

The Historicity of Sense in Husserl's
O r i g i n
o f
G e o m e t r y

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by
Karl Tat Leung Ip

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Abstract

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The present writing ventures into a study of Husserl's phenomenology of history operated and presented in the Crisis, especially in the Origin included in it. The introduction attempts to delimit and intro our theme. In section one, we delimit our theme in three abstractions and, in section two, we introduce it by setting it within its initial broad background. The history is shown to be a pure history of sense. Our task is to investigate this history and its possibilities. We first give, in chapter I, a proper determination to the sense. Then we will devote chapter IV to history and chapters II, III, V to its possibilities.

Chapter I determines the sense as ideal Objectivity. In section one, we establish the necessity of determining sense as ideal Objectivity and, in section two, we shown the significance of the genesis of ideal Objectivity. In section three, the ideal Objectivity receives an exploration. It is defined and proved to be lingual in division A, and is differentiated into three levels. The problem of possibilities is abstracted as two moments: the possibilities of absolute ideality and that of absolute Objectivity.

Chapters II and II deals with the problem of absolute Objectivity which is again abstracted as two moments: the

origin and the tradition. Chapter II proves that language and the living present are the conditions of possibility for an original genesis of absolute Objectivity. In section one, the pure possibility of lingual expressibility is shown to be the essential characteristic of the absolute Objectivity. In section two, we plunge into the original language, human existence and world. Division A reveals that both the world and mankind are horizons, and the latter stands out against the former. Division B makes manifest that the common language is a horizon standing out against mankind and hence the world so that both of them are lingual. Then, in section three, the original constitution of absolute Objectivity is traced. Division A shows that the living present provides psychical validity. Division B shows that speech provides interpsychical validity. Finally, division C shows that writing provides absolute validity.

Chapter III proves that sedimentation, reactivation and univocity are the conditions of possibility of a tradition of absolute Objectivity. Section one shows that origin and tradition are interenveloped. Section two works out the concepts of sedimentation and reactivation. The interplay of them with original genesis is shown in division A to be the original mode of language. Two derivative modes, namely, passivity and logicality, are explained in division B. Several implications concerning language and sense are drawn in division C. We bring in, in section three, the most concrete determination of constitutive language. In division A, univocity is determined as an ultimate condition of sedimentation and reactivation. In division B, univocity is illuminated as an infinite telos. A

primordial temporalization of the living present at the lingual and historical level operates in sedimentation and reactivation. The univocal language and the living present are the ultimate conditions of possibility for the absolute Objectivity.

Chapter VI determines history as the all-encompassing ultimate horizon. Section one develops explicitly the primordial temporalization of history. History is shown to be the vital movement, totalized at our present, of the interweaving of original sense-formations and sedimentations. Section two reveals the horizon as the concrete form of history--the dialectic of our present and the implication of totalization and projection. Section three proves that the real history of fact is abstract movement of the pure history of sense.

Chapter V traces the condition for absolute ideality as idealization. In section one, we distinguish idealization and Idea from factuality. In section two, we first distinguish them further from static essentiality and then delve into a positive determination. Eventuality, idealization is shown to be an unceasing unifying and Idea the unifying sense. Idealization is the condition of possibility of the absolute ideality, i.e., Idea.

The conclusion recapitulates, in section one, all the arguments and theses, and furnishes finally a whole picture of history. In section two, we articulate an interplay of presence and absence on the margin of Husserl's phenomenology.

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The praises let them deserve--the flaws I reply.

Handwritten note: 許立 = and 許立 deserve special "thanks" for ~~don't~~ having met them this time.

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INTRODUCTION

§1. The Delimitation of the Investigation

Our present and forthcoming endeavour moves within the thinking horizon set up by the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). As this phenomenology was cultivated, refined, developed and forever renewed by Husserl for nearly fifty years of meditation, an abundant set of interdependent concepts and a crisscross field of interdependent problems are instituted, in which concepts and problems fade and arise, with their meanings shading into each other to form an interwoven nexus. Although one may for convenience divide the whole train of Husserl's phenomenology into several "phases", one should be warned that a correct understanding of each phase requires reference backward and forward to other phases. The present writing concentrates its whole energy only upon the historical phenomenology Husserl enthusiastically engaged in in his last years. This last meditation of Husserl, being developed out of his previous thinking inwardly, though simultaneously echoed outwardly with the socio-political situation and the philosophical scene, will necessarily make use of and at the same time transform those previous phenomenological concepts such as intentionality, constitution and reproduction. Accordingly, a making use and transforming of them in this essay is inevitable. Nevertheless, an explicit thematization of them requires nothing less than a careful and thor-

ough study of the whole movement of Husserl's thought, which cannot be accomplished here; hence, this essay only involves them in an implicit manner. It follows that we are moving in the present writing upon an abstraction.

Anyone who is even just a bit familiar with the philosophical writings of Husserl up until the "Krisis"¹ period cannot help but discovering in the writings from that period new terminologies, together with a novel nexus of articulation of the new with the old ones. In the most fascinating complexes of terms would no doubt be those concerning history and lifeworld [Lebenswelt]. A mere glimpse of the Crisis may suggest that part I and II of the text, which clarify and trace to its origin the "crisis" phenomenon through displaying the complexes of terms concerning history, serve only as a convenient, hence replaceable, preparatory pathway towards, but contribute nothing to, the "Sachen" of philosophy; whereas part III, especially part III A which deals with the lifeworld, asserts upon the "Sachen" of philosophy, provides new and refines early systematic doctrines of philosophy, but with no innovation in method. However, just a not all-total careless and irresponsible reading reveals that they are by no means the case. Regarding the complex of historical terms, first of all, the display of the complex at least practises an

1. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana Band VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff: 1954, 1962), hereafter cited as Kr.. English translation: The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, tr. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), hereafter abbreviated as Crisis in the text and cited as Cr.. Husserl started to reflect on the themes in Crisis in 1934 and began its composition in 1936 until the summer of 1937, when his terminal illness began.

implicit knowledge of history, if not lifting it up to an explicit knowledge in a philosophy of history. The historical reflection upon philosophy displayed through the complex projects, and itself cultivates, history as a problematic. And we cannot see in advance that the whole nexus of reflection involved finally culminates in an innovative historico-philosophical understanding of mankind. The history of philosophy and the philosophy of history merge into each other and result in a historical philosophy. Besides, one would suspect reasonably, having carefully and responsibly read through the text, whether it is as obvious as one would otherwise conceive, or even whether it is possible, that the problematic of the lifeworld can be severed from the historical reflection without affecting the being of the latter. At any rate, the first point alone succeeds in rejecting the first of the above-mentioned misunderstanding. Regarding the problematic of the lifeworld, the fact that a considerable portion of part III A is devoted to revise the transcendental reduction makes it safe for us to construe that the lifeworld can be anything but a theme among many which can be thematized by an already constructed reduction; on the contrary, it prescribes a conception of reduction. In addition, one is justified to suspect if the lifeworld can retain its being, not merely be discovered, with the rapture of the historical reflection. In any case, the first point alone succeeds in rejecting the second of the above-mentioned misunderstanding. Let us take a concise summary. Speaking abstractly, the historical reflection is not a mere method which can be applied indifferently to any content; rather it projects its own content. The

lifeworld is not a mere content which can be thematized by an already constructed method; rather it prescribes its own method. Speaking concretely, the very being of the historical reflection and the lifeworld envelop each other. It follows that the historical reflection and the lifeworld taken together contribute to an innovation of phenomenology. Of course, all these have only been alluded to - they remain to be proved. Abstractly speaking, the four different points picked up above correspond to four different tasks. But, concretely speaking, since the two complexes interweave together and form a nexus of articulation within the Crisis, every clarification of each point must involve the others; hence, we have nothing but one single task. Nevertheless, the present writing confines its thematic light only to the problematic of history, and in doing so, may throw a dim light upon the interrelation between history and lifeworld; whereas the problematic of lifeworld is tacitly put in an excess of darkness. Thus, it is upon another abstraction that the present itinerary is conducted.

Furthermore, confining ourselves to the problematic of history, the present essays by no means claims to exhaust the whole field. In the Crisis, Husserl engages in a historical reflection in the midst of a life-crisis of humanity manifested as a cultural crisis, and strives to throw light on the situation by bringing us back to the original sense of philos-

ophy and science. The Vienna Lecture¹ traces philosophy back to its primordial, original genesis as a sense of the Greek culture. In the part II of Crisis delineates the subtle transformation of this original sense in the modern period. In this way, Husserl furnishes us with a history of philosophy, indeed, a history of humanity, which can be employed to elucidate the crisis of humanity as expressed in the crisis of philosophy. However, the historical regressive inquiry [Rückfrage], which results in a history of philosophy and, subsequently, a theory of the crisis of modern humanity, itself practises a philosophy of history. Seldom, though not at all never, does Husserl reflect upon the Rückfrage itself and clarify the notion of history involved, not to speak of investigating into the possibility of that history. Roughly speaking, within the problematic of history, Husserl provides us with three levels of thematization, though intermingled with each other: (1) the crisis and its explanation and solution, (2) the history of philosophy, of culture, or of humanity and its thematization, and (3) a philosophy of history which articulates a notion of history and investigates into the formal structure and the concrete conditions of possibility of this notion of history. The first presupposes the second whereas the second presupposes the third. And our sole

1. The Vienna Lecture refers to the reworked text of the lecture given by Husserl in May, 1935. It is edited under the title "Die Krisis der europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie" as the third Abhandlung in Krisis, pp. 314-348. Two English translations: (1) "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man" in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, ed. & tr. Quetin Lauer (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 149-92. (2) "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity" as appendix I in Crisis, pp. 269-99. The second version will be used and is abbreviated as The Vienna Lecture in the text and PCH in citation.

aim in the present writing is to throw light on the third level of thematization, although each of them mutually includes the others. Therefore, again there is an abstraction upon which we are proceeding.

In summary, we first have an abstraction from all of Husserl's thought before the "Crisis" period, then one from the problematic of the lifeworld, and finally one from the interpretation and clarification of the history of philosophy and the crisis of philosophy, of culture, and of humanity respectively. Yet, it cannot be overemphasized that what is abstracted is never cut off from the remaining, but each mutually imply the other implicitly. In this manner, the present writing, if it succeeds in what it endeavours to accomplish thematically, will disclose nothing more nor less than the entire problematic of history as Husserl has got a vision of it. Nevertheless, accompanied with the thematization, a fund of concepts not belonging directly to the problematic of history will also be tacitly worked upon, the richness of it can serve studies of other aspects of Husserl's phenomenology. So this essay may be seen as an initial step towards a specific manner, namely, taking the last phase as a centre of interpretation, of the total clarification and understanding of the phenomenology of the great master Edmund Husserl - a forever servant of humanity so honest, so serious and so humble.

§2. Preparatory Considerations

In this section, we attempt to summarize briefly and succinctly Husserl's interpretation of the history of humanity and philosophy. Our account never claims to be exhaustive and does not follow the actual chain of the presentation in The Vienna Lecture and the corresponding texts in Crisis. Since it ineluctably makes use of words or concepts which intertwine together as the problematic of history we will venture into in our main text, this summary will serve as an introduction to these concepts by setting them within a broader background from which it is initially articulated.

Men always live, as much in the beginning as nowadays and in the future, with an original natural practical attitude, having a fundamental historical mode of human existence. Men obviously always live in communities and are engaged in communal cultural activities. The natural life always naively and straightforwardly is directed toward this or that affair, with some particular ends in view, sometimes even electing a life-vocation. The whole life-praxis furnishes with various situationally dependent criteria: we could distinguish the real from the illusory, the true from the false, the good from the bad, the beautiful from the ugly, and so forth. It is in a particular surrounding world that we display our natural life which remains bound to some personal interests, purposes and goals, and to a tradition. The natural men have only finite tasks.

In ancient Greece, the theoretical attitude was born. A reorientation of the original attitude, an Umstellung of the original Einstellung, broke out such that an astonishment

toward, instead of the previous engagement in, the world and the worldly life was accomplished for the first time. Men started to wonder and continue to be so whether what is held to be real by the tradition **is actually real**, what is held to be true **is actually true**, and so on. Idealization takes place which constitutes such Ideals as the what-is-in-itself and the truth-in-itself. Philosophy, or science, is instituted: it is all-encompassing universal science of the totality of all that is, which strives for the absolute and objective episteme and cuts itself off from the relative and subjective doxa. Henceforth, the practical life is idealized so as to bring about Ideas such as the genuine good, the absolute beauty, etc. Guided by the infinite Ideas, the scientific culture revolutionizes the whole originally spiritual cultural mode of human existence. All spiritual performance and achievement are set free from every factual bondage and are given the dignity of universality and supra-spatiotemporality, and they all signify an unheard-of historicity of human cultural life, an unheard-of tradition of ideal truth and norm. A humanity is legitimized which signifies men with infinite tasks.

In this way, philosophy is **at the first time** constituted in **concrete intentional acts** and is constituted as having an **original sense which is the sense of the original constituting acts**: man strives for universal knowledge of man and world through rational insights, and then shapes rationally our ethical, political and social life as well as the surrounding world. But philosophy is itself **an Idea**, indeed, **the Idea**: "we must certainly distinguish between philosophy as historical fact at a given time and philosophy as idea, as the idea

of an infinite task" (PCH, Cr. AppI, p. 291, Kr. p. 338). "Philosophy ... encompasses all ideals and the total ideal, i.e., the universe of all norms" (PCH, Cr.AppI, p. 289, Kr. p. 336). Philosophy as the Idea of all Ideas signifies infinity and totality: it unifies and places all Ideas in an unending movement. It is a **telos**, that is, a perfect and ultimate end, which remains forever the infinite pole towards which all theoretical and practical Ideas as well as the total Idea of all these Ideas approach. Therefore, philosophy as the universal task of episteme, of rational knowing and living, is the **teleological sense** of the humanity as such. Taking the two points together, it seems that philosophy is paradoxical since it is at once the origin and the telos of the unending movement of humanity and so an unsurpassable infinity is inserted which will destroy philosophy. However, philosophy is also the unending movement itself which bridges the origin and the telos. The entire history of philosophy is the forever struggling towards clarity of the at once original and teleological sense. Unifying all sciences and cultures and conferring a sense upon them, the philosophy "has constantly to exercise its functions as one which is archontic for the mankind as a whole"(Ibid.). The history of philosophy and the history of humanity are by their very meanings necessarily merged together: philosophy is the innermost and essential motivation of the culturo-historical movement whereas history is the culturo-spiritual manifestation of philosophy.

We can extract from the above summary that the history of humanity, which is articulated essentially by the history of

philosophy, is not a flux of events arisen and passed away causally. The history as a whole is an **infinite** process of a **sense** towards an **Idea**; yet the sense and the Idea, both being the One Philosophy, are identically one. This at once original and teleological sense of the history was **once** constituted or instituted in **concrete** intentionality **for the first time**. Speaking not so much in the most encompassing and ultimate manner we have so far been, each branch of culture, guided by the universal task of episteme, can be seen as a history or a tradition which is also an infinite movement of an original sense accomplished in concrete intentional act. We have thus picked up some essential features of the peculiarly new notion of history which operates in Husserl's historical reflections and which is the main theme of the present writing. Primarily, it is a history of sense. We will venture into the concrete and apriori conditions of the possibility of the historicity of sense, and this history of sense itself. Our main text will be Crisis, especially The Origin of Geometry,¹ and Derrida's Introduction,² an excellent study on our theme.

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1. This manuscript dates from 1936 and bears no title. Eugen Fink edited and published it (beginning with the third paragraph) in the Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. I, no. 2 (Jan 15, 1939), pp. 203-25, under the title "Der Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem". It appears in Krisis as Beilage III, pp. 365-86, and in Crisis as appendix VI, pp. 353-78. It will be abbreviated as (the) Origin in the text and Or. in citations.
 2. Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction tr. w/ preface & afterward John Leavey, Jr. (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). Hereafter abbreviated as In

CHAPTER I

SENSE AS IDEAL OBJECTIVITY

One may complain, as it is reasonable, that the word "sense" is employed in Husserl's text in an extremely fluctuating way that it interweaves with many words or complexes of words with seeming similarities but subtle nuances. How can the problem of the origin of sense, the historical constitution or genesis of sense, serve as a clue to the disclosure of the problematic of history, if the unity of the different uses of the word "sense" itself suffers from dispersion, if the sense of sense bears an unclarity? All these signify not a fundamental fault but an ultimate scene of the institution of a sense, the legitimation of a word, in general. The sense performs, and simultaneously deforms, itself through each occurrence. (Does not the sense shiver itself in these sentences?) So do not be annoyed by those unclarified or even unclarifiable, shifts of sense, but trace them responsibly, do not just cite them as they are there, but relive them, reinstitute them; and this reliving and reinstating is the very living and instituting of the sense itself.

§1. The Necessity of The Determination of Sense as Ideal Objectivity

Inquiring into the "what" and the "how" of the history of sense, Husserl has in the Origin: has: (1) determined tacitly and nearly unrecognizably the sense as Objectivity; (2) restricted its scope to the ideal Objectivity; and (3) shifted to ideality as the anchor of inquiry. The problem of the genesis of sense is transformed to that of the ideal Objectivity of sense. Are these simply unnoticed shifts of words and themes so that the question under discussion is falsely replaced by another one? Or do the substituting ones remain the same as the substituted ones, thus the shift results in the tackling of the same question concealed under different words? Neither of them seems to be the case. Since the sense, instead of being determinant in its meaning and being already constituted, is struggling on its own way, is being constituted and is self-constituting, in and through the text (or more precisely, in and through the present reading and writing of the text, the reactivation of the meaning, or sense, of the text). Once again we let that which we are striving to clarify resonate in our very striving: the inter-envelopment of the tradition and our living present.

Why such a shift is needed here? We are asking after the primal institution of a tradition, the origin of sense, i.e., the original sense of the constituting intentional act. Naturally one can always investigate the structure and genesis of intentional consciousness without specific reference to any

particular object; however, regarding the sense of an act, as lucidly phrased by Derrida, "The **primordial** sense of every intentional act is **only its final** sense, i.e., the constitution of an object (in the broadest sense of these terms)" (Intro. p.64). What we, the inheritor of the handed-down sense, have at hand is, of course, the constituted sense. So we must start with the constituted sense if the origin is sought. Now, in connection with geometrical sense, the ideal Objectivity belongs to its very meaning. Asking how the ideal Objectivity is constituted therefore contributes towards the ultimate clarification of the origin, and the historicity, of sense.

However Husserl proceeds in the text as if the sense has already been constituted, only to ask how it first presents itself originaliter in the personal consciousness of the inventor, and subsequently objectifies itself and attains intersubjective and objective validity. Does not the formulation imply that the geometrical sense is constituted exclusively with an egological subjectivity, such that the geometrical evidence of the sense, i.e., the grasping of it with the consciousness of its original being-itself-there [Selbst-da], does not include the evidence of an ideal objectivity? It does not remain for us to answer as we read:

[G]eometrical existence is not psychical existence; it does not exist as something personal within the personal sphere of consciousness: it is the existence

of what is Objectively¹ there for 'everyone'....Indeed, it has, from its primal institution [Urstiftung], an existence which is peculiarly supertemporal....This is, we note, an "ideal" Objectivity (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.356, Kr. pp.367-8).

Thus the question is : How is ideal Objectivity generated from something psychical?

1. Although David Carr contends that there is no difference in meaning between Gegenstand and Objekt (Cf. p. 22, translator's note 1), and hence does not distinguish them in the translation, we will follow Dorion Cairns in translating Gegenstand by object and Objekt by Object so that the difference in meaning, if there is any, will not be concealed by translation. Cairns asserts that there is a difference. Cf. Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 3, translator's note 2.

§2. The Significance of The Genesis of Ideal Objectivity

Instead of plunging into the question right now, we stop for a while to see what bearing it has on the problematic of history. On the one hand, is it a factual-psychological question about the factual-psychological genesis of the consciousness of something absolutely valid from something which is valid only psychically? On the other hand, is it a juridical question, misguided by genetic terms, which aims at static structures and formal conditions of possibility? Do not both questions presuppose that the sense as ideal Objectivity has already been constituted, as one asks how the constituted geometrical sense is developed in the real empirical realm while the other asks what conditions it needs to satisfy so as to be able to unfold in the empirical realm? The interconnections Husserl describes are always presupposed by any real and imaginary factual history, but they by no means signify the eidetic structures and formal conditions of possibility. Derrida writes:

...they refer to **concrete** acts lived in a **unique** system of instituting implications, i.e., in a system that has been originally produced only **once** - that remains de facto and de jure, **irreversible**. These then are the **interconnections-of** what is, in the fullest sense of the word, **history itself** (Intro. p.65).

Correlatively, the thinking Husserl engaged in is no doubt apriori, since it depends on no factual history, but in no way transcendental in the classical sense, which searches for formal conditions of possibility. We speak of **pure-intercon-**

nections-of history, **apriori-thought-of** history: does this not signify that they are in themselves ahistorical? Derrida (and Husserl) answer(s):

Not at all, for they are **nothing but** possibilities of the appearance of history **as such**, outside which there is nothing. History itself establishes the possibility of its own appearing (Intro. P.66).

Thus the questioning of the possibility of ideal Objectivity signifies nothing more or less than the a priori thinking upon the interconnections of history. The conditions of ideal Objectivity are those of history.

§3. The Meaning of Ideal Objectivity

After exposing the significance the question of the possibility of ideal Objectivity bears, Husserl again postpones an attempt to answer the question immediately. Rather, the meaning of the ideal Objectivity is explored succinctly, so as to lay bare which subjectivity the locus of the ideal Objectivity in question is. The exploration is accomplished in two steps: first the delimitation of ideality and then the stratification of three kinds of ideal objectivity.

A. The delimitation of ideal Objectivity

An ideality refers to, in the "Crisis" period as well as earlier, that which is repeatable with the evidence of being

identical.¹ An object (in the broadest sense of the word) can be so if, and only if, it is constituted at the very first as valid once and for all, and for "everyone", i.e., it is an identity self-enclosed and accomplished in the primordial intentional constituting acts. It follows that an ideal object is repeatable in indefinitely many cases because it is identical in itself as a **sense**. Repeatability follows from identity. Also follows from the identity the disconnection of ideal object with any duration of worldly time, i.e., the supratemporality of ideal object. The disconnection of an object with any duration of worldly time implies that the unity of sense of the object can be unfolded in any arbitrarily chosen worldly time, which is a mode of temporality Husserl called omnitemporality.² That is, supratemporality implies omnitemporality. Hence identity as a **sense** is the essential characteristic of ideal objectivity, from which repeatability, supratemporality, and so omnitemporality, can be derived.

Husserl then assimilates the ideal objectivity with one kind of human accomplishments in two steps. The first of

1. The identity in sense and validity does not at all exhaust the meaning of ideal object. Idealities already shown to be valid could serve as basis for further production of ideality. More radically, each ideal truth or validity is itself always on the way approaching the truth-in-itself at the infinity. Cf. PCH, Cr.AppI pp. 277-8. The problem of infinity will preoccupy us in chapter V.

2. §64 of Experience and Judgement provides us with a detail analysis of different types of temporality of ideal objectivity and real objectivity. "The timelessness of objectivities of the understanding, their being 'everywhere and nowhere', proves ... to be a privileged form of temporality, a form which distinguishes these objectivities fundamentally and essentially from individual objectivities. That is, a supertemporal unity pervades the temporal multiplicity within which it is situated: this supertemporality implies omnitemporality" (p. 261).

which is not at all novel with respect to Husserl's other writings:

[The ideal Objectivity] is proper to a whole class of spiritual products of the cultural world, to which not only all scientific formations [Gebilde] and the sciences themselves belong but also, for example, the formations of fine literature (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.356-7, Kr. p.368).

Being an ideal object is not, as one would be tempted to think, exclusively a matter of science, but an attribute to a class of spiritual products. Under the title "culture" we encounter a vast different levels, different kinds, different dimensions, etc. of human performance and achievement. Then comes the second step: which class of spiritual product do science and literary art belong to, and which class can ideal objectivity be adequately attributed? Husserl gives an answer in a footnote subsequently amended to a typed-out version prepared by Fink: that which is lingually¹ expressible and, hence, exists as lingual meaning or sense. In that footnote we read:

[I]t belongs to their Objective being that they be lingually expressed and can be expressed again and again; or, more precisely, they have Objectivity, their existence-for-everyone, only as meaning, as sense of speech (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.357n. Kr. p.368n).

Language moves into the focus of our science. And, again, in connection with geometry, we can read:

[The Pythagorean theorem] is identically the same in the "original language" of Euclid and in all "translation"; and within each language it is again the same,...(OrG, Cr.AppVI. p.357, Kr. p.368).

1. We follow the practice of Paul Ricoeur who restricts the word "linguistics" and all its grammatical forms to refer to matters concerning the scientific study of language and creates an adjective to refer to the natural language which is translated as "lingual" by J.P. Thompson in Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Cf. Thompson's note on translation.

We see that language is adhered to the ideal Objectivity not even in the sense of factual languages, not to speak of their empirical realizations into oral utterances and written documents. The adhesion of any one of these will impugn the ideal Objectivity. Thus, although language is introduced, the ideal spiritual formations and its constitution have nothing to do with the factuality of languages and their sensible embodiments.

Is language a, and indeed the, condition of possibility of the ideal Objectivity? If so, in what sense and in what manner? These will be answered afterwards. For the time being, let us raise a point marginal to, but yet within, Husserl's text, the very formulation of it is embedded in the setting of Husserl's text. We cite the sentence which follows immediately the last but one above-cited sentence:

This is true in a peculiar fashion in the case of the Objective sciences: for them the difference between the original language of the work and its translation into other languages does not remove its identical accessibility or change it into an inauthentic, indirect accessibility (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.357n, Kr. p.368n).

After attributing ideal objectivity to both science and literary art, Husserl deprives perfect translatability from the latter while it is a peculiar feature of the former. The Pythagorean theorem is identically accessible in all its translations whereas Goethe's Faust is not so. What else besides the factuality of different languages can be responsible for this unauthentic accessibility? Then, how can one reconcile the conflict between the identity of sense required by the ideal objectivity in general and the unauthentic, indirect accessibility demanded by the kind of ideal objectivity displayed by literary art? How can one reconcile the

conflict between the reduction of all factuality of language required by the ideal Objectivity in general and the necessary tie with factuality demanded by the ideal objectivity of literary art? Indeed, is the ideal objectivity a suitable genus for the sense-formations of sciences and that of literary art to subsume under? Is it not the case that the so-called ideal objectivity in general belongs exclusively to scientific formations, while the sense of the literary art is quite another matter? We observe a fundamental ambiguity in the meaning of ideal objectivity.

B. The stratification of ideal Objectivity

In this section we attempt to explore the stratification which Husserl differentiates within the ideal objectivity in general. It is first brought into light in Derrida's Introduction. Three levels of ideal objectivity have been distinguished, two of which are shown to be in some definite manner necessarily tied to factuality. One might expect that the ideality of literary art is clarified and determined satisfactorily, only to be totally disappointed. The theme of literary art simply never drifts into the discussion, which is conducted as if the ideal objectivity, and hence that of the literary art, have been secured.

The primary level is the identity of language itself.

[L]anguage itself, in all its particularizations (words, sentences, speeches), is ... thoroughly made up of ideal objectivities; for example, the word "Löwe" [lion] occurs only once in the German language; it is identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any given persons (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.357, Kr. p.368).

Each unit of language is an ideal objectivity, since it is

identical with any of its sensible realizations, phonetic or graphic. The factual existence of a word, for instance, and even the referent, if there is any, are irrelevant in regard to the very being of the word, which is an ideality. The factual existence of a speaking subject is also redundant in the being of an unit of language. "Insofar as this ideal object confronts language as such, the latter supposes a spontaneous neutralization of the factual existence of the speaking subjects, of words, and of the thing designated" (Intro. p.67). Although whether there is a German speaker who says or writes the word "Löwe" is neutralized, its being includes the meaning that it is a word of a factual language, namely German, which must be preserved in the factual subjectivity of the German speaking community, though the word may never be used by any or even all German speakers. Thus the ideal objectivity of language remains tied to the factual existence of a language and thus the factual existence of a speaking community. That is, it is bounded by a certain sense of factuality.

The secondary level is the ideality of the empirical lingual meaning of the lingual expression. The unity of meaning Löwe can be intended through the words "Löwe", "lion", "leo", etc. with evidence of being identical. And it is this ideal identity in meaning that legitimizes the perfect translatability from one language to another. The ideality at this level is freed from all factual existence of any given language and all factual lingual subjectivity. But it is by no means freed from any factuality. One always has to distinguish the object itself from the meaning and the expression, if the

expression refers through the meaning to an empirical object. The unity of meaning lion can be constituted only if there is a possible presentation [Gegenwärtigung] or presentification [Vergegenwärtigung] of the sensible lion.¹ Without any actual or possible lived experience of the natural, real lion, the meaning lion is not possible. Hence the ideality at this level inescapably adheres to an empirical subjectivity and, so, is dated with a factual spatiotemporality.

The tertiary level is the ideality of a priori object itself.

[The] idealities of geometrical words, sentences, theories - considered purely as linguistic formations - are not the idealities that make up what is expressed and brought to validity as truth in geometry; the latter are ideal geometrical objects, states of affairs, etc. (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.357, Kr. p.368)

For this kind of ideality, of which the geometrical one is an example, the sense and the object are one. There is no tie with any factual spatiotemporality, with any actual and possible empirical fact. All attachment to an empirical subjectivity is dissolved. Thus we have arrived at the absolute ideal Objectivity which is absolutely free of all factuality. The question of the possibility of the ideal Objectivity attains its essential formulation in the absolute ideal Objectivity. The pure possibility of the ideal Objectivity can be exclusively revealed in that of the absolute ideal Objectivity. It is because bound ideal Objectivities differ from the free one only in their necessarily essential connection in whatever

1. Gegenwärtigung is the act in which an actually present object is presented (e.g. perception) and Vergegenwärtigung is the act in which an object not actually present is intuitively presented (e.g. imagination and recollection).

manner with factuality, and, exclusive description of their genesis must involve the description of facts alongside that of the pure possibility if and only if the description is complete. The inquiry into the bound ideal Objectivity adds nothing essential to the pure possibility exposed by inquiry into the absolute ideal Objectivity. If we bear in mind that the possibility of historicity depends on that of ideal Objectivity, the inquiry into the absolute ideal Objectivity must purely reveal the possibility of historicity.

We have already succeeded in getting rid of all bound ideality, including that of language. This means that the pure possibility of historicity is immune to the factuality of language, whether it is a particular empirical language or language in general. That the absolute ideal Objectivity is freed from any empirical, factual subjectivity by no means implies that it is freed from all subjectivity but reveals that it is borne by a transcendental subjectivity. After all these determinations, now, Husserl can pose the question in all its clarity:

Our problem now concerns precisely the ideal objectivities which are thematic in geometry: how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a formation within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal Objectivity? (OrG, Cr.AppVI pp. 357-8. Kr. p.369).

CHAPTER II

THE HOW OF ORIGIN: LANGUAGE AND THE LIVING PRESENT

We have shown that the origin and the transmission of ideal sense, which is brought to be valid as truth, amount to nothing but a transcendental history possessing its own transcendental historicity, necessarily tied to a transcendental subjectivity. All possible attachment of sense and historicity to all factuality and all factual subjectivity is detached. The absolute ideal Objectivity is carefully distinguished from all bound idealities, including the lingual ideality and the ideality of lingual meaning. The condition of possibility for a pure history is dependent upon that of the absolute ideal Objectivity of sense. The guiding question is: how can something arise exclusively out of the psyche of an individual be objectified to become an absolute ideal Objectivity?

Husserl simply answers with no tension: "...it occurs by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its lingual flesh [Sprachleib]" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.358, Kr p.369)! How much effort one has to exert in order to neutralize language with respect to the absolute ideality, and how surprised one may be if one is eventually told that language is the possibility in question! How paradoxical it sounds that language returns just immediately after it has been exiled forever! In what sense is language required to constitute the

absolute ideal Objectivity of sense, of truth? Posing the question in the form of objectification, Husserl asks:

How does lingual incarnation [Verleiblichung] make out of the merely intrasubjective formation the **Objective**, which, for example, as geometrical concept or state of affairs, is in fact present as understandable by all and is valid, for all the future, already in its lingual expression as geometrical discourse, as geometrical proposition in its ideal geometrical sense? (ORG, Cr. AppVI p.358, Kr. p.369)

Is it employed in the sense of the primary level of the lingual ideality of a system of meanings? If so, is not the sense, the truth Husserl has endeavoured by all means to release from factuality, bounded again by some factual subjectivities, by a sensible spatiotemporality, by real history and culture? Does not the truth-sense then cease to be what it is? Even the language in general, which subsumes under its formality all actual and possible languages, i.e., systems of signification, cannot help obliterating the truth-sense, since, as the "pure grammar", the "a priori norms" of language, the language in general is, just as **any** factually actual or possible language, itself bounded by factual, empirical subjectivity and sensible spatiotemporality.

§1. The Pure Possibility of Lingual Expressibility

It is the **pure** ability of being lingually expressible, performed and achieved through the **pure** intentional lingual act, that constitutes the ideal Objectivity of the truth-sense out of a spiritual formation valid intra- and inter-psychically. We have a twofold implication concerning subjectivity and

language, articulated with the concept of sense. Firstly, the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which keep hold of truth, sense and being, must perform and achieve the accomplishments in and through an intentional act which synthetically unified various distinguishable acts, one of which is necessarily the lingual act. The personal and communal psychical acts and their correlates, the intra- and inter-psychically valid spiritual formations, are transformed into transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity and their correlate, the truth-sense, in and through the intentional act of **pure** speaking and writing. The transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the most subjective of all subjectivities (since subjectivity as the principle of activity encounters no actual and possible factual resistance when it is transcendental) and the ideal truth-sense-being, the most objective of all objectivities (since objectivity as the principle of resistance stands fast before all actual and possible factual activities when it is ideal), are originated simultaneously and inseparably in one stroke in the pure act of language. The transcendental subjectivity is itself lingual in a **pure** sense. Secondly, concerning language, we are going to remark on the pure possibility of lingual incarnation and the pure lingual intention. The **constituting** language by means of which the ideal truth-sense is constituted is **pure and transcendental**. It must not be confused with any actual or possible factual language, nor even with language in general, which is nothing but the eidos of language arrived at after an eidetic reduction. All these belong to the **constituted** language which has no constitutive capacity in front of the sense-object. However, this way of formulation

might give the wrong impression that we have a transcendental language on one side, and empirical languages together with an eidetic language on the other. The truth is that the so-called constituting language is not a language at all but the **pure** possibility of expressibility in a de facto language, which is the proper item we should contrast to de facto languages and language in general. In addition, the constituting lingual intentional act must not be confused with the meaning-bestowing act and meaning-fulfilling act in the lived experience of an empirical language, which is aptly analyzed in the Logical Investigations, though not to the last word. In the Investigations Husserl distinguishes between meaning and object, and contends that the meaning-bestowing act animates the vocal and graphic materials to make them the expression of an object, which is meant through the lingual meaning. The object must, of course, have its own sense, which, in turn, must be pre-lingual, pre-predicative, since all lingual meaning-acts are claimed to be exhausted in meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. In the Ideas, the theme of this pre-predicative sense is first brought to the fore, and the predicative meaning only models itself after the pre-predicative sense. It follows that the meaning-bestowing act, rather than constituting its own sense, presupposes that the meaning and the sense of object have already been constituted. The constituting intentional act of pure lingual incarnation must be separated from the lived experience of a de facto language.

Husserl asserts that the absolute ideal Objectivity of truth cannot be constituted without the pure possibility of a pure lingual incarnation. A spiritual formation would forever remain captive to the psychical life of a factual individual

subject if this pure possibility is not given. And, correlatively, every subjectivity would be bound forever to factuality, dated with an empirical spatiotemporality, if the pure lingual intention does not break through the surface of psychic acts. The problem is: how is the pure possibility of lingual incarnation given? How is the pure lingual intention given? It is, and must be, given together with a factual incarnation, together with a psychic act. It is from its very first legitimation permeated with factuality; or, more precisely, it is legitimated in its permeation with factuality. But one might suspect: is the factuality here the one we have reduced? Do we redescend towards the real language, the real culture, the real history, and the real time? Husserl writes that, through language, the sense receives its lingual flesh [Sprachleib]. The pure possibility of lingual incarnation [Verleiblichung] manifests itself originally in the incarnation into the lingual flesh. Note that flesh and body, Leib and Körper, should not be confused with one and other, though they are intimately tied to each other.¹ The pure possibility which constitutes the ideal Objectivity of sense, in its being and non-being, deals with Verleiblichung rather than Verkörperung. It concerns the former de jure while is accompanied with the latter de facto. It follows that we do not reintroduce factuality, which is exclusively connected with Körper, although, with the Leib, a peculiar kind of human using of language in a peculiar

1. Leib and Körper are concepts coming from the analysis of the intentionality of the body. Leib means the animate, living body which is the locus of intentionality in its kinesthetic function whereas Körper is the physical body, that is, body conceived as an empirical object. Husserl speaks of Sprachleib here to emphasize the constituting function of language.

iar sense is involved in the constitution besides the pure possibility made known above. In short, a train of thought makes us feel: the absolute ideal Objectivity is the pure possibility of lingual expressibility; the pure possibility is given de jure through the Sprachleib; The Sprachleib alludes to a lingual function more global than the pure possibility.

§2. The Unity of Language, Human Existence and The World

According to our previous consideration, it is necessary for us, to venture into the language which has already been working when the pure possibility of lingual expressibility, i.e., the constitution of sense is given. So we consider for a while how language is related to men and to the world. First we analyze the meanings of the world and fellow men which essentially interrelate with that language, then expose what the relation is.

A. The world and human existence

(i) The world as horizon

- . Living wakefully in the world we are constantly conscious of the world, whether we pay attention to it or not, conscious of it as the horizon of our life, as the horizon of 'things' (real Objects), of our actual and possible interests and activities (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.358, Kr. p.369).

The thing, instead of being a stubborn something existing in itself, is only the unity of validity of all our actual and possible endeavors. The world, instead of being the total collection of all the things-in-themselves, is just the inter-


woven nexus "in" which all this is displayed (but without all this, there is no world). However, we need some light upon the concept world-horizon. Is it universally valid? Or is it just valid in connection with factual community? We have the following texts at our disposal:

[N]atural life can be characterised as a life naively, straightforwardly directed at the world, the world being always in a certain sense consciously present as a **universal** horizon.... Waking life is always a directedness toward this or that, being directed toward it as an end or as means.... All this lies **within the world-horizon**.... (PCH, Cr.AppI p.281, Kr p.327, my emphasis)

Consciously we always live in the lifeworld.... Conscious of the world as a horizon, we live for our particular ends.... In this case a self-enclosed 'world'-horizon is constituted. Thus as men a vocation we may permit ourselves to be indifferent to everything else, and we have an eye only for this horizon as our world.... That this whole effective life and this whole work-world is held **within the always obviously [selbstverständlich] existing world** in the most universal, full, lifeworldly [lebensweltlich] sense (Cr.AppVII p.379, Kr p.459, my emphasis).

Nothing can be clearer than that in the cited texts: the world as "our" world is the **universal** horizon; it is contrasted with the "work-world" of any factual individual and community; and it is the world in the most universal, full, lifeworldly sense, which seems to be what Husserl calls surrounding world [Umwelt] or surrounding lifeworld [Lebensumwelt]. The first two points state that the world-horizon is universally valid while the third enjoys an ambiguity which may suggest adhesion to a factual community.

Let us see if it is. A surrounding world refers to the historico-cultural horizon of a particular community, the interwoven nexus of spiritual activities and endeavors in different levels as well as different dimensions, through which all the actualities are brought into being with their own validities, for exam-



ple, the actuality, the validity-unit Apollo in the cultural-historical life of the ancient Greek. All these endeavors and validities are deposited into a not fully determinate structure which invites new formations. Furthermore, all these activities gravitates towards and radiates from a responsible source of activities. We can see that each civilization [Menschheit] shapes its own surrounding world. The following testifies to our sayings:

"Surrounding world" is a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. That we live in our particular surrounding world, which is the locus of all our cares and endeavors - this refers to a fact that occurs purely within the spiritual realm. Our surrounding world is a spiritual formation in us and in our historical life (PCH, Cr.AppI p.272, Kr p.317).

The world-horizon is on the one hand universal whereas on the other hand it is cultural and spiritual. Then runs the following difficulty. The universal and the cultural characters of a world-horizon seem to be contradictory: universality implies detachment from any particular civilization, which in turn implies the abstraction of all cultural determination; culture implies attachment to a particular civilization, which in turn implies particularity. It seems that all we can talk about is either a universal world-horizon or a cultural world-horizon but never a universal-cultural one. To this we reply that there exhibits a formal generality within all factually actual and possible surrounding worlds. It is to this formal generality that the universal world-horizon is attributed. And this formalization preserves the horizontal characters: all acquisition is deposited into an open whole which innovates new formations; and every performance and achievement gravitates towards and radiates from a responsible source. The

legitimacy of formalization can be testified in connections with culture: there is a "first originally **form** of cultures" (PCH, Cr.AppI p.281, Kr p.327, my emphasis), in contrast to any factual culture. It is beyond doubt that the culture and the history we are referring to here are not yet the culture of science and the history of truth. We have so far clarified the meaning of that world which essentially relates to language: the world is the indefinitely open, formal and universal horizon of possible human historico-cultural experiences and activities, and is anchored upon human existence.

(ii) The human community as horizon

We then turn our gaze upon the human existence which is essentially related to language. One need not be surprised that the clarification is extremely straightforward, since it is formally the same with our preceding discussion.

Always standing out against the world-horizon is the horizon of our fellow men [Mitmenschen], whether there are any of them present or not....in each case "I" am conscious of them as "my" others, as those with whom I can enter into actual and potential, immediate and mediate relations of empathy.... [E]very human being...has his fellow men [Mitmenschheit] and, always counting himself, civilization [Menschheit] in general, in which he knows himself to be living" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.358, Kr. p.369).

Similarly, we can ask whether the fellow mankind refers to only a universal community or just a factual community. Once again we find that the text suggests that it is at once universal and cultural; and the latter implies factual particularity. Therefore we come upon a contradiction. Towards the resolution, we have no need to anticipate anything new. The Menschheit in question is "a certain norm-style of human exist-

ence (speaking in formal generality)" which "signifies a first historicity within which particular factual norm-styles of culture-creating existence remain formally the same" (PCH Cr.AppI p.281, Kr. p.326). That is, the fellow community we are speaking of is the formal and universal structure which reserves all actual way of communication into a world from which new ones spring. And this historico-communal life first radiates from and gravitated towards the "I", the "we".

(iii) The relation between the world and human existence

Going through the preceding twofold clarification, we can see this without any difficulty: the world is always the human world, and ultimately, our world; and, the horizon of our fellow men always stands out against the world-horizon. The world as horizon displays an openness and a centredness; and the "we" here and now is the centre of radiation and gravitation. The relation between the world-horizon and the lifeworld [Lebenswelt], and, correlatively, that between the "I" and "we" spoken of here and the transcendental accomplishing subjectivity and intersubjectivity which constitute the lifeworld, will not be inquired into in our present study.¹

B. The common language

(i) The human community as lingual horizon

1. Thus we have three worlds the surrounding world which is cultured in full sense, the world-horizon which is universally cultural and the lifeworld which is the "realm of original evidences [Evidenzen]," the universe of "what is intuitable in principle", of what is actually experienceable" (Cr. Pt.IIIA, §34d, p. 127, Kr. p. 130).

The language which is already at work at the moment the ideal truth-sense is constituted, is exclusively interwoven with the fellow mankind and the world horizon.

It is precisely to this horizon of civilization [Menschheitshorizont] that common language belongs. One is conscious of civilization from the start as an immediate and mediate lingual community. Clearly it is only through language and its far-reaching documentations, as possible communication, that the horizon of civilization can be open and endless one, as it always is for men.... civilization is, for every man whose we-horizon it is, a community of those who can reciprocally express themselves, normally, in a fully understandable fashion (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.358-9, Kr. p.369)

Now Husserl gives us a big bill: the human community is a lingual community. Two important aspects can be extracted from it. The first concerns the human community. With the assertion that the human community is lingual, it follows that all the work we have attributed to it in the above section is thoroughly accomplished through the medium of language. The second concerns the language. We should bear in mind that the human community being discussed here is never this or that de facto community but the formal mankind-horizon, which, as horizon, is nevertheless stamped with the "we" here and now as its centre of radiation and gravitation. Accordingly, the language we are attempting to clarify here is first of all the common language which is not this or that de facto language but is formal and universal. Besides, since the human community is lingual, the common language must be a horizon, which nevertheless accords a primacy to the "our" present, here and now speaking and writing. In short the common language is itself a horizon. Hence, taking the two aspects synthetically, we can see that the common language-horizon and the human community are interrelated possibilities in such a way that

the common language articulates the human communal acts whereas the community-horizon permeates the lingual acts. The relation between the language-horizon and community-horizon is identical with that between the community-horizon and the world-horizon: the language-horizon always stands out against the community-horizon. We have concretely exhibited what the common language is and what the relation between it and the community-horizon is and the latter has also received its concrete determination in the course.

(ii) The world as lingual horizon

After the clarification of the common language and its relation to the human community, the relation between the common language and the world-horizon can easily be discerned, since it is already hidden there.

[W]ithin this [the lingual] community everyone can talk about what is within the surrounding world of his civilization [Menschheit] as Objectively existing. Everything has its name, or is namable in the broadest sense, i.e., lingually expressible. The Objective world is from the start the world for all, the world which "everyone" has as world-horizon. Its Objective being presupposes men, understood as men with a common language (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.359, Kr. p.369-370).

The world-horizon, as "our" horizon, is the open and endless field of "our" communal acts, and it stretches itself through and through in these acts. Correlative to these communal acts are the ways of dealing with things, or objects, each of which is nothing but a unity of validities of dealings. Therefore, as the community horizon, the world-horizon is itself articulated through the common language. By means of this common language, we deal with objects, i.e., the objects manifest themselves, institute themselves as unities of validities, in

different ways. Therefore, the things, the objects, as unities of validities, are and, indeed, must be lingually expressible.

(iii) Further clarification

It cannot be overemphasized that what Husserl ventures into are the de jure conditions which a priori generate truth, science but never the de facto factors which accompany the generation. "Our" language, "our" fellow community, "our" world "here" and "now" - all these signify prescientific constituting functions with respect to science, to truth. They should never be confused with anything the very existence of which necessarily presupposes that sense and truth have already constituted. Therefore, they are not any real language, real fellow community, real world, all of which are always only variable examples. They are not even the eidos language, the eidos fellow community, the eidos world which, being brought into light through the eidetic reduction, deal with sense and truth as ready made. We thus find ourselves disagreeing with Derrida's exposition of Husserl on the prescientific constituting function of language, men and world. The common language is conceived as, or at least supposes, the eidos language. There we read: "The possibility of a mediate and immediate horizon of universal language first supposes that the hazardous problem concerning the possibility of a "pure grammar" and "a priori norms" of language is resolved..." (Intro. p.80). The world-horizon and the we-consciousness are conceived as a "pre-cultural pure Nature" (Intro. p.81) and the consciousness of facing a same thing with others: "[Two men] can always, immediately or not, stand

together before the same natural existent - which we can always strip of the cultural superstructures and categories founded on it... Consciousness of confronting the **same** thing, an object perceived as such, is consciousness of a pure and precultural **we**... This purely natural objective existent is the existing sensible world..." (Intro. p.81). Firstly, the pure grammar is the system of a priori norms which every language must obey so long as it is a system of signs expressing ready made sense and meaning. But the common language-horizon is not language in a full sense but the a priori genesis of sense and meaning. These two terms belong to two different levels of theorization. Secondly, although sense and being, for Husserl (at least after the Ideas), are generally determined as object or objectivity, the consciousness and the object are never self-contained but are horizon-consciousness and object-in-horizon respectively. And the horizon we are speaking of is the a priori conditions of culture, so it is cultural though every cultural factuality is suspended. Therefore, the "same thing" cannot be "an object perceived as such", a "purely natural objective existent"; the world-horizon cannot be "the existing sensible world".

Going through the above itinerary, I think it is sufficiently clear in what sense Husserl is talking about the original language, fellow men and world from which sense and truth originate. We end this section with Husserl's own words:

Language, for its part, as function and exercised capacity, is related correlatively to the world, the universe of Objects which is lingually expressible in its being and being-such. Thus men as men, fellow men, world - the world of which men, of which we, always talk and can

talk - and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably intertwined; and one is always certain of their inseparable relational unity, though usually only implicitly, in the manner of a horizon (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.359, Kr. p.370).

§3. The Objectification of Sense

The possibility of language as function and capacity is presupposed. Then, we turn back to the question: how can an immediate something occurred in the stream of consciousness in its first production be eventually objectified to be an ideal Objectivity? The process is, according to Husserl, accomplished in three stages: first, the identity of the spiritual formation within psychical egological subjectivity; second, the identity of the formation in psychical intersubjectivity; finally the identity of the absolute ideal Objectivity. Only in the second and third stage is language required. Note that the so called "process" and "stage" do not refer to a real process or real stages but the sense-genesis. The primal instituting geometer may at the very first moment in a single stroke institute the sense and, correlatively, attain the level of transcendental subjectivity, without going separately through the real stages.

A. The living present and psychical validity

The first stage, i.e., the production of the evidence [Evidenz] of the identity of a spiritual formation, is itself accomplished in two steps: first the identity out of a present flow of time-consciousness and second the one out of any actual

and possible flow.¹ The original being-itself-there in the original evidence, though being actually accomplished with psychical immanent acts and their act-contents, is anything but psychical immanent content, not to speak of the transcendent acts and contents, i.e., acts and contents themselves being treated as real things; and it should not be dated with the sensible, worldly time. The original being-itself-there is a synthetic unity accomplished in the living present[lebendige Gegenwart], which is a slice or a segment of the absolute flow of time-consciousness, in its work of unifying the retention, the protention and the primal impression, which retains the just-elapsed phase, anticipates the soon-coming phase, and enjoys the now-phase of the immanent acts and contents respectively. Thanks to the whole complicated operation, we can be conscious of, for example, a sound throughout its actual on-going in a present flow of time. So the original being-itself-there can be identified throughout a set of present psychic acts. Now the original evidence in the

1. Husserl lectured on the constitution of time in 1904-05 and left us a bulk of manuscripts dated from 1901 to 1911. Now they have appeared in book-form: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, ed. R. Boehm, Husserliana Band X (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). It includes the whole set of an earlier edition: Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, ed. M. Heidegger (Halle: Niemeyer, 1928), which contains the entire lecture notes and several manuscripts from 1905-11. We have an English translation of Heidegger's edition only: The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, tr. J. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). Husserl worked on the concept of the living present extensively in 1928-1933 (directly before the "Crisis period) and left us another bulk of manuscript which is preserved in the Husserl Archive in Louvain coded as the C-manuscripts. Fine studies of Husserl's theory of time in English are (1) John Borough, "The Emergence of an Absolute Conscious in Husserl's early Writings on Time-Consciousness", Man and World, vol. V, 1972, reprinted in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, Ed. & intro. F.A. Elliston & P. McCormick (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press) and (2) Robert Solowski, Husserlian Meditations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), §§52-53, ch. 5 and ch. 6, pp. 132-168.

first production may gradually fade away and disappear. But there is always the possibility of recollection. At first the once lived-experience [Erlebnis] and its experienced content is awakened obscurely, and then it can always be recollected in a present Erlebnis which lives through the past Erlebnis with the consciousness of its being once the case. That is, an evident consciousness of coincidence is brought forth which identifies the originally evident formation and the present one. Furthermore, we establish in this recollection the evident consciousness of the identity of the formation in any actual and possible repetition. Therefore, the original being-itself-there can be identified throughout the whole psychic life of an individual. That is, an identity of the spiritual formation is attained within the psychical egological subjectivity.¹ But "we have still not gone beyond the subject and his subjective, evident capacities; that is, we still have no 'Objectivity' given" (OrG, Cr. AppVI p.360, Kr. p.370).

B. Speech and interpsychical validity

It is the activity of speech, the direct, present, oral communication, that sets free the spiritual formation from the prison of the egological subject. By means of speech, different subjects can come to reciprocal understanding, and hence "the original production and the product of one subject can be -----

1. Before the "Crisis" period, what the living-present has accomplished attains transcendental validity. Whilst here, it accomplishes only something psychically valid. The mere form of primordial temporalization does not as it once did suffice to guarantee transcendental validity. Only a primordial temporalization of lingual material pervaded with lingual intention does suffice. The concept of the transcendental undergoes a profound change.

actively understood by the others" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.360, Kr. p.371). Similar to the case of recollection, the full understanding of other's production and product means nothing but a present Erlebnis which lives through again on other's Erlebnis. The product is reproduced with the evidence of being identical. In this way an identity of a spiritual formation is attained within the immediate speaking community. Nevertheless, the spiritual formation has not yet been fully constituted as ideal Objectivity. It is so tied to the factual communal subjectivity that it has no "persisting existence", no "continuing-to-be". It no longer endures when "the inventor are no longer wakefully so related or even are no longer alive", "when no one has actualized it in evidence" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.360, Kr. p.371).

C. Writing and absolute validity

The remaining task is waiting for writing to accomplish. "The important function of written, documenting lingual expression is that it makes communication possible without immediate or mediate address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.360-1, Kr. p.371). The possibility of writing detaches every possible attachment of a sense-formation to any factual individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity. That is, sense is no longer restricted to the factual evident consciousness of a psychic subject and the communal consciousness of the community in actual communication. Writing sets sense free from factual subjectivity. However, this by no means implies that sense is free from all subjectivity, quite the contrary, the disconnection of sense

from factual subjectivity shows only that sense is constituted in as transcendental subjectivity, and is spread and handed down in a transcendental community through transcendental historical communication. And the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity manifest originaliter in the pure intention of writing (which produces the sense) and the pure intention of reading (which reproduces the sense). Hence, the absolute ideal Objectivity of sense is constituted, and is constituted in its possibility of being written, being incarnated into a lingual flesh. The pure intentional act of writing is the ultimate condition of the constitution of sense and truth.

Writing occasions the hand-in-hand birth of the absolute subjectivity and the absolute objectivity through constituting the ideal truth-sense. More precisely, it is the couple pure intention of writing and pure ability of being written that do the work. As we have already pointed out earlier in this chapter, the pure possibility of writing, in both sense of being the pure intention and the pure ability, juridically necessarily originates together with the incarnation into a lingual flesh. Whereas a flesh is factually necessarily given together with a body. A flesh is an animate body while a body is an unanimated flesh; the former expresses intentions and meanings while the latter indicates them. The constituting function of language thus maintains a de jure necessarily relation with the lingual flesh but a de facto necessarily one with the lingual body. This double characteristic of language gives us two directionally reversal paradoxes. The first is the one that we have so far talked about in connection with

the lingual flesh: because of the possibility of expressible in language, a sense is free from all language; because of the possibility of being tied to factuality, a sense is free from factuality; because of the possibility of being bound to sensible spatiotemporality, a sense is free from sensible spatiotemporality; in short, because of the possibility of being not itself, of non-being, a sense is itself. Now to these we can always supplement with the reverse paradox in connection with the lingual body: because of being free from all language, a sense is expressible in language; because of being free from factuality, a sense is possibly tied to factuality; because of its being free from sensible spatiotemporality, a sense is possibly bound to sensible spatiotemporality; in short, because of being itself, a sense is possibly not itself. The global phenomenon language at once engenders and endangers truth-sense, engendering in endangering and endangering in engendering.

CHAPTER III

THE HOW OF TRADITION: SEDIMENTATION, REACTIVATION AND UNIVOCITY

Our (and Husserl's) inquiry into the possibility of a pure history so far have laid bare the condition for the original genesis of sense, and here comes the turn to throw light on the conditions for the transmission and the development of the sense, i.e., the reproduction of sense and the production of a new one out of those already valid.

Let us start with a precaution. We have just been talking as though an original sense has already been constituted by an instituting thinker, and the problem is how the inheritor of the sense can reproduce it and produce something new out of it. Do not those lingual gestures such as "already", "has been", "re"-produce and "new" suppose that the whole matter is conducted within the worldly or cosmic time? But have we not so patiently shown that the ideal truth-sense is supratemporal with respect to the sensible temporality and that it is omnitemporal? The genesis and the development of sense themselves display a historical time; they have their historical temporality, or, their historicity. Under no circumstances should the phenomenological historical time be confused with the mundane time.

However, unfortunately or not, we could proceed only with

our natural language, which remains blind and deaf to the distinction between transcendental and mundane-ness. We always strive for the transcendental by means of the mundane. Husserl has very early in his transcendental vocation pointed out that a "definitive fixation of scientific language" and a "complete analysis of phenomena" require each other, that "it is rooted in the nature of things".¹ Thus we transform our language in and through our transcendental inquiry at the same time. So while one is advised not to stick to those above words in their mundane senses, yet one also cannot, and should not, abandon them at all.

§1. The Dialectic of Origin and Tradition

The condition for the original genesis of sense is language, which is both Leib and Körper and which at the same time engenders and endangers the truth-sense. It seems that the question of the possibility of reproduction of sense is not so urgent as that of the possibility of securing it from some misery which may be resulted from its inborn danger. What kind of terrible misery can an absolute ideal Objectivity suffer from? A sensible object, say, a lion of flesh

1. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (cf. n.2, Introduction), pp. 96. Eugen Fink has underlined the point in his article in Kantstudien, 1933, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism" in The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings, ed. & tr. w/ intro. R.O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 143-144. The phenomenological reduction cannot be understood by a simple employment of language of the natural attitude but by a transformation of the natural language.

and blood, may perish, i.e., its being may be totally annihilated. What about ideal objects? Being idealities, they are, of course, in some sense, once and for all and for everyone. However, as we have shown, there are bound idealities, which necessarily adhere to factuality. The word "Löwe" itself, its very being, would have never been, if the actual and possible existence of German language and German speaking community is not given. The unity of meaning Löwe, similarly, would have never been, if the actual and possible existence of empirical subjectivity is not given. Only the absolute ideal Objectivity seems to be immune from any obliteration of being. Still, since the ideal truth-sense is instituted in language, does not a worldly catastrophe of written documents and vocal records or a massacre of all the people who are able to speak out and write down the sense destruct the sense? Yes, if destruction means that there is no longer a factual lingual subject who can lingually express the sense, there is not any phonetic and graphic materialization of the sense. Yet, the sense remains stubbornly the same in its being. No factuality can demolish the absolute ideal Objectivity.

In what sense can we then seriously speak of the obliteration of an ideal sense? In its very first constitution in the living present of the transcendental ego, which synthetically unifies all the different acts involved, we have no sense to speak of an obliteration of the sense, although an inborn danger is made known. However, if the first original acts of the instituting living present are not retained in another living present, be it another present of the same

psychic subject or a present of another psychic subject, the original living present and the sense it constitutes are in a peculiar sense obliterated. (The word "obliteration" itself is being obliterated.) We cannot say that the sense is obliterated since it is once created in a **past** absolute origin. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the sense is not obliterated since the **present** absolute origin has no memory of the **past** absolute origin, that is, the past is no longer the past of the present. It is no longer itself, it is nothing. The sense is endangered in its being in a present forgetting of it, i.e., a present inability to relive it. The possibility of reliving the sense is inseparable from the possibility of securing it. The possibility of reproduction of the sense is inseparable from the possibility of production of it. Accordingly, the production, the securing and the reproduction are not so discrete as one may first be tempted to think. The problem of the constitution of sense is being continued in the problem of its tradition.

§2. Sedimentation and Reactivation

A. The Original Mode of Language

We have observed that sense is constituted in a Verleiblichung of a pure writing intention, and a Verleiblichung is always accompanied with a Verkörperung. The sense runs its risk exactly when the geistige Leiblichkeit is completely downgraded to the Körperlichkeit. The flesh is totally taken to be the body. On the other way round, a present

inheritor secures the sense just in preserving the Geistigkeit of the Leib. The sense at the very first moment of its constitution is factually tied to a factual language in a necessary manner. The pure intention of writing is made known to itself in a factual writing-down in a factual language. The original constituting act may fade out gradually but the written sign still exists. (1) A reader of the lingual sign, as a lingual being with a common language-horizon with the first institutor, can understand the sense-formation fully, i.e., can **reactivate** the original sense of the acts in original evidence: "this is the capacity for reactivation that belongs originally to every human being, as a speaking being" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.361, Kr p.371). (2) The sense, being produced when it is incarnated and embodied, is from now on stamped with the lingual sign. An upsurge of sense is simultaneously a return to sign. A sense-formation necessarily arises from the already sedimentary sense-formations and falls back to the sedimentary soil. Every single dealing with it is mediated with the sign. The constitution is accordingly a **sedimentation**: "[T]he writing-down effects a transformation of the original mode of being of the sense-formation... It becomes sedimented, so to speak" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.361, Kr. p.371-2). (3) Lingual signs, being the flesh and the body of a primordial act, are thus nothing but an abstract aspect of the concrete constitution of sense: "[S]entences give themselves in consciousness as reproductive transformations of an original sense produced out of an actual, original activity; that is, in themselves they refer to such a genesis" (OrG, Cr.AppVI

p.365, Kr. p.374-5). Thus, after the notions of reactivation and sedimentation are introduced, how language as the condition for the origin and the tradition of sense fulfills its vocation can be determined concretely.¹

B. Two Derivative Mode of Language

Instead of exploring immediately the conceptual richness reactivation and sedimentation bring in, we first point out two other possible ways in which language functions as Husserl conceives, the first of which has already been brought in tacitly.

(i) Passivity

Lingual signs awaken their familiar meanings. "The awakening is something passive; the awakened meaning is thus given passively..."(OrG, Cr.AppVI p.361, Kr p.371). One could think "in terms of things that have been taken up merely receptively, passively, which deals with meanings only passively understood and taken over....Passivity in general is the realm of things that are bound together and melt into one another associatively, where all sense that arises is put together passively"(OrG, Cr.App p.361, Kr p.372). The sign as that which anchors the sedimentation must not be mistaken as either a sensible-experienceable thing or a lingual ideality. As a lingual sign for a speaking subject, it can and must

1. We can see in advance that with the introduction of sedimentation and reactivation, the primordial temporalization operates on the historical plane to contribute to the genesis of ideal Objectivity. It is only the transcendental historical subjectivity that is responsible for the ideal Objectivity.

arouse meaning in the latter's consciousness. It is precisely because of this function that the sign is a sediment of spiritual products. The awakening is "passive" and the awakened meaning is "passively" given. The speaking subject simply receives something. The meanings are so vague and undifferentiated that they fluctuate and flow into each other. Having received these sedimented meanings, a kind of thinking activity is possible which manipulates them by association. One receives the sedimented meanings passively, and then manipulates them associatively. The speaking subject abdicates his responsibility for the reactivation of the original sense. At one go, the sense is obliterated and the subject slips into an unauthentic life. At this point, one might accuse the sign of its concealment of sense and might think of getting rid of the sedimented meaning forever from the sign. But the concealment of sense or the connection with sedimented meaning is first of all the very condition for the being of the sign, for its being a "reproductive transformation" of an original sense and for its referring to an original genesis. It is also the necessary mode of being of the sense if the sense is originally produced in original activities. Without the passive awakening and the awakened meaning, the sign will not be able to allude to an original sense-genesis, and the sense is unable to be generated and advanced in a tradition. That is, both sign and sense will be nothing without the passivity.

(ii) Logicality

A peculiar activity called "explication" [Verdeutlichung] is always possible if the speaking subject has passively received a sedimented meaning in associative understanding. The vague and undifferentiated meaning can be "actively explicated." Explication "articulates what has been read...extracting one by one...the elements of sense, thus bringing the total validity to active performance...on the basis of individual validities" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.364, Kr. p.374). We can see that the activity of explication never transforms a sedimented meaning back to its origin; more radically, it never treats the passively awakening meaning as a sediment, as something which refers to an original genesis. This sort of activity simply takes a passive, receptive meaning as a matter of course, and it proceeds to bring in clarity and distinction out of the vague and undifferentiated meaning. Anyway, the meaning constructed in explication "is in the mode of having been originally produced....The explicated judgment becomes an ideal objectivity capable of being passed on" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.364, Kr. p.374). That is, the activity of explication has its own sort of evidence and the produced meaning-validity can always be brought back with an evident consciousness of being identically the same. Furthermore, this sort of activity makes possible "evident constructions of new judgments on the basis of those already valid for us" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.364, Kr. p.374). The whole of this kind of activity, the kind of evidence it brings forth and the meaning-validity produced are branded the "**domain of logic**" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.364, Kr. p.374). Explication is the logi-

cal activity; the evidence of explication is the logical evidence; the explicated meaning is the logical meaning, the proposition or the judgment. The sign has no constitutive role to play in the realm of propositional meanings.

C. Implications

Having pointed out these two possibilities besides the original function of language four interrelated points can be derived. (1) The original performance and reactivation are neither the passive understanding nor the active logical thinking. (2) The original evidence is not the logical evidence. (3) The sense is neither the sedimented meaning nor the propositional meaning. The propositional meaning ceaselessly presupposes and yet always forgets the original truth-sense. The propositional meaning is an ideal objectivity, and accordingly, is identical in itself and supratemporal. But these simply are not that of the ideal truth-sense. Then, if the sense is not the "objective", logical meaning, is it the subjective disposition affected by the objective? In ordinary discourse, one speaks of the propositional meaning of, e.g., geometry on the one hand and the meaning or the value of geometry for human life on the other hand. But the case is that both the so-called "objective" meaning and the "subjective" value are possible only after the ideal truth-sense has once been generated no matter it is forgotten or not. The sense is constituted before the fact and the value can be distinguished; the sense itself makes the distinction. (4) the sign in its primordial happening is not a propositional sign. The primordial sign is neither the expression nor the

indication in the Logical Investigations. The former expresses a meaning in its being animated by an expressive act whereas the latter indicates a meaning by an indicative act. However, the meaning they serve as a sign to mean and to label respectively is an already constituted, i.e., a logical propositional meaning. The primordial sign is the sedimentation of an original sense.

Now we can ask and answer for ourselves the question: How does a tradition of sense work? That is, how is a sense propagated and how is a new sense developed? The sense is always sedimented in signs. Each passive meaning and each logical meaning signifies a sense. Each advance of passive meaning or logical meaning signifies an advent of sense. A sense is reproduced if there is a present reactivation of the sedimented sign back to the original acts. And a new sense is produced if a new meaning is produced in the first place associatively or evidently in the passive or the logical sphere respectively, and then the associative or the evident production is reactivated back to the advent of sense. A pure tradition of truth-sense, as a lively advancing movement of sense, is thus nothing but the interpenetration and interdevelopment of original genesis, sedimentation and reactivation. But, at the same time, the phenomenon of "crisis" is made possible - the forgetting of the origin, i.e., a total surrender to passivity or logicity.

§3. Univocity

A. Univocity as the ultimate condition of sedimentation and reactivation

We now proceed to answer the question: What is the condition for a pure tradition? As we have shown, a pure tradition of ideal truth-sense is a intertwining advancing movement of sedimentation and reactivation. Thus, the condition for a pure tradition is that of sedimentation and reactivation. It takes no difficulty to see that sedimentation and reactivation are interrelated possibilities: (1) If a sense-formation can be sedimented in signs, then an ideal sense is constituted, and so it is valid for "everyone" lived in the tradition, i.e., it is reactivable. (2) If an original sense is reactivable, it is identically repeatable for "everyone", then it must be expressible in signs, i.e., it can be sedimented. Therefore sedimentation and reactivation share the same concrete condition of possibility. Language, as we have already analyzed, is the condition for sedimentation; and so is it for reactivation. That is, language is the condition for a pure tradition, a pure history. The word "language" refers to the global phenomenon of language in which the common language-horizon, the community-horizon and the world-horizon articulate against each other. Everything is lingually expressible and everyone can reciprocally express himself in a fully understandable fashion. But here a more concrete determination is brought forth:

[Reactivability] occurs when one has a view to the **univocity** of lingual expression and to securing, by means of the most painstaking coining of the relevant words, propositions, and complexes of proposi-

tions, the results which are to be **univocally expressed** (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.362, Kr. p.372, my emphasis).

To secure the results means to constitute the sense, i.e., to make it a sediment. Thus the condition for tradition and history is more specifically determined as the **univocity** of language.

Obviously, univocity belongs to the side of the common language-horizon whereas equivocity marks every natural language. By means of univocity, a sense-formation is able to deposit itself in a univocal expression and hence can be reactivated; that is, an ideal truth-sense is generated. Furthermore, guided by univocal expression, the interplay of sedimentation and reactivation always signifies the incessant advent of sense. If a science is to preserve its genuine, original sense, then

the method of producing original idealities out of what is prescientifically given in the cultural world must have been **written down and fixed in firm sentences**...furthermore, the capacity for translating these sentences from vague lingual understanding into the clarity of the reactivation of their evident sense must have been, in its own way, handed down and ever capable of being handed down (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.366, Kr. p.375-6, my emphasis).

It is in this way that univocal language is the ultimate possibility of the institution of sciences and of philosophy as a universal science, both of which strive for the absolute and objective truth. Univocity makes possible the scientific culture and the interior history, pure history. Whereas equivocal natural language is essentially tied to the prescientific and extrascientific life in which relative and subjective knowledge and actuality for our particular purpose and care are circulated. Equivocity is always the brand of factu-

al culture and exterior history, empirical history.

B. Univocity as telos

But, now, what is the univocal language itself? If it is not secured, all we have said will run the risk of being word-play. On the one hand, univocity seems to be sufficiently guaranteed by the common language-horizon. On the other hand, it seems that only if a language in full sense is at disposal, can an original sense be instituted. Is the univocal language formal and universal? Or is it a language in full sense? We have a dilemma. If it is a formal and universal structure, it has no constituting capacity. If it is a language in full sense, it is nothing but a natural language. And a natural language is a mobile and open complex of relations and contrasts, in which a word can be placed in ever new and unforeseeable articulations. It means that a language in full sense is an equivocal language, and therefore adulterates the pure history.

Everywhere it seems that we have empirical cultures on the one hand and the formal conditions for possibility on the other. The univocal language which is supposed to juridically generate pure sense in a concrete manner - what is it? Here Husserl makes a decisive resolution tacitly which is acutely pointed out by Derrida:

Absolute univocity is inaccessible, but only as an Idea in the Kantian sense can be...Univocity is also the absolute horizon of equivocity...univocity is both the apriori and teleological condition of all historicity; it is that without which the very equivocations of empirical culture and history would not be possible (Intro. p.104-5).

The univocal language is neither factual language nor formal

condition. It is the common language-horizon we have already explored. This common language-horizon is now determined as a teleological horizon: it is a telos at infinity which makes possible all factual language and towards which all factual language tends. It follows that the pure culture and history are also an infinite telos which makes possible all factual culture and history and to which they advance.

Now what consequences can we derive, if the univocal language is an infinite telos which poses an infinite task upon every language? (1) Since sedimentation functions exclusively within equivocal language, reactivation can never be complete and genuine in full originality. Every reactivation is guided by the genuine reactivation as an infinite telos. (2) Even the genuine sedimentation itself is an infinite telos guiding all factual sedimentation which is necessarily polluted by equivocity. (3) The original sense is accordingly itself an infinite telos since its constitution, i.e., its sedimentation and reactivation, is posed as an infinite task. The origin is the telos. (4) Man himself is idealized: our finite capacity to reactivate is posed within the infinite telos of reactivation. Mankind having infinite task is himself situated in an infinite horizon. Here is an infinitization of men: mankind with infinite task is itself an infinite task. Then, for this humanity, to be is forever to become.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORY AS THE ALL-ENCOMPASSING ULTIMATE HORIZON

In the previous discussion, we have attempted to elucidate the apriori and yet concrete conditions of absolute Objectivity. They are determined as language, writing, sedimentation and reactivation, and finally univocity. And correlatively, the pure intentional history has received a thematic treatment to a certain extent. It signifies an advent of sense rather than a concatenation of facts. So far we have concentrated all of our energy on the transcendental history and its concrete possibilities. However, what does history mean to our human existence in the world as a whole? Specifically, having been contrasted with each other, how do the pure history of sense and the empirical history of facts relate more determinately? Generally asking, how does the pure history relate to other human experiences and activities?

§1. The Historical Present

We, human beings, **always** live at the **present** in the three- in-one but one-as-three horizon -- the common language, the humankind [Menschheit] and the surrounding lifeworld as

the **one** prescientific cultural world. Each of them articulates against one another. To all this we have already thrown light on, Husserl at this moment of inquiry enriches with the following determination:

We are constantly, vitally conscious of this horizon, and specifically as a **temporal** horizon implied in our given **present** horizon....[The world-horizon], for every historical time and civilization[Menschheit], has its particular features and is precisely the tradition. We stand, then, within the **historical horizon** in which everything is **historical**(OrG, Cr. AppVI p.369, Kr. p.378, my emphasis).

All past human experiences and endeavours, accomplishments and achievements, are not **facts** scattered over the mundane time which is linear and homogeneous, but are rather **sense-formations** dwelling in the phenomenological time which is always totally converged to and lived in the present. In regard to the case that these human performance and achievement are precisely spiritual and cultural, the non-linear, heterogeneous phenomenological time in which they dwell cannot be more suitably called **historical**. Thus, the horizon of the common language, of the one mankind, of the one surrounding lifeworld is **temporalized**, or more precisely, **historicized**. Human being as lingual being, communal being and being-in-the-world-horizon is a temporal, or historical, being. In view of the fact that the human living in the surrounding lifeworld is characterized as the fundamental mode of human existence, that the surrounding lifeworld is the nourishing soil [Boden] from which all beings, as unities of sense, spring, and to which all of them refer back, we can see in advance that history is the ultimate scene of sense and being.

The historical horizon in and through which every being

discloses itself is "implied in our given present horizon". The historical time in and through which every being as sense is self-advancing or being advanced, that is, it is stamped with temporal or historical mark, is concentrated or gravitated at "our present". Every being as an always-advancing-forward shows itself at "our present". "Our present" presents the primordial unity of time which is derivatively partitioned into the past, the present and the future. Since it is the essential form of the historical lifeworld, it is responsible for the tradition, that is, the handing down and creating of spiritual products. It is itself cultural or historical.

We are going to elucidate the temporal or historical structure of the "our present" in two ways: first in what manner it is a "present" and then "our" present.

[T]he whole of cultural present, understood as a totality, "implies" the whole of cultural past in an undetermined but structurally determined generality.... [I]t implies a continuity of pasts which imply one another, each in itself being a past cultural present. And this whole continuity is a **unity** of traditionalization up to the present, which is our present as traditionalizing itself in flowing-static vitality (OrG, Cr. AppVI p.371, Kr. pp.379-380).

A cultural present is a totality which synthesizes all sense-formations and sense-interconnections. And these formations and interconnections are themselves historical, that is to say, they stretch out and advance along their own historical time. So each cultural present presents in a unifying nexus all the sense as having a historical past and projecting towards a historical future and merges them into the one historical time. Therefore, concretely speaking, every cultural present is an absolute primordial centre which manifests

everything and manifests them with a historicity. Abstractly speaking it is that to which everything converges, in which everything presents and from which everything projects. In this sense, a cultural present can be called a historical present. All sense-formations and sense-interconnections have thus been shown to be essentially dwelling in the historical time and totalized in a historical present. What about the historical presents themselves? How do they connect to one another? Two historical presents cannot be conceived as two things existing side by side simultaneously. Each historical present is an absolute which fuses everything and furnishes historical time. By what right can we distinguish **different** historical presents, not to speak of inquiring into their connection? "What is historically primary in itself is our present"(OrG, Cr. AppVI p.373, Kr. p.382). We always live in **our present** historical present which is the absolute of the absolutes. Yet it never closes itself up but refers back to **other past** historical presents and anticipates **other future** historical presents. In addition, every other historical present is meant as one which refers back and anticipates. That is, the present historical present "implies a continuity of pasts which imply one another". Each past historical present itself involves a continuity of its past historical presents. So the present historical present implies a continuity of continuities. This continuity, which continues something instead of annihilates it, must be a **unity** of past historical presents and the series of continuity each of them bears. Husserl uses the word "traditionalization" for the continuity of historical presents. All past tradi-

tionalization is unifiedly traditionalized in our present outside which no tradition is possible. Our present historical present is the traditionalizing itself.

Concisely speaking, our analysis of history can be divided into two levels: the sense and the historical present. (1) All senses are synthesized and each is totalized in a historical present as a totality which displays a historical time without which no sense is able to advance, i.e., without which no sense can be. (2) All historical presents are unified and each is traditionalized in our present historical present as traditionalizing itself. Senses and historical present are totalized and traditionalized up to our present. A sense always signifies an unending movement ceaselessly advancing forward which is "undetermined but structurally determined". The whole past is nothing but that which is totalized at the present as the nourishing soil from which a future is projected. This totalization and projection are performed in an unity of our present which permits the entire operation to be indefinite but structurally definite. Indeed, this entire operation is our present itself. And history is nothing but the unending movement of traditionalization of past historical presents and creation of future historical presents. "History is from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of sense" (OrG, Cr. AppVI p.371, Kr. p.380).

§2. Horizon as The Concrete Form of History

Our present historical present exercises the above-explored essential function, that is, exercises itself, under the form of horizon. It exists as a historical horizon which is the world-horizon, always open, always pregiven and prescientific, and forever the constant functioning soil of any activity and work. We are and must be conscious of the world so long as we are able to attend to particular actualities, knowledge and value:

We always already know of our present world and that we live in it, always surrounded by an openly endless horizon of unknown actualities. This knowing, as horizon-certainty.... All not-knowing concerns the unknown world, which yet exists in advance for us as world, as the horizon of all questions at the present and thus also all questions which are specifically historical. These are the questions which concerns men, as those who act and create in their communal coexistence in the world and transform the constant cultural face of the world (OrG, Cr. AppVI pp.373-4, Kr. p.382).

Every single human communal spiritual gesture, every single move, is historical, that is, synthetized with other sense-formations and totalized at the present and projected toward a future, by means of the horizontal structure of the formations themselves. All not-knowing and, following from it, all knowing which is the proper counterpart of not-knowing are displayed or conducted within an always already working horizon-knowing. The horizon-consciousness legitimizes actualities, knowledge, value, and so forth, in short, unites of validities, since each of them is legitimized so long as it is woven together with both things from its own category and from others, and forms a coherent nexus starting from itself as centre of reference. This consciousness also lays out the directions and ways for further determination of each unity of

validities, for more explicit delineation of the nexus of validities of each unity. We can see that the former signifies the centredness whereas the latter signifies the openness of the horizon. Horizon is already at work for every single move because a move must be a move within a horizon, that is, a move is necessarily horizontal in character. In this manner, Husserl contends that horizon is the presupposition of all human experience and endeavour:

This knowing, as horizon-certainty, is not something learned... the horizon-certainty had to be already there in order to be capable of being laid out thematically; it is already presupposed in order that we can seek to know what we do not know (OrG. Cr.AppVI p. 374, Kr. p. 382)

The so-called presupposition should not be misconstrued as the formal condition of possibility which prescribes all possible experience, imposes itself outwardly upon some given manifold, and whose meaning can be singled out though it never dwells in a region different from experience. Horizon is nothing outside the interwoven experience and endeavour of human existence; it is only the stretching out of them. We live through the horizon concretely.

Making more explicit what is already there in the above exposition, the two mutual and interenveloping characteristics of horizon, namely, centredness and openness, receives their historical setting. The centredness signifies the inheritance and preservation of old spiritual formations whereas the openness signifies the creation of new ones. Horizon displays the dialectic between the centredness and the openness, between a definite source and an indefinite stretch, which furnishes history with its form. The definite source in this

case is our present historical while the indefinite stretch is the totalization and traditionalization on the one hand and the projection and creation on the other. History is then the dialectic of the definite absolute and concrete historical present and the indefinite mutual implication of totalization and projection. All beings, as senses, as unities of validity, are stretched in the historical time, that is, are displayed in the dialectic of our present and its totalization and projection. Hence, we can say that history is the ultimate scene of being and sense. Everything is historical in the sense that it, either taking separately or communally with other beings, draws its entire history up to the present as inheritance from which a future is opened. The past instead of existing primarily as fact dated with a certain point or period in the mundane time, exists as sense at the present for the projecting of a future in the phenomenological time. The present, which totalizes the past so as a future is opened, is nothing but the projecting of the past toward the future. And the future is what the past thrusts towards at the present. It is horizon that accomplishes all these. The following passage from Derrida lucidly and elegantly articulates Husserl's insight into the bearing of the notion of horizon may assume on matters concerning experience in historical time:

Horizon is the always-already-there of a future which keeps the indetermination of its infinite openness intact (even though this future was **announced** to consciousness). As structural determination of every material indeterminacy, a horizon is always virtually present in every experience; for it is at once the unity and the incompleteness for that experience -- the anticipated unity in every incompleteness... The notion of horizon thus makes the a priori and the teleological coincide (Intro. p.117).

Thanks to horizon, history as the vital movement of sense and

being attains its form, namely, the dialectic of our present and the mutual implication of traditionalization and creation, which is yet concretely lived through in our human experience. So we can say that horizon is the concrete form of history.

We have then made clear that the pure history as an advent of sense itself displays a historical time. The historical temporality, or, in short, the historicity endures through the dialectic of our living historical present and the mutual implication of totalization and projection. Precisely because of its being a horizon, the surrounding lifeworld as the ultimate horizon of all being and sense. Every human experience and activity stretches themselves themselves out within the pure history. Everything happens must happen within the historical lifeworld. Everything is historical.

§3. Pure History and Real History

All these having been secured in our insight, the relation between the pure history and the real history could be determined more precisely. Starting with some commonplaces which are by no means devoid of throughout our presentation up till now, the pure history signifies an advent of sense while the real history is a concatenation of facts; the former engenders a lived-through phenomenological historical time while the latter occurs within the naïve, mundane cosmic time; the former gives birth to being and sense while the latter takes an abstract moment of being, namely, bare fact, which

endows inherently with no sense or meaning, for the being itself. Different sense-postures and sense-advances mutually imply each other and are totalized together and traditionalized up to our present, so as to thrust towards a future. Whereas the future events are linked to each other by causal relation in a factual space-time. As we have shown, sense and being are fundamentally historical in a purely transcendental manner, from which other modes of beings are derives subsequently. It follows that the fact and the causal relation of the real history is conceivable only after the sense and the sense-interconnection has already been at work. The pure history is primordial whereas the real history is derivative. Now, to all these which attempt every effort to contrast the pure and the real history as sharply as possible, we should supplement with connector which bridges the two kinds of history. Actually, the so-called history of fact is not so much a kind by itself as an abstract moemnt of the sense-movement, as we have already pointed out. More radically speaking, even the notion of fact is itself a spiritual formation instituted in the human sense-history, which serves certain theoretical or practical purposes and exercises certain functions. Each event of fact necessarily signifies an advent of sense just as a lingual sign is primarily a sedimentation which points back to original formation. Just as the primordial function of sign may be forgotten, the fact may be deprived of its function as an index of sense and is thereupon treated as bare fact, i.e. fact with no inherent sense. In this manner, Husserl writes:

Anything that is shown to be a historical fact ... necessarily has its inner structure of sense; but especially the motivational interconnections established about it in terms of every understanding have deep, further and further - reaching implications which must be interregated, disclosed (Org, Cr. App. VI, p.371, Kr, p.380)

Far from speaking arbitrarily, we dare hold fast that various texts of Husserl suggest that the so-called bare fact existed "objectively", there is only a human spiritual product. History does not reside in the so-called bare fact, which does not even exist as what the concept claims to be, but in our human participation, penetrated with understanding, and so eventually expressed in language. The praxis, the theoria and the logos merge together to furnish the actual subject matter of history. An advance of sense is sedimented in a historical practice, articulated with understanding and hence fixed in language, which must be reactivated back to its original sense-advance and sense-interconnection. The deep and far-reaching sense-implication must be interrogated, disclosed. Hence, in conclusion, the real history of fact is derivative with respect to the pure history of sense; and it is a sedimentation of the original movement of sense, which must be reactivated.

CHAPTER V

THE SOURCE OF IDEALITY

A sense has already been determined as an absolute ideal Objectivity, that is, as an absolute ideality and absolute Objectivity. We have so far only laid bare the apriori concrete and constitutive conditions for sense as absolute Objectivity, that is, for how sense can objectify itself. Furthermore, this objectification has shown to be nothing but the historical constitution of sense and, accompanied with this, historicity has shown to be an essential mark of every being and sense. We are now suitably entitled to attempt to elucidate the apriori concrete condition for absolute ideality.

The conditions of possibility which at once de jure and de facto constitute absolute Objectivity are the surrounding lifeworld, the human community, the common language horizon, the pure intention of writing, the capacity of sedimentation and reactivation, and finally the possibility of univocal expressibility. All these **concrete** conditions are necessarily not independent existents but interrelated possibilities of performance and achievement, or concisely, of pure activity itself. What is the at once de jure and de facto condition for absolute ideality? As concrete condition, it must be an activity which actually produces the ideality. Husserl terms this activity "idealization": "Ideas arise through a peculiar sort of spiritual accomplishment: idealization" (Cr. AppV p.348, Kr. p.361). In the following we

try to illumine the process of idealization and the ideality, and some related problems.

The ideality belongs exclusively to and marks the domain of science and philosophy. Here philosophy does not refer to the different philosophical schools, different systematic doctrines, different sets of problems, and so forth; it is taken in its primordial and ultimate sense: the all-encompassing science of the totality of what is. And sciences are not treated as separate yet logically connected systematic researches of different yet ontically connected regions of beings; they are unified under the universal task of philosophy. As we have already explored, the ideality is first of all an omnitemporal identity in itself. "[I]t produces in any number of acts of production by one person or any number of persons something identically the same, identical in sense and validity" (PCH, Cr. AppI p.278, Kr. p.323). Besides, what have been shown to be valid can serve to produce higher idealities, which in turn produce other higher idealities. In this way, "an infinity [marks] off as a universal field of work, as the domain of the science. Science, then, signifies the idea of an infinity of tasks" (Ibid.). Finally, the ideality innovates an unconditional truth-in-itself which is absolute and Objective in contrast to the relative and subjective prescientific truth. "This involves an infinity which gives to each factual confirmation and truth the character of being relative, of being a mere approach in relation precisely to that infinite horizon in which the truth-in-itself counts, so to speak, as an infinitely distant point" (Ibid., Kr. p.324). We can say that the birth

of ideality certifies the birth of science as the one universal science. In other words, idealization is the primordial philosophical act: it institutes the whole scientific culture or culture of truth. Scientific humanity has many infinite ideas, including strictly philosophical ones such as absolute truths, genuine goods and infinite tasks, and scientific ones such as points, straight lines and circles. In the Crisis, Husserl usually talks about idealization and idealities or ideas in connection with a particular branch of the universal philosophy, namely, mathematics, or more precisely, geometry. But Husserl claims that the mathematical idealities and their corresponding idealizations always have an exemplary signification. The following will pursue an clarification of the related problems of idealization, taking geometry as example.

§1. Idealization and Imaginative Variation

At the moment when the idealizing act breaks through the psychic realm all the conditions for absolute objectivity should have already been given. The cultural surrounding world can be taken abstractly as a world of "things", although "thingness" or "corporeality" can never exhaust it. And regarding a thing or a body, one can clearly see that it has spatiotemporal shape and material[stoffliche] qualities. In addition, one is always capable of paying attention only to the shape-aspect. Further, the practical goals of the prescientific life prefer some shapes rather than others.

Correspondingly, technical praxis and methods of measurement always attempt to produce these preferred shapes and improve them. For example, surfaces and edges, more or less "smooth" and "even", are, as it can easily be imagined, preferred shapes suiting practical ends; then, again, straight lines and even surfaces are preferred. So far, we have still been dwelling in the prescientific life and spiritual accomplishments. Husserl writes in a parentheses: "...proceeding from the factual, an essential form becomes recognizable through a method of variation" (Org, Cr. AppVI p.376, Kr.p.384). Is this "essential form" which is acquired through varying the factual the absolute ideality? Is this "method of variation" the idealization? Even if one possesses this kind of "essential form", one still remains captive to "the finitely known and unknown spaces and times as finite elements" (Ibid.), and has no "geometrical space, mathematical time" (Ibid.). "With his manifold finite shapes in their space-time [one] does not yet have geometrical shapes, the phoronomic shapes" (Ibid.). Nevertheless, a novel spiritual product is to be produced "out of these finite elements which serve as material" (Ibid.) "[The shapes, as] formations[Bildungs] developed out of praxis and thought of in terms of [gradual] perfection, clearly serve only as bases for a new sort of praxis out of which similarly named new formation[Gebilde] grow" (Ibid.). How are this variation and the resulting essential form determined in more detail? The following lines are illuminating in this regard:

No matter how arbitrarily we may transform [the actually experienceable] bodies **in phantasy, the**

free and in a certain sense "ideal" possibilities we thus obtain are anything but geometrical-ideal possibilities: they are not the geometrically "pure" shapes which can be inscribed in the ideal space.... Thus geometrical space does not signify anything like imaginary space...Fantasy can transform sensible shapes only into other sensible shapes (Cr. Pt.I §9a p.25, KR. P.22; my emphasis).

The above method of variation is an **imaginative variation** which varies **upon** the actual and possible shapes in our **imagination** . The essential form, being "free and in a certain sense 'ideal' possibilities", cannot be identified with any sensible shape, but it is not yet a "pure" shape. These imaginary possibilities are accompanied by the imaginary space. A prescientific man may in his natural life encounter many round sensible things. By imagination he is able to extract from these sensible shapes the concept of "roundness" which more or less corresponds to them in sensible intuition. But this "roundness" is not to be confused with the geometrical ideality of the "circle", although the former serves as material basis out of which the latter is constructed. So far, three levels can be distinguished with respect to shapes: the sensible shape, the imaginary shape and the pure shape. Correspondingly, there are three kinds of space: the finite sensible space, the imaginary space and the ideal space. And three kinds of capacity are responsible respectively: sensible intuition, imagination and idealization. Those from the first level are unities of validity of practical life and hence, as such, they are not elements of science. On the second and third levels, scientific research is possible. The second level gives rise to descriptive natural science such as geography whereas the third level gives rise to exact geometry. The essential form or imaginary possibility, e.g., roundness,

is by its very definition inexact and vague, which, nevertheless, satisfactorily suits the purpose of descriptive science. This essential form is called in the Ideas I **morphological type** or **morphological essence** (Ideas I, §74, p.166). A morphological type is "essentially, rather than accidentally, inexact and consequently also non-mathematical (Ibid.). However, this inexactness by no means makes them defective:

If the aim is to give appropriate conceptual expression to the intuitionally given essential characteristics of intuitionally given physical things, that means precisely that the latter must be taken as they are given. And they are given precisely as fluid; and the typical essences can become seized upon as exemplified in them only in immediately analytic eidetic intuition (Ibid.).

Hence, besides sensibility which intuits the sensible shapes within the finite space-time, mankind possesses the capacity of imagination which intuits the essentially inexact and vague morphological essence within an imaginary morphological space-time. And a descriptive science is always possible which operates with morphological concepts and aims at a conceptual determination of the sensible shapes.

§2. Idealization as Infinitization

All these, that is, all the prescientific spiritual accomplishments and their corresponding accomplishing capacity, are "always already there, already abundantly developed and pre-given to the philosopher who did not yet know geometry but who should be conceivable as its inventor" (Org, Cr. AppVI p.376, Kr. p.384) It is evident that an absolute

ideality is "a product arising out of an idealizing, spiritual act, one of 'pure' thinking." (Org, Cr. AppVI p.377, Kr pp.384-5). It can be seen that even the morphological type, the descriptive science and the imaginative variation serve only as the material basis of the breakthrough of the absolute ideality. Then the spiritual act which accomplishes it must not be equated with imagination, not to speak of sensibility; it is the pure thinking.

The following passages give us a more concrete determination of the idealizing act and the absolute ideality:

Geometrical concepts are **"ideal" concepts**, expressing something which cannot be "seen"; their "origin" and therefore their content are essentially other than those of **descriptive concepts** as concepts which express, not "ideals", but essences drawn immediately from intuition simpliciter. Exact concepts have as their correlates essences which have the characteristic of **"ideas" in the Kantian sense**. Contrasted with these ideas, or ideal essences, we find morphological essences as the correlates of descriptive concepts (Ideas I, §74, p.166).

The absolute ideality is nothing but idea in the Kantian sense. It is something which cannot be "seen": no possible sensible intuition and imagination can present it to a consciousness in empirical use.

That ideation which yields ideal essences, as **ideal "limits"** which is essentially impossible to be found in any sensuous intuition but which morphological essences "approach" more or less closely without ever reaching them - this ideation is fundamentally different in its essence from the seizing upon an essence by simple "abstraction" in which a salient "moment" is raised into the region of essences as something essentially vague, as something typical (Idea I, §74, p.167).

The determination of the absolute ideality as Idea (in the Kantian sense) goes further: the absolute ideality is a **limit** towards which morphological essences approach but never reach.

And the ideation, the process which brings forth Ideas, is strictly distinguished from the factual mental abstraction or the approaching of morphological essence in imagination. Nevertheless in these texts, which are from the static phase of phenomenology, the constituting capacity of idealization is not sufficiently admired and therefore its correlate, though being determined as Idea, is not so distinguishable from the *eidōs* as one may assume.

Let us read some texts from the Crisis:

[W]e can understand that, out of the praxis of perfecting, of freely pressing toward the horizon of **conceivable**[*erdenklicher*] perfecting "again and again"[*Immer-wieder*], limit shapes emerge toward which the particular series of perfectings tend, as toward invariant and never attainable poles (Cr. Pt. I, §9a, p.26, Kr. p.23).

The idealizing act maintains a closer relation with the praxis of perfecting than as suggested in the earlier texts. The perfecting is not performed in the sensible or the imaginative realm but "the horizon of conceivable perfecting again and again". The "conceivability" Husserl stresses in this sentence, as it is clear in the context, cannot be confused with imaginability and any factual mental faculty. It is not the correlative of factual man but that of the instituting thinker who constitutes the Idea in the constituting acts. And this thinker, as instituting thinker as such, is free to perfect again and again without an end. This free act of perfecting cannot be equated to any factual act which must encounter limit.

One can always make round things rounder and rounder by the given technical art. One can always make representations of round things rounder and rounder in one's imagination. It

is clear that there isn't any round thing or representation of round thing which can serve as the limits of round things and representations of round things respectively. To every given round thing and every given representation of round thing, one always suspect that a rounder one can be made or imagined. But this suspecting is only an empty anticipation of infinite perfection again and again while no fulfilling evidence is given which guarantees that any given practical intuition aiming at the more perfect could ever be fulfilled. Husserl writes: "Here the idealizing performance begins: the conception of the 'again and again'...**in infinitum**" (Cr. AppV p.346, Kr. p.359). Idealization is the removal of all limitation, the infinitization of the finitude of all perfecting again and again.

What arises first is the ideal of continuation which is repeatable with unconditioned generality, **with its own evidence, as a freely thinkable and self-evident possible infinity**, rather than the open endlessness[described above]; rather than finite iteration, this is iteration within the sphere of the unconditional "again and again", of what can be renewed with **ideal freedom....**

Accordingly, such an idealization overcomes even the limits of our finite capacity for coming to know the open world-horizon which continuously accompanies all actual, experiential knowing (ibid.).

Husserl here admits a peculiar sort of evidence of the infinity which is freely thinkable and can be freely returned to. This freedom is itself infinitized: it is an **ideal freedom**. Thus idealization involves the infinitization of mankind through the will and infinitization of the human will itself. The limits of our finite capacity is overcome in the infinitization of our resolute will to overcome. Our finitude is removed in our infinite will to be infinite.

Thus idealization is a leap to the infinity, an immediate presence at the infinite of an infinite number of infinite convergent series. And the absolute ideality, the Idea, is the infinite limit towards which an infinite number of infinite series tend. The evidence of this immediate presence is itself situated at the infinity since it is resolutely promised by an **ideal** free will. And the will is itself idealized in and through the promising posture. Now, regarding that an evidence of something is the conscious grasping of it in its original being-itself-there, the evidence at infinity intended by the idealizing act is indeed no evidence at all. The Idea can never be given in evidence. It follows that the idealization must be distinguished from the Wesensschau (the intuition of an eidos), which indicates an evident givenness of something, and correlatively, the Idea from the eidos. Although Husserl employs the same word "ideation" to denote both the idealization and the Wesensschau in earlier texts, its usage is diminished in later texts in proportion to the advance from static to genetic problematic. The difference between idealization and Wesensschau is: "one can constitute an object as a creation, the other can determine it in an intuition" (Intro., p.135). Correlatively, an Idea is the regulative telos towards which all that which it is an Idea of tends but an eidos is the invariant structure all that which it is an eidos of participates. The difference is one between the constituting and the constituted, the genetic and the static. Once an absolute ideality has been constituted through an idealizing act, the Wesensschau can intuit an eidos. Idealization is the infinite removal of all

finitude, the infinite leap to the infinity; it is concretely constituted in the infinite free will. This will itself at the infinity: the human finite will resolves to infinitize itself. This infinitization signifies the radical freedom of spirit, the breakthrough of the theoretical attitude from the original natural practical attitude, the birth of the infinite historicity of humanity out of the finite primordial and fundamental historicity of human existence. Absolute ideality is hence constituted.

However, an idealizing act and its accomplished absolute ideality can be identified only if an intuition of an *eidos* is evidently given. In view of the case that idealization must be performed with an evident consciousness of the performing act's being idealization, an act is idealization only if it is guided by a Wesensschau. Correlatively, an Idea can be identified or, more radically, constituted, only if a corresponding *eidos* serves as guide. It follows that idealization and Idea must be strictly distinguished in meaning but are inseparable in happening from Wesensschau and *eidos*.

After contrasting idealization and Idea with Wesensschau and *eidos*, it is clear that the evidence of an Idea (if one would like to predicate evidence upon Idea) must be strictly distinguished from the evidence of an *eidos*. The *eidos* has determinate content to grasp in intuitively evident manner whereas the idea regulates all determinate content but itself has no content for intuitive grasping. The former can be presented in evidence while the latter cannot--not because its content lies at the infinity but

because it has no content at all. Then, perhaps, we should ask radically: by what right does one claim that an in principle invisible Idea exist, even only juridically prior to the visible eidos, the sensibly visible individual and morphological essence? But Husserl resolutely turns the matter around: the eidos, the sensible individual and the imaginary morphological essence exist only because they are tending towards the Idea in an infinite movement. They exist only in and through their self-moving. It is the idea that grants being to the real, the invisible that makes something visible. The Idea is the invisible ground of visibility. Still more radically, we can ask: how does the Idea, the One unifying the infinitely many realizations, each one is by itself an infinite movement? An Husserlian response is not out of our disposal: the Idea, the One is the unity. An Idea never exists outside the total infinite movement but inside it to unify the movement as a whole. It is the unitary sense inside the total infinite movement.¹

Now let us turn to idealization. Since an intuitional performance must be measured by its intentional achievement, the idealizing act, accomplishing Idea, which has no intuitive content in principle, is indescribable with respect to how it actually works. Idealization takes the factual (both the sensible and the imaginary) as material basis and leaps

1. Note that Ideas are given a hierarchy. All actual and possible sensible round things and the morphological essence "roundness" tend towards the Idea "circle" which is determined in the eidos "circle". And the Idea "circle" itself participates in geometry as an infinite movement toward the Idea of geometry. Again, the latter is itself an abstract moment in the infinite task of episteme, in the infinite rational knowing towards the Idea of philosophy.

with no further due to an infinite pole, or a limit. It is the infinite removal of all finitude, the infinite leap to the infinity; it is concretely constituted in the infinite free will. This will is itself at the infinity: the human finite will resolves to infinitize itself. This infinitization signifies the radical freedom of spirit, the breakthrough of the theoretical attitude from the original natural practical attitude, the birth of the infinite historicity of humanity out of the finite, primordial and fundamental historicity of human existence. Absolute ideality is hence constituted.

CONCLUSION

§1. Recapitulation

Let us glance over what we have obtained, collect them together in the present in order to manifest them - and inevitably transform them too - so as to summon up our strength for further thrusts.

The at once primordial and ultimate history is a history of sense. An original sense is advancing or is being advanced ceaselessly in an unending movement towards a teleological sense. A history is the infinite lively forward development of a sense from an origin to a telos. The original sense is once constituted or instituted for its first time in and through concrete intentional acts as the unique total sense of the history it displays. The origin and the telos are nothing outside the history as the advent of the sense.

This singular sense may be differentiated into those plural senses, as we may speak of history as the implication of different senses instead of history as the development of a sense. The sense in singular as well as in plural can be determined as ideal Objectivity. The concrete genesis of the historicity of sense is then transformed as the concrete genesis of absolute Objectivity and absolute ideality.

To the apriori and concrete conditions of possibility for the absolute Objectivity. The problematic can be tackled under two aspects: the "how" of origin and the "how" of tradition, that is, how a spiritual formation can be objecti-

fied and how it can function within tradition. To the first aspect. Language and the living present are the required conditions. (1) A three-in-one and one-as-three horizon must always be already at work in order to objectify a psychically valid, spiritual formation: the common language, the mankind and the surrounding lifeworld, the first and the second standing out against the second the third respectively. The surrounding lifeworld is always the universal, formal and yet cultural world-horizon in and through which each being discloses itself as interwoven with other beings, that is, as a unity of validities, as a sense. And the mankind articulates itself against the world-horizon as the universal, formal and yet cultural community-horizon in and through which all the actual and possible human historico-cultural acts, which lay out the being-sense, display themselves in an intertwined manner. Finally, the common language as horizon, articulated itself against the mankind-horizon and the world-horizon, anchors all the actual and possible human acts and all being-senses in speech and writing which are understandable by "everyone". (2) The living present is an absolute here and now which constitutes a temporal object through synthesizing the elapsed phase, the now-phase and the coming phase of the immanent acts and contents, given respectively by the retention, the central impression and the protention. By means of the living present and the common language, real contents adhered to real moments in real time-duration is objectified. First of all, the living present and, based upon it, the recollection furnish the formation with intra-psychical validity. Then speaking determines the formation as inter-psychi-

cally valid in reciprocal lingual understanding within speaking community. And, finally, writing sets the absolute validity of the spiritual formation. Hence the absolute Objectivity of a pure sense is constituted in a certain manner of speaking. The absolute Objectivity is its pure possibility of being written down which is constituted in the pure intentional act of writing. The absolute transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity are lingual fundamentally. The pure writing must originate through a lingual flesh but a lingual flesh must be factually given with a lingual body. Therefore, a pure truth-sense is constituted through being sedimented.

To the second aspect of the conditions of absolute Objectivity. The problem of origin and that of tradition are in reality fused together. A sedimentation is a writing-down of the pure truth-sense into lingual signs, that is, it transforms the original mode of being of the sense-formation. A reactivation relives the original producing activity and hence the pure truth-sense through tracing back the passive meaning awakened by the lingual sign. The lingual signs are primarily presented to the consciousness as a reproductive transformation of an original truth-sense, that is, they refer to an original genesis. In this way, a tradition, in which an original total sense preserves itself through self-advancing, is instituted: a new sense is produced from the totality of sedimented meaning which is reactivated at the present. In turn, a sense can be sedimented and reactivated because every being, as sense, as validity of human activities, is lingually expressible, capable of being written down. In other words, it is precisely because every human being lives essentially

with the common language, every human being is a lingual being, that sedimentation and reactivation are possible. More precisely, it is because a sense is written down in firm sentences, is univocally expressed, that sedimentation and reactivation are possible. Hence, a tradition is constituted by means of original genesis, sedimentation and reactivation, which, in turn, are made concretely possible by the univocity of language.

Let us conclude the problem of the absolute Objectivity. The origin and the tradition interenvelope dialectically: an origin must disclose in a tradition and a tradition must develop an origin. The conditions for an origin have already been shown to be the common language (which articulates against the mankind and the surrounding lifeworld) and the living present. Since the language is used to deposit (and simultaneously generate) an original sense, we can now further infer that it is univocal. The conditions for a tradition have already been shown to be sedimentation and reactivation, and ultimately univocity. Sedimentation and reactivation, mediated with language, must be brought into light in the living present: the reactivation is a present activity which synthesizes and presents all the sediments at the present for further upsurge. The irreducible conditions for the absolute Objectivity are thus univocity and the living present. We must have a remark on the univocity. It is in itself a telos at the infinity that regulates all factual languages which are essentially equivocal. Following from this, both sedimentation and reactivation are posed as infinite task, so is an original genesis. The univocity as telos involves an ideali-

zation or infinitization which is structurally identical with that elucidated in the problem of ideality.

Now, to the apriori and concrete conditions of possibility for the absolute ideality. Similar to the sense, the absolute ideality, or the Idea in the Kantian sense, may be taken in the plural, as we speak of various Ideas in a history, or in the singular, as we speak of the Idea of history. An Idea is concretely constituted through idealization. First of all, idealization must be distinguished from any human factual faculty. An Idea is neither a sensible individual nor a morphological essence which varies from each individual. Correlatively, idealization is neither sensible intuition nor imagination which gives rise to an inexact morphological essence. Nevertheless, the sensible and the imaginable serve as the material basis of idealization. Besides, idealization must be distinguished even from the Wesensschau, an Idea from an eidos. An Idea has no content to be intuited and hence no finite evidence whereas an eidos possesses definite content which can be intuited in finite evidence. An Idea is an infinite limit-pole which regulates all realization of it whereas an eidos is an invariant structure which lays under all example of it. Idealization creates as an Idea whereas a Wesensschau intuits an eidos. Only after an ideal object has already been constituted by the idealization can the Wesensschau intuit it as an eidos. Nevertheless, only if guided by a Wesensschau which presents definite content, can idealization create a limit having no content at all. Finally, Idea and idealization are determined more positively. The concept of Idea is refined to its last determination. First, it is

the invisible ground of visibility: the visible exists only as a moment of the infinite movement towards the invisible Idea. At last, it is the unity of the infinite movement: it exists so long as it displays itself in the movement as the unitary sense of it. And idealization is the infinitization of the finitude of the perfecting again-and-again. It is the concrete condition of possibility for the absolute ideality. Here we must have a remark. The idealization, the infinitization of the human finitude, can never be given in finite evidence; rather, it is promised an infinite evidence by the will. It signifies that the human will resolves to infinitize itself.

Then, univocity, the living present and idealization are the constitutive conditions for the absolute ideal Objectivity. They make the sense constituted as an origin, instituted as a tradition and legitimized as a telos. They concretely and a priori make possible the historicity of sense.

After making explicit the condition, we now turn our gaze upon history itself. The surrounding life-world, the mankind and the common language together as a horizon are determined as temporal or historical. That every being is essentially a sense-unity of human experience and endeavour, that it is necessarily fixed in language - all these are performed within the phenomenological historical time. A historical present is an absolute primordial centre in and through which all senses are synthesized and each is totalized as a totality from which an upsurge is projected. Our present historical present is the absolute of all absolutes which unifies all historical presents and traditionalizes each of them. Then, history is

"the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of sense"(cited above, Ch. IV, §1, p.49). History achieves this essential work of itself by means of its concrete form as a horizon: the two mutual and interenveloping characteristics, namely, centredness and openness. The form of history is then a dialectic of our absolute and concrete historical present and the mutual implication of totalization and projection. All being, as sense, all human experience and endeavour, and all speech and writing stretch themselves out along history, gravitate towards the living historical present, and radiate towards a living future. History is the all-encompassing ultimate horizon of being and man. But this elucidation which treats sense exclusively as Object remains abstract. We must now merge it with results from the analysis of sense as ideality. In light of that theory, history is first determined as an infinite movement of finite senses towards an Idea, an infinite and teleological sense. Yet the finite sense is in itself nothing but a striving towards the Idea; it receives its sense and being from the Idea. Finally, the Idea as the regulative telos of the infinite movement is nothing but the unitary sense of the movement. In this way, all being and sense infinitize themselves and unify with each other to compose an infinite movement. The human knowing or will-to-know poses for itself an infinite task to overcome its finite capacity; it infinitizes itself in an infinite movement. This human will to infinitize is nothing more and nothing less than the reason: it constitutes the ideal truth-sense and unifies the infinite movement with the Idea as sense, and elevates

finite mankind to infinite humanity. And it is only the unifying movement itself. Hence, in conclusion, history is an infinite movement of beings as senses which are unified as announcing an unique sense running through from the origin to the telos, and are unified as so and so only at every present through the primordial living present which at one stroke totalizes all senses at the present and projects them forwards. Being and man are historical through and through and rational through and through. Reason is historical and history is rational. History is the infinite and all-encompassing ultimate horizon of being and man.

§2. Going Beyond

We are now entitled to see that a principle of presence dominates Husserl's phenomenology in its most manifest intention, yet a trace of absence always already slips into the text. (Derrida called the entire philosophy a metaphysics of presence.) For Husserl, being is always sense or object which discloses itself brightly and maintains itself as an identity. The primordial mode of being is presence. The language and the living historical present, as conditions for object, only make being present. Every being as sense manifests itself as a centre of a nexus of human performance, as a focus of a heritage of background and forward mutual envelopment, which is lingually expressible. And our human spiritual endeavour always receives nourishment from the tradition and develops itself forward - the sense is always historical. The two irreducible conditions complement each other to constitute the historical sense: the living historical present provides the

historicity in totalization which is at once creation, and language anchors the primordial temporalization in sedimentation and reactivation. Every being is then a sense, an object which preserves its identity in being a unity of historical Abschattungen. Every being signifies a presence within a horizon, and ultimately, within the one historical language-man-world-horizon. Every being is a present, as a being presents itself presently, which presents all the absent up to the present. The living present is the presence of being and the being of presence. Being is presence.

The determination of being as presence runs through all its essential steps and encounters its strongest resistance in the constitution of the ideal object. One could always appeal to accidental factual limitation for an explanation if the prescientific object never appears to be a centre of human experience, a focus of backward and forward mutual envelopment. But one could no longer do so in face of the ideal object which is immune to factuality. Besides language and the living present, idealization is also the condition for an ideal object. Does the cooperative work of the three successfully determine being as presence? At first sight, it seems that idealization brings in a principle of infinity which makes being as absence instead of presence. At this point, we should point out that even the constitutive language involves an idealization: it is the univocal language, that is, the infinite telos of all languages which are essentially equivocal. Does the infinitization operated in these two theoretical gestures really obliterate the project of being as presence? Quite the contrary. Upon the last analysis, an

Idea as telos is nothing but the unity of an infinite movement in which it displays itself as the unitary sense. The infinity signifies no infinity of mundane time or distance; rather, it is the infinity of the phenomenological time. The infinite movement is only the movement which endeavours to unify itself but is always advancing forward at the present. History is the pure movement, moving in the Living Present through the Logos, with the Idea, the One, the unity, the Being as the sense, and the Telos which is only the moving itself. Through the collaboration of the Logos, the Time, and the Telos, all beings and senses "are" in the most concrete and ultimate manner: they are together the One Appearing itself; or, in an abstract and general manner, every being "is": it is its one appearing itself. Only in this way can we say with full sincerity: being is presence.

But only in this way can we say without little frivolousness: no pure presence. The first point (which explains the second) is that although, and just because, the unity, instead of being outside of the Appearing, is the self-unifying of the Appearing itself as the Living present, which creates all beings as a one appearing and the totality of them as the One Appearing, this unifying never appears, not even in an appearing. The second point (which explains the first) is that the Living present is the primordial absolute, i.e., it is itself only if it at one stroke traditionalizes the past present and projects the future present as primordial absolutes. A present is an primordial absolute, i.e., it is itself only if it at one stroke totalizes and advances the senses. The senses are the appearings, the totality of senses is the

Appearing. Accordingly, a present is a passing of the Appearing which always already passes itself. The Living Present is the Passing of the passings. Although, and just because, it is all-encompassing, it is always in suspense for a next. Jointly speaking, the Living Present is the self-unifying of the One Appearing, yet the "self" is always on the run. The Logos, only in and through which the Living present or the unifying works, always intervenes and interrupts it: the living, the unifying is always lost in the mist of lingual gestures. Presence is supplemented with absence. Being should be crossed: ~~being~~.

Is it not the case or is it not true that being is scattered over the human deeds instead of being a centre of it? Is it not real or not true that being is exiled in the backward and forward reference instead of being a focus of it? Is it not real or not true that: being is dispersed in the lingual shade and shift instead of being their unity? But: what is the ground to speak of Being and Truth here? What is the ground to speak of the ground here? After they have been supplemented with the cross: ~~Being~~, ~~Truth~~ and ~~ground~~, never is it a matter to decide between the presence and the absence through our life. What matters is the question: which one should be played with in the logos. However, absence emerges so far only in connection with presence in a logos which is dominantly in intention only by the latter. We can say that this logos is one in which the words of absence and of presence shade into each other and outside which no logos of absence or logos of presence can be formed. All we have is an at once continuous interplay of presence and absence in the

logos. The presence and the absence are played at once. Still more radical, should and can our life and the logos be separated? From the very beginning, the philosophical logos speaks for and listens to nothing but life. It is the origination of the philosophical life. Now the long repressed absence is released from the presence, and therefore, the life itself, being a philosophical word, is supplemented. Should we then abandon the life in the playing of logos? Should life and logos be interrelated in a supplemented style?

The most serious, most basic and most profound problem of all is: how do we play with the logos? How do we relate our life to the logos? To this mystery, the present writing, regarding its initial purpose and limit, is to be silent. We end here in a conclusion - but a conclusion having a recapitulation and a going beyond only. The conclusion is lost and yet not lost in this missing.

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
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