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# The Doctrine of Liberum Arbitrium in Saint Bonaventure

William G. Thompson  
*Loyola University Chicago*

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**THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERUM ARBITRIUM  
IN SAINT BONAVENTURE**

by

**William G. Thompson, S.J.**

**A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School  
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts**

**August**

**1966**

## LIFE

William G. Thompson, S.J. was born in Detroit, Michigan, November 9, 1930.

He was graduated from St. Edward Grammar School, Detroit, in 1944, and entered the University of Detroit High School, in the same year. Upon graduation in June 1948, he entered the Jesuit Novitiate at Milford, Ohio, and was enrolled in the College of Arts of Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. In August, 1952, he entered West Baden College and was enrolled in the Bachelor of Arts Course of Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, from which school he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in June, 1953. He then entered the Graduate School of Loyola University to pursue his studies for the degree of Master of Arts in philosophy.

Presently he is teaching classical languages at the University of Detroit High School, Detroit, Michigan.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

In the history of medieval philosophy few names are more illustrious than St. Bonaventure; few problems more important than the nature of free choice.<sup>1</sup> St. Bonaventure's fame is surpassed only by his contemporary and friend, St. Thomas Aquinas. In the bull Triumphantis Ecclesiae, which declared St. Bonaventure a Doctor of the Church, Pope Sixtus V referred to the Saints as "the two olive trees and the two shining lights in the house of God, who by the plenitude of their love and the light of their erudition illumine the entire Church."<sup>2</sup> In his letter Quod Univer-  
sa Pope Leo XIII placed St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure side by side, and mentioned expressly that students of Thomistic Philosophy will derive much benefit by reading the works of St. Bonaventure.<sup>3</sup>

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1 The translation of liberum arbitrium as free choice seems preferable to free will or freedom of choice. As well as being a more accurate translation of the Latin, it does not prejudice the question as to the precise relationship of liberum arbitrium to the powers of reason and will.

2 Quoted from Clement M. O'Donnell, The Psychology of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas, Washington, 1937, 7.

3 Ibid., "Wherefore there is no doubt that especially Catholic youth who are growing up in the hope of the Church and who are devoting themselves to philosophical studies according to the doctrine of Aquinas will derive much benefit by reading through the works of St. Bonaventure."

St. Ignatius Loyola also recognized the high honor which must be accorded to St. Bonaventure. In his "Rules for Thinking with the Church" St. Ignatius states:

It is more characteristic of the scholastic doctors, such as St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and the Master of the Sentences, and others, to define and state clearly, according to the needs of our times, the doctrines that are necessary for eternal salvation, and that help to refute and expose more efficaciously all errors and fallacies.<sup>4</sup>

St. Bonaventure, Giovanni Fidanza, was born at Bagnorea in Tuscany in the year 1221.<sup>5</sup> Since as a child he was healed of a sickness through his mother's invocation of St. Francis of Assisi he seemed destined by God to enter the Franciscan Order. The date of his entrance, however, cannot be exactly determined. It may have been shortly before or after 1240, but in any case Bonaventure must have become a Franciscan in time to study under Alexander of Hales at Paris before the latter's death in 1245. Under Alexander's direction Bonaventure began his study of theology, pursuing the usual university course based principally on the Book of Sentences, a compendium of dogmatic theology written by Peter Lombard and accepted by scholastic theologians as the approved textbook of the time. The chair left vacant by the death of Alexander was filled successively by John of la Rochelle, Eudes Rigaud, and John

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<sup>4</sup> The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, trans. Louis J. Puhl, S.J., Westminster, Md., 1951, 159.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Philotheus Boehner, The History of the Franciscan School, St. Bonaventure, 1944, II, 33-34; Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Westminster, Md., 1950, II, 240-41.

of Parma, under whom Bonaventure completed his theological studies. Whether or not Bonaventure frequented the lecture hall of Albert the Great is uncertain; but he certainly must have heard of the enterprising professor who was promoting an Aristotelian renaissance in the field of philosophy.

St. Bonaventure along with St. Thomas Aquinas was involved in the difficulties between regulars and seculars at the University of Paris. In 1255 the faculty of the University refused to recognise him as a doctor and professor<sup>of</sup> theology. But he was finally recognised by the express order of Pope Alexander IV and accepted as a Doctor of Theology. He gave his inaugural address on October 23, 1257. Bonaventure was not to profit by the privilege which this recognition conferred upon him, for at the general chapter held at Rome on the second of February of that same year, though not yet thirty-six years of age, he had been named Minister General of the Franciscan Order.

Although Bonaventure's new responsibilities forced him to give up his teaching career, he was fortunately able to continue his writing. The next ten years were crowded with events centering around the welfare of his Order. Dissension arose between two factions of the Friars, some of whom favored a more rigorous interpretation of the rule, while others wished to broaden the interpretation of the rule. By his wisdom and prudence Bonaventure succeeded in checking the elements of discord and maintained the body of the



Order in its substantial purity.<sup>6</sup>

On June 23, 1273, much against his own will, Bonaventure was made Bishop of A\_l\_bano and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. He had also been asked by Gregory X to prepare the questions to be discussed at the Fourteenth General Council which opened at Lyons on May 7, 1274. While the Council was still in session, St. Bonaventure died on Sunday, July 15, 1274. He was canonized on April 14, 1482, and ranked as a Doctor of the Church by Sixtus V in 1587.

Among the many influences upon Bonaventure's thought, St. Augustine, whose authority in philosophy and theology was unquestioned clearly occupies the foremost place of importance. The growing interest in A\_ristotle effected Bonaventure, but he always remained true to the Franciscan spirit of Augustinianism.

Between the two influences which determined the trend of scholasticism during the middle of the thirteenth century, St. Bonaventure ever remained a faithful disciple of St. Augustine, the representative of a tradition which he had imbibed from Alexander of Hales and accepted and developed with the whole force of his powerful mind. Albert's influence on scholars of his own day and those of subsequent ages was great; he took instant hold of the mind of the young Thomas Aquinas, whose forerunner, guide, and master he was, and if he did not convert Bonaventure to his new ideas, it was not because the Seraphic Doctor was ignorant of the teachings of Aristotelianism but because, fully conscious of what he was doing, he had by preference thrown his lot with the traditional teaching.<sup>7</sup>

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6 Cf. Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. Dom Illyd Trethowan and F.J. Sheed, New York, 1938, 14-24; Paschal Robinson, "Saint Bonaventure," The Catholic Encyclopedia, New York, 1907, II, 648-54.

7 Emma Therese Healy, Saint Bonaventure's De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam, St. Bonaventure, 1940, 15.

In casting his lot with Augustine, however, Bonaventure, did not reject Aristotle.

He knew Aristotle well, quoted him constantly, adopted a large part of his technical vocabulary; he admired him sincerely and regarded him as the man of knowledge par excellence: . . . but he did not place him on a pedestal, nor suppose for a single instant that true philosophy must coincide with his teaching, nor that theology, the guardian of faith, must modify itself by a hair's breadth to come into harmony with him. From his first contact with the pagan thought of Aristotle, St. Bonaventure is as one who has understood it, seen through it, and passed beyond it.<sup>8</sup>

Besides Augustine and Aristotle, Bonaventure remained loyal to his master and father, Alexander of Hales, The first Franciscan to occupy a chair of theology at the University of Paris. In fact the Saint manifests such a profound respect for his teacher that he minimizes the originality of his own thought.

At quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae fratris Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum vestigiis non recedam. Non enim intendo novas opiniones adversare, sed communes et approbatas retexere. Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi scripti velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fateor, quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator.<sup>9</sup>

Bonaventure's spirit of conservatism will become very evident in the development of his doctrine of free choice. For the Saint's exposition of this point includes a survey of all the previous

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8 Gilson, Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, 5.

9 In II Sententiarum, Prae locutio (II, 1a). The information given in parenthesis refers to the volume and page number in the critical edition of Bonaventure's works: S. Bonaventurae, Omnia Opera, Quaracchi (Ad Claras Aquas), 10 vols., 1882-1902. The references in this thesis will all be made to this model of scholarship and completeness.

doctrines known in his time—Augustine, Damascene, Anselm, Bernard, Alexander, and Albert. His attempt to reconcile as many of them as possible results in a doctrine of free choice with a depth of meaning more comprehensive than the doctrines of his predecessors.

Saint Bonaventure follows the true Augustinian tradition by considering himself primarily a theologian, and a philosopher only per accidens.<sup>10</sup> He admits a methodological distinction between the sciences and also a distinction of subject-matter, but he insists that no satisfactory metaphysic or philosophical system can be worked out unless the philosopher is guided by and philosophizes in the light of faith.

If one were to define a philosopher as one who pursues the study of Being or the ultimate causes, or whatever other object one is pleased to assign to the philosopher, without any reference to revelation and precluding completely from dogmatic theology, the Christian dispensation and the supernatural order, then of course neither Augustine nor Bonaventure could be termed a philosopher; but if one is willing to admit into the ranks of the philosophers all those who pursue what are generally recognised as philosophical themes, then both men must be reckoned philosophers.<sup>11</sup>

For example, in Bonaventure's Commentary on the Sentences the problem of free choice arises in the theological context of the possibility of sin; but the analysis of free choice itself remains almost completely limited to the realm of philosophy and natural reason. Consequently it can be considered in itself and apart from its purely theological implications.<sup>12</sup>

10 Copleston, History of Philosophy, II, 248.

11 Ibid., 243

12 In II Sent., d.25, p.1, a.1, dub.1 (II, 607b)

The problem of free choice is one of great importance in the philosophy and theology of the Middle Ages.<sup>13</sup> The definition of free choice inspired by St. Augustine considered it as the power to keep oneself in a state of indifference as regards good and evil. Anselm of Canterbury reacted strongly against this definition because it failed to include God and the blessed in heaven who are absolutely incapable of sin. He chose to define free choice as the power of maintaining the right order of the will. Peter Abelard adopted the definition which had been given by Boethius—liberum de voluntate iudicium. But once again this concept met with opposition because it did not pertain to the blessed in heaven, who are necessarily joined to God yet possess free choice. A satisfactory, all-inclusive definition must consider free choice as the power to carry out what reason shall have decided with complete freedom from force. With this in mind Hugh of St. Victor defined free choice from the spontaneity of the act. Around 1140 his followers in their Summa Sententiarum considered free choice as a capacity or capability of the will to choose good or evil, depending upon whether the will was endowed with or deprived of

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13 | Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, Louvain-Genbloux, 1942, I, 11. "Il y aura sans doute quelque intérêt doctrinal à suivre au cours de deux siècles riches en pensée philosophique l'évolution du concept de libre arbitre. Toute philosophie morale doit en effet débiter par l'analyse psychologique de l'acte humain, où interviennent deux facteurs, la raison et la volonté. Or il se fait que le libre arbitre, comme son nom même l'indique, ne peut se définir que par l'action conjuguée de la volonté libre et de la raison, l'arbitre de la conduite humaine." Cf. also 217-24 for the subsequent historical review.

grace.

Peter Lombard accepted the definition from the Summa, but rephrased it to read facultas rationis et voluntatis. Since his Book of Sentences became the standard text in the universities of Europe, this expression of the nature of free choice was given several different interpretations. Some philosophers stressed the role of reason to the extent of identifying free choice with that power of the soul. The leaders in this movement were Robert of Melun, Simon of Tournai, and Praepostinus of Cremona. Another interpretation was advanced by Godfrey of Poitiers, who said that free choice was neither reason nor will but a third faculty distinct from the other two and capable of exercising supreme jurisdiction over them. Philip the Chancellor followed somewhat the same opinion, making free choice an habitual power of the soul, embracing both reason and will. But since with Augustine he held the soul to be one with all its powers, he avoided the difficulty involved in Godfrey's position. Still other philosophers, especially William of Auxerre, returned to the opinion expressed in the Summa Sententiarum and interpreted the word facultas as a faculty or capability. This was the interpretation which St. Bonaventure was to adopt.

The Saint's immediate predecessors and teachers also disagreed as to the nature of free choice. Alexander of Hales argued that free choice was an habitual power of the soul; but he distinguished it from reason and will. John of la Rochelle identified

free choice with reason since reason and will are one and the same faculty. Eudes Rigaud reasserted once again the opinion that free choice is neither a habit nor an habitual power, but rather a separate faculty which dictates the practical judgment of reason. Albert the Great agreed that free choice is a faculty distinct from reason and will, but explained its nature in a manner all his own.

With the historical stage well set, St. Bonaventure enters upon the scene to present his valuable contribution to this difficult question.

Saint Bonaventure, vers 1250, réagit contre tous ses prédécesseurs en faisant du libre arbitre, non point une faculté, mais simplement un habitus, une facilité. C'est par le libre arbitre que l'homme est maître de son activité, c'est-à-dire l'exerce facilement. La raison seule ne peut de la sorte dominer l'activité humaine, ni la volonté laissée à elle-même; mais à deux elles y parviennent: le libre arbitre n'est autre que la facilité d'agir provenant du concours des ces facultés. Bonaventure maintient cependant que le libre arbitre relève avant tout de la volonté.<sup>14</sup>

The purpose of this present thesis is to examine the doctrine of free choice as found in St. Bonaventure, stressing its relations to the powers of reason and will. Since the Saint claims that free choice is a habit of reason and will, it will be necessary to begin the thesis with a general discussion of these two powers and their relationship to the soul. An analysis of the precise nature of free choice will then be more profitable. In order to fill out the picture, the various relationships of free choice

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<sup>14</sup> Lottin, Psychologie et morale, I, 221.

must be explored. The fourth chapter will treat free choice in relation to its subject, its object, and its act; whereas the fifth chapter will discuss the relation of free choice to other creatures, to God and to the human body. This method of procedure follows the explicit discussion of free choice, as found in the second book of Bonaventure's Commentary on the Sentences, which is the fullest and most extensive treatment of the topic in the Saint's works. Since the thesis will be largely a process of textual analysis, primary sources will be used as much as possible. Secondary sources will serve to supplement or corroborate what is found in the writings of Bonaventure himself.

## CHAPTER II

### THE SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES OF REASON AND WILL

Free choice according to Saint Bonaventure is a habit of the two faculties of reason and will. Consequently a full understanding of the nature of free choice will necessarily involve some knowledge of the nature of these two faculties. Furthermore, since reason and will are faculties or powers of the soul, a general investigation of the soul will guarantee an adequate understanding of its faculties. The present chapter will consider the soul, the relation of the soul to its faculties, and the nature of reason and will. This general background will afford the necessary introduction to the nature of free choice.

Like many of the scholastic writers St. Bonaventure does not give an explicit proof for the existence of the soul. He passes over such a proof as unnecessary and goes on to give several definitions of the soul:

Ipsa [anima] est forma ens, vivens, intelligens, libertate  
utens.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Breviloquium, p.2, c.9 (V, 226b).



Anima autem non tantum est forma, immo etiam est hoc aliquid.<sup>2</sup>

Anima est perfectio corporis nati vivificari vita rationali.<sup>3</sup>

Anima est perfectio quantum ad substantiam et motor quantum ad potentias.<sup>4</sup>

The first and third of these definitions stress the relation of the soul to the body; the second brings out the substantiality of the soul; and the fourth shows its relation to its faculties. From these four definitions the Saint's doctrine of the soul can easily be elaborated.

The soul according to St. Bonaventure is the form or perfection of the body. It is not an accidental but a substantial form, the noblest of all forms, the form by virtue of which a thing is what it is.<sup>5</sup> An accidental form merely determines a substance to some accidental mode of being, such as the form of health by virtue of which a man is healthy; whereas the act of the soul is to give life to the body, a perfection which is by no means accidental.<sup>6</sup> Because it gives life to the organized body, the soul holds the principal place among all other forms.<sup>7</sup>

2 In II Sent., d.17, all, q.2, ad 5 (II, 415b).

3 Ibid., d.2, p.2, a.2, q.3, ad 3 (II, 82a).

4 In IV Sent., d.44, p.1, a.2, q.2, ad 3 (IV, 914a).

5. In II Sent., d.1, p.2, a.3, q.2 (II, 50b).

6 Ibid., r.2 (II, 49a).

7. There is some question as to whether St. Bonaventure held "ex professo" the doctrine of a plurality of forms. Cf. Anton Regis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul, Toronto, 1934, 48-55.

But besides being the form of the body the soul in its own right is an individual substance complete in itself. As a created substance the soul must be composed of matter and form since all creatures, whether spiritual or corporeal, must be composit to explain their limitation and ability to undergo change. Every creature has received all its attributes from the Creator, who is what He is. Receptivity is the mark of every creature and necessarily implies a composition.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the soul, as a substance, is changeable and accordingly must contain within its nature a principle which will allow it to change. Such a principle is matter.<sup>9</sup>

Spiritual matter, however, does not destroy the simplicity of the soul since, unlike corporeal matter, spiritual matter does not imply quantitative parts.<sup>10</sup> Matter in itself is neither spiritual nor corporeal. In their metaphysical content spiritual and corporeal matter are essentially the same; but in its actual physical existence matter is either spiritual or corporeal depending upon the form which determines its mode of existence.<sup>11</sup> This distinction between spiritual and corporeal matter allows the soul to be simple, i.e. without parts. Furthermore, the simplicity of

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8 In II Sent., d.3, p.1, a.1, q.1 (II, 91a).

9 Ibid., d.17, a.1, q.2 (II, 415a).

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., d.3, p.1, a.1, q.3 (II, 100b).

the soul follows from its spirituality and immateriality.<sup>12</sup> Simplicity also follows from immortality which is a necessary consequence of the soul's capacity for beatitude.<sup>13</sup>

The substantial unity of the soul would seem to argue against the substantial unity of man and in favor of a Platonic accidental union of the two complete substances of body and soul. But St. Bonaventure is most explicit in stressing man's substantial unity, basing it upon the mutual appetite and inclination which body and soul have toward each other: "Completio vero naturae requirit, ut homo constet simul ex corpore et anima tamquam ex materia et forma, quae mutuum habent appetitum et inclinationem mutuam."<sup>14</sup> God creates the soul with this natural inclination by which it is united substantially to the body so as to form one substance. Each soul has this natural inclination for one particular body and is the proper act of that body, giving it being, life, and intelligence, and making it capable of liberty.

But in addition to perfecting the body, the soul exercises the function of mover in relation to its faculties.

Anima est perfectio quantum ad substantiam, et motor quantum

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<sup>12</sup> Breviloquium, p.2, c.6 (V, 225b) Necessesse est etiam, quod sit substantia spiritualis et incorporea, ac per hoc simplex.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p12, c.9 (V, 227a) Quia nihil beatum potest beatitudinem amittere, nihil poterat esse beatificabile, nisi esset incorruptibile et immortale, necesse fuit animam rationalem immortalis vite de sui natura esse viventem.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.7, c.5 (V, 286b).

ad potentias; etsi anima non sit composita, immo simplex quantum ad substantiam, habet tamen multitudinem potentiarum, ratione quarum ad diversa organa comparatur.<sup>15</sup>

St. Bonaventure thus introduces his doctrine of the faculties of the soul. The traditional scholastic argument, agere sequitur esse, proves the necessity of these faculties. For if the soul did not have such faculties through which it could operate, then the operation of the soul would be identified with its existence; and since it always exists, it would always be operating; but this is clearly against common experience.<sup>16</sup> The soul also needs many faculties because of the necessary limitation of a created being. Only through a multiplicity of faculties can the soul enjoy complete power, just as through the various corporeal organs the body has its power.<sup>17</sup>

St. Bonaventure clearly maintains many faculties by which the soul has the power to operate. This raises the question of the distinction which obtains between the soul and its faculties.

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15 In IV Sent., d.44, p.1, a.2, q.2, ad 3 (IV, 914a).

16 In I Sent., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.3, ad 3 (I, 86b-87a). Ad illud quod objicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et operandi; dicendum, quod verum est de principio remoto, sed de proximo est impossibile. Nam si idem omnino esset principium proximum tunc idem esset in re esse et operari.

17 In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.2, ad 8 (II, 562a). . . . quoniam potentia creature arctata est, non potuit creatura habere posse perfectum, nisi esset in ea multitudo potentiarum, ex quarum collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius, resultaret unum posse completum; sicut manifeste animadverti potest in organis humani corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute alterius adjuvare.

The Saint answers: "Potentiae animae sunt substantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima; non sunt tamen cum ipsa omnino idem per essentiam."<sup>18</sup> A clear understanding of this somewhat subtle doctrine requires a more complete examination of Bonaventure's argumentation.

St. Bonaventure begins his solution by presenting a general discussion of natural powers. First of all, a natural power can be considered according to the manner in which it exists in the subject. Under this aspect the natural power designates the subject as being able to perform a certain act with ease or with difficulty, depending upon whether the power is considered as a positive, contributive element or a negative prohibitive element. This same natural power can also be considered in its ability to operate, i.e., to go out from the subject in which it inheres. Under this aspect the natural powers can be distinguished into two types: those which operate by means of an accident, and those which operate immediately from the substance. An example of the former is the fire's power of heating: "ignis enim per suam substantiam non calefacit sine caliditate."<sup>19</sup> The accident of heat must be present if the fire is to heat another object. In this case the operation of the power is not immediately from the substance, but proceeds remotely from the substance and proximately from the accident of heat.

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18 In I Sent., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.3 (I, 85b).

19 Ibid., (I, 86a).

St. Bonaventure names the powers of the soul as an example of the second type, i. e., a natural power which operates immediately from the substance. He applied this doctrine of natural powers to the powers of the soul in the following important, text, which must be included in full since it contains all the elements necessary for an understanding of his distinction between the soul and its faculties.

Per hunc modum intelligendum est in potentiis animae. Nam uno modo contingit nominare potentias animae secundum primum modum, ut dicunt facultatem quae dicit modum potentiae existendi in subjecto, sicut ingeniositas et tarditas; et haec quidem sunt in secunda specie qualitatis. Alio modo contingit nominare potentias, prout dicunt ordinem substantiae ad actum, qui est mediante aliqua proprietate accidentali, ut potentia syllogizandi, quae est in anima, cum habet habitum syllogizandi; et haec est in eodem genere, in quo est scientia syllogizandi, ut in prima specie qualitatis. Contingit iterum nominare potentias animae ut immediate egrediuntur a substantia, ut per tria: memoriam, intelligentiam, et voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto, intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi conjuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se. Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur ab anima—potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis—non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem.<sup>20</sup>

All the faculties of the soul—as all natural faculties—when considered in their mode of existence designate certain facilities which the soul enjoys in regard to certain operations. When these same powers are considered according to the manner in which they operate, they can be divided into two types. Some require the presence of an accident for their operation, such as the faculty

of syllogistic reasoning, which requires the habit of syllogistic reasoning for its operation. The second type of faculty, however, does not require the presence of any accident for its operation, but proceeds to operate immediately from the soul itself. The spirituality of the soul explains why such an immediate operation is possible, since a spiritual soul by its very nature is present and joined to itself. Reason and will are faculties of this second type. Consequently they are really distinct but consubstantial with the soul—distinct since they are principles of operation, but consubstantial since they do not constitute a different genus from the soul. They are in the same genus as the soul reductively (per reductionem).

St. Bonaventure frequently asserts what can only be a real distinction between the soul and its faculties, always basing this distinction upon the fact that the faculty goes out from the soul.<sup>21</sup> But he also insists upon the fact that these faculties manifest the nature of the soul. Hence they are essentially the same as the soul and of the same genus as the soul. They are essentially the same as the soul because without them the soul could never enjoy its fullest perfection.<sup>22</sup> They are consubstantial

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21 In I Sent., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.3, f.5 (I, 85b). . . virtus egreditur substantiam, quia operatur in objectum, quod est extra; . . . ergo, egreditur extra substantiam.

22 Ibid., ad 1,2 (I, 86b). . . quarto modo dicitur essentialiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, . . . et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentialiale; tamen non transit in aliud genus; ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae.

with the soul per reductionem.<sup>23</sup>

St. Bonaventure clarifies his doctrine somewhat by the example of the relation between an object and its likeness. The object is not so identical with its likeness that they would be one in number; nor is the object entirely different from the likeness as that they should be of a different genus. The likeness is reduced to the same genus as the object; but it still is really distinct from the object because it flows out from the object.<sup>24</sup>

The real, though non-essential, distinction between the soul and its faculties is the key to understanding the distinction which St. Bonaventure makes between the faculties themselves, especially between the faculties of reason and will. He adopts the common scholastic argument to prove that reason and will must necessarily be two distinct faculties of the soul. In Book II of his Commentary on the Sentences he takes up the objection that reason and will must be one since their objects, the true and the good, are essentially one and only rationally distinct. He answers this objection by stressing the different operations which must require different faculties.

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23 In IX Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.1, ad 8 (II, 562b).  
Sunt enim quaedam, quae sunt in genere per se; aliqua per reductionem. Illa per sunt in genere, quae participant essentiam completam illius generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per reductionem quae non dicunt completam essentiam, et haec sub quinque membris continentur . . . quaedam sicut viae.

24 In I Sent., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.3 (I, 86b).



Ad illud quod obicitur, quod potentiae differunt per objecta; dicendum quod immediatius distinguuntur potentiae per actus quam per objecta. Ad differentiam autem potentiarum essentialiam sufficit diversitas objectorum secundum rationem; et ideo, quamvis verum et bonum non different essentialiter, nihilominus tamen, quia cognoscere et amare absque dubio sunt actus differentes, potentiae, quae sunt ad hos actus, per se ipsas diversitatem habent.<sup>25</sup>

The Saint analyses the precise distinction which obtains between reason and will as real but not essential: "Ratio et voluntas, sive intellectus et affectus, sunt diversae potentiae, non tamen diversae essentiae."<sup>26</sup> Once again an examination of his arguments will help to clarify this position.

He begins by citing the three opinions prevalent among the various scholastic authors. The first opinion states that the faculties of the soul are nothing more than the soul as related to its act; hence the distinction between the faculties is by no means real or essential but merely a rational distinction of different <sup>a</sup>relations. The second position gives the faculties of the soul a reality which is independent of the soul itself. The faculties are not only relations of the soul to its different acts, but are proper accidents (proprietaes) which inhere in the soul and which, as accidents, are essentially distinct from the soul. The third opinion—the one which the Saint chooses to adopt—takes the middle ground between the first two opinions. Since the faculties are consubstantial with the soul, they do not differ essentially from each

25 In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.1, ad 3 (II, 561b).

26 Ibid., q.1 (II, 599b).

other. Yet since they are really distinct from the soul, these same faculties cannot be reduced to one faculty. They differ essentially in the genus of powers since they are faculties of different operations, different powers of the same soul. The Saint thus clearly maintains a real distinction between reason and will in genere potentiae.<sup>27</sup> But in the full light of his doctrine this real distinction is essential only in genere potentiae, since all the faculties are essentially the same as the soul to whose essence they can be reduced.<sup>28</sup> The essential unity of reason and will once more verifies the fourth meaning of the term essentiale: "Quarto modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima."<sup>29</sup>

An understanding of this distinction between reason and will is a necessary foundation for penetrating the nature of free choice which St. Bonaventure states to be a habit of these two

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27 In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.1 (II 560ab). Et isti dicunt, quod cum potentiae simpliciter non dicant aliam essentiam quam substantiam animae, quod non sic differunt essentialiter ipsae potentiae, quod sint diversae essentiae. Cum iterum non sint omnino idem cum animae essentia, dicunt, quod non sunt omnino idem per essentiam; et ideo quasi medium tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt, quasdam animae, potentias sic differre ad invicem, ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia; nec tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversae potentiae sive diversa instrumenta ejusdem substantiae . . . ad propositam quaestionem respondendum est, quod intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas non sunt una potentia, sed diversae.

28 Ibid., ad 8 (II, 562b).

29 In I Sent., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.3, ad 1,2 (I, 86b).

faculties. Would that he were more definite and clear on such an important question!

St. Bonaventure takes up the question of the division of the faculties in the same twenty-fourth distinction of Book II of his Commentary on the Sentences. He gives six different divisions which have been used by various authors. According to their nature the faculties are divided into vegetative, sensitive, and rational; then the rational are divided into intellective and affective. A second division is according to the function of the faculties, as when reason is divided into superior and inferior. Thirdly, the faculties can be divided according to states (status), as when the faculty is divided into speculative and practical. A fourth division is made according to their different aspects, as when the cognitive power is divided into reason, intellect, and intelligence. A fifth division is according to their acts; the sixth according to their modes of moving (modus movendi).<sup>30</sup> The Saint goes on to evaluate the six principles of division and shows a definite preference for the first of these, namely, the division of faculties according to their nature into vegetative, sensitive, and rational, and the rational into intellective and affective.

"Omnibus his modis diversitatis utuntur auctores in divisione potentiarum animae, et in solo primo modo dividendi attenditur proprie potentiarum diversificatio."<sup>31</sup> The division of the faculties

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30 In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.3 (II, 566ab).

31 Ibid.

of the rational soul into intellective or cognitive and affective receives further commendation when the Saint speaks of free choice in the following Distinction. He clearly states his agreement with the opinion that such a division is sufficient to explain all the operations of the rational soul.<sup>32</sup>

Saint Bonaventure shows the relation of reason to the other cognitive faculties by dividing the cognitive faculties into sensitive and intellectual powers and then further subdividing the intellectual powers into reason and intellect. The foundation for this division is the two-fold object which man by means of his intellectual powers can know—the universal rationes abstracted from concrete reality which are known by reason, and the separated spiritual substances which are known by intellect.<sup>33</sup> In the fourth of the above-mentioned divisions of the faculties of the soul he divides the cognitive faculties according to their different aspects (aspectus) into reason, intellect, and intelligence.<sup>34</sup> Reason is

32 In II Sent., d.25, p.1, a.1, q.2, (II, 596b). *Potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivam et motivam, et omnes actus animae per has potentias, quae sunt cognitiva et affectiva, sive ratio et voluntas, exerceri possunt, sicut rationes quae ad hoc inducuntur, ostendunt.*

33 In Hexaemeron, V, n.24 (V, 358a). *Intellectualis potentia est duplex: aut ut considerat universales rationes abstractas, ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut ut elevatur ad substantias spirituales separatas; et sic duae potentias, scilicet, ratio et intellectus.*

34 In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.3 (II, 566b). *Aliquando vero fit divisio potentialium secundum aspectus, sicut dividitur potentia cognitiva in rationem, intellectum et intelligentiam, secundum quod respicit ad inferius, ad par et ad superius.*

the cognitive intellectual power by which man knows by abstraction the things in space and time.

Saint Bonaventure defines the will as: "nihil aliud . . . quam affectus sive appetitus ratiocinatus."<sup>35</sup> A brief consideration of the general nature of appetite and the more specific nature of the will is necessary to understand the full meaning of that definition. The affective potency is an appetite, i.e., a faculty whose act is to be moved and affected. The basis of any appetite is two-fold: on the part of the subject possessed of the appetite there must be a specific need; while on the part of the object there must be the ability to satisfy that need.<sup>36</sup> When these two elements are given, the appetite immediately follows, since it is then possible for the subject to move toward the object. The possibility or power to move constitutes the appetite.

All the different appetites are adequately divided into concupiscible and irascible.<sup>37</sup> The concupiscible appetite is the appetite of acquisition, by which the subject seeks all the goods that it needs. The irascible appetite repels evil from the soul.<sup>38</sup> In man there are two concupiscible and two irascible powers. The

35 In III Sent., d.33, a.1, q.3 (III, 717b).

36 In IV Sent., d.49, p.1, a.1, q.2 (IV, 1003b). Duo sunt quae faciunt appetitum, scilicet convenientia et indigentia.

37 In III Sent., d.33, a.1, q.3 (III, 717b). Omnis autem affectus sive appetitus vel est vis irascibilis vel concupiscibilis.

38 Braxilognium, p.2, a.10 (V, 227b).

sensitive appetite man shares in common with the brutes—it tends toward the sensible good qua sensible. The rational appetite pertains to man's rational soul and tends toward objects which are above and beyond the sensible world. This rational affective power, which includes both the concupiscible and irascible<sup>1</sup> appetites, is called the will.<sup>39</sup>

This rational appetite, the will, has two modes of operation, a natural operation according to synderesis and a deliberative operation according to free choice. These operations, however, are not so distinct as to require two separate powers. They merely name the two ways in which the same power, the will, can operate.<sup>40</sup>

Saint Bonaventure explains the nature of synderesis in connection with conscience and the natural light which directs the intellect in its knowing. Synderesis is the natural weight of the will toward the good-in-itself, the bonum honestum.<sup>41</sup> This natural tendency, like the will itself, is created by God. The action of

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<sup>39</sup> In II Sent., d.25, p.1, a.1, q.6, ad 2 (II, 605b). Voluntas autem non dicit aliam potentiam per essentiam a concupiscibili et irascibili, sed nominat ipsum appetitum ut ratiocinatum sive rationi conjunctum.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.3 (II, 566b). Concedendum est igitur quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa potest esse eadem potentia, quae quidem secundum alium et alium modum movendi sic et sic appellatur.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., d.39, a.2, q.1 (II, 910a). . . . sic affectus habet naturale quoddam pondus, dirigens ipsum in appetendis . . . sic synderesis non nominat illud pondus voluntatis sive voluntatem cum illo pondere, nisi in quantum illam habet inclinare ad bonum honestum.

synderesis is three-fold: (1) it inclines and urges man on towards the good-in-itself; (2) it draws man back from committing evil; and (3) it cries out in remorse against the evil that man has already committed.<sup>42</sup> Synderesis is by nature an habitual power of the will rather than a habit of the will. This distinction will become more clear when free choice is discussed as a habit of reason and will.

When the will acts according to synderesis it is given the name "natural will." This is to distinguish its natural operation from its deliberative operation which flows from the "deliberative will" which is endowed with the habit of free choice.<sup>43</sup>

This introduces the question of free choice, the subject of the following chapter. Before considering free choice, however, it will be well to summarize briefly the points of St. Bonaventure's doctrine which have already been seen. The soul according to the Saint is the form of the body, a form which is completely substantial in itself, as well as being spiritual, simple, and immortal. It is really distinct from its natural faculties, such as reason and will; but at the same time is essentially the same as these faculties. Reason and will also are really and even essentially distinct as faculties; but distinct only in such a way as to be essentially the same as the soul from which they immediately operate.

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<sup>42</sup> In IV Sent., d.50, p.2, a.2, q.2, ad 4 (IV, 1052b).

<sup>43</sup> In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.3 (II, 566a).

Reason is the cognitive intellectual power by which man knows by abstraction the things inferior to himself, i.e., beings in space and time. Will is man's rational appetite which can operate naturally according to synderesis or deliberatively according to free choice. The question can now be asked: What is the nature of free choice?



## CHAPTER III

### THE NATURE OF FREE CHOICE

After St. Bonaventure concludes his division of the faculties of the soul and considers the various distinctions which obtain between the faculties, he takes up the question of sin and its relation to the faculties of the soul. This discussion necessarily leads him to the nature of free choice, the power by which man is capable of sin.<sup>1</sup> Although the Saint's treatment of free choice follows in a context which is primarily theological, the doctrine of free choice in itself is almost completely limited to the realm of philosophy and natural reason. Hence it can be examined in itself and apart from its purely theological implications.<sup>2</sup> The present chapter consists in a philosophical exposition of the nature of free choice.

Following the example of most of the medieval authors

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1 Since the consideration of free choice in this present chapter will deal for the most part with distinction 25, part 1, article 1, of In II Sententiarum, to facilitate references to the sections of this distinction only the question number and the page reference to volume II of the Quaracchi Opera Omnia will be given in the footnotes.

2 Dub. 1 (II, 607b). . . de libero arbitrio est loqui dupliciter; aut secundum quod est principium operum moralium aut secundum quod est principium operum gratuitorum. Et primo modo est de consideratione philosophorum.

St. Bonaventure nowhere gives an explicit and direct proof of the existence of free choice. The fact of its existence, however, is clearly implied throughout his works. As has been seen in the previous chapter, the Saint divides the operations of the will into two types, natural and deliberative. He makes deliberation the essential requirement for an act of the will according to free choice. After deliberation the will sometimes adheres to good, and sometimes to evil.<sup>3</sup> From this distinction it would seem that the existence of free choice is an immediate given of experience.

From a metaphysical point of view St. Bonaventure explicitly states that free choice is necessarily related to reason and will. For reason and will cannot exist or even be thought of without including a necessary relation to free choice.<sup>4</sup> This argument together with Bonaventure's further analysis of free choice sufficiently justifies the fact that he neglects to prove explicitly the existence of free choice. This will appear more certain in the further consideration of free choice.

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3 In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.3 (II, 566a).

4 Q.5, f.3 (II, 603a). Sed impossibile est esse vel intelligi aliquem habere rationem et voluntatem qui non intelligatur habere liberum arbitrium. Fr. DeBenedictis completes the Saint's argument: "The power of willing freely is intimately rooted in the soul to such an extent that it cannot be taken away from man. In fact, since the cognitive and the affective powers of man are, according to our author, faculties cosubstantial with the soul, it follows that free-will—the faculty of these faculties—based as it is upon the inseparability of these two faculties from each other and from the soul, is itself inseparable from the rational soul." Matthew DeBenedictis, The Social Thought of St. Bonaventure, Washington, 1946, 59.

St. Bonaventure does not begin his analysis by discussing the meaning of free choice. In fact he takes up the question of a definition after he has completed the discussion of the nature of free choice. For the sake of clarity, however, it seems more advisable to invert the Saint's order and bring up the question of the meaning of free choice before considering the nature of free choice. Actually the different meanings of free choice will be taken from his entire discussion of the nature of free choice, as well as from his more direct treatment of the definition as such.

The definition of free choice can be considered from three different viewpoints. First of all, the words liberum and arbitrium themselves can be analysed; secondly the nominal definition given by Peter Lombard can be evaluated; and thirdly, the more adequate definitions given by theologians and philosophers in the past can be analyzed and criticized with a view to adopting one of them. St. Bonaventure considers the meaning of free choice under each of these three aspects.

An analysis of the terms liberum and arbitrium provides a great deal of insight into the nature of free choice. A power is considered to be free if it has full control (dominium) over its object and its act.<sup>5</sup> Control over its object means that the power or faculty is not bound down by nature to some definite ob-

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5 Q.1 (II, 593a). Unde illa potentia dicitur esse libera quae dominium habet tam respectu objecti quam respectu actus proprii.

ject so that it can seek no other. For example the appetite of irrational animals is bound down to the useful and pleasurable good as its necessary object; whereas the rational appetite of man, the will, is free to seek any good whatever, whether it be useful, pleasurable, or good-in-itself. Control over its proper act means that the faculty can control not only the exterior object but also its own operations. For example, the will by its own command can begin to love what it has formerly hated, or begin to hate what it has formerly loved; whereas the irrational animals must necessarily love what they love and necessarily hate what they hate. St. Bonaventure concludes from this that every intrinsic operation does not imply a free faculty for that operation but only those operations in which the faculty moves itself.<sup>6</sup> The essence of freedom is the power of self-movement.

Arbitrium—which means "decision" but in this context is best translated as "choice"—does not differ from judgment except that it specifies those judgments which determine the activity of other powers which move in accord with the judgments.<sup>7</sup> Choice is one type of judgment. Judgment alone implies an act of reason which is regulated primarily and solely by the norm of truth; whereas choice implies an act of reason which is regulated primarily

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6 Q.1, ad 4 (II, 594a). Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus quo vis motiva movet se ipsam.

7 Q.1 (II, 593b). Arbitrium enim idem est quod iudicium, ad cuius nutum ceterae virtutes moventur et obediunt.

by the command of the will.<sup>8</sup> From this analysis of the terms liberum and arbitrium St. Bonaventure concludes that free choice can only be found in those who possess reason and will which are clearly required to explain the self-movement of freedom and the judgment which is <sup>h</sup> choice.

Peter Lombard begins his consideration of free choice by giving the definition common among his predecessors and contemporaries, "liberum de voluntate iudicium."<sup>10</sup> St. Bonaventure has little use for this definition, which he describes as nominal rather than real. It is not a real definition because it merely interprets free choice in other synonymous words. It is a mere tautology, since there are as many words in the definition as in the thing defined—like defining a black coat by calling it a black jacket. Furthermore, the definition is not valid in itself because the term is free choice rather than free judgment. Judgment—as has been seen—implies an act of reason guided only by the rules of truth; whereas choice implies an act of reason guided by the command of the will. Consequently this nominal definition is to be rejected in favor of a real definition.<sup>11</sup>

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8 Dub.1 (II, 607a). Iudicium importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis; arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum imperium voluntatis.

9 Q.1 (II, 593b).

10 Sent., d.25, c.1 (II, 588a).

11 Dub. 1 (II, 607ab).

St. Bonaventure begins his search for the real definition of free choice by stating that there must be only one definition which agrees with free choice as it really is. He then examines the various definitions given by his predecessors and shows how they all pertain to a single reality but under different aspects.<sup>12</sup> St. Anselm defines free choice in its most general meaning so as to include both creatures and God: "Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se ipsam."<sup>13</sup> This definition considers free choice in relation to its object, its act, and its ultimate end. St. Bernard's definition of free choice is restricted to creatures but does not specify whether they are in this life or in the next: "Liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile iudicium."<sup>14</sup> He considers free choice only in relation to its act, namely consent. St. Augustine according to Bonaventure considers free choice as it is found in creatures only in their present state in this life: "Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur." He thus treats free choice in relation to its object, bonum, and its act, electio. All three definitions pertain to the same, one reality but consider different aspects of that reality. The preference of one over the other two is a matter of arbitrary choice. St. Bonaventure chooses to consider free choice as found

12 Dub.2 (II, 608ab).

13 De Libero Arbitrio, c.3 (PL 158, 494).

14 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c.2, n.4 (PL 182, 1004)

in man in his present state in this life as a wayfarer; hence he adopts the definition which he believes to be Augustine's, namely that free choice is a "facultas rationis et voluntatis." Since this definition recurs again and again throughout his analysis of free choice, it is necessary to examine it more closely in order to understand its full meaning.

St. Bonaventure clearly thinks that the definition he adopts was originated by St. Augustine. Lottin, however, traces the origin of the definition to the school of Hugh of St. Victor who used the term habilitas in place of facultas, but with exactly the same meaning.<sup>15</sup> Gilbert of la Porée also adopted the same definition; and Peter Lombard included it in his Sentences, substituting facultas for habilitas: "Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente, vel malum, eadem desistente."<sup>16</sup> William of Auxerre was the first to attribute the definition to Augustine.<sup>17</sup> St. Bonaventure merely takes over the definition in the Sentences and follows the common opinion that the definition originated with Augustine. He stresses the first part of the definition, namely

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15 Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, I, 217. "Vers 1140 la Summa Sententiarum, de L'ecole d'Hughes de Saint-Victor, considere de libre arbitre d'un point de vue theologique comme l'aptitude de la volonte rationnelle, habilitas rationalis voluntatis, de choisir le bien ou le mal selon qu'elle est pourvue ou privee de la grace."

16 Sent., d.24, c.3 (II, 550b).

17 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, I, 64.

that free choice is a "facultas rationis et voluntatis": "Optime etiam definitur, cum dicitur esse facultas rationis et voluntatis. Facultas enim non tantum nominat potentiam, immo facilitatem potentiae, ex qua non tantum potens est, sed etiam praepotens est ad exeundum in actum."<sup>18</sup> Consequently, in Bonaventure's doctrine facultas means a facility, fitness, or capability rather than a faculty. He chooses to define free choice as a "capability of reason and will."

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St. Bonaventure admits the difficulty involved in clearly determining the nature of free choice. At the end of his exposition he warns the reader that his doctrine must be considered in its entirety if it is to be understood.<sup>19</sup> Consequently the best method of analyzing the Saint's doctrine of free choice will be to follow the steps of his argument as they are developed in distinction 25, part 1, of the Commentary on the Sentences.

The first question which the Saint considers is whether free choice is found only in those possessed of reason, or whether brute animals also enjoy this perfection. From the analysis of freedom and choice given above it is clear that free choice is found only in rational beings.<sup>20</sup> The fact that only rational

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18 Q.3 (II, 599b).

19 Q.6, ad 4 (II, 606b).

20 Q.1 (II, 593a). . . absque dubio liberum arbitrium reperitur in solis substantiis rationalibus.



creatures are praised and blamed, as well as the fact that deliberation is necessary for free choice, serve to bolster his argument.

In the second question St. Bonaventure takes up the issue as to whether free choice is a faculty distinct from reason and will. In his conclusion he attempts to reconcile the two most popular opinions. But first he begins with three introductory arguments which show that free choice is not really distinct from reason and will. The act of free choice is a judgment of reason. Consent includes deliberation and desire, which are respectively acts of <sup>e</sup> reason and of will. If free choice is another distinct faculty which moves the will, then the will cannot move itself and hence is not free.<sup>21</sup> The Saint then goes on to a more fundamental analysis of the question.

Bonaventure's principal argument consists in an examination and reconciliation of two opinions. Those who hold the first opinion wish to distinguish between free choice in a wide sense and free choice in a strict sense. In the wide sense free choice is not really distinct from reason and will; but in the strict and more proper sense it is distinct from reason and will as a power commanding and moving them. Its act is to reflect upon the operations of reason and will in order to regulate them.<sup>22</sup> This opinion

21 Q.2, ff. 2,3,4 (II, 595b).

22 Q.2, (II, 596a). . . ille videlicet quo dicitur quis velle discernere vel velle se velle.

was maintained by Alexander of Hales and St. Albert the Great, as well as by several of the less known scholastics of the Middle Ages, e.g., Peter of Capua, Godfrey of Poitiers, and Philip the Chancellor.<sup>23</sup>

The second opinion maintains that free choice is not distinct from reason and will since they are sufficient to explain all the operations of the soul. There is no reason to postulate a third power since nature makes nothing useless.<sup>24</sup> The fact that reason and will are spiritual faculties explains their power of self-reflection and self-movement which are needed in the act of free choice. This opinion was maintained by St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus as well as by many others who followed their opinion.<sup>25</sup>

In evaluating these two opinions St. Bonaventure states that they both are trying to express the same truth, since free choice can be said to be distinct from reason and will under one aspect and not distinct under another aspect. Distinctions can be either real or rational. A real distinction obtains between reason and will, whereas only a rational distinction can be made

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23 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, O, 219-20.

24 Q.2 (II, 596a).

25 St. Thomas, S.T., I, 83, 4o. Dicendum quod potentiae appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas potentiis apprehensivis, . . . Ostensum est supra quod ejusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut ejusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam ejusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una.

between reason as a cognitive power and reason as a motive power of the will. The distinction between free choice and the faculties of reason and will is rational since free choice is considered as moving and commanding reason and will, while reason and will are looked upon as being moved and as carrying out the command of free choice. This is the aspect of free choice considered in the first opinion mentioned above. However, the distinction between free choice and the two faculties must be limited to a rational distinction since it is made by an appropriation of the mind. The mind considers free choice as moving reason and will; but actually these faculties have the power of self-movement and self-reflection because they are spiritual powers of a spiritual soul. Therefore, reason and will are sufficient to explain all the operations of the soul including those of free choice.<sup>26</sup> St. Bonaventure sums up his position in the following conclusion: "Concedo enim quod liberum arbitrium secundum rem non dicit potentiam distinctam a ratione et voluntate; concedo tamen nihilominus quod aliquam distinctionem habet secundum rationem, ratione cujus dicitur facultas utriusque."<sup>27</sup> The precise nature of this rational distinction will

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26 Q.2 (II, 596b). Cum enim tam ratio quam voluntas sit nata super se reflecti, cum nomine voluntatem ut volentem aliquid et voluntatem ut volentem se velle, non dico potentiam aliam et aliam secundum rem. Movens enim et motum in spiritualibus non oportet differre secundum substantiam, quia, sicut dicit Anselmus, "voluntas est instrumentum se ipsam movens." et ratio etiam est virtus se ipsam cognoscens, pari ratione.

27 Q.2 (II, 596b-97a).

become clearer in the further analysis of the nature of free choice.

St. Bonaventure continues his investigation by reasserting the very important fact that free choice must include both reason and will. After quoting the authority of Augustine, Damascene, and Bernard, The Saint goes on to prove his point (1) from the term itself, (2) from the definition of free choice, and (3) from an analysis of freedom. The fact that he repeats and extends several of the arguments which he has already made in the first question shows how essential to Bonaventure's doctrine is the fact that one faculty alone is not sufficient to explain free choice, but that free choice must include both reason and will. At the cost of some repetition it will be well to follow St. Bonaventure and reconsider some of the arguments already seen.

The term free choice, liberum arbitrium, clearly shows that it must include reason to account for choice and will to account for freedom. The real definition of free choice as "a capability of reason and will" also depends upon the inclusion of two faculties. But the most conclusive proof comes from an analysis of freedom, which necessarily includes the notion of control (dominium) over the object and the act.<sup>28</sup> This control over the object requires that the faculty be capable of attaining a variety of objects—for example, a horse that can pull a thousand pounds

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28 Q.3 (II, 599a). Liberum enim arbitrium, sive nominat potentiam sive habitum, nominat ipsam potentiam ut dominam vel dominium illius potentiae; et hoc planum est ex ipso nomine liberitatis.

has control over five hundred pounds. Although it is true that only rational creatures can seek the good-in-itself, this control in relation to the object is not strictly limited to beings possessed of reason and will. However, if a being is to enjoy free choice and have full control over its acts, then it must necessarily be possessed of reason and will. The following text clearly proves why this must be so.

*Dominium autem potentiae respectu actus attenditur in hoc quod potentia potest esse in actu et cessare ab actu secundum suum imperium et secundum proprium motum. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis potentia hoc dominium habeat, necesse est quod ipsa possit movere se ipsam et quod possit se super actum suum reflectere. Nisi enim posset se super actum suum reflectere nunquam posset illum refrenare, nisi posset se ipsam movere, nec posset in illum exire, quando vellet. Reflectere autem se super se hoc est virtutis cognitivae, sublimatae a materia, quae quidem est ratio. Movere autem se hoc est virtutis appetitivae, rationem consequentis.*<sup>29</sup>

Complete control over its act requires (1) that a being be able to reflect upon its own act in order to know its nature--otherwise there would be no possibility of choosing one act rather than another; and (2) that a being be able to move itself toward the act which it wishes. Self-reflection and self-movement are properties only of those faculties which are spiritual in nature, i.e., the faculties of reason and will.

St. Bonaventure cites several examples to clarify this essential point in his doctrine of free choice. Two men working together are capable of moving a large stone which neither one of

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29 Q.3 (II, 599a).

them could move alone. The complete government of a family depends upon both the father and the mother. The hand and the eye are both required for writing. The same is true of free choice: "sic ex concursu rationis et voluntatis resultat quaedam libertas sive quoddam dominium ad aliquid faciendum et disponendum."<sup>30</sup>

From this same analysis of freedom St. Bonaventure concludes that the definition of free choice as a capability of reason and will is most apt since it comprehends both reason and will: "et ideo facultas dicit potestatem sive dominium, quod quidem dicitur esse rationis simul et voluntatis, quia non est unius nisi concomitante altera."<sup>31</sup>

The objection, however, can be raised that if free choice includes both reason and will, the two faculties must be parts, either integral or subjective, of free choice. If they are subjective parts then they are merely species or particular kinds of free choice, which accordingly can be fully predicated both of reason and of will; hence since reason and will are really distinct there would be two separate free choices in man—one in his reason, the other in his will. On the other hand if they are integral parts, taken together they make up an extended whole and then we cannot explain the act of choice, since it requires that the act of reason be prior by nature to the act of the will. Consequently

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30 Q.3 (II, 599a).

31 Ibid., (II, 599b).

it seems that free choice cannot include both reason and will. St. Bonaventure meets this objection by introducing a third possibility, a "potential" whole (totum potentiale). He agrees that free choice does not include reason and will in the same way that a universal includes its subjective parts; nor does it include the two faculties as <sup>n</sup> integral parts. Rather free choice embraces reason and will as a potential whole, which is the mean between the universal and the integral whole. It is like an integral whole in that both reason and will are required for free choice; it is like a universal whole because, when reason and will are joined together, free choice can be predicated of either of them.<sup>32</sup> The Quarrachi editors explain this potential whole by remarking that it is present in each of the parts according to its complete essence, but not in its complete capability. The concomitance of the two faculties is required for the capability to be complete. Consequently, though free choice can be predicated either of reason or of will, it is not predicated in the same way as a universal, which is predicated of its subjective parts both secundum totam essentiam and secundum totam virtutem. Free choice is predicated of reason and will only secundum totam essentiam.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Q.3, ad 6 (II, 600a). . . sed sicut totum potentiale, quod partim habet naturam totius integri, partim naturam totius universalis: naturam totius integri in hoc quod in una potentiarum non potest salvari absque altera; naturam vero totius universalis habet, quia ex earum concursu ad invicem quamlibet earum denominat.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., note 1.

After these preliminary questions St. Bonaventure takes up the basic issue involved in determining the nature of free choice: Is free choice a power or a habit? He begins his discussion of the question by stating that the term itself has been used to signify sometimes the power, sometimes the habit, and sometimes the act. However, the basic question remains: What is the fundamental reality of free choice?<sup>34</sup>

Once again St. Bonaventure reviews the various opinions so that he can be sure of an adequate solution to this question. The first opinion states that free choice is a universal whole which comprehends reason and will as a universal comprehends its subjective parts. St. Bonaventure easily dispenses with this opinion because, if it were true there would be two freedoms in man, one of reason, the other of will. This is clearly false and against all experience, as well as against the nature of freedom. The second opinion claims that free choice is a power consisting of reason and will to explain an operation which neither reason nor will can accomplish by itself. Because this third power of free choice can be reduced to act easily, i. e., by the mere union of reason and will, it is called an habitual power. This opinion—as has already been seen—was held by Alexander of Hales and St. Albert

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<sup>34</sup> Q.4 (II, 601ab). . . cui videlicet primo et principaliter nomen libri arbitrii imponatur, secundum quod de eo sacri doctores loquantur.



the Great. Alexander states: "liberum arbitrium est potentia habitualis, pro libitu eligentis et ex hoc, quod habitualis est, habet quod facile exeat in actum."<sup>35</sup> St. Albert agrees: "Revera liberum arbitrium est potentia perfecta per habitum naturalem, et habitus ille libertas est."<sup>36</sup> St. Bonaventure is not so quick in dispensing with this opinion. In fact he seems to pass it by rather than reject it. He merely says that it is difficult to understand how one power can consist of two and how free choice, a "capability of reason and will," can properly and directly be called reason and will.<sup>37</sup> From this definition of free choice Bonaventure concludes to the third opinion, namely that free choice is a habit of reason and will. Since free choice is a "capability of reason and will" it must be a habit of reason and will because habit and capability come to mean the same thing.

Quoniam igitur liberum arbitrium secundum propriam suam assignationem facultas rationis et voluntatis recte esse dicitur, hinc est quod liberum arbitrium principaliter dicitur habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tamquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tamquam unus habitus, qui quidem recte dicitur facultas et dominium, qui consurgit ex conjunctione utriusque et potens est super actus utriusque potentiae, per se et in se consideratae, sicut arbitraria potestas in duabus personis regimen habet super actus utriusque in se consideratae.<sup>38</sup>

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35 Summa, I-II, 390, sol. (I-II, 468b).

36 In II Sent., d.24, a.5.

37 Q.4 (II, 601b).

38 Ibid. (II, 601b-02a).

The Saint concludes that the fact that free choice is frequently used to signify a power does not prove anything about the basic nature of free choice since powers are frequently called habits and habits are frequently called powers. His intrinsic proof that free choice is a habit<sup>1</sup> of reason and will clearly depends entirely upon his analysis of free choice as "a capability of reason and will." But he also calls upon the extrinsic authority of St. Bernard to strengthen his position: "Liberum arbitrium est habitus animi liber sui."<sup>39</sup>

St. Bonaventure clarifies his position in the following question—question 5—in which he asks whether the habit of free choice adds anything to reason and will. In the course of his solution to this question he distinguishes three different types of habit. The first type of habit is found when a faculty is capable of a given act by its very nature. An example of this is the habit which the mind has of knowing itself—the mind is capable of knowing itself by reason of its very nature. In this case the habit is only rationally distinct from the power and adds nothing real to it. This first type of habit indicates that St. Bonaventure uses the term in a very wide sense so as to include the capability of a faculty for its own natural operation. As will be seen, this wide use of the term habit is also applied to free choice, but in a slightly different sense.

The second type of habit is verified when a faculty is

capable of a given act by reason of an accident which inheres in it. For example, the intellect is capable of knowing geometric figures by reason of an accident which it has acquired and which is outside the nature of the intellect itself. In this case the habit is really distinct from the faculty and adds a definite reality to that faculty.

The third type of habit pertains to a faculty which is capable of a given act by reason of its very nature but on condition that it be joined to another faculty for its operation. "Aliaque vero potentia facillima est ad aliquem actum per se ipsam, non tamen sola, sed cum alia; et sic potentia rationalis sine aliquo habitu superaddito ex sola conjunctione sui cum appetitu nata est in actum consentiendi et eligendi exire." <sup>40</sup> The faculties of reason and will are by their very natures capable of the acts of consent and choice, the only requirement being that they be joined together in the operation. This third type of habit does not add any absolute reality essentially distinct from reason and will, nor does it add merely a different way of understanding reason and will. It adds to each of the two faculties a real relation—a mutual relation of reason and will to one another.

Non addit aliquod absolutum, sed respectivum; sicut patet: cum dico rationem per se, rationem associatam sive adjunctam voluntati, non addo aliquid novum supra ipsam rationem secundum se, sed solum conjunctionem sui ad alterum, quantum ad

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40 Q.5 (II, 603b).

aliquem sequentem actum.<sup>41</sup>

Some of the points already seen help to clarify further St. Bonaventure's position that free choice is a relative habit of reason and will. As was seen in the previous chapter, the Saint is very careful to distinguish between the soul and its faculties of reason and will and also between the faculties themselves. He stresses the fact that these natural faculties are very deeply rooted in the essence of the soul, so much so that they are consubstantial with, though really distinct from the soul. Due to the spirituality of the soul they operate immediately from the soul without requiring the presence of an intervening accident.<sup>42</sup> Reason and will are really distinct from each other in genere potentiae; but because they are both consubstantial with the soul, they are not essentially distinct from each other.<sup>43</sup> This essential unity with each other and with the soul explains how they are naturally capable of a united operation, such as the act of choice or the act of consent. This natural capability, which is called free choice, is not really distinct from reason and will, but only refers to reason and will under the aspect of their relation to one another. It considers them under the aspect of their being able to join in a single operation. Consequently free choice is only rationally distinct from reason and will. Furthermore, since it

41 Q.5 (II, 603b).

42 In I Sent., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.3 (I, 86a).

43 In II Sent., d.24, p.1, a.2, q.1 (II, 560ab).

follows from the very nature of these faculties, free choice is aptly called a habit of reason and will.<sup>44</sup> The wide use of habit is justified since it brings out the point that free choice is not distinct from reason and will but identified with the natures of these faculties. Gilson makes the following comment on the Saint's use of the term habit.

This being so, the freedom of the will is to be ranked among the habits. It is a facility in the intellectual and voluntary activity and resembles rather a permanent disposition of the soul than a mere accident of the rational soul, as are many of its habits; it is rooted in the very essence of the soul, and this must be clearly grasped if we are to see exactly what it is.<sup>45</sup>

The unity of free choice, which includes reason and will as a totum potentiale, is deeply rooted in the substance of the soul, since it is accounted for by the essential unity of the two faculties of reason and will with the spiritual soul.

St. Bonaventure summarizes his ultimate explanation of free choice in the following passage:

Liberum arbitrium secundum essentiam nihil addit supra rationem et voluntatem; addit tamen aliquo modo secundum esse sive secundum relationem, quae quidem non ponit aliquam novam qualitatem esse in ratione vel voluntate, sed ponit rationem et voluntatem ad unum actum concurrere secundum naturalem aptitudinem.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Q.5 (II, 603b). . . habitus quo ratio et voluntas suis actibus dominantur; qui quidem est in eis ex sua naturali origine, pro eo quod naturaliter istae duae potentiae in eadem substantia sunt radicatae nec contingit unum ab altera separari.

<sup>45</sup> Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, 408.

<sup>46</sup> Q.5 (II, 603b).

As a corollary to the preceding analysis of free choice, St. Bonaventure takes up the question whether free choice resides principally in the faculty of reason or in the faculty of will, one of many questions which have been used to divide philosophers of every age into the two camps of intellectualists and voluntarists. He begins his answer by stating that free choice must reside in both faculties, since it begins with the act of reason and is consummated in the act of the will. The will must depend upon reason, since it would never move itself unless reason knew the object toward which and the act by which the will moves.

Et sicut voluntas non habet moveri ad objectum, amplectendo vel refugiendo illud, nisi praesambulo cogitatu, sic etiam non habet approbare, vel respuere sive elicere et refrenare actum proprium nisi rationis actus praecedat, qui dicitur ipsum esse bonum vel malum, perficiendum vel refrenandum.<sup>47</sup>

But although the movement of the will depends upon the preceding act of reason, free choice resides principally in the will because the will with its power of self-movement completes the act of free choice.<sup>48</sup> The will is the faculty that commands. The will is more completely free from all necessity than reason. The will is completely in man's power.<sup>49</sup> Bonaventure sides with Augustine in the camp of voluntarism.

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47 Q.6 (II, 605a)

48 Q.6 (II, 605b). Et quoniam penes illud principaliter residet penes quod consummatur, ideo principaliter libertas arbitrii et dominium in voluntate consistit.

49 Q.6, ff.1,2 (II, 604b-05a).

This conclusion once again explains the aptness of the term, liberum arbitrium. The initial step of a complex act is, as it were, the material element of the act; whereas the completion of the act is the formal element. Now the act of free choice is initiated by reason and completed by the will. Consequently the adjective, liberum, which refers to the will, informs the substantive or material arbitrium, which refers to reason. This formulation of the phrase is much more accurate than arbitraria libertas because it brings out the proper sequence of reason and will.<sup>50</sup> With this justification of the term St. Bonaventure closes his formal discussion of the nature of free choice in relation to reason and will.

In this chapter it has been seen that from an analysis of the definition of free choice, Bonaventure passes on to a consideration of the nature of free choice. He first rejects the common opinion that free choice is a faculty distinct from reason and will, by maintaining only a rational distinction due to the appropriation of the mind. He then reasserts<sup>t</sup> that free choice must include both reason and will, as a "potential" whole, since they are required for an adequate explanation of freedom. The specific nature of free choice as a natural disposition or "habit" of reason and will follows from its definition. It is a relative perfection which flows from the very nature of the two faculties.

The Saint's discussion closes with the voluntaristic emphasis of will over reason in the act of free choice. He then warns the reader that he must consider the analysis of free choice in its entirety if he is to understand the nature of this most noble of man's perfections.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Q.6 (II, 606b). Ex praedictis igitur patet quid sit liberum arbitrium secundum rem et qualiter se habeat ad rationem et voluntatem. Si enim omnia quae praedeterminata sunt insimul conferantur in unum, puto satis posse quietari intellectum. Si quis autem in aliquo praedictorum quiescere velit, reliqua non pertractans, non ita evidenter innotescet ei quae sit liberi arbitrii quidditas et essentia.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE SUBJECT, ACT, AND OBJECT OF FREE CHOICE

Complete and perfect knowledge about any subject must include knowledge of that subject in itself and in its relations. St. Bonaventure realizes the wisdom of this fact. And so after discussing the nature of free choice in itself, he takes up the many different relations which free choice enjoys. Free choice in itself is a relation, i.e., a relative habit of reason and will-- as was seen in the previous chapter. But free choice is also related to several different terms. Some relations pertain more directly to the nature of free choice, i.e., the relations of free choice (1) to the subject who is capable of possessing it, (2) to its act, and (3) to its object. Still other relations refer free choice to other beings outside its own nature, i.e., the relation of free choice (1) to other creatures, (2) to God, and (3) to the body with which, as a capability of the soul, it is substantially united. In the present chapter the three relations of free choice to subject, act, and object will be considered. The other three relations will be taken up in the following chapter.

The general procedure will be to follow the order in which St. Bonaventure discusses the various relations In In II

Sententiarum, distinction 25, part 2, article 1.<sup>1</sup> In a few places it will be necessary to fill out his doctrine by citing other sections. But these will be comparatively few. Since Bonaventure follows the question-solution procedure, and since his solutions to each of the questions raised introduces a new distinction or aspect of free choice, the best method of treating each question would seem to be to discuss; (1) the problem together with the main arguments for both sides; (2) the distinction which the Saint introduces to solve the problem; and (3) an elaboration of the solution through application of the distinction to the problem. This method, common to philosophers and theologians of the middle ages, has come to be known as the scholastic method.

St. Bonaventure first takes up the relation of free choice to its subject, i.e., to the person who possesses it. The precise problem to be solved is whether free choice is equally the same in all who possess it.<sup>2</sup> It would seem that it is the same because free choice means that the subject is free from external force. This freedom is clearly common to all. Also, free choice cannot be participated in varying degrees of more or less—either a person possesses free choice or he does not. And yet it is equally true

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1 Once again for convenience's sake in the present and following chapters only the question number and the Quaracchi page number will be given in the footnote references.

2 Q.1 (II, 609). . . utrum liberum arbitrium sit aequum in omnibus in quibus referitur.

that the dignity of free choice as it is found in creatures, cannot equal the dignity of free choice as it is found in God. Furthermore, the faculties of reason and will differ in God and in creatures, as well as among the different creatures; therefore, free choice, a habit of reason and will, must also differ.<sup>3</sup> What is the solution to this apparent dilemma?

Before the consideration of St. Bonaventure's solution it is important to note that in the present and following questions the Saint considers free choice sometimes in its most general application and sometimes as found only in creatures, whereas in his treatment of the nature of free choice in itself he chooses to confine himself to free choice as found in creatures in this life. As was seen in the previous chapter, he defines free choice as a "capability of reason and will." In the consideration of free choice made in the passage under discussion he adopts the definition of St. Anselm, who considers free choice in its most general meaning: "secundum quod convenit creaturae et Creatori, et sic definitur ab Anselmo, cum dicitur: Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se ipsam."<sup>4</sup> According to the explanation of St. Anselm creatures receive the right order (rectitudo) from God. Free choice is the power to preserve that right order

3 Q.1 (II, 610a).

4 IN II Sent., d.25, p.1,a.1, dub.2 (II, 608a); Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, c.3 (PL. 158, 494).

by means of one's own choices.<sup>5</sup>

The problem of whether free choice is equally the same in all who possess it St. Bonaventure solves by dividing freedom in several ways. The first division determines exactly what type of freedom the present problem concerns. Freedom in general is opposed to servitude; but just as there are different types of servitude, so there are different types of freedom. Servitude can be either that of force or that of subjection, the subjection being due either to an evil which is endured or to an evil which is performed. Servitude of force is opposed to freedom from force, whereas the servitude of subjection due to an evil which is endured is opposed to freedom from misery and the servitude of subjection due to an evil which is performed is opposed to freedom from fault.<sup>6</sup> The present problem clearly concerns freedom from force since it is evident that both freedom from misery and freedom from fault greatly differ in different individuals.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Q.1, schol.1 (II, 611a). For an excellent treatment of Anselm's influence upon St. Bonaventure of. Jean Rohmer, La finalité morale chez les théologiens de Saint Augustin à Duns Scot. Paris, 1939, 192-95.

<sup>6</sup> Dub.2 (II, 625b). Libertas autem opponitur servituti. Servitus autem duplex est, videlicet servitus coactionis et servitus subjectionis. Servitus autem subjectionis potest esse sub duplici differentia, secundum quod duplex est malum, scilicet malum quod patimur, et hoc est malum miserie, et in hoc attenditur libertas a miseria; et malum quod facimus, et hoc est malum culpae, et in hoc attenditur tertia libertatis differentia.

<sup>7</sup> Q.1 (II, 610b).

Freedom from force, however, can be considered from three different aspects: negatively as freedom from external force; as a dignity of those who possess it, which results from the other two aspects; or positively, as a capability of preserving right order.<sup>8</sup> This three-fold aspect of freedom from force is the key to Bonaventure's solution to the present problem.

Freedom from force in its negative aspect—precisely as immunity from force—is equal in all, in God and in creatures, because the essence of freedom is simply and universally to exclude all force and coercion. This much can be known about God by negation, even though it is impossible to have positive knowledge of the nature of free choice in God.<sup>9</sup>

Under the second aspect, as a dignity of the one who possesses it, free choice is found to be greater in God than in creatures, but equal in all creatures among themselves. It is greater in God since in him it is uncreated and unlimited, and since he is the cause of free choice in all others who possess it. Among creatures the dignity of this perfection remains equal in all because all receive it immediately and directly from God—not through some secondary cause. God must create the soul and its

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8 Q.1 (II, 610b). Haec autem facultas, prout privationis coactionis conjuncta est, habet quandam dignitatem.

9 Ibid. (II, 611a). . . etsi non possit intelligi veraciter esse dictum de aliquo quod dicitur per positionem, potest tamen intelligi de eo quod dicitur per omnimodam privationem.

spiritual faculties of reason and will, with which powers free choice is really identified; hence God creates free choice directly.

Furthermore, each creature enjoys freedom in relation to his own operations, in which he is independent of all other creatures and depends solely upon God, the first principle of all operations.<sup>10</sup>

The third aspect of freedom from force considers the positive capability or power of preserving justice and right order.

As such, freedom is clearly greater in God than in creatures, and even among creatures themselves it allows of varying degrees of perfection: "Una enim creatura multo potentior est altera in rectitudine servanda, sicut beata quam misera."<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, St. Bonaventure adopts the division of free choice made by St. Anselm according to the varying degrees in which it is found. First of all there is God's uncreated free choice as distinguished from the creatures' created free choice. Among creatures this perfection of free choice can possess right order or lack it. If it possesses right order, it can do so separably (as in the case of men here on earth) or inseparably (as in the case of the angels and blessed in heaven). If it lacks this right order, it can do so in such a way as to be able to regain it (as in the case of men

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10 Q.1 (II, 611a). Prout autem consideratur in creaturis relatis ad invicem sic habet in eis reperiri aequaliter, pro eo quod omne liberum arbitrium immediate est sub Deo constitutum et quodlibet est suarum operationum post Deum primum principium.

11 Ibid. (II, 611b).

on this earth) or in such a way as to be unable to regain it (as in the case of the damned).<sup>12</sup> These distinctions and divisions make evident the fact that freedom, as the power of preserving right order, can be found in varying degrees among those who possess it.

In summary, then, St. Bonaventure asserts that freedom as immunity from force is equal in all who possess it; that freedom as a dignity of the one who possesses it is greater in God than in creatures, but equal in all creatures; and that freedom as the power of preserving right order varies in degree even among creatures themselves.<sup>13</sup>

The second relation which St. Bonaventure considers is the relation of free choice to its act. The problem which he determines to solve is whether free choice includes acts which are either contingent or necessary, or whether it is restricted to acts which are contingent. It could seem that free choice is limited to contingent acts. It concerns those things which are in

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12 Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, c.14 (PL 158, 506) Libertas arbitrii alia est a se, quae nec est facta nec ab alio accepta, quae est solius Dei. Alia est a Deo facta et accepta, quae est Angelorum et hominum. Facta autem sive accepta, alia est habens recititudinem, quam servet, alia carens: Habens, alia tenet separabiliter, alia inseparabiliter; carens autem, alia caret recuperabiliter, alia irrecuperabiliter.

13 Q.1 (II, 610b). Liberum arbitrium quoad immunitatem a coactione aequaliter est in omnibus in quibus reperitur; quoad excellentiae dignitatem praestantius est in Creatore, sed aequaliter in creaturis relatis ad invicem; quoad facultatem justitiae servandae etiam in creaturis est inaequaliter.

our power and about which we take counsel; and as a voluntary act it is opposed to a necessary act. And yet the perfection of free choice is found in God and in the angels and blessed in heaven, even though their act must be necessary. Furthermore, freedom implies full control over any act that can be known by reason; therefore, since reason can know both the necessary and the contingent act, it would seem that free choice pertains to both.<sup>14</sup>

Once again St. Bonaventure solves the problem by distinguishing two different aspects of free choice--as free and as deliberative. Free choice as free pertains to both necessary and contingent acts; whereas free choice as deliberative pertains only to contingent acts. The essence of freedom according to Bonaventure is the power of self-movement, which is independent of all external force. Freedom does not necessarily imply what was later known as indifference either of exercise or of specification.

Cum enim duplex sit necessitas, videlicet coactionis et immutabilitatis, necessitas coactionis repugnat libertati arbitrii, necessitas vero immutabilitatis non, pro eo quod arbitrium dicitur liberum, non quia sic velit hoc ut possit velle ejus oppositum, sed quia omne quod vult appetit ad sui ipsius imperium, quia sic vult aliquid ut velit se velle illud; et ideo in actu volendi se ipsum movet et sibi dominatur, et pro tanto dicitur liberus, quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud.<sup>15</sup>

The only requirement for the act of free choice is that in the act itself the will move itself, whether the self-movement is necessary

14 Q.2 (II, 612ab).

15 Ibid. (II, 612b).



(in the case of God, the angels, and the blessed) or contingent (in the case of men on earth). Free choice can be saved even though the act and the object are necessary.

Free choice considered as deliberative, however, pertains only to contingent acts because the act of deliberation is itself always contingent. This deliberation is not essential to freedom as such; but whenever it is had, then indifference is present and the act of free choice is contingent. But even though the act of deliberation is always contingent, the object can still be either necessary or contingent.

In libero arbitrio est considerare actum volendi et ipsum volitum. Et in quantum liberum arbitrium est deliberans, necesse est quod contingentia sit circa utrumque istorum vel circa alterum: circa utrumque, ut cum quis deliberat utrum velit intrare religionem vel diligere inimicum; circa alterum, ut cum quis deliberat utrum debeat sibi placere vel displicere malum quod fecit vel utrum debeat consentire vel dissentire appetitui naturaliter inserto, utpote appetitui beatitudinis. 16

In this passage St. Bonaventure makes the basic distinction which later came to be known as freedom of exercise and freedom of specification—both of which include indifference as well as self-movement.

The Quaracchi editors give a further explanation of St. Bonaventure's position by showing how the scholastics of the middle ages used the term freedom in a much wider sense than it is commonly used in contemporary scholastic philosophy.<sup>17</sup> Freedom as understood

16 Q.2 (II, 612 b-13a).

17 Schol.2 (II, 594ab).

in modern scholastic philosophy excludes both external force and internal determination to one object or act; it includes indifference of exercise and specification, as necessary for the full control which the free faculty enjoys in relation to its object and its act. The proper operation of free choice, as found in men on this earth, is the act of choosing between different means in order to attain an end.<sup>18</sup> In general the medieval scholastics made the same distinctions, understanding freedom in a proper sense and in an improper sense. Freedom properly includes the freedom of indifference, both of exercise and specification. But they also use the term freedom in an improper sense to include only spontaneity which could obtain even though there were an intrinsic necessary determination to one object or act. Thus when St. Bonaventure speaks of free choice as free, he includes only spontaneity as essential to freedom; but free choice as deliberative includes indifference as well as spontaneity. The act of the will as free is opposed only to the necessity of force; the act of the will as deliberative is opposed not only to the extrinsic necessity of force but also to the intrinsic necessity of immutability.

St. Bonaventure summarizes his solution to the present problem—whether free choice includes acts which are either contingent or necessary, or whether it is restricted to acts which

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. George P. Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Human Nature, New York, 1953, 254-56.

are contingent: "Sic igitur actus liberi arbitrii deliberantis, quamvis possit esse circa necessarium, semper est contingens; actus vero liberi arbitrii, ut liberum est, non solum potest esse circa necessarium, sed etiam necessarius in se."<sup>19</sup>

It is important to note—by way of digression—that the question of the precise nature of the acts of free choice does not concern St. Bonaventure to such an extent as to receive a special consideration. Nowhere does he give an explicit and direct treatment of the acts themselves. His doctrine in regard to this important question must be gathered from texts which are scattered throughout his works. He does, however, make a three-fold division of freedom according to the different ways in which man's act of free choice can be considered.<sup>20</sup> Freedom of choice designates free choice in relation to the act of willing in itself; freedom of counsel, free choice in relation to the act of will with regard to an end—such would be the act of use, uti; freedom of enjoyment designates free choice in relation to the act of willing as accomplished and completed—such is the act of enjoyment, frui.<sup>21</sup>

Man's free choice considered in relation to the act of willing in itself has two operations, consent and choice, which, though they seem to be one, are really composite. They include

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19 Q.2 (II, 613a).

20 Dub.2, (II, 625b). Per comparationem ad illud ad quod scilicet ad actum in quem exit.

21 Ibid.

many different acts of reason and will.

Quamvis actus liberi arbitrii, utpote eligere et consentire, unus esse videatur; nihilominus tamen implicat in se actus diversos. Consensus enim dicit concordiam aliquorum duorum, et ita concursum actuum rationis et voluntatis in unum. Eligere etiam includit in se rationis iudicium et voluntatis appetitum.<sup>22</sup>

Bonaventure gives no explicit statement of the intrinsic nature of consent or choice. However, from what he does say about these operations some legitimate conclusions may be drawn. He mentions consent in several contexts of which the following three are the fullest.

Consensus non est aliud quam concordia voluntatis simul et rationis ad unum aliquid faciendum, unius ut arbitrantis et iudicantis alterius autem ut praeoptantis.<sup>23</sup>

Possimus consentire, quia potest praecedere deliberatio per actum rationis, et subsequi praeoptatio per actum voluntatis.<sup>24</sup>

Et si consensus respiciat simul rationem et voluntatem principaliter tamen, et completius voluntatem respicit, quia in ea consummatur.<sup>25</sup>

He makes the following mention of the act of choice:

Consensum sive electionem praecedit appetitus, nihil enim eligimus, nisi prius illud appetamus.<sup>26</sup>

Illum (actum electionis) antecedit deliberatio et praecognitio plurium.<sup>27</sup>

22 In II Sent., d.25, p.1, a.1, q.3, ad 5 (II, 599b).

23 Ibid., d.38, a.2, q.2 (II, 893a).

24 Ibid., d.25, p.1, a.1, q.2, f.3 (II, 595b).

25 Ibid., d.41, a.2, q.2, ad 1 (II, 953a).

26 Ibid., d.21, a.3, q.1, 2\* (II, 504a).

27 Ibid., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.2, ad 3 (II, 117b).

From these texts the following analysis, though not made by Bonaventure, seems justified. First of all it would seem that the act of free choice must be preceded by the appetency of the will for some object: "praecedat appetitus." In other words the will must be actually tending toward some object, i.e., a good which is its end, before it can consent or choose means towards that end. Secondly, the acts of consent and choice themselves are composite, including an act of reason and an act of the will. The act of reason must precede the act of the will.<sup>28</sup> This act of reason is called judgement or deliberation. Arbitrium means a judgement which is ruled not only by the rule of truth, but also and primarily by the command of the will.<sup>29</sup> Deliberation would seem to be a succession of such judgments, all of which are made somehow under the influence of the will.<sup>30</sup> The act of reason is followed by the self-movement of the will, which consummates the act of consent or choice. Hence, although the movement of the will depends upon the preceding act of reason, free choice resides principally in the will because the will with its power of self-move-

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28 In II Sent., d.25, p.1, a.1, q.6 (II, 605a). Et sicut voluntas non habet moveri ad objectum, amplectendo vel refugiendo illud, nisi praecambulo cogitatu, sic etiam non habet approbare vel respuere actum proprium nisi rationis actus praecedat, qui dicet, ipsum esse bonum vel malum, perficiendum vel refrenandum.

29 Ibid., dub.1 (II, 607a).

30 Ibid., d.3, p.2, a.1, q.2, f.3 (II, 116a). . . ubi deliberatio, ibi collatio et successio de necessitate.

ment completes the act of free choice.<sup>31</sup>

A more extensive analysis of the acts of reason and will would be beyond the evidence given in the writings of St. Bonaventure. The questions of the precise nature of the acts of consent and choice, the exact relation of the act of reason to the act of the will, etc., must be left to the insight and development of later scholastic philosophers and theologians.<sup>32</sup> The doctrine of St. Bonaventure must not be extended beyond its limits set by the Saint himself. He must not be made to say more than he actually said.

When free choice is considered in relation to its object the problem arises: Can free choice, as free, have evil as its object? It would seem that it can because people are blamed for sinful and evil acts—which implies that these acts are in their power and chosen freely. And yet the ability to sin is clearly a weakness and a defect rather than a positive power; but free choice is the most powerful force in man; hence free choice cannot be capable of sin. Furthermore, if free choice can choose what is evil, then the power to sin would be a part of free choice and found in all who possess free choice, i.e., in God, the angels, and men.<sup>33</sup>

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31 In II Sent., d.25, p.1, a.1, q.6 (II, 605ab).

32 Cf. Thomas, S.T., I-II, 13-15.

33 Q.3, ff.1-3 (II, 613b-14a).

St. Bonaventure again introduces two distinctions to solve the problem. Free choice can be spoken of in two ways—in a general sense which pertains to creatures and to God, or in a more specific sense which pertains to creatures and to creatures alone. This second more specific aspect of free choice can also be considered in two ways, as free or as deficient.

Free choice in the general sense, which extends to creatures and to God, has only the good and just as its object, i.e., as "illud quod intendit liberum arbitrium per actum proprium sive quod efficit."<sup>34</sup> Evil can be said to be the object of this free choice only if an object is understood as that which is rejected and detested.<sup>35</sup>

Free choice taken more specifically as found in creatures can be considered as free or as deficient. As free, it is by nature ordained only to what is good and just.<sup>36</sup> This position can easily be confirmed by what has already been seen of Bonaventure's doctrine. For free choice is only rationally distinct from reason and will and resides principally in the will. But it is clear that good—which is identified with the end—is the object of the will.<sup>37</sup>

34 Dub. 2 (II, 625b).

35 Q. 3 (II, 614b). . . et sic objectum ejus est bonum et aequum, malum vero non est objectum, nisi quis dicat hoc esse objectum, quia liberum arbitrium illud respuit et detestatur.

36 Ibid.

37 In I Sent., d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, f. 3 (I, 36). . . bonum autem objectum est voluntatis.

Consequently since free choice is really identified with the will, it is clear that only what is good can be its object. Furthermore, freedom implies full control over its object—which means that the object of free choice can be any good whatsoever, whether it be pleasurable, useful, or the good-in-itself.<sup>38</sup> The useful and pleasurable good can be the object of the rational appetite of man or the irrational appetite of the brutes; but the good-in-itself can be the object only of the rational appetite.<sup>39</sup> These several points help to strengthen Bonaventure's position that free choice as free is ordained only to good as its object.

When free choice is considered as deficient, however, it can go out to what is evil.<sup>40</sup> St. Bonaventure states that evil is clearly a privation of good: "mala non debet dici (potentia peccandi) propter hoc, quod non dicit privationem alicujus boni naturae."<sup>41</sup> The reason why free choice can go out to such a priva-

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38 In II Sent., d.25, p.1, a.1, q.1 (II, 593a). Tria autem sunt quae sint in appetitibus et quorum opposita sunt in fugis, videlicet bonum, conferens et delectabile; et nomine boni ibi intelligitur honestum . . . bonum honestum a solis rationalibus potest appeti.

39 In IV Sent., d.31, a.1, q.1 (IV, 717b) St. Bonaventure quotes Cicero thus: "Honestum est quod sua vi nos trahit et dignitate nos allicit." De Inventione, II, 52, 157: "Honestum est . . . quod sua vi nos adlicit ad sese, . . . trahens sua dignitate."

40 Q.3 (II, 614b). . . quia deficiens exit in actum deformatum, et ita in malum.

41 In II Sent., d.44, a.1, q.2, ad 5 (II, 1004b).



tion of good is not because it is free, but because its freedom is limited and deficient: "cum libertate habet defectabilitatem."<sup>42</sup> The ultimate reason for the deficiency and limitation of free choice is the creaturehood of its subject. Although man can choose evil because of this deficiency, his habit of free choice is not ordained to evil by its very nature. In fact it seeks evil only insofar as it appears under the aspect of good.<sup>43</sup>

St. Bonaventure is thus justified in his conclusion that only by defect can free choice choose what is evil: "Objectum liberi arbitrii tum secundum communem rationem, tum prout est in creaturis, per se est bonum, ita ut ipsum non, nisi quatenus est deficiens, eligat malum."<sup>44</sup>

In the consideration of free choice discussed in this present chapter St. Bonaventure makes several important distinctions of free choice and freedom. The problem of the relation of free choice to its subject leads him to distinguish freedom—as opposed to servitude—into freedom from force, freedom from misery, and freedom from fault. He goes on to point out three different aspects of freedom from force, i. e., the negative absence of exter-

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42 Q.3 (II, 614b).

43 Q.3 (II, 615a). . . non tamen ad illud ordinatur principaliter, quoniam hoc non convenit ei secundum naturae propriae complementum, sed potius secundum propriae naturae defectum. Praeterea, etsi de se eligat malum, numquam tamen eligit malum nisi in quantum apparet esse bonum.

44 Q.3 (II, 614b).

nal force, the dignity following upon free choice, and the positive capability of preserving right order. When the Saint considers the relation of free choice to its act, he considers free choice under two aspects, as free and as deliberative. He also divides freedom in relation to its act into freedom of choice, freedom of counsel, and freedom of enjoyment. And finally the problem of free choice in relation to its object gives rise to two different aspects of man's free choice—namely, as free and as deficient. Many of these important distinctions are still observed in scholastic philosophy, but for the most part under different terminology. Most of them did not originate with St. Bonaventure, but were incorporated by him into his general doctrine of free choice.<sup>45</sup> Since his doctrine is more complete than the doctrines of many of his predecessors, his application of these distinctions is also more extensive.

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<sup>45</sup> The distinctions of freedom from force, from misery, and from fault, as well as the distinctions of freedom of counsel and freedom of enjoyment go back at least as far as St. Bernard. Cf. De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 3 (PL 182, 1005-06).

## CHAPTER V

### FREE CHOICE IN RELATION TO GOD, CREATURES, AND THE HUMAN BODY

If free choice is to be known completely and thoroughly, it must be known in itself and in its relations. In the previous chapter those relations which pertain more intimately to the nature of free choice were discussed. In the present chapter it will be seen how St. Bonaventure completes his doctrine by considering the relations of free choice to other creatures, to God, and to the body. Although the Saint divides this matter into three separate questions, it would seem more advisable to combine the first two questions, since they are very closely connected. Consequently the two questions to be discussed are: (1) Can free choice be forced either by creatures or by God?; and (2) Can the use of free choice be impeded by an indisposition of the body?

The first of these questions considers free choice in relation to other creatures and to God. The issue is whether or not free choice can be forced. St. Bonaventure gives the following description of force: "Tunc autem voluntas dicitur cogi, quando intelligitur ipsam invitam aliquid velle, et repugnante actu voluntatis deliberativae, aliena virtute movente et repugnantia reman-

ente, ad aliquid volendo inclinari."<sup>1</sup> It would seem that free choice can be forced. For experience teaches that some acts are partially voluntary and partially involuntary, partially free and partially forced—e.g., the act of throwing merchandise overboard to save the ship. Furthermore, God as Creator has much greater power over human free choice than man has over the brutes; but man can use violence to force a brute to perform a given act; hence God must be able to force man's free choice in a similar and even more powerful way. And yet the nature of the will, as a spiritual faculty, is to enjoy the power of self-movement. Furthermore, freedom implies full control over all objects—which means that free choice cannot be forced to act against its inclination, since its inclination is toward all being.

St. Bonaventure begins his solution to this question of force by distinguishing free choice in relation to an external act, i.e., an act involving bodily movement, from free choice in relation to an internal act, i.e., an act of reason, will, or free choice. It is clear that other creatures can by violence force an external act against the will of the one who performs the act. For example, the pagans used brutality to force the Christians to kneel before a pagan idol. However, the interior act of free choice, the act of consent or choice, can never be forced either by God or by crea-

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1 Q.5 (II, 619b).

tures because this is a contradiction.<sup>2</sup> Free choice is free— which means that it enjoys full control over its object and its act. When it chooses something it does so freely. Free choice is voluntary—which means that when the will moves toward an object, it does so by moving itself since it is a spiritual faculty.<sup>3</sup> The act of free choice must necessarily be free and voluntary, or else it cannot be. But force means that free choice is moved unwillingly. From these mutually opposite properties of freedom and force St. Bonaventure concludes: ". . . liberum arbitrium cogi non est aliud quam actum liberi arbitrii simul et semel esse liberum et servilem, esse voluntarium et non voluntarium, esse a se et non a se."<sup>5</sup> Even God cannot contradict a nature which He has created, because He would be acting against His own will.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, neither God nor creatures can have any direct influence by force upon man's free choice. This fact clearly emphasizes the dignity and sacred-

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2 Q.5 (II, 619b). . . ut intelligatur quod Deus cogat liberum arbitrium, salva proprietate libertatis et ejus natura; et hoc modo non solum est impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile, pro eo quod implicat in se duo contradictorie opposita.

3 Ibid. (II, 619a). Ex hoc enim quod liberum arbitrium liberum est, si aliquid vult, libere vult; et ex hoc quod voluntarium est, si aliquid vult, voluntarie vult et se ipso movente vult.

4 Ibid. (II, 619b). . . intelligitur, ipsam (voluntatem) invitam aliquid velle.

5 Ibid.

6 Augustine, Super VI Genesim, c.18, n.29. Tam non potest Deus facere contra naturam, quam bonam instituit, quam non potest facere contra voluntatem suam.

ness of man's free choice.

St. Bonaventure very emphatically denies creatures any direct influence upon the internal acts of free choice; but he equally affirms that creatures can have an indirect influence on man's free choice. This indirect influence can be in either of two ways—by inducement or by impediment, both of which are compatible with freedom from force. St. Bonaventure gives the following description of inducement: "Tunc enim induci dicitur, quando persuasio fit, qua disponitur ut ad aliquod appetibile inclinetur; quae si valde intensa sit, nomen coactionis sortitur, quamvis non sit vera coactio."<sup>7</sup> It is clear that creatures can induce man by persuasion to choose one thing rather than another. This inducement is brought about either by offering a man something that he likes or by taking some such thing away from him.<sup>8</sup> The pagans tried to persuade the Martyrs both by promising rich rewards and by threatening pain and death. But the fact that the Martyrs were neither won over to paganism by their promises nor terrified by their torments proves that inducement is not the same as force. No matter how strong the persuasion might be, man still remains free to choose what he will.

Creatures can also indirectly influence man's free choice

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7 Q.5 (II, 619b).

8 Q.4 (II, 616b). Et sic liberum arbitrium induci potest, quia amat aliquid infra se, utpote vitam temporalem vel aliud con-simile, quod potest agens creatum conferre vel auferre.

by acting upon the body.<sup>9</sup> But although one person can so injure another as to make him incapable of choosing freely, this impediment is altogether different from force since it does not force him to place a positive act but rather prevents him from placing any act.<sup>10</sup> The reason why free choice can be influenced by an indisposition of the body will be considered below.

God's influence upon free choice is much greater than the influence of creatures. St. Bonaventure never denies the fact that man's free choice always remains dependent upon the Creator.<sup>11</sup> Just as God has created free choice and given it to man, so it is true that by His absolute power He can take away man's free choice and rule him by force.<sup>12</sup> But as long as man remains free, neither God nor creatures can force him to act, since force contradicts the nature of freedom: ". . . voluntatem cogere nihil aliud est facere nisi facere voluntatem simul et semel velle et nolle."<sup>13</sup>

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9 Q.4 (II, 616b). Potest (liberum arbitrium) etiam impediri propter inclinationem et conjunctionem sui ad naturam corporalem quae subest virtuti creaturae.

10 Ibid.

11 Q.5, f.4 (II, 616a). . . liberum arbitrium est secundum id quod est supremum in anima, cum ipsius sit regere et movere omnes potentias; sed eo quod supremum est in anima solus Deus major est.

12 Q.5 (II, 619a). . . quod possit (Deus) auferre libertatem et auferendo libertatem superinducere coactionem; et hoc modo nulli dubium esse debet quin Deus possit hoc facere quantum est de immensitate duae potentiae.

13 Ibid., f.4 (II, 619a).

St. Bonaventure reserves to God a very special direct influence upon man's free choice—God can change the will. The Saint describes this change of will as follows: "Tunc autem voluntas mutatur quando ipsa volente unum, potenti virtute affectio immittitur ei ad contrarium et de volente fit nolens, ita quod una affectio expellitur et contraria inducitur."<sup>14</sup> This change of will would take place when a man who has loved the things of the world has a change of heart and begins to condemn everything that he has loved. Such a change of heart is sometimes called compulsion, since the person is drawn away from the very objects which he formerly has loved; but such a compulsion is not the same as force, since it does not go against the nature of free choice. The change is brought about by the all-powerful God who implants in the will the contrary affection.

The question arises! How precisely does God put that affection in the will? St. Bonaventure does not give a direct answer to this question, but perhaps a solution can be suggested from other elements of his doctrine. As was mentioned in the second chapter, when God creates the will he gives it a natural, even instinctive tendency toward the good-in-itself. This natural weight of the will St. Bonaventure calls *synderesis*.<sup>15</sup> The action

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<sup>14</sup> Q.5 (II, 619b); cf. also St. Thomas, Super II Sent., d.25, q.1, a.2, ad 3.

<sup>15</sup> IN II Sent., d.39, a.2, q.1 (II, 910a).



of synderesis is three-fold: (1) it inclines and urges man on towards the good-in-itself; (2) it draws man back from committing evil; and (3) it cries out in remorse against the evil that man has already committed.<sup>16</sup> Consequently this habitual power of the will explains how the will is naturally inclined toward the good as its object.

In the present question of God's changing the will. St. Bonaventure introduces an additional power which God enjoys over the will, the power to incline the will toward a definite object by giving it a strong affection or tendency toward that object. St. Bonaventure does not explain how this change takes place. It would seem that God could bring this change about either by natural or supernatural means. Since God is the first cause and ultimate end of all man's actions, He could attract man's will by the power of His supreme goodness; or, on the other hand, God could give man a supernatural, actual, efficacious grace which would incline his will toward a definite object. This latter alternative would seem preferable, since St. Bonaventure, who is primarily a theologian, frequently stresses the need of grace to perfect nature.<sup>17</sup>

The final question which St. Bonaventure raises in his treatment of free choice is whether its use can be limited by an indisposition of the body. The testimony of experience clearly

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16 In IV Sent., d.50, p.2, a.2, q.1 (II, 910a).

17 Schol. 1 (II, 617b-18a).

shows that the answer to this question must be affirmative. It is evident (1) that free choice in children is not fully developed; (2) that those who are asleep do not have full control over their acts; and (3) that the insane are restricted in their use of free choice. From this evidence it is clear that the condition of the body somehow affects free choice.<sup>18</sup>

This solution, <sup>W</sup> however, introduces the more important and more difficult question of precisely how the body affects free choice.<sup>19</sup> The Saint reviews the four solutions which have been elaborated.

The first states that because of the bodily indisposition the soul is turned toward the body to such an extent that the uses of reason and free choice are thereby restricted.<sup>20</sup> When the body is injured, the soul turns toward it out of compassion; when the body is born defective, the soul attempts to make up for the imperfection. The soul, as it were, loses sight of itself in its concern for the body.

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18 Q.6 (II, 621b).

19 Ibid. Respondeo quod, etsi ad hanc questionem facile sit respondere, cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium ligetur per corporis ineptitudinem quantum ad usum, . . . ad illam tamen questionem quae hanc subsequitur, videlicet, quare ligetur liberum arbitrium ex corpori ineptitudine, cum non sit potentia alligata organo, valde difficile est respondere et ejus assignare causam.

20 Ibid. . . . propter conversionem dixerunt aliqui animam impediri ab actu rationis, existente ineptitudine ex parte corporis.

The second solution is that the use of free choice is limited because it lacks the proper condition of the body.<sup>21</sup> The intellect of man, as long as it is united to the body, depends upon the sense phantasm for its determination.<sup>22</sup> Hence when the body is somehow indisposed, the use of reason and free choice is likewise impeded.

The third solution explains the dependence of the soul upon the well-being of the body by the fact that the soul communicates its operations to the body.<sup>23</sup> The soul is the form of the body which gives the body all its perfections, vegetative, sensitive, and rational. It makes the body a man. Hence if the body is defective the soul cannot communicate to it the fullest perfections of reason and free choice.

These three solutions, however, encounter insuperable difficulties which arise either from ordinary experience or from scientific fact. Therefore, St. Bonaventure chooses to follow a fourth opinion which solves the question by stressing the substantial union of soul and body.<sup>24</sup> Because of this substantial union

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21 Q.6 (II, 622a). . . liberum arbitrium a proprio usu habet impediri propter privationem obsequii corporalis.

22 Ibid. . . intellectus noster excitari habet ab inferiori, quamdiu est conjunctus corpori.

23 Ibid. Operatio liberi arbitrii et rationis ex corporis ineptitudine habet impediri propter quamdam communicationem operationis.

24 Q.6 (II, 623a). . . unio animae et corporis ad unius ~~tentii constitutionem.~~

the soul must somehow depend upon the body for all its operations, whether they are vegetative, sensitive, or rational.<sup>25</sup> As long as the soul remains joined with the body, man's rational powers will depend upon the condition of the body, even though this dependence is far from the dependence of man's vegetative and sensitive powers.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, even the very highest operations of the soul can be impeded by an indisposition of the body. In fact this impediment is all the more frequent in regard to the act of free choice, because free choice requires the faculties of reason and will to be as unrestricted as possible. The slightest indisposition can impede the act of free choice.<sup>27</sup> With this solution to the relation of free choice to the body, St. Bonaventure brings his formal discussion of free choice to a close.

In this chapter it has been seen that St. Bonaventure shows that neither God nor creatures directly influence free choice by the use of force. He also analyzes the different ways in which they can influence free choice. Creatures can persuade man to

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25 Q.6 (II, 623a). Et propter ipsam unionem non tantum pendet anima ex corpore quantum ad actum sentiendi, sed etiam aliquo modo quantum ad actum intelligendi, quamdiu est in corpore, sed longe aliter et aliter.

26 Ibid. . . . sic, quamdiu anima est in corpore, intelligere suum non est sine corpore et sine aliqua dispositione ex parte corporis.

27 Ibid. Sic et in proposito facilius et frequentius contingit auferri usum libertatis quam quescumque actum potentiae intelligendi.

choose one thing rather than another. God can by His supreme power change man's tendency of will. And finally the condition of the body effects the use of free choice because of the substantial unity of body and soul.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

The story of man's free choice, as told by Bonaventure, begins with God in the creation of a spiritual, rational soul. For when God creates the soul, he gives it the spiritual powers to know and to love, he gives it the faculties of reason and will. These faculties, though really distinct from the soul, are essentially rooted in the very substance of the soul. They are naturally directed by God to their specific operations. The cognitive power of reason tends to know universal natures; the appetitive power of the will moves with a very natural weight toward the good-in-itself. But because these faculties are spiritual, they enjoy two special powers, self-movement and self-reflection. And since by their God-given nature reason can reflect upon itself and the will can move itself, these spiritual faculties can by their very nature unite to perform one composite operation in which they enjoy full control over the operation itself and the object of that operation. Such is the operation of free choice. This natural capability of reason and will is the habit of free choice. It is really identified with reason and will; but it designates their capability of a united operation in which reason is self-reflective and will is self-moving. It embraces both reason and will, as a

potential whole which is present in each of its parts according to its complete essence, but for its own operation requires the concomitant operation of the two parts. It is a relative perfection which begins in reason and is consummated in the will. Thus man's special power of free choice is given him by God in the creation of his rational soul.

But what does this gift of free choice mean to man? First of all, it makes him capable of performing operations which are within his own control. In other words, man is able to perform operations which are completely free from all external force. Neither God nor creatures can force the acts of free choice, since this would contradict the very nature of freedom. They can influence man in other ways; but they cannot force the interior act of choice. God can change man's free choice; other creatures can persuade and induce man's choice; and an indisposition of the body, with which free choice is substantially united, can impede the operation of free choice. But no one and no thing can ever directly force man's essential freedom.

This absolute freedom from external force gives man a dignity and excellence which elevates him far above the world of non-rational creation. He is surpassed in dignity only by God from whom he has received the precious gift of free choice.

This gift includes the power to preserve the right order which God has imprinted in man's very nature. But with this power comes a corresponding responsibility. For if man exercises his

free choice according to right order, he will attain heaven; but if he fails to do so, he will be damned for all eternity.

How does man exercise his free choice? In this life man uses his habit of free choice in the acts of choice and consent. Although each of these acts is one, its unity is composite, since it includes several operations of reason and will. Reason judges under the influence and at the command of the will, which directs reason by its power of self-movement. And since these acts are deliberative, it follows that they must be contingent. By means of consent and choice man goes out to what is good and just, thereby preserving the right order given him by God. But because of his creaturehood man can invert the right order and move toward what is unjust and evil. The preservation of right order is man's gravest responsibility.

The way man exercises his free choice in this life will determine his condition in the next life. If he succeeds in preserving right order, he will achieve his eternal beatitude. He will live forever in the love and enjoyment of God. His free choice will be necessarily fixed upon God, its necessary object, for all eternity. The story of man's free choice ends where it began—with God, the Creator and the highest good.

St. Bonaventure's doctrine of free choice gives a very detailed and organized solution to a problem which has puzzled philosophical minds since the days of Plato's Academy. Here for the first time we find a serious attempt to combine as much of tra-



ditional thought as possible with a new insight into the problem. Many points of Bonaventure's doctrine have necessarily been taken over from his predecessors. In fact one of his chief aims seems to be to reconcile the traditional ideal of Augustine with the growing interest in Aristotle. This attempt to express Augustine's concepts in Aristotle's terminology leads to several limitations and obscurities in Bonaventure's doctrine. This is especially evident in the discussion of the distinctions between the soul and its faculties of reason and will, as well as the distinction between free choice and the same two faculties. These real but non-essential distinctions are based on the doctrine of Augustine that reason and will proceed immediately from the soul without the intervention of any accidental perfections. The ultimate nature of these distinctions, expressed in the terminology of Aristotle remains a mystery.

St. Bonaventure's proof that free choice is a habit of reason and will is an original contribution and the most distinctive feature of his doctrine. This is his solution to the basic problem of the relation between free choice and the faculties of reason and will. Here he adds his penetrating insight to the findings of his predecessors, especially Anselm, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great. It would seem that all of these men had a very similar understanding of the fact that reason and will must somehow work together in the act of free choice. Bonaventure, however, seems to have been more successful in the struggle to express the precise

nature of this combined operation.

When Bonaventure's doctrine is compared with his contemporary, St. Thomas Aquinas, the differences between the Augustinian and the Aristotelian approach to the problem of free choice become most evident. St. Bonaventure was more concerned with the concept of freedom than with the will as such. St. Thomas, on the contrary, makes a profound study of the will itself. The results of this study serve as the basis of his conclusions regarding free choice.

Like St. Bonaventure, Thomas defines free choice as a "facultas voluntatis et rationis."<sup>1</sup> But their interpretations of this definition seem quite different. St. Thomas in quoting the definition means that, radically, the act of free choice is grounded in the intellect, but formerly and entitatively, it proceeds from the will.<sup>2</sup> St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, identifies the term "facultas" with his concept of a habit which resides in both reason and will, but preeminently in the will. The differences in the two doctrines seem primarily to be differences in terminology rather than differences in concept, since Bonaventure's understanding of habit comes to practically the same thing as Thomas' understanding of a proper accident.

St. Thomas' emphasis of the principle that the nature and function of the will depend upon and are conditioned by the

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1 St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., d.24, a.1.

2 Thomas, S.T., I, 83, 4, ad 1.

nature and function of the intellect seems to place him among the intellectualists rather than among the voluntarists. St. Bonaventure, however, is a voluntarist, and maintains the superiority of the will over the intellect.

An adequate consideration of the relative merits of Bonaventure's solution would require volumes. Suffice it to say that St. Bonaventure rightly deserves his high place of honor among the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages. His doctrine of free choice is a brilliant attempt to solve a most knotty problem, a problem which in the present picture of philosophical thought is still calling for a complete and adequate solution.

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The thesis submitted by William G. Thompson, S.J. has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

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