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**“An analysis of social and cultural changes in rural Iran,
with special reference to the impact of cultural factors
on educational change”**

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SUMMARY

The world was shocked by the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 because it was unexpected and out of keeping with the deposed Shah's attempts at secular modernisation. This thesis attempts to make sociological sense of the implications of the Revolution for education in Iran in terms of ideological influences.

The research reported in this thesis attempts to discover the nature of the social and cultural changes that occurred following the 1979 Revolution. Adapting Max Weber's interpretative approach, it focuses on the changing patterns of shared meanings and social relations in schools in one area of North West Iran. Taking a deliberately one-sided approach to educational change, this thesis isolates the impact of Islamic ideology on schools in the area where ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in 1995-96. Interviews, participant observation in schools, questionnaires and analysis of official documents were the chosen methods of research. The aim was to discover how Islamic ideology has been promulgated and how it has affected the day-to-day social relations of school teachers, pupils and administrators as well as their relations with parents and local authority officials.

The main findings not only confirm the pervasiveness of Islamic ideology in Iranian schools but also document its influence over matters such as curriculum design and delivery, the segregation of the sexes in schools, and the teachers' conditions of work and professional development. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the stated aims of educational reform were not always achieved and that some changes were ironic. The findings also showed that the recent history of change in Iranian schools calls for a flexible understanding of such notions as modernity, tradition, patrimonialism, and bureaucracy. Iran has certainly tried to modernise its educational system since 1979 but it has done so in ways which challenge much of the received wisdom about modernisation processes.

ABBREVIATIONS

AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
BP	British Petroleum
BPET	Bureau for Planning and Editing Textbooks
CFTES	Council for the Fundamental Transformation of the Educational System
EANSHSE	Executive Affairs for the New System of High School Education
GCSE	General Certificate of Secondary Education
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LEA	Local Education Authority
NSE	New System of Education
OCFTES	The Office of the Council for the Fundamental Transformation of the Educational System
OSE	Old System of Education
PE	Physical Education
RE	Religious Education
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
IRP	Islamic Republic Party

GLOSSARY

<i>Ad'l</i>	Justice
<i>Adabiyyat va ulum-e ensani</i>	Humanities and Literature
<i>Adalat-khaneh</i>	House of justice
<i>Ahkam</i>	Religious duties
<i>Amuzesh-e zemn-e khedmat</i>	In-service training course
<i>Anjoman-e eslami-e danesh-jouyan</i>	Islamic Society of Students
<i>Aqa</i>	Sir
<i>Arbab</i>	Master
<i>Ashegh</i>	Lover
<i>Asnaf</i>	Guilds
<i>Aumzesh-e omumi</i>	General education
<i>Ayandeh-sazan</i>	Builders of the future
<i>Bad-hejab</i>	Bad-veiling
<i>Badan</i>	Body
<i>Bast</i>	Sanctuary
<i>Canon-e farhangi-tarbiati</i>	Moral-cultural centres
<i>Chador</i>	Traditional veiling
<i>Ruhaniyat</i>	Clergy
<i>Dabir-khaneh-ye shura-ye taghyeir-e bonyadi-e nezam-e amuzesh va parvaresh</i>	The Office of the Council for the Fundamental Transformation of the Educational System
<i>Daftar-dar</i>	School's administration assistant
<i>Danesh-amuzan-e Pish-ahang</i>	Corp Students
<i>Danesh-gah-e payam-e nur</i>	The Open University
<i>Danesh-saraye ali</i>	Higher Teacher Training College
<i>Danesh-saraye ashayeri</i>	Tribal Teacher Training College
<i>Danesh-saraye moqaddamati</i>	Elementary Teacher Training College
<i>Danesh-saraye rahnemaei</i>	Guidance Teacher Training College
<i>Daneshgah-e tarbiat mo'allemin</i>	University of Teacher Training
<i>Diplom-e motavasseteh</i>	GCSE
<i>Do'a-ye Komeil</i>	Komeil Prayer
<i>Do-shifteh</i>	Double shift
<i>Dovreh-ye rahnemaei</i>	Guidance level (circle)
<i>Edareh-ye amuzesh va parvaresh</i>	Local Education Authority
<i>Emamat</i>	Imamate
<i>Emtahanat-e hamahang</i>	Co-ordinated exams
<i>Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat</i>	Constitutional Revolution
<i>Eqtesad-e ejtemaei</i>	Social Economics
<i>Eradeh</i>	Will
<i>Ertej'a-e siah</i>	Radically reactionary
<i>Eshgh</i>	Love
<i>Eslahat-e arzi</i>	Land reform
<i>Ezafeh-kar</i>	Overtime work
<i>Foru-e-din</i>	Secondary Shi'ite doctrines
<i>Fouq-diplom (kardani)</i>	Higher Diploma

<i>Gharb-zadegi</i>	Westoxication
<i>Gozinesh</i>	Selection
<i>Grouh-e amuzeshi</i>	Subject Specialist Group
<i>Grouh-haye momtaz</i>	Superior ranks
<i>Hafteh-ye mo'allemin</i>	Week of the Teacher
<i>Halabi-abad</i>	Slum
<i>Hasteh-ye tarbiati-e kar-konan</i>	Staff council of morality
<i>Hejab</i>	Veiling
<i>Hejran</i>	Separation
<i>Hezb-e Tudeh</i>	Mass (Tudeh) Party
<i>Hikmat-e eslami</i>	Islamic philosophical disciplines
<i>Hokumat va velayat</i>	Ruling and guardianship
<i>Honarestan</i>	Vocational high school
<i>Hovzeh</i>	Traditional Religious School
<i>Iran-e eslami</i>	Islamic Iran
<i>Islam-e nab</i>	Pure Islam
<i>Jama'ah-ye bi-tabaqe-ye tohidi</i>	Islamic classless society
<i>Jasus-khaneh</i>	Spy-house
<i>Jebheh-ye melli</i>	National Front
<i>Jihad-e akbar</i>	Inner holy war
<i>Kar-Danesh</i>	Work-Science
<i>Kar-khaneh-ye adam sazi</i>	Human manufacturing factories
<i>Kardani-e na-peyvasteh</i>	Non-adjointing Higher Diploma
<i>Kardani-e peyvasteh</i>	Adjointing Higher Diploma
<i>Khakh-neshinan</i>	Palace dwellers
<i>Khaneh-ye javanan</i>	House of youth
<i>Khaneh-ye pish-ahangi</i>	House of scouting
<i>Khanom</i>	Miss
<i>Khedmat-gozar</i>	Server ('Servant')
<i>Kollyyat-e nezam-e jadid-e amuzesh-e motavasseteh</i>	Generalities for the New System of High School Education
<i>Kukh-neshinan</i>	Slum dwellers
<i>Ma'ad</i>	Resurrection
<i>Madrasah</i>	Religious School
<i>Maghna'eh</i>	Islamic scarf
<i>Maktab</i>	Traditional School
<i>Marakez-e Sarnevesht saz</i>	Destiny-forming centres
<i>Marja' e taqlid</i>	Grand Ayatollah
<i>Marqin</i>	Unconsciously religious-biased faithful
<i>Mashough</i>	Loved
<i>Mihan</i>	Homeland
<i>Mo'ajezeh</i>	Miracle
<i>Modir-e Droos</i>	Director of Courses
<i>Mostakberan</i>	Oppressors
<i>Mostaz'afin</i>	Oppressed People
<i>Motakhasses-e maktabi</i>	Committed and doctrinaire expert
<i>Na sharghi, na gharbi, jomhuri-e islami</i>	Neither the East nor the West, but the Islamic Republic

<i>Nafs-e ammareh</i>	Material aspect of human being
<i>Nafs-e lavvameh</i>	Spiritual aspect of human being
<i>Nakethin</i>	Intellectual Traitors
<i>Namaz-e jama'at</i>	Collective Prayer
<i>Neghab</i>	The veil which covers all face
<i>Nehzat-e azadi-e iran</i>	Freedom Movement of Iran
<i>Nobbovat</i>	Prophecy
<i>Ommat</i>	Islamic nation
<i>Omur-e ejraei-e nezam-e jadid-e amuzesh-e motavasseteh</i>	Executive Affairs for the New System of High School Education
<i>Omur-e tarbiati</i>	Moral education
<i>Osoul-e din</i>	Principles of religion
<i>Osoul-e mazhab-e Shi'a</i>	Principles of Shi'ism
<i>Pish-daneshgahi</i>	Pre-university courses
<i>Qaumi</i>	Ethnic nationalism
<i>Qesetin</i>	Despotic rulers
<i>Rah-e Shab</i>	Nightline
<i>Rasta-khiz</i>	Resurrection
<i>Riazi-fizik</i>	Math-Physics
<i>Rouz-e zan</i>	Day of Women
<i>Rouz-ha-ye vizhe-ye khoda: ayyam-o'llah</i>	Special religious-political days
<i>Ruhani</i>	Clergyman
<i>Sadegi</i>	Simplicity
<i>Sahabeh</i>	Closest followers of the Prophet
<i>Sal-e avval-e motavasseteh</i>	Year-nine (Year-one of High school)
<i>Sal-e chaharom-e motavasseteh</i>	Year-twelve (Year-four of High school)
<i>Sal-e dovvom-e motavasseteh</i>	Year-ten (Year-two of High school)
<i>Sal-e sevvom-e motavasseteh</i>	Year-eleven (Year-three of High school)
<i>Sale-e avval-e rahnemaei</i>	Year-six (Year-one of Guidance level)
<i>Sazman-e Owghaf</i>	Organisation of Bequest
<i>Sazman-e Tablighat-e Islami</i>	Organisation of Islamic Advertisement
<i>Sazman-e Tarbiat Badani</i>	Physical Education Organisation
<i>Sepah-e danesh</i>	Literacy Corp
<i>Shakheh-ye fanni va herfeh-ei</i>	Vocational Studies
<i>Shakheh-ye nazari</i>	Theoretical Studies
<i>Shari'a</i>	Islamic law
<i>Shora-ye tarbiati</i>	Moral council
<i>Shura-ye ali-e enqelab-e farhangi</i>	Higher Council of Cultural Revolution
<i>Shura-ye danesh-gah</i>	University Council
<i>Shura-ye mo'alleman</i>	Teachers' Councils
<i>Sobh-e Jom'ah ba shoma</i>	Friday Morning Along with You
<i>Sunnat</i>	Tradition of the Prophet
<i>Ta'ahhod</i>	Commitment
<i>Tahajom-e farhangi</i>	Cultural invasion
<i>Takhassos</i>	Expertise
<i>Tarbiat</i>	Moral training
<i>Tarh-e enteqal beh amuzesh-e motavasseteh-ye matloob</i>	A Design for a Shift into the Desired High School Education

<i>Tarh-e karaneh</i>	Programme of Efficiency
<i>Tazkieh</i>	Training and purification
<i>Tazvir</i>	Hypocrisy
<i>Towhid</i>	Monotheism
<i>Tudeh</i>	Mass
<i>Ulama</i>	Clergy
<i>Ulum-e ensani</i>	Humanities
<i>Ulum-e tajrobi</i>	Experimental Sciences
<i>Usul-e-din</i>	Principal Shi'ite doctrines
<i>Vaez</i>	Preacher
<i>Vali-ne'mat</i>	Benefactors
<i>Vaqf</i>	Charity
<i>Velayat-e faqih</i>	Authority of the Jurist
<i>Vesal</i>	Unite with the sweetheart after separation
<i>Vezu</i>	Ablution
<i>Watani</i>	Territorial nationalism
<i>Zar</i>	Wealth
<i>Zur</i>	Force

INTRODUCTION

Like many other theses, this one has its roots in the author's biography. The mid-1970s were the years in which I started down the road which, unbeknown to me at the time, was to lead to doctoral studies in the sociology of culture and religion. Having originally dreamed of studying medicine at university I changed my mind after being influenced by numerous Iranian intellectuals. Their interpretations of Islam seemed to offer fresh routes towards social justice, so I decided to study Theology and Islamic Sciences at the University of Tehran.

After three and a half years of Theology I felt the need to further my studies with an MA in Comparative Religions and Gnosticism, hoping that this would be a good way into the sociology of culture and religions, on which Dr Shari'ati had already made his mark. At that time, however, it was not possible to take my interests in these branches of sociology further.

At the same time I also developed a strong interest in education, especially in rural areas. I began work as a teacher in rural primary schools in 1976 and subsequently gained experience of teaching at all levels of general education in Iran (primary, guidance and high school) as well as in higher education. The opportunity to pursue further studies of educational development, from a sociological point of view, did not arise until the early-1990s.

The University of Tabriz, in North West Iran, kindly provided me with the wonderful opportunity to conduct doctoral research on cultural topics in sociology. This thesis is the fruit of my attempt to bring sociological perspectives to bear on

relations between culture and education in schools in a rural area of Iran. But, as will become clear at several places below, this type of research is not without its problems. For example, sociological studies of Shi'ite Islam are not numerous, so the conceptual and theoretical framework for my research was not available 'ready made'. Limitations of time and resources also meant that I could only focus on selected aspects of education in one small part of a large and very diverse country with a rich history. And it is extremely important to stress that, since sociology studies only one dimension of reality, it leaves many other, equally significant aspects of reality untouched. Other studies using other disciplinary approaches are required if a good, all-round result is required.

Sociological studies of culture and religion do not entail any judgments about the truth or validity of holy scriptures, theology, doctrines or values. Indeed, my preference is for an 'interpretative sociology' which tries to avoid reducing people's faith and beliefs to a matter of social forces. My sociological observations about 'Islam' are not, therefore, about religious truth: they are only about the pattern of social relations and cultural norms through which Iranian Muslims 'translate' Islam into action. In other words, this thesis is about everyday cultural practices, associated with Islam, in the setting of rural schools. This is why the thesis title makes no mention of Islam.

After the introductory Chapter, the remainder of the thesis falls roughly into two parts. The first part, consisting of Chapters 2 to 4, considers the historical, cultural and ideological forces which paved the way for the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The second half of the thesis is an analysis of information collected mainly during two, three-month periods of fieldwork in North West Iran in 1995 and 1996. It

was necessary to arrange the chapters in this two-part fashion in order to establish clearly the extent to which Islam had influenced education in Iran (a) prior to 1979 and (b) in the years following the Revolution. It must be acknowledged, however, that the second half of the thesis is primarily where my claim to make a substantial contribution to sociological knowledge is based. Very few researchers have conducted fieldwork in Iran in recent decades; even fewer have conducted empirical studies of schools. The originality of my work therefore also lies mainly in the findings arising from my fieldwork and in my analysis of their significance for a sociological understanding of educational change in Iran since 1979. The latter point is all the more important because, as I shall explain in Chapter 6, it is rare for official permission to be given for fieldwork in Iran. Nevertheless, it was possible to collect original information by means of interviews, participant observation and questionnaires after negotiating access to my informants and respondents through informal and formal channels. My findings about change in school curricula, textbooks, relations between teachers and students, Teachers' Councils, relations with Local Education Authorities, career development and the New System of Education all cast new light on patterns of educational change. In this respect my thesis can lay claim to originality.

Chapter One sets out my reasons for adopting a theoretical perspective heavily influenced by Max Weber. It argues for the usefulness of taking an 'interpretative' stance to matters of culture and religion. But it is critical of Weber's limited understanding of the social dimensions of Islam.

Chapter Two analyses the political and ideological currents and events leading up to, and leading out of, the Iranian revolution. It examines the significance of what

can be considered, with the benefit of hindsight, to be the episodes which had the most formative effect on the revolution and its aftermath.

Chapter Three discusses theoretical perspectives on the Iranian Revolution to provide part of the background understanding of social change in Iran. It also establishes the broad outlines of the main currents running through Islamic ideology in Iran: populism, nationalism and islamism.

Chapter Four gives a brief account of the historical evolution of the country's school-level education system in the period leading up to 1979, with special emphasis on the educational policies of governments under the Pahlavi dynasty. The gradual separation of religion from state-controlled education is highlighted.

Chapter Five reports briefly on the post-1979 educational policies shaped by Islamic values. Their impact on institutional changes, philosophy of education and its goals, curricula and women's education is discussed. It also provides a very brief account of the impact of Iran's economic situation on schooling.

Chapter Six, after discussing the methodological strategies and methods of research, focuses on the changes that have occurred in school curricula and textbooks since 1979 in accordance with ideological pressure to make education conform with the new Islamic philosophy of education. Changes in the content of a sample of textbooks are presented in the Appendix.

Chapter Seven focuses on gendered social relations among students, teachers and administrators in Iranian schools. The main aim is to explain how ideological concerns play a significant role in shaping social interactions between males and females through (a) the establishment of new notions of appropriate relationships (b)

the shaping of agenda items discussed in the Teachers' Council, and (c) the conduct of new religious practices in schools.

Chapter Eight has a special focus on the central role of teacher training programmes after 1979. Then it discusses briefly the changes that have occurred in methods of teaching and assessing students. Finally, there is an analysis of teachers' perceptions of the ways in which their professional role and social status have changed since the revolution.

Chapter Nine sets out a brief consideration of the New System of Education beginning from the early years of 1990s. It contains arguments about its difference from the Old System of Education, its new philosophy, teachers' responses to the New System in schools and current problems in delivery.

Chapter One

MAX WEBER, MODERNITY AND ISLAM

The theoretical perspective from which this thesis is written is most heavily influenced by the work of Max Weber, the eminent German scholar who helped to lay the foundations for the development of social sciences in the early twentieth century (Beetham 1974; Mommsen 1974). It is therefore important to clarify the distinctiveness of Weber's approach to the practice of social scientific investigations. This will involve a brief discussion of some of his basic concepts, but there is no intention to examine the many and diverse interpretations of Weber's work (see Albrow 1990; Beckford 1989; Brubaker 1984; Käsler 1988; Roth & Schluchter 1979; Scaff 1989). Consideration will then be given to the questions that Weber raised about the sociological study of religion and about Islam in particular. The purpose of this opening Chapter is to set the scene for the specific issues with which this thesis is concerned, namely, the influence of government sponsored Islamic ideology on school-level education in a rural area of present-day Iran and the responses of teachers to this influence.

Interpretative Sociology, the label usually given to Weber's approach to sociology, is based on use of the human faculty of 'understanding'. This is mainly because the subject of sociology is human beings who are self-conscious and intentional and who sometimes behave unexpectedly in ways which would defy study by experimental methods. Interpretative sociology is therefore different from factorial theories, according to Blumer's classification of theoretical types such as Positivism,

Functionalism, Conflict Theory, and Exchange Theory which seek to study human groups in the same way as they would study animals, plants and soulless beings (Tanhaei 1992: 54-63). The assumption of these approaches to science is that they can control or predict human behaviour in determinate fashion. But the methodology of interpretative sociology is associated with probabilities: not certainties. Moreover, an interpretative researcher should not just examine a relationship between independent variables and dependent variables; but it is also necessary to understand and analyse events and phenomena in terms of their *meaning*.

In defining Sociology and 'social fact', Weber, unlike his French contemporary, Emile Durkheim, did not separate social structures and institutions from meaningful human actions. So, the notion of 'social action' forms the core of his sociology. This means that sociologists should try to understand how humans use, create and evaluate their various social relationships. Weber therefore preferred to use the *active* terms 'Vergesellschaftung' and 'Vergemeinschaftung' (meaning 'the processes of societalisation' and 'the processes of community formation') instead of the relatively *static* terms 'Gesellschaft' and 'Gemeinschaft'. Since humans interpret their social relationships and actions differently at different times, Weber also emphasised the need to situate social structures and relationships in their historical contexts. In short, social structures are probabilistic and changeable outcomes of intentional human action which can be understood, for sociological purposes, in terms of the meanings invested in them.

Weber's definition of sociology is as follows:

'The term "Sociology" is open to many different interpretations. In the context used here it shall mean that science which aims at the

interpretative understanding of social behaviour in order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course, and its effects.' (Freund 1968: 93)

Interpretative understanding, for Weber, involved grasping the meaning of actions with certainty. Yet, there is a hierarchy of understanding, of which the highest degree is intellectual understanding of rational action. The experiences of other people can sometimes be understood easily through sympathetic sharing, but there is no guarantee that this will explain everything, especially in the case of motivational understanding. For the certainty of understanding may be weakened either by the interference of incomprehensible external factors like chance, or by psychological complexity, as when two people react differently to the same circumstance. In these cases, interpretative understanding should rely on the findings of other sciences, such as psychology, psychoanalysis and biology, which investigate these problems.

Although Weber did not believe that the ability to put one's self in the place of other actors was an absolutely reliable way of producing meaningful interpretation, it is a useful method for grasping what needs to be explained. It presupposes a rational and authentic ideal-type of social action based on interpretative understanding, and it offers the greatest possible objective validity to the interpretative method.

Weber refined his analysis of social behaviour, or action, by classifying it into four types: 'traditional, affectual, rational value-oriented and rational goal-oriented.' Traditional conduct is based on mechanical reaction in blind submission to custom, and, therefore, includes incomprehensible elements. Affectual conduct comprises sensory, emotional, instinctive and passionate elements which only psychology and psychoanalysis can investigate. Rational value-oriented action is conduct which originates from the beliefs of the agent, without taking account of the foreseeable

results. Rational goal-oriented action is the most amenable to interpretative sociology because it involves the highest degree of rational verifiable proof. When the purpose of conduct, after deep consideration, has been decided, the agent chooses the appropriate means, taking account of their foreseeable results.

Each of these types of social action is an ideal-type or a pure case against which to determine whether specific conduct approaches the ideal in the purest sense or departs from it. So, an ideal-type, whether in the form of traditionalist conduct, affectual conduct, or rational value-oriented or goal-oriented conduct, is never more than a Utopian scenario which is designed theoretically to facilitate research. Its validity depends entirely on its usefulness in research, nothing else. In other words, it is only a 'paradigm', the aim of which is to enable sociologists to grasp the meaning of social action, processes, relationships and structures. So, although an ideal-type is necessarily a deliberate abstraction and selection from the complexity of empirical reality, it offers a better analytical grasp of it.

In his extended 'debate with the ghost of Karl Marx', Weber argued for the heuristic use of ideal-types. The problem with Marx's materialistic conception of history, to Weber, was that it took just one factor, the economic, as the only *real* one for comprehensive explanation of the whole of history. Weber responded one-sidedly to this one-sided point of view by writing *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, in which he tried to prove that if the economic aspect could affect the other elements of society, the cultural aspect could also do so, but only as understood in an ideal-type way.

One of the aims of this thesis is to show, in the spirit of Weber's use of ideal-types, that much can be learned about education in Iran after 1979 by isolating, *for*

analytical purposes only, the influence of religious ideas. Of course, education has also been shaped by many other factors, but this thesis deliberately explores the relatively neglected influence of religion. Only in this quasi-experimental fashion is it possible to appreciate fully the impact of religion on education and, thereby, to understand the distinctive trajectory of Iranian society in the post-revolutionary¹ era.

Weberian Themes in the Sociology of Religion

The following discussion is confined to a selection of concepts which were central to Weber's analysis of processes feeding into what many social scientists came to call 'modernisation', although this particular term did not occur frequently in Weber's own writings. The aim is not, however, to debate the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of modernisation. It is merely to clarify the reasons that Weber had for giving priority to certain concepts in his understanding of the direction of social change mainly in North America and Western Europe. In most cases priority was given to concepts highlighting the contrast between 'tradition' and 'modernity'. Despite the massive social changes that have occurred since Weber's day, it still remains helpful to approach the study of developments in Iranian society from this point of view, although later Chapters will show that modifications of some concepts are now required. In particular, the simultaneous *interplay between* aspects of tradition and aspects of modernity will be emphasised in Iranian education today.

1. Tradition and Modernity

(a) Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism versus Capitalism

One of the threads running through Max Weber's work in history, economics, politics, sociology and the study of religion concerns relations between systems of political power, systems of economic exploitation, and religious institutions. He was especially interested in the elective affinities which held together these parts of social structure at different historical periods. Without assigning causal priority to any one of them, Weber analysed the logic of their internal relations in various circumstances.

As far as the broad contrast between tradition and modernity was concerned, it seemed that patriarchalism and patrimonialism were incompatible with the kind of rational capitalism which developed at various locations in the West and at different rates from the fifteenth century C.E. onwards.

Patrimonialism, to Weber (1978a: 237-41), is any form of political dominion based on personal and bureaucratic power exercised by a ruling family. Its most important difference from other sorts of political power is, firstly, that patrimonial power is based on arbitrary criteria and, secondly, that its administration is controlled directly by the ruler. Traditionalism, in this policy, obstructs the path of rational economic development, because it lacks two requirements for the rationalisation of economic activity: a basis for the calculability of obligations, and sufficient freedom to permit private business. According to Weber, only certain sorts of capitalism can be developed under the dominance of patrimonial policy, because patrimonialism and patriarchalism tend inherently to regulate economic activity in terms of profitable, welfare or absolute values. They are: capitalist trading, capitalist tax farming, rent and sale of offices, capitalist administration of supplies, and capitalist plantations, in some conditions.

Closely related to the economic and political implications of patrimonialism are limitations on the scope for developments in religion which lay outside the control of institutions guarding tradition. For it was usually in the interests of their leaders to ensure that the dominant institutions of politics, economics and religion continued to observe traditional values, hierarchies and social practices. As will become clear later in this thesis, tensions between remnants of patrimonialism and various modernising forces have been at the centre of debates about social development in Iran throughout the twentieth century.

(b) Disenchantment of the World

Max Weber's account of the processes of modernisation is particularly distinctive for the primacy that it accords to the declining influence of religious, spiritual and philosophical currents of thought. Pride of place is given to the process of disenchantment which has allegedly helped to transform the ideal-typical world view of the West.

The Christian definition of the world and, as a consequence, the tension between this world and the concept of the other world helped to shape Weber's work, particularly his analysis of Protestantism and religion in general (Albrow 1990: 120-3). This tension stems from the *New Testament*: 'And he said unto them, Ye are from beneath; I am from above: ye are of this world; I am not of this world. I say therefore unto you that ye shall die in your sins: for if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins' (John 8: 23, 24). The world is the everyday life of earthly existence, where people are born, marry, obey or disobey, sin and die. This outward, temporal, routine and untidy world should be replaced, according to the Christian

Gospels, by the hope of a hereafter, and the kingdom of men has to be succeeded by the kingdom of God. Weber took these distinctions for granted in his works and constructed an image of the world of modernity as a time and place where the distinction between this world and an other world was becoming blurred. The ideals of modernity offered the prospect of a world where mystery, magic, luck and fate would be ousted by the forces of science, calculation and reason.

Analysis of the changes introduced into the Islamic educational system after 1979 will show, in later Chapters, that the disenchantment of the world may not be inevitable, indiscriminate or irreversible. Instead, it will become clear that Islamicist ideology has sought to promote certain forms of 'modern' knowledge without expelling all elements of religion and spirituality in their popular or formal guises.

(c) Rationalisation

The disenchantment of the world owes much, according to Weber, to one particular intellectual force for change, namely, the process of rationalisation. This is another example of the priority accorded by Weber to the capacity of ideational forces to shape the development of the material conditions of life and of social structures.

Rationalisation is the result of the scientific specialisation and technical expertise which were originally peculiar to western civilisation. Weber defined it as an attempt at refinement which tends to elaborate the conduct of life in a creative way and to increase domination over the external world. He does not equate increasing rationalisation with progress in the usual sense of the word, because it never guarantees a better understanding of our way of living. He wrote:

‘The increasing intellectualisation and rationalisation do *not*, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one *could* learn it at any time. Hence it means that there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.’ (Gerth and Mills 1991: 139)

Weber’s concept of rationalisation is not unproblematic (Brubaker 1984) but it helps to explain some of the tensions and ironies affecting the development of education in Iran after 1979. It will become clear in later Chapters that attempts to rationalise aspects of education have met with mixed results, some of them distinctly non-rational.

(d) The routinisation of charisma

Given the very high public profile enjoyed in Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other leading Muslim clerics before and after the 1979 revolution, this thesis will have to assess the impact of charismatic leadership on social change. Again, Max Weber’s pioneering analyses of charisma and of other bases of authority and power will provide the basic resources for interpretation.

According to Weber (1978b: 1121-3), charismatic authority thrives in unusual political or economic situations or when supernatural phenomena seem to occur. It proceeds from public enthusiasm generated by abnormal events and from recognition of heroism in a leader who displays exceptional powers or gifts. Faith in the leader himself and in his charismatic powers is often believed to be eternal, and he can be

regarded as a person who has been sent to the people to accomplish a divine mission. But this situation is unstable, because when the extraordinary enthusiasm subsides and the disciples have to return to their usual routines, at least the pure form of charismatic authority will diminish and may be transformed into an institution. Then it is either routinised or invisibly replaced by other structures, or combined with them so that it becomes only one aspect of a concrete historical structure.

A further refinement of the notion of charisma was sketched by Weber in his treatment of 'charisma of office'. This refers to the probability that commands will be obeyed if they emanate from people who occupy institutional offices with which exceptional powers and gifts have become associated. In this case, charisma is not, strictly speaking, attributed to individuals but to the offices that they occupy. This distinction has special relevance to Shi'ite Islam by virtue of the roles played by its clerics -- unlike the situation in Sunni traditions. 'Charisma of office' has a direct bearing on attempts to explain the mechanisms and processes whereby particular interpretations of Islam have been deployed throughout Iranian society in the period since 1979.

(e) Bureaucratisation

Max Weber's ideal-type of 'modern western rational bureaucracy' serves as a useful yardstick by which to assess the extent to which, and the manner in which, post-revolutionary Iran's public institutions have been rationalised. From the point of view of this thesis, the interesting question is not whether bureaucratisation has taken place but *how* it has occurred. It is especially important to discover how Islamic ideology has affected bureaucratic developments in theory and in practice. The field of

education provides a good opportunity for investigating the form and the outcome of bureaucratisation processes in an Islamic context.

The clearest example of rational-legal dominion ('Herrschaft' in German), in Weber's opinion, is modern Western rational bureaucracy. Contrary to patrimonialism it is characterised by:

- 1- special services and a clear division of obligations and decision-making powers based on the application of definite regulations or law.
- 2- support for officials in meeting their obligations under special regulations.
- 3- hierarchical establishment of duties.
- 4- employment of officials on the basis of qualification through examination or diplomas.
- 5- organisation of regular salaries during employment and afterwards.
- 6 - the right of people with higher authority to monitor the work of their inferiors.
- 7- the possibility of promotion for officials on the basis of objective standards.
- 8 - definite separation between officials and their official jobs. (Freund 1968: 234-5)

There is a lengthy and unresolved debate among sociologists about the relation between bureaucratisation and democracy. Weber himself, as well as his contemporary, Roberto Michels, recognised the practical benefits of modern Western rational bureaucracy for a democratic ordering of political life (Beetham 1974). At the same time, Michels was especially impressed by the capacity of bureaucracies to stultify the democratic spirit and to circumvent democratic processes in the long-term. These concerns are reproduced in present-day concerns about the role of 'experts' and 'professionals' in bureaucratic organisations. For this reason, it is essential to investigate the character of the bureaucratic structures and processes that were

introduced into Iranian educational institutions after 1979 to discover how far they reflect the prevailing political ideologies. The impact of Islamic ideologies will be investigated in detail.

2. Salvation and Religious Ethics

A recurrent theme in Weber's writings about modernisation deals with the impact of religiously-informed ethics on everyday social action. It is not just a matter of identifying the formal religious beliefs which directly inform action; it is also, and more importantly, a matter of teasing out the subtle and elusive connections between religious ways of thinking and feeling and pre-dispositions to live in certain ways. Reflecting Weber's interest in the influence of religiously-informed economic ethics, this thesis will try to probe the effects on educational policy and practice of the Islamic ideology propagated in Iran after 1979.

(a) This worldly and other worldly asceticism

Weber (1978a: 541-4) interprets asceticism as the disciplined and methodical pursuit of salvation. But the meaning of asceticism varies with the contents of different religions which represent different notions of salvation and the world. If the actual search for salvation involves withdrawal from the world including, for example, loss of attachment to family, worldly goods, and economic, political and artistic interests, Weber called it 'worldly-rejecting asceticism' ('weltablehnende Askese'). On the other hand, if salvation requires humans to concentrate on participation in the institutions of the world whilst remaining detached from them, to become one of God's elect, this is called 'inner-worldly asceticism' ('innerweltliche Askese'). This

latter type of asceticism influenced Weber's thinking about ascetic Protestantism's status as a cultural factor needed for the spirit of capitalism in ideal-typical form. For he took for granted that this-worldly asceticism was a rational way of rejecting everything that is irrational, esthetic or that relies on man's own emotional reactions to the world.

It is not the aim of this thesis to decide whether anything functionally equivalent to inner-worldly asceticism can be detected in post-1979 Iranian education, but Weber's research into asceticism and salvation at least poses the question of how individuals relate their religious convictions to their everyday life. The impact of Islamic ideologies on Iranian schoolteachers' professional views and practices since 1979 is therefore of central interest to Chapter 8.

(b) Religious ethics and economic ethics

Weber investigated ethics in order to know the psychological and empirical factors which influence the practical motives behind human activities, particularly economic activities. According to Weber, it is a mistake to reduce all factors to a single one if the complexity of human life is to be appreciated. So, economic morality does not rely merely on the forms of economic institutions; nor can it be restricted easily to the impact of religious organisations alone. It is the same with religious morality. This means that economics cannot be explained solely by religion, nor can religion be explained solely by economics. This is how Weber analysed Chinese, Indian or Ancient Jewish religious sentiments. He studied all the detailed material conditions of life - financial organisation, the urban or rural situation and the position of social strata - in order to understand the sociological aspect of religions (Freund 1968: 209-

17). This thesis will try to perform the same kind of analysis on the ways in which teachers in Iran perceive and negotiate relations between their religious ethics and their economic ethics.

3. Relations Between Religious and Socio-economic Development

One of Max Weber's most significant contributions towards the sociology of religion was to argue that the application of religious ideas can produce unexpected and ironic consequences. For example, his argument about the long-term effects of economic ethics inspired by varieties of Protestantism is justly famous for highlighting the ironic effects of this-worldly asceticism on the development of a capitalistic spirit. In a similar fashion, this thesis is also interested in studying the outcome of deliberate attempts to apply a particular form of Islamic ethics to Iranian society and culture. This is why it is necessary briefly to clarify the terms of Weber's reasoning.

Weber (1971: 183) responded in a deliberately one-sided fashion to those who interpreted culture and history in a one-sided, materialistic fashion by writing the most famous work in the sociology of religion, namely, the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber, in investigating the conditions in which western capitalism emerged, emphasised the importance of an element which other civilisations such as Babylon, Rome, China and India had lacked. As a result, they failed to develop capitalism. It was, according to him, the Protestant ethic which indirectly and ironically led to the rationalisation of economics and which was involved in the formation of the 'spirit of capitalism'. However, this was not the only cause, 'but one of the causes of certain aspects of capitalism'. In his view, there was a specific relationship in Protestantism between faithful Protestants and their God who had

determined their fate even before they had been created. They should devote their life to Him in the hope that they would receive at best a sign of their election. On the one hand, therefore, Protestants should also work as much as they could and should not waste their time. On the other, they must not spend money beyond what was necessary for living a simple life, because religion required them to avoid enjoying idle things and the temptations of the flesh. As a result, this style of life inadvertently and ironically fostered sobriety, efficiency and prosperity which, in turn, fed into an ethos which helped to cultivate conditions conducive to the spirit of capitalism.

4. Religious Professionals

Given Max Weber's preoccupation with processes of rationalisation and bureaucratisation, it follows that questions about the role of professionals in religious organisations were also of interest to him (Beckford 1973). Indeed, many sections of his writings about the sociology of religion analyse these topics in considerable detail. His analyses are not confined to Christianity but are applied to all the world's major faith traditions. In doing so, Weber refined many concepts specific to particular traditions as well as those of wider applicability. Yet, at the centre of these conceptual discussions is a recurrent theme, namely, the dynamic between (a) innovation in religious thought and experience (b) the status of specialists who clarify and conserve religious traditions, and (c) the form of religious organisations. Relations between these three factors have taken very different forms at different times in different cultural traditions. One of Weber's great achievements was to identify some broad patterns in these relationships.

The tension between priests and magicians was one such pattern. Paralleling Durkheim's claim that there was no 'church of magic', Weber stressed the logical connection between a priest's ritual and sacramental functions and the rule-governed, formal character of church-type institutions. This is not easily applicable to the Shi'ite clergy of Iran, but this thesis will consider how changes in Iranian education have permitted the clergy to play a novel role in relation to schools.

The scattered fragments of Weber's writings on Islam imply that the notion of priest did not fit easily into this particular faith tradition because it tended to lack church-type organisations controlling the training, appointment and disciplining of priests. This is especially noticeable in Weber's discussion of the kind of judicial system in which the 'kadi' administers the shari'a in a much less legal-rational way than was characteristic of western judicial systems. It will become apparent in this thesis that the institutions of Shi'a Islam enable members of the clergy to perform a number of professional tasks comparable with those of priests in, for example, Christian Churches. This sociological fact about Iranian clergy helps to explain aspects of recent educational change in Iran.

Weber's Characterisation of Islam

Some of the Weberian theoretical perspectives and concepts which are likely to have a useful bearing on the study of education in post-revolutionary Iran have been outlined above. In most cases they need adaptation to the specific character of Islam in different places and times. In a few cases their relevance is questionable. Before entering into the detail of the argument about education in Iran, therefore, it is necessary to take stock of Weber's account of Islam in general. At various points this

thesis will indicate the strengths and weaknesses of this account whilst maintaining that Weber's insistence on studying sociological patterns from the viewpoint of the meanings that actors bring to situations remains valid.

Weber (1978a: 623-7) characterised Islam less as a salvation religion and more as a religion with all the characteristics of feudalism. He thought that Islam increased its political power by extorting tribute (*jizyah*) from other religions' believers. So, it was a religion of the masters. In addition, wealth and the significance of what he considered to be luxuries, such as clothing, perfume and beard-coiffure all reflected the feudalistic character of Islam and its contrast to Puritanism. However, according to Weber, Islam contained a modicum of asceticism in the form of fasting, begging and penitential suffering. Furthermore, the original Islamic notion of sin corresponded with a feudal model as well, because sin was perceived as disobedience to the positive orders of the Prophet. Other vestiges of feudalism in Islam, according to Weber, included: the acceptance of slavery, serfdom, and polygamy; patriarchal dominion over women; the substantially ritualistic feature of religious duties; and the simplicity of religious and ethical requirements, which prepared the way for the dervish religion to be influential in Islam as a residue of an irrational and traditional identity.

The political significance of Islam in Weber's view was that it had succeeded in quelling personal feuds to increase the community's power against its enemies. Further, it rejected illicit sexual intercourse, supporting the legitimate form of reproduction in accordance with patriarchalism. Opposition to usury, the imposition of war taxes, and the official orders to support the poor, were its other political characteristics. In addition, there were political frameworks within which religious

responsibilities required in dogma could be honoured: belief that God is one and that Mohammad is his Prophet; pilgrimage to Mecca; fasting; prayers; special clothing; and the avoidance of particular unclean foods and gambling.

In sum, the image that Weber created of Islam is dominated by feudal, patriarchal considerations reflecting the religion's historical origins and its incompatibility with the conditions required for capitalist development. In Bryan Turner's words:

‘[T]he main point of Weber's analysis of Islam is not that the early warrior ethic precluded capitalism but that the political and economic conditions of Oriental society were hostile to capitalist pre-requisites...

When Weber came to analyse Islam, he focused on the political, military and economic nature of Islamic society as a patrimonial form of domination.’ (Turner 1974: 16, 20-21)

Moreover, Weber appeared to be largely unaware of the changes that had occurred in Islam and among the social circumstances of Muslims by the early twentieth century. And his sensitivity to the distinctiveness of Shi'ism seemed low. However, the reason for reviewing his characterisation of Islam is not to re-write Weber's work. The more modest aim is merely to sketch the conceptual framework within which Weber depicted Islam as a highly distinctive socio-religious, political and cultural system. Many of the following observations about Shi'ism in Iran will be incompatible with this particular way of depicting Islam. Nevertheless, it remains valid to make use of Weber's methodological principles of interpretative sociology to this study of the changes that have taken place in school-level education in one part of rural Iran in the present-day under the influence of revolutionary Islam.

The main reason for trying to isolate the influence of Islam in this thesis is that, as many commentators on Iran have agreed, it is a country in which religion occupies a position of virtual hegemony. For example, the leading French scholar of Iran, Yann Richard (1990: 109-10), claimed that any political regime based on revolutionary militancy would need to consolidate its power by means of ideology but that Iran was different in so far as it placed religion alone at the centre of its ideology. Moreover, as the next Chapter will show, religion has been close to the centre of most political events in Iran for various reasons throughout the twentieth century. Unlike that of some commentators, however, Richard's work is unusual for the emphasis that it places on the role of state schools as conduits through which Iran's revolutionary ideological currents have passed. He regards schools as the fulcrum of Islamist attempts to topple the Pahlavi monarchy and to re-islamise the entire Iranian society. In his view, schools were systematically used for the purpose of creating a new political culture and structure under the Islamic Republic (Richard 1990: 105).

This thesis will test the validity of Richard's argument and will explore in depth the intended and unintended consequences of educational change in Iran since 1979.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ This is a short-hand term for designating the period following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, beginning in 1979.

Chapter Two

PATHS TO REVOLUTION

In order to appreciate the distinctiveness of the religious influences exercised on school-level education in Iran following the 1979 revolution, it is essential to understand the political and ideological currents and events leading up to, and leading out of, the revolution. The main aim of this Chapter is to examine the significance of what can be considered, with the benefit of hindsight, to be the episodes which had the most formative effect on the revolution and its aftermath. They include the Tobacco Regie episode of 1890-92; the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11; the nationalist movements of 1951 to 1953; and the uprising of 1963. Where appropriate, special attention will be given to the variable extent to which Shi'ite clergy were willing or able to shape political developments. The ideological underpinnings of the revolution and of the Islamic Republic will be the focus of Chapter Three.

Before the analysis can begin, however, some definitions of two key terms are required. The aim is not to legislate for the use of terms but merely to give a general indication of the meanings attributed to them in this thesis.

Firstly, in defining 'revolution' and in consideration of its '*Islamic*' nature, the social and cultural movement of 1979 included both a 'return to the point of origin', as Copernicus had conceptualised the revolution of stars in astronomy in the mid-sixteenth century (Milani 1994: 8), and a liberating process, according to which 'Islam' became a philosophy which ought to change the world, not just interpret it. Change would be implemented through revolution; but not as an inherent necessity

caused by the motor of history, as Marx interpreted revolution in the nineteenth century.

The former conceptualisation of revolution as 'reversion' is best understood as 'the return to *pure Muhammadan Islam*', which has been a constant theme of various Islamic authorities of Iran. The latter definition, as a concept of progressive social and political change, seems to have been adopted under the influence of both Western and Eastern revolutionary historiography, particularly analysis of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia. This corresponds with the idea that the term 'revolution' had been 'neither sought nor discussed by most Iranian reformers' (Milani 1994: 8) until the 1920s, because monarchy had been viewed as a religiously authoritative institution.

According to this view, even the Constitutional Movement of 1905-1911 was never called a 'revolution' by the reformers themselves, but it was described as such by Iranian historians years later. Regardless of its controversial name¹, whether it deserves to be called 'revolution' or not, it was a social and cultural movement, apart from its political aspects, in which Islamic ideology played an important role and which had marked similarities with the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Secondly, there are many different ways of understanding 'ideology', but for present purposes a very general definition will be adequate. The term will be taken to mean 'any system of ideas underlying and informing social and political action' (Jary 1991: 295). This sense of the term differentiates it from that which underlies the Marxist theory of ideology, which is connected to ideas in relation to social classes. In other words, 'ideology' in the current work means the translation of ideas into action.

The following analysis of four episodes leading to the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 will take no account of the fact that the significance attributed by different scholars to these episodes reflects the scholars' ideological sympathies. The aim here is simply to indicate the events and situations which, according to scholars of widely differing ideological sympathies, helped to lay the foundations, positively and negatively, for the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

The Tobacco Regie

The Tobacco Regie episode (1890-1892) was the first major occasion on which Islamic ideology demonstrated its unique power against both a Qajar king and a Western company. For the first time, people experienced success in reversing a Shah's decision by turning to the clergy (*ulama*) and Islamic ideology. It was also a manifestation of unity between the clergy, the guilds (*asnaf*) and merchants against the Great Powers and the Qajar kings. The rebellion started when the people who were involved in tobacco production protested against the concession of 1890, according to which a British company had been offered the monopoly of the production, distribution, sale, and export of tobacco at a very cheap price by Naser ad-Din Shah. A Grand Ayatollah, Haj Hassan Shirazi, encouraged by Seyyed Jamal ad-Din Asadabadi and the merchants, issued a letter (*fatva*) 'enjoining on the people the complete abandonment of tobacco until the Concession should be repealed' (Browne 1966: 52). Therefore, the Shah cancelled the treaty in 1892 and had to pay a penalty of £500,000 to the British company. Although it is hardly possible to interpret such a rebellion as an ideological uprising against foreign powers and autocratic kings, the episode demonstrated the power of Islamic ideology to unite the concerned groups in

their pursuit of desirable objectives. In fact the episode neither reduced the influence of Russia and Britain over the country nor caused considerable subsequent change in the Shah's autocracy. Four years later, Naser ad-Din Shah was shot dead by a member of the clergy, Mirza Mohammad Riza of Kirman, who was one of the followers of Seyyed Jamal ad-Din Asadabadi.

At this time, there was also a small group of secular reformers who had some familiarity with Western modernisation and who wished to repeat the same process in their own country. Among them were Persian diplomats in the embassies abroad; some graduates of Dar al-Fonun, the first modern school in the country; some leading bureaucrats and a few Western-educated graduates. The idea of creating a written code of law and of modernising Persia from the *top*, copying Western styles, had brought them together (Milani 1994: 27). Utilising the experience of success acquired in the Tobacco Regie episode, in which the clergy and the merchants or guilds (*asnaf*) had been allies in attempts to have the concession annulled, they accepted an alliance with the clergy, who had connections with all segments of the people, in a scheme to modernise Iran in the Western style. This provided an appropriate background for the subsequent appearance of a stronger movement, i.e. the Constitutional Revolution.

The Constitutional Revolution

The Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) was a reaction to the disastrous events that had happened in the late nineteenth century, and expressed the dissatisfactions of reformers who wanted to discontinue the lawlessness, foreign domination and economic failure of the king Mozaffaru'd-Din Shah's autocracy, by creating a written

constitution and a national consultative assembly. The reformist group consisted of secular reformers, who presented ideological direction; the merchants and guilds, who supported the urban movement financially; and the clergy, who provided legitimacy for the uprising.

The revolution began in late 1905, when two sugar merchants were thrashed after being accused of financial corruption by the governor of Tehran, Aynu'd-Dawleh. This event led to demonstrations by the merchants and the people around them, and the death of several people, including clergymen. The Constitutional movement was strengthened when the merchants' objections were supported by the clergy, who were intolerant of a foreign Christian² managing an Islamic country's customs affairs, especially when a photograph appeared showing him dressed as a member of the clergy (Browne 1966: 112)³.

All these events created resentment in a large number of clergy and merchants. They took sanctuary (*bast*) in a holy shrine and insisted on the dismissal of Aynu'd-Dawla; the creation of a house of justice (*adalat-khaneh* or *majlis-i ma'dilat*), and the invitation of the clerical leaders from Qom. Although agreeing to the first and the last demands, the Shah failed to deal with the establishment of a house of justice, the functions of which were never clearly explained. But the angry people, mistrustful of the state, now asked Mozaffaru'd-Din Shah to draft a constitution and establish a national consultative assembly, Majles. These demands were finally accepted by him in 1906. The term 'constitution', *mashrutiyyat*, was now heard for the first time by some reformists (Keddie & Amanat 1991: 202-4).

The Persian constitution was finally drafted on the model of the Belgian constitution, but with the stipulation of a 'clerical committee', five of whom enjoyed

the power of veto over all parliament's approvals which might be contrary to Islamic law (*shari'a*). Although the reformers agreed in the matter of investing real power in the *Majlis* and ministers rather than the king, the alliance between the secular reformers and the clergy became fragile when trying to draft the constitution. It failed to satisfy the conflicting ideas of the two groups. For instance, while it contained some of the pluralistic ideas of the secular reformers, it also included Article Two, which restricted peoples' sovereignty through the vetoing powers of the 'clerical committee'. However, neither of these contradictory reforms were considered by the later autocrat kings. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Revolution, in practice, resulted in an almost wholly Western-style secular constitution and government. By contrast, the Revolution of 1978-9 was a movement of a different kind which led to a constitution highly inspired by Islam. Moreover, the nature of the revolutionaries and the perceived enemies were ideologically different on the two occasions (see Keddie 1983).

The Constitutional Movement witnessed divisions not only between the clergy and the secular reformers, but also among the clergy themselves. The majority of the clergy approved of constitutionalism and the insertion of many Articles, including the approval of Shi'ism and the official state religion in Article one, yet a small group of the clergy disagreed with the constitution.

The issue of conflict among the clergy never really arose before the victory of the Revolution of 1978-9 -- and almost all the clergy supported the Islamic Revolution. Furthermore, the clergy leaders adopted *a new political ideology* in the Revolution of 1978-9, distinguishing it from all the previous movements including the Constitutional Revolution.

Finally, the existence of disagreements between the clergy themselves as well as those between clergy and the secular reformers and the lack of ideological compatibility between different groups of the alliance in general contributed to the weakness of the movement and, as a result, the re-appearance of despotism during the Constitutional Revolution. In 1908 the Parliament was bombarded on the order of Mohammad Ali Shah (Mozaffaru'd-Din Shah's successor), the press was silenced, and public gatherings were prohibited. It is particularly worth remembering that democracy was not universally popular among the masses.

In 1925 the Prime Minister, Reza Khan, put an end to the Qajar dynasty and established a Pahlavi one (1925-79), whose title was drawn from the language of the Pre-Islamic period, and also changed the name of country from Persia to Iran stressing Iran's Ari'yan origin. Iranian nationalism emphasising the expansiveness of pre-Islamic Persia became the ideological basis of the Pahlavis' action. Under the Pahlavi regime, Iran experienced accelerated modernisation, centralisation, and secularisation. Under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah (Reza Shah's son), the USA gradually replaced the UK and the Soviet Union as the main external influence on Iranian internal affairs.

Oil, nationalism, and a *coup d'état*

In the last years of the second world war and into the post-war period, American interests concerning Iranian oil resources and the old policy of 'negative equilibrium' of Iranian politicians strengthened the bases of American intervention in Iranian internal affairs. Accordingly, the USA sought to reduce British imperialism over Iran and enforce an 'open door' policy (Ghods 1989). The USA also maintained its

influence over Iran by several agreements on military and economic development programmes after 1947 (Keddie 1981: 122-132).

Similarly, Britain was interested in keeping its concerns in Iranian oil resources from both the Americans and the Russians. The British attempted to allow neither country to make any oil concession with Iran, through supporting the very conservative agenda of Seyyed Zia's National Will Party. At the same time the Soviet Union, being rather indifferent about the conflict between the United States and Britain over Iranian oil, was also bidding for an oil concession in the North of Iran. But the Russian request was initially declined by the Iranian state of that time. In fact, the political situation was so unstable in Tehran that several governments fell in quick succession until 1951, when Dr M Musaddiq became prime minister. Such instability in the capital had encouraged riots in different parts of Iran, mainly in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, and also Khorasan, Khuzistan, Fars and elsewhere (see Fawcett 1992; Keddie 1981: 119-121; and Ghods 1989: 138-178). Stability was further affected because post-war Iran faced new and different social and economic conditions from those of the War period. A group of people who had profited from the War and accumulated money now became interested in investing in private industry as a new middle class after the War. Some of them, as well as parts of the bazaar middle classes, favoured a nationalist bourgeoisie in order to decrease foreign influence and obtain political and economic independence to control the Iranian economy.

Yet there were some other bazaar groups, the lower-middle-class, who, although having benefited from the war economy to some extent, lacked enough capital to invest in productive industry. The lower-middle-class became a very

powerful group when it was allied to the religious class, which had already been alienated by Reza Shah's despotism and his anti-clerical policies. Taking advantage of the new opportunity, the clergy wanted to re-express their Islamic concerns and regain at least some of their previous status. Some clergy demanded Islamic law in more areas. They also criticised the control and influence imposed by foreigners over the country. The majority of clergy, however, including the Grand Ayatollah Husain Borujerdi, were not interested in being involved with politics.

Moreover, the Iranian students and young intellectuals, who had suffered from restrictions on developing their talents and gaining proper employment, identified their problems with the masses. Industrial workers were another discontented group. Although they were a small group, their importance grew during the post-war period when they formed several trade unions, the majority of which were led by the *Tudeh* party. They sought social reform and joined many strikes, the most important of which was the strike of 1951 by the oil workers against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

However, there were some groups who were satisfied with the status quo. These were mainly the top bureaucrats, large landlords, some traders and even some people from the middle classes who enjoyed benefits from foreign relations or the underdeveloped distribution system, or through patronage from the high-ranking officers in the army, and so forth (Keddie 1981: 119-132).

Consequently, growing social and economic troubles appeared alongside the dispute about foreign influence and control during the second half of the 1940s. This led to the formation of many active political organisations with different ideologies: Marxism, nationalism and Islamism, but the issue of the AIOC was so important that

all social groups, even the landlord-dominated parliament, were preoccupied by it. Despite the increasing price and profits made from oil, the AIOC had reduced the fixed payment, which had been agreed in the concession of 1933 between AIOC and Iran (Keddie 1981: 133).

It is clear that the AIOC was considered as an instrument of British control and influence over Iran in terms of its economy and politics. This inflamed Iranian nationalist and radical sentiments.

After the parliamentary election in 1950, which focused on the oil issue, a coalition of groups from different ideologies of Marxists, pan-Iranists, and pan-Islamists, led by the nationalist party of the National Front, favoured the idea of the nationalisation of oil. Thus, Dr M Musaddiq and his party gained great popularity in the country. Finally, under a lot of pressure from the parliament, the Shah selected Musaddiq as the Prime Minister in April 1951. In brief, the oil industry was nationalised and the National Iranian Oil Company replaced the AIOC during Musaddiq's twenty-eight-month rule (until August 1953). Forcing the Shah to reign instead of rule, Dr Musaddiq asked him and the administration to follow the constitution. Thus, democracy became remarkably developed in his short period of rule, and different political organisations became much more active. But his government was confronted by many social, political and economic difficulties from both inside and outside Iran.

This became more obvious in the election for the Seventeenth Majlis which convinced the premier that the survival of his government depended on gaining control of the military forces (Ghods 1989: 185-6). When Musaddiq's application for controlling the Ministry of War was refused by the Shah on July 1952, he submitted

his resignation to the Shah, and Ahmad Qavam became the Prime Minister. But his five-day government faced a *fatva* issued by the Ayatollah Kashani, which made Iranian Muslims suspicious of the army, so Musaddiq replaced Qavam with a new cabinet.

Musaddiq's problems increased from August 1952 onwards, when the relationship between Iran and Britain ended. Domestically, he confronted the difficulties of: internal splits within the National Front; the problematic role of the *Tudeh* Party; economic difficulties imposed by the Western powers through sanctions and an oil boycott (see Homa Katouzian 1988: 57 and Millani 1994: 40). In foreign matters, the US not only refused the financial aid demanded by Dr Musaddiq but also intervened directly and covertly to weaken his government. Finally, Musaddiq's government collapsed, and the Shah returned to power on August 19, 1953. Thus democracy was buried once more, and the parties involved in this matter were left with permanent shame.

The years between late 1953 and 1960 were those in which most opposition groups went underground in reaction to persecution and arrests. Also, in foreign policy, Musaddiq's insistence on, and his subsequent failure in getting, financial aid from the US ironically intensified the desire of post-Musaddiq governments, under the Shah's rule, for two things. The first was to rely as much as possible on foreign debts and direct finances from the US; the second was to settle the issue of oil controversies to the benefit of backers of the coup in order to promote economic development.

With regard to the oil dispute, the American oil companies enjoyed the same share as BP (as the AIOC was renamed) in the agreed consortium of August, 1954 (Keddie 1981: 147). Thus the bases of a long-term dependence on the West,

particularly the US, were established in this period. As a result, the country suffered from both economic and political instability in the late 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand, political groups asked for free elections for the Parliament which were scheduled to take place in January 1961. On the other hand, inflation and corruption increased because an economic boom had led to popular discontent. The Prime Minister, Sharif-Emami, who was to be re-appointed to this post in the crisis of 1978, admitted the bad economic situation of Iran and announced a serious stabilisation programme, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But these policies not only failed to reduce the problems; they also caused bankruptcy among merchants and led to more discontent among the popular and middle classes who drew support from their old allies, the clergy.

The relaxed relationship between the Shah and the clergy between 1953 and 1960 had already been damaged by a land reform bill which was introduced in the late 1950s. However, the Shah had postponed its enactment due to Ayatollah Borujerdi's protest, who, until his death in March 1961, had interpreted it as an infringement of the Islamic right of land-ownership (Milani 1994: 48). Other factors may also have intensified tensions between the nation and clergy, on the one hand, and the Shah, on the other. For instance, the long-term depression caused by the coup of 1953, and the dissatisfaction with the Shah felt by those clergy who had already suffered from the conciliatory relationship of Ayatollah Borujerdi with the Shah, paved the way for growing tension between the government and the nation, particularly the clergy.

It was out of opposition to the land reform programme and the Local Elections Bill that Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as a very 'radical' political actor. As a result, the famous uprising of 5th June 1963 came about.

The Significance of the Uprising of 1963

Because the demonstration of 5th June 1963 played a significant role in the creation of the revolution of 1979, in the eyes of both insiders and outsiders, it would be worth attempting to present a detailed report about the contents of, and the reasons for, the demonstrations in 1962-63. However, I agree with writers like Keddie (1981: 290) and Tabari (1983: 66) that there is such ambiguity and 'confusion' that 'more research is needed' in this regard.

Nevertheless, writers have generally talked about four issues regarding the ideology of these demonstrations: land reform; the election bill of 1962; the referendum of January 1963; and the Shah's "capitulation" to the US. But there are disagreements between such analysts about each of the above-mentioned issues in terms of the details of the events, particularly how much of a role Ayatollah Khomeini played (beside his colleagues) and why he did so, in all demonstrations except the last one. However, all the writers agree that the demonstrations were the results of the tensions between the clergy and the state which appeared in the early 1960s. Moreover, while some writers seek to discover the religious origins of the demonstrations and try to analyse the clergy's opposition in the light of religion, others look for the demonstrations' political causes.

1. Land reform

Despite the paucity of views concerning the issue of land reform, the majority of writers, as far as I know, believe that it had not been a matter of great tension between Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shah. This is because the first problematic tension

between the Ayatollah and the government appeared in 1962, after the approval of new laws governing elections to local and provincial councils on 7th October, while the land reform programme had already been announced by the Amini government in 1961.

The land reform bill had already been designed and introduced, originally by Arsanjani, the Amini-appointed radical minister of agriculture, in 1959. But due to Ayatollah Borujerdi's protest against it in 1960, which was clearly stated through a letter to a member of parliament, Ja'far Behbehani, it had been postponed until after 1961, when the Ayatollah died. It should be noted that the original land reform bill, designed by Arsanjani, had some differences with the land reform bill subsequently approved by the land-lord dominated parliament and introduced by the Shah, now not as the 'land reform' programme but, as the 'White Revolution' in which he called for a national referendum in early 1963. Denying the involvement of Ayatollah Khomeini in the clergy's opposition to the land reform programme, Azar Tabari (1983: 66) remarks:

'One common misconception has been that Khomeini's opposition to the Shah was an outgrowth of resistance to agrarian reforms which were seen to threaten *'vaqf'* [charity] lands as well as landowner kinsmen of the clergy. Although several Ayatollahs opposed land reform, in relation to Khomeini, this oft-repeated claim has little or no factual basis. . . . The first demonstrations and petitions of Khomeini and his followers . . . only began in October 1962, and were directed, not against the agrarian reform (already in progress for over nine months), but against the new local election bill that the Cabinet had

passed on 7 October 1962. . Several ulama agitated against the 1962 reform, but Khomeini did not come out against the land-distribution programmes.'

The absence of involvement by Ayatollah Khomeini is also emphasised by Ervand Abrahamian (1993: 10): 'Khomeini's attack . . . focused not on land distribution, the reform's central piece, but One prominent cleric has recently revealed that in the discussions preceding these protests, Khomeini insisted that the clergy stay clear of land reform on the grounds that if they denounced it the Shah would be able to label them pro-landlord mullahs.' Other writers like Nikki Keddie (1981: 157-8), Shahrough Akhavi (1980: 95), Mohsen M. Milani (1994: 49), M. Reza Ghods (1989: 194) either deny explicitly or implicitly his opposition to land distribution or mention generally "the clergy's opposition" without expressing Ayatollah Khomeini's name as a focus of opposition.

Regardless of Ayatollah Khomeini's possible involvement in the matter, the ideology behind the clergy's opposition to land reform developed mainly on the basis of two issues: firstly, its probable impact on the *vaqf* lands controlled in some way by the clergy; secondly, the holiness of private ownership according to Islam. Although some writers consider the former as the most material threat against the clergy, land reform law did not necessarily mean an instrument to deprive the wealthy clergy of their own lands. However, this might have happened in some specific cases in the country, because the income obtained through the *vaqf* lands was mainly spent on meeting various religious needs: religious schools (*madrassahs*); religious teachers (the clergy) and students' (*tollab*) stipends; professional benefits; pensions; mosques; religious ceremonies and so forth (see Akhavi 1980: 95).

The inclusion of all the *vaqf* lands in the land distribution law would have led to the clergy's serious confrontation with economic hardships and, as a result, the reduction of their influence and status in the country, especially in rural areas. Unfortunately there is no detailed information available about the extent to which *vaqf* lands were under the clergy's administration at that time, although S. Akhavi (1980: 96-7) tries to give some data about the major landholders in the Isfahan area (in which the clergy had considerable priority over other classes) in 1946. The confiscation of some *vaqf* lands in the early stages of the land reform programme certainly injured the clergy and caused their resentment against the state to increase further.

2. Electoral reform

The issue of approving new laws for elections to local and provincial councils on 7 October 1962 is the issue on which commentators, as far as I know, agree that Ayatollah Khomeini attracted the attention of the population for the first time -- due to the widespread objection against such a bill. However, the ideology of such opposition by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers is not a matter of agreement between analysts. As parliament had already been dissolved by the Shah during the approval time of the bill by Alam's cabinet, the bill had raised complexities and confusion concerning whether Ayatollah Khomeini really opposed the enfranchisement of women, promised by the law inherently and religiously, but later changed his view during the revolution of 1978-79; or whether he always distrusted the government's real intention of offering voting rights to women and, therefore, did not consider it to be fundamentally a matter hostile to religion.

Some analysts have favoured the former, explicitly or implicitly, (for example: Tabari 1983: 66-7; Abrahamian 1993: 10; and to some extents Milani 1994: 49; and Akhavi 1980: 101). According to Tabari's and Milani's accounts, apart from the issue of women's suffrage in the related bill, there was another one which had resulted in the resentment of clergy, including that of Ayatollah Khomeini: the replacement of the term 'my holy book' instead of 'Qur'an' in swearing ceremonies. This, in fact, would lead to the recognition that other religions possessed holy books. This has not been discussed and argued frequently by such writers. It seems that the issue of women's rights has been more significant in discussions than the replacement of this term.

In Tabari's (1983: 66-7) view, the issues of the local election bill in general, and that of women in particular, were linked more easily to the defence of Islam for the clergy than the programme of land reform. This is because the former was based on populist interests unlike the latter, which might be considered to be pervaded with religious class interests. For this reason, in Tabari's view, 'the clergy reacted with great sharpness against proposals concerning women's rights and suffrage', rather than the land distribution issue. Attributed to the clergy, probably Ayatollah Khomeini, she claimed: "women's participation in social affairs is prohibited and must be prevented, since such participation involves many forbidden [*haram*] and corrupting interactions". According to this view, the issue of the local election bill was purely religious for the clergy, considering its anti-Islamic contents, and it faced total defeat under the pressure exerted by the clergy. But the struggle against the state never ended.

There are also writers who study the contents of the bill apart from the major points which were in vogue inside and outside the country (for example: Keddie 1981: 157-8; Algar 1988: 282; and Ghods 1989: 193). For Hamid Algar, 'the issue [the local election bill] was trivial in itself, but it provided the point of departure for a movement against the Pahlavi state that, moving through a series of finely calibrated stages, attained its triumph in February 1979.' Moreover, Nikki Keddie believes that the clergy's opposition, like that of other political groups, was formed under the economic and political crisis which had led to open opposition to both the Shah's autocracy and his backer, the West:

'As on many questions in many periods, it is wrong to characterise the outlook of the ulama leadership at this time either as purely "reactionary", as did the regime and most of the foreign press, or as "progressive", as did some Iranian students abroad.' (Keddie 1981: 157-8)

In the eyes of Nikki Keddie, issues such as the role of the United States and Israel, and the removal of the Shah (as an American puppet), not that of the Constitutional regime, were much more important for Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers than those of women's rights, land reform etc. For Keddie, it is interesting that even during the violent attack of the Shah's army on his religious school (*Feiziye*) on 3 June 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini introduced 'himself as a defender of the (monarchical) constitution: "the constitution has been bought with the blood of our fathers, and we will not permit it to be violated."' (Keddie 1981: 158)

For Ghods, the issue of women's voting rights under the autocratic rule of the Shah is meaningless: 'the former move [the vote for women] was purely symbolic,

since in Iran it was rare for anybody to participate in an honest election.’ This is also implied by Mohsen M. Milani (1994: 49) when he attributes this view to the clergy: ‘In a country where men do not enjoy the freedom to elect their representatives, they [the clergy] insisted, the granting of suffrage to women was not more than a recipe for increasing corruption and decadence.’

3. The 1963 referendum

The third issue which has been discussed as a matter of tension between the clergy, directed by Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Shah was the national referendum of January 1963 for the six-point reform programme of the Shah’s ‘White Revolution’, which was later called ‘The Shah-People Revolution’, with specific reference to the word ‘Shah’. It included land reform; women’s right to vote; the nationalisation of forests and pastures; sale of the state factories to finance the programme of land reform; workers’ profit-sharing plan; and the creation of a Literacy Corps, mainly for teaching in rural areas. Other points were added to it later.

Nearly all analysts who wrote about the issue of referendum believed that Ayatollah Khomeini and his colleagues did not oppose the government because of the contents of the six-point programme; rather, he opposed ‘the whole project’ and the referendum itself besides the other general political issues like the Shah’s autocracy, foreign control of certain economic and political issues and so forth (Abrahamian 1993: 10; Tabari 1983: 68-9; Milani 1994: 50; and Keddie 1981: 156). In the eyes of Akhavi (1980: 97-8), however, all of the above were ‘equally’ important as the contents of the six-point reform plan for Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates.

A referendum, in the clergy's view, was an improper reaction by the government to the clergy's demand for more influence in the state. They felt the government was trying to place an implicit restriction on the clergy's attempts to step outside their religious limits, through the referendum. This interpretation by the clergy was accompanied by the regime's insistence that this time, unlike with the local election bill, it would not withdraw from its position. Furthermore, the referendum, with its overwhelming tendency to favour the government, meant for the clergy that the regime was intending to strengthen its illegal bases by deceiving the 'naive people' and establishing public support for the Shah, and hurting the clergy's mass base as a result. Disappointed by its attempts to influence the government, the clergy decided upon face-to-face confrontation with the regime, and called for the people to boycott the referendum. According to Tabari and Milani, Ayatollah Khomeini questioned the illegal, illogical, and unconstitutional nature of such a referendum, on the one hand, and presented his 'own global alternative "Islamic" programme', on the other.

Yet the referendum was conducted, and support for Ayatollah Khomeini increased among the clergy, including the grand Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Golpayegani, in Qom. This led to continuous bloody clashes between religious students and the army until June 3, 1963, the day of *Ashura* (the martyrdom anniversary of the third Imam, Husain), when Ayatollah Khomeini announced war against the person of the Shah in his speech, and asked the army to join him. Milani (1994: 50) reports his speech:

'Let me give you some advice, Mr. Shah! Dear Mr. Shah... Maybe those people [advisors and the government in power] want to present

you as a Jew so that I will denounce you as an unbeliever and they can expel you from Iran and put an end to you! Don't you know that if one day some uproar occurs and that tables are turned, none of these people around you will be your friends. They are friends of the dollars; they have no religion, no loyalty.'

His open attack on the person of the Shah led to the Ayatollah's arrest, which was followed by anti-state riots and demonstrations in some main cities, including Tehran, for a week. The demonstration in Tehran was important because students from the University of Tehran (the National Front branch), alongside the National Front and bazaar, joined the protest for the first time. Under the command of a new general in Tehran, Ne'matollah Nassiri - who was later executed by the revolutionaries in the early days of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 - many people were killed and injured in Tehran, and in other major cities. Unfortunately, there are no exact records of the people who were killed and injured in these demonstrations. While the officials estimated the number of dead at 20 and injuries at 1000, the opposition put the numbers in thousands. But Milani (1994: 51-3) provides information about the occupational backgrounds of five hundred and eighty-eight and about the average age of two hundred and forty-four individuals who had been injured or arrested by the regime, which illustrates similarities between the uprising of June, 1963 and the revolution of 1977-79.

In attempts to exculpate itself, the government labelled the clergy as 'black reactionaries' who favoured the landlords and wished to reverse the country's progress through their opposition to the progressive ideas of the White Revolution. It also accused Ayatollah Khomeini of having some connections with the President of

Egypt, Jamal Abdo'l Naser. Ironically, this increased his popularity in society. Following the protest of influential clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini left jail after six weeks, but without having permission to come back to Qom, so he stayed in Tehran under house arrest. Following a change in government from Asadollah Alam to Hassan Ali Mansur, the new Prime Minister allowed the Ayatollah to return to Qom hoping to improve the relationship with the clergy.

Ayatollah Khomeini, as a highly popular grand Ayatollah, enjoyed a very warm welcome in Qom in January 1964. After his arrival in Qom, his associates sent a ten-point proposal to the government. Due to the significance of these points in Iran today, I would like to quote here a part of the proposal which has been mentioned by Milani (1994: 51-2) in order to show how similar post-1979 Iran was to the uprising of 1963-4:

‘Among other things, it included a demand for the implementation of the 1906 Constitution, especially Article 2 of the Supplementary Laws, which gave the ulama veto power over Majles legislation. It called for annulling all un-Islamic decrees, ending the influence of colonialism and Zionism in Iran, cleansing television and radio programmes of corrupt content, and preventing production and consumption of alcoholic beverages.’

It can be seen that the proposal contains issues which also became important after the revolution of 1979.

4. *Relations with the USA*

The fourth issue, which finally led to the fifteen-year exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, was his protest against Mansur's proposal, which included two bills. The first contained the government's request for granting diplomatic immunity (capitulatory rights) to American advisors and military personnel. The second included the government's demand for a loan of \$200 million from the US in order to buy military equipment. The proposal was approved by parliament in October 1964. This was publicly denounced by Ayatollah Khomeini who considered it a sign of bondage to the USA. He was subsequently exiled to Turkey in 1964, went to *Najaf* in Iraq in 1965 and stayed there until 1978.

As can be seen, apart from the land reform issue, it was Ayatollah Khomeini, among the other grand Ayatollahs, who was most strongly involved in radical political affairs. But the reactions of other clergy can be classified into four types, according to Akhavi (1980: 100-3).

First, the 'radical' clergy were led mainly by Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, and Ayatollah Mahallati Shirazi, Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani, Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmud Taliqani of Tehran, and, probably, Hojjato'l-Islam Hossein Ali Montazeri of Qom.

Second, the 'social reformers' were more involved in educational and social issues in the religious institutions than in open political activities. This group, according to Akhavi, was directed by Ayatollah Mortaza Motahhari, the chief ideologue of the Islamic revolution who was assassinated by the Forqan in April 1979. Other members of this group included Ayatollah Dr Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad Ibrahim Ayati and Dr Ali Shariati.

Third, the 'conservative' clergy, who were mainly aligned with the grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, enjoyed the highest authority through having specific and extensive relations with the preachers, *voa'az*, throughout the country, and accommodation with the grand Ayatollahs (*marja'-e Taqlid*), who had been nominated as successors of Ayatollah Borujerdi in Iran after his death.

The final group, as classified by Akhavi, was the clergy who were interested in co-operating with the Court. In his view, this group included the Imam Jum'ah of Tehran, Ayatollah Mahdavi, Allameh Vahidi, Mohammad Taqi Qomi, director of the Daro'l Taqrib in Cairo, Abbas Mohajerani, an officer in the Endowments Department, and possibly Mohammad Reza Behbehani.

The uprising of 1963 and the invaluable lessons which the clergy learned through their defeat, on the one hand, and the 'White Revolution' and its harmful effects on society in the following years, on the other, can best be seen as seeds sown in this period, which came to fruition in 1978-79. Disappointed with the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the regime, the opposition in general - and the radical clergy in particular - considered utilising the experiences acquired during the 1963 events. Some of them even considered resorting to an armed challenge to the Shah. Moreover, the uprising of 1963, during which the military forces and police had violently attacked the clergy and the religious school of *Faiziyeh* and after which Ayatollah Khomeini subsequently declared war (*jihad*) against the Shah, automatically politicised the clerical generation of that time. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini's exile left a legacy in most of the religious schools throughout the country, especially Qom, which were in direct contact with the masses through the mosques.

In addition, their defeat and the Ayatollah's exile created further co-operation among the clergy and especially among his own students.

Furthermore, the formation of new Islamic organisations, mostly underground ones, was another outcome of the uprising. One of them was the United Islamic Societies -- a conglomeration of three small Islamic groups based on Ayatollah Khomeini's order. Islamic Societies were also formed in some institutions, inside and even outside of Iran.

The clearest and most important result of the demonstrations of 1963 was the identification by the nation of Ayatollah Khomeini as a powerful and unique religio-political leader. His ideals were so comprehensive by this time that they enabled him to gather people from different backgrounds of class, education, occupation, and so on around himself. Each group found some common themes with him. For example, his themes of anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism; anti-Zionism; anti-totalitarianism; his emphasis on considering the nation's prestige and interests, and, more significantly, his stress on Islam were interesting respectively for leftists, Islamists, liberals, intellectuals, nationalists, and the masses. In this way he created strong bases among different groups of the society, to such an extent that even the secularists and intellectuals - those who had little belief and practice in Islam - respected him.

The Shah, for his part, had little to show to the nation's millions, in the way of material fruits of his 'White Revolution' in the post-1963 era. The programme of land reform led the country to succumb to the despotism of the sole, but highly powerful, master, by the removal of landlords as intermediaries between the peasants and the government. Their removal, in fact, undercut the absolute authority of landlords to the benefit of the central government. The way to this was paved through the creation

of various institutions in rural areas, such as the Literacy Corps; the Development Corps; the Health Corps; the Village Society (*Anjoman-e Deh*); and the House of Justice (*Khaneh-ye Ensaf*).

Moreover, the land distribution programme which culminated in the elimination of landlords led to the creation of a new and large class of petty-landowners. About 90% of the sharecroppers, the number of whom was estimated at more than 2.1 million in 1961, owned the lands on which they worked as sharecroppers during the first decade after the land distribution programme (Milani 1994: 47). Taking into account the members of their families, it can be appreciated what a huge percentage of the population this new class formed in the early 1970s.

Yet, although the peasants, as the new land owners, had acquired land, they lacked other necessary support to manage it. This led to a dramatic decline in agricultural products, and, as a result, further dependence of Iran on the West in order to meet import needs. It also created instability in both rural and urban communities as a result of the migration of peasants to the cities.

Disappointed peasants now had no choice other than migration to the cities, in which they sought to work in industries and other urban projects. But the industrial labour market, construction projects, and the urban employment market in general were too slow to keep pace with the shift. Vast slums (*halabi-abad ha*) were appearing increasingly rapidly around the cities, especially Tehran (South), the population of which increased from one to five million between the land distribution programme and the revolution of 1979 (Tabari 1983: 70). The gap between rich and poor was also dramatically increasing in the urban areas, particularly in 1975-77,

during which period the country suffered from thirty per cent inflation and unemployment among one million people.

Mosques were perhaps the only popular social organisations in the cities to bring the uprooted, discontented, and dispossessed peasants together. They were in fact attracted by the clergy who fostered acrimony against the regime, for the reasons mentioned previously. The religious themes of Islamic justice, the obligation on the rich to help the poor, and the generosity of voluntary redistributions of wealth impelled the huge class of urban paupers to seek their salvation in Islam. The creation of private, small 'Islamic Banks' in some cities by the traditional petty bourgeoisie, for the purpose of helping the very poor in the Islamic tradition in the form of loans without interest, as well as 'Islamic co-operative shops' -- in which the clergy became increasingly involved -- encouraged the urban poor to think of Islam as a possible way to a desirable future.

The traditional urban petty bourgeoisie were also unhappy with the situation. A huge segment of this class resented the damage which they had suffered from the increasing centralisation of distribution and the regime's support of capitalism and mass-produced consumer goods. Therefore, the worse their situation became, the more they thought of acting against global capitalism and both its foreign and domestic associates.

Furthermore, the Shah's policies, like those of his father, had culminated in the continual enlargement of a new non-manual middle class. Although the new petty bourgeoisie, which included the low-ranking officials of various bureaucratic positions, enjoyed prosperity to some extent (according to some writers), the regime failed to establish proper political institutions through which they could manage their

desired political activities. All these desperate strata of the urban populace, in fact, provided the main support for the formation of the Islamic Republic in the late 1970s.

Conclusion

One of the key points to have emerged from the above analysis is that, although the clergy played a crucial role in many of the incidents and upheavals prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, their contribution was mainly towards voicing and amplifying popular discontent rather than causing or fomenting it in the first place. To borrow a Weberian image, the clergy served as 'vehicles' of ideas and sentiments critical of government policies. By framing their criticisms in religious terms the Iranian clergy were able to give a relatively coherent focus to feelings of frustration, tension and dissent, the impact of which might otherwise have been reduced by the differences and rivalry between political factions. In the years following 1979 Islamic ideology emerged as the guiding thread of official policies for all areas of life and was particularly salient in the field of education.

Another central point of this Chapter concerns the capacity of the Iranian clergy to frame their ideological discourse in such a way that it made a favourable impression on people in widely differing circumstances. Of course, there was opposition to clerical ideas in some sections of Iranian society, especially among Western-oriented intellectuals and left-wing political groups; but the grievances felt by people in different regions, age categories, occupational groups and social classes seemed eventually to find an echo in clerical denunciations of successive governments and of the Shah's regime. It would be an exaggeration to claim that religion came to transcend all social differences, but the clergy's appeal to an overarching Islamic

framework of values and policies certainly helped to overcome many social divisions. The next Chapter will try to explain the ideological currents in Islamic ideology which facilitated popular support for the Revolution.

ENDNOTES

¹ Against some views, like Milani's, which reject the application of '*revolution*' to the social movement of 1906-1911, there are other views which favour the application (see Keddie, N. 1988. p. 298).

² A Belgian, whose name was Naus, had already been appointed as the Minister of the Customs Administration by the shah to improve the state revenues. (see Brown 1966)

³ There is a similarity between the Constitutional and the Islamic Revolutions in this regard, since the Islamic Revolution nearly began in early 1978 when a newspaper *Ettelaat* (January 7, 1978) printed an article in which Ayatollah Khomeini was attacked as an agent of colonialism and a traitor.

Chapter Three

THEORIES OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS

‘Given the continued growth of government power, and the expansion of the army, the bureaucracy, and of secular education, even in the villages, it appears probable that the political power of the *ulama* will continue to *decline* as it has in the past half century. Although leaders of the *ulama* in Iran retain more independent influence on political questions than those in most other Muslim countries, they now appear at most able to modify or delay certain government policies and not strongly to influence their basic thrust and direction. Despite the *ulama*’s economic and social conservatism, however, the issues they raise continue to strike a responsive chord among many Iranians.’

(Keddie 1972: 229)

This is a prediction of Iran’s future made in 1972 by the scholar Nikki R. Keddie, who did a great deal of work on both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. Therefore, it is not surprising that she was ‘shocked’ by the Iranian Islamic Revolution ‘and set in motion a search for [its] causes’ later (Keddie 1983: 579).

In the late 1970s the world witnessed rapid and violent social change in a country which was not accustomed to such upheavals. The events and their outcome became known as ‘the Islamic Revolution of Iran’. Social scientists, both outsiders and insiders, were surprised by the revolution: its Islamic identity, opposed to having

had a long experience of secularism; complete public agreement on the abdication of the Shah from power, in spite of the existence of many ethnic, religious, and cultural discrepancies among the nation; the country's characterisation as 'an island of peace' mobilised to a very advanced military standard; and the rapidity of its process with which the revolution unfolded -- all these factors made the revolution surprising and unpredicted. The number of works written about the features of this revolutionary upheaval is large, and it is not necessary to replay the events of 1979-80 here (but see Keddie 1981, 1983, and 1988; Abrahamian 1982 and 1988; Akhavi 1980; Arjomand 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1988; Dabashi 1993; Ghods 1989; Milani 1994; Moaddel 1993; Parsa 1989; Rahnema 1990; and Tabari 1983). However, most of the published accounts of the Iranian revolution are strictly political interpretations of the affair. Relatively few accounts deal with its ideological aspects. The aim of this Chapter is therefore to remedy these two shortcomings, by summarising some of the factors which led to such a revolutionary upheaval and then by analysing the role of the Islamic ideology advocated by supporters of the revolution.

The Iranian Revolution can be viewed from at least four theoretical perspectives, each emphasising one main factor: individuals; organisations; social classes; and ideology as episodic discourse. Although most of the existing theories overlap to some extent and have all paid attention to the four above-mentioned issues, to varying degrees they differ from each other in their identification of which of the four factors is a basis for the others. The following discussion of each perspective in turn is intended merely to indicate the range of theoretical ideas and their specific differences. In this sense, these theoretical perspectives provide part of the background understanding of social change in Iran against which later chapters will

highlight the significance of development in school-level education in a rural area of the country.

(i) Individuals

According to the individualistic interpretation of revolution, a social movement is originally a matter of individuals acting against some or all authorities because of problematic tensions resulting from too rapid structural change in a society. In this view revolution is initially subordinated to tensions created primarily in individuals. When the authorities are too weak to maintain social order, tensions are manifested beyond individual attitudes, in the guise of collective revolutionary behaviour. Tensions are caused by the collapse of social ties between individuals, due to the lack or loss of balance in the social system. Disorientated individuals result from the removal of intermediate connecting organisations between individuals and the political system, leading to the isolation of individuals and social groups. Alienation is caused by the great anger which growing expectations engender, and by disjunctions following excessively rapid modernisation which requires institutionalisation (Moaddel 1993: 3).

In the case of alternative ideologies, the discontented and disoriented individuals, each of whom bears one or more *grievances*, begin to react against their undesirable situation, because their mind is psychologically suggestible and they are prepared to act dangerously in the direction of mass movement. The term 'Convergence Theory' is sometimes used to characterise this type of explanation. The term implies that, in the face of a common stimulus or grievance, individuals choose to converge on the same kind of response. By resorting to the new value system,

tensions are released, solidarity is re-established and community is re-established. The new ideology proposes a new hierarchy of values and beliefs. The extent to which the new beliefs and values determine an individual's action depends on the degree of their internalisation by such an individual. Therefore, ideology, according to the individualistic theory of revolution, operates to unite the members of the community, specify the final aim and ratify social unanimity by proposing limits¹ to consciousness and action, hierarchical and generalised beliefs, and mental and cultural states resulting from past experiences or suppressed desires. In this view, then, ideology and action are correlated with each other in a very subjectivist and psychological way. Such a subjectivist perspective faces unresolved methodological problems, such as how mental conditions of individuals can be directly measured, or how ideology plays a role in shaping individuals' psychological conditions, and so forth.

Tilly's (1975: 487) concept of revolution in his paper of 'Revolution and Collective Violence' is mentioned as a core one for the individualistic theory. Other writers such as Algar (1969: 2), Savory (1979), Arjomand (1988: 4-5; 1984: 201-2), and Abrahamian (1982: 6) have also followed the individualistic model for interpretation of the Iranian Revolution's roots.

(ii) Organisation

By contrast, organisational theories of revolution question the validity of relating revolutionary ideology and collective behaviour to disoriented individuals alone. In fact, no collective action follows from the mere presence of an alternative ideology. However, resource mobilisation and potent organisation are needed to spread the

alternative ideology among interested audiences (dissatisfied individuals) and to co-ordinate them, without which no revolutionary movement would happen (see, for example, McCarthy & Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). Resource mobilisation requires the production of ideas and values and some publications, gathering the interested groups in specific places, stimulating their grievances, and the wide dissemination of values among the members of a community or society. All these are collective actions. Thus the success of a revolutionary movement is contingent on that of the collective attempts whereby interested groups or individuals co-ordinate their actions with each other, following common purposes. Communication between these groups and individuals often proceeds through *pre-existing* social networks.

Comparing the two theories with each other, the individualistic theory is interested in considering the significance of the state's action towards individuals and individuals' reaction to the state, whereas the organisational theory tends to look at the revolutionary movement from the perspective of political conflict. Moreover, while the psychological condition of the individual is considered as the proper location for developing a revolutionary ideology according to individualistic theorists, the development of alternative values (ideological change) is conceptualised in a special manner in which the new ideologues clarify how to respond to the question of the state, in the eyes of the organisational theorists.

Hegland (1987: 194-6), Oberschall (1973: 33), Tilly (1978), Fulbrook (1983: 16), Zaret (1985: 5), Wuthnow (1985), Stepan (1985: 338), and Neuhauser (1989) are all concerned with organisational aspects of social protest and upheavals. They all explain how organisation affects ideological shifts in revolutionary movements in different circumstances. Keddie (1972: 223) also draws on this theory implicitly in

her doctrine of Shi'ite institutional change from the *Akhbari* to the *Usuli* school in the late eighteenth century, but a more careful explanation of the Iranian Revolution that incorporates both individual and organisational analysis of revolution is presented by Tabari (1983).

(iii) Social class

Unlike the individualistic and organisational theories of revolution, class theories call for the significance of audiences. In fact, Marx's concept of revolution corresponds with the class theories. Revolution, for Marx, is a social conflict between the ruling class which controls the existing social order and the new class (the revolutionary class) which results from economic changes. Economic development and transformation in productive apparatus, therefore, cause increasing shifts in social relations of production and widen the division between proponents of the old and the new productive forces. Revolution is, in fact, the conflict between the two. During such a conflict, the ruling class, its related apparatus and its ideological superstructure are doomed, replaced by an alternative class which has revolutionary consciousness (Marx 1962: 363). There is widespread agreement among Marxists on this general point, but Marxist theories of class struggles are varied. Some expect revolution to follow automatically from class conflict; others make revolution conditional on the spread of class consciousness; and still others make revolution dependent on the activities of a 'vanguard party'.

For the explanation of the Iranian Revolution, Keddie (1983: 591) and, to some extent, Parsa (1989: 29-30) are concerned in some way with class theories of revolution -- particularly Keddie (1983: 591), who analyses both the Constitutional

Revolution of 1905-11 and the Islamic Revolution of 1977-79 in terms of Marx's conflict theory.

The class interpretation of revolution, like many other theories, is also a result of an interpreter's ideal type approach to research, as Weber claimed about Marx's theory of class conflict. This is particularly noticeable with Keddie, who presented various ideas on the explanation of the Iranian Revolution, in her many works on the topic. However, the impact of economic transformations in the last pre-Revolutionary decade on the revolution cannot be ignored.

(iv) Ideology

Under the influence of postmodernist thinking, Moaddel (1993) provides a fourth model for the interpretation of the Iranian Revolution, which he called 'Ideology as Episodic Discourse'. He thinks that to explain the roots of a revolution all the aforementioned theories, firstly, are involved in reductionism and, secondly, ignore the causal role of ideology independently of people's interests and values. In other words, according to Moaddel, such theories fail to transcend the mental functions of dissatisfied individuals, the dynamics of struggle in terms of organised disorientation or social class, and the restriction of seeing ideology as simply a prisoner of individuals' beliefs or works. Thirdly, such theories are allegedly unable to distinguish the two different and major aspects of each revolution: 'revolution as content' and 'revolution as mode'.

'Ideology', for Moaddel, 'operates through discursive practices inscribed in matrices of nondiscursive practices. Ideology is therefore conceptualised as a discourse, consisting of a set of general principles and concepts, symbols and rituals,

that human actors use in addressing the problems they face in a particular historical episode.’ (Moaddel 1993: 16) Inspired by the definition of ‘discourse’ made by Foucault (Sarup 1993: 32-89; Craib 1992: 177-196), Moaddel seeks the causes and processes of revolution in a set of theories and texts by which people form ‘their strategies of action’, explain their interests, raise specific questions while disregarding others, define a legal type of coalition, and seek intellectual bases for their actions. Determination of the nature of such a discourse must be sought in its specific historical context.

In his book entitled *Class, Politics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution*, Moaddel interprets the roots and consequences of the Iranian Revolution in terms of the interaction between these three factors, specifically in the post-1953 period. In this period, he believed, due to the disappearance of secular schools of thought like national-liberalism and communism, in addition to the political and economic policies exerted by the Shah, the revolutionary movement of 1977 to 79 with its *Shi’ite content* was formed. Yet, according to Moaddel, neither the economic problems nor the social dissatisfactions of the 1970s are able to explain the cause of the movement. But they can only be meaningful and effective in terms of *Shi’ite* revolutionary discourse. Moaddel denies that such discourse was originally part of the “political theory of pristine Shi’ism” and “institutional development of Shi’i ulama” beginning in the nineteenth century. He even rejects the argument that “the Shi’i ideology and religious institutions constituted *pre-existing* organisations that were utilised by the revolutionary actors”. But, he claims, ‘the ideology of Islamic opposition was *produced* by diverse intellectuals’ (1993: 24).

For present purposes, the value of Moaddel's theory lies less in its specific insistence on the autonomy of ideological rhetoric as a force in Iranian society and more in its capacity to bring out the diffuse importance of religious ideologies as one factor among others. Indeed, there has been no shortage of ideologies and ideologues in Iran in recent decades, most of them allied to radical versions of Islam. The following section will review the most significant contributions to these ideological positions. The remainder of the chapter will then identify the essence of three deep currents of ideology which fed into the 1979 revolution and have continued to flow out of it in modified forms. Their influence on educational policies and practices cannot be exaggerated.

The Sources of Revolutionary Ideology

Despite their differences, the existing theories of the Iranian Revolution confirm the significant role of Islamic ideology in both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. The ideology which was created, according to some theorists like Moaddel, and propagated among both new and old middle classes during mainly the last two decades of the Pahlavi regime, was employed in a specific form by the post-revolutionary governments. A number of ideologues played significant roles in forging this ideology: Jalal Ale-Ahmad, Dr. Ali Shariati, Morteza Motahhari, Seyyed Mahmud Taleqani, Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei, Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, and Ayatollah Khomeini.

In the eyes of most theorists (Moaddel 1993: 148; Dabashi 1993: 39-101; Milani 1994: 80; Abrahamian 1993: 23; Ghods 1989: 195; and Richard 1995: 82), the dawn of Islamic ideology begins with the rhetoric of Ale-Ahmad (1923-69).

Converted from Marxism, Ale-Ahmad rethought the reasons for Iran's underdevelopment and its domination by imperialism. He saw Islam as the most appropriate way to reach his goals in the Middle East. He wrote about forty-five works in his short life, three of which were of great significance in the presentation of Islamic ideology as a real saviour from imperialism: *Seh Maqaleh-ye Digar* (Three More Essays), *Gharb-zadegi* (Westoxication, or Plagued by the West) (1962), and *Dar Khedmat va Khianat-e Roushan-fekran* (Concerning the Service and Betrayal of the Intellectuals).

Shari'ati (1933-77), as an Islamic ideologue par excellence, starts wherever Ale-Ahmad leaves off, on most issues. This Sorbonne-educated intellectual was under the influence of Louis Massignon, Frantz Fanon, and Jean-Paul Sartre, as he himself notes. However, some great Shi'ite men like Ali, Husain, Abu Zarr Ghefari, Horr were counted as heroes by him (Keddie 1981: 215-7). In his numerous works, Shari'ati attempts to paint the "true" face of Islam which is different from the historically received one. His Islam challenges the imperialism and the cultural domination of the West; he even challenges Frantz Fanon's idea of religion and revolution. But, in Shari'ati's view, in order to challenge the West, the nations of the Third World must re-identify and re-think their own religious roots (Abrahamian 1988: 291). His conception of Shi'a is against *Zar* (wealth), *Zur* (force), and *Tazvir* (hypocrisy). His conception of religion also opposes *qasetin* (despotic rulers), *Mareqin* (the unconsciously religious- biased faithful), and *Nakethin* (intellectual traitors).

Against Shari'ati's refusal to consider Islamic philosophical issues as a proper means to confront irreligiosity, Morteza Motahhari (1920-79), as a chief ideologue in

this context, favoured Islamic philosophy as the most effective weapon. However, both of them tried hard to conceal this discrepancy. In Motahhari's view, the Islamic philosophical tradition was first among all sorts of knowledge to be dealt with amidst fast-propagating secularism. In fact, his various works were his philosophical attempts to react to secular issues during the pre-revolutionary period, among which there are: *Nezam-e Hoquq-e Zan dar Islam* (The Structure of Women's Rights in Islam) (1966-7), *khadamat-e Motaqabel-e Islam va Iran* (The Mutual Services of Islam and Iran) (1967), *Elal-e Gerayesh beh Maddi-gari: (beh Zamimeh-ye Materialism dar Iran* (Causes of Attraction to Materialism: Materialism in Iran) (1969). Such works contain strong attacks on the Iranian secular intellectuals. He had a very close relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini in the post-1963 period; indeed, the Ayatollah called him "his life's fruit" (*hasel-e omr*) following his assassination on the May 2nd, 1979. The anniversary of his assassination has been celebrated as "Teachers' Day" at schools every year since the revolution.

In addition to the rhetorical intimation and propagation of the Islamic ideology, which were accomplished by Ale-Ahmad and Dr Ali Shari'ati, and also its doctrinal legitimisation, which was established by Motahhari, the ideology then needed a Qur'anic justification. This was supplied by Ayatollah Taleqani (1910-79), who centralised the Qur'an in Islamic political discourse. The latter two functions attributed to the Islamic ideology were philosophically, textually (in terms of Qur'anic commentary), and gnostically completed by Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei (1903-81), a philosopher par excellence. However, this task was most likely performed unwittingly. Motahhari attended Tabatabaei's philosophy seminary in Qom, which was generally opposed by high legal authorities. Mainly through S. H.

Nasr and Dariush Shaygan, Tabatabaei also had significant discussions with Henri Corbin, the French Islamicist, which are said to have led to his apparent conversion to Shi'ism.

Mehdi Bazargan (1907-1995), a lay French-educated engineer, addressed mostly middle classes, merchants, and lower bureaucrats- unlike Shari'ati, who was an ideologue of young intellectuals. As an engineer and professor, Bazargan portrayed Islam as a complete religion which was compatible with scientific and technical progress. He, Ayatollah Taleqani and Dr Shari'ati were very close, especially in *Hosseyniyyeh-ye Ershad*, a religious institution in Tehran preferred by many religiously minded young intellectuals.

The significance of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini's (1902-89) discourse, in the appearance of the Islamic ideology, is so evident that some doubt whether the 'Islamic Revolution' could have happened without him. In his work *Kashfo'l Asrar* (Unveiling the Secrets), written in 1942, he attacked in part secularism and anti-clerical ideas mainly developed by Ahmad Kasravi, who was later assassinated by the radical group of *Fadaeian-e Islam* in 1946, and mostly the tyrannical conditions brought about by Reza Shah. Among his works the book entitled *Hokumat-e Islami* (Islamic Government), written in 1970 and now known as *Velayat-e Faqih* (Authority of the Jurist), played the most significant role in Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic ideological statement. In it he theoretically assumed a political guardianship for the clergy, without explicit or implicit identification of the clergyman who should personally take that position. However, his declarations and letters during the post-1963 period performed a probably more important role in terms

of the creation of the collective Shi'ite mind and action than the mere theory of *Velayat-e Faqih*.²

The theological, philosophical and political ideas that have just been reviewed are far from being the only sources of influence on Iranian education. It is clear that many ideas from other countries and cultures, for example, have also affected education in Iran. The important point here, though, is that the general orientation of schools has been subjected to highly distinctive forms of Islamic ideology since the early 1980s, some of which can trace their origins back to the thinkers discussed above. The main currents running through Islamic ideology in Iran include populism, nationalism and islamism. Each of them is a fairly inclusive category, so the purpose of the next section is not to examine them in minute detail but rather to establish their broad outlines, so that later discussions of school curricula and social practices can be related back to their influence. The three currents are merely distillations of the many ideas, sometimes contradictory, which have been in play for almost twenty years. Together, they serve as a framework which helps to make sense of otherwise confusing events and arguments. They have all been contested, but their direct and indirect effects on the policy and practice of education in Iran have rarely been in doubt. Later Chapters will examine these effects on Iranian education in greater detail.

Three Main Currents of Ideology

(a) Populism (*mardomi*)

In a broad context, populism is defined as 'support for the preferences of ordinary people' (McLean 1996: 392). In this view, 'a specific set of populist beliefs' is

identified and utilised in the 'defence of the (supposed) traditions of "the little man" against change seen as imposed by powerful outsiders, which might variously be governments, businesses, or trade unions. These beliefs are disproportionately prevalent among the *petite bourgeoisie*.' (McLean 1996: 392) Moreover, Peter Worsley (1993: 730) remarks:

'Populist movements claim to represent the people as a whole [*hameh ba ham*]: sometimes the entire nation, sometimes the majority of the people. Radical versions of populism that seek to represent and mobilise the poor or the underprivileged masses have therefore often begun as movements of protest and ended as parties.'

By populism, in other words, we mean here a movement in Iran through which the urban lower classes, in particular, are mobilised against a political regime, imperialism and foreign capitalism. To achieve this mobilisation, charismatic language, metaphor, and symbol, which exist potentially in the value system of the masses, are needed. In populist movements, 'ordinary people' are promised better living standards and the complete independence of their country from outsiders. Although the radical resentment rhetoric of the populist movement is targeted against capitalism and the upper classes, it actually supports the petty bourgeoisie and the doctrine of private property. Nevertheless, populist movements tend to stress the significance of political, national and cultural restoration rather than socio-economic restoration. Moreover, such movements resist ideologically elite and expert knowledge, and, in contrast, promote 'ordinary people'.³

There are various ideas about the origins of populism in Iran, but it seems that Ayatollah Khomeini lacked such ideas before the 1970s.⁴ Abrahamian assumes that

the infiltration of populism into Ayatollah Khomeini's views was probably influenced directly or indirectly by intellectuals like the ex-Tudeh Ale-Ahmad, who had already given his book *Gharbzadegi* (Westoxication) to Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf; Ali Shari'ati; and some political groups like the Confederation of Iranian Students in Exile - all of these intellectuals' ideas had been effectively under the influence of Marxism, particularly Maoism and Castroism, as Abrahamian (1993: 23) emphasised. For Abrahamian (1988: 295), Shari'ati was so much under the influence of populism that he distinguishes his Islam from the traditional and conservative clerical one:

'It is not enough to say we must return to Islam. We must specify which Islam: that of Abu Zarr or that of Marvan the Ruler. Both are called Islamic, but there is a huge difference between them. One is the Islam of the caliphate, of the palace, and of the rulers. The other is the Islam of the people, of the exploited, and of the poor. Moreover, it is not good enough to say that one should be "concerned" about the poor. The corrupt caliphs said the same. True Islam is more than "concerned". It instructs the believer to fight for justice, equality, and elimination of poverty.' Abrahamian (1988: 295)

This, to be sure, is not the only place that Dr Shari'ati shows his strong resentment against capitalists (*saheban-e zar va zivar* or *ashab-e kenz*) and favours the poor and ordinary people. All his works indicate implicitly or explicitly his populist ideas, and this is why he choose Abuzar as his 'hero' and calls his Islam the 'Islam of Abuzar'. Abuzar, known as '*Abuzar-e Ghefari*', was a Negro from Sahara, the fifth person to believe in Islam and the Prophet. For Shari'ati (1978: 308), Abuzar was a symbol of socialism, justice (*edalat*), and simplicity (*sadegi*): 'Who is Abuzar? -A

great revolutionary: anti-aristocracy, anti-despotism, anti-capitalism, anti-poverty, and anti-discrimination. The person who talks better than Prodom.’

Abrahamian (1993: 23) suggests that even Ayatollah Khomeini had unwittingly recognised the role already accomplished by the intellectuals and the university students, when he criticised his colleagues that they were still ‘asleep’:

“‘We cannot remain silent,” he [Ayatollah Khomeini] stressed, “until *college students* force us to carry out our duty.” One [Ayatollah] Khomeini disciple later admitted that the student guerrilla movement “left a deep impression on the Iranian people” and prompted the imam to increase his correspondence with the confederation in order to stem the influence of Marxism.’

Ironically, in view of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s opposition to Marxist ideas, he nevertheless based his populism on an analysis of conflicts between social classes. For example, it was in the 1970s that Ayatollah Khomeini split Iranian society into two conflicting classes in his works: on the one hand there were the oppressors (*mostakberin*), the rich (*servatmandan*), the upper class (*tabaqeh-ye bala*), the aristocratic class (*tabaqeh-ye a’yan*), the palace dwellers (*kakh neshinan*), and the Satan’s state (*hokumat-e sheytan*); and, on the other hand, there were the oppressed (*mostaz’afin*), the poor (*foqara*), the lower class (*tabaqeh-ye payin*), the needy class (*tabaqeh-ye mostamandan*), the slum dwellers (*kukh neshinan* or *zagh neshinan*), and the oppressed nation (*mellat-e mostazaf*). Such terms had hardly been used in his early writings (Abrahamian 1993: 26-7). In order to

make an acceptable and popular challenge to the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini targeted the socio-economic problems of the country rather than theoretical and doctrinal issues, like the principle of the *velayat-e faqih*.

Inspired by such populist ideas, demonstrators' slogans, coined during the revolution against the pre-revolutionary regime, also contained in part the concepts in which populism and Islamism interrelated interestingly:

'Islam belongs to the oppressed, not to the oppressors.

Islam is for equality and social justice.

Islam represents the slum dwellers, not the palace dwellers.

We are for Islam, not for capitalism and feudalism.

Islam originates from the masses, not from the rich.

The duty of the clergy is to liberate the hungry from the clutches of the rich.

Islam is not the opiate of the masses.

The poor were for the Prophet; the rich were against him.

The poor died for the Islamic Revolution; the rich plotted against it.

Oppressed of the world, unite.

(All slogans are quoted by Abrahamian 1993: 31)

After the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that, through the establishment of an *Islamic Republic*, a *real* Islamic society would be constructed in which there would be no sign of hunger, inequality, unemployment, illiteracy, slums, crime, prostitution, corruption, alcoholism, drugs, foreign dominion, and so forth. He, who had been titled as Imam, (which *Ithna-Ashari* 'Twelver' Shi'ite

Muslims reserve principally for the twelve Imams⁵) translated the early religious history of the prophets, including the Prophet Mohammad and the Imams, into populist notions. Apart from the attributions of '*mardom*' (people) and '*mellat*' (nation), which had originally been a religious term⁶, to the Iranians, they were now also called '*ummat*', i.e. those who unquestionably follow their Imam. But in terms of social class and status, the imams and the prophets, on the one hand, and the *ummats* who believed them, on the other hand, have always been of the same origin, as it was reinterpreted.

Throughout his post-revolutionary life, Ayatollah Khomeini continued his support of the poor and 'ordinary people'. Addressing the deputies of the Parliament, he emphasised that all MPs should continue to come from the 'middle class and the deprived population'. They should not be from the 'capitalists, land-grabbers, and the upper class, who lust in pleasure and know nothing about hunger, poverty, and barefootedness.' He also continuously reminded the post-revolutionary cabinets and high bureaucrats that their government and the revolution were the result of the sacrifice and serious participation of the 'deprived classes'. Therefore, they should be in their service.

In all the aforementioned characteristics of populism, Abrahamian sees similarities between Iran, in spite of its religious aspects, and parts of Latin America. In his view, they both invited the people to return to their 'native roots'; they both chose a 'third way' between communism and capitalism; they both had strong resentment against the 'comprador bourgeoisie' and the external powers, and their movements belonged originally to the middle classes. Above all, 'they turned out to be more interested in changing cultural and educational institutions than in

overthrowing the modes of production and distribution' (Abrahamian 1993: 38), the aspect which this present project is committed to explore about Iran.

Specific emphasis and insistence on 'ordinary people' was never confined to disregarding the rich and comprador capitalists- elite, intellectuals and expert knowledge were also resisted. The various post-revolutionary socio-political conflicts between the majority of the clergy and populace, on the one hand, and intellectuals, even religious intellectuals, on the other hand, illustrate the populist characteristics of the revolution. The early years of the post-revolutionary period, in particular, witnessed arguments about the primacy of religion (in the different names of commitment [*ta'ahhod*] and devotion to the doctrine of Islam [*maktabi*]) over expertise and technocracy (*takhassos*). Those who favoured such a sovereignty reasoned that if someone enjoys religiosity, he will automatically benefit from science and expertise, but science and technology were not in a position that would necessarily guide the elite to faith in God and taking responsibility towards Him.

The main characteristics of populism in Iran include not only the argument that the powerful have oppressed the weak and that the situation must be changed in favour of the latter, but also the more distinctive claim that foreign corruption is to blame for injustice and that Islam offers the only viable solution, as well as resentment, xenophobia and a 'generalised belief' (Smelser 1962) in the once-and-for-all capacity of radical Islam to restore the current balance between the powerful and the virtuous in Iran.

(b) Nationalism

‘Nationalism’, different from patriotism, ‘turns devotion to the nation into principles or programmes.’ (McLean 1996: 334) Although its appearance has varied in different times and places, nationalism’s general feature ‘is an assertion of the primacy of national identity over the claims of class, religion, or humanity in general.’ (McLean 1996: 334) In other words it is defined as an ideology which unites people in the name of a nation, based on the existing ‘common historical, linguistic and perhaps “racial” or religious ties ... with a particular territory’ (Jary & Jary 1991: 417), which is distinctive from others.

Although nationalism does not amount to a great system of ideas, unlike Marxism and liberalism, its impact on politics has never been less than their’s, if we consider the events of the past two centuries. For an individual, nationalism is confined to a ‘belief, or feeling of belonging to, a people’ (Jary & Jary 1991: 416) with some common characteristics. In an ideological form, however, it goes beyond biological and psychological aspects and,

‘...is usually seen [in philosophy and sociology] as a system of ideas, different from ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ because it is not ‘true’, and because it contains a great deal of special pleading. Nationalism is an ideology which builds on the idea of the nation and makes it the basis for action. This action can be political or non-political.’ (Kellas 1991: 21)

Nationalism explicitly represents idealism, for it displays the *idea* of the nation and the ideology of nationalism which conveys specific interests to be improved, regardless of the nature of the interests. ‘So nationalist ideology is a justification for the pursuit of self-interest.’ (Kellas 1991: 24)

Iran experienced a progressive form of nationalism (*reform nationalism*), as did China, Egypt and Turkey, in the early decades of the twentieth century. However, there were huge differences between these movements in terms of the nature and the degree of their achievements. Moves towards economic development, release from foreign control and protection of national identity were the principal characteristics of such an ideology. (Kellas 1991: 75)

Reform nationalism in Iran was first experienced in the era of the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11), during which there was an attempt to attain political and economic independence by emulating Western models of modernity. In terms of reform nationalism's contents, in fact, both the Constitutional and the Islamic Revolutions were concerned in some way with changing the existing Iranian state's relationship with the West. But, while the former movement followed a kind of liberal nationalism during its revolutionary discourse, the latter aimed to achieve cultural independence by stressing an indigenous and genuinely Islamic model of modernity, i.e. cultural nationalism.

Of course, in terms of the nature of nationalism and its relation with religion, we have to distinguish the largely secular nationalism conducted during the Constitutional Revolution from the events which occurred later; for example, under the official nationalist reign of Reza Shah, in the first half of the century. In the light of the liberal nationalism of the Constitutional movement, although some clergy, like Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri⁷, opposed women's education, others, like Ayatollah Tabatabaei, permitted their daughters to attend modern schools.

After the Constitutional Revolution, even into the second half of the century, Iran did not abandon 'official nationalism' or 'nation-building'.⁸ (However, during

the first half of the twentieth century, all forms of nationalism remained almost purely secular.)

Liberal nationalism re-appeared in Iran after the second world war, as in many other countries, particularly under the short-lived premiership of Dr. M. Musaddiq, during which all nationalist forces united in the demand for independence and democracy. Although a short period of co-existence between religion and nationalism became possible in 1951-2, it failed to continue during the rest of the 1950s. With the growth of 'cultural nationalism' and Islamic modernism since the 1950s, both religion and nationalism have thrived together. According to Ayatollah Khomeini:

'May your lives be hallowed [declared Khomeini on March 22, 1982 to encourage Iranian volunteers at the time of the recapture of Khorramshahr], brave fighters and soldiers in the path of God who have safeguarded the honour of Islam, made the Iranian nation illustrious and raised the heads of those committed to the way of God. The great Iranian nation [*mellat-e bozorg-e Iran*] and the children of Islam are proud of you, who have placed your homeland [*mihan-e khod*] on the wings of angels and raised it aloft among all the nations of the world [*melal-e jahan*].' (quoted in Richard 1995: 211)

Similar co-existence existed even in the pre-revolutionary period, such as when Ayatollah Khomeini called the Iranian army to join him for the 'salvation of Islam and Iran' during both the revolution of 1977-9 and the uprising of 1963, which led to his arrest. (Milani 1994: 50)

Moreover, the power of religion to guide loyalties, besides the exertion of 'officialG56

nationalism' seen particularly in the post-revolutionary period, gives a supranational force which prevents the rise of ethnic nationalism throughout the country. This was especially so in the mid-1970s. (Kellas 1991: 120-1) The post-revolutionary system of education has made some attempts to conceal the existing ethnic differences in the country and, in fact, to prevent the growth of ethnic nationalism by inserting Qur'anic verses, which emphasise the insignificance of ethnic issues vis-à-vis the importance of purity and faith in God, into Religious Education textbooks. For example: 'O you men! surely We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families that you may know each other; surely the most honourable of you with Allah is the one among you most careful (of his duty); surely Allah is knowing, Aware.'
(49: 13)

Cultural nationalism, in the sense of claims about the superiority of Iranian nation based on ideas of traditional culture, has taken at least three forms in post-revolutionary Iran, in general, and in the works of some Islamic ideologues before the revolution, in particular.

(i) Firstly, nationalism appears in the guise of an ideology which is anti-West, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. The aforementioned pre-revolutionary functions of foreign interference, particularly the West, in Iran led to the anti-Western nature of the revolution of 1979 and post-revolutionary events. On the one hand, Western interests were threatened by the possibility of penetration of the Iranian revolution into other Islamic countries, especially in the Middle East. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic was interested in enlarging the contradictions between Iran and the West in terms of culture and ideology.

The anti-imperialistic face of Iranian nationalism's new form became clear when the US and the Shah were 'translated' into the symbol of Yazid, and Ayatollah Khomeini became that of Husain.⁹ (see Halliday 1986: 88) Thus anti-imperialism became one of the major features of Iranian post-revolutionary nationalism. The Soviets, who had previously described the movement of 1963 as 'radically reactionary' (*erteja 'a-e siah*), now praised the clergy's reputation for being anti-imperialist: 'In the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini, "the dogma and traditions of Shi'ite Islam . . . [became] an offensive weapon against the tyrant-Shah and *Westernisation*, in the defence of *Muslim spiritual values* and social order, which would serve the interests of . . . the oppressed majority". Thus, "among all the Muslim clergy the Shi'ite clergy is distinguished by its socio-political activism," while "the Sunni clergy occupies more moderate and conservative positions," usually supporting the government of the state in which it lives.' (Atkin 1986: 288)

The anti-imperialistic position of post-revolutionary Iran reached in its peak when the US embassy, interpreted as '*jasus-khaneh*' (spy-house), was occupied in November 1979 (see Hooglund 1990). Although the hostage issue was theoretically connected to the misuse of the embassy in the past, and was, therefore, a challenge to the US, it was used, practically, to attract international attention and establish a network of contacts in the Muslim world. As Ayatollah Khomeini commented:

'We hope that all Muslim nations may join in this struggle between infidels and Islam. This is not a struggle between ourselves and America; it is between Islam and the infidels. . . . I call on all Muslim nationals, all Muslims, all Muslim armies, all Islamic security forces and all Muslim countries' presidents to co-operate with our nation; the

Muslims must rise in this struggle between infidels and Islam.'

(Halliday 1986: 101)

Of course, the anti-Zionist aspect of the revolution could also be analysed in this context. The Iranian nation is still identified as strongly anti-Zionist, despite the numerous social and political shifts which have occurred, particularly in the second half of the 1990s. Although Iranians never identify themselves with Arab nations, and they have paid a huge price for being a neighbour of an Arab country (Iraq) during both pre- and post-revolutionary periods, the post-revolutionary stress on the necessity of a united challenge against Israel is an attempt towards Islamic internationalism and solidarity. 'Cultural nationalism', in this context, is distinguished from both 'territorial nationalism' (*watani*) and 'ethnic nationalism' (*qaumi*), because, in this view, these latter are ways by which the West can divide the whole Muslim world into separate nations, in order to dominate them more easily. This interpretation is not confined to Iran; other nations with various Islamist entities, from the Atlantic to the Indus and beyond, share this outlook with their Iranian counterparts. (Matthee 1986: 247-74)

(ii) Secondly, nationalism appears as an ideology which emphasises the distinctiveness of Iranian nationality, despite its similarities to that of, say, Japan, India, and parts of Latin America. Such distinctiveness was manifested in the slogan of 'Neither the East nor the West, but the Islamic Republic' (*na shargi, na gharbi, jomhuri-e Islami*), which became the basis of post-revolutionary foreign policy in Iran. As Keddie (1981: 217) implies, Muslim nations with diverse populations, in fact, distrusted both the West and the East. This is because, according to Keddie, they suffered from the paralysis of Western ideologies of capitalist liberalism which

brought little fruit for them. Nor did they trust Marxist or socialist ideologies, which have lost their authority and dynamism due to their 'antihumanist and antireligious levelling'. Therefore, the only way out was for Islamic humanism to save Iran and other oppressed nations, according to the Islamic intellectuals in the Islamic world. This became one of the features of Iranian 'cultural nationalism' in the post-revolutionary period. According to Moaddel (1993: 154), various themes became important following the socio-economic and political shifts in this period:

'(1) the idea that underdevelopment and economic inequality is connected to Western cultural domination; (2) the idea that religion and politics are inseparable and that Islam is a revolutionary and anti-imperialist ideology; (3) the anti-Islamic nature of the institution of monarchy; and (4) the rejection of the political systems of both the West and East.'

(iii) The third aspect of Iranian post-revolutionary 'cultural nationalism' is a specific stress on the need to segregate the sexes as a means of imposing moral purity, particularly on women. This stress is related to nationalism because of its reaction against the Western values portrayed in modern models of gender policy.

Imperialism was believed to have penetrated Iranian values, thinking and culture as well as to have appropriated Iran's material resources. It was thought that only a return to the genuine values and traditions of Iranian culture, in the post-revolutionary value-system, could guarantee independence and salvation in this world and the next. The nation must start from its pure traditions in order to attain its desired status. Over-attention towards outward appearances is understandable in such a context,

such as paying more attention to traditional ways of life, the further enjoyment of religious purity, and the promotion of national and anti-Western values.

Although both genders were requested to consider religious requirements regarding the issue of purity and modesty, there has been special emphasis on women in this regard since the revolution. This is probably the result of ideological notions, the most important of which is that women perform two very different and sensitive roles. One is the positive role of wife and mother, whereas the second is that of a seductive temptress.

On one side, raising children and doing domestic duties are considered to be women's major roles. However, these do not prevent women from achieving their social functions, the fulfilment of which should not interfere with their principal tasks. A woman can enjoy a clerical job, as the prophets did. If a woman is corrupt, the world will become spoiled, and *vice-versa*. It is probably worth noting part of Ayatollah Khomeini's (1982: 101) speech on this subject, on the occasion of *Hazrat-e Fatimah* (the Prophet's daughter)'s birthday, first announced as Women's Day on 19 May, 1979:

'... Woman is the instructor of the society. From the lap of woman human beings emerge. The first stage of being true men and women is the lap of the woman. The happiness and wealth of the country depends on woman... Woman is the origin of all goodness. You saw, we saw, what women did in this movement. . . . We owe the movement to women.'

On the negative side, women could also be considered ironically as the source of corruption. This is allegedly because they *naturally* enjoy a different role from

men in terms of love and sexuality. This is clear from the quotations attributed to Ayatollah Motahhari by Haleh Afshar (1994: 28-9):

‘Men are enslaved by their sexual passions and women by their love for men . . . men wish to possess the body of women and to control her person, women wish to capture the heart of men and hold them through love. Men wish to rule women by their head; women wish to influence men through their heart.

Woman with her natural cleverness . . . has noticed the weak point that nature has given to men and has made him the seeker of love and the pursuer and has made woman the sought one and the pursued. ... when woman realised this situation and her position where men are concerned and recognised his weak point, she resorted to make up and ornaments and luxury to help her capture the man’s heart and at the same time, she distanced herself from man in the knowledge that she must not give herself for nothing, but must inflame his desire and passion and thus raise her own status.’

Considering the above statements from the post-revolutionary leaders of Iran, we can easily understand why purity and modesty were seen as important in stopping corruption in society, and why the struggle against corruption started with controlling women. In this view, a mixture of males and females, being side by side with each other, is not seen as progressiveness, like ‘going to cinemas and dancing’ (Khomeini 1982: 98); but dealing with modesty and chastity is progressiveness:

‘Women, like men, will participate in building the future Islamic society. They will have the right to vote and to be elected. Women

have contributed to the recent struggles in Iran alongside men. We will give all kinds of freedom to women. But, of course, we will put a stop to corruption. ... You [women] will be free to do correct things, to go to universities, and the like; everyone is free to do these things. But if anyone wants to do something against chastity, or harmful to the nation, a stop will be put to that. And this is progressive.¹⁰

Thus the establishment of purity and the necessity of its observation through compulsory veiling and sex-segregation became an important social policy in post-revolutionary Iran. One of the most effective ways of meeting such a requirement was education: bans on co-education (21 May, 1979); sex-segregated classes at the School of Divinity in Mashad University (26 Sep., 1979); abolition of all co-educational schools, and teaching segregation: women teachers for girls' schools and male teachers for boys' schools (22 July, 1980)¹¹; announcement of special uniforms to be worn by all female students (29 July, 1980); and by all female teachers (18 Aug., 1980).¹²

Of course, men were also required to meet purification processes and principles such as the avoidance of wearing of T-shirts or short-sleeve shirts, ties, and clothes with fashionable colours and styles, as well as shaving their faces or having fashionable hair styles. They were not asked to do so by formal state decrees; such things were dealt with by informal means, like the power of public opinion. It should not be surprising now to see why the West is blamed 'for a breakdown in morality via its free social practices'. (Cole and Keddie 1986: 26)

In short, Iranian nationalism of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods bears some similarity to that of other nation-states in developing countries.

But its intimate association with Islam and with notions of the cultural superiority of vaguely 'traditional' ways of life in Iran makes Iranian nationalism highly distinctive and potent as a strand of ideology. This nationalism has had many repercussions for Iran's educational system.

(c) Islamism

'Islamism', in this context, means that Islam is fervently believed to be the foundation of a good society, and that the whole of society should be based on Islamic values.

The separation of nationalism and Islamism from each other in Iran is so ambiguous and confusing that even the chief ideologues and the leaders of the Islamic revolution could hardly make such a distinction. Shi'ism in Iran is, in fact, a manifestation of the combination of Islam with the special cultural elements of Iranian society. Ayatollah Motahhari, whose works have always been recommended as the most authoritative Islamic references by the Iranian leaders, was proud of being an Iranian and expressed his enjoyment of 'the finest language of Persian'. However, he was strongly against Iranian particularism and nationalism in the support of Islamism and devotion to Arabic language. (Dabashi 1993: 195) Also *Hojjato'l-islam Hashemi Rafsanjani* admitted in an interview that 'in fact, eighty per cent of what we now do has no precedent in Islamic history' (Abrahamian 1993: 15), despite all the proclamations made for Iran as the only real Islamic country. His suggestion was never publicised. We can also sometimes witness this ambiguity in the personality of Ayatollah Khomeini. Although he never stopped his attempt to build society on the basis of pure Islam (*Islam-e nab*) during his leadership, he prevented Jalalo'l din Farsi, whose father was originally from Afghanistan, from being a candidate in the

first presidential election. Farsi had, however, been supported by the Islamic Republican Party.

Nevertheless, Iran has been an Islamic country for a very long time, and, in the eyes of post-revolutionary leaders, no patriotism should be supported at the expense of Islam. Almost ten years after the revolution, in 1987, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Islamic Parliament, made the following comment about the philosophy of the establishment of the IRP (Islamic Republican Party) shortly after the victory of the revolution in February 1979: 'in the beginning the mission of the party was to combat those who opposed the *Islamisation* of the country. Gradually as the opposition faded away, so did the mission of the IRP'. (Rahnema and Nomani 1990: 216) Although it had never been a real party, as its clerical founders¹³ played, and are still playing, crucial roles in the life of the Islamic Republic of Iran it is important to give a brief account of the ideology of the IRP, which had been published as 'Our Positions' (*mavaze-e ma*) in March 1981. This document reveals, in a condensed form, the 'theory' behind an idealised version of Iranian society.

The text begins with a definition of man but develops into a full justification of a Shi'ite way of life. Richard (1995: 186-87) has summarised it in the following terms:

'According to Islam, man, who is more than mere matter, endowed with the knowledge of good and evil, responsible toward his natural environment which he must use without becoming its slave, is also responsible toward himself, destined for salvation thanks to the gifts of God, and toward society in which he must blossom forth by overcoming hostile historical and social currents. There follows a

theoretical exposition of the revelation, the role of the prophets in telling us of salvation, the justification for the authority of the Prophet Mohammad and his heirs, the Imams: as it is the divine doctrine that saves us, we need the authority of those to whom the doctrine has been passed on. And today the specialists in the application of the Law are the heirs of the Prophet and the Imams, they have the knowledge and understanding (*feqh*) to reply, in the light of Islam, to the questions facing men in every era, whence their name *foqaha* (plural of *faqih*). Moreover, this is what the Islamic constitution has stipulated in its fifth article: the *velayat-e faqih* (governorship of the jurist-theologian) allows the assurance of Islamic doctrine over all social strata, as both Sunnis and Shi'ites have to submit to it in the name of reason, in order to achieve the "oneness" of society (*towhidi*); "doctrinal politics" (*siyasat-e maktabi*) causes society to progress towards the "rule of God", putting a check on the colonialist argument for the separation of the political and the religious.'

According to the IRP text, Iran was a democratic country, because the major institutions of the country had been chosen by the popular suffrage. 'But as only the authority of the doctrine guarantees man the power to be the master of his own destiny, there must be no yielding to demagogy and, without rushing things of course, the desires of the people that would not be in keeping with Islamic doctrine must be resisted.' (Richard 1995: 187) Moreover, the Islamic Republic was constructed on the bases of "councils" (*shuraha*). But 'the clergy will play a special role in the councils, as they are a protection and refuge for the people against dictatorship It

is the duty of the *ulama* to be present wherever their theoretical or practical qualifications predestine them for public service. But that does not give them any special privilege' (quoted in Richard 1995: 187).

Favouring the whole programme of the 'Cultural Revolution', the text considered its purpose to be destroying the effects of 'an anti-religious and hegemonic Western culture' which had diverted Muslims from their Islamic identity. According to the text, 'in all instances, technical specialisation must not be the sole criterion for the recruitment of the country's executives: favour should even be shown to those who, although less educated in their field, are Islam's fervent militants.' (Richard 1995: 188)

The judicial programme of the IRP, which included the penal code of an eye for an eye (*qisas*), and was approved by the Islamic parliament in broad outline, had few points in common with Western models of justice. But its emphasis 'is placed on the dissuasive effect of the principles literally set out in the Qur'an and in classical Islamic jurisprudence'. (Richard 1995: 188) 'The bill also assumes that the testimony of women, as in Islamic tradition, is worth only half that of men.' (Richard 1995: 188)

IRP's proposal for the economy avoided extremist ideas. But, in accordance with modern Islamist ideologues, it denied an absolute right of property ownership, for it belonged solely to God. The distribution of wealth had always been the main concern of its main member, Ayatollah Dr Mohammad Beheshti. The IRP 'clearly assumes the class character of the *petite bourgeoisie* of the bazaars, whose ideal of a liberal and protected economy it shares.' (Richard 1995: 189)

As regards foreign policy, the programme formalised the slogan “Neither East nor West, (but) Islamic Republic” whilst putting aside the historical context of the Islamic revolutionary ideology. ‘Furthermore, Iran is named in the text only when followed by the paraphrase “liberated part of the country of Islam” (*qesmat-e azad-shoda-ye mamlekat-e islam*).' (Richard 1995: 189) The selection of the ‘Islamic Parliamentary Assembly (*majles-e shoura-ye eslami*) was, in fact, the result of such a perception. This title excluded the so-called ‘un-believers’ and the members of non-Muslim minorities of Iranian nationality.

Besides the protection of nationalist interests against the West, Islamism desires and is also required to fight the Western values which have targeted Iranian pure religious culture, according to the post-revolutionary authority. In this view, the West contains all anti-Islamic elements: AIDS, homosexuality, violence, corruption, permissiveness, rape, impurity, prostitution, adultery, disasters in families and in the upbringing of the children, and so forth. All such catastrophes are the results of neglect of both religion and love of God. Following the solutions provided by Islam, however, the Islamic nation of Iran allegedly lacks such disasters. This public idea is a major difference between the West and Islam’s own community in terms of culture. Most Iranian authorities, like Hojjato’l-eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani (Richard 1995: 192), have made inquiries into the sexuality and moral corruption of the West. Of course, ‘Without obvious transition, one can pass from sexual morality to the political domain, to the need to uphold the government’s efforts, to protect Islam, all the concomitants of the aspiration toward security and purity.’ (Richard 1995: 192)

Finally, Iran has been a Muslim country during both pre- and post-revolutionary periods, but the definition of Islam is not the same in both periods. In

the wake of the Islamic revolution, Islam was not ‘the preservation of a heritage of dogmas’ anymore, but ‘an active application of beliefs’ i.e. Islam as ideology, the meaning which had been popularised by Dr Shari’ati. By the weapon of ideology, militant Islam is capable of combating all opposition and political doctrines and groups: Marxism, nationalism, imperialism, liberalism, and so forth. The construction and dissemination of ideology based on Islam have been actively pursued by the Islamic leaders of Iran since 1979. In fact, Richard (1990: 29, in translation) claims that an entirely new form of ideological discourse has developed in Iran alongside traditional theological discourse: ‘A new category of discourse about society has been officially given the name of “ideology” with manuals edited by clerical ideologues in official positions’. It is most apparent in public sermons but has also been propagated through all state institutions, particularly education (Richard 1995). Evidence about the use of state schools as conduits for Islamist ideology will be examined in later Chapters.

Conclusion

The fact that the Iranian revolution of 1979 has given rise to so many different types of explanation is not surprising. The meaning of events that are now regarded as paving the way for revolution was by no means clear at the time; numerous interest groups supported the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah’s regime, although their interests were not necessarily compatible with each other; and it took several years for the situation to settle down into a relatively stable pattern. Yet, running through all the confusions, chaos and ambiguity were several resilient strands of ideological thinking which strongly shaped the character of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the

1980s and 1990s. Each strand is a combination of political, philosophical and theological elements, some of which have echoes in the radical ideologies of other countries. But in their Iranian context these ideological strands are highly distinctive and pervasive. As later Chapters will show, however, this does not mean that ideology has necessarily been successful in making the Iranian school system fit the mould created for it by ideologues (see Omid 1994). Some of the practical outcomes are actually ironic, as indeed Max Weber would probably have expected.

ENDNOTES

¹ In modern Iran this is known as '*khatt-e ghermez*' or red line.

² See Dabashi 1993 for further information about the above-mentioned ideologues.

³ Given a different definition of 'populism' related to the charismatic abilities of a leader to attract to a certain extent of the populace around him- or herself, Alamdari (1998) believes that the period of 'populism' in Iran came to end with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. This was because, in his view, Ayatollah Khomeini's replacement did not enjoy such a charismatic power as his predecessor. Therefore, according to Alamdari, 'populism' was replaced by 'clientelism' in Iran in post-1989.

⁴ According to Bayat (1997: 43), 'the term "*mustaz'afin*" entered [Ayatollah] Khomeini's discourse only during the height of the revolution (Aban 1357) [about November 1978], when he used it merely to repudiate the Communists'. He also adds that Ayatollah Khomeini addressed 'lower-class people' only eight times in the eighty-eight messages, letters and sermons issued during the fifteen years leading up

to the revolution, compared with fifty references made to students, educated people and universities.

⁵ The Prophet Abraham was also called an Imam in the Qur'an.

⁶ The followers of the Prophet Abraham are called '*mellat*' in the Qur'an.

⁷ He believed that 'if we allow girls and handsome boys to go to school, corruption will spread in society like a plague'. For more information on this, see Paidar 1996: 53.

⁸ The definition of 'official nationalism' is given in Kellas 1991: 73.

⁹ Husain was the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad and the Third Shi'ite Imam, and was martyred by the order of Yazid, the Umayyad monarch, in 680 at the battle of Karbala, a city in present-day Iraq.

¹⁰ Ayatollah Khomeini's interview with Iranian reporters in Paris on January 23, 1979 (about twenty days before the victory of the revolution). For more information, see Khomeini 1982: 98.

¹¹ Of course, due to the lack of female teachers for teaching female students in most parts of the country, it was practically applied in only a few major cities.

¹² For more information, see Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 231-9. Sex-segregation policy was not confined to the first two years after the revolution, either in education or other parts of society.

¹³ The clerical founders were the *ulama* who had been the students of Ayatollah Khomeini at Qom: Ayatollahs and Hojjato'l-eslams Mohammad Beheshti (president of High Court of Justice), Abdo'l Karim Musavi Ardabili (who succeeded Beheshti after his assassination in 1981, and now one of the influential clergy in Qom), Ali Khamanei (the president of the Islamic Republic from 1981 to 1989 and the present

Islamic leader of Iran), Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (the speaker of the Islamic parliament until 1989, then the president of the Islamic Republic until 1997, and now chairman of the Expediency Council), and Mohammad-Javad Ba-Honar (Prime Minister, assassinated in 1981).

Chapter Four

HISTORY OF IRANIAN EDUCATION BEFORE 1979

Now that the political and ideological forces shaping the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been outlined, it is possible to begin the analysis of concomitant changes in the country's school-level education system. It is appropriate, therefore, to begin with a brief account of the system's historical evolution in the period leading up to 1979, with special emphasis on the educational policies of governments under the Pahlavi dynasty. The gradual separation of religion from state-controlled education in this period will be contrasted, in the following Chapters, to the post-1979 policies designed to infuse education with Islamic values.

Education Under the Qajars

The Qajar dynasty (1794-1925) governed Iran before the Pahlavi regime (1925-1979). The most respected government of this dynasty belonged to Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir (1848-52), the first prime minister of Nasiruddin Shah (1848-96), under whose government educational reforms and other forms of modernisation took place in Iran for the first time. According to Goldschmidt (1991: 162), Nasiruddin Shah had been ordered by foreign imperialism to run a programme of modernisation including mines, banks, railroads, and public services. In reaction to foreign imperialism, a Persian nationalist movement developed between 1870 and 1914. Ironically, it developed through the spread of telegraphs, roads, railroads, and both public and private schools whose engineering or models had been assisted by foreigners

(Goldschmidt 1991: 176). Therefore, modernisation was introduced as a gift of Western imperialism, accompanied by Westernisation which was incompatible with the Islamic ideals of the people.

Not until the mid-19th century did modern schools like Dar'ol-Fonun School, including the first technical schools, begin to replace the schools in Tehran and the larger cities, which had been traditionally held at neighbourhood mosques like the Qur'an classes, *maktab*, taught by clergymen who were called '*mullahs*'. *Maktab* was a pre-Islamic Arab educational institution which had penetrated into Iran during the Arab invasions (see Safavi-Hemami 1980: 13). Education in such schools had been strictly traditional and Islamic. Reading, writing, and the memorising of parts of Qur'an had been the schools' main concern at the lower levels; concentration on Arabic literature and Islamic sciences had been their objectives at higher levels.

(Keddie 1991: 178)

Of course, the Islamic educational institutions were not confined to *maktabs* in this period; '*Khaneghah*' and '*Madrasah*' were others where both adults and adolescents were involved. In '*Khaneghah*', founded by the Sufis, students learned how to liberate their "self" from material and mundane goods. '*Madrasah*' was a religious college for higher learning, which had been founded in Baghdad in 1065, and subsequently spread through different parts of Iran (see Safavi-Hemami 1980: 14).

Theoretically, Islam not only encourages Muslims to learn but it also regards learning as a duty of any Muslim, both men and women. For example, the first verse which was revealed to the Prophet of Islam, started with "read"; "learning is the duty of every Muslim, men and women"; Muslims "should seek learning from the cradle to

the grave”; Muslims “should seek learning, even if it is available in China, (because it was far away from Arabia)”; and so on. In practice, however, the religious centres of Islam in Iran not only did not pay attention to non-Islamic knowledge but they also restricted Islam to the teaching and learning of nothing but Islamic jurisprudence. The study of science was not recommended and was, at least, not practised.

According to Rashedi (1984: 82-4), the preliminary steps for establishing modern schools in Iran were taken by Western Christian missionaries in the first half of the nineteenth century. The first modern school for boys was opened in Tabriz, north-west Iran, by the Basel Missionary Society in 1833. By 1851 the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions alone had 45 schools with 871 enrolments. However, missionary schools were only for Christian children, and few Muslim pupils attended them.

Apart from the missionary schools, modern education in Iran began in principle with higher education, when the country came under the influence of the West. To begin with, there were colleges but no elementary schools. In 1851, Amir Kabir, who had been educated in Russia and Turkey, proposed to the Shah the foundation of a college, Daro'l-Fonun, to train administrative officials needed for the country, and this was later approved by the Shah. The subjects studied in Dar al-Fonun were: artillery, chemistry, cavalry, infantry, mathematics, mineralogy, medicine, military engineering (because of Iran's involvement in the war with Russia at that time), and physics. The students also had to study literature and foreign languages (English, Russian, and French) during their six-year period of study. The students who attended this college mainly belonged to the upper class and the aristocracy.

Later on, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Education, and Justice started to establish their own colleges, in 1901, 1902, 1911, and 1921 respectively. Finally, in 1934 under the Pahlavi regime, all six different colleges (of Arts and Science or Education, Law, Medicine, Theology, War, and Veterinary Medicine) which were located in Tehran, as well as the College of Agriculture which was located in nearby Karaj, came together to share the same administration under the name of Tehran University (see Fallahi 1993: 42-5). By the turn of the century, Iranians were also becoming familiar with formal education at the elementary and secondary levels.

The first elementary school in Iran was established in Tabriz in 1867, when Iran was gradually experiencing urbanisation for the first time. Elementary education, therefore, had to correspond to the urban needs of society. Pupils attended for six years, and the subjects were: the Persian language, history, religious teachings, arithmetic, ethics, geometry, and arts. By 1901 seven elementary schools existed in Tehran, and one school in each city of Tabriz, Shiraz, Mashad, Rasht, and Bushehr. They were all public schools which were not sponsored by the government. By 1910, 113 elementary schools existed in Iran, one third of which were for girls, with 10,531 pupils, according to Furter (1973: 9). The main growth at elementary level took place between 1906 and 1922, when elementary schools expanded to some villages and some private schools were also set up.

At the turn of the century, private secondary schools were also being established. Madresseh Elmieh, a private secondary school, was established in Tehran in 1898. Then the "Nezam" (Army) High school was instituted in Tehran to fill the needs of the army for educated personnel. Elmieh's initial curriculum included history, Arabic, French, Persian, and Mathematics. Under the Constitutional

government, a fundamental law of 1911 required the Ministry of Education to deal with the creation of public schools.

Under the Qajar dynasty in Iran, the French model of education was adopted for both elementary and secondary levels. The duration of each level was six years in imitation the French system. The curriculum of Year-seven included world history, Arabic, and hygiene, and these were added to the routine programme of grammar, literature, geography, history, composition, and mathematics. The eighth and ninth years' curriculum involved physics, chemistry, biology, geology, algebra, and mechanical drawing, apart from the regular programme. High school pupils also studied elementary economics, zoology, solid geometry and trigonometry during their last three years of secondary level.

Thus, although Iran was confronted by foreign imperialism under the Qajar dynasty, it also experienced some manifestations of modernity, including modern education. Both elementary and secondary schools built on French models were introduced into the country; and some enrolment of pupils, although a very low proportion of the population, took place.

Educational Policies under Reza Shah's Reign

Under the Pahlavi dynasty, modernisation, further Westernisation and secularisation all took place on a massive scale. The West influenced not only the social, political and economic spheres of Iran, but also brought about major changes in the culture through education. Weakening the norms and traditional mechanisms of control based on Muslim tradition, Reza Shah attempted to replace the Islamic lifestyle with a Western one. For example, Western-style schools with imported Western curricula

replaced the traditional “*maktab*” and “*madrasah*” which had been inherited from the Qajar dynasty.

Therefore, both *maktab*, which taught literacy through Islamic teachings, and *madraseh*, which taught traditional Islamic education, such as the Qur’an, theology, Muslim history, religious jurisprudence, and the Arabic language, were gradually transformed into a new style of school where the westernised system of education was to be taught: European languages and other subjects irrelevant to the culture of native people, in the eyes of commentators such as Mehran (1988: 172-3).

Nevertheless, as Hambley (1991: 232) indicates, during his drive towards secularisation, Reza Shah did not assault Islam and the clergy as much as Ataturk did in neighbouring Turkey, despite frequent claims to the contrary. Unlike Ataturk’s plan to increase literacy in Turkey by changing the language from Arabic script to Roman letters, Reza Shah employed an army corps of teachers who were obliged to teach in villages where they did not belong. Maboudian (1995: 75) thinks ‘this may have negatively affected the success of the programme’. For example, Iran’s literacy rate for men was only fifteen per cent in 1956 (Furter 1973: 11), although people were using the same model of alphabet as they had before.

During Reza Shah’s reign, France continued to be considered a proper example for Iranian cultural institutions, to the extent that a lot of French vocabulary was introduced into the Persian language. By this means, Iranians made the acquaintance of the French Revolution, the experience of which as a model of successful social change was probably not without effect in helping to create the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Reza Shah welcomed French models for Iran in both the macro- and micro-structure of educational policies. In terms of the macro-level, he centralised the educational system by establishing uniformity of curriculum and a central bureau in Tehran for administrative affairs. In accordance with this policy, the Ministry of Education took responsibility for textbooks, and the French model of subjects and textbooks was adopted again in 1928 (Fallahi 1993: 55). In the same year, the Ministry of Education was ordered, by law, to send one hundred students abroad each year in order to make Iranian society familiar with Western values. The countries in which most students chose to study, at their universities, were: France, Britain, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany. After returning home, most of the graduates occupied key university chairs in agriculture, medicine, education and law, all of which were needed for building a modern Iran.

Centralised state education was, in fact, instituted by the Pahlavi Shah in order to carry out his “top-down” revolution, in the language of Skocpol (1979): modernisation; training manpower for the needs of government and recently established industries; and development of pre-Islamic nationalism to present the image of a unified Persian nation. There were similarities, on this issue, between Reza Shah and Napoleon’s attitude to education in France in the early nineteenth century (Archer 1979: 153). But, unlike Reza Shah, Napoleon allowed the Church to control elementary education and supported Churches financially in return for receiving the benefit of political socialisation by the Church.

Although the educational model of Iran was based on the French system, there was a major difference between them in terms of the transition to modern public education. Unlike the French system, which gradually weaned people off the

teachings of the Church, Reza Shah wanted rapidly to create a centrally controlled state education system through which he could promote ideology and nationalism, and socialise every student into a modern Iranian citizen. Although in France, the Church retained control of elementary schools for a while in parallel with the expansion of state controlled schools, Reza Shah did not allow Iranian families to make a choice between state schools or *maktabs*. In general, he ignored the important role of Islam in Iranian history and everyday life.

In the new model of schooling, there was no teaching of the Qur'an, the sacred book which Iranians had respected for nearly 1400 years, as there had been in the *maktab* and *madrasah*. Religious prayers were also eliminated from the curriculum and in practice from schools. Yet religion still played an important role in people's everyday life. Therefore, although pupils were alienated from religion at schools, they had a close relationship with it within families. As a result, the Muslim nation did not welcome the new model of education, which they viewed as a Western institution. Most children were kept back from school, particularly outside Tehran and in villages, and the illiteracy rate rose day by day. This was the opposite of what Napoleon had achieved in France in dealing with the Church.

The new educational system, at the individual level, was also adopted from France. Before Reza Shah's reform, attendance at *maktabs* and *madrasahs* was mostly for boys and men, but schools were opened to both males and females for elementary education under his reforms. Now girls could also go to schools albeit in a new style of clothing which was absolutely different from that currently worn by ordinary people. Not only did they not have to wear the veil, but they were also

expected to wear a smock, trousers, and scarf. There was also severe punishment for the students who disregarded the regulations regarding study, uniforms and behaviour.

In 1939, the six-year high school programme was divided into two periods of three years. During the first three years, pupils learned general subjects like general sciences, mathematics, Persian and a foreign language, religious teachings and some non-curricular activities. For the second period, pupils had first of all to select an area of study which interested them, from mathematics, natural sciences, literature, or home economics for girls. Their selection of each area determined their future area of study in higher education. For example, the pupils who acquired a diploma in mathematics, natural sciences and literature, could pursue, respectively, engineering, medicine and law for their study in higher education.

Higher education institutions also underwent development. Apart from the integration of existing schools into the faculties of the University of Tehran, two other Normal schools were converted to the faculties of Science and Arts as Teachers' Colleges in 1928. The growth of the teacher training colleges in these years affected the development of Normal schools in the country. In 1933, new departments of Scouting and Physical Education were also established due to Reza Shah's special interest in such areas.

Within the emerging area of technology, the expansion of postal services, telegraph and railroads persuaded the authorities to open technical schools to fulfil the needs of imported technology. The Abadan Technical School was the major one, which later became a university. According to Fallahi (1993: 56), during Reza Shah's period, thirty-six Normal schools were instituted in total. Fallahi (1993: 56) also notes that girls could enter universities for the first time in the 1930s.

Stress on secularisation in addition to the use of the country's military force for his own concerns, like seizure of lands for himself, finally led to unrest among people and eventually the exile of Reza Shah from Iran in 1941. Emphasising the long line of Persian dynasties, Reza Shah had wanted to legitimise his position as a king of Iran through the enforcement of mandatory schooling and the school curriculum. But he never succeeded, for in spite of his educational reforms, Iran still suffered from 95 per cent illiteracy in 1948 (see Baldwin 1967: 143-4).

Mohammad Reza Shah's educational policies

In 1941, Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza, who was then twenty-one years old, replaced his father. During his reign, the US strengthened its interests in Iran and supported the young king. On the other hand, because of the oil industry's situation, the Shah was not interested in developing relations with Britain. The growing relationship with the US resulted in a shifting of the educational system from the French model to the American style.

Educational policy in Iran during the reign of the last Shah can be followed through the five Development Plans conducted from 1949 onwards. Although during the first and second Development Plans, which occurred between 1949 and 1955, and between 1956 and 1962, the place of education was not evident in the Plans, there was a growth in the number of students during these years, as indicated in the table below:¹

Table 1: Growth in the Number of Students, the Percentage of each level of Education, and the Population of Iran between 1940 and 1962

Year	Primary	Secondary	University	Total	Population
1940	287,245 (90.09%)	28,196 (8.84%)	3,395 (1.07%)	318,836	12,653,338
1945	287,905 (89.64%)	29,047 (9.04%)	4,218 (1.32%)	321,170	13,875,820
1951	650,355 (87.96%)	83,507 (11.3%)	5,502 (0.74%)	739,364	16,237,000
1955	769,166 (86.24%)	112,675 (12.63%)	10,097 (1.13%)	891,938	18,095,062
1962	1,719,353 (83.03%)	326,856 (15.79%)	24,456 (1.18%)	2,070,665	23,042,867

It can be seen that there is little growth in the number of students between 1940, the penultimate year of the first Pahlavi's reign (1925-41), and 1945, four years after the beginning of the second Pahlavi's reign (1941-1979). But, compared with the growth of the population (about 117%), there is a huge growth in students' enrolments between 1945 and 1951 (about 226% at the primary level, 287% at the secondary level -- which is very considerable -- and 130% at the university levels), probably influenced by the First Development Plan (1949-1955). The growth of children's participation in education also continues between 1951 and 1955, particularly in secondary (135%) and university (about 184%) education.

During the first Development Plan, the US began to influence the Iranian educational system, since they had already had a great deal of influence through the US Embassy in Tehran. Therefore, in this period, Iranian education shifted towards the American style of education. A group of American consultants were used to review Iranian educational policy and make proposals for change in 1948. According to their recommendations, although the duration of all elementary and secondary

levels and the three different fields of study at secondary level were left intact in the new system, curriculum and textbooks were altered.

During the second Development Plan (1956-1962), there was no change in the quality of education. However, as shown by the above table, the quantitative growth is remarkable (about 224% at the primary level, 290% at the secondary level, and 242% at the university levels compared with 127% growth of the population). During this period, two important events happened in education: the foundation of private schools due to the financial inability of the Ministry of Education to respond to growth in enrolment; and the establishment of vocational schools during the last years of the Plan.

The place of education was considered for the first time during the Third Development Plan (1963-1967). In view of its important role in solving economic and social problems, education occupied nine per cent of the total plan budget. However, the educational plan went further than the Third Development Plan and became a long-term twenty-year plan announced as the 'White Revolution' in January 1962. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 'White Revolution' was considered to be a programme hoping to achieve social, economic and political reforms. For Watson (1976: 27), its major purpose had originally been to destroy feudalism completely; create equal rights for women; increase the living standards of the majority of the populace; adjust the bureaucratic and judicial policy of the country; remove inequality in the distribution of wealth; and provide education for all people. The extent to which the programme succeeded in dealing with the above-mentioned issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. But since all the Third, Fourth and Fifth Development Plans were influenced by the long-term programme of the 'White

Revolution', this chapter intends to pay special attention to the impact of the 'White Revolution' on education in pre-revolutionary years.

The Shah's White Revolution affected education greatly. According to Hiro (1985: 53-4), the size of the educational system tripled between 1963 and 1977. Secondary schools expanded to twice their previous size, mostly in technical and vocational aspects. The numbers of students in teacher training colleges and universities rose from 14,240 to 227,500 and from 24,885 to 154,215 respectively; and enrolment at foreign universities increased from 18,000 to 80,000 (Hiro 1985: 53-4). Moreover, the monopoly of males and wealthy citizens over education ended. Despite such progressive changes in education, the ideology of Western superiority over Iranians as well as the low status of villagers (which was not so clear but inherent in the new system of education) had not been completely removed from the minds of the populace, especially villagers.

One of the major characteristics of the 'White Revolution' was the creation of the Literacy Corps. Ironically, its creation, as the most dramatic manpower programme of this period, had not been a result of the Third Plan (Baldwin 1967: 147). During the Third Development Plan, 35,000 corps members were sent to about 34,000 villagers, according to Fallahi (1993: 66). They were supposed, according to Furter (1973: 11), to take responsibility for the teaching of 386,765 pupils in 11,942 classes and 72,530 adults in 3973 classes, even in the most isolated areas of Iran. But, in practice, only about 270,000 children became literate through this project (see Fallahi 1993: 66), so that the Iranian literacy rate had still not exceeded sixty per cent of the population by 1978, according to the World Almanac 1982 (see Maboudian 1996: 99).

Undoubtedly, disempowerment of villagers was a major factor which affected both literacy and public education. Although lands were taken from the landlords and distributed among peasants through the so-called 'Land-Reform' programme of 1962, as inserted in the 'White Revolution', the peasants were virtually deserted on their distributed lands. They needed equipment and other facilities for farming, but they were too expensive for the poor villagers to buy. As a result, they either sold the land or even left it and moved to the cities to seek jobs as ordinary workers in factories or the construction industry.

Yet disempowerment of peasants was only one of the factors which led to the failure of the plan. The Literacy Corps project contained other weaknesses, despite having been planned to educate all people.

Firstly, the teachers who were sent to teach the villagers had undergone no training course relevant to this difficult job. After completing high school, the boys who failed in college entrance examination, had to go to garrisons to complete a two-year period of military service. They were trained to prepare for a possible war. But after the White Revolution of 1963, these same boys, as well as girls, went to garrisons for just six months training. For the remaining one-and-a-half years, they were sent to far-off villages or small towns to teach children at elementary level in the mornings and then adults in the evenings. To teach nomads, teachers were selected among them and trained, and the nomads' own tents were used as the school facilities. This programme was called "The White Tent" and was performed with the assistance of American educational experts.

Secondly, there was no continuity or stability in the teaching process in a village - after teaching for about one year and acquiring some experience, the military

conscripts (Literacy Corps) who had been drafted into teaching were replaced by new conscripts. After completing their two-year military service, a quarter of the Literacy Corps members were recruited by the Ministry of Education to be teachers at elementary level. The villagers were still deprived of an adequate teaching service by Literacy Corps people who were recruited later, for these were now serving in urban areas: not rural regions any more.

Thirdly, the corps often lacked any motivation for teaching the villagers enthusiastically, because they just considered themselves to be completing the two-year mandatory military service. Moreover, they were students who had failed the college competition exam to continue their study in higher education, so they lacked the spirit for doing other work, and the enthusiasm for teaching.

Fourthly, they were not generally sent to areas where they wanted to go or had been familiar with. As soldiers, they were sent to remote villages where the living conditions were quite hard, having come from urban areas. The situation was worse when they could not even speak the native languages, as occasionally happened.

Fifthly, the amount of work expected of a corp member was frequently unrealistic. A corp member who normally taught several year groups (*chand-payeh*) during day-time, which would be quite tiring, also had to teach adults at night-time. Certainly, he or she would not enjoy his or her job in this case, and could not deal properly with either public or literacy education.

Finally, since in Iranian culture, particularly in rural areas, adults enjoyed special respect from youths, it was not an easy job for the corp members, who were normally teenagers, to gain the respect of village adults as their teachers.

Apart from the aforementioned problems, there were other difficulties which the Third Development Plan confronted (see Mashari, 1980). For example, the budget allocated to this educational development was not adequate, and teachers' salaries were too low to deal with such huge changes (see Baldwin: 1967). However, the programme represented a new role in the educational system of Iran: the training of manpower for assembly-line work and the services sector as well as the inculcation of proper attitudes and action towards the new economic system.

The educational system remained the same into the 1960s. Namely, the duration of both elementary and secondary levels was six years each. The secondary level was divided into two periods (cycles) of three years. The pupils went to school for five and a half days, from Saturday morning until midday Thursday. By this time, the country at large had become familiar with the process of industrialisation and modernisation, but there was no reflection of this in the curriculum and textbooks; and the schools lacked the ability to prepare the pupils in parallel with that process. Therefore, in the 1960s, the need was felt for changing the educational curriculum in response to modernisation. In other words, in order to achieve the new economy, which the Shah was promising people, new attitudes, values and life styles were required. This led to noticeable attention to revision of the educational system through the Fourth Development Plan, which appeared at the same time. The new system of education was approved in 1966, and was put into effect in 1971, according to which curricula, textbooks, teachers and schools in general had to play a very important role in the new economy.

In the new system of education, the duration of the elementary level was reduced from six to five years; the first three-year cycle of the secondary level

remained the same, but changed its title to “the guidance level”, and the duration of the second cycle increased to four years. Pupils were intended to learn theoretical issues as well as practical training during the guidance level. They had also to be recognised and measured according to their strengths and weaknesses for their position at the next level and future jobs. For this purpose, Guidance and Counselling Headquarters (*hasteh-haye moshavereh va rahnemaei*) were established in guidance schools in 1971. The counsellors were graduates in counselling from the Teacher Training Colleges. Another feature of the new system of education at that time was the establishment of ‘Vocational Schools’ (*honarestan*). Attendance here followed completion of the guidance level, rather than going to high school.

After graduating from high school, in the new system, students who failed the college entrance exam had another option which was participation in another exam for admission to Teacher Training Colleges for guidance schools. The duration of these colleges was two years, and, after graduation, students acquired a Higher Diploma (*Fovgh-Diplom*) degree (between the first degree and A-level) in the special subject they had studied. Unfortunately, this new system also failed to meet the goals of establishing the ‘Guidance and Counselling Headquarters’ and of training manpower for meeting the needs of industries. There were still weaknesses and shortages in the fields of technology, science, teaching, and engineering. However, there had been a dramatic increase in the number of students in higher education during the Fourth Development Plan, from 60,000 students at the beginning of the plan to 115,311 at the end (Fallahi 1993: 70).

Mehran (1988) attributes this failure to the ‘dependent’ state of Iranian government at that time in all aspects of politics, economy, culture, and education.

Indeed, she explains all social and educational changes in Iran in that period as the result of the Shah's personal dependency on the USA. In her view, the dependent political and economic system required a dependent educational system which was not capable of meeting the needs of people and independent modernisation. But her explanation can be criticised for interpreting 'dependency' in mainly personal terms, thereby omitting more structural notions of dependency in the world-system of nation states.

For Mehran, the new Iranian educational system was not responsible for training a high-level skilled labour force for dependent industry, but training of middle-level industrial manpower was good enough. Indeed, skilled labour required for the imported assembly industry was also acquired by importing skilled technicians. Moreover, the services sector, which was going to have a massive share of the new economy, directly affected education, particularly higher education, because, according to Mehran (1988), 35.1 per cent of students were enrolled in the humanities and social sciences, in comparison with 22.3 per cent in engineering, 12.4 per cent in medical sciences, and 4.4 percent in agriculture in 1976.

During the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978), oil prices increased and this caused an economic improvement in the country which had positive effects on education. Providing free education for all became one of the major aims of the authorities. The vocational education curriculum was expanded, and was supported financially by the Ministry of Labour. Moreover, the number of students increased at all levels. In brief, as Rashedi (1984: 210-11) points out, Iranian education enjoyed more than ten-fold growth between 1953 and 1977. However, he describes this as a

result of the huge oil income of Iran at that time, rather than the Shah's 'dynamic character of leadership'.

Ideologically, the second Pahlavi Shah played on the Iranian national character for the development of Iran, as his father had done before. Nonetheless, Mohammad Reza Shah, unlike his father, had to confront a different ideology, the empowerment of the people, during the premiership of Dr Mohammad Mosaddiq. This ideology was similar to the spirit behind 1890 Tobacco Boycott, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the later Revolution of 1979. Not surprisingly, there is no sign of the people's empowerment ideology in textbooks of the Shah's reign, as Maboudian (1996: 87-8) claims. Instead, the school textbooks and curriculum represented the legitimisation of the Shah's government as the shadow of God and the father of the nation, and aimed to make the readers believe in the rebuilding of the Persian Empire. After sketching the impacts of the 'White Revolution' on education, Maboudian (1996: 110) concludes as follows: '... the nation was not unified by the Shah's educational reform within his White Revolution. Instead, it made the idea of an Islamic Republic of Iran as an autonomous nation, which rejected the West and valued its own culture as superior in morality, a welcome change.'

Mohsenpour (1988), who was director of the Bureau of Research on International Educational Systems of the Ministry of Education in Iran, also criticises some of the ideological aspects of the pre-revolutionary educational system. He (1988: 77-9) claims that 'weakening the religious beliefs and spreading atheism and polytheistic teachings' had been a common ideological aim of both the Shah and the leftists. In his view, this was done through the curriculum and teaching programme, mostly social science textbooks. In order to prove this, he (1988: 78) quotes from a

second-grade sociology textbook of the secondary level, published in 1975, to the effect that religion 'is imposed on human beings'. Mohsenpour (1988: 78-9) also claimed that 'Marxism formed the cornerstone of the social science textbooks of the guidance cycle as well as of secondary schools. It can be concluded that atheistic ideology was taught more in schools than in universities during the reign of the Shah.'

Yet, ironically, Mohsenpour (1988: 80) also describes education as "a vehicle for transmitting the principles of capitalism to Iranian students" through the textbooks for such subjects as mathematics.

In Mohsenpour's opinion, the textbooks were not the only means of inculcating the ideology of capitalism through education; the establishment of 'private schools', special orders and programmes had also been designed to favour the capitalistic way of life and Western culture. He (1988: 77) cites the main purpose of establishing private schools as 'to plant elitism'.

Preventing female students and teachers from wearing the veil and 'modest Islamic dress' (*hijab*) in schools, according to Mohsenpour (1988: 76), had also been designed to allow Western culture to infiltrate Iran: 'A decree abolishing the Islamic modest dress was passed by Reza Shah in 1938 and was seriously implemented in the schools. Stories, tales, activities, games, and even toys and dolls that were used in kindergartens and schools belonged to Western culture.'

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the policies underlying successive attempts to build an effective education system in Iran have all reflected prevailing ideologies and power relations. The close association forged by Mohammad Reza Shah between Iran and

the USA was particularly important in so far as it helped to create the conditions in which the development of education could be framed in overwhelmingly secular terms. As Chapter Three argued, resistance to, and resentment against, this form of secularisation eventually fed into the forces which deposed the Shah and paved the way for revolution in 1979. The following Chapters will trace the revolution's impact on the policy and practice of school-level education in the past nineteen years.

ENDNOTE

¹ Original data for primary, secondary, and university students have been adapted from Fallahi (1993: 61-2), and the numbers of the population for the indicated years have been calculated approximately by the author of this thesis by referring to 'Islamic Republic of Iran' (1998: 33).

Chapter Five

POST-1979 RE-ORGANISATION OF EDUCATION IN IRAN

Institutional Changes

The Islamic Revolution, as a cultural movement, has shown special consideration towards educational changes since the early days of its establishment. Not surprisingly, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the first institution whose changes were regarded as a major force for abolishing dependency on the West was the educational system. Even before the victory of the revolution, education had engaged the leader's attention as an instrument for making huge changes in all aspects of society. Therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini, condemning the Pahlavi kings' crime, announced in his first speech, in Tehran's cemetery, after returning home: 'We will replace all prisons with schools' (see Fallahi 1993: 30). In another speech, in the early years of the revolution, addressing the members of the Council of Cultural Revolution, he asserted: 'One of the very important problems is the fundamental changes in programmes especially those related to the educational system' (see Fallahi 1993: 30).

The struggle by the regime to change the educational system was intensified in April 1980, when the universities were closed in order to rid higher education of the influence of the East and the West, and to bring out the Islamisation of the universities. According to Sobhe (1987), the great stress on post-graduate studies in the Cultural Revolution of 1980 was the basic difference between the Iranian revolution and those of China and the Soviet Union.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iranian universities became centres for the open discussion of ideas between various political groups, according to Maleki' (1997). Such groups are classified by the author of the present thesis according to their identified ideologies, i.e. Islamism, Marxism and neo-Islamism.

(i) Islamists were those who unquestioningly favoured all of Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas (*khatt-e Imam*) and the authority of the clergy (*rahbariyat-e ruhaniyat*). Their ideal style of regime had been 'the Islamic Republic' (and nothing else '*faqat jomhuri-e eslami- na yek kalameh kam va na yek kalameh ziyad*'), which was approved during the referendum of 1 April, 1979. Among students, they were usually went under the title of 'the Islamic Society of Students' (*anjoman-e eslami-e daneshjouyan*).

(ii) The ideal of Leftists had been the establishment of a "People's Democratic Republic" in Iran. Various examples of leftist world governments were favoured by different leftist groups: the regimes of Soviet Union, China, Albania, Cuba, etc. as well as all ideologies of Marxism, Maoism, Leninism, Islamic Marxism, etc. Some leftist organisations of students in the universities were: "*daneshjouyan-e democrat*" (Democrat Students), supporters of "*hezb-e tudeh*" (Mass Party); "*daneshjouyan-e pishgam*" (Forerunner Students), supporters of "*sazman-e cherik-haye fedaei-e khalq-e iran*" (Organisation for Iranian People's Devotee Guerrillas).

(iii) Neo-Islamists were identified as 'a third path' (*khatt-e sevvom*). Contrary to Islamists, their preferred form of Islam could not be found in the traditional religious schools (*hovzeh*), and the body of the clergy (*ruhaniyat*) was not accepted as a real example of 'dynamic Islam' (*islam-e puya*), already defined by "Nakhshab-Taliqani-Shari'ati". The 'Islamic Democratic Republic' had been an ideal system of

government for all the neo-Islamic political groups. Such ideas were supported in universities by partisans of various student organisations such as “*jonbesh-e daneshjouyan-e mosalman*” (the Movement of Muslim Students), who were in fact supporters of “*jonbesh-e mosalmanan-e mobarez*” (the Movement of Champion Muslims).

In that period there was no parity between universities and the rest of the society in terms of the percentage of the population who supported the Islamic government. An interview with a witness of the events of that time made clear that the first group (Islamist students) had only acquired about twenty per cent of votes in a free election for representatives of students in the ‘University Council’ (*shora-ye daneshgah*). In addition, while the Islamist students were engaged in some marginal political activities outside the universities, the Marxist and neo-Islamist groups took advantage of the universities as the most important bases for anti-regime propaganda and the recruitment of new members.

Such developments were not desirable for the Islamic authorities, their supporters in the universities, i.e. the members of ‘the Islamic Society of Students’ (*anjoman-ha-ye eslami-e daneshjouyan*) or the masses, therefore the policy of ‘closing universities’ for the purposes of ‘cultural revolution’ was adopted. While the Islamist students supported the idea of ‘closing universities’, the leftist students were absolutely opposed to it. On the other hand, the neo-Islamist students, rejecting the closure of universities, instead favoured a ‘shift’ (*tahavvol*) in the educational system of Iran, which should meet national, not capitalist, interests and needs. Despite resistance, the evacuation of universities began on April 22nd 1980. The activities of all the opposition political groups were terminated, and all universities were formally

closed on 5 June 1980 for the purpose of a 'cultural revolution' for about three years. They were gradually re-opened after changes were made in the principles of university management, students' selection and employment of academics, to the benefit of the ruling Islamic ideology.

The shifts which occurred in higher education, in the manner explained above, never happened in general education. The necessity of rapid institutional change in higher education was urgently identified because of the activities of the political opposition, directed by their strong headquarters in the universities. In schools, however, there were no headquarters for the opposition and, as a result, no resistance to the ruling Islamic authorities. When the universities were closed, a council was directly appointed by the Islamic leader of Iran to review the educational system and propose the desired changes. This council was called "the Council of the Cultural Revolution" and concentrated mainly on Islamisation of the universities. Under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, the above-mentioned council appointed another council to review the elementary and secondary levels of education and recommended the required changes. The latter was called "the Council for Fundamental Changes in the Educational System". The final proposals of this council were published in the spring of 1989.

Institutional changes in line with the Islamic ideology occurred very smoothly in most schools. The most influential revolutionary agency in general education, in both Local Education Authorities (LEA) and schools, was 'Moral Education' (*omur-e tarbiati*). It caused other offices in educational departments to realign their activities with the required Islamic demands. For instance, members would attend 'collective prayers' (*namaz-e jama'at*) which had been instituted in state departments after the

revolution. The Office of 'Moral Education' in the LEAs was also in charge of the identification of appropriate teachers, among existing teachers of any subject, to send to schools. Firstly, they were to teach the curriculum of 'Islamic Education' and Qur'an; and, secondly, they were to control ideologically the daily affairs of schools. According to Mohsenpour (1988: 81), 'more than 18,000 committed instructors [Moral Teachers] who [we]re duty bound to Islamic principles and teachings supervise[d] extracurricular activities to help the students purify themselves morally.'

The conduct of 'collective prayers' for secondary school pupils was one of their duties. In girls' secondary schools, the implementation of sex-segregation policies between male teachers and students was another important task for them. Furthermore, since the enrolment of supporters for the opposition political groups mostly took place among the pupils or students of secondary schools and colleges, moral education teachers were expected to identify these supporters in schools and advise them to adopt beliefs and values in accordance with Islamic ideology. The members of the 'Islamic Society of Students', established after the revolution in secondary schools, helped 'moral teachers' to achieve their moral and ideological purposes.

Because teachers were to play a core role, as the Prophets did, in guiding (*hedayat*) individuals in the post-revolutionary educational policy of Iran, the criteria of their selection (*gozinesh*) had to be of an even higher standard than that of universities, in terms of ideology. All pre-revolutionary teacher training colleges, '*danesh-sara*', were immediately dissolved after the revolution. Some other teacher training colleges, now called "*marakez-e tarbiat-e mo'allemin*", were later established in greater numbers than before and with new criteria of selection.

As a result, any shift in the educational system, whether higher education or general education, was intended to help youths and children to resocialise culturally and politically. Special attention to 'moral education' was a very effective policy and was employed at all levels of both higher and general education. In general education, courses on morality and ethics were added to the official curriculum. Also in higher education, students in every field of study had to pass some courses in morality and Islamic beliefs when the universities were re-opened.

In terms of gender policies, Moghissi (1997: 135) believes that women's presence in education was reduced, and their functions were restricted to specific jobs, like 'wifely and motherly roles and their domestic responsibilities' in the rewritten textbooks. In Moghissi's view, the institution of annual competitions for reciting the Qur'an and of female militia (*basij*) in schools were other ways of socialising females according to Islamic ideology. With regard to higher education, women were also banned or restricted from studying some subjects of study in universities and colleges by 1985.

One thing which the Council of the Cultural Revolution was concerned to review was the curriculum. The Council divided the areas of study into five sections: 1) humanities and social sciences; 2) agriculture; 3) engineering and technology; 4) medicine; and 5) basic and applied sciences. Not surprisingly, the field which was most heavily criticised by the members of the Council and subsequently re-designed was that of humanities and social sciences, as it was believed to be the most influenced by Western values. Of course, some Islamic courses were also added to fields of study in the universities in order to impress Islamic ideology upon students, to protect the future of society.

Economic Situations

The economic situation of Iran was weakened by the following factors, which occurred either before, during or after the 1979 revolution: strikes at many institutions, worker riots, withdrawal of investments by foreign countries, nationalisation of private companies, the handing-over of management from experienced technocrats to young new employees, and a prolonged war between Iraq and Iran. This affected not only the poorly-paid teachers' economic situation, but also the situation of all white-collar workers and the average-income middle classes. However, as Bahari (1989: 1) says, the number of beggars in the streets had declined and, as many revolutionaries believed, the people still enjoyed a better life than they had before the Revolution. This happened despite the above factors, in addition to the doubling of the pre-revolutionary population, a rise in the rate of unemployment, the dramatic decline of oil prices after the Revolution and increasing inflation. This shows that the new revolutionary authorities were concerned with the improvement of people's living conditions, at least those of the lower classes, but whether they succeeded in fulfilling their wishes is another matter.

In these economic conditions, the life of Iranian teachers gradually worsened to such an extent that during the fieldwork conducted by the present author (in 1995-6) criticism of their situation had become commonplace. Even the official radio station of Iran described the teachers' survival as a miracle (*mo'ajezeh*) in its satirical programmes like 'Nightline' (*rah-e shab*). The teachers themselves agreed with this description because their normal expenditure exceeded the salaries they received from the LEA.

It therefore followed that most teachers, and even other white-collar workers, had to supplement their income by moonlighting. This was very noticeable when the present author attempted to conduct or continue interviews with teachers out of school time. Of course, such moonlighting could not have been confined to the years 1995-6, when the present author conducted his fieldwork, and this there had been discussed in the literature. According to Simpson, quoted in Bahari (1989: 2):

‘The real victims of the revolution have been the average-income middle class: the office-workers and teachers and civil servants. . . . a single job is often insufficient to provide enough money to cope with the naggingly high inflation. I have met teachers who are taxi drivers in their spare time, and taxi drivers who double as night porters, and night porters who are training as teachers.’

According to Bahari (1989), there was still high demand for educated employees in the open market. Professionals including teachers, especially in some subjects, were likely to be attracted to the market and to have a good chance of selling their knowledge in business, agriculture, industry and private institutions rather than in state schools.

Most of these moonlighters usually sought a second job, or more, to meet their basic needs in the face of rising living costs, or financial security against the costs of both unpredictable events, like serious illnesses and funerals, and predictable issues, like studying expenses and wedding costs of a member of family. Employers were normally expected not to encourage moonlighting among their employees, to the extent that some managers even may forbade working outside their institution. This was because moonlighting was seen to cause ‘higher absenteeism, less enthusiasm for

the primary job, increased fatigue and reduced productivity' (Bahari 1989: 3).

Nevertheless, Bahari (1989: 2-4) remarks that the Iranian educational authorities paid little attention towards the increasing number of moonlighting teachers in Iran.

New Philosophy of Education

Before we can understand the goals of education in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is necessary to consider its new philosophy of education. The philosophy of education tries to answer the following basic questions: 'what is the nature of the human being, and who are we aiming to educate? Where does the perfection of human beings lie? What is the identity and nature of the society in which education is pursued? Which value is the highest? How do we make a better life? And what is the end of a good life?'² (Taghi-Pour Zahir 1991: 111)

Despite the existence of many beliefs concerning the purity or impurity of the human soul by many religions and scholars, Islam maintains the duality of human nature. In this view, human beings contain both spiritual and material aspects. In the Qur'anic language, the spiritual aspect is called '*nafs-e lavvameh*', which aims toward truth, beauty, justice, perfection, benevolence and so on, and which makes it possible for human beings to reach the highest possible state. The other part of humans, according to the Qur'an, is titled '*nafs-e ammareh*', which tends towards immorality, performance of a crime or sin, baseness and so on, and which pushes humans to fall to the lowest place imaginable. Such a classification of the soul is reflected in the Persian mystic literature, expressed by famous poets like Rumi, Hafiz and Sa'di; and even in Islamic philosophy, as explained by Avicenna and Sohrevardi.

The presence of 'will' (*erاده*) in human nature, according to the Islamic interpretation, enables humans to select either the way of '*lavvameh*' or '*ammareh*'. The significance of education in guiding humans towards goodness and away from badness now becomes clear. Ali Shari'atmadari, a member of 'the Council of Cultural Revolution' and a famous theorist of post-revolutionary educational policies, remarked, according to Mehran (1990: 55): 'Muslims believe that the presence or lack of education can make a difference in the choice of humans, since it is through the acquisition of knowledge that they are made aware of the freedom and responsibility of choice'. Therefore only *correct* and timely education is able to discover the potential of individuals and direct their abilities towards freedom, away from the low, materialistic, and tempting carnal desires, and, as a result, to attain the unity of lover, loved, and love "*ettehad-e ashegh, mashough, va eshgh*" (see Mehran 1988: 320-3).

On the other hand, any change in a society can only follow shifts in the individuals' souls, according to the existing interpretation of Islam. The supporters of such a theory derive it from the Qur'anic verse: 'Truly God will not change a people's lot until they change what is in their souls' (13: 11). The individual members of society should take on the responsibility of changing their society by changing their beliefs and ideas. In other words, 'building oneself lies at the core of any attempt to reconstruct a new society and establish a new moral order', as Ayatollah Khomeini advised the nation (Mehran 1990: 56). Describing the nature of 'society', the Islamic intellectual, Ayatollah Taleqani also remarked:

'... [S]ociety is nothing but a composite of individuals and it is the spiritual and moral qualities of individuals that determine or change

social goals. . . . As the character of individuals' thoughts and spirits change, social relations and the character of society change correspondingly . . .' (See Mehran 1988: 3)

Given these ideas about the nature of 'human beings' and 'society', it is now understandable why the Islamic Republic of Iran paid special attention to education and schooling as ways to change the future structure of society, by re-shaping individuals in accordance with the new value system.

The post-revolutionary authorities took advantage of the Iranian students' alienation from the earlier regime and attempted to build an educational system which could produce students who believed and trusted the Islamic government and who believed that, unlike in the previous regime, the Islamic authorities were *from* the people and the *servers* (*khedmat-gozar*) of them. They suggested that since the Islamic ideology had its roots in the people's culture, an educational system which contained Islamic values and ideology would really meet the people's needs.

Revolution in Values

In contrast to the Pahlavi's emphasis on the ancient civilisation of Iran, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 produced the maxim 'our revolution is an ideological revolution, a revolution in values', like many other revolutions (see Wallace 1956). This was reflected in the decision to replace the sign of 'a lion with a sword in his hand and a crown backed by a rising sun' with the word 'Allah', on the national emblem (see Mohsenpour 1988). Ba-honar, the Education Minister and then the Prime Minister in the early years of the revolution, described the movement of 1979 as: 'A revolution in the cultural, intellectual and social essence of this nation, and its value system. It is

not a change of the political system alone...the cultural pattern of the nation has changed' (see Mehran 1990: 53). For this reason the Islamic Revolution of 1979, as an 'ideological revolution' or 'a revolution in values', paid special attention to training and teaching young people according to religious values in both higher and general education, changing textbooks, curriculum, administration, and institutions. Moreover, pre-revolutionary school names, which were thought to serve the Pahlavi's interests, were changed to those of traditional and modern religious personalities favoured by the ruling Islamic ideology.

Moreover, since the Iranian Revolution was a Third-World revolution in nature, it was inclined to cut the roots of political, economic and cultural dependence and foreign domination. In order to study the schooling system of Iran after the revolution, one should therefore examine the effects of the fact that the revolution was 'a revolution in values' and a Third-World revolution in the educational-value system. In other words, the main aim of the Islamic Republic of Iran as regards schooling was to produce young people who, firstly, recognise their Islamic identity, and, secondly, who oppose the interference and control of foreigners over domestic issues. These two aims, according to Mehran (1990: 54), played a significant role in formulating the educational principles of post-revolutionary Iran.

Purification and Commitment

The basic principles of Islamic education call for 'purification' and 'commitment' as responses to questions about the nature of human beings. Purification (*tazkiah*), defined as the cleansing of the soul, has been taken into consideration in the educational system of Iran because of the religious nature of the revolution and the

necessity of creating a new moral order to replace the old values, after 1979. The term 'purification', apart from the moral and traditional meaning of cleansing which covers individuals' private and personal lives, was also used in a political context to mean the purging (*tasfieh*) of unwanted 'counter-revolutionaries' from state organisations. Both forms of purification, *tazkieh* and *tasfieh*, have been stressed in the post-revolutionary education of Iran.

Purification of the soul (*tazkieh*) has been taught in different ways in schools: by the attempt to appoint pious teachers, in all subjects and administrators, to impart their experience to students and pupils in classrooms; the publication of Qur'anic verses or Persian mystic literature which call for purification in textbooks; printing or hanging papers which quote pious quotations from famous religious personalities on the walls of schools; the establishment of *jama'at* prayers in schools and the attempt to take students to the Friday prayers and so on. The content of education has similarly been purified in order to represent the ideology of the new government instead of the previous one. And the educational institutions were purified and cleansed of the administrators, teachers and students marked as 'counter-revolutionaries', 'agents of foreigners and imperialism' and 'enemies of Islam'. Inspired by the Qur'an, therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini announced: 'training and purification is prior to instruction' (*Tarbiyat va tazkiyeh moqaddam bar ta'lim ast*)³. This statement was written on walls in almost all streets of cities and towns as a post-revolutionary educational principle.

By the ideological interpretation of some religious texts, the term 'commitment' (*ta'ahhod*) also entered the post-revolutionary literature. According to this interpretation, every Muslim should care of, and take responsibility for, not only

his or her own religiosity, but also his or her Muslim brothers and sisters. By making no distinction between religion and politics, the authorities gradually began to use the term 'commitment' to describe the people who were loyal to the ruling Islamic ideology. 'Commitment' was further popularised, when the authorities used it in Islamising the universities (*islami kardan-e daneshgah-ha*).

In the eyes of the religious leaders, both commitment and expertise were necessary for cultivating Islamic education. In Ayatollah Khomeini's terms, they were 'two wings without one of which flying would be impossible' (Mehran 1990: 56). However, if someone were to ask them which one is more useful for the society, they would undoubtedly prefer the committed individual who is faithful to the revolution. It was reasoned that 'commitment' might be able to bring about 'expertise', but 'expertise' could not produce 'commitment'. In Ayatollah Khomeini's view, education without commitment is what the majority of educated people enjoyed during the Shah's reign, but this educational order could not bring about 'committed individuals, people concerned with the welfare of their country and prepared to overlook their narrow personal interests' (see Mehran 1990: 55).

In an interview with Mehran (1990: 57), Gholam-ali Haddad Adel sees the greatest difference between the present education system in Iran and other educational systems in two features: 'religious commitment and emphasis on abiding by Islamic principles'. For the Islamic Republic, therefore, only a committed and doctrinaire expert (*motakhasses-e maktabi*) is desirable, not just any expert. Mehran (1990: 56) adds that the model citizen of the Islamic Republic should actually possess three qualities of expertise (*takhassos*), commitment (*ta'ahhod*) and true piety (*mazhab*). In Mehran's view, the Islamic Revolution of Iran is similar in this respect to the Cultural

Revolution of China where expertise and specialisation came after 'redness', devotion to Maoism and support of the Chinese Revolution.

Educational Goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In 1971, the objectives of the Iranian educational system, which were summarised for the Paris bureau by the Iranian Commission for UNESCO, were divided into six elements: social, economic, political, cultural, health and ethical. The post-revolutionary educational goals, which were inspired by the new philosophy of education and announced by the Ministry of Education in 1983, were divided into five categories of: the spiritual, cultural-scientific, social, political and economic.

According to Haddad Adel, the ultimate goal of the post-revolutionary educational system 'has been the transformation of the schooling system from a secular, material and dependent state during the Shah's regime to a religious and self-reliant one. Creating true Muslims whose expertise will lead the country to independence and wipe the shameful stain of ignorance and backwardness from the Islamic nation' (Mehran 1990: 58). This is completely different from the pre-revolutionary educational system, the main aim of which, according to Iran's Ministry of Education, was: 'preparing the individual for a desirable personal and social life' by paying attention to 'particular needs of the youngsters and the adolescents in the different stages of their development and by considering their educational and occupational objectives' (Mehran 1990: 58). However, the present Iranian educational authorities claim that they also consider the personal educational needs, interests, and capacities of the pupils which are needed for national development.

A comparison of the stated educational goals between before and after 1979 indicates that while both educational systems are involved in having political and ideological direction and in keeping the youth loyal to the ruling power, there is a marked difference between them in terms of the nature and the extent of ideology. Given the open announcement by the Islamic government of the political state of education, it should not be overlooked that schooling during the former regime had also been both political and ideological (Nafisi 1992; Siavoshi 1995), although this could never be said in public.

Following Mohsenpour (1988: 85-6) the educational goals of the Islamic Republic, approved by the High Council of Education, can be summarised as follows:

- ‘1. The ideals of education in the Islamic Republic of Iran should strengthen the beliefs of students with respect to (a) oneness with god; (b) prophethood and revelation; (c) resurrection and its constructive role in the journey of human beings toward God; (d) justice of God; (e) Imamate and the leadership of the pure Imams; and (f) the dignity of humanity, its superior role, its freedom, and its responsibility before God.
2. Spiritual goal include (a) explaining the principles and the decrees of Islam; (b) fostering the moral development of children based on belief in God and virtue; and (c) strengthening the spirit of investigation and innovation in the fields of science, technology, culture, and Islamic affairs.
3. Scientific and cultural goals include (a) helping students discover the mysteries of the cosmos; (b) discovering the cause-and-effect

relations of natural phenomena for the purpose of accumulation of knowledge and technology as well as for utilisation of the knowledge and the experiences of human beings; (c) maintaining continuous development of schools and technology in the fields of agriculture, industry, and military affairs; (d) training committed and skilful manpower for all aspects of the development of the country; (e) making students familiar with Islamic teachings; (f) nurturing the artistic aptitudes as well as the aesthetic abilities of the students; (g) teaching the Persian language and scripts as well as the Arabic language to familiarise students with the Koran and Islamic instructions; and (h) creating a feeling of participation in a continuous teaching and learning process.

4. Social goals include (a) protecting the sacredness of family relations based on the Islamic faith; (b) extending and strengthening Islamic brotherhood and co-operation as well as strengthening national unity; (c) ensuring the existence of social, economic, and cultural justice; (d) building respect for the law; and (e) making people aware of the importance and the value of education and its goals; (f) cultivating the spirit of charity and ‘commanding the good and forbidding the evil’ as a collective duty and mutual responsibility.⁴

5. Political goals include (a) accepting the absolute rule of God over the world and human beings; (b) uniting all Muslim nations; (c) struggling against any kind of tyranny and domination and securing political independence; (d) strengthening the nation’s defence capacity

through military training in educational institutions for the purpose of ensuring the independence of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and (e) giving careful consideration to physical education.

6. Economic goals include (a) training students to participate in agriculture, industrial production, and husbandry to lead the country toward self-sufficiency; (b) creating a spirit of content and avoiding lavish practices in all aspects of the economy; (c) creating a spirit of respect for legal ownership; and (d) observing the principle of hygiene and protection of the environment as a public duty.'

All shifts in curriculum, textbooks, administration, social relationships, gender policies, and so on must be understood in the context of these goals. Changes in the curriculum, textbooks and gender relations are worthy of special attention.

Curriculum and Textbooks

In Iran, state-produced textbooks have played major roles in the teaching of the curriculum at all educational levels both before and after the revolution (see Nafisi 1992; Siavoshi 1995; Mohsenpour 1988). Given the importance attached to education by the Islamic authorities and the crucial significance of textbooks in educational policies, most activities in the first year of the Revolution concentrated on revising the textbooks provided by the Pahlavis. However, the textbooks are still revised almost every year. Although educational officials claim that all curricula and textbooks were basically revised after the revolution, some research suggests that only forty per cent of elementary schools' textbooks' content and just ten per cent of the content of all

general education textbooks' are different from the pre-revolutionary textbooks (Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffri 1994: 36). Since most of these changes have affected the subjects of religion, literature and the social sciences (in general, humanities), rather than mathematics and science, it can be assumed that the changes are mostly in the inclusion of Islamic ideology in the curriculum, to meet the new educational philosophy and goals.

The great significance of Islamic ideology becomes clearer still when Haddad Adel (1997) explains the Arabs' changing status in Iranian curricula and textbooks during both pre- and post-revolutionary periods. In his paper, Haddad Adel distinguishes the principles ruling post-revolutionary textbooks from those before the revolution. However, all the textbooks and curricula were state-provided during both regimes. It is worth remembering that Haddad Adel has been a Deputy Minister of Education and has been effectively involved in editing school textbooks and shifting the curriculum since the first years of the revolution. He describes the major characteristics of pre-revolutionary textbooks as follows:

- '1) Priority of Iranian nationality over Islamic religiosity in defining the identity of the Iranian nation past and present.
- 2) Putting extraordinary significance on pre-Islamic Iran (the ancient Iran) and praising its culture and ideals without citing its political and social corruption.
- 3) Description of the Arab conquest of Iran as the invasion by a barbaric and savage nation of a great civilisation, and the introduction of Arabs as being responsible for the backwardness of both ancient and present-day Iran.

- 4) Total neglect of the Muslim and, as a result, Arab world.
- 5) Unquestioning imitation of the West, especially the US, concerning the issue of Arabs and Israel.
- 6) Depiction of the attempt to introduce “Shi’ism” as an Iranian reaction against the Arabs’ invasion of Iran.’

In contrast to the pre-revolutionary educational principles for textbooks, Haddad Adel summarises the principles approved by the Islamic government since 1979 as follows:

- ‘1) Avoidance of contradiction between ‘Iranian nationality’ and ‘Islamic religiosity’, taking Islam into account as not just one of the bases, but as the fundamental base (*rokn-e rakin*), of ‘Iranian nationality’; and maintaining compatibility between the foundation of Islam and other national foundations such as language and customs of the national tradition.
- 2) Avoiding too much praise of ancient Iran, but encouraging the critical investigation of social and political events which occurred in pre-Islamic Iran.
- 3) Giving the reasons for the collapse of the Sassanid’s governments as the results of the weakness of the government; the faith power of recently converted Arabs to Islam; the truth-seeking of Iranians and their unhappiness with the Sassanid’s dynasty.
- 4) The introduction of Iranian society into the great family of the ‘Islamic nation’ (*ummat-e eslami*), another member of which is Arabic

society; and paying special attention to this member (Arabic society) because of its geographic proximity to Iran.

5) Adoption of an Islamic and independent political position on the issue of Arabs and Israel; defence of Palestinian ideals and definite opposition to the political policies of Western states, especially America, in this regard.'

Inspired by the above-mentioned principles, Iranian post-revolutionary textbooks, according to Haddad Adel (1997), had the following ideological character in terms of nationalism, Islamism, and Arabism:

a) Iran is identified as 'Islamic Iran' (*iran-e eslami*) in the textbooks, through which various manifestations of belief in Islam, in both past and present-day Iran, are presented to students in various forms.

b) Ancient Iran is no longer described as the lost paradise of Iranians, in textbooks. Although some positive aspects of the pre-Islamic Iran are implied, its social, intellectual and moral corruption are emphasised.

c) 'Kingship' (*shahanshahi*) is no longer seen as a gift from heaven, totally innocent, but is introduced in textbooks as the major factor for the Iranian nation's misfortune and disasters both past and present because of its essentially dictatorial nature. Instead, the role of both Islam in the promotion of Iranian society and Iranians in the flowering of Islamic culture and civilisation is emphasised in the textbooks.

d) In the textbooks, the Iranian nation (*mellat-e iran*) is introduced as a member of the Islamic community of nations (*ummat-e islam*). There is no more ethnic exclusivism or chauvinist thought in the curriculum, attributed to the Qur'anic

verses of '*enna akramakom endallah atqakom*' (. . . surely the most honourable of you with Allah is the one among you most careful [of his duty] . . .) (49: 13) and

'ennama'l mo'amenoon-a ekhvah' (The believers are but brethren, . . .) (49: 10).

That is, all Muslims are seen as the same as each other and brothers with each other, according to Haddad Adel. Therefore, solidarity of all Muslims is considered in all curricula as a basic principle.

More and better views of Arabs are presented in the textbooks. Despite the eight-year war imposed on Iran by Iraq, as an Arab country, and despite many Arab countries' support of Iraq, Arabs are not accused as the originators of such a war in the textbooks. Moreover, Arabs are not mentioned as the responsible and guilty people, even in lessons which explain Bloody Friday, during which many Iranian pilgrims were killed in Mecca. According to Haddad Adel, this is because the Islamic Republic is not concerned with creating hatred and divisions between Iranians and Arabs.

More significantly, 'Arabic Literature' has entered all post-primary curricula in any subject of study up to higher education. The curriculum of 'Arabic Literature', for Haddad Adel, is important in terms of Iran-Arab relations for two reasons: firstly, it paves the way for the possibility of future Iranian generations to have a dialogue with the Arab world; secondly, since the course contains some modern and traditional Arabic literature, Iranians will become culturally familiar with Arabic treasures of literature.

e) As the most important change concerning Arabs in the post-revolutionary curriculum, in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period, Haddad Adel chooses courses related to the 'Holy Land' (Palestine) and the issue of Arab-Israel relations.

At all educational levels and in many textbooks (particularly those of 'Persian Literature', 'Religious Education', 'History', and 'Arabic Literature'), various courses have been included about Zionism; the occupation of Palestine; the tragic fate of the Palestinians and more recently the people of Lebanon and Arab or Muslim nations overcoming their occupiers.

f) In the post-revolutionary textbooks, "Shi'ism" is not introduced as an Iranian reaction against the Arabs' invasion. Rather, according to Haddad Adel, Shi'ism is shown to have different origins from those assumed by the nationalists. Finally, to the question of why Arabs became so important in the post-revolutionary Iranian national curriculum, Haddad Adel (1997) responds:

' . . . Islam is the principal motive for considering Arabs in the textbooks. The relations between Islam as well as the Qur'an and the Arabic language, the birth and growth of Islam in Arabic lands, and the mixture of the early history of Islam with the history and geography of Arab lands have caused Arabs to have a . . . considerable presence in textbooks. . . . It can be guessed that Iranian presence in the Arabic countries' textbooks would be less than Arabs' presence in the Iranian textbooks. This is because if Islam has caused Iranians to pay attention to Arabs, there is no such necessity for Arabs in relation to Iranians. . . '

This influence of Islamic ideology is so strong that Iraq's role in all the disastrous events of the eight-year war and the war's later problems for Iran are completely ignored in the curriculum, simply because Iraq is an Arab country. In other words, since Arabia was the cradle of Islam, the original roles of Saddam Hossein and other Arab leaders in the creation and continuity of the eight-year war are

implicitly suppressed for the sake of highlighting Islamic solidarity between Arabs and Iranians, according to Haddad Adel (see category “*d*”).

Women’s Education

Along with the alteration of curriculum and textbooks, the new educational authorities initiated two other educational shifts which were both related to the views of the Islamic government on gender: conversion of mixed-sex schools to single-sex ones, and the introduction of an Islamic dress code for girls in schools. These two actions led to the assumption that the educational policies concerning gender would affect women’s equal right of enjoying education in terms of both quality and quantity, especially in rural areas and in some particular subjects like mathematics and science.

Research has been conducted to determine the impact of the above gender regulations on women’s education. Such research has mostly studied women’s education in terms of women’s access to general education, higher education, literacy, and the educational content of the curriculum and textbooks. Yet, in order to understand the impact of sex-segregation on women’s education, much more information is required. This is because educational issues are not just restricted to the above-mentioned categories.

Iranian women undoubtedly participate in schooling, and their rights of enrolment in education are acknowledged by the Islamic government authorities. Yet, their equal access to schooling is a matter for debate, as in many other countries. Historically, both traditional and modern educational institutions had been either established exclusively for males or at least highly male-dominated. Female schooling had always followed males’ education. Nonetheless, there has been

dramatic progress in Iran on women's enrolment in education in the last few decades, beginning in the Pahlavi period, although the number still lags behind men's enrolment to some extent. Such progress is illustrated in Table 2 by comparing the percentages of women's enrolment in the educational years of 1976-7, 1986-7 and 1996-7:⁵

Table 2: Female Proportion of Total School Enrolment

Schooling	1976-7		1986-7		1996-7	
	Total Enrolment	Percentage Female	Total Enrolment	Percentage Female	Total Enrolment	Percentage Female
Elementary	4,768,588	38	7,232,820	44	9,238,393	47
Middle (Guidance)	1,377,690	36	2,299,510	39	5,188,812	45
High School	979,182	36	1,292,013	40	3,589,332	48

According to the above Table, the gap between males and females enrolling at the secondary level has narrowed in post-revolutionary schooling, particularly in 1996. Decreases in the gap between boys' and girls' enrolment could partly be a result of the declining rate of males, of each age group, enrolling in school.

Comparing 1976 and 1986⁶, according to Aghajanian (1994: 47), although the percentage of both boys' and girls' enrolment from each age group increased in both elementary and middle schools, it decreased in high school. However, the rate of decrease was not the same for boys and girls. While the difference (between 1976 and 1986) for boys was 7.3 per cent (from 47.5 to 40.2), it was just 1.2 per cent (from 25.8

to 24.6) for girls. Nevertheless, according to Aghajanian (1994: 47), the increase in girls' enrolment from each age group in both elementary (from 41.7 to 61.5) and middle schools (from 23.4 to 35.7) was considerable in rural areas, between 1976 and 1986.

The assumption that female education was welcomed by families and the state will be further reinforced if one considers the following data on literacy programmes. According to Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 26) the literacy rate for rural women doubled between 1976 and 1986. This is because 'the majority of the literacy classes and the majority of the students have been in rural areas, reflecting both the higher rates of rural illiteracy and "the priority given to villagers in the allocation of resources in post-revolutionary Iran."' (Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari 1994: 33-6)

Nonetheless, sex-segregation becomes more evident at high school level, from which specialisation in education starts. Students are channelled at this level, into the subjects of study which determine their future roles in the society according to their sexes. Although girls form more than half (54 per cent and 52 per cent respectively in 1986 and 1990 compared with 32 per cent in 1976) of all students enrolled in business studies in vocational schools, their enrolment has been practically suspended in the agricultural and technical subjects. Women's enrolment in agriculture declined from 5 per cent in 1976 to zero in 1986 and 1990. In technical subjects, women's enrolment fell from 2 per cent in 1976 to 0.07 and 0.5 in 1986 and 1990 (See Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari 1994: 23).

With regard to high school, although the female proportion of enrolment is unfortunately unavailable, the proportion of female graduates illustrates their acceptance in high schools. However, the proportion of enrolment would definitely

be more than that of graduates for females in comparison with males. This is because it is more likely for females than males, particularly in rural areas, to leave school because of marriage. It may be worthwhile to mention that the majority of students, especially girls, in the Old System of Education (1969-92) were involved in academic schools rather than vocational. According to Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 30), for example, 86 per cent of all high school students (and 93 per cent of girl high schools students) enrolled in academic schools.

Unlike in pre-revolutionary academic schools, all fields of study have been appropriate for both of sexes in post-revolutionary schools. This is because the pre-revolutionary subject of 'Homeworking', which was restricted to females, was surprisingly eliminated after the Revolution, and another subject, called 'Economics and Social Sciences' was added instead for males and females.

Comparing the graduates from each of the academic areas between 1975-6 and 1989-90 (see Table 3 on next page), although the proportion of female graduates in natural science and mathematics has fallen, their proportion has risen in *all* academic fields compared with the opposite sex. In other words, not only has the gap between male and female graduates narrowed between 1975-6 and 1989-90, the proportion of women has gone beyond their proportion in the population in the two fields of natural science (56 per cent) and humanities (50 per cent). Women constitute 49 per cent of the population of Iran.

Although female enrolment in general education has increased in post-revolutionary schooling, particularly in rural areas, and although both males and females still enjoy the same formal curriculum, they actually learn different things in terms of educational content. Pupils and students from different sexes are not

Table 3: High School Graduates by Sex and Field, 1975-6 and 1989-90

	1975-6			1989-90		
	Number of Grads	Female Prop. of Grads	Prop. of Female Grads	Number of Grads	Female Prop. of Grads	Prop. of Female Grads
Natural Science	65,965	41	64	60,550	56	45
Mathematics	21,977	19	10	18,041	23	6
Literature	9,437	43	9	32,245	50	21
Homeworking	4,009	100	9			20
				Econ. & Soc. Sci.	33,039	46
<i>Total Academic</i>	<i>101,388</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>92</i>	<i>143,874</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>92</i>
Technical	10,763	2	0.4	9,381	0	0
Rural Vocational Service	3,281	2	0.2	816	0	0
	4,767	43	7	8,614	66	8
<i>Total Vocational</i>	<i>18,811</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>18,811</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>8</i>
Total	120,199	36	100	162,685	46	100

Source: Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 31)

supposed to be the same biologically, as they are in many other countries. According to the modern understanding of Islam, although both males and females are human beings, they are two different sorts of human beings, each of which has different biological, psychological, behavioural and, as a result, social characters (see Motahhari 1974). Thus they play different roles in both family and society, to some extent. Such a belief in the existence of an organic distinction between men and women affects the educational policies implemented, particularly when accompanied with another popular idea that sexual instinct, in the absence of regulation, would jeopardise all social institutions. However, sexual instinct is thought to be useful if under control. Educational policies for women would be tightened further, particularly at the secondary level, if it was established that women play a major role in arousing men's sexual desire (see Afshar 1987 and 1989).

Such an ideology affected educational content in the forms of female presence in the textbooks; change in dress and in the portrayal of sex-segregation in both textbooks and public settings; division of labour for different sexes in the textbooks and so on. Of course, the most dramatic change after the revolution occurred in women's dress, in textbooks and public settings. In spite of the Pahlavi's sex-integrated policies and interest in increasing women's presence in public affairs, the pre-revolutionary curriculum and textbooks were sex-segregated. According to Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 38), women had mainly been shown as mothers, housewives, and teachers in pre-revolutionary textbooks. Comparing the pre- and post-revolutionary curriculum, there is little difference between them in terms of the proportion of female characters pictured in the textbooks, and that of the depiction of tasks accomplished by women as home-workers (about half of all characters in both

eras), teachers and farmers. However, according to Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari, the percentage of women portrayed performing any kind of work declined from 23 to 17 in post-revolutionary textbooks.

Consequently, women's access to education has increased greatly at elementary and middle (Guidance) levels throughout Iran, although it still lags behind males. At the high school level, although the gap between women and men has declined considerably, and although the proportion of women attending school has increased, the numbers of both males and females from the high school age group enrolled in school have declined. However, this has happened more for males than for females, particularly in rural areas. To determine the causes of the general fall in high-school enrolment rates, more research is needed.

In brief, sex-segregation in schooling does not necessarily lead to the reduction of women's access to education; in fact, it may greatly increase their enrolment at school in a society in which families would not welcome mixed-sex institutions and where sex-segregation in public is common. This is even more significant when one considers that the number of coeducational schools was so small during the Shah's era that women's educational rights were often denied. Thus, policies of education regarding gender after the Revolution are a more realistic portrait of Iranian society than those prior to the Revolution.

Conclusion

It is widely assumed that the institution of education is one of the most important factors propelling societies towards modernisation and economic development. There is clear evidence that this was indeed the case in Iran under the last Shah's regime. It

is also true that Iranian governments since 1979 have sought ways of modernising and developing the economic resources of the country, but the policies governing Iran's trajectory have differed sharply from those operating in most other countries in respect of their religious and moral character. Moreover, education has been used as a 'vehicle', to borrow one of Max Weber's favourite images, for bringing Islamic values to bear on the creation and shaping of young people's thinking about the country's future. Changes in the philosophy of education and curricula in schools since 1979 demonstrate the extent to which attempts have been made to influence the processes of modernisation and development in Iran in accordance with a distinctive set of Shi'ite principles. The next four chapters will analyse the evidence of these changes in schools in one area of rural Iran.

ENDNOTES

¹ A religious liberal who had been the first Chancellor of the University of Tehran.

² This text has been quoted from a formal textbook for the students of 'Teachers Training Colleges', called '*usul va mabani-e amuzesh va parvaresh*' (The Principles of Education), published by the Ministry of Higher Education.

³ The single term 'education' in the English language is composed of two parts in Persian: *ta'lim va tarbiat* or *amuzesh va parvaresh*, 'referring to the training of the mind as well as the education of character and development of personality' (Mehran 1990: 57).

⁴ (*f*) is missing from Mohsenpour (1988), so it has been quoted from Mehran (1990: 60).

⁵ The source for 1976-7 and 1986-7 is Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 23); and the source for 1996-7 is Islamic Republic of Iran (1998).

⁶ Some further information is needed regarding school enrolment rate of boys and girls by age and sex in 1996.

Chapter Six

CURRICULUM AND TEXTBOOKS: THE ISLAMIC FACTOR

This is an appropriate point to recall the bearing of Max Weber's broadly methodological and philosophical perspectives on the design of this thesis. As was argued in Chapter One, the main aim is to explore the influence of ideas and values on the development of social structures and processes. To use Weber's own imagery, these ideational factors operate like 'switchmen' in so far as they can change the direction of historical forces -- including material forces. But there is no implication of necessity in Weber's argument. Rather, he tended to emphasise the probabilistic nature of social arrangements and social change. Likewise, the main philosophical assumption underlying this thesis is that sociological analysis can do no more than try to establish the degree to which certain events and social structures appear to be probable in the light of known factors. Again following Weber's example, this thesis places heavy importance on the contribution of ideas and values towards the probability that the Islamic revolution of 1979 would establish an educational system in Iran that would be significantly different from its predecessors. At the same time, Weber's fascination with the unintended consequences of attempts to implement particular ideas and values helps to reduce the risk of teleological explanation. Indeed, the following Chapters will draw attention to some of the ironic outcomes of schemes designed to translate ideas into educational practice.

Weber's practice of isolating one or more factors in a one-sided fashion is not, of course, without its problems. It can give a distorted or unrealistically simplified picture of complex situations. There is no guarantee that the isolated factors exercise

in themselves the most significant influence on events. Nor is it easy to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the isolated factors really are responsible for the effects attributed to them. Nevertheless, Weber's ideal-type method can be defended on several grounds. Firstly, the method is intended to facilitate comparisons between, for example, different religious ideologies or between different types of authority. Consequently, it may be justified to make abstractions from complex realities in order to distil the most significant factors. Secondly, exaggeration of the importance claimed for certain factors may be justified if it helps to correct previous misunderstandings. The *locus classicus* was Weber's claim that he deliberately exaggerated the contribution of 'the Protestant ethic' towards 'the spirit of capitalism' in order to balance the tendency of some economic historians, especially Marxists, to understand capitalism in exclusively materialist terms. Thirdly, the one-sided exaggeration of particular factors can be defended if it forms part of a quasi-experimental method -- a 'thought experiment' in Weber's terms. This means that ideal-type formulations do not claim to reveal the entire truth but only to show what can be learned from rigorously examining social phenomena from one particular point of view. This thesis does not use the ideal-type methods for purposes of comparison but it does place one-sided emphasis on Islamic ideology partly in order to counteract excessively political or economic interpretations of the Islamic revolution of 1979 and partly in order to conduct a kind of thought experiment to discover the specificity of purely religious influences on social life.

The focus of this Chapter will be on the changes that have occurred in school curricula since 1979. The dominant theme running through the Chapter will be the ideological pressure to make curricula conform with the new philosophy of education

analysed in Chapter Five. Before this theme can be analysed, however, it is necessary to give an account of the research methods employed in the collection of information about Iranian schools.

Research methods

Most of the information on which the following analysis of curricular changes and gendered social relations is based was collected during two, three month periods of intensive fieldwork in a rural area of North Western Iran based on an ethnographic study of religion and everyday life. Inspired by the relevant research literature (Atkinson 1990; Burgess 1982; Gilbert 1993; Hammersley 1992, 1990; Hammersley & Atkinson 1983; and Hobbs & May 1993), I watched what happened, listened to what was said, asked questions, and in fact collected any data relevant to understanding the education issues with which people were concerned in so far as they had been affected by religion. Although I used ethnographic methods in order to capture the meaning of everyday human activities and adequately understand social processes, I also drew upon questionnaires, interviews, life histories, and documents about the changes that had occurred over the previous twenty years. The first period of fieldwork took place during the autumn of 1995, and the second period in the spring of 1996, making a total of six months.

Both periods of fieldwork were conducted in a small town called formally 'Firuraq' and in the local dialect 'Perah' in the North West of the country. 'Perah' is an ethnically and religiously homogeneous town of about 10,000 inhabitants in West Azarbaijan Province. During the first period, I applied the methods of participant observation, life histories, questionnaires and analysis of documentary sources

relating to the New System of Education. However, I mostly concentrated on participant observation, including occasionally even working in schools as a teacher. The town included eight schools in total, all of which, with the exception of one primary school for boys, were observed by me. Therefore, during the first period I conducted my research at two high schools (one for boys and one for girls), three secondary schools (two for boys and one for girls) and two primary schools (one for boys and one for girls) as well as a vocational school in the neighbouring city of 'Khoy', where some students from rural areas, including 'Perah', were studying. Furthermore, I administered questionnaires about both 'in-service' and 'initial teacher' training programmes to 93 (67 male and 26 female) teachers, head teachers and administrators in all seven of the schools that I studied in the town. In addition, I interviewed ten other teachers from schools in neighbouring towns.

During the second period of fieldwork, I made further use of participant observation and life history methods as well as interviews. In addition, I collected documentary evidence and as many official statistics as possible. However, I concentrated mostly on interviews with teachers in the two high schools for boys and girls, a vocational school for boys, as well as with officials in the Local Education Authority (LEA) and head teachers. All teachers in the above schools, except one female teacher, head teachers and required officials of the LEA co-operated with me, so that I interviewed forty-five persons in total. I also administered four sorts of questionnaires, each with 167 questions, to about thirty teachers, head teachers and instructors. In the light of the first fieldwork experiences, three areas for investigation were selected for special attention in the second period. Each of them related to ideological and institutional changes following the Iranian Revolution of 1979:

- i) gendering of the curriculum (relating mainly to textbooks, timetabling, study conditions, discipline, assessment and access to resources)
- ii) teachers' conditions of work (training and qualifications, job security, authority relations, relations with parents and clergy, casualisation, pensions, morale, etc.)
- iii) a new system of vocational education (teachers' attitudes, ideological justification, resourcing, records of achievement, training, etc.)

Although the project was successfully conducted, and the information that I required was obtained, it met with numerous difficulties even in the early stages. My sponsor's decision to place a limit of three months on each period of fieldwork was the root of such problems. This is understandable in the light of the Iranian government policy to discourage students from conducting any social science research on Iran. However, my project was eventually approved by the Scientific Advisor to Iranian students in the Iranian Embassy in London. It may be worthwhile to mention that the authority to approve projects was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Higher Education instead of the Scientific Advisor, presumably in a further attempt to impose restrictions on research.

Therefore, it was not easy to identify a suitable site for successful fieldwork in such a limited period. The site had to meet the special requirements of my research in terms of population, lack of ethnic and religious diversity and representativeness of all important educational and religious institutions. Moreover, it had to be a site where I could obtain the local authorities' and informants' co-operation.

The role of friendship, personal acquaintance and a sort of patronage is so important for making social relationships in Iranian culture that it is almost impossible

for a complete outsider to gain access for research purposes. Even an insider who wishes to conduct research also encounters special problems such as the jealousy of friends and relatives. In cases like this, there may be gossip about the investigator behind his or her back, and this may adversely affect the outcome of research.

Nevertheless, making and having close relationships with informants was the key factor in obtaining information, so that the more friends I had in a school, the fewer problems there were.

Trust was a major issue for the local authorities and Islamist teachers, on the one hand, and for teachers from political positions such as liberalism, Marxism, socialism, social democracy, and so forth, on the other. However, none of the teachers who were opposed to the government's ideas identified themselves as supporters of such ideologies. After seventeen years of anti-Western propaganda, a researcher who attempted to collect information for a Western university would not easily be allowed to penetrate a site of research. The fact that Iranian society had been politicised under the various political perturbations of the previous two decades and was almost a stranger to the spirit of qualitative research methods helps to explain this situation. That is, research was interpreted in a very ambiguous political way.

Collection of data could mean for some radical Islamists that a researcher was seeking to supply information to the West, which had been identified in the mass media as the major cause of Iran's catastrophic problems both before and after 1979. Thus, acquiring permission for my research from educational authorities, which was finally granted by the national educational authorities, took up many weeks of my first period of fieldwork and generated a lot of disappointment and stress. Nonetheless, friendship

and patronage played a very significant role in getting this permission. It would have been impossible without recourse to these resources.

Yet obtaining permission did not necessarily guarantee that the project would proceed smoothly. The research process could have been interrupted or cancelled at any stage for many unforeseeable reasons, such as lack of co-operation by teachers; the revocation of permission from schools or local education authorities to continue with the research (particularly in female schools in view of sex-segregation policies); protest by Islamist teachers due to their suspicions about the nature of my research; the disagreement of the town's mayor with the conduct of fieldwork in that region; and so forth. The issue of suspicion became very serious during the first period of fieldwork, when I was mostly using participant observation. The schools' authorities, who were not familiar with such a method, were gradually losing their confidence in the research because, in their view, I was doing nothing in schools other than watching and listening. This was so serious in one school that I was followed around by a member of the school wherever I went.

The different expectations that most schools' authorities, on the one hand, and most teachers, on the other hand, had of me was a major problem during both periods of fieldwork, which seriously jeopardised the outcome of my research on occasions. From the early stages of the research onwards, I understood that 'if I did not give information I would not get any co-operation from my informants'. But they were not content with hearing my answers to their questions in private. Instead, they asked me some very controversial questions in public in staff rooms. These questions were sometimes asked by teachers who had already been identified as political opponents of the regime; and some even had legal convictions. Therefore, their presence in

some schools had maximised the sensitivities of schools and Local Education Authorities toward my research. This sometimes made me resentful and disappointed, but it was clear that without my previous knowledge of the community and unless I responded knowledgeably to their questions, the research could not have progressed. Contrary to the Islamist teachers and authorities, who might have suspected that I was collecting information for the West, such opposition teachers might have been equally suspicious that I was getting information for the Iranian authorities. The point to emphasise is that obtaining and keeping the trust of such diverse informants and, as a result, their co-operation, was an extremely difficult aspect of my research.

In order to avoid any suspicion or mistrust, I chose to write at nights about my days of observation in schools. Moreover, I avoided recording interviews with a tape recorder. I preferred to conduct informal interviews by making close relationships in the early stages, but formal interviews were also conducted, and notes were taken, only after I had elicited enough confidence from the informants. Furthermore, in order to collect information about the nature of changes in education before and after 1979, I avoided asking questions in which the words 'before the revolution' or 'after the revolution' were used. These formulations would have affected informants' responses and increased their wariness. Therefore, I asked them about the year of their graduation from schools and of entry into employment at the beginning of each interview in order to ensure that my questions referred to their own experience.

Although speaking with women in rural areas was virtually impossible, interviews with female teachers became possible in female schools. However, it was really embarrassing, especially in the first stages of interviews. Female teachers were, at first, accompanied by another female teacher during each interview, but they came

for interview by themselves after they had gained enough confidence. Although the average length of each interview was more than two hours for male interviewees, it was about 75 minutes for female interviewees.

The main reason for choosing a diversity of research methods was to obtain a 'rounded' view of the influence of Islam on educational changes in Iran since 1979, but there were other considerations as well. Firstly, it was necessary to take precautions in case I was prevented from applying any particular method in my research project. Having a variety of methods at my disposal was one such precaution. Secondly, I needed to collect information about a wide range of activities and processes: some took place in the offices of the LEA; some in school staff rooms; some in classrooms and playgrounds; and some in family homes. No single research method would have generated information about activities in all these, and other, locations. And thirdly, the influence of religion on public policy and personal conduct can be subtle, profound, unrecognised and controversial. As a result, it was necessary to adopt an eclectic approach to data gathering, in the expectation that interesting material would emerge from the variety of methods employed.

Textbooks and Curricula

The institution of education is based on state policies and supervision over what is taught, who is taught, and who teaches both males and females. In most modern societies, educational policies are designed to cultivate those human resources which governments deem necessary or desirable. In contrast to the educational policies of most developed and developing countries, which concentrate on training workers, Iranian educational policy places more emphasis on the need for training religiously

committed, socially responsible and faithful men and women who support the Islamic government.

Although, because of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the state-provided textbooks were altered in some ways, specifically in the area of humanities, these changes were the same for both girls and boys. However, some courses are taught differently for boys and girls, such as '*Defensive Readiness*' which is specific to boys; '*Self-dependence*' in the New System and '*Physical Education*', for which the curricula differ between males and females. Although the changes in curriculum and textbooks are supposed to be scientific in some aspects, nobody can ignore the process of politicisation and Islamisation of the whole curriculum, which has been going on since 1979.

After the revolution, major changes occurred in the areas of Humanities and Social Economics, with some courses attracting more attention than others. The courses of *history*, *philosophy*, *Arabic literature*, *Islamic education*, and to some extent the courses of *geography* and *Persian literature* were considered the most suitable fields within which the political ideology of the Islamic Republic could be cultivated.

(a) In *history* courses after the revolution, the study of pre-Islamic Iran was replaced with the *history of Islam*, although a brief history of the Prophet had been taught during the pre-revolutionary period. Moreover, an experienced teacher of history made clear to me that the course of *contemporary history* was taught completely differently in the Pahlavi period. Another long-standing teacher of history told me that, because of the revolution, the size of the *history* textbook increased by about one-third, and is being increased further each year. In addition to the increase

of the *history* textbook's size, the time allocated to the course has also been increased. He added that in the post-revolutionary educational system, teaching and learning *history* became one of the most important subjects of all the academic branches. This may have happened due to the specific attention which the Qur'an pays to the role of history as the main resource for learning from the fate of past communities and tribes. The same fate can be repeated at any time if the members of a community do the same thing, because the divine traditions are the same for all people in all times. In addition, the dominant political ideology of the state can be imparted to the younger generation through studying selected events of history.

(b) The curriculum of *philosophy* for humanities students in the present educational system of Iran is more generic than it was before the revolution (see Siasi 1975 and Abu-talibi 1994; and *Appendix*). This refers to human knowledge or ideas about what is the place of human beings in the world and what is valuable in life in the view of Islam or of those ancient Greek philosophers not considered inconsistent with Islam. This is in contrast to '*philosophy*' courses taught in the West, which tend to ask old questions by means of new procedures related to recent social phenomena. Rather, the '*philosophy*' course in modern Iran is designed to restore the '*pride of Iranian intellectualism*' -- which existed for centuries -- by perpetuating the Islamic philosophical disciplines (*hikmat-e eslami*) (see Rahman 1982: 35; 104-9). According to one teacher of philosophy, a pre-revolutionary '*Philosophy*' textbook, which only contained discussions of Western philosophy, was replaced by two different books entitled '*Philosophy*' and '*Acquaintance With Islamic Philosophy*'. The 59-page textbook of '*Philosophy*' for third year students of humanities contains topics related to the meaning and the realm of philosophy, and the ideas of the early

philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. In this teacher's opinion, the 156-page textbook 'Acquaintance With Islamic Philosophy', which is given exclusively to Year-twelve students of humanities, is similar in content to theology. 'It contains the idea of monotheism in the view of the first Imam, Ali, the narratives from the Prophet and the twelve Imams and issues referring to metaphysics, which is all directed to remove any doubt that Muslims had no philosophy and just copied Greece, India, or Judaism and Christianity', a teacher of philosophy said. This corresponded with the political ideology of independence and self-belief which has been one of the major characteristics of the Islamic Republic so far. The Ministry of Education, taking another step in this direction, published a new edition of 'Acquaintance With Islamic Philosophy' in 1995, in which the origins of Islamic philosophy and the ideas of anonymous Islamic philosophers are given special consideration, as this teacher let me know. He added that the textbook, which has been provided for the new system of education, is connected to theology in a more political way and indicates the philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeini's circle as a prominent one which tends to mysticism to some extent. Moreover, in the recent textbook, the cover pictures of Plato and Aristotle were replaced by the picture of the outstanding contemporary Islamic philosopher Allameh Tabatabaei, who was the philosophy teacher of Mortaza Motahhari.

(c) '*Arabic Literature*', apart from the course of 'English Literature' as a Western symbol, received special attention as a sacred phenomenon after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Learning 'Arabic Literature' was required of humanities students before the revolution because of its specific influence on Persian literature in post-Islam Iran, but in the post-revolutionary educational system of Iran, because Arabic

was the language of revelation and the Qur'an, it became a mandatory course in all subjects for all years from the guidance level to the end of high school (see Khazaei 1971; Refa'at 1993; and *Appendix*). Although the Islamic Republic used the Constitution to get all Iranians to learn Arabic, the educational system was too weak to put this into practice. However, the use of Arabic terms in administrative letters and teaching Arabic literature in traditional religious schools as well as the modern schools were taken as signs of increased religiosity. Regardless of one's beliefs, whoever used many Arabic words in letters would be considered very religious. Using the language of the Qur'an, the Prophet and his successors in Arabic is counted as a social and religious value, while using Western vocabulary in public arenas and in formal communications is not only discouraged but forbidden according to the law approved by the Islamic Parliament (see *Ettelaat* 5 December 1996: 2). The importance of Arabic is being increased by the authorities year by year so that the textbook's size has doubled and two hours per week have been added to the Arabic literature schedule at high school since 1993, as a teacher of Arabic literature explained to me. In his view, the parts which have been added to the textbooks, to be taught in the New System of education, are equal amounts of historical topics, moral issues, general information and issues from the Qur'an and *Sunnat*.

(d) The greatest changes in textbooks probably occurred in the subject of '*Religious Education*'. The pre-revolutionary title of 'Religious Education' was changed to 'Islamic Education' after the Islamic revolution, except in Year-twelve (or Year-four of the high-school) which kept its old title until about 1990. However, the contents were Islamic during both regimes (see Shoar 1968; Sadat 1993; and *Appendix*). Besides the dramatic changes in the content of the textbooks, almost all

pre-revolutionary religious education teachers were replaced by new teachers, from any subject of study, who were loyal to the Islamic values. Since religious education enjoyed less importance than courses of art and handwriting during the Shah's period, whichever teachers could not teach the main courses were appointed to teach religious education -- even if they had no religious beliefs. After the revolution, however, religious education was taken more seriously at schools. According to a teacher of 'Islamic Education', while moral issues formed the bulk of religious teachings before the revolution, post-revolutionary Islamic education textbooks contained the Islamic world view and ideology -- to protect the young revolutionary generation from both Western and Eastern ideologies, especially Marxism -- due to the high level of activity of different leftist groups in the early years of the revolution.

A teacher of Islamic education and the Qur'an explained to me that after the revolution the interpretation of the Principal Shi'ite doctrines (*Usul-e-din*), with the exception of 'justice' (*ad'l*), (i.e. belief in monotheism [*towhid*], prophecy, the Imamate [*nobovvat va emamat*] and resurrection [the return to other world, *ma'ad*]) as well as the doctrine of guardianship and governance (*velayat va hokumat*), was distributed among the Islamic education textbooks for years one, two and three respectively. The Year-twelve textbook, called 'Religious Education', covered issues about the knowledge of human beings, determinism and free will, human nature, divine laws (traditions), Marxism and some morals. She added that the Qur'an was not taught at the high school level during these years, and that Islamic education was taught three hours per week. By adding the Qur'an to years one, two and three of the high school curriculum, as well as the Secondary Shi'ite doctrines '*Foru-e-din*' (religious precepts), according to another teacher, the Islamic education timetable had

increased from three to five hours per week in 1985-86. Moreover, the title of Year-twelve textbook was changed to 'Islamic Education'; Marxism and some other sections were eliminated; and a new section on 'family' was included. After 1987-88, however, the schedule was reduced from five to three hours per week (two hours for Islamic Education and one hour for the Qur'an) again, and this was accompanied by a reduction of the content.

(e) One of the educational areas which became very active in a different way was '*Omur-e-tarbiati*' (extra-curricula activities). This area's activity during the reign of the Shah was restricted to the establishment of morning ceremonies (assemblies) at schools and the registration of some students as the Corps Students '*Danesh-amuzan-e Pish-ahang*' who attended demonstrations on public holidays during the Shah's regime and who dealt with artistic jobs such as painting, handwriting, poetry and fictional writing. After the Islamic revolution of 1979, the institution expanded its activity to establishing Islamic revolutionary values in schools and was eventually changed to 'moral education'. However, it retained its title of '*omur-e tarbiati*'. Apart from initiating morning ceremonies in which Qur'anic verses were read instead of a song for the Shah, 'Moral Education' called students to attend noon prayers at school with a clergyman who had been appointed by the LEA as an *Imam-e Jama'at*. Competitions to recite the Qur'an, Nahjo'l-balagheh (the collection of Imam Ali's letters and speeches) and to sing revolutionary songs were added to those of calligraphy, painting, theatre, book reading, poetry and story writing. In the opinion of another teacher, people were keen to attend the required programmes of this subject in the early years of the revolution. In the mid-1980s, the subject was formalised and given specific duties, which the LEA asked the teachers of moral education to

undertake. In addition, at the guidance level, 'moral education' had entered the Year-six national curriculum replacing English literature after 1986-87, and it benefited from having a formal textbook in all years of the guidance level from 1988-89 onwards. Its timetable for Year-six was two hours per week and for the other two guidance-level years was one hour per week. There was no systematic curriculum to teach pupils, and the lessons were mostly epistemological in the first years after 1986-87; but now most lessons have moral aspects.

The grades achieved in moral education are not reflected in the pupils' final results. The students at high school level, both boys and girls, have no textbook or curriculum for this subject. However, a comparison of two teachers showed that moral problems in a girls' high school were more serious than those of boys. According to a male teacher of moral education, 'the moral problems of the students are referred to the Staff Council for Morality (*hasteh-ye tarbiati-e kar-konan*) at the school; then they are dealt with according to the disciplinary rules of schools: the student writing a guaranteed commitment; keeping the student outside of the classroom for a certain time; contacting parents; reducing their grades.... If the problem is serious -- political, or violent..., the student will be referred to the LEA, but this has not happened at the school so far'. However, a female teacher of moral education told me: 'the students talk to me about their private, family and school life, or sometimes they tell me about the behaviour of other students. In the many years which I worked at the girls' high school, only four students could carry on their studies after high school level, because the moral corruption has increased among girl students, to such an extent that eighteen students have married at high school level so far this year.'

(f) As for the course on '*Geography*', although a teacher of the subject told me that most changes in this area after the revolution were because of new scientific findings, and changes have been towards more human geography than physical, including geomorphology and climatology. However, nobody can ignore the impact of the ruling political ideology on the textbooks' titles and their contents. After the revolution, a textbook called 'the Geography of Muslim Countries' was added to the national textbooks at high school level. However, this textbook was eliminated from the national textbooks provided for the New System of education, and another textbook called 'Political and Economic Geography' replaced it. A section on political geography was added for the New System, in order to familiarise the students with politics, in the geography teacher's opinion. Moreover, according to this teacher, another textbook called 'The Geography of Continents' was omitted from the series of textbooks provided for the New System of education by the government, while the textbook of 'General Geography' was almost unaltered. Concerning the 'Geography of Iran' textbook, he made clear to me that the section on Natural Geography remained almost the same, while a section on Human Geography was completely changed after the revolution.

(g) In the field of '*Persian Literature*', the biggest change after the revolution was in the academic subjects of Humanities and Social Economy - there were increases in the size of textbooks and schedule and changes in the content of the textbooks (see BPET 1976; BPET 1991; and *Appendix*). According to a teacher of Persian literature, the timetable for Humanities and Social Economy subjects increased from four hours per week before the revolution to six hours, for years one to three, and to eight hours for Year-twelve after the revolution. The timetable schedule

remained the same, four hours per week, for the academic branches of Experimental Sciences (*ulum-e tajrobi*) and Math-Physics (*riazi-fizik*) and the changes in content were negligible. However, as was suggested to me by another teacher of Persian literature, the time devoted to literature was reduced from six to four hours per week for years one to three, for a while, by establishing the vocational programme of 'Tarh-e Kad' in 1982.

In the opinion of a teacher of Persian literature, the content of post-revolutionary textbooks is totally different from pre-revolutionary ones. He believes that the literature in the Shah's period imposed blind obedience to the West in students' brains in any possible way, and that the students thought that 'there was another world in the West to which they should have access'. He maintains that 'in the literature of the textbook of the White Revolution, the Shah appears as the manifestation of God's will'. But after the 1979 revolution, in his view, literature was presented in Islamic form. 'Students understood that there were self-made and honourable people in the country who could influence the country's fate, as became clear in the War' he said to me. He implicitly admitted that daily political issues affect Persian literature: 'since nowadays the issue of cultural invasion (*tahajom-e farhangi*) is an important one, everything in society is ready to contend against it, including the textbooks in general and particularly through the mass media and journals'.

(h) Among courses on humanities and social sciences, some were changed less than others mentioned above, in terms of timetable schedule, the size of textbooks or their contents. According to a teacher of history, all three courses of history, geography and social sciences together had just one textbook until 1974, and the

minimum pass mark for this course was seven out of twenty. Drawing attention to the subjects' importance, their textbooks were separated from each other and the minimum passing grade increased to ten -- the same as other courses -- since then. Although the above situation continued after the revolution, the courses changed in other ways too. In the opinion of a teacher of sociology, the impact of religious and political ideology on the content of social sciences or sociology textbooks was greater than on other courses (see Nezami-Taleshi 1978; Tajgaram & Qandi 1979; and *Appendix*). For instance, the time allotted to sociology since the revolution has been dramatically reduced from thirteen hours per week for all years at high school until 1992-93 to just four hours under the New System of education. Moreover, the pre-revolutionary textbook title of 'Sociology' changed to 'Social Sciences' for all textbooks, for all students in Humanities as well as in Social Economic subjects, except the Year-twelve textbook, which kept the title of 'Sociology'. The same happened in the departments of Sociology at all universities in post-revolutionary Iran.

(i) Regarding 'Economics', it should be noted that the four pre-revolutionary academic subjects of study of Social Economics (*eqtesad-e ejtemaei*), Humanities (*ulum-e ensani*), Experimental Sciences and Math-Physics continued after the revolution until about 1993. After that date, the first two subjects were combined to form a separate academic subject of 'Literature and Humanities' which, in the view of a teacher of economics, is more about Humanities than economics. In the same way, the earlier textbooks of 'Islamic Economics' and 'Economic Growth and Development' in Year-twelve were replaced by just one textbook called 'Iranian Economy'. According to this teacher, the content of the latter book was more realistic

than the former, because although the textbook of 'Islamic Economics' presented economic arguments from the Islamic point of view and the textbook of 'Economic Growth and Development' had discussions of political economy, the new textbook included the present-day economic problems of Iran: electricity, population growth, OPEC, the economic value of oil etc. The creation of an 'Islamic Economics' textbook was in fact one of greatest impacts of Islamic ideology on social sciences after the revolution.

(j) An experienced teacher of *Biology, Botany and Geology*, who was unhappy with the New System of education, believed that the textbooks had progressed and developed gradually since 1970, the beginning of the Old System of education. This is because, he said, 'we are aware of the progress of science to some extent'. Comparing the pre- and post-revolutionary timetable for these subjects, he explained that the increase in time given to them after the revolution happened because of the demand for growth in the biological sciences. He made clear to me that, for example, Year-twelve students had eight hours a week for these courses between 1970 and 1975. Then, by eliminating the section on Botany from the 'Biology' textbook and the section on Evolution from the 'Geology' textbook, the hours were reduced to six by 1978. But after 1978, by increasing the biology hours from four to six and a half, re-establishing the botany course for two hours a week and increasing geology from two to three hours, the time devoted to these subjects in the weekly timetable almost doubled.

A biology teacher, confirming the reflection of recent findings in science on the textbooks, also admitted that the ruling Islamic ideology had had an effect on the content of the textbooks. He, who had taught science at guidance level both before

and after the revolution, believed that the pre-revolutionary textbook of Science was different from the post-revolutionary textbook, in which science is related to God and the knowledge of Him, and that this issue is mentioned wherever possible in the textbooks. In the early years of the revolution, he claimed, there had been some contradictions between the courses of Islamic Education, on the one hand, and biology or geology, on the other. While the science textbooks, according to the theory of Evolution, introduced monkeys as predecessors of mankind, the religious textbooks -- trying to indicate the theory of Evolution or the ideas of Darwin as just a theory and not necessarily a matter of fact -- introduced Adam and Eve as the first humans. According to this teacher, since 1984 there have been some attempts to reduce sensitivities towards such theories: 'for example, the name of Darwin was omitted from textbooks. Alternatively, his work was presented as "the theory of Evolution" or as "cause and effect", "the interaction of natural and human factors" or "the process of interaction between living things and non-living things"'. He also described as unsuccessful the experience of teaching courses on health, biology and microbiology to Theology students in the Teacher Training College, because firstly, the course was started late, and secondly, in his opinion, there was no connection between these subjects and this sort of course. Because of this, he had encountered misunderstanding about the theory of Darwin etc. In his view, religious issues were not the only things which affected the textbooks of science, for the anti-Western ideology of the revolution also affected the textbooks: 'although there was then such sensitivity towards foreign names in the textbooks- nowadays they have been converted to Persian synonyms.' Another long-standing teacher of Geology, without explaining detailed changes in the content, suggested to me that changes in the

Geology textbook have been directed more to scientific aspects than others.

Analysing the data regarding the titles of courses and textbooks, there is no doubt that the country wanted to develop through the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but in a very different way from the period of the Shah's rule or that of the West.

To respond to the pre-revolutionary needs of the remote regions, which had not been met, and to meet the post-revolutionary primary needs caused by the dramatic increase of the population, it was natural for the revolutionary authorities to turn to science and its recent findings, particularly in dealing with one of the main social problems of that time, health. Besides the dramatic increase in the number of students recruited by medical schools in comparison with pre-revolutionary university entrance guidelines, the post-revolutionary authorities accepted a huge number of medical students for different state-based universities in Iran by setting up a special competition in medical sciences as a matter of urgency after the Cultural Revolution of 1980. Therefore, the increase in teaching of the above-mentioned courses at schools, particularly biology, corresponded to these needs, as all three teachers of science I spoke to pointed out. It is interesting that besides the increase in time for studying biology in the weekly timetable, for the first time, there is a separate laboratory hour in the schedule in the New System of education, although this is just one hour per week for just three months of the six-month educational year, for Year-twelve students. Of course, this issue can be considered as just the first step of the Islamic government authorities' attention to experimental science.

Yet, as the data show, the special interest in developing science in the school schedule was just one face of the coin, but it had another face, a more prominent one, which the Islamic ideology of the revolution also demanded- that the Islamic ideology

be developed, through the courses of Islamic education, and by removing or weakening doctrines which contradict religious demands in the view of the majority of *Ulama*. Thus, post-revolutionary changes in textbooks concerning the elimination of discussions about Embryology, the theory of Evolution etc., the change in their titles, the conversion of Western scientific terms into their Persian synonyms are all responses to the demands of the religious-political revolutionary ideology. For this reason, another much-needed university entrance competition, besides that of Medical Sciences, was established after the Cultural Revolution of 1980 to allocate Theology students, in order to meet the religious needs of the schools and other institutions.

(k) Regarding the courses of *Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics*, it seems that there has been no major change in their contents or schedule- as was expected. According to a teacher of physics, the post-revolutionary textbook of Physics is the same as the pre-revolutionary one, except for the replacement of some chapters, which mostly took place in 1994 and 1995, for both the Old System and the New System of education. 'These changes have been due to the reduction of the huge size of the textbook, not because of the recent findings of science', he suggested to me. Complaining about these changes, the physics teacher remarked that the chapters have now lost their continuity and harmony both with each other and with other courses like mathematics. Another teacher of physics, however, confirming that reduction in textbook size was the motive for the changes, claimed that the changes in the New System textbooks have corresponded with the new findings of science usually taught in countries like Great Britain and the USA. However, he, without giving any evidence for this claim, admitted that he had never taught the earlier Physics textbook, but he had seen it. With regard to the post-revolutionary Physics textbook, what is

interesting is the establishment of a two-hour per week course in physics for Year-eleven humanities students. When I asked the above teachers the reason for this, the latter professed his ignorance, but the former suggested that it was due to the relation of Physics to Philosophy.

(1) Regarding the course of '*Physical Education*', an experienced teacher of PE made clear to me that, unlike in the early years after the revolution, sport and PE have now been taken into consideration. He added that some aspects of PE have now become even more organised than they were in the Shah's period. For example, according to the new regulations of refereeing, a referee has the right to give an offending player a red card at school level. When asked whether there are differences between girls and boys schools in terms of PE curriculum, he suggested that since 1985 handball has been added to the pre-revolutionary PE curricula of basketball, volleyball, football, table tennis and running at the boys' schools of the city of Khoy including Firuraq. He denied the existence of any textbook about PE courses either before or after the revolution. He believed that the number of matches between different classes and schools of boys has increased since the mid-1980s, even in comparison with before the revolution. However, all matches at school and class level were stopped by the authorities in 1995 as a result of another policy, through which the Physical Education Organisation (*sazman-e tarbiat-e badani*) deals directly with the selection of some skilled youths in order to attend provincial matches.

I interviewed a female PE teacher; it was conducted at a messy laboratory and she was accompanied with a female teacher of moral education. She confirmed that there was no special textbook available, due to lack of resources in her view, for the PE curriculum, and that girls' curricula and assessments were different from boys'.

She made clear to me that there were no martial arts at girls schools, but that their main courses were: volleyball, chess, basketball, badminton and table tennis.

According to this teacher, the games common to boys and girls were: volleyball, chess, handball and basketball. However, there was no facility, or perhaps possibility, for basketball at the girls school in which she worked.

(*m*) In the academic year 1995-96, a textbook was published, which was to be taught to Year-nine students, called 'General Acquaintance with the New System of Education'. Its aim was to guide the students through the new state-provided strategies of education. Although this was an optional course, pupils were encouraged to take it because, firstly, there was no other alternative facility to help students choose subjects -- according to a female teacher of this course -- and, secondly, all students who were going to choose the main subjects of study the following year needed to take it, according to a male teacher of this course. He explained to me that although the title of the curriculum is the same for both girls and boys, different topics are taught to each sex in Kar-Danesh (vocational studies), which is a new subject in the New System, and Vocational subjects. Although both Kar-Danesh and Vocational are, in fact, vocational (different from the academic subjects of Literature & Humanities, Experimental Sciences, and Math-Physics, for which the curricula are almost the same for both sexes), Kar-Danesh seemed to be taught to a lower level than Vocational. However, in both subjects, the curricula taught to girls are more vocational -- and this means more invention is needed than in other subjects; and the curricula allocated to boys are more technical -- more appropriate to boys' mentalities and physical capacities, as the male teacher of this course explained to me.

Interpreting the changes that had occurred in curricula and textbooks from a rather one-sided perspective, the impact of Islamic ideology on these changes was considerable. The changes occurred in all possible subjects of study including humanities and sciences. However, the susceptibility of humanities subjects to the imposition of ideology was greater than that of the sciences. Besides the changes required by religion, there have also been some other creative changes required by science, although they had to satisfy the religious requirements. To borrow a Weberian approach to the analysis of these changes, Iran was still in a 'rational' mode in so far as it was making attempts to increase domination over the external world. Nonetheless, it is interesting that none of teachers in the areas of science interpreted the increasing post-revolutionary attention to their areas as religious requirements. But, as Weber discovered during his studies on Asian religions (see Roth and Schluchter 1979: 45-59), there were major differences between Western Protestantism and Iranian culture.

Libraries

As has already been mentioned, an open atmosphere was not available for Iranian students and teachers to study different science books. The textbooks required by students and teachers were provided by the Iranian government, in both pre- and post-revolutionary regimes. The importance of libraries had always been hidden from Iranian society. Since Iranian students did not become properly familiar with the idea of book-reading and libraries, and were guided by state-provided textbooks and teachers from the early years of their education, they expected their lecturers to provide something for them to read and to help them pass higher education exams as

well. As a result, libraries were rarely considered by students -- if Iranian schools had them at all. It was interesting that when I asked teachers about the use of libraries by students, they replied: 'If they [students] study their own textbooks, that is good enough. There is no need to go to libraries to read other books'.

Because of the revolution of 1979, the schools' libraries, at least in the studied area, became active -- but only in the special field of religion. Some teachers from different academic subjects enthusiastically looked for some Islamic books, so they could become familiar with the new interpretation of Islam, in the very early years of the revolution. However, such enthusiasm did not last long. In my view, the existence of such enthusiasm was not surprising, in a secular society which was experiencing a new interpretation of an old religion. For this reason, I agree with the opinion of some writers who believe that the Iranian revolution of 1979 was political, as well as religious. If it had been religious alone, it would have been the continuation of earlier Islamic movements -- and there would have been no place for enthusiasm in understanding something which people already knew. Nevertheless, this enthusiasm was noticeable among both students and some teachers at schools during the first years of the revolution.

After the revolution of 1979, although both schools' and cities' public libraries were expanded, they developed specifically in the area of religious books. Regarding town and city libraries, there was no considerable increase in the number of scientific or practical books, even about Persian literature. The same was true for school libraries after the revolution, although most schools had no library at all before the revolution, as two teachers remarked. As I observed myself, and five teachers confirmed, there were no books relevant to their subjects of studies, other than

religious books, in the libraries of either boys' or girls' schools. However, there were far fewer books in girls' high schools than in boys' schools, according to my own observation. During my six months fieldwork in all the schools of one area, except for a few pupils on one occasion in a boys' guidance school, I never saw anybody use these libraries. Except for a few scientific books, which were described by the relevant teachers as useless, all the other books were religious and had been written by *ulama* who were loyal to the Islamic ideology of the revolution. In this regard, an educational official suggested: 'the role of libraries (in schools) is that the ruling ideas should reach the students through the libraries. The LEA has sent schools some books two or three times, all of which were religious books, except a few scientific books which are almost useless.'

I investigated the New System of education in the new branch of '*Kar-Danesh*' at a Vocational High School in a city close to the rural area- because there was no vocational high school in the rural area. Since this school employed a librarian and was well organised, I was able to acquire some statistics about the stock. Among the 3550 books at that school, there were about 2000 (56%) books on religion, about 200 (6%) books on different aspects of science studied at the school, about 500 (14%) historical and fictional books, about 20 (less than 1%) volumes on sport, about 30 (22%) volumes of religious and gnostic poems and about 800 (22%) books which the librarian called 'miscellaneous'. I then investigated students' visits to the library for their own needs over a period of about two months. In this vocational high school, of 481 visits to the library, 141 (29%) inquiries had been for religious books, 69 (14%) for books which met pupils' scientific needs and the other visits were for other titles. It should be noted that these inquiries were made by the male students of the

vocational branch, not the students of the branch of '*Kar-Danesh*'. Moreover, according to the head teacher of the vocational high school, most of the scientific books had been provided recently because of the special attention paid to scientific books and experiments by the New System of education. This could be confirmed by comparing the data regarding inquiries made by students of the New System and Old System. Out of the 481 inquiries, 379 (78%) cases were related to the New System of education and 102 (22%) cases were from students of the Old System of education. Moreover, while in the New System there were twice as many references to religious books as to scientific books (107 against 57), in the Old System of education there were three times as many (34 against 12). Furthermore, according to the librarian of the school, the students in the New System used the library more than the students in the Old System. I was told by some educational authorities that the role of the teacher of moral education and his activities was very important in all schools. As an example of a vocational school in a city in which the New System of education had led to shifts in scientific views, such statistics hint at the situation of schools' libraries in rural areas.

As regards town and city public libraries, I have to mention that apart from the problem of insufficient science books, which also affected schools' libraries, there were specific difficulties in terms of gender, which did not exist in the sex-segregated schools of Iran. As expected, the situation for girls wanting to use a town's public library was more problematic than it was in the city. Unlike the city girls, girls in the town even encountered problems in borrowing books. However, some teachers who were natives of the region believed that the number of female students who used the library for borrowing was very slowly increasing at that time, in comparison with the

early years of the library's establishment (1992). Out of twelve teachers, some of whom were natives, confirmed that the girls of that town were more or less deprived of using the library, because of its remote location in the town and their families' disagreement with the girls' use of it. Unlike boys, the female students of the New System of education were taken to visit the public library by the female advisor of the New System in that school, which could be interpreted as evidence of deprivation of library use by girls' families. Moreover, two female teachers and the school's head teacher stated that girls had borrowed books from the public library through the school, but either the school's authorities or the girls' teacher had returned the borrowed books. Furthermore, a male native teacher remarked that the girls in the village used their brothers, if they had any, to borrow or return books for them. According to the twelve teachers questioned, the families in the village were too biased culturally to allow their daughters to go to such public places. Although the boys had greater access to public places including libraries, they showed less interest in using them than girls, according to several teachers.

When I asked teachers about the possible reasons for students' lack of interest in reading books, and what they were interested in instead, they replied that the direction of students' interests had changed in recent years. Also, the libraries lacked sufficient power to attract youths there. Regarding boys' and girls' interests, some ideas seemed to be different from those of the first decade after the revolution but remained similar to those of the pre-revolutionary period.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the influence of the new philosophy of education (outlined in Chapter Five) and the Islamic ideology purveyed by agencies of the Iranian state after 1979 can be clearly discerned in aspects of school life. In particular, post-revolutionary revisions of textbooks and of the hours time-tabled for delivery of the Islamised curriculum reveal the extent to which, and the direction in which, education was transformed. These findings, in conjunction with evidence about other educational changes in Iran to be analysed in the next three chapters, are the first empirical contributions towards the case to be summarised in the Conclusions that Iran presents an interesting mixture of features which cut across some of Max Weber's distinctions between, for example, tradition and modernity, patrimonial and rational bureaucracies, and disenchantment of the world and rationalisation. It will be shown that Iran has been modernised, but not quite in ways predicted by Weber. Similarly, the growth of modern educational bureaucracies in Iran has not eliminated all aspects of patrimonialism. And attempts to rationalise educational provision have not furthered the disenchantment of the world. The effects of the Islamic Revolution on curricula and textbooks represent a particularly interesting compromise between aspects of tradition and aspects of modernity.

Chapter Seven

GENDERED SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS

The previous Chapter reviewed the changes in school curricula which followed the Iranian revolution of 1979. It showed how far Islamic ideology has affected the contents of textbooks and the delivery of teaching. This Chapter is designed to explain the changes that have occurred in the hidden curriculum running through post-revolutionary schools, especially the changes in social relations between teachers and students. The main theme is that not only textbooks and curricula but also school life in general had to conform with the new philosophy of education. Therefore, special attention will be given in this Chapter to the process of trying to ensure that social interactions between males and females were governed by Islamic ideology in all circumstances.

State-provided textbooks and curricula for students all over Iran are almost the same for both females and males. Yet, as we saw in Chapter Six, the effects of sex-segregation in education are greater than can be shown through the investigation of textbooks alone, for the delivery of education is not just confined to textbooks. Sex-segregation can take the form of inferior facilities or opportunities for one gender; different methods of teaching for each sex; fewer possibilities for boys or girls to express themselves in school, classroom or even in high positions in the LEA; fewer opportunities to pursue interests in a single-sex-dominated atmosphere and so on. I investigated these differences in social relationships and contexts in schools in a small town in north-west Iran. In this research, I looked at a wide range of student-teacher

interactions in male and female classrooms and schools as well as their respective facilities.

Teachers' relations with students

It was particularly important, in studying gendered social relations in schools, to learn about the experiences of teachers who worked with students of the opposite sex. To begin with, I conducted interviews with twenty male teachers who had taught in girls' schools. Ten of these teachers were either not employed before the Islamic revolution of 1979 or were not teaching girls at that time. The other ten informants adopted a wide range of practices for addressing their female students by full name. Five of them claimed that they addressed their female students merely by their surnames, while the other five teachers said that they called them either with the prefix of 'Miss' (*khanom*), in order to show them respect according to Iranian culture, and their surnames or just 'Madam' occasionally. But of all twenty male teachers, most were teaching girls when the interviews were conducted. Only one of them announced that he still addressed girls merely by their surname. Three of the teachers made clear to me that apart from just using 'Madam' or 'Miss' accompanied with the girls' surname, they sometimes addressed them as 'sister' or 'sister plus surname'. Another three teachers told me that they sometimes call them 'sister' or by their surname accompanied with the prefix 'sister', and sometimes just their surname, nothing more. Another teacher suggested that apart from using all of the above methods of addressing female students, he used the phrase 'my sister' as well. Two of the twenty teachers said to me that they addressed their female students by their surnames as well as the phrases 'dear sister' and 'my daughter'. However, nine teachers rejected the use

of the word of 'sister' altogether.

Comparing data regarding pre- and post-revolutionary ways of addressing female students by male teachers, we can perceive the impact of the revolution on this matter. If we suppose that the use of words like 'madam', 'miss' (*khanom*), 'my sister' or 'my daughter' indicates a respectful and friendly relationship, different from the traditional formalities of classrooms, we can conclude that the gap between students and teachers has narrowed since the revolution. My findings show that the 50% (5 out of 10) of teachers who addressed their female students by their surname alone before the revolution reduces to just 5% (1 out of 20) after the revolution. Moreover, some new words have entered into the language of male teachers addressing their female students which were not used before the revolution. Firstly, the use of 'sister' or 'surname accompanied with the prefix of sister' indicates the impact of religion on this issue. These terms were in vogue in the formal language of the Islamic state authorities. Secondly, the language of 'my sister' and 'dear sister' imply, apart from the impact of Islam on the post-revolutionary teacher-student relationship, a relatively friendly and close relationship between them. This would be especially significant in view of the traditional language of that rural area. Thirdly, the use of 'my daughter', mainly by old teachers, indicates again a narrowing of the wide gap which used to exist between teachers and students in pre-revolutionary education.

Of these twenty teachers who had worked in both girls' and boys' schools, fifteen believed that there was no difference between boys' and girls' classrooms in terms of teaching methods, while the other five teachers believed that gender issues sometimes affected their teaching methods. Yet, in terms of teachers' behaviour,

sixteen teachers of the above twenty claimed that their ways of behaving in girls' classrooms are different from in boys' classrooms. Only four teachers claimed that there was no difference at all between the two sorts of classes in terms of the teacher's behaviour.

The existence or lack of any difference in teaching methods among teachers depends to a great extent on the nature of their courses. The subjects of the five teachers who believed that they sometimes behaved differently in girls' classrooms, were biology, Persian literature and Islamic education. Both teachers of biology suggested that there were restrictions in teaching genetic issues in terms of speaking, presenting examinations and pictures and even clothing, according to one of them. He added that the girls' classes were not enjoyable for reasons to do with the ruling culture both before and after the revolution. However, there had been no control over the method of teaching before the revolution, and even genetic issues had been presented openly, while lessons on the sexual organs or menstruation were taught in a bowdlerised form in post-revolutionary classrooms.

Two experienced male teachers, of the four Persian literature teachers, made clear to me that the lessons relating to real love, as portrayed in the mystical literature of Iran, were affected when taught in girls' classes. One of them told me that he gave less explanation of those texts in girls' classes than in boys'. Another teacher remarked that a teacher felt shy and modest in teaching texts in which words were used like love (*eshgh*), body (*badan*, for example, in the sentence of *Hasank badani dasht chun sim-e noghreh*), separation (*hejran*), unite with a sweetheart after separation (*vesal*) and so forth. Such terms, according to this teacher, were used openly in boys' classrooms. In his view, the situation which affected the teaching of

such issues in girls' classes was intensifying daily in society, in comparison with pre-revolutionary times. Another two teachers of Persian literature, who believed that their methods of teaching in girls' schools were the same in boys' schools, had either little experience of teaching girls at high school level or experience of teaching girls at guidance level only.

One of the two male teachers of Islamic education who had taught at girls schools stated that some parts of the Islamic Education textbooks, concerning marriage or which contained words like 'sperm', and parts of the Qur'an which were related to 'Mary' and 'Joseph', affected his way of teaching in girls' schools. For example, when a female student had once asked him the meaning of the word 'sperm', he had become embarrassed and pretended he had heard nothing, and, fortunately for him she had not repeated her question. A teacher of psychology claimed that although the method of teaching was the same for both genders, there were some topics, like sexual glands, in the psychology textbook which he quickly passed over when he reached them in girls' schools.

The four teachers, out of twenty, who denied any difference between girls' and boys' classrooms in terms of teachers' attitudes to addressing students, taught courses of 'Persian literature', 'English literature', 'Physics', and 'Geology'. The other sixteen teachers all indicated that they had to exert more self-control in girls' classes. A young teacher of geography told me that his relationship with female students was less friendly than it was with boys. Even his way of looking at girls' faces was different; he tried to look at girls' faces less than boys'; and he avoided looking at girls individually. There was no contact between them out of class hours, and, inside classrooms, he was allowed to speak briefly to ill-disciplined students simply in order

to direct their mind towards lessons. He remarked that he had to appear more serious in his behaviour in girls' classes than in boys'; he laughed less and paid more attention towards lessons. However, in his view, the longer a teacher teaches the same female students, the fewer restrictions he will have with them. However, this openness will be never the same as in boys' classes. According to him, a teacher could not call a female student by her forename or use words like 'my dear' because a male teacher had to be more careful in his behaviour in girls' schools in the interests of not losing his job or respect and prestige among people.

Of the above twenty teachers, the two teachers of 'psychology and economics' and 'philosophy' pointed out that sensitivity about male teachers' behaviour in addressing their female students was lower in 1995-1996 (the time when this fieldwork was conducted) than in the mid-1980s when the prevailing atmosphere in girls' classes was less open. Conversely, a teacher of English literature claimed that the situation was still the same as in the mid-1980s. As mentioned above, we cannot ignore teachers' different personalities in dealing with this issue; the behaviour of teachers is too complicated to be reducible to a general formula for all male teachers at girls' schools. However, the exertion of great pressure and control over girls' schools cannot be ignored in the post-revolutionary educational system, especially in the 1980s. For example, the teaching of 'physical education' by male teachers in girls' schools was prohibited after the Islamic revolution of 1979.

By comparison, about 52% of the 23 teachers who were working in boys' schools continued the formal and traditional way of addressing male students after the revolution, 35% of which had been in a respectful way. But the other 48% of teachers, when addressing their male students, employed terms which were not used before the

revolution: 'brother', 'dear brother', 'faithful brother', 'my brother', 'brother and surname', 'sir' (*aqā*), '*haj aqā*', 'master (*arbab*)', 'my dear', 'my son', 'dear pupil', and also used their forenames.

Comparing the terms of address used for both male and female students by male teachers before 1979, we can conclude that the numbers addressing girls just by their surname or with a prefix was almost the same as it was for boys. After the revolution, however, male teachers used the new terms for girls more than they did for boys. In other words, the impact of the Islamic revolution has been greater on relations with female students than males on this issue, particularly if we just consider the impact of religion on the use of these terms. That is, while 40% (8 out of 20) of teachers, however infrequently, addressed girls as 'sister' or 'sister and surname', only about 17% (4 out of 23) of teachers called their male students 'brother', 'faithful brother' and 'brother and surname'.

Although some female teachers worked in a girls' high school, there was no female teacher at a boys' high school. However, in primary schools, the majority of teachers were women even in boys' schools. This was the same as in pre-revolutionary schools. Although there were no male teachers in girls' primary schools, a girls' high school in this rural area was male-dominated. However, as an experienced teacher suggested, these schools were more male-dominated before 1979 than after the revolution. Regarding the working situation of female teachers, two experienced teachers of history and biology who had worked in girls' high schools before the revolution, pointed out that female teachers and even female students did not wear the '*hejab*' inside school at all, but some of them might wear '*chadors*' or scarves outside of school. One of these teachers reminded me that the school staff-

room was common to both male and female teachers at that time, but after the revolution staff-rooms were sex-segregated.

In my fieldwork, I conducted an interview with a girls' high school assistant in a rural area. He was also the husband of the head teacher of that school, whom I could not interview directly. He asserted that he and his wife were, in fact, the same. He was technically called a 'director of courses' (*modir-e droos*) but he played the role of assistant to his wife. It is possible that he was in practice the real head teacher of that school; for example, he went to banks and the LEA to deal with the administrative affairs of the school. Male teachers consulted him about their problems, and he became very concerned when something was wrong with the school. In other words, he shouldered all of the responsibility for that school on his own, and his wife was not much more than a good arbitrator for female teachers. In other girls' high schools a male assistant would usually be a mediator between the female head teacher and male teachers.

In the girls' high school in which I conducted my fieldwork, there were eight female and eleven male teachers as well as a male administration assistant, a male laboratory assistant, two male cleaners, who also served tea to both male and female teachers, a male assistant head teacher, and a female head teacher. Therefore, the number of male officials in this girls' school was almost twice that of females. This indicates that, although there had been an attempt to make schools more sex-segregated in post-revolutionary times, male officials still dominated institutions in terms of employment. Among the eight female teachers from whom I requested an interview, only one teacher rejected my request. She taught biology for one day a week but was dissatisfied with teaching in a rural school. The other seven female

teachers agreed to be interviewed by me, but my requests were passed on to the head teacher through her husband, who was meant to be her assistant; and she transferred the requests to the female teachers.

Six of these female teachers stressed that they did not use the prefix 'miss' in front of pupils' surnames, except for a teacher of Arabic literature who mentioned that she sometimes used 'miss' when not addressing the girls as 'sisters'. A teacher of chemistry said that she had used the prefix of 'miss' the previous year, but this had caused the girls to laugh at her because of the rural culture they lived in. However, she still employed this term for addressing adult women in the city. Just one teacher out of the six, who was a teacher of moral education (*morabbi-e omur-e tarbiati*) and so did not really teach an academic subject, addressed the girls by their forenames. She reasoned that she knew all of them well enough, having lived in that rural area for seven years and that her job required a close relationship with them: 'my relationship with them is friendly. I usually speak to the students who are lonely or sad during break times'. A teacher of physical education reported that she addressed her female students by their forename and surname, while a teacher of literature addressed the girls just by their surnames without putting 'miss' or their forename in front. A teacher of Islamic education explained that she addressed them mostly as 'sisters' or just by their surname inside the class, but she might call them by their forenames outside of classes. She added that if she addressed the girls just with their forenames, they would undermine her authority; there had to be a wall between teacher and students.

Comparing these findings with male teachers' ways of addressing both their male and female students, we can see that the formal and traditional terms of address

are used more by female teachers with girls than by male teachers with either female or male students.

Regarding other behaviour, a teacher of chemistry said: 'when I teach [the pupils] a lesson, I expect them to listen it. If they do not pay attention, I may react towards them, for example I send them out of the class.' Then she pointed out: 'Of course, I have a friendly relationship with adults and the students of Year-eleven, but my relationship with the students of Year-nine is merely a teacher-student relationship.' Yet, contrary to the male teachers' relationships with their female students, female teachers' relationships with their girls students are more open and friendly outside school than inside classes.

A very important point which I discussed in an interview with the teacher of Islamic education was that she went to the back of a female class, sat among the girls, and talked with them about different issues like assessments, questions, lessons, moral issues and even family and private issues. This was only possible in a class with a female teacher and female students. It would have been impossible and even dangerous for male teachers to do this in girls' classes after the revolution, although a few 'corrupt' male teachers might have tried it in some girls' schools before the revolution, as one of my female informants pointed out.

It seems that both female and male students have enjoyed more openness in their classes after the revolution and that they have left behind their very formal pre-revolutionary relationships with teachers. After the revolution, however, there have been restrictions for girls which never existed for boys: their outward appearance has been changed dramatically and they must wear school dresses which are the subject of strict regulations. Moreover, the girls' relationships with the opposite sex came to be

controlled by school authorities and in-school organisations established after the revolution.

Students' relations with teachers

Of the twenty-six male teachers who responded to my question about change in male students' behaviour in addressing them, twenty five teachers admitted that there had been some changes in comparison with either the pre-revolutionary student-teacher relationship or the early years of the revolution. Sixteen of them had either taught, or studied at high school level, during the last years of the Shah's reign, and the other eight teachers had only experienced early post-revolutionary schools as high school students. The findings reveal a transformation in the post-revolutionary relationship between students and teachers; students felt more comfortable in classes and schools after the revolution than before. The teachers had various interpretations of these transformations, based on their own experiences and cultural backgrounds.

Six of the teachers commented on pupils making more noise and having less respect. These teachers believed that politeness and education are connected, and that since students had lost their motivation for studying, their respectful and polite behaviour had changed.

A teacher of physics blamed pupils' disrespect towards teachers on a lack of motivation and on the economic issues of the society: 'Respect towards teachers is less these days, in comparison with [before the revolution] when I was a student. Nowadays students do whatever they want. No more privileges are granted to education except to the children, particularly the daughters, of teachers. The children of the rich do not pay attention to education at all; when they are asked why they do

this, they point out the state of their own teachers' lives.' He added: 'Of course, the motive for education here, as a rural area, is stronger than it is in the city but it has decreased in general.' An experienced teacher of chemistry told me that students think that their duty is just coming to school, not studying. He explained that since his relationship with his students was not very friendly, he did not notice many changes in their moral behaviour, but he claimed that respect towards teachers had declined: '[The pupils] consider teachers as an instrument, nothing else. Whenever I see the men who used to be my teachers, I show respect to them in the same way that students should respect their teachers. When I was walking with one of my colleagues in an orchard a few days ago, one of my students shouted "don't steal the fruit, sir"'.

Two teachers of 'Persian and Arabic literature' and 'mathematics' linked the issue of students' behaviour to how far the school was from a city; the more remote a village, the more respect a teacher will enjoy there. Two other teachers welcomed the openness of their relationship with male students. One of them, who taught economics and psychology, thought that there had been many changes in students' behaviour after the revolution. Welcoming these changes, he described his relationship with his male students as friendly and remarked that they talked to him in a relaxed manner -- except for years one and two, particularly in humanities. He reasoned that since physical punishment was prohibited after the revolution, friendliness between teachers and students had increased.

Only six male teachers, out of the above-mentioned twenty-six, had taught in pre-revolutionary female schools in an urban area. As a matter of fact, there had not been girls' high schools in rural areas, so the girls who reached high school age or even guidance school age had to stay at home and wait for the relatives of a boy to

come and ask her parents to marry him, or go to the city to continue their studies.

This was the fate of all girls in rural areas before the revolution -- at least until 1985 in that part of north-west Iran in which I conducted my fieldwork. But a teacher of history who had taught at pre-revolutionary female schools in two cities of north-west Iran, comparing female schools before and after the revolution, noted that it had once been possible for boys and girls to mix in a school where a small number of female applicants were studying a special academic subject, such as Experimental Sciences or Math-Physics. He also made clear to me that although there were some restrictions about make-up in pre-revolutionary girls' schools, they were not universally observed; whereas there was much more strictness in girls' schools after the revolution.

Furthermore, neither girls nor boys had clothing restrictions under the Shah's system of education, but could not wear whatever they liked at post-revolutionary schools; jeans, for example, were banned. Unlike before the revolution, girls were now obliged to wear uniforms, in forms determined by the Islamic revolutionary authorities, called '*manto*' and '*maghnaeh*' with specified types and colours of socks and shoes as well.

In general, sensitivity towards opposite sex relationships has increased in all Iranian institutions, including schools, after the Islamic revolution. Nowadays, if corruption occurs in an institution, particularly schools, this sensitivity will be increased greatly through the authorities making strict guidelines for all institutions- possibly even legislation. For example, the relationship of a male teacher with a year-eight girl in a girls' school in the academic year 1993-4 resulted in the compulsory wearing of the '*chador*' in school and classes for all female students in 1994-95 by an order issued by the school's new head teacher, although this requirement was against the educational regulations. Although sensitivity about wearing the '*chador*' had been

reduced by 1995-6, the appointment of new school authorities with particular personal attitudes meant that strict limitations on male teachers' relationships with girls, even with regard to academic discussions, remained in force.

The matter of relationships with the opposite sex was not a new issue caused by the Islamic revolution. Most Iranian families, particularly in rural areas and small towns, were aware of the problem; it was not easy for a young girl to ask her male teacher an academic question in public in small towns. There is no doubt, however, that the opposite-sex relationship issue had been handled by families alone before the revolution, but was controlled by both families and the Islamic authorities after the revolution. Clearly families' control over their children, especially their daughters, increased after the revolution, owing to fears about their social status and future. Thus, in my opinion, the social status of young girls became more fragile as a result of the revolution of 1979, although the Islamic identity of the revolution made traditional families give their daughters more chances to appear in public places and institutions.

Regarding female students' relations with their female teachers, there were, predictably, no limitations on female teachers' making friends with girls either outside of classes or in school. However, the traditional and formal teacher-student relationship and perhaps the special roles girls had within families restricted them to have more contact inside school than outside. Nevertheless, female students had no problem in showing their feelings, emotions, respect and kindness towards their female teachers. Almost all the teachers mentioned the girls' kindness and expression of emotions, especially when a female teacher felt unwell. Nevertheless, none of the teachers characterised their students as shy, modest or bashful, but called them sometimes noisy, impolite or undisciplined. In this regard, there did not seem to be

any difference between pre- and post-revolutionary girls' schools.

From my interviews with female teachers, I gathered that there had been a shift in the rules concerning married female students after the Islamic revolution.

According to the pre-revolutionary educational rules, married female students were not allowed to enrol at a school; this was probably one of the means to stop families letting their daughters get married while very young. The Islamic-revolutionary authorities apparently did not see any contradiction between girls' performing both educational and family duties and so decreed that married girls could continue with their studies. According to some teachers, however, female students who revealed to other students details of their private relationships with their *fiancés* or husbands, spread moral corruption in girls' schools. In fact, this issue was cited by female teachers in particular as one of the main problems of girls' schools, which affected the students' behaviour towards teachers. Protesting against the moral corruption allegedly caused by having married students in schools, for example, a teacher of moral education had argued with the head teacher of a girls' school over why she was not going to dismiss married students from her school. Apparently head teachers had recently been given permission to dismiss married students, who had gone to live with their husbands and had caused moral problems at school.¹

Free Time

The school curriculum accounts for the formal interaction between teachers and students, but informal interaction during 'free time' is also revealing about the character of social relations in Iranian schools. But applying the phrase 'free time' to schools and classes is a little misleading for teachers; in fact, they did not really know

what I meant by it. The teachers thought that classes were the place for education and nothing else. What I had in mind were the few minutes of free time which were inevitably left at the end of each educational period or during refreshment breaks or in the exam season when some teachers used teaching time for marking students' exam papers. In both pre- and post-revolutionary educational systems of Iran, only teachers spoke during classes; both systems of education were boring for students and teachers, and breaks were needed in each 80- or 90-minute educational period. As the teachers were the only speakers and active members of classes, they expected their students to be active in these short breaks and to ask questions about their lessons. Seventeen male and female teachers, of the twenty-seven teachers who were interviewed on this topic, criticised students' lack of desire to ask questions, unaware of the fact that the students had become tired with long lectures.

However, we must also consider the changes which happened in the prevailing social, cultural and political atmosphere; students might have been interested in talking to each other about fashion, football matches or their family's material wealth before the revolution, whereas, after the revolution, they would be more interested in talking about politics, including opposition groups, or about the religiosity or secularity of their relatives and so on. The Islamic revolution of 1979 strongly affected male teacher-female student relationships during these free times in classes as well. Two teachers of history suggested that it had been possible to talk to girls individually in free times in pre-revolutionary girls' schools where they had worked, but there were no such possibilities in that rural area, and even in some urban areas, after the revolution. Male teachers' interpretations and expectations of girls' classes, regarding free time, differed from boys'.

Similarly, each gender's reaction to their teachers' free-time policy was different from the other. For example, a teacher of English literature, whose policy was to tell jokes to students in the few minutes of free time, suggested that male students reacted differently from females when they were told jokes; boys laughed loudly while girls laughed quietly; and, sometimes when they were too excited girls, caught their friends' skirts or leaned over each other. Thus, since boys showed obvious reactions, some teachers believed that they preferred free time in classes to females. In my opinion, one of the main effects of the Islamic revolution on women in public institutions, including schools, was that they attempted to present themselves as more shy and modest than they had been before the revolution. Thus, although the girls could not hide their excitement about their male teacher's jokes, on the other hand, they also wanted to show that they were not shameless girls, but were self-controlled and modest. These conflicting personalities in people, particularly women, became so strong after the revolution that families were recommended to cultivate them, at least in public. Moreover, since modesty in the religious texts was considered as a sign of religiosity (*al-haya-o men-a al-ddin*), it was also considered a religious value.

Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, differentiation between social and religious values has not been easy. Irrespective of whether the modesty was real, it even affected female teacher-female student social relationships in those girls' schools in which male teachers also worked. For example, a girls' high school assistant, talking about a female PE teacher's work, made clear to me that she did not like to teach sport in the school's playground because there were male teachers in the staff-room; she had even told him that male teachers should sit with their backs to the

windows in the staff-room so as not to see the yard, and that she would not run in the yard. According to the assistant, this situation had meant that students were too shy to play in the school's yard because of the men in the staff-room. This was different from pre-revolutionary PE in which male teachers played with their female students together in the yard. A female advisor of the New System of education also claimed that the presence of male teachers, and the special insistence on wearing the '*chador*' in a girls' school, prevented her from having a close and friendly relationship with her students in the school yard.

Before 1979 there was a department in each pre-revolutionary LEA, called '*omur-e tarbiati*', which was responsible for extra-curricular activities in schools. Extra-curricular activities included painting, calligraphy, creative writing, journalism, singing and theatre; and they usually happened as part of the celebrations on important days such as the Shah's birthday. After the revolution, however, this LEA department retained its Persian title (*omur-e tarbiati*), but its work was changed to 'moral education', and it became one of the most important devices used by Local Education Authorities for diffusing the political ideology of the Islamic revolution through schools, to the extent that Rajaei, the Education Minister at that time, called moral education teachers the 'soldiers of the revolution'.

After the revolution, more subjects were added to the content of 'moral education' such as reciting the Qur'an, *Nahjo'l-balagheh* (the collection of Imam Ali's letters and speeches) and book-reading. Since there was little interest among students in staying at school after lessons ended, and the break times were too short (about ten or fifteen minutes) to do much, most of the above activities were done at home. There were some 'moral-cultural centres' (*canoon-haye farhangi-tarbiati*) available for girls

in the city, where sewing, embroidery of flower designs, cooking, painting, calligraphy, design, decorative arts, manual arts, making nosegays, knitting and the Qur'an were taught. In my view, these sorts of centres were to replace pre-revolutionary centres like the 'houses of youth' (*khaneh-ye javanan*) or the 'houses of scouting' (*khaneh-ye pish-ahangi*). In the opinion of a female teacher of moral education, although the rural girls of that area and their families welcomed one-day trips to the countryside or journeys to the cities of Mashad or Ramsar, most of them did not welcome such centres. These one-day trips or seven-day summer trips to Ramsar, for which only clever and artistic students were selected, were in vogue before the revolution. After the revolution, however, a trip lasting a few days to the religious city of Mashad, was added to the journey to Ramsar.

By contrast, physical education lost its importance in the curriculum after the Islamic revolution of 1979. In my opinion, at least two issues, brought about by the ideology of the revolution, affected the status of physical education. First, physical education was considered to be connected somehow with pre-revolutionary activities, which were downgraded in many aspects of everyday life after 1979, including outward appearance, marriage festivals and parties. Second, a sort of Islamic rationalism was developed after the revolution, which questioned some aspects of life in vogue during the Shah's reign, like studying courses on religions or playing and watching certain sports. Ayatollah Montazeri, once the deputy of Ayatollah Khomeini, in questioning the philosophy of football suggested that there was no rational logic in a ball being chased by a number of players and, worse still, it was watched enthusiastically by thousands of people.

Special PE teachers who taught in pre-revolutionary primary schools were

transferred to different sections of Local Education Authorities, and the main teachers of primary schools were expected to teach PE as well. Moreover, these PE teachers lost the social standing they had before the revolution, and were not paid much attention in schools or society. He added that the administration of girls' sports changed after the revolution, and female PE teachers or instructors were put in charge of girls in schools and other institutions. He believed that this lower status of PE undoubtedly affected athletics events among students which had been popular, as in European societies, for both boys and girls at all educational levels in cities, provinces and the country before the revolution -- with no restrictions in terms of gender.

These athletics event were re-established for both boys and girls in the mid-1980s, but with more emphasis on boys than girls and with changes in some areas. For example, the running races for girls were eliminated, and male fans could not attend female matches and vice versa. According to LEA officials in 1995-96, although PE had still not recovered from the shock of the revolution, especially regarding females, the situation had improved in comparison with the early years of the revolution. This was because of PE's special role in filling the leisure time of youth thereby resisting 'cultural invasion' (*tahajom-e farhangi*) from the West and raising the national flag of Iran among other flags of the world. In my view, the Islamic authorities were also trying to change the ideology of PE from the pre-revolutionary bodily concept to a spiritual one; the slogan of 'O God, strengthen my body in the service of You' (*ghavve ala khedmateka javarehi*), which was a prayer of the first Imam, Ali, in the 'Komeil Prayer' (*do 'a-ye Komeil*), was used in all PE activities at that time. According to the Education Minister's order of that time, special PE teaching for years four and five was re-established at the primary school

level, but the problem still existed for other school years. This was such a problem that the PE authorities, according to an LEA official, were unable to assemble enough students to fill the city's volleyball team for participation in the province's competitions (despite the fact that volleyball was a popular sport). Furthermore, as he made clear, school races had been eliminated in 1995 in order to vire the funds into the country's Development Plan. The provision of resources for PE was more difficult than before the revolution.

Teachers' Councils

Discussion of problems with teaching, assessing and disciplining students occasionally took place in the local meetings of Teachers' Councils (*shura-ye m'olleman*). These normally convened once a month and were attended by the authorities and teachers who worked in a particular school, both before and after the revolution. In both regimes, such meetings were usually announced by a school's authorities in order to discuss problems with teachers, and to improve the school's situation. Some teachers claimed that there had always been a top-down relationship in these councils, pre- and post-revolution, and a large number of teachers who had no experience of teaching in pre-revolutionary schools also confirmed explicitly or implicitly that this was the case in post-revolutionary schools. According to those with teaching experience before 1979, a school had little authority to solve its teaching problems and, therefore, the authorities had to report major problems to the LEA. In both pre- and post-revolutionary Teacher's Councils, disciplinary problems were discussed more than all others. In both regimes, the primary aim of such councils had always been the issuing of orders, by the LEA, for teachers to implement.

According to seven teachers who had taught in pre-revolutionary secondary schools, although both pre- and post-revolutionary Teachers' Councils had a similar structure owing to the nation-wide centralisation of education, the following two differences existed between them. Pre-revolutionary councils were taken more seriously than the post-revolutionary ones; and teachers had felt more obligation to attend such councils during the Shah's regime than they did after 1979.

The expression 'Bring us our sweets; we are ready to sign your proceedings; but then let us go' was popular when I personally attended several councils during my fieldwork. This meant that there was no need for teachers to sit and discuss the issues which a head teacher wanted to set forth for discussion on behalf of the LEA and then sign the resolutions, for the teachers were ready to sign it in advance without wasting any time. Although political arguments sometimes arose in such councils after the revolution, there had previously been no possibility of criticising the Pahlavi's policies of education in such meetings. Finally, according to my informants, while female and male teachers sat next to each other in girls' school councils before the revolution, their meetings were later separated; alternatively, men and women sat in different rows. School authorities in both regimes, allegedly reacted the same way to the difficulties facing teachers at school. School authorities dealt with teachers' problems whenever they could; otherwise, they reported the issues to the LEA. Only one teacher believed that the Teachers' Councils in pre-revolutionary schools enjoyed greater independence in so far as their decisions were accepted by the Director of the LEA.

Regarding the importance of Teachers' Councils, the post-revolutionary meetings can be divided into two periods, firstly the very early years of the revolution,

between 1979 and about 1982; and secondly the period from 1982 until the present day. Using one of the most popular slogans of the revolution, 'Independence, *Freedom*, and the Islamic Republic', and Ayatollah Taliqani's emphasis on the necessity of consultation in managing the country's affairs after the victory of the revolution, many types of councils were either established or re-established in different institutions, including schools, in the very early years of the revolution. Ayatollah Taliqani was a member of the Freedom Movement Party and an intellectual clergy whose ideas were always seen as symbols of support for freedom. I conducted interviews with fourteen teachers who had been in employment in that period during the early years of the revolution, and it seemed that a much more open atmosphere ruled over these councils than before the revolution. This was because the teachers felt that they had to determine their own educational fate through councils and consultations in both girls' and boys' schools. 'Ideas were presented explicitly in such meetings, and nobody was afraid of anything', a teacher told me. In this period, although female teachers now had to sit in a different row from male teachers, they still shared the same office when they discussed issues. However, they were more reluctant to discuss certain topics than they had been before the revolution.

Teachers' Councils gradually lost their 'legitimacy' in boys' and girls' schools for the following reasons, according to some teachers, heralding the beginning of the second period of such councils' status. Firstly, the loss of legitimacy had been caused by the impact of teachers' economic situation on education. There was no spare time for post-revolutionary teachers to spend in such meetings; instead, they had to deal with the necessities of life after school. Difficulties in the provision of foodstuffs and the existence of inflation, which caused some teachers to take additional jobs, kept

teachers busier than they had been before the revolution. Therefore, teachers just wanted to sign the proceedings as soon as possible and get on with their daily business. According to a teacher of science, the councils' legitimacy was affected by teachers' social status; since teachers has lost status, there should be no expectation of legitimacy and high status for the Teachers' Councils either.

Secondly, and more importantly, the councils lacked any executive backing. Certainly in a centralised system, in which a top-down bureaucratic policy operated, there was no room for the presentation of ideas. Teachers described the council as a 'formality' which had no capacity to solve problems or even make decisions; and even if decisions could be made, according to a few teachers, solutions could not be implemented. There was no difference between boys' and girls' schools on this count, as all fifteen male informants emphasised. The fact that there were no practical results from the councils played an important role in the lack of teachers' interest in such councils. But whenever they felt that a practical decision was going to be made during a meeting, they made sure they attended it: 'If the planned subject of a meeting is related to pupils' assessment, they [teachers] will attend it; otherwise, either they will not attend or will just discuss different unrelated issues like welfare and economic problems', an educational official told me.

It was interesting that, unlike male teachers, female teachers were optimistic about Teachers' Councils. Five female teachers, out of six interviewed, described it as a 'useful and necessary' meeting, and another female teacher criticised the school's authorities because they paid no attention to it. She also criticised the teachers themselves who did not show serious interest in the council, leading to its irrelevance in her school. They were in favour of Teachers' Councils in which they could express

their ideas and problems, but, in my opinion, they lacked sufficient experience to see the results of these meetings -- they were too young to make an informed judgement about it. These teachers were more critical of themselves and the head teacher, who was female, than the structure of such councils. A female teacher also mentioned the limited number of female teachers in her school as an obstacle preventing them from attending such meetings seriously, because the council's meetings took place separately for male and female teachers.

Although both male and female teachers' meetings shared the same structure, there were differences in terms of the content of discussions between the councils in boys' and girls' schools. In the Teachers' Councils in girls' schools, according to one teacher, some of the points which were often discussed were rarely mentioned in boys' schools. Female teachers, for example, were asked to arrive at school on time; this was a special problem for married female teachers who could not always arrive at school on time or had to leave earlier due to their family commitments, as a female school official made clear to me. Moreover, all teachers were asked not to dismiss a female student from a classroom or a school, because there would be the possibility of her making a relationship with someone of the opposite sex outside the school. On the other hand, teachers were not allowed to teach female students after school hours for the same reason. In these meetings, school authorities emphasised that any change in a girls' school leaving time should be reported to parents in advance. But in general, wearing the '*hejab*' was the most important issue, according to all teachers who taught at female schools, and it was increasingly emphasised by the authorities in the meetings of girls' schools' Teachers' Councils.

The issue of assessment was probably the one which was most likely to make

teachers take Teachers' Council meetings more seriously. Teachers were asked to provide exam questions, to be in school during assessment time, to mark exam papers and then present them to the school on time in co-operation with the school authorities. Some teachers, most of whom were experienced, showed no interest in teaching, and they either left school early or arrived at school late, giving various excuses, as I observed. This was a common problem for boys' and girls' schools and was frequently discussed in council meetings. The registration of students and oral assessments by teachers were other issues with which the authorities were concerned. Furthermore, schools' financial problems, such as the cost of fuel or paper, and the jobs which teachers had to do for future special religious or national celebrations were other points about which teachers were questioned by the authorities. The teachers themselves complained about students' discipline, advised each other not to make very close relationships with students, discussed the lack of motivation for education among them, and chatted with each other about problems in their personal lives and the effects of inflation on their economic position. However, we should not forget that the main purpose behind holding these councils was for the LEA to issue orders to teachers via school authorities. Yet, attendance at Teachers' Councils, like many other things, had become more relaxed after the revolution.

Prayers in schools

Unlike in pre-revolutionary schools, after the Islamic revolution of 1979 Collective Prayers (*namaz-e jama'at*) were established in both male and female schools. Such prayers were usually performed by Imams who were appointed by the LEA. These prayers were established under the supervision and responsibility of moral education

teachers. It was unusual that the clergy associated with the Imamate of a girls' school, according to one teacher, also taught some classes when the teacher had not come to school, in order to teach the female students religious duties (*ahkam*). This never happened in boys' schools; when I asked a boys' high school official about this, he replied: 'the role of the clergy in school is just Imamate of praying, nothing else.'

Whilst conducting my fieldwork, I attended these prayers in different boys' schools of a rural area. The boys of each class attended the collective prayers in turn, each day. According to the girls' schools' authorities, the situation was the same for girls as for boys. This illustrated the increased formalisation of prayer, in terms of periodicity, since the early years of its establishment. As an observer, I noticed a few students who made a noise and interrupted prayers. However, this could have been expected during the early years of this practice, when some were not going to prayers of their own volition.

While there was no contact between the school's clergyman and boys, according to one teacher, female pupils at guidance level were more interested in asking the clergy their religious questions than were high school students. In this teacher's view, the pupils of guidance level were also more interested in praying at school than were high school students. She added: 'we do not force them [high school students] to pray due to limitations of space'. Moreover, according to a native male teacher, rural girls normally had less access to clergy, for cultural reasons, than boys. He claimed that girls did have access to mosques, although they actually went there less often than boys.

Although there was no special connection between the boys' high school and the mosque at all, the female students had been taken to the mosque four times during

one educational year: twice to pray, another time to attend the death anniversary of *hazrat-e Fatemeh* (the daughter of the Prophet), and another time for taking part in her birthday celebration, named by the Islamic government the 'Day of Women' (*rouz-e zan*).

Some students from each school, who were selected by senior staff, had had to attend Friday prayers in turn, accompanied by their teacher of moral education or school authorities, twice a month since 1995. According to my informant, it was not obligatory, but the principle was 'Don't ask; just do it'. This was another sign of the increased formalisation of prayers in recent years in comparison with the early years of their establishment.

Conclusion

The analysis of changes in social relations between teachers and students suggests that interactions between them in the post-revolutionary era are both more relaxed *and* more constrained by a prevalent concern with segregating the sexes as much as possible. This was apparent in the gendered differences in the ways that teachers and students commonly used for addressing each other. Sensitivity about the propriety of students relations with members of the opposite sex had increased sharply since 1979, thereby amplifying some patterns of pre-revolutionary culture. Even the conduct of 'free time' in schools had been influenced by gender sensitivities; and physical education had been severely curtailed. It is not surprising, then, that the business transacted at meetings of Teachers' Councils were heavily influenced by Islamic ideology. And the increased degree of formalisation in the relations between schools and the Imams appointed to conduct weekly prayers in further evidence of the

seriousness with which socialisation in Islamic values is now conducted in Iranian schools.

This chapter has provided further empirical evidence about the nature of the changes that have occurred in Iranian schools in response to Islamic ideology. This ideology illustrates the point made in the Conclusions below about the significance of irony in Max Weber's view of modernisation processes. For it is ironic that the post-revolutionary accentuation of the need for gender segregation in schools has coincided with a surprising degree of relaxation in relations between teachers and students. Further evidence of irony will be provided in the next chapter when an attempt will be made to examine the ways in which teachers have responded to the 'official' Islamic ideology in respect of their management, control and discipline of students.

ENDNOTE

¹According to Iranian culture, sexual relations between a couple are only allowed after the bride goes to her husband's house to live there permanently - not during the period of engagement.

Chapter Eight

TEACHERS' RESPONSES TO EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

The two previous Chapters sought to explain how Iranian authorities systematically brought Islamic ideology to bear upon school curricula and relations between teachers and students from 1979 onwards. It was possible to trace many major and minor changes back to the pervasive influence of Islamic ideology. This ideology was mediated (with varying degrees of success) by textbooks, the structure of the curriculum and, among other things, strict segregation of the sexes. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to claim that everything in Iranian schools was drastically transformed after 1979; and there is no doubt that some changes were relatively short-lived. Moreover, some new policies produced unintended consequences.

Nevertheless, Iranian schools show clear evidence of the power of Islamic ideology to re-order educational priorities and to shape classroom interactions.

Not surprisingly, Iranian school teachers have been sensitive to the impact of Islamic ideology on their professional training, career development, sense of job satisfaction and social status. Again, this impact has not been experienced uniformly but, as this Chapter will argue, there are some clear patterns in teachers' responses to the perceived changes in their professional life. It will become apparent once more that ideologically-inspired policies have not always produced their intended consequences.

The central role of teacher training institutions after 1979 as 'vehicles' for Islamic ideology's influence on education will be examined at the beginning of this

Chapter. The focus will then switch briefly to changes in methods of teaching and assessing students, before examining at greater length teachers' relations with a range of other parties interested in education. Finally, an attempt will be made to analyse teachers' perceptions of the ways in which their professional role and social status have changed since 1979.

Teacher Training Programmes

The issue of teacher training courses has been investigated in terms of both in-service and initial teacher training for both male and female teachers at primary, guidance and high schools during the three periods of the pre-revolutionary era, the first post-revolutionary decade (1979-1988) and the second period of the post-revolutionary era (1989-1996) in a rural area of Iran. This investigation was conducted by interviewing all teachers, with the exception of one primary school for boys. The total number of my informants was ninety-three, including sixty-seven males and twenty-six females.

Regarding the teacher training programme for men, although all teacher training colleges were established during the pre-revolutionary period, the number of teachers who had enjoyed such a programme before the revolution, especially at the primary school level, was less than it was after the revolution. In the area where I conducted my fieldwork between 1995 and 1996, I interviewed twenty-three male teachers from different academic levels who had taught during the pre-revolutionary period, and found that about 61% of them lacked any experience of teacher training college before becoming a teacher during the reign of the Shah. But, after the revolution, about 43% of them had completed such courses whilst working in schools. This was because, beside the establishment of teacher training colleges, the Education

Corps were also serving the needs of education, especially primary schools, under the impetus of the White Revolution (already discussed in Chapter Two). After the elimination of all corps policies after the revolution, teacher training colleges inevitably expanded throughout the country. Moreover, the ideology of the revolution required teaching to be seen as 'the job of Prophets', as the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran called it; and more consideration was given to training responsible and committed teachers through the development of the two-year teacher training colleges.

On the other hand, this ideology needed to deal with employed teachers as well. After interviewing male teachers, I found that the average length of existing teacher training courses in that area before the revolution was less than it was after the revolution; that is, it was 12.25 hours per each year against 29.77 hours in the post-revolutionary period. Furthermore, the locations of these courses had been in the local city, the centre of the province, and the capital city of Tehran, highlighting the centralisation of educational policy before the revolution.

As for the post-revolutionary period, this issue was studied separately for female and male teachers in two different stages; one between 1979 and 1988 and the other between 1989 and 1996. The percentage of male teachers who successfully completed teacher training college courses or some special university courses to become qualified to teach in school before being employed by a Local Education Authority, increased dramatically from about 31% before the revolution to more than 83% in the first post-revolutionary stage and more than 80% in the second. The data also showed that while 100% of guidance level male teachers in that area enjoyed such qualifications in both post-revolutionary stages, 50% of primary male teachers

(again in both stages), and about 15% of high school teachers in the first stage and about 17% of them in the second one lacked such qualifications. The low level of graduates from teacher training colleges at the primary education level had been affected by the Shah's Education Corp programme since all of them had been employed before the revolution, and the number of them at the high school level was a response to the special need for teachers in some specialisms who had graduated from universities in subjects other than education. Thus, the post-revolutionary educational authorities, unlike the pre-revolutionary ones, attempted to employ teachers who had graduated in Education (*tarbiat-dabiri*) or from teacher training colleges, as much as possible.

One of the main reasons for the importance of teacher training colleges reflects the religio-political ideology of the revolution which claimed that the future of the revolution depended on the good education of Iranian children, 'the builders of the future' (*ayandeh-sazan*). After interviewing a woman who used to teach at such colleges and became Director of teacher training college, it became clear to me that such colleges faced many changes after the revolution of 1979. The earlier two-year 'Tribal Teacher Training Colleges' (*daneh-saraye ashayeri*), to which students had been admitted after leaving primary school, and the two-year 'Elementary Teacher Training Colleges' (*daneshsaraye moghaddemati*), to which students had been admitted after passing Year-nine, were dissolved after the revolution. Moreover, the former two-year 'Guidance Teacher Training Colleges' (*daneshsaraye rahnamaei*), for which students were selected from high school graduates took the additional responsibility of training teachers for elementary schools -- in addition to changing the name to 'the Centres for Teacher Training' (*marakez-e tarbiat moallem*) after the

revolution. Furthermore, the pre-revolutionary four-year 'Higher Teacher Training Colleges' (*daneshsaraye ali*), whose students had been high school graduates and who were to be trained as high school teachers, retained their position with a mere change of title to the 'University of Teacher Training' (*daneshgah-e tarbiat moallem*).

According to my informant, the centres for teacher training became the focus of attention for post-revolutionary authorities hoping to make teachers loyal to the religio-political ideology of the revolution. Therefore, apart from establishing some special ideological courses for the students of such centres, they were governed by special rules, which differentiated them from the rest of the country, such as the obligatory wearing of the '*chador*' for women. My interviewee described this as a fruitless attempt, because when they graduated, some if not all students abandoned the obligatory '*chador*'. In that area, even the female chancellor of such a centre was also obliged by the Local Education Authority (LEA) to wear the '*chador*'. Therefore, the centres for teacher training had special significance for the post-revolutionary authorities as the main sources of ideological inspiration for all people who chose teaching as their profession. This feature sharply differentiates pre- and post-revolutionary teacher training programmes.

In my view, empty formalism not only ruled administrative affairs, as mentioned in the section above related to Teachers' Councils, but was also commonly felt even in dealing with religious and ethical issues at schools or such colleges. The special emphasis placed on the use of the '*chador*' by female authorities, teachers and students at such centres, regardless of its ironic role in society and its inappropriate psycho-social affects on them, is a clear sign of such formalism.

The importance of ideology is also reflected in the place accorded to courses on Islamic Theology and political ideology in post-revolutionary in-service teacher training courses. Through interviews conducted with ninety three teachers from different academic levels of education, subjects of study and levels of experience in a rural area of Iran, the figures in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 were obtained. The prominent position of the religio-political ideology course emerges clearly from comparison with the others.

Table 4: The percentage of in-service courses taken by the male teachers of a rural area between 1979 and 1988

Number	Course Title	Percentage
1	Theology and Qur'an	43.52%
2	Teaching methods of elementary level mathematics	11.64%
3	Elementary level teaching methods	8.34%
4	Mathematics and its methods of teaching in secondary level	5.46%
5	Humanities other than history	5.09%
6	Science	4.18%
7	Physical Education	3.43%
8	Administration and secondary level management	3.17%
9	History	2.24%
10	Vocational courses	1.01%
11	Elementary level management	0.64%
12	Courses not relevant to teaching	11.28%

Table 5: The percentage of in-service courses taken by the male teachers of a rural area between 1989 - 1996

Number	Course Title	Percentage
1	Theology and Qur'an	50.25%
2	Science	8.42%
3	Administration and secondary level management	7.45%
4	Humanities other than history	6.79%
5	Advisory for the New System of education	4.08%
6	Mathematics and its method of teaching in secondary level	2.34%
7	Social studies & methodology	2.33%
8	Elementary level teaching methods	2.27%
9	Elementary level management	2.23%
10	Teaching methods of elementary level mathematics	1.3%
11	Vocational courses	1.03%
12	Physical Education	1%
13	Art	0.63%
14	History	0%
15	Courses not relevant to teaching	9.88%

Table 6: The percentage of in-service courses taken by the female teachers of a rural area between 1979-1988

Number	Course Title	Percentage
1	Theology and Qur'an	67.86%
2	Elementary teaching methods	18.38%
3	Mathematics and its method of teaching	13.76%

Table 7: The percentage of in-service courses taken by the female teachers of a rural area between 1989-1996

Number	Course Title	Percentage
1	Theology and Qur'an	73.12%
2	Art	10.43%
3	Teaching methods in elementary level	5.16%
4	Science	4.18%
5	Advisory for the New System of education	4.08%
6	Physical Education	1.32%
7	Humanities	0.92%
8	The relationship between families and school	0.79%

In the pre-revolutionary system of education, although the political ideology of the regime which emphasised the pre-Islamic civilisation of Iran had been exerted through the curricula and courses, particularly History and the White Revolution, there was no place for a course of theology and RE in teacher training programmes.

Comparing the two regimes in term of the content of in-service teacher training programmes, the most important difference between them is the huge proportion of courses devoted to Theology and Qur'an (on average about 60% of all courses) after the revolution (that is, 43.52% of all courses between 1979 and 1988 by male teachers, 50.25% between 1989 and 1996 by males, 67.86% between 1979 and 1988 by female teachers, and 73.12% of all courses between 1989 and 1996 by female teachers).

Secondly, about half of all post-revolutionary training courses were totally unrelated to either the teachers' profession or their subject of teaching or, at most, barely related to their main job.

In comparing the pre- and post-revolutionary teachers' training programmes, some other differences arise -- for example, training for elementary school management in the pre-revolutionary educational system was more important than it was after the revolution. Also, psychological studies of children's behaviour had been independently taken into consideration more at that time than in post-revolutionary schools, at least in terms of *in-service* courses.

Comparing the above data regarding in-service teacher training programmes during the two regimes, I conclude that elementary school teachers in that area of Iran were given greater consideration in the pre-revolutionary educational system than in the post-revolutionary one. But the elementary level of education lost its relative importance after the Islamic revolution, to the benefit of the secondary level. Besides the reduction of in-service teacher training programmes, other events led to elementary teachers believing that their positions had been undermined after the revolution. For example, they talked to me about their low social status, unjust economic conditions and low incomes, and the existence of limits on the promotion of elementary level teachers. All these conditions led some primary school teachers to leave this level to work at higher academic levels or to take second, or even third jobs, like farming or carpet-weaving, in the hope of improving their living conditions and status.

Attention to secondary level, particularly high school, teachers was relatively stronger after the revolution. However, the appearance of different sorts of

universities, including many branches of the Islamic Azad University in various cities and even towns of Iran, and the Summer Teacher Training Programmes was a good opportunity for some elementary level teachers to improve their positions. The ideology behind this added attention to secondary level teachers was not so clear. Perhaps the post-revolutionary government wanted quick results to present to the world as a good example of Islamic government's benefits. This supposition is supported by the fact that the so-called improvement in the educational system, in the form of approving a New System, began at the high school level, although it had already been tried in the elementary and guidance levels before the revolution.

Furthermore, we should not ignore the huge number of teacher training programmes, together with the variety of courses conducted by the revolutionary authorities, in comparison with those provided by the pre-revolutionary regime. Comparing the average of all post-revolutionary in-service teacher training courses with pre-revolutionary courses, we can conclude that the average number of courses conducted by both post-revolutionary male and female teachers in that area, 29.77 hours per year, was about two and a half times higher than it was in the pre-revolutionary period, showing the importance of such courses after the revolution.

Furthermore, there were many differences and similarities in terms of the contents and number of courses between the first period of post-revolutionary teacher training programmes (1979-1988) and the second one (1989-1996), on the one hand, and between the two periods in terms of gender, on the other. Regarding the former point, Table 8 summarises the data:

Table 8: The average percentage of in-service courses taken by both male and female teachers of a rural area in the two periods of 1979-1988 and 1989-1996

Number	Course Title	1979-1988	1989-1996
1	Theology and Qur'an	55.69%	61.69%
2	Elementary level teaching methods	13.36%	3.72%
3	Mathematics and its methods of teaching in Elementary level	12.7%	0.65%
4	Mathematics and its methods of teaching in Secondary level	2.73%	1.17%
5	Humanities other than 'history'	2.55%	3.84%
6	Science	2.09%	6.3%
7	Physical Education	1.72%	1.18%
8	Administration and management for Secondary schools	1.58%	3.73%
9	History	1.12%	0
10	Vocational courses	0.5%	0.51%
11	Management for Elementary schools	0.32%	1.11%
12	Advisory for the New System of education	0	4.08%
13	Social Studies and Methodology	0	1.16%
14	Art	0	5.53%
15	Relationship between families and schools	0	0.39%
16	Courses incidental to teaching	5.64%	4.94%

According to the above Table, there were few changes in the subjects of Physical Education, vocational courses, relationship between families and schools, and incidental courses, in the second period after the revolution. However, the content of these changes might be more important than the extent of change. For example, although there was a small percentage difference between the two periods in the area of 'Incidental Courses', in actual fact, between 1989 and 1996 more courses

of 'Theology and Qur'an' (which was unrelated to the teaching subjects of the majority of teachers) replaced another unrelated subject of 'military training', which had been required in the first period due to the eight-year war with Iraq. Thus, although the content of incidental courses changed, there was only a small shift in the proportion of teachers taking the courses. But, in any case, the 6% increase in the course of 'Theology and Qur'an' between the first and second periods confirms the point already discussed in the sections on 'Gender' in Chapter Seven, according to which the emphasis of the LEA on the observance of Islamic modesty by females, both students and teachers, increased after about 1982/3. In other words, after the revolution, teachers, especially females as will be seen later, were exposed to a bombardment of ideology, which increased in the second period. This fact becomes more curious when we consider that besides the 6% increase of 'Theology and Qur'an' in the second period, the courses on 'Science', 'Art', and to some extent 'Social Studies and Methodology' also enjoyed more attention. This followed the popular slogan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which claimed there was no contradiction between religion and science. In other words, the new face of Islamic development, in which religion and science had come together, became clearer in the second period.

On the other hand, while the average time spent on in-service courses for male teachers in that area decreased from 31.53 hours per year in the period of 1979-1988 to 26.22 hours in 1989-1996, it increased for female teachers from 26.57 in the first stage to 32.3 hours per year in the second period. This suggests that more importance was given to female teachers than males in terms of in-service teacher training courses between 1989 and 1996 in comparison with the previous post-revolutionary years.

Thanks to the traditional culture of Iran, girls had been allowed to be employed in the LEA as elementary school teachers during both the pre- and post-revolutionary periods. However, this situation had been more difficult for women in the reign of the Shah than after the revolution. After 1979, in my view, women had more opportunity to extend their educational opportunities from GCSE level to the higher academic areas than they did in pre-revolutionary times. This was because, firstly, families showed less resistance to this, because of the creation of a proper Islamic atmosphere in the country by the Islamic Revolution. Secondly, the sex-segregation policy of the post-revolutionary government required the employment of as many female teachers as possible, so that men did not have to teach women. This was very noticeable in secondary schools, because there had been more than enough female teachers for both male and female elementary schools during both regimes, to the extent that elementary schools had been known as 'the female schools'. For this reason, while the number of female teachers at elementary schools in the area studied was static during 1979-1988 and 1989-1996, the number of female teachers in secondary schools shifted from three in the former to twelve in the later period. This means that the number of male teachers who used to teach female secondary students had been reduced in the second period in comparison with the first.

Regarding differences between male and female teachers in relation to in-service teacher training programmes, Table 9 offers relevant data:

Table 9: *The percentage of in-service courses taken by female and male teaches of a rural area during the post-revolutionary period*

Number	Course Table	Males	Females
1	Theology and Qur'an	46.89%	70.49%
2	Science	6.3%	2.09%
3	Secondary Level Math and its Methods of Teaching	3.9%	0
4	Elementary Level Math and its Methods of Teaching	6.47%	6.88%
5	History	1.12%	0
6	Humanities other than History	5.94%	0.46%
7	Social Studies and Methodology	1.17%	0
8	Art	0.31%	5.22%
9	Elementary Level Teaching Methods	5.3%	11.77%
10	Elementary Level Management	1.43%	0
11	Administration and Secondary Level Management	5.31%	0
12	Advisory for the New System of Education	2.04%	2.04%
13	Vocational Courses	1.02%	0
14	Physical Education	2.22%	0.66%
15	the Relationship between Families and School	0	0.39%
16	Courses not relevant to teaching	10.58%	0

In addition to the sex-segregation policy of conducting in-service teacher training courses separately for different sexes, there are a lot of differences between female and male teachers, according to the above Table, in terms of the courses offered by the LEA.

The majority of *experienced* teachers did not attend any in-service courses in the 1990s. When I asked them the reason for this, they responded that they had no need for such courses because they already had the maximum advantages determined

by the education department. Therefore, perhaps the most important motive for attending such courses would be the possibility of promotion. This fact, on the one hand, and a lack of regular and systematic planning for the development of such courses by the Education Department, as some teachers indicated and even some newspapers argued (for example, *Ham-shahri*, 29th November, 1995, p.11), had led to a reduction of the quality of such courses. This is particularly noticeable as regards the very old-fashioned method of teaching, i.e. lecturing, on such courses. The problem increases when we consider the accumulation of all courses over a short period. For example, a 150-hour course was crammed into 15 days, and a 210-hour course into 24 days. Another problem concerns the content of courses planned by the education department which were to be taught in each educational period of ninety minutes. For example, one session of ninety minutes on the Psychology of Growth, according to the planned programme, was supposed to cover all theories of Freud, Fromm, Ericson, Adler, Piaget and others from the Islamic perspective.

Teaching and Assessing Methods

According to participant observation and interviews conducted in the region, I discovered that the methods of teaching at all levels of elementary and secondary schools and those of pupil assessment under the New System of education as well as the old one were in general the same as in pre-revolutionary times.

A very old-fashioned method of teaching, with the teachers talking and the students listening and then memorising or practising, still governed the classrooms. However, a more open relationship between teachers and students, discussed in Chapter Seven set the post-revolutionary schools apart from pre-revolutionary ones in

terms of the students' chances of participating in the process of teaching through asking questions or making comments.

According to all twenty-nine of the teachers questioned on this subject, methods of teaching and assessing were the same as before the revolution, although under the New System some changes had occurred in the content of textbooks. For example, there were changes in the ways of proving some formulas in mathematics and in the relative attention to practical experiments and the use of laboratories in some courses in science. However, methods of teaching, and to some extent of assessment, permitted more flexibility in terms of the opportunity for teachers to develop personal interests and styles than was possible in the case of textbooks.

Such flexibility gave the teachers a chance either to cultivate their own planned or unplanned activities or to use school time simply as a way of biding their time until they could enjoy the job's real benefits (pension) in retirement. This is a particularly relevant point if we consider the security of their jobs. No teacher had lost his or her job except in a few 'political' cases.

It seemed that the expression of personal taste in teaching methods for some science courses was easier than it was in humanities. Regarding teaching some sessions in science, for example, a teacher suggested:

'according to my own interest, in order to teach about anatomy, students mostly provide some animals themselves, like rabbits, to dissect. If a sample was too rare to be found by students, I will bring it from my home. I teach all anatomy in the school laboratory using living creatures, not slides, etc. Neither LEA nor the school authorities play any role with this regard.'

This personalised and empirical teaching in science, which has been rare in the history of Iranian education of that region, was welcomed by students because it required them to provide the live material for their courses.

There was not so much freedom in teaching humanities. Although a teacher of geography believed different methods of teaching state-provided textbooks could be employed according to teachers' own personal tastes, he did not assume it was an easy job:

'in my subject, the tradition of teaching is talking by me and listening and memorising by them. This is our tradition. Students have fallen into this habit. But breaking a tradition and habit is so difficult that it takes as much as a whole year. As an example, in teaching political geography, I ask my students to present essays using daily newspapers etc. Yet I confront difficulties from students and my colleagues. They think that I want to show off that I enjoy a degree of mastery in my subject.'

Regarding changes in the methods of assessing students, a major difference between pre- and post-revolutionary education was greater centralisation of the process. However, the way of assessing in both regimes was the same: oral, written or a combination. In the oral form, a student was obliged to answer questions put by their teacher. This method constituted only a small part of the first two periods' assessment marks. However, in the New System of education, this method amounted to a quarter of each term's exams. The main method of assessment in Iran had always been in the written examination, whereby students had to answer questions in an

explanatory form. Therefore, there was no hint of the British way of assessing students, by means of essays, or reports.

Whatever ideology was behind the post-revolutionary introduction of standardised and externally moderated examinations, the new arrangements weakened teachers' power in the management of their classes. Obviously, this could lead to a further reduction of their social status and self-confidence.

Yet, there was no publication from the LEA regarding local schools' assessment results on the basis of which schools could compete among themselves, in the British way. However, there were rumours that competitions were taking place in the city, near the rural area in which I conducted my research between private schools trying to attract as many students' as possible. But there was no systematic and rational form of competition between them.

'Subject Specialist Groups'

A 'Subject Specialist Group' (*grouh-e amuzeshi*) was a gathering of teachers in an area who taught the same subject in a LEA's area. They were supposed to discuss new and better ideas regarding their subject, but my informants were not agreed about how far the groups were successful. 'Subject Specialist Groups' were post-revolutionary phenomena and were taken seriously in the early years of the revolution. But their importance gradually declined, for various reasons, after a while.

A few teachers explained that these groups had been active until 1992-3, until which time meetings for making comments about courses had been held once per month. In the following year, the meetings occurred once every three months. There was no meeting for such groups in 1994-5, although a Director of groups had been

appointed by the LEA in that year. According to the regulations at that time, teachers who encountered any special difficulty in their teaching had to write to such directors in the LEA and wait for a response. Yet, during 1995-6 all 'Subject Specialist Groups', except in a few areas, were dissolved in the local area. Since then, teachers who wanted to ask questions about teaching difficulties, had to write to the LEA, who then had to send the letter to the LEA of the relevant province. It would be investigated and answered by a team of three directors for that subject, which could take up to six months.

According to one teacher, the directors of such groups had been appointed by Education Authorities according to their experience and the percentage of students who had achieved success in their subject of teaching. Obviously, there had never been a female teacher as a director of such groups in that area.

Regarding the factors which had caused these groups' dissolution, one group of teachers believed that financial and economic issues had played an important role in their loss of importance. According to them, while the directors of such groups (who had been appointed by the educational authorities and not selected by the teachers themselves) were paid, the teachers who attended such meetings were not paid or given any other benefits. As a result, the teachers either did not attend the meetings or, if they did attend, they did not take them seriously and wanted to sign the relevant letters and leave the meetings as soon as possible, as in the Teachers' Councils.

A second group of teachers maintained that what led to the failure of 'Subject Specialist Groups' was the same empty formalism as had blighted the "Teachers'

Councils”. In their opinion, major educational problems and the new findings of various fields of science were never discussed in such meetings.

None of the teachers commented on the fact that the ‘Subject Specialist Groups’ had gone out of existence, while the “Teachers’ Councils” still survived, although the majority of teachers treated them alike in terms of empty formalism. In my opinion, this might be because, firstly, the formation of ‘Subject Specialist Groups’ was a financial burden for the LEA. Secondly, the payment for the directors of ‘Subject Specialist Groups’ was likely to have led to tension between the majority of teachers, on the one hand, and the LEA, on the other. However, this did not happen with the Councils. Thirdly, taking account of Iranian bureaucracy it seems reasonable that the “Teachers’ Councils”, in which more administrative issues were discussed than educational ones, should take precedence over ‘Subject Specialist Groups’, the main function of which was educational.

Nevertheless, there were three subject areas in which teachers continued to gather in a special place to discuss their own problems: Physical Education, Moral Education and the Advisory of the New System. Some meetings had been formed for PE teachers to discuss competitions between students and how to assess students in PE. Two meetings per month were being run for the teachers of moral education to discuss the tasks they should complete for the next month. They had to decide, for example, whether competitions about the Qur’an, or which religious celebrations should be held. One of these teachers made clear to me that, in such meetings, they were advised how to deal with students’ morality and religiosity. She added that they ought to ask such questions of the educational authorities in writing, but did not

explain the reason for this. Apart from two meetings, attendance at one of which was obligatory for teachers, three other meetings were held during the educational year.

According to a teacher of the New System Advisory course, there were meetings once a month for such teachers under the supervision of the moral education Office in the LEA. When I asked her about the difference between her position and that of teachers of moral education, she replied that these latter dealt with students' beliefs and religion, while she was to deal with students' morality and education. She added that, in practice, their work on morality was the same.

In sum, subject specialist teachers in PE needed to meet in order to co-ordinate competitions between schools, but staff in moral education and in the New System Advisory courses seemed to be motivated more by ideological careers with the religious and moral development of their students.

Teachers' Relationship with Students' Parents

The question of their relationship with students' parents did not seem to be important for teachers. Most of them thought that it was not their responsibility but should be accepted by school authorities and families. In line with the old-fashioned school bureaucracy, teachers still resorted to school authorities in order to convey their comments to a student's parents -- whether they wanted to talk to them directly or leave a message for them through the school. Moreover, they assumed that it was the parents' duty to make enquiries about their children's situation. Teachers were allowed to make such an enquiry only 'when they consider that a student's future is going to be jeopardised', according to a teacher of science.

25% of my informants rejected the idea that they should attempt to forge any relationship with students' parents anyway. These were mostly teachers on the courses related to humanities and those not native to the area. Furthermore, most of them had a great deal of experience and a second job.

In comparison, 28% of my informants had reasonable communications with their students' parents; and 47% of teachers suggested that they only had a little contact with them. It should be noted that the British practice of holding a "Parents' Evening", for parents to visit schools to get information directly from their children's teacher (in elementary schools) or tutor (in secondary schools) at set times during an educational year, did not exist in the area where I conducted my fieldwork. Only the parents who had a feeling of responsibility for their children's future visited schools to acquire information, whenever they felt it necessary or could make time for it. In the case of these visits, the head teacher or his assistant helped the parents by showing them their children's marks which were printed in books specific to each teacher or class.

If school authorities asked a student's parents to visit the school, they did not usually welcome it. As one head teacher suggested, this contact happened either when a school confronted financial problems and some help was required, or when a student had encountered very serious educational and/or disciplinary problems. Calling on parents for financial help, in fact, went back to the post-revolutionary 'Public Contribution' policy approved by the Ministry of Education, according to which parents should pay a part of schools' expenses as a 'voluntary contribution'. Yet, this was in tension with the post-revolutionary Constitution of Iran, according to which education and health care must be free for all Iranian citizens.

The only teachers who took the initiative to contact parents about their children's work were all native to the area studied, and it is interesting that they were all teachers of humanities.

Although several topics are put forward in the above quotation, the attitudes of villagers about the motives of education for both males and females, which was another evidence of the first form of relationships being established by parents, and also the teacher's interpretation of his status are all worth noting. In the view of the teachers who dealt with initiating contact with parents without being asked about them, this action increased after the revolution, in comparison with the first form in which parents first asked teachers about their children's situation.

In short, although there was no change before and after the revolution in terms of the existence of a system for making and keeping reasonable relationships with parents, the number of meetings was affected under the post-revolutionary economy, and as a result, there was a change of attitude towards education as the most proper way of gaining income and employment.

The Relationship with Clergy

Clergymen have always played important roles in Iran as a country in which the majority of the population are Shi'ite Muslims, especially after the Safavid dynasty. The necessity to follow a Shi'ite Grand-Ayatollah (*taghlid az yek marja-e taghlid*), without which a Shi'ite Muslim's worship and prayers would be ignored by God in the eyes of the *Ulama* (learned authorities on Islam), has always established a strong link between Shi'ite *Ulama*, on the one hand, and ordinary people, on the other. Therefore, a mutual relationship between clergymen and other Muslims was

inevitable in all areas of life in both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran, as in many other countries in which religion has been important to culture and society.

Although all state institutions, including schools, were run on the basis of a secular ideology under the Pahlavi regime, a sort of relationship undeniably existed between some clergy and some institutions, such as schools in a few cases, particularly during the last Shah's reign. My informants reported that there had been a few clergy who had some contact with the regime through, for example, the Organisation of Bequest (*sazman-e owghaf*), who taught courses such as Arabic literature in the pre-revolutionary schools of N. W. Iran . But those people who had worked in state institutions lost their legitimacy in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. According to a teacher, some of them were even accused of being collaborators with SAVAK, the secret Information Service of the Shah.

My interviews with various teachers and administrators showed that the clergy had established relationships with schools in two possible ways during the early years of the revolution: through the establishment of collective prayers (*namaz-e jama'at*) at school and the teaching of some courses, mainly RE and Qur'an. The only clergy allowed to do the above jobs were those whose merits had already been confirmed and who were introduced to the LEA by a powerful clergyman or the revolutionary 'Organisation of Islamic Advertisement' (*sazman-e tablighat-e Islami*). Both jobs were unknown in the schools of that region before the revolution.

Collective prayers (*namaz-e jama'at*) at noon were established at schools, along with other state institutions, under the charismatic message of the revolution, which was 'do not tell prayer that you have jobs to do, but do tell your business that you have prayers to deal with' (a famous expression from the second Islamic Prime

Minister which was written on the walls of state institutions). During the revolution's early years nearly all students and most teachers willingly or unwillingly attended such prayers which were conducted, at least at the secondary schools of the area studied, under the aegis of the Imamate. But, in the opinion of my informants, the ruling charismatic atmosphere over the schools in that area gradually turned to a sort of formalism in which the students of each class attended prayers in turns according to a schedule planned by school authorities. However, according to my own participant observation, there was still no special schedule for the classes of a boys' Boarding Guidance School. Yet, unlike in the early years of the revolution, the majority of teachers and even the head teacher no longer assumed that they were bound to attend such prayers. This was a common pattern in all schools which I observed.

Unlike the boys' secondary schools, including both guidance and high schools, there were no clergy in boys' elementary schools. There the teacher of each class was responsible for saying prayers with his pupils. There was also a schedule for the performance of collective prayers every day. If the pupils were interested, the teacher also taught them how they had to wash their faces and hands (*vezu*) and pray.

As a stranger (*na-mahram*), I was unable to conduct participant observation in female schools. However, I was informed by the school authorities that female schools were also running programmes of scheduled prayers.

The person responsible for establishing collective prayers at each school was the teacher of moral education (*morabbi-e omur-e tarbiyati*). Policy about prayers was made by a council called the 'Council for Establishing Prayer' which was made up of the head teacher, teacher of moral education and the clergyman of a school. Yet, as all teachers and head teachers emphasised, there was no other special

relationship between a clergyman of a school, on the one hand, and the teachers and the authorities of that school, on the other hand.

The visits of clergy to schools in order to teach Religious Education gradually reduced to nothing after a while -- for no apparent reason, despite their restricted presence in the early years of the revolution. This was in contrast to the clergy's increasing numbers at universities due to the establishment of courses related to theology and morality. Such courses were entirely taught by clergy in most universities; and non-clergy people, even graduates of theology, had no way of teaching them.

Therefore, an important change between pre- and post-revolutionary schools with this regard was that clergy appeared at schools in the early years of the revolution as additional agents of the ruling politico-Islamic ideology in an attempt to persuade staff and students to accept it through the traditional and familiar way of collective prayers.

Relationships with the Local Education Authority

The most important contact with the LEA for teachers at all academic levels was in the early weeks of each educational year, when they had to go to the appropriate office and discover the school at which they would teach. Yet, after a placement in a school of their choice or otherwise, each teacher could make an administrative inquiry to the LEA regarding their subject/level of teaching. For example, they could obtain information about in-service teacher training programmes and the possibility of registration on them, or the wording of end-of-year questions for the students in their region.

But as far as personal welfare was concerned, any teacher could contact their LEA when they confronted special problems, regardless of whether they had been caused by the authority, or about their own personal life when they thought that there was a possibility of getting help. For example, teachers might go to the LEA to correct the mistakes in administrative promotion certificates, to collect monthly payment slips, to discuss Health Insurance or to apply for a loan.

Although 21% of teachers questioned believed that the social relationship between themselves and LEA officials had improved and was gradually getting better, few of them gave evidence for their claims. According to some teachers, post-revolutionary educational authorities had become more courteous in their dealings with people who made inquiries to them, unlike the pre-revolutionary officials. One teacher described such conduct as friendly and Islamised. Recalling his time as a director of the same LEA before 1979, he said that the education authority's head under the Shah did not even allow teachers, particularly elementary school teachers, to sit down before he did. He said that it had been nearly impossible to make an appointment with the General Director of the Education Department for the province before the revolution, 'but all doors are open for you nowadays'.

Yet, the majority of teachers (76%) maintained that the situation was worse or more complex now than under the pre-revolutionary administrative system. In their view, a number of problems with the LEA had either occurred after the revolution or had developed strongly since then:

- irregular expansion of administration;
- favouritism;
- treating teachers informally instead of formally;

- inexperience;
- shirking responsibilities;
- sabotage the use of facilities which the law had provided specifically for teachers, not for educational administrators, such as continuing professional education;
- insisting that they were always right in disagreements over law and regulations;
- failing to deal with teachers' problems promptly;
- stiff relationships between ordinary staff and teachers, despite a more open relationship between the authorities and teachers;
- and the control exercised by a few experienced staff, instead of a director, over the administration.

Some of these difficulties must be understood in the context of changes that occurred after the revolution such as: the increase in the number of teachers, schools and students, and further centralisation of educational administration.

The case of female teachers' relationships with the LEA differed from that of male teachers. Their average rate of contacting the LEA was lower than males'. Women mostly resorted to their close male relatives such as their husband, father, and/or brother to solve administrative or personal problems, or else they preferred to telephone the office to make an inquiry.

To summarise, although the social relationship between educational *authorities* and teachers had become friendly and open in so far as teachers enjoyed the possibility of defending their rights as a consequence of the revolution, educational bureaucracy had not only failed to improve under the post-revolutionary policy but it had also been affected by other economic and social factors. So, teachers

still had to go to the LEA to find their salary slips among a pile of other slips and among a crowd of teachers who would blame their own colleagues for mixing the slips up.

Relationships with School Authorities

According to my own observation and interviews conducted with teachers, the relationship between managers and teachers in schools became more friendly and open after the revolution. Neither of these groups complained about their relationship with the other. In the teachers' view, unlike pre-revolutionary schools in which extremely formal relations between superiors and subordinates prevailed, post-revolutionary school authorities had established friendly, polite, and, in the words of religious teachers, 'brotherly' relationships with the teachers.

But most teachers believed that school managers still had no choice other than to pass the issues which they were unable to solve in school over to the relevant department in the LEA. However, in their view, there were slight differences in the nature of pre- and post-revolutionary reports to the LEA. That is, the top-down nature of the relationship between the school managers and teachers might have been emphasised more in pre-revolutionary reports than in post-revolutionary ones, as had also happened inside schools. Yet, schools after 1979, managers tried to solve problems inside schools not by relying on the LEA but by resorting to a method of arbitration, often used by village headmen. Nevertheless, the top-down relationship between the education authority administrators and school managers remained the same after the revolution.

Teachers' Assessments and their Promotions

Until about 1992-3, the criteria for the promotion of teachers had referred entirely to their competence and experience as teachers. Since then, according to all my informants, a sort of assessment form for teachers appeared in which morality and religious practices were given special recognition alongside their professional experience. In fact, these forms replaced the former criteria by which teachers could qualify for some kinds of promotions on the basis of their experience alone.

Promoted teachers received financial and administrative advantages, but only a small amount of money differentiated the best teacher of the area from the worst one.

Moreover, the introduction of this new promotion system increased tension between head teachers, on the one hand, and the majority of teachers, on the other. This tension started with the teachers' suspicion that promotion decisions were being made by head teachers alone, although there were meant to be four assessors.

In the first year of the new scheme, the majority of head teachers had given the maximum assessment mark (30) to all teachers, but this drew protests from the LEA. After several meetings in which the education authority explained the importance of this issue, the head teachers reduced the marks slightly for some teachers.

Nevertheless, 53% of my informants who commented on the new forms of teachers' annual assessments, disagreed with the criteria chosen. Most disagreements were about the section related to morality and religion. In their view such issues were not relevant to their job. Some teachers, including even those who were teaching RE and morality, believed that the application of such criteria had given rise to hypocrisy among some of their colleagues: 'You see someone who does not make their daily prayers, but they attend the Friday prayer, without making ablution (*vezu*), in order to

be seen by the head teacher, or they write their name on the list provided. As a result, those who wanted to take part in the Friday Prayer for the sake of God, do not do so.'

A further 32% of teachers trusted neither the criteria nor the head teachers, or others, who had been appointed to implement the new promotion scheme. In their view, apart from the problems of the criteria already raised, most of the people who were to deal with the criteria lacked enough commitment and knowledge to deal honestly with them because favouritism would affect the criteria.

In short, the impact of revolution on the annual assessment of teachers was not very noticeable until the 1990s when there was special emphasis on outward appearances and religious formalism leading, in an ironic way, to people becoming interested in going to the opposite extreme. Moreover, although the classroom, as the 'teachers' castle', had remained inviolate and no one examined or assessed the teacher's activities inside the classroom, not all teachers disagreed with their assessments.

Job Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction

Despite the existing personal and educational difficulties, the majority of teachers with whom I conducted interviews, were happy with their job. However, most of them, who were happy with their jobs, were displeased about their economic situation. For example, a teacher of philosophy gave this balanced opinion:

'As a Muslim, I do not believe only in this-worldly rewards, but I believe that my real rewards are reserved in my other-worldly account.

Although the education department does not pay enough to me, I am proud that I transfer my knowledge to students without having special

expectations from them. Hereby, I make a bridge between myself and the way of the prophets, and I know myself as a person who is subject to the verse of the Qur'an "those (the prophets) who publicise His message... and fear nothing, but God".

This was the real impact of the Islamic ideology on teachers' views about the meaning of their life. It was rarely seen in pre-revolutionary times.

Only 9% of teachers in my sample were totally dissatisfied with their job. Among them was a teacher of moral education, because the regulations concerning teachers of moral education were far more strict than for teachers in other subjects. In her view, the LEA discriminated between various teachers of moral education in terms of the types of schools to which they were appointed and the fairness with which their appointments were made.

Considering the Islamic-political ideology of the revolution, it is not surprising that the section responsible for moral training was more active than others in the LEA and that it expected its personnel to be more active than those of other sections. In fact, this was the most important feature which differentiated pre-revolutionary educational ideology from the post-revolutionary ideology. But what was surprising was that not only had the voluntary offer of concerned teachers to teach religion and morality in the early years of the revolution been transformed into bureaucratic formalism, but even the teachers who had been employed precisely to meet such objectives were also long-standing critics of their own jobs.

In addition to the shifts regarding teachers' job satisfaction, all my informants who were head teachers also voiced their dissatisfaction with being a head teacher. By their conduct at schools I visited, and their interviews, they implied that they were

really unhappy with being head teachers. Considering the situation, one head teacher said 'it is not clear for whom we work, students? teachers? or the LEA?'. He, in fact, wondered which of the above groups had priority over others in post-revolutionary schools. Moreover, according to head teachers, they were destined to clash with everybody: 'teachers come to the school with their special complexes, and so do students with their specific passions, each of which plays his own musical instrument', according to a head teacher. In addition to the usual difficulties of dealing with pupils, parents and officials head teachers also cited financial and material shortages; registration fees; the weakness of disciplinary regulations; teachers' assessment forms; and low payment for doing management jobs. The situation of these head teachers seemed to be different from that of their pre-revolutionary counterparts in many respects.

Working Conditions

The working conditions and life of teachers looked very different from pre-revolutionary periods, according to my own observations and my informants' suggestions. According to the Islamic ideology of the revolution teachers were not only described as people whose jobs were the same as the prophets' but it was as if they had also been promoted, when I was conducting my fieldwork, to the position which God himself held: 'God is a teacher, man is a student, and the world is a classroom' the General Director of the province Education Department announced in a seminar on 'Investigation of the Problems of Elementary Schools'. But, in practice, this ideology had been crushed under the wheels of inflation and economic pressures.

In actual fact, they were more than teachers: about 53% of my informants were engaged in occupations other than teaching. In other words, their second, and sometimes their third jobs were unrelated to teaching, but could be divided into two sections. The first group were the teachers, who were normally either natives or originally from other rural areas, who were involved in occupations which the villagers also held in that area, such as agriculture, carpet-weaving, animal husbandry, apiculture etc. This group formed about 31% of the teachers whom I interviewed.

The second group were the teachers who were also involved in urban occupations, like owning or renting stores to sell, for example, food, automobile spare parts, household requirements and carpet equipment, or painting on mirrors and selling them for relatives, as one teacher confessed with embarrassment. 'Of course, apart from painting, I also know carpet-weaving, construction work, and giving medical injections' he added. He was too embarrassed to announce whether or not he was doing the above jobs which he mentioned that he knew. This group amounted to 22% of my informants.

Although, according to the data, there was no significant difference between male and female teachers in terms of their working hours as teachers, the women were supposed to work further at home (cleaning, washing up, cooking etc.). But women's housework was supposed to be invisible in the eyes of their families.

Nevertheless, nobody in my sample was interested in retiring from teaching either at the normal retirement age or earlier except for a few teachers who thought they would have more money if they could work full-time in their extra jobs. By interviewing an administrator in the LEA, I found out that the rules for pension

payment in post-revolutionary periods were approximately the same as they had been before the revolution.

Job Security

No teacher had been employed as a 'part-time' teacher from the beginning of service by the Education Department. However, it was possible for a full-time employee to teach some additional courses part-time to earn more money. This had happened during both the Islamic Republic and the monarchical regimes. Also, in both periods, any employees who had been in the service of the education department as probationary teachers had to pass a test in the first six months of their employment. In the case of confirmation after six months, their position of employment would automatically change to a formal one. After that, they continued with their job until they retired, unless they had a serious political problem which might jeopardise their position.

In the first months after the victory of the revolution, according to my informants, nearly all teachers, including those who held beliefs opposed to the Shah, from various ideologies (whether right or left) and those who had been in favour of him, kept their job in that region. The exceptions were those who had co-operated with SAVAK. Since that time, however, any serious political action against the post-revolutionary government which could jeopardise its security could be problematic for any teacher fully or partly involved in such activities. By contrast, the issue of job security was not of concern to the vast majority of my informants.

Finally, the area where I conducted my research, had never had any professional association for teachers either before or after the revolution, except for a

very short period of time in the early years of the revolution in a nearby city, when an association called 'the Islamic Society of Teachers' had been established. But this too was dissolved after a while due to the penetration of the group by some extremists.

Teachers' Social Status

Without revealing the source of his information, a former Minister of Education claimed that although teachers were in twenty-third place in terms of their economic situation in Iran in the 1990s, they had the second highest social status among the various social classes of the society. Without having further information concerning the details of which social classes were better or worse than teachers in terms of social status and social class, most teachers were sceptical about the Minister's opinion and disregarded such claims about their own status in the community.

Although more than 80% of my informants believed that their status was constantly being degraded, about 18% of them were absolutely satisfied, including one who formally announced his satisfaction but informally criticised his status. One half of them were totally dissatisfied, and 32% of them enjoyed relative satisfaction about their own social status.

In identifying the reasons which led to the decline of their status, about 87% of reasons offered by my informants were related to post-revolutionary economic problems. In other words, these teachers believed that their social status was dependent on their economic position; their lower income dictated their lower status. For example, one teacher believed that when people saw teachers buying low quality goods and foods, they would not respect them. Another claimed that when teachers were unable to leave tips for a hairdresser or present a gift to a relative, they would

not be respected. There were many examples of this, but I content myself with a brief but radical quotation from a teacher: 'a teacher is regarded with contempt, and the teaching profession means poverty.'

Apart from the impact of economic problems, some teachers believed that other issues had affected their status, such as the appearance of different institutions issuing qualifications without meeting the official standards of higher education and without supervision by its authorities. According to teachers, this led to all higher education qualifications being devalued and, as a result, to the downgrading of knowledge. As examples, they mentioned the establishment of Islamic Azad Universities in all areas of the country, in-service teacher training institutions and private universities.

Moreover, according to a teacher who seemed to be loyal to the Islamic ideology of the revolution, ordinary people's ignorance of Islam had caused such a problem. In his view, Islam accorded the same function to teachers as to the clergy, so the former should enjoy the same social status in the community, but the masses did not understand Islam. He added that *ulama* had pushed teachers 'off the stage', and that the weakness of teachers and of Islamic *ulama* themselves had been another factor contributing to the low status of teachers.

In my view, the impact of the Islamic revolution was mainly felt by the middle class and lower class in Iran. The upper class and upper-middle class were cruelly affected by it as well during its early charismatic phase, but after a while they appeared to recover. Yet, it seemed that the middle and lower classes had changed places as a result of economic corruption on the one hand, and of the special attention of post-revolutionary governments to the lower classes on the other hand. They were

now called the 'Oppressed' people (a religio-political term for the lower classes) and were supported by the revolutionaries according to the Islamic ideology of the revolution. This could be connected to the ideologisation of the virtues of manual labour in the cultural background. There were few religious or political meetings in which a preacher or lecturer would not repeat the Qur'anic promise that the oppressed people would rule of the world. These lower classes were called the 'benefactors' (*vali-ne 'mat*) of revolutionary authorities by the founder of the revolution; and the revolution was indebted to their attempts and sacrifice, as he and other authorities emphasised repeatedly. Yet, on the other hand, middle class people, who were mostly administrators and who played a major role in the protests against the Shah's reign in the last decades of his rule, before 1979, lost their former social and economic status after the revolution, despite being theoretically praised by the authorities. The sanctity of manual work is also reflected in a famous suggestion attributed to Ayatollah Khomeini that Allah is the origin of work and craftsmanship (*haq-ta 'ala mabda 'a-e kar va kargari ast*).

Although September 23rd (the first day of each educational year) had been dedicated to teachers in the last years of the Shah's reign as 'Teachers' Day', this never enjoyed much popularity among teachers, students or their families. After the revolution it was expected that the anniversary of the death of Dr Ali Shari'ati, whose ideas had played a major role among educated people in the creation of the revolution, would be announced as 'Teacher's Day', but the death anniversary of Ayatollah Motahhari was given that title instead by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This may be another symbol of the intention to shape education and its public image in accordance with Islamic ideology.

Conclusion

The implicit theme of this chapter, as of several others, has been irony. In this case, it is ironic that the elevated spiritual status assigned to school teachers in the post-revolutionary Islamic ideology of Iran has not been matched by an improvement in any aspect of their professional lives. Instead, teachers in a rural area of north-west Iran consistently reported that their selection, training, socialisation, relations with parents, clergy and educational authorities, job satisfaction, job security and social status had all deteriorated since 1979. At the same time, this Chapter also argued that some of the worst bureaucratic features of education under Mohammad Reza Shah's regime had, rather unexpectedly, been mitigated by a new spirit of informality after the revolution.

This is further evidence of the point made in Chapter 7 about the unintended consequences of the Islamic Revolution for teachers' professional lives. Their relations with students appeared more relaxed; and their interactions with LEA officials had lost some of their formality. In this sense, the pattern of modernisation in Iranian education has not followed exactly the trajectory mapped by Max Weber, since the bars of his 'iron cage of bureaucracy' have been softened to some extent by Islamic ideology. As will be argued in the Conclusions, Iran's path to a modern system of education is distinctive for its combination of traditional and rational components. And, as the next chapter will show the introduction of the New System of Education was further evidence of the Iranian state's determination to bring education into line with an Islamic ideology, whilst incidentally providing a boost for private-sector employment markets.

Chapter Nine

THE NEW SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

A separate, but brief, consideration of the New System of Education (NSE) is required at this point for two reasons. Firstly, the post-revolutionary philosophy of education, as was argued in Chapter Five, intimated that a new balance should be struck between theoretical and practical components of the school curriculum. In many respects, the NSE represents just such a new balance -- at least in principle. It is therefore important to discover how well the new practice conforms with the new principle. Secondly, the NSE is a very recent innovation. As such, it deserves careful examination to see whether it offers any evidence of change in the Iranian government's education policies. At numerous junctures in this thesis it has been argued that the design and implementation of public policies have not evolved in a straight line but have changed as they passed through various stages. The relevance of the NSE to this thesis lies mainly in the opportunity it offers to assess whether significant new changes have occurred in education policy.

A note of caution is also in order at this point. The NSE was just beginning to be phased in at the time when fieldwork for this thesis was being conducted. It has still not been fully implemented in all parts of Iran, so the following observations must be regarded as partial and provisional.

Vocational Schools and the 'Tarh-e Kad'

Even before the Iranian revolution of 1979, the system of education at high school level had been divided into two main areas of 'Theoretical' (*shakheh-ye nazari*) and 'Vocational' (*shakheh-ye fanni va herfehei*) Studies, the latter being for to boys only in the area I studied. The students who went to the only vocational high school (*honarestan*) in that area were those whose marks were usually lower than those who had chosen Theoretical studies. 'Theoretical' studies, which was the most important area, included the four subjects of Humanities and Literature (*adabiyat va ulum-e ensani*), Social Economics (*eqtesad-e ulum-e ejtemaei*), Experimental Sciences (*ulum-e tajrobi*) and Maths-Physics (*riazi-fizik*). However, the first two were subsumed under the new name of 'Humanities' (*ulum-e ensani*) in the early 1990s, with the emphasis more on humanities and literature than on social economics.

In accordance with the self-sufficiency policy of the revolution which aimed to achieve for both cultural and economic independence, a vocational programme called 'Tarh-e Kad' was introduced into high schools in 1983. It was the first time that pupils and their families were made aware that schools might provide the necessary bridge between school and work. In other words, until that time the public conception of education was restricted to thinking that schools only provided children with the background for obtaining jobs in government departments. The main function of schools was allegedly confined to training people for administration, so whoever failed in their studies had to look to the open market to survive. Thus the programme of 'Tarh-e Kad' was a post-revolutionary bridge between state schools and various private sectors of society. Girls took some vocational courses in schools, but it was

boys who were usually directed towards modern business and computing to retain their supposed high status.

Finally, by reducing the time spent on courses such as Persian Literature, high schools kept one day free for 'Tarh-e Kad' in the form of 'work experience'. Students had to go to private shops and workshops which had been selected by agreements between themselves and their parents and which were approved by the Local Education Authority (LEA) in order to learn skills for the future. Through the programme of 'Tarh-e Kad' and becoming acquainted with their intended occupation, students tested their suitability for the job, on the one hand, and acquired knowledge about the realities of society outside school, on the other. Furthermore, this programme provided further economic help for the government, because the costs of education for high school boys were met for one day per week by private sectors of the economy.

Teachers who had experience of vocational affairs were employed as teachers of 'Tarh-e Kad' and as co-ordinators of relations between private businesses, and the students themselves. It had been assumed that such teachers, using their knowledge and life experience, would be able to recognise the special talents and needs of their students and give good advice to them and their parents about their future careers.

According to my informants, including the person who was in charge of 'Kar-Danesh' (vocational) Studies (a new area of study in the NSE) at that time, and the former director of 'Tarh-e Kad' in the LEA, such a progressive programme actually failed to meet its objectives. Not only did students fail to learn as much as they could from the open market to correspond with their theoretical teachings, but they also became involved with the hypocritical system of Iranian society. The contradiction

between the ruling value-system of schools and the ruling cultural value-system of the free market, was something that had been considered even by the designers of the 'Tarh-e Kad'. According to the LEA official in charge of it, '[Tarh-e Kad] had been designed in the hope that the value system of schools would influence the open market's values through the involvement of students, but the very opposite happened. The culture of the bazaar affected our schools' values'. In other words, students had been turned into puppets trained to follow illegal orders on the black market, according to my informant.

Moreover, the directors of shops and workshops refused to teach students properly on the grounds that they damaged tools and instruments. According to them, although the LEA had promised to help private businesses in terms of providing replacement instruments, this promise had not been kept by the LEA. This had created further distrust among the managers of private industry. On the other hand, students and their families often lacked the ability to replace damaged instruments, as one teacher remarked.

The majority of the teachers of 'Tarh-e Kad' either had had no familiarity with their duties, or were not able to identify and manage their students' problems properly. The quality of relevant teacher training courses and their scheduling, on the one hand, and the criteria for employing the teachers of 'Tarh-e Kad', on the other, had also been a problem. This was because the teachers who had been selected to teach 'Tarh-e Kad' were often those teachers, including my informants, who did not fit in well with any other part of the LEA or schools. Furthermore, according to one teacher, the majority of administrators and teachers who were involved in its delivery 'had no familiarity with "Tarh-e Kad", and had not been trained in the relevant

courses.’ Then he continued: ‘Of course, no training course was available in ‘Tarh-e Kad’ for any teacher or authority in the early years of its establishment. Some courses were established in its final stages, but were not effective. For instance, I took some courses entitled “Teaching Tarh-e Kad” for 140 hours just two years before its collapse, which had actually no benefits at all.’

Finally, the course’s lack of popularity among families and lack of attention from the educational authorities themselves -- for example, students’ marks in ‘Tarh-e Kad’ were not recorded on their certificates -- caused this progressive programme to fail, according to my informants. But, in their opinion, lack of motivation to work ‘*vojdān-e kari*’ on the part of the people involved with ‘Tarh-e Kad’ had also been a major factor leading to its failure. The programme really amounted to not much more than registration of students in their places of work; and there was no guarantee that they would even do that well. Nobody had cared about teaching the young people. In fact, one teacher alleged that the teachers of ‘Tarh-e Kad’ mostly used the time devoted to it for their own benefit in the open market. In other words, there was no commitment to the project in the area in which it had been one of the main objectives of the post-revolutionary educational system.

The Philosophy of the New System of Education

The above-mentioned problems of the ‘Tarh-e Kad’ as well as other problematic issues which the ‘Theoretical’ area of study had encountered in practice caused the authorities to review the Old System of Education (OSE). A book entitled *Kollyyat-e Nezam-e Jadid-e Amuzesh-e Motavasseteh* (Generalities for the New System of High School Education), printed by the office of Executive Affairs for the New System of

High School Education (*omur-e ejraei-e nezam-e jadid-e amuzesh-e motavasseteh*)

(EANSHSE 1992: 19-20) at the Ministry of Education, lists the educational insufficiencies of high schools under the OSE as follows:

- lack of flexibility towards students' different talents and interests;
- pressure on students to enter universities, leading to a constant increase in the number of students failing to obtain admission;
- emphasis on 'Theoretical' studies and lack of attention to applied and practical applications, as well as the failure of the 'Tarh-e Kad';
- lack of correspondence between the contents of curricula and the conditions of life in towns and villages;
- lack of flexibility towards innovations and the special problems of different parts of the country;
- wasting resources by making pupils repeat the same year if they fail just a few courses and, as a result, causing more students to leave education prematurely;
- the improper exercise of executive procedures;
- remoteness from communal needs;
- inflexible regulations which make it difficult to use resources optimally;
- and absence of a reciprocal relationship between vocational teaching on the one hand, and short courses on learning skills and special courses in higher education, on the other.

A group of experts called the 'Council for the Fundamental Transformation of the Educational System' (CFTES) (*shura-ye taghyeir-e bonyad-ei nezam-e amuzesh va parvaresh*) were commissioned in 1986 to provide a general framework for the New System of Education by the 'Higher Council of the Cultural Revolution'

(HCCR) (*shura-ye ali-e enghelab-e farhangi*). Soon after, the CFTES investigated the foundations, objectives and strategies of Islamic education before designing the structure of General Education (*amuzesh-e omumi*). Guidelines for the New System of Education (NSE) were finally approved by the HCCR in 1989 (OCFTES 1991: 4).

Because of the importance of high schools in the eyes of the Islamic authorities of education, on the one hand, and high schools' more fragile and sensitive position among other levels of education, on the other, priority was given to producing 'A Design for a Shift into Desired High School Education' (*tarh-e enteqal beh amuzesh-e motavasseteh-ye matloob*), which was approved by HCCR in September 1990 and sent for implementation to the Ministry of Education in February 1991(OCFTES 1991: 4-5). Finally, the Ministry of Education put the above-mentioned design into effect for ten per cent of Year-nine students in Iran in September 1992 (EANSHSE 1993: 10).

There were three reasons for the importance of high schools, according to the Islamic educational authorities. Firstly, high school was a link between general education and higher education, so any insufficiency would affect both of them. Secondly, high schools were transitional courses in terms of: (a) transmission from public and general education to higher education, (b) transition from the learning environment to the work environment and real life, and (c), transition from childhood where an individual's requirements were met by others to youth where an individual gained independence and accepted more responsibility. Thirdly, in many countries including Iran, high schools were the main centres for training skilled and semi-skilled workers, so special attention to high schools would have direct effects on plans for socio-economic development (EANSHSE 1993: 18-19).

The New System of Education was put into effect gradually in different areas of the country, year by year; beginning with the largest cities. The educational year of 1995-6 was the first year of the system's establishment in the town where I was conducting my fieldwork. Therefore, all students of year-nine were beginning the NSE. Year-nine was a general level, in which pupils' talents and interests were identified by advisors of the NSE, and students were advised to specialise in either 'Theoretical', 'Vocational' or 'Kar-Danesh' areas of study for the next two years -- until GCSE level -- depending on their exam results and interests. The reduction of the period of general education from twelve years to eleven, by reducing time at high schools from four years to three was one of the main changes under the NSE.

The eleven-year period of education in the New System of education is similar to the British model, particularly if we compare the two separate periods of education in Secondary schools in England. Although I have no evidence that Iran imitated the UK on this issue, the author of *Amuzesh va Parvareh dar Engelestan va Veils* (Education in England and Wales) says, in his Preface: '...I hope such [comparative] studies will be expanded, particularly at the present time when the necessity of a design for educational revolution at all levels of education, which could meet the needs and expectations of society, is obvious. Hereby, the educational planners and authorities could utilise the experiences of other countries which have transformed their educational systems in order to develop their societies' (Agha-zadeh 1991: 6).

Differences from the Old System of Education

Considering the shortcomings of the Old System of Education (OSE), listed above, four of the nine points were related to lack of sufficient attention to Vocational

Studies (*shakkeh-ye fanni va herfehei*). Two further points were connected with the importance of vocational studies in so far as the system failed to respond to the special needs of different regions of the country or to make a connection between the curricula and the conditions of towns and villages. As a result, special emphasis on vocational courses was inevitable in the NSE.

Contrary to the OSE's division of 'Theoretical' and 'Vocational' Studies, the NSE consists of the three areas of 'Theoretical', 'Vocational' and 'Kar-Danesh', with special emphasis on the last two. Although both 'Vocational' and 'Kar-Danesh' areas of study are, in fact, vocational, there are slight differences between them. As a result, the 'Vocational' area underwent several changes and achieved higher status in the NSE; and 'Kar-Danesh' acquired the old status of 'Vocational' Studies.

One of the major differences between the two systems of education was the change from 'years' to 'semesters'. Instead studying particular courses each educational year and of being assessed three times for each course, under the NSE students have to select courses each semester and are assessed only once in them.

The structure of the 'Theoretical' area of study remained the same in the NSE -- it still consisted of the three major subjects of study: Humanities, Maths-Physics, and Experimental Sciences. Students who gained GCSEs in one of the three major subjects of the 'Theoretical' area could either continue their studies for 'Pre-University' (*pish-daneshgahi*) courses (equivalent to A-levels), or transfer to the area of 'Kar-Danesh' to take skill-based courses in order to have a better chance of becoming employed, or carry on their studies in 'adjoining' (*peyvasteh*) or 'non-adjoining' (*na-peyvasteh*) higher diplomas (*kardani*) if they had certain qualifications or passed 'compensating' courses.

The previous 'Vocational' area of study was elevated from GCSE level to the Higher Diploma (*kardani-e peyvasteh*) level in the NSE and was extended to five years. However, students could give up study after three years and abandon education after GCSE. After obtaining a Diploma these students could either continue their studies in 'Pre-university' (A-level) courses, or seek employment. Students who completed all five years would obtain a Higher Diploma. Undoubtedly, giving vocational studies the Diploma status promoted its status in comparison with the OSE, in which carrying on education after GCSE required extra exams in vocational subjects.

Since there was no vocational college in the town where I conducted my research, I interviewed a director of such a college, about the characteristics of the 'Vocational' area of study, in a city close to the rural town. According to him, the 'Vocational' area had become less practical in the NSE. That is, following the reduction of high school educational years from four to three, the courses had kept their theoretical aspects but reduced their practical workshops. For this reason, he believed that the graduates of 'Vocational' colleges would enjoy higher status than those of 'Kar-Danesh' schools. He predicted, in other words, that his graduates might become technicians, whereas the graduates of 'Kar-Danesh' would play the roles of skilled or semi-skilled workers.

It was nearly impossible for the graduates of 'Kar-Danesh' to go on to university. This was because the students in this area, the majority of all Iranian students, had to be attracted into the open market after graduation. Discussing the two main innovations of the NSE, the Minister of Education at that time considered the

'Kar-Danesh' as one of those innovations which could encourage students to take up occupations (EANSHSE 1993: 11).

The number of students, who were mainly from the 'Theoretical' area of study, selected to study on 'Pre-university' courses was intended to be about twice or one and a half times the number of students expected by the Ministry of Higher Education to enter university each year (OCFTES 1991: 35). Therefore, only about 20-30 per cent of all high school students could enter 'Pre-university' courses (OCFTES 1991: 35). The authorities had probably planned that more than half of all students would study in the area of 'Kar-Danesh' and the rest would study in 'Vocational' and 'Theoretical' areas. But the actual proportion were 15% of students in 'Kar-Danesh', 5% in the 'Vocational' area, and about 80% in the 'Theoretical' area in the educational year 1995-6. One of my informants expected, however, that the numbers of 'Theoretical' students would be reduced, to the benefit of 'Kar-Danesh', year by year until the planning target was reached. Undoubtedly, such a system of education, if it succeeded, would change the face of Iran.

Response to The New System of Education in Schools

The effects of implementing the NSE must now be considered but it must also be remembered that the NSE had been put into effect only for year-nine high school students in 1995-96, when I was conducting my research in that area, while in a nearby city it had begun in 1992/93 for a restricted number of students (about 10%).

Teachers' interpretations of the transformation of educational policies were mostly economic and political rather than educational. That is, the Islamic authorities had established the NSE in order, in the teachers' view, to solve their own

economic (and to some extent political) problems: not to deal with the weaknesses and insufficiencies of the OSE. Some teachers speculated that educational reform had been necessary because there had hardly been any economic or domestic political improvements before or after the revolution. Their speculation about the reasons for introducing the NSE fell into five categories:

- (i) the NSE had been put into effect in order to reduce Iran's unemployment problems;
- (ii) the NSE would cost less than its predecessor, mainly because General Education would be reduced from twelve to eleven years in total;
- (iii) the NSE was designed to prevent too many students entering university entrance competitions;
- (iv) the NSE would encourage experimental science and vocational studies;
- (v) the NSE would show to other countries that the *Islamic* revolution had had an impact on the development of the country, while at the same time having a religious and Islamic nature.

Problems Caused by the NSE

The educational authorities of Iran anticipated that the NSE would entail a number of general problems:

- 1- the huge amount of planning required for the new system and its complexity;
- 2- managers would require further authority and power to deal with the problems of the NSE at all levels of the Ministry of Education, at provincial and regional level, and finally at school level;

3- the moral training and monitoring of students in the NSE would require further development, especially in the case of vocational students when they were working out of school;

4- greater co-operation would be required between the Ministry of Education, on the one hand, and the ministries of Higher Education, Health and Medicine as well as Labour and Social Affairs;

5- the expansion of vocational studies to such a vast extent would require additional resources and facilities;

6- the remuneration of teachers might not be high enough to motivate them to participate fully in the NSE.

In reality, there were many further difficulties which had not been foreseen by the educational authorities. According to my informants, including teachers, head teachers and people in charge of the NSE and 'Vocational Education' at the LEA, these additional problems included:

- lack of sufficient knowledge about the NSE among head teachers and educational authorities;
- the growth of indifference among not only teachers but also advisors of the NSE;
- inability to cope with the moral training of students and to devise ways of occupying their leisure time;
- parental resistance to the NSE and lack of publicity about its introduction;
- lack of facilities and resources for meeting the requirements of the NSE with reference to workshops, laboratories and so on;

- the delay in providing textbooks and the existence of some problems in textbooks which neither teachers nor students could solve;
- the moral and disciplinary problems associated with students visiting other institutions;
- the failure of schools and even the LEA to cope with all the different and contradictory orders issued by the Ministry of Education day after day;
- incompatibility between the size of textbooks and the time allotted for teaching them;
- inexperience of advisors and the occurrence of administrative problems;
- increased apathy among students (due to the creation of further obstacles to university entrance and other failings in the NSE) and the transfer of most students to 'Kar-Danesh';
- lack of co-ordination between the lessons of each course (especially in science) and between the courses themselves.

The teachers were not the only ones who complained about a lack of commitment among some LEA staff; some head teachers also accused people in the LEA of shirking their responsibilities. For example, a person in charge of a high school constantly complained about problems with his school's buildings and about the educational authorities' indifference to his reports. In his view, this would not have happened before the revolution. It seemed strange to him that although, according to the Islamic ideology, everybody, especially those who had been appointed as 'servants' (*khedmat-gozar*) of the nation, was responsible; yet nobody accepted the responsibility for dealing with educational issues in practice.

Furthermore, according to some of my informants, the impact of Islamic ideology on the curriculum in the NSE was the same as under the OSE. In their view, there was no possibility of , for instance, showing the different stages of the growth of an embryo in laboratories in either the NSE or the OSE.

In addition, approved ways of recording educational and moral activities became more complex in the NSE. Apart from the certificate on which a student's educational results were printed as a number between zero and twenty, a different certificate recorded the choice of courses. Moreover, there was a further sheet on which the level of each student's attainment in each course was recorded.

Furthermore, the school's NSE Advisor also supplied comments about each student's moral and educational activities. In this there was more emphasis on education than morality, according to one advisor, because dealing with morality was the duty of teachers of morality, not advisors. This way of recording students' progress was certainly different from the OSE, in which there had been a single sheet of paper containing students' personal details and their father's occupation.

Conclusion

The design of the NSE was consistent with a philosophy of education which could be traced back to the ideological roots of the 1979 revolution. The intention to 'modernise' school-level education, especially at the secondary level, was clear.

There can also be no doubt that the NSE was supposed to pave the way for a distinctively Iranian form of modernity in which vocational and technical skills would be encouraged more strongly than in the past. Consequently, attempts were made to limit the numbers of high school students whose ambitions were for 'theoretical'

studies and employment in government bureaucracies. Instead, the NSE shepherds students towards acquiring the skills required for success in the private sector's job market. These high-level educational objectives were all legitimated in terms of an Islamic ideology and sanctioned by courses in moral education.

The outcomes of the NSE have been mixed. It has probably succeeded in attracting more government funding for schools; and significant progress has been made in updating textbooks and rationalising the assessment of students. On the other hand, students and their parents have been slow to acknowledge the merits of the NSE; managers of companies participating in work experience schemes are critical; and teachers have a long list of complaints about inadequate training, resourcing and co-ordination. No doubt, some of these shortcomings will be overcome in time as the system matures. Meanwhile, it is clear that the NSE represents strong continuity with the Islamic ideology which has set the course for Iran's development since 1979. It is no less clear that the NSE represents another example of the 'mixed' pattern of modernisation in Iranian education. This means that elements of modernity are subtly combined with traditional notions of moral integrity.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has sought to examine the validity of the argument that schools have served as an important means of creating a new political culture and social structure after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Some commentators have gone so far as to claim that schools were the 'fulcrum' of ideological attempts to re-islamify Iranian society (see, for example, Richard 1990: 105). According to Nafisi (1992: 163), this was because education had previously been 'the fulcrum of a cultural dependency which was ruining the Islamic tradition' of Iran under the Pahlavis. In other words, education was central to the attempts of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary regimes to shape Iranian society in determinate, but very different, fashions. Others have merely stressed the fact that reform of education was one of the highest priorities of post-revolutionary governments in Iran. Hunter (1992: 98), for example, notes that 'One of the first steps taken by the Islamic regime as part of its overall cultural revolution was the reform of the educational system'. She also points out that successive post-revolutionary governments have continued to accord prominence to education in their reform programmes. Sceptics, such as Omid (1994), not only deny that the reforms have actually produced the intended changes but also allege that the quality of education has deteriorated in the aftermath of the Revolution and the war with Iraq.

The aim of this thesis has not been to judge the merits of these arguments about the centrality of educational reforms or about their consequences. Instead, the focus has been very largely on the patterns of social relations observed in rural schools affected by the reforms. In the spirit of a Weberian analysis, the research

reported in this thesis tried to discover how educational reforms have affected the day-to-day social relations of school teachers, pupils and administrators as well as their relations with parents, Islamic clergy and local authority officials. This required an interpretative theoretical stance and research methods which were designed to elicit the meanings that relevant actors perceived in their changing circumstances (see pp. 1-5).

A note of caution is necessary at this point. Although this thesis does not attempt to make explicit comparisons between Iran and other countries, it is important to avoid giving the impression that Iran is unique in so far as its state-sponsored ideology has tried to impose a particular direction on educational change. In fact, the governments of many countries take a highly 'dirigiste' attitude towards education (Lee 1991). Iran is perhaps unusual only in the extent to which its pre- and post-revolutionary governments have deliberately pursued educational changes which conformed with 'official' ideologies. The lineaments of the highly distinctive post-1979 ideology were set out in Chapter 3. The main questions for this thesis are how this ideology has made a social impact on Iranian schools and how teachers have responded. Without repeating the detailed findings reported in the preceding chapters, it is possible to draw their main implications together as follows.

Firstly, Max Weber's sharp, ideal-type distinction between tradition and modernity is a useful way of gauging social and cultural change in Iran but it cannot do justice to the many ways in which the distinction is blurred in reality. Iran has certainly tried to modernise its educational system since 1979; but Chapter 6 shows that it has done so in ways which restored primacy to some values considered traditional in Shi'ite Islam. The precise and shifting balance between tradition and

modernity is displayed in such things as encouraging girls to take secondary education seriously (see pp. 131-137) but simultaneously making it difficult for them to gather information from public libraries (see pp. 164-168). Another example concerns the tension between growth in the numbers of female teachers and the imposition on them of strict codes of dress and of an expectation that they will take more interest than men in Islamic ideology and moral education (see Chapter 7). The combination of tradition and modernity in such cases is highly significant for school life.

Secondly, an equally sharp Weberian ideal-type contrast between patrimonialism and modern Western rational bureaucracy has also proven to give a misleading picture of changes in Iranian schools. The crucial significance of the authority and power which used to be vested in officials mainly by virtue of their kinship relations has been eroded in modern Iran without being totally eclipsed by practices and roles legitimated by 'rational-legal' considerations. The situation in education is complex. Rational bureaucratic procedures and norms have certainly gained in importance, but relationships of patronage and deference based on traditional criteria of worth or power are still in place (see pp. 224-227). As a result, authority relations are currently a hybrid phenomenon. For example, the 1979 Revolution paved the way for the establishment of many types of committees and councils designed to foster greater professionalism and rationality among teachers and their managers, but the operation of these new groupings is still shaped by vestiges of patrimonial attitudes (see pp. 190-195). A wider irony of bureaucratisation since 1979 is that it sometimes clashes with the populist and egalitarian spirit which flourished during the early years of the Revolution when non-conformity with the Shah's all-pervasive bureaucracy was welcomed.

Thirdly, patriarchalism, as a characteristic of many patrimonial arrangements, should, according to Weber's scheme, have given way to the objective and impersonal practices of rational bureaucracy. Again, however, the pattern of change in Iranian schools since 1979 displays a bewildering mixture of patriarchal and rational themes. For example, the implementation of the value of formal equality among Iranians made it possible for greater numbers of female students to enter schools after 1979; but Chapter 7 shows that the application of other Islamic values has resulted in stronger segregation between male and female students as well as between male and female teachers. Indeed, rational procedures have been put in place to monitor and sanction gender segregation. Nevertheless, women have also entered the teaching profession in greater numbers since 1979.

Fourthly, Weber's expectation that modernisation would necessarily entail 'the disenchantment of the world' does not seem to have been borne out in any simple fashion in the schools of post-revolutionary Iran. Again, Chapter 6 shows that the pattern is mixed. On the one hand, the study of science and mathematics has been promoted to a high priority, especially for students who show academic promise. Vocational and technical education has also been boosted in recent years (see Chapter 9). On the other hand, the study of Islam and of Arabic culture has been strengthened and inserted into various subjects in the curriculum. Moreover, a programme of moral education based on clearly Islamic principles has received strong official encouragement and support (see Chapter 8).

Fifthly, and perhaps most subtly, the theme of irony pervades many of the findings in this thesis. This means that the significance of ideological currents and policies for educational change often turns out to be different from what was intended.

In some cases, the effect is virtually the opposite of the intention, with results that could be considered paradoxical and/or tragic. Indeed, just as Max Weber argued that the long-term effects of the Protestant Reformations in Europe ironically contributed towards the growth of a 'spirit of capitalism', so it seems that educational change in Iran under the influence of Islamic ideology has also had some ironic outcomes. For example, the creation of Teachers' Councils was intended to raise the status and morale of teachers by giving them a voice in debates about educational policy, but the teachers' own financial problems prevented some of them from participating. The poor attendance rate, in turn, dissuaded others from participating (see pp. 190-195). Another example concerns the tension between the importance attributed to moral education in the curriculum and the perceived lack of status on the part of those teachers appointed to deliver moral education (see p.230). A final example concerns the fact that, although Tarh-e Kad was supposed to inculcate certain Islamic values in students before they left school, the effect of 'work experience' schemes has been to cultivate in students some of the less desirable values of the market and workplace (see p.241).

These five general implications of the empirical findings from the fieldwork on which this thesis is based are not exhaustive. There are many other aspects of educational change in Iran since 1979, but, together, these points convey the complex, uneven and contradictory character of post-revolutionary situations. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that one of the limitations of the present work is that it does not do full justice to the wider social, political, cultural and economic context of changes in education. Instead, it has deliberately selected only those contextual factors which seemed to be most directly relevant to schools. Another limitation is that, for lack of

time and resources, it has not been possible to compare schools in one rural area of North West Iran with those in other parts of the country. No doubt, a wider sample of schools would have produced different findings; and longer periods of fieldwork spread over more years would have strengthened the findings. Similarly, more comparison with educational change in countries other than Iran would have been helpful.

These limitations must be taken seriously, but it must also be recognised that the theoretical and methodological strategies chosen for this research have actually generated substantial, new information. In particular, the decision to focus research on the impact of culture, including religion and ideology, on social relations and the meanings attributed to them by actors made it possible to obtain a close-up picture of the changes currently being experienced in Iranian schools. Since very few social scientists have managed to conduct this kind of 'close up', qualitative research in Iranian schools, perhaps because of the difficulties reported in Chapter 6, the originality of the findings should not be underestimated.

Yet, it is also clear that many questions remain important but unasked. Ideally, the agenda for future research would include more intensive studies of, for example, the teaching profession, the gendering of educational opportunities, the responsiveness of teacher training institutions to government ideology, the fit between curriculum and the needs of potential employers, and so on. It is hoped that this thesis has successfully indicated some of the directions that social scientific research on education in Iran could profitably take.

APPENDIX

A comparison of the contents of some pre-revolutionary textbooks with those of their post-revolutionary equivalents

Pre-revolutionary textbooks and their contents	Post-revolutionary textbooks and their contents
<p>Introductory Philosophy (Siasi 1975) Year 12: science and philosophy; psychology and philosophy; perceptions (sensory and mental); reactions; actions; language and personality; aesthetics; logic; methodology of different sorts of sciences and knowledge; theoretical ethics; applied ethics; metaphysics (absolute, appearance and reality, being, non-being; essence, causality, necessity, ...); brief history of philosophy: ancient philosophers (Socrates, ..), Islamic philosophers (Avicenna, ..), and modern philosophers (Bacon, Kant, Spencer, Comte, Sartre, Russell, ...)</p>	<p>Acquaintance with Islamic Philosophy (Abu-talibi 1994) Year 12: philosophy in the Islamic world; science and philosophy and their differences and relations; definition of philosophy in the view of Islamic philosophers; Islamic intellectual methods; Islamic philosophy of illumination '<i>eshraq</i>' (of the soul); Peripatetic Islamic philosophy (<i>falsafeh-ye mashsha'u</i>); sophism; existence and nature; originality, self-evidence, communion, and unity and multiplicity of being; truth and wrong; Islamic philosophers' solution; cause and effect; four sorts of cause; the ontological distinctions of possible, impossible and necessary being; theology in its specific meaning; the ways to God; limitations of sensory and experimental methods in theology; the Prophet and Imam's ways towards God,</p>
<p>Arabic Literature (Khazaei 1971) Year 11: bringing children up; bravery; from Bozorgmehr (an intellectual minister of pre-Islamic Iran); about science; from Imam Ali; maxims from the Qur'an and the Prophet's narrations; Shapour Zo'l-aktaf (a pre-Islamic Iranian king); Abu-bakr Zakariya Razi (an Islamic scientist); discourse of Ardashir (a pre-Islamic Iranian king);</p>	<p>Arabic Literature (Refa'at 1993) Year 11: the dreams of wakefulness; migrant birds; about <i>Nahj al-balagheh</i> (Imam Ali's speeches); Meitham Tammar (a revolutionary disciple of Imam Ali); O'thou Qods (Jerusalem); the tongue of volcano; the mother of her father (a nickname given by the Prophet to his daughter, Fetemeh); the Qur'an, Imams' narration; the First Martyr; positive knowledge of God;</p>
<p>Religious Education (Shoar 1968) Year 11: the Secondary Shi'ite doctrines and religious precepts (<i>Fru'ae din</i> and <i>Ahkam</i>): marriage, divorce, inheritance, ownership, ...; some verses from the Qur'an; ethics: the importance of Islam for relaxation of human beings, respect for women and loss of divorce, loss of jealousy, the importance of time;</p>	<p>Islamic Education (Sadat 1993) Year 11: authority and government: the authority and government of God, the characters of Islamic governor and exertion of authority, people in Islamic government, acquaintance with the thoughts of the founder of Islamic Republic of Iran; life after death: human beings and resurrection, resurrection in Qur'anic view, reward and punishment in the next world,...; ethics: the effects of sin in human beings' life, and keeping limits between men and women; religious precepts: social system.</p>
<p>Sociology (Nezami-Taleshi 1978) Year 9: environment; culture; norms and values; natural and social ecology; social system; bases of system; sorts of system.</p>	<p>Sociology (Tajgaram & Qandi 1979) Year 9: culture; socialisation of society; social currents; social aberrations; the conflict of cultures.</p>
<p>History of Persian Literature (BPET 1976) Year 12: science and literature in the period of Mongol Empire and Timorids; Safavid period; Afsharid, Zandieh and Qajar periods; the period of the Constitutional Revolution and its impact on Persian literature.</p>	<p>History of Persian Literature (BPET 1991) Year 12: political and social status of Iran during the first three centuries after <i>Hijrat</i> (science and Persian poem); political and social status of Iran from the 3rd to 6th AH (science and poems, and the poets of this period ...); political and social status of Iran from 6th to 10th AH (poem and poets in this period); Persian poems in the 10th, 11th and 12th centuries (AH) with consideration of political and social position of Iran; literary return; and poems in the period of the Constitutional Revolution.</p>

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