



1967

Theme and Structure in Plato's Republic and More's Utopia

Edward August Quattrocki
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss



Part of the [English Language and Literature Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Quattrocki, Edward August, "Theme and Structure in Plato's Republic and More's Utopia" (1967).
Dissertations. 865.

https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/865

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License](#).
Copyright © 1967 Edward August Quattrocki

THEME AND STRUCTURE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC
AND MORE'S UTOPIA

by

Edward August Quattrocki

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

June

1967

VITA

Edward A. Quattrocki was born on December 13, 1931, in Chicago.

After graduating from Leo High School, Chicago, in June, 1949, he subsequently attended Wilson Junior College, served in the United States Coast Guard, and received his B.A. degree in English literature from De Paul University, January, 1956. He then worked in industrial relations for the Western Electric Company and concurrently took graduate courses at the University of Chicago. In October, 1957, he was promoted to the position of employment manager with Western Electric and transferred to Oklahoma City.

In 1960, because of his interest and involvement in informal liberal education, the Fund for Adult Education awarded him a one-year grant to study English and the Humanities at Stanford University. After one year of full-time study, he was employed by Sylvania Electronic Laboratories in Mountain View, California. During the period from September, 1961, to September, 1964, he held positions as Employment Manager and Senior Operations Analyst. Having completed his thesis while employed at Sylvania, he received the M.A. degree from Stanford in June, 1964.

With the assistance of a two-year National Defense Education Act Fellowship, he began his Ph.D. studies at Loyola

University in September, 1964. He has continued his studies since September, 1966, with the additional aid of an Arthur J. Schmitt Fellowship, for which he is very grateful.

His master's thesis is entitled "Free Choice and Moral Responsibility in Seventeenth Century Tragedy." Under the auspices of Sylvania Electronic Laboratories, he has co-authored a classified report for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concerned with the feasibility of inspection of the Soviet Union under an arms-control treaty.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
<p>I. INTRODUCTION.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Statement of intention--Review of scholarship-- Premise for interpretation--Thematic similarity between the <u>Republic</u> and the <u>Utopia</u>--Stylistic differences--Procedure--Limitation of the scope of this study--Questions related to theme and structure.</p>	1
<p>II. WHAT IS JUSTICE?.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Structural plans of the <u>Republic</u> and the <u>Utopia</u> --Place, occasion, and characters of dialogues compared--Socrates' refutation of Thrasymachus' notion of justice--Hythlodæus' attitude toward injustice in Book I of the <u>Utopia</u>--Structure and function of prologue in the <u>Republic</u>--Place and function of exordium in the <u>Republic</u>--Comparison with prologue and exordium in the <u>Utopia</u>.</p>	26
<p>III. JUSTICE IN THE STATE.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Theory of social contract--Origin of justice-- Significance of opposed theories of origin of justice--Nature of justice--Importance of educa- tion--How order is achieved in the ideal state-- Causes and results of injustice--Importance of unity--Correlation between body politic and the individual human being.</p>	57
<p>IV. JUSTICE IN THE NATURE OF MAN.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Relationship between justice in the state and in the individual--Nature of the soul--Definition of virtue--Wisdom--Courage--Temperance--Difficulty in the structure of the <u>Republic</u>--Role of woman and the family in the state--Digression on war.</p>	92
<p>V. IS JUSTICE POSSIBLE?.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Why justice seems impossible--Relationship of the real to the ideal--Necessity for a philosopher-king --Essential nature of a philosopher--Ethical side of the philosophic nature--Additional virtues of the</p>	133

Utopians--Condition of philosophers in the world--
How the philosophic nature is corrupted--Necessity
for a basic change in the existing order of govern-
ment.

VI. THE SANCTION FOR JUSTICE. 168

The highest good toward which men aim--Character-
istics of the highest good--How man apprehends
the highest good--Relationship of man's apprehen-
sion of good to sanction for justice--Significance
of the parable of the cave--Education of the phi-
losophers--Requisites of leadership.

VII. THE JUST AND THE UNJUST LIFE. 197

Correspondence between Books VIII and IX of the
Republic and Book I of the Utopia--Source of
corruption in the ruling class--Timocracy--
Oligarchy--Democracy--Tyranny--Why a tyranny is
inferior to the ideal state--Role of the poets in
the state--Relationship between belief in immor-
tality of the soul and the sanction for justice.

VIII. THE COMPOSITION OF THE UTOPIA 226

Assumptions for a lack of unity in the structure
of the Utopia--Basis for assuming councilorship as
theme of Book I--Why the debate on councilorship
should not be considered theme of Book I--Relation-
ship of Book I to theme of justice--Problem raised
by the persona More's anomalous remark on Hythlodæus'
preference for Plato--Possible explanations for More's
remark--Reasons for altering J. H. Hexter's theory of
order of composition.

IX. UNJUST LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS. 258

Light thrown on form and content of Utopia by
More's contemporaries--Plan of Book I of the Utopia
--Function of the introduction--Roots of injustice
in Europe--Causes and results of injustice in
England--Why English penal system is unjust--
Alternate penal system to that in England--How
injustice affects all classes of society.

X. NATURE OF THE UNJUST TYRANT 295

Problem of a good man in a corrupt society--
Warmongering mentality of tyrants and their
sycophants--Tyrant's need to manipulate laws and
enslave his subjects--Significance of More's
indirect approach--Summary of injustice in Europe
--Partial solutions to injustice--Justice in
Utopia previewed.

XI. FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE. 323

Similarities and differences between Plato's and
More's ideal states--Physical characteristics of
Utopia--Character of political life in Utopia--
Methods of achieving unity--The family state--
Economic basis of society--Educational foundations
of the state--Utopian philosophy--End and aim of
Utopian institutions.

XII. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF JUSTICE 358

Punishment for crimes--Administration of justice
in internal affairs--Utopian foreign relations--
Causes of war--Conduct of war--Settlement of a
just peace--Theological beliefs as the sanction
for justice--How religious practices insure virtuous
behavior--Injustice and justice compared.

XIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 391

Explanation of objective and procedural method--
Intentions of authors compared--Summary of com-
parison of subject matter of the Republic and of
the Utopia--Summary of comparison of structures
of the two works--Conclusion.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Plato's Republic and Thomas More's Utopia continue to appeal to men of the most extreme ideological viewpoints despite the political, industrial, and scientific revolutions that have dated lesser works of Utopian literature. Both works obviously possess some common elements that have given them enduring significance. In this study an attempt is made to analyze the formal relationship between the Republic and the Utopia in order that the relationship between the subject matter and the form of the Utopia might be more clearly discerned.

In the sense used here, "formal" means the pattern of organization which gives expression to the content of the work. A comparison of the "form" of the two works, therefore, involves an analysis of the following aspects of each work: the handling of the major theme as a unifying principle; the way in which the major theme relates to the minor motifs; the logical divisions in the structure of the work; the way in which each part relates to the whole; and the relationship of the image patterns and other techniques of style to the work's theme and structure.

Ever since the Utopia was written, commentators have generally acknowledged that its subject matter was influenced by Plato. The extent and the limit to which More used the

Republic as a model, however, have never been thoroughly explored. In recent years, moreover, various contrary and even contradictory opinions about Plato's influence on More have arisen.

In the nineteenth century Lina Beger published the most complete study of the subject matter of the two works, but her analysis was made from a political not a literary point of view.¹ She points out how More uses the Republic and Plato's other political dialogues as reservoirs from which he draws various details and separate ideas. After comparing the two works, she concludes that More borrowed particular items from the Republic, but that his plan for the structure of the Utopia is different. The summary of her conclusion is as follows:

Die Entlehnungen oder Anregungen aus Plato sind zahlreicher, als es auf den ersten Augenblick scheinen mag. Sie betreffen jedoch mehr Einzelheiten, als den Plan des Ganzen, da die Grundgedanken beider Schriftsteller auseinander gehen und es ist somit in der Utopia die eigenthümliche Erscheinung geboten, dass ein Werk, welchem zahlreiche fremde Bestandtheile mosaikartig eingefügt sind, als Ganzes doch den Eindruck eines einheitlichen und originalen macht.²

Lina Beger's conclusion has been assumed in much of the criticism of the Utopia ever since. Even critics who have been concerned with the literary aspects of More's work

¹ Lina Beger, "Thomas Morus und Plato: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Humanismus," Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft, Tübingen, XXXV (1879), 187-216, 405-83.

²Ibid., p. 466.

have not questioned her statement that More did not follow the Republic for the "plan of the whole." Some have suggested that there might be a greater structural similarity than that seen by Lina Beger, but the comparison of the two works in this respect has not been pursued. The Reverend Edward Surtz, in the Introduction to the Yale edition of the Utopia, for example, recognizes that the Republic influenced the "broad bases of the Utopia" and that "the dominant moral search in both is for justice," but his discussion mainly concerns the specific characteristics in which the Utopia parallels Plato's Republic, Laws, and Critias.³

Other opinions that have gained currency in recent criticism tend either to minimize Plato's influence or to emphasize the differences rather than the similarities between the Republic and the Utopia. Russell Ames, for example, thinks that Plato's influence on the Utopia is not as great as the influence of More's own personal experiences. Ames writes that "there is substantial truth in Preserved Smith's assertion, concerning More and his Utopia, that 'the sources of its inspiration were neither Plato's Republic nor the writings of Roman and Christian publicists, but his own experiences

³Utopia, eds. Edward Surtz, S.J., and J. H. Hexter (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), Vol. IV of The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More (14 vols.; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963--), pp. clvi-clx. All citations from the text of the Utopia are taken from this edition. Quotations will be designated in footnotes simply with title, page, and line.

as lawyer, judge, and government officer."⁴ J. H. Hexter also stresses "how little More was bound either in detail or in essence by Plato's imaginary commonwealth."⁵ He points out how More differs from Plato in regard to such significant matters as communism, family relationships, and military affairs. Although Hexter puts greater stress than Lina Beger on the differences between the Republic and the Utopia, his conclusions, like hers, derive from a comparison of the ideational content of the two works and not from a comparison of literary form.

A. R. Heiserman, a recent critic who compares literary aspects of the two works, also sees a great difference between them.⁶ This tendency to minimize the relationship between Plato's work and that of More represents a curious quirk in literary history, since More and his contemporaries make a very definite identification of the Utopia with the Republic. This identification is made in several introductory pieces in the parerga of the Utopia. In his introductory poem Anemolius, the Utopian poet laureate, makes the claim: "I am a rival of Plato's republic, perhaps even a victor over it."⁷

⁴Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 8.

⁵Utopia, p. xxxii.

⁶"Satire in Utopia," PMLA, LXXVII (June, 1963), 163-79.

⁷Utopia, p. 21/5-6. This quotation is taken from "Six Lines on the Island of Utopia by Anemolius, Poet Laureate, Nephew of Hythlodæus by His Sister." These lines and the

Peter Giles likewise in a letter to Jerome Busleyden says, "It is known as yet to few mortals, but it is eminently worthy of everyone's knowledge as being superior to Plato's republic."⁸

Heiserman explains that these and other remarks contained in the parerga are meant to be ironic. He asks, "What did More and his contemporaries mean by likening Utopia to the Republic?" He then provocatively answers, "No student of the Republic could have imagined that More was writing a philosophical discussion in imitation of Plato's."⁹

The intention here is neither to dispute Heiserman's thesis that More's purpose in the Utopia is satiric nor to disparage his incisive remarks about the Republic. But the contention that the Utopia cannot be seriously considered as an imitation of the Republic serves as an antithesis to the main argument of this thesis. If it is possible to ascertain the reason why More, Giles, and their contemporaries, particularly Erasmus, Budé, and Busleyden, identify the two works, then perhaps the meaning of the Utopia can be better

letters referred to in the following pages were reprinted by John Froben at Basel with the March 1518 edition of the Utopia. See discussion of this edition in the Introduction to the Yale edition, pp. clxxxix-cxc.

⁸Utopia, p. 21/17-19. Peter Giles' letter is entitled: "To the Most Illustrious Jerome Busleyden, Provost of Aire and Councilor to the Catholic King Charles, Peter Giles of Antwerp Sends Greetings."

⁹"Satire in Utopia," p. 170.

appreciated.

Thomas More imitates the theme and the structure of the Republic in much the same way that he imitates the subject matter. Just as he takes details and specific ideas and adapts and changes them, he likewise takes the theme and structural pattern from the Republic and adapts and changes them to suit his purposes. This characteristic of More's style has been described by Richard S. Sylvester in regard to the way More uses his sources in writing Richard III: "He borrowed from everyone; when he did imitate, he paid greater attention to the larger matters of structure, characterization, and tone than he did to the purely verbal aspects of style."¹⁰ The case to be made, then, in the comparison which follows here, is that the Utopia is a thematic and structural imitation of the Republic which was changed and adapted by More to suit purposes different from but not contrary to those of Plato.

The proposition at the core of this argument is that justice is the theme and unifying principle of both the Republic and the Utopia. That More's contemporaries recognize this theme in the Utopia and that they make a serious identification of it with the Republic is evident from many of their remarks and particular from letters written by William Budé

¹⁰The History of King Richard III, ed. Richard S. Sylvester (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), Vol. II of The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More (14 vols.; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963--), p. lxxxiii.

and Jerome Busleyden.¹¹ Unfortunately, Erasmus has not left a critical analysis of the Utopia, but he remarks that More had in his youth written a dialogue "in which he carried the defense of Plato's commonwealth even to the matter of wives."¹²

But if we lament Erasmus' failure to publish an interpretation of the Utopia, we can be grateful that such eminent humanists as Budé and Busleyden published their illuminating commentaries. Although he does not mention Plato or the Republic by name, in his letter to Thomas Lupset, Budé sees justice as the predominant motif in the Utopia. The structure of Budé's letter in a general way corresponds to the structure of the Utopia. In the first half he bemoans the lack of justice in Europe just as More portrays the lack of justice in Europe in the first book of the Utopia, and in the second half he praises the admirable justice practiced in Utopia.

In the first part of his letter Budé's remarks about the injustice in Europe are particularly significant because he interprets the false European concept of justice as being "the stronger a man is the more he should possess."¹³ This is the same concept advanced by Thrasymachus and refuted by

¹¹Utopia, pp. 4-15, 32-37. These letters are headed "William Budé to Thomas Lupset, Englishman, Greetings," and "Jerome Busleyden to Thomas More, Greetings."

¹²The Epistles of Erasmus, tr. F. M. Nichols (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904), III, 398.

¹³Utopia, p. 9/9-10.

Socrates in the Republic and also advanced by various characters in Book I of the Utopia and refuted by Hythlodæus. Budé points out how Europeans neither understand nor follow justice because they are concerned with the letter of the law instead of being guided "by the standard of truth and by the command of the Gospel to be simple."¹⁴ They cannot distinguish between legal codes as promulgated in civil and canon law--the law that binds--and the law of justice that frees men. He laments that there is nowhere in evidence the definition of justice "acceptable to ancient writers."¹⁵

In the second part of his letter Budé identifies the causes for the prevalence of justice in Utopia and praises that island as the only place where justice is practiced. The basis of Utopian justice, according to Budé, rests on three principles: equality, peace, and contempt for gold and silver. The institutions of Utopia are responsible for this happy state of affairs. He praises the customs and laws of the Utopians, and he wonders at their holiness that has kept away the avarice and cupidity that expels justice and decency. In the most poetic passage in the letter, Budé contrasts the lack of justice in Europe with the admirable justice in Utopia. He suggests that justice has flown from Europe not to the skies

¹⁴Utopia, p. 7/29-30.

¹⁵Utopia, p. 9/1.

but to Utopia:

In Utopia the assertion could be made that Aratus and the ancient poets were dangerously close to being mistaken when they stationed Justice in the zodiac after her flight from the earth. If we are to believe Hythlodæus, she must have remained behind on the island of Utopia and not yet have made her way to the sky.¹⁶

Busleyden's praise of the Utopia, like Budé's, points up the theme of justice and directly ties the Utopia to the Republic. He begins by thanking More for giving the "world a description of the good and just constitution, which all must desire, in the commonwealth of Utopia."¹⁷ He comments that the much lauded commonwealths of the Spartans, Athenians, and Romans would not have been leveled to the dust if they had been regulated "by the same institutions, laws, decrees, and customs as this state of yours."¹⁸ Then he praises the practice in Utopia of "training the most qualified officials" rather than devoting too much energy to framing laws. The Utopians have "not done so without reason, for otherwise, if we are to believe Plato, even the best laws would all be counted dead."¹⁹ After this reference to Plato, Busleyden makes a direct comparison between the virtues of Plato's ideal man and the Utopian ideal man:

¹⁶Utopia, pp. 11/36-13/2.

¹⁷Utopia, p. 33/15-16. (Italics added.)

¹⁸Utopia, p. 35/7-8.

¹⁹Utopia, p. 35/17-19.

After the likeness of such officials, the pattern of their virtue, the example of their conduct, and the picture of their justice, the whole setup and proper course of a perfect commonwealth should be modeled. Above all else, there should be a combination of wisdom in the administrators, bravery in the soldiers, temperance in individuals, and justice in all.²⁰

In view of the twentieth-century concern with the issue of communism, it is interesting to note that Busleyden commends the Utopian institutions because they are based on a communistic principle. It should be emphasized, however, that Busleyden does not discuss communism as a separate issue, as many recent critics have done. He mentions it as a means to an end. Sharing goods in common "is totally directed to the maintenance of one uniform justice, equality, and communion."²¹

Budé and Busleyden both write in the spirit and tone of the Utopia in that they sustain the pretense that Utopia actually exists. As Heiserman points out, this fiction adds to More's satiric thrust.²² At the same time, however, their remarks indicate that they consider the question of justice seriously. They see justice as an essential idea in the Utopia, and Busleyden in particular makes a direct comparison between Plato's views on justice and those of More.

That critics since Budé's and Busleyden's commentaries

²⁰Utopia, p. 35/19-24.

²¹Utopia, p. 35/34-36.

²²"Satire in Utopia," p. 165.

were written have stressed neither the theme of justice in the Utopia nor the thematic similarity between the Utopia and the Republic perhaps can be accounted for by the comprehensive nature of the concept of justice. The threads of the themes of both works are difficult to follow because justice touches upon every aspect of life. The problem is less difficult in the Republic; but despite Socrates' repeated assertions that the subject of the inquiry of the dialogue concerns justice, some of the topics under consideration do not seem relevant. One commentator on the Republic seems to have identified the reason for these digressions: "It is difficult to say precisely what is the subject of the Republic, because in Plato's belief it is impossible to answer satisfactorily the question between the just and the unjust life without at the same time answering other questions of almost equal interest."²³ Socrates himself suggests why the discussion of justice must necessarily involve every other important question in life. After Thrasymachus has advanced his inadequate definition of justice, Socrates reprimands him for attempting to quit the discussion before his definition can be challenged: "Do you think it is a small matter that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life

²³The Republic of Plato (Everyman Edition; New York: E. P. Dutton, n. d.), Introduction, p. xvii.

that for each of us would make living most worth while?"²⁴

Justice, then, necessarily involves every other serious concern of man.

Since the themes of both works are entwined with various other motifs, it is not surprising that the relationship between the Republic and the Utopia is not readily apparent. Many readers of both works discover subordinate themes in accordance with their individual interests. Thus many interpreters deal primarily with such matters as education, communism, poetry, or metaphysics rather than with the subject of each work as a whole. Because the theme is even less evident in the Utopia than in the Republic, the tendency to discuss separate issues raised by the consideration of justice is perhaps more prevalent. It must be remembered that More never borrowed without changing and adapting for his purposes. Because his purpose was more literary and less philosophical than that of Plato, the theme in the Utopia obtrudes less than the theme in the Republic. Whereas Plato attempts to arrive at a definition of justice through dialectic, More

²⁴Plato, The Republic, tr. Paul Shorey, ed. T. E. Page (2 vols.; rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1963). All quotations from the Republic are taken from this translation and are cited hereafter by title, book, marginal number, volume of Shorey's translation, and page, as follows: Rep. I 344 D-E (Shorey, I, 71). In the following discussion Plato's ideal state will be referred to as "the republic," as distinguished from the Republic as a literary work.

intends to give a dramatic representation of justice.

The difference between the two works in this regard reflects the difference between Plato's and More's ideas about the nature of poetry. Despite the fact that the Republic is a literary masterpiece and contains poetry of the highest order, Plato holds that poetry is inferior to philosophy or dialectic as a means of apprehending truth. He therefore has no qualms about being overtly didactic. In typical Renaissance fashion, however, More puts great stress on delighting as well as teaching his audience. He states his own intention best in a letter to Peter Giles: "I do not pretend that if I had determined to write about the commonwealth and had remembered such a story as I have recounted, I should have perhaps shrunk from a fiction whereby the truth, as if smeared with honey, might a little more pleasantly slide into men's minds."²⁵ In contrast to Plato, More does not attempt to teach about justice by defining it; rather he disguises his intention through a fiction in order to "slide" justice into the reader's mind by an art that conceals art.

These different concepts about the nature of poetry are reflected primarily in the way Socrates and Hythlodæus participate in their respective dialogues. Whereas Socrates

²⁵Utopia, p. 251/5-9. This quotation is taken from More's letter to Peter Giles appended to the text and entitled: "Thomas More to Peter Giles, His Friend, Greetings," pp. 248-53.

leads the discussion in the manner of a philosopher or teacher, Hythlodæus delights his listeners in the manner of a poet. Socrates knows all the time where the logic of his dialectic leads, although Plato's artistry conceals the outline of the plan. Whenever conversation wanders into side paths, Socrates brings the participants back to the pursuit of justice; he states and restates the purpose of the inquiry at regular junctures. When the members of the party seem to be coming close to the meaning of justice, Socrates likens their art to the art of huntsmen:

Now then, Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it.²⁶

Socrates signals the theme in a similar manner throughout the entire dialogue. However far from the main path the pursuants have strayed, he insists on keeping the object of justice in view.

Socrates also regularly summarizes parts of the discussion and points the way to the next topic under consideration. Although the massive scope of the subject matter of the Republic gives rise to various interpretations of the structural plan of the whole, such orienting transitional statements clarify the connection between individual parts.

²⁶Rep. IV 432 B-C (Shorey, I, 365).

In contrast to Socrates' manner, Hythlodæus' method characteristically seems illogical in argument and unsystematic in description. He does not, like a teacher, draw his students to his point of view by rational dialectic. He is more like the evangelist who hopes to persuade by parable or like the didactic poet who hopes to instruct by holding the mirror up to nature.

The apparent absence of logic in Hythlodæus' approach is primarily evident in Book I. Instead of continually bringing the conversation back to the subject, as Socrates would have done, Hythlodæus consistently avoids the issue placed before him. When Peter Giles and Thomas More urge him to seek a position as a king's councilor, he takes the opportunity to spell out the various evils that beset the nations of Europe, but he never adequately answers the main point of the question about councilorship. He argues that he would be useless as a councilor because no king would listen to him, but this explanation hardly answers Thomas More's contention that duty calls him to do his best to effect a change in the corrupt state of affairs in Europe. Likewise, Hythlodæus' other comments about councilors only indirectly and somewhat inadequately answer Thomas More's point about duty. But this unwillingness to answer the question in a straightforward and logical manner is understandable when the thematic center of Book I is apprehended. The real concern of Hythlodæus is not

to convince Giles and More that he should not be a councilor but to reveal to them the causes and effects of injustice in the states of Europe.

Hythlodæus' manner of discussion, then, in Book I points up More's indirect method of introducing the theme of justice in contrast to Plato's direct method. In the Republic Cephalus raises the subject of justice and Socrates relentlessly pursues it. In the Utopia Peter Giles introduces the subject of councilorship, but Hythlodæus uses it as a pretext to expound his ideas on the subject of injustice. Socrates continually leads the conversation back to justice from the various subordinate themes to which it has strayed. Hythlodæus, in contrast, consistently carries the conversation forward to a consideration of injustice from the issue of councilorship stated and put before him by Giles and More.

Book II of the Utopia reveals another respect in which Hythlodæus and Socrates differ. Socrates invariably provides orienting statements that signal transitions between parts of the structure; Hythlodæus passes from one point in his description to another without summary or introduction. There are, of course, other points of comparison between Hythlodæus and Socrates that will be discussed in later analysis of the two works. The contrast in their respective modes of participation in the dialogues is mentioned here in order to suggest why the theme of the Utopia may not be readily perceived and to give an

indication of how the central characters in the two dialogues nevertheless serve an analogous literary function.

The analysis presented in the following pages centers on the comparison between the Utopia and the Republic in regard to their formal relationship, but to demonstrate such a formal relationship is not the primary end of this study. The primary objective is to discern the relationship between the subject matter and the form of the Utopia. The analysis proceeds upon the premise that the meaning of the Utopia becomes clearer when the relationship between its form and that of its main literary source is clearly discerned.

Either one of the two works could serve as the primary and the principal basis for the discussion of the comparison between them. It would hardly be practicable to discuss the structures of the two works simultaneously, because the parts of the structure of each work do not occur in the same order. The Utopia has the same unifying theme and includes most of the minor motifs and subject matters as the Republic, but the arrangement of the parts of its structure and the rationale for their arrangement are different. In the next several chapters, therefore, the subject matter of the two works will be compared within the context of the analysis of the structure of the Republic. In later chapters, after the parts of the Republic have been considered in the order in which they occur, the parts of the structure of the Utopia will be analyzed. In

this way the structure of the Utopia will reveal itself more clearly as the prior analysis of the structure of the Republic serves as a gloss.

The reason for beginning the comparison with an analysis of the structure of the Republic rather than that of the Utopia is twofold: first, the way that Plato handles the theme of justice in order to unify the parts of the structure serves as a gloss on the way that More handles the same theme; secondly, the structure of the Republic offers a convenient outline to compare and contrast the subject matters of the two works. Socrates' pursuit of justice through the dialogue is easy to follow once the key to the structure is found. At every juncture in the dialogue, therefore, his ideas can be compared and contrasted with corresponding ideas in the Utopia.

Although the meaning of justice in the two works is similar, it is not absolutely identical. More's life, times, and philosophy--particularly the Christian aspects of his philosophy--reflect differences in the function and organization of the just state. Since, in Plato's view, justice functions in man in a way similar to the way it functions in the state, the comparison of the concept of justice involves a comparison of both Plato's and More's assumptions and assertions about the nature of man.

If the works differ in subject matter and in form to the extent suggested, what then is the relationship between

the two? The Republic can be compared to a great classical symphony with a theme of justice that recurs in every movement. The Utopia, on the other hand, is more like a grand panoramic mural that depicts the contrast between injustice and justice. The Republic seems to develop in time and the theme recurs cyclically; the Utopia seems to unfold spatially so that the theme can be apprehended only when all the parts are seen at once in relationship to the whole. Hythlodæus himself suggests such a distinction when he compares his own method of representation with Plato's method of dialectic. Referring to the skeptics who doubt the virtues of communism, he says, "What if I told them the kind of things which Plato creates in his republic or which the Utopians actually put in practice in theirs?"²⁷ In this statement he implies that the republic "comes into being" as Plato creates it, but that Utopia already has a being and existence which he intends to depict.

The analysis of the Utopia and the Republic undertaken in this study attempts to avoid many of the irresolvable questions about More and his time. Numerous studies of More's work have been made from a variety of viewpoints--historical, biographical, economic, and sociological--but there have been relatively few studies which attempt to analyze the formal aspects of the Utopia as a work of art. The practice of

²⁷Utopia, p. 101/12-14.

attempting to know More's personality and personal opinions through a reading of the Utopia perhaps accounts for the many conflicting interpretations of the work. That More has been hailed as a prophet of the Soviet Union and has been canonized as a saint of the Roman Catholic Church indicates the extent of the cleavage in critical opinion. Another controversy concerns the question of the seeming inconsistency between More's apparently revolutionary ideas in the Utopia and his supposedly reactionary views later in life.

Growing out of the attempt to reconcile More's life with his work, at least three discernible schools of interpretation have arisen: one views More as a product of the Middle Ages and the Utopia as reactionary; a second sees More as a man of the Renaissance and the Utopia as a Christian humanistic work critical of its time but neither radically liberal nor reactionary; the third champions More as a farsighted liberal reformer and the Utopia as a social document which anticipates the twentieth century.²⁸ Although the con-

²⁸ Representative critics of the medieval school of criticism are R. W. Chambers, Thomas More (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962) and P. Albert Duhamel, "Medievalism of More's Utopia," SP, LII (1955), 99-126. Representative critics of the Renaissance school are Edward Surtz, The Praise of Pleasure: Philosophy, Education, and Communism in More's Utopia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), The Praise of Wisdom: A Commentary on the Religious and Moral Problems and Backgrounds of St. Thomas More's Utopia (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1957), and J. H. Hexter, More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952). Representative of the "modern" school are Karl Kautsky,

clusion of this analysis would tend to reinforce the second view stated above, the intention is to avoid such labelings of More and the Utopia. The life and times of the author will be referred to only as they reinforce or clarify a point that might arise naturally from a consideration of the text.

It is not to be inferred from these remarks that studies of the Utopia which aim at understanding the author or his times are not interesting and valuable in themselves. But subordinate issues ought not to be confused with the main theme; the meaning of the work can easily be distorted if separate parts are substituted for the whole. For example, much of the criticism of the Utopia assumes that the work has no unifying principle. More often than not, each book is discussed separately. The common assumption is that the subject matter of Book I is councilorship and that the subject matter of Book II is communism. When justice is seen as the unifying principle, however, it will also be seen that councilorship and communism are at bottom questions of justice. Hythlodæus' debate with More and Giles about whether the philosopher can be an effective councilor is a problem of the moral obligation of the just man; Socrates discusses the same

Thomas More and His Utopia (1899), tr. J. H. Stenning (London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1927), and Russell Ames, Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). For an extended discussion of the various interpretations of the Utopia, see Edward Surtz, "Interpretations of Utopia," Catholic Historical Review, XXXVIII (1952), 156-74.

problem in the Republic. Likewise, neither More nor Plato thinks of communism as a form of government as distinguished from democracy and aristocracy. In neither the Republic nor the Utopia is communism an end in itself. It is rather a means to be used to counteract the chief causes of injustice in the state.

That separate issues are often discussed to the exclusion of the main theme results not only from the comprehensive nature of the concept of justice but also from numerous other textual and historical difficulties. Difficulties in the work itself come from More's style. His constant use of irony, for example, gives rise to a variety of possible interpretations of any given issue and hence to a variety of interpretations of the whole. The fictional pretense that Utopia actually exists (as compared to the admission by Socrates in the Republic that his ideal state does not exist) raises the question whether More in certain sections intends us to take Hythlodæus seriously. These difficulties are related to the problem of point of view. Because the character Thomas More participates in the dialogue, the reader must distinguish between the voice of the author and the voice of the persona. While this problem relates primarily to Book I, the structure is particularly difficult to perceive in Book II because of the lack of orienting transitional links among the parts.

These stylistic difficulties within each book are

compounded by the differences between each book. The tone and the degree of participation among the members of the dialogue unquestionably change in Book II. These apparent differences have no doubt been magnified by an historical incident relating to the composition of the work. Erasmus states that More wrote Book II at leisure and afterwards dashed off Book I as time permitted.²⁹ This remark has added external evidence to the internal evidence in the text. It has supported the assumption that the Utopia is a fractured work--that Book I is distinct and separate and has little organic connection with Book II.³⁰ This assumption has been given further credence by J. H. Hexter's explanation of the history of the composition of the text.³¹ Although Hexter does not maintain that More's work lacks unity, his analysis tends to confirm the opinion that the subject matter of the "dialogue" in Book I differs essentially from the "discourse" in Book II.

Hexter's theory about the order of composition of

²⁹The Epistles of Erasmus, From His Earliest Letter to His Fifty-First Year, tr. Francis Morgan Nichols (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962), III, 398.

³⁰It is interesting to note that similar remarks have been made about the Republic. For a discussion of some theories about the composition of the Republic, see "On The Structure Of Plato's Republic And Its Relation To Other Dialogues," by Lewis Campbell, in Plato's Republic, eds. B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell (3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), II, 1-20.

³¹More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea, pp. 11-30.

various parts of the Utopia raises some pertinent questions about the overall structure of the work which must be considered before getting into the detailed discussion of its parts. After all, to assert that the whole of the Utopia has an organic structural unity assumes that Book I naturally precedes Book II and that the various parts fit together harmoniously. To assert that the Utopia is about "justice" presumes that it can be ascertained in most cases when More intends to be serious and when he intends to be ironic. That is, problems of structure are inextricably bound to problems of style and to problems of idea.

The difficulties in More's style and the enigma of the meaning of the Utopia, however, should not be emphasized too strongly; the literary excellence and disarming simplicity of the work account for its continued appeal. In proportion as it is difficult to get at the thematic center of the Utopia, it is rewarding to see the way in which More has developed the theme throughout and has embellished it by various literary techniques. The analysis of theme and structure, therefore, will involve a consideration of More's style: how he uses figures and rhetorical devices and how his diction and image patterns reinforce the theme of justice.

The emphasis, then, in this thesis will be on the formal literary aspects of the Utopia, but any such discussion must necessarily involve a consideration of subject matter.

Indeed, to attempt to discuss either the Utopia or the Republic without becoming gripped by the most basic questions which have concerned mankind is hardly possible. The subject matter and the form of the Utopia, like those of any great work, are inseparable. But since the critical mind dissects in order to understand, the form must be artificially separated from the subject matter so that the parts may be analyzed. It is, therefore, the premise of this thesis that the subject matter of the Utopia can be better understood through a formal criticism of the work taken as a whole. When the relationship between the beginning, the middle, and the end is seen and when all the parts are viewed in relationship to the unifying principle of justice, not only does the meaning reveal itself more clearly, but other literary techniques become evident.

First to be considered is how the theme of justice works as a unifying principle in the Republic and how the concept of justice in the Republic compares and contrasts with More's concept of justice in the Utopia.

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS JUSTICE?

Plato unifies the structural parts of the Republic through the development of the theme of justice. The problem of defining justice is presented in the first book. The theme develops as the participants in the dialogue attempt to descry justice in the ideal state. Each stage in the development of the theme constitutes a structural part, with each part relating to the whole insofar as it contributes additional meaning to the understanding of the concept of justice.


In following this structural plan, Plato gives an exemplary demonstration of Aristotle's dictum that a poem should have a beginning, a middle, and an end. The beginning, which is the first of five major parts of the entire work, includes all of Book I and the first half of Book II (I 327 A-II 367 E).¹ The four other major parts then develop from the problem posed in this first major part. The problem to be

¹Various commentators on the Republic have divided its structure into five major parts. To my knowledge, however, no one has identified the organic relationship among the parts in the same way as that described in the following pages. R. L. Nettleship's lectures have been helpful in working out the structural plan of the Republic and in interpreting difficult passages. See his Lectures on the Republic, ed. Lord Charnwood (London: Macmillan and Co., 1925). Many of his ideas occur in my interpretations without specific documentation.

solved in the entire dialogue as presented in Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) is posed in three questions pertaining to the concept of justice. What is the origin of justice and what is its nature? What is the sanction for justice? Is justice or injustice more beneficial to man and to the state?

The middle of the entire dialogue begins where Part I ends (367 E) and extends to the beginning of Part V (X 595 A-621 D). This middle segment contains three major parts--Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C), Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B)--each of which gives an answer to the three questions about the concept of justice posed in Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E).

Since the structure of the Republic is the basis of discussion in the next several chapters, and since the parts will be referred to repeatedly, it may be helpful to visualize the bare outline of the entire structure in a brief diagram:



Thomas More's handling of the theme of justice in the Utopia is analogous to Plato's in the Republic. The basic plan of the Utopia, like that of the Republic, is the formulation of a problem and the presentation of its solution. In the Utopia, however, this plan results in only two major parts, two books, which correspond to the formal divisions of the text. In Book I the problem is formulated--Hythlodæus describes the unjust conditions in the states of Europe and identifies the causes and effects of injustice. In Book II the solution is presented--Hythlodæus portrays the means whereby justice could be brought into existence, and he portrays the results of a rule of justice. The work is unified through the contrast between the injustice of the Europeans in Book I and the justice of the Utopians in Book II.

The same theme of justice, then, unifies both the Republic and the Utopia, but More's basic philosophical assumptions differ in certain respects from those of Plato. Hence in each work a similar theme produces a different picture of the ideal commonwealth. Basically More's ideas in the Utopia agree with those of Plato in the Republic in regard to the origin, the nature, and the results of justice, but More differs from Plato as to how justice manifests itself in the nature of man and in the body politic. The differences can be attributed mainly to More's Christianity and his propensity toward democracy.

The ideas about justice in the Utopia can conveniently be compared with corresponding ideas in the Republic by tracing Socrates' pursuit of justice in the latter work. Once the reader sees the outline of the structure of the Republic, Socrates' argument becomes relatively easy to follow. The separate parts of the structure provide concise segments in which Plato analyzes particular facets of the concept of justice. In the following chapters each part of the structure of the Republic is considered in order, and Plato's ideas are compared and contrasted with More's corresponding ideas in the Utopia. The structural analysis of the Utopia, it should be noted, will not be undertaken simultaneously with the structural analysis of the Republic. The structure of More's work will be analyzed after the plan of the whole Republic has been outlined and Plato's seminal ideas have been compared with those of More. The rationale for this procedure was discussed in the previous chapter.²

Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) of the Republic can be divided into two sections, which serve as a prologue and an exordium to the remainder of the whole dialogue: Book I is the prologue, and the first half of Book II (357 A-367 E) is the exordium.

In the prologue, Book I, Plato plants the seeds of the main arguments to be developed and expanded in the remainder

²Supra, pp. 17-18.

of the work. Socrates prepares for the subsequent revelation of the true meaning of justice by showing the inadequacy of the definition advanced by Cephalus and Polemarchus and by demonstrating the essential falsity of the definition advanced by Thrasymachus.

Book I opens with a brief introductory sketch of the place, the occasion, and the characters of the dialogue. This sketch provides some interesting points of comparison with the brief introductory sketch at the opening of the Utopia. The dialogue in the Republic takes place at Peiraeus, a seaport, where Socrates and Glaucon are visiting on a religious holiday. The dialogue in the Utopia takes place in Antwerp, a seaport, where Thomas More goes on business during a recess from his diplomatic mission in Bruges.

The occasion of the dialogue in the Republic is a chance meeting of friends following a religious service. Socrates and Glaucon are returning from paying their devotions to the goddess when they are met by Polemarchus and his friends. After exchanging friendly banter the company retires to the home of Polemarchus, where they meet the others who participate in the dialogue. Chief among this group are Cephalus, the aged father of Polemarchus; Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon; and Thrasymachus. Cephalus graciously greets the new arrivals and encourages them to talk. The old man begins to wonder about the world below, because he knows

that his death is not far off. He tells Socrates "that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him."³ Cephalus, therefore, spends a great deal of his time making peace with the gods through prayer and supplication. His opinions about the afterlife have been formed by the traditional teaching of the poets.

This opening conversation not only typifies the character of Cephalus, but it also balances and contrasts with Socrates' final statement about the poets and the afterlife at the conclusion of Book X. The Republic, then, opens as it closes with thoughts of immortality.

The occasion of the dialogue in the Utopia is also a chance meeting of friends after a religious service. Thomas More is returning from Mass when he meets Peter Giles in conversation with Hythlodæus.⁴ Before Peter Giles formally introduces the two men he describes Hythlodæus to Thomas More as a man with these two sayings constantly on his lips: "He who has no grave is covered by the sky," and "From all places it is the same distance to heaven."⁵ Although this statement

³Rep. I 330 D (Shorey, I, 17).

⁴Utopia, p. 300. In the note here which refers to the text p. 48/17, this parallel between the openings of the two works is drawn by the editors.

⁵Utopia, p. 51/13-15.

of Peter Giles is not expanded in the ensuing conversation, it indicates Hythlodæus' concern with the afterlife, a concern which is analogous to that of Cephalus at the opening of the dialogue in the Republic. Hythlodæus' closing comments in his description of Utopia in Book II also concern the afterlife. He describes the prayer of the Utopian priest: "Finally, he prays that God will take him to Himself by an easy death, how soon or late he does not venture to determine."⁶ The Utopia, then, like the Republic, opens and closes with thoughts of immortality. This should serve as a reminder to the reader that the central problems in each dialogue transcend the immediate and transient condition of man on earth.


The introductory sketches in the two works are also interesting for what they reveal of how More adapted incidents and characters in the Republic to suit his purposes. In the Republic Socrates, the central figure, is the narrator; in the Utopia Thomas More, a minor figure, is the narrator. The persona More's narration, however, is for the most part a recording of the narration of the central figure, Hythlodæus. Since Socrates leads the discussion of the Republic and Plato himself does not participate, the relationship between the author and the narrator is relatively simple and unambiguous. In the Utopia the relationship between the author and the

⁶Utopia, p. 237/27-28.

central character is more complex and ambiguous persona More participates in the dialogue as a narrator twice removed from the places he describes. It is safer to assume that Socrates speaks for Plato in most instances than it is to assume that either the persona Thomas More or Hythlodæus speaks for Thomas More the author at all times.

This difference in the handling of the narrative is also reflected in each work in the relationships between the minor figures and the central character. In the Republic eleven characters are mentioned as attending at the discussion. Seven--Socrates, Glaucon, Polemarchus, Cephalus, Adeimantus, Thrasymachus, and Cleitophon--actively participate in the dialogue. In the Utopia only Thomas More, Peter Giles, and Hythlodæus actively participate in the dialogue. (John Clement, More's servant, is present, but he does not actively participate.) There are other characters, of course, described by Hythlodæus but not present at the discussion at Thomas More's lodgings. Besides the Utopians and other fictitious peoples, there are individuals such as Cardinal Morton, the lawyer who is a guest at his house, and the French and anonymous kings. Some of these individual characters bear a relationship to Hythlodæus analogous to the relationship borne Socrates by characters of the dialogue in the Republic.

The most obvious correspondence between characters of the two works is that between Hythlodæus and Socrates.



Hythlodæus, like Socrates, is a philosopher, respected by a minority of his fellow men but rejected by the majority. He eschews riches and devotes his time to urging men to follow the good and just life. Other points of comparison between these two central characters will be made in the course of our discussion. Correspondences between other characters in the two works may not be readily apparent, yet there are significant likenesses which reveal themselves under closer analysis.

Cephalus, the first character who engages Socrates in serious conversation, corresponds to Cardinal Morton in the Utopia. It is at the home of Cephalus that the dialogue takes place. This old friend of Socrates represents the good qualities in the passing generation. Characterized as holy and hospitable, he strives to lead the good life. His knowledge of what is the good life comes from experience, not speculation. He cares more about making peace with the gods than about disputing with younger men.

Cephalus' chief literary function is to introduce the theme of justice. The problem of defining justice arises naturally from Cephalus' opinions about the satisfaction he intends to make in preparation for death. He says that the poets speak beautifully when they speak of a man who "lives out his days in justice and piety."⁷ Cephalus then goes on to

⁷Rep. I 331 A (Shorey, I, 19).

define justice as telling the truth and paying one's debts. This first mention of justice in the dialogue signals the theme, which runs as a continuous vein through the remaining books.

Although Cardinal Morton does not actively participate in the main dialogue of the Utopia, as does Cephalus in the Republic, the character and function of the two old men are alike in many ways. It is at Cardinal Morton's home that the first dialogue described by Hythlodæus takes place. He is described as a man "who deserved respect as much for his prudence and virtue as for his authority."⁸ He represents the fine qualities of an older generation in contrast to the kings and their councilors who have brought about injustice in England as well as in the other states of Europe. Like Cephalus, he is not as much interested in theoretical speculation about justice as he is in leading the just life. This attitude is evident from his involvement in the debate between Hythlodæus and the lawyer.

Although Cardinal Morton himself does not introduce the theme of justice in the Utopia, it is at his table that the subject is first mentioned. Hythlodæus describes how the lawyer sparks the conversation: "Availing himself of some opportunity or other, he began to speak punctiliously of the

⁸Utopia, p. 59/25-27.

strict justice which was then dealt out to thieves."⁹ In the ensuing discussion Cardinal Morton does not participate as a disputant, but he acts as though he were a judge hearing evidence. Hythlodæus confutes the lawyer's notions about penal justice as it is practiced in England; he recommends that the death penalty be abolished. At the conclusion of the argument the Cardinal shows his prudent and practical character. On the one hand he does not entirely accept Hythlodæus' proposal, but on the other hand he overrules the objection of the lawyer. His reaction to the debate is one of a pragmatic and open-minded administrator who truly wishes to implement justice. He remarks that "it is not easy to guess whether it would turn out well or ill inasmuch as absolutely no experiment has been made."¹⁰ Cardinal Morton, then, like Cephalus, represents a middle position between the wise and theoretical philosopher Hythlodæus and the ignorant and materialistic practitioners of politics like the lawyer.

In the Republic Socrates does not directly confute Cephalus' notion of justice. Before Socrates can question him about the implications of his definitions, the old man departs to offer sacrifice to the gods. The argument is then taken up by his son, Polemarchus.

⁹Utopia, p. 61/8-11.

¹⁰Utopia, p. 81/7-9.

The character of Polemarchus corresponds to the character of Peter Giles in the Utopia. Polemarchus serves as a character who brings the participants in the dialogue together. He meets Socrates and Glaucon returning from the festival and persuades them to come to his home so that they might have dinner and "good talk" and later attend the torchlight races. He is characterized as a personable young man, who has accepted without question the traditional opinions of his elders. He is interested in good talk, but his mind is not sufficiently trained to think through the implications of his naive opinions.

In taking up the arguments abdicated by his father, Polemarchus defines justice as giving every man his "due." Socrates shows that this definition is inadequate because it does not cover many obvious situations. Socrates points out that it would hardly be just to return a borrowed weapon to a mad man, although it may legally be his "due." Polemarchus then amends his definition and says justice is doing good to friends and harm to enemies. Socrates also shows this definition to be inadequate because sometimes we think our friends to be enemies and vice versa.

Socrates' attitude toward Polemarchus is that of an indulgent teacher. He simply insists that the young man attempt to define some of the terms that he uses glibly. Socrates finally succeeds in leading Polemarchus to the place where he can begin to acquire wisdom--the point at which he admits that

he does not know what justice means.

In the Utopia Peter Giles, like Polemarchus, serves the function of bringing the persons of the dialogue together. Apparently, he is a personable fellow who readily makes friends. Thus he can introduce an English diplomat to a Portugese philosopher. Although he delights in the conversation of the philosopher, Peter Giles is rather superficial in his opinions. An example is the commonplace reason he uses to urge Hythlodæus to become a king's councilor: service to a king, he tells Hythlodæus, could bring him riches and honor. In contrast, Thomas More, who also advises Hythlodæus to be a king's councilor, appeals to the philosopher's sense of duty. After Hythlodæus rejects Peter Giles's advice, Thomas More adds his "opinion":

It is plain that you, my dear Raphael, are desirous neither of riches nor of power. Assuredly, I reverence and look up to a man of your mind no whit less than to any of those who are most high and mighty. But it seems to me you will do what is worthy of you and of this generous and truly philosophic spirit of yours if you so order your life as to apply your talent and industry to the public interest, even if it involves some personal disadvantages to yourself.¹¹

The argument advanced by the persona More in this passage parallels Socrates' explanation of why the good man must seek public office. In his explanation, Socrates also rejects as spurious those reasons which Peter Giles urges on Hythlodæus.

¹¹Utopia, p. 57/7-14.

He says that "the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honour."¹² He goes on to explain that the good man consents to rule only to insure that a worse man than himself does not gain control of the state.¹³

Despite the prosaic opinion expressed by Peter Giles, he is treated with respect by Hythlodæus, whose attitude toward Peter is much like that of Socrates toward Polemarchus. Hythlodæus is friendly toward Peter and does not ridicule him, but he insists that his own view of the best state of the commonwealth is the right one.

Hythlodæus' respect for Peter Giles differs markedly from his treatment of the anonymous lawyer. He confutes the lawyer in much the same way that Socrates does Thrasymachus. In the Republic after Polemarchus admits his ignorance, Thrasymachus charges in with what he proclaims to be the true definition of justice. He says blatantly and simply that justice is the advantage of the stronger.

As a character in the dialogue, Thrasymachus represents a particular type of Sophist who makes rhetoric the chief subject of his teaching. His opinion about justice contains two major points: justice is the advantage of the stronger (I 338 C) and the life of the unjust is happier than that

¹²Rep. I 347 B (Shorey, I, 81).

¹³Rep. I 347 C (Shorey, I, 81).

of the just (I 343 D). The first point depends on a philosophical system which assumes a strict materialistic determinism. In this system nature is determined by blind force and thus is the result of necessary law, but a law that has no purpose behind it. Therefore, determinism, not free choice, explains man's conduct. In this scheme it follows that justice has no objective existence and that politics and legislation are artificial, rather than natural. Justice does not originate from an eternal law of the universe, but its validity comes from human conviction which creates it. Accordingly, Thrasymachus defines justice simply as the advantage of the one who has the power to enforce his will. He considers good and evil as subjective notions, dependent on the opinions of the most powerful. People, therefore, are objects to be used by the ruler in whatever way he chooses.

The philosophy of Thrasymachus is diametrically opposed to that of Socrates. Socrates argues that justice could not be the advantage of the stronger unless the stronger, namely, the ruler, were infallible in all his judgments. Furthermore, the ruler, like any artist, should exercise his art for the good of the object of the art. He should, like the good shepherd, concern himself with those committed to his care.

Thrasymachus refuses to accept Socrates' argument. He maintains that the ruler is not truly a ruler when he makes a mistake. Then he insists that the sensible shepherd does not

tend his sheep for their benefit but for his own profit. The smart king, accordingly, will manipulate his people to enhance his own power. In effect, Thrasymachus denies the existence of any non-material principle in man and equates man with beast.

Socrates counters this argument by showing Thrasymachus' inconsistency. Pointing out that Thrasymachus insists on being exact in regard to the infallibility of the ruler but not in regard to the art of the shepherd, Socrates maintains that when the shepherd raises sheep in order that they may be eaten or sold for profit he is not acting as a shepherd but as a banqueter or as a wage-earner. He explains further that the wage-earning art differs from the ruling art: "Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule?"¹⁴ Socrates cites this example primarily to demonstrate that the good ruler should be concerned about the well-being of his subjects.

After reversing Thrasymachus' contention that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Socrates turns to what he considers to be a weightier matter--Thrasymachus' "assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the

¹⁴Rep. I 345 E-346 A (Shorey, I, 75).

just."¹⁵ Thrasymachus maintains that in any competition between the just and the unjust the unjust invariably wins. Tyranny, which is "the most consummate form of injustice," best exemplifies the superiority of the unjust over the just. The superiority of tyranny can be seen in the result which "makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable."¹⁶

Socrates confutes this second point of Thrasymachus with three arguments. He first shows that virtue is goodness and wisdom and not vice and ignorance (I 348 A-350 C). He continues with the argument that justice is stronger than injustice (I 350 D-352 D). Finally he concludes with the proposition that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier (I 352 B-354 A).

To establish his first point Socrates again draws examples from the arts. He leads Thrasymachus to agree that in all arts there is an objective measure of perfection at which the good artist aims. The man who is without the idea of right or wrong or the idea of a limit at which he must stop is not the man who understands his art. If this is the case with all good artists, the unjust man, the one who attempts to

¹⁵Rep. I 347 E (Shorey, I, 83).

¹⁶Rep. I 344 A (Shorey, I, 69).

acquire all he can, is like a bad and ignorant craftsman. Socrates concludes this part of the argument by reversing Thrasymachus' opinion that justice is ignorance and simplicity: "Then the just man has turned out on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant."¹⁷

Socrates' next point that justice is stronger than injustice derives from the principle that unity is a desirable end in itself. He uses Thrasymachus' own admission that the unjust man tries to acquire all he can to argue that a city of such men would be filled with factions and strife. Likewise the unjust man would have strife or factions in his soul. It is self-evident that such a city or such a man could not be stronger than a just city or a just man that is unified.

The final argument in Socrates' confutation of Thrasymachus naturally comes from what has gone before. He reasons that the soul of man, like all other things, has its own proper function, which is to live well and not badly. He next reminds his hearers that justice is the virtue proper to the soul: "And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?"¹⁸ It follows, then, that the just man by definition is the one who lives well and is happy and the unjust man lives badly and is unhappy.

¹⁷Rep. I 350 C (Shorey, I, 93).

¹⁸Rep. I 353 E (Shorey, I, 105).

Socrates' debate with Thrasymachus, encompassing the greater portion of Book I of the Republic, in many ways parallels the three dialogues described by Hythlodæus in the greater portion of Book I of the Utopia. The lawyer at the home of Cardinal Morton and the councilors to both the French king and the anonymous king represent the same kind of insidious element in European society as do the Sophists in Athens. No character in the Utopia expresses as blatantly as Thrasymachus that justice is the advantage of the stronger, but the opinions advanced by Hythlodæus' adversaries, individually and collectively, amount to the same thing.

The lawyer who argues with Hythlodæus at Cardinal Morton's house most resembles Thrasymachus. He is audacious, proud, and insensitive. He begins the conversation by boasting of the strict justice dealt out to thieves in England. His notion of justice, like that of Thrasymachus, gives the advantage to the stronger, as is evidenced in his advocacy of the death penalty for sheep stealing, a policy which obviously furthers the interest of the rich landowners at the expense of the poor.

Hythlodæus confutes the lawyer with tactics similar to those of Socrates by showing that if the lawyer's opinions are followed to their logical conclusion they become absurd. He argues, for example, that the lawyer's "strict justice" in ridding the infested country of thieves results in an increase

of thievery and that it further induces the thief to commit murder. Hythlodæus also reasons that the lawyer's policy results in war. The large number of idlers in England will inevitably turn to thievery when they fall on hard times because they can serve no useful function. When the lawyer maintains that such idlers are necessary for national defense, Hythlodæus comments wryly, "You might as well say that for the sake of war we must foster thieves."¹⁹

The lawyer's reaction to Hythlodæus' remarks shows that he is more concerned with verbal victory and precise logic than he is with justice or truth. When he has obviously been beaten in debate, he is condescending and boastful in a manner that is reminiscent of Thrasymachus:

Certainly, sir . . . you have spoken well, considering that you are but a stranger who could hear something of these matters rather than get exact knowledge of them--a statement which I shall make plain in a few words. First, I shall repeat, in order, what you have said; then I shall show in what respects ignorance of our conditions has deceived you; finally I shall demolish and destroy all your arguments.²⁰

Besides the lawyer, the two kings and their councilors, described by Hythlodæus in Book I, view justice like Thrasymachus as the advantage of the stronger. These kings and their councilors presume that any means could be employed to satisfy their desire for territory and wealth.

¹⁹Utopia, p. 63/30-31.

²⁰Utopia, p. 71/22-28.

Hythlodæus argues that the policies of the two kings can lead only to misery for them and their subjects. The French king's policy will end negatively after "draining his resources and destroying his people."²¹ Hythlodæus argues his case against the French king's policy with an anecdote that exemplifies the same principle of unity that is stated by Socrates. He tells of the people called the Achorians, who, because they were not content with what they had, attempted to secure another kingdom for their monarch. After continual strife from within and without the two kingdoms, they decided finally that he and they would be better off if he ruled well the kingdom he first had, instead of attempting to rule over two disunited peoples.

In his hypothetical debate with the anonymous king, Hythlodæus argues that a king should put the welfare of his people before his own. In stating this case Hythlodæus uses the same image of the shepherd and his sheep that is used by Socrates in his discussion with Thrasymachus:

At this point, suppose I were again to rise and maintain that these counsels are both dishonorable and dangerous for the king, whose very safety, not merely his honor, rests on the people's resources rather than his own. Suppose I should show that they choose a king for their own sake and not for his--to be plain, that by his labor and effort they may live well and safe from injustice and wrong. For this very reason, it belongs to the king to take more care for the welfare of his people than for his own, just as it is the duty of a shepherd, insofar

²¹Utopia, p. 91/23-24.

as he is a shepherd, to feed his sheep rather than himself.²²

Although the metaphor of the shepherd and his sheep to describe a king's relationship to his people is an ancient one, there is a striking similarity between the contexts in which both Socrates and Hythlodæus use the image. Compare Hythlodæus' statement with Socrates' answer to Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic:

You see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd, not with regard to what is best for the sheep, but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them, as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which it is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed,²³ and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule.

In the Utopia, then, the lawyer, the kings, and their councilors dramatically represent the very notion of justice which Thrasymachus states as a theory in the Republic. In both works the basic assumptions for the antagonists' opinions are the same. For the lawyer, the kings, and their councilors, as for Thrasymachus, justice has no objective existence. The

²²Utopia, p. 95/10-19.

²³Rep. I 345 C-E (Shorey, I, 73-75).

only criterion in which they believe is the power of the will of the stronger.

The rebuttals to this philosophy, as have been indicated, occur in the first books of both the Republic and the Utopia. The first book in both works functions to pose problems concerning the definition and realization of justice and to show the inadequacy of popular opinions about the solution to these problems. With Book I serving as a prologue in each work, the contrast between the false ideas and the true ideas about justice are subsequently revealed in the description of the ideal state.

The prologue, Book I, of the Republic serves a much wider function, however, than merely stating the problem of defining justice. While Socrates is negating the propositions advanced by Thrasymachus, he is also outlining the argument which continues in the remaining nine books. In the concluding paragraph of the first book he summarizes the three main questions about justice that have been raised in the course of the discussion in Book I: "But just as gluttons snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry--what justice is--let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other

topic."²⁴ Implied in this passage are three basic questions about justice: What is justice? Is justice a good thing to be desired for its own sake, or an evil to be avoided? Is justice more profitable than injustice? These three questions form a nucleus around which Plato builds the structure of the whole Republic.

Despite the logic used in refuting Thrasymachus, Socrates' abstract argument does not altogether convince the other participants in the dialogue. Most of the time Thrasymachus has a concrete case in mind, whereas Socrates assumes an oversimplified meaning of his terms. In the discussion, however, Plato raises the major questions about justice which are amplified in the remaining nine books. These questions summarized by Socrates in the concluding paragraph of Book I relate to the nature of justice, the imperative for justice, and the results of justice.

The transition between the prologue and the remainder of the dialogue comes immediately at the beginning of Book II, which serves as an exordium to the remainder of the discourse. Because Thrasymachus' negative argument in Book I has provided no real opposition for Socrates' Glaucon demands that the same questions be restated and answered in a positive way. In echoing the popular opinions about justice, Glaucon weaves the main

²⁴Rep. I 354 B (Shorey, I, 107).

strands for the web of the whole argument of the Republic. He advances three arguments about justice which Socrates answers in the three main parts of the dialogue: Part II (II 368 A-V 471 E), Part III (V 472 A-VII 541 B), and Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 572 B). After Glaucon has made his three points, Adeimantus adds another element to the argument which Socrates answers in Part V (X 595 A-621 D). Thus, the entire structure of the Republic divides into five natural parts, with the problems to be answered in each of the last four parts contained in the exordium.

First, Glaucon restates the questions about justice which were raised in Book I: "I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man--as they say; though I, Socrates, don't believe it."²⁵ As his statement suggests, Glaucon does not advance the argument because he wants to convince his listeners. He proposes the three challenges because he wants Socrates to answer them positively and seriously, not negatively and glibly as he has done in his refutation of Thrasymachus.

²⁵Rep. II 358 C (Shorey, I, 113).

Glaucon's first argument raises the question: What is "the nature and origin of justice"? Socrates' answer is contained in Part II (II 368 A-V 451 B). Here he traces the origin and nature of justice in the origin and nature of the ideal state. Glaucon's second argument is basically the same as the question: What motivates men to act justly? Socrates' answer is contained in Part III (V 457 B-VII 541 B). Here he explains that justice is a universal form desired by men for its own sake and that justice in the state can be realized only when those who apprehend the form of justice--the philosophers--become the rulers. Glaucon's third argument raises the question: What advantages has justice over injustice? Socrates answers this question in Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 502 B). In these two books, he contrasts the just state and the just man with the tyrannous state and the tyrannous man. He shows that injustice begets tyranny and that tyranny is the most slavish and unhappy of all states in existence.

After Glaucon has advanced his three questions and has amplified the popular opinions about them, Adeimantus makes his additions. Adeimantus' views mainly reiterate the points made by Glaucon, but Adeimantus also gives a dimension to the argument not considered by Glaucon. He argues that those who act justly do so only for reputation and that in reality injustice brings more pleasures and rewards than justice. These arguments state in another way the two last points made

by Glaucon--namely, that necessity, not free choice, motivates men to be just and that injustice is more advantageous than justice. But in restating Glaucon's argument, Adeimantus introduces two questions: one about the immortality of the soul and the other about the didactic function of the poets. He argues that the advantages of the unjust over the just extend even to rewards and punishments after death. The poets and soothsayers, he maintains, teach that one who has been unjust during life on earth can buy his reward after death. On one hand the poets teach that "neither secrecy nor force can avail" against the gods. On the other hand, however, they teach that the gods can be persuaded:

These same authorities tell us that the gods are capable of being persuaded and swerved from their course by "sacrifice and soothing vows" and dedications. We must believe them in both or neither. And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice from the fruits of our wrong-doing.²⁶

Socrates answers this argument in his famous commentary on the poets and in the myth of Er in Book X. Book X has been considered to be the least organic part of the Republic. Some consider it as an afterthought. But the symmetry of the whole work is better appreciated when the reason for this addition can be seen adumbrated in Book II. Just as Adeimantus' argument on supernatural grounds is an epilogue to Glaucon's pragmatic argument in the exordium, Socrates' consideration of the effects

²⁶Rep. II 365 D-366 A (Shorey, I, 137-39).

of poetry on justice and the matter of immortality of the soul constitute an epilogue to the other nine books of the entire dialogue.

The first part of the Republic, with its prologue and its exordium, resembles in many ways Book I of the Utopia, which also contains a prologue and an exordium. The prologue in each work constitutes a complete unit, but at the same time it is organically linked to that which follows. It would not be necessary to read the prologue of either work in order to appreciate the literary value of the descriptions of the ideal states. In each work, however, the prologue serves as an effective contrast to what follows. Of course, there are many differences between the two prologues. Thomas More selects essential elements of Plato's analysis of injustice in Books VIII and IX and includes them in Book I of the Utopia. Whereas Socrates delays the discussion of the causes and effects of injustice until after his description of justice in the ideal state, Hythlodæus discusses the causes and effects of injustice during the refutation of the false concepts in Book I. Hence the prologue in the Utopia occupies a greater proportion of the entire work than does the prologue of the Republic.

The concluding portion of the first major part of each work contains an exordium. The exordium in the Republic, as has been indicated, occurs immediately at the beginning of Book II. It serves as a transition between the prologue and

the description of the ideal state. The exordium in the Utopia, which is the transitional link between Book I and Book II, comes at the conclusion of Book I.

The exact point at which the exordium in the Utopia begins is debatable. In his analysis of the composition of the work, Hexter has raised some interesting questions about the matter which will be taken up below in the more detailed analysis of the text (Chapter VIII).²⁷ Here it need only be indicated that Hythlodæus makes the transition from Book I to Book II by suggesting the contrast between injustice in Europe and justice in Utopia. This transition begins with the following paragraph: "Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you candidly my heart's sentiments, it appears to me that wherever you have private property and all men measure all things by cash values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth to have justice or prosperity--unless you think justice exists where all the best things flow into the hands of the worst citizens or prosperity prevails where all is divided among very few--and even they are not altogether well off, while the rest are downright wretched."²⁸ This passage brings into focus the contrast between the themes of Books I and II, and the remainder of the exordium amplifies the contrast. The

²⁷Hexter, More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea, pp. 11-30.

²⁸Utopia, p. 103/24-31.

exordium in the Utopia, occurring as it does after the refutation of the false concept of justice and before the description of justice in the ideal state, corresponds approximately to the function and the place where the exordium occurs in the Republic--that is, at the opening of Book II before the description of the ideal state and after the refutation of the popular opinions of justice in the prologue.

Another noteworthy similarity between the prologues and exordiums of the two works is the relationships among the characters. Both Plato and More put the reasonable arguments against the protagonists in the mouths of persons with whom the reader can sympathetically identify himself. In the Republic Glaucon and Adeimantus eloquently and persuasively present the same arguments which are asserted grossly and unconvincingly by Thrasymachus. By this rhetorical device Plato accomplishes two things: (1) he exposes the shallow philosophy and the flagrant techniques of the Sophists; (2) he seriously considers the deeper philosophical questions raised by Thrasymachus' naive assertions. In the Utopia a boorish lawyer and two tyrants and their sycophants oppose Hythlodæus' theories about justice. In contrast, Cardinal Morton, Peter Giles, and the persona More, all sympathetic characters, offer more reasonable objections to Hythlodæus' ideas. In the dialogue of the Utopia these sympathetic characters bear the same relationship to the lawyer, the kings, and the councilors as Glaucon and

Adeimantus bear to Thrasymachus in the dialogue of the Republic.

Immediately after the exordium in each work, a distinct break occurs. In the Utopia the break is the formal division between Book I and Book II. In the Republic the break occurs without a formal division in the middle of Book II (368 A). Socrates sets out in his search for justice in a seemingly roundabout fashion. He states his well-known plan to find justice in the individual by first identifying it in the larger elements of the state. As Socrates sets out in this way, he does not specifically indicate that he will answer Glaucon's and Adeimantus' arguments in turn. But when the entire discussion is seen in retrospect and the structural divisions are discerned, it becomes apparent that Socrates has answered each of their challenges point by point. Only in a less artistic work would this structural plan be more obvious.

CHAPTER III

JUSTICE IN THE STATE

Socrates begins the pursuit of justice in Book II of the Republic with an analysis of the origin of the state. He proceeds in this way in order to discern the nature of justice in the body politic and in the nature of man. This discussion, Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) of the entire dialogue, constitutes Socrates' first answer to the three challenges advanced by Glaucon in the exordium.

In his first challenge Glaucon reiterates the popular notions about the origin and nature of justice. Justice, he maintains, comes into existence because men mutually distrust one another. Since each man fears violence at the hands of another, all men in a group must agree on rules for their individual protection. Hence justice has no prior existence but comes into being when men recognize it. The nature of justice, therefore, is simply a compromise agreement, which each man would willingly break if he could do so with impunity. Glaucon puts the argument very succinctly as follows:

By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack

the power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and of covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice--a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge.¹

This argument rests on the same materialistic premise as Thrasymachus' simple definition of justice as the advantage of the stronger. Implied is a nominalism which denies the existence of universal forms. Good, evil, true, and false are assumed to be simply words which owe their validity to men's subjective opinions. The theory also implicitly denies any purpose working behind the functioning of the universe. Since no eternal or natural law exists apart from men's subjective opinions, the clever man will follow his natural instinct for power. Those who lack power contrive to subdue the strong man by promulgating the fiction that an absolute concept of justice exists.

The theory of an original social contract has been very influential and has been used in the most diverse interests. It was applied by Hobbes to justify absolute monarchy and by Rousseau to prove the absolute authority of the will of the people. They arrive at opposite conclusions, however, because they base their theories on opposite assumptions about the

¹Rep. II 358 E-359 A (Shorey, I, 115).

nature of man: Hobbes assumes that man is naturally warlike and destructive; Rousseau assumes that man is naturally good and peace-loving. These writers, and many others of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, commonly take an idea such as the theory of an original social contract and project it into the past with apparent solidity and concreteness.

The theory of the origin of justice predicated in both the Republic and the Utopia opposes the theory of an original social contract. Socrates attempts to determine where and how justice originates by looking for it in the origin of the state. He proposes that if the participants in the dialogue could observe the growth of a political organism, they would "see also the origin of justice and injustice in it."² He then proceeds to trace the development of the state. He does not attempt, however, to describe realistically the historical evolution of society; rather, he creates an hypothetical model from his logical analysis of the fundamental requirements of existing states. Socrates' theory about the beginnings of Society directly contradicts the statement made by Glaucon in the exordium. Glaucon says that the state comes into being because of men's mutual fear; Socrates says that the state originates in men's mutual needs: "The origin of the city, then . . . is to be found in the fact that we do not severally

²Rep. II 369 A (Shorey, I, 149).

suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things."³ Glaucon raises no objection to this statement, although it opposes his argument that man has a natural tendency toward war and strife.

From the premise that no man suffices unto himself, Socrates goes on to describe the essential elements of a healthy society. The first and chief need is food for "existence and life." Then comes the need for housing, and the third is for clothing. To fulfill these needs various essential occupations come into existence. In describing these occupations Socrates propounds one of the fundamental tenets upon which he bases his ideal state. He maintains that in order to perform his proper function well, a man should not divide his efforts among many different tasks. Thus the elemental state will have farmers, carpenters, shepherds, traders, and wage earners, each performing his own job and not pursuing the occupation of another.

After identifying the essential trades and occupations of the elemental society, Socrates goes on to describe the manner of the lives of the citizens. Before he can proceed far, however, Glaucon protests that the city described is fit only for pigs. Glaucon opines that men naturally desire conveniences such as couches and tables. Socrates allows Glau-

³Rep. II 369 B (Shorey, I, 149).

con's objection but reminds him that the elemental city does not require the conveniences he suggests: "The true state I believe to be the one we have described--the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder."⁴ The discussion then turns to the nature of the luxurious city. The description of the healthy city, however, has sufficed to identify the genesis of society. From this beginning it is implicitly agreed that the city comes into existence because of the needs and not, as Glaucon has maintained, from the fears of mankind. It follows, therefore, that justice does not originate in fears. Justice, as Socrates explains in the ensuing discussion, has objective existence outside the minds of men.

Socrates' description of the basic elements of the healthy city corresponds in many ways to the economic basis of the Utopian commonwealth. Although Hythlodæus does not explain in detail the genesis of society, he does mention that Utopus, the founder of the state, came upon a "rude and rustic people" and brought them almost to a state of "perfection of culture and humanity."⁵ In purporting to have seen an existing reality, Hythlodæus describes the geographical features of the island at the same time that he explains the political, economic,

⁴Rep. II 372 E-373 A (Shorey, I, 161).

⁵Utopia, p. 113/5-6.

and social bases of the commonwealth. In Utopia, as in Socrates' state, the occupations of the citizens grow out of their essential needs for food, shelter, and clothing. The basic occupation is agriculture. The only other crafts that occupy any number worth mentioning are wool-making, linen-making, masonry, metal-working, and carpentry.

In regard to the occupations in each state, however, there are two significant points of difference. First, the Utopians do not follow Socrates' injunction that each man should continue in one occupation. In Utopia every citizen receives military and agricultural training. In addition, the individual Utopians pursue the other trades mentioned above: "Besides agriculture (which is, as I said, common to all), each is taught one particular craft as his own."⁶

A second point of difference between the elemental states described in each work is the use of money. In Plato's state money is assumed to be a necessity. In Utopia it is not. Socrates explains that buying and selling will be necessary for the exchange of the products of their labor: "A market-place, then, and money as a token for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this."⁷ Since the Utopians share their goods, they have no need for money. Instead of buying and selling in

⁶Utopia, p. 125/33-35.

⁷Rep. II 371 B-C (Shorey, I, 155).

the marketplace, the head of a Utopian household simply goes to the public storehouses and "seeks what he and his require and, without money or any kind of compensation, carries off what he seeks."⁸ With the elimination of money the Utopians have eliminated also the trading and selling class, which is necessary in Socrates' elemental society.

This difference in regard to money and common property in the two works is mentioned because it is sometimes assumed that More's communism is similar to that of Plato. It should be remembered that communism in the Republic applies only to the guardians. Socrates makes this clear at the closing of Book III. He says that the other citizens may have money and possessions, but whenever the guardians "shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be householders and farmers instead of guardians."⁹

Despite the differences in the elemental needs of the two societies, the underlying assumption about the origin of justice is the same in the Utopia as it is in the Republic. In both works the existence of society depends on a mutual understanding among the citizens. Justice is not imposed as a coercive force to insure that citizens do not harm one another. Justice comes into existence neither because men mutually

⁸Utopia, p. 137/38-39.

⁹Rep. III 417 A (Shorey, I, 313).

distrust one another nor because men promulgate laws. Justice exists as an idealized form apart from the codification of specific laws. In fact, a point stressed in both works is that too many laws inhibit rather than promote justice in the state.

The theory of the origin of justice contains at its core the epistemological question of the existence or nonexistence of universals. Since the beginning of the recorded history of philosophy, men have been divided over the question of whether such concepts as truth, justice, and goodness have objective existence or whether their validity comes solely from men's opinions. Herschel Baker has described the persistence of this dichotomy among men in his two books, The Dignity of Man and The Wars of Truth.¹⁰ He sees this question at the root of most ideological controversies in the history of Western civilization. Baker's thesis is exemplified by the arguments of the Republic and the Utopia and the positions they oppose. For example, Machiavelli in The Prince, written in the same decade as the Utopia, propounds a theory of rulership similar to that which Thrasymachus advances in the Republic. It was little more than a century later in England that Thomas Hobbes set down almost a

¹⁰ Herschel Baker, The Dignity of Man: Studies in the Persistence of an Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), and The Wars of Truth: Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952).

verbatim copy of the social contract stated by Glaucon.¹¹

Perhaps the occurrence of the same political theories in Greece in the fourth century B.C. and in Europe during the Renaissance accounts for the sense of immediacy conveyed by both the Republic and the Utopia. Neither work can be read without feeling the polemical environment in which each was written. In this respect, both works differ from Aristotle's political writings, which seem to have been composed with an air of clinical detachment.

More's and Plato's refutation of the notion of relative justice does not involve only the question of the origin of justice. The philosophical assumptions underlying the entirety of each work repudiate the philosophy of materialistic determinism. In Book VI of the Republic, however, the discussion of the relative and the absolute nature of justice becomes specific. In this book Socrates explains how the knowledge of absolute justice proceeds from the apprehension of the form of the good. But since that section of the dialogue more

¹¹Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950). The theory of social contract is discussed in Chapters XIV and XV of Part I, pp. 106-33. Specifically, on pp. 118-19, Hobbes states: "And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of Justice. For where no Covenant hath proceeded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has a right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust: But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of Injustice, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just."

specifically pertains to the question raised by Glaucon concerning the imperative for justice, it will be discussed under that heading in a later chapter.

The second part of Glaucon's first argument in the exordium concerns the nature of justice: "Justice . . . is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honoured in the lack of vigour to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality 'a man' would never make a compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad."¹² Glaucon implies that a natural friction exists among men in the state and that each man naturally attempts to do as he wills. Justice is simply a safeguard against destruction.

Socrates does not give his definition of justice until the middle of Book IV. This definition, when he finally states it, seems oversimplified. He says, "This, then . . . my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice, this principle of doing one's own business."¹³ Injustice is simply the opposite: "The interference with one another's business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works it

¹²Rep. II 359 B (Shorey, I, 115).

¹³Rep. IV 433 B-C (Shorey, I, 369).

harm."¹⁴ The relevance of these simple definitions to Glaucon's challenge is not apparent by itself. Socrates derives the definitions from the description of the ideal state, which he has been developing up to this point in the dialogue.

Socrates equates justice with order and unity and injustice with disorder and disunity. Justice in the state, therefore, means a correct ordering of the parts of one polity, and justice in man means a correct ordering of the parts of one soul. The attainment of order in both the state and the individual depends upon a correct recognition of the hierarchical structure of each.

The just state is an organism, with three distinct classes, each performing its proper function. The function of an individual determines his class. As has already been mentioned, craftsmen and tradesmen, who supply the necessities of the state, make up the lowest class. The guardians, who protect the state, comprise the next class. The rulers, who direct the affairs of state, occupy the highest place in the hierarchical class structure.

In the Utopia More equates justice with order and unity, and injustice with disorder and disunity, as Plato does in the Republic. The concept of order in the Utopia, though not as rigid as that in the Republic, is also based on a hierarchy. The

¹⁴Rep. IV 434 B-C (Shorey, I, 373).

Utopians achieve order, however, with institutions and laws different from those in Plato's ideal state. The comparison of Plato's and More's concepts of hierarchy, order, and unity reveals their similarities and differences in regard to justice and injustice.

In the Republic the outline of the education of the guardians, which extends from II 367 E to III 412 B, serves as a basis of discussion for Socrates' answer to the question as to how order is achieved in the state. More's work has no comparable segment of the structure concerned with the description of the educational system of the Utopians. Furthermore, the space devoted to the discussion of education in relationship to the whole of the Utopia (about one-twentieth) is not proportional to the treatment given to it by Plato in relationship to the whole of the Republic (about one-fifth). Perhaps More does not emphasize education because he does not adhere to Plato's philosophical premise that virtue follows inevitably from knowledge. This difference in educational philosophy will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) of the Republic, where Socrates explains how the just soul, which has been properly nurtured, naturally seeks the form of the good.

Although the section on the education of the guardians in the Republic has no exact counterpart in the Utopia, Hythlodæus discusses in other connections many topics related to

those raised by Socrates in his explanation of the educational curriculum. Socrates begins the discussion of education by explaining the need for a special class of guardians. Because the city has needs beyond those of food, shelter, and clothing, wars of acquisition must be conducted. Socrates explains the reason: "Then we shall have to cut out a cantle of our neighbour's land if we are to have enough for pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants."¹⁵ From this inevitable requirement it follows that the city needs a special class of guardians. Their sole task is to conduct war and to stand guard in time of peace. Because of Socrates' basic premise that each man should devote himself to only one task, he exempts the guardians from other duties.

The great importance of the guardian class and its function in war contrasts sharply with the classless society of the peaceful Utopians. There is no special class of guardians in Utopia. Each citizen trains for military duty in order that every citizen be in readiness when the need arises. The Utopians are far more reluctant to engage in a war of expansion than Socrates suggests the citizens of the Republic are. The Utopians do not simply cut out a cantle of their neighbor's land, but

¹⁵Rep. II 373 D (Shorey, I, 163).

when the need arises, they do seek out unoccupied and uncultivated lands of the mainland nearest them and invite the inhabitants to join them in cultivating it. The Utopians, however, have no compunction in forcing the inhabitants to live according to their laws. Those who refuse, "they drive from the territory which they carve out for themselves. If they resist, they wage war against them."¹⁶

Hythlodæus' and Socrates' commentaries upon the justice of such wars of acquisition provide interesting contrasts. Hythlodæus says that the Utopians consider this kind of war just, because the inhabitants of the land fail in their obligation to cultivate it. Socrates avoids the question of a just war. He says that it is not yet time to speak "of any evil or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further discovered the origin of war."¹⁷ Although Socrates does not condone war he considers wars of acquisition to be inevitable for a luxurious state.

Because wars are inevitable the guardians of the republic must receive the best education possible in order to develop the necessary character to protect the state. The guardians' education, as outlined by Socrates, reveals how completely Plato integrates subordinate motifs into his major

¹⁶Utopia, p. 137/17-19.

¹⁷Rep. II 373 E (Shorey, I, 165).

theme. The whole system aims to develop and sustain justice in the state. In each part of the curriculum, Socrates keeps in view the end of developing order, harmony, and unity in the student.

Socrates begins the discussion with the prescription that education should develop the whole man. In establishing the music curriculum, which is addressed to the soul, the rulers must consider the tales told to the youths. The kind of tales prescribed by Socrates shows another facet of the way in which Plato conceives of the state as a rigid hierarchical structure. If the guardians are to know their proper place and function in the hierarchy, they must have a true understanding of the nature of God. Socrates maintains that the two laws and patterns concerning the gods to which speakers and poets will be required to conform are these: "God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good," and "he is simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his own form."¹⁸

This understanding of the nature of God underlies Plato's whole concept of the ideal state. Throughout the dialogue, Socrates emphasizes that stability, order, and unity are good, and that change, instability, and disorder are bad. For example, Socrates warns that the state must be wary of innovation

¹⁸ Rep. II 380 C-E (Shorey, I, 189).

in music and gymnastics, for as he explains, "the modes of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and social conventions."¹⁹ Socrates also implies that the ideal state cannot be the cause of evil. Indeed he seems to attribute the same characteristics to the ideal state as he does to God.

The Utopians, like Socrates, place great importance on the belief in God. All Utopians, "though varying in their beliefs . . . hold there is one supreme being, to whom are due both the creation and the providential government of the whole world."²⁰ The attitudes toward God in the respective works, however, points up the difference between Plato's rational habit of mind and More's voluntaristic tendencies. Socrates emphasizes that education should teach about the true nature of God. The Utopians stress belief in the inscrutable mystery of God. They hold that He is "a certain single being, unknown, eternal, immense, inexplicable, far above the reach of the human mind, diffused throughout the universe not in mass but in power."²¹

Socrates' recommendation for tales to be told about the nature of God concludes Book II of the Republic. In Book III

¹⁹Rep. IV 424 C (Shorey, I, 333).

²⁰Utopia, p. 217 18-21.

²¹Utopia, p. 217/12-15.

he specifies other tales that should be told to inculcate the proper virtues in the youths. Since the guardians above all others must have courage, they should hear tales that will inculcate bravery: "If they are to be brave, must we not extend our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them least likely to fear death?"²² Another virtue needed by the guardians is temperance. The education must, therefore, contain tales which inculcate self-control. Socrates points out the need for this virtue in the just state:

Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control? . . . And for the multitude are not the main points of self-control these--to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to be rulers over the bodily²³ appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest?

The matter of the tales in the musical education of the guardians, then, must reflect the true nature of God and must inculcate the virtues of courage and temperance.

After describing the matter of the tales, Socrates discusses the proper manner in which they should be told. He considers under this heading the mode (imitation or narration), the harmonies, and the rhythms. Here again he rejects or accepts the various possibilities according to the criterion of justice. The narrative is to be preferred over the imitative mode, because, as Socrates reasons, the imitator of base actions

²²Rep. III 386 A (Shorey, I, 201).

²³Rep. III 389 D (Shorey, I, 215).

will himself become debased. The guardians should not imitate cowards, drunkards, and slaves, "but if they imitate they should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them--men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality."²⁴

The harmonies of songs that induce softness and sloth must also be eliminated. Only those which develop the required virtues are allowed: "Leave us these two modes--the enforced and the voluntary--that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave--leave us these."²⁵ The rhythms, likewise, should not be complex but should be orderly and follow the natural movements of life.

Socrates' insistence on the ethical purpose of education also extends to painters and craftsmen. All must be forbidden from representing evil or illiberal dispositions in any product of their arts. The whole object of the educational system is to inculcate in the soul an appreciation of that which is orderly, beautiful, harmonious, and good.

The training in gymnastic, like the training in music,

²⁴Rep. III 395 C (Shorey, I, 235).

²⁵Rep. III 399 C (Shorey, I, 249).

is directed at the development of virtue in the individual. In the training of the body, as well as that of the soul, it is simplicity that achieves this end: "While simplicity in music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training it begets health in bodies."²⁶

The discussion of gymnastics and the training of the body leads Socrates to a consideration of the role of physicians and judges in the state. The necessity for physicians and judges, he says, is a sure proof of an evil and shameful state of education in the city. A man who spends the better part of his days in a court of law as a defendant or as an accuser is despicable. It is particularly shameful when, from a lack of all true sense of values, he "is led to plume himself on this very thing, as being a smart fellow to 'put over' an unjust act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice, every evasion, and wriggle out of every hold in defeating justice."²⁷

Likewise it is shameful to require medicine "not merely for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies," but because of sloth and dissipation.²⁸ Socrates severely criticizes the practice of treating lingering diseases and prolonging the life of a man beyond the period of his

²⁶Rep. III 404 E (Shorey, I, 269).

²⁷Rep. III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271).

²⁸Rep. III 405 C (Shorey, I, 271).

usefulness. He suggests that the practice of Aesculapius, which was followed in former years, should be adopted: "But if a man was incapable of living in the established round and order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state."²⁹

The interesting point of Socrates' discussion of medicine and law is that he evaluates them both in terms of justice. Only in a state where the bodies and souls of the citizens are in proper harmony can justice be realized. After describing the kind of judges and the kind of physicians that will be allowed in the state, he relates the art of the judges and the physicians to the souls and bodies of man:

Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-natured and incurable in soul they will themselves put to death.³⁰

The Utopians in the training of their youths also stress the development of virtue in the soul as well as health in the body. There is no mention of the kinds of tales that are told to children, but Hythlodæus says that "all children are intro-

²⁹Rep. III 407 E (Shorey, I, 279).

³⁰Rep. III 410 A (Shorey, I, 287).

duced to good literature."³¹ Their concern for moral development is evidenced by the fact that the priests are entrusted with the education of children and youth. The Utopians "regard concern for their morals and virtue as no less important than for their advancement in learning."³² They also inculcate virtue in their recreations. The adults as well as the children regularly play two games after supper: "The second is a game in which the vices fight a pitched battle with the virtues."³³

The Utopians apparently do not include gymnastic in their educational system, but they do not neglect the development and training of the body. They develop nimble, active, and strong bodies by "diligent labor" and "temperate living." They also participate in military training. As a result of their good habits, "nowhere are men's bodies more vigorous and subject to fewer diseases."³⁴

Because of the excellent conditions of their bodies, the Utopians have little need for physicians. They do not, however, hold the medical profession in the same low esteem as does Socrates: "Even though there is scarcely a nation in

³¹Utopia, p. 159/10-11.

³²Utopia, p. 229/10-11.

³³Utopia, p. 129/21-22.

³⁴Utopia, p. 179/28-29.

the whole world that needs medicine less, yet nowhere is it held in greater honor."³⁵ The Utopians esteem medicine because "they regard the knowledge of it as one of the finest and most useful branches of philosophy."³⁶ The chief abuse mentioned by Socrates in the Republic is avoided in Utopia. The physicians of Utopia do not attempt to prolong life beyond the period of a man's usefulness. If a Utopian has a disease "not only incurable but also distressing and agonizing without any cessation," the priest encourages him to put an end to his own misery or to allow others to do it.³⁷

Although they respect physicians, the Utopians regard lawyers with the same low esteem as does Socrates. Socrates points out the necessity for good judges, but he considers lawyers as useless. The Utopians allow judges to hear the cases of citizens, but they have the same opinion of lawyers: "They absolutely banish from their country all lawyers, who cleverly manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal points."³⁸

In the Republic, Socrates' explanation of the relationship of the judges and physicians to the souls and bodies of the guardians closes the discussion of education.

³⁵Utopia, p. 183/8-10.

³⁶Utopia, p. 183/11-12.

³⁷Utopia, p. 187/5-6.

³⁸Utopia, p. 195/15-17.

Socrates next considers who are to be the rulers of the guardians and how they are to be selected. The selection is based on loyalty and patriotism. The rulers are picked from the ranks of the guardians on the basis of their demonstrated patriotism. All the guardians are subjected to a test, similar to that given young colts by their trainers. Socrates describes the test and the reaction expected of a true leader: "Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state."³⁹

The designation of the ruling class completes Socrates' identification of the three classes in the hierarchical structure of the state. He suggests that order can be achieved in the state only if the founders take into account the inherent inequality and the essential differences among these three classes. Workers, guardians, and rulers must perform their respective functions, and they must maintain a

³⁹Rep. III 413 E (Shorey, I, 299-301).

proper relationship to one another.

Socrates recognizes that there may be a problem in making the citizens realize their differences and the necessity for maintaining the distinctions between classes. All the people, therefore, must be told what Socrates calls an opportune falsehood. The ruler, the guardian, and the worker classes are to be told respectively that while they thought they were being educated they were in reality being fashioned beneath the earth into gold, silver, and brass. Each man born into one of these classes remains in that class throughout life. Only rarely a son of a brass or a silver father will show enough native ability to advance to the next higher class. The hierarchy inherent in the opportune falsehood sets Plato's thought apart from that of More.

Although God holds the place of eminence in the Utopia as well as in the Republic, in Utopia there is little hierarchy in the ranks of men. More eschews Plato's insistence that men are divided into classes in respect to their separate functions. In Utopia each person must learn to farm, in addition to his regular trade. Some citizens may also learn additional trades, if they desire. All receive military training and fight when the need arises.

Unlike the citizens of the republic in their classes of gold, silver, and brass, the Utopians share equally their responsibilities and privileges. In contrast to the republic,

where class distinctions are hereditary, in Utopia the citizens elect their officials. Every thirty families choose annually an official whom they call a syphogrant. The syphogrants, "by secret balloting appoint a governor, specifically one of the four candidates named to them by the people."⁴⁰ Apart from the average citizens, besides the officials and priests, there exists only one small scholar class. A worker who shows exceptional ability may advance to this class, but since the number of scholars is not large (there are a combination of five hundred scholars and others exempt from labor in each city), the number of such advancements is necessarily limited.

Because More deviates from Plato as to what constitutes order, he likewise differs from him regarding what contributes to disorder. Plato sees disorder in any deviation from his hierarchical structure. When the ruling class fails to rule or when the warrior class becomes weak, disorder and injustice naturally follow. Hence, any tendency toward equality brings inevitable injustice. Democracy shows this tendency by treating equals and unequals alike. This state of disorder eventually terminates in tyranny. In this last extreme of injustice the hierarchy is completely upset. The worst element in the state rules and enslaves the best.

Thomas More, on the other hand, sees the causes of

⁴⁰Utopia, p. 123/15-17.

injustice in a different light. The whole thrust of the argument in Book I of the Utopia is that disorder and injustice come from class distinction. It must be noted, of course, that More condemns a class distinction based on ownership of money and private property, as well as on rank and title. Plato would hardly approve this kind of distinction. Nonetheless, the desideratum of equality prevails throughout both books of the Utopia. Only when men share responsibilities and privileges can true justice be achieved.

Although the Utopians differ from the guardians in that they perform multiple functions, they are similar to the guardians in the regimen of their lives. At the conclusion of Book III of the Republic, Socrates briefly describes the habitation and the way of life of the guardian class. He makes three stipulations to be followed in their lives: "In the first place, none must possess any private property save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will."⁴¹ The third is that all the guardians should eat at a common mess:

Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of war sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed stipend from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack. And resorting to a common mess like soldiers on campaign they will live together.⁴²

⁴¹Rep. III 416 D (Shorey, I 311).

⁴²Rep. III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311).

These three stipulations could be applied to all the Utopians. In Utopia the citizens do not own property. They do not live in military quarters like the guardians, but their family houses are equipped with folding doors which give admission to anyone, and they eat at common dining halls.

The regimen of life suggested by Socrates at the conclusion of Book III is criticized by Glaucon at the opening of Book IV. Glaucon opines that the guardians seem to have the most difficult lives of all the citizens. Instead of making the guardians content, he says such a life would make them the reverse of happy. Socrates answers that the ideal state is not established for the exceptional happiness of any one class but for the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole. The happiness of all classes can only come about when each class performs its proper function: "And so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left to the share of happiness that its nature comports."⁴³ In Plato's view happiness is not an end in itself. Socrates does not demean the desire for happiness, but he considers the happiness of the individual secondary to the primary objective of achieving justice in the state.

Happiness for the individual is considered more important in the Utopia than it is in the Republic. The Utopians'

⁴³Rep. IV 421 C (Shorey, I, 321).

attitude toward pleasure particularly gives evidence of this importance. In their philosophical debates, "they discuss virtue and pleasure, but their principal and chief debate is in what thing or things, one or more, they are to hold that happiness consists."⁴⁴ In both works happiness is important, but in the Utopia, unlike the Republic, the happiness of the individual is the reason for which justice in the state is desired.

In both works, moreover, it is assumed that a chief cause of unhappiness arises from the strife that the introduction of wealth foments. In the Republic, Socrates explains that gold and silver destroy the unity of the city. The result of wealth's being introduced is that "there are two at the least at enmity with one another, the city of the rich and the city of the poor, and in each of these there are many."⁴⁵ It follows that the rulers and the guardians of the ideal state should avoid the accumulation of gold and silver.

Socrates explains how the state that spurns riches has the advantage over other states in war. He compares the state without wealth to a lean athlete and the wealthy states to fat middle-aged men. He points out that the lean athlete would not only have the advantage in face-to-face combat with such adversaries, but he could also play one of his soft

⁴⁴Utopia, p. 161/23-25.

⁴⁵Rep. IV 422 E-423 A (Shorey, I, 327).

opponents off against another by appealing to one or the other's lust for gold. The state that has no desire for gold can use the greed of other states to its advantage. When engaged in war with a powerful adversary, the republic would send an embassy to the neighbor of the enemy. The embassy makes the following proposition: "We make no use of gold and silver nor is it lawful for us but it is for you: do you then join us in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy."⁴⁶ Because of the greed of the rulers in the average state, such a proposition would hardly be refused.

In the Utopia, More as author also shows wealth to be a force that disrupts the unity of the state. In Book I Hythlodæus depicts England as a state divided into two classes, rich and poor. He points out that the country is in such deplorable condition not simply because of poverty, but also because "alongside this wretched need and poverty you find ill-timed luxury."⁴⁷ Utopia, in contrast to England, is a unity because the citizens are neither rich nor poor. The Utopians use gold only insofar as its true nature deserves. Instead of hoarding it in the treasury, or being without it altogether, they keep a supply on hand to make "humble vessels" and to use in adorning their slaves. Similarly gems, which

⁴⁶Rep. IV 422 D (Shorey, I, 325).

⁴⁷Utopia, p. 69/29-30.

others account precious, the Utopians give to their children as playthings.

The Utopians keep gold on hand chiefly for the reason that Socrates recommends. In the conduct of war, they hire mercenaries and promise huge rewards to those who aid in defeating the enemy. In victory they disdain the spoils and offer them to their allies: "They present their auxiliaries with the rest of the confiscated goods, but not a single one of their own men gets any of the booty."⁴⁸ The message implicit in the Utopia and in the Republic is that strength and unity can be attained only when the citizens of the state free themselves from the greed for wealth.

Furthermore, strength and unity can only be achieved in a state of manageable proportions. In the Republic Socrates answers Glaucon's question as to the desirable size of the ideal state with the following prescription: "They should let it grow so long as in its growth it consents to remain a unity, but no further."⁴⁹ This is also the simple rule followed by the Utopians. They never allow the commonwealth to grow in population beyond that size which would destroy its unity. When the population increases beyond a fixed number, the Utopians set up colonies in uninhabited lands nearby. When the population decreases, the colonists come back to Utopia.

⁴⁸Utopia, p. 215/21-22.

⁴⁹Rep. III 423 C (Shorey, I, 329).

In a city whose institutions and customs are founded on principles of order and unity, few laws are necessary. In the Republic Socrates explains that the ideal state would not have to follow the practice of corrupt states, in which laws for innumerable trivial matters are constantly enacted. For example, there should be no reason to legislate the following matters: "Such things as the becoming silence of the young in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hair and the garments and the fashion of the footgear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind."⁵⁰ In Utopia there are "very few laws because very few are needed for persons so educated."⁵¹ The Utopians find that the chief fault "with other peoples is that almost innumerable books of laws and commentaries are not sufficient."⁵² Despite their few laws, the houses and the clothing of the citizens are remarkably uniform, and their habits are disciplined and praiseworthy. At the common meals, for example, the minors of both sexes "either wait at table on the diners or, if they are not old and strong enough, stand by-- and that in absolute silence."⁵³

⁵⁰Rep. IV 425 B (Shorey, I, 335).

⁵¹Utopia, p. 195/8-9.

⁵²Utopia, p. 195/10-11.

⁵³Utopia, p. 143/16-19.

Socrates' emphasis on unity terminates the main part of his description of the origin and development of the ideal state. He says shortly before the middle of Book IV:

At last, then, son of Ariston . . . your city may be considered as established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself, and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus and the rest, if we may in any wise discover where justice and injustice should be in it.⁵⁴

He then proceeds to identify justice in the state by first identifying the other virtues which he assumes any well-ordered state or man should possess. As each man in each class performs his own function, the class manifests one virtue in the life of the state. Hence, the function of the golden class is to rule, and it should possess the virtue of wisdom. Since the warrior class must defend the city or wage war, it should exhibit the virtue of courage. Socrates makes it clear that, although courage may be a characteristic of members of other classes, only the warriors manifest courage in the state. Temperance applies to all classes since it is the virtue by which one does well whatever one does. Justice also applies to all classes because it determines the correct relationship among the other virtues as they are possessed by separate classes. Finally, justice is the chief virtue because it manifests order in the state as well as in the individual.

Since More does not assume the idea of separate functions

⁵⁴Rep. IV 427 D (Shorey, I, 345).

and classes, he does not assume the idea of separate virtues manifested in the state. Because of their equality the Utopians are all expected to be as wise, courageous, and temperate as possible. In addition, they display Christian attributes which are not mentioned among the virtues by Socrates. A comparison of the virtues in Plato's and More's concept of the nature of man will be a subject of discussion in the following chapter.

After identifying justice in the state, Socrates returns to the point of his original inquiry. He proceeds to consider justice as it manifests itself in the individual man. The same principles of order and disorder, unity and disunity, he assumes, will be applicable in finding justice in man as have been applicable in finding it in the state. Socrates reveals how he identifies man and the state in his description of the ideal state as a perfectly functioning human being:

"That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same things in the same way." "Much the best." "And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man. For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connexions stretching to the soul for 'integration' with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labours in pain or is eased by pleasure." "The same," he said, "and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism."⁵⁵

More also conceives of the state as an organism, but he does not identify the relationship between the individual and the body politic as closely as Plato. He assumes, as Plato does, that the virtues and vices in individual men will be reflected in the virtues and vices of the state as a whole. For example, Hythlodæus explains how the Utopians aid the public welfare in their pursuit of individual pleasure: "As long as such laws are not broken, it is prudence to look after your own interests, and to look after those of the public in addition is a mark of devotion. But to deprive others of their pleasure to secure your own, this is surely an injustice."⁵⁶

Although he does not directly correlate the parts of the soul and the parts of the state in the Utopia, More does make the correlation in one of his Latin epigrams: "A kingdom in all its parts is like a man: it is held together by natural affection. The king is the head; the people form the other parts. Every citizen the king has he considers a part of his own body."⁵⁷

The origin and nature of justice, then, are similar in the Republic and in the Utopia. Both works assume as a basic premise that justice is not simply a notion which originates

⁵⁶Utopia, p. 165/29-32.

⁵⁷"Epigrammata . . . pleraque e Graecis versa," tr. and ed. L. Bradner and C. A. Lynch, The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), p. 172.

in the minds of man' rather it has absolute existence which transcends man's life on earth. In a state where justice manifests itself, the elements of the state function harmoniously so that order and unity result. Thomas More differs from Plato, however, as to how order and unity might be achieved in an ideal state, chiefly in that he eschews Plato's concept of a rigid hierarchical class structure.

This passage in the dialogue where Socrates describes justice in man and in the state (IV 432 A-434 C) marks a juncture in Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C). Up to this passage the discussion has concerned the functioning of the parts of the state. In the remainder of Book IV he turns to consider the functioning of the corresponding parts of man's soul. In the first half of Book V he then proceeds to analyze the relationship between the nature of man and the nature of woman and the relationship between the family and the state. The second half of Book IV and the first half of Book V serve as the basis for the discussion in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

JUSTICE IN THE NATURE OF MAN

At the beginning of the pursuit of justice in Book II of the Republic, Socrates implies that the study of man should logically precede the study of the state. In the ensuing discussion, however, he reverses the order and begins with the state. He explains that the component elements in the body politic are larger and more readily seen than those in man's nature. It is assumed, nevertheless, that the aim of the dialogue is to find justice in man.

Some commentators on the Republic emphasize Plato's concept of man as more important than his concept of the state. They interpret the work primarily as a treatise on moral philosophy. C. H. McIlwain, for example, expresses this opinion:

Its name might suggest that it was a book of political philosophy, but we very soon find that it is rather a book of moral philosophy. Its justice is in reality, as Aristotle later said, the whole of virtue shown in our dealings with others. It is a book about human life and the human soul or human nature, and the real question in it is, as Plato says, how to live best.¹

The Republic is certainly a classic treatise on morals, but it

¹The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 33.

would be a mistake not to recognize that it is also a book on political philosophy. Indeed it is difficult to separate the two aspects of the work without obscuring the meaning of the whole. Plato reminds us throughout the dialogue that the entity of the state and the entity of man are similar.

The Utopia also is read variously as a treatise on morals and as a treatise on politics. Some critics interpret it primarily as a work of political philosophy. For example, commentators such as Karl Kautsky and Russell Ames regard More as a prophet and assume that the Utopia is a model of the ideal state.² Other critics, however, such as A. R. Heiserman, read the Utopia as a treatise on morals. In opposition to those who interpret More's work as a serious political manifesto, Heiserman counters with this opinion: "While Utopia is not an ideal state, it provides a model for private conduct."³

The explanation for this contrary emphasis that was given above for the Republic also applies to the Utopia. More's work contains both political philosophy and guidance for private conduct. Other classic political works of the time, such as Machiavelli's The Prince and Castiglione's The Courtier, stress the conduct of the individual. The Utopia differs from these in that it concerns the state as a whole and not only the

²Supra, p. 20.

³Heiserman, p. 171.

individual. It is true, as Heiserman says, that Utopia "provides" a model for private conduct,⁴ but More subsumes the model of the ideal man in the model of the ideal state.

The Republic and the Utopia have meanings greater than any moral or political paraphrase that can be made of them. Their artistic characteristics, therefore, should be kept in mind in the attempt to extricate a model of the ideal man from the whole of each work. In abstracting and comparing the models of the ideal man, their differences in style and manner must be taken into account.

The close identity that Socrates makes between man and the state not only determines the subject matter but also shapes the form of the work. The entire dialogue can be divided into a series of comparisons between the larger elements of the body politic and the smaller elements of the individual man. Socrates gives the rationale for making this kind of comparison at the termination of his discussion of justice in the state:

But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there, we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will

⁴Ibid.

return again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth, and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds.⁵

Throughout the remainder of the work Socrates continues to test what he observes in man's nature against what he sees in the body politic.

In the Utopia Hythlodæus does not alternate his attention between the state and the individual. Nonetheless, Thomas More's philosophy of man permeates the entire work, although it is somewhat more difficult to abstract the profile of the ideal man from the Utopia than from the Republic. The reader of the Utopia must do for himself much of the work Socrates does for the reader of the Republic. Socrates draws conclusions about man's nature from his description of the ideal state; Hythlodæus describes the actions of men in the ideal state, which allegedly he has seen in his visit to the land of Utopia.

This difference between the analysis of Socrates and the narration of Hythlodæus again points up how More's style differs from that of Plato. The consideration of the nature of man in the Republic is raised as a philosophical question, and the discussion is theoretical and abstract. In the Utopia man's nature is represented concretely in the actions of the Utopians and the various peoples with whom they are

⁵Rep. IV 434 D-E (Shorey, I, 375).

contrasted. In order to compare concepts of man in the two works, therefore, one must compare Socrates' definitions and logical demonstrations with the inferences that can be drawn from Hythlodæus' description of the collective actions of the Utopians.

In the Republic assumptions about human nature pervade the whole dialogue. The discussion of justice as it is produced in man, however, becomes specific in the last part of Book IV. From an analysis of man's behavior Socrates concludes that the soul is divided into parts and that the moral virtues emanate from these parts. In his discussion of the parts of the soul, however, Socrates does not discuss all the aspects of man's nature. For example, he does not consider here the end or highest good of man. This he discusses in the next major part of the dialogue, where he considers the problem of the imperative of justice (V 471 D-VII 541 B), for the question of the end of man's nature more specifically relates to the two questions of what motivates men to be just and how the philosophic nature apprehends justice. These aspects of Plato's philosophy will be discussed in the following chapter.

The discussion of man's nature in Book IV primarily concerns the way the other moral virtues relate to justice in the soul. After the description of the ideal state, Socrates proceeds to descry justice in the individual as he

promised at the outset of the pursuit (II 368 A-B). Socrates' definition of justice in the individual shows a complete correspondence between the organism of the state and the human being. Justice in man as in the state requires hierarchy, order, and unity among his constituent parts. As justice results from the maintenance of a hierarchy among the parts of the soul, the disruption of the hierarchy produces disorder and disunity and results in injustice.

In his analysis of man's nature, Socrates presupposes the close union of body and soul. In the earlier books (II, III) he had developed the whole educational system with the assumption of a body-soul duality. He had recommended gymnastic and military training in order to develop the body, and music and literature for the development of the soul. Similarly, at this point Socrates explains that justice and injustice "are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference."⁶

Socrates' rationale for the division of the soul rests on the premise that man's functions parallel the functions of the state. The parts of the body politic are simply the sum total of the parts of the souls of individual men. The state, therefore, should have a life corresponding to the lives of all the men in it taken collectively. Since the

⁶Rep. IV 444 C (Shorey, I, 417-19).

state has three discernible parts, the soul should likewise have three: "We shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations."⁷

Deriving his conclusion about the soul from an analysis of man's behavior, Socrates observes that the human being functions in three distinct ways. From this observation he concludes that a man's actions must emanate from three different parts of the soul: the reason, the appetite, and the spirited element, called the Thumos.

One can most readily observe the functions of the appetitive part, since all men can be seen to desire certain things. A thirsty man, for example, desires drink. Furthermore, the appetites can be divided into two kinds. He calls necessary appetites those desires that we cannot divert or suppress and whose satisfaction is beneficial to us. Eating and sleeping are such appetites. He identifies as unnecessary appetites those that exceed what is necessary for health. These harmful appetites can be eliminated by correction and training.⁸

Socrates further observes that frequently another part,

⁷Rep. IV 435 C (Shorey, I, 377).

⁸The discussion of the division of the appetites does not occur in the Republic until Book IX (Shorey, II, 291-92).

which controls or checks the appetite, draws the soul away from the thing desired. From such observations he suggests that it might appear that the soul has only two parts: "Not unreasonably . . . shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive--companion of various repletions and pleasures."⁹ Socrates explains, however, that in addition to appetite and reason a third element, called the Thumos, or high spirit, can be discerned.

High spirit manifests itself in feelings of anger. At first glance it seems to be like the appetites, but on closer observation it frequently appears to oppose the appetites. For example, the spirited element makes a man angry within himself when he commits evil. This part in a properly functioning soul marshals itself on the side of reason in repelling the unnecessary appetites. In characteristic fashion Socrates explains how high spirit functions in the soul by comparing it to the analogous part in the body politic: "It is then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing

⁹Rep. IV 439 D (Shorey, I, 397-99).

kinds that composed its structure, the money-makers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?"¹⁰

Socrates' definition of justice in man, then, follows logically from his correspondence between the soul and the state. Justice in a man results from the maintenance of the natural hierarchy among the parts of his soul. Order requires that reason, with the help of spirit, controls the appetites. He explains, "We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom the several parts within him perform each their own task--he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair."¹¹

Because order in the soul also means unity, the just man, like the just city, is one instead of many. For justice to be produced in man, then, three correlated requisites must be operative--hierarchy, order, and unity. Socrates includes all three requisites in the following summary statement:

It means that a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own, and having first attained to self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself

¹⁰ Rep. IV 440 E-441 A (Shorey, I, 403-05).

¹¹ Rep. IV 441 E (Shorey, I, 407).

a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business.¹²

Man's nature, as assumed in the Utopia, is basically compatible with the analysis Socrates makes in the Republic, but there are also differences which reflect More's deviation from Plato's philosophy. The Utopians, like Socrates, assume a close union between soul and body. In their philosophy "they inquire into the good: of the soul and of the body and of external gifts."¹³ Hythlodæus makes the same analogy as Socrates in likening injustice in the state to disease in the body. He says that "special legislation" might sustain life in the body politic, but unless private property is eliminated there can be no hope of a cure: "By this type of legislation, I maintain, as sick bodies which are past cure can be kept up by repeated medical treatments, so these evils, too, can be alleviated and made less acute."¹⁴

Neither Hythlodæus nor the Utopians apparently concern themselves with establishing whether the soul of man is divided into three parts. Hythlodæus' description of the philosophy and the actions of the Utopians, however, suggests that their souls manifest the functions of the three parts Socrates

¹²Rep. IV 443 D-E (Shorey, I, 413-15).

¹³Utopia, p. 161/19-21.

¹⁴Utopia, p. 105/35-37.

describes. They recognize the necessity for reason to control the appetites: "That individual, they say, is following the guidance of nature who, in desiring one thing and avoiding another, obeys the dictates of reason."¹⁵

Although the Utopians recognize the necessity for the control of the appetites by reason, they take more delight in the proper satisfaction of their legitimate desires than Socrates would allow. They recognize two kinds of appetites. The appetites that Socrates calls necessary, they designate as those which contribute to genuine pleasure. Believing that reason leads man to satisfy the necessary appetites, they divide the necessary appetites into two classes: "The first is that which fills the sense with clearly perceptible sweetness";¹⁶ the second "they claim to be that which consists in a calm and harmonious state of the body."¹⁷ They use health as a criterion for determining a necessary appetite: "The delight of eating and drinking, and anything that gives the same sort of enjoyment, they think desirable, but only for the sake of health."¹⁸

The Utopians also recognize the danger of satisfying what Socrates would call the unnecessary appetites. These appetites, when not checked by reason, follow spurious pleasures.

¹⁵Utopia, p. 163/23-25.

¹⁶Utopia, p. 173/17-18.

¹⁷Utopia, p. 173/30-31.

¹⁸Utopia, p. 177/1-3.

A clouded reason judges even unnatural things to be pleasurable: "In fact, very many are the things which, though of their own nature they contain no sweetness, nay, a good part of them very much bitterness, still are, through the perverse attraction of evil desires, not only regarded as the highest pleasures but also counted among the chief reasons that make life worth living."¹⁹ Among the unnecessary appetites are the desires for honors, wealth, and fine clothes and the preoccupation with idle pastimes like dicing and hunting.

The Utopians reveal in their actions another function of the soul apart from reason and appetite. This function corresponds to that which Socrates calls the spirited element. Hythlodæus comments that in war "their spirit is so stubborn that they would rather be cut to pieces than give way."²⁰ The Utopians exemplify Socrates' prescription that the spirit should work on behalf of the reason in a properly ordered soul. Rather than being bold or impetuous in their fighting, they are determined and fired with conviction: "They are not fierce in the first onslaught, but their strength increases by degrees through their slow and hard resistance."²¹

The Utopians, then, do not speculate about how the soul

¹⁹ Utopia, p. 167/22-26.

²⁰ Utopia, p. 211/17-18.

²¹ Utopia, p. 211/15-16.

operates, but they act as though it functions as Socrates says it should. Recognizing that the properly functioning soul produces virtue, they define virtue in the same way as Socrates. For Socrates virtue, like justice, results when the soul maintains the hierarchy within itself by following nature:

And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature? . . . Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, ²² and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness.

The Utopians, likewise, think that virtue results from following nature and from allowing reason to control the appetite:

The Utopians define virtue as living according to nature since to this end we were created by God. That individual, they say, is following the guidance of nature who, in desiring one thing and avoiding another, obeys the dictates of reason.²³

An extremely important point of similarity in these two definitions of virtue is the idea of "following nature." Like Plato, More bases his understanding of justice on this notion. Throughout both the Republic and the Utopia justice is equated with the natural and injustice with the unnatural.

In the Republic Thrasymachus and Glaucon's understanding of "natural" differs markedly from Socrates' meaning.

²²Rep. IV 444 D-E (Shorey, I, 419).

²³Utopia, p. 163/21-25.

Thrasymachus implies that a king acts according to nature when he follows impulse and rules over his subjects in order to gratify his own selfish desires. Glaucon likewise quotes the popular meaning of nature: "By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil."²⁴ The notion of a hierarchy of the parts of the soul has no relevance to this concept of "natural." This meaning precludes the idea that to follow reason is to follow nature. Following nature in the materialistic philosophy means following impulse or desire. Hence what Thrasymachus and Glaucon call "natural" Socrates calls "unnatural." For Socrates, to follow desire unguided by reason would be to completely disrupt the natural hierarchy of the soul.

In the Utopia the kings, the councilors, and the lawyers at Cardinal Morton's assume Thrasymachus and Glaucon's meaning of natural, but the Utopians live in accordance with Socrates' meaning. The Utopians believe that nature calls all men to help one another to a happier life but that it is unnatural to advance one's own interest at the expense of another: Consequently nature surely bids you take constant care not so to further your own advantages as to cause disadvantages to your fellows."²⁵ The natural actions and philosophy of the Utopians in Book II

²⁴Rep. II 358 E (Shorey, I, 115).

²⁵Utopia, p. 165/20-22.

implicitly castigate the unnatural behavior of the kings and councilors in Book I. The kings and councilors act unnaturally by putting their interests before the interest of the common good.

The discussion of the moral virtues, other than justice, in the two works reveals the same differences that were indicated in the comparison of how Socrates and the Utopians regard the divisions of the soul. Socrates thinks it important to define and explain the nature of each of the four moral virtues, because in his philosophy correct action follows from correct knowledge. Hythlodæus simply describes the actions of the Utopians which demonstrate the virtues. The Utopians exercise the four moral virtues, however, in the way Socrates defines them.

Socrates begins the discussion of the moral virtues with wisdom. In this section (IV 428 B-429 B), however, Socrates does not examine the entire meaning of wisdom. He does not consider, for example, as he does in Part III (V 472 A-VII 541 B), this virtue as it pertains to the philosophic nature. In its full meaning, as possessed by the true philosopher, wisdom means the love of truth. In Book IV Socrates has not yet shown how the virtue of the true philosopher differs from that of other men.

In Book IV Socrates only explains how wisdom relates to justice. In the just state wisdom is possessed by the rulers;

in the just man wisdom pertains properly to reason, the ruling part of the soul. In the just state this virtue of the rulers enables them to exercise forethought on behalf of the whole polity; in the just man it enables the reason to exercise forethought on behalf of the whole soul. This exercise of forethought, or judgment, Socrates identifies as the ability to counsel well. He makes it clear, however, that counseling is only a single aspect of wisdom: "And surely this very thing, good counsel, is a form of wisdom."²⁶ The other aspect (or form, as Socrates calls it) of wisdom, namely, the philosophic love of truth, will be discussed in the following chapter in the analysis of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 D).

In the Utopia wisdom is associated also with the ability to counsel well. In Book I Peter Giles and the persona More urge Hythlodæus to be a king's councilor for the reason that in his travels he has acquired experience to add to his theoretical wisdom. Because "Raphael had touched with much wisdom on faults in this hemisphere and that,"²⁷ they urge him to assist some king or other with his counsel. Hythlodæus' chief reasons for rejecting the advice of his friends indicate that he does not believe that kings and councilors can be taught wisdom. Implying that the kings of

²⁶Rep. IV 428 B (Shorey, I, 349).

²⁷Utopia, p. 55/9-10.

Europe do not exercise wisdom on behalf of their own kingdoms, he says that kings "care much more how, by hook or by crook, they may win fresh kingdoms than how they may administer well what they have got."²⁸ Then he adds sarcastically that "among royal councilors everyone is actually so wise as to have no need of profiting by another's counsel, or everyone seems so wise in his own eyes as not to condescend to profit by it."²⁹

The councilors' lack of wisdom contrasts sharply with its possession by the Utopians. The difference stems from prejudice and pride. Displaying their characteristic narrow-mindedness in their unwillingness to take advice, they rationalize their failure to adopt new and better ways of doing things with an appeal to tradition: "Our forefathers were happy with that sort of thing, and would to heaven we had their wisdom."³⁰ They fail, however, to follow in those things in which their forefathers were really wise: "And yet, no matter what excellent ideas our forefathers may have had, we very serenely bid them a curt farewell."³¹

This characteristic of a narrow mind is closely associated with pride. The kings and their favorites show

²⁸Utopia, p. 57/29-30.

²⁹Utopia, p. 57/31-34.

³⁰Utopia, p. 59/6-9.

³¹Utopia, p. 57/35-36.

their lack of humility by their insatiable desire for praise and flattery. Hythlodæus explains that the councilors constantly play the role of sycophants to these "royal favorites whose friendliness they strive to win by flattery."³² In order to win approval the flatterers continually find fault with others. They "behave as if their whole reputation for wisdom were jeopardized . . . unless they could lay hold of something to find fault in the discoveries of others."³³ Specifically attributing the councilors' chief faults to pride and prejudice, Hythlodæus concludes his description of their attitude with the remark: "Such proud, ridiculous, and obstinate prejudices I have encountered often in other places and once in England too."³⁴

In contrast to the Europeans, the Utopians are truly wise, mainly because they are open-minded and not too proud to learn from others. They, unlike the Europeans, retain the good aspects of their tradition, but they readily accept new ideas. They take precaution to insure the continuity of the constitution, but they never reject what can be learned from others. For example, "whoever, coming to their land on

³²Utopia, p. 57/35-36.

³³Utopia, p. 59/4-6.

³⁴Utopia, p. 59/16-17.

a sight-seeing tour, is recommended by any special intellectual endowment or is acquainted with many countries through long travel, is sure of a hearty welcome."³⁵ In contrast to Europe, where the proud councilors fawn on the royal favorites in order to gain preferment, in Utopia the citizens make no attempt to gain positions of influence. Hythlodæus observes that the officials and the people "live together in affection and good will" and that "no official is haughty or formidable."³⁶

Hythlodæus makes it plain that the wisdom of the Utopians does not come from a superior natural intellectual endowment but that it primarily results from their open-minded attitude and their moral excellence. He compares the Europeans to the Utopians with the comment: "Though we are inferior to them neither in brains nor in resources, their commonwealth is more wisely governed and more happily flourishing than ours."³⁷

In the Utopia, then, the European kings and councilors are prejudiced and proud and, therefore, lack wisdom. As a result there is no justice in any state in Europe. The Utopians are properly open-minded and humble and, therefore, possess wisdom. As a result their commonwealth is justly ruled. In the Utopia, as in the Republic, wisdom properly pertains to reason, the ruling function in the nature of man.

³⁵Utopia, p. 185/3-5.

³⁶Utopia, pp. 193/39-195/2.

³⁷Utopia, p. 109/18-20.

Socrates next explains that as the rulers must exercise wisdom in the just state, the warriors must possess courage (IV 429 A-430 C). In the just man courage properly pertains to the spirited part as distinct from the rational and from the appetitive parts of the soul. Courage, however, is not an appetite but functions in the spirited part on behalf of reason. Socrates clarifies the connection between reason and spirit by comparing the soul to a beseiged city: "Would not these two [the reason and the spirit], then, best keep guard against enemies from without also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel, the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler's designs?"³⁸ Stressing the necessity for it to be associated with reason, Socrates defines courage as an "unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared."³⁹

The idea of correct conviction in Socrates' definition assumes importance, because courage is sometimes used as though it had no relationship to reason--as though it were synonymous with fearlessness. Shakespeare, for example, portrays Lady Macbeth as a person with such a notion of courage. Taunting her husband into murdering Duncan, she urges him to the deed

³⁸Rep. IV 442 B (Shorey, I, 409).

³⁹Rep. IV 430 B (Shorey, I, 357).

by exhorting him to screw his courage to the sticking place. She fails to see that in murdering the king, Macbeth's spirit would not be working in behalf of reason. Macbeth, however, realizes that such an unnatural action, which goes against reason, would not be courageous. His answer to Lady Macbeth epitomizes his tragedy: "I dare do all that may become a man./ Who dares do more is none."⁴⁰ Despite the fact that Macbeth commits the murder, he knows that his action is contrary to man's nature and is therefore a mockery of courage.

In the Republic neither Thrasymachus nor Glaucon specifically defines courage, but their understanding of "natural" precludes the ruler's use of reason in guiding his actions. In the state of nature outlined by Glaucon, the strong man need not use reason, but he must be fearless in gaining power over his peers. The way that Glaucon would have defined courage can be surmised, perhaps, by looking at courage in the enlarged picture of the theory of social contract drawn by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes says that courage is a passion: "Amongst the Passions, Courage (by which I mean the Contempt of Wounds, and violent Death) inclineth men to private Revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the Publique Peace."⁴¹

⁴⁰I, vii, 46-47, Shakespeare, The Complete Works, ed. G. B. Harrison (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1952).

⁴¹Hobbes, p. 619.

In Socrates' view of the nature of man courage is not numbered "Amongst the Passions." Courage would not incline men either to "private Revenges" or to the "unsettling of the Publique Peace." On the contrary, the courage of the guardians preserves the public peace. Hobbes includes no idea of correct conviction in his definition, as does Socrates. When one considers Socrates' definition next to that of Hobbes, the significance of Plato's influence on Thomas More becomes more apparent.

In the Utopia the virtue of courage is emphasized less than in the Republic. When the need arises, however, the Utopians display courage as defined by Socrates and not as defined by Hobbes. In the Republic courage becomes important because war must be accepted as a condition of existence. Socrates suggests, for example, that a state of enmity naturally exists between Greeks and non-Greeks: "I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian."⁴² The Utopians consider war "as an activity fit only for beasts,"⁴³ and they have no enmity toward non-Utopians. They "think that nobody who has done you no harm should be accounted an enemy."⁴⁴

Because the Utopians do not accept war as customary,

⁴²Rep. V 470 C (Shorey, I, 497).

⁴³Utopia, p. 199/39.

⁴⁴Utopia, p. 199/31-32.

courage becomes significant only at intervals. Nonetheless all the citizens train for military duty and all are expected to be courageous. The Utopians, however, have no respect for military gains made through brute force. They primarily respect victory that comes through the use of reason: "They boast themselves as having acted with valor and heroism whenever their victory is such as no animal except man could have won, that is, by strength of intellect; for, by strength of body, say they, bears, lions, boars, wolves, dogs, and other wild beasts are wont to fight."⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Utopians do not consider fearlessness without reason as an ingredient of courage. As Hythlodæus explains, "When personal service is inevitable, they are as courageous in fighting as they were ingenious in avoiding it as long as they might."⁴⁶ The Utopians' courage is fostered by their just institutions, which eliminate the cause of fears that beset most men when in danger: "The absence of anxiety about livelihood at home, as well as the removal of that worry which troubles men about the future of their families (for such solicitude everywhere breaks the highest courage), makes their spirit exalted and disdainful of defeat."⁴⁷

⁴⁵Utopia, p. 203/21-25.

⁴⁶Utopia, p. 211/13-15.

⁴⁷Utopia, p. 211/18-21.

All the Utopians, then, put in practice the courage that Socrates defines as necessary for the guardians. Their courage is based on reason and involves the correct conviction about the things to be feared and the things not to be feared: "So they do not hold their life so cheap as recklessly to throw it away and not so immoderately dear as greedily and shamefully to hold fast to it when honor bids them give it up."⁴⁸

In the Republic the next virtue considered after courage is temperance. Socrates explains that it, like justice, does not pertain to any specific part of the state or the soul. Rather, temperance creates harmony in the state or in the soul between the part that rules and the part that obeys. In the state the ruler should have a sufficient amount of wisdom to rule well, and the subject should be obedient; in the soul of the individual, the reason should be properly developed so that it can rule with authority over the appetite. Maintaining a balance between reason and appetite, a temperate man follows nature in avoiding excess. Socrates characterizes such a man as one who is "master of himself."

Temperance is a most conspicuous virtue in Utopia and in the Utopians. In the Utopian commonwealth the exercise of authority is hardly noticed. The chief functions of the ruling syphogrants are to elect the governor and "to manage and

⁴⁸Utopia, p. 211/25-28.

provide that no one sit idle."⁴⁹ Hythlodæus observes that even the scholars pursue their studies in the spirit of obedience. He comments that new subject matter was readily learned by intelligent and mature scholars "who undertook to learn their tasks not only fired by their own free will but acting under orders of the senate."⁵⁰ In the Utopian commonwealth, then, temperance is evident in the harmony that exists between the officials and the city. Hythlodæus explains how the citizens display filial endearment toward their superiors: "They are called fathers and show that character."⁵¹ The Utopians, as a people, display their temperance in various ways. For example, Hythlodæus emphasizes that "they do not lightly go to war,"⁵² but do so only when unduly provoked.

The temperance manifested in the commonwealth as a whole results from the proper relationship between reason and appetite in the individual Utopians. Advocating a rational control of the senses in their philosophy, they hold that "the senses as well as right reason aim at whatever is pleasant by nature."⁵³ In following nature they

⁴⁹Utopia, p. 127/23-24.

⁵⁰Utopia, p. 181/19-21.

⁵¹Utopia, p. 195/1-2.

⁵²Utopia, p. 201/4-5.

⁵³Utopia, p. 167/10-12.

follow the golden mean. Realizing that the pursuit of excessive pleasure is spurious, they "take care not to let a lesser pleasure interfere with a greater nor to follow after a pleasure which could bring pain in retaliation."⁵⁴

The harmony in the commonwealth, then, comes from the harmony within the souls of the individual citizens.

In the Utopia the virtues of justice, wisdom, courage, and temperance have much the same meaning as they have in the Republic. The important difference is that in More's view all the virtues should be manifested in all the citizens in the state, whereas in Plato's view each citizen should manifest primarily those virtues that are required for his function. Other characteristics of the just man are not specifically mentioned in the discussion of the moral virtues in Book IV of the Republic. These characteristics will be considered in the following chapter in connection with Socrates' description of the philosophic nature.

The second major part of the Republic (The Origin and Nature of Justice) seems to end at the close of Book IV. In his concluding words Socrates indicates that he intends to consider the vices that corrupt the just soul and the just state: "Now that we have come to this height of argument I seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form

⁵⁴Utopia, p. 163/8-10.

of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worth while to take note of."⁵⁵ The discussion of the vices, however, does not occur until the beginning of Book VIII. The reader could well omit the reading of Books V, VI, and VII without any loss in continuity. These three books, therefore, seem to constitute a long digression.

At this point in the Republic the greatest difficulty arises in attempting to analyze the overall structure. At the opening of Book V Socrates begins the discussion he had promised at the end of Book IV. However, Adeimantus stops him abruptly and exhorts him to go back and take up the matter of the community of wives, which he had passed over in the discussion of the origin and nature of justice: "We think you are a slacker . . . and are trying to cheat us out of a whole division [italics mine], and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to "get away with it" by observing thus lightly that, of course, in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody that the possessions of friends will be in common."⁵⁶ Socrates defers to the wishes of Adeimantus and pays back the "whole division" he had excerpted from the earlier discussion. The question arises here whether the "whole division," which

⁵⁵Rep. IV 445 C-D (Shorey, I, 421-23).

⁵⁶Rep. IV 449 C (Shorey, I, 427).

Socrates pays back in Book V, concludes Part II (The Origin and Nature of Justice) or begins Part III (The Imperative for Justice).

There are good arguments for considering the beginning of Book V as the beginning of the next major part (Part III) of the structure. First, the digression from the beginning of Book V through Book VII seems to be complete and unified in itself; Book VIII seems to follow logically upon Book IV. Second, it is difficult to determine where the next major part begins if not at the beginning of Book V. It seems more comfortable to assume that the beginning of a complete new part would occur at the opening of a book. This second argument gains support from the fact that Book V, taken by itself, is unified and coherent.

Within Book V is an extended sea metaphor, which can be divided into three parts, corresponding to three "waves of paradox." Socrates likens himself to a sea-tossed man attempting to swim his way over these three mighty waves. He says, "We, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea of argument in the hope that either some dolphin will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue."⁵⁷ The first wave of paradox starts near the beginning of Book V, in which, after a brief introduction, the direction which the discussion will

⁵⁷Rep. V 453 D (Shorey, I, 441).

continue is decided. It extends from this point, 451 C, to 457 C. In this section Socrates compares the natures of men and women and advances the idea that women as well as men should be guardians in the ideal state.

The second wave of paradox begins with the following transitional passage:

"In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our paradox and have not been quite swept away by it in ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what it proposes is both possible and beneficial." "It is no slight wave that you are thus escaping." "You will not think it a great one," I said, "when you have seen the one that follows."⁵⁸

The second wave of paradox contains the proposition that wives and children of the guardians shall be shared by all. This wave extends from 457 C to 467 A. "The 'great third wave' of paradox, the worst of all,"⁵⁹ begins after a short digression on war and extends from 472 A to the end of Book V, 480 A. It contains the proposition that in the ideal state philosophers must be kings.

Despite these reasons for considering Book V as the beginning of a new part of the whole structure of the Republic, there are equally good reasons for believing that Part III begins within Book V with the introduction of the

⁵⁸ Rep. V 457 C (Shorey, I, 453).

⁵⁹ Rep. V 472 A (Shorey, I, 503).

discussion of the third wave of paradox.⁶⁰ First, the matters discussed in the first two waves of paradox logically fit into the description of the ideal state, which has been continuous throughout Book IV. Before the first wave of paradox begins in Book V, Socrates indicates that he is about to resume the previous discussion: "We must return . . . and say now what perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there."⁶¹

This statement refers to a point in Book IV where Socrates passed over the subjects he now intends to consider: ". . . other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession of wives and marriage, and the procreation of children and all that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends that are common."⁶² Since it occurs in Book IV, this statement foreshadows the matter discussed in the first two waves of paradox in Book V--marital relations and the rearing of children. However, it makes no mention of the matter discussed in the third wave, the proposition that

⁶⁰The question as to whether Plato wrote the digression in Book V through Book VII at a different time from the remainder of the Republic need not be considered here. This analysis concerns only the logical divisions in the work and not the historical facts of composition. For a discussion of the arguments relating to interpolation of Books V-VII, see Lewis Campbell, "On the Structure of Plato's Republic and Its Relation to Other Dialogues," in Plato's Republic, eds. B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894) II, 1-11.

⁶¹Rep. V 451 C (Shorey, I, 433).

⁶²Rep. IV 424 A (Shorey, I, 331).

philosophers must be kings. Another reason for considering the third wave of paradox as the beginning of the next part of the whole structure is that the matter taken up here opens a completely new dimension of the discussion. Up to this point in the dialogue, Socrates has described the just state as it should exist if it were possible. This description includes all the details beginning with the origins of the state in Book II, 368 A, and continuing to the section that contains the third wave of paradox in Book V, 472 C.

Between the second and third waves of paradox there is a short digression on war (466 D-472 C). This section is only tenuously connected with the second wave of paradox. The digression begins with Socrates' suggestion that he intends to consider the question as to whether such an ideal state could exist and in what way it could come into existence. He suggests that wars and the way in which they will be conducted are too obvious for discussion.⁶³ However, since Glaucon wishes to pursue the discussion, Socrates proceeds with what essentially amounts to a digression, which serves as a transition between the second and third waves.

At the beginning of the third wave, the discussion changes from a consideration of the nature of the just state and the just man to a consideration of how the just state could

⁶³Rep. V 466 D (Shorey, I, 485).

be realized. Glaucon admits that the state Socrates has described would indeed be ideal if it were possible, but he challenges Socrates to explain how it could come into being: "The more such excuses you offer . . . the less you will be released by us from telling in what way the realization of this polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off."⁶⁴ Socrates' answer to this challenge indicates that the discussion to follow concerns a new aspect of the consideration of justice and injustice: "The first thing to recall, then, . . . is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice that brought us to this pass."⁶⁵ This statement signals a change from the discussion of the nature of justice and injustice to a consideration of the imperative for justice.

Although most critics who have written about the structure of the Republic divide the work at the beginning of Book V, the conclusion reached in the analysis here is that the logical division between Part II and Part III occurs within Book V at the beginning of the third wave of paradox (471 C). This conclusion is supported by a larger aspect of the overall structure. If the work is divided within Book V at the third wave of paradox (and not at the opening of Book V), then

⁶⁴Rep. V 472 B (Shorey, I, 503).

⁶⁵Rep. V 472 B (Shorey, I, 503).

Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) and Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) can be taken together as one logical unit, and Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B), and Part V (X 595 A-621 D) can be taken together as another logical unit. This alignment of the whole work can perhaps be better understood from the following diagram:

<p>The first logical unit Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) Prologue Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) The Origin and Nature of Justice</p>	<p>In this first half of the work Plato states the problems to be considered in the entire dialogue and defines justice and injustice.</p>
<p>The second logical unit Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) The Imperative for Justice Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) The Nature of Injustice Part V (X 595 A-621 D) Epilogue</p>	<p>In this second half of the work Plato investigates the causes and appraises the results of justice and injustice.</p>

The analysis of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), therefore, can be considered as the beginning of the second half of the entire dialogue. In this part Socrates answers the question of how justice is possible in both the state and man. Part II, which is referred to in this thesis as the imperative for justice, will be discussed in the following two chapters. Before proceeding to that part, however, the first two sections of Book V, which constitute the concluding portion of Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C), must be considered.

If the first two waves of paradox are interpreted as the conclusion to Part II instead of as the beginning of Part

III, the question may be asked why Plato chooses to pass over marital and family relationships which Socrates mentions in Book IV. The conjecture given here is that Plato had determined that it would be better to defer the consideration of the relationship between man and the family until after he had described the nature of man as an individual. Socrates suggests this reason when he resumes the discussion in Book V. He admits that perhaps it would have been better to discuss the matter earlier but concludes that "maybe this way is right, that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female, especially since you are so urgent."⁶⁶

The female drama begins with the first wave of paradox in Book V, 451 C. This section contains one of the major premises upon which Plato's communistic system rests. Socrates maintains that no essential difference exists between the nature of man and the nature of woman. Women, therefore, should perform the same functions in the state as men. Most importantly they, like men, should be guardians. Arguing from the premise that function determines the nature of a thing, he explains that the obvious physical difference is not essential. An essential difference would be, for example, the difference that exists between the nature of a physician and the nature of a carpenter. Socrates explains "that a man

⁶⁶Rep. V 451 C (Shorey, I, 433).

and a woman who have a physician's mind have the same nature. . . . But that a man physician and a man carpenter have different natures."⁶⁷

After he has laid down the premise in the first wave of paradox that men and women are by nature the same, Socrates proceeds in the second wave, 457 C, to consider family relationships. Plato apparently sees some little good but much more evil in the traditional institution of the family. Socrates visualizes the ideal state as one big happy family, but he thinks his ideal impossible to achieve without abolishing individual families. He reasons that if individual families are retained, the members of one family grow apart from members of another. He suggests that men possess wives and children for the same avaricious reasons that they possess any property:

It is not true, then, as I am trying to say, that those former and these present prescriptions tend to make them still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting the city by referring "mine" not to the same but to different things, one man dragging off to his own house anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and another doing the same to his own separate house, and having women and children apart, thus introducing into the state the pleasures and pains of individuals?⁶⁸

This remark implies that a man owns whatever he possesses in his own house, including women and children. Socrates assumes

⁶⁷Rep. V 454 D (Shorey, I, 443-45).

⁶⁸Rep. V 464 C (Shorey, I, 477).

that the elimination of private property would change the prevailing attitude toward wives and children and would redirect the positive attributes of family life into the larger unity of the state. In such a state, no matter whom a citizen meets, "he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these."⁶⁹ With his plan Socrates hopes to retain the best aspects of the institution of the family and eliminate the worst.

In the Utopia More reflects a Christian attitude toward the relationship between men and women and toward the family. Characteristically, More agrees with Socrates in regard to the similarity between men and women, but he rejects the implications that Socrates draws from his assumptions. The Utopian women share many of the same responsibilities as the men. They work at the same tasks. They go to war with their husbands. They consequently enjoy most of the same privileges. For example, the customs on mating and marital relationships ensure the rights of both men and women. Their equal rights can particularly be seen in the divorce law: "It sometimes happens . . . that when a married couple agree insufficiently in their disposition and both find others with whom they hope to live more agreeably, they separate by mutual consent and

⁶⁹Rep. V 463 C (Shorey, I, 473).

contract fresh unions, but not without the sanction of the senate."⁷⁰ Women also receive the same education as men. This privilege can be assumed from the fact that women are not debarred from the priesthood and the priests are selected from the elite group of scholars.

The Utopian women, however, hold a place in the family different from the place of women in the Republic. The Utopians retain the traditional hierarchy in the family: "The oldest . . . rules the household. Wives wait on their husbands, children on their parents, and generally the younger on their elders."⁷¹ Without disrupting the traditional family relationships, the Utopians achieve Socrates' ideal that the state should be one gigantic family. A sharing between and among families insures that "the whole island is like a single family."⁷² In depicting Utopia as a huge family, Thomas More might have been influenced by Aristotle's criticism of the Republic. Aristotle sees the problem with Plato's family state as an overemphasis on unity. Nettleship has commented on Aristotle's arguments and has added his own explanation:

Aristotle in his criticism of Plato's communism puts the most obvious and far-reaching objection when he says that Plato's fundamental fallacy is an exaggerated conception of the virtue of unity. This criticism, however,

⁷⁰Utopia, p. 191/1-5.

⁷¹Utopia, p. 137/30-33.

⁷²Utopia, p. 149/3-4.

would be expressed more truly by saying that Plato has a one-sided and defective conception of unity; he does not realize enough that unity in human society can only be obtained through diversity. The ideal state of society would be one in which there was the greatest scope for individual diversity, and in spite of that the greatest unity.⁷³

In his description of Utopia More seems to have heeded Aristotle's comments, except those in regard to ownership of private property. In the Utopia as in the Republic private property is identified as a source of disunity in the polity. The difference lies in what Plato and More apparently think the mass of men assume to be private property. In the passage quoted above (V 464 C, p. 123) Socrates implies that in the ordinary Greek household women and children are looked upon as property; therefore, he finds it necessary to establish that men and women have the same nature. Undoubtedly More does not think it necessary to emphasize the point that women have the same nature as men, for the era of Christianity intervening between Plato's time and that of More had established, at least theoretically, the position of women as human beings instead of as property. In Utopia, therefore, private property is abolished, but the traditional family relationship is retained.

In the Utopia, then, as in the Republic, unity is the desired objective, but the means of achieving it are different.

⁷³ Nettleship, p. 180.

Plato destroys the traditional hierarchy in the family in order to achieve unity through a hierarchy of classes among citizens. In contrast, More retains the traditional hierarchy in the family in order to achieve unity through equality among all citizens. Apparently, More thinks that Plato's scheme would not achieve the desired objective. To destroy the family unit would be to destroy the love and harmony that characterize the best families.

After his discussion of marriage and the family, Socrates digresses to consider the conduct of war. He explains that the women guardians, like the men, must go to war. The children who are to become guardians also must ride out to war as apprentices to learn their trade. In Utopia women go to war if they choose to join their husbands. In that case the whole family fights together "so that those may be closest and lend one another mutual assistance whom nature most impels to help one another."⁷⁴ That women and children go to war in the Utopia is a striking parallel with the Republic. The parallel not only shows how More borrowed details from Plato's work, but it also reveals how he adapted incidents to suit his own purpose.

The assignment of responsibility for war in the Utopia also parallels the Republic. The citizens in the Republic say

⁷⁴Utopia, p. 211/4-6.

that "only a few at any time are their foes, those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel."⁷⁵ The Utopians, likewise, "know that the common folk do not go to war of their own accord but are driven to it by the madness of kings."⁷⁶

The digression on war in the Republic concludes Part II, which begins after the exordium in Book II (368 A) and extends to the start of the third wave of paradox (V 471 C). In Part II Socrates answers the question about the origin and nature of justice put to him by Glaucon in the exordium. The philosophical rudiments of his answer are basically the same as the philosophical assumptions which underlie the Utopia. In both works these same theories about the origin and nature of justice are either stated or assumed: the origin of justice is in an eternal and immutable law that does not originate in the subjective opinions of men or in their laws or contracts; the nature of justice is order and unity, and the nature of injustice is disorder and disunity.

The differences between the Republic and the Utopia in regard to the origin and nature of justice pertain chiefly to the means of attaining similar ends. Because More has his own ideas about how order and unity might be achieved, he arranges the parts of the structure of the Utopia in a different order and with a different emphasis from the order

⁷⁵Rep. V 471 B (Shorey, I, 499).

⁷⁶Utopia, p. 205/29-31.

and the emphasis in the structure of the Republic. As will be discussed in later chapters More's rationale for the ordering of the parts of the structure of the Utopia is determined primarily by his apprehension of the injustices in the fundamental institutions in the nations of Europe, particularly England.

The next chapter continues the analysis of the Republic at the point (V 471 C) where Socrates extends the sea metaphor and dives into the third and greatest of the three waves of paradox. This paradox, that the ruler of the ideal state must be a philosopher, changes the dimension of the discussion. Now that justice has been defined in Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C), Socrates begins to explain how justice can be realized in the state and in the nature of man. This explanation constitutes Part III (V 471 C-VII 543 A).

CHAPTER V

IS JUSTICE POSSIBLE?

The Republic and the Utopia are likely to evoke similar responses in the reader. The ideal states described by Plato and More would be desirable if they were possible, but one wonders how citizens in any state could be induced to act as justly and as wisely as the guardians in the Republic and the citizens of Utopia. Plato and More both acknowledge that their descriptions of the ideal state arouse such skepticism by representing it dramatically in the characters of the dialogues.

In the Republic Glaucon responds to Socrates' description of the ideal state in the way one might expect of any intelligent listener. He admits that "if it could be realized everything would be lovely,"¹ but he wonders how it could come into actual existence.

Glaucon's mild skepticism follows consistently from the pragmatic explanation of the imperative for justice that he feigns to believe in the exordium (II 357 A-367 E). Summarizing the opinion of the multitude on the question, Glaucon argues that men, of their own free will, are never just.

¹Rep. V 471 C (Shorey, I, 501).

They may appear to be just, but this appearance is prompted by fear. Justice comes into being in the state, therefore, only when a powerful ruler imposes it upon men by force.

Glaucon supports his contention by telling the story of the ring of Gyges. A miraculous ring, he explains, was found by a shepherd in the country of Gyges. The shepherd could make himself invisible or again visible simply by turning the collet of the ring toward or away from himself. With this unique power the peasant gained supreme power and established himself as a tyrant. From the story Glaucon concludes that no man with such a ring would act justly; any man would use it to gain power and to fulfill his desires.

After Glaucon finishes his argument, Adeimantus makes the same point in another way. He says that Glaucon's argument gains support even from those who preach the desirability of acting justly. Such persons do not believe that justice is good in itself; they believe that it is a means of acquiring rewards and reputation. He argues, further, that the multitudes are also motivated by the expectation of rewards in the life hereafter. The poets, he says, teach that the gods can be influenced by vows and supplications to reward those who have acted unjustly during life. Moreover, the poets describe the life hereafter as a continuation of the sensual pleasures enjoyed by the unjust here on earth.

The arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus taken together

deny that justice is good in itself. If it is good at all, they maintain, it is the lowest of three classes of good. A "good" in the highest class, as Socrates explains, "we love both for its own sake and for its consequences, such as understanding, sight, and health."² A good in the second class we desire for its own sake without regard for its consequences. A good in the third and lowest class is sought only for its consequences. This third and lowest class is where the multitude place justice. They think that "it belongs to the toilsome class of things that must be practiced for the sake of rewards and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned as an affliction."³ If justice belongs to the third and lowest class of goods, man obviously does not seek it of his own free will. Rather, if he acts justly at all, he does so through a motive of self-interest. It is consistent, then, for Glaucon to wonder in Book V about the plausibility of a state where men are not coerced, and they seem to act justly of their own free will.

In the Utopia Peter Giles at the end of Book I and the persona More at the end of Book II make skeptical remarks similar to those of Glaucon. Before Hythlodæus describes the ideal state, Peter Giles says that it would be hard to convince

²Rep. II 357 C (Shorey, I, 111).

³Rep. II 358 A (Shorey, I, 111).

him that "a better-ordered people is to be found in that new world than in the one known to us."⁴ After Hythlodæus describes Utopia, the persona More says that "there are very many features in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for me to wish for in our countries than to have any hope of seeing realized."⁵

The skeptical comments made by Thomas More and Peter Giles ironically support the pragmatic theory of the imperative for justice, represented by Hythlodæus' adversaries in Book I. The opinions of the lawyer at Cardinal Morton's and of the European kings and councilors imply the arguments advanced by Glaucon in the Republic. The lawyer, for example, does not believe that justice is a good in itself. He assumes that men must be coerced by stringent laws, or they will prefer to steal and to defy authority. According to the lawyer, justice must be imposed on the people by force. The kings and their councilors also act in the way Glaucon says any man would act if he could make himself invisible and thereby escape reprisal for his injustice.

In Part III (V 471 C-VII 541 B) and in a portion of Book X of the Republic, Plato answers the question as to how justice can be established in the state and as to what motivates men to be just. In Part III Socrates outlines an alternative to

⁴Utopia, p. 107/25-26.

⁵Utopia, p. 247/1-3.

the deterministic theory that Glaucon argues for in the exordium. In Book X he offers an alternative to the description of the life hereafter, which Adeimantus in the exordium attributes to the poets.

The present chapter will consider Socrates' answer to Glaucon's challenge, which is given in Part III (V 471 C-VII 541 B), but not his answer to Adeimantus' challenge, which is given in Part V (Book X). Although Thomas More's answer to the question does not constitute a structural part of the Utopia, the answer can be inferred from an analysis of Utopian philosophical and theological opinions as they contrast with those of the other peoples with whom they are compared. In this and in the following chapter More's explanation of the imperative for justice is compared with that of Plato, but the significance of More's ideas in the structure of the Utopia is not considered fully. This significance will be treated below (Chapter XII), where the Utopians' religions are discussed.

Socrates' answer to Glaucon's opinion begins with the third wave of paradox in Book V, which begins Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B). Before revealing the paradox, however, Socrates makes some preliminary remarks about the relation of the ideal to the real. These remarks, though brief, have a significant bearing on the raison d'être of both the Republic and the Utopia. In a sense the reason for considering either work

seriously rests on the proposition that the ideal is more real than the actual. The rationale for creating an ideal state rests on the assumption that there exists an ideal form of justice itself.

By way of justifying the discussion just concluded, Socrates explains the value of creating an ideal state. Prompted by Glaucon's expressed doubt that the ideal state can be realized, Socrates answers that because a just state does not or cannot exist should not invalidate the existence of the reality as a concept: "A pattern, then, . . . was what we wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to injustice and the completely unjust man."⁶ He asks Glaucon whether a painter would be "any the less a good painter, who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist."⁷

In More's work *Hythlodæus* draws the picture of Utopia after being prompted by Peter Giles's skeptical remark. *Hythlodæus'* answer to Peter Giles suggests that More may have intended to draw the perfect picture suggested by

⁶Rep. V 472 C (Shorey, I, 505).

⁷Rep. V 472 D (Shorey, I, 505).

Socrates in his answer to Glaucon: "I do not wonder . . . that it looks this way to you, being a person who has no picture at all, or else a false one, of the situation I mean."⁸ Perhaps More's idea for the fiction that the ideal state exists in a land beyond the sea was prompted by Socrates' further remark: "If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past, or now are in some barbaric region far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be realized when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state."⁹ This statement of Socrates shows in another way the difference in the stylistic methods of Plato and More. Plato suggests that an ideal state may exist in some barbaric region, and More pretends that an ideal state does exist in such a region. Plato's theory of poetry would have precluded the fictional method adopted by More.¹⁰

The description of an ideal state, then, is good even if it cannot be realized. Neither Plato nor More, however,

⁸Utopia, p. 107/17-19.

⁹Rep. VI 499 C (Shorey, II, 65).

¹⁰This difference in aesthetic theory was discussed briefly in Chapter I. For a more complete discussion of the significance of More's fictional pretense, see the article by Harry Berger, Jr., "The Renaissance Imagination: Second World and Green World," Centennial Review, IX (1965), 44.

considers only the ideal. Both works answer the question of how a present state can be transformed into the ideal state. In the Republic Socrates begins his answer in the discussion that constitutes the third wave. He maintains that the realization of justice in the state requires that philosophers become kings or kings turn to philosophy. This proposition follows logically from Socrates' previous description of the nature of justice. If creating order among the parts of the state produces justice, then the attainment of justice begins with the placement of the best rulers in the ruling part of the body politic. The best rulers, as Socrates goes on to explain, are the philosophers.

This simple proposition, which Socrates calls the worst wave of paradox, needs much amplification. He therefore proceeds to analyze the philosophic nature. This analysis (V 471 D-VI 501 E) constitutes the first of two major sections of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B). In the second major section (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) Socrates explains how the philosophic nature must be nurtured.

In analyzing the philosophic nature, Socrates says it must first be determined "whom we mean by the philosophers, who we dare to say ought to be our rulers."¹¹ Defining the meaning of philosopher in a broad sense, Socrates explains that an

¹¹Rep. V 474 B (Shorey, I, 511).

indiscriminate love of wisdom marks the generic character of the philosopher. He then compares the philosopher's love of wisdom with other kinds of indiscriminate love. The lover of wine, for example, loves all kinds of wine, and the lover of honor loves all kinds of distinctions. This all-inclusive love must precede any discrimination among the objects sought by the lover. The philosopher in the generic sense, therefore, loves all kinds of intellectual pursuit.

Socrates does not indicate how many of the citizens of the republic are philosophers in this generic sense. In Utopia, however, practically all of the citizens possess this basic requisite of the philosophic nature. Explaining how the Utopians spend much of their leisure time in intellectual pursuits, Hythlodæus indicates that "a great number of all classes . . . both males and females, flock to hear the lectures, some to one and some to another, according to their natural inclination."¹² From the ranks of the Utopians, the syphogrants select an elite group of scholars, who "learn thoroughly the various branches of knowledge."¹³

In the Republic Socrates makes a further distinction between the lover of all wisdom and the lover of a special kind of wisdom. To love every kind of intellectual pursuit

¹²Utopia, p. 129/6-8.

¹³Utopia, p. 131/38-39.

is not enough to become a true philosopher. The true philosophers are "those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamoured."¹⁴ Those who search for truth distinguish themselves from others who follow intellectual pursuits by the fact that they try to understand the underlying principles, or "forms," behind appearances. "Forms" are the elements of unity in the various objects which we apprehend by the senses.¹⁵ Socrates' explanation of what he means by forms points up Plato's continual search for unity in multiplicity: "And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects."¹⁶

Justice is one of various kinds of forms. Because he can apprehend these forms behind the appearances of things, the true philosopher is distinguished from the man who possesses only right opinion. To explain this difference, Socrates compares the man who possesses only right opinion, as distinct from true knowledge, with a dreamer: "Is not the dream state, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this: the mistaking

¹⁴Rep. V 475 E (Shorey, I, 517).

¹⁵Nettleship, p. 197.

¹⁶Rep. V 476 A (Shorey, I, 517-19).

of resemblance for identity?"¹⁷

The true philosopher, then, can apprehend the form of beauty, whereas those who have only right opinion can "delight in beautiful tones and colours and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself."¹⁸ The true philosopher can also apprehend the form of justice, whereas the man with right opinion thinks that justice takes on many shapes, as determined by separate acts of individual men. He does not see, as does the philosopher, that justice is always and everywhere one and the same.

In this section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) Socrates does not explain why the philosopher desires to know the forms of truth, beauty, and justice, nor how he develops the desire to know. He merely assumes that the philosopher naturally desires to apprehend "forms." In Section II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III, Socrates discusses the question of why and how the philosopher desires to know true justice or beauty.

If one accepts the premise that the philosopher naturally apprehends "forms," however, Socrates' conclusion follows. This conclusion is the proposition contained in the third wave of paradox. The man with true knowledge of the "form of justice"

¹⁷Rep. V 476 C (Shorey, I, 519).

¹⁸Rep. V 476 B (Shorey, I, 519).

should rule the state instead of the man who sees only appearances.

An understanding of what Socrates means by "forms" is central to an understanding of the comparison between the Republic and the Utopia in regard to the imperative for justice. His use of the concept corresponds to the concept "universal" as it came to be used later in scholastic philosophy. During the Middle Ages the argument over whether universals had objective existence outside of the minds of men became the central problem of philosophy. The denial of the existence of universals grew from the voluntarism of Duns Scotus and the nominalism of William of Ockham and gave rise to disputes among various religious orders and institutions in Europe.¹⁹

The attitude toward universals that underlies the Utopia is ambivalent. The Utopians apprehend absolute truth, beauty, and justice behind the appearances of objects, but they display their characteristic dislike for speculation as to whether "universals" exist in nature. Hythlodæus explains their skeptical attitude: So far are they from ability to speculate on second intentions that not one of them could see even man himself as a so-called universal--though he was, as you know, colossal and greater than any giant, as well

¹⁹For a concise discussion of the controversy see Josef Pieper, *Scholasticism*, tr. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 109-36.

as pointed out by us with our finger."²⁰ In this passage More does not necessarily deny the existence of universals. It does indicate, however, More's reaction to the Schoolmen's obsessive concern with the question.²¹

Despite what Hythlodæus says about the Utopians' inability to see "man himself as a so-called universal," they strive to apprehend absolute truth, beauty, and justice behind the appearance of objects. Just as Socrates identifies the true philosopher by his love of truth, the Utopians regard the contemplation of truth as the highest of all pleasures: "To the soul they ascribe intelligence and the sweetness which is bred of contemplation of truth."²²

The Utopians are also distinguished from other peoples by their ability to see true beauty and not to be deceived by appearances: "While they consider it a sign of a sluggish and feeble mind not to preserve natural beauty, it is, in their judgment, disgraceful affectation to help it out by cosmetics."²³ Considering righteousness more beautiful than fine clothes, gems, and honors, the Utopians all wear the same kind of plain garments, and "gold and silver, of which money is made, are so

²⁰Utopia, p. 159/31-35.

²¹For a discussion of this reaction, see Surtz, The Praise of Pleasure, pp. 87-118.

²²Utopia, p. 173/12-13.

²³Utopia, p. 193/21-24.

treated by them that no one values them more highly than their true nature deserves."²⁴ The Utopians use gold, for example, as a symbol of slavery.

The most effective example of the distinction the Utopians make between appearance and reality occurs in the episode of the Anemolian ambassadors. The Anemolian dignitaries come to Utopia in fine robes and gold adornment with the assumption that their trappings enhance their moral worth. Thomas More evidences his ironic genius in contrasting these characters to the Utopian child, who in its simple way sees the "form" of beauty behind the appearance. The child sets the proper value on the trappings when he says, "Look, mother, what a big booby is still wearing pearls and jewels as if he were yet a little boy!"²⁵

The Utopians also contrast with the Europeans in that they see one form of justice behind the multiplicity of men's actions. Law and order reigns in Utopia despite its few laws. Because they are not distracted by minute interpretations of codes of law, the Utopians see the principle behind the law. The Europeans, on the other hand, manipulate laws because they cannot see the absolute nature of justice:

In consequence men think either that all justice is only a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the majesty

²⁴Utopia, p. 151/18-20.

²⁵Utopia, p. 155/33-34.

of kings or that there are at least two forms of it: the one which goes on foot and creeps on the ground, fit only for the common sort and bound by many chains so that it can never overstep its barriers; the other a virtue of kings, which, as it is more august than that of ordinary folk, is also far freer so that everything is permissible to it--except what it finds disagreeable.²⁶

Because the Utopians can discern the true nature of beauty and justice behind the appearance of objects, they have little need for rulers. While other nations seek Utopians to rule them, the Utopians function harmoniously with few leaders selected democratically from their own ranks. Significantly, however, the leaders are selected from the elite group of five hundred scholars: "It is out of this company of scholars that they choose ambassadors, priests, tranibors, and finally the governor himself."²⁷

The Utopian system of selecting leaders shows how subtly More adapted material in the Republic to suit his purposes. The method of selecting leaders from the elite group of scholars implies that the governor and the other officials have been elected because they possess the philosophic nature. This method of electing officials was not practiced in the Europe of More's time nor in the Greece of Plato's time. Socrates points out in a passage to be discussed below that in present society the multitude ridicules the true philosopher

²⁶Utopia, p. 199/10-17.

²⁷Utopia, p. 133/5-8.

and shuns him as an outcast. In the republic, as well as in Utopia, the citizens respect and obey the philosopher.

Socrates' identification of the true philosopher brings Book V of the Republic to a close. In the beginning of Book VI he describes the ethical side of the philosophic nature. He enumerates traits which the just man would have and which naturally proceed from the love of truth and from the four moral virtues of justice, wisdom, courage, and temperance. A true and not a sham philosopher will be concerned with the pleasures of the soul and "will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument."²⁸ Possessing a spirit of truthfulness and a "reluctance to admit falsehood,"²⁹ he will be of a liberal spirit. That is, he will have a "mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence," and he will not "deem this life of man a thing of great concern."³⁰ A man with this kind of mind will be just and gentle and not unsocial and savage. Socrates summarizes the nature of the philosopher as one who is "by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent, gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety."³¹

²⁸Rep. VI 485 D (Shorey, II, 9).

²⁹Rep. VI 485 C (Shorey, II, 7).

³⁰Rep. VI 486 A (Shorey, II, 9-11).

³¹Rep. VI 487 A (Shorey, II, 13).

These specific traits of the philosophic nature, in addition to the four moral virtues discussed in the previous chapter, are possessed by the Utopians, with some variation. The Utopians, for example, seek primarily the pleasures of the soul, but they are not indifferent to those of the body:

"The pleasures which they admit as genuine they divide into various classes, some pleasures being attributed to the soul and others to the body."³² Although they admit both kinds of pleasure as genuine, "they cling above all to mental pleasures, which they value as the first and foremost of all pleasures."³³

As a result of their moral virtues, the Utopians have a spirit of truthfulness and a reluctance to admit falsehood. In contrast to the situation in Europe, where flattery wins political preferment, in Utopia flattery brings no political advantage. In fact, "the man who solicits votes to obtain any office is deprived completely of the hope of holding any office at all."³⁴

The next trait mentioned by Socrates also characterizes the Utopians. Having minds habituated to thoughts of grandeur, they regard the contemplation of truth as the appropriate concern of man. They believe that "as much time as possible

³²Utopia, p. 173/9-12.

³³Utopia, p. 175/34-35.

³⁴Utopia, p. 193/37-39.

should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted to the freedom and culture of the mind."³⁵ Consequently, they have no inclination for such idle pastimes as dicing and hunting. Their minds and spirits have been cultivated so that they deem this life of man a thing of no great concern: "Almost all Utopians are absolutely certain and convinced that human bliss will be so immense that, while they lament every man's illness, they regret the death of no one but him whom they see torn from life anxiously and unwillingly."³⁶

The Utopians' virtues make them just and gentle and not unsocial and savage. In contrast to the savage Zapoletans, who are "fearsome, rough, and wild,"³⁷ they show gentleness in all their actions. For example, they are sociable toward strangers. Although few foreigners make their way to Utopia, those who come are treated with special favor. At the common meals, "the finest of everything is distributed equally among the halls according to the number in each, except that special regard is paid to the governor, the high priest, and the tranibors, as well as to the ambassadors and all foreigners."³⁸

The Utopians also have good memories and quick

³⁵Utopia, p. 135/21-23.

³⁶Utopia, p. 223/21-24.

³⁷Utopia, p. 207/12-13.

³⁸Utopia, p. 141/13-17.

apprehension. They evidence these traits particularly in their ease in learning the Greek language. Hythlodæus observes that "they began so easily to imitate the shapes of the letters, so readily to pronounce the words, so quickly to learn by heart, and so faithfully to reproduce what they had learned that it was a perfect wonder to us."³⁹ Their diligence chiefly explains the Utopians' quick grasp of the Greek language. Hythlodæus comments that he did not expect them to learn so quickly. "But after a little progress, their diligence made us at once feel sure that our own diligence would not be bestowed in vain."⁴⁰ Thus, the Utopians' good memories and powers of quick apprehension result from their virtues. In Book I Hythlodæus had made the point that although they exceed the Europeans in neither brains nor resources, their commonwealth is more wisely governed and happily flourishing than the nations of Europe.⁴¹

That intellectual prowess follows from virtuous conduct in the Utopia indicates an important difference in the philosophies of Plato and More. Whereas Plato emphasizes the point that virtuous behavior will naturally follow from a fully developed rational faculty, More implies a reversed procedure. In Plato's philosophy virtue follows knowledge; in More's philosophy knowledge follows virtue. This difference will be

³⁹Utopia, p. 181/14-17.

⁴⁰Utopia, p. 181/12-14.

⁴¹Supra, p. 110.

discussed in greater detail below. It is mentioned here to suggest the reason why the Utopians display more virtues than Socrates mentions in the Republic.

In addition to the moral virtues and the traits that proceed from them, the Utopians possess virtues and traits that are not specifically Christian, but they resemble the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Because reason does not suffice by itself for the investigation of true happiness, the Utopians believe that faith and reason must work together: "They never have a discussion of philosophy without uniting certain principles taken from religion as well as from philosophy, which uses rational arguments."⁴² Although a variety of religions have arisen in Utopia, all the Utopians hold that "there is one supreme being, to whom are due both the creation and the providential government of the whole world."⁴³

The Utopians also display the virtue of hope. Besides intelligence and the sweetness which comes from the contemplation of truth, the Utopians consider a good conscience and hope as two genuine pleasures of the soul: "To these two are joined the pleasant recollection of a well-spent life and the sure hope of happiness to come."⁴⁴ For a Utopian to die

⁴²Utopia, p. 161/32-35.

⁴³Utopia, p. 217/19-21.

⁴⁴Utopia, p. 173/13-15.

without hope is a mark of disgrace and causes melancholy silence in the other Utopians. On the other hand, "when men have died cheerfully and full of good hope, no one mourns for them, but they accompany their funeral with song, with great affection commending their souls to God."⁴⁵

The Utopians exercise also the virtue akin to Christian charity. This is evident in their generosity and in their compassion for others. For example, they generously share their food supply: "Though they are more than sure how much food the city with its adjacent territory consumes, they produce far more grain and cattle than they require for their own use: they distribute the surplus among their neighbors."⁴⁶ Deriving pleasure from their compassion, they say that it is "praiseworthy in humanity's name that one man should provide for another man's welfare and comfort--if it is especially humane (and humanity is the virtue most peculiar to man) to relieve the misery of others and, by taking away all sadness from their life, restore them to enjoyment, that is, to pleasure."⁴⁷

Just as the virtue of charity is closely associated with the beatitudes in the Christian religion, so it is also

⁴⁵Utopia, p. 223/34-37.

⁴⁶Utopia, p. 117/8-12.

⁴⁷Utopia, p. 163/35-39.

in Utopia. The Utopians show their charity, compassion, and mercy by caring expertly for the sick and infirm; they have erected four hospitals in the city of Amaurotum. The customs and institutions of Utopia cultivate the virtues of the citizens. For example, they are not permitted to grow accustomed to the butchering of animals, "by the practice of which they think that mercy, the finest feeling of our human nature, is gradually killed off."⁴⁸

Humility is a virtue practiced by a special group of Utopians but respected by all the citizens. A class of holy men, called Buthrescae, performs the tasks which others find odious. The attitude of the Utopians toward these men shows their high regard for those who humble themselves: "The more that these men put themselves in the position of slaves the more are they honored by all."⁴⁹

Piety is a special virtue of some of these men, who comprise one of two schools in their class. The one school rejects the pleasures enjoyed by others, especially matrimony. The other school works just as hard as the first, but those in it prefer matrimony to celibacy. The Utopians regard the latter school as saner but the former as "holier."⁵⁰

⁴⁸Utopia, p. 139/18-21.

⁴⁹Utopia, p. 227/2-3.

⁵⁰Utopia, p. 227/17.

The Utopians also display other virtues closely allied to those already mentioned. Although not specifically named, these additional virtues can be inferred from the general attitudes and behavior of the Utopians. They show tolerance in their open-minded acceptance of new ideas and their hospitality toward strangers. They show patience and perseverance in suffering offenses from their enemies before going to war.⁵¹ Their thrift and industry are shown in the way they maintain their houses and public roads in good repair.

The Utopian characteristics that correspond to the Christian virtues are not mentioned by Socrates in the Republic. Significantly, this omission points up an important difference in the philosophies underlying the two works. In the Republic Socrates assumes that virtue will follow naturally from knowledge of the forms of virtue. The Utopians, on the other hand, hold that unless men shape their characters by habitually good acts, knowledge of virtue is irrelevant. This important difference between the two works will be treated in greater detail in the next chapter in connection with the analysis of Section II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) of the Republic. In that section Socrates explains how justice and the other forms of virtue relate to knowledge of the form of the good. Here, however, it is necessary to

⁵¹Utopia, p. 201/34-35.

consider the next question raised by Adeimantus.

After Socrates describes the qualities of the philosophic nature, Adeimantus logically calls his attention to the actual condition of philosophers in the world. Adeimantus admits that the description of the philosophic nature is fine in theory, but he observes that those who are called philosophers are either useless or scoundrels. This observation prompts Socrates to explain the reasons for the low reputation of philosophy and to suggest the changes that would be necessary to reconcile the ideal philosopher with the real world. This explanation (VI 487 B-VII 501 E) continues to the end of Section I (V 471 D-VI 501 E).

Socrates first contends that philosophers are useless in the present state because the multitude can neither understand nor appreciate the philosophic nature. To explain his point, he employs the traditional ship of state metaphor. He describes a shipmaster who surpasses all the other members of the crew in height and strength, but he is slightly deaf and blind, and his knowledge of navigation "is on a par with his sight and hearing."⁵² The riotous and unruly crew care neither for exercising nor learning the art of navigation. Nevertheless, they desire to seize control of the ship. After his description of such a mutinous ship, Socrates asks rhetorically: "With

⁵²Rep. VI 488 B (Shorey, II, 19).

such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?"⁵³ Adeimantus agrees, and Socrates explains that what he has described is "the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers."⁵⁴ He then concludes that one should not blame the finer spirits for their uselessness, but rather "those who do not know how to make use of them."⁵⁵

The shipmaster's situation in the Republic parallels the situation of Hythlodæus in the Utopia. Hythlodæus is one of the finer philosophic spirits who realizes that he would be considered an idle babbler if he attempted to exercise his wisdom on behalf of the state. The attitude of the lawyer and the other guests at Cardinal Morton's home confirms his judgment. Because Hythlodæus realizes that his advice would be wasted on such ignorant people, he refuses to offer his services as a councilor to any king. Echoing Socrates' comments about the misunderstood philosopher, he summarizes his reasons for rejecting the persona More's suggestion that he become a councilor:

⁵³Rep. VI 488 E (Shorey, II, 23).

⁵⁴Rep. VI 489 A (Shorey, II, 23).

⁵⁵Rep. VI 489 B (Shorey, II, 25).

By this approach . . . I should accomplish nothing else than to share the madness of others as I tried to cure their lunacy. If I would stick to the truth, I must needs speak in the manner I have described. To speak falsehoods, for all I know, may be the part of a philosopher, but it is certainly not for me.⁵⁶

That More had Plato's shipmaster in mind when he conceived the character of Hythlodæus cannot, of course, be insisted upon too strongly. In writing the Utopia, More used many sources and adapted them to suit his purposes. The fact that the persona More takes Hythlodæus for a ship captain, however, may have been suggested by Plato's analogy. Indeed, Peter Giles significantly mentions that Hythlodæus is a ship captain like Plato. In the beginning of Book I the persona More tells Peter Giles, "My guess was not a bad one. The moment I saw him, I was sure he was a ship's captain." Peter Giles answers, "But you are quite mistaken . . . for his sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of Ulysses or, rather, of Plato."⁵⁷ Hythlodæus, then, represents in the Utopia the condition of all true philosophers in the less than ideal state.

After Socrates explains why true philosophers are useless, he points out why others who once had the potential for philosophy become corrupt. The philosopher's gifts themselves corrupt him: "The most surprising fact of all is

⁵⁶Utopia, p. 101/5-9.

⁵⁷Utopia, p. 49/34-37.

that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy."⁵⁸ This surprising fact happens because the best natures fare worse than inferior natures under conditions of nurture unsuited to them. Socrates charges that the Sophists have formed the corrupt opinions of the multitude with their teachings. Such opinions inevitably corrupt the young and inexperienced man with a potential for philosophy.

Socrates explains how this corruption occurs. Any youth who is handsome and talented receives constant flattery from the unthinking crowd. This flattery brings out in the youth the vices of pride and vain ambition. Socrates asks by way of explanation, "Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes, and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians, and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense?"⁵⁹ From these vices of pride and vain ambition an unwillingness to work inevitably follows. Socrates continues, "And if to a man in this state of mind someone gently comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave to win it, do you think it

⁵⁸Rep. VI 491 B (Shorey, II, 31).

⁵⁹Rep. VI 494 C (Shorey, II, 45).

will be easy for him to lend an ear to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings?"⁶⁰ Pride, vain ambition, and an unwillingness to work, all of which result from flattery, chiefly corrupt the philosophic nature.

This corruption is most unfortunate because the potential philosopher is capable of the greatest evil. Socrates uses an interesting image of a flowing stream to describe this misfortune: "And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel, but a small nature never does anything great to a man or a city."⁶¹

In the Utopia Thomas More also uses an image of a stream to describe the ruler's potential for good or evil. In Book I he urges Hythlodæus to offer his wisdom to some great monarch. He explains that Hythlodæus could thereby accomplish great good because "from the monarch, as from a never-failing spring, flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole nation."⁶²

Because the Utopians realize this potential for evil in the nature of a powerful man, they take adequate precautions

⁶⁰ Rep. VI 494 D (Shorey, II, 45).

⁶¹ Rep. VI 495 B (Shorey, II, 47).

⁶² Utopia, p. 57/16-18.

to guard against a tyrant rising among them. Hythlodæus explains how they guard against conspiracy: "To take counsel on matters of common interest outside the senate or the popular assembly is considered a capital offense. The object of these measures, they say, is to prevent it from being easy, by a conspiracy between the governor and the tranibors and by a tyrannous oppression of the people, to change the order of the commonwealth."⁶³

Because the Utopians realize that a man with a potential for good can become worse than an inferior man, they punish the crimes of their own citizens more severely than they do those of slaves taken from other countries: "Their own countrymen are dealt with more harshly, since their conduct is regarded as all the more regrettable and deserving a more severe punishment as an object lesson because, having had an excellent rearing to a virtuous life, they still could not be restrained from crime."⁶⁴ The practice in Utopia, as described in Book II, contrasts with the practice in Europe, as described in Book I. In Europe the rich and powerful, who are the greatest evildoers, perform their villainy with impunity, while the poor and indigent workers are punished severely for petty theft.

⁶³Utopia, p. 125/1-6.

⁶⁴Utopia, p. 185/26-30.

The vices identified by Socrates as the source of corruption in the philosophic nature are the same as those of the rich and powerful Europeans. Pride chiefly causes the corruption in Europe. The noblemen and sycophants in Book I, with the exception of Cardinal Morton, display this vice in their actions. Hythlodæus most explicitly identifies pride as the source of corruption, however, in his peroration at the conclusion of Book II. He likens this vice to a deadly viper: "This serpent from hell entwines itself around the hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in preventing and hindering them from entering on a better way of life."⁶⁵

In addition to being corrupted by pride, Europeans are corrupted by greed in the same way as the philosopher in the Republic. Hythlodæus' account of the council of the French king gives an example of men who unscrupulously go to war because of their greed for wealth and power. The same motivation prompts the anonymous king to enslave his people by manipulating the laws.

The third vice identified by Socrates is also a major source of the sad state of affairs in Europe. Socrates says that the young man corrupted by flattery will be unwilling to work. Hythlodæus points out that the idleness of the

⁶⁵Utopia, pp. 243/39-245/2.

noblemen and their attendants accounts for the thievery in England and the warlike mentality of the French. In England the retainers of noblemen, because they have no useful trades, must turn to stealing when their masters fall on hard times. In France the practice of retaining idle mercenaries is the chief cause of war. Soldiers, good for nothing except fighting, crowd and beset the whole country. The king and his councilors, therefore, must seek out pretexts for war in order to keep the idlers busy.

In the Utopia, then, the vices of pride, vain ambition, and sloth have corrupted the states of Europe in the same way that Socrates says that the philosophic nature is corrupted. Furthermore, the royal favorites and councilors in Europe fawn and flatter their betters like Socrates says the Sophists corrupt all youth with a potential for philosophy.

In contrast to Europeans, Hythlodæus himself and the Utopians have no desire for wealth, fame, or honor. They do not flatter, nor are they affected by flattery. Moreover, in Utopia all the citizens work at some task, in contrast to other nations where many sit idle.

After explaining how the Sophists corrupt the finer spirits, Socrates describes the results of this corruption. Because those who ought to follow philosophy have deserted her, a multitude of pretenders rush in to claim the name of "philosopher." The true philosopher, therefore, "remains

quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the end comes."⁶⁶

In the Utopia Hythlodæus specifically uses this image of the lonely, forsaken philosopher seeking refuge in a storm to justify his unwillingness to serve as a councilor. With this image he answers Thomas More's suggestion that he use an indirect approach in order to turn kings from their erroneous ways:

Plato by a very fine comparison shows why philosophers are right in abstaining from administration of the commonwealth. They observe the people rushing out into the streets and being soaked by constant showers and cannot induce them to go indoors and escape the rain. They know that, if they go out, they can do no good but will only get wet with the rest.⁶⁷

Socrates goes on to explain that because of the low state of philosophy, the true philosopher will never accomplish anything very great unless he finds a state adapted to his nature: "In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature and together with his own preserve the

⁶⁶Rep. VI 496 E (Shorey, II, 55).

⁶⁷Utopia, p. 103/16-21.

common weal."⁶⁸

The kind of commonwealth that Socrates suggests as necessary for the philosophic nature has obviously been found by Hythlodæus in Utopia. Realizing that no state outside Utopia suits his philosophic spirit, Hythlodæus has returned to Europe only temporarily in order to inform others of the wonderful island in the new world. He explains that he "lived there more than five years and would never have wished to leave except to make known that new world."⁶⁹

After the pessimistic description of the causes and results of the corruption of the philosophic nature, Plato concludes the first section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part III (V 471 D-VIII 541 B) with the hopeful declaration that the creation of the ideal state may indeed be possible if the changes he has suggested are implemented. The multitude, he says, can be persuaded to accept the philosopher-king if the pernicious effect of the Sophists' teaching can be eradicated. In order to change the present state into the ideal state, it would be necessary to begin with a clean slate and to change the constitution after the pattern set down in the description of the ideal state. After such a constitution had been formulated, the continuity of the state would require administrators with the same philosophic nature as the founders.

⁶⁸Rep. VI 497 A (Shorey, II, 55).

⁶⁹Utopia, p. 107/20-22.

In the Utopia Hythlodæus also suggests that a change in the basic structure of society would be necessary to effect reforms in Europe. It would be necessary to abolish the present system of private property and to begin anew with the system of the Utopians. He believes that "there is no hope . . . of a cure and a return to a healthy condition as long as each individual is master of his own property."⁷⁰ By following this remark with his description of the ideal state, Hythlodæus implies that Europe must reform itself by following the model of Utopia. The founding of Utopia follows Socrates' suggestion that a clean slate is the necessary requisite of the foundation of a new order. Utopus, the founder, conquered a "rude and rustic people" and brought them "to such a perfection of culture and humanity as makes them now superior to almost all other mortals."⁷¹ Though it has had few laws, the commonwealth has scarcely changed in justice and happiness since its beginning, for wise customs, laws, and institutions have insured that subsequent administrators would have the same wisdom as Utopus.

Wisdom and justice not only in the founders but also in the subsequent administrators, then, is the necessary requisite of both Plato's and More's ideal states. In the

⁷⁰Utopia, p. 105/37-39.

⁷¹Utopia, p. 113/5-7.

Republic Socrates declares that the realization of the ideal polity is difficult, yet not impossible. In the Utopia Hythlodæus goes beyond Socrates' hopeful declaration. He vouches to have seen the ideal state in existence.

The next question which follows from Socrates' declaration is how the philosophic nature is developed. Socrates points the way to the next section of the dialogue: "This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study."⁷² The discussion of these matters continues up to Book VIII and constitutes Section II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B).

The question of how the philosophic nature is developed involves a discussion of Plato's theory of knowledge and a more explicit treatment of the relationship between knowledge and virtue. It is in regard to these aspects of man's nature that the differences of the underlying philosophies of the Republic and the Utopia most clearly reveal themselves. These matters as they relate to the question of the imperative for justice will form the basis of discussion in Chapter VI.

⁷²Rep. VI 502 D (Shorey, II, 77).

CHAPTER VI

THE SANCTION FOR JUSTICE

A sanction for justice in the ideal state must account for man's most basic aspirations. In the Republic and in the Utopia the establishment of the sanction rests on the premise that man naturally seeks justice and that through reason he comes to know the true justice behind the appearance of individual men's actions. The two works differ significantly, however, in regard to the sanction itself. In the Republic to know the form of justice is alone a sufficient imperative for acting justly. In the Utopia there is implied an added necessity for belief in the immortality of the soul and in rewards and punishments in the life hereafter.

Plato bases the sanction on one of his most fundamental tenets--the idea that correct action invariably follows correct knowledge. Man's proper function, reason, leads him to live the moral life. The rationale for the assumption that the rational life and the moral life are almost identical comes to a focus in the second section (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B). In the foregoing chapter the assertion was made that in the first section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) Socrates affirms without explanation that by nature the true philosophic spirit apprehends the form

of justice. In the remaining section of Part III he explains why the philosopher naturally prefers justice over injustice and how he develops the rational faculty, which apprehends justice.

Socrates maintains that the philosopher will know justice and therefore act justly through a rational apprehension of the form of the good. The idea of good is the end of life--the supreme object of all desire and aspiration. With the realization of this supreme object, the philosopher comes to know justice and the other absolute forms, such as truth and beauty. Socrates explains that for the philosopher "the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial."¹ The problem, however, as Socrates admits, is that we have no adequate knowledge of the idea of good. He attempts, therefore, to describe the nature of the good by negation and analogy.

He begins his explanation by appealing to experience. It can be seen, he maintains, that all men strive for something which they think beneficial. He describes the form of the good as that "which every soul pursues and for its own sake does all that it does, with an intuition of its reality, but yet baffled and unable to apprehend its nature adequately."²

¹Rep. VI 505 A (Shorey, II, 87).

²Rep. VI 505 E (Shorey, II, 91).

Socrates then attempts to distinguish between the real good and the other objects of men's desires. Most men, Socrates observes, mistake various apparent goods for the true form of the supreme good. He says that neither of the two common opinions about the nature of the good are correct: "The multitude believe pleasure to be the good, and the finer spirits intelligence or knowledge."³ The finer spirits are mistaken because they cannot identify the exact knowledge of what is the ultimate good. They are "finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good."⁴ Those who mistake pleasure for the good are also confused because they must admit that men enjoy bad as well as good pleasures.

In the Utopia the treatment of man's aspiration toward the highest good is more subtle than Socrates' treatment in the Republic. Hythlodæus introduces the subject by making the startling disclosure that the Utopians regard pleasure, if not the highest good, as least akin to the highest good: "As it is, they hold happiness rests not in every kind of pleasure but only in good and decent pleasure. To such, as to the supreme good, our nature is drawn by virtue itself, to which the opposite school alone attributes happiness."⁵ In

³Rep. VI 505 B (Shorey, II, 89).

⁴Rep. VI 505 B (Shorey, II, 89).

⁵Utopia, p. 163/18-21. For a discussion of More's intention and method in the Utopians' philosophy of pleasure, see Surtz, The Praise of Pleasure, esp. pp. 1-22.

the subsequent discussion of the Utopian philosophy, Hythlodæus reveals by degrees that the Utopians have a more comprehensive understanding of pleasure than the meaning intended by Socrates.

Hythlodæus explains that the Utopians admit as genuine two kinds of pleasures--those of the body and those of the soul. The highest are those of the soul, to which they "ascribe intelligence and the sweetness which is bred of contemplation of truth."⁶ The Utopians, like the finer spirits described by Socrates, associate intelligence, and therefore knowledge, with the supreme good. Their understanding of the supreme good, however, goes beyond that of the finer spirits because they identify the object of knowledge. They say that truth is the object of the soul's contemplation. Those Utopians who realize the highest pleasure of the soul, therefore, have achieved what Socrates identifies as the object of the philosophic pursuit. For as he says in Book V, "the truth is the spectacle" of which the true philosopher is enamored.⁷

Unfortunately for our comparison, truth and the idea of the good are basic concepts which do not admit of simple definitions. It is difficult to discern from the context of

⁶Utopia, p. 173/14-15.

⁷Rep. V 475 E (Shorey, I, 517).

either the Republic or the Utopia how the ultimate truth differs from the ultimate good. Socrates says that the good is the source of truth, but he also describes the good in a way that seems to differ little from his implied meaning of truth. In Book V, when he identifies the distinguishing mark of the philosopher as the love of truth, he explains this characteristic as a perception of the objective form behind the appearance of objects. Then in Book VI he explains the same kind of perception in relationship to the knowledge of the good:

We predicate "to be" of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech . . . And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.⁸

If, then, the Utopians' understanding of the highest good is not identical with that of Socrates, it is at least compatible with it. By explaining that the contemplation of truth is the highest pleasure, More does not oppose Socrates' idea that the objective good is the supreme object of our aspirations. At first it appears that the Utopians have assented to a low estimate of the supreme good, but as Hythlodæus gradually reveals their understanding of pleasure, it becomes apparent that they have an idea of the supreme

⁸Rep. VI 507 B (Shorey, II, 97).

good not unlike that of Socrates. Further similarities between the idea of good in the two works become evident as the philosophy and the theology in each work are subsequently revealed.

Although Socrates admits that he cannot define the good precisely, he attempts to describe some of its characteristics. Besides being that which every man strives for, the good is the condition of all knowledge. It is the source of the knowledge of justice, honor, and everything else that is known. In order to explain this characteristic of the good Socrates makes an analogy between the visible world and the invisible or intelligible world. He likens the good in the intelligible world to the sun in the visible world. The sun gives light to the eye as the good gives knowledge to the intellect: "As the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this [the sun] in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision."⁹ Socrates extends the metaphor and compares the inadequate light of the moon and stars to the clear and fulsome light of the sun: "When the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colours the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind."¹⁰ Socrates then explains

⁹Rep. VI 508 C (Shorey, II, 103).

¹⁰Rep. VI 508 C (Shorey, II, 103).

how the good functions in the intelligible world as the source of all knowledge: "This reality . . . that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known."¹¹

Another characteristic of the good is its creative and sustaining force in the world. In explaining this function Socrates continues his analogy between the power of the sun and the power of the good. In the same way that the sun provides generation and growth to visible objects, the good gives being to and enlightens invisible objects: "The objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power."¹²

There are, then, three characteristics of the good mentioned by Socrates. The good is that toward which the soul naturally aspires; it is the condition of knowledge and truth in the world and in the minds of men; and it is the creative and sustaining power of the universe. These characteristics seem to be the same as those attributed to God. Socrates,

¹¹Rep. VI 508 E (Shorey, II, 103-105).

¹²Rep. VI 509 B (Shorey, II, 107).

however, does not identify the idea of good with the nature of God. He never makes it clear how the good differs from God, but he refers to them as two different concepts. He mentions God, for example, in his description of the tales told to the guardians in their musical education. Not mentioning the idea of the good in that section of the dialogue (II 377 A-383 C), he says that God cannot change and that He is the source of good but not of evil in the world. Conversely, in his discussion of the idea of the good in Book III, he never refers to the nature of God. Thus it would seem that God and the idea of the good are similar, but not identical.

Socrates' explanation of the idea of good has many points of likeness with the Utopians' ideas about God. It must be noted in discussing the Utopians' theological views that they are considered by Hythlodæus, and obviously by Thomas More, to be incomplete and in some cases defective. Until Hythlodæus and his party came to Utopia, the people had not known of Christianity and therefore could not be expected to have arrived at the fullness of religious truth. As a result of their incomplete knowledge, some Utopians "worship as god the sun, others the moon, others one of the planets."¹³ This practice can be accounted for by the explanation that the Utopians have, without benefit of Christian revelation, arrived

¹³Utopia, p. 217/8-9.

at their beliefs through reason. The Utopians, therefore, worship that source of light to which their individual rational faculties have directed them.

The Utopians significantly worship the same objects used by Socrates to explain the ineffable nature of the good. Just as Socrates points out the sun's superiority to the night's luminaries as a source of light, some Utopians prefer to worship the sun and others the moon or planets. Socrates, of course, with his superior rational faculty, knows that the sun is not itself the form of good. Likewise, the greater number of Utopians do not worship visible objects: "By far the majority, and those by far the wiser, believe in nothing of the kind but in a certain single being, unknown, eternal, immense, inexplicable, far above the reach of the human mind, diffused throughout the universe not in mass but in power."¹⁴

Although the wiser Utopians realize that the supreme being cannot be known completely, they can know about him through his works. They ascribe to him, as Socrates does to the idea of good, the creating and sustaining power in the universe: "To him alone they attribute the beginnings, the growth, the increase, the changes, and the ends of all things as they have perceived them."¹⁵ The Utopians, then, have come, with the aid of reason, to believe in the existence of a single

¹⁴Utopia, p. 217/11-15.

¹⁵Utopia, p. 217/15-17.

being who has many of the same characteristics ascribed by Socrates to the form of the good.

In the Republic Socrates next considers the process by which the philosopher comes to apprehend the form of the good. All men by nature seek to apprehend the good but the philosopher realizes the desire more than ordinary men. This assumption underlies the concluding passage in Book VI in which Socrates describes the four stages of intelligence through which the mind must pass in proceeding from the visible world of appearances to the intelligible world of reality. He assigns a name and value to each stage in a hierarchical order:

"Intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief to the third, and to the last picture-- thinking or conjecture."¹⁶

A particular man can attain more knowledge of the idea of good according to the level that his soul reaches in one of the four stages of intelligence. At the lowest level the soul deals only in appearances and images. Progressing from this level, the soul sees more of reality at each successive stage until it reaches the summit of the intellectual stage where the reality of the form of the good can be apprehended fully. The soul's natural desire to advance from the lowest to the highest stage of intelligence can be discerned from observing

¹⁶Rep. VI 511 E (Shorey, II, 117).

the intention and the methodology of the students of geometry and other sciences: "The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only with the mind."¹⁷ The soul, then, has a natural propensity toward the form of the good; it is not drawn on primarily by pleasure or other attendant benefits which result from the apprehension of the good.

This explanation of the soul's progress from appearances to the knowledge of the form of the good accounts for the sanction for justice in Socrates' philosophy. Once the soul knows the form of the good, it cannot be content with any lesser reality, nor will it choose to act in a base or evil manner. The ascent from ignorance to knowledge, therefore, parallels the ascent from vice to virtue. Since the knowledge of the good is the source of all other knowledge, the soul that apprehends the form of good must necessarily also apprehend justice. As the soul that knows good will not commit evil, likewise the soul that knows justice will not act unjustly. Thus, Socrates reasons that the knowledge of the form of justice is the sanction for justice.

Since only the ideal philosopher can attain to the

¹⁷Rep. VI 510 E (Shorey, II, 113).

highest level of the highest stage of reason or intellect, justice in the state depends upon the degree to which the king, or ruler, becomes the ideal philosopher. On the one hand, of course, the ideal is never realized perfectly, and on the other hand it is continually being realized. Hence Socrates does not say that the perfect state is possible, but he does say that a more perfect state than any now existing is possible if a philosopher can be found to rule it.

The most important point in which More's philosophy deviates from that of Plato is in regard to the sanction for justice. In the Utopia the connection between reason and virtue is not inseparable as it is in the Republic. Although following reason is an essential part of acting virtuously, the power of reason cannot attain to the knowledge of the ultimate reality. The Utopians put emphasis on the necessity for faith as well as reason. Therefore, they maintain that unless a man assents to certain basic beliefs that are part of the Utopian religion, he will not act justly. In order to insure the continuance of justice in the commonwealth, Utopus has insisted that every citizen be required to believe in the immortality of the soul and in eternal reward or punishment for behavior in this life. This belief, therefore, must be shared by all the citizens:

After this life, accordingly, vices are ordained to be punished and virtue rewarded. Such is their belief, and if anyone thinks otherwise, they do not regard him even

as a member of mankind, seeing that he has lowered the lofty nature of his soul to the level of a beast's miserable body--so far are they from classing him among their citizens whose laws and customs he would treat as worthless if it were not for fear.¹⁸

As this passage indicates, the sanction for justice comes from a belief in basic tenets of religion. Although the Utopians arrive at their religious beliefs through reason, they do not, as Socrates does, think that they can come to know exhaustively the nature of the ultimate reality through reason.

In the concluding section of Book II, Hythlodæus explains how the religious beliefs of the Utopians are the sanction for justice in the commonwealth. The importance of this section in the structure of the Utopia will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.

The sanction for justice, then, differs in More's work from the sanction in the Republic insofar as the institution and maintenance of justice in Utopia depends upon the citizens' expectation of eternal rewards or punishments. It should not be overlooked, however, that in the Republic Socrates affirms that in the afterlife all men will receive rewards or punishments. He treats this matter at the conclusion of Book X, where he answers the challenge advanced by Adeimantus in the exordium. This answer, contained in the myth of Er, will be discussed in the next chapter. Socrates' answer to

¹⁸Utopia, p. 221/33-39.

Adeimantus in Book X differs from his answer to Glaucon's pragmatic assertions as they relate to justice and injustice in this life. Prior to Book X, Socrates makes no appeal to rewards and punishments in the afterlife as a sanction for justice in this life. In the structure of the whole work, the myth of Er functions as a coda or addendum to the main argument of the first nine books.

In the first nine books Socrates argues that, even for a nonbeliever in the immortality of the soul, justice is to be preferred over injustice. In Book VII, therefore, he answers Glaucon's and Thrasymachus' arguments on their own terms. He wishes to demonstrate that man will freely choose justice over injustice if he truly knows the real distinction between the two. Furthermore, the distinction can only be made by the philosopher who has fully developed his rational faculty and therefore can apprehend the form of the good. To hold that the absolute good is the object of the philosopher's knowledge directly opposes Glaucon's statements in the exordium. Glaucon had denied that man naturally strives for the idea of an absolute good and had insisted rather that good is relative insofar as it is the "self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good."¹⁹ From this theory of man's basic aspirations, it follows that if man is to act justly he

¹⁹ Rep. II 359 C (Shorey, I, 117).

must be coerced by fear of reprisals. The main argument of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) refutes Glaucon's assertion by showing that true knowledge leads the philosopher to choose good of his own free will.

Since the sanction for justice in Utopia rests on the premise that rewards and punishments can be expected after death, the Utopians minimize the necessity for force or fear of reprisals in this life as an inducement for men to act virtuously. The Utopians, who act justly with few punitive measures to coerce them, contrast with the English thieves described by the lawyer in Book I, who will not act justly despite the threat of the death penalty. Even Cardinal Morton wonders why the death penalty is an ineffective sanction for justice. He asks Hythlodæus what other way there can be to punish thievery: "What force and what fear, if they once were sure of their lives, could deter the criminals?"²⁰ The Utopians and the citizens of the republic give witness to More's and Plato's denial that force or fear of punishment in this life is a necessary inducement to virtue. They rather affirm that man will act justly without coercion if he is properly nurtured.

After the discussion of the form of the good that closes Book VI of the Republic, Socrates next explains how the rational faculty of the philosopher is nurtured in order

²⁰ Utopia, p. 73/4-5.

that he may attain the highest stage of intelligence. Socrates' explanation occurs in Book VII, which constitutes the remaining portion of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B).

Socrates begins his explanation with the famous parable of the cave, which portrays in another way the four stages of intelligence. The parable also shows that the regrettable condition of education must be improved if philosophers are ever to be nurtured.

Socrates describes a cave in which men are shackled to fixed spots and able only to view shadows flashed on a wall before them. The scene represents the condition of man on earth: "This image, then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun."²¹ A man fortunate enough to be released from his shackles so that he may ascend to the outside world will be dazzled by the light of the sun. Such a man will be like the philosopher who catches a glimpse of the form of the good. Then, if the man goes back into the cave he will be an object of ridicule:

Do you think it at all strange . . . if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries of men cuts a sorry figure and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing

²¹Rep. VII 517 B (Shorey, II, 129).

darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things, in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?²²

In the Utopia Hythlodæus describes nothing similar to Socrates' allegory of the cave. In a sense, however, Hythlodæus himself represents the philosopher who leaves the cave and catches a glimpse of the light of the sun. He has previously left the prison which is Europe and has gone to Utopia where he has seen true justice. He balks at entering into European politics because he thinks that he would be unable to convince those who have seen only the shadows of justice. The lawyer at Cardinal Morton's, for example, typifies the condition in Europe. He wrangles about the appearance of justice, but he has no comprehension of its true form. Like the philosopher described by Socrates, Hythlodæus feels quite out of place in the company of the lawyer and his kind.

Furthermore, Socrates draws a conclusion from the allegory which has relevance to the debate on councilorship, a prominent motif in Book I of the Utopia. Socrates recognizes that an inevitable problem will arise whenever a philosopher reaches the stage where he can apprehend the form of the good. Once out of the cave, any man will be naturally reluctant to return. If no one who has seen the sun can be induced back

²²Rep. VII 517 D (Shorey, II, 131-32).

into the cave, however, no one will be capable of ruling the state. Consequently, those with the desire to lead have not the wisdom, and those with the wisdom have not the desire. Socrates explains why neither of the two classes of men can bring about the ideal state: "the one because they have no single aim and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest."²³ Socrates concludes that the dilemma can be solved only if the one who has seen the light, namely, the philosopher, is forced to return to the cave. There he must take his rightful position as ruler, however distasteful it may be. This conclusion seems to contradict the opinion Socrates expresses earlier in Book VI, when he says that the philosopher in the present state must necessarily retire from the affairs of men.²⁴ On one hand, then, Socrates says that the philosopher should avoid political affairs, but on the other hand, he says that the philosopher must become involved in the affairs of men. This is only an apparent contradiction, however, for Socrates speaks in the one instance from the psychological viewpoint of the individual

²³Rep. VII 519 C (Shorey, II, 139).

²⁴Rep. VI 496 E (Shorey, II, 55).

and in the other as the founder of the ideal state.

In Book I of the Utopia Hythlodæus represents Socrates' viewpoint in Book VI of the Republic and Thomas More his viewpoint in Book VII. Hythlodæus is reluctant to offer his services as a councilor to a European king because he has had a glimpse of the true form of justice in Utopia. The dilemma for Europe, however, is that unless philosophers like Hythlodæus can be induced to become involved in political affairs, the kingdoms are doomed to be ruled by men who lack wisdom. Thomas More recognizes the dilemma and espouses a position essentially the same as that of Socrates when the latter speaks from the viewpoint of the founder. More urges Hythlodæus to combine the wisdom of the philosopher with the practicality of the ruler. He insists that a dichotomy need not exist between philosophy and politics. He urges Hythlodæus to eschew academic philosophy in the court of kings and to adopt the kind of philosophy "more practical for statesmen, which knows its stage, adapts itself to the play in hand, and performs its role neatly and appropriately."²⁵

In Book I of the Utopia, then, Hythlodæus and Thomas More separately represent the two positions espoused by Socrates in two different books of the Republic. Significantly, More, the author, thereby dramatically suggests that the betterment

²⁵Utopia, p. 99/13-16.

of conditions in Europe is yet a long way off. It should be also noted, in respect to the structure of the Utopia, that the debate on councilorship is subordinate to the main theme. The determination of the moral duty of the philosopher is essentially a question of justice. The significance of this question in the structure of the Utopia will be discussed again in a later chapter.

Besides portraying the four stages of intelligence, the parable of the cave in the Republic points up the pitiable condition of men on earth and raises the question of how men can escape from the world of shadows to the sunlight of the world above. In the remainder of Book VII Socrates outlines the kind of education that would prepare the philosopher to traverse the distance from darkness to light.

The rigorous and prolonged educational system begins approximately at the age of fifteen with the study of arithmetic and continues to the age of fifty when the philosopher learns the science of dialectic, by which he comes to apprehend the form of the good. In successive stages and at prescribed ages, the student advances through the studies of geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, harmonics, and finally dialectics. These studies are included in some measure for their utilitarian value but primarily because they lead the soul to the comprehension of the good.

In Utopia the education of the scholars is not explained

in detail. Hythlodæus mentions, however, that the scholars study music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and dialectic, subjects included in the education of philosophers in the republic. The Utopians have developed their ability to a degree that puts them on a par with the ancients: "In music, dialectic, arithmetic, and geometry they have made almost the same discoveries as those predecessors of ours in the classical world."²⁶

Although Hythlodæus does not describe fully the content and purpose of these studies, he indicates that the Utopians exhibit a more pragmatic attitude toward their education than that prescribed by Socrates. In the Republic, for example, arithmetic is necessary for military science, but its primary purpose is to provoke reflection and thought. Geometry aids in the conduct of war in dealing with formations of troops. The student of geometry, however, should have pure knowledge as his objective: "For geometry is the knowledge of the eternally existent."²⁷ The Utopian scholars, as has been indicated, concern themselves with ultimate questions, but they also have interest in the utilitarian aspects of their education. Hythlodæus describes their objective: "Thus, trained in all learning, the minds of the Utopians are

²⁶Utopia, p. 159/22-25.

²⁷Rep. VII 527 B (Shorey, II, 171).

exceedingly apt in the invention of the arts which promote the advantage and convenience of life."²⁸ The Utopians' practical objectives lead them to more experimentation than Socrates would advocate in his educational philosophy.

The difference between the theoretical emphasis of Socrates and the experimental approach of the Utopians can be observed best in their respective attitudes toward astronomy. Socrates includes astronomy in his education because it compels the soul to look upward to heavenly things and away from the things of earth. The object of astronomy should be the study of the movements of "real speed and real slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain."²⁹ Socrates does not think that astronomy should include plotting the movements of heavenly bodies. His attitude toward such a practice becomes apparent as he continues, "These can be apprehended only by reason and thought, but not by sight."³⁰ Socrates has particular scorn for those who look for signs in the heavens. It is absurd, he maintains, "to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth."³¹ In this criticism Socrates apparently has in mind

²⁸Utopia, p. 183/25-27.

²⁹Rep. VII 529 D (Shorey, II, 185).

³⁰Rep. VII 529 E (Shorey, II, 185).

³¹Rep. VII 530 A (Shorey, II, 185).

those who confuse astrology with astronomy.

The Utopians' study of astronomy is contrary to Socrates' prescription, for they are concerned with the actual movements of heavenly bodies: "They have ingeniously devised instruments in different shapes, by which they have most exactly comprehended the movements and positions of the sun and moon and all the other stars which are visible in their horizon."³² The Utopians, however, do not examine the stars to find in them the "absolute truth." They are not astrologers: "Of the agreements and discords of the planets and, in sum, of all that infamous and deceitful divination by the stars, they do not even dream."³³

The Utopians also show their pragmatism and experimentalism in other studies. They have great respect for the physical sciences. They predict weather by observation of physical phenomena. They regard the knowledge of medicine "as one of the finest and most useful branches of philosophy."³⁴ Their emphasis on morals in philosophy also suggests an approach to life more practical than theoretical.

The stress on utilitarian education in the Utopia, in contrast to theoretical studies in the Republic, reflects in

³²Utopia, pp. 159/38-161/3.

³³Utopia, p. 161/3-6.

³⁴Utopia, p. 183/11-12.

another way the underlying contrary assumptions in the two works about the sanction for justice. Plato continually emphasizes the development and the power of reason; More, the development of the will through the practice and habit of virtuous action.

In the Republic the theoretical education becomes complete with the study of dialectic. This discipline fully develops the philosopher's reason, through which he finally comes to know the form of the good. In explaining what dialectic means, Socrates returns to his analogy between the visible and the intelligible worlds:

When anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable came to the goal of the visible.³⁵

Dialectic is not a body of knowledge; it is a process of inquiry that attempts systematically to determine what each thing really is. The students of philosophy through the method of dialectic develop the discipline that will enable them "to ask and answer questions in the most scientific manner."³⁶ Dialectic, then, is the keystone of the entire educational system in the Republic.

³⁵Rep. VII 532 B (Shorey, II, 197).

³⁶Rep. VII 534 E (Shorey, II, 209).

In the Utopia Hythlodæus unfortunately does not accompany his mention of dialectic with an explanation of how it is practiced. Apparently, however, the process is akin to that described by Socrates as the discipline in which questions are asked and answered in "the most scientific manner." That the Utopians follow this practice may be surmised from the inquiries they make in the part of their philosophy which deals with morals. They "inquire" into the nature of the soul. They "ask" whether the name good can be applied to the body and to external gifts as well as to the soul. They "discuss" and "debate" the way true happiness may be achieved.³⁷ The use of interrogative diction to describe the Utopians' method of study indicates that they conduct their search for truth through a process of discussion and debate. The science of dialectic, however, in the Utopia is neither explained nor emphasized. It is not the final objective in the educational system toward which every other subject aims. Since the development of reason is not the overriding consideration in their education, the Utopians do not emphasize dialectic to a greater extent than they do more utilitarian studies.

Despite the difference in content and emphasis in the educational systems in the two works, in both the best education is reserved for those who have demonstrated the

³⁷Utopia, p. 161/17-25.

competence to achieve the highest level. In the Republic the potential leaders must possess other qualities in addition to those required of the ordinary guardians. Most important, they must have quick apprehension: "They must have . . . to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty."³⁸ They must also have "a good memory and doggedness and industry in every sense of the word."³⁹

Those who are marked out for the scholarly education in Utopia must have almost the same qualities of character as those described by Socrates. Industry is a characteristic of all the Utopians. This can be seen particularly in their intellectual efforts: "In their devotion to mental study they are unwearied."⁴⁰ From such citizens they select the scholars. The scholars are "the individuals in whom they have detected from childhood an outstanding personality, a first-rate intelligence, and an inclination of mind toward learning."⁴¹ The inclusion of the requirement for "an outstanding personality" in this passage is significant. It suggests again the emphasis put on good habits and good behavior. It is, of course, assumed in the Republic that the philosopher will have

³⁸Rep. VII 535 C (Shorey, II, 211).

³⁹Rep. VII 535 C (Shorey, II, 211).

⁴⁰Utopia, p. 181/2.

⁴¹Utopia, p. 159/8-10.

a pleasing personality, but the omission of this trait in Socrates' selective criteria reflects his overriding concern for the intellectual capabilities of man's nature.

Socrates further exhibits his emphasis on reason in another criterion he sets down for the selection of leaders. He suggests that telling the truth is less important than distinguishing between the true and the false. This suggestion is apparent in his distinction between a voluntary lie and an involuntary falsehood: "Likewise in respect of truth . . . we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig."⁴²

This distinction is particularly interesting because Thomas More makes a similar one in his prefatory letter to Peter Giles, but he reverses the valuation of the two kinds of errors. In insisting upon his sincerity, Thomas More writes to Peter Giles that he includes in the Utopia only those facts that he knows to be true: "Just as I shall take great pains to have nothing incorrect in the book, so, if there is doubt about anything, I shall rather tell an objective falsehood than an intentional lie--for I would rather be honest

⁴²

Rep. VII 535 E (Shorey, II, 213).

than wise."⁴³ Whereas Socrates stresses the importance of knowing the difference between true and false, Thomas More puts greater emphasis on telling the objective truth.

The reliability of More's remark, of course, can be challenged since we know that the events described in the Utopia are not factually true. Such a challenge, however, can be applied to innumerable passages in More's writings since he continually mixes ironical and straightforward remarks. This remark and others will receive more discussion in a later chapter where More's irony is discussed specifically.

In the Republic the description of the education to be given to the philosophers brings to a close Book VII and also concludes Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) of the entire dialogue. Socrates returns in his final remarks to the point where he began the discussion of the imperative for justice in Book V. Returning to Glaucon's original query in Book V as to whether the ideal state is possible, Socrates reiterates the prescriptions which he called in Book V the "third wave of paradox":

Well then . . . do you admit that our notion of the state and its polity is not altogether a day-dream, but that though it is difficult, it is in a way possible and in no other way than that described--when genuine philosophers, many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn the present honours, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right and the

⁴³Utopia, p. 41/33-35.

honours that come from that above all things, and regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and administer their city?⁴⁴

In the Republic, then, justice is possible if the rulers are philosophers. In that event, they would apprehend the difference between right and wrong, just and unjust. It follows in Plato's philosophy that once the rational faculty in man perceives this distinction, just and virtuous action invariably follows. The sanction for justice, therefore, depends upon the proper development of the rational faculty in both the man and in the state. In the Utopia the sanction for justice derives not only from the development of the rational faculty in the leaders but also from the belief in the immortality of the soul and in eternal rewards and punishments.

The next question for consideration is whether it is more beneficial to the state and to the individual to follow justice or injustice.

⁴⁴Rep. VII 540 D-E (Shorey, II, 231-33.)

CHAPTER VII

THE JUST AND THE UNJUST LIFE

After considering the origin and nature of justice in Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) and the imperative for justice in Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), Plato next explains why justice rather than injustice is the happiest condition of existence for the state and for the individual. This explanation constitutes Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 392 B) in the structure of the entire dialogue. In this part Plato argues for the superiority of justice by revealing the basic causes and the insidious results of injustice. In the Utopia More portrays the causes and results of injustice before and after describing the ideal state. He treats the subject of injustice in Europe most thoroughly in Book I and again in summary fashion in the peroration at the conclusion of Book II.

In both works the unjust state shows itself to be most despicable because it contrasts sharply with the ideal state. In the Utopia, however, More reverses the order of contrast used by Plato in the Republic. Plato first describes the logical development of the ideal state and then the various stages in its disintegration. More, on the other hand, first depicts the corrupt states of Europe and then the ideal commonwealth of Utopia.

It is interesting to speculate whether More might have planned originally to follow Plato's order in depicting the best before the worst examples of political organisms. Since he presumably wrote Book II before Book I, he may have intended to follow Plato's example more closely. The question of the order of composition of the Utopia, however, is too complex to be discussed parenthetically. It will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter.

Although More reverses Plato's order of contrast, he accomplishes the same objective: showing the superiority of justice over injustice. Because More's method of dramatic representation differs from Plato's logical analysis, however, the parallels between Book I of the Utopia and Part IV (VII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic seem less obvious than they really are. Plato describes the corruption of the ideal state in Books VIII and IX in the same logical manner in which he analyzes the development of the state in Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C). He does not give a historical account of the way states or individuals actually have been known to disintegrate. Rather he logically analyzes the causes and the process of disorganization of the state and of the individual and describes four hypothetical stages of corruption between the best and the worst.

In Book I of the Utopia More also reveals the insidious nature of injustice, but his method differs from that of Plato.

More does not attempt to analyze the process of disintegration or to predicate progressive stages of injustice. He rather attempts to reveal the actual conditions in Europe through a fictional pretense that the events described are real. Indeed, many of the situations and circumstances described in Book I have been traced to actual events and conditions in More's time. Book I, however, is no more historically accurate than Book II. Unquestionably, it helps in understanding the Utopia to have an awareness of the particular historical situations to which allusions are made. But one should not mistake the Utopia for a sustained political or religious diatribe on specific abuses in Europe. The artistic purpose of the work taken as a whole transcends any specific reform the author may have intended in the particular anecdotes within either book.

In Book I of the Utopia More achieves the same artistic objective as that achieved by Plato in Books VIII and IX of the Republic. He forces assent from the reader that the injustice in Europe is pitiable, especially in comparison with the justice of Utopia. He accomplishes this end by arranging specific examples of corruption in a total picture of injustice. A comparison of More's portrayal in Book I and Plato's logical analysis in Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic reveals that the causes and the results of injustice in both works are similar.

In Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic Socrates answers Glaucon's third challenge as stated in the exordium. Glaucon argues the advantages of injustice over justice by describing a hypothetical case in which he compares the perfectly unjust man to the man who embodies justice. The unjust man, while gaining a reputation for justice, does what he pleases and lords it over weaker men. In contrast, the just man, reviled and persecuted, is blamed for injustice. In such a case, Glaucon concludes, the life of the unjust man is obviously happier and more beneficial than that of the just.

That Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) constitutes the answer to this challenge is indicated by Socrates at the opening of Book VIII. He begins by summarizing what has transpired up to this point in the dialogue. He then indicates that the discussion which follows concerns the question of the relative advantage of justice and injustice. He hopes to show that justice is more advantageous than injustice by describing the various stages of corrupt men and governments that proceed from the disintegration of the best man and the best state. He explains his purpose: "In order that, after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor."¹

¹Rep. VIII 545 A (Shorey, II, 241).

In observing the most unjust condition of a man and of a state, Socrates answers in another way Thrasymachus' argument as stated in Book I. Socrates shows that a man who lives in accordance with Thrasymachus' theories of justice would actually be the most unhappy and miserable of all creatures. Thus Books I, VIII, and IX have a common motif. (In depicting injustice in Book I, More telescopes the essential elements of these three books of the Republic.)

Socrates begins his narration of the process of disorganization by identifying the source of corruption in the ruling class. He maintains that there exists a "simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself, when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible."² This corruption of the ruling class results from an inevitable decay that comes to everything in the visible world. Even an ideal state, therefore, would eventually become corrupt. Corruption begins, for example, when the guardians miscalculate the propitious time to marry and beget children. Socrates explains that when the guardians "bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably, the offspring will not be well-born or fortunate."³ Thus Plato attributes the corruption in the

²Rep. VIII 540 D (Shorey, II, 245).

³Rep. VIII 546 D (Shorey, II, 247).

ruling class to hereditary imperfections brought about by astrological influences.

In the Utopia the source of corruption is likewise shown to emanate from the ruling element in the state. The persona More, at the beginning of Book I, implicitly assigns responsibility for the corruption in Europe to the character of the ruler: "From the monarch, as from a never-failing spring, flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole nation."⁴ There is no suggestion, however, that the corruption of the monarch or the state results from unpropitious breeding. Indeed, it can be assumed from the practice in Utopia that breeding has little or nothing to do with the causes of justice or injustice. In Utopia marriages are not arranged in order to produce future leaders of the state. The Utopians freely choose their marriage partners and their officials. Moreover, the criterion for the selection of officials does not depend upon blood lines. This difference in regard to breeding reflects More's democratic tendencies in contrast to Plato's preference for an aristocracy.

Socrates attributes a whole train of abuses to the unpropitious begetting of children. He describes the symptoms of the first stage of corruption which follows from unpropitious breeding. Injustice in the body politic starts

⁴Utopia, p. 57/16-18.

with avarice in the rulers. They begin to exhibit a love of wealth, power, and honor. The desire for wealth, particularly in the form of private property, grows out of a compromise of the principles upon which the ideal state is founded. The gold and silver classes, instead of remaining above the petty squabbles of the bronze and iron classes, become embroiled in their disputes:

When strife arose . . . the two groups were pulling against each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, and the other two, the golden and silver, not being poor but by nature rich in their souls, were trying to draw them back to virtue and their original constitution, and thus, striving and contending against one another, they compromised on the plan of distributing and taking for themselves the land and houses, enslaving and subjecting as perioeci and serfs their former friends and supporters, of whose freedom they had been guardians, and occupying themselves with war and keeping watch over these subjects.⁵

Socrates calls this first stage of corruption timocracy. In the timocratic man or in the timocratic state, the spirited element rather than the rational element takes control. A man with a spirited element dominant in his soul naturally seeks honor in contrast to the philosopher who seeks truth and wisdom. The timocratic man and the timocratic state, therefore, prefer war to peace. Socrates explains that the timocratic state differs from the aristocratic or ideal state chiefly "in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has

⁵Rep. VIII 547 B (Shorey, II, 249).

of this kind are no longer simple and strenuous but of mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for peace, and in honouring the stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying itself with war most of the time."⁶ After considering the timocratic man and the timocratic state, Socrates proceeds in the remainder of Book VIII to show the further disintegration of the ideal state. Oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny follow timocracy as the three advanced stages of evil and injustice.

Thomas More does not arrange the details of the picture of injustice and evil in Europe in Book I of the Utopia in accordance with a principal of progressive evil. Rather, as will be discussed in greater detail below, he fits the parts into an arrangement which represents a more static condition of injustice. Nonetheless, he portrays the causes and results of three of Plato's stages of corruption--timocracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. The evils of democracy, however, are conspicuously absent from More's picture.

In describing the sources of evil and injustice in Europe, Hythlodæus does not specifically label the kinds of corrupt governments as does Socrates. He does, however, identify those sources of corruption mentioned by Socrates as

⁶Rep. VIII 548 E (Shorey, II, 251).

symptomatic of the timocratic state. The overriding concern for war and the fear of wise men are common evils in Europe which account for its deplorable condition.

The description of the French king's council suggests that European rulers accept war and its stratagems as a customary condition of existence. The king and councilors do not even consider the question of the justice or injustice of war. They rather take for granted their intention to appropriate to themselves as much land as possible whether justly or unjustly.

Hythlodæus also suggests that councilors in general have a basic distrust of wise men. Early in Book I he explains that those who are unduly impressed with their own importance and who are concerned with their rank at court will hardly welcome wise or clever men into their midst: "If anyone, when in the company of people who are jealous of others' discoveries or prefer their own, should propose something which he either has read or done in other times or has seen done in other places, the listeners behave as if their whole reputation for wisdom were jeopardized and as if afterwards they would deserve to be thought plain blockheads unless they could lay hold of something to find fault with in the discoveries of others."⁷

⁷Utopia, pp. 57/39-59/6.

In the Utopia, then, Hythlodæus does not hypothesize a first stage in a process of corruption of the ideal state, as Socrates does in the Republic. He points out, however, that the states of Europe show the same evils as symptoms as Plato's timocratic state. He also ascribes to Europe the evils of oligarchy, the next stage of corruption described by Socrates.

Socrates explains that an oligarchy is a state based on property qualifications: "The rich hold office and the poor man is excluded."⁸ Those in ruling positions seek to maintain and augment their power and wealth by perverting the laws in their own favor, "for first they invent ways of expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end."⁹ Laws perverted in such fashion must be enforced by terror. The ruling class must particularly promulgate by force the basic law which prescribes ownership of private property as a prerequisite to hold office. This law, Socrates explains, "they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization."¹⁰

In a government thus established, the rich landowners become wealthier and more powerful, and the poor become poorer. This condition comes about from the practice of

⁸Rep. VIII 550 C (Shorey, II, 261).

⁹Rep. VIII 550 D (Shorey, II, 261).

¹⁰Rep. VIII 551 B (Shorey, II, 263).

buying and selling. Thrifty and acquisitive men take the means of sustenance from those with a spendthrift nature. In an oligarchic state a loss of goods results in a loss of means of livelihood. Thus the class of idle paupers increases. Socrates likens the idlers and malefactors in the city to drones in a beehive. He explains that the presence of drones is a symptom of an oligarchic state: "It is plain, then, . . . that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighbourhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime."¹¹

The oligarchic state is unjust primarily because the presence of two classes violates the principle of unity. The drones wage continual war on the rich. The result is that "such a city should of necessity be not one, but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting against one another."¹²

The characteristic evils of an oligarchy are, then, a ruling class based on property qualification, a perversion of laws with enforcement by terror, and a pauper class that has a parasitic effect on the body politic. Hythlodæus describes similar symptoms in the state of Europe in Book I of the Utopia.

¹¹Rep. VIII 552 D (Shorey, II, 269).

¹²Rep. VIII 551 D (Shorey, II, 265).

The condition of England, as depicted in the episode at Cardinal Morton's house, closely resembles the oligarchy defined in the Republic. The English ruling class derives its power from the ownership of land. Hythlodæus castigates the practice of those noblemen and abbots who constantly enclose more and more property in order to graze their sheep. He points out how the avarice of the rich results in the oppression of the poor: "Consequently, in order that one insatiable glutton and accursed plague of his native land may join field to field and surround many thousand acres with one fence, tenants are evicted."¹³

Not only do these rich landowners provide no productive service to their country; they also gather around them a class of idle retainers. Hythlodæus uses a drone metaphor similar to that used by Socrates to describe the noblemen and their attendants: "Now there is the great number of noblemen who not only live idle themselves like drones on the labors of others, as for instance the tenants of their estates whom they fleece to the utmost by increasing the returns (for that is the only economy they know of, being otherwise so extravagant as to bring themselves to beggary!) but who also carry about with them a huge crowd of idle attendants who have never learned a trade for a livelihood."¹⁴ Because these idlers have no

¹³Utopia, p. 67/14-16.

¹⁴Utopia, p. 63/5-11.

trade, they turn to begging or stealing when their masters die or fall on hard times. The rich landowners, as a consequence, exact harsh punishments in order to enforce the unjust laws. Such a law is that which prescribes the death penalty for stealing sheep. England, then, with its two classes of rich and poor constantly warring against one another, resembles the oligarchic state described by Socrates.

Furthermore, the anonymous king and his councilors (More probably had England in mind here) betray the vices of Plato's oligarchic man. They display their passion for wealth in the ways they plot to heap up treasures at the expense of the people. Moreover, most of their ingenious fund-raising methods involve a perversion of the law. One councilor, for example, reminds the king "of certain old and moth-eaten laws, annulled by long non-enforcement, which no one remembers being made and therefore everyone has transgressed."¹⁵ By reviving the law, the king can reap a rich harvest: "The king should exact fines for their transgression, there being no richer source of profit nor any more honorable than such as has an outward mask of justice!"¹⁶

Although More portrays the evils of timocracy and oligarchy in Book I of the Utopia, he conspicuously omits

¹⁵Utopia, p. 93/5-7.

¹⁶Utopia, p. 93/7-10.

the evils of democracy, the third stage of corruption in the Republic. This omission indicates More's deviation from Plato's political philosophy. Not only are the evils of democracy absent from the picture of injustice in Book I, but Utopia, as portrayed in Book II, manifests the obverse side of the democratic vices described by Socrates.

Socrates explains that the ruling elements seek honor in a timocracy and wealth in an oligarchy, but the citizens of a democracy seek freedom above all else. Unfortunately they confuse freedom with license. They think of freedom as the fulfillment of sensual desires. Thus, in a democratic man, the lowest or appetitive part of the soul overthrows reason, the highest part. This reversal in the soul of man corresponds to the overthrow of the wise man by the drones in the state. When drones control the state, every man can do as he pleases instead of performing the task suitable to his nature. As a result of this confusion of tasks, equals and unequals are treated alike.

The lack of distinction between equals and unequals destroys the hierarchical order, which is essential to justice. In the place of the three classes in the aristocratic state--leaders, guardians, and tradesmen--there arise in a democracy three classes of a different kind. The drones, who are the most numerous, become dominant. Socrates describes the frenzied behavior of the drone class: "The fiercest part

of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a buzzing and tolerates no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state."¹⁷ This class inevitably produces the capitalists who cleverly acquire money from the rest. These capitalists, the second class, supply money to the drones so that in effect a few wealthy men indirectly control the state. Those who till the land and have little property make up the third class. This lowest element of society shares in the wealth only "to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing to the people what they take from the well-to-do, to keep the lion's share for themselves."¹⁸ The equality in a democracy, therefore, is an illusion. Actually three unequal castes exist, and the distinctions among them are based on the worst possible criterion: a particular man rises above the others to the extent that his appetites become dominant.

In Utopia the evils Socrates ascribes to a democratic state have been avoided, although the Utopian commonwealth is basically a democracy. The basis of Utopian administration is democratic insofar as the people elect the governor and the ruling siphogrants. The citizens are also equal in most

¹⁷Rep. VIII 564 D (Shorey, II, 315).

¹⁸Rep. VIII 565 A (Shorey, II, 317).

respects. The equality of the Utopians is different, however, from that described by Socrates as characteristic of a democratic state. The Utopians share equally their goods and property. They also have equality of opportunity; any citizen may be elected to public office or may be selected to advance to the class of scholars. The other citizens have the opportunity to select a trade of their choice consonant with the needs of the whole state. Moreover, the Utopians base distinctions among citizens on merit, not on political influence or power. Regardless of function, however, all citizens share equally in the material advantages of the whole state.

Utopian equality is particularly evident in the administration of justice. Jurisprudence in Utopia directly contrasts with that practiced in England. The English law punishes equals and unequals alike. Hythlodæus points out that the number of murders in England is greater than it otherwise would be because the law makes no distinction between the crime of theft and that of murder: "Since the robber sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this single consideration impels him to murder the man whom otherwise he would only have robbed."¹⁹ The Utopians, on the other hand, prescribe punishment to suit individual crimes. They

¹⁹Utopia, p. 75/7-10.

punish adultery with the strictest form of slavery, and "for all other crimes there is no law prescribing any fixed penalty, but the punishment is assigned by the senate according to the atrocity, or veniality, of the individual crime."²⁰

Because the Utopians have a proper understanding of the end of man and the nature of justice, they do not confuse freedom with license. They do not feel that following one's inclinations is in itself freedom. They think, on the contrary, that a man who indulges his appetites without regard to reason is more apt to bring suffering upon himself than to achieve freedom. Their attitude toward pleasure gives evidence of this understanding of freedom. They follow only good and beneficial pleasures, because "pain they think a necessary consequence if the pleasure is base."²¹ Freedom for the Utopians pertains not to the appetites but to the rational part of man's nature. The constitution itself "looks in the first place to this sole object: that for all the citizens, as far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted to the freedom and culture of the mind. It is in the latter

²⁰Utopia, p. 191/22-26.

²¹Utopia, p. 177/36-37.

that they deem the happiness of life to consist."²²

The essential difference, then, between Utopian democracy and that described by Socrates relates to the concepts of freedom and equality. The Utopians adhere to the concept of freedom that Socrates ascribes to the aristocratic state and not to the license that he thinks is the evil of democracy. The Utopians, like Socrates, think that freedom for all the citizens can be achieved when each man does as he ought, as determined by reason, and not when each is allowed to do as he pleases. They believe also that all the citizens should share equally material, intellectual, and social advantages but that the law should not punish equals and unequals alike.

Although More evaluates democracy differently from Plato, he displays the same attitude toward tyranny. In both works tyranny is the worst stage of corruption. In the Republic Socrates points out that the process of disintegration eventually results in tyranny. Injustice reigns completely in a tyranny because the hierarchical order of nature is completely reversed--the worst elements rule the best. Being the last stage of corruption, tyranny incorporates all the evils of the other three stages. Like the timocratic man, the tyrant "is always stirring up some war so that the people may be in need of a

²²Utopia, p. 135/20-24.

leader."²³ The tyrant, like the oligarchic man, has an insatiable lust for gold. This lust motivates him to waste the resources of the people. Socrates explains how the tyrant's lust enslaves the people: "And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him."²⁴ Finally, like the democratic man, the tyrant has an unquenchable desire to gratify all his sensual appetites. He acts without inhibition, as a man in a dream: "When under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness."²⁵

After describing the nature of the tyrant and the manner of his life, Socrates devotes the remainder of Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) to showing why tyranny is inferior in all respects to the ideal state. This explanation at the same time answers the question of why justice is more beneficial than injustice. Socrates first argues that tyranny ironically results in the opposite of those ends for which it arises.

²³Rep. VIII 566 E-567 A (Shorey, II, 323-25).

²⁴Rep. VIII 567 A (Shorey, II, 325).

²⁵Rep. IX 575 A (Shorey, II, 349).

Instead of being free, rich, and secure from fear, the tyrant as well as the state he rules is enslaved, poor, and fearful. The tyrant is a slave instead of a free man because there is no order in his soul. His appetites completely rule his reason. Similarly, in the tyrannous state, the dictator and his sycophants eliminate or subjugate the finer spirits. Socrates describes the inevitable slavery of a tyrant and the state he rules: "If then . . . the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion obtain in him, and his soul teem with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and most frenzied, plays the despot?"²⁶ The tyrant and his state are also poor instead of rich because he and his subjects constantly crave to satisfy their insatiable appetites. Such anarchy and lack of order result in a city and a man full of terrors and alarms. Socrates draws the obvious conclusion that since a tyrant and his city are enslaved, poor, and fearful, they are not happy but wretched.

Socrates maintains further that the life of the just man is more pleasurable than the life of the tyrant. He begins his explanation with the proposition that there are three kinds of pleasure corresponding to three types of men: "And that is why we say that the primary classes of men also are three, the

²⁶Rep. IX 577 C-D (Shorey, II, 359).

philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain. . . . And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each."²⁷ Socrates then goes on to argue that the philosopher, in the course of his experience, has inevitably enjoyed the lower pleasures, but the lover of victory and the lover of gain have never tasted the highest pleasure. He concludes that since the true philosopher invariably chooses the love of wisdom over the other two lower pleasures, this kind of pleasure must be the best.

Socrates maintains even further that pleasure other than that of intelligence is merely an illusion. To explain his meaning, he cites the example of some people who call pleasure the neutral state that results from the cessation of pain or pleasure. He explains that true pleasure cannot be mere relief from pain, nor can true pain be cessation of pleasure. He bases this argument on the premise that "both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion."²⁸ Since a state of quietude, and not a state of motion, results from the cessation of pain or pleasure, it follows that quietude is a state neither of pleasure nor of pain. Furthermore, that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot be both pleasure

²⁷Rep. IX 581 C (Shorey, II, 373-75).

²⁸Rep. IX 584 A (Shorey, II, 383).

and pain. From this rather contrived argument Socrates draws this conclusion: "This is not a reality, then, but an illusion. . . . in such case the quietude in juxtaposition with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain."²⁹

Socrates compares the tyrant and the state he rules to the true philosopher-king and the ideal state in regard to freedom, wealth, fear, and pleasure. On all counts the tyrant is shown to be the loser. At the end of Book IX, the contrast between the best and the worst state is completed. The inescapable conclusion is that justice is more beneficial than injustice in both the state and the individual.

In the Utopia Thomas More reverses the order of the contrast between the worst and the best. The conclusion to be drawn, however, is the same. Book I depicts tyranny as the most wretched form of government. The nature of tyranny, however, must be abstracted from Hythlodæus' remarks about various conditions in Europe. Each state mentioned by Hythlodæus displays some characteristic of the tyrannical nature described by Socrates. Slavery is the condition of the people portrayed in the narrative of the conversation at Cardinal Morton's house. The French king and his councilors

²⁹Rep. IX 584 A (Shorey, II, 383-85).

represent the tyrannical characteristic of warmongering. The anonymous king and his councilors exhibit the greed of tyrants and the unscrupulous means they will employ to fulfill their desires. In true tyrannical fashion they exploit the people and pervert the laws. The councilors betray their natures by their consent to the famous statement of Crassus: "No amount of gold is enough for the ruler who has to keep an army."³⁰

The accumulation of these various vices in the men and the states they control gives a total impression of Europe as one vast tyranny. In referring to the anonymous king, Hythlodæus epitomizes this impression with the image of a prison: "To be sure, to have a single person enjoy a life of pleasure and self-indulgence amid the groans and lamentations of all around him is to be the keeper, not of a kingdom, but of a jail."³¹

In Book I of the Utopia, then, Thomas More portrays a tyranny which resembles in its basic elements the tyranny described in Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 392 B) of the Republic. He presents this picture in preparation for the description of the ideal state in Book II. In Book II he paints the antithesis of the defects that have emerged from the

³⁰Utopia, p. 93/38-39.

³¹Utopia, p. 95/37-39.

dialogue in Book I. In contrast to the slavery, war, and misery of Europe, there are freedom, peace, and happiness in Utopia.

The contrast is particularly significant in regard to "the matter of pleasure." Unlike the kings and councilors in Book I, who seek the gratification of their appetites, the Utopians seek only legitimate pleasures. The Utopians class as spurious pleasures those which the Europeans mistake for genuine, such as desire for gold, honor, and nobility. Like Socrates, they consider the pleasures of the mind as the highest: "To sum up, they cling above all to mental pleasures, which they value as the first and foremost of all pleasures."³²

Although in their definition of other kinds of pleasure the Utopians agree with Socrates about the highest kind of pleasure, they display characteristic unconcern for his fine distinctions. For example, they have no interest in the kind of demonstration which Socrates attempts in arguing that pleasures other than those of intelligence are illusions. Thomas More has the ninth book of the Republic in mind, no doubt, when he has Hythlodæus describe the Utopian attitude toward pleasure to be derived from a healthful state of the body:

They think that it is of no importance in the discussion whether you say that disease is pain or that disease is accompanied with pain, for it comes to the same thing either way. To be sure, if you hold that health is either

³²Utopia, p. 175/34-35.

a pleasure or the necessary cause of pleasure, as fire is of heat, in both ways the conclusion is that those who have permanent health cannot be without pleasure.³³

Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic, then, provides a number of significant parallels with the Utopia. In Book I of the Utopia More condenses Plato's entire discussion of the process of corruption of the ideal state, contained in Books VIII and IX of the Republic. The pictures of corruption, though different in the arrangement of parts and inclusion of details, are similar in their essential form.

The contrast between justice and injustice that is completed at the conclusion of Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic concludes Socrates' answer to the challenges which Glaucon presents in the exordium. Prior to Book X Socrates has described the nature of justice and has shown that the life of justice is more beneficial than the life of injustice. Moreover, he has argued in behalf of justice without reference to the promise of rewards and punishments after death. In Book X, which constitutes Part V of the entire dialogue, Socrates addresses himself to the challenges raised by Adeimantus in the exordium.

Adeimantus presents arguments similar to two of those advanced by Glaucon. He corroborates Glaucon's theory of a deterministic sanction for justice and of the advantages of

³³Utopia, p. 175/13-19.

injustice over justice. He maintains first that men praise justice not for its own sake, but for "the good repute with mankind that accrues from it."³⁴ Further, they hope not only to gain a reputation among men but also to gain a good standing in the sight of the gods. To substantiate their argument, such persons cite the tales told by the poets in which the gods favor the just with sensual delights. Adeimantus points out that even the worthy Homer and Hesiod teach such doctrines. Adeimantus argues next that to act unjustly is easier and more pleasant than to act justly. He again bolsters his argument with an appeal to the authority of the poets. The poets teach that a man can live unjustly on earth and yet gain rewards from the gods in the afterlife. Their teachings are particularly insidious because they "make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice."³⁵ They also teach conversely that even the just may be punished because "terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice."³⁶

Although Adeimantus states in another way two of his brother's arguments, he raises two issues which Glaucon does not consider. First, he maintains that the poets are responsible for the false teaching about justice. In explaining

³⁴Rep. II 363 A (Shorey, I, 129).

³⁵Rep. II 364 E (Shorey, I, 135).

³⁶Rep. II 365 A (Shorey, I, 135).

the role of the poets, Adeimantus reveals that they advise striving for the appearance rather than the reality of justice. He cites what the poets teach about this matter:

The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not assets, they say, but liabilities, labour and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised. Then since it is "the seeming," as the wise men show me, that "masters the reality" and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself without reserve.³⁷

Secondly, Adeimantus asserts that in the afterlife the gods do not reward and punish according to whether men have been just or unjust on earth. Rather, the unjust can continue their delightful and pleasurable course in the world below, if they observe special rites and functions prescribed by the poets and the soothsayers. With this second point Adeimantus denies man's responsibility for his moral action.

Socrates answers the two issues raised by Adeimantus in Part V (Book X) of the entire dialogue. In the first half of the book (595 A-605 C) he explains why the poets must be banished from the ideal state. In effect, Socrates undermines the legitimacy of the poets' authority which Adeimantus in the exordium attempts to establish. Socrates maintains that the poets cannot be credited as teachers, for they deal in appearances rather than in truth. He insists that even the renowned Homer cannot be allowed a hearing: "Shall we, then,

³⁷ Rep. II 365 C (Shorey, I, 137).

lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer, are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things they 'create,' and do not lay hold on truth?"³⁸ The first half of Book X, then, pertains to the poets themselves and to the reasons why they are not creditable teachers. They are banished because they are deceivers.

In the second half of Book X (608 C-621 D) Socrates offers an alternative to the doctrine about the afterlife taught by the poets. In this last section of the whole dialogue Socrates takes up the question of the immortality of the soul, a question which he has conspicuously avoided up to this point. In contrast to Adeimantus' description of the tales told by the poets in which the unjust continue after death in sensual delights, Socrates relates the story of Er. The myth makes the point that unless a man has through a virtuous life learned to choose wisely between good and evil, he can expect a life of torment and pain in the world below. By telling this story, Socrates directly confutes Adeimantus' implicit assumption that men need not be responsible for their actions.

The place of the myth of Er in the structure of the Republic parallels the position of the discussion of religion in the Utopia. Both works conclude with the affirmation of the belief in a life hereafter and the promise of rewards and

³⁸Rep. X 600 E (Shorey, II, 441).

punishments after death. As was mentioned in the last chapter, however, the belief in rewards and punishments after death is a more integral part of the structure of the Utopia because such belief is the basis for the sanction for justice. In the Republic, on the other hand, Socrates does not insist that belief in rewards and punishments in the life hereafter is necessary as a sanction for justice. He maintains, rather, that the knowledge of the form of justice attained in this life is a sufficient imperative.

In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to reveal how Plato unifies the parts of the structure of the Republic through the development of the theme of justice. At the same time the ideas contained in the various structural parts have been compared and contrasted with analogous ideas in the Utopia. This method of comparison and contrast has subtly suggested the ways in which Thomas More has adapted many of Plato's notions in his creation of the Utopia. The remaining chapters attempt to explain how More has arranged his ideas in the different parts of his structure and how he has unified the parts through the theme of justice. The chapters reveal that, although not a slavish imitation of the Republic, the Utopia follows the contours of Plato's work in its basic form.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COMPOSITION OF THE UTOPIA

A study of the structure of the Utopia can appropriately begin with a consideration of the order in which the books were composed. It is generally accepted that Thomas More wrote the second book before the first, the chief grounds for this theory being a letter written by Erasmus to Ulrich von Hutten in 1519. Erasmus remarks that More "had written the second book at his leisure, and afterwards, when he found it was required; added the first off-hand. Hence there is some inequality in the style."¹ This statement apparently has contributed to a rather widespread assumption that the Utopia is a fractured work. Many commentators, writing with this assumption, discuss either the first or the second book to the exclusion of the other.

Ordinarily Book II receives most attention. As Russell Ames has observed, "The 'Utopian' second part seems to dominate the mind whenever Utopia is mentioned."² Yet the literary excellence of the first book has not gone unnoticed. J. H. Hexter, in particular, has remarked upon the excellent

¹The Epistles of Erasmus, p. 398.

²Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia, p. 4.

literary quality of Book I.³

Hexter has also helped our understanding of More's composition of the whole work. His analysis, however, tends to confirm the impression that the Utopia, as a whole, lacks unity. He hypothesizes that More wrote the dialogue of counsel in the first book as an afterthought and that its subject matter is distinct and almost unrelated to the subject matter in Book II. He impugns the organic unity of More's work succinctly:

The part of Utopia that More composed first is itself a consistent, coherent, and practically complete literary work. This implies--what I believe to be true--that in More's original intent the first-written part of Utopia, probably completed in Antwerp, was a finished work, that only after he returned to London did he feel impelled to add anything to it, that the published version of Utopia falls into two parts which represent two different and separate sets of intention on the part of the author, the first embodied in the finished book he carried back from the Netherlands, the second in the additions he later made in England.⁴

Although Hexter does not set out specifically to show the lack of unity in the Utopia, he assumes that because Book I was written at a different time and under different circumstances than Book II, the work as a whole lacks unity. To support

³More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea.

⁴Ibid., p. 28. Hexter has published his theory of the composition of the Utopia in this book as well as in the Introduction to the Yale edition of the Utopia. His theory is more fully developed in his earlier work. In this chapter, therefore, it will be necessary to refer to both the earlier treatment (1952) and the Yale edition (1965) as the discussion requires.

his conclusions, he presents considerable evidence, some of which will be examined presently.

Many critics have argued that the Republic also lacks unity. They contend that the middle section, Books V-VII, was later inserted between Books IV and VIII in what was originally a complete work and that the philosophical content and tone of the later addition reveal a progression in Plato's thought and in his art. In an essay in which he argues for the unity of the Republic, Lewis Campbell summarizes this critical opinion and explains that those who argue against the unity of the Republic use the following evidence to support their theory:

They have proceeded to remark on the absence of allusions to V-VII in the concluding books, VIII-X, as compared with the frequent and distinct allusions in VIII-X to I-IV, and have further observed that the references to I-IV which occur in the central portion, V-VII, have more the appearance of deliberate quotation than of the subtle continuity which binds together I-IV, or VIII-X, when taken separately. A. Krohn also dwells on the difference of tone and philosophical content between V-VII on the one hand and I-IV and VIII-X on the other.⁵

Campbell argues that although some inequalities can be found in the structure of the Republic, the work as a whole is a masterpiece of unity. He states his conclusion:

The unity of the Republic as a literary masterpiece hardly needs defence. Each part has its own climax of interest, and in spite of the intentional breaks and digressions, or rather with their aid, there is a

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

continuous rise⁶ and fall,--as in a tragedy,--pervading the whole work.

Our analysis of the Republic in the foregoing chapters supports Campbell's conclusion. In the remaining chapters our intention will be to argue that More's work as a whole, like the Republic, is essentially unified and coherent despite some inequality in tone and style. Before presenting the positive argument in support of the Utopia's unity of structure, however, it seems appropriate to consider some of the evidence supporting the position that the Utopia is a fractured work.

Because J. H. Hexter is probably the most influential contributor to the general impression that the Utopia lacks unity, part of his argument will be considered in some detail. Having ingeniously reconstructed More's historical milieu, he concludes that Erasmus' statement about the reversed order of composition is not precisely correct. Hexter argues that some portion of Book I, namely, what he labels the introduction (Utopia, pp. 47-55), must have been written at the same time as Book II.

In developing his argument, Hexter traces More's activities between the time he apparently began writing the Utopia and the time he finished it. He surmises that when More returned to England from his trip to the Netherlands, the

⁶Ibid., p. 11.

uppermost problem in his mind was the decision of whether or not to enter the King's service as a councilor. According to Hexter, when More decided to write Book I, he had already completed Book II. Thus he had Book II in the back of his mind as he thought over his decision:

As he pondered his decision, we may surmise, More remembered his literary creation, Raphael Hythlodæus, somewhat amorphous still as he appeared in the Introduction and Discourse, not really fully characterized in the little book about Utopia that was almost finished . . . More thus set Hythlodæus up as the protagonist of a dialogue about counsel, a dialogue in which the perplexities coursing through his own mind were worked over in an exchange of views among Hythlodæus, Giles, and More.⁷

Hexter then reconstructs how More wrote the remainder of Book I in separate portions as he encountered specific problems relating to his decision: "How much further he got before he was again diverted we cannot say. At some point, however, he became acutely aware of another dimension of the problem about counsel."⁸ However accurate this reconstruction of More's state of mind may be, Hexter conveys an impression of the Utopia as a loosely structured, episodic narration of More's personal history.

Hexter's theory that the debate on councilorship forms the central core of the subject matter in Book I has been very influential. David Bevington, for example,

⁷Utopia, Introduction, p. xxxvi.

⁸Utopia, Introduction, p. xxxvii.

essentially agrees with Hexter that More's personal dilemma shaped the subject matter and form of Book I, although he disagrees with Hexter's theory that the character Hythlodæus represents the author More's state of mind.⁹ He maintains that both Hythlodæus and More as persona represent the tension which existed in the mind of More as the author. Bevington, in fact, interprets both books of the Utopia in terms of the problem of councilorship. After analyzing the ambivalent attitude in Book I, he sees the same ambivalence in Book II:

The description of the island of Utopia in Book II deals similarly with the problem of the philosopher in deciding whether or not to participate in a government. The respective stands of persona More and of Hythlodæus are merely the obverse of their previous positions concerning tyranny.¹⁰

Although both Hexter and Bevington maintain that the debate on councilorship dominates the subject matter in Book I, neither explicitly states that it is the theme. In fact, few critical articles deal specifically with the theme of Book I. The neglect of this important literary aspect of the Utopia suggests a widespread bewilderment as to the exact nature of the theme in Book I. Without specifically describing the theme, critics commonly assume it to be councilorship. At any rate, Hexter seems to have this intention when he writes that

⁹"Dialogue in Utopia: Two Sides to the Question," *Studies in Philology*, LVIII (July, 1961), 496-509.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 508-509.

Book I "is a tight-knit dialectic exploration of the problem of counseling princes in sixteenth-century Europe."¹¹

My purpose is not to discount the importance which Hexter and Bevington attach to More's personal dilemma. Both argue convincingly that the debate on councilorship reflects a real problem that More was pondering at the time he wrote Book I. It is my intention, however, to explain why councilorship should not be assumed to be the dominant theme of Book I. The debate on councilorship is subordinate, rather, to the theme of injustice.

The insistence here that the debate on councilorship is not the theme of Book I arises from the three following considerations: first, the actual exchanges between the persona More, Peter Giles, and Hythlodæus on the question of whether the philosopher should enter a king's service does not pervade the discussion, as does the theme of injustice, but it recurs at relatively infrequent intervals; second, the "dialectic exploration" is not "tight-knit," or a "close argument," as Hexter maintains;¹² and third, the point at issue in the debate, namely, the duty of a good man in an evil environment, is subordinate to the theme of justice.

In relation to the total length of Book I, the debate

¹¹Utopia, Introduction, p. xx.

¹²Utopia, Introduction, p. xxxviii.

on councilorship itself is only a small portion. The exchanges of views which specifically relate to counseling occur at three junctures, which comprise about one-fifth of the entire book. That is, roughly 220 lines out of 1100 pertain to the question of whether Hythlodæus should become a king's councilor. The interspersed anecdotes narrated by Hythlodæus--the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's and the two kings' council meetings--are only tenuously connected to the question. The other four-fifths of the book relates in one way or another to injustice.

The debate itself is neither tightly knit dialectic nor a close argument. Hythlodæus' answers to Peter Giles's and Thomas More's urgings to become a councilor are desultory and maundering qua answers. This is not to say that the artistic merit of the book suffers as a result. The casual nature of the conversation adds to the realistic effect and provides a framework within which the theme of injustice can be developed.

The first segment of the debate (55/15-59/17) contains two exchanges. Hythlodæus responds first to the arguments of Peter Giles and then to those of Thomas More. Peter Giles suggests that Hythlodæus could be of great service "by entertaining a king with this learning and experience of men and places."¹³ Furthermore, he adds that Hythlodæus

¹³Utopia, p. 55/18-19.

could profit himself as well as his relatives. Answering in a characteristic manner, Hythlodæus retorts to only one part, and that the least important, of the argument offered by Peter Giles. The mariner does not feel obligated to help his relatives since he has previously given them everything he owned.

Peter Giles then reasserts one of his previous points and adds another reason not mentioned previously. He repeats that Hythlodæus could make himself more prosperous. More importantly, he opines that the philosopher could profit other people "both as private individuals and as members of the commonwealth."¹⁴ In his reply Hythlodæus objects to the logic that his condition could be made prosperous by a way his soul abhors but fails to acknowledge the most important of Giles's reasons--that his services should be rendered to help other people.

Hythlodæus' evasion of the main issue prompts Thomas More to reassert Peter's point. He appeals to the philosopher's sense of duty. Praising Hythlodæus' learning and experience, he reminds him of his obligation to make some monarch follow "straightforward and honorable courses."¹⁵ Again avoiding the real issue, Hythlodæus does not directly answer More's

¹⁴Utopia, p. 55/37-38.

¹⁵Utopia, p. 57/16.

suggestion that he has a moral duty to become a king's councilor; instead he uses the opportunity to point out the injustice in the character of kings and their councilors. He first describes the warlike nature of kings: "In the first place almost all monarchs prefer to occupy themselves in pursuits of war--with which I neither have nor desire any acquaintance--rather than in the honorable activities of peace, and they care much more how, by hook or by crook, they may win fresh kingdoms than how they may administer well what they have got."¹⁶

As an argument against becoming a councilor this statement is spurious on two counts. First, Hythlodæus does not say "all monarchs" are concerned with war. He says "almost all." Why, then, does he not offer his services to one of those monarchs who are not concerned with war? Second, and more important, the statement begs the question. Giles and More presumably know already that many kings and their councilors are bent on war and conquest. For this reason, they urge Hythlodæus to attempt to effect a change in the habitual behavior of such warmongers. Hythlodæus, however, does not attempt to show why he could not influence the opinions of those in high places. Ironically, he proceeds to relate a story that proves just the opposite, i. e., his account of his debate at the home of Cardinal Morton.

¹⁶Utopia, p. 57/25-30.

If councilorship is taken as the theme of Book I, Hythlodæus' narration of his dialogue at Cardinal Morton's table must be considered a long digression. He tells the story ostensibly to show that kings' councilors cannot be swayed by sage advice. If the anecdote proves anything about councilors, it shows that at least one important royal councilor readily accepts good advice. The Cardinal, Lord Chancellor of England, displays his wisdom and open-minded attitude in his reaction to Hythlodæus' arguments about penal justice. Of those present, it is he who first recognizes the virtue of Hythlodæus' remarks. He agrees that the philosopher's theories should be tried in practice.

The narration of the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's table, then, is largely inappropriate as a rebuttal of the persona More's argument on counseling. By telling the anecdote, Hythlodæus avoids the point that More makes about his duty to be a councilor, and he proves, if anything, that some kings' councilors apparently are not concerned primarily with war and money. He also shows that Cardinal Morton, a royal councilor, could be swayed by a convincing argument. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the episode at Cardinal Morton's house develops the theme of injustice.

The episode at Cardinal Morton's table also points up the problem of irony that confronts us throughout both the Utopia and the Republic. One cannot be sure that More intends

the irony in the Cardinal Morton incident. In the Republic the handling of the character of Cephalus, for example, raises the question of Plato's intention. In the opening of the Republic Cephalus, displaying great satisfaction at the prospect of engaging Socrates in serious philosophical discussion, expresses regret that only occasionally does he have the opportunity to talk with a person of Socrates' wisdom and intelligence. Yet as soon as Socrates pursues the question of justice raised by Cephalus, the old man hurries off to sacrifice to the gods. Thus Cephalus, like Cardinal Morton, displays behavior contrary to the ostensible role assigned to him in the dialogue.

Indeed, the irony that runs through both the Republic and the Utopia explains in part why so many interpretations can be given for any particular passage in either work. If one reads the episode at Cardinal Morton's house as ironic, it becomes increasingly evident that More does not wish to stress the logic of Hythlodæus' argument against becoming a councilor. If the episode is not ironic, one must draw the conclusion that More's forensic prowess deserted him in the creation of his most famous work. (After all, More as a judge would not have accepted Hythlodæus' story as strong evidence.) An examination of the remainder of the debate on councilorship tends to support the former conclusion: More is not primarily interested in putting an airtight case for staying

out of politics into the mouth of his main character.

After Hythlodæus' narration of the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's, the persona More resumes the debate on councilorship (85/38-87/25). Indicating in this short passage that the story about Cardinal Morton does not answer the main point of his argument, the persona More restates the main point with the following curious remark:

Even now, nevertheless, I cannot change my mind but must needs think that, if you could persuade yourself not to shun the courts of kings, you could do the greatest good to the common weal by your advice. The latter is the most important part of your duty as it is the duty of every good man. Your favorite author, Plato, is of opinion that commonwealths will finally be happy only if either philosophers become kings or kings turn to philosophy.¹⁷

The remark is curious because Hythlodæus has not at any time up to this point in Book I mentioned Plato as his favorite author. How then does his recent acquaintance, Thomas More, know that he prefers Plato to other authors? This anomaly raises some interesting questions about the order of composition, to which we will return after further considering the logic of the debate on councilorship.

In addition to the question of composition raised by More's remark, his invocation of Plato's authority focuses the theme on the real issue of the debate. Appealing to the prescription Plato lays down for philosophers in the Republic, he exclaims: "What a distant prospect of happiness there will

¹⁷Utopia, p. 87/7-13.

be if philosophers will not condescend even to impart their counsel to kings!"¹⁸ In this statement the persona More alludes to Socrates' insistence in Book VII that the philosopher has the moral duty to render his services to the state. Socrates explains that the philosopher must surrender his own happiness for the common good:

The law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth.¹⁹

Hythlodæus, however, does not meet the issue of the moral duty of the philosopher. Instead, he repeats his previous assertion that kings cannot be changed. He, too, significantly invokes the authority of Plato in support of his position:

But, doubtless, Plato was right in foreseeing that if kings themselves did not turn to philosophy, they would never approve of the advice of real philosophers because they have been from their youth saturated and infected with wrong ideas. This truth he found from his own experience with Dionysius.²⁰

Again his answer misses the real issue--namely, the

¹⁸Utopia, p. 87/13-15.

¹⁹Rep. VII 519 E-520 A (Shorey, II, 141).

²⁰Utopia, p. 87/18-23.

duty of a good man in an unjust society. Furthermore, it contains a distortion of Plato's meaning in the Republic. Instead of defending the right of the philosopher not to serve the king, Hythlodæus simply maintains that kings must change themselves if they are to change at all. Although Hythlodæus refers in his statement to Plato's experience with Dionysius, he distorts Plato's meaning in the Republic, for Socrates never suggests that kings will ever turn to philosophy of their own accord. He makes it clear that one does not turn to philosophy without a rigorous intellectual training, which it is the responsibility of the philosopher founders of the state to provide.

But Hythlodæus insists, as the core of his argument, that kings and their councilors are by nature corrupt. To support this contention, he imagines two hypothetical situations in which the French king and an anonymous king are sitting in council with their advisors. Hythlodæus ostensibly tells these two stories to show how ineffective he or any good man would be in changing the politics of kings and their councilors. When considered as arguments against being a councilor, however, these anecdotes, like the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's table, must be considered digressions. Moreover, these anecdotes again beg the question.

Both anecdotes assume a prior acquiescence in the main point that Hythlodæus tries to establish--namely, that

kings and councilors are by nature corrupt and cannot be changed. Hythlodæus first places himself in a hypothetical situation with a king and his councilors who are "bent on war." It would be folly, no doubt, to attempt to persuade such men not to go to war when they have specifically assembled in order to plan strategy. But the situation described would not convince an objective listener that a wise councilor who had been urging peace over a period of years could not have prevented the king and his councilors from meeting in the first place.

The same criticism can be made of the story about the anonymous king. He and his councilors have met in session to determine ways of separating the people from their money. One cannot help wondering, however, why a wise councilor would wait until the decision to pervert the laws had already been made before urging a just fiscal policy.

The two hypothetical council meetings, then, show merely that one should not try to change a king and his councilors after their opinions are formed, not that a wise man cannot influence kings under any circumstances. However, although these two anecdotes are not convincing proofs of a philosopher's being ineffective as a king's councilor, they are effective examples of the injustice which exists in the states of Europe.

Significantly, these spurious arguments do not convince the persona More. He insists upon the point made previously

in the argument, that Hythlodæus misunderstands the role of the councilor. Explaining that the effective councilor does not, as Hythlodæus suggests, blurt out unpopular opinions that surely must fall on deaf ears, the persona More urges a more prudent course: "But there is another philosophy, more practical for statesmen, which knows its stage, adapts itself to the play in hand, and performs its role neatly and appropriately."²¹ Reaffirming the point he has made from the start, he insists upon the moral obligation of the philosopher: "If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account desert the commonwealth. You must not abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds."²²

Hythlodæus, however, remains unconvinced. He again insists that he would be ineffective as a councilor. Finally he indirectly answers More's point of moral obligation, but his argument is weak. He points out that his own moral well-being would be put in jeopardy by association with evil kings and councilors. This danger, he explains, results from the incorrigible nature of councilors: "Moreover, there is no chance for you to do any good because you are brought among

²¹Utopia, p. 99/13-16.

²²Utopia, p. 99/31-35.

colleagues who would easily corrupt even the best of men before being reformed themselves."²³

This argument is weak because it forces a conclusion which undermines Hythlodæus' general position. If evil councilors can corrupt philosophers, change of character is in fact possible. But Hythlodæus has insisted that he could not effect change in evil kings and councilors. To reconcile these two positions, it must be insisted that evil can change good but that good cannot change evil. This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the examples of the Utopians. Dealing with other peoples obviously does not corrupt the Utopians. Conversely, their examples persuade such persons as the Anemolian ambassadors to see the truth about gold and fine trappings.

Under close examination, then, the arguments of Hythlodæus are not convincing. The debate on councilorship at the end of Book I remains unresolved. This unresolved issue, as Bevington suggests, probably reflects More's state of mind at the time of writing Book I. But More has a larger purpose than simply portraying his own personal dilemma in a dramatic dialogue. Rather he wishes to give a total picture of tyranny and corruption in a realistic setting that would contrast sharply with the ideal justice portrayed in Book II

²³Utopia, p. 103/9-11.

Although at the time he wrote the dialogue in Book I, he may have already written Book II, this does not in itself prove that he did not specifically write Book I in order to serve as a startling contrast to Book II. He found the debate on councilorship a convenient and realistic framework in which to paint his portrait.

Although the foregoing has been an argument against Hexter's conclusions about the central focus in Book I, it should not be construed as an attempt to refute his argument for the reconstruction of the order of composition. The remark made by the persona More in Book I that Plato is Hythlodæus' favorite author, however, raises an interesting question about this matter. This anomaly suggests an alternate possibility to the order hypothesized by Hexter. From his thorough analysis of the text and the circumstances surrounding its composition, Hexter draws the following conclusion:

Summarizing the above analysis of the structure of Utopia, we suggest as probable the following sequence of composition:

Netherlands	{	Book I Introduction, pp. 46-58 [<u>leg.</u> 46-54].
		Book II Discourse on Utopia, pp. 110-236.
London	{	Book I Dialogue of Counsel including the Exordium, pp. 58-108 [<u>leg.</u> 54-108].
		Book II Peroration and Conclusion, pp. 236-46. ²⁴

Although the essential order of composition which Hexter reconstructs is not questioned here, the following analysis suggests reasons to suppose that More wrote the concluding

²⁴Utopia, Introduction, p. xxi.

section of Book I (specifically 103/32-109/36), not at the same time as Book I, as Hexter says, but at the time he wrote the discourse in Book II. The chief argument for proposing this variation in the order proposed by Hexter is that More's statement about Hythlodæus' preference cannot be explained very convincingly in any other way.

Various possible answers suggest themselves to explain the inconsistency of the persona More's remark about Hythlodæus' favorite author. If the whole question of the unorthodox order of composition had never been raised, a likely conjecture could be that More included the information about Hythlodæus' preference in an earlier draft of the Utopia. If such were the case, this omission in the final manuscript suggests that Hythlodæus' references to Plato might have been more extensive in the earlier draft. But speculation about the possible form of such a draft is idle in the absence of an extant manuscript.

Without conjecture about the implications of the reversed composition, one might consider two other explanations.

Possibly the persona More derived his notion about Hythlodæus' preference for Plato from a statement made by Peter Giles at the opening of Book I. There Peter Giles indicates that Hythlodæus is "no bad Latin scholar, and most learned in Greek."²⁵ Or it could be that Hythlodæus has let his preference for Plato

²⁵Utopia, pp. 49/39-51/1.

be known in some of the unrecorded conversation that the persona More as narrator does not choose to relate. For instance, in the introduction before the dialogue on councilorship, he remarks, "After we had greeted each other and exchanged the civilities which commonly pass at the first meeting of strangers, we went off to my house."²⁶ Then a few paragraphs later More refers to other tales told by Hythlodæus: "What he said he say in each place would be a long tale to unfold and is not the purpose of this work."²⁷ Can we assume that Hythlodæus mentioned his preference for Plato in the initial civilities that passed among the three men or in part of the narrative not reported by More?

Neither of the above explanations is satisfying; both seem to betray a lack of dramatic sensibility on More's part. It is unlikely that More as author would have had More as character conclude that Plato is Hythlodæus' favorite author simply on the basis of Peter Giles's casual remark that the philosopher prefers Greek to Latin authors. It would also be unwarranted to assume that Hythlodæus talked about his philosophical preferences while exchanging civilities or while narrating the less interesting part of his travels. More's dramatic technique demonstrated in other aspects of the

²⁶Utopia, p. 51/25-27.

²⁷Utopia, p. 53/30-31.

Utopia argues against such insensitivity.

The most plausible explanation is suggested by a reversed order of composition. In writing his first book last, More could have inadvertently presumed upon information already presented in the latter part of the work. This raises the question of where in the latter part of the text the persona More could reasonably have been assumed to derive the notion that Plato is Hythlodæus' favorite author. Hexter's theory of the order of composition would certainly be strengthened if Hythlodæus' preference for Plato were found to be stated in the parts of the text which Hexter says were written in the Netherlands. In that case, the persona More's reason for assuming Hythlodæus' preference in the dialogue in Book I would not be difficult to surmise. It could be assumed that in writing Book I after Book II, More as author simply forgot that he could not presume upon information given in the parts already written.

An indication of Hythlodæus' admiration for Plato does occur in the middle of the discourse in Book II. Here Hythlodæus lists the great books which he took on his voyage. He mentions that the Utopians "received from me most of Plato's works, several of Aristotle's, as well as Theophrastus on plants, which I regret to say was mutilated in parts."²⁸ This implied

²⁸ Utopia, p. 181/33-35.

preference for Plato might be the explanation for the persona More's assumption in Book I. If this passage were indeed written earlier than the statement in Book I, it might serve, in the absence of any other theory, to explain More's atypical lapse from his sustained pose of dramatic verisimilitude.

This explanation, however, does not win immediate acceptance. The same objection applies here as was suggested in rejecting the theory that More could have surmised Hythlodæus' preference from Peter Giles's casual remark at the opening of Book I. In both cases the persona More would be making an assumption about Hythlodæus' philosophical preference. Although there would be greater reason to assume a preference from Hythlodæus' reading list than from Peter Giles's general remark about Hythlodæus' Greek scholarship, the fact remains that, prior to More's assumption, Hythlodæus states a preference for Plato neither in Book II nor in Book I.

The place in the text where Hythlodæus gives the strongest indication that he prefers Plato occurs in the final section of Book I, namely, the exordium. Almost at the beginning of this final section Hythlodæus remarks that when he considers all the evils associated with private property, "I become more partial to Plato and less surprised at his refusal to make laws for those who rejected that legislation which gave to all an equal share in all goods."²⁹

²⁹Utopia, p. 105/4-7.

This expressed preference would corroborate Hexter's general theory if it had occurred in the portions which he says were written first. Supposedly, however, the exordium was written at the same time as the dialogue in Book I. In the order of composition, therefore, Hythlodæus' statement of preference occurs after the persona More's assumption of Hythlodæus' preference. But what if the exordium were written earlier, together with the discourse in Book II? Then, in the order of composition, Hythlodæus' statement of preference would have occurred prior to the persona More's assumption of preference. Moreover, other evidence from the text supports the supposition that the exordium may have been written as an introduction to Book II before the dialogue in Book I.

Hexter advances two main reasons for supposing that the exordium might have been written at the same time as the discourse in Book II. First, the exordium represents a distinct change in subject matter and style from the dialogue in Book I: "We can only be quite sure that it is a section, that from the breakpoint at which Hythlodæus veers onto the problem of property to the end of Book I we are dealing with a homogeneous piece of writing without an internal break."³⁰ Second, the exordium contains a reference to Hythlodæus'

³⁰More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea, p. 22.

five-year residence in Utopia. This same reference occurs in the introductory section to Book I and the discourse in Book II, both of which sections were supposedly written at the same time. Thus it would be reasonable to suppose that the exordium was also written earlier along with the introduction and the discourse.

After offering these two arguments for supposing the earlier composition of the exordium, Hexter rejects them. He reasons that if the dialogue were excerpted from Book I, the exordium would not follow logically upon the introduction. He argues that "specifically there is one bit of action that becomes unintelligible if More wrote the conclusion to Book I in the Netherlands before working out the dialogue."³¹ The "bit of action" referred to occurs at the end of the exordium when the three men go in to eat dinner in preparation for Hythlodæus' discourse on Utopia. The narrator makes this statement: "So we went in and dined. We then returned to the same place, sat down on the same bench, and gave orders to the servants that we should not be interrupted."³² Hexter raises a pertinent question: "Now if it was necessary to come back after dinner to hear Raphael tell about Utopia, what had the three men been talking about all morning?"³³ He then

³¹Ibid., p. 23.

³²Utopia, p. 109/32-34.

³³More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea, p. 23.

concludes that if this statement about the dinner break were written before the dialogue in Book I the whole morning referred to becomes an "artistic blank."³⁴

Although Hexter's argument is credible, there are equally good reasons for drawing the opposite conclusion. One need not maintain that the morning referred to in the exordium would be an artistic blank if the dialogue of council were not later inserted between the introduction and the exordium. In fact, it is difficult to explain how Hythlodæus could have narrated all that he was supposed to have narrated in a morning's talk, since, according to Hexter, the introduction was written first. The persona More tells us in the introduction that Hythlodæus had related a number of other adventures before proceeding to the description of Utopia. In the paragraph which Hexter maintains closes the introduction, More comments, "What he said he saw in each place would be a long tale to unfold and is not the purpose of this work."³⁵ If what Hythlodæus saw in each place was at all comparable to what he saw in Utopia, it would have easily filled up at least a morning's talk. Indeed, it is questionable whether he could have told all that he saw in addition to relating his dialogue on councilorship. The dinner break, then, does not

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Utopia, p. 53/31-32.

necessarily preclude the possibility that the composition of the exordium could have followed immediately after that of the introduction.

The more important question however, is whether the exordium logically follows upon the introduction. Hexter argues that the introduction to Book I concludes with the passage beginning "What he said he saw in each place" ³⁶ At this juncture Hexter maintains that the dialogue can be excerpted and the discourse in Book II can be inserted without any evident strain on continuity. Let us apply this same test to the exordium. If the exordium originally followed the introduction, would the strain on continuity be too great? Suppose the exordium as More originally wrote it started with the paragraph that begins, "As a result, when in my heart I ponder on the extremely wise and holy institutions of the Utopians. . . ." ³⁷ If we excise the initial transitional phrase, "As a result," there is no more reason to suppose that More passed from the introduction to the beginning of Book II than to suppose that he passed from the introduction to this point in Book I, except that the two preceding paragraphs also appear to be a part of the exordium.

Closer reading reveals, however, that these two

³⁶Utopia, pp. 53/30-55/6.

³⁷Utopia, p. 103/32-33.

paragraphs are characterized chiefly by their transitional nature. The first of the two, beginning "For this reason, Plato . . . ,"³⁸ refers to the previous discussion on councilorship; the second, beginning "Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you candidly my heart's sentiments . . . ,"³⁹ introduces the subject matter of the exordium--the injustice of private property and the justice of communism. It must be acknowledged that neither of these paragraphs following upon the introduction would provide a smooth transition. But if we assume that the paragraphs were written specifically to weld together the dialogue and the exordium, the transitional nature of the paragraphs becomes evident. After all, in writing the Utopia in a discontinuous sequence, More must have worked over a number of transitional links to make the parts fit together.

There appear, then, to be no better reasons for supposing that the opening of Book II rather than the exordium originally followed upon the introduction to Book I. Furthermore, there are other reasons to support the supposition that the exordium was written before the dialogue. First of all, the subject matter of the exordium is more closely associated with the discourse in Book II than with the dialogue in Book I. In the exordium of Book I Hythlodæus gives his most eloquent

³⁸Utopia, p. 103/16.

³⁹Utopia, p. 103/24.

panegyric on communism and his impassioned tirade against private property. The praise of communism occurs again in Book II, whereas communism serves only to contrast with the ownership of private property in Book I. The benefits of communism are nowhere mentioned in Book I until the exordium. With the exception of the break for dinner considered above, there appears to be no evidence in the exordium which presupposes the foregoing dialogue. In the dialogue, however, More's statement about Hythlodæus' favorite author, Plato, seems to presume upon Hythlodæus' stated preference in the exordium.

A second reason, relating to the character of Peter Giles, reinforces the supposition that the exordium was written before the dialogue. Peter's statement in the exordium seems curiously inconsistent with More's description of him in the introduction to Book I. In the introduction Peter Giles is described as an astute conversationalist. Thomas More says, "In conversation he is so polished and so witty without offense that his delightful society and charming discourse largely took away my nostalgia."⁴⁰ If we pass to the exordium from the introduction, this description of Peter remains consistent. Disregarding the dialogue that intervened between the introduction and the exordium, we see in the

⁴⁰ Utopia, p. 49/11-13.

following statement of Giles his friendly attempt to draw out the tale which Hythlodæus promises in the introduction: "It would be hard for you to convince me that a better-ordered people is to be found in the new world than in the one known to us."⁴¹ This statement can be considered polite and consistent with Peter's character only if we disregard the foregoing dialogue. But in light of Hythlodæus' castigation of the governments and institutions of Europe in the dialogue, Peter's remark either is extremely naive or is meant to bait Hythlodæus in a way that seems inconsistent with Peter's character.

The author More, of course, may have intended to be ironical. He may have been poking fun at his friend Peter. At least the passage must be read this way on the assumption that the exordium was written after the dialogue. Otherwise, Peter's statement seems to indicate that he has not understood Hythlodæus' virulent attack on the injustice in Europe.

Unless more external evidence is uncovered, it cannot be determined exactly how More put together the parts of the Utopia. Obviously, no argument based strictly on the text is likely to prove conclusively that the exordium was written earlier or later than the dialogue in Book I. But if the exordium was not written before the dialogue, some other

⁴¹Utopia, p. 107/24-26.

theory must be found to explain why the persona More assumes that Hythlodæus' favorite author is Plato.

Whether the exordium was written before or at the same time as the preceding part of Book I is an interesting question of the genesis of a literary masterpiece. The awareness that More wrote his work in a discontinuous fashion also alerts the reader to the possibilities of anomalies in the structure. There is a danger, however, in this kind of analysis. It may lead to unwarranted assumptions about the overall structure of the whole work. It should not be assumed that because More wrote various parts of his work at different times or because he inadvertently overlooked some details in linking the parts of the structure together, these facts in themselves prove the lack of unity in the Utopia. Though it is necessary to dissect a work in order to get at its meaning, there is danger in dissecting one part from the other without recognizing how each fits into the organic whole. Therefore, in the following chapters we shall attempt to show why the Utopia is a unified organism despite its reversed order of composition and the inequalities in its style.

CHAPTER IX

UNJUST LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS

The commentaries of More and his contemporaries, written to accompany the text, contain penetrating insights into More's style and the meaning of his work and are useful in an analysis of the theme and structure of the Utopia.¹ More's own observations and those of his humanist friends differ in many significant respects from modern studies. Many critics, for example, miss More's characteristic Renaissance intention in writing the Utopia. One school holds that More wrote his work as an idyllic fantasy or a humanist jeu d'esprit. Another attributes to More a profoundly serious intention and interprets the work as a political manifesto.²

More's contemporaries, on the other hand, make it clear that he has a dual purpose: he wrote the Utopia both to

¹These letters and poems are printed in the Yale edition, pp. 3-45.

²Representative of the school of criticism that considers the Utopia a jeu d'esprit are W. E. Campbell, More's Utopia and His Social Teaching (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1930); and Christopher Hollis, St. Thomas More (London: Burns and Oates, 1961). Representative of the school of criticism that considers the Utopia a political treatise are Ames, Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia; Kautsky, Thomas More and His Utopia; and Arthur E. Morgan, Nowhere Was Somewhere (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946).

instruct and to delight. William Budé makes this comment at the opening of his letter to Thomas Lupset: "I owe you really immense thanks, Lupset, most learned of young men, for having handed me Thomas More's Utopia and thereby drawn my attention to what is very pleasant reading as well as reading likely to be profitable."³ Gerhard Geldenhauer expresses the same opinion in his prefatory poem: "Reader, do you like what is pleasant? In this book is everything that is pleasant. Do you hunt what is profitable? You can read nothing more profitable."⁴

In the Utopia More treats matters of ultimate significance, yet he avoids the tedious rhetoric of a formal political or philosophical treatise. To read the Utopia without seeing both its serious and its humorous aspects is, in fact, to miss the full dimension of the work's greatness. One way in which More manages to be serious but not tedious is by the adoption of a conversational style. Writing about their joint conversation with Hythlodæus, More remarks in his letter to Peter Giles, "The nearer my style came to his careless simplicity the closer it would be to the truth, for which alone I am bound to care under the circumstances and actually do care."⁵ More's comment suggests the reason why the theme

³Utopia, p. 5/3-6.

⁴Utopia, p. 31/3-5.

⁵Utopia, p. 39/13-15.

and structure of the Utopia are difficult to perceive. One must trace Hythlodæus' discourse through the many digressions and abrupt transitions characteristic of casual conversation.

Although Plato also purports to record conversation in the Republic, he reveals no conscious attempt to sustain a pretense of verisimilitude. In fact, as was indicated earlier (Chapters III and VII), Plato has a low regard for an art which attempts merely to imitate actual occurrences. In Book X of the Republic he criticizes poets as well as painters for this practice. Such imitators, Socrates explains, are three stages removed from truth. In contrast to Plato, More suggests that his method of imitating conversation makes his style closer to the truth.

That More's art of imitation resembles that of a painter is noted by more than one of his contemporaries. Peter Giles writes to Jerome Busleyden, "When I contemplate the same picture as painted by More's brush, I am affected as if I were sometimes actually living in Utopia itself."⁶ John Desmarais remarks in his letter to Peter Giles that our knowledge of Utopia is owing to "the very learned More whose pencil has very skillfully drawn it for us."⁷ These observations suggest that the form of the work can be apprehended visually.

⁶Utopia, p. 23/3-5.

⁷Utopia, p. 29/8-9.

One should, therefore, look for patterns of images and other techniques of painting in the composition of the work.

More's method of comparison and contrast (1) highlights various parts of the structure and (2) sets one part off from another. William Budé in particular reveals that he apprehends More's use of this technique by commenting in his letter to Thomas Lupset on the contrast between the injustice in Europe and the justice in Utopia.

In the first part of the letter Budé explains the causes and results of unjust conditions in Europe. Learning and weighing the laws and institutions of Utopia has alerted Budé to injustice elsewhere. Because the whole human race is driven by an anxiety for wealth, legal and civil arts and sciences are used to enact methods of embezzling money rather than to effect justice. Observing that the Europeans pervert justice by adhering to the letter instead of the spirit of the law, Budé emphasizes that justice is least in evidence, ironically, in those nations where law and lawyers have the greatest authority. He points out that lawyers commonly manipulate the law and "prey like hawks on unadvised citizens."⁸ Budé's use of a beast image to emphasize the behavior of unjust lawyers is particularly significant because More also uses beast imagery in Book I to reinforce his theme of injustice (e. g.

⁸Utopia, p. 7/15-16.

the man-eating sheep, pp. 65/38-67/2, and the idle drones, p. 63/5-15).

Budé also observes that in Europe the great number of laws does not bring justice to the citizens. Noting the disparity between legalism and true justice, he compares the injustice which proceeds from merely interpreting the letter of the law to the justice which should proceed from the spirit of the law of the Gospel:

Anyone with a spark of intelligence and sense would admit, if pressed, that there is a vast difference between true equity and law as expressed in canonical censures (at present and for a long time past) and between equity and the law as expressed in civil statutes and royal decrees, just as there is a vast difference between the principles of Christ, who established the moral law, and the conduct of His disciples and the opposing doctrines and tenets of those who regard the golden heaps of Croesus and Midas as the ultimate goal and the essence of happiness.⁹

In the first half of his letter, then, Budé gives in his own words opinions about injustice in Europe which More portrays through his fiction in Book I of the Utopia. Budé observes that the European lawyers substitute strict laws and strained interpretations for true justice. For them justice means the advantage of the stronger. He identifies the sources of injustice in men's greed, avarice, and pride. These insights reveal that Budé sees the thematic lineament of More's first book. Neither he nor any of the other commentators remarks on the debate on councilorship in the first book.

⁹ Utopia, p. 7/30-39.

Their omission is in striking contrast to the emphasis that this subject receives in modern critical studies.

The injustice in Europe described in the first half of Budé's letter prepares for his contrast with the justice in Utopia. Indicating that justice prevails among the Utopians because they have not perverted the law, he speculates on what would happen in Utopia to the legal books which occupy much of the time of European lawyers: "You would see that interminable array of legal tomes, engrossing the attention of so many excellent and solid intellects even until death, viewed as hollow and empty and therefore consigned to bookworms or used as wrapping paper in shops."¹⁰

Perceiving that the meaning of the Utopia arises from the contrast between European injustice and Utopian justice, Budé observes ironically that the Utopians who have not had benefit of Christian revelation are in fact more Christian than the Europeans who profess to be Christians. After identifying the divine principles of the Utopians--equality, love of peace and quiet, and contempt of gold and silver--Budé wonders what would happen should Europe adopt such principles:

Would that the great and good God had behaved as benignly with those regions which hold fast and cling to the surname of Christian derived from His most holy name! Beyond the shadow of a doubt, avarice, the vice which perverts and ruins so many minds otherwise extraordinary

¹⁰Utopia, p. 11/21-25.

and lofty, would depart hence once for all, and the golden age of Saturn would return.¹¹

Budé's extraordinary letter not only incisively interprets the content of the Utopia, but its form also corresponds to that of the Utopia itself. Like the Utopia it divides into two parts with the first part linked to the second by a method of comparison and contrast. The whole is then unified by a comparison of the injustice in Europe with the justice in Utopia. Budé, therefore, must have recognized the unity of the Utopia in order to imitate its structural unity in his own style.

The unity of the Utopia is perceived also by Peter Giles. He comments on More's craft: "He has noted the sources from which all evils actually arise in the commonwealth or from which all blessings possibly could arise, all quite unknown to ordinary folk; or the force and fluency of his discourse by which in pure Latin style and forceful expression he has united numerous topics."¹² In this observation Giles not only praises the unity of the Utopia but also points to the contrast that exists between the evil in Europe and the goodness in Utopia.

The tone as well as the content of the letters in the parerga indicates subtle appreciation of the Utopia. The letters of all except Erasmus sustain the fiction that Utopia

¹¹Utopia, p. 11/31-36.

¹²Utopia, p. 23/12-16.

actually exists in some remote region of the globe. This pretense corroborates the irony in the work itself. By professing that Utopia exists when he and his readers know that it does not, More effectively satirizes his European audience. He magnifies the injustice in Europe by feigning to believe in the existence of Utopia in the same way that Socrates magnifies the ignorance of the Sophists by pretending to know nothing himself. In this sense both the Republic and the Utopia are ironic. More creates the tone of the Utopia as a whole by the use of specific ironic sallies throughout the work.

The title page itself, for example, contains an ironic commentary on the entire work. The full title is accompanied by the caption "A Truly Golden Handbook." Although such a caption is not uncommon in literature, the choice of the word golden may indicate that More intends to poke fun at his own effort to write a serious work. In light of what follows, the meaning of the caption is ambivalent. The surface intention is obvious: the word golden suggests the intrinsic worth of the book. More, however, does not use the word in this sense anywhere else in the Utopia. Throughout the work gold is used in a pejorative sense. In fact, gold becomes a symbol of pride, greed, and superficiality. As will be discussed in greater detail below (Chapter XI), More as author particularly assigns this symbolic meaning to gold in Book II (pp. 151/4-

159/2). Thus, if we apply to the caption the meaning of golden conveyed in the body of the work, we must conclude that More is wryly labeling his own effort as the appearance rather than the reality of truth.

Whether More intends this irony or not does not alter the fact that gold is used in two senses. It may be more than coincidence that Plato uses the word in the same double sense in the Republic. Employing golden with its usual connotation in the Phoenician tale told at the end of Book III, Socrates specifies that the founders must inform the citizens that the best men in the state have been fashioned beneath the earth from gold, the most precious element. Gold, however, is used pejoratively elsewhere in the Republic. For instance, Socrates forbids the guardians to possess gold because of its corrupting influence. Suggesting the two meanings of the word at the conclusion of Book III, Socrates explains that the guardians' inner gold must remain uncontaminated: "Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied."¹³

¹³Rep. III 416 E-417 A (Shorey, I, 311).

It cannot be claimed, of course, that the idea for the irony in the Utopia's caption comes directly from the Republic, but More's usage of the word gold reveals in another way how much his thought and that of Plato run in similar patterns.

In the following analysis of the theme and structure of the Utopia an attempt is made to read the work in light of the cogent observations of More's contemporaries. It is helpful, for example, to approach the overall structure with Peter Giles's suggestion in mind that More's art resembles that of a painter. The unity of the work reveals itself clearly when one observes how the theme that runs through Book I directly contrasts with the theme in Book II. Book I depicts the condition of injustice in Europe. In this picture More exposes the causes and results of a perverted concept of justice. This dark study of evil and corruption conditions the viewer for the clear bright colors which More uses in his picture of Utopia in Book II. From this contrast arises the inescapable conclusion that justice is superior to injustice in every respect.

This method and objective, as was discussed in the earlier chapters, is analogous to Plato's basic plan in the Republic. In the Republic Socrates argues for the advantage of justice over injustice by following his description of the ideal state with an analysis of the causes of injustice. The theme of injustice in Book I of the Utopia develops within the framework of the dialogue of counsel. Two major parts (55/15-

85/37 and 85/38-103/23) of the first book are marked off from each other and from the introduction (47/8-55/14) and the exordium (103/24-109/36) by the debate between Hythlodæus on one hand and More and Giles on the other. The specific exchanges on councilorship (55/15-59/17, 85/38-87/25, 97/39-103/23) serve as frames within which the major theme of the book is focused. Including the introduction and the exordium, therefore, the first book divides into four parts, which can be identified in the text as follows:

Part I (47/8-55/14)	Introduction
Part II (55/15-85/37)	Frame One: the first debate on councilorship and the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's house
Part III (85/38-103/23)	Frame Two: the second debate on councilorship, the French king's and the anonymous king's false notions of justice, and the concluding debate on councilorship
Part IV (103/24-109/36)	Exordium

In Chapter II it has been indicated how the introduction to the Utopia parallels the introduction to the Republic in regard to the place, occasion, and characters of the dialogue. In the present chapter, the introduction will be discussed primarily as it functions in the Utopia itself. In this first part of the structure, More sets the stage for the dialogue, introduces the main characters, and suggests the main theme and the controlling literary device. These functions can be discerned in three separate segments of the introduction.

In the first brief section (47/8-47/33) More, the author, places himself as narrator in a realistic historical setting. More is in Flanders as a commissioner of King Henry VIII, having been sent there to negotiate a commercial treaty with the representatives of Charles, Prince of Castile. The fact that the envoys are real historical personages serves More's ironic intention by predisposing the reader to accept the authenticity of the fiction which follows.

The first section (47/8-47/33) also reveals some traits of the narrator that have a bearing on the theme of the story he relates. His interest in justice and the affairs of state can be surmised from the high purpose of his diplomatic mission to Bruges.¹⁴ He further evidences his high regard for law and diplomacy in his praise of Charles's spokesman by commenting that Georges de Themseche is "most learned . . . in the law and consummately skillful in diplomacy by native ability as well as by long experience."¹⁵

This praise of Charles's chief representative is noteworthy because it indicates criteria by which More, the author, judges excellence throughout the remainder of the work.

¹⁴ More's mission was to settle a basic disagreement on the validity of the commercial treaty of 1506. For details see *Utopia*, p. 295, and E. Surtz, "St Thomas More and His Utopian Embassy of 1515," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXXIX (1953), 272-97.

¹⁵ *Utopia*, p. 47/28-30.

As will be discussed in the ensuing chapters, he has great respect for law but a low regard for legalism. He identifies good laws with justice but insists that too many petty laws bring about injustice. He admires the combination of learning and experience, for he has little regard for theories and abstractions that have not been tested by experience.

In the next segment of the introduction (47/34-51/21) the narrator explains the occasion of the dialogue and describes the characters of the other two main participants. A recess in the negotiations at Bruges has allowed him to make a visit to Antwerp, where one day he meets his friend Peter Giles in conversation with the philosopher-explorer Hythlodæus.

He describes Peter Giles and Hythlodæus. They both combine learning and experience, but their backgrounds and personalities are quite different. Their similarities and differences fit them appropriately for the dialogue which follows.

Peter Giles is a scholar and a gentleman. Among his many other virtues, he possesses a wise simplicity in nature and polish in conversation, qualities that make him an excellent intermediary in the dialogue between Hythlodæus and the persona More.

Hythlodæus has gained experience from his voyages as a mariner and as an explorer. He has not, however, traveled like most sailors. Peter Giles significantly observes that

"his sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of Ulysses or, rather, of Plato."¹⁶ With this mention of Plato, Giles implies that Hythlodæus has not visited remote regions merely as a curiosity seeker. Rather, he has journeyed as a sage who attempts to understand the foundations of political societies and the springs of human action. Peter's incidental remark subtly forewarns the reader that Hythlodæus' description of his travels concerns the most fundamental matters of human experience.

More's creation of the character Hythlodæus marks a significant difference between the dialogue form of the Utopia and that of the Republic. The dissimilarity lies chiefly in the fact that Hythlodæus is a fictional character, whereas Socrates actually lived and taught in Greece. The other characters in the Republic are also patterned after known historical personages. This is not to say that Plato has simply recorded the opinions of other men. The characters in his dialogue, however, generally represent the attitudes and personalities of their real-life counterparts.

In the Utopia the personae More, Peter Giles, and Cardinal Morton represent actual persons in much the same way as the characters in the Republic. Hythlodæus and the anonymous lawyer at Cardinal Morton's house, however, cannot be readily identified as historical personages. Of course,

¹⁶Utopia, p. 49/36-37.

More may have had real persons in mind when he created these characters, but their identity has never been agreed upon by any consensus of readers of the Utopia.

This combination of real and fictional characters in the Utopia is significant because it points the way that the dialogue form was to develop in English literature. Later writers of serious dialogues such as John Dryden adopt the fictional mode of representation. The characters in his An Essay of Dramatic Poetry, for example, represent actual persons known to be living at the time, but their identities are disguised by pseudonyms. Later philosophical dialogues, such as those of David Hume and George Berkeley, carry the trend even further away from Plato's practice of representing real persons in dialogue form. When this change from Plato to Berkeley is seen in retrospect, Thomas More's creation of the fictitious Hythlodæus shows itself to be a milestone in literary history.

Peter Giles's description of Hythlodæus concludes the second section of the introduction (47/34-51/21). In the concluding section (51/22-55/14) the persona More, as narrator, localizes the place of the dialogue. After exchanging civilities, the three men retire to More's quarters, where the discussion takes place in the garden.

The narrator first alludes to the numerous regions to which Raphael has traveled, thereby establishing the philosopher's qualifications to make astute observations and to compare

various countries. The narrator then indicates what is to be the matter of discussion in the ensuing dialogue. Indicating that he and Peter Giles are not curious to hear the things ordinary travelers talk about, the persona More explains that they want to learn of more serious matters: "Scyllas and greedy Celaenos and folk-devouring Laestrygones and similar frightful monsters are common enough, but well and wisely trained citizens are not everywhere to be found."¹⁷ In this sentence the mythical beasts contrast with the wisely trained citizens in a manner that parallels the contrast between Book I and Book II. The Europeans as described by Hythlodæus act like beasts. This allusion foreshadows More's use of animal imagery in various other places in Book I and forms a pattern which reinforces the theme of injustice. For example, the most vivid animal image in the entire work symbolizes the injustice of the practice of enclosure. Hythlodæus tells how the greed of a few wealthy landowners has created a horde of man-eating sheep. The animal imagery which Hythlodæus uses in Book I is discarded in Book II when he describes the wisely trained Utopians.

More's choice of the mythical beast Scylla as one of those that are "common enough" is also interesting, because Plato uses the same image in the Republic to describe the

¹⁷Utopia, p. 53/37-39.

tyrant's nature. Explaining the miserable conditions of the unjust man, Socrates asks his listeners to fashion in their minds a symbolic image of the soul. He visualizes man as a composite of three different animals: a human being representing the reason, a lion representing the spirit, and a monster representing the appetite. The monster, he says, is like "one of those natures that the ancient fables tell of . . . as that of the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerberus, and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one."¹⁸ In the soul of the unjust man, Socrates explains, the part represented by the monster rules over the parts represented by the lion and the man.

More's juxtaposition of the image of the mythical beasts and wisely trained citizens typifies the technique of comparison and contrast that he uses throughout the Utopia. He not only draws the comparison between the injustice in Book I and the justice in Book II, but he also makes similar smaller contrasts within each book. For example, in Book I the Europeans are variously compared with the Polyerites in regard to penal justice, the Macarians in regard to foreign policy, and the Achorians in regard to fiscal policy. In Book II the Utopians are contrasted with other fictitious peoples such as the Anemolians in their treatment of gold, the Alaopolitans, the Nephelogetes, and the Zapoletans in their attitudes

¹⁸Rep. IX 588 C (Shorey, II, 399-401).

toward war. This technique used by Raphael is already suggested at the conclusion of the introduction: "Raphael had touched with much wisdom on faults in this hemisphere and that, of which he found very many in both, and had compared the wiser measures which had been taken among us as well as among them."¹⁹ Peter Giles's expressed surprise at Raphael's wide experience and sagacity opens the second part of Book I.

In Part II (55/15-85/37) four sections are related to one another by the theme of injustice: (1) the injustice that prevails in the ruling class in Europe (55/15-59/18), (2) the causes and results of injustice in England (59/19-71/37), (3) the just Polyerite penal system as a glaring contrast to that prevailing in England (71/38-81/22), and (4) a comic interlude, emphasizing how far the corruption extends into the various classes in society (81/23-85/37).

The first section (55/15-59/18) opens with Peter Giles's suggestion to Hythlodæus that he offer his services to some king. He urges Hythlodæus to become a councilor for his own welfare as well as for the good of the king. Peter concludes his remarks with his least convincing argument: "Thus, you would not only serve your own interests excellently but be of great assistance in the advancement of all your relatives and friends."²⁰

¹⁹Utopia, p. 55/9-12.

²⁰Utopia, p. 55/20-22.

Hythlodæus' answer deserves special notice, for it is indicative of some of More's literary techniques. Here More as author gives a good example of how he advances the dialogue by a method of association of ideas. Hythlodæus does not answer Peter Giles as a participant might in formal debate but rather as one might in informal conversation. In his reply, Hythlodæus fastens on the words "relatives and friends," which are the key words in the last idea advanced by Peter:

As for my relatives and friends . . . I am not greatly troubled about them, for I think I have fairly well performed my duty to them already. The possessions, which other men do not resign unless they are old and sick and even then resign unwillingly when incapable of retention, I divided among my relatives and friends when I was not merely hale and hearty but actually young. I think they ought to be satisfied with this generosity from me and not to require or expect additionally that I should, for their sakes, enter into servitude of kings.²¹

Hythlodæus' fastening on the last idea mentioned by Peter Giles exemplifies the way More as author makes transitions throughout the whole work.

The mariner's answer itself is less important in respect to the debate on councilorship than it is in stressing some important aspects of his character. The revelation of his uncommon values conditions the reader for his eulogy on communism later in Book I. Because Hythlodæus reveals his personal disregard for private property here, his unstinting praise of communism in the latter part of the book is more

²¹Utopia, p. 55/23-31.

convincing. Hythlodæus' answer also shows his quick wit and his versatility with language. He prompts the desired reaction from Peter by using the word servitude instead of the word service. When Peter innocently corrects him, Hythlodæus replies that "the one is only one syllable less than the other."²²

This inversion of the meaning of the word service typifies the inverted order of the institutions, laws, and customs described in Book I. The whole of Europe is depicted as being in servitude. The people are in servitude to the ruling class, who are in turn enslaved by their own ignorance and vice. This servitude contrasts with the condition of the Utopians, who are truly free, because they "serve" their fellow men.

Hythlodæus uses the discussion of councilorship as a pretext to launch into his attack on the unjust conditions in the states of Europe. He begins with his condemnation of the ruling class. The persona More prompts his remarks with the comment that "from the monarch, as from a never-failing spring, flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole nation."²³ This striking image epigrammatically signals the

²²Utopia, p. 55/34.

²³Utopia, p. 57/16-18.

main point being made in this section (55/15-59/19). The meaning epitomized by the image recurs throughout the remainder of Book I. The reader is constantly made aware that the responsibility for the evils of the state rests chiefly with the ruling class.

Taking his cue from the persona More's statement, Hythlodæus assails the corrupt ruling class. He describes how kings and councilors customarily act in a way directly contrary to their proper function. The duty of a king should be to promote the peace and prosperity of his people, but, as Hythlodæus points out, most of them do exactly the opposite: "Almost all monarchs prefer to occupy themselves in the pursuits of war . . . rather than in the honorable activities of peace, and they care much more how, by hook or by crook, they may win fresh kingdoms than how they may administer well what they have got."²⁴ At the same time that Hythlodæus assigns responsibility to kings in this statement, he also introduces the subject of war, a minor theme which recurs throughout Book I and reinforces the major theme of injustice. In addition he foreshadows the anecdotes of the council meetings of the French and anonymous kings.

Next, Hythlodæus condemns kings' councilors because they lack the primary virtue required for their function. In

²⁴Utopia, p. 57/26-30.

the Republic Socrates points out that the ruling element in a just state must possess wisdom. According to Hythlodæus, however, wisdom is the virtue most lacking in the councilors of Europe. They show this deficiency by refusing to accept new ideas. Hythlodæus identifies the councilors with irrational creatures by likening their attitudes to those of crows and monkeys. They prefer their own ignorance to the wisdom of others, "just as the crow and the monkey like their own offspring best."²⁵

In this first section (55/15-59/18), then, More traces the roots of injustice in the state to the ruling class. Thus begins the picture of injustice that he develops throughout Book I. The picture is one of inverted order and of disunity, the same symptoms of injustice that Plato recognizes in the Republic. The inverted order is already adumbrated in the ruling class, which acts in a perverted manner.

In the next section (59/19-71/37) Hythlodæus recounts his discussion with the anonymous lawyer at the table of Cardinal Morton. As he begins, it appears that Hythlodæus intends to support his contention that councilors are corrupt. Ironically, however, he describes the councilor, Cardinal Morton, in the highest terms. In contrast to his condemnation of the councilors' lack of wisdom in the previous section (55/15-

²⁵Utopia, p. 57/37-38.

59/18), he commends especially Morton's statesmanlike sagacity. He praises Morton further by commenting that "his knowledge of law was profound, his ability incomparable, and his memory astonishingly retentive, for he had improved his extraordinary natural qualities by learning and practice."²⁶ Here again More displays his respect for law, learning, and experience, the same qualities he emphasizes in the characters of the Utopians.

Hythlodæus' abrupt switch from his condemnation of councilors in general to his high praise of Cardinal Morton in particular is difficult to understand if one expects the theme and structure of Book I to follow the syllogistic argumentation of a formal debate. The dialogue, however, does not develop in this way. Rather, the author More, in feigning to record the casual conversation, connects the sections of his structure by an association of ideas.

The transition turns on the word England. In his sweeping condemnation of kings and councilors in the previous section (55/15-59/18), Hythlodæus indicates that he has encountered corrupt councilors all over Europe and also in England. The persona More's expressed surprise at Hythlodæus' having been in England recalls to the philosopher's mind the incident at Cardinal Morton's house. The anecdote he tells does not support his point about the corrupt nature of councilors,

²⁶Utopia, p. 59/35-38.

but it effectively portrays the insidious results of the unjust laws and institutions of England.

This transition between segments of the structure is indicative of how More's style differs from that of Plato. In the Republic the tightly reasoned dialectic is not as realistic as the casual conversation in Book I of the Utopia. Although the characters seem real, Socrates' careful development of ideas does not convey the impression of informal dialogue. The theme is easier to follow, therefore, in the Republic than in the Utopia.

Unlike Socrates' carefully controlled argument, Hythlodæus conversational manner approaches verisimilitude. One encounters his habit of mind not infrequently in ordinary conversation. He is dominated by an idea that breaks through in his remarks whenever the opportunity presents itself. Concerned with social justice, he cannot suppress the urge to criticize injustice wherever it exists. Therefore, although he begins ostensibly to talk about councilorship, he takes the opportunity to talk about a much wider variety of subjects. In his seeming digression (59/19-85/37) from the matter put before him by More and Giles, the thread that ties his remarks together is his attack on injustice in England.

After describing the character of Cardinal Morton, Hythlodæus draws another contrast. The lawyer, who next enters the scene, is an example of one who perverts the law.

Though the discussion between Hythlodæus and the lawyer centers on the question of penal justice, Hythlodæus uses the occasion to describe a wider range of evils. In his description of how one unjust condition begets another, he shows the cancerous nature of evil. Greed, sloth, pride, and prodigality in the ruling class result in a condition of injustice in all strata of society.

The lawyer offers Hythlodæus the opportunity to talk about injustice by expressing his tacit admiration for "the strict justice" that was then dealt out to thieves in England.²⁷ He expresses surprise that despite large-scale capital punishment, the number of thieves increases. Hythlodæus answers that severe justice is not true justice. For one reason, capital punishment is too harsh a penalty for thievery. For another, such punishment does not go to the root of the problem.

The lawyer retorts that responsibility must be attributed to the thieves themselves. They prefer to be rascals instead of law-abiding citizens. This retort implies a theory of man's nature akin to that which Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus assume in the Republic. By his assertion the lawyer assumes that the law, by threat of punishment, must coerce men to act justly. Hythlodæus responds that most thieves would not steal if the laws and institutions of England were

²⁷ Utopia, p. 61/10-11.

not oppressive.

In making his point, Hythlodæus describes the true causes and results of injustice, namely, war and oppression brought about by the greed, pride, and idleness of the rich. Cripples, veterans home from war service, Hythlodæus explains, are not fit for their customary occupations and so must turn to begging or stealing. Furthermore, the practice of retaining a standing army creates a savage and brutal class in the society. Hythlodæus observes that "robbers do not make the least active soldiers, nor do soldiers make the most listless robbers, so well do these two pursuits agree."²⁸

Thievery is also caused by the sloth and greed of the noblemen. Preferring to be idle themselves, they attract parasites who also remain idle. When their masters fall on hard times, the parasites, never having learned a useful trade, must turn to stealing or begging. The idle rich, who are too lazy to work themselves, enclose vast amounts of pasture land to raise sheep for their own profit. As a result, they evict the poor, who must then turn to thievery. Thus, in exposing England as an unjust commonwealth, Hythlodæus explains how evil begets evil.

This picture of England has the essential lineaments of Socrates' explanation of injustice in Book VIII of the Republic. The classes in England correspond to the three in Plato's

²⁸Utopia, p. 63/32-34.

oligarchic state. The first class of rich landowners sit idle and live off the labor of the poor. They gather around them a second parasitic class of idlers who pay for their keep by fawning and flattery. The third class of disenfranchised poor, if not deprived of their livelihood altogether, are forced into virtual slavery.

In this discussion More employs figurative language that subtly reinforces the theme. The imagery and the diction make vivid a condition of oppression, inverted order, and disunity. The lawyer opens the discussion with an image, perhaps the dominant one in the entire first book. He ironically labels his picture of the treatment of thieves as "strict justice": "They were everywhere executed, he reported, as many as twenty at a time being hanged on one gallows, and added that he wondered all the more, though so few escaped execution, by what bad luck the whole country was still infested with them."²⁹ This image of the gallows symbolizes the oppression and injustice which permeates the whole first book.

Hythlodæus also uses language which suggests the theme of injustice. In his answer to the lawyer, he compares the members of the ruling class to schoolmasters "who would rather beat than teach their scholars."³⁰ Thus he conveys the

²⁹Utopia, p. 61/11-15.

³⁰Utopia, p. 61/24-25.

impression of England as divided into two warring classes. In describing the parasitic nature of the idle rich, he uses the same drone metaphor that Socrates uses in Book VIII of the Republic (552 A-560 E). He describes how the rich with their sycophants prey on the poor: "Now there is the great number of noblemen who not only live idle themselves like drones on the labors of others, as for instance the tenants of their estates whom they fleece to the utmost by increasing the returns (for that is the only economy they know of, being otherwise so extravagant as to bring themselves to beggary!) but who also carry about with them a huge crowd of idle attendants who have never learned a trade for a livelihood."³¹ With this statement Hythlodæus vividly and concisely describes the three classes of an oligarchy--the rich, their sycophants, and the poor--and identifies the characteristic vices of the drone class, namely, sloth and prodigality.

The inverted order of values in England is shown in the attitude of the ruling class toward the sick. When the parasites fall ill, they are turned out of the noblemen's homes; for, as Hythlodæus ironically comments, "the idle are maintained more readily than the sick."³² This perverted practice contrasts with the institutions in Utopia, where no one remains idle and

³¹Utopia, p. 63/5-11.

³²Utopia, p. 63/12-13.

where the sick are cared for in public hospitals. The lawyer also reveals a reversal of values in his attitude toward the proud gentlemen who fall on hard times. He opines that these parasites should be encouraged because on them "depend the strength and sinews of our army when we have to wage war."³³ Hythlodæus, quickly perceiving the spurious logic in this opinion, comments that "you might as well say that for the sake of war we must foster thieves."³⁴

Hythlodæus then cites the example of the French to show the folly of the lawyer's attitude. France retains a large number of idle and useless soldiers during peace in order to be prepared for war. Describing these idlers as a plague which infests the country, Hythlodæus points out that the French policy is not only ineffective but also self-destructive. The policy eventually results in the worst elements in the state overthrowing the government. Hythlodæus again uses a beast image to describe this condition: "Yet how dangerous it is to rear such wild beasts France has learned to its cost, and the examples of Rome, Carthage, Syria, and many other nations show."³⁵ The language here suggestive of the bestial element controlling the state echoes Socrates' description of

³³Utopia, p. 63/26-29.

³⁴Utopia, p. 63/30-31.

³⁵Utopia, p. 65/9-12.

tyranny in Book IX of the Republic (588 B-589 E).

In his explanation to Cardinal Morton of why enclosure causes thievery, Hythlodæus evokes perhaps the most dominant image of inverted order in the entire first book: "Your sheep . . . which are usually so tame and so cheaply fed, begin now, according to report, to be so greedy and wild that they devour human beings themselves and devastate and depopulate fields, houses, and towns."³⁶ The practice of enclosure, Hythlodæus explains, has made England a wilderness where a few greedy gluttons control vast areas of land and poverty haunts the rest of the people. Picturing the poor as oppressed, evicted from their land, overwhelmed by violence, and wearied by "unjust acts,"³⁷ Hythlodæus asks rhetorically how this oppression can be called justice: "After they have soon spent that trifle in wandering from place to place, what remains for them but to steal and be hanged--justly, you may say!--or to wander and beg."³⁸

Concluding his condemnation of the unjust institutions and laws of England with an impassioned exhortation, Hythlodæus calls for an end to these evils and suggests remedies that must be enacted to "cast out these ruinous plagues."³⁹ He tells the

³⁶Utopia, pp. 65/38-67/2.

³⁷Utopia, p. 67/18.

³⁸Utopia, p. 67/27-29.

³⁹Utopia, p. 69/38.

lawyer that unless the changes he suggests are enacted, "it is useless for you to boast of the justice you execute in the punishment of theft. Such justice is more showy than really just or beneficial."⁴⁰

With his pompous rejoinder to this exhortation, which the Cardinal cuts off sharply, the lawyer concludes the second section (59/19-71/37) of Part II (55/15-85/37).

The next section (71/38-81/22) opens with the Cardinal's suggestion that Hythlodæus offer an alternate solution to the problem of thievery: "But now I am eager to have you tell me, my dear Raphael, why you think that theft ought not to be punished with the extreme penalty, or what other penalty you yourself would fix, which would be more beneficial to the public."⁴¹ The first part of the Cardinal's query is curious at first glance, for Hythlodæus has already spoken at considerable length about why he thinks simple theft ought not to be punished with the extreme penalty. Cardinal Morton, however, recognizes that Raphael's harangue has gone far beyond the subject of capital punishment. Although Hythlodæus had begun to speak of capital punishment in his answer to the lawyer at the beginning of the previous section (59/19-71/37), he had quickly launched into a condemnation of the general

⁴⁰ Utopia, p. 71/9-11.

⁴¹ Utopia, pp. 71/38-73/2.

condition of injustice in England and in France. Now, however, prompted by the Cardinal's reminder, he returns to the specific issue of penal justice.

The section on penal justice (71/38-81/22) divides into two segments corresponding to the twofold request made by the Cardinal. Before offering an alternative penal system, Hythlodæus points out why capital punishment for thievery is unlawful. First of all, Hythlodæus maintains that extreme justice violates the principle of equity, because one man's life cannot be equated with another man's possession. To make this point, Hythlodæus declares: "In my opinion, not all the goods that fortune can bestow on us can be set in the scale against a man's life."⁴²

Hythlodæus then cites the laws of the Old and New Testaments. The divine law, he says, forbids us to take a man's life for such a trivial reason as stealing. Even the law of Moses, "though severe and harsh . . . punished theft by fine and not by death."⁴³ He argues that if the old law did not exact such a harsh punishment for thieving, surely the new law of mercy does not allow greater license for cruelty. Finally, he appeals to common sense. He maintains that a law that treats a thief as though he were a murderer will result in not a

⁴²Utopia, p. 73/10-12.

⁴³Utopia, p. 73/37-39.

decrease in theft but an increase in murder: "Since the robber sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this single consideration impels him to murder the man whom otherwise he would only have robbed."⁴⁴

In the next segment (75/16-81/22) Hythlodæus describes Polyerite penal justice, which makes the English system seem even more cruel. This anecdote reveals More's characteristic satiric technique. Instead of outlining an abstract legal code, he cites a concrete example by which Europeans can measure their own institutions and laws. Hythlodæus describes the Polyerites as people who by aid of reason alone and without benefit of Christianity have developed a more just and humane penal system than that of the English.

The Polyerites, like the Utopians, contrast with the English in many respects. Content to be isolated from other nations, they live a life more comfortable than splendid. Free from militarism, they are unconcerned about expanding their territory. In his description of the land of the Polyerites, Hythlodæus continues his criticism of the pride, greed, and warlike attitude of the European rulers.

The Polyerite system of penal justice, in contrast to that of the English, does not favor the rich and powerful at

⁴⁴Utopia, p. 75/7-10.

the expense of the poor and oppressed. The Polyerites exact punishment which benefits the common good. An apprehended thief must make restitution, not to the prince, but to the person from whom he has stolen. In punishment the criminal works on public projects which help all the citizens. Seeking justice, not revenge, the Polyerites attempt to rehabilitate a thief so that he may become a useful member of society.

Perhaps more than any other, this section shows Hythlodæus' curious logic and More's subtle irony. Hythlodæus ostensibly cites the example of the Polyerites as an argument against capital punishment, yet he unabashedly mentions that the Polyerite people exact the death penalty for reasons almost as trivial as the English. They condemn a prisoner to death for plotting escape or for throwing away his badge of servitude. These offenses which draw the death penalty are more serious than that for which the English execute their citizens, since escape from penal servitude and throwing away the badge of slavery show a defiance of law and authority. Nonetheless, these examples of the Polyerite retributive justice are surprising arguments to use against the injustice of capital punishment.

The most astonishing offense that exacts the death penalty, however, is for a free man to give money to a slave. In contrast to England, where the poor are executed for stealing from the rich, in the Polyerite land the main burden

of responsibility rests with the rich. Those with money are executed for giving aid to a poor criminal. The irony in this comparison condemns the avarice of the English with superb subtlety. Hythlodæus emphasizes the contrast by stressing the point that the Polyerites are so kindhearted that they care for their slaves almost entirely by almsgiving.

This section on the Polyerite penal system, then, advances the theme of injustice by showing an example of justice juxtaposed to the injustice in England. It also provides another link between Book I and Book II by foreshadowing the contrast between the Europeans and the Utopians.

The final section (81/23-85/37) of Part II (55/15-85/37) is a brief interlude which appears to be inserted primarily for comic variety. Hythlodæus explains that he is at a loss as to whether to suppress the humorous incident which occurred at Cardinal Morton's because, as he says, it is quite absurd. He decides to relate it, however, "since it was not evil in itself and had some bearing on the matter in question."⁴⁵

More than a simple humorous digression, however, the incident reveals the extent to which corruption pervades the social classes of England. The hanger-on and the friar, representing different classes in the society, exhibit the

⁴⁵Utopia, p. 81/24-25.

same vices as the lawyer. As he insists on the strict interpretation of the law despite the injustice in it, they both quote Scripture to revile one another. Not without point the humor satirizes those who use the letter of the Scripture to pervert the spirit of the word. Here, then, is another example of the inverted order of values in the body politic.

This section (81/23-85/37) also contains a foreshadowing of Book II. One of the guests at the Cardinal's table, ignorant of the existence of any better order of society, naively and sarcastically suggests that which he assumes to be an absurdity: "Raphael's proposal has made good provision for thieves. The Cardinal has taken precautions also for vagrants. It only remains now that public measures be devised for persons whom sickness or old age has brought to want and made unable to work for a living."⁴⁶ Public measures, of course, have been devised to care for the aged and the infirm in Utopia (see 139/33-141/11, 185/37-187/17), but the hanger-on ironically assumes that such a plan as the guest sarcastically suggests would be beyond the realm of possibility. He opines that this sort of person, the aged or infirm, be distributed and divided among the Benedictine monasteries. This anecdote, then, links Book I with Book II by More's technique

⁴⁶Utopia, p. 81/35-38.

of foreshadowing.

This section (81/23-85/37) concludes the second part of Book I. Hythlodæus has exposed effectively some of the causes and results of injustice in England. Moreover, the picture that he has drawn is one of inverted order (i. e., disorder) and disunity, the condition that Plato associates with injustice in the Republic. In the next part (85/38-103/23) of Book I More develops another variation on the same theme of injustice.

CHAPTER X

NATURE OF THE UNJUST TYRANT

In the third part (85/38-103/23) of Book I, the author More, continuing to lash out at injustice, brings into focus the problem of a good man's duty in an unjust society. Part III (85/38-103/23), like Part II (55/15-85/37), divides into four sections. In the first section (85/38-87/25), the persona More prompts Hythlodæus to speak further about the injustice in Europe. The second section (87/26-91/31) and the third (91/32-97/38) taken together portray the nature of a tyrant: the French king's council shows the insidious methods used by a tyrant and how his evil corrupts other countries; the anonymous king's council demonstrates how the greed of a tyrant enslaves his subjects. The last section (97/39-103/23) resumes the question of the good man in an unjust society.

The first section (85/38-87/25), though brief, focuses the theme of injustice in Book I. Urging Hythlodæus to become a councilor, the persona More paraphrases Plato's important requisite for justice in the ideal state: "Your favorite, Plato, is of opinion that commonwealths will finally be happy only if either philosophers become kings or kings

turn to philosophy."¹ To apprehend the full significance of this statement one must bear in mind Plato's great emphasis on the idea of a philosopher-king in the Republic. Occuring in Book V at the middle of the dialogue, Socrates' proposal is the crucial imperative for justice in the ideal state.² He insists that philosophers must rule the state if justice is to be attained.

The persona More's paraphrase of Socrates' proposal, stated at the thematic center of Book I of the Utopia, emphasizes the plight of the states of Europe. It is obvious from what has gone before and from what follows this central section that no state of Europe "will finally be happy." The kings and their councilors described by Hythlodæus are the very opposite of philosopher-kings. This pathetic irony is accentuated by the refusal of the philosopher Hythlodæus to serve as a councilor in Europe.

The problem put before Hythlodæus should not be interpreted simply as the author More's personal problem worked out in a fictional exercise. The choice confronting Hythlodæus in the Utopia not only had to be faced by Thomas More in his own life but also must be faced by every good man who sees the reality of evil in the world. Any man wanting

¹Utopia, p. 87/11-13; cf., Rep. V 473 C-D (Shorey, I, 507-509).

²This important passage in the Republic is discussed in Chapter V.

to build a better world order must decide whether and how he can best contribute to that end. Hythlodæus and the persona More, like personifications in a morality play, represent universal alternative choices. The decision Hythlodæus confronts, however, is subordinate to the theme of the entire work. His alternatives gain significance because he comprehends fully the dichotomy between Europe and Utopia. He reacts to the persona More's advice that he enter the politics at court as Socrates says any philosopher who has seen the form of true justice would react: he prefers to retire from the world of vice and corruption.³ The persona More, however, considering the matter from a different vantage point, feels keenly the tragedy for Europe if good men refuse to serve the state. The persona More's appeal to the philosopher, namely, that service as a councilor not only is Hythlodæus' duty but "is the duty of every good man,"⁴ indicates the universality of the issue.

In the structure of Book I the functional purpose of this exchange between the persona More and Hythlodæus is to provide a context within which the philosopher can denounce injustice in Europe. The persona More's appeal only stimulates Hythlodæus to return to the matter that dominates

³The similarity between Hythlodæus' attitude and that of the philosopher described by Socrates is discussed in Chapter VI.

⁴Utopia, p. 87/10-11.

his thinking, the condemnation of injustice begun in the earlier part of the dialogue. Whereas in the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's he has attacked mainly unjust laws and institutions, now he exposes the true nature of an unjust tyrant.

The two kings described by Hythlodæus contrast ironically with the persona More's wistful hope for a philosopher-king in Europe. The French king and the anonymous king represent two different aspects of the tyrant described by Socrates in the Republic,⁵ one portraying the tyrant's constant need to fight wars and the other showing his oppressive greed.

Hythlodæus suggests that these hypothetical kings are typical of rulers throughout Europe. Moreover, he despairs of ever changing their characters, saying that they "have been from their youth saturated and infected with wrong ideas."⁶ He explains that because the evil of kings is so deeply rooted his attempt to change them would be abortive: "If I proposed beneficial measures to some king and tried to uproot from his soul the seeds of evil and corruption, do you not suppose that I should be forthwith banished or treated with ridicule?"⁷

⁵Rep. VIII 566 A-567 A (Shorey, II, 323-25).

⁶Utopia, p. 87/21-22.

⁷Utopia, p. 87/23-25.

Hythlodæus' figurative language is similar here to that used by Socrates in describing an evil soul. Both convey the idea of the tyrant's incorrigible nature with metaphors of weeds and of infection. Socrates explains how the tyrant from his youth is infected by the drone's sting of unsatisfied yearnings. If the drone "finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside."⁸ He implies that such a man would not likely change, because "when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root."⁹

Using language similar to that of Socrates, then, Hythlodæus suggests that corruption infects the body of Europe in its most vital part. To support his general observations about European monarchs, he cites two hypothetical but realistic examples of how kings spread their contagion over their subjects and into other countries. These examples constitute the next two sections of Part II.

In the second section (87/26-91/31), Hythlodæus portrays the French king plotting to conquer Italy and Burgundy "and other nations, too, whose territory he has

⁸Rep. IX 573 B (Shorey, II, 343).

⁹Rep. VIII 565 D (Shorey, II, 319).

already conceived the idea of usurping."¹⁰ To achieve his nefarious objectives he gathers round him a "circle of his most astute councilors."¹¹

Hythlodæus' language in these opening remarks emphasizes the evil and calloused nature of the king's war preparations. His assertion that the decision to usurp other nations has already been made implies that the French king is a hardened and incorrigible tyrant. Any advice received from his councilors, therefore, is bound to echo his own perverse desires. Hythlodæus also uses the word astute in an ironic way to convey a meaning directly opposite to its denotation of wise or sagacious. Although the councilors' war machinations cannot be called astute in a just society, they are astute in the unjust society which the councilors control.

This opening sketch of the king and his councilors contains overtones of Socrates' description of the tyrant's relationship with his advisors, for the tyrant, according to Socrates, must gather round him "base companions" because "the better sort hate and avoid him."¹² In the same ironic tone that Hythlodæus uses to impugn the king's councilors, Socrates assails the wisdom of the tyrant and his flatterers.

¹⁰Utopia, p. 87/35-36.

¹¹Utopia, p. 87/27-28.

¹²Rep. VIII 568 A (Shorey, II, 327).

Explaining why Euripides is called wise, Socrates comments, "Because among other utterances of pregnant thought he said, 'Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.' He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise."¹³ Socrates obviously uses wise here in the same way Hythlodæus uses astute in the Utopia. In both works the irony subtly reinforces the theme by suggesting the inverted order of values in a tyranny.

Hythlodæus' enumeration of the councilors' recommendations conveys the impression that all Europe suffers under a tyrannical yoke. The councilors spread a net of alliances, treaties, and agreements involving most of the countries of Europe for the purpose of bringing Italy under French control. The French plan is to draw other peoples into a snare by pandering to their lust for power, money, and land. The Germans and the Swiss are to be lured by gold, the King of Aragon by the promise of another kingdom. The Prince of Castile, like an unwary animal, is to be "caught by the prospect of a marriage alliance."¹⁴ The Scots are to be "posted in readiness, prepared for any opportunity to be let loose on the English if they make the slightest movement."¹⁵

¹³Rep. VIII 568 B (Shorey, II, 329).

¹⁴Utopia, p. 89/10.

¹⁵Utopia, p. 89/17-18.

With this language--"caught," "posted in readiness," and "let loose"--Hythlodæus conveys the impression that Europeans act like beasts and not like rational human beings.

As Hythlodæus offers the maneuvering of the French councilors to argue against becoming a councilor, More as author ironically offers advice to King Henry VIII. By exposing the French attitude toward treaties, More as author suggests that England stay clear of entangling alliances. Hythlodæus explains that the French "agree that negotiations for peace should be undertaken, that an alliance always weak at best should be strengthened with the strongest bonds, and that the English should be called friends but suspected as enemies."¹⁶ More as author makes the same point again in Book II through Hythlodæus' description of the Utopian foreign policy (197/18-199/35). In contrast to the French, the Utopians do not think treaties necessary between peoples who trust one another: "'What is the use of a treaty,' they ask, 'as though nature of herself did not sufficiently bind one man to another? If a person does not regard nature, do you suppose he will care anything about words?'"¹⁷

More as author continues his indirect counseling through Hythlodæus' recommendations for the French king.

¹⁶Utopia, p. 89/13-16.

¹⁷Utopia, p. 197/20-25.

Castigating the injustice of war and the disastrous consequences of an imperialistic foreign policy, Hythlodæus would urge on the French king the principle of one king for one kingdom. Citing the example of the Achorian people, who learned to their regret that the acquisition of an additional kingdom brings only misery and slavery, Hythlodæus points out that war results in complete disorder in the society. The Achorians lost lives and money, their country became a breeding ground for thieves, and a general condition of injustice resulted which was reflected particularly in the fact that "the laws were held in contempt."¹⁸

Fortunately, however, the Achorians saw the error of their ways. They gave their king a choice of ruling one or the other of his two kingdoms, telling him that "he could not keep both because there were too many of them to be ruled by half a king, just as no one would care to engage even a muleteer whom he had to share with some one else."¹⁹ This animal image, like that of the man-eating sheep (65/38-67/2), contributes to the impression of the inverted order of values in Europe. Hythlodæus implies in his statement that the average man cares more about his beasts of burden than kings do about their subjects.

¹⁸Utopia, p. 91/9.

¹⁹Utopia, p. 91/15-17.

This story of the Achorian people exemplifies again the inconsistency of Hythlodæus' position in the debate on councilorship. Indeed, his evidence diametrically opposes the point he purportedly wishes to make. The account of the French council meeting supposedly shows that kings cannot be swayed from an evil course of action, yet the Achorians prove just the opposite by persuading their king to relinquish one of his kingdoms.

The primary function of the anecdote of the French council is not to advance Hythlodæus' argument but rather to point out an aspect of the tyrant's nature and to demonstrate the cancerous nature of evil in European society.

The French king reveals one characteristic vice of a tyrant; in the next section (91/32-97/38) the anonymous king shows another. Hythlodæus exposes the insidious methods used by the monarch and his councilors to extort money from the people. As was indicated in Chapter VII, the anonymous king and the tyrant described by Socrates have a similar preoccupation with war which drives them to extreme measures of raising revenue. Thus the councilors pervert the laws because they hold that "no amount of gold is enough for the ruler who has to keep an army."²⁰

The anonymous king's councilors assume, as Thrasymachus

²⁰ Utopia, p. 93/38-39.

does in the Republic, that justice is the advantage of the stronger. Each councilor proposes a scheme to fill the king's coffers at the expense of the people. One councilor, for example, would recommend to the king "that under heavy penalties he prohibit many things and especially such as it is to the people's advantage not to allow. Afterwards for money he should give a dispensation to those with whose interests the prohibition has interfered."²¹

The councilors realize that the king can best dupe the people by manipulating the laws and by binding the judges to himself, for with the judges under his influence "there will be no cause of his so patently unjust in which one of them will not either from a desire to contradict or from shame at repeating another's view or to curry favor, find some loophole whereby the law can be perverted."²² In a kingdom with judges such as these, no regard is given to the spirit of the law. Justice becomes synonymous with the will of the king, and for the king, "it is enough that either equity be on his side or the letter of the law or the twisted meaning of the written word or, what finally outweighs all law with conscientious judges, the indisputable royal prerogative!"²³

²¹Utopia, p. 93/10-13.

²²Utopia, p. 93/23-26.

²³Utopia, p. 93/33-36.

The perversion of laws and the dichotomy between the spirit and the letter of the law are emphasized throughout Book I. As was indicated above (Chapter IX), William Budé particularly notes this European attitude and contrasts it specifically with the attitude of the Utopians, who promulgate few laws but honor their spirit.

The anonymous king's councilors' perversion of law is particularly obnoxious because it attempts to maintain an appearance of justice. One councilor, for example, recommends exacting fines for the violation of "certain old and moth-eaten laws."²⁴ Such a scheme would be not only an excellent means of raising money, but also would be desirable because there is none "any more honorable than such as has an outward mask of justice."²⁵ The image here of sinister councilors shrewdly manipulating laws behind an outward mask of justice symbolizes the hypocrisy of the whole legal system.

Another example of the hypocrisy and the inverted order of values in the kingdom is evoked by one councilor's recommendation to impose taxes for war: "Another suggests a make-believe war under pretext of which he would raise money and then, when he saw fit, make peace with solemn ceremonies to throw dust in his simple people's eyes because their loving

²⁴Utopia, p. 93/5-6.

²⁵Utopia, p. 93/9-10.

monarch in compassion would fain avoid human bloodshed."²⁶ Hythlodæus makes the point particularly effective by the ironic comment that the "loving" monarch acts with solemn ceremonies to avoid human bloodshed.

Hythlodæus maintains, like Socrates (I 342 A-342 E), that the true test of the administration of justice in a state is the well-being of the citizens. He argues that a king, rather than owning his subjects, has them entrusted to his care as sheep are committed to the care of a shepherd. In Chapter II it was indicated how Hythlodæus uses the same shepherd image as Socrates to explain the proper relationship between the king and his people.²⁷

That a king who oppresses the people can expect nothing but strife and revolution is emphasized by Hythlodæus' rhetorical question: "Who is more eager for revolution than he who is discontented with his present state of life? Who is more reckless in the endeavor to upset everything, in the hope of getting profit from some source or other, than he who has nothing to lose?"²⁸ Rather than oppressing beggars, a true king exercises authority "over prosperous and happy subjects."²⁹

²⁶Utopia, pp. 91/39-93/4.

²⁷Supra, p. 46; cf., Utopia, p. 95/10-19, and Rep. I 345 C-E (Shorey, I, 73-75).

²⁸Utopia, p. 95/22-26.

²⁹Utopia, p. 95/33.

Socrates makes a similar point in Book IX. Contending that a tyrant who rules over slaves is in great danger of revolution, Socrates speculates that if a tyrant were without protection from his henchmen, "how great would be his fear . . . lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves."³⁰

Likening the domain of a tyrant to a prison, Hythlodæus emphasizes the tyrant's lust in portraying his wretched existence: "To be sure, to have a single person enjoy a life of pleasure and self-indulgence amid the groans and lamentations of all around him is to be the keeper, not of a kingdom, but of a jail."³¹ In addition to comparing the domain of a tyrant to a prison, Socrates describes the tyrant's nature in the same way: "And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites?"³²

Hythlodæus and Socrates also employ similar medical metaphors in referring to the tyrant and his state. Hythlodæus likens the tyrant to an incompetent physician who attempts to cure a diseased body: "As he is an incompetent physician who

³⁰Rep. IX 578 E (Shorey, II, 363).

³¹Utopia, p. 95/37-39.

³²Rep. IX 579 B (Shorey, II, 365). In his discussion of tyranny Socrates emphasizes that the people are in bondage. See particularly IX 577 A-529 E (Shorey, II, 357-67).

cannot cure one disease except by creating another, so he who cannot reform the lives of citizens in any other way than by depriving them of the good things of life must admit that he does not know how to rule free men."³³ Explaining how the tyrant must purge the city of the wise and rich citizens who would be likely to revolt, Socrates describes this practice as "just the opposite of that which physicians practice on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse."³⁴

Hythlodæus concludes his portrayal of the tyrant and his state with an exhortation which parallels that made in the French king's council and that at the home of Cardinal Morton. Recommending partial remedies for the injustices described, he cites a particular example. The Macarians, a people not far from Utopia, have a law that the king shall never have at one time in his coffer more than a thousand pounds of gold or its equivalent in silver. A good king promulgated the law to insure the prosperity of his people and the integrity of future monarchs. This previous sage felt "that since the king had to pay out whatever came into his treasury beyond the limit prescribed by law, he would not seek occasion to commit injustice."³⁵

³³Utopia, pp. 95/39-97/4.

³⁴Rep. VIII 567 C (Shorey, II, 325-27).

³⁵Utopia, p. 97/31-34.

The Macarians, like the Achorians and the Polyerites, compare favorably with the Utopians and contrast sharply with the Europeans on particular points of justice: the Polyerites display an exemplary system of penal justice, the Achorians and their king have learned to be content with one kingdom, and the Macarians and their king are content with moderate riches. The specific reforms suggested in these three examples, however, are only partial remedies which might alleviate the gross injustices in Europe. Only in Utopia are the causes of injustice completely eliminated.

The general state of corruption in Europe portrayed by Hythlodæus makes the concluding debate between him and the persona More more meaningful. The resumption of the discussion of the moral duty of the good man constitutes the final section (97/39-103/23) of Part III (85/38-103/23). Although Hythlodæus and the persona More come to no agreement on the question in the work itself, More as author implies his resolution of the problem by an oblique reference to his own practical policy.

The persona More resumes the debate by advising Hythlodæus on the method necessary to effect changes in the attitudes of kings and councilors. He argues that Hythlodæus should eschew his academic philosophy and adopt another kind, more practical for statesmen; for, if the philosopher cannot completely bring about good, he has at least a duty to abate

evil. The persona More emphasizes the desperate plight of Europe with figurative language of weeds overgrowing a garden: "If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account desert the commonwealth."³⁶ He appeals specifically to Hythlodæus' loyalties as a mariner by evoking the image of the ship of state floundering in a storm: "You must not abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds."³⁷

The persona More, aware of the philosopher's blunt manner, specifies the method that a statesman should use: "By the indirect approach you must seek and strive to the best of your power to handle matters tactfully. What you cannot turn to good you must make as little bad as you can."³⁸ In the remainder of this section (97/39-103/23) Hythlodæus, in rejecting the indirect approach, insists that such a method is not only wrong but also ineffective.

Hythlodæus characteristically supports his argument with an appeal to authorities. He refers first to Plato by identifying himself, the Utopians, and Plato on one side, in contrast to the councilors: "What if I told them the kind

³⁶Utopia, p. 99/31-34.

³⁷Utopia, p. 99/34-35.

³⁸Utopia, pp. 99/38-101/2.

of things which Plato creates in his republic or which the Utopians actually put in practice in theirs? Though such institutions were superior (as, to be sure, they are), yet they might appear odd because here individuals have the right of private property, there all things are common."³⁹ This passage not only identifies the Utopia specifically with the Republic, it also suggests the connecting link between Book I and Book II of the Utopia. Although Hythlodæus has not, up to this point in the dialogue, mentioned private property as such, he has shown it to be a cause of injustice in Europe. In Book II he reveals how the Utopians achieve justice by eliminating private ownership of property. Thus in this passage he suggests the contrast between the Utopians and Europeans which he later develops in Book II.

Proceeding with his rejection of More's advice by appealing to the authority of the Gospels, Hythlodæus argues that Christ never urged an indirect approach. On the contrary, "what He has whispered in the ears of His disciples He commanded to be preached openly from the housetops."⁴⁰ Hythlodæus maintains next that the indirect method is irrevelant: "As to that indirect approach of yours, I cannot see its relevancy."⁴¹ Insisting that the method would not

³⁹Utopia, p. 101/12-18.

⁴⁰Utopia, p. 101/27-28.

⁴¹Utopia, p. 103/1-2.

work and furthermore might endanger his soul, he rejects the persona More's advice with unequivocal finality: "Thus you are far from being able to make anything better by that indirect approach of yours."⁴²

The irony in Hythlodæus' continued rejection of the indirect approach is that More as author uses just such an approach throughout the Utopia to influence the rulers of Europe, particularly Henry VIII. In Book I Hythlodæus not only decries the injustice in Europe but gives specific recommendations for reform, recommendations which point up the balanced structure in the three different anecdotes related. He concludes each anecdote with an exhortation of specific advice that pertains to particular abuses in the Europe of More's day.⁴³

Thus More as author, through the main character Hythlodæus, follows the indirect approach rejected by the character himself in the dialogue. As his contemporaries observe, More as author intends to teach as well as to delight. The dialogue on council is an ingenious literary device through which Thomas More can advise kings indirectly while ostensibly rejecting the role of councilor. In fact, he suggests through the character Hythlodæus that kings would do well to attend

⁴²Utopia, p. 103/14-15.

⁴³For a discussion of the structural balance achieved by these exhortations, see Surtz, Utopia, Introduction, p. cxxiv.

to such books as philosophers have written. Hythlodæus insists that kings could find the good counsel of philosophers in published books "if the rulers would be ready to take good advice."⁴⁴

Hythlodæus concludes this final section (97/39-103/23) of Part III (85/38-103/23) with an image drawn directly from the Republic (VI 496 E). Justifying his decision to remain apart from the political affairs of Europe, he appeals again to Plato's authority:

For this reason, Plato by a very fine comparison shows why philosophers are right in abstaining from administration of the commonwealth. They observe the people rushing out into the streets and being soaked by constant showers and cannot induce them to go indoors and escape the rain. They know that, if they go out, they can do no good but will only get wet with the rest. Therefore, being content if they themselves at least are safe, they⁴⁵ keep at home, since they cannot remedy the folly of others.

As was discussed above (Chapter VI), Hythlodæus' reasoning here distorts Plato's full meaning in the Republic and therefore remains an unconvincing argument.

The final part of Book I (103/24-109/36) serves as a transition between the first and second books. The two sections in this part correspond to the two books of the work as a whole. In the first section (103/24-107/4) Hythlodæus summarizes his description of the wretched condition of life

⁴⁴Utopia, p. 87/18.

⁴⁵Utopia, p. 103/16-23.

in Europe and specifies the immediate cause of injustice. In the remaining section (107/5-109/36) he gives a preview of the well-ordered commonwealth of Utopia and stresses the chief differences between the European and the Utopian peoples.

Hythlodæus opens the first section (103/24-107/4) by attributing the injustice in Europe to the institution of private property and by picturing at the same time the disunity that exists in a society divided into two classes, rich and poor: "Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you candidly my heart's sentiments, it appears to me that wherever you have private property and all men measure all things by cash values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth to have justice or prosperity--unless you think justice exists where all the best things flow into the hands of the worst citizens or prosperity prevails where all is divided among very few--and even they are not altogether well off, while the rest are downright wretched."⁴⁶ This passage epitomizes the moral that Hythlodæus has been advancing throughout Book I. In each of his anecdotes the oppression of the poor by the rich results from greed for territory, gold, or goods.

In the next paragraph More as author represents in capsule form the overall structure of his whole work. Hythlodæus contrasts the unjust conditions in Europe with

⁴⁶Utopie, p. 103/24-31. (Italics mine.)

the good order in Utopia. The paragraph, which is only one sentence, divides neatly into two parts, each part corresponding to a book of the work as a whole. In the first half of the sentence Hythlodæus first praises the Utopians who achieve equality through their institutions: "As a result, when in my heart I ponder on the extremely wise and holy institutions of the Utopians, among whom, with very few laws, affairs are ordered so aptly that virtue has its reward, and yet, with equality of distribution, all men have abundance of all things . . ." ⁴⁷ He continues in the second half by comparing this happy state to other nations: ". . . and then when I contrast with their policies the many nations elsewhere ever making ordinances and yet never one of them achieving good order--nations where whatever a man has acquired he calls his own private property, but where all these laws daily framed are not enough for a man to secure or to defend or even to distinguish from someone else's the goods which each in turn calls his own, a predicament readily attested by the numberless and ever new and interminable lawsuits." ⁴⁸ In this sentence Hythlodæus summarizes Book I and foreshadows Book II. The Europeans cannot achieve good order despite innumerable laws and interminable lawsuits, whereas the Utopians have built a

⁴⁷ Utopia, p. 103/32-35.

⁴⁸ Utopia, pp. 103/36-105/4.

just society with few laws. The Utopians reward virtue and achieve justice through equality, in contrast to the Europeans, who ignore virtue and create inequalities.

Hythlodæus goes on to insist that Europeans cannot attain complete justice until they abolish private property and establish equality. To support this opinion he cites Plato, saying that "this wise sage, to be sure, easily foresaw that the one and only road to the general welfare lies in the maintenance of equality in all respects."⁴⁹ This reference is interesting because in the Republic Plato does not insist on "equality in all respects." In fact, the primary difference between Utopia and the republic is that in the former the citizens are equal and in the latter they are not. The guardians in the republic, however, are equal in regard to private property, this communism with the guardian class apparently being the equality to which Hythlodæus refers.

In his reference to Plato Hythlodæus obviously intends to identify Utopia with Plato's ideal state and to contrast it with Europe. He wishes to stress that the injustice in Europe results from institutions and laws that are manipulated by the ruling class and not from the perfidity of the people. In Europe he observes the proper order is completely reversed: "It generally happens that the one class pre-eminently deserves

⁴⁹Utopia, p. 105/8-10.

the lot of the other, for the rich are greedy, unscrupulous, and useless, while the poor are well-behaved, simple, and by their daily industry more beneficial to the commonwealth than to themselves."⁵⁰ To correct this inverted order Hythlodæus calls for the complete abolition of private property.

Allowing that partial remedies might be applied to correct some abuses in Europe, Hythlodæus makes suggestions which summarize most of the partial remedies previously recommended in each of the anecdotes in Book I. For example, he suggests legislation similar to that previously accredited to the Macarians: "Special legislation might be passed to prevent the monarch from being overmighty and the people overweening."⁵¹

The only complete remedy to injustice, however, is the establishment of communism. To make this point, Hythlodæus again uses a medical metaphor. He likens other haphazard solutions to repeated medical treatment that keeps a sick body at the point of death for a prolonged period. Only the abolishment of private property can effect a permanent cure, for otherwise, he says, "While you are intent upon the cure of one part, you make worse the malady of the other parts. Thus, the healing of the one member reciprocally breeds the disease

⁵⁰ Utopia, p. 105/14-18.

⁵¹ Utopia, p. 105/28-29; cf. Utopia, p. 97/5-38.

of the other as long as nothing can so be added to one as not to be taken away from another."⁵² With this evocative image of the diseased body politic reminiscent of Socrates' description of injustice, Hythlodæus concludes the first section (103/24-107/4) of the final part (103/24-109/36) of Book I.⁵³

The last section (107/5-109/36) begins with the persona More's objection to communism. Maintaining that communism would destroy personal incentive to work and disrupt the order and authority of the commonwealth, he advances traditional arguments similar to those made by Aristotle⁵⁴ against the Republic. Hythlodæus suggests that the picture of Utopia which he draws in Book II will reveal the answer to More's objection:

I do not wonder . . . that it looks this way to you, being a person who has no picture at all, or else a false one, of the situation I mean. But you should have been with me in Utopia and personally seen their manners and customs as I did, for I lived there more than five years and would never have wished to leave except to make known that new world. In that case you unabashedly would admit that you had never seen a well-ordered people anywhere but there.⁵⁵

⁵²Utopia, pp. 105/39-107/4.

⁵³In Books VIII and IX of the Republic Socrates' discussion of injustice is an extended metaphor of the pathology of a diseased state. See particularly VIII 563 E-564 A and 567 C (Shorey, II, 311-13 and 325-26).

⁵⁴Politics ii, 1, 1260^b-ii, 4, 1262^a. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 1146-49.

⁵⁵Utopia, p. 107/17-23.

The reference here to the Utopians as a well-ordered people signals the theme of Book II: according to both More and Plato justice is synonymous with proper order. In this passage Hythlodæus' assertion that he "would never have wished to leave" Utopia also indicates the natural reaction of the philosopher. In the Republic Socrates acknowledges that any man who has apprehended the form of justice is reluctant to return to the cave (Rep. VII 517 C).

When Peter Giles expresses surprise that a "better-ordered people" could exist outside of Europe, Hythlodæus again emphasizes the contrast between Europe and Utopia. Whereas in the first section (103/24-107/4) he describes the contrast between the two peoples in regard to private property, in this section (107/5-109/36) he delineates the differences in their characters. Pointing to the main reason why the Utopians have achieved a just society and the Europeans have not, Hythlodæus implies that the Europeans are too proud and prejudiced to learn from others and are too slothful to apply themselves diligently to arduous tasks. The Utopians, on the other hand, work hard and are always open to new ideas. Indicating that the distinction between Europeans and Utopians is not one of intelligence but of moral fiber, Hythlodæus explains that "even though we surpass them in brains, we are far inferior to them in application and industry."⁵⁶

⁵⁶Utopia, p. 107/37-39.

The final part (103/24-109/36) of Book I, then, links the two books of the Utopia by summarizing the injustice condemned in Book I and by foreshadowing the justice approved of in Book II. Book I closes with the three men's retiring to the persona More's house for dinner and returning afterward to his garden to hear Raphael describe Utopia. His description is made particularly startling by the corruption and disorder which has been portrayed throughout Book I. Utopia contrasts with Europe as sharply as the ideal state contrasts with tyranny in the Republic.

Unlike Plato's logical treatment in the Republic, More's theme in Book I unfolds like a large painting. Hythlodæus persistently exposes the various causes and results of injustice in the states of Europe. Furthermore his diction and imagery, as well as his stories and arguments themselves, reveal his dominant concern with injustice throughout Book I.

In Book I More creates Hythlodæus as a character with the same understanding and opinion of injustice as those evidenced by Socrates in Books I, VIII, and IX of the Republic. In the attitudes against which Hythlodæus argues, More also exposes the same false concepts of justice as those represented by Socrates' adversaries. Although More uses a different style and includes less in his scope, he has the same purpose as that of Plato. By sketching the negative side of the portrait in Book I in preparation for the positive side in Book II,

More leaves no doubt that justice is superior to injustice for man and for the state. When Hythlodæus completes the total picture of Utopia at the close of Book II, the unity of More's work will reveal itself clearly.

CHAPTER XI

FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE

To apprehend the unity of the Utopia, one should read Book II with reference to Book I. The theme of justice in the second book reveals itself more clearly in light of the theme of injustice in the first book. From these complementary themes taken together arises the meaning of the work as a whole. In this broad sense the Utopia parallels the Republic, for the meaning of Plato's work also emanates from the juxtaposition of the complementary but contrasting themes of justice and injustice.

In each work the central character commences his description of the ideal state in response to skeptical remarks made by his listeners. In the Utopia the persona More's defense of private property and Peter Giles's expression of loyalty to European traditions prompt Hythlodæus to give an account of the Utopian commonwealth. The persona More and Giles defend the status quo even though Hythlodæus has gone on at considerable length to point out the injustice in the kingdoms of Europe. In the Republic Socrates delineates the ideal state in reply to Glaucon's and Adeimantus' justification of the popular notions of justice. In the second book Glaucon and Adeimantus request Socrates to continue the search for

justice even though he has shown in Book I the inadequacy of the popular notion of justice. Thus both the place and the function of the Utopian commonwealth in More's work correspond in a general way to the place and the function of the ideal state in the Republic.

More, however, alters Plato's structure so that his portrayal of injustice in Book I takes up a greater proportion of the entire Utopia than Plato's treatment in Book I occupies in the whole of the Republic. In the Republic, however, Plato returns to the theme of injustice in Books VIII and IX, after his description of the ideal state. As has been shown in the preceding chapters, More in Book I of the Utopia gives various specific examples of injustice in Europe, which correspond to Plato's explanation of the nature of injustice in Books VIII and IX. Thus More compresses into Book I of the Utopia the essential elements of the subject matter treated by Plato in Books I, VIII, and IX of the Republic. Despite this alteration of the parts of the Republic, More achieves the same final effect: justice is shown to be preferable to injustice.

In reading Book II of the Utopia one must bear in mind how More's didactic purpose and style differ from those of Plato, lest the thematic and structural similarities between the two works be missed. Plato attempts to devise an ideal state that will reflect the true form of justice. Socrates makes this intention clear in Book V, as he comments on his

own attempt "to create in words the pattern of a good state."¹ Explaining that it would hardly be possible to realize in action what can be pictured verbally, Socrates advises Glaucon not to insist "that I must exhibit as realized in action precisely what we expounded in words."² Socrates, therefore, hypothesizes a theoretical state, which he admits exists nowhere in reality.

In contrast to Plato, More does not attempt to create a hypothetical vision of justice, but he suggests its form by representing a practical model. More's intention can be inferred from Hythlodæus' implication that the excellence of Utopia is beyond description. No wonder, then, that the persona More cannot be convinced verbally of the advantages of communism, since he "has no picture at all"³ of the situation in Utopia. Hence Hythlodæus tells the persona More, "You should have been with me in Utopia and personally seen their manners and customs as I did."⁴ Hythlodæus implies in this remark a meaning directly opposite to that of Socrates. Hythlodæus might well have paraphrased Socrates' comment to Glaucon thus: "Don't insist that I must exhibit in words what the Utopians realize

¹Rep. V 472 D (Shorey, I, 505).

²Rep. V 473 A (Shorey, I, 507).

³Utopia, p. 107/18.

⁴Utopia, p. 107/19-20.

in action." Rather than conjecturing how an ideal state would surpass any real one, More represents a state that purports to suggest an existing reality greater than words can describe.

This difference between the two works is suggested in the translation of the quatrain that precedes the *Utopia*: "Alone of all lands, without the aid of abstract philosophy, I have represented for mortals the philosophical city."⁵ By concrete details and particular instances, then, More depicts as existing in actuality what Plato brings into existence only in the mind.

More's method particularly suits his didactic purpose, for while delighting his readers, he also points out specific abuses in Europe. Therefore, he details concretely in Book II corrective measures to particular abuses described in Book I. Book II of the *Utopia*, then, should be read not only with the difference in method between the *Utopia* and the *Republic* in mind, but also with reference to the injustices in Book I of the *Utopia*.

Because More's didactic purpose and style differ from those of Plato, his description of *Utopia* contains details omitted from the *Republic* and lacks both the theoretical explanations and the particulars included by Plato. For example, Socrates not

⁵*Utopia*, p. 19/24-25.

only specifies the kinds of tales that should be told to the youth, but he also explains why such tales should be included in the educational system. Hythlodæus, in contrast, merely mentions that Utopian children are introduced to good literature.⁶ Conversely, Hythlodæus describes the religious ceremonies of the Utopians, whereas Socrates passes over the matter of religion with the slight comment that "the founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to keep them gracious."⁷

Despite the different emphasis and ordering of details in the respective descriptions of the ideal state, the works are similar in that both are unified by the theme of justice. As has been pointed out in the earlier chapters, Plato maintains that justice results when each constituent part in the state performs its function. Conversely, when one part fails in performing its function, the result is injustice.

The first book of the Utopia points out how disordered and disunified the states of Europe are. In the second book More as author shows how the institutions, laws, and customs of the Utopians contribute to order and unity among the parts of

⁶Utopia, p. 159/11.

⁷Rep. IV 427 C (Shorey, I, 345).

the commonwealth and hence to justice throughout the whole.

Although he accepts Plato's criterion that justice is manifested by order and unity in the state, More has his own ideas as to how these can be achieved. He adopts important features of the Republic, therefore, to suit his own purposes. Instead of following the Republic in arranging the parts of Book II, however, it appears that More turned to Aristotle's Politics.

In the Politics Aristotle mentions the two elements in which the well-being of the state consists:

Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine out of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. There are two things in which all well-being consists: one of them is the choice of a right end and aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions which are the means towards it; for the means and the end may agree or disagree.⁸

These two elements correspond to the major parts of Book II of the Utopia. In Part I (111/7-185/14) Hythlodæus describes the institutional foundations of the just state and the end to which the state is directed. In Part II (185/15-237/36) he shows how the citizens act in their relations to each other, to foreign states, and to God. Book II concludes with a peroration (237/37-247/3) which summarizes the subject matter of the whole work.

The first major part (111/7-185/14) divides into

⁸Politics vii, 13, 1331^b, p. 1294.

three sections in which Hythlodæus delineates the geopolitical (111/7-135/24), socioeconomic (135/25-159/2), and the educational and philosophical (159/3-185/14) foundations of the just state. The labels given here to the separate sections, of course, are chosen arbitrarily. In some cases, moreover, individual passages seem to be out of place under a specific label. Hythlodæus' conversational narration does not allow for strict logical categories in his material. Indeed, much of the verisimilitude achieved in More's style would be lost if the description of the island conformed to a precisely drawn outline. Nonetheless, the divisions indicated above appear to be clearly discernible.

In the first section (111/7-135/24), describing how the geography and political institutions of Utopia are conducive to a peaceful, well-ordered, and unified state, Hythlodæus begins by briefly explaining how the Utopians have combined art with nature to make their island an impenetrable fortress. Utopus, the founder of the commonwealth, apparently wanted to improve the defensive advantage of his country by making an island out of a peninsula. Ordering the excavation of fifteen miles on the side where the land was connected to the continent, he caused the sea to flow around the land. This incredible feat struck the neighboring peoples with wonder and terror. Thus, the Utopians developed their own institutions and laws away from the corrupting influence of other people.

The Utopians subsequently took advantage of their insular position and further enhanced their defensive capability. They controlled the navigation of the mouth of the bay, which "is rendered perilous here by shallows and there by reefs,"⁹ with the help of landmarks placed on shore. These landmarks also serve for defense, because if they "were removed to other positions, they could easily lure an enemy's fleet, however numerous, to destruction."¹⁰

The fortunate combination of the natural physical advantages of the island with the ingenious skill and hard work of the people accounts in part for the Utopian attitude toward war. They devote their time and effort to developing the island's natural resources instead of finding pretexts to gain more land and riches. The Utopians' attitude contrasts with that of the Europeans, who are described in Book I as idle, resistant to new ideas, and occupied with planning or engaging in war.

Because of the pretense that Utopia has a real existence, the description of the geography and the other physical characteristics of the commonwealth has no parallel in the Republic. Such detailed description would be irrelevant in Socrates' hypothetical state.

Hythlodæus next describes the political divisions

⁹Utopia, p. 111/19-20.

¹⁰Utopia, p. 111/28-30.

which reflect the order and harmony among the constituent parts of the commonwealth. Fifty-four city states, equal in size and population, encircle the capital, Amaurotum, which symbolizes the unity of all the people. No conflict arises among the city states because they consider themselves tenants instead of masters of what they hold. Hence, "no city has any desire to extend its territory."¹¹

The rural districts give further evidence of the regularity and harmony of the commonwealth. A specified number of inhabitants occupy the farmhouses, spaced "at suitable distances from one another" throughout the rural area.¹² Since all the workers share the burdens, they produce more food than they need. As Hythlodæus explains, they overproduce from charitable motives: "Though they are more than sure how much food the city with its adjacent territory consumes, they produce far more grain and cattle than they require for their own use: they distribute the surplus among their neighbors."¹³ Such distributive justice differs markedly from the practice in England, where "one insatiable glutton" can join field to field for raising sheep and cattle and drive the tenants from the land.¹⁴

¹¹Utopia, p. 113/36-37.

¹²Utopia, p. 115/1-2.

¹³Utopia, p. 117/8-12.

¹⁴Utopia, p. 67/14-26.

Harmony exists not only among the farms themselves but also between rural areas and the cities. The practice of requiring all the citizens to work for two years on the farms prevents any distinction from arising between city and farm workers. The Utopian cities display the same order and regularity as the farms. With identical houses laid out in symmetrical rows, they all follow the pattern of the capital, Amaurotum.

Socrates does not describe the political divisions in his ideal state, because, for one reason, the republic is not a confederation of cities but only one city state. In contrast to the rotation of farm and city workers in Utopia, however, the guardians in the republic live apart from other citizens.¹⁵ Socrates reasons that this separation will remove the guardians from the temptation of soft living and will keep them in readiness to defend the city.

The Utopians defend their cities by an ingenious combination of art and nature. They have the foresight, for example, to think of protecting their water supply in the event of an enemy invasion. Hythlodæus explains how the head and source of a little river "just outside the city has been connected with it by outworks, lest in case of hostile attack the water might be cut off and diverted or polluted."¹⁶ The Anydrus

¹⁵Rep. III 416 D-417 B (Shorey, I, 311-13).

¹⁶Utopia, p. 119/27-30.

River serves as a natural barrier of defense. The Utopians augment this natural feature by building a moat around the other three sides of the city, in addition to a wall with towers and battlements.

The exterior of the Utopian cities, although hostile and formidable in appearance, allows life inside to go on without fear of interruption. The peace and tranquility of the cities are symbolized by gardens situated back of the rows of houses. Hythlodæus describes their luxuriance: "In them they have vines, fruits, herbs, flowers, so well kept and flourishing that I never saw anything more fruitful and more tasteful anywhere."¹⁷ The lush Utopian gardens and the fertile farmland contrast sharply with the barrenness of the English countryside. Referring in Book I to the English landowners, Hythlodæus comments ironically that "these good fellows turn all human habitations and all cultivated land into a wilderness."¹⁸

Not only the physical characteristics of the island but also the equality of the people reveal the order and the regularity of the commonwealth. The citizens neither own property nor enjoy privacy in their homes because "folding doors, easily opened by hand and then closing of themselves,

¹⁷Utopia, p. 121/16-18.

¹⁸Utopia, p. 67/12-13.

give admission to anyone."¹⁹ In this respect all Utopians are similar to the guardians in the republic. Like the Utopians, the guardians must not "possess any private property" or "have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will."²⁰ But communism in Utopia applies to all the citizens, where in Socrates republic only the guardians and the leaders eschew private property.

Their voting privilege, however, makes the Utopian citizens different from all classes in the republic. They elect representatives, who in turn elect the governor. Any citizen may become an official, even governor, because all have equal opportunity to advance into the class of scholars from which the citizens "choose ambassadors, priests, tranibors, and finally the governor himself."²¹ In the republic the people have no voice in the selection of their officials. Socrates assumes that the leaders will have offspring who will also be leaders. Occasionally, however, the leaders will select the son of a guardian to be trained as a future member of their class.²²

Though the Utopian method of electing officials

¹⁹Utopia, p. 121/11-12.

²⁰Rep. III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311).

²¹Utopia, p. 133/6-8.

²²Rep. III 415 A (Shorey, I, 305).

differs from the practice in the republic, they have leaders who possess the qualities required of a leader by Socrates. A consideration of the method of choosing officials and of the philosophical education given the scholars makes it evident that the Utopian leaders combine a knowledge of civic affairs with theoretical wisdom. Thus the Utopians attain through a democratic method the end which Socrates prescribes as the crucial imperative for justice--their chief executive is a philosopher-governor.

The governor and other elected officials differ greatly from the kings and councilors in Europe. The Utopians take precautions that a tyrant will not arise among them. The governor who otherwise holds office for life can be "ousted on suspicion of aiming at a tyranny."²³ Although the elected officials "enter into consultation with the governor every other day and sometimes, if need arises, oftener," they are forbidden to enter into agreements in private.²⁴ Hythlodæus explains the reason for such practice:

To take counsel on matters of common interest outside the senate or the popular assembly is considered a capital offense. The object of these measures, they say, is to prevent it from being easy, by a conspiracy between the governor and the tranibors and by tyrannous oppression of the people, to change the order of the commonwealth.²⁵

²³Utopia, p. 123/20-21.

²⁴Utopia, p. 123/24-25.

²⁵Utopia, p. 125/1-6.

The Utopians put the same emphasis on maintaining the established order of the commonwealth as Socrates does in the Republic.

As has been indicated above, Socrates prohibits any influence which might upset fundamental political and social principles.

He therefore warns that the leaders of the republic "must throughout be watchful against innovations in music and gymnastics counter to the established order."²⁶ How different the stability of Plato's republic and More's Utopia appears in comparison with the agitated condition of Europe as portrayed in Book I! No doubt Hythlodæus has the wise measures of the Utopians in the back of his mind when he describes how the anonymous king and his councilors oppress the people by manipulating the laws to satisfy their greedy desires.

Another Utopian regulation that curtails the kind of corruption prevalent in the councils of Europe is the "custom of debating nothing on the same day on which it is first proposed."²⁷ This custom insures that an impetuous councilor who blurts out a foolish remark will not be tempted to defend it imprudently just to save his reputation. Such a law would obviously benefit the states of Europe, where the councilors express opinions on any proposal immediately. According to Hythlodæus, European councilors act "as if their whole

²⁶Rep. IV 424 C (Shorey, I, 331).

²⁷Utopia, p. 125/11-13.

reputation for wisdom were jeopardized and as if afterwards they would deserve to be thought plain blockheads unless they could lay hold of something to find fault with in the discoveries of others."²⁸

The Utopians also exhibit the equality and the order in their lives by the way they work and use their leisure time. In addition to farming every other two years, each citizen learns and exercises a trade. In contrast to the practice in the republic, where each citizen performs his assigned function, the Utopians respect freedom of choice as long as the individual does not choose against the common good. Although "for the most part, each is brought up in his father's craft . . . if anyone is attracted to another occupation, he is transferred by adoption to a family pursuing that craft for which he has a liking."²⁹

Because the Utopians have a sensible attitude toward work, they have plenty of leisure time. Work occupies six hours a day, and the remaining time, apart from meals and sleep, may be spent in intellectual pursuits, voluntary work at a trade, or productive and instructional recreation.

By comparing them to people of other countries, Hythlodæus explains why the Utopians have an abundance of

²⁸Utopia, p. 59/3-6.

²⁹Utopia, p. 127/12-17.

free time. In the remaining portion (129/30-135/24) of the first section (111/7-135/24) he directly attacks the European vices that he has been indirectly criticizing up to this point.

Although Hythlodæus does not mention Europe by name, he obviously means Europe when he refers to other countries. He again, as in Book I, castigates idlers and drones, rich noblemen and their retainers, priests and so-called religious, and sturdy beggars--all of whom live as parasites on the labor of the poor. In Utopia there are no such idle classes. With the exception of the few priests, scholars, and officials (scarcely more than five hundred in each of the fifty-four states) everyone in Utopia does physical labor.

Furthermore, the Utopians need not produce as much as other peoples because they have fewer desires. Hythlodæus explains that in countries other than Utopia the pride, vanity, and licentiousness of the people create superfluous needs:

"In a society where we make money the standard of everything, it is necessary to practice many crafts which are quite vain and superfluous, ministering only to luxury and licentiousness."³⁰ The Utopians, in contrast, produce only what "is required by necessity or comfort (or even pleasure, provided it be genuine and natural)."³¹

³⁰Utopia, p. 131/13-15.

³¹Utopia, p. 131/26-27.

The Utopians not only have fewer needs but also work less than others for the necessities of life. Their clothing lasts longer because they wear simple and sturdy garments and put no value on fineness of thread. Their houses last longer because they are repaired regularly. Nothing is allowed to deteriorate from neglect. Because they follow reason and nature in their commonwealth, "everything has its proper place and the general welfare is carefully regulated."³²

The Utopians, however, do not stress order and regularity as ends in themselves. Rather they reason that order, unity, and stability are necessary conditions for achieving their primary aim, which is identified by Hythlodæus at the conclusion of the first section (111/7-135/24):

The constitution of their commonwealth looks in the first place to this sole object: that for all the citizens, as far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted to the freedom and culture of the mind. It is in the latter that they deem the happiness of life to consist.³³

The first section (111/7-135/24) of Book II, then, shows how Utopus and his subjects developed the island to raise a rude and rustic people to a state of culture and humanity. Although the description of the geography and the other physical characteristics of the commonwealth has no parallel in the Republic, the fundamental institutions in

³²Utopia, p. 133/24-25.

³³Utopia, p. 135/19-24.

Utopia conform to Plato's primary requisite for the establishment of a just society. In Utopia, as in Socrates' republic, the needs of the citizens prompt them to work together to establish institutions that bring order and stability to the state. The basic institutions and customs of Utopia are consistent with Plato's idea of a healthy state. None of the luxurious superfluities, which Socrates says are characteristic of a fevered state, have been introduced.³⁴

The Utopians, on the other hand, are not as austere as the citizens described in Socrates' elemental city. Utopians have plenty of leisure time to pursue pleasure, "provided it be genuine and natural."³⁵ The emphasis on work and leisure time contrasts with Socrates' emphasis on military preparedness. Utopia, where recreation receives due regard, differs from the republic, where the best citizens "must not be prone to laughter."³⁶

In the next section (135/25-159/2) of Part I (111/7-185/14) Hythlodæus shows how the socioeconomic basis of Utopia contributes to the order and unity of the whole commonwealth. The basic social and economic unit is the family. By carefully regulating the number and the size of families in the island, the Utopians maintain a constant

³⁴Rep. II 372 E-373 B (Shorey, I, 161).

³⁵Utopia, p. 131/27.

³⁶Rep. III 388 E (Shorey, I, 211).

population that is consistent with unity. When the population swells beyond the fixed number, "they enroll citizens out of every city and, on the mainland nearest them, wherever the natives have much unoccupied and uncultivated land, they found a colony under their own laws."³⁷

In emphasizing the unity of the Utopian people, More as author follows Plato's prescription in the Republic. In Utopia, however, the ways and means of achieving unity differ from those in the Republic. Socrates, for example, says that the state should grow "so long as in its growth it consents to remain a unity,"³⁸ but his method of population control, unlike that of the Utopians, is to restrict the number of marriages: "But the number of the marriages we will leave to the discretion of the rulers, that they may keep the number of citizens as nearly as may be the same, taking into account wars and diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as possible, our city may not grow too great or too small."³⁹ Although Socrates does not suggest the inhabiting of other lands as a means of population control, he says that when the food supply becomes insufficient to feed the population "we shall have to cut out a cante of our neighbour's land if we are

³⁷Utopia, p. 137/19-22.

³⁸Rep. I 423 C (Shorey, I, 329).

³⁹Rep. V 460 A (Shorey, I, 461-63).

to have enough for pasture and ploughing."⁴⁰

In emigrating to the lands nearby, the Utopians wage war against the natives if they resist living under Utopian laws. Hythlodæus explains how they justify such a war:

"They consider it a most just cause for war when a people which does not use its soil but keeps it idle and waste nevertheless forbids the use and possession of it to others who by the rule of nature ought to be maintained by it."⁴¹ Such a rationaliza-

tion for war seems less surprising when the relationship between Book II and Book I is recognized. This passage obviously contains a veiled attack on the English ruling

class. Hythlodæus, in his debate with the lawyer in Book I, becomes quite agitated about the rich landowners who will not use the soil for farming yet forbid others so to use it.⁴²

Indirectly, then, More as author might be implying obliquely that the English who neglect to cultivate their land deserve to have it taken away.

The unity of the commonwealth is evident also in the method the Utopians employ to distribute goods. The cities are laid out in regular and equal quarters, with markets in a central position in each sector. The convenient markets

⁴⁰Rep. II 373 D (Shorey, I, 163).

⁴¹Utopia, p. 137/19-22.

⁴²Utopia, pp. 65/38-69/37.

easily allow the head of the household to come and receive what he needs without payment. From the central market food is allocated first to the hospitals and then to spacious halls that are located on every street at regular intervals.

In these halls "at the hours fixed for dinner and supper, the entire syphograncy assembles, summoned by the blast of a brazen trumpet."⁴³ The wholesome meals in the spacious halls symbolize the order, harmony, and unity which exist among all the Utopian people. The syphogrant and his wife occupy the central position at the head of the first table. If the syphograncy has a temple, the central position is shared with the priest and his wife. The others sit in an arrangement designed to maintain order and to educate the young. On both sides of the syphogrant and his wife "sit younger people, and next to them old people again, and so through the house those of the same age sit together and yet mingle with those of a different age."⁴⁴

At the beginning of the meals the assemblage is instructed by "some reading which is conducive to morality but which is brief so as not to be tiresome."⁴⁵ The reading is followed by conversation and music, both designed to add to

⁴³Utopia, p. 141/20-21.

⁴⁴Utopia, p. 143/28-32.

⁴⁵Utopia, p. 145/7-9.

the relaxation and good cheer of the company. Hythlodæus indicates that the meals, like every other Utopian custom and institution, aim at the well-being of the whole citizenry: "They burn spices and scatter perfumes and omit nothing that may cheer the company. For they are somewhat too much inclined to this attitude of mind: that no kind of pleasure is forbidden, provided no harm comes of it."⁴⁶

Hythlodæus' intimation of the Utopians' propensity for pleasure foreshadows his explanation of the philosophical foundation of Utopian society in the climactic final section (159/3-185/14) of Part I (111/7-185/14). Happiness and pleasure, as will be discussed below, are the aim toward which all Utopian institutions and customs are directed.

The Utopian method of distributing goods and their common meals point up the primary difference between the communism in Utopia and that in the republic. Socrates restricts the use of money and the communal life to the guardian class. He assumes that "a market-place . . . and money as a token for the purpose of exchange" will be required for the other citizens.⁴⁷ The guardian class is the only one in which meals are eaten in common. In contrast to the Utopians, who eat together in order to create a feeling of unity, the

⁴⁶Utopia, p. 145/22-26.

⁴⁷Rep. II 371 B-C (Shorey, I, 155).

guardians eat apart from the rest of the citizens in order to insure their unity. Socrates maintains that if the guardians become contaminated by living among other citizens the necessary hierarchy among the classes will be destroyed.⁴⁸

After the description of the Utopian meals, the next passage starts abruptly, headed by the caption "Utopian Travel." It does not appear at first that the ensuing discussion has much relevance to what precedes it. Closer analysis, however, reveals that Hythlodæus continues in the same vein that he has been following up to this point. He emphasizes the unity of the commonwealth by explaining how a citizen can travel anywhere on the island with confidence and security. Because the Utopian travelers share the work and food wherever they go, "they are at home everywhere."⁴⁹ Furthermore, the traveler has no temptation to avoid work, because there is "no wine shop, no alehouse, no brothel anywhere."⁵⁰

In contrast to this freedom and security, England as described in Book I, is a land infested with thieves and plagued by wandering beggars.⁵¹ Alongside the poverty and misery there is ill-timed luxury. Dives, brothels, and

⁴⁸Rep. III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311).

⁴⁹Utopia, p. 147/5.

⁵⁰Utopia, p. 147/22-23.

⁵¹Utopia, pp. 61/14-15 and 67/15-35.

alehouses give those fortunate men who are employed a pretext to evade work.⁵²

Although the description of Utopian travel is signaled by a caption in the text, only four paragraphs are devoted to it (145/33-147/32). Hythlodæus promptly moves on to describe the trade carried on within the commonwealth (147/33-149/4) and with other countries (149/5-159/13). The internal trade shows in another way how the people throughout the island are brought closer together. Without money they exchange goods as though they were one big family: "Those who have given out of their stock to any particular city without requiring any return from it receive what they lack from another to which they have given nothing. Thus, the whole island is like a single family."⁵³ The island family might be considered the dominant symbol in this section (135/25-159/2).

Socrates also desires that the state live as one large family, but he thinks it necessary to upset the traditional family relationship to achieve this end. As in Utopia, where the traveler feels at home wherever he goes, in the republic each guardian will feel akin to every other guardian, "for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son,

⁵²Utopia, p. 69/33-37.

⁵³Utopia, pp. 147/39-149/4.

a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these."⁵⁴

The Utopians also treat other peoples as though they were kindred. Their trade with other countries displays the Utopians' justice and charity. In the countries to which they send commodities, "they bestow the seventh part on the poor of the district and sell the rest at a moderate price."⁵⁵ In contrast to the Utopians' friendly attitude toward other countries, Socrates assumes that a natural state of enmity exists between the republic and non-Greek nations.⁵⁶

Because the Utopians produce an overabundance and have few needs themselves, they acquire great quantities of gold from their exports. In the remaining portion (149/29-159/2) of this section (135/25-159/2), Hythlodæus describes how the Utopians use and regard their wealth. They retain gold only for the purpose of financing unavoidable wars. Otherwise, "gold and silver, of which money is made, are so treated by them that no one values them more highly than their true nature deserves."⁵⁷ Using reason and following nature, the Utopians measure the value of a commodity by its utility. Hence they have a higher regard for iron than for gold.

⁵⁴Rep. V 463 C (Shorey, I, 473).

⁵⁵Utopia, p. 149/12-13.

⁵⁶Rep. V 469 B-C (Shorey, I, 493).

⁵⁷Utopia, p. 151/18-20.

By Hythlodæus' description of the means that the Utopians have devised to keep their treasures, More as author effectively turns gold into a symbol of infamy. Hythlodæus tells how the Utopians use this essentially worthless metal to make chamber pots and other humble vessels. In addition to such a lowly utilitarian function, gold also marks the guilt of criminals: "For those who bear the stigma of disgrace on account of some crime, they have gold ornaments hanging from their ears, gold rings encircling their fingers, gold chains thrown around their necks, and, as a last touch, a gold crown binding their temples."⁵⁸

This last touch especially imbues the symbol with latent suggested meanings. Most obviously the gold crown identifies Utopian slaves with European kings and noblemen. But more subtly, possibly, More as author intends to evoke a comparison with the poor Christ's crown of thorns. The harmless gold crown on the head of a guilty slave contrasts with the torturous thorns on the head of the guiltless Christ.

Having shown gold to be a symbol of infamy in Utopia, More as author then presents perhaps the finest satiric passage in the entire work. He introduces the Anemolian ambassadors, who are typical satiric characters. They come to Utopia, a land of reason and order, with their false European values.

⁵⁸Utopia, p. 153/10-14.

Hythlodæus portrays them as naively unaware of their exterior similarity to the Utopian slaves: "The ambassadors themselves, being noblemen at home, were arrayed in cloth of gold, with heavy gold necklaces and earrings, with gold rings on their fingers, and with strings of pearls and gems upon their caps."⁵⁹

The naiveté of the Anemolian ambassadors matches that of the guileless Utopians, who regard their own attitude toward gold as reasonable and the Anemolians' attitude as debased. Hence they mistake the relative importance of the members of the entourage: "They therefore bowed to the lowest of the party as to the masters but took the ambassadors themselves to be slaves because they were wearing gold chains, and passed them over without any deference whatever."⁶⁰ The satiric effect here arises from the artificial and false European values' being introduced into a natural and reasonable environment. With this humorous anecdote More as author shows European values to be based on appearance instead of reality.⁶¹

The tale of the Anemolian ambassadors parallels the analogous anecdotes of the Polyerites, the Achorians, and the Macarians in Book I. In Book II, however, More as author reverses the satiric method. The fictitious peoples in the

⁵⁹Utopia, p. 155/12-15.

⁶⁰Utopia, p. 155/25-28.

⁶¹The similarity of Plato's and More's attitude toward gold is discussed in Chapter IX, pp. 266-67.

first book resemble the Utopians in representing an exemplary pattern of behavior for Europeans. In the second book the Anemolians and other imaginary people such as the Zapoletans represent Europeans in thinly veiled disguise. Thus More as author employs analogous satiric methods as literary devices that unify the two books.

In this section (135/25-159/2), then, the theme of justice continues to develop as in the previous section (111/7-135/24). The socioeconomic basis of Utopian society, like its geopolitical foundations, contributes to unity and to a proper order of values in the body politic. Utopia, as a result, is like a large happy family. In emphasizing the unity of the Utopian people, More as author follows Plato's prescription in the Republic. In Utopia, however, the ways and means of achieving unity differ from those in the Republic. Thus, unity is emphasized in both states but for different reasons. In the Republic unity is synonymous with justice and is sought as an end in itself; in the Utopia unity is thought of as a necessary prerequisite to happiness for all the citizens.

The Utopian ideas about the end and aim of their society are elaborated upon further in the next section (159/3-185/14), in which Hythlodæus discusses the educational and philosophical foundations of the Utopian commonwealth. He begins with a brief description of the various branches of knowledge pursued by the Utopians. In contrast to the

theoretical approach to education advocated by Socrates, the Utopians are more practical. Their pragmatic investigations and experiments contribute to the common good of all the citizens. It follows, therefore, that they take great interest in that "part of philosophy which deals with morals."⁶² Socrates, in contrast, stresses that part of philosophy which deals with epistemology and metaphysics.

This section (159/3-185/14), containing the discussion of Utopian philosophy, occupies the important final position in Part I (111/7-185/14), because here Hythlodæus explains the end toward which the institutions and customs of the Utopians aim. By way of introduction to his exposition of the Utopian philosophy, Hythlodæus states the chief concern of their philosophical inquiries: "They discuss virtue and pleasure, but their principal and chief debate is in what thing or things, one or more, they are to hold that happiness consists."⁶⁴ Hythlodæus then proceeds to explain how the Utopians interpret "pleasure as the object by which to define either the whole or the chief part of human happiness."⁶⁵

⁶²Utopia, p. 161/18-19.

⁶³The similarities and differences between Utopian and Platonic philosophy are discussed in Chapter VI, especially pp. 168-79.

⁶⁴Utopia, p. 161/23-25.

⁶⁵Utopia, p. 161/27-29.

Although they reason that the pursuit of pleasure results in happiness, the Utopians have nevertheless accepted certain basic principles on faith. Hythlodæus cites the following examples: "The soul is immortal and by the goodness of God born for happiness. After this life rewards are appointed for our virtues and good deeds, punishment for our crimes."⁶⁶ The mention of the afterlife here foreshadows the discussion of religion and theology in the final section (217/6-137/36) of Part II (185/15-237/36). In the final section (217/6-237/36) Hythlodæus indicates that the Utopians believe the laws will be neither respected nor obeyed unless these principles are accepted by the citizens (221/28-223/3). In emphasizing faith equally with reason, the Utopians deviate from Socrates' philosophy. Although Socrates also maintains that a belief in God and in the afterlife is conducive to justice in man and in the state, he does not place the same importance on this belief as he does on the rational understanding of the form of the good.

In the discussion of Utopian philosophy in this section (159/3-185/14), however, Hythlodæus does not stress the necessity for belief in the immortality of the soul as a condition sine qua non for justice. Rather he shows how the Utopians regard virtue as its own reward here on earth. The

⁶⁶Utopia, pp. 161/38-163/3.

basic principles of religion are mentioned in this section (159/3-185/14) to indicate how the principles of philosophy and religion complement one another. The Utopians realize that the beliefs in rewards or punishments after death "belong to religion, yet they hold that reason leads men to believe and to admit them."⁶⁷ This importance placed on philosophy and religion is reflected in the position which the respective discussions occupy in Book II. The final section (159/3-185/14) of Part I (111/7-185/14), containing the discussion of Utopian philosophy, balances the discussion of religion and theology in the final section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185/15-237/36). The balance of these two sections in the Utopia corresponds in a general way to the analogous discussions of philosophy and theology in the Republic. Socrates explains the function and role of reason in Book VI and the likelihood of retributive justice in the afterlife in Book X.

Although the Utopians assent to fundamental theological principles, they derive their moral philosophy from following nature and obeying the dictates of reason. By following reason, they hold that the proper pursuit of pleasure will result in happiness. Hythlodæus explains how the Utopians associate pleasure with happiness and with the supreme good: "As it is, they hold happiness rests not in every kind of pleasure but

⁶⁷Utopia, p. 163/4-5.

only in good and decent pleasure. To such, as to the supreme good, our nature is drawn by virtue itself, to which the opposite school alone attributes happiness."⁶⁸

The Utopians have a broader understanding of what constitutes a genuine pleasure than does Socrates. Although Socrates recognizes legitimate pleasures akin to the genuine pleasures of the Utopians, he regards the only true pleasure as that which results from the pursuit of wisdom.⁶⁹ There is no contradiction between Socrates' ideas on pleasure and those of the Utopians, but the Utopians make the pursuit of pleasure a positive force in the maintenance of justice.

The Utopians reason that if each citizen satisfies only legitimate desires, then the whole commonwealth will benefit. Conversely, to deprive another of pleasure is to forfeit your own. As a result they have great respect for their laws and ordinances. Hythlodæus explains how these principles bolster the administration of justice in the commonwealth:

They hold that not only ought contracts between private persons to be observed but also public laws for the distribution of vital commodities, that is to say, the matter of pleasure, provided they have been justly promulgated by a good king or ratified by the common consent of a people neither oppressed by tyranny nor deceived by fraud. As long as such laws are not broken, it is prudence to look after your own interests, and to

⁶⁸Utopia, p. 163/18-21, cf. Rep. IX 580 D-583 A (Shorey, II, 371-81).

⁶⁹Rep. IX 580 D-583 A (Shorey, II, 371-81).

look after those of the public in addition is a mark of devotion. But to deprive others of their pleasure to secure your own, this is surely an injustice.⁷⁰

The Utopians, then, relate their philosophy directly to the common good of the state. Although it would appear on the surface that personal pleasure is inimical to common justice, the Utopians show that each man's happiness actually contributes to justice among all the citizens.

Hythlodæus describes how the behavior that results from Utopian philosophy differs from that of other peoples. Most Europeans confuse appearance and reality. They mistake fine clothes, honors, jewels, and superfluous wealth for true pleasure. Obeying the dictates of reason and following nature, the Utopians see that such opinions are erroneous: "Although the mob of mortals regard these and all similar pursuits--and they are countless-- as pleasures, yet the Utopians positively hold them to have nothing to do with true pleasure since there is nothing sweet in them by nature."⁷¹

In contrast to the "mob of mortals," the Utopians seek only genuine pleasures. Although they "cling above all to mental pleasures,"⁷² they do not eschew those associated with the body. Since they regard health itself as a pleasure, they

⁷⁰Utopia, p. 165/23-32.

⁷¹Utopia, p. 171/34-37.

⁷²Utopia, p. 175/34.

avoid those harmful delights that result in pain and disease. As a result of this philosophy of nature the whole country is healthy, vigorous, and vital. In language sharply contrasting with the metaphors of disease and corruption which he uses in Book I, Hythlodæus describes the health and prosperity of Utopia: "Nowhere in the world is there a more plentiful supply of grain and cattle, nowhere are men's bodies more vigorous and subject to fewer diseases."⁷³

After his exposition of Utopian philosophy, Hythlodæus returns briefly to describe other aspects of their learning and education. Their diligence and open-minded attitude enable them to learn rapidly and thoroughly. The Utopians have learned Greek easily because it is somewhat related to their own language. Hythlodæus also tells how he brought with him to Utopia a number of great books, the foremost of which were most of Plato's works. Thus, in another way More as author seems to identify his thinking with that of the Greeks in general and of Plato in particular.

This section (159/3-185/14) with its exposition of Utopian philosophy parallels the corresponding discussion of philosophy in the Republic. Socrates explains how the form of the good is the supreme object of knowledge at the conclusion

⁷³Utopia, p. 179/27-29; cf. Utopia, 95/39-97/4, 105/35-107/4. See also Rep. III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271), and Rep. IX 583 B-584 C (Shorey, II, 381-85).

of Book VI. As has been indicated above (Chapter VI), the Utopian understanding of the supreme good is not unlike Socrates' explanation of the form of the good. The Utopians, however, do not put as much emphasis on man's rational capability as does Socrates. Although in both works virtue is considered its own reward, the Utopians put more stress than Socrates does on the necessity for belief in rewards and punishments after death as a sanction for justice.

Hythlodæus' description of the Utopian philosophy and education brings to a close the first part (111/7-185/14) of Book II. He has shown how the Utopians' fundamental institutions and customs insure the order and unity of the commonwealth and thereby contribute to the happiness of all the citizens. The foundations, in brief, are (1) a well-ordered and unified confederation of city-states situated in a naturally advantageous physical environment, (2) an efficient economy based on and patterned after the unity and harmony in the family, and (3) education and philosophy that contribute to the happiness of all the citizens by stressing useful action and correct moral behavior. As Hythlodæus later reveals in Part II (185/15-237/36), it is upon these foundations that the Utopians deal justly with their own citizens, with their neighbors, and with God.

CHAPTER XII

THE MANIFESTATIONS OF JUSTICE

Having described the geography, politics, social relations, economy, education, and philosophy of the just state in the first part of Book II, Hythlodæus next shows how the Utopians act in relationships with dependent members of their own commonwealth, with foreign nations, and with God. Part II (185/15-237/36), like Part I (111/7-185/14), divides into three sections. The first section (185/15-199/35) portrays the administration of justice in the internal and the external affairs of the Utopians. The second section (199/36-217/5) deals with Utopian military affairs. The third section (217/6-237/36) explains how the theological beliefs and the religious practices of the Utopians insure the maintenance of justice in the commonwealth.

The first section (185/15-199/35) is probably the least well organized portion of the entire work. It seems that More as author does not have complete control of his materials. Hythlodæus, after talking briefly about Utopian slaves, successively reviews the Utopian attitudes toward illness and suicide, marriage and divorce, and fools and cripples. He talks then about officials, lawyers, and treaties. Closer analysis, however, reveals that each topic relates in one

way or another to the internal or external administration of justice.

More's difficulty in handling his materials in this section (185/15-199/35) seems to result from his attempt to show how the Utopians administer justice without numerous laws, without lawyers, and without alliances. For example, in describing the internal administration of justice, Hythlodæus shows how the Utopians act reasonably and naturally in their treatment of dependent members of the society (criminals, the infirm, women, fools, and cripples). Conversely, they punish those who act in a manner contrary to reason and nature. More does not, however, describe this natural and unnatural behavior in legalistic terminology, specifically because he attempts to show how retributive justice can be administered without a complex legal code.

Although the point cannot be insisted upon, it may be that More entitles this section "Slavery" because he means to indicate that the letter of the law enslaves and the spirit of the law frees man from his vices. There is an interesting parallel here with Socrates' opinions on law and medicine. Concluding the outline of the guardians' education, Socrates maintains that there is no "surer proof of an evil and shameful state of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those

who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men."¹ In this section (185/15-199/35) Hythlodæus describes why the Utopians are free from the necessity of physicians and lawyers.

Hythlodæus begins the discussion by indicating that the Utopians punish most crimes with slavery. He suggests, however, that slavery in Utopia is preferable to the ordinary life of the poor in other countries. It sometimes happens, for example, that "a hard-working and poverty-stricken drudge of another country voluntarily chooses slavery in Utopia."² The Utopians show their justice by treating foreign slaves better than their own countrymen who have been convicted of crimes. They reason that the criminal's conduct should be "regarded as all the more regrettable and deserving a more severe punishment as an object lesson because, having had an excellent rearing to a virtuous life, they still could not be restrained from crime."³

Although Hythlodæus gives slight attention to the matter of slavery in the opening passage (185/15-185/37) of this section (185/15-199/35), he returns to the subject again as he discusses the crimes against marriage and the family. Not only to commit adultery but also to tempt another

¹Rep. III 405 A (Shorey, I, 271).

²Utopia, p. 185/31-33.

³Utopia, p. 185/27-30.

to an impure act is punished by the strictest form of slavery. Since this crime attacks the basic social unit of the commonwealth, namely, the family, a person convicted of more than one offense is punished by death.

In meting out punishment for all other offenses, the Utopians take into account the nature of the crime. This practice contrasts with that in England, where the powerful and rich punish thieves and murderers alike by death.⁴ Moreover, the Utopians temper their justice with mercy. They have no motive of revenge in condemning slaves to hard labor, since they consider the slave's labor more useful than his death. Hythlodæus explains that they attempt to rehabilitate even the most hardened criminals in order that they may become useful members of society: "When tamed by long and hard punishment, if they show such repentance as testifies that they are more sorry for their sin than for their punishment, then sometimes by the prerogative of the governor and sometimes by the vote of the people their slavery is either lightened or remitted altogether."⁵ The Utopians thus exercise justice and mercy in their treatment of the lowliest members of society.

Socrates in the Republic does not discuss retributive justice as such, but he indicates that the punishment of equals

⁴Utopia, p. 75/5-6.

⁵Utopia, pp. 191/37-193/2.

and unequals alike is the sign of the corruption of a democracy.⁶
 He does not elaborate either on the treatment of slaves.

Apparently, however, in the republic some men are serfs by nature?⁷

Consistent with their humane treatment of slaves, the Utopians display the same reasonable attitude toward other dependent citizens, such as the sick and dying, women, fools, and cripples. In the short passage (185/38-187/26) following his introductory remarks on slavery (185/15-185/37), Hythlodæus shows how the Utopians behave reasonably and humanely toward the sick and the dying, who, even in their sickness and death, act for the common good. The Utopians give compassionate attention to all the sick, but they encourage the incurably ill to put an end to their misery by voluntary death. In this way the dying person will not be "a burden to himself, and a trouble to others."⁸ Thus, even in death, the Utopians think of their fellow citizens. In this regard the Utopians agree with Socrates "that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sick and doctor himself all his days."⁹

⁶Rep. VIII 558 A-C (Shorey, II, 289-91).

⁷Rep. VIII 547 B-C, 549 A (Shorey, II, 249, 255).

⁸Utopia, p. 187/7-8.

⁹Rep. III 406 C (Shorey, II, 275).

Furthermore, death comes under the jurisdiction of Utopian law. Although the Utopians consider voluntary death urged by the priests and officials as laudatory, they condemn unsanctioned suicide as a crime. Hythlodæus indicates the punishment for such an offense: "If anyone commits suicide without having obtained the approval of priests and senate, they deem him unworthy of either fire or earth and cast his body ignominiously into a marsh without proper burial."¹⁰

The discussion in this section (185/15-199/35) of the Utopian attitude toward the sick may appear to be partially redundant, since Hythlodæus has noted earlier how the sick "are lovingly cared for."¹¹ The former mention of the sick (139/33-141/11), however, relates to a different aspect of the theme. In the context where the earlier passage occurs, Hythlodæus is emphasizing the unity of the Utopian city by describing how efficiently and reasonably the Utopians distribute goods. He points out how the Utopians, before apportioning goods to the mess halls, first supply the four hospitals that lie outside the city.

From the subject of sickness and death, Hythlodæus moves on to discuss marital relationships. In this passage (187/27-193/8) he again seems to repeat a previously

¹⁰Utopia, p. 187/23-26.

¹¹Utopia, p. 185/38.

discussed topic. In the earlier passage (135/26-137/33), however, Hythlodæus explains how the family unit functions as the basic social unit. Here (187/27-193/8) he shows how the Utopian laws insure the stability of this fundamental institution.

The Utopians have strict regulations forbidding premarital sexual relationships because such offenses undermine the basic social unit of the commonwealth. Hythlodæus explains that "the reason why they punish this offense so severely is their foreknowledge that, unless persons are carefully restrained from promiscuous intercourse, few will contract the tie of marriage, in which a whole life must be spent with one companion and all the troubles incidental to it must be patiently borne."¹²

Because the Utopians take the marriage contract seriously, they have instituted a system of premarital inspection which insures that neither partner will have cause for complaint if his or her spouse should prove to have an otherwise hidden physical deformity. The Utopians reason that "if such a deformity arises by chance after the marriage has been contracted, each person must bear his own fate, but beforehand the laws ought to protect him from being entrapped by guile."¹³

¹²Utopia, p. 187/34-38.

¹³Utopia, p. 189/23-26.

Reasonable but strict laws regulate marriage and divorce. Hythlodæus explains that, although the laws allow for divorce, it is a rarity: "Matrimony there is seldom broken except by death, unless it be for adultery or for intolerable offensiveness of disposition."¹⁴ The Utopians consider adultery such a basic disruption of the commonwealth's foundation that its repetition is one of the few crimes punished by death.

Since marriages are arranged by the rulers in the republic, there is no reason to have premarital physical inspections. When exercising in their gymnastic training, however, the women of the guardians "must strip, since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment."¹⁵ Adultery in the republic is also considered a serious offense. Although Socrates does not mention the penalty for marital irregularities, he says that for the guardians "disorder and promiscuity in these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed thing in a happy state and the rulers will not suffer it."¹⁶

As the women guardians in the republic share equal privileges and responsibilities with the males, so also do Utopian women. The marriage and divorce laws in Utopia reveal just and humane treatment of women, who in other countries do

¹⁴Utopia, p. 189/29-31.

¹⁵Rep. V 457 A (Shorey, I, 451).

¹⁶Rep. V 458 E (Shorey, I, 459).

not share equal rights with men. Women are protected equally with men under the law and are punished equally for transgressions. A man, for example, cannot dismiss his wife because she has become old or deformed, once the marriage contract has been made. The Utopians "cannot endure the repudiation of an unwilling wife, who is in no way to blame, because some bodily calamity has befallen her."¹⁷

The Utopians also deal justly with other dependent members of society. They affix no penal servitude to the ill treatment of fools or cripples, but they consider it despicably unjust for one to be abusive to a man who is not responsible for his deformity of mind or body.

Besides strictly enforcing their few laws with just punishment as a deterrent to vice, the Utopians also reward virtue: "Not merely do they discourage crime by punishment but they offer honors to invite men to virtue."¹⁸

Passing from the consideration of Utopian retributive justice, Hythlodæus next describes the character of the men who administer the commonwealth and the attitude of the Utopians toward law and lawyers. The Utopians insure that self-seekers do not become administrators because "the man who solicits votes to obtain any office is deprived completely of

¹⁷Utopia, p. 189/34-36.

¹⁸Utopia, p. 193/29-31.

the hope of holding any office at all."¹⁹ The elected officials have few laws to administer because the island functions as one big family. Hence the officials "are called fathers and show that character."²⁰

The governor of Utopia, unlike Socrates' philosopher-king, is hardly distinguished from other citizens. He and the high priest symbolize the equality and the unity of the commonwealth by their ordinary garments and by the emblems they carry: "The governor himself is distinguished from citizens not by a robe or a crown but by the carrying of a handful of grain, just as the mark of the high priest is a wax candle borne before him."²¹ The emblems of the governor and of the high priest not only symbolize the unity of the Utopian people, but they also evoke a comparison with those objects which characterize the condition in Europe. Grain, indicating the peace and prosperity of the island, contrasts with the gallows and man-eating sheep, symbolizing the strife and destitution of the English people. The candle, emitting light, represents truth and reality, whereas gold symbolizes falseness and artificiality.

Because the Utopians have honest officials and

¹⁹Utopia, p. 193/37-39; cf. Rep. I 345 E-346 A (Shorey, I, 75).

²⁰Utopia, p. 195/1-2.

²¹Utopia, p. 195/4-7.

few laws, they, like Socrates, banish lawyers "who cleverly manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal point."²² Hythlodæus points out why other countries could not employ the simple and forthright legal procedures of the Utopians: "To secure these advantages in other countries is difficult, owing to the immense mass of extremely complicated laws. But with the Utopians each man is expert in law. First, they have, as I said, very few laws and, secondly, they regard the most obvious interpretation of the law as the most fair interpretation."²³

The spirit of Utopian justice as described in this section (185/15-199/35) differs in the most essential ways from that of the Europeans as portrayed in Book I. The reasonable and humane retributive justice in Utopia, which rehabilitates the criminal, makes a mockery of the strict punitive justice advocated by the lawyer at Cardinal Morton's. The picture of the Utopian citizens who honestly interpret their few laws parodies the portrait of the anonymous king's councilors, who behind a mask of justice resurrect old moth-eaten laws, promulgate new ones, and manipulate those in effect.

After delineating the internal administration of

²²Utopia, p. 195/16-17; cf. Rep. III 405 B-C (Shorey, I 271).

²³Utopia, p. 195/23-27; cf. Rep. IV 425 B (Shorey, I 335).

justice, Hythlodæus turns next to the foreign relations of the Utopians (197/1-199/35). Explaining that the excellence of the Utopian administration of justice has attracted neighboring countries to borrow officials from them, Hythlodæus suggests that justice in the state does not depend as much upon laws as upon the virtues of the administrators: "These two evils, favoritism and avarice, wherever they have settled in man's judgments, instantly destroy all justice, the strongest sinew of the commonwealth."²⁴

The identification of virtue in the rulers with justice in the state, of course, is one of the main points which supports the central theme of the entire work. As Jerome Busleyden observes, it is also a major point of likeness between the Utopia and the Republic. Referring to Utopia, he writes:

The latter has devoted its energies not so much to framing laws as to training the most qualified officials. It has not done so without reason, for otherwise, if we are to believe Plato, even the best laws would all be counted dead. After the likeness of such officials, the pattern of their virtue, the example of their conduct, and the picture of their justice, the whole setup and proper course of a perfect commonwealth should be modeled. Above all else, there should be a combination of wisdom in the administrators, bravery in the soldiers, temperance in individuals, and justice in all.²⁵

By exporting their rulers to other countries the Utopians reveal the healthy condition of their commonwealth.

²⁴ Utopia, p. 197/13-15.

²⁵ Utopia, p. 35/16-24.

They follow the reverse procedure from that evidenced by corrupt states. Socrates makes this point in the Republic: "Do you not think it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such qualities in yourself."²⁶

The Utopians maintain good foreign relations, but they put no trust in treaties and alliances. They feel that "the fellowship created by nature takes the place of a treaty, and that men are better and more firmly joined together by good will than by pacts, by spirit than by words."²⁷ This attitude is another evidence of the Utopians' opinion that legalism inhibits justice. They believe that a written treaty can be used as a pretext for violating the spirit of justice. Hence, within and between European nations, where treaties are customary, there arises a double standard of morality and of justice. Hythlodæus describes this double standard with a striking metaphor: "In consequence men think either that all justice is only a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the majesty of kings or that there are at least two forms of it: the one which goes on foot and creeps on the ground, fit only for the common sort and bound by many chains so that it can

²⁶ Rep. III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271).

²⁷ Utopia, p. 199/32-35.

never overstep its barriers; the other a virtue of kings, which, as it is more august than that of ordinary folk, is also far freer so that everything is permissible to it--except what it finds disagreeable."²⁸

Through the effective use of irony in this passage, More as author epitomizes the false notion of justice prevailing in Europe. Hythlodæus suggests here a picture of kings free to do what they will and of people bound to do as they are told--the notion of justice advanced by Thrasymachus in the Republic. Occurring in the context of the description of justice in Utopia, where the officials serve the people, this passage exemplifies More's technique of comparison and contrast which unifies the two books.

The discussion of the Utopian attitude toward treaties (197/18-199/38), as a preliminary to the description of "Military Affairs" (199/37-217/5), has a parallel in Book I in the council of the French king. Whereas the French make alliances in preparation for war, the Utopians eschew them to preserve the peace. This passage dealing with Utopian foreign relations (197/1-199/35), together with the following section describing Utopian military affairs (199/37-217/5), therefore, contrasts with the French council (87/26-91/31) in Book I in the same way that the passage on internal

²⁸Utopia, p. 199/10-17.

administration of justice (185/15-195/39) contrasts with the anonymous king's council (91/32-97/38).

This final segment (197/1-199/35) of Hythlodæus' description of the Utopian administration of justice serves as a transitional link to the next section (199/38-217/5), which deals with Utopian "Military Affairs." The discussion of treaties shows how, without treaties, the Utopians deal justly with their neighbors and prefer peace to war. Ironically, however, other nations who continually make treaties inevitably draw the Utopians into war.

The section dealing with Utopian military affairs (199/38-217/6) divides logically into three segments: the causes for war (199/38-203/35), the conduct of war (203/36-215/8), and the aftermath of war (215/9-217/5). Hythlodæus begins by explaining that the Utopians, by not going to war for slight and transient reasons, differ from other nations. Unlike the French as described in Book I, the Utopians consider war as inhuman: "War, as an activity fit only for beasts and yet practiced by no kind of beast so constantly as by man, they regard with utter loathing."²⁹ Other belligerent nations, however, force the Utopians to fight wars.

Besides the motive of self-defense, the Utopians fight primarily to free others from the yoke of oppression. Hythlodæus

²⁹Utopia, p. 199/38-39.

explains that only serious injustice perpetrated against their friends will provoke the Utopians to launch an offense: "They take the final step of war not only when a hostile inroad has carried off booty but also much more fiercely when the merchants among their friends undergo unjust persecution under the color of justice in any other country, either on the pretext of laws in themselves unjust or by the distortion of laws in themselves good."³⁰ Distortion of laws, then, a common practice in

Europe, chiefly excites the Utopians' sense of outrage.

Displaying the same attitude toward their adversaries as they show to criminals in their own country, the Utopians have no desire to perpetrate excessive punishment. Out of mercy, "they not only regret but blush at a victory that has cost much bloodshed";³¹ out of justice, "their one and only object in war is to secure that which, had it been obtained beforehand, would have prevented the declaration of war."³²

In the Republic little mention is made of the causes of war. Socrates, however, bases the entire education of the guardians on the assumption that his republic must inevitably fight wars with the barbarians. Thus both More and Plato are realistic in that they do not imagine their ideal states can

³⁰Utopia, p. 201/15-20.

³¹Utopia, p. 203/16-17.

³²Utopia, p. 203/27-30.

remain peaceful amidst nations that are hostile.

In the conduct of war, the Utopians take various measures to avoid the actual involvement of their own citizens in the hostilities. By bribing citizens of the enemy country, they attempt to kill the enemy king and others who foment the war. If this stratagem does not succeed, they sow seeds of dissension within the enemy country "by leading a brother of the king or one of the noblemen to hope that he may obtain the throne."³³ Should internal strife subside, they provoke it again by stirring up and involving the neighbors of their enemies. This they do "by reviving some forgotten claims to dominion such as kings have always at their disposal."³⁴ Finally, they hire Zapoletan mercenaries and employ "the forces of the people for whom they are fighting and then auxiliary squadrons of all their other friends."³⁵

The war stratagems of the Utopians may seem inconsistent with their behavior in other respects. After all, their tactics resemble the nefarious plottings of the French king and his councilors, which were condemned in Book I. The French, however, differ from the Utopians in their motives. The French foment dissension and hire mercenaries in order

³³Utopia, p. 205/34-35.

³⁴Utopia, p. 205/37-38.

³⁵Utopia, p. 209/16-17.

to conquer and oppress other peoples. In time of peace they prepare for war. As a result, mercenaries infest the country and create disorder among their own people. The Utopians use some of the same tactics, but they seek peace and justice, not strife and injustice. They never prepare for war during time of peace and never allow mercenaries on their soil.

Once their own citizens engage in hostilities, they are successful because of the justice in their commonwealth. Hythlodæus explains how the just order in their economy fosters courage in the warriors: "The absence of anxiety about livelihood at home, as well as the removal of that worry which troubles men about the future of their families (for such solicitude everywhere breaks the highest courage), makes their spirit exalted and disdainful of defeat."³⁶ He adds that "their good and sound opinions, in which they have been trained from childhood both by teaching and by the good institutions of their country, give them additional courage."³⁷ The Utopians, like the guardians of the republic, go to war accompanied by women and children. This practice is also thought to bolster the courage of the fighting force.³⁸

³⁶Utopia, p. 211/18-21.

³⁷Utopia, p. 211/23-25.

³⁸Utopia, p. 209/37-211/10; cf. Rep. V 455 D, 466 E (Shorey, I, 445, 485).

The training and good institutions in Utopia account not only for the courage of the Utopians but also for their military skill. Despite their superior brawn and fierceness, other men "are all inferior in cleverness and calculation."³⁹ Moreover, the discipline inculcated in their upbringing insures that the Utopians will not be beaten by disorder in their ranks or by impetuous behavior. For example, "they never pursue the fleeing enemy without keeping one division all the time drawn up ready for engagement under their banners."⁴⁰

With the victory assured, the Utopians show justice and mercy in the establishment of peace. They keep the truce "so religiously as not to break it even under provocation."⁴¹ Meting out punishment and rewards among the conquered people in accordance with a reasonable standard of justice, they punish by death "the men who prevented surrender and make slaves of the rest of the defenders."⁴² On the other hand, they reward those who urged surrender. They injure no noncombatant unless he is a spy.

The consideration of Utopian military affairs compares in some interesting ways with the corresponding segment in the

³⁹Utopia, p. 203/26-27.

⁴⁰Utopia, p. 213/2-3.

⁴¹Utopia, p. 215/10-11.

⁴²Utopia, p. 215/17-18.

Republic. Aside from the detailed points of comparison treated above, there are interesting similarities in the way the respective discussions relate to the respective themes of the two works. In the Utopia, the section on military affairs focuses More's attitude on war, which has been assumed in Hythlodæus' remarks on other subjects, e.g., the French council in Book I (87/26-91/31). War is shown to be a chief cause of injustice within nations as well as between nations. Although war for the Utopians is unnatural, it is inevitable even for them. They have an advantage over all other nations, however, because their just institutions, especially their educational system, prepare them to overcome the forces of unjust nations.

In a relatively brief segment (V 466 D-471 C) in the Republic, Socrates also focuses his attitude on war, which he has implied throughout the whole work. He bases the entire education of the guardians on the assumption that his republic must inevitably fight wars with the barbarians. His attitude toward war among Greek nations, however, is similar to that of the Utopians in their wars with other nations. Considering war as inimical to justice, Socrates maintains that the guardians should fight with other Greeks only in order to achieve justice and peace. After outlining the humane behavior that the guardians should display, he concludes: "And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy

the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent."⁴³ In both works, then, the discussion of war relates to the main theme of justice.

The last section (217/6-237/36) in Part II (185/15-237/36) appropriately concludes Hythlodæus' description of the three basic functions in which justice is manifested in the ideal state. Religion occupies the climactic final position after law and military affairs because the religious beliefs of the Utopians insure that justice will reign in the commonwealth.

Hythlodæus begins this section (217/6-237/36) with an explanation of the fundamental tenets of the Utopian theology. Most Utopians believe that "there is one supreme being, to whom are due both the creation and the providential government of the whole world."⁴⁴ Although the Utopians generally agree that a supreme being exists, various superstitions have arisen among them. Fortunately, however, they are gradually "beginning to depart from this medley of superstitions and are coming to unite in that one religion which seems to surpass the rest in reasonableness."⁴⁵

⁴³Rep. V 471 B (Shorey, I, 499-501).

⁴⁴Utopia, p. 217/19-21. The comparison of the Utopians' understanding of God with that which Socrates recommends for the education of the guardians is discussed in Chapter III, pp. 71-73.

⁴⁵Utopia, p. 217/26-29.

Hythlodæus compares the most reasonable of the Utopian religions to Christianity. In fact, he implies that the Utopians' common way of life comes closer to Christ's intention for His followers than the way practiced by the Europeans. Although the Utopians have not had benefit of Christianity, they are more reasonable than European Christians, a point Hythlodæus makes obliquely in an anecdote about one of his own company who "spoke publicly of Christ's religion with more zeal than discretion."⁴⁶ In condemning all those who did not share his opinion, this Christian contrasts with the reasonable Utopians, who tolerate people of all religions as long as they do not disturb the public peace. The Utopians would even have tolerated this zealot, except that he was "stirring up a riot among the people."⁴⁷ Religious toleration in Utopia, then, extends as far as the maintenance of order in the commonwealth will allow.

The Utopians' attitude stems from the wise laws originally set down by Utopus, who sanctioned religious freedom for the good of the state as well as for the benefit of religion itself. He realized that the religious turmoil that existed in Utopia before his arrival was the cause of disorder and disunity. Hythlodæus explains that "he had made the observation that the universal dissensions between the

⁴⁶ Utopia, p. 219/25-26.

⁴⁷ Utopia, p. 219/33.

individual sects who were fighting for their country had given him the opportunity of overcoming them all."⁴⁸

Utopus knew also that religious freedom is meaningless unless the laws and ordinances of the state are obeyed. He thought that such obedience could not be expected unless the citizens believed in the immortality of the soul and had the expectation of reward or punishment after death. Hythlodæus explains the reasoning of Utopus in the key passage in this section (217/6-237/36):

He conscientiously and strictly gave injunction that no one should fall so far below the dignity of human nature as to believe that souls likewise perish with the body or that the world is the mere sport of chance and not governed by any divine providence. After this life, accordingly, vices are ordained to be punished and virtue rewarded. Such is their belief, and if anyone thinks otherwise, they do not regard him even as a member of mankind, seeing that he has lowered the lofty nature of his soul to the level of a beast's miserable body--so far are they from classing him among their citizens whose laws and customs he would treat as worthless if it were not for fear. Who can doubt that he will strive either to evade by craft the public laws of his country or to break them by violence in order to serve his own private desires when he has nothing to fear but laws and no hope beyond the body?⁴⁹

In Utopia, then, the fundamental theological beliefs are considered requisites to the maintenance of justice in the state. In this respect More's concept of justice differs much from that of Plato. As was discussed earlier (Chapter V),

⁴⁸Utopia, pp. 219/38-221/2.

⁴⁹Utopia, pp. 221/29-223/3.

Socrates maintains that virtuous behavior will follow from the rational apprehension of the form of justice. Although he believes that virtue will be rewarded and vice punished in the afterlife, Socrates does not insist upon this belief as a necessary sanction for justice in the republic. In contrast, the Utopians "think reason insufficient and weak by itself for the investigation of true happiness."⁵⁰ Thus, both More and Plato place importance on reason and belief, but in More's work the theological tenets receive greater emphasis than in the Republic.

In the remainder of this section (217/6-237/36), Hythlodæus describes the religious services of the Utopians. Because Socrates does not place as great emphasis on religion as do the Utopians, he does not elaborate on the religious services and practices in the republic. He suggests that such matters are beyond his province as a philosopher: "The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to keep them gracious."⁵¹ Hythlodæus, however, shows how the religious practices of the Utopians move them to virtuous actions which bring about justice in the commonwealth.

⁵⁰Utopia, p. 161/36-37.

⁵¹Rep. IV 427 B-C (Shorey, I, 345).

While paying respect to the dead in their funeral rite, they hope to incite the living to virtue. They erect a pillar with an epitaph to the memory of the deceased and extol his deeds with laudatory speeches. They judge that this reverence for the dead is a "most efficacious means of stimulating the living to good deeds."⁵² In addition, the belief that departed souls walk among the living "keeps men from any secret dishonorable deed."⁵³

The belief in life hereafter has also induced a special class of holy men to perform exceptional good works for the well-being of the whole commonwealth. Hythlodæus explains that because these men, called Buthrescae, are determined to merit the happiness coming after death, they perform the menial and odious chores that most men avoid:

Some tend the sick. Others repair roads, clean out ditches, rebuild bridges, dig turf and sand and stone, fell and cut up trees, and transport wood, grain, and other things into the cities in carts. Not only for the public but also for private persons they behave as servants and as more than slaves.⁵⁴

The few holy priests exercise their office on behalf of the whole people, especially since they are elected by a popular vote. More than any other group, they shape the

⁵²Utopia, p. 225/4.

⁵³Utopia, p. 225/17.

⁵⁴Utopia, p. 225/31-35.

virtuous character of the people. They not only preside over religious services, but they also guard public morals and educate the youth. Considering virtuous training no less important than learning, "they take the greatest pains from the very first to instill into children's minds, while still tender and pliable, good opinions which are also useful for the preservation of their commonwealth."⁵⁵

Although the holy priests can effect tremendous good in the commonwealth, they can do no great harm. Few priests ever turn from virtue to wickedness, but if any should, Hythlodæus points out that the state is not greatly injured: "Even if it does happen, human nature being ever prone to change, yet since they are but few and are invested with no power except the influence of honor, it need not be feared that they will cause any great harm to the state."⁵⁶

The priests not only foster harmony within the commonwealth, but they also promote peace between the Utopians and their adversaries in time of war. In the midst of hostilities, they pray for peace and urge the abatement of bloodshed. Finally, they are instrumental in settling the peace on just terms.

All the manifestations of religion contribute to the

⁵⁵Utopia, p. 229/11-14.

⁵⁶Utopia, p. 233/9-10.

unity of the people and to the stable order of the commonwealth. Coming to the temples on feast days, they worship the divine nature as a community of believers. Because of their unified spirit, "nothing is seen or heard in the temples which does not seem to agree with all in common."⁵⁷

Utopian families make peace with one another before participating in the sacrifice and go to the temples together. "Fear of swift and great punishment" prompts a reconciliation of hearts and dissipates any enmity that exists among them.⁵⁸ They even assign places to the worshippers in the temples in order to instill virtue in the young people. Elders accompany the youth because, "if children were trusted to children, they might spend in childish foolery the time in which they ought to be conceiving a religious fear towards the gods, the greatest and almost the only stimulus to the practice of virtues."⁵⁹

Religious sacrifice, music, and prayer are conducted in accordance with reason and marked by piety and simplicity. At the services the people dress in white garments, and the priests wear inexpensive but artistically embroidered vestments. Even the latter's robes are designed to inculcate love of God and

⁵⁷ Utopia, p. 233/9-10.

⁵⁸ Utopia, p. 233/35-36.

⁵⁹ Utopia, p. 235/5-8.

civic responsibility. Through an interpretation of the pattern on his vestments of feathers, the priests reminds the people "of their own piety toward God and their duty toward one another."⁶⁰

Hythlodæus concludes his description of the Utopian religions with an image of the people and the priest in a great common prayer of thanksgiving and petition. The priest, leading the prayer, recognizes God as creator and governor of all things and thanks Him "for all the benefits received, particularly that by the divine favor he has chanced on that commonwealth which is the happiest and has received that religion which he hopes to be the truest."⁶¹ The celebrant ends the prayer with a petition to God for union with Him in life everlasting.

In the final section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185/15-237/86), then, the sanction for justice in the commonwealth is strongly affirmed. The Utopians hold that justice in the state cannot be achieved unless all the citizens adhere to the basic tenets of religion. Utopia functions as a stable and well-ordered commonwealth principally because a perfect harmony exists between church and state.

In the Republic Socrates also discusses the belief in rewards and punishment after death in the concluding pages

⁶⁰ Utopia, p. 235/29-30.

⁶¹ Utopia, p. 237/14-17.

of the final book. As has been indicated above, however, Socrates' account of the myth of Er is an epilogue that does not contain in it the primary sanction for justice. Socrates gives evidence of belief in retributive justice in the afterlife, but he predicates the establishment of justice in the republic on the theory that man will act virtuously without external inducements if he comes to understand the form of justice. Nonetheless, Socrates' final remarks in the Republic indicate the expectation of immortality. He explains that if we believe in the immortality of the soul and act righteously, "both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well."⁶² Thus Socrates concludes the Republic with the same thoughts of the afterlife as those expressed by the Utopian priest at the conclusion of Hythlodæus' description of Utopia.

After his account of the Utopian religions, Hythlodæus summarizes in his peroration the theme of the two books of the entire work. The peroration (237/37-245/16), together with the persona More's concluding remarks (245/17-247/3), constitutes the final part (237/37-247/3) of Book II. In summarizing the theme of the two books, Hythlodæus compares the injustice in Europe to the justice in Utopia and concludes that the Utopian commonwealth is far preferable. In the first three paragraphs

⁶²Rep. X 621 D (Shorey, II, 521).

(237/37-239/25) of the peroration, Hythlodæus emphasizes the difference between Utopia and other countries in regard to the well-being of all the citizens. In Utopia the public and the private welfare are synonymous. In contrast, outside Utopia each man seeks his own welfare, a situation which militates against the common good. In Utopia, where no one owns property, everyone shares the wealth. Thus, there is peace and security among all the citizens.

In the next three paragraphs (239/26-241/35) Hythlodæus reviews the unjust conditions in Europe which he had described in detail in Book I. Beginning this review, he emphasizes how the situation in Utopia differs from that which is thought to be just in other countries: "At this point I should like anyone to be so bold as to compare this fairness with the so-called justice prevalent in other nations, among which, upon my soul, I cannot discover the slightest trace of justice and fairness."⁶³ He asks, "What brand of justice is it" that the rich and idle attain luxury and grandeur, and the poor common laborers who perform the essential work "earn such scanty fare and lead such a miserable life that the condition of beasts of burden might seem far preferable"?⁶⁴

He proceeds to show that the parasitic nature of the

⁶³Utopia, p. 239/26-29.

⁶⁴Utopia, p. 239/29-39.

economic system aggravates the condition of injustice. Not only do the rich perform no useful work, but they also extort money from the poor. This injustice is made more galling, because the rich pervert the laws to perpetuate their injustices. Hythlodæus maintains that even before the practice of distorting the public laws became prevalent, "it seemed unjust that persons deserving best of the commonwealth should have the worst return. Now they have further distorted and debased the right and, finally, by making laws, have palmed it off as justice."⁶⁵

After reviewing the situation in Europe, Hythlodæus explains that the Utopians have achieved justice by eliminating the material cause of injustice (241/36-243/10). He exclaims that with the elimination of money "what a mass of troubles was then cut away! What a crop of crimes was then pulled up by the roots!"⁶⁶ The elimination of money in other countries, he maintains, would result in plenty for all and security for the rich as well as the poor. To reinforce his argument, he points out the irony of the unjust system of private property: the rich are enslaved as much as the poor: "Even the rich, I doubt not, feel that it would be a much better state of affairs to lack no necessity than to have abundance of

⁶⁵Utopia, p. 241/21-24.

⁶⁶Utopia, p. 243/1-2.

superfluities--to be snatched from such numerous troubles rather than to be hemmed in by great riches."⁶⁷

With the contrast between injustice and justice completely drawn, Hythlodæus points to the chief reason why the whole world has not adopted the form of a commonwealth established by the Utopians. He proclaims passionately that pride is the principal cause of all the injustices in the world. Pride, like a serpent from hell, "entwines itself around the hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in preventing and hindering them from entering on a better way of life."⁶⁸ In his final remarks Hythlodæus explains that, because the Utopians are free from pride, they have attained a stability and order in their commonwealth which cannot be disrupted by either internal discord or foreign invasion.

Thus, Hythlodæus' peroration ties together the theme of injustice in Book I with the theme of justice in Book II. One can hardly escape the conclusion that justice is to be preferred to injustice. Ironically, however, in his concluding remarks, the persona More remains unconvinced about the means advocated by Hythlodæus. His realistic and essentially pathetic reaction is perhaps the only one possible for a man who must go on living in the unjust condition of European

⁶⁷Utopia, p. 243/22-25.

⁶⁸Utopia, pp. 243/39-245/2.

affairs: "I cannot agree with all that he said. But I readily admit that there are very many features in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for me to wish for in our countries than to have any hope of seeing realized."⁶⁹

Thus, when the contrasting themes of injustice in Book I and justice in Book II are discerned, the relationship between the structures of the Republic and the Utopia becomes evident. The Republic, like the Utopia, reveals through a contrast of the best and the worst examples of the body politic that justice is to be preferred over injustice. Although the individual parts of the structures of the two works are arranged differently, each part in the Republic and in the Utopia is unified to the whole by the central theme of justice.

⁶⁹ Utopia, pp. 245/39-247/3.

CHAPTER XIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This thesis has been undertaken to understand better the subject matter and the form of the Utopia. To add another full-length study to the already voluminous criticism of More's work might seem superfluous. If my objective has been accomplished, however, the study is justified, because it treats significant questions about the Utopia which have remained hitherto unanswered. The great variety of critical articles and books dealing with diverse aspects of the Utopia indicates a general disagreement as to its main theme. A common assumption underlying much of this criticism is that the work is not a unified whole but that two distinct and different themes run through its two books, namely, councilorship in Book I and communism in Book II.

Besides the many conflicting interpretations of the work itself, there is general disagreement about Plato's influence on the form and content of the Utopia. Some critics note that More has borrowed numberless details from the Platonic dialogues. Others, however, minimize Plato's influence. Although a few have recognized a general similarity between the themes and the structures of the two works, no full-length analysis of their formal relationship has been made.

The foregoing study grew out of the conviction that the

theme of justice unified the structure of the Utopia. It appeared, moreover, that the relationship of theme to structure in the Utopia was analogous to the corresponding relationship in the Republic. This basic assumption was supported by the opinions of More and his contemporaries. In contrast with many modern critics, they placed great emphasis on the theme of justice in the Utopia and identified More's work very closely with that of Plato. A general conviction, then, supported by More's contemporaries, led to this analysis that has attempted to ascertain the extent and limit to which More had used the Republic as a model for the Utopia.

The method chosen for this thesis has been to analyze inductively the structure of each work in order to discern the formal relationship between theme and structure in the two works. This procedure has necessarily presented difficulties which might not have occurred had the subject been approached deductively. Perhaps some repetition and some elaboration of details might have been eliminated had evidence from each text been selected primarily to support the initial assumption. The inductive method, however, has achieved better the objective of showing not only the similarities between the two works but also the differences.

This inductive approach has revealed indeed that More follows the basic plan of the Republic but that he changes and rearranges the details of Plato's work to suit his own

purpose. More, like Plato, argues for the superiority of justice over injustice by describing an ideal state where justice reigns and by contrasting it with a corrupt state which epitomizes injustice. More, however, writes with a tone and style different from those of Plato. Because he intends more overtly to delight as well as to teach, he reveals the theme and the structure in the Utopia less obviously than Plato does in the Republic.

Furthermore, More's didactic intention is more specific than that of Plato. His aim to reform specific current abuses in Europe, such as enclosure and war, determines to some extent the inclusion of and the emphasis on certain details in the various parts of the structure of the work. On the other hand, Plato writes with a more universal intention. He obviously draws upon experience and observation in his own and other societies and criticizes popular notions relating to justice, but he appears rarely to allow a particular contemporary abuse to determine details in the description of his ideal state.

In portraying the ideal state, More assumes meanings of justice and injustice similar to those of Plato. In Utopia, as in the republic, justice originates in the needs of mankind and manifests itself in order and unity in society. In both states the citizens cooperate mutually in establishing laws and institutions toward those two primary ends.

More differs from Plato, however, in his conception of how order and unity may be achieved. Most fundamentally, the difference concerns the functioning of the parts of the state and those of the soul of man. In Plato's republic three distinct classes, each assigned a specific responsibility, work together to produce order and unity in the body politic. Socrates' division of the state into three distinct classes stems from the theory that a man performs best when he has only one function. Hence, justice results when the rulers, guardians, and workers each do the task for which they are most suited.

In Utopia order and unity are achieved by minimizing the distinctions between classes. Each man performs more than one function, and every man has the opportunity to advance to the ruling class. Order and unity are attained when each and every citizen is concerned with the function of the whole commonwealth instead of attending only to a single narrow task.

Despite their differences as to the proper activity of the individual citizen, both More and Plato have a similar concept of the nature of man. Justice in a man's soul, like justice in the state, results from a proper relationship among the soul's parts. When the rational element, with the aid of the spirit, rules over the appetites, man's soul achieves order and unity.

Because More and Plato differ in some respects on

what contributes to order and unity in the state, they must also diverge on the causes of disorder and disunity. In the Republic injustice results from the blurring of distinctions between classes. In the Utopia, on the other hand, More indicates a reverse process of corruption. Disorder and disunity occur when artificial distinctions arise among classes. In both works, however, a tyranny constitutes the most unjust state because in it the worst element rules the best. Likewise, in the soul of man, the worst corruption comes about when man inverts the proper order in his nature and allows the appetites to rule the reason.

Plato, however, places greater emphasis on the power of man's reason to achieve justice in his own soul and consequently in the state. He therefore theorizes that man, if he really comprehends and appreciates the nature of justice, will act justly. This position repudiates the deterministic philosophy which insists that justice must be imposed on the state by external coercion.

More also emphasizes reason, but he does not assume that man will act virtuously simply by understanding the form of true justice. In the Utopia the sanction for justice involves the belief in God and the expectation of either reward or punishment after death. Plato also indicates that man will be rewarded or punished in the afterlife for his behavior here on earth, but he does not make this expectation

the vital sanction for justice in the ideal state. In Plato's republic, where philosophers are kings, justice is made manifest without the necessity of belief in the hereafter.

Neither in the Utopia nor in the Republic, however, does the demonstration of the advantage of justice over injustice depend upon the expectation of immortality. In both works justice is shown to be its own reward and injustice its own punishment. In the republic and in Utopia the happiness of all the citizens results from the proper functioning of the whole state. Conversely, a tyranny, because of its injustice, is the most unhappy state for rulers as well as for subjects.

These basic similarities and differences in the subject matter of the two works are reflected in the development of the themes and in the arrangement of the parts. The general structural plan of the Utopia exhibits More's objective: a demonstration of the advantages of justice over injustice. In Book I he exposes the causes and the results of injustice in preparation for his portrayal of justice in Book II. This plan follows Plato's model in a general way, as will be made clear at once.

In Book I of the Utopia Hythlodæus discredits the notion that justice is the advantage of the stronger. He shows in the first half of this book that those who use the laws and institutions of England to satisfy their own lust for money, prestige, and power have caused a general condition of

poverty, crime, debauchery, and war in the commonwealth. In the second half of this first book he describes how kings and councilors bring about this same result by distorting the nation's laws and by manipulating international treaties and alliances. Hythlodæus' concept of justice answers to that of Socrates, and the concept which Hythlodæus attacks corresponds to that of Thrasymachus, in Book I of the Republic.

Although less detailed in its discussion of the abstract theory of justice that Book I of the Republic, the first book of the Utopia presents a broader picture of the causes and results of injustice. To compensate for the ideas found in the first book of the Republic but omitted in his own first book, More draws additional subject matter from Books VIII and IX of the Republic. Describing injustice in England and throughout Europe, Hythlodæus gives various specific examples of contemporary injustice that correspond to Plato's explanation of the stages in the disintegration of the ideal state. England as described in the first half of Book I, and the nations ruled by the French and anonymous kings in the second half, show the same symptoms of injustice that Plato asserts are characteristic of oligarchic and timocratic states. The total picture of corruption in Europe conforms to Plato's description of the debased condition of a tyranny.

At the conclusion of Book I More inserts an exordium which pinpoints the difference between injustice in Europe and

justice in Utopia. The position of the exordium--at the conclusion of the picture of injustice--corresponds to the place of the exordium in the Republic. Plato's exordium is found early in his second book, that is, after he has rejected the popular false notion of justice (in Book I) and before he begins to delineate the ideal state (in the rest of Book II).

In both works the description of the ideal state follows in response to skeptical remarks made by other participants in the dialogue. Thus both the place and the function of the description of Utopia in More's work correspond in a general way to the place and the function of the picture of the ideal state in the Republic.

The ideal states in the two works, though different in details and in arrangement of materials, are made alike by the unifying theme of justice. Although More does not organize the parts of his structure in exactly the same order as does Plato, he inserts in each section in Book II of the Utopia one or more of Plato's key concepts, adapted and changed to conform to his plan for the achievement of order and unity in the state.

In Part I (111/7-185/14) of Book II, Hythlodæus describes the geopolitical, socioeconomic, and educational and philosophical foundations of the just state. In aiming at the happiness of all the citizens, the Utopians have shaped their laws and institutions to insure that order and unity

prevail in the commonwealth. In the first section (111/7-135/24) More in a broad sense adapts Plato's concept of the elemental society that Socrates explains at the beginning of his remarks on the origin of the city (II 369 B-372 E). Socrates maintains that men can live in peace and harmony in a city which has only the necessities of life. The introduction of luxuries, however, brings war and other activities which result in a fevered state.

At the beginning of the description of Utopia, More develops this concept of the elemental city by adding variety and details without introducing the superfluties that Socrates says are characteristic of a fevered state. Because Hythlodæus purports to describe an actually existing commonwealth, he mentions geographical features and physical characteristics which would be irrelevant in Socrates' hypothetical republic. The geopolitical foundations of Utopia, however, conform to Plato's requisite for the establishment of justice. In Utopia, as in Socrates' elemental city, the needs of the society prompt the citizens to develop only the basic crafts and to work together to establish institutions that produce order and stability.

In the next section (135/25-159/2) More shows how the Utopians achieve Plato's desideratum of a unified family state. In contrast to Plato, who finds it necessary to realign traditional family relationships, More establishes the family

as the basic socioeconomic unit. Instead of regulating the number of marriages, which Socrates suggests as a means of controlling population, the Utopians avoid over population through the emigration of families to colonies found in sparsely inhabited lands nearby. All Utopians live together as one large family because they neither own nor desire to own private property, the source of greed and friction in other states. With this complete abolition of private property More alters Plato's concept of a restrictive communism that applies only to the guardian class.

In the final section (159/3-185/14) More adapts and changes Plato's system of education and philosophy. The Utopians study the same subjects as the guardians in Socrates' republic but they deviate from his insistence on a theoretical and speculative approach. Not only do they search for truth but they also study practical subjects for the material betterment of the whole commonwealth.

Similarly, in philosophy the Utopians emphasize moral behavior as the requisite for justice in the state, whereas Socrates stresses dialectic and metaphysics. Socrates maintains that if the rational faculty is sufficiently developed to apprehend the forms of goodness and justice, virtuous action will follow. Although the Utopians consider the contemplation of truth as the appropriate aim of philosophical inquiry, they hold that reason by itself, without the aid of religion, is

unable to apprehend the supreme good. Despite this difference, the underlying philosophy in both states is similar: virtue is its own reward and vice its own punishment.

The section (159/3-185/14) containing the discussion of Utopian philosophy occupies the important final position in Part I (111/7-185/14). Here Hythlodæus explains the Utopians' opinion that pleasure properly understood will bring justice and therefore happiness to the entire commonwealth. Socrates' discussion of philosophy, which occupies a central position in the Republic (Book VI), describes how the apprehension of the form of the good by the philosopher-king insures that justice will prevail in the ideal state.

In Part II (185/15-237/36) of Book II, More borrows and changes key ideas on law, medicine, military affairs, and religion in the Republic. In the first section (185/15-199/35) he adopts Socrates' idea that a just state is characterized by the sound body and mind of its citizens. Socrates maintains that it is a shameful state which tolerates petty laws, lawyers arguing subtle points, and physicians treating long illnesses brought on by debauchery. The Utopians live in a just commonwealth with few laws and no lawyers. They are healthy and robust so that the service of physicians is not required. Even those who chance to become mortally ill are not encouraged to live beyond the period of usefulness to their fellow citizens.

In the next section (199/38-217/6) More shows how the

Utopians' institutions and education insure their prudence in avoiding war, their courage in fighting, and their justice in establishing peace. In like manner, all the institutions in Plato's republic, particularly the educational system, inculcate these virtues in the guardians. But in contrast to the republic, where only the military class manifests these virtues in war, in Utopia all the citizens engage in military affairs. Even ordinary Utopian women, like women guardians in Plato's republic, accompany their men into battle.

The last section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185/15-237/36) appropriately concludes Hythlodæus' description of the basic ways in which justice is manifested in the ideal state. Religion occupies the climactic final position because the religious beliefs of the Utopians insure that justice will reign in the commonwealth. More puts greater emphasis on religion in the Utopia than Plato does in the Republic because the basic beliefs of the Utopians are the sinews that hold the commonwealth together. For example, the Utopians hold that no man will act justly unless he believes at least in the existence of God and in reward or punishment after death.

Because More lays great stress on the need for religion in the maintenance of justice in the commonwealth, he devotes considerably more discussion to it than Plato. Utopia, in a sense, is a theocratic democracy. Herein it differs from Plato's military and philosophical aristocracy. Despite the

difference in emphasis on religion, however, the descriptions of both ideal states conclude with thoughts of immortality.

From the evidence advanced in the foregoing chapters, our conclusion is that More has used the Republic as a model for the theme and structure of the Utopia. His intention is basically the same, and he merely borrows and arranges details in a different order. He shows that justice is more advantageous than injustice by contrasting the best with the worst examples of the body politic. After perceiving fully the formal relationship between these two works, we can see that both the Republic and the Utopia reveal order and unity among all their parts. Thus More and Plato achieve justice in their works--both in subject matter and in form.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ames, Russell. Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.
- Aristotle. Politics in The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941.
- Baker, Herschel. The Dignity of Man: Studies in the Persistence of an Idea. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947.
- . The Wars of Truth: Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Beger, Lina. "Thomas Morus und Plato: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Humanismus," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Tübingen, XXXV (1879), 187-216, 405-83.
- Berger, Harry, Jr. "The Renaissance Imagination: Second World and Green World," Centennial Review, IX (1965), 36-78.
- Bevington, David. "Dialogue in Utopia: Two Sides to the Question," Studies in Philology, LVIII (July, 1961), 496-509.
- Campbell, Lewis. "On the Structure of Plato's Republic and Its Relation to Other Dialogues," in Plato's Republic, Vol. II. Edited by B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Campbell, W. E. More's Utopia and His Social Teaching. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1930.
- Castiglione, Baldesar. The Book of the Courtier. Translated by Charles S. Singleton. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959.
- Chambers, R. W. Thomas More. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962.
- Duhamel, P. Albert. "Medievalism of More's Utopia," Studies in Philology, LII (1955), 99-126.
- Erasmus, Desiderius. The Epistles of Erasmus, Vol. III. Translated by F. M. Nichols. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1904.

- Heiserman, A. R. "Satire in Utopia," Publications of the Modern Language Association, LXXVII (June, 1963), 163-79.
- Hexter, J. H. More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952.
- Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950.
- Hollis, Christopher. St. Thomas More. London: Burns and Oates, 1961.
- Kautsky, Karl. Thomas More and His Utopia (1899). Translated by J. H. Stenning. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1927.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others, Vol. I. Translated by Allan Gilbert. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965.
- McIlwain, C. H. The Growth of Political Thought in the West: From the Greeks to the End of the Middle Ages. New York: Macmillan Co., 1932.
- More, Sir Thomas. The History of King Richard III. Edited by Richard S. Sylvester. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963. Vol. II of The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More. 14 vols. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963--.
- _____. The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More. Translated and edited by L. Bradner and C. A. Lynch. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953.
- _____. Utopia. Edited by Edward Surtz, S.J., and J. H. Hexter. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965. Vol. IV of The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More. 14 vols. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963--.
- Morgan, Arthur E. Nowhere was Somewhere: How History Makes Utopias and How Utopias Make History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946.
- Nettleship, R. L. Lectures on the Republic. Edited by Lord Charnwood. London: Macmillan and Co., 1925.
- Pieper, Josef. Scholasticism. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1960.

Plato. The Republic. Translated by Paul Shorey. Edited by T. E. Page. 2 vols. Revised edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1963.

Surtz, Edward L., S.J. The Praise of Pleasure: Philosophy, Education, and Communism in More's Utopia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

. The Praise of Wisdom: A Commentary on the Religious and Moral Problems and Backgrounds of St. Thomas More's Utopia. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1957.

. "Interpretations of Utopia," Catholic Historical Review, XXXVIII (1952), 156-74.

. "St. Thomas More and His Utopian Embassy of 1515," Catholic Historical Review, XXXIX (1953), 272-97.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Edward August Quattrocki has been read and approved by members of the Department of English.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 29, 1967
Date

Edward Surtz
Signature of Adviser