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Conceptualising the Globalisation Security Nexus in the Asia-Pacific

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Globalisation-security nexus

Globalisation and security vie individually for the status of the least well-conceptualised, but yet most controversial, of academic and policy-making issues. Security has been described as an underdeveloped concept, and globalisation, for a variety of reasons and as briefly described below, has been subject to any number of definitions. That both issues are so often poorly conceptualised, therefore, only gives further grounds for concern when attempting to examine the two in conjunction. For if academics and policy-makers alike can agree that globalisation and security are the two most pressing of contemporary international issues, but still experience difficulty even in analysing them in separation, then the prospects for understanding their intersection and the ‘globalisation-security nexus’ appear to be poor. In these uncertain circumstances, we all should fear for our security.

There is thus an urgent need to define and interconnect the twin issues of globalisation and security. Indeed, it could be argued that a number of pioneering attempts have already been made to investigate the relationship between globalisation and security, in terms of its creation of new security actors, problems and responses.¹ However, although valuable in providing a starting point and emergent framework for consideration of the globalisation-security nexus, these attempts have tended to lack a strong empirical basis, and geographical and historically contingent focus. Such a

focus is important because globalisation is likely to differ in its security impact between different regional contexts and different sovereign-states. Conversely, those studies which have concentrated on non-traditional security issues, such as economic dislocation, migration and crime, within the actual context of the Asia-Pacific have usually lacked a strong conceptual basis for explaining the reasons as to why it should be that globalisation has had a deep impact upon the sovereign-states of this particular region.

All of this argues that there is a need to combine the study of globalisation and security, but that this also should be carried out through the balanced application of analytical frameworks to particular regional cases. Hence, this article attempts, in a number of stages, to both build upon the existing globalisation-security nexus literature and to extend it to the case of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War (or post-globalisation) period. The first of these stages is to define more fully the essence of the term globalisation, and the inherent problems that it presents broadly for the existing international order. The second stage is to examine the impact of globalisation upon security in both generic terms and specific regional terms in the Asia-Pacific by focussing on its generation of new referent objects of security, threats, and policy responses. The third stage is then to seek to explain the differentially heavy impact of globalisation in the Asia-Pacific as the outcome of the internal and external structural weaknesses of the sovereign-states of the region, in turn a product of the historical intertwining of the processes of globalisation, bipolarisation and decolonisation; and how these state vulnerabilities will continue to hamper the efforts of policy-makers of the region to respond to the challenges of globalisation.

Conceptions of globalisation

Definitions

Globalisation is a notoriously slippery concept and has produced a bewildering number of definitions. Globalisation has been defined variously as universalisation (the expansion of cultures across the globe); internationalisation (increased interaction and interdependence between peoples in different states); Westernisation or Americanisation (the homogenisation of the world along Western or US standards); and liberalisation (the spread of deregulated forces of technology, production, trade, and finance across borders). Many of these definitions are indeed facets of globalisation—both in terms of its causation and eventual outcomes. But these definitions still fail to capture the qualitatively different nature of globalisation from other processes and phenomena associated with the interaction of social forces on a global scale. Globalisation represents a qualitatively different process due to its essential de-territorialisation, or stated in reverse, supra-territorialisation of social interaction.² That is to say, globalisation is a process which increasingly reconfigures social space away from and beyond notions of delineated territory, and *transcends* existing physical and human borders imposed upon social interaction. For instance, global financial transactions, facilitated by information technology, can now often operate without reference to physical territorial distance or human-imposed territorial barriers. It is important to avoid the type of 'hyper-globalisation' thesis which views the world as moving towards a condition of being totally 'borderless'. For it is apparent that there is considerable territorial 'drag' upon the free-flow of globalisation forces, that not all forms of economic interaction such as trade and labour migration are as fully globalised as finance, that there are wide disparities in the degree of

globalisation across different regions of the world, and that there is both resistance to and reversibility in the process itself. Nevertheless, globalisation as a process of supra-territorialisation is increasingly affecting large sections of the world, and must be acknowledged as a markedly different (although certainly not unrelated) process to those other definitions of social interaction noted above. Hence, even though universalism, internationalisation, westernisation and liberalisation may eventually result in globalisation, the fact that they may not necessarily be entirely detached from territorialisation means that they remain on a qualitatively different level to the inherently supra-territorial phenomena of globalisation.

Challenges to the inter-sovereign-state security order

The phenomena of globalisation as supra-territorialisation and the reconfiguration of social space carries significant implications for existing forms of social organisation, and, most importantly in the case of security issues, the dominant position of the nation-state (or far more accurately for many states, sovereign-state) within the existing globality. Needless to say, the state with its exclusive jurisdiction—or in other words, *sovereignty*—over a particular social and territorial space, delineated by a combination of physical geography and most especially human construction, has been the basic unit for the division of global space in the modern era. States in the past have attempted in theory and practice to exercise sovereign control over all forms of social interaction in the political, economic, and security dimensions, both within and between their territorial borders. Quite clearly, and as elucidated below with reference to the Asia-Pacific, not all states throughout history have been able to exercise the same degree of sovereign control over all forms of social interaction. Nevertheless, sovereign-states rooted in territorial notions of social space have been

the prime unit for facilitating, impeding and mediating interaction between the societal groups, organisations, and citizens and other categories of collective and individual societal units contained within their borders. Hence, to date, global social space has been primarily international, or inter-sovereign-state, social space.

However, the inherent nature of globalisation as a process which transcends and overrides territoriality as the dominant principle for the organisation of social space now poses a fundamental challenge to the sovereign-state as the basic social unit which exemplifies and undergirds this very territorial principle. Sovereign-states must contend with the freer flow of social forces on a global scale which move with declining reference to the previous limitations and channels imposed by state borders. This increasing porosity of state borders, relative decline in the *de facto* sovereign authority of states over social interaction, and corresponding increased exposure of 'internal' societal groupings to 'external forces' (or even indeed the removal of the traditional domestic-international divide to create an inter-mestic arena for social interchange) has a number of outcomes for security discussed below. For if global social space has been primarily international or inter-sovereign-state space for much of the modern era, then the security order as one aspect of social interaction has been primarily built around the inter-state order. But it is clear that the security order is now pitted against the phenomenon of globalisation which generates security issues diametrically opposed to and often beyond the limits of sovereign-state authority.

Globalisation's impact on security in the Asia-Pacific

If we view globalisation as a process which is driven forward by political choice in favour of liberal economics, and results in forms of social interaction which transcend

territorial borders and state sovereignty, then it is possible to conceive of its impact on security in a number of areas. These involve both the *vertical* extension of security in terms of the referent objects of security, and the *horizontal* extension in terms of security threat dimensions.³

Levels of referent objects

One noticeable impact of globalisation has been to accentuate the concept, which has preexisted in certain contexts, that the state's position as the prime referent object of security is now rivalled by other societal groupings. The study of security has traditionally rested upon the assumption that the security of the institution of the sovereign-state can be necessarily conflated with the security of the 'nation' or general population and citizenry contained within that state's borders. Hence, in the past and still in the contemporary period, the tendency of security studies has been to argue that the survival of states, as institutions which are created as the embodiment of collective national will, and which serve as the point of interface or 'gatekeeper' to shield their citizenry and populations from external threats, is indivisible from the survival of peoples or nations. The result has been to produce a view of security which concentrates not just upon states as the key referent objects of security, but also mainly upon the external aspects of state security. For the traditional 'realist' paradigm, then, security is concerned with external threats to states, and especially those threats imposed upon states by inter-sovereign-state conflict—the natural outcome of friction in an international system dominated by states all seeking to ensure the security of their own populations from external challenges.

The identity and role of sovereign-states as the referent object of security, undoubtedly remains central to our understanding of security in the contemporary era, and this may be especially so for those states which can assert with conviction the character of being nation-states, marked by a cohesive association between the security interests of state as an institution and its 'national' population as a whole. In other instances, though, the assumption that the security of states as referent objects approximates with that of the population or nation at large, and consequently that all states focus upon external threat perceptions, is inaccurate. The tendency of traditional security paradigms to 'black box' internal state dynamics mean that inevitably they neglect also those internal threats which arise from a fundamental divergence between the perceived security interests of states themselves and segments of their population. Newly-established and late-starter sovereign-states with borders cutting across and encompassing a variety of national and ethnic groups are particularly sensitive to internal security threats. It is often the case that such states confront substantial minority ethnic groups which reject the definition of nation and state emanating from the government. As a result, these groups seek instead to secure autonomy or to secede, and may often launch insurgency movements, so challenging the integrity and internal stability of the state.

Another internal security problem, often independent of, but also at times inter-linked with and capable of reinforcing ethnic separatism, is that of a crisis of the state's political legitimacy and leadership amongst the general population. In certain states, the majority of the population may support the cause of national and state integrity, but come to reject the political legitimacy of the government system or governing regime and elite. The antagonism of the general population towards the political

regime may be aroused by a variety of factors centering on perceptions of misgovernment, including the management of the economy, issues of crime and corruption, and the commitment to stable or democratic government. The outcome can be political turmoil, violent demonstrations, and even revolution. If prolonged, political unrest can bring the prospect of factionalism and civil war. Most explosive of all is a combination of political crisis and ethnic separatism which can threaten the internal disintegration of a state. As outlined below, many states in the Asia-Pacific, as developing sovereign-states, but often only partially 'nation'-states, are subject to these twin problems of ethnic separatism and political legitimacy. Hence, these states have focussed much of their security policy-making energy on dealing with internal rather than external security threats.

Therefore, the argument that the state cannot be considered as the exclusive, or even main, referent object of security, and that there is a need to give our attention to problems of the internal security of societal groupings contained within the state's sovereign territory, is not new. Globalisation's impact, though, has been to heighten this consciousness of the potential divisibility of the security of the sovereign-state from that of its internal societal elements. Globalisation as a process which transcends territorial and sovereign boundaries, and thus which penetrates with relative ease the internal social space of the state, inevitably also brings with it security effects that diminish the role of the state as the barrier to external threats and that impact directly and differentially upon internal societal groups. For example, globalisation has such an impact in the dimension of economic security, whereby the free flow of market forces across borders, and the accompanying wealth creation but also economic dislocation that it engenders, undercuts the ability of the sovereign-state to act as the

principal arbiter of the economic welfare of its internal society. Globalisation's capacity to strip the supposed protection of the state away from societal groups and citizens then helps to explain why there has been a significant shift in security perspectives away from those fixated on the state, and towards the irreducible, yet ultimate, level of individual and 'human security'.⁴

The East Asian financial crisis illustrates well many of these security effects of globalisation. The crisis from 1997 onwards produced a set of economic costs for societal groups (ethnic and economic) and individual citizens that many of the states of the region found themselves unable at first to mitigate and redistribute. In these circumstances, even though the governmental apparatus of the states of the region remained intact, societal groups and individuals began again to view certain states as redundant frameworks for the preservation of their economic and political security interests, and so looked to detach themselves from political dependence upon them. The result for many of the states has been to produce short and longer term crises of legitimacy. In Malaysia, differences over economic policy responses to the financial crisis triggered an elite power struggle between Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim from 1997 to 1999, which then spilled over into civil violence between the police authorities and rival political support groups. The effect of the crisis has also been to re-expose differences in economic status amongst the Malay majority and Indian and Chinese minority groups which the government had attempted to suppress since the race riots of 13 May 1969 through ethnic distributive and high growth policies—leading to renewed religious and ethnic tensions, and occasional inter-communal violence, as with a number of deaths of Malays and Indians in March 2001 in troubles near Kuala Lumpur.

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the general enfeeblement of the central government and military apparatus caused by the shock of the financial crisis has opened an ugly 'Pandora's box' of internal security problems at the societal group and individual level. The financial crisis undermined export-oriented high-speed growth policies that had supported the state-building efforts of President Suharto's New Order and which were designed to integrate Indonesia's multifarious ethnic and religious groupings. In turn, the conversion of the financial crisis into a full-blown economic crisis and the further impoverishment of large sections of Indonesian society, which had come to expect economic liberalisation to bring relative improvements in living standards, generated not only a tragedy of economic and human security but also set in train a political regime crisis. This political crisis, accompanied by mass violence on the streets of Jakarta between the police and pro-democracy groups, led to fall of the government of Suharto in May 1998, and formed the backdrop for the political turmoil of President Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency until July 2001. Simultaneously, the economic crisis and the perceived economic inequalities that it highlighted between the Javanese majority and Chinese minority sparked 'pogroms' of elements of the former and the Indonesian military against the latter in May 1998.

As is well known, the financial crisis has also formed the occasion for the security situation in other regions of Indonesia to spiral out of control. Long-term economic tensions between Dayaks and transmigrant Madurese, heightened by the impact of the crisis, has produced violent clashes and thousands of refugees in Sambas, West Kalimantan Province. The economic crisis and related social instability have also promoted conditions for the reemergence of religious violence. From 1999 onwards,

Muslims and Christians have been involved in inter-communal violence in Ambon, Maluku province, resulting in thousands of deaths and widespread destruction of property. Meanwhile, political confusion in Jakarta was one factor which encouraged the Fretilin pro-independence movement in East Timor and enabled the former Portuguese colonies' eventual breakaway from Indonesia. However, this was only achieved after considerable bloodshed in clashes between pro-independence supporters and anti-independence militias backed by the Indonesian military; the displacement of up to three quarters of East Timor's population; the destruction of ninety percent of the province's physical infrastructure; and the eventual intervention of a UN-sanctioned and Australian-led International Force in East Timor from September 1999 onwards. The Indonesian state at the same time has been faced with revitalised autonomy or independence movements in West Irian Jaya, and Aceh—emboldened by the decline of the formerly highly centralised state created under Suharto and seeking greater political freedom from a state which they no longer view as serving their political, economic or security interests. The Free Aceh Movement has proved particularly virulent, escalating the guerilla war which it has been engaged in since 1973, and intent on recovering control of the province's rich oil and gas reserves. The knock-on effects upon inter-sovereign-state security of the Indonesian state's potential disintegration has been shown by the East Timor crisis, but the problem of Aceh has also indicated the wider security risks involved, with the guerilla movement's successful disruption a large proportion of Japanese LNG imports from the province.

Dimensions of threat: economic, environmental, military

Globalisation's most obvious influence has been its integrative and disintegrative economic characteristics, and the consequent impetus it gives to problems of the economic and then the military security of states and their societal constituents. The spread of liberal market forces is capable of bringing economic inclusion and interdependence, which may contribute to social stability and peaceful relations internally and externally (a form of 'democratic peace' argument). Nevertheless, the disintegrative effects of globalisation can simultaneously contribute to insecurity in a number of ways.

Firstly, globalisation can produce economic exclusion for states and individuals. This may be marked by disparities of welfare, which can then feed through into military tension amongst states in an attempt to wrest economic benefits from others, or result in internal unrest within states. In the case of the Asia-Pacific, this type of problem can be seen in North Korea's loss of access to the socialist economic sphere following the end of the Cold War, and its exclusion, both self- and externally-imposed, from the rapidly globalising political economy of the region. North Korea has then been presented with a new security dilemma by the globalisation-security nexus. For on the one hand, North Korea's reluctance to reform and integrate itself into the region will only exacerbate the deep-seated structural economic crisis that it has experienced since the latter stages of the Cold War which could lead to the implosion of its political regime. On the other hand, though, the North Korea leadership is also aware that the economic liberalisation even on a modest scale would expose its closed political economy to the shocks of globalisation, transcend previously imposed sovereign barriers to the political control of its internal society, and also threaten the collapse of the regime. Hence, faced with the twin risks of this dilemma, the North

Korean regime has attempted to steer a middle path with a limited policy of opening to the outside world but on terms that it has sought in part to dictate. In practice this has meant that North Korea has utilised its remaining military assets in a strategy of brinkmanship to extract economic concessions in the form of food aid, but also preferential access to energy, financial aid, investment and international economic institutions, from the surrounding powers.⁵ In many instances, North Korea's strategy has succeeded brilliantly, maneuvering around larger powers to gain short-term economic concessions (even if over the longer term North Korea is effectively mortgaging its remaining military assets and setting itself on a trajectory towards integration into the region), and has been a demonstration of how the fear of globalisation and the related problems of economic exclusion, can also generate increased regional military tensions.

Secondly, globalisation is capable of re-mapping economic and social space, with the frequent result that economic interdependency can pull actors and regions away from the defined territorial space of the sovereign-state and towards regions incorporated within other states. In these instances, the rise of regionalisation can lead to the disintegration of state structures, with unforeseen consequences for internal and external security. These problems in the Asia-Pacific are encapsulated in speculation about the breakaway from the Russia of its Far East provinces resulting from their desire for greater control over their own natural resources, and the possible 'deconstruction' of China as economic liberalisation undermines the capability of the centre to govern the local provinces. Moreover, China's economic liberalisation has created problems of security not only between centre and provinces, but also within the provinces themselves, as China's gradual abandonment of socialist principles

erodes the basis for the 'iron rice bowl' which ensured political stability and was one of its greatest achievements in terms of providing human security for the bulk of its population.

Thirdly, globalisation can generate economic rivalry amongst states, transnational corporations (TNC), societal organisations and individuals for scarce natural resources; again often threatening to spill over into military conflict. The most prominent example of globalisation spurring on high speed economic growth and competition for natural resources is China's territorial aspirations in the South China Sea and desire to acquire the energy resources necessary for continued economic expansion. The potential that this creates for military conflict between China and a number of Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) states, and the risks that it poses for other regional states such as Japan using the Sea Lines of Communication in the South China Sea, are well documented. In addition, rapid economic growth, which brings with it expanded domestic food consumption and often population growth, has given greater force to disputes amongst ASEAN states such as Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia over fishing grounds in Exclusive Economic Zones; to territorial disputes involving fish stocks such as that involving Japan and South Korea over the Takeshima (Tok-do) Islands; and to competition for precious fresh water resources in areas such as the Mekong Delta.⁶

Fourthly, globalisation can often result in economic dislocation, poverty, and financial crises. All this can lead to insecurity for states, societal groups and individuals, which can again feed into social instability within and amongst states and possible armed

conflict. The discussion above of the problems of many ASEAN states in the wake of the financial crisis of 1997 provides examples of these types of security problems.

Moreover, sitting in between these integrative and disintegrative economic effects of globalisation are those security problems connected with transnational or trans-sovereign crime. Globalisation promotes trans-sovereign crime because economic integration and disintegration in tandem create both supply and demand factors for those actors engaged in criminal activities. By this it is meant that economic dislocation and disparities within a certain state or societal grouping creates incentives to engage in wealth-generating activities by the supply of illicit products such as narcotics or arms. In turn, globalisation's creation of economic wealth in certain areas of the world creates a market and demand for the supply of these economic commodities. Crime as an economic activity and the trade in 'illicit' commodities is clearly not a new phenomena. Indeed, in the past the chief suppliers of narcotics have been sovereign-states themselves, the opium trade in East Asia being one notable example. But economic globalisation, facilitated by transport and information technology, has enabled crime organisations to mimic the behaviour of TNCs, to move with still greater ease across deregulated economic space, and thus to impinge even more directly upon the welfare of other societal groups and individuals.⁷ Hence, in the Asia-Pacific, rapid economic growth and the establishment of improved communications has led to an expansion in narcotics trafficking in terms of both volume and sophistication since the end of the Cold War. The breakdown of previous Cold War barriers to economic interaction amongst many states of the region and the new wealth of many citizens has increased the market for narcotics. Conversely, the financial crisis and economic downturn since 1997 has also acted to make drug

trafficking an economic lifeline for the citizens of many ASEAN states. The traditional concentration of the narcotics trade in the Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand and Laos has transcended sovereign-state borders to include a wider economic area that includes also much of Southern China. Burmese Shan, Thai and Chinese ethnic organised crime groups have remained engaged in the trade, but grown in sophistication through the exploitation of information technology and improved transport infrastructure.⁸ The security risks of the regionalisation and globalisation of the narcotics trade in the Asia-Pacific are demonstrated by the health and welfare effects of drug addiction on millions of users in the region, as well as the economic distortion and systemic corruption it engenders in many of the regional states. Similarly, the drugs trade has not been the only area of organised crime to have expanded in the region as a result of globalisation processes. Studies have demonstrated that piracy has increased in recent years in Southeast Asia, driven by the increased opportunities of the expansion of shipping traffic resulting from the region's rapid economic growth, but also the increased motivation to engage in crime on the part of those groups which have been marginalised in the process of economic globalisation.⁹

The other most notable security effects of economic globalisation are environmental. Although in the past socialist systems have been responsible for some of the worst examples of environment degradation, the spread of liberal economic globalisation has arguably taken these problems to new heights. Liberal capitalism's vast and largely unimpeded appetite for natural resources, and the pollution that usually results, not only threatens directly the health of groups of individuals in various regions (soil, water and air pollution), but also threatens indirectly the existence of

humankind through the total destruction (global warming, sea level changes) of the biosphere. The impact of globalisation and economic liberalisation on environmental security in Asia-Pacific region can be seen with concerns about how China's economic growth may impose massive pollution costs on its own citizens and those of neighbouring states, and the impact of forest fires across the Indonesian archipelago in 1997 and 1998. The fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra were the product of high-speed development policies which allowed unregulated logging and forest clearance and generated a 'haze' that affected the health of literally millions of Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean citizens. In many ways, the fires represented the apogee of the globalisation-security nexus as they functioned to threaten human security, in complete transcendence of sovereign-state borders, and revealed the inability to compartmentalise international and domestic security in an era of globalisation.

Globalisation and the future security agenda in the Asia-Pacific

Globalisation's differentially heavy impact in the Asia-Pacific

This article has identified a host of problems in the Asia-Pacific which illustrate the crucial interconnection between globalisation and security. These problems are exemplified by the East Asian financial crisis which has threatened to impact upon all levels of security from that of the state to the individual, and across all dimensions from the economic, to the environmental, and to the military. Moreover, the fact that the financial crisis has had such severe and prolonged security effects in the Asia-Pacific since 1997, in contrast to other financial crises which occurred near simultaneously in Russia and Latin America, argues that the globalisation-security nexus may be having a differentially heavy impact in this region compared to others.

In turn, these observations raise two crucial and interrelated issues that form the focus of the remaining part of this article. The first is the reasons for why the Asia-Pacific region has been and will continue to be particularly prone to the security effects of globalisation, and the second is a consideration of whether the states and policy-makers are equipped to deal effectively with the challenges of the unfolding post-globalisation security agenda.

Vulnerable sovereign-states: decolonisation, bipolarisation and globalisation

As stated in the introduction to this article, it is important to understand the relationship between globalisation and security through reference to both generic analytical frameworks and specific regional contexts. The first section of this article argued that the essence of globalisation as a security problem is to be found in its transcendence of barriers to interaction across social space, and hence its challenge to the sovereign-state as the existing basis for the global security order. The forces of globalisation quickly search out any inconsistencies and flaws in the structure of sovereign-states, and can prise open their external security barriers. Consequently, this suggests that in order to comprehend the reasons for the differential impact of globalisation across regions then it is necessary to examine the differential nature of sovereign-states in each region, and their ability to absorb and withstand the security shocks associated with globalisation.

In the case of the Asia-Pacific, it can be seen that they are inherently vulnerable to the impact of globalisation due to the dual influence of the processes of decolonisation and bipolarisation upon the state-building process in the post-war period. The effect of decolonisation upon the Asia-Pacific region was to create states modelled in theory

along the lines of the sovereign and nation-states of their former colonial masters, but which in practice have not always conformed to these ideals. In many instances, the idea of the sovereign-state came before or diverged from that of the nation-state: shown by the fact that the territorial and sovereign space of states in the region was often delineated along former colonial borders which had been drawn arbitrarily and in contradistinction to trans-border ties of ethnicity and religion, and which continued to incorporate minority groups brought in under colonial migratory policies—problems particularly salient in many ASEAN states. These contradictions between sovereign space and societal composition clearly weakened from the start the internal political cohesion of states in the region, and laid the ground for the potential divisibility between the security interests of the state and its societal constituents. Moreover, the common legacy of distorted development from the colonial period also placed these states in a disadvantageous economic position to maintain their internal stability. Therefore, the preoccupation of many states in the Asia-Pacific region since the post-colonial has been to preserve their internal integrity by advancing the process of state-building, and particularly in the economic sphere, as a means to reconcile these structural contradictions.¹⁰

The problematic position of newly-established sovereign-states in the region was further compounded either during or immediately after the decolonisation phase by the impact of the onset of the Cold War. The bifurcation of the region between the competing ideologies and political economies of the socialist and capitalist blocs was to create a legacy of military confrontation which has endured in many parts of the region, such as the Korean Peninsula, to this day. Nevertheless, perhaps more important when considering the post-Cold War and post-globalisation security

agendas is the effect of the Cold War upon the state building-agendas and development of the political economies of many of the states in the region. The socialist camp, consisting of the USSR, China, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos, initially under the auspices of the USSR and later rendered asunder internally by the Sino-Soviet split, created an alternative developmental economic system to that of liberal capitalism which ensured the security of its members, but also which was fundamentally vulnerable when exposed to the forces of liberal capitalism at the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the capitalist camp, consisting of many of the original ASEAN states, South Korea, and centred on the US and increasingly Japan, enabled its members to evolve distinctive models of developmental capitalism, and to use economic growth to mitigate problems of internal instability. On the other hand, though, the system, revolving as it did around a form of proto-globalisation which was designed to support the security interests of the US and thus which insulated these states to some degree from full competition, also had a distinct effect on the future resilience of these states in the face of economic liberalisation.¹¹ The developmental states of the region were provided with preferential access to technology and the markets of the US and West, whilst simultaneously being able to restrict access to their own markets.

Therefore, the overlapping processes of decolonisation and bipolarisation have had a significant impact upon the development of the sovereign-states of the Asia-Pacific, and their ability to respond to the process of globalisation. Firstly, these processes have created states marked by internal contradictions between the delineation of territorial space and societal composition, and a near ineradicable and potential divisibility between the proclaimed security interests of these states and large sections

of their citizenry. Secondly, they have created states either fundamentally unprepared to cope with global economic forces as in the case of as North Korea, or states such as those of ASEAN driven by the need to exploit the benefits of liberal capitalism to paper over the political and security cracks in their own societies, but which have been insulated in the past from the full effects of capitalism's tendency towards periodic crises. The end of the Cold War and the declining incentives on the part of the US to provide special economic dispensations is also increasingly exposing the states of the region to fully-fledged modes of liberal capitalism and their attendant security costs. In sum, then, the Asia-Pacific has been and continues to be characterised by states especially vulnerable to those forces which attack territorial sovereignty, generate external economic shocks, and frustrate state-building agendas—the very conditions which globalisation is capable of creating and exploiting to the detriment of security.

Responses and policy implications

The above discussion of the inherent structural weaknesses of many of the states of the Asia-Pacific and their resultant inherent vulnerability to the globalisation-security nexus leads discussion to the crucial issue of whether they will be capable of responding to globalisation's future challenges. Detailed examination of these issues will form the basis of future studies, but the aim here is simply to stress two key points about the evolving globalisation-security agenda in the Asia-Pacific. The first is that the nature of globalisation as often an economic phenomenon means that military power alone is not sufficient to meet its security demands. There is a continued need for comprehensive approaches to security which employ military and economic power in balanced combination. The second point is that globalisation's

essentially supra-territorial phenomena means that it cannot be responded to within the traditional confines of the territorial state. Globalisation's ability to circumvent territorial boundaries means that all its associated security problems, including economic dislocation, crime and environmental pollution, are trans-sovereign in character. States are then faced with trans-sovereign problems that require multi-national and, most controversially, trans-sovereign responses.

The evidence from the responses of Asia-Pacific states to recent security problems is that they continue to understand fully the importance of the need for a comprehensive approach—demonstrated with Japan's 'Human Security' initiatives in response to the East Asian financial crisis since 1998. But it is not clear if the policy-makers of the region are yet ready to fully contemplate trans-sovereign responses to many extant security issues. The inability of the ASEAN states to respond to the trans-sovereign problem of the Indonesian 'haze', and the divisions evident in the organisation over the question of external intervention in the East Timor crisis, indicate that they still hold the norms of exclusive territorial sovereignty and non-intervention to be largely sacrosanct, even at considerable cost to the human security of their own and other states' populations. Again, this reluctance to breach the principle of sovereignty is explained by their hard-fought efforts for decolonisation and state-building in the Cold War period, and the states of the region may be able to compensate with improved multilateral coordination and adaptive forms of governance such as the ASEAN+3, and new functional norms such as 'flexible' engagement. However, policy-makers will also need to consider that the maintenance of exclusive sovereignty may prove untenable in an era of globalisation and that they will have to support more actively policies of humanitarian intervention and the explicit criticism

of each other's 'internal' security affairs, if they are to address effectively the globalisation-security nexus.

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