

A DEFENSE OF INCORRIGIBILITY AND SELF-INTIMATION

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Summary

In this project, I defend two theses.

The first holds that if you have the introspective belief that your phenomenal experience seems to you to be a such-and-such, then necessarily, your phenomenal experience seems to you to be such-and-such. In other words, your introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of your phenomenal experiences are logically incorrigible.

The second holds that if you have a phenomenal experience, then necessarily, you will be aware of it, given that you are paying attention to it. In other words, your phenomenal experiences are logically disposed to be self-intimating.

1: The Two Theses

1.1: Preamble

Presumably, if you accidentally press your hand against the surface of a hot kettle, your phenomenal experience will seem to you to be what one feels when one's hand is burned. Assuming that you are paying attention to your phenomenal experiences, is it logically possible for you *not* to be aware of this particular phenomenal experience of getting your hand burned? And is it logically possible that the introspective belief that you have (if you do have one) about this phenomenal experience is *not* that it seems to you to be what one feels when one's hand is burned? In this situation, is it logically possible that you have the introspective belief that your phenomenal experience seems to you to be a tickle or a caress instead?

I argue that all of the above scenarios are logically impossible. I defend the thesis that our introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of our phenomenal experiences are logically incorrigible, and the thesis that our phenomenal experiences are, in a way, logically self-intimating. I defend the view that one will be aware of one's phenomenal experiences if one is paying attention to one's phenomenal experiences. I also defend the view that if one has the introspective belief that one's phenomenal experience seems to one to be *Y*,¹ for example, then necessarily one's phenomenal experience *in fact* seems to one to be *Y*. If I succeed in defending these two theses, then some doctrine of transparency of one's phenomenal experiences is entailed—that the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are immediately and accurately

¹ *Y* being any phenomenal experience a human being is capable of having.

made known to oneself at the time one has those experiences, given the appropriate conditions specified above. Besides defending these two theses, I also present some of their implications for other areas in the philosophy of mind.

I define the central terms of this project in Section 1.2. Next, I distinguish the two theses more clearly and highlight some misconstruals of these two theses in Section 1.3. By doing so, I hope to dispel any objection formed due to misconstrual of either thesis. I hope that this maneuver also helps to bring out the intuitive force of the two theses.

In Chapter 2, I explain the implications of these two theses for Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument, the Zombie Argument and the Inverted Spectrum Argument. I hope to show that this project, if successful, has significant consequences for these three arguments.

In Chapter 3, I present and respond to objections against the thesis of logical incorrigibility, and in Chapter 4, I do the same for the thesis of logical self-intimation.

In the final chapter, I suggest ways to handle the issues that are left unresolved by the end of this project.

1.2: Definition of Terms

1.2.1: Phenomenal Experience

By phenomenal experience,² I am referring to the kind of experience that has a subjective, qualitative feel to it. Examples of phenomenal experiences are the red appearance of a tomato, the loud blare of a horn, the unique taste of *wasabi*, the smoothness of silk, the aroma of coffee, the pain that comes with a pin prick and so on. There is a particular feeling when you have these experiences, although you might not

² I use the terms "phenomenal experiences" and "qualia" interchangeably.

always find it easy to describe without being repetitive, describing it as the kind of experience one has when looking at a red tomato, for example. The usual description of such a phenomenal experience is that it is red, reddish, or has a reddish character.³

There are a few aspects of a phenomenal experience. One of them is the causal aspect. The causal aspect of a pin prick in my finger might be the act of pricking my finger with a pin. Another aspect of a phenomenal experience might be its spatial aspect. The spatial aspect of a pin prick in my finger is that of being located in my finger. In this project, I am concerned only with the *phenomenal aspect* of a phenomenal experience. The phenomenal aspect of a pin prick in my finger would be the sensation of a pin prick, and that of the red appearance of a tomato would be the red sensation. I am concerned only with how a phenomenal experience *feels*.

1.2.2: Introspective Belief

By introspection, I mean the act of “the mind turn[ing] inward on itself and perceiv[ing] a procession of mental events”, to use Armstrong’s words.⁴ Introspective beliefs, then, are beliefs that are derived via introspection, and correspondingly, introspective beliefs about one’s phenomenal experiences are beliefs that are derived via introspection of one’s phenomenal experiences.

One can have introspective beliefs about things other than one’s phenomenal experiences. Bernard may have introspective beliefs about his beliefs about the moon—upon introspection, he believes that he believes that the moon is not made of blue cheese.

³ Chalmers makes a similar point about the difficulty we have in describing our phenomenal experiences; see David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 8.

⁴ D. M. Armstrong, “Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?”, The Philosophical Review.72,4 (October 1963), p. 417.

Mary may have introspective beliefs about what she knows—upon introspection, she believes that she does not know who Samuel Clemens is. I focus solely on one’s introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one’s phenomenal experiences. If I look at a red tomato, and upon introspection, I believe that my phenomenal experience seems to me to be the red appearance of a red tomato, then it can be said that I have an introspective belief about the phenomenal aspect of my phenomenal experience of looking at the red tomato. In this case, my introspective belief simply is that my phenomenal experience seems to me to be the red appearance of a red tomato.

In *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, Armstrong argues that if mental processes are in fact physical states of the brain, then introspection, a mental process, must be a physical process in the brain. To be exact, he thinks that introspection is a self-scanning process in the brain.⁵ The conclusion, that introspection is a physical process in the brain, is entailed by Central-state Materialism, the latter being the view that mental states are purely physical states of the central nervous system.⁶ Armstrong ends up discarding the theses of logical incorrigibility and logical self-intimation to maintain the logical integrity of Central-state Materialism.

I am not defending the theses of logical incorrigibility and logical self-intimation in the light of any particular theory of consciousness, much less Central-state Materialism. I do not share Armstrong’s goal of establishing Central-state Materialism. My aims are to elucidate, examine, and defend, if possible, the two theses he chooses to discard. For these reasons, I think that we need not and should not conceptualize introspection as a self-scanning process in the brain. Consequently, we need not conceptualize introspective

⁵ D. M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), p. 102.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

beliefs as beliefs formed via self-scanning processes in the brain either. I think that introspection should simply be seen as the perception of our phenomenal experiences, following the definition given by Armstrong. Introspective beliefs are then beliefs formed after perceiving our phenomenal experiences.

1.2.3: Incorrigoibility and Logical Incorrigoibility⁷

When I say that one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are incorrigoible, I mean that it is impossible for one to have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences. Following Armstrong, a definition of the notion of incorrigoibility-for-A⁸ is as follows: p is incorrigoible for A if, and only if:

- (i) A believes p ,
- (ii) (A believes that p) implies (p).⁹

So, to say that Susan's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of her phenomenal experiences are incorrigoible is to say that if she has the introspective belief that whatever she is looking at seems white to her, for example, then whatever she is looking at *does in fact* seem white to her. However, this thesis of incorrigoibility does not rule out the *logical* possibility that some or all of the introspective beliefs one has about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences might be false. Even if this thesis of incorrigoibility were true, it might still be *logically* possible that one has the

⁷ I use the terms "incorrigoibility", "indubitability" and "infallibility" interchangeably.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-1. Armstrong argues that an individual's incorrigoible awareness of her own mental states does not entail others' incorrigoible awareness of that same mental state of hers, so he thinks that it is convenient to define incorrigoibility-for-A rather than simple incorrigoibility. I agree with him, and the way I have described incorrigoibility so far is consistent with his point.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

introspective belief that whatever one is looking at seems white to one, for example, but in actual fact, whatever one is looking at *does not* seem white to one.

When I say that one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are *logically* incorrigible, I mean that it is *logically* impossible for one to have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences. To rephrase it with the notion of possible worlds, if one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are *logically* incorrigible, then there is no *logically* possible world in which one has the introspective belief, that whatever one is looking at seems white to one, for example, but in fact, whatever one is looking at does not seem white to one. If one has the introspective belief that one's phenomenal experience seems to one to be *Y*, then *necessarily*, one's phenomenal experience seems to one to be *Y*. Armstrong's definition of incorrigibility-for-*A*, which is, in my terms, logical-incorrigibility-for-*A*, is as follows: *p* is *logically* incorrigible¹⁰ for *A* if, and only if:

- (i) *A* believes *p*,
- (ii) (*A* believes that *p*) *logically* implies (*p*).¹¹

I defend this thesis of logical incorrigibility. I argue that a person who has the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience seems to her to have such-and-such qualities, is *necessarily* having a phenomenal experience that seems to her to have such-and-such qualities. Supposing Susan has the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be an itch on the sole of her left foot, I argue that given that

¹⁰ Armstrong does not use the term "logical incorrigibility". He only uses the term "incorrigibility", but the definition of incorrigibility he gives coincides with what I have termed "logical incorrigibility".

¹¹ *Ibid.*, (italics mine).

introspective belief she has, *necessarily* her phenomenal experience seems to her to be an itch on the sole of her left foot.¹²

The thesis of incorrigibility is quite intuitive, and most of us are probably inclined to accept it. However, the thesis of *logical* incorrigibility is much stronger and harder to defend, and many who accept the weaker thesis of incorrigibility are hesitant to accept the thesis of logical incorrigibility. An argument in favor of the thesis of incorrigibility will seem redundant to most, since the thesis is, as I mentioned, quite intuitive. However, an argument in favor of the thesis of logical incorrigibility will not seem *as* redundant as one in favor of the thesis of incorrigibility, and the reader may be expecting such an argument in my project.

Nevertheless, I maintain that the thesis of logical incorrigibility requires no argument in favor of it, because although less intuitive than the thesis of incorrigibility, it still holds enough intuitive force to warrant a “default position” status. I think that the thesis of logical incorrigibility is even more intuitive than the claim that it is wrong to torture helpless infant humans for recreation. Since we would not require one to give an argument to support this latter claim, I think that an argument in favor of the thesis of logical incorrigibility is not required as well. Those who reject the thesis of logical

¹² Robert Francescotti defends a thesis of incorrigibility that is similar to the thesis of incorrigibility that I defend. He defends the view that “[n]ecessarily, for any individual x, if x has an [introspectively proper report] of the form ‘My current conscious experience has qualitative character Q,’ then x’s [introspectively proper report] is true.” See Robert Francescotti, “Introspection and Qualia: A Defense of Infallibility”, *Communication & Cognition* 33,3/4 (2000), pp. 161-73. An introspectively proper report (of one’s phenomenology), as used by him, refers to a report, about one’s phenomenology, that “contain only the data of introspection proper”. This is to be distinguished from a report, about one’s phenomenology, that is “based at least partly on inferences from the introspective data.” *Ibid.*, p. 167. Suppose I am told that the drink I am offered is going to taste sweet, when in fact it will taste bitter. Probably, my introspective report of how the drink tastes to me, when I finally taste it, might *not* be an introspectively proper report, if I let my expectation of how the drink will taste like get in the way of the introspection data when making my introspective report. If that expectation did not get in the way, and I made the introspective report on the basis of the introspection data only, then my introspective report would be an introspectively proper report.

incorrigibility should be the ones to provide the arguments to support their charge instead. For my part, I simply have to defend the thesis against these objections.

1.2.4: Self-intimation, Logical Self-intimation and Dispositional Logical Self-intimation¹³

To say that one's phenomenal experiences are self-intimating is to say that awareness of one's phenomenal experiences never fails to accompany one's phenomenal experiences. If Susan's phenomenal experiences are self-intimating, and if her phenomenal experience seems to her to be a pain in her left knee, then she will be aware of that pain. Following Armstrong, a definition of self-intimating-for-A is as follows: *p* is self-intimating for A if, and only if:

- (i) *p*,
- (ii) (*p*) implies (A believes *p*).¹⁴

The thesis of self-intimation does not rule out the *logical* possibility that on some or all occasions, one is unaware of the phenomenal character of one's phenomenal experiences. Even if this thesis is true, it might still be *logically* possible that one has phenomenal experiences that one is totally unaware of.

To say that one's phenomenal experiences are *logically* self-intimating is to say that one logically must be aware of one's own phenomenal experiences. In other words, it is not logically possible that awareness of one's phenomenal experience fails to accompany one's phenomenal experience. Armstrong's definition of what I term "logically-self-intimating"-for-A is: *p* is *logically* self-intimating for A if, and only if:

- (i) *p*,

¹³ *Ibid.* Armstrong credits the term "self-intimation" to Gilbert Ryle.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

(ii) *(p) logically implies (A believes p)*.¹⁵

The thesis of logical self-intimation that I defend is a weaker version than the one presented here. The one I defend allows for occasions when a person might actually be unaware of her phenomenal experiences, but only because she is not paying attention to them.

Peter Carruthers gives the example of Samuel, a soldier in the midst of battle, who is unaware of the pain in his hand from holding the red-hot barrel of a gun. It is clear that he experiences pain because he jerks his hand away and nurses it in the way one would nurse a burned hand. However, when questioned, he admits that he was totally unaware of the pain during the heat of battle.¹⁶ In this example, it might be the case that Samuel was genuinely unaware of the pain during the heat of the battle, but I think that if he were not pre-occupied with dodging bullets and engaging the enemy, he would have been aware of that pain in his hand.

A second example illustrates the same point. Imagine driving a vehicle for a long time without taking a break. Due to your weariness, you might end up in a state where you continue driving the vehicle without actually being aware of what you do with the vehicle. For example, you might have avoided an oncoming vehicle, stopped for pedestrians to cross the road, or observed various traffic signals. However, you might have been genuinely unaware of these actions of yours, after you “came to”. But I think

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, (italics mine).

¹⁶ Peter Carruthers, *The Animals Issue: Moral theory in practice*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 187. Carruthers meant this as an example of unconscious pain. I think it works just as well to illustrate the point that one could be unaware of one’s own phenomenal experiences.

that if you had been paying attention while driving, you would have been aware of the oncoming vehicle, the pedestrians and the signals.¹⁷

Or I could be looking at a whiteboard that is almost completely white except for a very faint smudge of pink at the corner. I might not hesitate to say that the whiteboard seems to me to be totally white. The pink shade at the corner, although present to me, might have easily blended in with the whiteness of the rest of the whiteboard, such that I can hardly make out any pink in all that whiteness. But if my attention were directed to that pink shade, then I think that necessarily, I would be aware of it.

Considering the cases above, I think that it is more reasonable to defend the following version of logical self-intimation: One's awareness of one's phenomenal experiences is logically disposed to accompany one's phenomenal experiences. More precisely: p is dispositionally logically self-intimating for A if, and only if:

- (i) p ,
- (ii) (p) logically implies (if A carefully considers whether p , then A believes that p).

This thesis of dispositional logical self-intimation allows the possibility that one might be unaware of one's phenomenal experiences, but retains the logical connection between the person's awareness of her phenomenal experiences and the occurrence of those phenomenal experiences, in cases when her attention is not diverted elsewhere.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 170. Carruthers uses this as an example of unconscious experience. Also see William G. Lycan and Zena Ryder, "The loneliness of the long-distance truck driver", *Analysis* 63,2 (April 2003), p. 132. Lycan and Ryder credit this example of the long-distance driver to Armstrong. They refer to this example to make a similar point about unconscious experience, but they are concerned with the issue of higher-order perception rather than the issue we are concerned with, namely dispositional logical self-intimating phenomenal experiences.

1.2.5: Logical Transparency of One's Phenomenal Experiences

The doctrine of logical transparency of one's phenomenal experiences which I defend in this thesis is a combination of the theses of logical incorrigibility and dispositional logical self-intimation.

If a person's awareness, of a particular phenomenal experience of hers, is logically disposed to accompany the phenomenal experience in question, and if it is logically impossible for her introspective belief of the phenomenal experience (if she has an introspective belief about the phenomenal experience) to be false, then her phenomenal experience can be said to be logically transparent.¹⁸

1.3: Misconstruing the Theses

1.3.1: Distinguishing Incorrigibility from Self-intimation

Some might think that the theses of incorrigibility and self-intimation are similar, although they are actually quite different. The incorrigibility thesis states that it is logically impossible that one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are mistaken. It says nothing about one's awareness of one's phenomenal experiences. With regard to one's phenomenal experiences, error alone is ruled out by the thesis of incorrigibility, but not ignorance.

On the other hand, self-intimation states that logically, one is disposed to be aware of one's phenomenal experiences. It says nothing about the truth values of one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences.

¹⁸ To make it more readable, from this point, I shall replace terms to do with "logical incorrigibility" with terms to do with "incorrigibility"; terms to do with "dispositional logical self-intimation" shall be replaced with terms to do with "self-intimation".

With regard to one's phenomenal experiences, ignorance alone is ruled out by the thesis of self-intimation, but not error.¹⁹

1.3.2: Distinguishing Incorrigeability from Logically Privileged Access

The thesis of incorrigibility should also be distinguished from the thesis of logically privileged access. To hold that one has logically privileged access to one's phenomenal experiences is to hold that logically, one's introspective beliefs about one's phenomenal experiences are the best authority regarding the qualities of one's phenomenal experiences. Any other evidence²⁰ cannot override the verdict of one's introspective beliefs when the qualities of one's phenomenal experience are in question.

To illustrate the thesis of logically privileged access, consider the following example. Suppose that Susan's phenomenal experience seems to her to be a headache, and her introspective belief is that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be a headache. However, for some reason, her behavior and physiology suggest that her phenomenal experience cannot seem to her to be a headache. Her behavior and physiology suggest that her phenomenal experience should seem to her to be a stomachache instead. If Susan has logically privileged access to her own phenomenal experiences, then her introspective belief, about what her phenomenal experience feels like to her, overrides the behavioral and physiological evidence regarding the matter.

Unlike the thesis of incorrigibility, the thesis of logically privileged access does not maintain that necessarily, one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of

¹⁹ Armstrong, *Mind*, p. 101. Armstrong makes a similar point in his book, although he talks about incorrigibility and self-intimation in general, instead of what I term "logical incorrigibility" and "dispositional logical self-intimation."

²⁰ Examples of these are physiological or behavioral evidence.

one's phenomenal experiences are true. All the latter maintains is that one's introspective beliefs are the best authority to consult concerning the qualities of one's phenomenal experiences. Nevertheless, that authority could still falter, as far as privileged access goes. Moreover, the thesis of incorrigibility does not maintain that one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are necessarily the best authorities to consult concerning the qualities of one's phenomenal experiences. Even though our introspective beliefs about the qualities of our phenomenal experiences cannot falter according to the thesis of incorrigibility, it still allows that there might be some other evidence that is an equally good authority to consult regarding the matter, whatever that other evidence might be.

Thus one might hold the doctrine of logically privileged access but not the thesis of incorrigibility, and vice versa. As Armstrong points out, A. J. Ayer, in his 1959 British Academy lecture, "Privacy", conceded that he held such a position—he disagreed with the Incorrigibility Thesis, and yet maintained the doctrine of logically privileged access.²¹ This position entails that one could have mistaken introspective beliefs about one's phenomenal experiences, but if there is any correction to be made to those mistaken beliefs, it comes only from further introspection, not from behavioral or physiological evidence.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

1.3.3: Misconstruing the Thesis of Incorrighibility

1.3.3.1: The Focus on the Phenomenal Aspects of Phenomenal Experiences

One might be distracted by *prima facie* counter-examples against the thesis of incorrighibility, if one misconstrues it to mean that one's introspective beliefs about *every aspect* of one's phenomenal experiences are incorrighible.

Here is one "counter-example" based on this misconstrual of the thesis. I can be mistaken about the *cause* of my headache right now. I might think that it is caused by a toothache I have been having for the past couple of hours, but it might actually be a result of staring at the computer screen for a prolonged period of time. If this is the case, then I have a mistaken introspective belief about my headache.

The problem with the above "counter-example" lies with its focus on the wrong aspect of my phenomenal experience. The thesis of incorrighibility states that one's introspective beliefs about the *phenomenal aspects* of one's phenomenal experiences are incorrighible. The example above focused on the *causal aspects* of one's phenomenal experiences instead. What my thesis is concerned about is how one's phenomenal experience *feels to one*, and whether one's introspective belief, that one's phenomenal experience *feels a certain way to one*, is true.

Consider the same example once more. My thesis maintains only that if one's introspective belief about one's phenomenal experience is that it seems to one to be a headache, then one's phenomenal experience does seem to one to be a headache. It does not matter whether that headache-like phenomenal experience was the result of a toothache or the result of staring at the computer screen for a prolonged period of time.

1.3.3.2: Not Inevitable Introspective Beliefs

One might misconstrue the thesis of incorrigibility to mean that when an individual has a phenomenal experience that seems to her to be *Y*, then she will *inevitably* have the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be *Y*. My thesis makes does not make such a claim.

I allow that it is *not* inevitable that one has introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of every phenomenal experience one has. All I maintain is that it is undeniable that one *does* frequently formulate such beliefs, and I am drawing your attention to these instances when one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are actually formulated. On its own, the thesis of incorrigibility does *not* hold that introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences necessarily accompany one's phenomenal experiences. All it maintains is that *if* one has an introspective belief about the phenomenal aspects of a phenomenal experience one has, then necessarily, that introspective belief is true.

1.3.3.3: The Distinction between Logical Incorrigibility and Logical Necessity

In *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, Armstrong draws a distinction between incorrigibility and logical necessity. I borrow his distinction to illustrate another misconstrual of the thesis I defend.

Incorrigibility might be misconstrued as logical necessity. However, it should be noted that an incorrigible introspective belief need not be a logically necessary one and vice versa. My introspective belief, that my phenomenal experience right now resembles that of a sharp pain in my abdomen, might be incorrigible, but that introspective belief is

not logically necessary. We can easily conceive of many logically possible worlds in which I do not have that introspective belief now, because in those worlds, my phenomenal experience may resemble an itch instead. Or it may be the case that in those worlds, I do not even exist.

Conversely, beliefs of logically necessary truths need not be incorrigible. The belief that the square root of two hundred and eighty-nine is seventeen is logically necessary. But I could have a mistaken belief that the square root of two hundred and eighty-nine is fifteen instead. As Armstrong pointed out, it took a long time to convince Hobbes that Pythagoras' Theorem necessarily followed from Euclid's axioms.²²

1.3.3.4: One's Introspective Beliefs and How the World Is

The thesis of incorrigibility maintains that if one has the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience *feels* a certain way, then her phenomenal experience does *feel* that way. This is an example of what my thesis maintains: If an individual has the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be a sharp pain in her abdomen, then her phenomenal experience does in fact *seem* to her to be a sharp pain in her abdomen.

My thesis does *not* maintain the following: From her introspective belief, that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be a sharp pain in her abdomen, it follows that her phenomenal experience is *in fact* a sharp pain in her abdomen.

My thesis says nothing about whether she is *in fact* feeling a sharp pain in her abdomen. Considering Descartes' Evil Demon hypothesis, it could be the case that whenever we are *in fact* seeing something blue, we are being tricked into thinking and

²² Armstrong, "Introspective Knowledge", pp. 417-8.

believing that our visual experience is of a red object.²³ One's introspective belief that something seems red to one does not logically entail that that thing is *in fact* red.

Therefore, we should avoid misconstruing the thesis of logical incorrigibility to mean that if one has the introspective belief that one's phenomenal experience seems to one to be a sharp pain in one's abdomen, for example, then one's phenomenal experience is *in fact* that of a sharp pain in one's abdomen. According to my thesis, what follows from that introspective belief is that one's phenomenal experience *does seem* to one to be a sharp pain in one's abdomen.

1.3.3.5: Reports of One's Introspective Beliefs

In his article and subsequent book, Armstrong presents objections to the incorrigibility of *reports* of one's introspective beliefs about one's phenomenal experiences. His first two objections capitalize on the time gap between the occurrence of one's phenomenal experiences and one's formulation of the reports of one's introspective beliefs about one's phenomenal experiences.²⁴ These two objections are less cogent against the thesis of incorrigibility because the thesis does not focus on *reports* of one's introspective beliefs. It focuses on the introspective beliefs themselves, and the time gap between the occurrence of one's phenomenal experiences and the formulation of one's introspective beliefs about those phenomenal experiences are negligible, if not absent.

²³ René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and The Meditations*, translated by F.E. Sutcliffe. (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968), p. 100. What Descartes concedes at this point in *The Meditations* includes the possibility of us being deceived every time we think we are seeing something red.

²⁴ Armstrong, "Introspective Knowledge", pp. 419-21, and *Mind*, pp. 104-6.

Any critic of the thesis of incorrigibility should bear in mind that it focuses on the introspective beliefs themselves. It should not be misconstrued as a thesis about the *reports* of those introspective beliefs.

1.3.4: Misconstruing the Thesis of Self-Intimation

*1.3.4.1: Not Simply Logical Self-Intimation*²⁵

Some might argue that we have phenomenal experiences of which we are totally unaware. I had a cousin who used to sleep-walk, but he swears he cannot remember doing any of that, even though I questioned him the next morning after the sleep-walking incidents. I am usually unaware that I wave my hands when I get too excited in an engaging discussion. I am also usually unaware that my voice is raised when I quarrel with someone. There are many other similar examples in which one is unaware of one's phenomenal experiences.

My thesis allows for one to be unaware of one's phenomenal experiences, only because one is not paying attention to one's phenomenal experiences. Mary could be unaware of her phenomenal experience of her finger being pricked by a pin. She could have moved her finger *as if* she felt something, and yet insist that she was unaware of any pain-resembling phenomenal experience at all. Maybe that pain was blocked out by a concurrent greater pain that she felt in her stomach, such that her attention could not but be directed at the stomach pain instead of her finger prick pain. Even though she is unaware of her finger prick pain, she is at least disposed to be aware of it—if not for the other distracting phenomenal experience, she will be aware of finger prick pain.

²⁵ I revert back to the usage of terms like “logical self-intimation” and “dispositional logical self-intimation” only in this section to emphasize the difference between the two.

2: Connections with Other Areas in Philosophy of Mind

In this chapter, I explain two implications of the theses of incorrigibility and self-intimation for other areas in philosophy of mind. The implications of the theses are by no means limited to these areas alone.

2.1: Implications for Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument

The theses have implications for a popular topic in philosophy of mind right now, but before I go into that, let me set the background of the discourse.

The debate between monistic theories of consciousness and dualistic theories of consciousness has been the most central one in philosophy of mind for some time. The monistic theories are those that postulate that the phenomenal (or the mental) and the physical are not two separate substances. Instead, there is only one substance—either everything is physical or everything is phenomenal. The dualistic theories of consciousness deny this and hold that physical and phenomenal are two distinct substances, or that physical and phenomenal might be the same substance, but both have different properties. There is no clear winner in the debate. However, materialism, a monistic theory that claims that the physical logically determines the phenomenal, is regarded as the default position these days because it is most clearly compatible with present-day science.

However, things seemed to have changed since David Chalmers published *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*. In that book, Chalmers argues in favor of a theory of consciousness called “Naturalistic Dualism”. It is a theory that holds that dualism is true, but that in every possible world that obeys the laws of nature that

apply to the actual world, conscious functional duplicates of human beings in the actual world are phenomenally identical to the human beings in the actual world. Chalmers relies on two arguments—the Fading Qualia and Dancing Qualia Arguments—to support his claim.²⁶

Showing that one’s introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one’s phenomenal experiences are incorrigible would be a step in converting the Dancing Qualia Argument into an argument in favor of a form of materialism. I shall elaborate, after giving a brief explanation of the Dancing Qualia Argument.

The Dancing Qualia Argument is in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*. It aims to establish that it is naturally impossible for conscious functional duplicates to have inverted qualia—a scenario where, looking at the same object, I have a red phenomenal experience whereas my conscious functional duplicate has a blue phenomenal experience, for example. If the Dancing Qualia Argument works, then it has to be conceded that there is no possible world, in which the natural laws of our actual world apply, where a conscious functional duplicate of a human being in the actual world differs from her human counterpart in terms of phenomenal experiences.

For the sake of the *reductio*, let us assume that it is naturally possible for conscious functional duplicates to have inverted qualia. Thus, we can imagine that there are two functionally identical visual cortexes that give me visual phenomenal experiences—one made up of neurons and another made up of silicon. While the present visual cortex has neurons doing the work to give me visual phenomenal experiences, the silicon duplicate has silicon instead to do the same job.

²⁶ Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, pp. 253-63, 266-74.

Imagine, also, that there is this switch that allows me to switch the usage between these two visual cortexes. Since we have assumed that it is naturally possible for conscious functional duplicates to have inverted qualia, let us assign a red phenomenal experience to my using the neural visual cortex and a blue phenomenal experience to my using the silicon one. When the neural visual cortex is in use, the phenomenal experience, of looking at a red tomato, seems to me to be red. When the silicon visual cortex is in use, that phenomenal experience, of looking at the same red tomato, seems to me to be blue.

At the flip of the switch, the operation of the neural visual cortex will be seamlessly transferred to the silicon one. After the switch is flipped, the silicon visual cortex will be in charge of my visual phenomenal experiences. If I flip the switch back, then the neural visual cortex will take over again. Now, suppose the switch is flipped back and forth. The neural and silicon visual cortexes will take turns being in charge of providing me with visual phenomenal experiences. What will my phenomenal experience of looking at a red tomato seem like to me? According to the conditions we have laid out in this hypothetical scenario, the phenomenal experience of looking at a red tomato should seem red to me one moment, then blue the next, then red again, then blue ... and so on. The qualia will seem to me to be “dancing”.

Despite all of this, there should be no change in my functionality because the two visual cortexes are, as stipulated, functional duplicates. Hence, I should display no sign of registering a change in how my visual phenomenal experiences seem to me. I should not stop and say, “Hmmm, something seems weird. It seems to me that my qualia are dancing.” I am supposed to be functionally as normal. I should behave as if there were no

change in my visual experience even though my qualia *do in fact* seem to me to be dancing.

However, if I *am* functionally as per normal even though the switch is flipped back and forth, then that suggests that I could have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of my phenomenal experiences. I would have the introspective belief that my qualia do not seem to me to be changing, as I would believe if the swapping of visual cortexes had never happened. This is so because, as Chalmers admits, it is “extremely implausible” that the simple replacement of the visual cortex would result in the addition of “significant new beliefs” like, “My qualia seem to me to be dancing.”²⁷ However, in actual fact, my qualia *do seem to me* to be dancing. Hence, I am actually having the introspective belief that my qualia seem to me to be as per normal, but *in fact*, they seem to me to be dancing.

But it is not naturally possible for one to have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one’s phenomenal experiences.²⁸ Therefore, by *reductio ad absurdum*, we have to reject the initial assumption that inverted qualia are naturally possible.

The Dancing Qualia Argument can be restated as follows:

DQA1) There is no naturally possible world in which an individual has the same functional organization as that of her human counterpart in the actual world,

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

²⁸ This view of incorrigibility is different from the thesis of incorrigibility that I defend. It is a weaker version of incorrigibility, holding that there is no possible world, where the natural laws of our actual world apply, where one could have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one’s phenomenal experiences. This weaker thesis does not rule out the *logical* possibility of one having mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one’s phenomenal experiences.

and is conscious, but has different introspective beliefs about her own phenomenology from those of her human counterpart in the actual world.

DQA2) There is no naturally possible world in which an individual has the same introspective beliefs about her own phenomenology as those of her human counterpart in the actual world, but has different phenomenology from that of her human counterpart in the actual world.

DQA3) Therefore, there is no naturally possible world in which a conscious individual has the same functional organization as that of her human counterpart in the actual world, but has different phenomenology from that of her human counterpart in the actual world.

Premise *DQA2* is the claim that one's introspective beliefs about one's phenomenal experiences are naturally incorrigible—that there are no possible worlds, in which the natural laws of our actual world apply, where one could have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences. If it can be shown that one's introspective beliefs about one's phenomenal experiences are not merely *naturally* incorrigible, but *logically* incorrigible, then that would be pushing a stronger, logical reading of premise *DQA2*. The stronger reading of the premise will read:

DQA2a) There is no *logically* possible world in which an individual has the same introspective beliefs about her own phenomenology as those of her human counterpart in the actual world, but has different phenomenology from that of her human counterpart in the actual world.

Premise *DQA2a* pushes the Dancing Qualia Argument in the direction of functionalism²⁹, a form of materialism incompatible with naturalistic dualism. The task of pushing a stronger, logical version of premise *DQA1* still remains. I shall not be arguing for these further claims in this project. Instead, I only give my reasons for thinking that a logical version of premise *DQA1* is plausible, and suggest how to go about establishing it, later in Chapter 5. If logical readings of *DQA1* and *DQA2* are defensible, then all that remains to prove the truth of functionalism is to show that any functional duplicate of a conscious being must have consciousness of at least *some* sort (however minimal).

The thesis of self-intimation plays a separate role in the Dancing Qualia Argument. Recall what happens when the switch is being flipped on and off. My qualia would seem to me to be dancing. However, I am not supposed to behave as if my qualia seem to me to be dancing. This could be a point of contention.

A critic of the Dancing Qualia Argument could argue that I do not react as if the switch is being flipped on and off because I am unaware of my phenomenal experiences at the time. She argues that the natural possibility, of one having mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences, is not necessarily a corollary of the lack of reaction on my part even when the switch is flipped on and off. If that is the case, then there will not necessarily be a contradiction between the view, that one's introspective beliefs about one's phenomenology are naturally incorrigible, and the initial assumption that inverted qualia are naturally possible. Subsequently, Chalmers' intended *reductio* fails.

²⁹ I take functionalism to hold that there is no logically possible world in which an individual has the same functional organization as that of her human counterpart in the actual world, but has different phenomenology from that of her human counterpart in the actual world.

What the thesis of self-intimation does is to forestall such a critique of the Dancing Qualia Argument. My thesis holds that one is logically disposed to be aware of one's phenomenal experiences. If the thesis stands, then I am logically disposed to be aware of my phenomenal experiences and the change in them when the switch is being flipped on and off. My thesis allows that it is possible that I could be unaware of the change in my phenomenal experiences if I were not paying attention to them. However, my thesis holds that it is *logically* impossible (and not merely *naturally* impossible), that when I am asked about my phenomenal experiences, or when I think about them, that I am unaware of them or any change in them. It rules out the scenario that the critic is arguing for.

2.2: Implications for the Zombie Argument

For our purposes, let us define zombies as individuals who are physically, behaviorally and functionally identical to human beings in the actual world, except for the fact that they (the zombies) are phenomenally empty. If you observe and interact with a zombie and her human twin, you would not be able to tell one apart from the other. However, while the human being has phenomenal experiences like you and I do,³⁰ her zombie twin has none. The latter only behaves as if she is in pain, as if the coffee tastes bitter to her, as if she was startled by the loud sound, and so on.

The Zombie Argument has been used as an argument against materialism.³¹ It goes like this:

³⁰ I am assuming that you and I are not zombies in the first place.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-9, 123.

- ZA1) We can conceive of a logically possible world where an individual is physically, behaviorally and functionally identical to her human counterpart in the actual world, but while her human counterpart in the actual world has phenomenal experiences, this individual in the logically possible world is phenomenally empty.
- ZA2) Whatever is conceivable we should allow to be logically possible, unless we have some compelling argument against its logical possibility.
- ZA3) We have no compelling argument against the logical possibility of a world where an individual is physically, behaviorally and functionally identical to her human counterpart in the actual world, but while her human counterpart in the actual world has phenomenal experiences, this individual in the logically possible world is phenomenally empty.
- ZA4) Therefore, we should allow that it is logically possible for there to be a world where an individual is physically, behaviorally and functionally identical to her human counterpart in the actual world, but while her human counterpart in the actual world has phenomenal experiences, this individual in the logically possible world is phenomenally empty.³²

If zombies, by definition, behave exactly like their human counterparts, it is not far-fetched to hold that a zombie's introspective beliefs are identical to those of her human counterpart. (At the very least, the zombie's reports of her introspective beliefs will be identical to those of her human counterpart, since my definition of zombies states that they are behaviorally identical to their human counterparts.) If it is the case that

³² Michael Pelczar's formulation of the zombie argument. Michael W. Pelczar, "What is Sufficient for Consciousness?" Unpublished manuscript, 2004. p. 3.

zombies and their human counterparts have identical introspective beliefs, then the thesis of incorrigibility will have a bone to pick against the logical possibility of zombies.

Let me explain using the following argument:

- Z1) If zombies are logically possible, then it is logically possible for a zombie to have the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience (even though she does not have any phenomenal experiences!) seems to her to be a stomachache, for example, but not in fact be having a phenomenal experience that seems to her to be a stomachache. (Given my considerations in the preceding paragraph, coupled with my definition of zombies postulating that they are phenomenally empty.)
- Z2) It is *not* logically possible for a zombie to have the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be a stomachache, for example, but not in fact be having a phenomenal experience that seems to her to be a stomachache. (That is, if the thesis of incorrigibility is successfully defended.)
- Z3) Therefore, zombies are not logically possible.

If the thesis of incorrigibility is successfully defended, then it can be used as a premise against the logical possibility of zombies, as I have presented above. The only way to refute this argument would be to reject premise *Z1* by arguing that either,

- a) Zombies do not have introspective beliefs about their phenomenology, unlike their human counterparts, or
- b) Zombies have introspective beliefs about their phenomenology, like their human counterparts, but zombies and their human counterparts do not have identical introspective beliefs about their phenomenology. (Zombies can have introspective

beliefs that their phenomenal experiences do not *feel* any way to them, unlike the introspective beliefs their human counterparts have, given the same conditions and phenomenal experiences.)

Both are not easy routes to take.

If we take route *a* and argue that zombies do not have introspective beliefs about their phenomenology, unlike their human counterparts, we might eventually come to a dilemma: Either we hold that zombies do not have any introspective beliefs about anything at all, or we hold that zombies are devoid of introspective beliefs that are only about their phenomenology.

The first horn of this dilemma has us hold that zombies do not have any introspective beliefs about anything at all, and not just that they do not have any introspective beliefs about their phenomenology. But our definition of zombies might be at odds with such a stand. By our definition, the *only* difference between zombies and human beings is that the former are phenomenally empty. Zombies behave just like their human counterparts do in the same situation. Thus, it is hard to see the coherence in a situation where a zombie, like her human counterpart, answers, “I believe that I know that the moon is not made of blue cheese,” to the question, “Do you know that the moon is not made of blue cheese?” when the zombie has no introspective belief about her own knowledge of whether the moon is made of blue cheese.

The second horn of the dilemma has us hold that zombies have introspective beliefs about their feelings or their epistemic beliefs, for example, like their human counterparts do, but somehow, zombies lack introspective beliefs about their phenomenology, even though their human counterparts have them. But how are we to

explain this almost arbitrary choice of what kinds of things zombies might have introspective beliefs about?

We cannot worm our way out by arguing that introspective beliefs about one's phenomenology are phenomenal themselves, and since zombies are, by definition, devoid of phenomenology, they are therefore devoid of introspective beliefs about their phenomenology. We will then be required to explain why only their introspective beliefs about their phenomenology are phenomenal while their other introspective beliefs are not.

Taking route *b*, we face a different dilemma: Either we hold that zombies have different introspective beliefs from those of their human counterparts regarding everything (not merely have different introspective beliefs from those of their human counterparts regarding their own phenomenology), or we hold that *only* the zombies' introspective beliefs of their own phenomenology are different from those of their human counterparts.

The first horn puts us in situations where zombies have different introspective beliefs from their human counterparts' about everything, and yet they still behave exactly like their human counterparts. For example, a zombie will answer, "I believe that I know that the moon is not made of blue cheese," like her human counterpart does, even though the zombie's introspective belief about her knowledge of the moon is different from that of her human counterpart. Such situations are definitely ones we do not want to get ourselves into.

Taking the second horn, we will be required to explain why only zombies' introspective beliefs about their phenomenology are different from those of their human counterparts. If we are unable to do so, the choice seems too arbitrary.

2.3: Implications for the Inverted Spectrum Argument

The thesis of incorrigibility will also create problems for the Inverted Spectrum Argument, also an argument against Materialism.³³ Briefly, the Inverted Spectrum Argument goes like this:

- ISA1) We can conceive of a logically possible world where an individual is physically, behaviorally and functionally identical to her human counterpart in the actual world, but the phenomenal experiences of the individual in this logically possible world differ from those of her human counterpart in the actual world.
- ISA2) Whatever is conceivable we should allow to be logically possible, unless we have some compelling argument against its logical possibility.
- ISA3) We have no compelling argument against the logical possibility of a world where an individual is physically, behaviorally and functionally identical to her human counterpart in the actual world, but the phenomenal experiences of the individual in this logically possible world differ from those of her human counterpart in the actual world.
- ISA4) Therefore, we should allow that it is logically possible for there to be a world where an individual is physically, behaviorally and functionally identical to her human counterpart in the actual world, but the phenomenal experiences of the individual in this logically possible world differ from those of her human counterpart in the actual world.³⁴

³³ Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, pp. 99-101.

³⁴ Modified from Michael Pelczar's formulation of the Zombie Argument above.

Unlike zombies, these individuals described in the Inverted Spectrum Argument are capable of having phenomenal experiences like human beings do. But while a human being in the actual world has a phenomenal experience that seems to her to be that of the taste of chocolate, the same phenomenal experience might seem, to the inverted-spectrum-capable counterpart in this logically possible world, to be that of the taste of vanilla, for example. If they have the same introspective belief about how the ice cream tastes to them; e.g., both have the introspective belief that the ice cream tastes like chocolate to them, then one of them must have a mistaken introspective belief.

Utilizing the thesis of incorrigibility, we can argue against the logical possibility of inverted spectrum cases also in the following way:

- IS1) If inverted spectrum cases are logically possible, then it is logically possible for an individual from the inverted spectrum world to have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of her phenomenal experiences. (Given my considerations in the preceding paragraph and how I define inverted spectrum.)
- IS2) It is *not* logically possible for an individual from the inverted spectrum world to have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of her phenomenal experiences. (That is, if the defense of the thesis of logical incorrigibility is successful.)
- IS3) Therefore, inverted spectrum cases are not logically possible.

To refute this argument, one must argue that either,

- c) Inverted-spectrum-capable individuals do not have introspective beliefs about their phenomenology, unlike their human counterparts, or

- d) Inverted-spectrum-capable individuals have different introspective beliefs about their phenomenology than those of their human counterparts in the actual world.

Once again, these two are not easy routes to take.

Taking route *c*, we will face the dilemma to either hold that inverted-spectrum-capable individuals do not have introspective beliefs at all, or that they have introspective beliefs about everything except for their own phenomenology.

The first horn of this dilemma leaves us with incoherent situations where inverted-spectrum-capable individuals, like their human counterparts, answer, “I believe that I do not know Samuel Clemens’ middle name,” even though these inverted-spectrum-capable individuals do not have any introspective beliefs about their knowledge of Samuel Clemens at all.

The second horn of this dilemma requires us to explain why these inverted-spectrum-capable individuals are devoid of *only* introspective beliefs about their phenomenology, in order to escape the charge of being arbitrary.

Route *d* seems, *prima facie*, a reasonable alternative. One might think that taking this route will not lead us to problems similar to those faced if we take route *b* in the preceding section. Since inverted-spectrum-capable individuals have different phenomenology from that of their human counterparts, it follows that their introspective beliefs about their phenomenology will differ from those of their human counterparts.

But this route leads us to a dilemma as well. We have to either hold that all of the introspective beliefs of inverted-spectrum-capable individuals are different from those of their human counterparts, or hold that *only* the inverted-spectrum-capable individuals’

introspective beliefs about their phenomenology are different from those of their human counterparts.

For the first horn of the dilemma, we will have situations where an inverted-spectrum-capable individual, like her human counterpart, answers, “Yes,” when asked, “Do you believe that you know that you are not dreaming right now?” even though the former does *not*, unlike her human counterpart, have the introspective belief that she knows that she is not dreaming right now. How do we explain away the incoherence between the inverted-spectrum-capable individual’s introspective belief and behavior?

For the second horn of the dilemma, how do we explain why the inverted-spectrum-capable individuals’ introspective beliefs about their phenomenology are different from those of their human counterparts, while their introspective beliefs about their knowledge, for example, are not different from those of their human counterparts? At first, it might seem plausible if we defend this position by arguing that since the phenomenology of the inverted-spectrum-capable individuals are different from the phenomenology of their human counterparts, the introspective beliefs of both parties about their own phenomenology must also be different. But I think this move relies on the assumption that one’s introspective beliefs about one’s phenomenology are themselves phenomenal in nature. We will then be pressed for an explanation of why only introspective beliefs about one’s phenomenology are themselves phenomenal in nature, while introspective beliefs about things other than one’s phenomenology are not also phenomenal in nature. If we cannot give such an explanation, the charge of being arbitrary still falls on us.

3: Objections to Incorrighibility

In this chapter, I present objections to the thesis of incorrighibility, and provide resolutions to these objections. These objections are by no means exhaustive, for I have chosen to present and address only the more important ones.

3.1: Alleged Counter-examples

In this section, I present two alleged counter-examples that challenge the thesis of incorrighibility. These two examples try to show, not only that it is logically possible for one to have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences, but that such cases are actually possible in reality. If they are genuine counter-examples, then my thesis collapses completely.

3.1.1: Hot Water, Cold Water

Roger is an officer in the army. After losing a battle, he is captured by the enemy and locked in prison for interrogation. His captors try many non-violent methods of interrogation to make Roger spill the beans about a particular military secret, but it seems like Roger will not speak unless he gets it the hard way. So his captors decide to break all the rules.

One of them, Brutus, reaches for the kettle that is on a stove nearby. He waves the kettle menacingly before Roger's eyes and informs him that there is enough hot water in the kettle to make tea for ten, and threatens to scald Roger with boiling water unless Roger speaks. Roger still refuses, even though he seriously believes that Brutus will go ahead with his threat. Bracing himself, he tells Brutus that he will never speak.

Brutus can no longer control his temper and splashes the water in the kettle all over Roger's bare back. Unbeknownst to both Roger and Brutus, the water in the kettle was not even warm. In spite of that, in that instant when the water came into contact with Roger's back, Roger, thinking all along that the water would feel hot and that he would feel the pain of having one's back scalded by hot water, let out a scream that sounded *as if* he really was in great pain. Roger only realizes, moments later, that the water is not even warm, but he continues screaming in case Brutus finds out and reaches for another kettle with hot water this time.

Examples like the above are not difficult to conceive of, and one might be tempted to use such examples to criticize the thesis of incorrigibility. Such examples, if genuine, serve as counter-examples to the thesis of incorrigibility. These examples aim to show that the thesis is false—that one could have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences. Opponents to my thesis will point out that in this example, at the point in time when the water came into contact with Roger's back, there was a brief moment during which his introspective belief about the phenomenal aspect of his phenomenal experience was mistaken. In that brief moment, he had the introspective belief that his phenomenal experience seemed to him to be the pain of having one's back scalded by hot water, when in fact, his phenomenal experience *did not* seem to him to be the pain of having one's back scalded by hot water.

Here is what I think happened in Roger's case. Before the water came into contact with his back, he already had the belief³⁵ that his phenomenal experience would seem to him to be the pain of having one's back scalded by hot water. Probably, this pre-

³⁵ In order to make things less confusing, let us call this the pre-experience belief. The experience refers to whatever phenomenal experience Roger has when the water from the kettle comes into contact with his back.

experience belief blinded him to what his phenomenal experience *actually* seemed like to him right after the water came into contact with his back. Thus, his post-experience belief³⁶ might have been overwhelmed by his pre-experience belief. That overwhelming but mistaken belief about what his phenomenal experience would seem like to him might have caused him to behave as if his phenomenal experience seemed to him to be the pain of having one's back scalded by hot water, even though his phenomenal experience did not *in fact* seem to him to be the pain of having one's back scalded by hot water. It was only moments after the water came into contact with his back that he realizes that his phenomenal experience did not seem to him to be that pain of having one's back scalded by hot water.

I think that Roger had a mistaken belief about what his phenomenal experience *would seem like to him when it eventually happens*. He believed, falsely, that it would seem to him to be the pain of having one's back scalded. However, he did *not* have a mistaken introspective belief about what his phenomenal experience *actually* seemed like to him when the water came into contact with his back. His introspective belief was that his phenomenal experience seemed to him to be not one of pain, but of non-scalding water on his back. This latter belief is the one we should be focusing on. That is his introspective belief about the phenomenal aspect of his phenomenal experience, and it is not mistaken. The former belief is a mistaken belief, but it is not an introspective belief about the phenomenal aspect of his phenomenal experience. It is not an introspective belief to begin with, and it is not about the phenomenal aspects of his phenomenal

³⁶ This post-experience refers to the belief he had right after the water came into contact with his back. This belief is an introspective belief, and it is the one whose truth values we have to focus on. If this belief is false, then the objection pulls through, and the thesis of incorrigibility falls apart.

experience at the moment, but about the phenomenal aspects of a phenomenal experience he thought he was going to have eventually.

That his introspective belief was not mistaken is evident from the fact that he could realize his mistake in his pre-experience belief after the water came into contact with his back. This realization is possible only because his post-experience belief—his introspective belief about the phenomenal aspect of his phenomenal experience, is accurate, allowing him to correct his previous mistaken belief.³⁷

There are other similar examples. Suppose I am blindfolded and asked to taste different condiments to guess what they are. A plate of sauce is presented before me. I am only told that it is a sweet black liquid. I take a sip, strongly anticipating a sweet sensation. Unbeknownst to me, the liquid is actually vinegar, and not some sweet tasting liquid. Nevertheless, the strong anticipation of a sweet sensation might overwhelm my introspective belief about my phenomenal experience when it finally occurs, and for a very brief moment, I might even believe that my phenomenal experience seems to me to be sweet. But the stinging taste of vinegar will quickly take over and I will correct my previously mistaken belief.

In these two cases, the strong anticipations, of the way one's phenomenal experiences would seem like to one, result in mistaken beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences when they finally occur. However, these are not mistaken *introspective* beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal

³⁷ Francescotti addresses a similar example about a fraternity hazing. However, our stances with regard to these objections differ slightly. He holds that in his case, strong expectation of a certain sensation caused the subject to actually have a mistaken introspective report. My position is that there is no mistaken *introspective belief* involved in the whole case. Francescotti resolves the objection by arguing that even though there was a mistaken introspective report, it was not a mistaken *introspectively proper report* (since the subject in his case made the introspective report based partly on a strong expectation of how he would feel). See Francescotti, "Introspection", pp. 164-9.

experiences. Hence, cases such as these are not genuine counter-examples against the thesis of incorrigibility, and are no cause for worry.

3.1.2: Phantom Limb and Phantom Pain

A person who has had a limb amputated may feel that her limb is present even when it is in fact absent. Such “limbs” are what is referred to as phantom limbs. Sometimes, a person with a phantom limb claims to actually feel “pain” that seems to come from the phantom limb. Such “pain” is referred to as phantom pain.

Opponents of the thesis of incorrigibility might use such cases of phantom limbs and phantom pain as counter-examples to the thesis. The opponent would argue that in such cases, a person has the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be that of pain in her phantom limb. But surely she cannot be feeling pain in a “limb” that is no longer connected to her body despite her belief that it seems to her that she is feeling pain in that “limb”. She must then be having a mistaken introspective belief about the phenomenal aspects of her pain. Hence, the thesis of incorrigibility is false.

I think this is only a *prima facie* counter-example. This example is a problem for the thesis of incorrigibility only if one misconstrues my thesis.

In Section 1.3.3.4, I cautioned the reader that the thesis of incorrigibility should *not* be misconstrued to mean that if one has the introspective belief that the snow outside seems white to one, for example, then the snow outside *is indeed white*. The thesis maintains only that, in the same context, if one has the introspective belief that the snow outside seems white to one, then the snow outside *indeed seems white to one*. The thesis does not make the claim that one’s introspective beliefs entail how the external world *is*.

The thesis only makes the claim that one's introspective beliefs entail how the external world *seems to one*.

Let us turn our attention back to the problem of phantom limbs and phantom pain. Misconstruing the thesis of incorrigibility, the opponent would have it maintain that if a victim of phantom limb syndrome has the introspective belief that she seems to be feeling pain in her limb, then she must indeed be feeling pain in her limb. However, she cannot possibly be feeling pain in her limb, since the limb does not exist, so her introspective belief is false, and so is the thesis of incorrigibility.

Now, construing the thesis correctly, it simply maintains that if the patient has the introspective belief that she seems to be feeling pain in her limb, then it *indeed seems to her* that she is feeling pain in her limb. What seems true to her may in fact be false. What matters is whether it does at least *seem* to her that she is feeling pain in her limb, and I think that no one denies that that is the case.

3.2: Modal Arguments

Relying on the alleged conceivability of scenarios in which one has mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences, modal arguments attempt to establish that these scenarios are logically possible, thereby falsifying the thesis of incorrigibility.

The general form these modal arguments take is as follows:

MA11) We can conceive of a logically possible world where one might have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences.

MAI2) Whatever is conceivable we should allow to be logically possible, unless we have some compelling argument against its logical possibility.

MAI3) We have no compelling argument against the logical possibility of a world where one might have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences.

MAI4) Therefore, we should allow that it is logically possible for there to be a world where one might have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences.³⁸

For example, an opponent might argue that she can coherently conceive of a scenario where she has the introspective belief that it seems to her that she is feeling a tickle under the soles of her feet, when it actually seems to her that she is feeling distinct pain at that same place instead. And if such scenarios are conceivable and coherent, and there is no strong objection against the logical possibility of such scenarios, then it should be conceded that such scenarios are logically possible. Therefore, the argument goes, it is not logically impossible for one to have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences. Hence, the thesis of incorrigibility is false.

I cannot provide a knock-down argument to dispel these modal arguments, given the limitations of this project and the sheer vastness of the literature on modal arguments. Nevertheless, I provide a reasonable response that I think is good enough to keep these modal arguments at bay.

³⁸ The Zombie Argument and the Inverted Spectrum Argument in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 are modal arguments also.

For the modal arguments to work, the hypothetical scenarios have to be coherent. If I can show that there is some incoherence in the conception of these scenarios, then that will allow us to reject premise *MAII* and subsequently, the rest of the modal argument. But even if I cannot go all the way by showing conclusively that there is some incoherence in the conception of these scenarios, going halfway by showing that it is not clear that these scenarios can be coherently conceived will be good enough to push the situation to a stalemate.

I, for one, cannot conceive of a logically possible world where one has mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspect of one's phenomenal experiences. But my opponent maintains that such scenarios are conceivable and coherent. She claims that she can conceive of a case where a person has the introspective belief that her phenomenal experience seems to her to be a headache, for example, and yet, her phenomenal experience *does not* in fact seem to her to be a headache. She finds it strange that I cannot conceive of such a scenario, when there is nothing incoherent about such a scenario, or so she claims. However, I think that such scenarios only "seem" conceivable and they are so because they are not ones in which the subject is the person doing the conceiving. In other words, if we were to try to conceive of ourselves having mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of our own phenomenal experiences, we might be less willing to hold that such scenarios are coherently conceivable. Let me illustrate with the following example.

Suppose *you* are hard at work at your desk in your study. Working up a good rhythm, you finish paragraph after paragraph of substantial writing, thanks to the quiet, conducive environment your room affords you. All of a sudden, the quietude is shattered

by a loud, blaring car horn, coming from just outside the window. Now suppose that at that point in time when the quietude was shattered, your phenomenal experience seemed to you to be a loud, blaring car horn. You were startled when you heard it, and you had to take some time to calm your nerves before you could recover that rhythm that you lost. At the same time, suppose, that upon introspection, you form the belief that your phenomenal experience at that point in time did not seem to you to be a loud, blaring car horn, but some other sound instead. Maybe you believe that it seemed to you to be the sound of gentle, flowing water, or the sound of birds chirping, or the sound of someone snapping his fingers, to name some alternatives. Does this inconsistency between your introspective belief and the phenomenal aspect of your phenomenal experience seem the least bit coherent to you? Most of us would not think so.

By providing this example, I hope to show that most of us, save the few proponents of the modal arguments, would intuitively find such scenarios far from coherent, although we might not be able to explain clearly why they seem incoherent. Nevertheless, my opponent might require me to go one step further and explain where the logical contradiction lies in the conception of these “apparently coherent” scenarios.³⁹ Unless that is done, the objection goes, I cannot reject the conceivability of these hypothetical scenarios. However, I think that by appealing to the common intuition regarding the matter, I can at least push the situation to a stalemate.

In his article, *On the Burden of Proof*,⁴⁰ James Cargile argues convincingly that the burden of proof lies on the party that does not have the support of the proper

³⁹ Chalmers makes the same point here—that those who want to reject modal arguments on the basis that the hypothetical scenarios described are inconceivable have to show the logical contradiction in those scenarios; see Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, p. 99.

⁴⁰ James Cargile, “On the Burden of Proof”, *Philosophy*.72 (1997), pp. 59-83.

presumption that something is true. He gives the example of torching derelicts for recreation. He thinks that there is a proper presumption that recreational torture is evil, and one who seeks to prove its opposite bears the burden of proof.⁴¹ In our context, it is safe to say that the proper presumption is that the hypothetical scenarios, of people having mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of their phenomenal experiences, are incoherent. The corollary is that the opponent who maintains that such hypothetical scenarios are coherent bears the burden of proof to show how such scenarios are coherent. And if she cannot show that, then the most she can get out of her modal argument objection is a stalemate. Until one party can prove his case, my opponent and I are at an impasse.

This move of mine heavily depends on the assumption that in this debate about the coherence of such hypothetical scenarios, the proper presumption is in my favor. This move would fall apart if I were wrong about that proper presumption. But as long as the proper presumption is on my side (and I think that that is the case), I am relieved of the burden of proof, and the onus shifts back to the proponent of the modal arguments.

3.3: Armstrong's Objections to Incorrighibility

In *Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrighible*,⁴² Armstrong presents four objections to the general thesis of incorrighibility. These objections attack a slightly different thesis of incorrighibility. However, two of them can be modified such that they become plausible objections to the thesis of incorrighibility, and I present them here.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁴² Armstrong, "Introspective Knowledge".

3.3.1: Regarding the Modifications to the Objections

The thesis of incorrigibility is not exactly what Armstrong's objections target, so I have to make slight modifications to them in order for them to be plausible objections to the thesis. These modifications are done only to enable his objections to target the thesis of incorrigibility. I have tried to retain the potency of the objections as much as possible.

The objections target the thesis that one's introspective *knowledge* and *reports* of one's *phenomenal experiences* are incorrigible, or logically incorrigible. The thesis states only that one's introspective *beliefs* about the *phenomenal aspects* of one's phenomenal experiences are *logically incorrigible*. The thesis does *not* hold that *reports* of the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences are logically incorrigible.

Therefore, I modify Armstrong's objections such that they target the thesis that one's *introspective beliefs* of the *phenomenal aspects* of one's phenomenal experiences are *logically incorrigible*.⁴³ I think that it is not crucial that I include the objections against the logical incorrigibility of one's *reports* about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences, since the thesis targeted by such objections is significantly different from the one I defend.⁴⁴

3.3.2: If You Can't Be Wrong, You Can't Be Right⁴⁵

The objection goes: The notion of true introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences makes sense only if it is possible for one to have false introspective beliefs about the same thing. Simply put, if you cannot be wrong

⁴³ From this point onwards, I discuss only the modified versions of Armstrong's objections and views, and leave behind his original objections to avoid any confusion.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 420-1. This is especially true for Armstrong's second objection. He seems to be focusing on the incorrigibility of *statements* about one's phenomenal experiences with that objection.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 421-2. This objection is a modification of Armstrong's third objection.

about something, you cannot be right either. Since the thesis of incorrigibility denies that it is logically possible for one to have false introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences, it follows, according to the objection, that the notion of true introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences makes no sense. But surely we do not want to hold that the notion of true introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences makes no sense or is meaningless, so we should reject the thesis.

In response, let me provide the following three counter-examples:

1. It is logically impossible for two and two to add up to anything other than four. Nevertheless, the idea, that "two and two gives four" is true, does not seem meaningless at all.
2. Suppose zombies are logically impossible. Still, the idea of zombies being logically possible does not seem meaningless, albeit false given the above supposition.
3. It is logically impossible for it to be raining at time T , at location P , and for it also to be not raining at T , at P . However, the idea, of it raining at T at P and not raining at T at P is not meaningless. The idea is just illogical, incoherent, and inconceivable.

Given that these are genuine counter-examples, this objection is no cause for worry.

3.3.3: Distinct Existences Objection⁴⁶

Consider the two acts of perceiving what seems to be something red to you, and introspecting that perception. These two are *distinct* acts, and Hume's argument about "distinct existences" may be applied. Hume argues that for any two distinct things, we can always conceive of one existing in the absence of the other. So it is conceivable that the act of perception might occur while the act of introspection might not occur, or vice versa. It follows, then, that it is logically possible that perception occurs while introspection does not, or conversely, that introspection occurs even when perception does not.

The thesis of incorrigibility holds that the former case is logically possible, so there is no conflict there. It is, however, the latter case that we are concerned with. The objection, if valid, will mean that it is logically possible for a person to have the introspective belief, that it seems to her that she has a stomachache, for example, when in fact, she did not have any phenomenal experience to begin with.

Armstrong thinks that the defender of the thesis of incorrigibility is forced to argue that the two acts—perception and introspection about that perception, are not in fact distinct existences. What the incorrigibilist could hold is that perception and introspection about that perception are analogous to the size of X⁴⁷ and the shape of X, or analogous to the extension of X and the color of X. Shape and size are not the same thing, but they are not distinct existences either. And if an object has a shape, then necessarily,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 422-3, and Armstrong, *Mind*, pp. 106-7. This objection is a modification of Armstrong's fourth objection in his article. Armstrong reiterates the same objection in his book.

⁴⁷ X being any physical object.

it has a size. Similarly, color and extension are not the same thing, but neither are they distinct existences. And if an object has a color, then necessarily, it has an extension.⁴⁸

However, Armstrong disputes this rejoinder. He argues that the act of introspecting about a perception is analogous to a machine performing a self-scan. He goes on to draw the following two analogies between a machine scanning itself and a man eating himself, and between a machine scanning itself and an eye scanning itself by means of a mirror. He insists that there is an “absolute distinction” between that which is scanning and that which is scanned—a distinction that is similar to that between eater and eaten, and between the scanning eye and itself.⁴⁹

Armstrong’s objection can be represented as follows:

- AOI1) The act of introspecting a perception is analogous to a machine performing a self-scan.
- AOI2) There is an absolute distinction between that which is scanning and that which is scanned.
- AOI3) There is an absolute distinction between the act of perceiving and that of introspecting that perception.
- AOI4) For any two acts that are distinct, it is logically possible that one occurs while the other does not.
- AOI5) Therefore, it is logically possible that the act of perceiving occurs while the act of introspecting that perception does not, and vice versa.

⁴⁸ Armstrong, *Mind*, p. 106.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

Even though I think that premise *AOII* is not clearly false, I think that it is not necessarily true either. Other analogies of introspection and perception are available and these may let us avoid the undesirable conclusion, *AOI5*.

Premise *AOII* follows from Armstrong's theory of the mind—Central-state Materialism. Since this theory holds that “mental states” like perception and introspection are simply physical states in the brain, it is only natural that the analogy drawn is that of a machine performing a self-scan. Introspection and perception are two distinct physical states in the brain, and that is conducive to the analogy of a machine performing a self-scan. However, if one holds a different theory of consciousness, one may think that that analogy of introspection is not entirely accurate.

One who is not bound by the Central-state theory may hold that unlike the self-scanning mechanism and what is being scanned, introspection and perception, respectively, are not totally independent of each other. It may be that introspection cannot take place without perception, or vice versa. Instead of using the analogy of a self-scanning mechanism, one may suggest that the concepts of introspection and perception are analogous to the concepts of bachelor and man respectively. If you are a bachelor, then necessarily you are a man. Analogously, if introspection takes place, then necessarily perception takes place also. You cannot call a person a bachelor if that person is not a man. Likewise, you cannot say that introspection has taken place without there being any perception.

For that matter, Armstrong's suggested rejoinder of the defender of the thesis of incorrigibility works. If we do not hold the Central-state theory (and we are not holding it in this project), I do not see why the analogies of bachelor and man, of shape and size,

and of color and extension, are inappropriate.⁵⁰ If the concepts of introspection and perception are analogous to the concepts of bachelor and man, or shape and size, or color and extension respectively, then it is not difficult to see why it is logically impossible for introspection to occur without perception.

If these other analogies of introspection and perception are more appropriate, then premise *AOII* is questionable, and we need not accept the conclusion, *AOI5*.⁵¹

In fact, even if we held the Central-state theory, the thesis of incorrigibility is not necessarily incompatible with it. For all we know, perception might be a functional state in the brain that is a part of a larger functional state, introspection. What follows is that introspection cannot occur when perception does not. So even on Armstrong's terms, this objection is no cause for worry.

⁵⁰ Kirk has a similar but more detailed argument against Armstrong's analogy of introspection. Kirk argues that from Armstrong's analogy, it does not follow that any description that "applies to part of a certain thing or process when certain other parts are present, could also be correctly applied to it when [these other parts] are absent." It also does not follow that no description "could be such that a necessary condition of its applying to the whole of a certain thing or process should be the applicability of a certain other description to a part of that thing or process." See Robert Kirk, "Armstrong's Analogue of Introspection", *The Philosophical Quarterly*.21,83 (April 1971), p. 160.

⁵¹ Francescotti defends his thesis against the objection that the conscious state is distinct from the introspective awareness of that conscious state (because the object of perception is distinct from the perceptual awareness of that object of perception). He argues that introspectively proper reports are reports about how one's conscious states appear to one. So one's conscious states' appearances are part of one's introspective awareness of those conscious states. The two—introspectively proper reports of the conscious states and the conscious states themselves, are not wholly distinct. Therefore, introspectively proper reports about conscious states cannot be mistaken. See Francescotti, "Introspection", pp. 168-70.

4: Objections to Self-intimation

In this chapter, I cover the objections against the thesis of self-intimation. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the objections presented here are far from being exhaustive, for I only address those that I think are the strongest.

4.1: Alleged Counter-examples

4.1.1: The Uncanny Chicken-sexers⁵²

Chicken-sexers are trained to correctly guess the sex of the chick they are looking at. These people are shown photographs of chicks. Not knowing the sex of the chick they are looking at, these chicken-sexers have to guess the sex of the chick. They are told when they guess correctly, and thus they gradually get better at guessing. Eventually, they almost always guess the sexes of chicks correctly.

If you were to ask the sexers about the difference between the phenomenal aspects of looking at a photograph of a male chick and that of looking at a photograph of a female chick, they would not be able to tell you. This could suggest that the sexers themselves are unaware of that difference between the phenomenal aspects of the two phenomenal experiences.

According to the objection, the sexers are paying attention to the phenomenal experiences they are presented with—the appearances of the chicks. And there is some difference between the phenomenal aspect of looking at a male chick and that of looking at a female chick, and that difference is what allows the sexers to guess the sexes of the

⁵² Armstrong uses the example of the chicken-sexer to argue that empirically, it is not the case that one necessarily is aware of one's "mental experiences" or "inner experiences". It is an attack on a more general thesis of self-intimation than the thesis of dispositional logical self-intimation that I defend. See Armstrong, "Introspective Knowledge", pp. 431-2.

chicks correctly. Yet, the sexers sincerely admit that they are unaware of the alleged phenomenal experience in question.

Let us start by supposing the sexers are telling the truth—that they are unaware of the phenomenal experience that enables them to correctly differentiate between male and female chick. I still think that this alleged counter-example could be resolved in the following way.

Instead of postulating a difference, between the phenomenal aspects of looking at a male chick and that of looking at a female chick, which is responsible for the sexer's ability to correctly guess the sex of the chick she is looking at, we could suppose that that ability does *not* depend on there being any difference in the sort of phenomenal experiences she has when looking at the chicks. It is plausible that the sexer's training effectively "by-passes" her phenomenal experiences—she is responding to features of the chicks that she herself is not consciously aware of. So it is not the case that the sexer is unaware of some phenomenal aspects of the phenomenal experiences she has when she looks at the chicks, because the phenomenal experiences of looking at a female chick and that of looking at a male one is not different in the first place.

Alternatively, I could argue that there might well be a "that-one's-a-female-chick" feeling a sexer has when looking at a female chick; likewise, there might well be a "that-one's-a-male-chick" feeling when she looks at a male chick. And these *are* noticeable to the sexer, allowing them to correctly guess the sex of the chick she is looking at. I will then be disputing the premise of the objection—that the sexer is unaware of what it is that enables her to correctly guess the sex of the chick she is looking at. She actually is aware

of something—those feelings mentioned above. Maybe they just leave very negligible impressions on her.

4.2: Modal Arguments

In Section 3.2, I showed how an opponent of the thesis of incorrigibility could utilize modal arguments as objections. In similar fashion, an opponent of the thesis of self-intimation could also utilize modal arguments as objections.

An opponent might argue that she can coherently conceive of a hypothetical scenario in which she is paying attention to how her chocolate ice cream tastes to her, but yet is unaware of how her chocolate ice cream tastes to her, even when the question arises for her with regard to whether she is aware of how her chocolate ice cream tastes to her. If such hypothetical scenarios are conceivable and coherent, then it should be conceded that such scenarios are logically possible, since we do not have any compelling argument against its logical possibility. Thus, it is logically possible for one's awareness to *not* be disposed to logically accompany one's phenomenal experiences. Hence, the thesis of self-intimation is false.

My response to this objection is similar to my response to the modal arguments objection to the thesis of incorrigibility.

I think that hypothetical scenarios such as the one above are incoherent. However, if my opponent is not convinced, I can always shift the burden of proof back to her.

It is safe to say that the proper presumption here is that hypothetical scenarios like the one above are incoherent. Therefore, the one not having the support of the proper presumption is the proponent of the modal arguments, and therefore she bears the burden

of proof. She has to show why such scenarios are coherent for her argument to work. If she cannot do so, then any modal argument of hers relying on such scenarios can be put at bay.

4.3: Distinct Existences Objection⁵³

Consider the two acts of perceiving what seems to be something red to you, and being disposed to be aware of that perception. The act of perception and the act of being disposed to be aware of that perception are distinct acts, and once again, Hume's argument about "distinct existences" may be applied. The objection is that it is conceivable that the act of perception might occur while the act of being disposed to be aware of that perception might not occur, or vice versa. It follows, then, that it is logically possible that perception occurs while the act of being disposed to be aware of that perception does not, or conversely, that the act of being disposed to be aware of a perception occurs even when the act of perception has not taken place.

The thesis of self-intimation holds that the former case is logically impossible, but makes no stand about the latter case. If the objection goes through, then it will mean that it is logically possible that one might have a phenomenal experience that seems to one to be a stomachache, for example, and yet not be disposed to be aware of that phenomenal experience.

Again, the defender of the thesis will have to argue that the two acts—that of perception and that of being disposed to be aware of that perception, are not in fact distinct existences. She will have to hold that perception and being disposed to be aware

⁵³ This objection is a modification of my objection in Section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3.

of that perception are analogous to the shape of X⁵⁴ and the size of X, or analogous to the color of X and the extension of X. Shape and size are not the same thing, but they are not distinct existences either. And if an object has a shape, then necessarily, it has a size. Similarly, color and extension are not the same thing, but they are not distinct existences either. And if an object has a color, then necessarily, it has an extension.

However, an opponent might argue that the act of perception is analogous to a machine undergoing an internal process, and the act of being disposed to be aware of that perception is analogous to that machine being in a state where it is able to register that internal process that is going on. There is an “absolute distinction” between the state of undergoing an internal process, and that of being in a state where it can register that internal process that is going on.

The objection can be represented as follows:

- AOS1) The act of being disposed to be aware of a perception is analogous to a machine being in a state where it is able to register an internal process that is going on.
- AOS2) There is an absolute distinction between the state of undergoing an internal process and that of being able to register that internal process.
- AOS3) There is an absolute distinction between the act of perception and that of being disposed to be aware of that perception.
- AOS4) For any two acts that are distinct, it is logically possible that one occurs while the other does not.
- AOS5) Therefore, it is logically possible that the act of perception occurs while the act of being disposed to be aware of that perception does not, and vice versa.

⁵⁴ X being any physical object.

As before, I think that there can be other analogies of the acts of being disposed to be aware of a perception and that of perception that may let us avoid the undesirable conclusion, *AOS5*.

For all we know, those two acts in question are not totally independent of each other. It may be that the act of perception cannot occur without the act of being disposed to be aware of that perception. We could use the analogies of bachelor and man, of shape and size, and of color and extension again. I do not see why these analogies of being disposed to be aware of a perception and perception are less appropriate than the machine analogy. If my suggested analogies are used instead, it is not difficult to see why it is logically impossible for perception to occur without there being a disposition to be aware of that perception.

My suggested analogies show that premise *AOS1* is questionable, and that we need not accept the conclusion of the objection, *AOS5*.

5: Conclusion

Before concluding, I tie up some loose ends in my project.

5.1: Pushing a Logical Version of Premise *DQA1* of the Dancing Qualia Argument

In Section 2.1, I argued that the thesis of incorrigibility pushes a logical version of premise *DQA2* (premise *DQA2a*) of the Dancing Qualia Argument. In this section, I give my reasons for thinking that a logical version of premise *DQA1* is also plausible.

Premise *DQA1* simply states that in every possible world that obeys the laws of nature that apply in the actual world, one's introspective beliefs about her own phenomenology are entailed by her functional organization. Holding a logical version of this premise—that one's introspective beliefs about her own phenomenology are logically entailed by her functional organization, does not seem incoherent to begin with. In fact, I think that this latter version (call it Premise *DQA1a*) is entailed by premise *DQA2a*, coupled with the thesis of incorrigibility.

The functionalist theory of consciousness, as I have defined it, holds that one's phenomenology is logically entailed by one's functional organization. I think the functionalist theory of consciousness is reasonable to a certain extent. When we imagine the functional organization of a human being duplicated on another logically possible being or thing, we expect that latter being or thing to possess most, if not all, of the phenomenology the human being has. So if we have a cat whose functional organization is identical to mine, then we would expect the cat to be able to have the same phenomenal experiences I am capable of having, given the same conditions. If we have a teddy bear

that happens to have a functional organization similar to mine, then even this teddy bear will be capable of having the phenomenal experiences I am capable of having.

Suppose we adopt this functionalist theory of consciousness. At the same time, suppose that the thesis of incorrigibility is true. The former theory entails that necessarily, any functional duplicate of a human being in the actual world will have whatever phenomenal experiences its human counterpart has, given the same conditions, provided that it has any conscious experience at all. The thesis entails that logically, conscious functional duplicates and their human counterparts cannot possibly have mistaken introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of their phenomenal experiences. What follows is that conscious functional duplicates and their human counterparts will have identical introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of their phenomenal experiences. This means that one's functional organization entails one's introspective beliefs about the phenomenal aspects of one's phenomenal experiences.

5.2: Epilogue

The defense of the two theses is, by no means, exhaustive. As I mentioned, the objections I present are merely those that I think are the strongest and the ones that have to be addressed most urgently. Future objections are not ruled out. Nevertheless, for now, if my arguments work, then we can dispel, at least partially, the doubts shrouding these two intuitive views of our phenomenal experiences.

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