



1977

Aristotle's Attitude Towards Homer

Donald J. McGuire
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss



Part of the [Philosophy Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

McGuire, Donald J., "Aristotle's Attitude Towards Homer" (1977). *Dissertations*. 1684.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1684

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License](#).
Copyright © 1977 Donald J. McGuire

ARISTOTLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HOMER

by

Donald J. McGuire, S.J.

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

February

1977

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Fr. Raymond V. Schoder, S.J., the director of this dissertation, has earned my very special gratitude for his invaluable guidance, inspiration, encouragement and generous help in all the steps of its preparation. I am grateful too for the help and insights of my readers, Dr. Joann Stachniw, Fr. John Festle, S.J., Dr. Leo M. Kaiser, and Dr. James G. Keenan. I wish to acknowledge gratefully the skillful and dedicated typing of a difficult polylingual manuscript by Mr. John D. Gooch and Miss Yvonne Holmes, the valuable typing assistance of my sister, Patricia McGuire, as well as the generous support given to the whole preparation of the manuscript by my brother, Mr. Joseph T. McGuire, and his partner, Mr. Frank M. Perz. I am grateful too for the constant encouragement of all my family and for the support of my fellow Jesuits, especially my superiors, Fr. Torrens Hecht here at Loyola and Fr. Donald Pantle at Carroll House in Washington, D.C. I want to thank Robert Jay Goldberg and Kim Goluska for their faithful assistance, Dr. and Mrs. Jerry Naples and their family for their generous support and encouragement, and finally the countless others who inspired, encouraged and helped me on the way.

VITA

The author, the Reverend Donald J. McGuire, S.J., is the son of Joseph Philip McGuire and Ellen Veronica (Kirby) McGuire. He was born July 9, 1930, the fifth of nine children, in Oak Park, Illinois.

He grew up in a home that was filled with the love of Greek and Latin Classics his father had gained early in the century at St. Ignatius College. He completed seven years of elementary education with the Sisters of the B.V.M. at St. Agatha Grammar School where he graduated at twelve years of age in June, 1943. At sixteen, in June of 1947 he graduated with a Classical Honors Diploma from his father's Alma Mater, St. Ignatius High School, where he had had a four-year scholarship.

August 21, 1947 he entered the Society of Jesus at Milford, Ohio where he spent the next two years in intensive spiritual training. During the ensuing two years at Milford he completed most of his undergraduate courses. In August, 1951 he went to West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana to pursue the study of Philosophy. In June, 1952 he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts *cum laude* there with a major in Classical languages from Loyola University of Chicago. In June, 1954 he received the Licentiate in Philosophy *cum laude* from West Baden College.

For the next three years he taught Latin at Loyola Academy, a Jesuit secondary school in Chicago, Illinois. In the summer of 1955 he completed all the courses required for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago. At the completion of four years' study of Theology he received the Licentiate in Theology *cum laude* from West Baden College and was ordained a priest in June, 1961.

From June, 1961 until February, 1965 he lived in Europe. The summer of 1961 he studied the German language and culture in Bavaria. From September, 1961 to June, 1962 he engaged once again in intensive spiritual and Apostolic training at Münster in Westphalia, Germany. From October, 1962 to February, 1965 he did special studies at the Philosophical Institute of the Theological Faculty of the University of Innsbruck, Austria. During his stay in Europe, besides mastering German and French, he did extensive priestly work during vacations in Germany, Austria, England, and Ireland--retreats, parish work, hospital and military chaplaincy, and the teaching of Theology. During the summers of 1962 through 1964 he traveled extensively in Europe, studying cultures, but especially visiting the academic institutions of twenty countries to evaluate the balance of scientific and humanistic studies at every educational level.

After returning to the United States he taught Classical Greek and Theology at Loyola Academy in Wilmette,

Illinois from February, 1965 to February, 1970. There he became Chairman of the Classics Department and co-founded an Honors Program which featured an in-depth introduction to Eastern and Western cultures, in which the students studied seven semesters of Classical Greek language and literature along with six semesters of Mandarin dialect and Chinese culture.

In February, 1970 the author began his work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classical Studies at Loyola University of Chicago. In February, 1974 he received the degree of Master of Arts in Classical Studies from the same University.

Throughout the last ten years of teaching and study he has continued priestly work, concentrating on parish work and especially retreats.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
VITA	iii
Chapter	
I. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM, ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS	1
II. RELATED LITERATURE	14
III. ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER AS MASTER OF THE ARTS OF LANGUAGE	39
IV. ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER AS SOURCE OF PHILOSOPHIC AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION	80
V. ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER AS TEACHER OF HUMAN VALUES	109
VI. OTHER ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER	142
VII. ARISTOTLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HOMER: A SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL	150
BIBLIOGRAPHY	167
APPENDIX	175
INDEX	179

CHAPTER ONE

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Praise did not flow readily from the pen of Aristotle. It seemed to have very little place, in fact, in the intensely critical and analytical method of the Philosopher. His generous praise of Homer, therefore, is all the more surprising, when it soars exuberantly above the quiet, even plane of his very ordered, disciplined argumentation.

He calls Homer 'godlike'¹--an epithet that would be extravagant even from an extravagant critic! Coming from this precise, conservative thinker it deserves especially serious attention and very careful evaluation.

That Aristotle was not alone in recognizing the enormous presence of Homer in the world of Greek thought and culture would not be difficult to demonstrate. Aeschylus comes to mind immediately when he spoke of his works as "slices from the banquet table of Homer".² The words of Dionysius of Halicarnassus echo the same thought: "Homer is the source of every sea, every river, and every spring".³

¹"θεσπέσιος ἄν φανείη," *Poetics* 1459a, 30.

²"οὐδ' ἐπὶ νοῦν βαλλόμενος τὸ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ λαμπροῦ Αἰσχύλου, ὃς τὰς αὐτοῦ τραγωδίας τεμάχη εἶναι ἔλεγεν τῶν Ὀμήρου μεγάλων δειπνῶν. *Athenaeus* 8 347e.

³Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Compositione Verborum* 24.

The statement implies that the poets who follow Homer are utterly dependent upon him. But Dionysius did not limit the Poet's influence to poetry. He asserts that through Homer all other studies came into Greece, including philosophy.⁴

Modern Homeric studies have strengthened rather than diminished this ancient judgement. Giacomo Soleri wrote in 1961 of the impossibility of a Greek of the ancient world prescinding from the Homeric influence.

Era praticamente impossibile a chionque, vivente nell' ambiente greca, prescindere da Homero, limitandosi ad ignorarlo....⁵

Certainly then, in a sense, Aristotle had no choice as a Greek but to live in an Homeric world. This insight has led many to explain Aristotle's frequent reference to Homer on this basis alone--that he had to speak of Homer. This is certainly a facet of the explanation of Aristotle's great involvement with the Poet. But it is not the whole answer. In saying it we have really begged the question, since we are simply stating that Aristotle, himself, like his pupils, submitted to a profound Homeric influence.

Some have suggested that he went to the defense of the Poet because he felt the attacks on Homer were attacks on Poetry itself.⁶ To defend Homer therefore meant to defend

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Giacomo Soleri, "Omero E I Pensatori Greci", *Rivista Di Studi Classici*, 1961 (September 2) p. 157.

⁶ Mitchell Carroll, *Aristotle's Poetics, Chapter XXV in the Light of the Homeric Scholia*, Baltimore: 1895, p. 12.

poetry. Again there is truth here, but a begging of the question. We have still to answer the question--why did Aristotle identify poetry with Homer? Why was Homer The Poet, as he called him? Why did his thoughts turn so frequently and with such unflinching admiration to the Poet?

This defense-of-poetry explanation exposes the problem even more, since it reveals that not all Greeks shared Aristotle's unbounded admiration for Homer. We are driven even further to inquire into the extent and reasons for the Aristotle-Homer special relationship.

The question revolves around the determination of whether Aristotle's choice of Homer was ultimately on his part free, or determined by the circumstances of Greek culture and education. The only route to an answer to that question, it seemed, lay in a thorough examination of Aristotle's expressed attitude towards the Poet.

It is the aim of this study to determine Aristotle's attitude towards Homer from an examination of all the many references he makes to Homer in his extant works as they are contained in the Immanuel Bekker edition of Aristotle.⁷ It aims to present all the passages where he cites or alludes to Homer, to analyze their significance, and discover

⁷Immanuel Bekker, *Aristotelis Opera*, (Vols. I, II, IV, and V). Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, edidit Academia Regia Borussica, 2a Ed. quam curavit Olaf Gigon. (Reprint of Berlin Ed., 1831-1870 except for Vol. III). Berlin: 1960-1961.

aspects and interrelationships of Aristotle's views on Homer for a full and balanced picture.

Before the text-by-text analysis the state of scholarship on the question of Aristotle's attitude towards Homer will be examined in the second chapter. The primary purpose there will be to determine to what extent scholars have ever attempted an analysis of Aristotle's attitude towards Homer by examining his citations of and allusions to the Poet in the course of his writings. Works, therefore, related to this study will be compared in the light of its purpose to note especially: the texts of Aristotle they select, the methods of analysis they use, and the conclusions they draw about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer.

The main body of the study will center in chapters three, four, five and six, where all the Homeric citations and allusions of Aristotle are examined and evaluated. This is how the preliminaries of the study proceeded.

Using Bonitz's *Index Aristotelicus*⁸ as a basic reference and guide all the pertinent texts were collated with the lists drawn from Heitz⁹ and Ross¹⁰. The dependability

⁸*Ibid*, Hermann Bonitz, "Ὀμηρος," *Index Aristotelicus*, Vol. V, pp. 507-508.

⁹Emil Heitz, "Homerus", Index, Vol V, *Aristotelis Opera Omnia* (Latin), (5 Vols). Vol. I-II, Johann Friedrich Dübner, ed; Vol. III-IV, Ulco Cats Bussemaker, ed. Paris: 1874-1878.

¹⁰William D. Ross, Ed. "Homer", Separate indices of the 12 vols. of *The Works of Aristotle Translated into English*, London: 1952-1962.

of each text was noted--the Aristotelian and Homeric texts in themselves, but especially whether Aristotle's Homeric text differed from our *textus receptus*. All the discrepancies and difficulties discovered in this investigation of the texts will be noted and evaluated in every case in the course of this study.

After the Aristotelian and Homeric texts were studied in their separate larger contexts, they were grouped according to the particular attitude they manifested. Four classifications or groups were determined.

The first group of texts, which will be examined in the third chapter, exemplify Aristotle's view of Homer primarily as a master of the arts of language--as poet and rhetorician. 'Primarily' is an important qualification here, since it should be noted at the outset that these classifications represent a primary not an exclusive characteristic. For example, when the Philosopher views Homer as "the Poet" his view extends beyond language to many of the deepest insights into man's life and destiny.

The second group of texts, treated in the fourth chapter, will center around Aristotle's view of Homer as a source of scientific and philosophic information. The third group will see Homer primarily as a teacher of human values. These will be studied in the fifth chapter, while the last group which escape simple classification will be treated in the sixth chapter as 'other texts'.

In the treatment of all of these texts, particularly helpful insights of ancient and modern commentators will be noted.

In the course of the four textual chapters (Three through Six), whenever an Aristotelian passage containing an Homeric quotation is cited, the Poet's words will be set off from the Philosopher's with a smaller, Greek elite typeface. Aristotelian passages without such elite typeface will be recognized as containing only allusions to Homer. In the Footnotes, all Homeric citations--for quotations or allusions--will be preceded by an equal sign and enclosed in parentheses, e.g.: (=Odyssey i.1.).

All the Homeric quotations and allusions found in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* of Immanuel Bekker will be included in this study, even those from treatises judged not the work of Aristotle by the last hundred years of Aristotelian scholarship--*On the Cosmos, The Problems, On Wonderful Things Heard*, and Books IX and X of *The History of the Animals*. The Homeric references from these works, considered not authentically Aristotle's, will be studied chiefly for three reasons along with those viewed quite universally until recently as strictly Aristotle's.

First, the present uncertainty about the 'Aristotelian Problem'--what is genuinely Aristotle's work?--justifies an openness to every work or fragment that has been seriously attributed to the Philosopher. The whole atmosphere sur-

questions than answers. Where is the true doctrine of Aristotle to be found--in those extant treatises that the last century of scholarship has unquestionably called authentic or only in the fragments of the dialogues? If the fragments prove to be the only authentic Aristotle, would not the whole *Corpus*, and not just those treatises considered spurious until now, fall into the non-authentic category? Which fragments or parts of fragments are authentically Aristotle? To what specific lost work does each fragment or part of fragment belong? What works and doctrine of Aristotle did those who prepared the spurious works of the *Corpus* have before them? How much did they adhere to or deviate from his doctrine? Anton-Herman Chroust, in the general preface of his recent (1973) two-volume work on the Philosopher vividly presents this uncertainty of Aristotle's authorship injected into the world of Aristotelian scholarship:

Both Rose and Jaeger, it will be noted, never so much as questioned Aristotle's authorship of the *Corpus*. In 1952, Joseph Zürcher, in his *Aristotle's Work and Spirit* (Paderborn, 1952), advanced or, more accurately, implied the startling thesis, subsequently rejected by almost all scholars, that certain treatises incorporated in the *Corpus*, especially the *Metaphysics*, must in large part be credited to Theophrastus and to the Early Peripatus, although it is quite certain that some Aristotlian compositions actually came to be included in the *Corpus*. . . . Presumably, at some future time, we might, whether we like it or not, be compelled to rename the present *Corpus Aristotelicum* and call it more discriminately *Corpus Scriptorum Peripateticorum Veterum*, that is, a 'collection' of

writings which not only includes authentic *Aristotelica*, but in all likelihood also contains authentic *Peripatetica*. . . . It is possible . . . that further investigations may, indeed, remove any and all reasonable doubts about the authenticity of the whole *Corpus Aristotelicum* and thus assuage our justifiable apprehension.¹¹

The second reason for justifying the inclusion of the presently named spurious works of the *Corpus* in this study is that obviously, in some true sense, they are Aristotelian. Until we have resolved some of the above-mentioned questions about genuine Aristotelian authorship and come to a better understanding of why these works were included in the *Corpus* in the first place, it seems reasonable to include them here, as expressing Aristotle's mind just as validly as any treatise accepted as authentic.

The third reason for including the Homeric quotations and allusions from the spurious works is that a study containing all Homeric references in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* contributes to the understanding of a true phase of Aristotelian scholarship. Bekker's *Corpus* is a universally recognized landmark in the history of our understanding of Aristotle. Immediately after its publication the critical work of scrutinizing the judgements that caused the inclusion or exclusion of works on the basis of authenticity began and has continued into our time. In fact, since Jaeger's study of the development of Aristotle's

¹¹Anton-Herman Chroust, *Aristotle*, 2 Vols.; Vol I, Notre Dame, Notre Dame University: 1973, pp. xi-xv, *passim*.

thought appeared,¹² the increased intensity of investigations of the *Fragments* revitalized interest in the question of determining the authentic work of Aristotle. Paul Wilpert observed this:

When Werner Jaeger in his important book interpreted the dialogues as belonging to Aristotle's early writings and pointed to the difference between the doctrines of the dialogues and those of the treatises as marking a development of thought, the reports of the lost works became important for the understanding of Aristotle's philosophy and its development. The fragments were studied with growing interest, and recent years have seen a great number of scholarly publications dealing with particular titles. The outcome was that Rose's *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* were looked upon as real fragments of lost writings. The collection, which originally included everything ascribed to Aristotle by ancient tradition, was now regarded as containing the remains of lost genuine works.¹³

Until these problems about authenticity, which have developed since Bekker's *Corpus Aristotelicum* was published, reach a more comprehensive resolution it is essential that other studies of Aristotle go forward, even provisionally. This is true especially of a study like the present one which has never been done for the Bekker edition before. Every allusion or quotation drawn from a treatise which is presently judged spurious will be noted as such, of course. Since the spurious Works will be noted clearly, for

¹²Werner Jaeger, *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*, Berlin: 1923.

¹³Paul Wilpert, "The Fragments of Aristotle's Lost Writings," *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* [Papers of the *Symposium Aristotelicum* held at Oxford in August, 1957] I. Doring and G. E. L. Owen, eds. Göteborg: 1960, p. 259.

simplicity's sake 'Aristotle' or 'the Philosopher' will be spoken of as the author in the general conclusions.

The *Fragments* which contain their author's citation of or allusion to Homer will be included in an appendix. Since there is so much study precisely about the authenticity of the *Fragments* it seemed better to set them all apart from the *Corpus* and not include them in the conclusions of this study. It is evident that all the *Fragments* constitute a continuing crucial but separate problem of Aristotelian scholarship and deserve a thorough separate study.

Paul Wilpert traced the chief modern problem with the *Fragments* to Rose's conviction that led him to decide to list them as belonging to *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* for the Bekker edition of Aristotle.

Rose's conviction that the tradition represented by the *Fragments* is spurious was based upon the observation that the doctrines attributed to Aristotle in the *Fragments* very often do not agree with the thoughts of the treatises. He assumed that the majority of the fragments of lost, putatively Aristotelian works, together with the associated doxographical comments, had nothing to do with Aristotle at all; and on this assumption he collected everything that had been attributed to Aristotle at any time in later antiquity.¹⁴

Wilpert concludes that modern scholarship on the *Fragments* must break with the Rose limitations.

There is urgent need for another critical survey of the material which contains evidence of Aristotle's lost works. No satisfactory results can be expected as long as we continue to base our researches on a collection

¹⁴Wilpert, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

which was meant to give a conspectus of pseudepigrapha. To a greater or lesser degree, later investigations are influenced by Rose's material. . . . What we have to do is to establish which of the texts and which of the evidence can be assigned to Aristotle and in particular to a given work of Aristotle, with as much certainty as is attainable under the circumstances.¹⁵

Recently Chroust has echoed Wilpert's observations:

The basic scholarly attitude towards Aristotle's lost works still is determined and, hence, prejudiced by what Rose had said in support of his unusual (and questionable) thesis contrived about one hundred years ago. . . . Barring a few isolated instances, the present status of the many problems connected with the lost works of Aristotle does not permit us to establish with any degree of certainty which particular texts are genuine fragments or excerpts, and which are merely doxographical accounts of frequently doubtful value. Neither does it really enable us to determine with any degree of certainty which texts may be safely credited to Aristotle or, perhaps, to a particular composition or title.¹⁶

Based on these realistic appraisals of the present reliability of the *Fragments*, citations from them, as previously stated, will be simply included as a separate appendix to this study. It is hoped that at some later date they will be subjected to an investigation similar to the one the *Corpus Aristotelicum* is receiving in this study and throw more light on the conclusions reached here.

The main goal of this study is limited, therefore, to examining all Homeric quotations and allusions in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* to gain an understanding of the attitude towards Homer they manifest.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 262-263.

¹⁶Chroust, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. xv.

In view of the uncertainties surrounding the authenticity of the treatises of the *Corpus* and in view of the work that remains to be done with the *Fragments* there is no intention here of trying to determine a development or change in the Philosopher's opinion of Homer. This study will have to rest with the determination of: inconsistencies, if there are any; aspects of Homer's thought included in the view of the Aristotle of the *Corpus*; and finally, the importance of the Philosopher's stand on Homeric studies.

A clear underlying purpose of this effort is to gain, too, a greater knowledge of the *Nachleben* of Homer--Homer's influence on those who followed him, in this case, the Aristotle of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

G. Glockman maintained in 1968 that the influence of the Poet has not yet been fully researched.¹⁷

Guided by this realization surely G. Lohse produced earlier his fine series of three articles on the Homeric citations in Plato¹⁸. This same conviction led Jan Fredrik Kindstrand to research Homer in the work of Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides, and Maximus of Tyre. Kindstrand's apology for his work is even more appropriate here since this study deals with an earlier and more important link binding Homer and ourselves--namely, Aristotle.

¹⁷G. Glockmann, *Homer in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Justinus*, Berlin: 1968, p. 25.

¹⁸G. Lohse, "Untersuchungen über Homerzitate bei Platon," *Helikon* Vol. IV (1964), 3-28; Vol. V (1965), 282--295; Vol. VII (1967), 223-231.

Was zuerst Homer betrifft, möchte meine Arbeit einen Beitrag zu dem Nachleben des Dichters leisten. Es mag fast überflüssig erscheinen, von der grossen Bedeutung zu sprechen, die Homer für spätere Zeiten gehabt hat. . . . Die Bedeutung Homers ist nicht im Laufe der Zeit geringer geworden, sondern umgekehrt scheint er eine grössere Macht über seine Hörer und Leser zu bekommen, wie er auch eine immer erhabeneren Stellung eingenommen hat. Hier werden wir die Aufnahme Homers kennenlernen, wie sie in einer begrenzten Zeit und in einer bestimmten literarischen Richtung geschehen ist.¹⁹

If it is true, as Kindstrand observes, that Homer's importance does not diminish with the passing of time but rather grows in power over his listeners, then surely the greatest and most important surge in the growth of Homeric influence occurred when Aristotle enthusiastically let the mighty river of Homer flow into his own great sea.

¹⁹Jan Fredrik Kindstrand, *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik*, Uppsala: 1973, p. i.

CHAPTER TWO

RELATED LITERATURE

Thorough searches into the history of Aristotelian scholarship surprisingly revealed no work identical in scope and intent with the present study. In view of the obvious clues to Homer's pervasive presence in the works of Aristotle still more surprising was the revelation that nothing even similar in scope to this work was ever undertaken. No study appeared, therefore, which attempted to present an analysis of all Aristotle's Homeric texts and allusions with the purpose of evaluating the Philosopher's attitude towards the Poet.

Exhaustive bibliographical research uncovered only some works related more narrowly to Aristotle's use of Homer. Indices of the actual Homeric texts and allusions to Homeric texts in Aristotle have been published, as well as evaluations of Aristotle's literary theory and judgement, especially as related to the *Poetics* and *Homeric Problems*. Philological evaluations of the Philosopher's Homeric texts appeared too, along with an evaluation of his literary judgement as derived from his Homeric texts and allusions in the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Some few works appeared, narrower in approach than the present study. These indicated that Aristotle viewed Homer as

contributing more than just literary values to him.

Some of these related works proved very useful for locating, evaluating, and especially verifying the texts of the Philosopher and Poet presented in this study.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine and compare in the light of the present study all the other works found to have examined in any way the textual relationships of Aristotle to Homer. This is to demonstrate: how the objectives, methods, and conclusions of these other studies differ from our own; what distinct understanding of the relationship of the Philosopher to the Poet they give; and in what way their conclusions support or complement our study.

First we will consider the indices which mainly provided only the list of *loci* in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* that cited or otherwise referred to Homer: the *Index Aristotelicus* of Hermann Bonitz for the second edition of Immanuel Bekker's *Aristotelis Opera*, the index of Firmin Didot's Latin edition of the *Aristotelis Opera Omnia*, the separate indices of William D. Ross's Oxford English edition of the *Works of Aristotle*, and Arthur Ludwich's *Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen*.

Next we will examine the studies which are exclusively concerned with the reliability of Aristotle's Homeric quotations and the reasons for the variations of his Homeric text from our own -- the studies of George E. Howes, T. W. Allen, Stephanie L. West, Adolph R mer, and Richard

Wachsmuth.

Then we will give special attention to the work of W. S. Hinman, part of whose professed purpose most closely approximated our own. He intended, at least from the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, to draw some conclusions about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer and the other writers he quoted.

The next group of studies we will review -- by Frederick von Schlegel, Ludwig Adam, Mitchell Carroll, Henrietta V. Apfel, Frederic R. White, and Hubert Hintenlang -- have a much newer purpose. They engage in various approaches to the understanding of the Philosopher's more sustained studies of the Poet: *Poetics* xxv, Προβλήματα Ὀμηρικά, and the ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά.

Finally we will examine the studies of James Hogan, Howard B. Schapker, S. J., P. W. Forchhammer, and Otto Körner. All of these move beyond the Philosopher's evaluation of Homer as literary source and model. They view Aristotle as recognizing the Poet's influence on his thinking in the realm of ethics, rhetoric, and physical science.

Let us turn first to the Aristotelian indices.

Under the word Ὀμηρος the *Index Aristotelicus* of Hermann Bonitz¹ provided the primary list of Aristotelian

¹Hermann Bonitz, "Ὀμηρος", *Index Aristotelicus*, Vol. V, (pp. 507-508) *Aristotelis Opera*, (5 Vols.) Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, edidit Academia Regia Borussica, 2aEd. quam curavit Olof Gigon, Berlin: 1960-1961, (Reprint of Berlin ed. 1831-1870).

citations and references to Homer and served as the chief reference and guide for the whole study. Bonitz's very norms for the division and arrangement of the citations provided considerable help in our compilation of the texts. He indicated all the texts in which the name 'Homer' or 'Poet' appears and noted texts that simply referred to rather than cited Homer. He pointed out obviously contaminated or missing verses as well as texts differing slightly from ours and isolated single words quoted from the Homeric text by Aristotle. He singled out Homeric verses in Aristotle that are absent from our Homer and texts that are not found in our codices.

Bonitz, however, did not include many passages of Aristotle which simply allude to rather than cite the Poet's verses. Our decision to include these texts in our study was strengthened by our discovery of them in the index of the Firmin Didot Latin edition of the *Aristotelis Opera Omnia*² and in the pertinent separate indices of the Oxford English edition of *The Works of Aristotle*.³ Arthur Ludwich's *Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen*⁴

²Emil Heitz, "Homerus", *Index*, Vol. V, *Aristotelis Opera Omnia*, (5 Vols.) Vol. I-II ed. Johann Friedrich Dübner; Vol. III-IV ed. Ulco Cats Bussemaker. Paris: 1874-1878.

³William D. Ross, ed. "Homer", Separate indices of the 12 Vols. of *The Works of Aristotle* Translated into English. London: 1952-1962.

⁴Arthur Ludwich, "Aristoteles", *Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen*, (71-132) Leipzig: 1898.

was very useful too for this process of selecting the Homeric texts of the Philosopher.

Next let us consider studies concerned exclusively with the reliability of Aristotle's Homeric text and its comparison with our own.

George E. Howes' article, "Homeric Quotations in Plato and Aristotle"⁵ evaluates the reliability of the text of each of Aristotle's citations from Homer. Howes discusses all the texts including the fragments but excluding those texts that are simply allusions to Homer, adhering closely to the list established by Bonitz. His purpose was "a study of the quotations from Homer found in our manuscripts of Plato and Aristotle" to "show whether these authors quoted accurately or not" and to "shed some light upon the Homeric text of their day."⁶

Howes' evaluation of the dependability of each Homeric citation in Homer is valuable. He groups the Philosopher's Homeric texts in eight categories:⁷

A *No Variants:* Twenty-eight quotations show no readings different from the best manuscripts of Homer.

⁵George E. Howes, "Homeric Quotations in Plato and Aristotle", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, VI, Ed. by a committee of the Classical Instructors of Harvard University, (153-237) Boston: 1895.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 210-236.

- B *Slight Variants:* Thirty-nine passages in which the variants of Aristotle and Homer are so few and slight that they are undoubtedly due to scribes.
- C *Agreement with the Best Manuscripts of Homer:* Twenty passages in which the manuscripts of Aristotle agree with the best Homeric manuscripts although some variants exist in the scholia of Eustathius.
- D *Quotations Adapted Into the Text:* Eight quotations in which Aristotle evidently adapted Homer's words to his own sentences, using the same readings as our Homer or very consistent with our Homer.
- E *Aristotle's Variants Substantiated:* Ten texts in which Aristotle's Homeric text differs from ours but can be substantiated by manuscripts of Homer, scholia, Eustathius or ancient authors.
- F *Homeric Verses Omitted in Aristotle:* Three.
- G *Verses Not Found in Our Homer:* Eleven verses of the Poet familiar to the Philosopher but not found in our Homer.
- H *New Readings in Aristotle:* Eighteen passages in which Aristotle quotes Verses found in our Homer but gives readings unsupported by other testimony.

Howes concludes:

I think we may say that there are occasional passages where the presumption seems very strong that he has quoted from memory and quoted wrongly. We cannot, however, dismiss all, or even many, of his variants in that abrupt way. Whether he quoted from memory or not, for the following reasons I feel that his readings are entitled to a careful consideration, and that where they differ from the traditional text of Homer, in most instances they probably give us variants of high antiquity.⁸

A clear conclusion that we can draw from Howes' work, whether we agree with the details of his solution or not, is that we are not in a position to reject as not authentically Homeric even the most problematic of his cited verses from Homer.

T. W. Allen, in his book on the transmission of the Homeric texts, discusses the additions, omissions, and different versions of Homer's verses in Aristotle. Although he directs some unwarrantedly harsh barbs at the Philosopher's artistic ability--". . . mistakes of memory are admissible, for far from being a cunning artist like Plato, Aristotle is no artist at all, he adduces Homer for scientific not artistic purposes . . ."⁹ His conclusion is much the same as Howes'.

When therefore we have made the allowances called for by the Aristotelian corpus, it is plain that texts of Homer were extant in his day varying considerably from

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

⁹ Thomas William Allen, "Early Quotations", *Homer: The Origins and Transmission*, Chapter IX Oxford: 1924, p. 253.

the later vulgate and not infrequently containing extra lines.¹⁰

Allen's judgement is supported too by the more recent work of Stephanie L. West.¹¹

Adolph Römer, in a lecture he delivered in Munich on May 3, 1884, recognized the high place that Homer's poetry held throughout the works of Aristotle.

Aristoteles in allen denjenigen seiner Schriften, deren Inhalt sich nicht durchaus in rein abstracten Dingen bewegt, von allen griechischen Dichtern am meisten die beiden grossen Gedichte des Homer heranzieht, um seine eigenen Lehren an schlagenden und feinsinnigen Versen des Dichters zu erläutern und seinen Lesern einzuprägen . . . aus seiner eigenen innigen Verehrung des Dichters ist jene reiche Menge von Citaten geflossen, mit welchen die Werke des Philosophen durchwoben sind.¹²

Römer was a philologist but he wanted to tread a middle ground between an appreciation for the great respect Aristotle showed for Homer in his frequent citations of the Poet and the sharp and sometimes destructive evaluations of texts produced by philological study. With that purpose Römer goes on to investigate the Philosopher's Homeric citations in the corpus and fragments, especially evaluating the accuracy and applicability of the more problematic quotations. Römer takes the position that Aristotle's

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 260.

¹¹Stephanie L. West, *The Ptolemaic Papyri of Homer*, Köln: 1967.

¹²Adolph Römer, "Die Homercitate und die homerischen Fragen des Aristoteles", *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und historischen Classe der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, zu München*, (264-314) München: 1885, pp. 264-265.

tendency to quote from memory and as briefly and pointedly as possible led to corruptions in his Homeric text.¹³

Richard Wachsmuth's dissertation¹⁴ takes a new look at the accuracy of Aristotle's Homeric text in the more difficult variants of his accepted works, the Homeric problems, and the fragments. He concludes that seeing these together would help shed light on them. He offers some interesting insights into various problem texts.

We can now turn to a consideration of the work whose purpose, at least in part, most nearly approximates our own.

W. S. Hinman's *Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics*¹⁵ moved closer to our study under two important aspects than the other works we have considered. First, he included allusions to Homer as well as citations from Homer found in Aristotle's works. Secondly, he attempted to draw some conclusions about the Philosopher's attitude towards the writers he quoted. He

¹³The clumsiness of papyrus rolls led ancient scholars (e.g. Plutarch) to quote from memory. It would have been too time-consuming and laborious for an ancient to verify the accuracy of all his quotations.

¹⁴Richard Wachsmuth, *De Aristotelis Studiis Homericis Capita Selecta* (Quattuor), *Dissertatio Inauguralis*, Berlin: 1963.

¹⁵W. S. Hinman, *Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics*, New York: 1935. Cf. Raymond V. Schoder, S.J. "Literary Sources Cited by Aristotle in the *Poetics*, II", *Classical Journal*, LXV (1970), p. 359. A convenient list of all Aristotle's references to Homer in the *Poetics*--less cumbersome than Hinman's Part III, *op. cit.*

stated his purpose clearly:

From the comparison of the quotation or allusion with the context of the paragraph in which it occurs we shall try to discover what were the reasons for Aristotle's quoting or alluding.¹⁶

Hinman fulfilled the letter of this stated purpose. In each case he did relate the Homeric quotation to the particular reasoning of the paragraph of Aristotle in which it was found. But, he made no attempt to gain any common insights by comparing and collating all the paragraphs in which the Philosopher quoted Homer.

Hinman's expressed purpose was, after all, literary. This purpose he did fulfill. He described it when he wrote:

We may also discern some indication of Aristotle's literary preferences and antipathies both as to authors and as to kinds of literature.¹⁷

But here too, I fear, Hinman's success was moderate since he based his judgement mostly on a quantitative analysis rather than on anything intrinsic to what Aristotle states.

In a sense Hinman attempted too much and too little. He attempted too much since his study was directed at all the literary quotations and allusions in the three works of Aristotle mentioned. His attempt was too modest since he limited his study of Aristotle to the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. The reasons he adduced for this limitation are not cogent. He argued that the three

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

treatises formed a sufficient basis for valid conclusions since they contained many literary quotations and allusions.

Hinman's work was very useful to the present study. It provided corroborative insight for many of the quotations and allusions examined here. With regard to the Homeric allusions found in Aristotle, Hinman's was the only comparable study I could find to test my own judgements about them.

In the final analysis, however, the value of Hinman's work was vitiated by his drawing conclusions from simply quantitative analysis and, as one critic of his study has pointed out¹⁸, by his unsubstantiated dismissal of Aristotle as a sound literary critic. His reasoning was not at all cogent when he argued:

Wherever a reason can be determined for a quotation and allusion, that reason shows that Aristotle has used a literary illustration solely for the sake of elucidating the point under discussion. He has not turned aside from his topic for the purpose of quoting some beautiful passage or alluding to a favorite author. Many a quotation ends abruptly although its aesthetic and even literary value would be enhanced by its extension.¹⁹

This was a strange argument that would turn the incisive mind of Aristotle from his perfectly appropriate method to 'purple patches' just to make him fulfill some arbitrary

¹⁸C. G. Hardie, "Quotation in Aristotle and Others", Book Review of W.S. Hinman, *Literary Quotation and Allusion*, in *Classical Review*, XLIX (1935) p. 223.

¹⁹Hinman, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

definition of a literary critic.

Hinman's categorization of texts was very useful along with Howes' for collating and evaluating all of Aristotle's Homeric references in the present study. He grouped quotations as "exact," "inexact," "incapable of being tested for accuracy," or "doubtful". Allusions to Homer he classified as "supported by other evidence," "not supported by other evidence," or "incorrect allusions". In the three works, Homer is quoted seventy-two times. "Of the sixty-four quotations from him that can be tested, forty-eight are given exactly--seventy-five percent."²⁰ Homer is alluded to forty-four times in the three works. Hinman listed forty-one allusions as supported by other evidence, only one as not supported, and two allusions (to the *Margites*) as incorrect--ninety-five percent accurate.

Hinman seemed to accept, but not wholeheartedly, the possibility of tracing Aristotle's 'inaccuracy' to truly variant ancient texts. In discussing the question: "Did he use a manuscript of Homer different from any extant today?"²¹ Hinman discussed some problematic texts and concluded:

When we consider that Homer is quoted by Aristotle with seventy-five percent of accuracy where that can be tested, and also that there are seventy-two quotations from Homer in the three treatises combined it is as difficult to reject these doubtful quotations as it is to accept them. At best they may indicate that

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 170.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 177.

Aristotle had a text of Homer which contained lines that were later deleted by Alexandrians, but the evidence is too weak to prove it. These peculiar lines may have been rejected by the Alexandrians, or Aristotle may have erred in quotation.²²

After W. S. Hinman's work, the literature related to the present study narrows to works that pursue an understanding of Aristotle's explicit Homeric studies. These are studies on the *Poetics*, especially Chapter Twenty-Five, the προβλήματα ὁμηρικὰ,²³ and the ἀπορήματα ὁμηρικὰ.²⁴

We propose here to examine briefly seven of the more important studies of this kind, with the seventh forming a natural bridge to the last three studies we wish to consider in this chapter and to the broader perspective of our own study. They will be discussed in the order of their chronological appearance.

Two essays by Frederick von Schlegel appeared in 1822²⁵ in successive chapters of the Third Book of his collected works. The first essay traces the attitude of the Greeks before Aristotle towards the Homeric works. The second analyzes Aristotle's view of them, especially artistically as it was expressed in the *Poetics*. Both essays are

²² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

²³ Westerhain, ed., *Biographi Minores*, p. 404 §77.

²⁴ C. Gabriel Cobét (Ed.), *Diogenes Laertius*, Paris: 1878, §5,1 ¶26.

²⁵ Frederick von Schlegel, "Ansichten und Urteile der Alten von den homerischen Gedichten" (4.Kap.) 67-82; "Weitere Erörterung der Aristotelischen Grundsätze über die epische Dichtart" (5.Kap.) (83-108, 3.Band) *Sämmtliche Werke*, Vienna: 1822.

laborious Hegelian musings, outstanding for their lack of practical information.

The second work was Ludwig Adam's *Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos*²⁶ which appeared in 1889. After establishing the central place that the Homeric epics held in the culture and education of the Greeks prior to Aristotle Adam emphasizes the Philosopher's high praise of Homer.²⁷ Examining the epics as the forerunners of tragedy, Adam stresses the tragic element that Aristotle saw in Epic. He demonstrates too that Aristotle's position on Homer strongly influenced the Alexandrian school's attitude towards the Poet. Especially valuable is Adam's brief bibliography of essays and lectures that appeared in Germany between 1830 and 1867 on the topic of Aristotle's view of Homer.²⁸ Only one of these works appeared in any standard bibliography I consulted.²⁹

Mitchell Carroll's doctoral dissertation, *Aristotle's Poetics: Chapter Twenty-Five in the Light of the Homeric Scholia* which was published in 1895,³⁰ demonstrates that

²⁶Ludwig Adam, *Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos nach ihrer Entwicklung bei Griechen und Römern*, Wiesbaden: 1889.

²⁷*Ibid.*, "Urteil des Aristoteles", pp. 18-29.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p.15. Cf: The works listed there: Schömann, Rasso, Trendelenberg, Nitzsch.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Georg Friedrich Schömann, "Disputatio de Aristotelis censura carminum epicorum", *Opuscula Academica*, Vol. III (30-46), Berlin: 1858.

³⁰Mitchell Carroll, *Aristotle's Poetics: Chapter Twenty-Five in the Light of The Homeric Scholia*, Doctoral Dissertation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1895.

the difficult Twenty-Fifth Chapter of the *Poetics* contains the elements of a systematic treatment of the faults of poetry and of Homer's inconsistencies. He bases his conclusion on a study of the Porphyrion ζητήματα of the Homeric scholia, of which the προβλήματα ὁμηρικὰ of Aristotle and his followers was a source. The προβλήματα ὁμηρικὰ considered and answered the criticisms and censures of Homer by philosophers and sophists. As a result the *Fragments* preserved for us furnish us with numerous illustrations of the principles stated in *Poetics* XXV in which objections of critics to poetry and proper methods of answering them are discussed. Carroll makes his point by analyzing Aristotle's method.

The Philosopher begins by laying down certain general propositions as a basis for the consideration both of the critics' objections, ἐπιτιμήματα, and of the solutions to the objections, λύσεις. Carroll explains that Aristotle had twelve explanations for the faults found in Homer. They are grouped under three headings: those from consideration of the objects imitated, those from consideration of artistic correctness, and those from consideration of the method of representation. These are carefully examined in *Poetics* XXV along with examples of typical attacks on selected quotations from Homer and possible defenses against those attacks.

Carroll's scholarly investigations of the intimate connection between Aristotle's *Problems* and Chapter Twenty-

Five of the *Poetics* bring to light the great effort the Philosopher expended in the defense of Homer. Carroll argues that the other evidences of Aristotle's activity in the study of the Poet justify his chapter in the *Poetics* which is devoted almost exclusively to the defense of Homer. His evidence of the Philosopher's concern for Homer is impressive:

Aristotle's hearty veneration for Homer is shown by the numerous citations of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in his works and by the frequent expressions of admiration occurring in the *Poetics*; perhaps to this we may attribute his appearance as a defender of the Poet against his many detractors. Isocrates testified that the Homeric poems were objects of study in the Lyceum and Dio Chrysostom is the authority for the statement that Aristotle in a number of dialogues concerned himself with Homer. Besides these and other indications of Aristotle's Homeric activity a peculiar interest is in a special work which had the Homeric poems for its exclusive object, and which has come down to us under different titles, ἀπορήματα ὁμηρικὰ or προβλήματα ὁμηρικὰ.³¹

Henrietta V. Apfel's article on Fourth Century B.C. Homeric Criticism³² appeared in 1938. When she discusses Aristotle she stresses the fact that he seemed to have regarded it as his task to defend the great epics against Plato's attacks. He did this, she indicates, in his two major works on literary questions, the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, but especially in the fragmentary *Homeric Problems*.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

³²Henrietta V. Apfel, "Homeric Criticism in the Fourth Century, B.C.", *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1938 (245-258).

She begins the main thrust of her article when she takes up the consideration of the fragments of this work.

The work which Aristotle devoted to the defense of Homer has unfortunately come down to us only in fragmentary form. There is sufficient however to show us his methods which he indeed had already shown in Chapter Twenty-Five of the *Poetics*.³³

Demonstrating that Aristotle's greatest service to the Poet lay in his defense against the attacks of the moralists, Apfel clarifies briefly each one of the fragments. She concludes her treatment of Aristotle's defense of Homer in the *Fragments* with an observation about the text of Homer which Aristotle used.

The text of Homer which Aristotle used apparently differed considerably from extant MSS. It is true that he often quoted only a few words, or only those which he needed to prove his point, regardless of their sense in the positions where he quoted them. He sometimes deliberately deformed a passage to suit his purpose.³⁴

Apfel's article manifests a fine awareness and control of the more important recent work on Aristotle's criticism of Homer. She refers directly to Howes, Carroll, Hinman, Römer, and Wachsmuth.

Frederic R. White submitted a doctoral dissertation in 1942 to the University of Michigan on the development of Homeric criticism.³⁵ White's evaluation is concerned only with criticism in the literary sense. He tries to make the

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

³⁵ Frederic R. White, *The Development of Homeric Criticism: Ancient and Medieval*, Doctoral Dissertation, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1942.

point that the Philosopher imposed norms upon the Homeric epics and fails to grasp the obvious preoccupation of Aristotle with discovering his very norms for literary judgement in the Homeric Epics. This prejudice of White which leads him to trace the faults of Alexandrians to Aristotle is clearly expressed when he says:

Aristotle, the master of those who know rather than of those who, with Socrates and Plato, question and search and finally leave the matter open for further discussion, provided a convenient code for conscientious critics.^{3 6}

One would wish that White who so summarily dismisses one of the greatest questioners and searchers of human history would heed his own advice, and regarding Aristotle "question and search and finally leave the matter open for further discussion." Fortunately White's approach is not characteristic of other students of the relationship of Aristotle to Homer who leave the matter open for much further discussion.

The next pertinent work appeared in 1961 with the publications of Hubert Hintenlang's Heidelberg dissertation about the *Homeric Problems*.^{3 7} This author examines in great detail the texts of the *Homeric Problems*, compares them to the Twenty-Fifth Chapter of the *Poetics* and shows that they harmonize well with Aristotle's theory. Hintenlang demonstrates a very exact parallelism between

^{3 6} *Ibid.*, p. 74.

^{3 7} Hubert Hintenlang, *Untersuchungen zu den Homer-Aporien des Aristoteles*, Dissertation, Heidelberg: 1961.

Chapter Twenty-Five of the *Poetics* and the *Problems*, showing the practical application of the Philosopher's own theoretical principles. His bibliography lists numerous valuable studies both of special and general interest on Aristotelian criticism of Homer.

Finally, we can turn to the studies which see Aristotle as recognizing Homer's influence on his ethical, rhetorical, and scientific as well as literary thinking with our consideration of the latest important study, an article by James Hogan on the *Poetics* which appeared in 1973.³⁸ Hogan is impressed by the importance that Aristotle gives to Homer's epics in his consideration of tragedy.

From the discussion of principles in the first five chapters to the comparison of epic and tragedy in the last four, Homer provides the prototype and model. We find, moreover, a constant stress on the dramatic values in Homer and the clear implication that the techniques of the two genres, at their best, have much in common.³⁹

Hogan collects and assesses all the references to Homer and epic poetry found in the *Poetics*, presenting them as they occur in the text. He offers some observations on Aristotelian notions like "ἀμαρτία, which though not explicitly applied to epic in the *Poetics* might be thought relevant to an Aristotelian interpretation of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*."

³⁸James C. Hogan, "Aristotle's Criticism of Homer in the *Poetics*," *Classical Philology*, LXVIII (April, 1973), (95-108).

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 95.

Hogan's final observation forms an intriguing introduction to the last few works we consider in this chapter and to the broader perspectives of this study.

Much of what has been said touches on or implies a continuity in ethical values between the time of the epics into the fourth century. Though his (Aristotle's) criticism is certainly more aesthetic than ethical in its origin and argument, some typical ideas, e.g. the emphasis on action, have deeper roots in Greek thought than the tragedy of the fifth century. . . . If we proceed somewhat negatively it may be said that the frequent use of the Homeric paradigm to illustrate formal procedures suggests that Aristotle did not perceive a fundamental lack of harmony between the ethical premises of the *Poetics* and those of epic.⁴⁰

Hogan's statement opens the study of the relationship of Aristotle to Homer to fresh, broader perspectives. That Aristotle was profoundly influenced by Homer in his literary judgement is not seriously challenged. This is clear from the present chapter. But what of the other facets of Aristotle's multiple genius--ethical, religious, social, scientific? As Hogan opens up to examination the whole area of Homer's influence on Aristotle's ethical considerations, it seems reasonable to pursue a study of Homeric influence on other areas of Aristotelian thought.

Many more studies like the Master's thesis of Howard B. Schapker, S.J., at Loyola University of Chicago in 1959⁴¹ would help to demonstrate empirically the fact of this broader influence of Homer on Aristotle. Schapker clearly

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁴¹ Howard B. Schapker, S.J., *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Homer*, Master's Thesis under the direction of Raymond V. Schoder, S.J., Loyola University of Chicago, 1959.

shows the presence of many of Aristotle's canons of rhetoric in the speeches of the *Iliad*, although he does not draw the obvious conclusion that Homer's practice influenced Aristotle's theory.

When the *Iliad's* more accomplished oratorical efforts are considered, then, the close rapport between the two Greeks is as remarkable as it is indisputable.⁴²

Schapker's work is singled out here since it shows that because of the broad nature of Greek rhetoric itself this community of rhetorical principles between the Philosopher and the Poet manifests a much broader similarity than simply literary. Part of the community in rhetorical principles that Schapker discovers in Homer and Aristotle approximates the community in ethics that James Hogan speaks of above.

Schapker writes:

In short, Aristotle requires an orator to have a complete and integral theoretical understanding of man's nature, and to be master of all practical means, argumentative and psychological, of inducing men to make correct judgements.⁴³

In the world of science too the Homeric presence in Aristotle deserves more scholarly attention. In 1885 P. W. Forchhammer published an article in the magazine section of a Munich newspaper entitled simply *Aristoteles und Homer*.⁴⁴ The central point of Forchhammer's argument was that if we

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁴⁴ Peter W. Forchhammer, "Aristoteles und Homer", *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung*, Nr. 242 (München: September, 1885), 3562-3563.

follow Aristotle's insight into Homer's use of metaphors we can uncover the factual events he clothes with fantasy. Forchhammer applied the insight to Homer's description of Achilles' battle with the rivers of Troy. After personal observation of the Spring flooding around the Trojan plain he suggested that Homer's description of Achilles' battle with the rivers was not merely allegorical. Homer was working with the solid meteorological fact of Spring flooding that interfered with the Greek siege of Troy.

Forchhammer fortifies his position with observations from Pausanias, Strabo and Plutarch who recognized the tendency of the ancients to describe their physical world in myths. Certainly we have discovered in our times that this grasp of the mythologizing by the ancients has led archaeologists to break through mythical packaging to wonderful discoveries in the ruins of the ancient world.

Forchhammer's observations, if not his conclusions, lead us to recognize how Aristotle could confidently accept empirical facts from Homer, although they were embedded in fantasy.

Otto Körner, an expert on Homeric zoology, who published his first book on the subject in 1880,^{4 5} expresses in the second edition fifty years later, his impatience with the failure of zoologists to record the extraordinarily accurate details of Homeric zoology.

^{4 5}Otto Körner, *Die homerische Tierwelt*, Berlin: 1880.

Die homerische Tierkunde ist bis in die neueste Zeit von den Geschichtsschreibern der Zoologie teils vernachlässigt, teils ganz und gar übersehen worden.^{4 6}

In a book in 1917 he devoted his efforts to demonstrating the importance of the Homeric animal classification systems for those of Aristotle.^{4 7}

All of Körner's painstaking research confirms the existence of the broader influence of the Poet on Aristotle. Körner's studies establish that influence in a purely empirical science--zoology.

The principal governing this chapter was to examine every study which approached in any substantial way the relationship of Aristotle to Homer. The purpose was to establish the distinctiveness of the present study as well as its dependence on these other related studies, which fell into five groups: 1) indices, 2) text reliability studies, 3) W. S. Hinman's work which stands alone and draws conclusions about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer from Homeric quotations found in the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, 4) studies of Aristotle's more extended literary approaches to Homer, (*Poetics* XXV, Προβλήματα Ὀμηρικά, and the ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά), and 5) studies exemplifying Aristotle's acceptance of a broader than just literary influence of Homer on his thought. How then is our work distinct from these and how does it relate to them?

^{4 6}Körner, *op. cit.*, 2d ed., München, 1930, 1.

^{4 7}Körner, *Das homerische Tiersystem und seine Bedeutung für die zoologische systematik des Aristoteles*, Wiesbaden: 1917.

Our study makes use of the first category listed above, the indices examined, but is not just a specialized index of Aristotelian texts that quote or allude to Homer. It depends on the second category, the studies that seek to establish the reliability of Aristotle's Homeric texts, without undertaking on its own any special test of textual reliability. Our study is like the Homeric part of Hinman's work in that it works with allusions as well as quotations and draws conclusions about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer. It is not limited as Hinman's to the literary values from Homer which Aristotle accepts in his *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Our work extends to the whole *Corpus Aristotelicum* and to Homeric principles and insights accepted by the Philosopher in all fields of human thought and endeavor. The studies of the fourth category, limited to *Poetics* XXV, the Προβλήματα and ἀπορήματα, give us an insight into the intensity of Aristotle's admiration of the Poet, but are clearly much narrower in their approach than our study. The last works of this category, beginning with Hogan's article, serve as an introduction to the fifth and final category of studies--those which recognize some influences of Homer on the Philosopher other than literary. Once again, however, these studies are much narrower in their approach to the question of Aristotle's attitude toward Homer.

At the very conclusion of this chapter, where we have considered the important works related to our study, we have presented a natural bridge in the work of Hogan, Schapker, Forchhammer, and Körner to our analysis in the next four chapters. We can more confidently begin the work of demonstrating the true extent of Homer's influence on Aristotle's thought--an influence that touched not only his literary and aesthetic judgement, but his ethical and religious, as well as his scientific and philosophical theory and practice. In the face of the mass of Aristotelian scholarship that has ignored it, the opening we have seen is small, but it is an opening that deserves to be widened if only a little more.

CHAPTER THREE

ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER AS MASTER OF THE ARTS OF LANGUAGE

The approach of Aristotelian scholarship to the Philosopher's judgement of Homer has centered quite naturally on his treatment of Homer primarily as poet and then as rhetorician. There has been a solid tradition of study of Aristotle's evaluation of the Poet's poetic and rhetorical excellence. The present chapter in no sense will attempt to supplant these studies. It will simply analyze the texts of Aristotle which explicitly view Homer as poet and rhetorician to show what they reveal of Aristotle's attitude towards the Poet.

There are eighty-five places in the extant works of Aristotle in which Homer's rhetorical and poetical character is touched. Forty-one times Homer is cited or mentioned in this light in the *Rhetoric*, forty-two times in the *Poetics*, once in the *Topics*, and once in the *Sophistical Refutations*.

The art of rhetoric as seen by Aristotle eludes a single modern category. It is not just concerned with language and style, although these are a necessary part of his *Rhetoric*. Ancient rhetoric, and more properly here, Aristotelian rhetoric, examines a wide range of human

behavior and values as well as techniques of language.

Lane Cooper summarizes it well:

His principles . . . he (Aristotle) sought . . . in the living pattern of the human heart. All the recesses and windings of that hidden region he has explored; all its caprices and affections, whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuse, to gratify, or to offend it have been carefully examined. . . . The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle is a practical psychology and the most helpful book extant for writers of prose and for speakers of every sort . . . and the modern psychologist commonly will find that he has observed the behavior of human beings less carefully than did Aristotle, even though the author keeps reminding us that in the *Rhetoric* his analysis of thought and conduct is practical, not scientifically precise and complete.¹

J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire suggests the strong emphasis Aristotle gives to the behavioral or ethical side of his *Rhetoric*:

. . . Aristote ne méconnaît pas la partie technique de l'art; mais il la subordonne; dans son ouvrage, cette partie tient moins de place peut-être que la morale, la politique et la psychologie.²

According to Aristotle rhetoric is the study in which one learns "what to say persuasively in every case."³ This 'whatness' leads the *Rhetoric* into the study of human values. To speak nobly, wisely, and persuasively to the assembly or jury one must understand and influence human passions, motives, and ideals.

¹Lane Cooper, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*. (New York: 1932), pp. xi-xvii *passim*.

²J. Barthélemy Sainte-Hilaire, *Rhetorique d'Aristote*. (Paris: 1870), pp. lxxiv-lxxv.

³*Rhetoric* 1355b, 26.

Because of the dual nature of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*--its literary aspect and its ethical aspect--nineteen of the Homeric citations in that work will not be included in this chapter but will be discussed in the fifth chapter. The present chapter deals with Aristotle's attitude towards the poet as master of the art of language itself--of 'how to speak' rather than 'what to say'. The above-mentioned nineteen citations strongly exemplify the ethical side of Aristotelian rhetoric. They will be treated, therefore, in our later consideration of Aristotle's attitude towards Homer as a teacher of human values.

Aristotle's isolated reference to Homer in the *Topics* can serve to set the tone of this whole chapter. He points to Homer as the exemplar of the important facet of style he is discussing. He is advising the student of argument to adduce examples and illustrations to clarify his argument. Almost casually he says the examples should be to the point and drawn from things that are familiar to the hearer, "of the kind which Homer uses and not the kind that Choerilus uses; for thus the proposition would be rendered clearer."

Εἰς δὲ σαφήνειαν παραδείγματα καὶ παραβολὰς οἰστέον, παραδείγματα δὲ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἴσμεν, οἷα Ὅμηρος μὴ οἷα Χοερίλος· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν σαφέστερον εἴη τὸ προτεινόμενον.⁴

In the *Rhetoric*, in counseling the orator to use language most effectively and persuasively, Aristotle turns to the example of Homer twenty-three times.

⁴*Topics* 157a, 14-17.

In presenting the appropriate purposes of each of the three kinds of oratory--deliberative, forensic, and epideictic--Aristotle demonstrates how all other considerations in a speech are subordinated to the one ruling purpose of that kind of oratory. Since the purpose of the epideictic orator, he argues, is to praise what is honorable and fault what is disgraceful, he does not consider what is more proper to deliberative oratory, namely, what is expedient or harmful. In fact, the epideictic orator often praises a man for disregarding what is expedient and in his own interest, to perform some honorable deed. An example of this the Philosopher finds in Homer since Achilles is praised for disregarding his own safety to protect the body of his comrade Patroclus and avenge his death.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγορήσας τοῦ αὐτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος ἔπραξέ τι καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ ἁειδῶς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐξὸν ζῆν. τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.⁵

Aristotle said there were five 'inartificial' proofs that properly belonged to forensic oratory: laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths. After discussing laws he spoke of the two kinds of witnesses the orator should use for persuasion--ancient and recent. The 'ancient' had to be poets and men of good repute whose judgements were known to all. The first such ancient witness that the Philosopher

⁵*Rhetoric* 1358b, 37-1359a, 6 (No quotation from Homer but a true statement paralleled in the *Iliad*.)

mentions is Homer, of course, to whom the Athenians appealed, he says, in the matter of Salamis. Aristotle's allusion is to *Iliad* ii.557-558, where the Poet says that Ajax led his twelve ships from Salamis and took his position with the Athenians.

Περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσι διττοί, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου οἱ δ' ἐκτός. Λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τοὺς τε ποιητὰς καὶ ὄσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰσὶ κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὀμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος⁶

He advises the use of common and frequently-quoted maxims if they are appropriate for persuasion since their very commonness seems to earn them universal acknowledgement as true. His first example is exhorting soldiers to risk danger. Here he cites Hector's words to Polydamas who has threatened him with an adverse omen; the best of omens is to defend one's country.

καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἀρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ἀποδείξαντα. χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμας, ἐὰν ὡσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς ὁμολογούντων ἀπάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους "εἷς οἶωνος ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πατρὸς,"⁷

⁶*Rhetoric* 1375b, 26-30 (= *Iliad* ii.557-558). Aristotle does not indicate any Homeric passage, and line 558 is disputed and attributed to Solon. Athens and Megara were struggling over the possession of Salamis. The Spartans, who acted as arbitrators, awarded Salamis to the Athenians on the strength of these two lines of Homer.

Ἄξας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας,
στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἴν' Ἀθηναίων ἴσταντο φάλαγγες,

⁷*Rhetoric* 1395a, 8-14 (= *Iliad* xii.243). The Homeric quotation is accurate here but Aristotle's interpretation is loose, since Hector is correcting a bad omen.

His second example of the effective use of a common maxim is exhorting soldiers to battle when they are outnumbered. Here he turns to Hector's words when he is about to fight Achilles.

καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττους ὄντας "ξυνοσ 'Ενυάλιος,"⁸

In forensic accusation or defense, enthymene as well as examples, according to Aristotle, should be used as a means of proof. The use of enthymene demands a grasp of all that really belongs or appears to belong to the subject of the defense or accusation. The argument is easier when facts are used more plentifully and when the facts used are less common and more intimately related to the subject. To praise Achilles because he went to Troy would not single him out, but praise because he killed Hector could be intended only for him.

It is not surprising that the Philosopher is probably alluding to the twenty-second book of the *Iliad* here.

ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλείω ἔχηται τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσοῦτῳ ῥᾶον δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ δ' ἐγγύτερον, τοσοῦτῳ οἰκειότερα καὶ ἥττον κοινά. λέγω δὲ κοινά μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ "Ἴλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην. ἴδια δὲ ἂ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἔκτορα τὸν ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων"⁹

As Aristotle turns to various language devices which the orator may use for greater effect he frequently invokes

⁸*Rhetoric* 1395a, 14-15 (= *Iliad* xviii.309).

⁹*Rhetoric* 1396b, 9-17 (= *Iliad* xxii).

the Poet. He cites Homer as giving a good example of the use of paromoiosis at the beginning of a clause when it should always be in entire words.

ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, παρίσῳσις δ' ἐὰν ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις, δ' ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχη ἐκάτερον τὸ κῶλον. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἔχειν. καὶ ἀρχῇ μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἢ δὲ τελευτῇ τὰς ἐσχάτας συλλαβὰς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα. ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα "ἀργὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ," "δωρητοῦ τ' ἐπέλοντο παρὰρρητοῦ τ' ἐπέεσσιν."¹⁰

Then he turns to the use of metaphors. Similes are metaphors, he argues, since they differ from them very little. When Homer says Achilles "rushed on like a lion" he used a simile. If he had said, "a lion, he rushed on," he would have been using a metaphor. Because both Achilles and a lion are courageous he transfers the sense and either calls Achilles a lion (metaphor) or compares him to a lion (simile). Similes are used in prose, but less frequently, he cautions,

"Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρὸν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα "ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν," εἰκὼν ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσε," μεταφορά· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσε μετενέγκας λέοντα τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα. χρήσιμον δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις δέ· ποιητικὸν γὰρ.¹¹

¹⁰Rhetoric 1410a, 22-30 (=Iliad ix.526).

¹¹Rhetoric 1406b, 24. Although Homer does compare Achilles to a lion, nowhere in our Homer do we have the exact expression quoted by Aristotle as Homeric. If we were to conflate two passages from Iliad XX we would come close to his expression,

Πηλεΐδης δ' ἐτέρωθεν ἐναντίον ὄρωτο λέων ὡς, (Iliad xx.164);
αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμμεμῶς ἐπόρουσε κατακτάμεναι
μενεαίνων, (Iliad xx.441-42).

He wants the orator to produce an impression of intelligence. He argues that to learn something with ease is a naturally pleasant experience and that all words that make us learn please us. Metaphors, he suggests, are the best teachers and therefore most pleasant. Citing Homer's calling old age 'stubble', he shows us that in that metaphor learning comes through the genus since both old age and stubble have lost their bloom.

τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἢδὲ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ἡδίστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνώτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν. ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἶπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησε μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα.¹²

Treating metaphors again Aristotle demonstrates how Homer uses them often to invest inanimate objects with life. This technique, he notes, produces an effect of vivid here-and-now action, an effect of lifelikeness. To this precise ability Aristotle attributes Homer's popularity. He cites five examples, one from the *Odyssey* and four from the *Iliad*. The *Odyssey* example charges ruthlessness to a stone:

Twice in the *Iliad* too Homer uses similar expressions to compare Diomedes to a lion:

ὥς δὲ λέων μῆλοισιν ἀσημάντοισιν ἐπελθὼν, (*Iliad* x. 485);

ὥς δὲ λέων ἐν βουσί θορῶν ἐξ αὐχένα ἄξῃ (*Iliad* v.161).

Agamemnon too is compared to a lion in the *Iliad*:

ὥς δὲ λέων ἐλάφοιο ταχείης νήπια τέκνα ῥηιδίως συνέαξε, (*Iliad* xi.113-114).

Aristotle is probably quoting freely from Homer, cf: W. S. Hinman, *Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics*, New York; 1935, p. 44.

¹²*Rhetoric* 1410b, 10-15 (= *Odyssey* xiv.213).

'Again the *ruthless stone* rolled down to the plain',

καὶ ὡς κέχρηται Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ τῷ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα λέγειν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποεῖν εὐδοκίμεϊ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε, "αὕτις ἐπι δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λάας ἀναιδῆς,"¹³

In the *Iliad* an arrow is pictured as bitter:

'[the bitter] arrow flew'

καὶ "ἔπτατ' ὄϊστός,"¹⁴

Or the arrow is described as eager:

'[the arrow] eager to fly towards the crowd,'

καὶ "ἐπιπέσθαι μενεαίνων,"¹⁵

In the *Iliad* too spears are seen as desiring flesh to eat:

'[the spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh,'

καὶ "ἐν γαίῃ ἕσταντο λιλαϊόμενα χροοῦ ἄσαι,"¹⁶

Or the spearpoint is characterized by eagerness:

'And the spearpoint, quivering eagerly, sped through his breast,'

καὶ "αἶχμη δε στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαίμῳσα."¹⁷

The Philosopher concludes that the Poet attaches these vivid attributes to inanimate objects by using proportional metaphors--as the stone is to Sisyphus so is a ruthless

¹³ *Rhetoric* 1411b, 31-34 (= *Odyssey* xi.598).

¹⁴ *Rhetoric* 1411b, 34-35 (= *Iliad* xiii.587,592). Reading= variant from MSS. Our *Iliad* reads: ἔπτατο πικρὸς ὄϊστός.

¹⁵ *Rhetoric* 1411b, 35 (= *Iliad* iv.126).

¹⁶ *Rhetoric* 1411b 11-1412a, 1 (= *Iliad* xi.574).

¹⁷ *Rhetoric* 1412a, 1-2 (= *Iliad* xv.542).

person to the person he is treating ruthlessly.

έν πάσι γάρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γάρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τᾶλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον.¹⁸

The Philosopher then observes that Homer does the same thing with his much admired similes, achieving the same vividness by giving life and self movement to inanimate things. He cites a single example from the *Iliad*, describing waves:

ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταῦτα· "κυρτά, φαληριόωντα. προ μὲν τ' ἄλλ', αὐτὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλα." κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια μίμησις.¹⁹

Another species of metaphor is the accepted hyperbole according to Aristotle. He judges that they are youthful since they show passion and those who are impassioned usually use them. Achilles' words in Book IX of the *Iliad* he finds a good example of this youthful passionate hyperbole.

Not even if he offers me gifts as numerous as
the sand and dust . . .

Will I marry a daughter of Agamemnon, son of
Atreus,

Not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty,
or Athene in accomplishments.

εἰσὶ δὲ ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γὰρ
δηλοῦσιν. διὸ ἀργιζόμετοι λέγουσι μαλιστα·

¹⁸ *Rhetoric* 1412a, 2-6.

¹⁹ *Rhetoric* 1412A, 6-9 (= *Iliad* xiii. 799).

"οὐδ' εἴ μοι τόσα δοῖη ὅσα φάμαθος τε κόνις
 τε.
 κούρην δ' οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο,
 οὐδ' εἴ χρυσεῖη Ἀφροδίτη κάλλος ἔριζοι,
 ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίη."²⁰

When Aristotle advises the proper use of asyndeta he again turns to Homer. Observing that an asyndeton produces amplification, he cites the Poet's handling of Nireus. Mentioning his name frequently and successively Homer seems to say more than he actually does. Through this fallacy he increased Nireus' reputation. Although mentioning him in only one passage and never again, he perpetuates his memory.

ἔτι ἔχει ἴδιόν τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ
 πολλά δοκεῖ εἰρησθαι· ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ
 πολλά, ὥστ' ἐάν ἐξαιρεθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι τούναντίον ἔσται
 τὸ ἐν πολλά. ἔχει οὖν αὐξησιν· "ἦλθον, διελέχθην,
 ἰκέτευσα" πολλά· δοκεῖ δὲ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπον, ὅσα
 φημί. τοῦτο δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ
 "Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν, Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης, Νιρεὺς ὅς κάλλιστος."
 περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλά εἴρηται, ἀναγκη καὶ πολλάκις
 εἰρησθαι· εἴ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλά δοκεῖ, ὥστε
 ἠύξησεν ἅπαξ μνησθεῖς διὰ τὸν παραλογισμὸν, καὶ
 μνήμην πεποιήκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον
 ποιησάμενος.²¹

In treating exordia he tightens the bond between forensic oratory and epic. He says that in speeches and epic poems exordia should give the hearer an early preview of the subject to avoid confusing him with an undefined theme. He cites the opening lines of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as

²⁰ *Rhetoric* 1413a, 28-34 (= *Iliad* ix.385, 388, 389, and part of 390). This is the only case where Aristotle omits intervening lines when quoting. cf: Hinman, *ibid.*, p. 42.

²¹ *Rhetoric* 1413b, 31-34; 1414a, 1-7 (= *Iliad* ii.671-673). Aristotle quotes the exact beginning of each line: 671, 672, and 673, omitting the rest of each line.

examples of good exordia, showing how Homer gives his hearers control of the themes from the outset.

Sing the Wrath, O Muse . . .

Tell me of the man, O Muse . . .

δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔπεισι δεῦρμά ἐστι τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμῃται ἡ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ· ὁ δούς οὖν ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο "μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά," "ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε μοῦσα,"²²

Aristotle counsels that in the exordium an orator should arouse the hearer's good will. This primary effort of any speaker he finds exemplified in the Poet when he has Odysseus pray that on reaching the Phaeacians he may find friendship or compassion.

πόθεν δ' εὖνους δεῖ ποιεῖν εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ δ' εὖ λέγεται
 "ὁδὸς μ' εἰς Φαίηκας φύλον ἐλθεῖν ἠδ' ἐλεεινόν,"
 τούτων δεῖ δύο στοχάζεσθαι²³

Continuing his discussion of exordia Aristotle argues that in deliberative oratory the speaker must often work to remove prejudice. The last of several methods he suggests could be used by both accuser and defender. Since the same action may have been done from different motives, the accuser, he suggests, must disparage it by attributing the worst motive, while the defender must praise it as proceeding from the best motive. An Homeric situation comes first to

²²Rhetoric 1415a, 11-16 (=Iliad i.1;Odyssey i.1).

²³Rhetoric 1415b, 27 (=Odyssey vi.327).

the Philosopher's mind. When Diomedes chose Odysseus he could have done it because he saw him as the bravest of men or as a coward and therefore too insignificant to be his rival. Aristotle's allusion is clearly conjectural here but is based on the fact that Diomedes does choose Odysseus in the tenth book of the *Iliad*.

κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἔνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· οἷον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα προεἶλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα, τῷ δ' ὅτι οὐ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῦλον.²⁴

In advising the speaker to avoid burdening the hearer with unnecessary material, Aristotle tells him to mention past events only if they arouse pity or indignation and if they are presented as actually happening. As his prime example of good handling of the past he cites Odysseus' narration of his wanderings to Penelope. Odysseus had told the long story to Alcinous in Books IX to XII. Here, in Book XXIII, since the hearer already has the facts, Homer has Odysseus relate it to Penelope very effectively and vividly in 60 lines.

ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν, ὅσα μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οἴκτον ἢ δεινῶσιν φέρει. παράδειγμα δ' Ἀλκίνοῦ ἀπόλογος, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἑξήκοντα ἔπεσι πεποιήται.²⁵

²⁴ *Rhetoric* 1416b, 8-14 (= *Iliad* x.242 ff.).

²⁵ *Rhetoric* 1417a, 11-14 (= *Odyssey* xxiii.264-284, xxiii.310-343).

Aristotle counsels the speaker to accompany his speaking with unmistakable facial expressions and bodily gestures that will communicate what is characteristic of himself or his adversary. Such details are persuasive since they are recognized by the hearers and suggest what he does not know. Of the numerous good examples of this which he says are in Homer he cites the reaction of Odysseus' nurse Eurycleia after Penelope reminds her of the lost Odysseus. Aristotle remarks that those about to weep put their hands to their eyes.

When she [Penelope] stopped speaking the old nurse covered her face with her hands.

ἔτι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγειν, διηγούμενον καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα καὶ ἃ ἴσασιν, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἐκείνῳ προσόντα. "ὁ δ' ἤχετό με ὑποβλέψας." καὶ ὡς περὶ Κρατύλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων καὶ τοῖν χεροῖν διασείων· πιθανὰ γάρ, διότι σύμβολα γίνεται ταῦτα ἃ ἴσασιν ἐκείνων ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν. πλεῖστα δὲ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὀμήρου ἔστιν.

ὡς ἄρ' ἔφη γρη῏ς δὲ κατέσχετο χερσὶ πρόσωπα·

οἱ γὰρ δακρῦειν ἀρχόμενοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.²⁶

Since forensic oratory is concerned with the existence or non-existence of facts, Aristotle argues that demonstrative and necessary proofs, therefore enthymemes, have a place in it. He recommends against the use of too many enthymemes in succession, however, since they destroy one another. He ends tersely with a warning against prolixity, "there is a limit to quantity," quoting Menelaus' recommen-

²⁶ *Rhetoric* 1417a, 36-38; 1417b, 1-7 (=Odyssey xix. 361).

dation to the youth Pisistratus.

Friend, since you have said as much as a wise man would say . . .

ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτατα, τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστ' ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὐ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ γεγονός ἀνάγκην. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ' ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὄρος·

ὦ φίλ', ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσ' ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' οὐ τοιαῦτ'·^{2 7}

In the very first chapter of the *Poetics*, Aristotle bestows the title of poet on Homer as he summarily dismisses Empedocles as a poet. He declares that the only thing these two had in common was meter, making it clear that he parted from those who felt meter made the poet.

πλὴν οἱ ἀνθρώποι γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς τοὺς κατὰ μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἱατρικὸν ἢ μουσικὸν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν ἐστὶν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν.^{2 8}

This affirmation of Homer as poet is significant since it betrays the poetic primacy Aristotle saw in Homer. With his first thought about poets the name of Homer occurs first to him.

^{2 7} *Rhetoric* 1418a, 1-8 (= *Odyssey* iv.204).

^{2 8} *Poetics* 1447b, 13-20. cf: Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152 E, in which Plato expresses the same opinion as Aristotle about Empedocles.

As the *Poetics* progresses, a clearer idea of the depth and complexity of Aristotle's concept of 'Poet' is gained as well as of the precise reasons for which he recognized and honored Homer as the greatest of poets.

Living persons, that is, men doing or experiencing something, are represented in certain arts. Ethically they must be better or worse than we or on the same plane with us. Homer's people are 'better', he says.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἦθη σχεδὸν ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις· κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῆ τὰ ἦθη διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἦτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, . . . οἷον Ὅμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἠγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος ὁ τὰς παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δηλιάδα χείρους.²⁹

In representing these living persons three approaches are possible: first, partly narrative and partly through characters, secondly, the narrator remaining himself throughout, and thirdly letting the characters carry out the whole action themselves. Homer's method, he observes, is the first.

Ἐτι δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορά τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιο ἂν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντά ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.³⁰

²⁹ *Poetics* 1448a 1-5; 1448a, 11-14.

³⁰ *Poetics* 1448a, 19-24. cf: Plato, *Republic*, 392 D-394 D, in which Plato characterizes Homer in the same way as Aristotle--as narrating and dramatizing his story.

Sophocles (who is significantly the tragedian most honored by Aristotle) is compared with Homer. In one respect he sees them as the same kind of artist. They both portray good men.

ὥστε τῇ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἄν εἶη μιμητῆς Ὀμήρω Σοφοκλῆς.
μιμοῦνται γὰρ ἄμφω σπουδαίους,³¹

Aristotle attributes the famous satire *Margites* to Homer. He says that he could not name any satire prior to Homer although he concedes there were probably many satirical poets.

τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὀμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτον
ποίημα, εἰκόσ δὲ εἶναι πολλούς· ἀπὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου ἀρξαμέ-
νοισ ἐν οἷς καί³²

He concludes that just as Homer was the supreme poet of the heroic style he was first to mark out the main lines of comedy. In epic he excelled because his representations were made not only good but dramatic. In the *Margites* he formed his drama out of the laughable as such, not out of personal satire. His *Margites* therefore, Aristotle argues, is analogous to his epics: the *Margites* is to the comedies what the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are to the tragedies.

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὀμηρος
ἦν (μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὔ, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ μιμήσεις δραμα-
τικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς κωμωδίας σχήματα
πρῶτος ὑπέδειξεν, οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιή-

³¹*Poetics* 1448b, 25-27.

³²*Poetics* 1448b, 28-30. Whether Aristotle was right to attribute the *Margites* to Homer is not the issue here. We wish only to examine what Aristotle judged was Homer's work.

σας. ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιάς καὶ Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγωδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμωδίας.³³

Homer based the unity of his epics on singleness of action. "Supreme in all other respects" says Aristotle, he achieved this either from instinct or knowledge of his art. He excludes events of Odysseus' life like his wounding at Parnassus and his feigned madness because they did not relate to the single action of his epic. He followed the same principle in the *Iliad*.

ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ ὧν οὐδὲν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πράξιν, οἷαν λέγομεν, τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν συνέστησεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα.³⁴

Tragedy should have a single rather than double outcome according to Aristotle. He cites the *Odyssey* as an epic with a double outcome, since it ends in opposite ways for the good and bad characters. Tragic playwrights, he judges, seem to favor the double outcome, which is more proper to comedy, just to please audiences.

δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστὶ σύστασις, ἡ διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα, καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χειρόσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν·

³³*poetics* 1448b, 34-38; 1449a, 1-2. cf: *supra*, footnote ³² on the matter of the *Margites*' authenticity as Homeric and the relevancy of that question to our study.

³⁴*poetics* 1451a, 22-29. Note that although 'the wounding' belongs to the *Odyssey* (xix.392-466), it is not part of the poem's action. 'The madness' is not in the poem at all.

ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ' εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἔστι δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμωδίας οἰκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ, ἂν οἱ ἔχθιστοι ᾧσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγισθος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνήσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενός.^{3 5}

The Philosopher's inclusion of the *Odyssey* in this discussion suggests only mild criticism. The *Odyssey* does not fall into his worst category in which "nobody kills anybody at the end." Even more to the point, his discussion is about tragic not epic ideals. Furthermore, in another place he clearly says what is appropriate here too, that even poorer forms in the hands of the Master are masterly.^{3 6}

Here occurs one of the few negatively critical uses Aristotle makes of Homer in all his works. Discussing tragedy he states that a play's dénouement should be caused by the plot and not mechanically as it is in the *Medea* and the embarkation incident in the *Iliad*. (Only the uncaused intervention of Athene stops the flight of the Greeks.) Of course here Aristotle is discussing the norms of tragedy and not epic. The intervention of the gods in epic is more acceptable than in tragedy--in fact it is integral.

φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ μύθου συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ὡς περ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλου· ἀλλὰ μηχανῆ χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος ἢ ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν, ἃ οὐχ οἷον τε ἄνθρωπον εἶδέναι, ἢ ὅσα ὕστερον, ἃ δεῖται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας.^{3 7}

^{3 5} *Poetics* 1453a, 30-39.

^{3 6} *Cf. infra.*, Footnote ^{5 9} concerning Aristotle's unbounded admiration for the Poet.

^{3 7} *Poetics* 1454a, 31-1454b, 1-5 (= *Iliad* ii.155-181).

The tragic poet is advised here by Aristotle to depict short-tempered or lazy people or others with similar character traits truthfully, yet to present them as persons of worth. He cites the example of Agathon and Homer in their portrayal of Achilles.

οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν, ἐπιεικειᾶς ποιεῖν παράδειγμα ἢ σκληρότητος δεῖ, οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα Ἀγάθων καὶ Ὅμηρος.³⁸

In his discussion of 'discovery' that follows, Aristotle looks to Homer again. He takes up the least artistic kind first--discovery by tokens or marks, saying that these are used mostly because of lack of inventiveness. The best use of tokens is with spontaneous rather than contrived recognition. In Homer he cites one better and one poorer use of tokens. The better, since it follows naturally, occurs when Odysseus' nurse Eurycleia discovers the old scar on his thigh as she bathes him (*Od.* xix.386-475). The poorer, since it is contrived, occurs when Odysseus tells Eumaeus the swine-herd who he is, proving it by showing his wound (*Od.* xxi.205-225). The first is produced by the logic of events, since it was at least probable that Odysseus would be bathed by Eurycleia when he arrived

Gerald Else, in his *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument*, (Cambridge: 1963) argues that in place of ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι one should read ἐν τῇ Ἀυλίδι (referring to *Iphigenia at Aulis* of Euripides). His arguments are persuasive and save the *Iliad* from completely unwonted criticism by Aristotle.

³⁸ *Poetics* 1454b, 11-14.

as a stranger. The other is manufactured by the poet and does not follow from the logic of preceding events.

Ἄναγνώρισις δὲ τί μὲν ἐστίν, εἴρηται πρότερον· εἶδη δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρώτη μὲν ἡ ἀτεχνοτάτη, καὶ ἣ πλεῖστοι χρῶνται δι' ἀπορίαν, ἢ διὰ τῶν σημείων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρῆσθαι ἢ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, οἷον Ὀδυσσεὺς διὰ τῆς οὐλῆς ἄλλως ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πίστεως ἔνεκα ἀτεχνότεραι, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐκ περιπετείας, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις, βελτίους.³⁹

Here again a somewhat negative criticism of Homer is implied, one might conclude, first, because he uses token discoveries at all, and secondly because he has used a contrived token discovery. Careful review of the facts, however, reveals a very mild criticism if there is any at all.

Aristotle is careful to say tokens are 'mostly' used because of to lack of inventiveness. One might safely conclude from Aristotle's very elevated general view of Homer, that he does not accept Homer's use of tokens as anything but inventive. It seems significant too that his prime example of a proper use of discovery by token is from Homer, as if to say, if anyone used a token discovery inventively it was Homer.

Without evaluative comment the Philosopher cites Homer as giving an example of another type of discovery--the discovering person is distressed upon seeing something that

³⁹*Poetics* 1454b, 19-21; 1454b, 25-30 (=Odyssey xix. 386-475; Odyssey xxi.205-225).

evokes a sad memory. According to Aristotle the Poet exemplifies this kind of discovery in his story of Alcinous when Odysseus is moved to tears as he hears the tragic events of his own wandering recounted by the minstrel.⁴⁰

In the case of the contrived use of token discovery the following should be kept in mind: Aristotle once again is offering here norms for good tragedy, not epic. A subsequent observation of his seems to apply here as well as to the example in Homer he cites when he makes the observation. He states that the inexplicable finds far greater scope in the epic, since we do not actually see the persons of the story. He cites the example of Achilles' pursuit of Hector, observing that the episode would be ridiculous on stage but is acceptable in epic.

δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον. διὸ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα, ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηναῖς ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανεῖν, οἱ μὲν ἐστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεσι λανθάνει.⁴¹

Aristotle demonstrates the brevity of the basic *Odyssey* story, remarking that its length comes from its numerous episodes.

ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασι τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἢ δ' ἐποποιία τούτοις μηκύνεται. τῆς γὰρ Ὀδυσσεΐας μακρὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀποδημοῦντός τινος ἔτη πολλὰ καὶ παραφυλαττομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ μόνου ὄντος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν οἴκοι οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ χρήματα ὑπὸ

⁴⁰ *Poetics* 1454b, 37-1455a, 4 (= *Odyssey* vii.521ff.).

⁴¹ *Poetics* 1460a, 11-17. (cf: *Iliad* xxii.205).

μνηστήρων ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιβουλεύσθαι· αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθεῖς, καὶ ἀναγνωρίσας τινὰς αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς διέφθειρεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.⁴²

Advising against making a tragedy consist of many stories as in epic, he observes that the length of the *Iliad* gives each part its proper size.

χρὴ δὲ ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, μεμνησθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποιικὸν σύστημα τραγωδίαν. ἐποποιικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολύμυθον, ὅσον εἴ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὄλον ποιοῖ μῦθον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μῆκος λαμβάνει τὰ μέρη τὸ πρέπον μέγεθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δράμασι πολὺ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀποβαίνει.⁴³

A poet should not be seriously censured for failing to distinguish matters that belong more properly to elocution; for example, when Homer uses a command instead of a prayer in the opening line of the *Iliad*.

ὅσον τί ἐντολή καὶ τί εὐχή καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλή καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτησθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὐχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μῆνυ ἀειδε θεά." τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξις ἐστίν. διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὄν θεώρημα.⁴⁴

The *Iliad* springs readily to Aristotle's mind as an example of unity. A phrase, he says, may be a unit because it signifies one thing or is a combination of several

⁴² *Poetics* 1455b, 15-23. cf: Hinman, pp. 113-114 on this citation for interesting argument about whether Aristotle recognized books XXIII and XXIV as authentically Homeric.

⁴³ *Poetics* 1456a, 10-15.

⁴⁴ *Poetics* 1456b, 11-19 (= *Iliad* i.1).

"phrases". 'Man' is one because it signifies one thing, but the *Iliad* is one because it is such a combination of phrases.^{4 5}

Aristotle takes up some examples of language devices and techniques and cites Homer frequently.

One kind of metaphor is the application of the term for the genus in place of the term for the species. The Poet says: "Here stands my ship." Lying at anchor is a species of standing.

μεταφορὰ δ' ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν ἐπὶ εἶδος, οἷον "νηῦς δέ μοι ἦδ' ἔστηκεν." τὸ γὰρ ὀρμεῖν ἐστὶν ἐστάναι τι.^{4 6}

A type of metaphor is the application of the term for the species in place of the term for the genus. When Homer speaks of Odysseus doing 10,000 noble things he is simply saying Odysseus did many noble things, since ten thousand is a species of many and is substituted here for 'many'.

ἀπ' εἶδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος· "ἦ δὲ μὲν Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔσθλα ἔοργεν" τὸ γὰρ μῦθον πολὺ ἐστὶν, ᾧ νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται.^{4 7}

A way of inventing or 'coining' an expression is the use of a word, poetically, to express a meaning it does not ordinarily have. This is exemplified in the *Iliad* when Homer uses the word ἀρήτηρ (prayer) three times to mean

^{4 5} *Poetics* 1457a, 28-30.

^{4 6} *Poetics* 1457b, 6-11 (= *Odyssey* i.185; xxiv.308).

^{4 7} *Poetics* 1457b, 11-13 (= *Iliad* ii.272).

ιερεύς (priest).

πεποιημένον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινῶν αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνια εἶναι τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὰ κέρατα ἐρνύγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητῆρα.⁴⁸

Lengthening a word is making use of a longer vowel than usual or inserting a syllable, as Πηληιάδεω for Πηλεΐδου.

ἐπεκτεταμένον δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφρημένον τὸ μὲν, ἐὰν φωνή-εντι μακροτέρῳ κεχρημένον ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῆ ἔμβεβλημένη, τὸ δ' ἐὰν ἀφρημένον τι ἢ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεητεταμένον μὲν οἷον τὸ πόλεως πόλης καὶ τὸ Πηλεΐδου Πηληϊάδεω,⁴⁹

Altering a word means coining a part of the word but leaving the rest of it unchanged: δεξιτερὸν instead of δεξιόν.

ἐξηλλαγμένον δ' ἐστὶν, ὅταν τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλείπη τὸ δὲ ποιῇ, οἷον τὸ "δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν" ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιόν.⁵⁰

Aristotle argues that the poet should mix unusual or rare words with ordinary and commonplace words. Too much of either sacrifices necessary values. The rare or unusual expressions give the poetry distinction and dignity while the ordinary and commonplace provide clarity. He recommends altering experimentally the balance of commonplace and rare expressions in a Homeric verse to experience its resulting

⁴⁸ *Poetics* 1457b, 33-35 (= *Iliad* i.11-12: οὐνεκα τὸν Χρῦσην ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα Ἀτρεΐδης.

= *Iliad* i.94: ἀλλ' ἔνεκ' ἀρητῆρος, ὃν ἠτίμησ' Ἀγαμέμνων.

= *Iliad* v.78: ὅς ῥα Σκαμάνδρου ἀρητηρ ἐτέτυκτο, θεὸς δ' ὡς τίετο δῆμωι).

⁴⁹ *Poetics* 1454a, 1-4 (= *Iliad* i.1).

⁵⁰ *Poetics* 1458a, 5-7.

deterioration. He provides three examples of the kind of experiment he suggests.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος συμβάλλονται εἰς τὸ σαφές τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν αἱ ἐπεικτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοπαὶ καὶ ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς γιγνόμενον τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ εἰωθότος τὸ σαφές ἔσται.

τὸ δὲ ἀρμόττον ὅσον διαφέρει, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρεῖσθω, ἐντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέτρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν μετατιθεῖς ἂν τις τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα κατίδοι ὅτι ἄληθῆ λέγομεν.⁵¹

Καὶ

νῦν δέ μ' ἔων ὀλύγος τε καὶ οὔτιδανος καὶ ἄκιυκος,
εἴ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατιθεῖς
νῦν δέ μ' ἔων μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδής.⁵²

Καὶ

δίφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθεῖς ὀλύγην τε τράπεζαν.
δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεῖς μικρὰν τε τράπεζαν.⁵³

Καὶ

τὸ "ἠϊόνες βοόωσιν" ἠϊόνες κρᾶζουσιν.⁵⁴

When he finally takes up narrative poetry explicitly, Aristotle criticizes other epic poets for a lack of organic unity in their works. Homer is called 'divinely inspired' since he did not attempt to dramatize the Trojan War as a whole because it would have to be too long or too complicated, but organized his poem around one part of the story and used many other incidents as episodes (e.g. the catalogue of ships) to put variety into his poem. His excellence lies in the way he relates the other parts to his theme.

⁵¹ *Poetics* 1458b, 1-5, 15-19, 24-31.

⁵² *Poetics* 1458b, 24-27 (= *Odyssey* ix.515).

⁵³ *Poetics* 1458b, 28-30 (= *Odyssey* xx.259).

⁵⁴ *Poetics* 1458b, 31 (= *Iliad* xvii.265).

διό, ὡπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη, καὶ ταύτη θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον, καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος, ἐπιχειροῦσαι ποιεῖν ὄλον· λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι· ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ. νῦν δ' ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβῶν ἐπεισοδίους κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίους, οἷς διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποιήσιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἓνα ποιούσι καὶ περὶ ἓνα χρόνον, καὶ μίαν πράξιν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεύας μία τραγῳδία ποιεῖται ἑκατέρας ἢ δύο μόναι, ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαί, καὶ ἐκ τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος πλεον ὀκτώ, οἷον ὄπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκτιήτης, Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος, πτωχεῖα, Λάκαιναι, Ἰλίου πέρσις καὶ ἀπόπλους καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρωάδες.⁵⁵

In the direct comparison of the elements of tragedy that are common to epic, Homer receives the highest praise again from the Philosopher. Epic he declares, must be simple or complex and revolve about character or catastrophe. It must have reversals, calamities and discoveries as well as good thought and diction. Homer, he says, pioneered and excelled in all these elements, making the *Iliad* exemplify simplicity and suffering and the *Odyssey*, complexity and character.

Ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ταῦτά δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ· ἢ γὰρ ἀπλῆν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν δεῖ εἶναι. καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως ταῦτά· καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων. ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. οἷς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἰκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκάτερον συνέστηκεν ἢ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἢ δὲ Ὀδύσεια πεπλεγμένον· ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου καὶ ἠθικὴ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ πάντας ὑπερβέβληκεν.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ *Poetics* 1459a, 31-37; 1459 b, 1-7.

⁵⁶ *Poetics* 1459b, 8-17.

Again Homer excels, according to Aristotle, in the matter of the role the poet should play in his own character. Unlike other poets he recedes immediately and remains out of sight while the people he has created dominate the scene, each with his own distinctive character.

Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιός ἐπαινεῖσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ ὁ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτόν γάρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὄλου ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις· ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα φρονησάμενος εὐθύς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀηθές, ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθη.^{5 7}

Aristotle judges that above all else Homer has taught others the proper way to trick their audience or use fallacy, leading their audience unobtrusively to draw its own false conclusions. He cites the example in the washing episode when Odysseus tells Penelope he is a Cretan from Knossos who once entertained Odysseus on his voyage to Troy. He describes Odysseus' dress and companions as proof. Penelope is guilty of the fallacy: he can only know these details if his story is true; but he does know the details, therefore his story is true. She recognizes the truth of *Odyssey* XIX, lines 220-248 and because of that accepts the untruth of lines 184-200.

δεδίδαχε δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τοῦδι ὄντος τοδὶ ἢ ἢ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. διὸ δὴ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος,

^{5 7}*Poetics* 1460a, 5-11.

ἄλλου δὲ τούτου ὄντος, ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ προσθεῖναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναί ἀληθὲς ὄν, παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων.⁵⁸

Aristotle proceeds to an argument that reveals his unbounded acceptance of the Poet. He flatly asserts that the inexplicable elements in the story of Odysseus' landing would clearly be unacceptable if an inferior poet had written them. Since it is Homer, Aristotle says, the absurdity of those elements is concealed by the charm of all the poet's other qualities. The inexplicable elements Aristotle is referring to are Odysseus' ship running aground at the harbor of Phorcys in Ithaca and the Phaeacian sailors carrying him ashore without waking him.

τούς τε λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος . . . ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκθεσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτά, δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιήσειεν· νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφανίζει τὸ ἄτοπον.⁵⁹

Aristotle turns to the defense of Homer against a dozen or more criticisms that have been levelled against certain Homeric approaches and expressions.

First, he counters the charges against poetry itself. He grants that a poet errs if he portrays an impossibility, but he argues that it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the object of poetry--making that part or some

⁵⁸ *Poetics* 1460a, 18-26 (= *Odyssey* xix.164-260).

⁵⁹ *Poetics* 1460a, 27-29; 35-36; 1460b, 1-2 (= *Odyssey* xxiii.116).

other part of the poem more effective. As an example of this effective use of the portrayal of impossibility, he cites the pursuit of Hector.

ποῶτον μὲν, ἂν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα ἡμάρτηται. ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς· τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται, εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος. παράδειγμα ἢ τοῦ Ἔκτορος δίωξις. εἰ μέμτοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥτιον ἐνεδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, ἡμάρτηται οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γάρ, εἰ ἐνδέχεται, ὅλως μηδαμῆ ἡμαρτηθῆσαι.⁶⁰

Next he considers the charge that what the poet wrote was untrue. His first example is stories about the gods. Here Aristotle has Homer in mind since he cites Xenophanes who opened the assault on Homeric theology at the end of the Sixth Century. His defense of Homer is that he was simply recounting the accepted tales and texts.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' οἷα δεῖ, οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἶους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷοι εἰοί, ταύτη λυτέον. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασίν, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν. ἴσως γὰρ οὕτε βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν οὐτ' ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης· ἀλλ' οὖν φασὶ τάδε.⁶¹

The second case about untruth to which Aristotle offers a solution is the expression "their spears stood erect on butt-spikes." It had been argued that this would be a bad position for the spears since they could easily fall and cause alarm. Aristotle's solution is that Homer did not defend this arrangement but merely stated it as a fact. He

⁶⁰ *Poetics* 1460b, 22-29 (= *Iliad* xxii.205).

⁶¹ *Poetics* 1460b, 32-36; 1461a, 1.

adds that this was still the method of handling spears in Illyria.

ἴσως δὲ οὐ βέλτιον μὲν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν, οἷον τὰ
περὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν, "ἔγχεα δὲ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος."
οὕτω γὰρ τότε ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί.⁶²

Some objections to Homer's language can be solved by appropriate changes in diction. A good example of this argument is the plea that the Poet is using a rare expression instead of an ordinary one. For instance, in the first book of the *Iliad* some object that Homer has Apollo attack the mules and swift-footed animals first with his arrows. In sending the plague on the Greek army, they object, why should he attack the mules first? Aristotle's solution is that the word οὐρῆας means sentinels here, not mules.

τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὀρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλώττη
"οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον." ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει
ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας.⁶³

A similar objection argues that Homer says Dolon was a swift runner but he was deformed. Aristotle's solution is that Homer's expression, 'distorted of form', really means, as in the Cretan expression, distorted or ugly in feature. In that case the man's ugly face certainly would not necessarily hinder his running swiftly.

καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα "ὅς δὴ τοῦ εἶδος μὲν κακός," οὐ τὸ
σῶμα ἅμα ἀσύμμετρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχροῦν· τὸ γὰρ

⁶² *Poetics* 1461a, 1-4 (= *Iliad* x.152, 153).

⁶³ *Poetics* 1461a, 9-11 (= *Iliad* i.50).

εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρήτες εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσιν.⁶⁴

The final case of this sort is the expression, "livelier mix it". Aristotle argues that it may not mean 'undiluted' as one would give wine to a drunkard, but 'quicker'.

καὶ τὸ "ζωρότερον δε κέρατε" οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ θᾶπτον.⁶⁵

The Philosopher argues that other Homeric expressions should be understood in a metaphorical sense to resolve seeming contradictions. An example of such an apparent contradiction that he cites seems to arise from his confusion of two widely divergent but similar situations and texts in the *Iliad*. Aristotle clearly wants to refer to the situation at the beginning of the tenth book. There Agamemnon lies awake pondering how he can save the Greeks from disaster, while the other chieftains sleep. As Aristotle sets up the seeming contradiction he seems to quote mistakenly the first two lines of *Iliad* II which describe Zeus as he comes to the decision to send a dream to the sleeping Agamemnon. These lines portray Zeus lying awake pondering how to honor Achilles, while the other gods and men sleep.

τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, οἷον "ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι εὐδον παννύχιοι."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ *Poetics* 1461a, 11-14 (= *Iliad* x.316).

⁶⁵ *Poetics* 1461a, 14-16 (= *Iliad* ix.203).

⁶⁶ *Poetics* 1461a, 16-17 (= *Iliad* ii.1-2: "Ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἵπποκοροῦσται εὐδον παννύχιοι, Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε νήδυμος ὕπνος, mistakenly quoted for *Iliad* x.1-4:

After seemingly stating the rest of gods and men were asleep, Homer would appear to contradict himself when he states a little later that Agamemnon marvelled at the voices of flutes and pipes rising up to him from the Trojan plain. If literally everyone except Agamemnon were asleep none could be awake playing pipes and flutes. Aristotle resolves his seemingly mistaken contradiction, however, by arguing that the ἄλλοι of the first statement refers not to 'all' the rest but metaphorically to 'many' of the rest. If only 'many' therefore and not 'all' were asleep, some, he concludes, could have been awake to play flutes and pipes.

ἄμα δέ φησιν "ἦτοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον το Τρωϊκόν ἀθήσειεν,
αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὀμαδόν." τὸ λάρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοὶ
κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολὺ τι.^{6 7}

The second problem that Aristotle judges can be answered by a metaphorical interpretation occurs when the Poet seems to say that the constellation, Ursa Major, alone of all the constellations 'does not share in the ocean's baths.'

In this reference to the 'Great Bear' which Homer makes once in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey* there seems to be an error since the other Northern constellations also do not set. Aristotle's solution is that the word 'alone' may be used here metaphorically for one of its species, 'best known.'

Ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαϊῶν
εὔδον παννύχιοι, μαλακῶ δεδμημένοι ὕπνῳ·
ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἄτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα, ποιμένα λαῶν,
ὕπνος ἔχε γλυκερὸς πολλὰ φρεσὶν ὀρμαίνοντα.

^{6 7} *Poetics* 1461a, 17-20 (= *Iliad* x.13-14).

καὶ τὸ "οἷη δ' ἄμμορος κατὰ μεταφορὰν· τὸ γὰρ
γνωριμώτατον μόνον.⁶⁸

Objections to the meaning of some Homeric texts may be answered, Aristotle judges, by changing the accentuation of a crucial word in those texts. He cites two examples, both of which occur in the *On Sophistical Refutations* as well as in the *Poetics*. The same argument (Aristotle attributes it to Hippias of Thasos) is advanced in both these works to justify Homer by shifting the accent of a key word in each of the texts.

The first such Homeric text Aristotle clearly thought he was quoting from the beginning of the second book of the *Iliad*. The sequence described there from which the Philosopher thought he was drawing the problematic phrase portrays Zeus as he instructs and sends a dream to Agamemnon.

κατὰ δὲ προσφθίαν, ὥσπερ Ἰππίας ἔλυεν ὁ θάσιος τὸ
"δίδομεν δέ οἱ"⁶⁹

⁶⁸*Poetics* 1461a, 20-21 (= *Iliad* xviii.489; = *Odyssey* v.275).

⁶⁹*Poetics* 1461 a, 21-23 (= *Iliad* ii.13-15. Aristotle's text of Homer probably read as follows:

οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἀμφὶς Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
ἀθάνατοι φράζονται· ἐπέγναμψεν γὰρ ἅπαντας

"Ἥρη λισσομένη, "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρεσθαι,"

Note that our *Iliad* ii.15 reads as follows: "Ἥρη λισσομένη, Τρῶεσσι δὲ κήδε' ἐφήπται. The expression, "δίδομεν δε' τοῖ εὖχος ἀρεσθαι" is found in the twenty-first book of the *Iliad*, line 297 of our Homer. There Poseidon, accompanied by Athene addresses Achilles, and tells him he will not be vanquished by the river, must confine the enemy within the walls and after killing Hector return to the ships. The sea-god ends with: "We grant you to win glory."

If we accept the phrase "δίδομεν δέ οἱ" as part of Aristotle's *Iliad* II, 15, the problem centers around that expression. As it stands Zeus is telling a lie since he would be directing the Dream to lure Agamemnon to disaster with a promise he knew was deceitful. By changing the accent from the first to the second syllable (δίδομεν to διδόμεν) the statement becomes a command (a shortened form of the infinitive διδόμεναι used as an imperative). The deceit, by this means, is transferred to the lips of the Dream and Zeus's honor as being truthful is preserved.

The other text Aristotle cites which he feels can be saved by simply changing the accent of a single word describes a 'completely withered' stump of oak or pine that rises a fathom above the earth and 'does not rot in the rain.'

καὶ "το μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ." ⁷⁰

Cf. also On Sophistical Refutations 166b, 6-9 for the identical solution of this textual problem by change of accent: καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα παρὰ τὴν προσφθίαν ἐστίν.

⁷⁰*Poetics* 1461a, 23 (= *Iliad* xxiii. 328). *Cf. also: On Sophistical Refutations* for the identical solution of this textual problem by change of accent:

Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσφθίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ῥάδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἐνίον διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα " το μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ." λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσφθίᾳ, λέγοντες τὸ οὐ ὀξύτερον.

As it stands the statement is incredible--a completely withered stump that does not rot. To resolve the problem Aristotle alters the breathing mark from ού to οὖ so that the text now means that part of it (the withered stump) rots in the rain.

In another case the solution to a problem text of Homer lies in the ambiguity of an expression and saves the Poet's arithmetic. The problem occurs in the tenth book of the *Iliad* when Odysseus tells Diomedes the night is almost over since 'more' than a third still remains. If 'more' than two parts of the night were already gone a third of the night could not be still left. Aristotle's solution is that πλέω is ambiguous here and means 'full' rather than 'more'. Homer, according to the Philosopher therefore says here 'a full two-thirds of the night is gone.'

τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολία, "παρῶχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ." τὸ γὰρ
πλέων
ἀμφίβολόν ἐστίν.⁷¹

Other objections can be answered by accepting an expression not literally but according to its usual rendering. Just as wine and water are often called 'wine', so greaves made of copper and tin alloy can be called 'tin', since compounds are called by the name of their more important part.

⁷¹ *poetics* 1461a, 26 (= *Iliad* x.252).

τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως, οἶνον τὸν κικραμένον οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι, ὄθεν πεποίηται "κνημῆς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο," καὶ χαλκίας τοῦς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένουθς,⁷²

Another objection is answered by accepting an expression as metaphorical. Ganymede is spoken of as pouring 'wine' for Zeus, although the gods do not drink wine. But here nectar is metaphorically being referred to as "the wine of the gods".

ὄθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἴνοχοεῦειν, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν.⁷³

In conclusion Aristotle offers a general principle for handling seeming contradictions in the words of the Poet. He suggests that the often different ways an expression can be understood should be examined before one makes an unwarranted presupposition and arrives at an adverse verdict. A case in point is:

'The spear of the hero was held fast in the gold.' The problem was how could a spear that penetrated two folds be held fast in an exterior layer of gold. The solution seems to be in the fact that the gold was enough to stop the movement of the spear even though its point dented the layers of brass underneath.

⁷² *Poetics* 1461a, 27-29 (= *Iliad* xxi.592).

⁷³ *Poetics* 1461a, 29-31 (= *Iliad* xx.234). The fact that the gods abstained from wine is given in *Iliad* v. 341, but we will not take it as a separate allusion since it is commonly held.

δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά τι ὑπεναντίωμά τι δοκῆ
σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνῃ τοῦτο ἐν
τῷ εἰρημένῳ, οἷον "τῆ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος," τῷ ταύτῃ
κωλυθῆναι. τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται ὡς πῶς μάλιστα ἂν
τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν καταντικρῦ ἢ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει,
ὅτι ἔνιοι ἀλόγως προὔπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ κατα-
ψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότες ὅτι δοκεῖ
ἐπιτιμῶσιν, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ἢ τῇ αὐτῶν οἴῃσει.⁷⁴

Finally, near the very last lines of the *Poetics*,
after heaping the highest praises on Homer, Aristotle em-
barrassedly states a criticism of the epic genre itself, as
compared with the genre of tragedy. Of the Poet's works
only the *Iliad* falls under the shadow of negative criticism.
The awkward inclusion of the *Odyssey* in the Aristotelian
text can be ignored as an interpolation.⁷⁵ The criticism of
the epic is based on the dilution that occurs when it in-
cludes many separate episodes along with its main action.

First he praises tragedy for its shorter span and more
concentrated form. The *Oedipus* of Sophocles would suffer,

⁷⁴*Poetics* 1461a, 33 (= *Iliad* xx.272).

⁷⁵*cf.* Gerald Else, pp. 648-649. "The conduct of the
argument here betrays a certain embarrassment: naturally,
since it implies a criticism of Homer. Aristotle does not
reveal this at once. He begins with the indirect evidence
from tragedy and only brings in the *Iliad* obliquely, *exempli
causa*:

(λέγω δὲ οἷον . . . ὥπερ . . .).

Thus the critique of Homer is not--Aristotle carefully keeps
it from being--the main business of the passage. But to
continue, 'As the *Iliad* for example has many such sections'
--namely such as could be developed into separate tragedies
--'which have bulk in themselves also'--that is, in addition
to the bulk of the main action--'and the *Odyssey*.' This
last remark is more than an awkward afterthought, breaking
into Aristotle's construction and word order; it is an
interpolation . . . "

cf. Else's whole discussion, pp. 638-650.

he says, if it were put in as many verses as the *Iliad*.

τὸ γὰρ ἀθροώτερον ἥδιον ἢ πολλῶ κειραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ,
λέγω δ' οἶον εἶ τις τὸν οἰδίπουν θεῖη τὸν Σοφοκλέους
ἐν ἔπεσιν ὅσοις ἡ Ἰλιάς.⁷⁶

Next he goes on to his explicit criticism of the epic, obliquely using the *Iliad* as an example. If the epic is composed of a number of actions it can give the impression of being heavily diluted, he says. The *Iliad* has a number of parts of that kind which have bulk in themselves, and is still as well constructed as the epic permits; that is, it is as much an imitation of a single action as it can be. Aristotle clearly speaks here of an inherent limitation in the epic genre which he feels is handled as well as can be by the Poet. As Gerald Else says: "He wants to prove the superiority of tragedy without allowing his ideal poet to be involved in the defeat of his genre."⁷⁷

λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐὰν ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη,
ὡπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη [καὶ ἡ
Οδύσεια], ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει μέγεθος, καὶ
[καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ποιήματα] συνέστηκεν ὥς ἐνδέχεται
ἀριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μιᾶς πράξεως μίμησις.⁷⁸

With Aristotle's suggestion here that there is a weakness in the epic form itself rather than in Homer we have completed our review of all the Philosopher's references to the Poet as master of the arts of language. We have

⁷⁶*Poetics* 1462b 1-3.

⁷⁷Else, p. 650.

⁷⁸*Poetics* 1462b 5-9.

seen Aristotle clearly present Homer over and over again as a model for orators and for tragic and comic, as well as epic, poets. We saw him recommend that every orator should imitate Homer in the effective use of examples, illustrations, facts more relevant to his subject, figures of speech, ingratiating introductions, unmistakable facial expressions, and bodily gestures. Like Homer every orator, we have learned from Aristotle, should avoid prolixity and burdening his audience with unnecessary material.

After he attributed the origins of satire and the main lines of comedy to the Poet we saw him recommend Homer's poetic technique too, as the best and most worthy of imitation. His portrayal of only good or 'better' people should be imitated, as well as his adherence to a unity of action and outcome and natural development of the denouement from the plot itself. Tragic writers, following the example of Homer, should, Aristotle advised: portray inferior people as having worth, observe brevity, use discovery gracefully, form tragedy from a single story, maintain unity of plot, admit defects that do not destroy tragic art form, and use figures of speech creatively. We saw the Philosopher encourage epic writers, too, to follow the Poet's lead by relating the parts of the epic closely to its central theme, by making a simple or complex epic excel in its own class, receding personally in the story, employing fallacy ingeniously, and making acceptable what is inexplicable.

In the end we saw Aristotle's admiration of Homer perhaps in its strongest light as he patiently defended the Poet against a whole series of criticisms based on Homer's alleged untruthfulness, portrayal of impossibility, and involvement in contradictions.

We move now to the next chapter and a consideration of Aristotle's references to Homer as a source of Philosophic and scientific information. Before we go on, however, we can conclude that the examination of this chapter has led clearly to a single resounding affirmation; in the *Corpus* of his writings Aristotle recognized Homer as the master of the language arts.

CHAPTER FOUR

ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER AS SOURCE OF PHILOSOPHIC AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION

Aristotle's recognition of Homer's mastery of the arts of language may come as no surprise. His acceptance, however, of the poet's authority in philosophic questions and many scientific areas is another matter. At least it must lead those who wish to evaluate Homer or Aristotle or Aristotle's relationship to Homer to base their judgement on a much broader perspective than has been the custom.

The evidence for this chapter is quite extensive. In philosophic and scientific matters the Philosopher turns to Homer thirty-five times citing or alluding to fifty-three Homeric texts to support some observation of his own. In the *Historia Animalium* he finds examples in Homer to exemplify his judgement ten times, in the *Motion and Progression of Animals* and the *Generation of Animals*, once each. The Poet's backing is established six times in the *Problems*, again six times in *On the Cosmos*, three times in the *Metaphysics*, twice each in *About the Soul*, *On Marvelous Things Heard*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* and once each in the *Meteorologica* and the *Politics*.

This chapter will show that Aristotle sought Homer's

support in the main questions of his Philosophy of God and in a wide range of scientific areas, touching anthropology, bio-chemistry, geography, geology, medicine, meteorology, physics, physiology, psychology and zoology. It will analyze the thirty-five Aristotelian texts that approach the Poet as a source of philosophic and scientific information, to shed light on the Philosopher's attitude towards Homer.

Questions related to the existence of the first cause of the world would be surely classified as central to Aristotle's philosophy of God. In four of those questions he cites Homer to illustrate his conclusions--the nature of the first cause, God's existence, God's place in the universe, and God's control and providence over all things.

In the *Metaphysics* he discusses the various ancient positions on the nature of the original force in the world. When he is treating of those who maintained that the original force was water he singles out an opinion of his times. He says that some think that men of very ancient times, who first speculated about the gods, held that the primary force was water. They represented Ocean and Tethys as the parents of creation and the oath ('oaths are sworn by what is most ancient') of the gods to be by water--Styx, as the poets called it. In the Poet we find the Philosopher's observation verified clearly five times.

εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ πρὸ
γῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας οὕτως
οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως ὑπολαβεῖν· Ὠκεανὸν τε γὰρ

καὶ Τηθύον ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὄρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν· τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ὄρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν.¹

Later in the *Metaphysics* he is careful to note, however, that the early poets agree that the first governing principle of the universe was single. They assert, he observes, that Zeus was King and ruler, not the original forces, such as Night, Heaven, Chaos, or Water. An example of the Homeric formula that states this primacy of Zeus is found in Book I of the *Iliad*.

οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ταύτῃ ὁμοίως, ἧ βασιλεύειν καὶ ἄρχειν φασὶν οὐ τοὺς πρώτους, οἷον νύκτα καὶ οὐρανὸν ἢ χάος ἢ Ὠκεανόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία.²

In the *Motion and Progression of Animals*, when the Philosopher asks whether or not an immovable cause of the movement in the universe must necessarily exist at rest outside the universe he poses the primary question of his

¹*Metaphysics* 983b, 27-33 (= *Iliad* xiv.201). Homer names Ocean and Tethys as the gods' origin: Ὠκεανόν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύον, (= *Iliad* xiv.245-246--Homer names Ocean alone here as the source of all the gods: καὶ ἄν ποταμοῖο ῥέεθρα Ὠκεανοῦ, ὅς περ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται. In three places Homer names Styx as that by which the gods swear their oaths. If the gods swear their oaths by it, Aristotle reasoned, it must be the most ancient thing, since oaths are sworn by the most ancient things. (= *Iliad* ii.755): ὄρκου γὰρ δεινοῦ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρώξ. (= *Iliad* xiv.271): ἄγρει νῦν μοι ὄμοσσον ἄατον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ, (= *Iliad* xv.237-238): καὶ τὸ κατειβόμενον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ, ὅς τε μέγιστος ὄρκος δεινότατός τε μέλει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι, (= *Iliad* xv.37-38).

²*Metaphysics* 1091b, 4-6 (= *Iliad* i.494: καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἴσαν θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες πάντες ἅμα, Ζεὺς δ' ἦρχε.

whole philosophy of God. We know his response to this question is a resounding affirmative in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*.³ Here he suggests agreement with those who hold this view and finds support in the *Iliad* when the Poet says that not all the gods and goddesses together could pull Zeus down to earth from the highest point of heaven.

ἄρα δὲ δεῖ ἀκίνητόν τι εἶναι καὶ ἡρεμοῦν ἔξω τοῦ
κινουμένου, μηδὲν ὄν ἐκείνου μόριον, ἢ οὐ; καὶ τοῦτο
πότερον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός οὕτως ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον;
ἴσως γὰρ ἂν δόξειν ἄτοπον εἶναι, εἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινή-
σεως ἐντός. διὸ δόξειν ἂν τοῖς οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εὖ
εἰρησθαι Ὀμήρω
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἐρύσαιτ' ἐξ οὐρανόθεν πεδίονδε
Ζῆν' ὕπατον πάντων, οὐδ' εἰ μάλα πολλὰ κάμουτε·
πάντες δ' ἐξάπτεσθε θεοὶ πᾶσαί τε θέαιναί.
τὸ γὰρ ὅλως ἀκίνητον ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἐνδέχεται κινηθῆναι.⁴

The next six references, which treat the place where God dwells and his governance of all things, are drawn from *On the Cosmos*, of which D. J. Furley says: "The probability is that it was a deliberate forgery."⁵ But of the author Furley later observes:

. . . he certainly reproduces enough genuinely Aristotelian thought to make it reasonable that he should wish to usurp Aristotle's name. This is an important point. Those who have proved that the work is a forgery have sometimes overlooked that it is a forgery of Aristotle . . . of the *Protrepticus* and

³*Metaphysics* 1072a, 19-1073a, 14.

⁴*Motion and Progression of Animals* 699b, 32-700 a, 3 (=Iliad viii.20, 21, 22). Note that the lines are not quoted in the proper order. Also the πάντων of Aristotle's text reads μήστωρ in our text.

⁵D. J. Furley, *Aristotle (pseudo-Aristotle): On the Cosmos* (Loeb Classical Library translation) Cambridge, Mass: 1965, p. 338.

De Philosophia, the Aristotle whose '*flumen orationis aureum*' was praised by Cicero, rather than the Aristotle of the school treatises which survive today.⁶

Apropos of the texts about God's existence and governance that this present study is about to examine, Furley notes:

Those who believe that knowledge of Aristotle's work was absolutely confined to the published writings until Andronicus's edition, will say that the author of the *De Mundo* (*On the Cosmos*) shows knowledge of doctrines (e.g. of the Unmoved Mover, if this was not contained in the *De Philosophia*, and various meteorological details) which were known only after Andronicus. . . . I am inclined to believe that the author of the *De Mundo* could have known all the Aristotelian matter that he reproduces before the publication of Andronicus's edition, and that the style and manner of the work indicate a date, before this edition made Aristotle's school-treatises more widely known.⁷

In his work, *On the Cosmos*, the Philosopher delves further into the question of the place where God exists. He sets the question in the context of God's providence which he declares is essential for the preservation of all things--'an unwearying power by which he controls even things that seem very distant.' His home is in the highest place, as Homer indicates, he says.

σωτήρ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ἀπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν ὀπωσδήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον συντελουμένων ὁ θεός, οὐ μὴν αὐτουργοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου χόρου κάματος ὑπομένων, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει χρώμενος ἀτρύτῳ, δι' ἧς καὶ τῶν πόρρω δοκούντων εἶναι περιγίνεται. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτῳ καὶ πρώτῃν ἔδραν αὐτὸς ἔλαχεν, ὑπατός τε διὰ

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 339.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 339-340.

τοῦτο ὠνόμασται, καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ἀκροτάτῃ κορυφῇ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἐγκαθιδρυμένος οὐρανοῦ.⁸

A little later he states that God holds a place high above the cosmos, bright and untroubled which we call 'heaven' because it shines all over. He finds support in Homer when the Poet describes Olympus, the dwelling place of God, as safe, without wind, rain, snow, or clouds, radiant and airy.

τοῦτον οὖν ἔχει τὸν λόγον ὁ θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ, συνέχων τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἀρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν, πλήν ὅτε μέσος ὢν, ἐνθα ἡ γῆ τε καὶ ὁ θολερὸς τόπος οὗτος, ἀλλ' ἄνω καθαρὸς ἐν καθαρῷ κῶφῳ βεβηκώς, ὃν ἐτύμως καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρον εἶναι τῶν ἄνω, ὄλυμπον δὲ οἶον ὀλολαμπῆ καὶ παντὸς χόρου καὶ ἀτάκτου κινήματος κεχωρισμένον, οἷα γίνεται παρ' ἡμῖν διὰ χειμῶνος καὶ ἀνέμων βίας, ὥσπερ ἔφη καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος

Ὀλύμπόνδ', ὅθι φασὶ θεῶν ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
ἔμμεναι. οὔτ' ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται οὔτε ποτ' ὄμβρῳ
δεύεται, οὔτε χιῶν ἐπιπίλναται, ἀλλὰ μάλ' αἴθρη
πέπταται ἀννέφελος, λευκῆ δ' ἀναδέδρομεν αἴγλη.⁹

All ages of men have always testified that God inhabits the region above. All men lift their hands to heaven when they pray. Homer, he says, testifies to this when he asserts that the wide heaven in the aether and the clouds belongs to Zeus.

συνεπιμαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος ἅπας, τὴν ἄνω χώραν ἀποδοὺς θεῶ· καὶ γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀνατείνομεν τὰς χεῖρας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εὐχὰς ποιούμενοι. καθ' ὃν λόγον οὐ κακῶς κάκεινο ἀναπεφώνηται

Zeus δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρύν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλησιν.¹⁰

⁸On the Cosmos 397b, 20-27 (=Iliad i.499). cf. Iliad v.754 and viii.3 for similar expressions of the place where God dwells.

⁹On the Cosmos 400a, 3-14 (=Odyssey vi.42-45).

¹⁰On the Cosmos 400a, 15-19 (=Iliad xv.192).

Returning to the theme of providence in the *On the Cosmos* the Philosopher states that God was an impartial, unchangeable law over all things. He administers the well-ordered arrangement of heaven and earth guiding even the tiniest things serenely and harmoniously. His governance extends as Homer says to 'sweet figs and olives.'

νόμος μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἰσοκλινῆς ὁ θεός, οὐδεμίαν ἐπιδεχόμενος διόρθωσιν ἢ μετάθεσιν, κρείττων δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ βεβαιότερος τῶν ἐν ταῖς κύρβεσιν ἀναγεγραμμένων. ἡγουμένου δὲ ἀεικινήτως αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμμελῶς ὁ σύμπας διοικονομεῖται διάκοσμος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, μεμερισμένος τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα, κατὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη· καὶ γὰρ ἄμπελοι καὶ φοῖνικες καὶ περσέαι συκαὶ τε γλυκεραὶ καὶ ἐλαταί, ὡς φησὶν ὁ ποιητής,¹¹

Aristotle continues the same theme stating that God's guidance touches trees that bear no fruit, too, but have some other purpose. He governs plane-trees, pines, box-trees and as Homer says, 'alders, poplars, and sweet cypresses.' Once again he finds illustrations of his insights in the Poet.

τὰ δὲ ἄκαρπα μὲν ἄλλας δὲ παρεχόμενα χρείας, πλάτανοι καὶ πίτυες καὶ πύξοι
κλήθρη τ' ἀγχειρός τε καὶ εὐώδης κυπάρισσος,¹²

Aristotle concludes the theme of God's provident care of vegetation with further support from Homer sustaining the lovely lyrical tone of this whole passage. God's providence extends to those trees that bear a sweet but perishable harvest in autumn. Homer speaks of them--'pear, pomegranate,

¹¹On the Cosmos 400b, 28-401a, 2 (=Odyssey xi.590).
cf. also Odyssey vii.116.

¹²On the Cosmos 401a, 2-4 (=Odyssey v.64).

and apple trees with their shiny fruit.'

αἶ τε καρπὸν ὀπώρας ἠδὺν ἄλλως δὲ δυσθησαύριστον
φέρουσαι,
ὄχλαι καὶ ῥοιαὶ καὶ μηλέαι ἀγλαόκαρποι,¹³

Furley is right when he observes of the God of *On the Cosmos*:

He maintains the order of the cosmos by means of an undefined "power," which relieves him of the dishonourable necessity of personal intervention. Clearly we have here a development, however remote, of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover.¹⁴

Furley, however, moves in a much more productive direction--one taken firmly by Chroust¹⁵--when he turns a little later to the Aristotle of the *Fragments* and notes:

Aristotle himself, however, seems to have spoken with a rather different voice in his published works. In the *De Philosophia* he said that the orderly movement of the heavenly bodies was one of the reasons for man's belief in gods.¹⁶

Leaving Aristotle's Natural Theology or science of God we will turn now to the sciences in which he touches men most immediately--anthropology, psychology, physiology, and medicine. Four times in anthropological considerations he cites Homer to illustrate his own observations. Twice he

¹³*On the Cosmos* 401a, 5-7 (=Odyssey xi.589).

¹⁴Furley, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

¹⁵Chroust, *op. cit.*, "Aristotle's Religious Convictions," Chapter XVI, Vol. I, pp. 221-231; "A Proof for the Existence of God," Chapter XIII, Vol. II, pp. 159-174; "The Concept of God in Aristotle's Philosophy," Chapter XIV, Vol. II, pp. 175-193. Chroust concludes that the Aristotle of the *Fragments* came not only to a provident but also a personal God.

¹⁶Furley, *op. cit.* p. 336.

turns to the Poet in psychological judgements, and once each in physiological and medical observations.

The first anthropological consideration occurs in the History of the Animals when he is discussing the winter migrations of cranes to the marshlands south of Egypt where the Nile River has its source. In a brief single sentence digression Aristotle says that there the cranes fight the Pygmies, a true, not fabled, race of dwarfs who live in underground caves. He accepts here Homer's observations about the Pygmies in the *Iliad*.

οἷον αἱ γέρανοι ποιοῦσιν· μεταβάλλουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν Σκυθικῶν πεδίων εἰς τὰ ἔλη τὰ ἄνω τῆς Αἰγύπτου, ὅθεν ὁ Νεῖλος ῥεῖ· οὗ καὶ λέγονται τοῖς Πυγμαίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν γένος μικρὸν μὲν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ἵπποι, τραγλοδύται δ' εἰσὶ τὸν βίον.¹⁷

Two considerations that touch anthropology relate to the social and political mode of existence of the Cyclopes, Homer's race of giants. The first reference occurs in the *Politics* in which the Philosopher says that Homer's Cyclopes are a good example of the earliest form of political existence. It is found, he notes, in early cities, in some of his contemporary foreign peoples, and in family-founded colonies. Homer tells us the Cyclopes lived in scattered families, each of which had its own rule based on its own household, and their political ties were based on family ties. We cannot conclude here that Aristotle accepts

¹⁷ *History of the Animals* 597a, 4-9 (= *Iliad* iii.6).

the Cyclopes as a true race of men, as he accepted the Pygmies. Very clearly, however, the Philosopher says that when Homer was describing the socio-political existence of the Cyclopes he was describing the true earliest form of socio-political life among peoples.

διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος, "θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων." σποράδες γὰρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον φησὶν.¹⁸

The second reference is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle states that only Sparta binds its citizens by law to a proper diet and physical exercises. Other states neglect this matter, he says, and let every man live as he pleases, like the Cyclopes of Homer, 'laying down the rules for his wife and children.' Here the Philosopher is noting that governments of his own time were as primitive as the Homeric Cyclopes in the matter of governing proper diet and physical regime for their citizens. Once again, however, we are noting here only the anthropological aspect of the passage--Aristotle's acceptance of Homer's record of a very early form of socio-political organization. He refers again to the same text in the *Odyssey* noted above.

ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῆ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχου.¹⁹

¹⁸ *Politics* 1252b, 19-24 (= *Odyssey* ix.114,115).

¹⁹ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1180a, 24-29 (= *Odyssey* ix.114,115).

The final consideration of Aristotle that relates to anthropology is concerned with the attractive qualities of the Trojan women who settled in Daunia. The Philosopher tells of the honor in which the women of that district were held by the Greeks. They were descendants of the Trojan women who settled there after the fall of Troy. They burned the ships of their Greek captors to avoid slavery at the hands of their captors' Greek wives and to become themselves the new wives of their Greek captors. Aristotle reminds us that Homer recognized the special traits of these Trojan women when he spoke admiringly of them as "long-robed" and "deep-bosomed."

τὰς γὰρ Τρωάδας τὰς ληφθείσας αἰχμαλώτους καὶ εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους ἀφικομένας, εὐλαβηθείσας μὴ πικρᾶς δουλείας τύχῳσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι προὔπαρχουσῶν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς γυναικῶν, λέγεται τὰς ναῦς αὐτῶν ἐμπρῆσαι, ἔν' ἅμα μὲν τὴν προσδοκουμένην δουλείαν ἐκφύγῳσιν, ἅμα δ' ὅπως μετ' ἐκείνων μένειν ἀναγκασθέντων συναρμοσθεῖσαι κατὰσχῳσιν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρας. πάνυ δὲ καὶ τῷ ποιητῇ καλῶς πέφρασαι περὶ αὐτῶν· ἔλκεσιπέπλους γὰρ καὶ βαθυκόλπους κάκεινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἰδεῖν ἔστιν.²⁰

The next two passages are drawn from the *Problems* which scholars have attributed to an author or authors other than Aristotle. In the preface to his translation of the work, E. S. Forster, says:

The inclusion of the *Problemata* in the Aristotelian Corpus is no doubt due to the fact that Aristotle is known to have written a work of this kind, to which

²⁰On *Marvellous Things Heard* 840b, 8-17: Trojan women are spoken of as 'trailing-robed'; (= *Iliad* vi.442; *Iliad* vii.297). They are characterized as 'deep-bosomed' (= *Iliad* xviii.122, *Iliad* xxiv.215). This treatise is viewed as spurious and composed mostly as excerpts from Theophrastus.

reference is made in his genuine works and by other writers. An examination of these references shows that some of them can be connected with passages in the *Problemata*, while others cannot; from which it may be concluded that, while the *Problemata* is not the genuine Aristotelian work, it nevertheless contains an element derived from such a work. It is also obviously indebted to other Aristotelian treatises especially those on Natural History, to the Hippocratean writings, and to Theophrastus.²¹

In Book XXX of the *Problems*, the Philosopher is concerned with problems connected with thought, intelligence, and wisdom. He raises a question at the beginning that places him in the realm of psychology and the problem of psychosomatic connections. He asks why all men outstanding in philosophy, poetry, and the arts are melancholic. Some, he said, are even affected by the diseases of black bile, like the epilepsy, sores, and frenzy of Heracles, the sores of the Spartan, Lysander, and the insanity of Ajax. Many other heroes, philosophers and poets have suffered similar things. Homer, he said, gives us the evidence of Bellerophontes, depressive and reclusive, driven to wander the desert restlessly. He suggests that something about the nature of these gifted people produces these psychological and physical sicknesses.

ἔτι δὲ τὰ περὶ Αἴαντα καὶ Βελλεροφόντην, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἐκστατικῶς ἐγένετο παντελῶς, ὁ δὲ τὰς ἐρημίας ἐδίωκεν, διὸ οὕτως ἐποίησεν Ὅμηρος "αὐτὰρ ἔπει καὶ κεῖνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, ἦτοι ὁ καὶ πεδίον τοῦ Ἀλήϊου οἶος ἄλατο, ὃν θυμὸν κατέδων, πάτον ἀνθρώπων ἀλεείνων." καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἡρώων ὁμοιοπαθεῖς φαίνονται τούτοις. τῶν δὲ ὕστερον

²¹E. S. Forster, *Problemata, The Works Of Aristotle Translated Into English*, W. D. Ross, Ed, VII, Oxford: 1927, p. vii.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ ἕτεροι συχνοὶ τῶν γνωρίμων. ἔτι δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν ποίησιν οἱ πλεῖστοι. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων γίνεται νοσήματα ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης κράσεως τῷ σώματι, τοῖς δὲ ἡ φύσις δῆλη ῥέπουσα πρὸς τὰ πάθη.²²

From this problem he moves naturally to the example of the effect imbibed alcohol has on different people. Clearly, he said, alcohol makes the type of person he has just discussed melancholic. Alcohol's effect changes as drinking progresses, he notes. Varying the quantity of alcohol consumed varies the effect on the drinker. The different transient characteristics produced by alcohol are comparable, the Philosopher observes, to the more permanent temperaments caused by nature. He suggests that there are substances in the body which produce various psychological traits we find among human beings. In the *Odyssey* he finds support for his examples of the effect of alcohol on the psychology of the individual who is consuming it.

ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ εἷς ἄνθρωπος μεταβάλλει τὸ ἦθος πίνων καὶ χρώμενος τῷ οἴνῳ ποσῶ τινί, οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἦθος εἰσὶ τινες ἄνθρωποι. οἶος γὰρ οὗτος μεθύων νῦν ἐστίν, ἄλλος τις τοιοῦτος φύσει ἐστίν, ὃ μὲν λάλος, ὃ δὲ κεκλινημένος, ὃ δὲ ἀρίδακρος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τινὰ καὶ τοιοῦτους, διὸ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε "καὶ μέ φησι δάκρυ-πλῶειν βεβαρημένον οἴνῳ."²³

Psychology is the subject again in three different contexts in which Aristotle examines the relationship between man's sense perception and his true thought. He

²² *Problems* 953a, 21-31 (= *Iliad* vi.200+.201 sq.).

²³ *Problems* 953b, 7-12 (= *Odyssey* xix.122). (Note text differs from MSS).

emphasizes how really distinct they are. He recognizes, however, how most men have failed to grasp the great difference between sense perception and thought. In fact, as he observes, they have for the most part identified them. Homer, too, he thinks, seems to identify thought with sense perception. This is one of the few places in which the Philosopher suggests any negative evaluation of the Poet.

Aristotle's strongest statement in the matter occurs in his work *On the Soul*. He says that the older philosophers actually assert that thinking and perceiving are identical. After observing that Empedocles held that judgement grows with what appears to a man and that a man's thinking continually appears to him in different forms, he concludes that Homer implies the same thing when he says in the *Odyssey*, "Such is the nature of man's thought." All these authors, he argues, suppose the process of thinking to be a bodily function like perception.

καὶ οἳ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταύτων εἶναι φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἶρηκε "πρὸς παρεόν γὰρ μῆτις ἀξέεται ἀνθρώποισιν" καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις "ὄθεν σφίσι αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοῖα παρίσταται." τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὀμήρου "τοῦτος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν." πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν,²⁴

What the Philosopher is attempting to preserve here throughout is the mind's ultimate independence of matter. He is not denying, therefore, the ultimate origin of man's knowledge in the senses--it is fundamental to his whole

²⁴ *About the Soul* 427a, 21-27 (= *Odyssey* xviii.136).

doctrine here in the third book of this treatise.²⁵ He finds in the ancients a failure to distinguish adequately the mind and its spiritual realm and faculties from the body and its corporeal world and sense faculties.

This judgement of the Philosopher is evidenced clearly in an earlier passage of the same treatise *On the Soul*. Here he says Democritus actually identified soul and mind and believed that truth was subjective. This same thinker, Aristotle says, regarded as accurate Homer's description of Hector, in his dazed state as "lying thinking other thoughts." Democritus does not use the word mind to denote a faculty concerned with the truth, he argues, but identifies the soul and the mind. (Note that the Philosopher is not objecting here to Homer's statement but rather Democritus's use of the Poet's observation.)

ὡσπερ Δημόκριτος. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ταύτῳ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον· διὰ καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὸν Ὅμηρον ὡς Ἔκτωρ κεῖτ' ἄλλοφρονέων. οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτό λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν.²⁶

In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle touches again finally on the same question, quoting the above Homeric passage once again. Here he is stressing the ancient philosophers' belief that thought is completely dependent on bodily

²⁵ *About the Soul*, III, 2-8.

²⁶ *About the Soul* 404a, 27-31 (= *Iliad* xxiii.698- This is the only passage we have in our Homer that describes such a "thinking of other thoughts," but it refers to Euryalus, not Hector.)

condition. According to their conviction reality therefore is what each man's physical perception makes it to be according to his physical condition at the moment of that perception. These thinkers, the Philosopher observes, maintain that Homer also clearly held this view when he made Hector, stunned by a blow, lie with thoughts deranged. This implied, he argued, that even those who are 'out of their minds' still think, although not the same thoughts. If there is more than one kind of thought, these ancient philosophers concluded, there must be more than one kind of reality.

Ἄναξαγρόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἐταίρων τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτ' αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσι. φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἑκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, κείσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονούτας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονούντας ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτά. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, εἰ ἀμφοτέραι φρονήσεις, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἅμα οὕτω τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.^{2 7}

In the *History of the Animals* he is discussing human physiology and touches on man's main vascular system. As he describes the *vena cava* (including the jugular vein), its location and its connection with the other main blood vessels of the upper part of the torso he observes that Homer spoke of this blood vessel in the *Iliad*.

ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν σφόνδυλον τοῦ τραχήλου τείνουσα φλέψ καὶ τὴν ῥάχιν πάλιν παρὰ τὴν ῥάχιν τείνει· ἦν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν εἴρηκε ποιήσας "ἀπο φλέβα πᾶσαν ἔκερσεν, ἢ τ' ἀνα νῶτα θέουσα διαμπερες ἀυχέν' ἰκάνει."^{2 8}

^{2 7} *Metaphysics* 1009b, 26-34 (= *Iliad* xxiii.698- cf. Footnote ^{2 6} for evaluation of this text.)

^{2 8} *History of the Animals* 513b, 24-28 (= *Iliad* xiii.546-47)

In a discussion of the treatment of wounds and bruises in the *Problems*, Aristotle questions why both thapsia, which is hot and caustic, and cold bronze are used in the treatment of bruises. The use of cold bronze he finds exemplified in the *Iliad*.

Διὰ τί ἡ θαψία καὶ ὁ κύαθος τὰ ὑπώπια παύει, ἡ μὲν ἀρχόμενα, ὁ δὲ ὕστερον, ἐναντία ὄντα; ὁ μὲν γὰρ κύαθος ψυχρός, ὡπερ καὶ ὁ ποιητῆς φησι "ψυχρον δ' ἔλε χαλκον ὀδοῦσιν" ἡ δὲ θαψία θερμὸν καὶ καυστικόν.²⁹

Moving on now to science related to the animal world, we find Aristotle illustrating and supporting ten of his zoological observations from the pages of Homer. In fact, as Otto Körner points out, he accepts Homer's evidence in zoology as on a par with actual observation.³⁰ Seven of these observations occur in the *Philosopher's History of the Animals*, one in the *Generation of Animals*, one in the *Problems*, and one in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The first of Aristotle's references to Homer in a zoological context is found in the *History of the Animals* when the *Philosopher* is discussing traits of Laconian hounds. After stating that the male of this breed lives ten years and the female twelve, he notes that bitches of other breeds generally live fourteen or fifteen years and some as

²⁹*Problems* 890b, 7-10 (=Iliad v.75). From a work considered spurious. Cf: Footnote ²¹, *Supra*.

³⁰"Über die Verwertung homerischer Erkenntnisse in der Tiergeschichte des Aristoteles," in Sudheffs *Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin*, XXIV (1931), pp. 185-201.

many as twenty. This is why some people, he says, accept Homer's statement that Odysseus's hound Argos died in his twentieth year.

ζῆ δ' ἡ μὲν Λακωνικὴ κύων ὁ μὲν ἄρρην περὶ ἔτη δέκα,
ἡ δὲ θήλεια περὶ ἔτη δώδεκα, τῶν δ' ἄλλων κυνῶν αἱ
μὲν πλεῖσται περὶ ἔτη τετταρακαίδεκα ἢ πεντεκαίδεκα,
ἔναι δὲ καὶ εἴκοσιν· διὸ καὶ Ὅμηρον οἴονται τινες
ὀρθῶς ποιῆσαι τῷ εἴκοστῷ ἔτει ἀποθανόντα τὸν κύνα
τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως.³¹

The next two Homeric zoological citations come a little later in the same work of the Philosopher. Here while he is making observations about the traits of bulls he declares that five years of age marks the bull's prime. For this reason, he says, Homer is commended for using the expression 'a five-year bull.'

ἀκμάζει δὲ μάλιστα πεντέτης ὢν, διὸ καὶ Ὅμηρόν φασι,
πεποιηκέναι τινὲς ὀρθῶς ποιήσαντα "ἄρσενα πενταέτηρον"³²

The Poet is commended too for another description of a bull in his prime, (identical in meaning to the above phrase according to Aristotle) 'a nine-seasons' bull.'

καὶ τὸ "βοὸς ἐννεώροιο." δύνασθαι γὰρ ταύτόν.³³

Again in the History of the Animals Aristotle confirms an observation about an animal by citing Homer. In this

³¹*History of the Animals* 574b, 29-575a, 1 (=Odyssey xvii.326-327. The text is as follows: "Ἀργὸν δ' αὖ κατὰ μοῖρ' ἔλαβεν μέλανος θανάτοιο, αὐτίκ' ἰδόντ' Ὀδυσῆα ἐεικοστῷ ἐνιαυτῷ.

³²*History of the Animals* 575b, 4-6 (=Iliad ii.402ff.; Iliad vii.315; Odyssey xix.220).

³³*History of the Animals* 575b, 6-7 (=Odyssey x.19).

context he is describing characteristics of the wild boar, and states that, as Homer observes, castrated wild boars grow larger and fiercer.

τῶν δ' ἀρρένων καὶ ἀγρίων οἱ τομῖαι μείζους γίνονται καὶ χαλεπώτεροι, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν "θρέψεν ἐπι χλοῦνην σὺν ἄγριον. οὐδε ἐφίκει θηρέε γε σιτοφάγῳ, ἀλλὰ ῥίψ ὑλήεντι."^{3 4}

Aristotle's fifth citation of Homer's authority in zoological matters occurs when he considers the evidence that the long-horned ram of Libya is born with horns. The Philosopher extends Homer's observation, which is limited to rams, to include either ewes or other horned animals.^{3 5}

Homer, the Philosopher notes, says the long-horned ram in Libya is born with horns.

καὶ ἐν μὲν Λιβύῃ εὐθύς γένηται κέρατα ἔχοντα τὰ κερατώδη τῶν κριῶν, οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄρνες, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τᾶλλα.^{3 6}

The next three passages, as was indicated earlier, are drawn from the ninth book of the *History of the Animals*, which is viewed by many scholars as spurious. A. L. Peck,

^{3 4}*History of the Animals* 578a, 32-578b, 2. Note that this citation is a mixture of two loci in Homer: *Iliad* ix.539: ὄρσεν ἐπι χλοῦνην σὺν ἄγριον ἀργιόδοντα, and *Odyssey* ix.190, 191+: καὶ γὰρ θαῦμ' ἐτέτυκτο πελώριον, οὐδὲ ἐφίκει

ἀνδρί γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ῥίψ ὑλήεντι

It is questionable whether the word χλοῦνην here has the meaning Aristotle gives it.

^{3 5}*Cf. Historia Animalium*, Tr. D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, IV, *The Works of Aristotle*, Ed. J.A. Smith, W.D. Ross, 606a, 20, Footnote ⁴. Oxford, 1910.

^{3 6}*History of the Animals* 606a, 18-20 (= *Odyssey* iv.85).

in the preface of his translation of the work, observes:

In the ninth Book A.-W. (Aubert and Wimmer) find inconsistencies, irrelevancies, and repetitions, and some un-Aristotelian obscurities of style; it may, they think, have been put together from notes left by Aristotle, but it is a disorderly composition and some of it is "careless bungling" (zum Theil gedankenloses Machwerk). Dittmeyer follows them in rejecting it, and endorses Joachim's view that it was put together by some Peripatetic at the beginning of the third century, incorporating matter from Theophrastus.^{3 7}

Again in the History of the Animals the Philosopher supports his animal observations with the evidence in Homer. He describes the cymindis, a black rarely seen mountain bird, long and slender, about the size of the 'dove-killer' hawk.

ἡ δὲ κύμινδις ὀλιγάκις μὲν φαίνεται (οἰκεῖ γὰρ ὄρη),
 ἔστι δὲ μέλαν καὶ μέγεθος ὅσον ἰέραξ ὁ φασσοφόνος
 καλούμενος, καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν μακρὸς καὶ λεπτός. κύμινδιν
 δὲ καλοῦσιν Ἴωνες αὐτήν· ἥς καὶ Ὅμηρος μέμνηται ἐν
 τῇ Ἰλιάδι εἰπὼν "καλκίδα κικλήσκουσι θεοῦ, ἄνδρες δε
 κύμινδιν."^{3 8}

Later in the same work Aristotle cites the support of the Poet when he is mentioning various species of eagles. He describes a species called the Plangus. It is second among eagles in size and strength, lives in mountain meadows and near marshy lakes, and is called 'duck-killer' or 'black eagle'. Homer, he says, speaks of this bird when Priam visits the tent of Achilles to seek the return of Hector's body.

^{3 7} A. L. Peck, Tr., *Aristotle: Historia Animalium*, (3 Vols.), I, Cambridge, Mass: 1965, p. lv.

^{3 8} *History of the Animals* 615b, 5-10 (=Iliad xiv.291).

ἕτερον δὲ γένος ἀετοῦ ἐστὶν ὃ πλάγγος καλεῖται, δεύτερος μεγέθει καὶ ῥώμῃ· οἰκεῖ δὲ βήσσας καὶ ἄγνη καὶ λίμνας, ἐπικαλεῖται δὲ νηητοφόνος καὶ μορφνός· οὗ καὶ Ὅμηρος μέμνηται ἐν τῇ τοῦ Πριάμου ἐξόδῳ.³⁹

The next citation of a Homeric text by Aristotle in the *History of the Animals* to support his own zoology occurs in a long discussion of the traits of lions. The Philosopher says that two statements about the lion are true--one that he is particularly afraid of fire, and the other that, keeping his eye trained on the hunter who strikes him, he pounces on him. The first trait, he says, is clearly mentioned by Homer.

ἀληθῆ δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, τό τε φοβεῖσθαι μάλιστα τὸ πῦρ, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν "καίόμεναί τε δεταί, τὰς τε τρεῖ ἐσσύμενός περ," καὶ τὸ τὸν βαλόντα τηρήσαντα ἴεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦτον.⁴⁰

Another observation on the traits of the lion is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle discusses the virtue of temperance and the vice of profligacy. They are concerned with those pleasures which man shares with the lower animals. These lower animals, he observes, derive pleasure from smell and sight only accidentally, that is, only in so far as they relate to eating. The lion takes pleasure, not (in the words of the Poet) in the sight of a stag or mountain-goat, but in the prospect of a meal.

³⁹*History of the Animals* 618b, 23-26 (=Iliad xxiv.315-316). The Oxford text of Homer reads:

αὐτίκα δ' αἰετὸν ἦκε, τελειότατον πετεηνῶν,
μόρφνον θηρητῆρ', ὃν καὶ περικνὸν καλέουσιν.

⁴⁰*History of the Animals* 629b, 21-24 (=Iliad xi.554; xvii.663).

ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμάϊς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν. οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἦσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτη φαίνεται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδῶν "ἡ [εὐρων] ἔλαφον ἡ ἄγριον αἴγα," ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει."⁴¹

In the *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle makes another zoological observation that he supports with evidence from Homer. He is discussing the aging process in a man and the other animals. In his explanation of the greying process he notes that of all animals beyond man, the horse seems to grey the most. The reason for this greying of the horse, he feels, is the thinness of the bone that surrounds its brain. This is demonstrated by the fact that a blow delivered to this spot can kill a horse. An example of this, he notes, can be found in the *Iliad*.

τοῖς δ' ἵπποις [αὐτῶν] ἐπισημαίνει μάλιστα ὧν ἴσμεν ζῴων, ὅτι λεπτότατον τὸ ὀστοῦν ὡς κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τῶν ἄλλων. τεκμήριον δ' ὅτι καίριος ἡ πληγὴ ἡ εἰς τὸν τόπον τοῦτον γίνεται αὐτοῖς· διὸ καὶ "Ὀμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν "ἕνα τε πρῶται τρίχες ἵππων κρανίῳ ἐμπεφύασι, μάλιστα δε καίριόν ἐστιν."⁴²

The final zoological observation Aristotle makes for which he cites an Homeric example is found in the *Problems*. In a rather complex argumentation about the characteristics of eunuch bulls and rams he argues that maleness leads to

⁴¹ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1118a, 17-24 (= *Iliad* iii.24).

⁴² *Generation of Animals* 785a, 11-16 (= *Iliad* viii.83-84).

growth in breadth and depth as well as height. Femaleness, however, produces growth only in height. The eunuch bull or ram, therefore, losing its maleness, grows only in height. Homer, he says, exemplified this when speaking of the orphaned daughters of Pandareus, he said that 'Sacred Artemis gave them height.'

τὸ δὲ μέγεθος μόνον οἱ εὐνοῦχοι εἰς τὸ ἄρρεν μεταβάλλουσιν· μείζους γὰρ γίνονται. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ ἄρρενος· τὰ γὰρ θήλεα ἐλάττω ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρρένων. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ θήλυ; οὐ γὰρ εἰς πᾶν τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ μῆκος μόνον, τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν καὶ εἰς πλάτος καὶ εἰς βάθος· τότε γὰρ τετελειώται. ἔτι δὲ ὡς ἔχει τὸ θήλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, οὕτως αὐτοῦ τοῦ θήλεος ἢ παρθένος πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη γενναία, ἢ δὲ οὐ. εἰς τὴν τούτων οὖν μεταβάλλει· ἐπὶ μῆκος γὰρ ταύταις ἢ αὔξησης. διὸ καὶ Ὅμηρος εὖ τὸ "μῆκος δ' ἔπορ' Ἀρτεμις ἀγνή," ὡς διὰ τὴν παρθενίαν, ὃ εἶχε, δυναμένης δοῦναι.⁴³

Coming finally to sciences of the simply physical world, Aristotle makes five observations for which he finds support in the Homeric poems. The first, a geological-geographic observation, occurs in the *Meteorologica*, when the Philosopher is discussing the settlement of people in marshy areas that gradually develop into dry land. The precise time and place of earliest settlement in such gradually changing areas is forgotten, he thinks. The settlers usually inhabit the dry land as it becomes available very gradually over a very long period of time. This he observes is what happened in Egypt, whose ancient name was Thebes. Homer, he observes, supports the evidence of Egypt's ancient name.

⁴³ *Problems* 894b, 24-35 (= *Odyssey* xx.71). Cf: Footnote²¹ *Supra*.

οἷον συμβέβηκε καὶ περὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος αἰεὶ ξηρότερος ὁ τόπος φαίνεται γιγνόμενος καὶ πᾶσα ἡ χώρα τοῦ ποταμοῦ πρόσχωσις οὔσα τοῦ Νείλου, διὰ δὲ τὸ κατὰ μικρὸν ξηραινομένων τῶν ἐλῶν τοὺς πλησίον εἰσοικίζεσθαι τὸ τοῦ χρόνου μῆκος ἀφήρηται τὴν ἀρχήν. φαίνεται δ' οὖν καὶ τὰ στόματα πάντα, πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ Κανωβικοῦ, χειροποίητα καὶ οὐ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ὄντα καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἢ Αἴγυπτος θῆβαι καλούμεναι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ Ὀμηρος,⁴⁴

the matter of Egypt's changing terrain. He mentions Egypt as though Memphis either were not there or at least were not as important as in Aristotle's time. The Philosopher's argument from the Poet here--an argument from silence--is not as strong as his usual argument.

οὕτω πρόσφατος ὢν ὡς εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας μεταβολάς· ἐκείνου γὰρ τοῦ τόπου ποιεῖται μνείαν ὡς οὐπω Μέμφιος οὔσης ἢ ὄλως ἢ οὐ τηλικαύτης. τοῦτο δ' εἰκὸς οὕτω συμβαίνειν· οἱ γὰρ κάτωθεν τόποι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὕστερον φκίσθησαν· ἐλώδεις γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἐγγύτερον τῆς προσχώσεως διὰ τὸ λιμνάζειν ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις αἰεὶ μᾶλλον. μεταβάλλει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πάλιν εὐθιγεῖ· ξηραίνόμενοι γὰρ οἱ τόποι ἔρχονται εἰς τὸ καλῶς ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ πρότερον εὐκραιεῖς ὑπερξηραίνόμεναι τότε γίνονται χεῖρους.⁴⁵

Besides the mention in the ninth book of the *Iliad*, Egypt surfaces in three places in the *Odyssey*, again without any mention of Memphis. The first two citations are brief, the third extended. Menelaus tells Telemachus in the first citation how he 'wandered over Cyprus, Phoenicia, and

⁴⁴ *Meteorologica* 351b, 27-35 (= *Iliad* ix.381-382: οὐδ' ὄσ' ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν ποτινίσεται, οὐδ' ὄσα θῆβας Αἰγυπτίας) Leaf (The *Iliad* p.398, n, 381) argues that Aristotle is accepting an interpolation here, since the Thebes referred to is probably the city in Boiotia.

⁴⁵ *Meteorologica* 351b, 35-352a, 9.

Egypt'. The text of Homer reads:

Κύπρον Φοινίκην τε καὶ Αἴγυπτίου ἐπαληθεῖς, Αἰθιοπὰς
θ' ἰκόμην καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἑρεμβούς καὶ Λιβύην,^{4 6}

A little later in the same book Homer is describing how Helen mixed a drug into the wine served at the banquet Menelaus was having in Telemachus' honor. She had gotten the drug from 'Polydamna . . . a woman of Egypt, for there the earth, the giver of grain, bears the greatest supply of drugs'. It would be unlikely that Memphis, whether it existed or not, would be mentioned by the Poet here. The Homeric text reads as follows:

τοῖα Διὸς θυγάτηρ ἔχε φάρμακα μητιόεντα,
ἔσθλά, τὰ οἱ Πολύδαμνα πόρεν θῶνος παράκοιτις
Αἴγυπτίη, τῇ πλεῖστα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα
φάρμακα,^{4 7}

In a final, extended passage (lines 245-291 of Book XIV) about Egypt, Odysseus is describing his decision to journey to that land, his voyage and sojourn there and departure for Phoenicia and Libya. One could reasonably expect mention of Memphis here, but it is not forthcoming. In describing his arrival there he speaks of the river, the fair fields, the plain, the city, but nothing of Memphis or the changing terrain of Egypt. The most pertinent part of the long Homeric passage reads:

"Πεμπταῖοι δ' Αἴγυπτον εὐρρείτην ἰκόμεσθα,
στῆσα δ' ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ποταμῷ νέας ἀμφιελίσσας.

^{4 6} *Odyssey* iv.83-85.

^{4 7} *Odyssey* iv.227-229.

ἐνθ' ἢ τοι μὲν ἐγὼ κελόμην ἐρίηρας ἐταίρους
αὐτοῦ παρ νήεσσι μένειν καὶ νῆας ἔρυσθαι,
ὀπτῆρας δὲ κατὰ σκοπιάς ὠτρυνα νέεσθαι·
οἱ δ' ὕβρει εἴξαντες, ἐπισπόμενοι μένεϊ σφῶ,
αἴψα μάλ' Αἴγυπτίων ἀνδρῶν περικαλλέας ἀγρούς
πόρθεον, ἐκ δὲ γυναῖκας ἄγον καὶ νήπια τέκνα,
αὐτούς τ' ἔκτεινον· τάχα δ' ἔς πόλιν ἵκετ' αὐτή.
οἱ δὲ βοῆς αἴοντες ἄμ' ἠοῖ φαινομένηφιν
ἦλθον· πλήτο δὲ πᾶν πεδίον πεζῶν τε καὶ ἵππων
χαλιοῦ τε στεροπῆς.⁴⁸

In a discussion of the possible bio-chemical change of the color of an animal's coat due to the water it drinks, Aristotle asserts that for this reason the same animal can be white when raised in some regions, and black when raised in others. After speaking of rivers that make rams white and others that make them black, he says 'it is widely believed that the Scamander makes them yellow.' For this reason, the Philosopher declares, they say Homer calls that river Yellow instead of Scamander.

καὶ ἐν τῇ Αἴτανδρία δὲ δύο ποταμοὶ εἰσιν, ὧν ὁ μὲν λευκὰ ὁ δὲ μέλανα ποιεῖ τὰ πρόβατα. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ Σκάμανδρος ποταμὸς ξανθὰ τὰ πρόβατα ποιεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρόν φασιν ἀντὶ Σκαμάνδρου Ἐάνθον προσαγορεύειν αὐτόν.⁴⁹

In his *On Marvelous Things Heard*, Aristotle finds support for an historical conclusion based on geological evidence that he agrees was clearly illustrated in Homer. He discusses geological limitations that some say would have precluded certain routes for Jason out of the Pontus. For

⁴⁸ *Odyssey* xiv.257-268.

⁴⁹ *History of the Animals* 519a, 16-20 (= *Iliad* xx.73-74).
ἀντα δ' ἄρ' Ἐφαιστόιο μέγας ποταμὸς βαθυδίνης,
ὄν Ἐάνθον καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον.

example, he accepts along with other proofs 'still more convincing evidence' that the voyage out did not take Jason and the Argo through the Symplegades. The 'still more convincing evidence' is found in the *Odyssey* when the Poet says it is impossible to sail past this place because of the very dangerous eruptions of Mount Etna.

ἔτι δὲ τούτων φανερώτερα σημεῖα λέγουσιν, ὅτι οὐ διὰ τῶν Συμπληγάδων ἐγένετο ὁ ἔκπλους, αὐτῷ τῷ ποιητῇ ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις μάρτυρι χρώμενοι. τὴν γὰρ δυσχέρειαν τοῦ κινδύνου ἐμφανίζοντα λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι παραπλευσαι τὸν τόπον,

ἀλλὰ θ' ὁμοῦ πίνακας τε νεῶν καὶ σώματα φωτῶν
κύμαθ' ἄλος φορέουσι πυρός τ' ὀλοοῦτο θύελλα.⁵⁰

In the *Problems* the Philosopher cites Homeric support for his explanation of a light phenomenon he observed in the physical properties governing the sea's waves: Water set in motion appears darker. Homer recognized this, Aristotle says, when he said that the wind made the sea black. It appears lighter, the Philosopher observed, because it is more transparent when it is still. Movement makes the water less transparent and therefore blacker to the eye.

Διὰ τί τὸ ὕδωρ ἥττον φαίνεται λευκόν, ἐὰν κινῆται, οἶον καὶ ἡ φρίκη; διὸ καὶ "Ὀμηρος ἀρχομένου φησὶ τοῦ πνεύματος "μελάνει δέ τε πόντος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ." ἢ διὰ δύο αἰτίας, ἐγγύθεν μὲν τῆς ὄψεως οὔσης, διὰ τὸ διαίεναι τὴν ὄψιν μᾶλλον ἡρεμοῦντος, κινουμένου δὲ μὴ εὐθύπορεῖν· τὸ δὲ διαφανὲς λευκὸν φαίνεται.⁵¹

⁵⁰On *Marvellous Things Heard* 839b, 28-34 (= *Odyssey* xii.67-68). N.B.: The treatise is considered spurious and traceable mostly to excerpts from Theophrastus.

⁵¹*Problems* 934a, 13-18 (= *Iliad* vii.64). Cf: Footnote²¹ *Supra*.

In one further observation of a physical science-- meteorology--Aristotle cites Homer in support of his position. In the *Problems* he is discussing the characteristics of the different prevailing winds when he wonders why the south-west wind is the calmest and the gentlest of all winds. He recognizes that Homer agrees with the observation since he describes it as the wind that always blows in the Elysian Fields.

Διὰ τί ὁ ζέφυρος εὐδαινός καὶ "Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ Ἥλυσίῳ πεδίῳ, "ἀλλ' αἶει ζεφύροιο διαπνεύουσιν ἀήται;"⁵²

In this chapter we have found Aristotle turning repeatedly to Homer to illustrate or support one philosophic or scientific observation he has made. The range of subjects in which he referred to the Poet was truly remarkable. It swept from the philosophy of God through anthropology, psychology, physiology, and medicine in the human sphere, zoology and biochemistry in the world of animals, and geography, geology, meteorology, and physics in the purely physical realm.

The quotations from the Philosopher which we have studied in this chapter reveal that his approach to Homer in these philosophic and scientific matters was quite distinct from his approach to him in the arts of language. The same high degree of admiration and matter-of-fact

⁵²*Problems* 943 b, 21-23 (= *Odyssey* iv.567). This reading of Aristotle does not agree with our text which reads: ἀλλ' αἶει ζεφύροιο λιγύ πνεύοντος ἀήτας. Cf. Footnote ²¹ *supra*.

respect were just as clearly in evidence, but with a subtle difference. In matters related to the arts of language Homer is approached as the master and teacher. Here, in philosophical and scientific questions we find him approached not as master philosopher or scientist but as the reliable source and reservoir of traditional wisdom and lore.

CHAPTER FIVE

ARISTOTELIAN TEXTS ON HOMER AS TEACHER OF HUMAN VALUES

Searching in human experience and principles for what is good or desirable for man is a central effort of Aristotle's philosophy of man. The record of this quest is scattered throughout the Philosopher's works, but is mainly found, of course, in the three explicitly named ethical works, in the *Politics* and in the *Rhetoric* which, as we noted in Chapter Three, has a clearly ethical orientation.

In the course of his inquiry into human values, as revealed in his extant works, Aristotle turns to the authority of Homer fifty-four times to support his judgement about some particular human good. Relating to values he cites Homer twelve times in the *Politics*, eighteen times in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, three times in the *Eudemian Ethics* and twice in the *Magna Moralia*. Again, too, while treating some aspect of man's values he claims Homer's support seventeen times in the *Rhetoric* and once each in the *Metaphysics* and *Poetics*.

The present chapter will analyze the fifty-four Aristotelian texts that see Homer as teacher of values to deduce what they show about Aristotle's attitude towards the

Poet.

Homer's epics are stories of men in action. At no point are they theoretical or speculative discussion. It is not surprising therefore to find the Philosopher reaching for Homer to verify some principle not in the abstract but in the concrete world of men's practical lives.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a practical work--a guide to help the orator persuade men to choose, decide, or act. When he weighs human values in this treatise Homer frequently occurs to him.

Early in the work as the Philosopher discusses how the deliberative orator must exhort men to the expedient and dissuade them from the inexpedient he equates experience with goodness. Judging it necessary to grasp first the basic notions of goodness and expediency in general, he assumes goodness to be 'whatever is desirable for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose something else.'

ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα ἢ αἰρετόν, καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ἄλλο αἰρούμεθα,¹

Pleasure and happiness are good since they are universally desirable, he argues, and they come with the exclusion of evil and possession of good. He lists necessary goods--things generally recognized as excellent in themselves and productive of many other advantages: justice, courage, self-control, magnanimity, magnificence and other

¹*Rhetoric* 1362a, 21-23.

virtues of soul; health, beauty, and other virtues of body; wealth, friendship, honor and good reputation; eloquence, capacity for action, natural cleverness, good memory, readiness to learn, quick-wittedness, and all similar qualities; all the sciences, art, and life itself.

After listing these generally accepted human values Aristotle gives a principle to determine the goodness of doubtfully good things: the opposite to evil is good or the opposite to the advantage of our enemy is generally good for us. Exemplifying the principle, the Philosopher quotes Nestor's warning to Achilles and Agamemnon that their common enemy would be happy to hear of their quarrel.

καὶ ὅλως ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ χαίρουσι,
 τούναντίον τούτῳ ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εὖ εἴρηται
 "ἢ κεν γηθήσαι Πριάμος." ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ'
 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταῦτο συμ-
 φέρειν τοῖς ἐναντοίοις.²

Since an end is a good, every end or purpose that costs us much labor and expense, Aristotle concludes, is valued as a good by us. This value the Philosopher finds illustrated in Homer when Hera pleads with Athene to prevent the Greeks from leaving Troy and Helen.

καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται· φαινόμενον
 γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἦδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται,
 καὶ τέλος πολλῶν· τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν· ὅθεν ταῦτ'
 εἴρηται, "καὶ δὲ κεν εὐχολην Πριάμῳ"³

²*Rhetoric* 1362b, 33-37 (= *Iliad* i.255). Aristotle gives only a few words of the quotation, since the line was so well known.

³*Rhetoric* 1363a, 2-6 (= *Iliad* ii.160). Another partial quotation is given here, but enough to suggest the rest.

According to Aristotle the same value is illustrated again when Odysseus sympathizes with the Greek army's longing to leave Troy but encourages them to hold out. He tells them it would be disgraceful after fighting so long to return home empty-handed.

καὶ αἰσχρόν τοι δηρὸν τε μένειν.⁴

Arguing from the general principle that everything deliberately chosen appears as a good, Aristotle reasons that whatever is preferred by a wise or good man or woman must be good--as when Athene preferred Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Paris, and Homer Achilles.

καὶ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν οἷον Ὀδυσσεῖα Ἀθηναῖα καὶ Ἑλένην Ἰησεύς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἰ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλεῖα Ὅμηρος. καὶ ὅλως τὰ προαιρετὰ.⁵

Discussing next how to determine greater good or expedience the Philosopher asserts that appearances can alter the value we place on a thing. A good thing, for example, can seem like more and therefore more desirable if it is offered in parts. Conversely, according to Aristotle, something bad can appear worse if it is broken down and presented in parts. This is exemplified in the *Iliad*, he thinks, when Meleager is persuaded to fight upon hearing of all the evils, considered separately, that happen to a city

⁴*Rhetoric* 1363a, 6 (= *Iliad* ii.298). Still another partial quotation to suggest the rest of a well known passage.

⁵*Rhetoric* 1363a, 16-19.

that falls to the enemy.

καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται·
 πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητῆς
 φησι πεῖσαι λέγουσαν τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι
 ὅσσα κάκ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστῳ ἀλφῆ.
 λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,
 τέκνα δέ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.⁶

Another principle for determining a greater good, according to the Philosopher, is: the natural is a greater good than the acquired because it is harder. Here Aristotle means that what a man must develop simply on his own, without any help beyond his own nature, demands harder work. The end-product is a greater good, he concludes, since it was produced with greater personal effort. Homer illustrates this, Aristotle thinks, when the Minstrel Phemius, compelled to sing for Penelope's suitors, speaks of his being self-taught.

καὶ τὸ αὐτοφύεθς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου· χαλεπώτερον γάρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητῆς φησιν "αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί."⁷

A little later in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle broadly defines pleasure as a kind of sudden and perceptible relaxation of the soul into its natural state. Everything pleasant, he maintains, must be experienced in the present, remembered from the past, or hoped for in the future. He concludes to the existence of a principle that he discovers verified in the *Odyssey*. Not only does the memory of agree-

⁶*Rhetoric* 1365a, 10-15 (= *Iliad* ix.592-594). Aristotle's text here differs from ours.

⁷*Rhetoric* 1365a, 29-30 (= *Odyssey* xxii.347).

able things cause us pleasure. The remembrance of even some disagreeable things can cause us pleasure too, if they have subsequently brought us some honor or good.

ὡς ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνησθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστίν, οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ' ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ἢ ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται, "ἀλλ' ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνησθαι πόνων," καὶ "μετα γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἄνηρ μνήμενος, ὅστις πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργη."⁸

Aristotle concludes that everything that brings pleasure by its presence generally brings pleasure too when it is looked forward to or remembered. Anger affords an example of pleasure derived from something looked forward to. It is pleasurable since it looks forward to revenge. An example of this, according to Aristotle, occurs in the *Iliad* when Homer observes that anger is much sweeter than honey.

διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἡδύ, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ "ὅστε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο."⁹

The Philosopher makes the same point about anger a little later when he examines anger more closely. He cites the same passage from the *Iliad*. To the pleasure produced

⁸*Rhetoric* 1370a, 32-1370b, 6 (=Odyssey xv.400-401). N.B.: Aristotle misquotes the second line, which reads as follows in the Oxford text: ὅς τις δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πόλλ' ἐπαληθῆσιν his text differs from ours. Note also that the first quotation (ἡδύ. . . πόνων--not hexamter) is from a lost work of Euripides, not Homer.

⁹*Rhetoric* 1370b, 10-12 (=Iliad xviii.108).

by looking forward to future revenge he notes another more present cause of pleasure in anger. He says that since men dwell upon the thought of revenge when they are angry, they experience a phantasy of carrying out their revenge that causes the same pleasure that accompanies a vivid dream.

καὶ πάση ὀργῇ ἔπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δ' ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνάτων αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ "ὅστε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται." ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονὴ τις διὰ τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι διατρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ· ἢ οὖν τότε γινομένη φαντασία ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων.¹⁰

Memory of an absent loved one provides an example of pleasure derived from something remembered. For this reason, Aristotle argues, there is a certain amount of pleasure even when the absence of the beloved is painful. Pain is caused by the absence of the loved one, but pleasure comes with the remembrance of his actions and personality. Once again the Philosopher finds Homeric support. The very same formula is used twice to describe how recollections of an absent loved one cause weeping. The formula appears in the *Iliad* concerning grief for the dead Patroclus. It occurs again in the *Odyssey* touching the sorrow at Odysseus' long absence from home.

καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοι ἐρῶσιν. διὸ καὶ ὅταν λυπηρὸς γένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐγγίνεται τις ἡδονή·

¹⁰ *Rhetoric* 1370b, 1-9. (= *Iliad* xviii. 108).

ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δ' ἐν τῷ μεμνησθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκείνον, καὶ ἃ ἔπραττε, καὶ οἶος ἦν. διὸ καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως εἴρηται, "ὡς φάτο, τοῖσι δε πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἕμερον ᾤρσε γόοιο."¹¹

When the Philosopher comes to the closer analysis of anger mentioned above he cites the Poet eight times to exemplify various insights into that human passion. Perhaps he recognized a special competence in Homer on this subject, since the whole story of the *Iliad* centers around the anger of Achilles.

Anger is defined in broad terms by the Philosopher as a desire accompanied by pain for real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent unmerited slight against oneself or one's friend. Dishonor, he maintains, is a characteristic of insult. One who dishonors another belittles and angers him. Achilles typifies this, according to Aristotle, when he protests that Agamemnon has angered him because he dishonored him by keeping his prize, Briseis.

ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὃ δ' ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμὴν, οὔτ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ. διὸ λέγει ὀργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς "ἠτίμησεν· ἔλων γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας"¹²

Achilles expresses his anger at Agamemnon for essentially the same reason on two other occasions, using the same formula both times: because Agamemnon 'treated him like a

¹¹*Rhetoric* 1370b, 22-29 (= *Iliad* xxiii.109; *Odyssey* iv.183). In the latter Homeric quote ἐφ' is used in place of our ὑφ'.

¹²*Rhetoric* 1378b, 29-33 (= *Iliad* i.356; *Iliad* ix.367).

dishonored refugee'.

καὶ "ὡσεὶ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην," ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος.¹³

Pursuing the nature of insult the Philosopher declares that men believe they are entitled to be highly esteemed by those who are their inferiors in any respect. This was Homer's insight, he thinks, when portraying Agamemnon's wrath he called the anger of kings great.

προσῆκειν δ' οἶονται πολυωρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν ταύτῃ ὑπερέχη πολὺ, οἶον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῇ λέγειν ῥητορικῶς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν καὶ ἄρχων ἀρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ ἀρχεσθαι ἄξιου. διὸ εἴρηται "θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφῶν βασιλῆων"¹⁴

Aristotle notes that the Poet was expressing the same insight in the first book of the *Iliad*. Speaking of proud Agamemnon's anger the seer Calchas tells Achilles that a mighty king, angered by an inferior, might succeed in swallowing his anger for a day but will continue to bear a grudge afterwards.

καὶ "ἀλλὰ γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·" ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν.¹⁵

¹³*Rhetoric* 1378b, 33-34 (= *Iliad* ix.648; *Iliad* xvi.59).

¹⁴*Rhetoric* 1378b, 34-1379a, 5 (= *Iliad* ii.196). In some MSS the singular βασιλῆος is used. (The Oxford Classical text has the plural form.)

¹⁵*Rhetoric* 1379a, 5-6 (= *Iliad* i.82). Note that a little later in this same passage there is an observation even more supportive of Aristotle's position. In line 91, Book I of the *Iliad* Achilles says Agamemnon swears he is by far the greatest of the Achaeans. The Oxford text reads: ὅς νῦν πολλὸν ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὐχεται εἶναι.

Mildness is the opposite of anger. A man is mild, the Philosopher observes, to those who humble themselves before him and do not contradict him. He seems to recognize they are afraid of him, and no one who is afraid slights another. Even the behavior of dogs demonstrates that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, since they do not bite those who sit down. Aristotle does not refer to Homer here explicitly but we find an excellent illustration of his observation in the *Odyssey* when "Odysseus cunningly sat down" as the swineherd's hounds rushed at him with loud barking.

καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγουσιν· φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ἥττους εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἥττους φοβοῦνται, φοβούμενος δὲ οὐδεὶς ὀλιγωρεῖ. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινουμένους παύεται ἡ ὀργή, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δάκνοντες τοὺς καθίζοντας.¹⁶

Examining further what causes men to grow mild rather than angry the Philosopher notes that anger is personal. For this reason a man is less angry (milder) if he thinks the person he wants to punish will never know who punished him. Homer provides an example once more. The angry Odysseus wants Polyphemus to know it was he who gave him his savage injury. This suggests that he would have felt unavenged if Polyphemus remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what.

¹⁶*Rhetoric* 1380a, 21-25 (= *Odyssey* xiv.29-31:
 Ἐξαπίνης δ' Ὀδυσῆα ἴδον κύνες ὑλακόμωροι
 οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς
 ἔζετο κερδοσόνῃ

καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθήσεσθαι οἴωνται ὅτι δι' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνθ' ὧν ἔπαθον· ἡ γὰρ ὀργὴ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστιν· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ. διὸ ὀρθῶς πεποιήται "φάσθαι 'Ὀδυσσεῖα πολυπύρθιον," ὡς οὐ τετιμωρημένος, εἰ μὴ ἦσθετο καὶ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ ἀνθ' ὅτου.¹⁷

Aristotle's next conclusion follows naturally. Since you cannot be as angry with a person who does not know you are angry with him or that you are punishing him, clearly you cannot be angry with the dead. They are beyond pain which is the intent of the angry. Aristotle finds this illustrated in the *Iliad* when Homer wants to restrain Achilles' anger against dead Hector.

ὥστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθάνονται ὀργίζονται, οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὡς πεπονθόσι τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν οὐδ' αἰσθησομένοις οὐ οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφίενται. διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ "Ἔκτορος ὁ ποιητῆς, παῦσαι βουλόμενος τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα τῆς ὀργῆς τεθνεῶτος, "κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίωνων."¹⁸

After defining indignation as 'pain at another's undeserved good fortune', Aristotle examines the concept more fully. In his analysis he concludes that a particular good must be suitable or proportionate to the individual. There is indignation, for example, at the inferior who challenges one who is superior to him. Cebriones, the son of Priam, provides an example of this in the *Iliad*, as the Philosopher observes. He avoided battle with Ajax lest he incur Zeus' indignation.

ἐὰν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὧν μὴ τοῦ ἀρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, νεμεσητόν. καὶ τὸν ἥττω τῷ χρεῖττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα

¹⁷ *Rhetoric* 1380b, 20-24 (= *Odyssey* ix.504).

¹⁸ *Rhetoric* 1380b, 24-29 (= *Iliad* xxiv.54).

μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· ὄθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἰρηται,
 Αἴαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο.
 Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φῶτι μάχοιτο.¹⁹

Each of the three ethical works, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and *Magna Moralia* contains a formal study of the virtues. Courage is the first virtue studied in all three works.

Rather than give a definition of that virtue he employs his 'golden mean' principle for determining the nature of virtues. He places true courage midway between too much and too little fear. He examines various characters called courageous and shows how they fulfill or fail the norm.

Citizen's or civic courage is not true courage but most closely resembles it. This courage occurs among troops who are rewarded by their state with honors for enduring danger but disgraced or penalized for cowardice. This civic courage, he says, we find among Homer's heroes. The same verse in the *Iliad* that expresses Hector's avowed motive for facing Achilles is cited in all three ethical works as exemplifying citizen's courage. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is introduced as follows:

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ

¹⁹*Rhetoric* 1387a, 31-35 (= *Iliad* xi.542). Note that only the first verse is in the accepted text of Homer. The second verse is not found in any of the MSS, but it may have been in Aristotle's Homer. Cf: Hinman's enlightening discussion of this line: *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44

όνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἔκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει.²⁰

In the *Magna Moralia* it is mentioned in much the same way:

πάλιν ἔστιν ἄλλη ἀνδρία πολιτικὴ δοκοῦσα εἶναι, οἷ δι' αἰσχύνην τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀνδρεῖοι εἶναι. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· καὶ γὰρ Ὅμηρος πεποίηκε τὸν Ἔκτορα λέγοντα "Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει," διὸ οἴεται δεῖν μάχεσθαι.²¹

In the *Eudemian Ethics* the introduction is similar but the above Homeric citation is preceded by four words alleged to be Homer's but not found in our Homer.

ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων αἰτίων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖν ἀνδρεῖοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἔκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα· Ἐκτορα δ' αἰδώς εἴλε· Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει. " καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρία αὕτη.²²

Another example of citizen's courage the Philosopher finds in the *Iliad* when Diomedes says that if he fails to face Hector the Trojan will boast later in Troy about his cowardice.

καὶ Διομήδης,
Ἔκτωρ γὰρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων,
Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.²³

²⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116a, 15-23 (= *Iliad* xxii.100).

²¹ *Magna Moralia* 1191a, 5-9 (= *Iliad* xxii.100).

²² *Eudemian Ethics* 1230a, 16-21 (= *Iliad* xxii.100).

²³ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116a, 24-26 (= *Iliad* viii.148-149).

Next Aristotle discusses the courage of troops forced into battle by their leaders. It is similar to the above but inferior since its motive is fear rather than shame, and the desire to avoid pain rather than disgrace. He cites Hector motivating the Trojans with this kind of courage.

τάξαι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζο-
μένους εἰς ταυτό· χεῖρους δ', ὅσφ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ
διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν
ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ
Ἔκτωρ

ὄν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,
οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύννας.²⁴

In another context in the *Politics* as he discusses a king's authority as military leader in the field the Philosopher finds Agamemnon using the same kind of motivation with his troops.

κτεῖναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ
τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς
νόμῳ. δηλοῖ δ' Ὅμηρος· ὁ γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν
ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξεληθόντων δὲ καὶ
κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει γοῦν "ὄν δέ κ' ἐγὼν
ἀπάνευθε μάχης, οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύννας ἢ δ' οἰωνούς.
παρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος."²⁵

²⁴ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116a, 29-35. The words of Aristotle's citation of Homer here describe in substance what we find Hector saying to his troops in our *Iliad* xv. 348-351:

ὄν δ' ἄν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε νεῶν ἐτέρωθι νοήσω,
αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι, οὐδέ νυ τόν γε
γνωτοί τε γνωταί τε πυρὸς λελάχωσι θανόντα,
ἀλλὰ κύνες ἐρύουσι πρὸ ἄστεος ἡμετέροιο.

But the citation, although not exactly the same, identifies far more readily with the words we find in our Homer, *Iliad* ii.391+, 393+, describing Agamemnon addressing his troops. cf: quotation in immediately following footnote.

²⁵ *Politics* 1285a, 8-14 (= *Iliad* ii.391+, 393+) Note that the last line of this Homeric citation is not found in our Homer.

Spirit is in the courageous along with courage. When the courageous encounter danger a certain kind of excitement and impulse of spirit moves them, says Aristotle. This form of courage inspired by spirit seems to be the most natural courage. Reinforced by deliberate choice and purpose it appears to be the truest courage. The Philosopher found Homer speaking often of this concomitant spirit. The Poet uses the expression 'strength of spirit' in the *Iliad*.

ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμόν. ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενοι, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὁμηρὸς "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ"^{2 6}

Aristotle says Homer mentions might and spirit together, too.

καὶ "μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε"^{2 7}

In the *Odyssey* Aristotle notes a description that indicates excitement and impulse of spirit: 'bitter anger welling up through his nostrils.'

καὶ "ὄριμυ δ' ἀνα ῥῖνας μένος"^{2 8}

^{2 6} *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 24-27 (= *Iliad* xiv.151): Note two other very similar expressions: *Iliad* xvi.529: μένος δέ οἱ ἔμβαλε θυμῷ. *Iliad* xi.11: 'Αχαιοῖσιν δέ μέγα σθένος ἔμβαλ' ἐκάστω καρδίῃ.

^{2 7} *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 28. Exactly the same phrase which Aristotle cites from his Homer cannot be found in ours, but we have many equivalents: *Iliad* xv.232: ἔγειρε μένος μέγα, *Iliad* xv.594: ἔγειρε μένος μέγα, θέλγε δέ θυμόν. The identical formula occurs in three passages: *Iliad* v.470; *Iliad* vi.72; *Iliad* xi.291: Ὡς εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμόν ἐκάστου, *Iliad* xxiii.468: μένος ἔλλαβε θυμόν.

^{2 8} *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 28 (= *Odyssey* xxiv.318). This differs from our Homer which reads: ἀνὰ ῥῖνας δέ οἱ ἦδη/ ὄριμυ μένος προὔτυψε.

A fourth phrase, 'his blood boiled', is quoted but is not found anywhere in our Homer.

καὶ "ἔξεσεν αἷμα:" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὀρμήν.²⁹

Nobility of courage must be the real motive of courageous men Aristotle observes. Therefore men are not to be viewed as courageous if they simply rush into danger, driven by pain and anger, and blind to the dangers they face. If such were courageous, the Philosopher argues, even asses would be brave when they are hungry. No blows will make them stop grazing. Here Aristotle seems clearly to be thinking of Homer's simile in the *Iliad*, in which, speaking of Ajax fighting, he describes the stubborn ass who refuses to be driven from grazing by the repeated blows of boys.

οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνοσ καὶ θυμοῦ ἔξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς.³⁰

²⁹ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 29-30. Note that this phrase is found in *Theocritus* xx.15, who must be borrowing it.

³⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b, 33-36; 1117a, 1 (= *Iliad* xi.558-568).

ὥσ δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἰὼν ἐβλήσατο παῖδας νωθῆς, ᾧ δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἔαγη, κείρει τ' εἰσελθὼν βαθὺ λήϊον· οἱ δέ τε παῖδες τύπτουσιν ῥοπάλοισι· βίη δὲ τε νηπίη αὐτῶν· σπουδῆ τ' ἐξήλασαν, ἐπεὶ τ' ἐκορέσσατο φορβῆς· ὥσ τότε· ἔπειτ' Αἴαντα μέγαν, Τελαμώνιον υἱόν, Τρῶες ὑπέρθυμοι πολυηγερέες τ' ἐπίκουροι νύσσοντες ξυστοῖσι μέσον σάκος αἶέν ἔποντο. Αἴας δ' ἄλλοτε μὲν μνησάσκετο θούριδος ἀλκῆς αὐτίς ὑποστρεφθεῖς, καὶ ἐρητύσασκε φάλαγγας Τρώων ἵπποδάμων, ὅτε δὲ τρωπάσκετο φεύγειν.

Aristotle observes that human virtue, courage, for example, could be so lacking in an individual that he would be called a 'beast'. Conversely virtue could be present on a super-human or divine scale. This latter he finds exemplified in Homer when Priam speaks of his son, Hector, as a god.

πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρόμῳτοι λέγειν τὴν
 ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, ἠρωϊκὴν τινα καὶ θεϊαν, ὥσπερ
 Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἑκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι
 σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός, "οὐδε ἐφίκε/ ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι
 ἄλλα θεοῦ."³¹

In a discussion about wisdom the Philosopher calls it the most perfect kind of knowledge. He implies that there is a general wisdom. It is not limited to a single art as, for example, in sculpture and statuary-- the 'wisdom' that merely indicates a particular artistic excellence. He cites Homer in the *Margites* speaking of a man whom the gods did not make a digger or ploughman or wise in anything else.

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις
 τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν
 καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν
 ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν·
 εἶναι δὲ τινὰς σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ'
 ἄλλο τι σοφοὺς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ
 "τον δ' οὔτ' ἄρ' σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα/ οὔτ' ἄλλως
 τι σοφόν."³²

Friendship, Aristotle asserts, is a virtue, or involves virtue, and is a requisite of life itself--needed in all the

³¹ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1145a, 18-22 (= *Iliad* xxiv.258).

³² *Nicomachean Ethics* 1141a, 9-15. (= *Margites* fragment II; OCT Vol.V, p.156). Note that Aristotle accepts the *Margites* as Homeric. Cf. also 1448b, 28-30 discussed in Chapter Three.

periods and conditions of human life. The rich, he says, need friends to share and preserve their wealth. The poor need them often as their only resource. The young need friends to guard them from error; the elderly, to care for them; those in the prime of life, to assist them in the performance of noble deeds. This need of friendship is illustrated by Homer, according to the Philosopher, when he says in the *Iliad* that two together will plan and carry out actions better.

καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς
θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν
βοηθεῖ, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἄκμῃ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σύν
τε δὴ ἔρχομένῳ" καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτεροι.³³

In four different works Aristotle refers to the same phrase of Homer to exemplify a common insight into the nature of friendship--that it is based on attraction of persons like each other. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* he paraphrases it when he says that some people consider friendship a matter of similarity.

Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους,
ὄθεν τον ὁμοῖόν φασιν ὡς τον ὁμοιον, καὶ κολοιδόν ποτὶ κο-
λοιδόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.³⁴

In the *Magna Moralia* he introduces the Homeric citation with the other when he asks whether friendship does indeed

³³ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a, 12-16 (= *Iliad* x.224). Aristotle's Homer differs slightly from ours here.

³⁴ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a, 32-35 (= *Odyssey* xvii.218). κολοιδός ποτὶ κολοιδόν is a proverbial phrase not in Homer.

flourish between those who are alike as men seem to believe.

πότερον γάρ ἐστὶν ἢ φιλία ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ κολοῖός φασὶ παρὰ κολοῖόν ἰζάνει, καὶ "αἰεὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον."^{3 5}

In the *Eudemian Ethics* the Homeric citation is introduced again when the Philosopher begins to examine what men consider the basis of friendship.

ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ ἔξωθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγοντες· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν εἴρηται "ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον·" καὶ γὰρ "κολοῖος παρα κολοῖόν." "ἔγνω δε φῶρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον."^{3 6}

Aristotle concludes that the extreme views on the nature of friendship are wrong. He rejects equally the principles that only likes or only opposites can be friends. Heraclitus he identifies as one who maintains that only opposites can be friends. He observes that this early Greek thinker rejected Homer's prayer that strife should perish between god and man. Aristotle does not agree with Heraclitus' rejection but simply states it. He would hardly countenance this twisting of the Homeric plea for peace to mean the denial of differences between god and man.

οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα· καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι "ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο·" οὐ γὰρ

^{3 5} *Magna Moralia* 1208b, 8-10 (= *Odyssey* xvii.218+).

^{3 6} *Eudemian Ethics* 1235a, 4-9 (= *Odyssey* xvii.218). The φῶρ proverb is of unknown origin, not in Homer.

ἀν εἶναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῆα ἀνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων. δύο μὲν αὐται δόξαι περὶ φιλίας εἰσί, λίαν τε καθόλου κενωρισμένα τοςοῦτον, ἀλλαι δὲ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκεῖαι τῶν φαινομένων.^{3 7}

In the *Rhetoric*, while considering what constitutes the pleasurable for man, Aristotle concludes that things that are like each other generally please each other. Among other quotations he cites, in part, the Homeric 'like to like' verse cited above.

καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὁμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ. ὄθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, ὡς ἤλιξ ἤλικα τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἶει τον ὁμοῖον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα, καὶ ἀεὶ κολουος παρα κολουόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.^{3 8}

The Philosopher proposed that moral virtue is a mean between two vices, one involving excess, the other, deficiency. It was hard, he argued, to be good, since it was hard to find the middle course. He advises, therefore, that we steer ourselves from the more erroneous side--from what is more contrary to the middle course, thus choosing the least of evils. He found this doctrine expressed in the *Odyssey* by Calypso, "Hold the ship out beyond the surf and spray."

διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωπεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ "τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἔκτος ἔεργε/ νῆα." ἀκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἥττον· ἐπεὶ

^{3 7} *Eudemian Ethics* 1235a, 25-31 (= *Iliad* xviii.107+).

^{3 8} *Rhetoric* 1371b, 12-17 (= *Odyssey* xvii.218).

οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπὸν, κατὰ τὸν δευτέρον φασι πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν^{3 9}

To achieve this difficult middle course the Philosopher advises us to guard against things we find naturally pleasurable, since we do not judge them impartially. We should, he argues, feel towards pleasure as the elders of Troy felt towards Helen. We should repeat their saying in all circumstances, he says, since we are less likely to miss the mean if we dismiss pleasure.

ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτήν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἤττιον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιῶντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἶπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν.^{4 0}

Desires, which are in the order of attractions, are either common to all men, Aristotle notes, or peculiar to certain persons. The desire for food is natural to all men, as the desire for sexual intercourse is natural to the

^{3 9} *Nicomachean Ethics* 1109a, 30-35 (= *Odyssey* xiii.219-220):

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
νῆα, σὺ δὲ σκοπέλου ἐπιμαίεο·

This actual citation is the words of Odysseus giving a command to his steersman according to advice he received from Circe, not Calypso in *Odyssey* xii.108-109:

ἀλλὰ μάλα Σκύλλης σκοπέλω πεπλημένος ὄκα
νῆα παρέξ ἐλάαν, ἐπεὶ ἡ πολὺ φέρτερόν ἐστιν.

^{4 0} *Nicomachean Ethics* 1109b, 7-13 (= *Iliad* iii.156-160):

"Οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοὺς
τοιγῆδ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάσχειν·
αἰνῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῆς εἰς ὄπα ἔοικεν·
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς τοίη περ ἑοῦσ' ἐν νηυσὶ νεέσθω,
μηδ' ἡμῖν τεκέεσσί τ' ὀπίσσω πῆμα λίποιτο."

young and lusty, as Homer observes.

τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἢ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων.⁴¹

In discussing the traits and values of the 'great-souled' man Aristotle discusses one of his weaknesses. The 'Great-souled,' he says, do not like to hear of benefits they have received from others. They prefer rather to hear of the benefits they have bestowed on others. This is why Homer makes Thetis avoid specifying and rather speak generally and tentatively of the services she has rendered Zeus, although her son has urged her to remind the supreme god of all she has done for him.

δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί.⁴²

Justice, according to the Philosopher, is the virtue that lies at the heart of man's political relationships. It is a virtue that must involve others. When Aristotle treats

⁴¹ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1118b, 8-11 (= *Iliad* xxiv.130). Aristotle alludes here to Homer's statement that a noble man has intercourse with his wife.

⁴² *Nicomachean Ethics* 1124b, 15 (= *Iliad* i.503-506).
 "Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἴ ποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ὄνησα
 ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ, τόδε μοι κρήνην ἐέλδωρ·
 τίμησόν μοι υἱόν, ὃς ὠκυμορώτατος ἄλλων
 ἔπλετ'·"

Earlier Achilles has begged his mother precisely to specify her services to Zeus to persuade him to return a favor to her for his benefit. Cf: *Iliad* i.393-412.

the nature of injustice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he argues that one cannot treat oneself unjustly. A person experiences injustice only at the hands of another person. To illustrate this he cites the case in Homer of Glaucus giving Diomedes arms worth more than eleven times the exchange he would receive for them. Aristotle's point is that Glaucus cannot be spoken of as treated unjustly since he did it to himself.

ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει "χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβου' ἐννεαβοίων," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ δίδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἔκνούσιον, δῆλον.⁴³

Later in the same work, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he concludes that uncontrolled desire causes greater injustice than anger that is uncontrolled. He cites an illustration of this conclusion in the *Iliad*, in which the Poet describes one of the emblems embroidered on Aphrodite's belt. There she is pictured in her crafty lust deceiving the wisest men. Her unrestrained desire 'with malice aforethought' surely causes an outrage that shows more contempt and produces more resentment than unpremeditated anger.

ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμῶδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασί· "δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς." καὶ τὸν κεστόν Ὅμηρος· "πάρφασις, ἣ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον Πύκα περ φρονέοντος." ὥστ' εἶπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.⁴⁴

⁴³ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1136b, 9-14 (= *Iliad* vi.236).

⁴⁴ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1149b, 13-20 (= *Iliad* xiv.217).

In the opening paragraph of the *Politics* Aristotle stresses the primacy of man's political relationships in his philosophy of man. He calls man's association with the state supreme.

δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δέ, καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων, ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ.^{4 5}

He finds the person who is by nature stateless either at the bottom of the human scale or superhuman. He cites the *Iliad* to illustrate those who are the lowest of human beings, when Homer speaks of the clanless, lawless, hearthless man.

ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστὶν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ' Ὀμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς "ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιος." ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητῆς, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὦν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς.^{4 6}

As we noted in Chapter Four, the Philosopher twice cites Homer's description of the Cyclopes' familial form of government as the most primitive form of political partnership. We return to those two passages here briefly only to note that Aristotle did not only cite the Homeric Cyclopes' socio-political organization to record their primitive form

We have φρονεόντων for Aristotle's φρονέοντος. cf: *Rhetoric* 1380a, 34-36. Here Aristotle characterizes anger as less resented since it fails to show contempt for its victim:

καὶ ταῖς δι' ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἥττον ὀργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ.

^{4 5} *Politics* 1252a, 3-7.

^{4 6} *Politics* 1253a, 1-7 (= *Iliad* ix.63).

of government. He was also viewing them in the light of the principles of effective government. On these grounds he clearly rejects this early governmental structure as inadequate. In the immediate context of the *Politics* where the reference is found, however, the Cyclopes are presented in a straightforward historical manner.⁴⁷ It is in the *Nicomachean Ethics*' citation of this same passage about the Cyclopes in the *Iliad* that Aristotle is clearly critical of this family-centered government as inadequate. With the exception of Sparta, he notes, most states fail to legislate a proper diet and physical regime for their citizens. Every man lives like the Homeric Cyclopes, making the rules for his own household. The best thing, he adds, would be a proper system of public regulation.

έν μόνη δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· έν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῆ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπιχῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχου. χράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι.⁴⁸

Slavery was part of the socio-political system of ancient Greece as it was of the ancient world generally. Even in that pagan context, however, Aristotle's statement about the nature of slaves rings cold and inhuman. In the

⁴⁷Note text and discussion presented in Chapter Four, pp. 89-90, 109.

⁴⁸*Nicomachean Ethics* 1180a, 24-30 (= *Odyssey* ix.114-115). Note text and discussion presented in Chapter Four, pp. 90, 109.

process of classifying live and lifeless instruments he gives the example of sailing and says for the helmsman the rudder is a lifeless tool and the look-out man a live tool. Articles of property, he says, are tools for the purpose of life, and a slave is a live article of property. These live tools are best since they can do their task when ordered. The best of these too he seems to conclude are those that can see what to do in advance, like the tripods of Hephaestus, which, he says, Homer describes as entering the heavenly company 'self-moved.'

τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δ' ἔμψυχα, οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἷαξ ἄψυχον, ὁ δὲ πρωρεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρετής ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν. οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωῆν ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ χτήσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὡς περ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων, πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρετής. εἰ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὡς περ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ Ἥφαιστου τρίποδας, οὓς φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θεῖον δύνεσθαι ἀγῶνα,⁴⁹

Two widely divergent passages--one metaphysical and the other political--find Aristotle asserting the superiority of a single rather than multiple governing principle. In both places he illustrates his conclusion with the same Homeric citation.

The first passage occurs in the *Metaphysics*. There the Philosopher is arguing to the existence of a single cause and governing principle of all being. He concludes the Twelfth Book of that work with the rejection of those who

⁴⁹ *Politics* 1253b, 27-37 (= *Iliad* xviii.369-376).

postulate multiple causes of being. He applies Homer's principle of the superiority of a political government that has one ultimate ruler to the superiority of a single moving and governing cause of the whole universe of being.

ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐν ἧ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐθὲν λέγει οὐθείς· οὐδ' ἐνδέχεται εἶπεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἶπη, ὡς τὸ κινουῦν ποιεῖ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντός οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὔσα ἢ μὴ οὔσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλὰς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκυρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω."⁵⁰

The second passage is in the *Politics*. Here, Aristotle cautions about a democracy in which the people collectively and not the law are sovereign. Demagogues arise, the better classes of citizens are denied their rightful place as governors, and the assembly decrees over-rule the law. Referring to the *Iliad* Book II text quoted above, he clearly seems to want Homer's support for his judgement. He honestly wonders, however, what kind of rule the Poet had in mind when he disparaged the rule of the many in this text. Was he thinking of many ruling as individuals or many ruling as a single composite monarch?

ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ἢ πολίτης, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὸν νόμον, ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ' οἱ

⁵⁰ *Metaphysics* 1075b, 34-1076a, 4 (= *Iliad* ii.204).

νόμοι μή εἴσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί.
μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν.
οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες.
Ὅμηρος δὲ ποῖαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην,
πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ᾧσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς
ἕκαστος, ἄδηλον.⁵¹

As the Philosopher develops his basic political principles early in the *Politics* he equates the rule of a father over his household with the rule of a king over his subjects. Both father and king, he says, are superior in love and seniority. This is why Homer, according to Aristotle, accepting Zeus as father of men and gods designates him King of all.

ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννησάν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν "πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε," τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων.⁵²

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* the Philosopher alludes to the same Homeric passage and many other places where the Poet calls Zeus father. Here he states even more succinctly that the ideal king rules like a father and that this is why Homer calls Zeus father.

ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἢ βασιλεία εἶναι.⁵³

⁵¹ *Politics* 1292a, 2-15 (= *Iliad* ii.204). Note that this is the only time Aristotle ever questions the meaning of a Homeric text and whether the meaning Homer actually intended supports his position.

⁵² *Politics* 1259b, 10-14 (= *Iliad* i.544).

⁵³ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1160b, 22-27 (= *Iliad* i.503, 544 et saepe).

A little later in the same work he compares a king to a shepherd. He argues that both must be guided by a similar spirit of benevolence. The king works for the welfare of his subjects as a shepherd does for his sheep. This, Aristotle says, is why Homer calls Agamemnon 'the shepherd of his people'.

Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐρεγείας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἔν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν.⁵⁴

In Aristotle's judgement civil strife arises not only because of inequality of property but also because of inequality of honors. The common people are dissatisfied if property is unequally distributed. The higher classes, he observes, object if honors are equally distributed. This equal distribution results in the situation rejected by Homer in which the noble and the base have the same honor.

ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν. τούναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι. ὅθεν καὶ "ἐν δε ἰῆ τιμῇ ἡμεν κακος ἡδε καὶ ἐσθλός."⁵⁵

The person who shares in the honors of the state, the Philosopher maintains, is a citizen in the fullest sense. On the other hand, the person without those honors is like an alien. To verify this in Homer Aristotle turns to two

⁵⁴ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1161a, 10-15 (= *Iliad* ii.243, 772, iv.413 et saepe).

⁵⁵ *Politics* 1266b, 38-1267 a, 2 (= *Iliad* ix.319).

citations from the *Iliad* which he uses to show that anger is caused by dishonor. In the two citations Achilles uses the same formula to express the reason why he is angry with Agamemnon: the King has 'treated him like a dishonored refugee'.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἶδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν "ὥσεί τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην." ὥσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων.⁵⁶

To government and rulers he applies even more appropriately the same principle and Homeric text that he applied to friendship treated earlier in this chapter.⁵⁷ He recommends that the man who is ruling alone appoint many other men to handle the numerous matters he could never attend to by himself. Citing the *Iliad* the Philosopher observes that although a good man deserves to rule because he is good, two good men are better than one.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας, ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθύς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα καταστήσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον ἐστίν, εἶπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἑνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ "σύν τε δυ' ἐρχομένω"⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Politics* 1278a, 34-38 (= *Iliad* ix.648, xvi.59). cf: Footnote ¹³ this chapter.

⁵⁷ Note that this same text Aristotle used in the *Rhetoric* 1378b, 33-34 to exemplify man's need of friendship.

⁵⁸ *Politics* 1287b, 8-14 (= *Iliad* x.224). Note that this principle does not negate the principle discussed earlier--that the best government is by a single leader. This present principle is expressed in the context of the ruler's need of counsel. The Homeric text makes this clear. It goes on to say: 'then one recognizes before the other where

In Agamemnon's prayer he finds further Homeric support for the need to share the burdens of government. The king prays for ten more fellow-councillors.

καὶ ἡ εὐχή τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, "τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδ-
μονες."⁵⁹

After establishing that education of the young is of the highest importance to a ruler Aristotle outlines principles of a curriculum. The major part of his consideration he devotes to music, which he uses as an example of the principle of liberal education. In a brilliant statement of the philosophy of liberal education he maintains that purely liberal pursuits, like music, should be joined to education in the necessary and useful.

διὸ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλὰς· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον· οὐδ' αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκὴν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὀρῶμεν γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς. λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτῇ· ἦν γὰρ οἶονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν.⁶⁰

In two places in the *Odyssey* he finds Homer illustrating the liberal or purely pleasurable purpose of music. In both cases Homer's emphasis is on the pleasure that the minstrel will bring to those at the banquet--the whole

the advantage lies.' (καὶ τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν / ὅπως κέρδος ἔη.)

⁵⁹ *Politics* 1287b, 14-15 (= *Iliad* ii.372).

⁶⁰ *Politics* 1338a, 13-24.

purpose of his song. The first Homeric citation is drawn from the Seventeenth Book.

διόπερ Ὀμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν ἄλλ' οἷον μὲν ἐστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλεῖην. καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἑτέρους τινὰς "οἱ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν" φησιν, "ὅ κεν τέρπησιν ἅπαντας."⁶¹

The second citation, followed by the Philosopher's strong demand for a liberal education, comes from the Ninth Book's beginning, where Homer pictures the pleasure of good food and drink accompanied by the pleasure of music.

καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι διαγωγὴν, ὅταν εὐφραϊνομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων "δακτυμόνες δ' ἀνα δώματ' ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ/ ἤμενοι ἐξεύης." ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶ παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερόν ἐστίν.⁶²

This discussion of a good ruler's responsibility for the liberal education of the young completes our study of Aristotle's references to Homer which demonstrate his acceptance of the Poet as teacher of human values. In the *Rhetoric* we have seen the Philosopher cite Homer in support of his views on an orator's need to understand and employ principles of human behavior. In the explicitly named ethical works of Aristotle we have seen him refer to Homeric examples of principles related to courage, wisdom, friendship, moderation, sexual desire, justice, uncontrolled desire, and anger. Finally, in the *Politics* we saw him turn to the Poet for illustrations of his political principles.

⁶¹ *Politics* 1338a, 24-27 (= *Odyssey* xvii.385+). The

We can turn now in chapter six to the few remaining passages in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* which refer to Homer in a less substantive manner.

whole citation is troublesome, but the substance in our version or Aristotle's supports his point. The first part of his Homeric citation is not found in our Homer, but might have followed line 383. The whole pertinent passage (*Iliad* 382-385) as we have it in the Oxford text follows:

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
 ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἷ δημοεργοὶ ἔασι,
 μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
 ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων·

Note that the final line of Aristotle's citation differs from ours but corresponds rather closely to it.

⁶²*Politics* 1338a, 27-32 (=Odyssey ix.7,8).

CHAPTER SIX

OTHER ARISTOTELIAN REFERENCES TO HOMER

All of the passages of Aristotle which touch on Homer in some substantive way have been examined in this study already. In each of these texts the Philosopher cited or alluded to Homer as an exemplar either in Language Arts, Philosophy and Science, or in the teaching of human values.

Only ten Aristotelian texts, in which the Poet is cited or referred to remain to be examined. In none of these texts does Aristotle use the Poet for any substantive reason. In six texts Homer is cited simply to exemplify some problem in predication, grammar, or induction. In one text the Philosopher rejects a false use of the Poet, in another, a faulty evaluation of the *Odyssey*. In the remaining two texts Homer is cited only incidentally to illustrate some statement of Aristotle.

Rather than attempt any formal categorization of these ten texts, they will be examined separately in the order in which they appear in the Bekker text.

The first of these passages occurs in Aristotle's treatise *On Interpretation*, in a discussion of types of predication. Here the Philosopher inquires whether predication can always move from the more complex to the simpler--from a predicate of greater comprehension to one of

lesser comprehension--and still remain correct. Of course it will not remain correct, he argues, if the new predication involves a contradiction. Even if it involves no contradiction, however, it could become incorrect if the comprehension of the predicate is narrowed. The example Aristotle adduces is this: although it is accurate to say 'Homer is a poet,' the inference would be inaccurate to go on and say simply, 'Homer is' (that is, 'Homer exists'), since the 'is' of the first statement was incidental and not substantive.

ἢ ὅταν μὲν ἐνυπάρχη, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀληθές, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνυπάρχη, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἀληθές, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρός ἐστὶ τι, οἶον ποιητής. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἔστιν, ἢ οὐ; κατὰ συμβεβηκός γὰρ κατηγορεῖται τοῦ Ὀμήρου τὸ ἔστιν· ὅτι γὰρ ποιητής ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὐτό, κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ Ὀμήρου τὸ ἔστιν.¹

The second and third Aristotelian texts under inquiry here are concerned about predication too. One is from the *Posterior Analytics* and the other from the *On Sophistical Refutations*. Both are concerned about the very same problem of ambiguity--the ambiguity in the word κύκλος, which could mean 'circle' or in the context of the Homeric poems, 'cycle,' as in 'epic cycle.'

In a discussion of mathematics in the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle observes that ambiguity is not common in that science but passes unnoticed in dialectical argument. For example, it could be asked: "Is every circle

¹On Interpretation 21a, 24-30.

(κύκλος) a figure?" Drawing a circle makes the answer patent, but what if someone asked, "Are the epic poems a circle (κύκλος)?" Quite clearly they are not, but the other meaning of κύκλος has slipped in to cause the ambiguity.

έν δέ τοῖς μαθήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοίως ὁ παραλογισμός, ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἔστιν ἀεὶ διττόν· κατὰ τε γὰρ τούτου παντός, καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν κατ' ἄλλου λέγεται παντός. τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐ λέγεται πᾶν. ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν οἷον ὁρᾶν τῇ νοήσει, έν δέ τοῖς λόγοις λανθάνει. ἄρα πᾶς κύκλος σχῆμα; ἂν δὲ γράψῃ, δῆλον. τί δέ; τὰ ἔπη κύκλος; φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.²

Aristotle cites the same ambiguity in his treatise *On Sophistical Refutations* when he is discussing how an argument can be false when it involves a question which can have more than one meaning. The falsity of the argument can lie either in the contradiction, or in the contradiction and the proof, or in the proof alone. In the argument, for example, that 'Homer's poetry is a figure' because it forms a κύκλος the falsity lies in the proof, as the Philosopher rightly concludes.

ἔστι γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως. διὸ ἢ έν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον ἢ έν τῇ ἀντιφάσει (προσκειῖσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὴν ἀντίφασιν), ὅτε δ' έν ἀμφοῖν, ἂν ἢ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος. ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιγῶντα λέγειν έν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ έν τῷ συλλαγισμῷ ὁ δὲ, ἂ μὴ ἔχοι τις, δοῦναι, έν ἀμφοῖν, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἢ Ὁμήρου ποίησις σχῆμα διὰ τοῦ κύκλου έν τῷ συλλογισμῷ.³

A little later in the same treatise Aristotle reaches for what is most known to him and his audience. He alludes

² *Posterior Analytics* 77b, 27-33.

³ *On Sophistical Refutations* 171a, 4-11.

to the first two lines of the *Iliad* to exemplify a hypothetical solecism.⁴ The Philosopher argues that it is possible to commit a solecism and not seem to do so, or not to commit one and seem to do so. If, as according to Protagoras, μῆνις were masculine, to call it οὐλομένον (masculine) he would seem guilty of a solecism, but, in fact, would not be.

Σολοικισμὸς δ' οἷον μὲν ἐστὶν εἴρηται πρότερον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, εἰ ὁ μῆνις καὶ ὁ πῆληξ ἄρρεν ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν κατ' ἐκεῖνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ οὐλόμενον φαίνεται μὲν ἄλλ' οὐ σολοικίζει.⁵

In the *Physics* Aristotle discusses the relationship of time to things that exist now, have existed, or will exist in the future. Among non-existents those which are included in time must have existed once (like Homer) or will exist in the future (some future event). Once again the example that springs into his mind first and would be most known to his audience is the Poet.

τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὅσα μὲν περιέχει ὁ χρόνος, τὰ μὲν ἦν (οἷον "Ὀμηρὸς ποτε ἦν) τὰ δὲ ἔσται (οἷον τῶν μελλόντων τι), ἐφ' ὁπότερα περιέχει, καὶ εἰ ἐπ' ἄμφω, ἀμφοτέρω καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔσται.⁶

⁴*Ibid.*, 165b, 20-23. Solecism is listed as the fourth of five states to which the debater wishes to reduce his opponent. It is defined as making the opponent, as a result of the argument, speak ungrammatically. τέταρτον δὲ σολοικίζειν ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.

⁵*Ibid.*, 173b, 17-22.

⁶*Physics* 221b, 31-32, 222a, 1-2.

In the *Parts of Animals* the Philosopher observes that Homer is falsely adduced to support the notion that the severed human head can go on speaking. Aristotle deals with the position bluntly when he says, "Of course speech is impossible once the windpipe has been severed and no motion is forthcoming from the lung." Both Homeric passages that these erroneous critics seem to cite preclude any such interpretation.

γάρ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἀξιοπίστων ἀκοῦσαι λεγόντων ἢ τὸ
περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὡς ἀποκοπεῖσα φθέγγεται τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων. λέγουσι γὰρ τινες ἐπαγόμενοι καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον, ὡς
διὰ τοῦτο ποιήσαντος
φθεγγομένη δ' ἄρα τοῦ γε κάρη κονίησιν ἐμίχθη,
ἀλλ' οὐ φθεγγομένου.⁷

While discussing the process of deliberation and choice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle turns to Homer for an illustration of the deliberative process he is describing. He says a man stops his enquiry about how he is going to act when he gets back to the origin of action on himself--his dominant choosing part, his reason. The Philosopher finds a good comparison for this in the ancient Homeric constitutions according to which kings proclaimed to the people the measures they had chosen to adopt.

βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον
ἤδη τὸ προαιρετὸν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν
προαιρετὸν ἐστὶν, παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει
ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνάγαγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ

⁷The *Parts of Animals* 673a, 13-17 (=Iliad x.457; =Odyssey xxii.392). Both texts in our Homer read the same with φθεγγομένου which means as he (not 'it'--'his head') spoke. φθεγγομένου δ' ἄρα του γε κάρη κονίησιν ἐμίχθη.

ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμέτω· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προέλοιντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ.⁸

Again in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the Philosopher simply illustrates with an example from Homer a point he makes. In a discussion about the comparison between magnificence and liberality, he observes that magnificence involves greater magnitude of giving than liberality. It consists in suitable expenses on a large scale. Magnificent therefore cannot be applied, he argues, to a person who spends adequate amounts on things of small or moderate importance. This would be like Odysseus, he notes, who pretending to be a beggar who was previously wealthy, says 'Often I gave alms to homeless wayfarers'.

τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὃ. ὃ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπῆς, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη". ἀλλ' ὃ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὃ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐλευθέριος, ὃ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς.⁹

In the *Art of Rhetoric* the Philosopher discusses the inductive method of demonstrating a proposition. He quotes Alcidas' proof by induction that talented people are

⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1113a, 2-9. (= *Iliad* ii. 381 ff.) (This allusion to Homer is confirmed here and elsewhere in the *Iliad*.)

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1122a, 23-30 (= *Odyssey* xvii.419-421).
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἕνατον
ὄλβιος ἀφνειὸν καὶ πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη,
τοίῳ ὁποῖος εἶμι καὶ ὄτευ κεννημένος ἔλθοι.

honored everywhere. The Parians honored Archilochus, he said, in spite of his evil-speaking, the Chians honored Homer, although he had rendered no public services, the Mytileneans, Sappho; the Lacedemonians, Chilon; the Italiotes, Pythagoras; the Lampsacenes, Anaxagoras. The accumulation of examples of honor bestowed on talented persons affects the truth of the proposition.

καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν·
 Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα
 τετιμῆκασιν, καὶ Χῖοι Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολιτικόν, καὶ
 Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ γυναῖκα οὔσαν, καὶ
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα
 φιλόλογοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ
 Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ
 τιμῶσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν.¹⁰

Once again Aristotle cites an observation of Alcidas in the *Art of Rhetoric*. This time however his observation is rejected by the Philosopher in a discussion about the poor use of metaphor. Inappropriate metaphors, Aristotle argues, make prose wooden. He feels Alcidas used an inappropriate--too far-fetched and therefore unclear--metaphor when he described the *Odyssey* as 'a beautiful mirror of human life.' For Aristotle's taste a metaphor like this needs too much accompanying explanation.

ἀσαφεῖς δέ, ἂν πόρρωθεν. οἷον Γοργίας "χλωρὰ καὶ
 ἕναιμα τὰ πράγματα· σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχροῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας,
 κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας·" ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὡς
 Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων, καὶ
 τὴν Ὀδύσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ
 "οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει προσφέρων·" ἅπαντα
 γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπίθανα διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.¹¹

¹⁰ *Rhetoric* 1398b, 9-16.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1406b, 8-14.

With the completion of our examination of these ten passages which elude our three major classifications of Aristotle's Homeric references we have finished the study of all the passages in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* which contain a reference to Homer to justify or illustrate a principle. His choice of Homer in these cases seems incidental, since any other name could have been readily substituted. If anything, the Philosopher's use of Homer here simply demonstrates how proximate to his thought the Poet was.

We can now turn to a final review and appraisal of all the passages we have studied and the conclusions we are justified in reaching in this study about Aristotle's attitude towards Homer.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ARISTOTLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HOMER: A SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL

Before we summarize the evidence of the last four chapters and attempt to draw any conclusions from it about Aristotle's attitude towards the Poet we must recognize the limitations of the present study. It represents only the first step in a three-step work that will have to be completed to make any thorough and final judgement about the Philosopher's attitude towards Homer. The next step essential to the work is a study along the lines of the present one, but collating and evaluating the Homer quotations and allusions in the *Fragments* of Aristotle. This must be followed ideally by the final step, a much subtler, more difficult work, based on the clues established in the first two parts: a study of the wisdom of Homer -- its principles of literary art and human knowledge and behavior -- *implicit* in the *Corpus* and *Fragments* of Aristotle's writing. Only when all three of these steps are completed will we be able to come to any final conclusions.

From the present study, however, we can draw certain limited but firm conclusions about the Philosopher's attitude towards Homer as expressed in his references to the

Poet in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. In very brief summary we can say that he referred to Homer 1) very frequently,¹ 2) in a far wider range of topics than just literary and artistic, 3) with unquestioned acceptance and approval of the Poet's judgement all but five times.

The first conclusion, therefore, that immediately follows from the evidence of the last four chapters: Aristotle of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* turned frequently to Homer, in fact, more frequently than to any other literary figure, and all but five times most approvingly. In one hundred and sixty-nine places in nineteen of the treatises, four of them judged spurious, he invoked the Poet by quotation or allusion one hundred and eighty times. One hundred and twelve of these citations were direct quotations, sixteen of which were in the four works generally judged spurious. Sixty-eight citations were allusions, two of which occur in spurious works.

The very divisions of our study in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters indicated the wide range of the Philosopher's use of Homer in language, philosophy and science, human values, and simply as a tool of argument. A

¹The available evidence indicates that Aristotle refers to Homer far more frequently than to any other author. Cf. W.S. Hinman, *Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics*, New York: 1935. Hinman compares the frequency of Aristotle's references in these three works to various authors and concludes that the Homeric references far outnumber those of any other author. No study comparable to Hinman's is available for the other works of the *corpus*.

closer look reveals that his Homeric references touch almost every aspect of the Aristotelian man--oral, literary, aesthetic, religious, scientific, psychological, ethical, social, and political. A step-by-step summary of the main part of the study here will serve to emphasize the extent and intensity of Aristotle's admiration for the judgement of Homer.

In the third chapter we examined all the passages of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* in which Aristotle refers to Homer by quotation or allusion for his excellence in poetry and the literary side of rhetoric. The conclusion of this examination was a resounding affirmation that Homer is seen there as the master of the language arts, the model of orators and poets, epic, comic, and tragic. We found that, to speak more effectively, every orator, according to Aristotle, should imitate Homer. Like the Poet, every orator, in the Philosopher's judgement, should give examples and illustrations deftly to clarify his argument and in epideictic speeches he should praise men who disregard danger and expedience to do something heroic. Like the Poet he should use common maxims effectively, facts more readily associable with his subject, and effective language devices like paromoiosis, simile, metaphor, and asyndeton. In his exordia he should imitate Homer by giving his hearers a clear early preview of his discourse, arousing their good will, and trying to remove prejudice. Finally, like Homer

the orator should employ, Aristotle exhorts, unmistakable facial expressions and bodily gestures, avoid prolixity in his use of enthymemes and avoid burdening his listeners with unnecessary material.

Homer is the Philosopher's model for poets, too. In fact, he is clearly the Philosopher's Poet par excellence from the moment early in the *Poetics* when he dismisses Empedocles as a poet and suggests that Homer earned the title for more than meter. As Hinman demonstrates, Homer holds first place throughout the discussion in the *Poetics*:

Homer ranks first as the source of quotations and the object of allusions, being at the head of both lists, which total forty-nine. Although Sophocles is not quoted at all, the twenty-three allusions to him exceed in number the total of both quotations from and allusions to any other author than Homer. Euripides stands a close third with one quotation and nineteen allusions. Next is Aeschylus with one quotation and six allusions.²

Homer who was the first, according to Aristotle, to write satire and mark out the main lines of comedy, typified the best in poetic technique. He represented 'good' people and people who were 'better.' He presented his story most effectively--partly by narrative and partly by action. His story's action was single.

Two principles, more proper to tragedy than epic, should be maintained solidly in tragedy, he argued, in a way that they were not expected to be maintained even in Homer's epics: the outcome should be single for both the

²*Ibid.*, p. 130.

good and the bad characters; and the denouement should be more natural--caused by the plot and not some mechanical intervention.

Writers of tragedy are advised by Aristotle to imitate Homer's techniques: present inferior people as having some worth, be brief, use discovery aptly, form the tragedy out of a single tale, insist on unity of plot, and accept defects that do not vitiate the tragic art form. They are to imitate his creative use of language devices, too: metaphors genus for species or species for genus, coined words for word parts, lengthened words, and mingling of rare and commonplace expressions.

Epic writers are exhorted also by the Philosopher to pattern their work after the Poet's: to maintain organic unity by relating the parts more closely to the theme, to make the epic, whether simple or complex, excel in its proper class, to recede personally in the story, to use fallacy adroitly and make the inexplicable acceptable.

Aristotle's special regard for Homer is discernible particularly when he demonstrates how typical Homeric problems could be solved through patient interpretation. The Poet's portrayal of an impossibility is justified since it makes the poem more effective. His apparent untruthfulness is refuted in one case, since he is transmitting a traditional story, and in another, since he is relating an

exceptional but true fact. Many problems with Homer's words, the Philosopher argues, can be solved by a change of diction or accent, or by a metaphorical rather than literal reading, or by an unusual rather than common reading.

Aristotle cautions the reader of Homer to look carefully for the sense in which an expression was intended, rather than conclude it is contradictory. In the end, Aristotle's seeming negative criticism of Homer reducibly implied: "Epic has a serious limitation, a weakening that can occur because of its many episodes, but Homer conquers it as well as it can be conquered."

In the fourth chapter we found Aristotle's admiration for the Poet in philosophic and scientific matters just as warm as in the literary arts. In philosophy and science, however, he turned to the Poet not as expert but as the source of traditional wisdom. There we studied all the quotations or allusions to Homer in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* that view him as a source of philosophic and scientific information. The evidence demonstrated that the Philosopher of the *Corpus* sought Homer's support for his philosophy of God and a wide range of scientific areas--anthropology, psychology, physiology and medicine in the human sphere, zoology and bio-chemistry in the world of animals, and geography, geology, meteorology, and physics in the inanimate world.

In the philosophy of God, His existence, His place in the universe, and His governance of all things are all supported by Homeric references.

Relating to the science of man, in the realm of anthropology, the battle between the Pygmies and Cranes at the Nile's source, the Cyclopes' patriarchal societies, and Sparta's unique insistence on her citizens' physical regime and diet are illustrated by supportive Homeric texts. In the realm of psychology conclusions about the effect of black bile and imbibed alcohol on human temperament are demonstrated by citations from Homer. In physiology Homeric testimony is cited to illustrate the truth of an observation about the human jugular vein. In medicine Homer's words are used to shed light on a practice in the treatment of bruises.

Concerning man's science about animals in zoology the truth of several observations is confirmed by evidence from Homer: the longevity of Laconian hounds, the prime age of a bull, the fiercer nature of castrated wild boars, and the birth of already horned long-horned rams in Libya. Homeric evidence is adduced too, for: the lion's fear of fire and his eye-fixation on the hunter he is about to attack, the existence of two birds--the Cymindis and Plangus, the greying process of horses which is unique among animals and similar to man's greying process and growth in height as the unique effect of femaleness on

the growing process of animals. In bio-chemistry Homeric evidence is used to support the observation that the water an animal drinks can cause the distinct coloring of his coat.

We turned next to the science of the physical world to discover that in Meteorology Homer is invoked to verify the Southwest as the gentlest of the winds. In a question relating to geography and geology the Poet is cited to support the evidence that the gradual drying of a marshland makes the time of its earlier habitation difficult to determine. In geography he is called upon to lend support to the fact of Egypt's changing terrain and the absence of Memphis at a certain time of Egyptian history. In geology Homer's testimony about Mt. Etna's volcanic activity is invoked to support the preclusion of the Argo's supposed route past it. Finally in physics moving water's loss of transparency is supported by cited Homeric evidence.

All this evidence of our fourth chapter leaves no doubt that in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* the Philosopher does not only recognize Homer's literary expertise, as was demonstrated in our third chapter, but readily turns to Homer for insights in the whole range of human sciences--about God, man, animals, and the physical world.

In the fifth chapter we considered the many times Aristotle identified Homer through quotation or allusion as a teacher of human values. Once again we found him warmly

accepting and approving of the Poet.

The first texts we considered were drawn from places in the *Rhetoric* where the Philosopher is dealing with the understanding of human values incumbent on the orator, who must know in an intensely practical way what moves men to act or brings them to understanding. How do men determine a value or a higher value? What brings them pleasure? What stirs or assuages their anger? Aristotle finds Homeric support for his answer to each one of these questions.

The next texts we studied were found essentially in the explicitly ethical treatises--the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia*. Once again the Poet is cited to back his conclusions about true courage. It is not ordinary citizen's courage, motivated by fear, or risk driven by pain or anger and blind to danger. Courage is accompanied by an elevation of spirit and can be truly super-human. Homer illustrates, too, his conclusions about general human wisdom, the need and nature of human friendship, and the cautions that must be heeded to steer the middle course of virtue. He finds support in the Poet, too, for his observations, that strong sexual desire is natural to the young and that the 'great-souled' like to hear about the benefits they have bestowed, not what they have received. Finally, in his treatment of justice, the fundamental virtue of political life, Homeric evidence backs his conclusions that no person can be unjust to himself and that

uncontrolled desire, since it is premeditated, causes greater injustice than uncontrolled anger.

The last group of texts we examined, which cited or alluded to Homer in support of the Philosopher's judgements on human values deal with man's political life and are mainly drawn from the *Politics*. Evidence from the Poet is adduced by Aristotle to ground a whole series of conclusions about the political order: that the apolitical man is on the lowest rung of humanity; that Sparta's unique involvement in the legislation of her citizens' diet and physical regime deserves imitation; that slaves ought to show initiative in the service of their masters; and that the ruling principle ought to be single, but rulers need counselors. Homeric evidence is evoked in support of these other principles of political order, too: that the ruler ought to be like a father and a shepherd; that inequality of goods disturbs the lower class of citizens, but equality of honors disturbs the upper class; that citizenship is a man's most honored treasure; and that education of the young needs music with its completely liberal purpose--enjoyment.

Finally, to complete our task of examining all of Aristotle's Homeric references in the sixth chapter we gathered the ten remaining passages of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* in which the Philosopher refers to Homer. In none of these was the Poet called upon to justify a conclusion, yet they confirm in their own way the evidence that this study

has presented in the previous three chapters. These references, although they do not evaluate the Poet, at least confirm the conclusion that Homer was close to the mind of the Philosopher, and that as he taught even grammar, predication, and induction Homer occurred to him readily as a most familiar instrument of his reasoning and argumentation.

Surely it could be argued from all this that Aristotle used Homer so much because the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the most shared common reference of the Greeks he was teaching. But this does not explain the fact that he actually found the truths he discussed verified in the poetry of Homer--the principles of poetry and rhetoric, philosophy and science, psychology and ethics--concretely exemplified and expressed. He accepted in Homer a heritage of truth and wisdom much as we accept such a heritage in the Bible or even in Shakespeare. Except for a little gentle twisting of the Homeric text, especially in the twenty-fifth chapter of the *Poetics*, there is no sign of coercion. Rather, there is every sign that he turned to the Poet confident that he would find in him agreement with his own conclusions.

Römer a long time ago made the point that must be made here. Aristotle turns to Homer as a *φρόνιμος*, a source of wisdom, and at one point calls him just that.

Wir werden uns daher nicht wundern, wenn für die allerverschiedensten Äusserungen seines reichen Geistes homerische Verse zur Stütze und zur Erläuterung herangezogen werden. Den Alten waren ja zum Teil ganz

abweichend von unsrer modernen Auffassung die homerischen Gedichte in so fern das Buch der Bücher, als sie dieselben nicht allein als eine Quelle der ψυχαγωγία, sondern auch der διδασκαλία betrachteten.

Nennt und fasst nun auch Aristoteles den Dichter φρόνιμος auf in der Stelle der Rhetorik I.6 1363a 17:

καὶ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ
 γυναικῶν προέκρινέν, ὅσον Ὀδυσσεύα Ἀθηναῖα καὶ
 Ἑλένην Ἰθησεύς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ Θεαὶ καὶ
 Ἀχιλλεῖα Ὀμηρος,

so hält sich doch seine Berufung auf ihn zum Entscheid rein wissenschaftlicher Fragen in ganz bescheidenen Grenzen. . . .³

One senses, in fact, a certain reverent confidence in the Philosopher towards the very words of the Poet, as though ordinarily hard-won wisdom were natural to them, simply waiting to be grasped from them and used.

Finally we come to the third conclusion of our study-- the Philosopher's almost universally unquestioning acceptance and approval of the Poet's judgement whenever he referred to him. Of the one hundred and sixty-nine times Aristotle turns to Homer, only five times (all of which occur in the *Poetics*) is there even a suggestion of negative criticism. Each one of these possible negative criticisms was discussed in the third chapter of this study: the double outcome of the *Odyssey* the divinely effected flight of the Greeks in the *Iliad*; the contrived discovery of Odysseus' identity by Eumaeus; and the possible dilution of

³Adolph Römer, "Die Homercitate und die homerischen Fragen des Aristoteles", *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und historischen Classe der königlicher bayerischer Akademie der Wissenschaften*, zu München, München: 1885, p. 265.

the *Iliad* plot through its many episodes. In each of these cases we have seen the note of criticism reduced to almost nothing if not completely eliminated. In the end we have the picture of an overwhelmingly positive stance in the Philosopher's attitude towards the Poet--he admires him, defends him, and relies upon him unreservedly. What can be said of this strange, wonderful homage of the greatest scientific mind of antiquity to the first great poet?

Aristotle's defense of poetry and the poet he identified with poetry was not incidental. It lay at the heart of his insight and played a key role in his approach to education. Since ideas did not have a separate existence for him, but were embodied in nature and man, there was no reason why the poet should not be relied on as much as the scientist to understand reality. For Aristotle, therefore, poetry was not alien or hostile. It 'loved wisdom' as much as philosophy. At one point he said it was "more philosophical than history."⁴

We are not surprised to read that towards the end of his life Aristotle is said to have written to his friend Antipater: "The more lonely and isolated I become, the more I have come to love myths."⁵ After all, this is the same Aristotle who wrote in the *Metaphysics*: "A person who is

⁴*Poetics* 1451b, 6-7.

⁵Demetrius, *De Elocutione*, 144 (Frag. 668, Rose).

puzzled and wonders considers himself ignorant. Therefore even one who loves myths is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for the myth is made up of wonders."⁶ In these words perhaps we come closest to Aristotle's own defense of his obvious love of Homer. At the center of his thought he perceived a unity between mythologizing and philosophizing.⁷ He seems convinced that myth has a vision of the truth that we cannot acquire except through myth. This is inferred in another passage of the *Metaphysics* which is one of the most intriguing and stimulating of the whole *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

A tradition in the form of a myth has been handed down to posterity from the most ancient thinkers, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the Divine pervades all of nature. . . . Now if we accept . . . that they supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an inspired saying. We should reflect that since every art and philosophy has probably been repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished again, these beliefs of theirs have been preserved as a relic of former knowledge.⁸

There is a poignancy in this passage that blends well with the fragment of the letter to Antipater quoted above--the sense of despair in 'every art and philosophy' contrasted with the sense of reliance on the beliefs that are handed down in myth. Aristotle was drawn to Homer, it would seem,

⁶*Metaphysics* 982b 14-15.

⁷Anton-Herman Chroust, *Aristotle*, 2 Vols.; Vol. I, Notre Dame, Notre Dame University: 1973, pp. 221-22, 230-231.

⁸*Metaphysics*, 1074b, 1-13.

because he found in him a wisdom and truth he could discover nowhere else as surely or universally. All his science and philosophy would peak and perish as science and philosophy had peaked and perished before, but the truth of Homer preserved in myth would endure.

There was even more, we can conclude, to the relationship between Aristotle and Homer. It was based on identity--an identity grounded in the unity of the wisdom they reached by their separate paths of poetic insight and philosophy.

In her superb biography of G. K. Chesterton, Maisie Ward tells the story of how Chesterton wrote his book on St. Thomas Aquinas:⁹

He began by rapidly dictating to Dorothy about half the book. So far he had consulted no authorities but at this stage he said to her:

"I want you to go to London and get me some books."

"What books," asked Dorothy.

"I don't know," said G.K.¹⁰

When he received the books,

He flipped them rapidly through . . . and then dictated to her the rest of his own book without referring to them again.¹¹

Later Etienne Gilson, the renowned scholar of St.

Thomas and Medieval Philosophy said of the book:

Chesterton makes one despair. I have been studying St.

⁹Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *St. Thomas Aquinas*, London: 1933.

¹⁰Maisie Ward, *Gilbert Keith Chesterton*, New York: 1943, p. 619.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 619.

Thomas all my life and I could never have written such a book.¹²

Much earlier in the biography Maisie Ward gives the reason that probably explains why Chesterton could write so penetratingly and with such ease about Aquinas:

He himself had what he attributes to St. Thomas--'that instantaneous presence of mind which alone really deserves the name of wit.'¹³

St. Thomas and G. K. C. had the same view and spirit.

Chesterton's perception of the paradox in things was reducibly the same as Aquinas's recognition of the analogy of proper proportionality in being. No two approaches to truth could seem more opposed than Chesterton's blithe leaps of paradoxical intuition and the incredibly close reasoning of Aquinas's argument for the existence and properties of the human soul in the *Summa Contra Gentes*.¹⁴ Yet they shared a single spirit of wisdom--"instantaneous presence of mind" or "wit" as Chesterton described it.

Perhaps Rembrandt had a similar insight into the Philosopher and the Poet when he brought them together in his magnificent painting, "Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer." Homer ranged the world of God and nature and man with the free imaginative spirit of the poet interpreting in song and myth what he saw there. Aristotle moved through

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 620.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 204.

¹⁴St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentes*, II, cc. xlvi-cx.

the same world with the disciplined systematic approach of the scientist and philosopher producing detailed and closely reasoned analyses and syntheses of a staggering number of subjects. Yet somehow, in the end, the Philosopher and the Poet shared a single spirit. The purpose of this study, we might conclude, was to show that Aristotle recognized his affinity of spirit with Homer and demonstrated it widely in his writings.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Allen, Thomas W., tr. and ed. *Odysseae. Homeri Opera*, vols. III and IV. *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1919.
- Bekker, Immanuel. *Aristotelis Opera*. vols. I, II, IV and V. Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia Borrusica. 2a ed. quam curavit Olaf Gigon. Berlin, 1960-1961. (This is a reprint of the Berlin edition of 1831-1870 except for volume III.)
- Bonitz, Hermann. *Index Aristotelicus*. vol. V, *Aristotelis Opera*. vols. I, II, IV and V. Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia Borrusica. 2a ed. quam curavit Olaf Gigon. Berlin, 1960-1961. (This is a reprint of the Berlin edition of 1831-1870 except for volume III.)
- Heitz, Emil. *Index Aristotelis Operum Omnium*. vol. V. *Aristotelis Opera Omnia* (Latin). 5 vols. Vols. I-II, Johann Friedrich Dübner, ed.; Vols. III-IV, Ulco Cats Bussemaker, ed. Paris: Didot, 1874-1875.
- Monro, David B. and Allen, Thomas W., trs. and eds. *Iliadis. Homeri Opera*, vols. I and II. *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920.
- Rose, Valentinus. *Aristotelis Qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta*. Editio Stereotypa Editionis Primae MDCCCLXXXVI. Stuttgart: Teubner (1966):463.
- Ross, William D., ed. *The Works of Aristotle* translated into English. 12 vols. London: Clarendon Press, 1952-1962.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

- Adam, Ludwig. *Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos nach ihrer Entwicklung bei Griechen und Römern*. Wiesbaden: C. Limbarth, 1889. "Pp. 115."
- _____. *Homer, der Erzieher der Griechen*. Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1897. "Pp. vii + 149."
- Allan, D.J. *The Philosophy of Aristotle*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. "Pp. vi + 175."
- Allen, Thomas William. *Homer: The Origin and Transmission*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. "Pp. 357."
- Buffière, F. *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée Grecque*. Thèse Faculté des Lettres. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956. "Pp. 677."
- Carroll, Mitchell. *Aristotle's Poetics, Chapter XXV in the Light of the Homeric Scholia*. Ph.D. thesis (1893) Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore: J. Murphy and Company, 1895. "Pp. 66."
- Chesterton, Gilbert Keith. *St. Thomas Aquinas*. London: Sheed and Ward, 1933. "Pp. xii + 248."
- Chroust, Anton-Herman. *Aristotle*. 2 vols. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973. "Pp. xxvi + 437 (vol. I); pp. xx + 500 (vol. II)."
- Cooper, Lane. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932. "Pp. xlviii + 259."
- Davidson, Thomas. *Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals*. New York: Burt Franklin, 1969. "Pp. 256."
(This is a reprint of the edition of 1892.)
- Düring, Ingemar. *Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1966. "Pp. 670."
- _____. *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*. Göteborg: Eleanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1957. "Pp. 490."
- Düring, Ingemar, and Owen, G.E.L., eds. *Aristotle and Plato*

- in the Mid-Fourth Century*. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1957. Göteborg: Eleanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960. "Pp. viii + 279."
- Else, Gerald. *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. "Pp. xvi + 670."
- Farrington, Benjamin. *Aristotle: Founder of Scientific Philosophy*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. "Pp. 118."
- Forster, E.S. *Problemata*. The Works of Aristotle translated into English. W.D. Ross, ed. 12 vols. vol. vii. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927.
- Furley, D.J., ed. and tr. *On the Cosmos*. Aristotle. Loeb Classical Library translation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.
- Glockmann, G. *Homer in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Justinus*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1968. "Pp. 200."
- Grant, Sir Alexander. *The Ethics of Aristotle*. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1874. "Pp. xxvi + 437 (vol. I); pp. xx + 500 (vol. II)."
- Heidenhain, Friedrich. *Die Arten der Tragoedie bei Aristoteles: Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung seiner Poetik und zur Geschichte der ästhetischen Homerkritik bei den Alten*. Strasburg W.-Pr.: Buchdruckerei von A. Fuhrich, 1887. "Pp. 40."
- Hinman, W.S. *Literary Quotation and Allusion in the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics*. New York: Staten Island, 1935. "Pp. 201."
- Hintenlang, Hubert. *Untersuchungen zu den Homer-Aporien des Aristoteles*. Dissertation, University of Heidelberg. Heidelberg, 1961. "Pp. 148."
- Jaeger, Werner. *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*. 2. veränderte Auflage. Berlin: Weidmann, 1955. "Pp. 446."
(The original edition was published in 1923.)
- Kindstrand, Jan Fredrik. *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik*. Uppsala, 1973. "Pp. 251."
- Körner, Otto. *Das homerische Tiersystem und seine Bedeutung für die zoologische Systematik des Aristoteles*. Wiesbaden: J.F. Bergmann, 1917. "Pp. 30."

- _____ *Die Homerische Tierwelt*. 2. neubearbeitete und ergänzte Auflage. München: J.F. Bergmann, 1930. "Pp. 100."
(The original edition was published in Berlin in 1880 by the Nicholai'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.)
- Lehrs, K. *De Aristarchi Studiis Homericis*. Reprographischer Nachdruck der 3. Auflage, Leipzig, 1882. Hildesheim: Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964. "Pp. viii + 506."
- Ludwich, Arthur, ed. *Aristarchs Homerische Textkritik*. 2 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1885. "Pp. viii + 635 (vol. I); pp. ix + 573 (vol. II)."
- _____ *Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1898. "Pp. 204."
- Lynch, John Patrick. *Aristotle's School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. "Pp. xiv + 247."
- Margoliouth, David S. *The Homer of Aristotle*. Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1923. "Pp. ix, 245."
(This book has been reproduced by the Library of Congress in 1975 as Microfilm 34026.)
- Myres, Sir John L. *Homer and His Critics*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958. "Pp. xii + 302."
- Peck, A.L., tr. *Historia Animalium*. 3 vols. Loeb Classical Library translation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Sainte-Hilaire, J. Barthélemy. *Rhetorique d'Aristote*. 2 vols. Paris: Ladrangé, 1870
- Schapker, Howard B., S.J. *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Homer*. Master's thesis (Raymond V. Schoder, S.J., dir.) Loyola University of Chicago. Chicago, 1959.
- Wachsmuth, Richard. *De Aristotelis Studiis Homericis Capita Selecta (quattuor)*. Dissertatio Inauguralis. Berlin: University of Berlin, 1963.
- Thompson, D'Arcy Wentworth, tr. *Historia Animalium*. The Works of Aristotle translated into English. W.D. Ross, ed. 12 vols. vol. iv. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910.
- Ward, Maisie. *Gilbert Keith Chesterton*. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943. "Pp. xv + 685."

White, Fredric R. *The Development of Homeric Criticism: Ancient and Medieval*. Ph.D. thesis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1942.

SECONDARY SOURCES

ARTICLES

- Apfel, Henrietta V. "Homeric Criticism in the Fourth Century, B.C." *TAPA* (1938):245-258.
- Chambers, Mortimer. "Aristotle's Homer, *Poetics* 1451a 24-27." *Classical Philology* LXI (1966):186-187.
- Davison, J.A. "Aristotle's Homer, *Poetics* 1451a 26-27." *Classical Review* XIV (1964):132-133.
- Düring, Ingemar. "Aristotle." *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Begonnen von Georg Wissowa, fortgeführt von Wilhelm Kroll und Karl Mittelhaus unter Mitwirkung zahlreicher Fachgenossen. Herausgegeben von Konrat Ziegler. Supplementband XI. Stuttgart, Alfred Druckenmüller (1968):159-336."
- Forchhammer, Peter W. "Aristoteles und Homer." *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung* Nr. 242. München (September 1885):3562-3563.
- Friedrich, Wilhelm. "Der Λογος der Odyssee in *Poetik*, k. 17." *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie* CIX. Leipzig: Teubner (1874):609-612.
- Fries, K. "Ad Aristotelis *Problemata Homerica*." *Philologische Wochenschrift* (1933) Leipzig, Reisland: 1358-1359.
- Gantar, K. "Zu Aristoteles' *Poetik* 8, 1451a 23-25." *Ziva Antika* XI. Skopije: Faculté de Philosophie, Seminar de Philologie Classique (1962):294.
- Gottschlich, Emil. "Über den Begriff der ethischen Tragödie und des ethischen Epos bei Aristoteles." *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie* CIX. Leipzig: Teubner (1874):614-618.
- Hogan, James C. "Aristotle's Criticism of Homer in the *Poetics*." *Classical Philology* LXVIII (April 1973): 95-108.
- Howes, George E. "Homeric Quotations in Plato and Aristotle." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* VI. Ed. by a committee of the Classical instructors

of Harvard University. Boston (1895):153237.

Körner, Otto. "Über die Verwertung Homerischer Erkenntnisse in der Tiergeschichte des Aristoteles." *Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin* XXIV (1931):185-201.

Kraemer, J. "Arabische Homerverse." *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* XXXI. Wiesbaden: Steiner (1956):259-316.

Lesky, Albin. "Homerus." *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Begonnen von Georg Wissowa, fortgeführt von Wilhelm Kroll und Karl Mittelhaus unter Mitwirkung zahlreicher Fachgenossen. Herausgegeben von Konrat Ziegler. Supplementband XI. Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller (1968):687-846.

Lohse, G. "Untersuchungen über Homerzitate bei Platon." *Helikon* IV (1964):3-28. *Helikon* V (1965):248-295. *Helikon* VII (1967):223-231.

Römer, Adolph. "Die Homercitate und die homerischen Fragen des Aristoteles." *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und historischen Classe der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, zu München*. München (1885):264-314.

Schoder, Raymond V., S.J. "Literary Sources Cited by Aristotle in the *Poetics*." *Classical Journal* LXV (1970):359.

Schömann, Georg Friedrich. "Disputatio de Aristotelis censura carminum epicorum." *Opuscula Academica* III. Berlin: Weidmann (1858):30-46.

Shewan, A. "The Homer of Aristotle." *Classical Philology* XXII (1927):311.

Soleri, Giacomo. "Omero E I Pensatori Greci." *Rivista Di Studi Classici* (December 2 1961):157.

Steinberger, Alfons. "Ein Citat des Aristoteles aus Homer: *Poetics* 1461a 16." *Blätter für das Bäterische Gymnasialschulwesen* XVIII. München: Bayerisches Gymnasiallehrerverein (1882):332-334.

Teichmüller, Gustav. "Aristoteles Lehre über den Unterschied des Epos von der Tragödie." *Verhandlung der 25. Versammlung Deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in Halle, 1867*. Leipzig (1868):48-53.

Tsagarakis, O. "Aristotle's *Poetics* 1451a 24-30."
Phoenix XXII-2 (1968):159-162.

von Schlegel, Frederick. "Ansichten und Urteile der Alten
von den homerischen Gedichten." *Sämmtliche Werke* III.
Vienna (1822):6782.

"Weitere Erörterung der Aristotelischen
Grundsätze über die epische Dichtart." *Sämmtliche
Werke* III. Vienna (1822):83108.

Wilpert, Paul. "The Fragments of Aristotle's Lost Writings."
Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century.
Papers of the *Symposium Aristotelicum* held at Oxford
in August, 1957. Ed. by Ingemar Düring and G.E.L.
Owen. Göteborg (1960).

APPENDIX

A List of the *Loci* in Rose's Collection of the Fragments of Aristotle in Which Homer Is Alluded to or Cited

The first item of each entry--the letter 'f' followed by an Arabic number--represents the number Valentine Rose assigned to that particular fragment in his collection of Aristotle's fragments which were published in 1870 in volume V of the *Aristotelis Opera* of Immanuel Bekker, pages 1463 to 1589. The second item--an Arabic number following 'R³'--gives the number Rose assigned to the same fragment in his *Aristotelis Qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta* which he published in 1886. This is followed by the Bekker number of the fragment. Finally the specific *locus* in which the fragment occurs is cited and the Homeric text(s) it alludes to or cites.

1. f12 (R³10) 1476a 1. Sextus Empiricus. *Adversus Dogmaticos* 3, 20-23 (=Iliad xvi.851).
2. f12 (R³10) 1476a 3. Sextus Empiricus. *Adversus Dogmaticos* 3, 20-23 (=Iliad xxii.359).
3. f13 (R³11) 1476a 17. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Dogmaticos* 3, 26-27 (Iliad iv.297,298).
4. f13 (R³11) 1476a 22. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Dogmaticos* 3, 26-27 (Iliad ii.554).
5. f65 (R³75) 1486b 30. Diogenes Laertius 2, 46.
6. f66 (R³76) 1486b 36-45; 1487a 1-38. Pseudo-Plutarchus. *de Vita Homeri* 1,3.
7. f66 (R³76) 1487a 32, 35. "Ομηρος Ἰήτης.
8. f108 (R³101) 1495b 9, 21. Athenaeus xv. 674f. (=Iliad i.470; *Odyssey* viii.170).
9. f137 (R³142) 1501a 42-45; 1501b 1-5. *Scholion* ext. marg. (Porphyrii Ὀμηρικὰ ζητήματα). Cod. Ven. B ad Iliad ii.73 (=Iliad ii.53).
10. f 138. 1501b 6-14. *Scholion* ext. B (Porphyrii sec. Eustathius) ad Iliad ii. 169.).

11. f138. 1501b 15-19. *Scholion* BL ad *Iliad* v.577.
12. f138. 1501b 20-25. *Scholion* A sec. Vill. ad *Iliad* xxiii.269.
13. f139 (R³143) 1501b 26-34. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* ii.183.
14. f140 (R³145) 1501b 35-45; 1502a 1-16. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* ii.649.
15. f141 (R³146) 1502a 17-27. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* ii.649.
16. f142 (R³147) 1502a 28-37. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* iii.236.
17. f143 (R³148) 1502a 38-43; 1502b 1-19. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* iii.276ff.
18. f143 (R³148) 1502b 6. *Scholion* ext. B(E) ad *Iliad* iii.276 (=Iliad x.332+).
19. f143 (R³152) 1502b 8, 14. *Scholion* ext. B(E) ad *Iliad* iii.276 (=Iliad iii.298-300).
20. f143 (R³148) 1502b 16. *Scholion* ext. B(E) ad *Iliad* iii.276 (=Iliad iv.65-67).
21. f144 (R³149) 1502b 20-23. *Scholion* ext. B(L) ad *Iliad* iii.277. (Cf. *Schol.* Vendob. ad *Odyssey* xii.)
22. f145 (R³150) 1502b 34. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* iii.441.
23. f146 (R³151) 1503a 1-14. *Scholion* ext. B(LED) ad *Iliad* iv.88.
24. f146 (R³151) 1503a 9. *Scholion* ext. B(LED) ad *Iliad* iv.88 (=Iliad iii.454).
25. f147 (R³152) 1503a 17-30. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* iv.297.
26. f148 (R³153) 1503a 31-43. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* v.741 (Cf. *Scholion* ad *Odyssey* xi.634.)
27. f149 (R³154) 1503a 45; 1503b 1-3. *Scholion* int. B ad *Iliad* v.778.
28. f150 (R³155) 1503b 4-15. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* vi.234.

29. f151 (R³156) 1503b16-33. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* vii.93 (=Iliad vii.111-112).
30. f152 (R³157) 1503b 34-40. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* vii.228.
31. f153 (R³158) 1503b 41-45; 1504a 1-2. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* ix. 17.
32. f154 (R³159) 1504a 4-17. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* x.98.
33. f155 (R³160) 1504a 18-25. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* x.153.
34. f156 (R³161) 1504a 26-44; 1504b 1-12. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* x.252.
35. f157 (R³163) 1504b 13-28. *Scholion* Cod. ven. A ad *Iliad* xix.108. (=Iliad i.527--1504b 18.)
36. f158 (R³166) 1504b 29-38. *Scholion* ext. B ad *Iliad* xxiv.15.
37. f159 (R³167) 1504b 39-44; 1505a 1-2. *Scholion* Victor. (Townl.) ad *Iliad* xxiv.420. (Cf. Suid. s. μεμυκότα.)
38. f160 (R³168) 1505a 3-8. *Scholion* int. B (Eustathius 1365) ad *Iliad* xxiv.569.
39. f161 (R³169) 1505a 9-16. *Scholion* (ed. Dindorf) HQE ad *Odyssey* iv.356.
40. f162 (R³170) 1505a 17-35. *Scholion* T ad *Odyssey* v.93.
41. f163 (R³171) 1505a 36-45; 1505b 1-6. *Scholion* (TQEP) Vindob. ad *Odyssey* v.334.
42. f164 (R³172) 1505b 8-13. *Scholion* HQ et Vindobon. ad *Odyssey* ix.106 (*Scholion* T ad *Odyssey* ix.311).
43. f165 (R³173) 1505b 14-25. *Scholion* HT ad *Odyssey* ix.345 (*Odyssey* ix.333); *Scholion* QM (ad *Odyssey* ix.333) et Vindob. (ad *Odyssey* ix.315). (=Odyssey vi.4,6--1505b 20,25.)
44. f166 (R⁴174) 1505b 26-42. *Scholion* HTQ (M) ad *Odyssey* ix.525.
45. f167 (R³175) 1505b 43-45; 1506a 1-16. *Scholion* Vindob. ad *Odyssey* xii.128,129. Eustathius p. 1717.

46. f169 (R³177) 1506a 34-40. *Scholion* Vindob. ad *Odyssey* xvii. 326.
47. f170 (R³178) 1506a 41-45; 1506b 1-7. *Scholion* Vindob. ad *Odyssey* xxiii.337.
48. f172. 1506b 32. Athenaeus xiii.556d (=Iliad ii.226-228).
49. f174. 1507a 5-13; 1507b 1-3. Plutarchus *de aud. poetis* 12 (=Iliad xxiii.296).
50. f175 (R³100) 1507b 4-13. Athenaeus v. 6p. 188e (=Odyssey viii.449--1507b 9-10; *Odyssey* iv.48--1507b 10-11).
51. f346 (R³384) 1536a 39. Plutarchus. *Thes.* 25 (=Iliad ii.546).

INDEX
OF
ARISTOTELIAN AND HOMERIC CITATIONS

	Pages
<i>On Interpretation</i>	21a, 24-30 143
<i>Posterior Analytics</i>	77b, 27-33 144
<i>Topics</i>	157a, 14-17 41
<i>On Sophistical Refutations</i>	166b, 6-9 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 13-15 72
<i>On Sophistical Refutations</i>	171a, 4-11 144
<i>On Sophistical Refutations</i>	173b, 17-22 145
<i>Physics</i>	221b, 31-32
	222a, 1-2 145
<i>Meteorologica</i>	351b, 35-
	352a, -9 <i>Odyssey</i> xiv. 257-268 105
	<i>Odyssey</i> iv. 227-229 104
	<i>Odyssey</i> iv. 83-85 104
<i>Meteorologica</i>	351b, 27-35 <i>Iliad</i> ix. 381-382 103
<i>On the Cosmos</i>	397b, 20-27 <i>Iliad</i> viii. 3
	<i>Iliad</i> i. 499 85
	<i>Iliad</i> viii. 3 85
	<i>Iliad</i> v. 754 85
<i>On the Cosmos</i>	400a, 3-14 <i>Iliad</i> vi. 42-45 85
<i>On the Cosmos</i>	400a, 15-19 <i>Iliad</i> xv. 192 85
<i>On the Cosmos</i>	400b, 28-
	401a, -2 <i>Odyssey</i> xi. 590 86
	<i>Odyssey</i> vii. 116 86
<i>On the Cosmos</i>	401a, 2-4 <i>Odyssey</i> v. 64 86
<i>On the Cosmos</i>	401a, 5-7 <i>Odyssey</i> xi. 589 87
<i>About the Soul</i>	404a, 27-31 <i>Iliad</i> xxiii. 698 94
<i>About the Soul</i>	427a, 21-27 <i>Odyssey</i> xviii. 136 93
<i>History of the Animals</i>	513b, 24-28 <i>Iliad</i> xiii. 546-547 95
<i>History of the Animals</i>	519a. 16-20 <i>Iliad</i> xx. 73-74 105
<i>History of the Animals</i>	574b, 29-
	575a, -1 <i>Odyssey</i> xvii. 326-7 97
<i>History of the Animals</i>	575b, 4-6 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 402ff 97
	<i>Iliad</i> vii. 315 97
	<i>Odyssey</i> xix. 220 97
<i>History of the Animals</i>	575b, 6-7 <i>Odyssey</i> x. 19 97
<i>History of the Animals</i>	578a, 32-
	578b, -2 <i>Odyssey</i> ix. 190-191 98
	<i>Iliad</i> ix. 539 98
<i>History of the Animals</i>	597a, 4-9 <i>Iliad</i> iii. 6 88
<i>History of the Animals</i>	606a, 18-20 <i>Odyssey</i> iv. 85 98
<i>History of the Animals</i>	615b, 5-10 <i>Iliad</i> xiv. 291 99
<i>History of the Animals</i>	618b, 23-26 <i>Iliad</i> xxiv. 315-316 100

			Pages
<i>History of the Animals</i>	629b, 21-24	<i>Iliad</i> xi. 554	100
		<i>Iliad</i> xvii. 663	100
<i>The Parts of Animals</i>	673a, 13-17	<i>Iliad</i> x. 457	146
		<i>Odyssey</i> xxii. 329	146
<i>Motion and Progression of Animals</i>	699b, 32-		
	700a, - 3	<i>Iliad</i> viii. 20-22	83
<i>Generation of Animals</i>	785a, 11-16	<i>Iliad</i> viii. 83-84	101
<i>On Marvellous Things Heard</i>	839b, 28-34	<i>Odyssey</i> xii. 67-68	100
<i>On Marvellous Things Heard</i>	840b, 8-17	<i>Iliad</i> vi. 442	90
		<i>Iliad</i> vii. 297	90
		<i>Iliad</i> xviii. 122	90
		<i>Iliad</i> xxvi. 215	90
<i>Problems</i>	890b, 7-10	<i>Iliad</i> v. 75	96
<i>Problems</i>	894b, 24-35	<i>Odyssey</i> xx. 71	102
<i>Problems</i>	934a, 13-18	<i>Iliad</i> vii. 64	106
<i>Problems</i>	943b, 21-23	<i>Odyssey</i> iv. 567	107
<i>Problems</i>	953a, 21-31	<i>Iliad</i> vi. 200ff	92
<i>Problems</i>	953b, 7-12	<i>Odyssey</i> xix. 122	92
<i>Metaphysics</i>	983b, 27-33	<i>Iliad</i> ii. 755	81-82
		<i>Iliad</i> xiv. 201	81-82
		<i>Iliad</i> xiv. 245-6	81-82
		<i>Iliad</i> xiv. 271	81-82
		<i>Iliad</i> xv. 37-38	81-82
		<i>Iliad</i> xv. 237-238	81-82
<i>Metaphysics</i>	1009b, 26-34		95
<i>Metaphysics</i>	1075b, 34-		
	1076a, - 4	<i>Iliad</i> ii. 204	135
<i>Metaphysics</i>	1091b, 4- 6	<i>Iliad</i> i. 494	82
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1108a, 30-35	<i>Odyssey</i> xii. 108-9	128-9
		<i>Odyssey</i> xiii. 219-20	128-9
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1109b, 7-13	<i>Iliad</i> iii. 156-160	129
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1113a, 2- 9	<i>Iliad</i> ii. 381ff	146-7
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116a, 15-23	<i>Iliad</i> xxii. 100	121
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116a, 24-26	<i>Iliad</i> viii. 148-9	121
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116a, 29-35	<i>Iliad</i> xv. 348-351	122
		<i>Iliad</i> ii. 391,393	122
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116b, 24-27	<i>Iliad</i> xiv. 151	123
		<i>Iliad</i> xi. 11	123
		<i>Iliad</i> xvi. 529	123
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116b, 28	<i>Iliad</i> xv. 232	123
		<i>Iliad</i> xv. 594	123
		<i>Iliad</i> v. 470	123
		<i>Iliad</i> vi. 72	123
		<i>Iliad</i> xi. 291	123
		<i>Iliad</i> xxiii. 468	123
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116b, 28	<i>Odyssey</i> xxiv. 318	123
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116b, 29-30		124
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1116b, 33-36		
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1117a, - 1	<i>Iliad</i> xi. 558-568	124

		Pages
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1118a, 17-24 <i>Iliad</i> iii. 24	130
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1118b, 8-11 <i>Iliad</i> xxiv. 130	130
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1122a, 23-30 <i>Odyssey</i> xvii. 419-21	147
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1124b, 15 <i>Iliad</i> i. 503-506	130
	<i>Iliad</i> i. 393-412	130
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1136b, 9-14 <i>Iliad</i> vi. 236	131
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1141a, 9-15	125
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1145a, 18-22 <i>Iliad</i> xxiv. 258	125
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1149b, 13-20 <i>Iliad</i> xiv. 217	131
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1155a, 12-16 <i>Iliad</i> x. 224	126
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1155a, 32-35 <i>Odyssey</i> xvii. 218	126
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1160b, 22-27 <i>Iliad</i> i. 544	136
	<i>Iliad</i> i. 503	136
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1161a, 10-15 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 243	137
	<i>Iliad</i> ii. 772	139
	<i>Iliad</i> iv. 413	137
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1180a, 24-29 <i>Odyssey</i> ix. 114-115	89
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	1180a, 24-30 <i>Odyssey</i> ix. 114-115	133
<i>Magna Moralia</i>	1191a, 5- 9 <i>Iliad</i> xxii. 100	121
<i>Magna Moralia</i>	1208b, 8-10 <i>Odyssey</i> xvii. 218	127
<i>Eudemian Ethics</i>	1230a, 16-21 <i>Iliad</i> xxii. 100	121
<i>Eudemian Ethics</i>	1235a, 4- 9 <i>Odyssey</i> xvii. 218	127
<i>Eudemian Ethics</i>	1235a, 25-31 <i>Iliad</i> xviii. 107	127-8
<i>Politics</i>	1252b, 19-24 <i>Odyssey</i> ix. 114-115	89
<i>Politics</i>	1253a, 1- 7 <i>Iliad</i> ix. 63	132
<i>Politics</i>	1253b, 27-37 <i>Iliad</i> xviii. 369-76	134
<i>Politics</i>	1259b, 10-14 <i>Iliad</i> i. 544	136
<i>Politics</i>	1266b, 38-	
	1257a, - 2 <i>Iliad</i> iix. 319	137
<i>Politics</i>	1278a, 34-38 <i>Iliad</i> ix. 648	138
	<i>Iliad</i> xvi. 59	138
<i>Politics</i>	1285a, 8-14 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 391,393	122
<i>Politics</i>	1287b, 8-14 <i>Iliad</i> x. 224	138
<i>Politics</i>	1287b, 14-15 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 372	139
<i>Politics</i>	1292a, 2-15 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 204	135
<i>Politics</i>	1338a, 13-27 <i>Odyssey</i> xvii. 385	140
<i>Politics</i>	1338a, 27-32 <i>Odyssey</i> ix. 7, 8	140
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1358b, 37-	
	1359a, - 6	83
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1362b, 33-37 <i>Iliad</i> i. 255	111
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1363a, 2- 6 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 160	111
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1353a, 6 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 298	112
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1363a, 16-19	112
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1365a, 10-15 <i>Iliad</i> ix. 592-4	113
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1365a, 29-30 <i>Odyssey</i> xxii. 347	113
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1370a, 32-	
	1370b, - 6 <i>Odyssey</i> xv. 400-401	114
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1370b, 1- 9 <i>Iliad</i> xviii. 108	115
<i>Rhetoric</i>	1370b, 10-12 <i>Iliad</i> xviii. 108	114

			Pages
Rhetoric	1370b, 22-29	<i>Iliad</i> xxiii. 109	115-6
		<i>Odyssey</i> iv. 183	115-6
Rhetoric	1371b, 12-17	<i>Odyssey</i> xvii. 218	126
Rhetoric	1375b, 26-30	<i>Iliad</i> ii. 557-558	43
Rhetoric	1378b, 29-33	<i>Iliad</i> ix. 367	116
		<i>Iliad</i> i. 356	116
Rhetoric	1378b, 33-34	<i>Iliad</i> ix. 648	117
		<i>Iliad</i> xvi. 59	117
Rhetoric	1378b, 34-		
	1379a, - 5	<i>Iliad</i> ii. 196	117
Rhetoric	1379a, 5- 6	<i>Iliad</i> i. 82	117
Rhetoric	1380a, 21-25	<i>Odyssey</i> xiv. 29-31	118
Rhetoric	1380b, 20-24	<i>Odyssey</i> ix. 504	119
Rhetoric	1380b, 24-29	<i>Iliad</i> xxiv. 54	119
Rhetoric	1387a, 31-35	<i>Iliad</i> xi. 542	119-120
Rhetoric	1395a, 8-14	<i>Iliad</i> xii. 243	43
Rhetoric	1395a, 14-15	<i>Iliad</i> xviii. 309	44
Rhetoric	1396b, 9-17	<i>Iliad</i> xxii.	44
Rhetoric	1398b, 9-16		148
Rhetoric	1406b, 8-14		148
Rhetoric	1406b, 24	<i>Iliad</i> xi. 113-114	45
		<i>Iliad</i> v. 161	45
		<i>Iliad</i> xx. 441-442	45
		<i>Iliad</i> xx. 164	45
		<i>Iliad</i> x. 485	45
Rhetoric	1410a, 22-30	<i>Iliad</i> ix. 526	45
Rhetoric	1410b, 10-15	<i>Odyssey</i> xiv. 213	46
Rhetoric	1411b, 31-34	<i>Odyssey</i> xi. 598	47
Rhetoric	1411b, 34-35	<i>Iliad</i> xiii. 587, 592	47
Rhetoric	1411b, 35	<i>Iliad</i> iv. 126	47
Rhetoric	1411b, 11-		
	1412a, - 1	<i>Iliad</i> xi. 574	47
Rhetoric	1412a, 1- 2	<i>Iliad</i> xv. 542	47
Rhetoric	1412a, 2- 6		48
Rhetoric	1412a, 6- 9	<i>Iliad</i> xiii. 799	48
Rhetoric	1413a, 28-34	<i>Iliad</i> ix. 385,8,9,90	49
Rhetoric	1413b, 31-34		
	1414a, 1- 7	<i>Iliad</i> ii. 671-673	49
Rhetoric	1415a, 11-16	<i>Iliad</i> i. 1	50
		<i>Odyssey</i> i. 1	50
Rhetoric	1415, 27	<i>Odyssey</i> vi. 327	50
Rhetoric	1416b, 8-14	<i>Iliad</i> x. 242ff	51
Rhetoric	1417a, 11-14	<i>Odyssey</i> xxiii 264-284, 310-343	51
Rhetoric	1417a, 36-38		
	1417b, 1- 7	<i>Odyssey</i> xix. 361	52
Rhetoric	1418a, 1- 8	<i>Odyssey</i> iv. 204	53
Poetics	1447b, 13-20		53
Poetics	1448a, 1- 5		54
Poetics	1448a, 19-24		54

		Pages
<i>Poetics</i>	1448b, 25-27	55
<i>Poetics</i>	1448b, 28-30	55
<i>Poetics</i>	1448b, 34-38	
	1449a, 1- 2	55-56
<i>Poetics</i>	1451a, 22-29 <i>Odyssey</i> xix. 392-466	56
<i>Poetics</i>	1453a, 30-39	56-57
<i>Poetics</i>	1454a, 1- 4 <i>Iliad</i> i. 1	63
<i>Poetics</i>	1454a, 31-	
	1454b, 1-15 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 155-181	57
<i>Poetics</i>	1454b, 11-14	58
<i>Poetics</i>	1454b, 19-21	
	1454b, 25-30 <i>Odyssey</i> xix. 386-475	59
	<i>Odyssey</i> xxi. 205-225	60
<i>Poetics</i>	1454b, 37-	
	1455a, 1- 4 <i>Odyssey</i> vii. 521ff	60
<i>Poetics</i>	1455b, 15-23	60-61
<i>Poetics</i>	1456a, 10-15	61
<i>Poetics</i>	1456b, 11-19 <i>Iliad</i> i. 1	61
<i>Poetics</i>	1457a, 28-30	61
<i>Poetics</i>	1457b, 6-11 <i>Odyssey</i> i. 185	62
	<i>Odyssey</i> xxiv. 308	62
<i>Poetics</i>	1457b, 11-13 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 272	62
<i>Poetics</i>	1457b, 33-35 <i>Iliad</i> v. 78	62
	<i>Iliad</i> i. 94	63
	<i>Iliad</i> i. 11-12	63
<i>Poetics</i>	1458a, 5- 7	63
<i>Poetics</i>	1458b, 1- 5	
	1458b, 24-31	64
<i>Poetics</i>	1458b, 24-27 <i>Odyssey</i> ix. 515	64
<i>Poetics</i>	1458b, 28-30 <i>Odyssey</i> xx. 259	64
<i>Poetics</i>	1458b, 31 <i>Iliad</i> xvii. 265	64
<i>Poetics</i>	1459a, 31-37	
	1459b, 1- 7	65
<i>Poetics</i>	1459b, 8-17	65
<i>Poetics</i>	1460a, 5-11	66
<i>Poetics</i>	1460a, 11-17 <i>Iliad</i> xxii. 205	68
<i>Poetics</i>	1460a, 18-26 <i>Odyssey</i> xix. 164-260	67
<i>Poetics</i>	1460a, 27-29	
	1460a, 35-36	
	1460b, 1- 2 <i>Odyssey</i> xxiii. 116	67
<i>Poetics</i>	1460b, 22-29 <i>Iliad</i> xxii. 205	68
<i>Poetics</i>	1460b, 32-36	
	1461a, 1	68
<i>Poetics</i>	1461a, 1- 4 <i>Iliad</i> x. 152, 153	69
<i>Poetics</i>	1461a, 9-11 <i>Iliad</i> i. 50	69
<i>Poetics</i>	1461a, 11-14 <i>Iliad</i> x. 316	69-70
<i>Poetics</i>	1461a, 14-16 <i>Iliad</i> ix. 203	70
<i>Poetics</i>	1461a, 16-17 <i>Iliad</i> ii. 1-2	70
	<i>Iliad</i> x. 1-4	70
<i>Poetics</i>	1461a, 17-20 <i>Iliad</i> x. 13-14	71
<i>Poetics</i>	1461a, 20-21 <i>Odyssey</i> v. 275	72

			Pages
		<i>Iliad</i> xviii. 489	72
Poetics	1461a, 21-23	<i>Iliad</i> xxi. 297	72
Poetics	1451a, 23	<i>Iliad</i> xxiii. 328	73
Poetics	1461a, 26	<i>Iliad</i> x. 252	74
Poetics	1461a, 27-29	<i>Iliad</i> xxi. 592	75
Poetics	1461a, 29-31	<i>Iliad</i> xx. 234	75
		<i>Iliad</i> v. 341	75
Poetics	1461a, 33	<i>Iliad</i> xx. 272	76
Poetics	1462b, 1- 3		77
Poetics	1462b, 5- 9		77

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Fr. Donald J. McGuire, S.J., has been read and approved by the following committee:

Fr. Raymond V. Schoder, S.J., Director
Professor, Classics, Loyola

Dr. Joann Stachniw
Assistant Professor, Classics, Loyola

Fr. John Festle, S.J.
Assistant Professor, Classics, Loyola

Dr. Leo M. Kaiser
Professor, Classics, Loyola

Dr. James G. Keenan
Associate Professor, Classics, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

January 10, 1977
Date

Raymond V. Schoder, SJ
Director's Signature