



1963

An Evaluation of the Theses of Pierre Rousselot and Louis-B. Geiger on the Problem of Love in St. Thomas Aquinas

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Recommended Citation

Schwarz, Robert Joseph, "An Evaluation of the Theses of Pierre Rousselot and Louis-B. Geiger on the Problem of Love in St. Thomas Aquinas" (1963). *Master's Theses*. Paper 1845.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE THESES OF PIERRE ROUSSELOT
AND LOUIS-B. GEIGER ON THE PROBLEM OF
LOVE IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

June
1963

LIFE

Robert Joseph Schwarz was born in Chicago, Illinois, on July 10, 1934.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the days of the famous banquet reported by Plato, the question of love and friendship has been of interest and importance to the theorician. What is love? What are its forms? What are its causes? What are the results of this phenomenon, of which every man, philosopher and rustic, has some experience? In the Middle Ages the problem of man's love for God was of special interest. Is it possible to love God more than oneself? Can one love God with a love which is not a mere seeking of one's own good, one's personal happiness? According to the teaching of Aristotle, an object is loved in so far as it constitutes a "good" for the subject loving. Hence the scholastic followers of the Philosopher had a particular difficulty in admitting the possibility of a love of God above self. If a truly "disinterested" love for God should be admitted, what would be the relation of such a love to the subject's natural desire for his good--his perfection and happiness? In its most basic terms the problem was the apparent opposition between love as self-regarding and love as self-sacrificing. It was the old problem of reconciling the egocentric and the altruistic elements of love: eros and agape, amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae. Although the general treatment of this problem was classically expressed by Plato in his account of Agathon's celebrated drinking party, the most intense analysis of the question was made in the Middle Ages. Stienne

Gilson presents the problem as it faced the philosophical and theological minds of the period of the Scholastics:

To love as we ought, we should, in the first place, have to love all things for God's sake just as He loves them, and then, next, we should have to love God for Himself just as He loves Himself. The difficulty lies precisely here: that it is by no means immediately evident that this demand contains no contradiction. A finite being's love for his own good is, and, it would seem, cannot but be, interested; how then can we demand of him a disinterested love? When God is said to love Himself for His own perfection alone, the case is simple enough; since His perfection is such that nothing is left for Him to acquire, He can rejoice in it without power to complete it; but that man who needs so many things, and needs God more than anything else, can or even ought to love his own supreme good otherwise than as a good to be acquired--is that not a mere impossibility? ¹

In 1908 Pierre Rousselot presented a historical survey of the problem of love, entitled Pour l'Histoire du Problème de l'Amour au Moyen Age.² This work, one of the first modern studies on the nature of love, centered attention on one aspect of the question, the notion of a pure or disinterested love for God. The study of P. Rousselot has provided the impetus for many modern thinkers who have analyzed his thesis and in turn have grappled with the problem.

In following the concept of love in the writers of the Middle Ages, Rousselot found that the various theories could be grouped into two general schools, what he called the "physical" concept and the "ecstatic" concept. As will be seen in Chapter II, the adherents of the physical concept of love conceived love as based upon the natural and necessary tendency of all beings to

¹ Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1949), p. 279.

² Pierre Rousselot, Pour l'Histoire du Problème de l'Amour au Moyen Age (Munster, 1908).

seek their own good before all else. According to this theory, there is a fundamental identity between love of self and love of God, as if it were ultimately one and the same thing to love oneself and to love God. The adherents of the ecstatic concept, on the other hand, postulated self-forgetfulness as the necessary condition of all true love, literally putting the lover "outside of himself," and freeing the love from all egocentric connections.

Speaking of his study, Rousselot claimed that he merely tried to correlate the theories of love of one period of thought so as to furnish a preliminary survey for further historical investigation and interpretation.³

Of the philosophical writers who commented on this question after Rousselot's thesis, one of the more recent and most important has been Louis-B. Geiger. P. Geiger criticized Rousselot's findings on several points,⁴ but

³"Ici d'ailleurs l'on n'a pas eu l'ambition d'écrire une histoire de deux conceptions de l'amour, même pour ce qui concerne les XII^e et XIII^e siècles, période à laquelle le présent travail est restreint. On a simplement voulu rassembler quelques matériaux pour ceux qui tenterait une pareille étude, et éclairer, en certains points, les secrètes relations logiques qui ont fait s'attirer ou se repousser les idées. Les résultats de nos recherches ont été répartis sous deux chefs." (Rousselot, p. 5). Alluding to subsequent criticisms of Rousselot's thesis, Martin D'Arcy has written: "But even granted that he [Rousselot] was wrong in his main contention [with regard to the two concepts of love], he nevertheless presented a problem which is in no sense imaginary. He did show that it is possible to have a conflict of loves, and that, in fact, there are two tendencies which are not easily reconciled. The first is serene and poised; the second ecstatic and poignant. The first explains adequately why it is so natural to love oneself and seek one's own happiness and perfection. But as it is so naturally self-centered, it does not explain so easily how a man can love another, even God, more than himself. The second kind of love, with its emphasis on self-sacrifice, did explain the love of one's neighbour and of God to the contempt of self; but it in its turn seemed inadequate to justify self-perfection as an end." (M. C. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love, New York, 1959, pp. 11-12).

⁴See Chapter III below.

especially with regard to the latter's presentation of the teaching of St. Thomas. Geiger judged that Rousselot had misinterpreted the true doctrine of Aquinas on the problem of love, and considered the matter important enough to present a criticism of Rousselot's thesis in his Conférence Albert le Grand in 1952 for the Institute of Medieval Studies.⁵

This present paper will aim at giving a comparative evaluation of these two interpretations of the thought of St. Thomas: Rousselot's thesis, rightfully considered important in the history of the discussions on the nature of love; and Geiger's critique, recognized as one of the most valuable contributions to the study of this question. This paper will study the presentations of both Rousselot and Geiger, and then the doctrine of St. Thomas on love, especially under the particular aspect of the "problem of love." The evaluation of Rousselot and Geiger in the light of the teaching of St. Thomas will be the primary purpose of this thesis.

The main sources for this paper will be Rousselot's Four l'Histoire du Problème de l'Amour au Moyen Age, and Geiger's Le Problème de l'Amour chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin, together with the writings of St. Thomas which bear on this matter. Since an evaluation is to be given of the positions of Rousselot and Geiger, Chapters II and III of this paper will give objective summaries of each man's presentation of the doctrine of St. Thomas. Following this, Chapter IV will consider the thought of St. Thomas as presented in his own writings, and will offer a systematic exposition of his doctrine on love and the problem

⁵Louis-B. Geiger, Le Problème de l'Amour chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal, 1952).

of love. After St. Thomas' position has been textually studied and established, each principal element of Rousselot's interpretation will be evaluated in the light of the teaching of St. Thomas, and both Geiger's critique of Rousselot and his own exposition of St. Thomas will similarly be studied.

CHAPTER II

ROUSSELOT'S THESIS ON THE PROBLEM OF LOVE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

In his study, Pour l'Histoire du Problème de l'Amour au Moyen Age, Pierre Rousselet presents the abstract formulation of the "problem of love" thus:

"Un amour qui ne soit pas egoïste est-il possible? Et, s'il est possible, quel est le rapport de ce pur amour d'autrui à l'amour de soi, qui semble être le fond de toutes les tendances naturelles?"¹ The problem was posed during the Middle Ages mainly in the concrete form: "Utrum homo naturaliter diligat Deum plus quam semetipsum."² It was in this particular formulation of the question that the principles were sought for a theory of "disinterested" love. One solution offered to this problem proposed that the best way to love one's self was to love God, so that the two loves—love of one's own happiness and the pure love of God—were identified. But this was not a solution to the speculative problem: can these two types of love be reduced to a common principle, or are they actually irreducible? For those who defined man's will as the inclination toward his own good, the appetite for his happiness, the problem was especially difficult. They had to reconcile this foundation of love with the possibility of a love for God that would be such that a man would be ready to sacrifice all his goods of body and soul, and even his own happiness, for

¹Rousselet, p. 1.

²Ibid.

God. The problem, then, may be summarized: if love is defined as man's seeking for his own happiness, how can man have a pure, disinterested, unselfish love of God, a love for God for God's own sake, as commanded in Holy Scripture?

Analyzing the ideas of love which writers of the Middle Ages evolved in response to the problem, P. Rousselot reduces the theories to two "schools," that of the "physical" concept of love, and that of the "ecstatic" concept. The physical concept--physical here meaning pertaining to nature--designates the doctrine of those who base all love on the necessary tendency that all beings have to seek their own good. "Pour ces auteurs, il y a entre l'amour de Dieu et l'amour de soi une identité foncière, quoique secrète, qui en fait la double expression d'un même appétit, le plus profond et le plus naturel de tous, ou, pour mieux dire, le seul naturel."³ This doctrine was finally put into precise and systematic form by St. Thomas, who, following Aristotle, found the fundamental principle in unity, the raison d'être, the measure, and the ideal of all love. It was St. Thomas again who, according to P. Rousselot, established the perfect continuity between love of desire and love of friendship.⁴ Thus Rousselot calls the physical notion of love the Graeco-Thomist concept.

The ecstatic concept, on the other hand, is marked by the careful distinction between love of another and any tendencies toward self.

[L'] amour, pour les tenants de cette école, est d'autant plus parfait, d'autant plus amour, qu'il met plus complètement le sujet 'hors de lui-même.' Il s'ensuit que l'amour parfait et vraiment digne de ce nom requiert une réelle dualité de termes: le type du

³p. 3.

⁴Ibid.

véritable amour n'est plus, comme pour les auteurs précédents, celui que tout être de la nature se porte nécessairement à lui-même. L'amour est tout à la fois extrêmement violent et extrêmement libre: libre, parce qu'on ne saurait lui trouver d'autre raison que lui-même, indépendant qu'il est des appétits naturels; violent, parce qu'il va à l'encontre de ces appétits, qu'il les tyrannise, qu'il semble ne pouvoir être assouvi que par la destruction du sujet qui aime, par son absorption dans l'objet aimé. Etant tel, il n'a pas d'autre but que lui-même, on lui sacrifie tout dans l'homme, jusqu'au bonheur et jusqu'à la raison.⁵

"C'est parce que l'amour est purement conçu comme tendant d'une personne à une personne qu'il est conçu comme extatique, comme violent les inclinations innées, comme ignorant les distances naturelles, comme une pure affaire de liberté."⁶ This ecstatic concept was not formulated explicitly in formal theoretical expositions, but rather was implied in the wealth of devotional literature of the time, the ascetical oratory, prose, and poetry. Rousselot cites such authors as Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard as partisans of both schools, since he finds their systematic speculative treatises to be inconsistent with their sermons, meditations, and other "lyrical effusions."

After this preliminary survey Rousselot divides his thesis into two parts, the first a study of the physical concept of love, and the second a study of the ecstatic concept. Since St. Thomas is presented as an adherent of the physical theory, this paper will deal mainly with the exposition given by Rousselot in the first part of his thesis, "La conception physique ou gréco-thomiste."

The important problem of love, states P. Rousselot, ceased to be a problem

⁵pp. 3-4.

⁶p. 56.

for the adherents of the ecstatic concept, who separated appetite, the seeking of one's own good, and love, the disinterested seeking of the good of another. But when love was defined as a movement of the appetite toward one's good, when all love was considered a form of this self-seeking, then a conflict arose in the very expression of "disinterested love"--disinterested because for another, and love because essentially for self. With this restatement of the problem, Father Rousselot proceeds to the doctrine of love proposed by St. Thomas. At the beginning of his exposition of this solution to the problem, Rousselot cites a text from Aristotle, taken from the ninth book of the Nicomachean Ethics: "Amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum."⁷ Rousselot sees this text of the Philosopher as open to two interpretations. The first takes the words in their immediate and surface meaning, and would say that self-love is only "un point de départ nécessaire, une cause motrice occasionnelle qui, chez tous les hommes, donne le premier branle à la puissance d'aimer."⁸ According to this sense, it would seem that self-love is the first experience of love--as it were, the initiation into love and loving.

However, one could search more deeply into the meaning of this text: "On pouvait, creusant davantage, et cherchant non seulement l'occasion première, mais encore la raison formelle de l'amour, affirmer qu'une appétition n'est concevable que comme une recherche de soi-même, et non seulement faire dériver de l'amour propre les inclinations altruistes, mais encore les y réduire, d'une

⁷Nic. Eth., IX, 4; Bekker 1166a1-2. Rousselot, p. 7. Rousselot states that the text he is quoting is "naturally the text of the Ethics that the Scholastics knew, that is, the translation of Herman the German."

⁸P. 7.

façon qui restait à préciser."⁹ In this case, the seeking of one's own good would be the very principle, the formal ratio of all love.

If one chose the first interpretation, he could easily reconcile his position with that of the ecstatic concept. But if one understood the text of Aristotle according to the second interpretation, it seemed necessary to consider any affection for another as merely an imitation, a participation of a self-centered inclination: "l'amour qu'une substance singulière se porte à elle-même était alors la mesure, le modèle, et la raison de tous les autres amours qui peuvent se trouver en elle. Et c'est ici qu'il devenait difficile d'expliquer les faits que l'expérience imposait ou que supposait le dogme; il semblait qu'on ne pût distinguer qu'en paroles l'amour d'amitié et l'amour de désir ou de convoitise."¹⁰

Rousselot establishes the following now as St. Thomas' doctrine of appetite and love. The tendency to the last end specifies the will. This last end, which is the universal and necessary mover of the will, is beatitude, the perfect good of the subject. Hence the love of self, which has as its object the good of the subject loving, is the measure of all other loves and surpasses them all.¹¹ Thus St. Thomas expresses what Rousselot considers a definition of love: "Ex hoc . . . aliquid dicitur amari quod appetitus amantis se habet ad

⁹Pp. 7-8.

¹⁰P. 8.

¹¹For St. Thomas' teaching that the will is specified by the tendency to the last end, beatitude, Rousselot cites the following texts especially: S.T., I-II, 1, 6; I-II, 1, 8; I-II, 5, 8. For the doctrine that self-love is the measure of all other loves and surpasses them all he cites: S.T., II-II, 25, 4; C.G., I, 102; III, 17.

illud sicut ad suum bonum. Ipsa igitur habitudo vel coaptatio appetitus ad aliquid velut ad suum bonum amor vocatur . . . Unumquodque amamus in quantum est bonum nostrum."¹²

Having established that self-love is the basis of all love, we now face the question of how one can love God more than his own self. One solution, formulated by William of Auxerre,¹³ proposed the theory that man recognizes in God a good that is more excellent than his own, since his own being is but an imitation of God's being and a gift from God's goodness. If, however, one loves this more excellent good for one's own sake, this love is still self-love or desire, and the problem remains. To avoid this reduction to self-love, St. Thomas must find a principle which would bring man to seek the good of God "aussi spontanément, aussi naturellement, aussi directement, qu'il tend à son bien propre. Or, de principe d'amour direct et véritable . . . il n'y en a pas d'autre que l'unité."¹⁴

Rousselot maintains that the concept of unity is for St. Thomas the basic principle in the solution of the problem of disinterested love, and that this concept is to be understood in the light of the principle of the part and the whole.¹⁵ "Cette solution, plus d'une fois répétée par S. Thomas, fait bien voir

¹² In de Div. Nom., c. 4, lect. 9. Rousselot, p. 10.

¹³ See Rousselot, p. 10 and Appendix I.

¹⁴ P. 10.

¹⁵ Rousselot here quotes the argument from Quodl., 1, 8, part of which says: "Diligere Deum super omnia plus quam seipsum est naturale non solum angelo et homini, sed etiam cuilibet creaturae, secundum quod potest amare aut sensibilibiter aut naturaliter. . . . Videmus autem quod unaquaeque pars naturali quadam inclinatione operatur ad bonum totius, etiam cum periculo aut detrimento proprio: [here St. Thomas gives the example of the hand that exposes itself to the

que, pour répondre aux difficultés qu'on faisait à la conception 'physique' au nom de l'amour pur, et désintéressé, il maintient dans toute sa rigueur l'axiome fondamental de la doctrine, mais il élargit la notion que cet axiome supposait. Il demeure acquis qu'une chose est aimée en tant qu'elle est une avec le sujet aimant; mais c'est le concept d'unité qui doit être critiqué, pour qu'on ne le restreigne pas à l'unité égoïste et close des 'individus.'¹⁶

According to St. Thomas, maintains P. Rouscelot, to consider merely the weak unity of the part apart from the unity of the whole is to stop with an incomplete view. A thing is truly known when it is known in its full context, and "unumquodque secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est."¹⁷ "On ne doit donc point considérer l'appétit naturel d'une 'partie' à part de l'appétit total, et beaucoup moins l'opposer à l'appétit total: ce serait ne rien comprendre à l'essence de l'objet."¹⁸

Unity, an analogical notion, is applied not only to different types of wholes and parts, but also to participations. This is how St. Thomas' solution accounts for man's love for God. "Dieu n'est pas, pour S. Thomas, l'ensemble des êtres de l'univers; il est l'Être infini, séparé, auquel tous les êtres participent en l'imitant. Lorsque c'est à Dieu qu'on songe, il faut dire de toute créature: hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est. On répondra donc à la question classique: quia omnis creatura naturaliter

blow of the sword for the sake of the body, and of the citizen who exposes himself to the danger of death for the sake of the whole body politic]. Manifestum est autem quod Deus est bonum commune totius universi et omnium partium eius; unde quaelibet creatura suo modo naturaliter plus amat Deum quam se ipsam . . . creatura vero rationalis per intellectuales amorem, quae dilectio dicitur." Rouscelot, pp. 10-11.

¹⁶ p. 11.

¹⁷ S.T., I, 60, 5 c. Rouscelot, p. 12

¹⁸ p. 12.

secundum id quod est, Dei est, sequitur quod naturali dilectione etiam angelus et homo plus et principalius diligit Deum quam seipsum."¹⁹

In summary, Father Rousselot has so far established the following as the doctrine of St. Thomas: (1) All love is based on self-love, the subject's seeking of his own good. (2) The principle of love (and hence even of self-love) is unity. (3) The unity of the subject must be considered in the subject's full context, as a participation in God, the infinite Being. (4) Therefore, self-love, based on the unity of the subject participating in God, is a love by which the subject seeks God's good primarily, without relating God's good to his own good and so reducing love of God to love of self: in the complete context, love of self is love of God. Rousselot now formulates St. Thomas' doctrine in the following terms:

Grace à cette explication, il devient clair que l'amour d'amitié et l'amour de convoitise ne sont plus deux phénomènes entièrement différents et réunis, on ne sait par quel hasard, sous l'étiquette d'un même nom, mais qu'il sont, au contraire, en parfaite continuité. Par l'amour de convoitise, je constitue un objet instrument par rapport à moi-même--partie de moi-même, pour ainsi dire--je ne le considère qu'en fonction de moi-même (ainsi l'eau que je bois, le pain que je m'assimile, la fleur que je respire, et que je jette lorsqu'elle ne me plaît plus); par l'amour d'amitié, c'est la moi, le moi individuel et borné que je ne regarde plus qu'en fonction de l'objet aimé; mon amour naturel me constitue partie d'un vaste ensemble, qui m'englobe, ou participation d'un être supérieur, qui me fait exister. Quand je désire un fruit ou une fleur, c'est moi que j'aime en réalité; de même, quand je cherche mon plaisir et que je crois m'aimer, en réalité, plus profondément et plus vraiment, c'est Dieu que j'aime.²⁰

Thus Rousselot can state that St. Thomas reconciles the two positions:

¹⁹P. 13. Quotation is from S.T., I, 60, 5 c.

²⁰Pp. 13-14.

"1° l'amour désintéressé est possible, et même profondément naturel.--2°

l'amour purement 'extatique,' l'amour de pure dualité est impossible. 'Supposé, dit-il, que Dieu ne fût pas le bien de l'homme, l'homme n'aurait aucune raison d'aimer Dieu.'"²¹ The reason for this is that man's unity (which is the basis for love) follows upon his being, and man's being is a participation of God's being. Later, when comparing St. Thomas' doctrine with that of Aristotle, Rousselot again says: "L'amour est tout d'abord conçu, chez S. Thomas, comme un appétit naturel de perfectionnement, comme une tendance à l'actualisation, et, par conséquent, à l'unification. Pour employer le mot d'Aristote, c'est une conception de toutes manières φυσικωτέρα . L'affection type, celle qui mesure les autres, c'est celle où le bien de l'être aimant dépend totalement, exclusivement, de l'être aimé; c'est l'amour de Dieu."²²

St. Thomas has reconciled the physical concept of love--that all love is based on self-seeking--with a true disinterested love--a love of God more than of one's self. Rousselot indicates that St. Thomas would have gone even further, that his doctrine was tending toward a principle opposite to the one suggested earlier: "au lieu de réduire l'amour de Dieu à n'être qu'une forme de l'amour de soi, c'est l'amour de soi qu'il réduit à n'être qu'une forme de l'amour de Dieu."²³ St. Thomas teaches that "tout être de la création, en chacune de ses appétitions, désire Dieu plus profondément que l'objet particulier qu'il vise."²⁴

²¹ S.T., II-II, 26, 13 ad 3. Rousselot, p. 14.

²² P. 28.

²³ P. 15.

²⁴ Ibid., Rousselot cites C.G., III, 18 and 25.

Rousselot cites the text: "Propter hoc igitur tendit ad proprium bonum, quia tendit ad divinas similitudines, et non e converso,"²⁵ and claims that St. Thomas' whole doctrine of love is a consequence of this initial concept, which for St. Thomas defines appetite.²⁶ This new response to the problem of love, declares P. Rousselot, does not contradict the first one, it deepens it. It repeats the proposition that in a natural whole no part has any individuality or unity of its own that it can oppose to that of the whole. If a conflict can arise between love of oneself and love of God--and experience does show such conflicts--then this conflict happens as a result of a disorder inflicted on nature by original sin. "Unde homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum, et ita Deus diligebat plus quam seipsum et super omnia."²⁷

In rational beings, then, there are two levels of appetite.

En tant qu'ils sont des êtres de la nature (naturaliter) ils aiment Dieu plus qu'eux-mêmes, et ne le savent pas. En tant qu'ils conçoivent et raisonnent (rationaliter), ils traduisent pour leur conscience cet appétit de Dieu en appétit du 'bien en général;' et, comme le 'bien en général,' n'étant pas un être subsistant, ne peut être aimé d'amitié pure, c'est à l'être subsistant restreint qu'ils sont eux-mêmes qu'ils rapportent d'abord tous leurs désirs; leur rôle naturel était de procurer le bien du tout en procurant le bien de la partie qu'ils sont eux-mêmes; ils conçoivent maintenant cette partie comme existante à part du tout, et son bien, comme opposable au bien total; ils sont tentés de subordonner au bien 'privé' le bien du tout. Cependant, l'appétit indéterminé du bien, qui s'est traduit d'abord en égoïsme et en amour de convoitise, se traduit ensuite, par un changement naturel et insensible, en amour d'amitié. C'est que l'individu raisonnable ne se conçoit pas nécessairement comme tout

²⁵ C.G., III, 24.

²⁶ P. 16.

²⁷ S.T., I-II, 109, 3 c. Rousselot, p. 17.

définitif et fin unique; il peut imaginer d'autres tous où lui-même joue le rôle, soit de partie subordonnée, soit de moitié, La vertu consiste à ne point se proposer pour fin d'autre tout que l'ensemble complet des êtres, dont le bien coïncide avec le bien de Dieu même, et à toujours agir comme si l'on avait l'intuition que l'appétit du 'bien en général' n'est qu'une expression, conforme à la nature des animaux raisonnables, du désir qui suspend tout être à Dieu.²⁸

Rousselot has here clearly distinguished natural love and rational love. By the first, creatures love God more than themselves and do so without knowledge. By the second, rational beings direct their love first of all to the "limited subsistent being" which they themselves are. But recognizing themselves to be parts of a greater entity, they love the good of the whole more than their own good, the good of a mere part of the whole. "C'est que l'individu raisonnable ne se conçoit pas nécessairement comme tout définitif et fin unique . . . La vertu consiste à ne point se proposer pour fin d'autre tout que l'ensemble complet des êtres."

Rousselot has now established St. Thomas' position concerning man's natural love for God above all other things. However, the case of man's rational love, whereby he can love something else more than God, poses all over again the problem of love, restating the possibility of a conflict between love of God and love of one's own interests. The sacrifice of man's own good to God's good seems to indicate a fundamental duality between man's appetite for his own good and his love for God, a duality which is the essential note of the ecstatic concept of love.

To answer this difficulty, Rousselot appeals to the general principle of St. Thomas' philosophy that for a spiritual being its individual good and God's

²⁸ Pp. 17-18.

good are perfectly identified. Hence, he says, "sa perfection comme partie et sa beatitude d'être singulier coïncident."²⁹ The spiritual good and good in itself are the same. In man, opposition between these two goods is possible because of the composition of his nature. Rousselot indicates three points following from this: (1) "[P]arce que l'homme n'est pas purement spirituel, ce qu'il peut appeler 'son bien' ne coïncide pas toujours avec le bien en soi. La jouissance de certains biens des sens peut être incompatible, dans tel ou tel cas, avec l'acquisition d'une perfection meilleure."³⁰ (2) "Mais . . . tout sacrifice d'un bien des sens à un bien de l'esprit, en étant un sacrifice à Dieu, est nécessairement aussi un sacrifice à soi-même. L'esprit, en effet, est l'homme même, plus intimement, plus vraiment que le corps."³¹ (3) "[C]ertaines opérations de l'esprit pouvant, puisque notre vie est temporelle, se trouver incompatible avec un autre acte meilleur, ou, puisque notre âme est faible, nous être une occasion de désordre moral, l'exercice en pourra être prohibé."³² Thus any sacrifice of one's own good to God's good is but a provisional sacrifice, and but a sacrifice to man's true self.

Thus Father Rousselot has given his exposition of St. Thomas' teaching on love for God, disinterested love according to the physical concept. He finds a perfect continuity between the love by which man seeks his own good, and the disinterested love for God. Love, according to Rousselot's interpretation of

²⁹P. 20.

³⁰P. 21.

³¹Ibid.

³²P. 22.

St. Thomas is based on unity, and a being loves according to its unity. Thus by nature a part loves the good of the whole of which it is a part more than it loves its own particular good. Since man is a participation of the absolute Being which is God, he naturally loves the good of God, the "whole" of which he has participated being, more than he loves the good of himself, the participated "part." Hence love of self is derived from love of God, and not the other way around. The sacrifice that a man makes of his particular good to the good of God, while being a sacrifice to God, at the same time, in so far as man is a spiritual being, is a sacrifice to himself, since his spiritual good is identical with God's good.

In Chapter II of Part I Rousselot traces the history of some of the notions which comprise St. Thomas' solution of the problem of love. These notions were available in the philosophical and theological writings existing at the time of St. Thomas, but seemed to have been overlooked by Thomas' Scholastic predecessors. Chapter II mainly elucidates the relation of the doctrine St. Thomas evolved with that of his contemporaries and predecessors, Greek, Arabian, and Scholastic. Chapter III studies the thought of two medieval writers, Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard, in the light of the physical concept of love. Rousselot traces the outlines of the theory as presented in the various writings of these men. Since Chapters II and III of Rousselot's work do not treat directly of St. Thomas' doctrine of love, they will be considered in this study only in so far as they contribute to an understanding of his position. Part II of Rousselot's book is an exposition of the ecstatic concept of love, the second of the two divisions that he makes of the medieval thought concerning the question of love. As this part of the book does not concern his

presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine, it does not pertain directly to the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER III

GEIGER'S THESIS ON THE PROBLEM OF LOVE IN ST. THOMAS

Almost forty-five years after the publication of Rousselot's thesis on the concept of love in the Middle Ages, Louis-B. Geiger found that the views presented therein, in spite of the many criticisms raised against them, held much weight among a great number of philosophers.¹ If the views of Rousselot are correct, Geiger thinks, a primary group of theologians during the Middle Ages would have made a radical separation of appetite and of love. Another group of theologians, the followers of the physical concept, would have rejected the dualism of appetite and love and at the same time the dualism of the subject loving and the object loved. Geiger especially questions whether the physical concept of love as presented by Rousselot accurately presents the mind of St. Thomas on this matter.

Geiger proposes in his study to restrict himself to Rousselot's presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine, and he begins by giving his summary of that presentation. In concluding his survey, Geiger notes that Rousselot has made a three-fold distinction: (1) Egoistical love, that of the part for its own good, isolated from the good of the whole, (2) Disinterested love according to the physical theory, the love of the part for its good, in which it refers this good to the good of the whole but still desires it as its own good, (3) Disin-

¹Geiger, pp. 13-14.

terested love according to the ecstatic concept, completely independent of the appetite for one's own good, a pure love of the being that is loved.²

Having given Rousselot's presentation of the doctrine of St. Thomas, Geiger now proceeds to give his criticism of the points in Rousselot's thesis to which he objects. After this preliminary criticism, Geiger presents his own exposition of the doctrine of St. Thomas, and then a fuller evaluation of Rousselot's arguments.

Geiger is able to admit that the natural love of man for his own good can be extended to include God's good. He finds difficulty, however, in recognizing a disinterested love in the desire of our own good, even when this love is directed, not toward our individual good, but toward our good as a part of the whole, as a participation of the divine Being. The part, Geiger admits, does love the whole more than itself. The hand does expose itself to protect the whole body--although Geiger notes the obvious fact that it is the man, the whole, that exposes the hand, a part, to protect the whole body. But would this be a disinterested love? If the part exposes or sacrifices itself to protect the good of the whole, two motives are possible. Either the part does this in order to guarantee its own safety, which depends on the safety of the whole; in which case there would be no disinterested love. Or else the part so acts because the good of the whole deserves to be saved, apart from any consideration with regard to the proper good of the part, and even at the expense of the part; and in this case there is a disinterested love, but not a love according to the physical concept. Geiger would say that the part seeks the good of the whole

² P. 25, n. 3.

either for the part's own good, or else for the good of the whole with no regard for the part's good. In the first case we have physical love, love of one's own good, but not a disinterested love. In the second instance we have a true disinterested love, but not a physical love.³ Hence we have the dilemma by which, in the theory of the part and the whole, a love that is both physical and disinterested is impossible.

In this way Geiger denies the very foundation of Rousselot's theory. He further states that the solution does not lie in the establishment of the priority of the love of God over the love of self. Either, he says, the love of God is by nature prior to the love of one's own good--and we thus depart from the physical concept, founded on the priority of love of self; or the love of God, whatever priority it has on the natural level, remains psychologically the desire of our own good--and the talk of a disinterested love becomes meaningless. "Les notions de partie et de tout, de participation et d'unité, en effet, ne disent rien, formellement, touchant la nature de l'amour et sa qualité. Ce dernier peut demeurer un amour intéressé tout en se portant matériellement sur le bien du tout ou sur le bien de Dieu."⁴

After this criticism Geiger makes a concession for the sake of argument. He would grant to P. Rousselot the coherence of a physical-disinterested love, but he presses his main objection: even granted such a theory, is the theory the doctrine of St. Thomas?⁵

³P. 26.

⁴P. 27.

⁵Ibid., "Accordons cependant que la théorie de l'amour physique est une théorie cohérente. Accordons même qu'en dépit de l'équivoque dénoncée plus haut,

Geiger objects now that Rousselot has treated with apparently complete univocity the notions of appetite, love, beatitude, good, and happiness, notions which St. Thomas treats with so many distinctions and differences. Rousselot, says Geiger, has failed to define adequately such concepts as appetite and natural appetite, concepts upon which he founds his physical theory of love.

P. Geiger states that Rousselot defines appetite as the "nécessaire propension naturelle qu'ont tous les êtres de la nature à rechercher leur propre bien."⁶ Rousselot furthermore speaks indifferently of appetite, desire, self-love, and egoistic love. The good as P. Rousselot presents it is the term of desire, and is a good only because it is desired. Rousselot uses the terms good and my good indifferently. An object is good because it is related to a subject as his good, and sometimes it is the perfection or the pleasure of the subject, and sometimes the objects which are able to afford that perfection or pleasure. Hence we have three terms: the subject of the appetite; the term of the appetite, the perfection of the subject; and the realities which are desired because they have a relation to the good of the subject.

Thus the universe seems to be made up of a collection of individuals, each one animated by a natural appetite or desire for its own good which draws to itself the things which make for its perfection and happiness. This natural appetite for the perfection of the subject is the basis of all affection and

elle exprime un véritable amour désintéressé de la partie pour le tout. Il reste alors à résoudre un problème d'ordre historique, et c'est le suivant: Cette conception physique de l'amour, qualifiée aussi de gréco-thomiste, à supposer qu'elle soit grecque, est-elle thomiste?"

⁶Rousselot, p. 3. Quoted by Geiger, p. 29.

good. Geiger notes the fundamental univocity of the whole world of appetite and good supposed by such a physical theory. "Partout où il se rencontrera, l'appétit sera convoitise du bien propre du sujet, puisqu'il n'y a de bien, donc d'objet à aimer, que sous la forme du désirable."⁷ Geiger fears that Rousselot has neglected the objective ontological basis of the good, and has made it entirely subjective.⁸ Love itself is reduced to this impersonal necessary tendency of the natural appetite. "Avec le bien, dont il est le désir, il se trouve enfermé dans un domaine où rien ne peut entrer qui d'abord n'ait été transformé en le bien du sujet. S. Thomas, d'après le P. Rousselot, ne va-t-il pas jusqu'à écrire que 'supposé que Dieu ne fût pas le bien de l'homme, l'homme n'aurait aucune raison d'aimer Dieu?'"⁹

Geiger concludes that Rousselot attributes to St. Thomas a notion of love according to which love is a natural appetite in the strictest sense of the word. This notion would say that the will, the principle of love is like any other natural appetite. That is, the will can tend only toward its own good. It tends in that direction as a nature—in the necessary, purely dynamic, centripetal and impersonal manner that is common to it and to all natures.

The physical concept of love, then, ultimately rests on an implicit monism of nature and of natural appetite. In saying that the adherents of this theory "found all real or possible love on the necessary tendency of natural beings to

⁷Geiger, p. 31.

⁸See especially p. 31, n. 8.

⁹P. 32. Reference is made to Rousselot, p. 14, and to S.T., II-II, 26, 13 ad 3.

seek their own good,"¹⁰ Rousselot considers this tendency as the case for all beings in nature. The rest, says Geiger, flows logically from this supposition; therefore it is necessary first of all to verify this supposition.¹¹

After this preliminary critique of Rousselot's presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine, Geiger proceeds to his own exposition of St. Thomas, dividing his treatment into four areas: appetite in general, sense appetite, intellectual appetite, and disinterested love. The following is Geiger's presentation of the thought of St. Thomas.

Appetite in general requires three elements: the subject of the appetite; a term, called the good or the end; and the appetite itself, which constitutes a dynamic bond between the subject and its good. "Appetere autem nihil aliud est quam petere quasi tendens in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum."¹² This tie reveals the existence of a relation of complementarity between the subject and its good, a relation founded on the being of both, and which makes it possible for the one to be the good of the other in so far as it assures the perfection of the other. "On appellera appétit naturel tout principe d'inclination de ce genre, donné par et dans la nature même d'un être."¹³

This inclination of course is different in beings which have knowledge and in those which do not. In beings which do not have cognition, appetite means merely their nature and their natural ordination to their perfection or natural

¹⁰Rousselot, p. 3. See Geiger, p. 37.

¹¹Geiger, p. 37.

¹²De Ver., 22, 1, c. Geiger, p. 42.

¹³p. 42.

activity. Their perfection, however, is attained in their action in accordance with the harmony of the universe, not merely in their development on their own account.

In creatures endowed with cognition, on the other hand, two different elements are noted. In these creatures the appetite is put into operation by knowledge, either sense or intellectual, and the appetite constitutes an autonomous psychological power, distinct from the nature or essence of the being. Indeed, between an appetite which is psychological and an appetite which is merely ontological, there is such a difference that we may properly speak of two different orders in the world of appetite.¹⁴

The immediate object of sense appetite, states P. Geiger, is sensible delight, a subjective state, distinct from the real good toward which the animal is ordered by nature and which it pursues by a totality of operations destined to put it in the possession of the good. In the case of sensible appetite, then, Geiger distinguishes two forms of good: the objective realities, called good because of their power to assure the perfection of the subject, and the psychological order of good, the delight. This subjective good is a sign of the objective good, and is itself a good, capable of itself enticing the sense appetite.¹⁵

It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish these goods: the delight; the realities toward which we are moved by our appetite aroused by the delight; and

¹⁴ Pp. 44-45.

¹⁵ P. 47.

finally, the perfection or conservation of the being of the subject.¹⁶

Leurs rapports sont d'ailleurs complexes. La délectation est un bien par elle-même. Elle est aussi un bien relatif pour autant qu'elle signale la présence du bien objectif. Ce dernier est un bien parce qu'il apporte au vivant ce dont il a besoin pour assurer son bien proprement dit, son développement, son existence et la permanence de l'espèce. Il est un bien encore parce qu'il suscite cet autre bien qu'est la délectation. L'homme sait se procurer la délectation sans accepter de se laisser engager à l'égard des exigences réelles de l'objet. Il sait aussi faire naître la délectation par des stimulants qui tiennent toute leur valeur et toute leur bonté exclusivement de leur liaison avec la délectation.¹⁷

Sensible affection is entirely bound up in the subjective world of this delight. It is the only good toward which the sense appetite tends, and in quest of which the creature acting through sense appetite reaches the objective good which gives him perfection of being. Here Geiger makes a five-fold distinction: (1) Beings with their own ontological goodness. (2) Their relative goodness for a living subject, their objective utility. (3) The objective order between the subject and these goods, an order of potency and act. (4) The delight, the subjective sign of the presence of the objective goods. (5) The order between the subject and the delight, the psychological appetite for the delight.¹⁸ Man is able to seek the delight alone, and to define the good in terms of the delight. This is the sphere to which the animal is restricted. However, man is able to mount to the first element, and discover the existence of the good in itself, which the animal cannot do.

It is pointless to speak of interested or disinterested love in the case of animals, since the sense appetite is always subjective--its object is the

¹⁶p. 48

¹⁷pp. 48-49.

¹⁸p. 51, n. 24.

delight found in an action. In the case of the natural love of a sentient being, the subject by its natural appetite pursues its delight, and through this delight or subjective good it pursues its objective good—its own being as well as its own actions—ordered to the good of the individual and to the good of the species.¹⁹ Since the animal cannot have a love for the good in itself, it is only on the level of intellectual cognition, where the psychological and objective goods can be known as such, that the subject can sacrifice the psychological good to the objective good of the individual or of the whole or species.

At this point Geiger proceeds to a study of the intellectual appetite. This intellectual appetite requires intellectual cognition, by which we can know the natures or essences of objects. By intellectual cognition we can know what the good is. Since goodness formally manifests itself by the attraction which emanates from a being, and since appetite of the good is the inclination toward the being from which this attraction emanates, to know the good is to know that a being possesses in itself that by which it can arouse an inclination by the attraction which emanates from it. Geiger states that we must consider this attraction which is exercised by a being and which is love if we want to grasp the formality of the good.

Now in each particular instance we can distinguish the reason for the attraction of the being. Certain objects we seek and we call good because in

¹⁹P. 55., "Pour être tout à fait précis il faudrait donc dire que le vivant est ordonné, par un amour naturel de bienveillance, au bien individuel et au bien de l'espèce, qu'il poursuit l'un et l'autre par des actions appropriées, dont le déclenchement se fait par l'effet de la délectation, seul bien directement poursuivi sur le plan psychologique."

their presence we experience a certain enjoyment, pleasure, or delight. In this case our love is not for the good, the thing in itself, but for the delight. It is the delight and not the object itself which offers the attraction and toward which our inclination tends. In this case our love is a desire or a concupiscent love.²⁰

Again, we can find our love stimulated by the utility of the object, its value in relation to our own good. Here again our love is one of desire. Desire, Geiger points out, has psychologically three elements: a subject that desires, an object that is desired, and a good, distinct from this object, for which it is desired.²¹

Reflecting now on the love which we bear ourselves, we find a love that is not subordinated to any other love. We seek our own good, our perfection and happiness for their own sake, "parce que ces réalités exercent sur nous un attrait qui ne semble demander aucune justification."²² This good is identified with our own selves, and so is not loved for the sake of another good—our love here is directed to a good for its own sake. This is not a desire, a concupiscent love, but a benevolent love. This love, however, which makes us love our own being and perfection for themselves, is the principle of the desires by which we love those objects which are able to assure our perfection and happiness.

We find that we have such a love as this for other beings, whenever we are

²⁰ P. 58., "Notre amour à leur égard est une convoitise ou un amour de concupiscence."

²¹ P. 60, n. 30.

²² P. 59.

in the presence of a good that is such a good in itself and not only a good in relation to another good. Only in the presence of such a good in itself and for itself can we have a love that is love "purement et simplement." This is so even if such a good in itself be not the good in the plenitude of its perfection. Geiger compares the difference between such an absolute good and a relative good to the difference between substance and accident. And as a created substance, even though a true substance, has an ultimate dependence on the absolute Being, so does the substantial good have an ultimate dependence on that which is goodness by its essence, in the fullness of perfection. "Le monde du bien se découvre alors dans toute sa diversité, les biens relatifs empruntant leur valeur aux biens absolus qu'ils peuvent contribuer à faire naître ou à développer, ces derniers empruntant leur propre bonté absolue à l'Absolu de la bonté première."²³

As there is a hierarchy of being and of good, so there is a hierarchy of love: accidental love, which supposes a more profound love; substantial love, benevolent love, the love of a good for itself; and finally a love of the good as such, the absolute Good, which we all seek in every love, even though we do not always know it. In our love, Geiger says, we begin with a love of delightful and useful goods. Thence we proceed further. "Dans le secret de notre coeur nous savons que ce n'est pas là aimer vraiment. Car aimer purement et simplement, c'est être et demeurer en présence de ce qu'on aime, 'ut in illo sistat, non ut inde aliquid ei proveniat,' comme S. Thomas le dit magnifiquement à propos de la charité surnaturelle; ce n'est point passer auprès du bien

pour lui faire seulement l'emprunt de quelque avantage ou trouver par lui quelque satisfaction qu'il ne serait pas lui-même."²⁴

For such a pure love of a good in itself, we must be able to know a being that is such a good, to know it as a good in itself without any relation of utility or delight to ourselves. On the other hand, if the good has no relation to ourselves, would it in fact be a good for us and could we love it?

"Nous avons donc à choisir, semble-t-il, entre un amour qui va de soi, puisque son objet est ce qui est bon pour nous, et un amour pur mais irréalisable, puisque son objet serait un bien ensoi, donc sans rapport avec nous, donc impossible à aimer."²⁵ We have here again the dilemma of the problem of disinterested love.

Geiger states that in order to be loved either as an accidental or substantial good, the being must be present to the subject as the good it is. But the presence of the good as such--necessary for a love of the good as such--is precisely intellectual cognition. If this is the case, "c'est donc dans la mesure et dans la mesure seulement où grâce à la connaissance intellectuelle le bien peut se révéler lui-même en ce qu'il est, qu'un amour pourra naître dans notre cœur, qui soit enfin l'amour du bien pour lui-même et en lui-même."²⁶

²⁴ Pp. 62-63. Geiger here gives St. Thomas' distinction of amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae from De Spe, 3 c. The last part of this quotation reads: "Alius autem est amor perfectus quo bonus alicuius in seipso diligitur, sicut cum amando aliquem volo quod ipse bonus habeat, etiam si nihil inde mihi accedat; et hic dicitur esse amor amicitiae, quo aliquis secundum seipsum diligitur, unde est perfecta amicitia."

²⁵ P. 64.

²⁶ P. 65.

Thus the nature of love depends strictly on the nature of cognition. Intellectual cognition alone can recognize the good as it is, whether it is a case "de la délectation, du bien utile, de ce qui est bon absolument, parfaitement ou imparfaitement. Car nous pouvons connaître, grâce à notre intelligence, la nature du bien."²⁷

Having established the principles of love of the good as such, Geiger now proceeds to discuss disinterested love, calling attention to the necessity of keeping the distinction between sense appetite and intellectual appetite. Disinterested love, of course, is a love that is not interested. This interested love is defined as a love which, posing as objective, is really directed toward the good of the subject itself. This love has three elements: the subject that loves; the good that the subject pretends to love or thinks it loves, the apparent object of the love; and the interest or the good of the subject, which is the real object of the love.²⁸

To have a disinterested love of the good for itself requires, as Geiger has pointed out, a recognition of the good as such. One does not free himself from interested love by merely suppressing the interest, any more than one establishes a wireless communication by removing the wire. Disinterested love is not achieved by the simple exclusion of all reference of interest or utility with regard to the subject. The mere suppression of this reference to the subject does not create an interest in the object, but rather removes the reason for the subject to be interested in any object other than himself. It has

²⁷ P. 67.

²⁸ See above, p. 34, and Geiger, p. 60, n. 30.

failed to give the subject a reason why his love should tend to the good of the object. "J'ai dés-intéressé le sujet, je ne lui ai pas donné l'amour désintéressé."²⁹

For the possibility of a disinterested love, it is not a question, therefore, of stopping the self-seeking interest, but of engendering a love of the good in itself and for itself, "pure présence affective du sujet à l'object, quand ce dernier est un bien qui mérite un tel amour."³⁰ This affective presence requires the intellectual comprehension of the good. "Si l'on dégage la réalité positive, l'amour désintéressé coïncide donc avec l'amour spirituel du bien qui par sa valeur absolue mérite d'être aimé pour lui-même . . . Notre amour peut être désintéressé non point formellement parce que nous pouvons aller contre l'amour de nous-mêmes ou sacrifier notre bien, mais parce que nous pouvons par notre amour aller vers un bien dont la valeur absolue a pu se manifester à notre esprit."³¹

For an intellectual love to be a disinterested love, it must have three characteristics, which Geiger calls objectivity, rectitude or truth, and a disinterested character. By the objectivity of spiritual love Geiger understands being in the presence of the good on the level of the good itself, because of which the good is seen and attained formally as good, and not only materially through the effects which flow from it.³² Thus in spiritual love,

²⁹ Pp. 72-73.

³⁰ P. 74.

³¹ P. 75.

³² P. 76.

rational love, the subject is present to the good in two closely-tied ways: the objective intentional presence of the cognition of the nature of the good, and the objective presence proper to love, dependent on the cognitional presence. Because of our intellectual cognition we are able to know the nature of the good and to know our own being in the presence of the good and our ordination to the good. In true love there is a complementarity, on the level of being, between the subject and the object. The objectivity spoken of here is the product of the intellect's power to know the natures of things, applied to the acts of the subject and their ontological structure. By this power "nous pouvons être présents à nos actes, aux objets qui les spécifient et comprendre avec la nature des uns et des autres leur mutuelle coordination au plan de notre être même."³³

The texts, Geiger claims, must be interpreted with this understanding of the intellectual appetite, and not with the notion that the will is distinguished from other appetites merely by the difference of its object.³⁴

Objectivity, then, is the cognizance and love of a good in itself, for its own sake, and not a good in relation to the subject. But for our love to tend toward the good as it really is, it must have rectitude, or truth: it must attend to the good as it is in the hierarchy of goods. For there is an order

³³p. 79.

³⁴p. 79, n. 41. "Si l'amour spirituel est spécifié par la connaissance intellectuelle, et si cette dernière est objective comme nous l'avons rappelé, l'amour spirituel est nécessairement objectif lui aussi, présence affective au bien sous la raison de bien, saisie par l'intelligence." Geiger documents this position with three texts: In XII Met., 7, n. 2522; S.T., I-II, 4, 2 ad 2; and C.G., I, 44.

of goods: of means and ends, of higher and lower goods, of finite and infinite goods, of goods by participation and the good by essence. The natural objectivity of the intellectual appetite has its fuller development in its natural rectitude. A partial good or a partial pleasure is loved in truth only when it is loved precisely for what it is, a partial good or as a pleasure. The importance in the moral sphere of this rectitude of love, the love of objects according to the true value, is easily seen. "Il nous faut comprendre et admettre concrètement que ce qui a valeur par soi, le vrai, le bien, la destinée spirituelle des personnes humaines, Dieu, souverain Bien et souveraine Vérité, nous ne les aimons en vérité que si nous refusons toujours de les réduire, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, au rang de moyens pour des fins individuelles ou collectives, politiques, sociales ou économiques."³⁵

The objectivity and rectitude of intellectual love, then, are the cognizance and love of a good for its own sake, in its proper context in the hierarchy of goods. The disinterested character of love depends on both its objectivity and rectitude: on its objectivity, as the condition of its possibility, since only a subject that knows what the good is and can be present to it as it is, can love it as it is and for what it is; on the rectitude, as the condition of its morality or legitimacy, since our pure disinterested love does not have the right to operate except in the presence of a good which truly deserves such a love. Based on intellectual cognition, spiritual love is objective, directed toward the good as it is in itself, whatever kind of good it is. This love is objective and true when it is directed to such a good

according to the value it has in the scale of goods. The love will be objective, true, and disinterested, when it is thus in the presence of a truly absolute good.

Geiger himself sums up his exposition:

[L]'affectivité humaine prise dans toute sa généralité comporte, outre l'appétit naturel de chacun de nos pouvoirs, l'amour sensible et l'amour spirituel. L'amour sensible a pour objet le bien, ou plus exactement telles et telles choses bonnes dont la bonté est signalée et jugée par la délectation sensible. L'amour spirituel, du fait de sa liaison à la connaissance intellectuelle a pour objet formel le bien comme tel. Il est objectif puisqu'il porte sur le bien dont les différents modes peuvent être discernés par notre connaissance.³⁶

Love is objective, true or morally good and centripetal when it is directed toward the proper good of the subject, but under the formality of the good as such and conformed to the "truth of the good." This love is a benevolent love. Such a love is objective, true, and interested when it is in the presence of goods which by their nature are to promote other goods, and especially the good of the subject. Spiritual love can be objective and true, even when accepting the delights concomitant with the possession of certain goods, when the delight is accepted for the good that it is, and not raised to the position of a good to be sought for itself.

Spiritual love is objective, true, and disinterested when it is in the presence of a good whose absolute value demands such a love. That is, a love that is objective and true--directed toward a good according to its hierarchical value--offers to the good having an absolute value a response equally abso-

³⁶pp. 87-88.

lute: "le pur hommage de notre coeur qu'il mérite."³⁷ This love will have a unique form in the presence of the good which not only has an absolute value, but which is the Absolute Good, source of all good and of all love, and hence of our love and of our good.

True love, then, loves all things according to their proper value. It is directed toward God, not because God bestows on the subject his greatest good, but because God is in truth the Good. Geiger quotes St. Thomas on this.³⁸

This, with an application to the aptitude of our natural love for God to the supernatural love of charity, concludes P. Geiger's systematic presentation of the position of St. Thomas on the question of disinterested love. Geiger now proceeds to compare his interpretation of St. Thomas with that of Rousselot. Geiger agrees that St. Thomas' theory of love can be called a physical theory, if this is understood to mean that love is rooted in the nature of the being that loves, and that it has a connection with that being's natural end. The will is indeed a natural appetite, he says, but we must avoid a careless use of this term and remember that the structure of this drive toward good is affected by the differences of the various levels of being in which it operates. Rousselot has restricted his notion of natural appetite to that tendency of a being for its natural development that is identified with the nature of the being, whether inanimate, sentient, or intellectual. With this initial mistake,

³⁷p. 91.

³⁸S.T., II-II, 26, 3 ad 3: "[H]oc quod aliquis velit frui Deo, pertinet ad amorem quod Deus amatur amore concupiscentiae. Magis autem amamus Deum amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae: quia maius est in se bonum Dei quam participare possumus fruendo ipso." Geiger, p. 91.

one is led to attribute to sense and intellectual appetite that which is true only of the natural appetite of the inanimate world.³⁹

The will, then, is a natural appetite only in the sense that it is given with the nature of an intellectual being. Because of its foundation in intellectual cognition, the will tends by its nature to the objectivity mentioned above. The will, the natural appetite proper to man, is not, however, the only natural appetite in man. For man also has a sense appetite, which is a natural appetite, and the natural appetite of each of his faculties, vegetative and cognitive, for its proper object or good. The will, unlike the other types of natural appetite, is not focused on any determined good. Its formal object is the good. Hence it is incorrect to say that the object of the will is the good of the subject, in the sense that this is some particular good. The good of man is first of all his existence, but ultimately it is his operation and by his operation his possession of his end. Now the operation of the will is the love of the good according to truth, and it is toward this operation that the will is inclined by nature. "A la lumière de la vérité nous aimerons ce qui est bon, y compris nous-même à notre rang, comme bien. S'aimer soi-même ce n'est donc pas convoiter pour soi des biens qui seraient des choses bonnes à acquérir. C'est d'abord se porter vers son achèvement naturel. Or notre achèvement naturel en tant qu'hommes, en tant qu'êtres doués de volonté, c'est d'aimer toutes choses selon la vérité du bien."⁴⁰ This is our good, the good

³⁹P. 94., "L'appétit et l'amour se trouveront alors représentés comme un pur dynamisme par lequel un être tend vers son plein développement et capte tout ce qui peut le favoriser."

⁴⁰Pp. 97-98.

to which we naturally tend. For man, therefore, to love oneself is essentially to will to love according to the truth. This and only this type of self-love is according to man's nature.

St. Thomas states that the object of our will is our beatitude, but this beatitude is not some subjective state of well-being or feeling of peace and delight. It is rather our possession of our last end. This beatitude is the contemplation of the truth proceeding from the love of the good for itself. Furthermore, since man's beatitude is his union with his last end through his proper operation, the love of the good according to the truth, it is impossible to conceive that he can tend toward his good or his beatitude by the desire of his own good. For his rational love is not able to tend toward an activity, pure desire, which would be contrary to nature, nor is it able to make him tend toward beatitude in such a way that would certainly make him miss it.⁴¹

Hence, to speak of desire with regard to the natural appetite of the will is erroneous for two reasons. First, because the natural tendency of a faculty toward its ultimate act is a benevolent, or at least a complacent, love, as is every love that a being has for its final good. Desire deals only with goods which are means to the end. Secondly, because the act of spiritual love, which by nature is objective and true, is able to be sometimes a love of benevolence and sometimes a love of desire: a benevolent love, a disinterested love,

⁴¹Pp. 99-100., "Notre volonté, en tant que puissance, a, comme toute puissance, un ordre naturel à son acte. On peut l'appeler un appétit naturel. Mais l'acte de l'amour spirituel ne nous unit à notre bien que si tout ensemble il nous donne d'atteindre le bien et s'il nous le fait atteindre d'une certaine manière, c'est-à-dire conformément à la raison droite, cette conformité étant rendue possible par la structure particulière de l'amour spirituel que nous avons appelée son objectivité."

when it is in the presence of such a good as deserves this love;⁴² a concupiscent love when it is directed toward goods which are means to a further good. Hence, to define the will as a love of desire, a concupiscent love--to attribute to it a love of self, even an egoistic love--is to confuse everything. In benevolent love there are but two terms: the good itself, present to the subject by his knowledge; and the love which tends toward it. The subject's own perfection, his good, is attained in this act of love, without his formal direction toward it. In fact, the love is taken up with the good which is the object of the love, which alone is present to the consciousness; this love is not taken up at all with the subject's good. "La volonté est donc un appétit naturel en un sens spécial, propre au monde de l'esprit. Son objet est le bien comme tel. Son acte est notre bien, notre perfection ou notre béatitude justement parce que par lui nous sommes conjoints directement au bien par un amour du bien lui-même, non point par une convoitise qui ne pourrait atteindre son objet que par la raison formelle de mon bien."⁴³

The act of the will is later defined as "un amour qui, grâce à la connaissance intellectuelle, est un amour objectif du bien, et un amour désintéressé du bien en lui-même, quand il se trouve en présence d'un bien

⁴²See p. 43 above.

⁴³Geiger, p. 101. This statement is important as Geiger's summary and definition of the will. He quotes here S.T., I, 59, 1 c: "Quaedam . . . inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam rationem boni, quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinantur in bonum, non quidem quasi ab alio solusmodo directa in bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent, neque in bonum particulare tantum, sicut ea quibus est sola sensitiva cognitio, sed quasi inclinata in ipsam universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas."

absolu, fini ou infini. Alors mon bien, c'est-à-dire l'activité conforme à la nature du pouvoir qui m'est donné par la nature, consiste justement à aimer le bien et à l'aimer en vérité selon les différentes valeurs qu'il comporte."⁴⁴

In what sense now can the love of self be called the measure of all other loves? Geiger explains that it is such a measure in that by the act of the will we tend toward our good and our perfection. Since our perfection as men consists in love conformed to right reason, when we have this love, ordered to the good in itself, we are pursuing naturally our own perfection. The natural quest for our own good and disinterested love are thus intimately connected.

"[L]'amour selon la vérité est l'acte naturel de notre volonté, donc notre perfection, et . . . nous ne pouvons rien aimer sans du même coup et par surcroît, trouver naturellement, non pas psychologiquement, notre propre perfection. Nous ne pouvons aimer Dieu pardessus toutes choses, nous ne pouvons lui sacrifier nos biens, sans le faire par un amour qui réalise notre vraie nature, donc nous achève et nous conduit vers notre bonheur."⁴⁵

In the case of love that is according to nature, disinterested love and the natural love of self is one and the same love: "en tant qu'acte il est notre perfection, sans qu'il doive nécessairement faire l'objet d'un autre acte, qui, psychologiquement le prendrait pour fin et le subordonnerait ensuite au bien de Dieu; en tant qu'acte d'amour spirituel il est orienté tout entier vers le bien absolu, fini ou infini."⁴⁶

⁴⁴ P. 103.

⁴⁵ P. 104.

⁴⁶ P. 105.

Geiger restates the problem of love at this point: the apparent impossibility for one act to be at the same time both a disinterested love of the good as such or the good of another, and also the realization of our natural tendency toward our perfection. There would seem to be two objects and hence two acts, whose directions are diametrically opposed, one turned completely toward the object, and the other directed completely toward the self. In re-applying his solution to the problem, Geiger says that the difficulty lies in considering the good of the self as one thing, and the good which is the object of disinterested love as another thing, thus presenting two absolute goods which would require two acts of absolute love. But in reality our perfection is not a thing, it is an act. Hence Geiger states again:

Notre bien n'est pas un trésor à convoiter mais un objet à aimer par cet acte qui est l'amour du bien selon la vérité, c'est-à-dire l'amour désintéressé et absolu quand il se trouve en présence d'un bien absolu. Un seul et même acte est donc, objectivement parlant, comme acte immanent, l'accomplissement de notre perfection et l'amour désintéressé du bien. Il ne peut être l'un sans être l'autre. Il est les deux indissolublement, ou il n'est pas. Il ne peut être l'amour désintéressé du bien sans être en même temps l'acte, donc l'achèvement exigé par un être fait pour reconnaître le bien et lui rendre l'hommage qui lui est dû. Il ne peut être l'achèvement naturel d'un tel être sans constituer un amour désintéressé et pur. ⁴⁷

Here the reader can see the critical point of a doctrine of disinterested love—Rousselot's understanding of the intellectual appetite of man and his need to make use of the principle of the part and the whole, and Geiger's understanding of this intellectual appetite and his consequent rejection of the part-whole theory. Rousselot would say that a love of self becomes a disinterested love when we refer our good to the good of the whole, to the good of God.

Geiger, on the other hand, maintains that the love of the good of God for itself and above all else is precisely our good, our perfection as beings endowed with intellect and will. "Notre perfection ne s'obtient donc pas par une sorte de crispation, mais au contraire par une ouverture et une mise en rapport avec le bien, notamment avec le bien de Dieu que nous ne sommes pas par notre essence, et que nous ne pouvons posséder justement qu'en nous ordonnant à lui par l'hommage de notre amour pur et absolu."⁴⁸

In the pure love of the good in truth, especially the absolute good, our own perfection is attained without our advertence to it. Thus Geiger says that this is "le sens profond de l'oubli de soi, sur le terrain, non de l'appétit naturel mais de l'attention psychologique."⁴⁹ To fail to do this, to ignore one's place in the order of goods, is to fail in achieving one's true goal.

What then is the metaphysical basis for this necessary connection between the two movements of our appetite? Geiger rejects Rousselot's theory of natural appetite understood in the sense of Aristotelian physics. Since love, whether natural, sentient, or intellectual, is the response to some good, and since the good is the attraction which emanates from being itself in so far as it has perfection, love consists in the response of a being to being and to the good identical with being. Every movement toward the good is a movement toward being, whether to acquire, preserve, or augment, or whether to love it for itself by reason of its perfection manifested by the intellectual cognition.

⁴⁸P. 107. See also p. 107, n. 63.

⁴⁹P. 110.

Geiger here draws on the theory of participation. God, in whom being, good, and truth are identical, cannot create anything which would not be a being, good because of its very being, and animated in some way with a love of the good. The ultimate reason for this love must be sought in the "similitude nécessairement imprimée en tout être bon et attiré par le bien, c'est-à-dire par l'être en tant qu'il est parfait, et finalement par Celui en qui l'être et le bien sont identiques à son amour."⁵⁰

In the intellectual creature, which participates in God's being and God's pure love of His good, its love is distinct from its being, and is a second act, the natural term of the natural tendency of its spirit toward its perfection. This pure love is a perfection accidental to the being which loves, since by nature it is made to love the good.

Geiger notes further that the natural appetite of the will for the act which is its completion is itself a love of benevolence. "Sur le plan psychologique le vouloir de l'amour désintéressé sera lui-même un amour désintéressé ou pur."⁵¹ Geiger quotes St. Thomas' statement⁵² that the will can will to will, that one can love to love. We are able to know that our love is a good, and therefore we are able to love it as a good in itself, with objectivity and rectitude--to love the good which is precisely "l'amour du bien selon la vérité, similitude de l'Amour dont Dieu s'aime Lui-même, le Bien

⁵⁰P. 113.

⁵¹P. 115.

⁵²S.T., II-II, 25, 2 c.

Absolu, c'est-à-dire la Perfection absolu de l'Être."⁵³

The reason, then, for the intimate connection between the natural appetite for our perfection and the most disinterested love is to be found in the metaphysics of every true good and every true love. Good is not first of all the object of desire, but rather the perfection of the being and the basis for the attraction which emanates from it in so far as it is perfect. Hence love is not first of all a desire or a "centripetal" quest for one's own good. Love is primarily homage to the good itself, a movement toward the good in so far as it is such.⁵⁴

Thus concupiscent love, far from being the source and model of all love, is seen to be the particular type of love found among beings which must promote their own good by borrowing from the goods of other beings, goods which are good in relation to these beings that desire. Even in these beings, however, there is some mixture of love of the good together with desire for the good, in so far as the subject recognizes the true good of the object. But, Geiger notes still again, "pour toute créature, l'amour le plus pur demeure un bien à

⁵³p. 117.

⁵⁴"L'amour désintéressé et l'amour du bien propre ne sont pas liés parce qu'il faut assurer avant tout la satisfaction de l'appétit qui porte chaque être vers son propre achèvement, quitte ensuite à opérer l'unité des biens partiels et du bien du tout. Au contraire, c'est parce que le bien et l'amour sont en Dieu son essence même, sous la forme de l'amour absolument pur du Bien sans défaut, qu'ils se trouvent inscrits nécessairement dans tout être créé par son être même, et que tout amour revêt, nécessairement cette double grandeur d'être l'hommage suscité par le bien et de constituer la perfection naturelle de toute créature, singulièrement de la créature spirituelle, faite à l'image de Dieu, capable par conséquent de connaître le bien et de l'aimer pour lui-même et d'aimer par-dessus tout le Bien et l'Amour, source de tout bien et de tout amour." (Pp. 117-118.)

acquérir, une perfection vers laquelle elle aspire, l'acte second qui, naturellement, l'achève tout en l'ordonnant au bien et notamment au Bien de Dieu."⁵⁵

Now since this is so, St. Thomas could not possibly have said that our natural appetite, the desire of our good, is our primary love, source and measure of all other love, from which comes the disinterested love of God. He could not have offered the explanation that our love of our own good, while remaining self-seeking, would become a disinterested love of the good of God when we, extending the comprehension of our good, would arrive at the point where we consider our own good as the good of a part, a participation. Here Geiger climaxes his argumentation. "Mais s'il [St. Thomas] n'a pas pu le dire, comment expliquer qu'en effet il l'ait dit? La réponse est très simple: il ne l'a pas dit."⁵⁶ The texts cited by P. Rousselot, in fact, say just the opposite to the meaning that he drew from them. At the end of his exposition of St. Thomas, Rousselot had quoted the Angelic Doctor: "Supposé, dit-il, que Dieu ne fût pas le bien de l'homme, l'homme n'aurait aucune raison d'aimer Dieu."⁵⁷ This text manifestly affirms for Rousselot the priority of the love of our own good. God must be a good for us, or else we would have no reason to love Him.

Unfortunately, says Geiger, this text, so very clear and decisive, is not St. Thomas' but P. Rousselot's. In the context of the text cited, St. Thomas

⁵⁵p. 119.

⁵⁶p. 120.

⁵⁷S.T., II-II, 26, 13 ad 3. Rousselot, p. 14; see above, p. 16. Geiger, p. 120.

is endeavoring to clarify the order of love in heaven, and is explaining how God is the whole reason for loving for each of the blessed. The full response of St. Thomas reads: "unicuique erit Deus tota ratio diligendi, eo quod Deus est totum hominis bonum. Dato enim per impossibile quod Deus non esset hominis bonum, non esset ei ratio diligendi." The text, then, is not to be interpreted as Rousselot presents it, reading esset as an impersonal verb and understanding Deum as the object of diligendi. The text is rather to be understood: "Granted the impossible supposition that God were not the good of man, then He would not be for man the reason for loving."⁵⁸ In the same question 26 St. Thomas had said: "dupliciter est aliquid causa dilectionis. Uno modo, sicut id quod est ratio diligendi. Et hoc modo bonum est causa diligendi: quia unumquodque diligitur in quantum habet rationem boni."⁵⁹ Thus our text explains the fact that God is the whole reason for loving because He is the whole good of man, since the good is the reason for love as its formal object. Besides, St. Thomas concludes this passage by saying: "Et ideo in ordine dilectionis oportet quod post Deum homo maxime diligit seipsum." Geiger then notes what St. Thomas had said in the body of the article in question: "Quia intensio actus dilectionis provenit ex parte subjecti diligentis, ut supra dictum est. Et ad hoc etiam donum caritatis unicuique confertur a Deo, ut

⁵⁸Geiger, pp. 121-122. "Supposons par impossible que Dieu ne soit pas le bien de l'homme, il, c'est-à-dire Dieu, ne serait pas pour l'homme la raison d'aimer." The English translation of this text reads: "For if we make the impossible supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason for loving." (The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Vol. 6, New York, 1916.)

⁵⁹S.T., II-II, 26, 2 c.

primo quidem mentem suam in Deum ordinet, quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui ipsius."⁶⁰

For St. Thomas God Himself is the whole of the good, and the good is the reason for loving. Therefore man loves God more than he can love any other thing, which would only be a deficient participation in God's goodness. Geiger thus summarizes the doctrine of St. Thomas:

[L]'homme aime Dieu parce que Dieu est le bien de l'homme, car il n'y a d'amour que du bien. Dieu est toute la raison d'aimer parce qu'il est le bien total. L'homme aime donc Dieu d'abord et par-dessus tout. Il s'aime ensuite lui-même. Et puisque l'objet de l'amour de soi est un amour encore, à savoir l'amour de Dieu par-dessus toutes choses, l'amour de Dieu est premier non seulement dans l'ordre d'intensité mais encore dans l'ordre de nature. Voir dans l'amour de Dieu une convoitise de Dieu ou du bien de Dieu pour moi, ce serait inscrire dans la nature un appétit contraire à l'ordre du bien, donc la mettre comme perversité naturelle au compte de l'auteur même de la nature.⁶¹

Rousselot had cited another text to verify his thesis: "Non enim esset in natura alicuius quod amaret Deum nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus."⁶² But, as Geiger says, even without appealing to the context, we find here, not the doctrine of the primacy of self-love, of the desire for one's own good, but simply the statement that the love of God would not be found imprinted in the very nature of a being if that being did not depend on the good which is God.

Ce qui revient à dire, si je ne me trompe, que la créature aime Dieu naturellement plus qu'elle-même parce qu'elle tient de Dieu, qui est bon, son être et sa bonté. La raison profonde pour laquelle le bien de Dieu se trouve inscrit à titre de fin dans

⁶⁰ S.T., II-II, 26, 13 c.

⁶¹ Geiger, pp. 122-123.

⁶² S.T., I, 60, 5 ad 2. Rousselot, p. 14, n. 3; Geiger, p. 122.

la nature même de la créature c'est que la créature n'est pas, ainsi qu'il peut paraître à première vue, un être autonome dont il faudrait ensuite chercher le rapport avec Dieu. Elle est par Dieu, par participation de son être et de sa bonté. C'est la raison du rapport unique qui existe entre le bien de la créature et le bien de Dieu. Dieu, en d'autres termes, n'est un étranger, un autre pour aucune créature. Il ne l'a jamais été. Si par impossible il pouvait l'être, ou bien la créature n'existerait pas ou bien elle serait Dieu.⁶³

The objection to which St. Thomas is replying in this passage is just the thesis that P. Rousselot is trying to establish: "Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed naturali dilectione quilibet diligit alium propter se: unumquodque enim diligit aliquid in quantum est bonus sibi. Ergo dilectione naturali angelus non diligit Deum plus quam seipsum." To this St. Thomas answers: "cum dicitur quod Deus diligitur ab angelo in quantum est ei bonus, si ly in quantum dicat finem, sic falsum est: non enim diligit naturaliter Deum propter bonum suum, sed propter ipsum Deum. Si vero dicat rationem amoris ex parte amanti, sic verum est: non enim esset in natura alicuius quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus." The creature loves God in so far as God is its good, but because God's good is the creature's reason for love, ratio amoris, and not because this good is for the creature a final cause.

Geiger next studies another text, one upon which Rousselot has based his whole thesis. The context is the discussion whether by charity man should love God more than himself.⁶⁴ It seems not, and the first opinion offered argues in this way: "Dicit enim Philosophus, in IX Ethic., quod amicabilia

⁶³Geiger, p. 124.

⁶⁴S.T., II-II, 26, 3.

quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum. Sed causa est peior effectu. Ergo maior est amicitia hominis ad seipsum quam ad quemcumque alium. Ergo magis se debet diligere quam Deum." In answer to this St. Thomas says: "Philosophus loquitur de amicabilibus quae sunt ad alterum in quo bonum quod est obiectum amicitiae invenitur secundum aliquem particular-em modum: non autem de amicabilibus quae sunt ad alterum in quo bonum praedictum invenitur secundum rationem totius." The principle holds, then, by which the love of another is based upon love of self; it holds, that is, in every case "except only the one which P. Rousselot has put at the center of his study, the case of God."⁶⁵

Hence not only is the love of God the most fundamental love inscribed in the nature of every creature, but this love, by which the creature loves any good whatsoever, is itself a participation in the love by which God loves Himself. The ultimate reason for love is that "nous aimons et toute créature aime parce que Dieu est amour et que rien ne saurait exister qui ne soit sa créature, donc par participation de sa bonté et de son amour."⁶⁶ The creature loves because of its very being, and the very nature of its love is that it be directed toward God, in whom the creature, its goodness, and its love participate.

⁶⁵Geiger, p. 126.

⁶⁶pp. 127-128.

CHAPTER IV

ST. THOMAS' TEACHING ON LOVE

At this point the writings of St. Thomas himself must be studied to discover his own presentation of his teachings on the nature of love and especially on the notion of man's love for God. For a proper understanding of his thought on this subject, it would be good to survey briefly the metaphysical context in which Aquinas would have his doctrine understood.

St. Thomas teaches that created beings exist in an imperfect, limited manner, dependent on a Creator that is an absolute, perfect Being. The existence of contingent beings requires the existence of an infinite Being possessing the plenitude of perfection. For every creature this absolute Being is the first efficient cause, the first and original formal exemplary cause, and the ultimate final cause. The creature exists by communication of the divine perfection, and hence by a participation in it. This communication gives the creature both its existence and its particular essence, a nature having a certain likeness to the infinite divine essence. "Esse autem rerum creaturarum deductum est ab esse divino secundum quendam deficientem assimilationem."¹

This likeness or proportionate similitude of the created being to its Creator is realized in the substantial form whereby the creature is what it is.

¹In de Div. Nom., c. 1, lect. 1.

The creature, however, being composed of potency and act, is not immediately constituted in its ultimate perfection. Hence it can achieve its proper perfection only in the proportion that it is reduced from potency to act according to the exigencies of its nature. Thus upon any form follows a corresponding inclination to further actualization of the potency of the being. Any created being is what it is from the first moment it exists, but it has not reached its final fulfillment until it achieves the degree of actuality proper to its nature. The realization of this fundamental inclination, rooted in the creature's nature, constitutes the ultimate perfection of the created being.

It is evident, then, that there is a natural inclination, radicated in the very nature of every created being, and that the progressive realization of this inclination constitutes the perfection of the being and the attainment of its purpose of existence. Thus every natural form has a consequent inclination or tendency. Hence, St. Thomas defines appetite generically as an inclination following upon the form of any being: "quaslibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio."² In general, appetite is the inclination or direction of a being toward what is good for it or away from what is harmful to it: "nihil enim est aliud appetitus naturalis quam quaedam inclinatio rei, et ordo ad aliquam rem sibi convenientem."³ St. Thomas again says that the natural appetite in any being is its movement toward its full completion or development, its inclination toward its end and toward the operations conducive to its goal. "Res naturalis per formam qua perficitur in sua specie habet inclinationes in

² S.T., I, 80, 1 c.

³ De Ver., 25, 1 c.

proprias operationes et proprius finem, quem per operationes consequitur: quale est enim unusquodque, talia operatur et in sibi convenientia tendit."⁴

"Ad formam autem sequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid huiusmodi: quia unusquodque, inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam."⁵ Following upon the types of form which may be in a being, there are three types of appetite, the natural appetite of inanimate things, the sense appetite of sentient beings, and the rational appetite of intelligent beings.⁶ As has been seen, God in creating beings intends to communicate to them a participation in His own being. He intends to communicate to them perfection, and creatures by their nature seek to maintain a fuller share in this perfection. Hence it may be said that the divine goodness is the end of all creatures.⁷ Thus what God intends in finite beings is that they should acquire a likeness to the divine perfection as their last end.⁸ "Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum inquantum est essendi principium, quia omnia inquantum sunt tendunt in Dei similitudinem qui est ipsum esse."⁹

It is evident that the appetitive potency is not a univocal but an analogous concept.

Quae tamen inclinatio diversimode invenitur in diversis naturis, in

⁴C.G., IV, 19.

⁵S.T., I, 5, 5 c.

⁶See C.G., III, 25; S.T., I, 59, 2; I, 80, 1; I-II, 26, 1 and 2.

⁷See S.T., I, 44, 4 c; De Ver., 21, 2 c.

⁸See C.G., I, 96; III, 19.

⁹S.T., II-II, 34, 1 ad 3.

unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura intellectuali invenitur inclinatio naturalis secundum voluntatem; in natura autem sensitiva, secundum appetitum sensitivum; in natura vero carente cognitione, secundum ordinem naturae in aliquid.¹⁰

Et quia cuiuslibet rei tam materialis quam immaterialis est ad rem aliam ordinem habere; inde est quod cuiuslibet rei competit habere appetitum vel naturalem, vel animalem, vel rationalem seu intellectualem; sed in diversis diversimode invenitur.¹¹

In the rational creature the appetitive faculty is called the will. As the natural appetite of any creature seeks the perfection of that creature, so in a human being the will, by a necessity of its very nature, seeks the good and perfection of the person. It cannot seek the contrary.¹² St. Thomas teaches that man's happiness, his last end, is the perfect good. This good is sought by the will as the universal good, alone capable of satisfying the rational appetite. Since this universal good can be found only in God, God alone can be man's beatitude and the ultimate object of the human will. "Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum: alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum . . . Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo: quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest . . . In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit."¹³

¹⁰ S.T., I, 60, 1 c.

¹¹ De Ver., 23, 1 c.

¹² C.G., III, 109. "Quaelibet voluntas naturaliter vult illud quod est proprium volentis bonum, nec potest contrarium huius velle."

¹³ S.T., I-II, 2, 8 c.

The human will, then, as the principle of the inclination following upon the form of an intellectually apprehended object, is an immaterial faculty with a universal inclination to the good.

Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum . . . Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.¹⁴

Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinantur in bonum; non quidem quasi ab alio solummodo directa in bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent; neque in bonum particulariter tantum, sicut ea in quibus est sola sensitiva cognitio; sed quasi inclinata in ipsum universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas.¹⁵

This bonum universale is thus the adequate object of the human will.

Since the will is a faculty of a rational being, the intellect gives the ordination to the end for the subject. The will is inclined to seek the good and the well-being of the person in an orderly way, by subordinating means to ends, and to seek the end in and for itself.¹⁶ Dom Gregory Stevens, a recent commentator on the Thomist notion of love, says in this matter:

Finality so orders the will's appetitions that what is good in itself, the end, is preferred to the goods by participation (means) and the good of the person becomes not the ultimate determinant, but rather determinable. In other words, the end is sought in and for itself, not in subjection to the personal good, so that this latter becomes the material, not the formal, object of the will. Thus, the ultimate object of the will, its most formal determination is to the end (ratio finis) just as, in the objective order, the end is the ultimate formal 'ratio'

¹⁴ S.T., I-II, 10, 1 ad 3.

¹⁵ S.T., I, 59, 1 c. See also S.T., I, 59, 4 c; I, 82, 2 ad 2; I, 82, 4 c; I, 82, 5 c; De Ver., 22, 6 ad 5.

¹⁶ See In XII Met., 7, n. 2522; C.G., I, 44.

of the good.¹⁷

The will, St. Thomas teaches, is directed toward the good--that is, it seeks an object in so far as the object is capable of perfecting another: "voluntas in nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione boni."¹⁸ "Bonum dicit rationem perfecti."¹⁹ It is the perfection of a being, the existence that it has, capable of perfecting another being in its existence, that makes the perfective being an object of seeking for the perfectible being: "unumquodque dicitur bonum, in quantum est perfectum: sic enim est appetibile."²⁰ "Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum: nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem."²¹ For any being its good is its perfection, its conservation and development in existence and its attainment of its end. As has been seen above, every created being exists by communication of, and participation in, the infinite Being that is God. Because of this creation, every creature exists with imperfect, limited perfection. As having a limited perfection, the creature has a natural inclination for the completion of its perfection. As having perfection, it is capable of being perfective of another, and hence of being the term or goal of the natural appetite of another.

¹⁷Gregory Stevens, O.S.B., "The Disinterested Love of God According to St. Thomas and Some of His Modern Interpreters," The Thomist, XVI (October 1953), 504. "Voluntas autem respicit finem ut objectum proprium." (S.T., I, 5, 4 ad 3.) "Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis." (S.T., I-II, 72, 3 c. See also I-II, 73, 6.)

¹⁸S.T., I, 82, 2 ad 1.

¹⁹S.T., I, 5, 1 ad 1.

²⁰S.T., I, 5, 5 c.

²¹S.T., I, 5, 1 c.

Hence because every created being has participated perfection, it is both perfectible and appetitive, and also perfective and appetible.²² For anything to attract a person in the line of the good, of final causality, the object must be proportioned or adapted to the subject so as to be the subject's good.²³

The will, as has been said, naturally seeks the perfect good of the subject, his beatitude.²⁴ St. Thomas, however, does not make a subjective good the ultimate object of the will. "Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis."²⁵ The object of the will must contribute to the perfection of the person, but this does not mean that it is solely a perfectivism, or sought as such. The object of the will is a good, absolute and good in itself. The subject loves the good because it is good, although this good is also the subject's good. As a recent author has written, for St. Thomas "le bien est de nature métaphysique, il est un absolu métaphysique qui, par définition, n'admet pas qu'on le réfère à autre chose qu'à lui-même. Le fait que l'homme trouve son bien à aimer le bien ne fait pas que le bien soit le bien parce qu'il est le bien de l'homme. Si le bien est le bien de l'homme, c'est parce que, d'abord,

²² S.T., I, 5, 3 c. "Omne ens, in quantum est ens, est in actu, et quodam modo perfectum: quia omnis actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni."

²³ S.T., I, 62, 2 c. "Naturalis autem inclinatio est ad id quod est conveniens secundum naturam."

²⁴ S.T., I, 19, 3 c; I, 41, 2 ad 3; I, 60, 2; C.G., I, 80.

²⁵ S.T., I-II, 2, 7 c.

il est le bien."²⁶

Although the will, by its very nature, is the faculty seeking the good and happiness of the entire person, and although the object of the will is desired in so far as it is related to the good of the person, the will's inclination to the good of the person is not its ultimate formal determination. While the will cannot operate with regard to anything not seen as beneficial to the person, the motive of self-interest is not for this reason the formal cause of all the will's acts.²⁷ The ultimate formal object of the will is the end. The end is willed in and for itself, and not formally because it contributes to the good or well-being of the subject.

The principal act of the will, love, is an affective union, according to St. Thomas, by which the lover's good and the beloved object are identified.

"Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui."²⁸ The will is passive in the order

²⁶ A. Malet, Personne et Amour dans la Théologie Trinitaire de Saint Thomas d' Aquin (Paris, 1956), p. 126. See also In XII Met., 7, n. 2522; S.T., I-II, 4, 2 ad 2; C.G., I, 44.

²⁷ S.T., I, 60, 5 ad 2; see above, pp. 58-59.) "[C]um dicitur quod Deus Diligitur ab angelo inquantum est ei bonus, si ly inquantum dicat finem, sic falsum est: non enim diligit naturaliter Deus propter bonum suum, sed propter ipsum Deum. Si vero dicat rationem amoris ex parte amantis, sic verum est: non enim esset in natura alicuius quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unusquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus."

²⁸ S.T., I-II, 28, 1 ad 2.

of specification, and it is specified by its object in the order of final causality. The object moves the will to act, to love, by the special attraction proper to the order of final causality. In the words of Dom Stevens, "The object moves the will to act (to love), not by a physical efficiency, but by the special 'attraction' proper to the order of final causes. The will adapts itself and actively tends toward the object in the order of efficient causality, and in this the will is seen primarily as an active faculty. It is the act of the will in regard to the end that is primarily the act of love, just as it is the proper effect of the end to awaken and cause love."²⁹

St. Thomas lists the causes of love as three--the good,³⁰ knowledge,³¹ and likeness.³² It should be noted that knowledge is not properly a cause of

²⁹Stevens, p. 510.

³⁰S.T., I-II, 27, 1 c. "[A]mor ad appetitivum potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit propria causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum. Amor autem proprium obiectum est bonus: quia, ut dictum est, amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonus id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonus sit propria causa amoris."

³¹S.T., I-II, 27, 2 c. "[B]onum est causa amoris per modum obiecti. Bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit, IX Ethic. [Nic. Eth., IX, 5; Bekker 1167a3-10.] quod visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi. Et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum."

³²S.T., I-II, 27, 3c. "[S]imilitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris. Sed considerandum est quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu: sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes. Alio modo, ex hoc quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione, illud quod aliud habet in actu: sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens extra suum locum, habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo

love, but rather a condition.³³

Likeness, St. Thomas says, is, properly speaking, the cause of love. Likeness is here proposed as a universal cause of love, not just as the cause of love between two equals. "Omne quod appetit aliquid, appetit illud in quantum habet aliquam similitudinem cum ipso."³⁴ The likeness spoken of here is not the intentional likeness which is the principle of knowledge, but a likeness "secundum esse naturae,"³⁵ some common form shared by the lover and the beloved. As Aquinas often repeats, "bonum enim in rebus est,"³⁶ and the good is perfective "non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet in re."³⁷ Because of the proportion between the subject as perfectible and the object as capable of perfecting, the subject is inclined toward the object for the sake of real union with it in its concrete existence. The beloved object is good for the loving subject and so attracts the subject precisely because it is proportioned to the lover in its being, "secundum esse naturae." "Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum: quantum vero ad amorem

loco existenti. Vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum: nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus. Præterea ergo similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae . . . Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem concupiscentiae, vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis."

³³ De Car., 4 ad 4. "Non enim ea ratione aliquid diligitur quia cognoscitur, sed quia est bonum."

³⁴ De Ver., 22, 1 ad 3.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ De Ver., 21, 1 c.

³⁷ De Ver., 21, 3 c.

quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis."³⁸ The cause of love is this union consisting in likeness--a likeness of act to act, or of act to potency, or a likeness of proportions.³⁹

This likeness, the cause of love, explains the notion of the good, the object of love.

[A]moris radix, per se loquendo, est similitudo amati ad amantem, quia est ei bonum et conveniens.⁴⁰

Alio modo ens est perfectivus alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura; et per hunc modum est perfectivus bonum; bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. [Met. II, 4; Bekker 1021a27]. Inquantum autem unus ens est secundum esse suum perfectivus alterius et conservativus, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur; et inde est quod omnes recte definiendo bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertineat ad habitudinem finis.⁴¹

St. Thomas says that a being's goodness is the perfection that it has. "Perfectio uniuscuiusque est bonitas eius."⁴² "Bonitas uniuscuiusque est perfectio

³⁸ S.T., I-II, 28, 1 ad 2.

³⁹ Ibid., "[C]umne quod appetit aliquid, appetit illud inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem cum ipso. Nec similitudo illa sufficit quae est secundum esse spirituale; alias oporteret ut animal appeteret quidquid cognoscit; sed oportet quod sit similitudo secundum esse naturae. Sed haec similitudo attenditur dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod forma unius secundum actum perfectum est in alio; et tunc ex hoc quod aliquid sic assimilatur fini, non tendit in finem, sed quiescit in fine. Alio modo ex hoc quod forma unius est in alio incomplete, id est in potentia; et sic, secundum quod aliquid habet in se formam finis et boni in potentia, tendit in bonum vel in finem, et appetit ipsum."

⁴⁰ In III Sent., 27, 1, 1 ad 3.

⁴¹ De Ver., 21, 1 c.

⁴² C.G., I, 38.

sius."⁴³ "Natura autem boni vel ratio in perfectione consistit."⁴⁴ Since a creature has its perfection by participation in absolute perfection, all beings have goodness according to the likeness they have to God.⁴⁵ Now for Aquinas direct love for another is an extension of the direct love every being has for itself. Supposing the subject's proper goodness and love for himself, the likeness of another being to the subject makes possible the extension of his love to that other. The good which the subject recognizes in himself is seen to be shared by another. The subject's unity with himself causes his love of self. The community of goodness between the subject and the object, the union consisting in likeness, allows the subject to recognize the good in the object, and is a cause of his love for the object. "[S]icut plus est esse unum quam uniri, ita amor magis est unus ad seipsum, quam ad diversa quae ei uniuntur."⁴⁶ "Unusquodque primo et per se appetit suam perfectionem, quae est bonus uniuscuiusque, et est semper proportionatus suo perfectibili, et secundum hoc habet similitudinem ad ipsum."⁴⁷ Father Robert Johann remarks in this regard:

What I love in myself or another is a subsistent likeness of God. Thus the ultimate oneness of value is assured. God the Creator, present in all, is loved in all and above all. But this unique Value, as participated, is indistinguishable from that core of reality most proper to each creature, its own subsistence. It is the presence of this Value in the creature that is the creature. Hence each creature is a unique value,

⁴³C.G., I, 40.

⁴⁴C.G., I, 39.

⁴⁵See S.T., I, 6, 4 c.

⁴⁶S.T., I, 60, 3 ad 2.

⁴⁷In de Heb., lect. 2 (ad fin.).

yet comming in its uniqueness with every other creature in the Unique Value. Since, therefore, what I love in being is the presence of the Absolute, I can love it in the other as well as in myself. And since as in myself it is myself, and in the other it is himself, so my own proper good, loved in myself, can be found by likeness in the other in the very trait that irreducibly distinguishes him from me, his proper subsistence.⁴⁸

Because love implies such a fitness and suitability of the object loved to the subject loving, love is perfective. "Amor importat quendam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum: unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum."⁴⁹ In short, it may be said that because of likeness a being is good and it is lovable. Having a likeness to God, a creature has perfection and goodness. Having a likeness to another being, it can be recognized as good and can be loved. Furthermore, because of the likeness a creature has to God, it tends toward God as the fulfillment of its perfection. Hence likeness accounts for the creature's goodness, its attractiveness in the order of good and of love, and its appetite or inclination toward God.

Here it would be good to consider St. Thomas' distinction between amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae, friendship and desire, benevolent love and concupiscent love.

[C]um amare sit velle bonum alicui, dupliciter dicitur aliquid amari: aut sicut id cui volumus bonum, aut sicut bonum quod volumus alicui.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Robert C. Johann, The Meaning of Love (Westminster, Maryland, 1955), p. 30.

⁴⁹ S.T., I-II, 17, 1 c.

⁵⁰ De Car., q. un., 7 c. See also C.G., I, 91; III, 90.

Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quid vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae: ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae. Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur: quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter: amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.⁵¹

The distinction for St. Thomas is based on the double tendency implied in the definition of love: amare sit velle bonum alicui. The one for whom the good is willed, whether it be oneself or another, is loved directly with benevolent love. The good itself, loved with reference to the subject loving or even to another, is loved with concupiscent love. The basis for the distinction here is the difference between substance and accident. A thing can be loved in two ways. It can be loved as a subsistent good, a good in itself, and here it is really loved and good is wished to it. Or a thing can be loved as a relative good, perfective of a substance, and here the object is loved with a desire. It is loved not for what it is in itself, but rather for some perfection to be derived from it.⁵² Thus there is distinguished the subject of love, the object of love, and the end. Benevolent love is directed to the end, a person; and concupiscent love is directed toward the good, which in benevolent love is identified with the end. St. Thomas also distinguishes the two types of love

⁵¹ S.T., I-II, 26, 4 c.

⁵² See In de Div. Nom., c. 4, lect. 9

according to the types of likeness that have been seen.⁵³ Thus in benevolent love the object of love has an actual and not merely potential likeness to the subject in virtue of which the other is loved on the same basis as is the self. In concupiscent love the will is directed to an accidental good desired as a perfection for the person, and this good is related to the person, the end, as act to potency.

In establishing the nature of man's love for God, both Rousselot and Geiger put great stress on St. Thomas' understanding of the principle of the part and the whole.⁵⁴ This principle is to be understood in the context of St. Thomas' teaching on God's creation of the universe. As has been seen, the purpose of the Creator in producing the world of finite creatures is the unity and order of the whole universe. For God gave creatures a limited communication, or participation, in His unlimited perfection. Thus each creature exists in a participated likeness to the divine Being. But since individual finite beings could not adequately reflect the divine perfection, God created the various beings of the universe, so that the complex ordered whole of creation would more perfectly reflect His infinite perfection. Existing in a state of imperfection and of potency, these creatures strive for further perfection, for greater participation in and similitude to the unparticipated perfection of God. The purpose of the Creator in producing the world of finite beings is the unity and order of the universe as such. It is only the perfection of the whole

⁵³ S.T., I-II, 27, 3 c. See above, pp. 72-73.

⁵⁴ Rousselot, pp. 7-14, 23-32; Geiger, pp. 26-27, 120-128.

which more or less perfectly realizes the divine likeness.⁵⁵ Each particular created reality, each part of the universe, therefore, is significant only in its proper place in the context of the whole universe.⁵⁶

Thus the part is for the whole, and the good of the part is ordered to the good of the whole. But no created being exists, acts, or tends to further perfection, except in accord with its particular nature. If the part is what it is and what it should be only within the context of the whole, then it is natural for each part to be inclined to the whole rather than to itself: "bonum partis est propter bonum totius: unde naturali appetitu vel amore, unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus."⁵⁷ Since it is only the whole which more or less adequately reflects the divine perfection and shares its goodness, it is only in the proportion that the part exercises its nature within the context of the whole that it too proportionately accomplishes its role in reflecting and sharing the perfection and goodness of God, and thus accomplishes its own perfection as well. Only in the ordered relation of the parts within the whole, with their proper subordination and coordination do they accomplish the purpose of their existence. "Unusquodque intendens aliquem finem, magis curat de eo quod est

⁵⁵ S.T., I, 47, 3 c. "[I]pse ordo in rebus sic a Deo creatis existens unitatem mundi manifestat. Mundus enim iste unus dicitur unitate ordinis, secundum quod quaedam ad alia ordinantur. Quaecumque autem sunt a Deo, ordinem habent ad invicem et ad ipsum Deum."

⁵⁶ S.T., I, 47, 1 c. "[P]erfectius participat divinas bonitates et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam aliae quaecumque creaturae."

⁵⁷ S.T., I-II, 109, 3 c.

propinquius fini ultimo: quia hoc etiam est finis aliorum. Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi: cum ad ipsum ordinetur sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum huius vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius; unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. Id igitur quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi."⁵⁸

In creating the universe God has given it this ordination to Himself, its efficient and final cause. All creatures are ordered to the good of the whole universe, the intrinsic good of the universe.⁵⁹ According to such an interpretation of the principle of the part and whole, God is the end of the universe and of each creature, and the whole is the universe, not God Himself. By a predicamental relation, creatures, including man, are related to God as to their ultimate end.

The principle may also be interpreted as follows. God is the plenitude of goodness, the "whole," and the creatures are deficient likenesses, participations, "parts." Since the limited good of each creature is a participation of the perfect good of God, the good of the creature may be considered as a part in relation to God, the whole. Hence by this transcendental relation creatures are related to God.

The first interpretation of the principle of the whole and part stresses the actual ordination of the universe and of each of its parts to God, and

⁵⁸ C.G., III, 64.

⁵⁹ See S.T., I, 11, 3; I, 21, 1 ad 3; I, 47, 3; I, 65, 2.

emphasizes the notion of final causality. The second interpretation stresses the participation of each creature in God, the whole and universal good. As has been seen, St. Thomas notes two causes of love (besides the condition, knowledge): the good and likeness--the one stressing final causality and the other formal causality. In the two interpretations of the principle of part and whole, both of these causes are seen to pertain to the creature's love for God.

By showing, through the principle of the part and the whole, that God is the ultimate end to which the entire universe and each of its parts are directed, St. Thomas has given the final reason, in the order of the good, for the creature's stronger inclination toward, and love of, God. The second interpretation of the principle corresponds to the second cause of love, likeness, similitudo. According to this interpretation, the totality of God's goodness and the partiality of man's participated likeness in this goodness require a primary love of the unparticipated goodness. For without this the love of the participated good would be inexplicable, as the existence of a limited being would be inexplicable without the existence of a subsistent being. In this theory, the good of the creature is seen to be the unparticipated totality of good rather than its own partial participated good.

One of the most important texts dealing with this doctrine has been cited by Rousselot:

Unusquodque autem in rebus naturalibus, quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cuius est, quam in seipsum. Et haec inclinatio naturalis demonstratur ex his quae naturaliter aguntur: quia unusquodque, sicut agitur naturaliter, sic aptum est agi, ut dicitur in II Physic. [Phys. II, 8: Bekker 199a8-15]. Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit, ad conservationem totius: sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius cor-

poris. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, huiusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis: est enim virtuosus civis, ut se exponat mortis periculo pro totius reipublicae conservatione; et si homo esset naturalis pars huius civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei naturalis. Quia igitur bonum universale est ipse Deus, et sub hoc bono continentur etiam angelus et homo et omnis creatura, quia omnis creatura naturaliter, secundum id quod est, Dei est; sequitur quod naturali dilectione etiam angelus et homo plus et principalius diligat Deum quam seipsum.⁶⁰

St. Thomas uses his familiar examples of the hand and the body, a natural or substantial whole; and the citizen and the state, an artificial or moral whole.

In both cases the good of the individual member is the common good of the whole.⁶¹ The creature by its very nature pertains to God: "id quod est, Dei est"; and God, the universal good, is considered as the whole of which every creature is a participation. Hence the good of the creature is ordered to the good of God.

St. Thomas shows that the whole may be considered as the created universe, of which God, its source and end, is the common good. Here the whole is referred to as the totality of creation rather than God. The creature in this case tends primarily to the common good of this whole, so that love of self is derived from this love of the common good.

Diligere autem Deum super omnia est quiddam connaturale homini; et etiam cuilibet creaturae non solum rationali, sed irrationali et etiam inanimatae, secundum modum amoris qui unicuique creaturae competere potest. Cuius ratio est quia unicuique naturale est quod appetat et amet aliquid, secundum quod aptum natum est esse: sic enim agit unumquodque, prout aptum natum est, ut dicitur in II Physic. [Phys. II, 8; Bekker 199a10]. Manifestum est autem quod bonum partis est

⁶⁰ S.T., I, 60, 5 c. See Rousselot, p. 13; above, p. 15.

⁶¹ See S.T., II-II, 58, 5.

propter bonum totius. Unde etiam naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus.⁶²

Earlier in his career, St. Thomas had argued as follows: every creature tends more strongly to the object which most perfectly realizes that creature's own good. The part finds its good more perfectly in the whole than in itself, and thus the part loves the good of the whole more strongly than its own limited good. But man's good is found more perfectly in God, the cause of all good, than in self. Therefore man loves God more than self.

Bonum autem illud unusquisque maxime vult salvari quod est sibi magis placens; quia hoc est appetitui informato per amorem magis conforme; hoc autem est suum bonum. Unde secundum quod bonum alicuius rei est vel aestimatur magis bonum ipsius amantis, hoc amans magis salvari vult in ipsa re amata. Bonum autem ipsius amantis magis invenitur ubi perfectius est. Et ideo, quia pars quaelibet imperfecta est in seipsa, perfectionem habet in sub toto, ideo etiam naturali amore pars plus tendit ad conservationem sui totius quam sui ipsius. Unde etiam naturaliter animal opponit brachium ad defensionem capitis ex quo pendet salus totius. Et inde est etiam quod particulares homines seipsos morti exponunt pro conservatione communitatis cuius ipsi sunt pars. Quia ergo bonum nostrum in Deo perfectum est, sicut in causa universali prima et perfecta bonorum, ideo bonum in ipso esse magis naturaliter complacet quam in nobis ipsis. Et ideo etiam amore amicitiae naturaliter Deus ab homine plus seipso diligitur.⁶³

St. Thomas' use of the principle of the part and the whole synthesizes the two notions and the two causes of love. In the notion of the common good are based both the predicamental relation of man to God, his creator and last end, and the transcendental relation of man to God, the universal and total good. The direction of the whole and its parts to God places the reason of

⁶² S.T., I-II, 109, 3 c. See also S.T., II-II, 26, 3.

⁶³ In III Sent., 29, 3 sol. See also In de Div. Nom., c. 4, lect. 9 & 10.

love in the order of the good, of final causality; and the doctrine of participation explains the likeness between the creature and God as a cause of love. The notion of God as the common good of the universe and its parts indicates that God is the ultimate end, independent of creatures and separate from the universe; and that He is immanent to the universe and to each creature, with His goodness participated in by all creatures. God, the common good of the universe, is thus the first and principal object of the love of His creatures.

It must be noted here that Aquinas assigns man a special place in the ordination of the universe to its good. Rational creatures have a privileged position in the universe because, as natures capable of attaining God Himself by knowledge and love, they alone stand in immediate relation to God as their object. As the last end of the universe is God, whom only rational creatures can attain directly by knowledge and love, they only are willed by God for their own sake, and everything else is willed by Him with reference to them.⁶⁴ Thus there is in the universe an order and harmony in which the lower is subordinated to and serves the higher, all things contribute to the perfection of the whole, and the whole universe itself exists for the divine perfection.

Sic igitur et in partibus universi, unaquaeque creatura est propter suum proprium actum et perfectionem. Secundo autem, creaturae ignobiliores sunt propter nobiliores sicut creaturae quae sunt infra hominem, sunt propter hominem. Ul-

⁶⁴ S.T., II-II, 2, 3 c. See also C.G., III, 112. "Sola natura rationalis creata habet immediatum ordinem ad Deum, quia ceterae creaturae non attingunt ad aliquid universale, sed solum ad aliquid particulare participantem divinam bonitatem vel in essendo tantum, sicut inanimata, vel etiam in vivendo et cognoscendo singularia, sicut plantae et animalia. Natura autem rationalis in quantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis rationem, habet immediatum ordinem ad universale essendi principium."

terius autem, singulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. Uterius autem, totum universum, cum singulis suis partibus, ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem, in quantum in eis per quendam imitationem divina bonitas representatur ad gloriam Dei: quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione, cognoscendo et amando.⁶⁵

St. Thomas later repeats this immediate ordination of man to God, in speaking of the end of creatures. All creatures, he says, have the same ultimate end, God, but they do not all attain Him in the same way. "Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum: quod non competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem in quantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt."⁶⁶

The notion of the good and of likeness is St. Thomas' explanation of the innate tendency, the natural appetite, of all creatures for God, a tendency rooted in the very nature of their being. Creatures, existing with a limited degree of perfection, with a potency and innate inclination for further perfection, naturally tend toward other being so proportioned to them as to be capable of realizing this perfection. In that such an object is perfectum it is perfectivum, and in so far as it is this it is bonum. But any being is perfectum only in so far as it participates in God's unlimited perfection, as it has a likeness to the divine being and goodness. Hence in loving any created good, the creature loves indirectly and implicitly the source of all good.

⁶⁵S.T., I, 65, 2 c.

⁶⁶S.T., I-II, 1, 3 c.

[O]mnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque bonum, sive appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali, qui est sine cognitione: quia nihil habet rationem boni et appetibilis, nisi secundum quod participat Dei similitudinem.⁶⁷

[O]mnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum; quod est proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad cognitiones sensibiles. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori cognoscente.⁶⁸

In the realm of rational love, as the union through likeness is the principle of the love for others, the union of the subject with himself is the principle of his natural love for self and the basis of his love for others. Because of the substantial unity of the subject with himself, he naturally loves himself; but the subject has this unity only by participation, so this self-love is further determined and measured by some higher principle. Hence the subject will love himself only in the proportion that he loves the unparticipated being which is the principle and measure of both the unity of the subject and of his love of self. As Aquinas has said, "quia omnis creatura naturaliter secundum id quod est, Dei est, sequitur quod naturali dilectione etiam angelus et homo plus et principalius diligat Deum quam seipsum."⁶⁹ St. Thomas teaches that the will is necessarily moved toward the ultimate end of the subject: "illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est

⁶⁷ S.T., I, 44, 4 ad 3. See also C.G., III, 24 and 25.

⁶⁸ S.T., I, 6, 1 ad 2.

⁶⁹ S.T., I, 60, 5 c. See above, p. 82.

tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle: quod est beatitudo."⁷⁰ In speaking about the universe of creatures and its ordination to its end, St. Thomas states that the ultimate end of this universe is God.⁷¹ God, being the ultimate end of all creatures and the reason for the goodness and appetibility of any end, is implicitly sought in any movement of an appetite.⁷² Writing on St. Thomas' theory of love, Michael Faraon remarks in this matter:

But, if it is true that the unity of the individual is the principle of its love of self, and if it is true that the subject is one only by participation, then its self-love is further determined and measured by some higher principle. Therefore the subject will love itself truly only in the proportion that it loves more that being which because it is one by its very essence is consequently the measure and principle of both the unity of the subject and of its love of self . . .

In other words, the principle of the subject's love of another is the union of similitude or likeness which exists between lover and beloved. But, since union is specified by unity, it is the unity of the subject with itself which is the principle of its ability to be like something else. However, since the subject is being by participation, and since being and unity are convertible, it is one only by participation. Therefore even its unity is further determined and

⁷⁰ S.T., I-II, 10, 2 c. See also S.T., I, 82, 1 and 2.

⁷¹ S.T., I-II, 2, 8 ad 2. St. Thomas here is not saying that man is merely a part of the universe, but is referring to the comparison made in the objection which he is answering. "Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus."

⁷² De. Ver., 22, 2 c. See also S.T., I, 44, 4 ad 3. "Et ideo, sicut Deus, propter hoc quod est primum efficiens, agit in omni agente, ita propter hoc quod est ultimus finis, appetitur in omni fine. Sed hoc est appetere ipsum implicite."

measured by that being which is one by its very essence. That is to say, the subject is one with itself only in the proportion that it reflects and is measured by the essential unity of God. Therefore it loves God for Himself, and itself for God, and all others as referable to God.⁷³

According to St. Thomas, then, because of the relationship of whole and part, man by his rational will naturally and necessarily loves God implicitly more than he loves his own good. Even the sinner loves God in this way.⁷⁴ This love is a love for God above all other things, but so far only an implicit natural necessary love for God.

The natural love that man has must be seconded in the sphere of conscious, deliberate love. The human will, as a rational appetite, must concur with the demands of the rational nature of which it is a faculty. No rational love, no self-love, can be erroneous in itself. It can, however, be false in so far as man's nature lacks the integrity that is proper to it. A person can love with a false love. That is, in his rational love, his conscious, deliberate love, man can love erroneously--he can love himself or others, not as they are, but as he mistakenly thinks them to be. He can love a good with an improper evaluation of it in the hierarchy of goods.⁷⁵

Furthermore, St. Thomas definitely teaches that man in the state of integral nature had an explicit act of love of God, and of all creatures because

⁷³Michael Joseph Faraon, O.P., The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love (Dubuque, Iowa, 1952), pp. 56-57.

⁷⁴See De Malo, 16, 3 ad 1; In I Sent., 5, 2 ad 5.

⁷⁵S.T., II-II, 25, 7 c. "Mali autem aestimant principale in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporalem, scilicet exteriores homines. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsum, non vere diligunt seipsum, sed diligunt id quod seipsum esse reputant. Boni autem, vere cognoscentes seipsum, vere seipsum diligunt."

of God.

Unde homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum. Et ita Deum diligebat plus quam seipsum, et super omnia. Sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ad hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei. Et ideo dicendum est quod homo in statu naturae integrae non indigebat dono gratiae superadditae naturalibus bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia; licet indigeret auxilio Dei ad hoc eum moventis. Sed in statu naturae corruptae indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis.⁷⁶

Since God is thus the object of a natural tendency, He can also be the object of a conscious act, for "illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali, potest appeti appetitu animali cum fuerit apprehensum."⁷⁷ This act of love of God is natural to man, and not based on sanctifying grace. "Super communicatione autem honorum naturalium nobis a Deo facta fundatur amor naturalis, quo non solum homo in suae integritate naturae super omnia diligit Deum et plus quam seipsum, sed etiam quaelibet creatura suo modo . . . quia unaquaeque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium."⁷⁸

It is important to remember that the object of love is such that the possession of it will be good for the subject. This does not mean that the object is good merely because desired, merely because it perfects the lover; nor, as has been seen, does it mean that the good is loved as a mere means to the subject's perfection. The object is good in itself and is loved as such;

⁷⁶ S.T., II-II, 109, 3 c.

⁷⁷ S.T., I-II, 30, 3 ad 1. See also S.T., 1, 60, 2 c.

⁷⁸ S.T., II-II, 26, 3 c.

yet being good, it perfects the subject who possesses it.⁷⁹

Following upon the explicit knowledge that man has of God there can be an explicit love of God. God can be loved in so far as He is known--whether with the more or less confused knowledge common to the unlearned, or whether with the more scientific knowledge acquired by reasoning. Since man can know God as the sovereign good, his last end, his beatitude, he can love God with a free act of love, with a rational explicit voluntary natural love.

This act of love is a free moral act, an act "according to reason."⁸⁰

Further, this explicit act of love is possible only to rational creatures. The text from De Veritate already seen⁸¹ continues:

Et ideo, sicut Deus, propter hoc quod est primum efficiens, agit in omne agente, ita propter hoc quod est ultimus finis, appetitur in omne fine. Sed hoc est appetere ipsum Deum implicite; sic enim virtus primae causae est in secunda, ut principia in conclusionibus; resolvere autem conclusiones

⁷⁹C.G., III, 24. "Secundum vero quod tendit ad hoc quod sit bonum tendit in divinam similitudinem; Deo enim assimilatur aliquid in quantum bonum est; bonum autem hoc vel illud particulare habet quod sit appetibile, in quantum est similitudo primae bonitatis propter hoc igitur tendit in proprium bonum quia tendit in divinam similitudinem, et non e converso. Unde patet quod omnia appetunt divinam similitudinem quasi ultimum finem."

⁸⁰De Perf. Vitae Spir., c.13. "Considerandum est autem, quod bonum commune secundum rectam rationem est bono proprio praeferendum: unde unaquaeque pars naturali quodam instinctu ordinatur ad bonum totius. Cuius signum est, quod aliquis percussioni manum exponit, ut cor vel caput conservet, ex quibus totius hominis vita dependet. In praedicta autem communitate qua omnes homines in beatitudinis fine conveniunt, unusquisque homo ut pars quaedam consideratur, bonum autem commune totius est ipse Deus, in quo omnium beatitudo consistit. Sic igitur secundum rectam rationem et naturae instinctum unusquisque seipsum in Deum ordinat sicut pars ordinatur ad bonum totius."

⁸¹See above, p. 88.

in principia, vel secundas causas in primas, est tantum virtutis rationalis. Unde sola rationalis natura potest secundarios fines in ipsum Deum per quamdam viam resolutionis inducere, ut sic ipsum Deum explicite appetat. Et sicut in demonstrativis scientiis non recte sumitur conclusio nisi per resolutionem in prima principia, ita appetitus creaturae rationalis non est rectus nisi per appetitum explicitum ipsius Dei, actu vel habitu.⁸²

Man loves God with a free conscious explicit love, not because God is for man his greatest good which is to be acquired. Man so loves God precisely because God's goodness is the very source and principle for all other goods, because God's goodness is the very reason that other good things have goodness and can be loved. To love God in and for Himself is man's proper operation, his end, his highest good. Man's nature requires that he seek his perfection, his own good; but this good is achieved in the act of the pure love of God. St. Thomas was offered this precise point as an objection: by his natural love any person loves another for his (the lover's) own sake, since every creature loves something just in so far as it is a good for himself--a "bonum sibi." To this St. Thomas answers quite decisively that since everyone depends on the good which is God, in loving his own good the person loves more the unparticipated source of all good. He does not love God as a greater good to be acquired for himself, the lover. This text has been seen above: "non enim esset in natura alicuius quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unusquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus."⁸³ Here, it is remembered, the text states that God's goodness is the ratio amoris. St. Thomas later repeats this thought: "uniquique erit Deus tota ratio diligendi eo quod Deus est totum hominis bonum: dato enim, per

⁸² De Ver., 22, 2 c.

⁸³ S.T., I, 60, 5 ad 2.

impossibile, quod Deus non esset hominis bonum, non esset ei ratio diligendi.⁸⁴
 Hence God's goodness is the ultimate ratio for love of any object, since unless God were good, no creature would be good, and so no creature would be an object of love.

Thus in rational love the person realizes that he belongs to God; he realizes his existential context. Etienne Gilson says in this regard: "To say that if man of necessity loves himself he cannot love God with disinterested love, is to forget that to love God with disinterested love is man's true way of loving himself. Whatever of amour propre he retains, makes him so far forth different from that love of God which is God; and all love of self for the sake of self that he abandons, makes him, on the contrary, like to God."⁸⁵

Father Paul Siwek says of any love for another: "Etiam in actibus s.d. altruisticis seu actibus amoris benevolentiae respectus ad proprium appetentis bonum non omni ex parte deest. Nam ut res quaedam propter se ipsam seu gratis amemus, cognoscere debemus . . . saltem implicite hoc: ista res meretur, quae propter se ipsam a nobis ametur. Sed cognoscendo hoc, implicite cognoscimus talem amorem esse--spectata adaequate natura nostra rationali--nobilem ac nos nobilitantem seu nobis convenientem seu nostrum bonum (appetibile)."⁸⁶

All man's acts, then, all his operations are directed of their own spontaneity toward the Being that is at the same time their source and their end.

⁸⁴ S.T., II-II, 26, 13 ad 3.

⁸⁵ Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A.H.C. Downes (New York, 1949), p. 288.

⁸⁶ Paul Siwek, S.J., Psychologia Metaphysica (Rome, 1948), p. 341.

The problem was not how to have a love of God superior to all other loves, but rather how to make this love conscious, how to make the person fully aware of himself, of God, and of his proper relation to God. This is a problem of educating and directing love.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION OF ROUSSELOT'S AND GEIGER'S THESES

So far three expositions of disinterested love have been studied: first, Pierre Rousselot's interpretation of the doctrine of St. Thomas; secondly, Louis-B. Geiger's criticism of Rousselot's interpretation and his own presentation of the teaching of St. Thomas; thirdly, a survey of the writings of St. Thomas himself and a systematic analysis of his thought as presented in the texts. It may already be noted that Rousselot and Geiger, although presenting different views on several points, both offer valuable insights into the thought of St. Thomas and the question of love. It now remains to consider the interpretations of each and to determine the value and defects of these two interpretations.

Rousselot's first step in his argumentation is to establish the primacy of self-love. This he does by showing that beatitudo, the perfect good of the subject, is the universal and necessary mover of the will. Hence, he says, the love of self, which has as its object the good of the subject loving, is the measure of all other loves and surpasses them all.¹ To substantiate this interpretation of St. Thomas, Rousselot gives a somewhat cursory reference to some texts of Aquinas. Granting that St. Thomas does speak of beatitudo as

¹See above, p. 10.

man's last end, Rousselot fails to give the full explanation of the nature of beatitude and that of the proper good of the subject. As Geiger points out, and as is seen in the teaching of St. Thomas, man's ultimate end is not a good which is to be acquired, but precisely a pure love of the Absolute Good. What the will tends to is indeed the good of the subject, but it is not because it is the good of the subject that the will tends to it. As has been seen above,² the will tends by a necessity of its nature to the good and perfection of the person, and cannot tend to the contrary.³ But there is no question here of making the subjective good of the person the ultimate object of the will. Such a position is explicitly rejected by St. Thomas.⁴ What is stated is that there will always be a relation of convenientia between the good of the person and the external object of the will's act.⁵ Therefore the text cited by Rousselot, "Unde sicut unitas est principium unionis, ita amor quo quis diligit seipsum, est forma et radix amicitiae: in hoc enim amicitiam habemus ad alios, quod ad eos nos habemus sicut ad nosmetipsos,"⁶ must be understood in the light of the full doctrine of St. Thomas. According to Aquinas, this foundation of love of others on love of self pertains only to love for other crea-

²Pp. 57-59.

³See C.G., III, 109.

⁴S.T., I-II, 2, 7 c and ad 2.

⁵One might note that in his earlier works St. Thomas defines the good as perfectivum (De Ver., 21, 1 c) and later as simply perfectum (S.T., I, 5, 1 c and 3 c). It still remains that the object of the will must contribute to the perfection of the person, even though this does not mean that the good is merely a perfectivum.

⁶S.T., II-II, 25, 4 c. See above, p. 10.

tures. St. Thomas clearly says here that this does not pertain to our love for God.⁷ In the following question⁸ St. Thomas states: "Super communicatione autem bonorum naturalium nobis a Deo facta fundatur amor naturalis, quo homo . . . in suae integritate naturae super omnia diligit Deum et plus quam seipsum." The interpretation of this cannot be Rousselot's reduction of God to the subject's bonum proprium. As Geiger notes,⁹ such an extension of man's love for his own good to include God's good would be possible but would not be a disinterested love.

Rousselot appeals to the concept of unity as the fundamental principle of love, and interprets this unity according to St. Thomas' principle of the part and whole. Man, being a "part" of God, naturally loves God, the "whole," more than his own individual unity. Rousselot puts such emphasis on unity to differentiate clearly this physical love from the ecstatic love, one of whose essential characteristics is a radical dualism of subject and object: "la pluralité, ou tout au moins la dualité, y est présentée comme un élément essentiel et nécessaire du parfait amour."¹⁰ In considering unity almost exclusively as the basis of love, Rousselot seems to neglect the explicit doctrine of St. Thomas that the good and likeness are the proper causes of love. What Rousselot says of unity as the cause of love is to be completed by the notion of similitudo, of likeness. St. Thomas clearly speaks of an unic similitudo.

⁷See above, pp. 49-50.

⁸S.T., II-II, 26, 3 c.

⁹See above, p. 21.

¹⁰Rousselot, p. 58.

itudinis, not mere unity, as the basis of love.¹¹ The two notions must be considered together. H.-D. Simonin notes this importance of the concept of unity, and insists on its completion by the concept of likeness.

Il est impossible de mieux mettre en relief le principe de l'unité, comme cause de l'amour que ne l'a fait le P. Rousselot dans son excellente étude pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour. Il fait, de ce principe de l'unité, la marque propre de la solution thomiste et le point central qui rend raison de tout le problème. Aussi, suffirait-il de renvoyer à ces pages devenues classiques, si leur auteur, tout entier dominé par son intuition métaphysique, n'avait quelque peu négligé la question de la similitude. Or il semble que, sans porter atteinte à la synthèse présentée par le P. Rousselot, on puisse, et même l'en doive y faire intervenir cette notion essentielle.¹²

Cependant, cet amour du sujet créé pour lui-même n'est pas le fondement ultime et dernier de l'amour créé. Cet être que le sujet aime en lui ne dit pas identiquement ce qu'il est. Seul Dieu, Être Premier, identique à son essence, s'aime lui-même d'un amour absolu et premier. Tout être créé n'existe, tout être créé n'est bon que dans la mesure où il dépend et se rapproche de l'Être Incréé, Source de son être limité et Terme illimité de ses désirs. L'Être qu'il aime en lui-même est une similitude de l'Être Premier; en s'aimant lui-même, selon la loi de toutes choses, c'est, métaphysiquement parlant, l'Être Incréé qu'il aime et vers lequel il se porte d'un élan premier, bien supérieur à celui qui le porte vers lui-même: l'Être Premier est règle de son amour comme il est mesure de son être et de sa bonté. Si l'Être créé est semblable à lui-même, s'il est un en lui-même, il ne l'est pas d'une façon absolue, il ne l'est qu'en tant qu'il est, c'est-à-dire en tant qu'il est semblable à l'Être Premier et uni avec lui.¹³

In establishing the principle of unity as the fundamental principle of

¹¹ S.T., I-II, 26, 3; I-II, 28, 1 ad 2.

¹² H. -D. Simonin, O.P., "Autour de la Solution Thomiste du Problème de l'Amour," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, VI (1931), 257.

¹³ Ibid., 160-161.

Love, however, Rousselot wishes to free this concept of unity from that of an egoistic and closed unity of the individual. Rousselot points the way to a theory of the openness of the person. St. Thomas "détruisait l'illusion de l'individu 'clos.'"¹⁴ However, Simonin believes that Rousselot has exaggerated his criticism of the individual. "On peut penser que le P. Rousselot a quelque peu exagéré sa critique de la notion de l'individu, mais il a parfaitement raison de ramener le problème de l'amour à celui de l'un et du multiple qui reste, depuis Platon, le grand problème philosophique."¹⁵ Still, Rousselot does stress the fact that a limiting egoism is not a truly natural tendency, that the notion of natura curva in seipsum is not a principle of St. Thomas. Rousselot goes beyond the restricting action of individual unity and emphasizes the notion that every creature belongs to another: "hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est."¹⁶ He enlarges the notion of the part and whole to include that of participation.

The emphasis that Rousselot places upon this principle, however, especially as presented in S.T., I, 60, 5, and his interpretation that the subject loves principally the good on which it totally depends, seems to make man's love for God too self-centered. Rousselot's exposition here is at least less complete than would be desired for the central part of his thesis. A proper distinction is not made between the various instances of part-whole relationships--the hand and the body, the citizen and the state, the individual and the

¹⁴Rousselot, p. 31.

¹⁵Simonin, p. 261, n. 2.

¹⁶See above, pp. 12-13.

species, man and God. There can be no doubt that St. Thomas uses the principle of the part and the whole in this problem, but his precise meaning is not easy to discover. Certainly a single text is insufficient for an understanding of his thought. It does seem certain that Rousselet has avoided the danger of pantheism, which would follow from an interpretation of this principle that is too literal. Some precisions must be made with regard to the precise, exact meaning intended by Aquinas.

It may be said here that the theory of the part and whole as used by Rousselet is very much open to criticism. The examples of the hand and body and of the citizen and the state tend to be misleading. It is true that these are the examples used by St. Thomas. Unfortunately, Rousselet bases his position too much on the few texts employing these illustrations, and neglects the broader context of St. Thomas' teaching. As has been seen, Rousselet has to twist the notion of the whole. In the whole which is the body, the member part must act as a part of the whole organism if the body and the member are to remain healthy. In fact, it is not the hand which sacrifices itself to protect the head, but rather the man, who has both head and hands, which sacrifices the member. The citizen is a part of the state, but a moral part, not a physical part as in the previous case. Man has a certain relation to the community, but he is not a mere subordinate part. The theory that he is, is precisely the basis of the modern totalitarian state. These images are illustrations, and unfortunately have no direct application to the relation which exists between God and man. M. C. D'Arcy would simply reject this argument of St. Thomas.

This defectiveness in the comparison would be unimportant if the

comparison were not the basis of the argument; but here the argument gains all its force from the comparison. We want to know how a man who is by nature bound to love himself can also love God more than himself. If it can be shown that in loving himself truly he is, in fact, loving God more than himself, then the difficulty is answered. The problem is how can this happen when all appearances are against it. St. Thomas says: "Look at an organism and you will see that there a part is nothing but a part or member of the whole, and therefore in truly loving itself it is loving not itself independently of the whole but the whole to which the part belongs utterly." But if one objects and says, "I am not on all fours with a part: I have an independent existence which can never be reduced to being just the part of something else;" then the answer has broken down, and the difficulty remains.¹⁷

Rousselot errs in presenting as identical the relation of individual and species and that of creatures and God--that just as the individual loves the species more than itself, so the creature loves God more than itself. The difficulty here is that the creature simply does not love the species more than itself. The species is a mere formal totality of perfection, an abstract universal existing only in concrete individuals, existing by a composition of the form and matter, and having no existence outside the individuals. God, on the other hand, is the subsistent totality of perfection, of which the creature is a deficient likeness, a participation. Hence it is idle to speak of love for the species, since the species as such does not exist in the real order. Nor would a creature love the totality of individual members of the species more than itself, since in the line of formality the specific determination is realized totally in each individual; there is formally no more essential perfection in the collection of individuals of a species than in any single one taken separately. God, however, being the ontological totality of perfection

¹⁷D'Arcy, pp. 106-107.

participated in by the individual, is loved implicitly when the creature loves itself. P. Rousselot would have done better to make a more precise distinction between the various kinds of totalities. He tends to speak as if logical wholes and ontological wholes, physical wholes and moral wholes, are all to be considered as on an equal footing.

Certainly St. Thomas recognizes that the relation of part and whole does not apply in the same way to the hand and the body, the man and the state, the individual and the species, and the person and God. In the passage already singled out¹⁸ St. Thomas states that all creatures, by all that they are, pertain to God. But they do so in different ways. Aquinas' full thought shows that they achieve their likeness to God, their assimilation with Him, in different ways: "divinam bonitatem unaquaeque res imitetur secundum suum modum."¹⁹ They have different grades of being, and different relations of part to whole. The notion of part and whole must be taken analogously, lest man, ordered directly to God, be considered on the same plane with other creatures, ordered to the harmony of the universe. Creatures will seek the unparticipated good rather than their own participated good, but they will do so precisely in the way that they are ordered to the good. Speaking of the principle of the part and whole, Nédoncelle remarks: "L'idée est profonde, mais elle ne distingue pas suffisamment les relations de nature et les relations des personnes. Il en résulte un certain malaise et l'analyse garde un caractère incomplet: elle nous laisse peut-être en deçà d'Aristote, et sûrement de saint Thomas, tout en

¹⁸ S.T., I, 60, 5 c.

¹⁹ C.G., III, 20.

les commentant."²⁰ As creatures exist, so are they ordered to their last end, and so do they tend to it. Unlike all sub-human creatures, man has a direct ordination to God based on a unity or union of likeness.

Rousselot says that the part loves the good of the whole for the sake of the whole, and that it does so with a disinterested love, finding in that good of the whole its own good. He thus bases this love on self-love, according to the physical concept of love. He is not clear with regard to his notion of the part finding its own good in the good of the whole, and leaves the matter open to the interpretation that the part loves the good of the whole because it is its own good. Geiger notes this and rightly remarks that in such a case there is either disinterested love or else love according to the physical theory, but not both.²¹ However, as has been observed, Rousselot does not simply reduce God to a form of my good. He rather opens the individual and expands his good to a completely comprehensive good, so that the individual seeks his own good in and with the good of the whole. But it is the identification of the good of the part with the good of the whole which he makes that opens the way to real ambiguity in his theory, regardless of which of the two goods he reduces to the other.

Etienne Gilson also rejects an understanding of the part and whole which would be too literal. Because of his failure to clarify completely his doctrine, Rousselot has left himself open to criticism: "What has made it easy to go astray here is the common contemporary abuse of what, originally, was a mere

²⁰ Maurice Nédoncelle, Vers une Philosophie de l'Amour et de la Personne (Paris, 1957), p. 85, n. 4.

²¹ See above, pp. 22-23.

metaphor, the first step in a manuductio, too often taken in a distressingly literal way."²² Gilson criticizes the over-simplification of understanding the concept of part and whole with too close a comparison of the various types of part and whole relations. His comments repeat the criticisms expressed by other authors.

It is still true to say that God is the universal Good under which all particular goods are contained, but the relation of dependence in which man stands to God is no longer that of a part to its whole. God is not a whole of which man is a part; man is not a part of which God is the whole; the universal here in question embraces the particular in quite another manner than that in which the body contains the hand that exposes itself for its defense, and, as a necessary consequence, the love by which man naturally loves God more than himself is very different from the mere brute instinct that moves the hand to protect the body; and it differs even from the rational process which prompts the citizen to sacrifice himself for the city. Would we know in what this love consists we must first of all ascertain in what sense it is true to say that God is the "universal" good of which man is the particular case.²³

Geiger denies any value at all in the principle of the part and whole, because, he says, it does not offer anything formally to the discussion of love,²⁴ and although the principle "peut tempérer l'égoïsme constitutif de l'appétit naturel dans l'univers aristotélicien, elle ne peut le supprimer."²⁵ However, it must be noted that the principle, with its notion of the common good, contains the two aspects of final causality and formal causality--the good and similitude, the two causes of love indicated by St. Thomas. The notion of God as the common good of the universe and of its parts

²²Gilson, Spirit, p. 283.

²³Ibid., 285.

²⁴See above, p. 22.

²⁵Geiger, p. 129.

shows that God is the last end and that his goodness is participated in by all creatures. This concept embraces both the predicamental relation of man to God, his source and ultimate end, and the transcendental relation of man to God, the universal and unparticipated plenitude of goodness. Thus God as the common good of the universe is the first and principal object of the love of each of his creatures, according to the way in which each creature exists and loves.

Geiger observes that Rousselot treats with apparent univocity such notions as appetite, love, and good.²⁶ Again, Rousselot's failure to make precise distinctions leads to difficulties in accepting his thesis. Although the moral order is based upon the natural order, and although the human will rests on the basis of a natural appetite, yet the will operates on the psychological level and determines its own actions. This power of self-determination depends on the primary natural ordination to an ultimate end. This end is pursued in the manner appropriate to an intellectual being, by reason and rational will. There is no question of a failure of St. Thomas to distinguish between the moral and the physical levels, or to equate psychological with ontological finality. Therefore, in considering the nature of man's love one must remember the specific nature of the moral order. Rousselot seems to have failed in this matter, and at the most he gives a general analysis of appetite,²⁷ without presenting the proper characteristics of the rational appetite. In the same way, he neglects to give a satisfactory explanation of the notion of the good. Man's end is given as beatitudo and bonum perfectum,²⁸ and the good is described simply

²⁶ See above, p. 23.

²⁷ Rousselot, pp. 8-10.

²⁸ Ibid., 9.

as "id quod omnia desiderant."²⁹ With this foundation it is easy to consider God, even when loved as having a greater unity with the person loving than that person has with himself, as some kind of good to be acquired.³⁰ Geiger points out the general principle of Rousselot's interpretation of St. Thomas: "tous les phénomènes d'amour étant pour lui [St. Thomas] l'expression d'une même réalité naturelle (la volonté, l'appétit), il faut nécessairement leur trouver un fond commun réel et permanent; il y a un objet unique et spécifique de l'amour."³¹ Hence Geiger notes that Rousselot's physical concept of love "repose donc en dernière analyse sur un monisme implicite de la nature et de l'appétit naturel."³²

It must be said in this regard, however, that Rousselot does make a distinction between natural appetite and rational appetite in man.³³ Although this does not save Rousselot's application of the part and whole, it does show that Rousselot distinguishes man from the rest of nature. Furthermore, his general discussion of appetite and love is not to be completely rejected, as Geiger would have it; for it presents the universal law of nature and of nature's primary love for God. In this universal law all creatures, including man, participate, although in an analogous way. In his use of this principle, St. Thomas applies it to all creatures and their different types of love, and

²⁹Ibid., 10.

³⁰See Above, pp. 15-16, 38-39.

³¹Rousselot, p. 18, n. 1. Geiger, p. 35, n. 11.

³²Geiger, p. 37. See above, p. 25.

³³See above, pp. 15-16.

thereby does show that the natural love for God above all else pertains to all creatures and all love. St. Thomas shows that the physical order reflects man's moral order: "inclinatio enim naturalis in his quae sunt sine ratione, demonstrat inclinationem naturalem in voluntate intellectualis naturae."³⁴

Indeed, for man, to love God implicitly is not only possible but naturally necessary. God, because He is the ultimate end, is sought for in every particular end.³⁵ The will, ut natura quaedam, naturally and necessarily loves God, its ultimate end, antecedently and more strongly than any particular end.³⁶

Rousselot's use of the principle of the part and whole does, however, suffer from the lack of distinction already seen; and although he gives a general analysis of love, he fails to indicate the specific nature of rational love. As has been observed, Rousselot's use of the good allows an interpretation according to which, in the case of the relation of man to God, the good of the whole is a good to be acquired by the part. Geiger rectifies this notion and indicates that man must love God, on whom he depends, not because man depends on God in order to attain his own good, but because God is the supreme perfection, the source and end of all good and love. St. Thomas notes that the part and the whole here are not to be compared as if they were of the same species or even genus. The case at hand is a relation of the finite to the infinite. "[N]on dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et speciei: sed secundum

³⁴ S.T., I, 60, 5 c.

³⁵ See De Ver., 22, 2.

³⁶ See S.T., I, 60, 5.

analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et alia per participationem."³⁷ Geiger in fact says: "Le P. Rousselot a bien signalé l'importance de ce thème de la participation. Mais il a omis de tenir compte de l'analogie de l'appétit qui seule permet d'en exploiter tout le contenu doctrinal."³⁸ The love of man as a participation in God's infinite goodness will be explained as a recognition and love of the fullness of Absolute Good in God, loved for its own sake. Man's love cannot ultimately be explained as a seeking for a fuller form of his own good, to be made his acquisition in any way.

Geiger's own exposition of rational love centers on three principles, properties of rational love consequent upon its intellectual nature: objectivity, rectitude or truth, and the disinterested character. He summarizes his own doctrine:

En résumé il faut donc dire que l'amour spirituel est toujours objectif sous peine de ne pas être un amour spécifié par la connaissance intellectuelle, ce qui est sa nature même. Il porte donc toujours sur le bien en lui-même, quel que soit le mode de ce bien. Cet amour objectif est en même temps vrai quand il est ordonné, c'est-à-dire s'il respecte, dans la qualité de son mouvement vers le bien, le poids, le nombre et la mesure qui régissent et de quelque manière définissent le bien. Cet amour objectif peut être désintéressé et vrai quand il se trouve en présence d'un bien vraiment absolu. Il sera désintéressé mais illégitime quand il érige abusivement en bien absolu soit un bien utile soit quelque bien qui par nature devrait demeurer subordonné à d'autres biens.³⁹

³⁷S.T., I, 4, 3 ad 3.

³⁸Geiger, p. 112, n. 67.

³⁹Geiger, p. 87.

Geiger states that it is the objective character of rational love which makes possible the love for God in Himself and for Himself, a love completely different from that natural appetite by which all creatures are said to love God in loving their own good. Geiger rejects the implication latent in Rousselot's exposition that God is to be understood in terms of a kind of good which is to be acquired by man as his last end or bonum perfectum, a notion arising from Rousselot's simplified treatment of participation and his inadequate discussion of appetite. "Car le bien de Dieu et le bien de l'homme ne sont pas deux choses qu'il faudrait identifier matériellement, plus ou moins intimement, pour que l'homme puisse naturellement aimer le bien de Dieu plus que le sien. Le bien naturel de l'homme c'est justement l'assour du bien selon l'ordre de la vérité du bien."⁴⁰ Thus, as Geiger notes, human reason can know and judge the nature of the good, and the will can love the good as such, in itself. Love is a response to the good of the object, and when following the order of right reason love will be in accord with the hierarchy of goods. In emphasizing the "order of truth in love,"⁴¹ Geiger notes the ordination in the will's activity, in the nature of the rational appetite itself, corresponding to the hierarchy of goods and ends in the universe.

In view of the doctrine of St. Thomas and the defects in Rousselot's presentation of that doctrine, it is necessary to agree with Geiger in his remarks on Rousselot's use of certain texts of St. Thomas.⁴² Geiger shows that, con-

⁴⁰ Ibid., 34, n. 10.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 81.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 120-126. The texts discussed are: S.T., I, 60, 5 ad 2; II-II, 26, 3; Ibid., 13 ad 3. See above, pp. 46-50.

trary to the apparent meaning of Rousselot's interpretation, God is to be loved by man, not because He is man's good, but because as the Absolute Good He is the very reason for all good and all love.⁴³

Geiger stresses the act of rational love as being the perfection of the person. The object of the will is the good, and the act of the will with regard to its object is the good of the person loving. Hence, he says, the rational love of God, love that is objective and true as the absolute response to the absolute good, is disinterested; and this act of love for God above all else is the good, the perfection, of the subject. "Il n'y a en vérité qu'un seul acte qui, psychologiquement parlant, est l'amour du bien, l'amour désintéressé du bien d'autrui ou du bien de Dieu, et qui naturellement est notre perfection et nous conjoint à notre vrai fin, à qui il suffit d'être ce qu'il est, pour être en même temps notre perfection."⁴⁴

Geiger proceeds to say that we are able to love this act of pure love of God with a benevolent love.⁴⁵ Quoting St. Thomas, he says that we are able to know that our love is a good, and that therefore we are able to love it as a good in itself. Here P. Geiger is not in accord with his master. It would be a metaphysical anomaly to have a direct love of benevolence for an entity that is only an operation and an accidental perfection of the substance. According to his distinctions of benevolent love and concupiscent love,⁴⁶ St. Thomas

⁴³ S.T., II-II, 26, 13 ad 3; I, 60, 5 ad 2.

⁴⁴ Geiger, p. 108.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 115-117. See above, pp. 44-45.

⁴⁶ See above, pp. 63-65.

would have to say that this love of our love for God is definitely a desire. In the text quoted by Geiger he says exactly that. The text reads in part: "Per amicitiam autem amatur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ipse amicus ad quem amicitiam habemus et cui bona volumus. Alio modo, sicut bonum quod amico volumus. Et hoc modo caritas per caritatem amatur, et non primo, quia caritas est illud bonum quod optamus omnibus quos ex caritate diligimus. Et eadem ratio est de beatitudine et de aliis virtutibus."⁴⁷ St. Thomas clearly states that our love for charity is one of concupiscence or desire, basing his distinction upon the double tendency implied in the notion of love: velle bonum alicui.⁴⁸

Johann remarks in this regard:

Take, however, the man who is actively orientated to what is really Absolute, to Substantive Plenitude precisely as transcending the bounds of nature. Here the operations are indeed desired for the subject as perfective; yet, since the subject does not love merely himself in the exclusiveness of his nature, but sees his own ultimate good in the proper subsistence of Another, the operations themselves are more profoundly desired as the means of adhering to and communing with that Other. The direct love that animates the desire is more profoundly a love of that Other, to whom whatever is perfective of the subject is, together with the subject, actively ordered.⁴⁹

Both Rousselot and Geiger explain man's disinterested love for God on the grounds that man sees that if there is anything in his own being which is lovable and which he does indeed love, it is present in God perfectly. Hence he recognizes and loves the infinite good more than his own limited finite good.

⁴⁷ S.T., II-II, 25, 2 c.

⁴⁸ De Car., 7 c. See above, p. 63.

⁴⁹ Robert C. Johann, S.J., The Meaning of Love (Westminster, Maryland, 1955) p. 66.

The point of disagreement between the two commentators is mainly the nature of the relation of this value present in man and this value present in God.

Rousselot touches on the key concepts of unity, part and whole, and God as the common end of the universe; but he fails to develop the full value of these notions.

In spite of the criticisms which must be made of Rousselot's study on love, he has, as has been seen, brought up matters of fundamental importance. He has given only the outline of his interpretation of St. Thomas, and as a result there remains a certain lack of clarity in his exposition and a consequent doubt with regard to the full and exact meaning of some of his statements. In his critique of Rousselot, Geiger offers an observation which is of interest here: "On sait que la mort sur le champ de bataille des Espagnes a arraché prématurément le P. Rousselot à son labeur intellectuel. On aime à penser qu'il n'aurait pas manqué, si la possibilité lui en avait été accordée, de préciser lui-même et de mettre au point sa pensée touchante ce thème de l'amour désintéressé et du sacrifice de soi, dont il a montré, de la seule manière indiscutable, qu'il portait en son cœur l'authentique réalité."⁵⁰

Even the critics of Rousselot, however, have been charged with failing in their analyses of love. These authors, together with their master, St. Thomas,

⁵⁰Geiger, p. 29, n. 5. A few years after the publication of his thesis, P. Rousselot did give another, although brief, definition of pure love: "L'acte d'amour pur, selon moi, n'exige essentiellement qu'on écarte aucun motif honnête, mais seulement qu'on les veuille tous finalement propter bonum Dei, non propter bonum nostrum. Mettre à la base de tout notre bien, rapporter Dieu à nous, serait déshonnête. Mais vouloir son propre bien, temporel ou éternel, propter bonum Dei, c'est amour pur." (letter of May 14, 1914, to M. le Chanoine Tiberghien, quoted in Elie Marty, Le Témoignage de Pierre Rousselot, S.J., Paris, 1940, p. 206).

are criticized because of their "objectification of the existential."⁵¹

"Even the recent study of P. Geiger, which offers an excellent criticism of Rousselot's position and penetrating insights into that of St. Thomas, is deficient on this score. The whole explanation of love is approached from the outside. Lover and beloved are objectified and analyzed as abstractions. And the charm and mystery of personal communion as well as its most profound metaphysical implications are sacrificed to a study of appetite and its various types of actuation."⁵² The approach to being suggested here is that of "interiority," an approach that seeks to free metaphysics from the realm of essences and abstract concepts. This approach seeks a full investigation of all being, the most important level of which is that of the person, the subject, the "I." It seeks to grasp being in its absoluteness, by a sort of interior presence to itself.

Hence the insistence of contemporary thinkers on this experience as occupying a privileged place in metaphysics. The interiority of consciousness first reveals to us what it means really to exist. It presents being not as a flattened image or an impenetrable block seen only from the outside, but in all its inner warmth, depth and mystery. Through the direct, immediate and concrete consciousness of the self we first contact being as absolute, a value in and for itself, a deep center and source of initiative, an energy that poses itself and can, through a process of transcendentalization, be understood as founding the reality of all that is. This is the experience of being as subject or subjectivity.⁵³

This approach seeks to recognize the object of love as an incommunicable and irreducible sovereign self, and yet maintain the community in being which

⁵¹See Johann, pp. 3-10.

⁵²Ibid., p. 7.

⁵³Ibid., p. 7.

is the communion of love. It seeks to save the interiority and ecstasy of love. Based on the community of likeness in existence, of beings in Being, the creative presence of the Absolute, the communion of love is seen to accomplish the union and consummate the participation of beings in Being which is both its foundation and its goal. This approach, demanded by Johann and others for an adequate analysis of love, claims to be a fuller interpretation of Aquinas than either Rousselet or Geiger offered.

[This approach to love] is found in the metaphysics of participation which is the glory of St. Thomas, and in an analysis of the essential openness of personality--that is, the possibility of persons to establish between themselves a relation of reciprocity, and the fact that each one, in existing for another, deepens and fortifies his own proper existence If my love has an ambition, it is to render him [the other] infinitely lovable; its one goal, his total flowering in existence. If I am enriched by his goodness, and I am more than words can describe, it is precisely because somehow I attain it in itself, as unique Thus, finally, although there is indeed distinction and duality, there is no radical exclusiveness or exteriority. For, although my good in the other is found outside the limits of my proper nature, it is not outside the intimacy of that value that I love in myself, the creative presence of God.⁵⁴

It is difficult to see what essential addition this new approach has made to the traditional doctrine of St. Thomas. It is also difficult to see the value or validity of such an approach, which proposes to explain love without a more fully exploited and deeper philosophical dependence on the principle of act and potency and on participation. A further discussion of this position is beyond the scope of this paper, but the matter shows that the question of love remains a vital one yet for philosophers.

This question of love, since the days of classical Greece one of the perennial problems of the philosophers, has cut across many areas of philosophy. It

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

has reached into the nature of the good, the ordination of creatures to God in the universe, the meaning and destiny of man, the concept even of being, and ultimately the very approach to philosophy itself.

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Robert Joseph Schwarz, S.J.

has been read and approved by three members of the Department of
Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact
that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the
thesis is now given final approval with reference to content,
form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Feb. 22, 1963

Date

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Signature of Adviser