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**PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION
AS FOUND IN THE REPUBLIC**

by

Richard Martin Mackowski, S. J.

**A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts**

May

1955

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VITA AUCTORIS

Richard Martin Mackowski, S. J., was born in Detroit, Michigan, May 19, 1929.

He was graduated from Corpus Christi Grammar School, Detroit, in 1944, and entered Pershing High School, Detroit, in the same year. At mid-term, 1945, he transferred to the University of Detroit High School. Upon graduation in June 1948, he entered the Jesuit Novitiate at Milford, Ohio, and was enrolled in the College of Arts of Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. In August, 1952, he entered West Baden College and was enrolled in the Bachelor of Arts Course of Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, from which school he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in June, 1953. He then entered the Graduate School of Loyola University to pursue his studies for the degree of Master of Arts.

During the years, 1945-1947, he also studied French at the Berlitz School of Languages, Detroit.

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ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

- A. Two senses in which the term "education" can be understood:
 - 1. Physical, intellectual, moral training,
 - 2. "Controlled" physical, intellectual, moral education.
- B. "Intellectual" education is the development of man as man.
 - 1. Cardinal Newman echoes Plato on liberal education.
- C. The scope and purpose of this Thesis:
 - 1. To study the nature and purpose of a liberal education propounded by Plato in the Republic.
 - 2. Liberal education is opposed to utilitarian education.
- D. The Problem: Is Plato's educational theory liberal or utilitarian?
- E. Contents: The Four Factors of Education:
 - 1. Educand,
 - 2. Educators,
 - 3. Methods,
 - 4. End of Education.

CHAPTER I: PLATO'S PSYCHOLOGY OF MAN

- A. Introductory: the study of philosophy--"what is it" and "why is it so."
- B. The nature and operations of the human soul:
 - 1. the soul is divine and immortal,
 - 2. it seeks wisdom, gentleness, humanness, beauty, goodness.

3. it is imprisoned in the body,
4. it seeks happiness,
5. it has a definite value,
6. it is the "unifying principle of the self,"
7. it is immutable,
8. it is made up of three elements or psychological tendencies:
 - a. reason (τὸ λογιστικόν),
 - b. spirit (τὸ θυμοειδές),
 - c. appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

C. Virtue: nature and import.

1. Definition: "virtue is knowledge,"
2. the operations and effects of virtue,
3. the divisions of virtue:
 - a. Prudence or practical wisdom, (σοφία),
 - b. Justice, (δικαιοσύνη),
 - c. Temperance, (σωφροσύνη),
 - d. Fortitude or Courage, (ἀνδρεία).

Recapitulation: the necessity of education in regard to the faculties and tendencies of the soul according to the norms of virtuous living.

CHAPTER II: THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE MAKING

- A. Introductory:** the necessity of the directive factor in education; preview of the process of philosophic education.
- B. The Educator:**
 1. Who he is,
 2. his importance
 3. the qualities of a good teacher,
 4. opinions regarding the teaching class.
- C. The Methods of Education:**
 1. divisions of education,
 - a. under parents, nurses, official attendants,
 - b. under public officials,
 - c. under State appointed officials and controlled directors of music and gymnastic,

- d. under expert dialecticians.
 - 2. The basic problem in Plato's philosophic education: "transformation."
- D. The curriculum of a liberal education considered and established:
- 1. Music,
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 - 3. Mathematics,
 - 4. Dialectics,
 - 5. Active life in politics,
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- A. Introductory: Man's desire for beatitude, which he attains by education; complex concepts involved in the study of the "end" of man:
- B. Happiness of Man:
 - 1. Definition,
 - 2. To be found in virtuous living, but "virtue is knowledge of the Good."
- C. The Good of Man as his ultimate end:
 - 1. The nature of the Good,
 - 2. The "intuitive contemplation of the Good."

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- A. Recapitulation of the preceding chapters: synthesis.
- B. The Ideal Personality embodied in the "philosopher-king,"
 - 1. Balance of soul,
 - 2. Life of virtue and contemplation,
 - 3. Immortality,

4. Becoming like to God, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ θεῷ.
- C. The validity of a liberal education in the Republic:
1. Comparison: Plato and Newman,
 2. Synthesis and Conclusion.

INTRODUCTION

Readers of the Republic are often confronted with the problem whether the theory of education proposed by Plato is liberal or merely utilitarian. The purpose of this thesis is to show that there is sufficient indication in the text of the Republic for a truly liberal education. But first, let us consider the meaning of education.

The term education can be taken in two senses. In its first and wider meaning it signifies the physical, moral, and intellectual development of a person, the "experiences"¹ he undergoes in the ordinary conditions of life. In its second and more restricted meaning, education is understood as the controlled development of the physical, moral, and intellectual life of a person.² But the perfection of education, whether taken in its general

¹ "In the wider or generic sense, education is used as equivalent to 'experience,' the experience of a living organism interacting with its normal environment. . . . but in the specific social institution known as 'schooling,' it is guided experience, nurture rather than mere nature, which is said to be especially educative." R. C. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Education, London, 1947, 10-11. "...the human creature is a living organism whose motions are controlled by reason through a comprehension of objective realities. Education is the training of this organism." F. H. Anderson, The Argument of Plato, London, 1935, 148.

² W. Kane, S. J., Some Principles of Education, Chicago, 1938, 1.

or special sense, consists in this, that it is a "development" an activity or a growth, of the educand along certain lines towards a definite goal. As an activity, it is a tendency towards an end; it has a definite purpose in view. But this goal of education, clearly, can have no other end than the development of human personality. The aim of education, therefore, is the perfection of man as man. Now, the distinguishing characteristic of man is his intellectual nature. For he is endowed by his Creator with the faculties of intellect and will. And so, his nature is perfected in proportion as he develops these faculties of his soul.

In this treatise, we are restricting our consideration of education to its secondary meaning and we will refer to it here as "liberal education," or as Cardinal Newman puts it, "intellectual" education.

He writes:

One main portion of intellectual education of the labours of both school and university is to remove the original dimness of the mind's eye; to strengthen and perfect its vision; to enable it to look out into the world right forward; steadily and truly; to give the mind clearness, accuracy, and precision, to understand what it says, to conceive justly what it thinks about, to abstract, compare, analyse, divide, define, and reason, correctly. ³

3. John Henry Cardinal Newman, The Idea of a University, edited by Daniel M. O'Connell, S. J., Chicago, 1927, 345. For Newman's distinction between "liberal" and "servile" knowledge, Harrold comments: "It goes without saying, then, that Newman will deny to utilitarian or professional instruction any of the values of a liberal education. Calling in

Consciously or unconsciously, there is a Platonic echo here.

Note the close parallel with Plato's thought in the seventh book of the Republic, where the author gives us a striking account of the process of education in the famous allegory of the cave. At first sight, perhaps, it may appear idealistic. But the fact remains that it is the way all men who are desirous of true knowledge and wisdom must go. Plato tells us that when one of these prisoners has been released from the darkness of the cave...

He would need, then, to grow accustomed before he could see things in that upper world. At first it would be easier to make out shadows, and then the images of men and things reflected in water, and later on the things themselves. After that, it would be easier to watch the heavenly bodies and the sky itself by night, looking at the light of the moon and stars rather than the Sun and the Sun's light in the day-time.

Last of all, he would be able to look out at the Sun and contemplate its nature, not as it appears when reflected in water or any alien medium, but as it is in itself in its own domain.⁴

"To be able to contemplate the sun as it is in its own domain"

clearly parallels Cardinal Newman's "to remove the original dimness of the

Aristotle and Cicero as authorities, he differentiates between 'liberal knowledge' and 'servile knowledge'. . . 'that alone is liberal knowledge, which stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel...'. " Charles F. Harrold, John Henry Newman, London, 1945, 104; citation of Idea of a University, 107-109.

⁴ Plato, Republic VII, 516b, translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford, The Republic of Plato, Oxford, 1945.

mind's eye; to enable it to look out into the world right forward, steadily and truly."

But the scope of this thesis is not to compare Plato with the noted Catholic churchman. Rather, we wish to analyse the Platonic theory of education in the light of what we believe to be the real meaning of a liberal education. Cardinal Newman defines it as one which produces "a philosophical habit of mind."

A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are, freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom; or what in a former Discourse I have ventured to call a philosophical habit. . . . And now the question is asked me, what is the use of it?⁵

O'Connell takes up this question. He says:

The answer is that the mere knowledge of anything can be an end in itself, and that a comprehensive view of the right values of all the Sciences, of their mutual bearings, and of their discoveries, is in itself worth while acquiring independently of any power, honor, or the conveniences and comforts of life.⁶

The problem of applying this notion of a liberal education to Plato is a delicate one. It has been treated by commentators from Plato's time up to and including our modern era. It is delicate in this sense, that

5 Newman, Idea, 120.

6 Ibid., 115; Cicero has a similar passage: "Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem, in quae excellere pulchrum putamus, labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus," De Officiis, I, vi.

Plato has failed to leave a clear indication of his mind on the subject.

There are, therefore, as many opinions as to the real meaning of the contents of his work as there are participants in the panel.⁷ Whatever position one chooses to defend, it is sure to have its adversaries. A close study of the text, however, will guide us in making some logical conclusions.

Three chapters of this thesis will be devoted to a careful examination of the four factors of education. These four factors are: (1) the educand, or the basic material to be transformed; (2) the educator, or the agencies which effect this transformation with the help of the educand; (3) the methods of education, and (4) the goals towards which the educand is to be directed.⁸ A fourth chapter will contain our conclusions.

7 Liberal education can be conceived of in many different ways. The following is an example of a way different from that of Plato: "Liberal education has been conceived in many ways, and there is still wide-spread disagreement as to what constitutes a liberally educated man. . . . men and women are liberally educated to the degree that they are literate and articulate in verbal discourse, in the language of the arts, and in the symbolic language of science; informed concerning their social, physical, and spiritual environment and concerning their relationship thereto as individuals; sensitive to all the values that endow life with meaning and significance." From the Report of the Committee on "The Nature and Purpose of a Liberal Education," Association of American colleges, 1943.

8 Kane, Principles, 1.

CHAPTER I

PLATO'S PSYCHOLOGY OF MAN

The study of philosophy is man's search for truth. It is an attempt on the part of man to understand all that comes within the realm of his experiences. Philosophy is a seeking for a comprehensive view of the nature of things. It asks the questions: what is it? and why is it so?

In this first chapter, we will seek to answer the first question, what is it? What is the nature or specific perfection¹ of Plato's educand? In order to understand man better, we must consider, first of all, who he is and what are his constitutive elements. The answer is not as easy as it may appear at first sight. Man, philosophy tells us, is a rational animal. He is a composite of body and soul, and a complex

1 "Perfection (τελειότης) means completeness. From Tim. 30c and 32c ff, we learn that perfection means all-inclusiveness in regard to all that which belongs to its kind. A perfect thing is a whole which is equivalent to the sum total of all its parts. In Rep. 371e and 443b, the term "perfect" is applied to a state which is so constructed that every part is provided for and doing its own work." Culbert Gerow Rutenber, The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato, New York, 1946, 67.

being with many aspects in regard to intellection, volition, emotion, etc. But his special characteristic is his rational life, the fact that he is endowed with intellect and will.

Plato realized this well. Among the ancients he might rightly be called the philosopher of man.² For, unlike his early predecessors,³ his code of morality was the code of the nature of man, ἡ φύσις ἀνθρώπου. And all things were to point to the specific perfection of that nature,⁴ which in reality was to be the life of virtue. The code of morality was also, for Plato, the code of virtue, for virtue alone was the essential element for happiness, man's end. Virtue was the

2 Robert F. Harvanek, S. J., The Portrait of a Philosopher in the Dialogues of Plato, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, 1941, 78. "One of the real things in us and around us, with which we are most vitally concerned, is the intricate maze of human culture. Plato was also concerned with this, and has left us many unwritten 'reminders' of what he saw, and of what we also may be able to see." John Wild, Plato's Theory of Man, Cambridge, Mass., 1946, 1.

3 The early Ionian philosophers were primarily interested in the explanation of natural, physical phenomena, e. g., matter, change, etc., and it was not until Socrates and Plato that philosophy centered around man and his place in the kosmos.

4 Plato, Laws VII, 807c-d.

motivating force of mankind.⁵ It was the health of man's soul,⁶ and man alone, so far superior to the animal, could attain this virtue. Speaking of its excellence, Plato states that if virtue could be shown to men, she would attract all hearts and all would be assimilated into her. Man was man, therefore, when he practiced virtue, especially the virtue of prudence, or practical wisdom, as it is called, the virtue which gave man his specific nature.

And it is this virtue which is necessary to man to give him his complete nature as man, and to complement and to bring to full development the other virtues in man. It does not usurp the place of justice, for justice is still the active virtue, but justice and temperance and fortitude are all the result of the apprehension of truth, ἀληθείας ἐπάπτεσθαί which is wisdom /i. e., prudence/, the characteristic virtue of the philosopher. This virtue then, with all its implications of knowledge, truth, and being, gives coloring to the complete explanation of all virtues in man, and provides a principle of unity to the personality of man, namely, the knowledge of his ultimate end.⁷

5 Meno 73c-d.

6 "It appears then that virtue is as it were the health and comeliness and well-being of the soul, as wickedness is disease, deformity, and weakness." Republic IV, 444e. All translations of the Republic will be those of Francis MacDonald Cornford, The Republic of Plato, Oxford, 1945. Translations of other works will be indicated individually below.

7 Harvanek, Portrait of a Philosopher, 11-12.

Hence, the study of Plato's educand, from the psychological point of view, necessarily involves the study of human virtues. This we must do in order to arrive at a more complete and comprehensive understanding of man, according to the Platonic conception of the norm of morality.

Psychology teaches us that man is a being made up of body (σῶμα) and soul (ψυχή). These are the principles of his nature and the two joined together form but one complete being, man. In Plato, this doctrine may not appear accepted at first sight, for, according to him, the soul was conceived as a being immortal in its own right,⁸ and pre-existent before its union with the body.⁹ But, for him, the soul is the intellectual and moral personality of man. It constitutes the most important part of his being.¹⁰ Psychology of man, then, involves the study of the traits, feelings, and attitudes, collectively, of the human

⁸ Republic X, 608d, 610e; Laws XII, 959b, 967e.

⁹ Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, translated from the Second German Edition by Gilbert Highet, Vol. II, New York, 1943, 169.

¹⁰ Paul Shorey, What Plato Said, Chicago, 1934, 647; citations of Republic IX, 585d.

soul, its nature and operations in relation to the body. For, as Plato tells us, when there is harmony between body and soul "there can be no fairer sight to see than the harmonious union of a noble character in the soul with an outward form answering thereto and bearing the same stamp of beauty." ¹¹

Analysing the nature of the soul, we find that it is somehow divine with an eternal destiny. For there is in man the rational element which is a spark of the divine. ¹² By nature the soul is a lover of wisdom, of gentleness, humanness. ¹³ This is a love of the beautiful and the good. The soul is immortal; ¹⁴ her immortality is established beyond doubt,

11 Republic III, 402d.

12 "The conception of the soul as the highest part of man seems to have been imported to Greece by those mystical teachers and prophets who are usually somewhat summarily lumped together as the Orphics. . . . From them must have come the conception of the intellect as the noblest and immortal part of man, of salvation through knowledge, the conception so magnificently expressed in the Phaedo, and it remained with Plato to the end." G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, London, 1935, 121. See also Frederick Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome, Vol. I, Westminster, 1946, 213; Reference to Phaedo 245a ff.

13 Republic II, 375a; IX, 581c.

14 Ibid., X, 608d-612a; Phaedrus 245; Meno 81, 86; Phaedo 86, 87, 92 ff., 105 ff.; Timaeus 41, 43, 69; Laws XII, 959b, 967e; See secondary sources: A. -Ed. Chaignet, La Psychologie de Platon, Paris, 1862, 195; F. H. Anderson, The Argument of Plato, London, 1935, 182-3.

writes Plato.¹⁵

To understand, then, the nature of the soul more profoundly, we must study it, not in its present condition as imprisoned in the body,¹⁶ but in its liberated state which reason alone can discern.¹⁷ In its present state it is marred by impurity and evil of every sort.¹⁸ To see it, however, with the eyes of reason, as it exists in itself, one must fix the attention on its love of truth and notice at the same time how she seeks to understand and converse with the divine and immortal.¹⁹ The soul's natural tendency is always to seek happiness. And for this reason its true state can only be one of complete happiness which belongs to the divine and immortal.²⁰

The soul is of greater worth than the body, for it is that part of man's nature which is concerned with the immutable, the immortal, and the true.²¹ Upon reflection, the soul is found to be spiritual in nature.

15 Republic X, 610-611a.

16 Anderson, Argument, 115, 126; Phaedo 246c.

17 Republic X, 611c-d.

18 Ibid., 611c; See also Phaedo 81 ff.

19 Ibid.; Sir James George Frazer, The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory, London, 1930, 46, 307.

20 A. E. Taylor, Plato, London, 1948, 27-28.

21 Republic, IX, 585b.

The body, on the other hand, is occupied with the things of space and time, with the changeable and the perishable. It has less truth and essence than the soul,²² and exists solely for the sake of the body.²³ Plato says:

"Far purer is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable."²⁴

But this is not the lot of the body but of the soul.

Moreover, the soul (ψυχή) is the unifying principle of the self. Plato stresses this fact to such a degree that his theory of mind (νοῦς) can only with difficulty be distinguished from his theory of the self. The self is practically identifiable with the soul (ψυχή).²⁵

22 Ibid., 585d.

23 Laws IX, 870b.

24 Republic IX, 585c: Cornford makes the following observation regarding this passage. "The text here is corrupt and much disputed. With the slight change of εἰ to ἦ at 585c 12 the MS. text can literally be rendered as follows: 'And does the substance of an always unchanging thing partake any more of reality than of knowledge?--No. --Or of truth?--No. (In other words, the substance of an always unchanging thing partakes of knowledge and so of truth just as much as it does of reality.) ἦ δὲ (sc. οὐσία) ἀληθείας ἥττον (μετέχει), οὐ καὶ οὐσίας ἥττον μετέχει) ; And does not the substance which partakes less of truth, also partake less of reality? Necessarily.'" Cornford, Republic, 312, note 1.

25 "Thus, when Plato refers to mental processes, he uses interchangeably the terms which faculty psychology is concerned to keep distinct. The Hellenic equivalents of Understanding, Intelligence, Mind, etc., are used in one and the same context, as if they were synonyms." R. C. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Education, London, 1947, 213; Taylor, Plato, 27; Republic IV, 443d.

A further point arises whether the soul in Plato's psychology is simple or complex. And here we encounter difficulties. For upon examination of its nature, three elements²⁶ are discernable: reason, spirit, and appetite. Plato referred to them as τὸ λογιστικόν,²⁷ τὸ θυμοειδές,²⁸ and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν,²⁹ respectively. Consequently, the soul must be complex. But this apparently contradicts the immortality and eternal destiny of the soul, for how can that which is made up of parts not be subject to change and corruption? Furthermore, although the rational part is immortal and similar to the divine, the two other formalities are perishable. The difficulty is resolved, however, by a correct understanding of the term "part" (μέρος). Copleston writes:

The word 'part' may justifiably be used in this connection, since Plato himself employs the term μέρος ; but I put it just now in inverted commas in order to indicate that it is a metaphorical term and should not be taken to mean that the soul is extended and material. The word μέρος appears in 444 b 3 of the fourth book of the Republic, and before this Plato uses the word εἶδος , a word that shows he regarded the three parts as forms or functions

26 Republic IV, 441a-c, VI, 504a, VIII, 550a, IX, 580a.

27 Ibid., IV, 439d, VI, 511d.

28 Ibid., V, 456a.

29 Ibid., IV, 439d.

or principles of action, not as parts in the material sense.³⁰

But to call these three elements "parts" of the soul is not very illuminating. The word μέρος seems used only as a term of convenience and merely signifies that some kind of partition was made.³¹ Cornford supports this interpretation.

The soul has been described earlier as having several 'parts'; but we are not to think of it as like a material thing made up of parts into which it can be broken up and so destroyed. Both Plato and Aristotle hold that the reason (nous)³² is man's true self and indestructible essence. It seems to be suggested here that conjunction with the body entails the accretion of desires and functions indispensable to mortal life, but that these 'forms' or 'aspects' of soul disappear with the death of the body, provided that the soul has been 'purified' by devotion to the pursuit of wisdom.³³

30 Copleston, History of Philosophy, 208.

31 N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, Oxford, 1951, 36.

32 Since it is difficult to find clear indications in Platonic philosophy, as Professor Lodge implied in his comment, (see above, page 12, note 25), a definite relationship between νοῦς and ψυχή cannot be established by us. Hence, νοῦς in this passage can be easily identified with ψυχή, or the self, in view of what we have stated above, (see page 12).

33 Cornford, Republic, 342; "Nevertheless, the normal soul is one in which a proper proportion is sustained among its constitutive parts." Anderson, Argument, 59; See also: Republic IX, 590a-c, Timaeus 87c, Sophistes 228c, Philebus 64d.

Along with this psychological discussion of the parts of the soul, two more points merit consideration before we take up the analysis of each element individually. The first is that it is precisely by these three elements that diversity is accounted for in human nature.³⁴ Each of these principles operates towards the proper functioning of the soul in general. All three exist in the same soul at the same time, but each is really distinct from the other.³⁵ One predominates, however, in order to give to the soul its special characteristic, as rational, spirited, or passionate.³⁶ The analogy is taken, of course, from the threefold division of the State, which is made up of three types or classes of people.³⁷ Reason is the special characteristic of the philosopher group; the spirited element is predominant in the warrior type; appetite or passion is the distinguishing mark of the peasant class. "And so, after a stormy passage," writes Plato in the words of his master Socrates, "we have reached the land. We are fairly agreed that the same three elements

34 Republic IX, 584b-586d.

35 Ibid., IV, 441a-b.

36 Ibid., 441d-e.

37 Ibid., 441c.

exist alike in the State and in the individual soul."³⁸

We may note in passing the question of the will in Plato's psychology. We bring this up because commentators often treat it together with their discussions on the three parts of the soul. It is a difficult question in this respect that nowhere does Plato specifically consider this topic in the Republic, and there are but vague references to it in his other works.³⁹ Murphy observes:

It is sometimes suggested that Plato's reason for not giving separate recognition to what we call the 'will' is that he is in effect dividing the volitional soul, or in other words, is formulating the motives by which the will is determined. So the three 'parts' are sometimes said to be the three main motives or 'springs of action.'⁴⁰

Let us analyze now each of the three "parts" of the soul, showing their relative importance in order to understand better the function of each in Plato's psychology of education. For in this system education consists primarily in the proper management of these elements on the part of the educand.

³⁸ Ibid.; See also Parmenides 137a. Compare Pindar, Olympian, XIII, 114.

³⁹ Gorgias 523a-525g; Laws V, 730c; Protagoras 320d-322e; Phaedo 113d-114d; Phaedrus 245c-249d; Timaeus 42b-e; Republic III, 413a, IV, 443d-e, X, 613e, 617d-e.

⁴⁰ Murphy, Interpretation, 35.

It is for this reason that Plato insists so strongly that one of the most important functions of education, in the early stages the most important one, is the training of the emotions and of desire. If the child is ever to grow into the full life of goodness according to reason, it must be trained to have the right emotional responses before it can reason at all. It must be trained to feel pleasure at beauty and love of goodness and disgust at ugliness and hatred of badness instinctively, so that when it is of an age to reason, it will accept the teaching of reason gladly and reason will find its proper emotional support ready. In this training of the emotions art, poetry and music are all-important.⁴¹

We begin our analysis with reason. Reason (τὸ λογιστικόν) ranks as the highest of these parts.⁴² It is the source of judgment, belief, and conviction. Reason arouses a special kind of activity in the human soul, namely, thinking and knowing. Its real function is to enable the soul to perceive realities,⁴³ for the testimony of the senses is deceptive.⁴⁴ A higher faculty is required to know the subsistent forms as

41 A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, London, 1949, 55.

42 Frazer, Plato's Ideal Theory, 46.

43 Anderson, Argument, 59.

44 Phaedo 65, 83a.

they are in themselves;⁴⁵ these forms, for Plato, were the only reality. Reason also keeps the soul's lower tendencies under control, provided that man wills it so. Hence, it would seem that will is a part or characteristic of reason, not as some commentators suspect, a part of the soul's lower tendencies.

As the conscious element in the nature of the educand, reason knows what states are desirable to man and which are not. It also knows how man can gain these states in action. To this end, it employs the "passionate spirit" (τὸ θυμοειδές), as its ally.⁴⁶ But when reason fails to control the soul, her lower tendencies assume authority. The result is organic chaos and moral depravity. But the perfect soul is that one in which there exists complete harmony in the proper subordination

45 "Colours are individually seen by the eyes, sounds by the ears, and other sensory qualities by their respective appropriate organs. But a percipient may think of more than one sensory quality at the same time, and compare these qualitatively, quantitatively, and as to past, present, and future. Moreover he can consider them in terms of being and non-being, of sameness and difference; he can discern and discuss them as realities. Such activities as these do not belong to mere separate, unrelated senses, but to a synthesizing reason. Instead of saying, that we know by the senses, it would be more in keeping with the facts to argue that we perceive by reason through them." Anderson, Argument, 172-3; Citation of Theaetetus 184b-186e.

46 Anderson, Argument, 59.

of its constitutive elements. ⁴⁷

The senses being in themselves deceptive and untrustworthy, it is the specific function of the rational element to preserve the mind from the illusions of the senses. ⁴⁸ Otherwise it would be acting contrary to its nature. For reason is characterized by its love of knowledge, ⁴⁹ knowledge not of the mutable and perishing (τὰ γιγνόμενα), but of the good and the beautiful. Plato puts it in these words:

Whereas the part whereby we gain knowledge and understanding is least of all concerned with wealth or reputation. Obviously its sole endeavor is to know the truth, and we may speak of it as loving knowledge and philosophic. ⁵⁰

Reason, therefore, is the determining factor among the different possible activities of the human soul. It does this by virtue of its knowledge of the goals towards which it consciously and naturally tends. It is not, however, a cold judiciary distinct from organic activity. Human

47 The wise man employs all his energies in freeing and harmonizing the nobler elements of his nature and in regulating his bodily habits. Plato writes: "To this end the man of understanding will bend all his powers through life, prizing in the first place those studies which will fashion these qualities in his soul." Republic IX, 591c.

48 Ibid., X, 602d-e.

49 Ibid., IX, 581b-c.

50 Ibid., VI, 5112

life is a continual process of willing and desiring. Passion is regulated and spirit excited, but in the midst of this constant flux of the soul's lower tendencies, reason lives and moves in its pursuit of those ends which it apprehends as good and beautiful. Of its very nature it is far superior to appetite and spirit, mainly because, as Plato himself tells us, far purer is the being of that which is concerned with the unchangeable and immortal, and the true.

Finally, reason is further subdivided into four stages of cognition: εἰκασία, πίστις, διάνοια, νοῦς.⁵¹ (Νοῦς may be used interchangeably with νόησις). Δόξα is the summary name for the first two stages. Διάνοια is a third kind of apprehension intermediate⁵² in value between δόξα and νοῦς. Διάνοια is more vivid than opinion, but dimmer than knowledge (νόησις). Νοῦς is the highest of these stages and it has for its object τὰ νοητά, although Plato sometimes

51 Ibid., VI, 511e, VII, 534a.

52 Ibid., VI, 511d.

makes these the object of διάνοια. ⁵³ Properly speaking, it is by that the philosopher contemplates the eternal forms in themselves. ⁵⁴

Spirit (τὸ θυμοειδές) is the second principle of the soul. It is that part of man's soul with which he loves and which causes him to be angry or ashamed when he has come to realize his over-indulgence in some lower appetite. ⁵⁵ Spirit is, in a way, the ally of reason. But it differs from reason in this respect that, whereas reason is the guide of man's soul, directing it towards the good and the true, spirit helps it control the basest of man's natural drives. It is by far the most influential and strongest portion of the soul and by nature it is most desirous of gain over passion. ⁵⁶

53 "Yet Plato must have meant to draw some distinction between the objects of διάνοια and those of νοῦς, as well as between those activities themselves. The conclusion to be drawn is surely that he thought of Ideas as falling into two divisions, a lower division consisting of Ideas involving number and space, and a higher division not involving these. When philosophy has done its work, the Ideas which hitherto were only διανοητά have become νοητά by derivation from the unhypothetical first principle; yet they remain different Ideas from those which were from the start objects of νοῦς." Sir David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford, 1951, 64-5.

54 Ibid., 48.

55 Republic IX, 580e.

56 ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὐτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε προστα-
τησέτον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐστὶ
καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον. Ibid., IV, 442a.

When it works together with reason, it is reason's best safeguard against evil and disorder. It is also the body's strongest defense against impediments from without which may cause harm to the soul's progress in the attainment of virtue. Reason is like a general in battle, counseling and commanding. But spirit, under its leadership, is like the brave soldier, obeying courageously the commands and counsels of its leader.⁵⁷

He is courageous, Plato writes, whose soul is able to endure in pleasure and pain the admonition of right reason concerning what ought or what ought not to be done in particular circumstances.⁵⁸ And he is the wise soldier in whom reason prevails as the governor of the soul. Spirit, therefore, is not in the least to be despised, for when it acts in harmony with the dictates of reason "together they will be the best defenders of the whole soul and of the whole body against attacks from without."⁵⁹ Finally, "the spirited elements we think of as wholly bent upon winning power and victory and a good name. So we call it honor-loving or ambitious."⁶⁰

57 Ibid., 442b.

58 Ibid., 442c.

59 Ibid., 442b; see also III, 415e.

60 Ibid., IX, 581a; earlier Plato has told us that a proper training of this element produces courage. But if it is overstrained, one becomes savage and hard. See, III, 410d.

The third element is appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).⁶¹ This is the most vile and ignoble of the three. Appetite is a sort of complex element which is to be found in the animal tendencies of man. Thus it expresses itself in sensual desires, in hunger, thirst, and sex.⁶² But the difference between appetite and spirit is not always clear, as these elements seem to have very much in common. For Plato, however, the distinction between them seems easily proven. First of all, observing children, he writes, we can see in them that they are full of spirit and this almost as soon as they are born. This is also as true of animals as it is of children who have not yet reached the use of reason.⁶³ Furthermore, Homer proves our point: "He smote his breast and rebuked his soul."⁶⁴ In this verse the poet has clearly supposed that the power which reasons about the better and the worse is different from irrational anger which it reproaches.⁶⁵

61 Ibid., IV, 441a.

62 Ibid., IX, 580e.

63 Ibid., IV, 441b.

64 στῆθος δὲ πλήξας καρδίην ἠνίπα^πμύθω . Homer, Odyssey, XX, 17; citation of Republic IV, 441b. Plato has also quoted this line from Homer, above III, 390c; see Phaedo 94e.

65 Republic IV, 441b. On the distinction between the different parts of the soul, see also: Laws XII, 963e; Aristotle, Politics 1334b 22 ff.; Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought, Chicago, 1903, 42-43.

Unlike the pleasures of reason which are by far the sweetest and which are the causes of the most pleasant life, the pleasures of passion or appetite are mixed and unreal. They are devoid of reason,⁶⁶ and as such cannot be beautiful.⁶⁷ Pleasures are mere shadows; they are only images of the true pleasures of the mind. For they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves and cause no rest. This is illustrated in the following quotation. Men in whom passion is predominant are

... never really satisfied with real nourishment, the pleasure they taste is uncertain and impure. Bent over their tables, they feed like cattle with stooping heads and eyes fixed upon the ground; so they grow fat and breed, and in their greedy struggle kick and butt one another to death with horns and hoofs of steel, because they can never satisfy with unreal nourishment that part of themselves which is itself unreal and incapable of lasting satisfaction.⁶⁸

It follows, therefore, that the pleasures of such a life are mere illusory phantoms of real pleasure. Pleasure and pain become more clearly defined by their contrast to one another.⁶⁹

66 Philebus 65 ff.

67 Hippias Major 299d-e.

68 Republic IX, 586a-b.

69 Ibid., 586c-3.

But to preserve peace and harmony in the soul, reason must again come into play. As Armstrong says:

I spoke before of the ruling reason and of man's duty of obedience to his reason, and this is certainly an essential part of Plato's morality. At the end of his life it is the great dominating theme of all his thought, this rule of the divine reason in man, in the State, and in the universe. But as applied to man it requires that there should be in him a kingdom of reason to rule over, some non-rational but still living and conscious element whose duty it is to obey. These the three-part psychology provides.⁷⁰

Once under the guidance of reason, then, the lower elements cannot war against the soul since they cannot act contrary to right reason. Passion, for instance, never takes part with appetite against reason. As Plato said, proof of this is man's own experience.

Do we not often find a man whose desires would force him to go against his reason, reviling himself and indignant with this part of his nature which is trying to put constraint on him? It is like a struggle between two factions, in which indignation takes the side of reason. But I believe you have never observed, in yourself or in anyone else, indignation make common cause with appetite in behavior which reason decides to be wrong.⁷¹

So much, then, for the parts of the soul and their specific

70 Armstrong, Introduction, 54.

71 Republic IV, 440a-b.

functions in the make-up of the human personality. Let us now observe what each in its own turn contributes to the soul as parts of a whole. The two lower elements, we recall, work together to sustain man's sensitive and vegetative life. In this respect, man is similar to the brute; and like the animal he is dependent upon these tendencies of his being. But in another sense, he is also independent of these, for, being endowed with reason, the governing factor of his soul, he could not act as man if he were completely subject to his senses. This faculty is peculiar to man alone, as Aristotle remarked later in the same century: "the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle."⁷²

This is important in the psychology of Plato's educational theory, for in the process of man's intellectual, moral, and physical development, it will be seen how man rises above the levels of appetite and spirit and with the "mind's eye" looks out into the vast ocean of knowledge to get a glimpse of reality. As he matures, he is being educated in truth, and wisdom, and goodness.

Under reason's own supervision, spirit, passion, and reason must live together in harmony.⁷³ Only then will the educand have arrived

72 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, vii, 1098a.

73 Republic IV, 443d-444a, VIII, 554e; Phaedo 61a.

at that state of harmonious living which is the core and distinctive note not only of Plato's educational theory, but of all subsequent Greek philosophy. In this alone consists the ideal of human perfection (καλὸς κάγαθὸς ἀνὴρ), the beautiful (τὸ καλόν) which can only be achieved by bringing reason into predominance over all else. Thus

... turning to the vast sea of beauty and beholding many beautiful and grand sights, he produces thoughts in the abundance of philosophy, until having grown and increased in strength, he beholds some one such science, -- which is the science of this beauty.⁷⁴

Finally, the perfect human personality is the one in which all three principles exist properly subordinated one to the other. This is done when spirit, as the auxiliary of reason, works together to keep the appetites under control. The educand then is said to possess that harmony of soul which, in the words of Plato, is a twin sister (together with grace) of goodness and virtue.⁷⁵

Nothing else makes it more possible for a soul to attain its perfection here in this world of phenomena and appearances than when its principles are in accord with one another. In the concrete this is done by

74 Symposium 210c-d.

75 Republic III, 401c-e.

virtuous living.⁷⁶ Man must strive to perfect himself by cultivating his rational nature. Truth, wisdom, and goodness, therefore, will be the great objectives of this man's life. For these are the determining factors which act upon reason and distinguish it from the souls of animals and plants. Reason in its pursuit of these goals, is the instrument man must constantly employ if he wishes to advance higher -- from knowledge of things in this world, on towards wisdom, which consists in the contemplation of the good, and finally unto the attainment of perfect virtue, which is happiness, the goal of his life. Virtue, then, will be the result of harmonious living.⁷⁷

What this virtue is, we shall presently consider, for virtue and knowledge, being interdependent concepts in Plato, are the very foundation of his theory of education. Here lies the core of Platonic humanism.⁷⁸

Virtue is the ultimate criterion by which a man is to be judged good or bad.⁷⁹ This excellence of soul, as virtue is often referred to, is necessary for man, and the more virtuous a man is, the more perfect will he be. For human perfection consists in the virtuous life, as we shall see in

76 Anderson, Argument, 92.

77 Ibid.

78 Grube, Plato's Thought, 231, 233.

79 Ibid., 233.

the following chapter. Virtue is also the standard by which men are to be judged human or not, since humanness, in Plato, is founded upon virtue. This, of course, implies what we have said above concerning the important role reason must play in the government of man's life. Man is man only in so far as he permits reason to be the ruling factor in his life. Otherwise, if the lower tendencies prevail, he is like cattle with stooping heads and eyes ever fixed upon the ground, trying to satisfy with unreal nourishment that part of himself which is itself unreal and incapable of lasting satisfaction.⁸⁰

Before we proceed to study the four cardinal virtues, however, which are the characteristics of the ideal personality, we shall consider first what Plato meant by virtue (ἀρετή) in general.

If health and goodness of the soul are to be achieved by the educand, he must know goodness and act rightly. For "...virtue is knowledge of the good; right action follows immediately from right

knowledge."⁸¹ Plato echoes Socrates on this point, who taught that virtue

was knowledge.⁸² But what did Socrates mean by knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in

⁸⁰ Republic IX, 586a-b.

⁸¹ Armstrong, Introduction, 30; See also Raphael Demos, The Philosophy of Plato, New York, 1939, 321; citation of Meno 77b.

⁸² Protagoras 361a; Copleston, History of Philosophy, 218; Cornford, Republic, 175; Warner Fite, The Platonic Legend, New York, 1934, 182; Jaeger, Paideia, II, 64, 66.

this regard?

First of all, he did not mean simply abstract knowledge of propositions.⁸³ Knowledge was something more profound, for him. It is a kind of intuition or immediate realization of the good as such.⁸⁴ 'Επιστήμη is the understanding of the good together with the mastery exercised by that understanding with regard to the human soul.⁸⁵ This knowledge of the good will, therefore, grow within us and become a reality taking shape in our souls.⁸⁶ "As the mind moves towards knowledge, the character must develop along the same lines, and the result of both these movements is knowledge of the Good."⁸⁷

Knowledge, therefore, is the intuitive contemplation of the

83 Armstrong, Introduction, 30.

84 Ibid.; See also R. L. Nettleship, "Plato's Conception of Goodness," Philosophical Remains, London, 1901, 389; citation of Charmides 174c-d.

85 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 381.

86 Ibid., 230; reference to Epistle VII, 343e-344b.

87 Ibid., 316; reference to Epistle VII, 344a.

Good in itself,⁸⁸ as the efficient and final cause of all good in the universe⁸⁹ and of the existence of the universe itself.⁹⁰ Indeed, not many men are expected to arrive at so sublime an end. And only those who realize their excellence (ἀρετή) are capable of governing the ideal city. Such a ruler is "our" philosopher.⁹¹ While the rest must be schooled by him in the "popular" or "civic" virtues.⁹² This type of virtue is founded upon correct belief, not immediate knowledge.

But if virtue is knowledge, as we have seen, it can be

88 Taylor identifies knowledge with the idea of the good. "The account of that supreme goodness which is indistinguishable from knowledge is absolutely necessary in any presentation of Socratic ethics." Plato, 281; Adam notes the following distinction in Plato, based on Republic IV, 438c: "Knowledge and nothing more," as opposed to knowledge plus some specification, e. g. astronomical knowledge, literary knowledge, etc. It is interesting and constructive to study Parm. 134 A ff. side by side with this passage. There αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη has for its object τῆς δ' ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, i. e. the Ideas; here we do not soar so high, for μαθήματος αὐτοῦ only "learning and nothing more." James Adam, The Republic of Plato, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1926, 252.

89 Republic VII, 516c (reference here is to the sun): for the idea of the good as the cause of all things, see VI, 509b.

90 Cornford, Republic, 175.

91 "It is shown in the Republic that it is only the philosopher who has knowledge of the good for man can be the only true ruler and teacher." Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 219.

92 Adam, Republic, I, 262; Copleston, History of Philosophy, 219; Taylor, Plato, 143-145; citation of Protagoras 322 f.

taught.⁹³ Taylor observes:

Of course, we readily see that 'philosophic goodness,' being thus identical with knowledge of true good, must be 'teachable,' if you go to work the right way, whereas a 'goodness' which does not repose on apprehension of principles cannot be taught; it can only be 'imbibed' by habituation in conformity to a tradition.⁹⁴

In the Protagoras, Socrates presents himself as doubting whether virtue can be taught or not, while Protagoras claimed to be a teacher of ἀρετή. In the end, we find that the speakers have taken opposite positions. Socrates affirms that virtue is teachable; Protagoras now doubts it.⁹⁵ Armstrong comments on this passage:

If virtue is knowledge, then in a sense it can be taught, but it is not an external technique which can be taught in the manner of the Sophists. All that the teacher can do is to persuade his pupil so to turn himself that the vision strikes the 'eye of the soul,' to exercise his mind so as to draw out of it the truth which is being sought.⁹⁶

93 "But Socrates wondered whether the educators themselves had any clear idea of what they taught, and further, who were the right teachers? When he raised the question: can virtue be taught? he was really emphasizing that if it could be taught, it must be knowledge of some sort." Grube, Plato's Thought, 231; commenting on Meno, 87c, Protagoras, 329b; See also Stella Van Patten Henderson, Introduction to Philosophy of Education, Chicago, 1948, 324.

94 Taylor, Plato, 145.

95 Protagoras, 329b-c, 361a-c.

96 Armstrong, Introduction, 31.

In connection also with the idea that virtue is knowledge and that it is teachable, Plato maintains that no one does evil knowingly and willingly.⁹⁷ Let us, then, examine briefly what are the causes of evil in man's soul.

Although virtue is a unity,⁹⁸ the forms of evil are infinite.⁹⁹

Still, there exist certain basic evils which cause all other evils. One of these is ignorance which, according to Demos' interpretation, is "the belief and hope in what is not true."¹⁰⁰ For it is evident that just as goodness and virtue come from knowledge of the good, so evil comes from the lack of such knowledge.¹⁰¹ Ignorance, for Plato, is something positive. It is the presence of false belief for "man's mind is filled with wrong values and with other falsehoods which he gets from his parents, early teachers, the community."¹⁰² Demos reduces the causes of evil, in Plato, to two.

97 Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 219.


98 Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic, translated and edited by D. J. Allan, Oxford, 1940, 45.

99 Republic IV, 445c.

100 Demos, Philosophy of Plato, 320.

101 Protagoras, 345b, 353 ff.; Meno, 77.

102 Demos, Philosophy of Plato, 320.



to ignorance on the one hand, and to strife, in its generalized sense, on the other, and that strife is distinct from ignorance. Strife is the rebellion of appetite against knowledge. While under the Socratic influence, Plato refers to ignorance as the root-evil, but, to the degree that he emancipates himself from this influence, he adds strife to the list. But this is not a distinction between an earlier and a later Plato, for, even in the Laws, Plato accounts for evil by ignorance.¹⁰³

A final consideration in our discussion of virtue is, as we have remarked earlier, that it is one. Virtue is a unity.¹⁰⁴ Hence, there will be but slight distinction¹⁰⁵ between the particular virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude,¹⁰⁶ and the general notion of virtue as knowledge, which we have discussed above, as Jaeger so well brings out:

True virtue is one and indivisible. A man cannot have one part of it without the other Socrates is pious and brave, just and temperate, all in one person. His life is both a battle and the service of God.¹⁰⁷

103 Ibid., 321

104 Republic IV, 445c; Laws, XII, 963c, 965d; Meno, 71e, 74a; Protagoras 329c-d. On the resolution of all virtues into knowledge, see Frazer, Plato's Ideal Theory, 12, 15; see also Frederick Solmsen, Plato's Theology, Ithaca, 1942, 69. For references to Aristotle on virtue is one, see: Nicomachean Ethics, VI, xiii, 1144b 17 ff., III, xi, 1116b 4; Eudemian Ethics, I, v, 1216b 2 ff., Taylor, Plato, 28; Rutenber, Imitation of God, 69.

105 Copleston, History of Philosophy, 218.

106 Republic IV, 428e-429d; Laws I, 631d, III, 688a, XII, 963c-964a.

107 Jaeger, Paideia, I, 66-67, 331

When we behold a single one of these particular virtues, Plato tells us, we are merely considering one aspect of the true concept of virtue as such. Copleston's comment is in order here. It is worth quoting at length.

In general we may say that Plato accepted the Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge. In the Protagoras¹⁰⁸ Socrates shows, as against the Sophist, that it is absurd to suggest that justice can be impious or piety unjust, so that the several virtues cannot be entirely disparate. Furthermore, the intemperate man is one who pursues what is really harmful to man while the temperate man pursues what is truly good and beneficial. Now, to pursue what is truly good and beneficial is wise, while to pursue what is harmful is foolish. Hence temperance and wisdom cannot be entirely disparate. Again, true valour or courage means, e. g. standing your ground in battle when you know the risks to which you are exposed; it does not mean foolhardiness. Thus courage can no more be separated from wisdom than can temperance. Plato does not, of course, deny that there are distinct virtues, distinguished according to their objects or the parts of the soul of which they are the habits; but all these distinct virtues form a unity, inasmuch as they are the expressions of the same knowledge of good and evil. The distinct virtues are, therefore, unified in prudence or the knowledge of what is truly good for man and the means to attain that good.¹⁰⁹

We shall now consider the different aspects of virtue. By way

108 Protagoras, 330c ff.

109 Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 218-19; see also Stenzel, Method of Dialectic, 45.

of introduction we see that it is in the fourth book of the Republic primarily that Plato discusses the particular cardinal virtues. Prudence (σοφία) is the virtue of the rational part of the soul. Courage (ἀνδρεία), also termed fortitude, belongs to the spirited part. Temperance (σωφροσύνη) consists in the union of the spirited and passionate parts under the guidance of right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος). Justice (δικαιοσύνη) however, is a general virtue. It consists in this, that every part of the soul performs its proper function in due harmony.¹¹⁰ Prudence is the first virtue we shall discuss.

The virtue of prudence or, as Plato often called it, practical wisdom, is to be found in that man who knows how to apply the contemplated eternal Ideas of the good to practical affairs such as government or the life in society. But reason guides him in making the proper choice of action in given circumstances. Furthermore, the divine power of virtue will help him direct his actions towards that which he has contemplated. For "wisdom, it seems, is certainly the virtue of some divine faculty, which never loses its power, though its use for good or harm depends on the direction towards which it is turned."¹¹¹

110 Copleston, History of Philosophy, 220.

111 Republic VII, 518e-519a.

According to Plato, prudence is that virtue which distinguishes man from other living beings. Aristotle defined it as "the reasoned and true state or capacity to act with regard to human goods."¹¹²

And centuries later, Saint Thomas Aquinas echoed his illustrious predecessor when he said that prudence is the perfective principle of all the moral virtues, since it is based upon that principle in man which is specifically human. Saint Thomas writes:

Ad prudentiam autem pertinet applicatio rectae rationis ad opus quod non fit sine appetitu recto. Et ideo, prudentia non solum habet rationem virtutis quam habent aliae virtutes intellectuales sed etiam habet rationem virtutis quam habent aliae virtutes morales, quibus etiam connumeratur.¹¹³

Prudence complements and perfects the other virtues in man, for "fortitude and temperance and justice and in short true virtue exist only with prudence."¹¹⁴

Next is justice. Justice is that virtue which keeps everything in its proper place. It makes for the proper balancing of man's soul, seeing to it that both the parts of the soul and the citizens of the State perform

112 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, v, 1140b 20.

113 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47, 4 c.

114 Phaedo, 69b.

their proper functions. This is the virtue of harmony.¹¹⁵ The just man, therefore, is the one who can keep his soul in good order internally. In his role as citizen, he maintains and fulfills his rights and obligations to the State as a whole and to the other members in so far as they are parts of that whole.

Justice gives to the soul its special excellence. Plato states that whereas all things which have ends also have their special excellences by which they fulfill these ends,¹¹⁶ so too the virtue of justice in the soul. While the special excellence of the soul is virtue, its end is happiness,¹¹⁷ just as the eye has an excellence corresponding to its end.¹¹⁸ The eye's end is to see; its specific excellence is sight. Now, in regard to the virtue of justice, this is brought out very clearly in the following dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus. Socrates asks:

Then the next point is this. Has the soul a function that can be performed by nothing else? Take for example such actions as deliberating or taking charge and exercising

115 Republic, IV, 443c-e.

116 Republic, I, 353b; see also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, i, 1094a 1-3, vii, 1097b 12-1098a 14.

117 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, vii, 1097b 10 - 1098a 15.

118 Republic, I, 352e, 353c; V, 477c.

control: is not the soul the only thing of which you can say that these are its proper and peculiar work?

No doubt.

And we also speak of the soul as having a certain specific excellence or virtue?

Yes.

Then, Thrasymachus, if the soul is robbed of its peculiar virtue, it cannot possibly do its work well. It must exercise its power of controlling and taking charge well or ill according as it is itself in a good or a bad state.

That follows.

And did we not agree that the virtue of the soul is justice, and injustice is its defect?

We did.

So it follows that a just soul, or in other words a just man, will live well; the unjust will not.

Apparently, according to your argument.

But living well involves well-being and happiness.

Naturally.

Then only the just man is happy; injustice will involve unhappiness. 119

From this we conclude, then, that justice is the virtue of the soul's strength, order, and harmony. The just man is the wise and the good

man. He is far superior to the other classes of men. For in him, reason dominates over the lower tendencies. Only the just man can be truly the happy man.

From prudence and justice, a third virtue arises. This is the virtue of temperance. It implies order in a unified whole, for its function is to keep the faculties of the soul each in its own orbit of operation. Temperance is an essential quality of all the soul's parts. Its primary concern is to check the passions from interfering with each other and so dispose them that each performs its proper duty freely and with ease. It looks above all to human conduct, as Taylor says:

As its derivation implies, the word means literally the possession of a 'sane' or 'wholesome' mind; sophrosyne is thus contrasted with the 'folly of the man who 'forgets himself' in the hour of success and prosperity, and 'presumes on' his advantages of wealth or power, pushes them to the full extreme in his dealings with the less fortunate. . . . Again, the word is a name for the kind of conduct thought becoming specially in the young towards elders, soldiers towards their superior officer, citizens towards their magistrate.¹²⁰

Thus, the virtue of temperance or sophrosyne is a basic virtue in man. Plato also likens it to the ordering principle of reason. It is certainly one of the chief virtues the philosopher must possess if he is to be

120 Taylor, Plato, 48.

a truly just and temperate man, the teacher and exemplar of his people. ¹²¹

Temperance, too, helps us know what we know and do not know. ¹²² It is the health of the soul. ¹²³

Both justice and courage need temperance. It would not be incorrect to say that it is also very similar to the virtue of prudence, for it makes for harmony in the soul. ¹²⁴ Temperance makes him who has it "master of himself."

Temperance. . . is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously implied in the saying 'a man being his own master'; . . . he is his own master when the part which is better by nature has the worse under its control. It is certainly a term of praise; whereas it is considered a disgrace, when, through bad breeding or bad company, the better part is overwhelmed by the worse, like a small force outnumbered by a multitude. A man in that condition is called a slave to himself and intemperate. ¹²⁵

Finally, there is the virtue of fortitude, which makes possible

¹²¹ The virtue of the philosopher, see: Phaedo, 68 c; Republic, VI, 485e, 490e, 491b, 494b. Philosopher is exemplar, see R. C. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, London, 1928, 389.

¹²² Charmides, 167a.

¹²³ Gorgias, 504d, 507a.

¹²⁴ Republic, IV, 430e, 441e, 442d, 443d; IX, 591d; Laws, II, 653b.

¹²⁵ Ibid., IV, 430e-431b.

the realization of right order and harmony in man and in the State. Fortitude is the most active of the virtues. It strengthens and quickens the soul in time of opposition. Fortitude is knowledge of that which brings fear or inspires confidence in the human soul.¹²⁶ It is concerned with the good and evil of all time.¹²⁷ Courage makes the soul fearless in battle and brave in its attacks upon the enemy.¹²⁸ Hence, it may seem at first sight that it is strictly a military virtue. But all men need it, for all men need to be courageous in private life, even in peacetime, and especially in time of war. In regard to the first instance, it is the duty of all men to fight against their evil inclinations, their passions, desires, and fears. Whereas prudence and justice give to the soul a certain steadfastness and strength to live on principle, fortitude imparts to the soul vigor and vitality in aggression. Fortitude is courage blended with knowledge of the good and evil, as we have seen, and of what to pursue and what to flee. It springs from the spirited element of man's nature when, regardless of pleasure or pain, he holds fast to the injunction of right reason. He is courageous in the fullest sense of the word

126 Ibid., II, 375c-376e; IV, 429c, 442b; Taylor, Plato, 257.

127 Laches, 199a-c.

128 Taylor, Plato, 257.

who is able to preserve through all the vicissitudes of his life right notions about what is to be feared and what is not. Fortitude is certainly one of the virtues of the philosopher. Such a man will not deem death to be terrible.¹²⁹

Rather, because he is a virtuous man, his mind will be habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of time without end and of all being.¹²⁹

* * * * *

This, then, is the basic material of Plato's educational theory. Man is a composite of body and soul, capable of deep feeling and strong emotion. He is a complex and complicated being, difficult to understand. The more we study him, the more there remains to know about him. And through the long process of education, we will see how he develops and matures both physically and intellectually toward the one great goal of his life, happiness. But we have also seen that happiness is only attainable through virtuous living. This we saw was knowledge, which only he who has devoted his entire life generously and patiently to the acquirement of harmony can have and enjoy to the full. In this lies true wisdom and goodness and truth.

¹²⁹ Republic VI, 486a; for courage as one of the virtues of the philosopher, see also: 490e, 495a.

Thus far, then, we have merely analysed the nature of Plato's educand. We have seen how his soul is made up and how it operates. With the fundamental notions we have learned about him in this chapter, we shall proceed in the following chapter to show how Plato would have him direct these faculties of his body and soul to the attainment of his sublime destiny. Chapter II will be a discussion of the second and third factors of education, the educator and the means of education.

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE MAKING

To the ancient Greek, "education" did not so much mean following nature, as it indicated directing nature to its proper ends. This implied, of course, not only employing the proper means, whereby the educand was guided towards his specific goal, but the need of the directive principle, the educator, who was to do the guiding according to approved customs and standards. It was the duty of the educator to impart to the student entrusted to his care certain fundamental virtues such as self-control, manliness, and a sense of personal responsibility. It was the task of every individual, with the help of his elders, to fit himself early in life for citizenship and the enjoyment of leisure ($\sigma\chi\omicron\lambda\eta$)¹ in the higher pursuits

1 "Leisure is not necessarily idleness; or vanity, though it is such indeed from the point of view of a working class. Leisure may be as strenuous as you please. The essence of the ideal is what in the language of today we may call 'self-culture,' used in the broad sense: namely, the perfect development both of soul and body undisturbed by the care for ways and means." Fite, Platonic Legend, 141; Cicero expresses this same idea in the De Oratore: "Ac fuit quidem, cum mihi quoque initium requiescendi, atque animum ad utriusque nostrum praeclara studia referendi, fore iustum et prope ab omnibus concessum arbitrer." De Oratore, I, i, 1.

of wisdom and virtue. This would also insure the State against subsequent corruption, for the State was good or bad in proportion as its citizens were good or bad.²

The early commencement of education had its advantages.

Its purpose was primarily to train and control the lower tendencies in man and make reason predominate in his soul. Plato had in mind the philosopher type of citizen, who was to be the man of reason and in whom the virtuous life was to achieve its full flowering. This, indeed, was the truly noble life. It was the finest way for a man to work out his perfection and destiny:

All other ways of life are vain, false, even pernicious. With fervor and conviction, Plato insists that, to begin with, the true philosopher must rise above all lower ideals. He must make great sacrifices.³

The same author comments further:

Only by doing what is right, by paying justice to men and reverence to the gods, can a man lead a truly

2 Republic, III, 412a; Jaeger comments: "If the Republic is to be preserved, there must always be someone in it who has the art of guiding it by maintaining this balanced paideia--or, as Plato says when he takes up this thought later and elaborates it, there must always be an element in the state in which the founder's spirit lives actively on." Paideia, II, 234. The reference to the Republic here is VI, 497d.

3 Raymond V. Schoder, S. J., "Plato's Concept of the Philosophic Life," The Modern Schoolman, XIX, November, 1941, 2.

happy and noble and successful life. Such alone may be the philosopher's ideal.⁴

Hence, the perfection of his nature as philosopher implied a certain degree of the "divine" in his character.⁵ This divine element is immutability.⁶ It is this divine perfection in him, coupled with virtuous living, that makes him strong in resisting the evil inclinations of sense appetite and steady in his quest of wisdom. The perfect change but rarely, Plato maintains.⁷ The aim of all men, then, should be to arrive at union with the divine, according to the measure of immutability each has acquired in his state of life. The process, therefore, by which men are to acquire it is of major importance. That is why Plato is so uncompromising and careful in drawing up the general outline and the specific details in his system of philosophic education. He is scrupulously exact in determining the precise length of time to be devoted to each subject,⁸ the curriculum of courses,

4 Ibid., 3.

5 Republic, II, 380e-381a; Rutenber, Imitation of God, 68.

6 Ibid., 382a.

7 Ibid., 381b.

8 For a brief outline of Plato's program of studies are Cornford, Republic, 256; for Plato's own more elaborate plan see Republic, VII, 535a-541b. Detailed treatments will be found in Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 231-33; Lodge, Theory of Education, especially Chapters V, "Education for Leadership," 88-113, and IX, "The Pupils and Learning," 184-210.

and the types of teachers, for very much depends upon the means one must employ if he is to arrive at his final destiny. It is Plato's purpose to educate for the best possible results. And so, this education can only be fully realized with the best possible equipment. First, we shall consider this process from the educator's point of view. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to a careful analysis of the means of education, which are the curriculum of a liberal education in the ideal State.

Plato makes only implicit reference to the teachers in the Republic. He implies that only professional instructors are to be hired, for they know what sort of things are necessary for the development of the whole man.⁹ It is in the Laws, however, that Plato treats of the teachers in some

9 In regard to the idea of "the development of the whole man" in Plato and, consequently, in liberal education as such, I quote Marrou. He expresses this in terms of man's quest for truth. "Le véritable homme d'Etat, ce chef, ce 'roi' idéal qu'il s'agit de former se distinguera de toutes contrefaçons en ce qu'il possède la science, la science critique et direct du commandement, au sens technique que revêt dans le grec de Platon ce mot d' ἐπιστήμη: science véritable, fondée en raison, par opposition à la δόξα . l'opinion vulgaire. . . . Par suite, le type d'éducation imaginé par Platon pour la formation du chef politique est une type de valeur et de portée universelles: quel que soit le domaine de l'activité humaine vers lequel on s'oriente, il n'y a qu'une haute culture valable: celle qui aspire à la Vérité, à la possession de la véritable science." Henri-Iréné Marrou, Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, Paris, 1948, 105; citations of The Statesman, 259b, 292b, Hippias Major, 298b.

detail. That teachers are necessary, there is no doubt, for: "neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters."¹⁰

Teachers should be brought from foreign lands with the prospect of a good salary¹¹ and their duty is to impart to the child the principles of harmony and grace both of body and soul. For a good education is that one which tends most towards the beauty and excellence of mind and body.¹² Teachers should undergo careful selection, since only the qualified are able to take up so important a duty as the education of the future philosopher, who is to be the leader and model of the State. We must consider, therefore, who the teachers of the ideal Republic are. This is, however, a difficult problem, Lodge informs us. We will discover, somewhat to our surprise, that we have raised a problem which is insoluble to a very great extent.¹³ Lodge states that German scholars have classified the teachers into three groups corresponding to the three classes of citizens.

¹⁰ Laws, VII, 808d; also, I 643b, VI, 766a, VIII, 829c; see Republic, IV, 424e.

¹¹ Lodge, Theory of Education, 144; Laws, VII, 804d.

¹² Laws, VII, 788c.

¹³ Lodge, Theory of Education, 138.

Their division is: the Nährstand, Wehrstand, and Lehrstand.¹⁴ But it is only when we try to study these in detail that we encounter difficulties. The following is Lodge's treatment of the analysis of these groups.

The Nährstand corresponds to the peasant class.

The Nährstand is easily enough identified. It is constituted by the farmer class--and presumably also the artisans who build the farm-houses and other homes with their ploughs, utensils, and other furnishings, and the business men who market the farm products and make possible the exchange of goods and services so necessary in any but the most primitive community. Taken all together these constitute by far the largest group in the community. They are not exactly citizens.¹⁵

Corresponding to the warrior type of citizens are the Wehrstand, who are also easily enough identifiable, according to Lodge.

It corresponds in principle to the 'silver' class of auxiliary guardians in the Republic, whose duties are primarily of a military nature. These auxiliaries are undoubtedly of a freeborn citizen class who elect their executive officers in a number of classes and grow gradually into exercising all the functions of citizenship.¹⁶

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

But, he comments further:

It is when we come to the Lehrstand that difficulties begin to multiply upon us. Presumably the Lehrstand is identified by German scholars with the 'full' guardians, i. e., the extremely small group of highest magistrates who from the age of fifty till the period of retirement direct the community in all its ways, 'making philosophy their chief pursuit, but when they have brought up others like themselves to be governors of the State they will depart to the Islands of the Blest.¹⁷

This interpretation, we feel, is an adequate one and it seems very much in accord with Plato's views represented in his Laws, though only implicitly mentioned in the Republic.¹⁸ In both works there are indications that young children born in the ideal State are first trained by mothers and nurses and similar attendants authorized by the State to do so. Note, however, that no child is to be educated by his own mother. The purpose of this stipulation is to insure uniformity of education as well as complete selflessness on the part of the philosopher-king, who is to have no family ties whatsoever, the better to rule his people and thus stand as an example for them to imitate him.

17 Ibid.

18 Republic, II, 376c, VI, 484b-c, 498a-c, 501d-e, 503b, VII, 520a-b, 521b, 525b, 540b, VIII, 543a. (In each of these passages Plato implies that the Guardian class should be made up of philosophers, and these are to be the teachers of the State.)

Teachers must exercise great care in the training of the young. Their "stories" must have been censored before they can be related. Early in the Republic Plato states:

It seems, then, our first business will be to supervise the making of fables and legends, rejecting all which are unsatisfactory; and we shall induce nurses and mothers to tell their children only those which we have approved, and to think more of moulding their souls with these stories than they now do of rubbing their limbs to make them strong and shapely.¹⁹

The importance of this censorship cannot be overemphasized. Plato, like a good master, made much of long experience. "Perhaps we shall hardly invent a system better than the one which long experience has worked out," he tells us, "with its two branches for the cultivation of the mind and of the body."²⁰ But the cultivation of the mind is by far the more important part of education, for it is by this principle that man arrives at his supreme happiness in virtuous living. Experienced instructors will always be leaders in this. They will give their pupils a clear and comprehensive view of all that they will be required to know and do in life. If there be doubt or hesitation on the part of the young, they have only to follow the example and advice of their teachers and thus escape the

19 Ibid., II, 377b-c.

20 Ibid.

danger of living a life not based on principle. The teacher must therefore possess all those qualities and virtues which are essential in his particular field, whether that field be gymnastics, music, mathematics, the arts in general, or dialectic. His students, on the other hand, will be expected to imitate him²¹ along these lines and even surpass their master if possible. Concerning the qualifications of the teacher, Plato notes the following:

The teachers ought to excel the rest of mankind, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know (or, on the other hand, whose evil actions require to be punished and reprov'd), what is the nature of virtue and vice. . . . And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?²²

It is sometimes argued, however, that these foreigners who are attracted to the city by pay, cannot be persons of great importance or

21 Jaeger, Paideia, I, 1939, 100. See Isocrates, To Nicocles, 31.

22 Laws, XII, 964b-d. See also: Republic, II, 375a-376c, III, 388e, 395d, IV, 421a, VI, 504d; for the guardian to be high-spirited and gentle, see: Republic, II, 375b-c, III, 410c-e, VI, 503b-d; Timaeus, 18a; Laws, V, 731b; he must be a warrior, Republic, III, 416d-e, Laws, XII, 964c; must have gold and silver mingled in their veins, Republic, III, 415a; must possess wisdom, Republic, IV, 428e, Laws, XII, 965a; must preserve moderation, Republic, V, 466b; must be courageous, III, 413e, 416e, VI, 503e.

of sound reputation. Lodge remarks on this point:

But the reference to the director of education assures us that they are experts in their own line, the best that can be obtained for love of money. Furthermore, the teacher-training which enforces successful study of Plato's Laws 'and similar writings' as a necessary preliminary to the state appointment as teachers, assures that such teachers will be adequately acquainted with the usages of the model city, as well as being masters in their own lines of expertise.²³

But we cannot suppose that teachers of gymnastics or of music are the highest magistrates of the city, the philosopher-kings, who are fifty or more years old. The idea is absurd, Lodge writes.²⁴ Just as state officials are appointed to watch over young children from the cradle until about the age of six, so ought we to presume that there must be state officials designated to direct the training of gymnastics and music. Boys and girls attend these schools from about the age of six to ten. We rely on the following passage from the Laws to confirm this opinion. Plato states that in regard to things pertaining to gymnastics, for instance, "there ought to be public teachers receiving pay from the state, and their pupils should be the men and boys, women and girls, who are to know all these things."²⁵

23 Lodge, Theory of Education, 141.

24 Ibid.

25 Laws, VII, 813d-e.

So much for the qualifications of the teachers in Plato's system. As a part of the process of education, we shall now consider the different types of teachers with respect to the various stages of education. The following analysis is adapted from Lodge.²⁶

(1) Children up to the age of six receive their education from their parents, nurses, and other attendants. The parents' position is occupied in part by a state-designated official and the playground matron who is put in charge over her subjects for a period of one year. These teachers are usually a part of the citizen class. However, some will be members of the "auxiliaries" or Wehrstand, while others will be chosen from the group of higher magistrates called the Lehrstand, but these in only special cases of necessity. Nurses and attendants belong to the non-citizen class and, as slaves, might even fall outside the official Nährstand.

(2) Children from about the age of seven to ten also have as their teachers state-appointed officials, who are normally and usually, but not exclusively, members of the non-citizen class. Obviously enough, these belong neither to the Wehrstand nor the Lehrstand, but to the Nährstand. There is one exception, however. The veterans who are to watch over their pupils when taken on military expeditions as spectators

²⁶ Summarized from Lodge, Theory of Education, 148.

and instructors of these children, might be regular citizens. This is also true of the adjudicators in certain military contests, who are "colonels and generals of horse." These persons belong to the Wehrstand, unless the "veterans" are of more than sixty years of age, in which case as teachers emeriti, they are incorporated into the Wehrstand by courtesy.

(3) Children of teen age, who are at this time pursuing courses in literature, music, and mathematics, are instructed by teachers who are appointed by the State under the control of the director of education, and so are presumably non-citizens. These would be classified with the Nährstand.

(4) Finally, we came to the dialecticians, who are graduates of some higher institution like Plato's Academy. They are teachers of a comparatively small group of citizens who are being trained in dialectics as candidates for higher magistracies. The teachers of this group are ranked with the official Lehrstand only.

In recapitulation of this section, we might briefly state that children of school age were to be taught by state-appointed officials of a definite non-citizen class. These were the foreigners brought into the country by pay. In this group might also be found a few military officers acting as adjudicators and advisory experts.

On the other hand, the only children to be educated by the

official citizen class, the Lehrstand, were: (1) the very young ones who were children of the Lehrstand class; (2) candidates for magistrate positions of the highest group who study dialectics and (3) misguided adults who are committed to the House of Common Correction. The State was to undertake the training for citizenship, since it alone was prepared to delegate state offices and salaries to competent instructors, under the appointment of the director of education.

With this, then, we conclude our treatment of the second factor of education, the teacher, and how the teachers vary as the process of education approaches its final end. We have seen the four divisions of this process, and now we shall study the particular details of the educational program as found in the Republic. But first, a word or two about the basic problem of education.

Education, as we have seen in Chapter One, is the process of transformation of the educand, the raw-material, along definite lines towards a particular goal. This is stated very clearly by Lodge in his chapter on "The Pupils and Learning." Lodge writes:

The problem of education, as Plato sees it, is how, starting with human babies, with their instinctive motion-tendencies, their complete ignorance, and their complete helplessness, to assist them to develop themselves into self-maintaining citizens of his model city: able and willing to take their places in carrying on and indeed improving upon its traditions. The problem can be solved, he believes, only if all

the citizens and everyone of the social institutions characteristic of the ideal community, cooperate and bring to bear their efforts. ²⁷

In order to achieve this end, Plato was convinced, the student's courses must be so organized and integrated that the relations between them can become clear and their synthesis more possible and effective. For, he says, they are all but one study--the study of man by man. Their end is indeed that of becoming the philosopher-king, the culmination of all that man stood for. And the goal of all these studies is Truth. Truth is the aim of the good philosopher. This comes from his love of knowledge.

One trait of the philosophic nature we may take as already granted: a constant passion for any knowledge that will reveal to them something of that reality which endures forever and is not always passing into and out of existence. And, we may add, their desire is to know the value of that reality. . . . Is there another trait which the nature we are seeking cannot fail to possess-- truthfulness, a love of truth and a hatred of falsehood that will not tolerate untruth in any form? Yes, it is natural to expect that. ²⁸

But if this search for truth is to be effective, it must be cumulative and synthesized. It must enable the educand to achieve a sense

27 Ibid., 185.

28 Republic, VI, 484b-c, 486e, 500c, 501d.

of real accomplishment when the time comes for the full enjoyment of his life of virtue in the contemplation of the good, the beautiful, and the true. It is only then that he will really come to appreciate the deep value of the philosophic life, in which the full meaning of virtue and truth and happiness is unfolded for him. In this consists the truly liberal education, the purpose of which is to help man acquire knowledge for its own sake. This knowledge will help man also acquire those human qualities which manifest themselves in virtuous habits and attitudes, which the philosopher alone can really have and appreciate. But it is also the duty of teachers to stimulate and inspire children from their earliest years to develop such qualities. The final test of this education, however, is the kind of man or woman it produces; as Emerson said: "What you are speaks more loudly than what you say." This, then, is the basic problem of education, according to the mind of Plato; man must undergo a conversion. It is in the famous allegory of the cave that Plato develops this idea. He traces the progress of the human mind from its lowest state of unenlightenment to knowledge of the Good.

Imagine the condition of men living in a sort of cavernous chamber underground, with an entrance open to the light and a long passage all down the cave. Here they have been from childhood, chained by the leg and also by the neck, so that they cannot move or see only what is in front of them, because the chains will not let them turn their heads. At some distance higher up is the light of a fire burning behind them; and between the prisoners

and the fire is a track with a parapet built along it, like the screen at a puppet-show, which hides the performers while they show their puppets over the top.²⁹

It is important to analyze this passage, for in it Plato gives us the basis for his philosophy of education.

Men are like the prisoners described in the allegory.

When a figure of an animal passes in front of the cave and its shadow is imprinted on the wall in back, their first impulse is to imagine it to be reality. While they are bound in that prison, their ignorance will not permit them to see reality. But when they are released and go out into the light of the sun, they are blinded. They require slow adjustment, a process which is of its very nature long and arduous.

The world of our experience, which we take to be reality, is only a shadow-world. The real world is the world of Ideas, which we know, not by sense knowledge, but by intuitive contemplation. It is the purpose of education, therefore, to help men make "their turning around to the light of day" easier and more effective. Gradually, they will become accustomed to seeing things as they are in the perfect contemplation of the Good in all its forms, as reflected in this imperfect world of fleeting

²⁹ Republic, VII, 514 a-b.

shadows.

In order to learn to contemplate the Good, however, man must learn first to free himself from the bonds which hold him to this world. He must turn around and move upwards to the world of thought, where he will find knowledge and reality. Education guides him in this turning toward and correct focusing of the "mind's eye toward the light of the sun," which is knowledge, and in which he finds his happiness in virtuous living.³⁰ Plato is convinced that there is no royal road to learning. From the cradle onward the child must learn by experience what it means to make study a part of himself. Only then will it be possible for him to live his life μακαρίως καὶ εὐδαίμωνως. An excellent summary of the above is given by Plato when he says:

If this is true, then, we must conclude that education is not what it is said to be by some, who profess to put knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if they could put sight into blind eyes. On the contrary, our own account signifies that the soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it with; and that, just as one might have to turn the whole body around in order that the eye should see light instead of darkness, so the entire soul must be turned away from this changing world, until its eye can bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendor which we have called the Good.

³⁰ Charmides, 173d-e; Euthydemus, 281b; Meno, 88c; Alcibiades, 134e.

Hence there may be an art whose aim would be to effect this very thing, the conversion of the soul, in the readiest way; not to put the power of sight into the soul's eye, which already has it, but to ensure that, instead of looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to be.³¹

Plato divides his educational syllabus into two parts.³² The first part consists of undergraduate work, a detailed explanation of which is given in the second and third books of the Republic. It corresponds to the education in physical culture and the arts prevalent at Athens during Plato's time.³³ The second part, or graduate work, is intended for the philosopher group. Here lies the core of his theory of a liberal education, the purpose of which, as we have seen, is to lead men to an understanding of the eternal verities, and it is theirs exclusively.

We shall now consider the curriculum of liberal education in detail.

31 Republic, VII, 518b-d.

32 For the divisions of education in Plato, see Marrou, Histoire, 488-90. The author gives the purpose of the Laws and the Republic as treatises on education.

33 For a complete study of Athenian education, see Paul Girard, L'Education Athenienne, Paris, 1889; see also Protagoras, 325c.

Liberal education, in the mind of Plato, helps the individual cultivate "a philosophical habit of mind" which will lead him to a sense of self-reliance and personal responsibility,³⁴ the distinguishing marks of a mature citizen.³⁵ If any man is to grow in self-mastery and personal depth in the higher pursuit of wisdom, he must begin his formal education early in life.³⁶ For virtue then will have a better chance to take deep root and give meaning and coloring to all his actions. Plato insists on this early start throughout the Republic. In one place he says:

And the beginning, as you know, is always the most important part, especially in dealing with anything young and tender. That is the time when the character is being moulded and easily takes any impression one may wish to stamp on it.³⁷

It is for this reason, too, that Plato commands the teacher to use all sorts of disciplines over the child, and that their parents charged the master to pay far more attention to their children's good behavior than to their letters and sport activities.³⁸

34 Fite, Platonic Legend, 15.

35 Republic, IV, 424a-e.

36 Nettleship, Lectures, 290.

37 Republic, II, 377a-b; see also, Laws, I, 643b-c.

38 Protagoras, 325d.

If a sound system of nurture³⁹ and education is maintained, it produces men of good disposition; and these in their turn, taking advantage of such education, develop into better men than their forebearers, and their breeding qualities improve among the rest.⁴⁰

Concerning the first stages of education, it is upon the tremendous influence of the stories which mothers and nurses tell their children that Plato bases his censorship of the poets, though he does not discuss here the details of infant education.⁴¹

During the early period, Plato tells us, we begin by telling children stories, which are in the main fictitious.⁴² These stories are

39 Plato's idea of the essence of education is most simply and comprehensively expressed in the word "nurture." (For the use of τροφή or cognate terms, see Republic, III, 401b-e; 402a; 403c; 412b; IV, 424a; 491d-e, and Phaedrus, 247e ff., where the metaphor is enlarged upon.) R. L. Nettleship, The Theory of Education in the Republic of Plato, Chicago, 1906, 5.

40 Republic, IV, 424a-b.

41 Plato discusses the education of children more fully in the Laws. See Laws, I, 643b, VI, 766a, VII, 788a-793a, 808d-809d, 810a-b, VIII, 829c.

42 "The words 'fiction,' 'fictitious,' are used to represent the Greek pseudos, which has a much wider sense than our 'lie': it covers any statement describing events which never in fact occurred, and so applies to all the works of imagination, all fictitious narratives ('stories') in myth or allegory, fable or parable, poetry or romance. As Plato does not confuse fiction with falsehood or identify truth with literal statements of fact, pseudos should be rendered by 'fiction' or 'falsehood' according to the context, and sometimes by 'lie.' It can also mean 'error' when it corresponds to the passive verb epseusthai = 'to be deceived' or 'mistaken' (as at 382b, 535e)." Cornford, Republic, 68.

narrated to them while they are of an impressionable age, and so mothers and nurses must exercise great care that children do not hear just ordinary casual fables which may have been made up by casual authors.⁴³ The reason for this is to prevent children from receiving into their infant, easily impressioned minds, ideas which are the very opposite of ones with which we should wish to have them mature. For this reason, too, a censorship of the authors of such stories of fiction is established.⁴⁴

From about the age of six to seventeen or eighteen,⁴⁵ the early training in music, gymnastic, literature, and elementary mathematics is carried on with as little compulsion as possible.⁴⁶ For the most part, Plato adopts the system of the ordinary Athenian schools, only removing those features which will not help to produce the type of character the philosopher-king is to have.⁴⁷ These simplifying reforms are part of the

43 Republic, II, 377a-d, III, 386a-387a-d, 391d-e, X, 595bc. See also Pierre-Maxime Schuhl, Études sur la Fabulation, Platonicienne, Paris, 1947.

44 Ibid.; censorship of the arts, see III, 401b, also Grube, Plato's Thought, 235; censorship of poetry, Laws, VII, 801c-d, 817d, VIII, 829d.

45 Nettleship, Legend, 290.

46 Cornford, Republic, 256; reference to text, VII, 536e; see also Jaeger, Paideia, II, 424, and Grube, Plato's Thought, 240.

47 Cornford, Republic, 67.

process of abolishing the luxurious⁴⁸ and unhealthy elements in contemporary education.⁴⁹ Briefly, these important years are devoted to reading and writing, memorizing and reciting epic and dramatic poetry,⁵⁰ lyre-playing and singing lyric poetry, the rudiments of arithmetic and geometry, and gymnastics. The objective of all these courses is to give to the student a deeper insight into the harmonious order (κόσμος) of the entire universe.⁵¹ And this is what the Greeks called ἁρμονία .

Harmony, therefore, of both body and soul is the ideal of liberal education, "the fairest of sights to see."⁵² Often Plato makes it seem almost synonymous with virtue itself.⁵³ He reminds us of this when he says that harmony of body and mind finds its way into the inward soul and imparts to it grace (χάρις). Harmony makes the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful.⁵⁴ Such a man will then most keenly perceive omissions

48 Republic, IV, 420d-e, 421-e, 422a. This is explained in detail by Wild in his chapter "Social Life and Its Deformation," Theory of Man, 87-131.

49 Cornford, Republic, 67; Jaeger, Paideia, II, 139.

50 Cornford, Republic, 66.

51 Ibid., 88-89.

52 Republic, III, 402d.

53 Laws, II, 653b.

54 Harvanek, Portrait of a Philosopher, 38.

and faults in his own character, and so strive to correct them. Without harmony, no amount of brains or cleverness will give people the wisdom that is goodness. Harmony, moreover, introduces the soul into a new life, which is the life of virtue. For, when all the soul's faculties have been brought into conformity with one another under the direction of right reason, the end product is virtuous living, as we have seen in the first chapter.⁵⁵ Hence, the soul lives happily in union with the body, reason being the master of the whole.

In order to see how this works out in the concrete, we shall study each of the courses of Platonic education in detail. We shall also see how perfectly Plato's system of education fulfills the definition of a liberal education we have quoted in the introduction to this treatise.⁵⁶ Let us recall, then, that the purpose of a liberal education is knowledge for its own sake, rather than for any other end. Its real aim is to produce that philosophical habit of mind which only knowledge of the highest sort can provide.

Education in music (μουσική)⁵⁷ and gymnastic (γυμ-

55 Above, 26-27.

56 Above, 4.

57 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 211, 222, 224.

ναστική)⁵⁸ are discussed first, and Plato is firmly convinced that each plays an important part in the molding of the philosopher type of character.

Grube's comment on 410c is pertinent here:

Plato then--410c--tells us that both mousike and gymnastics are needed in education, and both have the welfare of the soul in view. Neither alone leads to a satisfactory result, for gymnastic alone makes a man rough and quick tempered, while mousike alone makes him too soft. What we should aim at is a proper balance of these two elements, temper and love of learning. These are the main principles of education, and there is no need, says Socrates, to go further into detail. The whole of the system here described aims at implanting in the young right habits and ways of thinking, that is 'right beliefs', for the virtues of the auxiliary guardians simply consist in their ability to hold on to these beliefs in spite of temptation, throughout life (412e).⁵⁹

But music is to be taught before gymnastic,⁶⁰ and should be continued throughout life.⁶¹ Music includes a wide range of subjects from literature to mathematics,⁶² and is designed, like its counterpart gym-

58 Ibid., 210, 225, 230, 405, 408; citation of Republic, II, 376d-377a.

59 Grube, Plato's Thought, 236.

60 Republic, III, 403b. See Jaeger, Paideia, II, 230.

61 Republic, III, 403c.

62 Cornford, Republic, 66.

nastic, for the improvement of the soul.⁶³ Music softens and tempers the rugged athlete, just as physical exercises render the effeminate poet strong and virile.⁶⁴ But if either one is carried on to excess, it makes the weaker nature effeminate (μαλακός).⁶⁵ So too, the brawney athlete, if he has no education, degenerates into a wild beast.⁶⁷ Music and gymnastic, therefore, should be mingled in equal proportions, and both attempered to the individual soul.⁶⁸

Music and gymnastic play prominent roles in the earlier training of the philosopher-king. If he is to be a guardian and a teacher (exemplar)⁶⁹ to his people, he will require a well proportioned education before he is called upon to use his intellect in its proper function.

Music, by which is meant a literary and artistic training, will attune the soul to beauty, whose elements are rhythm,

63 Republic, III, 410d-e. See Grube, Plato's Thought, 236.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., III, 411a.

66 Ibid., 405c.

67 Ibid., 411b

68 Ibid., 412a.

69 Jaeger, Paideia, I, 100.

proportion and harmony. Since these are qualities of truth also -- for through them truth becomes beauty -- they will tend to conform the philosophic nature or reasoning element of the soul to truth. Gymnastic will develop the body and temper the emotions. The result of the coordinated training of the faculties of the future ruler (who is to be our philosopher) will be temperance and fortitude . . . 'And will not the soul of a balanced person be sober and brave? By all means. And that of an unbalanced person cowardly and boorish? Very much so!⁷⁰

Furthermore, music, which consists of literature and mathematics,⁷¹ helps to produce the element of gentleness in human nature, in contrast to the brusqueness of the athlete. It attracts the soul to beauty by impressing upon it a character of the sense of rhythm,⁷² harmony, and grace. These, indeed, constitute the true essence of beauty.

Speaking of beauty, Plato writes in the Symposium:

But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her shining in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the most piercing of our bodily senses; though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her . . . But

411a.

70 Harvanek, Portrait of a Philosopher, 7-8; Republic, III,

71 Fite, Platonic Legend, 245.

72 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 226.

this is the privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable to sight.⁷³

It is, therefore, for this reason that training in music is so important during the early years. Rhythm, harmony, and grace sink deep down into the soul and make the man who has them a man of noble spirit in the fullest sense of the term. Such a person is best prepared for the pursuit of knowledge in philosophy. He is quick to perceive any marks of ugliness or impurity in his character, in art, or in nature in general. Such blemishes will rightly disgust him and he will return to the desire of that aim towards which a good education is to be ordered.

Approving all that is lovely, he will welcome it home with joy into his soul and, nourished thereby, grow into a man of noble spirit. All that is ugly and disgraceful he will rightly condemn and abhor while he is still too young to understand the reason; and when reason comes, he will greet her as a friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.⁷⁴

This, then, is the main purpose of education in music and literature. Character is perfected and developed through union with the beautiful, the true, and the good.

The beautiful (τὸ καλλόν) in itself connotes for Plato,

73 Symposium, 211a.

74 Republic, III, 401e-402a.

balance, moderation, grace, and everything that makes the human personality gentle, noble, and good.⁷⁵ The true (τὸ ἀληθές) helps a man see the things of this world in their proper relationships to the divine and the eternal; and these in their turn, bring him in contact with the Supreme Good (τὸ Ἄγαθόν), which is the object of philosophy--contemplating and loving that which is the cause of all beauty, truth, and goodness. This is the characteristic element of the balanced personality, the proper object of a liberal education.

Thus far we have focused our attention on the literary development of character during the early years of philosophic formation. If true balance of body and mind is to be achieved then the body must also be formed. This is the purpose of education in gymnastic, for the beautiful body is supposed to be the reflection of the deeper side of man's nature, the well-balanced soul. This concept pervades all Greek thought, language, art, architecture. Plato, too, is conscious of it. That is why he insists that man's body, like his soul, should also strive after beauty, though Plato does not really make education of the body distinct from that of the soul. Both are primarily meant for the soul, as Anderson

75 Ibid., 400e.

comments:

Music and gymnastic, Plato expressly tells us, are not established, 'as many people suppose, the one for the tendance of the body, the other for the tendance of the soul.' The one supplies it with strength and restraint; the other imparts grace and an orderly 'philosophic' disposition. Each supplements and counter-balances the other...⁷⁶

But the soul induces on the level of organic habit the virtue of courage and temperance, strength of body, and the exercised perception of order.⁷⁷

For centuries, the ancient Greeks believed that athletic ability was the highest type of physical prowess.⁷⁸ Since the training of the athlete was very rigid and highly developed, it seemed only logical that guardians, too, must undergo similar training. Like the athlete, the guardian should not indulge in too much eating or drinking. He must enable himself to stand any change in food, drink, weather, and should be careful about preserving his health "to be a thing of razor-edged delicacy."⁷⁹ But Plato wants a simplified form of gymnastics (ἀπλῆ

76 Anderson, Argument of Plato, 129.

77 Ibid.; reference to Republic, III, 410b-412a.

78 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 231

79 Ibid.

γυμναστική).⁸⁰ Jaeger remarks: "Just as instrumentation and harmony had been cut down to simplicity, so physical training ought to be freed of extravagance and revert to the strict minimum."⁸¹

But why does Plato prescribe that the philosopher, who is to spend the remainder of his life in contemplation, must exercise and undergo all the exertions called for by gymnastic? There are at least three reasons: the first, to form the body and thus make it beautiful;⁸² the second, to insure the health of the body, for physical strength also helps the soul;⁸³ as Juvenal put it: "Mens sana in corpore sano."⁸⁴ But the third reason, the most important of the three, is to develop the virtue of courage.⁸⁵ For courage, as we have already seen in chapter one, is that virtue which enables one to act in all circumstances, through fear and

80 Republic, III, 410a.

81 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 231, 405; citation of Republic, III, 404e.

82 Republic, II, 376e, III, 403d-e, VII, 521e.

83 Ibid., III, 410a-e.

84 Juvenal, Satyrae, X, 356.

85 Republic, III, 410b.

pain and pleasure, in obedience to the commands of reason concerning what is to be feared and what is to be dared.⁸⁶ Courage is really the product of educational discipline.⁸⁷ It may further be described as a kind of self-reliance. In this case, it is the protection and salvation of character from any dangers which may beset it. But this courage is not the manifestation of animal strength which is found in beasts; it is, rather, a virtue which helps to produce a strong character in man, so that he may face life with confidence and keep steadfast in time of pain and pleasure, fear and desire. This courage in its own way also makes for harmony of soul and body. It is the distinguishing mark of the philosopher. In this connection, therefore, it must be remembered that, for Plato, a philosopher is not defined as a man concentrating on abstract concepts all his life; he is the ideal human being, the perfect personality, though the activity of thinking -- because he is a philosopher --⁸⁸ is his chief characteristic.

86 Anderson, Argument of Plato, 60; quotation from Republic, IV, 441c-443b.

87 Republic, IV, 429a-d.

88 "The ideal character is a blend of 'culture' and 'manliness.' Throughout Plato's discussion of this method, that is, throughout the first scheme of Education, the word φιλόσοφος means what it meant to Pericles of the Funeral Oration. (Citing, Thuc. ii, 40: φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας). . . . The other method is that of the thinker, the professed

A philosopher was nothing more than a man, but a man with nothing left out. That is, he was a man who was fully developed in all his faculties and who took his part in the daily affairs of his family and country. He himself was made up of body and soul, and like all men, had to take care that both were kept together.⁸⁹

Kathleen Freeman, in her article "Plato: the Use of Inspiration," further amplifies this idea.

Now what is Plato's ideal human being? One in whom the intellectual faculty is supreme, and the intellectual method the only means of apprehending the truth; one, that is, who examines a class of particular objects and then generalizes, step by step, until he reaches the farthest abstraction attainable. He is to grow nearer and nearer towards pure mind.⁹⁰

In these matters, it is principally the virtue of courage that gives the philosopher assurance of perseverance and success in the pursuit of his sublime end. It strengthens him. That is why gymnastics is a part of his curriculum and why it is coupled so intimately with education in music. A purely athletic training would make him too hard and violent and

philosopher. According to it the claims of intellect are paramount." R. Hackforth, "The Modification of Plan in Plato's Republic," Classical Quarterly, VII, October, 1913, 267.

89 Harvanek, Portrait of a Philosopher, 39.

90 Kathleen Freeman, "Plato: the Use of Inspiration," Græce and Rome, IX, May, 1940, 146; also Grube, Plato's Thought, 273.

thus would cause him to lose sight of his objective. Too much music, on the other hand, would make him too weak and too soft to be able to attain his goal.⁹¹ Moderation would be lacking in both instances.⁹²

Music and gymnastic, again, are the inseparable elements of philosophical education during its early stages. They cannot be separated, as intellectual education can be separated from physical training. Music and gymnastic are the bonds that hold together the sensitive and rational elements of human character and human nature. Anyone who can attune $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\rho\mu\acute{o}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$; $\kappa\epsilon\rho\alpha\nu\nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$)⁹³ them in the proper harmony will be more pleasing to the Muses than the legendary hero who first put together all the strings of the lyre.⁹⁴ Plato could not have summarized the very essence of his philosophy of education better than in that simile. With this forceful

91 Republic, III, 410d.

92 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 234.

93 Republic, III, 411e; Jaeger comments on this passage: "Plato's terms for this blend are $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\rho\mu\acute{o}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ and $\kappa\epsilon\rho\alpha\nu\nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$. The latter term is taken from medicine. All health is the result of the right mixture ($\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota\varsigma$), according to Greek medical doctrine; see Paideia, III, 6. The harmony of athletic and musical paideia is healthy education. See also Republic, 444c. But Plato thinks of the health of human nature in its entirety -- not of the health of the body alone." Jaeger, Paideia, II, 405-6.

94 Republic, III, 411e.

picture, he concludes his description of the philosophers' education.⁹⁵ The lyre, indeed, is a highly cultivated instrument, with many strings. It is mute for him who cannot play it. It is intolerably monotonous for him who knows only how to pluck one of its strings. But to sound many of its strings at once, and produce not noisy dissonance but a sweet chord, is the difficult art of true education.⁹⁶

So much for music and gymnastic. We shall now discuss mathematics and its relation to philosophic education. Jaeger's comment is in order here.

Thereafter begins another course of education connected with the mathematical studies which were completed earlier,⁹⁷ and designed to reveal and illuminate the connection between the disciplines previously studied in isolation, and their objects. They are now to be compared with one another, until the student arrives at a 'synopsis,' a comprehensive view, 'of their mutual relationships and the nature of being.' Although it starts with mathematics, this stage of knowledge is not mathematical but dialectical, for the dialectician is the 'synoptic' who can see the connections and relationships of the various realms and objects of knowledge.⁹⁸

95 Ibid., 412b.

96 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 234.

97 Reference to arithmetic as part of music, see 63.

98 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 314-15; citation of Republic, VII, 537c; see also Nettleship, Lectures, 291.

In the Laws⁹⁹ Plato tells us that mathematics is the basis of real education, if we are to come to know reality. In the Republic and the Gorgias, mathematics is said to be the focal-point of intellectual interest.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, mathematics helps to draw the soul towards love and beauty, for it is through pure mathematics that the soul comes to dialectic, and finally arrives at contemplation as such. Plato's interest in mathematics and logic is the dominant feature of his later works. Fite remarks:

Even the Philebus, which sets out to be a discussion of the nature and worth of pleasure, is largely occupied with the relation of the determinate to the indeterminate (the One and the Unlimited) and the meaning of determinate number. The Timaeus is a mathematical physics designed to embrace all nature. The polity of the Laws contemplates a city ordered throughout by the principle of number; in which mathematics is to be the basis of education. . . .¹⁰¹

He concludes unexpectedly:

It seems, then, that the mind of Plato -- and to the reader of literature about Plato this is the unexpected conclusion -- was not so much the mind of a poet as the mind of a mathematician; possibly indeed the clearest instance in the history of thought of what is called 'the mathematical mind.'¹⁰²

This is his conviction, he affirms, but what precisely does he

99 Laws, VII, 818a, 819a-820d.

100 Fite, Platonic Legend, 229.

101 Fite, Platonic Legend, 229-30.

102 Ibid., 230.

mean by the 'mathematical mind'? Clearly, he does not mean that all mathematicians necessarily have "mathematical minds." Mathematicians, he goes on to say, are men and human minds are more or less critical. It is, however, the uncritical mind that he is referring to here, for which mind the formulae of mathematics are the sole and final expression of reality -- "by no means exclusively, or even necessarily, the mind of a mathematician."¹⁰³ This, we believe, is how Plato would have us interpret this concept of the "mathematical mind." Fite further explains:

Mathematics and formal logic will then be one and the same. And this means that mathematical reasoning (in popular phrase the essence of reasoning) is after all simply reasoning; that the mathematical mind is simply the logical mind, the intellectual mind; or -- if you please -- mind. . . . the final reality is not simply what is given in the mathematics of number and space. Yet for him, for his type of imagination, in these terms of number and space is paved the only pathway to reality. They are the terms in which reality can humanly be conceived.¹⁰⁴

Mathematics in Plato's system is a graded course consisting of arithmetic (ἀριθμητική),¹⁰⁵ plane geometry (γεωμετρία),¹⁰⁶

103 Ibid., 231.

104 Ibid., 232.

105 Republic, VII, 524d-526c.

106 Ibid., 526c-527c.

solid geometry (ἐν περιφορᾷ ὄν ἤδη στέρεον . . . περί τῆν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καί τὸ βάθους μετέχον),¹⁰⁷ astronomy ἀστρονομία,¹⁰⁸ and harmonics (πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον).¹⁰⁹ And since the aim of the science is to motivate the soul to desire immortal and immutable things, "to draw the soul upwards," the courses should be begun as soon as the student is made ready for them by music and gymnastic. This period covers the years from 20 to 30;¹¹⁰ it comprises the student's higher education.

The purpose of mathematics is to teach the educand how to think; it makes for clarity and precision of thought, just as literature and music make for clarity and elegance of expression. Besides its usefulness

107 Plato states that solid geometry does not appear to have been investigated as yet. See, Rep. VII, 528b. Shorey comments on this statement: "This is not to be pressed. Plato means only that the progress of solid geometry is unsatisfactory. . . . To understand Plato we need only remember that the extension of geometry to solids was being worked out in his day, perhaps partly at his suggestion, e. g. by Theaetetus . . . and that Plato makes use of the discovery of the five solids in his theory of the elements in the Timaeus." Paul Shorey, Plato: The Republic, (Loeb Classical Library), II, London, 1935, 176.

108 Republic, VII, 528e-530c.

109 Ibid., 530c-531c.

110 Cornford, Republic, 256.

for commerce and arts,¹¹¹ it leads men towards reality in so far as it challenges the human mind to examine the confusions of sense and to make exact definitions. Plato writes:

Since properties of number appear to have the power of leading us towards reality, these must be among the studies we are in search of. The soldier must learn them in order to marshall his troops; the philosopher, because he must rise above the world of change and grasp true being, or he will never become proficient in the calculations of reason. Our Guardian is both soldier and philosopher; so this will be a suitable study for our law to prescribe. Those who are to take part in the highest functions of the state must be induced to approach it, not in an amateur spirit, but perseveringly, until, by the aid of pure thought, they come to see the real nature of number. They are to practice calculation, not like merchants or shopkeepers for purposes of buying and selling, but with a view to war and to help in the conversion of the soul itself from the world of becoming to truth and reality.¹¹²

If, therefore, the educand acquaints himself with mathematics in the spirit of a philosopher and not a shopkeeper, as Plato says, he will be able to reason about abstract number with ease and so rebel against the introduction of sensible elements into argumentation.¹¹³ His soul will rise

111 Republic, VII, 525c-e

112 Ibid., 525b-c.

113 Ibid., 525d.

above the merely changeable (τὰ γιγνόμενα)¹¹⁴ and readily grasp the things that are truly real. Winspear neatly summarizes this section on mathematics.

It [arithmetic] enables the 'soul' to seize hold of the real, to rise above the changing Geometry, too, leads its devotees to turn their eyes away from this transitory and perishing world if it is properly learned and abstracted from the necessities of everyday life So the rulers of kallipolis will be trained in geometry, for 'geometry is knowledge of the pre-existent and not of that which comes into being and passes away.' After geometry, astronomy -- not for the awe and reverence excited by a contemplation of the starry heavens, but because of the value of the abstract principles that they embody.¹¹⁵

What astronomy is to the eye, harmony is to the ear; the two are sister sciences as the Pythagoreans say and we, Gloucon, agree.¹¹⁶

These, however, must not be studied as the vulgar teachers of music have studied them.¹¹⁷ Plato would rather have us study the underlying principles of harmonics so that we may arrive at the intrinsic meaning and intelligibility this science gives to mathematical harmonies, which, he

114 Alban Dewes Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought, New York, 1940, 230; citation of Republic, VII, 525a.

115 Ibid., 230-31.

116 Republic, VII, 530d.

117 Ibid., 530e-531a.

says, the Pythagoreans have striven to discover. ¹¹⁸

We see, then, in summary, that mathematics is indispensable in the Platonic system of education. For the philosopher is a man whose sole pleasure in life is to think and to ask himself questions and to discover by reasoning the ultimate explanations of the most important problems of life. Such a man can never stop seeking; he is always anxious for more -- for his ultimate end in life is to unite himself to the sufficient reason for the existence of all other things in life, namely, the Good. But this requires one more step of education, dialectic.

Dialectic (διαλεκτική), ¹¹⁹ then, is this next stage of philosophic training. It is, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the most important period of the student's education; ¹²⁰ and it comprises the years

118 Winspear, Genesis of Thought, 231.

119 "What, then was the logical doctrine of Plato's Socrates? Its purpose was to prove by Dialectic that the virtues are united under a single comprehensive ἀρετή, namely, the possession (κτησις) of the Good-Itself." Stenzel, Method of Dialectic, 29.

120 "So here, the summit of the intelligible world is reached in philosophic discussion by one who aspires, through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses, to make his way in every case to the essential reality and perseveres until he has grasped by pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is what we call Dialectic." Republic, VII, 532a-b.

from 30 to 35,¹²¹ during which time the educand devotes all his powers to the study of the ultimate principles of morality and human life.¹²² This period is not to be interrupted by any other work.

Dialectic, which is said to be the most difficult branch of philosophy,¹²³ is the science of first principles. Since it dispenses with all hypothetical thinking,¹²⁴ it is consequently the "keystone of all the other sciences."¹²⁵ As for the nature of this science, Fite observes the following:

The word 'dialectic' (or 'dialectics') is used loosely today to characterize any fine-spun argument. Dialectic is a kind of super-logic; for the sceptical 'chop-logic,' or 'hair-splitting.'¹²⁶ But for Plato the word stood for a definite method of thought, never clearly explained, peculiar to philosophy. In modern times it marked his distinction between philosophical thought and scientific Dialectic

121 Cornford, Republic, 250, 253; citation of Republic, VII, 539d-e, also Winspear, Genesis of Thought, 232.

122 Nettleship, Lectures, 290.

123 Republic, VI, 498a-b. Plato is speaking here of the difficulty of philosophic discussion.

124 Anderson, Argument of Plato, 165; Lodge, Education, 176. Textual reference, Republic, VII, 534b-e.

125 Republic, VII, 534e.

126 Cornford notes a similar observation, Republic, 223.

was Plato's critical examination.¹²⁷ In his own terms it is the method of noesis as against that of dianoia, or as commonly rendered, of 'reason' as against 'understanding'; and his explanation of the distinction is embodied in the scheme of the 'divided line' at the close of the Republic, VI.¹²⁸

We give a diagram of the Divided Line adopted from that of Fite, Brumbaugh, Cornford, and others.¹²⁹ See figure I on the following page.

127 Fite remarks that "it is worth noting here how his critical examination differs from ours. Today I should say that the first critical question applied to a concept is, How did it originate? The second and deeper question is then, What are the human motives which find expression in the concepts (say) God, property, duty, conservation of energy? This second question at least is never asked by Plato. For him it seems that the human meaning of a concept is unimportant; and his dialectic is interested only in the formal consistency of the completed concept." Legend, 234.

128 Ibid.; see also Cornford, Republic, 222-23.

129 Fite, Legend, 234; Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato's Mathematical Imagination, Bloomington, 1954, 101-06; Cornford, Republic, 221-23; Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 151-54; in the "Line," Murphy maintains, Plato is contrasting sensible knowledge (eikasia, pistis) with intellectual knowledge (dianoia, noesis), and is not, as Ferguson thinks, contrasting the different degrees of intellectual knowledge. A. S. Ferguson, "Plato's Simile of Light," CQ, XV, July-October, 1921, 131; N. R. Murphy, "The Simile of Light in Plato's Republic," CQ, XXVI, April, 1932, 93-94.

FIGURE I
THE DIVIDED LINE

STATES OF MIND: PROCESSES	OBJECTS
<p><u>INTELLIGENCE</u> (νοῦς, νόησις)</p> <p><u>DIALECTIC:</u> Pure Reason: from hypothetical thinking to non-hypothetical principles to Forms.</p> <p><u>INTELLIGIBLE WORLD</u></p>	<p><u>FORMS</u> (αἱ ἀρχαί) Pure Essences or "first principles," Divine things, the Good, F. of Justice, Truth, etc.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><u>Socrates</u></p> <p><u>WORLD OF BEING</u> (ὄν)</p>
<p><u>THINKING</u> (διάνοια)</p> <p><u>MATHEMATICS:</u> Science: from hypothesis to conclusions.</p>	<p><u>MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS</u> (μαθηματικά): Scientific, geometrical constructions, diagrams.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><u>Glaucon</u></p>
<p><u>BELIEF</u> (πίστις)</p> <p><u>SENSE EXPERIENCE:</u></p> <p><u>VISIBLE WORLD</u></p>	<p><u>VISIBLE</u> or <u>COMMON OBJECTS</u> (ζῶα, κ.τ.λ.)</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><u>Thrasymachus</u></p> <p><u>WORLD OF BECOMING</u> (τὰ γιγνόμενα)</p>
<p><u>IMAGINATION</u> (εἰκασία)</p> <p><u>CONJECTURE:</u></p>	<p><u>IMAGES</u> (εἰκόνες) Shadows, appearance, (τὰ φαινόμενα)</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><u>Cephalus</u></p>

The following is Shorey's excellent summary of Plato's treatment of the Line.

A line unequally divided represents in its longer section the intelligible world of ideas presided over by the idea of the good, and in its shorter portion the world of sense and opinion ruled by sun. Suppose the segments of the line to be divided in the same ratio as the whole. The subdivision of the smaller may then represent at the lowest stage of reality images and reflections, and above them the so-called real objects of sense. The corresponding divisions of the intellectual world are, at the top, the domain of pure ideas apprehended by the reason and studied through the dialectical method, and below them the ideas, it is true, but ideas apprehended by discursive thought and studied by the inferior method of the sciences, 'as, e. g., mathematics. The method of science is inferior to that of dialectics in two points: (1) Science assumes hypotheses (the definitions and axioms of geometry) into the validity of which it refuses to inquire. (2) Science embodies and contemplates the ideas in sensuous images. It uses 'real' things (geometrical blocks or diagrams) as copies of the ideas which it studies, just as 'real' things themselves are copied by images and reflections in mirrors and water. Dialectic, on the other hand, deals with pure ideas undistorted by sensuous imagery; and if assumptions or hypotheses are questioned is always ready to push the inquiry back beyond hypothesis to first principles. ¹³⁰

By dialectic, therefore, Plato means the technique of philosophic conversation (δῖάλογος) carried on by asking questions and answering them, in order to attain perfect truth. ¹³¹ Its real aim is to

130 Shorey, What Plato Said, 232-33.

131 Grube, Plato's Thought, 239; Republic, VII, 534d.

arrive at such a state of mind which can render an "account" (λόγος)¹³² of some Form, as for instance, the moral Form of Justice, which he treats in this dialogue.¹³³ At this point, sense images are no longer available, and the movement of the mind is not downward, so as to deduce conclusions from premises, but rather upward, where it examines the premises themselves and reasons to the ultimate principle on which all of them depend.¹³⁴

Furthermore, the purpose of dialectic is to secure the final confirmation¹³⁵ and synthesis of mathematical knowledge¹³⁶ in conjunction

¹³² Armstrong, Introduction, 165; Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 152.

¹³³ "Dialecticians will thus grasp the Forms and finally the supreme Form. They will be able to classify things in accordance with those Forms, and will (ask questions and answer them 534d) with perfect truth and perfect logic; dialectic is the 'keystone of the whole structure of science' (534e). . . . He (the dialectician) will also be the man who sees truth as a whole, and can make correlations between different parts of it." Grube, Thought, 239-40; see also Cornford, Republic, 223.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Republic, VII, 533c-d.

¹³⁶ When the mind has arrived at knowledge of the Good by the process of dialectic "the lower sciences will also become knowledge in the highest sense to him because to him they are no longer based on the hypothetical." Grube, Plato's Thought, 26; this is expressed by Plato in Republic, VII, 511b.

with the whole of reality, which is the world of the eternal Forms.¹³⁷

There is no other method of inquiry which so systematically attempts in every instance to grasp the nature of things as they are in themselves.¹³⁸

For "when the eye of the soul is sunk in a veritable slough of ignorance, this method gently draws it forth and guides it upwards, assisted in this work of conversion by the arts we have enumerated."¹³⁹

But besides this learning of method from dialectic, the educand hopes to arrive at that state of mind, punctum stans,¹⁴⁰ which is based, not upon authority, but judicious reasoning. Only then will we have acquired steadfastness of character and not fluctuate with every changing mood. He will remain firm and thus be able to lend adequate support to everything he can build upon it.¹⁴¹

137 "The world of Forms revealed by this method of dialectic is a very complex structure, and Plato insists repeatedly in his later dialogues that it is the business of the philosopher to acquire as exact as possible a knowledge of it. He must know the contents and the divisions of the more universal Forms." Armstrong, Introduction, 45.

138 Republic, VII, 533b.

139 Ibid., 533d.

140 Lodge, Theory of Education, 206.

141 Republic, VII, 530; Meno, 80a-b; Laws, X, 885c, 886d, 888b; see also, Lodge, Theory of Education, 206.

Finally, dialectic makes us feel at home in a realm which surpasses sensual experience, and in turn, gives clarity of vision and deep insight into the meaning of reality. This the other sciences cannot give. For if science were left to itself, it would only turn the student into a technical scientist or mechanic. But for a philosophic education, to cultivate, to develop, and thus to strengthen the intellectual powers of man needed by the philosopher-king, the hypotheses of the lower sciences need to be transcended. Dialectic is the only science that can effect this. It helps in the building up of a personality devoted to goodness and truth, rather than to the mutable things of this shadow-world, as Plato calls it.¹⁴²

In the magnificence of his philosophic contemplations the ideal human being will see all life in its proper relationships to the divine and the eternal.¹⁴³ He will be a lover of learning and wisdom;¹⁴⁴ he will not be content with the multiplicity of individuals which are mere phenomena or shadows of the true world.

He will go on until he attains knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul: drawing near and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth. Then he will have

142 Lodge, Theory of Education, 223.

143 Republic, VI, 486a.

144 Ibid., 486b-d.

knowledge and will live and grow truly. His mind is fixed upon true being, his eyes directed toward things fixed and immutable, all in order moving according to reason; to these he will conform his self imitating that with which he holds reverential converse. ¹⁴⁵

Cardinal Newman expresses this same thought in his Idea of a University.

To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression . . . ¹⁴⁶

This training in dialectic is to continue for five years. It shows clearly, we believe, what Plato's concept of reality actually was and what it meant for him personally. ¹⁴⁷ Still, it ought to be remembered that these five years do not constitute the philosopher's ultimate destiny in life.

¹⁴⁵ Condensed (Republic, VI, 485d) by Lodge, Theory of Education, 223-24. Other references, Republic, VI, 490a-b, Symposium, 210d.

¹⁴⁶ Newman, Idea of a University, edit. by O'Connell, 138-39.

¹⁴⁷ "As Plato grew older he came more and more to think of reality in terms of a series of ordered worlds, 'kosmoi', the world of Forms, the visible heaven or world of the everlasting heavenly bodies, the most perfect possible image of its archetype in the world of Forms, the ideal, perfectly ordered State, the image of the visible image of heaven among men, finally the human soul, a microcosm, an image in miniature, of both heaven and the state, and moreover related to the ordering principle of the visible heaven or material universe." Armstrong, Introduction, 44.

They are just another stage of his development, although the most important ones of them all. These years are meant to prove whether or not the educand is capable of distinguishing himself as liberated from sense-perception and ready to reach out towards the eternal good.¹⁴⁸ Plato also tells us that these years are parallel in intention to the two or three years of compulsory gymnastics,¹⁴⁹ as Jaeger observes:

They are the gymnastics of dialectic; they are to the dialectic contradictions and synopses of the previous ten years what the abstract and systematic dialectic of Plato's The Statesman and The Sophist are to his more elementary early dialogues.¹⁵⁰

With this, then, we shall conclude our treatment of dialectic¹⁵¹ and move on to consider the last stage of philosophical education. This is the active life in politics.¹⁵²

Active life in some political position is the practical application of the principles the educand has gleaned during his formal years of

148 Republic, IV, 435b-c.

149 Ibid., 435e, VII, 537b.

150 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 315, 431.

151 For a fuller study of dialectic, see Stenzel, Method of Dialectic; Carmelo Librizzi, I Problemi Fondamentali della Filosofia di Platone, Padova, 1950.

152 Nettleship, Lectures, 291.

school training. It covers the period from 35 to 50,¹⁵³ and the young dialectician is entrusted with a public office so that "he may not be behind the others in practical experience."¹⁵⁴ This experience speculative wisdom cannot provide. Therefore, if the philosopher's character is to be fully rounded out and made "gentle",¹⁵⁵ he must take part in active intercourse with his fellow citizens. During this period, he is to be sent back down into the cave,¹⁵⁶ as it were, and he must be compelled to accept military commands and various other positions which are suitable to the young.¹⁵⁷ He is tested once more to see whether he is steadfast in virtue, especially in the virtues of prudence and courage. Prudence, because it means practical wisdom, or that virtue which is found in the man who knows how to apply the contemplated eternal ideas of the good to practical affairs such as government or the life in society;¹⁵⁸ courage, because it makes him

153 Republic, VII, 540a.

154 Ibid., 539e; see also, Grube, Plato's Thought, 240.

155 Hackforth, "Modification of Plan," CQ, 266; Republic, II, 375c.

156 Shorey, What Plato Said, 235; citation of Republic, VII, 539e.

157 Nettleship, Lectures, 291.

158 Above, 36-37.

strong and firm in his pursuit of true justice to be found in right order. The philosopher-king, who is to be "our" ruler and teacher, is to be a man of constant and noble character. Prudence and courage provide this magnificent trait in him.

At the end of this period of probation, then, the educand proves himself ready for the true goal of his life, which is the life of philosophy. Plato gives us a beautiful description of this life.

Then, when they are fifty,¹⁵⁹ those who have come safely through and proved the best at all points in action and in study, must be brought at last to the goal. They must lift up the eye of the soul and gaze on that which sheds light on all things; and when they have seen the Good itself, take it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the individual. . . . And so, when each generation has educated others like themselves to take their places as Guardians of the commonwealth, they will depart to the Islands of the Blest. The state will set up monuments for them and sacrifices, honoring them as divinities, if the Pythian oracle approves, or at least as men blest with a godlike spirit.¹⁶⁰

But it remains for us to study this life in detail in the next chapter, as it is the beginning and the end of the life which can only be found

159 Grube, Plato's Thought, 240.

160 Republic, VII, 540a-c.

in that which is the beginning and the end of all human endeavor--the Good.¹⁶¹ For "the true order of going to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that beauty"¹⁶² which, indeed, is the Good, man's end.¹⁶³

161 Speaking of the Good, Plato writes that it is a "thing that every soul pursues as the end of all her actions." Republic, VI, 505a.

162 Symposium, 211c-d.

163 Republic, V, 452d-e; Symposium, 201b, 204e; Lysis, 216d; Euthydemus, 301a; Cratylus, 439d; Phaedo, 100b-d.

CHAPTER III
THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE

Human life, as experience proves, consists of endless repetition of desires. The human soul seeks a real and perfect dwelling place. It desires to be perfectly happy.¹ But, if happiness is defined by philosophers as the perfect and stable possession of the good desired, it logically follows that, as long as man remains in this imperfect and mortal life, he cannot be perfectly happy, for happiness and perfection go hand in hand. Plato realizes this well. That is why the perfect personality, for him, must be endowed with the "divine" element,² which we spoke of in the preceding chapters, for the perfect human personality must be strong and

¹ Laws, IX, 870a; Euthydemus, 279d; Aristotle expresses this in a similar fashion: τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. Nicomachean Ethics, I, VII, 1098a.

² Theaetetus, 176b. See also, Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 218.

immutable in every respect.³ And the Good (τὸ Ἄγαθόν) is the source of such a nature. Human destiny, therefore, is union with the Good, which is Divine. Thus, "the gods have a care of anyone whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue."⁴ And education is the means by which a man achieves this sublime end. For this reason, Plato defines education as the art (τέχνη) or process by which "the entire soul must be turned from this changing world, until its eye can bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendor which we call the Good."⁵ Its aim is to make certain that the eye of the soul, instead of looking in the wrong direction, is guided along the way it ought to be.⁶

The end of education, however, is not as simple and clear as it may seem at first sight. It involves complex concepts which we shall endeavor to analyse and explain in the present chapter. These concepts are: (1) the nature of happiness, (2) the Good as man's ultimate end, and

3 Phaedo, 78d; Philebus, 58a.

4 Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 218; Republic, X, 613a-b.

5 Republic, VII, 518c-d; education as "art", 518d.

6 Ibid.

(3) the ideal personality embodied in the concept of the philosopher-king (φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν).⁷

The question of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is intimately connected with the problem of the function (τὸ ἔργον) and virtue (ἀρετή) of the human soul.⁸ For all things, Plato tells us, have their peculiar

7 "This οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν is perhaps the most famous sentence in Plato. For the idea Cf 499b, 540d, Laws, 711d, 712a, 713e ff. It is paraphrased by the author of the seventh Epistle (324b, 326a-b, 328a-b) who perhaps quotes Plato too frequently to be Plato himself. Epistle ii. 310e, though sometimes quoted in this connection, is not quite the same thought. It is implied in the Phaedrus 252e φιλόσοφος ^{καὶ} ἡγεμονικός, and Polit. 293c, and only seems to be contradicted in Euthydem. 306b. Aristotle is said to have contradicted it in a lost work (fr. 79, 1489b 8ff.). It is paraphrased or parodied by a score of writers from Polybius xii. 28 to Bacon, Hobbes, More, Erasmus, and Bernard Shaw. Boethius transmitted it to the Middle Ages (Cons. Phil. i. 4. 11). It was always on the lips of Marcus Aurelius. Cf. Capitol, Aurel. i. 1. and iv. 27. It was a standardized compliment to princess in Themistius, Julian, the Panegyrici Latini, and many modern imitators. Among the rulers who have been thus compared with Plato's philosophic king are Marcus Aurelius, Constantine, Arcadius, James I., Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. There is a partial history of the commonplace in T. Sinko's Program, Sententiae Platonicae de philosophis regnantibus fata quae fuerint, Krakow, 1904, in the supplementary article of Karl Praechter, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, xiv. (1905) pp. 479-491, and in the dissertation of Emil Wolff, Frans Bacons Verhåltnis zu Platon, Berlin, 1908, pp. 60 ff." Shorey, The Republic, (Loeb Classical Library), I, 508-09.

8 Commenting on the term ἔργον, Cornford writes: "The word translated 'function' is the common word for 'work'. Hence the need for illustrations / Some things have a function; a horse, for instance, is useful for certain kinds of work. Republic, I, 352e. / to confine it to the

functions and virtues to perform, and the human soul has these, too,⁹

"Take, for example, such actions as deliberating or taking charge and exercising control," these are the proper functions of the soul, although living (τὸ ζῆν) is its most important one.¹⁰

But what is the soul's specific excellence or virtue? For,

"If the soul is robbed of its peculiar virtue, it cannot possibly do its work well. It must exercise its power of controlling and taking charge well or ill according as it is itself in a good or a bad state."¹¹ Hence, justice

(δικαιοσύνη) will be the specific virtue of the soul, for it follows that the just man will live a good life, and the unjust man will not.¹² But to live a

good life constitutes well-being and happiness (εὖ ζῆν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνῃ).¹³ The just man alone can be truly happy. On the other hand,

narrower sense of 'function,' here defined for the first time." Republic, 37. Plato's definition of function reads: "Would you agree to define a thing's function in general as the work for which that thing is the only instrument of the best one?" Republic, I, 352e; for examples, see, Ibid., 352e-353d.

9 Republic, I, 353a.

10 Ibid., I, 353d.

11 Ibid., I, 353e.

12 Ibid..

13 Ibid., 345a.

injustice will bring unhappiness (ἄδικος ἄθλιος) to him who is unjust. ¹⁴

This is the fundamental argument for happiness, as Plato presents it in the Republic. Nettleship comments on this section, saying that the reasoning here is intensely abstract and all depends on the strict definition of terms. Virtue seems to be taken in two different senses, for certainly the virtue of a man and a horse are two distinct concepts. But what is the common factor in both of them that makes us call them virtue?

Can we call anything virtue which does not involve the doing well of the function, never mind what, of the agent that possesses the virtue? Is there any other sense in which we can call a thing good or bad, except that it does not do well that which it was made to do? ¹⁵

But as for Plato's own treatment of happiness, Nettleship further remarks:

Again, happiness in its largest sense, welfare, well-being, or doing well, is a complex thing, and one cannot readily describe in detail all that goes to make it up; but does it not necessarily imply that the human soul, man's vital activity as a whole, is in its best state, or is performing well the function it is made to perform? If by virtue and by happiness we mean what it seems we do mean, this consequence follows: when men are agreed that a certain sort of conduct constitutes virtue, if they mean anything at

14 Ibid.

15 Nettleship, Lectures, 42.

all, they must mean that in that conduct man finds happiness. And if a man says that what he calls virtue has nothing to do with what he calls happiness or well-being, then either in calling the one virtue he does not really mean what he says, or in calling the other happiness he does not really mean what he says. This is substantially the position that Plato takes up in this section.¹⁶

The author's analysis is correct, we believe. It remains for us, then, to formulate some working definition of happiness in order to establish a firm basis for our study of the end of Platonic education.

Happiness will consist of the following elements: τὸ ζῆν , for it implies the soul's specific function (ἔργον) of life; ἀρετή , since happiness is some form of virtue or excellence; and δίκαιοσύνη because it is that virtue which enables man to live well.¹⁷

We must further investigate what it is in the nature of justice that makes for happiness. This will be the purpose of the following section.

In the first chapter of this thesis,¹⁸ we have seen that justice is an essential quality in the character of the good man. For it is that

16 Ibid. , 42-43.

17 References to these in Plato have been cited above.

18 Above, 37-40.

virtue which gives to the soul of the good man its specific excellence. It keeps all things in their proper places. "When a man's soul is in the state it ought to be," Plato writes, "then that man is happy."¹⁹ The just man is the man of perfect ἀρετή.²⁰ And justice is the good man's chief concern. It is not a matter of external deportment that really matters, but of the inward self and of attending to all that is man's goal in life.²¹ The just man is he who...

does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts, like the terms in the proportion of a musical scale, the highest and lowest tones and the mean between them, with all the intermediate intervals. Only when he has linked those parts together in well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of many, will he be ready to go about whatever he may have to do. . . . In all these fields when he speaks of just and honorable conduct, he will mean the behavior that helps to produce and preserve this habit of mind.²²

Anything that will militate against this noble disposition of

19 Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 216.

20 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 348; reference of Republic, IV, 444c.

21 Adam, The Republic of Plato, I, 262.

22 Republic, IV, 444a.

soul, he will term unjust, and notions which hinder the desire for wisdom and harmony he will call ignorance and folly.²³

Justice is that virtue which effects spiritual unity of soul when all its parts are set in harmony under the control of right reason. This spiritual unity, moreover, will manifest itself in the outward actions of man and of the state in general.²⁴

It is, consequently, the element of harmony in justice which produces happiness, for true justice is to be found in the man who knows how to control his passions, which are the cause of evil and disorder in the soul. Such a person is considered to be truly a good man (ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ), and happiness is found only in good men. (In the Symposium Plato writes that true happiness is gained only by possession of the good.²⁵ This possession (κτῆσις) we will discuss later.)

The good man is the just man, to whom the greatest happiness is given.²⁶ This is clearly seen when the good life is compared with

23 Ibid.

24 Adam, Republic of Plato, I, 262.

25 Symposium, 204e.

26 Republic, IX, 580b, also the Laws, II, 664b.

the life of the despot. Cornford comments on this.

The man whose soul is under the despotism of a master passion is the unhappiest by three tests of well-being: freedom, wealth, and security from fear. His unlimited license to 'do what he likes' is not genuine freedom, which consists in doing what the true, i. e., the reasonable, self wills for the good of the whole man. (In the Gorgias 466 ff. Socrates argues against Polus that the autocrat is least of all men able to do what he wills in this sense.) No man is rich whose desires can never be satisfied. The despot, moreover, as the enemy of mankind, must live haunted by fear.²⁷

Man's happiness, therefore, in Plato's philosophy, consists in the living of a good life, which is the life of virtue, for which philosophic education is intended. "The happy life is, in brief, the principle of 'the good' in conscious, self-directed activity."²⁸

In chapter one we analysed the metaphysics of virtue and saw that Plato identified it with knowledge. We must know, then, what is the precise relationship between virtue as knowledge and man's happiness.

As we have seen, virtue comes to mean knowledge because it is the art of living. In the light of this, man must realize the true

27 Cornford, Republic, 301.

28 Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 390.

significance of happiness as the goal of his life. He must know the correct means to attain it and thus have all his actions to contribute towards this goal.²⁹ But only those means will be valid which are directly associated with the end. Pertinent to the point is Wild's comment.

Life, like art, is rationally directed procedure. Like art, it involves an end which dictates a certain formal structure, which in turn dictates the active disposition of a certain matter--verbally distinguished from technical procedure as action or behavior. The essential difference lies in the fact that all these elements are bound together in one and the same substantial structure, whereas the arts are only loosely joined together in a hierarchy.³⁰

In a note Wild adds the following:

Thus Aristotle begins his account of φρόνησις (Nicomachean Ethics, 1140 A 25) by pointing out that it involves the ability to plan well, concerning what is good and advantageous, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, ἢ ἰσχύον, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως.³¹

To live well, then, man must live in conformity with his end.³² A man's actions, consequently, would be misdirected if he were of the opinion that wealth or power or sense pleasure were his real and

29 Wild, Theory of Man, 89.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 391

ultimate end. Taylor remarks that:

Pleasure attends our progress to the 'good,' but not our fruition of it; that will be the 'neutral' condition, painless but not pleasurable. This is what is meant by the view that pleasure is always 'becoming,' never is 'being.'³³

Pleasure, for this reason, since it is not being, cannot be an end. Because it is not being, it cannot be considered good, and as such, cannot be appetible. Furthermore, in Platonic philosophy, pleasure, at most, can only be a means to an end, never really an end in itself.

Plato also tells us that society as a whole, if it is to attain happiness, should be governed by perfect men³⁴ who have learned, through a long³⁵ and difficult process of education,³⁶ not only the true goal of man's life, but the real meaning of the good in all its forms, as existing in the ordinary means to be used by man if he wishes finally to arrive at happiness, the Supreme Good. Thus by virtuous living, which is good, man attains his final destiny. For virtue is the source of all man's good

33 Taylor, Plato, 428; cf. Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 393.

34 Fite, Platonic Legend, 136; Republic, VI, 503a.

35 Republic, VI, 504d.

36 Fite, Platonic Legend, 137; Jaeger, Paideia, II, 267; H. W. B. Joseph, Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic, London, 1949, 4.

actions.³⁷ Plato says:

Virtue does not have its origin in things and possessions, but rather, things, possessions, and all other human goods whether public or private, have their origin in virtue.³⁸

Virtue keeps the soul's parts in order and thus makes for a happy and peaceful life. Such is the life worth living (βίος βιωτός).

To this Plato adds:

People think that all the luxury and wealth and power in the world cannot make life worth living when the body constitution is going to rack and ruin; and are we to believe that, when the very principle whereby we live is deranged and corrupted, life will be worth living so long as a man can do as he wills, and wills to do anything rather than to free himself from vice and wrong-doing and to win justice and virtue?³⁹

But this is an absurd question, Plato asserts. And we all agree with him, for virtue, which is knowledge of the Good, constitutes the true basis for man's happiness. Hence, we must then analyse what the precise nature of the Good is, if, as Plato maintains, it is that which all men

37 Wild, Theory of Man, 90.

38 Apology, 30b 2. Quoted in Wild, Theory of Man, 90.

39 Republic, IV, 445a-b.

pursue in life.⁴⁰

Plato's positive doctrine concerning the Good is contained in the seventh book of the Republic, in sections 506d to 509c. But we cannot divorce the interpretation of it from that of the whole passage to the end of the book. That much controversy besets many parts of this section, is the opinion of Joseph,⁴¹ but Plato's general position regarding the Good remains clear. "The Good," according to Joseph's analysis of the passage, "is the μέγιστον μάθημα, to a knowledge of which rulers of the city must attain, if they are to know the nature of their task and carry it out."⁴²

In his explanation of the Good, Plato says that some philosophers identify the Good with pleasure. But, in the long run, they themselves must confess that such an opinion is tenuous, because even some pleasures are evil.⁴³ Another group tells us that knowledge is the Good of man.⁴⁴ Plato answers them, that since knowledge must have an object, which can only be the good, they define the very term they wish to be defined.

40 Demos, Philosophy of Plato, 72; reference to Republic, IV, 506a.

41 Joseph, Knowledge and Good in Republic, 13.

42 Ibid.

43 Republic, VI, 505b-c, and 506b.

44 Ibid.

Therefore, man's Good cannot be identified with knowledge.⁴⁵ The first position is ridiculous, Plato says, and the second leads us into equal perplexity.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, men are sometimes content with the mere appearance of justice or beauty and say that it is the Good of man. But when they actually come to the Good, they desire what is really so and are no longer content with belief (δόξα).

Challenged to define the Good, Socrates admits that he cannot do so off-hand. But he is willing to describe the source of the Good. He proceeds then with a parallel between the sun and the Idea of the Good.⁴⁷ The cause of light in the physical world is the sun, and light is essential to sight,⁴⁸ which is the noblest of man's senses.⁴⁹ I quote the important passage of the Republic at length.

It was the Sun, then, that I meant when I spoke of that offspring which the Good has created in the visible world, to stand there in the same relation to vision and visible things

45 Ibid.

46 Grube, Plato's Thought, 73; Republic, VI, 506c.

47 Joseph, Knowledge and Good in Republic, 14; Grube, Plato's Thought, 23, 66.

48 Cornford, Republic, 219; citing Timaeus, 45b, 67c.

49 Grube, Plato's Thought, 23; Republic, VI, 508b.

as that which the Good itself bears in the intelligible world to intelligence and to intelligible objects.

How is that? You must explain further.

You know what happens when the colors of things are no longer irradiated by the daylight, but only by the fainter luminaries of the night: when you look at them, the eyes are dim and seem almost blind, as if there were no unclouded vision in them. But when you look at things on which the Sun is shining, the same eyes see distinctly and it becomes evident that they do contain the power of vision.

Certainly.

Apply this comparison, then, to the soul. When its gaze is fixed upon an object irradiated by Truth and reality, the soul gains understanding and knowledge and is manifestly in possession of intelligence. But when it looks towards that twilight world of things that come into existence and pass away, its sight is dim and it has only opinions and beliefs which shift to and fro, and now it seems like a thing that has no intelligence.

That is true.

This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to him who knows them his power of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of Goodness. It is the cause of knowledge and truth; . . . And, just as in our analogy light and vision were to be thought of as like the Sun, but not identical with it, so here both knowledge and truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify either with the Good is wrong.⁵⁰

50 Republic, VI, 508c-d.

The parallel is clear. The sun supplies light in the physical world so that the eye of man can see. Similarly, in the intelligible world, the Good is that from which we derive knowledge and truth, and the mind that knows. ⁵¹

The Good, moreover, enables the soul to function wisely. It helps it ascend higher to its full stature through an understanding of reality and a participation in a world of true being. This creator of rational goodness or virtue, therefore, can be no other than the "Form of the Good as it is in itself." ⁵² It is the cause of intelligence, intelligibility, and intelligible things. ⁵³ Thus, the Good, is called a Form because it is the object of human knowledge. ⁵⁴ It also quickens man's capacities for understanding and perceiving reality, just as the sun enables the powers of the eye to see. ⁵⁵

Hence, the Good holds a unique position in the acquisition of

⁵¹ Joseph, Knowledge and Good, 14-15; Grube, Thought, 24.

⁵² Republic, VI, 508d.

⁵³ Joseph, Knowledge and the Good in Republic, 18.

⁵⁴ Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 163.

knowledge in Platonic psychology; for the Good, as has been seen, is the cause of reality (ἀλήθεια), of being itself (ὄν),⁵⁶ and all that is intelligible.⁵⁷ We must consider, then, just how the fact of goodness renders a thing intelligible. Joseph notes:

and this is, of course, at the same time to say that the apprehension of that goodness gives us knowledge, or makes us understand. If we find anything evil, or indifferent and worthless, we ask why it should be, as we do not ask about what is good. The same reason in man which rebels against contradiction rebels against evil; and does not find intelligible what is evil, any more than what is contradictory. Coherence by itself is not enough. This is why we speak of the 'problem of evil': we should not speak correspondingly of a problem of good. In that we acquiesce and are content; but what is evil we seek a reason why it is not otherwise. In this way ethical and metaphysical issues run together.⁵⁸

Although the Good is the highest of Forms,⁵⁹ yet it is something more than a Form. As the single transcendent reality of absolute

55 Anderson, Argument of Plato, 105-106; references of Republic, V, 476e-579a, VI, 507b-509d.

56 Taylor, Plato, 286.

57 Armstrong, Introduction, 39.

58 Joseph, Knowledge and Good in Republic, 18-19.

59 "Die höchste, alle anderen Ideen und selbst die der Wahrheit und der Schönheit überragende Idee, ist aber die des Guten." Dietrich Becker, Das Philosophische Entstehen Platon's, Freiburg, 1862, 161; also Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 153-59.

perfection, it is the ultimate cause and reason for the existence of the universe.⁶⁰ It is important to note, however, that the Good is not identifiable with the God who governs and orders the visible world, although it is something like what we mean by God.⁶¹ God, in Platonic philosophy, is a Soul, not a Form.⁶² Rutenber's comment on the nature of God, in Plato, is pertinent here. He states:

God, the divine soul, differs not in kind but in degree only from human souls (Phaedr. 247d, Phil. 30a f. Cf. Tim. 51a-d). He, too, is energized by a perfect contemplation of the realm of forms, which includes a form of life.

Participation in this form of life or motion constitutes God an eternal, living soul. God's very being as a self-mover is maintained by this participation in a form of motion (cf. Soph. 254a, where a form of motion is mentioned). The essence of God is νοῦς, so his essential being is thinking being and his essential motion is thought (cf. the Demiurge of the Timaeus, Phil. 28e, but especially Laws, 896e f, 897d). He thinks the forms and

60 "Nichts Schönes, nichts Wahres und Seiendes gibt es, was nicht an der Idee des Guten Theil hätte und von ihr herstammte. Alles was ist und was erscheint, hat die Schönheit seiner Erscheinung, hat den Grad seines Seins vom Guten. Das Gute ist darum der centralste und universalste Begriff des Göttlichen. We diese Idee erfasst hat, steht auf der Höhe aller Ideen und hat das eigentliche Wesen der Welt begriffen und den Grund von Allem erkannt." Becker, Philosophische, 161; also Armstrong, Introduction, 39.

61 Republic, VI, 508e.

62 Armstrong, Introduction, 39. For a thorough study of God and the divine element in Plato, see René Mugnier, Le Sens du Mot ΟΕΙΟΣ chez Platon, Paris, 1930.

thinks them truly because he thinks them as they really are (Phaedr. 247d f). The goodness of God, which is an attribute constantly stressed in the dialogues (Phil. 22c, Tim. 29e, Rep. Bk. 2, Laws Bk. 10 et al.), is derivative from the wisdom which the intuition of the forms gives him. The form of the Good is the light by which he 'sees', since the Good is the cause of the intelligibility of the forms, but it is also the complete content of God's mind since the Good is that which gives to the forms their being.⁶³

The Good, furthermore, as the absolute principle of value,⁶⁴ contains within itself the ideal of human nature, and thus also the ideal of the virtues of that same nature.⁶⁵ As a result, its function is that of

⁶⁶ It is the criterion by which man judges his actions. Lodge's observation clarifies the point.

The ethical life . . . seeks to realize value; but what could be more valuable than the life which consistently realizes the maximal value-potentialities of its organism, and applies the principle of value itself in its thoughts, words, and works? The ethical life seeks a firm basis in objective values; but what life could be more firmly based than the life which rests upon the

⁶³ Rutenber, Imitation of God, 34-35.

⁶⁴ Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 393.

⁶⁵ Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 180-81.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 181.

principle of ultimate reality and forms itself entirely upon the nature of the world which is real in the deepest sense?⁶⁷

The Good, consequently, is that which every soul by nature pursues and constitutes as the end (τέλος) of all its activity.⁶⁸ But, as Copleston remarks, it is not an unrealized τέλος, a non-existent goal to be achieved in life. It is, on the contrary, an existent end, "an ontological Principle, the Supremely Real, the perfect Exemplary Cause, the Absolute or One."⁶⁹ Indeed, it is the greatest and best of being.⁷⁰

The Good is the saving principle in man's life⁷¹ and confers happiness upon him in all his morally good acts.⁷² In the Symposium, Plato states that it is also the object of desire in love, because love is the everlasting possession of the Good. Whence it is that all men will

67 Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 393.

68 Anderson, Argument of Plato, 153; citations of Republic, VI, 506a; Gorgias, 468b-c, 499a-b; Philebus, 20d.

69 Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 181; citations of Republic, VI, 507b, VII, 540a.

70 Republic, VII, 515e.

71 Ibid., X, 609b.

72 Symposium, 204e.

necessarily desire immortality together with the Good, for love by nature seeks that which is immortal.⁷³ But immortality will only be had by him in the next life when he is finally united to the object of his love in the life of immortality.

Inspired by the vision and love of the Supreme Good,⁷⁴ then, man will be compelled by it to direct all his actions to attain it.⁷⁵ He will therefore be required to have knowledge of the Good,⁷⁶ which consists in the intuitive contemplation of this sublime end.⁷⁷ Schoder observes regarding the nature of this contemplation:

This contemplation (θεωρία) is the very soul of philosophy. Such is its sweetness that, as St. Thomas was to repeat later, the more one tastes of it the greater grows the desire. It is essentially an apprehension of abstract, unchanging, ever-abiding realities, to be acquired not by mere sense-knowledge or conjecture, but only by discursive reason and intuition.⁷⁸

73 Ibid., 206a, 207a.

74 Cornford, Republic, 215.

75 Republic, VI, 505a.

76 Ibid., 505a-b.

77 Demos, Philosophy of Plato, 73; Rutenber, Imitation of God, 63, 66.

78 Schoder, "Philosophic Life," 4; citation of St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, 3. 25.

Cornford gives us an amplification of this intuitive knowledge, as Plato would have us understand it. The author states that:

The knowledge is of a kind in which the soul is united with the harmonious order it knows, an insight which harmonizes the soul's own nature and illuminates the entire field of truth. Up to that point the philosopher has used his power of intuition . . . but only at that moment does he 'begin to have νοῦς .' He becomes a god, knowing the true from the false, the good from the evil, and incapable of error and wrong-doing.⁷⁹

This intuitive contemplation, which has for its object the Good itself, is the goal towards which all men must aspire and which is the end of philosophic education. Man must know the Good and in turn become like to the gods. Indeed, he must assimilate himself reverently to what reason reveals as the nature of the divine.⁸⁰ The life of the philosopher depicted by Plato satisfies the demands of the happy life.

Philosophic education, therefore, in the Platonic sense, is a truly liberal education, for knowledge, as is obvious in this case, is had for its own sake, because man's happiness consists in it. Man unites himself to the divine by such knowledge. The end of education must therefore

79 F. M. Cornford, "Mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic 6-7," Mind, XLI, 1932, 190.

80 Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 393.

be sought in virtuous living. But virtue is knowledge. Virtue is also the basis for the good life and the happy life. Moreover, virtue, knowledge, the Good, and happiness are an inseparable unity, in the Platonic ideal, and can be realized only in the philosopher, who is the Platonic ideal in the fullest sense of the word.

"Such, then, is man's true good, the good life, εὐδαιμονία, and the compelling motive in the search for it is Eros, the desire or longing for the good or happiness."⁸¹

⁸¹ Copleston, History of Philosophy, 217.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERMANENT RELEVANCE OF PLATO'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY

This completes our study of the philosophy of Platonic education, which we have considered in the light of the four factors of education. We give a brief recapitulation of the preceding material here. It will help us better to understand and appreciate the nature and purpose of the philosophic life as a whole.

Chapter one dealt with the first factor, the educand, or the basic material of education in need of transformation. Analysing the nature of the educand, we saw that man is composed of two principles of being, body and soul. The more important one of these is naturally the soul. Hence, the emphasis on the psychological aspect of human nature.

We analyzed the soul and found that it had certain characteristic qualities, such as immortality, the desire for happiness and the Good, to mention but two. And although immutable, it was found to be made up of parts or psychological tendencies: reason, spirit, and appetite. The task

of education consisted in achieving harmony between these disparate elements. And so, with the spirited element as its ally, reason was to keep the lower inordinate passions of man under control. For when reason reigns, there exists true and perfect harmony in the human soul. We say that this is virtue, particularly the virtue of justice.¹

Devoting our attention to a study of virtue, we discovered that it was the basic code of morality in Platonic ethics. Virtue meant knowledge because it was the art of correct living. Moreover, because knowledge in this case had for its object the Good as such, it was the cause of the good and virtuous life. A study of the four important cardinal virtues followed.

Chapter two took up the other two factors, the educator, the directive principle of education, and the methods, the means by which the educand was to be guided and directed towards his ultimate end. The

¹ "Auch die Seele des Einzelnen ist nur dann gerecht, wenn jeder dieser ihrer Teile das Seinige tut, also eine naturgewollte Ordnung in ihr waltet: die Vernunft die Führung hat, der Mut, das Gefühl ihr zur Seite steht, das als richtig Erkannte treulich, standhaft und tapfer durchführt, und die Begierden trotz des ihnen einwohnenden Hanges zu massloser Ausbreitung von der Einsicht beherrscht und eingeschränkt werden." Kurt Schilling, Platon, Wurzach, 1948, 132.

curriculum of liberal education was established and considered in detail.

We have seen how each of the stages of philosophic education in Plato contributed its share towards a fuller maturing of the educand's personality. Again, moderation or balance of soul was the objective of this type of training, for in this consisted man's happiness. The just man is the truly happy man.

Finally, in the third chapter, we discussed in detail the nature of the end of education, which we said to be happiness. But happiness belonged to the philosophic life exclusively. All other forms of happiness were only imitations of it.

Union with the Supreme Good constituted the happy life. Thus, with the vision of the Good and beautiful inspiring him on to the virtuous life, the philosopher-educand consecrated his time and eager efforts to the possession of this sublime destiny. His was the task of lifting his heart towards things divine, "for no man can be a god, I think, but divine, yes."² Such men, in Platonic terminology, were philosophers, the perfect embodiment of the human ideal.

² Republic, III, 416e, VII, 520c-521b; Laws, V, 742a; Critias, 112c.

The philosopher's character is full of grandeur--intolerant of all lies, unfettered by sense pleasures, royally free from all pettiness, broad and acute of mind, unafraid of death, scornful of gain, well-ordered. Now all this flows from his whole-souled contemplation of truth / "liberal education" / -- all truth and all being, both human and divien. For no man is truly a philosopher unless he covets wisdom in its totality, albeit whoever possesses that totality (e. g., the gods) should rather be called simply 'wise' than 'philosopher,' which means 'courter of wisdom.'³

The philosopher's greatest pleasure consists in the grand enjoyment of the vision of beauty. No other life has comparable delights to offer. In the Symposium Plato writes:

When a man has been thus far tutored in the lore of love, passing from view to view of beautiful things, in the right and regular ascent, suddenly he will have revealed to him, as he draws to the close of his dealings in love, a wondrous vision, beautiful in its nature; and this, Socrates, is the final object of all these previous toils.⁴

Plato then goes on to describe the nature of so marvelous an end. Man cannot stop short of the Beautiful, for the Beautiful is identical with the Good,⁵ which is man's ultimate end. The Beautiful is, first of all,

³ Schoder, "Philosophic Life," 4; citations of Republic, VI, 485d-486b, 475b; Theaetetus, 174e-175b; Symposium, 204a.

⁴ Symposium, 210e-211a.

⁵ Republic, V, 452e, Lysis, 216d; Symposium, 201b, 204e; Cratylus, 439d-e; Euthydemus, 301a; Phaedo, 100b-d.

everlasting...

and neither comes to be nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes; next, it is not beautiful in part and in part ugly, nor is it such at such a time and other at another, nor in one respect beautiful and in another ugly, nor so affected by position as to seem beautiful to some and ugly to others. Nor again will our initiate find the beautiful presented to him in the guise of a face or of hands or any other portion of the body, nor as a particular description or portion of knowledge, nor as existing somewhere in another substance, such as an animal or the earth or the sky or any other thing; but existing ever in singularity of form independent by itself, while all the multitude of beautiful things partake of it in such wise that, though all of them are coming to be and perishing, it grows neither greater nor less, and is affected by nothing.⁶

The philosopher, whose desire is this glorious vision of the beautiful, is indeed the just man, for his soul exists in perfect harmony with the body. He is the best of men and the most righteous, Plato asserts, and is also the most kingly. Reason, being the ruling principle of his soul, makes him king and master over himself: τοῦτον δ'εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτα-
τόν τε καὶ βασιλεύοντα .⁷ As his name indicates, he is a lover of

⁶ Symposium, 211a-b.

⁷ Republic, IX, 580c.

wisdom and all knowledge,⁸ --not in part only, but in whole. "After all, the philosopher is essentially a lover of wisdom, and it is characteristic of a lover that he wants as much of whatever he loves as he can get."⁹

That the philosopher must also be a man of rare gifts is Plato's stipulation for the ideal personality. He cannot be a man whose... qualities like ready understanding, a good memory, sagacity, quickness, together with a high-spirited, generous temper, are seldom combined with willingness to live a quiet life of sober constancy. . . . Confronted with intellectual work, they become comatose and do nothing but yawn.¹⁰

The philosopher must rather be a man completely devoted to the pursuit of his end--truth, beauty, and goodness. His must be the perfectly virtuous life. Fifty years have been spent in preparing for it. During all this time he was being proved in the powers of his intellect and

⁸ A philosopher by definition is a lover of all wisdom, a lover of all truth and beauty and being (Phaedr. 248d, 249c f; Rep. 485a ff). As such he has no ulterior motive for his efforts than the assimilation of himself to the truth (Rep. 533b-c, 490a-b). By participating in wisdom the philosopher assimilates himself to God, growing in divinity and likeness to God (Taylor, Plato, 191). The secular and temporal self is re-made in the likeness of the eternal (Ibid., p. 192, commenting on Phaedo 78b-84b). Reference of Republic, V, 475b.

⁹ Harvanek, Portrait of a Philosopher, 35. For a fuller treatment of the idea of "lover," see 15 ff.

¹⁰ Republic, VI, 503c-d.

the strength of his character, whether he can endure being pulled this way and that, or whether he will flinch at all. But it is only when he has passed this severe testing successfully that he will be able to turn the eye of his soul heavenward and behold the all absorbing object of his love, the very Good itself.¹¹

Then, at last, the world will lie open before his mind, well-ordered and intelligible, connected and pervaded by a single unifying principle which he can discern in many forms and combinations,¹² but can distinguish from all the others. The shadows and appearances of everyday life will manifest their true meaning for him, for he will see through them, and led by them, come to know the realities which they reflect.¹³ The isolated and self-contradictory maxims of popular morality he will interpret as insights into perfection. Human nature suggests these to him all his life, even though he does not realize it.¹⁴ The separate sciences will no longer talk to him "in dreams"¹⁵ and fleeting visions. They will point

11 Ibid., VII, 540a.

12 Ibid., VII, 534c; V, 476a.

13 Ibid., VII, 520c.

14 Ibid., VI, 501b.

15 Ibid., VII, 533c.

beyond to an everlasting vision of truth and absolute being.¹⁶ This he will achieve because he is a lover of wisdom and truth.

Philosophy will be, not a cunning device of words or an occupation for a listless hour, but the articulate language of truth which a lifetime is too short for learning. Only eternity can interpret that language fully, but to understand it is the nearest approach to heaven upon earth, and to study it is true education.¹⁷

In addition to all this, the philosopher is a man of unique intellectual ability, quick apprehension, and real devotion to study. He is averse to all trivial details. Rather, he is always anxious to view reality as a complete whole. He looks down on fleeting time and changing-sense perceptions from a great height. He does not cherish his life for its own sake. His interests do not lie in external goods. Pomp and circumstance are foreign to his ways of thinking. Steadfast of character and always determined to act rightly, he is magnanimous in all the things that he does either for himself or for the benefit of others. And he possesses considerable charm too. The philosopher is, indeed, "a friend and kinsman" of truth, justice, courage, temperance, and above all, of prudence; the

16 Nettleship, Theory of Education, 143-44.

17 Ibid., 144; citations of Republic, VI, 498c-d, and VII, 519c.

virtue which makes man man. The philosopher is essentially one who loves God, as Saint Augustine writes: "Plato dicit amatorem Deie esse philosophum."¹⁸ The philosopher's qualities are then summed up in the simple but no less profound phrase καλὸς κάγαθός .¹⁹ The philosopher is a perfect gentleman.²⁰

Because it is of the very essence of his philosophical studies to make him desire union with the divine, the philosopher is the true imitator of God.²¹ His soul yearns to form itself by striving towards wisdom. "If there is any progress towards a higher level of being and

¹⁸ Saint Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VIII, 11, in Patrologia Latina, J. P. Migne, 41, Paris, 236.

¹⁹ Jaeger notes: "Rep. 489c. In Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics (which in this as in other things is closely connected with Plato) the man of perfect arete, who unites all 'parts of arete' in himself, is characterized by possessing kalokagathia (8. 3. 1248b8). In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle dropped this, as he dropped other Platonic ideas. It is important especially for one who, like Plato, is accustomed to regard his philosophy as paideia, to note that the philosophos of Plato is simply the kaloskagathos resurrected and inspired by the spirit of Socrates--the kaloskagathos who was the highest cultural ideal of the classical Greek period." Paideia, II, 413-14; see also, Paideia, I, 1, and 316 (kalogathia = gentlemanly character).

²⁰ Jaeger, Paideia, II, 268; also Vol. I, 316.

²¹ Rutenber, Imitation of God, 58; Phaedo, 278d.

therewith to higher perfection, then that progress is, as Plato says in the Theaetetus, 'becoming like God.'²² Rutenber expresses his idea thus:

At death the philosopher alone can gain entrance to the communion of the gods (82b-c), for he is most like them of all men (Phaedr. 248d). The philosopher has a reality greater than that of all other men; in fact, all other men can be hierarchically scaled according to the degree to which they adumbrate the being of the philosopher (Phaedr. 248d f. Cf. Meno, 100a).²³

In the light of the Platonic portrait, therefore, there should be no mystery about the aim of true education in Plato's ideal State. It is clear that, for him, the true objective of philosophic training is union with the divine in the life of eternal immortality. The underlying motive of the philosopher's love is to grasp the meaning of, as much as he can, and enjoy the everlasting vision of the Beautiful and the Good which lead him up to God. But, clearly, such eternal enjoyment can only be had in the perfect life, when the soul is no longer bound down to the senses of the body.²⁴

22 Jaeger, Paideia, II, 296; Theaetetus, 176a.

23 Rutenber, Imitation of God, 58.

24 Grube, Plato's Thought, 127. Librizzi amplifies this idea. "Che la soluzione del problema morale--considerato come problema della liberazione dell'anima da ogni impulso disarmonico e malefico, sensibile o malefico, sensibile o materiale, e quindi, in fondo, del libero arbitrio, fine ultimo delle aspirazioni razionali in quanto implicante la libera e serena contemplazione dell 'Eterno Bene e la massima beatitudine--

The soul must exist in a state of perfect freedom, so that it can be free to rise upwards²⁵ and become like to God, in whom the philosopher finds his happiness.²⁶ Such is the life of immortality.

The question arises, what then did Plato understand by the concept of immortality? Lodge's interpretation seems most in accord with ancient philosophy. We shall quote him on this directly.

It [immortality] is, of course, an 'idea.' The easiest way of approach to its meaning is to say that it is a kind of life lived by the 'immortals,' i. e., the kind of life lived by Zeus, Hera, Athene, and the other gods,

si trovi al centro di tutte le indagini platoniche, è cosa ormai che dovrebbe risultare evidente. La ricerca dei motivi che hanno spinto Dio a costruire il mondo o l'altra riguardante la vera scienza, come le ricerche intorno al vero bello o allo Stato perfetto, ecc., tutto ciò non ha altra meta, nel pensiero speculativo del sommo Filosofo, che rendere possibile un perfetto innalzamento della spiritualità morale dell'uomo al fine di liberare l'anima, o lo spirito, da ogni comune e consueta falsa visione e di risospingerla al mondo perfetto e divino." Librizzi, Filosofia di Platone, 113.

25 Anderson, Argument of Plato, 122.

26 "Now it is sufficiently clear that this conception of homolosis (becoming like to God), as the central fact to Plato of the religious life, involves, that is to say, both the knowing what God is and the bringing together of God and man." Paul Elmer More, The Religion of Plato, London, 1921, 38; see also Schoder, "Philosophic Life," 7, and Anderson, Argument of Plato, 113. St. Augustine expressed this notion in Plato: "Si ergo Plato huius imitatore, cognitore, amatore dixit esse sapientem, cuius participatione sit beatus, quid opus est excutere caeteros?" De Civitate Dei, VIII, 5, P. L., 41, 229.

and shared in, though to a lesser extent, by the demigods recognized by Greek mythology.²⁷

Lodge proceeds to examine what are the chief characteristics of this life. He says that it has two sides or aspects. On the one hand, it consists in the contemplation of the eternal ideas in the heaven beyond the physical heaven, namely, the intellectual world which is apart from the space-time world of sun, moon, and stars.²⁸ In other words, the soul, after its separation from the body, is immortal in so far as it assimilates itself to the divine in the contemplation of the eternal ideas. The divine essence is indeed, as Lodge states, holiness, justice, and wisdom. This means that the acts of divine beings, therefore, are always patterns of virtuous action²⁹ which the philosopher is to make the rule of his life.

On the other hand, the activity in the space-time world which constitutes the other aspect of the immortal life, is not something in which the gods have no concern. There is a definite relation between gods and men, as is obvious from the study of ancient Greek mythology itself.

27 Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 395. See also: Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 214-15, and C. Ritter, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, New York, 1933, 282.

28 Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 398.

29 Ibid., 396.

The activity which they have is a portion of their 'work', in doing which they realize themselves. Plato always insists upon this activity.³⁰ We quote Lodge's explanation of the meaning of the term 'work' in this connection.

Each /immortal/ has his own work to do, and fulfills his especial function in harmonious co-operation with the rest.³¹ The inspiration for this work is drawn from contemplation of the eternal ideas in the intellectual place, which lies altogether outside the merely physical universe. It is especially the ideas of courage, temperance, holiness, justice, and wisdom which inspire them.³²

It is certain that Plato believed in the immortality of the human soul. He gives us a number of proofs establishing the fact,³³ but we shall study only one of them here. Treatments of his other more elaborate proofs are referred to in the notes below.³⁴ Chaignet gives an excellent

30 Ibid.; References of Republic, X, 612e; Laws X, 899d.

31 Republic, III, 378b; Phaedo, 247a; Cratylus, 109b; Laws, XII, 941b.

32 Lodge, Theory of Ethics, 396.

33 Phaedo, 70d-72e, 72e-77d, 78b-80e, 103c-107a; Phaedrus, 245c; Laws, X, 896a-b.

34 Anderson, Argument of Plato, 122; Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 212-15; Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London, 2-3; A. J. Festugière, Contemplation et Vie Contemplative selon Platon, Paris, 1936, 90-94; Fraser, Growth of Theory, 54; Grube, Plato's Thought, 138; More, Religion, 59.

summary of the proof presented by Plato in the Republic.

Le mal du corps est la dissolution: une substance ne peut périr par le mal d'une autre substance: or la substance de l'ame est spirituelle et non materielle comme celle du corps, donc l'ame n'est point sujette à la dissolution que ne peut point atteindre ce qui est simple et sans parties.³⁵

At the very end of the Apology, Socrates turns to the judges who have voted for his acquittal and confides to them the mood in which he departs this world. Death, he says, is one of two things, both good. Death is either a dreamless sleep, or it is a transportation to a happier region where one will meet and cross examine the great dead,³⁶ and this he believes to be the more probable opinion. But death, for sure, is not the end of all.³⁷ It is, indeed, another life. It must never be feared by the philosopher,³⁸ for the wise man fears nothing.³⁹ Death is but the beginning of a new and

35 A. -Ed. Chaignet, La Psychologie de Platon, Paris, 1862, 203.

36 Ronald B. Levinson, In Defense of Plato, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, 65; citation of Apology, 40b-41c.

37 Phaedo, 107e.

38 Republic, III, 386a-387d.

39 Apology, 25, 35; Phaedo, 62-68.

happier life.⁴⁰ In Plato, it is a belief in the immortality of the human soul that gives the final touch to his educational theory and to all his ethical teaching. This is the conclusion we draw from the above. There is an intimate connection here with his conception of progress as the ultimate good of man. It is "the glory of going on and still to be."⁴¹

The ideal personality, in Platonic philosophy, is exemplified in the true philosopher: "lover of wisdom, lover of truth, lover of the beautiful and the good." Such is the man of perfect virtue, whose beautiful and good life is spent entirely in gleaning the fruits of his labors, of generous study and sacrifice. A man of virtue, he wills to communicate it to others.

With Plato, the man of virtue was the one who contributed to and shared in the 'good' or 'virtue' represented by the community. To Plato, education meant the systematic attempt to transmit this virtue to posterity.⁴²

40 Shorey, What Plato Said, 82-3.

41 R. K. Gaye, The Platonic Conception of Immortality and Its Connection with the Theory of Ideas, London, 1904, 257.

42 John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan, A Catholic Philosophy of Education, Milwaukee, 1948, 419.

This is true according to the old dictum that "man is by nature a social animal." Men have a common end and they have common needs which can only be met if there are many living together in a society.

The philosopher's is a twofold reward. Here upon earth it consists in the happy and virtuous life, living for himself and for others, but always keeping in view that he must go farther. His ultimate end is essentially becoming like to God--ὁμοίωσις θεῶ.

The ultimate step in Plato's praise of philosophy is that it brings man to the supreme beatitude of likeness to God and blissful sharing in the unending divine life--not in a supernatural degree, of course, to the utmost of man's capacity. The faithful philosopher we are assured, finds a welcome to the blessed isles of the gods after death, and this may become his permanent everlasting guerdon. For the philosophic life is essentially a becoming like to God (ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῶ), by way of becoming righteous and holy in imitation of those grand realities which the philosopher's mind has first grasped in concept. This is the true wisdom and worth, before which all human cleverness fades into menial craft, and from which the workers of iniquity exclude themselves unto everlasting damnation among other fools of their kind. ⁴³

The philosopher's ideal is, indeed, the noble life of virtue--in justice, goodness, wisdom, and truth. Never shall that man be left un-

43 Schoder, "Philosophic Life," 7; citations of Gorgias, 526c; Theaetetus, 176a-d; Laws, 716c-d; Republic, VI, 500c, X, 613a-b.

cared for by the gods. He desires to become just, and by devoting his life to virtue, he becomes like to God so far as in his power lies. ⁴⁴

"Higher than this no man can go, except to learn from Revelation what deeper depths of grandeur the ideal may contain, and by God's pity to achieve it." ⁴⁵

* * * * *

In conclusion, we shall endeavor to correlate our analysis of Plato's principles of education with Cardinal Newman's excellent definition of a liberal education. Although this definition was quoted in the introductory part of this thesis, we shall restate it again here.

A liberal education, Newman writes, is one which produces "a philosophical habit of mind and..."

which lasts through life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, wisdom... ⁴⁶

Before comparing this definition with Plato's philosophic ideal, it is necessary that we say something about Newman's liberal education in general. Harrold will be our source for this.

45 Schoder, "Philosophic Life," 7.

46 Newman, Idea of a University, edited by O'Connell, 120.

The author begins by taking a negative approach to the study of Newman. He says that one of the best ways to study the celebrated churchman's theory of a liberal education is first to see what such an education is not.⁴⁷ Harrold summarises Newman on this point.

He tells us, for one thing, that it is not a 'loading of the memory of the student with a mass of undigested knowledge.' It is not 'an unmeaning profusion of subjects . . . implying a smattering in a dozen branches of study'; . . . Nor is it cultivation of the intellect achieved by what is popularly known as 'seeing the world, entering into active life, going into society, traveling . . . coming into contact with the principles and modes of thought of various parties, interests, and races'. . . Again, education is not merely instruction.⁴⁸

If these are not the elements of a liberal education, what are?

What then does Newman understand by liberal education? We have seen earlier that such education meant the acquisition of knowledge mainly for its own sake. Knowledge in this sense was an end in itself. To repeat, it is knowledge which produces a philosophical habit of mind. Newman's amplification of this idea reads:

To have even a portion of this illuminative reason and true philosophy is the highest state to which nature can aspire, in the way of intellect; it puts the mind above the influences of change and necessity, above anxiety, suspense, unsettle-

47 Harrold, John Henry Newman, 103.

48 Ibid., 103-04.

ment, and superstition. . . . The perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education . . . is clear, accurate vision and comprehensive of all things, as far as the finite mind can embrace them . . . it has almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things and the music of the spheres.⁴⁹

Returning to the analysis of the definition, the important factor to note is that Newman's "philosophical habit of mind" is an exact parallel of Plato's "intuitive contemplation of the Good." Both in the Republic and in the Idea of a University philosophical education is propounded. The objective of the intense course of studies of such a training is precisely that of transforming the raw material of education into the ideal personality, whom we shall identify as man at his best, whose faculties of mind and will are so developed that he is, what Plato would call the true philosopher, and whom Newman would term "the liberally educated man." He is a man who is completely devoted to truth, whose eager endeavors throughout life are to get at truth more and more, for in this matter, because he is a lover whose love can never be satisfied, truth constitutes the goal of his philosophic training. And truth is infinite! The philosopher is a lover, not merely of a part of wisdom and truth, but of the whole.⁵⁰ He is

49 Newman, Idea of a University, edit. by O'Connell, 156-58.

50 Republic, V, 475c.

a philosopher ($\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha, \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha$) in the truest sense of the term.

What are the elements of a philosophical habit of mind?

Newman expresses this well when he says that true knowledge produces "freedom, equitableness, calmness, and wisdom."⁵¹ In a word, it is the cultivation of the human spirit, the education of man as man. But to cultivate this spirit of man, one must train especially those parts of his nature which make him what he is--his intellect and will. Because it will make him more what he is destined to be, knowledge, sought for its own sake, will be the chief pursuit of his life. His rational powers, those precisely which are proper to human beings, will be developed; and in proportion as he develops these, he will become what he is destined to be by God--MAN, who is the image and likeness of GOD.⁵² Plato confirms this when he says, speaking of the philosopher:

He will take society and human character as his canvas, and begin by scraping it clean. . . . Next, he will sketch in the outline of the constitution. Then, as the work goes on, he will frequently refer to his model, the ideals of justice, goodness, temperance, and the rest, and compare with them the copy of those qualities which he is trying to create in human society. Combining the various elements of social life as a painter mixes his colors, he will reproduce the complexion

51 Newman, Idea of a University, O'Connell, edit. 120.

52 Republic, VI, 501b.

of true humanity, guided by that divine pattern whose likeness Homer saw in the men he called godlike. He will rub out and paint in again this or that feature, until he has produced, so far as he may, a type of human character that heaven can approve. ⁵³

⁵³ Ibid., 501b-c.

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by **Richard M. Mackowski, S.J.** has been read and approved by three members of the Department of **Classics.**

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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