



1951

Panslavism as a Factor of Russian Imperialism in the Balkans Before the World War I

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Recommended Citation

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PANSLAVISM AS A FACTOR
OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN THE BALKANS
BEFORE THE WORLD WAR I

by

Stefan S. Fales

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

February

1951

LIFE

Stefan S. Falez was born in Slivnica pri Mariboru (Slovenia, Yugoslavia), December 3, 1920.

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He began his graduate work at Loyola University in September 1949, under a scholarship of His Eminence Samuel Cardinal Stritch.

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis was to study the role that the idea of Pan Slavism played in the Russian interests on the Balkan Peninsula. Even though it was impossible to find sufficient original material, the author sought to bring out the evidence that the Russian imperialist policy was not interested in the Balkan Slavs because of a common racial kinship, but because the Balkan Slavs occupied a geographical position the control of which was necessary to the Russians in their push toward the Mediterranean Sea. It was only when these main points of Russian policy were endangered that they adopted the Pan Slavist technique in order to protect their own interests, because they were claiming that "Slavs must serve Russia, not Russia Slavs."

Whereas texts in French, German or Russian have been used, the parts quoted in the thesis are translated by the author unless otherwise stated.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The question of Russian aims in the Balkan Peninsula is not an invention of twentieth-century thought; nor is this question a very simple one, because there are involved innumerable factors which serve to complicate the already complex idea of imperialism itself. The facts of history show that any power which has tried to create an Empire in South-eastern Europe has had to dominate first the Balkan Peninsula.

Romans, Turks, Habsburgs, Tsars, and Germans - all concerned themselves first with South-eastern Europe in order to clear their way for further imperialist gains. Hence, the Balkans have repeatedly been the scene of conflicts of political, religious and military nature. The political nickname given to this peninsula is "Europe's Powder Keg," and it is a well chosen name, indeed; but, if the Balkans are the European Powder Keg, the small Balkan nations furnished only the keg, whereas the Powder itself was being furnished by the Great Powers.

An attempt to analyse every particular method and experiment which has been tried by any one Power to establish its influence over the Balkan Peninsula would be too enormous in scope and would give but a general picture of the conflicts over this continuously disputed area.

East and West: the split of the Christian Church in eleventh Century into the Eastern and Western Church followed the geographic line between the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, leaving Slovenians and Croatians with Rome, while Greeks, Serbians, Romanians and Bulgarians remained with the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Slovenians and Croatians were for centuries under the direct control of the Habsburg Emperors, whereas the other Balkan nations stayed under the rule of the Sultans. This separation has contributed much, certainly, to the picture even as it exists today.

Russia has been, undoubtedly, one of the strongest powers in this play of interests, but curiously enough, there has never been undertaken a thorough study of the elements and factors utilised by Russia to establish her influence over the Balkan Peninsula up to the beginning of the Great War; nor have the various factors stimulating her ambitions ever been separately discussed. This work is an effort to analyze only the particular role which has been played by Pan Slavism in the Russian imperialist policy in the Balkans.

The Russian push towards the Balkans did not begin, as did Pan Slavism in the nineteenth century, but it was a result of the early internal consolidation of the Muscovite Principality and of its growing external importance. Therefore, a short survey of the Russian expansion southward is necessary before the question of Pan Slavism and of its influence can be discussed.

There is certainly no need of describing the geographical position of the Balkan Peninsula, even though there are some slightly different opinions as to its geographical limits towards Central and South-western Europe. As the interests of Russia, before the Great War, did not generally come beyond

the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this discussion will refer only to the Balkan Peninsula in its stricter sense--thus excluding Croatia and Slovenia, and the Rumanian Principalities, which do not belong to the Balkan Peninsula--and to the national groups in those areas. Other Slavonic groups, namely Cro-
 atians, Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and Slovenians, will be mentioned only to the extent necessary for obtaining a general picture of the Pan Slavist idea.

At the outbreak of the Great War, many circulating German pamphlets endeavored to prove that the main cause for the outbreak of the war lay in Pan Slavism and in its application by Russians in their expansionist policy in the Balkans. As is the case today, little was known at that time concerning what exactly Pan Slavism was; and it was even less known how much the Pan Slavist idea really contributed to the seething undercurrents of the era, especially as it influenced Russian imperialist aims in Southeastern Europe,

Pan Slavism is a very difficult movement to define. In general, it is the name given to the efforts of the Slavic nations in Europe for a cultural and political unity of all Slavs. Undoubtedly, it meant different thing to different men. Originally, it was merely a movement to organize, protect, and assist the culture of Slavic nations: literature, music and arts. Gradually it took on a political meaning: a union, so far as possible, of all the Slavic peoples into one political formation. As it was considered by the Russian Government, it almost certainly meant the extension of Russian power and influence over all Slavic nations. In the hands of Russian Government, the Pan Slavism became a tool of Russian imperialism, to be utilized only if it served the Russian needs.

Historians generally agree that Pan Slavism is a result of the era of nationalism; the whole question of the Pan Slavist idea will be discussed in one of the following chapters. Due to the fact, however, that long before Pan Slavism was born, Russians were looking southward to the Black Sea and to the Straits, considering them as their natural outlets to the open seas, the Balkan Peninsula was the natural hinterland of, and the strategic position for these outlets; the idea of Pan Slavism seemed to be the ideal mean to this end.

CHAPTER II

THE DREAM OF RUSSIA

Ever since the invasion of the Turks into Europe, and especially after the fall of Constantinople, the European Powers, under the political leadership of the Roman Pontiffs, were anxious to expel the invaders from Europe. The growing Principality of Moscow was considered as a very needed help in a common struggle against the Turks; the Powers therefore tried to convince the Russians that the duty of expelling the Turks from Europe lay with them. The Powers knew, however, that the Muscovites would never consider such a difficult task unless a considerable number of advantages could be expected thereby. They knew also that the idea of making the Black Sea, the Propontis,¹ and the Aegean Sea into Russian lakes was the "Dream of Russia" ever since her first descent upon Constantinople in the ninth century² and that some plan catering to that Russian ambition would be too attractive for Russians to reject.

The Ecumenical Council in Florence, 1439, decided that the reunion of the two Churches must be obtained and that the Orthodox should be brought

1 Propontis is the Sea of Marmara between European and Asiatic Turkey, connected with the Black Sea by the Bosphorus, and with the Aegean by the Dardanelles.

2 Louis Leger, Ed., Chronique dite de Nestor, Paris, 1884, 16.

back to Rome,³ It was not just by chance that the idea of marrying the last Christian Emperor of Byzantium, Sophia Paleologus,⁴ to the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan III, was conceived. In the hope that, with the growing power of the Muscovites, the liberation of the Christians could be accomplished, and with the conviction that with the marriage of Sophia to Ivan III the union of the two Churches could be realised, Pope Paul II offered Sophia's hand to Ivan III, and the marriage took place in Rome, in 1492.⁵

With the marriage to the Byzantine Princess the right of succession to the Byzantine throne passed to Ivan III and his family. Aware of this right to succession, Ivan III did not forget to assume the double-headed eagle, the emblem of the Byzantine Empire, as the symbol of his house and as the manifestation of the Russian right to the Byzantine throne.

The desire of Rome to have the ruler of Moscow join in a crusade against the Turks was not realised, for the Grand Prince of Moscow did not show the slightest intention of engaging in hostilities with the Turks who were

3 The Greeks, Russians and Latins discussed there the Union of the two Churches, and adopted a program the bases of which were to remain permanent. The Emperor of Byzantium, John Paleologue, also attended. P. Paul Pierling, S.J., La Russie et le Saint Siege, Paris, 1896, i, xix, 27.

4 Sophia was a niece of Constantine Paleologus, the last Byzantine Emperor. Her father, Thomas Paleologus, Constantine's brother, was driven out of Greece by the Turks and was given shelter in Rome where he died. The Popes acted as guardians to his children.

5 The idea of this marriage is ascribed to Cardinal Bessarion, a Greek by origin, who was one of the most zealous promoters of the Union of the Greek and the Latin Church; he had been envisioning the desired re-union of the two Churches through the princess who in Rome had come under the Latin influence. P. Pierling, Russie et le S. S., I. 130.

then at the peak of their power. In accepting the offered marriage, he did not intend to obey the orders of the West, but rather calculated more on an increase of his own prestige. He did not lose time in assuming the title of Tsar,⁶ and within a short time he succeeded in liberating himself and his Principality of the rule of Golden Horde of which he had been vassal.

In Russia the marriage with Sophia Paleologus resulted, however, in a symbolical significance. After the fall of Constantinople, which has coincided with a period of bitterness between Moscow and Byzantium because the Moscow Princes had not approved the formal dependence of the Russian Church upon the Patriarch of Constantinople, the struggle for nationalization of the Russian Church was much more facilitated. A theory, completely opposed to the ideas which caused the union between Sophia and Ivan III, was formulated by a monk, Philoteus, of the Pskof monastery, and by the Metropolit, Zosime, according to which theory Russia as the protectress of Orthodoxy was to be the heiress of the Eastern Roman Empire, and Moscow was to step in as the natural successor to Constantinople.⁷ Before its fall, Constantinople claimed the leadership of the Greek Church; after the fall, Moscow was to take its place and

6 The title of Tsar did not become a formal and proper title of the Grand Princes of Moscow until the coronation of Ivan III's grandson, Ivan IV, in 1547.

7 Metropolit Zosime wrote in 1492: "Two Romes have fallen, the Third Rome will be Moscow and there will be no fourth. . . ." Quoted by Paul Milioukov, Histoire de Russie, Paris, 1932, I, 142.

The idea of the "Third Rome" was originated in the Bulgarian literature of the fourteenth century. Trnovo, the capital of Bulgarian Tsar, was to succeed Constantinople as the center of the Christian Orthodox world and to become the "Third Rome" as Constantinople had been called the "Second Rome." After the Turkish invasion of Europe, Russians adopted the idea. Ibid.

become the "Third Rome." The Tear of "All the Russias" was to preserve the true faith, and the "Dream of Russia" was becoming a - "Mission."⁸

For long centuries since Russia has prosecuted these claims which she had been practically given by the West. She has never dismissed the idea that the Christian peoples of the same religion in the Balkans, as were the Romanians and the Greeks, and of the same religion and race, as were the Bulgarians and Serbians, would welcome the armies of the Tear as armies of a Liberator, and would voluntarily accept the domination of a "Holy Russia" in exchange for the domination of the Turks.

Two centuries passed, however, before the first concrete step was made towards the South. The conviction that the possession of a portion of the coast of the Black Sea would give Russia a convenient port and an accessible seaboard, led Peter the Great to enter the war against Turkey; in 1696, he captured the city of Azov near the mouth of river Don; with the Peace Treaty of Constantinople, in 1700, the possession of Azov was ratified, making thus the presence of Russia in the Black Sea a concrete, even if undesirable fact.⁹ Peter the Great was not, however, satisfied, and in 1711, he resolved to cross the river Pruth and to take possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. But fortune this time, was not with him, and he had to renounce also the possession of the port of Azov. He died in 1725, and a fable has it that he left a testament in which he denounced "the yoke" imposed by the barbarians upon the Balkan Chri-

8 Jan Kucharzewski, The Origins of Modern Russia, New York, 1948, 12.

9 Gabriel Noradounghian, Ed., Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1897, I, 198, art. 4.

stians, and in which he gave the program for future Russian expansion: approach as nearly as possible to Constantinople.¹⁰ Even though the document in all probability was an invention of later centuries, it yet testifies to the durable impress Peter the Great left in declaring the acquisition of Bosphorus and Dardanelles as the "Historic Mission" of the Holy Russia; for his imperialist program was for two centuries after his death continuously "disguised as the duty of protecting the Balkan Slavs and the Orthodox Christians."¹¹

The Russians did not rest long after the death of Peter the Great. In 1736, they renewed their attempts with the invasion of Crimea and with occupation of many fortresses along the coast of the Black Sea. The Treaty of Belgrade, in 1739, however, was not too favorable for Russia because the Turks were still strong enough to make her renounce her conquests in Moldavia; but Russian were allowed to keep the city of Azov which they had reconquered. They had not as yet gained, however, the right of maintaining warships in the Black Sea. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Belgrade can be said to be the corner stone laid down for the definite Russian presence in the Near East.¹²

10 Fassard, Ed., Testament de Pierre le Grand, Paris, 1860, art.VIII: "S'etendre sans relache . . . vers le sud, le long de la mer Noire." Art. IX: "S'approcher le plus possible du Constantinople et des Indes. Celui qui y regnera sera le vrai Souverain du monde. En consequence susciter des guerres continuelles, tantot au Turc, tantot a la Perse; etablier des chantiers sur la mer Noire; s'emparer peu a peu de cette mer. . . ."

11 Stojan Pribicevic, Spotlight on the Balkans, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1940, 28.

12 William S. Davis, A Short History of the Near East, New York, 1922, 274. Noradounghian, Recueil, I, 258, art. 3 and 9.

Catherine the Great resumed the mission of Russian expansion. She knew how to follow Peter the Great's policy and in her first war with Turkey, 1768-1774, she obtained for Russia the fortresses in the mouths of the rivers Dniester and Danube; her fleet had destroyed the Ottoman navy off the the Island of Chios, in 1770. With the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, 1774, the Ottoman Porte ceded to Russia many fortresses in the Black Sea and gave the Tsar the right to make "representations on behalf of the Balkan Christians." Article VII of this Treaty gives Russia the right to protect the Christian religion in Turkey, and Turkey promised that her Christians would no longer be persecuted. Such a vague clause became the basis for all further claims and actions that Russia undertook in the Balkans, especially in the Danubian Principalities. A permanent Russian Embassy was established in Constantinople and the Consulates were to be opened wherever Russia would consider it necessary; Russian subjects were given the right to trade freely within all the Ottoman Empire and to navigate the Black Sea and the Danube river.¹³

In 1873, Catherine the Great took possession of Crimea and Russian tendencies were clearly manifested when she accompanied, on a visit through the region, the Emperor of Austria with whom she has just made a new arrangement for the partition of the Ottoman Empire; on the arches which were erected to greet her along the way it was written: "This is the way to Byzantium."¹⁴

¹³ Andrei Lobanov-Rostovski, Russia and Europe 1789-1825, Durham, 1947, 404. Noradounghian, Recueil, I, 324, Art. XI: "[Turkey] permits a free passage from the Balck Sea to the White [sic!] Sea, and from the White Sea to the Black Sea to Russian merchant ships and vessels."

¹⁴ Alfred Austin, Russia before Europe, London, 1876, 16.

After the second war which Catherine the Great fought with the Turks, 1787-1792, the privileges gained at Kutchuk-Kainardji were confirmed by the Treaty of Yassi, 1792; Russia received the whole of Crimea and extended her frontiers along the Black Sea to the river Dniester.¹⁵ Russia's magnificent position in the Black Sea had an unfavorable effect upon French and British diplomats, for they saw increasing the danger that the Tsars would become the dominators of the Near East and that they could thus easily control all the direct routes to India and beyond; this was especially alarming to the British and to their doctrine of the "Balance of Power." Catherine the Great's death and the subsequent British policy saved Constantinople.¹⁶

By the time Catherine the Great had died, the strength of the "guardian" of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles had steadily declined. Turkey had lost Hungary, Transylvania, Crimea, the Northern Coast of the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov. Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia were desperately trying to rid themselves of the Turkish rule, and Egypt was in revolt against the Sultan. Turkey was in a stage of consumption, whereas Russia was coming into her full strength.

Under the reigns of Paul (1796-1801), and Alexander I (1801-1825), Russia found herself, ironically enough, on the side of Turkey as the result of the anti-French coalition and of the Treaties of Alliance of 1798 and 1805. Moldavia and Wallachia came again under the Russian control, and both were allotted Russian protected Hospodars: Moldavia prince Murusi, and Wallachia Prin-

15 Noradounghian, Recueil, II, 16.

16 Davis, Near East, 276.

ce Ypsilanti, with the understanding that they were to be elected for a period of seven years, but could be removed if Russian Ambassador in Constantinople should request it. Both Hospodars "had to take into consideration" the requests of the Russian consular officers.¹⁷ The Treaty of Alliance of 1805 had even a greater significance: it declared the Black Sea closed to all armed ships except the Russian and Turkish ones; it engaged the two powers to oppose with all their forces the entry of any other ships.¹⁸

At this time Russia was contemplating a League of the Balkan Slavs to serve as a bulwark against Napoleon and Austria. The Turks were to be promised Illyria and Balmatia, and a general rebellion was to be raised among the Balkan Slavs who were to be promised emancipation from the Ottoman rule and the creation of a Slav Empire under the protection of Russia. It was at this time that the Russians first assisted the Serbians in their rebellion under Karageorge; Russian agents were very active among the Serbs. Even though the Serbian interests brought Russia into a war with Turkey, Russian policy was yet very undecided. Moreover, inasmuch as the plan for a Balkan League was premature, and, because Russia at that time had but an "academic interest" in Serbia, Russia signed the Treaty of Tilsit, in 1807, withdrew from the war, and left Serbia alone to the mercy of the Turks.¹⁹

17 Lobanov-Rostovski, Russia and Europe, 405.

18 Secret clauses annexed to the Treaty of Alliance, 1805, Art. VII: "The two contracting ~~parties~~ after having agreed to close the Black Sea . . . engage themselves to prevent with all their forces that any foreign ships carrying ammunitions enters this Sea." Noradounghian, Recueil, II, 76.

19 Lobanov-Rostovski, Russia and Europe, 413, 414.

Napoleon's successes were not favorable to Russian ambitions, for Napoleon himself was cherishing the idea of a magnificent Eastern Empire; in such a circumstance the Russian presence in the Straits and on the Balkan Peninsula was not too convenient. At Tilsit, in 1807, Napoleon showed himself rather opposed to a Russian occupation of Constantinople; in the secret convention, however, concluded with Alexander I at Erfurt, in 1808, he recognised the Russian protectorate over Wallachia and Moldavia, but he insisted on the integrity of other Turkish provinces.²⁰ Alexander I's fear was manifested in a message to Napoleon in the correspondence preceding the Treaty of Tilsit, when he wrote: "I offer you the half of Europe, I will help you to obtain it, secure you in the possession of it, and all I ask in return is the possession of a single Strait, which is also the key of my house."²¹ The rupture with Napoleon compelled the Tsar to sign the Treaty of Bucharest, in 1812; he had once more to renounce Wallachia and Moldavia, retaining only a part of the occupied territory, namely Bessarabia, between the rivers Dniester and Pruth.

After the fall of Napoleonic Empire, Russia was able to renew her march upon Constantinople and the Balkans. The Greeks started their struggle for independence, in 1821, under the Russian influence. The situation was complicated, and the Greek cause almost lost when the Allied Powers intervened and

20 David Urquhart, Progress of Russia, London, 1853, Second edition, 438.

21 Fedor F. Mertens, Recueil de Traites et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances Etrangeres, XIV, 71-72; XI, 328-329. Sergiei Tatishchev, Alexander I-er et Napoleon, Paris, 1891, 360, 618.

defeated the Turkish and Egyptian fleets in the Bay of Navarino, 1827, facilitating the advance of the Russian Army as far as Adrianople. With the Treaty of Adrianople, in 1829, Russia's influence in the Near East was confirmed; Moldavia and Wallachia were granted autonomy, Serbia independence, and Greece the basis for her Kingdom. Russian ships were permitted a free passage through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, but the same privilege was extended to all nations at the peace with the Sublime Porte,²² mainly for the fear that Russia could exclude the other Powers from presence in the Near East.

The internal difficulties which followed in Turkey in connection with the rebellions in Egypt forced the Sultan to ask Russians for assistance. Nicholas I (1825-1855) was more than glad to offer it, and he did not hesitate to send Russian troops to the aid of the Sultan; the Russian troops landed on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. A few months later the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833, was signed. It was Treaty of Defensive Alliance between the Tsar Nicholas I and the Sultan Mahmud, with the common "defense of their States against any interference." An extra article (Art.I) provided that Turkey would assist Russia whenever it might be necessary, by closing the Straits and not allowing "any foreign warships to enter the Straits under any pretext."²³

This Treaty of Defense, which had been concluded for a period of eight years, caused consistent protests from England and France, for it evi-

22 Noradounghian, Recueil, II, 126, 174.

23 Ibid., 229-231.

dently had bound Turkey to Russia as a mere vassal and "compelled [her] to live under the Russian protection and to lend an ear to Russia."²⁴

The foreign policy pursued by Tsar Nicholas I made possible the acquisition of future markets for the Russia products, and assured him the outlets to the open Seas; his intentions were directed, however, more towards placing the Cross once again on the top of St. Sophia, than towards the liberation of the Slavonic brethren from the Ottoman yoke. Russia would have obtained her purpose, had it not been for the jealousy of the Western Powers, who did not like the exceptional position Russia had acquired over the Turks since the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, in which she had ~~been~~ confirmed as the protectress of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Porte and had obtained considerable privileges for Serbia, and, the protectorate over Wallachia and Moldavia. When the Tsar, after having tried peacefully to obtain from Turkey the control of the Holy places and after having insisted on obtaining special privileges over the Christians in the Balkans, declared the war on Turkey, the Western Powers decided to interfere. They saw that Russian successes would disturb the status quo in the Balkans and wanted to put an end to the dominant Russian influence within the Ottoman Empire; hence, they started the war of Crimea.²⁵ The war, unfortunately, ended with the defeat of Russia, and the

²⁴ Russian Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode as quoted by Oscar Browning, A History of Modern World, London, 1912, I, 174.

²⁵ On the causes of the Crimean War Bernardotte E. Schmitt, "The Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War," American Historical Review, New York, XXV, Oct. 1919-July 1920, 49, says: ". . . the Tsar intended from the beginning to secure a protectorate recognised by the Porte over the Greek Christian subjects of the Porte and never ceased from that programme. But under-

allies did everything in their power to ruin the position of Russia, not only in the Straits but also in the Black Sea. With the Treaty of Paris, 1856, Russia lost all her privileges and was reduced to quite an impotent position on the Black Sea. The period of isolated Russian interventions in Turkey was ended, and the Powers granted en commun the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, assuming also the responsibility of guaranteeing the privileges given to Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia.²⁶

Alexander II (1855-1881), who succeeded Nicholas I in the most critical time of the Crimean defeat, assumed a policy of peace. Prince Alexander Gorchakov was appointed as Chancellor in Count Nesselrode's place; under him the Foreign Office was opened to some influence of liberalism and nationalism. The official policy pursued at that time was in concert with Austria-Hungary. During the years 1856-1870, the internal situation in Russia ~~unmodified~~; the liberation of the serfs in itself was mainly directed toward obtaining better soldiers for the Russian Army, and was therefore, showing the intention of Russia to become a great military power. Such internal strengthening gave Russia finally the opportunity to liberate herself from the humiliating clauses of the Paris Treaty. Fully aware of the returning strength of Russia, the Chancellor

standing the certain opposition to this from the other powers, he sought to detach one or more of them from the concert. He failed to accomplish this, but his pride, a belief in the justice of his cause, and high confidence in his military strength led him to refuse all concessions. The principal cause of the Crimean War, was then, the continued effort of Russia, after the question of the Holy Places had been regulated, to carry through a policy which would have profoundly disturbed the status quo in the Near East. Whether the diplomacy of the Powers opposed to this policy was conducted in the manner best calculated to restrain the Tsar, is another question."

Prince Gorchakov, in October 1870, addressed to the Powers, signatories of the Treaty of Paris, a circulaire in which he announced that the Emperor Alexander II thereby declared that Russia no longer considered herself bound by the obligations of the Treaty of Paris, because its clauses restricted her sovereign rights on the Black Sea. As a consequence, the Treaty of London, March 13, 1871, abrogated the articles of the Treaty of Paris and of the Russo-Turkish Convention, relating to the neutralisation of the Black Sea.²⁷

Then, rebellions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1875, the following uprising for freedom in Bulgaria, 1876, and the war of Serbia and Montenegro with Turkey, all became causes for Russian intervention. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 did not start as a war for conquest of Turkey. It was really provoked by the influence of Slavophiles on Russian public opinion. It would not have been too difficult to avoid it, had Turkey accepted the modest reforms for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, which the Powers had requested from Turkey after atrocities had been committed upon the Christians there.²⁸ Turkey, however, did not want to grant the requested reforms, and Russia, as the pro-

27 Noradounghian, Recueil, III, 334.

28 A Conference of the Ambassadors of European Powers was held in Constantinople in December 1876 where the settlement of the Bulgarian Question was discussed. Having seen the failure of the Conference, Russia and Austria concluded a Secret Military Convention with which Russia would have free hand in Bulgaria and Austria the right of occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Secret Convention was concluded at Budapest, January 15, 1877.

For the Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, see Noradounghian, Recueil, III, 400-495.

The secret Convention of Budapest: Mihajlo Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878, Cambridge (Engl.), 1939, 145-150. Benedict H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880, Oxford, 1937, Appendix II, 596-601.

tectress of the Balkan Christians and Slavs, considered herself obliged to declare war in defense of these people. The success of the Russian armies seemed to indicate an early fall of Constantinople into Russian hands; but the unfavorable attitude of Austria, England and Germany prevented the final capitulation of the Ottoman Porte, inducing Russia and Turkey to sign, on March 3, 1878, at San Stefano, a few miles from Constantinople, the famous Peace Treaty of San Stefano. In this Treaty Turkey agreed to recognize Bulgaria as a vassal Principality, with a territory between lower Danube and the Aegean Sea, including the whole Macedonia; Serbia and Romania were recognized as entirely independent; Montenegro had her territory doubled, and Dobrudja was ceded to Russia.²⁹

As the newly created Bulgaria would have been practically a Russian protectorate, the Great Powers, especially Great Britain, realized that Russia would be in a position to dominate the whole Balkan Peninsula. Once again the Powers intervened, demanding the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano. Russia had to agree, because she did not feel herself in the position of fighting another war.³⁰ The Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878, prevented the actual dismemberment of European Turkey, and thus limited Bulgaria to a small area be-

²⁹ Alfred Rambaud, Expansion of Russia, Second Edition, New York, 1904, 41. George Vernadsky, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia, Boston, 1936, 342. Noradounghian, Recueil, III, 509.

³⁰ Russia's opposition to the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano was a priori condemned to fail because of determined allied resistance. "What Russia concedes or does not concede, can in no way prejudice the decisions of the Congress," Von Beust wrote to Lord Derby. Confidential Communication of March 24, 1878, quoted from British Archives by Stojanovic, Great Powers, 236.

tween the Danube river and the Balkan mountains; the area South of the Balkan mountains was erected into the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia. Macedonia was returned to Turkey and Dobrudja was given to Romania; Austria-Hungary conserved the right to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as agreed in the Convention of Budapest. Russia had nothing but a small portion of Besarabia.³¹

Even if the Treaty of Berlin made Bulgaria practically a Russian protectorate, it did not change the Russian position in relation to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, because it simply confirmed the London Convention of 1871. Russia herself was at that time still in the process of reconstructing her Black Sea fleet and was not able to oppose the imposed limitations she did not like. The internal situation in Russia was quite complicated, and the crisis culminated with the assassination of the Tsar Alexander II, in 1881.

Alexander III (1881-1894), in taking over the reign of Russia, had to face the discomforture of the current Russian policy in Bulgaria; moreover, new expansionistic aims in Asia were distracting Russian policy from the immediate interests in the Balkans. Alexander III did appoint, for a short period, as his Minister of Interior, the well-known General Ignatyev, former Ambassador

³¹ Noradounghian, Recueil, IV, 175. Vernadsky, History of Russia, 343. England was the Power which wanted the revision of San Stefano at any price. In a letter to Sir Elliott, British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Salisbury speaks of the interests of both Britain and Austria "in respect of which their common action would produce far more efficacious results. . . . To both it appears of primary importance that the Slav State shall receive as small an extension of territory and influence as possible; that every condition tending to place that influence at the disposal of Russia shall be resisted, and that all practicable support shall be given to the races which are likely to act as barriers to the advance of the Slavonic Power." Confidential letter No. 295, May 4, 1878, quoted by Stepanovic, Great Powers, 254.

Constantinople, indicating thus his intentions, which, however, he was unable to carry out. Although Nicholas II, who succeeded Alexander III, in 1894, followed the currents defending the Russian imperialist policy in the Middle East and especially in the Far East, he too, could not follow at the same time a forward policy in the Balkans and in the Straits. The alignments preceding the First World War gave the Foreign Minister Isvolsky some hopes for the renewal of the Russian pursuit of Constantinople. His agreement, however, with Austria-Hungary on the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina³² failed to grant any privileges for Russia in the Straits. The formation of the Balkan League, and the following Balkan Wars, soon caused a further disruption of the Turkish Empire; despite this, however, by the beginning of the 1914 the problem of the Straits and of the Russian descent upon Constantinople seemed soluble only in a European War, mainly because of Germany's part in the situation. The entry of Turkey in the war, in October 1914, on the side of Central Powers, cut Russia off from her Western Allies and thus complicated the realization of her centuries-long "Dream."³³

³² Mason W. Tyler, The European Powers and the Near East, Minneapolis, 1925, 205.

³³ Benedict H. Sumner, A Short History of Russia, Revised Edition, New York, 1949, 271-276.

CHAPTER III

THE MYTH OF PANSLAVISM

With the march of Napoleonic armies through Central and Northeastern Europe, the ideas of the French Revolution were spread among the peoples on the way. The idea of Liberalism and Nationalism became very powerful force even among the small nations of Eastern Europe. The sufferings which these small nations had to undergo for centuries now culminated to cause an awakening remembrance of their past glories, and of their historical positions before the loss of their national independence.

In spite of the fact that there is not such thing as a common Slav language,¹ there is a common denominator found in all the Slav languages. While a member of one of these groups does not understand the spoken word of the other, unless he studied it, he can decipher the meaning of the written words from their roots; the roots, in general, are the same because they have a common origin in the Old- or so-called Church-Slavonic language. Syntax, etymology, orthography, and even alphabet are different; a common root of the words

1 "A Russian does not understand a Bulgarian; a Bulgarian does not understand a Pole; a Servian [Serbian] does not understand a Czech. These various so-called Slav communities have no common grammar, not even an entirely common alphabet. They have each of them a distinct literature, such as it is, a different history, and different traditions." Elizabeth . Latimer, Russia and Turkey in XIX Century, Chicago, 1894, 358.

does, however, identify all of the Slav languages and indicates a common origin of all the Slav nations.² Under the influence of the new ideas, the conviction of this common origin, stimulated the small Slav nations to think that the only chance to end their sufferings and oppressions lay through their own efforts and in their mutual solidarity.³ The idea of this "Slav Solidarity" in opposing a common danger is found, more or less explicitly, as far back as the sixteenth century's epic literature of various Slavic nations, and it can be found formulated by the Polish poet Strykowski in his O Wolności Korony Polskiej,⁴ and a few years later in the epic Osman by the Croat poet from Dubrovnik, Ivan Gundulić (1588-1638); this last epic was a hymn of the Catholic Slavs on the Adriatic Sea telling of their hopes for Polish aid.

A clear idea of the unity of the Slavic races is for the first time manifested in Juraj Krizanić (1618-1683), a Croat and a Catholic priest.

Krizanić was a theologian; in Vienna, Bologna and Rome, he studied the language and the doctrine of the Greek Church, and dreamed of the Union between the Greek and the Roman Church. His cry, "[t]hey [the Greek and the

2 A detailed discussion would bring us in the field of comparative Philology and would go, therefore, beyond the scope of this work.

3 "In a crude, unreasoned way [the idea of Solidarity] is felt by every Slavonic peasant. There is certain distinctive atmosphere which binds the Slavs and differentiates them from all that is not Slavonic. It is hard to define what is this common element, but it exists. - The spirit of Slavdom shows itself in many different ways and will still break out in many different forms. Everywhere alike the spirit of Slavdom finds its fullest expression in peasant life and its strongest binding link in language." Lewis B. Namier, Germany and Eastern Europe, London, 1915, 37.

4 E. Shaurio, "From Krizanić to the Slavophiles," Slavonic and East European Review, London, VI, 1927-1928, 322.

Roman Church] shall be no more two nations, neither shall they be divided into two kingdoms, but they shall be one fold and one shepherd,"⁵ is not only a cry for the spiritual unity of the Christians, but is also a yearning of a Slav for the reunion of all his brother Slavs. The uniformity in religion which Krizanic had in mind consisted in the recognition of the Pope's supremacy by the Russian Tsar, with the privilege of using the Old Slavonic church liturgy; he was not encouraged, however, by the Vatican and he was not even given the permission to use the Slavonic liturgy himself, though it was used continuously in numerous Catholic Churches in Croatia.⁶

With the hope of bringing the Pope and the Tsar into an agreement on the reunion of the two Churches, Krizanic asked to be designated for missionary work in Russia. He presented the Congregation of Propaganda Fide (Propagation of Faith) a memorandum containing a plan for this missionary work. "Ocella turbida e stravagante" was the Congregation's judgement on his proposal, and Krizanic left on his own account for Russia in 1659.⁷ One of his main objects was to persuade the Russian Tsar to undertake the leadership of the Slavonic world and to liberate the Western Slavs and the South Slavs.⁸ Inasmuch

5 Olga Novikoff, Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause, London, 1883, 234.

6 Hector M. Chadwick, The Nationalities of Europe and the Growth of National Ideologies, Cambridge (Engl.), 1945, 114.

7 Michael N. Pavlovsky, Chinese-Russian Relations, New York, 1949, 173, note 150.

8 "It is for thee, oh Great Tsar, to watch over the Slav peoples, and, like a good father, take care of thy dispersed children. Rouse them to be aware of their shameful condition; give them assistance in throwing off their foreign yoke. Extend to the Slave of the Balkans that exterior force which

as he was advocating a purely Slav, and, above all, Russian civilisation, and at the same time advocating a Union of all Slavs, Orthodox as well as Catholic, at a time when Russia was in great fear of Westernisation, he soon became suspect in Moscow and was sent to Tobolsk in exile. After an exile of almost fifteen years he was allowed to return to Moscow; he is reported later as being a military chaplain in the army of Jan Sobieski and probably died during the abttle with the Turks under the walls of Vienna.⁹

While Gundulic considered only the Turks as main oppressors of the Slavs, Krizanic added also Germans. "We are plundered by the Germans, the Jews. . ." writes he; "no peoples under the sun were ever so insulted, so injured, as the Slavs by the Germans."¹⁰ His hatred for the Germans is explained in his work Politica, which was written while he was in exile. It is there that he writes:

they need to regain their feet and once more to be numbered among the nations. Quoted by Novikoff, Skobelev, 240.

At an other occasion he turns in thought to the Russian Tsar: "Thou art the only Sovereign given us from God to help both the Danube Slavs and the Poles and the Czechs, that they may feel their persecution and abasement, may take thought for their enlightenment and may throw the German yoke from their necks. The Bulgars, the Serbs, the Croats, have long since lost not only their state, but all their strength, their language, their thought, and if thou canst help them now, then at least endeavour to correct their Slavonic language, open the eyes of their minds by your books, because clean language and moral enlightenment are the pledge of state strength. Thou art indeed the sovereign of us all, the father of our people; and we, like children, put our firm hope after God above all in thee. . . ." Quoted by Shaurlo, "From Krizanic to the Slavophiles," Slavonic Review, VI, 324.

9 Novikoff, Skobelev, 239. Chadwick, Nationalities of Europe, 115.

10 Quoted by Novikoff, Skobelev, 238.

The Germans have driven us [the Slavs] from whole districts - Moravia, Pomerania, Silesia, Prussia. In Bohemia there are only very few Slavs left. In Poland all the towns are full of strangers and we are their slaves; it is for them that we till the soil, for them that we make war, and they remain to feast in their houses and treat us as dogs and pigs. By their incessant attacks and insults they have reduced many Slavs who live among them to such a situation of despair that they are ashamed of their language and race, and give themselves out as members of another nation. The Germans after introducing themselves into all the Slav States are furious at not having been able yet to reduce to their power the Russian Empire, which God has always preserved from their yoke. Hence of all Slavs they most detest the Russians, and do all they can to harm them and spread the most infamous reports about them. They have managed to make Russians absolutely despised in Europe and to dividd them [they are] continually sowing among them causes of intestinal quarrel.¹¹

In the same work, the manuscript of which he has sent to the Tsar, Krizanic pleaded for the unity of the Slavs, and expressed the principles by which a Slav State could become strong, great and honoured. His watchword was "Rely upon yourselves and beware of foreigners."¹²

Many Russians seem to have been interested in Krizanic's writings; his ideas, however, were not adopted at that time.¹³ He was too far ahead of his time. In the seventeenth century religion and nationality were conceived of as inseparable, and, because Krizanic preached also the union of the Russian Church with the Roman Catholic Church, his Slavonic doctrine only excited suspicion. The firm religious color of the nationalist idea as he preached it, was unacceptable to the Orthodox Church in Moscow; and, because of the too-

11 Quoted by Robert W. Seton-Watson, "Panславism," Contemporary Review, London, OX, 1916, 421.

12 Quoted by Louis Leger, Nouvelles Etudes Slaves, Paris, 1880, I, 21.

13 The manuscript of Krizanic's Politica was published only in 1859. Seton-Watson, "Panславism," Contemporary Review, OX, 421.

strong nationalist tenor in his religious ideal, he was also disapproved of in Rome. In spite of all this his ideas were not completely forgotten.

Indeed, Krizanic's "Slav Solidarity" did not die. It continued to flourish, and the new growing spirit of Romanticism contributed to its evolution. The dream of unity of the language among the Slavic nations had never ceased to maintain its fascination, and as the leaders of the Slavic groups were not generally politicians, but literary men, the idea was largely cherished and propagated in literature and philology. It took a more concrete form among the Czechs and Slovaks especially, where the leaders and young intellectuals, under the influence of the Herder's schools of German Historical Romanticism, applied the ideas of the same school to their Slav nations, in contrast to the ideas of German reciprocity or Pangermanism.

The nineteenth century found Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians and Croats as nations of peasants and practically devoid of upper middle classes. The only men who could have undertaken a defense of these peoples were their own historians, philologists, and priests; "Sanctus amor Patriae," the motto of the German Historical school, had its influence on them also, and the idea of the "Slavonic Reciprocity" became the basic element of their studies.

When, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the process of denationalization of the Slavonic peoples under the Austro-Hungarian rule was advancing to a dangerous extent, the literary men of the Slavic groups dedicated themselves to intensive works in the field of history and philology, even though they encountered much difficulty from official censorship. A Czech, Dobrowsky, published in 1808 in Prague, the work Slavin, in which he pointed

out the greatness of the Slavs; in the same year, a Slovenian, Kopitar, published, in Ljubljana, the Grammar of the Slavic Language of Krain, with the intention of awakening the dormant Slavic feelings among the Slovenians. A romantic canto, Slavy Dcera (The Daughter of Slava - Glory), was published in 1821 in Slovakia, by Jan Kollar, a Slovak Lutheran Priest¹⁴. This work is considered to have had the greatest effect of all in awakening the Slavic feelings, for it is a poem glorifying the historical past of the Slavs, and calling for a real unity among the Slavic peoples. "Scattered Slavs," cries the poet, "let us be united whole, and no longer mere fragments! Let us be all or naught!" In the first part of the poem, the poet is urging the Slavs to distrust "the foreign languages, to speak their language, [for] it is a honor for the Slavs to be called Slavs; forget the foreign customs, find again your own. . . ." He continues: "Also to us God has given the intelligence and the force. Let us know how to use it."¹⁵ Five years after the appearance of the final cantos, Kollar created a new sensation with his Rozpravy o Slovanske Vzajemnosti, (Dissertation on the Slavonic Reciprocity).¹⁶ It is in this work that he stresses

14 Jan Kollar was born in Mosovce in Slovakia; he studied theology at Pressburg [Bratislava] and Jena and in 1819 became pastor of the Slovak Lutheran Church in Budapest, from where he had to withdraw to Vienna in 1848. "Jan Kollar and Literary Panславism," Slavonic and East European Review, London, VI, 1927-1928, 336.

15 Ibid., 338. Louis Leger, Etudes Slaves, Paris, 1875, 316.

16 The German version of this work appeared in Leipzig, in 1837, under the title Ueber die literarische Wechselseitigkeit den Verschiedenen Staemmen und Mundarten der Slawischen Nation, (Concerning literary Reciprocity between the various Races and Dialects of the Slavonic Nations). Albert Frazak, "Slovak Sources of Kollar's Panславism," Slavonic and East European Review, London, VI, 1927-1928.

an absolute necessity for reciprocity among the Slavs, because "[t]he world is against the Slavs; most foreign writers who have treated of the Slavs are like those unclean animals which only seek dirt for nourishment and, hence, even when they find a quite clean road, stick their noses into every corner in order to discover a dunghill."¹⁷

At the same time of the publication of Kollar's Slavy Deera, there appeared, in 1826, another work, written in Latin and entitled Elementa Universalis Linguae Slavicae e vivis dialectis eruta et suis logicae Principiis aucta. In this work the author, John Herkel, also a Slovak, defended the necessity of the unification of the Slavs and their effective, cultural reciprocity proposing directly a "unio in literatura inter omnes Slavos, sive verus panslavismus."¹⁸ Herkel became thus the first one to use the term Panslavism. It can be said that from this time on the word Panslavism began to be used for Slavonic reciprocity, and as soon as it took on, after 1848, and additional political color, the word Panslavism became a real bugbear to non-Slavonic nations.

The writings of Kollar and Herkel, to which many others soon were added, really inspired the Czechs, the Croats, the Moravians, the Ruthenians, the Slovenians, and the Serbs within the Austrian Empire, to resist with redoubled forces the attempts of the denationalization; they gave them also the idea of a common "Mother of all Slav Peoples" which should one day come and protect them

17 "Jan Kollar and Literary Panslavism," Slavonic Review, VI, 342.
Jan Kollar, Rozpravy o Slovanske Vsaļemnosti, Edition 1931, Prague, 110.

18 "Literary Union among all Slavs or a true Panslavism," quoted by Frazak, "Slovak Sources of Kollar's Panslavism," Slavonic Review, VI, 581.

all. Most of those who were so inspired, however, did not realize what the consequences would really be if these poetic dreams should be realized. The possible results of this realisation were therefore analyzed by those German and Austrian statesmen who were directly concerned. The conclusion they drew was that of a possible establishment of a Great Russian Empire including all Slavs; they assumed, however, that all the West and South Slavs were sympathetic with Russia, and even presupposed that all of them wanted to become Russians themselves. Such a conclusion necessarily terrified them, for they saw their own positions endangered; therefore, they began war in earnest against a practically non-existing enemy.

The redoubled efforts to suppress and extinguish the nationalist feelings of the Slavs only strengthened their fervor and their resistance. The Slavic leaders saw an absolute need of some organization to combine the efforts of their common struggles for national rights. This led them to summon a Congress in Prague, in 1848. The Congress was attended only by the delegates of Slavic nations living in Austria-Hungary; Russians were not present. The Congress was promoted and organized by the Czechs, and its aim was to prevent, by the political cooperation of all Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the centralism and the germanisation.

The Czech historian Palacky, who presided over the Congress, told the delegates:

We Slavs, we do oppose any domination based on force; we do oppose all privileges and all political distinctions on one class; we are asking equality before the law, and without conditions. . . . It is not, however, only for individuals that we are claiming [these rights]. The natural law of nations is not less sacred to us than that of the individuals. No doubt, history is showing that development

was more complete with certain nations than it was with others; but it [history] shows also that the first ones have not an unlimited faculty of the development. Nature does not distinguish either noble nations or the simple ones; it did not call any of them to dominate over the others; it did not select any nation to serve as an instrument to the intentions of its neighbor; all nations have equal right to develop to the highest degree of humanity; this is a divine law which no nation can violate without exposing itself to punishment.¹⁹

The Congress did have some results, and a cooperation of Slav delegates in the Parliament of Vienna was achieved. To avoid a complete failure of the Congress, however, the delegates, who could not understand each other even though they were all Slavs, had to adopt a foreign language familiar to a large majority of them, so that the delegates of the "children of the Great Mother Slavia" carried their debates on in German, in the language that all detested the most.²⁰

For the Western Slavs the Pan Slavist idea held but little significance. The comparative study of the Slavic languages did stimulate national feelings and a renewed interest in the customs of the Slavic peoples; it did give them the romantic dream of the brotherhood; but it had practically no other results. The Slav nations proved that they considered their own national interests more important than any other thing, and that they were under no circumstances willing to sacrifice their interests for some hypothetical and perhaps illusory harmony in the Slavonic world.

19 Leger, Nouvelles Etudes, I, 26.

20 Chadwick, Nationalities of Europe, 116. Albert Housset, Le Monde Slave, Paris, 1946, 33.

None of the Slavic nations accepted the idea of the Slavic reciprocity as such. There was a kind of linguistic Pan Slavism among the Western Slavs, but there were not sufficient grounds for a political Pan Slavism; Slovenians and Croatians, Czechs and Slovaks, all belonged to the Latin Church, and there could be found no religious side for their Pan Slavism. The Poles were all Roman Catholics, and they were the only ones who had not lost their upper classes and who still had the possibility of developing their own rich culture; they did not need, nor did they trust, the magnificent words of the reciprocity among the Slavs, because they have had their own bitter experience. As for the Balkan Slavs, they had been appealing to the Russians and had sought reciprocity, not as Slavs but as members of the Orthodox Church; for them Russian friendship and assistance carried with it an ever constant danger of the Russian domination and not a possible Federation among Slavs, because they knew that in Russia, the idea of "Slavonic Reciprocity" took on a completely different aspect.

21 Warrior, Germany and Eastern Europe, 45.

Russian historian Herzen says in a letter to the editor of the "English Republic" in Paris, in 1854, that Poland "was less Slavonic than other nations; she was Catholic and Catholicism is inconsistent with the Genius of Slavs. Poland preserved her independence, because she infringed upon her racial unity and came closer to the Western nations." Buchaczowski, Modern Russia, 139.

CHAPTER IV

SLAVOPHILES, RUSSIAN PANSLAVISTS

It is true that many Russians were interested in the ideas that Kri-
zanic spread in the seventeenth century, especially in those in which he advo-
cated reforms in Russia itself. His idea of Slavonic reciprocity, however, ne-
ver established itself in Russia. In its place, there grew up another concern,
also based upon the feeling of common kinship among the Slavs, but limited more
exclusively to the Slavonic peoples of the Orthodox religion. It was a kind of
reaction against the Westernized reforms introduced by Peter the Great, and at
the same time a wish to restore the old Muscovite Russia, with Moscow as the
Capital,¹ appealing to Russian "national costumes, traditions, Orthodox theo-
logy and glorification of Russian past."²

This was the so called school of the Slavophiles, who thought that the
civilisation of the Western nations had failed, that the West was completely
corrupted, and that, therefore, Russia and the Slavs must not let themselves be
influenced by the West.³

✓ 1 The Capital of Russia under the Tsars was St. Petersburg.

2 Feliks Gross, Ed., European Ideologies, New York, 1948, 826.

✓ 3 Latimer, Russia and Turkey, 295.


Slavophilism had much in common with modern nationalist movements. It was a movement in Russia which encouraged the wearing of the Russian national dress, and which wanted to bring Russia back to her own "Russian" attitudes, without the Western influence. It raised the Russian language to a pinnacle, as a greater language than German or French, and in any case the only proper language for all Russians to use.

The Slavophiles did not criticise the Orthodox Church, because the Church was national. The Church for them was neither Greek nor Byzantine; it was what the Russian people had made it; it was an integral part of Russian national expression.

The Slavophil movement in Russia took shape in a moment when Russia and the whole Slav world was fully instilled with new hopes. Russia prided herself in having freed Europe from the Napoleonic yoke. The national spirit and the literature of the Western Slavs was in full bloom; the Balkan Slavs appeared again on the historical scene with their struggle for independence; and, the ideas of romantic nationalism were becoming widespread.

Along with the conception of the unity among the Slav world, which arose from the studies and works of European ethnographers, philologists, and writers, Russia also felt the compelling teachings, proclaimed and strengthened by the French Revolution, requesting the freedom of oppressed nations.

The idea of Pan Slavism took a definite and concrete form in Russia, when, in 1825, there was organised, among the soldiers in ~~Kla~~ who returned from the European wars, a secret society called "United Slavs," which emanated, inspired by the ideas with which the organisers have come in contact, a



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great Slav Federation;⁴ later, there followed, in 1830, the first society of slavophiles, the leaders of which were Homyakov, Kireyevski, and the brothers Aksakov.⁵ Under the Slavophiles the "Great Slav Idea" assumed a peculiar Orthodox character.⁶ This group declared that the influence of the West was fatal to all the Slav races, save to the Russians. They considered that only Russia was based upon concord, freedom, and peace. They became the apostles of the idea that the Catholic Slavs must be rescued from the corruption of the West and brought back to Orthodoxy, because Russia and other Slav peoples were to play an important role in the history. (As an example of this attitude, one can find a particular and prophetic appeal for the Slav solidarity in the poems of Homyakov written in this period. He sings to Russia of her duty in helping the numerous "brothers in the Danube valley, in the Carpath, on the Alps and on the Balkans, who are waiting the moment when thine [Russia's] large wings will protect their weak heads,"⁷ foreseeing that "the brothers will be reunited, all great, all free, and will march victorious against the enemy."⁸ Homyakov's brotherly feelings for the South Slavs were, up to the end of his life, based upon the religious kinship; he had not identical feelings towards

4 Shkurlo, "From Krizanic to the Slavophiles," Slavonic Review, VI, 333. Benedict H. Sumner, Russia and Pan-Slavism in the Eighteenth Century, Transactions of Royal Historical Society, London, 1935, 29.

5 Novikoff, Skobeleff, 236.

6 J.D. Stojanovic, "The First Slavophiles: Homyakov and Kireyevski," Slavonic and East European Review, London, VI, 1927-1928, 565.

7 Poem "The Slav Eagles" - Leger, Etudes Slaves, 211-212.

8 Ibid., 212-213.

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the other Slavs who did not profess the Orthodox religion, because the "Church is only one, and its is Orthodox."⁹

Kireyevski was more systematic than Homyakov. He tried to work out some sort of compromise. For him "[t]he West needs not to be thrown aside, but it must be supplemented and must be given a formulation of Russian principles."¹⁰

Slavophiles were fighting primarily for Russia's return to her own spiritual independence devoid of any Western influences; they were defending an essentially Russian conception and an Russian attempt towards the philosophy and history. "We have never walked hand in hand with other nations, we do not belong to any of the great families of mankind, either to the West or to the East; we do not have the tradition of either."¹¹ This was the basic element of their doctrine. The complete independence of Russian spirit was the first object of their plan. There is, however, no need to point out that, with such conceptions, the Slavophiles were even attributing to Russia a divine mission, the mission of liberating the other Slavs and grouping them under the protection of "Holy Russia." As long as the Slavophiles were busy with the particular Russian national problems, they were more or less independent and inoffensive elements. When they turned their attention, however, to other peoples

9 Homyakov in his Essay on the Church, quoted by Stojanovic, "The First Slavophiles," Slavonic Review, VI, 565.

10 Kireyevski in The Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy, quoted by Stojanovic, "The First Slavophiles," Slavonic Review, VI, 571.

11 Chaadayev's Philosophical Letter, quoted by Kucharszewski, Modern Russia, 90. Milloukov, Histoire, II, 789.

they became involved in political problems and programs advocating the political expansion of Russia;¹² with the adherents among the elite of the Russian educated class they easily became real exponents of Russian expansion.

The mutual repulsion of Russia and Europe for one another is therefore to be considered the main element of the Slavophil philosophy. Associating Russia must intimately with Slavdom, and adding the factor of Orthodox Faith, the Slavophiles found a special religious basis for their conception of the "Great Slav Idea" and for Russia's place in it. Even if, for the Slavophiles, Russia had the "Great Mission of serving the Slavs,"¹³ they yet saw the realization of this "Great Slav Idea" not in a Union of all Slav nations--into one Federated Empire, of which Russia should be the head--as it was in the minds of the Western Pan Slavists--but only in a "Greater Russia;" and so these Slavophiles were practically Pan-Russians. One of the Slavophil leaders, Ivan Aksakov, writes of the Pan Slavists:

We consider it [Pan Slavism] impossible, firstly because it would require the adoption of a single faith by all the Slav races; and Catholicism of Bohemia and Poland would bring a hostile foreign element into our community, which could not be amalgamated with the Orthodox faith of the other Slavs; secondly, because the individual elements of the Slavonic nations must previously be dissolved and fused into a differently characterized, more powerful, more united and mighty nationality - namely Russian; thirdly, because a large part of the Slavonic races is already infected by the influence of the barren Western Liberalism, which conflicts with the spirit of Russian Orthodoxy. Russia is far more to me than all the Slavs. We have been reproached with indifference to all Slavs outside the Russian Kingdom [sic]; nay, outside the Greater Russia.¹⁴

12 Gross, Ideologies, 826.

13 Anton Florovsky, "Dostoyevsky and the Slavonic Question," Slavonic and East European Review, London, IX, 1930-1931, 415.

✓ 14 Quoted by Latimer, Russia and Turkey, 296.

The Emperor Nicholas, to whose attention Aksakov's opinion was called, thought that

[He] is right; for everything else is madness. God alone can determine what is to happen in the far future. Even if every circumstance should combine to lead up to this [the Pan-Slavic Union], its accomplishment would be the ruin of Russia.¹⁵

In spite of the differences between the western Pan-Slavists and the Russian Slavophiles, the latter are, as far as their feelings towards the rest of the Slavonic world are concerned, commonly identified with the Pan-Slavists. There is no doubt, however, that anyone speaking of the Russian Pan-Slavists, actually refers to the Slavophiles in their attitude towards the other Slavs and towards Russia's duties in reference to them.

The attempts of Moscow Slavophiles to bring the Catholic Poles under the Double Cross were without success, for the Poles were not willing to forget the injustices done to their country; the Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, and Slovenians, too, did not like the idea of the "Greater Russia," and were certainly not too eager to exchange the Habsburg domination for that of the Russian Tsar. The Slavophiles, therefore, devoted all their attention to the Balkan Orthodox Slavs, Serbians and Bulgarians, preferring pecuniary aid to young men who were willing to enter a course of studies at any of the Russian Universities, and influencing them by publishing a multitude of pamphlets and periodicals for their study. They had but comparatively little success, however, for the majority of their proteges from these countries forgot too readily that

15 Ibid.

they had enjoyed the advantages of a Russian education and that they were, therefore, indebted to the Slavophiles.¹⁶

In Russia, however, the Slavophiles were becoming stronger and stronger, and money was abundantly placed at their disposition; but because the movement did not enjoy the sympathies of either the Tsar or of the Court,¹⁷ public opinion necessarily dwindled to a very mild and platonic longing for the union of all the Slavonic peoples.

Even if Tsar Nicholas I did not commence the Crimean War to liberate the Balkan Slavs, as would have been the wish of the Slavophiles, but rather to obtain for Russia the control of the Holy Places, yet the Slavophil historian Herzen saluted its outbreak as the beginning of the Slavonic era, foreseeing Constantinople as the Capital of the United Slavs. "The real Capital of the United Slavs is Constantinople, the Rome of the Eastern Church, the center of all Slavo-Greeks," he wrote expecting the triumph of Russia as the leader of Slavdom and describing the war as an "introduzione maestosa e marziale of the Slavonic world to universal history and simultaneously una marcia funebre to the old world."¹⁸ The fact is that the Crimean war was partly influenced by the Orthodox Church for the masses believed that they were fighting for Christ,

¹⁶ Francis H. Skrine, The Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900, Cambridge (Engl.), Second Edition, 2-4.

¹⁷ "The Slavophil Party in Russia - up to the last few years - has been calumniated, vilified, described as treacherous to its oath, to its country and its Emperor, and found anything but support in official St. Petersburg circles." Novikof, Skobelev, 233.

¹⁸ Quoted by Kucharzowski, Modern Russia, 140.

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fighting "to free the Christian Slavs of the Balkans and the Holy Places of Constantinople and Jerusalem from the unclean hands of the Mahometans;"¹⁹ thus a religious and national character was given to the war.

Under the Tsar Alexander II, the Slavophil activity had much more of a free hand than it had under the reign of Nicholas I; the official Tsardom, however, remained still suspicious and disinterested. When Alexander II conceded his people a kind of liberty of the Press, the Slavophiles came forward at once to assert their claims to public attention and consideration. Their attitude towards West did not change, but became even stronger :

The [the Westerners] never forget. . . that between Russia and the West there can be no alliance, neither for the sake of interests, nor for the sake of principles, that in the West there exists not a single tendency which would not conspire against Russia, especially against her future, and which would not try to harm us. And this is why the only natural policy of Russia towards the Western Powers must be not an alliance with one or the other of these powers, but dis-union, division of them, because only when they are divided among themselves do they cease to be hostile to us - because of impotence, and, of course, never because of conviction. This severe truth will perhaps shock the tender souls, but in the end this is the law of our existence as a tribe and as an Empire, and the only way of ignoring this is to cease to be Russian.²⁰

The Slavophiles formed a so-called National Party, the program of which was twofold: it advocated an anti-Western attitude in home policy, and the "Great Slav Idea" in the foreign policy. These Russian Fanslavists with their idea of the absorption of all the Slavonic nations into the Russian, were proposing this idea on the grounds of a bond of union which could be acceptable by all Slavs. As the Orthodox Church was the State Church in Russia,

¹⁹ Stephen Graham, Tsar of Freedom: the Life and Reign of Alexander II, New Haven, 1935, 185.

²⁰ Tyutchev to his sister, quoted by Gross, Ideologies, 849.

and it was accepted also by the Balkan Slavs, it was believed that the Orthodox religion would be the best medium for such union. This idea was largely publicised, it was supported by the Russian clergy, and it assumed large sympathies, including many personalities of the State and Government.

The immediate object of the Slavophiles was to find a Russian solution to the problems of national life, and then to obtain the emancipation of all other Slavs, bringing them under Russian protection. Both aims were very enthusiastically accepted by the public opinion in Russia. Numerous students and scholars were continuously invited from other Slavic countries to visit Russia, and to study Russian customs and the Russian language. The patriots all over the Empire were instructed to organize suitable receptions for these "Slavonic Guests," and a Congress was suggested in which the interests and the problems of "brother nations" would be considered and where the hopes and sufferings of their "Great Common Fatherland" would be discussed.

To such an enthusiastic atmosphere in which the Slavophiles now operated, also higher official circles could no longer remain indifferent; the Russian Correspondence, a Ministerial journal, stated in April 1867:

It can not reasonably be expected of us that we should deny our past. We shall, therefore, allow our guests to consider that they are visiting a sister nation from whom they have everything to expect and nothing to fear. We will listen to their grievances, and the recital of their woes will only serve to draw them closer to us. If they choose to compare their political state with our own, we shall certainly not be foolish as to persuade them that they only enjoy conditions which are the most favorable to Slavonic development. These conditions, we believe, on the contrary, to be very hard ones. We have already said so, a hundred times, and we are ready to repeat it.²¹

²¹ Russian Correspondence, April, 1867, as quoted by Julian Klaczko The Two Chancellors: Prince Gorchakov and Prince Bismarck, London, 1876, 273-274.

A Congress was summoned for May 1867 in Moscow, and ethnographical exposition was to be organized at the same time.

The Emperor and the Empress offered considerable sums to defray the expenses of the undertaking, the Grand Duke Vladimir accepted the post of honorary president; the highest dignitaries of the Church and the State undertook its direction. The warmest appeals were addressed to the Slavs of Austria and Turkey, to their various historical, geographical or other scientific societies, urging them to contribute, by numerous deputations, to the magnificence of the exhibition; and a whole cloud of emissaries overspread the countries of the Danube and the Balkan in quest of adherents, samples and 'types'.²²

Seventy-five deputies²³ represented all the Slavic nationalities from Austria-Hungary and from Turkey. There were no Poles at the Congress, because they did not forget the Russian attitude towards Poland during the last years. Banquets and the receptions were offered in honor of the delegates in St. Petersburg, and the Congress was hailed as "the day last arrived, when the Slavonian races unite for the common welfare."²⁴ The Emperor Alexander himself welcomed the deputies as "brothers Slavonians," and the delegates acclaimed the "Great Slavonic Power whose creative task . . . is in the European East."²⁵ It was decided that a Congress should be held each two years in order to discuss the problems of Slavonic reciprocity. It was also decided that a publishing company should be formed in order to strengthen the intellectual

22 Klaczko, Two Chancellors, 272.

23 The number of deputies and nations represented in reported differently by the different authors. The above number is given by Novikof, Skobelev, 242.

24 Bohemian delegate to the Congress, Rieger, as quoted by Novikof, Skobelev, 242.

25 Serbian delegate, quoted Ibid., 242-243.

contacts of the Slavonic nations; and, moreover, that a permanent Committee should be organized in Moscow to act as a link between the various Slavonic organizations.²⁶ It was felt that

[t]he Slavonic question must be solved by the Slavonians themselves, and chiefly by Russia. Russia is no longer Russia. It is Slavonia, nay, Pan-slavonia. The resources at her disposal are not material but moral. Slavonic Russia is no menace to civilization, but only prepares Europe for witnessing the reunion of the Slavonic family. The first blow in the great struggle must be the cutting through the Eastern knot.²⁷

Officially the Government did not do anything for the Congress. The Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, on one occasion remarked: "The Russians welcomed you so heartily to their country that there remained nothing for the Government to do."²⁸ In spite of the official indifference of the Government, the Minister of the Public Instruction, Count Tolstoy, found an excuse to participate to a formal reception where he said:

We have simply come together as Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western Slavonians. You have been lead here by the impulse of your hearts, by the consciousness of the brotherly ties binding us together. The ties of the history of a thousand years, the ties of blood, language and the Pan-slavistic idea have asserted their rights. Let us strengthen those ties by the unity of speech and the creation of a common science. The scientific study of the Russian language is impossible without the study of Slavonic dialects, just as the study of the Russian history is incomplete without the insight into the simultaneous development of related nations. The ties between you and us, therefore, are not along physical, but also moral and spiritual. Is there anybody sceptical enough to doubt the durability of these ties, to doubt that Providence has a grand future in store for the Great Slavonic Race?²⁹

26 Albert Mousset, Le Monde Slave, Paris, 1946, 46.

27 Serbian delegate, quoted by Novikoff, Skobeleff, 243.

28 Ibid., 242.

29 Quoted Ibid., 244-245.

The spirit of the Congress was interpreted by Tyutchev:

Welcome, twice welcome, oh brothers of the four quarters of the Slavonic world! The family feast is offered to all. Not as strangers, but as guests you are here. You are at home. In Russia every Slav is at home. More at home often than in his own country, where, alas! he is often ruled by a foreigner, and where it is a crime to be a Slav. Severed long by envious fate, we have never ceased to be one nation, the sons of one mother. For this the world cannot pardon us. But as you will never desert Russia, Russia will never desert you. The world dreads the thoughts of all Slavs standing together, and addressing ~~it~~ as one. It had injured and insulted us so long, the memory of wrongs will never be effaced from our hearts. At the awaking of Slavonic self-consciousness it trembles and dreads the judgment of God. The treatment accorded us for centuries has not ceased. Our brethren assembled here still bear traces of their ancient wrongs. . . . Belief in Divine justice will never be extinguished in our hearts, whatever may be the sacrifices demanded of us. God lives, and the cry "All hail the Tsar liberator!" will some day be heard far beyond the Russian frontier.³⁰

In such an atmosphere, Russians, calculating on the ~~fact~~ the reception had made on the delegates and on their conception of the greatness and the glory of Russia, proposed that a resolution be passed to the effect that all Slavs adopt Russian as their literary language. This had an immediate chilling effect upon the enthusiasm of the delegates who did not agree with such a proposal. The Czechs thought it would be necessary to discuss such a proposition in a common meeting of all the educated classes of the different nations. The Serbians absolutely excluded such a possibility because they considered that the political, scientific and moral progress among the Slavonic nations could be achieved only through each nation's own language. Only the Bulgarians were in favor of the proposition, declaring that they would be glad to accept Russian for their literary language.³¹ Hence, because these Russian

³⁰ Ibid., 243-244.

³¹ Vladislav Savic, Southeastern Europe, New York, 1918, 246.

aims were too particular the Congress had no other results than the establishment of the Slavic Benevolent Societies throughout the Russian Empire, with the main centers in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Odessa, and Kiev.³² These Societies, even though of a mere philanthropical character, became neurological centers from which subsequently originated stimuli for Russian ambition in the Balkans. Such societies have since played, moreover, an important and efficient part in Russian foreign policy for they formed a skeleton organization which could be rapidly expanded should the circumstances be favorable. Hence, "besides the rigid Muscovite patriotism they now had, what they never had before, powerful supporters in both the Winter Palace, and the Anichov Palace, and powerful allies in a new stream of anti-foreigners policy."³³

After the Congress of Moscow, the West and South Slavs at last realized the exact meaning of Russian Pan Slavism. They became more critical and less susceptible to the idea of the "Great Mother Slavia," for they had seen that the Russian Pan Slavists did not want a federated union of all Slav nations,

Julian Kiczko, "Le Congres de Moscou et la Propagande Pan Slaviste," Revue des Deux Mondes, Paris, LXXI, September 1867, 162.

³² A similar body, a Benevolent Committee, was already set up in 1857-1858, in Moscow, with the approval of the Tsar Alexander II, with the aim of assisting the Slavs South of Danube to "develop their religious, educational and other national institutions and of bringing young Slavs to Russia to be educated." Its work was almost entirely concentrated upon the Bulgars. From the beginning it was closely connected only with the Church dignitaries, receiving assistance from them in Moscow and in the provinces. Later it found a good backing also in the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Office, by which it was supposed to be controlled. Sumner, Russia and Pan Slavism, 29. David Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis, 1875-1878, London, 1936.

³³ Sumner, Russia and Pan Slavism, 30-31. Winter Palace was the residence of the Tsar; Anichov Palace was the Headquarter of the Foreign Office.

as they did, but only a Greater Russia. In reference to this the Czech historian Palacky wrote, expressing the feelings of the Czechs:

People in Europe as well as in Russia, have various opinions as to the relations of the Russians with other Slavonians. Some Russians regard these relations as proofs of a certain platonic love among the Slavonian nations; others believe the Slavonians will fuse with the Russians; others that all the Slavonian nations must be united. These last assert that all Slavonians must become Russians. Their Pan Slavism is consequently Pan-Russianism.

I answer every one and call thus: - The Czechs have fought for their national individuality more than a thousand years, and at the cost of immeasurable sacrifices have maintained it. Now they will not sacrifice it for the sake of some doubtful promise. This is also the case with all other Slavonians, and especially with those of the South. Our own language we shall never give up; we shall never sacrifice our own literature. The chimera of one common tongue for all Slavonians will for ever remain a chimera and nothing more. The Czechs will be their own masters; the Czechs will never be Russian subjects; to this we shall never agree.³⁴

The Congress of Moscow did not remain unobserved, and its eventual success was rather undesirable to foreign observers. The Nation of September 19, 1867, stated in an editorial:

Russia who for the last ten years has been biding her time, has become perfectly aware. . . that there is no hope of doing anything against the Turks by means of a religious crusade. She has become aware, moreover, that the Greeks will not serve her purpose, and that if she is to get hold of Constantinople, she must put a mightier force in movement than either Hellenism or Orthodoxy. She has therefore, given up religious enthusiasm and has betaken herself to Pan Slavism. . . .

Russian emissaries swarm on both sides of the Danube, preaching the unity of the Slavonic race, and in addition to this that all Slavs are

³⁴ E.L. Mijatovics, "Pan Slavism," Fortnightly Review, London, XIV, 1873, 111.

The Belgrade Vidov Dan, of November 12, 1872, commenting the Palacky's point of view, expressed the Serbian feelings: "Our readers know well that we have never ceased to point out the absurdity of Pan Slavism. The voice of Palacky is the voice of the whole Czechian nation; and what the Czechs condemn as dangerous, no other Slavonian nation will accept. After this condemnation the Pan Slavism idea will linger on like a dying flame in the brains of some idealists or some egotists of a peculiar kind. Ibid.

Russians. Newspapers of the propagation of these doctrines, and published in Russian, have been established in Bohemia and Hungary; and Slav deputations from all parts of the Continent have been invited to St. Petersburg, and sumptuously entertained at banquets at which the political unification of the race was preached as a sacred duty. In fact, the Pan-slavist theory has now become a revelation.³⁵

After the Russian Pan-slavists had seen that the Congress of 1867 had not the outcome that they expected, they adopted a new line of tactics, basing their propaganda on the want of harmony. They started emphasizing the danger of disappearing of the small Slavic nations, for, they maintained, only the great States were able to maintain their political position. "It is Providence who will lead all the Slavonian nations, even against their will, if it must be, to unite with the Russian, and form one and the same Great Empire; if not they shall become Germans."³⁶ The Western Slave did not succumb to these appealing Russian arguments, and pursued their own program unaided, trying to obtain from the Austrian Government the concessions they wanted, creating thus a kind of new theory of the "Austro-Slavism, which . . . caused so much disillusionment to our Russian Slavophiles."³⁷

The Slavophil argument which warned of the danger of Germanization, had much more effect on the South Slavs, whose original superstitious inclinations had been strengthened by their long contact with the Turkish fatalists. The Serbs and Bulgarians were therefore much more susceptible to the Russian influence and concluded: "If we are fated to lose our national individuality

³⁵ "The Pan-slavist Movement in Eastern Europe," The Nation, New York, September 19, 1867, 233.

³⁶ Mijatovics, "Pan-slavism," Fortnightly Review, XIV, 111.

³⁷ Roman, baron Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, New York, 1922, 94.

we would rather become Russians, who are also Slavonians, than Germans, who have been the enemies of the Slavonians all the time."³⁸ Such circumstances undoubtedly offered the best opportunity for the establishment of Russian influence among the Southern Slavs, and thus Russia has been led to concentrate her attention on the Balkans, giving to her aims of predominance a purely nationalistic character.

In Russia public opinion grew continuously in favor of the Pan Slavist idea; it was stimulated by continual reports on Turkish misrule over the Balkan Christians; it grew especially after the publication of two works: Opinion of the Eastern Question, by General Rostislav Fadeyev, and Russia and Europe, by Nicholas Danilevskii. Both works appeared between 1869 and 1871 and both articulated the faith and hopes of Pan Slavism.

In Fadeyev's work the old Eastern Question had become a Slavic Question. The chief enemy of Slavdom and the barrier to Russian advance in Turkey was Austria, because she knew that she could control her Slavs only as long as Turkey held hers; consequently, the Eastern Question could be solved only in Vienna, and the only way, then, to Constantinople, was through Vienna.³⁹

For Danilevskii, it was Russia's obligation to assume the leadership in the struggle for freeing the oppressed brethren; it was to be warfare against Austria and Turkey, both bitter enemies of the Slavdom. His Russia and Europe contained the most radical formulation of the Pan Slavist program, based on the opinion that every Russian is a born Pan Slavist:

³⁸ Mijatovics, "Pan Slavism," Fortnightly Review, XIV, 1873, 112.

³⁹ Sumner, Russia and Pan Slavism, 42. Harris, Dial History, 57.

Sooner or later, whether we want it or not, the fight with Europe [or at least with the greater part of it] is inevitable, and it will be a fight because of the Eastern Question, that is, for the freedom and independence of the Slavs, for the possession of Tsargrad [Constantinople], for everything which in the opinion of Europe represents an object of illegitimate Russian ambitions and which in the opinion of every Russian worthy of that name represents the inevitable demand of Russia's historical Mission.⁴⁰

In the field of foreign political relations, Danilevskii claimed Russia should unite all the Slavs, if not under her sceptre, at least under her hegemony; Constantinople, moreover, should become the Capital of the Russian Empire and at the same time the Capital of the future Slavonic Federation.⁴¹

A hostile attitude towards Europe, the contrasting of Russia and Slavdom with the nations and civilizations of the West, the emphasis laid upon religion as the main force in the history of the Slavs and of the Russian people--all these viewpoints are common to all Slavophil writers. Dostoyevsky was convinced that Russia "will not have had and never has had such haters, envious, slanderers and even enemies, as all these Slavonic tribes, as soon as Russia shall have liberated them and Europe agreed to recognize their independence." But he also pointed out that the solution of the Eastern Question and of the Slavdom "is essentially the solution of the destinies of the Orthodox Faith;" for him Russia had a historical right to Constantinople, because she was the leader of the Eastern World.⁴²

⁴⁰ Nicholas J. Danilevskii, Russia i Evropa, Fourth Edition, St. Petersburg, 1889, 474. Gross, Ideologies, 484.

⁴¹ Thomas G. Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul, London, 1919, I, 291-293.

⁴² Florovsky, "Dostoyevsky and the Slavonic Question," Slavonic Review, IX, 418-420.

During the years which followed, the work for Slavic Welfare and unity was carried on by the Benevolent Societies. Motives for the gifts and contributions were various, because some "participant were generous enthusiasts; some were enemies of the Occident; some were apostles of Orthodoxy; some were covert champions of Russian Imperialism. All those motives, however, sanctioned a propaganda of words and deeds among Southern Slavs."⁴³

In spite of its national and religious creed, Slavophilism continued to be regarded with mistrust by the official Government, and was suspected as having demagogic tendencies. Thanks to the events in the Balkans, however, and to the continuous new of the Turkish misrule over the Christians, Slavophilism began gaining strength, little by little, even at the court of Alexander II, where it found supporters also in the strict entourage of the Empress and of the Tsarevich Alexander.

It was only in the eighteen-seventies that the Slavophil movement succeeded in gaining a strong hold on Russian public opinion. The successful insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1875, and the bloody repression of the Bulgarian uprising, in 1876, caused an ever-increasing interest for the Russian public opinion in the cause of the Slavs in the Near East.⁴⁴ Public opinion, led by the Slavophil writers, Katkov, Aksakov, and others, was deeply interested in the fate of the oppressed Christian populations, and the press sharply criticised the indolence and indifference of the Government and even of the Tsar and caused finally the Russian entry into the war with Turks, 1877.

⁴³ Harris, Diplomatic History, 36.

⁴⁴ Graham, Tsar of Freedom, 198.

The attitude of the Slavophiles during this period, their direct intervention in the conflict, and their influence on Russian declaration of war, will be discussed in the Chapter on Pan Slavist influence on Russian foreign policy.

As Alexander III was considered a Slavophile himself, having been under their influence, his ascension to the Russian throne, in 1881, opened the hopes of a new successful era for the "Great Slav Idea" and for the spread of the Slavophile ideas in general. Even if Pan Slavism, in the early eighteen-seventies, was still of some interest, and caused some rumors, especially in France, where they were looking towards Russia as a helpmate in the French struggle against Germany, it was yet in a declining state, and it did not, certainly, grow in the sense in which it was initiated.⁴⁵

With the opening of the new century, however, and especially after the Revolution of 1905, a new tendency became noticeable in Russia. Connections with other Slavs were renewed after an elapse of many years, but this time the Poles were also being taken into consideration. The idea was not a development of the Slavophile theories as represented by Homyakov, Kireyevsky, the Aksakov brothers and Danilevskii. It was not given the old, and somehow abstract and mystical idea of a special Slav mission. A more practical outlook for a cultural, political and economical commonwealth, based on the kinship of the Slavic nations, was gaining territory. The need of a cultural union was considered much more important than any other conception, and it was stressed

⁴⁵ Swaner, History of Russia, 235-236.

at the Conference of 1907, at St. Petersburg, and the Congresses in Prague, 1908, and Sophia, 1909.⁴⁶

These Congresses resulted in the pronouncement of such solemn declarations as: "The Slavs must afford each other help and must regard themselves as equal members of the Great Slavonic family," and "Every Slavonic nation must. . . be enabled to develop its individuality freely, independently and on its own way. . . ." etc. But, what was more important, many resolutions were accepted. The foremost concerned a common policy between the various Slav academies and learned societies; other propositions related to the preparation of a general Congress of Slavists, an edition of Slav Anthropology, and the preparation of a Slavonic Encyclopaedia and of a common Slav Dictionary. Emphasis was given to the interchange of scientific books, scholars and students; a Slav Book Fair and a common organization of Theatres was proposed; no political program, however, was laid down.⁴⁷ The most enthusiast defender of this Neo-Panslavism was a Czech, Dr. Karel Kramar, and the main purpose of his fight was to bring a reconciliation between Poles and Russians, because for him "no oppressor of other Slavs is a Slav." This Neo-Panslavism did not insist on the Orthodoxy, and as such had no concrete influence neither in Russia itself, nor on the Balkan Slavs.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ V.V. Bobceov, "The Slavs after the War," Slavonic and East European Review, London, VI, 1927-1928, 291-301.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 291-292.

⁴⁸ Sumner, History of Russia, 236-238.

CHAPTER V

BALKAN UPRISINGS

The first people in the Balkans who tried to regain their old freedom and independence were the Serbs.¹ Taking the opportunity of the Janissaries revolution against the Sultan in the Province of Belgrade, which culminated in 1804, the Serbians, whose spirit of nationality and of past glory had been restrained by the Ottoman rule for four hundred years, started their fight for independence under the leadership of Karageorge.

As they were aware that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to fight alone against the Turkish armies, they addressed themselves first to the Austrians, saying that they could not and would not remain any longer under the Turkish yoke, and that they wished to come under the rule of Austrian Imperial House: Everything is ready to ask the Emperor to send a Prince as the ruler of the country. If Austria could not stand for this, the Serbs will have to address themselves, even with not with pleasure, to another Christian Power in order to free themselves of the foreign oppres-

¹ Leopold von Ranke, The History of Serbia and the Servian Revolution, translated Mrs. Alexander Kerr, London, 1855. Robert W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans, London, 1917, 21-43. Ferdinand Tsehevill, The History of the Balkan Peninsula, New York, Revised Edition, 1922, 319-326. Sir J. Arthur Mariott, The Eastern Question, a Historical Study of European Diplomacy, Oxford (Engl.), 1925, 159-164.

sion.² The Viennese Government, however, decided not to help the insurrectionists, and suggested that they continue to submit themselves to the Turkish authorities. There was already at that time in Serbia a group of people who possessed strong pro-Russian and Anti-Austrian feelings, which were based upon religious and racial kinship. The exponents of this group were glad that Austria refused to help their insurrection and acclaimed Russia because they had always thought that their salvation depended only from Russia: "We must address ourselves to Russia! - The White Tsar will help us indeed!"³

In August 1804, therefore, the Serbians applied to Russia for help. The Tsar was not averse to listening to the Serbian requests, but because of his own policy towards Turkey, he advised the Serbs to submit their wishes directly to the Sultan, and promised that the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople would be instructed to insist upon the acceptance of the Serbian requests. Thereupon, the Serbians sent a mission to Constantinople, early in 1805, and their demands were really backed by a contemporaneous Russian pressure on the Porte, proposing to the Porte an anti-Napoleonic Alliance.⁴ The Sultan promised the requested reforms, but he was merely temporizing, actually expecting that his troops would repress the uprising before the concessions would be granted. For, Russia already had been planning for a long time to take definite steps in the Balkans, despite her promises to Austria, and despite the

2. Spiridon Gopcevic, Russland und Serbien von 1804 - 1915, Muenchen, 1916, 13.

3. Ibid., 27.

4. Ranke, History of Servia, 93-94.

24

fact that the Russian armies were already busy enough fighting with Prussia against the French. The Turkish hesitation did not please the Tsar, and on December 27, 1806, the Russian troops, under the command of General Prozerovisky, entered the Danubian Principalities without a Declaration of War. Even though the Serbians were practically victorious, having in the meantime defeated the Turkish armies in Serbia, they were for the first time united with the Russians in a common fight against the Turks. At this time European events were rapidly changing; the Alliance of Tilsit, between Emperor Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I, interrupted the Russo-Turkish war with a truce. The conflict continued in 1809, and finally ended with the Treaty of Bucharest, in 1812. This Treaty left the Serbians really to the mercy of Turkish reprisals which led to another Serbian uprising under Miles Obrenovic, in 1815; the Porte finally agreed to concede autonomy to Serbia, but did not do so until 1821, when the difficulties began with the Greeks. The Convention of Ackerman, in 1826, made Serbia almost completely autonomous, and gave Russia a form of protectorate over the new Principality.⁵ With the Treaty of Adrianople, in 1829, the terms of the Ackerman Convention were confirmed. Serbia's autonomy was definitely achieved in 1830, when Miles Obrenovic was recognized as the hereditary Prince of Serbia also by the Porte.⁶

It was quite difficult to achieve stabilization of the internal condition in Serbia. The Sultan had, by the right of sovereignty, a continuous

5 Ibid., 235. Noradounghian, Recueil, II, 116-127.

6 Seton-Watson, Rise of Nationality, 38-39. Schevill, Balkan Peninsula, 321-323.

control over the young Principality. Austria and Russia, both wanted to have an influential part in the Serbian political orientation. A systematic and regular evolution of internal political life was therefore rather difficult, especially because of the internal struggle between the two national dynasties, the House of Obrenovich and the House of Karageorgevich. In 1842, the rule of the Obrenovich House was replaced by the rule of the Karageorgevich family. As Russia was opposed to the new Prince Alexander, he felt himself forced to accept the Austrian influence. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1853, Serbia was in a difficult position, for she was a vassal state of Turkey, and could have been asked to fight on the side of the Turks against Russians; yet, being under the Russian protection, and because of her racial and religious kinship, she felt that she should be on the side of Russia. On the advice of Russia, however, she remained neutral, because the Turks were ready to grant her privileges anyway.⁷ Even though Russian influence upon the Prince and his Court declined further after the Crimean War, he was not able to control the feelings of the masses which continued to remain agitated and influenced by the pro-Russian agents.⁸ The Obrenovich House was restored again in 1859, and Prince Michael brought from exile the western conception on sovereignty; because of the firm attitude of Prince Michael Obrenovich, the last Turkish garrison withdrew from Serbia in 1867. After the assassination of Prince Michael, in 1868,

7 Prince Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, The Servian People, their past Glory and Destiny, with the collaboration of Princess Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich (Eleanor Calhoun), New York, 1910, II, 687-688.

8 Seton-Watson, Rise of Nationality, 39-40. Schevill, Balkan Peninsula, 323-326.

when his successor Milan Obrenovich was still under age, Serbia tried to introduce a constitutional reform; she succeeded despite Russian opposition to the amendment which she considered dangerous to her influence.⁹ The adoption of the new constitution was considered a successful display of Austrian influence. Once of age, Prince Milan, led by his foreign minister Ristic, tried to maintain a balance between Russia and Austria. After a visit to Tsar Alexander II, which was considered a hostile act towards Austria, he also paid a visit to Emperor Francis Joseph and thus "corrected" the mistake. Thus, indeed, Serbian foreign policy then remained under the joint influence of the League of Three Emperors who were anxious to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.¹⁰

The insurrection of 1875, which started in a remote village of Herzegovina, was the beginning of a general uprising which eventually spread to Bosnia and Bulgaria. The insurrection was aided by Serbia and Montenegro and caused the Russo-Turkish war of 1877. Public opinion in Serbia was for open support of the fight for freedom in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prince Milan himself was opposed to any intervention, and this attitude was supported at the time by both Austria and Russia. The maltreatment of the Serbian traders in Bosnia and the great number of fugitives from Bosnia and Herzegovina who were becoming a

9 "Instead of wasting her energies on internal administrative reforms, Serbia, it was urged by Russia, should devote herself entirely to the task of strengthening her international position, of course not for the sake of Serbia, but for the sake of the role which Serbia was destined to play in the Russian plans for opening of the Straits." Vaso Trivanovich, "Serbia, Russia and Austria during the rule of Milan Obrenovich, 1868-1878," Journal of Modern History, Chicago, III, March-December 1931, 416.

10 Ibid., 425-426.

burden for the Serbian State, gave Serbia an official excuse of declaring, together with Montenegro, war on Turkey, on June 30, 1876, without any approval from Russia.¹¹ Turkey was stronger than was expected, and Prince Milan had to ask the help of the foreign Powers. Because of the pressure which these Powers exercised upon Turkey, peace was signed on February 28, 1877, on the basis of a status quo ante.¹² In the meantime the situation in Russia was being so controlled by Slavophil influence that she, under the pressure of public opinion, on April 24, 1877, declared war upon Turkey. In order to comply with the subsequent Russian requests, Serbia began, on December 15, 1877, a second war with Turkey, without, however, having secured from Russia any promises concerning the territories which she was to receive in case of victory. The Treaty of San Stefano gave practically nothing to Serbia in the way of territorial expansion, because Russia did not want to offend the Austrian pretensions. The Serbs protested, but the Russian Government was frank enough to admit that the Russian and Bulgarian interests were first and those of Serbia only secondary; after all, Bulgaria would ensure their road to Constantinople.¹³ At the Berlin Conference the Serbian requests were supported by Austria, for the exchange of granting Austrian influence in Serbia. Serbia was proclaimed a

11 Serbian Foreign Minister Ristich thought that the best policy was to confront Russia with a fait accompli: "If we attempt to bargain. . . she will force us to do her will; if we confront her with a fait accompli, we may draw her after us. . . our defeat more surely than our victory would bring Russia out of her reserve and would force her to take a hand in the development." Slobodan Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, 1868-1889, Beograd, 1926, I, 310.

12 Trivanovich, "Serbia, Russia and Austria," Journal of Modern History, III, 435-436. Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, I, 388-389.

13 Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, Servian People, 705-706.

sovereign country, but received only some two hundred square miles of new territory.¹⁴

The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of their pacification was decided in such a way that they were put under Austrian administration. The population was certainly dismayed to see their hopes for liberties now denied, for they foresaw that they will be put again under a foreign ruler, and that their fight for freedom had not results. Austria-Hungary had, however, to confront a strong opposition of the whole population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the occupation was completed only after four years of continuous conflict.¹⁵

After the Berlin Congress, the Austrian influence on the Serbian politics grew even greater. Prince Milan was profoundly disappointed in Russia and her insincerity towards Serbia; he threw himself completely under the protection of Austria, obtaining even a promise of armed support of his throne by Austria, under the terms of a Secret Convention, concluded June 28, 1881.¹⁶ On March 3, 1882, Serbia was proclaimed a Kingdom.

The internal situation of Serbia was all but satisfactory. A sense of insecurity prevailed, and the atmosphere was quite favorable for various plots against the ruling Obrenovich House. The so-called "Palace Revolution," on June 11, 1903, ended the rule of the Obrenovich's House, and with it the prevalence of the Austro-Hungarian influence on the Serbia Government. Peter

14 Noradounghian, Recueil, IV, 175.

15 Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, Servian People, II, 706-707.

16 Stojan Protich, "The Secret Treaty between Serbia and Austria-Hungary," Fortnightly Review, London, LXXXV, 1909, 838-849.

Karageorgevich was proclaimed as the King of Serbia, and Serbia became again a strictly Russian protegee.¹⁷

The Greeks started their struggle for independence in 1821, not without the influence of the current revolutionary ideas--especially as felt by the intellectual class--and not without Russian interest.¹⁸ The Greek revolt was partly caused by the anti-Christian policy of the Sultan Mahmud, and sponsored partly by Russia. There was a large Greek colony in Odessa, composed of bankers, merchants, and priests. This colony was a breeding place for the ideas of Greek nationalism, and the center for the struggle of the Greek Church against the Crescent. It was there that a Society, bearing the name "Hetairia," was formed, whose purpose was to liberate the Greeks from the Turkish yoke. The founders of the group counted also on Russian assistance, because, since 1820, the Foreign Minister of the Tsar Alexander I, was Capodistrias, who was of Greek birth himself.

The actual fight for independence started in 1821, when Alexander Ypsilanti, a Hetairist Chief and a General in the Russian army, crossed the river Pruth into Moldavia, with the intention of arousing the Romanian population against the Turks, and so to strengthen the position of the Greek rebels.¹⁹ Ypsilanti's expedition was without success, because his troops were dispersed by the Turks; however, the Greek rebels did not stop. Their rebellion made-

17 Mariott, Eastern Question, 173-180. Schevill, Balkan Peninsula, 327-344.

18 Ibid., 331.

19 Ibid., 332.

ned Sultan Mahmud, who took revenge against the Greeks in a massacre of Greek Christians in the Turkish capital, also hanging the Patriarch of Constantinople, Gregory V, 20

The Russian Ambassador in Constantinople was instructed in July 1821, to demand from the Ottoman Porte the restoration of former privileges of the Christian Church in Greece; to ask, moreover, the Porte for some kind of satisfaction for the murder of the Patriarch; and finally to request consent for Russia to exercise her rights of protection according to existing Treaties. The Porte did not answer these demands in the requested time, and the Russian Ambassador asked for his passports. Even though Alexander I had dismissed, in 1822, his Greco-phil Minister, Capodistrias, he made, in January 1824, proposals for an active intervention in favor of the Greek insurgents; but at a Conference of the Ministers at St. Petersburg, the Russian Cabinet rejected the project, 22

The successor of Alexander I, Nicholas I, influenced partly by England, and partly by his own ambitions, was more favorable to the Greek cause, and presented the Porte with an ultimatum, which led to the Treaty of Acheron, in 1826. In 1827, in London, he made an agreement with England and France, stipulating that the Greeks must be given independence. The subsequent allied intervention, which followed, with the famous battle of Navarino, in 1827, was practically the birth date of Greek Freedom.

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- 20 Seton-Watson, Rise of Nationality, 51-52.
 - 21 Harlott, Eastern Question, 184-185.
 - 22 Shiras, Expansion of Russia, 73.

The result of the battle at Navarino meant, really, a triumph for Russia. The Tsar thought that the long-expected opportunity to restore the double-headed eagle to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles had come, and in 1828, he entered the war with Turkey, sending an army of one hundred thousand men to cross the Balkans and to take Constantinople. The Army met with serious opposition only after had crossed the river Danube, but the battle was never decided, even though the fortress of Varna fell into Russian hands. When the Russian army under the command of General Diebitch came to Adrianople, the Porte was terrified, and--not knowing how disastrous the conditions of the army were--signed the Treaty of Adrianople with an immense gain to Russia. As far as Greece was concerned, the Porte agreed to accept whatever solution would be adopted by the three protecting Powers. On February 3, 1830, the Kingdom of Hellenes was proclaimed, and the new throne was offered to Prince Otto of Bavaria.²³

The recognition of Greek independence by the Porte was therefore a practical result of the successful ambitions of Nicholas I. The Greeks, however, even though of Orthodox faith, did not constitute a special interest for Russia, for whom the main interest lay in weakening the Ottoman Empire in order to have a safer route to Constantinople. This is why the Greeks have remained more or less continuously under a joint influence of their "Godparents" without any concrete interference of Russian politics.²⁴

²³ Noradounghian, Recueil, II, 126, 174. Scheyll, Balkan Peninsula, 340.

²⁴ Browning, Modern World, I, 166. Skrine, Expansion of Russia, 105.

The Bulgarians were the last nation in the Balkans to regain their independence.²⁵ They owe to Russia almost everything relating to their national regeneration and their liberation from Turkey. Between 1856 and 1878, a group of Bulgarian nationalists was trained in Russia on Russian expense. Not all of them returned to Bulgaria with an Orthodoxy or with the belief in the might of Tsarism as was expected by their Russian "benefactors." The Russian agents soon found out that the Bulgarians did wish, indeed, to get rid of the Turkish yoke, but that they also did not desire to come under any Russian autocratic tutelage.²⁶

The revolutionary ideas of 1848 also found their way to Bulgaria. The Bulgarian awakening did not take immediately a political form, but it merely attempted to obtain certain cultural freedoms and a religious independence. In soliciting religious concessions from the Sultan, the Bulgarians were backed by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. They had not, however, had any concrete leaders for a political action.²⁷ The small uprisings which followed the Crimean War were easily repressed by the Turks. The fight for a national Church was finally successful, and in 1870 a firman of the Sultan created an independent Bulgarian Exarchate with only a formal dependence from the Greek Patriarch. Bulgarian nationalists were far from being satisfied. At a secret in Bucharest, the exiled leaders declared that Bulgaria had not need of an Exarch, but that she did need a rebel leader.²⁸ In fact, when the rebellion of

26 Schevill, Balkan Peninsula, 385, 407-409.

27 Vernadsky, History of Russia, 339.

28 Seton-Watson, Rise of Nationality, 83-84.

Bosnia and Herzegovina took place, in 1875, Bulgarians felt the necessity of an uprising to be attempted on a completely nationalist basis. An initial insurrection, which took place at Stara Zagora, was immediately repressed by the Turks. A new revolutionary Committee was constituted, and in May 1876, when the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not as yet been decided, a serious uprising took place in Bulgaria. Turkish counter-measures resulted in a horrible massacre which caused the indignation of the Western nations, especially of Russia. The Russian entry into war with Turkey was for the Bulgars proof enough that the Russians were their liberators; it was because of the Russian victory, that their centuries-long oppression was broken. Under the Treaty of San Stefano, Bulgaria was to be administered by a Russian Commissar until a Constitution was formulated. Russia would have thus been assured of having a directive position in Bulgaria. The rude interference of the Western Powers in the situation, however, and the subsequent Treaty of Berlin, made the Great Bulgaria of San Stefano a small Principality. Bulgaria received her own Constitution in 1879, and her throne was given to Prince Alexander of Battenberg.²⁹

According to the arrangements of the Berlin Conference, Bulgaria was to remain under the Turkish sovereignty. As things were, the administration was in hands of some Russian Generals, and the Bulgarian army had Russian officers and Russian instructors. The new Prince Alexander himself was a nephew of the Tsar Alexander II.

The Bulgarians did not lose much time, however, in becoming dissatisfied over the Russian rule of their Principality; they aspired to a full in-

dependence, without any Turkish or Russian control.³⁰ Because Prince Alexander took the side of the people, he fell into the disfavor of his Imperial uncle, Tsar Alexander. The differences with Russia became very acute in 1883, when Prince Alexander had to re-establish the Constitution "made in Russia" that he had abrogated in 1881. Tsar Alexander III was even less favorable to the Prince Alexander. Reciprocal hostility grew because the Russians were opposed to the inclusion of the Southern part of Bulgaria, namely of Eastern Rumanian Province, into Greater Bulgaria, which was to be carried out according to the original intentions of the Treaty of San Stefano. Russia was not really contrarious to this annexation as such, but she desired it as a Russian protectorate and not as a completely independent state as the Bulgarians envisioned. The Bulgarian nationalists, led by Stambulov, requested Prince Alexander to accept the throne of a United Bulgaria. He did not like the idea of losing his throne, as Stambulov had threatened, and in September 1885, despite Russian opposition, announced that he would accept the rule over the Great Bulgaria. The situation was unfavorably seen not only by Russia, but also by Austria; and because of this disfavor, Bulgarian unification had seen to confront another difficulty. This was a war with Serbia, probably instigated by the Austrians, under whose influence she was at that time, but also stimulated by Serbian ambitions. The Unifications of the two Bulgarias was not advantageous to Serbian plans, which contemplated expansion Eastward. The war was successful for the Bulgarians, and only an Austrian intervention saved Serbia. In spite of all

³⁰ Mariott, Eastern Question, 309-315.

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these difficulties, the union of two Bulgarias was finally achieved, and recognized by the Ottoman Porte in 1886. The Peace Treaty of Bucharest, March 3, 1886, between Serbia and Bulgaria restored the status quo ante. Prince Alexander's success displeased the Tsar very much; besides the Tsar was also disappointed at the Prince's liberal ideas in regard to Russian domination in Bulgaria. One night, in August 1886, a group of Russian officers compelled Prince Alexander to sign an abdication and to leave Bulgaria. He was recalled by a Provisional Government, headed by Stambulov, and in September, re-entered Bulgaria; but, when, four days later, Tsar Alexander III refused to recognize his restoration, he had to leave for ever. The Russia adviser to the Agency, General Kaulbars, did not succeed in raising the number of the Russophiles, and the Sobranje, after conferring the powers to Stambulov, refused to accept a Russian nominee for the throne. In July 1887, the Bulgarian delegates elected Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha as the Prince of Bulgaria.³¹ Russia refused to recognize this election, but the Prince, who was backed by Bismarck and Emperor Francis Joseph, defied the Russian opposition, and accepted the throne. The relations with Russia began to improve only after the death of Tsar Alexander III, in 1894, beginning thus a new period of Russian influence in Bulgarian affairs, which can in no way be compared with that period which preceded and coincided with the main crisis of the eighteenth century. One can say that the years 1894 to 1910 were the happiest in the history of Russo-Bulgarian relations. A constantly existing undercurrent of distrust, however, caused by

31 Ibid., 320.

the inconsistency of Russian policy, was continuously undermining Russian prestige. It was also the policy of Prince Ferdinand that Bulgaria must lean upon both Russia and Austria simultaneously; he felt that to give preference to one of the two would be the end of Bulgaria. Russia did not maintain her promises and her policy towards Bulgaria was never definite. In the year 1911, there started a rapid decline of Russian influence, mostly because an understanding had been reached, already in 1908, between Bulgaria and Austria, which resulted in Bulgaria being proclaimed independent, on October 5, 1908. The two Balkan Wars, 1912 and 1913, offered only more proof of the weakness of Russian influence. Even though Bulgaria was in fact a child of Russia, the Great war instilled in Bulgaria a very strong anti-Russian feeling, and brought her to the arms of the Central Powers.³²

³² Sergiei A. Korf, Russia's Foreign Relations during the last Half Century, New York, 1922, 124-126.

CHAPTER VI

THE MEANS TO THE END

Peter the Great and Catherine II never dreamed about Pan-Slavism as a moving force for their aims of expansion. Russian politicians of that time were not interested in their Slavic brethren because of some common racial origin. Their interest in the fortunes of various Slavic nations was based, as far as it existed at all, on the religious relationship.

Since the capture of Azov by Peter the Great, in 1696, the center of the Slavic hopes had been based upon Russia. It is impossible, however, to ascertain whether or not Peter the Great was acquainted with the writings of Stefan Krstevic. The fact is that he had been in contact with the Slavonic world and as early as 1697, he is reported as having said: "Will my last breath I shall not cease to wish to work for the liberation of the Christians."¹ When, in 1711, Peter the Great was preparing to march against the Turks, he allegedly sent a certain Milorodovic to the Montenegrins asking them to join him in the common struggle against the common enemy. Even Russia's later failures did not shake the enthusiasm with which the Montenegrins received Peter the Great's invitation, recalling the Year ever since as the Liberator's.²

1 Skarvilo, "From Krsenica to the Slavophiles," Slavonic Review, VI, 220.

2 Chadwick, Nationalities of Europe, 115.

A Serbian historian, Stojanovic, published in the early years of the twentieth century a series of documents with which he proved that the Slavs of south were in contact with Russia and Peter the Great, and that they considered each Russian success as their own success.³

Similarly, Catherine the Great was not thinking in the terms of Pan-slavism or Slavism in general when she adopted the policies of expansion of Peter the Great. The idea of a common kinship was not forgotten, for when she was fighting the Turks, she turned to the Balkan Slavs and to the Greeks, inviting them to take up arms and to fight with her against the Turks. Since then, each Russian war against the Turks has also caused disorders and uprisings among the Balkan Slavs, many of whom would seek refuge after such wars in Russia in order to escape Turkish reprisals, bringing with them the hate of the oppressors and the hope that Russia would help their home countries.⁴ With her "Greek Project," Catherine the Great made an agreement, in 1782, with the Austrian Emperor for the partition of Turkey, but her intention was not the liberation of the Balkan Christians, but the creation of a Greek Empire and the possession of the Straits for Russia.⁵

The policy of Catherine the Great was taken up again by Tsar Alexander I, who succeeded the throne in 1801. According to the memoirs of Prince

³ These works were published in Serbia and came to the attention of the writer during his studies in the old country. They are not available in any of the libraries here. The author, Stojanovic, is mentioned also in Mousset, Le Monde Slave, 44.

⁴ Sharle, "From Krizanie to the Slavophiles," Slavonic Review, VI, 330. Savic, Southeastern Europe, 238.

⁵ Stojanovic, Great Powers, 1.

Adam Czartoryski, at that time Foreign Minister of Russia, the Russian policy proposed that

the Turkish territories in Europe should be divided into separate states, governed locally, and bound to each other by a federation, upon which Russia would be able to secure to herself a decisive and lawful influence by means of the title of Emperor or Protector of the Slavs of the East which would be accorded to His Imperial Majesty. In any case this influence would be established by the part the Russians will have taken in the liberation of these territories, by identity of religion and origin, and by a wise policy and skilful selection of posts to be occupied by our troops. If the consent of Austria should be necessary, she might be given Croatia, part of Bosnia and Wallachia, Belgrade, Ragusa, etc. Russia would have Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, and above all Constantinople and the Dardanelles, together with the neighboring ports which would make us masters of the Straits. France and England could be offered some islands in the Archipelago or establishments in Asia or Africa.⁶

Some conceptions which would have had influence upon Alexander the First's policy, may be found in the writings of certain Karazin, who

dreamed the establishment of a 'Slavic Empire'. . . . This Empire was, with the time to be extended to the Adriatic Sea, in Albania and Macedonia, and on the other side to embrace Serbo-Croatian lands of Austria. . . . This Empire which would very soon develop and organize, would be bound to the Russian Empire by ties of religion, blood, and thankfulness, and would become Russia's. . . . natural base for all her activities and relations with Europe and Africa.⁷

It would be improper to say that Russian assistance to the martinous Serbs in 1806, was not also influenced by some kind feelings, possibly unconscious, of a common kinship; one should say, however, that the main reason was certainly not this feeling of a common origin, but rather the undeniable Russian tendency for the control of the Balkan Slavs.

⁶ Adam Gielgud, ed., Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and his Correspondence with Alexander I, Second edition, London, 1888, II, 54.

⁷ Quoted by Gross, Ideologies, 827.

As early as 1807, a Russian diplomatic agent, Rodofikin, was sent to Belgrade. In communications to General Prozorovisky, who was in charge of the Russian armies in the Balkans, he repeatedly insisted that

it would be desirable. . . that no other diplomatic agents be admitted to Serbia because they have the right to contact the Prince and the Nobles; this would give them the opportunity to prevent a concrete influence of Russia over this country. . . . The foreign agents can find now here a real opportunity for a work against our wishes; one can be sure that Austria will make all efforts to diminish our influence here, because there is no doubt that we will, while we are here, establish our own influence.⁸

In another letter he repeated that

it is very important to establish the Russian influence over Serbia, especially for the case of a war between Russia and Austria, because the latter can in such a case remain helpless and therefore made impotent at the beginning of the war. Turkey would be, so to say, completely at the disposition of the Russian Court.⁹

Rodofikin wanted Russian influence in Serbia at any price. To make sure that such influence and other Russian interests would be carried out, he maintained that

in Serbia must be established, before everything, a senate, the President of which will be the Prince and which will sit, in all important occasions, the Russian consul or agent. This will prevent an independent policy of the Prince and preclude him from any steps which could damage the Russian interests.¹⁰

The interests which Russia had in mind were the Black Sea and the Straits; if Serbia were controlled completely by Russia, an eventual Austrian "Dang" towards the Straits would be paralyzed. The fact that the Serbians

8 Gopcevic, Russland und Serbien, 135.

9 Ibid., 136.

10 Ibid., 137.

were Orthodox only favored the establishment of the Russian influence, Russia being considered as the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The aid Russia brought to the Serbs, did, however, give impetus to the idea of Slavic kinship in Russia. Even if national glory, and romanticism, and the new born interest in their own history, inspired Russian interest in their common race, there was nothing of this influence in the Russian policy of expansion in the Balkan Peninsula. For Alexander I, the main aim was to maintain a weak Turkey under Russian influence, and to have free hand in the Danubian Principalities. The Holy Alliance, in September 1815, in itself "usually regarded as an unholy alliance of reaction against liberalism, constitutionalism and nationality,"¹¹ bound Alexander I, and therefore he was not in position to support any revolutions of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte. As his opinion on the necessity of intervention did not coincide with the other Powers he broke with them and decided to take an independent action in favor of the Greeks.

The renewal of the Holy Alliance, caused by the revolutions of 1830, forced Nicholas I to speak with two voices. On the one hand he did not want to encourage any movements which could be considered hostile to the Habsburg Empire; on the other hand he could not see the attitude of the Slavs outside of Russia, who were awakening under the influence of the new ideas, and who yet would not take notice of the constant appeals of the Orthodox Christians against the Ottoman oppression. The official foreign policy of Russia, however, between 1822 and 1856, was directed by the German-born Foreign Minister, Count

¹¹ Sumner, History of Russia, 395.

Nesselrode, who was the enemy of any Slav movement and did not like the idea of their emancipation. Because he wanted Russia to maintain alive the solidity of the Holy Alliance, no appeals were to be made to the oppressed Slavs or Orthodox, because any such appeal would have raised serious repercussions in Vienna. These intentions, nevertheless, did not remain unknown, and in spite of the most conservative directing lines of the official policy, they were discussed by the outside observers.

It is principally the South Slavic Nationalities that the Russian cabinet works to subjugate. For half a century it has surrounded the schismatic Slavs of Turkey and Austria with quite special protection. Promises, magnificent gifts, nothing is spared in order to seduce them. Sacred ornaments sent by Russia fill their churches; their most beautiful liturgical books are presents of the Holy Synod of St. Petersburg. The principal personalities. . . receive all kinds of gratifications from the Tsar, rings with diamonds, even decorations arrive from the Neva as recompense for services rendered to the cause of Slavic literatures. The Muscovite agents know how to hide under this purely literary propaganda one of the most active political propaganda. In the name of the independence of the whole race they call the subjugated Southern Slavs for a coalition with Tsar against their oppressors. Thus they pretend to find a Pan Slavism of a special order, which would consist of grouping the different Slavic nations under the sceptre of Romanovs as protected powers. This thought appears from the beginning to the end in the long Pan Slavist epos of the Slovak poet Kollar under the title Slavy Deera. . . . It would be imprudent to contest what the ideas have of the seductive and dangerous; one must indeed recognize the existence of a Russian Pan Slavism, only one may deny its Slavic Character and that it ever could possess the sympathy of any independent Slav.¹²

After 1850, Nicholas I inclined to favor the intensified pressure of the Slavophil movement which grew during the two decades preceding the Crimean War, and was sympathetic to the arming of Christians in Turkey, appea-

¹² Cyprien Robert, "Les Deux Pan Slavismes: situation actuelle des Peuples Slaves vis-a-vis de la Russie," Revue des Deux Mondes, Paris, XVI, October-December 1846, 472-473.

ing to them "to rise in defense of Orthodoxy but not in defense of Slavdom."¹³

The official policy, which was normally followed by Nicholas I and his Foreign Minister, was not followed by the Russian agents and diplomats in the Balkans. Vienna, which was afraid that Serbia and the Principalities would fall completely under Russian influence, was especially alarmed. Such a perturbed position led the Emperor Francis Joseph, in January 1854, to ask Nicholas I openly in a personal letter, to cease inciting the Balkan Christians, because no changes were to be made in the political situation of the European Turkey.¹⁴

After the Crimean War, the relations with the other Slavs came to be of greater interest. Alexander II appointed as his Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Gorchakov, (1856-1881), replacing Count Nesselrode. It can be said that with Gorchakov's appointment, the Foreign Office was made more accessible to outside influence of liberalism and nationalism in favor of the oppressed peoples. The "official" Russia started reflecting the propaganda of those currents of Russian national opinion which had always hailed the other Slavs as "little brothers," and which sustained Russia as having the mission of saving them from the infidel Moslem oppression and as protecting them from the contaminating influence of the West.

The main interest of the Slavophiles was the Orthodoxy; prior to the Crimean War they did not take, with some exceptions, any too great an interest

¹³ Sumner, History of Russia, 230.

¹⁴ Ibid., 404-405.

in the other Slav peoples. At the beginning of the reign of Alexander II, their influence was substantially unimportant. After 1856, a substantial change occurred and the leaders, carried along by the impetus, started to concentrate their attention on the Balkan Slavs, especially after the formation of the Slavonic Benevolent Committee, officially approved by the Tsar and the Foreign Office.¹⁵ From the Slavophil theories of pure Orthodoxy and of the Mission of Russia in saving the "little brothers," there grew, after 1856, much more strident and active a doctrine, which became the animating force of Russian expansionism, namely Pan Slavism, which based, as it has been already seen, its main emphasis on the general community of the Slav interests. In the eighteen-sixties, the Pan Slav idea characterized Russian public opinion, the enthusiasm of which culminated in the well-known Slavonic Congress of Moscow, 1867. The Pan Slav idea was shared by many influential personalities, and did not lack some kind of official support. But neither the Government nor the Tsar were committed to it. Alexander the Second's policy toward Poles and Ukrainians was even in direct contrast to Pan Slavist preachings. To the Foreign Minister, Gorchakov, the sphere of immediate Russian interests was the West rather than the East.¹⁶ His definition of Russian foreign policy after the Crimean War, namely that "La Russie ne boude pas; elle se recueille,"¹⁷ manifests, however, his intimate conviction of what Russia had yet to do, and after

¹⁵ Charles Seeger, Editor, The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky, former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to France, London, 1920, 163.

¹⁶ Graham, Tsar of Freedom, 154.

¹⁷ Klaczko, Two Emperors, 79-103.

the Polish revolution, in 1863, he won great popularity among the Slavophiles to whom, "ath that time he held up one finger. . . but they took the whole hand."¹⁸

The Slavophil outlook also found influential adherents in the Imperial family, in the Church, and in the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Office. Its most powerful proponent was General Ignatyev, a well-known enthusiast in the Slavonic cause who was, in 1864, appointed as Russian Minister, and later Ambassador, to the Ottoman Porte.

With the appointment of General Ignatyev to Constantinople, the activity of the Panslav movement as an exponent of Russian policy in the Balkans became very active; the fact is, that it was especially Ignatyev's capacity, interference, and influence that gave impulse to this activity, which culminated in the Balkan uprisings and in the complications which led to the crisis in 1876 and 1878.

Ignatyev's attitude towards Panslavism was predominantly political. He respected the racial distinctions of the Slavs, their spirit of independence, and their "particularism without submitting to each other."¹⁹ He thought that the unity of Slavs could be attained only by "a slow process, with the help of a common literary language, in the form of a defensive form of alliance uniting their armed forces against a common foe under a common diplomatic and economic

¹⁸ Graham, Tsar of Freedom, 154.

¹⁹ Alexander Onou, "The Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev," Slavonic and East European Review, London, IX, 1930-1931, 386-387. Bernard H. Sumner, "Iganyev at Constantinople," Slavonic and East European Review, London, XI, 1932-1933, 341-353.

direction.²⁰ He defended a clear formula of Pan Slavism as he considered it:

The Austrian and Turkish Slavs must be our allies, the weapons of our policy against Germans. In order to attain this object Russia may make sacrifices for their liberation and consolidation; but to sacrifice exclusively Russian interest, taking the means for the end, only to have in view the liberation of the Slavs and to leave them afterwards to follow a policy hostile to us, and content ourselves with the humane side of our successes, would be unreasonable and criminal.²¹

Ignatyev came to Constantinople with a definite opinion on the policy that Russia should follow in the Balkans. His first and most important point was the revision of the Treaty of Paris, of 1856, and ~~abolishing~~ the clauses neutralizing the Balk Sea and limiting Russian naval rights; further, he wanted the return of Bessarabia to Russia. The command of Constantinople and of the Straits constituted the second point of his program, because Russian security on the Black Sea depended upon this control of Constantinople and of the Straits.

Ignatyev's main line of policy was to organize some form of common action among the Balkan Slavs, under the direction of Russia. The aim of Pan Slavism was to pave the way through the two principal difficulties which were the particularism of the Slavs themselves, and the hostility of the Dualistic Austria-Hungary as a rival of Russia in the fight for the first place in the Balkan Peninsula and for the leadership of Slavdom. According to Ignatyev, Russia alone should control the Balkans, and the Balkan Slavs should look only towards Russia.²²

20 Onou, "Memoirs of Ignatyev," Slavonic Review, IX, 389-390.

21 Ibid., 390.

22 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 46. Sumner, "Ignatyev at Constantinople," Slavonic Review, VI, 343-344.

Soon after his arrival at Constantinople, Ignatyev contacted the leaders of the Balkan Slavs. In his memoirs he wrote:

I got into contact with all the Slavonic peoples, preparing them for independence. The subterranean work directed against the Treaty of Paris, also against Western and in general foreign influence on the Bosphorus, especially against the Turkey herself and Austria-Hungary, had to be continued till the increasing strength of Russia and favorable events in Europe permit us to work out an independent solution of the Eastern Question in the Russian sense, that is by forming units of a common blood and common religion, united to Russia by indissoluble bonds, in return for the transfer of the Straits.²³

At the time of the Cretan disturbances, 1866-1868, Ignatyev advised the Russian Government to utilize the opportunity for its own purposes by

supporting the demands of the Greeks drawing away Greece from the hands of the West, transforming them into Russian allies and supporters of Slavonic emancipation, and uniting them to our common interests. At first my voice was a solitary one. Later St. Petersburg became excited with the idea of doing something for the Cretans and the Greeks. . . . But the Foreign Office continued to waste time and lost all favorable opportunities always aiming at remaining friendly with other Powers in the European Concert which were constantly in every way opposing Russian interests.²⁴

Even though Slavophil influence was constantly growing in Moscow and at St. Petersburg, Ignatyev's propositions were not favorably accepted and he continued to complain that

all this has been overlooked in St. Petersburg. The Cretan insurrection has been repressed, the Greeks turned against us. . . . The premature death of Prince Michael [Obrenovich of Serbia, in 1868] destroyed the plan [Ignatyev's] of an independent rising of all Balkan peoples and the creation of a great Serbo-Bulgarian principality. . . . We could no longer the action of Serbia as the principal one; as she could be squeezed in the

²³ Onou, "Memoirs of Ignatyev," Slavonic Reviews IX, 391-392

²⁴ Ibid., 392-393.

fist of Austria-Hungary, we had to look for other combinations to attain the same results.²⁵

Ignatyev's Slavophil enthusiasm had also a great deal of cold diplomatic calculation. He wanted the freedom of the Balkan Slavs, but he wanted it, if possible, without Russia's entry into an open war against Turkey. As a diplomat he had foreseen all the diplomatic complications and difficulties of a Russo-Turkish war. Therefore, he pressed the Balkan nations to fight against Turkey, because it would have been easier to prevent an eventual intervention of the Powers in a war between Turkey and the Balkan States, than it would have been in the case of the war between Russia and Turkey. Ignatyev's plan was more and more to weaken Turkey with the Balkan wars and uprisings and make her thus dependent from Russia.²⁶ Russia would have only to collect the diplomatic results:

All our art must consist in keeping in our hands the threads of every possible movement in the Balkans, without exciting the Christian population prematurely. . . without leading them to an open conflict with the Porte. If these movements are sufficiently simultaneous, then we might direct towards a goal, in keeping with their respective just and vital interests and with the interests of Russia.²⁷

The first thing Ignatyev considered necessary was to support the Bulgarian nationalists in their fight for the independence of the Bulgarian Church. Up to 1870, the Church in Bulgaria was controlled by the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople. The Greeks had continuously tried to Hellenize it; it was natural that the Greek attempts only stimulated Bulgarian nationalist fee-

25 Ibid., 398.

26 Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, 295.

27 Onou, "Memoirs of Ignatyev," Slavonic Review, IX, 396.

lings and caused more serious attempts to acquire a separate church. Ignatyev who was known as a genius of intrigue, had immediately understood the situation, and as a Slavophil, naturally wanted to help the Bulgarian cause. After having won the friendship of the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople and of other Christian communities, he now wished to find a reasonable excuse for interesting himself in the religious questions; hence, he encouraged the Bulgarians to deny their religious allegiance to the Greek Patriarch. With his influence at the Ottoman Porte, he obtained the recognition of Bulgarian claim for the national Church and its official approval, in 1872. He lost, however, the friendship of the Greeks.²⁸

General Ignatyev was not the only one, however, who was working on behalf of the Russian Pan Slavists in the Balkans. There were many Russian consular officers and diplomats, most of whom were Ignatyev's adherents and of whom many were in close connection with the Slavonic Benevolent Committees in Russia. At the Embassy in Constantinople, Ignatyev's best supporters were the first counsellor of the Embassy, Nelidov, the first Dragoman Onou, and some others in junior posts.²⁹ Almost every Russian consular officer in the European part of the Ottoman Empire was the exponent of Pan Slavist theories. Backed by such professional elements, Ignatyev was the most forcible representative of the Russian policy of expansion in the Balkan Peninsula.

Official Russia was not at all interested in the agitations of the

28 Vernadsky, History of Russia, 339. Skrine, Expansion of Russia, 243-244.

29 Sumner, Russia and Balkans, 32.

Panslavists in favor of the Balkan Slavs. Gorchakov was much more interested in remaining on friendly terms with the Western Powers; he looked upon the Eastern Question, especially after the repeal of the Black Sea naval clauses, in 1871, through the spectacles of the Western Powers,³⁰ Personally, he knew little and cared less for the details of the problem, which problem for official Russian policy meant only a necessary difficulty in friendly relations with Austria-Hungary. This unofficial policy of Ignatyev and of the Panslavs, of agitating the Balkan Slavs and urging Russia to support them, provoked various protests, especially from the Austrian side. In a letter to the Tsar, Gorchakov reported his reaction to the complaints of the Austrian Foreign Minister Andrassy:

When it was insinuated to us that agents of Russian Government had endeavoured to spread disaffection and to prepare a rising in Turkey and elsewhere, I repeatedly challenged Andrassy to name a single one of those agents who could be shown to be in relations with the Russian authorities, and I declared that stern and summary justice would immediately be used out to him.³¹

In spite of official opposition, by 1875 many of the hopes of Russian nationalism were based on Ignatyev, and his influence was of the greatest political consequence both in Russia and in the Balkan Peninsula.

In the propaganda for rebellion against Turkey in the Balkans, the most effective ground was found, no doubt, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Already in 1860, the British consul at Sarajevo reported to the Foreign Office that

³⁰ Vernadsky, History of Russia, 338-339.

³¹ A. Meyendorff, "Unprinted Documents: Conversations of Gorchakov with Andrassy and Bismarck in 1872," Slavonic and East European Review, London, VIII, 1929-1930, 403-408; Letter of Gorchakov to the Tsar, September, 4, 1872.

"the conduct of the Turkish authorities in these provinces had been sufficient, in conjunction with foreign agitation, to bring Bosnia to the very verge of rebellion, whilst Herzegovina is in a state of war."³²

The priests and merchants were particularly devoted to the Slav cause. In summer 1875, after two years of underground hatching, the revolution broke out in Herzegovina. It is impossible to ascertain just to what extent the revolt was planned and prepared by various Slavonic Committees alone, or how much of a part Russian influence played through these Committees and consular or secret agents. The uprising was, as it is evident from the reports of British consular agents, mainly due to Turkish misrule of the population.³³ It can not be denied, however, that the rebellion was incited to a certain extent by outside elements. The Russian consulates at Sarajevo, Mostar, and Ragusa were suspected of playing prominent parts. There is no concrete evidence that any of the Russian consular agents were ever really so strongly motivated by a Pan Slavist attitude as to intervene or to influence the uprising. The British consul at Sarajevo, Holmes, did not think that his Russian colleague could be dangerous, describing Bosnia as not being under any Russian influence and asserting that the Russians there are very quiet.³⁴

³² Reports on Conditions of Christians in Turkey, 1860, presented to Parliament, 1861, quoted by Mariott, Eastern Question, 283.

³³ The opinion that the revolt was originated by economic distress of the population and not by Russian or Pan Slavist agents, is confirmed by the research of Prof. Temperley. Harold W.V. Temperley, The Bulgarian and other Atrocities, 1875-1878, in the Light of Historical Criticism, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1932, XVII, London, 1932, 108-112.

³⁴ Holmes to Elliott, on January 12, 1874, quoted by Sumner, Russia and Balkans, 136.

It might be true that the uprising was not caused or prepared directly by the Russian Pan Slavists or their agents. The fact remains, however, that once the insurgents took up arms, the rising became a weapon in the hands of Slavonic Societies in Serbia, Montenegro, and Russia. The official attitude of these countries was opposed to any interference but the diplomatic one; the efforts of the Slavonic Societies were, however, much more efficient than any official diplomatic intervention.³⁵

The Russian Slavonic Committees were, more than anyone else, interested in the cause of the Bosnians. They had their own followers on the spot: the Russian consul general at Ragusa, the diplomatic agent for Centinje, and his whole staff. Toward the end of 1875, the consul general, Yonin, was joined by some new members: Colonel Bobrikov and Colonel Monteverde from the Russian war office. Monteverde's wife was sent there by the St. Peterabrug Slavonic Benevolent Committee and acted as the correspondent of the Slavophil newspaper, Russky Mir.³⁶ In the early months of 1876 numerous other Russian agents appeared at Ragusa. The British consular reports affirm that by the beginning of 1876 "there seemed little doubt that the effect of Russian agents and money was very considerable."³⁷ The money received from Russia, namely from the Slavonic Committees, was mostly expended in aiding the combattants and not for the actual refugees as it was intended.

³⁵ Ibid., 141

³⁶ Ibid., 580-583.

³⁷ Ibid., 580.

After Serbia and Montenegro declared the war on Turkey, in 1876, Yonin quite openly admitted his part in the insurrection; while speaking with a British diplomatic agent, Mason, he told him that he did "not create the situation, but he profited by it. It began as a small stream which might have been lost for want of direction; so he put up a stone here, a stone there, and kept water together."³⁸

Although the Russian Government was not directly responsible for the insurrection, yet the insurrection would have collapsed had it not been for Russian money. The Italian consula general at Ragusa, Durando, was told by the private secretary of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro that "if the Tsar could inspect the letters which His Highness [Prince Nicholas] had received, His Imperial Majesty would sent not only Mr. Yonins, but Prince Gorchakov also to Siberia."³⁹

Serbia was at this time considered the most important element for the realisation of Slavophil plans. Official Russia seemed for some years to consider Serbia as a legitimate sphere of Austrian influence; not so the Pan-slavists. The fact that in 1871, Russia had the courage to denounce the Paris Treaty clauses, was explained in Serbia as the sign that Russia has completely re-established herself from the Crimean defeats, and that her influence over the Balkan Peninsula would again become prevailing. In such circumstances, friendly relations with Russia were considered much more important than with

³⁸ Mason's report to Foreign Office, August 23, 1875, quoted by Sumner, Russia and Balkans, 581-582.

³⁹ Ibid., 582.

with Austria.⁴⁰ Ignatyev had seen the disposition of Serbian politicians, and tried intelligently to bring Serbia back into the sphere of Russian influence, suggesting as the first step, a visit of Prince Milan to the Tsar. The visit did take place in autumn 1871, when the Tsar was at Livadia. Such machination justly alarmed the Austr-Hungarian diplomats, who were afraid that Serbia would become the center of Pan Slavist propaganda.⁴¹

When the revolt broke out in Herzegovina, the internal situation in Serbia was not as yet completely clear. The Serbian feelings were in favor of the rebels, even though Prince Milan himself was opposed. Popular subscriptions were opened and funds were raised for the sick and wounded insurgents. Committees were organized to enroll volunteers for Herzegovina, and the Beograd Press proclaimed that Serbia and Montenegro could not remain indifferent to this new loss of the Slavonic blood. Even the Serbian Cabinet was in favor of intervention. When the Foreign Minister, Ristich, also declared himself in favor of the war, "the affairs of Serbia . . . had assumed a much more critical aspect. . ."⁴² because Serbia had thus taken a hostile attitude towards the Porte.

In the meantime the Powers became apprehensive over the possible extremes of the Herzegovinian rebellion, and a common action was considered necessary, especially to prevent any armed intervention and further European com-

⁴⁰ Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, 117.

⁴¹ Slobodan Jovanovic, "Serbia in the early Seventies," Slavonic and East European Review, London, IV, 1925-1926, 387.

⁴² Report of White to Derby, August 17, 1875, quoted by Sumner, Russia and Balkans, 108.

plications. A consular mission was composed to settle the conflict. In the six-member commission, the French and Italian representatives were considered in favor of the Serbian aspirations; the Austrian one was believed to be neutral; the Russian and ~~the~~ German members were open supporters of the Slavs; only the British consul favored the Turks.⁴³ Ignatyev, who wanted to concentrate all activity on behalf of the Balkan Christians into his hands at Constantinople, proposed that the consular mission should report the complaints of the Christians to their own Governments and not to their ambassadors at Constantinople, and that a special commission should be appointed to discuss the settlement of the question. He suggested that the same mission recommend the measures to be adopted in relation to the Porte, including eventual military reprisals in the event the Porte should refuse the proposal and maltreat the insurgents.⁴⁴ In the meantime he was pressing himself upon Sultan, trying to convince him to grant to the Christians certain reforms on his own, avoiding thus any further interference of the Powers. He did obtain from Sultan an Irade with some reforms for the Christians. At the same time the Austrian Foreign Minister, Andrassy, was organizing a common intervention of the Powers. Ignatyev, also unsatisfied himself with the reforms that the Porte had promised, still wished to prevent Andrassy's intervention; and hence he tried to convince the Tsar to accept the Sultan's promised reforms, saying that a refusal would mean the collapse of Russian influence and a triumph of hostile intrigues.

43 Ibid., 142-164.

44 Onou, "Memoirs of Ignatyev," Slavonic Review, IX, 401-402.

at Constantinople. The Tsar, however, did not want any separate and secret action or understanding with Turkey, because he favored, under the influence of Prince Gorchakov, the collaboration of the three Powers, in order to keep alive the League of the Three Emperors. Bismarck's opinion was the leading opinion for Tsar Alexander; and Bismarck thought that a war could only be prevented if all the Powers would agree to work loyally together in maintaining the territorial status quo in the Balkans.⁴⁵ Ignatyev's action was thus overruled, and on December 30, 1875, Andrassy submitted to the Powers a note as it should be proposed to the Porte, requesting in it full and entire religious liberty, abolition of tax-farming, the employment of direct taxes for local needs, and the improvement of the conditions of the rural population.⁴⁶ A special commission composed of an equal number of Christians and Moslems was to control the execution of the reforms. The note was proposed to the Porte in January 1876, and it accepted by Sultan with surprising rapidity. The insurgents, however, were very suspicious and did not wish to accept mere assurances without any guarantees, nor did they show any desire to abandon the struggle. All Austrian attempts to move the insurgents into submission were unsuccessful; a proposed mediation through Prince Nicholas of Montenegro proved to be fruitless, for Prince Nicholas had decided to prevent any real reconciliation. He hoped for a common action together with Serbia, and is quoted as saying that "nothing will come of the reconciliation; the insurgents will put forward such propo-

45 Stojanovic, Great Powers, 47-48.

46 Ibid., 56-57. Mariott, Eastern Question, 286.

sals that the Porte will not be able to accept them."⁴⁷ The proposals of the insurgents requested that the Christians be given at least a third of their land as their own property; that the Turkish garrisons withdraw from Herzegovina; that the Turks rebuild the churches and houses they had destroyed; that Christians should disarm only when Moslems also disarmed; that a commission be set up to study a constitution for reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina; that a European commission should receive from the Porte sufficient money to aid the Christians; and that Austria and Russia should maintain their agents in the towns, where the Turkish garrisons remain in order to supervise the carrying out of the reforms.⁴⁸

There was no time, however, to take into consideration these proposals, because in the meantime the situation grew daily more complicated, and the revolutionary fever finally spread to Bulgaria where it broke out in May, 1876. The insurrection of Bulgaria had been prepared immediately after the uprising in Herzegovina, and some of the Bulgarian leaders had even gone, as early as 1875, to Serbia and to Russia⁴⁹ asking for help. However, the rebellion was accidentally discovered by the Turks before the Bulgarians were able to receive any assistance from anywhere, and it was repressed with very bloody measures. It is almost impossible to ascertain how much Serbia and the Slavonic Committees contributed to the Bulgarian revolt. It would, certainly, be quite strange if Serbia had not given any importance to such an uprising in

47 Sojanovic, Great Powers, 52.

48 Ibid., 53.

49 Ibid., 56.

Bulgaria; for she envisioned herself as playing the leadin role in the future of the Balkan peoples.

The general opinion, especially in London, was that the failure of the combined intervention at the Ottoman Porte, the resistance of the insur- gents, and the contemporaneous insurrection of Bulgaria were all due to the ma- chinations of Ignatyev and his Pan Slavist agents. The London Times wrote on June 7, 1876, that

(1) t is Russia which has armed the Serbians and the Montenegrins against the Turkish authority and holds them ready to enter in the campaign. . . Russian missionaries are despatched to kindle the zeal of the Slavs, Rus- sian society furnishes money for thei equipment, Russian Journals pro- claim the extent and the power of the Crusade.⁵⁰

The Times was no doubt right, but it did not distinguish the official Russia of Gorchakov and the Tsar from Ignatyev's activity and from the Slavo- phil propaganda, which at that time had not as yet overcome the prevailing at- titude of official St. Petersburg.

Disraeli himself accused Ignatyev as being responsible for the eve- lution of the events in the Balkans. Shouvalow, the Russian ambassador at Lon- don, informed Gorchakov that Disraeli had told him the following:

Because I am speaking to you in all confidence, let me tell you that I consider a great mistake the behavior of your ambassador at Constanti- nople. General Ignatyev represents there a policy we hoped you would a- bandon after the war of Crimea. It is he who continuously excites the Christian population against the domination of the Porte, who makes trou- bles also between them and who gave, with the authority belonging to his position, the Sultan the advice which precipitated his fall and the decay of the Empire.⁵¹

50 Ibid., 57.

51 Shouvalow to Gorchakov, June 11, 1876, quoted by Seton*Watson, "Unprinted Documents," Slavonic Review, III, 672.

At the same time Disraeli gave a more positive opinion of the situation, when he observed that

[t]he insurgents are not fighting for refers, and nothing will satisfy them, because they are fighting for independence. In this state of things the struggle and the shedding of blood is inevitable: neither you nor we can prevent it. You have been wrong to restrain Montenegro and Serbia, since the conflict was imminent and its solution depended upon its issue. We believe that a bleeding is necessary and we will consider it together. If it is the Christians who get the upper hand, then we shall only have to register the accomplished facts; if it is Turkey who crushes the Christians and if repression becomes tyrannical, it will be the turn of all the Great Powers to interpose themselves, in the name of humanity and there the interference of Europe will be legitimate.⁵²

Nelidov, who was counsellor for the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, indicated in his memoirs that Ignatyev was really in close contact with the insurrectionists. He related that the agents were coming to see Ignatyev and to ask him for advice. If there was some hope, they said to him, for Russian assistance, they would continue fighting; if not, they would try reconciliation. Ignatyev's opinion was that he would not like to compromise the insurgents; yet on the other hand he did not wish either abandon them; thus he continued to encourage them.⁵³

As for Russia, her official attitude was manifested in her semi-official press which always spoke in favor of peace. Completely different was the situation with the unofficial, mostly Slavophil, press. It advised Serbia to liberate herself of all foreign diplomatic influence, and openly suggested that Serbia and Montenegro enter the war to help their "brethren" in Bosnia

52 Ibid. Stojanovic, Great Powers, 70.

53 M. Nelidov, "Souvenirs d'avant et d'après la guerre de 1877-1878," Revue des Deux Mondes, Paris, XXVII, 1915, 305-306.

and Herzegovina. Novoye Vremya wrote that the Slavs would never another such opportunity; Golos thought that Serbia had the right to go to war in order to solve the Eastern Question in a natural way: "Russia will not allow her kinsmen in the Balkans to be crushed in their struggle, even if the whole of Europe had to burn in flames for it."⁵⁴ The Russian Government, through Novikov, its ambassador in Vienna and a faithful supporter of the official policy, strongly advised Serbia not to go into war, because Russia would not help her; for it was insisted the Eastern Question must be solved only in joint discussion with Austria and Prussia.⁵⁵

Ignatyev, at the other side, who was strongly supported by the Slavophiles—who were, incidentally, becoming an important factor in Russian politics, and with whose aspirations the heir-apparent, later Tsar Alexander III, openly sympathized—encouraged the war and assured everyone that Russia would follow suit. This dualism of Russia policy confused the Serbs in Belgrade, where the Russian consuls, Katsov, who as a subordinate of Novikov, was officially recommending peace, but who privately as a sympathizer of Ignatyev, worked under the latter's instructions, inciting the Serbs and organizing a project for Serbo-Montenegrin alliance.⁵⁶

The Slavonic Benevolent Committees were very active, and by April, 1876, had already sent to Serbia General Oheranyev, who was the editor of the

⁵⁴ Quoted by Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, I, 305.

⁵⁵ Jovanovic, "Serbia in Seventies," Slavonic Review, IV, 394.
Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, I, 293.

⁵⁶ Jovanovic, "Serbia in Seventies," Slavonic Review, IV, 394.

militant Slavophil newspaper, Russky Mir. He was to carry out the Slavophil plans into actuality. He insisted only that the War should not be fought merely for the Serbs, but for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, namely for the "Great Slav Idea."⁵⁷ Only a war for the "Holy Slavonic Cause" could provoke a real enthusiasm of the Russian public opinion. The Slavophiles did not expect that Serbia should defeat the Turks, but only that she resist the struggle for two months; within such time, they thought, Russia would enter the war.⁵⁸

Counting on the promises of Ignatyev and Chernayev, and excited with the propaganda of the "Holy Slavonic Cause," Serbia and Montenegro, on July 1, 1876, declared war upon Turkey, expecting that soon all other Balkan peoples would follow her example.⁵⁹ There was enormous sympathy in Russia for Serbian cause, and assistance for the Serbs was given in great amount by private efforts: funds were collected, medical supplies were sent and a few thousand volunteers joined the Serbia army.⁶⁰ Chernayev was given Serbian citizenship and made the Commander in Chief of the Serbian army, giving so the impression that Russia was acting behind the scenes.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, I, 306-309.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 308. Stojanovic, Great Powers, 85.

⁵⁹ Vernadsky, History of Russia, 340.

⁶⁰ "Our sympathy for the Serbian cause was so clear that I would have not done my duty if I would have given help to some decision which could prevent their victory or stop them in a favorable moment. In that period we openly patronized the Serbian cause. Our volunteers, our money, our Red Cross, everything was sent there; I was transmitting, myself, through Russia, the important news that I was able to find on the movements of the Turkish troops which were operating against Serbia." Nelidov, "Souvenirs," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXVII, 335.

⁶¹ Cathart - Tsar of Freedom, 202-203.

However, the Serbian army was too weak and Russian help too scarce—before the armistice there were only 2,718 volunteers⁶²—and already the first defeat discouraged Prince Milan. Afraid that the Porte might ask his abdication, he hurried to ask Russian and Austrian protection, with the result that the Powers asked an Armistice for both Serbia and Montenegro. Russia intervened with an ultimatum, the hostilities ceased, and the status quo ante was restored.⁶³

At the same time, St. Petersburg was undergoing a change of view. The Slavophiles succeeded in arousing the Slav feelings of their countrymen by exploiting the successful rebellion of Bosnia and Herzegovina and pointing out the Bulgarian atrocities and the Serbian war.⁶⁴ A great propaganda scheme was again started in favor of the Balkan Slavs. The crusade was preached in Churches and patriotic speeches were delivered all over the country. Distinguished persons were seen begging help for the Christians. The press glorified Chernayev and propagandized the assistance of Russian volunteers. The intellectuals were especially incited; they desired above all else the liberation of the Balkan Slavs and claimed the necessity of Russia's entry into war. The excitement reached the throne and the Empress Maria and the heir-apparent patronized the action.⁶⁵ The spirit had overcome the strictly European outlook of

⁶² Stojanovic, Great Powers, 92-95, quoting Spomini Jevrema Gucica, (the Memories of Jevrem Gucic), III, 243.

⁶³ Confr. page 52

⁶⁴ Graham, Tsar of Freedom, 193-209.

⁶⁵ Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, I, 294. Stojanovic, Great Powers, 89.

Prince Gorchakov and it now convinced the Tsar Alexander II that he must not merely be "true to his private conscience as a pacifist and as a hater of war; he must lead his people."⁶⁶

In view of the probable necessity of Russia's intervention in the war of Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey, Gorchakov concluded a secret agreement with Austria, at Reichstadt, on July 8, 1876, in which it was agreed that if the war were favorable to Russia, Constantinople was to become a free city; Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Albania would receive autonomy, but no large Slavonic state was to be formed in this part of Balkan Peninsula. Serbia and Montenegro would be allowed to increase their territories. Austria was to remain neutral and would be compensated with the permission to annex part of Bosnia as well as the whole or part of Herzegovina.⁶⁷

There was a great deal of talking of an eventual joint Austro-Russian occupation of the insurgent provinces of Turkey. The fear of a large Slavonic state was the reason for the refusal of such a proposal, because the danger was foreseen that Russia, once in possession of some part of the Balkan Peninsula would never relinquish it. A contemporary diplomat voiced this fear as follows:

Admitting even that the proposition was made, which I think very doubtful, the cabinet of Vienna could not have accepted it without falling out on one side with the Magyars, and without, on the other side, helping Russia to put an end to the Ottoman rule in Europe, as well as to sap the foundations of our Monarchy. It is said that this occupation would not only amount to a guarantee for the execution of the reforms demanded from the Porte. Now, as these reforms would be realized either too late or not at all, Russia would have a pretext for remaining for a

⁶⁶ Graham, Tsar of Freedom, 213.

⁶⁷ Vernadsky, History of Russia, 340. Sumner, Russia and Balkans, Appendix II, 583-601.

long time in Bulgaria; and its occupation would soon take the form of conquest. We should do the same, you would say, in Bosnia and in Herzegovina. But of what advantage would that be if Russia had once succeeded in installing herself on a position of the Balkan Peninsula. From that point to the realization of a [Pan Slavist] Empire, there is but a step. It would be preferable for Russia to declare war against the Porte on her own account, provided she engaged formally to claim no increase of territory for herself.⁶⁸

England also suspected Russia of planning the creation of a great Slav Empire in the Balkans; at least she did not know what to do to overcome her centuries-long distrust and to look for a pacific solution in accord with those who are in her eyes the future masters of Constantinople and of the Slav Empire.⁶⁹

In spite of the slight change of official policy in favor of Slavophiles, it was not the sympathy for their ideas that led the Russian policy, but the vision of the Straits and the need to prevent other Powers from occupying them.

Before every thing, it is necessary to remove any pretext that England occupies alone the Dardanelles. . . . We must be afraid, that once entered, England will not go out. Such a hit given to the primordial interests of Russia in the East could not be compensated by any success obtained elsewhere.⁷⁰

The Tsar himself considered it necessary to point out that Russia did not intend to create any large state in the Balkans:

⁶⁸ Opinion of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat, quoted in "The Eastern Question from the point of view of Eastern Christians," The Macmillan's Magazine, November 1876-August 1877, New York, XXXV, 93.

⁶⁹ Shouvalov to Tsar, July 2, 1876, quoted by Seton-Watson, "Unprinted Documents," Slavonic Review, III, 670.

⁷⁰ Shouvalov to Gorchakov, December 4, 1876, quoted by Seton-Watson "Unprinted Documents," Slavonic Review, IV, 444.

I understand your resistance to the formation of a great Serbian State. I do oppose, like you, this combination. Partial autonomies, however, without breaking the political ties, would not have the same inconvenience.⁷¹

The same attitude was once confirmed by Gorchakov to Novikov: "We remain faithful to the idea of not favorizing there [in the Balkans] the constitution of a great compact Slav or other state."⁷²

It was, however, impossible for the Tsar and the Government to remain indifferent to Slavophil enthusiasm. After all, the Slavophiles were also the supporters of the autocratic regime. Not willing to identify itself with the Slavophiles, the Government was very cautious and did not furnish any official assistance. It did, however, facilitate the passage of the volunteers into Serbia and gave leave-of-absence to volunteering officers. News from the Balkans, the heroism of the volunteers, and the death of the Pan Slavist Nicholas Kireyev, who was killed while leading a Serbian brigade against the Turks, kept the Russians in a state of fever. They felt it was impossible for Russia to keep out and turn their backs on the Balkan Slavs at such a critical moment of their existence. Following the stream of the Russian opinion, Alexander II, in November 1876, said if Europe were willing to continue to receive rebuffs from the Porte, he could at least, no longer consider neutrality as consistent with the honor and dignity of Russia. The Slavophiles hailed his moderate expressions and glorified him as the Tsar "cut in the line of Peter the Great and

71 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph, September 23, 1876, quoted by Seton-Watson, "Unprinted Documents," Slavonic Review, IV, 188.

72 Gorchakov to Novikov, December 6, 1876, quoted by Seton-Watson, "Unprinted Documents," Slavonic Review, IV, 441.

Catherine II.⁷³ Referring to the Tsar's guarded statement, Ivan Aksakof, in a speech published in March, 1877, in the Slavophil Paper, Moskovsky Vedomosti, expressed the approval of the greater part of the Russia people:

Our Great and powerful Russia, leaving the straight path of truth, is wandering in the forests and mazes of diplomacy, to the astonishment and satisfaction of all Europe. She has never ceased to labor for the arrangement of a benevolent European Concert in favor of the Slavs, and each time, when at her instigation the Concert has been arranged, the proceeds of the performance go somehow into the pockets of the Turks. We have witnessed a whole series of consultations, conferences, and diplomatic tours, in which all who took part, without deceiving each other, deceived Russia grossly and openly without even having recourse to ruse. But no amount of deceit, no injuries or insults could shake the stubborn meekness [sic!] and pacific spirit of Russian diplomacy, though the insults made the cheeks of Russia blush for shame. Meanwhile the Turks kill, impale, and violate Bulgarians, Bosnians, and Serbs and hundreds and thousands of Slav families have been starving as fugitives in foreign lands. If the martyred people of Bulgaria, after the promises held forth to them by the popular movement in Russia of 1876, lose their faith in Russia, they will sink in such an abyss of despair that they will be morally ruined, and give themselves up to the power of the foreigner. The precious Russian blood, poured out in Serbian battle fields for the Slav cause, has not only remained unavenged but has been as little thought of as it had been the blood of savages. . . . It has come to this that our volunteers, to whom the Emperor himself was pleased to refer, were on their return regarded by many people, especially in the higher classes of St. Petersburg, almost pariahs. The police, adapting themselves to the influence from above, eagerly stripped them of their Serbian uniforms and Montenegrin costumes, so that nothing should recall the 'shameful enthusiasm' of last year. . . . Let us not lose courage or grow lax in our exertion. Let us rather redouble our efforts to alleviate the bodily and spiritual sufferings of the Orthodox Slavs, to strengthen our mutual religious and moral solidarity, to confirm their faith in Russia, to uphold the dignity and honor of the Russian name in the unequal struggle with enemies abroad and at home--a struggle with ignorance and prejudice, and with voluntary and involuntary treason to Russian nationality among Russians themselves. May the historic mission of Russia be fulfilled! Behind us is the people, before us the Tsar's word spoken at the Kremlin.⁷⁴

73 Graham, Tsar of Freedom, 227-229.

74 Ibid., 228-229.

The British ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that the Russian Government was very embarrassed by the excitement of the nation; he defined it as the "commencement of a religious movement which finally drew within its compass the Court, the Government and the nation, and became the leading spirit of a national policy from which there was no means of receding."⁷⁵ It is evident that the Pan Slavists brought Russia into such a situation that war was inevitable. It was declared on April 24, 1877.

The outbreak of the war gave a new impetus to the Slavophiles; they were aware that it was their own work, and they believed it to be undertaken for the "Great Slav Idea." At numerous meetings, Alexander II was acclaimed as the Tsar of the Slavs. Ivan Aksakov wrote again that the Russian flag

has been raised for the recovery of the liberty and human rights of the oppressed, humiliated, and despised by the civilized Europe. The slumbering East is awakening and not only the Slavs of Balkan Peninsula, but also the whole Slav world awaits its resurrection. A new era is approaching; the dawn of the Great Slav day is on the point of breaking.⁷⁶

The Grand Duke Nicholas was appointed the Commander of the Russian army in the Balkans. He was known as a great sympathizer with the Slavophil cause, and this appointment gave the war even more of a Slavophil character. General Ignatyev was called to serve as his counsellor, and Nelidov as the Chief of his political department.⁷⁷

The Russian advance proceeded with unexpected speed; the fortress of Plevna was captured after a short Turkish resistance and the Russian army

75 Ibid., 198.

76 Moscow Gazette, May 23, 1877, quoted by Stojanovic, Great Powers, 154.

77 Stojanovic, Great Powers, 154.

appeared before Adrianople. The Turks were not capable of continuing the struggle; they surrendered and signed the Treaty of San Stefano. The Russian soldiers were elated with their victory, and they now intended to continue on and ultimately to create a Great Bulgaria, which would have secured for Russia the exclusive domination of the Balkans and would prevent Austria from ever taking Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ignatyev and Nelidov were the strongest supporters of this project, and to this end thought they would play off both Austria and England. Had indeed the Treaty of San Stefano been ratified the principal aims of the Slavophiles would have been obtained: a large Bulgaria would have established her definite domination over the Straits and the Peninsula.⁷⁸ Constantinople would have remained entirely at the mercy of the Russian fleet and of the Bulgarian army. The Eastern frontier of Bulgaria would have barred an Austrian road to Salonika. The intervention of the Great Powers, however, prevented Russia from thus solving the Eastern Question to her own benefit; and this also meant the defeat of the Slavophil program of expansion.

The Congress of Berlin resulted in considerable disillusion for the Slavophiles, and since that time there was a steady decline in their enthusiasm for the "Great Slav Idea." During the years immediately after the Berlin Congress, while Austria was taking possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were still some repercussions among the Slavophil ambients in Russia. When Ignatyev was made, after the death of Alexander II, the Minister of Interior, the Slavophil activity had relative freedom for some time. In January, 1862, Golos, a Slavophil newspaper, published an article in which Aksakov complains

78 Novikoff, Skobelev, 250.

that the Austrian campaign against Herzegovinians, Bosnians and indirectly also against Montenegrins, is a campaign against us. Every drop that is shed of the Slavonic blood will leave a strain in this circumstances. Is Russia to stand by, with indignation in her heart and the blush of shame on her face while the Slavs are forced under the hated yoke of Latin, German or Swabian? Or shall we take another line?⁷⁹

In the eighteen-eighties, Russia was approaching France, and Pan-Slavism revived for a while. A wave of enthusiasm, or better a wave of alarmistic supposition was caused by the speeches of the Slavophile General Skobelev, in 1882. In his first speech in Moscow, he emphasized that "the faith in the historical mission of Russia is our consolation and strength." It caused a certain excitement, and when in February 1882, he left Moscow for Paris, some were of the opinion that he was banned; the Slavophiles, however, asserted that he had gone on a confidential political mission. In Paris, he delivered a speech which was also published by the Novoye Vremya, a Slavophil newspaper closely affiliated with the Minister of Interior, Ignatyev. In this speech Skobelev pointed out the inevitability of a conflict between the Slavs and Teutons.⁸⁰ The speech created a certain amount of confusion and worry among the diplomats, and many of them foresaw a dangerous outcome.⁸¹

⁷⁹ John F. Baddeley, Russia in the Eighties: Sports and Politics, London, 1921, 122.

⁸⁰ "I am bound to tell you the reason why Russia is not always equal to the discharge of her patriotic duties in general, and to the fulfillment of her mission as a Slav Power in particular. It is because at home as well as abroad, Russia has foreign influences to contend against. We are not the masters in our own house. . . . And shall I tell you the name of . . . that oppressor of Russians and Slavs? You all know him. It is the author of the 'Drang nach Osten.' It is the German. . . . The German is the enemy. A struggle is inevitable between the Teuton and the Slav. . . . I can assure you that you [Serbia and Montenegro] shall not be left to fight alone. . . ." Novikoff, Skobelev, 282-283.

⁸¹ The Belgian Ambassador in Berlin reported to his Government: "The

The activity of the Slavophiles began declining when Ignatyev was relieved of his duties as the Minister of Interior. The difficulties with the new State of Bulgaria were deeply disappointing to St. Petersburg; Bulgaria excluded the control of her "Big brother" and had passed to some extent into the orbit of Austria; the Pan Slav theory was proven a failure and was losing prestige at St. Petersburg. Alexander III himself was disappointed in the Slavs and in the Slavonic cause; in 1885 he wrote that Russia must

have one principal aim, the occupation of Constantinople, so that we [Russians] may once for all maintain ourselves at the Straits and know that they will remain in our hands. That is the interest of Russia and it ought to be our aspiration. Everything else that take place in the Balkan Peninsula is secondary for us. There has been enough propaganda to the detriment of the true interests of Russia. The Slavs must now serve Russia, and not we them.⁸²

Popular Pan Slavism continued to live in the hearts of the Russian people, but found no echo in governmental circles. The weakness of the Russian army and several distracting internal questions kept Russia from further cherishing any immediate ideas of expansion in the Balkan Peninsula.

The Slavophiles submitted themselves to the official policy, and only occasionally caused some light excitement for foreign diplomats. They remained in opposition to the official governmental policy, but kept attitude of patience complying with the pacific intentions of the Tsar, and postponing the realization

confidence of General Skobelev, . . . reveals the attempt to give to Pan Slavism the force of a movement for internal revolution and of external expansion at great damage to Russian relations with her neighbors and of the European peace. Report of February 23, 1882, in Bernhard Schwertfeger, Editor, Die Belgischen Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, Berlin, 1925, I, 26.

⁸² Quoted by Sumner, History of Russia, 275.

tion of those hopes which they could never renounce.⁸³

In 1896, Nelidov, who was the ambassador at Constantinople, tried to insist that Russia take advantage of the opportunity afforded by certain complications which Turkey had in Armenia, and take the possession of the Straits. His project was rejected by the Russia Cabinet in which the majority of the members were opposed to Slavophil ambitions. The Russian Foreign Minister followed, during this period, the policy of maintaining the status quo in the Balkans. Only after the Revolution of 1905-1906, did Russian Foreign policy return its attention to the Balkans; and it seemed then to take up once more the cause of the Pan Slavists. The principles which the revolution brought to the Government were hostile towards everything German and wished to lessen the influence of the Germans. Therefore, the Pan Slav group was supported, as was its policy in the Balkans where a new danger, that of daily-increasing German expansion was replacing Turkish misgovernment.⁸⁴ The greatest aims for the Russian Pan Slavists were now to stop the German infiltration in the Balkans and to defend the autonomous development of the Slav portions of the Balkans. The governmental policy had not, however, a unified direction, and it was more directly interested in the immediate solution of the Question of the Straits.

It has been long understood that the emancipatory policy pursued by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula awakened national self-consciousness among the Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Empire and threatened its existence. The Austrian

83 Schwertfeger, Beligischen Dokumente, I, 24, 257, 263.

84 Tyler, European Powers, 19.

and German policy aimed, therefore, to a full subjugation of the Balkans to their influence.⁸⁵ Russia wanted, as has been stated, to prevent these Austro-German intentions and to maintain the independence of the Balkan states. The intentions, and later the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which Russian Foreign Minister Isvolsky agreed in order to preserve to control of the Straits for Russia, only favored Austro-german aspirations. It kindled intense anger in the Muscovite minds, but the Russian bear only growled; she did not bite.⁸⁶

Serbian nationalism was excited because the Austrian action cut off all Serbian hopes of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result, however, the connections between Serbia and Russia became once again very close, and public opinion in Russia favored again the "little Slav brother." Russia began to plan and encourage a Balkan League under her own leadership. The League ostensibly was directed against the Turks, but her ultimate end was Austria-Hungary and her movements towards the Straits. During the Balkan wars which followed, a wave of Pan Slavist enthusiasm arose in Russia, and contributions of money and medical supplies were sent to the states of the Balkan League. The general intention was to press the Government for a more aggressive Russian policy as the leader and the protector of the Slavic people. "Slavic banquets" were organized and ended with the most pronounced statements denouncing Russian pacifism, and with demands for a "cross on St. Sophia," a "Scutari for Montenegro," and "Outlets to the Adriatic for Serbia."⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Sergiei D. Sazonov, Fateful Years, 1909-1916, London, 1928, 156.

⁸⁶ Tyler, European Powers, 205.

⁸⁷ H. H. Fisher, Editor, Out of My Past, the Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov, transl. Laura Matveev, Sanford, 1935, 330, 340.

Meanwhile the war in the Balkans was spreading; and the Allies, after having defeated the Turks, started fighting among themselves.⁸⁸ Russia was to have been mediator, but her influences over the League's members proved to be very weak, because neither the Serbians, nor the Bulgarians were willing to place their interests unreservedly in the hands of Russia.⁸⁹ Because Russia had favored the Serbians, she lost her sympathies in Bulgaria, who turned closer to Austria-Hungary. With the anti-Russian feelings of her leaders and with an anti-Russian Government, Bulgaria remained in the sphere of the Central Powers, even though the majority of the average Bulgarian people had little sympathy for this alliance. The ties between Serbia, Montenegro, and Russia grew stronger; and Sazonov has stated that "Russia's fundamental task is to guarantee the political and economical emancipation of Serbia."⁹⁰ When the Great War started the Pan-Slavist interests were once again emphasized and the necessity of helping Slavonic Serbia against the German aggressors was proclaimed.

88 Ibid., 344.

89 Sazonov, Fateful Years, 92.

90 Sumner, History of Russia, 409. Verndasky, History of Russia, 393.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

While preparing for the First World War, Germany did everything to promote the impression that the greatest enemy to European civilization was Pan Slavism; she tried to represent herself as the champion of liberty and progress against this Slavish danger, and to convince the world that Pan Slavism was the most dangerous weapon of "Russian barbarism."¹

It may well to consider the misconceptions which have been widespread as to the character of Pan Slavism in general as well as to the term as applied to the particular aspirations of Russia--those hopes, namely, of making Constantinople the capital of her Empire and of seeing the cross once more upon the dome of St. Sophia. These were purely Russian aspirations which had little or nothing in common with the real Pan Slavist ideals.

→ Pan Slavism was a direct outcome of the dismemberment of the Slavic nations and of their sufferings under foreign rulers. It was a cultural movement aiming to realize the efforts of the Slavonic races in Europe for unity and the protection of their own civilization and literature. It originated in the ideals and beliefs of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, where their national

¹ Richard Charnatz, Zarismus, Pan Slavismus, Krieg!, Wien, Leipzig, 1915, 1-5.

existence was menaced by the Germans and the Magyars. It was kept alive by their hopes that through its purposes, the dangers, which threatened their national individuality would be prevented. It was the result of the pressure exercised by the Germans on the Slavs within their domain and it was a counter part to aggressive German political nationalism or Pangermanism.² The Pan Slavist enthusiasts proposed the composition and propagation of a universal language which would preserve their national independence and their own national characteristics.

If Austria had satisfied the demands of the Slavic groups within her Empire by giving them the guarantees for their national existence, and if Hungary had adopted the same course in dealing with her subjects, and if both of them had granted to those groups a national autonomy under their sovereignty, Pan Slavism would have had no reason for its existence and would probably not have been born.

General Ignatyev once told the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Andrassy, that Pan Slavism was distinctly the creation of Austrians. All the early Pan Slav writers were Austrian subjects. Pan Slavism was only a principle which developed out of the oppression of Slavs. It was the cry for fraternal help against intolerable oppression. Austria and Turkey were the two great generators of Pan Slavist enthusiasm. It was their injustice, their oppression of the Slavs, which led to the invention of the Pan Slavist theories. To kill Pan Slavism in the simplest way was to treat the Slavs justly.³

² Grove C. Haines and Ross J.S. Hoffman, The Origins and Background of the Second World War, New York, 1947, 42.

³ William T. Stead, Truth about Russia, London, 1888, 308. ✓

The division of the Slav nations into those who recognized the religious supremacy of Rome, and those who remained with the Eastern Church, indicates more than a mere religious difference. It brings with it a difference in traditions and affiliations and even antagonisms. The Western half of the Slavs had for the most part passed through similar stages of economic and intellectual development; the Eastern Slavs had experienced completely different influences.

The continual hostilities and political difficulties which were common to both the Eastern and the Roman group, in addition to the strong feelings of racial kinship and of a common historic past—all these influenced literary Pan-Slavism and gave it a political character. The national aspirations of the Slavic peoples could be safe, their leaders asserted, only in a Union of the Slavonic races into a single state.

The distinctive national temperaments however, of the various Slavic groups rendered difficult, if not impossible, any unification among them. Only when there was envisaged a pressure of an external danger of persecution, did they begin considering an eventual subordination of their individual interests to the possibility of a common defense. The same bond, the common hostility against the Turks, against the Magyars and against the Germans, became thus a force linking them together. It was natural that this common fate turned their eyes and their sympathies towards Russia, the only Slavonic nation which was independent and strong, and which could protect more sincerely their common aspirations for freedom and independence. There developed, especially among the Bulgarians and Serbs, among some Czechs and Slovaks and a few Croats, a strong tendency to see Russia as a possible liberator of all other Slavs.

The Russian politicians knew how to avail themselves of such an opportunity and endeavoured in every way to obtain control over the movement of Pan Slavism, believing that it would help them sooner or later to realize their own aims and to overthrow the Austrian Empire. This would also enable Russia to take the lion's share of the spoils, including the provinces of the European Turkey.

In Russia the ideas of the Pan Slavism were taken up by the Slavophiles and soon were developed into a political movement, the object of which was the chrysalization of Russian national life first at home, and then in the extension of Russian protection to all other Slavic peoples. Russia was destined to realize Slavic hopes for freedom, was to become their liberator, their protector, and above all their unifier.⁴ The Slavophil movement aimed, therefore, at preserving the spiritual and cultural bond between Russia and the West and South Slavs, and it was to bring about a political union under Russian leadership. Imperial Russia, however, was not particularly interested in the Pan Slav movement among the Western Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. She was rather concerned with the Orthodox populations within the Ottoman Empire, and precisely with the Southern Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula, because all her inte-

⁴ A characteristic opinion on the unification of the Slavonic nations is given by Stead: "As for establishing a gigantic Slavonic Empire, including all Slavonic peoples under one sceptre, that is a dream. What the Slavonic enthusiast hope for is exactly the same as that for which English enthusiasts long when they talk of the union of English speaking peoples. All that we hope for is that all differences between the various English families shall be adjusted by arbitration rather than by war. . . . All English speaking men should make common cause against anyone who might attempt to crush the weakest member of the fraternal league. . . . That is our ideal. It is also the ideal of the Slavonic society—a society to which, if they were Russians, most Englishmen would of course belong." Stead, Truth about Russia, 308.

rests referred back to one question: who is to keep the keys of the Tsar's own house, Constantinople and the Straits? It was natural consequence of these facts, that the program of Russian Pan Slavism was focused upon the Russian domination of the whole Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

The Orthodox ruler of Holy Russia was not interested in the feelings of those who were not Orthodox; his eyes were turned to those who were Orthodox and who at the same time occupied a desirable position between the Adriatic and the Black Seas, between the Danube and the Aegean. The struggle of the Balkan people for their independence offered to Russia only an opportunity to realize what she was not strong enough to realize by herself. The political formula of the Pan Slavists, as adopted by the Slavophiles, was to serve as the necessary form of Russia's good will of protecting them and of supporting their aspirations. The severities and the atrocities which the Serbs and the Bulgarians suffered from the Turks were of a great aid to Russian policy. The protection of the Tsar was continuously needed to prevent a complete destruction of the Christian churches and of the Christian population.

The Russian conviction of, and interest for, her holy mission in the Balkans was stimulated by the Slavophiles. Their Pan Slavism had always a double basis, one racial and the other religious, both quite interwoven. Their aim of liberating the correlative from the Turkish yoke, and their ideal of establishing a Holy Greek Empire of Russian nationality with the Capital at Constantinople, gave to their activities the character of a nationalistic and political movement, and in the seventh decade of the last century these aims and ideals created a real political influence upon Russian foreign policy, espe-

cially in the Balkans.⁵ The active part the Slavophiles played in the Balkan insurrection gave the world the impression that official Russia also backed the movement.⁶ In spite of their national and religious creed, the Slavophiles were regarded with mistrust by the official ambients. The events in the Balkans contributed to their temporary popularity; such pressures and the popular enthusiasm excited by them gave the Government an excuse to intervene in the name of Slavdom for the settlement of the question. The Government soon afterwards showed again its indifference for the Slavonic cause; it retained what was more realistic for the Russian policy of expansion: namely the interest in the Straits and Constantinople. As a purely intellectual and political force, Pan Slavism has rendered the Russian aspirations to the domination of Balkans more evident, but it also complicated the solution of the Eastern Question.

The crisis of 1875-1878 proved that the Russian and Austrian interests and aspirations over the Balkans were irreconcilable. A lasting agreement between the two was impossible, for both wanted a complete domination of the people and of the Peninsula. Had it not been for the interference of Pan Slavist enthusiasts, Russian influence would have probably been diminished to insignificance. Even so, the success of the Vienna government in preventing the creation of a Slavophil projected Great Slavonic State in the Balkans, did certainly limit, for the time being, this Russian influence.

5 Sazonov, Fatefull Years, 271, 272.

6 "The insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbo-Turkish war and the Bulgarian atrocities, aroused a great enthusiasm for the 'brother Slavs' all over Russia and pushed the Slavophiles to the fore." Seeger, Iawolsky, 163.

When the subject peoples of the Turkish Empire did not succeed in obtaining what they were fighting for, their continued looking towards Russia. Because she did not feel strong enough, and because she was not primarily interested in the aspirations of the Slavic peoples as such, her influence was replaced by the Austrians and Germans.

With the beginning of the twentieth century, when political changes resulted in the internal regime of Modern Russia, the interests of Russia turned again to the Balkan Slavs. A new Pan Slav movement was in progress and an "Association to promote Friendship among the Slavs" was founded in Moscow, in 1908. Its leaders were mostly liberals and it had much more influence on the Russian Government into which new elements had grown. It no longer emphasized the Orthodox religion; it was trying to bring about a reconciliation with the Poles; and it was directed more against Austria-Hungary than against Turkey, all in correspondence with the general trend of the Russian Foreign policy.⁷

Russia's policy in the Balkans at that time was to maintain the independence of the Balkan States, to welcome them back under her influence, and to counteract the Austrian attempts of expansion towards the East. Her "Historical Mission"--the emancipation of the Christian Slavs from the Ottoman yoke--was almost accomplished by the beginning of the century. Its completion, however, should be left to the efforts of the peoples themselves. Absolutely the only attitude Russia ever maintained, was to prevent these Balkan peoples from becoming influenced by the Powers which were hostile to Russia. Foreign Minister Sazonov, wrote in his Memoirs that

7 Vernadsky, History of Russia, 386.

[t]he ultimate aim of Russian policy was to obtain free access to the Mediterranean, and to be in a position to defend her Black Sea Coasts against the constant threat of the eruption of hostile naval forces through the Bosphorus.⁸

Even if the Balkan peoples had never needed the guardianship of Russia, Russia always considered that they were not strong enough to dispense with her aid in the case of any attempt upon their national existence. Serbia particularly seemed exposed to such a danger, for here the Austrian diplomats were trying to re-establish the Austrian influence which had declined since the fall of the Obrenovich family. Bulgaria was considered in a similar, if not a worse situation, because of her German-born ruler. Russia was eager to paralyze the Austro-German attempts, for she had always cleverly

proclaimed and defended the principle of the independence of the Balkan States. . . in view of their inalienable right to an independent political existence. In our eyes this principle, in addition to its moral significance, has also a practical value; for not only was it not detrimental to any of Russia's vital interests, but it indirectly furthered their maintenance. 'The Balkan Peninsula for the Balkan peoples,' was the formula which comprised the aspirations and aims of Russian policy; it precluded the possibility of the political predominance, and still more of the sovereignty in the Balkans, of a foreign power hostile to Balkan Slavdom and to Russia.⁹

Under the influence of the new Pan Slavist ideas, in the last years before the Great War, the Russian Foreign policy under Sazonov tried to avert the Austro-German penetration in the Balkans. The Pan Slav Conferences at Sofia and Belgrade were to pave the road to a new understanding among all the Slavs. Great importance was given to the attempts of a reconciliation with the Poles, because of the conviction that "[t]he road to Constantinople lies

✓ 8 Sazonov, Fatefull Years, 50.

✓ 9 Ibid., 50-51.

through Warsaw."¹⁰ The Congresses had no practical result, nor did they succeed in solving the Polish Question. The influence of the New Pan Slavists had some result in the constitution of the Balkan League, but the influence was not strong enough to dominate fully the feelings of the Balkan Slavs or to have any practical effects among them, for they did not believe any longer in the sincerity of Russian sentiments.

Russia has been indisputably the only effective and military Slav Power. Her claims and her aims have always been too great, indeed, to carry out by herself. It was, consequently, her policy to induce the Christians in the Balkans to fight her battles. By waving before them the flag of the humanitarian and ideological programs of Pan Slavism and of the Great Slavonic Idea, she succeeded in confusing them so greatly that they did not perceive that the battles they were fighting were not their own but Russia's. She used and abused, and this to a great extent, indeed, the sincere sympathies which the Balkan Slavs had for her as the only independent Slav Power; and she knew how to use the agitations of the Slavophiles at home. But the support she gave to Pan Slavism as such was rather insignificant, because it was difficult for her "to believe in a sincere sympathy of the Slavic races for an autocratic Russia."¹¹

Pan Slavism as such, then did not represent in the Balkans any concrete movement for political unity. It was a political formula which, under

✓ 10 Sumner, History of Russia, 236.

11 "Je ne vous dissimule pas qu'il m'est difficile de croire a une sympathie sincere des races Slaves pour la Russie autocratique." Prince Gorshakov to Novikov, May 9, 1877, quoted by Sumner, Russia and Balkans, 269.

certain circumstances was adopted by Russia in order to keep the Balkan Slavs under her control. Moreover, even if the Balkan Slavs did obtain their freedom mainly by means of Russian aid they were never willing to remain tools in the Russian hands; for they considered the Russian policy to be selfish, aiming to obtain, not their freedom and independence, but the guarantees necessary for the economic development and for the safety of the most vulnerable part of her own Russian territory.

In characterizing the importance of Pan Slavism in Russian policy of expansion in the Balkans, Engels wrote:

But behind this. . . theory [of Pan Slavism] there stood the terrible reality of the Russian Empire, - of that Empire which by every movement manifested a pretension to consider the whole of Europe the property of the Slavic tribe and in particular, of its only energetic part - Russia. That Empire, which with two such Capitals as Petersburg and Moscow, is unable to find its center of gravity until the City of Tsar (Constantinople is called in Russian Tsargrad), in which every Russian peasant sees the true focus of his religion and nation, becomes the residence of the Russian Emperor. . . . The intrigues by which Russian diplomacy supported the recently invented Pan Slavism are well known in Central Europe - a doctrine which could not better have corresponded to its aims.¹²

12 Quoted by Gross, European Ideologies, 808.

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2. Articles in Periodicals: Indispensable first source material has been found in M. Nelidov, "Souvenirs d'avant et d'après la guerre de 1877-1878," Revue des Deux Mondes, Paris, vol. XXVII, 1915, 302-339; vol. XXVIII, 1915, 241-277; vol. XXIX, 241-270. Nelidov was the first counsellor of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople when General Ignatyev was Ambassador there; he covers the period 1875-April 1877, and San Stefano to Berlin. The activity of General Ignatyev and the influence of the Russian Slavophiles upon him and his attitude can be traced in Benedict H. Sumner, "Ignatyev at Constantinople, 1864-1874," Slavonic and East European Review, London, vol. XI, 1932-1933, 341-353, 556-571; and Alexander Onou, "The Memoirs of Count Ignatyev," Slavonic and East European Review, London, vol. IX, 1930-1931, 386-407, 627-640; vol. X, 1931-1932, 108-125; both articles are based mostly on the Memoirs of Ignatyev published in some Russian periodical before the outbreak of World War I.

O. SPECIAL WORKS

1. Books: Special works consulted for the original documentation of the aims of Russian expansion were: Louis Leger, Editor, Chronique dite de Nestor: traduite sur le texte Slavon-Russe avec introduction et commentaire critique par Louis Leger, Paris, 1884, and Passard, Editor, Testament de Pierre le Grand, ou Plan de domination Europeenne laisse par lui a ses descendants et successeurs au throne de Russie, Paris, 1860. This last one is probably apocryphal; both are however, considered the main source of the early Russian history.

The work of Spiridion Gopcevic, Russland und Serbien von 1804-1915, nach Urkunden der Geheimsarchive von St. Petersburg und Paris und des Wiener Archivs, Muenchen, 1916, deals with the relations between Serbia and Russia, especially documented for the early period; the documents he refers to are in the Archives of St. Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna. Authentic accounts of the internal situation in Russia are given by John F. Baddley, Russia in the Eighties, Sports and Politics, London, 1921. Baddley was the correspondent of the London newspaper, Standard, and was a personal friend of Count Shouvalov, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James. Another direct account is William T. Stead, Truth about Russia, London, 1888; Stead was for a while in Russia and has been in personal contact with many of the Russian politicians, especially Count Ignatyev.

As for the doctrine of Pan Slavism in general, the author has used as principal source Jan Kollar, Rozprawy o Slovanske Vzajemnosti, edited by Milos Weingart, Prague, 1931; this is a commented re-edition of the Kollar's work of 1836, reproducing both Czech and German texts. Louis Leger, Etudes Slaves, Voyages et Literature, 2 vols., Paris, 1887, and his Nouvelles Etudes Slaves, Histoire et Literature, Paris, 1880, are both first-hand works and necessary sources for the study of contemporary Slavs and of Pan Slavism. Leger was a well known French scholar of the Slavic Questions and was also Director of the Slavic Institute in Paris.

The work of Nikolai J. Danilevskii, Rossia i Evropa, Fourth edition, St. Petersburg, 1889, is the catechism of Russian Pan Slavism and is therefore indispensable. An authority on the situation in Serbia and on the foreign influences in Serbia is Slobodan Jovanovic, Vlada Milana Obrenovica, 1868-1889, 2 vols., Beograd, 1926-1927. Indispensable for the study of the influence of Pan Slavism on Russian policy in the Balkans and of the activity of Russian diplomats are, because of their large documentation, the works of Benedict H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1872-1880, Oxford, 1937; his Russia and Pan Slavism in the Eighteenth century, Transactions of Royal Historical Society, London, 1935; David Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis, 1875-1878, London, 1936; and Mihajlo Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878, Cambridge (Engl.), 1939.

2. Studies in periodicals: The articles of E. Smurlo, "From Krizanic to the Slavophiles," Slavonic and East European Review, London, vol. VI,

1927-1928, 321-335; J.D. Stojanovic, "The First Slavophiles: Homyakov and Kireyevsky," Ibid., 561-578; and "Jan Kollar and Literary Pan Slavism," Ibid., 336-343, were all of great help to the author for their concrete contribution in the discussion of Pan Slavism and Slavophiles.

III. SECONDARY MATERIAL

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Stefan S. Falez has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Feb 15th 1951
Date

John A. Zucchin
Signature of Adviser