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The Place of the Body in the Life of the Soul According to Saint Thomas Aquinas

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THE PLACE OF THE BODY IN THE LIFE OF THE SOUL
ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

by

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VITA

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INTRODUCTION

It is not a matter of surprise to us that we find scant treatment of the body in the fragments left us by early Greek philosophers. If the nobler part of man, to wit, the human soul, was scarcely conceived to be more than a quantitative or qualitative arrangement of water, air, fire, or the atoms, we can hardly expect that any sketch of the place that the body occupies in the life of the soul would have found space in the earliest systems of philosophy.

Plato, indeed, did devote attention to the study of man, but his doctrine falls short of a satisfactory solution of the nature of man as that nature is testified by our own experience. In the Platonic system, the body contributes nothing to the nature of man, nothing essential to the soul's perfection in knowledge, and nothing to its happiness. Rather, would Plato have us look upon the body as a weight upon the soul, a hindrance and a burden to it. Let us briefly consider each of these points.

First of all, the body apparently contributes nothing to the nature of the soul. This Plato would have to hold if he asserted, as, in fact, he did, that the soul was created apart from the body for which it had no aptitude nor inclination. It must then have been fashioned in the full perfection of its nature. The Demiurge, Plato tells us, created souls, not in proportion to the number of bodies to which they were to be united, but rather according to the number of stars, to which stars they were to return if they lived

well their time of probation. Furthermore, there could have been nothing in the nature of human souls which required human bodies, for the Platonic creator placed some souls "in the earth, and some in the moon, and in the other stars which are the vessels of time,"¹ the choice, it would seem, deriving from no special distinction in the nature of the souls. To the younger gods had been assigned the task of forming the human body and of giving to the souls destined for these bodies something that was yet lacking to them.

. . . and when he had sown them he committed to the younger gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired them to furnish what was still lacking to the human souls and make all the suitable additions, and rule and pilot the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner which they could and avert from him all but self-inflicted evils.²

This addition that the lesser gods made seems at first sight to contradict the notion that souls were created in the full completion of their natures. If they were, then, why should the makers of the body be requested to supply what souls lacked? The explanation, if it is the correct one, only strengthens the former assertion, for souls, as the Demiurge formed them were perfect with no special powers which required human organs for their exercise, but when they were obliged to go into human bodies they needed something added to what they had already received to fit them for their new office. The following citation seems to warrant the interpretation just given.

¹Plato, *Timaeus*, 42, (Translation by B. Jowett, Hearst's International Library Company, New York, 1914).

²Ibid.

Now, as they were implanted in bodies by necessity, and were always gaining or losing some part of their bodily substance, in the first place there was a necessity that they should have sensation and be affected all in the same manner by external force; and in the second place, they must have love which is a mixture of pleasure and pain; also fear and anger, and the feelings which are akin or opposite to them; . . .³

What the souls seem to have lacked and what the lesser deities supplied were the passions, the sensitive powers of the human soul. What is of interest here and to the point is that the body apparently contributed nothing in the way of completing the nature of the soul. Although this portion of Plato's thought is found in his mythical account of creation which does not admit of too serious an interpretation, still his teaching on pre-existence and the burden of the body substantiate this position.

For Plato, the whole nature of man was soul, and only soul. This he does not explicitly state except in the doubtfully authentic dialogue, First Alcibiades, and in one other text which seems clearly to express the underlying idea in Plato's whole exposition of the relation of soul and body.

Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and that, therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are rightly said to be our shades or images, for that the true and immortal being of each of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other gods . . .⁴

If man is entirely soul, he is not a unity, for he has a body attached to him which must necessarily be a complete substance if the soul is, and

³Ibid.

⁴Laws, XII, 959. (Emphasis mine)

of two complete substances united together there cannot result an essential unity. The unity of man is sacrificed, but the nobility of the rational soul preserved. But if the human soul were such a noble and self-sufficient being, why, then, should it ever have been united to a body? Is this subjection to life in a human body a punishment inflicted on the soul for an offense committed in some previous state? That view-point Plato attributed to the Orphic poets,⁵ and although he did not explicitly endorse it, he certainly considered the body no blessing, since he could say: "the connection of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of them, as I am ready to maintain quite seriously."⁶

Indeed, the body is a prison to which the soul has been confined. We are not, then, astounded at the definition by which Plato distinguishes it: "the grave of the soul which may be thought to be buried in this present life."⁷ Why buried? Because the soul had lived before, delighting in that vision of "beauty shining in brightness" which it had enjoyed in that other existence in which the body had had no part. In that blessed state souls had lived an exquisite life, for then they were pure, and "not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body as in an oyster shell."⁸ "Living tomb" and "oyster shell" are, to say the least, not very flattering epithets by which to designate the human body, but Plato was forced to view the mortal frame of man in this light since he

⁵Cratylus, 400.

⁶Laws, VIII, 828.

⁷Cratylus, 400.

⁸Phaedrus, 250.

expressly stated that souls had contemplated the absolute ideas and had been nourished on the divine beauty, wisdom, and goodness, and only descended from their exalted height to earthly shrines because of some weakness that interfered with the soul's contemplation of the ideas. Thus he tells us that ". . . the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or musician, or lover; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be a righteous king or warrior or lord. . ." ⁹ and so on down to the ninth degree which determines the soul to birth in a tyrant.

It is not difficult to see why the body in such a system will have no share in the soul's growth in knowledge. Rather than a source of understanding, it is a cause of the soul's forgetting those truths it had previously known. The soul is deceived by the senses which are unreliable witnesses since they do not report on the absolutes which alone are real. The soul can best find truth when she is wholly recollected in herself and has the least possible intercourse with the body.

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge? - is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the rest of the senses? . . . Then when does the soul attain truth? for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived? . . . Then must existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all? Yes. And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble

⁹Ibid., 246-249.

her-- . . . And in this the philosopher dishonors the body; his soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by herself.¹⁰

The soul considers the body as hindering it in the contemplation of ideas in their highest purity, for to this it attains in its perfection when the soul goes to the true essences with the mind alone.

. . . he attains to the knowledge of them in their highest purity who goes to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the act of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or any other sense in the company of reason, but with the very light of the mind in her clearness penetrates into the very light of truth in each; he has got rid as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of knowledge when in company with her--is not this the sort of man who, if ever man did, is likely to attain to the knowledge of existence?¹¹

Not only is the body a check upon knowledge because she is a deceiver, but also by reason of the care she demands and the turmoil of the passions which prevent a man from giving his whole attention to contemplation.

And when they consider all this must not true philosophers make a reflection of which they will speak to each other in such words as these: We have found, they will say, a path of speculation which will bring the argument to a conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is mingled with this mass of evil, our desires will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food.¹²

Plato then lists as other properties of a body which serve as a burden to the soul, subjection to disease, its "loves, and lusts, and fears and fancies,"

¹⁰Phaedo, 65.

¹¹Ibid., 66.

¹²Ibid., 66.

and every sort of evil and idol which prevent people from having "so much as a thought." He further remarks that all troubles such as wars, fighting, dissensions, and the like are all to be traced back to the love of money and the love of money to the service required by the body. Then he concludes that even if "there is time and inclination towards philosophy, yet the body introduces a turmoil and confusion and fear into the course of speculation, and hinders us from seeing the truth." Plato then crystallizes his whole thought in a short sentence: "and all experience shows us that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul in herself must behold all things in themselves:" That blessed state we must not hope to attain while we live, but after death, for when the soul is united to the body she cannot have pure knowledge. She must then expect true knowledge, if she is to have it at all, only after death, for then, "and not till then the soul will be in herself alone and without the body."¹³

Clearly, then, the body is considered by the Platonic soul to be a veritable burden to it, and from the fact that it is an obstacle to knowledge, it follows that it is likewise an obstacle to happiness, for happiness is "the possession of the good,"¹⁴ and the highest good is wisdom, "the one true coin for which all things ought to exchange."¹⁵ Having considered that all other desirable objects are goods, not in themselves, but in their use, and that this use is given by the possession of wisdom, he concludes

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Symposium, 204.

¹⁵Phaedo, 69.

that "wisdom is the only good and ignorance the only evil."¹⁶ To be happy, therefore, every man must strive "to make himself as wise as he can."¹⁷

Now, to become wise is to become godlike,¹⁸ and in this process of divinization, the body is again more of a hindrance than a help. The soul must, consequently, flee from the body. It must be purified to attain to this true wisdom, and what, Plato asks, is Purification but the liberation of the soul from the body?

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself, out of all the courses of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can--the release of the soul from the chains of the body.¹⁹

The soul is ever seeking release from the body, and, indeed, it is the special study of philosophy to master the art of body-separation, for "the true philosophers, and they only, study and are eager to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul their special study?"²⁰ The wise man who seeks to possess wisdom, and, consequently, happiness, must "disregard the things of the body," and "Instead of caring about them, despises anything more than nature needs." He is "entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body." Indeed, he "would like as far as he can, to be quit of the body and turn to the soul," and thus it is that "philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the

¹⁶Euthydemus, 281.

¹⁷Ibid., 282.

¹⁸Theaetetus, 176.

¹⁹Phaedo, 67.

²⁰Ibid.

soul from the body."²¹ Philosophy is looked upon as a merciful champion coming to deliver this noble being of the human soul, imprisoned in a body, "fastened and glued" to that which is no help but a burden to it, and philosophy it is which gently leads the soul to the realm of truth from which she is excluded by contact with a body.²²

The body thus contributes nothing to the soul's happiness in this life since it is regarded by the soul as "that heavy, weighty, earthly element of sight" by which the soul is "depressed and dragged down again into the visible world,"²³ and from the company of this, its enemy,²⁴ it ever strives to be liberated. Neither has the body any part in the happiness of the soul after death, for the Platonic soul, duly purified, will "live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these."²⁵

Thus has Plato conceived the place that the body occupies in the life of the soul, and although we can readily sympathize with his zealous care to escape mastery of the soul by the body, we cannot conclude that he has adequately accounted for human beings as they appear to us. With his idea of a soul as an immortal being whose very essence is "self-motion," and because of this self-motion must have had no beginning since "the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten,"²⁶ with such a notion as this, if it be Plato's real thought rather than his mythical

²¹Phaedo, 64.

²²Ibid., 83.

²³Ibid., 81.

²⁴Ibid., 67-68.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Phaedrus, 245.

description of the soul's creation, then we can readily understand why the body was violently united to the soul and why it constituted such a weight upon the soul. Indeed, we may be tempted to say that the soul is a god, and during the time of its confinement it seeks to be true to its own divine self and act in accordance with its divine nature. This, M. Gilson, referring to the Platonic doctrine, expresses very aptly in the following passage.

When a philosopher thus reaches the intelligible world, he does not strictly speaking, divinize his soul: his soul is a god in its own right. He does not even, strictly speaking, immortalize his soul; his soul is an indestructible life; it is immortal in its own right. A philosopher is a human soul which remembers its own divinity and behaves as becomes a god.²⁷

* * * * *

But Plato was a pagan, and as such, his erring thought found no restrictions laid upon it by revelation. Was it, then, a peculiarly pagan attitude--this minimization of the body's place in the life of the soul, and have all Christians, fortified by the doctrine of the satisfaction the Creator found in all his works, given to the less noble part of man its share in his life? We all know that this has not been the case, and a brief sketch of that pre-eminently saintly Christian and profound philosopher, St. Augustine, will make us appreciate all the more readily the task achieved by the Angelic Doctor in his enlightened and thoroughly common-sense description of human nature.

Plato had felt no need to safeguard the unity of man, for Plato did not

²⁷Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1941), 29.

consider 'man' as the work of the creator, and, therefore, not a part of a harmonious whole, the elements of which were meaningful and wisely arranged. St. Augustine found himself in somewhat of a different position. A Christian could not tolerate any theory of man which would make of him something unnatural, a composite whose two parts were united together, as it were, by force, and, therefore, not originally intended the one for the other. Will the Christian Augustine, then, maintain the unity of man and sacrifice the immortality of the individual soul, as was done, apparently, by Aristotle,²⁸ or will he make man to be all soul or all body? It is not easy to get at the roots of the Augustinian solution. Certainly we can say that he wanted to preserve both the unity of the man and the immortality of his soul, but did not justify his position and perhaps, we may add, acknowledged that he saw no way in which to explain the mystery.

The question of whether man consisted of only the soul or only the body was raised by St. Augustine when he sought the object that would make a man happy. Obviously, the beatitude of man would require to be something above man's nature. It was, therefore, necessary to determine, if possible, that nature. He thus presents the question:

Nec nunc definitionem hominis a me postulandum puto. Illud est magis quod mihi hoc loco quaerendum videtur, cum inter omnes pene constet, aut certe, id quod satis est, inter me atque illos cum quibus nunc agitur hoc conveniat, ex anima et corpore non esse compositos, quid est ipse homo, utrumque horum nominavi, an corpus tantummodo, an tantummodo anima. Quanquam enim duo sint, anima et corpus, et neutrum vocaretur homo, si non esset alterum (nam neque corpus homo

²⁸Aristotle, De Anima, III, 5, 430a20.

esset, si anima non esset; nec rursus anima homo, si ea corpus non animaretur;) fieri tamen potest ut unum horum et habeatur homo et vocetur.²⁹

He then asks whether we should consider the union of soul and body like to that which exists between two objects harnessed to the same thing. Or should we think of the soul's relation to the body as the relation of the light to the case in which it is contained? Or again, may we say that the soul is the horseman, and the body its horse? These are just so many difficulties which the Saint confesses are not easily solved, or if they are readily solvable they require time and strength to probe them which he will not devote to the task in this present instance.³⁰ A little further on, he seems to dismiss the subject with the reflection that whether soul and body make the man, or soul only, or body only, is not the important question, but rather this: what is it that gives perfection to the soul?³¹

Man, for the holy Bishop of Hippo, is, indeed, a composite of body and soul. "Sic, cum quaeritur ex quibus sit homo compositus, respondere possum: ex anima et ex corpore;"³² However, the definition that he considers most suited to man as viewed by men attributes the nature of man to the soul, and not to the body as a necessary part of that nature. How otherwise can we interpret the well known definition: "Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore"?"³³ The same idea he

²⁹St. Augustine, De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, IV, 6, (Opera Omnia, J. P. Migne, Paris, 1861) XXXII.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., I, V, 7.

³²De Quantitate Animae, I, 2 (Migne, XXXII).

³³De Mor. Eccl., I, XXVII, n.52.

expresses elsewhere in a slightly different terminology: "Quid est homo? Anima rationalis habens corpus."³⁴

That is how St. Augustine defines man, but when we find that he has designated the soul as "substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata,"³⁵ we may ask, with M. Gilson,³⁶ how the man differs from his soul if the definition of each is identical. However, St. Augustine still maintains that the union of body and soul must constitute a unity, and an essential unity. In speaking of the Incarnation, he states that the Word united to the flesh made but one person, "Sicut anima habens corpus, non facit duas personas, sed unum hominem."³⁷ And again when speaking of the interior and exterior man referred to in the Scriptures to the effect that man serves God's law with his mind, and the law of sin with his flesh, he insists that both actions derive from one and the same principle, for man is one, and it is the very same man who sins whether it be by his mind or by his body.

Denique ita conclusit: 'Igitur ipse ego mente servio legi Dei, carne autem lege peccati' (Rom., VII, 19-25) 'Ipse ego', inquit. Non enim duo sumus inter nos contrarii de diversis principiis venientes; sed 'ego ipse' mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati; quamdiu languor oblutatur salutem.³⁸

There can be no doubt that St. Augustine is concerned to safeguard the unity of man, but if man is a rational soul using a body, it seems fairly

³⁴In Joannis Evangelium, Tract., XIX, v, 15 (Migne, XXXV).

³⁵De Quant. Animae, XIII, 22.

³⁶E. Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, translated by A.H.C. Downes, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930) 174.

³⁷In Joan. Evan., Tract., XIX, v, 15.

³⁸Ibid., Tract., XLI, viii, 11.

obvious that he would make a one out of two substances which seem to be complete wholes, an impossibility both mathematically and philosophically. As M. Gilson noted,³⁹ with the principles that the Christian Plato has formulated, he can hardly justify his conclusion as to man's unity, though St. Augustine himself might be the first to object to such a criticism.

Now, in such a doctrine concerning the union of the soul with the body, what place can be expected to be reserved for the body? First of all, we must observe that St. Augustine vehemently denies that the body is bad in itself. That had been the heresy of the Manichaeans, and their saintly opponent is at pains to refute them, and that in a very virile manner.⁴⁰

The very conception that St. Augustine had as to this being a universe wherein things could not better be, necessitates this optimism of the worth of the human body in itself and the good of its union with the human soul. In speaking of the justice of God which sustains and arranges and holds all things in the best possible manner, he states: "qua [justitia] etiam factum est, ut non modo sint omnia, sed ita sint, ut omnino melius esse non possint."⁴¹ The human body, then, as part of this harmonious whole, is a decided good, and anyone who denies that the human body and its members are the work of God may be considered accursed.⁴²

All that the body has it owes to the soul, life, integration, preservation, and all the rest.

³⁹Gilson, *The Sp. of Med. Phil.*, op. cit., 174.

⁴⁰*Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, XXI, V, 9, (Migne, XLII).

⁴¹*De Quant. Animae*, XXXIII, 75.

⁴²*Contra Faustum Man.*, XXI, 9.

. . . corpus hoc terrenum atque mortale praesentia sua [i.e., by the presence of the soul] vivificat; colligit in unum, atque in uno tenet, diffluere atque contabescere non sinit; alimenta per membra aequaliter, suis cuique reddit, distribui facit, congruentiam eius modumque conservat, non tantum in pulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque gignendo.⁴³

The body does, indeed, depend upon the soul in the Augustinian system, but in what sense, if any, can the soul be said to depend upon the body? Does the rational soul require a body for the beginning of its existence? Concerning the first soul, St. Augustine seems to have held that it was created before its body, as he states in the following:

Credatur ergo, si nulla scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi; anima vero jam ipsa crearetur sicut primitus conditus est dies, et creata lateret in operibus Dei, donec eam suo tempore sufflando, hoc est inspirando, formato ex limo corpori insereret.⁴⁴

With regard to the origin of all other human souls, except for his complete faith in God's creation of them directly or indirectly, he is silent repeating over and over again in his refutation of a young man who presumed to knowledge on that score that he himself did not feel qualified to make any certain statement concerning the soul's origin, and that the young man would do well to share his hesitation on the subject.

Quod ei ne contingat, quanto melius tenet de animae origine cunctationem meam, ne audeat affirmare, quod nec humana ratione comprehendit, nec divina auctoritate defendit; ne cogatur insipientiam profiteri, dum veretur ignorantiam confiteri.⁴⁵

⁴³De Quant. Animae, XXXIII, 70.

⁴⁴De Genesis ad Litteram Imperfectus, VII, 24, n.35, (Migne, XXXIV).

⁴⁵De Anima et Ejus Origine, I, xiii, n.16, (Migne, XLIV).

And also:

(nihil enim horum tanquam certum affirmamus, sed quid horum verum sit adhuc quaerimus.)⁴⁶

What St. Augustine does not hesitate to proclaim with certainty is that the soul is not united to the body because of a punishment inflicted on it in view of another existence prior to that of its life in a human frame. Indeed he waxes indignant at a certain Vincentius Victor, the same who held positive opinions about the soul's origin, because the latter said that the soul deserved to be polluted by the body.⁴⁷ No less will St. Augustine permit the body to be considered as alien to man's nature, for he observes that the entire nature of man is spirit, soul, and body, and spirit and soul are identical.

Nature certe tota hominis est spiritus, anima et corpus, quisquis ergo a natura humana corpus alienare vult, desipit.⁴⁸

The soul was not united to the body by force. It was made to be placed in a body, and it has a natural desire for that body.

Sed si ad hoc fit anima, ut mittatur in corpus, quaeri potest utrum, noluerit, compellatur? Sed melius creditur hoc naturaliter velle, id est, in ea nature creari ut velit, sicut naturale nobis est velle vivere.⁴⁹

However, strongly as he holds this natural desire of the soul for its body, he gives no philosophical justification of it. When, for example, he inveighs against Victor for the erroneous judgments put forward by the latter,

⁴⁶Ibid., I, xvii, 27.

⁴⁷De Anima et Ejus Origine, III, viii, n.11.

⁴⁸Ibid., IV, 11, n.3, for the passages concerning soul and spirit, Ibid., IV, xiii, n.19, also, Ibid., IV, xxii, n.36.

⁴⁹De Gen. ad Litt., VII, 37, n.38.

he contents himself with repeating before each new tenet that he denies, that the young man may not hold such views if he wishes to be a Catholic. Thus: "Noli credere, nec dicere, nec docere, 'Quod anima meruerit esse peccatrix ante omne peccatum', si vis esse catholicus."⁵⁰ Now, why would not St. Augustine attempt a philosophical demonstration concerning the points he criticized in his opponent, notably that concerning pre-existence of souls and the body looked upon as a punishment? Was his reticence because he could not see any natural reason for the union of soul and body and, therefore, had to content himself with submissive faith? At any rate, he states quite plainly that the body is man's heaviest burden, owing to original sin. This has happened by God's most righteous laws, a well-known fact, but an impenetrable mystery.

Sed inter omnia quae in hac vita possidentur, corpus homini gravissimum vinculum est, justissimis Dei legibus, propter antiquum peccatum, quo nihil est ad intelligendum secretius.⁵¹

The soul is united to the body for reasons known to the Creator. Such a being as man, composed of body and soul, is a unit in an order wherein all things are most beautiful, for the Supreme and true God judges a thing to be most beautiful when it is as it is. "Id enim iudicavit esse pulcherrimum, ut esset quidquid est, quomodo est."⁵² No one, therefore, should take it ill that the soul should be united to the body, for so great and divine an order could not better be connected. "Quae cum ita sint, quis est qui iuste stomachetur quod agendo atque administrando corpori data sit, cum tantus et

⁵⁰De Anima et Ejus Origine, III, viii, n.11.

⁵¹De Mor. Eccl., XXII, 40.

⁵²De Quant. Animae, XXXVI, n.80.

tam divinus rerum connecti melius non possit;"⁵³

The body, consequently, cannot be termed the body of this death except because of original sin.⁵⁴ It is fallen man, not natural man, that St. Augustine describes, and fallen men we are, in very truth. Why not content ourselves with such a picture and strive to free ourselves from a burden felt by all of us? Such a treatise will not satisfy us precisely because we know that there was a first man, and that first man had a nature like unto our own, and in that nature free from the evil effects of sin he lived at least for some time. The soul and body of that first man, essentially comparable to ours, were united naturally. Why should this have been so, if the first man, too, were only a soul using his body? It is extremely beautiful--this description of the perfect order of the universe, and the unfathomable good of a human composite,--constituted just as it is and in no other way--, but we may be permitted to ask why, if the Augustinian soul has no need of its body, should its union with that body be such an admirable thing, God's wisdom excluded, which, of course, St. Augustine would never exclude? True enough even the Augustinian soul makes use of the senses.⁵⁵ This use of the senses, we may add, is not identical with a need for them. Their chief need would be for knowledge, but the soul, according to our great saint, does not understand by any help from the body, but rather when it wishes to understand it turns away from the body. "Non enim id agit, nisi qui intelligit: nec corpus intelligit, nec animus auxiliante corpore intelligit; quia cum

⁵³Ibid., XXXVI, n.82, et sqq.

⁵⁴De Peccato Originali, II, XLI, n.37, (Migne, XLIV).

⁵⁵De Quant. Animae, XXI, n.35.

intelligere vult, a corpore avertitur."⁵⁶

We can see, moreover, from his doctrine on sensation that he will not permit any action of the body on the soul.⁵⁷ Sensation does not pertain to the human composite; it is wholly and entirely an action of the soul. Still there appears to be some dependency of the soul on the body for contact, at least, with the exterior sensibles, but St. Augustine, possessed as he is by that principle that the lower cannot act upon the higher,⁵⁸ can only reach the conclusion that the whole problem is a paradox, and the union of a spiritual substance with a corporeal one a mystery which he cannot understand. "Quia et iste alius modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus, at animalia fiunt, omnino mirus est, nec comprehendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est."⁵⁹ M. Gilson in treating of this particular problem in St. Augustine's doctrine assures us that one will seek in vain for a solution of this enigma.⁶⁰

A partial explanation of the problem may, however, be found by a different approach to the difficulty. Although it may be true that the lower cannot act upon the higher, still the higher can act upon the lower, and this is precisely what happens in the Augustinian account of sensation. The soul is in the body to give life to that body and to maintain it. In its role, then, of animator and protector, the soul must be cognizant of what is taking

⁵⁶De Immortalitate Animae, I, 1, (Migne, XXXII).

⁵⁷For a lucid exposition of the doctrine of St. Augustine on sensation consult E. Gilson, Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin, (J. Vrin, Paris, 1929) 71-86.

⁵⁸De Musica, VI, 5, n.8, also De Genes. ad Litt., XII, 16, n.32-33.

⁵⁹De Civ. Dei, XXI, 10, 1. Quoted in Gilson, op. cit., 30.

⁶⁰Gilson, Introd. à l'Etude de S. Aug., op. cit., 60.

place in the body subject to her care. If there is any increase or decrease in the functioning of the corporeal organs, the soul must be aware of it and turn her attention to the re-establishment of harmony disturbed by an outside influence on the body.⁶¹ The definition of sensation as stated by the philosopher of Hippo expresses this idea in a carefully worded formula: "passio corporis per seipsam non latens animam."⁶² It is not fitting here to add more about this definition, but we should like to observe, as did St. Augustine himself, that the soul is not in the body to be acted upon or to receive; she is there to act and to give.⁶³

This does indeed establish the problem in a new light, but it only deepens the mystery of a noble soul united to a body to which it gives everything, and from which it apparently receives nothing in return. The soul, as judged by its office in sensation, becomes the servant of the body, while remaining essentially superior to the corporeal part of man. The metaphysical principle underlying such a doctrine and one that gives to it its true character is in the words of a profound student of St. Augustine, "la servitude d'une âme qui se met au service d'un corps, bien qu'elle lui demeure irréductiblement transcendante jusque dans l'acte même de la sensation par lequel elle s'y soumet."⁶⁴

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the body figures

⁶¹De Musica, VI, 5, n.9.

⁶²De Quant. Animae, XXV, n.48.

⁶³De Musica, VI, 5, n.9.

⁶⁴Gilson, op. cit., 83.

scarcely at all in the soul's growth in knowledge.⁶⁵ What man knows, he knows by reason, and sense perception is not knowledge. "Et omne quod scimus, ratione scimus: nullus igitur sensus scientia est. Quidquid autem non latet, ad scientiam pertinet: ad nullum sensum pertinet non latere, . . ."66

Human reason and knowledge transcend the sense organs in such a way as not to depend, it would seem, upon these channels at all. The soul must recede from the sensibles and seek the pleasure that is within.

Humana vera anima per rationem atque scientiam, de quibus agimus, quod sunt ista longe praestantiora sensibus, suspendit se a corpore quantum potest, et ea quae intus est libentius fruitur voluptate; quantoque in sensus declinat, tanto magis similiorem hominem pecori facit.⁶⁷

Now, St. Thomas would never gainsay the primary excellence of reason and knowledge over the senses. He would likewise concede the necessity of withdrawal from sense indulgence, and, therefore, he would grant with the Christian Plato, that the soul should not waste time on the senses beyond the limit determined by nature. "Quamobrem, quamvis aliud ex alio incidere libenter, tamen in eo sermone demoror, quo admonetur anima, ne se, ultra quam necessitas cogit, refundat in sensus;"68 But he does differ in fixing those natural limits of the part played by the sense organs. The Augustinian

⁶⁵Charles Boyer, S.J., in his Essais sur la Doctrine de Saint Augustin, (Beauchesne et ses Fils, Paris, 1932) 166-183, considers that there is in St. Augustine a doctrine of abstraction, in its basic principles, not unlike Thomistic abstraction. He likewise holds that the differences between Thomism and Augustinianism in what regards the union of soul and body have been exaggerated, for he states: "Ces différences sont plutôt dans le degré d'achèvement et de précision que dans la substance de la doctrine." 170.

⁶⁶De Quant. Animae, XXIX, n.57.

⁶⁷De Quant. Animae, XXVIII, n.54.

⁶⁸Ibid., n.55.

soul withdraws from the senses into itself to become a child of God; the Thomistic soul goes to itself and God through the senses. Thus St. Thomas would understand in a somewhat different manner the procedure implied in the following statement: ". . . sed ab his potius ad seipsam colligat, et re-
puerascat Deo: quod est novum fieri, vetere exuto;"⁶⁹

We may conclude, therefore, that the human body has no essential part in the life of the soul, according to the teaching of St. Augustine. Union of soul and body is a natural thing--even a good; the body naturally belongs to the soul in this life, and in the next something will be wanting to the soul's complete fulfillment if it has not its body.

. . . inest ei naturalis quidem appetitus corpus adminis-
trandi; quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota inten-
tione pergat in illud summum coelum, quamdiu non subest
corpus, cujus administratione appetitus ille conquiescat.⁷⁰

But a justification of the union of soul and body and a description of the body's place in the life of the soul which satisfies us it would be difficult to find in the writings of the great philosopher and bishop of Hippo. It matters little whether we grant that he outlined in broad design the same sketch St. Thomas was to complete in clear and skilful drawings in the same masterly way he marked out the reconciliation of faith and reason treating of their respective merits and their interaction; we must admit that it is to the greatest of the Scholastic philosophers that we owe the rational justifi-
cation of the union of soul and body and a description of the true and vital place played by the body in the life of the rational soul.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰De Gen. ad Litt., XII, 35, n.65.

At first sight, it might seem, that St. Thomas also has not devoted much space to a treatment of the human body. In his treatise on man, he himself declares that he will consider man's nature in relation to its spiritual aspect and not in relation to its material side except in so far as the material part has bearing on the spiritual part. "Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam."⁷¹

The concern, then, of the Angelic Doctor, seems primarily and entirely to be taken up with the rational soul. A detailed account of the essence of the soul, its powers and its operations can, therefore, be sought and found in his philosophy, but no such complete and all-embracing delineation of the human body can be discovered therein. We may, consequently be tempted to think that again in this system the body has been neglected, but a glance at the text just quoted will quickly dissipate all fears on that score. St. Thomas there states that he will not treat of the human body except in so far as it is related to the soul, but for those who know the intimate relation which exists between the soul and its body in the doctrine of St. Thomas, it will not be difficult to conclude that the human body holds a place of no little importance in the writings of this learned Saint. Thus we may discover in his works a sketch of the body, its nature, constituent parts, and disposition such as will be necessary to portray its close relationship to the rational soul.

⁷¹St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.75, a.1.Prol., (Ed. Leonine, Rome, 1888).

It is the purpose of this thesis to investigate that part which St. Thomas gives to the human body in the life of the rational soul and, therefore, to seek in the treatises of the eminent theologian an account of the body in so far as it influences the soul. We shall consider:

First, the place that the human body has in the beginning of the rational soul in the perfection of its nature.

Secondly, the share that the body has in all the operations of the soul, particularly in its highest operation; namely, understanding.

Thirdly, the disposition required of the body for its intimate relation to the soul.

Fourthly, the problem of whether or not the body can be considered an impediment to the soul.

Fifthly, the place of the body in the final happiness of the soul.

Precisely because man is a compound of body and soul, we shall see that the body occupies an important and necessary place in the substantial, accidental, and final perfection of this nobler part of man's nature. In view of the relationship that it bears to the rational soul, the body is, consequently, not excluded from the attention of the greatest of the Schoolmen, nor is it, in any real sense, minimized.

A brief sketch of the task undertaken thus presented, we shall turn to the consideration of the dependence of the rational soul on the body for the beginning of its existence. In this first chapter, as well as in the subsequent ones, we shall be guided by the desire to adhere as closely as possible to the actual expressions and argumentation adopted by the Angelic Doctor, convinced, as we are, that St. Thomas better than anyone else, explains St. Thomas.

CHAPTER I
THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY FOR
THE BEGINNING OF ITS EXISTENCE

In the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, great care is taken to safeguard the unity of man. It is for this reason that the body plays such an important place in the life of the soul. Man, for the Angelic Doctor, is neither a soul, nor a body, nor a soul enclosed in or merely using a body; man is a composite of body and soul. His very unity derives from the close and intimate union of these two parts. The relationship of the body to the soul will, therefore, be no merely accidental one, but one that is truly essential. We shall devote the following pages to a study of the first important part the body has in the life of the soul.

The rational soul depends upon the body in the sense that it begins to exist only in the human body. That the soul is a subsistent being, that it is in itself nobler than the body, and that the soul does not exist for the body, but rather the body for the soul, St. Thomas certainly admits,¹ but that the rational soul can begin its existence in the perfection of its nature outside the human body, he will not grant, for he tells us: ". . . anima, quamvis non dependeat a corpore quantum ad suum esse vel quantum ad suum finem, dependet tamen quodammodo quantum ad suum principium."²

¹A discussion of the being of the soul may be found in: St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1 a. 2, c., also Contra Gentiles, II, 68.

²St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., d.XVII, q.2.a.2.ad 4^{um}, (Mandonnet, Lethielleux, Paris, 1929, II).

The reasons that are given for the necessity that devolves upon the rational soul's receiving its existence only in the body may be summarized as follows: First, the perfection of the nature of the human soul requires that it should begin to exist only in a human body;³ secondly, the soul is related to the body as form to matter, to constitute one being, and in one and the same being, man, for example, the form or the act cannot precede the matter or the potency;⁴ thirdly, no reasonable cause can be assigned for the union of the soul with the body if the soul were created in its perfect natural state without the body;⁵ fourthly, since matter is the principle of individuation, there could be no distinction between this soul and that soul if they were created before their union with their determinate matter;⁶ and fifthly, the rational soul needs the senses, and it would not have been fitting for it to have been created without a body equipped with sense organs.⁷

We shall now consider the first proof; namely, that the perfection of the nature of the human soul requires that it should begin to exist only in a human body. The soul is an incomplete substance, a part, but only a part of human nature; the body, likewise, is an incomplete substance, also only a part of human nature. But God created all things in a state of natural perfection, for what is perfect should precede what is imperfect. Therefore, it was necessary that the soul should receive its existence in the

³St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c. (Marietti, Tarini, Rome, Italy, 1927, I).

⁴St. Thomas Aquinas, Cont. Gent., II, 83, also Ibid., 89, (Bertrand, Barri, Ducis, Paris, 1878).

⁵St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Cont. Gent., II, 83.

human body, as St. Thomas states in this underlying principle: ". . . res creatae sunt a Deo in sua perfectione naturali. Perfectum enim naturaliter praecedit imperfectum, . . ."8 The soul was, therefore, not created without the body, nor the body without the soul because such an order would have been contrary to the first formation of things: "Sed contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel anima sine corpore fecerit cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae."9

The rational soul, for St. Thomas, although it is only a part of human nature, is nevertheless a "hoc aliquid," a this particular thing, but it is not this particular thing in the sense that it is complete in its being and in its species, but only in the sense that it is this particular thing in act. This may, perhaps, appear in a clearer light by noting the three meanings which St. Thomas attaches to the expression, "hoc aliquid." "Hoc aliquid" may be applied to matter, to form, and to the composite. In each case the meaning will be different. When the term is applied to matter, it does not mean that matter is this particular thing in itself, but only that it is in potency to become so. "Materia quidem est, quae secundum se non est hoc aliquid, sed in potentia tantum ut sit hoc aliquid."10 When we apply the term to a form, we mean that the form is this particular thing in act.

"Forma actu est, secundum quam jam est hoc aliquid in actu."11 However, it

8Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

9Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.4, ad 3um.

10St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium, II, lect. 1, n.215, (Pirota, Marietti, Tarini, Rome, Italy, 1924), also Sum. Theol., I, q.75, a.2, ad 1um.

11Ibid.

is only of the composite that we can truly say that it is this particular thing. (This applies only to composite substances in the material order, for separate substances, although not composed of matter and form, are still "hoc aliquid" since they are subsistent in act and complete in their nature):

Substantia vero composita est, quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur enim esse hoc aliquid, id est aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse et specie; et hoc convenit soli substantiae compositae in rebus materialibus. Nam substantiae separatae, quamvis non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sunt tamen hoc aliquid, cum sint subsistentes in actu et completae in natura sua.¹²

Now, the human soul can be said to be this particular thing in so far as it can subsist in itself, but because it has not a complete species in itself, but is a part of a species, it is not entirely true to say that it is this particular thing.

Anima autem rationalis, quantum ad aliquid potest dici hoc aliquid, secundum hoc quod potest esse per se subsistens. Sed quia non habet speciem completam, sed magis est pars speciei, non omnino convenit ei quod sit hoc aliquid.¹³

It is because the soul is not complete in its species that it requires its proper matter for its completion in its proper species, and this is likewise the reason why a body cannot be said to be united to it accidentally.

. . . licet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae, communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse totius compositi; tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam; sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei.¹⁴

We find the same idea in this passage:

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, ad 1^{um}. (Marietti, Rome, Italy, 1927, II).

Anima autem non habet perfectionem suae naturae extra corpus, cum non sit per se ipsam species completa alicujus naturae, sed sit pars humanae naturae.¹⁵

It is evident that St. Thomas teaches that the soul does not in itself constitute a distinct species, but why precisely should that be the case? The answer lies in the type of spiritual substance the soul is. It is nobler than matter, but less noble than purely intellectual substances; it is on the horizon of corporeal and separate substances, ". . . manifestum est quod ipsa in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta."¹⁶ The soul is an intellectual substance, that is true, but it requires help which the organs of the human body can give to it for its act of intelligence. The body is, consequently, naturally united to it to complete the species of the soul. "Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animae humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem humanam."¹⁷

Since, therefore, the human soul has not what is required for the proper operation of its species, it is not complete in that species, as St. Thomas insists upon again and again: "Non enim aliquid est completum in specie, nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam operationem ipsius speciei."¹⁸

The human soul must begin to exist in the human body precisely because it is a part, and only a part, of human nature. Now no part separate from

¹⁵Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

¹⁶Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, c.

¹⁷Cont. Gent., II, 68.

¹⁸Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, c.

its whole has the perfection of its nature. Thus if the soul were created before the body, it would be an imperfect thing, ". . . nulla pars habet perfectionem naturae separata a toto. Unde anima, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet perfectionem suae naturae nisi in unione ad corpus;"¹⁹

Furthermore, it is not fitting that the soul should exist in an imperfect state, that is, apart from the body, before it has existed in a perfect state, that is, in union with the body, for the perfect precedes what is imperfect in the order of natural things. "Perfectum autem est prius imperfecto, in rerum naturalium ordine. Non igitur competit naturae ordini quod anima fuerit prius creata corpore exuta, quam corpori unita."²⁰

The rational soul, consequently, is united to the body because of the good which is its substantial perfection; namely, the completion of the human species, and also because of the good which is its accidental perfection; namely, that it should be perfected in knowledge by reception from the sensibles, for this manner of understanding belongs to the nature of man:

. . . anima unitur corpori et propter bonum quod est perfectio substantialis, ut scilicet compleatur species humana; et propter bonum quod est perfectio accidentalis, ut scilicet perficiatur in cognitione intellectiva, quam anima ex sensibus acquirit; hic enim modus intelligendi est naturalis homini.²¹

That the body is for the perfection of the soul and what part it plays in the accidental perfection to which we have referred, will receive further consideration when we treat of the need for the body, in the following chapter.

¹⁹Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.2, ad 5^{um}., (Marietti, II).

²⁰Cont. Gent., II, 83.

²¹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, ad 7^{um}.

We have seen, then, that it would have been unfitting for the soul to have been created without the body because its nature requires it to be united to a human body, and God would not have created it in the perfect natural state its species required, had He not united it to a body immediately.

Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfectu statu suae naturae secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei specie exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari.²²

St. Thomas strongly insists upon the naturalness of the union between soul and body. Indeed he states that if the soul were not capable of being united to the body, it would be of a different nature, ". . . si anima non esset corpori unibilis, tunc esset alterius naturae;"²³ It is in very truth so natural for the human soul to be united to the body that a soul never united to a body so as to make one being would not be a human soul, for what is beside nature cannot be always: "Amplius, anima humana naturaliter unibilis est corpori. Anima igitur quae numquam corpori unitur ad aliquid constituendum non est anima humana quia quod est praeter naturam non potest esse semper."²⁴

It is unnatural for the soul to be without the body because without its corporeal complement, it lacks the perfection of its nature. With unnatural and imperfect things, it would not have been fitting for God to have begun

²²Sum. Theol., I, q.90, a.4.c.

²³In II Sent., d.I, q.q.2, a.4, ad 1^{um}.

²⁴Cont. Gent., IV, 37.

His work, for if God did not make man without a hand or foot, which are natural parts of man, still less did He make a soul without a body:

Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab his quae sunt praeter naturam: non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore.²⁵

This leads us to the second proof that the soul receives existence only in the human body, and this proof is based upon the principle that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body, and together with the human body, constitutes one being. Now in one and the same being, act is not prior to potency, as we shall explain further on, (Vide footnote 53). Therefore, the soul which is the act of the body, is not prior to, but simultaneous with, the human body.

To begin with, the rational soul is not just a subsistent being; it is a form, a substantial form. For the soul to be a substantial form, two conditions are required: first, it must be the principle of substantial being to that of which it is the form; and secondly, from its union with matter, there should be effected one, and only one, being.

Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cujus est forma: principium autem dico non effectivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia convenient in uno esse quod non contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui dat esse; et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una

²⁵Sum. Theol., I, q.118, a.3, c.

secundum esse ex materia et forma constans.²⁶

The rational soul is the principle of substantial being to the human body, for the form and the act of a thing is that whereby a thing from a potential being is made into an actual being: "Quod autem ut forma propria anima corpori uniatur, sic probatur, illud quo aliquid fit de potentia ente actu ens, est et forma et actus ipsius."²⁷ Now, the soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, and one being thus results from the matter and the rational soul: ". . . anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae."²⁸

The soul is, therefore, the form of the body because it actualizes the body, gives it being: "Corpus autem per animam fit actu ens de potentia existente. Vivere enim est esse viventium. . ." ²⁹ That by which the body lives is the soul, and the soul is that by which the human body has being in act. "Manifestum est enim, id quo vivit corpus, animam esse; vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Hujusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma."³⁰ In nature, matter has being only through the form, and the form coming to the matter bestows being on that matter. "In natura igitur rerum corporearum materia non per se participat ipsum esse, sed per formam; forma enim adveni-

²⁶Cont. Gent., II, 68.

²⁷Ibid., 57.

²⁸Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a, 1, ad 5^{um}.

²⁹Cont. Gent., II, 62.

³⁰Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, c.

ens materiae facit ipsam esse actu, sicut anima corpori."³¹

It should be clear enough, then, that the soul is the form of the body, since it gives being to the body, actualizes what was being only potentially. Is the soul on that account a substantial form or an accidental form? The substantial form gives being simply to its subject; an accidental form gives it being, not being simply, but only in respect to something else, that it should be colored, or large or small, or some other like quality, which quality would be only an accidental one. By an accidental form, a thing becomes such a thing; by a substantial form, a thing becomes a being. "Est autem hoc proprium formae substantialis quod det materiae esse simpliciter; ipsa enim est per quam res est hoc ipsum quod est. Non autem per formas accidentales habet esse simpliciter, sed esse secundum quid; puta esse magnum, vel coloratum, vel aliquid tale."³²

If, therefore, the form does not give being simply to a thing, but comes to it already existing in act, that form will not be a substantial form. "Si qua ergo forma est quae non det materiae esse simpliciter, sed adveniat materiae jam existenti in actu per aliquam formam, non erit forma . substantialis."³³

But since the soul does give being to the body, and being simply, it is a substantial form. Moreover, it is because the soul is the substantial form of the body that it must be so closely united to it since being belongs

³¹Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.1, c.

³²Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.9, c.

³³Ibid; This same distinction between substantial and accidental form is clearly expressed in In De Anima, II, lect.1, n.224.

to a thing more closely and immediately than anything else. ". . . inter omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus. . .; unde oportet, cum materia habeat esse actu per formam, quod forma dans esse materiae, ante omnia intelligatur advenire materiae, et immediatius ceteris sibi inesse."³⁴

This point may appear in a clearer light if we consider what St. Thomas says when commenting upon Aristotle's definition of the soul, that it is the act or form of a physically organized body having life potentially. He invites us to observe that the soul is the form of the physically organized body having life potentially, and not merely having life. For, he tells us the body having life is understood to be the living composite substance. This composite does not belong to the definition of the form, that is to say, the form is not the whole composite. The matter of the living body is that which is related to life as potency to act, and this act is the soul by which the body lives.

Dixit autem 'habentis vitam potentia' et non simpliciter habentis vitam. Nam corpus habens vitam intelligitur substantia composita vivens. Compositum autem non ponitur in definitione formae. Materia autem corporis vivi est id quod comparatur ad vitam sicut potentia ad actum: et hoc est anima, actus, secundum quem corpus vivit.³⁵

The intellectual soul is the first act by which man lives, and feels, and knows, and moves because nothing acts except so far as it is in act, and a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now, life is shown through various activities, but the first principle of each of these activities is

³⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.9, c.

³⁵In De Anima, II, lect.1, n.222, also Cont. Gent., II, 68-69, and 89.

the soul.

Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima: anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus.³⁶

This does not mean, however, that it is the soul that lives, and feels, and moves, and knows. For St. Thomas, it is the man that acts, and this leads us to the second condition necessary for the soul to be the substantial form of the body; namely, that soul and body should form one and only one substance. One thing cannot result from the union of two substances existing in act and complete in their species, but a unity can result from the combination of two incomplete substances, and soul and body are substances of this kind. ". . . ex duabus substantiis actu existentibus et perfectis in sua specie et natura non fit aliquid unum. Anima autem et corpus non sunt hujusmodi, cum sint partes humanae naturae; unde ex eis nihil prohibet fieri unum."³⁷

Soul and body, since they constitute one being, cannot be united by way of contact, properly so called, for such a union is only between bodies, and the soul is not a body.

Similiter autem patet quod substantia intellectualis non potest uniri corpori per modum contactus proprie sumpti. Tactus enim non nisi corporum est; sunt enim tangencia quorum sunt ultima simul, ut puncta, aut lineae, aut superficies, quae sunt corporum ultima, non igitur per

³⁶Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.1, c.

³⁷Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.2, ad 11um.

modum contactus substantia intellectualis corpori uniri potest.³⁸

Neither can the union of soul and body be that of virtual contact, which is that by which one thing touches another but is not itself touched by that other. It is by this sort of contact that a heavenly body touches an elemental body, in so far as it changes the elemental body but is not itself changed by the contact. "Corpora enim coelestia tangunt quidem hoc modo elementaria corpora, in quantum ea alterant; non autem tanguntur ab eis, quia ab eis non patiuntur."³⁹ Now, although a heavenly body can, in a sense, be said to be united in this way to the elements, such a union does not make one thing simply, for a thing has unity from the same cause that it has being. ". . . ab eodem aliquid habet esse et unitatem; unum enim et ens se consequuntur."⁴⁰ Since the heavenly body does not give being to the object it touches, it does not make one thing simply. Such a union would not suit soul and body.

Sic igitur substantia intellectualis potest corpori uniri per contactum virtutis. Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiando, quod non est esse unum simpliciter. Sic enim dicitur unum quomodo et ens. Esse autem agens non significat esse simpliciter. Unde nec esse unum in agendo est esse unum simpliciter.⁴¹

Now, the human composite must be a thing which is simply one, but there are three ways in which a thing may be said to be simply one: an indivisible

³⁸Cont. Gent., II, 56.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., 73.

⁴¹Cont. Gent., II, 56.

one, a continuous one, or an essential one.⁴² Now, an intellectual substance and a body cannot form together the kind of one that is indivisible, for the one that they will constitute obviously must be composed of two substances. Nor can they form together the one which is continuous because parts of the continuous are parts of quantity, and it is clear that there is no quantity in an intellectual substance.

Unum autem simpliciter tripliciter dicitur: vel sicut indivisibile, vel sicut continuum, vel sicut quod est ratione unum. Ex substantia autem intellectuali et corpore non potest fieri unum quod sit indivisibile. Oportet enim illud esse compositum ex duobus. Nec iterum quod sit continuum, quia partes continui quantae sunt.⁴³

It remains, therefore, to determine whether the union of body and soul can result in the one which is essential. From two things which are permanent, essential unity does not result except from substantial form and its matter, for from a substance and an accident, for example, a man and his clothes, there cannot result a substance that is one essentially. "Ex duobus autem permanentibus non fit aliquod ratione unum, nisi sicut ex forma substantiali et materia. Ex substantia enim et accidente non fit ratione unum; non enim est eadem ratio hominis et albi."⁴⁴

If the soul were in the body as a sailor in a ship, the soul would doubtless move the body, but it would not with the body constitute one thing, for the union would, in that case, be only a virtual one. Nor can the soul

⁴²For examples of these three types and further explanation consult Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 7, 1015b17-1017a (Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House, New York, 1941).

⁴³Cont. Gent., II, 56.

⁴⁴Ibid.

be related to the body as a man is related to his clothes, because the union existing between a man and his clothes is only an accidental one since the soul, in such a union, would constitute the entire essence.

In refuting those who held that the whole nature of man was in his soul, and that man was not a unity consisting of two incomplete substances but a soul related to its body as a driver to the thing he moves, St. Thomas states that this opinion cannot be maintained because in that case the soul would not give species to the body and its parts; whereas the contrary is true, for we know that when the soul departs, the various parts of the body retain their names only in an equivocal sense. The eye of a dead man, for instance, is only called an eye equivocally as that of a painted or stone eye.

Ita si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, non daret speciem corpori, neque partibus ejus; cujus contrarium apparet ex hoc quod recedente anima, singulae partes non retinent pristinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus aut lapideus; et simile est de aliis partibus.⁴⁵

This same thought of the soul's bestowal of species on the body appears in practically the same phrasing when St. Thomas proves that a spiritual substance can be united to a body and that it must be united to it as form to matter. Thus:

Si enim anima non uniretur corpori ut forma, sequeretur quod corpus et partes ejus non haberent esse specificum per animam; quod manifeste falsum apparet; quia recedente anima non dicitur oculus aut caro et os nisi aequivoce. Sicut oculus pictus vel lapideus. Unde manifestum est quod anima est forma et quod quid erat esse hujus corporis; id est a qua hoc corpus habet rationem suae speciei.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, c.

⁴⁶Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.2, c.

That the soul could not give species to the body if it were in it only as a sailor is in his ship is evident because the soul would then be only a mover, and the thing moved does not derive its species from that which moves it.

. . . mobile non sortitur speciem a suo motore. Si igitur anima non conjungitur corpori nisi sicut motor mobili, corpus et partes ejus non consequuntur speciem ab anima. Ab eunte igitur anima, remanebit corpus et partes ejus ejusdem speciei. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum; nam caro, et os, et manus, et hujusmodi partes, post abcessum animae, non dicuntur nisi aequivoce, cum nulli harum partium propria operatio adsit, quae speciem consequitur. Non igitur unitur anima corpori solum sicut motor mobili, vel sicut homo vestimento.⁴⁷

Furthermore, the soul cannot be united to the body as a sailor to his ship because, since such a union would be accidental, death which effects their separation would not be a substantial corruption. But we know that death does bring about the dissolution of the composite; this, therefore, could not be true. "Et praeterea si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, sequeretur quod unio animae et corporis esset accidentalis. Mors igitur, quae inducit eorum separationem, non esset corruptio substantialis; quod patet esse falsum."⁴⁸

The composite substance which is the result of soul and body united is, therefore, one being essentially, not accidentally, nor virtually, as we have seen. It is one precisely because the composite receives its being from the form. Before the advent of the form, the composite may be said to have existed potentially, but it did not have being actually. ". . . materia

⁴⁷Cont. Gent., II, 57.

⁴⁸Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, c.

est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus ejus; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva ejus."⁴⁹

That soul and body should combine to form one being is absolutely necessary in the doctrine of St. Thomas, for it is always the man that feels and lives and knows. It is true that the soul is the first principle of these operations, but we cannot say that the soul knows, or feels, or acts; it is the man that performs those activities.⁵⁰ Moreover, things different in being cannot produce an action which would be one in origin. Many agents acting together can perform the same action, such as rowing a boat. The termination of such an action would be one, but on the part of the rowers themselves there would be many actions by many actors. Now, although the soul has a proper operation in which the body has no share, for example, understanding, there are, however, some operations which are common to body and soul working together, such as to fear, to be angry, and the like, for these happen by some change in a determinate organ of the body. This makes it clear that there are operations pertaining to the composite, and soul and body must, therefore, be one being, and not each a distinct being.

Item, impossibile est quod eorum quae sunt diversa secundum esse sit operatio una. Dico autem operationem unam non ex parte ejus in quod terminatur actio, sed secundum quod egreditur ab agente. Multi enim trahentes navem, unam actionem faciunt ex parte operati, quod est unum, sed tamen ex parte trahentium sunt multae actiones, qui sunt diversi impulsus ad trahendum. . . . Quamvis autem animae sit aliqua operatio propria, in qua non communicat corpus, sicut

⁴⁹Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.1, c.

⁵⁰Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.1, c.

intelligere; sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi et corpori, ut timere, irasci, et sentire, et hujusmodi. Haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem aliqujus determinatae partis corporis. Ex quo patet quod simul sunt animae et corporis operationes. Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa.⁵¹

It is quite evident, therefore, that since being and operation belong neither to the form alone nor to the matter alone, but to the composite, being and action are attributed to two substances which stand to each other as form to matter, for we say that a man is healthy in body and health, and that he is knowing in knowledge and soul; knowledge is the form of the soul knowing, and health is the form of the healthy body. But living and feeling belong to both soul and body, for we live and sense as man, not in just the soul, nor in just the body, but the soul is still the principle of life and feeling,--and is, therefore, the form of the body.

Amplius, quia tam esse quam etiam operari non est solum formae nec solum materiae, sed conjuncti, esse et agere duobus attribuuntur, quorum unum se habet ad alterum sicut forma ad materiam, Dicimus enim quod homo est sanus corpore et sanitate, et quod est sciens scientia et anima. Quorum scientia est forma animae scientis, et sanitas corporis sani. Vivere autem, ac sentire attribuitur animae et corpori. Dicimur vivere et sentire anima et corpore, sed anima tamen sicut principio vitae et sensus. Est igitur anima forma corporis.⁵²

The two requirements to be fulfilled in order that a substances may be the substantial form of a thing have, consequently, been verified in the rational soul. The rational soul is a substantial form, first, because it gives being simply to the body, that is to say, it communicates existence to

⁵¹Cont. Gent., II, 57.

⁵²Ibid.

the body; and secondly, because together with the body it constitutes one being, since the composite receives its being from the soul, and before the advent of the soul has being only in potentiality.

Now, since the soul is the substantial form of the human body, it is natural that it should be united to its proper matter. To be separated from the body is unnatural to the soul, as we shall show in the final chapter. Since, therefore, union with the body is according to nature, and separation from the body not in accordance with nature, it is fitting that what is natural should precede what is unnatural, and that the soul should be first united to the body before being separated from it, and should, therefore, receive existence only in the human body. This is fitting because what becomes a thing according to nature is in it "per se"; whereas, that which becomes a thing beside nature is in it only accidentally and always follows what becomes the thing "per se." Therefore, the soul was not created before the body to which it is united.

Amplius, unicuique formae naturale est propriae materiae uniri; alioquin constitutum ex forma et materia esset aliquid praeter naturam. Prius autem attribuitur unicuique quod convenit ei secundum naturam quam quod convenit ei praeter naturam; quod enim convenit alicui praeter naturam, inest ei per accidens; quod autem convenit ei secundum naturam, inest ei per se: quod autem per accidens est, semper posterius est eo quod est per se. Animae igitur prius convenit esse unitam corpori quam esse a corpore separatam. Non est igitur creata ante corpus cui unitur.⁵³

There is, however, one sense in which we may say that the soul precedes the body, and another sense in which we may say that the body precedes the

⁵³Cont. Gent., II, 83.

soul. Soul and body, as we have said, are related to each other as act and potency. Now, in nature whatever is in potency to become something must be actualized by something already in act. However, in one and the same thing potency is prior to act.

Actus autem, . . . natura est prior potentia. Est enim finis et complementum potentiae. Sed ordine generationis et temporis, universaliter loquendo actus est prior potentia. Nam id quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per aliquid ens actu. Sed in uno et eodem potentia est prior actu. Nam aliquid est primo in potentia, et postea actus fit.⁵⁴

Now, the human body is matter proportionate to the human soul, for it is related to it as potency to act: ". . . corpus humanum est materia proportionata animae humanae; comparatur enim ad eam ut potentia ad actum;"⁵⁵ But the human body from being potentially human is made actually so by the coming of the human soul. In this sense, then, matter does precede the soul in point of time, matter considered as being in potentiality to form; it is then not human in act but only in potentiality, for when it is human in act, as perfected by the human soul, it is neither prior nor posterior to the soul, but simultaneous with it.

Corpus igitur humanum, secundum quod est in potentia ad animam, utpote quum nondum habet animam, est prius tempore quam anima; tunc autem non est humanum actu, sed potentia tantum; quum vero est humanum actu, quasi per animam humanam perfectum, non est prius neque posterius anima sed simul cum ea.⁵⁶

The soul in the sense that it has the being which it communicates to its

⁵⁴In De Anima, II, lect.1, n.228, also Cont. Gent., II, 89.

⁵⁵Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, ad 5um.

⁵⁶Cont. Gent., II, 89.

matter can likewise be said to be prior to the matter which it will take to itself, but in the being of the composite there is no true priority, for body and soul are created simultaneously, and the being of the composite is the being of the form.

Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est subsistens . . . esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae; non est enim inconueniens quod idem sit esse in quo subsistit compositum, et forma ipsa, quum compositum non sit nisi per formam. . .⁵⁷

The second proof, then, that the rational soul receives existence only in the human body is based upon the principle that the soul is the substantial form of the body, and although it actualizes the body, which is its proper matter, it does not begin to exist apart from the body because its being does not subsist apart from the being of the composite, as St. Thomas states when he concludes the statement just quoted with the words: ". . . nec seorsum utrumque subsistat."⁵⁸

A third proof that the soul begins to exist only in the body is found in the impossibility of sufficiently accounting for its union with the body if it already existed and had the completion of its nature, ". . . si anima rationalis extra corpus creata fuit, et ibi habuit sui esse naturalis complementum, impossibile est convenientem causam assignare unionis ejus ad corpus."⁵⁹

Now, if the soul pre-existed, it must have been united to the body either by force, or by nature, or by deliberate choice, or by divine ordi-

⁵⁷Ibid., 68.

⁵⁸Cont. Gent., II, 68.

⁵⁹Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

nance.

It could not have been joined to the body by force because that would make of the resultant composite the effect of violence and thus opposed to nature. We cannot admit that the human composite is something unnatural, for we have proved that the soul is the substantial form of the body, and the form of a natural thing is its nature; "Item, natura est secundum quam res aliqua dicitur res naturalis. Dicitur autem res naturalis ex hoc quod habet formam . . . Forma igitur rei naturalis est ejus natura."⁶⁰ As we have already shown that St. Thomas insists upon the naturalness of the union between soul and body, we need only mention here that the thought of any union which would be the result of force is repugnant to us, for we cannot suppose that man is an unnatural being. Furthermore, intellectual substances are in a higher order than are the heavenly bodies, and if nothing violent can be found in these latter, much less can it be found in the former. Therefore, we must conclude that rational souls are not united to their bodies by force. This is the argument which St. Thomas gives when he investigates the possibility of violence as a cause of union:

Si autem violenter (omne autem violentum est contra naturam), unio igitur animae ad corpus est praeter naturam; homo igitur, qui ex utroque componitur, est quid innaturale; quod patet esse falsum. Praeterea, substantiae intellectuales altioris ordinis sunt quam corpora coelestia; in corporibus autem coelestibus, nihil invenitur violentem neque contra naturam; multo igitur minus in substantiis intellectualibus.⁶¹

Souls created before their bodies would not be united to them by nature,

⁶⁰Cont. Gent., IV, 35.

⁶¹Cont. Gent., II, 83.

for if it is nature that unites them, souls would have had a natural desire for union with their bodies from the first moment of their creation. Now the natural appetite is immediately operative unless it is in some way hindered, as is clear from an observation of the movements of heavy and light bodies. Therefore, if pre-existing souls were endowed with this natural desire for union with bodies, they would have been immediately united to them unless they were prevented. But everything that impedes the exercise of a natural appetite does so by violence. It would follow, therefore, that it was by violence that souls were at some time separated from their bodies. This consequence would be unfitting since there can be nothing violent in substances such as rational souls, as has been shown.

*Si autem naturaliter animae sunt corporibus unitae, naturaliter igitur animae in sui creatione appetierunt corporibus uniri. Appetitus autem naturalis statim prodit, in actum, nisi sit aliquid impediens, sicut patet in motu gravium et levium; natura enim semper uno modo operatur. Statim ergo a principio suae creationis, fuissent corporibus unitae, nisi esset aliquid impediens. Sed omne impediens executionem naturalis appetitus, est violentiam inferens. Per violentiam igitur fuit quod animae essent aliquo tempore a corporibus separatae; quod est inconveniens, tum quia in illis substantiis non potest esse aliquid violentum, ut supra ostensum est, tum quia violentum et quod est contra naturam, quum sit per accidens, non potest esse prius eo quod est secundum naturam, neque totam speciem consequens.*⁶²

It is clear, therefore, that it is not by nature that souls created before bodies would be united to their bodies since such a union would have to be by violence, and so, unnatural and accidental and, consequently, such an unnatural state could not precede the natural nor be consequent upon the

⁶²Cont. Gent., II, 83.

whole species, as St. Thomas states in the above text. Furthermore, why should souls created from the beginning desire after long intervals to be united to bodies since spiritual substances are above time as superior to heavenly revolutions? ". . . quia nulla ratio esset quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora, voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones coeli excedens."⁶³ Nature would not have brought about a union after so many years because what happens at time intervals is caused by the movement of celestial bodies since movement is the measure of the spaces of time. Now souls without bodies would not be subject to the movements of celestial bodies; wherefore, we cannot say that souls were united to bodies by nature if we hold that they first existed bodiless. This is what St. Thomas has expressed as follows:

Nec iterum potest dici, quod post aliquos annorum circuitus naturalis ei appetitus supervenerit corpori adhaerendi; et quod ex operatione naturae hujusmodi unio sit causata. Nam ea quae certo temporis spatio secundum naturam aguntur, ad motum caeli reducuntur sicut ad causam, per quam temporum spatia mensurantur. Animas autem separatas non est possibile caelestium corporum motibus subjacere.⁶⁴

If, however, it is said that it is natural to the soul to be at one time separated from the body and at another to be united to it, this would seem impossible because whatever varies naturally in a subject is accidental to it, for example for a man to be young at one time and old at another time. If, therefore, it were natural to the soul to be at one time united to the

⁶³Sum. Theol., I, q.118, a.3, c.

⁶⁴Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

body and at another time separated from the body, it would follow that it is accidental to the soul to be united to the body at all, the consequence being that man himself would be an accidental being. This seems to be the thought of the following passage:

Si autem dicatur quod utrumque est animae naturale, scilicet uniri corpori et esse a corpore separatam pro diversis temporibus, hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia ea quae naturaliter variantur circa subjectum sunt accidentia, sicut juvenitus et senectus. Si igitur uniri corpori et separari a corpore naturaliter circa animam varietur, erit accidens animae corpori uniri; et sic ex hac unione homo constitutus non erit ens per se, sed per accidens.⁶⁵

Although in this quotation, St. Thomas is speaking of a soul pre-existing without a body as an unnatural thing, still he holds the same opinion with regard to the soul after death has occasioned the separation of soul and body. More will be said on that subject when we treat of the final happiness of the soul in the last chapter, but we may note in passing this remark of the Angelic Doctor's:

Manifestum est . . . quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur, est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Quum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam corpori iterato conjungi: quod est resurgere.⁶⁶

The soul is likewise not united to the body by deliberate choice: first because if it were united to the body by its own will, it could leave the body at its own will, and it is quite evident that the soul has not this power. "Non enim potest dici, quod proprio motu se corporibus adjunxit, cum

⁶⁵Cont. Gent., II, 83.

⁶⁶Cont. Gent., IV, 79.

videamus quod deserere corpus non subjaceat animae potestati; quod esset, si ex voluntate sua corpori esset unita."⁶⁷

Furthermore, it could not be united by its own choice because if it could begin to exist apart from the body, it would be in a higher state at that time than when joined to the body. Now it is impossible that it should desire to exist in a less perfect state unless it were deceived. It could not be deceived because if it were in a perfect state it would have perfect knowledge and no bodily passions to influence it.

Si autem dicatur quod neque per violentiam neque per naturam corporibus uniuntur, sed spontanea voluntate, hoc esse non potest. Nullus enim vult in statum pejorem venire nisi deceptus. Anima autem separata est altioris status quam corpori unita, et praecipue secundum Platonicos, qui dicunt quod ex unione corporis patitur oblivionem eorum quae prius scivit, et retardatur a contemplatione purae veritatis. Non igitur volens corpori unitur nisi decepta, Deceptionis autem nulla causa in ea potest existere, quum ponatur secundum eos scientiam omnium habere. Nec posset dici quod iudicium ex universali causa procedens in particulari eligibili subvertatur propter passiones . . . quia passiones hujusmodi non sunt absque corporali transmutatione; unde non possunt esse in anima separata. Relinquitur igitur quod anima, si fuisset ante corpus, non uniretur corpori propria voluntate.⁶⁸

Likewise it could not be united by its own choice because such a union would be a chance union since everything resulting from two mutually independent wills is a casual effect. This is clear from an example. If a person desiring to meet an acquaintance, but not making an engagement to do so, were to meet the desired man by chance at a certain place, we would designate such a meeting as a chance one. Now, with regard to soul and body, the will

⁶⁷Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

⁶⁸Cont. Gent., II, 83.

of the begetter would not depend upon the will of the pre-existing soul. Since the union of soul and body could not take place in such an instance without the concurrence of both wills, it would follow that if there were a union, it would be a chance one, and the generation of man a casual, not a natural, occurrence. Obviously this cannot be admitted for such a union happens in the majority of instances.

Praeterea, omnis effectus procedens ex concursu duarum voluntatum ad invicem non ordinarum est effectus casualis; sicut patet quum aliquis, intendens emere, obviat in foro creditori illuc non ex conducto venienti. Voluntas autem patris generantis, ex qua dependet generatio corporis, non habet ordinem cum voluntate animae separatae uniri volentis. Quum igitur absque utraque voluntate unio corporis et animae fieri non possit, sequitur quod sit casualis; et ita generatio hominis non est a natura, sed a casu; quod patet esse falsum, quum sit ut in pluribus.⁶⁹

That the soul is not united to the body by deliberate desire and choice seems clear then from the three preceding arguments: first, the soul lacks the power to leave the body at will; secondly, the soul would not choose to exist in a less perfect state; and thirdly, a union dependent on the will of the soul could only be a casual one.

Finally, if the soul existed before its union with the body, we cannot say that it was united in time by divine ordinance. For if it be said that God united the soul to the body for the perfection of the soul, what reason could be assigned for His having created the soul without a body? "Similiter non potest dici, quod a Deo sint corpori alligatae, si eas prius absque corporibus creavisset. Si enim dicatur, quod ad earum perfectionem hoc fecit,

⁶⁹ Ibid., also Sum. Theol., I, q.118, a.3, c.

non fuisset ratio quare absque corporibus crearentur."⁷⁰ If God did create the soul before its union with the body, that state of the soul would have been more perfect since God created each thing according to its nature. Now just as it is repugnant to us to think that any soul would deliberately choose a worse state, so it is likewise inconceivable that God, in His divine goodness, would reduce the soul from a higher state to a lower one.

Si autem rursus dicatur quod nec ex natura nec ex propria voluntate animae corpori unitur, sed ex divina ordinatione, hoc etiam non videtur conveniens, si animae ante corpora fuerunt creatae. Unumquodque enim Deus instituit secundum convenientem modum suae naturae; unde et de singulis creatis dicitur: 'Vidit Deus quod esset bonum' (Gen., I, 10), et simul de omnibus: 'Viditque cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona' (Ibid., 31). Si igitur animas creavit a corporibus separatas, oportet dicere quod hic modus essendi sit convenientior naturae earum. Non est autem ad ordinationem divinae bonitatis pertinens res ad inferiorem statum reducere, sed magis ad meliorem promovere. Non igitur ex divina ordinatione factum fuisset quod anima corpori uniretur.⁷¹

Further, it is contrary to divine wisdom to ennoble lower things to the detriment of higher. Now bodies subject to generation and corruption are the least in the order of things. It would, therefore, have been unsuitable to divine wisdom to ennoble human bodies by uniting to them pre-existing souls because it is evident that union with bodies would be a less perfect state for souls and to their detriment if they had pre-existed.

Praeterea, non pertinet ad ordinem divinae sapientiae, cum superiorum detrimento, ea quae sunt infima nobilitare. Infima autem in rerum ordine sunt corpora generabilia et corruptibilia. Non igitur fuisset conveniens ordine sapientiae, ad nobilitandum humana corpora, animas prae-existentes eis

⁷⁰Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

⁷¹Cont. Gent., II, 83.

unire, quum hoc sine detrimento earum esse non possit, ut ex dictis patet.⁷²

Nor can we say that God united souls to bodies as a punishment for some sin committed in a pre-existing state. The soul would thus be in the body as in a prison, and it would follow that the formation of natures composed of spiritual and corporeal substances would have been accidental and not originally intended by God. This is again contrary to what we are told of creation: that God saw all the things that He had made and found them good. We can see from this that God's goodness, and not the creature's sin, was the cause of His good works.

Si vero in earum poenam hoc factum est, ut corporibus quasi quibusdam carceribus intruderentur, . . . propter peccata commissa, sequeretur quod institutio naturarum ex spiritualibus et corporalibus substantiis compositarum, esset per accidens, et non ex prima Dei intentione: quod est contra id quod legitur Genes., I, 31: 'Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona:' ubi manifeste ostenditur bonitatem Dei et non malitiam cujuscumque creaturae fuisse causam bonorum operum condendorum.⁷³

It would certainly be contrary to reason to hold that union of body and soul were a punishment of sin for the soul is naturally a part of human nature and imperfect without the body, just as is any part separated from its whole, and it is repugnant to reason to suppose that God would begin His work with imperfect things:

Unde non est dicendum, quod animae habuerint merita bona vel mala, antequam corporibus unirentur. Est etiam contra rationem. Nam cum naturaliter anima sit pars humanae naturae, imperfecta est sine corpore existens, sicut est quaelibet pars separata a toto. Inconveniens autem fuisset

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

quod Deus ab imperfectis suam operationem inciperet; unde non est rationabile quod animam creaverit ante corpus, sicut neque quod manum formaverit extra hominem.⁷⁴

Furthermore, punishment is opposed to the good of nature, and because of this is said to be something evil. If, therefore, the union of body and soul is a penalty, it is not a good of nature. This is an impossible supposition since union is intended by nature and is the natural end of human generation. If such union were not a natural good, the being of man would not be a natural good.

Poena enim bono naturae adversatur, et hoc dicitur mala. Si igitur unio animae et corporis est quoddam poenale, non est bonum naturae; quod est impossibile; est enim intentum per naturam, nam ad hoc naturalis generatio terminatur. Et iterum sequeretur quod esse hominum non esset bonum secundum naturam, quum tamen dicatur post hominis creationem: 'Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat et erant valde bona' (Gen., I, 31).⁷⁵

That union of soul and body is a punishment is proved false from the Old Testament, from reason, and from Apostolic teaching, for St. Thomas says: "Sed hoc repugnat apostolicae doctrinae; dicit enim Apostolus, Rom., IX, 11, de Jacob et Esau loquens: 'Cum nondum nati essent aut aliquid boni vel mali egissent; etc.' Eadem autem est ratio de omnibus."⁷⁶

We have now shown that it is necessary to hold that souls were not created before their bodies because no reason can be fittingly assigned for their union with their bodies if they pre-existed. We have seen that they could not be united by force for the union resulting would be an unnatural

⁷⁴Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.4, c. (Marietti, II)

⁷⁵Cont. Gent., II, 83.

⁷⁶Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.4, c., also, Cont. Cent., II, 83.

one; they could not be united by nature since we can see no reason why they should experience any desire for bodies if they once lived without them especially since they are not under the influence of the heavenly bodies; they could not be united by deliberate choice for they would not wish to enter into a less perfect state than that they formerly enjoyed apart from their bodies; moreover, such a union by the concurrence of two mutually independent wills could only be a casual one and man, consequently, a being "per accidens"; likewise we cannot say that God ordained that pre-existing souls should in a moment of time seek dwelling in bodies since it is contrary to His wisdom and goodness to reduce creatures to a lower from a higher state or to elevate lower creatures at the expense of superior beings; it is likewise repugnant to divine wisdom and goodness that man should be constituted as he is as a result of sin, a state contrary to the good of nature resulting in man's nature composed of soul and body being something unnatural. And this leads us to the fourth argument given by the great Christian philosopher to prove that the rational soul is created at the same time as its body and not before.

Human souls depend upon their bodies for their distinction one from another. Diversity of souls, in other words, depends upon diversity of bodies. If human souls were not created together with their proper matter, they would not differ one from another. Now, St. Thomas holds that each rational soul is substantially distinct from every other rational soul, but this distinction does not arise from a difference in the essential principles

of the soul, nor from a different kind of soul, but from the aptitude which each soul has for its own body, for one soul is adapted to this particular body, and another soul to that particular body. In stating that the multiplicity of souls separated from their bodies by death follows upon a substantial distinction of forms, ". . . quia alia est substantia hujus animae et illius;" he adds:

Non tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium ipsius animae, nec est secundum diversam rationem ipsius animae, sed est secundum diversam commensurationem animarum ad corpora; haec enim anima est commensurata huic corpori et non illi, illa autem alii, et sic de omnibus.⁷⁷

Again he states that souls are diversified according to number because they are capable of being united to bodies, numerically diversified.

". . . unde per hoc quod est unibilis diversis corporibus, diversificatur secundum numerum. . ."78 This same thought we find in slightly different terminology in the following:

. . . sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem competit quod tali corpori secundum speciem uniatur, ita haec anima differt ab illa numero solo, ex hoc quod ad aliud numero corpus habitudinem habet; et sic individuantur animae humanae . . . secundum corpora, non quasi individuatione a corporibus causata.⁷⁹

We shall refer a little later, (Infra, footnote, 92), to the last clause in the text just cited, but here we desire only to emphasize that matter is the principle of individuation of forms.

⁷⁷Cont. Gent., II, 81.

⁷⁸Compendium Theologiae, I, 85, (Opuscula Omnia, R. P. Mandonnet, Lethielleux, Paris, 1927, II).

⁷⁹Cont. Gent., II, 75.

The fact that there are differences in men even from their birth led some to suppose that difference must have arisen from merit, as the objection states: "Sed secundum justitiam non dantur diversa et inaequalia nisi in illis in quibus aliqua inaequalitas meriti praeexistit."⁸⁰ To this St. Thomas replies by asserting again that diversity of souls derives from diverse dispositions of their bodies and not from a difference in merit of souls. Justice pertains to what is due to a thing, but nothing is due to a soul as yet uncreated.

. . . ad justitiam pertinere reddere debitum; unde contra justitiam fit, si inaequalia aequalibus dantur, quando debita redduntur, non autem quando gratis aliqua dantur: quod convenit in creatione animarum. Vel potest dici, quod ista diversitas non procedit ex diverso merito animarum, sed ex diversa dispositione corporum;⁸¹

Now just why is it that souls depend upon their bodies for their distinction one from the other? The answer is that if souls differed as souls, each soul would constitute in itself a distinct species, for a distinction of forms is a distinction of species, according to St. Thomas, who holds that there is a two fold distinction in things: one, a formal distinction in those things that differ specifically; the other, a material distinction in those things which differ numerically. "Duplex distinctio invenitur in rebus: una formalis in his quae differunt specie: alio vero materialis in his quae differunt numero tantum."⁸²

Just why is it that the soul is not a species in itself? Precisely

⁸⁰Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, obj. 15.

⁸¹Ibid., ad 15^{um}.

⁸²Sum. Theol., I, q.47, a.2.c.

because it is a form, and a form is not perfected in its species without its proper matter. We saw in the first proof of the soul's dependency upon the body for the beginning of its existence that St. Thomas insists upon the fact that the soul is not the entire essence of human nature, but merely a part of human nature. If each soul were a distinct species, men would differ the one from the other specifically, and this cannot be held. Perhaps we may present this in a clearer light if we consider very briefly the reason that St. Thomas gives to prove that the soul has not all that it needs for the perfection of its nature. The species of a thing, he tells us, is judged according to the operation proper to it according to its nature. ". . . species rei iudicatur secundum operationem competentem ei secundum propriam naturam,"⁸³ Now, the proper operation of the soul is understanding. This operation, though distinct from the body, requires material received through the senses for the exercise of its operation. In the grade of intellectual substances it is, therefore, the last since higher intellectual substances do not in any sense require bodies for the exercise of their proper operations. Speaking of immaterial substances, St. Thomas has this to say:

. . . et hoc quidem gradatim producitur usque ad animam humanam, quae in eis tenet ultimum gradum, sicut materia prima in genere rerum sensibilium; unde in sui natura non habet perfectiones intelligibiles, sed est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad formas sensibiles; unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum intelligibilium acquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus; et cum operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione suae naturae competit ei quod corpori uniatur, et quod

⁸³Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.7, ad 4^{um}.

sit pars speciei humanae; non habens in se speciem completam.⁸⁴

More will be said later on this need of the soul for the senses (Infra, footnote, 99, and the following chapter); it is simply mentioned here to insist upon the impossibility of human souls being of different species, and just why they are not complete in their species. As forms, rational souls are identical. They differ by union with their matter. "Quaecumque sunt idem specie, differentia autem numero, habent materiam. Differentia autem quae ex forma procedit inducit diversitatem speciei; quae autem est ex materia inducit diversitatem secundum numerum;"⁸⁵ Obviously by "habent materiam" St. Thomas does not mean that there is matter in the soul. The soul cannot have matter in it because it can know the natures of all corporeal things, a knowledge which it could not have if anything material were in it since that material element would constitute an obstacle to the understanding of other beings.⁸⁶ A clear exposition of this is contained in the text which follows:

Cum enim anima non sit composita ex materia et forma. . . distinctio animarum ab invicem esse non posset nisi secundum formalem differentiam, si solum secundum se ipsas distinguerentur. Formalis autem differentia diversitatem speciei inducit. Diversitas autem secundum numerum in eadem specie ex differentia materiali procedit; quae quidem animae competere non potest secundum naturam ex qua fit, sed secundum materiam in qua fit.⁸⁷

The soul is, therefore, individualized by matter, not matter which is a part

⁸⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.7, c.

⁸⁵Cont. Gent., II, 93.

⁸⁶St. Thomas proves this point in: Sum. Theol., I, q.75, a.5,

Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.6, Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.1, c.

⁸⁷Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, c.

of it, but by the matter in which it is, and for which it has an aptitude.

" . . . anima non individuatur per materiam ex qua sit, sed secundum habitudinem ad materiam in qua est."⁸⁸ The soul finds its perfection through its matter, and souls are, therefore, multiplied according to number, not according to species " . . . quamvis anima non habeat materiam partem sui ex qua sit, habet tamen materiam in qua est cujus perfectio est; ad ejus enim divisionem multiplicatur secundum numerum, et non secundum speciem."⁸⁹

Matter is, therefore, the principle of individuation, but not matter considered in itself. To be the principle of diversity matter must be under certain determinate dimensions, for St. Thomas states:

Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis efficitur haec materia signata, et sic individuatur forma, et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie. Unde patet quod materia secundum se considerata non est principium diversitatis secundum speciem, nec secundum numerum: sed sicut principium diversitatis secundum genus prout subest communi formae; ita est principium diversitatis secundum numerum prout subest dimensionibus interminatis:⁹⁰

And again St. Thomas says that if it should be asked why this form differs from that, there is no other reason than that it is in this determinate matter. " . . . sed si quaeratur quare haec forma differt ab illa, non erit alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata."⁹¹

It should be clear, then, that it is determinate matter, matter proportionate to the rational soul, such as the substance of the human body, that

⁸⁸Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.6, ad 13^{um}.

⁸⁹In II Sent., d.XVII, q.2, a.1, ad 5^{um}.

⁹⁰In Boeth. De Trinitate, q.4, a.2, c. (Opuscula Omnia, Mandonnet, III).

⁹¹Ibid., ad 4^{um}.

is the matter which is the principle of diversity, but lest it should be thought that the worth of the individual suffers from this dependency upon matter for his distinction from other individuals, it may be well to note that St. Thomas does not make of matter, even determinate matter, the cause of diversity.

Manifestum est autem . . . quod causa diversitatis in rebus non est materiae diversitas. Ostensum est enim, quod materia non praesupponitur actioni divinae, qua res inesse producit. Causa autem diversitatis rerum non est ex materia nisi secundum quod materia ad rerum productionem praeexigitur, ut scilicet secundum diversitatem materiae diversae inducantur formae. Non igitur causa diversitatis in rebus a Deo productis est materia.⁹²

This is simply affirming that the multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of forms since the matter is for the form, and the material distinction for the formal one, as he insists upon: "Cum autem materia sit propter formam, distinctio materialis est propter formalem."⁹³

That the form is not for the matter but the matter for the form is an essential point in the Thomistic doctrine. We find it again expressed in these terms:

Adhuc, secundum res habent esse, ita habent pluralitatem et unitatem, nam unumquodque secundum quod est ens, est etiam unum: sed non habent esse formae propter materiam, sed magis materiae propter formas, nam actus melior est potentia, id autem propter aliquid est, oportet melius esse: neque igitur formae ideo sunt diversae ut competant materiis diversis, sed materiae ideo sunt diversae, ut competant diversis formis.⁹⁴

St. Thomas reaches the conclusion that souls are multiplied according

⁹²Comp. Theol., I, 71.

⁹³Sum. Theol., I, q. 47, a.2. c.

⁹⁴Comp. Theol., I, 71.

to the multiplication of bodies, but also that the multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls by observing that things that need to be adapted or that are proportionate the one to the other are together multiplied or unified each by its own cause. Now, if the being of the one depends upon the being of the other, the unity or multiplicity of the one depends likewise upon that other; if not, then it depends upon some extrinsic cause. Now, matter and form must always be proportionate to each other, and, as it were, naturally adapted to each other because the proper act of a thing is produced in its proper matter. Matter and form must, therefore, always agree in multitude and unity. If the being of the form depends upon the being of the matter, its multiplicity and also its unity will depend upon the matter, but if not, it will, indeed, be necessary that the form should be multiplied according to the matter, that is to say together with the matter and proportionate to it, but not in such a way that its very unity and multiplicity, however, should be dependent upon the matter. He concludes, consequently, that since rational souls are forms independent of matter in their being, they are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, but the multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls. This is, moreover, the reason that he gives for the continuation of the multiplicity of souls after separation from their bodies:

. . . quaecumque oportet esse invicem coaptata et proportionata, simul recipiunt multitudinem vel unitatem, unumquodque ex sua causa. Si igitur esse unius dependeat ab altero, unitas vel multiplicatio ejus etiam ex illo dependet; alioquin ex alia causa extrinseca. Formam igitur et materiam semper oportet esse ad invicem proportionata et quasi naturaliter coaptata, quia proprius actus in propria

materia fit; unde semper oportet quod materia et forma consequantur se invicem in multitudine et unitate. Si igitur esse formae dependet a materia, multiplicatio ipsius a materia dependet et similiter unitas; si autem non, erit quidem necessarium multiplicari formam secundum multiplicationem materiae, id est simul cum materia et (secundum) proportionem ipsius; non autem ita quod dependeat unitas vel multitudo ipsius formae a materia. Ostensum est autem quod anima humana est forma secundum suum esse a materia non dependens. Unde sequitur quod multiplicantur quidem animae secundum quod multiplicantur corpora; non tamen multiplicatio corporum erit causa multiplicationis animarum. Et ideo non oportet quod, destructis corporibus, cesset pluralitas animarum. . .⁹⁵

It should be manifest, then, in what sense St. Thomas means us to take matter as a principle of individuation. It is both this matter and this form which make a thing an individual. This form, the rational soul, although a self-subsistent being, cannot, precisely as form, be a self-subsistent being. It requires its matter to enable it to be distinguished from every other soul, and, therefore, it cannot begin to exist apart from its determinate matter.

Unde sicut diversitatem in genere, vel specie facit diversitas materiae, vel formae absolute, ita diversitatem in numero facit haec forma et haec materia: nulla autem forma, in quantum hujusmodi, est hic ex seipsa. Dico autem in quantum hujusmodi propter animam rationalem, quae quodammodo ex seipsa est hoc aliquid, sed non in quantum forma. Intellectus vero quamlibet formam quam possibile est recipi in aliquo, sicut in materia, vel sicut in subjecto, natus est attribuere pluribus, quod est contra rationem ejus quod est hoc aliquid, unde forma fit per hoc quod recipitur in materia: sed cum materia in se considerata sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam in se receptam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis. Non enim forma individuatur per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur in hoc materia, vel illa

⁹⁵Cont. Gent., II, 81.

distincta et determinata ad hoc et nunc.⁹⁶

We can say, consequently, that we cannot have many human souls of the same species which would at the same time differ one from the other unless they were united from the very beginning of their existence to their proper bodies. God is, however, the efficient cause of their distinction. But it is no less true to say that matter is a principle of individuation because without matter human souls would differ in species as do all separate substances.

Sic ergo solum ponere possumus plures animas humanas ejusdem speciei, numero diversas esse, si a sui principio corporibus uniantur, ut earum distinctio ex unione ad corpus quodammodo proveniat, sicut materiali principio, quamvis ab efficiente principio talis distinctio sit a Deo. Si vero extra corpora animae humanae fuissent creatae oportuisset eas esse specie differentes, sublato distinctionis materialis principio, sicut et omnes substantiae separatae a Philosophis ponuntur specie differentes.⁹⁷

We find the same argument stated elsewhere:

Impossibile est enim diversitatem in numero sub eadem specie causari nisi ex diversitate materiae: quia ad diversitatem formalium principiorum sequitur diversitas specierum. Si ergo anima, ut dictum est, non habeat materiam ex qua sit, non possunt plures animae unius speciei esse diversae numero, nisi per diversitatem materiae in qua sunt. Unde si ante corpus creatae fuissent, oportuisset eas vel esse diversas in specie, et sic omnes homines specie differre ex diversitate formarum; aut quod esset una tantum numero, . . .⁹⁸

The doctrine of St. Thomas as regards the first essential relationship of the body to the soul may now be briefly summarized. The rational soul is

⁹⁶In Boeth. De Trinitate, q.4, a.2, c.

⁹⁷Q. Disp. De Potentia, q.3, a.10, c.

⁹⁸In II Sent., d.XVII, q.2, a.2, c.

created by God at the very moment when it is infused into the potentially human body. That this must be the case is evident when we consider that the soul without its body is not in the perfection of its nature since it is an incomplete, though subsistent, substance and requires a body for the completion of its species. The soul is, moreover, a form, and every form requires to be united to its proper matter. It is the act of the human body and communicates to the composite its own being which then becomes the being of the composite. Now in one and the same being, man, for example, act is not prior to potency but simultaneous with it. Furthermore, if the soul were created apart from the body, it is clear that only at the price of making man an unnatural being can we assign a cause for the union of a pre-existing soul with its body. For neither force, nor nature, nor deliberate choice, nor divine ordinance can sufficiently explain why a nobler creature existing in the fulness of its natural perfection should at some time be united to a less noble and corporeal substance, a substance which would necessarily not be essential to the soul if it could begin to exist without it. Finally, we have seen that it is matter which is the principle of individuation of rational souls, and without that matter one soul would not be distinct from another without at the same time constituting a different species, a consequence which would make men differ specifically, which conclusion is obviously absurd.

As a further proof that the human soul receives existence only in the human body, St. Thomas states that the soul needs the senses, and as nature does not fail to supply whatever is necessary to anything for its proper

operation, it would not have been fitting for the soul to have been fashioned without a body which would have sense organs.

Si ergo anima humana ad intelligendum sensibus indiget (natura autem nulli deficit in necessariis ad propriam operationem explendam, sicut animalibus habentibus animam sensitivam et motivam dat convenientia organa sensus et motus), non fuisset anima humana sine necessariis adminiculis sensum instituta. Sensus autem non operantur sine organis corporeis, . . . Non igitur fuit instituta anima sine corporeis organis.⁹⁹

Having now shown that the soul needs the body in order to have its substantial perfection, we shall turn our attention to a consideration of the manner in which the soul likewise needs the body for its accidental perfection, and that brings us to the next chapter.

⁹⁹Cont. Gent., II, 83.

CHAPTER II
THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY IN THE
EXERCISE OF ITS OPERATIONS

In the first chapter we considered that the human body was necessary for the substantial perfection of the rational soul, which was only a part of human nature and an incomplete substance. That was what may be termed the first perfection of the soul. The second is its accidental perfection, that is to say the perfection of the soul in the exercise of its operations. The distinction St. Thomas gives as follows:

. . . duplex est rei perfectio: prima et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem secunda est finis. Finis autem vel est operatio sicut finis citharistae est citharizare. . .¹

Because the human soul has a variety of powers which require a body for their exercise, the rational soul can, in a very real sense, be said to need that body. Let us first see why the soul should have so many powers. St. Thomas assigns two reasons for this. The first is taken from the soul's place in the hierarchy of beings. In the order of beings the lowest creatures cannot attain perfect goodness, but they are able to achieve imperfect goodness which they gain by means of few activities. There is a higher order of beings that can attain perfect goodness but only by means of many activi-

¹St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 73, a. 1, c.

ties, and these beings are rational souls. Still higher up on the scale of being are those creatures that can achieve perfect goodness and can do so by fewer movements. These are angelic spirits. The highest in this order of being is God, Who, without any movement at all, is perfect goodness. It may serve to make this clearer by an analogy. In health there are various dispositions or degrees. He is least disposed to health who can never be perfectly healthy but who can, by means of a few remedies, succeed in reaching imperfect health. Better disposed to health is he who has it in his power to become perfectly healthy but who is obliged to make use of many remedies to do so. Still better disposed is he who can become perfectly healthy by means of very few remedies. Finally best disposed is the one who is in a state of perfect health and needs no remedies at all. The human soul, St. Thomas concludes, is in the class of those who can reach their perfection by the exercise of many and various powers and operations.

Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur; et ideo quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem: quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo: et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam.²

The second reason given for the variety of the soul's powers is taken from the position of the soul which is midway between the spiritual and corporeal worlds, for in the rational soul, the powers of both these orders meet

²Sum. Theol., I, q.77, a.2, c.

together. "Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum: videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum."³

The soul has nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual powers, but these forces do not all belong to the soul in the same way, for some pertain to the soul as to their principle, and others pertain to the soul as to a subject. Thus the intellectual powers, as understanding and will, are performed without a corporeal organ, and are, therefore, in the soul as in their subject. There are, however, other operations of the soul which are performed by means of physical organs, as sight by the eye and hearing by the ear, and so for all the other operations of the sensitive and nutritive parts. The powers which are the principles of these operations belong to the composite as to their subject and to the soul as to their principle.

Manifestum est autem . . . quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle, Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.⁴

The soul is said to be the principle of these operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts because it is through the soul that the composite has the power to perform them. ". . . Omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii: quia per animam coniunctum habet

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., a.5.c.

quod tales operari possit."⁵

Although some powers of the soul are thus attributed to it as to their subject and others as to their principle, they all, however, flow from the essence of the soul as from a principle because although the sensitive and nutritive powers have the composite as their subject, the composite itself owes its actuality to the substantial form, and hence the actuality of these lesser powers, which are accidental forms, is caused by the actuality of the subject, which, as we have just stated, derives from the soul.

Manifestum est autem . . . quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, . . . vel compositum. Compositum autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio: quia iam dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est in actu, et recipitur in eo in quantum est in potentia.⁶

The nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual powers are thus rooted in one and the same soul, and this must be the case if the unity of man is to be preserved. Now, unity follows being. If, therefore, the intellectual soul gives being to the composite it will likewise give it unity. This can be considered from another point of view. Different powers not rooted in one and the same subject do not impede one another's action unless the powers are contraries, and the powers of which there is question here are not contraries. Now, in the human soul we can observe that different powers do hinder one another, for when one power is intense, another is remiss. We can only con-

⁵Ibid., ad 1^{um}.

⁶Sum. Theol., I, q.77, a.6, c.

clude that these actions and their powers which are their proximate principles must be reduced to one ultimate principle. The human body cannot be that principle, for in the act of intelligence it has no part, and bodies other than the human body have not these same powers we find in the soul which they necessarily would have if the body were the principle of them. The principle of the various powers we see exercised by man must be one form through which the body is the kind of body that it is, and that one form is the rational soul.

. . . diversae vires quae non radicantur in uno principio, non impediunt se invicem in agendo, nisi forte earum actiones essent contrariae, quod in proposito non contingit. Videmus autem quod diversae actiones animae impediunt se. Cum enim una est intensa, altera remittitur. Oportet igitur quod istae actiones, et vires quae sunt earum proxima principia, reducantur in unum principium. Hoc autem principium non potest esse corpus; tum quia aliqua actio est in qua non communicat corpus, scilicet intelligere; tum quia, si principium harum virium et actionum esset corpus, in quantum hujusmodi, inveniretur in omnibus corporibus; quod patet esse falsum. Et sic relinquitur quod sit principium earum forma aliqua una per quam hoc corpus est tale corpus, quae est anima. Relinquitur igitur quod omnes actiones animae quae sunt in nobis ab ipsa una procedunt; et sic non sunt in nobis plures animae.⁷

As has been said the operation of the rational soul is not performed through any corporeal organ, but that of the sensitive soul is performed through a corporeal organ, but not through any corporeal quality, for although heat and cold, wetness and dryness are required for the functioning of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the sense operates by virtue of these qualities; they do serve, however, for the proper

⁷Cont. Gent., II, 58, also, Q. Quodl., XI, q.5, a.5,c. (Marietti, V).

disposition of the sense organ. The lowest of the soul's activities, which is that of the vegetative soul, is performed both through a corporeal organ and by virtue of corporeal qualities. Yet low as this activity is, it yet exceeds the operation of a purely corporeal nature, for it is performed from an intrinsic principle, and not from an extrinsic one, as are the movements of bodies, for every animated thing in a certain manner, moves itself.

Est ergo quaedam operatio animae, quae in tantum excedit naturam corpoream, quod neque exercetur per organum corporeale. Et talis operatio animae rationalis. Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidam fit per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis: quia etsi calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae hujusmodi qualitates corporae requirantur ad operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis procedat; sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. Infima autem operationem animae est, quae fit per organum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur tamen operationem naturae corporeae: quia motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio, hujusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco; non enim commune est omnibus operationibus animae; omne enim animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum. Et talis est operatio animae vegetabilis.⁸

It is in virtue of the soul's office as a form that it possesses the lower operations as well as the higher ones. ". . . quia aliae operationes vitae sunt actus animae in quantum est forma corporis corruptibilis et transmutabilis; cum quaedam enim transmutatione et alteratione corporali sunt."⁹

For sensation and nutrition there can be no question of the soul's need for the body. These activities the soul could in no way perform without physical organs, and we may, therefore, say that for such actions the body is

⁸Sum. Theol., I, q.78, a.1.c.

⁹Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.6, c.

absolutely necessary. "Invenitur autem corpus necessarium ad aliquam operationem animae, quae mediante corpore exercetur; sicut patet in operibus animae sensitivae et nutritivae."¹⁰ Without a bodily organ, St. Thomas tells us, there is no sensation. ". . . sentire accidit in ipso moveri a sensibilibus exterioribus; unde non potest homo sentire absque exteriori sensibili, sicut non potest aliquid moveri absque movente."¹¹

It is only when we come to the higher operations of the rational soul that the necessity for a human body admits of questioning. Now, the intellectual operations of the soul, we repeat, are not exercised through the medium of the body, but the body, in a way, ministers to their production. "Est autem aliqua operatio animae, quae non exercetur corpore mediante, sed tamen ex corpore aliquod adminiculum tali operationi exhibetur;"¹²

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into a discussion of the Thomistic theory of knowledge except in so far as will be necessary to show what part the body has in the intellectual operation of the soul, for if its role is only an accidental one, union of body and soul would seem to be both useless and unnatural. Now, St. Thomas would never admit that, for he considers that the sensitive powers are necessary to the soul, not merely as accidental stimulants nor as dispositive conditions, but as representatives to the intellectual soul of its proper object. "Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per accidens tamquam excitantes . . . neque disponentes tantum . . . sed ut

¹⁰Sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3, c.

¹¹Cont. Gent., II, 57.

¹²Sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3, c.

repraesentantes animae intellectivae proprium objectum. . .¹³

The soul requires something corporeal for its operation in a twofold manner: in one way, as an organ through which it operates, as the soul needs the eye to see, and in this way the soul could not need a corporeal organ for knowing; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. The other way in which the soul may need something corporeal is as an object, just as for sight a colored body is required. In this second way, the soul depends on a material thing, an object, which object consists of phantasms--sense images from which the agent intellect can abstract the intelligible species.

. . . anima indiget aliquo corporali ad suam operationem dupliciter. Uno modo sicut organo per quod operetur, sicut indiget oculo ad videndum: et sic ad intelligendum non indiget aliquo organo, . . . Si autem sic indigeret organo ad intelligendum, esset corruptibilis, utpote non potens per se operari. Alio modo anima ad operandum indiget aliquo corporali sicut objecto, sicut ad videndum indiget corpore colorato, et sic anima rationalis indiget ad intelligendum phantasmata, quia phantasmata sunt ut sensibile intellectivae animae, . . .¹⁴

Over and over again we find St. Thomas insisting that the soul depends on nothing corporeal as a co-principle of knowledge or of intellectual operation. On the other hand, the principle of vision requires both the faculty of sight and the eye consisting of the power of vision and the pupil. Thus, just as the eye besides all that it has otherwise still requires an object on which the color will be, so, too, does the intellect need its object, though it does not need an organ for an act of knowing.

. . . intellectus in corpore existens non indiget aliquo

¹³Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.15, c.

¹⁴Q. Quodl., X, q.3, a.6, ad 1^{um}.

corporali ad intelligendum, quod simul cum intellectu sit principium intellectualis operationis, sicut accidit in visu: nam principium visionis non est visus tantum, sed oculus constans ex visu et pupilla. Indiget autem corpore tamquam objecto, sicut visus indiget pariete in quo est color: nam phantasmata comparantur ad intellectum ut colores ad visum, . . .¹⁵

And again:

. . . corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organo quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti: phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum.¹⁶

An intellectual substance is united to a body, therefore, not in as much as it is intelligent, but in as much as it needs those operations which are exercised through the body for the completion of its intellectual operation since it knows by abstraction from the phantasms.

Si ergo aliqua substantia intelligens corpori uniatur, hoc non erit in quantum est intelligens, sed secundum aliquid aliud; sicut supra dictum est, quod necessarium est, animam humanam uniri corpori, in quantum indiget operationibus per corpus exercitis ad completum intellectualis operationis, prout intelligit a phantasmatis abstrahendo;¹⁷

Furthermore, we cannot say that the phantasms are merely useful, for they are so essential that as long as the soul is in the body it cannot understand without a phantasm, nor can it remember except through the sensitive powers of cogitation and memory through which the phantasms are prepared. Having said that the intellect finds its object in the phantasm, St. Thomas thus continues: ". . . unde, quamdiu est anima in corpore, non potest

¹⁵Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad 22^{um}.

¹⁶Sum. Theol., I, q.75, a.2, ad 3^{um}.

¹⁷Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.5, c.

intelligere since phantasmate, nec etiam reminisci nisi per virtutem cogitativam et memorativam per quam phantasmata preparantur, . . .¹⁸

That this must needs be so we have two indications. First, our own experience of ourselves and others assures us that the act of the intellect is hindered when the imagination, or any other sense organ, is impaired. Now, this would not happen if the intellect did not depend upon the exercise of some power which did make use of a corporeal organ. Hence since the imagination, memory, and other sensitive powers do require organs, the lesion of any one of these latter will be an impediment to understanding. Wherefore, in case of frenzy and lethargy, it happens that one does not understand those things of which he had previous knowledge. The second indication is likewise attested by experience. We know how dependent we ourselves are upon phantasms, for when we learn something new, we form certain images to serve us as examples, and also when we essay to impart our ideas to another, we employ examples and illustrations of various kinds that from these the student may grasp our thought. Thus has St. Thomas accounted for our need of phantasms:

. . . impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indiciis apparet. Primo quidem quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius actum actus alicuius potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed

¹⁸Cont. Gent., II, 81.

etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod, impedito actu virtutis imaginativæ per læsionem organi, ut in phreneticis; et similiter impedito actu memorativæ virtutis, ut in lethargicis: impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praecepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et unde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum.¹⁹

Phantasms are, therefore, necessary, according to St. Thomas, both to acquire fresh knowledge and to utilize the knowledge that we actually possess, and if the imagination is hindered, so, too, is the act of the understanding. A concise expression we find elsewhere repeated in the following terms:

Et ex hoc est quod intellectus impeditur in intelligendo, laeso organo phantasiae: quia quamdiu est in corpore indiget phantasmatis non solum quasi accipiens a phantasmatis dum acquirit scientiam, sed etiam comparans species intelligibiles phantasmatis dum utitur scientia acquisita. Et propter hoc exempla in scientiis sunt necessaria.²⁰

We cannot insist too strongly upon the influence which the sensitive powers exercise over the act of understanding, for we shall see in the third chapter what bearing this has on the disposition of the human body. The following citation, though it merely repeats what has been said, emphasizes it clearly and strongly:

Licet enim intellectus non sit virtus corporea, tamen in nobis operatio intellectus compleri non potest sine operatione virtutum corporearum, quæ sunt imaginatio, et vis memorativa et cogitativa, . . . Et inde est quod impeditis harum virtutum operationibus propter aliquam corporis in-

¹⁹Sum. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, c.
²⁰Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad 22^{um}.

dispositionem, impeditur operatio intellectus, sicut patet in phreneticis et lethargicis, et aliis hujusmodi.²¹

And again:

. . . cum phantasma sit objectum intellectus possibilis, . . . secundum statum viae, anima ad suum actum phantasmatis indiget, non solum ut ab eis scientiam accipiat secundum motum qui est a sensibus ad animam, sed etiam ut habitum cognitionis quam habet circa species phantasmatum, ponat secundum motum qui est ab anima ad sensus, ut sic inspiciat in actu quod per habitum cognitionis tenet in mente. . . unde laesa imaginatione per laesionem organi, ut est in phraeneticis, intellectus impeditur ab actuali consideratione etiam eorum quae prius sciebat.²²

Now, why is it that the phantasms are so necessary in the act of human understanding? The reason, for St. Thomas, is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. The nature of a thing existing in matter is the proper object of the human intellect, united to a body. This nature must be in an individual thing. The nature of a stone, for example, is in an individual stone, of a horse in an individual horse, and so on. We cannot, therefore, have true and complete knowledge of anything unless we know it as it is, existing in the individual. Now, knowledge of the individual comes to us from the senses and the imagination. When the intellect wishes to understand its proper object, it must first go the phantasms to grasp the universal nature existing in the individual. Consequently we can readily see in what sense the Angelic Doctor says that we can understand nothing without reference to the images:

Hujus autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. . . Intellectus autem humani, qui

²¹Cont. Gent., III, 84.

²²In II Sent., D. XX, q.2, a.2, ad 3um.

est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens et per huiusmodi naturas, visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem; et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.²³

In the passage just cited St. Thomas mentions that it is through such natures of visible things that we rise to a knowledge of things invisible. This sets forth another important aspect from which to view the need for the body which the rational soul experiences. Only through corporeal objects do we know the incorporeal, and since incorporeals have no phantasms by which we can know them directly, we would be deprived of that knowledge did we not arrive at a certain degree of comprehension through a comparison of them with corporeal things that have phantasms. In this way we know truth by a consideration of something of which we possess the truth; we know God, in like manner, as the cause of the effects we see around us, as possessing in the highest possible perfection the qualities we find in creatures, and by denying of Him certain attributes we realize He cannot possess. In the present state of life we know other immaterial substances only by remotion or in comparison with other things.

. . . incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparisonem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum

²³ Sum. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, c.

sunt phantasmata: sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deus autem, . . . cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata.²⁴

And also:

Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, . . .²⁵

It is because of its aspect towards the lower realm of beings that the rational soul must thus seek its knowledge of the higher:

Manifestum est enim quod anima humana corpori unita aspectum habet ex unione corporis ad inferiora directum; unde non perficitur nisi per ea quae ab inferioribus accipit, scilicet per species a phantasmatibus abstractas; unde neque in cognitionem sui ipsius neque in cognitionem aliorum potest devenire, nisi in quantum ex praedictis speciebus manuducitur. . .²⁶

We cannot, however, arrive at a perfect knowledge of these immaterial things because of the insufficient proportion between materials and immaterials.

. . . ex rebus materialibus ascendere possumus in aliqualem cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non tamen in perfectam: quia non est sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales, sed similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiuntur ad immaterialia intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, . . .²⁷

In stating that it is appropriate that Holy Scripture should present

²⁴Sum. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, ad 3^{um}, also, Cont. Gent., IV, 1.

²⁵Sum. Theol., I, q.85, a.1, c.

²⁶Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.17, c.

²⁷Sum. Theol., I, q.88, a.2, ad 1^{um}.

divine and spiritual truths clothed in material forms, St. Thomas gives as the reason that it is fitting that God should provide for each thing according to that thing's nature, and as the understanding natural to man is by way of the senses, it becomes a human being to arrive at divine truths through sense presentations.

Deus enim omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum naturae. Est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia veniat: quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet. Unde convenienter in Sacra Scriptura traduntur nobis spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium. . .²⁸

Since it is difficult for man to transcend the sensible, Divine Providence thus draws him to things divine through the material, and that because such a procedure is natural to the human being, as St. Thomas again remarks:

Quia vero connaturale est homini ut per sensus cognitionem accipiat, et difficillimum est sensibilia transcendere, provisum est divinitus homini ut etiam in sensibilibus rebus divinatorum ei commemoratio fieret, ut per hoc hominis intentio magis renovaretur ad divina. . .²⁹

Not only does the human mind depend upon the senses to reach its knowledge of things incorporeal, it likewise depends upon them for direct knowledge of the individual. The reason for this is that the intellect can have direct knowledge only of the universal by abstracting the intelligible species from matter which is the principle of individuation. To know the particular which is in matter only, if we speak of natural things, the intellect must turn to the phantasms. Thus it is only indirectly, and by a certain reflex action, that the mind gets at the singular; direct knowledge

²⁸Sum. Theol., I, q.1, a.9, c.

²⁹Cont. Gent., III, 119.

comes through the senses.³⁰

Again in speaking of species received from things, the Angelic Doctor states that singulars are not known from these, but from a reflex action to imagination and sense.

. . . et ideo ex eis singularia non cognoscuntur, quae individuantur per materiam, nisi per reflexionem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem et sensum, dum scilicet intellectus speciem universalem, quam a singularibus abstraxit, applicat formae singulari in imaginatione servatae. . .³¹

Not only does the soul need the senses for its knowledge of things immaterial and things singular, it even needs them for an understanding of first principles, for we should not be able to conceive that the whole is greater than any of its parts, if we had not first seen some whole thing, any more than a man born blind is able to have any idea of color.

Praeterea, id quod per sensum in nobis acquiritur non fuit animae ante corpus. Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in nobis ex sensibilibus causatur; nisi enim aliquod totum sensu percepissemus, non possemus intelligere quod totum esset majus parte, sicut nec caecus natus aliquid percipit de coloribus. Ergo nec ipsorum principiorum cognitio

³⁰Sum. Theol., I, q.86, a.1, c. ". . . singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis: intellectus autem noster . . . intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium.

Indirecte autem, et quasi per quamdam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia, . . . etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, . . . Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, 'Socrates est homo.'

³¹In II Sent., D. III, q.3, a.3, ad lum.

affuit animae ante corpus; multo igitur minus aliorum.³²

This last clause to the effect that if the soul does not know first principles without the help which comes from the senses, much less does it know anything else, reminds us that for St. Thomas the soul knows nothing through innate species. In refuting those who held that the soul did have such species, and that, consequently, the sense did not "per se" cause knowledge, but only "per accidens," in as much as upon the stirring of a certain sense the soul was roused to a memory of its former knowledge, St. Thomas holds that this is false for two reasons: first, such a doctrine is unreasonable because the soul would not forget what it knew naturally and furthermore no fitting reason could be assigned for union of the soul with the body if the senses were not really needed; and secondly, experience teaches us that if a man is lacking in one sense, his knowledge of the object apprehended by that sense is wanting, and this would not be the case were he endowed with innate species.³³

As St. Thomas visualizes it, the mind is like a blank slate on which

³²Cont. Gent., II, 83.

³³Sum. Theol., I, q.84, a.3, c. "Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum. Primo quidem si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere; nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua parte, et alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur esse inconueniens, si ponatur esse animae naturale corpori uniri . . . Inconueniens enim est quod naturalis operatio alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum naturam. Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si intellectuali animae essent naturaliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species naturaliter inditas."

nothing is written, having no intelligible species of its own which belong to it naturally for the exercise of its proper operation, understanding. To all knowledge it is only in potency and must be reduced to act through intelligible species received from exterior things by way of the senses which are required by the sensitive powers. Why the soul needed to be united to the body can thus readily be seen. And this is as it should be for St. Thomas never tires of repeating that the soul is the least in the order of intellectual substances as prime matter is the least in the order of sensible things.

. . . naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri, quia cum sit infima in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, sicut materia prima est infima in ordine sensibilium, non habet anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem propriam exire possit, quae est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intellectuales; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, . . . Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et animam humanam necesse est corpori uniri.³⁴

That the human soul should be actualized in knowing by intelligible species drawn from material things is in accord with its position in the scale of beings. The order and distinction of intellectual substances is similar to that of corporeal substances. From a consideration of the material order, then, we may arrive at a clearer grasp of the immaterial. The highest bodies have a potency in their nature which is wholly actualized by their form. In lower bodies the potency of matter is not completely per-

³⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

fect by the form, but receives now one form, now another, from some external agent. Likewise, inferior intellectual substances, such as human souls, have an intellectual potency which is not actualized except successively by reception of intelligible species from things. The intellectual potency of the higher intellectual substances is, on the other hand, completely actualized by intelligible species connatural to them.³⁵

A difficulty may here arise. Obviously, understanding by means of simply intelligible species is superior to understanding by means of species abstracted from the phantasm. Now, since nature is always ordered to the best, why was not the human soul so fashioned as to have the first mode of knowing natural to it, rather than the second? St. Thomas thus presents the difficulty:

Cum enim natura semper ordinetur ad id quod melius est; est autem melior modus intelligendi per conversionem ad intelligibilia simpliciter, quam per conversionem ad phantasmata: debuit sic a Deo institui animae naturae, ut modus intelligendi nobilior ei esset naturalis, et non indigeret corpori propter hoc uniri.³⁶

To answer this, St. Thomas offers as a consideration the fact that the

³⁵Sum. Theol., I, q.55, a.2, c. "Sic enim oportet intelligere distinctionem et ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, sicut est distinctio et ordo corporalium. Suprema autem corpora habent potentiam in sui natura totaliter perfectam per formam: in corporibus autem inferioribus potentia materiae non totaliter perficitur per formam, sed accipit nunc unam, nunc aliam formam, ab aliquo agente. Similiter et inferiores substantiae intellectivae, scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intellectiva in substantiis spiritualibus superioribus, idest in angelis, naturaliter completa est per species intelligibiles, in quantum habent species intelligibiles connaturales ad omnia intelligenda quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt.

³⁶Sum. Theol., I, q.89, a.1, c.

universe requires that there should be a hierarchy of beings for the perfection of the universe. "Hoc autem perfectio universi exigebat, ut diversi gradus in rebus essent."³⁷ As a further reply, he considers that, although the manner of understanding by means of phantasms is not so elevated as the mode proper to higher intellectual substances, still it is the best and most perfect as regards what is possible for rational souls. "Considerandum est igitur quod, etsi intelligere per conversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter nobilius quam intelligere per conversionem ad phantasmata; tamen ille modus intelligendi, prout erat possibilis animae, erat imperfectior."³⁸

The reason that knowledge by means of simply intelligible species is not suited to human souls lies in the fact that because of the weakness of its intellectual power it could understand such objects only in a confused and general way, the consequent of which would be that rational souls would have only imperfect knowledge. That this is true is verified by an examination of other intelligences. God is Supremest Intelligence and the First Principle of all intellectual light. As they recede the farther from this First Source, other intelligences participate in it less, and have, consequently, weaker intellectual power. Now, of all intellectual substances, the rational soul is most distant from the First Principle of light; as a result, its intellectual power is less strong, and its manner of understanding must needs be in proportion to its strength. The light in the First Intelligence is such that by one intelligible form, the Divine Essence, God knows all other

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

things. Superior intelligences, nearer than the human soul to the fountain source, know by fewer and more universal intelligible forms.

. . . anima, cum sit infima in ordine intellectivarum substantiarum, infimo et debilissimo modo participat intellectualem naturam. Nam in primo intelligente, scilicet Deo, natura intellectualis est adeo potens quod per unam formam intelligibilem, scilicet essentiam suam, omnia intelligit; inferiores vero substantiae intellectuales per species multas; et quanto unaquaeque earum est altior, tanto habet pauciores formas, et virtutem magis potentem ad intelligendum omnia per formas paucas.³⁹

That consideration leads to the conclusion that if inferior intellectual substances had forms so universal as the higher intellectual substances, the knowledge of the former would be imperfect since their power of knowing is weaker. "Si autem substantia intellectualis inferior, haberet formas ita universales sicut superior; cum non adsit ei tanta virtus in intelligendo, remaneret ejus scientia incompleta; quia tantum in universali res cognosceret, et non posset deducere cognitionem suam ex illis paucis et singulis."⁴⁰ If this mode of knowing were natural to the human soul, it would thus gain only confused and general knowledge, as St. Thomas states:

Anima ergo humana, quae est infima, si acciperet formas in abstractione et universalitate conformes substantiis separatis; cum habeat minimam virtutem in intelligendo, imperfectissimam cognitionem haberet, utpote cognoscens res in quadam universalitate et confusione.⁴¹

An example may help to clarify this point. Those men whose intellects are weaker do not acquire knowledge by conceptions so universal as those whose intellects are more powerful, but they must needs resort to details

³⁹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.15, c.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

and examples, many of which can be dispensed with by keener minds. "Quod aliquo modo apparet in hominibus: nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus per universales conceptiones magis intelligentium non accipiunt perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur."⁴²

Thus, for perfect knowledge human souls must have recourse to material objects and by their intellectual light reach out for the intelligible species proportionate to their power which will make them from being potential knowers actual ones. For the perfection of their intellectual operations, therefore, rational souls needed to be united to bodies.

Et ideo ad hoc quod ejus cognitio perficiatur, et distinguatur per singula, oportet quod a singulis rebus scientiam colligat veritatis; lumine tamen intellectus agentis ad hoc necessario existente, ut altiori modo recipiantur in anima quam sint in materia. Ad perfectionem igitur intellectualis operationis necessarium fuit anima corpori uniri.⁴³

This should suffice to portray in what way the body ministers to the accidental perfection of the rational soul, that perfection being the completion of its operations. For nutrition and sensation, we have seen that St. Thomas holds that the body is absolutely essential, and for the act of intelligence it is also needed if the lowest of the intellectual substances is to reach the perfection of its proper operation. The senses and the sensitive powers may be unnecessary for intellectual substances which have their proper object independently of exterior pathways, but for the human soul there is no mode natural to it other than that whereby it grows in know-

⁴²Sum. Theol., I, q.89, a.1, c.

⁴³Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.15, c.

ledge through abstraction of its proper object from the phantasms received from sensibles through the medium of the organs of the human body. The phantasm, as we have seen, is necessary both to the acquisition of new knowledge and to the application and use of the knowledge we have. Since, therefore, phantasms are acquired through the senses and the sensitive powers work through organs, the body which will, consequently, be most suited to the rational soul must be one whose disposition will best fit this mode of knowledge which is proper to the rational soul. Just what that disposition is considered to be by St. Thomas we shall endeavor to determine in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
THE DISPOSITION OF THE HUMAN BODY
IS SUITED TO THE RATIONAL SOUL

The kind of body which will be suited to the rational soul depends to a large extent upon the close and intimate relationship which must, in the view of St. Thomas, exist between the soul and its body. Thus he explicitly states that the soul is the efficient, formal, and final cause of the body, for in his commentary on Aristotle, he says: "Et cum principium et causa dicatur multipliciter, anima dicitur tribus modis principium et causa viventis corporis. Uno modo, sicut unde est principium motus. Alio modo, sicut cujus causa, id est finis. Tertio, sicut substantia, id est forma animatorum."¹

That St. Thomas means by the principle of movement, referred to in this passage, the efficient cause is clear from another in which he tells us that this was the sense attached to it by Aristotle. To the objection that the soul would need to precede the body in point of time if it were the efficient cause of the body, St. Thomas gives as the interpretation of Aristotle the following: ". . . Philosophus non dicit animam, efficientem esse causam corporis, sed causa unde est principium motus, in quantum est principium motus localis in corpore, et augmenti, et aliorum hujusmodi. . ." ² It is this

¹St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 7, n.318.

²Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.10, ad 6^{um}.

conception of efficient cause, therefore, which we must give to St. Thomas' own statement: ". . . corpus autem disponatur ad hoc quod sit proportionatum esse per actionem animae, quae est causa efficiens corporis. . ."3

Although in the first chapter we treated of the soul as the form of the body with reference to the time of the existence of the rational soul, we shall here again for the sake of unity consider that St. Thomas holds that the rational soul is the substantial or formal cause of the body for two reasons: first, it is the formal cause of its body because it is the cause of its being in that the human body is actualized by the rational soul, and secondly, since the act of anything is the form of that thing, and, consequently, its formal cause, the soul is the formal cause of the body because it is the act of the body which was only potentially in act before its advent.

Et primo, quod anima sit causa viventis corporis, ut forma: et hoc duplici ratione: quarum prima talis est. Illud est causa alicujus ut substantia, idest, ut forma, quod est causa essendi; nam per formam unumquodque est actu. Sed anima viventibus est causa essendi; per animam enim vivunt, et ipsum vivere est esse eorum: ergo anima est causa viventis corporis, ut forma.⁴

Id quod est actus alicujus, est ratio et forma ejus quod est in potentia: sed anima est actus corporis viventis. . . ergo anima est ratio et forma viventis corporis.⁵

The rational soul is not only the efficient and formal cause of the

³Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.10, ad illum., also In IV Sent., D.XLIV, q.1, a.2, s.1, c. (Simon Occhi, Venice, 1780) ". . . anima habet se ad corpus non solum in habitudine formae, et finis, sed etiam in habitudine causae efficientis."

⁴In II De Anima, lect. 7, n.319, also Cont. Gent., II, 68-70.

⁵Ibid., n. 320.

body, but it is its final cause as well. ". . . anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis."⁶ The reason given is that just as the intellect acts for an end, so, too, does nature. Now the intellect in the things that are achieved through art orders matter and disposes it for the form; in like manner does nature. Since, therefore, the soul is the form of the body, and the matter is disposed for the form, the human body will have as its end the rational soul.

Et quod sit causa, ut finis, viventium corporum, sic ostendit. Sicut enim intellectus operatur propter finem, ita et natura. . . Sed intellectus in his quae fiunt per artem, materiam ordinat et disponit propter formam: ergo et natura. Cum igitur anima sit forma viventis corporis, sequitur quod sit finis ejus.⁷

That the soul is the final cause of the body has an important bearing on the disposition of the body, for the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not for the sake of the matter since form is not for matter but rather matter is for form. ". . . considerandum est quod unio animae et corpori non est propter corpus, sed propter animam: nec enim forma est propter materiam, sed e converso."⁸ Now because matter is for the form, it is from the form that we seek the reason that the human body is such as it is. ". . . cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso; ex parte animae oportet accipere rationem, quale debeat esse corpus cui unitur; . . ."⁹

The soul, as we explained in the last chapter, requires a body as a necessary instrument for its operations of sensation and nutrition, and for

⁶Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

⁷In II De Anima, lect. 7, n.321.

⁸Sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3, c.

⁹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c., also Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, c.

its intellectual operations, as a minister.

Invenitur autem corpus necessarium ad aliquam operationem animae, quae mediante corpori exercetur; sicut patet in operibus sensitivae et nutritivae. . . Est autem aliqua operatio animae, quae non exercetur corpore mediante, sed tamen ex corpore aliquod adminiculum tali operatione exhibetur.¹⁰

Now, form gives being and species to matter that matter may be suited to the operations of the form, and because the body is to minister to the various activities of the rational soul, it must have diversity of parts.

. . . cum materia sit propter formam; hoc modo forma dat esse et speciem materiae, secundum quod congruit suae operationi: et quia corpus perfectibile ab anima ad hoc quod congruat diversis operationibus animae, requirit diversitatem in partibus. . .¹¹

Furthermore, just as the whole organized body is so related that it may zealously serve the soul's operations which are exercised through it, so, too, there is one organ related to, or corresponding to, each determinate operation. ". . . sicut totum corpus organicum se habet ut deserviat operationibus animae quae per corpus exercentur, ita se habet unum organum ad unum determinatam operationem."¹² A great variety of organs is demanded because the soul, though simple in its essence, is yet manifold in its powers and operations. ". . . anima rationalis quamvis sit simplex in essentia, tamen est multiplex in potentiis et operationibus; et ideo oportet quod corpus suum multa habeat organa ad diversas operationes apta; . . ."¹³

¹⁰Sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3.c.

¹¹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.10, ad 2^{um}.

¹²Ibid., ad 9^{um}.

¹³In II Sent., D.1, q.2, a.5, ad 3^{um}., also Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, ad 3^{um}., and also, Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.10, ad 17^{um}.

Diversity of organs is, therefore, in proportion to diversity of operations, and this in turn to the gradation in perfection of forms, for nobler forms have a greater variety of operations. This is because perfection in activity corresponds to perfection in being since operation pertains to being existing in act. Having said that the soul, like any other form, is the principle of its operations, St. Thomas continues:

Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, cum operatio sit existentis in actu; et ideo quanto aliqua forma est majoris perfectionis in dando esse, tanto etiam majoris virtutis in operando. Unde formae perfectiores habent plures operationes et magis diversas quam formae minus perfectae.¹⁴

In less perfect beings a diversity of accidents is sufficient for diversity of operations, but for the more perfect, a diversity of parts is needed. In fire, for example, various activities pertain to various accidents. Fire ascends according to its lightness and heats according to its warmth, but no organs are required for such.

Et inde est quod ad diversitatem operationum in rebus minus perfectis sufficit diversitas accidentium. In rebus autem magis perfectis requiritur ulterius diversitas partium; et tanto magis, quanto forma fuerit perfectior. Videmus enim quod igni conveniunt diversae operationes secundum diversa accidentia; sicut ferri sursum secundum levitatem, calefacere secundum calorem, et sic de aliis; sed tamen quaelibet harum operationum competit igni secundum quamlibet partem ejus.¹⁵

Animate bodies have nobler forms than inanimate ones and, consequently, more operations, and parts, as well. In plants, for instance, the activities

¹⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.9, c.

¹⁵Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.9, c.

of the root, the stem, and the branches are not identical. "In corporibus vero animatis quae habent nobiliores formas, diversis operationibus deputantur diversae partes; sicut in plantis, alia est operatio radicis, alia rami, et stipitis; . . ."16 He concludes, then, that animated bodies, as they are more perfect, will require more parts to correspond to their greater perfection, and that since the rational soul is the most perfect of forms, its body, consequently, will need a greater variety of organs or parts.

. . . et quanto corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter majorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri majorem diversitatem in partibus. Unde cum anima rationalis sit perfectissima formarum naturalium, in homine invenitur maxima distinctio partium propter diversas operationes;. . .17

It is to the rational soul, therefore, that we must look for the reason why the human body is what it is and is not what it is not, and chiefly to the proper operation of this noblest of forms, for it is its function of understanding which will necessitate a body different from all other bodies.

". . . cum materia sit propter formam, forma autem ordinetur ad propriam operationem oportet quod talis sit materia uniuscuique formae ut competit operationi illius formae; . . ."18 Now, if the rational soul needs to be united to a body to receive that which will actualize it in knowing; namely, the intelligible species received from things by way of the senses, it follows that the body to which the soul is united must be such that it is most capable of representing to the intellect the sensible species from which the

16Ibid.

17Ibid., also II Cont. Gent., 71, and also, Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.4, c.

18Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.10, ad 1^{um}.

agent intellect can extract its proper object. The human body must, therefore, be best disposed for sensation.

Si ergo propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus mediante sensu; necessarium est quod corpus, cui anima rationabilis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad repraesentandum intellectui species sensibles, ex quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultent. Sic ergo oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, esse optime dispositum ad sentiendum.¹⁹

Since without organs there is no sensation and since nature does not fail to furnish what is necessary, there must be sense organs in the human body. Now, although there are several senses, there is one which is the foundation of all the others; namely, touch, in which man's whole sensitive nature chiefly consists. "Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit; . . ."20

Why is it that touch should be considered by St. Thomas to be the foundation of all other senses, rather than sight, or some one of the other senses? One reason is that the sense of touch is absolutely essential to make a body an animal body. For no other sense can this be said because there are some animals which, although they have no other sense but touch, are truly called animals because they have this sense of touch. Concerning this, the following comment of St. Thomas will be interesting to note:

. . . sicut vegetativum potest separari a tactu et ab omni sensu, sic tactus potest separari ab aliis sensibus. Multa enim sunt animalia, quae solum sensus

¹⁹Op. cit., a.8, c., also Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, c.

²⁰Ibid., also In III De Anima, lect., 3, n.602.

tactus habent, sicut animalia imperfecta. Omnia autem animalia habent sensum tactus. Vegetativum autem principium dicimus illam partem animae, qua etiam vegetabilia, idest plantae, participant.²¹

Likewise of interest is his gradation of living things with regard to touch.

Sic igitur ex praedictis patent tres gradus viventium. Primus est plantarum. Secundus animalium imperfectorum immobilium, quae habent solum sensum tactus. Tertius est animalium perfectorum quae moventur motu profressivo, quae etiam habent alios sensus. Manifestum est autem, quod quartus gradus est eorum quae habent cum his etiam intellectum.²²

We see, therefore, that because of this sense a thing is first entitled to be called an animal. ". . . propter hunc sensum primo animal dicitur;..²³

Without this sense of touch, moreover, the animal would die, and nothing can have this sense unless it be an animal, nor be an animal unless it have the sense of touch, as St. Thomas expresses it: ". . . cum necesse sit omne animal habere tactum, . . . manifestum est quod solum per privationem hujus sensus, scilicet tactus, necesse est animalia mori. Hic enim sensus convertitur cum animali, nec aliquid potest ipsum habere nisi sit animal, nec aliquid potest esse animal nisi habeat hunc sensum."²⁴

Touch is so necessary because it is through it that discernment between the suitable and the non-suitable is made whereby the safety of the animal is secured, and the good sought and the evil avoided. "Et ideo nisi animal haberet sensum tactus, per quem discerneret convenientia a corruptivis, non posset haec fugere et illa accipere, et ita non posset salvari animal. Ne-

²¹In II De Anima, lect.3, n.260.

²²Ibid.

²³Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

²⁴In III De Anima, lect., 18, n.869, also Cont. Gent., II, 90.

cessarium est igitur ad salutem animalis, quod habeat sensum tactus."²⁵

Now, how does St. Thomas account for this power of discrimination which he attributes to the sense of touch and which is one more reason why it is the foundation of all the other senses? He tells us that it is the organ of the common sense which discerns the sensible of one sense from the sensible of another sense, for to distinguish the essence of white and sweet belongs to the intellect, but to distinguish the way in which the sense is modified belongs to sense. "Cognoscimus autem differentias albi et dulcis, non solum quantum ad quod quid est utriusque, quod pertinet ad intellectum, sed etiam quantum ad diversam immutationem sensus. Et hoc non potest fieri nisi per sensum."²⁶

The sense which thus discriminates is touch whose ultimate organ is not flesh since it has the ability to discern the tangible from other sensibles and for this reason is the root of all the other senses because it is so closely related to the fountain source of all the senses, to wit, the common sense.

Et si, per aliquem sensum fit, hoc maxime videtur, quod fiat per tactum, qui est primus sensuum, et quodammodo radix et fundamentum omnium sensuum; et ab hoc, animal habet, quod dicatur sensitivum. Unde manifestum est, quod caro non est ultimum organum sensus tactus: quia cum per sensum tactus fiat discretio, necesse esset quod ipso contactu carnis a tangibili fieret discretio tangibilis ab aliis sensibilibus. Attribuitur autem ista discretio tactui non secundum quod tactus est sensus proprius, sed secundum quod tactus est fundamentum omnium sensuum, et propinquius se habens ad fontalem radicem omnium sensuum, qui est sensus communis.²⁷

²⁵In III De Anima, lect.17, n. 360.

²⁶Op. Cit., lect., 3, n.601.

²⁷Op. Cit., n.602.

The reason that touch can thus discriminate is, therefore, because the organ of the sense of touch is also the organ of the common sense, and the reason that flesh cannot be the ultimate organ of the sense of touch is that since discernment is effected through touch it is necessary that by the very contact of the flesh with the tangible, discernment of the actual tangible from other sensibles should occur. Consequently, this discrimination is attributed to touch not in so far as touch is a proper sense, but rather in so far as it is related to the common sense and is the root of all the other senses. Furthermore, it is because the organ of touch is diffused throughout the whole body that it can be the organ of the common sense.

Oportet autem illud principium sensitivum commune habere aliud organum, quia pars sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem sine organo. Cum enim organum tactus diffundatur per totum corpus necessarium videtur, ut ibi sit organum hujus principii sensitivi communis, ubi est prima radix organi tactus.²⁸

And this is the reason why touch can be the foundation of all the other senses; namely, because the organ of touch is diffused throughout the whole body, and the instrument of any sense is also the instrument of the sense of touch, as St. Thomas states: ". . .tactus est fundamentum omnium aliorum sensuum: manifestum est enim, quod organum tactus diffunditur per totum corpus, et quodlibet instrumentum cujusque sensus est etiam instrumentum tactus; . . ."29

Two more indications given by St. Thomas that the sense of touch is the principal sense are: First, when this sense is inoperative, all the other

²⁸Op. cit., n.611.

²⁹In II De Anima, lect., 2, n.484.

senses are also. For no other sense is this true. Our sense of vision, for example, or our sense of hearing may not be functioning, but that does not prevent our tasting, smelling, and the like. ". . . et inde est quod immobilitato hoc sensu, ut in somno accidit, omnes alii sensus immobilitantur; . . ."30 Secondly, all the other senses are impeded not only by the excess of their own proper sensibles, as vision is hindered when the light is too brilliant, and hearing when sound is too intense, but also they are hindered by an excess of the proper sensible of touch, that is to say, by too much heat or cold and the like. ". . . et iterum omnes alii sensus non solum solvuntur ab excellentia proprium sensibilium, sicut visus a rebus multum fulgidis et auditus a maximis sonis; sed etiam ab excellentia sensibilium secundum tactum, ut a forti calore vel frigore."31

The body which can have the sense of touch cannot be a simple body because it must be so constituted that it can perceive its object without any medium. We might, perhaps, suppose that a body which needed to be properly equipped for hearing could be composed of air, for the auditory sense contacts its proper object through the medium of air, or again that a body which was to be suited to the sense of sight only could be composed of light, for light is the medium between sight and its object, but the body which must have the sense of touch, and every animal body must have, needs to be so formed that it will require no medium between itself and its object for touch is not exercised through a medium but simply through direct contact

30Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

31Ibid.

since it perceives through itself. Now, an airy body, or a body of light, or of fire, for instance, could not contact sensible objects, and, therefore, could not be an instrument of touch. The animal body must be such, as a consequence, that through it the sense of touch can be constituted.³² Obviously, then, this body cannot be of any one element. "Et, quia corpus animalis oportet esse tale ut per ipsum fiat sensus tactus, impossibile est quod ullum elementorum sit corpus animalis: neque terra, per quam non sunt alii sensus: neque alia elementa, per quae fiunt sensus."³³

Perhaps the strongest reason which St. Thomas gives to prove that the animal body cannot be of any one element is that it must be a medium between contraries, and so must not have any element in excess, as it would have if it were made of fire only, or air, or water only.³⁴

Now, the human body, although it is an animal body, is united to a

³²In III De Anima, lect.18, n.865. ". . . oportet quod omne corpus animatum, scilicet anima sensibili, sit tale, ut per ipsum possit fieri sensus tactus. Omnia autem elementa praeter terram, possunt esse organa, vel media aliorum sensuum, scilicet aer et aqua faciunt sentire per alterum, idest per medium. Sed tactus non fit per medium, sed in tangendo ipsa sensibilia; et ideo sic nominatur, quamvis et alii sensus sentiant quodammodo in tangendo, non quidem immediate, sed per medium immutat ipsum. Solus autem sensus tactus in tangendo sensibile sentiti per ipsum, et non per aliquod medium."

³³Ibid., n.866, also, Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, ad 1^{um}, and ad 12^{um}.

³⁴Ibid., n.867. "Cujus ratio est, quia illud, per quod fit tactus, oportet esse medium inter qualitates tangibiles, ad hoc quod sit susceptivum earum, utpote in potentia existens ad eas, . . . Et hoc est verum non solum respectu qualitatum terrae, sed etiam omnium tangibilium qualitatum. In corporibus autem simplicibus non invenitur medium inter qualitates tangibiles, sed inveniuntur ipsae qualitates, secundum extremitatem contrarietatis. Et inde manifestum est, quod per nullum corpus simplex, nec per aliquid corporibus simplicibus vicinum, potest fieri sensus tactus. Et ideo ossibus, capillis et talibus partibus non sentimus, quia superabundat in eis quod terrae est, et non reducuntur ad medium prout tactus requirit. Also, Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, ad 1^{um}.

rational soul, and therefore, must be constituted somewhat differently from other animal bodies. The first difference will consist of its being so fashioned as to be the best possible instrument for touch. The reason that this must be is that the intellectual powers of man are dependent, as we have seen in the second chapter, upon the sensitive powers, and these sensitive powers are in turn dependent upon the sense of touch. "Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, debeat esse optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum sensus tactus: . . ."³⁵

As every animal body, the human body must be composed of contraries because the organ of touch must be a medium among the contraries. ". . . organum autem tactus oportet esse medium inter contraria; . . . Unde corpus congruens tali animae fuit corpus ex contrariis compositum."³⁶ Now it is necessary for the organ of touch to be a medium precisely because it must have contraries, not actually, but potentially. ". . . oportet organum tactus non habere actu contrarietates, sed potentia; . . ."³⁷

St. Thomas proves that the sense of touch is only in potency in the following manner. The sense organ suffers from a sensible object, for sensation is, in a way, suffering. This sensible object which contacts the organ is what really actualizes the sense of touch. Now, the organ of touch does not perceive the quality of the object which affects it when the organ itself already possesses that quality in act, for we do not perceive that

³⁵Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

³⁶Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.

³⁷Cont. Gent., II, 90.

which is hard or soft, hot or cold, according to the mode in which any of these is in the organ itself, but we feel the degrees of tangibles by the sense of touch when the organ of this sense is in a middle state between two contraries, e.g., hot and cold. And thus it is that we are able to distinguish between hot and cold, and the like, for if heat were in act in the body, the degree of heat in the sensible could not be ascertained, and so for cold, and all the others.

Manifestum est autem, quod organum tactus, . . . est quaedam pars, quae est in potentia ad hujusmodi qualitates. Organum enim sensus patitur a sensibili, quia sentire est pati quoddam: unde sensibile, quod est agens facit ipsum tale in actu, quale est sensibile, cum sit in potentia ad hoc. Et propter hoc, organum tactus non sentit illam qualitatem secundum quam est in actu. Non enim sentimus id quod est calidum aut frigidum, durum aut molle, secundum illum modum quo haec insunt organo tactus; sed sentimus excellentias tangibilium, quasi organo tactu constituto in aliqua mediante inter contrarias tangibiles qualitates.³⁸

Moreover, to discern what is very hot the sense of touch must know what is very cold, for heat and coldness are relative qualities. One and the same object, for example, may be both hot and cold depending upon that to which it is compared. If lukewarm water is compared to boiling water it is cold; if, on the other hand, it is compared to ice water, it is hot. The sense of touch must be susceptible of both extremes in order to determine accurately the quality of the sensible that affects it, and for this reason it may be said to be both extremes in potency. Just as the organ which is to detect white or black must be actually neutral to both, and so for each

³⁸In II De Anima, lect., 23, n.547.

sense organ with regard to its proper object, so, too, the sense of touch must be neither hot nor cold actually, but both potentially.

Et propter hoc organum tactus discernit extrema tangibilum: medium enim est discretivum extremorum: potest enim pati ab utroque extremorum, eo quod dum comparatur ad unum habet in se rationem alterius; sicut tepidum in comparatione ad calidum, est frigidum; in comparatione ad frigidum, est calidum: unde medium patitur ab utroque extremorum, cum sit quodammodo utrique contrarium. Et oportet quod, sicut organum, quod debet sentire album et nigrum, neutrum ipsorum habet actu, sed utrumque in potentia, et eodem modo in aliis sensibus; sic etiam se habeat in sensu tactus; scilicet organum neque sit calidum, neque frigidum actu, sed potentia utrumque.³⁹

However, there is this difference between touch and the other senses. They are not only in potency to their sensibles, but they must be absolutely without them in their organs. There must be no color in the eye, to make one application, because the receiver of a thing must be without the thing received. The organ of touch is not under this necessity, for touch must be capable of being acted on by all those qualities of which the animal body is necessarily composed; to wit, heat, cold, dryness, wetness, and the rest. It is not possible, therefore, for the organ of touch to be entirely free from its proper sensibles, but it must be reduced to a medium in order to be in potency to contraries.⁴⁰ It is obvious, then, that perfection of touch

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c. "Cum autem organum cujuslibet sensus non debeat habere in actu contraria, quorum sensus est perceptivus; sed esse in potentia ad illa, ut possit ea recipere, quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto; aliter necesse est hoc esse in organo tactus, et in organo aliorum sensuum. Organum enim visus, scilicet pupilla, caret omnino albo et nigro, et universaliter omni genere coloris; et similiter est in auditu et in olfactu; hoc autem in tactu accidere non potest. Nam tactus est cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus necesse est componi corpus animalis, scilicet caloris et frigoris, humidi et sicci; unde impossibile est quod organum tactus omnino sit denudatum a genere sui sensibilis; sed oportet quod sit reductum ad medium sic enim est in potentia ad contraria." Also, Sum. Theol., I. q.91, a.1, ad 3^{um}.

will correspond to a medium disposition. "Et propter hoc, quanto animal habet complexionem magis reductam ad medium, tanto habet meliorem tactum."⁴¹

Now, because mixed bodies have nobler forms the closer they approach to evenness of complexion, that body to which the rational soul is united must, consequently, have the most equable disposition, according to St. Thomas:

". . . quum videamus corpora mixta tanto nobiliores formas habere quanto magis ad temperamentum commixtionis perveniunt; et sic quod habet formam nobilissimam, utpote substantiam intellectualem, si sit corpus mixtum, oportet esse temperatissimum; . . ."⁴² Man has, therefore, the noblest form and the most equable of bodies. "Et ideo, quanto talia corpora ad majorem aequalitatem mixtionis accedunt, tanto nobiliorem formam sortiuntur a Deo: quale est corpus humanum, quod est temperatissimae mixtionis, ut probat bonitas tactus in hominibus, et nobilissimam formam habet, scilicet animam rationalem."⁴³

St. Thomas tells us further that in this evenness of temperament we can see terminated in man, as in the most perfect, all the operations of the inferior natures:

Corpus ergo cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis. In quo apparet quod tota operatio inferioris naturae terminatur ad hominem sicut ad perfectissimum. Videmus enim operationem naturae procedere gradatim a simplicibus elementis commiscendo ea, quousque perveniatur ad perfectissimum commixtionis modum, qui est in corpore humano. Hanc igitur oportet esse dispositionem corporis cui anima rationalis unitur, ut scilicet sit temperatissimae complexionis.⁴⁴

⁴¹In II De Anima, lect., 23, n.548.

⁴²Cont. Gent., II, 90.

⁴³De Occultis Operationibus, (Mandonnet, Opuscula Omnia, I, 5).

⁴⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

There is for St. Thomas a very decided relationship between intellectual ability and the sense of touch and evenness of disposition, for we find such expressions of the great Saint as the following:

. . . quanto est melioris tactus, tanto est melioris intellectus, quia subtilitas tactus sequitur aequalitatem complexionis.⁴⁵

And again:

. . . unde etiam videmus quod molities carnis et bonitas tactus, quae aequalitatem complexionis demonstrant, sunt signa boni intellectus.⁴⁶

Also:

. . . et quod propter bonitatem hujus sensus etiam unus homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes. Molles enim carne (qui sunt boni tactus) aptos mente videmus.⁴⁷

Finally:

Et propter hoc homo inter animalia melioris est tactus. Et inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt melioris intellectus.⁴⁸

We can scarcely say that an idea that appears so frequently in the works of the Angelic Doctor was an inconsiderable one for their author. Indeed, St. Thomas insists that it is this very sense of touch which makes men, of all other animals, the most prudent, and makes man differ from man in mental cleverness. No other sense can lay claim to such importance. "Unde, quia homo habet optimum tactum, sequitur quod sit prudentissimum omnium aliorum animalium. Et in genere hominum ex sensu tactus accipimus, quod aliqui in-

⁴⁵In II Sent., D.1, q.2, a.5, c.

⁴⁶Cont. Gent., II, 90.

⁴⁷Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

⁴⁸Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, c.

geniosi sunt, vel non ingeniosi: et non secundum aliquem alium sensum."⁴⁹

The necessary corollary to this is that men whose flesh is hard are weak in intellectual power, and those whose flesh is soft are well-endowed in mind. This St. Thomas does not hesitate to affirm, for he continues his thought thus: "Qui enim habent duram carnem, et per consequens habent malum tactum, sunt inepti secundum mentem: qui vero sunt molles carne, et per consequens boni tactus, sunt bene apti mente. Unde etiam alia animalia habent duriores carnes quam homo."⁵⁰

St. Thomas accounts for this correspondence between aptitude of mind and the sense of touch in the following manner. Since touch is the foundation of all the other senses, and since the instrument of any other sense is also the instrument of the sense of touch, as we have before remarked, (Supra, footnote, 29), it is on this sense that a sensitive nature depends. He who has a better sense of touch will have, consequently, a more sensitive nature, and, therefore, in the mind of St. Thomas, a keener intellect. The reason for this is that excellence of touch is a disposition to excellence of intellect. This will not hold true for any other sense. One may, for example, have a more delicate sense of hearing without at the same time having a more sensitive nature, and so for all the other senses save only touch.

Sed dicendum est, quod duplici ex causa, bonitas mentis respondet bonitati tactus. Prima ratio est, quod tactus est fundamentum omnium aliorum sensuum: manifestum est enim, . . . illud, ex quo aliquid dicitur esse sensitivum, est sensus tactus. Unde ex hoc quod aliquis habet meliorem tactum, sequitur quod simpliciter habet meliorem

⁴⁹In II De Anima, lect., 19, n.483.

⁵⁰Ibid.

sensitivam naturam, et per consequens, quod sit melioris intellectus. Nam bonitas sensus est dispositio ad bonitatem intellectus. Ex hoc autem, quod aliquis habet meliorem auditum vel meliorem visum, non sequitur quod sit melius sensitivus vel melioris sensitivae simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid.⁵¹

Furthermore, goodness of touch is consequent upon goodness of complexion, and upon goodness of complexion nobility of soul follows because every form is proportionate to its matter. Wherefore we may conclude with St. Thomas that those whose touch is more perfect are nobler in soul and clearer in mind.

Alia ratio est, quia bonitas tactus consequitur bonitatem complexionis sive temperantiae. . . Ad bonam autem complexionem corporis sequitur nobilitas animae: quia omnis forma est proportionata suae materiae. Unde sequitur, quod qui sunt boni tactus, sunt nobilioris animae, et perspicacioris mentis.⁵²

A better sense of touch, then, denotes better intellect, and perfection of touch is consequent upon complexion and softness of the flesh, and also upon greater or less susceptibility to heat and cold, for St. Thomas gives this latter condition in the following passage.

Et ideo oportet quod sensus tactus tanto sit certior quanto complexio corporis est magis temperata, quasi ad medium reducta. Hoc autem maxime oportet in homine, ad hoc quod corpus ejus sit proportionatum nobilissimae formae. Et ideo homo inter alia animalia habet certissimum tactum, et per consequens gustum, qui est tactus quidem. Et huius signum est; quod homo minus potest sustinere vehementiam frigoris et caloris quam alia animalia; et etiam inter homines, tanto est aliquis magis aptus mente; quanto est melioris tactus; quod apparet in his qui habent molles carne, . . .⁵³

⁵¹In II De Anima, lect., 19, n.484.

⁵²Ibid., n.485.

⁵³De Sensu et Sensato, I, 9, (Ioannem Keerbergium, Antwerp, 1612, Tomus Tertius).

These qualities in the human body, to which we have just referred, are indications of a good intellect, but they are not all that is required. The act of understanding depends upon the interior sense faculties and so upon their organs, as well as upon the exterior senses and their organs, and the disposition of these interior organs will be a determinant factor in estimating the strength of mental power. Thus, after speaking of the impediment to understanding caused by the indisposition of the organs of the imagination, memory, and "vis cogitativa," to which we have previously called attention in chapter two, St. Thomas continues: "Et propter hoc etiam bonitas dispositionis corporis humani facit aptum ad bene intelligendum, in quantum ex hoc praedictae vires fortiores existunt."⁵⁴

Now, the disposition of these organs mentioned above depends upon the brain, and as man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, "Praecedit etiam homo omnia animalia, quantum ad vires sensitivas interiores; . . ."⁵⁵, he has the largest brain of all other animals in proportion to the size of his body.

Unde, quia ad bonam habitudinem potentiarum sensitivarum interiorum, puta imaginationis, et memoriae, et cogitativae virtutis, necessaria est bona dispositio cerebri; ideo factus est homo habens majus cerebrum inter omnia animalia, secundum proportionem suae quantitatis.⁵⁶

The two reasons that account for one man's being able to understand better than another are taken from these two dispositions; namely, the disposition of the body, and the disposition of the interior organs. The con-

⁵⁴Cont. Gent., III, 84.

⁵⁵Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ad lum., also I, q.78. a.4, c.

⁵⁶Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

ditions are thus presented by St. Thomas:

. . . unus alio potest eandem rem melius intelligere, quia est melioris virtutis in intelligendo; . . . Hoc autem circa intellectum contingit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo ex parte intellectus, qui est perfectior. Manifestum est enim quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto meliorem sortitur animam: quod manifeste apparet in his quae sunt secundum speciem diversa. Cujus ratio est, quia actus et forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae capacitatem: unde cum etiam in hominibus quidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam maioris virtutis in intelligendo. . . Alio modo contingit hoc ex parte inferiorum virtutum quibus intellectus indiget ad sui operationem: illi enim in quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum.⁵⁷

In the passage just cited, St. Thomas once again states that diversity and dignity of souls is derived from a diversity of bodies. As we noted in treating of the distinction of souls in the first chapter, if diversity of souls depended on diversity of the forms, that would entail a specific difference. Now this is untenable in the Thomistic system. ". . .differentia formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositione materiae, non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum numerum; sunt enim diversorum individuorum diversae formae, secundum materiam diversificatam."⁵⁸ The disposition of the rational soul follows the disposition of the body, then, partly because the rational soul receives something from the body, and partly because forms are diversified according to the diversity of the matter. ". . . ipsam dispositionem corporis sequitur dispositio animae rationalis; tum quia anima rationalis aliquid accipit a corpore; tum quia secundum

⁵⁷Sum. Theol., I, q.85, a.7, c.

⁵⁸Ibid., ad 3um.

diversitatem materiae diversificantur et formae."⁵⁹

The brain is an important part of the human body, and it is because of it that man, alone of all other animals, has an upright stature. In order that the brain may be freer in its operations, the head must be erect. This requires a high degree of heat in the heart, and this necessity, as we shall see later, (Infra, 66), affects the other senses.

. . . et ut liberior sit ejus operatio, habet caput sursum positum; quia solus homo est animal rectum, alia vero animalia curva incedunt; et ad hanc rectitudinem habendam et conservandam necessaria fuit abundantia caloris in corde, . . . ; cujus signum est quod in senio incurvatur homo, cum calor naturalis debilitatur.⁶⁰

That an upright stature is becoming to man, as well as necessary, St. Thomas gives four reasons. First, man was given his senses not merely to procure the necessaries of life, for which purpose they were given to other animals, but also to acquire knowledge. That accounts for their position chiefly in the face, for in this way, man can contact things above and below, and from all drink in knowledge and enjoyment,

. . . habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini, non solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad cognoscendum. . . solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilibus secundum seipsam. Et ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram, . . . homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et praecipue per visum, . . . libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat veritatem.⁶¹

⁵⁹Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad 7um.

⁶⁰Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

⁶¹Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ad 3um.

The second reason has been already given; namely, that the greater freedom of the brain requires an upright stature, (Supra, 60). The third is that if man were not of an erect posture, he would need to use his hands for feet, and thus would not have the free use of them for other purposes. "Tertio quia oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret."⁶²

St. Thomas gives as the fourth cause that the tongue of the human animal would become hard and protruding if it were employed as the instrument for acquiring food. This, moreover, would prove an impediment to speech, which is the natural vehicle of the reason.

Quarto quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum caperet ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium rationis.⁶³

Delicate touch, soft flesh, evenness of complexion, large brain, and upright stature, are, therefore, dispositions which are proper to bodies united to rational souls, and, consequently the human body is fittingly disposed for its form. Having noted these five elements, St. Thomas considers that he has sufficiently accounted for the construction of the human body, for he concludes: "Et per istum modum ratio dispositionis humani corporis est assignanda ad singula quae sunt homini propria; . . ."⁶⁴

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

But has he sufficiently accounted for the disposition of the human body? The human body is certainly not the most perfect possible of bodies, nor is it even so perfect as the bodies of many other animals in many respects. Now, surely, the most perfect of forms, such as is the rational soul, should have been united to the most excellent of bodies. This objection St. Thomas meets by conceding first of all that it is indeed true that other animals have a better sight, a more sensitive smell, a more acute hearing, greater agility in movement and the like, even natural clothing and arms of defense which men have not, but that also we must observe that the human body excels other bodies in touch, equability of temperament, brain, and that these are more desirable assets than those by which other animals surpass the human animal. Furthermore, we must remark that the human body had to be endowed just as it is in order to minister to the intellectual operation of the rational soul. For this, man's temperament must be of an even disposition, and to this evenness can be traced the explanation that human sight is not so keen and human audition not so delicate as the animal sight and hearing. This too prevents greater swiftness in movement, for excess in speed is repugnant to an equable temperament.

Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare quaedam animalia sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam homo, propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est consequi in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et eadem etiam ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam animalia sunt homine velociora, cui excellentiae velocitatis repugnat aequalitas humanae complexionis.⁶⁵

That human beings have poorer scent than other animals can likewise be

⁶⁵Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ad 1um.

accounted for in the following manner. For erect posture, as we have remarked elsewhere, (Supra, 60), there is required great heat in the heart. Now this heat must be moderated by a low temperature in the brain. For this low temperature, the brain must have great humidity, since the brain is large. Now, for the perfection of smell, much dryness is required, which dryness is impeded by the humidity of the brain. Wherefore, the olfactory sense is less powerful in man than in some other animals, whose brain, though large, does not have to be very damp as there is not so much heat in the heart to be counteracted.

Sicut homo, inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum. Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum: . . . tam etiam ut frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, quem necesse est in homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit rectae staturae. Magnitudo autem cerebri, propter eius humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, qui requirit siccitatem.⁶⁶

In place of natural weapons and clothing, men have been endowed with reason which can conceive a great variety of instruments and can choose the proper one for the proper circumstance, and with hands which are, as it were, the organ of organs. Other animals are guided by instinct and thus determined to this thing or that, but such necessity would not have been suited to the rational animal.

. . . alia animalia habent aestimativam naturalem determinatam ad aliqua certa; et ideo sufficienter potuit eis provideri a natura aliquilibus certis auxiliis; non autem homini, qui propter rationem est infinitarum conceptionum; et ideo loco omnium auxiliorum quae alia animalia naturaliter habent, habet homo intellectum, qui est species speci-

⁶⁶Ibid.

erum; et manus, quae sunt organum organorum, per quas potest sibi praeparare omnia necessaria.⁶⁷

Furthermore, horns and claws, feathers, thickness of skin, and such things are unsuited to the softness of flesh and equability of temperament which are essential to the human animal because these qualities indicate an abundance of the earthly element which cannot predominate in an even complexion such as is that of the human body.

. . . cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum, quae sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiae terrestris elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et teneritudini complexionis humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis. Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi paranda.⁶⁸

Another objection to the explanation of St. Thomas of the suitability of the human body is based upon the soul's distinction of being the most subtle of forms. Since it is that, why then should it not have been united to the most subtle of bodies? We have partially answered this in showing what must be the temperament of a body which was to excel in the sense of touch. (Supra, 33 et 34). We shall content ourselves with adding here only the words of St. Thomas which directly answer the question; namely, those wherein he states explicitly that the rational soul could not have been united to the most subtle of bodies, fire, for example, since then the matter could not have been reduced to an even disposition.

⁶⁷Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, ad 2^{um}.

⁶⁸Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ad 2^{um}.

. . . licet anima sit subtilissima formarum, in quantum est intelligens; quia tamen, cum sit infima in genere formarum intelligibilium, indiget corpori uniri, quod fit mediante complexione, . . . necessarium fuit quod corpus cui unitur, haberet plus in quantitate de gravibus elementis, scilicet terra et aqua. Cum enim ignis sit efficacissimae virtutis in agendo; nisi secundum quantitatem inferiora elementa excederent, non possent fieri commixtio, et maxime reducta ad medium; ignis enim alia elementa consumeret.⁶⁹

Furthermore, to no simple body could the rational soul be united, for in simple bodies contraries are in act and could not be reduced to a medium. We repeat this text:

In corporibus autem simplicibus non invenitur medium inter qualitates tangibiles, sed inveniuntur ipsae qualitates, secundum extremitatem contrarietatis. Et inde manifestum est, quod per nullum corpus simplex, nec per aliquid corporibus simplicibus vicinum, potest fieri sensus tactus.⁷⁰

And, although it was not fitting for the rational soul to be united to a heavenly body because such a body has no contraries and would not be a suitable instrument for touch, still the human body is most like this body in that it is most distant from contraries because of the evenness of its disposition.

De nobilitate autem corporis caelestis est, quod non habet contrarium; unde quanto plus corpus separatur a contrarietate, similis caelo efficitur . . . et ideo illud corpus quod venit ad maximam aequalitatem mixtionis, est simile caelo, et tale corpus debet esse corpus humanum;. . .⁷¹

That the human body has defects, and that these defects are, in a certain sense, natural to it, St. Thomas will not deny, nor will he seek to

⁶⁹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, ad 1um.

⁷⁰In III De Anima, lect., 18, n.867, cited also (Supra, 34)

⁷¹In II Sent., D.1, q.2, a.5, c.

evade the issue by falling back upon sin as the cause of the corruption, fatigue, subjection to disease, and the like disadvantages of the body, for he considers that sin did not detract from human nature, considered in its principles and the properties that flow from them. ". . . bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici: primo ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus ipsa natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae, et alia hujusmodi. . . Primum bonum naturae nec tollitur, nec diminuitur per peccatum."⁷²

To ascertain in what respect these defects can be said to be natural, we may note first of all the twofold meaning of the word 'natural.' A thing that has a nature is called natural. That is the first distinction. The second is that a property flowing from that nature is said to be natural, for example, to be lifted up is natural to fire. ". . . naturale dicitur dupliciter; vel id quod habet naturam, sicut dicimus corpora naturalia; vel illud quod consequitur naturam secundum naturam existens, sicut dicimus quod ferri sursum, est naturale igni: . . ."⁷³ It is in this latter sense of properties flowing from the nature of things that we shall consider whether death and such like defects are natural to man. ". . . et sic loquimur nunc de naturali, quod est secundum naturam."⁷⁴ Now, nature consists of matter and form. Something, therefore, may be natural to a thing according to the form or according to the matter. The act of heating is natural to fire according to form, for action follows form. On the other hand, the ability to

⁷²Sum. Theol., I-II, q.85, a.1, c.

⁷³Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c. For a further discussion of this point concerning nature, consult Aristotle, Physics, II, 1, 192bl.

⁷⁴Ibid.

be heated by fire, as in water, is natural to water, not as to its form, but as to its matter. And since form is more truly nature, so to speak, than is matter, what is natural to anything according to its form is more natural to it than what is merely natural according to its matter.

Unde cum natura dicatur dupliciter, scilicet forma et materia, dupliciter dicitur aliquid naturale: vel secundum formam, vel secundum materiam. Secundum formam quidem, sicut naturale est igni quod calefaciat nam actio consequitur formam; secundum materiam, autem, sicut aquae est naturale quod ab igne calefieri possit. Cumque forma sit magis natura quam materia, naturalius est quod est naturale secundum formam quam quod est naturale secundum materiam.⁷⁵

The natural condition of matter can likewise be viewed from two different aspects. There is one condition of matter that makes it suitable for such and such a form. This is matter considered in relation to its end, and this is what is looked to by the agent when he selects matter for some definite purpose, for he needs must choose those qualities which will be useful to the thing he proposes to fashion. The second condition of matter is that which follows of necessity from the very nature of the matter itself. This consequent is not according to matter's suitability to its form, for it may even be repugnant to the form, and, therefore, this is not chosen in the matter nor intended by the maker when he seeks the best matter for the form he has in mind.

Sed id quod consequitur materiam, dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum congruit formae; et hoc est quod agens eligit in materia: alio modo non secundum quod congruit formae, immo forte repugnat etiam formae et fini, sed ex necessitate materiae; et talis conditio non est electa

⁷⁵Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.

vel intenta ab agente; . . .⁷⁶

There are, therefore, certain conditions in matter which make a certain matter proper for a certain form and certain conditions which have no relation to the form but which follow of necessity from the matter. The former are what the agent seeks in making something, and not the latter, as we find St. Thomas again affirming: ". . . sed tamen considerandum est, quod in his quae sunt ex materia, sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia, propter quas talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; et sunt aliquae quae consequuntur ex necessitate materiae, et non ex electione agentis; . . ."⁷⁷

Now, whatever is destined for an end will be so constituted as to serve to the attainment of that end, as is clear in artificial things especially. ". . . ea quae sunt ad finem, instituuntur secundum rationem finis, ut patet praecipue in artificialibus."⁷⁸ Since God created all natural things, each thing can, consequently, be called a work of art, and God, a Divine Artist. The Divine Artist, as any human artist, desires to give to each of His productions the best disposition in view of the purpose for which the object is intended. This best disposition may not, however, be the very best absolutely, but only relatively, and it may even be compatible with many defects. An example may illustrate this more clearly. A man wants to fashion a saw. This saw must cut, and must, therefore, be made of matter which may not indeed be the most beautiful, or entirely free from undesirable accidents such as subjection to rust, dullness, and the like, but which will be capable of

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

⁷⁸In II Sent., D.19, q.1, a.2, c.

serving or fulfilling the end of the saw; namely, to cut. Iron, as a consequence, and not glass, will be selected by the fabricator of this instrument.

. . . omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina: unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad finem. Et si talis dispositio habet secum adiunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui facit serram ad secandam, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad secandam; nec curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior materia, quia talis pulchritudo esset impedimentum finis. Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem.⁷⁹

And also:

. . . sicut ad faciendam serram artifex eligit duritiem in ferro, ut sic serra utilis ad secandam; sed quod acies ferri hebetari possit et fieri rubiginosa, hoc accidit ex necessitate materiae.⁸⁰

Furthermore, these undesirable qualities which are not suited to a form or to its end, would willingly be excluded from the matter proper to the conceived end, if this were possible, but since it is not, they must be accepted and accounted for, not by their final cause, but rather by their material cause. It is for this reason that the agent who acts in view of an end and who looks to the final cause of the thing should not be called to task for conditions which flow from the matter itself.

Invenitur tamen in ferro aliqua conditio secundum quam ferrum non habet aptitudinem nec ad formam nec ad finem, sicut quod est frangibile vel contrahens rubiginem vel aliquid hujusmodi, quae sunt impeditiva finis; unde non sunt electa

⁷⁹Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, c.

⁸⁰Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

ab agente, sed magis ab agente repudiarentur, si esset possibile. Unde . . . in accidentibus individui non est quaerenda causa finalis sed solum causa materialis: proveniunt enim ex dispositione materiae, non ex intentione agentis.⁸¹

These principles, then, namely, that something may be natural to a form and not natural to the matter, and vice versa, and that matter itself has certain conditions which give it an aptitude for a certain form and other conditions which are necessitated by the very qualities of the matter and which may even be repugnant to the form, will make clear, perhaps, in what sense, we may affirm that the defects of the human body are natural to man and also in what respect the human body has the best possible disposition. According to the form of man, understanding, willing, and such operations, are natural to him. "Sic ergo homini est aliquid naturale secundum suam formam, ut intelligere, velle, et alia hujusmodi; . . ."⁸² Also, according to his form, incorruptibility is natural to man because, as St. Thomas holds, every form intends perpetual being in so far as it can, but only the rational soul whose being does not wholly depend upon matter, since it has immaterial operations, can achieve it.

Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse, quantum potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae; quinimo habet propriam operationem immaterialem, . . . Unde ex parte suae formae naturalior est homini incorruptio quam aliis rebus corruptibilibus.⁸³

⁸¹Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Sum. Theol., I-II, q.85, a.6, c. also, Cont. Gent., II, 79.

Now, the rational soul is destined to eternal beatitude and, consequently, is adapted to its end by reason of its immortality. But the human body which has the rational soul for its proximate end is adapted to that end in one way, but in another way it is not. ". . . forma hominis, quae est anima rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatem, proportionata est suo fini, qui est beatitudo perpetua; sed corpus humanum, quod est corruptibile, secundum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo proportionatum est suae formae, et quodammodo non."⁸⁴ It is adapted to the soul in that it is so constructed that it may serve the soul in its acquisition of knowledge. For this reason the human body had to be composed of contraries, as has been previously stated, (Supra, 36, et sqq.), and in this sense it is matter proportionate to its form.

Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam; . . . Secundum aptitudinem quidem ad formam, necessarium est corpus humanum esse ex elementis compositum, et medie complexionatum. . . Unde corpus congruens tali animae fuit corpus contrariis compositum.⁸⁵

Now, anything composed of contraries is subject to corruption, for contraries are the ". . . causa corruptionis in rebus, . . ."⁸⁶ This corruption is an absolute necessity since it is inseparable from the matter itself. ". . . cum necessitas corruptionis sit necessitas absoluta, utpote proveniens ex ipsa materia, . . ."⁸⁷ It is according to this condition following upon matter that the human body is not adapted to its form. "Quod autem sequitur

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.

⁸⁶In II Sent., D.19, q.1, a.2, c.

⁸⁷In II De Anima, lect., 7, n.317.

ex necessitate materiae quod sit corruptibile, secundum hanc conditionem non habet aptitudinem ad formam, sed magis repugnantiam ad formam."⁸⁸

If, however, there could be found in nature any body composed of elements which would, at the same time, be incorruptible, that body would certainly be adapted to the rational soul, that is to say, proportionate according to the nature of the soul, and not merely according to the end intended. As far as that goes, we may say the same for any other thing. If iron could be found which would be unbreakable and not subject to rust, that would be the iron most suited to a saw, but since there exists no such iron, the hard and breakable kind must suffice. So, too, with regard to the human body. Since only corruptible matter can be found which will, at the same time, be organic and composed of contraries, such matter must be taken for union with the rational soul.

Unde si in natura inveniri potuisset aliquod corpus ex elementis compositum quod esset incorruptibile, proculdubio tale corpus esset conveniens animae secundum naturam; sicut si posset inveniri ferrum infrangibile et rubiginem non contrahens, esset convenientissima materia ad serram, et talem artifex quaereret; sed quia talis inveniri non potest accipit qualem potest, scilicet duram vel frangibilem. Et similiter quia natura non potest invenire corpus ex elementis compositum quod secundum naturam materiae sit incorruptibile, aptatur naturaliter animae incorruptibili corpus organicum licet corruptibile.⁸⁹

⁸⁸Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.

⁸⁹Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c., also Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8.c. "Magis enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam non consequeretur, si posset inveniri; sed quia inveniri non potest, propter hujusmodi defectus consequentes non praetermittit ex hujusmodi materia convenienti facere opus. Sic igitur et in corpore humano contingit; quod enim taliter sit commixtum et secundum partes dispositum, ut sit convenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est electum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptibile, fatigabile et hujusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic mixtum ex contrariis subjacere talibus defectibus."

Neither can it be said that God could have done otherwise, for in the formation of natural things, we do not inquire what God could effect, but what the nature of things permits to be done. "Nec potest obviari per hoc quod Deus potuit aliter facere: quia in institutione naturae non quaeritur quid Deus facere potuit, sed quid rerum natura patitur ut fiat, . . ."90

However, God provided man with a remedy for these defects by the gift of immortality of which man rendered himself unworthy by sin.

Sed quia Deus, qui est hominis institutor, hanc necessitatem materiae sua omnipotentia potuit prohibere ne in actum prodiret, ejus virtute collatum est homini ante peccatum ut a morte praeservaretur quousque tali beneficio se reddidit peccando indignum; sicut et faber praestaret ferro ex quo operatur, si posset, quod numquam frangeretur.⁹¹

Likewise:

Sciendum tamen est, quod in remedium horum defectuum Deus homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium justitiae originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae, quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nec mors nec aliqua passio vel defectus homini accideret, nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficio; et subjacet defectibus secundum quod materiam requirit.⁹²

St. Thomas concludes, then, that death and corruption are natural to man according to the necessity of matter, but according to his form, immortality is proper to him. "Sic ergo mors et corruptio naturalis est homini secundum necessitatem materiae; sed secundum rationem formae esset ei conveniens immortalitas. . . Et in quantum immortalitas est nobis naturalis, mors et corruptio est nobis contra naturam."⁹³

90Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

91Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.

92Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, c.

93Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.

This will suffice to show that the human body has a disposition suited to the rational soul because this very disposition was determined by the needs themselves of that soul. The proximate end of the human body is the human soul, and since matter is always for the form and not the form for the matter, it was fitting that the body should have been so disposed as to be an instrument suited to minister to the operations of the form to which it was united. Because the intellectual operation of the rational soul depends in some sense upon the sensitive nature of the body, that body had to be an apt subject for sensation with many sense organs required by the diverse activities of the soul. Furthermore, it had to be composed of contraries and constituted of a medium complexion that it might have a delicate touch, which is the foundation of all the senses and which is more perfect in man than in any other animal. Soft flesh, large brain in proportion to his body, erect posture were also necessary to man, and, therefore, the human body was given these. In many things it may be surpassed by other animals, and we may also add, is not free from defects proper to itself, but these defects considering the nature of the rational soul, could not have been avoided, and thus we come to a further problem concerning the body; namely, Can the body be considered to be a burden to the soul? In the light of Thomistic principles we shall discuss this subject in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE BODY IS NOT A HINDRANCE TO THE SOUL

If we consider man in his nature, apart from original sin, we may say that St. Thomas will, in no sense, consider the body a burden to the soul. If, on the other hand, we approach this subject from the view-point of fallen and sinful man, then there is a sense in which the Angelic Doctor will concede that the body is a hindrance to the soul.

First of all, let us look at man as God made him. He is a composite substance, a unity resulting from the union of two incomplete substances, one of which, the soul, though capable of an independent existence, yet requires, in a very real sense, the other part, the body, for its full perfection. Now, if the rational soul attains the perfection of its nature through its union with the body, it surely cannot be said that through this self-same union it suffers an impediment. ". . . non est in detrimentum animae quod corpori uniatur, sed hoc est ad perfectionem naturae."¹

Furthermore, if the body occupies such an important place in the exercise of the soul's operations, as we have seen it does, it certainly cannot be said to hinder these operations, for nature would not unite one thing to another if that other impeded the operations of the higher substance since nature seeks in such a combination rather to facilitate these activities than to obstruct them in any way. "Nulli autem rei natura adjunxit per quod sua

¹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.2, ad 14^{um}.

operatio impediatur, sed magis ea per quae fiat convenientior."² Union of the soul with the body is, therefore, for the perfection of the soul in its nature and in the exercise of its operations, for, as St. Thomas expresses it: "Anima unitur corpori ut perficiatur non solum quantum ad intelligere phantasmaticum, sed etiam quantum ad naturam speciei, et quantum ad alias operationes quas exercet per corpus."³

To hold that man's proper operation, understanding, is impeded by the body, (as those maintained who were of the opinion that souls existed in another world before they came to bodies and forgot through this very contact the knowledge they had had previously), is to affirm that man is an unnatural being, a consequential position which is, for St. Thomas, unthinkable.

Videtur etiam sequi ex hac opinione quod unio animae ad corpus non sit naturalis: nam quod est naturae alicui non impedit ejus propriam operationem. Si igitur unio corporis impedit intelligentiam animae, non erit naturale animae corpori uniri, sed contra naturam; et ita homo qui constituitur ex unione animae ad corpus, non erit aliquid naturale: quod videtur absurdum.⁴

Such a doctrine that the body is a check upon the intellectual operation of the soul suggests, moreover, that the union of soul and body is not for the sake of the soul but rather of the body. But it is unfitting that the soul, which is the nobler of the two, should, for the purpose of the body's ennoblement, suffer an impediment to its proper operation because of this very contact with and ennoblement of the body.

Sed secundum hanc opinionem non videtur quod possit

²Cont. Gent., II, 83.

³Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.1, a.3, ad 11um.

⁴Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.15, c.

assignari rationabilis causa propter quam anima corpori uniat. Non enim est hoc propter animam; cum anima corpori non unita perfecte propriam operationem habere possit, et ex unione ad corpus ejus operatio propria impeditur. Similiter etiam non potest dari quod propter corpus; non enim anima est propter corpus, sed corpus magis propter animam, cum anima sit nobilior corpore. Unde et inconveniens videtur quod anima ad nobilitandum corpus sustineat in sua operatione detrimentum.⁵

If the soul, through union with a body, did not reach by this very means, its ultimate perfection, it would be of a different nature, and, consequently, we must admit, if we agree with St. Thomas, that according to the nature which it has, the soul cannot better attain its end than through its union with the body. "Si anima non esset corpori unibilis, tunc esset alterius naturae; unde secundum hanc naturam quam habet, non potest melius ad divinam bonitatem accedere quam per hoc quod unitur corpori."⁶ Through the exercises it performs through its body or with that body's help, it arrives at its terminus, beatitude. "Et etiam secundum operationes quas in corpore exercet, ad divinam beatitudinem accedit merendo..."⁷

The end of man, for St. Thomas, is to arrive at the contemplation of truth, for, as he affirms, the last end of anything is that which it reaches through the exercise of its proper operations. Now, all the proper activities of man lead him to a contemplation of truth, and it was for this reason that his soul was given a body; namely, that through it he might acquire knowledge, not that he might forget or lose it.

. . . ultimus finis rei cujuslibet est id ad quod res per-

⁵Ibid.

⁶In II Sent., D.1, q.2, a.4, ad 1^{um}.

⁷Op. cit., c.

venire nititur per suas operationes. Sed per omnes proprias ordinatas operationes et rectas homo pervenire nititur in veritatis contemplationem; nam operationes virtutum activarum sunt quaedam preparationes et dispositiones ad virtutes contemplativas. Finis igitur hominis est pervenire ad veritatis contemplationem. Propter hoc igitur anima est unita corpori; quod est esse hominem. Non igitur, per hoc quod unitur corpori, scientiam habitam perdit; sed magis ei unitur ut scientiam acquirat.⁸

Elsewhere, we find the same thought expressed as follows:

Ultima perfectio animae humanae consistit in cognitione veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc quod perficiatur anima in cognitione veritatis, indiget uniri corpori, quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt sine corpore.⁹

However, it is just here that the difficulty begins. The ultimate perfection of the natural intelligence of rational substances consists in the knowledge of separated substances, but in this life, because of its union with the body, the soul cannot have a direct knowledge of these, and in that sense at least, the body would seem to be an impediment. Not for St. Thomas, who holds that it was not in vain that the soul was united to the body; rather it was precisely that it might more perfectly attain that knowledge which is proper to it that the soul was given a body.

. . . ultima perfectio cognitionis naturalis animae humanae, haec est ut intelligat substantias separatas; sed perfectius ad hanc cognitionem habendam pervenire potest per hoc quod in corpore est, quia ad hoc disponitur per studium, et maxime per meritam; unde non frustra corpori unitur.¹⁰

Certainly, St. Thomas will admit that this knowledge of separated substances is only the kind that is acquired through intelligible species ab-

⁸Cont. Gent., II, 83.

⁹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.1, c.

¹⁰Op. Cit., a.17, ad 3um.

stracted from the phantasms, but this mode is the one proper to the human intellect, and for it union with the body is an absolute necessity, rather than an obstacle.

. . . finis ad quem se extendit naturalis possibilitas animae humanae, est ut cognoscat substantias separatas secundum modum praedictum; et ab hoc non impeditur per hoc quod corpori unitur; et similiter etiam in tali cognitione substantiae separatae ultima est felicitas hominis ad quam per naturalia pervenire potest.¹¹

As for admitting that the body hinders the soul from seeing God in His essence, that would be impossible for St. Thomas, since it is, according to his thought, impossible for any created intellect with or without a body to attain to a knowledge or vision of God in His essence unless that intellect receive some special help from God. "Non est autem possibile quod ad istum visionis divinae modum aliqua creata substantia ex virtute propria possit attingere."¹² Furthermore, to see God in His essence belongs properly to the Divine Nature, and since that Essence transcends the limit of any created nature, it belongs properly to no other nature. The action of God, therefore, is needed to enable anyone to have a direct sight of God.

Videre autem Deum per ipsam essentiam divinam est proprium naturae divinae. . . quidquid excedit limites alicujus naturae, non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem ulterius; sicut aqua non tendit sursum nisi ab aliquo alio mota. Videre autem Dei substantiam transcendit limites omnis naturae creatae. Nam cujuslibet naturae intellectualis creatae proprium est, ut intelligat secundum modum suae substantiae. Substantia autem divina non potest sic intelligi, . . . Impossibile est ergo perveniri ab aliquo intellectu creato ad visionem divinae substantiae, nisi per actionem Dei, qui omnem creaturam transcendit.¹³

¹¹Op. cit., a.16, ad 1um.

¹²Cont.Gent., III, 52.

¹³Ibid., also Q. Disp. De Veritate, q.10, a.11, c.

It is not our intention to penetrate further into this problem which more properly finds place in the Thomistic theory of knowledge, but we call attention to it here just in so far as it is necessary to show in what sense the body is not an impediment to the soul. It is obvious that the rational soul, though made for the vision of God, ". . . quamvis intellectus noster sit factus ad hoc quod videat Deum. . ."14, could not attain that vision even without the body were it not given a special light by God to do so. Consequently, in this point at least, the body is not a burden to the soul. It is because of the finite nature of the soul, and for no other reason, that this must be the case.

Cum autem ad visionem divinae substantiae intellectus creatus quodam supernaturali lumine sublimetur, . . . non est aliquis intellectus creatus ita secundum suam naturam infirmus, qui non ad hanc visionem possit, elevari. . . lumen illud non potest esse alicui creaturae connaturale, sed omnem creatam naturam excedit secundum virtutem.15

From the standpoint, then, of nature, it is to the soul's advantage to be in a body since only there can it acquire perfection, but, considered practically and not theoretically, the body can be a burden to the soul and that fact St. Thomas does not hesitate to face and trace to original sin.

When treating of the disposition of the body, we saw that it was necessary for the body to be corruptible because composed of contraries. Now, it is this very corruptibility which St. Thomas considers to be an obstacle to the soul. We find in his works many expressions which suggest this burden of

14Q. Disp. De Veritate, q.10, a.11, ad 7^{um}. (Marietti, III)

15Cont. Gent., III, 57, Cf. John F. McCormick, "The Burden of the Body," (The New Scholasticism, October, 1938, XII, no. iv, 398).

the body as deriving from its corruption. In answering the objection that the body is an impediment to the soul in its knowledge of truth, he explicitly states that the soul's mode of understanding, though natural to the human soul, is yet below that of spiritual superior substances, and that even in its own characteristic mode it suffers an impediment from the corruption of the body. ". . . iste modus cognoscendi est naturalis animae, ut percipiat intelligibilem veritatem infra modum quo percipiunt spirituales superiores, accipiendo scilicet eam ex sensibilibus; sed in hoc etiam patitur impedimentum ex corruptione corporis, . . ."16

And again he tells us that the intellectual light in man is shadowed through union with the body, and is impeded so that it cannot freely perceive even naturally knowable truths--, but here again he assigns the cause to the corruptibility of the body.

Lumen intellectuale ubi est purum sicut in angelis, sine difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter demonstrat, ita quod in eis est omnia naturalia cognoscere: in nobis autem lumen hujusmodi est obumbratum per conjunctionem ad corpus et ad vires corporeas, et ex hoc impeditur, ut non possit libere veritatem etiam naturaliter cognoscibilem inspicere secundum illud Sapient., IX, 15. 'Corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem.' Et ex hoc est, quod non est in nobis omnino veritatem cognoscere, scilicet propter impedimenta sed unusquisque hoc magis vel minus habet in potestate secundum quod lumen intellectuale est in ipso purius.¹⁷

Likewise, we find St. Thomas affirming that it is difficult for man to turn to his beatitude for two reasons. One is that it is beyond his nature,

16Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.2, ad 15^{um}.

17In Boeth. de Trinitate, q.1, a.1, ad 4^{um}.

and the other that he is impeded by the corruption of the body and the infection of sin. "Converti autem ad beatitudinem ultimam, homini quidem est difficile et quia est supra naturam, et quia habere impedimentum ex corruptione corporis et infectione peccati."¹⁸

Furthermore, St. Thomas assigns three reasons why the mind is prevented from being wholly absorbed in God, two of which, sin and temporal affairs, he can eliminate, but the third which results from the burden of a corruptible body, he must retain.¹⁹

It is thus evident that the body does weigh upon the soul, and that that depression in this life cannot be lifted. Man would fain find rest in God, but he is prevented from so doing by that which the Apostle can call the body of this death. That contemplation of truth which would give him the coveted rest in God man can only desire, not fully attain, because the body inclines

¹⁸Sum. Theol., I, q.62, a.2, ad 2^{um}.

¹⁹Q. Disp. De Caritate, q.1, a.10, c. (Marietti, II) "Impeditur autem homo in hac vita, ne totaliter mens ejus in Deum feratur, ex tribus. Primo quidem ex contraria inclinatione mentis; quando scilicet mens per peccatum conversa ad commutabile bonum sicut ad finem, avertitur ab incommutabile bono. Secundo per occupationem secularium rerum, . . . Tertio vero ex infirmitate praesentis vitae, cujus necessitatibus oportet aliquatenus hominem occupari, et retrahi, ne actualiter mens feratur in Deum; dormiendo, comedendo, et alia hujusmodi faciendo, sine quibus praesens vita duci non potest; et ulterius ex ipsa corporis gravitate anima deprimitur, ne divinam lucem in sui essentia videre possit, ut ex tali visione caritas perficiatur; secundum illud Apostoli, II ad Cor., v, 6; 'Quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem.' Homo autem in hac vita potest esse sine peccato mortali avertante ipsum a Deo; et iterum potest esse sine occupatione temporalium rerum, . . . Sed ab onere corruptibilis carnis in hac vita liber esse non potest. Unde quantum ad remotionem primorum duorum impedimentorum, caritas potest esse perfecte in hac vita; non autem quantum ad remotionem tertii impedimenti, et ideo illam perfectionem caritatis quae erit post hanc vitam, nullus in hac vita habere potest, nisi sit viator et comprehensor simul; quod est proprium Christi."

the soul to earthly truths.

Non est autem in contemplatione contentio et certamen ex contrarietate veritatis quam contemplamur; sed ex defectu nostri intellectus, et ex corruptibili corpore, quod nos ad inferiora retrahit, secundum illud (Sapient., ix, 15): 'Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem.' Et inde est quod quando homo pertingit ad contemplationem veritatis, ardentius eam amat: sed magis odit proprium defectum et gravitatem corruptibilis corporis, ut dicat eum Apostolo (Rom., vii, 24): 'Infelix ego homo! quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?'²⁰

The human body because of its corruptibility is then a decided burden to the rational soul in that highest intellectual act; namely, contemplation.

But is this susceptibility to corruption the only sense in which the Angelic Doctor considers that the body weighs upon the soul? St. Thomas tells us that when the soul is separated from the body, it will understand more freely than when in it because the weight and care of the body dims the intellectual clarity of the soul in this life. ". . . anima separata est quidem imperfectior, si consideretur natura qua communicat cum natura corporis: sed tamen quodammodo est liberior ad intelligendum, in quantum per gravedinem et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiae impeditur."²¹ And he further reminds us that there is no doubt that through corporeal movement and sense occupation the soul is hindered from receiving the impressions of separated substances, and that, therefore, it is only during sleep or upon withdrawal from sense activity that men can receive revelations.

Nec tamen dubium est quin per motus corporeos et occupationem sensuum anima impediatur a receptione influxus substantiarum separatarum: unde dormientibus et alienatis a sensibus quae-

²⁰Sum. Theol., II-II, q.180, a.7, ad 2um.

²¹Sum. Theol., I, q.89, a.2, ad 1um.

dam revelationes fiunt quae non accidunt sensibus utentibus.²²

Withdrawal from the senses, then, is a necessary condition for higher understanding, for the reception of impressions from separated substances, and for knowledge of the future.

Nam anima, quando impeditur ab occupatione circa corpus proprium, redditur debilior ad intelligendum aliqua altiora; unde et virtus temperantiae, quae a corporeis delectationibus retrahit animam, praecipue facit homines ad intelligendum aptos; homines etiam dormientes, quando corporeis sensibus non utuntur nec est aliqua perturbatio humorum aut fumositatum impediens, percipiunt de futuris, ex superiorum impressione, aliqua quae modum ratiocinationis humanae excedunt; et hoc multo magis accidit in syncopizantibus et extasim passis, quanto magis fit retractio a corporeis sensibus.²³

And again:

. . . anima quando abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior redditur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium substantiarum; et etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus qui ex impressionibus causarum naturalium in imaginatione humana relinquuntur, a quibus percipiendis anima impeditur cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata.²⁴

Now, although dependence upon the senses does prove an impediment to the reception of knowledge from a higher source than phantasms, this should be no argument to prove that the body is a burden because knowledge that does not come to the intellect through the senses is not natural to it even when the soul is separated from the body, for St. Thomas says: ". . . modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri: sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et

²²Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.15, c.

²³Cont. Gent., II, 81.

²⁴Sum. Theol., II-II, q.172, a.1, ad 1um.

similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam."²⁵

If that were the extent to which St. Thomas concedes that the body is a burden, we might well give his answer to the difficulty of the body's corruptibility and dismiss the subject, but the problem is not so easily solved, and before we attempt an explanation of the first real obstacle, we must consider that St. Thomas maintains that the senses not only impede higher knowledge, but also that knowledge which is in very truth proportionate to the rational intellect, and that the passions, too, have their share in the depression of the soul by the body.

St. Thomas insists that in this life we can know higher things through lower ones, causes through their effects, and, so too, the First Cause through His effects. That mode is quite within the nature of the human mind. "Unde nec per hanc viam cognosci Deus altiori modo potest quam sicut causa cognoscitur per effectum."²⁶ But even for this knowledge of effects we must admit, St. Thomas says, that sense occupation is an impediment to a full and lucid comprehension of them. "A consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a sensibilibus, et circa se occupatur."²⁷

Corruptibility and sense distraction are thus two weights upon the soul caused by its union with the body which St. Thomas recognizes as impediments to understanding. The third is found in the human passions.

²⁵Op. cit., I, q.89, a.1, c.

²⁶Cont. Gent., III, 48.

²⁷Sum. Theol., I, q.94, a.1, c., Cf. McCormick, op. cit., 396.

. . . homini sunt impedimenta plurima perveniendi ad finem. Impeditur enim debilitate rationis, . . . Impeditur etiam ex passionibus partis sensitivae et ex affectionibus quibus ad sensibilia et inferiora trahitur; quibus quanto magis inhaeret, longius ab ultimo fine distat; haec enim infra hominem sunt, finis autem superior eo existit.²⁸

The act of contemplation is hindered through the vehemence of the passions which incline the soul's attention to sensibles, he states in the following: "Impeditur actus contemplationis, in quo essentialiter consistit vita contemplativa, et per vehementiam passionum, per quam abstrahitur intentio animae ab intelligibilibus ad sensibilia, et per tumultos exteriores."²⁹ It is, however, because the soul does not rule the body that such a hindrance must be recognized, as St. Thomas says: ". . . nunc autem impeditur ex corporis unione, propter hoc quod anima non perfectae dominatur in corpus."³⁰

Now, how can St. Thomas insist so strongly upon this naturalness of the union existing between the soul and its body, as we have seen he does, and still grant that this body, which is such a burden, is yet for the soul's good? All these defects that we have noted, St. Thomas will answer us, flow from man's nature considered from the aspect of his matter. A body composed of elements must needs be corruptible. Desires in man are necessary if the senses are, and the struggle consequent upon desires flows from the necessity of the matter itself. "Pugna quae est in homine ex contrariis concupiscentiis etiam ex necessitate materiae provenit; necesse enim fuit si

²⁸Cont. Gent., III, 147.

²⁹Sum. Theol., II-II, q.180, a.2, c.

³⁰Q. Disp. De Pot., q.5, a.10, ad 6^{um}.

homo haberet sensum, quod sentiret delectabilia et quod eum sequeretur concupiscentia delectabilium quae plerumque repugnat rationi."³¹

All this St. Thomas admits. Man is subject to corporeal and spiritual defects, and these can, in a certain sense, be attributed to matter.

Posset tamen aliquis dicere hujusmodi defectus, tam corporales quam spirituales, non esse poenales, sed naturales defectus ex necessitate materiae consequentes. Necesse est enim corpus humanum, quum sit ex contrariis compositum, corruptibile esse, et sensibilem appetitum in ea quae sunt secundum delectabilia moveri, quae interdum sunt contraria rationi, et intellectum possibilem, quum sit in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, nullum eorum habens in actu, sed ex sensibus natum ea acquirere, difficulter ad scientiam veritatis pertingere et de facili propter phantasmata a vero deviare.³²

However, he continues, and we must consider this as his answer in so far as an answer can be given, if we think rightly on the matter, we must conclude that God would not have united the soul to a body which would naturally impede it unless at the same time He gave to the soul some special help whereby these aforesaid consequences necessarily following upon matter would in no wise be a check upon the rational nature.

Sed tamen, si quis recte consideret, satis probabiliter poterit aestimare, divina providentia supposita, quae singulis perfectionibus congrua perfectibilia coaptavit, quod Deus superiorem naturam inferiori ad hoc conjunxit ut ei dominaretur, et, si quod hujus domini impedimentum ex defectu naturae contingeret, ejus speciali et supernaturali beneficio tolleretur; ut scilicet, quum anima rationalis sit altioris naturae quam corpus, tali conditione credatur corpori esse conjuncta quod in corpore aliquid esse non possit contrarium animae, per quam corpus vivit; et similiter, si ratio in homine appetitui sensuali conjungitur et aliis sensitivis potentiis, quod

³¹Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, ad 7um.

³²Cont. Gent., IV, 52.

ratio a sensitivis potentiis non impediatur, sed magis eis dominetur.³³

St. Thomas can only conclude, therefore, that from the standpoint of faith, and that indeed is the only reasonable standpoint, man, in the beginning, was free from those defects which are consequent upon matter, and that it was only after the advent of sin that he became subject to the full possibilities of his lower nature.

Sic igitur, secundum doctrinam fidei, ponimus hominem a principio taliter esse institutum quod, quamdiu ratio hominis Deo esset subjecta, et inferiores vires ei sine impedimento deservirent et corpus ab ejus subjectione impediri non posset per aliquid impedimentum corporale, Deo et sua gratia supplente quod ad hoc perficiendum natura minus habebat; ratione aversa a Deo, et inferiores vires a ratione repugnarent et corpus vitae, quae est per animam, contrarias passiones susciperet. Sic igitur, hujusmodi defectus, quamvis naturales homini videantur, absolute considerando humanam naturam ex parte ejus quod est in ea inferius, tamen, considerando divinam providentiam et dignitatem superioris partis humanae naturae, satis probabiliter probari potest hujusmodi defectus esse poenales.³⁴

The body of the first man, then, in the light of the above citation, was proportioned to the human soul according to that which was required of it by nature; namely, that it should be a fitting instrument through which the human intellect could be perfected, but it was also proportionate to the soul according to grace since the defects belonging to the very nature of the body were to prove in no way burdensome to the soul. ". . . corpus Adam fuit proportionatum humanae animae, . . . non solum secundum quod requirit natura, sed secundum quod contulit gratia: qui quidem privamur, natura manente ea-

³³Ibid.

³⁴Cont. Gent., IV, 52.

dem."³⁵ Because of its noble form, the body was destined to live forever, and although incorruptibility was not natural to it according to the active principles of nature, nevertheless it was natural to it in view of its end, to wit, that it should be matter suited to its rational and incorruptible form, as is said by St. Thomas:

Deus, . . . in institutione humanae naturae aliquid corpori humano attribuit supra id quod ei ex naturalibus principiis debebatur, scilicet incorruptibilitatem quamdam, per quam convenienter suae formae coaptaretur; ut, sicut animae vita perpetua est, ita corpus per animam posset perpetuo vivere: et talis quidem incorruptibilitas, etiam si non esset naturalis quantum ad activum principium, erat tamen quodammodo naturalis ex ordine ad finem, ut scilicet materia proportionaretur suae naturali formae, quae est finis materiae.³⁶

It is thus evident that the soul of man was to suffer no impediment from the corruptibility of his body, and this conclusion is in full accord with reason, for it was fitting that the rational soul which exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter should have been granted a power whereby it could preserve the body in a way that would surpass the capacity of corporeal matter.

Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existens; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quamdiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis materiae, . . . conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam corporalis materiae.³⁷

³⁵Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, ad 6^{um}.

³⁶Cont. Gent., IV, 81.

³⁷Sum. Theol., I, q.97, a.1, c.

As for the need of phantasms and corporeal organs which seem to be an impediment to knowledge, that was always natural to man even before sin. The human intellect, then as now, was obliged to revert to the phantasms for understanding.

Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod ex hoc quod anima est accomodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde et hic modus intelligendi etiam animae primi hominis competebat.³⁸

The knowledge of separated substances which the first man had was not perfect, but this imperfection came, not from the fact that the body was an obstacle to the soul, but because the connatural object of the human intellect fell short of the excellence of separated substances. In the present state of man, his knowledge is imperfect for both the above reasons.

. . . hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravatione corporis; sed ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem deficimus propter utrumque.³⁹

Adam, consequently, in the view of St. Thomas, did not have direct knowledge of God in His essence. Nevertheless, he knew God more perfectly than we can know Him because he suffered no impediment to a clear and strong understanding of intelligible effects.

Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderentur et superiora, ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non impediabatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis

³⁸Op. cit., q.94, a.2, c.

³⁹Ibid., ad 2um.

percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita.⁴⁰

With regard to the hindrance which comes to man in his present state through the passions and through the rebellion of the body, St. Thomas replies that the soul had complete mastery over the body in the primitive state of innocence. "Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori perficiendo et gubernando accommodata, sicut et nunc: . . . Sed huius vitae integritatem habebat, in quantum corpus erat totaliter animae subditum, in nullo impediens, . . ."41

There have always been passions in man, but in the first human being there were none with evil as their object.

. . . omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant, . . . similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt esse praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri ut suo tempore habendi, et desiderium et spes non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae.⁴²

But the lower powers could not act against the reason then.

Sed contra hoc etiam homini fuit datum remedium in statu innocentiae, ut scilicet inferiores vires in nullo contra rationem moverentur.⁴³

As for the passions constituting a check upon man, even in his fallen state, we need only say that, for St. Thomas, these passions, considered in themselves, are neither morally good nor morally evil. When they are subjected to reason, then they deserve to be termed morally good, when not,

⁴⁰Sum. Theol., I, q.94, a.1, c.

⁴¹Ibid., a.2, c.

⁴²Sum. Theol., I, q.95, a.2, c.

⁴³Q. Q. Disp. De Anima, q.1, a.8, ad 7um.

morally evil.

. . . *passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus; sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, . . . Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum vel malum morale.*⁴⁴

The passions can be mighty forces for good in the perfecting of human beings or mighty forces for evil. They incline to virtue when controlled by reason and to sin, when not. ". . . *passiones animae, in quantum sunt praeter ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum: in quantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutem.*"⁴⁵ Furthermore, we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions.

*Sed secundum passiones absolute consideratas neque laudamur neque vituperamur. Non enim aliquis laudatur neque vituperatur ex hoc quod absolute timet vel irascitur sed solum ex hoc quod aliquialiter timet vel irascitur, idest secundum rationem vel praeter rationem.*⁴⁶

By no means, therefore, are passions diseases of the soul unless they are unchecked by reason. "Non enim *passiones dicuntur morbi, vel purbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione rationis.*"⁴⁷ Rather are they important factors in man's moral good because that good, since it is based on reason, will be all the more perfect as it has reference to more things pertaining to man.

⁴⁴Sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.1, c.

⁴⁵Op. cit., a.2, ad 3um.

⁴⁶In II Eth. lect., 5, n.300, (P. Fr. A. Pirota, Marietti, Tarini, Italy, 1934), also Sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.1, ad 3um.

⁴⁷Sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.2, c.

Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omne motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones moderatae per rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae homini conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus possit obedire ratione, . . . ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem.⁴⁸

It is only in man, however, that good depends upon the proper ordering of the passions and the bodily activities, for in God and the Angelic Spirits, there is neither sensitive appetite nor bodily members. ". . . in Deo et in angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeum actuum, sicut in nobis."⁴⁹

It might be useful to pause at this point in order to ascertain that part which St. Thomas assigns to the passions in the life of the will. That they have a share must be evident from the very fact that the rational soul is decidedly a human soul and reaches its perfection in a human way, and this way does not exclude the passions.

We must first remark that just as this great Christian philosopher insists that the intellect is not exercised through a corporeal organ, so does he assert that the will, which, in his thought, is in the reason, is an entirely immaterial and incorporeal power, not dependent on any material organ. "Voluntas enim, . . . est in ratione. Ratio autem est potentia non alligata

⁴⁸Op. cit., a.3, c.

⁴⁹Ibid., ad 2um.

organo corporali. Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea."⁵⁰

However, the intellectual appetite, or will, can be moved by the sensitive appetite. ". . . ex parte obiecti appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem."⁵¹ And the sensitive appetite, furthermore, is the act of a bodily organ, ". . . appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporali."⁵²

Now, if the will is moved by the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite depends upon a corporeal organ, it seems clear that the disposition of that organ will affect the sensitive appetite, and, in a certain sense, the will.

Est autem sciendum quod appetitus sensitivus in hoc differt ab appetitu intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas, quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus organi corporalis non autem voluntas. Omnis autem actus utentis organo dependet non solum ex potentia animae, sed etiam ex corporalis organi dispositione; sicut visio ex potentia visiva et qualitate oculi per quam iuvatur vel impeditur. Unde et actus appetitus sensitivi non solum dependet ex vi appetitiva, sed etiam ex dispositione corporis.⁵³

Before we consider just what influence the passions exercise over the sensitive appetite and, therefore, over the will, we must first note that the movements of the sensitive appetite which use corporeal organs are what we mean here by passions, and that these passions are, consequently, always accompanied by some bodily alteration. ". . . passiones sunt motus appetitus sensitivi qui utitur organo corporali. Unde omnes cum aliqua corporali

⁵⁰Sum. Theol., I-II, q.9, a.5, c.

⁵¹Op. cit., I-II, q.9, a.2, c., also, Op. cit., I-II, q.10, a.2, c.

⁵²Op. cit., I-II, q.9, a.5, ad 3^{um}.

⁵³Sum. Theol., I-II, q.17, a.7, c.

transmutatione fiunt."⁵⁴

Now, as to the influence exerted upon the free will of man by these passions, we can say that in the exercise of its act, the will can be moved necessarily by no finite object, for regardless what object is presented to man, he has it in his power not to will it actually. However, the will can be moved as to the specification of its act, which it derives from the object. ". . . voluntas movetur dupliciter: uno modo, quantum ad exercitum actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex objecto."⁵⁵ This is where the passions of the sensitive part enter. They can move the will just in so far as the will is moved by its object. The reason for this is that the will is moved by what man apprehends to be good. Now, the passions can make an object appear to man good and fitting at one time which he would not judge to be so at another time. ". . . passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab objecto, inquantum scilicet homo aequaliter dispositus per passionem iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum, quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret."⁵⁶

The object which influences the will must be a suitable good which is apprehended. That is evident. Furthermore, the good apprehended as good and desirable must be apprehended as such in particular and not just in general. Moreover, unless the object appears to be desirable from every possible angle, the will can be inclined to it under one particular aspect rather than under another, and one of the three elements that can color man's

⁵⁴In IV Eth., lect., 17, n.867, also Q. Disp. De Verit., q.26, a.1, c.

⁵⁵Sum. Theol., I-II, q.10, a.2, c.

⁵⁶Op. cit., a.3, c.

perception of the good, is, according to St. Thomas, the disposition of the body, for as a man is, so will the good seem to him.⁵⁷

As an example of this, we know that the will of the man who is angry is moved to something quite different from that to which the calm man's will is directed in much the same way as food is looked upon as desirable by the healthy man, and undesirable by the man who is ill. "Unde aliter movetur ad aliquid voluntas irati et voluntas quieti, quia non idem est conveniens utriusque; sicut etiam aliter acceptatur cibus a sano et aegro."⁵⁸ It is because the sensitive appetite changes man's disposition, therefore, that he judges a certain thing to be appropriate or not appropriate, and it is in this fashion that the will can be moved by the sensitive appetite on the part of the object.

Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur; conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet. Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus non eodem modo accipit aliquid, ut conveniens, et ut non conveniens. . . Manifestum est autem quod secundum appetitus sensitivi immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem; unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur ipsi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur ei extra passionem existens; sicut

⁵⁷Q. Disp. De Malo, q.6, a.1, c. "Patet ergo quod si consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte exercitii actus, non movetur ex necessitate; si autem consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte objecti determinantis actum voluntatis ad hoc vel illud volendum, considerandum est, quod objectum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum; . . . requiritur ut id quod apprehenditur ut bonum et conveniens apprehendatur ut bonum et conveniens in particulari, et non in universali tantum. . . Et quod voluntas feratur in quod sibi offertur magis secundum hanc particularem conditionem quam secundum aliam, potest contingere tripliciter. . . Tertio vero modo contingit ex dispositione hominis; quia, . . . qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."

⁵⁸Ibid.

irato videtur bonum quod non videtur quieto; et per hunc modum ex parte obiecti appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem.⁵⁹

Is this bodily disposition subject to reason? In so far as it precedes the act of the sensitive appetite, that is to say, in so far as a man may be disposed to one passion rather than another in respect of his physical constitution, it is not. But in so far as his condition is consequent upon the act of the sensitive appetite, for example, in so far as man becomes heated by anger, this condition can be subject to reason.

. . . qualitas corporalis dupliciter se habet ad actum appetitus sensitivi: uno modo, ut praecedens, prout aliquis est aliquammodo dispositus secundum corpus ad hanc vel illam passionem; alio modo, ut consequens, sicut eum ex ira aliquis incalescit. Qualitas igitur praecedens non subiacet imperio rationis; quia vel est ex natura, vel ex aliqua praecedenti motione, quae non statim quiescere potest. Sed qualitas consequens sequitur imperium rationis, . . .⁶⁰

Now, what bearing has all this, which looks like a digression, upon the question of the burden of the body? Just this, that we must think of man as a composite of body and soul, destined to be that, not so made by chance or an accident or sin or by any other such unnatural cause. Man was so fashioned that from the very beginning he was to reach his intellectual and moral perfection through his human body working with his rational soul. Senses and sensitive appetite are natural to the human being, and what belongs to that creature by nature was neither given him nor taken away from him when he fell from his Creator's friendship. "Ea quae sunt naturalia homini neque substra-

⁵⁹Sum. Theol., I-II, q.9, a.2, c.

⁶⁰Sum. Theol., I-II, q.17, a.7, ad 2um.

hantur, neque dantur per peccatum."⁶¹ It is not, then, a matter of surprise to us to find that St. Thomas teaches that man will attain a greater perfection of moral good if his sense appetite as well as his rational appetite moves him to it.

Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod Psal., LXXXIII, 3, dicitur: 'Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum,' ut 'cor' accipiamus pro appetitu intellectivo, 'carnem' autem pro appetitu sensitivo.⁶²

The power to love and hate, to desire and hope, dare and fear, and all the rest are certainly necessary for complete human perfection, and all these passions belong not to the soul alone, nor to the body alone, but to the composite. "Passiones autem sunt communes totius compositi ex anima et corpore, cum pertineant ad partem sensitivam."⁶³

Nor does virtue consist in the complete cessation of the passions, for St. Thomas affirms that they have spoken ill who were of such convictions and for this reason:

. . . quod totaliter a virtuoso volunt excludere animae passiones. Pertinent enim ad bonum rationis ut regulentur per eam appetitus sensitivus, cujus motus sunt passiones. Unde ad virtutem non pertinent quod excludat omnes passiones, sed solum inordinatas, quae sunt ut non oportet et quando non oportet et quaecumque alia adduntur pertinentia ad alias circumstantias.⁶⁴

Thus spoke the human saint, and because this common-sense philosopher

⁶¹Sum. Theol., I, q.98, a.2, c.

⁶²Op. cit., I-II, q.24, a.3, c.

⁶³In X Eth., lect.12, n.2114.

⁶⁴In II Eth., lect.3, n.272, also Sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.1 and 2.

and profound Christian never forgets that man is a unity of body and soul, he will never permit that his intellectual or moral perfection be accomplished without the body having its full share of contribution. ". . . anima enim indiget corpore ad consecutionem sui finis, in quantum per corpus perfectionem acquirit, et in scientia, et in virtute, . . ."65

A body so essential as an instrument to an intellectual soul cannot constitute a real burden to it, but since the soul is situated midway between two worlds, it must incline toward the higher to have its full perfection, and that can only be had by a corresponding withdrawal from the lower.

". . . quia, quum anima humana sit in confinio corporum et incorporearum substantiarum, quasi in horizonte existens aeternitatis et temporis, recedens ab infimo appropinquat ad summum; . . ."66

If the body can be said to shadow the intellectual light of the soul, it is precisely because the soul's nature is the lowest in the order of intellectual substances and can only receive its light veiled and, as it were, through the instrumentality of matter, which necessarily obscures the brilliant rays of the purely intelligible. But, viewed in itself, the body is no weight upon the soul, but an absolute necessity for the soul's development in this life.

Substantiae enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet animae, habent esse affine corpori, in quantum sunt corporum formae: et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus, et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur: alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Cont. Gent., III, 144.

⁶⁶Op. cit., II, 81.

⁶⁷Sum. Theol., I, q.55, a.2, c., also, McCormick, op. cit., 400.

That the body is, in a certain sense, necessary even in the next life for the perfection of the happiness of the rational soul, we shall now endeavor to establish in our final chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY FOR THE FULL PERFECTION OF ITS FINAL HAPPINESS

The important place that the human body occupies in the life of the rational soul has now been sketched, and from the standpoint of reason presents no difficulty as to the naturalness and necessity of the soul's union with the body.--But the soul when separated!--That is another aspect to the question and offers a little more of a problem. The soul has its being independent of matter. It needed matter for its perfection in this life, but it always felt somewhat burdened by a corruptible body so that when the time came for corruption of that body according to the laws of nature, one might expect this noble and rational substance to heave a sigh of relief, wing its flight to higher, purer regions, rejoicing in its liberation from the ties that bound it to anything corporeal, forever free to soar amid eternal, unchanging, spiritual realities.

For those, indeed, who looked upon the union of soul and body as something accidental, an unnatural, burdensome relationship, such a conception might well prove satisfactory, but for St. Thomas, what was natural once is natural always, and, consequently, the human soul will never be all that it should be until it again meets its body. To be forever separated from its proper matter would be contrary to the nature of the rational soul, and what is against nature cannot continue forever. The soul will last forever; it cannot last forever without its body. Reason assures us that the immortality

of the soul requires the future resurrection of the body.

Ostensum est enim (Liber II, 79) animas hominum immortales esse. Remanent igitur post corpora a corporibus absolutae. Manifestum est etiam . . . quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur, est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Quum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam corpori iterato conjungi: quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram.¹

There is, however, one sense in which separation from the body can be said to be natural to man, and another in which it cannot. If we consider the subject from the point of view of the body, as we have remarked previously, (Chapter III, p. 98), we must admit that corruption is natural to it, and that without the special preservation which it was destined to receive from the soul, the body is subject to death, and thus separation of soul and body, considered with reference to the body, is natural to man. On the other hand, if we have regard to the nature of the soul and the disposition which was given to the body in the beginning, severance of the rational form from its human matter is accidental and contrary to nature. "Si igitur ad naturam corporis respiciatur, mors naturalis est. Si vero ad naturam animae et ad dispositionem, quae propter animam supernaturaliter humano corpori a principio indita fuit, est per accidens, et contra naturam, cum naturale sit animam corpori esse unitam."²

Further, we are told that union with the body belongs to the soul by reason of its nature, and that when it is separated from the body, it will

¹Cont. Gent., IV, 79.

²Comp. Theol., I, 152.

retain its aptitude and natural inclination for the body. An illustration of this St. Thomas takes from a consideration of a light body. According to that body's nature, it is proper to it to be lifted up, but the light body remains light when taken from its proper place; yet it keeps an aptitude and an inclination towards that place. So, too, the soul, when separated from the body keeps its own being, but it does not lose its aptitude and natural inclination for union with its body.

. . . secundum se convenit corpori levi esse sursum. Et sicut corpus leve manet quidem leve cum a loco proprio fuerit separatum, cum aptitudine tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.³

Desire for reunion with the body will remain in the separated soul, and there will not be perfect rest of will until the soul rejoins its body, since the will cannot attain perfect peace as long as it is the subject of a natural desire left unfulfilled.

Considerandum est autem, quod non potest esse omnimode immobilitas voluntatis, nisi naturale desiderium totaliter impleatur. Quaecumque autem nata sunt uniri secundum naturam, naturaliter sibi uniri appetunt: unumquodque appetit id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam. Cum igitur anima humana naturaliter corpori uniatur, . . . naturale ei desiderium inest ad corporis unionem. Non poterit igitur esse perfecta quietatio voluntatis, nisi iterato anima corpori conjungatur, quod est hominem a morte resurgere.⁴

In the preceding chapters, we devoted some attention to the fact that the body is necessary for the soul's substantial and accidental perfection.

³Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.1, ad 6^{um}.

⁴Comp. Theol., I, 151.

Here, we shall investigate what St. Thomas has to say concerning the body's relation to the soul's final perfection.

Man's final perfection, which is perfect beatitude or happiness, consists in the divine vision. "Consummatio autem hominis est in adeptione ultimi finis, qui est perfecta beatitudo, sive felicitas quae consistit in divina visione, . . ."⁵ Now, St. Thomas holds that the final perfection of anything requires the first perfection of that thing, the first perfection of anything being that it should be perfected in its nature, and the final that it should attain its end. For the human soul to be fully perfected as regards its end, it must, therefore, be perfected in its nature, and that nature requires to be united to a human body. The nature of the soul is that it should be part of man as his form, and as no part has its perfection outside the whole, the rational soul must be united to its body to have the full perfection of its nature, not only at the beginning of its existence, but always.

Item, finalis perfectio requirit perfectionem primam: prima autem perfectio uniuscujusque rei est ut sit perfectum in sua natura, finalis vero perfectio consistit in consecutione ultimi finis. Ad hoc igitur quod anima humana omnimode perficiatur in fine, necesse est quod sit perfecta in sua natura, quod non potest esse nisi sit corpori unita. Natura enim animae est ut sit pars hominis ut forma: nulla autem pars perfecta est in sua natura, nisi sit in suo toto. Requiritur igitur ad ultimam hominis beatitudinem, ut anima rursus corpori uniatur.⁶

The rational soul, therefore, in the ultimate perfection of the human

⁵Op. cit., 149.

⁶Comp. Theol., I, 151.

species, cannot forever be without the human body. ". . . anima in perfectione ultima speciei humanae esse non potest a corpore separata: unde nulla anima in perpetuum remanebit a corpore separata: . . ."7

The soul without the body is imperfect, and as everything naturally desires perfection, final happiness for man cannot be attained unless the full perfection of his nature is assured.

. . . naturale hominis desiderium ad felicitatem tendere. Felicitas autem ultima est felicitis perfectio. Cuicumque igitur deest aliquid ad perfectionem nondum habet felicitatem perfectam, quia nondum ejus desiderium totaliter quietatur; omne enim imperfectum perfectionem consequi naturaliter cupit. Anima autem a corpore separata est aliquo modo imperfecta, sicut omnis pars extra suum totum existens: anima enim naturaliter est pars humanae naturae. Non igitur homo potest ultimam felicitatem consequi, nisi anima iterato corpori jungatur; praesertim quum ostensum sit quod homo in hac vita non potest ad felicitatem ultimam pervenire.⁸

Absolutely speaking, however, for man's perfect happiness which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, the body is not necessary because that vision does not depend upon the body, since the intellect will not require the phantasms for the understanding of the Divine Essence.

Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem intelligibilem contuetur, . . . Manifestum est autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, . . . Unde cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata.⁹

⁷In IV Sent., D.43, q.1, a.1, s.2, c., (Venice, Simon Occhi, 1780, Tomus, XIII)

⁸Cont. Gent., IV, 79.

⁹Sum. Theol., I-II, q.4, a.5, c.

St. Thomas does not, however, leave that statement as it stands, for he qualifies it by distinguishing the two ways in which something may pertain to another's perfection.: in one way so as to constitute the essence of the thing, and in that sense the body does not belong to the perfection of human happiness, because the essence of man's happiness is not in his body; in a second way as being necessary for the well being of that thing, and in this latter sense the perfection of human happiness does require that the soul be reunited to the body. The reason that this is so is that since operation follows the nature of a thing, the more perfect the soul is in its nature, the more perfectly will it exercise its proper operation, in which its beatitude consists.

Sed sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid pertinet. Uno modo ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius: sicut pulchritudo corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae non pertineat pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quanto anima perfectior erit in sua natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua felicitas consistit.¹⁰

As long, therefore, as the soul is separated from the body it is prevented from enjoying the entire perfection of its happiness. This hindrance, however, is not one of opposition, but rather one of defect. It simply means that the soul has not all that it needs to make it perfect in every way. It is happy, but it cannot tend with all its strength to its last end because it desires that its enjoyment in beholding God should overflow into

¹⁰Ibid.

the body in so far as that can be. And, consequently, so long as the soul is not united to the body, it rests in its delight in God in such a way that it still desires to have its body participate in its own happiness.

. . . dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris: et tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad omnimodam eius perfectionem requiritur; et tale impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae perfectionis ipsius. Et sic separatio animae a corpore dicitur animam retardare, ne tota intentione tendit in visionem divinae essentiae. Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile; et ideo quamdiu ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo, quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum corpus pertingere.¹¹

Besides being contrary to faith and well-established authority, the position of those who deny the reunion of the soul with the body is, therefore, likewise untenable from the standpoint of reason. St. Thomas is so convinced, both by his faith and by his reason, that bodies will one day find again their noble forms that he can say that the souls of the saints do not enjoy the Divine vision so perfectly before the resurrection as afterwards.

Sed haec positio praeter hoc quod est fidei contraria, ut ex auctoritatibus inductis et pluribus aliis patere potest, etiam a ratione discordat. Non enim perfectio beatitudinis esse poterit ubi deest naturae perfectio. Cum autem animae et corporis naturalis sit unio, et substantialis, non accidentalis, non potest esse quod natura animae sit perfecta, nisi sit corpori conjuncta; et ideo anima separata a corpore non potest ultimam perfectionem beatitudinis obtinere. Propter quod . . . animae sanctorum ante resurrectionem non ita perfecte fruuntur divina visione sicut postea; unde in ultima

¹¹Sum. Theol., I-II, q.4, a.5, ad 4um.

perfectione beatitudinis oportebit corpora humana esse animabus unita. . .¹²

Indeed, this must be the case, for the human body has been ordained to the soul, not according to man's animal life, but rather according to the perfection of his nature, and, this very body with such a destiny, though composed of contraries, will not forever be subject to corruption.

Corpus etiam hominis ordinatur ad hominem, non secundum animalem vitam, sed ad perfectionem naturae ipsius. Et quamvis corpus hominis sit ex contrariis compositum, inerit principium incorruptibile, quod poterit praeservare a corruptione absque violentia, cum sit intrinsecum.¹³

It should be clear, then, that St. Thomas affirms that reason demands the resurrection of the body, but what kind of body? Will a body composed of contraries, equipped with sense organs, and the like, be a fitting partner to the separated soul?

As St. Thomas sees it, the body must be of the same nature after the resurrection as before, and this for the following reasons: First, the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Now, every form must have its determinate matter, and since the soul will be of the same specific nature, the body must also be of the same specific nature. The risen body will, consequently, be composed of flesh and bones and other such parts.

. . . anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae. Omnis autem forma habet determinatam materiam: oportet enim esse proportionem actus et potentiae. Cum igitur anima sit eadem secundum speciem, videtur quod habeat eandem materiam secundum speciem. Erat ergo idem corpus secundum speciem post resurrectionem et ante; et sic oportet quod sit consistens ex carnibus et ossibus, et

¹²Q. Disp. De Pot., q.5, a.10, c.

¹³Ibid.

aliis hujusmodi partibus.¹⁴

Since the body is to be the same in the essentials after its reunion with the soul as it was while united to it while on earth, all its members will likewise rise. This St. Thomas explains in the following manner. The soul is related to the body not only as form and end but also as efficient cause, for it is related to the body as art is related to the art effect. Now, whatever is explicitly revealed in the product of the art is wholly and originally contained in the art itself, and likewise whatever appears in the parts of the body is originally contained in a certain manner in the soul. Furthermore, just as the art is not perfected if its exterior expression lacks something which is contained within the art itself, so neither can man be perfected unless all that is contained implicitly in the soul is exteriorly manifested in the body, for in the contrary case the body would not be completely proportionate to the soul. Therefore since in the resurrection the body is to be completely proportionate to the soul because it will only rise according to the relation it has to the rational soul, we must conclude

¹⁴Cont. Gent., IV, 84.

that a perfect man will rise with all the members which are now in his body.¹⁵

To explain this a little more clearly, we may say that St. Thomas considers the members of the body as related to the soul in a two-fold manner, either according to the relation of matter to its form, or according to the relation of an instrument to the agent, for one and the same is the proportion of the whole body to the whole soul and of parts to parts. If, therefore, we take the members of the body as under the first relationship, their end is not their operation, but rather their end is the perfection of the species, and this use of the members of the body; namely, to complete the body in its species, will be required even after the resurrection. If, on the other hand, we take the members of the body in view of their second relationship in which their end is their operation, even though they will not all be used after the resurrection to enable the soul to exercise its activities, they will still have a decided utility in showing forth the powers of the soul. According to St. Thomas, then, we must conclude that although all

¹⁵In IV Sent., D.44, a.1, a.2, s.1, c. ". . . anima habet se ad corpus non solum in habitudine formae, et finis, sed etiam in habitudine causae efficientis: est enim comparatio animae ad corpus, sicut est comparatio artis ad artificiatum, . . . Quidquid autem explicite in artificiato ostenditur, hoc totum implicite, et originaliter in ipsa arte continetur: et similiter etiam quidquid in partibus corporis apparet, totum originaliter, et quodammodo implicite in anima continetur. Sicut ergo artis corpus non esset perfectum, si artificiato aliquid deesset eorum quae ars continet; ita nec homo posset esse perfectus, nisi totum quod in anima implicite continetur, exterius in corpore explicetur; nec etiam corpus ad plenum proportionaliter responderet animae. Cum ergo oportet in resurrectione corpus hominis esse animae totaliter correspondens, quia non resurgit nisi secundum ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem; oportet etiam hominem perfectum resurgere; utpote quod ad ultimam perfectionem consequendam reparatur: oportet quod omnia membra quae nunc sunt in corpore, in resurrectione hominis reparentur."

the members of the human body will not retain the same functions they performed while the body was united to the soul on earth, they will be in the risen body to reveal the potencies of the rational soul and to enable the body to be a perfect human body.

. . . membra dupliciter possunt considerari in comparatione ad animam: vel secundum habitudinem materiae ad formam, vel secundum habitudinem instrumenti ad agentem. Eadem est enim comparatio totius corporis ad totam animam, et partium ad partes, . . . Si ergo membrum accipiatur secundum primam comparationem, finis eius non est operatio, sed magis perfectum esse speciei; quod etiam post resurrectionem requiretur. Si autem membrum accipiatur secundum secundam comparationem, sic finis eius est operatio, nec tamen sequitur quod quando deficit operatio, frustra sit instrumentum: quia instrumentum non solum servit ad exequendam operationem agentis, sed ad ostendendum virtutem ipsius: unde oportebit ut virtus potentiaturum animae instrumentis corporis demonstratur, etsi numquam in actum prodeant, ut ex hoc commendatur Dei sapientia.¹⁶

It is likewise necessary that the same body should rise again for yet another reason. In the definition of natural things, St. Thomas tells us, the essence of a species is signified, and in that definition matter finds its place. Now, if the matter should vary specifically the species of the natural thing would have to vary. Since man is a natural thing, if he does not resume the same specific body, he will not be of the same species and can be called a man only equivocally.

. . . cum in definitione rerum naturalium, quae significat essentiam speciei, ponatur materia, necessarium est quod variata materia secundum speciem, varietur species rei naturalis. Homo autem res naturalis est. Si igitur post resurrectionem non habebit corpus consistens ex carnibus et ossibus, et hujusmodi partibus, sicut nunc habet, non

¹⁶In IV Sent., D.44, q.1, a.2, s.1, ad 1^{um}.

erit qui resurget, ejusdem speciei, sed dicitur homo tantum aequivoce.¹⁷

Thirdly, the human body must be the same because man must rise the same in number. In the thought of St. Thomas, man would seem to have been made in vain if he does not arrive, the same in number, at the end for which he was fashioned. He must have the same soul and the same body when he rises as that which he had while on earth; otherwise, there would not be a resurrection, properly so called.

. . . necessitas ponendi resurrectionem est ex hoc ut homo finem ultimum propter quem homo factus est, consequatur; quod in hac vita fieri non potest, nec in vita animae separatae, . . . alias vane esset homo constitutus, si ad finem ad quem factus est, pervenire non posset. Et quia oportet quod illud idem numero ad finem perveniat quod propter finem factus est, ne in vanum factum esse videatur, oportet quod idem numero homo resurgat; et hoc quidem sit cum eadem anima eidem numero corpori coniungitur, . . . alias enim non esset resurrectio proprie loquendo, nisi idem homo repararetur.¹⁸

Again, in refuting those who denied the resurrection, St. Thomas affirms once more that for any resurrection the same thing that falls must rise again; otherwise there is no resurrection. This applies especially to the body.

Et praedicti errores haeticorum destrui possunt ex hoc quod veritati resurrectionis praediudicant, quam sacra Scriptura profitetur. Non enim resurrectio dici potest, nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat: quia resurrectio est iterata surrectio; eiusdem autem est surgere, et cadere: unde resurrectio magis respicit corpus quod post mortem vivit: et ita si non est idem corpus quod anima resumit, non dicitur resurrectio, sed magis novi corporis assumptio.¹⁹

¹⁷Cont. Gent., IV, 84.

¹⁸In IV Sent., D.44, q.1, a.1, s.2, c.

¹⁹Op. cit., D.44, q.1, a.1, s.1, c.

Also:

. . . differentia quae est inter animam resurgentis: et animam in hoc mundo viventis, non est secundum aliquid essenziale, sed secundum gloriam et miseriam; quae differentiam accidentalem faciunt: unde non oportet quod aliud corpus numero resurgat, sed alio modo se habens, ut respondeat proportionabiliter differentia corporum differentiae animarum.²⁰

Now, in order that man should rise the same in number, the essential parts of man must be the same in number. ". . . ad hoc quod homo idem numero resurgat, necessarium est quod partes ejus essentielles sint eodem numero. Si igitur corpus hominis resurgentis non erit ex his ossibus ex quibus nunc componitur, non erit homo resurgens idem numero."²¹

Identity of essential principles is necessary that a thing should be the same in number. The principles of a human being are matter and form, and, therefore, the matter that rejoins the human soul must be essentially the same as that to which it was first united. St. Thomas again expresses this as follows:

. . . ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiritur identitas principiorum essentialium. Unde quodcumque principiorum essentialium, etiam in ipso individuo, varietur, necesse est etiam identitatem variari. Illud autem est essenziale cujuslibet individui quod est de ratione ipsius; sicut cuilibet rei materiali sunt essentialia materia et forma: unde si accidentia varientur et mutantur, remanentibus principiis, essentialibus individui, ipsum individuum remanet idem. Cum ergo principia essentialia hominis sint anima et corpus, et haec remaneant, quia resurget eadem anima et idem corpus; dicendum, quod corpus hominis resurget idem numero.²²

²⁰Op. cit., D.44, q.1, a.1, s.1, ad 2^{um}.

²¹Cont. Gent., IV, 84.

²²Q. Quodl. XI, q.6, a.6, c. (Marietti, V).

However, since there has been a substantial corruption, the resurrection cannot take place through the action of nature, but only by the divine power.

Ea vero quae secundum substantiam corrumpuntur, non reiterantur eadem numero secundum operationem naturae, sed solum secundum speciem. . . Cum igitur corpus humanum per mortem substantialiter corrumpatur, non potest operatione naturae idem numero reparari. Cum igitur hoc exigit resurrectionis ratio, . . . consequens est quod resurrectio hominum non fiet per actionem naturae, . . . sed resurgentium reparatio sola virtute divina fiet.²³

The human body, therefore, will be of the same specific nature. It cannot become a spirit, for in order that one thing may be transformed into another, each must have matter, but a spiritual substance cannot have matter in it. "Ponere enim corpus transire in spiritum est omnino impossibile. Non enim transeunt invicem, nisi quae in materia communicant. Spiritualium autem et corporalium non potest esse communicatio in materia, cum substantiae spirituales sint omnino immateriales, . . ." ²⁴ Furthermore, if the human body were converted into a spiritual substance, it would be transformed either into the spiritual substance of the soul, or into some other spiritual substance. If into that of the soul, then after the resurrection man would be nothing but soul, as he is before the resurrection when the soul is in a state of separation from the body. The resurrection, then, would have no effect upon the condition of man. If, on the other hand, the body were changed into some other spiritual substance, it would follow that from the union of two spiritual substances some one thing in nature would result. That would be impossible because every spiritual substance is 'per se' subsistent.

²³Comp. Theol., I, 154.

²⁴Cont. Gent., IV, 84.

. . . si transeat in substantiam spiritualem corpus humanum, aut transibit in ipsam spiritualem substantiam quae est anima, aut in aliquam aliam. Si in ipsam, tunc post resurrectionem non esset in homine nisi anima; sicut et ante resurrectionem. Non igitur immutaretur conditio hominis per resurrectionem. Si autem transibit in aliam substantiam spiritualem, sequetur quod ex duobus aliquid unum in natura; quod est omnino impossibile, quia quaelibet substantia spiritualis est per se subsistens.²⁵

Nor will the human body become like to air or wind or any such thing, for man's body, like the body of any animal, must have a determinate figure both in the whole and in the parts. Now, a body with a determined figure must be in itself terminable because a figure is something which is comprehended in its term or terms, and air is terminable not in itself, but in something else.

Similiter etiam impossibile est quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit quasi aereum, et ventis simile. Oportet enim corpus hominis et cujuslibet animalis habere determinatam figuram in toto et in partibus. Corpus autem habens determinatam figuram, oportet quod sit in se terminabile, quia figura est quae termino, vel terminis comprehenditur; aer autem non est in se terminabilis, sed solum termino alieno terminatur. Non est ergo possibile quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit aereum vel ventis simile.²⁶

This is again proved by considering that the body that is to rise must have the sense of touch because without it the body would not be animal, and, if not animal, then not the human body. Now, neither air nor any other simple body could be susceptible to touch because such a body would not be a medium of contraries.

. . . corpus hominis resurgentis oportet esse tactivum, quia sine tactu nullum est animal: oportet autem ut

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Cont. Gent., IV, 84.

resurgens sit animal, si sit homo. Corpus autem aereum non potest esse tactivum sicut nec aliquod corpus simplex, quum oporteat corpus, per quod fit tactus, esse medium inter qualitates tangibiles, ut sit quodammodo in potentia ad eas, . . . Impossibile est igitur quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit aereum et simile ventis.²⁷

For the same reason, the risen body cannot be a celestial body since such a heavenly body could not be an organ of touch as it has no contraries either in act or in potency.

Ex quo etiam apparet quod non poterit esse corpus coeleste. Oportet enim corpus hominis et cujuslibet animalis esse susceptivum tangibilium qualitatum ut jam dictum est. Hoc autem corpori coelesti non potest convenire, quia non est neque calidum, neque frigidum, neque humidum neque siccum, neque aliquid hujusmodi vel actu, vel potentia. . . Corpus igitur hominis resurgentis non erit corpus coeleste.²⁸

We must, therefore, conclude that the body which the rational soul will resume after the resurrection will be neither a heavenly body, nor an airy one, nor that of any other animal, but it will be a human body composed of flesh and bones and the same members which it had while body and soul were united in this earthly life. "Non enim resumet anima in resurrectione corpus coeleste, vel aereum, vel corpus alicujus alterius animalis, . . . sed corpus humanum ex carnibus et ossibus compositum organicum eisdem organis, ex quibus nunc consistit."²⁹

The disposition of risen bodies, however, will not be the same as is that of bodies still united to their souls before dissolution sets in, for the corruptibility which weighed upon the soul will no longer be present in

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Comp. Theol., I, 153.

the risen body, and the rebellion of man's lower nature will no longer drag his higher nature down. The reason that this must be is again taken from the principle that the body is for the soul and the condition of the risen body must be proportionate to that of the separated soul.

Quia vero corpus est propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et organum propter artificem, animae vitam praedictam consecutae tale corpus in resurrectione adjugetur divinitus, quale competat beatitudini animae. . . Quae enim propter finem sunt disponi oportet secundum exigentiam finis. Animae autem ad summum operationis intellectualis pertingenti non convenit corpus habere, per quod aliquo modo impediatur, aut retardetur. Corpus autem humanum ratione suae corruptibilitatis impedit animam et retardat, . . . Corpora igitur resurgentium beatorum non erunt corruptibilia, et anima retardantia ut nunc, sed magis incorruptibilia, et totaliter obedientia ipsi animae, in nullo ei resistent.³⁰

All risen bodies will, therefore, be incorruptible.

Disponetur igitur corpus communiter omnium secundum convenientiam animae, ut scilicet forma incorruptibilis esse incorruptibile corpori tribuat, contrariorum compositione non obstante, eo quod materia corporis humani, divina virtute, animae humanae quantum ad hoc subjicietur omnino.³¹

Just what the disposition of the glorified body will be may be ascertained from a consideration that the soul is both the form and the motor of the human body. In as much as it is form, it is not only the principle of the body's substantial being but even of its proper accidents which are caused in the subject by the union of the matter with its form. Now, in proportion as the form is stronger, its impression upon its matter is so much the less impeded by any exterior agent. We can see this in fire whose form,

³⁰Op. cit., I, 167.

³¹Cont. Gent., IV, 86.

which is said to be the noblest among the elementary forms, confers this upon fire that it is not easily changed by any exterior agent from its own natural disposition. Likewise, the beatified soul in its supreme nobility and power bestows something of this nobility and power upon the body reunited to it; namely, that it should be subtle and spiritual.³²

The glorified body will thus be a subtle and a spiritual body, and this subtlety will derive from the dominion of the glorified soul over its body, and from its spirituality its subtlety will arise, as St. Thomas confirms when stating the opinions of others as his own in the following citation:

Et ideo alii dicunt, quod dicta complexio, ex quo corpora humana subtilia dicentur, erit ex dominio animae glorificatae, quae est forma corporis, super ipsum; ratione cuius corpus gloriosum spirituale dicitur, quasi omnino spiritui subiectum. Prima autem subiectio animae subiicitur, est ad participandum esse specificum, prout subiicitur sibi ut materiae formae, et deinde subiicitur ei ad alia opera animae, prout animae est motor; et ideo prima ratio spiritualitatis in corpore est ex subtilitate, et deinde ex agilitate, et aliis proprietatibus corporis gloriosi: . . .³³

In the resurrection, then, the body will be entirely subject to the soul. First, as we have just seen, by the gift of subtlety, the body will be sub-

³²Comp. Theol., I, 168. "Anima enim est corporis forma et motor. In quantum autem est forma, non solum est principium corporis quantum ad esse substantiale, sed etiam quantum ad propria accidentia, quae causantur in subjecto ex unione formae ad materiam. Quanto autem forma fuerit fortior, tanto impressio formae in materia minus potest impediri a quocumque exteriori agente, sicut patet in igne, cuius forma quae dicitur esse nobilissima inter elementares formas hoc confert igni, ut non de facili transmutetur a sua naturali dispositione patiendo ab aliquo agente. Quia igitur anima beata in summo nobilitatis et virtutis erit, utpote rerum primo principio conjuncta, confert corpori sibi divinitus unito, primo quidem esse substantiale nobilissimo modo totaliter ipsum sub se continendo, unde subtile et spirituale erit."

³³In IV Sent., D.44, q.2, a.2, s.1, c.

ject to the soul in as much as the soul is the form of the body, giving it specific being. Secondly, by the gift of agility, the body will be completely dominated by the soul in all its movements and actions in as much as the soul is the motor of the human body. Thus the glorified body will be wholly subject to the glorified soul, not only in such a way that there will be found in it nothing that will resist the will of the spirit, for such subjection was found in the body of the first man, but even that there will be some perfection in the body by an overflow, as it were, from the glorified soul by which this subjection will be more proportionate to the soul. That, at least, seems to be the thought in this passage:

. . . corpus gloriosum erit omnino subiectum animae glorificatae, non solum ut nihil in eo sit quod resistat voluntati spiritus, quia hoc fuit etiam in corpore Adae, sed etiam ut sit in eo aliqua perfectio effluens ab anima glorificata in corpus, per quam habile reddatur ad praedictam subiectum: quia quidem perfectio dos glorificati corporis dicitur. Anima autem coniungitur corpori non solum ut forma, sed ut motor; et utroque modo oportet quod corpus gloriosum animae glorificatae sit summe subiectum. Unde sicut per dotem subtilitatis subiicitur ei totaliter, in quantum est forma corporis, dans esse specificum; ita per dotem agilitatis subiicitur ei in quantum est motor, ut scilicet sit expeditum, et habile ad obediendum spiritui in omnibus motibus, et actionibus animae.³⁴

Impassibility is another quality which will belong to the risen body, as St. Thomas states:

Corpus humanum, et quidquid in eo est, perfecte erit subiectum animae rationali, sicut etiam ipsa perfecte subiecta erit Deo; et ideo in corpore glorioso non poterit esse aliqua mutatio contra dispositionem illam qua per-

³⁴In IV Sent., D.44, q.2, a.3, s.1, c.

ficitur ab anima; et ideo corpora illa erunt impassibilia.³⁵

The cause of this quality of impassibility is again the dominion which the soul will exercise over the body. "Causa autem eius dominium animae super corpus; quod quidem dominium causatur ex hoc quod servitur Deo immobili-
ter: unde in illo qui perfectius fruitur, est maior impassibilitatis causa."³⁶

Another prerogative of glorified bodies will be the quality of clarity, and this will be an overflow from the glory of the soul into the human body.

. . . ideo melius est ut dicatur quod claritas illa causabitur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, non recipitur per modum influentis, sed per modum recipientis; et ita claritas quae est in anima ut spiritualis, recipitur in corpore ut corporalis; et ideo secundum quod anima erit maioris claritatis secundum maius meritum; ita enim differentia claritatis in corpore, ut patet per Apostolum I Corinth., xv, et ita in corpore glorioso cognoscitur gloria animae sicut in vitro cognoscitur color corporis quod continetur in vase vitreo, . . .³⁷

What the glorified soul has, therefore, the glorified body will share, and as the soul is elevated to the glory of heavenly spirits, the body, too, will receive the properties of heavenly bodies, such as clarity, impassibility, mobility without difficulty and labor, in a word, it will be entirely perfected by its form.

. . . sicut anima hominis elevabitur ad gloriam spirituum coelestium, ut Deum per essentiam videat, . . . ita ejus corpus sublimabitur ad proprietates coelestium corporum, in quantum erit clarum, impassibile, absque difficultate, et labore mobile, et perfectissime sua forma perfectum.³⁸

But human bodies will be celestial, not in nature, but in glory, for

³⁵Op. cit., D.44, q.2, a.1, s.1, c.

³⁶In IV Sent., D.44, q.2, a.1, s.2, c.

³⁷Op. cit., D.44, q.2, a.4, s.1, c.

³⁸Cont. Gent., IV, 86.

there are heavenly bodies, and there are earthly bodies, and the glory of the one is not the glory of the other. Wherefore, just as the glory to which the human soul is elevated exceeds the natural power of celestial spirits, so, too, the glory of the risen body exceeds the natural perfection of the celestial bodies, and human bodies will be clothed with greater brightness, stronger impassibility, and they will enjoy more perfect agility and dignity of nature.

. . . et sic propter hoc Apostolus dicit (I Cor., xv, 40) resurgentium corpora esse coelestia, non quantum ad naturam, sed quantum ad gloriam. Unde cum dixisset quod sunt corpora coelestia et sunt terrena corpora, subjunxit, quod alia est coelestium gloria, alia terrestrium. Sicut autem gloria, in quam humana anima sublevatur, excedit naturalem virtutem coelestium spirituum, . . . ita gloria resurgentium corporum excedit naturalem perfectionem coelestium corporum, ut sit major claritas, impassibilitas, firmior agilitas, et dignitas perfectior.³⁹

The human body, consequently, will have its full share in the happiness of its noble partner, for the perfect beatitude of man consists both in soul and body, and we may well bring this final chapter to a close on the strong, true note, struck by the Angelic Doctor when he utters his profound and satisfying conviction that while the soul contemplates God and enjoys the eternal beatitude for which it was formed, the body, too, is there, radiant in the overflow of the superabundant glory of her noblest of forms, the immortal soul.

Hominis autem beatitudo perfecta consistit in anima et corpore, . . . in anima quidem, quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur Deo; in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus 'resurget spiri-

³⁹Ibid.

tuale, et in virtute et in gloria et in incorruptione,
ut dicitur I Cor., xv, 40.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Sum. Theol., III, q.15, a.10, c.

CONCLUSION

As we have endeavored throughout this essay to gather together at the end of each chapter the most salient features of the matter treated therein, a very brief statement should suffice to bring this topic to a close. In our study of St. Thomas concerning the place that the body occupies in the life of the soul, we have essayed to portray the very intimate and necessary relationship existing between the soul and its body. We have seen that this great Scholastic holds that the rational soul really needs the human body to begin its existence in the full perfection of its nature. Without its proper matter, the rational soul, as a form, is incomplete. Alone it does not constitute human nature, for it is only a part of human nature, and requires the other part, the body, for the completion in its species. Without the body, moreover, human souls would differ specifically because matter, in the Thomistic system, is the principle of individuation. Furthermore, if the rational soul could begin to exist apart from the body, no reasonable cause could be assigned for its union with the body, and we should be eventually led by such a supposition to the conclusion that union of body and soul is unnatural, and man, an unnatural being, a consequence which is manifestly absurd.

Not only is the body necessary for the perfection of the nature of the soul, it is likewise necessary, as we have seen, for the perfection of its operations, from the lowest activities to the very highest. It is, moreover,

because of this need of the body for the perfection of its activities that the human body is constituted just as it is, for the body exists for the soul, and not the soul for the body. It was not to ennoble the human body that God joined the two together, but it was because the soul is a human soul, not a pure spirit, and as such, receives its full perfection in no other way than by its union with a human body.

A body so essential to the soul in this life is not really a burden to it, but because of sin, the body was deprived of those gifts, which by a supernatural favor, would have made it more perfectly proportionate to its incorruptible form. By its conquest over the defects of the body, in so far as these defects may be overcome, the rational soul now reaches up to its final beatitude, and when it has attained it, it does not forget the human body in which it dwelt in its struggle towards its goal. What is natural to the soul once is natural to it always, according to the Angelic Doctor, and since the soul will live forever, the body will be always a natural complement of the soul, and, therefore, we can say that it is true that the body must be reunited to it, and this body must be essentially the same as that to which it was joined while on earth. In a certain sense, we have seen, the body is even necessary for happiness of the separated soul, and by an overflow into itself from the glory of its beatified form, it will be rewarded for its vital share in the life of the pilgrim soul.

Far from being an evil, a burden, or an obstacle and prison of that noble and immortal creature, the rational soul, the human body is a real good and a source of development in that it is through it that the rational

soul attains its substantial, accidental, and its final perfection. Our reason, as well as our faith in the wisdom and power of the Divine Artist Creator assures us that so it must be, and we are grateful to the Angelic Doctor for his establishment of the human body in its rightful place in the scheme of the universe and his bestowing on it, by rational justification, a dignity and usefulness, unmatched in any other corporeal being.

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