



1976

Dispersal and Confinement: Strategies of Gerrymandering in Chicago

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Recommended Citation

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DISPERSAL AND CONFINEMENT:
STRATEGIES OF GERRYMANDERING IN CHICAGO

by
Charles R. Catania

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

June
1976

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Services rendered by Dr. David Protesse as director and advisor as well as Drs. Corey Venning and Thomas Bennett are greatly appreciated. Their aid in the compilation and sorting of data and encouragement were of major import to the completion of this thesis.

Special mention must be made of the assistance rendered by Mary T. O'Brien in the final editing and Rose Marie Kinner in the typing of this manuscript.

Aldermen Dick Simpson, Leon Despres and especially William Cousins were invaluable in the research aspects of this thesis.

The technical assistance provided by David Lowery was instrumental in compiling the final draft.

PREFACE

Problem identification and solving in the realm of political conflict requires that each actor respond by using his or her own prescribed set of values. There are legal requirements that determine, to a degree, the extent to which these values may be implemented. These requirements may be general in their scope or particular in their application to a given circumstance. Such a specific application may be noted in the case of the laws dealing with elections in the state of Illinois.

In Illinois, if you are a citizen; if you meet age and residency requirements; if you are registered; if you are in the vicinity of your precinct polling place on election day; you may vote in a primary and/or general election.¹ On the presumption that a major goal of a political party is to elect its members to public office,² one would be safe in assuming that it would be to the advantage of the political parties in the state to ensure the fulfillment of all of these "ifs."

Over the years, students of politics have developed numerous ways to measure attempts to fulfill these requisities. Eligibility and registration statistics and voting indices are available and they can be

¹State of Illinois Election Laws, October 22, 1973, Sections: 3-1; 7-43

²Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957)

evaluated by both simple and elaborate techniques. The analysis of this type of data has spawned questions which have been dealt with, to some degree of satisfaction, by political analysts (i.e., voting patterns in terms of education levels, SES, race, religion, and ethnic background). To my knowledge, there has been no effort to evaluate the apparently deliberate attempt to fragment a specific element of a definable urban community and thus prevent it from developing a cohesive voting bloc that could presumably rival the existing power structure. At its base, this would appear to be the nature of the study at hand. But what I intend to review involves deeper questions; questions of legality and misuse of public trust as a result of the phenomenon known as "gerrymandering."

The immediate concern of this study is political power in relation to electoral representation of the Spanish-speaking and black minorities in Chicago. The approach involves a consideration of the redistricting ordinance that was adopted by the Chicago City Council on November 5th, 1973,³ and what effect this ordinance had on the wards' populations and subsequently the nature of the electorate.

The consequences of a political action that affect the individuals in a given community in reference to their elected officials may be viewed from two distinct perspectives. The action may be examined in terms of the effect on the individual ward (in relation to the potential for democratic elections), and also may be examined in reference to the effect on the city as a whole (given that the individual ward is part of

³Chicago Municipal Code, Section: 4, pars. 12-64

the governing structure of the city). While the city is certainly more than the sum of the fifty wards, it must be noted that within the governing structure, each individual ward has a function to serve insofar as it is as equally represented by an alderman as any and all of the remaining wards. In this sense, any ward that is gerrymandered affects the equality of representation on the entire City Council.

Obviously, any connection between a single gerrymandered ward and the assumption that the city as a whole has suffered from undemocratic practices would be a tenuous one at best. For that matter, two, three, or even five wards would not necessarily prove a correlation. However, in the event that the effect of a single incidence of gerrymandering did indeed affect the surrounding wards adversely, one could begin to establish a correlation. Furthermore, if this relationship between the gerrymandered ward and its surrounding wards were to affect the nature of the leadership in the city (by increasing the opportunity for an individual or party to win the election), a possible conclusion might be that the ability to gerrymander may have great influence on the continued election of certain members of the existing power structure.

In the text of this analysis I will establish that certain wards were gerrymandered. I will further establish the relationship between this action and those who control the apparatus for redistricting. While the intentions of those actors involved in the gerrymandering can only be imputed, the function served by the action itself can be examined.

Whether or not a correlation between gerrymandering and the continued existence of the machine can be established is perhaps best left

to history, but for the moment the objective is to replace as many of these "ifs" as possible with actual data. There would appear to be five major concerns that should be approached in order to accomplish this: First, the problem must be defined along with its ramifications. Second, gerrymandering will be placed in its historical perspective. From this point, the third approach will be a study of gerrymandering in its political context, that is, Chicago. Fourth, the consequences of the action of gerrymandering and their relationship with the political power structure in Chicago will be explicated. The fifth and final step will be to draw any possible conclusions from the establishment of this relationship.

VITA

The author, Charles R. Catania, is the son of Francis P. Catania and Rose F. (Vizza) Catania. He was born January 9, 1951, in Chicago, Illinois.

His elementary education was obtained in the catholic schools of Chicago, Illinois, and secondary education at St. Laurence High School, Oak Lawn, Illinois, where he was graduated in 1969.

In September, 1969, he entered Loyola University of Chicago and in June, 1973, received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in Political Science. He was elected a member of Alpha Sigma Nu in 1973.

In September, 1973, he was granted an assistantship in Political Science at Loyola University of Chicago. In June, 1976, he was awarded the Master of Arts in Political Science.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
PREFACE	iii
VITA	vii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	x
CHAPTER	
I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	1
II. STRATEGIES OF GERRYMANDERING	10
III. THE POLITICAL SETTING OF CHICAGO	19
IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	31
V. GERRYMANDERING IN CHICAGO: AN OVERVIEW	42
VI. THE 31ST WARD: A CASE STUDY	63
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF A GERRYMANDER	80
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	95
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	100
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF APPORTIONMENT CASES - 1961-72	102

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Intersection of Elective Party and Governmental Positions in Chicago	23
2. Population Changes as Noted by Census Data	48

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure		Page
1.	The Original Gerrymander: A Legislative District in Essex County, Massachusetts	13
2.	Artist's Conception of Growth of Gerrymandering	37
3.	7th, 14th, 19th and 31st Ward Boundaries: September 28th, 1961	55
4.	7th, 14th, 19th and 31st Ward Boundaries: November 5th, 1970	56
5.	Intersection of Ward Boundaries: 1961 and 1970	57
6.	Major Concentrations of Spanish-speaking: 1960 and 1970	67

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Urban analysis may at times become a tedious endeavor unless one is able to define its parameters. Because this analysis involves a definite political structure as well as what may prove to be the result of informal policy, both the structure (the Democratic Party and its relationship with Chicago city government) and the policy (gerrymandering) must be defined and placed within the context of the question at hand. That is to say, when examining gerrymandering in Chicago, the role of political "machine" and governmental development in the city as well as any prior history of gerrymandering become essential to defining the parameters of the struggle between the machine and the rights of the minority.

Attempting to identify all the actors in this conflict, at least individually, would have questionable value. Despite the understanding that the "machine" in Chicago is not entirely monolithic--that it is comprised of several interests which play a definite role in this struggle--it becomes necessary to refer to the Democratic Party as an approximation of a single entity. Edward C. Banfield gives reason to this in his description of the "machine" in Chicago and its "boss:"

...(a machine is a party of a particular kind; one which relies characteristically upon attraction of material rewards rather than enthusiasm for political principles)... As party 'boss', the mayor plays the principle part in making up the 'ticket'. One who defies

his control may be 'dumped' at the next primary, and one who is loyal to him may be chosen for rapid advancement. In addition, he has a vast amount of patronage at his disposal; he can give or withhold the hundreds of jobs without which most ward committeemen could not maintain their positions. Without being dishonest himself, he can regulate the 'take' of those who profit from their connection with politics. Having control of the police force, he can decide how rigorously laws are to be enforced.¹

In more precise terms, "machine" refers to that political party with a virtual monopoly over political resources which distributes tangible incentives in exchange for votes.² It is bureaucratic in structure with a clearly defined hierarchy. Like any other bureaucracy, self-maintenance is very high on its list of priorities.³ Yet, despite strong resistance from regular party "bosses," the twentieth century in the United States has been marked by an end to the one-party rule of its big cities (City of Chicago excepted).

The question of governmental development in terms of the demise of the machine and the rise of reform has been well studied from the social science perspective. There have been four major theories concerning governmental development in urban America. The "conventional wisdom" of the field, which may be described as Assimilation Theory, includes the writings of Edward Banfield⁴ and Robert Dahl.⁵ They trace

¹Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961) p. 237

²Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Random House, 1966) p. 115

³Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1962) p. 189

⁴Banfield, Political Influence p. 237

⁵Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961)

governmental development in terms of demographic changes that dialectically lead to the destruction of the machine.

When Robert Dahl did his study of New Haven, it was viewed by many in the academic community as an accurate study of democracy and power in an American city. It was hailed by many as a "classic" study of pluralist theory of local power structure.

The study expresses the view that governmental development is a function of demographic changes. That is to say, the changes in the social composition of the electorate (e.g. SES, education, ethnicity) produce a measurable change in the nature of government. "Accompanying and probably causing this (demographic) change...appears to be a profound alteration in the way political resources are distributed..."⁶ Dahl goes on to say that the main evidence "...for the shift from oligarchy to pluralism is found in changes in the social characteristics of elected officials..."⁷

For Banfield,⁸ increasing wealth, upward mobility, and the loss of ethnic identification with machine candidates are the keys to the eventual destruction of the machine in Chicago. These factors were to precipitate a "good government" consciousness that would lead the machine to reform itself, or the voters to eventually "vote the rascals out." Coupled with the movement towards the suburbs, only a small electorate was

⁶Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961) p. 11

⁷Ibid.

⁸Banfield, Political Influence (See especially Chapter VIII for ensuing argument.)

to be left in the inner city machine heartland, causing a loss of the machine's voter base. And yet, nearly fifteen years after Banfield's study, on November 5, 1974 and again on February 25, 1975, the candidates slated by Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Democratic machine won overwhelming victories.

While this cursory recounting of the main elements of Assimilation Theory (or for that matter any of the other theories that are to follow) does not begin to do it justice, the main intention here is to acknowledge the existence of these theories and to suggest an alternative theory that may well explain a significant portion of the success of the machine in Chicago.

The second theory that seeks to explain why reform occurs can best be labeled the "muckraker theory." Held most widely by political journalists (in Chicago, Mike Royko of the Chicago Daily News is a prime example⁹), the process involves a "picking off" of the top leadership of the machine through investigation of their activities. Often times the process involves the combined efforts of a journalist and a civic-minded organization (such as the Better Government Association in Chicago).

Through investigative reporting, a journalist can uncover questionable activities on the part of the leaders of the machine. If sufficient incriminating evidence is found, national, state or county prosecutorial staffs may investigate through a grand jury indictment. Once the main members of the machine have been eliminated through prosecu-

⁹Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The New American Library, 1971)

tion and conviction, the machine's structure would crumble. This approach to reform was believed to be the reason for the fall of the political "bosses" in Kansas City and Boston.¹⁰

The third main theory, most highly represented by James Q. Wilson, suggests that reform stems from an internal struggle for power that grows out of the development of "competitive parties."¹¹ According to Wilson, reform occurs when reform clubs within the party develop and create competition for resources. Perhaps the most classic example of this was the ultimate destruction of Tammany Hall in New York in 1961. The class structure in Manhattan had undergone a fundamental change. Reform clubs, which had periodically developed before the change, now began to organize among the new middle class inhabitants. It became apparent to them that the party could not be reformed by any outside effort. Together with several minor scandals, this loss of Tammany's voting strength (which was rooted in the lower class and immigrant families) allowed the reform clubs to mount a campaign sufficient enough to oust Tammany leaders.

The fourth theory suggests that reform occurs when a repressed faction of the city makes ideological demands on a machine which forces it to collapse because of its inability to deal with such demands. Peter

¹⁰Pendergast and Curley were the respective "bosses" in these cities. In 1939 the Democratic machine in Kansas City collapsed after Pendergast's conviction due to the hounding of the press and the Department of Justice's diligence in pursuing tax evasion claims resulting from a bribe. For further discussion see: Alfred Steinberg, The Bosses (New York: McMillan and Co., 1972)

¹¹James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) See especially Chapter II for an account of the ultimate destruction of Tammany Hall.

Knauss¹² and David Protess¹³ both express this concept in their analyses of the machine in the city of Chicago. It is their contention that once ideological demands are made, the machine will be forced to give way. Demands placed on the machine of an ideological nature (such as "civil rights") cannot be converted into patronage and therefore cannot be dealt with in the fashion that is usually employed by a machine. Ideology cannot be disaggregated. Even the less controversial areas such as air pollution must be dealt with in a way that the machine, qua machine, cannot profit from.¹⁴

Each of these theories outlines either the process or conditions for the demise of the machine, noting that when and if certain conditions are met, the likelihood of the machine's continued power is extremely limited. By preparing a chronicle of elements that lead to the fall of one machine or listing the elements that are antithetical to the very existence of any machine, these theories would hope to establish a basis for predicting the fall of the machine in Chicago.

There is evidence that conditions that would tend to validate these theories do exist in Chicago. There is indeed a move to the suburbs as Banfield suggests, the formation of reform clubs as Wilson suggests and ideological demands are being made as Knauss and Protess

¹²Peter Knauss, Chicago: One Party State (Champaign, Illinois: Stipes Publishing Co., 1970)

¹³David Protess, "Banfield's Chicago Revisited," Social Service Review (June, 1974)

¹⁴Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: Non-Decision Making in the Cities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971)

have stated. There are several other indices such as ticket-splitting, primary challenges, the emersion of ideologues, to some extent, the "Americanization of the immigrant"¹⁵ and the convictions of several top city officials that would indicate the presence of conditions for the demise of the machine. But the machine still remains in control of almost every local office. Republications and independents hold less than a half-dozen seats in the City Council. There must be a tool available to the machine to continue its hold over the elected positions in the city of Chicago; a strategy that has enabled the machine to overcome the forces suggested by these theories. This is where I believe the use of gerrymandering becomes an important part of the machine's efforts to retain its control. I will now proceed to a brief review of the literature on the subject in order to lay the basis for this claim.

The greatest amount of work on the general subject of reapportionment has been confined to the levels of national and state legislative districts and school district boundaries. It has not been on the local level, where the influence of the machine can be noted. Rather, it has grown out of the case of Baker v Carr.¹⁶ Gordon Baker and Robert Luce¹⁷ have dealt with the area concerning legislative redistricting in light of the Supreme Court's decision of "one man, one vote"

¹⁵Eugene Lewis, The Urban Political System (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1973)

¹⁶Baker v Carr 389 U.S. 186; S.Ct. 691 (1962)

¹⁷Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: Random House, 1963); Robert Luce, Legislative Principles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930)

and the nature of legislative principles (respectively) in great detail. Along with Karl Bosworth and Andrew Hacker¹⁸ their contributions have centered on the legal implications and political consequences of these aspects of gerrymandering. Because they have focused on state and national levels, none of these authors have approached the subject in terms of the political advantages and/or disadvantages and social consequences that can be realized through the maneuvering of local legislative districts. Because the literature of the field does not examine gerrymandering (in any detail) in an urban machine setting, both citizens and students of politics are faced with the problem of the absence of adequate information.

Charles Fishman, who has prepared a manual for black lawyers who wish to fight racial gerrymandering, writes: "This report was printed... in the hope that the wide dissemination of this information would be of value to the black community as it seeks to assert its rights in the political arena."¹⁹

The emphasis in the book is on legal considerations used in combating racial discrimination that is manifested through discriminatory reapportionment practices. Fishman's objective is to acquaint black leaders with the signs of gerrymandering, the effect it has on the black community, and to arm them with the legal elements necessary to combat

¹⁸Karl A. Bosworth, "Law Making in State Governments" in The 48 States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators (New York: Columbia University, 1955); Andrew Hacker, Congressional Districting: The Issue of Equal Representation (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1963)

¹⁹Charles Fishman, Reapportionment and Racial Gerrymandering (Washington: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1971)

it. After Fishman initially states that he feels the power of the black community is in jeopardy because of gerrymandering, he refrains from considering any further political implications. It is from the perspective of these other implications that the balance of this study will view governmental development in Chicago. Political aspects such as gerrymandering's effect on the nature of the City Council, the continued role of the machine, and the advancement of the political career of certain Chicago politicians as well as the consequences of these actions must be considered. When examined in concert, these considerations present the overall effect that gerrymandering has had on the city.

Any further discussion of these political implications and social consequences of gerrymandering should be preceded by an examination of the terms and elements that are to be considered. Their description will become the groundwork upon which the relationship between gerrymandering and power in Chicago will be established. It is through this relationship that the effects of gerrymandering can best be viewed.

strategy will be referred to as "confinement," and the second as "dispersal." (These two strategies of gerrymandering will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.)

It is difficult to determine, even approximately, what percentage of the overall control of the machine involves the actual use of gerrymandering. It is the express intention of this study to establish gerrymandering as an important tool (along with patronage and other forms of perquisites) in the machine's efforts to retain control in the city of Chicago. Because of the difficulty involved in identifying the actual extent of the role of gerrymandering, and in light of the fact that it is a tool employed by the machine to alter the social makeup of a particular community, the social consequences of the act of gerrymandering (not just its motivations) must be taken into account.

The functional approach,¹ as a theoretical framework for examining and clarifying the relationship between actions and their social consequences,² allows for the consideration of the role of gerrymandering in terms of its effect on the community in relation to the establishment (or prevention of) equitable representation. Furthermore, a functional analysis of the role of gerrymandering in the maintenance of machine control in Chicago provides an explanation of a social action that may not be empirically proven. That is to say, data can only respond to the questions asked of it and the data establishing gerrymandering in Chicago

¹Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (reved.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957) pp. 19-84

²Ibid.

will not respond, of itself, to the question "why?" Because one could not be present to examine the motivations for gerrymandering, it becomes necessary to examine the consequences (both manifest and latent) of this social action and then impute possible reasons for them.

In any analysis, the process or social action to be examined must be clearly defined and placed within the context in which it is to be analyzed. In this case, the process is referred to as gerrymandering and the following definition and etymology of the word will help to establish a basic working knowledge of the term:

To gerrymander is to divide a state, county, city, etc. into sections, election districts or other civil divisions in an unnatural and unfair way with a view to give a political party an advantage over its opponent, or for some other improper purpose.


In 1812 while Elbridge Gerry was Governor of Massachusetts, the Republican legislature redistributed the districts in such a way that the shapes of the towns forming a single district in Essex County gave to the district a somewhat dragon-like contour. This was indicated on a map of Massachusetts which Benjamin Russell, an ardent Federalist and editor of the "Centennial", hung up over the desk in his office. The celebrated painter, Gilbert Stuart, coming in to the office one day and observing the uncouth figure, added with his pencil a head, wings and claws and exclaimed, "That will do for a salamander." "Better say a gerry-mander!" growled the editor; and the outlandish name, thus duly coined, soon came into general currency. (See illustration on following page.)³

With the etymology of the word developing out of a confrontation in Massachusetts, it is ironic that the first known cry for its abolition also originated there. At the Massachusetts State Constitutional Convention of 1853, Charles Francis Adams, a delegate from Boston contended:

I maintain that the moment a majority in a Republic assumes to draw a distinction with the intent that certain men shall be enabled to

³The etymology and definition of "gerrymandering" is derived from, Webster's New International Dictionary (1958)

THE ORIGINAL GERRYMANDER:
A LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT IN ESSEX COUNTY MASSACHUSETTS



enjoy twice or thrice the amount of political power which an equal number of other men possess, that is the hour when tyranny begins...⁴

Something as intricate as this piece of "political skulduggery"⁵ demands an equally intricate combination of professionals to achieve the intended results. By its very definition, the machine has the necessary strength as well as personnel to achieve this complicated end. But, are the forces of assimilation actually working against any attempt to gerrymander on racial and ethnic grounds, forces that would appear to be able to overcome any strength or combination of personnel?

In the review of the literature, the social scientists' view of assimilation was discussed. Perhaps additional insight into the question of assimilation's role in counteracting the machine's influence can be gained from an examination adopting the ethnic group's point of view. Cynthia Enloe's⁶ analysis of ethnicity deals with the concept of nation-state and the role of ethnicity, but a great deal of what she says would seem just as applicable to the city of Chicago. She denies that as a nation-state develops (or in this case, if I may be permitted the analogy, the city of Chicago), ethnicity attenuates. Concerning the role of the ethnic group itself in the process of assimilation, Enloe says:

..."Thou shalt preserve thy integrity." This is not so with ethnic groups, which are constantly caught up in debates whether they should

⁴Robert Luce, Legislative Principles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930) p. 25

⁵Robert W. Dietsch, "The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's Gambit" in Saturday Review (June 3, 1972) p. 42

⁶Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973) p. 160

exist at all. Does the best hope for the community's members lie in assimilation, sloughing off peculiar traits and associations for the sake of joining the larger mainstream? If this is the consensus, it means creating organizations and tactics to press for an end to discrimination and ascriptive criteria in public life... For an ethnic community it requires a new self-consciousness about what exactly ethnic distinctiveness entails...the argument never ends; it contigues to shape the resources and priorities of communal development.⁷

There exists a certain similarity between Dahl's estimation and that of Enloe. For Enloe, emphasis is placed on the community's decision whether or not to assimilate while Dahl appears to present assimilation in terms of the greater society's view of the process. While both views do illustrate the same process, Enloe adds the dimension of expressed choice by the community. Even though Dahl does not deny this aspect of assimilation, his preoccupation with the societal influence tends to question the importance of the community's role.

If the type of consciousness that Enloe refers to can be raised, the effect would stimulate ideologically-oriented questions that machines are not able to handle. Ideology does not involve a trade-off; there is nothing to be sold and nothing to be bartered. A machine would be rendered less effective in a situation of this nature. Again, the response of the machine would be to stem such activity to prevent confrontation on a level where it could not meet its "opposition" without a clear advantage. In this case, efforts would necessarily be placed on preventing or at least minimizing the opportunity for the opposing groups to organize.

⁷Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973) p. 160

In view of this application of assimilation to Chicago, it would seem as if the theory expressed by Knauss and Protesch would prove to be most accurate. Within the conceptual framework of their theory, gerrymandering would become merely a tool for preventing the collective expression of an ideological demand. But in addition to this aspect of gerrymandering is the realization that the effects of its application would indicate an attempt to quantitatively destroy the vote power of these ethnic and racial minorities.

The process by which the machine develops and applies the strategies of gerrymandering will be explained in the next chapter. The data presented will illustrate that the results of the redrawing of the ward boundaries served no other distinguishable purpose than the possible one explained by gerrymandering. To this end, the principles of gerrymandering seem to be applied in two ways in Chicago. First, there is the attempt to group racial or ethnic communities in certain areas with the consequence of containing their power by limiting the possible number of representatives they can elect to the City Council. Secondly, and primarily in the case of the Spanish-speaking community, by dispersing the community into as many wards as possible, the machine is able to keep them from gaining a politically potent majority in any one ward and thereby keeping them from electing any representation at all.

From a practical political standpoint, these aspects of gerrymandering in Chicago are identifiable. However, legally, their identification presents another problem. The data that is available

indicate that neither the national Congress nor the individual state legislatures has been able to define and outlaw gerrymandering.⁸ It has been largely the function of the courts to determine the legality in a few specific cases. But these legislatures have been able to define "equality of representation" and the courts have assured its political application in the "one man, one vote" ruling of Baker v Carr.

Reform cities seem more readily able to accept (or perhaps more precisely, have little choice but to accept) this ruling than is a machine city like Chicago. In Detroit, electing the councilmen at large precludes any attempt at gerrymandering, and in Los Angeles, the nature of the physical city and the scattered instance of racial and ethnic groupings makes such attempts futile. The high degree of decentralization in New York and the rise of minor parties as well as the splintering of the Democratic Party have kept the possibility of gerrymandering nearly nonexistent (although gerrymandering does take place on a national and state legislative level).

The essence of the difference between the opportunity for gerrymandering in a machine city and in a reform city is that reform cities tend to be less centralized (formally and informally). They are too highly fragmented to effectively gerrymander. Control of the apparatus for redrawing the ward boundaries is certainly a prerequisite for gerrymandering. In a highly centralized city (even if only informally), this control can be achieved with relative ease. It is also necessary to

⁸Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 26

obtain approval for this action (even if only tacit), approval that can be realized through the logrolling effects of the patronage system.

How has Chicago become centralized? To what degree has this increased the opportunity to gerrymander? The only way to answer these questions is to examine the political setting in Chicago.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL SETTING OF CHICAGO

The state of Illinois has two United States Senators and twenty-four Congressmen. There are fifty-nine Illinois Legislative Districts, each with three representatives and one senator. Illinois is divided into 102 counties of varying size and population.¹ In the city of Chicago there are fifty wards² with over 3,000 precincts³ and seventy-five community areas.⁴ There are appointed precinct captains and elected aldermen and committeemen. Within this complexity of geo-political and community divisions lies the structure of a polity.

In a city like Chicago (which has seen a predominance of Democratic "machine style" politics for the last forty-five years, the last twenty under Mayor Richard J. Daley), the manifestation of representation is undeniably intertwined with both party and governmental roles. The very nature of the machine demands that party officials and representatives work as closely as possible; indeed, sometimes they are indistin-

¹Illinois Blue Book, 1973-1974, (Springfield, Illinois: September, 1974)

²Chicago Municipal Code: Section 4:12-64

³Source for the number of precincts is the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. With the population shifts in the city during the time of this analysis, the number of precincts was constantly changing. Yet, at no time was it less than 3,000.

⁴Local Community Fact Book (Chicago Community Inventory, 1950, 1960, 1970)

guishably close.⁵

The political atmosphere in Chicago does not seem to be one of corruption alone (even in light of the conviction of many top political leaders), for as Theodore Lowi has pointed out: "A 'machine' (member) might be removed from office, its leaders indicted, but more than likely the organization suffered very little. Morale seems higher in defeat than in victory."⁶ The situation may well stem from the dominance of party politics, even though aldermanic elections are, by law, non-partisan.⁷

In effect, there are two systems existing simultaneously in Chicago. One system is that of an established government: a mayor and city council. The other system is political, the Democratic Party. Before continuing with this analysis, a description of these two systems is in order.

The formal party structure in Illinois is largely determined by the Illinois Election Code.⁸ The code outlines nominating and election procedures that limit the scope of any political party. While this factor limits the growth of the party influence in certain directions, it

⁵Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The New American Library, 1971) p. 21

⁶Theodore J. Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition" in Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. v

⁷Chicago Municipal Code: Section 2:1-4

⁸State of Illinois Election Laws: Sections 7:2; 8:2 (October 22, 1973)

does not place parameters on internal party activities.⁹

In Chicago, the Chairman of the Cook County Central Democratic Committee is also the Mayor of the city. This, of course, is not a provision of law but rather a result of political circumstance. Both positions have ex officio powers encompassing a wide scope of influence. The power vested in the Chairman of the party is transferred through a network of ward and township committeemen. It is then passed down through the precinct captains and finally reaches the party electorate. The degree of party-member loyalty (which can be translated into the vote-getting ability) is rewarded with an appropriate number of perquisites; the rewards may cover the entire spectrum from clearing debris or repairing a curb all the way to slating a loyal party member for office or granting a job.

The fifty Democratic Ward Committeemen of the city of Chicago, together with the committeemen from thirty suburban townships, make up the Central Committee with Mayor Daley as their party chairman. The relationship that exists between the structure of the Party and the city government is best illustrated by this account that appears in Boss:

Most of them (committeemen) hold an elective office. Many of the Daley Aldermen are ward bosses. Several are county commissioners. Others hold office as county clerk, assessor, or recorder of deeds and a few are congressmen and state legislators. Those who don't hold office are given top jobs running city departments...¹⁰

⁹State of Illinois Election Laws: Sections 7:8 (October 22, 1973)

¹⁰Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The New American Library, 1971) p. 70

At the time of this research, there were fifteen aldermen who were also ward committeemen (see table on next page). Just as the Mayor served as both party officer and elected official, so too did these fifteen aldermen. The positions of alderman and mayor in these cases would appear to take the duality of party and government and make them as one. This action prompted Royko to say of Daley, "He tries to separate political work from his duties as mayor, but nobody has every been able to see where one ends and the other begins."¹¹

The question has come up often: Does Mayor Richard J. Daley possess the slate-making power that many claim he does? In relation to this question of the power to decide who runs for what office, when and how, Mike Royko has this to offer:

...but even the slate-makers do not kid themselves into thinking they are deciding who the candidates will be. They listen to the applicants, push their favorites, the men from their wards, and wait for Chairman Daley to make up his mind. Some of the men on the slate-making committee have been surprised to find that they themselves were slated to run for offices they hadn't sought. It is a one man show and they know it. (Emphasis added.)¹²

Although the governmental structure in Chicago originally was designed to be a "weak mayor-strong council" model, the informal reality of the Mayor's personality and organizational ability seem to have overcome this formal designation. His personal contacts, energy, old friends (as well as his ability to make new ones) and his forceful manner aid in his projection of a strong mayoral position. Of course, his control over

¹¹Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The New American Library, 1971) p. 21

¹²Ibid., p. 81

INTERSECTION OF ELECTIVE PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL
POSITIONS IN CHICAGO

(Aldermanic Elections - 1971)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Government Position</u>	<u>Party Position</u>	<u>Ward</u>
William Barnett	Alderman	Committeeman	2nd
Eugene Sawyer	Alderman	Committeeman	6th
Alexander Adduci	Alderman	Committeeman	9th
Edward Vrdolyak	Alderman	Committeeman	10th
Edward Burke	Alderman	Committeeman	14th
William Shannon	Alderman	Committeeman	17th
Thomas Fitzpatrick	Alderman	Committeeman	19th
Bennett Stewart	Alderman	Committeeman	21st
Vito Marzullo	Alderman	Committeeman	25th
Thomas Keane	Alderman	Committeeman	31st
Wilson Frost	Alderman	Committeeman	34th
Thomas Casey	Alderman	Committeeman	37th
Anthony Laurino	Alderman	Committeeman	39th
Seymour Simon	Alderman	Committeeman	40th
Roman Pucinski	Alderman	Committeeman	41st

an estimated 35,000 patronage jobs is very helpful also.¹³

The formal governmental structure of the city is controlled by Richard J. Daley in his capacity as mayor. Together with fifty aldermen, they form the Chicago City Council (with Daley filling the role as presiding officer). Even within this formal designation, there is ample room for exercising a controlling force. In the case of the reapportionment of ward boundaries, the function lies within the scope of legislative duties performed by the City Council. In spite of the fact that Daley's formal power is limited to the role of presiding officer, his control reaches the legislative procedures involved in the act of reapportionment.

The apportionment function itself comes under the auspices of the Rules Committee of the City Council. The Chairman of the Committee is Alderman Thomas Casey (a regular Democrat who was first elected as Alderman of the 37th ward in 1965 at a special election held on May 18th; prior to his election, Casey served as the Democratic Ward Committeeman for the 37th ward). Alderman Casey appointed a special subcommittee to study available data and to make recommendations to the standing committee as to possible new ward boundaries.

The Chairman of this special subcommittee was Alderman Thomas Keane (31st ward). The relationship between Keane and Daley is best explained by this passage by Mike Royko: "Keane is considered to be second in Party power...It is his (Daley) Council...and Keane manages it for

¹³This estimate was reported in Gosnell's Machine Politics as that of Alderman Leon Despres as cited by Robert C. Nelson, "Machine Politics Described", in Christian Science Monitor (July 10, 1961)

him." This informal arrangement affords Daley the opportunity to wield tremendous power through the established formal structure.

On November 5th, 1970, Thomas Keane, as Chairman of the special subcommittee, presented to the entire City Council his map for redistricting the wards in Chicago. Keane "managed" forty-one votes in favor of the ordinance revision while the opposition numbered but six.

The function of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with the political atmosphere of Chicago to lay the groundwork for establishing the existence of gerrymandering and the role it plays in machine maintenance. I have already indicated that the apportionment function is entrusted to the legislative branch of city government and that Mayor Daley is able to exert a great deal of influence upon those performing this function. Mention must be made of Daley's power and the extent to which he does indeed bring it to bear in legislative actions.

It would appear as if the power that Daley exerts is a product of his unopposed position in Chicago. However, despite claims to the contrary by many of his party cronies,¹⁴ Mayor Daley is not omnipotent. Edward Banfield asserts that the mayor faces three "checks" that prohibit him from exercising unlimited power.¹⁵ It is Banfield's contention that the three checks are placed by other elected officials, the court system and the electorate themselves. If Banfield's contentions are correct,

¹⁴Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The New American Library, 1971) (See especially Chapter IV for further discussion of this point.)

¹⁵Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961) pp. 238-239

then Daley would have only limited power in the City Council.

The first check that Banfield refers to would appear to be based on the premise that effective government necessitates counterbalancing measures between the different levels and branches: a premise that I would be hard pressed to find any fault with. This "balancing" that he finds "essential" can be achieved through different methods. There is that based on partisan or ideological grounds; that based on the concept of the "common good" regardless of the official's personal affiliation; and there is a balance borne of pressure and discipline. Banfield admits that this first check is usually performed by a member of the opposite party. But this end is not always so easily accomplished in Chicago in view of the fact that there seldom exists an elected official of the opposite political party.¹⁶

With the slate-making ability that Daley possesses and Banfield's own admission of Chicago's home rule provisions in the Illinois Constitution¹⁷ and the absence of any real party opposition, there would seem to be few elected officials to perform this first check. When an official does attempt to check Daley's power he finds himself faced with

¹⁶With the noted exception on the local level of Bernard Carey as Cook County States Attorney, there are few local officials elected in Chicago from the Republican Party. However, independent Democrats and other Democratic Party "irregulars" may also perform the function that Banfield refers to.

¹⁷Illinois State Constitution, Article VII; Section 6

serious primary and general election battles.¹⁸

"The principle of the separation of powers, which assures the court's independence...¹⁹ is the basis for the second check described by Banfield. A confrontation between the machine and the court would probably produce a civic controversy that may weaken the electorate's view of the machine. But Banfield continues by admitting that judges often take "cues" from political leaders in deciding cases (except in civil matters).²⁰ He counters this admission by adding that one sure way to avoid political influence is to take the case to the Supreme Court. However, this action takes time, money and organization. Since forces opposing the machine have been hard pressed to organize viable campaigns in both city and county elections, the probability of organizing an effort that would reach the Supreme Court is highly limited (the present case of gerrymandering excepted). Furthermore, not only is Mayor Daley the personal friend of many of the judges, but the absence of merit selection has allowed the Mayor again to exercise his slate-making power in slating perspective candidates for the bench in Chicago.

¹⁸A classic example of Daley's ability to co-opt his opposition may well be the case of Benjamin Adamowski. In 1963, Adamowski was the Republican candidate for mayor running against Richard J. Daley. Adamowski was engaged in a bitter conflict with Daley and on several occasions claimed that Daley misused the police to spy on Adamowski. Daley narrowly won the election over Adamowski's formidable challenge. For the election in 1975, Benjamin S. Adamowski publically endorsed Richard J. Daley in his re-election campaign against Independent Democratic Alderman William Singer.

¹⁹Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961) p. 239

²⁰Ibid., p. 239

In relation to the third check coming from the electorate, Banfield proposes that the electorate's potential to vote the machine out of office constitutes a force for compromise which, in turn, could compel the Mayor to respond to the interests of the electorate or face possible defeat in a primary or general election. With corruption in city government, loss of tax base, deteriorating schools and selective dispersal of services facing them, the electorate in Chicago still refrained from changing this potential into a reality in the primary and general election that provided Richard J. Daley with an unprecedented sixth term as mayor.

These checks do exist; it is undeniable. Their effectiveness in view of the re-election of Mayor Daley and his aldermen remains questionable. There seem to be but two alternative answers in light of these election results. Either the electorate is satisfied with city government as it is (the Mayor has responded to their interests), or there exists another force that prohibits the exercise of this potential. It is entirely possible to establish the existence of such a force that would mitigate the opportunity to express the potential to vote out the machine without answering the question of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the Chicago electorate. There are several conditions that may cause the electorate to refrain from exercising this potential even if they were dissatisfied.

One condition that could cause reluctance to exercise the right of recall may well involve the Mayor's influence in the formal structure of the city's government. Control of the different agencies and levels

of the executive branch enables the Mayor to exert his influence on the lives of a great number of people connected with these different agencies. This passage from Banfield (when coupled with the knowledge of the Mayor's ever present slate-making power) aptly describes the depth of his influence:

The executive, however, is not a single body. It is several. The mayor is one. The city treasurer and city clerk, both elected and therefore no more responsible to the mayor than he to them, are others. Schools are run by a board appointed by the mayor but not removable by him. Public housing is run by another such board, the transit authority by another, parks by still another...²¹

The combination of party chairman and mayor tends to overcome the formal decentralization that this explanation of the executive branch of Chicago's government indicates. The influence that can be exerted on the lives of all individuals associated with these facets of the government (not to mention those individuals who can be reached by other party members) may account for some of the conditions that prevent a specific portion of the city from exercising the potential Banfield referred to.

There are other points at which the formal separation of party position and nonpartisan official seem to disappear. This in itself also may keep certain members of the electorate from initiating any potential check on the Mayor. Besides the half-dozen self-proclaimed independents, there is only one person on the current city council who claims to be anything but a Democrat, Alderman Dennis Block (48th ward).

Opposition to the Regular Democratic Party leadership in the

²¹Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961) p. 236

Chicago City Council rarely, if ever, exceeded ten votes.²² The estimated average of opposition is closer to two votes. This study of the opposition illustrates more closely the connection between the structure of the Democratic Party and the nature of government in Chicago.

The reasons for explaining the relationship between the Democratic Party and Chicago's city government is to illustrate that the unification of these two separate entities has created an atmosphere one can safely assume that the interests of one of these two entities is undoubtedly the interest of the other.

Based on this awareness of the mutual interests of the Party and the elected officials in Chicago, there are grounds to impute possible reasons for certain political actions. If the role of the City Council as redistricter was indeed biased by the influence of the Democratic Party, then the need for continued gerrymandering as a result of this bias should be examined. However, before entertaining any notions of bias and collusion, the concept of gerrymandering should be placed in a national as well as local perspective to gain some insight into its possible political repercussions.

²²An unpublished study by Ole Bjarrum of Loyola University in Chicago of 250 randomly selected ordinances in 1967 and 1973 indicated that 205 of the 250 received no opposition at all. In those instances where opposition was recorded, the average number of votes in opposition to machine policy was 3.75. There were only three occasions where the vote in opposition exceeded 10.

²³Theodore J. Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition" in Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. x

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

...ingenious techniques for capitalizing upon ethnic and racial heterogeneity have been invented in city after city...The machines (which employed them) were based upon a congeries of people with uncommon ends, held together at the center by logrolling and at the periphery by fraternite, egalite and ignorance...¹

One of the "ingenious techniques" that machines have employed is gerrymandering. It has invaded all levels of government in the United States and owes its allegiance to neither Democrat nor Republican, to no particular region of the country, level of economy or extent of education.

While it is the expressed intention of this study to examine gerrymandering in Chicago, a proper perspective from which to judge the consequences of this action must be provided. To develop the basis for this perspective, I have chosen to examine historical aspects of the use of gerrymandering on national and state levels and then proceed to its specific application in Chicago, highlighting both similarities and differences among the levels.

Prior to the "one man, one vote" ruling of Baker v Carr, there were seven states (New Jersey, Idaho, South Carolina, Montana, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada) that, regardless of population size, allowed each

¹Theodore Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition," Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. v

county the same number of representatives in the state senate.² (This does not include those states that followed the same formula for their lower house or for both houses.) As Karl Bosworth has pointed out, under a system that permits inequality of representation "...any 'sovereignty' of counties or towns is based on entrenched political power, not on constitutional or democratic theory."³ If Bosworth's estimation is correct, then a system existing with these inequities illustrates a model where the states involved are unitary and not federal in their makeup. With inherent inequities in the system that result from variations in size and population such as these do, the use of gerrymandering to the advantage of any particular political party becomes an elementary maneuver.

The extent to which "...a civil division can be drawn to present an unfair advantage to a given political party" may best be noted by the example of the New Jersey legislature. In 1960, "...rural Sussex County's 49,255 inhabitants and metropolitan Essex County's 923,545 each sent one senator to the New Jersey Legislature."⁴ Similar inequities were noted in 1963 and in 1965 in Washington, Oregon, South Dakota, Minnesota, Virginia and Indiana (as well as in the seven previously mentioned states). But each of these examples and the countless others

²Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 25

³Karl A. Bosworth, "Law Making in State Governments," The Forty-Eight States, Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955) p. 95

⁴Baker, op. cit., p. 25


noted by Baker, Bosworth, Hacker et al. illustrate a representation borne of unequal size and not of the type that occurred in Chicago.

The undemocratic principles at work in reapportionment that fail to reflect the true population of a given civil division are more readily corrected than those realized through gerrymandering for partisan, ethnic or racial reasons. It is true that gerrymandering of the New Jersey type denies equality of representation, but it does not single out a specific portion of the population (identifiable by race, political affiliation, or ethnic background). In fact, this former type of reapportionment develops usually for one of two reasons: constitutionally inadequate provisions that limit the ability to correct these inequities or legislative failure to redistrict in accordance with population shifts, even when such constitutional provisions were available.

These two prevailing reasons for the inequality of districts are based on the realization that like Sussex and Essex Counties in New Jersey, the difference was a product of population size. An equally as common practice is the effects of reapportionment that collect or exclude certain sections of a given area in terms of past voting records. A cursory examination of some of the "cartographical surgery"⁵ that took place in New York will demonstrate this type of gerrymandering.

In both 1951 and 1961 the Republican legislature in New York found it quite elementary to gerrymander Congressional Districts (without seriously affecting population totals for the districts). What was the

⁵Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 82



old 12th District (now the 15th) wound its way through the streets of Brooklyn gathering small pockets of Republicans. For four straight elections, the Republicans succeeded in electing one of their own to Congress from this district. In 1960, the election was lost to a Democrat. In 1961, the Republican legislature created the 15th District (in Brooklyn), returning it to their list of "safe" GOP districts.⁶ The resulting map, a product of the Republican legislature's attempt to return lost Republican seats, resembled the map that Governor Gerry first produced in 1812.

In an article in the New Republic, Robert Dietsch has quoted Congressman Emanuel Celler (Dem., New York) as saying that the New York Congressional Districts resemble "...wash hanging on a line, quaint abstract painting and East and West Pakistan." In the same article Dietsch relates Tylor and Wells' estimation by citing "...the Districts appear as the Jaws of the Wrench, The Upside Down Crocodile, The Camel Biting the Tail of the Buffalo Which is Stepping on the Tail of the Dachshund."⁷

These descriptions are only slightly exaggerated for effect. Splitting blocks, retracing steps, and apparently abandoning all logic are characteristics of this type of apportionment. But the loss of logic is only visible to those who do not bother to examine the case further.

⁶Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 83

⁷Robert W. Dietsch, "The 1971 Gerrymander" in The New Republic (May 29, 1971) p. 21

The 1961 map of New York's legislative districts illustrates the depth of influence of gerrymandering by what appears to be a totally illogical creation of a district. The 16th legislative district, comprised in part by the northern section of Staten Island, is continued six to eight miles away in the center of Brooklyn.⁸ This maneuver is politically logical because voting patterns indicate that both areas are highly Republican.

In the case of New York and California in 1961, and the other states previously mentioned, this type of gerrymandering is best achieved under certain limited conditions. The operationalizing of gerrymandering is facilitated when one party clearly dominates both houses of the legislature (and therefore controls the machinery for re-districting) and when that party holds the position of chief executive in the state. When a party dominates the legislature, it becomes much easier to rearrange districts to facilitate the re-election of party members (especially when there is no fear of reprisal from the opposition or little chance of a veto from the governor). From the two definitions we have arrived at (machine and gerrymandering), one is faced with the consideration that those conditions that facilitate gerrymander are approximately the same conditions that describe the existence of a machine. This is not to say that only a legislature with one party with a clear majority or a machine controlled polity is able to gerrymander, but rather that these particular conditions facilitate it. In the previous chapter, I related how dominance of the Chicago City Coun-

⁸This evaluation is based on the New York Congressional District Map as it appeared in the Congressional Quarterly (4-10-71)


cil by Mayor Daley and the Democratic Party facilitated the opportunity for gerrymandering.

In the following chapters, I will explain how that opportunity became a reality. What of the actual mechanics of implementing such a technique as gerrymandering? Chicago, the archetype of the "old politics," usually manages to come up with the latest methods and the most advanced technology for aiding its political leaders in their bids for re-election. Chicago will have to take a back seat on this occasion, however. While a few members of the Chicago City Council redrew ward boundaries, Robert Dietsch, in an article in the Saturday Review, was revealing how the Hoosiers technologically surpassed the efforts of Mayor Daley and Company. The article states:

The baroque possibilities of gerrymander-by-computer are illustrated in Indiana, where the fifth Congressional District has been cybernetically carved out to be ultra-safe for Republican Representative Elwood H. Hillis. The district was made to run from just south of the Michigan line through at least half of the Hoosier state to Indianapolis. The gerrymanders did throw into Hillis' district a portion of Washington Township (outside of Indianapolis) that is turning Black and that normally votes Democratic. In a complex bit of mathematics that was aided by the computer, the gerrymanderers figured that Hillis could lose those 4,000 Black votes and still remain safe, and that the votes meanwhile would be taken away from Democrat Andrew Jacobs, Jr., in an adjoining district. For Jacobs' own district the GOP computer worked out some very fancy geometry. The district used to be "L" shaped and had only eight corners--a relatively compact and contiguous district. But today, after the work of the Indiana gerrymanderers and the computers, Jacob's district has at least twenty-four corners, and its western boundary jigs and jags like a salamander scurrying over hot rocks.⁹

The political cartoon on the following page perhaps best illustrates the relationship that has developed between the political "boss"

⁹Robert W. Dietsch, "The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's Gambit," Saturday Review, (June 3, 1972): 42-47



and the technological age.¹⁰ It may well suggest that the "boss" has not died off, but rather has become computerized; a nameless figure, a product of our need for progress.

Recounting the story of the Indiana 5th Congressional District demonstrates the degree to which gerrymandering has become a part of our political culture. It would not seem out of the scope of this analysis to envision an entire profession growing up around the desire for more precise gerrymandering. One must not only examine population statistics, but growth charts, numbers of registered voters and partisan strength are all now fundamental to a successful gerrymander like that of the Indiana 5th Congressional District. With the computers enormous capacity to store, categorize and recall information, the results can now be more exact and equally as devastating. As any programmer can tell you, a computer is only as neutral as those who program it. While they were originally used to aid in the complex calculations necessary to comply with the Court's ruling concerning the population of legislative district, computers now are used to consider those factors they were initially designed to ignore.

While Indiana may have affected the first noted use of technology, Chicago has used gerrymandering (in its more traditional form) for quite some time. In fact, Gosnell recounts this episode in Chicago's history:

In drawing ward lines all the tricks of gerrymandering are also employed by the aldermen...the extent to which nationality and racial

¹⁰Robert W. Dietsch, "The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's Gambit," Saturday Review, (June 3, 1972) p. 43

groups were cut into small bits by the 1921 and 1931 ward lines... Ward committeemen of Irish extraction have been particularly active in splitting up their bailiwicks so as to prevent their defeat by Italian, Polish or Jewish rivals.¹¹

It would appear that in the 160 years since Elbridge Gerry, all that has been learned is how to apply more complex techniques to an already complex method.

Just as time has not changed the effects of gerrymandering on the political scene, it would appear that time is unable to change even the scene itself in Chicago. Harold Gosnell has said "...the political power structure of the city of Chicago has probably changed the least during the decades following 1937..."¹² From an historical perspective, one can witness the eventual demise of all other big city machines;¹³ yet, Chicago still is run by a Democratic machine organization.

In this era that Gosnell refers to, there has always been a close relationship between the mayor of Chicago and the Cook County Central Democratic Committee. Through patronage and the control of party nominations, along with the informal relationship created between county agencies, the political "bosses" of this era have developed a well-functioning machine.¹⁴

¹¹Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) pp. 30-31.

¹²Ibid., p. 221

¹³For more in depth analysis and explanation see Alfred Steinberg, The Bosses (New York: McMillan, 1972)

¹⁴Gosnell, op. cit., p. 223

Democratic party chairman in the early period, Patrick A. Nash, "walked hand-in-glove with Mayor Kelley."¹⁵ There was no question as to the significance of the Kelley-Nash machine.

In the middle period, the election of Martin Kennelley as a reformer was engineered by Party Chairman Colonel Jacob Arvey to justify party maintenance. He felt it was necessary to "suffer through" the interim with a reformer rather than face possible defeat. While Kennelley was not part of the machine-producing group, the political boss of the period (Arvey) staged Kennelley's election, a task that only a powerful man could have accomplished.

When Richard J. Daley decided to run for mayor after his election as Party Chairman in 1953, he was denied Arvey's support but still went on to win the primary over incumbent Mayor Kennelley in 1955.¹⁶ It was a major step forward in machine politics in Chicago to try and combine the two positions of mayor and party chairman in one individual. It would take a great deal of political expertise to accomplish such a bold maneuver.

In the mayoral election of that year, Daley defeated Robert E. Merriam with his "greatest support coming from the Black Belt and from the west side wards where the machine was strongest."¹⁷ The role of the black wards in this first Daley victory is important to the consideration

¹⁵Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. 223

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 226-227

¹⁷Ibid., p. 227

at hand. It was the black area that put Daley in power, and it would be demonstrated later that continued support by the black community would be essential to his re-election.

Daley won over Sheehan in 1959 with big support again coming from the black areas (although with 71.4% of the vote marked for Daley, it was not to prove to be a test of his strength in the black areas). But in 1963, Daley faced his most formidable challenger since Merriam (and in terms of election results, his most formidable challenger to date). Daley won the election over Benjamin Adamowski with a vote margin of 55.7% to 44.3%. An analysis of the election results establishes that Adamowski received 51% of the votes cast in all white areas while Daley won an "enormous black vote."¹⁸ There could be no doubt about the election outcome: without the black areas Daley would have had much greater difficulty in winning that election.

In the following chapters, individual wards with large numbers of minorities will be examined to illustrate the link between the need for the support of the black areas and the use of gerrymandering in achieving some control over these areas. The analysis is divided into two chapters to correspond to the two major methods of achieving control; i.e., "dispersal" and "confinement." In terms of the confinement strategy, the 7th, 14th and 19th wards will be examined; the dispersal strategy will be examined through an analysis of gerrymandering in the 31st ward.

¹⁸Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The New American Library, 1971)

CHAPTER V

GERRYMANDERING IN CHICAGO:

AN OVERVIEW

The complaint has been made that the entire city of Chicago has been gerrymandered in the reapportionment of its wards in 1971.¹ The contention involves the concept of "key" wards which allegedly were altered to allow regular Democrats to obtain or to strengthen their hold in certain areas of the city. The result of such a situation would be that the surrounding wards would suffer from this remapping² and therefore would be "inadvertantly gerrymandered;" if a sufficient number of "key" wards existed, the city as a whole (all fifty wards) would also certainly be affected by the reapportionment.

¹The entire city gerrymander was outlined in the brief filed by William Cousins in the case of Cousins v City Council, 73-1891; 73-2127, 7th Cir. (1971). In this brief filed with the District Court in Chicago, Cousins, as attorney for the plaintiffs, contended that more than just the blatantly gerrymandered wards were at stake.

²The logical conclusions, as the theory was presented by Cousins, is that when a particular ward is gerrymandered to afford one party or individual a certain electoral advantage, those civil divisions immediately contiguous to the ward in question would undoubtedly suffer a comparable miscarriage of justice. To draw the argument to its fullest, presumably, if one ward was gerrymandered it could affect every other ward in the city in what may be called a "ripple effect." It is my understanding that Cousins did not intend for this to be the conclusion we were to draw from his theory, but rather that there were indeed a series of smaller "ripple effects" simultaneously affecting the city.

What I propose to do in this chapter is establish an overview of four wards in the city that I consider "key" wards.³ By examining the 7th, 14th, 19th and 31st wards I would hope to present a general picture of the nature of gerrymandering in the city. In the following chapter, the 31st ward will be examined in greater detail with the express intention of explicating the problem and its ramifications in terms of social consequence.

Inasmuch as there is obvious difficulty (and questionable value) in examining all fifty wards, these particular wards were chosen to highlight the type of situation encountered as well as to present concrete examples of the relationship between the Democratic Party and the act of gerrymandering in Chicago.

The rationale for my choice of wards involves both political and legal aspects as well as the socio-economic elements of the communities involved. In terms of the legal consideration, in the case brought to trial⁴ three of the four wards were named among those alleged to be most flagrantly gerrymandered (all but the 19th). All four wards were experiencing a racial change in the nature of their electorates. All four wards were "machine dominated" wards controlled by machine aldermen in tandem with the Democratic Ward Committeeman (who, in three of the four cases, was the same man, the 7th ward being the exception).

³My choice of the term key wards is designed to coincide with the theory as introduced by Cousins but in a more limited sense as the remainder of the text will bear out.

⁴Cousins v City Council of Chicago, 73-1891; 73-2127, 7th Cir. (1971)

While they shared these elements in common, there are elements in each ward that make the individual ward particularly important to a study of this nature. In 1971, the Alderman of the 7th ward was Nicholas J. Bohling. Within two months of his election he was appointed to fill a vacancy on the Bench in Chicago which in turn forced a vacancy in his aldermanic seat. The special election that followed entertained a field of sixteen candidates; an election that resulted in a run-off between Rev. Richard Lawrence (the Independent Voters of Illinois endorsed candidate and former member of the Woodlawn Organization) and Robert Wilinski (a community activist with local youth groups and restaurant and bar manager). After Wilinski won the election, Rev. Lawrence joined several others in filing suit to claim gerrymandering in Chicago in the hopes of gaining relief in terms of the 7th ward. In 1973, the Federal Court of Appeals ordered the 7th ward redrawn and another election held. At this time, Wilinski declined to seek the office and Gerald Jones (former city college administrator, and presently a sociology teacher) won the election. Subsequent to this action, a federal three-judge Appeals Panel ordered the 7th ward returned to its original boundaries and denied Wilinski the aldermanic seat, leaving Jones as the alderman.⁵ In the 1975 aldermanic elections, Robert Wilinski, the Regular Democratic

⁵The court's decision to return the 7th ward to its original boundaries came after the major portion of the research for this paper had been finished. Nonetheless, the outcome of the decision has little or no bearing on the study insofar as the order to redraw the ward boundaries does not prove that gerrymandering didn't take place just as the initial order to redraw did not prove that gerrymandering did take place.

candidate, defeated Gerald Jones in yet another run-off election and now serves as the alderman of the 7th ward.

Before, during and after this political battle, the 7th ward was experiencing a racial changeover. Just prior to and after the election the area became largely black and Latino. The ward is ideal for this type of study--racially changing, politically turbulent with Democrat battling Independent--and as such lends itself to gerrymandering.

The 14th ward is a blue collar, middle class neighborhood experiencing a somewhat similar and yet unique change. The alderman before the alleged gerrymandering as well as after it was Edward M. Burke. The 14th ward has been a "machine dominated" ward at least since 1953 when Joseph P. Burke, the father of the current alderman, won in a special election. When Joseph Burke died in December of 1968, his son was slated by the machine to run in the special election of March 14, 1969. Edward Burke won re-election in both 1971 and 1975. With the influx of blacks into the 14th ward in the late sixties and carrying over into the seventies, the ward was undergoing a change that might have created a contest for Burke possibly resulting in the election of a black alderman.

While the 14th ward was a blue collar neighborhood, the 19th ward was a predominantly Irish Catholic, upper-middle class area whose boundaries appeared to move westward with each reapportionment. It, like the two previous wards, was "machine dominated" at the time of the 1971 reapportionment. For four consecutive terms, Alderman Thomas Fitzpatrick

(who also served as the Democratic Ward Committeeman) represented the 19th ward in the City Council. Fitzpatrick became an influential Democrat through his role on the Zoning Board and Plan Commission (Fitzpatrick was Chairman of the Committee on Buildings and Zoning). Again, this ward, like the two previous wards, was experiencing a racial change that may have caused competition for the aldermanic seat.

The 31st ward is also "machine dominated:" it had been "run" for thirty years by the same man--Thomas Keane, until his conviction for mail fraud and conspiracy in 1973. It too was undergoing a change in the electorate. But the change in the 31st ward is unlike the other wards in that the change is not from white to black, but from white to Spanish-speaking. There are other elements that make the 31st ward an important choice: the alderman from the 31st ward was in charge of the reapportionment itself. A study of this ward highlights the two major approaches employed by the machine to gerrymander (i.e., "dispersal" and "confinement").

All four wards were "machine dominated" prior to the alleged gerrymandering. They then underwent a demographic change in the electorate that could have precipitated a challenge to the machine for the aldermanic seats. Finally, after the reapportionment of the ward boundaries, these wards were returned to their original social makeup and "machine dominance" continued.

A statistical analysis of each of these wards will demonstrate how this change was accomplished. While it is perhaps easy to place greater emphasis on either the pros or cons of a given argument with the

use of statistics, in a more comprehensive sense they tend to speak for themselves. The chart on the following page lists the population shifts for the four wards being analyzed. The change is based on census figures for the last twenty years and in the case of all wards except the 31st includes a three per cent conversion factor. This factor was added to the population figures in the 1970 census only after the new ward boundaries were considered. It is a methodological inclusion that results from various claims of census inaccuracies that have been reported since 1970.⁶ The three per cent figure is somewhat arbitrary in that it is designed to meet a compromise between the two major claims concerning the inaccuracies. The United States Census Bureau has admitted to a possible two per cent undercount because of inaccurate reporting methods, while urbanologist Pierre de Vise claims that Chicago's population has been undercounted by over 138,000 people (about four per cent).⁷ Both claims of inaccuracy are based on the 1970 census figures. The 31st ward, however, does not include this factor because of an updated population count of the Spanish-speaking (based on ward boundaries) that was released by the City of Chicago Department of Development and Planning.⁸

⁶The account of de Vise's claims of census inaccuracy were reported by Dennis Byrne in the Chicago Daily News, Tuesday, March 26, 1974.

⁷Ibid.

⁸The report released by the Department of Development and Planning for the City of Chicago can be obtained from their Office of Information.

POPULATION CHANGES AS NOTED BY CENSUS DATA

Ward	Community Area	1960 Population Count*	1970 Population Count**	Total After Reapportionment: 1971***
7th	South Shore	7,018	55,483	
7th	South Chicago	<u>2,488</u>	<u>10,208</u>	
		9,506	65,791	29,563

14th	Fuller Park	11,692	7,168	
14th	New City	166	2,126	
14th	West Englewood	1,368	4,000	
14th	Englewood	<u>13,600</u>	<u>17,000</u>	
		26,826	30,294	6,760

19th	Auburn-Gresham	15	7,878	
19th	Beverly	14	0	
19th	Washington Hts.	1,848	10,641	
19th	Mt. Greenwood	4	88	
19th	Morgan Park	<u>4,498</u>	<u>7,401</u>	
		6,799	26,008	7,714

31st	Humboldt Park	7,860	11,122	
31st	West Town	<u>20,935</u>	<u>48,900</u>	
		28,795	60,022	22,159

* The figures in this column indicate the U.S. Census totals for 1960 for the black population in the 7th, 14th, and 19th wards and the Spanish-speaking in the 31st ward.

** The figures in this column indicate the U.S. Census totals for 1970 for the black population in the 7th, 14th, and 19th wards and the Spanish-speaking in the 31st ward.

*** The totals in this column represent the black or Spanish-speaking totals for the individual wards after the 1971 reapportionment in Chicago.

As of 1960, on the South Side of Chicago along the lakefront, the 7th ward was primarily comprised of two community areas: South Shore and South Chicago. According to the United States Census figures, South Shore contained 7,018 blacks.⁹ Immediately south of this area is the community designated as South Chicago; in 1960, there were 2,488 blacks. This brought the total black population of the ward to over 9,000. In the same two communities in 1960, the white population totaled 113,493; a ratio of greater than ten to one.

If the ward boundaries of the 7th ward and all of the immediately surrounding wards had not been changed after the 1970 census, the black population of this area would have totaled 65,791. The white population of the same area under the same conditions would have totaled 60,493. The ratio of black to white had changed from ten to one in favor of the white population to a five thousand-plus black majority.

However, with the eventual change in the ward boundaries, the newly constructed 7th ward, including the conversion factor of three per cent, contains a black population of 29,563. Over 30,000 blacks were "excluded" from the "new" ward. Where did they go? Certainly, it is evident that moving the ward did not involve the actual displacement of families, but the possible political reasons for this action would tend to leave the question open for further discussion. The largest portion of the 30,000 blacks (approximately 60%) were included in the redrawing

⁹All data and statistics concerning the nature and size of the populations analyzed in this study are taken from E. M. Kitagawa and P. M. Hauser, Local Community Fact Book (Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, 1950, 1960), unless otherwise noted.

of the 5th ward. The 5th ward is "traditionally" independent (twenty years of service by anti-machine Alderman Leon Despres). If one considers the election outcome in the pre-gerrymandered 5th ward a foregone conclusion in terms of the unchallengability of Alderman Despres, then the possible reason for the increased black population in the ward could be an attempt by the machine to obfuscate any future hopes Despres (a white) might have.

The results of the ward boundary change are evident. The white population of the 7th ward after the change was 37,569. There were now 8,000 more whites in the ward, as opposed to the 5,000 black majority before the ward boundaries were changed. The opportunity for the machine to control the election was increased with the presence of a clear majority of whites; for slate-making reasons, it is certainly easier to appeal to one ethnic or racial group than it is to appeal to two distinct groups in the same ward. The outcome of the elections that resulted from the change bears out this analysis; when the court ordered the ward remapped (and as it turns out, in favor of a majority of blacks) a black, Gerald Jones, won the election. When the federal Appeals Panel of judges returned the ward to its original "gerrymandered" boundaries (with the 8,000 white majority) a white, Robert Wilinski, won the election.

Why not create a new black ward and "allow" the residents to elect a machine candidate? At present the machine is dealing quite well with the fifteen black wards already in existence. One can only theorize as to why they hope to limit the number of black wards. However, taking into account the possibility that these fifteen aldermen have a racial

heritage in common and that this heritage may be strong enough to cause them to vote along racial or ideological lines, the machine might fear the outcome of this unification in relation to possible opposition to machine policy. It is true that fifteen is not sufficient to cause great turmoil; yet, with the inclusion of the half-dozen independents and one Republican in the City Council, sheer numbers are enough to cause party regulars some concern about adding additional all-black wards.

By using gerrymandering to control the number of wards where blacks could possibly elect their own representatives, the machine is able to limit the extent to which this potential unification can approach a reality. Through this process of containment (which is necessary because of the large population of blacks in the city as opposed to the Spanish-speaking), the machine is able to establish a limited number of all black wards and divide the remaining blacks up in such a manner as to keep them from gaining a political advantage in any other wards.

The 7th ward is not the only example of the use of this containment policy. Located approximately in the geographic center of the city is the geopolitical distinction referred to by municipal code as the 14th ward. This ward is comprised (either wholly or in part) of the community areas known as Fuller Park, New City, West Englewood and Englewood.¹⁰

¹⁰While the population figures for each community area are close to being accurate, the transformation from community figures to ward figures tend to distort the actual picture to some degree. However, the overall effect is minimized by using the same formula in all cases and adding the conversion factor.

The combined black population for these four community areas (in proportion to the percentage they contribute to the total makeup of the ward) was 26,826 in 1960. The white population for the same period was 30,383; a white majority of some 4,000 persons existed at the time of the 1960 census. Had the ward boundaries remained the same after the 1970 census, the black population of the 14th ward would have totaled 30,294. The increase of less than 4,000 blacks in less than ten years is not as large an increase as many of the other wards in the city experienced in the same time span. But this increase, coupled with the decrease in the white population from 30,833 to 18,991, would have given blacks a clear majority in the ward. Obviously, the loss of inhabitants in the ward necessitated a change in the ward boundaries.

The 14th ward contained nearly 27,000 blacks in 1960 and over 30,000 in 1970; one would expect that if the pattern of gerrymandering used in the 7th ward was applied to the 14th ward, the results would indicate a probable loss of one-half of its black population. After re-drawing the ward boundaries, however, the black population (including the conversion factor of three per cent) was 6,760. Nearly 25,000 blacks were drawn out of the "new" ward. The 7th ward lost approximately 55% of its black population while the 14th lost almost 76%.

As indicated by the increase in the black population of both the 3rd and 11th wards, the blacks excluded from the 14th were drawn into these wards. The 3rd ward was redrawn to include approximately 16,000 of those excluded (with the 11th receiving the remaining amount). The eastern edge of the 14th ward (a totally black area) was remapped into

the 3rd ward (which in turn allowed the reapportioners to move the 14th ward farther west into "all white" areas). The 3rd ward was "controlled" for the machine by United States Congressman Ralph Metcalfe. (Metcalfe, former alderman and current Democratic Ward Committeeman for the 3rd ward had previously demonstrated his loyalty to the machine but began a major break as a result of his position on community control of the police and his endorsement of William S. Singer for the Democratic candidate for Mayor. The complete break did not materialize until after the 1971 redrawing, however.) With the 3rd ward being both a black and a machine ward, the influx of additional blacks would not affect the future election outcomes.

In the case of the 11th ward where the remaining 9,000 or so blacks were moved to, the Alderman, Michael Bilandic, is unquestionably a machine alderman. In Daley's own ward, there is always a concerted effort to produce the best turnout and the greatest number of Democratic votes in the 11th ward. The black population of the 11th ward after this move was no more than twenty per cent--a percentage that still allowed for an overwhelming control by machine captains even in the event that blacks decided to vote against a machine candidate. The area that was incorporated into the 11th ward was already a black neighborhood (along the frontage of the Dan Ryan Expressway). This maneuver permitted the reapportioners to move the 14th ward two blocks farther south (as well as farther west with the aid of the 3rd ward maneuver). The resulting white majority in the 14th ward (over 36,000) would have been more than

enough to elect a white Daley alderman, thereby limiting the number of black wards and still keeping the machine in power in that area. (They did elect Alderman Edward M. Burke, who also served as the Democratic Ward Committeeman).


The maps on the following pages indicate the position of the 14th ward (as well as the other three wards being examined) in both 1960 and 1970. The third map in the group is an overlay of both years and graphically portrays the changes in ward boundaries.

Another ward that fits somewhat into the pattern already established in terms of gerrymandering in Chicago is the 19th ward. Situated in the southwestern most corner of the city, the 19th ward in 1960 included all or part of Auburn-Gresham, Beverly, Morgan Park, Mount Greenwood and Washington Heights.

Population shifts in this area for the past ten years have been quite significant. Auburn-Gresham was .2% black in 1960; by 1970 it had become 68.67% black. Washington Heights was 12.5% black in 1960; by 1970 the black population had grown to 74.66%. From 1950 through 1970, Beverly and Mount Greenwood remained less than 1% black. Morgan Park on the other hand, experienced a change from 35% to 47% black population for the same period.


From an economic standpoint, Beverly and Mount Greenwood (both of which are entirely in the 19th ward even today) are numbered among the top five communities in terms of average family income. The percentages of families in these areas that are earning more than \$10,000 annually are 79.26% and 72.01% respectively. Both of these areas are

7TH, 14TH, 19TH AND 31ST WARD BOUNDARIES: SEPTEMBER 28, 1961




Source: Chicago Board of Election Commissioners

7TH, 14TH, 19TH AND 31ST WARD BOUNDARIES: NOVEMBER 5TH, 1970



Source: Chicago Board of Election Commissioners

INTERSECTION OF WARD BOUNDARIES



1961 Boundary

1970 Boundary

Source: Chicago Board
of Election Commissioners

predominantly Irish-Catholic, and nearly a quarter of the residents attended four or more years of college. Only Hyde Park had a higher percentage of residents attending college for four or more years (perhaps related to the presence of the University of Chicago).

In contrast, the other three community areas have an average of 8.60% of the residents attending four or more years of college and 62.35% make more than \$10,000 annually. It was no wonder then, that after the new ward boundaries were drawn in 1970, the black population of the 19th ward was only 7,714 and this maneuver was accomplished by excluding all of Washington Heights and Auburn-Gresham. There can be no other possible explanation of this action than the one explained by gerrymandering; in effect, the removal of these two community areas from the 19th ward created two entirely "safe" wards for the Democratic Party while preserving the number of established black wards. This action gave the Democratic Party an "unfair advantage" in terms of ability to elect certain aldermen. The creation of the "unfair advantage" is directly in line with the very definition of gerrymandering that we examined in Chapter II. There are innumerable ways to redraw the boundaries of the 19th ward and still remain within the parameters of the "one man, one vote" concept, and yet, the one chosen happens to exclude two black communities. One would be inclined to conclude that this was more than just chance or coincidence.

The only way to effectively accomplish this gerrymandering was to place the black population in a ward that would not affect the machine's control in the area. The 34th ward, which originally was

located on the Near North Side, was moved to the South Side, and the area around the 19th ward was redrawn to include this relocated ward. The blacks that were removed from the 19th ward were placed in the 34th and 21st wards with the greater part of the land mass (about 75%) and the corresponding population placed in the 34th ward. The area that was covered by the 34th ward was already an all black area and under machine control. It was a matter of routine for the machine to elect black Alderman Wilson Frost. The election of Frost, president pro tem of the City Council and a key black leader in the machine, placed the entire area under complete machine domination.

Had the machine not moved the blacks into the already black area that was to become the 34th ward, the black population of the 19th ward would have been 26,008. In effect then, the function served by the gerrymandering of the 19th ward was to keep the level of blacks at the 1960 mark and contain them in one area (the 34th ward), thereby preventing them from possibly gaining two wards in terms of representation.

Since the entire next chapter involves a detailed study of the Federal Court of Appeals' findings on the alleged gerrymandering of the 31st ward, I will limit discussion of the ward to the data found in the 1960 and 1970 census that pertains to the population of this area. As previously noted, the term I have given to the action of gerrymandering in the case of the 31st ward is "dispersal." It involves a conscious effort to "scatter" a particular population (in a political sense) by dissecting the community's boundaries with ward boundaries. By separating the particular ethnic community into several different wards, it is

possible to keep any ethnic consciousness expressed through the ballot from resulting in the election of a representative of the ethnic group in question.

Before the 1970 census, the 31st ward was primarily composed of Humboldt Park and West Town. The total Spanish-speaking population of the 31st ward in 1960 was 28,795.¹¹ If the ward boundaries had remained the same, the 1970 Spanish-speaking population of the 31st ward would have numbered 60,022. However, after the 1970 redistricting, the present Spanish-speaking total is 22,022. (No conversion factor was necessary because the city of Chicago has published an up-to-date census of the Spanish-speaking in the city by ward.)

The change in the ward boundaries in the 31st enabled the machine to limit the Spanish-speaking to approximately one-third of the total ward population. This effort, however, created the problem of where to place the remaining Latinos. The 26th ward is located directly South-east of the 31st. The alderman is Stanley M. Zydlo, a Regular Democrat. In 1960, the Spanish-speaking represented 4.8% of the total population of the 26th ward. In 1970 they were 32.5% of the ward's population--a politically non-important factor in the case of majority rule when faced with ethnic voting patterns). In 1960, the 32nd ward had a Spanish-speaking population of 4.89% and the 33rd had only 0.22%. These wards

¹¹The figures for the Spanish-speaking community are not taken from the Local Community Fact Book as are all the figures for the black population. Rather, they are taken from an updated census made by the City of Chicago. Because they are listed by ward and not community area as are the black population figures, the transformation from community to ward is unnecessary and therefore the conversion factor is not employed.

are represented by Terry M. Gabinski and Tex Sande, both of whom are members of the Regular Democratic Party. By 1970 the Spanish-speaking totals had grown to 25.5% and 18.6%, respectively. City-wide in the same ten-year period, the Spanish-speaking population of Chicago had increased 125%. And yet, in these three wards, the population increased anywhere from 800% to 900%. In the 33rd ward, the population went from 156 Spanish-speaking to 12,483.

Why was it advantageous to the machine's position to engineer a move of this nature, and more importantly, why move them to 26, 32 and 33? The large concentration of Spanish-speaking in the area of the 31st ward endangered the re-election of one of the key members of the machine, Alderman Thomas Keane. (Keeping in mind the machine policy discussed in Chapters IV and the beginning of V, which involves appealing to a homogeneous community, the difficulty in Keane's ward was a result of the trifurcation of the community--white ethnics, blacks and now latinos.) Even if this was not uppermost among the concerns of the mayor, it certainly would have been expected to bother Keane and as chief architect of the redistricting plan, he was in a position to do something about it.

Why this particular maneuver occurred becomes more apparent when viewed from the perspective of the entire redistricting that took place that year. Specifically, in terms of both the 19th ward and the 31st ward, the machine felt that a change was necessary. The problems were quite different. In 19 what was needed was an additional ward where the black population could be contained, while in 31 what was needed was the

correct number of wards which would allow the dissection of the Spanish-speaking community to keep it from establishing a majority in any ward and thereby retaining machine control over the area.

It appears that the answer to both of these problems was the 34th ward. By removing it from the Northwest Side, the machine was able to take the remaining four ward (31, 26, 32 and 33--all of which are and were machine-dominated wards) and rearrange their boundaries so that each one of these loyal machine wards received a portion of the potentially dangerous Latin community. The choice of these wards was logical in that they were all within a reasonable distance of the center of the Spanish-speaking community and were already machine-dominated. Besides the obvious advantage of moving the 34th ward to keep the 31st ward "safe", the maneuver also provided the additional advantage of the previously discussed 19th ward maneuver.

Obviously, there is no better ward to examine in detail at this point than the one that "belongs" to the man who redrew the ward boundaries in the city: the 31st ward of Alderman Thomas Keane.¹²

¹²The research for this analysis covers an era when Thomas Keane was alderman of the 31st ward. Since that time he was forced to give up his office after his conviction in federal court for mail fraud and conspiracy. In the 1975 Aldermanic Elections in Chicago, Thomas Keane's wife won the election and now represents the 31st ward.

CHAPTER VI

THE 31ST WARD: A CASE STUDY

The main reason for the focus on the 31st ward involves Alderman Thomas Keane. If one assumes that gerrymandering is designed to aid a particular party or its members, the logical place to look for evidence of gerrymandering would be in those areas where the leading party members enjoy control. As cited in Chapter III of this paper, Thomas Keane has proven to be the second most influential man in the Democratic Party in Chicago (second only to Richard J. Daley). Thus, his home ward would be a logical beginning point for an investigation of this nature.

One would expect that if gerrymandering were to take place, certainly those responsible for the redistricting would have to be part of the gerrymandering effort. It is not unreasonable then, to examine the actions and impute possible motives for the manner in which ward boundaries were redrawn. Not only did Thomas Keane have the opportunity to affect a change of any nature he desired by virtue of his role as the Chairman of the special subcommittee commissioned to present a suitable reapportionment of the city, but he also possessed the political knowledge and contacts necessary to achieve a goal such as gerrymandering.

A second reason for closer examination of the 31st ward involves the litigation that resulted from the alleged gerrymander. In the court battle that followed the allegations of gerrymandering in the city, two

wards were central to the entire discussion: the 7th ward which was ordered redrawn on the grounds of gerrymandering (although it was later returned to its original boundaries after a series of appeals), and the 31st ward which was not ordered redrawn at all.

Before pursuing this line of thought with all its implications, it is necessary to examine the physical aspects of the ward and the population composition in order to understand the profitability of gerrymandering.

On September 28th, 1961, a map containing the ward boundaries of the City of Chicago was entered into the municipal code along with the descriptions of the individual wards. The map was presumably based on the population changes noted by the 1960 United States Census data. Of particular interest to the people on the Northwest Side of the city were the new ward boundaries of the 31st ward. The alderman at this time was Thomas Keane.¹ The ward that Keane represented since he was first elected in 1945 began at the intersection of Chicago and Western Avenues. It proceeded north on Western Avenue until it intersected with North Avenue, where it turned west. It continued west on North Avenue until Pulaski Road; turning south on Pulaski where it returned to Chicago Avenue. The ward then continued east on Chicago until it returned to the point of origin. Obviously, the ward was a compact rectangle incorporating a fairly contiguous piece of property.

¹This map resulted from the city ordinance adopted on September 28th, 1961 as Municipal Code of Chicago, Sections 4-13 to 4-64.

On November 6th, 1970, a map containing the "new"² ward boundaries of the City of Chicago followed the same filing process. Again, it was of particular interest to the people on the Northwest Side to note the proposed new boundaries of the 31st ward. Section 4-44 of the Municipal Code (amended) outlines these new boundaries.

An examination of these two sets of boundaries (see maps on pages 55 and 56) leads to two observations. The first is that the resulting western edge of the proposed new ward was seven blocks farther west than the corresponding boundary on the 1961 map. The second observation is that the eastern edge of the ward resembles a drain pipe in its new and contorted form, while the previous boundary formed a simple right angle. Perhaps at first there appears no need for further investigation. However, considering the new ward and its changed boundaries in light of census data which indicates an increase of Spanish-speaking at the eastern edge of the ward and a predominance of "white ethnics"³ at the western edge (38.8% foreign stock in the community area, 93.2% of whom live in the western one-third of the ward⁴), there is reason enough

²The map that resulted from this ordinance was adopted by the Chicago City Council as Municipal Code of Chicago, Sections 4-13 to 4-64 amended, November 6th, 1970.

³The term "white ethnics" is used in the manner of Weber as he described this need for human collectivity based on an assumption of common origin, real or imaginary, Max Weber, The Ethnic Group, in Talcott Parsons, et al. Theories of Society, Vol. 1, p. 305 (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961)

⁴All data and statistics concerning the nature and size of the populations analyzed in this study are taken from E. M. Kitagawa and P. M. Hauser, Local Community Fact Book (Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, 1950, 1960, 1970)


to investigate this redrawing further.

Humboldt Park (which is the community area corresponding to the western edge of the 31st ward) has approximately 15.5% Spanish-speaking while West Town (which is the eastern edge) has a Spanish-speaking population of 39.09%. In 1960, two-thirds of the 31st ward was in West Town and only one-third in Humboldt Park. In 1970, however, the order was reversed and now two-thirds of the 31st ward's population lives in Humboldt Park.

Despite the increase in Spanish-speaking in West Town, the total population of the area decreased by ten per cent. The figures and maps illustrate one constant factor: in 1960 the Spanish-speaking were seventeen per cent of the total ward population; in 1970, there was a significant increase in this population. It was so significant that even after the ward was moved nearly a mile farther from the center of the Spanish-speaking community, it still comprised thirty-three per cent of the ward's population. Even without examining the registration rates and voting patterns of minorities, in numerical consideration alone, the Spanish-speaking remain a political minority in the 31st ward despite their growth in numbers in the general area.

From an evaluation of census data and figures and maps supplied by the Department of Development and Planning of the City of Chicago, the approximate central point of the Spanish-speaking community lies at the intersection of Division and Western Avenues (see map on following page). Not only is a portion of the 31st ward's boundaries part of this intersection, but it also serves as part of the boundaries for three

MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS OF SPANISH-SPEAKING IN 1960 & 1970



other wards. The 34th ward, which was located in the same general area before and after the 1960 reapportionment, was moved to the South Side after the 1970 reapportionment and used to incorporate the black area surrounding the 19th ward. (See argument offered in Chapter V.) After the removal of the 34th ward, the expansion and reorganization of the remaining wards was possible. The remaining four wards were restructured in such a manner as to separate the Spanish-speaking into different political subdivisions, thereby keeping them from gathering in any one particular ward.

This action, which I have termed "dispersal," is the opposite of the "confinement" action taken in the previously discussed wards. In 7, 14 and 19 the object was to combine black areas and separate them from the white areas to facilitate the election or re-election of machine candidates. By sectioning off the black areas the machine was able to plan election strategy with a more homogeneous electorate in mind. In my estimation, this action was necessary because of the large numbers of people that had to be dealt with. In the case of the Spanish-speaking, their numbers do not warrant any action that would cause the machine to relinquish its power in the area and allow the election of a latin. Yet they do constitute a large enough group to cause possible election battles. The machine's response was to divide the community up into "controllable" numbers and separate it politically.

The community at large had a response of its own. It came in the form of legal recourse. I have already stated that the judicial branch, on all levels, has taken the most definitive stand in terms of

dealing with gerrymandering, but because of the indeterminate nature of gerrymandering, it has been difficult to adjudicate the alleged practice. There was a particularly important case concerning gerrymandering in Chicago (i.e., the response of the community at large). The case deals with six specific instances of gerrymandering with reference to nearly a dozen more occurrences as well as a stated position dealing with the effect on the entire city. The center of the review is the 31st ward.

Cousins v City Council of Chicago⁵ was brought to remedy alleged racial and ethnic gerrymandering in the reapportionment of Chicago's wards in 1970. The case was filed in December, 1970 and brought immediately to trial. At the conclusion of the first trial (in Chicago's Court), judgment was entered in favor of the defendants (The City Council, Mayor Richard J. Daley, and the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners). Subsequent to this decision, the plaintiffs--the Independent Voters of Illinois (a subsidiary group of the parent organization, Americans for Democratic Action, an organization engaged in political campaigning and fund raising for "independent-minded" candidates), Committee for an Effective City Council (an ad hoc committee organized by civic-minded citizens to prepare the charges against the defendants and to raise money for the court battles) and some twenty individuals--appealed the ruling. After being notified of the court's decision to remand the case for retrial before a different judge, the defendants took recourse in filing for a writ of certiorari. The plaintiffs claimed that

⁵Cousins v City Council of Chicago, 73-1891; 73-2127, 7th cir. (1971)

citations in the filing were "clearly erroneous."⁶ The United States Supreme Court denied petition for the writ.

Subsequent to the Court's denial (which took place on May 25th, 1972), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the person of the Honorable Thomas R. McMillen, issued the Decision and Order⁷ finding only the 7th ward in the City of Chicago had been drawn so as to discriminate against a minority. To remedy the situation, he ordered the ward redrawn and a special election held. He failed to rule on the 31st or any other ward in question.

According to a brief filed in the United States Court of Appeals by Michael Shakman, another attorney for the plaintiffs, the trial judge also found that the other wards had been drawn to exclude blacks and Puerto Ricans or to ensure a white majority, but McMillen refused to order relief with respect to those wards because of a "misapprehension of the proper rule of law to apply to his own findings."⁸

The suit filed by these groups and individuals charged that the city had been gerrymandered in its entirety. (See discussion of "key wards' theory in Chapter V.) In lieu of the reapportionment of all of the city's wards, the plaintiffs submitted a number of intermediary steps they felt would remedy the most drastically gerrymandered wards. On

⁶In a conversation with Alderman Dick Simpson in November of 1973, Simpson (as a principle in the litigation), used the term "clearly erroneous" in relation to the grounds on which the defendants were filing for the Writ of Certiorari.

⁷Appellate Court, 7th Cir., 446 F. 2d at 835

⁸Plaintiffs Brief filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council,

August 10, 1973, the plaintiffs again filed a motion,⁹ this time for an injunction and an injunction pending appeal, in which they sought an order foreclosing the City Council from proceeding with its announced plans to reapportion all wards for the 1975 aldermanic and mayoral elections. The responsibility for this new apportioning of the ward boundaries would be placed in the hands of the same subcommittee that produced the currently contested reapportionment of 1970. This subcommittee would undoubtedly be chaired by the same man who provoked most of the controversy surrounding the initial claim of gerrymandering, Alderman Thomas Keane. In November of 1974, the Circuit Court finally ruled in favor of the City Council and denied the motion for an injunction.

The central character in the entire controversy appears to be Thomas Keane himself. During the course of the trial, evidence the plaintiffs submitted established the existence of what became known as the "Secret Map."¹⁰ Testimony was given concerning the preparation of a secret map in Alderman Keane's private law office, by a Keane aide and three college student interns paid by the city. This map was surreptitiously used by Alderman Keane as the basis for the official map he drew publicly at City Council Rules Committee meetings. According to Michael Shakman, "...the "Secret Map" and the discovery of its existence

⁹Appellate, 310, 313

¹⁰For a detailed discussion of the "Secret Map" see the 2nd Plaintiffs Brief, filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, Federal Appellate Court for the 7th Circuit.

during the first trial was like an episode out of Perry Mason."¹¹

The trial court found that in drawing the 31st ward on the "Secret Map," Edward Bell (Keane's aide),

...resisted the inclusion of additional blacks or Puerto Ricans in the new ward by keeping it as far west as was feasible. We believe that this was presumably in accordance with Keane's wish.¹²
(Emphasis added.)

This quote from the Court's own decision seems evidence enough that gerrymandering for certain political reasons did in fact take place in the 31st ward.

The plaintiffs went on to contend that since the actual 31st ward on the enacted map was identical with the one on the "Secret Map" there was no way for Keane to escape responsibility for what Edward Bell and the three college students had done. Furthermore, they felt because Keane was acting in an official capacity as agent of the City Council, the City Council must share the blame for Keane's actions by virtue of their tacit approval. They substantiated their claim of the relationship between Bell and Keane with additional evidence including City Council records indicating that Edward Bell was paid by the city and had acted as agent for Alderman Keane in several official actions prior to this situation.¹³

¹¹This comment made by Michael Shakman appears in the 2nd Plaintiffs Brief, filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, Federal Appellate Court for the 7th Circuit, p. 11

¹²Appellate ruling: App. #311

¹³The argument offered by the defendants indicated that they were not contesting whether or not the actions were indeed politically motivated but rather if the initiation came from Keane or Bell himself.

In response to the claim that the reapportionment of the 31st ward was a discriminatory exclusion of Puerto Ricans, the City Council argued that the change actually benefited the Spanish-speaking community by increasing their population in the 26th ward.¹⁴ (By the city's own figures, the per cent of the total population that was Spanish-speaking after the reapportionment was 33.0% for the 31st ward and 32.5% for the 26th ward.) Despite the fact that the resulting populations of Spanish-speaking in these two wards were practically identical, there is no evidence indicating that the Spanish-speaking population that was excluded from the 31st ward was transferred to the 26th ward as the city claimed. In fact, the evidence I presented in Chapter V indicates that the Latinos were dispersed among three wards (26, 32, and 33). There was no testimony in any of the three court cases explaining that this "beneficient gerrymander" was to help the Spanish-speaking constitute a majority or even a sizeable minority somewhere else. If indeed this was the object, the logical course would have been to gather them in the ward already containing the highest proportion of Spanish-speaking, that is, the 31st ward. The only mention of any such action by the City Coun-

¹⁴While in effect the Spanish-speaking population of the 26th ward was increased by the action taken by Keane, one must view the overall results of the action as a whole. The total population of Spanish-speaking in the 26th ward became over 32% as a result of the re-districting; an overall increase of some 28%. However, all five wards in the immediate area with any noticeable Spanish-speaking population increased as a result of ethnic migration patterns. The ever present factor of no one ward with more than 33% Spanish-speaking is still vital to the consideration at hand. One can not ignore or blame coincidence for the fact that in a predominantly Spanish-speaking area of the city, the geo-political boundaries manage to dissect the community in such a manner as to develop five wards, none of which have close to a majority of Spanish-speaking.

cil was in the brief filed by the Council's attorneys in response to the appeal entered by the plaintiffs.¹⁵ The plaintiffs argued that the city's attorneys were making "...a blatant effort to concoct an after-the-fact justification for the unconstitutional discrimination practiced by the City Council and Alderman Keane."¹⁶ The plaintiffs were granted an appeal in the case; once again the emphasis was almost entirely on the 31st ward.

The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants in the first appeal based on the distinction between discrimination with respect to the larger community (the entire Spanish language group) and discrimination in terms of the particular (the Latin American minority). The court had ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to make a distinction between the two and therefore left the court with questionable jurisdiction. In the Court's words:

Furthermore, the evidence concerning the Spanish language group reveals that although totalling about 80,000 persons, it contains an unknown number of aliens and it is so scattered as to constitute a minority in any ward, unless perhaps a special ward were to be drawn to accommodate this group. We find and conclude that the plaintiffs evidence concerning the Spanish language group is not relevant to the pleadings or to the Court of Appeals mandate and in any event fails to prove grounds for relief.¹⁷ (Emphasis added.)

There is legal precedent that questions the trial court's decision based on the point of citizenship. The 14th amendment prohibits

¹⁵City of Chicago, Defendants Brief filed in response to Cousins v City Council, pp. 23-24

¹⁶Plaintiffs Brief filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, p. 11

¹⁷Gomillion v Lightfoot; 466 F. 2d at 841 (1970)

discrimination against persons, it does not limit the scope of jurisdiction to citizens.¹⁸

In the first appeal the court denied relief because there was no basis for jurisdiction in a case of this nature. In the second appeal, the emphasis was placed on two different aspects.

The star witnesses in one aspect of the second appeal were the three college student interns hired by the city and subsequently involved in drawing the "Secret Map" because of their assignment to Alderman Keane.¹⁹ In the brief filed by the plaintiffs for their second appeal, they claimed that to remedy the situation, it would be essential that an independent agency of some nature would have to assume responsibility for redrawing the ward boundaries. Part of the reasoning applied to this request (for the reapportionment function to be assigned to another agency) was the consideration that in the future, Keane and the City Council would not be foolish enough to hire college students who would so quickly divulge potentially damaging information.

In response to the question of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs presented the opinion that the Court should use three rules of law in the decision and order on the claim of gerrymandering. The first rule stated

¹⁸See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)

¹⁹In the briefs and trial transcripts the mention of the college students is listed as such: The three students and Professor Murray, their supervisor. The explanation I was given by a clerk in the Federal Building sounds plausible in that he stated that because of their youth and unintentional involvement perhaps their names have been stricken from the record.

that minority group members are protected from having ward boundaries drawn to dilute or minimize their voting strength; there should be no requirement that the minority constitute a majority of ward members before the gerrymander. In defense of this position they cited the case of Gomillion v Lightfoot: "When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment (gerrymandering), it violates the fifteenth amendment."²⁰

The second rule of law stated that to prove unlawful racial or ethnic discrimination, it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that the dominant purpose of the defendants' action was discrimination. In Wright v the Council of the City of Emporia, the Supreme Court recognized this principle. The Court of Appeals had found that the primary purpose of the city was benign, and that it was not a cover-up for racial discrimination. But in the Wright case the Supreme Court had already rejected the dominant purpose theory by stating:

This "dominant purpose" test finds no precedent in our decisions. It is true that where an action by school authorities is motivated by a demonstrated discriminatory purpose, the existence of that purpose may add to the discriminatory effect of the action by intensifying the stigma of implied racial inferiority...it is difficult for the court to determine the "sole" or "dominant" motivation behind the choice of a group of legislators...thus we have focused on the effect and not on the purpose or motivation...the existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.²¹ (Emphasis added.)

This Supreme Court decision appears to reject the position assumed by the first trial judge when he claimed that Alderman Keane's

²⁰Gomillion v Lightfoot, 466 F. 2d at 841 (1970)

²¹Wright v Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S.: 451, 461-2 (1972)

action was not intentional, and it was therefore permissible.

The third rule of law that the plaintiffs felt was necessary to achieve proper adjudication in this case is that even if racial or ethnic discrimination is the product of a variety of motivations, it is unlawful. In reversing a lower court decision in the case of Smith v Adler Realty Company, the Supreme Court held: "it (race) cannot be brushed aside because it was neither the sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimination. We find no acceptable place in law for partial discrimination."²²

These three rules of law offered by the plaintiffs were intended to be applied to the actions of the defendants. However, there was one defendant which claimed no part in the action whatsoever. The Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, in a brief filed by its attorney, Thomas Foran, contended that the board is charged with the administration of election laws concerning the aldermen in the City of Chicago and not with the way in which those laws come into being. Foran claimed "...it is not the responsibility of the Board, under law, to determine the location of the City's wards and their boundaries...as such, the Board is a neutral party...(and)...merely awaits the directions of the Court, if any."²³

In spite of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in the case,

²²Smith v Adler Realty Company, 436 F. 2d at 344 (1970)

²³Brief and Argument of Defendant Appellee, Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago in response to Cousins v City Council, p. 3

the Court refused to order remedy in the area of the 31st ward, and subsequently, it remains the same as it was on the "Secret Map." The Court found that the action of the defendants was politically motivated, yet no relief was granted because whether or not the gerrymander had taken place, the Spanish-speaking would not have managed a politically potent majority. Based on the logic presented by the Court in its decision, one would have to conclude that gerrymandering is an acceptable practice if the minority in question couldn't win an election whether the gerrymander took place or not. (Perhaps, under this same logic, euthanasia is legal as well as moral to the extent that whatever may be done, the patient will eventually die.)

In its ruling the Appellate Court states:

The ward (31st) ended up with 25% Puerto Ricans (not including other Spanish-speaking persons) and 1.4% blacks. Had its boundaries been moved east or north to include more blacks or Puerto Ricans, the dominant majority would still have remained overwhelmingly as before. We find and conclude that the consideration for the shape and boundaries of the 31st ward were primarily political and that the failure to include certain areas of blacks and Puerto Ricans caused them no discernible loss of voting strength.²⁴ (Emphasis added.)

These two considerations (where the emphasis is added in the Court's ruling above) conflict with the precedent set by the Supreme Court concerning the "dominant purpose" test (as discussed earlier in this chapter). The focus, as the Court stated, should be placed on the action taken, that is that the consideration for the shape of the ward was indeed "primarily political." The Appellate Court's decision was questionable in this regard: if the ward boundaries were moved seven

²⁴Decision and Order of July 11, 1973, Appellate Court Ruling, App. 310-311

blocks east instead of seven blocks west, the Spanish-speaking population of the 31st ward would have been 39.6%, and the black population would have been 4.5%. Because the court was compelled to combine these two ethnic groups to form one minority factor, I feel equally compelled and submit that when they are combined and measure 44.1% of the total population that this figure is indeed quite discernible from the 26.4% that results from the Keane redistricting. Considering the 31st ward in light of the "dominant purpose" theory as well as the results of the minority movement (an action apparently not taken by the appellate court), the conclusion becomes an obvious one.

The evidence clearly points to the consideration that the 31st ward was indeed gerrymandered for "primarily political" reasons. The Court's decision does not reflect this evidence and in itself may reflect a "political influence" of another sort. At best, we can only speculate on this point. Regardless of the Court's reasons for ruling in favor of the defendants, it remains to be seen whether or not future cases of gerrymandering will test the fiber of our legal system. In any case, it is our social system that experiences the brunt of this kind of activity. The consequences of gerrymandering borne of primarily political ends certainly have great social implications, a subject to which we will now turn.

CHAPTER VII

CONSEQUENCES OF A GERRYMANDER

How successful was the attempt at limiting the political power of the Spanish-speaking and black minorities in Chicago? As with most questions of this nature, the answer depends on one's perspective. While both sides of this confrontation may have reason to celebrate, it is clear that the anti-gerrymandering forces have felt the full force of Chicago's "machine power."

There is one aspect of the entire debate that is obvious because of its absence. It was not the Spanish-speaking or black communities per se that engaged the battle with the machine; rather, it was the so-called independent influence in Chicago that again challenged the machine. One is faced with the realization that, until these communities begin to organize and develop a mode of participation, any question of fair and equitable representation may be purely academic. One cannot assume that electing black or Latin representatives in Chicago is going to cure the ills of their communities, but from a practical political approach, it would give them that all important foot in the door.

The purpose of these past pages has been to acquaint the reader with the relevant information concerning gerrymandering and its different forms and different manifestations in Chicago. The data and explanations so far supplied have only identified the nature of the pro-

blem and its relation to the source of power in Chicago. To fully comprehend the implications of a political and social action like gerrymandering, the action must be considered in light of its relationship to the source of power that it depends on for its existence. That is to say, without the power of the machine in Chicago, gerrymandering would not be possible to the extent I have described. While the ability to gerrymander appears dependent on holding political power, the converse is not necessarily true. We have to take this concept one step further and ask two questions about the machine's power even without the aid of gerrymandering. First, if the ward boundaries had been drawn in compliance with Baker v Carr, would there be any assurance that these minorities would or could elect their own representatives to the Chicago City Council? Second, would the election of one or two or even five representatives damage the machine's power?

In answer to this first question, it is inequitable to deal with the very nature of representation on a "what if" basis. Certainly what we are concerned with is the opportunity and not assurances. It is in the guarantee of minority rights that the fundamental elements of American democracy are embedded. The XIII, XIV, XV, XXIV and perhaps soon the XXVII amendments have repeatedly recalled the rights of the individual to his or her vote in our democracy. Nowhere in the Constitution of the United States, or for that matter in any interpretation of it, is there a passage that specifically assures that minorities will have a voice in government by virtue of their right to vote. They too have the right to cast their vote where they see fit, even though it may not be for a

minority representative. The question remains, however, not who they may vote for, but rather who are they kept from voting for?

With the first question restated in this manner we are logically confronted with the second question: Would the election of a handful of minority representatives to the Chicago City Council endanger the control that the machine now enjoys? If gerrymandering in Chicago takes away the minorities' ability to vote for a particular person, and if this is accomplished by the machine's direct intervention, then the minorities in Chicago are being denied the rights guaranteed by law and tested in the courts.

It may appear as if the use of gerrymandering in Chicago is the sole element of the machine's power. I doubt that an end to gerrymandering and the reapportionment of the wards in line with Baker v Carr would cause the machine to crumble immediately. However, without the ability to gerrymander in order to protect the re-election efforts of certain machine aldermen, the effectiveness of the machine could be severely hampered. The role that gerrymandering plays as an important tool for the maintenance and enhancement of the machine in Chicago could not easily be replaced. Even beyond this question of the machine's future one must ask if the use of gerrymandering does affect the quality (and perhaps the very existence) of minority representation in Chicago, and what are the consequences of this use in terms of the machine's desire for preservation and enhancement?

In light of the type of questions that need be asked (i.e., questions that deal with consequences primarily of social significance), the

most advantageous way of examining these questions is through a process that will scrutinize their social implications. Functional analysis, which was at one time primarily a technique employed in anthropological research of social and cultural differences, has been adapted by social scientists like Merton¹ to establish the social consequences of actions in terms of their relationship to the system attempting to implement them.

In Robert K. Merton's development of the conceptual scheme of functional analysis, he presents four concepts that are fundamental to an approach of this nature.² The first involves an awareness of the function that a social action serves. The second consideration involves an awareness of the process through which this function is eventually realized. The third aspect of the conceptual scheme lies in the direction of the unanticipated consequences of a social action, and the fourth consideration is of "those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system."³ The dysfunction that Merton speaks of in his fourth consideration may lead to interference with the system's accomplishments or may lead to an eventual structural change of the system.

In Peter M. Blau's study of bureaucracy⁴ he organizes his data

¹Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (revised; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957) pp. 19-84

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (revised; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)

along the paradigm developed by Merton. Blau defines function as an observed consequence of social patterns.⁵ The social patterns that we are dealing with in this analysis of gerrymandering are heavily imbued with the influence of a definite machine-dominated political system. There is no doubt then that the consequences of social patterns so imbued would be an effort to maintain and/or enhance this machine-dominated system. In keeping with Merton's paradigm and Blau's application, the consequences realized through these social patterns are observable in terms of both their "manifest" (the designed outcome of social action) and their "latent" (unintended consequences of a social action) natures.

One of the major manifest consequences realized through gerrymandering involves the previously discussed methods of enacting a gerrymander in Chicago. The containment and dispersal strategies the machine employs permit it to organize the composition of the electorate in the city's wards in such a fashion as to create "safe" districts for the reelection of machine aldermen (see Chapter V).

By this same process, limiting the number of "minority" and/or "independent" aldermen who could possibly challenge machine control could be achieved. Both of these intended consequences involve an effort to quantitatively destroy the vote power of these minorities. Through this effort another consequence, which may or may not be the intended object of the machine, must be examined. I refer here to the racial overtones

⁵Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (revised.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)

of gerrymandering. Because the reapportionment was conducted in "closed session," one can only impute possible racial motivations behind the reapportionment described in Chapter V and VI of this study. Three distinct possibilities are left. First, the machine's action was one borne of racial prejudice. This line of reasoning is altogether too extreme in reference to this aspect of political life in Chicago. Although many political actions are spawned of intense hatred for a particular ethnic or racial group, there is no empirical evidence to prove that gerrymandering was a result of this. A second possibility is that blacks and latinos were identified by the machine as potential challengers and as such were "dealt with" as all other challengers have been (e.g. reform clubs and Independents). While this approach seems more in line with the past performance of the machine, one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of killing two birds with one stone. Which presents the third possibility, that these two approaches were the impetus for the gerrymandering in Chicago. While the main reason behind gerrymandering in Chicago was indeed political, it would be unrealistic to assume that gerrymandering did not involve certain racial overtones. One must keep in mind that New York successfully gerrymandered the Democrats out of the 15th district, regardless of race or ethnic origin, and Chicago's gerrymander did single out two readily identifiable ethnic groups.

In examining the manifest consequences of gerrymandering (primarily the creation of "safe" wards), the effects in terms of political power at the ward level should be noted.

An analysis of the 1970 ward map indicates that there are fifteen

wards which contain a mixture of both black and white constituents. These wards lie on the border between the all black areas of the city and the all white areas. There are eleven of these "border" wards where blacks are in a minority and only four "border" wards where whites are in a minority.

The number of blacks who would be placed in a minority position in these eleven wards totals 151,628. The number of whites in a corresponding position would be 43,359, a difference of over one hundred thousand people who are placed in a relatively powerless position because this benefits the election of more readily "controlled" candidates. Scattering the Spanish-speaking as described in the previous chapter (in terms of political location) produced similar results.

By separating the Spanish-speaking into different wards, the first consequence of the action of gerrymandering (i.e., the creation of "safe" wards) is realized; even if they wished to vote against a machine candidate they are numerically insufficient to elect their own representative. (See discussion in Chapter V.) The action of gerrymandering quantitatively defines the electoral power of the Spanish-speaking after the fact, for while they may be gathered in great numbers in terms of their community location, they are scattered politically in terms of their ward location.

Another direct consequence of gerrymandering, which may very well be a product of the production of safe wards, involves minimizing potential opposition. It stands to reason that for every safe ward produced as a result of gerrymandering there exists one less ward with the poten-

tial to produce an anti-machine representative. In the examination of the four wards in this study there were an additional eight wards considered because of their role as recipient of the "displaced" populations. Seven of these eight wards are traditionally machine dominated (the exception being the 5th ward). After the populations were placed in these seven wards, the election results indicated that they remained machine dominated. At no time did the populations moved into these seven wards constitute greater than one-third of the ward's total population. By limiting the opportunity for opposing groups to constitute a majority in any of these seven wards, the machine has continued its domination in those areas.

These manifest consequences are obvious. Where the possibility of a loss of machine control existed, the policy of gerrymandering was employed to aid in strengthening this control. In the case of the all black areas, the wards were structured in such a way as to limit the number of possible minority aldermen by placing blacks in a minority position in the eleven border wards.

Since election results for these wards indicate continued machine dominance, there is evidence that gerrymandering did achieve the goals the machine appeared to have set. However, because one cannot conclude that these candidates would have lost if the gerrymandering had never taken place, the extent of the role of gerrymandering is somewhat ill-defined. While gerrymandering may appear to be a necessary cause for continued machine dominance, it can in no way be construed as a sufficient cause.

While the manifest consequences of this social action of gerrymandering appear to flow, one from the other, the latent consequences seem to be somewhat antithetical to each other (at least in terms of their effect on the machine's power). Because gerrymandering has all but closed the elective input channels, minority groups are forced to seek relief in other areas. Possible relief for the desire for representation can be vented in appointive positions. The machine certainly did not intend to create the demand for these appointive positions; it was not its intention to force the resurgence of ethnic consciousness that spearheaded these demands.

Once the Spanish-speaking were locked out of elective positions because of their minority position in Chicago's wards, they were forced to seek alternative methods. There remains a great deal of question regarding the role the machine actually played in the success of this alternative venture. Perhaps it was only coincident to closing the elective channels, but nonetheless, the Mayor simultaneously began appointing a number of Spanish-speaking individuals to fill administrative positions.⁶

Key to the question of the Mayor's motivation in appointing Spanish-surnamed individuals is the machine's track record in other areas of federal pressure. Currently, the federal government brought litigation to force the City of Chicago to hire policemen on a quota system. In response to this pressure, the city originally refused to comply with

⁶In a conversation with Ruben Cruz on April 26, 1976, columnist for the Chicago Sun-Times, the question of these appointments was raised. It is his opinion, as a leader in the Latin Community, that in the last five or six years Mayor Daley has succumbed to pressure by the Spanish-speaking community by appointing members to key positions in the city. These impressions, while supported by other Latin leaders, have not been substantiated by any other empirical data.

the federal government's order, prompting the government to withhold federal revenue sharing funds.⁷ The city has filed four appeals in the case and continues to battle the federal government's decision to this day.

Obviously, the city has not succumbed to federal government pressure in this area of minority hiring, so it does not seem logical to assume that in an area that does not have the millions of dollars at stake (as does police hiring), that the city would give in to less pressure.

In an across-the-board analysis of minority hiring in government, 5.4% of the Spanish speaking in the United States are in government service of some nature.⁸ Among the six major urban centers with a substantial Spanish-speaking population, only Miami has fewer Spanish-speaking in government than Chicago. These statistics reflect the highly limited role that the Spanish-speaking played in Chicago's city government, until five years ago when they became "conspicuously absent" (in relation to the national picture) from government or government-related positions.

What is the significance of this point in time? Obviously, gerrymandering is not a recent phenomenon, and certainly not a product of the last three years. Why then, if not in response to federal government pressure, did the Mayor begin these appointments? A possible

⁷United States of America, et al v City of Chicago, 73c 2080 (and consolidated cases) (1975)

⁸Chicago Spanish-speaking Population: Selected Statistics, City of Chicago Department of Development and Planning, September, 1973.

explanation might be that with the most recent redistricting (and as demonstrated in Chapter VI, the most blatant anti-Latin gerrymandering) and the futile attempt of the Spanish-speaking community to elect Luis Davila to the Illinois House of Representatives, the machine attempted to fulfill its distributive policies by giving the Spanish-speaking a share of the pie. The most recent census figures indicated in terms of sheer numbers, the Spanish-speaking community had to be reckoned with.

This first latent consequence was a manifestation of ethnic consciousness through the demand for recognition and representation. Another possible latent consequence of the informal policy of gerrymandering may involve an action similar to other machine policies: in the attempt to organize the black areas of the city into a limited number of wards, the unintended effect of stabilizing the community and containing black migration may have been realized. The political significance of this limiting of wards (discussed in Chapter V) through containing black migration is that the "containment policy" itself produced two effects: the first, the limiting of the number of black wards; the second, achievement of racial "stability."

The effectiveness of gerrymandering in terms of racial "stability" (in the physical sense of the ward) is not empirically demonstratable. However, there are certain factors, through functional analysis, that may lead one to believe that gerrymandering does play a definite role in shaping this stability.

From 1960 through 1970, the black population in the city of

Chicago increased by 150%.⁹ During this same period the percentage of people living in all white neighborhoods decreased by only twenty-one per cent. These figures indicate the relative immobility of the black population. For the most part, it expanded in neighborhoods that were already black and still remain black at this time.¹⁰

There are certain actions that contribute to this (either by intent or result) control of the black minorities. Low and moderate income and public housing facilities are almost exclusively built in black areas in Chicago,¹¹ and gerrymandering ward boundaries creates the geographic parameters of these areas. Because the available housing is only available in already established black areas, the majority of blacks are forced to move into these sections rather than elsewhere in the city.

Construction of highways and urban renewal projects tend to create physical barriers that stem the movement of families from one section of the city to another. This is another instance where the influence of gerrymandering can be witnessed. It is common practice to draw ward boundaries along present physical barriers which in turn reinforce the distinctions that already exist between racial and ethnic groups. This practice enables redistrictors to place highways, railroads and natural elements in the path of demographic movement.

⁹E. M. Kitagwa and P. M. Hauser, Local Community Fact Book (Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, 1950, 1960, 1970)

¹⁰David Protess, "Banfield's Chicago Revisited," Social Service Review (June, 1974)

¹¹Gautreaux v CHA, 296 F. Sup. 907 (North Dist., Ill. 1969)

Under this closer scrutiny, what appeared to be a latent consequence of gerrymandering begins to take on the proportions of a manifest consequence. The most profound element of the latent aspects of this consequence paradoxically seem to be the basis for the claim of their manifest nature. Specifically, I am referring to the question of stability. While it would appear that one could not guarantee that population movement would remain stable as a result of informal policy, the machine has been able to couple this policy with others in an attempt to achieve a guarantee of this nature. In effect then, what originally was a latent consequence--the apparent stability of blacks resulting from gerrymandering ward boundaries in Chicago--has been adopted by the machine and turned into a "desirable" or manifest action of gerrymandering (i.e., the combination of informal policies that lead to the physical stability of blacks in Chicago).

Some of these informal policies grow out of the experiences noted in a changing neighborhood. Among those who move may be members of the machine who serve as precinct captains or in other capacities as machine members. If one is in the practice of receiving and granting favors from a select group (such as the role that a machine captain plays), the transformation from one ward organization to another may result in forfeiting certain perquisites previously granted. These material inducements may be sufficient to encourage a person to look for another home in the same ward. Even in the case where a person is not induced to move because of the socio-psychological impact of a changing neighborhood, the same influences may come to bear.

If a gerrymandered ward outlines a particular ethnic or racial community, and the inhabitants are induced by their role in the machine to remain in that community, then the continued outlining of that community (through gerrymandering) may well mean the continued stability of the community (in terms of the physical aspects).

In the drawing of ward boundaries to create all black wards, such as the case of the 34th ward, machine domination may be viewed as preferable by the constituents. In this case, it would be in the best interests of those who share a preferred position with the machine to remain in the ward. By creating all black and all white wards, the machine may be establishing added incentive for the black population in Chicago to remain stable. The political ramifications of this incentive will most probably be noted in terms of electoral response.

The white community's response could be favorable electorally in return for keeping the black population "in its place."¹² In this role the machine would be seen as a "protector" by the white community. For the black community, the illusion of strength through numbers and physical proximity could result from this informal policy. The separation of the races, in conjunction with material inducements for remaining within a predefined geo-political distinction (which is largely the result of gerrymandering) could be viewed as sufficient cause for the black population remaining somewhat stable. This is not to say that the elements previously discussed (housing, physical barriers) do not play an impor-

¹²David Protess, "Banfield's Chicago Revisited," Social Service Review (June, 1974)

tant part, but rather that the stability factor as a latent-turned-manifest consequence of gerrymandering supplies the necessary final ingredient to make the entire package palatable.

Amidst all of these consequences lies the realization that the multi-ethnic population of Chicago has resisted the "melting pot" tendencies of cities with smaller and less diverse ethnic makeups. This resistance only made the role of the gerrymanderer more important in the eyes of the Regular Democratic Organization's leadership. As long as ethnic differences are pronounced, it will be necessary for candidates to appeal to a wide range of groups. Elections will depend upon the effectiveness of the coalitions that form in favor of a particular candidate and it will remain in the machine's interest to divide these groups up into single entities to facilitate logrolling efforts by initiating a specific appeal intended for a specific group. As long as it is politically more desirable to separate these groups than to combine them, gerrymandering will be an important tool for machine maintenance.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The element that lies at the very base of this analysis is the definition of a machine as a political party with a virtual monopoly over political resources which distributes tangible incentives for votes.¹ It is from this definition that the entire study developed and the role of gerrymandering was examined. I think at this juncture we can make some very important statements based on what has been thus far examined. Gerrymandering of itself does not make the Chicago machine a "machine." Neither do patronage or ward as opposed to at-large elections. Mayor Daley's ability to combine the roles of mayor and party chairman has not made the machine what it is. At least none of these aspects has accomplished this on its own; each factor has contributed to the continued success of the machine in Chicago. Each has indicated the presence of a machine in Chicago, and their perpetuation will most likely insure the machine's continuance.

In a behavioral analysis that examines one of these aspects in particular (i.e., gerrymandering), there should be some quantitative estimation of what impact the particular has had on the other aspects of machine dominance.

¹Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Random House, 1966) p. 115

The importance of gerrymandering among all the other indicators of machine power lies in its accessibility and relative ease of implementation under machine dominance. This is not to say that reform cities do not gerrymander, but rather the conditions that exist in a machine city allow the existing power structure to accomplish control of minorities with relatively little fear of reprisal.

This element has initiated a self-perpetuating cycle in machine-dominated Chicago. To gerrymander effectively, it becomes almost essential to have machine-type control. To continue this machine control, the electorate must re-elect machine members. A very effective way of achieving this control is through gerrymandering.

This concept stands at the center of the entire discussion of the role of gerrymandering. In the text of this analysis we have established the use of gerrymandering, its social as well as political consequences and the correlation between its future existence and that of the Chicago machine. What of the extent of this correlation? The answer to this is undeniably linked with the role of gerrymandering in the methods used for ensuring re-election.

The first premise is tautological: re-election is fundamental to the continued existence of the machine. The second premise is that the primary mode for accomplishing this objective is through the control of the apparatus of election; that is to say, the use of specific techniques (tools as it were) to ensure machine maintenance. If re-election (the first premise) is achieved through control of the electoral apparatus

(the second premise) then the object, machine maintenance, will be realized.

One way to measure the extent of this association is to examine the process (the method of controlling the electorate), in terms of the influence of gerrymandering. The role of the machine precinct captain in shaping the electoral habits of the citizenry has been documented in numerous accounts.² The control captain's exhibit is heightened by a variety of perquisites that enable them, as machine captains, to accomplish much more than their counterparts in reform cities (at least to the extent that reform captains do not enjoy a virtual monopoly over resources, and this allows for more viable competition by other parties and their captains).

This type of control over the electorate is best accomplished when stability (in terms of demographic movement) is achieved on the ward and even on the precinct level. While the ward is a political distinction and in and of itself has no physically limiting characteristics, the influence exerted by ward officials and the attempt to maintain "face to face contacts with individual citizens"³ allows the machine to "keep its grip upon the voters."⁴ What better way to keep this "grip" than to ensure a stable population by devising methods to keep it under the control of the same individuals? Gerrymandering, while separating

²Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. 23

³Ibid. p. 23

⁴Ibid. p. 23

these groups from other groups also serves to keep them in approximately the same area, thereby continually placing them under the control of the same ward officials.

The traditional control of the black areas that Gosnell attributes to the success of the first Daley mayoral election is not the same tradition that affects the Spanish-speaking in Chicago. Without this tradition of machine control, the orientation toward the Spanish-speaking community (as exemplified by the study of the 31st ward) differs from that used in the black areas inasmuch as it requires the dispersal tactics previously discussed. The effectiveness of this policy lies in the successful scattering of the Spanish-speaking into four wards and thereby preventing them from attaining the sheer numbers necessary for rivaling the machine's power.

Both of these orientations significantly contribute to the success of machine-style politics in Chicago. It is vital to the understanding of the methods employed by the machine that one places the entire scheme in perspective. The Chicago machine's ability to gerrymander comes from its control over political resources (patronage and other perquisites), its unrivaled elections (for the most part), the combination of the roles of mayor and party chairman, and the allegiance of the non-white community. Each one of these aspects of machine power is directly linked with the machine's ability to control the minorities--
which has been largely the result of gerrymandering. In other words, while gerrymandering could not be effectively implemented without the

aid of the machine, the machine in Chicago would have only limited effectiveness without gerrymandering.

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