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie or the Dutch East India Company
IOR	India Office Record, the British Library

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UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

- catty* Unit of weights. 1 catty = 16 taels = c. 600 grams
- facaar* A unit of weight in Tonkin. Purchase price shows how many taels of raw silk could be purchased for one tael of silver. Prices included both those offered by the Chua as well as local silk merchants.
- tael* A monetary unit and a unit of weights. 1 tael = 2.85 Dutch guilders before 1666 and 1 tael = 3.5 Dutch guilders after 1667. 1 tael = c. 37.5 grams.
- koku* A dry and liquid measure in Japan. 1 *koku* = c.180 liters.

GLOSSARY

D. Dutch; J. Japanese; C. Chinese; E. English

- baa* (D.) J. *ba* 紮 or *baa* ぼあ. Silk fabric with glossy surface. Thin but durable. Plain or died.
- bakufu* (J.) J. 幕府. The government of the Tokugawa *shōgun*.
- Nagasaki *bugyō* (J.) J. 長崎奉行. Magistrates of Nagasaki.
- calimbak* (D.) J. *kyara* 伽羅. Aloes wood.
- cassomba* (D.) Safflower, used for making red and yellow die
- chioe* (D.) Silk fabric. Either *chau* (J. 茶苧) or satin (J. *shusu* 縞子). *Chau* was named after Indian port city Chaul, near Bombay.
- chioerony* (D.) J. 綢. Silk fabric. A higher-quality of *sommungi*.
- chōgin* (J.) J. 丁銀. D. *schuitgelt*. A type of silver ingot that the Dutch traders called *schuitgelt* meaning “*schuijt* silver”. *Schuit* literally means “barge”. *Schuit* silver was probably named as such because the shape of the silver ingot resembled a boat.
- chōnin* (J.) J. 町人. Townsman. A social class under the Tokugawa *bakufu*. The class was mainly composed of merchants and craftsmen.
- Chop An official stamp or an official documents and licenses bearing a seal.
- Chua* (V.) Lord. Trinh rulers of Tonkin.
- Dagh-register* (D.) Journal kept by the chief of the VOC factories.
- daitōji* (J.) J. 大唐事. Highest-ranking *tōtsūji*.
- damast* (D.) J. & C. 緞子. Silk damask.

<i>danka</i> (J.)	J. 壇家. Either an individual or a household affiliated to a Buddhist temple in Japan.
<i>dispatchadores</i> (E.)	Vietnamese officials in charge of foreign ships
<i>foras</i> (D.)	J. 絹. C. 羅. Silk fabric.
<i>fluweel</i> (D.)	J. 天鵝絨 or びろうど. Silk fabric. Velvet.
<i>Fūsetsu-gaki</i> (J.)	J. 風説書. A form of report submitted from chief merchant of each Chinese junk to the magistrates of Nagasaki upon the junk's arrival at Nagasaki.
<i>gaasen</i> (D.)	J. 紗. Silk fabric.
<i>gilen</i> (D.)	J. 縮緬. Crepe silk.
<i>gooke</i> (E.)	See refuse silk.
<i>hamons</i> (E.)	V. 衙門
<i>hockin</i> (D.)	J. <i>hokken</i> 北絹 or 黄絹. Silk fabric with yellowish color.
<i>itowappu</i> (J.)	J. 糸割符. A Japanese system in which imported Chinese raw silk was purchased at a fixed price set by the Nagasaki authorities.
<i>jōdaka</i> (J.)	J. 定高 or the fixed ceiling. A Japanese trade system which capped the total amount of trade with Chinese junks and Dutch ships at Nagasaki.
<i>jurebass</i>	Interpreters
<i>jūtaku tōjin</i> (J.)	J. 住宅唐人. Resident Chinese or Chinese residents of Nagasaki who were officially naturalized as subjects of Japan.
<i>koban</i> (J.)	J. 小判. Small gold coins.
<i>lijwaten</i> (D.)	Tonkinese cotton.
<i>luas</i> (E.)	See <i>baa</i> .
<i>lyns</i> (E.)	See <i>peiling</i> .

<i>machidoshiyori</i> (J.)	J. 町年寄. Members of the council of the ward elders.
<i>nachoda</i>	Chief merchant of a junk, responsible for all business transactions during a voyage.
<i>namrak</i> (D.)	J. 黒漆. Black lacquer.
<i>naveta</i> (P.)	Small ocean-going ship.
<i>Ōbaku</i> (J.)	J. 黄檗. A school of Zen Buddhism established by Yinyuan Longqi in Japan. It was derived from the Linji School of Chan Buddhism in China.
<i>Oranda tsūji</i>	J. 和蘭陀通詞. Dutch interpreters appointed by the magistrates of Nagasaki
<i>otona</i> (J.)	J. 乙名. Chief of a ward.
<i>panghi</i> (D.)	J. 紗綾. A type of silk fabric.
<i>pelung</i> (D.)	J. 綸子. C. 綾子. Silk fabric.
refuse silk	Floss silk. Silk from the outer part of the cocoon. The quality is low and available only in small amounts.
<i>rōjū</i> (J.)	J. 老中. Senior councilors. Highest ranking members of the <i>bakufu</i> .
<i>sakoku</i> (J.)	J. 鎖国. A term for foreign policy regulations enacted by the Tokugawa <i>bakufu</i> during the 1630s.
<i>sambey</i>	To pay homage to.
<i>shuinsen</i> (J.)	J. 朱印船. Japanese ships with an official license for foreign trade.
<i>sittow</i> (D.)	J. <i>fushiito</i> 節糸; C. <i>si tou</i> 糸頭. Irregular and rough silk produced when two silk worms jointly build a cocoon.
Sōfukukji (J.)	J. 崇福寺. A Chinese Buddhist temple established in Nagasaki.
<i>Tonkinhakushu</i> (J.)	J. 東京舶主. Chinese merchants on board <i>Tonkinsen</i> .

- Tonkinsen* (J.) J. 東京船. Chinese junks that arrived at Nagasaki from Tonkin.
- tōtsuji* (J.) J. 唐通事. Interpreters of Chinese dialects officially appointed by the Nagasaki authority.
- yuishogaki* (J.) J. 由緒書. A type of Japanese historical narrative that is dedicated to a history of a family, temple, shrine, etc.


CONVENTIONS AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. Japanese and Chinese names are rendered family name preceding personal name. In some cases, Japanese pronunciations of Chinese names are provided parenthetically. Characters are provided for the first appearance of each individual.
2. All Chinese names are transliterated using pinyin system, although pinyin system probably does not reflect the way the seventeenth-century merchants from southern China actually pronounced these words.
3. Months and days originally based on the lunar calendar are converted into corresponding months and days in the Gregolian calendar. This was necessary to compare incidents in Chinese and Japanese sources to that in English and Dutch materials.
4. Dates for all figures, if known, will be given at their first appearance.



Map A. East and South China Seas in the Seventeenth Century

Figure A. Genealogy of the Wei Family



INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to discern the nature of the Chinese junk trade during the seventeenth century by examining social, religious and cultural ties among Chinese maritime traders and the influence of these ties on the organization of trade. It will demonstrate the shifts that took place around the rim of the East and South China Seas in the seventeenth century and point to the Qing conquest of Taiwan as a watershed in maritime history of East and Southeast Asia. In addition, it will argue that Chinese maritime networks were developed on the basis of economic, kinship, religious and cultural affiliations embedded in the social and commercial development of the late-Ming gentry society in China and therefore the nature of early modern Chinese junk trade was in essence private and informal.

Historiography of the Asian Trade

During the first three decades following World War II, the dominant question for global economic history was to explain how the inhabitants of the western end of the European peninsula managed to subjugate all other areas of the globe. Within this conceptual framework, modern world history was built around the story of superior Western civilizations overcoming less successful civilizations. Trade was seen as an extension of this dominance. In search for the bases of Western superiority, researches

were directed at discovering which particular factors gave Europeans their superiority.

The character of “Asian trade” as opposed to European joint stock companies was situated in a crucial junction in the history of early modern Southeast Asia.

During the second-half of the twentieth century, scholars such as J. C. van Leur, M. A. P. Meilink-Roelfsz and Niels Steensgaard defined the course of studies on the nature of early modern Asian trade, the Dutch East India Company and the Portuguese Estado da India. Jacob van Leur opened up the discussion about the character of early modern Asian trade.

Studying trade in the Indonesian archipelago during that time, he suggested that the equal footing of Asian and European trade organizations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By doing so, he liberated history of Asian maritime commerce from the Euro-centric view point. He stressed the peddling character of Asian trade and at the same time pointed out the limited influence of European trade in Asia.¹

Another Dutch historian M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, in *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*,

¹ J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History*, translated by James S. Holmes and A. van Marle (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1955), 133, 197-201.

criticized Van Leur for his overemphasis on the peddling character of Asian trade.

Based on her extensive research in the Dutch as well as the Portuguese archives, she argued that Asian commercial operations included merchants of great wealth, had sophisticated and effective credit instruments, extensive capital resources and traded in bulk goods across great distances. Therefore, it is inadequate to characterize Asian commercial operations as merely “peddling trade”. In doing so, she pointed out van Leur’s contradiction between his emphasis on the peddling trade and his thesis of the equal standing of Asian and European trade. She emphasized the modern elements in the organization of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and argued that with their economic, military and technical superiority, the Dutch East India Company constituted a “more highly organized form of trade than the partnership still generally current at that time in Asia and Europe”.²

In *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*, the Danish historian Niels Steensgaard defended van Leur against Meilik-Roelofs’s criticism. He found that the Portuguese mercantile activity brought no new elements to Asian commerce.³ He recognized the VOC as a more rational and advanced form of

² M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 10.

³ Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 93.

business organization than other contemporaries “were as profit-making institutions distinct from and superior to the peddlers”.⁴ At the same time, he acknowledged that European traders were not able to control every route or every market in the intra-Asian trade and that the peddling trade, however, survived due to the lower overhead costs and familiarity with local markets.⁵

Anthony Reid took a much more holistic approach than the authors above. His *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680* portrayed how international commerce brought about profound structural changes in Southeast Asia from the late-fifteenth to the late-seventeenth century. He fended off the stereotypical view of “stagnant and autarchic” Southeast Asia, and Asia by extension, in the early modern era that once prevailed in the scholarship of the field.⁶

What is striking is the dichotomy between Europe and Asia presented in the scholarship. Because “Asian trade” is a European invention, it is inescapable to discuss it without falling into the trap of the differentiation between “Europe” and “Asia (or non-Europe)”. Is “Asian commerce” an effective framework for a better

⁴ Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution*, 406.

⁵ Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution*, 410-1.

⁶ Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

understanding of commerce in East and Southeast Asia? In order to avoid the European prism, more empirical studies with an inductive approach are necessary.

Chinese Junk Trade

During the 1970s, a new generation of historians brought the Chinese junk trade under scrutiny. They were better equipped with indigenous language skills, especially Chinese. As far as the Chinese junk trade of the eighteenth century is concerned, historians of Southeast Asia like Ishii Yoneo, Sarasin Viraphol, Jennifer Wayne Cushman, Ng Chin Keong and Leonard Blussé described further the enormous expansion of Chinese commercial networks in Southeast Asia and questioned the assumption of European superiority in trade.

Ishii Yoneo introduced Japanese materials on the early modern Chinese junk trade in Southeast Asia to an international audience.⁷ Based on Japanese documents and Chinese sources rather than on European archival materials, Sarasin Vilaphol and Jennifer Wayne Cushman produced milestone researches about the early modern Chinese junk trade between East and Southeast Asia. In *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853*, the Thai historian Sarasin showed the dynamic

⁷ Ishii Yoneo, "Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam", *Journal of Siam Society* 59 (1971): 161-74. These documents were later translated into English. Ishii Yoneo, trans. *he Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tōsen Fūestsu-gaki, 1674-1723* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998).

growth, adaptability and flexibility of the Chinese junk trade between East and Southeast Asia and thus refuted the then dominant view of “stagnant Asia” before the Opium War.⁸ On the other hand, Cushman’s *Fields from the Sea* explored Chinese maritime policies, maritime customs administration and the pattern of the Chinese-Siamese trade. She highlighted the long-standing economic relations between China and Southeast Asia and considered the Chinese traders as major economic actors in Southeast Asia during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.⁹

Since the late-1980s, a shift in the historiography of the Asian trade saw works being written that gave more prominence to Asia. These studies shed light on the roles of merchants from Fujian in maritime commerce. Ng Chin Keong’s *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683-1735* analyzed various aspects of internal life in the southern Fujian province and described the socio-economic forces that contributed to the seafaring tradition of Fujianese people. He demonstrated the dynamism and creativeness in the indigenous trade during the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries and pointed out that even though there were restrictive regulations from time to time, the direct impact of these regulations

⁸ Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-1853* (London: Harvard University Press, 1977).

⁹ Jennifer Wayne Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1993).

on the trading community was minimal due to the flexible attitudes adopted by the officials at the provincial and local levels.¹⁰ Wang Gungwu described Fujianese merchants as the most successful group of Chinese overseas traders from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century.¹¹ Qian Jiang explored the Fujianese overseas expansion from the late-sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Through comparative studies of the Fujianese enclaves in Banten, Batavia, Manila and Nagasaki, his thesis supported Wang Gungwu's argument that Fujianese merchants were the most successful Chinese entrepreneurs in the pre-modern period.¹²

In addition, Blussé's seminal works on the VOC's activities in the China Sea region underlined the enormous expansion of Chinese commercial networks in Southeast Asian waters after the Qing lifted the maritime ban in 1683. He stressed the impact of Chinese commercial expansion in Southeast Asian society from 1683 to the 1820s. Blussé restated Anthony Reid's claim that the period as "the Chinese

¹⁰ Ng Chin Keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683-1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).

¹¹ Wang Gungwu, "Merchants without Empires: the Hokkien Sojourning Communities: The Rise of Merchant Empires", in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. James D. Tracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 419.

¹² Qian Jiang, "Merchants and Other Sojourners: The Hokkiens Overseas, 1570-1760" (Ph. D. diss., University of Hong Kong, 1998).

Century”.¹³ As far as the seventeenth century is concerned, Blussé pointed out the decline of the VOC’s trade in the South China Sea region during the second-half of the seventeenth century. He asserted that “the Manchu conquest of China and the realization of a separate Japanese world order” around the mid-seventeenth century shaped the structure of international trade in the area and “the Dutch trade in the region was curtailed by these institutional changes of a structural nature. Furthermore, increased rivalry and competition by Asian traders rendered Dutch trade in the region unprofitable, unless it was supported by special privileges or monopolies”.¹⁴

Japanese Historiography

Japanese scholarship on early modern Chinese commerce has evolved in three different scholarly traditions. In pre-war Japan, scholars of Japanese foreign relations wrote extensively on Japanese overseas expansion during the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. Works of Iwao Seiichi (1900-1988) and Murakami Naojirō

¹³ Anthony Reid, “Introduction”, in *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750-1900*, ed. Anthony Reid (London: Macmillan, 1997), 11-2; Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*. Dordrecht, Holland and Riverton U.S.A: Foris Publications, 1986; Leonard Blussé, “Chinese Century: The Eighteenth Century in China Sea Region”, *Archipel* 58 (1999): 107-130.

¹⁴ Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690”, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1996): 75-6.

(1868-1966) provided the scaffolding on which post-war scholarship on early modern Japanese foreign relations, as well as history of Southeast Asia, developed.¹⁵ Their depth of knowledge about the relevant European materials has been unsurpassed.

Nakamura Takashi and Nagazumi Yōko followed their tradition one way or another and explored various topics on the history of Japan and Southeast Asia. They all contributed to translating Dutch archival materials into the Japanese language and to making them available for a wider audience.¹⁶ Iwao and Nagasaki recognized the importance of Chinese overseas commercial networks in East and Southeast Asia and compiled quantitative data on Chinese shipping extracted from the Dutch archives.¹⁷

Yamawaki Teijirō focused on Chinese trade at Nagasaki during the Edo period.¹⁸ In

¹⁵ Iwao Seiichi, *Nanyō nihonmachi no kenkyū* (Studies of the Japanese quarters in Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Tōabunka Kenkyūjo, 1940); Iwao Seiichi, “Kinsei nisshi bōeki ni kansuru sūryōteki kōsatsu (A quantitative survey on the Sino-Japanese trade in the early modern period)”, *Shigaku-Zasshi*, Vol. 62, No. 11 (1953): 1-40; Murakami Naojirō, trans., *Bataviajō nisshi* (Abridged translations of *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia van’t passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India*), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1970-1975).

¹⁶ Murakami Naojirō, trans., *Nagasaki oranda shōkan no nikki* (Translations from the diaries of the heads of the Dutch factory at Nagasaki), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956-1958); Nagazumi Yōko, trans., *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki* (Translations from the diaries of the heads of the Dutch factory at Hirado), 4 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969-1970).

¹⁷ Iwao Seiichi, “Kinsei nisshi bōeki ni kansuru sūryōteki kōsatsu (A quantitative survey on the Sino-Japanese trade in the early modern period)”, *Shigaku Zasshi*, Vol. 62, No. 11 (1953): 1-40; Nagazumi Yōko, trans. and ed., *Tōsen yushutsunyū sūryō ichiran 1687- 1833* (Lists of volumes of imports and exports by Chinese junks between 1687 and 1833) (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1987).

¹⁸ Yamawaki Teijirō, “Kinsei nisshi bōeki niokeru fukushū shōnin no botsuraku (Decline of Fujiang merchants in Japanese-Chinese trade in the early

addition, historians of Southeast Asia such as Wada Hisanori made contributions towards a better understanding of Chinese maritime trade and its influence on the emergence of Southeast Asian polities.¹⁹

Japanese historians of Chinese history have a keen interest in the economic development of China and commercial relationships between China and Japan. Shiba Yoshinobu's study on Chinese commerce during the Sung dynasty provided the basis for studies on later periods.²⁰ Ōba Osamu studied the Chinese junk trade with Japan and its ramifications for Japanese culture during the Edo period.²¹ Matura Akira produced a series of works on the trade between the Qing and Japan.²² Liu Shiuh-feng examined the Qing maritime policies and Chinese junk trade at

modern period)", *Tōhōgaku* 12 (1956): 74-88; Yamawaki Teijirō, *Nagasaki no tōjin bōeki* (Chinese trade at Nagasaki) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1964).

¹⁹ Wada Hisanori, "Tōnanajia niokeru shoki kakyō shakai 960-1279 (The Chinese colonies in the Southeast Asia in the Sung period, 960-1279)", *Tōyō Gakuhō*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1959): 76-106.

²⁰ Shiba Yoshinobu, *Sōdai shōgyōshi kenkyū* (Commerce during the Sung dynasty) (Tokyo: Kazama Shobō, 1968).

²¹ For example, Ōba Osamu, "Hirado matura shiryō hakubutsukan-zō 'Tōsen no zu ni tsuite (On the scroll of Chinese ships in the possession of the Matura Museum in Hirado)", *Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies, Kansai University* 5 (1972): 13-29.

²² Matura Akira, *Shindai kaigai bōekishi no kenkyū* (Historical studies of Chinese maritime trade during the Qing period) (Kyoto: Hōyū Shoten, 2002).

Nagasaki.²³ Although there is undoubtedly a large scale accumulation of knowledge on Chinese commercial networks within East Asia, most of the researches focused on maritime trade between China and Japan, and paid little or no attention to Southeast Asia. Perhaps one of the biggest problems of Japanese scholarship is that these studies were mostly written in Japanese and are little known outside Japan.

Previous Studies on the Tonkin-Nagasaki Silk Trade

Despite these insightful researches on the Chinese junk trade, the topic has been understudied or marginalized, especially in English scholarly literature, primarily because sources are so sparse and fragmentary. As compared to our knowledge on the contemporary European trading organizations, such as the Dutch and English East India Companies, we have very limited tangible information on Chinese commercial networks at work. Obviously, it is due to the lack of Chinese sources that most empirical researches on Chinese junk trade have focused on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As far as the seventeenth century is concerned, we know even less about the way Chinese maritime traders carried out their

²³ Liu Shih-Feng, “Shindai zenki no kaigai boeki seisaku to Nagasaki boeki (Foreign trade policy and Nagasaki trade in the early Qing period)”, *Kindai nihon kakyō kajin kenkyū*, ed. *The Kindai nihon kakyō gakujutu kenkyū kai*, 14-22 (Nagasaki: The kindai nihon kakyō gakujutu kenkyū kai, 1988); Liu Shih-Feng, “Shindai zenki no fukken shonin to Nagasaki boeki (Fukien merchants and the Nagasaki trade during the early Qing dynasty)”, *Kyūsyū daigaku tōyōshi-ronshū* 16 (1988): 133-61.

commercial activities. This thesis asks two major questions. Firstly, how did Chinese merchants organize trade during the seventeenth century? And secondly, given the decline of the VOC trade in the China Sea in the later half of the seventeenth century, as Blussé described, what gave Chinese maritime traders from Fujian the competitive advantages against the largest European trading company, the VOC?

In order to answer these questions at an empirical level, this thesis looks at Tonkinese raw silk exports to Japan. Tonkinese raw silk played an important role in regional commerce of the mid-seventeenth century, when it became increasingly difficult for maritime traders to export raw silk from China. In search of an alternative supply of raw silk, foreign merchants flocked to Hanoi and Pho Hien in order to procure Tonkinese silk products in exchange for Japanese silver. A sizable amount of Tonkinese raw silk was exported to Japan every year from the 1630s to the 1680s. After the Tokugawa *bakufu* prohibited Japanese people from going overseas, the VOC and Chinese traders were the two major competitors in this branch of trade.

There have been a handful of works on seaborne commerce between northern Vietnam and Japan during the seventeenth century. P. J. M. Buch studied the Dutch activities in Vietnam.²⁴ P. W. Klein cast light on the Tonkin-Japan silk trade carried

²⁴ W. J. M. Buch, “La Compagnie des Indes Neerlandaises et l’Indochine”, *BEFEO* 36 (1936) 7-196; 37 (1937): 121-237; W. J. M. Buch, *De Oost-Indische*

out by the VOC. His pioneering work demonstrated the process by which Tonkin gave way to Bengal as a supplier of raw silk.²⁵ Most recently, Hoang Anh Tuan published a well-documented monograph on the economic, political and social relationships between Tonkin and the VOC from its onset in 1637 to the VOC's eventual withdraw from Tonkin in 1700.²⁶ His well-documented research undoubtedly set a new benchmark for future studies on Vietnamese-Dutch relations in the seventeenth century.

In addition, Japanese historians have made important contributions to our knowledge of the commercial transactions between Tonkin and Nagasaki.²⁷

Nagazumi Yōko illustrated the intermediary roles that Japanese residents of Tonkin played in facilitating commercial exchanges between the two places. Yamawaki Teijirō's study on Japan's import of raw silk included information on Tonkinese silk

compagnie en Quinam: de Betrekkingen del Nederlanders met Annam in de XVII^e eeuw (Amsterdam: 1929).

²⁵ Peter Wolfgang Klein, "De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel van de Verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie en het inter-Asiatische verkeer in de 17e eeuw", in *Bewogen en Bewegen: de historicus in het spanningsveld tussen economie and cultuur*, eds. Willem Frijhoff and Minke Hiemstra (Tilburg: Gianotten, 1986), 152-77.

²⁶ Hoang Anh Tuan, *Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637-1700* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007).

²⁷ Nagazumi Yōko, "17 seiki chūki no nihon-tonkin bōeki nitsuite (The Tonkinese-Japanese trade in the mid-seventeenth century)", *Jōsai daigaku daigakuin kenyū nenpō* 8 (1992): 21-46.

products.²⁸ Although their researches include fine data extracted from the Dutch archives, they have been virtually unknown outside the Japanese scholarly audience. Scholars from China and Taiwan have accumulated a vast amount of scholarly literature on the development of the Chinese junk trade from the late-Ming to the early-Qing period.²⁹ Yet, little has been written on the subject of Tonkinese silk.

It is clear that a Dutch-centered approach is dominant in existing scholarship largely due to the fact that the Dutch archives are the single most important source of information. The contemporary Dutch factors keenly watched Chinese mercantile activities at both ends. Their concern alone would call for a closer look at the roles of Chinese maritime merchants in Tonkin silk exports to Japan. However, with the lack of first-hand accounts by Chinese people, no serious attempt has been made to examine how Chinese maritime traders carried out their shipping operation. Since all the above-mentioned scholars explicitly limited the scope of their research to the roles of the VOC for good reasons, it will be unfair to criticize them for not discussing

²⁸ Yamawaki Teijirō, “Oranda higashi indo gaisha no tainichi kiito bōeki (Silk export to Japan by the VOC)”, *Nippon Rekishi* 305 (1973): 63-82; Yamawaki Teijirō, *Kinu to momen no edo jidai* (Silk and cotton during the Edo period) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2002), 51-2.

²⁹ For example, Lin Ren-chuan, *Ming mo qing chu si ren hai shang mao yi* (Private maritime trade during the late-Ming and the early-Qing) (Shanghai: Hua dong shi fan da xue chu ban she, 1987); Chu Te-lan, “Qing chu qian je ling shi zhong guo chuan hai shang mao yi zhi yan jiu (Studies of Chinese maritime trade under the frontier shift policy in the early Qing)”, in *Zhong guo hai yang fa zhan shi lun wen ji*, Vol. 2, ed. Zhong guo hai yang fa zhan shi lun wen ji bian ji wei yuan hui, 105-59 (Taipei: Zhong yang yan jiu yuan san min zhu yi yan jiu suo, 1986).

Chinese participation in this branch of trade. It is sufficient for the present purpose to point out that Chinese junk traders have never been allotted a deserved and an appropriate position in scholarly literature on the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade.

This thesis gains insights from Henriette Buggé's article on Chinese-Dutch competition in the silk trade to Japan in the seventeenth century. She proved that "neither Van Leur's theories on the activities of the companies superimposed on a primitive peddler-trade, nor Steensgaard's theories about the structural superiority of the companies are sufficient tools for the analysis of the relative weakness of the VOC vis-à-vis the Chinese junk merchants in East Asia".³⁰ With this as the point of departure, this thesis will explore how Chinese junk traders organized their trade in the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade in the seventeenth century and provide an alternative portrayal of the South China Seas trade during the seventeenth century.

Chan (Zen) Buddhism

Detailed up-to-date knowledge about markets and security situations at trading ports were essential in a successful business operation. Only with reliable communication circuits at work, could merchants seek commercial opportunities at markets. The best way to gather intelligence was through networks of people who

³⁰ Henriette Buggé, "Silk to Japan: Sino-Dutch Competition in the Silk Trade to Japan, 1633-1685", *Itinerario*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1989): 39.

shared common interests. Process of business transactions, where individuals interacted, negotiated and cut a deal with each other through various means, was far more complex, delicate and intimate than official records could indicate. To understand trade and how it really worked, it is necessary to look beyond business and explore different aspects of merchant lives.

It is true that the European sources are the most important sources for economic history of Asian maritime commerce in the early modern period. However, economic nature of these sources hinders us from finding rationales behind mercantile activities of Chinese traders. In order to solve this problem, this thesis introduces new material that has never been used for the study of commerce. What I call the Ōbaku (黄檗) material is a set of records written by Chinese monks in Nagasaki. The Ōbaku sect of Chan (禪)(J. Zen) Buddhism was introduced into Japan by Chinese monks, merchants and adepts who migrated to Japan during the early seventeenth century. Their writings contain references to individuals whose patronage was instrumental in the formation of Chinese monasteries at Nagasaki and provide a glimpse into the inner world of the Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki during the seventeenth century.

Recently, two scholars paid attention to the spread of Chan Buddhism in East and Southeast Asia during the seventeenth century. According to Wu Jian, “Chan Buddhism is by nature a missionary tradition” and therefore “the rise of Chan

Buddhism in China created a large-scale missionary work to reclaim the territory of Buddhism not only within China but also in East Asia in the seventeenth century". There is no doubt that a wave of Chinese overseas emigration served as a vehicle for the spread of Chan Buddhism in East and Southeast Asia. Examining Yinyuan Longqi's (隱元隆琦)(1592-1673) historic move to Japan that led to the spread of the Ōbaku sect of Buddhism in Japan, Wu aptly pointed out that being the most powerful fraction within the Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki, the Fuqing diaspora played a pivotal role in facilitating the Ōbaku monks' initial move to Nagasaki.³¹ It is no coincidence that Fuqing was the place where the headquarters of the Ōbaku sect Mount Huangbo (黃檗) were located and where Yinyuan as well as many other Ōbaku monks came from.

Charles Wheeler's study of Chan master Shilian Dashan's (石濂大汕) (1633-1692) journey to Cochinchina at the end of the seventeenth century pointed to close connections between a missionary tradition of Chan Buddhism and the formation of Chinese merchant communities in East and Southeast Asia. Wheeler acknowledged that firstly, Chinese temples in key ports played a vital role in holding the diasporic communities of Chinese seafaring traders together and, that secondly,

³¹ Wu Jiang, "Leaving for the Rising Sun: The Historical Background of Yinyuan Lingqi's Migration to Japan in 1654", *Asia Major* (Third Series) Vol. 17, Pt. 2 (2004): 120.

Buddhist monks acted as a bridge between their merchant patrons and local elites in host societies.³² Both Wu and Wheeler provide important insights into the roles of Buddhism in commerce and diaspora in early modern maritime East and Southeast Asia. However, while Wu's study does not explain why Fuqing merchants became so influential within the Chinese diasporic community at Nagasaki at this particular moment in the seventeenth century, Wheeler's work includes little empirical analysis on the two issues that he brought up.

This study will introduce Wei Zhiyuan (魏之瑗)(d. 1654) and Wei Zhiyan (魏之琰)(1618-1689) and show that they were most successful in trading between Tonkin and Nagasaki from the mid-1640s to the early 1680s. Exploring the Wei brothers' commercial, social, cultural and religious activities, it will demonstrate that most Chinese merchants who engaged in commercial exchange between Tonkin and Nagasaki hailed from Fuqing. "Tonkin merchants (*J. Tonkin hakushu* 東京舶主)" appeared in the Ōbaku material and the material specifically referred to this particular group of Fuqing traders who dominated the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade in the seventeenth century. The Wei brothers were the ringleaders of this group of seafaring traders. Their contribution to the temple both literally and metaphorically shaped the

³² Charles Wheeler, "Buddhism in the Re-ordering of an Early Modern World: Chinese Missions to CochinChina in the Seventeenth Century", *Journal of Global History* 2 (2007): 312.

early days of the Sōfukuji (崇福寺), colloquially known as Fuzhou-temple (福州寺). Building monasteries, inviting prestigious Chan masters from China and supporting public projects all required a sound economic foundation. Only the private commercial wealth that was accumulated from exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan made the Wei brothers' vigorous patronage of the Sōfukuji possible. Their participation in, and financial contribution to, religious activities and financial contribution were factors that confirmed the strong position of the Fuqing diaspora within the Sofukuji monastic community. In return, monasteries stimulated trade by providing merchants with an “associational matrix”, as Timothy Brook described, that was particularly critical for the survival of the Chinese trading community in Nagasaki when anti-Christian persecutions stormed through Japan during the first half of the seventeenth century.³³

Methods

This thesis applies a micro-level approach and looks at Chinese maritime merchants, namely Wei Zhiyuan and his younger brother Wei Zhiyan. The Wei brothers originally came from Fuqing (福清) county, Fuzhou prefecture in Fujian (福建) province. They were the most successful owners-operators of most junks navigating between Tonkin and Nagasaki in the mid-seventeenth century. The fact

³³ Timothy Brook, *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1993), 321. Ssee Chapter Four for detailed discussion.

that their entrepreneurial activities comprised a large part of Chinese junk traffic between the two places provides a justification for the scope of this thesis. Based on Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese materials, this thesis provides information on the Wei brothers' activities even though they produced no records themselves.

There is no doubt that many people were involved in the Wei brothers' business. Nevertheless, extant commercial documents, whether Dutch, English or Japanese, provide little information on other individuals who participated in the Wei brothers' commercial enterprise. In order to solve this problem, this thesis looks beyond business transactions and explores social, religious and cultural aspects of merchants' lives.

The sources for this research were written in Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese. Regarding trade, the Dutch records kept at the Nationaal Archief of the Netherlands in The Hague provide crucial information. The published materials such as the *Generale Missiven* and the *Dagh-register Batavia* also included useful data. For the period from 1672 onwards, "Tonkin Journal Registers" in the India Office Records at the British Library in London were consulted. Japanese official documents such as *Kai hentai* and *Tōtsūji kaisho nichiroku* were also useful for the last two decades of the seventeenth century. They are available in printed form.

Generations of the Wei family kept family archives which include genealogical records and original correspondences between families in Fuzhou, Tonkin and Nagasaki. Although the family archives are not immediately accessible, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture (NMHC) owns photocopies of some manuscripts. In addition, Koga Jūjirō Manuscript Collection at NMHC includes copies of letters exchanged between a local historian of Nagasaki Koga Jūjirō (古賀十二郎) (1879-1954) and one of the descendants of Wei Zhiyan during the 1920s. It contains valuable accounts of the Wei family. In terms of Chan Buddhism, writings of Buddhist monks were found in Hirakubo Akira's edited volumes.³⁴

Part One delineates the landscape of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade and introduces Wei Zhiyan as a key subject of this thesis. Chapter One is dedicated to a description of the natural, political and economic environment for trade in Tonkin during the seventeenth century. Chapter Two portrays the rise and fall of Tonkinese raw silk exports to Japan in the seventeenth century. This chapter intends to provide an alternative view that complements the hitherto Dutch-centered narrative of the early modern seaborne commerce between northern Vietnam and Japan. Chapter Three is a survey of Wei Zhiyan's activities. Plowing through Dutch, English,

³⁴ Hirakubo Akira, ed., *Shisan kōtei Ingen zenshū* (Newly edited and annotated complete works of Master Yinyuan), 12 vols (Tokyo: Kaimei Shoin, 1979); Hirakubo Akira, ed., *Mokuanzenji zenshū* (Complete works of Master Muan), 8 vols. (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 1992); Hirakubo Akira, ed., *Sokuhi zenshū* (Complete works of Master Jifei), 4 vols (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 1993).

Chinese and Japanese sources, it presents fragments of his life in a chronological sequence.

Part Two is the analytical accompaniment to Part One. Existing materials on Tonkin are scarce. Owing to the unparalleled wealth of Japanese and Chinese materials, Chapters Four and Five are set in Nagasaki. Chapter Four examines the Wei brothers' involvement in the Sōfukuji monastic community and illustrates the roles of Buddhist monks and monasteries in commerce. Chapter Five is an extended case in point of how informal and private connections with the local elites helped the Wei brothers gain the upper hand in trade at Nagasaki. Chapter Six provides a quantitative analysis that will show how the factors that were in operation at the time in Chapter Four translated into efficient trade.

PART ONE

THE SEETING AND THE ACTORS

CHAPTER ONE

THE TRADING ENVIRONMENT IN TONKIN

From the first decades of the seventeenth century, Chinese merchants and later Portuguese traders appear in the records as exporting Tongkingese raw silk and silk goods to Japan. By the late 1630s, the Portuguese had been expelled from Japan and the Dutch East India Company (the VOC) saw an opportunity to enter the Japanese silk trade by establishing a factory in Tonkin in 1638. Foreign traders flocked to Hanoi from across the oceans to the extent that Tonkin had never experienced before. Japan was the biggest and the most profitable market for the products of Tonkin. Tonkinese silk products were exported to other destinations, and other items such as musk and lacquer wares were marketable elsewhere. Both the VOC and EIC marketed Tonkinese silken fabrics in Europe. On the other hand, the Trinh lords were hungry consumers of luxury exotic clothes, guns, brimstone and saltpeter.³⁵ The last three items were imported to equip their naval and land forces in their warfare against the Nguyen. This chapter introduces the political, environmental and economic conditions in northern Vietnam during the seventeenth century and how it impacted the business dealings of the two main players in the silk trade: the Wei brothers and the VOC. Firstly, it will briefly discuss the political background of

³⁵ In 1675, the *Chua* specifically expressed his desire for these foreign items. IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 143v-144r.

seventeenth-century Tonkin, then the river systems at the Red River Delta and navigation routes to Tonkin will be laid out. Lastly, natural and human factors that affected economic activities in Tonkin will be discussed.

The Political Background

In seventeenth-century Tonkin, foreign trade was controlled by the Trinh rulers who used the emperors of the Le (V. Lê 黎) dynasty (1428-1788) as figureheads. Actual power rested in the hands of Trịnh lords. Europeans visiting Tonkin regarded the Trinh lords as “kings” of Tonkin. The areas under the Trinh were called “Tonkin” after its capital Dong Kinh (V. Đông Kinh 東京) meaning “eastern capital”, which is now called Hanoi.³⁶ On the other hand, the Nguyen (V. Nguyễn 阮) lords secured their control over the central and southern parts of present-day Vietnam, also known as Cochinchina, with Hue (V. Huế 順化) as its capital. Although both lords, or *Chua* (V. Chúa 主), ruled in the name of the Le emperor, the figurative emperor held little power. The reality was that Tonkin under the Trinh and Cochinchina under the Nguyen existed as two independent political entities. Between 1627 and 1672, the Trinh and the Nguyen were at war with each other. After the first Trinh attack, the

³⁶ The official name of the capital under the Trinh Lords was Dong Do (V. Đông Đô 東都). It was also known as Dong Kinh and Thang Long (V. Thăng Long 昇龍). Colloquially, it was known as Kecho (V. Kẻ Chợ), meaning “market place”. It was officially renamed in 1831 and became Ha Noi (V. Hà Nội 河內). For the sake of convenience, however, I will refer to the city as Hanoi throughout this thesis.

Nguyen built a massive fortified wall in the north of Hue and defended these lines every time the Trinh army took the offensive. Eventually, peace was declared in 1673. However, the division between the north and the south lasted till 1775 when finally the Trinh army broke through the Nguyen walls.³⁷

Trinh lords faced another potentially disastrous threat on the northern border. In 1592, the Mac (V. Mạc 莫) clan was driven out of Hanoi into the northern mountains bordering China.³⁸ Under the diplomatic protection of the Ming dynasty, the Mac clan kept the northern most province of Cao Bang (V. Cao Bằng 高平) and continued to watch for an opportunity to take the capital.³⁹ They remained there until 1667 when Trinh army defeated the Mac and remnants of the Mac army took refuge in China. Ten years later, the Mac's last attempt to invade northern Vietnam was defeated by the Trinh Tac.

The Nguyen lords coordinated foreign trade fairly effectively through Hoi An (V. Hội An 会安). The Chinese, Japanese and Portuguese ships gathered at this new

³⁷ M. L. Cadière, “Le Mur de Đổng Hới: étude sur l’ établissement des Nguyễn en Cochinchine”, *BEFEO*, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (1906): 87-254; Buch, “La Compagnie” (1937); Buch, *De Oost-Indische compagnie en Quinam*.

³⁸ The Mac kings ruled Vietnam from Hanoi northwards between 1527 and 1592.

³⁹ Olga Dror and K. W. Taylor, *Views of Seventeenth-Century Vietnam: Christoforo Borri on Chochinchina and Samuel Baron on Tonkin* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 2006), 128.

outer port from the late sixteenth century. In 1601, Dutch merchants arrived at Hoi An in 1601. Facing stiff competition from Japanese and Portuguese merchants, coupled with a series of unfortunate accidents, the VOC's trade at Hoi An never made a profit. In 1638, one year after the VOC officially opened up trade relations with Tonkin, Dutch merchants withdrew from Hoi An. The decision to abandon trade at Hoi An was politically as well as commercially motivated. From 1627 onwards, Trinh Tonkin and Nguyen Cochinchina were in a constant state of war against one another. It was feared being involved in both courts could potentially put the VOC in a precarious position in the future.⁴⁰ The Trinh rulers welcomed the Dutch largely because they wanted access to European weapons in order to counter the superior artillery power of the Nguyen supplied by the Portuguese.⁴¹ In hoping for a possible military alliance with a European power, the *Chua* welcomed the arrival of the VOC in 1637.⁴² Despite their precautions, between 1642 and 1643, the reluctant Dutch was drawn into the Trinh-Nguyen wars.⁴³ On the other hand, there is little information on Chinese merchants' activities in Tonkin in the first half of the seventeenth century.

⁴⁰ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 63-6.

⁴¹ Li Tana, *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1998): 43-6.

⁴² Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 114.

⁴³ For a detailed analysis of the Dutch involvement in the Trinh-Nguyen wars, see Buch, "La Compagnie" (1937), 114-5; Katō Eiichi, "17 seiki chūyo rengō higashi indokaisya no tainichi kōshō to jōhōdentatsumō: yahatosen lilo gō no tonkin kōkai wo megutte (The VOC pathways of intelligence: The voyage of the *Lillo* to Tonkin)",

The Red River Delta and the Rise of Pho Hien

The Red River (V. Sông Hồng 紅河) basin is an intricate complicate river system that was hazardous for large oceangoing ships to reach the capital and central market town which was Hanoi. There were two major channels that led to Hanoi. The contemporary Europeans called the first channel Tonkin River or “*Araquaron River*” and the second “*Rockbo River*”.

The Dutch preferred the Tonkin River. As far back as 1636, the VOC was exploring the possibility of making Tonkin their main silk supplier and they mapped out a strategy for exporting Tonkinese silk into Japan. Nicolaes Couckebacker, who was at that time the chief of the Hirado Factory, wrote a report on business conditions in Tonkin. He examined the itineraries of Japanese ships sailing from Japan to Hanoi and asked Japanese merchants why they did not use the Thai Binh estuary. The merchants mentioned several reasons. First, one of the Japanese junks was wrecked a few years earlier when it hit a hard sandbank at the entrance to the Thai Binh estuary. Second, it was difficult for ships to navigate out of this river (the Thai Binh River) to the sea due to the coastline of this area which stretched from the northeast to the southwest. Third, the sale of *Chua*'s silk took place in July, or late June at the earliest.

Tokyo daigaku shiryōhensanjo kenkyū kiyō 3 (1992): 9-21; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 67-83.

Traders from Japan faced great difficulties in their return voyage because this estuary was situated further north than the other rivers. It took at least twenty to twenty-five days, or sometimes even thirty days, from the estuary to circumnavigate Hainan (海南) Island and come out into the South China Sea. According to Couckebacker's judgement, Dutch ships would not face this difficulty because they were fitted with better sails than Japanese junks.⁴⁴

What the European seamen called the "River of Tonkin", "Arquaron River" and sometimes the River of "Domea" were in fact tributaries of the Thai Binh River and the Red River. Dutch and English ships moved up the Thai Binh river or one of its branches called Van Uc river (V. Sông Văn Úc 多魚河) by entering either Thai Binh estuary (V. Cửa Thái Bình 太平海口) or Van Uc estuary (V. Cửa Văn Úc 多魚海口). "Domea" was the name of the village on the sandbar where Dutch crew stayed. Dutch ships, which were unsuitable for sailing up shallow winding rivers, were moored before this town.⁴⁵ From there, VOC merchants hired local barges and pilots to send their goods to Hanoi. The boats then turned westwards into the Luoc River (V.

⁴⁴ Report from Nicholaes Couckebacker to Batavia, 21 April 1626, in *DB, 1636*: 67-74. Full text of Couckebacker's report is translated into Japanese. Murakami, *Bataviajō nisshi*, Vol. 1, 247-55.

⁴⁵ William Dampier, *Voyages and Discoveries*, with an Introduction and Notes by Clennell Wilkinson (London: The Argonaut Press, 1931), 16. For more on the transportation system of the Red River Delta see Charles B. Maybon, *Histoire Moderne du pays d'Annam (1592-1820)* (Paris: Typographie Plon-Nourrit, 1919), 403-9; Murakami, *Bataviajō nisshi*, Vol. 2, 177-8.

Sông Luộc 海潮江, also known as *Canal des Bambous*), which eventually debouched into the Red River to the southeast of Pho Hien.⁴⁶

On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that Chinese junks preferred the Dai An estuary (V. Đại An 大安海口), which flowed into the gulf south-westward of the Thai Binh estuary. In 1688, a well-known English buccaneer named William Dampier (1651-1715) was onboard a ship sailing towards Hanoi. He observed the following.

One of these Rivers or Mouths is called Rokbo [*sic*]. It discharges it self [itself] into the sea near the N.W. [northwest] corner of the Bay... its Bottom is soft Oaz [ooze], and there for very convenient for small vessels, and it is the way that all the Chinese and Siamars [Siamese] do use... The other River or Mouth, was that by which we entered; and 'tis larger and deeper than the former. I know not its particular Name; but for distinction I shall call it the River of *Domea*.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ For the names of rivers and tributaries, I use names supplied by Sakurai Yumio's article, "Chin chō ki koga delta kaitaku shiron (The Red River Delta in the Tran Dynasty, 1225-1400)", *Tōnanajia kenkyū*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1989): 275-300. For more on Domea, see Nguyen Quang Ngoc, "Finding Domea, the Border Port of the Tonkin Estuary", in *Lion and Dragon: Four Centuries of Dutch-Vietnamese Relations*, ed. John Kleinen et al. (Amsterdam: Boom, 2008), 63-74.

⁴⁷ Dampier, *Voyages and Discoveries*, 14.

Upon arrival at Pho Hien, he added that:

No Europeans come up so far as this with their ships (that I could learn) yet the Siamites [Siamese] and Chinese bring their ships up the river Rokbo [Rockbo], quite to Hean [Pho Hien], and like at Anchor before it: and we found there several Chinese junks. They ride afloat in the middle of the river.⁴⁸

Dampier's accounts indicate that Chinese and Siamese junks were still able to go up to Pho Hien via the Day River in the late 1680s. Siamese junks were structurally no different from Chinese junks and were operated by Chinese seamen and traders.⁴⁹ It seems both Japanese junks in the early 1630s and Chinese junks in the late 1680s chose the Day estuary to reach Hanoi. Chinese junks went upstream on the Day River (V. Sông Đáy) to Pho Hien, passing such towns as Ninh Binh (V. Ninh

⁴⁸ Dampier, *Voyages and Discoveries*, 18.

⁴⁹ During the seventeenth century, the King of Ayutthaya himself or members of the royal family were the main investor of Siamese junks coming to Nagasaki. Siamese junks arriving in Tonkin also received investments from the same party. IOR G/12/17, pt. 3: 164v. Siamese ambassadors was usually onboard the Siamese junks but they had nothing to do with the carrying out of business. Siamese junks were organized by and operated under the leadership of Chinese traders who were in charge of all business transactions on behalf of the sponsor who were usually a member of Siamese royal family. Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-1853* (London: Harvard University Press, 1977), 58-69; Ōba Osamu, "Hirado matsura siryō hakubutukan zō 'Karahunenozu' nitsuite", *Kansaidaigakuk tozai gakujutu kenkyūjo kiyō* 5 (1972): 13-49; Iioka Naoko, "Ayutaya kokuō no tainichi bōeki: sakokuka no Nagasaki ni raikō shita syamsen no tokōkeiro no kentō (Siamese junk trade with Japan, 1679-1728)", *Nanpō Bunka* 24 (1997): 65-100.

Binh 寧平) and Phu Ly (V. Phủ Lý 富里) on the way. From Pho Ly, junks turned into Phu Ly River that met the Red River at the south side of Pho Hien. Dutch and English traders often referred to this channel as the “Rockbo River”. It was also known as the “the Luc-va” among French missionaries who travelled in Chinese vessels.⁵⁰ According to a Vietnamese scholar, the name “Rockbo” came from the mispronunciation of the Vietnamese name for the river, “Doc Bo” River.⁵¹




Figure 1.1 River Systems in the Red River Delta⁵²

⁵⁰ Forest, *Les Missionnaires Français au Tonkin et au Siam*, Vol. 2, 131, 157.

⁵¹ Nguyen Thua Hy, “Pho Hien as Seen from European Sources”, in *Pho Hien: the Centre of International Commerce in the Seventeenth–Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Association of Vietnamese Historians, People’s Administrative Committee of Haihung Province (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 84-5

⁵² Modified from Sakurai Yumio, “Rakuden mondai no seiri: kodai kōga deluta kaitaku shiron (A preliminary essay on reclamation in the ancient Red River Delta)”, *Tōnajiia kenkyū*, Vol. 17, No. 1: 11 (Figure 4).

Which estuary did Wei Zhiyan choose to navigate during his active career spanning from the 1650s to the early 1680s? The following incident that occurred between the junks belonging to Wei Zhiyan and the VOC ships illustrates that his junks preferred the Day estuary. The *Dagh-register Batavia* mentioned the event as follows: In 1663, the Governor General dispatched two ships, the *Hoogelanden* and *Bunschoten*, from Batavia to Tonkin to blockade Zhiyan's junks en route to Nagasaki.⁵³ Since the *Hoogelanden* was stuck and damaged on the bar of the Tonkin River, the *Bunschoten* was deployed to keep the two junks "inside the Rockbo River".⁵⁴ Based on this brief account, we can deduce what might have taken place between the two Chinese junks and the two Dutch ships. The two Dutch ships from Batavia first probably sailed up to the Thai Binh River mouth. There, they stayed around *Domea*, where the Dutch ships used to berth. When the news reached *Domea* that two Chinese junks bound for Japan had left Pho Hien and were sailing down the Day River, the *Hoogelanden* was dispatched to the south with the mission to close off the mouth of the Day River. But it hit the notorious sandbar of Tonkin and could no longer carry out the task. As a substitute, the *Bunschoten* headed to the Day estuary and patrolled the Day River mouth to prevent the Chinese junks from sailing out to

⁵³ This event will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two and Three.

⁵⁴ See Chapter Tree.


sea. This is the most probable scenario for how the Dutch could keep Chinese junks “inside” the Day River.

There were other occasions where Chinese junks clearly used the Day estuary in the mid-seventeenth century. In June 1666, when a French Father François Deydier (1537-1698) traveled from Ayutthaya to Tonkin, he took passage in a vessel of a Chinese who was accustomed to traveling to Tonkin. The vessel left Bangkok and arrived at “the embouchure of the river of Tonkin”. According to Alain Forest, “the embouchure of the river of Tonkin” probably meant “the Luc-va”.⁵⁵ Later, in 1674, it was reported that a junk of Lin Yuteng bound for Nagasaki was forced to sail “back to the Rockbo River”, suggesting that the vessel actually used the “Rockbo River”.⁵⁶ In 1676, English merchants heard that two junks from Japan arrived at the bar of the Rockbo River and came upstream to Pho Hien.⁵⁷ In addition, a map drawn by the English in the 1670s showed the “place where the junks lie” near the place where “Rockbo River” branched out from the Red River. (Map 0.1) This evidence, together with William Dampier’s testimony, strongly suggests that Chinese junks, which were smaller than the Dutch ships, preferred the Day estuary to the Thai Binh estuary throughout the mid-seventeenth century.

⁵⁵ Forest, *Les Missionnaires Français au Tonkin et au Siam*, Vol. 2, 129, 131.

⁵⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 110r; Nakamura, “Tonkin daihakushu”, 386-7.

⁵⁷ IOR ,G/12/17, pt. 2: 148r.




Source: The original map is owned by the British Library, London. This map is adopted from Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, xxxiii. Indications were made by the author.

Map 0.1 The "River of Tonkin" as depicted by the English c. 1670s

A review of the different routes taken by the VOC and the Wei brothers is important to explain the development of certain trading towns in Tonkin, in particular Pho Hien in the mid-seventeenth century, which previous studies have not adequately dealt with. The descriptions of the two different routes up to Tonkin show that each crosses the other strategically at Pho Hien. This will explain why Pho Hien emerged as the entrepot and gateway to Hanoi in the early seventeenth century.⁵⁸ It was strategically and conveniently situated at the spot where all foreign merchants going up to Hanoi for business came together. Up to Pho Hien, they could come through different rivers. While Chinese merchants preferred to sail up the Day River, the Dutch and English traders chose the Thai Binh–Luoc channel. Possibly, there were other river mouths that small vessels could use as their entry points. From Pho Hien to Hanoi, it was one strait way up the Red River. Pho Hien occupied a perfect location as a checkpoint and customs post to control the movement of people as well as goods going up to Hanoi. Pho Hien became important because the Pho Hien-Hanoi route and villages, places, people in between affected the production of silk subsequently the trade of silk from Tonkin to Nagasaki. This impacted the business dealings made by the two key players in the trade: the Wei brothers and the VOC. The main events that effected the area between Pho Hien and Hanoi will be discussed.

⁵⁸ For the establishment of Pho Hien see Kin Eiken, “Futsuryō indoshina Tonkin Hung-yen niokeru hokyaku nitsuite (On Pho Hien in Hung-yen, Tonkin, French Indochina)”, in *Indoshina to nihon tonō kankei* (Historical intercourse between Indochina and Japan) (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1943), 199-234; Truong Huu Quynh, “The Birth and Development of Pho Hien”, 27-38.



Map 0.2 Gulf of Tonkin

The Day Estuary

The Day estuary served as the main embouchure for foreign vessels in the early seventeenth century. Most ocean going ships did not go through the present-day Qiongzhou Strait (瓊州海峽) between Leizhou Peninsula (雷州半島) in Guangdong and Hainan Island, which connects the Gulf of Tonkin in the west to the South China Sea in the east. Instead, as mentioned earlier, they usually circumnavigate Hainan (海南) Island. Later on, however, it became almost inaccessible to big vessels due to increased deposit of silt that raised the level of the river bed.⁵⁹ By the time the

⁵⁹ Nguyen Thua Hy, "Pho Hien as Seen from European Sources", 84.

English arrived in Tonkin in the early 1670s, Dutch ships were no longer able to enter the Day estuary.

Two factors could be pointed out as reasons for why Chinese oceangoing junks, and European ships for that matter, avoided using the Qiongzhou Strait. Firstly, the Strait was narrow, dangerous and not easy to navigate. This can be seen from the instance of William Adams' voyage round Hainan Island on his way from Nagasaki to Tonkin in 1619. On his return journey, he chose to sail through the "Straits of Hainan". His junk struck a rock though it was "miraculously" spared from any damage.⁶⁰ Secondly, frequent occurrences of piracy posed a serious security problem for commercial ships passing through the waters bordering between the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin and Guangdong province for centuries. Several incidents suggest that Chinese pirates were operating along the Sino-Vietnamese coast in the second half of the seventeenth century. From around 1650, a Chinese "robber" from "Lubon" called Thun raided commercial vessels sailing between Macao and Tonkin. In June 1660, the *Chua* sent one of his sons with about forty well-armed galleys to capture Thun. In the end, however he managed to escape.⁶¹ Then, in the 1680s, a small group of impoverished farmers and fishermen gathered in a place

⁶⁰ Christopher James Purnell, *The Log-book of William Adams, 1614-19* (London and Reading: The Eastern Press, 1916), 262.

⁶¹ *DB*, 1661: 52-3.

called Longmen (龍門) near the Qing-Tonkin border and attacked trading ships making voyages between Macao and Tonkin (Map 0.2). Soon, more than a thousand people joined them with 100 small crafts. The Guangdong government could not suppress the attacks and reported them to Beijing instead. In 1690, the Qing court dispatched an army to Longmen and, at the same time, requested the Trinh to organize a joint operation against the pirates. The Trinh responded to the request by dispatching a general with approximately 5,000 men and eighty ships.⁶² Based on these two separate accounts of attacks, it can be concluded that the area was not safe for commercial vessels. Rich cargoes of oceangoing junks could easily fall prey to piracy.⁶³

Environment and Trade

In seventeenth-century Tonkin, production of raw silk was vulnerable to damages of drought, famine, epidemic and wars. In addition, the *Chua* and his mandarins' handling of business did not provide much incentive for foreign merchants. In fact, one of the most important key factors behind the Wei brothers' successful business operation was their decision to settle in Nagasaki that enabled them to accumulate wealth and capital in a secure and stable environment. For the

⁶² *KH*, 2: 1276-7.

⁶³ For more information on piracy along the South China coast during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century, see Dian H. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast 1790-1810* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987).

better understanding of the Wei brothers' commercial activities, it is important for us to look at these issues in detail.

The Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade was dependent on the harvest of raw silk. Tonkin produced both white and yellow silk. Trade and production essentially followed the changing weather conditions. Between December and February, junks bound for Tonkin left Nagasaki to catch the north-eastern monsoon. They sailed southwards along the lengthy coastline of China, passed the south of Hainan Island and sailed northward along the coast of northern Vietnam. They usually arrived in Tonkin by the end of March. Silk was produced twice a year. In villages, farmers reared silkworms at home. April and May were the peak of production of summer silk. Sales of the *Chua's* silk, which foreign merchants could not avoid, started around late June and sometimes in July. Hence, Chinese traders normally spent from three to four months in Tonkin. By the end of July, junks had to leave Tonkin to catch the last stage of the southwestern monsoon. If they departed later than that, there was a high possibility that the winds would reverse on their way and, as a result, they would have to turn back to Tonkin. They arrived in Nagasaki in late August and early September. The voyage usually took about a month or little longer.

Little is known about distribution system in Tonkin. Farmers cultivated silkworms again during the months of October and November. The production

volume of this silk was less than half of the silk harvested during the summer. After a portion of the silk was submitted to the *Chua* as a tax, the remainder was at farmers' disposal. Japanese and Chinese residents of Tonkin might play the role of intermediaries, engaging in the purchase of raw silk from the silk-producing villages and transporting it to Hanoi. Since foreign ships were absent from Tonkin during the winter, there were no buyers for winter silk for export.⁶⁴ Competition would have been less intense and, hence, prices could have been cheaper during the winter seasons. Japanese residents of Tonkin purchased winter silk and sold it to the highest bidders who were usually Chinese.⁶⁵ From the 1650s, some Chinese merchants began to take the advantage of cheaper silk by spending winter in Tonkin and purchasing silk for export in the following summer when the new batch of junks would arrive.⁶⁶ Yet, Tonkin was not at all a stable supplier of silk. This pattern of silk production was often disturbed by various factors culminating in multiple disasters.

Natural Disasters

Natural disasters were main factors affecting the production of silk. The silk supply fluctuated from year to year according to the weather conditions. Farmers in

⁶⁴ Murakami, *Bataviajō nisshi*, 255-6.

⁶⁵ Kurihara, "Oranda higashi indogaisha to tonkin", 23; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 110.

⁶⁶ Kurihara, "Oranda higashi indogaisha to Tonkin", 17.

Tonkin were confronted with both dry and wet weather. Land was regularly ravaged by drought, floods and sometimes a combination of both which made conditions for producing silk even more difficult.

The production of silk was dependent on two basic factors: a good crop of mulberry leaves to feed silkworms and the availability of labor to cultivate silk. In the Red River Delta, mulberry fields were often located on sand banks outside dykes along rivers.⁶⁷ Because of their location, the fields were vulnerable to water damage caused by heavy rain, water overflowing the dykes and subsequent flooding in the fields.⁶⁸ When mulberry trees were destroyed by floods, silk worms perished for lack of food. In 1653 and 1654, Tonkin produced very little silk because a flowing current of water swept away the mulberry trees and, since there were no mulberry leaves to feed the silkworms, they starved to death.⁶⁹ In July 1673, the Governor of Pho Hien was coping with severe flooding in the region. To deal with this situation, he decided to cut the river to save the town, causing drowning in two provinces downstream in

⁶⁷ Nishimura Masanari, “Hokubu vietnam kōga heigen ni okeru wajūgata teibōkeisei ni kansuru shiron (The formation of enclosed-type dykes in the Red River Plain)”, *Tōnanajia kenkyū*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2007): 208.

⁶⁸ Sakurai Yumio, “Tōnanajia kinsei no kaishi (Beginning of the “early modern” in Southeast Asia)” in *Nihon no kinsei* (Early modern Japan), ed. by Asao Naohiro (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1991), 344-5; Kurihara, “Oranda higashi indogaisha to Tonkin”, 9-10.

⁶⁹ DN, Aug 20 & 24, 1653, NFJ 66; Kurihara, “Oranda Higashi indo gaisha to Tonkin”, 16.

the process.⁷⁰ Although dykes were restored immediately after the water had subsided, this drastic measure affected the mulberry fields.⁷¹ Between 1660 and 1673 the government issued seven orders to repair dykes which probably meant that they were destroyed at least seven times.⁷² Wet conditions were particularly disadvantageous for business. In Pho Hien, Lin Yuteng owned a warehouse, which “very seldom went [*sic.*] dry for it is built on a [man-]made bank in the midst of [a] ditch”.⁷³ The conditions of such place were “so bad and hazardous of fire, water and rats”.⁷⁴

During winters, on the other hand, the monsoon winds blew from the northeast along the China coast and across the gulf of Tonkin, causing water shortage and consequently drought. When the area was hit by drought and large-scale famine, disease rapidly spread among the population. Under such circumstances, there was no one to take care of silk worms or to reel silk off cocoons and, hence, silk products did not come onto the market. For example, the first few years of the 1680s imposed

⁷⁰ Farrington, “English East India Company Documents”, 160.

⁷¹ In the seventh month of 1673 (12 August and 10 September, the Trinh government issued an order to restore the dykes. Nishimura, “Hokubu vietnam”, 206.

⁷² Nishimura, “Hokubu vietnam”, 206; Chen, “Teiji shōkō (Study on *Teiji*)”, *Sōdai ajia kenkyū* 9 (1988): 252-3.

⁷³ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 31r.

⁷⁴ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 122f.

extreme hardship on the people of northern Vietnam. In 1681, Tonkin was hard-hit by a massive drought. Rice crops failed and hundreds of people died from starvation and wide-spread disease.⁷⁵ In order to alleviate the food shortage, the *Chua* granted a Chop without any gifts or charges whatsoever to ships that would bring only rice.⁷⁶ This measure, however, was not enough to ease the seriousness of the problem. In March 1682, severe famine in nearly all the villages of the provinces of Kinh Bac (V. Kinh-Bắc 京北) and Son Tay (V. Son Tây 山西) had left more than two thirds of the weavers dead as well as poor people that used to spin the silk from the silkworms.⁷⁷ Samuel Baron, who at that time was an employee of the EIC, wrote that this famine “swept away two-thirds of the inhabitants” in the early 1680s.⁷⁸ Chinese merchants arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin also reported that “a third of the population”

⁷⁵ *KH*, 1: 342-3.

⁷⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 7: 278r. In Tonkin, a *Chua*'s “chop” was required for a merchant to make every move from anchoring and landing to unloading merchandise. The Dutch called it “*teijkenen*” or “*tjap*”. A chop is an official document bearing a seal-impression or stamp. Obtaining a chop was not free. Foreign visitors had to pay for it. Apart from chops issued by the *Chua*, the governor of Pho Hien issued his own chops for landing, housing and selling goods at Pho Hien. In order to go up and down the Red River between Pho Hien and Hanoi, merchants needed to obtain two chops for a chop was valid for only one way. In 1688, Dampier wrote, “Not so much as a boat being suffered to proceed without it [a chop]”. IOR G/12/17 pt .2: 111; Nagazumi, “17 seiki chūki no nihon Tonkin bōeki”, 27; Dampier, *Voyages and Discoveries*, 18.

⁷⁷ Farrington, “English East India Company Documents”, 158.

⁷⁸ Dror and Taylor, *Views of Seventeenth-Century Vietnam*, 245. Samuel Baron was born and raised in Hanoi. His father, Hendrik Baron (d.1664), was a Dutch manworking for the Dutch factory in Tonkin and his mother was Vietnamese. For more on Samuel Baron, see Dror and Taylor, *Views of Seventeenth-Century Vietnam*, 74-83.

perished from mass famine in this year.⁷⁹ According to an account by French priests, “the poor people piled up in troops and were going to plunder everywhere where they knew they would find something to eat”.⁸⁰ Silk production came to almost a complete halt during the famine. In 1681 and 1682, no new silk products came onto the market. The damage of the drought was so devastating that it took more than a few years for the regions to recover. Until 1684, silk was rare in Tonkin.⁸¹ The country straggled through the lingering effects of the successive natural disasters for the rest of the decade. It was only in 1689 that “price of rice dropped [in the country] and the people of Tonkin found little ease in their lives”.⁸² Some of the natural disasters were in part caused or compounded by administrative failures on the part of the government for their negligence of irrigation works and slow relief.⁸³

Table 1.1 Natural Disasters in Tonkin, 1633-1696

Year	Type of Disaster	Source
1633	dry weather, insects on silk worms, low harvest	DN, September 13, 1633

⁷⁹ *KH*, 1: 417.

⁸⁰ Forest, *Les Missionnaires francais au Tonkin et au Siam*, Vol. 2, 57-8.

⁸¹ *KH*, 1:343, 417-8, 420.

⁸² *KH*, 2: 1116.

⁸³ Nguyen The Anh, “State and Civil Society under the Trinh Lords in Seventeenth Century Vietnam”, in *La société civile face à l’ état dans les traditions Chinoise, Japonaise, Coréenne et Vietnamiennne*, ed. Leon Vandermeersch (Paris: École fançaise d’Extrême-Orient, 1994): 376.

1634	Famine	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 946
1641	heavy rain, floods	<i>DB</i> , 1641-1642: 65
1649	heavy rain, floods	<i>GM</i> 2: 389
1653	floods	Kurihara, 17
1654	floods	DN 21 August 1654, <i>NFJ</i> 67
1657	big storm, floods	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 960
1660	epidemic, low harvest	<i>DB</i> , 1661: 49-51
1663	floods	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 974; <i>DB</i> , 1663: 689-92
1664	Drought	<i>DB</i> , 1664: 549
1668	Drought	Taylor, 18
1669	Drought	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 988
1670	drought, epidemic	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 990
1673	Floods	<i>IOR/G/12/17</i> pt 2: 73v
1675	Drought	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 1003
1679	Floods	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 1003
1681	drought, famine	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 1010; <i>KH</i> , 1: 342-3, 417
1682	famine, epidemic	<i>KH</i> , 1: 343, 417, 420
1683	famine, floods	<i>KH</i> , 1: 418
1684	Floods	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 1014; <i>KH</i> , 1: 418
1685	drought, floods	<i>KH</i> , 1: 607
1687	drought	<i>DVSKTT</i> , 3: 1016
1693	drought	<i>KH</i> 2: 1566
1696	famine, epidemic	Forest, Vol. 2, 58

Notes: Forest, *Les Missionnaires Français au Tonkin*, Vol. 2.

Man-made Disasters

In addition to natural conditions, man-made disasters impacted badly on the silk industry. During dry conditions, Hanoi frequently suffered from fires. While fire may be considered a natural disaster, in Hanoi, a fire was made worse by the way the city was built and by its administrative difficulties. In 1626, Giuliano Baldinoti (1591-1631), the first Catholic priest to visit Hanoi, noted that fires had already destroyed the city several times over. Once a fire broke out, it quickly spread because

the place was densely populated and ordinary houses were constructed from bamboo and covered with thatch which easily caught fire.⁸⁴ William Dampier called such simple structures “*cajan*” houses.⁸⁵ Although there was a “reservoir of water” in the city which was useful to quench fires, several thousands of houses were burned to the ground each time. The reconstruction of the residences was quick owing to the simple structures of the houses.⁸⁶ Fire was a serious threat to business because commodities had to be kept intact in warehouses for a certain period of time. In the early 1670s, the English discovered that except for the *Chua*’s residence, the Dutch factory and a few Chinese houses, all houses were made of bamboo and no place was secure from the danger of fire.⁸⁷ Once a fire broke out, all people could do was to spread wet mats on their valuable properties and hope the winds would blow the other direction so that their houses would escape the flames.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Dampier, *Voyages and Discoveries*, 36. “

⁸⁵ “*Cajan*”, a word with Javanese and Malay origin, means the leaves of the *Nypa* palm or, sometimes, a woven mat made from them. Henry Yule, *Hobson-Jobson: A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases, and Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical, Geographical and Discursive* (London: J. Murray, 1903), 140.

⁸⁶ Two modern translations are available in French. “La relation sur le Tonkin du P. Baldinotti”, *BEFEO* 3 (1903), 77-8. A more recent translation with the original Italian text can be found in *Peninsule* 30 (1995), 124.

⁸⁷ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 11v, 31r.

⁸⁸ Letter from William Keeling in Hien to William Gyfford in Hanoi, 18 November 1673, IOR/G/12/17 pt.2: 93v.

Violence, robbery and theft were other problems that undermined security prospects for trade. In 1619, when an English navigator William Adams (1564-1620) led a Japanese ship to Tongking, thieves targeted his cargoes more than once.⁸⁹ During the 1630s, Japanese traders told the Dutch that, when their boats cruised upriver to Hanoi, they armed themselves with guns against robbers and other malicious people who were everywhere along the rivers, and that their merchandise had to be protected against theft and fire while stored in the warehouses.⁹⁰ In 1645, Wada Risaemon witnessed a group of ninety-two brigands attack a Chinese junk sailing up to Hanoi and kill its crew members.⁹¹ Even under normal situations, their commodities could easily be targets of theft. In 1619, when the English navigator William Adams (1564-1620) visited Tonkin on a Japanese junk, thieves targeted his cargoes more than once.⁹² During the 1630s, Japanese traders who had business with Tonkin related that their merchandise had to be constantly protected against theft and fire while they were stored in the warehouses.⁹³ Upon their arrival in Tonkin in 1673, the English merchants were warned: “the people frequently set [houses] on fire to

⁸⁹ Purnell, *The Log-book of William Adams*, 260.

⁹⁰ Letter from Couckebacker in Hirado to Batavia, 21 April 1636, *DB*, 1636: 71.

⁹¹ Nagazumi, *Shuinsen*, 213.

⁹² Purnell, *The Log-book of William Adams*, 260.

⁹³ Letter from Nicolaes Couckebacker in Hirado to Batavia, 21 April 1636, *DB*, 1636: 71.

steal under pretense to come to help quench it”.⁹⁴ Once a fire broke out, all people could do was to spread wet mats on their valuable properties and hope the winds would blow the other direction so that their houses would escape the flames.⁹⁵

Setting aside fires and thefts, the ongoing conflict between the Trinh and the Nguyen might very badly impact on the economy of Tonkin. Between 1627 and 1672, the Trinh of Tonkin led seven expeditions against the Nguyen to the south. The offensives were staged in 1627, 1633, 1643, 1648, 1655-60, 1661 and 1672.⁹⁶ The absence of the *Chua* from Hanoi during these expeditions easily triggered social unrest around the capital which seriously affected commercial transactions. In 1643, Antonio van Brockhorst and Jan van Elseracq, two Dutch merchants, reported that while Trinh Trang (V. Trịnh Tráng 鄭樞)(r. 1623-1657) led his army to the south, rumor spread around the capital in their absence that the Mac was preparing for an attack on Hanoi. Most of all principal merchants escaped from the capital and farmers and merchants both complained about the inconvenience of thieves and rogues which disrupted trade. People could not travel the roads to Hanoi without being robbed by bandits. Due to the difficulties of transportation, merchandise stopped coming into

⁹⁴ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 28v.

⁹⁵ Letter from William Keeling in Hien to William Gyfford in Hanoi, 18 November 1673, IOR/G/12/17 pt. 2: 93v.

⁹⁶ Cadière, “Le Mur de Đông Hới”, 87-254.

Hanoi from other parts of the country. As a result, commercial transactions in the capital came to a halt and Dutch traders could not carry out business for five-six consecutive days.⁹⁷ During the 1655-1660 campaign against the Nguyen, a large part of the inhabitants of Hanoi fled to the countryside to avoid conscription. This hindered trade for most business transactions conducted at the capital.⁹⁸

Besides the chronic state of war between the Trinh and the Nguyen until 1672 and the Mac until 1677, internal divisions in the *Chua*'s court brought chaos to Tonkin. In 1645, while Trinh Trang fell seriously ill, his second son Trinh Tac was chosen to succeed his father's lordship. This brought about a revolt by Tac's eldest son Lich (V. Trịnh Lịch 鄭灑), who was joined by his younger brother Sam (V. Trịnh Sâm 鄭崙) and his uncle. In the midst of the revolt which took place in the city itself and killed 4,000 people, merchants fled to the villages and commercial activities in Hanoi came to standstill.⁹⁹ In 1652, a plot by the *Tư lễ giám* (V. Tư lễ giám 司禮監) Hoang Nhan Dung (V. Hoàng Nhân Dũng 黄仁勇) against the Trinh court was exposed. In 1653, Hoang was decapitated.¹⁰⁰ Trinh Trang passed away in 1657, and

⁹⁷ C. C. van der Plas, *Tonkin 1644/45: Journal van de Reis van Anthonio van Brouckhorst* (Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut vor de Tropen te Amsterdam, 1955), 18-9. DN, 26 May 1643, NFJ 57.

⁹⁸ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 111.

⁹⁹ *DVSKTT*, 3: 950; Van der Plas, *Tonkin 1644/45*, 100; Taylor, "Literati Revival in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam", 9.

¹⁰⁰ DN, 7 August 1652, NFJ 65; *GM*, 2: 650-5; *DVSKTT*, 3: 953. Taylor, "Literati Revival in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam", 10; Hasuda Takashi, "17 seiki

Tac succeeded his father. Fearing insurrection and great bloodshed, which normally followed such occasions, all the citizens of Hanoi fled to the nearby villages. As long as the citizens did not return, commercial transactions did not take place.¹⁰¹ With Trinh Tac firmly in control, the Canh-tri (V. Cảnh Trị 景治) years (1663-1672) enjoyed relative peace and political stability.¹⁰² However, in December 1672, there were rumors of an insurrection to the east. 5,000 starving peasants moved on to Pho Hien and looted the houses of strangers.¹⁰³ In the summer of 1674, there was a mutiny of the Thanh-hoa (V. Thanh Hóa 清華) and Nghe-an (V. Nghệ An 乂安) troops broke out in the capital.¹⁰⁴ Amid the political chaos, Wei Zhiyan reportedly lost more than 2,000 taels.¹⁰⁵ In 1683, when the reign of Trinh Tac ended and Trinh Can (V. Trịnh Căn 鄭根) was installed as a new *Chua*, Tonkin experienced another

vietnam teishi seiken to kangang (The Eunuchs in seventeenth-century Vietnam)", *Machikaneyam ronsō* 39 (2005): 10-1.

¹⁰¹ DN, 20 August 1657, NFJ 70.

¹⁰² Nguyen, "State and Civil Society under the Trinh Lords", 376-7.

¹⁰³ Farrington, "English East India Company", 160.

¹⁰⁴ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 118r-119r. Chinese traders witnessed the mutiny in Tonkin. A crew member of Zhiyan's junk testified about the course of events to the Japanese officials when he arrived at Nagasaki in 1675. His testimony can be found in *KH*, 1: 109-10. There is another detailed account by a contemporary eye-witness. Samuel Baron, *A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen*, in Dror and Taylor, *Views of Seventeenth-Century Vietnam: Christoforo Borri on Chochinchina and Samuel Baron on Tonkin* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 2006), 250-1; For the context of this mutiny see K. W. Taylor, "Literati Revival in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam", *JSEAS*, Vol. 18, No.1 (1987): 18-21; Nguyen, "State and Civil Society under the Trinh Lords", 376-7.

¹⁰⁵ DN, 9 July 1675, NFJ 88.

round of succession crisis, which claimed causality.¹⁰⁶ In sum, the political situation of seventeenth-century Tonkin was highly unstable and unpredictable.

Recurring wars and unpredictable political situation provided no incentive for foreign traders to settle down in the country. Given the security and stability of Nagasaki as compared to Tonkin, it is not too difficult to imagine why Itchien was so eager to settle down in Nagasaki and why Zhiyan was very keen to remain in Nagasaki as long as the magistrates of Nagasaki permitted him to do so. Their ability to accumulate commercial capital and to make a smooth hand over of business between the brothers was certainly facilitated by the fact that their wealth was kept in Nagasaki and not in Hanoi or Pho Hien. In Tonkin, the *Chua* could confiscate the assets of wealthy foreign merchants, as happened most spectacularly in regard to Wada Risaemon (和田理左衛門)(d. 1667). This Japanese merchant had once accumulated as much as 50,000 taels in assets, but when he passed away Trịnh Tac declared himself as heir to the fortune and seized the whole property, leaving Wada's mother and son a mere 600 taels.¹⁰⁷ Such arbitrary treatment of the assets of foreign residents by the *Chúa* could hardly encourage foreigners to engage in economic activities that might lead to capital accumulation in Tonkin.

¹⁰⁶ *KH*, 1: 417-418, 420-421.

¹⁰⁷ Kurihara, "Oranda higashi indogaisha to tonkin", 23; Nagazumi, "17 seiki chūki no nihon-tonkin bōeki nitsuite", 41; Buch, "La Campagnie" (1937), 165.

Table 1.2 Fire, Wars, Mutinies, Social Unrests in Tonkin, 1643-1677

Year	Type of Disasters	Source
1627	Attack on the Nguyễn	Cadière, 87-254.
1633	Attack on the Nguyễn	Cadière, 87-254.
1643	War against the Nguyễn, The Mac aggression	Van der Plas, 22
1645	Civil war	Van der Plas, 22
1648	Attack on the Nguyễn	Cadière, 87-254.
1652	Conspiracy	DN, 7 August 1652, NFJ 65
1655-1660	Nguyễn attack on Tongking	Cadière, 87-254.
1657	Social unrest	DN, 20 August 1657, NFJ 70
1661	Attack on the Nguyễn	Cadière, 87-254.
1672	Looting in Phố Hiến	IOR/G/12/17 pt 2: 60r
1672	Attack on the Nguyễn	Cadière, 87-254.
1673	Fires at Pho Hien	IOR/G/12/17 pt. 2: 93v
1674	Mutiny in Hanoi	IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2r: 118r-119r; <i>KH</i> , 1: 109-10
1677	Revolts in Cao Bằng	<i>KH</i> , 1: 209-10
1682	Mutiny	<i>KH</i> , 1: 343, 417, 420
1683	Mutiny	<i>KH</i> , 1: 417-8
1692	Potential succession crisis	IOR/G/12/17 pt. 8: 347r

Notes: Cadière, “Le Mur de Đồng Hới”, *Tonkin 1644/45*; Nguyen, “State and Civil Society under the Trịnh Lords”.

A quick comparison between Hanoi and Nagasaki is rather striking. Over the course of the seventeenth century, Nagasaki transformed itself from a obscure fishing village into a busy international port with the legal, administrative and economic infrastructure that enabled the *bakufu* to promote and control foreign trade. In contrast, Tongking’s volatile political situation and chronic state of war too often induced a chain of social unrest, which compounded the already difficult natural

conditions to ensure the local export silk industry was vulnerable to any serious external competition.

Foreign Traders

The Wei brothers and the VOC were not the only foreign merchants active in the Tonkin market. Many other traders of foreign origin visited Hanoi seeking profit. Before we explore the Chinese junk trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki specifically, let us dwell on different groups of foreign merchant that contested for silk in seventeenth-century northern Vietnam.

The traders that visited Tonkin may be divided into two general groups: Asian traders and European traders. Asian traders comprised mainly of the Japanese, the Zheng and those from Southeast Asia. When all these foreign merchants met each other in Tonkin, their common language seemed to be Portuguese.¹⁰⁸ In addition, the knowledge of the Chinese language was considered to be an advantage. In 1675, finding it increasingly difficult to communicate with the “treacherous” Tonkinese *jurebass*, EIC merchants in Tonkin proposed to the Council at Banten to “get a good

¹⁰⁸ Farrington, “English East India Company Documents”, 153.

honest Chinaman from Bantam [Banten] (if a Chinaman can be so) who writes China [Chinese] well, and is of a ready wit and apt for business".¹⁰⁹

In the first two decades of the seventeenth century, Japanese traders visited Tonkin. Unlike other mainland Southeast Asian ports such as Cochinchina, Siam and Cambodia, however, they had never established sustainable Japanese quarters that existed till the end of the century. Nevertheless, after their own government abandoned overseas Japanese communities, Japanese residents of Tonkin kept themselves engaged in the Tonkin silk export to Japan. Wada Risaemon, also known under his Christian name Paolo de Vada, was one of the most influential people in the court of the Trinh who used his special connection to high-ranking government officials as well as to the *Chua's* inner court to facilitate his own gain. Wada was instrumental in trade between Manila and Tonkin. In addition, his ships visited Siam and Makkasar.¹¹⁰ After his death in 1667, the Japanese presence was no longer significant in Tonkin.

¹⁰⁹ Letter from Tonkin to Henry Dacres and the Council at Banten, 24 July 1675, IOR G/12/17, pt. 3: 168r.

¹¹⁰ He was a native of Nagasaki who migrated first to Macao, relocated to Cochin China and finally settled in Tonkin. From the late 1630s to the 1660s, based primarily in Tonkin, he traded with Nagasaki, Makassar, Manila and Siam. Over the decades, he managed to correspond with his relatives in Nagasaki. The VOC ships carried their letters one way and the other. Tokyo University Historiographical Institute, ed., *Tōtsūji kaisho nichiroku* (Official diaries of the office of Chinese interpreters), Vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), 67 (henceforth cited as *TKN*). Through his wide network among the Japanese expatriate communities in the neighboring ports of Macao and Japan, he often provided the Portuguese with up-to-date information about recent political developments in Japan. For more details

Zheng junks from Taiwan visited Tonkin from 1653 to 1684. They too shipped Tonkinese silk to Nagasaki and, therefore, were the most intimidating competitors of the Wei brothers besides the VOC. The last ship from Taiwan appeared in Tonkin in 1684. It happened to be in Nagasaki when the Qing took Taiwan.¹¹¹ After the Qing lifted the decades-long maritime ban, Chinese junks from Ningbo (寧波) started appearing in Tonkin. Some of them returned to Ningbo from Tonkin, while others sailed directly up to Nagasaki. The last such junk to sail to Nagasaki was recorded in 1724.¹¹²

Besides those junks carrying away Tonkinese silk destined for Japan, junks from Southeast Asian ports such as Ayutthaya, Manila and Batavia occasionally showed up in Tonkin with diverse local products. It had been recorded that King

of his life see, Madalena Ribeiro, “The Japanese Diaspora in the Seventeenth Century: According to Jesuit Sources”, *Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies* 3 (2001): 69-70; Iwao, *Nanyō nihonmachi no kenkyū* (Studies on Japanese quarters in Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1966), 208, 289-9; Iwao, *Zoku nanyō nihonmachi no kenkyū* (Continues: Studies on Japanese quarters in Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1987), 272. Nagazumi, “17 seiki chūki no nihon Tonkin bōeki nitsuite”, 36-41; Nagazumi, “17 seiki chūki no nihon-tonkin bōeki”, 36-42; Kurihara, “Oranda higashi indogaisha to Tonkin”, 23-4; Alain Forest, *Les Missionnaires Français au Tonkin et au Siam XVII-XVIIIe Siècles*, Vol. 2 (Paris: Harmattan, 1998), 133; Madalena Ribeiro, “The Japanese Diaspora in the Seventeenth Century: According to Jesuit Sources”, *Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies* 3 (2001): 69-70; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 55-6.

¹¹¹ *KH*, 1:418.

¹¹² *KH*, 2: 1115-6. Also see Iioka, “Ayutaya kokuō no tainichi bōeki”, 98 (Table 6).

Narai (r. 1656-1688) of the Ayutthaya kingdom dispatched two junks to Tonkin with his Siamese ambassadors on board in 1670, 1671 and 1676.¹¹³ As was often the case with Siamese junks, these Siamese delegates were part of a commercial venture orchestrated by the King of Ayutthaya himself.¹¹⁴ In 1673, three small Chinese junks arrived from “Penan [Penang]”. They were reportedly laden with “drugs” for Tonkin, cotton wood and iron pans.¹¹⁵ In 1674, a small vessel from Manila arrived in Tonkin, laden with 60,000 catties of brimstone and twenty bales of “coast cloth”¹¹⁶. In the summer of 1676, one “Batavian junk” from Palembang and another from Malacca arrived. The latter was loaded with goods including pepper, saltpeter, brimstone, alum, cotton and betel nuts.¹¹⁷ Some Chinese junks from Batavia visited Tonkin en route to Japan.¹¹⁸

European traders who visited Tonkin were made up of Portuguese, English and French. The Portuguese Macao-Tonkin route was inaugurated by Jesuit missionaries in 1626, following the Japanese Christians who had migrated to Tonkin via Macao a

¹¹³ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 57; IOR, G/12/17, pt. 3: 164v.

¹¹⁴ Iioka, “Ayutaya kokuō no tainichi bōeki”, 81-2.

¹¹⁵ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 60v.

¹¹⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 110r.

¹¹⁷ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 3: 167v, 198v.

¹¹⁸ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 130v.

few years earlier.¹¹⁹ The ship had a license to trade issued by Trinh Trang.¹²⁰ From 1626 to the 1660s, at least one Portuguese vessel, either a *galliot* or a smaller-sized *naveta*, visited Tonkin from Macao every year. Some were directly owned by the Jesuits and others were consigned primarily with Jesuit merchandise and capital. The Portuguese also freighted or consigned their goods on Chinese ocean-going junks bound for Tonkin.¹²¹ After direct traffic between Macao and Nagasaki was cut off, Japanese Christians in Tonkin conducted a triangular trade between Macao, Tonkin and Nagasaki. Since they were not allowed to go back to Japan, they dispatched their junks to Nagasaki under the command of Chinese chief merchants.¹²²

¹¹⁹ See Gonoï Takashi, “Nihon iezuuskai no tōnanajia fukyō to nihonjin shisai (The Catholic church in Japan and their missionary works in Southeast Asia in relation to diasporic Japanese communities)”, *Nihon Rekishi* (1981): 58-9; Gonoï Takeshi, “Iezusukai hikaiin no kongergasan to kaisōka (*Congregação* and the ranking of non-Jesuits in Asia: The relationship between *dōjuku* in Japan and *catechista* in Tonkin)”, *Shigaku Zasshi*, Vol. 103, No. 3 (1994), 53-8; Riberio, “The Japanese Diaspora in the Seventeenth Century”, 67. For a contemporary account by the Jesuit priest who led the 1626 mission, see Baldinotti, “Relation du Royaume de Tonkin nouvellement découvert (1626)”, 111-130.

¹²⁰ Gonoï, “Iezusukai nihonkanku niyoru Tonkin fukyō”, 96-7.

¹²¹ Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, 113-4. Such operations seemed to continue until 1673. A Portuguese ship arrived in Tonkin from Macao in March 1673. 21 March 1673, IOR G12/17, pt. 2: 65v. This seemed to be the last ship from Macao. Also see Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, 119.

¹²² Riberio, “The Japanese Diaspora in the Seventeenth Century”, 69.

During the 1620s, in the wake of the warfare against the Nguyen, Trinh Trang invited Portuguese merchants from Macao to visit Tonkin for trade.¹²³ As early as 1626, when Jesuit missionaries visited Tonkin, they took passage on a Portuguese vessel leaving Macao. In 1628 when a promised vessel from Macao did not turn up in Tonkin, the *Chua* ordered Catholic priests to leave his territory. Clearly, the *Chua* allowed Jesuits to propagate their faith in Tonkin so that ships from Macao would come to his domain more regularly.¹²⁴ This strategy proved effective and the Portuguese kept visiting Tonkin. Between 1636 and 1638, the volume of Tonkinese raw silk imported into Japan by the Portuguese far exceeded that of Chinese silk.¹²⁵ In the aftermath of their expulsion from Japan, the Portuguese attempted to revitalize their trade with Japan by investing in Chinese junks leaving Macao for Tonkin.¹²⁶ Portuguese vessels came to Tonkin annually until 1673.¹²⁷ By the early 1680s, they seemed to have abandoned their business in Tonkin. In 1681, a Chinese merchant found that all the Portuguese, who used to stay in a house at a place called “*Raichauman* (来潮漫)”, or Pho Hien, near the coast had left Tonkin.¹²⁸ Only one

¹²³ Gonoï, “Iezusukai nihonkanku niyoru Tonkin fukyō”, 96-7.

¹²⁴ Gonoï, “Iezusukai hikaiin no kongregasan to kaisōka”, 25, 52-4.

¹²⁵ Nagazumi, “17seiki chūki no nihon-tonkin bōeki nitsuite”, 32.

¹²⁶ For more details on the Portuguese investment in Chinese junks, see Chapter Four.

¹²⁷ Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, 119.

¹²⁸ In Vietnamese sources such as *Đại Nam Nhất Thống Chí* (大南一統志), the place appears as 来潮滿 or 来朝漫. According to Fujiwara Riichirō, both refer to

local servant remained in the house.¹²⁹ Spanish merchants from Manila also occasionally arrived at Tonkin. They brought silver as well as brimstone and, in exchange, carried local goods such as silk and musk back to Manila.¹³⁰

In 1671, the EIC decided to set up a factory in Nagasaki, Taiwan and Tonkin. Their ultimate goal was to cut into the Japan trade, which they had prematurely abandoned in 1623 by selling Tonkinese raw silk in exchange for Japanese silver and copper. The EIC merchants arrived in northern Vietnam in 1672. Between 1672 and 1676, the English merchants in Tonkin were unable to conduct trade for no English ships arrived in Tonkin and they were virtually left out of the rest of their far eastern network during this period. In 1674, the English factors in Tonkin learned from Chinese merchants arriving in Tonkin from Nagasaki that the *bakufu* ordered the *Return* to leave immediately without selling any goods.¹³¹ The English hopes for the resumption of the Japan trade were dashed and henceforth, the Tonkin factory was given a new purpose to supply finished silk for the European market.¹³² In 1675, the

Pho Hien. Fujiwara Richirō, “Reichō kōki teishi no kakyō taisaku (The Trinh’s policy toward Chinese immigrants in the late period of the Le Dynasty)”, in *Tōnanajiashi no kenkyū* (Studies on the History of South-East Asia) (Tokyo: Hōzōkan, 1986): 244.

¹²⁹ *KH*, 1: 316-7.

¹³⁰ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 109r.

¹³¹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 113v.

¹³² For the context of the English operation in the South China Sea during the early 1670s, see Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company*

Chua plainly told the chief of the English factory of Tonkin, William Gyfford, that the English “should be ranked as the third sort of strangers” after the VOC and Lin Yuteng, because the English “were not as good as our words” and failed to live up to their original promises of bringing their ships yearly to Tonkin and serving the *Chua* with cloth, guns, brimstone and saltpeter like the Dutch.¹³³ The English merchants had never been able to pull themselves out of their third-ranked status for the remainder of the century. The English factory ceased operations in 1697.¹³⁴

French missionaries arrived in Tonkin rather early. Unlike their Portuguese counterparts who often invested their capital in Chinese junks, their concern was more straightforward: the propagation of the Catholic faith.¹³⁵ In 1669, the French attempts

Trading to China 1635-1834 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 31-40; C. R. Boxer, “Jan Compagnie in Japan 1672-1674, or Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in Japan and Formosa”, *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 2nd series, Vol. 7 (1930): 139-203; Peter Pratt, *History of Japan: Compiled from the Records of the English East India Company at the Instance of the Court of Directors, 1822* (Kobe: J. L. Thompson, 1931), 118-99; D. K. Basset, “The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East, 1623-84, Part II: 1665-84”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (1960): 145-57.

¹³³ A Letter from William Gyfford in Tonkin to the Council in Banten, in IOR G/12/17, pt. 2: 143v-144r.

¹³⁴ For the details of the English operation in Tonkin from 1672 to 1693, see Hoang Anh Tuan, “From Japan to Manila and back to Europe: The Abortive English Trade with Tonkin in the 1670s”, *Itinerario*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2005): 73-92.

¹³⁵ For the activities of French missionaries in northern Vietnam, see Forest, *Les Missionnaires Français au Tonkin et au Siam*, Vol. 2.

to open up trade with Tonkin failed miserably. A few years later, Trinh Tac told English traders that the French had promised to send a ship to Tonkin every year to serve him, but they had lied.¹³⁶ By the turn of the eighteenth century, however, all foreign merchants, except the Chinese, had disappeared from the Tonkin scene.

It is against this natural, political and economic environment that Chinese junk traders and other foreign interest groups conducted their commerce in northern Vietnam. They all had an eye on Tonkinese raw silk. The next chapter explains why Tonkinese raw silk became such a sought-after commodity at this particular time by narrating vicissitudes of the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade from the perspective of Chinese maritime traders.

¹³⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 3: 137; Forest, *Les Missionnaires Français au Tonkin et au Siam*, Vol. 2, 16-7.

CHAPTER TWO
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TONKIN-NAGASAKI SILK TRADE
DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

For about half a century, from the 1640s to the end of the 1680s, Tonkin played a significant role in the maritime trading networks of the China Sea region by exporting raw silk at a time when it became increasingly difficult to obtain raw silk from China. In an attempt to cut into potentially lucrative silk trade, traders of diverse origins visited Tonkin's political capital and primary market, Hanoi, both by sea and by land. Among them, the VOC and private Chinese traders fiercely competed for Tonkinese raw silk because Japan was by far the largest importer of raw silk in the region and they were the only commercial agents who were allowed to trade with Japan directly.

Scholars such as P. W. Klein, Leonard Blussé, and more recently, Hoang Anh Tuan, provided detailed analyses on Dutch business dealings.¹³⁷ They generally agree that the Dutch export of Tonkinese raw silk to Japan was at its zenith from 1641 to 1654 and on the decline thereafter. It is fair to point out that due primarily to the lack of information on Chinese mercantile activities, the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade has been understood predominantly from the Dutch perspective. However, Henriette Buggé's quantitative research proved that the Chinese maritime traders were not

¹³⁷ Klein, "De Tonkinees-Japnse zijdehandel"; Blussé, "No Boats to China"; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*.

inferior to the Dutch in exporting Tonkingese silk to Japan.¹³⁸ This chapter attempts to lay out the rise and fall of Chinese junk trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki during the seventeenth century. By placing the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade into the context of Chinese maritime commerce and relating that to the vicissitudes of the VOC business operations between these two places, it will shed new light on the hitherto untold aspects of commercial exchanges between northern Vietnam and Japan during the early modern period.

Since the different factors that affected the Tonkinese raw silk export occurred at different places—and often contemporaneously—it is not entirely practical to trace the sequence of events in a strict chronological order. Hence this essay focuses on several important events that brought about changes in the dynamics of maritime commerce in the China Sea region and examines how each event contributed to shaping the course of the trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki through the seventeenth century. To begin with, we shall look at changes in Japan's foreign policy during the 1630s and how they resulted in elevating Tonkin's position in the regional commercial networks in the following decades. The issues and conditions in China will be discussed later.

The Beginnings

¹³⁸ Buggé, "Silk to Japan", 34.

It is unknown how or when Tonkinese silk was initially brought to Japan. As early as 1619, William Adams reported in his log book that Tonkinese silk was “the commodity most desired” for export to Japan.¹³⁹ Unfortunately, there is no record on the status of Tonkinese raw silk in the Japan market during the first two decades of the seventeenth century. Then, in February 1634, the VOC observed that the Chinese junks imported 250,000 cattles of raw silk to Japan including some from Tonkin.¹⁴⁰ Until 1635 when the *bakufu* prohibited Japanese people from either leaving or returning to Japan, the Japanese merchants were active in trading between Tonkin and Japan. Each year the Japanese brought 25,000 to 30,000 taels of silver to Tonkin and, in exchange, purchased raw silk.¹⁴¹ In addition, Portuguese merchants including some Jesuits played a pivotal role in the raw silk trade. From their base at Macao, these merchants conducted lucrative silk-for-silver trade between China and Japan since the late sixteenth century. The Portuguese Macao-Tonkin route was inaugurated in 1626 by Jesuit missionaries following the Japanese Christians who previously migrated to Tonkin via Macao.¹⁴² Regular trade transactions between the two places existed until

¹³⁹ Purnell, *The Log-book of William Adams*, 183.

¹⁴⁰ *DB* 1634, 249.

¹⁴¹ *DB* 1637, 157.

¹⁴² Gonoï Takashi, “Nihon Iezusukai no Tōnan Ajia fukyō to Nihonjin shisai (The Catholic church in Japan and their missionary works in Southeast Asia in relation to diasporic Japanese communities)”, *Nippon Rekishi* 399 (1981): 58–9.

the 1660s.¹⁴³ From 1636 to 1638, the Portuguese imported much more Tonkinese raw silk into Japan than Chinese raw silk.¹⁴⁴ There is no doubt that Tonkinese raw silk comprised a substantial share of Japan's import of raw silk in the mid-1630s. Chinese, Japanese as well as Portuguese traders were involved in transporting raw silk from northern Vietnam to Japan.

Having failed to settle themselves in mainland China, the Dutch established Casteel Zeelandia on the island of Taiwan (台湾) in 1624. With no direct access to the Chinese market, the Company was dependent on Chinese boats traveling back and forth between Fujian and Taiwan for their supply of raw silk. Most of these Chinese ships were under the influence of Zheng Zhilong (鄭芝龍)(1604–1661), father of Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功)(1624–1662) or Koxinga.¹⁴⁵ In 1636, in order to fully enforce anti-Christian measures and put down Jesuit infiltration, the *bakufu* considered the possibility of terminating their relationship with the Portuguese, who had been the largest exporter of Chinese raw silk to Japan. Concerned about the future import of raw silk, the *bakufu* repeatedly questioned the Dutch merchants if they were

¹⁴³ George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630-1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 119.

¹⁴⁴ Takase Kōichiro, “Makao-Nagasaki kan bōeki no sōtorihikidaka, kiito torihikiryō, kiito kakaku (The Turnover, amount, and price of raw silk of the Portuguese trade at Nagasaki in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries)”, *Shakai-keizai-shigaku*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1982): 67–68.

¹⁴⁵ Blussé, “No Boats to China”, 65.

capable of bringing in as much raw silk as the Portuguese had done. In 1637, the VOC responded to this by dispatching the *Grol* from Nagasaki to northern Vietnam with the aim of opening trade with Tonkin. Now that the Japanese merchants were out of overseas trade, the Dutch saw the perfect opportunity to take over the trade, which used to be in the hands of the Japanese.¹⁴⁶ In the following year, the VOC officially inaugurated a factory in Tonkin and began exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan.

In 1639, the Portuguese merchants were expelled indefinitely and no longer allowed to trade with Japan. Alongside the expulsion of the Portuguese, the *bakufu* sought to compensate for any shortages that might be incurred by the termination of the Portuguese pipeline between Macao and Nagasaki. In order to ensure a continued supply of Chinese raw silk yarn, the *bakufu* ordered the heads of the Sō clan of Tsushima and the Shimazu of Satsuma to increase their respective trade with Korea and Ryūkyū. In all likelihood, the *bakufu* approached Chinese merchants in Nagasaki with a similar request.¹⁴⁷ If that was the case, such an official promotion of junk trade must have provided incentive for some Chinese merchants to expand their silk trade and encouraged others to start new businesses with Tonkin, which had a good record of exporting raw silk to Japan in the preceding years. By eliminating the Japanese and

¹⁴⁶ Nagazumi, “17 seiki chūki no Nihon-Tonkin bōeki”, 25–6.

¹⁴⁷ Tashiro Kazui, “Foreign Relations during the Edo Period: Sakoku Reexamined”, *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1982): 293.

Portuguese merchants, the introduction of the so-called *sakoku* policy created new opportunities not only for the Dutch but also for the private Chinese traders to increase the Japan trade in the following decades.

Chinese Competition in Tonkin

The 1640s saw the rise of Tonkin as a leading exporter of raw silk in the region. In 1641 when Zheng's junks started trading directly with Japan, Tonkinese silk products grew its importance in the VOC's intra-Asian trade.¹⁴⁸ As mainland China was off-limits and the Zheng refused to cooperate, the VOC found a solution at Tonkin. In 1642 and 1643, the Dutch merchants found that they were the sole silk buyers at Tonkin and with few prospective buyers around, farmers in Tonkin considered abandoning sericulture and, instead, focused on cultivating rice.¹⁴⁹ The *Dagh-register Nagasaki* confirms that no Chinese junks from Tonkin were registered in the 1642 trading season and a mere 580 catties of raw silk were imported from Tonkin to Nagasaki in 1643.¹⁵⁰ Chinese trading activities were on hiatus during these years.

¹⁴⁸ Blussé, "No Boarts to China", 67.

¹⁴⁹ Van der Plas, *Tonkin 1644/45*, 22.

¹⁵⁰ DN, 16 October 1642, NFJ 56; DN, 7 November 1643, NFJ 57.

In the second half of the 1640s, Chinese maritime traders invigorated their commercial activities and, as a result, created intense competition for raw silk on the Tonkin market. In 1647, the Dutch merchants at Nagasaki mentioned that a prominent Chinese resident of Japan sent his junks to Tonkin with a large capital.¹⁵¹ In that year, two Chinese junks from Japan appeared at Tonkin with a sum of 80,000 taels in silver. Chinese merchants offered what the Dutch considered excessively high prices and succeeded in purchasing 40,000 catties of raw silk as well as other commodities. Only after their departure were the Dutch able to purchase raw silk.¹⁵² In 1648, the Chinese merchants arrived at Tonkin with 120,000 taels of silver. Again, by bidding the highest price, they bought most of the silk available on the market. The Dutch had to wait to enter the market until these Chinese merchants departed for Japan.¹⁵³ In 1649, three Chinese junks bound for Tonkin sailed from Nagasaki.¹⁵⁴ By that time, the Dutch factors recognized Chinese mercantile activities as foremost threat to the company's operation at Tonkin.¹⁵⁵ In 1650, a Chinese trader arrived at Nagasaki from Tonkin with capital worth 80,000 taels. Learning that this particular Chinese trader would not return to Tonkin that year, Antonio van Brockhorst, the chief of the Dutch

¹⁵¹ DN, 6 and 9 August 1647.

¹⁵² *GM*, 2: 325.

¹⁵³ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 153.

¹⁵⁴ DN, 17, 23, and 25 December 1649, NFJ 63.

¹⁵⁵ Blussé, "No Boats to China", 143–64.

factory at Nagasaki, felt hopeful about the Company's business prospects in the next trading season at Tonkin because "the Company would not be hindered as much by the Chinese."¹⁵⁶ It is clear that during the second half of the 1640s Chinese merchants with substantial financial capabilities began exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki and Chinese business transactions cast a shadow over the future of the VOC business at Tonkin.

Different groups of Chinese merchants were involved in exporting Tonkinese raw silk and their arrival intensified competition for raw silk in the Tonkin market during the early 1650s. Ships belonging to the Zheng family competed with other Chinese merchants such as He Bin (or Pincqua) from Taiwan and the Wei brothers.¹⁵⁷ Bidding against each other, their vigorous commercial activities led to an increase in the purchase price of raw silk and hence obstructed the Dutch business activities in Tonkin. In 1650, the arrival of six Chinese junks completely thwarted Dutch business. Chinese merchants offered high purchase prices that the Dutch could not afford.¹⁵⁸ The six junks carried away more than 82,000 catties of raw silk from Tonkin. It was

¹⁵⁶ DN, 19 October 1650, NFJ 63.

¹⁵⁷ For the career of He Bin, see Tonio Andrade, "Chinese under European Rule: The Case of Sino-Dutch Mediator He Bin", *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2007): 1–32.

¹⁵⁸ DN, 23 and 26 July 1650, NFJ 63.

only after their departure that the VOC managed to fetch 57,825 cattles of raw silk.¹⁵⁹ In 1653, the arrival of five Chinese junks again spurred competition in Tonkin. While the Dutch factory had approximately 250,000 taels available for that trading season these five Chinese junks together brought a sum of 400,000 taels of silver.¹⁶⁰ In 1654, the Governor General of Joan Maetsuycker (1606–1678) could not help but admitting that “if Chinese traders would continue to offer high purchase price for raw silk, the VOC would no longer be able to obtain much silk in Tonkin in the coming years.”¹⁶¹ In the face of the intense competition in the Tonkin market, the VOC was forced to shift its primary silk supplier once again from Tonkin to Bengal in the mid-1650s.¹⁶²

The Qing Maritime Ban and the Zheng's Landing on Taiwan

In their struggle to establish control over littoral China, the Qing court issued a series of restrictive maritime policies, which culminated in the promulgation of a maritime ban in 1655. All Chinese maritime activities were now considered illegal. Though the ban was supposed to prevent the coastal population from supplying aid and provisions to the Zheng family, it was not immediately effective. From 1661 onwards, the Qing introduced more drastic measures to eliminate any possibility of

¹⁵⁹ *GM*, 2: 450–1.

¹⁶⁰ *GM*, 2: 702; Kurihara, “Oranda Higashi Indo gaisha to Tonkin”, 16.

¹⁶¹ Kurihara, “Oranda Higashi Indo gaisha to Tonkin”, 26.

¹⁶² Blussé, “No Boats to China”, 68; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 148-9.

collaboration between the Zheng navy and the local population. The residents of such coastal provinces as Guangdong (廣東), Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu (江蘇), and Shandong (山東) were forcibly relocated inland to a distance of fifteen to twenty-five kilometers.¹⁶³ In April 1661, gradually being cornered, Zheng Chenggong launched an attack on the Dutch on Taiwan. After a nine-month siege, the Dutch fortress fell, thus bringing an end to the Dutch rule over the island.

The Qing Maritime Ban and the Zheng's landing on Taiwan exerted a substantial influence on Chinese commercial shipping between Tonkin and Nagasaki. Firstly, with the loss of Taiwan, the VOC sought to revive its position in the China Sea region. As part of restructuring their business in Asia, the Dutch merchants at Tonkin explored the possibility of overland trade between Tonkin and China by dispatching an expedition to the border area.¹⁶⁴ In the meantime they adopted more aggressive policies towards Chinese junks sailing in high seas. In 1662, in order to secure the purchase of Tonkinese raw silk, the Governor General and the Council of the Indies in Batavia ordered the fleet leaving for China to attack the rich junks trading between China and Japan. In the summer of 1663, the Governor-General sent

¹⁶³ Cheng Ko-cheng, "Cheng Cheng-kung's Maritime Expansion and Early Ch'ing Coastal Prohibition", in *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. E. B. Vermeer (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1990), 238–40.

¹⁶⁴ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 106–9.

a vessel from Batavia to Tonkin for the purpose of intercepting the fully laden Chinese junks leaving Tonkin for Nagasaki.¹⁶⁵ Due to this procedure, two junks under Wei Zhiyan, who had been the most successful in exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki since the mid-1650s, were blockaded by the Dutch ships and unable to leave Tonkin for two years. In addition, the Governor-General instructed Dutch merchants in Tonkin to attack the Chinese junks trading between Tonkin and Cambodia and Siamese junks sailing between Tonkin and Nagasaki.¹⁶⁶ The strategy failed however because the magistrates of Nagasaki and other Japanese officials, who had a personal stake in these Chinese junks, explicitly expressed their strong discontent at the Dutch handling of these Chinese junks. In addition, the Trịnh government of Tonkin virtually protected the Chinese junks against the Dutch aggression.¹⁶⁷ When it became obvious that both Japanese and Tonkinese authorities did not want the Dutch to intrude the Chinese commercial activities, the VOC conceded and gave their Chinese competitors free rein.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ *DB* 1663, 194, 690.

¹⁶⁶ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 114.

¹⁶⁷ The details can be found in Chapter Three. See also, Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 113-4.

¹⁶⁸ Letter from the Governor General of Batavia to Nagasaki, 25 April 1665, in *DB* 1665, 89-90.

Secondly, the Zheng's withdrawal from the mainland intensified competition among Chinese maritime traders. Though Taiwan produced deerskins and sugar, which were in high demand in Japan, the island did not produce silk. Fujian's export industry depended on the supply of raw silk from Jiangsu and Zhejiang.¹⁶⁹ As these areas came firmly under the influence of the Qing, silk became scarce and expensive in Fujian. Chinese merchants were no longer able to find sufficient amounts of export items at Fuzhou, Amoy (廈門), Quanzhou (泉州), and Zhangzhou (漳州).¹⁷⁰ Zheng Jing (鄭經)(1642–1681), who succeeded his father Zheng Chenggong after the latter's untimely death, strove to find a way to obtain silk and other merchandise outside China. He approached the Spanish at Manila and the English at Banten.¹⁷¹ As the condition along China's southern coastal regions turned against them, Zheng's forces resorted to more violent acts towards other Chinese junks trading in the China Sea. In 1673, English merchants observed that the "Chinese in Taiwan were chiefly bent on

¹⁶⁹ Fan Jin-min, *Jiang nan si chou shi yan jiu* (Historical studies on silk in Jiangnan) (Beijing: Nong ye chu ban she, 1993), 261–262; Xu Xiao-wang, "Wan ming yu fujian jianzhe qu yu mao yi (On the regional trade between Fujian and the two provinces Jiangsu and Zhejiang in the late-Ming dynasty)," *Journal of Fujian Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)* 1 (2004): 22–30.

¹⁷⁰ Pang Xinping, "Kai-hentai kara mita Shinsho no kaikin to Nagasaki bōeki (Chinese junk trade with Nagasaki during the period of the maritime ban in the early Qing as seen from *Kai hentai*)", *Osaka keidai ronshū*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2004): 232–3, 238.

¹⁷¹ E. H. Blair and J. A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493–1898* (Cleveland, Ohio: A. H. Clark, 1903–1909), 42, 119.

attacking the Tonkin junks bound for Japan.”¹⁷² Zheng’s fleets were clearly targeting the rich cargoes of Chinese junks sailing from Tonkin to Nagasaki. They succeeded at least once during the summer of 1676: the Zheng naval vessels ambushed and plundered a junk belonging to Wei Zhiyan while it was en route to Japan.¹⁷³ In the mid-seventeenth century, whereas Japanese and Tonkinese interventions rendered the Dutch attempts to hinder Chinese commercial activities invalid, unavailability of the supply of Chinese raw silk increased competition for the purchase of Tonkinese raw silk among Chinese maritime traders.

The Revolt of Three Feudatories, 1673–1681

In 1673, Wu Sangui (吳三桂)(1612–1678) of Yunnan (雲南) revolted against the Emperor Kangxi (康熙)(r. 1661–1722), which triggered the anti-Qing movement known as the Revolt of Three Feudatories. Geng Jingzhong (耿精忠) in Fuzhou and Shang Zhixin (尚之信)(d. 1680) in Guangdong followed Wu. Initially, Geng and Shang, the two warlords from the coastal provinces, not only dispatched their own junks to Nagasaki but also invited other Chinese traders to visit their ports. They encouraged foreign trade and promised to protect these traders against the Qing navy. Yet, their initiatives soon went to naught for both Geng Jingzhong and Shang Zhixin

¹⁷² DN, 9 July 1673, NFJ 85. English translation is quoted from C. R. Boxer, *Jan Campagnie in Japan, 1600–1850: An Essay on the Cultural, Artistic and Scientific Influence Exercised by the Hollanders in Japan from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centuries* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), 183.

¹⁷³ DN, 5 August 1667, NFJ 89.

surrendered to the Qing in 1676.¹⁷⁴ From then on, although some private junks still managed to slip through the Qing lines of inshore defense and sailed to Japan, the Chinese maritime traders found it exceedingly difficult to gather enough merchandise to fit out ocean-going junks at any Chinese port.¹⁷⁵

Some traders visited Tonkin because their access to Chinese ports was denied. In April 1675, for instance, a Chinese merchant arriving in Tonkin reported that his junk first “went from Batavia last year to Canton [Guangdong] where she loaded and went to Japan. And this year [he] went to Canton again from Japan but could not negotiate his affairs there by reason of the war between the usurping Tatar and the Chinese. Most China at present prohibits all trade even to their own people therefore this China man came hither [Tonkin].”¹⁷⁶ After Shang Zhixin was arrested and executed in 1680, Guangdong came under Qing control.¹⁷⁷ In 1683, a junk from Guangdong submitted a report to the Nagasaki authorities explaining that three junks, including his, were chased away from Guangdong by the Qing patrol boats, one of

¹⁷⁴ Tanaka Katsumi, “Shinsho no Shina enkai: Senkairei wo chūshin toshite mitaru (China coast in the early Qing period: The removal from boundary)”, *Rekishigaku Kenkū*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1936): 73–81; Vol. 6, No. 3: 319–30.

¹⁷⁵ Pang, “*Kai-hentai kara mita*”, 234–9.

¹⁷⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 130v.

¹⁷⁷ Pang, “*Kai-hentai kara mita*”, 236–7.

them took shelter at Tonkin and the other two headed to Cochinchina.¹⁷⁸ These accounts highlight Tonkin's position in the China Seas trade during the seventeenth century. When Chinese ports became virtually inaccessible from the sea, Tonkin functioned as an alternative outlet for Chinese junk traders who wished to procure goods for the Japanese market.

In addition, overland traffic between China and northern Vietnam was another crucial factor affecting the position of Tonkin in the commercial networks in the China Seas region. The Revolt in southern China also affected the Tonkin market trade route via land. Chinese traders from Guangxi (广西) province regularly visited Tonkin through overland routes connecting northern Vietnam and China. It took roughly thirty days to travel between Guangxi and Hanoi through the mountains.¹⁷⁹ The Vietnamese officials also participated in these trade transactions across the border. In 1672, the English were informed that “*Ung-ja Hans*, one of the four great governors of the Kingdom [of Tonkin], who commands all that part of the country bordering China, is a great merchant.”¹⁸⁰ Between 1673 and 1681, Wu Sangui and, after his death, his grandson Wu Shifan (吳世璠)(d. 1681) were at war with the Qing.

¹⁷⁸ Hayashi Harukatsu, and Hayashi Nobutoku, eds, *Kai hentai* (Conditions accompanying the change from the Ming to the Qing) (henceforth cited as *KH*), Vol. 1 (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1981), 359–60, 388–92.

¹⁷⁹ *KH*, 1: 208–9.

¹⁸⁰ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 38r.

As a result the import of silk goods from Zhejiang—which, as mentioned before, was the major center of silk production in China—was interrupted. As a result, silk products became rare especially in the Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou provinces. Guangxi merchants traveled to Tonkin on foot and procured Tonkin silk for the war-stricken provinces. When the Guangxi traders arrived at Hanoi, the purchase price of raw silk soared accordingly.¹⁸¹

Rise of Ningbo and Demise of Tonkin

The demise of the Tonking-Nagasaki silk trade by Chinese junks may be attributed to the Qing conquest of Taiwan and the consequent lifting of the Chinese maritime ban in the mid-1680s. From the 1650s to the early 1680s, as the Qing tightened control over the coastal areas, the number of Chinese junks visiting Nagasaki decreased gradually but steadily (Table 2.1). In 1681, this number was at its lowest.¹⁸² The Qing measures to strengthen coastal security were taking full effect. In 1683, the last remnants of the Zheng regime surrendered to the Qing. In the following years, the restrictions that had been imposed for about three decades on the coastal

¹⁸¹ *KH*, 1: 208–9.

¹⁸² According to Dutch sources, no Chinese junk appeared in Nagasaki in 1681. Iwao Seiichi, “Kinsei Nisshi bōeki ni kansuru sūryōteki kōsatsu (A quantitative survey on the Sino-Japanese trade in the early modern period),” *Shigaku zasshi*, Vol. 62, No. 11 (1953): 12. On the other hand, Japanese sources reveal that nine junks arrived at Nagasaki. Arano Yasunori, “Kinsei chūki no Nagasaki bōeki taisei to nukeni (Trading system and contraband trade at Nagasaki),” in *Nihon kinseishi ronsō*, ed. Bitō Masahide Sensei Kanreki Kinenkai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1984), 407. Either way, the least number of incoming Chinese junks was recorded in 1681.

and overseas shipping to curtail the Zheng family's activities were finally removed. Immediately upon lifting of the ban, numerous commercial junks sailed out from mainland China to the outer sea, which completely changed the rhythm of commerce in the East and Southeast Asian waters.

The number of Chinese junks that arrived at Nagasaki explicitly shows the sudden and enormous expansion of direct shipping between mainland China and Japan. Although the two sets of figures presented in Table 2.1 do not exactly match, a common trend can be observed: a sharp increase in the number of Chinese junks visiting Nagasaki after 1685. Japanese sources reveal that eighty-five Chinese junks from various ports of China flocked to Nagasaki in 1685 alone.¹⁸³ This number continued to increase until 1688 when a disproportionately high total of 194 Chinese vessels arrived at Nagasaki.¹⁸⁴ On average, both the Dutch and Japanese sources agree that more than one hundred junks visited Nagasaki every year during the second half of the 1680s. Consequently, Tonkin lost its relevance to commercial junks that had to sneak past the ban in the past.

¹⁸³ Hayashi Fukusai, ed. *Tsūkō ichiran* (Catalogue of the seaborne traffic), vol. 4 (Osaka: Seibundō Shuppan, 1967), 300, 310.

¹⁸⁴ Arano, "Kinsei chūki no Nagasaki bōeki", 407.

Table 2.1
 Chinese Shipping to Nagasaki in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century
 (Annual Average of Five-Year Periods)

Year	Number of Chinese Junks	
	According to the Dutch Archives	According to Japanese Sources
1650–1654	54.8	N/A
1655–1659	54	N/A
1660–1664	42.2	N/A
1665–1669	36.8	N/A
1670–1674	33	31.8
1675–1679	28.6	28.2
1680–1684	23.4	23.0
1685–1689	118.8	119.4
1690–1694	81	81.4
1695–1699	81.6	77.2

Source: Iwao, “Kinsei Nisshi bōeki”, 12–13; Arano, “Kinsei chūki no Nagasaki bōeki”, 407.

Notes: Chinese junks include those from mainland China, Taiwan, and all other Southeast Asian ports.

As for the period of 1685–1689, the number includes those junks that were forced to leave Nagasaki without trading.

The immediate impact of the lifting of the ban was that Ningbo 寧波 and its offshore island Putuoshan 普陀山 reemerged as major trading centers for the Chinese junks heading to Japan. In the early 1690s, Ningbo clearly supplanted Tonkin as the hub of raw silk export to Japan. In 1691, a Chinese merchant, whose junk just arrived at Nagasaki from Tonkin via Ningbo, witnessed that “due to its convenient location, numerous junks from many different places were unremittingly gathering at Ningbo and therefore, to be honest, it is impossible to know exactly how many junks were

coming to Nagasaki.”¹⁸⁵ This shift was clearly reflected in the itineraries of junks traveling between Tonkin and Nagasaki (Table 2.2). Merchant junks from Ningbo began to appear at Tonkin en route to Nagasaki. Moreover, even those that used to trade bilaterally between Tonkin and Nagasaki called at Ningbo. For example, in 1693, a Chinese trader, who had been in the business between Tonkin and Nagasaki for the previous few years, arrived at Tonkin, hoping to secure the purchase of Tonkinese raw silk and textiles. However, when he found the supply of raw silk to be rare and expensive due to a drought, he decided not to purchase any raw silk in Tonkin. After obtaining some textiles, his junk sailed to Putuoshan where he reequipped the vessel with raw silk and textiles prearranged and transferred from Ningbo.¹⁸⁶ From 1694 to 1696, no Chinese junk arrived at Nagasaki from Tonkin (Table 2.2). In 1697, a junk from Tonkin reappeared in Nagasaki. A report submitted by a chief merchant of this junk is indicative of dim commercial prospects in Tonkin at the end of the seventeenth century. Upon his arrival at Nagasaki, he reported to the local authorities that, “there was no junk leaving for overseas at a harbor of Tonkin [at the time when his junk departed from there]. Many commercial junks used to visit this place in order to obtain products of Tonkin. Junks from Tonkin had visited Nagasaki for many years. However, in recent years, no junks came to Tonkin for trade.”¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ *KH*, 2: 1317-8.

¹⁸⁶ *KH*, 2: 1565-6.

¹⁸⁷ *KH*, 2: 1933-4.

Table 2.2

“Tonkinese Junks” as Recorded in *Kai hentai*, 1680–1712

Year	Ship No.	Navigation Route
1680	15	N/A
	25	Tonkin - Nagasaki
1681	N/A	Tonkin - (wrecked on the way to Nagasaki)
	N/A	Tonkin - (wrecked on the way to Nagasaki)
1682	4	Tonkin - Nagasaki
1684	2	Tonkin - Nagasaki
	4	Tonkin - Nagasaki
1686	71	Tonkin - Nagasaki
	72	Tonkin - Nagasaki
1689	42	Tonkin - Nagasaki
	44	Amoy - Tonkin - Nagasaki
1690	82	Tonkin - Nagasaki
	87	Amoy - Tonkin - Nagasaki
1691	18	Ningbo - Nagasaki
	85	Wenzhou (温州)- Nagasaki
1692	59	Tonkin - Nagasaki
1693	58	Ningbo - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Nagasaki
1697	86	Amoy - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Nagasaki
1698	70	Ningbo - Tonkin - Nagasaki
1699	37	Ningbo - Tonkin - Nagasaki
1702	88	N/A
1703	N/A	N/A
1708	101	Guangdong - Tonkin - Nagasaki
	102	Tonkin – Nagasaki
1710	52	Ningbo - Tonkin - Ningbo - Nagasaki
1711	55	Ningbo - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Nagasaki
1712	62	Ningbo - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Wenzhou - Nagasaki

Source: Modified from Iioka, “Ayutaya kokuō no tainichi bōeki,” 98.

Note: Ship No. is as registered at Nagasaki.

Between 1690 and 1712, the Nagasaki authorities classified fourteen Chinese junks under the category of “Tonkinese junk,” even though seven of them actually departed from Ningbo.¹⁸⁸ Only three junks originally departing from Tonkin sailed directly to Nagasaki (Table 2.2). All the three junks belonged to a Tonkin-based Chinese trader called Lin Yuteng who had been trading between Tonkin and Nagasaki since 1667.¹⁸⁹ It is not difficult to infer that Lin Yuteng was the only Chinese merchant carrying out bilateral trade with Japan after 1685. Lin Yuteng’s last junk appeared at Tonkin in 1708, which marked the end of the regular direct shipping between Tonkin and Nagasaki. After returning to Tonkin, he sold his junk to another Chinese merchant from Ningbo and retired from overseas business.¹⁹⁰

Conclusion

The seventeenth century witnessed Tonkin’s rise and fall as an international entrepôt in the China Sea region. While the supply of Chinese raw silk suffered due to

¹⁸⁸ Before 1715, the Chinese interpreters at Nagasaki geographically categorized all incoming Chinese junks according to several factors such as port of departure and origins of cargoes. However, the criteria were not consistently applied over the course of the seventeenth century. Therefore, it was possible that a junk that came from Ningbo to Nagasaki by way of Tonkin was classified as a Tonkin junk. See, Iioka, “Ayutaya kokuō no tainichi bōeki,” 69.

¹⁸⁹ Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensanjo, ed. *Tōtsūji kaisho nichiroku* (Diaries of the office of Chinese interpreters), Vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), 62.

¹⁹⁰ *KH*, 3: 2680. See Chapter Three.

the Ming-Qing transition and the subsequent political turmoil in China, Tonkin gained its importance as an exporter of raw silk and silk piece goods for the Japanese market. Having established their bases at both Tonkin and Nagasaki, Chinese maritime traders such as the Wei brothers and Lin Yuteng took advantage of the void the *sakoku* policies of the Tokugawa *bakufu* and the maritime ban by the Qing court. Tonkinese raw silk was in demand so long as the Qing maritime policies prohibited Chinese junks from going overseas and Tonkin enjoyed privileged access to the Japanese market. However, when the Qing rescinded the maritime ban and silk from the lower Yangzi River Delta once again started flowing out into overseas markets, Tonkinese raw silk lost its competitive edge and Tonkin lost its relevance to commercial junks that had to sneak past the ban in the past.

CHAPTER THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF WEI ZHIYAN'S ACTIVITIES


This chapter chronologically presents the activities of the Wei Zhiyan. Before getting onto any critical analysis in Part Two, it is important as well as necessary to clarify the factual record. This is especially the case because this thesis will eventually develop an entire argument based on the activities of Wei Zhiyan, about which there has hitherto been very little knowledge.

Secondly, a chronology is useful to bring together the multifarious sources, each of which describes one small aspect of Wei Zhiyan's life. To construct a reasonably comprehensive narrative out of patchy and often inconsistent data takes meticulous and thorough research in the archives and a good understanding of the materials. This process, albeit an essential and unavoidable procedure of historical research, would be a digression if placed in the middle of a critical analysis. In addition, the second part of this thesis is not going to examine what occurred in his life in chronological order. By collating all the critical information pertaining to Wei Zhiyan's life, this chapter attempts to serve as a platform for the rest of this thesis.

Collating the various sources serves as an important check to the otherwise one-sided nature of each source. This thesis relies on materials that are diverse in

nature and dispersed in terms of geographical location. Accordingly, conditions and surroundings in which these materials were recorded and preserved differ from one case to the next. They were written to serve distinctively different purposes. For example, some are written by Buddhist monks and compiled by their disciples to hand down the masters' words and legacy to future generations of believers. On the other hand, the VOC and EIC merchants kept their journal registers for mainly commercial purposes and later to submit summaries to their superiors. What they took note of were matters relating to their business operations. Having up-to-date details about competitors were important duties of VOC and EIC personnel. Hence, Dutch and English accounts include valuable quantitative data on Chinese shipping. Then, there are formal reports filed by the Japanese officials at Nagasaki and submitted to the *bakufu*. While the central government was concerned about controlling trade and ensuring security of the country, the local officials had personal interests in trade. They would never file a report about, for example, illicit commercial transactions that they themselves were involved in.¹⁹¹ Another type of record is family history called *Yuishogaki* (由緒書)(Figure 3.1). It sometimes provides information that no other source is able to. But, the difficulty in interpreting the sources is that they tend to glorify accomplishments of their ancestors.

¹⁹¹ This pointed will be explored in detail in Chapter Five.



Written by Ōga Yūgorō and submitted to the *bakufu* in 1808.
Owned by the Ōga family. Photographed by the author.

Figure 1.1 (Ōgake) *Yuishogaki*

An explanation is needed with regards to the secondary sources consulted for this thesis. This chapter relies heavily on Nakamura Takashi's insurmountable work on "Itchien". Nakamura read extensively in the Dutch archives and collected almost all accounts pertaining to Itchien.¹⁹² His article was the constant and most reliable guidance throughout my research inside and outside the VOC archives. W. J. M. Buch's classic work on the VOC in Vietnam was also an important guide.¹⁹³ In cases

¹⁹² Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 376-96.

¹⁹³ Buch, "La Compagnie" (1937), 121-237.

where I am unable to cite original manuscripts, I will quote from his work. By the same token, I am greatly indebted to Miyata Yasushi's studies on Chinese communities in Nagasaki.¹⁹⁴ As far as English archives are concerned, Anthony Farrington's introductory studies were helpful.¹⁹⁵ Without their detailed, well-documented and often insightful studies, this thesis would not have been possible.

Besides the Wei brothers, another important character is Lin Yuteng (林子騰). A number of scholars studied about this particular Chinese trader. Wada Hisanori devoted an entire article to Lin. Based primarily on *Kai Hentai*, Wada discussed Lin as a prominent Chinese merchant who frequented Nagasaki from Tonkin after Wei Zhiyan had ceased his shipping operation.¹⁹⁶ In the meantime, Anthony Farrington talked about Chinese "Captain Nitthoe" in his survey on English East India Company records pertaining to Tonkin. Farrington says Nitthoe was the most important trader to Japan between 1674 and 1680. Referring to both works by Wada and Farrington, Qian

¹⁹⁴ Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 521-45; Miyata, *Tōtūjikakei ronkō*, 962-99.

¹⁹⁵ Anthony Farrington, "A New Source for Chinese Trade to Japan in the Seventeenth Century", *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 25 (1985): 187-91; Farrington, "English East India Company Documents", 148-61.

¹⁹⁶ Wada Hisanori, "Tonkin kakyō Lin Ganteng no Nagasaki bōeki (The Nagasaki trade conducted by a Chinese from Tonkin Lin Ganteng)", in *Suzuki Shun kyōju kanreki kinen tōyoshi ronsō* (Collected articles of Oriental history commemorating the sixtieth birthday of Prof. Suzuki Shun), ed. Suzuki Shun kyōju kanreki kinen kai (Tokyo: Sanyōsha, 1964), 765-782.

Jiang pointed out that the person called “Nitthoe” by the English was actually Lin Yuteng.¹⁹⁷ This was a great discovery, considering the degree of difficulty in identifying Chinese names in European sources.

This chapter highlights several points of particular relevance to Part TWO. It will point to the closely-knit family ties among the Wei family, Wei Zhiyan’s patronage of a Buddhist monastery, and active participation in public projects in Nagasaki. At the same time, his cultural resources played a substantial role in nourishing his relationships with Japanese officials at Nagasaki. His skills in playing music and composing poetry and the artistic style of his portraits indicated that he fundamentally adhered to the late-Ming gentry culture that prospered in China from the late 16th century. At the same time, Wei Zhiyan’s commercial activities and relationships with fellow merchants will highlight the nature of Chinese commercial organization.

1618

Wei Zhiyan was born in 1681 in Fuqing county, Fuzhou prefecture in Fujian province.¹⁹⁸ A family source says he was a great-great-grandson of the provincial

¹⁹⁷ Qian Jiang, “Shi qui zhi shi jiu shi ji chu yue nan yan hai di Zheng guo fan chuan mao yi (Chinese junk trade along the coast of Vietnam from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century)”, in *Zhong guo hai yang fa zhan shi lun wen ji*, Vol. 9, ed. Liu Shi-Feng (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2005), 305-6.

¹⁹⁸ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 972.

administrative commissioner (C. *Buzhengshisi* 布政使司), Wei Timing (魏体明) (1523-1591). Timing was from Donghan (東瀚), Fuqing county and reached the highest degree of *jinshi* (C. 進士) or “presented scholar” degree in 1656. He later became the *Buzhengshisi* of Sichuan province and the surveillance commissioner (C. *Anchashi* 按察使) of Yunnan province.¹⁹⁹ It seems plausible that Wei Zhiyan had a link to Wei Tinming one way or another. This makes Wei Zhiyan a member of a prominent gentry family in Fuqing.

Zhiyan had at least two older brothers and one younger sister.²⁰⁰ One of his elder brothers named Wei Zhiyuan was later nicknamed the One-Eyed Chinese Itchien by the Dutch. It is not clear when Wei Zhiyuan, or Itchien, was born. Before leaving China, Zhiyan was married to Lin Zhengzong (林申宗) and had a son called Wei Yongchang (魏永昌) and a daughter named Dingguan (定官). Yongchang was called Heer (鶴兒) or Hege (鶴哥) as a child.²⁰¹ Zhiyan was said to have left his wife and children in Fujian but corresponded with them throughout the course of his life.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ *Qian long fu qing xian zhi* (Gazetteer of Fuqing county) (1898; Reprint, 2000), 326-7; *Ming shi lu* (The Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty), *juan* 144.

²⁰⁰ Sonoda Kazuki, “Annan koku taishi kara minjin Gi Kyūshi ni yoseta shokan nitsuie (A letter of a prince of Annam addressed to Wei Chiu-Shi)”, *Minami-ajia gakuho* 1 (1942): 66-7.

²⁰¹ Letter from Ōga Kanichirō in Shenyang to Koga Jūjirō in Nagasaki, 27 August 1920, Koga Jūjirō Manuscript Collection, NMHC.

²⁰² Sonoda, “Annan koku taishi”, 66.

Yongchang visited his father at Nagasaki at least once and wrote dozens of letter to Zhiyan during his fathers' lifetime.²⁰³

1628-1644

Little information is available as to when Itchien appeared in Nagasaki for the first time. Since it was not Itchien but Zhiyan who founded the Ōga (鉅鹿) family in Nagasaki, the family's genealogical records disregard Itchien. To make matters more complicated, they also failed to present credible information about Zhiyan. In 1768, one of Zhiyan's great grandsons, Ōga Tamibe (鉅鹿民部) noted that Zhiyan left China during the late Chongzheng (崇禎) period (1628-1644) in order to avoid the turmoil in China.²⁰⁴ It seems reasonable to suppose that like many other Ming Chinese who sought refuge outside China, Itchien left home during this turbulent Ming-Qing transition period.²⁰⁵ Itchien probably appeared in Nagasaki during the early 1640s.²⁰⁶

²⁰³ Letter from Ōga Kanichirō in Shenyang to Koga Jūjirō in Nagasaki, 27 August 1920, Koga Jūjiro Manuscript Collection, NMHC.


²⁰⁴ *Gi Shimei (Ōga Tamibe), Wei shi yue pu (Music Scores of the We Clan) (Kyoto: Shorin Geikadō, 1768), reprinted in Xu xiu si ku quan shu (Shanghai: Shanghai g guji chubanshe, 1995), Vol. 1096, 13.*

²⁰⁵ For more on the Ming refugees, see Claudine Salmon, "Réfugiés Ming dans les Mers du sud vus à travers diverses inscriptions (ca.1650-ca.1730)", *BEFEO* 90-91 (2003-2004): 177-227.

²⁰⁶ Sonoda, "Annankoku taishi", 51-2.

1647

By the end of the 1640s, Itchien had emerged as one of the most prosperous merchants of Fuzhou origin in the Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki. This can be deduced from his extraordinary contribution to Buddhist temples in Nagasaki. Itchien was an active and eminent member of the monastic community of the Sōfukuji, which was established by Chinese merchants from the Fuzhou area. This year, twenty-nine supporters of the temple donated a total of 554 taels of silver to cast a bell for the temple. Itchien donated a substantial amount of 150 taels, which made him the single biggest contributor to this project (Figure 3.2 **Error! Reference source not found.**)²⁰⁷.



Source: Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 337. Courtesy of Nagasaki Bunkensha.
Cast by Ayama Sukeueon in 1647.

²⁰⁷ Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 333-7.

Figure 3.2 Temple Bell at Sōfukuji

1650

Itchien donated a main gate to Zenrinji (禪林寺), another temple in Nagasaki.²⁰⁸ In Tonkin, in the mean time, Wei Zhiyan's Vietnamese wife Vũ Diệu Thịnh (武妙盛) (1636-1698) gave birth to their first son, Wei Yongshi (魏永時) (1650-1719).²⁰⁹

1651

On 24 July, Itchien's junk departed Tonkin together with another Chinese junk.²¹⁰ During the night of 26 August, two dismasted junks arrived in Nagasaki. One of them was owned by the one-eyed Tonkinese Chinese or Itchien (Appendix A.1).²¹¹

1652

On 1 February, Itchien's junk departed Nagasaki for Tonkin carrying a sum of 77,000 taels of silver in the form of *chōgin* as well as a vast quantity of commodities.²¹² On 25 March, Itchien arrived in Tonkin. To make inroads into the court, he presented 70-

²⁰⁸ Nagasaki-shi, ed., *Nagasaki shi-shi: Chishi hen butsuji bu* (History of the Nagasaki Municipality: geography: Buddhist temples) (Osaka: Seibundō Shuppan, 1981), Vol. 2, 661. The gate stands there up to the present.

²⁰⁹ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 976.

²¹⁰ DN, 22 August 1651, NFJ 64.

²¹¹ DN, 1 February & 12 March 1652, NFJ 64.

²¹² DN, 12 March 1652, NFJ 65.

80 pieces of fine embroidered *peling* from China to the *Chua*.²¹³ His junk presumably departed Tonkin shortly after 23 July.²¹⁴ His departure from Tonkin is deduced from the fact that Itchien's junk carried a letter from Jacob Kiser in Tonkin with an appendix dated 23 July. His junk appeared in the bay of Nagasaki in the morning of 27 August. As it reached the roadstead by about midday, the junk loudly and showily fired cannon shots.²¹⁵ The Dutch observed that the Itchen's junk brought a "good" cargo.²¹⁶ Among the three Chinese junks from Tonkin that arrived in Nagasaki that summer, Itchen's junk was by far the largest.²¹⁷ Meanwhile, Itchien was working to obtain a license from the magistrates of Nagasaki to settle down in Nagasaki.²¹⁸

1653

On 23 January, junks owned by Itchien and Pincqua left Nagasaki for Tonkin. Itchien's junk carried 100,000 taels of silver, 30,000 cattles of *gockins* copper, printed textiles and cotton. The Dutch entrusted a copy of the letter from Frederick Coyett (1651-1687) addressed to Jacob Keyser in Tonkin to Itchien's junk.²¹⁹ Another

²¹³ Letter from Jacob Keyer in Tonkin to Nagasaki, 10 July 1652, NFJ 353.

²¹⁴ DN, 29 September 1652, NFJ 65.

²¹⁵ DN, 1 February 1652, NFJ 65.

²¹⁶ DN, 27 August 1652, NFJ 65.

²¹⁷ Makamura, *Tonkin daihakushu*, 380.

²¹⁸ For more details, see Chapter Five.

²¹⁹ DN, 23 March 1653, NFJ 66.

source says Itchien's junk actually brought 200,000 taels to Tonkin.²²⁰ However, much sought-after silk was in short-supply that year. As competition heated up with the arrival of five Chinese junks, the price of raw silk skyrocketed. Itchien and Pinqua were unable to purchase as many goods as they initially intended. Itchien left unspent silver as much as 30,000 taels with his men in Tonkin, so that they could get their hands on the winter production of silk while he was away in Nagasaki.²²¹ On 20 July, Itchien and Pinqua set sail for Nagasaki from Tonkin.²²² Itchien did not appear in Nagasaki this year, however. Itchien might have headed back to his home in China to take his brother. In the winter of 1653, Wei Zhiyan left his family in Fujian and did not return since.²²³

While Itchien was away, the Dutch managed to fetch a good price for their import of Tonkinese raw silk. Coyett attributed this to Itchien's absence from Nagasaki.²²⁴ When the Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker in Batavia received news from Nagasaki that Itchien had been absent from Nagasaki, he wished for

²²⁰ Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 380-1.

²²¹ Kurihara, "Oranda higashi indogaisha to Tonkin", 17.

²²² DN, 20, 23, 24 August 1653, NFJ 66; Kurihara, "Oranda higashi indogaisha to Tonkin", 16.

²²³ "Letter from an elder brother of Zhiyan in Fujian to Zhiyan in Nagasaki", quoted in Sonoda, "Annankoku taishi", 66.

²²⁴ DN, 6 October 1653, NFJ 66.

Itchien's death for the sake of the company's smooth business operations.²²⁵ On the other hand, people of Nagasaki rumored that the Dutch must have captured and murdered Itchien.²²⁶

1654

Between 20 July 1653 and 25 July, Itchien returned to Tonkin in tatters after an obviously tough journey.²²⁷ He brought 160,000-170,000 taels of silver.²²⁸ Around 20 August, Itchien returned to Nagasaki. (Appendix A.2)²²⁹

In Nagasaki, Itchien fell sick. In the early morning of 17 November, he passed away due to an illness from which he had been suffering from for a long period of time. Itchien left a sum of silver worth more than 200,000 taels. Itchien's younger brother, "Gickouquan," was present in Nagasaki at the time of Itchien's death. "Gickouquan" immediately inherited his brother's fortune.²³⁰ This is the first official appearance of Wei Zhiyan.²³¹

²²⁵ Kurihara, "Oranda higashi indogaisha to Tonkin", 26

²²⁶ DN, 2 August 1654, NFJ 67.

²²⁷ DN, 3 August 1654, NFJ 67. This is based on the fact that Itchien carried a Dutch letter from Tonkin to Nagasaki written on 25 July 1654.

²²⁸ Letter from Gabriel Happart in Nagasaki to Governor General, 30 October 1654, VOC 1207: 785-6v.

²²⁹ DN, 21 August 1654, NFJ 67.

²³⁰ DN, 17 November 1654, NFJ 68.

1655

In March, Zhiyan kicked off a business of his own with an initial investment worth 70,000 taels of silver by dispatching a brand-new junk built in Nagasaki with his Tonkinese servant “Tonkin Rocquan (東京六官)” serving as *nachoda*, or chief merchant, onboard. Rocquan was to continue his master’s trade.²³² On the way to Tonkin, however, the junk was shipwrecked by a storm and floundered off the coast of Hainan Island. The cargo and most of the crew were lost. Only Rocquan and a few Chinese crew members survived and reached Tonkin without any belongings.²³³

Meanwhile, Zhiyan stayed in Nagasaki and was involved in the monastic community of the Sōfukuji. On 28 April, he was one of those who requested the renowned Chinese Chan (禪: J. Zen) master Yinyuan Longqi (隱元隆琦)(1592-1673)

²³¹ “Gickouquan” was most likely a rendition of his business name 魏九官(J. Gi Kyūkan) in a dialect. The Dutch spelled it in various ways but provided enough information for us to be able to identify whom they discussed. For example, they described Zhiyan as “Kouquan (brother of Itchien)” and “Gicoquan, brother of the late one-eyed Chinese”.

²³² DN, 4 April 1655, NFJ 68; DN, 18 July 1656, NFJ 69; Morinaga Taneo and Ecchū Tetsuya, eds., *Kanpō nikki to Hankachō* (*Kanpō nikki and Hankachō*) (Nagasaki: Nagasaki bunkensha, 1977), 213.

²³³ DN, 18 July 1656, NFJ 69.

to visit the Sōfukuji. When Yinyuan entered the temple on 27 June, Zhiyan was in attendance there to welcome the master.²³⁴

1656

In the afternoon of 19 August, a junk of the “brother of the late One-Eyed Chinese Itchien [Zhiyan]” arrived in the roadstead of Nagasaki. The vessel was newly built in Tonkin and carried costly cargoes (Appendix A.3).²³⁵

1657

At the end of 1656, it is rumored that Zhiyan was to leave for Tonkin with a total capital of 70,000-80,000 taels of silver. It is unknown exactly when he headed to Tonkin, but he certainly operated a successful business in Tonkin this year. The Dutch reported that two large Chinese junks came to Tonkin this summer and dominated the market. Zhiyan’s junk seemed to be one of the two.²³⁶ In late August, he appeared in Nagasaki with 41,350 catties of Tonkinese raw silk (Appendix A.4).

1658

²³⁴ Hirakubo Akira, ed., *Shisan kōtei Ingen zenshū* (Newly edited and annotated complete works of Ingen), Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kaimei syoin, 1979), 1709.

²³⁵ DN, 19 August 1656, NFJ 69.

²³⁶ Nakamura, “Tonkin daihakushu”, 381-2.

On 23 January, “*nachoda* Kouquan, Itchien’s brother [Zhiyan]” embarked on a new voyage to Tonkin with his junk carrying 40,000-50,000 taels of silver for trade.²³⁷

Zhiyan appeared in Tonkin on 23 March and soon engaged in buying silk. He managed to procure the finest quality of silk at twelve *facaar* for one tael of silver.²³⁸

By the time Zhiyan left Tonkin, no Dutch ship had arrived from Batavia. Zhiyan took the opportunity to buy a good amount of fine silk, which the merchants in Tonkin were initially holding for the Dutch, for a reasonable price.²³⁹ He managed to buy fine silk at nine to 9.5 *facaar* and, then, eleven to twelve *facaar*.²⁴⁰

His large ocean-going junk left Tonkin on 22 July and sailed into Nagasaki on 13 September. He brought rich cargoes consisting mainly of Tonkinese raw silk and piece goods (Appendix A.5).²⁴¹ He also delivered a letter from Gustavus Hansz in Tonkin to Joan Boucheljon, the chief merchant of the Nagasaki factory.²⁴²

²³⁷ DN, 16 April 1658, NFJ 71.

²³⁸ Nakamura, “Tonkin daihakushu”, 382.

²³⁹ DN, 14 September 1658, NFJ 71.

²⁴⁰ Nakamura, “Tonkin daihakushu”, 382.

²⁴¹ Notes on the specification of the commodities brought by 38 Chinese junks from China, Siam, Cambodia, Quinam, Tonkin and other places in Nagasaki. 3 January 1657 to 11 October 1658, VOC 1228: 810-810v.

²⁴² DN, 13 September 1658, NFJ 71.

In November, Zhiyan and several prominent Chinese residents of Nagasaki such as Wang Xinqu (王心渠)(1594-1678), He Caocai (何高在)(1598-1671) and Lin Shoudian (林守壘)(1610-1694) requested Jifei Rui (即非如一)(1606-1671) to take the abbacy of the Sōfukuji.²⁴³ On the eighth day of the twelfth lunar month (31 December), Zhiyan held a memorial service for his late brother at the Sōfukuji.²⁴⁴ Zhiyan told Jifei that he had shed tears in thinking of his brother. Jifei presided over a special memorial for Itchien. Zhiyan donated 100 *koku* (fifteen tons) of rice for the service. The monastic community recognized that Zhiyan was supporting the temple much in the same way his brother Itchien did with his generosity in the founding days of the temple.²⁴⁵

1659

Zhiyan left Nagasaki for Tonkin in late February and stayed in Tonkin over the winter.²⁴⁶

1660

²⁴³ Hirakubo, *Sokufi zenshū*, Vol. 3, 1309-11.

²⁴⁴ The eighth day of the twelfth lunar month was marked by Chan Buddhists as the date when Buddha achieved his enlightenment.

²⁴⁵ Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 524-5; Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenshū*, Vol. 1, 50-3.

²⁴⁶ DN, 3 June 1659, NFJ 71; *DB*, 1661: 182.

On 13 July 1660, Zhiyan set sail for Nagasaki by the southern monsoon winds. His junk was reportedly loaded with cargoes of raw silk and silk fabrics with an estimated value of 180,000 taels. Yet he was prevented from completing his journey by a storm in which his junk lost a mast and he was forced to sail back to Tonkin.²⁴⁷

1661

In Tonkin, Wei Yongzhao (魏永昭) (1660-1738), son of Zhiyan, was born.²⁴⁸

Zhiyan's richly loaded junk left Tonkin bound for Nagasaki. On 26 August, however, it was caught up in a storm near the Gotō Islands. The ship lost its masts and sea water damaged its cargoes.²⁴⁹ On 10 September, the junk managed to make its way through to Nagasaki.²⁵⁰

Master Yinyuan turned seventy years old. On this occasion, Zhiyan composed congratulatory poetry dedicated to the Master.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ DN, 30 October 1660, NFJ 74; Letter from Henrcik Indijk in Nagasaki to Governor General Joan Maetsuyker, 1 January 1661, in *DB*, 1661: 182; Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 382.

²⁴⁸ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 979.

²⁴⁹ DN, 26 August 1661, NFJ 74.

²⁵⁰ DN, 10 September 1661, NFJ 74.

²⁵¹ Hirakubo, *Ingen zenshū*, Vol. 12, 5351-2.

1662

The “rich Chinese trader Itchien alias Kouquan [Zhiyan]” suspended his journey to Tonkin this year. The magistrate of Nagasaki granted him permission to stay in Nagasaki for one year. With this official license, he was able to remain in Nagasaki and continue his business by sending his agent off to Cambodia on 18 February.²⁵²

1663

In late January, two junks belonging to Zhiyan were ready for a voyage to Cambodia. However, Zhiyan did not travel personally this time. Under the pretext of illness, he was granted a license to remain in Japan for another year.²⁵³ On 3 February, Zhiyan’s junk departed for Cambodia.²⁵⁴ This junk left Cambodia on 8 May and turned up in Tonkin in order to procure silk merchandise on behalf of Zhiyan.²⁵⁵ The Dutch merchants in Tonkin observed that the junk was equipped with 100 people including Koxinga’s soldiers and it was loaded with goods such as pepper, lead and rattan,

²⁵² *GM*, 3: 439; Letter from Hendrick Indyk in Nagasaki to Governor General Johan Maetsuyker in Batavia, 5 November 1662, NFJ 293; DN, 18 February 1662, NFJ 75.

²⁵³ DN, 24 January 1663, NFJ 76; *DB*, 1663: 646.

²⁵⁴ DN, 2-3 February 1663, NFJ 76.

²⁵⁵ In the early 1660s, the VOC traders started mentioning Zhiyan as “Itchien”. However, the Dutch never described Zhiyan as the “One-eyed Chinese”, which was a unique nickname reserved for Zhiyuan.

clearly from the booty of Taiwan (Appendix A.6).²⁵⁶ On 5 August, it arrived in Nagasaki with rich cargoes.²⁵⁷ Meanwhile in Batavia, the Governor General made a decision to intercept Zhiyan's junks.²⁵⁸

On 15 April, a fire broke out in Nagasaki. Blown by strong westerly wind, it quickly spread and totally devastated the town over night. With only 301 houses escaping the fire, the rest of the 2,801 houses were burnt to the ground.²⁵⁹ It is not known if Zhiyan had a house in Nagasaki before this fire. Had he already owned a house in Sakaya-chō (酒屋町), it was surely one of the houses that the fire destroyed. He built (or rebuilt) his mansion by 1665.²⁶⁰

On 17 May, the *Bunschoten* and the *Hoogelanden* were dispatched from Batavia to Tonkin, with the *Hoogelanden* instructed to act against “the armed Japanese trading junk”. The *Hoogelanden* was stuck and damaged on the bar of Tonkin. Instead, the *Bunschoten*, equipped with four iron cannons and other arms

²⁵⁶ Letter from Hendrick Baron in Tonkin to the Company, 6 November 1663, in *DB*, 1663: 690.

²⁵⁷ DN, 5 August 1663, NFJ 76; *DB*, 1663: 646.

²⁵⁸ See Chapter Two.

²⁵⁹ *TKN*, 1: 10-1.

²⁶⁰ DN, 14 February 1665, NFJ 78. In 1963, Sakaya-chō was divided into two parts and became a part of Sakae-chō (栄町) and Uono-chō (魚の町).

taken over from the *Hoogelanden*, was used to keep two junks under Wei Zhiyan inside the Rockbo River.²⁶¹

1664

In the beginning of 1664, Zhiyan was busy fitting out his junk with weapons and equipment for another voyage to Tonkin. His junk set out for Tonkin, while he himself remained in Nagasaki.²⁶² On 10 March, Zhiyan's junk arrived in Tonkin with a large capital of 200,000 taels of Japanese *chōgin*.²⁶³ His junks were blockaded by the Dutch and were unable to leave Tonkin. In March, learning the arrival of this junk in Tonkin, the Dutch submitted a written request to the *Chua* together with two iron canons as a means to persuade him to prohibit Zhiyan from beginning to trade until the Company wrapped up its business. This preventive measure proved in vain, because the *Chua* was very explicit about his intention to give no favor to one foreign party over another in his domain.²⁶⁴ On 17 May, Joan Maetsuyker sent out an instruction to Tonkin to persist in attacking the junk of "Couquan [Zhiyan]".²⁶⁵

²⁶¹ *DB*, 1663: 690.

²⁶² Letter from Willem Volger in Nagasaki to Governor General in Batavia, 1 January 1664, in *DB*, 1664: 32.

²⁶³ Letter from Hendrick Verdonk to Governor General, 5 November 1664, in *DB* 1664: 549.

²⁶⁴ Letter from Hendrick Verdonk in Tonkin to Governor General in Batavia, 5 November 1664, in *DB*, 1664: 549.

²⁶⁵ Letter from Governor General in Batavia to Hendrick Verdonk, 17 May 1664, in *DB*, 1664: 203.

Meanwhile, in Tonkin, there was a rumor that the *Chua* was planning to chase away the *Hoogelanden* from the river and free the passage for Chinese junks. The Dutch agents deliberately spread the rumors that they had been given an order to capture any foreign ships from and to Japan, the *Hoogelanden* cruised the river to prevent Chinese junks from leaving Tonkin. Zhiyan's two junks did not dare to leave Tonkin that summer.²⁶⁶

Around 1664, one of the four major patrons of the Sōfukuji He Caocai traveled up to the Ōbakusan Manpukuji (黄檗山萬福寺) in Uji (宇治), Kyoto.²⁶⁷ He delivered Zhiyan's letter to Yinyuan. In his reply, Yinyuan praised Zhiyan for cultivating his virtues during his residence in Nagasaki and emphasized the importance of believing in the Buddhist teachings.²⁶⁸

1665

In Tonkin, Zhiyan's two junks were at the beginning of 1665 still blockaded in the Rockbo River by the two Dutch ships. By late February, Hendrick Verdonck heard

²⁶⁶ Letter from Hendrick Verdonck in Tonkin to Governor General, 23 February 1665, VOC 1252: 234-5.

²⁶⁷ For more on the Ōbakusan Manpukuji, see Chapter Four.

²⁶⁸ Nanyuan Xingpai and Gaoquan Xingdun, eds., *Huangbo heshang taiheji*, in *Kokuyaku zengaku taisei* (Japanese translations: collections of Zen studies), ed. by Kokuyaku zengaku taisei, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: Nimatsudō Shoten, 1930), 51-2, 27; Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 455.

that they would leave for Japan with the *Chua*'s passes in the coming May. In a letter of 14 May 1665, Maetsuyker restated the order to keep the Chinese junks blockaded unless the *Chua* ordered the Dutch to release them.²⁶⁹ The Governor General later cancelled this order and told the Tonkin factory to lift the blockade of the river in order to avoid angering both the *Chua* and the Japanese in Nagasaki.²⁷⁰ In the end, the *Chua* provided Zhiyan's junks protection by granting a pass and a flag that enabled them to depart Tonkin.²⁷¹ In the following year, Zhiyan sent his junk to Cochinchina instead of Tonkin.²⁷²

On 14 February, the Dutch at Nagasaki were informed that "Chinese Quicquan, the brother of the late one-eyed Chinese Itchien", who had a house in this town for about two to three years and always tried to stay with several excuses, was instructed to depart by the magistrate of Nagasaki. A junk was constructed swiftly to be ready for Zhiyan's voyage to Tonkin. With this new ship, Zhiyan would navigate to Tonkin and join his other two junks that were blockaded by the VOC.²⁷³

²⁶⁹ Letter from Governor General in Batavia to Hendrick Verdonk in Tonkin, 14 May 1665, in *DB*, 1665: 107.

²⁷⁰ Letter from Governor General to Japan, 25 April 1665, *DB*, 1665: 89-90.

²⁷¹ Letter from Constantin Ranst and the Council in Tonkin to the Company, 30 October 1665, in *DB*, 1665: 370-1.

²⁷² DN, 14 January 1665, NFJ 79.

²⁷³ DN, 14 February 1665, NFJ 78.

On 22 July, Zhiyan's junks departed for Nagasaki with a pass and a flag from the *Chua*.²⁷⁴ On 25 August, at least one of them returned to Nagasaki (Appendix A.7).²⁷⁵

1666

On 14 January, Zhiyan dispatched a junk to Cochinchina.²⁷⁶ The following incident seems to confirm that his junk appeared in Hoian. Around July, Sumiyaa Hichirobei (角屋七郎兵衛) (1631-1672) wrote a letter to his two brothers in Japan. He lent five taels of silver to a helmsman of Zhiyan's junk, Chang Erge (長二哥), and asked his two brothers at Nagasaki to collect this amount from Chang.²⁷⁷

The ninth day of the ninth month (6 October) was the day of Chongyangjie (重陽節).²⁷⁸ On this occasion, Jifei, who was then at Kōjusan Fukujuji (廣壽山福聚寺) in Kokura (小倉), composed a poem expressing his wish to return to China and

²⁷⁴ See Chapter Two.

²⁷⁵ DN, 25 August 1665, NFJ 78.

²⁷⁶ DN, 14 January 1665, NFJ 79.

²⁷⁷ A letter from Sumiya Hicrobei in Annam to Sumiya Hichirojirō and Kurobei in Japan, 1666, in *Annanki* (Notes on Annam), ed. Matsumoto Dadō (1807), 9-12. *Annanki* can be found in digital form on the website of the Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (as of 11 May 2008, the URL for the database is <http://www.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ships/shipscontroller>). For more details on the Kadoya family, Kawashima Motojirō, *Shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū* (Historical studies on *shuinsen*) (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppansha, 1921), 442-81.

addressed it to four Chinese merchants from Tonkin, namely Gu Changqing (顧長卿) (d. 1679), Lin Shixiang (林石香), He Zirang (何子謙) and Wei Zhiyan.²⁷⁹

1667

On 13 February, “Itchien’s brother” and his “scribe” appeared in Tonkin with a large capital.²⁸⁰ On 8 October, Zhiyan’s junk came back to Nagasaki with considerable cargoes reportedly worth around 420,000 taels of silver (Appendix A.8).²⁸¹ However, when the items were sold, they realised only 300,000 taels in total.²⁸² Lin Yuteng appeared in Nagasaki as a chief merchant of Ship No. 28 from Tonkin. On 30 September, he asked the Association of Chinese Interpreters (*J. Tōtsūji kaisho* 唐通事会所) permission to export 66,800 taels of *chōgin*.²⁸³ Later evidence from the Dutch archives indicate that Lin Yuteng was Zhiyan’s “scribe”.

1668

²⁷⁸ “Congyangjie” literally means “double yang festival”. In contemporary English, it is often translated as “Double Ninth Festival”.

²⁷⁹ Hirakubo Akira, ed., *Shinsan kōtei Sokuhi zenshū* (A complete works of Jifei) (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 1993), Vol. 3, 1144-5.

²⁸⁰ Letter from Daniel Six in Nagasaki to Governor General, 13 October 1667, NFJ 298; Letter from Constantine Ranst in Nagasaki to Cornelis Valckenier in Tonkin, 26 January 1668, NFJ 299.

²⁸¹ DN, 8 October 1667, NFJ 80.

²⁸² DN, 17-21 December 1667, NFJ 81.

²⁸³ *TKN*, 1: 62.

At the beginning of the year, in Nagasaki, the construction of Zhiyan's new junk was under way. Both the new junk and the old one that just came back from Tonkin were expected to leave for Tonkin shortly.²⁸⁴ On 26 January, it was reported that Zhiyan would bring 300,000 taels of silver to Tonkin.²⁸⁵ At the end of January, a well-armed junk of Zhiyan departed for Tonkin. Despite the previous report only the new junk embarked on a voyage to Tonkin with Zhiyan personally onboard.²⁸⁶ In Tonkin, his business was at a standstill due to the shortage of silk commodities and interference by the *Chua*. In late June, his first attempt to depart for Nagasaki failed. In July, it was said that he would try to leave again soon.²⁸⁷ Between 22 and 24 August, Zhiyan safely came back to Nagasaki with his junk which reportedly carried cargoes worth up to 280,000 taels (Appendix A.9).²⁸⁸ One more of Zhiyan's junks arrived in Nagasaki this summer.²⁸⁹ On 9 September, his articles were sold with the following prices: *peling* 5 and then 5.07 taels, *sommungi* 4.9 taels, *baa* 6.8 taels per piece.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁴ Letter from Constantine Ranst to Governor General, 9 January 1668, VOC 1267: 712v-713.

²⁸⁵ DN, 24-25 January 1668, NFJ 81.

²⁸⁶ DN, 27-31 January 1668, NFJ 81.

²⁸⁷ Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 385.

²⁸⁸ DN, 21-24 August 1668, NFJ 81.

²⁸⁹ Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 385.

²⁹⁰ DN, 9 September 1668, NFJ 81.

Later on, Dutch merchants in Nagasaki speculated that Zhiyan would not be able to fit out a junk during this winter, for he was no longer allowed to export copper coins.²⁹¹ At the end of 1668 or in the beginning of 1669, however, Zhiyan's junk left for Tonkin. This can be deduced from the fact that his junk came back to Nagasaki from Tonkin in the next summer.²⁹²

1669

Zhiyan's junk arrived in Nagasaki from Tonkin some time between 27 and 30 August. It brought 35,000 cattles of silk and silk piece goods. The Dutch called Zhiyan a "notorious trafficker".²⁹³ By 15 November, Zhiyan managed to sign a contract with the magistrate of Nagasaki regarding the quantity and price of copper coins.²⁹⁴

In Nagasaki, Zhiyan donated 500 taels to the Sōfukuji for the construction of a new approach to a hall dedicated to the sea goddess *mazu* (媽祖). The renovation was completed in 1671.²⁹⁵

²⁹¹ Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 385.

²⁹² DN, 27-30 August 1669, NFJ 82.

²⁹³ DN, 27-30 August 1669, NFJ 82.

²⁹⁴ DN, 7 & 15 November 1669, NFJ 83.

²⁹⁵ Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 526; Uchida Naosaku, *Nihon kakyō shakai no kenkyū* (A study of Chinese society in Japan) (Tokyo: Dōbunkan, 1949), 82.

1670

On 21 January, Zhyan departed for Tonkin with his junk, carrying a capital worth 21,000-22,000 taels in copper coins, *koban* and other commodities.²⁹⁶

1672

On 25 June, an English frigate, the *Zant* sailed into Pho Hien.²⁹⁷ On board were six EIC personnel, including William Gyfford as the Chief of the Tonkin factory and his subordinates.²⁹⁸ At Pho Hien, they met the Chinese captain called “Nitthoe [Yuteng]”, who was about to leave for Japan (Appendix A.10).²⁹⁹ Gyfford asked Yuteng to deliver a letter to David Stephens who had been sent by the *Return* to establish a factory in Japan. Yuteng refused to carry such a letter for it could put him in a difficult position in Japan but agreed to pass the news of the *Zant*'s safe arrival in Tonkin by word of mouth. Yuteng's junk left for Japan within a few days of the English's arrival.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁶ DN, 21 January 1670, NFJ 83.

²⁹⁷ For more on the English operation in Tonkin, see Chapter One.

²⁹⁸ IOR, G/12/17 pt. 1: 4; Consultation by Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 10 May 1672, in *The English Factory in Taiwan*, ed. Chang Hsiu-jung et al (Taipei: National Taiwan University 1995), 120; Anthony Farrington, ed., *Catalogue of East India Company Ships' Journals and Logs 1600-1834* (London: British Library, 1999), 724.

²⁹⁹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 33-4.

³⁰⁰ Letter from William Gyfford and Thomas James in Tonkin to David Stephens in Japan, 7 August 1672, IOR, G/12/17 pt. 1: 23v.

According to the Dutch archives, Zhiyan's junk departed from Tonkin to Nagasaki in late June. On 14 July, Zhiyan resurfaced in Nagasaki with his junk richly loaded.³⁰¹ Here it may be noted that the Dutch and English might have been referring to the same Chinese junk. That means Zhiyan dispatched a junk to Tonkin and Yuteng worked as *nachoda* for Zhiyan's junk.

Upon Yuteng's departure, the *Chua* ordered the English to stay at Yuteng's empty house at Pho Hien until he returned from Japan.³⁰² In Hanoi, there was no place secure from fire for all the houses were "*cajan*" house except for those of the *Chua*, the Dutch and a few Chinese merchants.³⁰³ The Governor of Pho Hien, *Ung-ja Lien*, arranged to let out Yuteng's house to the English.³⁰⁴ When Nicholas Waite arrived at the house on 25 July, the house required some maintenance before they could move in: the doors were broken and its warehouse had some problems.³⁰⁵ On

³⁰¹ DN, 14 & 18 July 1672, NFJ 85.

³⁰² IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 14r.

³⁰³ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 11v.

³⁰⁴ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 18r, 28v. "*Ung-ja*" is almost certainly "*ông già* (翁爺)". It was a respect form of appellation in Vietnamese, literally meaning "venerable sir". See Hasuda Takashi, "17 seiki vietnam teishi seiken to kangan (The Eunuchs in the seventeenth-century Vietnam)", *Machikaneyam ronsō* 39 (2005): 10-1. "*Lien*" could be a transcription of a personal name.

³⁰⁵ Letter from Nicholas Waite in Pho Hien to William Gyfford in Hanoi, 25 July 1672, IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 17r.

19 August, *Ung-ja Lien* said that the English had better stay there till Yuteng's return because there was no other house that was big and secure enough for the English to store all their goods. Yuteng's house was the only house in Pho Hien that was not a *cajan* but a tiled house.³⁰⁶

Zhiyan acquired permanent residency in Japan.³⁰⁷ (*Ōgake*) *Yuishogaki* says that after he was granted permanent residency, Zhiyan was permitted to visit Kyoto and Osaka. During these trips, Zhiyan had occasion to showcase his skills as a musician at the Emperor's court.³⁰⁸ During the late summer, Yinyuan at the Manpukuji composed a poem to express his joy for the safe return of the Tonkin merchants.³⁰⁹

1673

According to English sources, since early January the English merchants in Tonkin expected Yuteng's return daily.³¹⁰ After the English finished removing all their goods from Yuteng's house on 15 January, the house was again put in the hands of the

³⁰⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 1: 31r.

³⁰⁷ For the details see Chapter Five.

³⁰⁸ (*Ōgake*) *Yuishogaki*. Chinese residents of Nagasaki needed to obtain permission for a trip outside Nagasaki from the magistrates of Nagasaki. Such permission was granted on a case-by-case basis only after the magistrates verified the purposes of their journey. It was rather rare and special for a Chinese to be permitted a trip.

³⁰⁹ Hirakubo, *Ingen zenhū*, Vol. 10, 4948.

³¹⁰ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 62r, 63r.

Governor of Pho Hien, who immediately sent his soldiers to look after it.³¹¹ On 20 March, Nicholas Waite at Pho Hien heard rumors that Yuteng's junk was at the river and was expected to come up to Pho Hien within a couple of days.³¹² Until 5 April, he waited there for a *Chua*'s chop to be delivered.³¹³ As soon as he arrived in Pho Hien he demanded Nicholas Waite to compensate for what had been lost when the English left his house.³¹⁴ After concluding business with the *Chua* over the summer, Yuteng departed for Japan on 14 July. This time his cargoes were largely composed of silk fabrics such as *sommungi*, *baa* and *pelung*.³¹⁵

On the other hand, the Dutch reported that Zhiyan's junk set sail from Nagasaki on 14 February.³¹⁶ This junk turned up in Tonkin at the end of April. It left Tonkin in the middle of July and returned to Nagasaki in September.³¹⁷ Given the fact that only one junk sailed into Nagasaki from Tonkin during the summer of 1673, the above reports given by the English and the Dutch suggest that Lin Yuteng was on board Zhiyan's junk. It is not known if Zhiyan came to Tonkin personally.³¹⁸

³¹¹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 60v.

³¹² IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 66r.

³¹³ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 67r.

³¹⁴ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 66v.

³¹⁵ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 71v.

³¹⁶ DN, 14 February 1673, NFJ 86.

³¹⁷ Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 386.

³¹⁸ Iwao, "Kinsei nisshi boekishi", 12.

On 28 March, *Ung-ja Thay*, the King's mandarin inspected Nitthoe's junk at Pho Hien. On 5 April, the *hamon* of *Ung-ja Thay* came down with the *Chua*'s chop for Yuteng's junk and took what he liked in the name of the *Chua*.³¹⁹ Before his departure from Tonkin, Yuteng was forced to pay an additional 700-800 taels to the *Chua* for he did not report all his copper coins in the *Chua*'s Roll.³²⁰ On 14 July, Yuteng's junk departed for Japan loaded mostly with raw silk, *sommungis*, *baas* and *peling*. The English asked Yuteng to deliver a letter to Japan. Yuteng refused to carry such a letter for he did not know whether the "Emperor [*shōgun*]" of Japan admitted the English to his country.³²¹

During the summer, Wu Shunguan (吳順官), a son of Kadoya Hichirobei, arrived in Nagasaki from Cochinchina.³²² He was entrusted with a missive from the "Prince of Annam (安南國太子)", whom Sonoda Kazuki identified as Nguyễn Phúc Diễn (阮福演) (1640-1684), addressed to Zhiyan. Phúc Diễn was the eldest son and

³¹⁹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 66v-67r.

³²⁰ As soon as a foreign vessel arrived in Pho Hien, the *jurebass* visited the ship. Merchants of the ship were required to submit a list of cargoes, the number of guns the ship carried, the number of crew members and their names to the *jurebass*. The English merchants called the list "the King [*Chua*]'s roll". The *Chua* chose what he wanted from their cargoes according to the items stated in the roll. Knowing this, foreign merchants usually reported amount of capital much less than they actually had. Anything concealed would be forfeited by the *Chua* were they to be discovered. The *jurebass* were always keen to find such hidden items on the foreign ships.

³²¹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 71v.

³²² Matsumoto, *Annanki*, 32-3.


heir apparent of the Nguyen Lord, Nguyễn Phúc Tần (阮福瀨) (r. 1648-1687).³²³

Phuc Dien requested in his missive that Zhiyan loan him 5,000 taels of silver for the purpose of arms buildup, possibly, against the Trinh (Figure 3.3).³²⁴

³²³ Sonoda, “Annankoku taishi”, 60-2.

³²⁴ Sonoda was not the first scholar to write about this letter. The full text of the letter from the Prince of Annam to Wei Zhiyan, together with two other letters, was published in Hanoi in 1924. Chu Kuang, “Ben zhao qian dai yu ming mo yi shi guan xi zhi yi shi (Historical anecdotes with regards to the relationships between our previous dynasty and the late Ming royalists)”, *Nam Phong: Van-Hoc Khoa-Hoc Tap-Chi* 81 (1924): 48. Later, the same text was compiled in *Minh đô sử* (明都史), 1. 95, unpublished, Viện sử học (Institute of History), Hanoi. I am indebted to Charles Wheeler for information on these Vietnamese materials.

Why was it published in Hanoi first? The following is the most likely scenario: the eighth generation of Zhiyan’s descendant, Ōga Kanichirō (鉅鹿貫一郎) (1686-1927) was very interested in his ancestral background. In the early 1920s, he sent a series of letters to historians inside and outside Japan, seeking their opinion about his ancestors. He contacted Sonoda in Shenyang, China around 1923-4, Koga Jūjirō in Nagasaki in 1920 and Makino Toyosaburō (牧野豊三郎) at l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient in Hanoi also in 1920. These letters included copies of the above mentioned three letters. Chu Kuang somehow obtained copies of these letters directly or indirectly from Makino. Letter from Ōga Kanichirō to Koga Jūjirō, 27 August 1920, in Koga Jūjirō manuscript collection, NMHC; Letter from Makino Toyosaburō to Ōga Kanichirō, 26 October 1920, in Koga Jūjirō Manuscript Collection, NMHC; Sonoda, “Annankoku taishi”, 66.



Owned by the Ōga family. Photographed by the author.

Figure 3.3 Letter from Prince of Annan to Wei Zhiyan

1674

On 1 January, Johannes Camphuijs in Nagasaki wrote a letter to the Governor General, in which Camphuijs expressed his concern over Zhiyan’s relationship with the local officials and merchants in Nagasaki. He advised the Governor General that as far as trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki was concerned, the company should not make an enemy of Zhiyan, because he was on good terms with *machidoshiyori* (町年寄) and a number of Japanese merchants in Nagasaki.³²⁵

³²⁵ Nakamura, “Tonkin daihakushu”, 386.

In late January, Zhiyan's junk left Nagasaki for Tonkin.³²⁶ The Dutch noted that only two Chinese junks arrived in Tonkin during 1673: one was a junk of Zhiyan's and the other came from Batavia. This meant that anyone who arrived from Japan must have come with the junk belonging to Zhiyan.³²⁷ William Gyfford noted that Yuteng's junk appeared in Pho Hien on 27 February. The date seems right in contrast to the departure of Zhiyan's junk from Japan on 23 January as the Dutch noted. According to English observations, Yuteng brought 80,000 taels of silver, including a few copper coins, to Tonkin.³²⁸ The Dutch reported 100,000 taels. In any case, the European traders were impressed with the sizable amount of Yuteng's capital.

By the middle of March, Yuteng's junk was still riding at mooring off-shore. The *Chua's dispatchadores* ordered that the *Chua* must take half of his 80,000 taels of silver. On 18 March, getting tired of arguing with the *dispatchadores*, Yuteng went up to Hanoi with an intention to *sambey*, or pay homage, to the *Chua* and petition against the *dispatchadores*. He personally negotiated with the *Chua* and seemed to find an acceptable compromise: Yuteng agreed to deliver 20,000 taels to the *Chua* and 10,000

³²⁶ Letter from Joan Camphuis in Nagasaki to Albert Brevinck in Tonkin, 20 July 1674, NFJ 206.

³²⁷ Buch, "La Campagnie" (1937), 171.

³²⁸ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 105v, 109v.

taels to the prince and he would receive the same amount in copper cash. On 21 March, ready to fetch the money from his junk and deliver it to the King, Yuteng waited all day for the *Chua*'s license for sailing back to Pho Hien. When he received the license, he sent it to the Governor of Hanoi to obtain another pass from the Governor. The governor said he would not grant it till the next morning because it was already too late in the day. By 25 March, he was back in Pho Hien. On this day, the *Chua*'s *dispatchadores* and *hamons* came down to take away the money. Then, they fell into their old tone, saying that Yuteng had to deliver 40,000 taels to the *Chua* and 20,000 taels to the prince. Yuteng again sailed up to Hanoi to pay another visit to the *Chua*. The English merchants estimated that if the *Chua* did not abate, "the loss will be about 10 percent by the King's [*Chua*'s] payment in copper coins and valuing the silver at less than real worth".³²⁹

On 30 May, Yuteng visited the English merchants who had been eagerly waiting for a chance to obtain the latest news about the *Return* in Japan. Yuteng informed them that the *Return* had been denied access to Japan because the Dutch told the magistrate of Nagasaki that the King of England was married to a Portuguese princess.³³⁰

³²⁹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 106v. It was customary for the *Chua* to take goods or money from foreign traders and pay them in silk or copper cashes at a dear rate.

³³⁰ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 109v, 110v-111r. Yuteng's information was quite accurate. The *Return* arrived in Nagasaki on 29 June 1673. The *bakufu* refused the English appeal on the grounds of the marriage between Charles II (1630-1685) and a

In Hanoi, a mutiny of soldiers broke out in Hanoi in early June.³³¹ Zhiyan reportedly lost more than 2,000 taels in the middle of the revolt.³³²

According to the English, Yuteng's junk departed for Nagasaki on 18 July. However, the adverse winds and a leakage problem on the vessel at the Bay of Tonkin forced his junk to return into the River. His junk came back to Pho Hien on 12 August. The junk could no longer proceed on its journey that year for it was too late and the monsoon had passed.³³³ At the same time, the VOC merchants in Tonkin witnessed that the junk of Zhiyan left Tonkin on 20 July but was stranded for fourteen days in the waters near the mouth of the Rockbo River. They bailed out the waterlogged junk and made it through to Tonkin.³³⁴ The two stories are similar enough to indicate that the English and the Dutch were talking about the same event.

Portuguese princess, Catharine of Braganza (1638-1705). Basset, "The Trade of the English East India Company", 153; Alastair Lamb, *The Mandarin Road to Old Hué: Narratives of Anglo-Vietnamese Diplomacy from the Seventeenth Century to the Eve of the French Conquest* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), 34.

³³¹ *KH*, 1: 109-10; *IOR*, G/12/17, pt. 2: 118r-119r. For the context of this mutiny see K. W. Taylor, "Literati Revival in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam", *JSEAS*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1987): 18-21.

³³² *DN*, 9 July 1675, NFJ 88.

³³³ *IOR*, G/12/17, pt. 2: 110r, 121r.

³³⁴ Letter from Albert Brevinck in Tonkin to Martinus Cesar in Nagasaki, 20 May 1674, NFJ 306.

Luckily, his cargoes suffered little damage.³³⁵ Yuteng's aborted voyage and return to Tonkin pleased the English merchants in Tonkin. William Gyfford wishfully thought that the price of silk would likely become cheaper in the following year because Yuteng would not be able to buy much in the next year.³³⁶ Another one of Zhiyan's junks sailed from Tonkin to Nagasaki this year.³³⁷

1675

According to English sources, the *Chua* made agreements on the sale of his silk with his business partners. The Dutch received fifteen *facaar* of raw silk for one tael of fine silver, Yuteng fourteen *facaar* and the English thirteen *facaar* respectively.³³⁸ Yuteng set sail for Japan on 19 May.³³⁹ These facts give us confirmation that the Dutch and the English were referring to the same Chinese junk from Japan. On 8 July, Zhiyan's junk arrived at Nagasaki. The value of his cargoes was estimated to be worth 200,000

³³⁵ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 110r; Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 386-7.

³³⁶ Letter from William Gyfford in Tonkin to the Council at Bantam, 3 October 1674, IOR G/12/17 pt. 2: 122v.

³³⁷ Letter from Martinus Casar in Nagasaki to Albert Brevinck in Tokin, 23 January 1675, NFJ 306.

³³⁸ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 144r.

³³⁹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 134r ; Letter from Albert Brevinck in Tonkin to Martinus Cesar in Nagasaki, 20 May 1674, NFJ 306.

taels of silver.³⁴⁰ A *Fūsetsu-gaki* attested to the arrival of a Chinese junk from Tonkin on 8 July.³⁴¹

1676

On 19 January, Zhiyan dispatched his junk with “Chinese captain Iethoe [Yuteng]” onboard.³⁴² His junk left Nagasaki and sailed to Tonkin in the company of a junk under the Zheng. On 23 February, the English heard that two junks from Japan arrived at the bar of the Rockbo River.³⁴³ On 1 March, both junks reached Pho Hien.³⁴⁴

The English took note of what took place between the two Chinese junks and the *dispatchadores* during this summer. According to their reports, “they [the two junks] brought, besides silver plates and copper coins, several medicinal drugs and purslane from China and Japan, all which the *Chua*, the prince and etc. took for their own use, [by] paying [at] their own prices for the same”. By 26 April, the merchants in the Chinese junks agreed with the silk merchants for the price of their silk, which

³⁴⁰ DN, 8 July 1675, NFJ 88.

³⁴¹ *KH*, 1: 111-4.

³⁴² Letter from Albert Brevinck in Tonkin to Joan Camphuijs in Nagasaki, 15 July 1676, NFJ 307.

³⁴³ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 148r.

³⁴⁴ Letter from Albert Brevinck in Tokin to Joan Camphuijs in Nagasaki, 15 July 1676, NFJ 307.

was at 15.5 *facaar*.³⁴⁵ Besides that, according to Dutch knowledge, “Iethoe” or Yuteng, on the junk of Zhiyan’s junk, contracted with the *Chua* for 1,500 taels of free trade every year and “dazzled” the mandarins.³⁴⁶

On 9 June, the Chinese junks departed for Japan.³⁴⁷ In July, Zhiyan’s junk departed from Tonkin and was accompanied by the aforementioned Zheng’s junk. Just before reaching Macao, however, Zheng’s junk sailed ahead and waited in ambush for Zhiyan’s junk. A number of naval vessels from Taiwan rushed out to join the force and launched a surprise attack against Zhiyan’s junk. Because of the attack, one of the sails was damaged by cannon shots and one life was lost.³⁴⁸ Fortunately, the timely northern wind saved Zhiyan’s junk and helped it escape back to Tonkin.

Zhiyan turned sixty years old. He received a congratulatory letter from his estranged family in Fujian.³⁴⁹

1677

³⁴⁵ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 148. “Purslane” is a name of a plant, probably indicating some sort of medicinal herbs in this case.

³⁴⁶ Letter from Albert Brevinck in Tonkin to Batavia, 28 November 1676, VOC 1322.

³⁴⁷ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 149r.

³⁴⁸ DN, 5 August 1667, NFJ 89.

³⁴⁹ (Ōgake) *Yuishogaki*.

On 14 January, Dirk de Haas wrote that Zhiyan's junk had not showed up in Nagasaki yet.³⁵⁰ On 1 June, "the Captain of Itchien's [Zhiyan] junk named Ithoe [Yuteng]" procured a new batch of raw silk and left Tonkin for Japan.³⁵¹ The junk was hit by a storm near the Pescadores. The accident killed all members of the crew except seven people including the *nachoda* [Yuteng], an accountant and the pilot.³⁵² The EIC records added that Yuteng lost his junk, cargos and seventeen to eighteen crew members near the coast of Taiwan. Yuteng survived and put a boat, which carried as many survivors as possible, ashore to Taiwan where they were detained as prisoners by the people of the Zheng.³⁵³

1678

Towards the end of 1678, in Nagasaki, Zhiyan was preparing for another voyage. A rather small junk, worth less than 3,000 taels, was being built for Zhiyan, in place of the big one he lost in Taiwan. He planned to dispatch the new junk to Tonkin by catching the last breeze of the north-eastern monsoon.³⁵⁴

³⁵⁰ Letter from Dirk de Haas in Nagasaki to Albert Brevinck in Tonkin, 14 January 1677, NFJ 308.

³⁵¹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 3: 198v; Letter from Joan Besselman in Tonkin to Dirck de Haas in Nagasaki, 16 July 1677, FNJ 308.

³⁵² Albert Brevinck in Nagasaki to Jan Besselman in Tonkin, 2 January 1678; DN, 17 & 18 August, 2 & 14 September 1678, NFJ 91.

³⁵³ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 4: 222v.

³⁵⁴ DN, 15 December 1678, NFJ 91.

1679

On 10 March, the English reported that two junks from Japan arrived in Tonkin.³⁵⁵

The said two junks headed out for Nagasaki on 15 July. Reportedly, they lost 4,000 taels due to certain silk merchants who ran away with their money.³⁵⁶ Although there is no conclusive evidence, at least one of them might have belonged to Zhiyan.

According to the Dutch, two Chinese junks came to Tonkin from Nagasaki. The first one arrived in Tonkin on 20 March and the second on 1 April. Together, they brought a sum of 90,000 taels. They did not inform the *Chua* of the 80,000 taels of silver and 440 chests of copper. They invested this capital in silk. They departed for Nagasaki on the last day of July.³⁵⁷ Although the reported arrival and departure dates do not exactly match, it is likely that the English and Dutch were referring to the same two Chinese junks from Japan.

In Nagasaki, Zhiyan and his sons became Japanese upon permission from the magistrate, Ushigome.³⁵⁸ In the same year, Zhiyan had a wooden bridge renovated as a stone bridge.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁵ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 4: 250v.

³⁵⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 3: 261v.

³⁵⁷ Iwao, “Kinsei nisshi bōeki”, 37.

³⁵⁸ (Ōgake) *Yuishigaki*.

1680

On 21 February, Yuteng resurfaced in Tonkin with his junk loaded with Japanese earthen ware, beetle nuts, silver and some copper coins.³⁶⁰ Another junk arrived in Tonkin from Japan on 4 March. The Chinese traders from these two junks faced a typical problem in doing business in Tonkin.

The King [*Chua*] formerly made a contract with the Chinamen that came from Japan not to meddle with their plate [silver] on condition that each junk would allow him annually 1,000 tael, and the Prince 500 tael, which proportions were paid them this year. Yet notwithstanding the king [*Chua*] forced from both the junks 10,000 taels and the prince 7,000 tael, for which they will pay silk at a dear rate, of which extortion the Chinamen made many unavailing complains.³⁶¹

On 22 May, Chinese merchants reached an agreement with the silk merchants for their silk: first grade of silk seventeen and second grade eighteenth tael weights of

³⁵⁹ See Chapter Five for further details.

³⁶⁰ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 5: 272v.

³⁶¹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 5: 273v.

silk for one tael of silver; their *pelings* at 2,100 copper coins with a rate of 1,550 pieces of copper coins per one tael of silver.³⁶² On 11 September, a junk of Zhiyan's came back to Nagasaki from Tonkin.³⁶³

Zhiyan donated the main gate to the Matsunomori shrine (松森神社).³⁶⁴

1681

Three appointed commissioners visited Nagasaki in order to gather information on the current situation of foreign trade and to uncover any illegal activities engaged in by the magistrates and other officials. Zhiyan was assigned to host Okada Hahirouemon (岡田八郎右衛門), the highest ranking official among the three, along with thirty-five members of his entourage.³⁶⁵

³⁶² IOR, G/12/17, pt. 5: 273v.

³⁶³ DN, 11 September 1680, NFJ 94.

³⁶⁴ Nagasaki-shi, *Nagasaki-shi shi: Chishi hen*, Vol. 2, 497; Niwa Kankichi & Morinaga Taneo eds., *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei: seihen* (Annals of Nagasaki) (Nagasaki: Nagasaki bunkensha, 1973), 97-8.

³⁶⁵ Nagazumi, "Nagasaki bugyō", 19; Oka Kiyosuke, *Kiyō gundan* (Tales of Nagasaki) (1716; reprint, Tokyo: Kondō Shuppansha, 1974), 88; Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 234-5. See Chapter Five for details on their visit.

Also this year, Zhiyan had the main hall of the Sōfukuji refurbished. It had a single-layered roof since 1646 when the temple hall was initially constructed. At this time, by means of Zhiyan's donation, the roof was upgraded to a two-tiered roof.³⁶⁶

In light of the following two accounts, it is clear that Zhiyan and Yuteng fitted out two junks and departed from Tonkin for Nagasaki in late summer of that year. Zhiyan took passage on one junk and Yuteng on the other.

The chief merchant of Ship No. 4 Tonkin in 1682, whose name was not mentioned in the *Fūsetsu-gaki*, related the events of his unsuccessful venture in the previous year [1681]. On 1 August 1681, his junk departed from Tonkin to Nagasaki along with Lin Yuteng's junk. When they reached Xiamen on 14 August, the wind turned against them. On 19 August, for want of favorable winds, they decided to return to Tonkin. Both junks were back in Tonkin on 16 September. The aborted voyage caused them to sustain losses. They spent a winter in Tonkin and his junk departed again from Tonkin on 9 June 1682 and so did Yuteng's junk.³⁶⁷ The chief of the English factory in Tonkin, Thomas James, also noted that the junks of Captain Neitthoe [Yuteng] and Quo Quan lost their voyages in 1681.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 968-9.

³⁶⁷ *KH*, 1: 344.

³⁶⁸ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 3: 284v.

“Quo Quan” in Thomas James’ statement was another variation of Zhiyan’s name. Therefore, Zhiyan was the *nachoda* of No. 4 Tonkin Ship. These Chinese junks brought with them no less than 150,000 taels of silver besides Japanese copper coins and other products to Tonkin.³⁶⁹

1682

In May, the two junks mentioned above departed Tonkin for Nagasaki earlier than they did in the previous year so that they would not lose another voyage. The large part of their cargoes was comprised of raw silk but also included some *peiling*, *baas*, *sommung*, *hockins* and refuge silk. In the same month, about ten days before their departure, Yuteng and Zhiyan presented a joint petition to the *Chua*, asking the *Chua* to consider how greatly they have suffered by losing their voyage in the previous year. They requested the *Chua* to dispose of raw silk at a certain pre-fixed price in the following years. They proposed sixteen *facaar* for first-grade silk and seventeen *facaar* for second-grade. The *Chua* took a few days to consider the proposal, during which time he sought the opinions of the EIC merchants on this matter.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁹ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 7: 285r.

³⁷⁰ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 7: 284v-285r.

On 29 June, Zhiyan's junk from Tonkin arrived in Nagasaki.³⁷¹ Yuteng's junk followed shortly.³⁷² Because of a severe famine, new silk did not come on the Tonkin market.³⁷³ Zhiyan and Yuteng brought the stock of old raw silk to Nagasaki, which they had bought in Tonkin one or two years before.³⁷⁴ At the end of 1682, Yuteng and Zhiyan left Nagasaki for Tonkin again.³⁷⁵

1683

On 7 February, two Japanese junks appeared in Tonkin. The *nachoda* of the two junks came up to Hanoi on 23 February. They met William Hodges at the English factory and informed him of a famine that had killed many people in Japan since the previous year.³⁷⁶ On 25 February, they *sambeyed* to the new *Chua* [Trinh Can] and presented lavish gifts congratulating the *Chua* on ascending to the throne. The two junks brought 205,000 taels of silver.³⁷⁷ Nonetheless, they were unable to purchase any silk

³⁷¹ *KH*, 1: 344. IOR, G/12/17, pt. 8: 310r; IOR, G/12/17, pt. 7: 284r.

³⁷² *KH*, 1: 421.

³⁷³ *KH*, 1: 417, 420. See Chapter One.

³⁷⁴ *KH*, 1: 344.

³⁷⁵ *KH*, 1: 417-8, 420-1.

³⁷⁶ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 8: 309v. Between 1680 and 1682, unusual weather conditions caused a famine throughout Japan. People faced serious food shortages and suffered an epidemic of diseases. Nagasaki was no exception. Chinese temples in Nagasaki provided rice porridge to the people and offered prayers. Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 242-53.

³⁷⁷ IOR, G/12/17, pt. 8: 310r.

due to the terrible famine and wide-spread epidemic. Neither Yuteng nor Zhiyan could fit out their junks. Both stayed in Tonkin and waited for a new harvest of silk in the following year.³⁷⁸

1684

From 19 May to 20 August, another *bakufu* commissioner Toda Matabei (戸田又兵衛) stayed at Zhiyan's mansion.³⁷⁹ During Toda's stay, a fire broke out in the neighborhood. Although it happened in the daytime and was soon extinguished, it scared Zhiyan's household.³⁸⁰

Around the lunar New Year, a portrait of Zhiyan was drawn by a painter called Xie Zhongyan (謝重燕) from Quanzhou (Figure 3.4).³⁸¹ In the same year, renowned Ōbaku portraitist Kita Genki (喜多元規) (active 1664-1709) drew his first portrait of Wei Zhiyan. On 10 December, Qiankai Xingan (千凱性安) (1626-1705), who was the then abbot of the Sōfukuji, gave a eulogy for the portrait (Figure 3.5).³⁸²

³⁷⁸ *KH*, 1: 418; *DVSKTT*, 2: 1010. See Chapter Two for more details on the bad crop in the early 1680s.

³⁷⁹ For details on their visit, see Chapter Five.

³⁸⁰ Ōoka, *Kiyō gundan*, 89; Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 269-70.

³⁸¹ No further information is available on the identity of the painter. Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 971.

³⁸² Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 970. For more on the Ōbaku portrait painting, See Chapter Four.



By Xie Zhongyan from Quanzhou. Dated 1684.
 Hanging scroll. Color on silk. 144.5 x 64.1 cm.
 Owned by the Oga family. Photographed by the author.

Figure 3.4 Portrait of Wei Zhiyan on Outing



By Kita Genki. Dated 1684.
 Hanging scroll. Color on silk. 121 x 51 cm.
 Photographed by the ahtour.

Figure 3.5 Portrait of Wei Zhiyan by Kita Genki, 1684

On 27 August, Zhiyan and Yuteng came back to Nagasaki with their respective junks. Theirs were the only ones that left Tonkin for Nagasaki this year. Zhiyan was on Ship No. 2 from Tonkin. According to his *Fūsetsu-gaki*, it was a bad year in Tonkin again. While Tonkin had not fully recovered from the famine, the mutiny against the new *Chua* claimed casualties and silk production failed. Yuteng could purchase only half the amount of silk that he used to be able to purchase before. He entrusted 10,000 taels of silver to a *nachoda* Lin Ershou (林爾受) in Tonkin for the purchase of new production of raw silk in the following year”.³⁸³ Another source said that Yuteng actually left 40,000 taels in Tonkin.³⁸⁴ During the winter, Yuteng again put up sail for Tonkin.³⁸⁵

1685

Early in 1685, Yuteng arrived in Tonkin. He made some profit from selling his cargoes. Despite his intentions of sailing back to Japan, he was unable to gather good exportable raw silk. He spent the remainder of the year at Tonkin having his junk repaired and running errands.³⁸⁶

³⁸³ *KH*, 1: 418, 420-1.

³⁸⁴ *KH*, 1: 420-1.

³⁸⁵ *KH*, 1: 608-9.

³⁸⁶ *KH*, 1: 608-9.

1686

Yuteng managed to buy a small amount of yellow silk and departed from Tonkin on 19 July. Although his junk was hit by a storm and nearly foundered during the voyage, it made its way back to Nagasaki and registered as Ship No. 72.³⁸⁷ Having been away from Nagasaki since 1684, Yuteng did not know about the new trade restrictions.³⁸⁸ Yuteng asked permission for trade by stressing the following:

We were people of the Ming. After eventually the Qing took over the Ming some of us did not go back home. Hence, we went back and forth between Japan and Tonkin. I stayed in Japan for such a long time that I strongly feel as though I were a subject of Japan. I am very grateful that the country [Japan] has been kind to me for more than a few decades.³⁸⁹

On the occasion of his seventieth birthday, letters from his relatives in Fujian were delivered to Nagasaki.³⁹⁰ Liu Xuanyi wrote a congratulatory letter to Zhiyan (Figure 3.6).³⁹¹


³⁸⁷ *KH*, 1: 608-9.

³⁸⁸ For details on the new trade regulations, see Chapter Two.

³⁸⁹ *KH*, 1: 608-9.

³⁹⁰ (Ōgake) *Yuishogaki*.

Zhiyan held a memorial service for the thirty-third anniversary of Itchien's death at the Sōfukuji.³⁹² Qiankai offered a reburial service for Itchien.



Hanging Scroll. Dated in 1686.
Owned by the Ōga family.
Photographed by the author.

Figure 3.6 Congratulatory Words from Liu Xuanyi to Wei Zhiyan
on Zhiyan's Seventieth Birthday

1687-8

Zhiyan stayed in Nagasaki. Yuteng's business in Tonkin did not go well. He decided to suspend his voyage to Japan and stayed in Tonkin.³⁹³

³⁹¹ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 972.

³⁹² Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 972; Sonoda, "Tonkin daihakushu", 67.

1689

Zhiyan passed away because of illness during the early hours of the morning on 6 February. His death was immediately reported to the *Tōtsūji kaisho*.³⁹⁴ Qiankai presided over a Buddhist funeral ceremony for Zhiyan at the Sōfukuji.³⁹⁵ He was buried alongside Itchien (Figure 3.7).



Chinese-style tombs for the Oga family.
Address: 2-36 Nishiyama-chō, Nagasaki-shi Nagasaki, Japan.
Photographed by the author.

Figure 3.7 Tombs of the Wei Brothers

³⁹³ *KH*, 2: 1113-4.

³⁹⁴ *TKN*, 3: 206-7.

³⁹⁵ Yoshinaga Setsudō, ed., *Nagasaki sōfukuji nenpyō* (Nagasaki: Shojuan Sofukuji, 1961), 12.

After Zhiyan's death, his son Yongzhao asked Kita Genki to draw another portrait of Zhiyan. At the end of August, Master Qinkai put a eulogy on the portrait (Figure 3.8).³⁹⁶



By Kita Genki. Dated 1689.

Hanging scroll. Color on silk. 111.2 x 48.9 cm.

Source: Kyoto National Museum, *Ōbaku no bijutsu*, 83.

Courtesy of Kyoto National Museum.

Figure 3.8 Portrait of Wei Zhiyan by Kita Genki, 1689

After staying in Tonkin for three years, Yuteng left Tonkin on 15 June and arrived at Nagasaki on 16 July.³⁹⁷ During his stay in Nagasaki, he had his junk

³⁹⁶ Kyoto National Museum, ed., *Tokubetsuten Ōbaku no bijutsu: Edo jidai no bunka wo kaeta mono* (Special exhibition on “the Art of Ōbaku”) (Kyoto: Kyoto National Museum, 1993), 169.

reconditioned. However, the repair work was done in haste and the junk departed without the hull being fixed properly. On its way back to Tonkin, water started leaking in from the hull. After a rough voyage, Yuteng returned to Tonkin and spread the news of Zhiyan's death among members of the Chinese community.³⁹⁸

1690

Yuteng could not have his leaky junk repaired in Tonkin because Tonkin was a place where both sides of the river bank were too high to pull the junk onto. Considering the danger of navigating a leaking junk, Yuteng thought about abandoning the vessel.

But if we can not sell our merchandise, crew members of the ship would be impoverished. Our sailors discussed the matter and decided to sail to Japan even though water was coming in. During the voyage, the sailors kept bailing water from the ship day and night. Since the ship was laden mostly with light cargo, I [Yuteng] told them that we could possibly make it through to Japan as long as we did not change our mind.... adverse winds made our journey even more difficult. Nonetheless, because we sincerely pursue a profit, we came here [Nagasaki] at the risk of our lives.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁷ *KH*, 2: 1113-4.

³⁹⁸ *KH*, 2: 1275-6.

³⁹⁹ *KH*, 2: 1275-6.

Yuteng's leaky junk eventually arrived at Nagasaki.⁴⁰⁰ Yuteng brought a deed written in Chinese together with 1,100 catties of raw silk from some Chinese merchants in Tonkin. The deed said:

Zhiyan was in Tonkin before he moved to Japan. Back then, he lent silver [to other traders in Tonkin]. Since Zhiyan lived in Japan in his last years, he had no opportunity to collect some of the silver [from the borrowers]. The borrowers were in a bad shape and unable to repay their debts. Zhiyan had no way to recover the money. Years passed and Zhiyan no longer pursued their debt. The borrowers came to know of his death from the junk coming back to Tonkin from Japan last year. They thought that they should return the money even though Zhiyan had already passed away, especially because they had been doing well recently. Although Zhiyan passed away, he had two sons. The borrowers asked Yuteng to deliver the raw silk to the sons as a repayment.⁴⁰¹

Yuteng's junk set sail from Nagasaki on 29 November.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰ *KH*, 2: 1391-2.

⁴⁰¹ *TKN*, 1: 262-3.

⁴⁰² *KH*, 2: 1390-1.

1691

After leaving Nagasaki, his old junk started leaking from the bottom of the hull. It was obvious that the junk was unable to complete the voyage to Tonkin. Yuteng decided to call at Wenzhou and check the hull. The junk was found too old to repair thus Yuteng gave up the vessel and had a new one built. Hearing that a new junk was under construction, some traveling merchants from Wenzhou and Ningbo gathered with their raw silk and silk textiles. With new cargoes onboard, Yuteng's junk left Wenzhou on 4 July. After finishing some business at Putuoshan, the junk arrived at Nagasaki.⁴⁰³

1692

Yuteng's junk left Tonkin on 9 July and reached Nagasaki on 16 August.⁴⁰⁴

1698

In Hanoi, Vũ Diệuthịnh, Zhiyan's Vietnamese wife, was not feeling well since the last winter. Neither medication nor prayer worked. In the morning of 17 May, she passed away at the age of sixty-three. Prior to that, Vũ Diệu Thịnh was remarried to Lê Thống Cẩn (黎統謹) from Cổ Đô town, Đông Sơn district, Thiệu Thiê prefecture,

⁴⁰³ *KH*, 2: 1471-2.

⁴⁰⁴ *KH*, 2: 1471-2.

Thanh Hóa province (清華道紹天府東山縣古都社) and, with him, she had a son Lê Đình Tương (黎廷相) and a daughter Công Thị (琮氏).⁴⁰⁵

1699

On 27 May, the magistrate of Nagasaki appointed Zhiyan's Tonkinese servant Wei Xi (魏喜)(1659-1711), now called Gi Goheiji (魏五平次), as Tonkin-cum-Quangnam (廣南) interpreter.⁴⁰⁶

1702

Following his father's [Lê] order, Đình Tương held a funeral for his mother. On 10 October, Vũ Diệu Thịnh was peacefully put in the ground in Thanh Hóa.⁴⁰⁷

Afterwards, Lê Đình Tương wrote a letter to their half-brothers, Wei Yongshi and Yongchao in Nagasaki to inform them of their mother's death.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁵ Letter from Lê Đình Tương in Hanoi to his two brothers [Wei Yongshi and Yongzhao] in Nagasaki, 1702, in Chu, “Ben zhao qian dai yu ming mo yi shi guan xi zhi yi shi”, 49; *Minh đô sử*, l. 96.

⁴⁰⁶ *TKN*, 2: 199.

⁴⁰⁷ At the time *Minh đô sử* was compiled, her grave existed in Phú Văn (富文) village under the care of the Lê clan. *Minh đô sử*, l. 96.

⁴⁰⁸ Letter from Lê Đình Tương in Hanoi to his two elder brothers [Wei Yongshi and Yongzhao] in Nagasaki, 1702, in Chu, “Ben zhao qian dai yu ming mo yi shi guan xi zhi yi shi”, 49; *Minh đô sử*, l. 96.



Hanging scroll. Color on silk. Not Dated.
Owned by the Oga family.
Photographed by the author.

Figure 3.9 Portrait of Wei Zhiyan and Vũ Diệu Thịnh

1703

Lin Yuteng was in Nagasaki this year. On 23 September, he testified about the usage of a particular kind of Chinese incense in front of the Chinese interpreters.⁴⁰⁹

Around mid-autumn, Yongshi and Yongchao wrote back to Lê Đình Tương. They expressed their gratitude to him for telling them about when and how their mother passed away and for taking care of her burial ceremony. Thirty taels of silver were enclosed for Lê Đình Tương to be able to set up a proper altar for their mother.⁴¹⁰ Yuteng probably delivered this letter to Tonkin.

⁴⁰⁹ *TKN*, 1: 365.

⁴¹⁰ Letter from Wei Yongshi and Yongchao in Nagasaki to Lê Đình Tương in Hanoi, 1703, in Chu, “Ben zhao qian dai yu ming mo yi shi guan xi zhi yi shi”, 49; *Minh đô sử*, 1. 96.

1706

Yuteng arrived in Nagasaki onboard of Ship No. 21 from Nanjing.⁴¹¹

1708

Yuteng's junk left Tonkin on 22 July and sailed into Nagasaki on 10 September.⁴¹²

This marks Yuteng's last appearance in the historical record.

⁴¹¹ *TKN*, 2: 113.

⁴¹² *KH*, 3: 2581.

PART TWO

ANALYSES

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FUQING NETWORKS

The previous chapter illuminated a variety of activities that the Wei brothers carried out in their life times. Apart from their commercial enterprise in the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade, their social, cultural and religious activities in Nagasaki were highlighted. Previous studies that were dependent in a large part on Dutch and English sources failed to pay enough attention to Chinese merchants' conduct outside the economic sphere. This chapter intends to show Chinese junk traders as people whose lives were not simply defined by their economic undertakings and examines how these religious and cultural factors could have help hem facilitate trade.

Chapter Three included accounts of Wei brothers' involvement in the Sōfukuji monastic community. This signifies not only that the Wei brothers were Buddhist but also that they had means to patronize the Buddhist monastery. However, that does not explain why they chose this particular Buddhist monastery as their object of patronage. In order to understand their patronage of the Sōfukuji and the rationale behind it, this chapter will explore the roles of Buddhism in seventeenth-century Nagasaki. The first part of this chapter delves into the evolution of Chinese Buddhist monasteries in Nagasaki from private gathering places for Chinese merchants to full-fledged Buddhist temples during the first-half of the seventeenth century. The

second part will explore the involvement of the Wei brothers in the monastic community of the Sōfukuji.

The Origin of Chinese Buddhist Temples in Nagasaki

Since the second decade of the seventeenth century, the Chinese expatriate community was divided into three sub-communities according to native places or dialect lines. Each group, which was comprised of merchants from the same regional area, had its own small makeshift shrine (proto-temple) that later developed into a Buddhist temple.⁴¹³ The oldest Chinese temple in Nagasaki was the Kōfukuji (C. Xingfusi 興福寺) founded in 1623 by immigrants from the so-called *sanjiang* (三江) region including Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Jiangnan (江南) areas. The temple was known as Nankindera (南京寺) after the largest city of the region, Nanjing (南京). Merchants from the Fujian province were split into two groups according to their distinct linguistic features. In 1628, the migrants from the southernmost part of Fujian province established the Fukusaiji (C. Fujisi 福濟寺). In the beginning, a main group of supporters were from the Quanzhou area and, therefore, the temple was colloquially called Senshūji (泉州寺) or Quanzhou temple. Later on, it extended its

⁴¹³ Before the establishment of these three Chinese temples, Goshinji (悟真寺) catered services to the Chinese people staying in Nagasaki. Established in 1598, it is the oldest Buddhist temple in Nagasaki. The Goshinji International Cemetery contains some of the oldest tombstones belonging to early Chinese settlers in Nagasaki. Takeuchi Mitsuyoshi and Shorota Masayoshi, *Nagasaki bosho ichiran: Goshinji kokusai bochi hen* (List of cemeteries in Nagasaki: Goshinji international cemetery) (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1990).

service to those from Zhangzhou as well as Yongchun (永春) and was often referred as Shōshūdera (漳州寺) or Zhangzhou temple.⁴¹⁴ At first, the Chinese temples served only the most basic religious needs of the Chinese expatriate community, mainly conducting funeral and memorial services. At this early stage, the religious identity of émigré monks was often obscure. For example, some of the monks came to Nagasaki as traders and then became monks to fill the needs of local Chinese communities.⁴¹⁵

Sōfukuji and the Wei Brothers

In 1629, Sōfukuji was inaugurated by a group of Chinese people from Fuzhou area as the third Chinese religious institution established in Nagasaki. Hence, it was known popularly as Fukushūji (福州寺) or Fuzhou temple. The majority of its supporters were the migrants from Fuqing, Changyue (長樂) and Minhou (閩侯) counties.⁴¹⁶ Similar to the other two Chinese temples in Nagasaki, the origins of the

⁴¹⁴ For the origins of the Chinese temples in Nagasaki, see Li Hsien-chang, “Nagasaki santōji no seiritsu (Foundations of the Three Chinese Temples in Nagasaki)”, *Kinsei bukkyō: Shiryō to kenkyū*, 6 (1962): 9-26; Nakamura, “Kinsei nihon no kakyō”, 233-71.

⁴¹⁵ Yoshinaga Setsudō, “Ōbakuō no torai ni tsuite”, in *Kōfugaiu*, ed., Miura Jitsudō (Nagasaki: Fukusaiji, 1924), 2; Jiang, “Orthodoxy, Controversy and the Transformation of Chan Buddhism”, 274.

⁴¹⁶ Uchida, *Nihon kakyō shakai no kenkyū*, 51-66; Nakamura, “Kinsei nihon no kakyō”, 233-9.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, Fuqing natives comprised a large part of the Chinese community in Nagasaki. In the early 1980s, scholars conducted field research at the Sōfukuji cemetery and collected data from the inscriptions of Chinese tombstones. Among 225 tombstones surveyed, ninety-six belonged to those from

temple probably dates back further to when merchants of Fuzhou origin first enshrined and revered statues of the sea goddess *mazu* (媽祖). In 1632, the temple was officially recognized as a Buddhist monastery with the Chinese monk Chaoran (超然)(1567-1644) as its designated founder. As soon as its authorization as a Buddhist monastery was granted by the *bakufu*, an independent hall dedicated to *mazu* worship, called *Masodō* (媽祖堂) was constructed.⁴¹⁷ Through the generations, the abbot of the Sōfukuji gave the highest priority to looking after this tutelary deity of seafaring people.⁴¹⁸

As natives of the Fuqing county, which is located northeast of Fuzhou, the Wei brothers were one of the most active members of the Sōfukuji monastic community in its early days. The Wei clan was counted as one of the four biggest patrons (J. *danotsu* 檀越) in the early days of the Sōfukuji, alongside Wang (王), He (何) and Lin (林) clans.⁴¹⁹ After Itchien passed away in 1654, his contribution to the temple was

Fuqing, fifty-nine were of Changyue natives, and thirty-nine were related to Minhou. In total, people from these three counties comprised eighty-six percent of those who were buried at the temple. Miyata Yasushi, “Sōfukuji no tōjin bochi (Chinese tombstones at the Sōfukuji)”, in *Nagasaki kashō taieki gō kankei monjo no kenkyū* (Studies on the materials concerning “Tai Eki Gō”), Vol. 2, ed. Ichikawa Nobuchika (Miyazaki: Miyazakidaigaku kakyōshi kenkyūkai, 1985), 57-104.

⁴¹⁷ Nakamura, “Kinsei nihon no kakyō”, 240-1

⁴¹⁸ Uchida, *Nihon kakyō shakai no kenkyū*, 69-71; Nakamura, “Kinsei nihon no kakyō”, 251-2. “*Maso*” is standard Japanese pronunciation of the same character *mazu*.

well-appreciated and remembered through Zhiyan's constant participation in various religious activities at the temple. In 1682, for example, Zhiyan requested the temple to hold a ceremony to commemorate the thirty-year anniversary of Itchien's death.⁴²⁰



Photograph by the author.

Figure 4.1 The Masodō at the Sōfukuji


⁴¹⁹ Junshin joshi tankidaigaku Nagasaki chihō bunkashi kenkyūjo ed., *Nagasaki zushi* (Nagasaki: Junshin joshi tankidaigaku, 1991), 113. The original manuscript by a Nagasaki local Suitsū, aka Nagasaki Kunjo, was compiled in 1715.

⁴²⁰ Hirakubo Akira ed., *Sokuhi zenshū: shinsan kōtei*, Vol. 1, 52-3.



Photograph by the author.

Figure 4.2 Junpūji



Photograph by the author.

Figure 4.3 Senrigan

The Wei brothers played notable roles in the construction of the *masodō* (Figure 4.1). The stone-paved approach to reach the *masodō* was constructed with funds from donation by Zhiyan.⁴²¹ Inside the hall, the *mazu* is seated on the central altar of the hall. She is accompanied by other subsidiary deities. In front of them are two colorfully painted guards protecting the goddess. The red guard standing on the right side is Junpūji (C: Shun feng er 順風耳), “favorable wind ears” (Figure 4.2), while the blue guard on the left was called Senrigan (C: Qian li yan 千里眼), “thousand leagues eyes” (Figure 4.3). The two statues of the demon guards were said to have been carved in China.⁴²² Apart from these two statues, two panels and a pair of *ren* (J.

⁴²¹ Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 526. See also Chapter One.

聯) are related to the Wei brothers.⁴²³ A horizontal panel “*Hai bu yang bo* (海不揚波)” is above the alter for the *mazu*. It was written by Itchien and literally translates to “the sea that does not wave”. A pair of wooden *ren* donated by Zhiyan can be found on the columns above the altar for the *mazu* (Figure 4.4). The second panel, “*Wan li an lan* (萬里安瀾)” (Figure 4.5), is attached to the outer wall of the entrance of the *masodō*. It says “peaceful waves prevail thousands of miles”. These ornamentations of the building physically attest to the sea-oriented nature of the Wei brothers.

⁴²² Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 531.

⁴²³ “*Ren*” are a pair of stripe-shaped wooden boards put symmetrically on a pair of pillars. Combining each part written on a *ren* together makes a sentence or poetry.



Photograph by the author.

Figure 4.4 The Alter for the *Mazu* inside the Masodō



Photograph by the author.

Figure 4.5 “*Wan li an lan*”



Photograph by the author.

Figure 4.6 *Daiyūhōden*

After the hall of the *mazu*, the first gate for the temple *Daiippōmon* (第一峰門) was set in place in 1644. All the structural components of this gate were measured and cut in China before they were transported to Nagasaki.⁴²⁴ The construction of the main hall, *Daiyūhōden* (大雄寶殿), was completed in the early spring of 1646 with donations by He Gaocai as well as Wei Zhiyan. Plates and hangings were donated by Zhiyan (Figure 4.6). Although we are unable to assess the original dates when they were set up in the hall, they reveal strong connections between the Wei brothers and the Sōfukuji. In addition, in 1647, Itchien donated 150 taels for the casting of the

⁴²⁴ *Nagasaki meishō zue*, 117.

temple bell. His name is engraved on the surface of the bell.⁴²⁵ Their influence on the Sōfukuji is evident up until the present day.

The Importance of Being Buddhist

It is evident that the Wei brothers were instrumental in the foundation of the Sōfukuji. While their involvement could be attributed to sheer religiosity on their part, this was but one of the reasons for them close associated to this Buddhist monastery. Firstly, it was critical for them to prove that they were not Christians to be able to remain and trade in Nagasaki. Throughout the Edo period (1603-1867), the core of the *bakufu*'s policy towards religion was strictly "No Christianity". In December 1637, a Christian uprising broke out in Shimabara (島原) and Amakusa (天草) Islands nearby Nagasaki. There has been a longstanding discussion among historians of Japanese history about whether the nature of the rebellion was essentially religious or not. It is enough to point out that from the very beginning the *bakufu* regarded it as a Christian rebellion.⁴²⁶ After the rebellion, adamant about eradicating Christianity from Japanese soil, the *bakufu* launched a storm of anti-Christian persecution. In 1639, all Portuguese people and their local families were expelled indefinitely. When a

⁴²⁵ See Chapter Tree and Five.

⁴²⁶ Many studies have been done on the rebellion. For this thesis, I refer mainly to Irimoto Masuo, "Shimabarano ran to kirishitan ikki (Shimabara rebellion and Christian 'uprising')", in *Sakoku*, eds., Katō Eiichi and Yamada Tadao (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1981), 223-71; Kanda Chisato, *Shimabara no ran: Kirisnitan shinkō to busō hōki* (Shimabara rebellion: Christian belief and armed uprising) (Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 2006).

Portuguese embassy arrived from Macao in the next summer with the hope of reopening trade in Japan, sixty-one Portuguese members of the embassy were executed. Their *galliot* was burned and subsequently sunk at the Nagasaki harbor. In the aftermath of this incident, the *bakufu* was wary of possible Portuguese retaliation.⁴²⁷ Regardless of the *bakufu*'s stern anti-Christian policy, however, Jesuit priests continued to set foot on Japanese soil. In August 1642, a group of Jesuit priests and their servants were arrested on one of the Ryūkū Islands (琉球諸島).⁴²⁸ Again, less than a year later, a group of ten Christians was taken prisoner on a small island off the coast of Hirado. It turned out that a Chinese junk gave them passage to Japan.⁴²⁹ The point is that the *bakufu* had reason for concern about an impending Portuguese retribution and about continuous Christian infiltration via Chinese junks during the 1640 which impacted its dealings with Chinese traders.⁴³⁰

In 1639, Inoue Chikugo no kami Masashige (井上筑後守政重) (1585-1662) was appointed to the *Shūmon aratame yaku* (J. 宗門改役) (the office of Grand

⁴²⁷ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 375-6, 382-4; *Kabankōshi kōbunki*, in Nagasakikenshi hensan iinkai ed., *Nagasaki kenshi: shiryōhen*, Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1965), 288.

⁴²⁸ Viallé and Blussé, *The Deshima Dagregisters, Vol. XI 1641-1650*, 73, 75-6, 98-9.

⁴²⁹ Viallé and Blussé, *The Deshima Dagregisters, Vol. XI 1641-1650*, 103-4.

⁴³⁰ Nakazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol 4, 506. For the security measures adopted by the *bakufu* see, Kimura Naoki, “17 seiki chūyō bakuhansai kokka no ikokusen taisaku (Bakufu policy towards foreign shipping in the middle of the seventeenth century)”, *Shigaku-Zasshi*, Vol. 109, No. 2 (2000): 55-77.

Inquisitor of Religious Affairs).⁴³¹ A system of religious surveillance (J. *Shūmon aratame* 宗門改め) was designed to prove that all persons on Japanese soil were non-Christian by affiliating people with authorized Buddhist temples. Since around the 1620s, it had been carried out by some local lords (J. *daimyō* 大名) in an inconsistent manner.⁴³² In the wake of the Shimabara rebellion, the *bakufu* developed it into a nation-wide religious surveillance system. This was achieved through institutionalizing *danka seido* (檀家制度) or the patron system. Under the the *danka* system, the entire populace was required to register at a Buddhist temple within a certain geographical and social area.⁴³³ By means of an annual examination of religious beliefs, a Buddhist temple issued household members a surety to the effect that none of them was Christian. In this way, all Japanese were administratively incorporated into the existing Buddhist structure and being a Buddhist became the

⁴³¹ For his career and role in the anti-Christian campaign, see Leonard Blussé, “The Grand Inquisitor Inoue Chikugono kami Masashige, Spin Doctor of the Tokugawa *Bakufu*”, *Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies* 7 (2003): 23-43; Nagazumi Yōko, “Orandajin no hogosha to shitenō Inoue Chikugo no kami Masashige (Inoue Chikugo no kami Masashige as guardian of the Dutch factors)”, *Nihon Rekishi*, 327 (1975): 1-17; Anesaki Masaharu, “Prosecution of Christians after the Shimabara Insurrection”, *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1938): 293-300.

⁴³² In Nagasaki, one of the first membership lists of Buddhist temples was compiled in 1616. For more details on the development of *shūmon aratame* in Nagasaki, see Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki bōekishi no kenkyū*, 198-206.

⁴³³ Kenneth A. Marcure, “The *Danka* System”, *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1985): 39-40.

only way to prove one's non-Christian identity.⁴³⁴ Chinese residents of Japan were no exception to these measures.

The ostensible evolution of the *mazu* hall into a Buddhist monastery was a unique phenomenon in seventeenth-century Nagasaki. Apart from the Sōfukuji, the two older Chinese temples also had their roots in shrines where Chinese traders gathered and venerated the *mazu*. The three temples simultaneously transformed into Buddhist monasteries in the 1640s. Scholars of Japanese history have not agreed on the extent to which the anti-Christian persecution by the *bakufu* prompted the geneses of Chinese Buddhist temples in Nagasaki.⁴³⁵ However, we should keep in mind that a temple for the *mazu* did not necessarily have to be annexed by a Buddhist temple in such places as Malacca, Pho Hien, Hoi An, Batavia, Banten and Taiwan where Chinese traders settled and from where they fitted out junks to Nagasaki during the seventeenth century.⁴³⁶ Apart from that, the absence of temples for Taoist, Confucian

⁴³⁴ Marcure, "The *Danka* System", 42-3. For the development of *shūmon aratame*, see Ōhashi Yukihiro, "Kirishitan kinsei to shūmon aratame (Anti-Christianity and *shūmon aratame*)", in *17 seiki no nihon to higasi ajia* (Japan and East Asia in the seventeenth century), ed. by Fujita Satoru (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2000), 69-99; Ōkuwa Hitoshi, "Jidanseido no seiritsu katei (Development process of the *jidan* system)", *Nihon Rekishi* 242 (1968): 23-36; 243 (1968): 22-33.

⁴³⁵ Uchida, *Nihon kakyō shakai no kenkyū*, 52-3; Li Hsien-chang, "Nagasaki san tōji no seiritsu (Establishment of the three Chinese temples in Nagasaki)", *Kinsei Bukkyō: Shiryō to Kenkyū*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1962): 10, 26; Nakamura, "Nagasaki no tōji", 250.

and clan worshipping in seventeenth-century Nagasaki was obvious.⁴³⁷ Together, these factors suggest that the *bakufu*'s anti-Christian policy seared upon the evolution of the *mazu* halls into full-fledged Buddhist temples in Nagasaki.

Institutionalization of the Chinese Temples

As mentioned earlier, it was the custom for a Chinese vessel to carry an image of *mazu* and other deities onboard during the voyage.⁴³⁸ Chinese mariners believed the goddess could control water and give divine protection through their journey across the sea. The veneration of *mazu* was a very important part of their seafaring life. Shipboard organization of a Chinese junk included a *honggong* (C. 香工), a crew

⁴³⁶ See Salmon, "Réfugiés Ming", 188, 218; Chen Cing-ho, "On the Rules and Regulations of the Duong-Thuong Hoi Quan at Faifo (Hoi An), Central Vietnam", *Southeast Asian Archives* 2 (1969):150-2.

⁴³⁷ In 1691, *Dojindō* (土神堂), a hall for the guardian of the land, was built upon the request from the sojourning Chinese merchants. Then, in 1736, the Chinese were allowed to have a hall for the worship of *mazu* and *handi* (漢帝). In the following year, *Kannonō* (觀音堂), a hall dedicated to *Guanyin* (觀音), was erected. Note that these religious facilities were only set up after the establishment of the Chinese quarter or *Tōjinyashiki* (唐人屋敷) in 1689 and inside its secluded compound. It was in the first year of the Meiji period (1868-1912) that *Ba min hui suo* (八閩會所) was established by merchants from the Fujian province. It was renamed as *Fu jian hui guan* (福建會館) in 1898. For more details on the foundations of other Chinese native-place associations in Nagasaki, see Uchida, *Nihon kakyō shakain no kenkyū*, 149-56.

⁴³⁸ A great deal has been written on the historical development of the *mazu* worship both in Chinese and Japanese. For a study in English, see James L. Watson, "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien Hou ("Empress of Heaven") Along the South China Coast, 960-1960", in *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China*, ed. by David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, Evelyn S. Rawski (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press), 292-324.

member whose exclusive duty was to pay homage to the *mazu* and make offerings every morning and evening during the voyage.⁴³⁹ When a vessel entered a port, the *mazu* was carefully disembarked and transferred to a special place where she was housed until the junk's next voyage.⁴⁴⁰ The three Chinese temples were established during the 1620s based on such a shrine dedicated to the worship of the *mazu*. In the 1640s, as mentioned earlier, these shrines rapidly evolved into temples with a more explicit Buddhist color. It is no coincidence that this decade was the height of anti-Christian persecution.

Since 1639, the *bakufu* repeatedly issued anti-Christian orders to crew members of Chinese junks. At the same time, the authorities began utilizing the Chinese temples as a medium for disseminating its anti-Christian orders among the Chinese in Nagasaki.⁴⁴¹ On 2 September 1639, the special envoy from the *bakufu*, Ōta Bicchū no

⁴³⁹ Nishikawa Joken, “Zōho kai tsūshō kō”, in *Nihon suidokō, Suido kaiben, Zōho kaitushokō*, annotated by Iijima Tadao and Nishikawa Tadayuki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 106. *Zōho kai tsūshō kō* was originally published in 1709.

⁴⁴⁰ In the early 1690s, a German physician Engelbert Kaemfer (1651-1716) observed what took place before the departure of a Chinese junk: “On the previous day [of the departure], the image of the sea god P’u-sa, or Bosa, would have been collected from the temple with bells and cymbals (where he [*sic.*] had been taken on arrival) and installed again in the ship. This Bosa is a god unknown to the Japanese whom the Chinese merchants and mariners take with them, and to whom they make many vows when in danger. Every night gilded pieces of paper are lit and thrown into the sea in her honor with a great noise of reverberating bells and bowls. Also puppet plays or comedies are performed at night in public streets after a successful journey, if this has been pledged”. Beatrice M. Bodart-Bailey, trans., *Kaempfer’s Japan: Tokugawa Culture Observed* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 227. We may reasonably assume that the custom dates back in the early seventeenth century.

kami Sukemune (太田備中守資宗)(1600-1680) personally gave the final deportation order to the Portuguese. On the same day, chief merchants and skippers of Chinese junks, who were present in town, received a summons from the office of the magistrates. In the early morning of 3 September, all gathered before Ōta Bicchū no kami. He read out an order from the *shogun*.

The prohibition of bringing Catholic priests and their Christian followers into Japan has been reinforced. From now on, if priests, their followers or Christian objects as well as books are discovered onboard a junk, regardless of what is written or who is aboard, the vessel will be sent to the bottom of the sea along with all of its cargos and crew members. In the meantime, any informant will be richly rewarded.⁴⁴²

Afterwards, a copy of the order was handed to those in attendance. The Chinese were excused after they pledged to obey the order.⁴⁴³ Similar orders were issued in 1640 and 1641 respectively.⁴⁴⁴ Besides these repeated orders, a new process of cargo

⁴⁴¹ Li Xian-zhang, *Nagasaki tōjin no kenkyū* (Studies on Chinese in Nagasaki) (Nagasaki: Shinwa Ginkō, 1991), 19-20, 26.

⁴⁴² *TK*, 6: 369-70; Nakazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol 4, 282; C. R. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacón: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555-1640* (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos, 1959), 161-2.

⁴⁴³ Nakazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol. 4, 282.

⁴⁴⁴ *TK*, 6: 379-80.

inspection (J. *niaratame* 荷改) was probably introduced around this time. Before anyone onboard was permitted to set foot on the ground, official inspectors checked the cargoes and crew members' belongings for any possession of Christian related objects.⁴⁴⁵

Chinese monks and temples were supposed to play a role in the screening of crew members' religious backgrounds. In the spring of 1642, a magistrate of Nagasaki Baba Toshishige (馬場利重) (d. 1657) issued an order specifically to the aforementioned three Chinese temples and asked for their cooperation. The *shogun* requested the abbots of the Chinese temples examine the religious affiliations of junk crew members. In particular, the monks were requested to observe cargo handling operations and to observe crew members when they brought their *mazu* into a Chinese temple.⁴⁴⁶ This was because an image of the female deity of the *mazu* could have resembled to the Virgin Mary and the local Japanese officials, who were unfamiliar with foreign objects, had difficulties in distinguishing between the two. The magistrates needed Chinese monks, who had crossed the sea personally and were acquainted with seafaring customs, to help examine and identify the female figure as a Chinese sea goddess and, consequently, a non-Christian deity. After the monk assured

⁴⁴⁵ Li, *Nagasaki tōjin no kenkyū*, 287-91.

⁴⁴⁶ Nagasaki shiyakusho, ed., *Nagasaki shi: Chishi hen, butsuji bu*, (History of Nagasaki municipality: Geography, Buddhist temples), vol. 2 (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Shiyakusho, 1923), 222-3.

of the non-Christian nature of the figure, the *mazu* was installed safely at one of the Chinese temples. A visit to the temple became an integral part of the religious screening and Chinese temples functioned as an official surveillance mechanism for ensuring that there were no Christian influences on Chinese junks.⁴⁴⁷

During the early 1640s, the *bakufu*'s persistent investigations uncovered more than a few incidents in which Christian objects were uncovered on Chinese junks.⁴⁴⁸ These incidents sparked fear among the Chinese on the other junks. "They [the Chinese] have sold very little of their cargo and are sitting around very sad and worried about how the matter will be solved", wrote the chief of the Dutch factory at Nagasaki, Jan van Elserack.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁷ Nakamura "Nagasaki no tōji", 250.

⁴⁴⁸ For example, in July 1642, a medallion with saints and a box with the figure of the crucified Jesus Christ were discovered in the possession of a Chinese crew member on a junk arriving from Fuzhou. On 17 September 1644, a rosary and a book were discovered on a Chinese junk. After all members of the junk crew were tortured mercilessly, eight of them were forced to confess to being Christians. This gave a shock to the magistrates of Nagasaki and other officials, who had never thought that any Roman Catholics were to be found among the Chinese, and yet now there were eight of them on one of the smallest junks. Viallé and Blussé, *The Deshima Daghregisters Volume XI 1641-1650*, 68-9, 178-9. For more cases about Christians found onboard Chinese junks during the 1640s, see Li, *Nagasaki tōjin no kenkyū*, 291-302.

⁴⁴⁹ Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé, eds., *The Deshima Daghregisters, Volume XI 1641-1650* (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2001), 179-80.

Chinese merchants from Tonkin had particular reason to worry about their safe business conduct in Nagasaki because of ongoing trade between Macao and Tonkin. The Portuguese in Macao did not easily give up their trade with Japan. In the first half of the 1640s, the Portuguese made every effort to continue their trade with Japan.⁴⁵⁰ The handsome profit derived from the Macao-Nagasaki trade was not easy to dismiss. When Zheng Zhilong sent his men to Macao to purchase merchandise in 1641, the Portuguese refused to sell any with the hope that they would be accepted in Japan again.⁴⁵¹ The abrupt termination of trade in 1639 left the Portuguese with too much stock of expensive silken fabrics that could only be sold in Japan.⁴⁵² In 1640, François Caron (1600-1673) reported to his superiors in Batavia that “they [the Portuguese and Chinese] help each other mutually, for otherwise it would not have been possible for the Portuguese to carry on”.⁴⁵³ In 1641, the Dutch encountered junks of Cambodian Chinese bound for Japan, which carried silken fabrics belonging to the Portuguese.⁴⁵⁴ The Portuguese managed to hold on to their Japanese business through Chinese and Japanese merchants in Tonkin and Cambodia during the first half of the 1640s.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁰ Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, 112.

⁴⁵¹ Viallé and Blussé, *The Deshima Dagregisters Volume XI*, 7.

⁴⁵² Nagazumi, “17 seiki chūki no nihon Tonkin bōeki nitsuite”, 37.

⁴⁵³ Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 168.

⁴⁵⁴ Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, 112.

In the first half of the 1640s, therefore, the *bakufu*'s suspicion of finding Christians and Christian objects on board junks from Tonkin and Cambodia in particular was not entirely groundless. On 15 November 1641, an *Oranda tsūji* Namura Hachizaemon (名村八左衛門) (d. 1674) confided to van Elserack that various goods belonging to priests and the Portuguese were discovered on board junks from Tonkin and Cambodia. While both junks were forced to leave immediately with all their cargoes unsold, the authorities made it clear that much more severe punishments would be waiting for them in case they returned to Nagasaki. After this incident, the Nagasaki authorities considered banning Chinese junks from Tonkin and Cambodia specifically.⁴⁵⁶ It seemed that this kind of speculation had spread in Nagasaki even earlier. Carel Hartsingh (d. 1663), who had left Nagasaki on 19 December 1640, had already been acquainted with the same rumor at the time of his departure.⁴⁵⁷

Taking such situations into consideration, it is not difficult to infer Itchien's reasons to play a role as the biggest patron of the Sōfukuji as a Buddhist temple.

⁴⁵⁵ *DB*, 1641-1642: 58. Also see Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, 112; Nagazumi, "17 seiki chūki no nihon Tonkin bōeki nitsuite", 37.

⁴⁵⁶ Viallé and Blussé, *The Deshima Dagregisters Volume XI*, 50.

⁴⁵⁷ *DB*, 1641-1642: 65; Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol. 4, 450.

Being a merchant who regularly traveled abroad, he had to be careful and sensitive about the *bakufu*'s skeptical eyes towards seafarers whose overseas conduct the authorities had no capacity to control, especially since he wished to settle down in Nagasaki.⁴⁵⁸ His obvious connections with Tonkin could pose him as an additional concern. As an owner and operator of junks, he had to make sure that nothing and nobody suspicious could be discovered on his vessels. His acquaintance with the abbots of the Sōfukuji fostered by his large donations to the temple could have helped secure his position in Nagasaki.

The Fuqing Networks

In the first three quarters of the seventeenth century, the monastic community of the Sōfukuji was a particularly influential faction of the Chinese community in Nagasaki and it produced several high ranking Chinese officials.⁴⁵⁹ Within the Sōfukuji monastic community, however, those who migrated from Fuqing county were particularly influential. Out of the four founding fathers of the temple, three of them, namely Itchien, He Caocai and Lin Shoudian, were from Fuqing.⁴⁶⁰ Another

⁴⁵⁸ See Chapter Five.

⁴⁵⁹ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 162, 346; Kobata Atsushi, *Kingin bōekishi no kenkyū* (Historical studies on the trade of silver and gold) (Tokyo: Hōseidaigaku Shuppanyoku, 1976), 296.

⁴⁶⁰ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 388, 451, 799; Nakamura, “Kinsei nihon no kakyō”, 234.

influential Chinese Lin Gongyan (林公琰)(1598-1683) whose son Lin Daorong (林道榮)(1640-1708) came to prominence as *daitōji* was also from Fuqing.⁴⁶¹ In reality, the Sōfukuji was founded by these merchants from Fuqing. Besides these big founders, another example of a member of the temple was Wei Zhiyan's long-term business partner Lin Yuteng. It is known that a merchant called Lin Yuson (林于尊), who passed away in Nagasaki in 1691, was from Donghan town, Fuqing county.⁴⁶² According to the second letter of his name, it was highly likely that he was a brother or cousin of Lin Yuteng. If that was the case, Yuteng and Zhiyan were from the same town in the same country.

It was through this Fuqing network that Chinese monks were recruited from Fuqing to Nagasaki. The year 1654 was the turning point in the history of the Chinese Buddhist temples in Nagasaki as well as in the development of Zen Buddhism in Tokugawa Japan.⁴⁶³ In as early as 1652, leaders of the Nagasaki Chinese community wrote to renowned Chan Master Yinyuan Longqi (隱元隆琦)(1592-1673) to visit Nagasaki. After several refusals, Yinyuan finally accepted the invitation and left his

⁴⁶¹ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 346-52.

⁴⁶² Miyata, “Sōfukuji no tōjin bochi”, 66.

⁴⁶³ For the impact of the importation of Ōbaku Zen into Japan on early modern Japanese Buddhism, see Helen J. Baroni, “Bottled Anger: Episodes in Ōbaku Conflict in the Tokugawa Period”, *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3 (1994): 191-210.

monastery, Wanfusi (萬福寺) at Mount Huangbo (黃檗山) in Fuqing county.

Yinyuan accompanied by twenty of his disciples, finally set foot in Nagasaki in May 1654.⁴⁶⁴ Yinyuan himself was a native of Fuqing and many of his disciples who accompanied the master to Nagasaki were from the same place. Yinyuan first settled in the Kofukuji.⁴⁶⁵ Then, upon request from a group of Chinese lay believers, including Wei Zhiyan, Wang Xinqu (王心渠)(1594-1678), He Gaocai and Lin Taiqing (林太卿) (1572-1645), Yinyuan proceeded to the Sōfukuji on 27 June. Wei Zhiyan was among those who greeted and welcomed Yinyuan at the temple.⁴⁶⁶ One of Yinyuan's disciples, Jifei Ruyi (即非如一) (1606-1671) arrived in Nagasaki in 1657. He was also a native of Fuqing. He soon forged close friendships with the Fuqing merchants. In the winter of 1658, Jifei officially became the abbot of the Sōfukuji.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁴ For more information on the revival of Chinese Buddhism during the seventeenth century and the roles of Mount Huangbo, see Wu Jiang, "Building a Dharma Transmission Monastery in Seventeenth-Century China: The Case of Mount Huangbo", *East Asian History* 31 (2006): 29-52.

⁴⁶⁵ For the details of Yinyuan's journey from Fuqing to Nagasaki, see Nonin Kōdō, ed., *Ingenzenji nenpu* (Chronological history of Master Yinyuan) (Kyoto: Zenbunka Kenkyūjo, 1999), 250-6. Japanese and Chinese scholars have given a great deal of thought to the Yinyuan's move to Japan and the motivations behind it. Some scholars focus on his political mission in relation to Zheng Chenggong's attempt to request military aid from the *bakufu*. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Wu Jiang, "Leaving for the Rising Sun: the Historical Background of Yinyuan Lingqi's Migration to Japan in 1654", *Asia Major* (Third Series) Vol. 17, Pt. 2 (2004): 89-120.

⁴⁶⁶ Hirakubo Akira, ed., *Shisan kōtei Ingen zenshū* (Newly edited and annotated complete works of Ingen), Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kaimei syoin, 1979), 1686-709; Nagasaki-shi, *Nagasaki-shi shi: chishihen*, 366; Baroni, *Ōbaku Zen*, 45.

⁴⁶⁷ Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenji zenroku*, Vol. 3, 1310.

Another point to note is that Chinese merchants were often related to one another. For example, a merchant called Yu Weihe (俞惟和) (1605-1674), who was also an important patron of the Sōfukuji in its early days, left Fuqing for Japan following his uncle Lin Taiqing.⁴⁶⁸ Wang Xinqu's first daughter (d. 1682) was a wife of Lin Daorong.⁴⁶⁹ One of Zhiyan's sons Yongzhao married to a daughter of Liu Yinyuan (C. 劉宣義) (1633-1695). Liu Yinyuan was second generation migrant from Changyue county. He served as *daitсуji* from 1650 till his death in 1695 and was one of the most respected Chinese residents of Nagasaki of his time.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, there were blood relationships between monks and merchants. Jifei was related to Lin Gongyan.⁴⁷¹ Yinyuan himself had mercantile connection. In 1669, a merchant called Lin Rumо (林汝默) (d.1675) arrived in Nagasaki. He claimed that he was Yinyuan's nephew.⁴⁷² Networks among the Fuqing diaspora, or the Fuqing network, were instrumental in the foundation of the Sōfukuji. In other words, these Chan masters and Chinese merchants were from the same social group in China.

⁴⁶⁸ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 299, 388, 412, 972; Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 470.

⁴⁶⁹ Hayashi, *Nagasaki tōtsūji*, 96-7.

⁴⁷⁰ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 979.

⁴⁷¹ In 1799, an *Oranda tsūji*, Narabayashi Jūbei (榎林重兵衛)(1750-1801), whose sister married Hayashi Hyakujūrō (林百十郎) (b. 1771), one of Lin Daorong's descendants, told a historian Tatehara Suiken (立原翠軒)(1744-1823) that Lin Daorong was indeed a cousin of Jifei. Tatehara Jingorō, "Narabayashi zatsuwa (Tales of the Narabayashi family)", in *Kaihyō sōsho*, Vol. 2, ed. Shinmura Izuru (Kyoto: Kōseikaku, 1930), 6-7.

⁴⁷² *TKN* 1: 137-42, 250; Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 68.

Tonkin Merchants in the Sōfukuji Monastic Community

Yoshinaga Setsudō, in his article published in 1929, pointed out the important roles which Tonkin merchants played in the Sōfukuji monastic community. Since then, the place of Tonkin merchants in the founding of the monastery has been virtually forgotten.⁴⁷³ However, if we carefully look at various writings by prominent Ōbaku monks such as Yinyuan and Jifei, it is evident that Wei Zhiyan and other merchants from Tonkin had close ties to Yinyuan and Jifei.⁴⁷⁴ In 1664, He Gaocai went up to Ōbakusan Manpukuji (黄檗山萬福寺) in Uji (宇治), Kyoto, which was established by Yinyuan in 1661 and was named after the Huangbo Monastery in Fuqing. There He had a chance to meet the Masters Yinyuan and Jifei.⁴⁷⁵ On this occasion, He presented a letter and gifts from Zhiyan to Master Yinyuan. The content of Zhiyan's letter is not known, but we do know Yinyuan's reply to Zhiyan. In his letter addressed to Zhiyan, Yinyuan praised Zhiyan for cultivating his virtues while he lived in Nagasaki and emphasized the importance of believing in the Three Treasures (三宝).⁴⁷⁶ In the summer, Yinyuan composed a poem to express his joy for the safe

⁴⁷³ Yoshinaga, "Ōbakusō no torai ni tsuite", 2.

⁴⁷⁴ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 972-9.

⁴⁷⁵ From 1663 to 1664, Jifei stayed at the Ōbakusan Manpukuji.

⁴⁷⁶ Nanyuan Xingpai and Gaoquan Xingdun, eds., *Huangbo heshang taiheji*, in *Kokuyaku zengaku taisei* (Japanese translations: collections of Zen studies), ed.

return of the “Tonkin merchants” to Nagasaki.⁴⁷⁷ It should be noted that as far as Hirakubo Akira’s editions of Yinyuan’s works is concerned, “Tonkin merchants (*Tonkinhakushu* 東京船主)” was the only term appeared in the writings of Yinyuan that referred to a specific category of merchants. This indicates that there was as particular group of merchants who engaged in trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki.

As for Jifei, Zhiyan personally visited Jifei at the Sōfukuji and discussed the matter relating to his belief although it is not possible to determine exactly when their meeting took place.⁴⁷⁸ In 1657, a group of nine “Tonkin merchants” visited Jifei at the Sōfukuji on the day of the winter solstice. This group was composed of Wei Zhiyan, Lin Ershou (林爾受), Gu Changqing, He Junteng (何君騰), He Zhirang (何子讓), He Kunmei (何崑媚), Pan Xuereng (潘雪仍), Lin Shixiang (林石香) and Yue Meichu (薛梅初).⁴⁷⁹

Kokuyaku zengaku taisei, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: Nimatsudō Shoten, 1930), 27, 51-2. Both original Chinese texts and Japanese translations are included in this edition. Since it is certain that the letter was delivered by He Gaocai and that He visited Manpukuji in 1664, I assume Zhiyan wrote to Yinyuan in 1664 and the above is Yinyuan’s response to Zhiyan. Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 455.

⁴⁷⁷ Hirakubo, *Ingen zenhū*, Vol. 10, 4948.

⁴⁷⁸ Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenji zenshū*, Vol. 1, 40-1.

⁴⁷⁹ Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenji zenshū*, Vol. 1, 45-7.

Some of these “Tonkin merchants” appeared in Jifei’s writings more than once, suggesting they bonded over several decades. In the fall of 1657, Lin Ershou consulted Jifei with their compositions of poetry.⁴⁸⁰ In 1666, Jifei, who at that time resided at Kōjusan Fukujuji (廣寿山福聚寺) in present Fukuoka (福岡), expressed his desire to go back to China in his poem addressed to Gu Changqing, Lin Shixiang, Lin Ershou and He Zhirang.⁴⁸¹ There are further references to Tonkin merchants in Jifei’s writings, but they were not dated. For example, Jifei edited Japanese-style poetry composed by Lin Yuteng, Gu Changqing and Lin Ershou.⁴⁸² Jifei composed a mournful poetry for Yue Meichu who died after twenty years being away from his home in China.⁴⁸³ On one occasion, Jifei presented a poem to Gu Changqing, Lin Ershou and He Kunmei respectively.⁴⁸⁴

On the business side, these merchants were involved in Zhiyan’s trade. In 1675, Gu Changqing, who also hailed from Fuzhou, arrived in Nagasaki from Tonkin onboard one of Zhiyan’s junks.⁴⁸⁵ We have no information as to whether he left

⁴⁸⁰ Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenji zenshū*, Vol. 2, 996.

⁴⁸¹ See Chapter Three.

⁴⁸² Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenji zenshū*, Vol. 2, 951.

⁴⁸³ Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenji zenshū*, Vol. 3, 1152.

⁴⁸⁴ Hirakubo, *Sokuhi zenji zenshū*, Vol. 2, 949, 978, 996.

⁴⁸⁵ Xu Xing qing, *Xin ding zhu shun shui ji bu yi* (Supplement to the collected works of Zhu Shunshui)(Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004), 287; *Kai Hentai* included a report of Ship No. 2 arriving from Tonkin. The report was made on

Nagasaki since that visit. In the end, he passed away in Nagasaki in 1679.⁴⁸⁶ In the case of Lin Ershou, we have a little more concrete evidence showing that Lin Ershou worked closely with Lin Yuteng. As mentioned earlier, Lin Ershou's first appearance in Nagasaki was recorded in 1657. In 1682, Lin Ershou resurfaced in Nagasaki onboard Lin Yuteng's junk. Ershou returned to Tonkin that year. In 1684, while Yuteng's junk departed from Tonkin to Nagasaki, Yuteng entrusted 400 teals of silver to Lin Ershou who remained in Tonkin that summer.⁴⁸⁷ We have no information about other Tonkin merchants. Yet, due to the fact that they visited the temple with Zhiyan and that most Chinese junks coming from Tonkin around this time were under Zhiyan, it can be assumed that these "Tonkin merchants" were either working for Zhiyan or traveling merchants from Tonkin who took a ride on Zhiyan's junks.⁴⁸⁸

In addition, it might be the case that He Gaocai, one of the four founding fathers of the Sōfukuji who was also from Fuqing, came to Nagasaki via Tonkin as was the case with the Wei brothers. Nakamura Tadashi once mentioned that He

8 July 1675. Although the report itself did not directly reveal whose junk this was or who was its chief merchant, the Dutch confirms the arrival of Wei Zhiyan's junk on the exactly the same date. *KH*, 1: 109-10; NFJ 88, DN 8 July 1675. Therefore, there is no doubt that Ship No. 2 belonged to Zhiyan..

⁴⁸⁶ Miyata, "Sōfukuji no tōjin bochi", 65.

⁴⁸⁷ *KH*, 1: 421.

⁴⁸⁸ For more on traveling merchants, see Chapter Six.

Gaocai was a “Tonkin merchant”.⁴⁸⁹ According to Miyata Yasushi, Watanabe Kuranosuke regarded He Gaocai as a “Tonkin merchant”. Miyata said that he could not find anything that supported Watanabe’s claim.⁴⁹⁰ With the lack of references, I was not able to verify either Nakamura or Watanabe’s claims. Nonetheless, judging from the above-listed names of Tonkin merchants such as He Junteng, He Zhirang and He Kunmei, I believe there is a high possibility that He Gaocai once lived or, at least, had relatives in Tonkin.

The Chan masters were recruited and invited to Japan through networks among the Fuqing merchants. Wei Zhiyan and the “Tonkin merchants” patronized the Sōfukuji because of their linkage to Fuqing. The Sōfukuji was established by this group of Fuqing merchants and “Tonkin merchants” was an integral component of it. In other words, Fuqing network was the backbone of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade.

In terms of fiscal matter, Chinese temples in Nagasaki were completely and exclusively dependent on donations from their lay patrons.⁴⁹¹ Therefore, their congregations’ economic status directly reflected upon the temples’ financial well-being. From the 1660s to around 1688, the Sōfukuji flourished under the abbacy

⁴⁸⁹ Nakamura, “Nagasaki no tōji”, 214.

⁴⁹⁰ Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronko*, 422-3. For more on the life of He Gaocai, see, Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 421-39; Li, *Nagasaki tōjin no kenkyū*, 236-40.

⁴⁹¹ Nakamura, “Nagasaki no tōji”, 258.

of Master Jifei. In fact, this period is regarded as the heyday of both the Sōfukuji and the Fukusaiji, which was established by emigrants from southern Fujian.⁴⁹² On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the congregation of the Kōfukuji was comprised of Chinese migrants from the Nanjing area. Under the Qing's maritime ban, few junks managed to sail out from the region and, as a result, the temple faced serious financial difficulties in the second half of the seventeenth century.⁴⁹³ This confirms that merchants from Fuzhou area were a major force in commercial exchange in the China Sea region in the mid-seventeenth century.

As far as the Sōfukuji is concerned, Nakamura Tadashi pointed to two factors that contributed to the prosperity of the Sōfukuji in the later-half of the seventeenth century, namely, the monopoly of the Japan trade by the Zheng regime until 1683 and the subsequent increase in the number of junks coming from Fujian to Nagasaki after the lift of the Qing maritime ban in 1684.⁴⁹⁴ However, it is doubtful that these two factors played any part in bringing about the heyday of the Sōfukuji. First of all, as described in Chapter Two, most Chinese junks visiting Nagasaki after 1685 were from Nanjing area. Secondly, Zheng Zhilong hailed from Quanzhou and accordingly the Zheng clan belonged to the congregation of the Fukusaiji. This is confirmed by

⁴⁹² Nakamura, "Nagasaki no tōji", 243.

⁴⁹³ Nakamura, "Nagasaki no tōji", 235.

⁴⁹⁴ Nakamura, "Nagasaki no tōji", 243.

the fact that the Zheng's trustee in Nagasaki Chen Daolong (陳道隆)(d. 1676) was the most powerful patron of the Fukusaiji from 1640 till his death. Chen Daolong was a son of Zhangzhou native. The Zheng family had many junks under their influence but they were mostly from southern Fujian. The existence of the Sōfukuji and the Fukusaiji as two separate religious institutions suggests that merchants from southern and northern Fujian were two distinct sub-ethnic groups and they did not mingle well with each other. Thus, the Zheng's commercial activities had no immediate link to the Sōfukuji. The pinnacle of the Sōfukuji was attained due to the successful commercial undertakings of the Fuqing merchants. It is no doubt that Wei Zhiyan and other "Tonkin merchants" played an important role in this development. The golden age of the Sōfukuji ended in the late-1680s when Tonkinese raw silk lost its place on the Japan market as a result of Qing's new maritime policies.

Music, Poetry and Portraits

Apart from patronages of the Buddhist monasteries, another interesting aspect of merchants' life in Nagasaki was their cultural activities. As has been mentioned, Tonkin merchants, including Zhiyan, consulted with the Ōbaku masters about poetry. Merchants and monks presented poems to each other on several occasions. Poetry worked as a communication media both within and outside the Chinese community in Nagasaki. In 1676, at the height of the mid-autumn season, the magistrates of

Nagasaki Ushigome Chūzaemon invited Liu Xuanyi and Lin Daorong to a poetry party at his residence. Alongside two of the most respected and influential Chinese residents of Nagasaki, three “Ming Chinese” from Tonkin, Gu Changqing, He Qianfu (何倩甫) and Lin Shangzhen (林上珍) joined the party and each of them composed a poem about the mid-autumn.⁴⁹⁵ Around the same time, Ushigome introduced He Qianfu and Lin Shangzhen to a young Japanese scholar Ōtakasaka Shizan (大高坂芝山) (1647-1713) who was keen to learn Chinese poetry.⁴⁹⁶ He Qianfu was a Fuqing native. This makes that except for Lin Shangzhen who was from Zhangzhou, this group was comprised of northern Fujian diaspora.⁴⁹⁷

Besides poetry, music was another important cultural medium through which Chinese migrants and Japanese people interacted with each other. Apparently, Zhiyan was a musician of some sort. During the Edo period, two types of Chinese music were imported to Japan via Nagasaki. One was *Mingaku* (明樂), meaning “Ming-styled music” and the other was *Shingaku* (清樂), which was supposed to be the music of the

⁴⁹⁵ Hayashi Rokurō, *Nagasaki tōtsūji: daitsūji Hayashi Dōei to sono shūhen* (Chinese interpreter in Nagasaki: Hayashi Dōei) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000), 90-1.

⁴⁹⁶ Hara Nensai and Tōjō Kindai, *Sentetsu sōdan* (Various stories of Confucius scholars) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1994), 212. It was originally published in 1816. For further details on Lin Shangzhen and He Qianfu, see Tokuda Takeshi, *Kinsei nicchū bunjin kōryūshi no kenkyū* (Studies of interactions between Chinese and Japanese literati in the early modern period) (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 2004), 103-110.

⁴⁹⁷ Nagasaki shidankai, ed., *Nagasaki meishō zue* (Graphics of scenic of beauty in Nagasaki)(Nagasaki; Nagasaki Shidankai, 1931), 448.

Qing period.⁴⁹⁸ Zhiyan is widely considered as the founder of the *mingaku* in Japan.⁴⁹⁹ There is graphic evidence illuminating musical aspect of his life. One of his portraits depicts Zhiyan playing a type of Chinese flute called *changxiao* (長簫) (Figure 4.7). Zhiyan's grand son Ōga Tamibe (鉅鹿民部)(1728-1774) chose not to succeed as the head of the family and instead pursued musical career as a *Mingaku* master in Kyoto.⁵⁰⁰ According to Tamibe's account, Zhiyan fled from China with his musical instruments and brought them to Nagasaki.⁵⁰¹ His *Wei shi yue qi* introduced a

⁴⁹⁸ Note that this typology of Chinese-styled music has been exclusively developed in Japan and never been in use anywhere else including China. These musical genres exist only in Japan. Since their importation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, *Mingaku* and *Shingaku* have blended into each other, led to a creation of single musical category *Minshingaku* (明清樂). In Nagasaki where *Mingaku* and *Shingaku* were implanted, it is sometimes called *Tōgaku* (唐樂), simply meaning Chinese music. For the evolution of *Minshingaku* up to present, see Wang Wei, *Nihon kakyō ni okeru dentō no saihen to esunishiti: saishi to geinō o chūshin ni* (Tradition and reconstruction of “ethnicity” of overseas Chinese in Japan: from the perspective of ritual and performing arts) (Tokyo: Fūkyōsha, 2001).

⁴⁹⁹ Today, there are groups of people who practice *Minshingaku* in Nagasaki and Tokyo. On the current situation surrounding *Mingaku* and *Shingaku*, see Wang, “Nagasaki ni tsutawaru chūgoku ongaku”, 2-4.

⁵⁰⁰ In 1764, Tamibe went up to Kyoto to spread *Mingaku*. For the next seven years, he stayed there, taught *Mingaku* to his disciples and realized the heyday of the *Mingaku* in Kyoto. Tamibe was also known as a painter. Hama, “Minshingaku oboegaki”, 5-6; *Heian Jinbutsushi* (Who's who of Kyoto), 1768. *Heian Jinbutsushi* can be found in digital form on the website of International Research Centre for Japanese Studies in the *Heian Jinbutsushi* Database (as of 26 April 2008, the URL for *Heian jinbutuishi* database is <http://jsjhp1.nichibun.ac.jp>).

⁵⁰¹ Wei Hao (Ōga Tamige), *Wei shi yue pu* (Musical scores of the Wei clan), Kyoto: Shorin Geikado, 1768; Wei Hao (Ōga Tamige), *Wei shi yue qi* (Music instruments of the Wei clan), 1759.

In 1881, the Ōga family sold the instruments to the present-day University Art Museum, Tokyo National University of Fine Arts and Music. Some of the instruments were on public display in 1977. For the studies on these instruments see Hama Kazue, “Minshingaku oboegaki”, *Bungakuronshū* 15 (1966): 9-15. From the perspective of

set of instruments including *changxiao* (Figure 4.7). After Wei Zhiyan was granted permanent residency in Nagasaki, he requested permission from the magistrates of Nagasaki to travel up to Kyoto and Osaka. Apparently, the permission was granted as around the end of 1672 or the beginning of 1673 he visited Kyoto. In Kyoto, Zhiyan had occasion to showcase his mastery of *Mingaku* at the court of the emperor.⁵⁰² The only possible way that this could be arranged was through the good connections between the emperor's court and the Obaku monks at the Manpukuji.⁵⁰³



Color on silk. Not dated.

Source: Miura, *Kōfūgaiu*, 51.

Figure 4.7 Wei Zhiyan and His Two Sons Playing Music on a Boat

musicology, see Hayashi Kenzō, *Ming yue ba diao yan jiu* (Studies on the eight musical scores of *mingaku*) (Shanghai: Yueyun chubanshe, 1957).

⁵⁰² (Ōgake) *Yuishogaki*.

⁵⁰³ See Noni, *Ingenzenji nenpu*, 64-5.



Figure 4.8 *Changxiao* and Other Musical Instruments Depicted in *Wei shi yue qi*

Mingaku was composed of instrumental and vocal parts. According to a scholar of Chinese music who examined the *Mingaku* scores, the songs bear remnants of southern Song culture.⁵⁰⁴ A reading of the lyrics suggests that it contained elements of court, religious and literati music, which was dissimilar to popular folk music.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰⁴ Scholars of Chinese music have used *Mingaku* scores and lyrics as an indication of what kind of music was played during the late Ming period, since it had long been lost in China.

⁵⁰⁵ Wang Wei, “Nagasaki ni tsutawaru chūgoku ongaku ‘Minshingaku’ no saikō: sono denshō to henyō (‘*Minshingaku*’ renaissance: tradition and evolution)”, *Nagasaki Dansō* 89 (2000): 19.

Besides being performed and enjoyed privately, *Mingaku* was performed at Chinese temples during religious ceremonies and festivals.⁵⁰⁶ It is not surprising that a scholar indicated the similarity in pronunciations between the Ōbaku chants and *Mingaku* phonetics.⁵⁰⁷ On the other hand, *Shingaku*, which is said to have been brought into Japan in the first-half of the nineteenth century, was folk music from the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi and Fujian provinces.⁵⁰⁸ The difference between *Mingaku* and *Shingaku* might suggest that the social and cultural backgrounds of the merchants coming into Nagasaki had changed greatly from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. However, to argue this point would carry us too far away from the purpose of this thesis. It should be underscored that Wei Zhiyan played *Mingaku* which was a mixture of court, religious (both Buddhism and Taoism) and literati music in the Fujian area in the early-seventeenth century.

Lastly, I shall mention a legend regarding the origin of “lion (J. 獅子)” in Nagasaki. Every year, the city of Nagasaki holds an autumn festival called the Nagasaki Kunchi festival (J. 長崎くんち). During this festival, dances and parades

⁵⁰⁶ Hama, “Minshingaku oboegaki”, 13; Wang, “Nagasaki ni tsutawaru chūgoku ongaku”, 10-1, 20.

⁵⁰⁷ Yang Kuei-hsiang, “*Gishi gakufu no kaidoku nitsuite (Decoding Wei shi yue pu)*”, a paper presented at the third conference of the Society for Research in Asiatic Music, 12-13 October 2003, Tokyo, *Newsletter (The Society for Research in Asiatic Music)*, 57 (2003): 4.

⁵⁰⁸ Wang, “Nagasaki ni tsutawaru chūgoku ongaku”, 20.

were performed by representatives of each district in front of the Suwa Shrine (諏訪神社). The origin of the festival dates as far back as 1634. Around 1655, a dance performance called “Karako shishi odori (唐子獅子踊)” was added in the repertoire of performances.⁵⁰⁹ What makes it particularly interesting for us is that people of Nagasaki believe this particular “lions” of “Karako shishi odori” came not from China but from Tonkin. The music played, with which the lions dance accordingly, is believed to be one of the *Mingaku* tunes that Wei Zhiyan brought into Nagasaki.⁵¹⁰ The year 1655 was when Zhiyan began his own business after Itchien’s death. Lions from Tonkin dancing in tune with *Mingaku* could have been a suitable celebration for launching his career in the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade.

There are five remaining portraits of Wei Zhiyan (Figure 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, 3.9 and 4.7). These portraits were a blend of painting, poetry and calligraphy, drawn in the style that was popular among the literati in the end of the Ming period. Two of them were drawn by a Japanese portrait painter Kita Genki (喜多元規) (active 1664-1709). Kita was a prolific painter who worked exclusively within the confines of the Ōbaku monastic community. His portrait subjects included Chan masters and other Japanese Ōbaku monks. Although he produced hundreds of portraits during his career, he drew

⁵⁰⁹ Wang, “Nagasaki ni tsutawaru chugoku ongaku”, 11.

⁵¹⁰ Wang, “Nagasaki ni tsutawaru chugoku ongaku”, 3.

only a handful of portraits of laypersons.⁵¹¹ The fact that Genki drew Zhiyan's portrait is yet another implication that Zhiyan was an important figure in the Ōbaku monastic community in Nagasaki.

Unfortunately, we have is no information on Chinese merchants' religious or cultural activities in Tonkin. However, the following episode gives us a glimpse of what might have occurred between Tonkinese officials and Chinese traders alongside business. In 1673, the English traders at Pho Hien recorded a peculiar behavior of *Ung-ja Thay*, one of the *Chua's disppachadores*. In the evening of 8 March, *Ung-ja Thay* visited English factors at their new house in Pho Hien. *Ung-ja Thay* told William Gyfford that he came with his musicians and singers to be merry with the English. *Ung-ja Thay* and his men stayed with the English at the house until midnight. In the interim, his men took, or "stole" as Gyfford bitterly remarked, a small silver cup. When Gyfford complained about it to *Ung-ja Thay*, *Ung-ja Thay* just told Gyfford that he promised to do great things for the English at the *Chua's* court if they gave the cup to his singers.⁵¹² Although Gyfford seemed to be unappreciative about *Ung-ja Thay's* offer, this is a telling incident. It is unlikely that *Ung-ja Thay* treated

⁵¹¹ For details on the career of Kita Genki and Ōbaku portrait painting, see Nishigori Ryōsuke, *Ōbaku zenrin no kaiga* (Ōbaku paintings) (Tokyo, Chūōkōron Bijutsu Shuppan, 2006); Elizabeth Horton Sharf, "Ōbaku Zen Portrait Painting: A Revisionist Analysis", Ph. D. diss., University of Michigan, 1994.

⁵¹² IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 63r.

the English as such without a preceding practice. One can only guess that Vietnamese officials might have visited Chinese merchants at their lodgings to spend a joyful time together and yet at the same time to make a deal with each other.

Late-Ming Literati Culture

Blood relationships and homeland affiliations were the essential factors that bound Chinese emigrants in Nagasaki together. However, in order to secure their place in a potentially volatile foreign country, networks and cooperation among merchants and monks were not enough. For their survival and success, it was important to be able to extend their influence beyond the closely-knit Chinese émigré community. Late-Ming high culture represented in music, poetry and painting provided means to communicate with elite members of the local Nagasaki community.

Wu Jiang, who studied the transmission of Chan Buddhism to Japan in the seventeenth century, aptly pointed out that “from the perspective of cultural exchange, the transmission of Chan Buddhism in Japan was not simply a religious event. Along with the transmission of the Buddhist dharma, various associated cultural elements were introduced into Japan. In addition to their religious teachings, Chan Buddhists reconfigured various cultural elements and presented themselves as representative of

Chinese high culture. In this sense, the Ōbaku monks were not only messengers of a new Buddhist teaching, but they were also the transmitters of high culture”.⁵¹³ Louis Jaque Berger, in his study on the Chinese émigré community in seventeenth-century Nagasaki, observed that “Chinese monks played a social and political role in the creation of a network of international intellectual exchange based upon shared spiritual beliefs and intellectual ideals: respectively Buddhism and Chinese secular literati culture”.⁵¹⁴ He continued that “Interactions between Chinese monks and leading Japanese scholars paved the way for the beginnings of an elite, multi-ethnic intellectual society in late-seventeenth century Tokugawa Japan.... It was only possible for these Chinese and Japanese intellectual elites to share these cultural media because they shared knowledge of literary Chinese, the high-status language of Japan as well as China at this time”.⁵¹⁵ Because Chan Buddhism was an integral part of late-Ming Chinese literati life, as Timothy Brook vividly illustrated, it is safe to say that it was Chinese literati culture that provided common ground for Chinese monks and Japanese elites to develop mutually beneficial relationships. Both Wu and Berger’s observations were right about the important roles that Chinese monks played in religious, cultural and intellectual exchanges between the Chinese émigré

⁵¹³ Wu Jiang, “Orthodoxy, Controversy and the Transformation of Chan Buddhism” (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 2002), 304.

⁵¹⁴ Louis Jaque Burger, “The Overseas Chinese Community in Seventeenth Century Nagasaki” (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 2003), 120.

⁵¹⁵ Burger, “The Overseas Chinese Community in Seventeenth Century Nagasaki”, 130.

community and elite members of the local society in Nagasaki. It is no doubt that high culture, or more specifically late-Ming literati culture in this case, helped the monks make inroads into the upper echelons of the local society in order to achieve their religious and, perhaps, political goals.

However, what Wu and Burger missed was that it was not only the monks that participated in and contributed to such transmission of high culture. A handful of monks newly migrated from China without any backing could not have achieved much. Firstly, the monks needed financial means that enabled them to enact the lives of high culture and to keep their religious allure alive. Secondly, the existence of lay believers was crucial since it was only through these individual patrons that cultural, religious and social life could be played out in front of the local audience. For these two reasons, it is no exaggeration to say that it was Chinese merchants' commercial success that prompted the expansion of the Ōbaku sect and its emergence as the third biggest sect of Zen (Chan) Buddhism in Japan in the course of the seventeenth century. Chinese residents of Nagasaki invited monks from China to serve not only their spiritual but also their secular needs. On the other hand, accepting invitations from the Chinese community in Nagasaki, Chan monks took the opportunity to spread their lineage overseas. It was a natural course of action for the Chan monks because Chan Buddhism was essentially a missionary religion.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁶ See Introduction.

Describing connections between Buddhist monasteries and secular powers, Brook pointed out that “the [late Ming] gentry’s patronage may be regarded as a proactive undertaking designed to create an associational matrix through which they could negotiate common concerns and represent their joint identity both to the state and to those outside the elite”.⁵¹⁷ Buddhism “played a significant role in the cultural construction of the late-Ming gentry, helping to illustrate their status and define their autonomy at a time when status was contestable”.⁵¹⁸ A similar process can be seen in the patronage given by Chinese merchants to Buddhist monasteries in Japan. Chinese merchants’ patronage to Chinese Buddhist temples at Nagasaki could be considered as a site where Chinese settlers related to each other, negotiated their common concerns, which included economic interests, and represented their identity to the authorities and the people of Japan. In this regard, the construction of Buddhist temples and other philanthropic activities such as the construction of bridges could be recognized as social and cultural projects that served to define the status of the Chinese émigré community in Nagasaki and reaffirm their joint identity as Chinese and residents of Nagasaki.

⁵¹⁷ Brook, *Praying for Power*, 321.

⁵¹⁸ Brook, *Praying for Power*, 125.

Just as the local gentry of late-Ming China enjoyed the privilege of calling upon the magistrate on matters which concerned them personally, leaders of the Nagasaki Chinese community established their friendships with the magistrates of Nagasaki and exerted informal influence on decisions affecting their own interests. Such traits also suggest a connection between the late-Ming gentry class and overseas commerce. While there is no conclusive evidence to reinforce this connection, Chinese merchants' public behavior indicate that Chinese junk traders, who migrated from China amid the chaotic Ming-Qing transition, were members of the gentry families of the late-Ming period. The Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki was in fact a reenactment of the late-Ming gentry life. This was the key for their success at Nagasaki as their high culture was something that the Japanese elites appreciated. This cultural package enabled them to communicate with the magistrates of Nagasaki at a level that the Dutch factors could not. The VOC surely tried to reach out to influential persons by presenting exotic gifts and giving them opportunities to view modern arms. But, no matter how impressive they might be, objects themselves were insufficient to get them into the inner circle of the local commercial elites.

Conclusion

Merchants from Fuqing, Changye and Minhou counties established the Sōfukuji. Among them, those from Fuqing constituted the most influential faction of the Sōfukuji monastic community. Their strong position within the congregation was

derived from the fact that Fuqing merchants dominated the lucrative Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade. Wei Zhiyan successfully organized his business between northern Vietnam and Nagasaki as a ringleader of the Fuqing traders. The wealth they accumulated from the Tonkin silk export to Japan contributed to the realization of the golden age of the Sōfukuji in the second-half of the seventeenth century. Because donations were the only source of income, Chinese monasteries' financial standings exclusively depended on their patrons' commercial success or failure. Chinese monks had reasons to promote trade for their own benefit. Besides protecting patrons from the anti-Christian persecutions, Buddhist monks played intermediary roles and the monastery provided a platform for Chinese merchants to form and cultivate relationships with the authorities. Religion and culture became the medium for communication and partnerships with elite members of the local ocommercial community. Therefore, the reality of the Chinese Buddhist temples in Nagasaki was economic as much as religious and cultural.

In a broader Chinese social and cultural context, Chinese merchant' patronage of Buddhist institutions should be examined against the backdrop of the formation of gentry society and the revival of Buddhism in the late-Ming China. Chinese monks and merchants brought literati culture that was peculiar to the late-Ming gentry society. Wei brothers' undertakings such as their patronage of a Buddhist temple, intimate relationships with the magistrates of Nagasaki and contribution to the public

reveal that they acted upon a code of conduct typical of late-Ming gentry. The nature of Chinese maritime commerce during the seventeenth century was in essence private and informal, a pattern embedded in the socio-economic developments of the late-Ming gentry society in China.

CHAPTER FIVE

WEI ZHIYAN AND THE SUBVERSION OF THE “*SAKOKU*”

This chapter explores the question of how Wei Zhiyan managed to carry on with his overseas trade at Nagasaki despite increasingly restrictive Japanese foreign and trade policies. Nagasaki was the only port of trade that Chinese junks were allowed to access from the mid-1630s onwards. Studies of the Chinese junk trade with Tokugawa Japan under the so-called *sakoku* policy fall, in general, into two categories -- namely studies of institutions and studies of quantities. The first focused on administrative institutions, regulations and procedures that the Tokugawa authorities installed one after another over the years. The latter made great and almost heroic efforts to quantify imports and exports carried by Chinese junks as opposed to those by the Dutch ships. Yet, such approaches inherently conceal and gloss over more “human” aspects of trade and the fact that trade often took place outside the law. This is to say that individual traders and their networks among the local Japanese community have never been studied in any real depth.

Chinese merchants exerted their influence over local officials at Nagasaki by mobilizing their social and cultural assets. This chapter first lays out the regulatory frameworks placed upon Chinese people in Nagasaki and the way they were put into

practice. Regardless of all the official rules and regulations, Wei Zhiyan resided in Nagasaki from the 1650s onwards and continued to trade until the late-1680s.

Previous studies, which did not acknowledge the existence of such Chinese commercial operation originating from Nagasaki under the *sakoku*, were not able to explain how the Wei brothers maneuvered around the restrictive Japanese policies and pursued their commercial ventures. By examining Wei Zhiyan's relationships with the local commercial elites, the nature of relationships between Chinese traders and the local elites in seventeenth-century Nagasaki will be highlighted.

The "Sakoku" Edicts and Chinese Residents in Japan

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, thriving trade between China and Japan created the conditions whereby Chinese residents could be seen everywhere in Japan. Chinese junks were allowed to call at any port and people of Chinese origin were free to settle anywhere in Japan or to leave there again for other overseas venture.⁵¹⁹ However, during the 1630s, the Tokugawa *bakufu* issued five directives successively to the magistrates of Nagasaki. The so-called "*sakoku*" edicts gradually

⁵¹⁹ For more information on the Chinese presence in Japan at the turn of the seventeenth century, see Kobata Atsushi, "Tōjinmachi, chūgokujin no rajū nitsuie (On Chinese residents in Japanese Chinatowns)", in *Tōhōgakkai sōritsu gojūsshūnen kinen tōhōgaku ronshū* (Eastern studies fiftieth anniversary volume), ed. Tōhō Gakkai (Tokyo: Tōhō Gakkai, 1997), 567-684; Nakajima Gakushō, "16-17 seiki no higasi ajia kaiiki to kajin chishikisō no idō: minami Kyushu no minjin ishi wo megutte (Mobility of the Chinese intellectuals in the East Asian maritime region during the late-sixteenth and the early-seventeenth century: Chinese physicians sojourning in the south Kyushu)", *Shigaku-Zasshi*, Vol. 113, No. 12 (2004): 1-37.

changed the landscape of maritime East and Southeast Asia, including the legal position of Chinese junks and residents in Japan.⁵²⁰ The main objectives of these directives were to prevent Christian infiltration into Japanese soil and suppress arms export from Japan. The Portuguese were eliminated from Japanese soil. Japanese people were prohibited from going overseas or even repatriating. As a consequence, Dutch and Chinese traders became the sole agents of foreign trade through Nagasaki. The following section will outline the contents of the edicts concerning Chinese activities at Nagasaki and their effects.

The first series of *sakoku* edicts was installed in April 1633 and forbade Japanese people to go abroad except for those onboard the ships with the *rōjū*'s permits. In addition, for the first time, it placed restrictions on the duration of stay by Chinese junks in Japan. It stated that foreign ships had to leave Nagasaki no later than the twentieth day of the ninth month each year and, should they arrive later than that, they had to depart within fifty days after their arrival at the port.⁵²¹ This directive was designed to limit the duration of foreigners' stay in Nagasaki, and those visiting

⁵²⁰ The term “*sakoku*” was not in use during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the time when these measures were implemented, the *bakufu* did not see their actions as shutting Japan off from the rest of the world. Yamamoto Hirofumi, *Kaneijidai* (The Kanei era) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1989). For the invention of the term “*sakoku*” at the beginning of the nineteenth century, see Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 12-22.

⁵²¹ Ishii Ryōsuke, ed., *Tokugawa kinreikō* (Tokugawa interdicts) [TK], Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1959), 375-6 (No. 4049); TK, 5: 226-7.

Nagasaki were now forced to leave after a stipulated period of time. Chinese traders were not exempt from the restriction. This suggests that it was the *bakufu*'s intention that no new immigrants were to be permitted to settle in Japan from 1633 onwards. In the meantime, the edict put no restriction on the activities of Chinese residents already residing in Japan.

The second and third edicts were similar to the first, but they imposed further restrictions on Chinese residents. In 1634, the second decree added an appendix, stating that this interdiction was being extended to foreigners living in Japan.⁵²² Chinese residents were hence prohibited from fitting out their own junks and from boarding visiting vessels.

Subsequently, in July 1635, the *bakufu* issued the third set of directives in which overseas trade via Japanese ships was completely suspended. Apart from restricting Chinese access exclusively to Nagasaki, the *bakufu* intended to end outbound shipping operations originating from Japan altogether. Without exception, Japanese ocean-going vessels were forbidden from departing Japan. All commerce with Chinese junks was confined to Nagasaki and the Chinese junks were not to enter other Japanese ports along the way to or from Nagasaki.⁵²³

⁵²² *TK*, 6: 377.

⁵²³ *TK*, 6: 377-8; *TK*, 4: 35.

In August 1635, the head of the Dutch factory at Hirado, Nicolaes Couckebacker, was informed that neither Japanese vessels nor Japanese people were allowed to leave or return to Japan and the same applied to the Chinese residents in Nagasaki.⁵²⁴ Resident Chinese were no longer permitted to leave Japan.

The fourth and fifth ordinances issued in the next few years placed further restrictions on the activities of foreigners. In 1636, the fourth ordinance revised and reinforced the contents of the third. It included deportation for the offspring of Portuguese and Spanish fathers as well as their Japanese wives. These persons were to be immediately deported to Macao.⁵²⁵ Following that, in February 1639, the magistrates of Nagasaki ordered the Dutch to transfer the offspring of Dutch and English men with Japanese women to Batavia, along with their mothers.⁵²⁶ Concurrently, a prohibition was imposed on the arranging cohabitation of Dutch men with Japanese women. In the autumn of 1639, it was prohibited to facilitate marriages

⁵²⁴ Nagazumi Yōko, trans., *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki* (Diaries kept at the Dutch factory at Hirado), Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 254. This work is a Japanese translation of Dutch manuscripts called “Dagh-register gehouden in Japan t’Comptoire Firando (Daily journal kept at the Dutch factory in Hirado, Japan)” between 1627 and 1641. As far as the Dutch materials before 1639 are concerned, this chapter relies on Nagazumi’s Japanese translation of Dutch material as its primary source.

⁵²⁵ *TK*, 6: 378; *TK*, 4: 35.

⁵²⁶ *TK*, 7: 74.

between visiting Chinese traders and Japanese women.⁵²⁷ The fifth and final edict, which was introduced in the summer of 1639, delivered the death blow to Portuguese trade with Japan. It completely barred Portuguese ships from entering Nagasaki. As a result, Chinese junks and Dutch ships became the sole agents that were granted direct access to the Japan market through Nagasaki.⁵²⁸

The freedom which Chinese residents used to enjoy were gradually restricted over the course of the 1630s with each successive edict being issued. In the initial phase of the establishment of Tokugawa foreign policy, it was essential to divide Chinese people into permanent residents and transient visitors, in order for the *bakufu* to exercise effective control over the movement of people. From 1634, as we have seen, the *bakufu* prohibited Chinese residents from departing Japan. Facing this ban, some Chinese residents expressed their discontent by submitting a joint-petition to the magistrates to seek permission to go back to China. It is unclear exactly when this plea was presented to the magistrates. However, on 2 February 1639, Couckebacker received a report from Edo (present-day Tokyo) that:

⁵²⁷ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 181, 302-3.

⁵²⁸ *TK*, 6: 378-9. The Dutch remained at Hirado until 1641 at which time their factory was forcibly transferred to Nagasaki by the *bakufu*.

Many Chinese people live in Nagasaki. Some of them are married and have children here [in Nagasaki]. For a long time, they have been requesting that they would like to go back home to China. But their plea has not yet been presented to the council of *rōjū*, and members of the council have not even been informed of the existence of such a plea. Consideration of this appeal is to be postponed till the next occasion arises.⁵²⁹

Later on, in May 1639, the authorities granted permission to the Chinese to leave Japan. Those who chose repatriation to China were still free to visit Nagasaki for trade, but were no longer allowed to reside in Nagasaki in the future.⁵³⁰ On the other hand, those who remained in Nagasaki were called “*jūtaku tōjin* (住宅唐人),” literally meaning “resident Chinese”. They were free to make their homes anywhere in the town. With their language abilities and familiarity with overseas affairs, many worked for the Nagasaki authorities, helping them take care of matters pertaining to Chinese junks and people during their stay in Nagasaki. Hence, these resident Chinese were incorporated into the local administrative system.

⁵²⁹ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 167.

⁵³⁰ Nakamura Tadashi, “Sakokuka no bōeki: bōdeki toshiron no shiten kara (Trade under the sakoku: from a perspective of port city)”, in *Sakoku*, ed. Katō Eiichi and Yamada Tadao (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1961), 296.

Enforcement of the Edicts in Practice

According to the government policies detailed above, no subject of Japan, including Chinese residents, was permitted to leave Japanese soil. But enforcing the restrictions was another matter altogether. The question here is how strictly the Nagasaki authorities were able, or even willing, to enforce the interdictions. An incident, which occurred off the coast of Tonkin between a junk under the VOC and a junk under a Chinese allegedly residing in Japan, is illustrative of Japanese officials' attitudes towards Chinese residents in the late-1630s and their laxness in enforcing the edicts on investigation when an edict might have been disregarded. The event seems to have unfolded as follows.

In the summer of 1638, Carel Hartsinck, the inaugural chief factor of the VOC factory in Tonkin, hired a Chinese junk and fitted it out with raw silk and silken textiles for the Japan market. On 8 August, the *Zantvoort* and the chartered junk departed together from Tonkin for the Penghu Islands. While Hartstinck was onboard the *Zantvoort*, the chartered junk was in the hands of a Chinese captain, with thirty-five Chinese crew and nineteen Company men serving onboard. Shortly after, the two vessels parted company near the Gianh River. However, the Chinese crew

members who were armed launched a surprise attack on the Dutch ship. The Chinese killed all the Dutchmen on board, captured the junk and sailed away with its cargo.⁵³¹

News of this event reached François Caron, the head of the Hirado Factory, on 30 July 1639. Somehow, Caron came to believe that the Chinese captain, skipper and the main members of this chartered junk were inhabitants of Nagasaki, with wives, children and houses in town.⁵³² A month later, Caron visited the governor of Nagasaki, Suetsugu Shigefusa (末次茂房), and requested the Nagasaki authorities to inquire into the case and find out who committed the assault. He also asked that the Chinese offenders be prosecuted and that the assets that belonged to their families be seized to compensate for the lost Dutch junk. Suetsugu promised that he would have the matter investigated and assured Caron that the magistrates of Nagasaki would take the matter seriously if the allegation had reasonable grounds. This is because a Chinese resident of Japan who had a wife as well as children, was forbidden from setting sail from Japan.⁵³³ Suetsugu conveyed the Dutch request to the magistrate but no action was taken with regard to the Chinese residents in Nagasaki.⁵³⁴

⁵³¹ Buch, “La Compagnie” (1937), 206; Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 123-4.

⁵³² Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 251-2. With regards to this alleged Chinese attack on the Dutch junk, it is not certain whether it was Chinese residents of Nagasaki who actually attacked the Dutch.

⁵³³ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 280.

⁵³⁴ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 302.

On 4 October 1639, Caron dispatched an interpreter to the magistrate of Nagasaki, Ōkouchi Masakatsu (大河内正勝), to enquire as to the progress of the investigation. Four days later, Caron received a reply, in which the magistrate insisted that:

It is impossible to collect compensation from families of the said Chinese who attacked the junk under the Dutch, because his wife and children do not live in Nagasaki. This can be proved by the fact that according to the order from the *bakufu*, a resident of Japan is not allowed to set sail from Japan whether a foreigner or a Japanese. Therefore, there is nothing the Dutch can do with this matter and they are not to demand their rightful compensation here [in Nagasaki]. They must seek a fair justice at the place where the murderers' houses are located.⁵³⁵

It was clear that the magistrate had no intention of taking up this matter. Once again, on 20 October 1639, Caron brought the issue up for discussion when he personally went to Nagasaki for a meeting with the magistrate. Having heard the same story

⁵³⁵ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 295-6.

many times, all Ōkouchi did was to repeat the same old mantra: Chinese inhabitants who had wives, children and houses in Japan were not allowed to leave the country.⁵³⁶

The magistrate's words make it clear that the authorities were of the opinion that those who did have wives, children and houses in Japan were considered "residents" of Japan and thus were forbidden from going abroad. In responding to the head of the VOC factory in Japan, they stood firmly on the premise that no illegal activities were being conducted by the residents, be they Japanese or Chinese. In practice, however, it appears some of the Chinese "residents" of Nagasaki carried on their overseas activities during the late-1630s. The Nagasaki authorities were undoubtedly aware, or at least informed, of such illegal conduct but were determined to turn a blind eye to it.

Itchien's Failed Attempts

By the end of the 1640s, Itchien had become one of the most prosperous merchants of Fuzhou origin in the Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki. This can be deduced from his extraordinary contribution to Buddhist temples in Nagasaki. While these contributions were indicative of his wealth, Itchien was not simply being generous. He had his own agenda. On 1 May 1652, the chief of the Dutch factory in Nagasaki, Adriaen van der Burgh, and his entourage went for an outing around the

⁵³⁶ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan*, Vol. 4, 302.

town of Nagasaki. During the excursion, they paid visits to several temples in town and found one particularly beautiful and large temple built by the “One-eyed” Chinese not long before:

The Chinese *nachoda*, whom we call One Eye and who left [Nagasaki] for Tonkin on 1 February with excellent capital, had built [this temple] for the improvement and adornment of this place [Nagasaki]. But he has not been able to obtain a license for a permanent abode in Nagasaki. Notwithstanding that he has offered a large sum of silver to this end, he is forced to return to Tonkin every year, because he is considered a bandit in China whence he returns [to Nagasaki] every year with large capital.⁵³⁷

It was the Sōfukuji that impressed Van der Burgh with the glamour on that afternoon. Apparently, Itchien was eager to settle down in Japan and his donations were intended to coax the Japanese authorities into granting him permanent residence. More tellingly, the Nagasaki authorities were well aware that Itchien’s active donations were meant to “buy” a license to reside in Japan. Besides that, this episode reveals several important aspects of Itchien’s life. Firstly, by that time, he had been travelling between Nagasaki and Tonkin for some time. Secondly, going back to China was not an option for him.

⁵³⁷ Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé, *The Deshima Dagregisters, Volume XII (1650-1660)* (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2005), 61.

Zhiyan's Residence in Nagasaki

We noted above that if a person had a house or family in Nagasaki, the Nagasaki authorities considered him to be a resident of Japan and thus forbade him from leaving or returning to the country. Therefore, if we take the *sakoku* directives at face value, it was illegal, if not impossible, for someone who owned a house in Nagasaki to personally conduct overseas trade. Zhiyan was such a person who should have been limited by the edicts. Because he had a mansion in Nagasaki, he could be considered a resident. Zhiyan owned a large mansion at Sakaya-chō. It is not known exactly when he settled in the ward. The mansion would have been built or rebuilt after the massive fire that totally devastated Nagasaki on 15 April 1663.⁵³⁸ As early as 1665, the Dutch reported that Zhiyan owned a house in Nagasaki.⁵³⁹ Nevertheless, there is undeniable evidence that Zhiyan continued engaging in foreign trade and travelled between Tonkin and Nagasaki from the 1650s to the 1680s.

He made no effort to hide his wealth and overseas connections. The mansion had a distinctive Chinese style. It is said that his wooden mansion was in part built with timbers shipped from China. Likewise, the garden was decorated with stones

⁵³⁸ *TKN*, 1: 10-1.

⁵³⁹ *DB*, 1663: 646.

brought from overseas.⁵⁴⁰ He owned a coloured statue of Buddha presented to Zhiyan by “the King of Tonkin”, meaning the *Chúa*. The Tonkin Buddha was carefully placed in a special shrine dedicated to it in the mansion’s compound and remained there until 2 April 1775, when the Ōga mansion suffered an accidental fire and was burned to the ground.⁵⁴¹

During the late-eighteenth century, prior to the fire, the household was famous for its Chinese-styled interiors and possession of exotic foreign items and they received visitors from outside Nagasaki. These possessions were indications of wealth accumulated from foreign trade. Apparently, the mansion was an attraction to those who were interested in foreign cultures and had a chance to visit Nagasaki. A good example would be the Lord of Kagoshima, Shimazu Shigehide (島津重豪) (1745-1833), whose passion for Western as well as Chinese learning was quite well-known. On 31 August 1771, during his stay in Nagasaki, he paid a visit to the then head of the Ōga family Tazaemon (鉅鹿太左衛門) (1734-1803), at his mansion and viewed its Chinese garden.⁵⁴² In 1782, even after the mansion itself was lost in

⁵⁴⁰ Nagasaki-shi, ed., *Nagasaki-shi shi: fūzoku hen* (History of the Nagasaki municipality: Folk culture), Vol. 1 (Osaka: Seibundō, 1981), 611.

⁵⁴¹ Nakata, “Gishi to *Ghishi gakufū*”, 143; Miyta, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 536-7.

⁵⁴² Kagoshima-ken ishin siryō hensanjo, ed, *Kagoshima-ken shiryō: Kyūkizatsuroku tsuironku* (Historical materials on the Kagoshima Prefecture: *Kyūkizatsuroku tsuironku*), Vol. 6 (Kagoshima: Kagoshima-ken, 1976), 276. Ōga Tazaemon was one of Zhiyan’s great-grandsons and Ōga Tamibe’s younger brother. After the aforementioned fire of 1775, the family was no longer able to give the

the fire, a geographer Furukawa Koshōken (古河古松軒) (1726-1807) visited Nagasaki and took note of the curious art works of the Ōga family.⁵⁴³ A little later, in 1788, a famous scholar-painter Shiba Kōkan (司馬江漢) (1747-1818) also called on the family.⁵⁴⁴

During his lifetime, Zhiyan entertained a different group of visitors. By the late 1670s, the *bakufu* was aware that unlawful activities were going on in Nagasaki and that many officials were involved in the contraband trade.⁵⁴⁵ In March 1681, following the installation of the fifth *shōgun* Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (徳川綱吉) (1646-1709), the *bakufu* appointed eight teams of special commissioners and dispatched them to different areas of the country. Their primary objective was to investigate local administration and check on coastal defense.⁵⁴⁶ As for Nagasaki, however, the *bakufu* was especially interested in investigating any misconduct

Tonkin Buddha a proper space. Thus, it was presented to Shimazu Shigehide. Nakata, “Gishi to *Ghishi gakufu*”, 143.

⁵⁴³ Furukawa Koshōken, *Saiyū zakkī* (Jottings of travels in the west) (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1927), 166.

⁵⁴⁴ Shiba Kōkan, *Kōkan saiyū nikki* (Kōkan’s diary of the journey to the west) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1986), 107.

⁵⁴⁵ Nagazumi Yōko, “Nagasaki bugyō to *shihō shōhō* (Magistrates of Nagasaki and the *shihō shōhō*)”, in *Sakoku nihon to kokusai kōryū* (Japan under the sakoku and international relations), Vol. 2, ed. Yanai Kenji (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988), 18-22.

⁵⁴⁶ Itazawa Takeo, “Shokoku junkenshi to sono jissai (Shokoku junkenshi and its realities)”, *Nippon Rekishi* 163 (1959): 109-16.

committed by officials with regards to unlawful trading activities. On 7 June, the Dutch were informed that three appointed commissioners, Okada Hahirouemon (岡田八郎右衛門), Togawa Mokunosuke (戸川杳之助) and Shibata Hichirobei (柴田七左衛門), were to visit Nagasaki so as to gather information on the current situation of foreign trade. In truth, they were entrusted with the mission of uncovering any illegal activities engaged in by the magistrates and other officials.⁵⁴⁷ On this occasion, Wei Zhiyan was assigned to host Okada, the highest ranking official among the three, along with 35 members of his entourage.⁵⁴⁸ After that, Zhiyan and his son regularly served the lodging needs of the *bakufu* commissioners. Between 19 May and 20 August 1684, Toda Matabei (戸田又兵衛) and Odagiri Kibei (小田切喜兵衛) visited Nagasaki during another round of these inspection tours. Zhiyan provided Odagiri and his 36 attendants with a temporary abode during that visit.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁷ Nagazumi, “Nagasaki bugyō”, 19.

⁵⁴⁸ Ōoka Kiyosuke, *Kiyō gundan* (Tales of Nagasaki) (1716; reprint, Tokyo: Kondō Shuppansha, 1974), 88; Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 234-5. There was no accommodation for travelers in Nagasaki. All who visited Nagasaki had to find lodging in residences of *chōnin*. Nagasaki-ken, ed. *Nagasaki-ken shi: taigaikōshō hen* (History of Nagasaki Prefecture: International relations) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986), 377.

⁵⁴⁹ Ōoka, *Kiyō gundan*, 89; Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 269-70.

Zhiyan and Nagasaki Officials

It is intriguing that Zhiyan was hosting these high-ranking officials dispatched by the *bakufu* with the particular mission of investigating on-going illicit trade in Nagasaki when he himself was still actively engaged in trade and even personally ventured out to high seas. This unlikely scenario could be beneficial to Zhiyan if it was assumed that Nagasaki officials deliberately placed the bakufu commissioner with Zhiyan so as to keep him outside of suspicion. This would have been done in their own self interest since local officials themselves benefited financially from Zhiyan's trade.

This can be implied from the positions of two prominent Nagasaki officials in Zhiyan's business. In Nagasaki, Yamaguchi Ichizaemon (山口市左衛門) and Murata Iuemon (村田伊右衛門) helped Zhiyan with his business transactions.⁵⁵⁰

Unfortunately, it is not clear in what way these two men actually provided Zhiyan with assistance. But there are a number of clues as to who they were. Both of them were wealthy *chōnin* in Nagasaki. When the *bakufu* inspectors visited Nagasaki in 1667, Yamaguchi served one of the inspectors as one of his local purveyors.⁵⁵¹

Yamaguchi had a residence in Motokōya-chō, located a street away from Zhiyan's

⁵⁵⁰ Nakata, "Gishi to *Ghishi gakufu*", 141.

⁵⁵¹ *Kaban kōeki meisai*ki, in Nagasaki-ken, *Nagasaki-ken shi: shiryō hen*, 339.

mansion. Between 1689 and 1704, while conducting his own trade, he carried out business for the domain of Uto as the domain's designated merchant in Nagasaki.⁵⁵²

Murata was a money changer and resided in Sakaya-chō as a neighbour of Zhiyan.⁵⁵³ At the end of 1698, when the two *bakufu* commissioners again visited Nagasaki, Ōga Seibei (鉅鹿清兵衛) (1661-1738), a son of Zhiyan who succeeded his father, provided the envoys with accommodation, as did Murata.⁵⁵⁴ Murata became a *Tōjin yashiki otona* (唐人屋敷乙名) some time between 1699 and 1704.⁵⁵⁵

Previously, in 1689, in order to house all the Chinese visitors to Nagasaki, a secluded Chinese quarter known as *Tōjin yashiki* (唐人屋敷) had been established in a corner of the harbour. *Tōjin yashiki otona* was the mayor of this Chinese quarter and thus responsible for all matters concerning the Chinese people throughout their stay in Nagasaki. Due to the fact that *Tōjin yashiki otona* was chosen from among seventy-seven *otona* (ward headman 乙名), Murata must have been the *otona* of the Sakaya- chō district before he took up the post of *Tōjin yashiki otona*.⁵⁵⁶ It is clear

⁵⁵² Nagasaki-ken, *Nagasaki-ken shi: taigaikōshō hen*, 368-70.

⁵⁵³ Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 346-8, 362-3.

⁵⁵⁴ Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 246.

⁵⁵⁵ *TKN*, 7: 73, 99, 106.

⁵⁵⁶ For more information on the administrative system of Nagasaki, see Nagasaki-ken, *Nagasaki-ken shi: taigaikōshō hen*, 388-436.

that the local officials, consisting of upper-class *chōnin*, were involved in Zhiyan's trade.

The Dutch were also aware of Zhiyan's unholy alliance with the local officials. In 1674, Johannes Camphuijs in Nagasaki expressed his concern over Zhiyan's relationship with the local officials and merchants in Nagasaki. He advised Batavia that as far as the Tonkin trade was concerned, the company should not make an enemy of Zhiyan because he was on good terms with the *machidoshiyori* and a few Japanese merchants in Nagasaki.⁵⁵⁷ *Machidoshiyori* were top local administrators of Nagasaki. While the magistrates were assigned by the *bakufu* and stationed at Nagasaki only for a limited time, the posts of *machidoshiyori* were succeeded hereditarily and they exercised strong control over the administration of Nagasaki. Practically speaking, it was the *machidoshiyori* and *otona* of each ward who supervised and carried out all business transactions in Nagasaki, making Zhiyan's close relationship to them particularly beneficial to his interests.⁵⁵⁸

The local officials seemed to have a tacit agreement that they were not to speak or give too much information to the commissioners. In 1681, while Zhiyan hosted

⁵⁵⁷ Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 386.

⁵⁵⁸ Nagasaki-ken, *Nagasaki-ken shi: taigaikōshō hen*, 390; Yamawaki, *Nagasaki no tōjin bōeki*, 292.

Okada, an interpreter of Dutch, Shizuki Magouemon (志筑孫右衛門) took care of the other commissioner, Shibata. Shizuki “discovered many things” and reported them to Shibata, which apparently upset some of the people in town. After the commissioners left, Shizuki was attacked and beaten up by a mob.⁵⁵⁹ In the case of the 1684 inspection, both Toda and Odagiri took up lodgings in the Sakaya-chō for three months. During their unexpectedly long stay, residents of the district were “bored” and complained about their day-and-night guard duties.⁵⁶⁰ The boredom prevailing the otherwise usually busy street implies that the residents of the Sakaya-chō had to put their “regular” flow of business, whether legal or illegal, on hold and behave themselves in the presence of the *bakufu* commissioners.

On top of that, in all likelihood Wei Zhiyan colluded with the magistrates of Nagasaki. His overseas trips had to be approved by the magistrates. The magistrates gave Zhiyan permission to stay in and to leave Nagasaki. In 1662 when the circumstances around Taiwan did not allow Zhiyan to sail personally, the magistrate gave him permission to stay in Nagasaki for one year under the pretext of illness. Using several excuses, he managed to stay in Nagasaki until February 1665 when, eventually, the magistrate ordered him to depart. In 1664, whereas the Dutch

⁵⁵⁹ Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 234; Ton Vermeulen, ed., *The Deshima Dagregisters their Original Tables of Contents Volume I, 1680-1690* (Leiden: Leiden Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1986), 14.

⁵⁶⁰ Ōoka, *Kiyō gundan*, 89; Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 269-70.

blockaded the river in Tonkin to prevent Zhiyan's junks from leaving for Nagasaki, the Dutch aggression towards these two junks obviously upset the "emperor's" men in Nagasaki. The "emperor" in this context meant the *shōgun*. In Nagasaki, the ones directly appointed by the *shōgun* were the magistrates. Hence, the Dutch came to know that the magistrates had substantial shares in Zhiyan's junks. Eventually, Batavia ordered the Tonkin factory to end the blockade of the river to avoid strong discontentment from the Japanese.⁵⁶¹

Zhiyan's relationship to the magistrates of Nagasaki went further than mere business transactions. A relationship of give and take between Zhiyan and the magistrates was instrumental in Zhiyan and his sons acquiring permanent residency in Japan. Zhiyan worked on acquiring permanent residency in Japan by submitting a private petition to a newly-installed magistrate of Nagasaki, Ushigome Chūzaemon.⁵⁶² On 15 October 1672, a Japanese translation of his petition together with a recommendation by the magistrate reached the council of the *rōjū* in Edo.

Commenting on Zhiyan's request, the magistrates noted that:

⁵⁶¹ See Chapter Three.

⁵⁶² Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 159-60. Ushigome was no doubt one of the most colourful and controversial magistrates of Nagasaki. He supported Chinese cultural activities and formed close personal friendships with Chinese residents of Nagasaki. On the other hand, the frustrated Dutch at the Deshima factory despised him for being corrupt and driven by self-interest. For greater detail on Ushigome and his administration, see Nagazumi, "Nagasaki bugyō", 1-27; Ecchū Tetsuya, "Nagasaki bugyō Ushigome Chūzaemon Katsunari", *Nagasaki dansō* 71 (1986):63-99; 72 (1987): 85-118; 73 (1987): 64-85; 74 (1988): 86-107.

A Chinese called Wei Zhiyan and his two sons hoped to reside in Nagasaki permanently. This man has visited Nagasaki for business for the last thirty years. He has been very dutiful about all matters. For these reasons, it should not be difficult to permit him to reside in Nagasaki.⁵⁶³

The *rōjū* told the magistrate that the decision was to be made by the *shōgun* himself. Later on the same day, the *rōjū* consulted personally with Tokugawa Ietsuna. Ietsuna granted Zhiyan's wish.⁵⁶⁴ On 1 November 1672, the Dutch in Nagasaki were informed that Zhiyan was granted “a license to live in Nagasaki as a subject of Japan”.⁵⁶⁵

The timing of Zhiyan's various donations seems to have coincided with the process of his seeking residency. In 1669, Zhiyan donated 500 taels of silver to the Sōfukuji for the reconstruction of its stone-paved approach to the Masodō (hall for *mazu*). The restoration was completed in 1671.⁵⁶⁶ Subsequently, in 1679, Zhiyan and

⁵⁶³ *Nagasaki oyakushotome*, in *Kinsei Nagasaki taigai kankei shiryō* (Materials concerning foreign relations and Nagasaki during the kinsei), ed. Ōta Katsuya (Tokyo: Shibunkaku, 2007), 77-8.

⁵⁶⁴ *Nagasaki oyakushotome*, 78.

⁵⁶⁵ DN, 1 November 1672, NFJ 85.

⁵⁶⁶ Miyata, *Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō*, 526.

his sons, Wei Gao and Wei Gui, became Japanese upon permission from the magistrate, Ushigome. To celebrate this occasion, Ushigome presented Zhiyan's sons a Japanese family name Ōga after their ancestral homeland in China. Henceforth, Yongshi and Yongzhao became Ōga Seizaemon (鉅鹿静左衛門) and Ōga Seibei (鉅鹿静兵衛) respectively. Besides changing their names, the two sons also changed their Ming-styled clothing to Japanese ones. Zhiyan was permitted to keep his Chinese name and wear Ming attire on the grounds that he had served the Ming before. Congratulating him on this occasion, the magistrate presented five gold tablets to Zhiyan and a *wakizashi* (short sword 脇差) to the sons.⁵⁶⁷ This year, Zhiyan had a wooden bridge between Motofurukawa-chō (元古川町) and Motokōya-chō (元紺屋町) rebuilt as a stone bridge. The new bridge was called Furukawa-bashi (古川橋).⁵⁶⁸ In 1680, when Ushigome initiated a reconstruction of the Matsunomori shrine, Zhiyan responded by donating the main gate to the shrine.⁵⁶⁹ In addition, in 1681, Zhiyan had the main hall of the Sōfukuji renovated. It had been a single roof since 1646 when the temple hall was initially constructed. At this time, by means of Zhiyan's donation, the temple roof was upgraded to a double-layered roof.⁵⁷⁰ It appears that Zhiyan's donations coincided with his acquisition of permanent residency and naturalization, as

⁵⁶⁷ (Ōgake) *Yuishogaki*.

⁵⁶⁸ Nigita Yugi, ed., *Nagasaki meishō zue* (Drawings of places of scenic beauty in Nagasaki) (1818; reprint, Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1974), 4.

⁵⁶⁹ Nagasaki-shi, *Nagasaki-shi shi: Chishi hen*, Vol. 2, 497.

⁵⁷⁰ Miyata, *Tōtsūji kakei ronkō*, 968-9.

though they were meant as returns to the magistrate for his favour of granting him permanent residency. After almost a quarter of a century, by means of his wealth and local connections, Wei Zhiyan finally obtained what his brother, Itchien, dreamed of.

It should be noted that the period between 1672 and 1684 was the time when Nagasaki flourished under the *Shihō shōhō*. Ushigome Katsunari, who served as the magistrate of Nagasaki from 1671 to 1682, was instrumental in implementing the *Shihō shōhō*. It is known that Ushigome gave Chinese merchants higher purchase prices in order to encourage more Chinese junks to come to Nagasaki. In return, the Dutch factors despised Ushigome for his commercial greed and overbearing approach to business.⁵⁷¹ During this period, profit from foreign trade was widely and generously distributed among the officials and merchants of Nagasaki.⁵⁷² The thriving port city attracted many merchants from other parts of Japan. The residential population of Nagasaki increased by more than 30 percent from 40,025 in 1672 to 52,702 in 1681.⁵⁷³ Apart from the residents, crew members of Chinese junks and Dutch ships seasonally sailed into the port. In 1679 alone, for example, thirty-two Chinese junks brought a total of 2,965 traders and seamen. They scattered around and

⁵⁷¹ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin suryō ichiran*, 15-7.

⁵⁷² Nagasaki-ken, *Nagasaki-ken shi: taigaikōshō hen*, 297-309. For details on the *Shiho shōhō*, see Chapter Two.

⁵⁷³ Morinaga, *Kanpō nikki*, 151, 238.

stayed in the town, whereas 416 crew members of four Dutch ships were confined in the artificial island of *deshima*.⁵⁷⁴

As Chinese junk trade brought prosperity to the town, the magistrates of Nagasaki, sitting at the top of its administrative system, enjoyed cosy relationships with the *jūtaku tōjin* and behaved “as though they had become themselves merchants”.⁵⁷⁵ Wei Zhiyan certainly contributed to and benefited from the flourishing commercial community of Nagasaki.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the so-called “*sakoku*” edicts prescribed the economic and social milieu in which the Chinese merchants conducted their business at Nagasaki. Yet, while Chinese traders were free to mingle with the locals, what regulated and facilitated trade at the port was not simply a set of impersonal codes enforced by the *bakufu*. When people met, the boundaries between what was legal and illegal blurred. The processes of business transactions, where individuals interacted, negotiated and cut deals with each other through various means, were far more complex, delicate and intimate than the policies officially allowed. Even after the

⁵⁷⁴ Nagasaki-ken, *Nagasaki-ken shi: taigaikōshō hen*, 379.

⁵⁷⁵ Ōoka, *Kiyō gundan*, 43.

implementation of the *sakoku* policies during the 1630s, the Japanese officials and merchants invested in Chinese junks and provided them with support and protection against the VOC and the Tokugawa *bakufu* both directly and indirectly. Taking full advantage of their personal connections with the upper echelon of the local commercial community, Chinese traders managed to find a way around the restrictive regulations, and hence to defy state control.

What characterized the mid-seventeenth century was that Qing, Tokugawa and Trinh governments were in the process of gaining control over the independent local powers who hold fast to vested interests. In 1677, Trinh Tac pacified the last members of the Mac army along the Tonkin-China border. Zheng Jing died in Taiwan in 1681. The rest of the Zheng family surrendered to the Qing navy in 1683. Wu Sangui's grandson and successor Wu Shifan (吳世璠)(d. 1681) committed suicide in Yunan in 1681.⁵⁷⁶ In the same year, Ushigome Chūzemon resigned abruptly from his post as the magistrate of Nagasaki due to a mysterious "illness". At last, in 1685, the Qing finally lifted the maritime ban and numerous junks rushed out of the China coast to the East and South China Seas. In the face of uncontrollable force of private commercial activities at the last turn of the seventeenth century, East Asian states began to reshape the seventeenth-century commercial networks that were in essence private and informal.

⁵⁷⁶ See Chapter Two.

CHAPTER SIX

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: THE PATTERN OF CHINESE TRADE

The previous chapter illustrated how the Wei brothers used their informal relationships with the local officials and merchants of Nagasaki in order to facilitate their trade. Regardless of a series of restrictive legislations enacted by the bakufu, the Wei brothers managed to carry out their business through the mediation of their local acquaintances as long as they could bring profit to those who unofficially invested in their business enterprise.

This chapter concerns the efficiency of Chinese junk shipping. It examines different aspects of the junk trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki during the seventeenth century from a quantitative perspective. The previous chapter showed that the Wei brothers were the most formidable competitor of the VOC as well as the Zheng in terms of the volume and value of Tonkinese raw silk they exported to Nagasaki. By providing quantitative data to buttress that quantitative analysis, this chapter will argue that Wei Zhiyan, and his later successor Lin Yuteng, were the most active and successful agents of exchange between Tonkin and Nagasaki through the second-half of the seventeenth century. This entails quantifying the size and

efficiency of the Chinese shipping operation and comparing the operation to that of their primary competitor, the VOC.

In order to provide a quantitative analysis, this chapter relies on various types of contemporary accounts written by the Dutch, the English as well as the Japanese. The lack of first-hand documentation by Chinese merchants themselves is evident. As a result, it is not entirely possible to gather uniform and consistent data for different periods. In most cases, data on Chinese junk shipping quoted here were collated from various sources and presented in this chapter for the years where data was available. Nevertheless, even this fragmentary statistical evidence provides us with substantial insight into the state of the Chinese shipping operation in East and Southeast Asia.

This chapter focuses exclusively on the volume of raw silk, even though silken fabrics were important export commodities to Japan as well. Various kinds of silk products were exported from Tonkin to Nagasaki. Ryukyu and Korea played significant roles in importing Chinese raw silk into Japan, though this thesis does not focus on the raw silk trade between these two places and Japan. Besides raw silk, silken fabrics such as *hockin*, *peling* and *baa* were important commodities as well. However, it is difficult to aggregate data on these textiles as they were too diverse in kind. Even though this chapter does not specifically address silken fabrics, it should be kept in mind that from the 1640s onwards, Chinese junks consistently brought

more silken fabrics from Tonkin to Nagasaki than the VOC and that Japan was the single most important market for these Tonkinese silk products during the seventeenth century.⁵⁷⁷ Only small quantities of raw silk and silken fabrics were exported to Europe by the VOC and later by the EIC.

This chapter first illustrates the overall trend of Japan's raw silk import from a quantitative perspective. This will help clarify the position of Tonkinese raw silk in view of the fluctuations in the Japan market over the seventeenth century. Then, the size of Chinese junks arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin will be examined as it is one of the key factors that explain the efficiency of the Chinese junk trade. Lastly, using the purchase and sale prices of Tonkinese raw silk in Tonkin and in Nagasaki respectively, an attempt will be made to estimate how much profit the Chinese junk operation could generate from a return voyage. Wherever possible, comparisons will be made between the Chinese junk trade and VOC shipping. Highlighting the differences in their efficiency of trade, this chapter argues that Chinese junks traveling between Tonkin and Nagasaki were more efficient than the VOC since they were usually operated by a smaller crew than VOC ships, yet they carried larger capital than Dutch ships.

⁵⁷⁷ Buggé, "Silk to Japan", 27 (Table I).

The Size of the Japan Market

In order to understand the position of Tonkinese silk in the Japan market and how its position changed over the course of the seventeenth century, it is important to examine the size of the Japan market and the overall trend of Japan's import of raw silk via Nagasaki. In 1615, a Spanish merchant named de Avila Giron reported that Japan annually purchased 300,000 to 350,000 cattles or more of raw silk.⁵⁷⁸ Between 1585 and 1638, the Portuguese imported between 100,000 and 250,000 cattles of raw silk into Japan.⁵⁷⁹ Iwao Seiichi calculated that during the eras of Genna (1615-1624) and Kanei (1624-1643), Japan imported between 200,000 and 400,000 cattles of raw silk every year via Nagasaki.⁵⁸⁰ The volume imported by the VOC was not at all significant prior to the establishment of the Taiwan factory in 1624. We have little information regarding the Chinese shipping. Katō Eiichi estimates that Chinese junks annually imported around 150,000 cattles of raw silk into Japan during the 1630s.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁸ Sakuma Tadashi, et al., trans., *Nippon ōkokuki* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965): 66. This is a Japanese translation of Bernaldino de Ávila Girón's *Relacion del Reino de Nippon a que llaman corruptamente Japon*.

⁵⁷⁹ Takase, "Makao-Nagasaki kan no bōeki", 62-6.

⁵⁸⁰ Iwao, "Kinsei nisshi bōeki", 26-7.

⁵⁸¹ Katō Eiichi, "Seiritsuki no itowappu ni kansuru ichikōsatsu", in *Taigaikankei to sakoku*, Vol. 8, ed. Fujino Tamotsu (Tokyo: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1995), 87.

Figure 6.1 **Error! Reference source not found.** shows the division by supplier of the total of 334,000 cattles of raw silk that Japan imported in 1634. Out of this total, Tonkinese raw silk had a significant share in the Japan market. A Japanese *shuinsen* returning to Nagasaki from Tonkin was loaded with 100,000 cattles of Tonkinese raw silk, accounting for at least 30 percent of Japanese raw silk imports via Nagasaki that year.⁵⁸² As mentioned in Chapter Two, Tonkinese silk comprised the bulk of cargo imported into Japan by the Portuguese during the last few years of their operations in Nagasaki. In 1636, the Portuguese brought 25,027 cattles of Chinese raw silk as well as 53,343 cattles of Tonkinese raw silk into Japan.⁵⁸³ In 1637, six Portuguese galleons imported a total of 124,727 cattles of raw silk which comprised of 87,431 cattles from Tonkin and 37,296 cattles from China.⁵⁸⁴ In 1638, 15,908 cattles of Tonkinese raw silk and 19,632 cattles of Chinese raw silk were imported by two Portuguese galleons.⁵⁸⁵ Hence, Tonkinese silk accounted for 65 percent of the total volume of raw silk imported into Japan by the Portuguese between 1636 and 1638. The geographical proximity between Macau and northern Vietnam should be taken into account to explain the large share of Tonkinese raw silk in Portuguese


⁵⁸² Letter from Nicolaes Coukebacker from Hirado to Batavia, 24 November 1634, VOC 1114: 76-88, translated and quoted in Iwao, *Shingan shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū*, 315.

⁵⁸³ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol. 3, 409-10.

⁵⁸⁴ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol. 4, 28.

⁵⁸⁵ Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol. 4, 148-52.

cargoes. This large amount of Tonkinese silk imported by the Macao-based Portuguese suggests that an active seaborne traffic existed between northern Vietnam and Macao during the 1630s. In brief, the Japanese and Portuguese were the two major exporters of Tonkinese raw silk into Japan in the first half of the 1630s. Japanese overseas shipping operations were completely abandoned in 1635. Then, faced with the looming possibility of the Portuguese expulsion from Japan in the second half of the 1630s, it was of urgent importance for any party interested in the Japan trade to tap into the Tonkin market.



Source: Iwao, *Shingan shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū*, 301.

Figure 6.1 Division of Raw Silk Imported into Japan by Supplier, 1634




Figure 6.2 Total Volume of Imported Raw Silk via Nagasaki and Divisions by Supplier, 1635-1666

Figure 6.2 indicates that the total volume of raw silk imported by Japan fluctuated between 100,000 to 300,000 catties during the 1640s and then, 200,000 to 400,000 catties during the 1650s. The 1650s seemed to be the pinnacle of Japan's raw silk imports. Under the *pancado* pricing system in Japan, Japanese *itowappu* merchants were required to buy the whole amount of Chinese raw silk brought into Nagasaki at fixed prices no matter how much or little raw silk was brought in. Because the sale prices were reviewed only once every year, Zheng Zhilong was able to manipulate sale prices of raw silk in Nagasaki by sending only a small portion of Chinese raw silk to Nagasaki around the time when the review was taking place. This resulted in the setting of high sale prices for Chinese raw silk for one year forcing the *itowappu* merchants to bear a considerable loss. In 1655, having borne a considerable

loss, the *itowappu* merchants petitioned the *bakufu* to suspend the *pancado* system for the following year. The *bakufu* decided to abandon the fixed price completely and the *pancado* system was abolished.⁵⁸⁶

The *aitai shōhō*, which allowed buyer and seller to directly negotiate prices of all imports including raw silk, was introduced in 1655 to replace the *pancado* system. Nagazumi Yōko suggested that direct trade was advantageous to Chinese merchants based on the fact that Chinese traders welcomed the new regulations.⁵⁸⁷ In the late 1650s, Chinese junks imported a larger amount of raw silk into Nagasaki than the VOC ships. In 1659, a total of 406,870 cattles of raw silk was imported into Japan via Nagasaki, of which Chinese junks carried 245,123 cattles and the VOC 161,747 cattles (Appendix B). Scholars agree that in the era of the *aitai shōhō*, sale prices of import commodities in Nagasaki skyrocketed because of greater competition among the domestic buyers, thus expanding the profit margins of foreign suppliers. Chinese traders maximized revenues and profits by importing a large volume of merchandize.

⁵⁸⁶ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 11-3; Ren, *Kinsei nihon to nicchū bōeki*, 117.

⁵⁸⁷ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 13; Ren, *Kinsei nihon to nicchū bōeki*, 117; Yamawaki, *Nagsaki no tōjin bōeki*, 22-4; Innes, “The Door Ajar”, 297.

Accordingly, Japan's silver outflow hit its peak during the 1660s as it was used to pay for the raw silk.⁵⁸⁸

In order to control the increasing outflow of silver at a time when Japan's silver production began to show signs of decline, the *bakufu* restricted the outflow of silver from Nagasaki. In 1668, the VOC was prohibited from exporting silver. From the 1670s on, it is evident that Japan's total import of raw silk via Nagasaki gradually decreased as a result of the *bakufu*'s efforts to curtail the export of Japanese silver.⁵⁸⁹ At the same time, the *bakufu* strongly encouraged domestic silk production from the late-seventeenth century. The declining trend in the importation of raw silk continued towards the end of the century. According to Yamawaki Teijirō's study, the VOC imported an annual average of 86,000 catties of raw silk from various origins between 1641 and 1684. In 1697, Chinese junks and Dutch ships together imported approximately 100,000 catties of raw silk into Japan. By 1710, the amount further diminished to 55,000 catties.⁵⁹⁰ With the advance of sericulture technology and

⁵⁸⁸ Innes, "The Door Ajar", 297; Tashiro Kazui, "17, 18 seiki higashiajia ikinai kōeki nio keru nihon gin (Japanese silver in the East Asian regional trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth century)", in *Ajia kōekiken to nihon no kōgyōka* (Intra-Asian trade and the Japanese industrialization, 1500-1900), ed. Hamashita Takeshi and Kawakatsu Heita (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2001), 133.

⁵⁸⁹ While the importation of raw silk through Nagasaki decreased, Chinese raw silk continued to flow into Japan via Korea during the last three decades of the seventeenth century. Tashiro, "17, 18 seiki higashiajia ikinai kōeki nio keru nihon gin", 136-8.

⁵⁹⁰ Yamawaki, *Kinu to momen no edojitai*, 31 (Table 5, 6, 7).

reeling techniques, the quality of domestic raw silk slowly improved. Domestic raw silk gradually replaced imported Chinese raw silk and Japan almost completely stopped importing foreign raw silk by the mid-eighteenth century.⁵⁹¹ Tonkinese raw silk exports to Japan have to be examined against this background of the rise and fall of Japan's foreign silk imports.

The Place of Tonkinese Raw Silk on the Japan Market

During the 1640s, most raw silk imported by Chinese junks came from China. It is believed that the majority of the junks coming to Nagasaki around this time were under the control of Zheng Zhilong. His junks supplied Chinese raw silk to the VOC on the island of Taiwan until the beginning of the 1640s. In 1641, Zhilong initiated direct shipping between Fujian and Nagasaki, thus bypassing the Dutch. With the lack of supply of raw silk from China, the VOC was heavily dependent on Tonkin as an alternative supplier of raw silk to the Japan market.⁵⁹² From 1641 to 1649, more than half of the raw silk imported by the Dutch originated from Tonkin. In 1649

⁵⁹¹ Yamawaki, *Kinu to mdomen no edojidai*, 31 (Table 5, 6, 7). For more information on the development of sericulture and the silk industry in Japan, see Inoue Zenjirō, “Yōsan gijutsu no hatten to sansho (Development of Sericultural technique and manuals for silk production)”, in *Nihon nōsho zenshū* (The complete works on agriculture books in Japan), Vol. 35, ed. Yamada Tatsuo et al., (Tokyo: Nōsanryosonbunka Kyōkai, 1981), 458-9; Kudō Kyōkichi, et al., “Kinsei no yōsan seishi gyō (Sericulture and the silk reeling industry in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century)”, in *Kōza nihon gijutsu no shakaishi* (Social history of Japanese technologies), Vol. 3, ed. Nagahara Keiji and Yamaguschi Keiji, 103-36 (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1983).

⁵⁹² Blussé, “No Boat to China”, 67.

specifically, Tonkin accounted for seventy-nine percent of the raw silk import by the VOC (Appendix B). The 1640s was the boom period of Tonkinese raw silk exports to Nagasaki by the VOC.⁵⁹³ By contrast Chinese junks did not bring much raw silk from Tonkin until 1646. This probably suggests that Zheng Zhilong, whose active maritime career ended in 1646 with his defection to the Qing, was not interested in Tonkin as a source of supply for raw silk. As long as he was able to obtain exportable merchandize from mainland China, it was not necessary to send his junks to Tonkin. Having learned that the Dutch made a significant profit from bringing Tonkinese silk into Nagasaki, however, an “established Chinese of Japan” dispatched his ship directly from Nagasaki to Tonkin in 1647.⁵⁹⁴ Although extant evidence is circumstantial rather than conclusive, this “established Chinese of Japan” may well be Itchien’s first appearance in the historical record.

During the 1650s, Tonkinese raw silk comprised 27 percent of the total silk imports into Japan.⁵⁹⁵ Both Chinese junks and Dutch ships brought more raw silk into Nagasaki than they did during the previous decade (Figure 6.2). However, in the second-half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch deliberately moved away from

⁵⁹³ Klein, “De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel”, 166; Blussé, “No Boat to China”, 68; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 148-9.

⁵⁹⁴ See Chapter Three.

⁵⁹⁵ Calculated according to the data presented in Appendix B.


using Tonkin as a silk supplier and instead switched to Bengal. Hoang Anh Tuan identifies the 1650s as the first phase of decline in the Tonkin trade of the VOC. The switch from Tonkinese to Bengali silk by the VOC has been taken by Hoang as an indication of the low marketability of Tonkinese silk and the increasing popularity of Bengali silk in the Japan market during the second-half of the seventeenth century. He points out that the profitability of Bengali silk, which he attributed to its supposed popularity in the Japan market, caused a rapid decline in the export volume of raw silk from Tonkin into Japan from the mid-1650s.⁵⁹⁶

Insofar as trends in Dutch shipping are concerned, our data supports his view. However, his assumption about the better marketability of Bengali silk is difficult to corroborate. The high profitability of Bengali silk for the VOC did not necessarily indicate the poor marketability of Tonkinese raw silk on the Japanese market. Indeed, it is doubtful that the popularity of Tonkinese silk in general fell on the Japan market during the 1650s. In 1660, the chief of the Nagasaki factory commented: “The Bengali *bariga* silk has been weight [sic]. Because the [local] merchants keep looking for the arrival of Kouquan [Zhiyan] from Tonkin, we [the Dutch] have decided to offer most of the Bengali silk for sale as soon as possible. For [sic] if this Chinese

⁵⁹⁶ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 99, 158.

[Zhiyan] appears, he might harm our sale of the [Bengali] silk”.⁵⁹⁷ This note was written in the middle of their sale of Bengali silk, which had been in progress for more than a week. In other words, Japanese merchants anticipated the arrival of Tonkinese silk that Zhiyan would bring into Nagasaki. This implies that the marketability, or popularity, of Tonkinese raw silk was as great as that of Bengali silk, if not greater. Zhiyan’s junk, loaded with Tonkinese raw silk valued at 180,000 taels, was hit by a storm on its way from Tonkin to Nagasaki and was forced to return to Tonkin that year. Bengali silk fetched an “unexpectedly” high price because Tonkinese raw silk was missing from Nagasaki.

Figure 6.3
Volume (in catties) of Tonkinese Raw Silk
Imported by Chinese Junks and Dutch Ships, 1640-1666



⁵⁹⁷ DN, 27 September 1660, NFJ 73. The English translation is taken from Viallé and Blussé, *The Deshima Dagregisters*, Volume XII, 434.

The VOC's switch from Tonkinese to Bengali raw silk can be explained by a different set of factors that did not concern the marketability of Tonkinese silk. The VOC, in fact, had difficulties sustaining their trade with Tonkin. The arrival of Chinese merchants in Tonkin in the late 1640s intensified the competition on the Tonkin market. The VOC struggled to procure as much raw silk as they used to as Chinese merchants were able to offer local silk merchants higher prices than the VOC since they operated with lower overheads. For example, unlike the VOC, Chinese junk traders did not have fortresses or naval vessels to maintain their commercial networks. As highlighted in Chapter Four, their commercial networks were founded on the basis of social and cultural connections among individual traders. Thus, the VOC needed a higher profit margin and could not afford to pay as much for silk as their Chinese rivals.⁵⁹⁸ In the face of stiff competition from the Chinese merchants, the purchase price of raw silk in Tonkin increased dramatically during the 1650s also pushed by his higher sale price on the Japan market. Because of the stiff competition, the VOC decided to switch suppliers because they were able to buy Bengali silk at a cheaper price.

Table 6.1

Prices (in taels) of Raw Silk Imported by the VOC into Japan, 1641-1670 Annual Averages of Five-Year Periods

	Bengali Raw Silk			Tonkinese Raw Silk		
	Purchase Price	Sale Price	Profit Margin	Purchase Price	Sale Price	Profit Margin
1641-1645	1.43	2.84	98%	1.26	2.76	119%
1646-1650	1.44	2.97	107%	1.24	3.00	142%
1651-1655	1.24	2.70	118%	1.68	2.51	48%
1656-1660	1.52	2.57	69%	1.89	2.44	29%
1661-1665	1.45	1.75	21%	1.58	1.92	22%
1666-1668	1.06	2.22	110%	1.53	2.57	68%
Ave.	1.35	2.60	92%	1.36	2.51	84%

Source: Klein, "De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel", 170 (Table 2).

The data in Table 6.1 comparing the purchase and sale prices of Tonkinese and Bengali raw silk bears out the assertion that Tonkinese silk did not decrease in marketability. This can be seen by its high sale price on the Japan market and larger profit margins. According to Table 6.1, from 1641 to 1668, the average purchase prices of Tonkinese and Bengali raw silk were 1.36 and 1.35 taels per catty respectively. They were sold at an average sale price of 2.51 and 2.60 taels per catty in Nagasaki. On average, the profit margin for Tonkinese raw silk was 84 percent and for that of Bengali silk was 92 percent. However, given that Bengali silk incurred higher transportation costs, the difference in profit margin seems diminished. If we look at each period, it is clear that during the second-half of the 1640s, Tonkinese raw

silk brought more profit to the VOC than Bengali raw silk with its wider margin between purchase and sale price.

From 1651 to 1660, on the other hand, the VOC achieved higher profit margins on Bengali silk due to its lower purchase price and higher sale price than on Tonkinese raw silk. This suggests that the volume of raw silk available in Tonkin was limited, causing great competition among foreign traders and an increase in its purchase price. This shortage was caused by the Trinh's costly military expeditions against the Nguyen from 1655 to 1660, which also compromised the quality of the silk available. Nonetheless, from 1661 to 1668, Tonkinese raw silk was sold at higher prices than Bengali silk, suggesting that contrary to assertions by Hoang of the VOC trade, Tonkinese raw silk remained competitive and marketable on the Japan market during the 1660s. This could also explain why the VOC repeatedly made attempts to expand its trade in Tonkin from 1660 to 1670, even though Bengal turned out to be a more stable supplier of raw silk.⁵⁹⁹

The inability of the VOC to sustain and expand their trade in Tonkin points to weaknesses in their business operations which were not observed in the Wei brothers' business. Between 1670 and 1699 when the VOC finally decided to close down the

⁵⁹⁹ For the Dutch attempts to expand the Tonkin trade during the 1660s, see Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 103-11.

Tonkin factory, the Dutch exported Tonkinese silk to Japan on an irregular basis which could be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, from 1671 onwards Tonkinese products were first shipped to Batavia and then from there they were transported to various destinations. This was a preventive measure to curtail private trade by the Dutch factors in Tonkin. As a result, the profit margin of Tonkinese silk cargoes in Nagasaki further decreased after 1671.⁶⁰⁰ Secondly, in 1673, Trinh Tac made a truce with Nguyen Puc Tan, marking the end of the decades-long Trinh-Nguyen war. Given that the Trinh rulers accommodated the VOC in their domain primarily because they were keen to obtain modern weapons and military assistance from the Dutch, it is not at all surprising that the Trinh Lords no longer found a compelling reason to favor the VOC's commercial activities in their realm after the end of the war.

On the other hand, that the Wei brothers did flourish under the same difficulties experienced by the Dutch indicates efficiencies in their operation. The lack of consistent data for the 1660s and the 1670s makes it difficult for us to identify trends during the second-half of the seventeenth century. Yet, it seems that Japan's overall imports of raw silk via Nagasaki decreased during this time. Between 1662 and 1664, only a small volume of raw silk was imported from Tonkin. Chinese junks were not able to leave Tonkin because the Dutch were blockading them to prevent them from leaving Tonkin for Nagasaki. In 1663, the VOC succeeded in assembling and

⁶⁰⁰ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 116-7.

transporting silk cargoes worth 136,000 taels to Japan.⁶⁰¹ In 1665, Japan took in more than 600,000 catties of raw silk of which 23 percent originated from Tonkin. This surge in imports could be explained by the fact that Japan did not import much raw silk in the previous years.

Japan's total import volume of raw silk was on the decline during the 1660s and 1670s. In the 1670s, the VOC's export of Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki was reduced to a minimal level.⁶⁰² However, Chinese merchants continued to bring substantial amounts of Tonkinese raw silk into Nagasaki till the mid-1680s. As a result, Tonkinese raw silk sometimes comprised an even larger share on the Japan market during the 1670s and the early 1680s than previous decades. In the first few years of the 1680s, Japan's import of Tonkinese raw silk increased. Chinese junks exported to Nagasaki 89,065 catties in 1680 and 114,000 catties in 1682 respectively. Tonkinese silk comprised 47 percent and 67 percent of the total raw silk imported into Nagasaki by Chinese junks in those two years.⁶⁰³ The increased volume and share of Tonkinese raw silk on the Nagasaki market was presumably due to the fact that Chinese junks could not sail out from mainland China under the strict maritime security controls

⁶⁰¹ *DB*, 1664: 508, 581.

⁶⁰² Klein, "De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel", 168 (Table 1); Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 156 (Figure 6).

⁶⁰³ Appendix B.

enacted by the Qing court. Figure 6.3 shows that Tonkinese silk maintained its secure place on the Japanese market throughout the seventeenth century. While overall Japan's import of raw silk via Nagasaki was on the decline in the second-half of the seventeenth century, there was no significant sign of decline in terms of the volume of Tonkinese raw silk imported by Chinese junks into Nagasaki from 1640 to 1683.

Therefore, the declining marketability or popularity of Tonkinese silk on the Japanese market was not the reason for the decline in the Dutch trade of Tonkinese raw silk. Rather, the VOC stopped dealing in Tonkinese raw silk because it was less profitable for them than trading in Bengali raw silk. This was due to hikes in the purchase price of raw silk on the Tonkin market as a result of aggressive bidding by Chinese merchants. The VOC switched its main supplier of raw silk from Tonkin to Bengal in a deliberate attempt to avoid stiff competition on the Tonkin market and to maximize profit by taking advantage of a higher profit margin on Bengali silk.

The Effect of Shipboard Organization: Calculating the Number of Crew Members on Tonkin Junks

Having observed the position of Tonkinese raw silk on the Japan market, let us turn to the efficiency of Chinese junk shipping. In order to discuss the efficiency of the Chinese junk trade, it is crucial to understand the transport capacity of a junk,

which can be calculated in three ways. The first way to look at the transport capacity of a junk is to examine the size of its crew. Next, transport capacity could be calculated as the value of capital that Chinese merchants shipped out of Japan to Tonkin for each voyage. Lastly, the value of cargoes that a junk exported into Japan may also be taken as an indication of its transport capacity. We know that at one point in his career, Wei Zhiyan operated three junks at the same time. The efficiency of his operation can thus be measured using those three ways.

In terms of the size of crew, ship-by-ship data are available only from the 1680s onwards from Japanese sources. Between 1674 and 1727, the number of crew on a Chinese junk varied between fifteen and 120 people depending on the size of the vessel.⁶⁰⁴ Around 1680, the average number of crew members found on Chinese junks visiting Nagasaki was between eighty-five and ninety-five people per vessel (Table 6.2).

⁶⁰⁴ Iio, “Ayutaya kokuō no tainichi bōeki”, 90-100 (Appendix 2-11).

Table 6.2

The Number of Chinese Junks and Crew Members Visiting Nagasaki, 1679-80

Year	Total Number of Chinese Junks	Total Number of Chinese People Visiting Nagasaki	Average Size of Crew per Junk
1679	31	2,965	95.6
1680	29	2,483	85.6

Source: Nakamura Tadashi, “Sakokuka no bōeki: bōeki toshiron no shiten kara (Trade under the sakoku: from the perspective of a port city)”, in *Sakoku*, ed. Katō Eiichi and Yamada Tadao (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1981), 318.

Notes: Chinese junks include those from mainland China, Taiwan and all other Southeast Asian ports. The number of crew members includes non-Chinese members such as Siamese on junks from Ayutthaya.

Japanese sources contain more solid data on Tonkin junks regarding the last few decades of the seventeenth century (Table 6.3). From 1684 to 1708, Lin Yuteng used three different junks, meaning he changed his vessel twice for several reasons. In 1690, the first ship started leaking from the hull on its way back from Nagasaki to Tonkin (Ship A). The vessel was obviously too old to repair. Lin Yuteng abandoned it and had a new ship (Ship B) built in Wenzhou in 1691 as a replacement.⁶⁰⁵ Japanese sources also indicate the presence of a third junk (Ship C). Considering that Lin Yuteng served on the both junks and Ship B and Ship C were manned by more or less the same number of crew members, the two junks could possibly be identical but it is impossible to prove. The average number of crew members onboard these three

⁶⁰⁵ Since the late-tenth century, Wenzhou was a center for shipbuilding because it produced good timber. During the 1680s, most junks coming from Ningbo were built in Wenzhou. *KH*, 3: 1691.

vessels every time they arrived at Nagasaki was forty-nine. In terms of the size of its crew, Tonkin junks during the 1680s fell into the category of small-sized junks. In *Zōho kai tsūshōkō*, Nishikawa Joken (西川如見) (1648-1724) divided Chinese junks into three groups according to the number of ordinary sailors they carried (C: *shuishou* 水手 or *gongshe* 工社). Around ten to twenty people were assigned to a specific duty position. In addition to these officers, “large ship(s) were staffed by 100, medium-sized ship(s) were staffed by sixty to seventy, and small ship(s) were staffed by thirty to forty” ordinary sailors.⁶⁰⁶ Tonkinese junks fell into the third category.

Table 6.3 Number of Crew Members onboard a Tonkin Junk

Year	Ship No.*	Ship	Crew**	Chief Merchant	Source
1684	No. 4 from Tonkin	A	N/A	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 1: 343-4
1686	No. 72 from Tonkin	A	N/A	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1113
1689	No. 42 from Tonkin	A	66	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1113
1690	No. 82 from Tonkin	A	53	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1390-1
1691	No. 85 from Wenzhou	B	51	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1390-1
1692	No. 59 from Tonkin	B	51	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1471-2
1693	No. 58 from Tonkin	B	46	Lin Sanguan	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1566-7
1694	No. 8 from Shacheng***	B	44	Lin Kongteng	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1621
1695	No. 52 from Guangdong	B	46	Lin Sanguan	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1762-3
1696	No.18 from Wenzhou	B	43	He Longfu	<i>KH</i> , 2: 1778
1698	No. 6 from Wenzhou	B	45	He Longfu	<i>KH</i> , 3: 1960
1706	No. 27 from Nanjing	C	N/A	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 3: 2581
1708	No. 102 from Tonkin	C	46	Lin Yuteng	<i>KH</i> , 3: 2581

*Note**: Ship No. is the way the junk was registered in Nagasaki.

*Note*** : Number of crew members includes both Chinese and Tonkinese.

*Note****: Shacheng (沙埕) is located in present Fuding city (福鼎市), Fujian province.

⁶⁰⁶ Nishikawa, *Zōho kai tsūshōkō*, 106-7.

The Value of Capital Shipped From Nagasaki to Tonkin in Taels

Another way to measure the size of a junk is to examine how much capital a Chinese junk transported from Nagasaki to Tonkin. Both Chinese and Dutch merchants brought Japanese silver, and later copper, to Tonkin. There was nothing else that they could use to buy silk in the silk-producing villages in northern Vietnam.⁶⁰⁷ Hence, silver comprised most of the cargoes of Chinese junks and Dutch ships leaving Nagasaki for Tonkin. As has been pointed out in Chapter Six, local Japanese elites participated in Zhiyan's venture by investing their capital in his junks as well.

Another point to note is that every person on a Chinese junk was a merchant in the sense that every crew member conducted trade on their own account whenever the opportunity arose during a voyage. Wei Zhiyan was the owner, investor and chief merchant of his junks. Traveling merchants (*C. ke shang* 客商), who carried their own goods or consignment cargoes, were often invited to share the cargo compartments of a junk.⁶⁰⁸ Furthermore, each crew member of a Chinese junk, from

⁶⁰⁷ Sakurai, "Tōnanajia 'kinsei' no kaishi", 351; Kurihara, "Oranda higashi indogaisha to tonkin", 10.

⁶⁰⁸ For more on traveling merchants, see Ng, *Trade and Society*, 158; Chen Guodong, "Cong si ge ma lai ci hui kan zhong guo gu dong nan ga di hu bu: *Abang, kiwi, kongsi yu wangkang* (*Abang, kiwi, kongsi and wangkang*)", in *Han wen hua yu*

the senior officer in charge of navigating the junk to the lowest ranked ordinary sailor, was permitted to bring along a certain amount of cargo onboard and to conduct trade during a voyage. While servants of the VOC received a fixed salary in regular intervals, crew members of a Chinese junk received little or no salary for their services on a Chinese junk, which was one of the factors that lowered operation costs of Chinese junks.⁶⁰⁹ Jennifer Wayne Cushman suggested that merchandise shipped by the crew accounted for one-fifth to one-third of the total capacity of the junk.⁶¹⁰ On a Dutch ship, private handlings by crew members were considered “illegal” and were strictly prohibited, although that did not stop the Dutch factors from conducting large-scale private trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki.⁶¹¹

zhou bian min zu (Han culture and peripheries) (Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 2003), 131-9.

⁶⁰⁹ For more details on Chinese shipboard organization, see Nishikawa Joken, *Zōho kai tsūshōkō* (1708; Reprint, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1944), 106-7; Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 149; Ōba, “Hirado matsura shiryō hakubutsukan-zō ‘Tōsen no’”, 30-2.

⁶¹⁰ Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 105-6.

⁶¹¹ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 99-100, 159.

Table 6.4 Value of Capital in Taels Imported into Tonkin by Chinese Junks, 1633-1683 (Annual Averages of Five Year Periods)

	No. of Chinese Junks That Arrived in Tonkin from Nagasaki	Value of Capital Imported into Tonkin	Average Value of Capital per Junk
1633-1635	2	160,000	80,000
1636-1640	1	35,000	35,000
1641-1645	N/A	N/A	N/A
1646-1650	3	200,000	66,667
1651-1655	4	412,000	103,000
1656-1660	2	120,000	60,000
1661-1665	1	200,000	200,000
1666-1670	3	388,300	129,433
1671-1675	2	140,000	70,000
1676-1680	2	90,000	45,000
1681-1685	3	355,000	118,333
Total	23	2,100,300	91,317

Sources: See Appendix C, in which the annual data and sources are provided.

Table 6.4 shows the amount of Japanese silver that Chinese junks exported to Tonkin from 1633 to 1683. Extant data covers twenty out of the fifty-one-year period. The table shows the value of capital in taels that Chinese junks reportedly carried when they departed from Nagasaki or, alternatively, when they arrived in Tonkin. The data presents information on twenty-three Chinese junks that traded between Tonkin and Nagasaki. The value of capital that a Chinese junk brought from Japan to Tonkin fluctuated in an inconsistent manner, varying from 35,000 taels in 1637 up to 300,000 taels in 1668.⁶¹² On average, a junk transported capital worth 90,000 taels for each

⁶¹² Appendix C.

voyage and Chinese junks exported 110,000 taels of capital, mostly in the form of silver, per year from Japan to Tonkin. Most likely the figures presented in Table 6.3 did not include the value of merchandize and capital that each crew member brought onboard for their personal business dealings. Assuming that at least one-fifth of the cargo compartment was reserved for their cargoes, Chinese junks would have carried more capital than Table 6.4 indicates.

Table 6.4 presents another set of data on the value of capital that the VOC invested in the Tonkin market. Data is extant for forty-six out of fifty-one years from 1633 to 1683. During this period, an average of 2.3 Dutch ships appeared in Tonkin every year and one Dutch ship imported an average of 40,000 taels of capital into Tonkin. The VOC invested an average of 95,000 taels per year into the Tonkin market.⁶¹³

⁶¹³ The figure is calculated from Table 6.5 by dividing the total value of VOC capital imported into Tonkin 4,366,131 taels by forty-six years.

Table 6.5 Value of Capital in Taels Invested in Tonkin by the VOC, 1637-1683
Annual Averages of Five-Year Periods

	No. of Dutch Ships That Arrived in Tonkin	Value of Capital Imported into Tonkin	Average Value of Capital per Ship
1636-1640	11	459,331	41,757
1641-1645	27	579,741	21,472
1646-1650	7	534,110	76,301
1651-1655	9	494,089	54,899
1656-1660	7	295,869	42,267
1661-1665	14	580,789	41,485
1666-1670	11	637,315	57,938
1671-1675	12	393,790	32,816
1676-1680	8	249,482	31,185
1681-1685	3	141,615	47,205
Total	109	4,366,131	40,056

Source: Modified from Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 225-9 (Appendix 3 and 4). Dutch guilders were converted into taels.

Note: Figures for the 1641-1645 period include naval vessels dispatched from Batavia to Tonkin for a coordinated attack against Cochinchina in alliance with the Trinh Lord.

A comparison of Table 6.4 and 6.5 shows clearly that Chinese junks arriving in Tonkin from Nagasaki carried a larger capital than Dutch ships did. This observation is in line with the Dutch factors' comments that Chinese merchants operated their business with lower freight costs than the VOC.⁶¹⁴ These general trends are also evident when we scrutinize the ten-year period from 1650-1659.

⁶¹⁴ Bugge, "Silk to Japan", 32.

Table 6.6 The Wei Brothers vs. the VOC on the Tonkin Market, 1650-1659

	The Wei Brothers			The VOC		
	A	B (taels)	C (catties)	D	E (taels)	F (catties)
1650				1	70,000	57,852
1651	1		45,500	2	110,000	
1652	1	77,000	64,500	2	230,000	65,250
1653	1	100,000		1		50,296
1654	1	160,000-170,000	51,000	2	40,000	28,031
1655	1	70,000		1		0
1656	1	70,000-80,000	52,650	1	50,000	44,323
1657	1		41,350	1	90,000	14,190
1658	1	40,000-50,000	51,500	0		0
1659	1			1	100,000	33,477
Total	9	532,000	306,500	12	690,000	293,419
Ave.	0.9	88,667	51,083	1.2	98,571	41,917

Notes:

A. Number of junks operated by the Wei brothers between Tonkin and Nagasaki

B. Value of silver imported by the Wei brothers from Nagasaki into Tonkin.

C. Volume of Tonkinese raw silk exported by the Wei brothers from Tonkin to Nagasaki.

D. Number of VOC ships that arrived in Nagasaki from Tonkin.

E. Value of silver imported by the VOC ships from Nagasaki into Tonkin.

F. Volume of Tonkinese raw silk exported by the VOC from Tonkin to Nagasaki.

Sources: For the VOC, adopted from Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 129 (Table 1); 228 (Appendix 4). For the Wei brothers, see Chapter Three and Appendix A.

The 1650s was a critical period for the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade. During this period, Chinese merchants and the Dutch factors fiercely competed against each other in purchasing raw silk on the Tonkin market. During the 1650s, most Chinese junks operating the Tonkin-Nagasaki route were identified as the Wei brothers' junks.

Table 6.6 is a comparison between the Wei brothers and the VOC on the Tonkin market, in terms of the value of capital imported from Nagasaki to Tonkin as well as the volume of raw silk exported from Tonkin to Nagasaki. Until the mid-1650s, silver occupied approximately 95 percent of the Dutch annual import to Tonkin, and silk products, including both raw silk and silken textile, comprised more than 85 percent of Tonkinese exports to Japan.⁶¹⁵ Although no equivalent data is available for the Wei brothers, there is no doubt that the staple of their trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki was the exchange of Japanese silver for Tonkinese silk products, mainly raw silk.

From 1650 to 1659, the VOC invested 98,571 taels of silver on average in the Tonkin market annually. They imported around 99,000 taels of Japanese silver into the Tonkin market every year. On their way from Tonkin to Nagasaki, each ship exported about 40,000 catties of raw silk. On the other hand, the Wei brothers operated only one junk during this decade. Their junk exported 89,000 taels of Japanese silver to Nagasaki and brought back 51,000 catties of Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki every year (Table 6.6). The Wei brothers' financial standing in the Tonkin market was comparable to the VOC's and they competed with one another in the Tonkin market. In some years during the 1660s, Wei Zhiyan clearly outperformed the

⁶¹⁵ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 129; Nagazumi, "17 seiki chūki no nihon Tonkin bōeki", 34.

Dutch factors. In 1660, for instance, Zhiyan did much better than the Dutch factors in the Tonkin market. He amassed raw silk and silk pieces goods with an estimated value of 180,000 taels ready for export to Japan. The VOC managed to spend only 4,224 taels on purchasing local items out of 22,727 taels invested in the market that year.⁶¹⁶ At the same time, both Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show a plunge in Tonkinese raw silk exports during the 1656-1660 period, reflecting the devastating economic situation in Tonkin during the Trinh's fifth and longest military campaign against the Nguyen from 1655 to 1660. In the middle of this economic depression in northern Vietnam, the VOC shifted its main supplier of raw silk from Tonkin to Bengal. It was a strategic and critical decision for the VOC to avoid severe competition on the weak Tonkin market and to be able to sustain their Japan trade. Despite the differences in trade due to the war and the subsequent economic depression, the Wei brothers persevered during these years and in fact turned a profit.

Sale Value of Cargoes Imported from Tonkin to Nagasaki

On their outbound journey from Tonkin, Chinese junks were fitted out with raw silk, silk piece goods and other products from Tonkin.⁶¹⁷ When Chinese junks sailed into Nagasaki, the VOC factors were keen to know the value and contents of their

⁶¹⁶ DN, 30 October 1660, NF J 74; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 111.

⁶¹⁷ For information on other Tonkinese products for export, see Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 165-85.

ladings. However, the Dutch were contained in the artificial island of *deshima* and were not allowed to contact local people or Chinese merchants in person. Therefore, the official Japanese interpreters of the Dutch language (J. *Oranda tsūji* 阿蘭陀通詞) were asked to gather commercial information on Chinese junks and to inform the Dutch. It is difficult to assess the credibility of the information collected in such a manner because, first of all, even the Dutch merchants did not necessarily trust the information given by the *oranda tsūji*.⁶¹⁸ Secondly, we do not know if cargoes were actually sold at their reported value. Sometimes imported items failed to fetch as good a price as initially expected. In 1667, for example, Japanese merchants estimated that Wei Zhiyan brought cargoes that were expected to be sold at 420,000 taels in total. In the end, the cargoes were actually sold for a total of 300,000 taels.⁶¹⁹ Nonetheless, since available quantitative data on the value and contents of Chinese junks is so scarce, it is useful to pay attention to the Dutch reports.

With respect to the sale value of Tonkinese raw silk in Nagasaki, it can be calculated in accordance with the volume of raw silk put on sale as well as the prices at which these items were sold. In 1654, Itchien's junk returned to Nagasaki on 18 August. Reportedly, it brought 51,000 catties of Tonkinese raw silk.⁶²⁰ According to

⁶¹⁸ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 8.

⁶¹⁹ See Chapter Three.

⁶²⁰ Appendix A.2.

the Dutch factors stationed at Nagasaki, the Tonkinese silk that the Chinese junks brought to Nagasaki that year was sold to Japanese merchants at 2.04 and 2.48 taels per catty.⁶²¹ Based on these figures, Itchien clearly outdid the VOC that year. His shipment of Tonkinese raw silk was sold at an estimated 100,000-130,000 taels while the Dutch only sold Tonkinese silk at Nagasaki for a total of 75,000 taels in the same year.⁶²²

During the 1660s, the VOC exerted all their efforts to expand its trade in Tonkin.⁶²³ Yet, their efforts failed and Chinese merchants outperformed the VOC for most of this decade. In 1660, while Zhiyan's junk returned to Nagasaki with cargoes value at 180,000 taels, the VOC failed to send a ship from Tonkin to Japan.⁶²⁴ In 1667, Zhiyan imported 67,750 catties of Tonkinese raw silk into Japan. It fetched the price of 3.0 taels per catty at Nagasaki, thus bringing their total sales for that year to 203,000 taels.⁶²⁵ The Dutch shipment of Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki yielded only 85,429 taels that year.⁶²⁶ In 1668, Zhiyan's junk returned to Nagasaki with cargoes

⁶²¹ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 356. Also see Appendix B.

⁶²² The sales volume of the VOC was calculated based on the figures given by Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 157-8.

⁶²³ For their various efforts to break through difficult circumstances in Tonkin, see Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 158-9.

⁶²⁴ DN, 30 October 1660, NFJ 74: Appendix A.8.

⁶²⁵ DN, 17-21 December 1667, NFJ 81.

⁶²⁶ Klein, "De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel", 168 (Table 1).

reportedly worth up to 280,000 taels.⁶²⁷ The Dutch sale of Tonkinese raw silk at Nagasaki was worth 123,429 taels that year.⁶²⁸ Given that Tonkinese silk usually comprised more than 85 percent of the total cargoes, the sizes of the Dutch shipments were much smaller than Zhiyan's shipment and thus yielded less sales.

From the 1670s onwards, the VOC exported Tonkinese raw silk on an irregular basis.⁶²⁹ In 1675, the VOC exported 42,000 taels worth of cargoes from Tonkin to Japan, while Lin Yuteng's junk brought lading worth 200,000 taels from Tonkin to Nagasaki.⁶³⁰ In 1682, two Chinese junks under Zhiyan together brought 114,002 catties of Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki, which was sold at 2.05-2.1 taels per catty.⁶³¹ Their joint sales amounted to 230,000-240,000 taels, supporting the argument of this chapter that Chinese undertakings in Tonkinese raw silk export to Japan remained strong in the 1670s and the early 1680s.

⁶²⁷ DN, 21-24 August 1668, NFJ 81.

⁶²⁸ Klein, "De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel", 168 (Table 1).

⁶²⁹ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 159-60.

⁶³⁰ Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 226 (Appendix 3); DN, 8 July 1675, NFJ 88.

⁶³¹ Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 348, 358.

Profit

Having discussed the value of capital that Chinese junks invested in Tonkin and the volume of Tonkinese raw silk they exported to Nagasaki, let us turn to the issue of profit: How much profit could Chinese junk traders make from exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan? Without comprehensive data on their invested capital, the purchase and sale prices of raw silk as well as the costs of their operation, it is impossible to assess how much profit Chinese junk operations could make from one return voyage. This section looks at a few cases where enough quantitative data is available to make some kind of estimate on profit.

In 1654, the arrival of six large Chinese junks, two Dutch ships, one ship from Manila and a small vessel from Macao created intense competition on the Tonkin market. Silk became extremely dear and raw silk was traded at eight-nine *faccar* or 0.11-0.13 taels of silver per tael (37.5g) of raw silk.⁶³² In Nagasaki, Tonkinese raw silk imported by Chinese junks fetched prices of 2.04 and 2.48 taels per catty or 0.127 and 0.155 taels of silver per tael of raw silk.⁶³³ Profit margins were apparently slim that year.

⁶³² Appendix D.

⁶³³ Appendix E.

In 1680, Yuteng bought raw silk from local silk merchants at the prices of seventeen and eighteen *facaar* in Tonkin, meaning that one tael weight of raw silk cost 0.055-0.058 taels of silver. In Nagasaki, Tonkinese raw silk fetched 2.1-2.5 taels per catty, meaning 0.131-0.134 taels of silver per tael of raw silk.⁶³⁴ Therefore, this transaction alone generated a profit margin of more than 120 percent. In 1682, Chinese merchants paid silver one tael for sixteen taels of raw silk, which meant that 1 tael of raw silk cost 0.06 taels of silver.⁶³⁵ In Nagasaki, Tonkinese raw silk was sold at 2.1-2.5 taels per catty.⁶³⁶ In other words, one tael of raw silk yielded 0.13-0.16 taels of silver. The profit margin was between 117 percent and 167 percent. Chinese junk shipping between Tonkin and Nagasaki achieved reasonable performance from the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade in the 1680s when the Dutch trade at Tonkin was in its last phases of decline.

Conclusion

Wei Zhiyan's Tonkin-Nagasaki business was indeed a well-oiled machine. He ran his business with his own junks manned by fewer crew members who carried larger capital than a VOC ship usually did. This means his business was more profitable and efficient. The late 1650s was the critical decade for the Dutch trade

⁶³⁴ Appendix D and E.

⁶³⁵ Appendix D.

⁶³⁶ Appendix E.

between Tonkin and Nagasaki, during which time aggressive Chinese economic activities on the Tonkin market increasingly outperformed the Dutch. From 1655 to 1660, silk production in northern Vietnam was affected by a series of wars between the Trinh and the Ngyuen. Competition among foreign traders on the Tonkin market further intensified due to the shortage of available raw silk. With a sizable amount of capital at hand, including Japanese capital invested by the Nagasaki officials, Chinese merchants bid against the Dutch and offered higher purchase prices for raw silk than the VOC could afford. Chinese maritime traders were able to withstand narrow profit margins during this period because their shipping organization did not require large profit margins to sustain a large organization, fortresses and naval ships.

Tonkin was a small market whose production capacity of raw silk was limited and achieved little visible improvement over the course of the seventeenth century. Frequent occurrences of natural disasters and the constant state of war described in Chapter One severely affected silk production in northern Vietnam. Tonkin alone was not able to fulfill Japanese demand for raw silk. Under these circumstances, the VOC was compelled to switch its main supplier of raw silk from Tonkin to Bengal. As a result, the Dutch export of Tonkinese raw silk to Japan declined from the 1660s onwards. Chinese junks, on the other hand, stayed in business and continued to bring substantial amounts of raw silk from Tonkin to Nagasaki until the mid-1680s.

Raw silk and silken products were the single most significant export items that Tonkin produced during the seventeenth century. Yet, production of raw silk was constantly threatened by natural and human made disasters, which made its supply of raw silk irregular. Tonkin's production capacity did not improve or change much throughout the seventeenth century. In 1637, Nicholaes Couckebacker optimistically estimated that northern Vietnam could deliver 150,000 to 160,000 catties of raw silk annually. However, Tonkin never lived up to that expectation. Tonkin managed to supply in slight excess of 100,000 catties of raw silk to Japan only during good years such as 1651, 1656 and 1665. In 1651 and 1656, Chinese junks and Dutch ships together exported the largest volume of Tonkinese raw silk to Japan, amounting to over 120,000 catties. In 1665 again, Japan imported around 120,000 catties of raw silk from Tonkin. From 1682 onwards, Tonkin suffered a series of natural disasters as described in Chapter One. The early 1680s was arguably one of the most difficult times for the people of northern Vietnam during the seventeenth century. As a result, commercial transactions in Tonkin almost came to a complete halt.

It was the Qing conquest of Taiwan and subsequent liberation of Chinese overseas commerce that entirely changed the conditions for maritime trade in the East and South China seas. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, soon after the Qing liberated Chinese maritime commerce, Ningbo reemerged as a center for trade with Japan. The year 1692 can be effectively considered as the end of direct Chinese junk

shipping between Tonkin and Nagasaki. In 1693, Chinese merchants found raw silk too expensive in Tonkin, presumably due to the expensive prices of copper on the Tonkin market, the currency used to purchase silk in Tonkin. They bought only a small quantity of piece goods in Tonkin and sailed up to Ningbo where they procured Chinese raw silk and silken fabrics for Japan.⁶³⁷ From 1693 to 1724, Lin Yuteng and other Chinese junk traders operated a triangular trade between Ningbo, Tonkin and Nagasaki. The last such ship was recorded in Nagasaki in 1724, marking the end of early modern trade between northern Vietnam and Japan.⁶³⁸ Once Chinese raw silk found an outlet for overseas trade, Tonkin lost its role as the alternative supplier of raw silk to the Japan market and dropped out from the maritime commercial circuits of East and Southeast Asia.

⁶³⁷ *KH*, 2: 1565.

⁶³⁸ Iioka, “Ayutaha kokuō no tainichi bōeki”, 98 (Appendix 6).

CONCLUSION

Detailed and up-to-date knowledge about the market, including the security situation at trading ports, gave a competitive edge in long-distance seaborne commerce. The best way to gather intelligence was through networks of people with a basis of cooperation. It was through human interactions that information was transmitted, trust was built, deals were negotiated, and eventually trade was conducted both within and despite the formalities. Since business transactions occurred in the arena of direct human contacts, mercantile activities did not exist in isolation from other aspects of merchants' lives. Business negotiations could be mediated through a variety of commonalities, including native place affiliation, religious institutions and shared culture. All of these exerted a certain amount of influence on the way trade was organized.

Exploring the Wei brothers' activities, this thesis illustrated that Fuqing merchants were the dominating force in exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan. As far as the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade is concerned, Fuqing merchants outdid and outlasted both the Zheng and the VOC. Their contribution to the Sōfukuji literally and metaphorically shaped the early days of the monastery. Thriving private trade was conducive to the dissemination of Chan Buddhism. It is no coincidence that the Sofukuji realized its golden age at the height of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade. In

return, monasteries stimulated trade by providing merchants with a platform for interacting with the local officials in a private sphere that was one of the key factors for their successful business operation.

When business took place privately and unofficially, cultural capital was indeed an important resource for Chinese literati-entrepreneurs in conducting trade. Chinese merchants wrote poems, played music and patronized painters. Impressing the local elites with their high culture, they were able to build networks within the circle of local elites, crucially including the magistrates of Nagasaki. With the means and resources to connect with the ruling elite in the private sphere, Chinese merchants exerted a certain amount of influence over the conduct of trade and were able quietly to subvert the aims of state control.

Timothy Brook's studies on Buddhist monasteries and the evolution of the late-Ming gentry society from the late-sixteenth to the late-seventeenth centuries indicate that patronage of Buddhist monasteries was an integral part of gentry life.⁶³⁹ The Wei brothers' undertakings, such as their patronage of a Buddhist temple, intimate relationships with the magistrates of Nagasaki, and contribution to charity and public projects, reveal that they acted upon a code of conduct typical of late-Ming

⁶³⁹ Brook, *Playing for Power*, 15-23.

gentry. Given that the Wei brothers were born into this social class, the nature of Chinese maritime commerce during the seventeenth century followed a pattern embedded in the socio-economic developments of the late-Ming China. Brook pointed out that for most men from local gentry families, their utmost concern was economic rather than political. While only a few managed to launch a political career, the rest had to find a way to survive and for their families to continue to prosper. The Wei brothers' participation in maritime commerce exemplifies one such endeavor. Their successful operations in the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade enabled the family to weather the turbulent Ming-Qing transition. Furthermore, their cultural assets made it possible for generations of the Wei (later Ōga) family to maintain their privileged status as cultural elites in Nagasaki even after the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade ceased to be significant. The revival of Chan Buddhism in southern China, which in large part depended on the development of the local gentry class, may also have a maritime connection.

The multi-faceted networks of diasporic Chinese provided a backbone to seaborne commerce in early modern East and Southeast Asia. The Ming-Qing transition in China, changes in foreign and economic policies of Tokugawa Japan, the existence of the anti-Qing Zheng regime on the island of Taiwan, as well as civil wars in Tonkin, all affected regional commerce and the mercantile activity of Chinese maritime traders. Economic, political and social changes that occurred around the rim

of the East and South China Seas transcended national boundaries. Chinese traders were the agent of this exchange. They were able to play this role effectively and efficiently by mobilizing their cultural assets and by networking among people. This era of private trade ended when the Qing finally conquered Taiwan in 1683 and, subsequently, both Qing China and Tokugawa Japan extended their bureaucratic controls into the maritime worlds of East and Southeast Asia.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A Cargo Lists of Wei Zhiyan's Junks

Appendix A.1 Cargo List of Itchien's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
On 27 August 1651 as Reported by the VOC

45,550 catties	Tonkin raw silk
681 pieces	white <i>peiling</i>
445 pieces	black <i>peiling</i>
1,168 pieces	<i>sumungijs</i>
910 pieces	<i>choie</i>
143 pieces	<i>hockins</i>
14 catties	musk
1,100 catties	lead
1,803 pieces	sappanwood
10 pieces	sandalwood
100 catties	camphor
620 catties	various medicines
170 pieces	raw <i>baa</i>

Source: Note on the incoming cargos by Chinese from 1 November 1650 to 13 September 1651, VOC 1183: 427v.

Appendix A.2 Cargo List of Itchien's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
On 18 August 1654 as Reported by the VOC

51,000 catties	Tonkinese raw silk
1,203 pieces	Tonkinese <i>peeling</i>
355 pieces	white <i>gilens</i>
801 pieces	<i>sommungis</i>
195 pieces	<i>damast</i>
364 pieces	<i>hockins</i>
313 catties	raw <i>baa</i>
14 pieces	<i>fluwelen</i>
22 pieces	Tonkinese cotton
5 pieces	<i>foras</i>
2,000 catties	<i>sittouw</i>
1,620 pieces	sappanwood
21 packs	medicines
30 packs	ray skin
100 packs	Chinese gold

Source: Note on the commodities brought to Nagasaki by Chinese junks from 28 October 1653 to 6 October 1654, VOC 1207.

Appendix A.3 Cargo List of Wei Zhiyan's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
On 19 August 1656 as Reported by the VOC

52,650 catties	Tonkin silk from the Chua
156 pieces	Tonkinese <i>peiling</i>
185 pieces	<i>chioe</i>
483 pieces	<i>somongijs</i>
269 pieces	<i>gilens</i>
160 pieces	<i>hochins</i>
20 pieces	<i>baa</i>
20 pieces	Tonkin cotton
400 catties	cardamom
5,000 catties	Tonkin cinnamon
1,000 catties	various medicines
10,000 catties	sappanwood

Source: Report on cargoes brought to Nagasaki by Chinese junks 1652-1657, NFJ 823.

Appendix A.4 Cargo List of Zhiyan's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
as Reported by the VOC on 20 August 1657

41,350 catties	Tonkinese raw silk
1,350 pieces	<i>pelings</i>
850 catties	<i>sittouw</i>
693 pieces	<i>gilens</i>
34 pieces	<i>panghsis</i>
133 pieces	<i>sommungi</i>
260 pieces	<i>hockins</i>
38 catties	<i>baa</i>
66 pieces	<i>gasen</i>
574 pieces	<i>chioe</i>
320 pieces	<i>chioerony</i>
4 pieces	<i>lijwaten</i>
10,000 catties	sappanwood
2 pieces	<i>fluweel</i>
9 pieces	elephant task
1,900 catties	medicines
2 catties	musk
1 box	small commodities
2 boxes	Chinese books
10 catties	Tonkinese silver

Source: VOC 1223: 580.

Appendix A.5 Cargo List of Zhiyan's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
On 13 September 1658 as Reported by the VOC

51,500 catties	raw silk
2,157 pieces	<i>Peling</i>
229 pieces	<i>Hockins</i>
38 pieces	<i>sommungs</i>
127 pieces	<i>Gilens</i>
80 pieces	<i>Chioe</i>
8 pieces	white <i>pluijs</i>
2,300 catties	<i>Sittow</i>
13 catties	Musk
1,700 catties	various medicines
408 catties	elephant task
7 packs	small commodities

Source: Notes on the specification of the commodities brought by thirty-eight Chinese junks from China, Siam Cambodia, Quinam, Tonkin and other places in Nagasaki, 3 January 1657 to 11 October 1658, VOC 1228: 810-810v.

Appendix A.6 Cargo List of Wei Zhiyan's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from
Cambodia On 5 August 1663 as Reported by the VOC

39,350 pieces	diverse kinds of deerskin
782 pieces	caw hide
1061 catties	buffalo horns
10,000 catties	Cambodian nuts
12,000 catties	brown sugar
10,000 catties	sappanwood
900 catties	wax
300 catties	pepper
18 pieces	tiger hide
150 pieces	<i>haye</i> skin (a kind of ray skin)
10 catties	rancheros horns
60 catties	<i>cassomba</i>
600 pieces	<i>roche</i> skin (a kind of ray skin)
20 catties	<i>calimbak</i>
25,000 catties	<i>namrak</i>

Source: DN, 5 August 1663, NFJ 76.

Appendix A.7 Cargo List of Wei Zhiyan's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
On 25 August 1665 as Reported by the VOC

35,150 catties	raw silk
838 pieces	<i>peiling</i>
530 pices	<i>hockins</i>
160 pieces	<i>sommung</i>

Source: Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 384.

Table A.8 Cargo List of Zhiyan's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
On 8 October 1667 as Reported by the VOC

67,750 catties	raw silk
11,886 pieces	<i>peeling</i>
13,467 pieces	<i>hockins</i>
3,026 pieces	coarse <i>sommungis</i>
900 pieces	black <i>sommungis</i>
1,034 pieces	
3,870 pieces	<i>gilens</i>
208 pieces	Chinese <i>panics</i>
60 pieces	<i>phelpen</i>
3,857 pieces	
61 pieces	various <i>pluijs</i>
1,090 pieces	<i>baa</i>
540 pieces	
20 catties	<i>naaij zide</i>
30 catties	Musk
3,050 catties	Alum
20 catties	dried alum
300 catties	fragrant woods
700 catties	Licorice
163 catties	Tonkin silver

Source: Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu", 285.

Note: I have consulted with the two manuscripts to which Nakamura referred to, namely Letter from Daniel Six in Nagasaki to Cornelis Valkenier in Tonkin, 6 November 1667, VOC 1267: 706-7 as well as DN, 8 October 1667, NFJ 80. However, I have failed to find the above data in either of them.

Appendix A.9 Cargo List of Zhiyan's Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin
As Reported by the VOC on 21-24 August 1668

450 piculs	<i>peiling</i> <i>sommungis</i> <i>baas</i>
130 catties	Chinese silk pieces goods musk dried medicines

Source: DN, 21-24 August 1668, NFJ 81.

Appendix A.10 Cargo List of Zhiyan's Junk Leaving Tonkin for Nagasaki
As Reported by the EIC on 4 September 1672

50,000 catties	raw silk
1,000 pieces	broad <i>baas</i> purple
10,000 pieces	<i>sommungi</i>
30,000 pieces	<i>lyns</i>
2-300 pieces	<i>laas</i>
1,034 pieces	<i>luas</i> or <i>hockin</i>
great quantity	refuse silk

Source: IOR G/12/17, pt. 1: 33r-4v.

Appendix B. Volume of Raw Silk Imported into Japan, 1633-1683

Year	A	B	C	D	E	F
1633	250,000					
1634	250,000	100,000	40%	64,000	0	0%
1635				120,000		
1636				142,100		
1637					58,241	
1638					64,051	
1639	43,220				68,500	
1640	*82,488	9,350	11%		110,739	
1641	131,755	20,750	16%	110,622	30,351	27%
1642	60,535		0%	87,585	28,470	33%
1643	68,746	580	1%	71,914	36,298	50%
1644	63,682		0%	98,953	61,709	62%
1645	148,705	1,300	1%	138,175	75,283	54%
1646	116,125	3,700	3%	91,418	63,933	70%
1647		40,000		83,843	49,469	59%
1648	12,887	0	0%	76,926	50,447	66%
1649	125,141	26,500	21%	69,972	55,152	79%
1650	183,280	39,800	22%	103,647	57,825	56%
1651	*187,545	120,827	64%		0	
1652	187,500		0%	120,943	65,206	54%
1653	222,170	30,700	14%	151,133	50,296	33%
1654	139,631	51,850	37%	80,588	28,031	35%
1655	174,822	20,800	12%	81,077	0	0%
1656	211,620	79,000	37%	185,495	44,323	24%
1657	115,883	42,300	37%	124,389	14,190	11%
1658	147,100	55,870	38%	144,683	0	0%
1659	245,123	2,250	1%	161,747	33,477	21%
1660	259,821		0%	146,749	0	
1661	208,788	41,000	20%			
1662	102,680	0	0%			
1663	47,275	450	1%			
1664	112,598		0%			
1665	232,645	70,300	30%	277,051	49,202	18%
1666	16,000	0	0%	127,082	36,854	29%
1667		67,750		63,276		0%
1668				221,359	51,740	23%
1669		35,000		179,175	57,665	32%
1670				168,398		0%

1671	50,000			120,031		0%
1672		50,000		223,244	34,447	15%
1673				211,812	44,393	21%
1674	220,000	60,000	27%			
1675		70,000				
1676	133,283		0%			
1677				172,425		
1678						
1679				121,059		
1680	*189,814	89,065	47%			
1681						
1682	170,254	114,002	67%			
1683	9,749	676	7%			

A: Total volume of raw silk imported by Chinese junks including Chinese, Cochin Chinese, Cambodian, Bengali and Tonkinese silk.

B: Volume of Tonkinese raw silk imported by Chinese junks.

C: Share of Tonkinese silk (B/A)

D: Total volume of raw silk, including Chinese, Bengali, Persian and Tonkinese, imported by the VOC ships.

E: Volume of Tonkinese raw silk imported by the VOC ships.

Source: A: For 1639, Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*, Vol. 4, 296; for the rest, Yamawaki, *Kinu to momen no edojidai*, 29-30. *Corrected by the author in reference to Nagazumi, *Tōsen ushutsu nyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 330-49.

B: For 1633 and 1634, Iwao, *Shingan shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū*, 301 & 315; for 1647, DN, 6 & 9 August 1647, NFJ61; for the rest, Nagazumi, *Tōsen ushutsu nyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 330-49.

C: Share of Tonkinese raw silk (B/A)

D: For 1635 and 1636, *GM*, 1: 514, 589; for the rest, Yamawaki, “Oranda higashi indo gaisha”, 76-7.

E: For 1637, 1638 and 1640, Nagazumi, “17 seiki chūki no nihon tonkin bōeki”, 35 (Table 4); for 1639, Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 148; for the rest, Yamawaki, *Kinu to momen no edojidai*, 29-30.

F: Share of Tonkinese silk (E/D)

Appendix C. Estimated Capital in Taels
Imported into Tonkin by Chinese Junks, 1637-1683

Year	Trader(s)	Value (<i>taels</i>)	Item	Sources
1633	1 junk	80,000	Silver	Nagazumi, Vol. 3, 70
1634	1 junk	80,000	Silver	Iwao, 314
1637	1 junk	35,000	Silver	Nagazumi, Vol. 4, 23
1647	2 junks	80,000	Silver	<i>GM</i> , 2: 325
1648	1 junk	120,000	Silver	Hoang, 153
1652	Itchien	77,000	Silver	DN, 12 March 1652, NFJ65
1653	Itchien	100,000	Silver	DN, 23 March 1653, NFJ66
1654	Itchien	160,000-170,000	Silver	DN, 3 August 1654, NFJ67
1655	Zhiyan	70,000	Silver	DN, 18 July 1656, NFJ69
1656	Zhiyan	70,000-80,000	Silver	Nakamura, 381-2
1658	Zhiyan	40,000-50,000	Silver	DN, 16 April 1658, NFJ71
1664	Zhiyan	200,000	Silver	<i>DB</i> , 1664: 549
1667	Yuteng	66,800	Silver	<i>TKN</i> , 1: 62
1668	Zhiyan	300,000	Silver	DN, 24-5 January 1668, NFJ81
1670	Zhiyan	21,000-22,000	Copper	DN, 21 January 1670, NFJ83
1673	Zhiyan	50,000	Copper	Nakamura, 386
1674	Zhiyan	80,000-100,000	Copper	IOR, G/12/17, pt.2: 105v-106v
1679	2 junks	90,000	Silver, copper	<i>GM</i> , 4: 381
1681	Zhiyan	150,000	Silver, copper	IOR, G/12/17, pt. 6: 285r
1683	2 junks	205,000	Silver	IOR, G/12/17, pt. 8: 310r

Sources: Hoang, *Silk for Silver*; Nakamura, "Tonkin daihakushu"; Nagazumi, *Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki*; Iwao, *Shinban shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū*.

Note: Name of chief merchant indicates one junk. When name of chief merchant is not available, number of ships is given.

Appendix D. Purchase Price (in *faccar*) of Tonkinese Raw Silk in Tonkin

Year	Purchase Price	Seller	Buyer	Source
1637	15	The <i>Chua</i>	Portuguese	Nagazumi, 33
	16-17, 18-20	merchants	Portuguese	Nagazumi, 33
	15	The <i>Chua</i>	Dutch	Hoang, 146
	16	Merchants	Dutch	Hoang, 146
	17	Mandarins	Dutch	Hoang, 146
1639	15	The <i>Chua</i>	Dutch	Nagazumi, 33
1643	17.4	Ave.	Dutch	Nagazumi, 33
1652	(1 st)11, 11.5	Merchants	Dutch	Kurihara, 16
1653	(2 nd , 3 rd)11, 11.5	Merchants	Dutch	Kurihara, 16
	(1 st)8	Merchants	Chinese	Kurihara, 16
1654	(1 st)8, 8.5, 9	Merchants		Nakamura, 381
1658	(1 st)11 → 9, 9.5*	Merchants	Zhiyan	Nakamura, 382
	(2 nd)11, 12	Merchants	Zhiyan	Nakamura, 382
1659	(1 st)8	Merchants	Zhiyan	Nakamura, 382
1664	8, 8.5, 9	Merchants	Zhiyan	Nakamura, 384
1665	(1 st)13	Merchants		Nakamura, 384
1675	15	The <i>Chua</i>	Dutch	IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 144r
	14	The <i>Chua</i>	Yuteng	IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 144r
	13	The <i>Chua</i>	English	IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 144r
1676	15.5	Merchants	Chinese	IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 148r
1677	9.5-14	Merchants	Chinese	IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 198r
1680	(1 st)17, (2 nd)18	Merchants	Yuteng	IOR, G/12/17, pt.6: 273v
1682	(1 st)16, (2 nd)17	The <i>Chua</i>	Yuteng	IOR, G/12/17, pt.7: 284v

Note: (1st): first-grade or *cabessa* silk; (2nd): second grade or *bariga* silk.

Note:* At the beginning of the summer trading season, first-grade silk could be purchased at 11 *faccar*. After the competitors from Macao arrived, the price rose to 9 to 9.5 *faccar* for first grade silk.

Appendix E.
Sale Price (*taels per catty*) of Tonkinese Raw Silk at Nagasaki

Year	Chinese	VOC	Portuguese
1636		2.90	2.94
1637		1.80	2.03
1638		2.40	2.46
1639		2.72	
1643	2.8	2.65, 2.72	
1645	2.9	2.41, 3.31	
1646	2.8	2.23, 2.93	
1650		1.74	
1651		2.77, 2.83, 2.39, 2.25	
1654	2.48, 2.04	2.43	
1668		2.21	
1667	3.0	2.90	
1669	2.95, 3.3		
1680	2.1-2.15		
1682	2.1-2.5		
1683	2.7		

Sources: Nagazumi, *Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 352-61; Nagazumi, “17 seikichūki no nihon Tonkin bōeki”, 32-3; Hoang, *Silk for Silver*, 146-7, 154-5.

Appendix F. Trinh Lords in Tonkin in the Seventeenth Century

Reign	<i>Chúa</i>
1623-1657	Trịnh Tráng
1657-1682	Trịnh Tạc
1682-1709	Trịnh Căn

Appendix G. Governor Generals of the VOC in the Seventeenth Century

Terms	Governor General
1636 – 1645	Antonio van Diemen
1645 – 1650	Cornelis van der Lijn
1650 – 1653	Carel Reniers
1653 – 1678	Joan Maetsuyker
1678 – 1681	Rijcklof van Goens
1681 – 1684	Cornelis Janszoon Speelman
1684 – 1691	Joannes Camphuys

Appendix H. Chief Factors of the VOC Factory in Tonkin

Term	Name
1637 – 1641	Carel Hartsinck
1642 – 1647	Antonio van Brockhorst
1647 – 1650	Philip Schillemans
1650 – 1651	Jacob Keijser
March 1651 – June 1651	Jan de Groot
1651 – 1653	Jacob Keijser
1653 – 1656	Louis Isaacszn Baffart
1657 – 1659	Nicolaas de Voogt
1660 – 1664	Hendrick Baron
1664 – 1665	Hendrick Verdonk
1665 – 1667	Constantijn Ranst
1667 – 1672	Cornelis Valckenier
1672 – 1677	Albert Brevinck
1677 – 1679	Johannes Besselman
1679 – 1687	Leendert de Moy
1687 – 1691	Johannes Sibens

Appendix I. Abbots of Sofukuji during the Seventeenth Century

Term	Chinese	Japanese	
1646–	Baizhuo Ruli	Hyakusetsu Nyori	百拙如理
1650 – 1655	Daozhe Chaoyuan	Dōsya Chōgen	道者超元
1655 –	Yinyuan Longqi	Ingen Ryuki	隱元隆琦
1655 – 1657	Daozhe Chaoyuan	Dōsya Chōgen	道者超元
1657 – 1663	Jifei Ruyi	Sokuhi Nyoitsu	即非如一

Appendix J. Magistrates of Nagasaki in the Seventeenth Century

1640 – 1642	Tsuge Masatoki	柘植正時
1642 – 1650	Baba Toshishige	馬場利重
1642 – 1650	Yamazaki Masanobu	山崎正信
1650 – 1665	Kurokawa Masanao	黒川正直
1651 – 1660	Kainoshō Masa	甲斐庄正述
1660 – 1662	Tsumaki Yorikuma	妻木頼熊
1662 – 1666	Shimada Tadamasa	島田忠政
1665 – 1666	Inou Masatomo	稻生正倫
1666 – 1671	Matsudaira Takami	松平隆見
1666 – 1672	Kawano Michisada	河野通定
1671 – 1681	Ushigome Shigeyasu	牛込重恭
1672 – 1680	Okano Tadaaki	岡野貞明
1680 – 1693	Kawaguchi Munetsune	川口宗恒
1681 – 1686	Miyagi Masayoshi	宮城和甫
1686 – 1687	Ōsawa Mototetsu	大沢基哲
1687 – 1694	Yamaoka Kagesuke	山岡景助
1687 – 1696	Miyagi Tomosumi	宮城和澄
1694 – 1701	Kondō Mochikage	近藤用景
1695 – 1702	Niwa Nagamori	丹羽長守
1696 – 1698	Suwa Yoritaka	諏訪頼隆